

Ukrainian Review

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The Present State of the Ukrainian Ferrous Metal Industry

V. HOLUBNYCHY

The aim of this article is to review the development and present state of the ferrous metal industry in the Ukraine, determine its importance in the USSR and compare it with development in the West.

The ferrous metal industry covers the mining of iron ore and the production of pig iron, ordinary iron and steel and also the initial rolling of steel. The pig iron production mentioned in this article also includes that of ordinary iron.

The geological reserves of iron ore of all kinds in the Krivoi Rog basin comprise, according to the last calculations, 1.5 milliard tons.¹ According to the author's calculations, less than one sixth of all deposits have been mined since the Krivoi Rog reserves started to be worked. Before World War II, about 30% of all the surveyed deposits in the Krivoi Rog basin were untouched.² Apart from the Krivoi Rog deposits, there are large reserves of low content iron ores in the Ukraine: in the Kremenchug Raion there are about 2.6 milliard tons of 35% iron content ore, the exploitation of which will probably begin at the end of the Sixth Five-Year Plan after the Kremenchug hydroelectric station is completed; the deposits in the vicinity of Nikopol have a 33% content of iron, those near Zaporozhe 37% and those on the shores of the Azov Sea 45%.³ The lowest iron content which could profitably be used was until recently 30%, but the new technological developments during 1954—1955 in the United States lowered this figure to 10—15%.⁴ These facts indicate that there is no approaching exhaustion of the Krivoi Rog deposits, nor a possibility of a raw material crisis in the ferrous metal industry of the Ukraine. Technological improvements in methods of enriching poor quality ores must be taken into account here. It should be noted that even in the 1920's it was predicted that raw material reserves of the Ukraine would soon be exhausted and it

¹ *Radyanska Ukraina za 20 rokov* (Twenty Years of the Soviet Ukraine), Kiev, 1937, p. 6.

² D. F. Virnyk, *Dopomozhemo shvydshe zahoity tyazhki rany zapodiyani viynoyu* (Let us Quickly Heal the Heavy War Wounds), *Review of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR*, Kiev, 1945, Nos. 4—5, p. 63.

³ S. P. Rodionov, *Problema Velykoho Kryvoho Rohu* (The Problem of Greater Krivoi Rog), *Review of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR*, 1940, No. 1, p. 55; *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii Ukrainskoi SSR* (Outline of the Economic Geography of the Ukrainian SSR), Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1949, Vol. I, p. 62 ff.

⁴ *The New York Times*, November 2, 1954, p. 40; January 2, 1955, p. 4; June 12, 1955, p. 1.

was on this assumption that the Gosplan of the USSR decided that the metallurgical industry should not be developed in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, even at that time Ukrainian scientists called such forecasts "absurd myths"⁵ and this was proved by the subsequent thirty years' development of the Ukrainian ferrous metal industry.

Since 1954 the Crimea has formed part of the Ukrainian SSR and total reserves of iron ore have increased by a further 3 milliard tons from the Kamysh-Barun ores with 35%—42% iron content.⁶ So far these deposits have been used only by the Kerch and Azovstal metal works. Moreover, not all the Ukrainian deposits have been surveyed and described. For instance, before World War II, there were indications of iron ore deposits near Lvov, in Volhynia and in the Carpathian mountains.⁷

Naturally, the gradual exhaustion of the Saksagan deposits of the Krivoi Rog basin, which contained the richest and most easily accessible ore, has limited supplies of ore to the Ukrainian metal industry in recent years, but this has not hampered the mining of iron ore to any great extent, as may be seen from the data given below, which indicate output without the Crimea. On the whole, the Soviets consider that poor quality ores from the Krivoi Rog basin will not have to be utilized before the end of the Sixth or the beginning of the Seventh Five-Year Plans.⁸

Mining of Iron Ore in the Ukraine⁹

(Millions of Tons)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Output</i>
1940	18.9	1951	24.9
1946	6.0	1952	29.1
1947	9.0	1953	32.0
1948	12.0	1954	33.6
1949	15.5	1955	36.8
1950	20.9	1960	55.2 (Planned figure)

These figures show that the production of iron ore in the Ukrainian SSR is currently twice as large as before World War II. The annual increase of production in recent years, however, has decreased more than five times compared with the years immediately after the war; during 1947 production increased by 51%, in 1948 by 33% and in 1954 by only 5%. This can of course be explained by the fact that during the postwar years old iron ore mines

⁵ Prof. Y. B. Dymensteyn, *Pro rayonuvannya metalurhichnoho vyrobnytstva v SSSR* (The Allocation to Economic Regions of Soviet Metallurgical Production), Review of the *All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*, Kiev, 1928, No. 19, p. 243.

⁶ B. Baranov, *Krym* (The Crimea), Moscow, 1935, p. 18.

⁷ *Gorny zhurnal* (The Mining Journal), Moscow, 1940, No. 4, pp. 12—13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1947, No. 10, p. 5.

⁹ Data taken from the author's work *Promyslova produktsiya Ukrainy za 1913—1955 rr.* (The Industrial Production of the Ukraine in 1913—1955). To be published later this year by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich.

which had been destroyed were rebuilt and put into commission and recently, as appears from the press,¹⁰ the building of new mines has lagged behind because of red tape. This is also proved by the fact that labor efficiency in the Krivoi Rog basin has increased considerably in contrast to the situation in the Donbas coal mines. In 1940 the daily output of ore per driller was 56 tons¹¹ and in 1954 the average output was 145 tons.¹²

In 1940 the Ukraine produced 63% of the whole production of iron ore in the USSR,¹³ in 1950 only 52.5%¹⁴ and now it is again about 60%.¹⁵ The percentage output of Ukrainian iron ore within the framework of world production was 3.6%¹⁶ in 1913 and 13.6%¹⁷ in 1955. Thus, the Ukraine is the third largest world producer of iron ore, as may be seen from the following table.¹⁸

Average Monthly Output of World Producers of Iron Ore
(Millions of Tons)

	1938	1954
USA	2.4	6.6
France	2.7	3.7
The Ukraine	1.3	2.8
The USSR (minus the Ukraine)	1.1	2.3
Great Britain	1.0	1.3
Sweden	1.1	1.2
Western Germany	?	0.8
Canada	?	0.6

Nearly all the iron ore produced in the Ukraine in 1940 was consumed on the spot by the Ukrainian metal industry. Only 600,000 tons, or 3% of production, were exported.¹⁹ There are reasons to suppose that in the post-war period this percentage increased considerably. Data on the present-day consumption of iron ore are not available for the Ukraine. However, consumption for the entire USSR in 1940 and 1950 was 93% and 92% of production respectively.²⁰ Thus the all-Union proportion remained practically unchanged

¹⁰ *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 10 and 13, 1953.

¹¹ *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafiï Ukrainskoi SSR*, Vol. I, p. 310.

¹² *Trud*, April 3, 1954.

¹³ *Narysy rozvytku narodnyoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi SSR* (The Outlines of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR [Institute of Economy], Kiev, 1949, p. 430.

¹⁴ *Quarterly Bulletin of Steel Statistics for Europe*, United Nations, Geneva, March, 1954, p. 90.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, February 16, 1956.

¹⁶ *Puti narodno-khozyaistvennogo razvitiya Ukrainskoi SSR* (Ways of Developing the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Kharkov, 1928, p. 16.

¹⁷ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, United Nations, Geneva, Sept. 1955, pp. 32—33.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Quarterly Bulletin of Steel Statistics for Europe*, pp. 90—91.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

and it is therefore possible that this is also the case in the Ukraine for the same period. However, the destination of iron ore exported from the Ukraine has undoubtedly changed. It is known that before World War II exports were mainly directed northward to the regions of Moscow and Leningrad. After the war, as a result of the expansion of the metallurgical industry in Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European satellite countries which do not possess iron ore deposits, and also of the American embargo on the export of ores from France and other Western European countries to Eastern Europe, a strong demand for Ukrainian ore appeared on Eastern European markets.²¹ The recent development of the iron ore basin in the Kola peninsular and the development of metallurgy in the north-western economic region of the USSR (Cherepovets metal works)²² began to replace Ukrainian iron ore and metal for the Leningrad—Moscow markets, thus releasing the Ukrainian export for Eastern European markets.

The ferrous metal industry of the Ukraine is not only self-sufficient in iron ore but possesses a convenient and adequate base of coal, manganese ore and flux limestone. The so-called "Ukrainian Triangle" is unique because of its short distances: it is only 534 kilometers by rail from Krivoi Rog to Gorlovka in the Donbas, 440 kilometers from Gorlovka to Nikopol, where the deposits of manganese ore lie, and only 100 kilometers from Nikopol to Krivoi Rog. The main part of the metallurgical industry of the Ukraine is based upon this natural triangle. The remainder is on the shores of the Azov Sea, where it is being developed on a base of Donbas coal and Kerch iron ore. In 1940 the distribution of ferrous metal in the Ukraine was as follows:²³

	<i>Pig Iron</i>	<i>Steel</i>
Donbas	45.7 ⁰ / ₀	38.9 ⁰ / ₀
Dnieper Area	41.3 ⁰ / ₀	46.4 ⁰ / ₀
Azov Sea Area	13.0 ⁰ / ₀	14.7 ⁰ / ₀

There are reasons for asserting that even today this distribution remains without any essential changes save for a slight change in the Donbas during the Fifth Five-Year Plan.²⁴

During the postwar reconstruction of all 26 specialized metallurgical works in the Ukraine, not less than 75% of their equipment was renewed. The original equipment had been evacuated to the east in 1941 and because of transport costs and reassembly problems it was not returned. Many blast furnaces, open hearth furnaces and rolling mills were so badly damaged during the war that it was impossible to repair them. Therefore the metal works have been largely rebuilt. It was pointed out recently²⁵ that while undergoing reconstruction, the principal metallurgical enterprises were enlarged

²¹ *Trends in Economic Growth. A Comparison of the Western Powers and the Soviet Block*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1955, p. 4.

²² *Pravda*, September 3, 1955.

²³ *Narysy ekonomichnoï heohrafiï Ukrainskoi SSR*, Vol. I, p. 320.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Entsyklopediya Ukrainoznavstva* (The Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Munich—New York, vol. I/III, 1949, p. 1095.

and their capacity increased. The following production figures were projected for enterprises such as the Azovstal works: 2.2 million tons of pig iron, 2.4 million tons of steel and 1.4 million tons of rolled steel per annum.²⁶

During the Fifth Five-Year Plan no new metallurgical works were built in the Ukraine but the extension of works built during the Fourth Five-Year Plan continued. An example of this process is clearly seen in Zaporozhstal, the second metallurgical enterprise in the Ukraine. In 1950 these works produced 1.4 million tons of pig iron²⁷ and in 1954 more than 2.8 million tons:²⁸ the plan for 1955 envisaged 3 million tons.²⁹

It is hard to determine whether such huge undertakings reflect negatively on the economy of their production processes. Certainly, present empirically proved American theory states that with an increase in the size of the enterprise the per unit cost of production decreases in spite of the considerable cost of administration, labor efficiency increases and there are improved possibilities for technological advancement which considerably facilitate work and save money. Although the correctness of these theories in the case of the Ukrainian metallurgical industry cannot be proved, it seems clear that parallel to the increase in our metal works, productivity and the rational utilization of capital have increased in them as well.³⁰

The average coefficient of efficiency in the useful exploitation of the capacity of blast furnaces in the entire USSR in 1954 was 0.80—0.70.³¹ The efficiency of work in the Ukrainian ferrous metal industry has also increased a great deal compared with prewar times. In 1954 the blast furnace workers at the Azovstal works surpassed their prewar level of labor efficiency by 59% and the smelters at the same works by 75%. Blast furnace workers at the Petrovsky works in Dnepropetrovsk surpassed prewar production by 43%, smelters by 40% and rollers by 63%.³²

Nevertheless, despite expansion of enterprises and increased production, technological methods of production are somewhat backward. In 1954, the temperature of steel in open hearth furnaces was measured optically because special thermometers for this purpose had not yet been introduced.³³ As late as 1954 at the Zaporozhstal works, the beginning of standardization of the basic processes of smelting was introduced.³⁴ Production figures suggest that this has not particularly hampered the increase of production.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 25, 1954.

²⁸ *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1954, p. 21.

²⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 25, 1954.

³⁰ See *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 25, 1954 and June 14, 1955. The coefficient of efficiency given there is the proportion of the actual capacity of the furnace in cubic meters to the daily production of pig iron in tons.

³¹ *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1954, p. 23.

³² *Radyanska Ukraina*, January 8, 1954.

³³ *Ibid.*, January 10, 1954.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, March 2, 1955.

*The Production of Ferrous Metal in the Ukraine*³⁵

(Millions of Tons)

	<i>Pig Iron</i>	<i>Steel</i>	<i>Rolled Steel</i>
1940	9.2	8.6	6.3
1946	2.9	2.4	1.7
1947	3.7	2.6	2.2
1948	5.3	4.4	3.8
1949	7.0	6.4	5.7
1950	9.2	8.2	7.0
1951	10.8	10.1	8.3
1952	12.9	11.7	9.6
1953	13.7	13.6	10.5
1954	14.8	15.1	12.1
1955	16.6	16.8	13.5
1960 (Planned figures)	24.8	?	20.2

The decrease in output of ferrous metals in the Ukraine within the total production of the USSR compared with the pre-World War II level³⁶ has been caused by the development of metallurgy in the eastern regions of the USSR during and after World War II, that is, at the time when the devastated Ukrainian industry was being rebuilt. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, approved by the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, did not foresee any further large development of metallurgy in the eastern regions of the USSR, but Malenkov stated quite clearly at this congress that: "An important effect in the expansion of industry is that during the past period industry in the eastern regions developed at a speedy rate, with the result that... in 1951 the eastern regions produced over half of all steel and rolled goods."³⁷

The Ukrainian metallurgical industry regained its pre-1940 level of production as late as 1950. This means that the German invasion cost Ukrainian metallurgy two five-year plans in its development.

The place of Ukrainian iron and steel output in the world can be seen from the following tables:³⁸

³⁵ Data from *Promyslova produktsiya Ukrainy za 1913—1955 rr.* The indices are given for the Ukraine without the Crimea.

³⁶ D. F. Virnyk, *Ekonomichny rozkvit Ukrainskoi SSR—torzhestvo leninsko-stalinskoi natsionalnoi polityky* (The Economic Development of the Ukrainian SSR: The Triumph of the Lenin-Stalin National Policy), Kiev, 1951, p. 87; *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 14, 1955; *Pravda*, February 15 and 16, 1956.

³⁷ G. Malenkov, *Otchetny doklad XIX sezda partii o rabote Tsentralnogo Komiteta VKP(b)* (Report to the XIX Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee), Moscow, 1952, p. 42.

³⁸ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, September 1955, pp. 50—53.

The Average Monthly Output of World Producers of Pig Iron and Steel
(Millions of Tons)

<i>Pig Iron</i>	1938	1954
USA	1.6	4.4
The Ukraine	0.7	1.2
USSR (minus the Ukraine)	0.6	1.2
Western Germany	1.2	1.0
Great Britain	0.6	1.0
France	0.7	0.9
Japan	0.2	0.4
 <i>Steel</i>	 1938	 1954
USA	2.4	6.7
USSR (minus the Ukraine)	0.8	1.6
Great Britain	0.8	1.5
Western Germany	1.5	1.4
The Ukraine	0.7	1.2
France	0.7	1.1
Japan	0.5	0.6

In 1954, as may be seen from the table, the Soviet Union and the Ukraine, taken together, were second only to the United States in pig iron production. In steel production, however, the Ukraine had by 1954 sunk from fourth place, which she occupied before the war, to fifth. In 1954 the Ukraine's contribution to world pig iron production was 10.6% and to world steel production 7.1%.³⁹

There is another interesting comparison. In America in 1954, 493,000 workers were employed in the ferrous metal industry;⁴⁰ during that year they produced 210,156,000 so-called "short tons" of metal, i. e., pig iron, steel and rolled goods (one short ton = 2000 lbs).⁴¹ Expressed in metric tons, one worker produced 388 tons of metal in a year. In the Ukraine in the same year 110,000 workers produced 42,112,000 metric tons of metal (consisting of pig iron, steel and rolled goods),⁴² which is 382 tons per worker annually. Considering that the working day of the Ukrainian metallurgist was 14.5% longer than the American, the annual production of the Ukrainian metal worker was 327 tons, or 84% of the efficiency of his American opposite number.

It is not known how much of the output of the Ukrainian ferrous metal industry is consumed on the spot and how much is exported. The Soviet government is particularly anxious to conceal this information as it might be incriminating. The Ukraine, it would appear, exports rather too much ferrous metal instead of processing it at home. Compared with its metallurgical

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Business Statistics*, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, 1955, p. 60.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 156—158.

⁴² Data taken from *Promyslova produktsiya Ukrainy za 1913—1955 rr.*

base, the machine construction and metalworking industry of the Ukraine is not sufficiently developed. This is why ferrous metals are sent in large quantities for processing to the Moscow and Leningrad regions and are then returned to the Ukraine as ready-made machines and other products.

The analysis of production distribution of the Ukrainian ferrous metal industry is made more difficult since, through the shortcomings of centralized bureaucratic planning in the USSR, a great deal of metal is transported over long distances to and from the borders of the Republic. But Soviet sources insist that the Ukraine remains as considerable an exporter of metal as before World War II.⁴³

However, this scant information on the output distribution of ferrous metal in the Ukraine indicates that there is a tendency to increase the demand for metal on the spot. In 1940, out of 8.6 million tons of steel produced in the Ukraine, about 4.5 million tons, or slightly over 50%, was used within the country; the rest was exported.⁴⁴ On the other hand, out of 8.2 million tons produced in the Ukraine in 1950, 4.9 million tons, or 60%, was consumed in the country and the remainder exported.⁴⁵ Thus after World War II the domestic consumption of metal increased by 10%. This tendency continues and is encouraged by the noticeable increase in the development of the metal processing and machine building industries in the Ukraine during the last 10 years, a development relatively greater than in other branches of industry, including metallurgy.⁴⁶

Remembering that each of the three branches of the ferrous metal industry — pig iron, steel and rolled goods production — is vital to the existence of the other two, it is possible to establish certain tendencies in their development. The table of absolute production indices for these three branches was taken as a starting point in the analysis.

Ignoring the period of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was exceptional, it may be observed that during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951—1955), the production of pig iron increased by 80%, of steel by 105% and of rolled goods by 93%. The average annual rate of increase in that five-year plan was: pig iron — 12.2%; steel — 15.2% and rolled goods 14%. If we compare the proportional quantity of steel produced with that of pig iron and the output of rolled goods with that of steel, then we can say what quantity of pig iron was used for the production of steel and what quantity of steel for the production of rolled goods.

Information available clearly indicates that the steel industry in the Ukraine has developed in recent times at a faster rate than the pig iron industry and that production of rolled goods has developed more slowly than that of steel. The reasons for this rapid increase were the following: first, since 1952 the Azovstal works have produced steel from low-quality pig iron made from Kerch phosphorus ore.⁴⁷ Earlier, technology was not sufficiently advanced to allow the use of this type of pig iron in steel production. Second,

⁴³ *Planovoe khozyaistvo* (The Planned Economy), 1954, No. 1, pp. 36—37.

⁴⁴ *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafiï Ukrainskoi SSR*, Vol. I, p. 325.

⁴⁵ *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1954, No. 1, p. 37.

⁴⁶ *Narysy rozvytku narodnyoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi SSR*, pp. 431—432; *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 1st. ed., vol. LV, p. 800; *Radyanska Ukraina*, October 19, 1952, January 15, 1954 and February 19, 1956.

⁴⁷ *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 2, 1955.

technological changes in steel production brought about a decrease in the use of pig iron as a productive ingredient. Although we do not know the amount of pig iron needed to produce one ton of steel, the process of decrease as far as is known is normal. The smelters at the Stalin works in Stalino plan to decrease the amount of pig iron necessary for the production of one ton of steel by 660 kg. during the Sixth Five-Year Plan.⁴⁸ Third, it is possible that the increase in steel production in recent years is due to a decrease in exports from the Ukraine of pig iron, but there are no data to support this. It can only be assumed that the introduction of technological improvements such as oxidization in steel production at the Zaporozhstal works has increased the demand for pig iron and might therefore have caused the decrease in its export.

*

On the other hand the fact that an increase in the production of rolled goods is lagging compared with steel production indicates that first, the technological development here has been too slow and second, that steel is obviously exported from the Ukraine in far too large a quantity. This is supported by admissions in the press that because of the lack of steel the rolling mill at Azovstal and the tube mill at the Kuibyshev works are not working to full capacity.⁴⁹ Because the production of steel is at present considerably larger than that of rolled goods and because the machine construction industry in the Ukraine produces most of its own steel as far as castings are concerned, the lack of material for the rolled goods industry indicates that steel is exported for cold rolling and pressing beyond the borders of the Ukraine.

There is not sufficient correlative data to determine trends in the development of production and distribution of rolled goods. Before World War II the demand for them was as high as 60% of home production in the Ukraine and the consumption of tubes over 40%.⁵⁰ From general tendencies in the industrial development of the Ukraine it seems that this proportion has not decreased.

Finally, a word should be said about the changes which have taken place in recent years in the administrative system. Before 1954, without exception, the whole metallurgical industry of the Ukraine was directly subordinated to the centralized administration of the Soviet government. The government of the Ukrainian SSR had no say whatsoever in metallurgical matters, because all metal works were considered to be of Union importance. All plans for development, production incentives, instructions on distribution and the location of production in the Ukraine and in the USSR came exclusively from Moscow. But in 1954 Union republic ministries were created for the first time in the USSR and the appropriate ministry in the government of the USSR was decentralized.

After the creation of the Ministry of the Ferrous Metal Industry of the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR divided the metallurgical works in the Ukraine into enterprises of Union and Republic administration. It is not known how many of the Ukraine's 26 metal works were transferred to the administration of the government of the Ukrainian SSR. However, the press has revealed that such large enterprises as the Kirov

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1955.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, September 2, 1955.

⁵⁰ *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii Ukrainskoi SSR*, Vol. I, p. 325.

works in Makeevka, the Voroshilov works in Voroshilovgrad, the Frunze works in Konstantinovka, the Enakievo works and the Azovstal works are at present under republic management.⁵¹

The decentralization of the administration of the Ukrainian ferrous metal industry in 1954 took place "with the aim of improving the management of the enterprises and whole branches of the industry."⁵² At last, centralization was condemned as harmful. However, it should be made quite clear that this decentralization, as a process determined by the individual development of the economy of national regions of the USSR which gradually become self-sufficient economic units, is far from complete. The size and number of the enterprises in the Ukraine are continually increasing and the economic expediency of local cooperation between the enterprises is becoming more necessary. Therefore the planning and management of these economic complexes from a distant center in Moscow is increasingly difficult; it leads to an increase in bureaucracy, the costs of administration are higher and there is waste as well as delay in planning and supply. There is also a decreased rate in the development of production. Thus decentralization is and will remain an objective historical need and an ultimate inevitability.

There are two other objective factors which favor decentralization. The development of the Russian metallurgical and general industrial base in the north-west and east of Russia proper will reduce the need for metal imports from the Ukraine, which are not very profitable in view of high transport costs. The second factor is strategic. The government learned a lesson from World War II when the loss of the Ukrainian metallurgic industry was extremely heavy to the Union, which had come to depend excessively upon it. Strategic expediency calls for the creation of separate and partially or completely independent and self-sufficient economic regions, so that the loss of one or two of them would not hamper the functioning of the rest.

However, decentralization of the management of the ferrous metal industry of the Ukraine means only a certain amount of economic independence from the center in Moscow; the political dependence remains.

The Ministry of the Ferrous Metal Industry of the Ukrainian SSR in all main respects remains an executive organ carrying out the decisions of the center. It works, as do all other Union republic ministries, according to the principles of subordination to the Council of Ministers of the Republic on the one hand, and to the Ministry of the Ferrous Metal Industry of the USSR on the other. Capital investments, production plans and orders concerning distribution continue to be controlled from Moscow.

⁵¹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, April 10, 1955.

⁵² *Komunist Ukrainy*, June 1955, p. 23.

Social Insurance and Social Security in the Ukraine

V. PLYUSHCH

It is worth examining the problem of social security in the USSR, particularly as Communist propaganda continually maintains that the Soviet social security system is the best in the world and concurrently stresses the pitiful state of social welfare in Western European countries and in the United States.

This is emphasized, moreover, both in popular publications and in textbooks. In *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), which is used at university level, we read: "Soviet social insurance, which is the best in the world, is of great international and political significance. It is one of the most outstanding examples of the enormous superiority of the Soviet social and state order over the capitalist."¹

Professor S. Y. Kopelyanskaya, in her work *Prava materi i rebenka v SSSR* (The Rights of the Mother and Child in the USSR), remarks: "In the USSR the most advanced socialist law in the world exists, works and develops."²

E. I. Astrakhan, sharply criticizing the state of social insurance in capitalist countries, stresses: "It covers only certain branches of insurance, and does not cover large contingents of workers and employees... The level of insurance benefits and pensions in capitalist countries is very low. Insurance benefits in the capitalist countries are subject to many limitations."³

Professor A. Y. Pasherstnyk, in his article *Suchasne zakonodavstvo pro pravcyu u kapitalistychnykh krainakh* (Current Labor Legislation in the Capitalist Countries), uses even sharper words: "After the end of World War II, owing to the increased general crisis of capitalism and postwar difficulties in the capitalist economy, the capitalist assault on the living standards of the working class became particularly aggressive and cruel."⁴

The social insurance system in the USSR is the pride of the Communist regime. The resolution passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on September 23, 1929 declared:

¹ *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), Moscow, 1949, p. 314.

² Prof. S. Y. Kopelyanskaya, *Prava materi i rebenka v SSSR* (The Rights of Mother and Child in the USSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 3.

³ E. I. Astrakhan, *Gosudarstvennoe sotsialnoe strakhovanie* (State Social Insurance), *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo*, pp. 318 and 319.

⁴ Prof. A. E. Pasherstnyk, *Sovremennoe zakonodatelstvo o trude v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh* (Contemporary Labor Legislation in the Capitalist Countries), *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo*, p. 404.

Social insurance in the USSR embraces the most important sectors of social and cultural life and is one of the most significant achievements which the working class has accomplished through the victory of the October Revolution.⁵

Insurance and social security in the USSR, as all other sectors of social, economic, political and cultural life in the Soviet Union, is built on the ideological basis of Marxism—Leninism.

Astrakhan, an expert on Soviet labor law, explaining the ideological basis for the principles of social welfare in the USSR, commented:

In the socialist community, social insurance funds, as well as other forms of social security, are created through deductions from general social production.

Therefore, from the economic point of view, the payment of benefits or pensions or other forms of insurance is a payment to the worker of a certain part of that amount of public production which was earlier reserved for those in need of social aid.⁶

This statement is based on the teaching of Karl Marx, who said that surplus products would remain after the liquidation of capitalism and would be used for those who because of their extreme youth or age cannot participate in production.

Astrakhan also tried to explain the very unequal insurance benefits for different strata of the Soviet population:

The distribution of material benefits through social insurance is based on the principle "to everyone according to his work." This principle aims at encouraging the best workers in a very wide sense. Wages, the number of years worked, the worker's attitude to his duties, efficiency and so on are all taken into account.⁷

The author fails to mention that this socialist principle, "to everyone according to his work," means in practice that social security is available only for those segments of the Soviet population which are important for strengthening the present Communist system—that is for those "who have exceptional achievements to their credit in the spheres of revolutionary, military, professional and public activity."⁸

Of the economic approach to social insurance Astrakhan says: "Social insurance is one of the factors which strengthen labor discipline, improve labor productivity and therefore consolidate the economic might of the Soviet Union."⁹

This economic and discriminatory approach toward social security will become clearer after an analysis of Soviet labor legislation.

⁵ *Direktivy VKP(b) po khozyaistvennym voprosam* (Directives of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Concerning Agricultural Problems), Moscow, 1931, p. 589.

⁶ Astrakhan, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

⁷ *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo*, pp. 323—4.

⁸ N. Rytnikov, *Sotsialnoe strakhovanie i sotsialnoe obespechenie* (Social Security and Social Insurance), *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE], Vol. "USSR," col. 1153.

⁹ Astrakhan, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

The social needs of the Soviet population in case of illness or permanent disability, old age and medical attention as well as childrens' allowances are organized and administered by the social insurance and social security organs. According to the law, social insurance covers all workers who receive their pensions from social security organs.

In theory the social insurance system is controlled by the trade unions and not by the State. It is the duty of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions to administer social insurance, supervise and instruct trade unions in this respect, draw up the social insurance budget and transmit it for approval to the State organs. The central committees of the trade unions are responsible for the activities of oblast and krai committees of the trade unions in social insurance matters. In factories and other establishments social insurance is dealt with by the works or local trade union committees with the aid of the social insurance council. This council establishes the right to insurance benefits, controls payments of insurance contributions, benefits and pensions and ensures that the workers do not receive aid without justification. In practice, the collection of contributions and payment of benefits is carried out by the administrative staffs of the establishments concerned.

The trade unions also exercise very strict control over all forms of social benefits. For instance, it is the duty of the medical boards to see that workers do not abuse sickness certificates and that expenses for medical treatment are limited. Generally speaking, the trade unions' part in insurance matters is confined to supervising the distribution of benefits and has little to do with actually protecting the workers' interests.

As already stated, social insurance departments grant benefits in cases of temporary disability. When the employee stops working and because of disability or old age becomes a pensioner, he is placed under the care of the Ministry of Social Security of the Union Republic in which he lives. The social security organs pay pensions and deal with the employment of pensioners.

Workers' insurance contributions are paid by law in full by the enterprises which employ them. The amount of these contributions is established by the Soviet government. Various trade unions pay different insurance contributions; for instance, workers in the oil industry subscribe about 8% of their wages, but the trade union of workers in higher educational establishments and scientific institutions pays only 4%. In practice, these deductions are made from the workers' wages, as social insurance contributions are taken into account when wages for particular categories of workers are established by the state.

It should be pointed out that social insurance funds are used not only for benefits in case of temporary unemployment, pensions, childrens' allowances, grants during pregnancy and so on, but also for the maintenance of a large network of health establishments and rest homes. By the end of 1941, social insurance funds were paying to maintain 231 sanatoria and 632 rest homes. In 1945 there were over 230 night sanatoria and in 1946 367 health resorts maintained by these funds.¹⁰

The Soviets invariably stress that a large network of medical establishments, sanatoria, tourist hostels and camps is maintained at the expense of social insurance funds. However, this leads in fact to a decrease in funds available for benefits and pensions. If it is remembered that all these sanatoria

¹⁰ BSE, Vol. "USSR," col. 1150.

and health establishments benefit only certain privileged categories of persons, it will be observed that living standards have only improved for a limited percentage of the Soviet population and this at the expense of the ordinary worker and of decreases in his benefits for temporary disability and pension. This is despite section 120 of the Soviet Constitution, which declares:

The citizens of the USSR have the right to material security in old age and also in case of illness and disability. This right is secured by the wide development of social insurance for workers at the expense of the State, by free medical aid and by a large network of health resorts given up to the use of the working people.¹¹

As stated earlier, social insurance covers only workers. Despite the fact that the number of workers in the USSR is continuously increasing and now amounts to about 48 million persons,¹² this group composes only about 24⁹/₁₀ of the whole population.

Another form of social welfare is the so-called mutual insurance within the framework of the industrial cooperative system and invalids' cooperatives. It is not so well organized but nevertheless it secures certain benefits for the incapacitated members of this group of the population. The nationalization of industry and the constant struggle of the Communists against the co-operative movement have reduced the importance of this group to a minimum. According to the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), in 1941 3,888,434 workers were employed by the cooperative system.¹³ In recent years, the number has decreased to around 2 million.

In addition to the great agricultural masses in the kolkhozes, there are peasants who farm individually as well as a small number of craftsmen, small-scale tradesmen and those without any definite occupation, or, as they are called, the "untoiling elements." These are not covered by any system of social welfare. As concerns the kolkhozniks, their social welfare is assured only by public funds, which are not always available in adequate amounts. In other words, their social security is an extremely unstable factor.

The Soviet Government takes the best possible care of its faithful servants, who include top-level Party officials, Party workers, servicemen and MVD employees.

Also belonging to these privileged groups are the more important scientists, the upper stratum of technical and economic workers, eminent musicians, artists and writers. These categories and members of their families are granted a separate medical service (special hospitals, sanatoria, rest homes and health resorts), special regulations on cash benefits they may receive in case of temporary disability and pensions in case of disability and old age. The funds for all this are supplied by the Union as well as the Republic budgets for social security. The size of these pensions is established according to the importance of the individual to the government and Party. In any case, they are sufficiently large to ensure a normal living standard and the greater part of the allocations from the State budget for social security is spent on them.

¹¹ *Konstitutsiya SSSR* (Constitution of the USSR), Moscow, 1955.

¹² *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statistichesky sbornik* (National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Handbook), Central Statistical Administration, Moscow, 1956, p. 189.

¹³ *BSE*, Vol. "USSR," col. 67.

In theory, the remaining members of the population, who do not belong to any of the groups mentioned above, should receive social benefits from the social security budget. In practice, however, if they receive any aid at all, it is in such small amounts as to be quite insufficient for a bare existence. This fact is not concealed even by official Soviet sources. For instance, N. Rytnikov, in his article *Sotsialnoe strakhovanie i sotsialnoe obespechenie* (Social Insurance and Social Security),¹⁴ wrote:

In the USSR pensions are provided for the following persons... [here he enumerates the special categories mentioned above who should receive pensions from social insurance]. Other disabled and needy persons who do not belong to these groups are provided for within the limits of grants administered by the organs of social insurance.

This means that no norms of social aid are provided by law for most of the aged, disabled and orphans, who are not covered by special insurance.

Soviet legislation, particularly the statute on collective farming, admits that temporarily or permanently disabled members of a kolkhoz and their families are to be provided for from the kolkhoz funds. In *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* it is stated:

Kolkhoz mutual aid covers the members of each kolkhoz, and is granted through the kolkhoz general mutual aid fund. It is financed through assignments from kolkhoz funds for aid to the disabled and from the personal incomes of the kolkhozniks themselves, or directly by kolkhozes through their funds for aid to the disabled.¹⁵

As can be seen, the law does not provide any permanent form of social security for the kolkhoznik; it does not mention his right to compensation for injury arising from an accident at work; it does not lay down any rates of benefit in case of temporary disability or even the smallest pension. The law only deals with voluntary "mutual aid" granted from the "kolkhoz aid fund."

To any one who has the slightest knowledge of how the kolkhozes are exploited in the USSR it is clear that this double-talk hides the complete absence of any social care for disabled kolkhozniks or their families. Under such conditions, when the State appropriates almost all produce of the kolkhoz and when payments to the kolkhoz fund can be made only after the excessive quotas for grain deliveries to the State have been fulfilled, what funds can possibly be left over? How can the "financing of public mutual aid from the personal income of the kolkhoznik" be carried out when this personal income is so low that it does not cover the most essential needs of the working kolkhoznik himself? According to Y. G. Gudim-Levkovich, in a certain group of kolkhozes which had low yields the income of a kolkhoznik in 1947 was 0.44 kg. of grain and 52 kopecks per working day; in a group of kolkhozes with medium yields it was 1.88 kg. of grain and 1 ruble 9 kopecks and in a group with higher yields 3.98 kg. of grain and 2 rubles 50 kopecks per working day.¹⁶ According to the same author, 40% of all kolkhozniks averaged between 100 and 200 working days per annum.¹⁷

¹⁴ BSE, Vol. "USSR," cols. 1152—3.

¹⁵ *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo*, p. 316.

¹⁶ Y. G. Gudim-Levkovich, *Trud v sovremennykh kolkhozakh* (Labor in Present-day Kolkhozes), *Vestnik*, Munich, 1952, Vol. II, p. 55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Even if it is assumed that a certain proportion of the kolkhozes can and do contribute to such a fund for mutual aid, these funds are pitifully small and therefore the benefits they provide for the maintenance of the disabled, invalids, the aged, widows and orphans are not large enough for a bare existence. In practice the cost of keeping the non-working members of the kolkhoz falls upon the working members of their families, whose wages have already been quoted.

Summing up, it can be said that out of the entire population of the USSR only some 30% benefit from aid from social insurance, which is regulated to a certain extent by law. The remaining 70% are left to their own resources, which are pitiful in view of the low earning capacity of kolkhozniks and workers.

It is interesting to compare the proportion of the population covered by social insurance in some of the countries outside the Communist bloc. According to official statistics, in the German Federal Republic 40 million persons, or 80% of the whole population, were covered in 1953 by social insurance; of this number 18 million were working members of a family and over 6 million were pensioners.¹⁸ In the same year, according to the state statistical service of the German Federal Republic, 1,350,000 persons, or 2.7% of the entire population of Western Germany, were covered by the state welfare scheme.¹⁹ Hence in 1953 social insurance and the state welfare scheme in the German Federal Republic covered a total of 41,350,000 persons — nearly 83% of the entire population. In Switzerland, medical insurance embraces about 70% of the population.²⁰ In Great Britain, state social security, entailing the expenditure of hundreds of millions of pounds, exists for the entire population. In Australia about 85% of the population is insured voluntarily and 15% at the expense of the state.²¹ In Holland 80% of the population is insured, either by compulsory or voluntary contributions.²² In Austria also about 80% of the population is insured.²³ In France all workers together with their families are covered by social insurance.²⁴ Thus by 1950 about 80% of the population of Western Europe was covered either by compulsory or voluntary insurance.²⁵

Naturally, Soviet propaganda describes the social security conditions for employees in the United States in the darkest possible colors. When popular Soviet literature on this subject is examined the impression is gained that there is no provision for the needy at all in the United States. United States law has in fact established compulsory benefits for unemployment and pensions for the aged; out of the 4,197 million dollars voted for war veterans, 2,304 million dollars were put aside for the pension scheme.²⁶ There is compulsory insurance in case of illness and some firms pay a considerable part of the

¹⁸ *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, Munich, 1955, Vol. V.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1955, Vol. IV, p. 65.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1955, Vol. IX, p. 166.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1952, Vol. V, p. 58.

²² *Ärztliche Mitteilung*, Cologne and Berlin, April 11, 1955, p. 343.

²³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1955, p. 1001.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, April 21, 1953, p. 146.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1952, p. 235.

²⁶ Prof. P. L. Kovankovsky, *Finansy SSSR posle vtoroi mirovoi voyny* (Soviet Finances after World War II), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1954, p. 60.

contributions toward this insurance. Voluntary insurance has grown to enormous proportions in recent years. According to the *World Medical Journal*, about one hundred million people in the United States are insured against hospitalization, about 80 million are covered in case of an operation and 56 million are covered by so-called general insurance in case of illness.²⁷ According to data from Chicago University, in 1954 89,500,000 persons, or 58% of the entire population of the United States, had some kind of insurance coverage in case of illness.²⁸

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Having reviewed the extent to which the Soviet population is covered by social insurance and compared the situation in the USSR with conditions in other countries, let us examine the types of social insurance in the USSR, their scope and the cost of social insurance and social security to the State budget.

According to existing legislation on social insurance in the USSR (which only applies to workers), benefits from social insurance funds are paid in the event of the temporary disability of a worker (industrial injury, illness, pregnancy and so on), the necessity of caring for a sick member of the family and quarantine. In case of disability or old age the law provides a pension. In addition, the law provides certain other kinds of social security, such as grants for the purchase of articles necessary for newly-born infants, for feeding children and for funeral expenses. By the special decrees issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 8, 1944 and November 25, 1947, grants to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers were provided for.²⁹ In addition, insured persons have the right to free medical attention comprising consultations with a doctor, free medicine and free hospitalization.

Thus the scope of social aid to an insured person in the USSR is considerable and at first glance appears to be easily obtainable. Unfortunately, the rights of the insured person are in practice limited and the extent of aid received completely inadequate.

Insurance for workers against illness is the best organized. The insured are fully entitled to take advantage of free medical services. But even here there are certain shortcomings. All the insured are attached to certain raion polyclinics and dispensaries. These medical establishments are state-owned and their employees simply officials. The sick have, in fact, no right freely to select a doctor but must accept medical aid from the specialists provided for them. The shortage of doctors results in their being overworked; in 1955, for instance, there were only five doctors to every 10,000 of the population in the Ukraine. In Western Germany the figure was 13.8, in Italy 20 and in the United States 14; in the Ukrainian SSR, therefore, one doctor sees about forty patients a day,³⁰ which with the absence of any material interest

²⁷ *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1955, Vol. IV, p. 67.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1955, Vol. IX, p. 167.

²⁹ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), Moscow, No. 37, 1944, and No. 41, 1947.

³⁰ This is described in detail by the author in his monograph *Okhorona zdorov'ya v Ukraini* (Health Services in the Ukraine), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1956.

by the doctor often leads to lack of interest in the patient.³¹ The provincial polyclinics and dispensaries are poorly equipped; sometimes they have no X-ray apparatus and are not provided with sufficient instruments for the proper diagnosis and treatment of patients.³² The prescription of medicine for the patient is limited by certain instructions and very often dispensing chemists do not possess the appropriate medicine or equipment necessary for treatment. This is proved by continual reference to the subject in the professional and general Soviet press.³³

The issue of medical certificates, on the strength of which the worker can be excused from work and receive sickness benefit, is strictly limited by certain conditions. The doctor issuing the certificate is fully responsible for its issue and it is valid for only a limited period of time. The extension of the certificate after 10 days is complicated by numerous formalities.³⁴

Admission to hospital is even more complicated. There is a chronic lack of hospital beds; for example, in the whole of the Ukraine there are about 120,000 hospital beds, whereas in Germany there were in 1953 513,104 beds³⁵ and in Great Britain about 510,000.³⁶ Hospitals are distributed very unevenly and are mostly concentrated in large towns and industrial areas. Moreover, it is difficult to gain admission to a hospital, particularly a specialist hospital. A stay in a sanatorium is usually granted to persons particularly favored by the government and Party — Party functionaries, higher officials, the higher strata of the intelligentsia, stakhanovites and shock workers. Only 20% of all admissions to sanatoria are free of charge; the rest are paid for, partly or in full, by the insured patient.

Benefit during temporary disability is supposed to be paid from the first day of illness, but there are some essential limitations typical of the Soviet regime. For instance, benefit is paid from the first day of illness only to those who are employed in their first post or who have been transferred from another post through official channels.

All persons who have joined an enterprise after leaving their former work of their own accord and all those who were released from their former work for such reasons as lack of discipline must work for six months in their new job before becoming eligible for benefits in case of temporary disability.

In addition to this, persons who have been sentenced to corrective labor for truancy, malingerers and persons who do not carry out medical instructions receive no benefit whatsoever in case of temporary disability. There are also certain restrictions for other categories of patients, such as those who become

³¹ *Ibid.*; see also *Mezhoblastnoe soveshchanie zaveduyushchikh gorodskimi zdravootdelami* (Inter-oblast Conference of the Heads of Municipal Health Departments), *Meditsinsky rabotnik* (Medical Worker), No. 2, p. 2, and announcements in *Meditsinsky rabotnik*, Nos. 4—11, 1956.

³² V. L. Plyushch, *Okhrona zdorovya v Ukraini*; see also *Meditsinsky rabotnik* for 1954, 1955 and 1956.

³³ *Meditsinsky rabotnik*, 1955, Nos. 7, 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 34, and 1956, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9.

³⁴ Plyushch, *op. cit.* The lack of hospital beds is repeatedly mentioned in *Meditsinsky rabotnik*, 1956, Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 11.

³⁵ *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1955, Vol. II, p. 23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1955, Vol. VI, p. 98.

ill as a result of alcoholism, those who do not appear regularly for medical inspection and so on.

These restrictions on the receipt of benefits in case of temporary disability were introduced by the Government with the special purpose of forcing the worker to remain with a given enterprise. The right of a worker to be excused from his duties because of disability or when the need arises to care for a sick relative looks very imposing at first glance. In practice, legislation provides in such cases for the issue of a medical certificate for only three days and even then in very limited cases. In this connection the official Soviet handbook says: "The extension of this term is permissible in certain cases and only for a limited period."³⁷

Further limitations exist concerning the amount of benefit payable for temporary disability. The most typical limitation is the payment of only half the benefit in case of temporary disability to persons who are not members of a trade union. Adolescents who are members of a trade union receive only 60% of their wages; others receive 30%. Persons who have worked continuously in the same place for less than three years receive 50% of their wages (a non-member of a trade union only 25%), those who have worked in the same place for from three to five years receive 60% and workers with five to eight years' continuous service 80%. (If they are not members of a trade union they receive only 30% or 40% respectively.) Only those persons who have worked in the same place for more than eight years without a break and who have not been punished for truancy or any other misdemeanor can count on receiving their wages in full in case of illness. By way of comparison it may be mentioned that in the German Federal Republic, benefit in case of disability is the wage earned in full, irrespective of whether work has been continuous or whether one is a member of a trade union.

The principal types of pension granted under social insurance in the USSR are for disability and old age. For a very small number of people a pension for length of service is available. The disability pension is given for disabilities which are either caused by general illness brought about by an accident at work or an occupational disease.

Insured persons entitled to a pension are divided into categories according to the usefulness of their work to the Government, the skill required in carrying it out and any danger connected with it. Higher officials, higher Party functionaries, MVD personnel, eminent scientists, writers and artists, generals and similar privileged groups do not belong to these categories but are dealt with separately. Workers at the coal-face and those who do other work injurious to health belong to the first category and those who are employed in specially important branches of industry—for instance, the coal and machine-building industries, metallurgy, rail and water transport—to the second category. All other workers belong to the third.

This division of the population into categories is typical of Soviet class distinction.

If the various categories of social insurance in the USSR are combined, the following picture of its caste structure will be obtained:

1. The Soviet "upper crust," which is given high "personal" pensions from the State budget.

³⁷ *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo*, p. 348.

2. Military personnel, MVD and MGB employees, militia, frontier guards and members of certain other special organizations in receipt of permanent pensions, which are also listed separately.

3. Eminent scientists and technologists who are also in receipt of personal pensions.

4. Painters, architects, musicians, sculptors, writers and other artists who receive pensions either by Government decree or from special funds—literary, musical, architectural and so on.

5. The three categories of workers mentioned above.

6. Employees of the industrial and invalid cooperative system.

7. Peasants who farm individually and others who are not included in the State or cooperative system.

These benefits for the disabled and aged vary considerably. They may be compared to the very great differences which obtain in the political, cultural and material life of Soviet workers. However, the differences in the lives of pensioners are even more striking. As the wage of a collective farmer differs greatly from the salary of a high official, Party worker or professor, so pensions vary from 20 rubles to many thousands of rubles.

In addition to this division into groups according to the category's value to the Government and Party, there is another differentiation, based on the degree of disability. From this viewpoint all invalids are divided into three categories. To the first group belong those who are completely disabled; to the second group belong those who are completely unfit for work but who do not need constant nursing, whilst the third comprises persons who are not fit for regular work but can take some light or part-time employment.

The old age pension may be granted to men who have passed their 60th birthday and who have worked for not less than 20 years. Industrial workers who are incapacitated can only receive a pension if they have completed an uninterrupted period of work the length of which varies according to profession. The length of this period depends on many factors—age, category, type of work, its productivity and so on. On an average one has to work for not less than 15 years in order to qualify for a pension. If there has been a break in work of over five years the whole of the preceding period is discounted. These conditions considerably decrease the chance of obtaining an old age or disability pension.

Thus a considerable number of Soviet workers who are apparently secured by the normal system of social insurance, within the regulations mentioned above, have no right to an old age or even a disability pension. Workers and employees who are incapacitated as the result of an accident at work or have become victims of a recognized occupational disability (e.g., the loss of a limb in a machine, gas poisoning etc.), fare a little better. True, they do not receive any special damages for an accident for which the enterprise was to blame as is the case in Germany and the United States, for example, but at least they receive their pension irrespective of how many years they have worked.

As for the amount of old age and invalid pensions in the USSR, the old-age pension for the first group of workers is paid at the rate of 60% of their wages, for the second group at the rate of 55% and for the third group at the rate of 50%. Invalids are pensioned at the following rates: the first group

receives from 67% to 69% of their wages; the second group from 47% to 49% and the third group from 33% to 35%. Standard rates are different for workers invalidated owing to an accident at their place of work for which the enterprise is responsible or who become invalids through contracting a recognized occupational disease: the first group receives a pension amounting to 100% of their wages, the second group 75% and the third 50%.

At first glance, the size of these pensions is quite reasonable, but social insurance legislation contains one very important point. No matter how much a worker or employee was earning at the time he was due to start receiving his old age pension or invalid pension, even when the latter is claimed as the result of an accident at the enterprise or because of an occupational disease, the size of his pension is calculated on the basis of a wage of 300 rubles per month. Exceptions to this rule are made only in a few special cases.

If the pensions of all these groups of the Soviet population are calculated in terms of cash, then for the ordinary worker or employee they will vary at best from 99 to 300 rubles per month. (See Table 1.)

The grant for the birth of a child is a single payment of 120 rubles for buying essential articles and 180 rubles for food: out of this sum 220 rubles are paid out immediately and the balance of 80 rubles is paid when the baby is five months old. This grant cannot exceed 300 rubles and is paid only when the parents' income does not exceed 500 rubles during the last month before the birth takes place. The grant for temporary disability is paid for 35 days before the birth and 42 days afterwards. Women who are not trade union members or who have not worked long enough receive proportionally smaller grants. In cases of death a grant of 100 rubles is made.

Table 1

Pensions for Invalids in the Soviet Union
(Rubles)

	First Group	Second Group	Third Group
Industrial invalids	300	225	150
1st Category	207	147	105
2nd „	204	144	102
3rd „	201	141	99

Old Age Pensions

1st Category	According to age and conditions of work but not exceeding 180 rubles
2nd „	According to age, length of service and conditions of work but not exceeding 165 rubles
3rd „	According to age, length of service and conditions of work but not exceeding 155 rubles.

In order to present the real value of these grants certain calculations and comparisons must be made. The average income of a qualified worker in the USSR in 1955 was 1,000 rubles and of a semi-skilled worker from 500 to 600 rubles per month.³⁸

The pensioned worker, therefore, receives at most only 300 rubles. The minimum necessary to buy food according to official prices in 1955 was not less than 200 rubles per month.³⁹ A man's shirt cost from 78 to 245 rubles; a man's suit from 100 to 1,800 rubles, a woman's coat from 650 to 2,800 rubles; a dress from 400 to 775 rubles; men's shoes from 550 to 775 rubles and women's shoes from 500 to 750 rubles.⁴⁰

Therefore even the pension of a 100% invalid is barely sufficient for a very modest diet, rent and petty expenses. Pensioners in other groups cannot afford even to buy sufficient food on their pensions.

If Soviet pensions are compared with those in the German Federal Republic it becomes apparent that standard Soviet rates are nearer to the grants given by the German welfare organs (*Fürsorge*) to persons who are not insured and who have no claim to any pension. For instance, a displaced person receives from DM 60 to 180 a month according to the size of his family and the place where he lives, an amount, when calculated in purchasing power, equivalent to from 300 to 900 rubles. The benefit paid to the single tubercular patient in the German Federal Republic is about 140 marks per month, that is, 700 rubles.⁴¹ Pensions and insurance benefits in other European countries are similar. The old age pension in the United States averages 100 dollars a month — that is, in terms of real value, not less than 1,000 rubles.

It is interesting to note that the present benefits provided by Soviet social insurance are small even in comparison with those in prerevolutionary Russia, where the social security of the workers was very limited.

Rytnikov, for instance, states that the workers in tsarist Russia "received benefits at rates from 25% to 50% of their wages."⁴² Taking the average pay of a worker in tsarist Russia at 30 rubles per month, his pension would be 15 rubles. If it is remembered that food prices in tsarist Russia were, on an average, 50 times lower than in the USSR,⁴³ it is easy to calculate that the pension of a worker expressed in terms of present Soviet currency was about 750 rubles a month.

The inadequate security provided for invalids and old people in the USSR causes a very considerable proportion of sick people to avoid being pensioned off and to continue their employment. Persons who have been forced to

³⁸ Salaries are based on reports by escapees from the USSR.

³⁹ The quantity of food needed is given according to the minimum physiological requirements. Its cost is quoted from Prof. M. Velychkivsky's analysis, *Ekonomichny stan trudyashchykh u SSSR* (Economic State of Soviet Workers), in *Vyzvolny shlyakh* (Liberation Path), Ukrainian Publishers, Ltd., London, 1956, No. 2, p. 140.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ When comparing food prices in the USSR and in the German Federal Republic it should be assumed that the relationship of 1 DM to one ruble is as 1 to 5. When comparing the prices of commodities this relationship increases to 1 to 10. Prof. Kovanovsky, the well-known expert of Soviet finance, accepts the same rate. The author considers this a very conservative estimate.

⁴² *BSE*, Vol. "USSR," col. 1147.

⁴³ Velychkivsky, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

retire must also work nonetheless in order to survive. Rytnikov states that in 1945, in one organization in the RSFSR alone, the All-Russian Cooperative Union of Invalids (*Vsekoopinsoyuz*), there were 1,780 invalid artels comprising 14,400 enterprises, in which were working "about 200,000 war and industrial invalids and a large number of persons who were blind, deaf and dumb." ⁴⁴

Even more interesting data is supplied by F. Ananchenko, Minister of Social Security in the Ukrainian SSR. He has stated that in 1955, 89% of all World War II invalids in receipt of pensions as well as 64% of all industrial invalids were employed; 74% of all persons who received pensions for long service and 64% of all old age pensioners were employed and 67% of the latter were working in the Donbas mines. ⁴⁵

The problem of exploiting to the maximum the so-called "residual" fitness for work of invalids and the chronically sick is dealt with at length by Soviet medical literature. ⁴⁶

For example, Dr L. H. Savchenko, a district medical officer in the Vasilkov Raion, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, writes:

We are trying to direct tubercular patients into work which does not require strenuous physical effort or long hours of exposure to the sun, instead of work in the fields, where they would have to work in all weathers. We also see to it that patients with active tuberculosis are not allowed to work in childrens' establishments or in food enterprises, dairy farms and so on. ⁴⁷

*

Soviet propaganda constantly insists that both Government and Party spend huge sums of money on social security. An analysis of the Soviet budget for State income and expenditure is a very difficult matter. Soviet sources give little information on the financial economy of their country and in many instances the data necessary for an analysis are either absent or are given in percentages of a non-specified sum. Finally, certain items of expenditure as, for example, defence and internal security are concealed beneath budget headings which have nothing to do with these matters. Professor P. L. Kovankovsky, an authority on Soviet finance, writes:

How the budgets of the USSR are constructed we do not in fact know. They are not published in full, nor are they discussed at sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Instead, a speech is made by the Minister of Finance in which certain selected figures are given, and even these are often only percentages of a non-specified sum. Soviet authorities have secret items of expenditure. The budgets of the USSR do not show in full expenditure for military purposes. The real expenditure on the country's armaments is concealed beneath other headings in the budget and it is impossible to separate them. ⁴⁸

⁴⁴ BSE, Vol. "USSR," col. 1152.

⁴⁵ *Pravda Ukrainy*, Kiev, Dec. 14, 1952.

⁴⁶ Plyushch, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ L. G. Savchenko, *Opyt protivotuberkuleznoi raboty v usloviyakh sel'sko-khozyaistvennogo raiona* (Experience of Antitubercular Work in an Agricultural Raion), *Problemy tuberkuleza* (Problems of Tuberculosis), 1954, No. 6, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Kovankovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 14 and 15.

Without knowing the true Soviet expenditure on social insurance and social security it is necessary to adopt a critical attitude toward information published by Soviet sources. According to the data contained in the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), the budget for social insurance in 1947 was 14,875 million rubles;⁴⁹ for 1949, Prof. Kovankovsky gives a figure based on official Soviet data of 16,600 million rubles, for 1950—18,100 million rubles and for 1951—21,000 million.⁵⁰ Expenditure on social security amounted, in 1949, to 21,400 million rubles, in 1950 to 22,400 million rubles and in 1951 to 22,300 million rubles.⁵¹ These data are published by the USSR for the West.

Expenditure on the national economy, social and cultural needs, defence and administration is contained in Table 2 below.

Table 2

*State Expenditure of the USSR 1948—1952*⁵²

	(Billions of Rubles)					
	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	Total
<i>National Economy</i>	147.5	152.5	157.3	178.5	180.4	816.2
Industry	94.1	75.5	85.3	—	98.1	—
Agriculture and Forestry	20.5	32.7	36.6	—	34.7	—
Transport and Communications	14.3	14.7	15.0	—	15.4	—
Trade and Supplies	4.1	6.5	9.3	—	—	—
Non-specified Purposes	14.5	23.1	11.1	—	32.2	—
<i>Social Services</i>	119.2	123.8	126.4	127.4	124.8	621.6
Education	—	60.8	59.9	59.0	60.0	—
Health and Physical Culture	—	21.6	22.0	21.0	22.8	—
Social Security	—	21.4	22.4	22.3	37.5	—
Social Insurance	—	16.6	18.1	21.0	—	—
Aid to Mothers	—	3.4	4.0	4.1	4.5	—
<i>Defence</i>	63.2	79.1	82.9	96.4	113.8	435.4
<i>Administration</i>	13.1	13.7	13.8	14.3	14.4	69.3
<i>Unknown Items</i>	27.1	43.2	32.3	34.9	26.8	164.3
<i>Total</i>	370.1	412.3	412.7	451.5	460.2	2,106.8

⁴⁹ BSE, Vol. "USSR," col. 1149.

⁵⁰ Kovankovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 21 and 57. Dashes indicate that the relevant data are unavailable

At first glance it appears that expenditure on social security and social insurance in the USSR is considerable and that it increases from year to year. But when we compare expenditure on these items with that on the national economy and defence, it is obvious that the proportion of the total expenditure devoted to social insurance is small. Expenditure on social security, for instance, constitutes only 5% of the total, and that on social insurance from 4% to 4.7%, whilst the national economy accounted for an average of 40% and defence from 17% to 25%.

The annual increase of expenditure on social insurance in absolute figures and in percentages of the total budget is a mere 0.5%; expenditure on social security in 1951, both in percentages and in absolute figures, was smaller than in 1950. Combined expenditure on social insurance and social security in 1952 was smaller than in the three preceding years.

At the same time the total budget increased by more than 20%; expenditure on agriculture by more than 50%, on defence by 100% and on commerce by more than 100%. It would seem that after World War II, which caused tremendous human losses and destroyed thousands of medical and other establishments, expenditure on social security should have been considerably increased, as it was in other countries.

According to Soviet sources, during World War II 7 million persons were killed or disappeared without trace and 11.5 million persons were injured.⁵³ Thus millions of children were orphaned and the number of invalids and widows was greatly increased — all categories of the population that are entitled to social security.

The war also devastated large areas of the country. Again according to Soviet data, 1,710 towns, about 70,000 villages and 66.2 million square meters of living space were ruined. Six thousand hospitals, 976 sanatoria and 656 rest homes were destroyed.⁵⁴ Enormous funds for rebuilding various social service establishments were therefore necessary. Furthermore, it should be remembered that during the last ten years the number of workers and employees in the USSR has increased by 10 million⁵⁵ and expenditure on social insurance for workers should have shown a similar increase. In fact, this expenditure has remained more or less static.

It is impossible to make a direct comparison of expenditure on social insurance and social security in the USSR with that in other countries because social services in the USSR are entirely run by the state. In the USSR there is no private or public insurance against illness or temporary or permanent disability nor social care for the needy by the churches, philanthropic societies or private individuals. All institutions and funds which formerly administered social services have been nationalized.

There is nothing comparable in the countries of the free world. In the United States, for example, life is based upon private enterprise and so, to

⁵³ A. A. Zaitsov, *Dinamika naseleniya SSSR na 1952 god* (Population Changes in the USSR in 1952), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1953, p. 45.

⁵⁴ BSE, Vol. "USSR," col. 1145.

⁵⁵ A. Poplyuiko, *Izmenenie sotsialnogo oblika krestyanstva v SSSR* (Changes in the Social Status of the Peasantry of the USSR), *Vestnik*, Munich, 1953, Vol. IV, p. 73.

a great extent, is the insurance system. A considerable part of expenditure on social services is borne by the authorities of the separate states, local government bodies, churches, philanthropic societies and private foundations. There are nearly 7,000 philanthropic foundations and about 180 million dollars is spent annually by them on charity.

In 1956 the Ford Foundation assigned 200 million dollars for 3,500 charity hospitals and 90 million dollars for 42 private medical schools. The Rockefeller Foundation during the entire period of its existence has spent 478,747,000 dollars on charity.⁵⁶

Although the Federal Government of the United States does not claim to provide a complete social service, it nevertheless devotes a certain portion of the budget to this purpose. During the years 1948—1952 United States expenditure on social needs was 10,049 million dollars (4.2% of the total budget), of which 1,869 million dollars were spent in 1948, 1,907 million dollars in 1949, 2,214 million dollars in 1950, 2,380 million dollars in 1951 and 2,679 million dollars in 1952.⁵⁷ From 1948 to 1952 money provided for these items by the Federal budget increased by 810 million dollars, or more than 43%.

If we take into account the real value of the Soviet ruble and the American dollar (at the rate of 1 dollar = 4 DM and 1 DM = 5 Soviet rubles), then it is easy to see that during five years 200 milliard roubles from the Federal budget were spent on social needs alone. This is more than was spent on social insurance, social security and grants to unmarried mothers and mothers with several children together during the same five years in the USSR. To this sum must be added funds assigned by the governments of the separate states, by various insurance companies, charity societies, churches and private individuals. According to Professor P. L. Kovankovsky, aid to war veterans alone received 10,793,000 dollars in 1948—1952,⁵⁸ whilst a sum of 2,304 million dollars,⁵⁹ i.e., about 40 billion rubles, was spent on pensions in 1953.

In the German Federal Republic, conditions resemble those in the Soviet Union only a little more. There is wide legislation concerning social services, and compulsory social insurance and its organization is mostly undertaken by the state. The basic feature of this system is that it is not the policy of the government of the German Federal Republic to monopolize social security but to give priority in these matters to public bodies; it does not limit private initiative or the activities of charitable societies and churches. There is a widely organized system of insurance against illness (*Krankenversicherung*), against unemployment (*Arbeitslosenversicherung*), disability (*Invalidenversicherung*) and old age (*Altenversicherung*); there is special security for employees (*Angestelltenversicherung*), officials (*Beamtenversicherung*) and other occupational groups, such as workers in industrial enterprises, miners and sea transport workers. This security is achieved through a network of general insurance companies (*Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen* and *Landkrankenkassen*), insurance companies (*Ersatzkrankenkassen*), special insurance companies

⁵⁶ Quoted from *Svoboda* (Liberty), Munich, No. 241, 1955.

⁵⁷ Kovankovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

(*Innungs-, Privatkrankenkassen*) and insurance companies belonging to enterprises (*Betriebskrankenkassen*). As has already been pointed out, these insurance companies covered about 40 million persons in 1953. By a special law contributions are paid to these companies partly by the employers and partly by the workers. On general sickness insurance alone 1,762 million marks were spent in 1949, 2,969 million marks in 1950, 2,332 million marks in 1951, 2,702 million marks in 1952 and 3,082 million marks in 1953.⁶⁰ In five years, therefore, expenditure on only one kind of social insurance reached the sum of 11,787 million marks, involving an increase of 1,320 million marks.

Total expenditure on social security in the German Federal Republic, that is, on insurance against illness, unemployment and disability, aid to war victims, workers' security and other kinds of aid, amounted to 17,110 million marks in 1951,⁶¹ to 17,900 million marks in 1952⁶² and 19,200 million marks in 1953.⁶³

In absolute figures (taking into account the real value of the Soviet ruble), total expenditure on social security was thus far greater in the German Federal Republic than in the USSR. If it is remembered that the population of the USSR is 200.2 millions⁶⁴ and of the German Federal Republic 53.4 millions,⁶⁵ then it appears that in Germany, which lost the war, expenditure on social security and social insurance was many times greater than in the USSR.

Western Germany is not a special case among other European countries. In the USSR, as has already been stated, from 8% to 10% of the entire budget is spent on social aid and social insurance, together with expenditure on unmarried and married mothers with large families. Western Germany devotes 20% of the national income to the same purpose,⁶⁶ France 13.7%, Italy 10.8% and Great Britain 11.3%.⁶⁷

In the USSR, 226 rubles per person per annum are spent on all kinds of social security—that is, less than 50 DM. In the Saar, the corresponding annual sum is 169 marks per capita, in Belgium 719, in Western Germany 535, in Sweden 521, in Great Britain 494, in France 476, in Austria 359, in Switzerland 328, in Holland 328 and in Denmark 319.⁶⁸

It should be pointed out these sums in the European countries include only certain kinds of social security and not expenditure by numerous charitable societies, churches and private individuals.

Having rebuilt the country's industry since World War II, it might be assumed that the Soviet government would at last turn its attention to social security.

⁶⁰ Dr. Walter Körting, "Soziale Wandlung," *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1955, Vol. VIII, p. 147.

⁶¹ *Knaur's Lexikon*, Munich, 1951/52, pp. 1629—30.

⁶² *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1953, Vol. X, p. 164.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1953, Vol. XII, p. 204.

⁶⁴ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR*, p. 17.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 253; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Stuttgart, Vol. IV, April 1956, p. 174*.

⁶⁶ *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1953, Vol. X, p. 164.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Körting, *op. cit.*, *Bayerisches Arzteblatt*, 1956, Vol. VI, p. 98.

Some information is available concerning expenditure on social security in 1955. In that year it was planned to spend 45,800 million rubles (which is less than in 1952) on social security and social insurance.⁶⁹ How much was in fact spent is not known, but it may be assumed to be less than the sum mentioned, since the USSR underspent its proposed expenditure for 1955 by 25,700 million rubles. Assuming that 45,800 million rubles were spent in 1955, this would amount to 213 rubles per head of the population, again much less than in any European country and also less than in 1952. If expenditure on the health service and physical culture (30,400 million rubles⁷⁰), the equivalent of 141 rubles per capita annually, is added to this figure, then total expenditure in 1955 on social insurance and social security as well as on the health service and physical culture would amount to 354 rubles per capita, which is about 70 DM. This is much lower than corresponding indices in European countries.

⁶⁹ *Izvestia*, Dec. 27, 1956.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

The Kakhovka Hydroelectric Project and the Greater Dnieper Scheme

S. PROTSYUK

I

The Soviets call the Kakhovka hydroelectric project one of the "great achievements of Communism" or, as it was termed before Stalin's death, "an achievement of the Stalin epoch." The decision to execute this project was taken in 1950 and included, apart from Kakhovka, the hydroelectric schemes at Kuibyshev and Stalingrad and on the Amu-Darya River. The enormous amount of propaganda which accompanied the decision is explained by the fact that the Kremlin wished to focus the attention of the broad masses of the population on measures being taken by the Party and Government to increase the general wellbeing of the country and to distract attention from the constant difficulties of everyday life and the danger of a new war. Some observers consider the latter reason to be the more important since, by introducing large-scale building programs spread over a number of years, the Kremlin hoped to prove to the people that no new war was contemplated. Such projects as the Volga-Don canal¹ and the planting of protective forest belts carried out directly after the war also served the same purpose.²

However, it would seem that these apparent reasons behind the construction of great hydroelectric undertakings are only partially correct. Apart from the widely publicized projects at Kakhovka, Kuibyshev and Takhia-Tash on the Amu-Darya River, a number of similar projects were initiated in the postwar years which, by their size and economic importance, surpass those of Kakhovka and Stalingrad. In this connection, attention should be paid to three projects about which a little information has lately become available: a series of five power stations on the Angara River near Lake Baikal, of which that near Irkutsk is now being built, and two powerful hydroelectric plants on the river Irtysh, one between Lake Zaisan and Ust-Kamenogorsk and the other at the confluence of the rivers Bukhtarma and Irtysh. It is known

¹ The official decision on the construction of the Volga-Don Canal was announced on Dec. 28, 1950. In fact, this decision amounted to a speeding up of work started long before, and brought forward by two years the date on which the canal was to be put into operation.

² As the experience of recent years shows, the realization of this project met with enormous difficulties. Protective forest belts planted by forced peasant labor at the cost of millions of working days are withering and degenerating prematurely.

³ *Ezhenedelny obzor vazhneishikh sobytii v SSSR* (Weekly Review of the Most Important Events in the USSR), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, No. 73, 1955, p. 6.

that Ust-Kamenogorsk will produce approximately 160,000 kWh per annum; no precise data are available, but the scope of the work already carried out supports the above figure.⁴ The Bukhtarma projects is even more ambitious than that of Ust-Kamenogorsk.⁵ After its completion, the capacity of the Irkutsk hydroelectric station, one of the first to be built on the Angara River, will be twice as great as that of Dneproges.⁶ These are the most important of the powerful hydroelectric schemes which are either already finished, as the one at Ust-Kamenogorsk, or are to be completed in the near future. There is reason to believe that the Siberian power stations will be put into commission earlier than that at Kakhovka and certainly earlier than either Stalingrad or Amu-Darya. Nevertheless, no mention has been made of them in the spate of Soviet propaganda dealing with this branch of the economy, although good use could be made of them in building up the morale of the people, as has been done before with the much publicized "great constructions of the epoch." There is no doubt that political and strategic motives⁷ play an important part here, but it would be a mistake to consider the projects on the Dnieper (i. e., Kakhovka), Volga or Amu-Darya rivers solely from the point of view of their propaganda value. Even so, this does not mean that all hydraulic engineering projects in the USSR have a definite and permanent economic value. Some of them are profitable to a greater or lesser degree, while others have no clear economic basis and therefore appear merely to serve some imperialistic purpose.

In this survey an effort will be made to consider the Kakhovka project from the standpoint of economic principles in general and its relation to the various branches of the Ukrainian national economy in particular.

The Kakhovka power station is a link in the Greater Dnieper scheme. The exploitation of the Dnieper system for economic purposes started in ancient times and particular importance was attached to it as a waterway. The earliest known records go back to the periods of the Scythians and the Antae, with which we shall not deal in this survey; those who are interested may find information in the appropriate sources.⁸

In more recent times the economic possibilities of the Dnieper began to be energetically developed during the first half of the nineteenth century.

⁴ Some information was published in 1946: see *Ogonek*, Nos. 38—39, Sept. 1946, pp. 39—41. According to a Moscow Radio report broadcast on July 3, 1953, 2.5 million cubic meters of earthworks and 600,000 cubic meters of concrete had been constructed and 500,000 cubic meters of fittings installed.

⁵ See *Ogonek*, No. 38, Sept. 1953, pp. 18—21. More recent information may be found in *Izvestia*, Feb. 25, 1954, and *Sovetskaya Latvija* (Soviet Latvia), July 4, 1954.

⁶ Radio Volga, April 4, 1954; *Pravda*, Feb. 22 and Oct. 22, 1954.

⁷ Hydroelectric power stations have been built on the Irtysh and Angara rivers because of the presence of uranium ore deposits in the vicinity and the need to supply electricity to atomic installations exploiting these deposits. The well-known project for cultivating the virgin lands of Siberia and northern Kazakhstan should also be regarded in the light of the creation of a local agricultural base for the new industrial centers, which, in their turn, are stimulated in their development by the availability of local geological resources and of power supplied by the new hydroelectric stations.

⁸ M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of the Ukraine-Rus), vols. I—III, new edition, New York.

The Dnieper rapids, which were an obstacle to regular navigation, became the object of much interest but the embryonic scheme to dynamite them was unrealistic.⁹ Even nowadays, when technology is far more advanced than it was in the forties of the last century, it would be extremely difficult and costly to blow up the rapids, despite the enormous power of modern explosives. After considering a number of other schemes the tsarist government of the time decided to build a diversionary canal. Work on this project went on from 1843 to 1854; however, the system of canals which were to take advantage of a number of natural branches of the Dnieper was so badly planned and incompetently built that they often silted up, were much too shallow and the flow of water too fast to be of any use for navigational purposes.

The solution of the problem—to raise the level of the water and so cover the rapids—was beyond the ability of the engineers of the day: they worked on it unsuccessfully for half a century and only in 1905 was a foreigner—Heinrich Graftio—able to work out a new plan, which was accepted in part by the tsarist government. Graftio's plan, however, was not put into operation until 1911—six years after it had been proposed, and the outbreak of World War I soon put an end to the work. It should be mentioned that all previous schemes for exploiting the Dnieper, both for navigation and the generation of electricity, had been based upon hydrological surveys of the Ukraine. Officially, such surveys began in 1875, when the Navigational Survey Commission was set up, but recently much interesting information has been published which deals with the period prior to 1875.¹⁰ In 1656 an order was issued by the Zaporozhe Kosh (High Command) creating the Dnieper River Guards, whose duty it was to keep watch on the movements of the Tartars and also to navigate barges through the rapids. Zaporozhe pilots also kept accurate observations of the water level. Data on the freezing and breaking up of the ice on the Dnieper from 1756 are to be found in the Central State Historical Archives of the Ukraine and an early survey of the water level at the Nenasytets Rapids is dated 1778—1783.¹¹ In the 1770's an order was issued for the resettlement of Zaporozhe pilots from the village of Kaidaky (Kodak) in the village of Lotsmano-Kamenka, where a river observation post was to be set up. N. Mosakovsky's theory that regular observations of the Dnieper water level at Lotsmano-Kamenka only began in 1845 is repudiated nowadays by students of the subject. In the Central State Historical Archives of the Ukrainian SSR documents are to be found which date the beginning of observations at Lotsmano-Kamenka as early as 1818 and daily observations of navigational conditions from 1828. Observations near Kremenchug began in 1789. The "Water and Land Communications Expedition" arranged by the tsarist government in 1818 recommended the widespread observation of rivers. Plans for this matured very slowly, but in 1838 water gauges were installed at Kiev, Loev and Cherkassy on the Dnieper and at the port of Mozyr on the Pripet. The great flood which took place in the spring of 1845

⁹ The canal project for the Dnieper rapids was first elaborated during the reign of Catherine II.

¹⁰ N. Y. Drozd and H. I. Shvets, *Z istorii hidrolohiichnykh doslidzhen Dnipro* (Notes on the History of Hydrological Surveys of the Dnieper), *Visnyk AN USSR* (Journal of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR), 1953, No. 1, pp. 73—78.

¹¹ The navigational channel through the Nenasytets Rapids was well-known in Cossack times, when it was known as "the old Cossack passage."

brought about the establishment of more observation posts.¹² In 1858 instructions were issued which were based upon the previous twenty-year period of observations. In 1879 new and more comprehensive instructions were published founded on the work of the Navigational Survey Commission; official manuals and annual hydrometeorological surveys were also issued. As may be seen from Table 1, hydrological observations of the Dnieper at the Zaporozhe Rapids go back three centuries and, near Kiev, two hundred and fifty years.

Table 1

The Beginning of Hydrological Observations on the Dnieper
(According to N. I. Drozd and H. I. Shvets)

Observation Point	Year when Irregular Observations Started	Year when Regular Observations Started	Year when Winter Ob- servations Started
Mogilev	—	—	1838
Rogachev	—	—	1815
Loev	1836	—	1814
Kiev	1702	1839	1756
Cherkassy	1836	1847	1839
Kremenchug	1789	1860	1813
Dnepropetrovsk (formerly Ekaterinoslav)	1836	—	1802
Lotsmano-Kamenka	1778	1828	1802
Nenasytets Rapids	1781 (1656)	—	—
Berislav	1844	—	—
Kherson	—	1865	1838

II

A new era in the solving of the Dnieper problem began after World War I and the revolution in Russia and the Ukraine. In 1920¹³ a much publicized plan known as *GOELRO* for the electrification of the USSR was announced.

¹² The need for systematic hydrological observations of the Dnieper was strongly advocated by the civil engineer Zavadovsky, of the Kiev Region Communications Board, in the middle of the XIX century.

¹³ A. Lebed and B. Yakovlev, in *Transportnoe znachenie gidrotekhnicheskikh sooruzhenii SSSR* (Soviet Waterways), published by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in 1956, state that Prof. Aleksandrov submitted his project for a dam on the Dnieper in the Zaporozhe area to *GOELRO* in 1919. The commission for working out the *GOELRO* plan was only established in Feb. 1920 and did not complete its preparatory work until Dec. 1920. The *GOELRO* plan was approved by the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets on Dec. 22, 1920.

In its original form *GOELRO* was of purely local importance as it only included projects for hydroelectric and thermal stations in the territory of the Russian Federation, such countries as the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Caucasus at first being left out of the plan.¹⁴ Later, however, the Bolsheviks began to extend *GOELRO* to include these territories, but in such a way that it was the economy of the USSR as a whole which would benefit and not the individual areas.

Prof. Aleksandrov's Dnieper Dam project was, indeed, included in the *GOELRO* scheme in 1920—1921, but at that time it contained no constructional details. Even the 1923 version of *GOELRO* did no more than acknowledge the necessity of "regulating the Dnieper between Kiev and its estuary so that its lower reaches (between Zaporozhe and Kherson) would be accessible to sea-going ships."

The pace of reconstruction work on the Dnieper system was increased at the start of the five-year plans. We know that the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR passed a resolution on the construction of Dneproges on February 10, 1927. Officially the work was completed on October 10, 1932, but in fact only the earthworks, concrete installations and five aggregates of 62,000 kW each were put into commission. The capacity of Dneproges at that time was 310,000 kW;¹⁵ four more turbo-aggregates remained to be put into commission in order to achieve a capacity of 558,000 kW.¹⁶

Dneproges apart, several other hydroelectric schemes on the Dnieper were planned which together, it was hoped, would fully exploit the resources of the river. It should be stressed that the original Dnieper project provided for the building of only one power station, namely that at Aleksandrovsk (now called Zaporozhe). This is borne out by the *Skhematicheskaya karta elektrifikatsii Rossii* (Chart of the Electrification of Russia), which was prepared by E. Shulgin, M. Smirnov and M. Lapiro-Skoble, all members of the *GOELRO* Commission, and published by *Gosudarstvennoe Tekhnicheskoe Izdatelstvo* (State Technical Publishing House) at the end of December, 1920. A few years later, in 1922—1924, technical circles close to *GOELRO* discussed the possibility of regulating the Lower Dnieper by means of three dams and the building of hydroelectric stations at Aleksandrovsk, Nikopol and Gornostaevka, which is a little lower down the river than Kakhovka. These projects were worked out with the aim of improving navigation.

¹⁴ It should be recalled that a formal treaty between the Soviet Ukraine and the RSFSR was not concluded until Dec. 28, 1920, and that the USSR as a union of states emerged on Dec. 30, 1922—the I Congress of Soviets.

¹⁵ A. V. Vinter, *Velikie stroiki kommunizma* (Great Constructions of Communism), Moscow, 1952, p. 192.

¹⁶ For further information on the construction of Dneproges the reader is referred to G. M. Zhdanov, *Elektricheskaya skazka na Dnepre*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1928; A. M. Gavrilov and I. V. Popov, *Dnepr idet v step*, Leningrad, 1951; A. Vinter and A. Markin, *Rol elektrifikatsii v postepennoe perekhode SSSR ot sotsializma k kommunizmu* (The Role of Electrification in the Gradual Transition from Socialism to Communism), Gospolitizdat, 1952; *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE], 1st ed., vol. XXII, pp. 729—745 (article "Dneproges") and 767—782 (article "Dneprostroy"); *ibid.*, 2nd ed., vol. XIV, pp. 577—578 (article "Dneproges im. V. I. Lenina") and 590—592 (article "Dneprostroy"); *Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Small Soviet Encyclopedia) [MSE], vol. II, pp. 901—903 (article "Dneprostroy").

In 1926—1927, immediately before approval for the construction of Dneproges was given, the Greater Dnieper Scheme was ready; this was designed to embrace new hydroelectric stations at Nizhnedneprovsk, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Kamenskoe (now Dneprodzerzhinsk), Kremenchug and Pereyaslav. The power from these stations was to have covered 900,000 square kilometers of the Ukraine and the adjoining lands to the north, which had then a population of 44 millions with a density of 50 persons per square kilometer, 18,592 kilometers of railroad track and an agricultural area of 34,574,000 hectares. Prof. E. Rusakovsky, one of the leading authorities on electricity problems in the Ukraine, gives many details in his works of the various hydroelectric projects and their relation to thermal stations in the region which would have been covered by the Greater Dnieper Scheme. The annual output of the Nizhnedneprovsk plant was to have been 1,500 million kWh, of Kamenskoe 1,200 million kWh, of Kremenchug 1,700 million kWh and of Pereyaslav 500 million kWh. In addition, two smaller stations were to have been built, one on the water reservoir near Orsha, with a capacity of 150 million kWh, and another near Bryansk, on the Desna tributary, of 50 million kWh. Four cumbersome centralized transmission systems were planned within the Greater Dnieper Scheme. The most important of them, the Donetsk-Azov system, was intended, according to the plan, to consume about 50% of all the energy produced by the Greater Dnieper Scheme. Next in importance was the Zaporozhe-Dnepropetrovsk system, which was to consume 25% of the power generated. The southern system embraced Melitopol, Nikolaev, Odessa, Dzhankoi (in the Crimea) and Krivoi Rog. The 1936 plan even laid down the power of the high-voltage transmission lines which were to extend from the Nizhnednepetrovsk hydroelectric station to the above-named centers: by the end of the 1940's this was to reach 100,000 kW. The fourth system was to include the Kremenchug power station, together with those in the Kiev, Kharkov and Poltava oblasts. It is clear that this was to cover all hydroelectric and thermal stations.

Table 2¹⁷

Capital Investment in Rubles per Annual Output of 1000 kWh

Type of Plant	Kiev	Kremenchug	Nikolaev	Dzhankoi
Thermal power stations . . .	160	150	125	125
Thermal power stations with auxiliary heating functions	90	90	80	80
Hydroelectric stations . . .	275	200	300	300

¹⁷ In the first section of this table, investments are given in rubles at the so-called fixed value of 1926—1927. Part of the capital invested in hydroelectric stations is used for improving navigational conditions. In the data for hydroelectric stations in the third section, only personnel employed in the stations themselves and on transmission lines are taken into account, while in the case of thermal stations those engaged on the extraction and transportation of fuel are also included.

Thermal stations with auxiliary heating functions supply heat for industrial plants and sections of towns and workers' settlements.

Cost of Current Generated (in Kopeks per kWh)

Type of Plant	Kiev	Kremenchug	Nikolaev	Dzhankoi
Thermal stations	2.75	2.5	2.5	2.5
Thermal stations with auxiliary heating functions .	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Hydroelectric stations	1.15	1.75	1.5	1.5

Labor Required (in Man-Years) for Generating One Million kWh per Annum

Type of Plant	Kiev	Kremenchug	Nikolaev	Dzhankoi
Thermal stations	3.25	3.0	3.0	3.0
Thermal stations with auxiliary heating functions .	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Hydroelectric stations	1.1	0.05	0.1	0.1

In the middle thirties the Ukrainian State Planning Commission prepared tables giving the cost of constructing all the power stations to be built on the Dnieper and showing the financial side of the whole project. Some of the most interesting data from these tables are given in the following table, from which it is clearly seen that the construction of hydroelectric power stations is the most economical.

The construction of a large reservoir on the Dnieper near the hydroelectric station at Kremenchug was planned and would eventually have increased the potential of the Dnepropetrovsk generating station by 800 million kWh per annum. Output was also to be increased by the construction of dams at Orsha, Smolensk and Dorogobuzh on the Upper Dnieper and on some of its tributaries—the Berezina, the Sozh and the Desna—but no hydroelectric power stations were to be built at these dams.

In his survey of the Kakhovka project¹⁸ M. Khymych mentions the Ukrdniprovd project of 1933. According to his survey the following hydroelectric stations were to be built on the Dnieper River: (1) Dneproges (558,000 kW), (2) Ingulets (240,000 kW), (3) Kamenskoe (175,000 kW), (4) Kremenchug (210,000 kW) and (5) Pereyaslav (104,000 kW). It will be seen that this plan is similar to that worked out by the Ukrainian State Planning Commission in 1936. There is some inconsistency in the names given to one of the Lower Dnieper power stations; in some projects it is known as Nizhnedneprovsk, in others as Ingulets and in others again as Nikolaev. There is also considerable variation in the figures for the planned electricity output of the Kremenchug station. According to Ukrdniprovd it was 210,000 kW and according to the Ukrainian State Planning Commission about 260,000 kW. Khymych mentions that Ukrdniprovd was planning the construction of as many as ten hydroelectric power stations on the Upper Dnieper alone, between Dorogobuzh and Kiev, the total capacity of which was to be 195,000 kW. On the other hand, the Ukrainian State Planning Commission only considered building two

¹⁸ *Novi dni* (New Days), Toronto, 1955, Nos. 62 and 63.

hydroelectric power stations above Kiev with a total output of not more than 50,000 kW. It may be concluded that the projected building of ten power stations on the Upper Dnieper was an exaggeration, for the exploitable power of the river varies from 2,800 million kWh in a dry year to 4,400 million kWh in a wet year.¹⁹ True, the building of reservoirs at Kremenchug, Orsha, Smolensk and Dorogobuzh on the Dnieper itself and also on the tributaries Berezina, Sozh and Desna would, after their completion, increase the Dnieper reserves, but it was hardly possible or expedient even then to build the power stations on the Upper Dnieper which were planned by Ukrdniprovd.

As far as transport and navigation were concerned, the plans put forward in the thirties envisaged the possibility of artificially deepening the river for a distance of 60 miles between the Zaporozhe dam and Dnepropetrovsk. Nizhnedneprovsk was also intended to play an important part in this scheme as the high level of the water would have to be kept up by its dam as far up the Lower Dnieper as Zaporozhe as well as Krivoi Rog on the Ingulets River. In the Greater Dnieper Scheme of the thirties, especially during the period of Ukrainization, a great deal of attention was paid to the linking of the Dnieper with the Donets system, not so much from the point of view of the generation of electricity as from navigational considerations and in order to supply water to the Donbas. At that time a waterway between the Dnieper and the Don was planned through the rivers Samara, Volchya, Torets and Northern Donets. This fact is mentioned because for the last fifteen years the Dnieper-Don link has apparently been forgotten and, on instructions from Moscow, it has been "removed from the agenda." This link would be of particular importance to the national economy of the Ukraine as well as to the whole of the European part of the USSR. In the plans of the thirties a link between the Dnieper and the Baltic Sea at Leningrad is mentioned, together with the construction of canals between the Dnieper and the Western Dvina through the river Lovat. From the viewpoint of land melioration the Greater Dnieper Scheme of 1933—1936 hoped to (a) irrigate 1,850,000 hectares²⁰ in the Dnieper basin, especially the lower reaches of the river; (b) irrigate 800,000 hectares in the northern Crimea and (c) drain 4,500,000 hectares on the upper reaches of the Dnieper, particularly in the north-western oblasts of the Ukraine and the adjoining oblasts of Belorussia.

This third problem is often treated separately from the Greater Dnieper Scheme as a question of draining Polesie (the Pripet region). All projects for exploiting the Dnieper were worked out in the thirties: two decades have passed since then and it will be interesting to see to what extent the plans have been realized.

¹⁹ BSE, 1st ed., vol. XXII, article "Dneprostroy."

²⁰ These figures apply to the final achievements of the project. By the end of the Second and during the Third five-year plans, it was intended to irrigate only 200,000 hectares in the southern Ukraine, which were to be used chiefly for the cultivation of grain crops. The areas which were to be irrigated in the 1940's and 1950's were to be devoted to cotton, vines and industrial crops. These plans, naturally, did not foresee the changes and delays caused by World War II.

III

As stated earlier, the Greater Dnieper Scheme included the construction of the following large power stations: Pereyaslav, Kremenchug, Kamenskoe and Nizhnedneprovsk.²¹ However, certain sources dating from the thirties for some reason omit to mention some of these stations. For example, *Karta rozvytku richkovoho transportu v evropeyskiiy chastyni SSSR* (Map Showing the Development of River Transport in the European Part of the USSR), published in Professor Rusakovsky's work,²² does not include the power station at Pereyaslav and indicates only those at Kremenchug, Dneprodzerzhinsk and Nizhnedneprovsk, the last named situated, not on the site of the present Kakhovka station, but near Kherson. It was stated in the commentary that the building of all three stations would start during the Third Five-Year Plan.

There is no information on the building of the power station at Pereyaslav during the entire period 1937—1955. It is possible that this project, which is relatively unimportant for the economic and military potential of the USSR, was postponed until a much later date, perhaps even the Sixth or Seventh Five-Year Plan. It is, however, a great loss to the Ukraine, for a hydroelectric power station at Pereyaslav would considerably improve supplies of electricity to the central oblasts, which, so far, are much less industrialized than the south-eastern Ukraine. An exceptionally unsatisfactory situation is evident in the central part of the country west of the Dnieper. In the postwar years the thermal power stations to the west of the Dnieper were almost always overloaded and were quite unable to satisfy the needs of the non-industrial oblasts. Because of this overloading there were many serious breakdowns in the supply of current. In 1947, soon after they had been rebuilt, Vinnitsa and Zhitomir were almost completely destroyed by fire. It was disclosed that the cause of the fires was constant overloading and the order that work must be carried out at all costs, irrespective of technical norms and safety measures.²³ Though the situation has somewhat improved in the fifties and the number of breakdowns and accidents decreased, there has been little change in supply since the increase in potential is only slight. This is probably the reason why the industrialization of the central oblasts west of the Dnieper has not

²¹ In the narrow sense the term "Greater Dnieper" applies to the system of the Dnieper, connected by a network of canals with the Vistula, Dvina, Volga, Bug and Don rivers. In the wider sense it also comprises the system of hydroelectric stations and hydraulic engineering projects such as reservoirs, inland ports, irrigation canals and schemes for the draining of certain areas.

²² Apart from Prof. Rusakovsky, projects were worked out by T. P. Zolotaryov, A. V. Vinter, B. I. Vaits, S. A. Kukil-Krayevsky and A. E. Probst. Vaits' and Probst's work is particularly valuable, although it was criticized by the Party authorities. The Party also attacked Prof. Probst for his theories concerning the geographical location of power resources in the USSR (see *Pravda*, May 14, 1955).

²³ S. Y. Protsyuk, *Pislyavoyenna vidbudova promyslovosti Ukrainy* (The Postwar Reconstruction of Ukrainian Industry), *Tryzub*, Brussels, No. 9, May 1948; and *Do pytannya elektryfikatsii Ukrainy* (The Electrification of the Ukraine), *Ukrainski visti* (Ukrainian News), Neu-Ulm, Aug. 25, 1949.

The most recent information is given by H. Klymenko in an article in *Radianska Ukraina* (The Soviet Ukraine), March 11, 1956, where he states that a new hydroelectric station at Kakhovka was completed during the Fifth Five-Year Plan.

progressed.²⁴ There is every reason to believe that a power station at Pereyaslav would do a great deal to foster the industrialization and agriculture of the central oblasts on the right bank of the Dnieper, but unfortunately the realization of this project has been postponed indefinitely.

The improvement of the economy of the central oblasts on the right bank of the Dnieper is an urgent problem for the whole of the Ukraine and the negligence with which it has so far been treated is extremely injurious to the economic potential of the Ukraine.

Taking advantage of the relative easing of conditions in the USSR immediately after the war (1945—1947), the Ukrainian authorities obtained permission for the construction of the hydroelectric power station at Kremenchug. Although this station and its dam are situated approximately 150 km south of Pereyaslav they could, under propitious conditions, do a great deal to aid the economically weaker oblasts on the right bank of the Dnieper. The dam was in fact planned for this very purpose, although in 1946—1947 the power to be generated at Kremenchug was reduced to 100,000—120,000 kW, less than half of that which was projected in 1933—1937. The earthworks were begun in 1946—1947 and some details concerning them were even published. For instance, toward the end of 1947 *Ogonek* published several photographs of the site and some technical information.

The Kremenchug dam is of unusual length—12 km.—but the latest information concerning it was published in 1947 and since then nothing further has been heard about its construction. It seems, although this is not absolutely certain, that work there stopped in 1948. We know that in 1948 Moscow started tightening up the easier conditions which had been apparent after the war. This began with a campaign in the cultural field; such publications as *Korotky kurs istorii Ukrainy* (A Short History of the Ukraine), edited by Pokrovsky and Huslysty, as well as *Korotky kurs istorii Ukrainskoi literatury* (A Short History of Ukrainian Literature), edited by Kyrylyuk, were condemned as “nationalistic deviations.” There followed the persecution of Rytsky, Yanovsky and other writers. There is no doubt that this tightening of policy soon became general and was extended to cover the planning of the national economy. Probably one of its victims was the Kremenchug power station and dam. Five years later, in 1953, it was reported that work on some hydroelectric projects near Kremenchug was to be restarted, but this is of secondary importance and concerns, in all probability, the improvement of navigational conditions between Kiev and Zaporozhe.

It is interesting to note that up to 1950 it was thought that after the completion of Dneproges new hydroelectric stations would be built on the Dnieper between Kiev and Zaporozhe. While the majority of specialists, aware of the policy of exploitation carried out by the Kremlin, were skeptical of the possibility of such important hydroelectric power stations as Kremenchug or Pereyaslav being built, some of them nevertheless thought that work on the Dneprodzerzhinsk station would soon start. This reasoning was supported by the fact that during the Fourth Five-Year Plan there was a tendency to develop new centers of the machine-building industry along the banks of the Dnieper whose enormous consumption of electricity would not be fully satis-

²⁴ Here we have particularly in mind the extension of the network of enterprises processing agricultural produce and also the transfer of certain branches of the chemical and machine-building industries from the Donbas and the Dnieper basin.

fied by Dneproges. After the war a huge aircraft-engine factory was started near Zaporozhe and an automobile factory near Dnepropetrovsk.²⁵ Suddenly, on September 21, 1950, the decision to build the hydroelectric power station at Kakhovka and a system of irrigation canals connected with it was announced. Many details of the Kakhovka scheme have already been published, but it is worth recalling the most important. 1.3 million cubic meters of concrete installations are to be built as well as 14 million cubic meters of dikes; 12 million cubic meters of earth are also to be excavated. The dam itself will be 4.7 km. long; it is composed of a central concrete portion with an embankment extending on each side. The water level will be raised by fifteen meters and thus a large reservoir will be made of about 240 km. in length and up to 20 km. in width. The capacity of the Kakhovka station is to be 250,000 kW and there will be five turbo-aggregates of 50,000 kW each. This last detail is especially interesting because although aggregates of 100,000 kW or more have been built for years in the USSR, it has been decided to use medium-sized aggregates at Kakhovka. Super aggregates of 100,000 kW were built by the *Elektrosila* works in Leningrad and the turbo-generator works at Kharkov²⁶ but in the middle of 1954 it was revealed that the super aggregates built at Leningrad had serious practical shortcomings and the factory was sharply criticized. The aggregates were very uneconomical and even dangerous to use, but unfortunately their disadvantages were not discovered until after they had been installed at various power stations (see Pervukhin's speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on April 26, 1954).²⁷

Before discussing further constructional details at Kakhovka, it is expedient to examine the figures concerning earthworks and reinforced concrete installations. For the sake of comparison let us recall that for the construction of Dneproges 8 million cubic meters of earthworks had to be built, 2.2 million cubic meters of rock excavated and 1.2 million cubic meters of concrete laid. Since the capacity of Dneproges is 566,000 kW and that of Kakhovka only 250,000 kW, it is apparent that the construction of Kakhovka is consider-

²⁵ Certain data on the aircraft engine plant at Zaporozhe are to be found in *Postwar Experiences in an Aircraft Plant in Zaporozhe after World War II*, Manuscript 6, Research Project of the East European Fund, Inc., New York, 1953.

Construction of the Dnepropetrovsk Automobile Works began in 1945—1947, and four of the main buildings were ready in 1948; after this all news of the project ceased, since its construction was continued under strict secrecy as a military installation. By 1950, fifteen of the works buildings were finished and some even had machinery installed. Preparatory work on a further twelve buildings had also been carried out. The area covered by the works, including workers' housing estates, exceeds ten square kilometers. When finished it will probably be the largest automobile factory in Europe. (See Erich Toussaint, "Die Russische Automobilindustrie," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 28, 1954.)

²⁶ A turbine of 100,000 kW and 1,500 rpm was designed at the Kharkov Turbo-generator Works in 1935—1936, but up to 1941 the construction of such aggregates was still in the experimental stage. (See I. N. Flakserman, "Thermal Stations and Power Lines," *Elektroenergetika SSSR* [The Soviet Electric Power Industry], Moscow, 1937, p. 206.)

²⁷ Generators of 100,000 kW exhibit deficiencies in other countries as well. Considerable interest, for example, was aroused in the engineering world by the failure of two turbo-generators at a power station in Toronto. See Clade Gibb, "Investigation into the Failure of the 100 MW Turbo-Generators," *The Engineer*, London, Feb. 18 and 25, 1955.

ably more expensive than that of Dneproges. The reason for this is that it was found difficult to decide upon the most suitable site on the Lower Dnieper for constructing a dam. Finally a spot near the village of Kozache, 106 km. from the Dnieper estuary, was chosen.²⁸ This seems to be quite a good situation; the river is one kilometer wide, the water is deep and the banks on both sides are relatively high. However, the geological structure is not favorable for building a dam. The water flows over a brittle limestone interspersed with layers of clay, which has to be strengthened and reinforced with layers of concrete.²⁹ This is a costly but unavoidable business. However, it is almost impossible to find a place on the lower reaches of the Dnieper where it could be avoided. Nevertheless, there is no reason to maintain that Kakhovka is uneconomical because of the high cost of its construction. The measures undertaken for strengthening the foundations of the dam near Kozache are, as it happens, insignificant when compared with similar undertakings at Stalingrad and Kuibyshev. The former will require 6 million cubic meters of concrete foundations and the latter 7 million. This is not to be wondered at since it is known that the hydroelectric station at Stalingrad is being built on even worse foundations, geologically speaking, than Kakhovka. The most enlightening information concerns the direction which the current of the Stalingrad and Kuibyshev stations will take. Out of the 10,000 million kWh planned for Kuibyshev only 1,500 million kWh will be used for the irrigation of lands east of the Volga, but 6,100 million kWh per annum will be used for the development of industry in Moscow. The Stalingrad station, which also is to generate 10,000 million kWh per annum, will supply 2,000 million kWh for the irrigation of lands east of the Volga and north of the Caspian Sea while 5,200 million kWh per annum will be used for Moscow and the Central Industrial Region. This illustrates the priority enjoyed in the economic sphere, as in all others, by the capital of the USSR. Investments in the development of Moscow's industry are not considered from the viewpoint of profitability.

An important section of the Kakhovka project are the canals and installations such as locks and sluices which are associated with them. The system of the Southern Ukrainian Canal is rather complicated. The canal begins in the reservoir above Dneproges (Lenin Lake) and then runs through the rivers Molochnaya and Konskaya, after which it forks, one branch running to the Sea of Azov and the other to the Chapli Reserve (Askaniya Nova).³⁰ The fork

²⁸ This is, in fact, the site of a former village. During construction some 2,300 square kilometers of land above the dam were flooded and the inhabitants resettled, mostly in newly built estates such as Nova Kakhovka. About 240 kilometers of railroad lines, including the stretch along the top of the dam, have to be relaid, among other reasons, in order to serve the new estates.

²⁹ Valuable information about the bed of the Lower Dnieper is to be found in B. V. Pyaskovsky, *Geologicheskoe stroenie korennoy lozha i sostav allyuvialnykh otlozhenii nizhnego Dnepra* (Geological Structure of the River Bed and the Composition of Alluvial Deposits in the Lower Dnieper), *Zemlevedenie* (Agriculture), vol. XXXV, No. 2 (1933), p. 127.

³⁰ The Askaniya Nova Reserve comprises a number of research establishments concerned with agriculture, plant technology and animal husbandry and also a large zoological park. The area of the Reserve is given by Prof. I. Rozhin (*Orlyk* [Eaglet], 1947, No. 8, p. 21) as 26,000 hectares and by the MSE as 50,000 hectares. It was laid out in 1828 and its organization greatly developed by Dr. Falts-Feyn in the 1880's.

in the canal occurs at the dam on the river Molochnaya north of Melitopol. This dam is 8 km. long and 40 m. high³¹ and contains a reservoir with a capacity of 6,000 million cubic meters.³² Near the Askaniya Nova Reserve the Southern Ukrainian Canal receives water from the reservoir of the Kakhovka dam and then runs southwards to Sivash, where its name changes to the Northern Crimean Canal and from where it extends as far as Kerch.³³ From these main canals three principal irrigation canals branch off: from the reservoir on the river Molochnaya to Nogaisk; from Kakhovka reservoir to Krasnoznamenska and from Dzhankoi to Razdolnoe. The length of the main navigable canal is about 550 km. and that of the irrigation canals approximately 300 km. In a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR it is stated that this system should secure the irrigation of 1.5 and 1.7 million hectares of land respectively in the southern Ukraine and the Crimea by the canal and sprinkler systems. However, H. Davydov, Secretary of the Council for the Study of the Productive Resources of the Ukraine, a body attached to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,³⁴ gives rather more modest figures in his report. He says that during the next five to seven years an irrigational system for 1.2 million hectares will be built in the southern Ukraine and that this includes not only the southern Ukrainian and northern Crimean canal systems but also those built from the Ingulets River.³⁵ Since

All the above-mentioned establishments are controlled by the Research Institute of Acclimatization and Hybridization. By the decrees of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR of April 11, 1919, and Feb. 8, 1921, Askaniya Nova came under the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine as a national reserve.

³¹ E. Kasimovsky, *Velikie stroiki kommunizma*, 1951, p. 73.

³² The Kakhovka reservoir will have a capacity of 19 billion cubic meters. This is an approximate figure quoted in *BSE*, vol. XIV, p. 572. Other sources give smaller figures.

³³ In 1955 a port for the transportation of trains on specially constructed ferries was built in the northern districts of Kerch. The transportation route is Kerch, Port Krym (on the Stalin Railroad), Taman, Port Kavkaz (on the North Caucasus line). (See *Ogonek*, No. 19, 1955, p. 25.)

The course of the Crimean Canal is probably not definitely plotted even now. There are certain changes in the 1954—1955 plan compared with the draft of 1950—1951. It is now known that the Crimean Canal will follow the course originally laid out for the Krasnoznamenska irrigation canal, which is 64 kilometers long; it will then turn toward the Perekop isthmus in the direction of Dzhankoi. In this way the designers of the canal are attempting to solve the difficult and, from the technical point of view, interesting problem of cutting the canal across Lake Sivash. Other solutions, which envisage the cutting of a tunnel or a channel in the sea bed, have proved impracticable, especially in view of the importance of the canal for transportation purposes. Incidentally, the chart of hydraulic engineering projects on the Dnieper, published in the article by S. Andriyanov, head of Dneprostroi, in *Velikie stroiki kommunizma*, 1951, p. 156, shows a tunnel planned across Lake Sivash.

³⁴ *Visnyk AN USSR*, 1953, No. 2, p. 80.

In the directives of the XX Party Congress it is stated: "The Ingulets irrigation system must be completed and put into commission... The first stage of the Krasnoznamenska system must be completed and a start made on constructing the North Crimean Canal" (*Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1956).

³⁵ Work on the Upper Ingulets system appears to have been completed. A dam has been built below the junction of the Vysun River; from the reservoir above the dam, water is fed by two pipes into the irrigation canals 56 km. long which lead to a special reservoir near Nikolaev. The Ingulets system is, of course, part of the

this program of irrigation, laid down in 1953, will take from five to seven years to complete, it will not be realized any earlier than the seventies.³⁶

The irrigation of the southern Ukrainian oblasts is expected to increase crop yields considerably. Very great hopes are attached to the extension of cotton-growing areas, which, after the project is completed, will reach 750,000 hectares.³⁷ In the Crimea, areas under fruit and vegetables will be increased fifteen to twenty times and the area under industrial crops will also be greatly enlarged. These industrial crops are mainly oleaginous plants such as teasel, Crimean rose (*Rosa crimea*), *Salvia selarea*, lavender, *Eugenol vanillinum* and geraniums.³⁸ Grain crops are expected to increase to 36—40 centners of winter wheat per hectare and 60—70 centners of spring wheat per hectare. These figures, however, must be regarded only as theoretical. Even according to official Soviet sources the yield of winter wheat in 1937 was, on an average, ten centners per hectare; 20—30 centners was considered a rare "stakhanovite" achievement.³⁹ As far as spring wheat is concerned, the average for the USSR in 1937 was 13.7 centners per hectare and a yield of thirty centners was thought to be something very much out of the ordinary.

The following table shows the anticipated yields of other crops:

Table 3

Crop	Centners per Hectare
Cotton	20—30
Potatoes	.. 160
Rice .	. 48
Tomatoes .	. 500
Grapes	. 100—200
Peanuts	. 20
Tobacco	15

Greater Dnieper scheme, but it is regarded as being definitely separate from the Kakhovka plant. The earth works of the Ingulets system, which were completed at the end of 1953, required the excavation of six million cubic meters of earth. This figure includes work on the eleven distribution canals, with a total length of 200 km., which branch off from the main canal.

³⁶ The complete program for the southern Ukraine also covers the irrigation of 280,000 hectares in the catchment area of the Konskaya River and certain raions of the Kherson Oblast. This is to be carried out with the aid of the Ivanovka, Blagoveshchenka, Krasnoznamenska and Sergozy systems, together with that of the Western Zone (on the right bank of the Dnieper). The problem of the Ingulets irrigation system was studied by a group of specialists from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, who spent three years in the Bashtanka Raion of the Nikolaev Oblast. This problem is not easy, since the Ingulets often dries up in summer, and the wind carries salt seawater up the Dnieper as far as the confluence of the Ingulets. This has an adverse effect, among other things, on the chemical composition of the soil.

³⁷ Gavrilov and Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³⁸ *Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo* (Kolkhoz Production), 1953, No. 2, pp. 3—5.

³⁹ Balzak, Vasyutin and Feigin, *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR* (The Economic Geography of the USSR), vol. I, p. 376.

The same doubts as those on the increase in wheat yields apply to the above crops. The figure concerning cotton is particularly questionable. Prewar cotton yields in the Ukraine were very low; in 1934 the average was 0.8 centners per hectare and although the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow in 1939 gave the average yield as 5.9 centners per hectare, it is rightly pointed out by Prof. A. Arkhimovich⁴⁰ that this was intended solely for propaganda purposes. In 1950 the highest yield ever achieved reached 14.4 centners per hectare in the Molotov Kolkhoz in the Kherson Oblast.⁴¹ True, cotton is sown on non-irrigated soil in the Ukraine, and after the completion of the Kakhovka power station the cotton fields will be irrigated. Nevertheless, Soviet statistics claim that the average cotton yield in the Asian republics under the most propitious climatic conditions and on land which is mostly irrigated was 15.1 centners per hectare in 1940. Thus to achieve an average yield of 20—30 centners per hectare in the Ukraine will be extremely difficult, if, indeed, it is within the realms of possibility. Moreover, the principal problem in cultivating cotton is not so much the humidity of the soil as the number of warm and sunny days during the year.

O. M. Favorov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, claims that in his research he has found that the best variety of tomatoes to be grown on irrigated soil would probably be "Odessa 71."

It is expected that rice will be cultivated on irrigated soil without resource to flooding but by the application of periodic watering. Research stations advise the use of the *Zoloti skhody* (Golden Steps) type of rice for this purpose as, under experimental conditions, it has produced 30 centners per hectare without flooding. However, this figure contradicts the above table.

Such hopes of the prosperity which would ensue after the irrigation system was completed have existed ever since Dneproges was built. The irrigation projects for the southern Ukraine published in 1936—1937 (see the works of Prof. Rusakovsky) mentioned an area of 1,850,000 hectares and, in the northern Crimea, 800,000 hectares, making a total of 2,650,000 hectares in all. It was expected at that time that the scheme would take two five-year plans to complete: thus the date when the work was likely to be finished was approximately 1947. At the moment the authorities promise to irrigate 1.2 million hectares by 1960, which is less than half the area planned in 1937, and, moreover, thirteen years after the supposed completion of the former plan. The modesty of the present plan compared with the original one speaks for itself.

Grain yields in the southern Ukraine depend to a great extent on the climatic conditions of the steppe. For example, Academician P. A. Vlasyuk states that in 1953 conditions in the southern oblasts were such that very high yields were anticipated, but because of the *sukhovei* (a very dry wind) at the time when the grain was swelling, the yield was half the amount that had been expected; in 1952 OD-3, the best variety of winter wheat, produced a weight of 34 gms per 1,000 grains but in 1953 it was reduced to 20 gms per

⁴⁰ Prof. A. Arkhimovich, *Kultura khlopchatnika v SSSR* (Cotton Growing in the USSR), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1954.

⁴¹ V. Ignatev, *Podem khlopkovodstva v pervoi poslevoennoi pyatiletke* (The Increase in Cotton Cultivation During the First Postwar Five-Year Plan), *Sotsialisticheskoe selskoe khozyaistvo* (Socialist Agriculture), 1951, No. 8, pp. 25—32.

1,000 grains.⁴² A fair number of agronomists have indicated their doubts as to whether irrigation alone will secure high yields in the southern Ukraine. This is why several other measures are being studied as well as the question of irrigation. Two of these are the cluster planting of pine trees in order to immobilize shifting sands in the Lower Dnieper region⁴³ and the application of suitable fertilizers. Research carried out by the Institute of Agro-Chemistry and Plant Physiology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR shows that magnesium and potassium sulphate fertilizers and also a combination of them with chlorine compounds would prove the most effective fertilizers for winter wheat and cotton in the southern Ukraine if accompanied by irrigation. These potassium compounds can only be found in the western oblasts of Subcarpathia (Kalush and Stebnyk) and are therefore some 600 km. distant from where they are required. The new method of applying small doses of gypsum at the time of sowing is still in the experimental stage and it is difficult at present to foresee what the results will be. Incidentally, the application of gypsum to the salt marshes in the southern Ukraine was recommended by a decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on April 19, 1949, and although it was planned at that time to apply gypsum to about 300,000 hectares this was not in fact carried out and the results were inconclusive. It will be seen from the above that the estimated sudden increase of yields by means of irrigation alone should be approached with care and some skepticism.

From the agronomical point of view, most doubts on the result of irrigating the southern Ukraine arise from efforts to cultivate the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Central Asia which Khrushchev announced in 1954, four years after the plans for building the hydroelectric power stations and networks of irrigation canals in the southern Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia had been promulgated. There is no doubt that the rulers of the USSR became apprehensive of achieving the remarkable results that they had claimed would supervene with the aid of irrigation systems alone and they therefore switched over to other and more effective methods. Khrushchev himself admitted this in his interview with the British scientist, Prof. J. D. Bernal, which was published in the British and Soviet press at the end of Dec. 1954. During this interview Khrushchev stated that together with the program for rational irrigation of the arid belt⁴⁴ there arose the new and difficult problem of

⁴² *Visnyk AN USSR*, 1953, No. 10, p. 7.

⁴³ Nearly 160,000 hectares were to have been planted with pine, but the total area planted by the winter of 1953—1954 was only 5,000 hectares. The situation with regard to protective afforestation in the Ukraine is very unsatisfactory. The experience of 1949—1954 showed that afforestation work requires the expenditure of much time and effort on the part of kolkhozniks and that results can on an average only be expected after 10—12 years. By the beginning of 1955 only 15%—20% of the afforestation plan for the southern Ukraine had been carried out: the proportion of the sowing area that was to have been planted with trees was 4%, but in fact it was about 0.7%. (See V. Koldanov's article in *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, Nov. 16, 1954.)

⁴⁴ The danger of droughts in the southern Ukraine is best illustrated by recent data. The effect of dry winds in 1953 is mentioned by Vlasyuk (see above). In reports for 1954 it was stated that in some regions of the southern Ukraine there had been no precipitation for eighteen months. (See *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Research and Planning Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Organization, Geneva, 1955, p. 75.)

applying the most beneficial and successful fertilizers to the soil. To achieve this a number of new fertilizer factories were to be built and this would take some time. "Meanwhile," said Khrushchev, "we cannot wait."

Naturally, the solution to the question of the fertility and full agricultural exploitation of the lands in the southern Ukraine is not limited to irrigation alone, but includes many other factors. An enormous part in this is played by local climate, geological structure, flora and landscape relief. Precipitation in the southern Ukraine in winter is very small and depth of snow is one of the decisive elements in determining the fertility of a given area. In the region of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the maximum depth of snow hardly reaches 10 cm. and in the Ochakov area it is not more than 3 cm.; irrigation, therefore, will only partly compensate for the ruinous influence of the strong, hot *sukhovei* blowing across the steppe.⁴⁵

IV

The Kakhovka hydroelectric power station is of great importance for the improvement of river and also, to a certain extent, of maritime navigation in the Ukraine. The authorities do not claim that the canals in the southern Ukrainian and northern Crimean system are navigational canals but, after studying the technical information available, it is apparent that they will have to play a fairly large part in water transport. The dam of the Kakhovka power station is of some consequence since it will raise the level of the Dnieper by 15 m. and thus the headwater from the dam will reach the Zaporozhe dam. Conditions for navigating large ships on the Lower Dnieper will thus be noticeably improved as a stretch of water approximately 240 km. long will be increased in depth. Between Kakhovka and Zaporozhe the river runs through a long lake which, at the confluence of the Bazavluk River with the Dnieper, is about 20 km. wide. When the flatness of the surrounding countryside is remembered as well as the fact that it is land which is very well developed from the agricultural point of view, the extensive flooding which will result from the 15 m. rise in the water level will be seen to be one of the most adverse aspects of this project. In order to present the facts in a more attractive light, the authorities give the area of land in square kilometers⁴⁶ instead of the usual measurement, which is in hectares. The area which will be flooded covers 200,000 hectares and will constitute a very

⁴⁵ Details of geographical and climatic conditions in the southern Ukraine may be found in Khymch's article in *Novi dni*, 1955, No. 62, p. 13. See also A. D. Arkhangel'sky and N. M. Strakhov, *Geologicheskoe stroenie i istoriya razvitiya Chernogo morya* (The Geological Structure and History of the Development of the Black Sea), Leningrad, 1938; A. A. Kaminsky, *Tipy zasukh i ravninnykh sukhoveev SSSR* (Types of Droughts and Dry Plane Winds in the USSR), Publications of the Main Geophysical Observatory, No. 1, Moscow, 1934; I. V. Novopokrovsky, *Zonalnye tipy stepei evropeiskoi chasti SSSR* (Zonal Types of Steppe in the European USSR), *Zemlevedenie* (Agriculture), Moscow, 1937, vol. XXXIX, No. 3, pp. 193—201; and M. S. Shalit, *Geobotanichesky ocherk gosudarstvennogo stepnogo zapovednika Chapli* (A Geobotanical Survey of the Chapli State Steppe Reserve), *Byuleten fitotekhnichnoi stantsii Stepovoho Institutu Chapli* (Bulletin of the Phytotechnical Station of the Chapli Steppe Institute), 1930, vol. I, pp. 29—52.

⁴⁶ That is, 2,300 square kilometers. (See *Velikie stroiki kommunizma*, 1952, p. 195.)

great loss to agriculture. The extent of this loss will be appreciated when it is remembered that the first stage of the costly Upper Ingulets irrigation system will provide only 100,000 hectares in the Nikolaev Oblast. Those in charge of the Kakhovka project are attempting to decrease the flood area by building protective dikes. One such dike, 3.8 km. long, is being built between the Dnieper and Nikopol. As the width of the upper section of a dike such as this is between ten and twenty meters, it is obvious that the cost of construction must be very high. The improvement of water transport on the Lower Dnieper is indeed being achieved at a price.

One of the most interesting stretches of water from the point of view of transportation is between the dam on the river Molochnaya and the Sea of Azov. So far no details concerning it are available: moreover, the charts of the southern Ukrainian canal system lack the appropriate conventional symbols between Melitopol and the Molochnaya reservoir. However, there have been articles in the press dealing with the system of transport canals which is to connect the southern Ukraine with the Sea of Azov.⁴⁸ One especially enlightening article on this subject is that by H. Ostapenko on the Kerch iron ore, published in *Pravda* on April 12, 1955, in which he says that in 1954 the Kamysh-Burun Combine was to send enriched iron ore from the Kerch deposits to two centers, one the "Azovstal" Works group of metallurgical workshops at Zhdanov (formerly Mariupol), and the second probably some factories near the Dnieper when they have been connected by a short, deep waterway with Kerch.

There is some danger of salt water from the Sea of Azov spreading far into the maritime regions of the canal,⁴⁹ which would of course be very harmful to the fertility of the land in these districts. The estuary of the Molochnaya River, which is sometimes called the Molochnoe Lake, is separated from the Sea of Azov by a narrow spit of land and the water from the estuary does not flow into it: thus it will be necessary to build a protective dike and sluice between the estuary and the sea.

V

The Kakhovka hydroelectric power station and the system of southern Ukrainian and northern Crimean canals are intended to play an important part in the agricultural development of the southern Ukraine. Brief mention has already been made of the importance of transportation in the Kakhovka project. Let us now deal, again briefly, with the importance of the Kakhovka

⁴⁷ According to the report delivered by P. M. Pershyn at the session of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in the Snigirevka Raion in Feb. 1953.

⁴⁸ See V. V. Zvonkov's article in *Velikie sooruzheniya stalinskoi epokhi* (Great Constructions of the Stalin Epoch), Moscow, 1951, p. 136.

⁴⁹ The problem of protecting maritime regions—particularly those which are irrigated—against the harmful influence of seawater is given a great deal of attention in the United States. (See *Seawater Intrusion into Ground Water Basins Bordering the Californian Coast and Inland Bays*, Division of Water Resources, Sacramento, Cal., Dec. 1950; F. B. Laverty, "Recharging Wells Expected to Stem Seawater Intrusion," *Civil Engineering*, New York, May 1952; and P. Baumann, "Experiments with Fresh-water Barriers to Prevent Seawater Intrusion," *Journal of the American Water Workers' Association*, May 1953, pp. 521—534.

generating station in the industrialization of the southern oblasts and ultimately the whole of the Ukraine.

It should be stressed in the first place that the construction of hydro-electric power stations should in itself stimulate the spontaneous development of certain branches of industry in their immediate neighborhood. This applies particularly to the building materials industry. This question is worth studying in a little more detail because it is precisely this industry which is one of the weakest links in the economy of the Ukraine. It also illustrates how a project such as Kakhovka is tied up with this particular branch of Ukrainian industry and how it should be exploited for the economic development of the whole of the Ukraine. An analysis of this question in relation to the building of Kakhovka reveals only too clearly the difficulties and obstacles which are brought about by the present Communist policy.

A proper treatment of constructional problems at Kakhovka, especially that of supplying building materials to the site, should bring about an improvement in the quality of the building materials and a simultaneous reduction of their cost; further, it should also bring about the automatic industrialization of adjoining regions. However, it is precisely in this sphere that a number of disadvantages become apparent; local resources are not being properly exploited and building materials are frequently brought from very distant oblasts. This is a great loss to the economy of the adjoining districts, since the construction of the Kakhovka power station should develop local building industries. The industrial potential of these districts would then be increased and would secure the further development, not only of these particular districts, but of several branches of the national economy of the Ukraine as a whole.

The necessity of establishing new building materials enterprises in the vicinity of Kakhovka is demonstrated by the scope of the project. The construction of the dam on the Dnieper alone requires 1 million cubic meters of concrete and reinforced concrete. The system of canals connected with the power station requires a further 1 million cubic meters of concrete, 800,000 cubic meters of reinforced concrete, 500,000 cubic meters of prefabricated ferroconcrete, 300,000 cubic meters of bricks and 1 million cubic meters of stone. This is only for the most essential work on the project itself, and does not include materials necessary for housing and industrial building or the construction of roads, which will become very extensive in the near future. If these figures are expressed in terms of raw materials they will appear as follows: approximately 1.5 million tons of cement, 75,000 tons of lime, 250 million bricks, 8 to 10 million cubic meters of gravel and stone, hundreds of thousands of kilometers of cement or ceramic pipes, etc. The manufacture of these materials in the vicinity of Kakhovka should be the first consideration, but the competent authorities have not paid it the attention it requires. In 1952, for example, 60%—70% of all the bricks and almost all the tiles transported by "Ukrvodobud" came from distant oblasts, even as far away as Transcarpathia. The cost of transporting 1,000 bricks is 300—350 rubles. Considering 250 million bricks are needed for the Kakhovka project, it is not difficult to calculate the sum required for their transport alone.

Meanwhile, in 1951 the Institute of Building Materials of the Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR published the *Dovidnyk rodovyskhch mineralnoi syrovyny dlya budivelnnykh materiyaliv v oblastyakh zony budiv-*

nytstva Kakhivskoi HES ta Pivdenno-Ukrainskoho Kanalu (Guide to Deposits of Mineral Raw Materials for the Building Industry in the Oblasts Surrounding the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station and the Southern Ukrainian Canal), which clearly shows that most of the territory of the Kherson, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk and Nikolaev oblasts, which surround the Kakhovka project, is almost equally rich in brick and ceramic clays, sand suitable for cement and glass production as well as limestone and decorative stones. These raw material deposits could serve as a base for the future production of red and silicate bricks, blocks and slabs for walls and partitions, binding materials, tiles, road clinker, granite, rubble and gravel and all kinds of ceramics suitable for plumbing and decoration.

The raw material deposits which should in fact be used in building the Kakhovka power station may be divided into a number of groups. First, there are the granites found in the quarries of the southern Ukraine, of which the most important are the Kamenka-Dneprovskaya grey granite quarry, quarries on the island of Khortitsa,⁵⁰ a group of quarries situated along the river Mokraya Moskovka, the Natalevka and Yantsevo grey granite quarries in the Elisavetovka Raion and the Tokovka red granite quarries near Stulnevo railway station. There are also rich granite deposits in the Chernigovka and Skelyuvate quarries in the Melitopol Raion.

In the southern Ukraine there are 139 deposits of "powder" limestone, which could be widely used in building, and 329 deposits of "compact" limestone, as well as ninety deposits of sandstone. There are also limestone deposits in the basin of the river Konskaya, above the village of Grigorevka, in the village of Khitrovka and in the Kamyshev Raion, one near the dam on the Molochnaya River close to the village of Terpenie, in the village of Novo-Nikolaevka, one in the settlement of Pavlovka in the Vasilevka Raion, in the village of Skelky, others in the villages of Evgenovka, Ivanovka and Galaganovka in the Snigirev Raion and the deposits at Kasperovka and Sebinovka. The limestone layers have an average depth of between two and four meters; they are situated usually between two and eight, occasionally ten meters, beneath the surface. In most of the limestone deposits, building sands are also found.

The area round Kakhovka is also rich in deposits of building clay, but up to 1952 only nineteen deposits of kaolin had been uncovered. This type of clay deserves particular attention because blocks made of it have proved to be exceptionally strong and inexpensive. These clays are widely used for the production of thin-walled, hollow blocks for use in the construction of external foundation walls, dividing walls, attic and interior floor linings, etc.

Building sands often accompany limestone deposits and are found in considerable quantities near the villages of Velikaya Lepetikha, Vorontsovka and Berislav and also near Kakhovka and Tsyurupinsk. The deposits at Pologi are of such excellent quality that they could be recommended for the most important buildings.

⁵⁰ The fact that these quarries exist indicates that the historical remains of the Cossack period have been destroyed.

In spite of this abundance of raw materials in the southern Ukraine very little has been done to establish new enterprises to produce building materials. Apart from a few small or medium-sized enterprises in the immediate vicinity of Kakhovka, up to the end of 1952 there were no large works producing building materials in the area, with the exception of a concrete works at the village of Klyucheve. The central authorities in Moscow are slowing down and discouraging the use of local resources in the building of the Kakhovka power station. They completely disregard the opinions of Ukrainian scientists and specialists⁵¹ as well as criticisms expressed by important figures in local economic planning. As early as January 1952 P. Obratsov, head of the Oblast Planning Commission in Zaporozhe, wrote that the Ministry of the Building Materials Industry had done absolutely nothing to encourage the construction of new building materials enterprises in Zaporozhe Oblast. More than that, the same Ministry stopped the construction of two large brickworks in Zaporozhe itself; according to the plan these works should have begun production in 1953, but in 1952 work on them had not even started.⁵²

This state of affairs is not only injurious to the Kakhovka generating station, the completion of which has already been postponed, but primarily to the entire process of further industrializing the southern Ukraine. The lack of building materials may slow down considerably the construction of several industrial enterprises—future consumers of the electricity to be generated at Kakhovka—as well as housing construction, which, in any case, is lagging behind in the whole of the Ukraine. The need for building materials will be considerably increased, in the next few years alone, by the influx of large numbers of settlers to the newly irrigated areas and by the need to resettle families from the flooded zones. These two categories of people alone will require additional living space amounting to one million square meters, to say nothing of several thousand farm buildings, stores, etc., and hundreds of factories for producing food and both light and heavy industrial products.

⁵¹ At the joint session of the Council for the Study of Labor Problems of the Ukraine and the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held in Feb. 1953 in the Snigirevka Raion, it was stated that the production of building materials from local raw material in the area of Kakhovka was expanding very slowly. The few oblast enterprises at present in existence have increased production to an extent which is quite inadequate for the area's needs. Meetings devoted to problems connected with the Kakhovka plant are held fairly frequently: this is natural in view of the importance of the project for the Ukrainian economy. At the session of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held on July 3, 1951, E. Blyznyiak and Dr. E. N. Myshustyn dealt with hydrology and thermophilic organisms in the rivers of the southern Ukraine, while H. F. Proskura, of the Department of Hydraulic Machines in the Kharkov Polytechnic Institute, examined the problem of rectilinear water turbines for the Kakhovka plant. On May 23—25, 1952, a joint session of the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Architecture of the Ukraine took place at Zaporozhe at which the architectural design of the plants at Kakhovka and elsewhere on the Southern Ukrainian Canal was discussed. A number of other Ukrainian research establishments are working on problems connected with Kakhovka, especially agricultural institutes (e.g., the Dokuchaev Institute in Kharkov), the Ukrainian Experimental Station for Viticulture and Reclamation of Sands at Tsyurupinsk, the Khortitsa branch of the All-Union Research Institute for the Electrification of Agriculture and the institutes for cotton research. Some of these institutions are directly subordinate to Moscow.

⁵² *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1952.

For such a vast building program, millions of bricks and hundreds of thousands of tons of cement and lime are necessary.

Of all the questions concerning the supply of building materials in the Kakhovka zone the one most satisfactorily solved so far is probably the supply of metallurgical and fuel slag from the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe oblasts. Here and in the Donbas a number of factories have been built which produce slag bricks, cement, various slag-concrete blocks and slabs, etc. During the years 1948—1949 a start was made on the construction of factories producing slag-concrete blocks (with a projected annual capacity of five million blocks each) at Dnepropetrovsk and Stalino and of brick and ceramic factories at Dnepropetrovsk (where there are two such plants), Artemovsk and Kuchurgan (in Odessa Oblast). In 1955 the construction of the only factory in the Ukraine to produce pre-stressed concrete was begun at Kiev. This factory is to produce about 120,000 cubic meters of concrete per annum, but it is a very long way from Kakhovka.⁵³

As slag-concrete blocks are produced locally their use at Kakhovka presents no transport difficulties and indeed they are cheaper than ordinary red bricks. The Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR has calculated, on the basis of 1953 prices and labor norms obtaining in the building industry in the Kherson and Zaporozhe oblasts, that when local building materials are transported by road the amount saved per thousand bricks replaced by other materials would amount to 58 rubles when slag-concrete blocks are substituted and 174 rubles when perforated slag-concrete blocks are substituted.

Recently two new and valuable raw materials which should be widely used in the Kakhovka project have been found in the southern Ukraine. These materials are reed blocks and *mikroporit*. A factory at Kherson is producing reed blocks from raw material from the Dnieper water meadows. Working at full capacity, it can produce 400,000—500,000 square meters of reed blocks in a year. Substitution of these blocks for partitions of the conventional type would save approximately 33% of former building costs. At Zaporozhe a new factory recently started producing *mikroporit* from local deposits of clay and sand. *Mikroporit* will also be used for dividing walls, and for this purpose it will be at least 10% cheaper than gypsum blocks. Many other ways of making use of local raw material in the construction of the Kakhovka station could be worked out. This also applies to future housing and industrial building in its vicinity. For example, it would be practical to arrange for the crushing of clinker to be done at the site where the cement is in use.⁵⁴ Thus, the weight

⁵³ Six such factories are being built in Russia, namely, in Moscow and Lyubertsy (which are now complete), and at Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk. These will each have a capacity of 120,000 cubic meters per annum. In addition there are the works at Molotov and Orel, with an annual capacity of 60,000 cubic meters each, and about ten smaller works in the Moscow Oblast with an annual capacity of 30,000 cubic meters each.

⁵⁴ The building of a new cement works in the vicinity of Kakhovka would not really have been expedient since close by there are such large works as those at Kramatorsk, Amvrosievka and Enakievo (each of which produces over 150,000 tons a year) and also at Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk, which produce over 50,000 tons a year each. After the war a concrete works was built at Krivoi Rog, and cement produced there was used for ferroconcrete elements incorporated in the Kakhovka plant. (See *Stroitel'naya promyshlennost* [The Building Industry], 1955, No. 2.)

of material transported would be reduced and in addition clinker is easier to move since it does not require packing. Also clinker crushed on the spot makes it unnecessary to build special storage sheds for it. The cost of installing cement-crushing machinery on the building site is no higher than in an ordinary factory. It is also necessary to begin production of ceramic and glass pipes in the southern Ukraine as these could, in many instances, replace metal pipes, especially in the construction of irrigation and amelioration systems. Clay, which is the cheapest material, could be used in making glass pipes. The Kiev Institute of Silicate Technology has already experimented with various types of clay which have proved to be quite suitable for glass production, but so far this has not been done on an industrial scale in the southern Ukraine.

VI

What influence will the Kakhovka power station have on other branches of industry in the southern Ukraine? According to the 1937 plan for Dneproges electricity was to be generated at the rate of 3,600 million kWh per annum.⁵⁵ A power station with an annual output of 1,200 million kWh will therefore produce a third of the quantity of electricity generated by Dneproges. We do not know if Dneproges achieved what was planned in the postwar period; the maximum indices for Dneproges since the war are about 2,400 million kWh per annum.

A powerful Dnieper industrial combine receiving power from Dneproges has emerged in Zaporozhe and its vicinity. The largest enterprises of this combine are an aluminum works, a ferroalloy factory, a metallurgical combine, an electrode factory and a coke and chemical plant.⁵⁶ Figures indicating the planned output of these factories and their consumption of electricity are given in Table 4.

Assuming that Dneproges achieved its planned capacity of 3,600 million kWh per annum, the Dnieper combine consumes 2,235 million kWh, or about 65%. In fact the prewar generating rate of Dneproges was never higher than 2,400 million kWh per annum: hence the amount of electricity used by the industrial combine would be 95%.

When the disproportion between the increased output of Dneproges and the output of the enterprises in the Dnieper combine is taken into consideration, this percentage is seen to be inaccurate and shows that the main consumers of the electricity generated by Dneproges are the heavy industries along the banks of the river. Among the other consumers the only one of importance is the town of Zaporozhe itself, which, with its population of 290,000, was consuming 176.5 million kWh per annum before the war.

In comparison with industry, agricultural and irrigational enterprises consumed an insignificant amount of Dneproges electricity. In 1936 the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for the Electrification of Agriculture

⁵⁵ In 1955 Dneproges produced 2,160 million kWh.

⁵⁶ Other important works in the Dnieper combine include a timber-processing plant and factories producing carbides, refractories and slag-concrete blocks. These works are not very large, but they consume large quantities of current from Dneproges.

on the island of Khortitsa published data on the agricultural consumption of electricity from Dneproges in the territory of the present Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe oblasts (see Table 5).

Table 4

Commodity Produced	Output of Factory	Electricity Consumed per Annum (In kWh)
Aluminum and electrodes	40,000 tons of aluminum, aluminum oxides and electrodes	1,200 million
Ferroalloys ⁵⁷	10,000 tons of ferrochromium with high carbon content; 77,500 tons of ferroalloys; 60,000 tons of ferrosilicon (45%); 4,500 tons of refined ferrochromium, and 3,000 tons of tungsten	460 million
Coke and coke by-products ⁵⁸	1,380,000 tons of coke (4 batteries); 560 million cubic meters of gas, and 110,000 tons of coke slag (raw material for the chemical industry)	
Metallurgical products	1,600,000 tons of pig iron; ⁵⁹ 1,200,000 tons of thin sheet steel; 750,000 tons of thick sheet steel; 685,000 tons of constructional steel (for machine construction), and 525,000 tons of profile iron	
Electric steel	200,000 tons of constructional electric steel (for machine construction); 70,000 tons of electric steel (for instrument making), and 76,000 tons high quality special steel (for instrument making)	575 million

Table 5

Irrigational equipment	87 sets for 3,500 hectares
Electric threshing machines	754 (crops from about 350,000 hectares)
Machine Tractor Stations	16 stations
Electrically driven ploughs	About 3,000 hectares
Hothouses	4,100 frames
Household needs of kolkhozniks	44,000 houses

⁵⁷ In 1937 the factory concerned produced about 70% of the total Soviet output of ferrosilicon and 50% of the total Soviet output of ferrochromium.

⁵⁸ In 1941 the daily production of industrial gases at the coke and chemical and the metallurgical works with four blast furnaces working was 74,000 cubic meters of coke oven gas, 740,000 cubic meters of blast-furnace gas and 310,000 cubic meters of producer gas.

⁵⁹ In order to achieve this output of pig iron the Zaporozhstal Metallurgical Works requires 1,380,000 tons of coke from the local coke and chemical works and, in addition, approximately 200,000 tons of metallurgical coke, which is brought from the Donbas.

Considering that sowing and threshing were in operation for only about one and a half to two months of the year, it appears that very little of the electricity produced by Dneproges was used in agriculture.

The distribution of the current to be generated by the Kakhovka power station will be entirely different from that of Dneproges. Here agriculture will be the main consumer. Up to the present there is no reason to expect the building of large factories in the Kakhovka district expressly for the consumption of its electricity. On the other hand it is highly probable that electricity from Kakhovka will be directed in part toward Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe, where since the war several large enterprises have been built which even Dneproges is not sufficiently powerful to supply with the necessary current without intermissions.⁶⁰ It is true that most of these new factories are devoted to machine construction and do not therefore consume enormous quantities of electricity; nevertheless, the size of the Dnepropetrovsk Automobile Works, Dnepropetrovsk Radio Works, Zaporozhe Aircraft Engine Works and others is such that they must use a fair amount. It must also be remembered that certain factories built before the war, particularly those manufacturing aluminum and metallurgical products, were fundamentally reconstructed after the war and their output considerably increased.

The likelihood of new industrial enterprises, particularly heavy industry, in the region of the Kakhovka project is not very great. The prospects of light industry developing in the southern Ukraine are a little better. The increase in agricultural production brought about by the irrigation of the southern Ukraine will undoubtedly act as a stimulus to the development of new enterprises for processing agricultural products. The south Ukrainian food industry already has a large number of canning factories, as, for example, at Kherson and Tiraspol and in the Crimea. At Simferopol alone there are three large canning factories and in 1953 the output of the Crimean fruit-canning industry exceeded 10 million cans per annum.⁶¹

Simultaneously with agricultural development, industry in the southern Ukraine will raise its output and some new enterprises will be built. It is interesting to note that the decision to build the Kakhovka power station caught the planning authorities of the Ukraine unawares. Almost on the eve of this decision a beginning was made on the construction of two large fruit-canning factories, one at Izmail and the other at Kamenets-Podolsky, while the construction at Cherkassy of one of the largest canning factories in the Ukraine was completed shortly after.⁶² These factories were built in such a way that their capacity could be increased in order to process the additional fruit and vegetables expected after the irrigation scheme is carried out.

⁶⁰ Dneproges is here treated as a separate unit, although in fact it belongs to the unified network of the Southern Power System, the function of which is to compensate fluctuations in power consumption by the various industrial centers.

⁶¹ *Pravda*, June 11, 1953. Other canning factories in the southern Ukraine such as those processing fish and milk are not mentioned here.

⁶² The Cherkassy canning factory was built in 1936 and before World War II produced twenty million cans of twenty different varieties of preserves a year. After its reconstruction in 1953 its production rose to thirty-nine million cans of nearly seventy varieties. The Fifth Five-Year Plan provides for its further extension to a production of sixty-five million cans a year.

The extension of the Ukrainian textile industry is also associated with Kakhovka. One of the largest new textile enterprises will be the combine at Kherson. According to the plan it is to be equipped with 250,000—300,000 spindles and 6,000 looms. It is being built in stages; the first spinning and weaving shop was to have been in operation in 1954 but its construction (by Stakhanovite methods) was not completed until 1955. Next will come a second spinning and weaving shop, then a fiber-treating shop. A housing estate for 20,000 workers is being built at the combine. There are also signs that textile combines will be built at Novaya Kakhovka and Militopol, but it does not seem likely that they will be included in the building program earlier than the Sixth Five-Year Plan.

The development of the textile industry is very closely connected with the rate of increase in the cultivation of cotton in the southern Ukrainian oblasts and not with the construction of the Kakhovka power station. The decision to build the Kherson textile combine was made after the decision on the Kakhovka hydroelectric station. A separate and quite large thermal station is under construction for the Kherson combine: thus the textile works will not be direct consumers of current from Kakhovka.⁶³


The construction of this separate power station especially for the Kherson combine is most interesting and calls for particular attention. The fact that hydroelectric power stations are being built in separate economic zones such as Kakhovka, Kuibyshev, Stalingrad and Bukhtarma does not mean that all the current they produce will be consumed in their particular zones. In other words, if we know that 600 million kWh per annum produced at Kakhovka will be used for agriculture and the other 600 million kWh are earmarked for industry, it does not necessarily mean that this power is to go to industries situated in the immediate neighborhood of the power station.

In 1947—1948 a new project was worked out for unifying all the electric power networks in the USSR. Under this scheme the so-called "southern USSR system" comprised the first stage; the second was the combination in one network of the European part of the USSR and later the whole of the USSR. At the moment this is still only a project and so far the plans to combine in one system Dneproenergo, Donbasenergo and Kakhovka have only been partly realized, though similar work has been carried out on some of the systems in central Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. The plans made in 1947—1948 were based on the earlier plans for a unified network covering the southern USSR.

One of the characteristics of the 1947—1948 project is the effort being made to transmit direct current over long distances. So far high-tension lines almost entirely transmit alternating current. It is known that the insulation of high-voltage lines transmitting high-amperage current is practically impossible, but the transmission of direct current entails very little difficulty. Under the scheme the same initial sources will generate current as at present, but in future its transmission will be by direct current. In practice the scheme will work thus: alternating current will be produced by ordinary generators and its voltage increased by rectifiers; then by the use of these powerful

⁶³ *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1952.

A variant of the project for linking Ukrainian power stations by a network of high-voltage lines. This diagram shows the network of one of the 1937 projects; the voltage was to have been 220 kW.



rectifiers⁶⁴ the alternating current will be changed into direct current and transmitted to consumers over distances of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. Arrived at its destination, the direct current will be reconverted into alternating current with the aid of special invertors. After inversion the voltage will be decreased and the current delivered directly to the consumers. Detailed mathematical calculations made by Ukrainian scientists have revealed that losses by this method are only 0.2%—0.3%.

It is clear, of course, that these changes in the high-voltage power network can only gradually be realized, for they require new and expensive equipment such as rectifier and inverter stations. This is why the transmission of direct current is still only in the experimental stage. Nevertheless, increasing efforts to link up a number of high-voltage systems are being made and there is no doubt that the Kakhovka station is also included in a network of this type, with the result that power generated there is consumed by enterprises thousands of kilometers away. In view of this it does not seem likely that atomic factories based on power from Kakhovka are to be built in the Ukraine. Moreover, Moscow does not apparently consider it expedient for political reasons to develop atomic industry in the Ukraine.⁶⁵ Even if there are certain strictly secret installations in the Ukraine, especially in the western part of the country, it may be assumed that they are only indirectly connected with the atomic industry. It is probable that they are mostly test ranges for rockets and other guided missiles, possibly with atomic warheads.

Returning once more to the question of setting up textile centers in the southern Ukraine, it should be stressed that their establishment depends on the irrigation of areas for growing cotton⁶⁶ and other industrial crops,⁶⁷ and also, no doubt, measures undertaken to increase the number of sheep in Tavria and the Crimea. It is much safer to base calculations for other branches of the light industry in the Kakhovka region on the general development of the natural resources of the southern Ukraine and not on any increase in the supply of electric power. Mention has already been made, for example, of the question of fertilizers suitable for use after irrigation. The answer will be the erection of new chemical factories and already it is possible to observe efforts in this direction. For instance, a new slag-crushing works was built in 1955. The output of this works will be 340,000 tons of phosphate fertilizers per annum⁶⁸ and the factory will eventually be turned into an independent unit.

⁶⁴ These rectifiers resemble those designed by German scientists shortly before World War II. They are now being used in British industry, for instance, at the Thomson Houston works at Rugby. (See *The Engineer*, London, July 9, 1954, p. 53, and Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 96—97.)

⁶⁵ Here strategic considerations also play their part: the Ukraine is too near to American bases in Turkey and the Near East. It is therefore much safer to assume that atomic plants in the USSR are connected with the construction of the enormous hydroelectric stations on the Irtysh and Angara rivers.

⁶⁶ In 1938 the area sown to cotton in the Ukraine and the Crimea was 278,600 hectares and the yield about 1,450,000 metric centners. (See *Vsesoyuznaya selskokhozyaistvennaya vystavka v Moskve: pavilyon "Kultura khlopatnika"* [The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow: the Cotton Growing Stand], Moscow, 1939.)

⁶⁷ Teasel, for instance, which is used to produce the nap on woolen and silk materials.

⁶⁸ *Ogonek*, 1955, No. 1.

It may be assumed that in general Kakhovka will provide no especial stimulus for the industrialization of the district and its importance can hardly be compared with that of Dneproges in 1934—1941. Kakhovka will primarily be of importance for the development of Ukrainian agriculture and only as a result of this will new industrial centers be likely to emerge in the region. As a result of research carried out in the years 1950—1955, it was decided to concentrate on cultivating grain crops, fruit and fodder, and in most of the southern oblasts cotton also in the irrigated areas. These plans have already been dealt with in some detail in an earlier section of this article; the first stage of their realization will commence when the first part of the Kakhovka power station is put into operation.

On June 10, 1955, the navigational sluices at Novaya Kakhovka were put into commission. The total length of this canal is three kilometers. Irrespective of the fact that the difference between lower and higher headwater after the filling of the reservoir will be a few meters, the Novaya Kakhovka lock has but one compartment as against the three compartments of the Dneproges system; thus the passage of a ship takes a shorter time than at Zaporozhe. The building of this canal took just over two years and required over 7 million cubic meters of earthworks, the laying of 240,000 cubic meters of concrete and the construction of 17,000 tons of equipment such as automatic steering mechanisms.⁶⁹

On July 1, 1955, a start was made on the installation of the first two turbogenerators. These turbogenerators will enable the first powerful pumping station on the Ingulets River to be put into commission and will permit the irrigation of the first 20,000 hectares of land on the borders of the Kherson and Nikolaev oblasts. Such is the modest beginning of this interesting and undoubtedly important irrigation scheme for the arid lands in the southern Ukraine. There are still many years of strenuous work and continuous research ahead and many possible changes to be introduced during and after the completion of building. It is sometimes difficult to avoid the thought that the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station and its system of canals is really no more than one huge experiment.

For the power station to be put into operation many serious problems will have to be solved. If they are solved correctly the effectiveness of the project and its real value to the national economy of the Ukraine will be proved. Some of the most urgent problems are these: the mechanization of various processes in livestock breeding and other departments of agriculture in order to use the current from Kakhovka in the most economical manner. Contrary to official Soviet propaganda, the Ukraine has made negligible progress in this sphere and the mechanization of these agricultural processes is far behind America and the majority of leading European countries. There is at present a scarcity of machines in sovkhozes and kolkhozes, while those that are available are of very poor design and quality and are not at all efficient. The Machine Institute and the Institute of Agricultural Engineering of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR have noticed this lack, although questions connected with the cultivation of the southern Ukraine were not included in their research for 1955.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ *Pravda*, June 11, 1955.

⁷⁰ See Pershyn in *Visnyk AN USSR*, 1954, No. 12, pp. 45—47.

The numerous questions concerning the exploitation of the Kakhovka power station are still not being properly studied, and so far no concrete system or guiding principles for the distribution of electricity under conditions of full or partial electrification of agriculture in the southern Ukraine have been worked out. Similarly, no plan for a unified system of automation and remote control of electric substations of the Kakhovka network has so far been developed, and on the whole the situation with regard to automation and especially remote control is very unsatisfactory throughout the electricity supply service of the Ukraine.

Although the principal concrete installations on the Kakhovka dam and lock were finished in the summer of 1955, there are still a number of hydrological problems to be studied which, logically, should have formed the basis for the technical designs of these installations. It is strange that this hydrological research should have to be carried out, as it were, *post factum*. One particularly urgent question is that of accurately working out the flood level of the Dnieper and a method of forecasting the amount of water lost from the river and its tributaries. Hydraulic calculations should be made in order to work out suitable types of installations for reducing the energy of the water in the lower part of the project.⁷¹ It has already been pointed out that the decision to start constructing the Kakhovka project was made unexpectedly. In addition to this much pressure was exerted between 1950 and 1955 by the Party and technical administration to speed up the work, to complete it ahead of schedule and to lower the cost of construction. This has brought about a very real danger that some of the work on the project may not be up to standard. This is especially true of some of the earthworks, which were built almost entirely by forced peasant labor recruited from neighboring raions. Technical supervision of the work has not always been carried out at the proper level and this has been mentioned occasionally in official reports. It is therefore most important that research into the resistance of dikes and dams and the amount of water seeping through them should be carried out. In order to do this it is necessary to work out a theory for calculating the limits of erosion on the shores of the new reservoirs.

It is also necessary to study the navigational conditions of the irrigational and drainage canals in the southern Ukrainian and northern Crimean systems. One very important and complicated problem will be to discover the most economical method of irrigation, for conditions in the southern Ukraine are very different from those in Central Asia. In the very near future scientific and research organizations will be faced with many problems concerning the biological cycle, the fishing industry in the reservoirs and some stretches of the canals, the development of a system of pest control and protection of the irrigated areas.⁷² As will be seen, the amount of essential research to be done is very considerable and it will be some time before it is completed and the results made known.

⁷¹ Research on this subject is being carried out under B. A. Pyshkin, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

⁷² By 1955 the Institute of Entomology and Phytopathology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR had not achieved any remarkable success in this field of research.

VII

Let us now make a resume of the general characteristics of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station.

In the first place the importance of the Kakhovka power station is greatly exaggerated. It is possible to argue that at some future date definite economic profit will accrue from the system of canals in the southern Ukraine and northern Crimea, providing they are fully exploited, but on the other hand, the amount of power actually generated by the Kakhovka station remains insignificant. By modern standards power stations of 250,000 kW are considered to be of no more than moderate size. Since the last war many power stations of 100,000—300,000 kW have been built in Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France and even such small countries as Sweden or Switzerland. In all these countries the exploitation of water resources is developing very successfully, but the same cannot be said for the Ukraine. Canada, with its gigantic projects, in comparison with which future Soviet projects pale into insignificance, occupies pride of place. Ontario and Quebec between them possess hydroelectric power stations of over 9,600,000 kW—Ontario 3,530,000 kW and Quebec 6,860,000 kW. Quite soon a powerful new hydroelectric station with a capacity of 2,760,000 kW will be put into commission in British Columbia and another of 650,000 kW on the Yukon. It should be pointed out that the population of Canada is only a third of that of the Ukraine. Countries a great deal smaller, in respect of population, industrial development and economic potential, than the Ukraine have managed to build large modern hydroelectric stations since the war. Sweden is building one at Stornorrforf of 172,200 kW and another at Kilforsen, the first part of which will generate 285,000 kW and by 1957 40% of all the power Sweden generated in 1954. Another hydroelectric project of about 200,000 kW is under construction at Harspragnet.⁷³

Great Britain is also taking energetic steps to increase her output of electricity. Each year several new units of considerable size are put into operation and their combined output exceeds that of Kakhovka by nearly six times. The following table illustrates how many additional kilowatts have been generated each year during the period 1947—1954.⁷⁴

Table 6

Year	Capacity of New Power Stations Put into Commission
1947	340,000 kW
1948	566,000 kW
1949	703,000 kW
1950	965,000 kW
1951	1,113,000 kW
1952	1,539,000 kW
1953	1,413,000 kW
1954	1,431,000 kW

⁷³ *Water Power*, London, 1955, Nos. 5 and 7.

⁷⁴ *The Engineer*, June 7, 1955, pp. 24—26.

The above figures refer to thermal power stations alone. As far as hydroelectric power stations are concerned, it is sufficient to say that in northern Scotland during the years 1949—1954 431,385 kW of additional power were generated under the North of Scotland Hydroelectric Board scheme.

In this survey no mention has been made of the huge power projects in the United States, India and China. A comparison between the implementing of power projects in Canada, Great Britain and Sweden on the one hand and in the Ukraine on the other shows conclusively that the latter is indeed lagging behind.

It will be seen that since thermal stations will, by 1960, be generating 85% of the entire electricity output of the Ukraine, the contribution made by the Kakhovka station will play a very insignificant part.⁷⁵ Soviet statistics are usually expressed in percentages of percentages. For example, the output of electricity in the Ukraine in 1953 exceeded that in 1913 by 43 times,⁷⁶ but a similar comparison for the USSR as a whole during the same period shows an increase of 68 times. It is clear that the production of electricity is not developing at the rate required by the industry of the Ukraine. The situation with regard to hydroelectric power stations is especially unsatisfactory. According to the survey of 1948 easily accessible water resources amounted to 2.6 million kW, but up to the present 70% of them have not been exploited.⁷⁷

The cultivation of the arid zone in the southern Ukraine aims at increasing agricultural production and making good use of the skill of Ukrainian farmers, for agricultural production in the Ukraine is the cheapest in the whole of the

Table 7

Labor Expenditure per 100 Tons of Agricultural Produce (in man-days)	
Northern Crimea	497
Southern Ukraine	502
Northern Caucasian regions, Don, Kuban, Sal Steppe	586
Ukrainian Forest and Steppe Belt	615
Trans-Volga Region (Ufa)	580
Trans-Volga Region (Steppe)	629
Region West of Urals	658
Central Forest and Steppe Belt	691
Volga—Don Region	691
Moskva—Oka Region	873
Northern Dvina—Pechora Region	1,084
Polesie	733
Baltic Republics	1,064

⁷⁵ I. T. Shvets, *Deyaki naukovi problemy v haluzi teploenergetyky* (Some Problems of Thermal Power), *Visnyk AN USSR*, 1955, No. 2, pp. 3—14.

⁷⁶ H. Klymenko, *Za leninskym plyanom elektryfikatsii* (Lenin's Plan for Electrification), *Radyanska Ukraina*, April 17, 1954.

⁷⁷ S. Kheylo, *Bilya karty respubliky* (Looking at a Map of the Republic), *Radyanska Ukraina*, Jan. 17, 1948.

USSR. Table 7 illustrates the efficiency of agriculture in various economic regions of the USSR.⁷⁸

The figures relating to the Ukraine and Russia speak for themselves and require no further comment.

The introduction of new navigational waterways on the Dnieper and in certain parts of the canal system is made necessary by the distances over which goods have to be carried and the increase in these distances since World War II. The following table gives the most important types of goods affected.

Table 8

Type of Cargo	1940	1953	Increase in Distance
Timber	1,019	1,193	174
Grain	736	949	213
Ferrous Metals	966	1,101	135
Cotton	1,814	2,375	561
Mineral Building Materials	253	328	75

It is clear that to transport goods over such long distances is extremely detrimental to the economy of the country, since it not only increases the costs of industrial production but also the living costs of the population. It must be admitted that some increase in distances is caused by the development of new regions of the USSR but the basic causes are the transport of Ukrainian coal and iron to almost all the industrial centers of Russia, of Ukrainian agricultural produce to these same centers (especially to Moscow and Leningrad) and of cotton from Central Asia to Russia. A part is also played by the inappropriate location of some important branches of industry, as has already been shown by the example of the Ukrainian building materials industry.

The exploitation of Ukrainian labor on the Kakhovka project is both ruthless and inhuman. This applies particularly to the conditions in which women are employed: these conditions are almost as frightening as those in the immediate postwar period. At Kakhovka women work on the laying of concrete and on the vibrators.⁷⁹ Handling these Soviet-designed vibrators is very trying and unhealthy because of the constant jerking of the body and the terrifying noise: this fact is admitted by Soviet building specialists themselves.⁸⁰ The question of working conditions at Kakhovka, however, belongs to the realm of sociology and there is not enough space in this survey to deal with it in any detail.

Even the agricultural side of the Kakhovka project is depressing. At a moment when, thanks to the irrigation scheme, increased yields in the southern

⁷⁸ S. G. Strumilin, *Estestvenno-istoricheskoe raionirovanie SSSR* (The Division of the USSR into Raions on Natural and Historical Principles), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1947.

⁷⁹ See M. Rudenko's article in *Radyanska Ukraina*, April 30, 1955.

⁸⁰ I. G. Sovalov, *Izgotovlenie zhelezobetonnykh konstrukttsii i detalei na vybratsionnykh ploshchadkakh* (The Production of Reinforced Concrete Structures and Parts with the Aid of Vibrators), *Stroitel'naya promyshlennost*, 1955, No. 2.

Ukraine and a general improvement in the food situation are anticipated, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants are being forced to leave their homes and it is not they who will reap the benefits after the arid zone has been irrigated. At a time when one might expect some limited resettlement of the peasants from the overpopulated areas, especially those in the western oblasts of the country, in the new farms which are to be set up in the southern Ukraine and the Crimea, large masses of the Ukrainian population are being forcibly deported to northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia to work on the virgin lands. According to the latest calculations, between March 1954 and March 1955, 330,226 adults, excluding young people under the age of eighteen, left the Ukraine.⁸¹ In place of the deported peasants, a "mechanized technique" is being introduced into Ukrainian agriculture, especially in the irrigated southern districts. The most distressing fact of all is that Ukrainians deported to Kazakhstan are working not so much for the improvement of the food situation in the USSR as for the increase of exports and state food reserves.

Beside these facts the positive aspects of the Kakhovka project for the agriculture of the Ukraine become blurred. The advantages which should accrue from it, particularly to the peasants but also to the population as a whole, seem most doubtful.

This survey has dealt with the construction of the Kakhovka hydro-electric station from the economic angle in general and from the point of view of its role in the national economy of the Ukraine in particular: an analysis of the project from the technical point of view has not been attempted. This is a subject for a separate essay. It would be interesting to discuss the construction of various installations, the expediency of applying this or that metallic or non-metallic material, the technical problems of concrete installation, machine equipment, the system of supervising both the power station and the canal network, and lastly the method of generating and distributing the current. In order, however, to analyze these questions properly it will be better to wait until the first parts of the project are put into commission and detailed data on its operation are available.

⁸¹ Y. Mironenko, "Recent Demographic Changes in the USSR," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, June 1955, p. 38. Mironenko's calculations are based on published data concerning the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. He assumes that the annual increase in population in the Ukraine is 2.01%, i. e., the same as the average for the entire USSR. See *Pravda*, March 3, 4 and 10, 1955.

⁸² *Komunist*, 1953, No. 17, p. 45.

Fresh Light on the Nationality Policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government

D. SOLOVEY

Introduction

An article by Y. Kurishkov, "On the International Representation of the Ukrainian SSR," published in *Visnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainiskoi SSR* (Review of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR), 1954, No. 5, contains the following statement made in the name of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences:

The national policy of the Communist Party is founded upon the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; the right to self-determination of nations, including secession and the establishment of an independent state; the abolition of all national and religious privileges and restrictions, and the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups.¹

How much truth there is in this bald assertion may be judged only on the basis of concrete facts. These facts are assiduously concealed by order of the Communist Party of the USSR. Fortunately, scholars of what may be called the Stalinist school of falsification are unable to conceal all the facts with sufficient speed and thoroughness.

The Proportion of Periodicals Published during 1956 in Russian and in the Languages of the Republics of the National Minorities

First of all mention must be made of a booklet issued by the Vneshtorgizdat (Foreign Trade Publishing House) in Moscow and entitled *Newspapers and Magazines of the USSR for 1956* (published by *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga* [International Book], Moscow, 72 pp.). It may be obtained from the Four Continent Book Corporation, 822 Broadway, New York 3, N.Y., USA, which is the American outlet of *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*. The booklet is a catalogue listing all the important newspapers and periodicals published in 1956 by each of the sixteen republics of the USSR. The less important provincial publications of the different republics are not included. Each publication is followed by the republic in which published. The language of publication is given for each publication, as well as the subscription price. It is a kind of

¹ Quoted from *Suchasna Ukraina* (The Contemporary Ukraine), Aug. 1, 1954, p. 3.

commercial prospectus, but an official one, as there are no other publications in the USSR.

The number of newspaper and magazine titles given in the booklet is 559, of which 347, or 62.3%, are published in the RSFSR and the remainder in the other 15 republics of the USSR.

According to the census of 1926, Russians (Great Russians) constituted 52.9% of the entire population of the USSR,² but after the annexation of the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories formerly belonging to Poland, the Ukrainian territories formerly belonging to Rumania and Hungary, and the small Baltic states, the percentage of Russians was probably much smaller. For 1939, Y. P. Mironenko, making allowances for the populations of the newly organized territories, estimates the percentage of Russians as 51.6,³ a figure which, in our opinion, is much too large.

The statistical review published in Moscow in 1956 under the title *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR* (National Economy of the USSR) does not, unfortunately, include a survey of the distribution of the population of the USSR by nationalities, but merely gives the total population of the USSR at the beginning of 1956 and its distribution among the 16 republics. However, it is possible on the basis of these figures to establish at least the approximate number of Russians living in the USSR on January 1, 1956. The 77,791,124 Russians given in the 1926 census as living in the entire USSR then made up 77.1% of the 100,891,244 inhabitants of the RSFSR. If we assume that this percentage still held at the beginning of 1956, we arrive at a figure of 86,800,000 for the Russian population of the USSR as of that date (77.1% of 112,600,000, the population of the RSFSR on January 1, 1956). As the population of the USSR at the beginning of 1956 was 200,200,000 these 86,800,000 Russians constituted only 43.4% of the total. For our present purpose, however, we shall keep to Mironenko's figure of 51.6%.

If the nationality policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and of the Government of the USSR were not a colonial one and did not aim at enforced Russification, the percentage of important periodical publications would correspond to the percentages of the different peoples, i.e., Russian and non-Russian publications should amount to 51.6% and 48.4% respectively, or thereabouts. In fact, however, the proportion of periodical publications of the RSFSR published in Russian is 62.3% and thus exceeds the proportion of Russian population by 10%, while the proportion of periodicals published in the national (non-Russian) republics is only 37.7%, or about 10% below the percentage of the non-Russian population of the USSR.

Further light is thrown on the question by an examination of the titles of the newspapers and magazines published in the non-Russian national republics, which reveals that among the 212 publications of the 15 non-Russian

² Population statistics for 1926 are taken from Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, 1946, pp. 51 (Table 22) and 67 (Table 26).

³ Y. P. Mironenko, *Naselenie SSSR i ego natsionalny sostav* (The Population of the USSR and Its National Composition); *Ezhenedelny obzor vazhneishikh sobytii v SSSR* (Weekly Review of the More Important Events in the USSR), No. 50; Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1955, p. 18, Table 1.

republics only 156, or 27.9% of the total, are published in the national languages. Of the remaining 56 publications, 50 are printed in Russian and 6 are printed both in Russian and in some other language. Since experience proves, however, that in such bilingual publications the use of Russian predominates (see examples below), these 56 publications may be regarded as printed in Russian.

While the non-Russian population of the USSR amounted in 1939 to 48.4% of the total, and probably now amounts to at least one half, the periodical publications of these non-Russian republics in their native languages make up only one third (27.9%) of the total for the USSR, while the Russians, with only 51.6% of the population, have at their disposal 72.1% (see Table 1).

In the RSFSR itself, with its large non-Russian population, including several million Ukrainians, there is blatant discrimination. Although the census of 1926 showed that these national minorities constituted then 27% of the entire population of the RSFSR, there is not a single publication issued in the RSFSR in the language of any of these minorities at the expense of the RSFSR state budget, whereas the other 15 republics are forced by the Bolshevik apparatus to publish 26.4% of their local periodicals in Russian at the expense of their own severely limited republic budgets.

The nature of the contents of the periodicals also merits attention. Only newspapers and magazines of general content are published in the languages of the national minorities and in their own republics. As to professional or other specialized literature, the few such publications appearing in the national republics are generally published in Russian. For instance, while there are many scientific periodicals published in the RSFSR, only five of the 15 non-Russian republics—the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian, Estonian and Latvian—have periodicals of any kind issued by their Academies of Sciences, while the remaining 10 republics have none. We shall deal at length with the publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR later on. As to the other four national republic Academies having periodicals, their publications are poor in format and few in number. All are called *Izvestiya* (News). In Estonia they are published in Russian only (Catalogue No. 553); in Latvia and Armenia they are supposed to be bilingual Russian and native language publications, but in fact consist largely of Russian. In one such so-called bilingual publication issued by the Ukrainian SSR—*Publikatsii Kyivskoi Astronomichnoi Observatorii* (Publications of the Astronomical Observatory in Kiev)—Nos. 3, 1950, and 4—5, 1953, the title page was indeed printed in Ukrainian and Russian, but all the articles were in Russian. We shall call attention to other examples later on. In Belorussia the *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk* (Journal of the Academy of Sciences) is published in separate Belorussian (No. 421) and Russian (No. 422) editions.

As has been pointed out, no periodicals of the Academies of Sciences of the remaining ten national republics are listed in the 1956 catalogue. However, scanty information available about a few non-periodical publications indicates that any periodicals that may exist are printed in Russian. For example, the only publication of this type mentioned in the catalogue is *Voprosy izucheniya russkogo yazyka: Sbornik lingvisticheskikh statei* (Problems concerning the Study of the Russian Language: Symposium of Linguistic Articles), edited by Kh. Kh. Makhmudov, Alma-Ata, Academy of Sciences of

the Kazakh SSR, Institute of Language and Literature, 1955, catalogue No. 474.⁴ No other scientific publications of the Kazakh SSR are mentioned in the catalogue.

Unfortunately, there are no more or less complete catalogues of the non-periodical publications of the entire USSR available on this side of the Iron Curtain. It is not even known whether such catalogues exist. We can, however, draw some conclusions from the catalogue of the Four Continent Book Corporation, since it is a representative of *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga* in Moscow. In view of this fact, we may certainly consider the Corporation's catalogues to be representative of the book market throughout the USSR and of its national policy, especially in respect to scientific and technical literature.

We have examined three such catalogues. Data calculated on the basis of these catalogues is, of course, selective, but it gives a truly depressing picture of the situation with regard to cultural development in the 15 non-Russian republics under Bolshevik dictatorship. This data is listed in Table 2.

From this data it may be seen that of the 1,303 publications imported from the USSR 1,253, i.e., 96.16%, are published in Russian, and only 50, i.e., 3.84%, in the other languages of the USSR. Twenty-seven of these 50 publications, i.e., 2.07% of the total, are published in Ukrainian, but it is characteristic that among the scientific and technical publications of all the departments mentioned (agronomy, zoology, botany, etc.) there are no non-Russian publications, although plenty of non-Russian names of authors occur, including many Ukrainian and Caucasian. Only in the third catalogue, where scientific and technical publications are mentioned together with belles-lettres, school literature, music, articles on sport, etc., do we find 50 titles of non-Russian publications, 12 of them being musical publications, mostly notation. Among these publications are also 7 in Ukrainian (6 of them dealing with the so-called *Vossoedinenie*, the Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia), 1 in Belorussian and 4 in Armenian. The remaining non-Russian publications are mostly belles-lettres and children's literature.

We have also succeeded in obtaining a catalogue of the Russian-American Book Agency *Vek* (602 West 139th Street, New York 31, N.Y., USA), list No. 7, April 1954. Probably this organization, too, is a representative or even a department of *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, for the catalogue looks much like those of the Four Continent Book Corporation and is printed on the same printing machine. The catalogues do not differ from one another in their appearance. The specimen in question is not complete, and lists the books from Nos. 492 to 1,114, i.e., 623 publications concerning different branches of science (except the humanities). All these publications imported from the USSR are published in Russian.

We have also succeeded in obtaining two of the latest catalogues of A. Buschke (80 East 11th Street, New York 3, N.Y., USA). The first of these catalogues (List No. 2/56 Russian Books, New Acquisitions) mentions 79 titles of scientific and technical books published in the USSR. Among them there is not one book in any of the languages of the 15 non-Russian republics of the USSR. Under No. 23 is listed a book published in the capital of Azerbaidzhan (E. A. Pakhomov, *Monetnye klady Azerbaidzhana i drugikh res-*

⁴ See the catalogue (List No. 2/56) issued by A. Buschke's bookstore on 80, East 11th St., New York 3, N.Y., USA, which deals in USSR publications.

publik, kraev i oblasti Kavkaza, The Monetary Treasures of Azerbaidzhan and Other Republics, Krai, and Oblasts of the Caucasus, 6th ed., 1954, 92 pp.), but it is printed in Russian. There are two other books, listed under Nos. 70 and 77, which were published in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, but both are printed in Russian. One of them was published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (N. R. Medvedeva, *Normalnaya i patologicheskaya fiziologiya zhyrovogo i lipidnogo obmena*, Normal and Pathological Physiology of the Fat and Lipoid Exchange, Kiev, Institute of Physiology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1955, 365 pp.), and the other by the Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR (V. A. Tkachenko, *Arkhitektura sanatoriya*, The Design of a Health Resort, Kiev, 1954, 156 pp.).

The second catalogue (List No. 3/56, Russian Books), lists 176 titles of books, including scientific and technical publications. Among them we find one book in Lithuanian (T. Ivanauskas, *Lietuvas Pauksčiai*, Lithuania's Birds, vol. III, Vilno, 1955, 369 pp.) under No. 58, and another in Ukrainian (O. Z. Zhmudsky and O. M. Faydysh, *Energiya atomovoho yadra ta ii zastosuvannya*, The Energy of the Atomic Nucleus and its Application, Kiev, 1955, 96 pp.) under No. 176. The remainder are in Russian, although there are many authors with Georgian, Ukrainian, and other names. Among these works we find:

1. Publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaidzhan SSR in Russian—Nos. 7, 40, and 64;

2. Publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (No. 22—A. S. Lazarenko: *Opredelitel listvennykh mkhov Ukrainy*, Characteristic Features of the Deciduous Mosses of the Ukraine; Kiev, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Lvov Natural Sciences Museum, 1955, 467 pp.).

Examination of these six catalogues shows that among the 2,181 publications imported to the USA from the USSR 2,129, i.e., 97.6% of the total, are published in Russian, and only 52, i.e., 2.4%, in the languages of the other peoples of the USSR, who constitute more than 50% of the entire population of the USSR. In addition, among the 52 publications mentioned only a few can be considered as really scientific works.

From all this we can see that the policy of the Soviet Government, the former Politburo and the present Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party aims at retarding as far as possible the cultural, scientific and technical development of all the peoples of the USSR except the Russian people by hindering the development of their scientific and technical languages. The tsarist policy aimed at hindering all non-Russian languages in their development has been well adapted and applied by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR.

Periodical Publications of the Ukrainian SSR

in Comparison with Those of the RSFSR

We have demonstrated the position of periodical publications in all the 15 non-Russian republics and compared them with those of the RSFSR. We shall now deal separately with the publications of the Ukrainian SSR. A sum-

mary of all central periodical publications, made on the basis of the above-mentioned catalogue, is given in Table 3.

From this table it is evident that of 52 central newspapers and magazines published in the Ukrainian SSR 40, i.e., 76.9%, are published in Ukrainian, and 12, i.e., 23.1%, in Russian. If we compare the number of publications printed in the Ukrainian SSR with the total printed in the entire USSR, we see that they constitute only 9.3% of the total, and those in Ukrainian as little as 7.2%. According to the census of 1926, Ukrainians constituted 21.2% of the population of the USSR,⁵ and, according to the estimates of 1939 based on the new boundaries of the USSR, about 18.9%.⁶ Official Soviet statistics do not include any figures concerning the number of Ukrainians living within the state boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR and outside them in other regions of the USSR. On the basis of certain calculations, however, it can be assumed that, at the beginning of 1956, the Ukrainians (as an ethnic group) constituted 20% of the entire population of the USSR. As for the population of the Ukrainian SSR, official statistics give the figure of 40,600,000 people, i.e., 20.2% of the 200,000,000 population of the entire USSR.

The situation assumes a blacker aspect if we compare the amount of scientific and technical periodicals published in the RSFSR with those published in the Ukrainian SSR, disregarding publications on literature, sports, gymnastics, children's books, etc. The results of such a comparison are shown in Table 4.

Table 1

*Russian and Non-Russian Central Periodical Publications of the USSR
Compared with the Russian and Non-Russian Population of the USSR*

Language	Total	Percentage	Population
Russian .	403	72.1%	51.6%
Non-Russian	156	27.9%	48.4%
Total	559	100.0%	100.0%

⁵ Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 51, Table 22.

⁶ Mironenko, *op. cit.*, p. 18, Table 1.

Table 2

Books Imported from the USSR, According to 1955 Catalogues

Language of Publication	List No. 2 May 1955 (23 pp.) Scientific and Technical	List No. 2 Nov. 1955 (22 pp.) Scientific and Technical	List No. 3 Oct. 1955 (27 pp.) Miscel- laneous	Total	Percent of Total
Ukrainian	—	—	27	27	2.07
Belorussian	—	—	1	1	0.08
Armenian	—	—	4	4	0.31
Georgian	—	—	4	4	0.31
Latvian	—	—	9	9	0.69
Lithuanian	—	—	5	5	0.38
Total Non-Russian	—	—	50	50	3.84
Russian	406	364	483	1253	96.16
Total	406	364	533	1303	100.00

Table 3

Publications of the Ukrainian SSR for 1956

Language of Publication	Newspapers	Periodicals	Total	Total as Percentage of the USSR
Ukrainian	7	33	40	7.2
Russian	3	9	12	2.1
Total	10	42	52	9.3

Table 4

*Specialized Periodical Publications of the RSFSR
and the Ukrainian SSR According to Subjects⁷*

Subject According to the RSFSR Catalogue (pp. 5—43)	RSFSR		Ukrainian SSR		
	Total	Catalogue No.	Total	In Ukrainian	In Russian
I. Social and Economic; Communal and Political .	45	20—64	5	2	3
II. Science	79	65—143	12	9	3
III. National Economy (Industry, Transport, Communications, Commerce, Finance)	72	144—215	1	—	1
IV. Agriculture	18	216—233	3	3	—
V. Medicine and Hygiene .	50	234—283	2	1	1
VI. Arts and Architecture .	10	284—293	2	2	—
VII. Pedagogics	16	328—343	5	5	—
		20—293			
Total		290	30	22	8
		328—343			

With reference to Table 4 one should note:

(1) In the RSFSR there are 72 specialized periodicals issued pertaining to Group III (National Economy), while in the Ukrainian SSR there is only one, and even that is a Russian-language publication.

(2) In the RSFSR there are 50 specialized periodicals issued pertaining to Group V (Medicine and Hygiene), while in the Ukrainian SSR there are only two, one of which is in Russian.

(3) In the RSFSR 79 special periodicals are issued pertaining to Group II (Science); in the Ukrainian SSR there are 12, three of them Russian-language publications.

Table 3 showed us that 76.9% of all periodical publications issued on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR are printed in Ukrainian, and 23.1% in Russian. The disproportion is more acute when it comes to scientific and specialized periodicals: only 70.3% of periodicals in this category appearing in the

⁷ The publications of the RSFSR are already divided into the groups mentioned in the catalogue. The catalogue contains no such systematization of publications issued in the Ukrainian SSR and we have been obliged to do this ourselves. For a list of all these publications see Appendix No. 1, paragraph 10.

Ukrainian SSR are published in Ukrainian, while the number of Russian-language publications amounts to 29.7%.

Furthermore, as may also be seen from the catalogue, some periodicals come out 24 times a year, some 12 times, some are bi-monthlies, and some only quarterlies. They vary, moreover, in volume. Unfortunately, the catalogue again gives no indication of their size, but this, on the whole, may be deduced from their annual subscription rates. The degree of variation can be seen from the following example: the annual subscription for the Ukrainian-language scientific and popular scientific publications (Group II) costs from \$0.50 to \$6.00 (this latter rate being charged for only one periodical). Meanwhile, the annual subscription for Russian scientific periodicals published in the RSFSR ranges from \$2.00 and \$2.50 (of which there are only two instances) to \$48.00.

Thus if, for example's sake, we take for the RSFSR the same group of scientific journals (Nos. 65—143 in the catalogue), analyze them and compare the results with the data on the Ukrainian SSR, we arrive at the picture given by Table 5.

Table 5

*Scientific Periodicals Published in the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR
with the Number of Titles, Annual Rate of Publication and the
Total Cost of Annual Subscriptions*

	RSFSR (In Russian)	Ukrainian SSR		Col. 4 as % of Col. 1	
	In Russian	In Ukrainian	Total		
Number of Titles of Scientific Periodicals	79	3	9	12	15.2
Annual Rate of Publication	641	14	64	78	12.2
Total Cost of Annual Sub- scriptions in Dollars	798.50	12.50	25.50	38.00	4.7

This table shows that the total of scientific periodicals published in the Ukrainian SSR constitutes 15.2% of the total of similar periodicals published in the RSFSR. Yet the number of issues of scientific journals published annually in the Ukrainian SSR amounts to only 12.2% of the corresponding figure for the RSFSR, and their total cost is still lower, i. e., only 4.7%.

As we have just seen, a considerable number of the scientific journals published in the Ukrainian SSR (29.7%) are in Russian. Let us now examine the proportion between scientific periodicals printed in Ukrainian and those printed in Russian—these latter including only those which are published in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. This will give us the picture as presented by Table 6.

Table 6

*Scientific Periodicals Published in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR
in Russian and in Ukrainian*

	In Russian		Total	In Ukrainian	Col. 4 as %
	RSFSR	Ukr. SSR		(Ukr. SSR)	of Col. 3
Number of Annual Issues	79	3	82	8	11.0
Number of Titles . . .	641	14	655	64	9.8
Total Cost of Annual Sub- scriptions in Dollars .	795.50	12.50	811.00	25.50	3.1

As Table 4 demonstrates, the disproportion between scientific journals published in the Ukrainian SSR and those published in the RSFSR is not as great as it is in the other groups. Group III (National Economy), for instance, has not a single Ukrainian-language periodical, while Group V (Medicine and Hygiene) boasts one Ukrainian-language journal. The actual significance of all scientific and technical Ukrainian-language journals, compared with the total of similar journals printed in Russian, amounts, therefore, to less than 3.1%. At the same time, the population of the Ukrainian SSR (40,600,000) constituted on January 1, 1956, not 3.1%, but 36% of the population of the RSFSR (112,600,000).⁸ Moreover, according to the latest data, the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR for 1956—which was confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on January 24, 1956—shows on the income side the sum of 29,460,249,000 rubles, which, when compared with the sum of 74,181,000,000 rubles in the state budget of the RSFSR, amounts to 39.7%.

A comparison of these indices reveals the concrete results of the well considered, well organized, and well camouflaged colonial policy of the Politburo vis-à-vis the national minorities.

The analysis given above makes it clear why the former Politburo and the present Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the Government of the USSR under its control have for these 26 years concealed all statistical materials and especially absolute figures concerning the USSR and the national republics of which it is composed.

D. F. Virnyk⁹ says: "The Soviet Ukraine is a country of metallurgy, coal-mining, machine construction, chemical manufactures, iron ore, manganese,

⁸ Mironenko, *op. cit.*, p. 22, gives the population of the RSFSR as 120,000,000 inhabitants, and that of the Ukraine as 44,100,000. We have assumed for the Ukraine a population of only 42 millions, the figure which Kyrychenko mentioned in his declaration. If we were to take Mironenko's figure the proportion of the population of the Ukrainian SSR to that of the RSFSR would be still higher, i. e., 36.7%.

⁹ D. F. Virnyk, *Ukrainskaya SSR: Kratky istoriko-ekonomicheskyy ocherk* (The Ukrainian SSR: A Short Outline of Its History and Economy), Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1954, p. 6.

oil..." Elsewhere he states that, before World War II, the Ukraine "...produced half of the entire Soviet Union's iron ore, 61.2% of its cast iron, 47.1% of its steel and about 48% of its rolled metal..."¹⁰

This is quite true, of course. One would think, however, that the periodicals dealing with such important sections of the national economy in a republic as large as the Ukraine, which—as Virnyk states quite correctly—"does not lag behind France as to the number of its population," should be up to par accordingly. Yet in the catalogue in question they are not to be found. Their absence is simply explained by the fact that no such periodicals are published, since the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not interested in the development of Ukrainian culture and science. It is interested merely in the greatest possible exploitation of the riches of the Ukraine for the requirements of the Union as a whole. Only the periodical *Avtomaticheskaya svarka* (Automatic Welding) (No. 358 in the catalogue) is published in the Ukraine, and even this is in Russian. There is one more periodical, apparently of a theoretical nature, entitled, *Ukrainsky khimicheskyy zhurnal* (Ukrainian Chemical Journal (No. 397), but this too is printed in Russian. Meanwhile—as the catalogue testifies—there are scores of Russian-language periodicals concerned with these very branches of the national economy (within the scope of Group III alone) which are published in the RSFSR.

At one point Virnyk says: "The Ukraine is one of the largest regions in the USSR and in the world where sugar beet is grown and sugar manufactured."¹¹ Another passage states: "In 1913 there were about 200 sugar factories in the Ukraine, which together produced 1,101,500 tons of sugar. The share of the Ukraine in the entire Russian Empire's production of granulated sugar in 1913—14 constituted over 80%." ¹² Despite this fact the Ukraine has no special periodical pertaining to this very important branch of industry. In the RSFSR, however, such a periodical exists (No. 190), although the RSFSR produces only about one-fifth of the amount of sugar produced in the Ukraine. The Institute of Sugar Industry was established in Moscow—not in Kiev.

Where is that equality and that much-praised "friendship between the brother-nations of the USSR," which Virnyk writes about, and what do they consist in? We are faced with facts of violence, of economic and cultural brigandry, of crying injustice. Where is that development of the Ukraine, of the Ukrainian people and of Ukrainian culture on which Virnyk places so much verbal emphasis, following directives received from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? On page 179 of his book he quotes the "solemn-sounding" (as he says) words of the anthem which the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks presented to the Ukraine:

Flourish, O beautiful and vigorous Ukraine!
You have found your happiness in the Soviet Union;
Equal among equals, free among the free,
You bloom like a flower under the sun of freedom.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

When confronted with reality, these "solemn-sounding" words are pure mockery in our ears, a mockery by cynics who know only too well that nobody in the whole country would dare to contradict them.

Virnyk states that in 1941 127,000 students were enrolled in the 166 institutions of higher education of the Ukrainian SSR, and that the Ukraine has now new categories of specialists at her disposal.¹³ Elsewhere he gives more recent information to the effect that, in 1953—54, there existed in the Ukraine 144 institutions of higher learning which had, including external students, 275,000 students in all.¹⁴ This is confirmed by O. Lyubchenko, chairman of the Central Administration of Specialized Schools at University and Secondary Level of the Ukrainian SSR. He states that in the academic year 1954—55 the Ukraine was due to have 147 higher institutions of learning, which would admit 49,350 first-term students as well as 23,000 external students and nearly 3,000 students attending evening courses.¹⁵

Such a rate of attendance at institutions of higher education in the Ukraine over the whole period the Ukrainian SSR has been in existence, i. e., over three and a half decades, should have created by now a large stratum of Ukrainian intelligentsia, specialists and scholars. Indeed, in, let us say, 1932, 10,063 scientific personnel were employed at research institutions in the Ukraine; but in 1933, after the "purge of class-hostile elements," there were only 8,414 of them left.¹⁶ Later, in 1940, after all the various purges under Stalin and Yezhov resulting in the physical destruction of great masses of people, there were only "over 5,000" scientific workers left in the Ukraine.¹⁷ Virnyk writes that (at the beginning of 1954) the Ukraine has 475 scientific research institutions employing nearly 15,000 scholars and scientists.¹⁸ In his article Lyubchenko corroborates Virnyk's data, but he is more precise. According to him, at the beginning of the academic year 1954—55, there were 15,347 professors and lecturers working in the institutes and universities of the Ukraine. We must bear in mind that this number was established after all those endless "purges," after the utter havoc wrought upon the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and many other scientific and research institutions, after the mass deportations and mass liquidation of Ukrainian scientific workers on a scale such as was not experienced to an equal extent by Russian scientific

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 168. Compare the figures in our table (Table 8).

¹⁵ O. Lyubchenko, *Vyshchi uchbovi zaklady Ukrainy pered novym navchalnym rokom* (Institutions of Advanced Education in the Ukraine on the Eve of the New Academic Year), *Radyanska Ukraina*, July 6, 1954.

¹⁶ D. Solovey, *Holhota Ukrainy, Chastyna 1: Moskovsko-Bolshevytsky okupatsiyny teror v USSR mizh pershoyu ta drugoyu svitovoyu viynoyu* (Calvary of the Ukraine. Part 1: The Russian-Bolshevik Occupation Terror in the Ukrainian SSR between World War I and World War II), pub. by *Ukrainsky Holos* (Voice of the Ukraine), Winnipeg, 1953, p. 226.

¹⁷ K. Huslysty, L. Slavin and F. Yastrebov (editors): *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Outline History of the Ukraine), Institute of Ukrainian History and Archaeology, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

¹⁸ D. F. Virnyk, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

personnel.¹⁹ From Lyubchenko's article we learn that most of these 15,347 Ukrainian scholars and scientists belong to the younger generation and do not include the "purged old men"—and yet there are over 15,000 of them!

As to the specialists, Virnyk states that "in the postwar years alone over 400,000 young specialists were trained in the Ukraine."²⁰ We have no doubt as to the correctness of this figure. The Ukraine has seven universities, namely, at Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov, Chernovtsy and Uzhgorod. Apart from these universities there is, as may be seen from Lyubchenko's article, a multitude of institutes for special training in the Ukraine. There are institutes of machine construction, metallurgy, mines, building, motor highways, agriculture, hydraulic engineering, technology, polytechnics, commercial economy, credit economy, communal construction, medicine, veterinary medicine, foreign languages, pedagogics, etc.: as was stated above, 147 institutions of higher learning in all.

Thus the data adduced in Virnyk's book, which was published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and in the article by Lyubchenko, who is a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR, gives us to understand that the Ukraine has an army of hundreds of thousands—perhaps even of a million—of all kinds of specialists, and over 15,300 scientists and lecturers teaching at institutions of higher education.

Where, however, we would ask, are the Ukrainian-language periodicals to serve this army? In the catalogue they are almost non-existent, and what there is strikes us rather as a mockery of the Ukrainian people by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Government of the USSR.

In view of the foregoing, what is the value of all those statements—even if they bear the brand of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR—announcing that "the Communist Party and the Russian people have manifested solicitude for the development of the culture of the Ukrainian people,"²¹ or that "during the Soviet regime the Ukraine has changed from a backward and needy country into a flourishing socialist republic with... highly developed arts and sciences"?²²

These categorical statements, which are clearly contradicted by all the facts submitted above, are reiterated a great many times in Virnyk's book. The book also contains many absolute and relative figures, but they are disjointed and presented in piecemeal fashion, and give no opportunity for comparison with the RSFSR or the USSR. They are intentionally presented in a form which makes it impossible to verify them. The reader is unable to draw correct conclusions from them; rather, they are intended to lead him astray. Virnyk's book is an ordinary premeditated deception, produced by a pupil of the "Stalin school of falsification" and presented to its readers in the form of a publication of the Ukrainian SSR's supreme institution of learning and science. It bears witness to the deep humiliation the Academy of

¹⁹ See, for instance, D. Solovey, *op. cit.*, pp. 217—243.

²⁰ D. F. Virnyk, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR has been subjected to by the anti-Ukrainian nationalities policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its agency—the Kremlin Government.

The only statement in Virnyk's book which approximates the truth is that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Government of the USSR are actually to some extent concerned about raising the Ukraine's economy and increasing its productivity. Yet this is not done in the interest of the Ukrainian people; it is done for the purpose of exploiting the Ukraine still more effectively in order to satisfy the needs of the Russian empire which passes itself off under the name of "USSR."

However, facts are facts. All those hundreds of thousands of specialists and technical intelligentsia and all those 15,000 (at least) scientists of the Ukrainian SSR have been deprived of the opportunity of making use of Ukrainian scientific and technical literature by the brute force of the Bolshevik occupational machinery. Ukrainian scientific workers have no means of contributing to Ukrainian culture, of developing Ukrainian scientific literature or of working on the development of a Ukrainian scientific and technical language and terminology. In other words, they cannot do what their Russian colleagues are doing quite freely, without having to cope with any obstacles set in their path.

*The Russifying Role of the People's Commissariat of Education
and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR*

Subordination to Moscow of Ukrainian Institutions of Higher Education

In the first part of this article we made use of information relating to central periodical publications in the USSR for 1956. Unfortunately we have no similar materials concerning the publication of books at our disposal. The assumption that things are no different in this field is fully corroborated by the selective data (gained from the analysis of six catalogues brought from the USSR to the United States) submitted at the beginning of our paper. We demonstrated there that of the 2,181 titles of publications brought from the USSR, only 28, i.e., 1.3% were printed in Ukrainian. For illustration, we shall also make use of some data submitted by R. Paklen pertaining to the period preceding World War II.²³ Having studied the large model catalogue of 320 pages entitled *Robitnycha Biblioteka* (Workers' Library), which lists books recommended for workers' libraries by the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, Paklen states that the share apportioned in this catalogue to Ukrainian-language editions is "pitiful." And this catalogue reflected the situation on the book market in the Ukraine as well as the trend of the People's Commissariat of Education itself! Paklen states that of the works on energetics, aviation, timber processing, leather dressing, public

²³ R. Paklen, "*Bila Knyha*": *Natsionalna i sotsiyalna polityka sovyetiv na sluzhbi moskovskoho imperiyalizmu: Na osnovi avtentychnykh uryadovykh sovyetskykh danykh* ("White Paper": National and Social Policy of the Soviets in the Service of Moscow Imperialism: On the Basis of Authentic Official Soviet Data), pub. by *Ukrainsky Polityk* (Ukrainian Politician), p. 44.

affairs, co-operatives and accounting approximately 5% are in Ukrainian, while the remaining 95% are in Russian. We give the other figures he submits in Table 7.

Table 7

*Books Recommended by the People's Commissariat of Education
of the Ukrainian SSR for Workers' Libraries
(Before World War II)*

Branches of the National Economy	Books Recommended		Total
	in Ukrainian	in Russian	
Food Industry	2	36	38
Coal Industry	1	9	10
Metallurgical Industry	—	32	32
Railroad Transport	1	71	72
Total	4	148	152

Of the books recommended for workers' libraries in the Ukraine 97.4% are in Russian and 2.6% in Ukrainian. Moreover, those in Ukrainian are small and of inferior quality, while 25 of those published in Russian on the food, coal and metallurgical industries and 42 of those in Russian on railroad transport consist of 100 or more pages.

Just as eloquent are the following data concerning the supreme scientific institution of the Ukrainian SSR—the Academy of Sciences, which, beginning from 1930, was over a long period radically purged of Ukrainian elements (“bourgeois nationalists”) and even had the word “Ukrainian” struck from its official title. From a bibliographical note on the *Visnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainiskoi SSR* (Journal of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR), No. 5 for 1953, we learn that the number of its publications has been constantly decreasing during recent years, namely:

Year	Number of Scientific Works Published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR	Percentage in Relation to 1950
1950	210	100.0
1951	180	85.6
1952	135	64.3

This is in itself a significant phenomenon: for some reason the volume of scientific work published by members of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR has diminished from year to year. Moreover, this supreme

scientific institution of the Ukrainian SSR is actually conducting obvious Russifying activities among the Ukrainian people in the Ukraine. The reviewer of the above-mentioned issue of the *Visnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainiskoi SSR* for 1953 gives the following information about the Academy's publications:

All works on technical and scientific subjects are published in Russian... There exists not a single specialized periodical on Ukrainian studies. All works scheduled for publication by the Academy of Sciences are Russian-language papers: P. P. Yefymenko, *Primeval Society*; M. Pidoplichko, *The Fungi of Coarse Forage*; Vorobeva, *Types of Forest in the European USSR*. Then follow several papers on botany and the technical disciplines, all of them Russian too.²⁴

A bibliographical note on the August issue (No. 8) of the same journal for 1953 gives a list of recent publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. The reviewer points out that "of the 18 learned papers which have been recently published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, only two were in Ukrainian... The remainder,... most of them dealing with engineering or the sciences, were printed in Russian."

Furthermore, the reviewer remarks that "the Botanical Garden of the Ukrainian SSR [in Kiev] has published a collection of papers entitled *Akklimatizatsiya rastenii* (The Acclimatization of Plants) in Russian," and that the work on Ukrainian studies, "*Kratkoe soobshchenie Instituta arkhologii* (Review of the Archeological Institute), containing lectures and articles by Yefymenko, Shovkoplyas, Dovzhenko, Smishko, Bohusevych, Danylenko, Pidoplichko, Slavin and others, was also published in Russian."

Furthermore, "the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR publishes the *Ukrainsky matematichesky zhurnal* (Ukrainian Mathematical Journal), the *Ukrainsky khimicheskyy zhurnal* (Ukrainian Chemical Journal) and other periodicals all in Russian"; and "in the list of popular brochures on agricultural subjects quoted by the *Visnyk*, half of the titles are in Russian."²⁵

In general, a critical examination of the register, so far as it is accessible, of publications by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR makes it obvious that most of the genuinely scientific works are being published in Russian, while pseudo-scientific, propagandistic compositions which are intended to obscure the minds of the Ukrainian people and to discredit Ukrainian learning and culture, are for the most part printed in Ukrainian.

A fine specimen of such pseudo-scientific publications harmful to the Ukrainian people is the *Istoriya Ukrainiskoi SSR* (History of the Ukrainian SSR), vol. I, issued by the Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in Kiev in 1953 (784 pp., large octavo). This book was also published in Russian.²⁶

²⁴ *Ukrainska nauka pid moskovsko-bolshevytskym hnitom* (Ukrainian Science and Learning under Russian Bolshevik Oppression), *Svoboda* (Freedom), Sept. 2, 1953, p. 2.

²⁵ *Rusyfikatsiya ukrainskoi nauky pid sovyetamy* (Russification of Ukrainian Science under the Soviets), *Svoboda*, Nov. 21, 1953, p. 2.

²⁶ At least we happened to find, in the catalogue of the Telberg Book Co. (544, Sixth Ave., New York 11, USA), List 723 A, No. 67, the book *Istoriya Ukrainiskoi SSR*

This volume was edited by a board composed of O. K. Kasymenko (Editor-in-Chief), V. A. Dyadychenko, F. Y. Los, F. P. Shevchenko and F. O. Yastrebov. Apart from members of the editorial board, the following historians contributed various chapters: K. H. Huslysty, I. D. Boyko, K. I. Stetsyuk, M. A. Rubach, I. O. Hurzhy, O. A. Parasunko, S. A. Kytarev, O. F. Yermolenko, I. I. Kompaniyets, Y. I. Shcherbýna, I. H. Shovkoplyas, V. A. Bohusevych and H. M. Shevchuk—together 18 persons. But these scholars did not write this *History* unaided. As the foreword tells us, “the entire team of academic workers of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR took part in preparing the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* for publication.”

The main point, however, is the following:

In the process of preparing the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, the scholars of the Institute of History were greatly assisted by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Institutes of History of the Union republics, the Department of History of the Academy of Social Disciplines attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Moscow State University.

Evidently, the team of 18 scholars concerned with the writing and editing of this *History* had quite a number of nurses or, rather, supervisors, leaders and censors. What kind of “scientific work” was born of all that “great assistance” may be easily guessed if one glances at the learned apparatus which figures in the book. This rather weighty first volume of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* contains 146 references to sources. These include:

Sources	References
Lenin	68
Stalin	47
Marx and Engels	22
<i>History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Short Course)</i>	5
Resolutions of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks .	2
<i>Pravda</i> (1947)	1
<i>Bolshevik</i> (1947)	1
<hr/>	
Total	146

v dvukh tomakh. Tom I: Ot pervobytno-obshchinnogo stroya do vtoroi russkoi revolyutsii (History of the Ukrainian SSR in Two Volumes. Vol. I: From the Primitive Communal Order to the Second Russian Revolution), Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, ed. A. Kasimenko and others; Kiev, 1953, 840 pp. The different number of pages and the specification of the first volume (which is lacking in the Ukrainian edition) suggest that this is a different, and a Russian-language, edition.

No references to other sources are contained in this allegedly scientific work. This is presumably in accordance with the directives of the "Stalin school of falsification," which can be reduced to the following basic principles:

1. Always to refer in a maximal degree to the works of Party leaders and invariably to lay stress upon their genius and unique significance (see, for instance, the remarks about the genius displayed in Lenin's and Stalin's works on pages 560, 676, 713, 722, etc.). So, for instance, we read on page 538:

Leninism emerged—the highest achievement of Russian and universal culture. The birth of Leninism was of immense consequence for working people throughout the world and for the development of the culture of all peoples of our country, including the Ukrainian people.

2. Systematically to condition the reader to the idea that only these works are the foundations of all learning, and that not only no course of history, let us say, of the Ukraine can be written without them, but even a paper on a linguistic subject cannot be conceived without considering "J. V. Stalin's teaching about language" (see p. 143). Even for a manual of astronomy they are indispensable.²⁷

3. Strictly to avoid referring to works which were not written by Party leaders:

(a) that references to works by Party leaders might not get lost among such references;

(b) that works which are alien to the Party, its ideology, and "general line" might not be popularized, and that readers may not be given an excuse to search for and read these works.

4. Not to stop at any falsification wherever this may be demanded by the interests of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). This must be done in a subtle way. The statements which are to be conveyed to the reader must have the form of axioms which cannot be doubted, discussed or checked. Precise references are inadmissible because they may too quickly and easily lead to a discovery of the falsification.

This is also why we find in this *History of the Ukrainian SSR* a great number of weighty statements which are not supported by any proofs, quotations or precise indications of sources. Let us demonstrate the foregoing by means of the following example. F. O. Yastrebov writes (p. 508):

Opposing democratic centralism [established by the Bolsheviks in the USSR], Dragomanov tried, in a nationalist way, to sow enmity between the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples.

As we can see, the accusation raised against M. P. Dragomanov, a highly distinguished Ukrainian politician and scholar of the second half of the 19th century, is a very grave one. It is obviously a repetition of the accusation raised against Dragomanov by the Galician Russophile, Ploshchansky in the

²⁷ See, for instance, P. I. Popov, K. L. Baev, B. A. Vorontsov-Velyaminov and R. V. Kunitsky, *Astronomiya: Uchebnik dlya fiziko-matematicheskikh fakul'tetov pedagogicheskikh institutov* (Astronomy: Manual for Faculties of Physics and Mathematics at Pedagogical Institutes), State Publishing House for Pedagogical Literature of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR, Moscow, 1953, *passim*.

ultrareactionary Russian newspaper *Kievlyanin* (The Kievan) in 1874, just when the Archeological Congress, at which a group of Ukrainian scholars played a prominent part, was taking place at Kiev. Ploshchansky stated that Dragomanov was a "Polish revolutionary agent who was harmful to Russo-Slavic unity."²⁸ This accusation was the reason for Dragomanov's dismissal from Kiev University. Yastrebov, however, in reviving this Black-Hundred accusation in a somewhat different guise, fails to substantiate it with facts or references.

In the sub-chapter headed "The Emergence of the Russian Centralized State and its Significance in the History of the Ukrainian People" another co-author of this *History*, K. Huslysty, states:

The emergence of the Russian centralized state played an extremely important role as a progressive factor in the history of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples...

He adds:

This significance of the Russian state for the historical fate of the Ukrainian people has been, in every way possible, suppressed by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who based their views on the unscientific reactionary "theory" about the Kievan Rus having, allegedly, been a "Ukrainian state"...²⁹

The reader may wonder why Huslysty, a historian of the Ukraine, should be pained by the thought that the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" consider the Kievan Rus to have been a Ukrainian state. The reason is, that

they [the Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists"] refute the historical connection between the Russian centralized state and the Kievan Rus and slanderously represent the unifying policy of the Russian state with regard to the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands as having been just as rapacious as other countries' aggressive policies (p. 149).

Thus it appears that the "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists" (among whom the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* includes M. Dragomanov, V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevsky, V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlyura and a great many other persons) refuse to acknowledge the relation of inheritance or succession, i.e., they refute the right of the "Russian centralized state" to the territory of the Kievan Rus. This means that they refuse to recognize the Russians' right to dominate the Ukraine as an "inseparable part" of Russia and to exploit the Ukraine at will. The "bourgeois nationalists," says Huslysty,

by falsifying the history of the Ukraine, have hushed up the growth of the economic, political, and cultural connections between the Ukraine and Russia; they have hushed up the constant gravitation of the Ukrainian people toward a unification with the Russian people, as well as the inestimable rôle the Russian people have played by giving constant aid to the Ukrainian people in the latter's struggle for liberation from alien oppression (p. 149).

²⁸ M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrani tvory* (Selected Works), vol. I, Prague, 1937, p. 72.

²⁹ An interesting detail: in the *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, which claims to be a scientific work, the name *Rosiyyska derzhava* (Russian state) is always written with a capital letter, while *ukrainska derzhava* (Ukrainian state) is, as a rule, written with a small letter.

In the first place, what falsification is meant here? There has certainly never been a colony in the world in which economic, political and cultural connections with the mother country did not grow over the centuries; but this hardly constitutes justification for Russia (now the USSR), the biggest colonial empire in the world. Even if it were to, then the same principle should surely be applicable to other "imperialist sharks."

In the second place, precisely what "inestimable role" played by the Russian people in giving "constant aid" to the Ukrainian people in the latter's "liberation struggle" does the author have in mind? Exactly what "role as a progressive factor" did the emergence of the "Russian centralized state" play in the history of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples? Not only Dragomanov considered the period after the Ukraine's unification with the Muscovite empire after the treaty of 1654 as a time during which the Ukraine gained nothing; in 1857 and 1863 Hertenzen also, whose authority even the authors of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* would not dare to contest, wrote in *Kolokol* (The Bell) about the "hardships the Ukraine suffered after Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time when she was united with Moscow," when she (the Ukraine) fell into "tsarist bondage" and "suffered reprisals in the form of serfdom, levy of recruits, lawlessness, robbery and the whip." He demanded independence for the Ukraine.³⁰

Thirdly, the *History* substitutes throughout the concept "Russian people" for the concept "Russian ruling stratum." It is generally accepted that the Russian people had, until 1905, no voice in the administration of the Russian empire. Even from 1905 till 1917 it played a very small part in state administration, and this situation finally led to the Revolution and its horrors. Thus, all statements about the "inestimable" and "progressive" role the "Russian people" played in the life of the Ukrainian people are mere propaganda on the part of the authors of the *History*. It is obvious that this substitution of the Russian people for the ruling upper layer in interpreting the past is necessary to enable the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to make the Russian people appear responsible for the whole of its policy, including its nationalities policy and the inhuman extermination of many millions of members of the "national minorities," among them Ukrainians.³¹

The *History* contains countless statements of this kind, which are submitted to the reader as being axiomatic without making any attempt to support them with arguments or to refer to sources. The *History* contains, for instance, the following passages:

(a) The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist historians (Antonovych, Hrushevsky and others) stated, in their endeavor to falsify the historical facts; that the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples differ radically from each other with regard to their origin, character, history and culture. The nationalist S. Smal-Stotsky tried to prove that not even in their

³⁰ M. P. Dragomanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 24 and 331.

³¹ See, for instance, our paper in *Ukrainsky zbirnyk* (Ukrainian Review), vol. II, 1955: *Ukrainske selo v rokakh 1931—1933* (The Ukrainian Countryside During the Years 1931—1933).

languages are the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples closely related (p. 142).

Of course, no concrete data are adduced as to what was falsified and where, resulting in an intentional confusion (and this in an academic work) of two very different concepts, "falsification" and "statement." Furthermore, the authors state:

(b) The works of V. Vynnychenko, O. Oles, M. Hrushevsky and the like reflected the ideological corruption of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and its armor-bearers. Their tendency was to disarm the people spiritually and to distract them from the struggle for their basic interests (p. 632).

These statements are completely unsupported. There is not the least hint as to where, when or how Vynnychenko, Oles and Hrushevsky distract the Ukrainian people "from the struggle for their basic interests."

(c) The bourgeois nationalists assisted the tsarist regime in suppressing the revolutionary movement. On the eve of World War I, the nationalists, headed by M. Hrushevsky, concluded an agreement with the fiercest enemy of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, the Constitutional Democrats, and showed themselves to be the faithful servants of tsarism (p. 684).

The Russian nationalists, who were enemies of a Ukrainian national liberation (e.g., Purishkevych, Markov, Savenko and Shulgin), did assist the tsarist regime in suppressing all manifestations of the Ukrainian national renaissance. But who those were who, "headed by M. Hrushevsky" (i.e., the Ukrainians), assisted tsarism as its faithful servants is not specified and no concrete facts are mentioned.

The *History* also says:

(d) The spokesmen for the interests of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and of the landowners who had turned bourgeois, the Ukrainian National-Liberals, whose program was close to that of the Constitutional Democrats, were fundamentally opposed to the liberation of the Ukrainian people from social and national oppression. The ideologist of the National-Liberals was that obdurate nationalist and agent of Austro-German imperialism, M. Hrushevsky, whom Lenin characterized as "a rampant reactionary." Hrushevsky rose with undisguised hatred against the friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and was opposed to their joint struggle for freedom and independence (p. 685).

None of these statements either is supported by any scientific argumentation. The single reference to Lenin's unsubstantiated phrase is no proof. Lenin nominated Stalin for the leading position in the Party—and the Twentieth Party Congress, in February 1956, was compelled to renounce Stalin, Lenin's creature, and expose him as a falsifier, a maniac and a psychopathic butcher. Thus it appears that Lenin did not know even his own comrades too well; what, then, is the value of his unsubstantiated judgement about M. Hrushevsky?

(e) They [the Ukrainian Social-Democrats] were headed by those malicious enemies of the Ukrainian people, the political adventurers V. Vynnychenko and S. Petlyura, who made every effort and applied all possible methods to fight for the realization of the counterrevolutionary aspirations of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks conducted a ruthless struggle against this subtle nationalism and revealed that its revolutionary phraseology and demands for a "national culture" and "national independence" were only a camouflage for the exploitation policy of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie (p. 685).

These, too, are only demagogical phrases which are not in the last supported by any concrete arguments. The same must be said also about the following passage:

(f) The most reactionary views were preached by M. Hrushevsky, a typical representative of bourgeois-nationalist historiography, who deliberately distorted the history of the Ukraine. This reactionary ideologist of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists preached chauvinism and national exclusiveness in his multivolumed *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusi* (History of the Ukraine-Rus) and *Ilyustrovana istoriya* (Illustrated History), falsifying throughout the true history of the Ukraine. He deliberately denied the deep-rooted historical connections between the brotherly Russian and Ukrainian peoples and, bowing before the bourgeois culture of Western Europe, propagated a Western, Austro-German orientation, his final goal being to subject the Ukraine to the bondage of an alien imperialism... In their despicable writings M. Hrushevsky's adherents and disciples constantly sang the praises of the bloody misdeeds of foreign imperialist usurpers (pp. 723—724).

And so forth. The scientific value of these statements can be easily estimated by the unbiased reader himself. Yet the editorial board of this *History* states:

Before the Great Socialist October Revolution, there existed no scientifically-founded history of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, these most malicious enemies of the Ukrainian people, consistently strove to undermine and destroy the inseparable union of the Ukrainian, Russian and other peoples of our country; they falsified the history of the Ukraine and tried to poison the minds of the working people with chauvinism—all in the course of defending the interests of the ruling classes of exploiters... Soviet historians... have devoted all their attention to the creation of a truly scientific history of the Ukrainian people (pp. 6—7).

Although we cannot find any references to any historical sources in this truly unscientific history, its pages are speckled with names of major and minor "leaders." Unfortunately, the editors (possibly by an unintentional oversight) have not supplied the book with an index of the names mentioned in their collective work. Therefore, glancing through the book and stopping on those pages which especially dazzled our eyes with the multitude of names printed on them, we made ourselves a selective list:

(a) Lenin's name was quoted 150 times on the only 30 pages we looked through;

(b) on a mere 15 pages Stalin's name was quoted 57 times;

(c) on a mere 10 pages Gorky's name was quoted 63 times.

(See Appendix No. 3)

(We did not count with what frequency the names of other much-mentioned "leaders" such as Molotov, Zhdanov, Kirov, Kaganovich and others appear on the pages of this *History of the Ukrainian SSR*.)

We understand, of course, that Lenin and Stalin (as the organizers of the armed intervention by the Russian Red Army, which in 1919—1920 by force of arms occupied the territory of the young independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the sovereign democratic state of the Ukrainian people, and established there an aggressive occupatory Bolshevik dictatorship) fully deserve to have their names figuring on the pages of a history of the Ukraine; though, we believe, they should not figure there so frequently and not in that light, and, of course, not in that volume which takes us no farther than October, 1917. We fail, however, to understand what relation Maxim Gorky had to the history of the Ukraine and to her, let us say, cultural development—and prior to 1917, at that—that he should be mentioned so often in the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*. By the way, he too has fallen victim to Stalinist Bolshevik despotism, which first broke this once prominent writer's spine and then destroyed him completely according to the well-known satirical formula as given by Franko in his *Tsekhmyster Kuperyan* (Guild Master Kuperyan):

Here we'll kill him on the spot
And put him on the pale.
But when he's dead we'll mourn him
And praise him as a saint.

The reason for the frequency with which we meet Gorky's name in this *History* explains itself on page 725, from which we learn that "great assistance was given to modern Ukrainian literature by Gorky . . . Gorky unsparingly exposed the corruption of the ideas and the reactionary nature of the creative work of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist writers."

The matter becomes still clearer when we take a close look at some of the sections into which the chapters are divided. Let us take, for instance, Section 3 of Chapter X, written by F. O. Yastrebov. Its title is "The Development of Ukrainian Culture in the First Half of the 19th Century." To our astonishment we see that 81 lines of this *History of the Ukrainian SSR* are devoted to Pushkin, the "glory and pride of the Russian people, the father of modern Russian belles-lettres." These lines contain the following passage:

Pushkin sang the praise of Kochubey, Iskra and Paliy, these sons of the Ukraine who were unswervingly devoted to the Ukrainian and the Russian peoples and burned with hatred for the Swedish barons and Polish magnates. The poet castigated that insidious and supercilious traitor of the Ukrainian people and enemy of Russia, Mazepa, who sold his people to the foreigners (pp. 449—450).

This extract makes it clear why there is so much talk here about Pushkin. Further on, 19 lines are given to the "great Russian poet" Lermontov. Here we find the following passage, which, no doubt, is very important for the history of the Ukraine:

The poet's love of his people manifested itself forcefully in the poems *A Tale of Tsar Ivan Vasilevich, Borodino* (1873) and other works. In *Borodino* there resounds a powerful patriotic appeal to stand up like a wall in defence of the fatherland against the inroads of the foreigners, to fight to the death for our own Moscow (pp. 451—452).

Among Lermontov's works no *Poltava* could be found with Kochubei, Iskra, and the "traitor" Mazepa figuring in it; space had therefore to be found for *Borodino* and the appeal that "our own Moscow" must be defended to the death.

Thirty-eight lines of the book are dedicated to Gogol, but there is not the least mention that he was a Ukrainian, that he was born in the Ukraine, that he loved her and that the fact that he wrote in Russian was a result of the tsarist régime's colonial policy of Russification, which had then already been going on for almost 200 years. Instead, it is pointed out that "Gogol was a great Russian artist of the written word," that "Gogol added glory to Russian literature," that "Gogol manifested himself as a patriot who loved Russia ardently" and so on (p. 452).

All this is true, of course: Pushkin was a Russian poet of genius, Lermontov was a great Russian poet, Gogol really did add glory to Russian literature. But what relation has it all to the "Development of Ukrainian Culture in the First Half of the 19th Century"?

And still more curious: 38 lines are allowed in two places alone (pp. 446 and 459—460) to V. G. Belinsky, who, as Yastrebov states, "considered it necessary to devote special attention to the heroic feats of the Russian people" (p. 446), who "exalted the foremost representatives of the Russian people," who "prided himself on the high achievements of this people's culture and believed in its great future" and whose "views on history were also shared by Shevchenko." Yet there is not a word said about Belinsky's brutal publications against Shevchenko, in which, alas, he betrayed himself shamefully as a Pan-Russian chauvinist, no better than Purishkevich was at a later period. Thus, a total of 176 lines are allotted for the elucidation of matters which, to say the least, have very little to do with explaining the "Development of Ukrainian Culture in the First Half of the 19th Century." At the same time, 19 lines are conceded to I. P. Kotlyarevsky (p. 453); 6 lines to P. P. Hulak-Artemovsky; 14 lines to H. F. Kvitka-Osnovyanenko (pp. 453—454); and 7 lines to Y. P. Hrebinka (p. 454). Only Shevchenko has been lucky: 98 lines are devoted to him in three places (pp. 454, 457, 460). In all, the above-mentioned Ukrainian writers have been allowed 144 lines, as against the 176 lines given in the same section to the Russian writers.

But even apart from this, one can find here many things that have no connection with the history of the Ukraine, because all adduced data lays stress on Russian science, Russian scholars, and so forth. It is, evidently, the author's full intention to cram the pages of his work with similar information. Read, for instance, the following excerpt:

Russian science and engineering made progress in the first half of the 19th century, although the feudal Government of the tsarist regime paid no heed to their development and allowed only trifling sums for research work and technical improvements. Regardless of these extremely unfavorable conditions, Russian science in many cases outstripped the scientific achievements of other countries in the field of discovery and technical invention. Moreover, many of these inventions had under the tsarist regime no chance to develop any further.

There is the world-famous talented Russian mathematician M. I. Lobachevsky (1793—1856), who created a new system of geometry which was eventually applied in diverse problems of science...

In the fields of physics and engineering there were such prominent scientists and inventors as Petrov, Yakobi, the Cherepanovs, Anosov and others.

V. V. Petrov made a series of discoveries in the field of electrochemistry and electro-metallurgy. In 1833—1834 Y. O. and M. Y. Cherepanov (father and son) built Russia's first railroad in the Urals: P. P. Anosov discovered a method of producing Damascus steel, while B. S. Yakobi and E. Kh. Lents discovered the revolving capacity of electro-magnetic current.

In the field of chemistry, the gifted scientist M. M. Zinin (1812—1880) made a discovery of world-wide significance: he laid the foundation for a synthesis of aniline dyes (p. 458) . . . [etc.]

This is simply some tedious, clumsily composed catalogue of names taken from the history of Russian culture, forcibly inserted into a chapter of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* which is supposed to deal with the development of Ukrainian culture.

The conclusion of this chapter is just as unexpected. The author says:

The first half of the 19th century distinguished itself in Russia, including the Ukraine, by a very considerable development in all fields of modern [here the author modestly refrains from adding "Russian"] culture. Russian literature, art, science and learning produced a series of great writers, artists and scholars who by rights occupied a prominent place in universal culture (p. 461).

This, however, is no exception. Similar passages are very frequent in the second section, which deals with the "Development of Ukrainian Culture in the Second Half of the 19th Century." Here, too, we shall substantiate our statement by adducing quotations:

These [viz., Belinsky's, Chernyshevsky's and Dobrolyubov's] democratic views on history were shared by P. P. Shchapov. His historical works were dedicated to the study of the communalities [obshchiny] and of popular movements in Russia. For his democratic convictions and publications Shchapov was deported to Siberia by the tsarist Government.

The well-known Russian bourgeois historian S. M. Solovev wrote in the 1850—1870's a many-volumed *History of Russia from the Earliest Times*, which in our days has significance only as a source of reference. Solovev founded his historical research work on the idealistic view of the Russian autocratic state which was then prevalent in official scholastic circles. In his *History of Russia*, Solovev idealized the history of the Russian tsarist regime.

The views held by Solovev and Chicherin—who stood close to the former—were developed by V. Y. Klyuchevsky, who looked upon the history of Russia through the spectacles of bourgeois liberalism. Klyuchevsky based his studies and lectures on the idea that there existed no class struggle in Russia's past. The characteristic feature of the ideology followed by Klyuchevsky (who subsequently joined the bourgeois party of Constitutional Democrats) was his liberal-bourgeois preaching of peace between the classes, i.e., the aspiration toward a "supra-class," actually bourgeois, state (p. 558).

Or:

Karl Marx estimated the work by the well-known Russian economist, V. V. Berni-Flerovsky, *The Situation of the Working Classes in Russia*, very highly. Marx pointed to the methodological shortcomings of this

book, remarking at the same time that it comes next in importance to Engels' work on *The Situation of the Working Classes in England* (p. 559).

We have deliberately quoted some samples from among a mass of similar materials in order to give the reader a chance to judge for himself what it all has to do with the history of the Ukraine.

Thus, under the pretence of dealing with the development of Ukrainian culture, the author constantly insists on giving information about the development of Russian culture, mentioning facts from the history of the development of Ukrainian culture only by the way; and even then, in most cases, with a scarcely-restrained hostility and an endeavor to belittle their value. A fine specimen of the author's allegedly scientific method is his reference to the *Istoriya Rusov*, a most interesting anonymous political pamphlet written in Russian, but of Ukrainian origin and Ukrainian orientation, which was printed in 1846, i. e., some half century after it was written. *Istoriya Rusov* is an original and unusual denunciation of Russian centralist despotism and its criminal record in the Ukraine. Yastrebov, however, does not even mention this most important side of the *Istoriya Rusov*, which, incidentally, exerted a great influence on Shevchenko. Yastrebov says:

This work contains a favorable estimation of the reunification with Russia, but at the same time is permeated with the nationalist idea that the Kievan Rus is identical with the Ukraine and that the historical development of the Russian people had its origin in the Ukraine. This idea was caught up by the nationalist historians of the Ukraine and later on developed in the works of the bourgeois-nationalist historian M. Hrushevsky (p. 459).

He makes, of course, no attempt to substantiate his statement that the Kievan Rus is not identical with the Ukraine, and of course, the young reader in the Ukraine, where there is no other literature available just as there exists no scientific criticism, takes all these statements for granted.

We ourselves are witnesses to the fact that the Bolsheviks have in recent years rehabilitated many formerly proscribed Russian writers and are again considering their creative work as being part of the Russian cultural heritage. They have, for instance, republished Leskov, whom before they branded as a reactionary, and even Dostoevsky, who wrote the most malicious satire on Bolshevism in its prototype, the *Nechaevshchina* (*Besy*, *The Demons*). Now they are trying to make him popular even in the Ukraine. For instance, the Soviet press reported lately the opening of a book exhibition in the libraries, institutions of learning and houses of culture of the city of Kiev in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of Dostoevsky's death and dedicated to his memory.³² Furthermore, the Russian Bolsheviks have amnestied the not so long ago proscribed "counterrevolutionaries" S. Yesenin, Ivan Bunin and others.³³ Yet Yastrebov even now unhesitatingly denies one of the most prominent figures in, and creators of, Ukrainian culture of the 19th century,

³² *Ukrainski visti* (Ukrainian News), Feb. 23, 1956, p. 10; V. Aleksandrova, *75-letie so dnya smerti Dostoevskogo* (The 75th Anniversary of Dostoevsky's Death), *Sotsialisticheskyy Vestnik* (Socialist Messenger), New York, Nos. 2—3, 1956.

³³ *Ukrainsky Prometey* (Ukrainian Prometheus), Dec. 15, 1955, p. 3.

Panteleymon Kulish, any part in the history of this culture and, moreover, defames and slanders him. About Oles, Vynnychenko, etc., we shall not even speak. His mention of them is purely abusive.

Now let us take a look at section 9 of Chapter XI, with goes by the title of "The Development of Ukrainian Culture in the Second Half of the 19th Century." This is a continuation of the preceding section and has been written by the same author. Here, too, there is a lengthy introduction dealing with Russian writers, to whom the following space is devoted (pp. 541—558):

Chernyshevsky	30 lines
Saltykov-Shchedrin	18 "
Nekrasov	29 "
Tolstoy	18 "
Ostrovsky	10 "
Turgenev	15 "
Chekhov	13 "
Uspensky	10 "
Dobrolyubov	15 "
Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov jointly	33 "
<hr/>	
Total	191 lines

All of it is invariably emphasized in the following manner:

The Trans-Carpathian Ukrainians longed for a reunification with the Ukraine and for the establishment of close relations with the Russian brother-nation. In the second half of the 19th century the advanced Ukrainian youth of Trans-Carpathia read the works of the great Russian and Ukrainian writers A. S. Pushkin, T. H. Shevchenko, N. V. Gogol and A. S. Griboedov (p. 550).

All the above-listed Russian writers are, no doubt, the most distinguished representatives of Russian literature and criticism of the second half of the 19th century. We value their talent as we value many Western writers, but what is their relation to the "development of Ukrainian culture in the second half of the 19th century"?

True, at a cursory glance, matters appear in a somewhat better light in this section. There is mention of many Ukrainian writers, as, for instance, Marko Vovchok, S. V. Rudansky, Osyp-Yury Fedkovych, I. S. Nechuy-Levytsky, P. Y. Rudchenko (Panas Myrny), M. P. Starytsky, I. I. Manzhura, Olga Kobylanska, M. M. Kotsyubynsky, I. Karpenko-Kary, I. Franko, P. A. Hrabovsky and Lesya Ukrainka. Together they are conceded approximately 360 lines. But this is again only apparently so. In the large paragraph on Marko Vovchok, for instance, almost half of the space is taken up with renderings of Dobrolyubov's articles, a good deal of it is devoted to Turgenev and only very little of it remains for Marko Vovchok herself. So it is in many cases. Everywhere the author looks first of all for some influence by Russian writers on Ukrainian writers. Further on he gives whole pages (especially pp. 554—558)

to a survey of the achievements of Russian learning and culture. Here again he presents a catalogue of names taken from the history of the development of Russian culture. Yet at the same time we can find here no mention of many names connected with the development of Ukrainian culture or of many important facts in the history of its development; even if we do, such references are restricted to two or three words devoid of any significance or to depreciative remarks and rude abuse. Instead, we read here about the "great Russian painter V. I. Surikov, who created realistic monumental paintings on historical subjects" (p. 552); about the "famous painter V. M. Vasnetsov (1848—1926), who took the themes for his paintings from Russian popular fairy-tales" (p. 552); about the "Russian composer of genius P. I. Tchaikovsky (1840—1893)" and about the "prominent composers A. S. Dargomyzhsky, A. N. Serov, and others," who "contributed greatly to the treasury of Russian music" (p. 553). Here we meet also Balakirev, Moussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov and Cui, who... with the active support of V. V. Stasov, struggled "for the national character and picturesqueness of Russian music" (p. 553). Here there is mention also of the chemist D. I. Mendeleev, who was "ardently in favor of building factories in Russia" (p. 554), of the "founder of the Russian school of physics, A. G. Stoletov" (p. 554), of the "well-known Russian physicist N. A. Umov" (p. 555), of P. L. Chebyshev, who "gained glory in the field of Russian mathematical research" (p. 555), of the astronomer F. A. Bredikhin (p. 555), of K. A. Timiryazev (p. 555), of the "gifted Russian scholar" I. M. Sechenov (p. 555), who receives as many as 16 lines, and of the "great Russian scientist I. I. Mechnikov," whose share extends to 17 lines (p. 556); furthermore, there is talk of the surgeon N. V. Sklifosovsky, who "did gigantic work in organizing the medical disciplines in Russia" (p. 556), the "Russian scientist" A. S. Popov, the inventor of wireless telegraphy (p. 556), and so on.

Even the famous mathematician Mykhaylo Vasylyovych Ostrohradsky (1801—1861), who was born and reared in a village of the district of Kobyl'yaky in the province of Poltava, Yastrebov describes (in the preceding chapter) as a "prominent Russian mathematician" (p. 448). Elsewhere he points out that Ostrohradsky was "one of the founders of Russian mathematics," that in his works he was the first to solve problems of mathematical analysis and "gained a place in the front ranks of universal scholarship for Russian mathematics" (p. 458). Thus writes Yastrebov, an expert on the history of Ukrainian culture, in spite of the fact that Ostrohradsky's Soviet biographer B. V. Hnyedyenko wrote several years before him (in *Uspekhi matematicheskikh nauk* [Achievements in Mathematics], 1951, vol. VI, p. 24) that Ostrohradsky "...spent almost every summer in his native province of Poltava. There he spoke Ukrainian to his heart's desire."³⁴

Ostrohradsky's biography tells us also that, when lecturing on mathematics at St. Petersburg University, he often used Ukrainian words "when he wanted to stress the essence of his idea." We also learn that Ostrohradsky's favorite poet was T. H. Shevchenko; that Ostrohradsky and Shevchenko were close friends and that Shevchenko wrote in his diary on April 13 (25), 1858 (on his return from deportation) that the prominent mathematician welcomed

³⁴ We quote from Kh. Ryabokin, *M. Ostrohradsky — Velyky ukrainsky vcheny* (M. Ostrogradsky—a Great Ukrainian Scientist), *Svoboda*, Feb. 1, 1953, pp. 3—4.

him as a fellow-countryman and member of the family who had long been separated from them, and so on.³⁵

This makes it clear enough who and what M. V. Ostrohradsky was. Yet, instead of explaining the tragedy of the Ukrainian people whom the brutal Russifying police system of tsarist Russia had forcibly deprived of their intelligentsia (Shchepkin, Gogol, Ostrohradsky and a great many others), abandoning the masses of the Ukrainian people to want, lawlessness, ignorance and exploitation, Yastrebov manages to write only a few words about Ostrohradsky, stressing even then that "Ostrohradsky was a distinguished Russian mathematician"—in a chapter on the development of Ukrainian culture in the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*. But why "Russian"? Is it because, within the boundaries of the Russian Empire, he wrote and lectured in Russian since, owing to the Russian police regime, the Ukraine was at that time wholly deprived of any opportunity of having her own national schools and of developing learning and culture in the vernacular? In that case Ostrohradsky might just as well be considered a Frenchman: he acquired his mathematical education in Paris (1822—1828), not in Russia, and his early scientific papers were written in French.³⁶

Let us, however, return to our survey of the second chapter. After naming this host of Russian scholars, Yastrebov mentions O. F. Mozhaysky and K. E. Tsiolkovsky, stressing here, too, that "Russia is the fatherland of aviation" (p. 556).³⁷

Yastrebov, the "dogmatist"—to quote Trotsky—"of the Stalin school of falsification," has quite intentionally tried to accentuate the poverty of Ukrainian culture and learning and the great wealth of Russian culture and learning, although in the 17th century Ukrainians were the main organizers of schools and education in the Russian Empire and taught and lectured there. Nowhere does he speak at all clearly of the means employed or the results obtained from the nationalities policy pursued first by the Muscovite tsardom and later by the Russian Empire. Nowhere does he explain the effect produced by the fact that Ukrainians were deprived of their national schools of all types. He fails to mention that the policy of forcible Russification conducted in the Ukraine over more than two centuries retarded the development of Ukrainian culture and learning and systematically separated the educated strata from the Ukrainian national stock, forcing them to sacrifice their strength and their talents on the altar of Russian culture.

True, for "objectivity's" sake he writes in the first chapter:

Tsarism subjected all non-Russian nationalities which inhabited Russia to national oppression. It ignored the existence of the Ukrainian people. Ruthlessly suppressing the Ukrainian culture, the tsarist Government did not permit the Ukrainian language to be used in schools (p. 446).

But this is all. There follows a flood of words about the "traitor" Mazepa (p. 450); about the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists; about the "immense

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ The genius displayed in Lenin's works is emphasized in several passages, e. g., on pp. 560, 713, 722, etc. The greatness of Stalin's works is also mentioned, e. g., on p. 676.

significance such centers of Russian culture as St. Petersburg and Moscow had for the development of Ukrainian culture" (p. 455); about the place in the front ranks "of Russian and universal histrionic art which was occupied in the first half of the 19th century by the Moscow *Maly teatr* (Little Theater), where the great Russian actor M. S. Shchepkin (1788—1863) performed"; while the "birth of a professional theater in the Ukraine in the first half of the 19th century bears witness to the great significance of Russian culture for the development of dramatic art in the Ukraine" (p. 456). The author says that "Shevchenko loved and treasured the Russian language, which was his second mother tongue," that "in the 1840's he wrote in Russian the poems *Trizna* (The Funeral Feast) and *Slepaya* (The Blind Girl), the plays *Nikita Gaidai* and *Nazar Stodolya*, and others. Later on, in deportation, he wrote many works in Russian, of which nine tales have survived: *Naimichka* (The Maid-Servant), *Varnak* (The Vampire), *Knyaginya* (The Princess), *Khudzhnik* (The Painter), *Bliznetsy* (The Twins), *Muzykant* (The Musician) and others. Shevchenko also kept his diary in Russian..." (p. 454).

This is all quite true. But it is only half of the truth; and this half has been tendentiously picked out. The other—and very important—half, namely, the reasons for the above-mentioned phenomena, has been wholly suppressed. Meanwhile, this matter has long ago been scientifically explained—among others by Russians whom chauvinism had not blinded, as, for instance, in the note of the Russian Academy of Sciences entitled *Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskogo pechatnogo slova* (Concerning the Abolition of the Suppression of the Little-Russian Printed Word), which was published at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Valuev decree (1863) and the Ems ukase, issued by Tsar Alexander II in 1876, are both mentioned briefly by Yastrebov: "Minister Valuev's circular letter and the law of 1876 categorically forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in the schools" (p. 540). This is all. No mention is made about the effect these two Russian official decrees had on the development of Ukrainian culture and science, which, despite all police restrictions imposed by the Russian Government, had begun to develop little by little. The author concedes only one sentence to the closing down of the "South-Western Department of the Russian Geographical Society," which took place as a result of the law of 1876; but he does not say clearly why it was closed down. He does not even say that this Department was in Kiev, or that Ukrainian scholars and scientists had gathered around it; nor does he mention their names. He does not say that this closing-down was a significant stage in the process of suppressing the development of Ukrainian learning and science despite the fact that it conducted its business in Russian, since under the Russian absolute monarchy this society could only use the official language, which was Russian.

Instead, the author puts stress on a less important matter of no practical significance, only to have one more occasion to emphasize the word "Russian":

"The prominent Russian pedagogues K. Ushynsky, V. Vodovozov and others spoke and wrote against this prohibition of the use of the Ukrainian language in schools. They demanded that instruction in Ukrainian schools be conducted in the children's native language" (p. 540).³⁸

³⁸ K. D. Ushynsky was, incidentally, a Ukrainian (see *Ukrainsky zbirnyk*, vol. III, p. 80, footnote 11).

He goes on to say that:

"Despite the fact that all advanced learning was persecuted by the tsarist regime, distinguished scholars working in the Ukraine—at the universities of Kiev, Kharkov and Novorossiisk (founded in Odessa in 1865)—in the second half of the 19th century, contributed greatly to science" (p. 540).

To what science? Yastrebov deliberately leaves this question open because this is his "scientific" method. It is intended to make the reader (who is not adequately informed, since under Soviet conditions he has no opportunity of using any but Soviet literature, let alone getting access to sources) believe that the subject in question is Ukrainian scholarship; for this passage is located in the chapter on the "development of Ukrainian culture." Yet the author is actually speaking about Russian scholarship in the Ukraine, since the law of 1876 put insurmountable obstacles in the way of Ukrainian scholarship. Nevertheless, although Yastrebov brings the word "Russian" into prominence wherever this is convenient for him, he omits it in this case, as in many similar cases, quite intentionally.

In 1946 the Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR in Kiev was still publishing its Ukrainian-language bulletin entitled *Visnyk Akademii Arkhitektury Ukrainskoi SSR*.³⁹ Yet the Moscow catalogue of periodical publications for 1956 does not mention this *Visnyk*; it has ceased publication. Instead, we find a book by V. A. Tkachenko published in Russian by this Academy in 1954 and entitled *Arkhitektura sanatorii* (The Designing of a Health Resort).⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to discover information about publications by the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR since, obviously, there are only very few of them. The problems which ought to be investigated by these institutions are, for some reason, being studied by Russian scholars and the results of their studies published by Russian academic institutions—in Russian, of course. Thus, in the catalogue of the second-hand book dealer G. Sabov we found the following Russian-language publications on Ukrainian studies which have not come out in Ukrainian:

(a) Bezsonov: *Arkhitektura Zapadnoi Ukrainy* (Architecture of the Western Ukraine); published by the Academy of Architecture of the USSR; 92 pages and numerous illustrations.

(b) V. G. Pashuto: *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Outline of the History of the Galician-Volhynian Rus); published by the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1950, 328 pages.

(c) *Arkhitektura Andreevskoi tserkvi v Kieve* (Architecture of St. Andrew's Church in Kiev), 1951, text and tables. (The catalogue mentions neither author nor place of publication.)

(d) *Pamyatniki russkogo prava* (Russian Legal Documents), Part I: *Pamyatniki prava Kievskogo gosudarstva* (Legal Documents of the Kievan State), Moscow, 1952, 287 pages. (The catalogue does not mention the publisher.)⁴¹

³⁹ See *Kataloh knyzhok ukrainskykh i karpatorusskykh* (Catalogue of Ukrainian and Carpatho-Russian Books), list No. 3, issued by George Sabov, Slavic Books, Rt. 1, Box 903, Highlands, Lakeland, Fla), No. 306.

⁴⁰ See the afore-mentioned catalogue issued by A. Buschke (List 2/56), No. 30.

⁴¹ See Sabov's catalogue, nos. 190, 192, 251 and 252.

There arises the question why such publications on Ukrainian studies are coming out in Moscow and in Russian, and why not in Kiev and in Ukrainian.

These examples prove once more that we have to deal, not with a chance contingency or exception, but with a system. These are the results of the policy of Russification which is being systematically pursued by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and which aims at an all-out impediment of the cultural and national development of the Ukrainian people as well as of all the other nationalities subjugated in the USSR for the purpose of their de-nationalization.

This systematic Russification of the Ukraine consists not only in the fact that all leading posts in the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) of Education or Culture and also in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR are now occupied by Party members who, being subordinated directly to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, are obedient executors of its orders, but also in the fact that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, having no trust in its bureaucrats in Kiev, has subordinated all universities of the Ukraine to the Moscow Ministry of Higher Education. Most institutes and even a considerable number of technical schools have also been subordinated partly to the Ministry of Higher Education in Moscow and partly to the various special Ministries in Moscow. The extent of this subordination may be seen from Table No. 8. We have taken the absolute figures for this table from the article by V. Feliks, whose sources were *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for May 22, 1954, and *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) for June 17, 1954.⁴²

Table 8

*The Number of Students in the Ukrainian SSR in 1954
and to Whom They Were Subordinated*

Type of School	Subordinated to:		Total
	Moscow	Kiev	
<i>Absolute Figures:</i>			
Universities	213,000	62,000	275,000
Technical Schools . .	83,000	151,000	234,000
Total:	296,000	213,000	509,000
<i>Relative Figures:</i>			
Universities	77.5%	22.5%	100.0%
Technical Schools . .	35.5%	64.5%	100.0%
Total:	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%

⁴² V. Feliks, "Melnikovshchina" *prodovzhuyetsya* (The Melnikov Era Goes On), *Vpered* (Forward), Oct. 1954, p. 2.

As we can see from Table 8, of the total number of 509,000 students at higher and technical schools in the Ukraine, as many as 296,000, i. e., 58.1%, are subordinated immediately to Moscow. And if we take the universities, institutes and colleges alone, then of their total number of 296,000 students, all of 213,000, i. e., 77.5%, are subordinated to central offices in Moscow. This means that 77.5% of the students at all the institutes of higher education and 35.0% of the students at all the technical schools in the Ukrainian SSR are being instructed in totally Russified institutions of learning, which, although situated geographically in the Ukraine, are subordinated directly to Moscow. Moscow runs these institutions of education as it sees fit for itself. It makes use of graduates from the universities and technical schools within its sphere of control exactly as it wishes, sending them after graduation where they are needed for further Russification and the interests of the Russian economy.

The university level and technical schools in the Ukraine are not the only ones subordinated to the ministries in Moscow which are conducting systematic Russifying activities among the population of the Ukraine. In the Ukraine there are also a number of elementary schools—we have at present no information on their exact number—which, too, are subordinated directly to, and controlled and managed by, Moscow. We learned this from a speech delivered by deputy O. V. Kvitka of the Stalino Oblast at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 26, 1955. This deputy, *Radyanska Ukraina* reports, raised the question “of the transfer of those schools of elementary education which are now under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications [of the USSR] to the ministries of education of the Union [national] republics.”⁴³

Apparently no such solution of this question has been adopted, since we have been unable to find any announcement to that effect.

The Transfer of Ukrainian Specialists and Scholars from the Ukraine

Virnyk writes:

Russian scholars are taking a very active part in the work of the Academy of Sciences and other scientific institutions of the Ukrainian SSR, while Ukrainian scholars, for their part, are contributing considerably to the development of learning in the other Soviet republics. The works of Ukrainian scholars are enriching Soviet and universal science and learning.⁴⁴

How is all this to be understood if looked at in the light of all that was said before? This “idyll” can be understood correctly only when it is set against the background of plain facts. It is, indeed, a plain fact that graduates from the universities even of the Western Ukraine are being sent outside the boundaries of the Ukraine.⁴⁵ Most Ukrainian scientists and specialists are also compelled to leave the Ukraine and to help develop Russian culture.⁴⁶

⁴³ *Radyanska Ukraina*, Dec. 27, 1955, p. 2.

⁴⁴ D. F. Virnyk, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁴⁵ See, for instance, *Vpered*, No. 6 (34), p. 4.

⁴⁶ On Ukrainian scientists working for Moscow institutes see P. Shayenko, *Z nauky i tekhniky* (From the Field of Science and Technology), *Ukrainsky Prometey*, 1956, No. 8, p. 4.

When they are sent to any of the other national republics of the USSR, they are, in addition, forced to help carry out the Russifying policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

So, for instance, tens of thousands of specialists were taken from the Ukraine in 1954 to Kazakhstan alone. O. Yurchenko, basing his data on Soviet sources, writes that "by the end of March, 1954, the Kiev branch of Moscow will have sent 11,000 mechanization experts" to Kazakhstan for the cultivation of the virgin and fallow lands.⁴⁷ On the basis of data furnished by *Radyanska Ukraina* for March 31, 1954, the newspaper *Ukrainski Visti* (Ukrainian News) states that 22,000 have been transported from the Ukraine to Kazakhstan.⁴⁸

Vsevolod Holub, on the basis of more recent figures published in the Soviet press, writes: "Before the harvesting season [1954], 40,000 young mechanizers were forced to leave the Ukraine."⁴⁹ This number constitutes 10% of those 400,000 specialists who, according to Virnyk, had received their training after the war. These 10% were taken away from the Ukraine in the course of only half a year. Thus tens of thousands of mechanization experts, i.e., drivers, tractor and combine operators, all kinds of technicians and, of course, engineers, have been sent to Kazakhstan. Ostensibly, they went voluntarily; actually they were forced to go. In addition to these 40,000 mechanizers, agronomists,⁵⁰ medical personnel⁵¹ and probably also other specialists that were needed there were also sent from the Ukraine in 1954.

We would emphasize that these figures refer to a part of 1954 only. The mass deportation of specialists from the Ukraine is no fiction. The details given above have been taken from official Soviet sources. There is no reason, of course, to deny that the overwhelming majority of these specialists were of an inferior category, but the higher category specialists among them must also be counted by thousands. For it is a fact that an army of lower-category specialists is as a rule unable to work satisfactorily without a sufficient number of executive personnel, i.e., of higher-category specialists, just as an army cannot operate without adequate numbers of highly-qualified personnel.

Those Ukrainian scientists and experts who remain in the Ukraine are forced—for lack of Ukrainian scientific publications—to contribute to Russian publications and to write their papers in Russian. They are also better advised to read their lectures at the higher institutions of learning in Russian so as to escape being branded "bourgeois nationalists" and thus becoming candidates for deportation to concentration camps.

As to Russian specialists and scientists who are sent to the Ukraine to replace those Ukrainians who have been taken away from the Ukraine or have been forced to flee from their motherland because of the anti-Ukrainian

⁴⁷ *Deyaki pidsumky ta vysnovky* (Summaries and Conclusions), *Meta* (Goal), 1954, No. 4 (8).

⁴⁸ *Ukrainski Visti*, Neu-Ulm, 1954, Nos. 33—34 (808—809), p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Vpered*, 1954, No. 12 (49), p. 3.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, *Suchasna Ukraina*, May 9, 1954, p. 4: *Z sovyetskoi presy* (From the Soviet Press).

⁵¹ See, for instance, *Ukrainski Visti*, May 20, 1954, p. 4, on the departure of "58 medical workers" from Dnepropetrovsk alone.

terror (disguised as a struggle against "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism"), they conduct all their work—the reading of lectures at institutions of advanced education and the writing of articles and treatises—in Russian. (This is well illustrated by the information we discussed above concerning the language of the publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for 1953.) This means that Russian scholars, on arriving in the Ukraine, fulfill the function of Russifiers, regardless of whether they wish to or not. Through their work in the Ukraine they are helping to retard the development of a Ukrainian scientific and technical terminology. Their children, too, remain Russians, since Russian schools are being established for their benefit even in those parts of the Ukraine where there never were Russian schools before—in Lvov, Chernovtsy, etc. On the other hand, those Ukrainians who have been taken outside the Ukraine and are compelled to use only Russian in their new places of residence and outside their homes and whose children have no Ukrainian schools at their disposal must needs become gradually assimilated and de-nationalized.

The Russification of Universities and Specialized Schools

Virnyk writes:

In the course of these years [evidently the years after World War II] in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR alone 25 institutions of higher education have been established, including the first state university in the history of Trans-Carpathia—that at Uzhgorod, which has four faculties.

Twenty-one thousand students are attending the twelve institutions of higher education at Lvov—all of them children of workers, kolkhozniks and the intelligentsia...

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have devoted special care to the development of Soviet science and culture in the Western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. At Lvov a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR has been organized consisting of four research institutes; a branch of the V. I. Lenin Museum has also been opened there. The Soviet state is releasing considerable funds to enable scientific work at institutions in Lvov to be fully developed. During the Soviet regime, Lvov has become an important scientific and cultural center of the Soviet Ukraine. There are 1,500 scholars in Lvov, including 12 members and corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, over 70 doctors and about 500 *kandidaty* (the academic degree next below the doctorate) in various disciplines and associate professors (*dotsenty*). In addition, the chief town in every oblast of the Western and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine is fast becoming a center of higher education and of scientific research work.⁵²

We do not doubt that Virnyk's data concerning the number of higher schools, scholars, etc., is quite correct; but he does not explain just what "Soviet science and culture" is being supported in the Western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government. For some reason, he leaves it unexplained whether the

⁵² D. F. Virnyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 169 and 172.

"Soviet science and culture" in question are Russian "Soviet science and culture" or Ukrainian "Soviet science and culture."

Virnyk does not say, for instance, how many professors and lecturers at the institutions of higher education of the western oblasts of the Ukraine deliver lectures on the several courses nor in what language. We know from practice (which at the time we had occasion to observe closely with our own eyes) that until the death of M. Skrypnyk, People's Commissar of Education, in the summer of 1933, the higher schools of the Ukraine were being gradually Ukrainized or, in other words, de-Russified. The number of lectures delivered at these institutions in Ukrainian increased despite stubborn resistance from certain professors whose attitude toward the Ukrainian language was one of contempt and hostility. Until 1933 there had even appeared an ever-increasing number of Ukrainian-language manuals for students of higher schools. These manuals had been either written in Ukrainian or translated from foreign languages. But after the utter havoc suffered by the Ukraine during the Postyshev era, after Skrypnyk's death and the purge of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Ukrainian-language lectures disappeared from all the non-humanistic faculties of the higher schools of the Ukraine. We ourselves observed this in Kharkov and, according to the evidence supplied by other people, this was the case in other cities of the Ukraine also. Since 1933 no Ukrainian-language manuals for students at university level in the Ukrainian SSR have been written or printed. Only some manuals were left for the departments of Ukrainian philology, Ukrainian literature, etc.,—but only for appearances' sake. At the same time as lectures in Ukrainian were discontinued at higher (especially technical) schools in the Ukraine, thousands of Ukrainian professors and authors of Ukrainian-language scientific papers and handbooks for students at university level simply disappeared. In 1933 alone the number of scientific workers employed in scientific research institutions in the Ukrainian SSR was reduced, as already stated, by 1,649, i.e., by 16.4%, as a result of "purges of class-hostile elements." One thousand six hundred and forty-nine persons who had required many years of training and who had been specially selected for research work were lost to the Ukraine during one year alone, and this was neither the beginning nor the end of the havoc wrought among the ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Within the period 1932—1940 alone, the number of scientific workers in the Ukraine decreased (as stated above on page 78) from 10,063 to 5,000.

Let us, however, return to the matter of the language in which lectures are delivered at institutions of higher education in the Ukrainian SSR. Here we find some strange things, as for instance, when a group of French students visited Kharkov in 1954. They had not enough time to carry out a close examination of the work of Kharkov University or to learn what language was principally used by the lectures. Yet, from what one of the participants in this brief visit states, it appears that students at Kharkov University were even afraid to use the Ukrainian language freely in conversation.

He writes:

We had a social meeting with Kharkov students, most of whom were girls. For some reason, they were very shy and bashful. Although the University premises were, of course, familiar to them, they took up their

position along the walls and spoke neither to one another nor to us. It took some time before we could establish contact with them. I spent five minutes among them and put questions to them in Ukrainian, to which they replied in Russian. The whole atmosphere of this meeting was cool and there was no enthusiasm or liveliness in our talk. While the students of Moscow University felt themselves to be masters, these looked like orphans.

In the final result, I came across more in Kharkov that was Russian than Ukrainian. Our talk with Ukrainians at Moscow University was much more interesting than it was here. I told the students that this astonished me; I also told them that I was very much interested in everything Ukrainian, that at the Paris Institute of Foreign Languages, where lessons were given in 43 languages, I had chosen Ukrainian and Russian for my studies, and that this was why I was so greatly interested in everything Ukrainian. This enlivened the girls a little. They began asking me whether I studied Ukrainian literature, what work I was reading, etc. . . .

Only after long conversations did the students lose some of their timidity, the author says. "They asked me to tell them about France and began putting questions to me, and only then did we all speak Ukrainian with animation."⁵³

Such a phenomenon would hardly be possible if Kharkov University were a truly Ukrainian cultural center, and not a fortress of Russification established here by force.

Since the above-stated situation does actually exist and has been observed, it is irrefutable proof and evidence that, under the guise of "independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR," there reigns a colonial regime of national oppression in the Ukraine.⁵⁴

The Russification of institutions of advanced education in the entire Ukraine is also proved by an official document which appeared during the struggle for power which was going on inside the Party for some months after Stalin's death. The confusion arising from this conflict caused a brief paralysis and a certain weakening in the activities of Moscow's terroristic apparatus. What we have in mind is the resolution passed at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in June 1953, which contains the following passage:

The Plenum has found that the task of leading and managing the western oblasts of the Ukraine has been carried out unsatisfactorily by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine as well as by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The Plenum stated that the Bureau of the Central Committee and the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Com-

⁵³ Yurko Turkevych, *Ya buv v Ukraini v 1954 rotsi* (I was in the Ukraine in 1954), *Vpered*, Oct. 1955, pp. 7—8.

⁵⁴ See, for instance, the materials collected in the following books: Semen Pidhayny, *Ukrainska inteligentsiya na Solovkakh: spohady z 1933—1941* (The Ukrainian Intelligentsia on the Solovki Islands: Memoirs, 1933—1941), *Prometey*, 1947; D. Solovey, *op. cit.*; and D. Lobay, *Neperemozhna Ukraina: Fakty pro borotbu Moskovy z ukrainskym natsionalizmom na kulturnomu fronti po druhiy svitoviy viyni* (The Invincible Ukraine: Facts About Moscow's Struggle Against Ukrainian Nationalism on the Cultural Front After World War II), Winnipeg, 1950.

rade Melnikov, have distorted the Lenin-Stalin nationalities policy of our Party in their practical work. These distortions manifested themselves in the vicious practice of nominating for the most part functionaries from other parts of the Ukrainian SSR to responsible positions in the western oblasts of the Ukraine, and also in the introduction of Russian into West Ukrainian institutions of higher education as the language in which lectures and lessons are to be given.⁵⁵

V. Feliks, on the basis of official announcements in the press of the Ukrainian SSR concerning admissions during 1953 to institutions of higher education, presents the following results of his calculations by way of illustration:

In the whole of the Ukraine 77.7% of all institutions of higher education and 38.7% of all technical schools have been Russified, which means that they have been switched over to Russian. In Kiev itself 81% of all institutions of higher education and technical schools have been Russified. In the Western Ukraine all institutions of higher education and 82% of all technical schools have been Russified.

These figures may not be absolutely accurate since they were arrived at by means of the selective method; but there is no doubt that they come very close to reflecting the real situation. The author adds to his results the following very important remark: "In the Ukrainian SSR only agricultural and pedagogical higher schools are still primarily Ukrainian in character, but by no means all of them. Ukrainization prevails in the country, not in the big cities."⁵⁶

After the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine had passed the resolution of June 1953, the Minister of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR, K. Z. Lytvyn, delivered, according to *Radianska Ukraina* for June 20, 1953, a report at a meeting of the Party nucleus of the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR, in which he spoke about the question of "removing the grave shortcomings and mistakes which were pointed out by the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine." He remarked that "the holding of lectures and classes at institutions of higher education and at special secondary schools in Russian" was to be discontinued.⁵⁷

In the editorial of its issue for June 28, 1953, *Radianska Ukraina* printed the following passage:

As was pointed out by the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in many institutions of higher education in the Ukraine, especially in the western oblasts, the importance of the Ukrainian language has been underestimated and lectures in most subjects have been given in Russian... The foremost duty of directors of institutions of higher education and also of Party organizations is to put a resolute end to this underestimation of the Ukrainian language at institutions of higher education and to issue instructions for lessons to be given in the native language.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Quoted from V. Feliks' article, *Rozvytok politychnoi revolyutsii na Ukraini* (Development of the Political Revolution in the Ukraine), *Vpered*, Sept. 1953, p. 4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Quoted from V. Feliks, "*Melnikovshchina*" *prodovzhuyetsya*.

As we can see, the wording of all these utterances, both oral and written, is very careful; they do not name the body that is really to blame for the forcible Russification of the Ukrainian population and the setback in the development of Ukrainian science—namely, the Politburo. The fact, however, of Russification and of the harm caused by it is clearly indicated by these documents.

This new state of affairs, however, lasted for only a brief interval, and after the summer of 1953 everything soon returned to the *status quo* before Stalin's death.

Nothing is said in Soviet publications, including Virnyk's book, about the language in which students' handbooks are mostly written. Thus, for instance, in the article already mentioned Lyubchenko merely says that "in the plan for the academic year 1954—1955, 450 manuals and reference books for institutions of higher education and technical schools in the Ukraine are scheduled for publication."

In the Ukraine there are institutes for the study of foreign languages. One can, however, find little evidence that there exist good Ukrainian manuals or expertly composed Ukrainian dictionaries of foreign languages for their use. There is neither a Ukrainian-French and French-Ukrainian dictionary of, at least, medium quality nor a Ukrainian-German and German-Ukrainian dictionary. True, in 1929 the State Publishing House of the Ukraine published the rather good, though not very large, German-Ukrainian Dictionary compiled by I. Sharovolsky "after directives issued by the First Department of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences." The publication of this dictionary was not, however, a result of the solicitude of the Bolshevik regime. On the contrary, this regime very soon destroyed it on a charge of "bourgeois nationalism" at the same time as it destroyed the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. During World War II a Ukrainian-German dictionary by Y. Rudnytsky and Z. Kuzelya was published—outside the Ukraine.

Things were more fortunate with the English dictionary, and even this, probably, only for the reason that an American UNRRA mission was operating in the Ukraine in 1946; for only as late as in 1948 were M. L. Podvezko's 50,000-word English-Ukrainian Dictionary and subsequently the same author's Ukrainian-English Dictionary issued. This is all that has been achieved in this field in three and a half decades.

With very few exceptions there are no Ukrainian-language manuals for that multitude of special institutes and higher schools of the Ukrainian SSR which are mentioned by Lyubchenko and of which, according to him, there are as many as 147. Their composition and publication is being intentionally impeded since they are not in accord with the "general line of the Party."

Apart from creating a setback in the development of the Ukrainian scientific and technical language, this circumstance is at the same time an obstacle in the process of instructing Ukrainian youth. It creates additional difficulties for them and puts them at a great disadvantage in comparison with their Russian counterparts. In his article in *Radyanska Ukraina*, Lyubchenko mentions, among other things, the considerable number of unsatisfactory marks received during the first term of the academic year

1953—54 by first-year students of several institutes. We give examples in the following table.⁵⁹

*Percentage of First-Year Students who Received Unsatisfactory Marks
during the First Term of the Academic Year 1953—54*

1. Rovno Institute of Pedagogics	11.7%
2. Belaya Tserkov Institute of Foreign Languages	13.0%
3. Odessa Institute of Technology	14.7%
4. Poltava Institute for Agricultural Engineers	18.0%

Unfortunately, Lyubchenko does not give the percentage of first-term students who are being eliminated from the higher schools of the Ukraine for having failed to obtain adequate results or compare it with corresponding data for the higher schools of the RSFSR. Furthermore, he does not dare to speak openly about the reason for this regrettable phenomenon, since he wrote his article in 1954. Only one year earlier, however, in the summer of 1953, *Radyanska Ukraina* was able to state the following openly in its editorial of June 28:

Most manuals for use in higher schools were also issued in Russian, particularly those dealing with specialized disciplines. Quite naturally, this circumstance hampered the studies of thousands of students and had a detrimental effect upon their progress.⁶⁰

Virnyk keeps silent, of course, about all these things.

For us the authoritative statement which the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine made at its session in June 1953 and which was later repeated by Minister Lytvyn and by the editorial of *Radyanska Ukraina* is sufficient. Let us add to it the following facts, which have come to our knowledge and which illustrate conditions in the Western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. The first fact: On December 24, 1955, RATAU (Soviet Telegraphic Agency of the Ukraine) reported that *Mineralogicheskyy sbornik*, No. 9, was issued in Lvov in Russian.⁶¹ This is obviously a technical journal of which nine issues so far have been published, probably over a period of nine years. *Naukovi zapysky Lvivskoho derzhavnoho universytetu im. Iv. Franka* (Academic Bulletin of the Ivan Franko State University in Lvov) for 1949 (vol. IV: Astronomy), though the title is in Ukrainian, is composed, as Prof. Kh. Ryabokin testifies, exclusively of articles in Russian. We have before our own eyes the *Astronomicheskyy sbornik* (Astronomic Symposium), Publishing House of the State University in Lvov, vol. II, 1954, which was published as vol. XXXII in the series *Uchenye zapiski Lvovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni Ivana Franko* (Academic Bulletin of the Ivan Franko State University in Lvov). The title of this symposium is also given in Ukrainian on a separate leaf, but all the nine articles it contains as well as the list of contents are printed exclusively in Russian.

Another feature of this book deserves our attention. The cover page as well as the inside title-pages (in Russian and Ukrainian) are marked, MVO SSSR (Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR), *Lvovsky Gosudarstvenny*

⁵⁹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, July 6, 1954, p. 3.

⁶⁰ Quoted from V. Feliks, "Melnikovshchina" *prodovzhuyetsya*.

⁶¹ *Svoboda*, Feb. 2, 1956, p. 4.

Universitet im. Iv. Franko. This means that the Ivan Franko University in Lvov is subordinated, not to the ministry in Kiev, but directly to the ministry in Moscow. Most of the professors of Lvov University have been sent from Moscow and, of course, they deliver their lectures in Russian. This is confirmed by the volumes of *Uchenye zapiski* of Lvov University which were issued in December 1954 and in 1949, about both of which we have reliable information that they were published in Russian. Finally, there is Lazarenko's book, mentioned above, entitled *Opredelitel listvennykh mkhov Ukrainy*, which is printed in Russian.

In conclusion we would point out that we have nowhere chanced upon traces of any scientific works from the same fields of knowledge published in Ukrainian.

Russification Accompanied by Russian Colonization

Obvious traces of Russification have been revealed in the Western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, where Russian ethnic elements had never existed before. For us, the significance of this process is quite obvious since we have had occasion to witness such phenomena with our own eyes. The explanation is that Russification on such a large scale is accompanied by extensive colonization, which relies on the ruthless application of military force. We shall adduce some evidence taken from foreign sources which cannot be said to be biased in favor of the Ukrainians and their struggle for liberation.

On January 8, 1956, the Polish emigre newspaper *Ostatnie Wiadomości* (Latest News) published for instance, the following information:

In Lvov... the Polish population has been pushed out to the periphery of the city, and its center has been flooded with Russians.

In Droboych... one can often hear people speaking Polish and Ukrainian in the town. But in the villages, kolkhozes and sovkhoses the majority of the people are Russians brought here from distant parts of the Soviet Union and Ukrainians from the region of the Dnieper...

It is strange at first to read about "Russians brought from distant parts of the Soviet Union" who now constitute the majority of the rural population. But this information is probably quite correct since this topic has also been taken up by Soviet writers in their literary works. In one of its issues, for instance, *Lvivska Pravda* mentioned a play by Mykhaylo Biryuk of Lvov, which was staged at a theater in Lvov. Its title is *Na vysokiy polonyni* (On the Mountain Pasture) and it tells about the "daughter-in-law Fedora, a kolkhoz worker from Kostroma, who came to the Carpathians to help the Gutsuls build a new life."⁶² *Radyanska Ukraina* for September 24, 1955 published a review of Ivan Tsyupa's tale *Na zustrich doli* (Meeting Fate Halfway), from which the reader learns that the Russian Vladimir Ryazantsev, after his discharge from the army (which at the same time reveals what units are stationed in the Western Ukraine), stayed on to work in the Western Ukraine and "told the [Ukrainian] workers there about what their fellow-

⁶² *Suchasna Ukraina*, June 20, 1954, p. 4.

countryman Ivan Franko had been daydreaming about.”⁶³ Though these things are presented to the reader in an “idyllic” environment, though they show an undisguised tendentiousness (it appears that the Russians came to teach the ignorant Ukrainians!) and have been taken by us from literary works, yet there is no doubt that they reflect a real fact: the colonization of the Western Ukraine by Great Russians from the RSFSR.

Similarly, in 1953 the magazine *Ukraina*, which is published in Paris under the editorship of Prof. Illya Borshchak, reported, *inter alia*, the following:

In the Moscow illustrated weekly *Ogonek* (No. 25) we chanced upon a well-done photograph with the legend: “At the Dimitrov Kolkhoz, in the Trans-Carpathian region of the Ukrainian SSR. The field team-leader reads the newspaper to the kolkhozniks during midday break.” A beautiful landscape; handsome Ukrainian girls and boys sit around the reader, who holds the open newspaper, the title of which has come out so well on the photograph. This article is *Zakarpatskaya Ukraina* (Trans-Carpathian Ukraine). This means that they read Russian newspapers to kolkhozniks in the Carpathian Ukraine, which had never belonged to the USSR.⁶⁴

Yet we have just learned from the newspaper *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word) that in the Trans-Carpathian Oblast they are now publishing the Russian-language newspaper *Sovetskoe Zakarpatye* (Soviet Trans-Carpathia).⁶⁵ It seems that, with the progress of Russification, the title *Zakarpatskaya Ukraina* (1949) had proved too “nationalistic” and was changed to *Sovetskoe Zakarpatye* (1956).

Now let us quote some more extracts from *Ostatnie Wiadomości*:

All oil works [at Drohobych] are guarded by special military units. The headquarters and staff of these units are billeted at Drohobych in a new building erected near the old defense headquarters. This building, together with the whole of Lishnyanska Street, is occupied by barracks. The presence of these Soviet detachments reminds one constantly of an occupation . . .

In Stry, the construction of a modern gas-distributing center has been completed. Through this center pass the gas-mains to Kiev and to Mukachev in the Carpathian Ukraine. In this center, all leading positions and office jobs are occupied by Russians.

Military detachments and Soviet soldiers are the most privileged section of the population of Drohobych and Stry . . .⁶⁶

Meanwhile, Virnyk writes in idyllic tones:

...In the oil, gas and osocerite industries of Cis-Carpathia, Russian, Azerbaidzhani and other workers, engineers and technicians are toiling side by side with Ukrainians. Here, in the toiling heroism of the oil workers of the Borislav district, the creative friendship between the workers of different nationalities manifests itself with special vigor . . . (pp. 124—125).

⁶³ *Svoboda*, Nov. 29, 1955, p. 7.

⁶⁴ *Nashe slovo*, London, Jan. 1956, p. 4.

⁶⁵ *Ukraina, ukrainoznavstvo i frantsuzke kulturne zhyttya* (The Ukraine, Ukrainian Studies and French Cultural Life), Paris, 1949, No. 1, p. 57.

⁶⁶ *Svoboda*, Jan. 26, 1956, p. 3.

As can be seen, Russians, Azerbaidzhani and others have arrived in such masses in the Western oblasts of the Ukraine (where these ethnic groups have never been settled before) and have become so vexatious for the local population that Virnyk finds himself compelled to mention this phenomenon, giving it a false idyllic coloring. Here it may be pointed out that Virnyk speaks of large numbers of alien workers being employed also in other parts of the Ukraine. They are being brought there in great numbers for the obvious purpose of enforcing the process of Russification among the Ukrainian population, while hundreds of thousands of the native population are being transferred to other regions of the USSR. Virnyk says, for instance: "At the hydroelectric power plant of Kakhovka (in the Southern Ukraine) representatives of many dozens of the nationalities of the USSR are working shoulder to shoulder. There they are organizing workers' "friendship of peoples brigades" (p. 153).

The object in creating such a Tower of Babel is obvious. The Party and the Government of the USSR are trying to intermix the various nationalities in order to speed up the process of Russification and, at the same time, to fill the territories of the national republics, first of all the Ukraine, to capacity with settlers, just as chauvinistic Polish governmental circles did not so long ago in Galicia and in Volhynia, having in view the Polonization of these non-Polish territories and, as a more immediate objective, the consolidation of groups of Polish colonists who would serve the Government as "eyes and ears."

Virnyk accompanies all these facts with the sweet and—in view of the real state of affairs—provocative refrain:

The Russian people is our elder brother, who rallies around himself the whole amicable family of the peoples of the USSR (p. 152).

The Russian socialist culture exerts a beneficial influence on all branches of the socialist culture of the Ukrainian people (p. 175).

A free life is blossoming for the working people of the western oblasts of the Ukraine (p. 165).

Finally we shall adduce the testimony furnished by a person who recently (after 1952) left Uzhgorod. This witness is familiar with the old as well as the new Uzhgorod. He has closely watched all the changes that have taken place there since the war. These are his own words:

Uzhgorod, capital of the Carpathian Ukraine, had nearly 35,000 inhabitants before the war. Now its population amounts to 100,000. This increase is due exclusively to the establishment of the Soviet regime in the Carpathian Ukraine. Thousands of Soviet employees (mostly Party functionaries), clerks of Soviet offices, technical personnel for local industrial enterprises and trade-union workers with everything they need "to reorganize the capitalist economy along socialist lines" have come here from the central and southern oblasts of the USSR and from the Ukraine. Some of them, namely those who occupied responsible posts, were given modern apartments of three, four or even six rooms, while the small fry settled down as they were used to at home: five or six in one or two rooms. Even if we take into consideration that the approximately 4,000 local citizens who have so far been deported from Uzhgorod belonged for the most part to the "capitalist strata of the population," i. e., possessed spacious apartments, even then we can well imagine the acuteness of the housing shortage in Uzhgorod.

Then he speaks about the troops:

Uzhgorod always was a border town. Previously it had five military barracks, including those on Domanyska Street, which were built by the Czechs. On the establishment of the Soviet regime, the number of barracks increased to twelve. Many buildings which before had been in private possession were turned into barracks...

As for the total number of soldiers in Uzhgorod, this amounts to between ten and twelve thousand. This number does not include about 5,000 troops that are stationed in the environs of the town within a radius of 12 kilometers.

In an article entitled "The Strategic Soviet Base," published on April 4, 1956, in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Zygmund Nagorski describes how Trans-Carpathia was turned after the end of World War II into a provisioning base for Soviet troops, how it is crammed with Soviet military garrisons and how its borders are especially closely guarded.⁶⁷

Concluding his article on Soviet Uzhgorod, the author adduces one more interesting detail: "... in every institution, in every office the situation is such that for each six members of the staff that have come here from the central raions of the USSR, there are only two from among the local population."⁶⁸

Thus, the Russification of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR has been accompanied by a process of Russian colonization, and this colonization is founded on military force. This is the conclusion which must be drawn from the facts.

These are, of course, only isolated items of information which have penetrated the Iron Curtain and which we have come upon by chance, but they fit the facts which were collected and grouped earlier. The official bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa had very good grounds when it stated in 1954:

Such cities as Kiev and Kharkov are being rapidly Russified, and it looks as if the Soviet leaders were purposefully reducing the Ukrainian national element to a minimum, restricting it ever more and more to the rural regions.⁶⁹

Even this, however, is not quite accurate. As we demonstrated above, in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR even rural life is being subjected to Russification. Thousands of Party members who were sent there specially to occupy executive positions are working on this project.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, thousands of the local people are being transported beyond the borders of the Ukraine and dispersed; some of them (of whom we shall speak on another occasion) are being simply liquidated. According to all the relevant data, this process is being carried out on a very large scale. *Sotsialisticheskyy*

⁶⁷ *Svoboda*, April 12, 1956, p. 2.

⁶⁸ *Sovjetsky Uzhhorod* (Soviet Uzhgorod), *Ukrainsky zbirnyk*, vol. I, Munich, 1954, pp. 78—79.

⁶⁹ *Ukrainsky Holos*, Winnipeg, Sept. 22, 1954, p. 1.

⁷⁰ *Ukrainski Visti*, Dec. 15, 1949, published, for instance, the information (which it had taken from the Soviet press) that 14,000 agitators were engaged in Lvov in carrying out a concrete political campaign.

Vestnik (Socialist Buletin), for instance, recently published an article signed "R. A." (obviously the editor, R. Abramovich) which states that, from the territories which were acquired by the USSR after World War II, including the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia (as he learned from reliable sources which he would not name), "from a quarter to one-third of the entire population" is being deported to the concentration camps of the USSR "in an incessant stream."⁷¹

A more detailed analysis of this problem does not come within the scope of the present article. This theme calls for a special and thorough study, which we shall concern ourselves with in the near future.

SUMMARY

I. From an analysis of figures derived from the official catalogue of all central periodical publications of the 16 national republics of the USSR, we can see that:

(a) The Russians, who constitute no more than 51.6% of the population of the USSR, are allotted 72.1% of the Union's periodical publications, while the fifteen other national republics, whose population amounts to 48.4% of the population of the entire Union, are provided for to the extent of a mere 27.9% of all periodical publications published on their territory. Most of them are of a general nature and there are only very few scientific and specialized technical periodicals, and in many of the republics none at all. Furthermore, all publications issued in the non-Russian national republics are considerably smaller in size than corresponding publications in the RSFSR. This is proof that the nationalities policy as conducted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the Government of the USSR is designed to hamper the cultural development of these peoples, to impede the development of their scientific and technical language and the publication of specialized literature, to keep these languages in a state of underdevelopment and constant backwardness and thus to facilitate the process of Russification.

(b) Although Ukrainians constitute nearly 20% of the entire population of the USSR (a proportion equal to 35% of the population of the RSFSR), the percentage of Ukrainian-language periodicals is only one-third as high, i. e., it amounts to only 6.8% of the entire number of periodicals published in the whole of the USSR. If we take scientific and specialized publications, the proportion of those printed in Ukrainian is still more negligible.

(c) The number of scientific and specialized publications is the basic criterion for assessing the level of a people's cultural development. A comparison of Russian-language and Ukrainian-language scientific periodicals issued in the USSR gives a clear picture of the real nationalities policy of

⁷¹ *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* (Socialist Messenger), 1954, No.2, p.39.

the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to the Ukraine: considered on the basis of the total cost of their subscription rates for 1956, Ukrainian-language scientific publications constitute only 3.1% in relation to the same category of Russian-language publications, while the proportion of the population of the Ukrainian SSR (40.6 millions) to that of the RSFSR (112.6 millions) is over ten times as high, i.e., 36%. As regards the employment of human effort in the interests of the Soviet national economy and the value of the material goods produced, the contribution of the Ukrainian SSR represents even more than 36% of that of the RSFSR. State income, as shown in the 1956 budget of the Ukrainian SSR (amounting to 29,460,249,000 rubles), constitutes 39.7% of the corresponding sum for the RSFSR (74,181,000,000 rubles).

(d) There are no Ukrainian-language publications whatever in that group of periodicals which are concerned, for example, with such important branches of the national economy as industry, transport, communications, trade or finance.

II. Materials taken from other sources, after examination and analysis, offer further confirmation of the fact that:

(a) The development of the Ukraine in the field of science and engineering has been checked deliberately and almost completely;

(b) The Ministry of Education and Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, under the control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are working as instruments for the Russification of the Ukraine. Evidence thereof is the language in which publications of the Academy of Sciences are printed and many features of the work of these institutions.

(c) The number of schools in the Ukraine offering instruction at the University level which have been subjected to Russification amounts to 77.7%. Only a few schools—most of them in the country and of minor importance—have not been subjected to this process.

This result has been primarily achieved by the direct subordination to Moscow of 77.5% of all higher institutions of learning (including all the universities) and 35.5% of the "technicums," i.e., specialized and technical schools, in the Ukrainian SSR, which, according to the constitution, is independent and sovereign.

(d) The process of retarding Ukrainian scientific and cultural development and the Russification of University-level schools in the Ukraine are being carried out with all the pressure the Bolshevik apparatus is able to recruit. This is accompanied by incessant propaganda about the "beneficial influence of the socialist culture of the great Russian people on the development of Ukrainian culture" (Virnyk, p. 26).

(e) The Russification of the Ukrainian population goes hand in hand with a mass exportation of Ukrainian specialists and scientists and also of considerable numbers of peasants and workers beyond the borders of the Ukrainian SSR, and an importation of Russian specialists, scientists, administrative personnel recruited from among Party members, military men, etc., into the Ukraine.

This is how the nationalities policy of the former Politburo (now the Presidium of the Central Committee) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union appears when subjected to examination.

Appendix No. 1

List of the Main (Central) Periodicals Published in the Ukrainian SSR During 1956

Note:

1. In the *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga* catalogue (see page 67), only the magazines published in the RSFSR are grouped according to their content. As for those published in the Ukraine, we ourselves have had to put group them on the basis of their titles alone; our grouping, therefore, may sometimes prove not quite accurate.
2. The division of periodicals into linguistic groups is based on the relevant remarks in the catalogue.
3. We have left before the title of each periodical the serial number with which it is marked in the catalogue. This will make it easier to find it in the catalogue.
4. After the title of each periodical we have given the annual number of issues in parentheses.
5. Comparing the information supplied here with that given in *Vpered* (Forward), 1956, No. 1, p. 8, on scientific periodicals published in the Ukraine in 1955, we find that:
 - (a) The quarterlies *Ukrainsky fizychny zhurnal* (Ukrainian Physical Journal), publication of which, according to the *Vpered* reviewer, began in the second half of 1955, and *Heolohichny zhurnal* (Geological Journal) are not included in the catalogue here analyzed. According to other sources, however, they continued to come out in 1956: apparently they were first issued after the catalogue was compiled.
 - (b) Two Russian-language journals began publication in 1956. These are *Vrachebnoe delo* (The Medical Profession) and *Oftalmologicheskyy zhurnal* (Ophthalmological Journal).

A. JOURNALS (42 titles; Nos. 358—399 according to the catalogue)

Group I (Social and Economic; Communal and Political):

(a) in Russian:

- 376 *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Communist
of the Ukraine) (12)
391 *Sovetskaya Ukraina* (Soviet
Ukraine) (12)

(b) in Ukrainian:

- 363 *Broshury-lektsii Tovarystva dlya
poshyrennya politychnykh ta nau-
kovykh znan Ukrainskoi SSR*
[TPPNZ Ukr. SSR], *Persha seriya:*
suspilno-politychna (Lecture Pam-
phlets of the Society for the Dis-

semination of Political and Scientific Information in the Ukrainian SSR, First Series: Social and Political) (24)

377 *Komunist Ukrainy* (Communist of the Ukraine) (12)

392 *Sotsyialistychna kultura* (Socialist Culture) (12)

Group II (Science):

(a) in Russian:

383 *Oftalmologicheskyy zhurnal* (Ophthalmological Journal) (4)

396 *Ukrainsky matematichesky zhurnal* (Ukrainian Mathematical Journal) (4)

397 *Ukrainsky khimichesky zhurnal* (Ukrainian Chemical Journal) (6)

(b) in Ukrainian:

362 *Botanichnyy zhurnal* (Botanical Journal) (4)

365 *Broshury-lektsii TPPNZ Ukr. SSR, Third Series: Natural Sciences* (12)

367 *Broshury-lektsii TPPNZ Ukr. SSR, Fifth Series: Engineering* (12)

368 *Visnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainiskoi SSR* (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR) (12)

372 *Dopovidi Akademii Nauk Ukrainiskoi SSR* (Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR) (6)

379 *Mikrobiolohichnyy zhurnal* (Microbiological Journal) (4)

388 *Prykladna mekhanika* (Applied Mechanics) (4)

395 *Ukrainsky biokhemicznyy zhurnal* (Ukrainian Biochemical Journal) (4)

399 *Fiziolohichnyy zhurnal* (Physiological Journal) (6)

Group III (National Economy: Industry, Transport, Communications, Commerce, Finance):

(a) in Russian:

358 *Avtomaticheskaya svarka* (Automatic Welding) (6)

(b) in Ukrainian:

None

Group IV (Agriculture):

(a) in Russian:

None

(b) in Ukrainian:

- 364 *Broshury-lektsii TPPNZ Ukr. SSR, Second Series: Agriculture* (12)
381 *Mekhanizatsiya silskoho hospodarstva* (Mechanization of Agriculture) (12)
393 *Sotsyialistychne tvarynnystvo* (Socialist Livestock Raising) (12)

Group V (Medicine and Hygiene):

(a) in Russian:

- 370 *Vrachebnoe delo* (The Medical Profession) (12)

(b) in Ukrainian:

- 386 *Pediyatriya, akusherstvo i hinekolohiya* (Pediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology) (6)

Group VI (Arts and Architecture):

(a) in Russian:

None

(b) in Ukrainian:

- 359 *Arkhitektura i budivnytstvo* (Architecture and Construction) (6)
380 *Mystetstvo* (Art) (6)

Group X (Pedagogics):

(a) in Russian:

None

(b) in Ukrainian:

- 366 *Broshury-lektsii TPPNZ Ukr. SSR, Fourth Series: Literature, Pedagogics and Art* (12)
373 *Doshkilne vykhovannya* (Pre-School Child Care) (12)
378 *Literatura v shkoli* (Literature in School) (6)
390 *Radyanska shkola* (Soviet Schooling) (12)
398 *Ukrainska mova v shkoli* (Ukrainian Language in Schools) (6)

Group of Periodicals Not Specified Above

In addition to the 30 magazines specified above, there are 12 other periodicals (2 Russian and 10 Ukrainian) mentioned in the catalogue as being published in the Ukrainian SSR (magazines for children, on literature, of general interest, etc.). They are the following:

(a) in Russian:

361 *Barvinok* (Periwinkle) (12)

385 *Pioneriya* (Pioneering) (12)

(b) in Ukrainian:

360 *Barvinok* (Periwinkle) (12)

369 *Vitchyzna* (Fatherland) (12)

371 *Dnipro* (Dnieper) (12)

374 *Zhovten* (October) (12)

375 *Zmina* (Change) (12)

382 *Nauka i zhyttya* (Learning and Life) (12)

384 *Pioneriya* (Pioneering) (12)

387 *Perets* (Pepper) (24)

389 *Radyanska zhinka* (Soviet Woman) (12)

394 *Ukraina* (12)

B. NEWSPAPERS (10 titles, Nos. 348—357 according to the catalogue)

(a) in Russian:

351 *Pravda Ukrainy* (300)

356 *Stalinskoe plemya* (Stalin's Generation) (265)

357 *Yuny Leninet*s (The Young Leninist) (52)

(b) in Ukrainian:

348 *Zirka* (Star) (52)

349 *Literaturna hazeta* (Literary Gazette) (52)

350 *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of the Ukraine) (265)

352 *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) (300)

353 *Radyanska kultura* (Soviet Culture) (52)

354 *Radyanska osvita* (Soviet Education) (52)

355 *Radyansky sport* (Soviet Sports) (104)

*Bibliography of Ukrainian- and Russian-Language Scholastic Publications
and of Publications on Ukrainian Subjects Which Have Appeared Both
in the Ukraine and Abroad During Recent Years*

A. Kiev Publications in Ukrainian:

I. HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

1. O. K. Kasymenko (editor-in-chief), V. A. Dyadychenko, F. P. Shevchenko, F. O. Yastrebov (editors): *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR* (History of the Ukrainian SSR). Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 121 pp., small octavo, 10,000 copies printed.

2. V. V. Usenko: *Vplyv Velykoi Zhovtnevoi Sotsyalistychnoi Revolyutsii na rozvytok revolyutsynoho rukhu v Zakarpatti v 1917—1919 r.* (Influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on the Development of the Revolutionary Movement in Trans-Carpathia in 1917—1919), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1955.

3. *Ukrainsky revolyutsiyni demokraty pro druzhbu ukrainskoho narodu z rosiyskym* (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democrats on the Friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian Peoples), collection of articles, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1955, 164 pp.

4. H. Zastavenko: *Rozhrom nimetskykh interventiv na Ukraini v 1918 r.* (Defeat of the German Interventionists in the Ukraine in 1918), Kiev, 1948.

5. M. Suprunenko: *Velyka Zhovtneva Sotsyalistychna Revolyutsiya na Ukraini* (Great October Socialist Revolution in the Ukraine), Ukrainian Publishing House for Political Literature, Kiev, 1948, 117 pp.

6. M. Suprunenko: *Ukraina v period inozemnoi voyennoi interventsii i hromadyanskoi viyny* (The Ukraine During the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and the Civil War), State Publishing House for Political Literature of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1951.

7. V. Chyrko: *Obyednavchy rukh na Ukraini za stvorennia SRSR* (Unification Movement in the Ukraine for the Establishment of a USSR), State Publishing House for Political Literature, Kiev, 1954, 152 pp.

8. V. Ilko: *Borotba trudyashchykh Zakarpattya za vozzyednannya z Radyanskoyu Ukrainoyu (1939—1944 rr.)* (The Struggle of the Workers of Trans-Carpathia for Reunification with the Soviet Ukraine [1939—1944]), Uzhgorod, 1954.

9. V. K. Osechynsky: *Halychina pid hnoblenniam Avstro-Uhorshchyny v epokhu imperiyalizmu* (Galicia under Austro-Hungarian Oppression During the Epoch of Imperialism), Lvov, Book and Magazine Publishing House, 1954, 187 pp.

10. S. Kykhtev: *Komunisty Donbasu v period pidhotovky i perevedennia Velykoi Zhovtnevoi Sotsyalistychnoi Revolyutsii* (The Communists of the Donets Basin During the Preparations for, and the Realization of, the Great October Socialist Revolution), State Publishing House for Political Literature of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 314 pp.

11. *Pidhotovka Velykoi Zhovtnevoi Revolyutsii na Ukraini* (Preparation of the Great October Revolution in the Ukraine), collection of documents, State Publishing House for Political Literature of the Ukrainian SSR, 1955, 941 pp.
12. V. Rudnev: *Ukrainsky burzhnazni natsionalisty — agentura mizhnarodnoi reaktsii* (The Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalists as the Agents of International Reaction), State Publishing House for Political Literature, Kiev, 1955.
13. A. H. Slyusarsky: *Slobidska Ukraina. Istorychny narys XVII—XVIII stolit* (The Ukraine. Historical Sketch of the XVII—XVIII Centuries), Kharkov Book and Newspaper Publishing House, 1954, 278 pp.
14. *Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi SSR* (Essays on the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), symposium, Kiev, 1949.

II. HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN LITERATURE AND PHILOLOGY

15. O. I. Biletsky (editor-in-chief): M. D. Bernstein, M. K. Gudzy, O. Y. Zasenکو, Z. P. Moroz, M. P. Pyvovarov: *Istoriya Ukrainskoi literatury, tom I: Dozhovtneva literatura* (History of Ukrainian Literature, vol. I: Prerevolutionary Literature), Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 732 pp., small octavo, 50,000 printed copies.
16. *Narys istorii Ukrainskoi radyanskoi literatury* (Outline History of Ukrainian Soviet Literature), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954.
17. S. I. Biletsky (editor): *Braterstvo kultur. Zbirnyk materiyaliv z istorii rosiysko-ukrainskoho kulturnoho yednannya* (Brotherhood of Cultures. Symposium of Materials on the History of Russian-Ukrainian Cultural Unity) (journalistic, literary and critical works by representatives of Russian and Ukrainian culture: Belinsky, Hertzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, Saltykov-Shchedrin, Syerov, Stasiv, Chaikovsky, Ryepin, Stanislavsky, Shevchenko, Franko, Panas Myrny, Lesya Ukrainka, Kotsyubynsky and others, with portraits of prominent people and illustrations), Kiev, 1954, 456 pp.
18. Prof. I. K. Bilodid: *Mova i styl romana Vershnyky Y. Yanovskoho* (Language and Style of Y. Yanovsky's Novel *The Riders*), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1955.
19. V. Dovbyshchenko and Yu. Boboshko: *Pro mystetstvo teatru. Teatr ta dramaturhiya nayvydatnishykh diyachiv rosiyskoi ta ukrainskoi literatury ta mystetstva* (The Dramatic Art. Dramatic Works by the Most Prominent Figures in Russian and Ukrainian Literature and Art), ed. I. Chabanenko, Publishing House *Mystetstvo* (Art), Kiev, 1954; 515 pp.
20. H. Izhakevych: *Pytannya rosiysko-ukrainskykh movnykh zvyazkiv* (Russian-Ukrainian Linguistic Connections), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 104 pp.
21. P. Pavli, M. Rodina and M. Stelmakh (compilers), M. Rylsky and K. Huslysty (editors): *Ukrainsky narodni dumy ta istorychni pisni* (Ukrainian Folk Epics and Historical Songs). (This collection contains selected texts of Ukrainian prerevolutionary and Soviet folk epics and historical songs, which depict such historical phenomena as the struggle against national and social oppression, serfdom, recruitment, bullock-carting (*chumatstvo*), farm-laboring,

and in Soviet times—the industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, etc.) Institute of the Arts, Folklore and Ethnography, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1955; 654 pp., 46 illustrations.

III. PHYSICS

22. O. Z. Zhmudsky and O. M. Faydysh: *Enerhiya atomnoho yadra ta ii zastosuvannya* (The Energy of the Atomic Nucleus and Its Application), Popular Scientific Library, Kiev, State Publishing House for Technical Literature of the Ukrainian SSR, 1955, 96 pp., small octavo, 25,000 printed copies.

B. Kiev Publications in Russian:

I. HISTORY AND ARCHEOLOGY OF THE UKRAINE

1. *Kharkov v Velikoi Oktyabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolyutsii* (Kharkov during the Great October Socialist Revolution), collection of documents, Kharkov, 1947.

2. *Vossoedinenie Ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve* (Reunification of the Ukrainian People in a Single Ukrainian Soviet State), Ukrainian Publishing House for Political Literature, 1949.

3. *Arkheologicheskie issledovaniya drevnego Kiev. Otchety i materialy (1938—1947)* (Archeological Research on Ancient Kiev. Reports and Materials, 1938—1947). (Excavations on the site of the St. Michael Monastery, the Desyatynna Church, the Vydybysky Cathedral, the Cathedral of St. Sophia, etc.) Institute of Archeology, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1951, 252 pp.

4. S. M. Korolivsky (editor): *Pobeda Velikoi Oktyabrskoi Revolyutsii i ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine* (The Victory of the Great October Revolution and the Establishment of the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine), Kiev, 1951, 511 pp.

5. L. Slavin (editor): *Drevni gorod Olviya. Istoriya i kultura Olvii ot VI v. do nashei ery i do V v. nashei ery* (The Ancient City of Olvia. The History and Culture of Olvia from the VI Century B.C. till the V Century A.D.), (Appendix containing references by ancient authors to Olvia), Scientific and Technical Propaganda Council, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1951, 96 pp.

6. Kasimenko and other editors: *Istoriya ukrainskoi SSR v 2-kh tomakh. Tom I: Ot pervobytno-obshchinnogo stroya do Vtoroi Russkoi Revolyutsii* (History of the Ukrainian SSR in Two Volumes. Vol. I: From the Primitive Communal Order to the Second Russian Revolution), Kiev, 1953, 840 pp.

7. V. Dyadychenko and other editors: *Osvoboditelnaya voyna 1648—1654 gg. i vossoedinenie Ukrainy i Rossii* (The War of Liberation of 1648—1654 and the Reunification of the Ukraine and Russia), (Foreword, 17 illustrations, maps of the War of Liberation of 1648—1654 and the territory of the Ukraine reunified with Russia in the second half of the XVII century and an appendix), Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Institute of History, Kiev, 1954, 352 pp.

8. N. Suprunenko: *Kommunisticheskaya partiya — vdokhnovitel borby ukrainskogo naroda za obrazovanie i ukreplenie ukrainskogo sovetskogo gosudarstva* (The Communist Party as Inspirer and Leader of the Ukrainian People in Their Struggle for the Establishment and Consolidation of the Ukrainian Soviet State), State Publishing House for Political Literature of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 226 pp. (Translated from the Ukrainian. Supplemented edition.)

9. E. M. Apanovich: *Istoricheskie mesta sobytii osvoboditelnoi voyny ukrainskogo naroda 1648—1654* (The Historical Site of Events in the Ukrainian People's War of Liberation of 1648—1654), Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 104 pp., 17 illustrations and a map. 20,000 printed copies.

10. D. F. Virnyk: *Ukrainskaya SSR. Kratky istoriko-ekonomicheskyy ocherk* (The Ukrainian SSR. A Short Outline of Its History and Economy), Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1954, 182 pp. of small octavo, 100,000 printed copies.

11. *Ocherki razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR* (Outline of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1954, 554 pp.

II. HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN LITERATURE

12. A. Beletsky, M. Bernstein and other editors: *Istoriya ukrainskoi literatury v 2-kh tomakh. Tom I: Dooktyabrskaya literatura* (History of Ukrainian Literature in Two Volumes. Vol. I: Literature of the Prerevolutionary Epoch). (Literature during the epoch of feudalism and the development of capitalist relations; literature during the epoch of the development of capitalism, imperialism and the proletarian revolution.) Shevchenko Institute of Literature, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954; 758 pp., illustrations.

III. ARCHITECTURE

13. *Arkhitektura Andreevskoi tserkvi v Kieve* (Architecture of St. Andrew's Church in Kiev), text, 21 table 12×9; 1951. (No information available concerning author, publishing house or place of publication.)

14. V. A. Tkachenko: *Arkhitektura sanatoriya* (The Designing of a Health Resort), Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1954, 156 pp.

IV. GEOLOGY

15. N. V. Logvinenko: *Iskopaemye ugli Ukrainy* (Minerals of the Ukraine), Publishing House of the Kharkov Institute, Kharkov, 1953, 121 pp.

V. ASTRONOMY

16. Prof. M. S. Eigson (editor-in-chief): *Astronomicheskyy sbornik: vypusk vtoroi* (Astronomical Symposium: Second Issue), (Bulletin of the Ivan Franko State University in Lvov, vol. XXXII), Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR, Ivan Franko State University, Lvov, 1954, 73 pp., octavo.

VI. NATURAL SCIENCES

17. A. S. Lazarenko: *Opredilitel listvennykh mkhov Ukrainy* (Guide to the Mosses of the Ukraine), Natural History Museum, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Lvov, Kiev, 467 pp., illustrations.

18. *Mineralogicheskyy sbornik* (Mineralogical Symposium), No. 9, Lvov, 1955.

VII. MEDICINE

19. N. V. Medvedeva: *Normalnaya i patologicheskaya fiziologiya zhirivogo i lipidnogo obmena* (Normal and Pathological Physiology of the Metabolism of Fats and Lipoids), Institute of Physiology, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1955, 365 pp.

C. Moscow Publications on Ukrainian Subjects

1. S. Bezsonov: *Arkhitektura Zapadnoi Ukrainy (i Galitsii s Bukovinoi)* (Architecture of the Western Ukraine, including Galicia and Bukovina). The epoch of the XI—XIII centuries. Academy of Architecture of the USSR, Moscow, 1946, 94 pp., 54 illustrations.

2. V. T. Pashnuto: *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Essays on the History of the Galician-Volhynian Rus), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1950, 328 pp.

3. *Pamyatniki russkogo prava. Vypusk I: Pamyatniki prava Kievskogo gosudarstva* (Russian Legal Documents: Part I, Legal Documents of the Kievan State), Moscow, 1952, 287 pp.

4. P. Gudzenko, A. Kasimenko and other editors: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei* (The Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia), (Documents and materials in three volumes. Vol. I: The Ukraine on the Eve of the War of Liberation of 1620—1647; vol. II: The War of Liberation of the Ukrainian People and Their Struggle for a Reunification with Russia, 1648—1651; vol. III: Conclusion of the Ukrainian People's Struggle for a Reunification with Russia: the Pereyaslav Council, 1651—1654), Moscow, 1954, XXXVII, 584, 557 and 644 pp.

5. A. Baranovich, L. Gaponenko and other editors: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei 1654—1954* (The Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, 1654—1954), (Collection of articles), Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1954; 440 pp., 2 maps, a view of the Moscow Kremlin from the Red Square, a view of Kiev from the north and a colored portrait of B. Khmelnytsky.

6. A. Kozachenko: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. K 300-letiyu Pereyaslavskoi Rady* (The Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia. Published on the Occasion of the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Council), State Publishing House for Pedagogical Literature, Moscow, 1954, 108 pp.

7. I. Grekov, V. Korolyuk and I. Miller: *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei v 1654 g.* (Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654), Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1954, 112 pp.

8. A. Zernov: *Nachalo knigopечатaniya v Moskve i na Ukraine* (The Beginnings of Bookprinting in Moscow and in the Ukraine), (Collection of papers on bookprinting), ed. Kuchmenko. Vol. I, Moscow, 1947, 104 pp.

9. I. Maryanenko: *Proshloe ukrainskogo teatra* (History of the Ukrainian Theater), 1954, 249 pp.
10. B. D. Grekov: *Kievskaya Rus* (Kievan Rus), 1953, 566 pp.
11. *Tezisy o 300-letii Vossoedineniya Ukrainy s Rossiei (1654—1954 gg.)* (Theses on the Occasion of the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, 1654—1954), 1954.
12. B. Itenberg: *Yuzhnorossiiskiy soyuz rabochikh — Pervaya proletarskaya organizatsiya v Rossii* (The South-Russian Workers' Union: the First Proletarian Organization in Russia), 1954, 88 pp.
13. N. I. Lyalikov: *Sovetskaya Ukraina* (The Soviet Ukraine), State Publishing House for Geographical Literature, Moscow, 1954.
14. *Obrazovanie Kievskogo Tsentralnogo Gosudarstva 1328—1533* (The Formation of the Kiev Central State in 1328—1533), Map in two parts, 1:2,500,000.
15. A. Beletsky, M. Dobrynin and others: *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* (Outline History of Ukrainian Soviet Literature), (From the period of foreign military intervention and the civil war of 1917—1920 to the postwar period, 1946—1952. Appendix of Ukrainian texts and verses, quoted in a Russian translation), T. Shevchenko Institute of Literature, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Moscow, 1954, 448 pp.
16. *Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti na mestakh v 1917—1918 gg.* (Establishment of the Soviet Regime in the Provinces in 1917—1918), (Collection of articles), State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1953. (Place of publication not mentioned.)
17. A. V. Likholat: *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine (1917—1922)* (Destruction of the Nationalist Counterrevolution in the Ukraine, 1917—1922). State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1954; 656 pp., octavo, 30,000 printed copies.
18. A. T. Dubrova: *Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika* (The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), State Publishing House for Geographical Literature, Moscow, 1954; 55 pp.
19. A. Nesterenko: *Ocherki istorii promyshlennosti i polozhenie proletariata Ukrainy v kontse XIX i v nachale XX stol.* (Outline History of Ukrainian Industry and the Position of the Proletariat in the Ukraine in the Late XIX and Early XX Centuries), State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1954, 308 pp.
20. Prof. G. N. Cherdantsev, Prof. N. P. Nikitin and Prof. B. A. Tutikhin (editors): *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR* (Economic Geography of the USSR), (Embraces all republics except the RSFSR), State Publishing House for Pedagogical Literature of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR, Moscow, 1954, 527 pp.

Remarks

1. This list of publications does not claim to be complete. It has been compiled on the basis of the following:

(a) the examination of books we have succeeded in obtaining. In these cases we state the number of copies printed;

(b) the study of a number of book catalogues issued by American firms specializing in books imported from the USSR;

(c) references contained in certain books published in the USSR;

(d) information derived from the press.

2. The lists headed "Kiev Publications" (A and B) include:

(a) publications issued in other towns of the Ukrainian SSR (Lvov, Kharkov, Uzhgorod);

(b) publications issued outside the Ukraine provided they bear a note stating that they were prepared under the auspices of some Ukrainian institution, e. g., the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

Collectivization in the Kirghiz SSR

A. KRAVCHENKO

This article is based on the actual experience of the author, who at the time was working in the Pavlodar Oblast under the chief engineer of the Pavlodar union trust of the Dairy Association. The author worked in his profession under the Soviet regime long before collectivization and often participated in different agricultural reorganizations. He often saw injustice, persecution and political oppression perpetrated by representatives of the Soviet regime; but he had never experienced such stark terror as in Kazakhstan during total collectivization, of which he was an eyewitness.

I

The Soviet government started the suppression of big farms in Siberia in 1920, but in Kazakhstan this process began only in 1923. It was more difficult to abolish such farms in Kazakhstan than in other parts of the Soviet Union, because it is much easier to subjugate people with a settled way of life than nomads. The main body of the population of Kazakhstan-Kirghizia had lived the life of nomads for centuries. They bred cattle and were therefore forced to move all the time with their flocks to places where there was enough good pasture and water for men and cattle. Every spring they left their winter quarters and moved with their old people and the whole household to the so-called *dzheiliau* (Kirghiz summer camp), where they set up their *yourtas* (nomadic dwellings) and lived till the late autumn. When winter came and the first snow fell, they brought everything back to their winter quarters.

For centuries the Kirghiz people saw nothing but their winter camp, the summer *yourtas* and the neighboring village. Only the rich *beys* visited such towns as Pavlodar, Semipalatinsk and Omsk once a year. Before the Soviets came to power every Kirghiz, rich and poor alike, had not the slightest idea how to till the soil or sow corn. He never saw potatoes, cucumbers or tomatoes. The only riches of these people were cattle, the wealth of a family being measured by the size of its herds. For instance, in the Pavlodar Oblast there was a rich man by the name of Chelkanov who owned 6,000 horses, 9,000 cattle, 1,500 camels and 18,000 sheep. This number of cattle was about two or three times larger than the stocks of today's collective farms. Many herds of this size were to be found in the Kirghiz steppe.

At the beginning of 1920 the Soviet government started spreading propaganda in villages and camps. "Only the Soviet government will give you all equal rights. The tsarist government treated you worse than cattle. You,

the Kirghiz people, were not even admitted to the Russian Army," the propagandists said.

From the first day that the recruitment of volunteers began, young people, impressed by this propaganda, rushed to the enlistment committees. A volunteer who wished to serve in the army had to bring with him a good horse of his own with a new saddle.

Propagandists visiting villages and camps praised the Soviet government and asked for presents such as horses, cattle, sheep, wool and hides. They declared: "Farmers give the Soviet government tons of grain, flour and oats, and, since you do not sow, give at least as many cattle as you can."

This was only the start. Day after day the propagandists went from one village to the next, all of them repeating the same thing: "Send gifts, prove that you recognize the Soviet government and support it." Of course, the rich Kirghiz had to give the most. A wealthy man could not present the government with only one cow or two sheep. So, from the beginning they gave two or three head of cattle, ten to fifteen sheep and one or two horses. By this method thousands of all kinds of cattle were gathered on the railroad stations at Pavlodar and Semipalatinsk. Of course, the Soviet government did not pay for this cattle.

In 1921, when Trotsky came out with the slogan: "Everyone on horseback to fight the Polish lords!" the rich Chelkanov, whom I mentioned before, gave the Red Army 2,000 horses between two and five years of age without asking for money.

These gifts continued until the end of 1922, but then it was obviously too much for the Kirghiz to give their cattle away continually and the presents stopped.

The Soviet government then began to look for other means of implementing its policy. Thousands of propagandists were working to stir up hatred between the poor and the rich Kirghiz. The people started to denounce one another and to fight among themselves. Amid these conflicts the Soviet government issued a decree creating the Kazakh SSR, and stated that from now on the Kirghiz nation would have the name of Kazakh. This decree was publicized by the propaganda machine in all villages and camps of the Kirghiz steppe.

The feelings of hatred, stirred up intentionally, spread over the whole Kirghiz country. Everybody began to recall long-forgotten insults. The Soviet government put political pressure on the rich Kirghiz and exploited the poor, who were ill-informed and confused by Soviet propaganda stirring up national feeling.

The government started to burden the upper class with demands for large contributions of money. These amounted to 5,000—10,000 rubles, and had to be paid within seven days.

A Kirghiz living in the steppe 400—500 kilometers from the cities of Pavlodar or Semipalatinsk who had to pay such a contribution was obliged to bring his cattle to one of these cities to sell it. But the cattle could not even reach the city in such a short time.

Concurrently the government closed the markets and fairs. The situation grew hopeless. Farms were plundered by the authorities for not paying the contributions. *Yourtas*, rugs, saddles, furs, cattle, gold and silverware were confiscated. Even earrings were torn from the ears of Kirghiz women. The con-

fiscated cattle was distributed among the poor in exchange for a receipt, so that if the government demanded the return of this cattle, the man who had received, for example, 3—5 cows, 2—3 horses and 50—100 sheep had to give them all back to the government. After the Soviet government had ruined the big farms of the Kirghiz steppe and evacuated the people, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was proclaimed.

After NEP was introduced, the political pressure applied by the government weakened. Only very few owners of big farms were lucky enough to survive, but later on even they were unable to escape.

II

At the beginning of 1927 the Soviet propaganda machine started to work again in an attempt to put into practice the slogan: "From nomad to settled life!" The people, however, who for centuries had lived as nomads, had no conception of what settled life meant and could not rapidly change their way of living.

The propagandists tried very hard to convince the people: "There is no Kirghiz nation any more," they said, "there are only Kazakhs, who have to put an end to their nomadic life." This statement gave rise to bitter arguments between propagandists and their opponents. The whole propaganda campaign was a complete failure. At a public meeting the Kirghiz demonstrated their unwillingness to change to a settled way of living.

It was very difficult for the Soviet government to subjugate people who did not live within definite areas but were constantly on the move. After this unsuccessful campaign, no promises made by the government could make the Kirghiz change their minds. The propagandists promised in the name of the government to help new farms in every way possible. This assistance included many privileges such as agricultural machines at special prices, long-term credits and a term of three years' exemption from taxation. The Kirghiz absolutely refused to change their way of life. Consequently, the government had to look for new methods to attain their goal. Finally such a method was found.

At the end of 1927 the Kazakh People's Commissariat (doubtless under pressure from the People's Commissariat of the USSR) published a decree according to which so-called "cultural centers" were to be built in every administrative district at the cost of the state. It was planned to build these centers in the midst of the steppe, near big lakes with good water, or along rivers. They were to comprise the following buildings: accommodation for the raion executive committee and the raion committee of the Communist Party; a hospital with obstetrical department; a veterinary center; a club with library and reading room; a butter production center; a cooperative shop; a school building for the first seven grades; a building for the NKVD and the militia; a courthouse and prosecutor's office; five big apartment houses for employees, and thirty houses containing two apartments each for the poor. The situation was very similar in all the oblasts of the Kazakh SSR.

The people learned from this decree that the construction of these cultural centers was of great importance and had to be completed at the latest by October 1928. The winter of 1927—1928 was spent in hard work. As laid down

in the government's project, construction materials were sent from Pavlodar (the distance from Bayan-Aul to Pavlodar is 280 kilometers, and from Kosh-Agach to Pavlodar 400 kilometers). Long convoys of trucks loaded with these materials moved through the steppe throughout the winter. Construction brigades were organized locally.

In the spring of 1928 building began. About 500 workers were employed on the center at Bayan-Aul. The speed required was typical of Soviet methods. Technical personnel, team leaders and foremen were all Kirghiz, without any knowledge of this type of work; but each of them had in his pocket a red book with the letters "VKP(b)" embossed in silver on its cover. The foundations of the buildings were filled with adobe instead of stones or bricks. Because of the rapid speed of construction this material had no time to dry sufficiently and was used half damp. In the entire Pavlodar Oblast there was only one chief engineer, who could not be present at every building site. In this oblast alone, sixteen cultural centers were simultaneously under construction. Team leaders and foremen, who frequently were unable to read the construction plans, made many mistakes. They made thin walls instead of sturdy, solid ones, and very often building had to be started all over again. The Kazakh People's Commissariat, however, issued repeated instructions to increase the tempo of the work so as to meet the deadline.

In October 1928 work on construction was not completely finished. The interior of the buildings was not even started and the winter put a stop to work altogether. It is not known how much money was spent on the construction of these cultural centers in the whole of Kazakhstan or even in the oblast of Pavlodar. That at Bayan-Aul alone cost 468,000 rubles, and only 75% of the original plan was fulfilled. Why were millions of public money spent on this work? The Soviet government wanted to prepare a basis on which to force the people of the Kirghiz to accept a settled way of life and to carry out total collectivization.

It was intended that after the cultural centers were finished raion, administrative and Party organizations, state purchasing centers and cooperative shops would be established round them. The employees of these organs would amount to 85% of all the Communists among the population. The apartment houses would be occupied by about 100 families of activists and poor farmers. These settlers would form the core of the future cities. The nomads would have to settle near these centers on account of all the cooperative and state purchasing organizations which were essential to them. After this change it would be much easier for the government to master those who still refused to become settlers.

When the spring came, the half-damp adobe defrosted and melted away. The walls of the buildings fell apart, the roofs were wrenched out of shape and collapsed. All the work and the money were totally wasted.

III

In August 1928 it became obvious that the Soviet government had decided to start total collectivization and to force the people to change to a settled way of life. Henceforth no more credits were given to farmers to procure milk, wool or hides. The people were urged to pay off old debts concerning

state purchases. They had to deliver all raw materials and produce to the state purchasing centers of Kazgostorg and Kazpotrebsoyuz, which consequently had the monopoly in their purchase and sale.

In August 1928 the oblast of Pavlodar received the governmental plan for the grain quota to be given to the state. This plan was based on amounts one and a half times greater than the expected harvest. At that time there were as yet no collective farms in the Pavlodar Oblast. The natives of Kazakhstan grew no crops, and so the Ukrainians had to make up this quota of grain.

According to the decree of the Kazakh People's Commissariat, the sale of grain and flour was illegal as long as scheduled supplies to the state were not secured. Violators of this law would be prosecuted. All roads from Pavlodar were controlled by armed and mounted militiamen and activists. From the city of Pavlodar to Bayan-Aul there were 28 such checkpoints. Everyone passing either on horseback or in wagons drawn by camels was stopped and searched. Even if only ten to fifteen kilograms of flour were found, they were confiscated without any receipt. Most of the people protested and were sent to the district militia, where a report was drawn up. Then legal proceedings were instituted and after two days the judge passed his sentence, which usually read as follows: "The militia unit stopped Dzhusumbaev and, while he was being searched, such and such an amount of grain was found, which he had intended to sell on the black market. Dzhusumbaev is sentenced to three years' imprisonment and his whole property confiscated."

The arrested Dzhusumbaev was expected at home by his wife and children, who hoped that he would bring with him flour from Pavlodar. Instead, however, a bailiff would appear and confiscate all property, including cattle and clothing. The entire family would be left homeless and starving. The convicted Dzhusumbaev would not be allowed to say goodbye to his family, but be taken under escort to the prison at Pavlodar.

There were thousands of such cases in the Kirghiz steppe at that time.

In all the oblasts of the Kazakh SSR the grain quota was as high as in that of Pavlodar, and everywhere it considerably exceeded the crop expected at the next harvest. In spite of the strongest measures taken by the government, the grain quota for Pavlodar was not delivered either at the appointed time or in the required amount; 90% of the Ukrainian farmers were unable to fulfil their quota and were severely punished by the government. The courts passed routine sentences: Karpenko, Sidorenko, Vasilenko, Knish and Kulish did not deliver the quota fixed by the government: Karpenko, Sidorenko, Vasilenko, Knish and Kulish are sentenced to 3—5 years' imprisonment and their property confiscated.

All grain was confiscated and brought to the state elevators. The Kirghiz people began to starve. They killed cattle, but this the Soviet government declared illegal, adding a new paragraph to the criminal code. Now it was impossible to buy bread throughout the whole territory. The Kirghiz people began to roam the steppe on horseback, in camel-drawn wagons or even on foot, with the remains of their household property and cattle, looking for bread.

The government sent mounted militiamen in all directions to stop these Kirghiz and send them back to their former haunts. The soviets in the villages received strict instructions not to issue permits to leave the Kazakh SSR.

In the spring of 1928 the administrative borders of all the oblasts in the Kazakh SSR were abolished, and all oblast officials transferred to administrative posts at the various raion centers of the republic. So, for instance, Neyasov, former chief of the Pavlodar Oblast executive committee, became the secretary of the Bayan-Aul Raion Party committee; whilst the former secretary of this committee became the chief of the Irtysh Raion executive committee. Thus all former oblast administrators were sent to posts at raion centers, whilst raion administrators were sent to village soviets and Party centers.

In this way everything was reduced to confusion. At raion centers the number of NKVD officials and militiamen was increased. Investigating, prosecuting and all other legal organs were enlarged. In the raion there was not even a single kolkhoz, but a raion collective cotton union and a raion farming union with agronomists, specialists in animal husbandry and veterinarians were organized. Preparations for the kolkhozes were rapidly set up.

Office accommodation for the new organizations and living quarters for their employees were required and had to be found quickly.



In the village of Bayan-Aul there lived among the Kirghiz population fifty Ukrainian families who had moved from the Ukraine in 1909. They settled down in the Kirghiz steppe, farmed, became wealthy and owned a great number of cattle, all kinds of agricultural machinery and big farmhouses. After the government had subjugated the Kirghiz, these Ukrainian farmers realized that they would lose possession of the farms they had built up by hard labor over a long period. So, secretly, they sold all their property, keeping for their own use only one or two horses, one or two cows, five to ten sheep and their farm buildings. The raion executive committee had to find room for the new organizations. It offered to buy the Ukrainians' houses, but the farmers refused to accept this offer under any circumstances. They were asked to think it over once more, but on the third day after this offer was made militia officials came to every farm, accompanied by two or three militiamen. They threw all the owners' property onto the street and drove the families out of their homes. This occurred in the late autumn; the first frosts started and snow fell. After the loss of their homes, the Ukrainian families had to look for some kind of lodging. The district administration was not interested in their fate. The Ukrainians left Bayan-Aul and moved into the semi-collapsed "cultural center" 35 kilometers away.

The closing of markets and the high corn quota were alone enough to ruin the Ukrainians of Kazakhstan, but the government continued its policy notwithstanding. For failure to deliver the government grain quota the courts relentlessly imposed sentences of 3—5 years' imprisonment and confiscation of the defendants' entire property. A way out had to be found from this hopeless situation.

In order to avoid being sent to prison for not fulfilling the grain quota and to help the starving families, the Ukrainians secretly drove their cattle to the raions of Western Siberia: for instance, to Slavgorod, Karasuk, Andreevskoe and Kupino. There they exchanged the cattle for grain. The prices they received were negligible. The best horse, for instance, was given away for five poods of corn, the best cow for three poods and a good

sheep for only one pood. The grain was immediately taken to the state elevators to fulfil the Government's quota.

Through a decree signed by Isaev, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh SSR and a Kirghiz by nationality, and Goloshchokin, secretary of the Kazakh Republic's Party committee, a Russian by nationality, hundreds of thousands of Kirghiz people were robbed of their homes, cattle and household effects and were left without bread. The Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out this horrible plan to force the Kirghiz people, who constituted 80% of the total population of Kazakhstan, to accept a settled way of life.

IV

In January 1929 about five hundred of the so-called "twenty-five thousand" arrived at Alma-Ata, the capital city of the Kazakh SSR. These men, who had been working in factories and shops in Moscow, were now mobilized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. They had been diverted from their work benches and transferred to carry out the total collectivization of the Kirghiz steppe. All of them Party members, they had not the slightest idea of how corn is grown, sown or harvested. Their task was to supervise people who, on their part, had never done any farming before either.

At that time Goloshchokin wielded unlimited power in Kazakhstan. The five hundred "agricultural experts," who had to organize the kolkhozes, were completely at his disposal. From Alma-Ata they were sent to all raions in Kazakhstan, accompanied by numerous agitators. In the raions they appeared in semi-military uniforms with guns in their belts. So, for example, in the district of Bayan-Aul thirty men from the "twenty-five thousand" arrived together with twenty propagandists. Each of them had directions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party. At once 28 of them were appointed heads of kolkhozes, and one became chairman of the raion kolkhoz union.

The men from Moscow also played a leading role at the meeting called by Party members of the raion. The raion was divided into plots, and a group of propagandists, headed by a Russian, was appointed for every plot. At the raion center a collectivization group consisting of five men was set up. These five, who held the fate of the people in their hands, carried out the task of total collectivization.

V

The organizers visited all the villages in one day. General meetings were promptly announced. The propagandists asked who of those present had received at any time cattle from the government and signed receipts for them. There were some of these poor Kirghiz in every village. Then they were asked how many head of cattle they had received and whether they still had them. Most of the Kirghiz replied that they no longer possessed such cattle. Because they were very poor, they had killed and eaten some of them, some had got lost in the steppe and others had been attacked by wolves. The collectivization commissioner shouted at the culprits: "Who permitted you to

destroy this cattle, which is the property of the State? The Soviet government lent it to you, and you wasted it." The commissioner would continue: "Since you are poor, you should be one of the first to enter the kolkhoz. If you do so, you will be safe. But if you refuse, you will be sent to prison and sentenced for wasting the cattle. What you have done was a misappropriation of state property and you will have to spend about ten years in prison." In every village there were about ten such misappropriators.

These people, together with local activists and Communists, formed the basis of the kolkhozes. The rest of the population was forced to join these farms soon after. Afterwards ten to fifteen Kirghiz would be talked into joining the kolkhoz and a resolution would be signed calling a public meeting for the whole village. At these meetings the appointment of a chairman for the kolkhoz would be confirmed.

Those farms which did not join the collective system were considered from now on as individual farms. In a short time the owners of these farms were asked by the Raion People's Commissariat to pay a tax of 1,000—2,000 rubles within a week. Farmers who could not pay this tax on time were arrested and sentenced to 3—5 years' imprisonment as defaulters. The whole of their property was confiscated. Cattle and all the rest of the household were given to the kolkhoz. Their families were turned out from their homes in the middle of winter.

Some farmers, however, were able to pay this tax, and, after they had paid, the government taxed them twice as heavily as before. Such measures forced many people to join the kolkhozes.

In January and February 1928 the collectivization commissioners came to all villages in the raion, accompanied by members of the People's Court, interrogators and prosecutors. The People's Court held its sessions in the villages; mock trials took place and defaulters were sentenced. At that time, groups of women and children were wandering round the Kirghiz steppe — all relatives of arrested farmers who had had to leave their homes. They could find neither food nor shelter. Thousands of children and old people died of cold and thousands starved to death. The first convoys of farmers convicted for not paying taxes and opposing collectivization were driven from Bayan-Aul to Pavlodar. Guarded by mounted militiamen, they walked without taking any rest, and were not allowed to sit down even at night. The government was in a hurry to get rid of these "criminals." Since the prison at Pavlodar was overcrowded, the Soviet administration ordered churches and mosques to be used for this purpose.

VI

This terror continued until the end of February 1928. The kolkhoz were not yet registered when plans for the sowing campaign arrived. These plans had been drawn up without taking into consideration either manpower or even draught cattle. So, for instance, a kolkhoz with 300 horses received a sowing plan for 300 hectares, a kolkhoz with 500 horses had to work out a plan for 500 hectares.

At the same time, plans were assigned for individual farms. These were drawn up on another scale. Every man between eighteen and twenty years

of age had to sow half a hectare. In this way every family had a sowing plan for at least half a hectare.

The railroad station at Pavlodar received supplies for the kolkhozes: grain for sowing, ploughs, harrows, sowing machines, tractors, etc. The kolkhozes had enough horses, but there was not enough equipment. Since no sledges were available in Pavlodar, the agricultural implements could not be delivered to the kolkhozes. With the assistance of the militia, all available sledges in the raion were collected and sent to Pavlodar. Raion organizations repeatedly offered to collect the equipment that had arrived, but it was packed so badly that it could not be transported. The kolkhozes sent enough horses, but they had to make three journeys to take all the equipment, and the journey to Pavlodar and back takes two weeks. It was late winter, spring was approaching and the roads might become impassable at any time.

There was also a shortage of qualified agricultural workers, team leaders, plowmen and sowers. In Pavlodar, agricultural courses for 500 people were organized. To teach this number of students only three agronomists were available, together with ten Ukrainian farmers.

Individual farms were in a much more difficult position. They received no help from the government. The Kazakh People's Commissariat made it obligatory for individual farmers to provide grain for sowing and to have enough agricultural equipment. The same decree laid down that individual farmers who failed to fulfil the sowing plan would be arrested and sentenced for sabotaging the government's plans. The relevant paragraph of this decree laid down as punishment for such a crime 5—8 years' imprisonment in a concentration camp and confiscation of the prisoner's entire property.

What was to be done? Where and how to buy the necessary agricultural equipment and grain? The Kirghiz farmers saddled their horses and rode 300—400 kilometers into West Siberian territory. There they exchanged their horses for grain. For an individual farmer it was impossible to buy any agricultural equipment. During the sowing campaign a great number of spades arrived in the raion, and these were the individual farmers' sole equipment. The commissioners for the sowing campaign were appointed by the Raion People's Commissariat and Party committee. They forced the Kirghiz to take spades and to dig the virgin soil. Grain had to be sown to fulfill the government's plan.

From three to five commissioners were sent by Party organizations to secure the fulfillment of the sowing campaign in all raions and kolkhozes. Plowing began. This was an extremely heavy task. The Kirghiz, who had never seen a plow before, and their horses, who had never worked on a farm, could not manage this work alone. Plows drawn by three or four horses ploughed the land to a depth, sometimes of three or four centimeters, sometimes of fifteen or twenty. Nobody knew how to regulate the furrows. In the district of Bayan-Aul only 48% of the sowing plan was carried out.

The situation did not improve when the time came to gather in the harvest. There were no machines to collect the corn and individual farmers even had no sickles. They gathered in the harvest by tearing the corn out of the soil with their hands or by cutting it with shears for clipping sheep.

VII

After the Kirghiz kolkhozes had been organized, the propagandists were sent to Ukrainian villages and settlements. Most of these villages were situated on either bank of the river Irtysh, where the soil was most productive, in the immediate neighborhood of the city of Pavlodar. The Ukrainian farmers not only had fields of grain, but had also planted melons, watermelons and cucumbers, which, because of the warm climate and fertile soil, could be grown in large quantities. The farmers used to send them down the Irtysh to Omsk and Semipalatinsk, and made a good price on them. In the Kirghiz steppe the Ukrainians were known as hard workers and very traditionally-minded people. The Ukrainian villages had three hundred or more farms. Some villages, as for instance Zyurupinka, Pishchanka, Spasskoe and Ermakovka, had even 800 to 1,500 farms.

After the Revolution, during the NEP period, such farms prospered and the farmers had their own agricultural machines. Every village had its own steam mill and wool-teasing factory and produced its own butter.

The population of the Ukrainian villages could not be divided into categories according to the degree of property. The only difference was that one farm had two or three cows or one or two horses more than another. In comparison with the Kirghiz, the Ukrainian farmers had few cattle. They concentrated on agriculture, especially the growing of melons.

During the New Economic Policy a farm of average size had a sowing area of 250—300 hectares of corn, 150—200 hectares of oats, 100—150 hectares of barley and 50—80 hectares of melons. The Ukrainian farmers owned horses of good breed and pedigree cows. It is not surprising, therefore, that these farms would suffer after the Soviet government came to power.

According to statistics, there were about 30,000 Ukrainian farms in the Pavlodar Oblast, most of them located near the city itself. All these villages and settlements opposed total collectivization. In spite of threats uttered by collectivization commissioners, all the Ukrainians refused to join the kolkhozes.

The government decided to take special measures to make them change their minds. The Ukrainian farms were therefore taxed, but not in the same way as the Kirghiz. For instance, if a Kirghiz cattle-breeder had to pay a tax of 2,000—3,000 rubles, a Ukrainian farmer with a similar amount of land had to pay 10,000—15,000 rubles within 3—5 days. The Ukrainian farmers might pay these taxes within the required time, but before they had received their receipts from the state bank, a new tax, twice as high, was announced.

A struggle began between the Ukrainians and the collectivization commissioners. The farmers drove these commissioners away from the villages. Even convoys of militiamen, sent to support the commissioners, were of little help. For example, in the village of Pishchanka, in the Maxim Gorky Raion, there arrived a convoy of fifty militiamen. But before they could even reach the village they were scattered by the farmers. Another convoy of militiamen was sent from Pavlodar to the village of Ermakovka, administrative center of a raion, which had about 1,200 farms, to help the local militia control the Ukrainians. This convoy, consisting of two hundred militiamen, was defeated in an open conflict. The head of the raion executive committee, the secretary of the raion Party committee, the prosecutor and the head of the raion militia were all killed on that occasion.

Resistance to forced collectivization broke out in all villages and farms where Ukrainian farmers lived. Representatives of the Soviet administration such as commissioners, propagandists, and militiamen were beaten mercilessly. This was the revenge of the farmers on the administration, which convinced the government that it was impossible to organize kolkhozes in the Ukrainian villages. On the arrival of a regiment sent from Omsk to control the rebellious farmers, the punishment of the farmers began. Visiting assizes, interrogators, and prosecutors arrived at every village. The Ukrainian farmers were arrested by soldiers, who brought them to village soviets for trial. They were sentenced on the spot. Mock trials were held in clubs. The prosecutor demanded capital punishment. In most cases the court passed the following sentence: "The defendant took part in riots against the Soviet government and also protested against governmental measures. He is sentenced to 5—10 years' imprisonment, to be served in one of the remote territories of the Soviet Union, and is herewith deprived of his civic rights. His property is confiscated for the benefit of the State." The convicts were immediately sent under escort to Pavlodar. Next morning their families were taken there in trucks or carts for deportation to Yakutsk, Zabaikalie and Narim. They were not permitted to take any property with them.

As a result of this policy the Ukrainian farms became empty. Kirghiz caught in the steppe were settled in them and kolkhozes were organized. The entire property of the deported Ukrainians was handed over to the new kolkhozes.

At the beginning of 1930, Stalin issued a pamphlet entitled "Dizzy from Success." In this pamphlet he accused the organizers of total collectivization of having applied wrong methods. The government began to prosecute the guilty administrators. The courts, interrogators, and prosecutors set to work once more, but this time visiting assizes passed judgement on raion collectivization commissioners and local illiterate Kirghiz Communists. These courts ignored the real culprits of the terror.

All resolutions concerning total collectivization were issued by the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party and the Soviet of People's Commissars. They were signed by Goloshchokin, secretary of the Central Committee, and the Kirghiz Isabayev, Chief of the People's Commissariat, who had changed his name to Isaev. Even these two men were liquidated later on. Isaev disappeared in 1933 and Goloshchokin was executed for "deviation" in 1936.

This description of collectivization in the Kazakh SSR offers another clear example of Soviet methods in enforcing the Kremlin's dictatorial policy on entire peoples whose only wish was to live their own lives in peace and independence.

Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of Resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress

R. YAKEMCHUK

The foreign policy of the Soviets may be presented under two fundamental aspects: the diplomatic and the ideological.

The main objective of the USSR's foreign policy is, like that of many countries of the Western world, to protect the interests of the state. In this sense, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union does not in the least differ from that of other countries: its successful pursuit depends, first, on geopolitical factors, second, on the means the country in question has at its disposal (i. e., on the condition of the army, the level of industry, the situation of the state economy), and third, on the international balance of power at a given time and in a given geographical area.

From the second point of view, however, this policy presents some peculiar features: the state interest of the USSR depends not only on plain utilitarian factors (as is mostly the case in the Western countries), but also on ideological ones; this means that the foreign policy of the USSR is a vehicle for Communist faith, science and culture, and the champion for a final and total victory of Communism in the whole world.¹

Taking the class nature of the Soviet state into special consideration, we may well assert that: "the foreign policy of the USSR is a continuation of the internal policy of the Soviet state," in other words, there is a close interdependence, a close dialectical connection between the domestic and the foreign policy of the Soviets.² "In the field of foreign policy," Molotov has stated, "our Party works on the principle that concrete conditions must be considered minutely and that the given situation and prospects of historical development must be interpreted correctly. Inflexible faithfulness to our principles and, at the same time, an elasticity in their practical application in

¹ Raymond Aron, "En quête d'une philosophie de la politique étrangère," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Jan.—March 1953, pp. 69—91; Raymond Aron, "Permanence and Flexibility in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, May—June 1955, pp. 8—13; *La politique étrangère et ses fondements*, Editions Colin, Paris, 1954, pp. 223—235; Max Beloff, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, Oxford University Press, 1956; and Paul Milioukov, *La politique extérieure des Soviets*, Editions Giard, Paris, 1934.

² *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE], 2nd. ed., vol. VIII, p. 258.

foreign policy—these are the factors that enable our Party to solve international problems successfully.”³

The resolutions passed at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union deal with just these two fundamental aspects of Soviet foreign policy, particularly with its ideological aspect. Thus, before speaking about any changes, we must necessarily dwell in the first place on the above mentioned basic aspects, especially on the fundamental principles of world Communism, and only then inquire into the question whether the XX Congress has introduced any changes into these fundamental principles and, if so, into the nature of and reasons for these changes.



The Ideological Aspect

The international position of the Soviet Union is determined, in the first place, by the Marxist thesis of class antagonism. According to this doctrine, the USSR is a state in which no class discrepancies exist and in which the means of production are in the hands of the people. The Western world, on the other hand, represents an antiquated form of society in which class discords are acute, owing especially to the unjust possession of the means of production by a small group of “capitalists.” In these countries social oppression reigns, and the legal guaranties—constitution, legislation and jurisdiction—are quite inadequate and unable to liquidate “oppression of man by man.” What these countries need are economic-social guaranties, which can be introduced only simultaneously with the transition of the means of production to collective ownership.

The present owners, however, the Communist theorists continue, resist any collectivization of the means of production. This is why the international proletariat—international because the “proletarian has no fatherland”—should unite itself in powerful Communist parties with the objective of seizing power in these countries under the leadership of the Communist Party of the USSR. In this manner, the proletarian order will finally rule in the whole world: this will be the beginning and origin of the universal socialist state, which, after having established material prosperity and destroyed all inequalities, will pass over into the Communist stage.

The orthodox interpretation of this theory maintains the idea that class antagonism is absolute, and also that the struggle between the “socialist” and “capitalist” systems is just as absolute in all its forms. This was once formulated by Lenin in the well-known thesis which was later developed by Stalin: “We live not only in a state,” Lenin said, “but also in a system of states, and, therefore, it is unthinkable that the Soviet Republic could long coexist with imperialistic states. In the final result, one system or the other will be victorious. Progressing toward this solution, a whole series of the most frightful conflicts between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois countries is inevitable.”⁴

³ *Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1956.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 3rd ed., vol. XXIV, p. 122.

True, it was conceded that the dissemination of Communism must not inevitably take the course of "incessant revolution," as Trotsky maintained;⁵ the seizure of world power will be possible only when the "bastion of socialism" (i. e., the USSR) will have grown sufficiently strong and ready for action. Consequently, in the first place a mighty industrialization of the country (heavy industry) must take place, while tactical temporary deviations such as the New Economic Policy are admissible.

What attitude did the XX Congress assume with regard to this thesis of a world hegemony of Communism? Although the Congress introduced corrections into a number of ideological principles (among other things into the above quoted citation from Lenin), it left one principle wholly unchanged; on the contrary, it even emphasized its urgency. This principle is a fundamental one and it refers to the Party's indestructible faith in the future victory of the Communist bloc over "capitalism" and in the construction of a universal Communist order. Mikoyan declared: "If, a hundred years ago, Marx and Engels said that a specter was haunting Europe—the specter of Communism—this is now no longer a specter: it is flesh-and-blood Communism, really existing and accessible to millions of toiling people. It advances invincibly with firm steps not only in Europe, but in the whole world; and it speaks loudly so that it can be heard by all."⁶

And Bulganin too said: "The Communist Party and the whole Soviet people are firmly convinced that in the historical contest between two systems, the socialist order, that is the progressive order, will come out victor."⁷

This fundamental guiding line must be kept well in mind when analyzing the proceedings and resolutions of the XX Congress in the field of foreign policy.



The Diplomatic Aspect

An analysis of the resolutions of the XX Congress on foreign policy calls for an examination of the most important international events which led to, or, rather, caused the policy of relaxed tension promulgated by the Congress.

The first symptoms of this "thaw in the cold war" appeared immediately after Stalin's death on March 15, 1953. True, Malik's initiative concerning an armistice in Korea dated back to June 23, 1951; but it was probably motivated primarily by factors quite other than a policy of relaxing tension; the Bolsheviks may possibly have considered, for instance, that China had suffered sufficiently in this war and that therefore it was time to discontinue it. The actual conclusion of a military armistice took place a full two years later, namely on July 27, 1953, i. e., after Stalin's death.

Already a few days after the dictator's death, one of the first acts of the new government was to annul the instructions given the British Embassy in

⁵ Léon Trotsky, *La révolution trahie*, Editions Grosset, Paris, 1936.

⁶ *Pravda*, Feb. 18, 1956.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1956.

Moscow in December, 1952, requiring it to evacuate its premises.⁸ It was the Bolsheviks who put forth the thesis of so-called "coexistence": in the speech he delivered on August 8, 1953, the then prime minister Malenkov enlarged broadly on the thesis of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the USA.

Yet despite the conclusion of the Korean armistice and the emergence of new symptoms in Soviet foreign policy, the dialogue between the West and the East developed only very slowly. Practically speaking, each of them retained its old positions and the Western countries, which remembered Yalta and Potsdam and their unwelcome consequences, proceeded cautiously; peace in Indo-China had not yet been attained. Before embarking on negotiations, the two blocs first tested the atmosphere and continued to watch one another's moves very closely.

The Big-Four Conference in Berlin (January 25—February 18, 1954) was only crowned with a relative success: of the three problems under discussion (universal relaxation of tension, the German problem and the Austrian problem), none was solved completely. When Molotov declared that there existed a close political interdependence between all controversial problems, Bidault, speaking for the West, replied that this "theory of planetary bargaining" was in no way justified. "I cannot see," the French foreign minister said, "why Austria's fate should depend on the fate of Korea, nor why an interdependence should be established between the problem of German unification and changes in the present position of Communist China." In practice, pursuing their policy of remilitarization, the Western countries declined the Soviet thesis of a unified Germany at the price of its "neutralization." The maintenance of the *status quo* in Germany had become a reality.⁹

On April 26, 1954, the second important Conference in Geneva took place: its task was to study the two problems of Korea and Indochina. As regards the Korean problem the progress is naught: the conference limited itself to confirming the *status quo*. The inquiry into the Indochina problem, on the other hand, was crowned with success: on July 21 an armistice agreement was signed, which left to the Communists—in exchange for peace—the territory north of the Seventeenth Parallel. The two sides agreed that, by July 20, 1956, at the latest, free elections would take place in Vietnam, which would decide the fate of the country.

The policy of relaxing international tension was continued; on January 26, 1955, Moscow proclaimed the end of the war with Germany, and a little later Chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow, the result of which was to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. In May, Khrushchev visited Belgrade and declared the Soviet Union's sensational *mea culpa* in its con-

⁸ Sir Alvary Gascoigne, "Soviet Foreign Policy," *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1955, pp. 24—34.

⁹ Alfred Grosser, *La situation en Allemagne en 1955: Rapport du Congrès International de Bruges, 1955*, Institut des Relations Internationales, Brussels, 1955, p. 46. Compare: Boris Meissner, *Russland, die Westmächte und Deutschland*, 2nd ed., Nölke Verlag, Hamburg, 1954; Alfred Grosser (ed.), *Les relations internationales d'Allemagne Occidentale*, Editions Colin, Paris, 1956.

flict with Yugoslavia.¹⁰ In the same period (April 15, 1955) the preliminary agreement to the Austrian peace treaty was signed in Moscow: for the first time since 1945, the Soviets agreed not to link the Austrian question with the German one and, in return for Austria's neutralization, to evacuate their armed forces. This was the first serious concession to the West. Likewise, the USSR returned on September 19, 1955 the military base of Porkkala to Finland and the governments of the two countries signed a friendship pact for a period of 20 years.

Still later, on July 18, 1955, the important conference of the heads of government of the Big Four (Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Fauré), opened in Geneva. No sensational decision was taken, but the tone in which the negotiations were conducted was correct: the diplomats "smiled" and debated in the "new spirit."

At the same time in UNO certain changes were taking place. After having long prevented the acceptance of new members into UNO, the Great Powers agreed at last on the admission of 16 new members, and the new Secretary General of the United Nations was recognized by the USSR.

As a result, in the economic field, a considerable trade increase followed.

Finally, Moscow encouraged personal contacts between political figures. Khrushchev visited China, Yugoslavia, Geneva, India, Burma, Afghanistan and London.¹¹ The French prime minister Guy Mollet (incidentally a "right-wing" socialist, damned by the *Soviet Encyclopedia*) went to Moscow. Then it was Tito's turn to go there and the reception he got was triumphal. Parliamentary exchanges were also very frequent.

Thus, it was in this atmosphere of a "cold peace" that the XX Congress of the Party was opened—an event awaited with great attention by the capitals of the free world.



The place occupied by foreign policy during the XX Congress was inordinately large. The reports as well as the debates gave it most attention: Khrushchev devoted almost one-third of his report to the international situation. The XX Congress forwarded three fundamental theses:

1. The possibility of peaceful coexistence between the Communist bloc and the free world;
2. The possibility of avoiding a third world war;
3. The possibility of a transition from "capitalism" to "socialism" [Communism] not only by armed protest [revolutions], but also in a peaceful way [parliamentary struggle].

These three theses are closely connected with each other. When analyzing them, the unshakeable belief in the final victory of "socialism" over "capitalism," as manifested by the Congress, should be kept firmly in mind.



¹⁰ For Khrushchev's secret report to the XX Congress, in which he shifted all responsibility for the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict on Stalin, see *Le Monde*, June 14, 1956.

¹¹ N. Boulganine, N. Khrouchtchev, *Voyage d'amitié en Inde, Birmanie et Afghanistan: Discours et documents officiels*, Editions en langues étrangères, Moscow, 1955.

1. The Possibility of Coexistence

A correct interpretation of this problem calls for a theoretical introduction. Essentially, Communism is the contradiction of capitalism, and not its complement. The element of antagonism is inherent in Communism in as far as it considers itself as "dialectical," "historico-scientific," and "pertaining to class." As long as Communism considers the triad of the historical development of mankind (feudalism—capitalism—Communism) as scientifically justified—and it does consider it as such—the thesis of peaceful coexistence, i.e., the rejection of antagonism, will be the result not of fundamental, nor of essential, but only of tactical and transitory considerations. On the historical level, a well-known passage from the Communist Manifesto of 1848 proclaims most emphatically that "the whole history of every society so far has been that of a class struggle."¹² On the dialectical level, Lenin gave this thesis a philosophical form: "Dialectics is the study of contradictions in the very essence of things."¹³ According to Mao Tse-tung, these contradictions are universal and absolute. The methods, however, of solving contradictions, i.e., the forms of struggle, are different, depending on the nature of the contradictions. Some of them bear the features of antagonism quite openly, others are concealed.¹⁴

The XX Congress did not revise these theoretical principles. On the contrary: Shepilov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the acute ideological divergences. "Of course," he declared, "we do not propose any compromises to capitalism as regards ideology and program. It is impossible to coordinate the capitalist and socialist conceptions with each other."¹⁵ This means that the thesis concerning coexistence is the result of practical considerations rather than theoretical ones. This thesis, incidentally, is far from being novel, since it was already formulated by Stalin in 1924, when, in opposition to Trotsky, he put forth the theory of "socialism in one country."

What, then, are the practical motives for which the XX Congress proclaimed the thesis of coexistence? It is known that the Communist doctrine on concrete political contradictions, a doctrine first outlined by Lenin, divides these contradictions into (1) those between the socialist and capitalist camps, and (2) those between the countries of the capitalist bloc.¹⁶

According to Stalin, the latter contradictions are more acute than the former ones. Moreover, not only are the contradictions between the Western capitalist countries sharper than any possible clashes between the Communist and the non-Communist world, but—as a result of inequalities in their economic development—they are so sharp as to lead to "inevitable wars

¹² Karl Marx et Frédéric Engels, *Manifeste du Parti Communiste*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1947, p. 11.

¹³ V. J. Lénine, *Marx, Engels, Marxisme*, Editions Sociales Internationales, Paris, 1935.

¹⁴ Mao Tsé Tse, "A propos de la contradiction," *Cahiers du Communisme*, August 1952, p. 814.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1956.

¹⁶ V. J. Lénine, *L'impérialisme — stade suprême du capitalisme*, Editions Tribord, Brussels, Paris and Ostend. See especially the chapter on the colonialism of the 19th century.

between the capitalist countries themselves.”¹⁷ In practical illustration of this view, the Communists believe that the outbreak of the two world wars was caused by divergent interests between the capitalist states. When, for instance, World War II broke out in 1939, the then neutral USSR took advantage of this clash between the capitalist countries and expanded its territorial possessions at the expense of Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Rumania.

The XX Congress not only failed to introduce radical corrections into this thesis, but even developed it. This was especially noticeable in Khrushchev's report, which said that “the general crisis is getting more acute every day,” that there is a fundamental contradiction “between the USA and Great Britain,” that “capitalism stands face to face with new violent economic and social upheavals.”

What does this mean? It means that, by relaxing their pressure on the Western world, the Soviets are trying to provoke potential, or to strengthen already existing, conflicts between countries of the non-Communist bloc, and then to profit from these conflicts.

This policy of relaxing direct pressure on the Western countries and thus creating further misunderstandings among them is not at all absurd; on the contrary, it is dangerous. Paradoxical though it might appear, a relaxing of the USSR's pressure on the Western world weakens the latter in the sense that the forces of the West, previously united in their struggle against an immediate Communist threat, now become more dispersed and display a tendency not only toward lack of unification, but even toward mutual weakening. This is noticeable in the Anglo-Greek conflict over Cyprus, in the isolation of France by the other Western states in problems concerning the Near East and in the Franco-German disagreements. All this is aggravated by a new factor: the political uprisings of Asiatic and African peoples who were previously or are still controlled by the West. This problem of the African and Asiatic peoples deserves to be commented on, since it plays a very important part in the new course of Soviet foreign policy.

The African and Asiatic colonial, or formerly colonial, peoples undoubtedly represent the weakest zone of resistance in the defense system of the West. These peoples have been under the rule of the West, and this domination was sometimes for them of very questionable value. They aspired toward state sovereignty, but these aspirations were not always well received among the ruling states. No wonder that the feelings of these peoples toward their former masters are not always too warm.

Yet the Western countries are very slow in meeting these new demands. Sometimes they defend their attitude, speaking about the Communist danger, the political immaturity of these peoples and their economic backwardness. No doubt, some of these arguments are fully, or at least in part, justified: it must be recalled that in many African and Asiatic countries the population's political awareness is far from being adequately developed, that the Communist danger is very real, and that the economic situation of these countries

¹⁷ J. Staline, *Les problèmes économiques du socialisme en URSS*, Editions en langues étrangères, Moscow, 1952, p. 40.

is frequently downright wretched. To leave these peoples to their own fate may, in some cases, lead to anarchy and misery.¹⁸

It must, however, be mentioned that an identification of the national aspirations of these peoples with Communist intrigues is not always justified, and must sometimes be even condemned. Moreover the cheap export of Western ideologies into these countries, including the doctrine concerning the struggle between the Communist and the Western world, without simultaneously granting economic and social alleviations, will not make any special impression on the peoples of these countries, either. "The universal ideologies," General MacArthur declared before the American Congress, "are hardly digestible for the Asiatic mentality and are not readily understood there. These peoples are striving, in the first place, to get more food for their stomachs, better clothing, and a sounder roof over their heads; and after that, they want to realize their natural national aspirations by attaining political freedom."¹⁹

No wonder, therefore, that this weakening of the West among the African and Asiatic peoples causes the Soviets to direct their political and economic efforts in just that direction: a political strengthening of dependent peoples weakens the West still more, and an improvement of their economic situation develops their sympathies for the USSR. According to the Marxist theory, these two aspects are closely connected: the Soviets consider that "political liberation" is only the first and a temporary (though sometimes unavoidable) phase in the course of "social-economic liberation," i.e., the transition to socialism.²⁰

¹⁸ This Asiatic area is actually a *famine zone*. While in the USA the annual per capita income amounts to 1800 dollars, it is in some Asiatic countries 100 dollars or even less; in Indonesia it amounts to 25 dollars. Asia, which represents 53 per cent of the world's population, receives no more than 10 per cent of the world's income. The corresponding figures for the USA are 9 per cent and 43.5 per cent respectively. While the annual grain harvest in Denmark amounts to 3.38 metric tons per capita of the population and in Belgium—3.14 metric tons, it is only 0.97 metric tons in China, in Pakistan—0.92, and in India—0.69 metric tons.

Prior to 1939, 38.6 per cent of the world's population were undernourished; today this proportion has increased to 59.5 per cent. In Sweden the average expectation of life of the population is 68 years; in India, people live 27 years on the average. At the same time, the world's population increases at a rate of 80,000 individuals a day, i.e., by 30 million people per annum, and this increase is especially strong in the Asiatic countries.

The above figures, collated by the United Nations, date back to 1951 and, therefore, require amending. It is, nevertheless, very probable that they reflect the general situation. The conclusion to be drawn is that the gap between the prosperity of the progressive countries and the need of the African and Asiatic peoples is not in fact diminishing, but rather constantly growing.

Sheyven, *Rapport relatif au Fonds Spécial des Nations Unies pour le développement économique des pays insuffisamment développés*, United Nations, New York, 1953—1954; and R. Yakemtchouk, "Les pays économiquement sous-développés," *Rayonne et fibres synthétiques*, Brussels, 1955, pp. 1819—1828.

¹⁹ MacArthur, Discours devant le Congrès, 19 avril 1951, *Documentation française: Chroniques étrangères (Etats-Unis)*, No. 159.

²⁰ J. Staline, *Le marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1949.

Thus, while the population of Europe is already adequately prepared to resist Communist expansion and since, therefore, Communist subversive activity often has a hard job there, no such acute and active resistance exists in Asia and Africa; on the contrary, some peoples or certain strata of these peoples sympathize quite openly with Communism, identifying it with agrarian reform. Hence the great efforts the Bolsheviks make to draw these peoples—by granting them alluring economic aid in the form of credits, goods and construction of factories—first into the economic, and then into the political orbit of the USSR. The brakes which were put on the “new economic policy” concerning light industry and agriculture can be explained, at least to some extent, by the need to fulfill the enormous industrial deliveries to China and India.²¹ Hence the present course in Soviet foreign policy: to preserve the *status quo* with regard to the USA and Europe (coexistence), and to promote expansion in the countries of Asia and the Near East. This is one of the main aspects—or even the motivating factor—in the policy of peaceful coexistence.

There exist also other factors determining the new course in Soviet politics. These factors are the result of considerations of an internal economic nature.

In the first place, the lessening of tension in the international sphere permits the Soviets to concern themselves more directly with a series of domestic problems, such as trying to find a solution for the agrarian problem and the transfer of population to Siberia and the deserts of Central Asia. There are grave shortcomings in almost all branches of the economy and these shortcomings were widely discussed even at the Congress itself. Therefore we may presume that one reason for the recent partial demobilization of the Red Army was to free some hitherto quite unproductive manpower and to use it for the most urgent requirements of economic development.

In addition, the Soviets consider that, in view of the “perfection” of their economic system, time works more advantageously for the USSR than for Western countries. This means that peaceful economic competition must finally lead to an indisputable superiority of Soviet industrial potential over that of the West. This is how former Foreign Minister Shepilov presented this situation:

During the past 26 years (1930—1955), the average annual increase in industrial production was: in the USSR—12.3%, in the USA—3.3%, in Great Britain—2.4%, in France—0.9%. If we compare the last 11 prewar years with the first 9 postwar years, that is, 20 years of normal economic development in the two worlds under conditions of peace, the picture is still more graphic. The average annual rate of development of industrial production during that period was: in the USSR—18%, in the USA—2.8%, in Great Britain—3.5%, and in France—2.5%. This is to say the socialist economy develops 5 to 7 times as fast as those of the capitalist world.²²

There is no doubt that these figures far from reflect the true state of affairs and should be considered only as an index of the Soviet conception of economic competition in both camps. It is, however, true that since 1918 the Soviets have progressed immensely in the industrial sector and converted

²¹ E. A. Glovinsky, “Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations,” *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, May 1955, p. 33.

²² *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1956.

the once almost exclusively agricultural country into a progressive industrial power; it is this industrial progress that has determined the role which the USSR is playing today in the international arena.

It must be mentioned here that some of the "people's democracies," especially China, are also rapidly becoming industrialized. Khrushchev declared in his report that the USSR has bound itself to furnish 391 factories and 90 workshops for the "people's democracies"; for China, the USSR is to establish, by 1960, as many as 156 factories and 21 workshops worth 5.6 billion rubles. This means that the Soviets are striving to turn the economic balance of power in their favor by the beginning of the new economic plan (i. e., by 1960). A political unbalance of power would be the consequence. Finally it must be admitted that on the demographic level, time is on the side of the USSR: the population is growing faster in the Communist camp than in the West.



2. The Chances of Avoiding a Third World War

It is a fact that World War II did not break out on the initiative of the USSR. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of August 23, 1939 made it easier for Hitler to launch his attack against Poland, yet it was not its immediate cause.

However, the action of the armed forces of North Korea who crossed the demarcation line on June 24, 1950, thus committing an obvious armed aggression—in which Communist China itself later participated—could not have taken place without the formal consent or even formal initiative of the USSR. There is no doubt that the outbreak of the Korean War was Moscow's responsibility.

Why did this conflict not develop into a third world war? Is it because the USSR was at that time not yet in possession of atomic weapons? On the other hand, how can we explain the absence of the Soviet representative at the UN Security Council, which permitted the Organization to condemn the aggressor and to decree a collective armed sanction? It may be assumed that the USSR's policy in Korea was not to provoke a third world war, but that its immediate objective was to bleed its Chinese ally sufficiently so as to be easily able to reduce him afterwards to the status of rank-and-file satellite and draw him still closer into the orbit controlled by Moscow. There is no question that the task of dominating 600 million Chinese presents the USSR with very complex problems.

Keeping this in mind, we must now look at the traditional Communist theory about wars, especially about world wars. According to the Communist classics, war is not only a political, but rather an economic and social phenomenon. The essence of war is not to be found in ordinary political divergencies, but in deep-rooted class antagonism: "War . . . is the highest form of conflict—a form to which recourse is had in order to settle differences between classes, nations, states [and] political blocs at a definite stage in the development of these differences."²³ Therefore, wars are supposed to be

²³ Mao Tsé Toung, *La stratégie de la Guerre révolutionnaire en Chine*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1951, p. 16.

inevitable as long as capitalism exists, since it is the latter which, allegedly, initiates class antagonism. "Wars will cease to exist only when capitalism is destroyed and when the socialist order is established in the whole world."²⁴ The mission of destroying capitalism falls to the lot of the "socialist" camp because, just as foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, the struggle between capitalism and socialism is a manifestation of the fundamental antagonism between the two blocs: "War is policy conducted by different means."²⁵ The wars conducted by the socialist camp are just wars, those conducted by the capitalist camp are unjust.

The XX Congress has not formally renounced the thesis about wars having an economic and social basis. Yet the Congress did revise this thesis inasmuch as, taking into consideration all the changes that have occurred in the world since Lenin formulated his theory about the inevitability of an armed conflict, as well as the enormous growth of the Communist bloc since 1939 (a growth which is alleged to promote peace), it declared that war is not inevitable. The Congress did not, however, deny the existence of a basic antagonism; this is why it declared that the USSR must be prepared for all eventualities.

There is no doubt that the might of the Communist bloc has grown considerably in comparison with 1939: Communism has established itself as a universal system and controls 900,000,000 people. According to Shepilov's calculations, Communism extends over 25% of our globe against 17% in 1939, it rules over 35% of the world's population against 9% in 1939, and it has at its disposal 30% of the world's industrial potential, against 7% in 1939. These figures are quoted only by way of information.

It is, however, not at all obvious why this increase in the might of the Communist bloc should be considered a peace factor: Communism, not capitalism, developed the thesis about antagonism; the stronger Communism grows, the greater becomes the importance of its theory and direct action. This theory is well known: it preaches antagonism and prophesies world victory for Communism. Now, so far Communism in practice has not presented the USSR to any great advantage: the Soviet aggression against Finland, which resulted in the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations; the Soviet intervention on September 17, 1939 in the German-Polish conflict; the occupation of the Baltic countries in 1940 by the Soviets; the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 1940; participation in the Greek internal war after 1945; the blockade of Berlin in 1948; participation in the Korean aggression in 1950 and participation in the Indochinese conflict.

Therefore we must seek the real reason for proclaiming the thesis about the possibility of avoiding a third world war elsewhere—namely in the following two factors. First, the present world distribution of forces is still disadvantageous for the Soviets: it is very probable that, in any world conflict, the Communist bloc would be unable to resist the technical and industrial superiority of the West. Moreover, today the Communist bloc is not as unified as it was in 1939; on the contrary, in addition to its traditional internal conflicts

²⁴ BSE, 2nd ed., vol. VIII, pp. 570—589.

²⁵ This formulation has been borrowed from von Clausewitz, *Théorie de la Grande Guerre*, trans. Lt. Col. de Vatry, Librairie Militaire de L. Baudoin, Paris, 1889. Compare: Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, The Free Press, Glencoe (Ill.), 1953, p. 10.

which are caused chiefly by the nationalities problem, it must now also cope with the occupied East European countries, with China and Yugoslavia.

Second, the fact that the Soviets also have atomic and hydrogen weapons has established a certain balance of power: paradoxical though it may sound, the invention of these terrible weapons of destruction has worked for peace. The new weapons in the possession of both adversaries render a total world war—in the traditional sense of the word—almost impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult, to conduct. The new weapons “are of a kind which makes it impossible to find a place in the world guaranteeing safety from sudden and total destruction.”²⁶ The enormous potential of the new weapons does not allow for an adequate protection of cities such as New York or Moscow against this “sudden and total” destruction. And so Communist science had to give way in this respect to genuine science and was compelled to admit that physics and chemistry are well able to revise and direct the Marxist laws of history. However, this does not mean that—in spite of logic and common sense—human stupidity, allied with a fanatical belief in creating a fictitious paradise for future generations, is incapable of committing the most senseless crimes.



3. *The Possibility of a Transition from “Capitalism” into “Socialism” by Peaceful Means*

This thesis concerns foreign policy inasmuch as it determines the form and extent to which the Communist parties in the West will strive for the seizure of power.

Following tradition, the writings of Communist leaders have kept unreservedly to a thesis expressed in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, which stated, that “the proletariat is establishing its domination by means of the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie,” i. e., by internal armed revolutions. Engels, for his part, though he vindicated, under certain circumstances, the possibility and necessity of a parliamentary struggle,²⁷ established his well-known theory of violence, a theory which was later developed by Communist and non-Communist theoreticians.²⁸

The practice conformed to the theory. Though Marx, for instance, considered the Paris insurrection of 1870 a tactical mistake, he nevertheless welcomed it as a “powerful manifestation of the Communist movement.” The attitude of the Bolshevik Party was similar in the prerevolutionary period, with the difference that the new situation created by World War I permitted the Bolsheviks to launch the slogan about transforming the “imperialist” war into an internal, i. e., a civil war. It was maintained that re-

²⁶ Albert Einstein, *Conceptions scientifiques, morales et sociales*, Editions Flammarion, Paris, 1952, p. 168. George E. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1954.

²⁷ See Engels’ foreword to Karl Marx, *Les luttes des classes en France*, Editions Sociales Internationales, Paris, 1936, pp. 22—27.

²⁸ Frédéric Engels, *M. E. Dühring bouleverse la science (Anti-Dühring)*, 3 vols., Editions Costes, Paris 1931—1933. Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*, Editions Rivière, Paris, 1910, pp. 105—111.

volution (the quickest way to seize power) distinguished the Bolsheviks from "right-wing socialists and renegades" such as Kautsky who admitted the possibility, and even necessity, not only of revolution, but also of evolution by parliamentary struggle. In this connection one could quote a whole series of Lenin's speeches and papers.²⁹

This is why the Bolsheviks refused to join the Duma in 1905. They did so later when the new conditions created by World War I made it possible for them to use the Duma for their propagandistic activities.

This tactic of "parliamentary participation" yielded practical results: it facilitated the forcible seizure of power in 1917, and was, therefore, recognized by the Party as advantageous. In 1920, Lenin furnished this maneuver with a theoretical basis. Since that time, the Bolsheviks have propagated peaceful parliamentary struggle as a preliminary step toward armed revolution.³⁰

What did the XX Congress contribute to this basic tenet? It introduced the following amendment: the parliamentary struggle can serve not only as a preparatory phase for an armed action [this being the traditional thesis], but also as a means for the transfer of power without armed struggle. In other words, the revolutionary method retains its expediency and, in certain cases, it even cannot be dispensed with; a peaceful transfer is, however, possible. Thus, the traditional thesis has not been refuted, only supplemented.

This new formulation calls for some explanation.

(a) Referring to the transition to socialism by revolutionary means, the Congress decreed that this method should be applied to those countries whose ruling circles are putting up a particularly strong resistance to Communist demands. In those cases, Khrushchev declared: "The transition to socialism will take the form of a severe revolutionary class-struggle." But as things are, there exist no criteria by which to determine precisely how strong the resistance of these non-Communist circles is, and to what extent capitalism is rooted in the given country, as a result of which factors a revolutionary struggle may or may not take place. This thesis allows for a very wide interpretation.

(b) The transition to socialism by peaceful parliamentary means was presented by the Congress in such a peculiar light that one feels compelled to question it altogether. Mikoyan, for instance, declared: "Practically speaking, the October Revolution took place almost peacefully . . . without bloodshed (!)." As other examples of a peaceful transition to socialism, he mentioned Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland! If this is how the

²⁹ V. J. Lénine, *La Révolution prolétarienne et le rénégat Kautsky*, Librairie de l'Humanité, Paris, 1921, pp. 25 and 77; *L'Etat et la révolution*, Librairie de l'Humanité, Paris, 1925; *Sur la route de l'insurrection*, Librairie de l'Humanité, Paris, 1924, pp. 168—169; *La lutte pour le pain*, Brussels, pp. 4—5; "Le marxisme," in *Karl Marx, Homme, penseur et révolutionnaire* (ed. D. Riazanov), Editions Sociales Internationales, Paris, 1923, pp. 99 and 107—108; and *La Révolution bolchéviste: Ecrits et discours de 1917 à 1923*, Editions Payot, Paris, 1931 (see especially the speeches delivered on Dec. 27, 1917; Jan. 18 and 21, 1918; March 7, 1918, and Oct. 22, 1918).

³⁰ V. J. Lénine, *La maladie infantile du communisme*. Editions Tribord, Brussels, Paris and Ostend.

Communists conceive the "peaceful transition to socialism," then their new program must be approached with great reserve.³¹

This means that all these theoretical cogitations are of only relative significance: Communist theory is so elastic that it can be applied in a variety of ways, dependent on political circumstances, time, the geographical situation and, particularly, tactical expediency. In the present instance, the proclamation of the thesis of a parliamentary road to power is intended to lead to the creation of "people's fronts" in the countries of the Western world, especially in Europe, this being an experiment already practiced before World War II, for instance, in France in 1936.

No doubt, this policy of the "unity of the working classes" will require some concessions by the Communists, such as were given in France, where the Communist Party gave its vote of confidence to the government headed by the right-wing socialist Guy Mollet. Thus, insofar as the Communist parties of the Western world are prepared to renounce the thesis of "splendid isolation" and submit at least to a limited cooperation with democratic parties—on the categorical condition that this policy will not lead to the creation of people's fronts—this trend need not be radically condemned. But if the Communist parties, rejecting all compromises, should continue to aspire to realize only their own programs and deceive the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, this policy should be severely condemned. It is obvious, however, that only practice, not theory, can indicate the correct attitude to be adopted with regard to the new course.



CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the foreign policy of the USSR, reflecting the class nature of the Soviet state and its domestic policy and being a weapon of the international proletariat in its struggle against the existing order, continues to aim at world victory. True, all universal ideologies (Christianity, humanism, existentialism, etc.) aim at attaining a dominant position; these ideologies, however, proceed peacefully and without military support, whereas Communism relies on the USSR, the Red Army and well-disciplined parties. Hence the inequality of the struggle.

³¹ It is well known that in 1948, the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia by sedition. This fact does not call for any commentaries. As far as the other countries of Eastern Europe are concerned, the Communists were able to seize power there only because these countries were occupied by the Red Army. The Communists' coming to power by parliamentary means, i.e., by elections, was possible only by deliberate falsification of these elections. For instance, the postwar Polish parliament has violated frequently basic parliamentary procedure. For example see: *Sejm Ustawodawczy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 4-go posiedzenia w dniu 8-go lutego 1947* (Constituent Assembly of the Polish Republic: Stenographic Report of the 4th Session on February 8, 1947), Warsaw, pp. 64—70. The issue is the intervention of deputies Hochfeld and Zulawski. See also the 13th session of the Sejm on May 31, 1947: dispute between the Sejm marshal and the deputies Mikolajczyk, Drobner, Nowak, Wójcik, Wykrzykowski, and the minister of industry and trade, Minc. Compare: Stanisław Mikolajczyk, *Le Viol de la Pologne*, Editions Plon, Paris, 1949.

This gigantic universal march of Communism is a dialectical process; that is, it is moving in phases: offensive is followed by respite, used to consolidate what has been achieved, or even by retreat, for a more effective offensive at a later date. The offensive has only one goal—world hegemony; yet the methods of struggle and the time of their employment may vary.

The present policy of easing international tension is only one link in this Communist dialectic of offensive and respite, strategy and tactics: the present stage is one of respite. It has been prompted by the following motives:

1. Communism is not yet prepared for a world revolution.

2. In the opinion of Communist theoreticians the Western world has not yet reached the last stage in the development of imperialism, and is not yet ripe for the downfall which will result from internal economic crises and a direct offensive by Communist forces. On a practical level, the goal of the new Soviet foreign policy is, by maintaining the *status quo* as regards problems of world security and the German problem—for which purpose the Soviets are developing extensive trade connections and ordering Communist parties in the Western countries to reduce pressure—to direct the energies of the Soviet state in the following directions:

- (a) Settlement of the most urgent problems of an internal nature (agrarian, light industry, virgin lands of Siberia and Central Asia);

- (b) Consolidation of the political and economic unity of the satellite bloc;

- (c) Consolidation of control over China, especially in the economic sphere;

- (d) Deployment of a large-scale offensive in Asia and Africa, a policy in which economic factors are playing the main rôle. Special attention will be paid to China and India. Together with the USSR, these two countries are intended to become a powerful bloc in Asia.

Paradoxically, this new trend toward Communist construction by economic expansion within and beyond the Soviet frontiers confronts the Western world with new problems which are much more difficult to solve than those arising from a Soviet policy of ordinary military expansion. A Communist offensive policy unites the West, a policy of relaxation disunites it. This is why the new foreign policy of the USSR makes it essential for Western policy to be given careful reconsideration.*

* This report was originally delivered by Dr. Yakemchuk at the Eighth Institute Conference, held in Munich, 1956.

Questions of Governmental Organization and Administration at the Twentieth Party Congress

A. YURCHENKO

In the Marxist-Leninist concept of historical development, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is considered an essential and indispensable political premise for establishing and developing a socialist, and later Communist, social system.

Marx and Engels, the authors of "scientific socialism," did not elaborate upon the actual state structure during the dictatorship of the proletariat, but they did put forth some rather definite ideas in their pronouncements. Marx, for instance, mentioned the Paris Commune as an approximate political form of proletarian dictatorship. He was right, inasmuch as the Commune undoubtedly represented a contemporary example of a political hegemony of forces which, to a certain extent, shared the ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, as far as the outward structure of the state was concerned, this French experiment did not produce any particularly new forms of state organization in comparison with the radical "bourgeois" tendencies of that time.

Engels expressed himself more clearly on the political structure of the state in which the proletarian dictatorship would be realized. "If there is anything at all about which there is no doubt," he wrote to Kautsky on June 29, 1891, discussing the Erfurt program of German Social-Democracy, "then it is this: Our party and the working class can come to power only under a political system similar to a democratic republic. The latter is the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as has been demonstrated by the great French Revolution."¹ Thus, the thesis of the "parliamentary path," which was proclaimed by Khrushchev at the XX Party Congress in 1956, is 65 years old.

Lenin, the founder of "revolutionary Marxism," or Bolshevism, also visualized the initial form of proletarian dictatorship, which he called the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," as a "democratic republic." However, the concept of this form was made much more exact by the Bolshevik theorist and leader, inasmuch as it was given an interpretation which virtually destroyed all previous concepts. The slogan of "a democratic republic" was needed by Lenin to achieve "victory over tsarism." In his view, the democratic republic had to be "a dictatorship," since it would have to rely upon armed might, the armed masses, and in-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Collected Works), 3rd ed., vol. XXI, p. 418.

surrection, but never upon any institution created "legally" or "in a peaceful manner."² Actually, this definition amounted to a revision of Engels' initial concept of dictatorship as government by the majority of society, since Lenin's "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship" was being realized under the "hegemony of the proletariat," (the latter being a minority in the Russia of the time), and consequently ensured the political supremacy of a *minority*. Its political consciousness and will were molded by its advance guard, the Bolshevik party, since "leadership by the party is the most important thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat."³

To quote Khrushchev, the leading representative of the collective leadership, any other road "was barred to the Russian Bolsheviks, who were the first to achieve the transition to socialism," since "Lenin pointed out to us another way, the only correct way to create a republic of soviets under the prevailing historical conditions, and we who followed this path achieved a universal historical victory."⁴ It is reasonable to assume that any alterations in a state system which had been either "thoroughly tested in practice" or which had brought about "the universal historical victory" were excepted.

The leading role of the Communist Party is the basic and essential premise of any potential state system which the collective leaders would consider acceptable or possible. Even in regard to the capitalist countries, where the parliamentary path to socialism is deemed admissible, this premise is unreservedly adhered to. In his report, Khrushchev has unequivocally stressed the following preliminary condition for the parliamentary path: "Whatever the actual form of transition to socialism, the political leadership of the working class, headed by their progressive section, will be the essential deciding factor. Without this the transition to socialism is impossible."⁵ The expression "headed by their progressive section" clearly means the Communist Party.

Thus, the parliamentary path to socialism and multi-party government are looked upon solely as auxiliary means, to which resort may be had under certain conditions and at certain transitory stages, preceding the attainment of the "highest" and ultimate stage of the Communist state structure.

The one-party system was firmly established in the Soviet Union in the first years of its existence. This situation was legalized by the Constitution of 1936 and remains unchanged today. After the death of Stalin, the collective leaders endeavored to compensate for the loss of dictatorship in its fullest and most perfect one-man form by their efforts to preserve and, as far as possible, consolidate the principle of the one-party system. The central aim of all their ideological and political measures is expressed in Khrushchev's laconic statement: "Our Communist Party is the ruling party."⁶ Much attention is again being devoted by them to the question of the role played by the Party, even though the fundamental points of this question were long ago settled and are no longer a matter of discussion. There is probably a connection between this new interest and the growing slackness and instability

² *Ibid.*, 4th ed., vol. IX, p. 40.

³ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE], 2nd ed., vol. XIV, p. 346.

⁴ Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Section I, "On the Forms of Transition to Socialism."

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, Section "The Party," para. 1.

in the governmental and political machinery, a process which could already be observed towards the end of Stalin's life.

During the crisis of the regime following Stalin's death, which in the ideological field showed itself particularly in the campaign against "the cult of the individual," the theme of democracy, i.e., the role played by the masses as creators of historical processes and the foundation of the strength and power of the state, was bound to become one of the basic weapons in the propaganda arsenal of the collective dictatorship. Such propaganda, however, always contained reminders of the leading role of the Party. Immediately after the XX Party Congress *Kommunist* wrote:

Lenin based his views on the unshakeable nature of the Marxist principle that the workers are the creators of history, creating all material goods as well as spiritual values . . . At the same time Lenin taught that the laboring classes and all workers united around them will be able to achieve socialism and Communism only under the guidance of the Communist Party, armed with knowledge of the laws of social development, a party which is steeled and welded in struggle, trained to observe the mood of the masses and to influence them in the spirit of Communism.⁷

"The leadership by the Party is a guarantee of the strength of the Soviet regime and of new victories on the road of transition from socialism to Communism . . ." "A further increase in the role of the Party as the leading force in our society is imperative in the interests of the Soviet people, the interests of Communist construction."⁸ Likewise, *Partiinaya zhizn*, in an April 1956 issue, after a few propagandistic sentences on the subject of the role of the masses and the importance of a close contact between them and the Party, raises a warning voice against what it calls "dragging along behind." The journal quotes Kalinin:

To lag behind the masses is also a kind of "contact" with the masses . . . But is it this kind of contact with the masses which we, the Bolsheviks, have in mind? Of course not. To follow the masses, who at times are carried away by backward elements, is a Menshevik line. Your Bolshevik line is to lead the masses, not simply to watch over them, but to lead them ahead, in the wake of the purposeful vanguard.⁹

Thus, the slogan that "the Soviet peoples are the decisive force in the building of Communism," which is now being emphasized in Soviet propaganda, really means that the Soviet peoples are a decisive force only to the extent that they can be organized and directed by the ruling party. Although, in fact, and even perhaps in the view of the collective dictatorship, the Soviet peoples are in the last analysis the decisive force, they are to continue as objects, not makers, of the will of the Soviet state.

One could cite many other references in Soviet ideological, legal and propaganda literature to the indestructibility of the thesis of a one-party dictatorship. The Soviet collective leaders are making every effort to preserve this fundamental principle of Soviet style "democracy." In this sense, they are logically following Lenin's thesis of the Party "as the basic weapon . . .

⁷ *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 5, p. 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁹ K. Permyakova, "Talks about Our Party," *Partiinaya zhizn* (Party Life), Moscow, 1956, No. 7, p. 47.

without which it is impossible to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat, to build up socialism, Communism," as well as Stalin's statement, made at the ratification of the 1936 Constitution, that whatever changes took place in the Soviet system, "the present leading rôle of the Communist Party would remain unchanged."¹⁰

The desire of the collective leaders to preserve and, as far as possible, consolidate the Party monopoly in managing the life of the country, is not confined to the relations between the Party and society. Logically, the leaders' efforts extend to the Party itself, as the instrument and bearer of the dictatorship. Therefore the post-Stalin Central Committee considers its main tasks to be, first, to prevent tendencies developing in the Party which could undermine its power as a mechanism of dictatorship and harm the one-party principle as the basis of the Soviet state; and, second, to preserve the elite character of the Party. In addition to the old slogan "The Soviet peoples are the decisive power," new slogans about "collective leadership" in the Party and "inner-Party democracy" are being promoted. However, the new slogans will make essentially little difference. A certain extension of the inner-Party democracy is undoubtedly occurring. Some manifestations of this process are being intensively exploited in Party literature to demonstrate the merits of the new leadership. However, even as the first moves were being made towards "democratization" inside the Party, the leaders complained threateningly about some individuals who had taken too seriously the pronouncements on "collectivism" and inner-Party "democracy" made at the XX Party Congress. Approximately one month after the Congress *Kommunist* quoted Lenin's warning, "We admit freedom of opinion inside the Party, but only within certain limits... we are under no obligation to go along with active propagators of opinions which are rejected by the majority of the Party." The editors of *Kommunist* added: "The value of criticism may be judged by whether it originates from the Party position and whether it is directed at strengthening the Party and our state." Further, Party members are required to exercise their "democratic" rights, but in an entirely different way: "A Communist has no right to remain silent," the central theoretical organ of the Party reminds the reader, "whenever there is evidence of attempts to undermine the principles of the Party spirit."¹¹ The broad masses of society remain uncertain of the limits to which criticism within the Party is to be tolerated and the point at which it becomes an "anti-Party" and "anti-government" attitude. When such "violations" arise and are mentioned in the press, they are dealt with in vague terms, without any indication how the limits of permissible criticism had been overstepped.

The measures undertaken by the collective leadership to preserve the elite character of the Party are particularly interesting. Figures on Party growth show that great efforts to this end were made during the first three years of the post-Stalin period (prior to the XX Congress). In the period between the last two congresses (1952—1956), the number of members in the Soviet Communist Party increased from 6,013,000 to 6,795,000, and the number of candidates decreased from 868,000 to 419,000. The average annual increase in the total of members and candidates amount-

¹⁰ J. V. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Questions of Leninism), 2nd ed., p. 523.

¹¹ G. Shitarev, "The Realization of Collectivity Is the Pledge of a Correct Leadership," *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 6, pp. 55—56.

ed to 1.5%. The increase was accounted for mainly by candidates becoming full members rather than by enlistment of persons formerly outside the Party. Since the growth of the Party in the period between the XVIII and XIX Congresses, i.e., between 1939 and 1952, constituted a threefold increase in members giving an average annual increase of 14% (in spite of four war years, which undoubtedly claimed the lives of many hundreds of thousands of Communists), there has been nearly a ninefold decline in the annual membership growth of the Party. Even assuming that a certain relaxation of Stalinist terror after his death led to a broader and more truly voluntary attitude towards joining the Party, this fact alone could hardly account for such a substantial decrease. During and after the Congress a number of rules and regulations on membership were made which support the assumption that the leaders themselves introduced restrictions on admission to Party membership. At the Congress, Khrushchev stressed the lack of attention given "to the control of the growth of the Party" as a "serious omission in the organizational work of the Party." He required that "a more resolute course of action be taken to improve in every way the quality of members admitted to the Party."¹² In this connection, an April 1956 issue of *Partiinaya zhizn* emphasizes that "the Party by no means admits all who wish membership, but only the most outstanding, devoted and active persons; the Party selects the best people and controls admission..."¹³ Here the journal cites Lenin's statement that the Bolshevik Party is "the only" party which does not seek an increase in numbers, but an "improvement in the quality of members."

Thus, to an even greater extent than under Stalin, the collective leadership recruits members not from those who wish to join but from those who are socially and ideologically desirable. Thus, entry into the Party's ranks is closed to those persons who might prove to be politically and ideologically dangerous. At the same time, the Party is being reinforced in a cautious manner with industrial leaders and other "prominent persons" who would not normally endeavor to attain political eminence. In view of the "leading role" of the Party in society and government, it is evident that the masses are just as unable to influence the course of political and social events from within the Party as from without. In contrast to the democracies, the Soviet elite is not formed by a normal, organic and free selective process, but by orders from above. Its class and caste character has not been lessened under the collective leadership but, on the contrary, intensified. In this way, by establishing a corporate system of mutual responsibility among those who are selected, the "collective" dictatorship is endeavoring to consolidate its foundations, which have been insecure since 1952. The Khrushchev Central Committee is attempting to compensate for a certain lack of flexibility during the post-Stalin period by strengthening the corporate spirit among the members of the "ruling party" admitted to membership under the "selective system."

Consequently, the collective leadership cannot in practice implement its statements on the further development of Soviet democracy. Even its promises are few and far between. The Central Committee report contains only part

¹² Report, *op. cit.*, Section "The Party," subsection "Organizational Party Work."

¹³ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1956, No. 8, p. 3.

of one page (out of a total of 96 pages) on the subject of "democratization." The subject was treated with slightly more attention by Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In the Congress resolution on the Central Committee report only one paragraph of about six lines deals with the matter and then only in a general way, without even the meager but concrete details given by Khrushchev and Voroshilov. The Central Committee resolution confines itself to a "demand" for the further intensification of creative activity and initiative among the workers, for more extensive participation by the masses in the administration of the state. "To this end it will be necessary to develop Soviet democracy in every possible way."¹⁴ However, the resolution does not say a word about the means for bringing this about. Khrushchev's report mentions serious defects in the activities of the principal part of the Soviet state machinery—the soviets—which "on occasions" amount to "direct departures from norms and statutes incorporated in the Soviet constitution."¹⁵ Illustrations given of such violations were the deputies' omission to report to their electors and the fictional character of the electors' right to recall deputies. It is symptomatic that, as pointed out by Voroshilov, in the course of nearly twenty years no "detailed method for the recall of deputies" has been worked out.¹⁶

Another instance of violations is to be found in the fact that sessions of the republic supreme soviets are convened only once a year, and not twice, as provided by the constitution. Local soviets, too, are being convened at irregular intervals. Even Voroshilov had to admit the purely decorative and ceremonial role of sessions of the soviets on all levels, which, in spite of the legal prerogatives invested in them, are actually no more than a passive and formal factor in the political and administrative life of the country. "Whenever sessions of soviets are not convened within the prescribed periods," Voroshilov states, "the soviets inevitably lose their leading role with respect to their subordinate and executive organs. This cannot fail to lead to contravention of the principles of Soviet democracy."¹⁷ These self-critical complaints are nothing new in Soviet state administrative practice. In fact they are as old as the Soviet administration itself. In this respect, the XX Congress could not make any new or original contribution. What genuinely independent activity could be expected from the soviets, when at best they remain only organs which, according to the well-known Soviet jurist and administrator, Professor S. Studenikin, have to draw up acts which are simply "the legal expression of the policy of the Communist Party"?¹⁸

For the sake of objectivity, however, it should be noted that reflection upon the "self-critical" comments on the Soviet state structure has this time led to some interesting and fairly sincere admissions. For instance, for the first time in the twenty years' existence of the second Soviet constitution,

¹⁴ Resolution of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Report of the Central Committee of the Party.

¹⁵ Report, *op. cit.*, Section "Further Consolidation and Development of the Soviet Public and State System."

¹⁶ K. E. Voroshilov, Speech at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1956, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁸ S. Studenikin, "The Significance of State Discipline in Soviet Society," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (The Soviet State and Law), 1956, No. 2, p. 19.

the parliamentary practices of the Soviet state are being commented upon (see the editorial of *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 3, 1956). This editorial illustrates the sterile character of debates in the Soviet legislative bodies. In order to avoid the impression that the shortcomings criticized are symptomatic of the entire Soviet parliamentary system, the Soviet legal journal selects the practices of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR as the object of its "disclosures." It states that "long before the beginning of the session of the Supreme Soviet... a definite number of deputies who are supposed to speak in the debates" are selected "from each oblast." Moreover, "the deputies wrote their speeches earlier (or had them written) and then read them aloud at the sessions." This editorial is of particular interest because it comments for the first time on the activities of supreme soviets, which, according to the constitution, are supposed to be the only legislative organs. "In actual fact, however," continues the editorial, "many problems which should be solved by a legislative decision are left to be dealt with by decrees of the presidiums of the supreme soviets." The presidium decree "has for a considerable period of time taken the place of law." The author is right in pointing out that "the confirmation of a decree, which has usually had the force of law for a fairly long time already, is not the same as passing a law... when hundreds of deputies take part in the debate upon the subject in question."¹⁹ These facts are not new. Nevertheless, they are of interest because this is the first time for many decades that this side of Soviet administrative practice has been mentioned. Does that mean that concrete steps will be taken to improve the situation? It seems to us that even if this were to happen the same situation would occur as has been the case in other similar undertakings. Any such improvements would inevitably prove abortive. It is sufficient to recall, for instance, the campaign to put new life into the soviets in the year 1924, or even the present constitution, which was originally motivated by the wish to democratize, at least in appearance, the elected organs of the Soviet state. The root of the problem lies in the organic incompatibility of a representative system and the one-party dictatorship.

The most important amendments and "reforms" undertaken by the Congress concern aspects of the state administration which are operative in inter-republic relations within the Soviet imperial unit. The Congress said little that was new on this subject, and confined itself to codifying certain processes which had become practice much earlier. At the beginning of 1954 a number of all-Union ministries were transformed into union-republican ministries (the coal industry, non-ferrous metallurgy, petroleum, communications, etc.). These transformations were noteworthy in that they affected branches of the state administration which had until then been under the exclusive authority of the top level. Particularly important in this respect was the transfer of certain branches of heavy industry, construction, communications and transportation to mixed or even exclusively republican authority. The reason for these measures is that the post-Stalin leaders were attempting to solve a crisis in an administration which, in the course of its 35 years' development, had reached a stage of excessive unwieldiness and clumsiness. Lenin's principle of "democratic centralism," which, particularly under Stalin, had been closely adhered to, had become a serious ob-

¹⁹ "For a Full Realization of Lenin's Principles of Soviet Democracy," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1956, No. 3, p. 7.

stacle to the work of the centralized administration itself, because it had lost flexibility and was overburdened with unimportant details. "Excessive centralization has grown up in the administration of industry," said Bulganin at a Central Committee plenary session in July 1955, and this, as the head of the government of the USSR admits, "is not beneficial to the work," because "on the one hand, it stands in the way of operational and practical management of enterprises, and, on the other hand, it lessens the responsibility of republican, economic, Party and government organizations for administrative work."²⁰ Apart from the establishment of new ministries in individual republics to share some administrative authority with the all-union ministries, it appears that a large number of industrial and other production units were removed from the direct control of all-union departments and turned over to existing republican ministries. At the Congress Bulganin spoke of 11,000 industrial enterprises affected. According to V. Churaev, 29,000 out of 38,000 industrial enterprises in the RSFSR are under republican and local administration.²¹ At the same time, Chairman of the State Economic Commission Saburov stressed the evident imperative need to broaden the functions of the councils of ministers of the union republics in controlling economic development within the territories of the respective republics independently of the (present) subordination of enterprises.²²

Although the reasons for these measures were mainly administrative in nature, the collective leaders have endeavored to supply a political motive for them. The changes were explained in particular by the fact that now "in all the union republics . . . national cadres have been forged and the general level of culture has been raised."²³ Similar statements were made by Bulganin, although six months previously he had made no reference whatsoever to ideological or political motives in the struggle against "excessive centralization." In February this year, supporting Khrushchev, he felt it essential to supplement his statements on the subject by stating that "they were in full conformity with Lenin's principles on the nationality policy of our party."²⁴ Khrushchev, who even before the Congress proclaimed the current slogan on the removal of the "petty controls" exercised over union republics, intends the slogan to foster "strengthening of the sovereignty of each republic." In addition to these declarations, it is noteworthy that in the course of the campaign for the dethronement of Stalin and the intensification of the Lenin cult, certain points were emphasized which were bound to deprive Stalin of his reputation as foremost Communist theorist and practitioner in nationality problems, while highlighting Lenin's rôle as an adversary of chauvinist tendencies and a partisan of national development for the non-Russian peoples in the USSR. At the Congress Bulganin stated:

²⁰ N. A. Bulganin's Report at the Plenum of the Central Committee, July 4, 1955, "On the Tasks Concerning Further Development of Industry, Technological Progress, and Amelioration of the Organization of Production," para. 5.

²¹ *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 7, p. 12.

²² M. Z. Saburov's speech at the XX Congress.

²³ Report, *op. cit.*, Section "Further Consolidation and Development of the Soviet Public and State System," para. 1.

²⁴ N. A. Bulganin's report at the XX Congress. Section "On the Development of the National Economy of the Union Republics and the Distribution of Industrial Forces."

The idea of creating a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a voluntary commonwealth of free and sovereign nations, endowed with equal rights, is due exclusively to the great founder of our Party and of the Soviet state, V. I. Lenin. He put forward, established and developed this idea. Moreover, even then, in 1922, Lenin warned against the possibility of excessive centralization in the future, against bureaucratic abuse, which might hinder the broad and many-sided development of the initiative of the union republics.²⁵

An explanation for Bulganin's thesis is to be found in Pentkovskaya's article "The Role of V. I. Lenin in the Formation of the USSR," which appeared in *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History), No. 3, 1956. This article contains references to unpublished documents from the Party archives. They reveal that the first basic project for the reunion of the so-called contract republics with Soviet Russia, which was worked out by a committee headed by Stalin, not only rejected the confederative principles of the "Ukrainian project," but simply proposed that the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasus be included in the RSFSR as autonomous formations. Lenin, already a sick man, had to intervene to replace this project for the "autonomization" of the Soviet republics, which up to then had been formally independent, with the establishment of the USSR, in which the republics had equal rights with the RSFSR.

Thus the collective leaders are trying to exploit the administrative changes in industrial management to further the aims of their new ideological tactics: the revival of "Lenin's principles" in Party and government life. As regards the problems inherent in the multi-national composition of the Soviet empire and its federative organization, the application of these principles can be seen in the more careful use of chauvinist concepts and slogans, and even in the equally cautious criticism of these concepts and slogans. The concept of the Russian nation as the "outstanding" and "leading force" in the USSR, which took shape during the last fifteen years of the Stalin regime, became not only an obligatory one in the field of political tactics, theory and historiography, but, in effect, one of the basic concepts in the doctrine of the Soviet state. The first years of the collective leadership brought about few changes in this respect. Even after Stalin's death measures inspired by the Great Russian concept were undertaken, as for instance the celebration of the threehundredth anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty. It is also noteworthy that even after the XX Congress, on March 11, 1956, the radio station of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany (in its first script in the series "Our Motherland," which is dedicated to the RSFSR), stated: "By right the Great Russian nation occupies a leading place in the family of the fraternal Soviet peoples."²⁶ Also, Khrushchev mentioned in his report the mistaken interpretation by "some comrades" of the feeling of national patriotism as contradicting "socialist internationalism." This is an oblique directive indicating a slackening in great-power chauvinism in the Soviet Union. The purely political reasons for this change cannot be dealt with here. It should, however, be noted that the openly great-power chauvinistic line of the Kremlin has already been exploited to the full. Now, however, the collective leaders feel obliged to take account of the sharply

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ "Our Motherland: the RSFSR," Radio Volga, March 11, 1956.

negative reaction of the non-Russian nations. Moreover, it has also realized that the chauvinistic course is in blatant contradiction to its anti-colonial line in international politics.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that any important changes are going to take place in the relations between the present components of the USSR. No hints of this were given at or after the Congress. The only genuine changes in Soviet policy are confined almost exclusively to the new system of administration of industrial enterprises. Another purely propaganda-type suggestion was made by Khrushchev for the creation of an Economic Committee of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR, whose task would be to work out projects connected with the "development of the economy of the union republics," in collaboration with "outstanding economists, experts on the economy of the republics."²⁷ In fact, however, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidium of the Central Committee remain the decisive factor. Consideration of the changes in the administrative structure of the union republic ministries from the legal and practical viewpoints shows that the political importance attached to them is exaggerated. The transfer of the administration of industrial and other production units to the authority of the ministries of individual republics does not in itself signify an extension of the rights of these republics in the respective branches. To quote Khrushchev: "The general management, the establishment of work tasks, the control over their fulfillment, the supply of equipment, the supply of capital investment"²⁸ remain, as before, under the control of the all-union ministries.

Altogether, the transfer of certain administrative functions from central departments in Moscow to their subordinate republican departments and even the granting of supervisory rights to the republican departments over the entire economic sphere on their territory, neither legally nor in practice indicate an increase in the constitutional rights of the republics. In effect, a simple mandate is given by the union to the organs of individual members of the union to fulfill tasks previously reserved for the union itself. The basic aspect of the administrative activities of republics and their legislative prerogatives remain unchanged. The ministries of the republics, while carrying out administrative functions within the framework of all-union plans, remain, in fact, the territorial administrations of the Moscow ministries.

Consequently, it is difficult to consider the changes as evidence of tendencies towards political or even purely administrative decentralization. The collective leaders make no reference to the possibility of decentralizing the state system. In proclaiming themselves one-hundred-percent Leninists they remain loyal to Lenin's basic principle of organization: democratic centralism. Mikoyan, for instance, appealed for a struggle against "bureaucratic centralism" in the name of Lenin's "democratic centralism." Khrushchev himself felt the need to stress the importance of a centralized planning system "which, since it is the greatest advantage of a socialist system, we do not and shall never reject."²⁹

There is one other factor which, although not directly connected with problems mentioned earlier, may be of importance in their solution. This is

²⁷ Report, *op. cit.*, "Further Consolidation . . .," para. 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

the establishment of a special bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the RSFSR, which has to provide for a "consolidation of the administration of economic and cultural affairs" in the principal and largest Soviet republic. Since this department is run by well-known representatives of the Central Committee secretariat and headed by Khrushchev, there can be little doubt that this measure, supposedly undertaken to develop the initiative of individual republics, will in fact serve to consolidate the entire Soviet state system. Moreover, its establishment appears to be intended as a countermeasure against decentralizing tendencies in the outlying republics. At the ideological level, the establishment of this department should serve to compensate for the rejection of propaganda of an openly chauvinistic character. Noteworthy in this connection is the publication of a series of articles which particularly underline the economic power of the RSFSR and its dominant role in the Soviet Union.

Apart from the talk on *Radio Volga* mentioned earlier, of interest also is Churaev's "Administration of Economy in the Russian Federation and Questions of Party and Organization Work" in *Kommunist* No. 7, 1956, and also an article on the development of the economy of the RSFSR during the Sixth Five-Year Plan in the journal *Slavyane*.

For all these reasons one is forced to the conclusion that the post-Stalin collective leaders are endeavoring to preserve in every way the basic principles of the Soviet system of state organization and administration. It would, however, be wrong to assume that since Stalin's death no changes have occurred in the situation of the Soviet peoples. The fact that the changes mentioned have been introduced, even if they make little difference, shows that a deep-rooted crisis continues and to a certain extent is growing more acute. At the same time, the extent and character of the measures undertaken "for the consolidation and perfection" of the Soviet state demonstrate the fact that the political and organizational resources of the Communist dictatorship are exhausted. This fact alone makes the fate of the regime and of its system more dependent than at any time during the last quarter of a century on the strength, the opportunities and the activity of factors which are in opposition to the regime.*

* This report was originally delivered by Dr. Yurchenko at the Eighth Institute Conference, held in Munich, 1956.

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