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THE UKRAINE
A Submerged Nation

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THE UKRAINE


A Submerged Nation

by

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

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THE UKRAINE
A Submerged Nation

Throughout the book the names of Ukrainians and of Ukrainian cities, towns, places, etc. are spelled according to the Ukrainian pronunciation of them.

CHAPTER I

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

THE Ukrainians are the most numerous people in Europe without a sovereign state form of organization. There are well over forty million Ukrainians in the world, over thirty-two million in the prewar Soviet Union, from five to six million in Poland (Polish and Ukrainian statistics are contradictory), a million and a half or two million in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Carpathian eastern province of Czechoslovakia. There are about a million Ukrainians in the United States, between three and four hundred thousand in Canada, a smaller number in South America.

There is a Ukrainian language, a Ukrainian culture, a Ukrainian historical tradition. Ukrainian folklore is rich and original and in more modern times there have been great Ukrainian authors and scholars, such as the national poet, Taras Shevchenko, the brilliant satirical novelist, Nikolai Gogol, the humane gifted storyteller, Vladimir Korolenko, who wrote in Russian, the leading Galician poet, novelist and scholar, Ivan Franko, the historian and nationalist political leader, Michael Hrushevsky. But efforts to organize an independent Ukraine, apart from the Kiev state that flourished in the tenth and eleventh centuries and went down before the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth, have always been frustrated.

The two periods when the dream of a Ukraine free from foreign rule were most nearly realized were in the middle of the seventeenth century, when Bohdan Khmelnytsky led his fierce rebellion of the Ukrainian Kozaks and peasants against Polish rule and in the years immediately after the end of the First World War. The break-up of the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires stimulated the growth of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. But the pressure of militarily better organized and stronger neighbors, the confused and chaotic social conditions that prevailed, especially in the part of the Ukraine which had formerly been under Russian rule, a devastating typhus epidemic weakened and finally broke down the efforts of the Ukrainian nationalist forces. The Ukrainians were unequally partitioned as between the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.

A probable result of the Second World War will be the union of almost all

Ukrainians under Soviet rule. Stalin has made it clear that he proposes to assert the Soviet claim to the eastern parts of Poland in which the Ukrainians form a great majority of the population and also to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which the Soviet Union took away from Rumania in the summer of 1940. This arrangement will not satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the Ukrainian people unless the Soviet Union is democratized from within and unless the Soviet Ukraine acquires genuine self-government.

The Soviet Ukraine has an area of 171,950 square miles, without including the additional territory annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940. This is larger than the combined area of three independent states, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. The homeland of the Ukrainians stretches from the wooded slopes of the Carpathians in the west to the neighborhood of the "Tranquil Don" in the east. Merging almost imperceptibly into Russia on the north, the southern boundary of the Ukraine is clearly marked by the Black Sea.

Fearfully devastated as it has been during the present war, the Ukraine is naturally a country rich in agricultural, industrial, and mineral resources. A Polish poet was thinking of the rich "black earth" of the Ukraine when he used the expression, "the birthplace of Ceres and Diana." Before the war the Ukraine, with about two per cent of the area of the Soviet Union, provided one-quarter of the Soviet grain, two-thirds of the sugar, three-fifths of the pig iron, half the coal, half the salt, one-fifth of the machinery, one-fifth of the chemicals. Like other parts of the Soviet Union, it has been intensively developed on the industrial side during the decade before the German invasion.

The construction of the huge Dnieprostroi dam and hydro-electric power plant on the lower Dnieper furnished power for a group of new factories in this region. A factory designed for the mass production of tractors in Kharkiv was only one of a number of plants which have made of this metropolis of the Eastern Ukraine a Soviet Pittsburgh, in close proximity to the largest source of Soviet coal, the Donetsk Basin.

As is natural over such a large area, there is a considerable variety of scenery and of climatic conditions in the Ukraine. Apart from the ramparts of the Carpathians in the west, the Ukraine is level country, gently rolling in some regions. In the east and south there is a predominance of the open steppe type of landscape, reminiscent of many stretches in the Middle West of the United States and Canada. In the valley of the Dnieper, which, with Galicia, may be considered the very heart of the historic Ukrainian homeland, the scenery is more varied and there are extensive forests in some regions.

Generally speaking, industry prevails in the eastern, agriculture in the western part of the Ukraine. The open steppes of the south produce bumper crops

of wheat in favorable years, but are liable to dry east winds and searing droughts. The agriculture of the northwestern part of the Soviet Ukraine is more mixed in character, with a considerable development of orchards and bee-culture. The Ukraine is the sugar-bowl of the Soviet Union, with a chain of sugar-beet plantations running from northwest to southeast. Galicia is a country of dense population and small peasant holdings, mostly less than twenty acres in size. It is from this former Austrian part of the Ukraine that most of the Ukrainian emigrants to the United States, Canada, and South America have come. The parceling out of land holdings and the difficulty of earning a living from such small farms have led to a considerable development of the cooperative movement in Galicia; this movement has been a factor in keeping alive the Ukrainian nationalist spirit. There are oil-fields in Galicia and large forests in Bukovina. But the principal Ukrainian mineral wealth is to be found in the Soviet Ukraine, with the large coal deposits of the Donets Basin, the iron of Kriviy Rih (Krivoi Rog) and the manganese of Nikopol. The importance of these last deposits is reflected in the prolonged stubborn resistance of the German armies in these regions after the line had been pressed much farther to the west on other parts of the front.

There are four main rivers of the Ukraine: the Dnieper, the third largest in Europe and associated with innumerable warlike episodes in Ukrainian history, the Dniester, the Buh and the Donets. The first three flow into the Black Sea, the last named is a tributary of the Don. Of these rivers the Dnieper is the most navigable and has several tributaries, the larger being the Pripiet and the Desna.

Like the largest Russian river, the Volga, the Dnieper has, along much of its course, a high right bank and a low left bank. Kiev, most famous of the old cities of the Ukraine, enjoys a striking and picturesque location on a cliff above the Dnieper. Other important towns along the winding course of the Dnieper are Kremenchuh, Dniepropetrovsk (formerly Ekaterinoslav), Zaporozhe (formerly Alexandrovsk), and Kherson. West of the Dnieper, because of the agricultural character of the country, there are comparatively few large towns, with the exception of L'viv, in Galicia, a city with a mixed Polish-Ukrainian population and historical and cultural heritage.

Of the four largest city centers of Ukrainian life, Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa and L'viv, each has a distinctive character and atmosphere. Kiev is one of the oldest cities of Eastern Europe; the exact date of its establishment is lost in the dim mists of pre-history. A Slav state, ruled by Varangians, or adventurous Norsemen, existed, with Kiev as its center, as early as the ninth century and came into contact with the Byzantine Empire by means of war and trade. When the Prince of this state, Vladimir, was baptized according to the Byzantine rite in

988 a decision of great importance for the whole religious future of Ruś was made.

Kiev doubtless owed its early rise to its favorable position as a crossroads of trade between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The Dnieper was a natural high-way to the Black Sea and thence to the countries of the Near East, and a network of rivers also provided access to the great trading city of Novgorod, in northwestern Russia, and to the shores of the Baltic.

Kiev was an early center of commercial wealth and some of the oldest churches and monasteries of Eastern Europe were built there. But the city paid a penalty for its wealth and exposed geographical position. Up to very modern times it has been subjected to devastating experiences of sack and destruction. The entire Kiev state, a riverine trading principality, was gradually weakened in the course of struggle with the nomadic peoples of the steppe. The center of organized political life shifted to the north and Moscow became the capital of the medieval Russian state, which slowly and painfully but relentlessly expanded against the weakening Tartars and other Oriental peoples to the east, and also toward the Baltic and Black Sea.

The Tartars under Batu, a nephew of Jenghiz Khan, sacked Kiev so completely in 1340 that a traveler who passed through the city later found nothing but ruins and a few survivors. The "Mother of Cities of Ruś," as Kiev is sometimes called, passed through a very similar experience in recent times. The population of Kiev was seven or eight hundred thousand before the German invasion. Only twenty or twenty-five thousand people were found when the Soviet armies reoccupied the city in November, 1943. The others had perished during the vicissitudes of the war, or dispersed to the villages, or had been forcibly evacuated either by the Soviet authorities before the city was lost or by the Germans before it was retaken.

Kiev is a city of golden cupolas, which stand out all the more impressively because the churches and monasteries which they crown are built, as a rule, on the tops of high hills. The cathedral of Saint Sophia, built in the eleventh century, has been rebuilt over and over again, but still retains some of its medieval characteristics, along with beautiful Byzantine frescoes and mosaics of the eleventh century. The monastery of Saint Michael and the Pechersky (cave) monastery are other interesting memorials of the past; the Pechersky monastery, with the relics of saints buried in its catacombs, attracted great numbers of pilgrims before the Revolution.

Kiev passed from hand to hand during the Russian Civil War and is said to have experienced some seventeen changes of administration. Because support for the Soviet regime in this part of the Ukraine was weak the capital of the

Ukrainian Soviet Republic was first established in Kharkiv, a city with a larger Russian working-class population. During the thirties, however, Kiev was made the capital and was developed as an administrative and cultural center. No large industrial plants were constructed there because of the danger of foreign invasion.

Kharkiv, in the northeastern corner of the Ukraine, is a city very different in history and outward appearance from Kiev. It was founded as a frontier fort in the middle of the seventeenth century and has few interesting relics of the past. On the other hand, some large public buildings, notably the so-called Home of Industry, headquarters of many of the Ukrainian state industries, have been erected under the Soviet regime. The city has been terribly devastated during the present war.

Odessa, the most important port on the Black Sea, also conveys the impression of being a comparatively modern city. Its population is extremely mixed and includes, among others, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Germans, Turks, and Tartars. Early in the nineteenth century it began to grow and prosper as the seat of government for the newly acquired Russian provinces of Novorossia (the southern part of the Ukraine) and Bessarabia and as a free port. Later its status as a free port was abolished; but it continued to lead a busy commercial existence as the main outlet for the large prewar Russian grain export.

Like Kiev, Odessa suffered very much during the Civil War and during the Second World War. It experienced almost as many changes of government as Kiev and was the scene of a short-lived French occupation in 1919. It fell to the Germans after a stubborn resistance in the autumn of 1941 and was one of the last large cities to which the Germans clung as late as March, 1944.

Lviv (known as Lemberg when it was a town of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) is the metropolis of Eastern Galicia. It is an old medieval town and a number of Ukrainian religious, cultural, and fraternal societies existed there in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was also a bulwark of the Polish state against attack from the east. Some of the major battles on the Eastern Front in the First World War were fought around this city, and its name began to figure in reports on the Soviet-German war in the spring of 1944.

All these cities, especially Kiev, are closely associated with many episodes in Ukrainian history. But the heart of the Ukraine is to be found in the village, rather than in the city. On both sides of the frontier the Ukrainians are very largely a peasant people, and this is reflected in the distribution of population between the cities and the country districts. In Eastern Galicia there is a higher proportion of Poles and Jews in the cities, of Ukrainians in the country districts.

This is also a marked characteristic of the Soviet Ukraine. Over wide areas, especially in the north and west of the country, in the rural regions of Kharkiv, Poltava, Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, the peasants are almost solidly Ukrainian in nationality, speech, and customs. But in the cities and larger towns there is a large mixture of Russians and Jews in the population.

Throughout their history the Ukrainians have been largely a people of free warriors (the Kozaks) and of peasant farmers. The main support of the nationalist movement, especially in the Soviet Ukraine, was to be found in the villages, where the local intellectuals, teachers, doctors, cooperative organizers, often took a leading part in the movement.

In this strong peasant background one may find the origin of some very attractive traits in the Ukrainian national character, frankness, simplicity, open-hearted hospitality. Much that is rich and colorful in the Ukrainian folk culture, from the traditional songs and legends to the brightly embroidered costumes which the village girls and young women wear on Sundays and holidays, is also rooted in this peasant life.

At the same time the predominantly peasant character of the Ukrainian people has been a handicap in the organization of an independent Ukrainian state. Because of nationalist and social oppression, the Ukrainians have not been given a fair chance to develop an adequate number of trained military officers and administrators for such a state.

Moreover, the East European peasant is often, and with good reason, decidedly negative in his attitude toward the state. What the state has given him is often little beyond oppression, conscription for military service and taxation. It has often been the case, in Russia and in Poland, as well as in the Ukraine, that the peasant has been more capable of rebelling against a bad government than of creating a good government.

One of the finest traits in the Ukrainian national character, a trait that is commemorated in some of the most powerful verses of Shevchenko, is the love of liberty. The Ukrainian heroes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the Kozaks, the warrior frontiersmen who fled from the yoke of Polish squire or Russian landlord and founded their wild, free military community "beyond the rapids," on the lower Dnieper. They went on expeditions, half-crusading, half-marauding, against Turks and Tartars, liberating large numbers of Christians who were held in slavery. They were unwilling to bow to any despotic authority, either of Polish King or of Russian Tsar or of the big landed Polish aristocrats. They were quick to rebel against their own elected "atamans," or military chiefs, if they found the latter guilty of oppression or of treason.

But the love of liberty, in itself, is not enough. It is likely to burn out in futile

explosions unless it is accompanied by a capacity for democratic self-discipline. And it is in the lack of this capacity, fully understandable in view of the oppressive conditions under which the Ukrainian peasants lived, that one finds part of the explanation for the failure of various attempts to create an Ukrainian sovereign state.

The Kozaks who followed the banners of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky and many less famous leaders won notable victories on the battlefield against Poles, Russians, Turks, and Tartars. But they proved unable to reap the political fruits of these victories. They were often fickle and unstable in their personal loyalties and rather too disposed to invite foreign aid in their internal feuds. So the unchecked liberty of the "Sitch," the region where the Kozaks maintained their military republic, was finally extinguished by the glacial, inexorable advance of the absolutist Russian despotism, which also proved stronger, by the ordeal of history, than the anarchical aristocracy of Poland.

There was a very similar experience in the present century. Had it been possible to refer the choice as between the Communists, the Whites, and the Ukrainian nationalists to a free election or plebiscite during the chaotic years that followed the First World War there can be little doubt, I think, that the nationalists would have won, especially in the regions with the greatest predominance of Ukrainian peasant population. The Ukrainian peasants proved by years of guerrilla warfare that they disliked both the social and economic reaction embodied in the White movement and the extreme forms of communism that were being forced on them from Russia.

But it is bullets, not ballots that decide the issue in a time of turbulent civil war. And not only in the Ukraine, but all over Russia the organized Red and White armies possessed a considerable advantage over peasants, without adequate military leadership or regular supplies of arms, whose chief methods of struggle were partisan warfare and withholding supplies from requisitions.

The tragedy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement was also the tragedy of the peasants, as a class, all over Russia as the sanguinary and tragic drama of revolution and civil war unfolded over the vast expanse of the former Russian Empire. Generally speaking, the peasants disliked both the Whites for trying to bring back the old landlord regime and the Reds for requisitioning their produce, attacking their religion and breaking up many of their old customs and ways of life. Convincing proof of this dislike was furnished by two incontestable facts of Russian history during this turbulent period. There was a high rate of desertion both from the Red and from the White armies. And there was a very large number of peasant revolts behind the lines. Some of these re-

volts were local disturbances, but others grew to such proportions that considerable numbers of troops were required to put them down.

But peasant reaction to both Red and White oppression was negative, not positive. It took the form of sporadic revolt, of holding back grain, whenever this was possible. But the peasants, as a class, were never able to organize a permanent government that would be more to their liking. Despite their numbers, they were a passive, rather than an active political force.

The same observations would hold good, in large measure, for that peasant folk, the Ukrainians. Their history from the seventeenth century until recent times has been filled with flaming outbursts against individuals and governments and groups and classes that tried to oppress them, against Polish aristocrats and Muscovite officials of the past, against Soviet commissars and Polish gendarmes in more recent times. But the ideal of a free self-governing Ukraine is still to be achieved.

Another factor that has hampered the emergence of an independent Ukraine is the mixture of peoples and of political influences over much of the territory where the Ukrainians constitute a majority of the population. The Ukraine has no very clearly marked boundaries, apart from the Black Sea to the south and, to a lesser extent, the Carpathians in the west. And the history of the Ukraine is a history of wars and conquests and colonization projects that have altered from period to period the racial composition of the country and have sometimes shifted the main centers of Ukrainian national life.

The mixture of Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia was intensified before 1939 by the Polish policy of granting land to ex-soldiers near the frontier and thereby bringing in new Polish colonists. Little is accurately known of what has happened or what may yet happen in this western Ukrainian borderland before hostilities are concluded.

The thirty-one million people who lived in the Soviet Ukraine, according to the census of 1939, are by no means all of Ukrainian stock. There have always been many Russians and Jews in the cities and towns, and many of the workers in the coal mines and steel plants of the Eastern Ukraine are Russian in origin and speech. Both under the Tsarist regime and under the Soviets there have been many uprootings and transplantings of population.

Banishment to forced labor has all too often been the fate of Ukrainians who were not regarded as sufficiently submissive. Large numbers of Ukrainians perished in laying the foundations of Peter the Great's new capital, St. Petersburg. This same sad story was repeated under the Soviet regime when great numbers of "kulaks," or relatively well-to-do peasants, were sent to labor under inhuman conditions in the timber camps and new building projects in various parts of

Russia. When the old center of Zaporozhian Kozak life, the Sitch, was finally broken up under Catherine II, many of these Kozaks were permitted to settle in what was then the frontier region of the Kuban, in the North Caucasus.

Greeks, Germans, Serbs were admitted to the southern Ukraine as colonists at various times and add to the diversity of the racial pattern. Just as there were many people of non-Ukrainian language and traditions within the boundaries of the Soviet Ukraine before the war, so one could find groups of Ukrainians scattered over Russia and Siberia. There are Ukrainian villages in Kursk Province and in the valley of the Volga. Just because they have always been a freedom-loving people, many Ukrainians, both under the Tsars and under the Soviets, were banished to Siberia.

One can only guess at the changes which the present war has brought to the Soviet Ukraine. But unfortunately there can be no doubt as to the heavy casualties and the widespread devastation. Many Ukrainians were evacuated more or less voluntarily to the Urals, Siberia, and Russian Central Asia. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Government, which exercises strict control over the movements of its citizens, will permit them to return to their native districts. Many others have been carried off to Germany.

The Ukrainian people have demonstrated their vitality and will to live in the past. They have survived harrowing experiences: the ferocious Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century, preceded and succeeded for centuries by invasion of other nomadic hordes, the triangular wars between Poles, Turks and Russians that turned the fertile lands west of the Dnieper into a virtual desert in the latter half of the seventeenth century. They will outlive the equally grim experiences of modern times. As soon as the elementary work of physical reconstruction has been completed one may expect that the Ukrainians, probably united under a single sovereignty for the first time in their long and often tragic history, will feel the stirrings of national consciousness and will demand their full rights of self-government and of equality of status, politically and economically as well as culturally, with the Russians and with all the other peoples that may be included in the Soviet Union.

Physically the Ukrainians are apt to be tall and broad-shouldered: dark hair and dark eyes are more common among the Ukrainians than among the Russians or the Poles. Some of the older Ukrainians wear the bushy moustaches that are familiar in pictures of the Kozak heroes of the past and of the beloved national poet Shevchenko.

Their language is different from Russian and there is no scientific basis for the efforts of extreme Russian and Polish nationalists to deny the existence of a separate and distinct Ukrainian national identity, language and culture.

During the heroic age of Ukrainian history, when the sturdy Kozaks fought in innumerable campaigns and in many parts of Europe, the Ukraine was a sort of No Man's Land, a dangerous frontier region, scene of many fierce campaigns, where the Kozaks maintained a turbulent independence amid the contesting ambitions of Russians, Poles, Turks, and Crimean Tartars, who maintained an independent state, subject to the hegemony of the Turkish Sultan, until the eighteenth century. It is this exposure to constant danger that imparted to the pioneer Ukrainians many qualities of American frontiersmen: daring, self-reliance, skill in all the arts and tricks of war with merciless and cunning enemies. The borderland (Ukraine) was a hard school; only the brave and the strong were likely to survive. And this old frontier, before it was finally pacified and brought under orderly administration, produced its full quota of Ukrainian popular heroes, some historical, some legendary.

CHAPTER II

THE HEROIC AGE

THE sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may be considered the heroic age in Ukrainian history. It was during this period that the Zaporozhian Kozaks carried out their most daring exploits, that the Ukrainian people freed themselves from Polish rule by means of a widespread national and social uprising. Most of the deeds and memories and associations that helped to stimulate the later Ukrainian sense of nationality stem from this period.

It was an age of "fire and sword," to quote the title of the novel in which the Polish author Sienkiewicz describes the war between the Poles and the Ukrainians under Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Scenes of bloodshed and massacre were frequent. The skies were often red with the flames of burning towns and the fortified homes of the country gentry.

But it was also an age of great vitality and rich color. Its spirit was lusty, adventurous, uninhibited. Something of that spirit has been preserved both in writing and in works of art. It breathes again in Gogol's "Taras Bulba," the story of a typical Ukrainian Kozak chieftain, in the poems of Shevchenko. It is reflected in the spirited equestrian statue of Bohdan Khmelnytsky that formerly stood in one of the principal squares of Kiev. One hopes it escaped destruction during the present war. And the artist, Ilya Repin, devoted his most famous painting to a depiction of the reply of the Kozaks to the Turkish Sultan, Mahmoud IV. A group of these famous warriors is represented with the utmost vividness and fidelity, as to costume and appearance, laughing uproariously as they compose a defiant response to the demands of the all-powerful Sultan.

One reason why this era was rather favorable to exploits of individual adventure is that it was a time of flux and confusion in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Polish rule was weakening, especially in the eastern borderlands of the medieval Polish state and Russia had not yet expanded to the shores of the Black Sea. Turkish power in such outlying principalities as Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, was largely exercised by indirect means and left a good deal of scope for autonomy. The hard-and-fast frontiers, regular armies, and efficient police systems of the nineteenth century had not yet come into existence. Just as in

medieval Europe, men were often obliged to rely on their own swords for justice and protection.

The most striking original feature of Ukrainian life was the Kozak military community in the region of the lower Dnieper. The word Kozak comes from the Turkish *kazak*, meaning free warrior, and the Kozaks were recruited from the more daring, adventurous peasants who preferred the wild freedom of a warlike frontier existence to the serfdom that was the lot of the peasants in Russia and Poland and, indeed, in most of Europe at that period.

The Sich, or fortress, of the Ukrainian Kozaks, the headquarters of this military republic, was located for a time on an island in the region of the Dnieper cataracts. Later it was shifted to the site of the present town of Nikopol. It was fortified against Tartar raids somewhat in the style of American frontier forts when Indian attacks had to be reckoned with. There were earthen walls reinforced by logs piled up to form bastions and a few of the primitive cannon of the time were mounted at intervals.

No women were allowed within the Sich, but many of the Kozaks kept their families on farms outside the stronghold, to which they returned during the seasons of agricultural work, returning to the fortress when a campaign was in preparation. Anyone of Christian faith, regardless of nationality, could join this democratic military order and fugitive serfs who reached the Sich were not given back to their masters. Within the walls of the fortress were a wooden church and simple barracks, mud huts thatched with reeds and covered with buffalo hides or felt. Many of the Kozaks were skilled in handicrafts and kept up their little shops outside the walls of the Sich. There were also peddlers' booths and liquor stores which never lacked for patronage, especially after some successful raid on the Turks or the Tartars, when money would flow freely.

The spirit of the Kozak organization was that of frontier equality. No aristocratic titles were permitted. The Kozaks called one another *tovarish* (comrade) or *braat* (brother) and prized very highly the right to elect their supreme commander, or Hetman, at a general assembly. On their military expeditions self-preservation imposed strict discipline. The Hetman had power of life and death over the individual soldier. But there was nothing permanent in the term of the Hetman's authority; he could be deposed by the same general assembly that elected him. As one can imagine, there were few niceties of parliamentary order in these Kozak assemblies; they could be swayed by oratory and their decisions were apt to be swift and tumultuous. The Kozak Host, or army, was divided into regiments; the commander of the regiment was a *polkovnik*, or colonel; lesser officers were known as *sotniks*, *atamans*, and *osauls*.

The Kozaks were supposed to be guardians of the uncertain frontier against the raids of Tartar horsemen who frequently emerged from the Crimea in search of booty and slaves. From their points of vantage they observed the movements of the Tartar raiders. If the latter were too strong to be intercepted during their advance they could sometimes be waylaid and successfully attacked in their retreat. The Kozaks were expert in the use of the rifle and the saber and were as skillful as early American frontiersmen in hiding their presence from a watchful and cunning enemy.

These warriors of the Sitch did not confine themselves to any tactics of passive defense. They often went off raiding themselves into Tartar or Turkish territory and developed famous skill in navigating the perilous rapids of the Dnieper in their canoes. Sometimes they embarked on larger vessels in the Black Sea and challenged the Sultan by burning villages within sight of Constantinople. A French engineer in the Polish service, Beauplan, gave the following description of the Kozaks:¹

There is nothing common about the Kozaks except their uniforms. They are energetic and sagacious, not greedy for wealth, but valuing freedom immeasurably; they are powerful of frame and easily endure heat and cold, hunger and thirst. In war they are noted for their endurance and courage, but are lighthearted, for they do not value their lives; they are of handsome appearance, alert and strong, and nature has endowed them with good health, for they are seldom subject to any diseases, rarely dying of sickness unless in very old age, and in the majority of cases they end their lives on an altar of fame—killed in war.

This Kozak free way of life was a potential threat both to the aristocratic feudal order in Poland and to the despotism of the Muscovite Russian state. The Sitch was too attractive to runaway serfs. Racial and religious considerations helped to complicate the relations between the Kozaks and the Polish authorities, although the authority of the Polish Crown was acknowledged until the middle of the seventeenth century.

The Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dnieper were being settled and colonized by Polish landlords, among whom were some very powerful and wealthy magnates, such as the Potockis and the Wisniowieckis. The Poles were almost invariably Roman Catholics, the Ukrainians were Orthodox or Uniate Catholics. And there was an antagonism, both national and social, between the Polish landlords and the Ukrainian peasant serfs.

It was a saying of the time that the Ukraine under Poland was paradise for the feudal lord, heaven for the Jew, but hell for the peasants. Jews were frequently

¹ Cited in "A History of Ukraine," by Michael Hrushevsky, pp. 225, 226.

employed as managers of the estates of the Polish nobles and also sometimes came into economic conflict with the peasants as traders, money-lenders, keepers of liquor stores. This is why the Jews were included with the Polish landed magnates as objects of popular rage during the fierce peasant uprisings of the seventeenth century and the Haydamak movement of the eighteenth century.

The mere existence of a free armed community like the *Sitch* in the vicinity of such a hotbed of potential unrest as the Ukraine was an incitement to revolt. Moreover, the irregular hostilities of the Kozaks against Turks and Tartars, carried out with little regard for the existence or nonexistence of a state of war between Poland and these peoples, frequently created diplomatic embarrassments for the Polish Government. However, the Kozaks were so useful that Polish policy was generally directed toward curbing and controlling them, not at destroying them.

During the chaotic phase in Russian history, known as the Troubled Times (1601-1613), when pretenders disputed the throne and Swedes and Poles fought each other over the prostrate body of the Muscovite state, the Kozaks helped the Poles and also fought in Russia on their own account. Peter Sahaydachny, Hetman of the Ukrainian Kozaks in the early seventeenth century, was a valuable ally of the Polish King on several occasions. Sahaydachny was one of the outstanding leaders in the Kozak raids on Turkish and Tartar lands. He attacked Caffa, principal slave market of the Crimea, in 1616, and freed thousands of slaves. Others were rescued in his raids on various places along the Black Sea coast. His friend, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Job Boretsky, could write with justice:²

When the Kozaks go to sea prayers are sent up to Heaven, for their first aim is to fight the Infidels in the name of the Christian faith. Their second aim is to free captives. No one in the world showers such benefits on Christian captives as they do; not the Greeks with their ransoms, nor the King of Spain with his powerful fleet. How much have the Kozaks achieved, owing to their courage and intentness of purpose. What with other nations ends only with fine words and high-flown speeches the Kozaks put into action.

Sahaydachny was a diplomat as well as a warrior. He succeeded in keeping on good terms with the Poles while he fostered the religious and cultural revival that was making Kiev a leading center of Ukrainian national life. Another mighty warrior of the later seventeenth century was Ataman Sirko. He was a typical child of the *Sitch* in his reckless courage, in his simplicity, in the ruthless cruelty which he could show when circumstances seemed to demand it.

² Cited in "The Ukraine: A History," by W. E. D. Allen, p. 93.

Tradition credits Sirko with the famous response to the Sultan that is commemorated in Repin's painting. The Sultan had sent a message to the Kozaks giving himself the usual titles, "Vice-Regent of God on earth," "King of Kings," etc. Sirko began his reply:

Thou art nothing but the Turkish Shaitan, brother and comrade of the accursed Satan, Lucifer's own secretary.

On one occasion Sirko was bringing back to the Ukraine a number of Kozaks who had settled in the Crimea after being carried off as prisoners. Some had adapted themselves to Mohammedan ways of life, and showed little desire to return. The old Ataman asked those who did not wish to leave the Crimea to step out, and then had them slaughtered. Going among the heaps of corpses, he said:

Pardon me, brothers. But it is better for you to sleep here until the Day of Judgment than to settle in the Crimea and beget children and be damned to all eternity.

This episode, which could be paralleled by many others in the history of religious wars, has another significance besides the revelation of the naïve faith which impelled Sirko to kill the countrymen who, as he felt, were imperiling their souls. It shows that the Kozaks, despite their frequent grim wars with Turks and Tartars, were capable, under certain circumstances, of adapting themselves to the position of Mohammedan subjects. As we shall see later on, considerable groups of Kozaks, when they found both the Polish and the Muscovite yoke intolerable, tried their luck by migrating into Turkey, although this experiment did not work out happily, in the long run.

A preliminary rumble heralding the storm that was to burst in full fury in the time of Bodhan Khmelnitsky was the uprising against the Polish landlords headed by a young Ukrainian officer, Severin Nalivayko, and the Zaporozhian Hetman Gregory Loboda, in the last years of the sixteenth century. This movement was put down partly because of dissensions in the ranks of the insurgents, partly because the "registered" Kozaks, who were more well-to-do and who enjoyed certain privileges under Polish rule, stood aloof from it.

Loboda was killed in the fighting and Nalivayko, who had been captured, was executed. The Polish Seym, or Parliament, in 1597, alarmed and exasperated by this outbreak, proclaimed the Kozaks "enemies of the fatherland" and called for their extermination. But the frontier commanders, aware of the difficulty of carrying out such a policy, preferred milder methods. The Polish authorities tried to make use of the Kozaks without permitting them to become too strong

by limiting the numbers of the registered Kozaks and keeping these, so far as possible, under the influence of the higher Polish commanders.

But the explosion of national and social revolt in the Ukraine could only be delayed; it could not be averted. The destined leader of this revolt was Bohdan Khmelnitsky, son of a Ukrainian landowner of the Greek Orthodox faith. Bohdan's family lived in medium circumstances; it was above the wretched level of the peasant serfs, but not in the class of the large landlords who were mostly Polish aristocrats. By race and religious faith, Bohdan was predisposed to join the ranks of the Kozaks, and his eloquence and skill in negotiation won him a good deal of personal influence and prestige.

There had been an unsuccessful rebellion of the rank-and-file Kozaks in 1637 because the Poles, on the occasion of the end of a war with Russia, cut down the number of registered Kozaks and required the others to return to serfdom. So great was the power of Poland at this time that the old liberties of the Sich were severely curtailed. The Kozaks were deprived of the cherished privilege of choosing their military leaders and were subjected to Polish commissioners. The Kozaks submitted at the time. But discontent smoldered and was a contributing factor in the great uprising of 1648.

Up to the age of fifty, there had been little to mark out Khmelnitsky as the future leader of the Ukrainian people. The political activity of the Kozaks had been repressed after 1637. Khmelnitsky lived quietly on a country estate which he farmed and managed quite successfully. Then a combination of events, personal and national, drew him into a whirlpool of activity and made him a leading figure on the political stage of Eastern Europe.

King Wladyslaw IV of Poland conceived the idea of using the Kozaks as the spearhead of an attack on Turkey. The King was eager to play the role of a crusader against the Mohammedan power; but the aristocratic Diet was averse to war and was unlikely to sanction the necessary appropriations and troop levies, unless it could be confronted with a *fait accompli*. As part of his plan the King invited several veteran Kozak officers to Warsaw in great secrecy and gave them a charter, restoring the rights and liberties which had been taken away in 1638. They were pledged to silence about the charter, which was only to be published, as a means of raising Kozak morale, when war was actually about to break out.

But the larger aspects of the King's plan miscarried. The Diet suspected his purpose in raising an army and ordered the force to be disbanded. The Polish Constitution was heavily weighted in favor of the aristocracy and against the King; and in a direct conflict of this kind the monarch had no alternative except to yield.

But Bohdan, having somehow learned of the secret negotiations, took advantage of Barabash, the old officer to whom the charter had been entrusted, while the latter was deep in his cups and got the charter away from him by means of a trick. Here was a weapon that could be used when the opportunity would arise.

An act of high-handed personal injustice, of which he was the victim, aroused him to action. A neighboring Polish squire, Czaplinski, coveted one of Bohdan's estates and also a beautiful woman with whom he was living, apparently not in formal wedlock, named Helen. In Bohdan's absence Czaplinski made a raid on the estate, forced or persuaded Helen to marry him, had one of Bohdan's sons beaten to death, and appropriated the land for himself.

Bohdan's efforts to obtain redress through legal means failed because the courts were always inclined to favor a Pole against a Ukrainian. He was taken into custody himself as a suspected malcontent; but the Ukrainian landowner who was supposed to watch him secretly sympathized with him and winked at his escape.

The Polish authorities sent out a general alarm for his apprehension; but Bohdan made his way to the Sich. Here he appealed to the hospitality of the Kozaks, reminded them of their grievances, told them of his wrongs. The Kozaks were in an inflammable mood. Envoys were sent to seek an alliance with the Crimean Tartars.

The decision to take the field against the Poles and to choose Bohdan as their leader was taken at a general assembly of the Kozaks on April 19, 1648, to the accompaniment of the rough pageantry of this warlike frontier outpost. Cannon were fired, kettledrums sounded, and Bohdan was solemnly presented with the insignia of the Kozak Host: the horsetail standard, a gilded mace set with precious stones, the silver seal of the community.

The Poles were aware of the threatening storm and had sent forces into the Ukraine under the Crown Hetman, Nicholas Potocki, and an assistant commander, Martin Kalinowski. But, as sometimes happens when a ruling class is threatened with a revolution, they suffered from overconfidence. Khmelnitsky outmaneuvered them politically and outgeneraled them in the field.

Bohdan's main political success was in winning over to his side most of the registered Kozaks on whose cooperation the Poles had counted. Taking advantage of a good espionage service and of conditions of the ground, he inflicted two crushing defeats upon the Poles, at Zhovty Vody (Yellow Waters) and at Korsun. The Polish army was cut to pieces and the two commanders, Potocki and Kalinowski, were handed over to the Tartars as prisoners and held for a high ransom.

These victories let loose a tremendous social insurrection. Bands of Ukrainian peasant guerrillas roamed the countryside, burning the manor-houses, killing the Polish landlords and their Jewish agents and tavern-keepers. It was a savage social war, with little quarter given on either side. A mysterious Scotchman, known to the guerrillas as Krivonos (Broken Nose), became famous as a leader of the insurgents.

Had Khmelnitsky been a social revolutionary he might have placed himself at the head of this peasant outbreak and marched on Warsaw. But he was a nationalist leader, a landowner himself, and his aim was rather to insure the autonomy of the Ukraine than to kindle the flame of an agrarian revolution which might well spread farther than he desired or intended.

However, a short-lived peace was only attained after more fighting. The biggest obstacle to a settlement after the battles of Zhovty Vody and Korsun was the implacable Prince Yeremy Wisniowiecki, a big landed magnate, with estates on both sides of the Dnieper. Prince Yeremy took the lead in organizing the counter-offensive against the Ukrainian peasant rebellion and he repaid in full the fiercest acts of the insurgents. Giving up the left bank of the Dnieper as indefensible, he moved into Volhynia and Podolia, striking at the guerrilla bands and inflicting the most savage vengeance on any peasants who fell into his hands.

As the Polish Government refused to repudiate Wisniowiecki, the war continued. After several more battles a treaty that confirmed Ukrainian self-government, while preserving a nominal authority of the Polish Crown over the country, was concluded at Zboriw in August, 1649. The Ukrainian Hetman was to be the highest administrative authority in the province of Kiev, Braslav, and Chernihiv. Polish commissioners in these provinces were to be of the Orthodox faith; there were to be no Polish soldiers there. Both Jews and Jesuits were to be excluded from the Ukraine; the number of registered Kozaks was increased to forty thousand and the metropolitan bishop of Kiev received a seat in the Polish Senate.

This was perhaps the high point in the career of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the nearest approach to the ideal of a self-governing Ukrainian state. Bohdan became a national hero and was greeted in Kiev with Latin orations from the scholars of the university.

But events took a less favorable turn for Bohdan personally and for the Ukrainian cause in 1651. The beautiful Helen, with whom the hardy old warrior was infatuated and whom he recovered from Czaplinski and formally married, was accused of an intrigue with one of his stewards. Bohdan ordered both put to death and then fell into a deep depression that apparently hampered his

usual alertness and activity in the campaign of 1651, when the Poles renewed the war.

The Poles were better prepared than they had been in 1648 and 1649 and Khmelnitsky faced a difficult diplomatic situation with the Crimean Tartars. They had been almost as much of a plague to the countryside in their capacity of allies as if they had been open enemies, because they could not outgrow their old habit of kidnapping villagers, especially attractive young girls, for their slave markets. Moreover, the Crimean Khan had played an equivocal role in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of Zboriw. He had forced the Ukrainians to accept compromise terms at a moment when they seemed on the eve of winning a complete victory, because he did not wish to see a strong Ukraine as a neighbor.

However, Bohdan invited the Khan to enter the new war as an ally, perhaps fearing that otherwise he might attack the Ukraine from the rear by agreement with Poland. The Poles won a notable victory in a three-day battle at Berestechko in June; the Tartars, at the critical moment, leaving the field. Bohdan, galloping after the Khan, was seized and held as a prisoner for a short time. Finally a new treaty was concluded with Poland at Bila Tserkva. The terms were less favorable than those of Zboriw, as the number of registered Kozaks was reduced to twenty thousand and the Ukrainian administration was retained only in the province of Kiev.

Many of the Kozaks who were dismissed from the army under the terms of this treaty emigrated to the lands east of the Dnieper which were coming more and more under the control and administration of Russia. An important shift in Kozak foreign policy in the direction of an orientation toward Russia was reflected in the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654, when the Kozak Rada, or general assembly, with Khmelnitsky's approval, granted to the Tsar of Russia, Aleksei Mikhailovitch, much the same suzerainty that had formerly been accorded to the King of Poland.

In what was perhaps a last spasm of doubt about the wisdom of this move, Khmelnitsky requested the Tsarist envoy at Pereyaslav, a Russian boyar, or nobleman, named Buturlin, to take an oath in the name of his sovereign to defend the Kozaks and maintain their liberties. Buturlin sharply refused, on the ground that the Tsar, as an autocrat, would take no pledges to his subjects. This was not a happy omen for the future of the traditional wild liberty and rough equality of the Sich. And the Kozaks, who had fought so many campaigns against Turks and Tartars, who had been the champions of Ukrainian national liberty against the Poles, gradually sank into the position of subjects of the Tsar, stripped of their former independent status. W. E. D. Allen points

out^a that Khmel'nitsky and the Russian Government placed somewhat differing interpretations on the implications of the Pereyaslav Agreement:

Khmel'nitsky's conception of life in the Ukraine under the new dispensation was that of a stratified class hierarchy, sanctioned by the authority of the Tsar, but based on Polish traditions, with a Kozak and Orthodox class of landed proprietors recruited from among the Kozak officers and substituted for the former Polish Catholic gentry. The Russian Government envisaged a state of affairs in which the Tsar was master of the whole land, and confirmed by rescripts the possessions of monasteries and churches, nobles and Kozaks, and also existing rights of property in the towns.

These differences of interpretation and the resentment of some of the leading Kozaks against the levelling autocracy of Moscow led to new shifts of orientation and to civil and international conflicts. As early as 1658 the shrewd and supple Vykhovsky, who had succeeded Khmel'nitsky as Hetman after the latter's death, swung back to the Polish allegiance under the so-called Hadyach Agreement. The Polish Government promised full respect for Ukrainian autonomy.

Vykhovsky and his associates believed that their interests would be better preserved under Polish than under Muscovite suzerainty. But the Ukrainian masses were more inclined to favor the Russian connection at this time, and Vykhovsky was unable to realize his plan. After a succession of wars and truces, Russia and Poland carried out a partition of the Ukraine, by concluding the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. The Dnieper was recognized as the boundary, Russia retaining title to all territory on the left bank, Poland to the lands on the right bank. The city of Kiev from that time passed into the possession of Russia.

A new complication was introduced into the situation because Peter Doroshenko, a Kozak leader with a considerable following, preferred the Turkish orientation to either the Russian or the Polish. He was convinced that the Ukraine would enjoy more self-government under the protectorate of the Sultan. But this policy did not work out successfully in practice. So fearful was the desolation of the right bank lands during the latter part of the seventeenth century that there was considerable migration to the east. This period is suggestively known in Ukrainian history as "The Ruin." Doroshenko, in a letter to Sirko, describes the condition of the country at that time in the following terms:

Where once stood towns and villages surrounded by gardens there only remain ruins of single walls and hungry dogs fight each other. The churches are all closed

^a W. F. D. Allen, "The Ukraine: A History," pp. 137, 138.

because there is no one to worship in them. All the fields are covered with weeds and our native land, formerly so gay and bright, has become a dreadful wilderness.

There was some recovery from this desolation after the Turks were pushed out of that part of the Ukraine by the Polish King, Jan Sobieski. But the rivalries of individual Kozak chieftains and the partition of the country between Russia and Poland put an end to the dream of a united Ukrainian state, which seemed possible of realization at the time of Khmelnytsky.

It is possible that, if Khmelnytsky's successors had been men of corresponding energy, ability and political farsightedness, Ukrainian unity might have been preserved. And the Ukraine, with the free and equal military brotherhood of the Kozaks as a strong element in its organization, might have been a haven of freedom for Russia.

In the last pages of his book, "Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine," Professor George Vernadsky suggests two interesting historical possibilities. He notes that the social revolutionary movement of Stenka Razin, which swept the valleys of the Volga and the Don in 1670 and 1671, possessed some points of similarity with the Ukrainian peasant uprising of 1648. It lacked the nationalist and religious character of the Ukrainian movement, but it aimed at the abolition of serfdom throughout Russia.

We may easily imagine [writes Vernadsky] that had Bohdan still been alive he would not have missed this opportunity to improve the status of the Ukraine. If the Ukrainian Kozaks had joined forces with the Don Kozaks, the course of history might have been changed and a democratic union of the Ukraine and Great Russia replaced the Tsarist monarchy.

A similar opportunity arose when the Don Cossacks rebelled, under the leadership of Kondrati Bulavin, in 1707, and all the military resources of Peter the Great were strained by his war with Charles XII of Sweden. Ivan Mazeppa was Hetman of the Ukraine at that time and was already contemplating his later desertion of the Tsar. But he missed the favorable chance of joining his forces with the insurgent Don Cossacks to the east. Bulavin's rebellion was suppressed and its leader committed suicide.

When Mazeppa carried out his revolt Peter was prepared to deal with any such movement promptly and vigorously. The Hetman carried with him only a comparatively small number of followers. And the decisive victory of Peter over Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 sealed the doom of an independent Ukraine. The centralizing absolutist Russian state organization was imposed with more and more rigor. The Hetman was reduced from the status of a semi-independent ruler to that of a puppet, and finally the office was abolished altogether.

Mazeppa was an interesting personality and might be called the last of the Hetmans. He was also one of the first of the Ukrainian political émigrés. Born of a noble Orthodox family, he was educated at the court of the Polish King Jan Casimir. He became involved in an amorous adventure with the wife of a Polish noble, who, according to a legendary account, had him bound naked to a wild horse, which was then turned loose into the steppe. This story has been perpetuated in a poem by Byron and in musical compositions inspired by the poem. Mazeppa survived this experience and rose to a position of authority and prestige in the Ukraine.

During the period when he was Hetman many churches, monasteries, and palaces were built; a baroque type of Ukrainian architecture is still known as the Mazeppa style. After Bohdan Khmelnytsky he was perhaps the strongest individual personality in the heroic age of the Ukraine.

He was over sixty when he was compelled to take sides as between Peter the Great and Charles XII, who was planning to strike at Russia through the Ukraine. Consequently he played his political cards with less vigor and subtlety than he might have displayed in an earlier phase of his career. After what Byron called, "dread Poltava's day" the old Hetman, with a few faithful followers, escaped across the frontier into Turkey. The Sultan refused to give him up, despite Peter's bribes and pressure; but he died soon after he had found this refuge in a foreign land.

One of Mazeppa's lieutenants, Orlyk, set up an eighteenth century government-in-exile. He claimed to be Mazeppa's rightful successor as Hetman and was recognized in this capacity by Sweden for a time. After the fashion of émigré leaders, Orlyk issued appeals to the European powers to help uphold the "natural rights" of the Ukraine "to free itself from oppression and to regain what injustice and force had taken away."

But these appeals led to no practical results. The annexation of the Ukraine to the east of the Dnieper by Russia was regarded as an accomplished fact. The Ukrainian provinces on the right bank fell into the possession of Russia after the final partition of Poland. The beginning of the eighteenth century coincided with a process of consolidation in Eastern Europe. Loosely organized systems of government, with the opportunities which these offered to bold rebels and adventurers, were giving away to hard-and-fast bureaucratically governed empires, such as Russia and Austria Hungary. A thoughtful historian describes this change as follows:⁴

⁴ W. E. D. Allen, "The Ukraine: A History," p. 206.

Poltava marked the end of the epic period of Ukrainian history. But like most great events it was the symbol of change rather than the cause of it.

The gallant and fantastic world of Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century was passing. The splendid Polish camps which had held the field against Kozaks, Tartars and Kalmucks; the half-Arabian, half-Byzantine panoply of the Turkish Sultans hunting and campaigning over all the lands between the Adriatic and the Caspian; the Zaporozhian pirates; Transylvanian Princes, Crimean Khans, Roumanian Hospodars and Georgian Kings were becoming spectres in the dim past with the Mongols, the Byzantines, the Pechenegs and the Kipchaks.

There were internal as well as external reasons for the failure of a Ukrainian state to emerge, in spite of the spectacular victories of Khmel'nitsky and the renowned fighting prowess of the hardy Kozaks of the Sich. The sense of nationality was much less firmly developed in the seventeenth century than it is in modern times. Even to such a gifted leader as Bohdan Khmel'nitsky the ideal of an independent sovereign state was not so clear as it would be to a modern nationalist. Foreign influences, Polish and Russian, affected the Ukrainian upper class to a certain extent.

The Kozaks themselves, ready to fight at a moment's notice when they felt a sense of injury and oppression, were impulsive to the point of fickleness. They oscillated uncertainly between Russian, Polish and Turkish orientations. And the original democratic equality of the members of the Host did not always survive the temptations of power and wealth. Many of the Kozak leaders who acquired land and wealth were glad to have their privileges confirmed by Russian Tsar or Polish King, even at the price of renouncing the ideal of independence.

There was also a gulf between the Kozaks and the masses of peasant serfs. Although these two groups often fought together against a common enemy, against Poles or Turks or Tartars, the mood among the Kozaks was rather to preserve their special rights and liberties than to free the serfs and thereby lay the foundation for a genuine Ukrainian peasant democracy.

But it would be unfair to criticize the Ukrainian leaders in this "epic period" for not going beyond the limitations of the political thought and social order of their time. By their deeds they left an indestructible heritage to later generations of Ukrainians. The names of Khmel'nitsky, of the Kozaks of the Sich were instinctively invoked when the First World War and the simultaneous collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires brought a new gleam of hope to the submerged Ukrainian nation. And during the two centuries which elapsed between the fall of Mazeppa and the First World War the flame of Ukrainian national spirit was kept alive by song and story, and by scholarly research in the native literature and history.

CHAPTER III

THE UKRAINE IN THE SHADOWS

THE defeat and flight of Mazeppa marked the beginning of a steady decline in the Ukrainian autonomy. Peter the Great appointed a subservient Hetman named Skoropadsky and transferred the site of the Ukrainian capital from Baturin to Hlukhiv, where two Russian regiments were stationed to take immediate action if the new Hetman should display any signs of taking independent action. The Tsar also employed a method which has frequently been utilized by the Soviet Government to break the resistance of the Ukrainians and other recalcitrant peoples: mass deportation to forced labor. Great numbers of Kozaks were sent to dig canals in the vicinity of Peter's new capital, St. Petersburg, and to construct fortifications along what was then Russia's southeastern frontier, in the neighborhood of Astrakhan and the Caucasus Mountains.

A grim picture of the sufferings of the Ukrainians in this forced labor is contained in the report of an officer who was present at the construction of the Ladoga Canal in 1722, Col. Cherniak, to the Senate:¹

In the construction camps on the Ladoga Canal there are many Kozaks who are sick and dying, and frightful diseases spread with appalling rapidity, the most common being fever and swelling of the feet, which cause many deaths. The officers in charge of the work, in pursuance of orders by Brigadier Leontiev, disregard the sufferings of the poor Kozaks, unmercifully abusing the sick laborers by beating them with clubs and giving them no rest day, night, or holiday, and on this account I fear that the Kozaks there will perish, as they did last year, when only about a third returned home. Wherefore I inform the Senate by this modest report, and humbly beseech you in your kindness not to allow all the Kozaks under my command to perish on the canal works, and not to transfer them to other places to undertake new tasks. God is my witness that these poor people are unfitted for further labor, for they have lost their health and strength and are barely alive. Permit them to go to their homes in the early part of September and do not keep them until the rainy season in the fall.

The sufferings of the Kozaks at this forced labor are a theme of Ukrainian folksongs. Mazeppa's lieutenant, Orlyk, from exile denounced the maltreatment

¹ Cited by Michael Hrushevsky, "A History of the Ukraine," pp. 376, 377.

of his countrymen. There was a curious unconscious anticipation of a situation that arose two centuries later, when large numbers of Ukrainians perished in the famine of 1932-33 and because of banishment to timber camps and forced labor on Five-Year-Plan construction enterprises. Orlyk found his successors in the few and little heard voices of the Ukrainian nationalists abroad.

After the death of Skoropadsky the strong-willed Tsar Peter decided to abolish the office of Hetman. It aroused too many dangerous memories of former independence. After the death of Peter the Hetmancy was restored for a time, then suspended. The last Hetman, Cyril Rozumovsky, was a favorite of the Empress Elizabeth. After the death of Rozumovsky the office of Hetman was definitely and finally abolished. Under the reign of Catherine II the administration of the Ukraine was assimilated to that of the other parts of the Russian Empire.

During the last period of the Hetman state the Ukraine east of the Dnieper was divided into ten regimental areas: Kiev, Chernihiv, Starodub, Nizhin, Priluki, Pereyaslav, Lubny, Hadiach, Mirhorod, and Poltava. The colonels of these regiments were the highest authorities in the districts concerned. They were appointed by the Russian Government, not by the Hetman. The democracy of the early times of the Zaporozhian Sich disappeared as the Kozak community became more and more stratified by differences of wealth and privilege. The stage was set for the complete liquidation of these last remnants of the old Ukrainian community organization, the colonels becoming landed aristocrats, the minor officers lesser landed gentry. The rank-and-file Kozaks were gradually reduced to the serfdom that was the common lot of the peasants at that time. The more independent and unruly of them were "liquidated," to use a contemporary Soviet phrase, either by deportation to forced labor or by the milder method of inducing or compelling them to migrate to other parts of the country and settle down to their old role as guardians of disturbed frontier districts.

One of the dramatic final blows to the old order in the Ukraine was the abolition of the wild independence of the Sich in 1775. There were still some six thousand Kozaks in this historic stronghold on the lower Dnieper. They were a thorn in the side of the Russian Government for two reasons. They never had outlived the habit of waging occasional undeclared private wars against lands occupied by Turks and Tartars. And the very existence of such a community was a threat to a social order based on serfdom.

So a Hungarian General Tökölyi in the Russian service surrounded the Kozak fort in 1775. The chief *ataman*, Petro Kalnyshevsky (1690-1803), called the last meeting of the Rada, or Council. There was some impulsive desire for

resistance and cannon were mounted. But the priest of the local church urged submission and the Kozaks were confronted with overwhelming military force. About half of them fled to Turkey where some remained in the Ottoman service for decades. The remainder surrendered. Kalnyshevsky himself was incarcerated in the Solovetsky Islands, where he eventually died. Arms were confiscated, a Russian garrison was placed in the fort, and the veteran Kozaks received an order to "disperse to the four corners of the world."

Later, a number of these Ukrainian Kozaks were transported to the Kuban region, along the east coast of the Black Sea. Here they established themselves as military pioneer settlers, were provided with liberal land allotments and required to furnish cavalry for the Tsar's army and also to take a hand in repressing the restless Mohammedan tribesmen of the Northern Caucasus.

Another step toward the Russification of the Ukraine was taken in 1781, when the regimental organization of the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper was abolished and this region was administratively organized in the "governments," or provinces of Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novgorod-Seversk. The process of annexing the greatest part of the Ukraine to Russia was completed when the Ukrainian lands on the right bank of the Dnieper were brought under Russian rule after the second partition of Poland in 1793.

These lands had remained under Polish rule, nominally at least, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. Because of the growing weakness of the Polish Government it was easier to organize uprisings that were partly nationalist, partly social in character. The more serious of these uprisings are known as the Haidamak movement. This name is supposedly derived from a Turkish word for brigand.

As usually happens when the central government is weak and local conditions are oppressive, there was a good deal of brigandage in the territory west of the Dnieper, as far as the hilly and wooded country of Eastern Galicia and along the Hungarian and Moldavian frontiers. But, since the brigandage was mainly directed against the Polish nobles and the city traders, the poor and exploited Ukrainian peasants looked on the brigand bands as friends and liberators and glorified the exploits of their more famous leaders in popular songs that are still heard.

One of the more important Haidamak rebellions occurred in 1733 and 1734, when there was a civil war between two contenders for the Polish throne and Russian troops entered the country to support one of the claimants, the Elector of Saxony, subsequently known as Augustus III. There were attempts in some regions to return to the old Kozak system of government. Memories of Khmel-nitsky's great uprising were recalled as peasant bands stormed the manor houses

of the Polish gentry. But the movement collapsed with the end of the Polish civil war, because the last thing the Russian Government desired to encourage was an insurgent peasant movement in the immediate vicinity of the Russian frontier.

Russian troops assisted the Polish landlords to "restore order." Most of the peasants who had joined in the insurrection relapsed into serfdom, but some continued to take part in the irregular Haidamak activities. There were several minor outbreaks, sometimes because of efforts of the Polish aristocracy and clergy to convert Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic faith by forcible measures.

The last big uprising in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper occurred in 1768 and followed a pattern very similar to that of 1733-34. Russian troops had entered the country because a group of Polish patriots, the Confederation of Bar, had raised a revolt against concessions which the Polish Government had made to Russia. The arrival of the Russian troops served as an encouragement to the Ukrainians to rebel. Rumors were circulated that the Empress Catherine II had published a "golden charter," authorizing the wiping out of the Poles and the Jews. Imaginary documents of this kind figure in many Russian insurgent outbreaks.

Under the leadership of Maxim Zalizniak, a Zaporozhian Kozak who had lived for many years in monasteries, and of Ivan Gonta, a Ukrainian who had been in command of the Kozak retainers at the Potocki estate, but abandoned the gentry for the Haidamak cause, the revolt spread over a fairly wide area. There was a noteworthy massacre of the gentry and the Jews at Uman and local guerrilla leaders, such as Jacob Shvachka, won for themselves a place in Ukrainian folk tradition by their daring and cruelty.

However, the suppression of the patriots of the Confederation of Bar also sounded the doom of the Haidamak insurgents. Russian troops turned against them and most of their leaders were captured and put to death.

Shevchenko once wrote: "Poland fell, but she crushed us, too." The reunion of the greater part of the Ukraine under Russian rule after the extinction of the Polish state brought about no improvement in the national status of the Ukraine or in the social condition of the Ukrainian peasantry.

On the contrary, the weight of the Russian state was now placed behind the Polish landlords on the right bank of the Dnieper. The sporadic relief which the peasants obtained through the Haidamak outbreaks disappeared, because such irregular guerrilla activity was made impossible by the well-developed Russian police and military regime.

Some of the Western Ukrainian territories, Eastern Galicia, Northern Buko-

vina, Carpatho-Ukraine, fell under Austrian rule. Milder and more liberal in its institutions than the stern Russian autocracy, the Austrian Empire gave somewhat more scope for the development of Ukrainian national life and culture. But here, too, the scales were generally loaded against the Ukrainians. Austrian policy shifted from time to time. But in the main it tended to favor the Poles against the Ukrainians in Galicia. In Bukovina the Ukrainians were mostly peasants, the landlord class was largely made up of Rumanians, with all that this involved in social and economic discrimination along nationalist lines.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the Ukrainian nationalist idea seemed almost doomed to extinction. The Ukrainian language was despised as a peasant dialect. Polonizing tendencies were strong among the Ukrainian country gentry on the right bank of the Dnieper, while Russifying influences were at work in the Ukrainian territories to the east.

What saved Ukrainian culture from this danger was the rich store of folk-songs and legends that was preserved among the peasants. One of the strongest tendencies of the nineteenth century was the awakening consciousness of national personalities, even among peoples who had lived for centuries under foreign rule and enjoyed no immediate hope of independence. From Ireland to the Balkans there was a tendency among educated men and women to seek out the sources of national culture in the traditional poems and stories of the peasants.

It was appropriate that the greatest literary figure of the Ukrainians, themselves a peasant folk, should be Taras Shevchenko, born a peasant serf in Kiev province in 1814. A nationalist literary note had already been struck by the publication, in 1798, of Ivan Kotlyarevsky's travesty on the *Aeneid*, which portrayed the wanderings of the uprooted Zaporozhian Kozaks and compared their adventures with those of the Trojans in Virgil's epic. The operetta *Natalka Poltavka*, by the same author, also focused attention on Ukrainian national customs and traditions.

Shevchenko was also a passionate nationalist; but at the same time he was a noteworthy humanist. He came to maturity at a time when the Russian educated class was beginning to increase in numbers and to extend the scope of its ideas and interests. In 1825 the Decabristi had lifted, if only for a moment, the banner of political revolt. Poets like Shevchenko and Nekrasov were touching on social themes as far as censorship permitted.

Growing up as a serf, Shevchenko instinctively looked at life from the standpoint of the oppressed majority of his countrymen; revolutionary, heroic, social, and humanitarian themes are strongly emphasized in his glowing verses. As

a boy he displayed a talent for painting and his owner, a landowner named Engelhardt, gave him the opportunity to study. A celebrated painter, Karl Brüllow, developed such an interest in the talented boy that he painted a portrait of the poet Zhukovski, tutor to the heir to the throne, which was bought for 2,800 rubles. Brüllow used this money to purchase Shevchenko's freedom.

But the true genius of the young Ukrainian lay in literature, not in art. His first collection of verses, "The Kobzar" (the Ukrainian name for minstrel), won immediate recognition. This was soon followed by "The Haidamaky," a glorification of this grim social and national struggle of the eighteenth century. Shevchenko also wrote much of the sufferings of peasant life. Characteristic of all his work is a passionate love of freedom.

In a poem entitled "The Dream," which for obvious reasons could not be published during his lifetime, he offers the following bitter inscription for a monument of Peter the Great: "To Peter I from Catherine II—the First crucified our Ukraine and the Second finished off his victim." In another poem, "Prometheus," Nicholas I is characterized, and not unjustly, as "the persecutor of liberty over the whole expanse of the Empire from Finland to Moldavia," and the state is denounced as "only capable of building prisons and forging chains."

Shevchenko, the son of a peasant serf, expressed the hatred which many peasants inarticulately felt for the state which clamped down the chains of their serfdom and sometimes conscripted them for wars in which they felt no concern. It is interesting to note that one of the greatest Russian authors of the nineteenth century, Leo Tolstoy, adopted an attitude toward the state that might be described as philosophical anarchism. Certainly the peasants, Ukrainians or Russians, had little reason to expect any good from the state.

Shevchenko was requested by the Kiev Archeographical Commission to travel in the Ukraine and study and sketch historical places and landmarks. He became more and more steeped in the events and characters of the heroic age of his country's history. Starting out as an ardent literary champion of the Ukrainian peasant against the Polish "pany," or nobles, he became more and more impressed with the negative role of Muscovite autocracy.

A poet who cherished such "dangerous thoughts" was never safe from arrest under the stern rule of Nicholas I. The police was especially watchful for any kind of organized society, no matter how small it might be or how innocent its objectives might seem.

Shevchenko, along with a number of other Ukrainian intellectuals, had come together in a group known as the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius. These were early Christian missionaries among the Slav peoples. This group in

its meetings discussed the necessity of general liberty and political equality and favored the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire and in all Slav countries. There was also a democratic Pan-Slav element in the movement. The program of the society called for widespread popular education and there was an interesting project for a federation of Slav peoples on a basis of equality. The head of the federation was to be elected; each nation was to preserve its separate identity, but problems of common interest were to be referred to a federal congress. This idea, in broad outline, may still be considered a very hopeful solution for the difficulties of the central and eastern European regions which are inhabited by people of many nationalities.

The Society of Cyril and Methodius, like the circle of Petrashevsky in Moscow, which existed under the reign of Nicholas I, was soon detected and sternly suppressed. The greatest poet of the Ukraine was consigned to punitive army service in a remote part of the empire. As part of his punishment he was forbidden to paint or to write. It was characteristic that Shevchenko, while brutally persecuted by the despotic Russian Government, won the friendship, sympathy, and admiration of liberal-minded Russian intellectuals.

The Ukrainian national poet benefited by an amnesty which was proclaimed by the new Tsar, Alexander II, after the death of Nicholas I. But his health was undermined and he died in 1861, the year of the emancipation of the serfs. He was buried in his beloved Ukraine, on the right bank of the Dnieper, near the town of Kanev. So strong and warm was the memory which he left among his countrymen that the Ukrainian Soviet Government, although it certainly did not express Shevchenko's ideals in many of its actions and policies, felt obliged to sanction a cult of the poet, whose picture was hung in almost all government offices.

Like many poets, Shevchenko created his own most enduring memorial in his verses. Much of the sadness of his life is reflected in a poem which he wrote after his arrest. Fortunately, the prediction that he will be forgotten was not fulfilled. The poem, as translated by Professor Clarence A. Manning, reads as follows:

It makes no difference to me
If I shall live or not in Ukraine
Or whether anyone shall think
Of me 'mid foreign snow and rain.
It makes no difference to me.
In slavery I grew 'mid strangers,

Unwept by any kin of mine;
In slavery I now will lie.
And vanish without any sign.
I shall not leave the slightest trace
Upon our glorious Ukraine,
Upon our land, but not ours.
No father will remind his son
Or say to him, "Repeat one prayer,
One prayer for him; for our Ukraine
They tortured him in their foul lair."
It makes no difference to me,
If that son says a prayer or not.
It makes great difference to me
That evil folk and wicked men
Attack our Ukraine, once so free,
And rob and plunder it at will.
That makes great difference to me.

The decades immediately after the death of Shevchenko were extremely unfavorable for the development of Ukrainian culture, history, and literature in the Russian Empire. While the new Tsar, Alexander II, was the author of some liberal social and administrative changes, such as the abolition of serfdom and the institution of limited local self-government through the *zemstvos*, he was alarmed and irritated by the Polish uprising of 1863.

Very few Ukrainians took any part in this movement, because the gulf between the two peoples was still too wide. But the Tsar's Ministers were impelled to take a distrustful and hostile attitude toward all nationalist movements among the non-Russian peoples of the Empire. The Minister of Education, Valuev, issued a circular denying that there was any such thing as a Ukrainian language, asserting that what passed for such a language was "bad Russian, spoiled by Polish influences." To print anything in Ukrainian except verses, stories and plays was forbidden.

The Tsarist Government went still further in 1876 and issued a blanket prohibition of the printing of books, pamphlets, or plays in Ukrainian. This had the effect—probably unforeseen by the Tsarist censors, and undesirable from the Russian political standpoint—of shifting the center of Ukrainian cultural life to Galicia. A Shevchenko Society was established in L'viv, with the aid of contributions from Russia. A number of Ukrainian authors and scholars,

Antonovitch, Kulish, Konisky, Netchuy-Levitsky and others, established headquarters in L'viv. During the seventies and eighties of the last century there was a noteworthy cultural revival in this part of the Ukrainian homeland.

Popular books were published; libraries and cultural groups were founded. The influence of the L'viv center extended from Galicia to Bukovina, and Ukrainians in Russia, still gagged by official order as regards the use of their native language, followed the development in Galicia with interest and sympathy. To be sure, there were serious handicaps and limitations to be overcome. Galicia is not a rich country and the Polish aristocrats, entrenched there as an upper class, generally enjoyed the favor of the Austrian Government. However, the Viennese bureaucracy was accustomed to employ the familiar method, *Divide et impera*, in governing the large and multi-national empire. So occasionally some crumbs of political or educational concessions would be thrown to the Ukrainians in Galicia, and the central government would try to acquire credit by taking the side of the Ukrainians against the Poles on a minor issue.

In view of the revival of Ukrainian literature and intellectual interests under the Austrian rule, which was mild and tolerant by comparison with the Russian, it is natural that the second great figure in Ukrainian letters, Ivan Franko, should be a son of the Western Ukraine. He was born in a small village in 1856; his father was a blacksmith.

Shevchenko and Franko share a warm humanism and sympathy with the under dog and a sense of Ukrainian nationality. But there are also considerable differences and contrasts in the personalities, careers, and backgrounds of the two men. Shevchenko was a genius; Franko, a highly developed talent.

The brilliant beginning and sad later years of Shevchenko's life might have furnished a theme for one of his own poems. Franko faced his share of persecution and misrepresentation and served a short term in an Austrian prison for political reasons. But the course of his life was easier and more prosaic than that of his poet-countryman.

Shevchenko grew up as a serf and absorbed from childhood the legends and stories of the glories of the old Kozak state. Franko was only compelled to undergo the familiar struggles and hardships of poverty. Moreover, the latter lived at a time when industrialism had made considerable progress, even in a comparatively neglected part of the Austrian Empire, such as Galicia. His novels, stories, and essays are consequently permeated with consciousness of new social conditions and problems which scarcely existed during the lifetime of Shevchenko.

Franko was a man of high moral and intellectual integrity. Like Dr. Stock-

man, the hero of Ibsen's "Enemy of the People," he did not hesitate to speak out what seemed to him the truth, however unpleasant it might sometimes be, to his countrymen. He confesses in one of his writings that he finds much that is lacking in the "Rusin" people. (The word Ukrainian was not used officially in Austria-Hungary, so Franko habitually employs this archaic substitute.) But he then proceeds to base his work for the national cause on a sense of duty and obligation:

If I feel myself a Rusin and work for Ruś with all my strength, it is not for reasons of a sentimental nature. I am guided above all by a feeling of doglike obligation. The son of a Rusin peasant, reared on black peasant bread, the work of stout peasant hands, I feel myself bound to repay those coins which a peasant hand has expended by the labor of my whole life, so that I can ascend to the heights, where one can see freely, where freedom is poured out richly, where universal ideals shine. My Rusin patriotism is not sentiment, not national pride, but a great yoke placed upon my shoulders by fate. I can protest, I can quietly curse my fate for placing that yoke upon me, but I cannot throw it off, I cannot seek another country. And if anything lightens the burden of this yoke for me, it is the sight of the Rusin people, which, although defeated and demoralized for long centuries, although today it is poor, awkward and joyless, yet gradually advances and somehow perceives in the widest circles the feelings of light, truth, and justice. It is worthwhile to work for this people and no honorable work for this people is lost.

Franko's writings cover a wide range, from Biblical fantasies on the themes of Cain and Moses to historical novels of the Ukrainian Middle Ages and to sketches of more recent times, such as "Nobleman's Pranks." Here the plot centers around the determination of a strong-willed Polish nobleman to maintain the old feudal rights over his serfs even after their emancipation has been decreed. The effects of industrialization on the old peasant life and the human difficulties that arise from everyday family relations furnish additional material for Franko's versatile talent. He was publicist as well as author and contributed a number of critical literary and historical essays to various magazines.

An outstanding Ukrainian woman author and contemporary of Franko was Lesya Ukrainka, the pen name of Larissa Kosacheva. She was the niece of Michael Drahomaniw, a leading Ukrainian intellectual, and was born in the part of the Ukraine under Russian rule. Highly educated and familiar with the language and literature of many foreign countries, Lesya Ukrainka was a lifelong sufferer from tuberculosis in an acute form. Physical suffering, solitude, wandering in foreign countries where she sought a more favorable climate—all these elements have placed a special imprint upon her writing.

Devoted to the nationalist ideal, she employed subtler, more symbolic forms of expression than some of the older and more conventional authors. Some of her

poems and plays are devoted to struggles for liberty in other lands and other circumstances. She is an author more adapted for the reading of the intelligentsia than of the common people, and her dramas in many cases are better suited for reading than for practical stage production.

Both Franko and Lesya Ukrainka died on the eve of the revolutionary end of the First World War, an end that was to arouse new hopes, new disappointments, new tragedies for the Ukrainian people.

Lesya Ukrainka's uncle, Michael Drahomaniw, for a time a professor at Kiev University, was an important figure in the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Resentful of the oppression of the Tsarist regime, he followed the example of many Russian intellectuals and went abroad with a view to expressing his ideas freely. Leaving Russia in 1875, he became acquainted with the Ukrainian intellectuals in L'viv and later moved to Geneva, the old Swiss city which has given asylum to so many revolutionary exiles. Here he began to publish a magazine *Hromada*, in the Ukrainian language. Its influence was felt both in Galicia and in the Russian Ukraine. In Ukrainian circles it enjoyed a prestige comparable with that of Alexander Herzen's *Kolołol* ("The Bell") among the Russian liberal and radical intellectuals.

Drahomaniw's social ideas were not unlike those of Herzen. He was an agrarian socialist, but not a fanatical revolutionary. His political views tended toward a wide decentralization of the Russian Empire on the basis of national autonomies, a liberal constitution, and a parliamentary system. Within the limits of Ukrainain life, Drahomaniw stood for a thorough education of the population by means of good schools, good popular books, and the development of Ukrainian literature on Western European lines.²

Like many other Ukrainian thinkers, like the founders of the Society of Cyril and Methodius, Drahomaniw was a Pan-Slavist. He believed in a federation of Slav countries, in which Galicia would be united with the remainder of the Ukraine and in which the Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans would participate. Such a federation, he believed, should decide the question of Constantinople and the Straits.

So, although Drahomaniw rebelled personally against Russian absolutism, his theoretical ideas on foreign policy were more in line with Russian than with Austrian interests. But after his death in 1895 a more definitely separatist and anti-Russian trend developed among the Ukrainian intellectuals of Galicia

² For an exposition of Drahomaniw's life and views see D. Doroshenko's "Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement," *The Slavonic Review* (London), No. 48, p. 654.

under the leadership of the distinguished historical scholar, Michael Hrushevsky. A man of great energy, Hrushevsky filled the chair for the history of Southeastern Europe which the Austrian Government established at the University of L'viv in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Although Hrushevsky was born and educated in Russia, or perhaps because of this fact, his interpretation of the Ukrainian past and his political thinking developed along distinctly anti-Russian lines.

The Hrushevsky school of thought did not entirely dominate the sentiments of all the Ukrainians in the Austrian Empire. There was some Russophile sympathy, especially among the isolated mountaineers of Carpatho-Ukraine. There was a complicated triangular political competition for influence in Galicia among Poles, Ukrainians who were for separation of the whole Ukraine from Russia, and Russophile Ukrainians.

The cultural persecution of the Ukrainian language in Russia was substantially relaxed after the Revolution of 1905. It was even possible for the staunchly anti-Muscovite Hrushevsky to go to Kiev and carry on historical research in this old center of Ukrainian political and cultural life. A new generation of Ukrainian writers began to appear and found material for literary work in the stormy events of the 1905 upheaval.

So long as the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires remained at peace, discussions of whether the Ukrainians would be better off under Russian or Austrian protection were of a theoretical character. There was no practical possibility of overthrowing either of the existing regimes by force. The struggle for Ukrainian national expression was limited to such modest forms as trying to win piecemeal political and cultural concessions from the Russian and Austrian authorities.

But the outbreak of the First World War aroused the hopes of all the submerged peoples of Europe, and not least of the Ukrainians. The very magnitude of the conflict made it clear to every farsighted observer that there would be far-reaching changes in the status quo.

At first it seemed that whatever unification of the Ukrainian people would take place would be under the auspices of Russia. Russian armies drove into Galicia and occupied L'viv in 1914. Tsar Nicholas II visited the captured city and referred to an "indivisible Russia," which would extend as far as the Carpathians. The pro-Russian faction in the city denounced the Ukrainian separatists. The newly appointed Russian Governor-General, Count Bobrinskoy, made the mistake of trying to reclaim the adherents of the Uniat Church to the Orthodox faith. The Uniat Metropolitan Count Sheptitsky was banished to Russia. This injection of religious strife into the situation made the Russian occupation

more distasteful to the Ukrainians of Galicia than it might have been under a more moderate policy.

The big German offensive in the summer of 1915 blighted Russian Pan-Slav hopes of crossing the Carpathians into Hungary and extending help to the Slav peoples of the Balkans. L'viv passed into Austrian hands again. Even when the Dual Empire collapsed in October and November, 1918, under the double pressure of military defeat and the aspirations of many of the subject nationalities for independence, Russia could not exploit this development for its own political ends. By that time Russia was the arena of a gigantic social civil war and that larger part of the Ukraine which had been under Russian rule had experienced some swift vicissitudes of political change and upheaval and was on the eve of still fiercer struggles. War and revolution had opened up new possibilities for the Ukrainian nationalist cause.

CHAPTER IV

WAR, REVOLUTION, NATIONALIST REBIRTH

BEFORE the First World War the Ukrainian nationalist movement was stronger in the cultural than in the political field. Ukrainian scholars, poets, writers reconstructed their country's past and tried to assert the right to express themselves in their native language. But there was less organized separatism in the part of the Ukraine under Russian rule than in some other regions of the Empire, such as Poland and Finland. And there was less secessionist sentiment among the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina than one would have found among the South Slav subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who were exposed to propaganda emanating from the neighboring independent state of Serbia.

But a combination of war and revolution brought the element of reality into the dreams of Ukrainian nationalists. The two empires which had divided the territory of the Ukraine proved unable to withstand the strain of a prolonged and unprecedentedly destructive war. The Russian Empire broke down first, when the Tsarist regime was overthrown in March, 1917, and replaced by a provisional government of a liberal-socialist character. The provisional government, in its turn, was replaced by the Soviet regime, following the military and political *coup d'état*, led by the Bolshevik Party, under the direction of Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin, in November, 1917.

The Bolsheviks were the more extreme wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Their seizure of power in the capital and in the larger cities was a challenge to civil war, because the more conservative and well-to-do classes were unwilling to accept their program of radical social and economic change. Class lines and conflicting social and economic sympathies influenced the course of nationalist revolution in the Ukraine. Some of the Ukrainian workers were won over by the Bolshevik, or Communist propaganda. Some of the non-Ukrainian population preferred a nationalist regime in Kiev to an all-Russian Soviet Government, because they feared wholesale confiscations and repressive measures against the propertied classes.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire experienced a different type of revolution, national rather than social in character, accompanied by comparatively little

bloodshed and economic change. All the regions of the former Russian Empire that remained under Soviet rule experienced a tremendous upheaval in former social and economic relations. Instead of the Tsarist regime came the dictatorship of the Communist Party. All over the Soviet Union private property in land and industrial enterprises was abolished and replaced by a huge state-controlled national economy.

In Austria-Hungary there was a general upsurge of the peoples which formerly felt themselves oppressed, in varying degrees, by the German-Magyar ascendancy. The Czechs, the Poles, the Italians, the Croats, Slovenes, and Rumanians either set up new states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, or joined existing countries—Italy, Serbia, Rumania. Apart from a brief interlude of Bolshevism in Hungary in 1919, there was no drastic social revolutionary upheaval, except for the inevitable suffering and impoverishment which were the consequence of the lost war and which hit some racial and social groups harder than others.

Revolutionary change affected the two sections of the Ukrainian people at different times. The Ukrainians of Russia had experienced about twenty months of free political activity before their brethren across the Austrian frontier were cast into a whirlpool of activity by the collapse of the Habsburg Empire.

The Tsarist regime in Russia collapsed on March 12, 1917, when the regiments of the Petrograd garrison, incited by the Volhynian Regiment (Ukraine), refused to fire on demonstrating throngs of rebellious workers and passed over to the insurgent side themselves. The sequel to this development was distinctly different in Russia and in the Ukraine and proved the strength and reality of the nationalist idea among the Ukrainian masses.

The only parliamentary body that existed in Russia at the time of the Revolution was the Duma, which had been set up after Tsar Nicholas II proclaimed a Constitution in 1905. During the reaction that followed the revolutionary upheaval of 1905 the method of electing deputies to the Duma was revised in such a manner as to give undue representation to the propertied and landowning classes, and to discriminate against workers, peasants, and members of non-Russian nationalities. Consequently the Duma was not considered genuinely representative and was swept away after the fall of Tsarism.

A provisional government, composed of Liberals and Socialists, was set up and there was a general understanding that the future form of the Russian state would be determined by a freely elected Constituent Assembly. Wartime conditions made it difficult to arrange the election of this Assembly, and it was only convened in January, 1918, after the Bolsheviks had come into power. It was dispersed almost immediately for it refused to ratify Bolshevik resolutions.

During the interval between the fall of the Tsar and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, during the months from March until November, 1917, actual authority in Russia rested largely in the hands of Soviets, spontaneously elected councils which sprang up all over the country. The membership of the Soviets in the cities and towns was made up largely of industrial workers and revolutionary intellectuals. The middle classes had little, if any, representation. Delegates were chosen in rather haphazard, irregular fashion in factory and trade-union meetings and the various Socialist parties, especially the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Socialist Revolutionaries, were strongly represented. Soldiers' Soviets came into existence in the armies at the front and in the garrisons in the rear. This new method of political organization spread more slowly in the country districts. But gradually peasant Soviets also began to appear.

During the first months after the overthrow of Tsarism the moderate Socialist parties, the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, possessed a majority of supporters in the Soviets. But after the unsuccessful attempt of the Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, to carry out a counterrevolutionary movement in September there was a strong swing to the Left among the masses and the Bolsheviks won majorities in some of the most important Soviets, notably Petrograd and Moscow. It was on the crest of this wave that Lenin rode into power through the Bolshevik Revolution of November 7, 1917. This revolution was legalized, at least in the opinion of the Bolsheviks, because an all-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in Petrograd, revealed a Bolshevik majority and approved the measures of the newly established Soviet regime.

In the Ukraine, on the other hand, the Central Rada, rather than the Soviets, was the strongest political force during the period between the two revolutions in Petrograd. It was organized on nationalist, not on class, lines; its president was the well-known professor and nationalist leader, Michael Hrushevsky.

In the beginning the Rada, which steadily expanded its base of popular support by drawing in delegates from trade-unions, cooperatives and other public organizations, and which also received the enthusiastic support of congresses of Ukrainian soldiers, did not advocate complete separation of the Ukraine from Russia. It was in favor of territorial autonomy for the Ukraine within a Russian federal republic.

There was a rise in Ukrainian nationalist feeling. Regiments in the service of the Rada called themselves after old Ukrainian national heroes, such as Khmel-nitsky and Polubotok. There was a widespread growth of newspapers and magazines, published in the Ukrainian language.

The Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party was centralist in its sympathies. So long as Cadet Ministers exercised a good deal of influence on the de-

cisions of the Provisional Government it was hard to reach an agreement with the more insistent non-Russian nationalities, such as the Ukrainians and the Finns. (Poland at that time was under German occupation.)

There were disputes about the proper boundaries of the Ukraine, about the scope of competence of the General Secretariat, the Ukrainian Government which had been nominated by the Rada, about the feasibility and desirability of organizing independent Ukrainian military units. In the middle of July, about the time of an unsuccessful pro-Bolshevik demonstration in Petrograd, the Polubotok regiment seized some of the public buildings in Kiev and tried to proclaim the Rada the sole governmental authority. However, the Rada itself regarded this step as premature and the soldiers were induced to return to their barracks.

After this turbulent period in July there was a temporary strengthening of the authority of the Provisional Government. A delegation from the Rada which went to Petrograd to discuss the details of Ukrainian autonomy was confronted with a demand that the Ukraine should include only five provinces, Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, Chernihiv, and Poltava, although Ukrainian claims extended to four more provinces in the southern and western parts of the country, Khar-kiv, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Tauride. Ukrainian nationalists also asserted that parts of Kursk and Voronezh provinces and of Bessarabia should ethnologically be included in the Ukraine.

The rapid swing to the Left in the autumn and the triumph of Bolshevism in the main centers of Russia favored the growth of all-out separatism in the Ukraine. A federal arrangement was scarcely possible when a Communist regime, determined to spread its system by every means of force and propaganda, was in power in Moscow. There was a three-cornered struggle for power in Kiev, the Ukrainian political center, in November, with forces of the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government, and the Central Rada contending for the upper land. The Rada emerged victorious in this confused struggle.

The Ukraine was proclaimed a "people's republic" in a proclamation (Universal) issued by the Rada on November 20. This document still urged a federative solution of the nationality question, in the following words:

Not separating from the Russian Republic, preserving union with it, we stand firmly on our land so that we can help all Russia with our forces, so that the whole Russian Republic may become a federation of free and equal peoples.

At this time the political and military situation in Russia was obscure and confused, and there was no certainty that the Soviet regime would remain in power. The proclamation clearly stated that, pending the meeting of an Ukrain-

ian Constituent Assembly, all authority in the Ukraine was vested in the Rada and in its Government, the General Secretariat. This was a *de facto* declaration of independence.

The Ukraine, like the whole of Russia at that time, was caught up in a wave of social radicalism. Among the soldiers there was complete disgust and disillusionment with the war, and the peasants were insistent on agrarian reform of the most drastic type. The Ukrainian Rada bowed to the popular will and inserted in the proclamation declarations about land and peace which were substantially similar to the decisions which the Soviet Government had already adopted in Petrograd. A speedy conclusion of peace was demanded, together with the abolition of rights of property in landed estates and in "other agricultural land not farmed by the labor of its owners."

The proclamation announced "freedom of speech, press, faith, assembly, unions, and strikes," established the eight-hour working day and promised the national minorities in the Ukraine (Russians, Poles and Jews) freedom of cultural and national development.

The disappearance of a strong central government in Russia favored the growth of Ukrainian nationalism up to the point of separatism. There was a political vacuum, which the Rada naturally filled. But the building up of a strong and stable Ukrainian Government in an atmosphere of social chaos, hunger, and economic collapse proved impossible.

The Soviet Government on December 17, 1917, sent an ultimatum to the Rada, accusing it of "carrying on a two-faced bourgeois policy, concealing itself behind nationalist phrases." Specifically it demanded that the Rada should stop the passage of anti-Bolshevik military units through the Ukraine, support the Bolshevik effort to put down the hostile forces led by the Don Cossack Ataman Kaledin, and cease disarming Soviet regiments and Red Guards (a Bolshevik workers' militia) in the Ukraine. Unless these demands were accepted within forty-eight hours, the Soviet Government announced it would consider the Rada "in a state of open war against the Soviet regime in Russia and in the Ukraine."

The situation was further complicated, because the Ukrainian Bolshevik leaders, repressed in Kiev, moved to Kharkiv, where there was more Bolshevik sentiment and closer contact with Russia, and organized a so-called Soviet Government of the Ukraine. Bands of armed Bolsheviks, sailors, workers, military detachments, gathered for the purpose of attacking both the conservative Cossack local government in the Don Territory and the "counterrevolutionary" Rada in Kiev.

The atmosphere of the time was very unfavorable to the Rada. In a period

of upheaval and social chaos the political group that puts forward the most extreme slogans possesses a distinct advantage. Professor Hrushevsky, an active participant in the events which he describes, sums up the difficulties which confronted the Rada very vividly in the following passage: ¹

During the last half of December, 1917, the position of the Ukraine became even more critical. As Bolshevik agitation began to take effect, the army became disorganized, the soldiers at the front stole military supplies, deserted, and on their way home plundered everything in their path, while the villages were occupied by anarchist bands which gained the support of the weak and terrorized those opposed to them. The plundering and destruction of estates, warehouses, and factories became common, so that the wealth of the nation was dissipated and its productive forces weakened.

Red forces under the command of an adventurous chieftain, Muraviev, began to advance on Kiev from Kharkiv in January, 1918. The Rada proclaimed the full unconditional independence of the Ukraine in a Fourth Universal, or Proclamation, published on January 22, 1918. The Ukrainian Republic was characterized as "an independent and sovereign power of the Ukrainian people, subject to no other authority." The General Secretariat was transformed into a Council of Ministers and was instructed to hasten the completion of peace negotiations with Germany and Austria and to take measures to clear the Bolsheviks out of the Ukraine.

The forces at the disposal of the Rada were insufficient for this purpose. Bolshevik agents slipped into Kiev and organized an uprising among the workers of the Arsenal district. For some ten days Kiev was the victim of prolonged street fighting and was also bombarded by the approaching troops of Muraviev. Finally the Rada evacuated the city and withdrew first to Zhitomir, later to Sarny. Discipline among the Red troops at this time was very poor and the capture of Kiev was marked by an orgy of murder and pillage that elicited protests even from the Kiev Soviet, which passed a resolution to the effect that "those who disgraced themselves by the murder of unarmed people must be expelled from the socialist army and handed over to a revolutionary court."

Meanwhile a new diplomatic situation changed the entire balance of military and political force and led to the speedy expulsion of the Bolshevik bands from Kiev. The war weariness of the Russian masses had been one of the principal causes of the success of the Bolsheviks. Once established in power, Lenin and his associates had no alternative except to seek the conclusion of peace as speedily

¹ "A History of Ukraine," pp. 533, 534.

as possible. The entire Russian Army was melting away from the front; there was no will to fight whatever.

The Allied powers paid no attention to Bolshevik overtures for the inauguration of general peace negotiations. Separate peace negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Governments of the Central Powers began in Brest-Litovsk on December 22. The mood among the Ukrainian soldiers was not different from that of the Russians. The Rada felt the same compulsion to conclude peace.

Leon Trotsky, head of the Soviet delegation, tried to utilize the peace negotiations as a springboard for revolutionary propaganda among the German and Austrian workers. He believed that the Russian Revolution could be projected into Central Europe, that the Kaiser's armies could be disintegrated through agitation. So he played for time, prolonging the negotiations and taking every opportunity to appeal to the peoples of Germany and Austria over the heads of their governments.

There were some strikes in munitions factories in Berlin and Vienna; but the structure of the German and Austrian empires was too solid to crumble before Trotsky's revolutionary methods. The discipline and loyalty of the German soldiers were still proof against propaganda.

As the German and Austrian negotiators became increasingly irritated over Trotsky's unconventional methods, they conceived the idea of playing the Ukrainian delegation which had arrived at Brest-Litovsk against the Bolsheviks. Count Czernin, head of the Austrian delegation, announced on February 1, on behalf of all the delegations of the Central Powers, that the Ukrainian People's Republic was recognized as "a free sovereign state, fully authorized to enter into international relations."

It was with deep grief and concern that the Ukrainian nationalists decided to accept close treaty relations with Germany and Austria and to appeal for German aid in driving out the Bolsheviks. They wished to establish an independent Ukraine and they had no illusions about the difficulties which the entrance of German and Austrian troops into Ukrainian territory would cause. Perhaps the principal consideration that weighed with the Ukrainian representative at Brest-Litovsk is expressed in the following terms by Professor Hrushevsky:²

It was not safe to abandon the country any longer to anarchy at the hands of the Bolsheviks and passively await the time when the people would become so disgusted by it that they would welcome the Ukrainian authorities.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 544.

A formal peace treaty was signed between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Government on February 9. It provided that the region of Kholm, an area in dispute between Poland and the Ukraine, should be ceded to the latter, that Austria should grant political and cultural rights to the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina, that the Central Powers should receive from the Ukraine a million tons of foodstuffs annually. It was understood that German and Austrian troops should assist the Rada in returning to Kiev and expelling the Bolsheviks from the Ukraine.

German and Ukrainian forces entered Kiev on March 1 and the Rada returned to its capital a few days later. The Bolshevik regime had not yet created a powerful, well-disciplined Red Army. Its military units in the Ukraine were mostly composed of irregular bands, fighting with little expert military leadership and without any definite plan. So it is not surprising that during March and April the territory of the Ukraine, as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack territory to the east and the southern racial frontier of Russia in the north, was cleared of these forces.

Unfortunately the Ukrainian national cause suffered, as had often been the case in the past, because the allies who had been called in to drive out one enemy abused their power and aroused the hatred of the population. The Rada was only able to function as a legislative body for two months after the reoccupation of Kiev. It was subjected to attack and criticism from several directions. The non-Ukrainians in the town resented the publication of laws and proclamations in the Ukrainian language and the prohibition of celebrations of the date of the Russian Revolution, March 12. The presence of the German Army was a cause of criticism.

The presence of this conservative foreign army also stimulated agitation against the Rada, with its radical program of agrarian reform, on the part of the landowners. The Polish landlords on the west bank of the Dnieper organized Polish legions and appealed to the Austrian Government to occupy Volhynia and Podolia and repeal the new agrarian legislation.

The Rada sought a basis of popular support by setting June 12 as the date for the meeting of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. But this body was never able to meet. For, on April 28, the German military authorities dissolved the Rada and held a hand-picked convention of their own. Most of the delegates represented the landlord and substantial farming interests.

Pavlo Skoropadsky, who was descended from an old Ukrainian family and had been an officer in the former Russian Army, became a puppet ruler under the Germans, with the old Ukrainian title of Hetman. There was a brief period of restoration of the old order in the Ukraine. Property was handed back to

former owners, the landlords were reestablished in their estates, strikes were forbidden, and the Germans endeavored to collect the foodstuffs they desired by means of forced requisitions.

Although the Ukraine is naturally a rich country, normal production had already been disorganized by revolution and chaotic civil war and there was much resentment against this attempt by foreigners to exploit Ukrainian food resources. So long as German military power was unbroken in the west the German troops were able to maintain their hold on the Ukraine, especially on the towns and railway lines. But the effort to extract food was largely thwarted by peasant sabotage and by scattered guerrilla resistance.

Not only Communists but Socialist Revolutionaries and other groups were active in promoting acts of underground resistance and terrorism. The commander of the German occupation forces, General Eichhorn, was mortally wounded by a bomb and ammunition dumps were blown up in Kiev and Odessa. A German official source gives a gloomy and realistic picture of the unpopularity of Skoropadsky's regime:³

Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamoring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy.”

This formula, “too many officers and too few soldiers,” explains the swift collapse of the Skoropadsky regime as soon as the Germans lost interest in the Ukraine because of the defeat in the west. Skoropadsky's name, which means “swiftly falling,” was fully justified by the course of events after the German military support became ineffective.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement revived and crystallized around a Directory of five persons, which was set up in the town of Bila Tserkva, south of Kiev. The most prominent figures in this new nationalist movement were Simon Petlura, who had been a military leader in the service of the Rada, and V. K. Vinnichenko, a writer with left-wing socialist views. Petlura adhered to

³ “Die Rueckfuehrung des Ostheeres,” cited by W. E. D. Allen, “The Ukraine,” p. 297.

the ideal of a national democratic Ukrainian republic. The more impressionable Vinnichenko wanted to declare in the Ukraine a "workers' and peasants' government," which would have differed very little from bolshevism, apart from its nationalist coloration.

It proved easier to get rid of the unpopular Skoropadsky Government than to set up a stable democratic regime. The Germans, now concerned only to evacuate their troops with as little friction as possible, withdrew support from the Hetman, who escaped from Kiev in disguise on December 14. Immediately afterwards the Ukrainian nationalist troops entered the city.

The Ukraine, which had been more or less held down by the German occupation, fell into a ferment of social upheaval. Indeed, the years 1919 and 1920, with their anarchical chaos, confused civil fighting, letting loose of class and national hates, recall some of the most turbulent epochs in the history of the semi-independent Ukraine of the seventeenth century.

The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the double pressure of military defeat and nationalist disaffection in the autumn of 1918 created the possibility for independent political activity in the Ukrainian regions of the Empire. A Ukrainian National Rada was organized in L'viv, principal city of Eastern Galicia, under the leadership of Dr. Eugene Petrushevich. This body proclaimed a Ukrainian national state, of which the territory should include Eastern Galicia, northwestern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, on October 19, 1918. The new state became known as the Western Ukrainian Republic and Ukrainian military command took command of L'viv on November 1. However, the military forces at the disposal of this new Ukrainian state were unable to withstand the pressure of the better armed and equipped Polish armies, which pressed into Eastern Galicia and occupied L'viv late in November. The Government of the Western Ukrainian Republic led a harassed existence in Stanislaw and other towns in the neighborhood of the former Austro-Russian frontier.

There was a natural sympathy between the nationalist movements in the former Russian Ukraine and in Galicia. A fusion of the two republics headed by the Directory in Kiev and by the Ukrainian National Rada in Galicia was announced in Kiev January 22. But Petlura was little more successful than the Rada had been in resisting the new onrush of the Bolsheviks. The Directory found itself forced to abandon Kiev on February 4 and from that time moved from town to town in the western part of the Ukraine under the pressure of military developments. At various times its headquarters were in Vinnitsa, Rovno, and Kamenets-Podolsk.

Attempts to obtain consideration for the claims of Ukrainian independence

at the Paris Peace Conference were not successful. The Foreign Minister of the Directory, A. Shulhin, an engineer named Sidorenko from the Western Ukraine, and a representative of the Jewish community in the Ukraine, Arnold Margolin, were among the members of the Ukrainian delegation at Paris. However, they encountered an unfavorable atmosphere. There was little knowledge of the historical side of the Ukrainian question among the representatives of the leading powers. France was committed to the idea of a "strong Poland" which would be a future counterpoise to Germany in Eastern Europe and therefore looked with disfavor on the Ukrainian claim to Eastern Galicia.

The United States was comparatively little interested in Eastern Europe and its official attitude was that nothing should be done to prejudice the future claims of a Russia that might emerge after the liquidation or modification of the Soviet regime. Great Britain wavered between the aggressively anti-Bolshevik policy of Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for War, who aided the Russian White leaders, Kolchak and Denikin, with munitions and supplies, and the occasional impulses of Prime Minister Lloyd George to seek a basis of agreement with the Soviet regime. Neither of these policies was favorable to Ukrainian aspirations.

It was also a handicap to the Ukrainian cause that the military situation developed unfavorably for Petlura's armies. There was a good deal of sympathy among the peasants, especially in the western and northern provinces, for the Ukrainian nationalist idea. But the deficiency in trained officers, in munitions, in sources of supply, made it impossible, as a general rule, for the Petlurist forces to cope on equal terms with the better organized Red and White armies. The Red Army by this time was utilizing the services of tens of thousands of experienced Russian officers and had emerged from the lawless, irregular, poorly organized stage of 1917 and 1918. The White Army of General Denikin attracted into its service a number of generals and officers, bitter opponents of communism, and enlisted a large number of its rank-and-file soldiers among the Don and Kuban Cossacks, some of the best human fighting material in Russia.

The Ukrainian peasants, however, disliked both Reds and Whites. They disliked the Reds because of their insults to religion, their habit of requisitioning food without paying for it, their attempts, in some cases, to impose communes on the peasants. They disliked the Whites because they tried to bring back the old regime, with its exploitation of the peasants by the large landed proprietors. They disliked both as predominantly Russian and alien to the Ukraine.

So the nationalist cause in the Ukraine found its most effective expression in guerilla warfare, which made the hold of both Reds and Whites on territory far

away from the large cities and railways very precarious. This guerrilla warfare was made possible on a large scale because of the planless, disorderly demobilization of the old Russian Army. Many detachments of peasant soldiers brought back not only rifles but machine-guns to their native villages. These weapons came into action very quickly when the peasants felt that they were being robbed and oppressed.

As is usually the case in guerrilla warfare, the mood of the people varied from time to time. For several months after the collapse of the German occupation there was a wave of pro-Bolshevik sentiment in the Ukraine. This was partly because of the reaction against foreign occupation and the restoration of the landlords, partly because the more attractive side of Soviet rule, the seizure and division of the big estates, was in the foreground, while the requisitions and other measures which were calculated to alienate the peasants had not begun on a large scale.

The Red Army swept over the Ukraine in the first months of 1919, meeting little opposition and winning a considerable number of recruits. A Ukrainian "ataman," or local military leader, named Hrihoriev, who had originally been a follower of Petlura, passed over to the Reds and helped to drive French and Greek troops which had intervened in South Russia out of the towns of Khereson, Nikolaev, and Odessa. By April, 1919, Soviet rule was established, nominally at least, all over the Ukraine, except for a part of the Donets Basin which was held by the White Army of General Denikin and an uncertain area in the northwest where the troops of the Directory held out.

But the Soviet hold on the country was weak and unstable. Causes of discontent were multiplying among the peasants. One of the prominent Soviet military leaders of this period, Antonov-Ovseenko, drew up a memorandum on the reasons for the outbreaks which were taking place behind the Red lines in the Ukraine. He mentioned the failure to select food officials from among the local people, the hatred for the chekas (branches of the Soviet terrorist political police), failure to give representation to the middle-class peasantry in the government, failure to give manufactured goods to the peasants. The predominance of aliens, especially Russians and Jews, in the local Soviet executive bodies was another cause of dissatisfaction, frequently mentioned in private Soviet reports.

At first the rumblings of revolt were of a minor character. But on May 7 Ataman Hrihoriev, commander of one of the largest military units in the Ukraine, turned openly against the Soviet regime, seizing the town of Elizavetgrad and issuing a "Universal," or proclamation, which summed up the grievances of the peasants quite vividly in the following passage:

Instead of giving you land and liberty they violently impose on you the commune, the Cheka, and the Moscow commissars. You work day and night; you have a torch for light; you go about in bark shoes and sacking trousers. Instead of tea you drink hot water without sugar. But those who promise you a bright future exploit you, fight with you, take away your grain with arms in their hands, requisition your cattle and impudently tell you that this is for the good of the people.

Hrihoriev was not strong enough to overthrow Soviet rule in the Ukraine. His troops became demoralized with drink and loot and he was finally driven from the main towns and railways and killed by a more famous guerrilla leader, Nestor Makhno.

But Hrihoriev's example was infectious. In one district after another the peasants took up arms under the leadership of a local leader, who called himself an "ataman." Many of these atamans were former teachers. Some were sincere Ukrainian patriots, others developed a tendency to rob and raid with little regard for any ideology. But the sum total of these peasant insurrections seriously affected the rear of the Red Army and made it possible for General Denikin, by a dashing offensive, to overrun the Ukraine, except for some of the provinces west of the Dnieper, during the summer and early autumn of 1919. Petlura took advantage of the weakening of the Red military situation and advanced at the head of an army drawn from Eastern and Western Ukraine to Kiev, which he occupied for one day at the end of August. His forces were then compelled to yield the city to the army of Denikin.

Intolerant Great Russian chauvinism and social reaction accompanied the advance of Denikin. The Ukraine was denied a separate nationality and referred to as "Little Russia" in the declarations of the Volunteer Army, Denikin's military organization. There was also a good deal of reestablishment of landlords on their estates.

As a result, the same process that had previously torn up the rear of the Reds operated to the disadvantage of the Whites. The peasant bands that had rebelled against the Soviets now often turned their arms against Denikin. After his military advance into Russia had been turned back in October and November by defeat in the neighborhood of Orel, Kursk, and Voronezh, Denikin's retreat into the Ukraine turned into a rout because of the disturbances in his rear created by peasant insurgents. Some of these were under Communist influence and leadership, others were adherents of the Ukrainian nationalist idea, others followed the anarchist banner of Makhno.

By February, 1920, the Whites had completely evacuated the Ukraine. Petlura's forces had been decimated by an epidemic of typhus in November and December, 1919, and the Ukrainian nationalists were unable to contest the possession

of the main cities with the Red Army, although guerrilla warfare was extensive in the regions remote from the large towns and railway lines.

One of the most picturesque figures in this chaotic era in the Ukraine was Nestor Makhno. Although he was not a Ukrainian nationalist, but an anarchist, he possessed the qualities of daring and popular leadership and skill in irregular warfare that one finds in many of the chieftains of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. He attracted a large following of peasants in the southern steppes of the Ukraine and fought impartially against Germans, Whites, and Reds—always in the name of peasant liberty.

Whenever Makhno and his partisans appeared in a village drink would flow, accordions would play, and it would be a bad time for local Communists and grain collectors—both usually unpopular figures with the peasants. Legends grew up about Makhno's skill in avoiding capture. He got uniforms of the Hetman's police for members of his band in 1918 and moved about the country, striking at unsuspecting German and Austrian detachments. He got his detachment through the line of the front by pretending that it was a Red unit in 1919. When he was bottled up in the Crimean peninsula in 1921 he slipped out by learning and giving the Red Army password.

Makhno's main field of activity was in the neighborhood of his native village, Hulai Polē. By 1921, after the end of the civil war, the Soviet control of the Ukraine was becoming too strong to permit a continuance of this guerrilla activity. Makhno and a small band of followers crossed the frontier into Rumania. At the height of his power, in the autumn of 1919, Makhno held Ekaterinoslav and some other large towns. Wherever he went he released prisoners and destroyed prisons. He printed his own money, with a humorous inscription that no one would be prosecuted for forging it. He may be remembered in history as the last of the Ukrainian peasant rebels.

The Directory which had represented the political side of the Ukrainian national government came to an end in December, 1919, and was replaced by a Cabinet, headed by Isaac Mazeppa. About the same time Petlura concluded a secret agreement with the Poles, whom he regarded as his only possible remaining allies. Under this agreement he expressed his "disinterest" in regards to Galicia, and also to the regions of Kholm, Polesia, and Western Podolia, which were already under Polish occupation.

This agreement bore fruit in April, 1920, when Marshal Pilsudski's Polish army, accompanied by Petlura's forces, marched on Kiev. At first the Red Army opposition was weak and Kiev was occupied on May 7. Pilsudski's design was to weaken Russia by extending Poland's boundary further to the east, per-

haps to the Dnieper, while supporting a Petlurist regime in the eastern part of the Ukraine.

But this enterprise completely miscarried. The Ukrainian peasants who disliked the Reds did not wish to see the return of the Polish landlords and the country was exhausted by the long turmoil of civil war. Petlura won very few recruits. The Polish lines of communication were overextended and the well-known Soviet cavalry leader Budenny threatened to cut off their retreat from Kiev. That city was abandoned in June and by August the line of the front had surged to the outskirts of Warsaw.

But Lenin, like Pilsudski, had overplayed his hand. There was an upsurge of Polish nationalist feeling and the Red Army, various units of which had become separated from one another in the swift advance, was severely defeated near Warsaw and driven back even more rapidly than it had moved forward.

History repeated itself, in a rather melancholy way for the Ukrainian nationalist cause, when the Ukraine was again partitioned between Russia and Poland, as was the case after the Treaty of Andrusovo, in 1667, although the partition agreed on by the terms of the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, was more favorable to Russia than the division prescribed by the Treaty of Andrusovo. The Soviet Union retained a good deal of Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dnieper. The whole of Galicia was left to Poland, the pre-war Austro-Russian boundary being accepted. Some parts of Volhynia and Podolia were included in Poland, along with the much disputed region of Kholm. Over five million Ukrainians were assigned to Poland under this settlement, while about thirty-two million remained on the Soviet side of the border.

Petlura settled in Paris, where he was murdered by a Jew named Schwartzbard, who declared that his act was committed to avenge the pogroms or massacres of Jews during the period of civil war in the Ukraine. As a matter of fact, however, as head of the Directory Petlura fought against the pogroms.⁴ Both the Ukrainian National Republic and the Government of the Western Ukraine continued to claim legal existence as "governments-in-exile." One of Petlura's lieutenants, Tiutiunuk, led a raid into the northwestern Ukraine in the autumn of 1921. But it was no longer possible to carry on civil war on a large scale. On both sides of the border the Ukrainian nationalist movement was compelled to resort mainly to underground methods of struggle.

⁴ See text of Petlura's anti-pogrom order (No. 131; August 26, 1919) to the troops of the Ukrainian National Republic. *The New York Times*, June 20, 1926.

CHAPTER V

THE UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

OF ALL the regions of the former Tsarist Empire the Ukraine was one of the most important for the Soviet regime to hold, for strategic and economic reasons. It was also one of the most difficult to assimilate to the methods and psychology of a Communist dictatorship.

The Ukraine was traditionally both the bread basket and the sugar-bowl of Russia. Under normal conditions it produced a considerable surplus of wheat, sugar-beets, fruit, and vegetables. It was also the principal source of Russia's coal supply and in the twenties it was the principal center of the Russian iron and steel industry, although in more recent times it has been outstripped in this field by the development of mineral resources and big new factories in the Urals and Western Siberia. It is through the Ukraine that Russia possesses access to the northern coast of the Black Sea, and to its most important port, Odessa. For all these reasons the Soviet Government considered the possession of the Ukraine a vital national interest.

At the same time, as the account of the course of revolution in the Ukraine in the last chapter shows, communism was not congenial to the Ukrainian people. Opposition to the Soviet regime was prolonged and stubborn, especially (and this is rather significant) in the regions where the Ukrainians form the greatest part of the population. There were fewer Communists in the Ukraine, in proportion to population, than there were in Russia, and there were distinctly fewer Communists among the predominantly peasant Ukrainians than there were among the Russians, Jews and other nationalities in the cities and towns. The Ukraine would never have been Sovietized if it had not been for the intervention from Russia.

Because it was a new revolutionary regime, the Soviet Government went about its task of splitting the Ukrainian people and winning them over with propaganda of more skill and subtlety than the Tsarist regime had ever showed. At the same time methods of extreme brutality were employed whenever there was mass resistance to Soviet economic policies.

In relation to the Ukrainians, as in relation to all non-Russian minorities, the Soviet Government proclaimed the principle of racial and cultural equality.

There was no repetition of the Russian chauvinism which had led to contemptuous disparagement of the Ukrainian culture and language. A Ukrainian Soviet Republic was proclaimed December 18, 1918, when the German occupation regime was in an advanced state of disintegration; all power was supposedly vested in the "Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants."

Kharkiv was designated as the capital of this Ukrainian Soviet Republic. There was a special Council of Commissars, the Soviet term for Ministers for the government of the Ukraine; for a time there was a separate Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Under the Soviet Constitution of June 6, 1923, the control of foreign affairs was reserved for the central government; early in 1944 control of military affairs and foreign affairs was restored to the constituent republics, of which sixteen were recognized at that time.

The leading figures in the first years of Soviet rule in the Ukraine were Christian Rakovsky, a cosmopolitan Rumanian revolutionary who acted as Prime Minister, Gregory Petrovsky, a simple peasant, who was President, and Mykola Skrypnyk, who was Commissar for Internal Affairs. Each of these men came to an unfortunate end—a rather frequent experience for "old Bolsheviks," regardless of their national origin. Rakovsky, already an old man, received a twenty-year prison sentence after one of the mass treason and sabotage trials in 1938. Petrovsky disappeared during the period of the purge and was never heard of again. Skrypnyk committed suicide.

While stamping out the last embers of guerrilla warfare, the Soviet Government, in the early twenties, pursued a policy of ostensible leniency toward Ukrainian nationalists and induced some well-known figures to return to the Soviet Ukraine. Professor Hrushevsky returned and was appointed president of the newly established Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Vsevolod Holubovich, an active leader in the nationalist movement, was also persuaded to come to the Soviet Ukraine, along with some others who had taken part in the nationalist movement during the civil war.

But these returned nationalists soon found that they were shut out from any political influence, although a certain scope of cultural activity was granted for a time to scholars, such as Professor Hrushevsky. Cultural autonomy was one of the trump cards of the Soviet Government in dealing with the Ukraine. The use of the Ukrainian language in schools, courts, newspapers, and public business was introduced, with provisions for the use of Russian, Yiddish, and other languages in regions where the Ukrainians did not constitute a majority of the population. In theory, at least, it was made compulsory for Russians who were appointed to state or Party posts in the Ukraine to learn the native language.

Had political and economic freedom kept pace with this cultural autonomy, the Ukrainians would have found little cause for complaint. Some of the most eminent Ukrainian thinkers in the past had advocated a free federative union of all Slav peoples on an equal basis as the solution of their country's national problem.

Unfortunately Soviet rule did not bring this political and economic freedom. Even in the cultural field liberty was sharply restricted because of the policy of strict censorship. It was impossible to advocate any non-Communist political theory. Ukrainian literature was suspiciously scanned for evidences of "nationalist counterrevolution." The Ukrainian nationalists who optimistically trusted themselves within the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine in many cases experienced the fate that later overtook so many old Bolsheviks. Hrushevsky was exiled to Russia in 1930 and died in 1934. Holubovich was shot when the persecution of Ukrainian nationalists reached a high point in 1931.

In all my trips in the Ukraine I was impressed by the contrast between city and village. The cities were much more affected by the new Soviet institutions, by the new Soviet ways of life. There one found larger Communist Youth organizations, more workers' clubs, posters, slogans.

But in the country districts the majority of the Ukrainian peasants continued to regard the Soviet regime as something foreign, something that had been imposed on them. I recall vividly an incident that occurred when I was traveling in the country districts of the Ukraine in 1924. My wife and I spent a few days in a village in a neat little whitewashed cottage which belonged to two sisters, Nadya and Sasha.

The teacher in the local school arranged a little celebration one evening. On the surface everything went in accordance with Soviet rules, and the recitations by the pupils ended with the singing of the "Internationale," then the official hymn of the Soviet Union. But, when the teacher was able to talk with us privately in his house and learned that we were foreigners and not Communists, he talked more and more freely about the feelings of the local peasants and how, during the period of the Civil War, then not very far off, they had risen up against Red and White tyranny alike.

"The Communists said we were bandits," said the teacher, throwing off all disguise with the revealing "we," "but I think we were like Garibaldi."

It was men like this teacher who could be relied on to take full advantage of every possibility of advancing the Ukrainian national cause through the cultural autonomy which was part of the Soviet policy in the Ukraine. Open discussion, such as one might have expected in a democratic country, was impossible because of the conditions of Communist dictatorship. But the history

of the Ukraine under Soviet rule is filled with complaints from Communist sources about the persistence of nationalist spirit among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Communist Party in the Ukraine was subjected to more frequent and violent "purges" than the same organization in Russia, because the impulse to assert national independence frequently cropped up even among Ukrainian Communists. Two representatives of this tendency in the twenties were Shumsky and Volubuyev. The former, who was for a time Commissar for Education, took advantage of the cultural Ukrainization of the country to defend, so far as possible, the nationalist position. Volubuyev persisted in exposing the "colonization" tendencies of Soviet economic policy, the tendency to exploit the Ukraine for the benefit of Russia.

The Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party sent a letter to the Third International at this time, accusing the Ukrainian educated class of trying to keep the country connected with Europe by suggesting that the interests of the Ukraine are contrary to the interests of the other Soviet republics. The state of feeling among the Ukrainian educated nationalists is rather well reflected in the following sentence in this letter:

Everything is being done to convince the masses that the Bolsheviks are, supposedly, continuing the imperialist policies of the Tsarist regime, that, in accordance with Tsarist precedents, they oppress non-Russian nationalities, and that the entire Bolshevik national policy is composed of empty phrases and deception.

Another rebel among the Ukrainian Communists was the popular writer Mykola Khvylovy. Active in various literary organizations and popular with the younger generation of Ukrainian readers, Khvylovy vindicated the right of the Ukraine to maintain cultural contact with the West—an indirect form of resisting domination from Moscow. He wrote on one occasion:

The previous generation of Ukrainian authors was already oriented toward the West. . . . Our generation will probably not be so successful, as a result of various circumstances. The generation to come must succeed.

In view of the severe restrictions imposed by Soviet censorship, the expression of such sentiments was almost equivalent to expressing hope that the Ukraine could free itself from Russian Communist domination. Khvylovy and his friends and associates came to be regarded as outright counterrevolutionists. As early as 1929 Stalin made the following reference to Khvylovy:

If we had nothing else but these discussions about Khvylovy, which have become so wide and heated in the Ukraine, there would be sufficient cause for profound alarm.

P. P. Postishev, who for a time was virtually dictator of the Ukraine in his role as Stalin's chief lieutenant in that country, strongly hinted, after Khvylovy's death, that he and other Ukrainian writers had become involved in a political struggle for freedom.

Among the Ukrainian writers of that time [said Postishev] there were many decidedly counterrevolutionary nationalist elements, who, after abandoning all hope for the victory of their counterrevolutionary cause and becoming convinced of their complete isolation, accepted the most bandit-like and aggressive methods of fighting. Dosvitny, Khvylovy and others, not successful in the field of writing, chose the path of terror.

One is reminded of the remark of the village teacher:

"The Communists said we were bandits. But I think we were like Garibaldi."

Khvylovy committed suicide in May, 1933, probably because he foresaw arrest and execution as a nationalist. He was not the only Ukrainian writer who perished in the unequal struggle with the powerful Soviet state.

The Ukraine passed through much the same stages of economic and social development as the other regions of the Soviet Union. The twenties represented a relatively mild period. The adoption of the NEP (New Economic Policy) with its legalization of private trade and abandonment of the previous policy of requisitioning the peasants' surplus produce, paved the way for recovery from the extreme hardships of the time of Civil War and so-called war communism.

But a much sterner epoch set in with the adoption of the First Five Year Plan toward the end of 1928. The objectives of this scheme of nationally controlled economy, as it worked out in practice, were to push ahead the industrial development of the Soviet Union at a very rapid pace and to replace individual with collective farming.

In a poor country like the Soviet Union this drive for new industrial construction, especially in the so-called heavy industries (iron and steel, machine building, metallurgy, chemicals, etc.) involved in the beginning a severe curtailment of the modest standard of living. Since foreign capital was unavailable, the initial expenses of constructing so many new big plants and importing necessary machinery and equipment from abroad could only be met by a process of compulsory belt-tightening on the part of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The situation was further complicated because of the simultaneous attempt to wipe out individual farming and to organize the peasants in so-called collective farms, where groups of fifty, a hundred or more peasant families

would farm the land in common, with the aid of tractors and other large machines leased to them by the state.

The instinctive peasant reluctance to surrender his individual land holding was especially strong in the Ukraine, and the arbitrary and violent methods employed to promote collective farming led to two great and little known tragedies in Ukrainian history, the liquidations of the kulaks as a class and the famine of 1932-33. In Russia the general system of peasant landholding had been the *obshchina*, or village community, which assigned to each peasant family its allotment and redistributed the land at periodic intervals. The land was not worked in common, as in the collective farm, but the instinct for individual land ownership was naturally weakened under such a system. Transition to collective farming was somewhat easier in regions where the peasants were already used to the idea that the land was community, rather than individual property.

But in many of the Ukrainian provinces, Chernihiv, Poltava and the regions on the right bank of the Dnieper, the *obshchina* was unknown. The peasants had been as turbulent in the Ukraine as anywhere else in rebelling against the landlords. But what they wanted was enlarged private farms for themselves, free from the oppressive burdens of debt and rent to the big landowner. They were definitely opposed to the Communist idea of forming agricultural communes and breathed a sigh of relief when this idea was dropped with the introduction of the NEP.

Now they were faced with what amounted to compulsion to give up their individual holdings and submit to the feared and unknown discipline of the collective farm, where they would be working for the state, rather than for themselves. Another grievance, which had existed ever since the Revolution, but which became aggravated during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1929-33), was that the peasants were not receiving what they considered a fair equivalent in manufactured goods and other city products for the grain and other foodstuffs which they were expected and, during the Five Year Plan, required to give up to the government collectors. I heard this grievance dinned into my ears whenever I made a trip in the Ukrainian countryside.

Faced with a mood of widespread discontent among the peasants that might have flared up in general uprising if it had been given leadership and organization, the Soviet authorities began systematically to break up and exterminate the ranks of the genuine or suspected nationalists. In 1930 an organization called *Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) was discovered and a group of its alleged members were brought to trial on the

charge of maintaining contact with individuals and groups in the Western Ukraine, which was under Polish rule.

In 1931 the discovery of a Ukrainian organization known as "The Nationalist Center" was announced. This afforded an opportunity to "liquidate," that is, execute a number of political leaders who had formerly been associated with the Rada and with the Ukrainian nationalist movement, including Holubovich, Shershel, and Mazurenko. The ever active OGPU (Soviet Political Police) announced the discovery of a "secret military organization" in 1933. Among the prominent individuals who were shot in connection with this case was Kotsiubinsky (Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars, or Cabinet).

The same year, 1933, witnessed the suicides of the writer Khvylovy and of the veteran Ukrainian Communist, Mykola Skrypnyk. The suicide of the latter was perhaps due to a variety of causes: remorse and bitterness over the famine that had been brought on by the policy of the Soviet Government, consciousness of having fallen into political disfavor, fear that he might be cast for a role in some new "treason and sabotage" trial.

A Ukrainian newspaper published outside the Soviet Union commented that if one should place on one side of the scales all Skrypnyk's crimes against the Ukrainian nationalist movement and on the other the little bullet with which he voluntarily ended his life the bullet would weigh more heavily in the judgment of the Ukrainian people.

Postishev, who had succeeded Kaganovich as Stalin's chief deputy in the Ukraine in the critical year 1933, summed up the official attitude toward "counterrevolution" in the Ukraine in the following passage in a speech which he delivered on January 20, 1934:

The discovery of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine was an unusually important signal for the Communist Party in the Ukraine. We learned from this that the Ukrainian nationalist counterrevolution had begun to concentrate its activity here in the Soviet Ukraine, and that its tactics lay in pushing its own people into social, economic and cultural life, into the Communist Party, into the Union of Communist Youth and into the schools, in order to make use of them for spreading nationalist ideas. In 1931 the Ukrainian Communist Party received another unusually loud and alarming signal. This was the uncovering of the so-called Ukrainian Nationalist Centre, which represented a number of nationalistic cross-currents. This was a military, national-fascist organization, and its object was to unite all the nationalistic counterrevolutionary forces in the Ukraine. Nationalist elements became especially active in 1931 and 1932 and forced their way into new institutions of socialist construction. In the beginning of 1933 the OGPU discovered another organization—the Ukrainian Military Organization.

It is difficult to pass a definite judgment on the significance of these Ukrainian political trials. Undoubtedly there was an element of nationalist dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia, and this aggravated the discontent which was widespread in the Soviet Union at that time against the new economic policies of the government and the sufferings and privations which accompanied these policies. A certain amount of "underground" political activity most probably developed under these circumstances, especially as there was no possibility of voicing political opposition in any open or legal manner.

At the same time the complete absence, in the Soviet juridical system, of safeguards for the individual who may be accused of that rather vague and general offense, "counterrevolutionary activity," opens the door wide to the persecution and "framing up" of individuals who may have committed no overt act, but who are disliked and suspected because of their former actions or because of their supposed mental attitude. So it is impossible to say with certainty how many of the persons executed, exiled, or imprisoned as a result of these trials were actually working for an independent Ukraine and how many were merely sacrificed to suspicion. It may, however, be affirmed with reasonable certainty that far more Ukrainians suffered for political reasons under the Soviet rule than under the Tsarist regime.

This is especially true if one counts among the victims of Soviet rule the large number of relatively well-to-do peasants who were "liquidated," that is dispossessed of their property and banished to forced labor as kulaks and the still larger number of people of all classes, mostly peasants, who perished in the political famine of 1932-33. This famine may fairly be called political because it was not the result of any overwhelming natural catastrophe or of such a complete exhaustion of the country's resources in foreign and civil war as preceded and helped to cause the famine of 1921-22.

Partly because of discontent with the new system of collective farming and the lack of manufactured goods, partly because the government had returned to methods of war communism, demanding arbitrarily all the peasants' surplus grain, without defining clearly what was supposed to constitute "surplus," the peasants in the Ukraine had slowed down their productive effort. Climatic conditions were also unfavorable, both in 1931 and in 1932.

The situation that had developed by the autumn of 1932 might be briefly summarized as follows. Despite the meager harvest, the peasants could have pulled through without starvation if there had been a substantial abatement of the requisitions of grain and other foodstuffs. But the requisitions were intensified, rather than relaxed; the Government was determined to "teach the peas-

ants a lesson" by the grim method of starvation, to force them to work hard in the collective farms.

Early in 1933 the Ukraine was declared "out of bounds" for foreign correspondents, so that there could be no widely circulated accounts of the great human tragedy that was taking place there. Moscow was flooded with rumors of widespread starvation, of carts going about the streets of Poltava and other towns, picking up the dead. In the autumn of 1933, when the ban on travel in the Ukraine by foreign journalists was lifted, I went with my wife, who was herself born in the Ukraine, to learn at first hand what had happened in the Ukraine. We visited two widely separated regions, one in the neighborhood of Poltava, on the left bank of the Dnieper, the other near the town of Bila Tserkva, on the right bank. We also made systematic inquiries at railway stations as we traveled across the country.

No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest desire to learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the Ukrainian countryside had experienced a gigantic tragedy. What had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were allowed to pass the Soviet censorship, but stark, outright famine, with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet Government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad.

But every village I visited reported a death rate of not less than ten per cent. This was not an irresponsible individual estimate, but the figure given out by the local Soviets. For, while it was easy to tell credulous tourists in Moscow that there had been no famine, it was impossible for local officials to make any such assertion when every peasant with whom we talked was mentioning friends and relatives who had perished, either from outright hunger or from typhus, influenza and other diseases that always ravage a famine-weakened population.

I retain an unforgettable impression of a village called Cherkassy, which is seven or eight miles south of the town of Bila Tserkva. On the road to this village an ikon showing the face of Christ had been removed, as part of the official anti-religious policy of that time. But the crown of thorns, with unconscious symbolism, had been permitted to remain.

Walking through the dusty streets of the village one was impressed by the sense of death and desertion. House after house seemed to be abandoned, with window panes fallen in and corn growing mixed with weeds in gardens which had been abandoned by their owners. The young secretary of the village Soviet, whose name was Fischenko, reported that 634 out of the 2,072 inhabi-

tants of the village had died. There had been one marriage in the village during the last year. Six children had been born, of whom one had survived. "It's better not to have children than to have them die of hunger," said a woman with whom I talked in the office of the Soviet.

"No," argued a boy, "if no children are born who can till the land?"

Another boy on one of the village streets called the death roll of his friends and acquaintances:

There was Anton Samchenko, who died with his wife and sister; three children were left. In Nikita Samchenko's family the father and Mykola and two other children died; five children were left. Then Grigory Samchenko died with his son Petro; a wife and a daughter are left. Gerasim Samchenko died with his four children; only the wife is still alive. And Sidor Odnorog died with his wife and two daughters; one girl is left. Gura Odnorog died with his wife and three children; one girl is still alive.

This kind of grim, stark chronicle could have been compiled in almost any village in the Ukraine in that terrible winter and spring of 1932-33. In the village of Zhuke, not far from Poltava, I went into a peasant house at random and found a listless looking girl, fourteen years old. Her father was in the fields; her mother and four brothers and sisters had perished during the famine. A woman in Poltava declared that "no war ever took from us so many people."

This was certainly no exaggeration. If one should take the ten per cent mortality figure as normal (and from what I learned on the trip I think this would be a conservative estimate) the number of deaths in the Ukraine must have been over three million. While no official statistics about this tragedy have been published there are two points of circumstantial evidence showing how the population growth of the Ukraine was retarded. The proportion of the Ukrainian population in the Soviet population, according to the census of 1939, was 17.5 per cent. It had been 20 per cent during the twenties. The absolute figure of the Ukrainian population reported in 1939 was 30,960,221, indicating a decline during the preceding decade.

There has perhaps been no disaster of comparable magnitude that received so little international attention. The Soviet method of stifling direct reporting of the famine by refusing permission to correspondents to visit the stricken regions until a new crop had been harvested and the outward signs of the mass mortality had been largely eliminated proved very effective. Officially Moscow officialdom continued to deny brazenly that there had been any starvation. Few correspondents were inclined to risk difficulties with the censorship by sending the story of events which had occurred some months in the past.

The Ukrainians abroad, to be sure, learned through indirect channels of

what had happened in their homeland and made unavailable attempts to organize relief and to bring the inhuman government policy that had led up to the famine to the attention of public opinion. The Ukrainians across the border in Poland naturally received the fullest information and any enthusiasm that had existed among them for communism was considerably cooled.

Agricultural conditions gradually improved in the Ukraine, as in other parts of the Soviet Union, after the crowning tragedy of forced collectivization, the great famine of 1932-33. Crushed by the ruthless weapon of starvation, the peasants gave up the struggle for individual landholdings. It is noteworthy that the death rate was much higher among the individual peasants than among the members of the collective farms during the famine. This is because the former were subjected to more ruthless requisitions and did not get the benefit of the tardy and inadequate relief measures which were organized for the collective farms.

Moreover, several changes in Soviet agrarian legislation and in the regulations governing collective farms made the new system somewhat more tolerable to the peasants. A fixed levy in kind was substituted for the former system of arbitrary and irregular requisitions. This gave the peasants some incentive to improve their output, whereas formerly they had felt that whatever they might raise would be taken away from them.

The organization of the collective farms, very sketchy and uncertain in the beginning, was settled by more definite rules. The right of the peasant in the collective farm to keep his own garden and raise his own chickens, pigs and domestic animals was affirmed.

A serious difficulty of collective farming in its early stages was that the old forms of farming were destroyed before there was sufficient provision for the new, in the shape of trained management and machinery. The horses were killed off or discarded before they could be adequately replaced by tractors. But with the passing of time the new Soviet factories turned out more and better tractors and the younger peasants became better acquainted with modern machinery.

In the beginning the peasant in the collective farm missed the stimulus of depending on the results of his own labor. Because he suspected that his neighbor might be loafing, he felt an impulse to loaf himself. But a graded system of wage payments, in money and in kind, proportioned to the amount and quality of work performed, overcome this handicap to some extent.

So, while the period from 1929 until 1933 was marked by a severe decline in the productivity of Ukrainian agriculture, with a great diminution in the herds and flocks and a desolate neglect of the normally fertile fields, the years from

1933 until the outbreak of the war with Germany witnessed a process of recovery, just as the country during the twenties had outlived the worst features of the bleak and hungry years of war communism.

The political casualty rate, however, remained very high. For reasons which can never be fully cleared up until an authoritative history of the tremendous purge of the Communist ranks during the thirties is written, the men who showed the greatest energy in stamping out all opposition to Stalin's rule often fell victims to the purge themselves. This was the case with Postishev, Stalin's principal lieutenant in the Ukraine from 1933 until 1935, with Kossior, who at the same time occupied the strategic post of Secretary of the Communist Party in the Ukraine. The well-known Ukrainian "old Bolsheviks," Chubar, who for years was Prime Minister, and Petrovsky, who had seemed as much of a fixture in the office of President of the Ukraine as Kalinin has been in Russia, were liquidated for reasons that were never made clear.

A later Prime Minister, Lubchenko, after boasting once that Ukrainian nationalism had been eliminated by the firm policy of the Communist Party, was apparently suspected of nationalism himself. He committed suicide, rather than face a trial in which the result was predetermined. Still another Prime Minister, Bondarenko, vanished mysteriously from the political scene and is presumably dead or in exile. Apparently a leading figure in the direction of Communist policy in the Ukraine in recent years had been a Russian named Khrushchev, a member of the Political Bureau, Stalin's circle of inner counselors.

The frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine were extended by the annexation of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina after the Soviet intervention in Poland in 1939. But this expansion was of brief duration. The Ukraine bore the brunt of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Whereas the Tsarist Army in the last war kept the Ukraine free from foreign occupation until after the Revolution, the German armored divisions, after being held up for a time west of Kiev, achieved a break through on a wide front.

The veteran partisan cavalry leader of the Civil War, Semyon Budenny, had been placed in command of the Ukrainian front. He proved deficient in necessary military capacity. Kiev was enveloped and captured in September, 1941, and during October and November the German advance rolled on across the steppes of the Ukraine until almost all the territory of the Republic, except for a corner of the Donets Basin, was occupied.

A counteroffensive, launched by Marshal Timoshenko against Kharkiv, industrial metropolis of the Eastern Ukraine, in the spring of 1942 miscarried. For a time the German armies advanced still further, to the foothills of the Caucasus and the Volga amid the ruins of Stalingrad. But Stalingrad turned

into a decisive German defeat. By February, 1943, the Soviet armies had retaken Kharkiv and were aiming at a deeper penetration of the Ukraine. This was not successful and a German counterdrive led to the reoccupation of Kharkiv.

The military downfall of the German occupation in the Ukraine took place as a result of the prolonged advance of the Soviet armies which began in the summer of 1943 and continued, with occasional interruptions, but without major reverses, until the spring of 1944. With the capture of Odessa in April, 1944, the expulsion of the German armies from the Ukraine was completed and the theater of war on the southern sections of the Eastern Front shifted to Rumania and Bukovina and Galicia, the familiar battlegrounds of World War I.

In view of the many acts of oppression and terrorism which characterized the Soviet regime in the Ukraine it may seem surprising that the Ukrainians showed such an uncompromising spirit of resistance to the German invaders. Several facts must be borne in mind in this connection.

Eight years elapsed between the appalling famine of 1932-33 and the German invasion. While the Ukraine, by Western standards, was far from a prosperous country in 1941, there had been enough improvement in material conditions to remove the spirit of apathetic despair which would have prevailed, in all probability, if the country had been attacked in 1932 or 1933.

The Germans behaved with the utmost political stupidity. Instead of encouraging the people to set up a non-Communist Ukrainian civil administration they clamped down a ruthless military regime, gave no encouragement at all to Ukrainian nationalists and even partitioned the country, handing over the town of Odessa and a strip of territory east of the Dniester to Rumanian administration.

Opportunities for first-hand observation of the Ukraine in the flames of the Soviet-German War by foreign military observers and correspondents have been few and brief. A cloud of uncertainty hangs over many details of the war and of the attitude of the Ukrainian civilian population.

In the light of past events, however, one may feel sure that the Ukrainians fought courageously for their homes, whether in regular units or in guerrilla bands. One may also feel sure that the Ukrainian problem in the future will be satisfactorily solved only if Communist dictatorship gives way to genuine democracy and if the full liberty of which the Ukrainian poets wrote, and for which so many Ukrainians died, becomes a reality.

CHAPTER VI

THE WESTERN UKRAINIANS

THE Soviet regime, with its headquarters in Moscow, finally crushed the attempts to set up an independent Ukrainian state. Simultaneously Poland was suppressing the nationalist aspirations of the Western Ukrainians and incorporating Eastern Galicia and other regions where the Ukrainians constituted a majority or a substantial minority of the population within the borders of the reconstituted Poland.

Poland possessed more influence in the councils of the Allied powers than the representatives of the Ukrainian nationalist regimes. The efforts of the great powers to obtain autonomy for the Ukrainians in the Polish state were feeble and ineffective. The Allied Supreme Council on June 25, 1919, authorized the Poles to occupy Eastern Galicia up to the line of the river Zbruch, the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia, with the provision that local autonomy and political and religious freedom be granted to the inhabitants.

A proposal by the Supreme Council in November that Poland should administer Eastern Galicia as a mandate for twenty-five years, with a plebiscite to be held at the end of that period, was rejected by Poland. The Allied powers were considerably handicapped in their discussion of the future of Eastern Europe because of uncertainty as to what kind of Russia would emerge after the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War. Under the circumstances matters were permitted to drift, with little insistent or positive intervention.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, Soviet Russia renounced claim to territory west of the line Minsk-Polotsk and the Soviet Ukrainian Republic renounced the land to the west of the line Staro-Konstantinov-Kamenets-Podolsk. There was consequently a division of the Ukrainian people, several million remaining on the Polish side of the frontier.

For a time the Allied powers refused to recognize this disposition of the question of Galicia. But there was no desire to challenge the Polish occupation by armed force. The situation was complicated, even for the Western Ukrainians themselves, because the larger part of the Ukrainian people had fallen under Soviet rule. A genuinely independent Ukraine would have been an irresistible magnet to the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. But many of the latter, even

while they keenly resented Polish oppression and discrimination, would have been averse to absorption into a Soviet Ukraine that was actually ruled from Moscow and that was avowedly hostile to religion and to private property.

The Polish Parliament passed a law in the autumn of 1922, establishing limited autonomy for the provinces of L'viv, Ternopil and Stanislaviw, and this paved the way for the recognition of Poland's possession of Eastern Galicia by the Conference of Ambassadors on March 14, 1923, despite the protests of Ukrainian nationalist groups. A large protest meeting against this decision was held by the Ukrainians in L'viv. As Raymond Leslie Buell wrote on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War:¹

Poland thus obtained title to this territory without having to give anything more than a moral pledge in favor of autonomy. No steps have been taken to carry out the unilateral promises made in the autonomy law of September, 1922, and Eastern Galicia is still governed from Warsaw.

Historically the relation between the Poles and Ukrainians had never been cordial. The new Polish state would have strengthened its position if it had adopted a federal, rather than a centralized form of administration, with far-reaching local self-government for predominantly Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian regions.

Unfortunately Polish policy took a diametrically opposite turn. Apprehensive about the loyalty of the eastern border regions, the Polish authorities instituted a severe police regime and also planted colonies of Polish ex-soldiers in the Ukrainian borderlands. There was also an effort to denationalize the Ukrainians by substituting for the former Ukrainian schools others that were nominally bilingual, but which actually gave the preference to the Polish language and by bringing a good deal of pressure on the people of the eastern provinces to speak Polish and to regard themselves as Poles.

The Ukrainian reaction to Polish rule assumed two forms. The largest political grouping among the Western Ukrainians was the Undo (Ukrainian National Democratic Union), which was headed by Dmytro Levitsky. It advocated the policy of obtaining maximum rights for the Ukrainians within the Polish state, and at the same time stressed the right of all Ukrainians to unite themselves in a sovereign and democratic Ukraine within Ukrainian ethnographic boundaries. The Soviet Government regarded this party as a dangerous enemy. One of the reasons Stalin has been insistent on annexing Poland's former eastern provinces is his desire to bring all the Ukrainians under his rule and stamp out all traces of non-Communist Ukrainian nationalism.

¹ "Poland: Key to Europe," p. 274.

For several years the Ukrainians boycotted elections to the Polish Parliament. But the Undo entered the political field in 1928 and elected thirty-four deputies to the Sejm, or parliament. Through newspapers, village libraries, cooperative organizations, the Undo tried to keep alive the national consciousness of the Ukrainians and to promote the well-being of the village communities. The most influential newspaper of this group was *Dilo*, "Action." The Undo favored a policy of reconciliation with Poland. A left-wing element among Ukrainians was under Communist influence; the Soviet regime, through its secret agents abroad, naturally tried to exploit for its own purposes such an element of weakness in the Polish state as the Ukrainian nationalist dissatisfaction.

Still another important current in the Ukrainian nationalist movement was represented by the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), which adopted a position of intransigent, uncompromising assertion of the right of the Ukrainian people to be organized in an independent national state. It was strongly anti-Polish and created a number of illegal groups, armed so far as possible, in Galicia. Following the tradition of the former Russian revolutionaries, the OUN organized attacks on individual Polish officials who were held responsible for oppressive acts of the Government.

Some brutal reprisals were inflicted pretty indiscriminately on the Ukrainian population by Polish troops and police, especially in the autumn of 1930. Libraries and cooperatives were destroyed, Boy Scout organizations with Ukrainian membership were dissolved, and Ukrainian high schools were closed. This "pacification," as it was officially euphemistically termed, was quite widely reported in the American press at that time.

The leading figure in the OUN and perhaps the most militant figure in the Ukrainian nationalist movement after the murder of Petlura was Colonel Evhen Konovalets. He had been an officer in the Austrian Army and was a prominent personality during the days of the Directory. The uncompromising program of Konovalets could have stood a chance of realization only in the event of a general European war, in which all the powers which had been oppressing the Ukrainians would go down. Konovalets was anti-Soviet, just as he was anti-Polish. He met his death in rather spectacular fashion when a Soviet agent in a café in Rotterdam handed him a bomb in the form of a cigarette-case. The bomb exploded with fatal effect. This occurred in 1938.

An English student of East European affairs summarizes the grievances of the Ukrainians under Polish rule in the years before the outbreak of the Second World War as follows:²

² Lancelot Lawton in "East Europe and Contemporary Russia," Vol. 3, No. 1.

The Ukrainians complain that their population, which they say amounts to six millions, is deliberately under-estimated, and that to facilitate this under-estimation large sections are wrongfully named Ruthenians. They complain that they have no University of their own in Lviv, that they are only allowed a small percentage of students at the Polish Universities, and that, on completing their education, these students cannot find any occupation outside business and petty trade. They complain that the number of schools at which Ukrainian as well as Polish is taught is continually being decreased. They complain that estates are being broken up in Ukrainian territory and distributed to Poles, not to Ukrainians, in other words Poles are systematically colonizing the Western Ukraine. They complain that their press is heavily censored and that organizations having no other object than the promotion of sport are frequently dissolved. They complain that local officials are a law unto themselves and that there is no justice for a Ukrainian, a fact which is well known to the Polish population, and which causes it to treat the Ukrainians with but scant respect. They complain that several thousands of Ukrainians are in prisons or in camps, and that arrested Ukrainians are kept in jail for a long time without any charge being preferred against them, while the police hunt for evidence.

Subjected to repression of different kinds in the Soviet Union and in Poland, leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist movement dispersed in various European capitals. Prague was a hospitable center and a number of Ukrainian cultural organizations were established there, the Free University, the Historical and Philological Society, the Museum of the Ukraine's Struggle for Liberation.

The Ukrainian National Republic, formed in Kiev in 1918, maintained a formal existence abroad in the form of a government-in-exile, headed first by Petlura, then by Andrew Levitsky. The Government of Western Ukraine, originally headed by Petrushevich, moved from Ukraine to Vienna, then to Prague, later to Berlin.

An area of about 10,000 square miles, included in Bessarabia and Bukovina, inhabited by over a million Ukrainians, was incorporated in Rumania. Here again the Ukrainians were subjected to persecution and discrimination. According to "*Dilo*," the leading Undo newspaper in Lviw, "The Ukrainians under Rumanian rule have not a single elementary, secondary or technical school, and private schools are not allowed. This applies also to reading-halls and cooperative societies. No Ukrainians are allowed in the civil service, and Rumanian enterprises import Rumanian labor rather than employ local Ukrainians."

Still another segment of the Ukrainian people is to be found in the remote mountains of eastern Czechoslovakia, in the region which has been variously called Podkarpatska Ruś and Carpatho-Ukraine. Several hundred thousand mountaineers have preserved traces of Ukrainian culture and folklore, including songs about legendary Ukrainian heroes, such as Dowbush, the Ukrainian Robin Hood,

While Czech methods of rule were less brutal than Polish and Rumanian, the mountaineers of Carpatho-Ukraine remained neglected and were given comparatively little opportunity for cultural advancement. The Czech authorities at times pursued a policy of playing off Russian against Ukrainian influences in this region. The region was reduced to the status of a province and given the name of Sub-Carpathian Ruś in 1928. Czechoslovakia concluded a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935. This may have involved a tacit understanding that Ukrainian aspirations in Carpatho-Ukraine should be discouraged.

The rise in the military power and aggressiveness of Nazi Germany threw the politics of Eastern Europe into a ferment. Boundaries began to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. The little Ukrainian outpost in the foothills of the Carpathians acquired sudden political importance in 1938-39. It was granted autonomy within the boundaries of the diminished Czechoslovak state after the Munich settlement. A Ukrainian nationalist cabinet, headed by Monsignor Augustin Voloshyn, took office on October 26.

The Carpatho-Ukrainians were severely disappointed when the little country was cut up by a decision of German and Italian representatives, meeting in Vienna to arbitrate differences between Czechoslovakia and its neighbors. A considerable part of its territory, with the capital, Uzhorod, was handed over to Hungary. However, Carpatho-Ukraine continued to exist in a loose federative relationship with what remained of Czechoslovakia, with its capital at Hust.

As the one bit of Ukrainian territory that was genuinely free, it attracted attention out of proportion to its size, population and natural resources. The more active figures in the Ukrainian nationalist movement went to Hust. The official language of the region became Ukrainian, with Hungarian and Jewish as minority languages. A small Ukrainian army was formed, with the romantic name of the Zaporozhian Sich Sharpshooters. There were hopes that the Carpatho-Ukraine might play the role of Piedmont in Italy, as the center from which the unification of the larger Ukrainian regions under Soviet and Polish rule might be undertaken.

When the Germans marched into Prague in March, 1939, and the Czechoslovak state completely dissolved, Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed its independence under the presidency of Monsignor Voloshyn. But Hungarian troops, with the approval of Germany and Italy, marched into the country, overcame a short but gallant resistance by the Sich Sharpshooters and carried out a forcible annexation of the territory by Hungary. Voloshyn and his Cabinet fled to Rumania.

The Carpatho-Ukrainians had been used as a pawn in the larger game of Nazi power politics. In the beginning Hitler favored the creation of this small autonomous Ukrainian state as a potential threat both to Poland and to the Soviet Union. But at the time of the complete break-up of Czechoslovakia the Nazi dictator changed his mind, most probably because he had already decided to come to the temporary agreement with Stalin that found expression in the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939. So Carpatho-Ukraine was thrown to the wolves. This incident might well have been a warning to Ukrainian nationalists to place no reliance on German aid in realizing the goal of national independence.

Monsignor Voloshyn himself, as quoted in the Yugoslav press,³ had some interesting revelations to make after the collapse of his regime. In the first half of March, on the eve of the German occupation of Prague, Hungary proposed that Carpatho-Ukraine should join Hungary with rights of self-government similar to those of Croatia and Slovenia under the Austro-Hungarian rule.

Voloshyn communicated this offer, which he personally favored, to Berlin, but received a reply to the effect that Germany did not wish to see a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. In view of this statement of the German attitude Voloshyn proclaimed the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine on March 14 and decided to resist the Hungarian invasion, although he knew that his own forces were inadequate for prolonged resistance. After the declaration of independence he was informed, to quote his own words, "that we were indispensable to the Reich for the creation of a Greater Ukraine, the formation of which would begin by the annexation of the Polish Ukrainian provinces, to be followed by that of the whole of the Russian Ukraine."

But when the Hungarian invasion began and Voloshyn appealed to Berlin for military aid he received a very different answer. He was told that "everything has changed" and was advised to give up the struggle. This little known incident perhaps gives a clue to the date when Hitler and Stalin reached a preliminary understanding. This theory receives further support from the tone of the speeches delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held at this same time, in March, 1939.

Stalin ridiculed what he described as the failure of French and British efforts to incite Germany against the Soviet Union and asserted that Russia would be no one's catspaw. D. Z. Manuilsky, a leading Soviet representative in the Executive Committee of the Communist International, attacked England in

³ See W. E. D. Allen, "The Ukraine," pp. 388, 389.

still plainer terms on the same occasion. He attributed to "the reactionary British bourgeoisie" a scheme to sacrifice the small nations of Southeastern Europe to Germany and to direct Germany eastward against the Soviet Union.

These statements by Stalin and Manuïlsky might well have been the sequel to the establishment of satisfactory contacts with Berlin. One of the conditions of such contacts was probably an agreement as to the partition of Poland and the leaving of the great majority of the Ukrainians to Soviet rule.

Since the spring of 1939 Carpatho-Ukraine has been under Hungarian rule. It has been renamed Uhro-Ruś. By April, 1944, the Red Army, under the command of Marshal Zhukov, was reported on the frontier of this region, which, because of its rugged, mountainous terrain, is well adapted to defense. The Soviet treaty with the Czechoslovak National Committee, headed by Dr. Benés, provides for the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak state within its pre-Munich frontiers.

The political ferment that led to the emergence and eclipse of Carpatho-Ukraine was only the prelude to much more spectacular developments, which affected the fate of the Ukrainian people directly and substantially. The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, was soon followed by a Soviet occupation of the eastern regions which had been under Polish sovereignty. Lwiw, main center of Eastern Galicia, was at first occupied by the Germans. But, apparently as a result of a previous agreement, the German troops withdrew from Lwiw and the territory of the Polish state was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union in such a manner as to leave the great majority of the Ukrainians on the Soviet side of the boundary. The Soviet-German line of demarcation followed to some extent the so-called Curzon Line, which had been proposed as an armistice demarcation line by the Supreme Allied Council in 1919.

Elections were held in the Western Ukraine after the Soviet occupation, with the usual Communist technique of allowing no voice whatever to opposition groups. A hand-picked "provisional popular assembly," made up of Communists and of individuals who were regarded as politically reliable by the Communists, voted on October 27 for union with the Soviet Ukraine. A law published in Moscow on November 1 confirmed this union. The Soviet official position since that time has been that the Western Ukraine constitutes an integral part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Actually there has been no opportunity for the people of that region to express their desires freely. Just as in the Soviet Ukraine, freedom of election, speech and press is non-existent. Even under the oppressive Polish rule Ukrainian nationalist delegates could sit in the Diet at Warsaw. Under Soviet rule no such representation of Ukrainian non-Communist opinion is possible.

The boundaries of the Soviet Ukraine were further enlarged in the summer of 1940, when the Soviet Government compelled Rumania to evacuate Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. By a decree of August 2, 1940, Northern Bukovina and the northern part of Bessarabia were absorbed into the Soviet Ukraine. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941, led to a swift overrunning of Eastern Galicia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina.

Any hopes that might have been placed in German aid in the establishment of an independent Ukraine were swiftly disillusioned. The Germans introduced a regime of partition and of military occupation. Rumania not only received back Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but a strip of Ukrainian territory to the east of the Dniester River, including the port of Odessa.

There is little accurate knowledge of what occurred in the Western Ukraine during the period of Soviet occupation, still less of the developments when the Germans took over this region. No independent foreign correspondents were admitted under either regime. There is, however, some evidence to show that the Western Ukraine under Soviet military occupation was not the paradise for the Ukrainian people which was depicted by Communist propagandists.

One of the most convincing bits of evidence, a miniature plebiscite, in fact, was the result of the Soviet-German agreement that Germans and people of German origin in Soviet Poland could return to Germany, while Ukrainians and Belorussians in the German occupied part of Poland could opt for the Soviet Union. As John Scott, an American correspondent, writes:⁴

The exchange of populations was carried out systematically, the most remarkable thing being that while nearly one hundred thousand Germans elected to go back to Germany from Western Ukraine and Belorussia, only some six thousand Ukrainians and Belorussians came back to Russia.

The same correspondent, who was in Russia at the time of the occupation of the Western Ukraine, reports the systematic pillaging of the country for the benefit of the Soviet Union, which from the time of its establishment has been chronically short of foodstuffs and manufactured goods:⁵

Considerably more enthusiasm for foreign conquests was noticed when the Red Army began coming back from "the front" with trunkloads of all kinds of manufactured goods bought at low prices in Poland. . . .

As soon as the Red Army crossed the border the Russian rouble was set up in competition with the zloty at one rouble to one zloty. This move involved great benefit to the Russians, as the buying power of the zloty was roughly ten times that

⁴ "The Duel for Europe," p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 52.

of the rouble. A million Red Army soldiers and officers came into Poland with their pockets full of roubles and bought everything they could get their hands on at about one-tenth the price they would have had to pay in Moscow.

On the heels of the incoming Red Army whole troops of the singers, actors, and political workers went into the new districts. They put on performances from Vilno to Bukovina. They also bought whole carloads of fancy foods and merchandise, some of which they ate or wore, but a great deal of which was sold at a handsome profit in the commission stores in Moscow and other old cities in the Soviet Union where such articles were scarce. Alexei Tolstoi, writer and literary secretary to Stalin, got into trouble with the Kremlin by trying to bring two carloads of acquisitions, including a mosaic, from Lvov (Lviv) to his estate near Moscow.

So, in the Western Ukraine, as in the larger part of the country which was under Soviet rule, the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for liberty and material well-being were not realized. Indeed the fate of the Ukrainians in Eastern Europe was harder after the First World War than it was when they were divided between the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. They suffered more from repression and discrimination under Polish and Rumanian rule than under Austrian sovereignty.

Official Soviet population figures tell a grim and unmistakable story of the sufferings of the Ukraine under Soviet rule. About 30,000,000 people lived in the territory of the Soviet Ukraine, within its pre-1939 frontiers, in 1917. The Soviet census of January 1, 1933, reported a population of 31,901,000 for the Ukraine.⁶ And the latest Soviet census, of 1939, gives 30,960,221 as the population of the Ukraine. So it appears that, for a period of over twenty years, there was a negligible increase of population, while during the thirties there was an actual decrease. There could be no more eloquent proof of the human losses inflicted by civil war, two great famines (in 1921-22 and 1932-33), and the mass deportations of so-called kulaks. Under normal conditions there would have been an increase of at least thirty per cent in a prolific peasant country, like the Ukraine, during a period of twenty-two years. The population should have been about 40,000,000, not about 31,000,000, as recorded in the last Soviet census. This would suggest that the abnormal losses of the Ukraine through death and deportation (over and above the normal death rate) must have been little short of ten million.

The happiest Ukrainians are those who have found a new home on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in the United States and Canada. Here, although they faced the uphill struggle of newcomers, they found conditions of political liberty of which their great poet, Taras Shevchenko, had dreamed. The Ukrain-

⁶ See W. E. D. Allen, "The Ukraine," p. 374.

ians in North America have been able to practice their religion and to develop their cultural institutions free from persecution and discrimination.

Loyal citizens of their new countries, they have retained a keen interest in their native land. They will hope that after the end of this war the Ukrainian people will receive more justice than it obtained after the First World War and that the principles of self-determination, of the right of the Ukrainians to govern themselves and to associate as they may choose on a basis of freedom and equality with other peoples of Eastern Europe, will be respected. If this is not the case, the Ukraine will remain a source of discontent and of possible war in Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER VII

THE UKRAINE AND THE FUTURE

I HAVE described the chain of historical vicissitudes that prevented the Ukrainians, the most numerous racial group in Eastern Europe, after the Great Russians, from achieving the status of an independent nation. What are the future prospects for Ukrainian freedom? This question is closely bound up with a larger issue: whether the evolution in that part of the world will be toward liberty, self-determination and peace, or whether a despotic militarist dictatorship, with power centered in Moscow, will prove in the future as great a danger to the freedom of small nations and to the peace and stability of Europe as Nazi Germany was in the past.

The Ukraine, like all the countries of Eastern Europe, has experienced terrible sufferings and has been profoundly shaken up as a result of two world wars. There were some hostilities on Ukrainian soil during the First World War; but many Ukrainians were killed or captured as soldiers in the army of the Tsar. And the Ukraine was one of the most far flung battle fronts of the Russian Civil War. Towns were taken and retaken; Kiev alone experienced more than a dozen changes of administration.

Still more devastating was the impact of the Second World War. During the first few months of fighting the Germans overran much the greatest part of the Ukraine, which they systematically pillaged and exploited for their military needs. The prolonged Soviet offensive that began in the summer of 1943 led to the retreat of the Germans from practically all of the country.

The Soviet retreat in 1941 and the German retreat in 1943-44 were both grim "scorched earth" affairs. Industrial plants and installations were blown up. Factory and farm machinery, so far as possible, was removed. Especially pitiful was the fate of cities like Kharkiv and some of the towns in the great coal center of the Donets Basin, which changed hands several times before the Soviet armies reoccupied them definitely.

* Large numbers of Ukrainians were removed from their country—some were sent beyond the Urals by the Russians, others were carried off to Germany or Poland. The tremendous clash between two such powerful military machines as

the German and the Soviet was more destructive than the irregular fighting of the period 1918-21, when there was no air bombing and little use of heavy artillery. As a result of the military technique of the twentieth century the Ukraine has been desolated on a scale comparable with the fiercest periods of struggle in that blood-soaked "borderland" in the seventeenth century, when Poles and Tartars, Turks and Russians, sometimes fought over its steppes.

The tasks of elementary reconstruction will be vast. Some cities and towns will have to be rebuilt almost from the ground up. It will probably be years after the end of the war before all the deported refugees can return to their homes; many of these will probably have succumbed to their privations. Both because of the courage that its people have shown and because of the extent of its suffering and need the Ukraine will deserve a high priority in any international reconstruction work inaugurated by the United Nations.

But the Ukrainian people, which has survived so many hard blows in the past, will rise again. The cities and towns will fill up, the fields will be cultivated again. The process of recovery that could be observed during the New Economic Policy, when the civil war had ceased and the unwise economic experiments of "war communism" had been abandoned, will take place again, even though some of the wounds in the body of the Ukraine will be deeper and may require more time to heal.

It is immensely important not only for the Ukrainians themselves, but for the future of peace and collective security in Europe how much genuine freedom this rich but tormented land will possess in the future. The aftermath of the First World War, with the dissolution of the Russian, German, and Austrian empires, aroused hopes that the old dream of an independent united Ukraine might be realized. These hopes were not realized. The Ukrainian People's Republic, popular as it was with the masses of the Ukrainian peasants and with the patriotic intelligentsia, fell before the blows of stronger and better organized military forces.

Most of the Ukrainians remained in the Soviet Ukraine. A few million in Eastern Galicia were included within the frontiers of Poland. There were smaller Ukrainian minorities in Bukovina, assigned to Rumania after the war, and in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia.

It cannot be said that either Soviet rule or Polish rule was satisfactory from the Ukrainian nationalist standpoint. In the matter of cultural autonomy, to be sure, the Soviet record was better than either the Tsarist or the Polish. The Ukrainians were encouraged to use their own language in courts, schools, newspapers, public business. Russians who were sent to the Ukraine as Soviet or Party officials were required to learn the Ukrainian language.

But political liberty was denied to the Ukrainians, as to the other peoples of the Soviet Union, including the Russians, under the streamlined dictatorship of the Communist Party. Communist Party leadership was centralized in Moscow. Again and again the highest officials of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, Chubar, Petrovsky, Lubchenko, Bondarenko, Shumsky, disappeared from office not because of any free vote of the Ukrainian people, but because of an arbitrary order of the all-powerful Soviet political police.

This is not freedom. This is not federative autonomy on the basis of equality. Ukrainian high officials were summarily removed from office, driven to commit suicide (in the case of Lubchenko), and probably put to death by order of a highly centralized political police, with headquarters in Moscow. There has been no recorded instance when a Ukrainian political police has been able to deal in this way with objectionable officials in Moscow.

It may, of course, be argued that Ukrainians in the Soviet Union are not singled out for special discrimination because of their language and nationality. There may be proportionately just as many Russians, or Georgians, or Finns, or Uzbeks who have been executed or sent to concentration camps without any kind of open trial. If Ukrainians are limited in what they may write or say publicly by a rigid censorship and well-justified fear of an ever watchful political police, this same condition prevails for all the other peoples of the Soviet Union, from Minsk to Vladivostok and from Archangel to Erivan.

But common servitude is not a status to which liberty-loving Ukrainians, in their own country or abroad, will ever be reconciled. What they want is common freedom with all the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Let this condition of full unconditional introduction of respect for personal and civil liberties and of genuine implementation of free elections be fulfilled and the Ukrainian national problem will lose most of its urgency.

Ukrainians are not isolationists. They do not imagine that their country, which has no very clear and definite boundaries to the north and to the east, would benefit by adopting a policy of hermitlike seclusion. They know that it is advantageous for them, so long as the principle of equality of treatment is strictly maintained, to share with the peoples of the Soviet Union a common railway and postal system and a variety of intimate trade and cultural contacts, free from tariff barriers. It would be all the better, from the Ukrainian standpoint, if this freedom of trade and freedom of cultural intercourse could be extended to include all the other countries of Eastern Europe and, indeed, of the whole world.

But "ethnic democracy," to use the phrase of Vice-President Wallace, while it is certainly an excellent thing in itself, is not enough to insure a happy

life for national groups. When a Ukrainian family was starving to death in that terrible winter and spring of 1932-33 it was no great consolation to be able to gasp out their last words in Ukrainian. When those Ukrainian peasants, men, women and children, who were unfortunate enough to be labeled as kulaks were herded into freight cars like cattle and sent off to what often proved to be the living death of forced labor under inhuman conditions they probably derived little comfort from learning that this ruthless policy of "liquidating the kulaks as a class" was applied with equal cruelty to Russians and to many of the Asiatic peoples of the Soviet Union.

It has become fashionable to sneer at political democracy. This is true not only of avowed communists and fascists, but also of some individuals who would perhaps like to consider themselves advanced liberals. It seems to me, however, that there is no more impressive lesson of recent history than the pragmatic value of political and civil liberties.

These two tragic episodes in recent Ukrainian history, the liquidation of the kulaks and the famine of 1932-33, simply could not have occurred in a country where elections were free, where there were independent courts and where people were able without fear of repression to express the most elementary feelings of humanity. If the Western democracies after the war will face the difficult problem of grafting more economic security on to their free political institutions the great Eurasian federation of peoples included in the Soviet Union will face at least an equally urgent problem in supplementing its publicly owned and operated economic system with adequate guaranties for the individual against arbitrary acts of the state.

The course of the war at the present time suggests that the fate of the Ukrainian people will be linked with that of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union. Stalin has insisted on the retention of all the territory he annexed in 1939 and 1940, including Eastern Galicia, with its large Ukrainian population, and Northern Bukovina. The only compact Ukrainian group which will apparently be left out of the Soviet Union, as Stalin envisages it after the war, will be in eastern Czechoslovakia and the eastern strip of Poland.

There remains the bare possibility that, as a result of an unforeseen turn of events, Poland may figure in the Ukrainian future. Should this be the case, should Eastern Galicia remain part of a future Polish state, deep changes in forms and methods of administration would be necessary in order to remove justified Ukrainian grievances.

There was at no time in the Western Ukraine, or Eastern Galicia, a catastrophe comparable with the famine in the Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33. Nor did

the Polish "pacification" of the Ukrainian regions, brutal and revolting as it was, break up and destroy so many human existences as the liquidation of the kulaks on the other side of the border. Poland was never so totalitarian in its political organization as the Soviet Union. Ukrainian non-Communist nationalists, completely outlawed and suppressed in the Soviet Ukraine, were able to elect members of parliament and to publish newspapers in Poland.

But, as has already been shown, the Polish administration in Eastern Galicia, where there was a Ukrainian majority in the population, pursued an irritating and shortsighted policy of discriminating against the Ukrainians on a basis of nationality and culture, in matters of education and religion. This weakened, instead of strengthening, the unity and stability of the Polish state and played into the hands of Soviet Communist agents, although many features of communism, as it worked out across the border, were distinctly alien to the great majority of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia.

Marshal Josef Pilsudski, one of the principal builders of modern Poland, was in theory a federalist. His long experience as a nationalist and a social revolutionary made him distrustful of what he regarded as the centralized absolutism of Moscow, whether the head of the Russian state was a Tsar or a Communist dictator.

Pilsudski dreamed of a federation of all, or most of the non-Russian and non-German peoples who live in the wide area between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This scheme failed, largely because Poland was not strong enough to take the lead in such a sweeping revision of the map of Eastern Europe. Moreover, Poland's experiences with Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Czechs revealed a lack of flexibility and give-and-take spirit which would be necessary for the successful functioning of a federation. The Polish case for an unconditional restoration of the 1939 eastern frontier would have been strengthened if the Polish Government-in-exile had issued a specific plan for reorganizing the administrative organization of Poland along federal lines, with wide self-government for the regions in which there are Ukrainian and White Russian majorities.

Neither the placing of almost all Ukrainians under centralized rule from Moscow nor the maintenance without change of the pre-1939 Polish administrative regime in Eastern Galicia would be a just and satisfactory program for the Ukrainian future. The Ukrainians who live in Galicia certainly have a right to be consulted, and by a free plebiscite, without foreign military occupation, before the fate of this region is decided. If they should receive this means of expression, the balance of probability is that they would, in the majority, vote

neither for unconditional annexation by the Soviet Union nor for the reconstitution of the former Polish administration, but rather for some arrangement under which their interests would be better safeguarded.

Will the new Soviet constitutional change, granting to each constituent republic control over foreign relations and military affairs, meet the needs of the Ukrainian case? Only time can give the answer to this question, because everything depends on how seriously and honestly this change will be implemented.

Genuine federative autonomy, in which groups of peoples would get the benefit of free trade, mass production and unified currency and transportation systems over wide areas of territory while retaining the fullest measure of cultural self-expression and full control of local administrative questions would be a hopeful formula not only for the Soviet Union, but for the whole of Europe. If the tormented old continent is to recover from the fearful shocks of the present war a wide application of the federal principle seems essential. One can easily think of European regions, the Balkans, for instance, and Scandinavia, where federation seems natural and logical. If there is ever to be a United States of Europe it will probably take the form of an association of federations.

If the Soviet Republics were to receive, in addition to the cultural autonomy which they have always possessed, actual control of their armed forces and of their foreign policies this would represent a long step toward political and psychological demobilization. The peoples of Eastern Europe would breathe more freely in the neighborhood of what now seems to be a formidable colossus of totalitarian power.

Unfortunately the parallel announcement that could alone have made such a far-reaching grant of local self-government a reality has not been forthcoming. This would have been the announcement of the self-liquidation of the one-party dictatorial system for the entire Soviet Union.

The whole question of the validity on the irrelevance of the Soviet constitutional change revolves around the maintenance or the abandonment of this one-party dictatorship. Few Americans understand clearly how this system works, because it is entirely contrary to anything known in American national political experience. Lenin summed up the idea in a nutshell when he said there could be any number of parties in the Soviet Union, but on one condition: that the Communist Party be in power and all the other parties, in jail. In this respect, at least, Stalin has been a faithful executor of Lenin's will.

Now under this system where a single party possesses a monopoly of power, where no opposition political organization is permitted, where the formation of

dissident groups within the single party is ruthlessly punished as "counter-revolution," all the elaborate constitutional arrangements in the Soviet Union are little more than window-dressing. The Communist Party "makes" the Soviet elections as it chooses. In the sole national election held under the new Soviet Constitution there was only one list of candidates, the list approved by the Communist Party. The same method, which gives no outlet for the political expression of critical sentiment, was used in the "elections" which preceded the admission of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the Soviet Union, which "ratified" the annexation of some forty per cent of the former territory of Poland to the Soviet Union.

It is a basic principle of the organization and discipline of the Communist Party that every member owes allegiance first of all to the ruling group in the Party, to the Central Committee, or, more accurately, to the Political Bureau, a smaller group of eleven members, Stalin and his closest associates, which passes on all important questions of policy. This makes for a highly centralized type of leadership, with little or no allowance for variations of feeling in the individual republics.

Under this system a Prime Minister or any other high official in the Ukraine or in any of the other constituent republics may be dismissed overnight and shifted to some other part of the country by a decision of the ruling group in Moscow. In the same way a Russian may be appointed in Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In that capacity he would possess virtually absolute power in making appointments to high posts in the administration of the Ukraine.

Now it is obvious that so long as the system of the one-party dictatorship remains, the formal shift in the constitutional set-up cannot be of very great practical importance. The establishment of nominally independent Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Military Affairs in the constituent republics will not appreciably affect the centralization of power in Moscow. For the men appointed to these posts, under the present system, will always be Communists. They will be subject to the strict discipline of the Party, which requires every member, under penalty of expulsion, to obey any order he receives from the directing authorities of the Party. Diplomatic notes in the future may be written in Ukrainian in Kiev, in Georgian in Tbilisi, in Armenian in Erivan. But their content will be dictated from Moscow.

Any Ukrainian or Georgian or Armenian Foreign Commissar or War Commissar who initiates policies which are distasteful to Stalin will not retain his post very long. He can be displaced at a moment's notice, under the present system, without any consultation of the popular will, by means of a simple order,

addressed to him as a Communist, instructing him to take up some new activity. Should he prove recalcitrant there is always the NKVD (Narkomvnudel), the third name for the formidable and unchanging Political Police (first known as the Cheka, then as the OGPU), with its wide and unlimited powers of arresting, banishing and shooting alleged counterrevolutionists.

No discussion of the significance of the recent Soviet constitutional change is realistic unless it proceeds on the knowledge that the central core of authority in the Soviet state is the one-party dictatorship. Lenin, the leader of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, was a vigorous and dogmatic controversialist. One of his favorite methods of argument was to declare: "He who does not understand this, does not understand anything." This Leninist phrase would apply accurately to persons who ignore the one-party dictatorship and its enormous centralizing implications in attempting to analyze the significance of the nominal extension of the autonomy of the constituent Soviet Republics.

It would, of course, be mistaken to assume that the Soviet system is incapable of change and modification. But convincing proof of such change or modification must be sought in concrete developments, rather than in formal alterations of the Soviet Constitution. When Soviet newspapers criticize Stalin's policies as freely as American newspapers criticize President Roosevelt's then, and only then, we may conclude that freedom of speech and press has been established in the Soviet Union. When foreign correspondents in Moscow report a lively contest, with two or more lists of candidates competing for election to the Soviet Congress and discussing without inhibition the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Government, then, and only then, can we assume that the peoples of the Soviet Union enjoy some genuine right of selecting their rulers.

Suggestions that the recent constitutional change in the Soviet Union has transformed the character of the Soviet federation into a loose association of independent peoples, comparable with the self-governing states of the British Empire (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire) are naïve and premature, to say the least. Only recently Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada publicly took issue with the contents of a speech delivered by Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States. When the Prime Minister of the Ukraine, or of some other Soviet Republic, expresses public disapproval of a statement by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington we may fairly assume that there has been some genuine measure of decentralization in the Soviet Union. Until there is some such development it will be wiser to proceed on the assumption that the essential political and economic controls are still lodged in Moscow.

As often happens in the case of formal constitutional changes, there is more in this extension of autonomy to the republics than meets the eye. The timing of the change is significant. It was announced when the Soviet armies had reached the frontiers of Latvia and Estonia and had driven a wedge into southeastern Poland, when the recovery of all the territory held by the Soviet Union before the German attack seemed to be a reasonable prospect in a fairly near future.

The Soviet authorities may well have reckoned that the legitimacy of the annexation of the formerly independent Baltic Republics would seem less arguable if they could point to the alleged freedom of the Soviet regimes in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to conduct their own foreign affairs. Moreover, the looser type of federative structure foreshadowed in the grant of control of military affairs and foreign relations, even though it will possess little substance in the original territory of the Soviet Union so long as the one-party dictatorship remains, may be a very serviceable instrument for the absorption into the Soviet sphere of influence of countries which Stalin does not propose to annex outright or to communize, at least in the immediate future.

Among such countries may be Poland, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, perhaps Greece, Hungary, and Austria, in Europe. It is not impossible that a Manchurian Soviet Republic and a Korean Soviet Republic may emerge in Asia, especially if the Red Army should deliver the decisive blows against Japan in that part of Asia.

Inasmuch as all the Ukrainians will be gathered within the future frontiers of the Soviet Union (the small group in eastern Czechoslovakia excepted) the Ukraine cannot expect as much autonomy in internal affairs as the Soviet Government will probably grant to countries which will fall within its sphere of influence, but outside its political borders.

So the future prospect of freedom for the Ukrainians, unless there should be an unforeseen turn in the course of the war, is inseparably bound up with the realization or non-realization of political and personal and civil liberties in Russia itself, and in the other republics of the Soviet Union. It would certainly be utopian to expect that such forces of nationalist discontent as may now exist in the Soviet Ukraine are strong enough to carry out any successful attempt at secession. And after the war there will be no foreign power in Eastern Europe strong enough to assist the Ukrainians in breaking away from Russia.

The reunion of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Bessarabia with their racial kinsmen who have lived under the Soviet regime for a quarter of a century will present some interesting and perhaps difficult problems of assimilation. While there are strong sentimental and cultural ties between these

two branches of the Ukrainian people, centuries of partition have subjected them to different influences. These influences have not been altogether counter-balanced by the common bonds of Ukrainian historical tradition and culture.

The Ukrainians of the west have been first under Polish, then under Austro-Hungarian, more recently again under Polish sovereignty. The Ukrainians of the East have been associated with Russia, first under the Tsarist regime, then under the Soviets. The Ukrainians of the West, for the most part, belong to the Uniate Church, which retains the Orthodox ritual but acknowledges the spiritual leadership of the Pope. The Ukrainians of the East are mostly of the Orthodox faith.

For two decades there was a wide gulf between the official attitudes toward religion and private property on the Soviet and Polish sides of the border. The main center of the Ukrainian nationalist movement has been in Galicia, rather than in Soviet Ukraine, for two reasons. The Polish administration, harsh as it was, did not completely blot out Ukrainian nationalist groups and parties, as all non-Communist political associations were blotted out, by the most ruthless methods, in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the youth in the Soviet Ukraine was heavily propagandized with Communist ideas and was drawn into the activity of the Young Pioneers, the Young Communists, and similar organizations. This was not the case among the Ukrainians in Poland.

During the twenty-one months of Soviet rule in the Western Ukraine in 1939-41 there was a systematic elimination, by arrest and deportation, of persons who enjoyed the confidence and respect of the people, priests, intellectuals, and especially men and women who had been active in the nationalist movement. It was the obvious and familiar Communist policy of destroying native non-Communist leadership as a preliminary step toward indoctrinating the masses with Communist ideas and preparing them for Soviet political and economic institutions. There has been a veil of obscurity over what has happened since the Germans took over this territory in the summer of 1941. It remains to be seen whether, in the future, the masses of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Bessarabia will prove to be clay in the hands of Soviet molders, or whether their stubborn adherence to nationalist and religious ideals will cause embarrassment to the Soviet rulers and perhaps affect their blood brothers, the Soviet Ukrainians.

It is not only Ukrainians in foreign countries who have reason to follow with interest and concern the fate of their homeland, which will most probably be reunited under Soviet rule after the end of the war. Genuine freedom for the Ukraine, genuine decentralization of authority and power in the Soviet Union will be favorable omens for the future peace of the world.

It is not the "common man" in any country who strives for war. The experience of the last quarter of a century has shown that aggression is the specialty of governments which are not subject to any effective popular control. So there is no reason to believe that the Russians, the Ukrainians, or any of the other peoples of the Soviet Union *would wish to go outside their own frontiers in wars of aggression*. One cannot be so confident in relation to the Soviet Government, so long as this government is a tight dictatorship of a small group of men, or rather of a single man, not subject to the controls of free press, free speech and free elections. The temptation to such a dictatorial government to embark on schemes of expansion in the disordered, impoverished Europe that will exist after the war may be very considerable.

What must be hoped, therefore, is that there will be relaxation all along the line in the Soviet dictatorship after the crisis of this terrific war has been passed, that there will be more freedom for the individual Soviet citizen in relation to the state, more freedom for the worker in state industry, for the peasant in the collective farm, and last, but not least, for the individual republic in relation to the central government.

The Ukrainian national problem is closely linked with the triumph of democracy and individual liberty in the Soviet Union as a whole. If and when this triumph is achieved, when the highest officials of the Ukraine, as of all the Soviet Republics, are responsible not to a small Communist clique in Moscow, but to the Ukrainian people, when the Ukraine is actually, not only nominally able to conclude treaties with foreign powers, to control its military forces, to form its trade and cultural contacts as it may choose, then much of the present apprehension about possible trends in Soviet policy will automatically disappear. The Soviet Union as a loose federation of equal peoples will seem much more friendly and much less formidable to its neighbors than the Soviet Union under a centralized dictatorship.

A free Ukraine, no longer subject to political dictation from Moscow, united with other peoples of the Soviet Union only by voluntary bonds of mutual economic interest, is an indispensable element in a free Europe and in a free world.

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