John Kolasky

THE SHATTERED ILLUSION

The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada



JOHN KOLASKY

The Shattered Illusion

The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada

PMA Books

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Kolasky, John, 1915–
The shattered illusion

Bibliography: p.
Includes index.

ISBN 0-88778-189-6 bd. ISBN 0-88778-190-X pa.

1. Communism – Canada. 2. Ukrainians in Canada.
I. Title.

HX103.K64 335.43'06'271 C79-094465-0

Design: Michael Solomon

Manufactured in Canada by Webcom Limited

PETER MARTIN ASSOCIATES LIMITED
280 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Canada M5S 1W1

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the many persons who assisted him by granting interviews, providing information and source materials, reading the manuscript and offering suggestions. Most prefer to remain anonymous for various reasons. Many of the Ukrainians feared for their relatives in Ukraine; some planned to visit their native land; a few were still members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations and did not wish to break with them.

Special thanks are due to the Society of Ukrainian Engineers and Associates in Canada through whose sponsorship the author received a modest grant for research from the Multiculturalism Program of the Department of the Secretary of State.

Preface

Communists operate not only through their party organizations but also through a series of front organizations which act as "transmission belts" for the party. In a multi-national society such as Canada the communists also operate through organizations that group people according to their national origin. Such associations are called "language mass organizations". The largest and most important of these was the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) and its World War II successor, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), both of which had subsidary organizations under their control.

Their history is important for a number of reasons. They had an ethnic base that included about three quarters of a million of Canada's population; they were the largest of three language mass organizations (the others were the Finnish and the Jewish) that formed the basis of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and the source of most of its funds; and their members came from a colonial nation that had been dominated by other powers for centuries.

The purpose of this study is two-fold: to examine the origin, the ideology, the composition and the activities of the ULFTA and AUUC and their subsidiaries, their impact on the Canadian community in general and the Ukrainian in particular, and their relations with the CPC and the USSR; second, to relate these factors to the growth, development and decline of the ULFTA and AUUC and their subsidiaries. The major emphasis of the study is on the period from World War II to the decade of the 1970s.

In writing a history of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations, one is faced with the difficulty of obtaining sources. Internal documents of these associations, intended for members only, are as guarded as state secrets. Consequently, few are available in public archives or private collections. The problem is further complicated because the leaders and activists did not keep any records. Some, more by chance than design, preserved a few documents among their books.

By canvassing dozens of members and former members, the author was able to amass the documents which, together with his private collection, were used as part of the source material for this work.

Data pertaining to the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations of an official nature was even more difficult to obtain. The personal papers of ministers and government departments, which might have provided information, could not be located or, more often, were not open to researchers. In some cases documents that would normally be available, had been lost or destroyed.

Although the CPC had ten language mass organizations, no scholarly study has been made of any of them. References to the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations in histories of Ukrainians in Canada are limited to a general outline of a page or two. The several works written by members contain some useful information. Their value is limited, however, by the tendency to glamorize the organization's activities and achievements, to gloss over embarrassing aspects of their past, to make sweeping generalizations on the basis of isolated events and to impose interpretations that conform to a preconceived ideology.

The basic data used was obtained from various sources. The newspapers of the pro-communist organizations provided some of the essential information on their activities, their relationships with the CPC and the USSR, and some statistics on membership and press circulation. The reports of the annual and bi-annual conventions of the ULFTA and the AUUC, all of which were located after considerable effort, contained policy decisions, reports on inner life, membership statistics and information on the general state of the organizations. Various other publications of the associations provided useful information that was not to be found elsewhere.

The data from published sources was augmented by information obtained through interviews with members and former members of the CPC, the ULFTA, the AUUC and the WBA who were willing to shed light on the behind-the-scenes aspects of organizational life. Among them were former members of the National Committees and the National Executive Committees of these organizations.

Care was taken to distinguish between what the interviewees stated as fact and what was merely opinion. Identical questions were discussed with more than one person. The information elicited was carefully checked against the author's lengthy personal experience as a member and activist of the CPC and the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

A distinction is made in the text between party and non-party members of the Ukrainian mass organizations. The members who were also in the party (this included the leaders) are referred to as communists; the non-party members are referred to as pro-communists. Similarly the mass organizations and their press are described as pro-communist.

There is no uniform system of transliteration of surnames. The spelling used is that adopted by each of the individuals mentioned. Transliteration of surnames and place names from Ukraine is made from Ukrainian rather than Russian (which is the common custom among Western scholars) with a few exceptions where a generally accepted English transliteration has been used. As is customary in referring to countries, the name *Ukraine* is used without the definite article, the use of which denotes a territory rather than a country.

John Kolasky
Toronto
November, 1978

Contents

List of Illustrations

List of Tables

Abbreviations

AUUC:	Association of United Ukrainian Canadians
CC:	Central Committee
CEC:	Central Executive Committee
COMINTERN:	Communist International
CPC:	Communist Party of Canada
CT:	*Canadian Tribune*
CURB:	Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau
G&M:	*Globe and Mail*
HP:	*Holos Pravdy*
LPP:	Labor Progressive Party
NAM:	*National Affairs Monthly*
NC:	National Committee
NEC:	National Executive Committee
NH:	*Narodna Hazeta*
NSh:	*Novy Shliakh*
PAC:	Public Archives of Canada
TODOVYRNAZU:	Association to Aid the Liberation Movement in Western Ukraine
TS:	*Toronto Star*
UC:	*Ukrainian Canadian*
UCC:	Ukrainian Canadian Committee
ULFTA:	Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association
UPA:	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
URV:	*Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty*
US:	*Ukrayinske Slovo*
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UZh:	*Ukrayinske Zhyttia*
WBA:	Workers Benevolent Association
Zh i S:	*Zhyttia i Slovo*
WFP:	*Winnipeg Free Press*

I
The End of an Era

By 1939 the Ukrainian pro-communist movement in Canada had been in existence for over twenty years. The formative years were important. It was during this period that the Ukrainian communists laid the foundation of their organizations, evolved the organizational and ideological patterns, acquired numerous halls in which they conducted their activities and forged a hard core of disciplined members and trained cadres.

The movement developed among a segment of Ukrainians who began migrating to Canada in 1891 and settling in what is now Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. From a trickle, the influx grew to a stream in the first decade of the twentieth century. Interrupted in 1914, the flow resumed after World War I to subside again in 1929 with the advent of the Great Depression.

A few came from the area that was part of the Russian Empire. Most were from the Western Ukrainian provinces of Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, which were under Hapsburg rule until the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, but became part of Poland (Galicia and Volhynia), Romania (Bukov na) and Czechoslovakia (Transcarpathia) after the war.

The newcomers, especially those in the earlier migrations, were illiterate or semi-literate peasants from overpopulated areas. Subjected to economic and national oppression at home, they came in search of land and a better life. Among them were few townspeople and fewer intellectuals.

The newcomers settled on homesteads or found employment in mining, lumbering or railway construction and maintenance where they worked long hours at low wages under primitive conditions.

A few came to the cities where they were employed as unskilled laborers or swelled the ranks of the unemployed.

In most cases, failing to integrate into Canadian society, they were destined to the lowest rung of the social scale and a life of isolation, privation and hardship. Their unenviable plight was further aggravated by Anglo-Saxon chauvinism, discrimination and sometimes outright hostility. Nevertheless, the majority, especially those who settled on the land, resigned themselves to the hardships of rural pioneer life. A small minority among those in the cities, in mining towns and on railroad construction sites embraced socialist ideas which were being disseminated by a few Ukrainian immigrants.

The spread of radicalism was restricted mainly to Ukrainians in the urban and industrial areas for several reasons. The Marxist appeal was directed to the proletariat. In Western Ukraine, where the new ideology began to take root in the 1870's as an avenue of protest against national and economic oppression, it found converts mainly in the cities. Those who brought it to Canada also settled in the towns and cities from where it spread to members of the working class.

Gradually these minority sentiments began to crystallize into organized radical, cultural and political activities. In 1904, the first of a number of local socialist cultural organizations, the Taras Shevchenko Society, was formed in Winnipeg with a membership of 400; in 1907, the first Ukrainian branches of the Socialist Party of Canada were set up in Winnipeg, Portage LaPrairie and Nanaimo; in 1909, a conference of Ukrainians resolved to form the Federation of Ukrainian Social-Democrats, which joined with Jews and Latvians in 1910 to form the Social-Democratic Party of Canada. In 1914, the federation was renamed the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party.[1]

The first socialist paper, the weekly *Chervony Prapor* (Red Banner), was launched in Winnipeg in 1907. After eighteen issues it ceased publication. In 1909 it was succeeded by the bi-weekly, *Robochy Narod* (Working People), which eventually reached a circulation of 3,500.[2] Another socialist weekly, *Robitnyche Slovo* (Word of Labour), was published in Toronto from 1915 to 1918. In Montreal, an active member of the party, Ivan Hnyda, established a private publishing firm, *Novy Svit* (New World), and pub-

lished an annual almanac and numerous popular pamphlets on social, economic and scientific themes.

The Russian Revolution stirred the emotions and fired up the imagination of many Ukrainians. It was interpreted as the prelude to the establishment of a universal socialist order. Consequently, dissemination of socialist ideas and membership in the Social-Democratic Party increased. By 1918 the Ukrainian federation had 1,500 members.[3]

On March 1, 1918, at a special meeting, members of the Winnipeg branch launched a campaign to build a Ukrainian labor temple* as a centre for its activity. The structure was completed in February, 1919. It had an auditorium with a seating capacity for 1,000. However, since political parties did not own real estate, it was decided that the building should become the property of a mass cultural educational organization which would include in its ranks those who were not members of the party. Consequently, in 1918, a broad mass organization was formed, the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association.[4]

When the Social-Democratic Party and its organ, *Robochy Narod*, were banned in September 1918 for anti-war and pro-Soviet agitation, the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association was transformed into a national organization which replaced the Social-Democratic Party as the disseminator of socialist and Marxist ideas among Ukrainians. The establishment of Soviet power in the former Tsarist Empire, the rising revolutionary wave in Europe and the unsettled post-war conditions in Canada favoured the growth of the new organization. Many independent local Ukrainian cultural societies proceded to affiliate. Its organizers travelled widely and set up branches in some of the most isolated Ukrainian communities. In 1924 the new organization was incorporated nationally as the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), a centralized cultural-educational labour organization whose activities were directed to the promotion of the communist cause among Ukrainians.

From its centre in Winnipeg the new organization spread to the industrial mining, lumbering and railroad centres, first in the west and then in the east. Membership growth among farmers was rather slow. The greatest successes in rural areas were in Alberta. Some of

*The halls were officially designated as "labor temples".

the farmers in that province had worked in mining and railroad construction where they had become imbued with socialist ideas. In Manitoba, inroads were made in the poverty-stricken northern area between lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba. Saskatchewan, the most agrarian of the three prairie provinces where the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church had established a solid foothold, had a small ULFTA membership, although its Ukrainian population was large.

A few incomplete reports made at its conventions indicated that the ULFTA experienced a slow irregular growth during this period. By 1939, it had 113 temples, 201 branches and about 10,000 members.[5]

In 1922 a second organization, the Workers Benevolent Association (WBA), a fraternal society, was formed. It was incorporated in the province of Manitoba but functioned as a national organization. In 1928 it acquired the property of a former country club outside Winnipeg and transformed it into an orphanage and a home for its retired members. For a few years the number of members and branches showed a steady increase. The onset of the depression had an adverse effect on the WBA. A decline in membership, which began in 1929, was not checked until 1936.

Basically, its membership was made up of adult males. Most of the branches were located in the urban industrial and mining areas. In 1931, the largest concentrations were in Manitoba (2,137), Ontario (2,054) and Alberta (1,173).[6]

Circumstances prompted the ULFTA to form another satellite organization. Repressive measures against the native Ukrainian population in Poland and Romania aroused the post-war immigrants and particularly former Ukrainian soldiers who had participated in the armed struggle for an independent Ukraine. In an effort to exploit this circumstance, the Ukrainian communists launched the *Tovarystvo Dopomohy Vyzvolnomu Rukhovi na Zakhidni Ukrayini* (Association to Aid the Liberation Movement in Western Ukraine or *TODOVYRNAZU*) in March, 1931. It was designed to appeal especially to the former Ukrainian veterans. Ostensibly its purpose was to render moral and material support to the radical movement in Western Ukraine, but the new organization also served to divert the attention of the Ukrainian immigrants from the struggle for Ukrainian independence and to extend communist influence among them.

Branches of *TODOVYRNAZU* mushroomed in all large centres where Ukrainians lived, drawing in members who had no direct previous contact with the communist movement. By 1939 it had eighty branches and 4,500 members, made up almost entirely of those who had migrated to Canada after World War I.

The three organizations, the ULFTA, the WBA and *TODOVYRNAZU,* formed the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Mass Organizations (The term became current in the mid-thirties). The parent body was the ULFTA in whose halls all activities were centred. The other two were auxiliaries or subsidiaries. *TODOVYRNAZU* limited itself to dealing with questions relating to Western Ukraine. The WBA, on the other hand, participated jointly with the ULFTA in its activities and campaigns, made financial contributions to the press and often maintained on its payroll people whose functions were not confined to the WBA.

The Ukrainian communists also launched cooperative enterprises (some in partnership with the Finns) through which they attempted to extend communist influence. The largest of these were located in Winnipeg, Fort William and Northern Ontario. They included coal and wood yards, grocery stores, bakeries and dairies. They also acquired in Edmonton a student's institute with accommodation for out-of-town youths attending various schools in the city.

The Ukrainian pro-communists used various publications to disseminate their views throughout the Ukrainian community. In 1919, a weekly, *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* (Ukrainian Labour News), was founded in Winnipeg. In 1920, it became a semi-weekly; in March 1922, a tri-weekly; and in January 1935, a daily. The name of the paper was changed on September 1, 1937, to *Narodna Hazeta* (People's Gazette). An additional weekly, *Farmerske Zhyttia* (Farmer's Life), was launched in May 1925. A monthly, *Holos Pratsi* (Voice of Labor), made its appearance in April 1922, and *Holos Robitnytsi* (Voice of the Working Woman), in February 1923. The two journals were merged in March 1924 into a semi-monthly, *Robitnytsia* (Working Woman). The youth had its own monthly, *Svit Molodi* (World of Youth), which began publication in March, 1927. Its name was changed in 1932 to *Boyova Molod* (Militant Youth).

Danylo Lobay was the first editor of *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty*. In March 1920, Matthew Shatulsky was added to the editorial staff and eventually became editor-in-chief. John Navis

(Navizivsky)* was business manager for the entire life of the paper. Among others who worked as editors, the most prominent were Matthew Popowich and Myroslav Irchan. Ironically, *Robitnytsia,* the women's journal of an organization that advocated women's liberation and equality of the sexes, was always edited exclusively by men.

Table 1

CIRCULATION OF THE UKRAINIAN PRO-COMMUNIST PRESS FOR THE YEARS 1925, 1927 AND 1929

	1925	1927	1929
Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty	6,800	8,700	10,000
Farmerske Zhyttia	2,500	4,800	5,500
Robitnytsia	5,800	6,500	6,700
Svit Molodi			3,700

Source: *Zvit deviatoho zyizdu . . . January 23-25, 1928, p. 49: Zvit desiatoho zyizdu . . . February 4-6, 1929, p. 66.*

In addition to newspapers and journals, which experienced a rapid growth in the 1920's (Table I), the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Publishing Association, established in 1924, produced a variety of other literature ranging from school texts to books on economics, politics, history, Marxism, literary works and popular propaganda pamphlets on topics of current interest.

A great deal of money and effort was required to maintain the association's press. Accounts of local activities and events were provided by branch members designated as "worker correspondents". Subscription rates were kept low to put the paper within reach of those with limited incomes. Since this did not cover the cost of publication, it was necessary to raise an annual sustaining fund. Consequently, the membership was mobilized each year for a campaign to collect funds and at the same time solicit renewals and new readers.

The communist leaders were particularly concerned that their press reach the new immigrants who began arriving in the early 1920's. These were generally of peasant stock, with some elemen-

*Brackets have been used to indicate the individual's original surname.

tary education. Many had taken part in various military campaigns on behalf of an independent Ukrainian state. Others were political refugees who had participated in illegal nationalist and radical movements and were forced to flee persecution. All in all, these newcomers were not the rather docile, illiterate peasants who came in the pre-war period, but aggressive young men with wide experience in life.

Unlike the pre-war immigrants who settled on the land, those who arrived in the 1920's came to the cities. Many, especially those from the lower rungs of the social scale, were recruited into the ULFTA and its subsidiaries, increasing the number of branches and swelling the membership rolls. The intellectuals and professionals among them, together with the small proportion of immigrants from areas occupied by Russia—most of them from the better-off strata of the population—were generally hostile to the Soviet regime. Consequently, they gravitated to the nationalist organizations.

A small number of adult members of the ULFTA were Canadian-born. Their backgrounds and the circumstances of their recruitment varied. Most came from the rural areas of the prairie provinces. Some had had earlier contact with socialist ideas through their parents; others were swept up in the frequent recruiting campaigns.

Like the membership, the leadership was made up mostly of individuals from the lower social strata, some of whom had advanced beyond the elementary level in their education. The founding and growth of the ULFTA is linked with four men: Matthew Popowich, John Navis, Matthew Shatulsky and John Boychuk.

Although Popowich was the most erudite and refined, Navis, an able administrator, emerged as leader. However, it was Shatulsky, the national secretary of the ULFTA, who gave the movement its ideological direction, carried the greatest burden of work and dealt with many of the day-to-day problems. Boychuk became the central figure in the Ukrainian pro-communist movement in Toronto. Other pre-war leaders of note were John Stefanitsky in Toronto and Ivan Kolisnyk, Danylo Lobay and Toma Kobzey in Winnipeg. All were from Galicia.

Among those who emerged from the ranks of the post-1918 immigrants as leaders, the most important were Myroslav Irchan,

Peter Prokop (Prokopchak), Peter Arsen (Krawchuk),* Ivan Sembay, Phillip Lysets and Michael Dushnitsky, all from Galicia; Oleksander Mankowsky and Michael Korol from Eastern Ukraine; and Stepan Macievich from Bukovina.

The ULFTA also developed a number of leading functionaries from the Canadian-born and those who arrived in Canada as children. Among these were John Weir (Weviursky), John Boyd (Boychuk), Tom Chopowick, Anthony Bilecki, Andrew Bileski, Stanley Ziniuk, Nicholas Hrynchyshyn, Michael Seychuk, Constantine Kostaniuk, Mary Kardash (nee Kostaniuk), Helen Weir (nee Kuchurian) and Mary Skrypnyk. Three leaders, W.A. Kardash, Michael Mokry and Mitchell Sago (Michael Saramaga), became active in the Ukrainian field after they had become prominent in the party.

These younger leaders were distinguished by a deep and abiding faith in, and a complete dedication to the cause they espoused, which is perhaps the most important characteristic common to them all. As a group they exhibited few of the outstanding qualities of the founders. None possessed the capacity for work and the versatility of Shatulsky, the erudition of Popowich, the administrative skills of Navis or the expertise in community relations of Boychuk. Some, however, stood out. The ablest was probably Weir. Others of particular note were Boyd, Kardash, Krawchuk, Macievich, Prokop, Helen Weir and Mary Kardash.

As sons and daughters of poor immigrants they were unable in those difficult times to obtain a higher education, but most received special communist training under the sponsorship of the movement they served. Some were trained at the Lenin school in Moscow where they spent from one to three years. Among them were John Weir, Martin Parnega, Michael Comishin, John Hladun and W.A. Kardahs. Three others, Tom Chopowick, Peter Prokop and Michael Seychuk, each spent a year at Institutes of Marxism-Leninism in Ukraine in 1931-1932. Several attended special political courses of six months duration during the 1930's organized by the CC of the CPC at a private summer resort near Grafton on Lake Ontario.

Many of the younger leaders—teachers, organizers, journalists and other functionaries—received their training at "Higher Educa-

*While using his cover name Krawchuk obtained Canadian citizenship on June 27, 1936. He later reverted to his real name.

1. Students of the ULFTA-WBA Higher Educational Course in Winnipeg, November 1925 to April 1926. In the second row second from left is Toma Kobzey who was expelled in 1935 for criticism of Soviet policies in Ukraine; fifth is Ivan Sembay, director of the course, who was deported to the USSR in 1932 where he perished in the purges. The last in the fourth row is Joseph Petelko, who has been secretary of the men's branch of the AUUC at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto since its inception. Fifth from the left in the last row is Andrew Bileski, a former communist member of the Winnipeg school board. On his left is Hryhoriy Smook, sho migrated to Ukraine in the early 1930s. He survived imprisonment and was released in the 1950s to live in exile in Karaganda, Kazakhstan.

tional Courses" organized by the ULFTA and the WBA and held periodically in Winnipeg. There were five such courses between 1923 and 1938 which turned out more than 100 graduates. The national courses were augmented by frequent district and provincial leadership courses varying in length from two weeks to six months.

Normally a few months would be considered inadequate for an extensive curriculum required to train teachers and functionaries. But the students were energetic, dedicated and mature, with wide experience in life and an unquenchable desire to learn. Most took up their positions as teachers, musicians, organizers, journalists and functionaries in the Ukrainian pro-communist movement.

The communist leaders understood that the Ukrainian immigrants, cut off from their homeland and isolated from Canadian society, yearned for their native culture. It was needed to fill the void opened up by isolation and nostalgia and to establish their identity in a foreign land. Consequently, great emphasis was placed on educational, cultural and social activities as a means of disseminating the communist ideology.

The role of the teacher, usually the only salaried functionary in the labour temple, was very important. The teacher taught children's school, directed the choir and sometimes conducted the adult education program, which included courses in the aims and structure of the association, courses for speakers, organizers and secretaries and frequent lectures on economics, history and a variety of other topics. He was usually also the best qualified to expound and interpret the faith and guard against the development of heresies.

The smaller branches of the ULFTA were not able to maintain teachers and did not have the personnel to carry on the extended cultural and educational programs of the larger branches. This was compensated for in part by the appearances of guest lecturers and cultural groups from larger branches, which made extended tours of smaller centres. In 1926 the Winnipeg girl's mandolin orchestra toured western and, in 1927, eastern Canada.

The crowning achievement of the ULFTA's cultural activities was its National Festival of Ukrainian Music and Dance held at the Mutual Arena Gardens in Toronto on July 15, 1939. A total of 1,500 participants composed of thirty-eight string orchestras,

2. The ULFTA Ukrainian girls' orchestra in Timmins in 1937 was typical of such musical ensembles. In the centre is the conductor, William Kunka, a gifted musician. *Photo courtesy Multicultural History Society of Ontario.*

thirty-two choirs and numerous soloists, representing branches from across Canada, performed before 10,000 spectators. The event was unequalled in Canada in either scope or pageantry.

The activities of the Ukrainian pro-communists also included contact with and support for the USSR, which was leading the way to the new social order. They followed its emergence and development with interest and trepidation, voiced their full support and mobilized their forces to render it assistance in its early years.

In 1921, when drought in the Volga region and in Ukraine caused a famine, they raised over $65,000 to aid the stricken areas.[7] Two groups of Ukrainians in Winnipeg and Montreal, in their desire to participate in the building of the new society, pooled their resources, purchased agricultural implements and set up two communes in Ukraine.[8]

The fourth convention of the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association in January, 1923, resolved to set up a Central Committee for Technical Aid to Soviet Ukraine to train, equip and dispatch workers to assist in reconstruction.[9] As a result, a small number of skilled tradesmen migrated to Ukraine in the years prior to 1931. In response to an appeal from Kiev, the fifth convention in February, 1924, agreed to assist financially in the erection of monuments to Shevchenko in Kiev and in Kaniv where the poet was buried. The succeeding convention in January, 1925, resolved to aid the agricultural institute in the town of Uman by assisting it to form ties with Canadian agricultural institutes and by sending it literature on agriculture.[10]

Since tourist travel was almost totally restricted by Soviet authorities, the only contact the bulk of the Ukrainians could have with Soviet Ukraine was through literature: books, journals and newspapers. The ULFTA book store in Winnipeg stocked Soviet literature and took subscriptions for periodicals. The Labor Farmer Publishing Association republished Soviet books while the press carried news on the USSR and articles by special correspondents from Ukraine and reprinted materials from the Soviet press. The ULFTA also imported films from Ukraine which were shown in the labor temples throughout Canada with considerable financial success. The first of these, *Taras Shevchenko*, a film depicting the life of the Ukrainian national poet, arrived in 1928 and was viewed with great interest and enthusiasm.

The leaders of the ULFTA attempted to expand relations with Soviet Ukraine. They hosted Ivan Kulyk, the representative from Ukraine on the Soviet trade mission in Canada between 1924 and 1927, at several gatherings; sent greetings to governmental and other bodies in Ukraine from their conventions; and hoped to send the Winnipeg girl's orchestra to tour Ukraine, and students to various educational institutions. However, there was little reciprocation from Soviet authorities.

The first direct personal contacts were established in 1923 when Shatulsky and Popowich visited the USSR. The latter was in the Soviet Union again in 1926 to attend the Seventh Plenum of the Communist International in November and December and the Convention of Poor Peasants in Kharikiv in January 1927. Navis was in Moscow in 1928 to attend the Sixth Congress of the Communist International from July to September. On April 11, 1931, a group of sixteen delegates from the ULFTA, headed by Navis and including John Boychuk, left for a six week tour of the USSR.

This was the only group from the ULFTA that visited the Soviet Union before the second world war. The unfolding of the Stalinist tyranny in the USSR in the early thirties limited contacts to correspondence with the Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in Kiev and the exchange of literature and newspapers.[11]

The Ukrainians also involved themselves in the Communist Party from its inception. The Ukrainian Labor Temple Association sent ten delegates to the founding conference of the Workers Party on December 11, 1921. It was renamed the Communist Party in 1924. *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* became an official organ of the party. At the first convention of the Workers Party in 1922, Boychuk, Popowich and Navis were elected to its Central Committee. The new party had separate Ukrainian and Finnish sections with their own language branches and general branches which included all other members.

Party control over the mass organizations was maintained through fractions* which were formed by party members in the Ukrainian mass organizations. There were local, provincial and national fractions, each responsible to a party body on the corres-

*The term was used to denote the secret caucuses formed by party members in organizations in which the CPC operated.

ponding level. The national party fraction, made up of party members of the national executive committees of the mass organizations, elected a national party fraction bureau whose composition had to be approved by the Politburo of the CPC and to which it was responsible. The number and composition of the bureau varied. In 1939 the members were Boychuk, Prokop, Lysets, Navis, Shatulsky, Woytyshyn, Korol and Krawchuk.[1 2]

Ukrainians participated in the campaigns and general activities of the party such as demonstrations, mass meetings and various elections, and sometimes were cast in leading roles. The first communist representative on a public body in North America was a leading member of the ULFTA, John Kolisnyk, elected alderman in Winnipeg in 1926. Another member, John Stokaliuk, became a senior official of the United Mine Workers Union in Western Canada. But nearly all the work of the Ukrainian party members was in the Ukrainian mass organizations. As a rule, they looked to their national party fraction bureau for leadership and guidance rather than to the district committees and the CC of the party.

In 1925, at its fifth congress, the Communist International launched a campaign to *bolshevize* all communist parties. This entailed the dissolution of the national federations and the language branches and the setting up of factory cells to achieve better contact with the workers. Non-industrial members were to be attached to factory cells.

The Finnish and Ukrainian leaders in Canada opposed the breaking up of the language sections. Eventually, in spite of their disapproval, the party was reorganized on the basis of factory and territorial cells and the language branches were dissolved.

In 1928, new friction developed after the VIII Plenum of the Communist International decreed the intensification and extension of the class struggle in its "class against class" formula. Since the party was based on Finns and Ukrainians, the new policy could only be implemented if these members, and especially the Ukrainians who were often employed in key industries, were willing to take the initiative. The Ukrainians were opposed to playing a leading role in the escalating struggles, fearing arrest and deportation. The difference developed into an open confrontation between the Ukrainians and other party leaders. In some localities Ukrainian halls were refused for party meetings. Opposition to the party lead-

3. Communist May Day meeting, 1922, in front of the Ukrainian labor temple in Timmins, Ontario. The building is typical of ULFTA halls in smaller communities. The Ukrainian pro-communists took an active part in, and their halls became the centres of, communist activities. *Photo courtesy Multicultural History Society of Ontario.*

ership was organized and a secret Ukrainian caucus was held at the Sixth Convention of the CPC, at which the question of breaking away from the party was raised. A pre-convention caucus of party members, who were delegates to the Eleventh Convention of the ULFTA in 1930, rejected a letter from the Politburo of the party criticizing the ULFTA for inadequate participation in the "revolutionary class struggle".

Normally, insubordination by party members brought immediate expulsion. But in this case, because of the numerical strength of Ukrainian members, such measures would have had catastrophic consequences for the party. The case was taken to the Communist International which, in 1930, sent out its representative, a Ukrainian who travelled under the name of Mykhailenko. He had his own funds and stayed in Canada for about six months. At the end of 1930, John Navis went to Moscow where he remained for three months. On his return he was ready to follow the new line.[13] The Comintern worked out a compromise whereby no one was to be disciplined in the Ukrainian section, but the Ukrainian communists were to cooperate with the party leadership.

In the meantime, the world economic crisis, ushered in by the stock market crash on Wall Street in 1929, resulted in widespread unemployment. Gradually, the Ukrainians began to accept the Comintern policy of participation in the sharpening economic and political struggles. Early in 1931, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the ULFTA issued a call to all its members to enter "into the general class struggle of the workers under the leadership of the Communist Party of Canada".[14]

In the same year, the CEC of the CPC began publishing a monthly journal in Ukrainian, *Za bilshovyzatsiyu* (For Bolshevization), which carried on agitation among Ukrainians for a "turn" in party work. It was edited by Popowich and produced at the ULFTA printshop in Winnipeg. Typical of the articles was one by Michael Korol, secretary of the Young Communist League (YCL) and a leading Ukrainian activist, who wrote of

> . . . the need to draw the mass youth organization into revolutionary mass work, into the whirlwind of class struggle of the toiling youth of Canada under the leadership of the YCL.[15]

The ground was thoroughly prepared for a "turn to the path of general revolutionary class struggle" at the Twelfth Convention of

the ULFTA, held July 15-20, 1931. Stalin, Skrypnyk, Thaelmann and Tim Buck were elected to the honourary presidium. Sam Carr, a member of the Poliburo of the party (sentenced in 1949 for forging a passport), sat in the presidium. In his address to the convention he prophesied:

> The day is not too distant when . . . we shall take the government into our own hands . . . All our labour organizations are accepting the call to world revolution.[16]

The convention listed among its most immediate objectives "unity with the general revolutionary labour movement . . . under the ideological leadership of the Communist Party of Canada" and "membership in the Party".[17]

After the "turn" the Ukrainian mass organizations followed every twist in the changing party line and increased their participation in all party activities and campaigns. They placed greater emphasis on promoting the class consciousness of their members and involving them in the class struggle. *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* gave prominence to reports of party activities, carried on incessant agitation on behalf of all communist causes and reprinted CPC and other documents such as the Tasks of the Sections of the Comintern which stated as one of its aims:

> To achieve leadership by mass actions (strikes, unemployed movement, demonstrations, etc.) which often errupt spontaneously, and lead them onto the path of organized political struggle, especially in the form of mass political strikes which will lead the working class to revolutionary battles for power.[18]

It was easy enough to impose the new party line on the ULFTA membership. At the beginning of the 1930s the CPC membership totalled about 2,500 to 3,000. Of these between 900 and 1,000 were Ukrainians,[19] most of whom were also members of the ULFTA. The latter's total membership at the beginning of 1929, including its women's and youth section, was 5,483.[20] Of these nearly one quarter were members of the youth section, leaving about 4,000 adults. With 900 to 1,000 of these as party members, it was an easy matter for the party to maintain control in the ULFTA.

After 1931, due in a large measure to the efforts of the Ukrainians, party influence increased among the unemployed, the farmers and the industrial workers. The votes of party candidates increased

considerably. Tim Buck, who polled 10,000 votes for Board of Control in Toronto in 1932, received 45,000 in 1939, just 250 short of election. In 1936 James Litterick was elected to the Manitoba legislature from Winnipeg. Other communists were returned to municipal councils in Winnipeg, Calgary, Regina, Windsor, Timmins and Toronto.

Ukrainians also formed the hard core of the communist trade union organizations and provided a great deal of the local initiaitive and leadership in most industries. (An exception was the lumber and pulp industry where the Finns predominated.) In the communist-sponsored Farmers Unity League they made up the bulk of the membership. The highest party vote was usually polled in constituencies with a large percentage of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian labor temples became the centres for communist activities: unemployed, farmers and trade union meetings, election rallies and party gatherings.

Ukrainians also contributed a major share of the funds for carrying on party work. In November 1934, the branches of the ULFTA collected a total of $12,259.81, a considerable sum for the time, for various party causes.[21] This did not include money Ukrainians contributed directly to party branches where they were members.

By the mid-1930's, as more native Canadians were drawn into the party and trained for leadership, they replaced many European-born Ukrainians. Consequently, the proportion of Ukrainians in the party declined slightly. However, they still performed most of the basic routine work such as distributing leaflets, canvassing, soliciting subscriptions and recruiting.

In their efforts to advance the communist cause, the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations faced a number of serious problems. Their support was based on the poorest strata of the Ukrainian community, which could not provide enough financial support. Even this inadequate base was eroded by the depression to the point that in 1932 *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* was reduced from six to four pages, *Farmerske Zhyttia* from eight to six and *Robitnytsia* from a semi-monthly to a monthly. In 1937, *Boyova Molod* and *Robitnytsia* were discontinued. The staff of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Publishing Association was trimmed. The wages of the remaining employees and the salaries of the secretary of the ULFTA and the secretary-treasurer of the WBA were reduced.

Another problem was the high attrition rate in membership. In

1926, the ULFTA lost 283 members out of a total of 2,223 in the men's and general branches. In 1930 after the depression set in, the number increased to 1,759.[22] After the "turn to the path of general revolutionary class struggle" and the sharpening hostility of the authorities, so many began to leave that Shatulsky called for a campaign against "cowardice, panic and desertion from the field of battle".[23]

Over one hundred Ukrainians from Canada, most of them members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations, perished as participants on the Loyalist side in the Spanish Civil War.[24] A number of members were lost through deportation, some by request, others because they had become public charges[25] and a few because of their participation in the communist movement.

Among the latter were Danylo Khomitsky, an employee of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Publishing Association, and Ivan Sembay, rector of the ULFTA student institute in Edmonton, who were deported in 1932, Khomitsky to Poland and Sembay to the USSR. A few others migrated to the Soviet Union. The most prominent was Myroslav Irchan, a Ukrainian communist writer.

Other losses were due to expulsions and defections over ideological and other differences. The first significant rift took place in 1932 when a group led by William Bosovych, a former representative on the Agit Prop Department of the CPC and provincial secretary of the ULFTA in Ontario; Nicholas Oleniuk, a former medical student in his native Bukovina; Nicholas Oliynyk, an unemployed worker; and others, were expelled for supporting the position of Trotsky. The group formed an organization, the Workers Cultural Educational Association, *Kameniari,* with about fifty members in Toronto and smaller groups in Hamilton and Montreal. The organization promoted plays, concerts and lectures and in October, 1933, began publishing in Toronto a bi-weekly paper, *Robitnychi Visty* (Labor News), which reached a circulation of about 2,000.[26] Numerically the organization remained small, but it was still a large thorn in the side of the ULFTA, especially in Eastern Canada.

In 1935, a new and larger revolt, that had been brewing for several years, errupted in the ULFTA. Among its leaders were a number of former social-democrats, steeped in the tradition of a federated form of party organization, who had opposed *bolshevization* and the dissolution of the language sections. As established pre-war immigrants who were steadily employed, many of them in

the railway shops, they had also opposed the "turn" in the ULFTA in 1931. Consequently they came into conflict with the younger post-war arrivals who, being unemployed or employed at very low wages, favoured a more militant role in the growing communist movement in Canada.

The liquidation of the kulaks, collectivization and the artificially-created famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 gave birth to certain reservations in the minds of some members regarding Soviet policies in Ukraine. These were intensified in 1933 by the suicide of Mykola Khvylovy, a prominent Ukrainian writer and party member, and Mykola Skrypnyk, a leading Bolshevik and Commissar of Education in Ukraine, and by the arrest and execution of twenty-eight Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev in December, 1934.[27] When it was revealed that Soviet authorities had also arrested two former leaders of the ULFTA, Irchan and Sembay, members bombarded the centre with questions about the reasons for the arrests, precipitating a serious crisis.

Navis was sent to Ukraine in the summer of 1934 to investigate the two cases but returned in December without any information. There was no attempt by the Ukrainian communist leaders to defend their former comrades who had returned to Ukraine and were arrested. They did not even raise doubts about the latter's guilt. Instead they attacked Irchan and Sembay in their press as "enemy agents" sent into the USSR to carry on disruptive activities. The matter reached a climax on March 10, 1935, at a communist fraction meeting of about 100 delegates who had arrived for the Fifteenth Convention of the ULFTA and the general deliberations of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Mass Organizations. Lobay, the first to question Soviet national policy in Ukrainian pro-communist ranks in Canada, condemned the attacks on Irchan and Sembay that appeared in the Ukrainian pro-communist press in Canada. The other leaders were not only reluctant to discuss the issue but did not allow Lobay to attend the subsequent party fraction meeting the following day.

The Ukrainian communist leaders were completely mesmerized by the Soviet regime. They regarded themselves as the guardians of divine truth. They would not allow such things as the death of several millions in the famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 or the purges of a few more millions in subsequent years to interrupt their

dream of a universal utopia. In his report to the conference of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Mass Organizations, Shatulsky declared that

> . . . the national policy of the party and the Soviet government in Ukraine is correct; we have full and unqualified faith in the party and the government. . . . When the Soviet government punishes someone and does not give a full or even any report of this it knows why it does this and we will not question it for this. We as communists, as members of the working class, *express, are expressing and will continue to express our full faith in it* [Italics in original. JK].[28]

Lobay relinquished his post as editor of *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* and broke with the communist movement. He was followed in September by ten other leaders, most of whom had been members since the ULFTA's inception, among them Toma Kobzey, the national secretary, and John Hladun. In January, 1936, the rebels formed the Workers and Farmers Educational Association, with a branch of seventy in Winnipeg, fifty-one in Transcona, and smaller branches in several other localities.[29]

A month later in Winnipeg they launched a weekly newspaper, *Pravda* (Truth), edited by Lobay. It attacked Russian chauvinism, Soviet national policy and the purges in Ukraine, which were interpreted as a campaign by the Kremlin rulers against Ukrainians and their culture. The paper's circulation remained small and the new organization made little headway.

Lobay and his group were men of integrity but they lacked the abilities, the appeal and the stature of leaders such as Boychuk, Navis, Popowich or Shatulsky. Moreover, they set themselves against a growing movement with an efficient apparatus, an established press and an active, disciplined membership, steeped in a crusading ideology and a faith that gave promise of a proletarian millenium. Nevertheless, the revolt was a serious blow which resulted in the loss of several dozen experienced leaders and activists, especially in Winnipeg.

However, Lobay and his group were not the most serious challenge the Ukrainian communists faced in the Ukrainian community. Their chief rivals were the Ukrainian nationalists who advocated independence for Ukraine and regarded themselves as spokesmen for their oppressed nation which was not able to express its will.

The nationalist camp was made up of the Greek Catholic Church with a lay organization, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics,

and several weekly newspapers; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its lay organization, the Ukrainian Self-reliance League and its organ, *Ukrayinsky Holos* (Ukrainian Voice); a number of smaller lay and religious groups and the independent weekly, *Kanadysky Farmer* (Canadian Farmer) and two political organizations: the Ukrainian National Federation, made up of post-1918 immigrants, most of whom had been participants in the armed struggles on behalf of Ukrainian independence in 1918-1920, and its organ, *Novy Shliakh* (New Pathway), and the United Hetman Organization with its organ, *Robitnyk* (Toiler), which favoured the reestablishment of an independent Ukraine as a monarchy with a hetman as sovereign.

Obviously, the communists had the support of only a small minority of the Ukrainian community.[30] However, they were better organized and disciplined, more aggressive and more vociferous. The publicity they generated was greatly out of proportion to their numbers.

After Hitler emerged supreme in Germany with his slogan of *Drang nach Osten* and his rabid and bellicose anti-communism, many Ukrainian nationalists were confident of an inevitable Soviet-German conflict in which the USSR would be shattered and Ukraine would achieve its independence. The communists branded the nationalists as lackeys of a foreign power who wished to subordinate Ukraine to German imperialism. They hurled charges of "fascists", sometimes singling out the Ukrainian National Federation and the United Hetman Organization, and sometimes blanketing the whole nationalist camp with the charge.

The nationalists used every possible occasion to condemn their opponents. They appealed to the government to take steps to protect innocent people who were being led astray by "agents of Moscow", to restrict communist activities, to cancel the charter of the ULFTA, to close the children's schools, to ban the Ukrainian pro-communist press and to deport the members. Shatulsky complained that:

> There was not one convention of these fascist organizations at which resolutions were not passed against us; there was not one affair of any kind at which appeals were not made against our organizations to the authorities that they curtail the Ukrainian labor farmer organizations.[31]

The problems of the pro-communists were further complicated when the authorities, who harboured deep-rooted apprehensions of anything communist or pro-Soviet, reacted to nationalist and other pressures. Fears for the maintenance of "law and order" and the preservation of the *status quo* appeared to be justified when communist-indoctrinated students refused to participate in cadet training in high schools, audiences failed to sing *God Save the King* and *O Canada* at communist meetings and Ukrainian pro-communists openly propagated atheism in their halls (See illustrations 4 and 5). Efforts by communists to organize unions and promote strikes for improved wages and working conditions were often interpreted as preliminary steps to revolution.

After the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations committed themselves to participation in the sharpening labour struggles under the leadership of the party, they were subjected to intensified persecution. In the anti-communist drives, labour temples were raided, members were arrested and in some cases jailed and even deported.

Among the eight members of the CC of the CPC arrested in August, 1931, and sentenced to five years imprisonment under Section 98 of the Criminal Code were John Boychuk and Matthew Popowich.

The same year a raid was made on the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Winnipeg, archives were seized and John Navis was arrested. On July 5, 1933, police, on the order of the provincial attorney general's department, raided the WBA head office, seized its records and suspended its charter. The court eventually dismissed the charges in both cases, but the episodes dealt a severe blow to the pro-communist organizations, especially in demoralizing some of the members. In Montreal, the provincial police raided the labor temple on January 26, 1938, under the provisions of the Padlock Law, and boarded up the windows and locked the doors.

In spite of the many problems, the unfavourable public climate, the temporary setbacks and the periodic declines of some of its organizations,the Ukrainian pro-communist movement flourished. The reasons were many. It filled a variety of needs in the troubled and unstable period of the inter-war years. The temples became centres to which Ukrainians flocked for diverse reasons. Isolated from the stream of Canadian social life because of language and



4. A Soviet poster-periodical, *The Atheist at His Machine*, No. 19, 1929, which was circulated in Ukrainian pro-communist ranks. The caption reads: "A Modern Variation on the Subject of Drunkenness in Caanan, Galilee". At the bottom: "The very first and most wicked bootlegger was Jesus Christ".

5. Another *Atheist at His Machine* poster, No. 20, 1929, used by Ukrainian pro-communists in their campaign against religion. "God" is being swept out of the factory.

customs, many were drawn to the labor temples, which in some communities were the only Ukrainian recreational centres, by the rich and varied social and cultural activities. They sent their children, for whom there were often no other provisions for after-school hours, to become acquainted with the Ukrainian cultural heritage. They also acquired musical and other training that very often was not available for other children.

During the Great Depression, thousands were deprived of the means of earning a livelihood, while many of those employed laboured for a pittance. Farmers could not sell their produce and many were forced off the land through the sale of their farms for mortgage and tax arrears. It was the communists who condemned such conditions and mobilized the underprivileged to fight for redress.

In a world of hopelessness and despair, the communists offered a simple and what appeared to be a logical explanation and a plausible solution for the deplorable state of the world's affairs. People who had been sinking into a state of demoralization and apathy were given a vision and a faith and imbued with a cause for which they could work. Individuals, who had been drifting aimlessly, merged their individualities into and became part of an international movement that promised to usher in a just social order with plenty for all.

Moreover, they saw a vision of a vast land that occupied one sixth of the earth's surface in which the workers and peasants had taken power, ended exploitation of man by man, abolished unemployment and were building a new society with security for all. Heaven for the Christians was in the hereafter; for the communists, paradise was emerging here on earth now. Distance lent enchantment to the dream. The initiated believed with a fervour and a zeal reminiscent of the early Christians. Ukraine and the USSR became the holy land and Moscow the Mecca to which they looked for inspiration and guidance.

For Ukrainians it was easier to fall under the influence of communist propaganda than for others. They were attracted by reports of the renaissance of the Ukrainian language and culture, which had been repressed under the Tsars, and were convinced that the national problem in Ukraine had been solved. Their impoverished peasant background, lack of education and the centuries-long for-

eign domination of Ukraine bred in them a deep sense of personal and national inferiority. To them the USSR, in which Ukraine was supposedly a willing and an equal member, appeared as a great Slav power destined to a leading role in humanity's march to a new social order. Identification with the Soviet Union and its ideology gave them a sense of strength and personal worth.

The Ukrainian communist leaders were able to exploit these sentiments to build a dynamic movement, based on a hierarchy of leaders, and a disciplined organization modelled on the Soviet communist party. The cost of the achievements was high. It required sustained dedication on the part of the leaders and activists and sacrifice in time and money by the rank and file.

The change in the international situation in the 1930's made it easier for the communists to operate. After the Nazis came to power and the USSR joined the League of Nations, fascism emerged as the main threat to the Western democracies. Fear of communism declined and the Soviet Union loomed as a bulwark against the menace of Hitler. Communist prestige rose to new heights after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 called for a united front with social-democrats and other radicals against fascism.

From outright pariahs who had advocated revolution, the Ukrainian pro-communists were gradually accepted as promoters of culture, whose orchestras and choirs performed before Canadian audiences to promote unity against fascism and war. However, the new popularity was short lived. Events in Europe soon brought them into disfavour again and ended abruptly an era in the history of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

II
Illegality and Revival

AFTER the outbreak of the second world war, the attitude of the CPC and the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations to the conflict influenced their fortunes. For years the communists had condemned fascism and clamoured for concerted action against Nazi aggression. They applauded the German-Soviet Pact, concluded on August 23, 1939, but called for the support of Poland when it was invaded by the Germans on September I.

A month later the organ of the CPC reversed its position to conform to the new Soviet line of opposition to the war. It published numerous Soviet articles and documents denouncing the conflict. Among these was the manifesto of the Comintern, issued on November 7, 1939. It was addressed "To the Proletarians and the Working People Throughout the World", whom it exhorted not to believe

> those who are calling upon you . . . to support the war under the false pretext of the defense of democracy. . . . It is not for the freedom of nations that they are fighting. But for their enslavement. . . .[1]

On September 12, the Ukrainian pro-communist daily, *Narodna Hazeta,* followed the Comintern line in denouncing Hitler's invasion of Poland and screamed: "Destroy Hitlerism! Save Humanity!" When the line changed the paper suddenly lost its enthusiasm for saving humanity. However, open opposition to the war would have immediately placed the organizations and their properties in jeopardy. Consequently, the party and Ukrainian communist leaders agreed that the Ukrainian pro-communist press would not openly oppose Canada's participation in the war.[2] The Ukrainian daily,

however, conducted subtle anti-war propaganda. In an editorial on November 25, it declared that

> . . . this war is bringing terrible destruction and great war burdens for all mankind, while the ruling classes, taking advantage of their position, are restricting the democratic rights of the people and intensifying fascism in their countries.

As the flames of war spread, the Canadian government directed its attention to communist activities in Canada. On November 20, 1939, the Honourable Ernest Lapointe, the acting Secretary of State, banned the Clarion under Article 15 of the Defense of Canada Regulations for "disseminating subversive propaganda". The party continued its anti-war agitation and on June 4, 1940, the government declared illegal the CPC and several other organizations, among them the ULFTA.[4] Under order-in-council PC2667 it vested control of all property of the banned organizations in the Custodian.[5]

The premises and facilities of the Ukrainian communist publishing enterprise were then leased by several prominent nationalists: Theodore Datzkiv and O. Hykavy, former editor and editor respectively of *Kanadiysky Farmer,* W. Bossy, leader of the United Hetman Organization, A. Zahariychuk, a Catholic and a member of the Winnipeg School Board, and M. Mandryka, a writer.[6] They continued to publish a weekly, *Narodna Gazeta,* the first issue of which appeared on December 25, 1940, and sent it out to subscribers on the old mailing lists. Because it was critical of the USSR many refused to accept the new paper and returned it. On April 30, 1941, it ceased publication and the equipment of the print shop was sold to the Ukrainian National Federation.

The WBA, a fraternal society, was not among those banned, although its secretary, Anthony Woytyshyn, was interned as a leading communist. However, on July 6, 1940, W.J. Major, the Attorney-General of Manitoba, appointed a chartered accountant, A.G. Harrison, to audit the association's books.

The report, submitted September 24, 1940, revealed endless irregularities and contraventions of the Insurance Act. Chartered as a provincial organization, the WBA operated illegally in other provinces, made false reports to the Superintendent of Insurance, lent money without security and often without interest charges, gave numerous donations to communist causes and organizations, made

sizable contributions to the ULFTA as well as partial payment of salaries and expenses of ULFTA organizers and officials (Table II).

Table II

LARGER DONATIONS MADE BY THE WBA IN 1937, 1938 and 1939

1937: February 18	National Executive, ULFTA	$100.00
May 26	ULFTA	250.00
June 3	I. Navis, Trip to Toronto	50.00
September 25	ULFTA, Organizational fund re Prokop	110.00
November 9	ULFTA, Donation re Spain	500.00
1938: January 13	ULFTA, re salary for Prokop	174.00
June 18	ULFTA, Higher Education Course	2,000.00
August 30	ULFTA, Organizational fund	300.00
October 11	ULFTA, Point Douglas branch	200.00
October 22	ULFTA, Organizational fund	200.00
November 23	*Clarion* donation	133.00
November 23	*Peoples Gazette*	500.00
November 30	Donation to *Clarion*	166.99
1939: January 10	ULFTA, Organizational fund	347.18
April 1	Donation, 20th anniversary *Peoples Gazette*	100.00
April 18	ULFTA, Organizational fund	300.00
November 27	Workers and Farmers Publishing Association	500.00

Source: *Narodna Gazeta,* March 26, 1941.

The financial standing of the WBA was such, as a result, that its bank overdraft was $20,769.17. The report concluded that:

> the WBA was managed not for the purpose for which it was . . . but rather for the financing of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association, the Labor Farmer Publishing Association (which were declared illegal by the government), the Clarion Publishing Company, the People's Cooperative Limited and other organizations closely associated with the ULFTA.[7]

As a consequence of the report the WBA was forbidden to accept new members.

But it was the ULFTA that suffered the heaviest blow. Not only was it the most active and the most militant of the pro-communist language organizations, but the country of origin of its members constituted an integral part of the USSR which had a pact with Germany with whom Canada was at war. Consequently, of all pro-communist organizations banned, only the leaders of the Ukrainian organizations were interned.[8] Moreover, the ULFTA suffered even

more than the CPC itself. Most of the top party leaders either left the country or went into hiding. The national officials of the ULFTA and its press stayed at their posts and were all arrested. (They constituted about one third of the ninety-eight communists interned.) (Appendix I) Consequently the ULFTA ceased to exist.

The CPC, on the other hand, continued to function even in the face of repression. The party quickly took steps to establish a new organ to disseminate its views. On January 20, 1941, two months after the Clarion was banned, a new communist weekly, the *Canadian Tribune,* appeared in Toronto with A.A. MacLeod as editor, assisted by several leftists and pacifists who propagated anti-war sentiments.

In the federal election of March 1940, the communists were successful in electing a spokesman to the House of Commons. She was Dorise Neilsen, the wife of a debt-ridden farmer living on relief, who ran as a "unity" candidate in North Battleford, Saskatchewan. A woman of great dignity and charm with uncommon ability, she campaigned with vigour, conviction and considerable emotion. Appealing to farmers who had become embittered by poverty and neglect, she received the support of Herridge's New Democracy Movement, the Communist Party and dissidents from the traditional parties.

On April 22, 1941, the communists scored another electoral victory. W.A. Kardash, a dedicated and active communist of Ukrainian ancestry, a former member of the ULFTA and an officer in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion in the Spanish civil war, was elected to the Manitoba legislature in the ten-member provincial constituency of Winnipeg, replacing James Litterick who had gone into hiding.

The party successes encouraged former members of the ULFTA to resume some of their activities, especially in the larger centres. They formed local cultural associations and rented accommodation, making it possible for some of the dance and drama groups, orchestras, choirs and schools to continue their work. For public concerts and plays, they rented halls and theatres. In some cases they attempted to lease their own temples, but without success. The initiative and leadership for the work among the Ukrainian pro-communists was provided by the Ukrainian members of the CPC.[9]

After the Ukrainian pro-communist press was banned in June, 1940, Stepan Macievich, an able journalist who had been employed by *Narodna Hazeta,* launched, on the instructions of the CC of the party, a short-lived illegal newspaper, *Za Voliu* (For Freedom).[10] Simultaneously, negotiations were begun with the Reverend M.N. Cependa, a Ukrainian priest of the Russian Orthodox Church, who was publishing irregularly a small newspaper, *Holos Pravdy* (Voice of Truth), in Smokey Lake, Alberta. In the autumn of 1940, Nicholas Hrynchyshyn, formerly on the staff of *Narodna Hazeta,* joined *Holos Pravdy,* which then became an unofficial organ of the Ukrainian pro-communists. With their support, the paper became a weekly in November. Its circulation rose rapidly from 300 to 7,000[11] and its language became typical of the banned Ukrainian press as it undertook to expose "the enemies of the people" but carefully avoided falling afoul of the Defense of Canada Regulations.

The surprise German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, produced a rapid change in the Canadian public attitude towards the Soviet Union. From a hated collaborator of Germany it suddenly became "our gallant ally". The communist line also underwent a sudden about face from open opposition to outright support of the war effort. On the day of the attack the Politburo of the outlawed communist party issued a call: "All Out for Soviet Victory over Fascism".[12] Dorise Neilsen who had so recently voted against the war appropriations declared her support for Mackenzie King and appealed for the formation of "victory clubs to speed on the Dominion's war effort". On December 27, the *Canadian Tribune* advocated "compulsory selective service that would assure Canada of an army large enough to defeat the enemy wherever he can be fought to our best advantage". Tim Buck, in hiding, pledged full and unconditional support for the war against Hitler and appealed for the enlistment of 10,000 party members and sympathizers into the armed forces for overseas service.

The sudden invasion of the USSR shocked the Ukrainian pro-communists, but it also opened up possibilities for expanding their activities. Within two weeks of the German attack, 1,500 Ukrainians gathered at a meeting in Toronto and expressed their "solidarity with the peoples of the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine now defending their sacred soil against a treacherous aggressor". They

proclaimed in a resolution that the "defense of the Soviet Union at this time is in reality a defense of Great Britain and a defense of Canada".[13] A week later a mass meeting of 5,000 Ukrainians at Massey Hall in Toronto demanded that the federal government extend moral and material aid to the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously, Ukrainian pro-communists began forming committees to assist their native land. In Sault Ste. Marie a committee sprang up two days after the invasion.[14] On the initiative of several able and aggressive young activists, Michael Dushnitsky, former secretary of the Ontario provincial committee of the ULFTA, Michael Mutzak, who was prominent in the association's cultural activities, Stepan Macievich, Nicholas Hrynchyshyn and others, a conference of representatives of the local committees was called. It met in Toronto on July 26, 1941. The gathering of fifty-six delegates formed a new organization, the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland, with headquarters in Toronto and elected Mutzak, president, and Dushnitsky, secretary.

The formation of the new association was followed two weeks later by the establishment of a weekly paper, *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* (Ukrainian Life), edited by Macievich and Hrynchyshyn, who had left *Holos Pravdy* because of misunderstandings with Reverend M. N. Cependa. Another weekly, *Ukrayinske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word), ably edited by the veteran, Shatulsky, was launched in Winnipeg on January 20, 1943, to serve Western Canada.

The newly-formed association plunged into feverish activity in aid of the USSR. Its press called for support of Victory Loans, increase in industrial and agricultural production and enlistment of all able-bodied males. Many of the leading members of the association joined the armed forces. To encourage others, the names of volunteers were published in the Ukrainian pro-communist press.

The WBA, which held its thirteenth convention on February 17-19, 1942, also gave top priority to the war effort. The main slogan of the gathering was: Strengthen the War Effort of Canada to Guarantee Victory Over Fascism. It resolved to aid in recruiting, to work in Red Cross campaigns and to invest in Victory Bonds.

The cultural groups used their talents unstintingly in entertaining military and civilian audiences across Canada. The Toronto mandolin orchestra performed regularly in war factories and military training camps; the Winnipeg ensembles appeared at least twice a month in training camps in Manitoba; the Calgary string orches-

tra staged about forty concerts for soldier trainees in a period of two and a half years.[15]

The women members organized special local projects in addition to participating in the general campaigns. In Winnipeg they met at the home of Mary Kardash and knitted socks for Canadian soldiers, and sweaters and mittens for Soviet children. They also sent parcels to Ukrainian servicemen and assisted in the United Service Centre for armed forces personnel. Altogether there were fifty-three local women's committees which sent parcels to soldiers valued at nearly $12,000.[16]

When voluntary enlistment did not provide the necessary number of recruits for the armed forces and the government announced a plebiscite on the question of compulsory military service, in 1942, the association issued an appeal for a "Yes" vote and conducted a vigorous campaign on its behalf.

In the meantime the communists carried on incessant agitation for allied military aid to the hard-pressed Soviet forces. Stalin's appeal on September 4, 1941, to the allies for a Second Front in the West to relieve German pressure was immediately taken up by them and agitation for military aid to the USSR was intensified.

In the process of participating in the war effort and the campaigns to aid the USSR, the Ukrainian pro-communists expanded their press and organizations. *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* which started out with a circulation of 5,000, increased to 12,000 in a few weeks. Within a year it had grown to 15,000 and there were hopes that it would reach 20,000.[17] *Ukrayinske Slovo* was also growing. In the autumn of 1943 it launched a campaign for 2,000 new subscribers. By the end of January, 1944, the quota had been reached.

The new organization, which had changed its name to Association of Canadian Ukrainians at its first convention in Winnipeg on June 4-6, 1942, registered considerable gains in membership. It recruited 1,900 new members during January-February 1944 and 2,579 during the same period in 1945. Over one third of these were in Ontario and nearly one quarter in Manitoba (Table VIII). The number of branches also increased from 200 in May 1942 to 248 by December 1943 and 315 by 1945 (Table IX).

The WBA which had experienced a decline after the outbreak of war, losing 876 members in 1940, many of whom left because of fear of persecution, also showed a steady growth. After its thirteenth convention in February, 1942, it was given permission by the au-

thorities to accept new members. The WBA scored another triumph in May when it received title to the main ULFTA hall in Winnipeg on which it had a mortgage. Its reopening on June 28 marked a great celebration with a packed house and many turned away. Over $2,000 was collected to cover the costs of repairs and seventy new members were recruited. On August 5, 1944, the WBA was granted a dominion charter by special act of parliament. This further spurred recruiting and by the end of 1945 it had 98 branches and 7,757 members (Table X).

Simultaneously with their activities on behalf of the war effort, the Ukrainian pro-communists conducted a campaign to obtain the release of their interned leaders, the lifting of the ban on the ULFTA and the return of their properties. They were actively supported by a number of representatives of the upper strata of the Canadian community: leading businessmen, lawyers, editors, educators, rabbis, church ministers, parliamentarians, trade union leaders and others whose politics ranged from Conservative, through Liberal, Social Credit, CCF to Communist.

The first phase of the campaign was initiated within two weeks of the German attack on the USSR with a demand by a meeting of 1,500 Ukrainian leftists for the release of all "anti-Nazi Ukrainian leaders" and "the withdrawal of the order-in-council declaring anti-fascist Ukrainian organizations illegal and confiscating their property".[17] On September 29, a delegation of Ukrainian pro-communists visited the Honourable Ernest Lapointe, then Minister of Justice, with the request that, pending a decision to return the properties of the ULFTA, the premises should be made available to their association which would "utilize this property to carry on war charities, promote recruiting and generally assist by all means at its disposal to further the specific war aims of this country".[18]

The campaign was given greater scope in the autumn when a petition form, asking that the ban be lifted, was printed in the *Canadian Tribune* with the request that it be signed and mailed to the government. Within a month, locals repesenting 40,000 trade unionists had endorsed it. The Alberta provincial convention of the CCF, held in February, 1942, added its voice to the demand that the ban be lifted.

Ukrainian pro-communists sponsored a conference in Ottawa in March, 1942, which dispatched a delegation accompanied by Angus MacInnis, CCF MP for Vancouver East. The delegates presented a



В листопаді-грудні відбудеться кампанія на "Українське Життя". Допоможіть газеті писати правду і викривати зрадників і ворогів народу. Всі до праці в пресовій кампанії! Зберім для неї якнайбільше фонду і приєднаймо тисячі нових передплатників!

6. Cartoon on the occasion of the beginning of the press campaign for *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* in 1943 in which the communist leaders expressed their confidence in vanquishing their nationalist opponents. As *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* unrolls the newsprint on which is written "Truth", it overcomes *Novy Shliakh*, the UCC and a Ukrainian with the nationalist flag. With an expression of horror on his face, Professor Kirkconnell raises his hands in a gesture of surrender as he is about to suffer a similar fate. The appeal reads: "Help the paper to write the truth and expose traitors and enemies of the people." *UZh, November 18, 1943.*

brief to the Honourable Norman McLarty, Secretary of State, requesting the removal of the ban on the ULFTA and the return of the confiscated properties.

Simultaneously, a National Conference for Democratic Rights, organized by the Reverend A.E. Smith, a long time activist and former secretary of the Canadian Labor Defense League, also sent a delegation to the Honourable Louis St. Laurent, Minister of Justice, requesting him "to release interned and imprisoned antifascists, remove the ban on the Communist Party and other workers' organizations and make democracy work for total war".[19]

In the House of Commons in March, 1942, Victor Quelch, Social Credit MP for Acadia, Alberta, twice asked the Minister of Justice what action he was contemplating regarding the interned antifascists "held merely on the charge of having been members of the Communist Party".[20]

The House of Commons appointed a select committee to consider and review the Defense of Canada Regulations. On July 16, 1942, the *Canadian Tribune* and several dailies carried a full-page open letter addressed to the Honourable J.E. Michaud, the committee's chairman, appealing for the lifting of the ban. It was signed by over 300 prominent citizens across Canada, from all walks of life, the first of whom was the Very Reverend Peter Bryce DD, former Moderator of the United Church of Canada and pastor of Metropolitan United Church in Toronto.

In the meantime, former members of the ULFTA formed a committee to promote their organization's case and approached the Civil Liberties Association (CLA) which undertook to spearhead the drive. As part of a broad campaign of pressure exerted on the government, the CLA sponsored a public meeting in Maple Leaf Gardens on July 17 in support of lifting the ban and releasing the internees. Arthur W. Roebuck, Liberal MP for Toronto-Trinity, was chairman; Very Reverend Dr. Bryce opened the meeting with a prayer; J.W. Noseworthy, newly-elected CCF MP for York South, and Arthur Hayes, a prominent American lawyer and counsel for the American Civil Liberties League, addressed the gathering; J.M. Macdonell, general manager of National Trust Company and a prominent Conservative, thanked the audience.[21]

The interned communists were gradually released in September and October of 1942, but the ban was not lifted in spite of recommendations by the select parliamentary committee to that effect which were tabled on July 23. The campaign then entered the second phase with the demand that the government implement these recommendations and lift the ban.

On October 10, 1942, another full-page open letter, urging the implementation of the report, appeared in communist weeklies and large dailies, addressed to the Prime Minister and entitled: We Stand For Freedom. Again there were over 300 signatories, headed this time by Mitchell F. Hepburn, the Premier of Ontario.

As the campaign gathered momentum, the CLA organized another mass meeting in Maple Leaf Gardens on October 13 at which 13,000 were present. Among the many prominent members on the sponsoring committee were A.Y. Jackson, of the Group of Seven, and Rabbis Samuel Sachs and Maurice Eisendrath. The speakers: Leopold Macauly K.C., Premier Mitchell Hepburn and Tim Buck, all urged an end to the ban.[22] There was another meeting in Massey

Hall on February 10, 1943, presided over by Sir Ellesworth Flavelle, a director of National Trust, and addressed by other noted public figures.

The CLA also sent letters to all MP's urging the lifting of the ban. It applied added pressure on the government through a drive for signatures to a petition urging the return of the ULFTA properties. In its issues of May 3 and 4, 1943, the *Toronto Daily Star* publicized the campaign with a photo of the members of the committee and a reproduction of the petition. Other dailies in Toronto and Winnipeg endorsed the campaign.

A national committee of ULFTA members, headed by Boychuk, worked with the CLA and simultaneously carried on a publicity campaign of its own. In March 1943, it published a book, *This Is Our Land,* by Raymond Arthur Davies, formerly one of the top leaders of the Young Communist League, outlining the cultural work of the ULFTA and the contributions of its members to the war effort. The book generated considerable sympathy for the ULFTA.

Two months later, the ULFTA committee issued a pamphlet, *Ukrainian Canadians Appeal for Justice,* pleading innocence. (The ULFTA was never charged with activities subversive to Canada.) It contained statistical data on the original cost, sale price and indebtedness of each hall (10 were debt-free) (Table III). The pamphlet which was widely distributed to organizations, prominent individuals and members of parliament, fanned the growing public sentiment that an injustice had been done and the halls should be returned to their original owners.

There were indications that the campaign was having its effect. Mackenzie King replied to a union's petition on behalf of the ULFTA that "due consideration would be given to representations urging lifting the ban". When the CLA pressed him early in October for a meeting on the issue, King agreed to see a delegation on October 19.

Subsequent government action obviated the need for the meeting. On October 14, the ban was lifted by an order-in-council which stipulated

> that all property rights and interests in Canada, or the proceeds thereof, vested in and subject to the control and management of the Custodian . . . be released to the person or organization from whom it was received. . . .[23]

Table III

ULFTA PROPERTIES SOLD BY THE CUSTODIAN

Location of Temple	Original Cost	Amount of Sale	Balance to ULFTA	Liability against Property
Toronto, Ont.	$130,000.00	$35,000.00	$24,762.89	$ 9,012.42
Edmonton, Alta.	16,000.00	5,291.00	3,540.00	505.42
Winnipeg, Man.	21,000.00	13,300.00	−408.19*	12,000.00
Hamilton, Ont.	16,152.15	5,650.00	3,243.41	2,398.57
Saskatoon, Sask.	16,250.00	1,500.00	299.80	352.03
Vancouver, B.C.	22,000.00	6,000.00	1,577.04	none
Lethbridge, Alta.	14,000.00	1,060.00	432.65	none
Bienfait, Sask.	8,000.00	860.00	55.59	400.00
Lachine, Que.	11,500.00	2,000.00	1,457.93	none
Brooklands, Man.	4,500.00	400.00	176.22	none
Libau, Man.	1,800.00	250.00	61.99	none
Arborg, Man.	2,000.00	356.00	89.06	none
Swift Current, Sask.	2,000.00	350.00	139.81	none
North Battleford, Sask.	560.00	210.00	79.52	none
Calgary, Alta.	15,000.00	1,500.00	1,073.72	none
Medicine Hat, Alta.	11,500.00	1,500.00	1,011.44	none
Timmins, Ont. (lot)	1,200.00	1,200.00	583.45	none
Gimli, Man. (lot)	No data available			none

*This figure is a debit against the ULFTA.

Source: *An Appeal for Justice: The case of the Seized Properties of the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association,* (Toronto: The Civil Liberties Association), 1944, p. 8.
Note: The first three temples were sold to the Ukrainian Nationalist Federation, the next three to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the seventh on the list to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Ibid., pp. 22, 24, 26, 28. The Toronto, Hamilton, Saskatoon, Brooklands and Libau temples were sold after the USSR entered the war. Ibid., p. 30.

Five days later, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, an advisory committee was set up by another order-in-council,

> to consider and make recommendations to him with respect to the manner and means which should be used in releasing the properties . . . and advise him in respect to any objections or complaints in respect to dealing with claims filed and any conflicting claims as to the ownership of said properties or the proceeds of any properties which may have been liquidated.[24]

Despite the orders-in-council, the properties were not released. Their return was complicated by the fact that sixteen of the temples and two building lots had been sold, some of them after the USSR

had entered the war. In addition, several of the libraries had been destroyed.

There had been considerable agitation on these issues for some time. Dorise Neilsen had raised the question of the sale of the properties in the House of Commons on February 10, 1942, and of the destruction of the libraries on July 5, 1943.[25] Ten days later she condemned government policy toward the ULFTA and read sworn affidavits of witnesses to the wanton destruction and burning of the libraries in Toronto and Edmonton.[26]

The situation was embarrassing for the government. St. Laurent disclaimed any responsibility with the remark that his ministry "had nothing to do with the property of the banned organizations".[27] McLarty, the Secretary of State and Custodian, had "no information as to what books, if any, were destroyed". Regarding the sale of the properties, he declared that

> . . . not a single labour temple which was able to carry itself was sold . . . except for one of three reasons: First, there was a mortgage against it, and usually heavily overdue. The revenue was not sufficient to pay the mortgage. Second, there were other cases in which there were heavy arrears of taxes . . . Third, some of the buildings were in an extremely dilapidated condition. . . .[28]

Mutzak issued a public statement in which he declared that none of the temples was dilapidated, that nine of the sixteen had no mortgage or tax arrears and all were disposed of at a fraction of their cost (Table III). In addition, the printing press of the Labor Farmer Publishing Association, valued at $75,000, was sold for $9,000.

Failure on the part of the government to return the halls triggered the third phase of the campaign by the ULFTA and its supporters. It began with a demonstration of 3,000 in front of the ULFTA temple at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto. The crowd, which tied up traffic, took the police several hours to disperse. The press again entered the campaign. In an editorial on October 16, the *Toronto Star* labelled the lifting of the ban without the return of the properties, "Incomplete Action".

In this phase, the issue was taken before the sessions of the Advisory Committee provided for by the order-in-council of October 19, 1943, and consisting of Judge George W. McPhee, chairman, and George A. Campbell and W. Gordon Thomson, members. When the committee began its sessions in Toronto on January 10,

1944, the Soviet armies were on the offensive and pro-Soviet fever was at its height. The atmosphere was most favourable for the ULFTA. Many leading representatives of churches, social organizations, business enterprises, trade unions and other prominent personalities appeared before the committee. They included musicians, many in uniform, who had received training in ULFTA halls. Arthur Roebuck asserted that the aim of the ULFTA had been "the furthering of goodwill . . . and the spreading of education and culture". Rev. J.B. Thomson, of Dufferin Street Presbyterian Church, regarded the members of the ULFTA as "fine Christians". John Karach, a former ULFTA teacher, testified that "no anti-British ideas were ever taught at the school".[29] The Committee was impressed. It recommended the return of all halls, including those that had been sold, the payment of taxes for the period the halls were under the care of the custodian, and the reimbursement for damages to the buildings.[30]

In January 1944, the unsold buildings were returned to their owners. The custodian made a payment of $13,033.79 to cover the taxes and another $10,791.70 to cover claims for damages in accordance with the recommendations of the advisory committee. For the halls that were sold (there is no mention of the two lots, one in Timmins, Ontario and one in Gimli, Manitoba), the custodian mailed a cheque to each local branch of the ULFTA for the amount of the sale price minus the charges,[31] a total of $38,297.16 for halls whose original cost amounted to nearly $300,000 (Table III).

It was a critical moment for the ULFTA. The NEC issued instructions to the local branches not to cash the cheques and initiated the final phase of the campaign for the return of the halls that had been sold. On March 25, 1944, a delegation of four, Boychuk, Navis, Prokop, and Dushnitsky, came to Ottawa where they had a meeting with McLarty who made it clear that he had no intention of repossessing the sold halls but promised to make a report to the cabinet which could then decide on the issue. The delegates also visited a number of MP's and cabinet ministers and decided to call a conference of representatives of the ULFTA and public figures to press their case. In the meantime, while the conference was in the process of preparation, Boychuk, on behalf of the ULFTA, sent a memorandum to Prime Minister King, outlining the associa-

tion's case and requesting the restoration of all property without any encumberance and compensation for all losses due to destruction or to the sale of the contents of various temples.

The press again took up the case with a fresh wave of criticism of the government. The new attack was set off by an editorial in the *Toronto Star* on January 13, 1944, followed by four others, demanding the return of the halls to their original owners. Others, including Percy Bengough, president of the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress, added their voices to the growing chorus. The CLA issued and distributed an attractive, illustrated 36-page pamphlry, *An Appeal for Justice,* which outlined the ULFTA's case in detail.

On July 25-26, 1944, a conference of leading members of the ULFTA, trade unions, churches and the press, with a number of MPs in attendance, was held in Ottawa. It selected a delegation, consisting of Rev. Dr. John Coburn, secretary of the Board of Evangelism and Social Services of the United Church; Pat Conroy, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Congress of Labour; and four Liberal MPs: Arthur Roebuck; Ralph Maybank, Winnipeg South Centre; Dr. J.P. Howden, St. Boniface; and T.J. O'Neill, Camloops. The delegation conferred with a sub-committee of the cabinet, composed of four ministers, and asked for the return of the remaining temples.

Public pressure and the impending federal elections apparently were causing some anxiety in Ottawa. In October, the government "decided that every effort was to be made to restore its properties to the ULFTA" and George A. Campbell was appointed to negotiate for their repurchase. Just what transpired between Campbell and the purchasers is not clear, but on January 25, 1945, an order-in-council was issued ordering, for reasons of "security, defense, peace, order and welfare of Canada", the delivery of the halls in Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Hamilton and Toronto to the Secretary of the State not later than April 30, 1945.[32] The NEC of the ULFTA was informed that seven of the sixteen halls would be returned, namely: Lachine, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Saskatoon and Edmonton, with a proviso that the ULFTA was to pay $6,000 for repairs to the Edmonton hall. The government offered payment in the sum of $20,000 for the halls in Calgary, Lethbridge and Medicine Hat but refused further compensa-

tion for the other six halls in Brooklands, Swift Current, Bienfait, North Battleford, Libau and Arborg or the two lots in Gimli and Timmins.

The NEC of the ULFTA realized that a federal election was in the offing and concluded that delay was hazardous. On April 7, 1945, it named a delegation of four, Boychuk, Prokop, Dushnitsky and Mutzak, and empowered it to conclude an agreement. After prolonged negotiations McLarty agreed to increase the payment for the three halls in Calgary, Lethbridge and Medicine Hat from $20,000 to $25,000 and to cover half of the $6,000 cost of repairs to the Edmonton hall. On these conditions a final settlement was made on May 10, 1945.[33] Three days later, elections were called. Separate negotiations were conducted between the custodian and the Labor Farmer Publishing Association, and in January, 1946, an additional $20,000 was allowed by the custodian for the printing equipment that had been sold.

The successful campaign for the return of the ULFTA property was accompanied by Ukrainian pro-communist revival and growth during the war. Many factors contributed to this phenomenon. The membership remained loyal, united and disciplined, continuing the cultural activities (although on a smaller scale) after the ULFTA was banned. Their unselfish involvement in the war effort, the Red Cross campaigns and the recruiting drives after the USSR became an ally won for the pro-communists wide public respect and support.

When the top leaders were interned, younger men stepped into the breach to give effective leadership. Working endless hours for the most minimal salaries, they set an example for the rank and file by their faith, enthusiasm and dedication. After release from internment the seniors resumed their posts, working with those who had replaced them. In the campaign for the return of their property an important role appears to have been played first by Mutzak and then by Boychuk, a communist veteran who used his experience and connections most effectively. Not only did the leadership use good judgement, wise strategy and sound tactics but it was able to mount well-organized and sustained offensives that generated mass public support. According to Boychuk:

> This was a campaign on an unprecedented scale. Tens of thousands of pamphlets were published in Ukrainian and English. . . . These . . . were

sent to all Canadian public institutions, to all municipalities, to trade unions, universities, churches and to members of parliament and the senate. There was not one significant provincial or national convention: liberal, conservative, church, YMCA, druggists, adult education and others, where the case of the ULFTA was not raised.[34]

In the campaign for the release of their leaders from internment and the return of their properties, the Ukrainian pro-communists had the support of numerous prominent citizens who were alarmed by the arbitrary application of the Defense of Canada Regulations, internment without charge or trial, the banning of organizations without a hearing and the disposal by the Custodian of property held in trust. Convinced that an injustice had been done and democratic and property rights infringed upon, they entered the fray on a matter of principle, to right what they regarded as wrongs, and played a decisive role in a sustained campaign which the government could not ignore.

Labor felt a sense of kinship and sympathy for the ULFTA, whose members in industry were ardent trade unionists. At the same time, it harboured a certain apprehension that the arbitrary application of the regulations was a dangerous precedent. In ad-



Почалась Чистка Власної Хати Правними Власниками

7. Ukrainian communist gloating after the ULFTA halls, which had been sold to the nationalists, were returned to them. On the left, the labor temple in Toronto; on the right – in St. Catharines. The cartoon is titled: "The rightful owners have begun a cleanup of their home." *UZh, February 3, 1944.*

dition, many union activists supported the campaign because of their communist convictions or sympathies.

Furthermore, Soviet entrance into the war, which gave hard-pressed Britain an ally, generated a great deal of pro-Soviet sympathy and created an atmosphere conducive to communist revival and growth. Many prominent Canadian citizens considered it quite anomalous that supporters of Canada's new ally should suffer internment and loss of property.

Voices of gratitude, admiration and support for the USSR were heard from various quarters. The Very Reverend Peter Bryce, in an article in the *Toronto Star* entitled "Let Us Repay Our Debt to Russia," asked: "What would have happened to us if Russia last year had been fighting on the side of Germany instead of fighting against Hitler?"[35]

In an article in the *Globe and Mail* on October 9, 1943, the Reverend I.G. Perkins of Donlands United Church praised the USSR for having "welded the countless races of one sixth of the world into a unity and a brotherhood that has amazed the world".

Some became completely mesmerized by Stalin's personality. The *Toronto Star* called him "one of the great men of all times". Rev. Dr. Stanley Russell of Deer Park United Church in Toronto described him as "a political and military genius of the first magnitude whose word is his bond and whose name will go thundering down the corridors of history as a mightier and better man than any who ever governed his country before him". Leonard Brockington KC rose to equal heights of eloquence. To him Stalin was "indomitable, with an eye that sees clearly, a heart that beats without fear and a tongue from which springs truth".[36]

Apprehensions of the Allies about Soviet aims were dispelled when Stalin declared:

> We have not and cannot have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples . . .[37]

The torrent of pro-Soviet propaganda was swelled by the panegyrics to the USSR delivered at rallies on various occasions. On November 25, 1942, a mass meeting of 17,500 in Maple Leaf Gardens launched the Aid to Russia Fund. It was followed by similar gatherings in other cities. On June 23, 1943, the second anniversary of the German invasion, "Salute to Russia" rallies were held all across Canada. The prime minister, provincial premiers, federal

and provincial ministers, municipal leaders, church dignitaries, trade union officials, military officers and other prominent individuals (including Eleanor Roosevelt) appeared at these meetings and paid tribute to the USSR.

Ukrainian communists thrived in the atmosphere of admiration for the Soviet Union. The leaders participated on committees and rubbed shoulders with Canada's elite. Their well-oiled machine worked behind the scenes to advertise and promote the pro-Soviet manifestations and to guarantee their success.

The titanic struggle between the USSR and Germany was presented as a contest between good and evil, between Soviet armies of liberation and Nazi forces of oppression. Aroused to a high emotional pitch, people were able to identify with right against wrong. When the Red armies began to advance and inflict defeats on the Germans, might and success were added to right, making identification with the USSR, the winning contestant, even more appealing and impelling. Those who were critical of the Soviet system or its policies, or even reluctant in their support of "Aid to Russia" campaigns, were branded "quislings" or "fascists", working for the victory of Hitler. The Soviet bandwagon was rolling and the popular thing to do was to climb aboard.

The fortunes of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were also closely related to and influenced by the development of the Canadian communist movement. On August 21-22, 1943, the communists launched a new political organization, the Labor Progressive Party, to replace the outlawed Communist Party.

The new party was soon chalking up electoral successes. Communists were reelected with increased majorities to municipal posts in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Timmins, where they had been represented before the war. Their candidates were also elected for the first time to municipal offices in Saskatoon, Montreal, Oshawa and Hamilton. In Ontario, two communists, A.A. MacLeod and J.B. Salsberg, were successful in the provincial election on August 4, 1943, and on August 9, Fred Rose, a leading communist, was elected to the House of Commons in a by-election in Montreal-Cartier. Ukrainian communists supported the party candidates and were among the candidates and the elected.

Communist growth was most spectacular in industry. Before the war the communists had been active in promoting unemployed

and trade union organization, developing a force of able and experienced organizers in the process. In many industries the communists laid the foundation for the mass trade union organization by the formation of small secret groups. In 1935, they disbanded their trade union centre, the Workers Unity League, and assigned their forces to organizing unions of the Committee for Industrial Organization which often came under their control. With the outbreak of the war, industries began to boom and masses of workers, among them many Ukrainians, flocked to factories in Ontario. Due to the shortage of labour, employers abandoned the practice of dismissal for union activity, a practice which was so prevalent in the pre-1939 depression period. Consequently, the trade union movement grew, with many experienced communists and their supporters in the leadership. Their dedication, and self-sacrifice and the euphoria generated by Soviet victories won for the communists the support and sympathy of large numbers of their fellow workers from whose ranks new party members were recruited and new cadres developed.

The extent of communist strength and influence in unions can be gauged by a Total War Rally for a second front, which was sponsored by the auto, electrical and seamen's unions at Maple Leaf Gardens on September 21, 1942. J.A. Sullivan, president of the Seaman's Union and chairman, faced an overflow audience. With him on the stage were: C.S. Jackson, international vice-president of the United Electrical Workers; George Burt, Canadian director of the United Auto Workers; Paul Fournier, president, Montreal Trades and Labour Council; A.A. MacLeod, editor of the *Canadian Tribune*; J.B. Salsberg and Norman Freed, recently-released communist leaders; Premier Mitchell Hepburn and John Boychuk. Special guests were three Soviet war heroes. For some reason Ottawa considered it inadvisible to invite them from Washington where they had been guests of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. They came instead as guests of the provincial government on the personal invitation of Premier Hepburn.[38]

The rally had special significance for the Ukrainian pro-communists. They had played a prominent role in early communist trade union organization. The expanding labour force contained many Ukrainians who had been unemployed and others who had been moving into industrial centres from Western Canada. In the unions

many fell under the growing communist influence. At the rally, they faced a mass spectacle of 18,000 persons, many of them fellow unionists, paying tribute to three Soviet war heroes. One of them, Liudmyla Pavlychenko, a woman sniper of the Red Army with 309 Nazis to her credit, was a Ukrainian, a fact which could hardly fail to arouse in them a sense of national pride.

The Ukrainian communist leaders skillfully exploited the favourable climate created by such affairs, and by the general trend of events, to promote their cause. Even though they lost their printing presses and six of their smaller temples which were located in less important centres, the Ukrainian communists regained possession of the rest of their halls, founded two new publishing establishments and two successful weekly newspapers, built a new numerically stronger organization, extended their influence in the Ukrainian and Canadian communities and emerged from the war with greater popularity and prestige than at any time in their history.

III

Maintaining the Momentum

THE victory over the Axis powers produced an unprecedented sense of confidence in the ranks of the Ukrainian communists in Canada. The USSR, which they had faithfully and unswervingly supported from its inception, had emerged from the war as a great and seemingly invincible power. In the West it had occupied half of Europe; in the Far East it contributed to the defeat of its arch enemy, Japan. Not only was the USSR in a position to influence the peace settlement and the future course of development of the post-war world, but it was rendering decisive support to the national communist movements in Eastern Europe in the establishment of communist-dominated governments, and deploying its forces in Asia to the advantage of the communists in China.

There was also a surge of left-wing sentiment unleashed by the war and motivated by hopes of a bright new world without wars or depressions. A widespread conviction prevailed that this could only be achieved by fundamental changes in society. Consequently, the political trend was to the left and the communists were in the ascendency. In France and Italy among the strongest single political groupings were the communist parties; in China the communists had established themselves as a viable alternative to the regime of Chiang Kai-shek; in Indonesia and Indo-China they were leading mass armed resistance movements against foreign domination.

Communist influence was further enhanced by the widespread hope and assumption that the cooperation of the Allied powers, achieved in the war, would be continued in peace time in the interests of progress and prosperity. Such a climate proved most suitable for the continued growth of the influence and power of the USSR and the non-ruling communist parties.

The leftward swing exerted its influence in Canada. The communists had entrenched themselves in the trade unions and a party member, J.A. (Pat) Sullivan, had become secretary of the Trades and Labour Congress. For the first time they had representatives in the House of Commons, the Ontario Legislature, the Toronto Board of Control and many other municipal bodies. The party's membership roll, its influence and its prestige exceeded all pre-war records.

The trend to the left was also reflected in the rapid growth of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. Their energetic and enthusiastic participation in the war effort and the numerous and massive appearances of their concert ensembles not only earned them great popularity but created the impression that they formed the largest and most patriotic group in the Ukrainian community.

Fully aware of the advantage they had gained over the nationalist organizations which had been forced to return the Ukrainian labor temples, the communists exuded a confidence which bordered on presumption and arrogance. They proclaimed theirs "the largest and most active Ukrainian organization", the leader "in the Ukrainian cultural field" and the "victor" who "can and should grow steadily". In a spirit of self-righteousness they described the nationalists as "dead souls", declared them completely bankrupt and predicted their early demise.[1] The communists envisaged themselves to be the chief and rightful spokesmen of the Ukrainian community.

They had good reason for such optimism. The nationalists were on the defensive. For the time being their hopes of establishing an independent Ukraine were shattered; they had little public support and a break had occurred in their ranks. Wasyl Swystun, of Winnipeg, and Mykyta Romaniuk, of Toronto, both barristers and prominent former nationalists, and William Yarmey, a Toronto physician, adopted a pro-Soviet position. Articles appeared in the Ukrainian pro-communist press by Mykyta Romaniuk and Mykhailo Sribniak, attacking the Ukrainian National Federation of which they had been members, and by A. Marko, from Saskatchewan, who defended Swystun. A former editor of *Ukrayinsky Holos*, Michael Kumka, joined the staff of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia*.

The self assurance of the Ukrainian communists was enhanced by the continuous expansion of the international communist movement with which they eagerly and openly identified. They revelled

in every new report of communist success, seeing each as a harbinger of the ultimate universal triumph of the communist cause. A Ukrainian communist leader summed up their attitude when he declared that:

> These are stirring days all over the world.... Half of Europe has already gone socialist. The other half is in the throes of transition.... Only the wilfully blind can fail to see ... the labor pains of a new world emerging....[2]

As evidence that capitalism was doomed the Ukrainian communists pointed to the unstable employment conditions. According to their press, "black clouds of economic crisis" were gathering over the capitalist world which would result in mass lay-offs.[3] They played on the fears of another depression and presented the communist movement as having the only alternative.

Flushed with confidence and certainty in the victory of their cause, the Ukrainian communists sought to maintain in the post-war the tempo of activity and the momentum developed during the war. They embarked on an ambitious program of expansion, the promotion of the communist cause and the glorification of the USSR as the world centre of class justice and human virtue.

Consequently, they initiated a series of carefully planned and organized events and projects: festivals and anniversary celebrations, ambitious programs for increasing the membership and the press circulation, and bold far-sighted plans for expanding the physical facilities of their organizations.

An important aspect of their programs revolved around cultural activities. The Ukrainian pro-communists treated the promotion of culture not as an end in itself but as a means of advancing their ideology. They placed a great deal more emphasis on the training of their cultural ensembles than did the nationalists. Consequently, they surpassed their rivals in the quality of their productions and in the number of performers involved. Mass cultural festivals became one of their favourite means of maintaining the tempo of activity, popularizing their organizations and winning new supporters and recruits.

Early in 1945, the pro-communists decided to initiate the transition from war to peace time activity and simultaneously celebrate the liberation of Ukraine by staging an Eastern Canadian Festival on June 30-July 1 in Toronto. The event would pay tribute to the

USSR, underline the association's connections with Ukraine, display its cultural forces and serve to inspire its members and supporters and to maintain the wartime momentum.

When the war ended on May 8, the event was transformed into a Victory Festival. On June 30, over 1,000 performers, made up of 350 choristers, 240 musicians of string and fifty of wind instruments, 200 dancers and 200 sportsmen, entertained and captivated a mass audience of 15,000 in Maple Leaf Gardens. Another concert was staged at a mass open air rally of 40,000 at Hanlan's Point near Toronto the following day.[4]

The festival was a tremendous success; a new and unexpected ingredient made it a sensation. The Ukrainian communist leaders, who apparently knew how to exploit their Soviet connections, provided a most pleasant surprise for the audience. Three delegates from the Ukrainian SSR to the UN Conference in San Francisco, V. Bodnarchuk, president of Kiev University, P. Pohrebniak, a professor and F. Parkhomenko, secretary and translator to the delegation, were passing through Ottawa on their way home. They stopped over and were invited to attend the festival. Bodnarchuk and Pohrebniak greeted the audience at Maple Leaf Gardens and G. Zarubin, the Soviet ambassador, thanked the Ukrainians for the aid they had given to the USSR during the war. The Ukrainian delegates and the ambassador were also present the following day at the open air rally at Hanlan's Point.[5]

The occasion generated considerable emotion and excitement among Ukrainians and raised the influence and prestige of the pro-communists. Not only were they celebrating the great victory for which they had worked with such zeal and determination but they were glorifying Soviet Ukraine and capitalizing on the USSR's popularity gained in the process of achieving victory. The nationalists were insisting that the Russians were suppressing the Ukrainian language. Yet here were Ukrainian representatives speaking in beautiful Ukrainian. Furthermore, the Ukrainian pro-communist organization was sponsoring their appearance, identifying itself with the living Ukraine and acting as the representative and spokesman of Ukrainians in Canada.

From Toronto the Soviet delegates went on to Winnipeg. On July 2, they appeared at a mass concert and meeting in Playhouse Theatre where Bodnarchuk described the German atrocities and the



8. The massed choir and orchestra that participated in the Ukrainian pro-communist Victory Festival in Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto on June 30, 1945. *UZh, July 12, 1945.*

great reconstruction program in Ukraine. In the evening they were honoured at a banquet in the Royal Alexandra Hotel, attended by 300 guests.[6]

The excitement of seeing and hearing the Ukrainian delegates from San Francisco was shared by Edmonton. The bulk of the delegation, headed by D.Z. Manuilsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR and former secretary of the Comintern, stopped over in Edmonton on June 29. The entourage included the Byelorussian delegates to the UN. The visitors were met not by officials of the Canadian government but by Navis, Shatulsky, Krawchuk and other communist leaders, accompanied by W.A. Macdonald, editor of the *Edmonton Journal.*

The delegates were treated to a dinner in the officer's mess at which Ukrainian communist leaders were present. In the evening they were guests at a banquet, sponsored by Ukrainian and Russian pro-communist organizations. Among the speakers was Navis who declared that:

> Only under the leadership of Marshall Joseph Stalin, the great genius, could the Ukrainian and other people of the mighty Soviet Union have withstood and vanquished such a cruel enemy as German fascism.[7]

A mere five years earlier the parent organization had been banned, its properties seized and the leaders interned as enemies of the state. Now they were meeting "representatives" of Ukraine and playing the role of state representatives themselves. It was pretty heady wine. They pointed to the delegates as proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine. Somehow it did not dawn on the Ukrainian communist leaders or, for that matter, on anyone else who repeated the myth of Ukrainian sovereignty, that had Ukraine been sovereign, it was more likely that officials of the Canadian government and not they would have been meeting the delegates. Had it been Molotov, Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, they would simply have been ordinary spectators watching from the sidelines. That did not alter the fact that the event raised the prestige of their organizations and provided new power for the momentum that they had developed during the war.

The Ukrainian communist leaders decided to try to make 1946 an even more momentous year for their movement. The Second Convention of their organization in January, 1946, approved a plan for a Western Canadian Festival of Ukrainian Music, Song and

Dance to be held in Edmonton July 26-28, and invited representatives of the arts from Ukraine to attend.

A number of distinguished Canadian personalities became patrons, among them the Governor-General, the Right Honourable Viscount Alexander, lieutenant-governors, provincial premiers, provincial chief justices, mayors and others.

A delegation of five arrived from Ukraine: L. Palamarchuk, editor of the daily, *Radianska Ukrayina* (Soviet Ukraine), organ of the CC of the CP and the government of Ukraine; Semen Stefanyk, a professor of law and son of the noted Western Ukrainian writer, Vasyl Stefanyk; Ivan Patorzhynsky and Zoya Haidai, operatic singers; and Andriy Malyshko, one of Ukraine's leading lyric poets. The group's arrival set a precedent: it was the first cultural delegation from Ukraine to Canada.

The festival began on Friday, July 26, with a colourful parade through the streets of the city by the 1,000 performers, attired in native costumes and led by the WBA brass band from Winnipeg. Thousands lined the streets to watch the procession.

On Saturday the arena was packed for the afternoon and evening performances. Many in the audience were moved to tears. The CBC national network broadcast the program. On the afternoon of the following day there was an open air rally in the Exhibition Grounds at which over 15,000 spectators were present. Some came several hundred miles to greet and hear the guests.[8]

After Edmonton they appeared in local festivals in eleven other Canadian cities, spending a total of seven weeks in Canada. Their presence caused a sensation in the Ukrainian community, helped to break down anti-Soviet feeling and raised the influence and prestige of the Ukrainian communists to an unprecedented height.

The staging of the series of festivals was a grandiose undertaking which no other Ukrainian organization had previously attempted. The leaders took great pains to impress upon their followers the full significance of the delegation. Its members were hailed as "the first real emmissaries of the great Ukrainian people" who came to Canada "as harbingers of national unity and solidarity". Their coming was "a great achievement for the AUUC"* and "a high honour" for the Ukrainians in Canada. It was underlined that the

*In November 1946, the Ukrainian pro-communist organization was incorporated as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC).

delegates came on its invitation because only it was worthy of such an honour and that "no other organization or ethnic group has revealed the artistic and organizational talent that our Association has revealed in organizing that and other festivals".[9]

In the meantime, plans to expand their organization were launched at the Second Convention on January 12-15, 1946, which met in the favourable climate generated by the visit of the delegates from the UN Conference. The convention, flushed with a sense of victory over fascism, declared that one of its tasks was "to extend our organization and our influence".[10] The delegates were proud of their organization's role in the war effort and the campaign to aid the USSR and Ukraine, jubilant over the return of the ULFTA properties, and confident of continued growth of the association in the future.

The 185 delegates carefully assessed the organization's shortcomings. They noted the neglect of educational work and the erosion of discipline, the shortage of experienced cadres, who could not be trained in wartime, the preponderance of male members, the paucity of Canadian-born in the ranks and the lack of a youth organization.

The convention mapped out an ambitious program to remedy the shortcomings and expand the Association. It instructed the NEC to strengthen the leadership by promoting younger men; appointing three national organizers, one of them a woman and one a youth; electing a farm member, who understood agrarian problems, to the NEC; forming a provincial committee in Quebec; and appointing a secretary. It also resolved to increase the circulation of the press "at the expense of readers of the nationalist press", to conduct an annual campaign to raise funds for the Association and recruit new members, to organize teacher training courses and to apply for a dominion charter.

The gathering paid special attention to the Canadian-born, who formed about two thirds of the Ukrainian population in Canada. It resolved to organize the adults into separate branches where they could conduct the meetings in English, to call a conference in the near future of youth workers to lay plans for forming an organization of Ukrainian youth, and to begin publishing a separate paper for the Canadian-born in English.[11]

Subsequent conventions followed the precedent of drawing up ambitious plans to promote activity and expansion. The third,

held in Toronto on February 12-15, 1948, and hailed as the most successful, prided itself on being the first bilingual convention. Its plans for the Future were reflected in the slogan "Attention to the Canadian-born". It resolved to organize children's clubs and to involve their members in various activities such as choirs, folk dancing, sports, outings and others, and to unite the thirty-one existing youth clubs into a national organization, the Youth Section of the AUUC, with its own national executive.[12]

The Fourth Convention, held on January 25-29, 1950, made much bolder plans. Since the festivals of 1945 and 1946 were so successful, the convention resolved to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the life and achievements of Ukrainians in Canada on Dominion Day, 1951, by staging another great national music festival and by the erection of a monument to Shevchenko on Canadian soil.

The NEC of the AUUC requested the Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries in Kiev to initiate negotiations on its behalf with a Ukrainian sculptor for the creation of a statue of Shevchenko. The society replied that it would make all the arrangements at its own expense.

9. The Shevchenko monument erected in Shevchenko Park midway between Toronto and Hamilton near Palermo, Ontario.

The monument was duly delivered and installed in a park named after the poet and located near the town of Palermo midway between Toronto and Hamilton. The ceremony in connection with the unveiling lasted two days. On June 30, 1951, a concert was staged at Maple Leaf Gardens by 1,500 performers, choristers, musicians, dancers and athletes before an audience of 10,000. The next day, July 1, the monument was unveiled in the presence of a crowd described as the largest gathering of Ukrainians ever held in Canada, and estimated by the sponsors at 45,000.[13]

In spite of the fact that the monument had been sent from the USSR, there were no Soviet embassy representatives at the ceremony. Since the defection of Gouzenko and his revelations of Soviet espionage in Canada, they had apparently felt it was most advisable to avoid publicity. The honoured guest at the ceremony, who cut the ribbon, was Vasyl Pylypiw, son of Ivan, the first Ukrainian immigrant to Canada.

Nevertheless, the erection of the monument was a memorable event in the history of Ukrainians in Canada. It became the talk of Ukrainian communities across Canada. Thousands came to view the imposing statue and pay tribute to Shevchenko. Its erection marked the zenith of Ukrainian pro-communist influence in Canada.

The great success of the unveiling prompted the Fifth Convention of the AUUC, which was hailed as the largest in the history of the Association, to decide on annual festivals to be held on Dominion Day weekend at Shevchenko Park. The festival the following year was linked with the opening of a Shevchenko Museum which the Association constructed beside the monument.

The museum contained numerous exhibits on the life and work of Ukrainians in Canada and Shevchenko in Ukraine. Again there were no representatives of the Soviet embassy at the opening. However, a few months later the Shevchenko Museum in Kiev sent about 500 exhibits, among them individual reproductions of paintings, depicting events in the poet's stormy life. The works contributed to a popularization and understanding of Shevchenko, although in some of the paintings historical truth is distorted to conform to Russian interpretation.

In one of them, Shevchenko appears as weak, bewildered and overawed in the presence of the Russian critic, V.G. Belinsky, who

is portrayed as strong, forceful and dynamic. In spite of the fact that Belinsky abhorred Shevchenko and everything Ukrainian, this canvas is proudly displayed in the museum as an indication of the great friendship between Shevchenko and Belinsky.[14]

The opening of the museum did not draw the crowd or generate the interest aroused by the unveiling of the monument, but it further enhanced the prestige of the AUUC and helped to maintain the enthusiasm and the pace of activity of the members at a high level. The museum also became an added attraction for those coming to visit the Shevchenko Park. The Ukrainian communists hailed it as "the second historic event in the life of Ukrainian Canadians".[15]

In the meantime, another important date was approaching. Great preparations were underway in Ukraine to celebrate the 100th anniversary in 1956 of the birth of Ivan Franko, Western Ukraine's outstanding poet and writer whom Soviet authorities claim as their own, but whose works they will not publish in full.[16] To mark the anniversary in Canada, the Sixth Convention of the AUUC resolved to hold local memorial meetings, stage a national festival and erect a Franko Museum in Winnipeg.

The festival lasted three days. The unveiling was highlighted by greetings from noted guests, among them Dr. James G. Endicott of the Canadian Peace Congress. For the first time in nearly ten years, a representative of the Soviet embassy appeared at a Ukrainian pro-communist gathering in the person of Stepan Demchenko.

The enthusiasm of the participants was somewhat dampened by a discordant note. The Society for Cultural Relations with Ukraine had asked the Society in Kiev to send a delegation to the festival. The Kiev Society agreed to delegate a group of eight, among them Zinovia Franko, niece of the great poet. On the intervention of Ukrainian nationalists the Canadian government refused to issue entry visas to the members of the group. In spite of this, the festival attracted large crowds, generated wide publicity for the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations and provided the members with new stimulus for further activity.

In addition to national, there were regional festivals organized by the cultural groups of one or more provinces. AUUC ensembles toured small communities which did not have their own performing groups. They also participated in events sponsored by other organizations and appeared at Expo in August, 1967.

The work involved in organizing the frequent festivals kept the membership in a state of constant activity. The opportunities to appear before large appreciative audiences encouraged the performers. The concerts themselves attracted large audiences and drew Ukrainians into the orbit of organizational involvement.

Ukrainian communist leaders returning from visits to Ukraine, also generated enthusiasm that helped to maintain the momentum. Prokop, the first from Canada to visit Ukraine after the second world war, spent nearly four months there in 1946. On his return he made an extensive tour of Ukrainian communities across Canada addressing seventy meetings on the effects of the war and the progress of reconstruction in Ukraine. People of diverse political and religious views, anxious for news from home, packed the meetings to hear him. In Winnipeg he spoke for three hours to a crowd of 1,500.[17] Shatulsky, Weir, Teresio, Krawchuk and others also went on tours and addressed large meetings on their return from visits to Ukraine.

There were other events that helped to inspire the members and sustain the momentum. Among these were special celebrations with concerts and banquets to mark various dates: the twenty-fifth anniversary of the WBA in 1947, the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Western Ukraine in 1949, the fiftieth anniversary of the Ukrainian pro-communist press in 1957, the fortieth anniversary of the ULFTA-AUUC in 1958 and others.

The leaders also attempted to maintain the feverish tempo of activity by setting quotas in the press, financial, recruiting and other campaigns. The members were then kept in a state of tension by continuous exhortations and proddings to achieve the goals that had been set.

The renewed momentum in the post-war period, generated by these activities, was given further impetus by the evidence of growth and achievement. The AUUC, which had 13,000[18] members and 315 branches in 1945, recruited 1,713 new members in 1946 and 1,211 in 1947 (Table VIII). The number of women's branches had more than doubled in the same period, from fourteen to twenty-nine. Thirty-two English-speaking branches were formed with over 1,000 members.[19]

The communist-dominated cooperatives, which were wholly or partially owned by Ukrainians, were also growing. A conference of

300 families in Sudbury agreed to buy shares in the Workers Co-operative of New Ontario, based in Timmins, to open a branch in their city. A meeting of the Peoples Cooperative in Winnipeg decided to initiate a campaign for new members to expand the enterprise.[20]

The two papers, *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* and *Ukrayinske Slovo,* reached a circulation of 25,000 in 1946.[21] A new paper in English, the *Ukrainian Canadian,* was launched under the able direction of John Weir, as editor. It began as an eight and later became a twelve-page semi-monthly tabloid that skilfully combined articles of general interest, translations of Ukrainian literature and poetry, organizational news, children's materials and sections on humour and sports. The paper aroused considerable interest and by the end of the year it already had 1,500 subscribers.[22]

The physical facilities of the pro-communist newspapers and organizations also expanded. In 1947 *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* acquired its own premises. Six years later it purchased a new automatic Chandler and Price press. In 1956 it received a new rotary press from the USSR.[23]

To expand and facilitate summer activities, the Ukrainian pro-communists acquired camp grounds where members could gather. In 1947, AUUC and WBA members jointly purchased a hundred acre farm near Palermo; in 1953, the WBA acquired a children's camp at Husavick on Lake Winnipeg; two years later the AUUC and WBA in British Columbia jointly purchased a picnic grounds in Haney; in Alberta the AUUC obtained grounds for a children's camp on Sylvan Lake.

The grounds of each site were improved and provided with various facilities. The erection of buildings at Palermo was begun in 1949. Ten years later an open-air swimming pool was opened. In 1961, an open-air amphitheatre, "the only one of its kind in Canada", was completed.[24]

Many of the labor temples proved outdated or inadequate to accommodate the increased influx of members and supporters. The branches in many localities: Ottawa and Port Arthur, Ontario; Highland Creek, Alberta; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Regina, Saskatchewan among others, proceded to remodel and enlarge their premises.

The number of labor temples also increased through the purchase and remodelling of old buildings or the construction of new ones. The AUUC purchased buildings in Geraldton (jointly with the Fe-

deration of Russian Canadians) in 1947, in Sault Ste. Marie in 1949, and in Montreal in 1962. New halls were constructed in Lac Cardinal and Sunset House, Alberta, in 1945; Volyn and Calgary, Alberta, and Point St. Charles, Quebec, in 1948; St. Catharines, Ontario, and Glace Bay, Nova Scotia, in 1949; Dunville, Ontario, in 1953. The largest and most modern of the new labor temples was constructed in Edmonton in 1952 at a cost of $150,000.

The completion of alterations to a labor temple, the purchase of another building or the construction of a new temple was marked by a large and enthusiastic celebration which was usually attended by leaders from the centre. At the opening of the Edmonton hall there was a crowd of 1,400 people and such AUUC dignitaries as Teresio, Shatulsky, Mokry and Mary Kardash.[25] Such events raised the spirits of the members and supporters and helped to maintain the momentum of the Ukrainian pro-communist movement.

Another means, constantly employed by the Ukrainian communist leaders to maintain a high level of enthusiasm and activity was the glorification of and identification with the USSR. In their agitation and propaganda, they hammered away at the theme that the Soviet Union was a just society, that it was a federation of free and equal republics, that only under Soviet rule had Ukraine, its language and its culture been able to develop freely, that only in alliance with Russia had the union of Ukrainian lands and independence of Ukraine been made possible, that only in a federation with the Russians could Ukraine have withstood the German attack.

Reports on the USSR were written in the most eulogizing tones. It was the bastion of peace, progress and justice. Everything it did was for noble and altruistic motives, whereas the USA and the other capitalistic countries were governed by dishonest, war-mongering politicians in the interests of grasping capitalists and imperialists, scheming to subvert the world to their control.

They identified their movement with the USSR which was held up as the vanguard of humanity's march to universal peace and justice. Each member was made to feel that he was part of this great "invincible power" that stood "on the summit of world history"[26] and that his or her participation in the Ukrainian mass organizations contributed to the realization of history's destiny.

The leaders never tired of trying to inspire the members by lengthy descriptions of "great achievements" in the USSR. Hrynchyshyn led the way. In one issue of *Ukrayinske Slovo,* of which he

was editor-in-chief, there were four articles on the subject: "Great Achievements in the USSR of Formerly Oppressed Nations"; "Great Achievements of Women in Forty Years of Socialism"; "Great Achievements of Ukraine During the Years of Soviet Power", and one article entitled simply, "Great Achievements".[27]

Anthony Bilecki, president of the WBA, who could not match Hrynchyshyn in quantity of production, outdid him in ecstacy of description. After returning from a trip to Ukraine he wrote: "We saw a revived, prosperous, flowering Ukrainian land and happy people".[28]

The editors also tried to inspire readers with a steady diet of articles on the "bright future" of the USSR. After describing Soviet advances in agriculture, one editorial declared: "With such a tempo of rapid development even the enemies do not deny that the nations of the Soviet Union . . . will have in the near future *the highest standard of living in the world* [italics in original].[29] A few days later the same paper quoted Khrushchov:

> By 1970 or even sooner the USSR will surpass the USA in all branches of industrial and agricultural production. . . .[30]

In addition, according to other editorials, income tax was to be abolished, the USSR was to introduce the shortest work day, "the Ukrainian people . . . will live in a country which in practice will resemble an imagined Eden" and "the perspectives before the USSR are truly limitless".[31]

The editors of the pro-communist press also revelled in the Soviet space achievements and exploited them to enthuse and inspire the readers to greater effort on behalf of the cause. They declared that the launching of the sputniks in 1957 revealed that "the Soviet Union surpassed the most advanced capitalist country, the USA, in science and technology".[32]

The launching of the five-ton space ship in 1961, which carried Yuri Gagarin, was greeted as "the triumph of advanced Soviet science, culture and the Soviet system", and "the greatest achievement in the history of man".[33]

The new program of the CPSU, published in 1961, which predicted the completion of the "material and technical basis" of communist society in twenty years (by 1980), was hailed as "a new milestone on the road to communism in the USSR" and as the "sunset of capitalism and the sunrise of communism".[34]

There were also attempts to revive and maintain the momentum with the unveiling of a bust of Vasyl Stefanyk, the noted Western Ukrainian writer, in Edmonton in 1971 and a monument to Lesia Ukrayinka, Ukraine's outstanding woman poet, in Saskatoon in 1976. But the crowds were small and neither event aroused much enthusiasm in Ukrainian pro-communist ranks. In spite of all their efforts, the Ukrainian communist leaders could not maintain the tension, the fervour and the great sense of urgency that inspired their followers during the war. Consequently, the pace of activity gradually slackened and the momentum slowed down.

IV

Communists Versus Nationalists

ONE of the greatest problems that the Ukrainian pro-communists faced in their efforts to promote the communist cause among Ukrainians was the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. The bitter conflict between the two groups during the war and in post-war periods went through several phases, with the issues over which the struggle was waged changing from one period to another. The initiative also passed from one group to the other depending on how the fortunes of each was affected by events at home and abroad.

The pro-communists were handicapped by their limited strength. In spite of their growth, they still represented only a small minority of the Ukrainians in Canada. In dozens of cities and towns, especially those in the prairie provinces such as Dauphin, Manitoba, or Yorkton, Saskatchewan, where there were large Ukrainian communities, the pro-communist organizations did not even have branches. In hundreds of smaller Ukrainian communities, served by one or more Ukrainian churches, there was not even a subscriber to the Ukrainian pro-communist press. In cities where the pro-communists might have a labor temple, the nationalists would have several halls and churches.

Their numbers limited the role they were able to play in political life. The election of a Ukrainian communist to public office was very rare, whereas there were hundreds of nationalists on local governing bodies as well as a number in provincial and federal legislatures. Eventually nationalists even received appointments to the federal cabinet and the senate.

The main controversy between the two groups was over the question of the status of Ukraine. The communists insisted that it

was a free and independent republic in a voluntary and equal union with Russia and other Soviet states. The nationalists maintained that the USSR was an empire and Ukraine a colony, dominated and oppressed by the Russians.

They saw hope for the realization of an independent Ukraine in the growing tension in Europe caused by Hitler's belligerence. In the unstable international situation in 1938-1939, with the USSR isolated diplomatically, the nationalists were able to seize the initiative and embark on a campaign to raise the issue of Ukraine on the international arena. Consequently they welcomed the Munich Agreement reached on September 29, 1938, between Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain. To them it marked the death of the League of Nations with its defense of the *status quo* and the birth of a democratic-totalitarian front directed against the USSR. They advocated the recognition of national minorities and the initiation of

> a strong mass movement demanding a plebiscite in the Ukrainian territories of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia . . . with a demand for the right of the secession of Eastern Ukrainian lands from Russia, a right guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.[1]

Representatives of nationalist organizations and churches, Ukrainian members of the House of Commons and provincial legislatures and other prominent Canadians issued a declaration to the British government and other world powers. In it they maintained that the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, embracing all the ethnographically Ukrainian territories, was an historic necessity in the interests of a balance of power, and urged the signatories of the Munich Pact to appoint an International Commission to make a final settlement of the Ukrainian problem.[2]

Prior to 1939, in their fervent desire to free Ukraine from Russian domination, the Ukrainian nationalists in Europe had sought German support. The conclusion of the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, followed by a war in which Germany was ranged not against the USSR but against Great Britain, France and Canada, caused considerable consternation in nationalist ranks. However, the various Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Canada immediately proclaimed their loyalty to and support for the Allied war effort. But this did not diminish their activities in the interests of Ukrainian independence. On November 7, 1940, with the participation of professors George W. Simpson and Watson

Kirkconnell and Mr. Tracy Philipps, a British diplomat working with the Canadian government, the nationalists formed the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), a central representative body of all Ukrainian churches and organizations with the exception of the pro-communists. Its aims were to coordinate the efforts of the Ukrainians in the war, to serve as the authoritative representative of Ukrainians in Canada and

> to act as spokesmen before the citizens and governments of Canada and the British Empire of the legitimate efforts of the Ukrainian nation in Europe for state independence on territories occupied by it and to render to the Ukrainian nation, within the limits of the Canadian and British constitutions, the greatest moral and material assistance directed toward the eventual liberation of the Ukrainian nation from foreign occupation of its territories.[3]

The position of the nationalists was clear and the Canadian government did not consider them subversive or disloyal. In January 1941, the Custodian of enemy alien property began disposing of the halls that had been seized from the ULFTA. The first sale, that of the hall in Edmonton, was made to the Ukrainian National Federation.

The forced entrance of the USSR into the war on the side of the allies placed the nationalists in a most awkward position. As loyal citizens of Canada they nominally became allies of their most hated enemy, the Russians, toward whom their attitude remained uncompromisingly hostile. *Novy Shliakh,* the organ of the Ukrainian National Federation declared on July 28, 1941, that the Ukrainian people "cannot stop regarding Stalin and his bloody regime as their deadly enemy".

The pro-communists had been in no position to counter or challenge the nationalists. The ULFTA was banned, their leaders were interned and they themselves were vulnerable to charges of disloyalty to Canada. The Soviet entrance into the war, however, radically altered their status in the Canadian community. After June 22, 1941, they declared their full support for the war effort and suddenly emerged as staunch patriots. Recognizing their favourable position, the pro-communists seized the initiative and launched a vigorous campaign against the nationalists whom they accused of supporting Nazi Germany.

The Ukrainian pro-communists were motivated by a desire to silence critics of the Soviet Union and mobilize all possible support

for Canada's new ally. There were also other considerations. By discrediting the nationalists, the pro-communists hoped to regain possession of the labor temples which had been sold to the nationalists and to extend their influence in the Ukrainian community.

The campaign took on the form of continuous sniping and denunciation, highlighted by charges and accusations. It was often augmented by attacks from the USSR and the Canadian newspapers which were influenced by communist propaganda.

The campaign began two weeks after the German invasion of the USSR. At a meeting of 1,500 Ukrainians in Toronto, a resolution was adopted urging the Canadian government "to curb the activities of the many pro-Hitler and pro-fascist Ukrainian groups in Canada".[4]

The Ukrainian National Federation, the most active and aggressive Ukrainian nationalist organization, was often singled out for attack. W.A. Kardash published a pamphlet in May 1942 entitled, *Hitler's Agents in Canada,* directed exclusively against the Ukrainian National Federation. He quoted from what he called "reams of propaganda . . . consisting of derogatory remarks, insults and what not against the Soviet Union and its fighting armies" from *Novy Shliakh* as proof that the Ukrainian National Federation was pro-Nazi and that the paper spread enemy propaganda. The logic was that if one was not pro-Soviet he was pro-Nazi.[5]

In another publication the communists accused the Ukrainian National Federation of being connected with Ukrainian Nazi agents in Europe and of acting as a fifth column in the service of Germany.[6] What gave the charges a ring of truth was the fact that some nationalist leaders in Europe were attempting to come to an understanding with the Germans to protect the interests of the Ukrainian population and to promote the cause of Ukrainian independence.

The Ukrainian National Federation attempted to counter communist charges. In 1943, it issued a publication outlining its history and describing its educational and cultural work; the radio telegraphy school in Toronto, the flying school in Oshawa, the summer schools in music and culture in Winnipeg; its economic achievements: consumer cooperatives, credit unions, a benevolent society; its close association with Canadian organizations such as the Canadian Legion; its declaration of allegiance and support of the war

effort. It branded the communist attacks on itself as "slanderous in form, dishonest in substance and predatory in aims" and reasserted its support for the "efforts of the Ukrainian nation for freedom".[7] The UCC also attempted to counter the communist charges. However, the nationalists could not match the communist propaganda, backed by the USSR and often repeated by the Canadian press, in either scope or intensity.

In February, 1942, as part of the nationalist campaign on behalf of Ukraine's independence, Anthony Hlynka, a Ukrainian Canadian who represented the constituency of Vegreville in Alberta for the Social Credit Party, proposed in the House of Commons that:

> In view of the fact that all subdued countries that had been sovereign nations prior to this war are now privileged to form their provisional governments-in-exile in order that they may carry on the work in the iterests of their respective peoples, and in view of the fact that Ukrainians, who form a larger group than any of these, have not now that privilege simply because they were not an independent nation immediately prior to this war, I humbly submit that steps should be taken by the Allied government to make it possible for the Ukrainians to be represented at the various conferences now being held from time to time. In Great Britain, the United States and Canada there are in existence United Ukrainian committees whose primary object is to assist the governments in Britain, the United States and Canada in the successful prosecution of the war. I do suggest, if I may, sir, that since all the allied nations are fighting for a common cause of freedom, that Ukrainian committees to which I have referred be also invited to delegate their representative or representatives to express the view of 50 million Ukrainian people at conferences held by the allied nations.[8]

The proposal that citizens of Canada, Great Britain and the United States should represent and speak on behalf of Ukraine, which formed part of the territory of an allied country, engaged in a joint war against a common aggressor, evoked sharp and widespread criticism. The Ukrainian communists were quick to grasp the implications of the proposal. In a resolution, circulated widely, the Association to Aid the Fatherland argued that

> . . . it would be a most unfriendly act for the Canadian government to even participate in, far less originate proposals for the dismemberment of Britain's greatest ally and friend in the common struggle to save humanity from Nazi barbarism.[9]

The communist attack on Hlynka's speech was followed by others. Victor Quelch, Social Credit MP for Acadia, Alberta, made it clear in the House of Commons that the opinions of his colleague

regarding the USSR were not those of the Social Credit Party.[10] On February 7, 1942, in a display of complete lack of understanding of Soviet reality, the *Toronto Star* replied to Hlynka's proposal with an editorial entitled, "A Peculiar Speech", which claimed that

> autonomy of the Soviet republics is clearly granted in the constitution of the union. The government of the Ukrainian republic has the right to pass a law at any time to secede from the federal body. That it has not done so to date is doubtless because the people of that province has not desired it.

A year later, in March, 1943, the UCC raised the question of the post war status of Ukraine. The Polish government-in-exile, in a statement regarding its boundary with the USSR, declared:

> The Polish government, which represents Poland in the boundaries in which Poland, first among the Allied nations, took up the fight imposed on her, had from the moment of the Polish-Soviet treaty on June 30, 1941, maintained unchangeable the attitude that so far as the question of frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia is concerned the *status quo* previous to September, 1939, is in force. . . .[11]

The statement not only affirmed Poland's desire to maintain her pre-war boundary with the USSR which included part of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, but by using the phrase "frontiers between Poland and Russia", she even refused to recognize Ukraine.

As a protest against this statement of the Polish government, the UCC issued a memorandum to the Prime Minister of Canada in the belief that its views "may be helpful in the framing of a Canadian policy in external affairs and in consolidating our war effort". The memorandum viewed "with apprehension the thesis advanced by the Polish government . . . which advocates that such a boundary should pass through the centre of the ethnic territory inhabited by Ukrainians", reminded the Canadian government that "the Atlantic Charter clearly and unmistakenly lays down as a principle the right of a people to determine their political destiny", asserted that "the post-war settlement . . . should result in the final political unification of the territories inhabited by Ukrainians" and that the claims of Ukrainians "to an independent free state in a free Europe should not be disregarded and that the Ukrainian question should be included in any just and permanent settlement of Europe".[12]

By 1943 the situation in Canada had changed considerably in favour of the Ukrainian pro-communists. Their ranks had been augmented by the formerly-interned leaders and hundreds of new members. In Europe, Soviet forces were on the offensive. They

had lifted the seige of Leningrad and recaptured Voronezh, Kursk and Stalingrad. Pro-Soviet euphoria was at its height. The Ukrainian pro-communists were riding high on the waves of Red Army successes and Soviet popularity. It was a most inopportune time for raising the question of the post-war status of territories of the USSR.

The communists took advantage of the pro-Soviet sentiment and used the occasion of the protest to attack their opponents. They ignored the statement of the Polish government-in-exile with which they were in disagreement. The communist leaders were primarily interested in discrediting the nationalists, but unable to find fault with the memorandum, they launched a tirade against its sponsors. In a statement forwarded to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Under Secretary for External Affairs in Ottawa, N.A. Robertson, Ukrainian communist leaders declared that the UCC included organizations "whose leaders are Paul Skoropadsky and Andriy Melnyk,* two Ukrainian pro-fascists now residing in Nazi Germany and working for a Nazi-Fascist victory in Europe" and added that "the Ukrainian Canadian Committee consists of open enemies of Canada and friends of Hitler".[13]

The USSR was apparently also considerably perturbed by the UCC memorandum, probably fearing that the question of Ukrainian independence could become an international issue. Gusev, in a meeting with Robertson, mentioned the resolutions in the Ukrainian nationalist press advocating an independent Ukraine. He described this as pro-fascist and declared that he did not understand why, with censorship in force, newspapers were allowed to publish articles advocating the breaking up of territories of an ally, the USSR.[14]

Soviet authorities embarked on a strong counterattack to discredit the nationalists and their demand for Ukrainian independence. A week after the UCC presented the memorandum, two rambling and often incoherent articles of argument and invective attacking the memorandum and its sponsors appeared simultaneously in the Soviet press. The first was by Alexander Bohomolets, president of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the second by Pavlo Tychyna, an outstanding poet and its Commissar of Education.[15]

*Melnyk was in a German concentration camp during most of the war.

Bohomolets charged that the UCC was composed "of a handful of Ukrainian-German separatists", argued that separation would mean breaking up of the single front of the peoples of the USSR against the common enemy, recalled that the consequence of Ukrainian independence in 1918 was its occupation by German armies and contended that smaller nations are not capable of defending themselves against larger aggressive powers. The solution was a union with a "neighbouring freedom-loving great power". Hence Ukraine joined the USSR as "an equal member".

Tychyna, in addition to attacking members of the UCC, the nationalist leaders in Europe and the memorandum, outlined Ukraine's past attempts to establish and maintain its separate existence and argued that it was impossible to create the power desired by the Ukrainian-German nationalists. He concluded by describing Ukraine as "free and independent in the full sense of the word".

The Ukrainian communist leaders immediately exploited the articles to discredit the nationalist demand for Ukraine's independence. They published them in the pro-communist press and in pamphlet form in both Ukrainian and English and distributed them widely.

The articles were followed by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 1, 1944, giving each Soviet republic the right to organize a ministry of foreign affairs with direct diplomatic relations with foreign states and a ministry of defense with national military formations. If this was not enough to convince the world that Ukraine was achieving its independence, the USSR later obtained the agreement of Churchill and Roosevelt to give Ukraine and Byelorussia representation at the UN.

The Canadian press was sympathetically disposed to the USSR for its heroic struggle against the Nazi invaders and strongly influenced by Ukrainian communist and Soviet propaganda. It reacted critically to the UCC memorandum even before the publication of the Bohomolets and Tychna articles. The *Windsor Star* questioned the UCC's right to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian nation, declared that the leaders of the UCC were out of touch with sentiment in Ukraine, pointed out that the raising of the question of Ukrainian independence could cause distrust and resentment in Soviet quarters and naively asserted that "the people of Ukraine will be well able to speak for themselves when the last invader is driven out".[16]

The *Vancouver News Herald*, rehashing typical communist propaganda, declared on April 3, 1943, that "the proposal is word for word, letter for letter, as made for more than a decade by out-and-out Nazi puppets in Germany and elsewhere".

The publication of the Bohomolets and Tychyna articles set off a new series of attacks in the Canadian press on the memorandum. On May 15, 1943, the *Toronto Star* wondered "what would be said in Canada if representatives of a little group of Canadian separatists who wish to set up an independent nation on the St. Lawrence were recognized in some allied country as the group entitled to favour as being representative of Canada".

Saturday Night declared in its May 22 issue that "we do not disapprove of communism as a form of government for the USSR, including Ukraine". A Vancouver columnist warned that the attempt to influence the Canadian government to speak on behalf of Ukraine's aspirations for independence could "involve the English-speaking world in a war with the Soviet".[17] The communist weekly carried a full translation of the Bohomolets article. An editorial entitled: "Attention Mr. St. Laurent!", described the UCC as "neither Ukrainian nor Canadian", but "a Hitlerite agency conducting subversive activities against our country's and the United Nations' war effort".[18]

Emboldened by the serious rebuff the nationalists had suffered over the memorandum, the Ukrainian pro-communists attempted to sow seeds of dissension in nationalist ranks and wreck the forthcoming congress of the UCC. On June 15, on the eve of the congress, they addressed an open letter to the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League and to the Ukrainian people of Canada. It suggested that the UCC repudiate the Ukrainian National Federation in order to make it possible "to unite all Ukrainians in the war effort to aid in the successful struggle with the enemy".[19] How *all* Ukrainians were to be united by expelling part of them was not explained.

At the congress held in Winnipeg on June 22-24, 1943, with over 600 delegates, representatives of the Ukrainian National Federation were assigned important roles. Volodymyr Kossar, second-vice-president of the UCC, chairman of its coordinating committee and national president of the Ukrainian National Federation, made a report on "Ukrainian Canadians and the War Effort". He revealed

that Ukrainians had done more than their share in all financial campaigns: Victory Loans, Red Cross drives, and in recruiting. Over 35,000 Ukrainians had joined the services out of a population of 305,869 (1941 census) or 11.4 per cent.

The congress reaffirmed its loyalty to Canada by resolving "to exert maximum effort toward the prosecution and the winning of the war". Simultaneously it raised the question of Ukraine, declaring that it "should receive equal treatment with other recognized nations as a free and united member in the family of European nations".[20]

Failing to split the Congress and unable to interpret the UCC activities as being disloyal to Canada or in favour of Hitler, the communists found another opening for attack. After the UCC had issued its memorandum of March 23, 1943, opposing Polish claims to Ukrainian territories, Polish circles in North America proposed an understanding with Ukrainians. At the opening of the Congress a declaration was presented by four Polish-Canadian organizations expressing a desire for mutual understanding and cooperation between the two peoples and recognizing Ukraine's right to self-determination.[21]

The declaration was not discussed but on opening day Professor Watson Kirkconnell addressed the congress on the subject "Canadian Ukrainians". In his speech he dealt with the question of Galicia, the Ukrainian province which had been part of Poland prior to 1939. The speaker took the position that legally the USSR had no right to this territory because the pre-war Polish boundaries had been guaranteed by the Anglo-Polish pact of mutual assistance of August, 1939.

Ukrainians had a strong antipathy toward the pre-war Polish regime and the Poles generally because of the treatment Ukrainians had suffered at their hands in Galicia prior to 1939. The Ukrainian communists used the Polish declaration and the speech by Kirkconnell at the congress, which was published in a separate pamphlet, to play on the anti-Polish feelings of the Ukrainians. They accused the nationalists of coming to an understanding with the Poles, charged that the question of Polish-Ukrainian detente "did not appear as the first topic on the congress agenda by accident", (it did not appear on the agenda at all), intimated that "something unclean is hidden behind all this understanding of the Polish and UCC gentle-

men" and taunted the UCC for cooperating with Polish "lords" and failing to condemn Ukrainian "quislings" who were serving "bloody Hitlerism".[22]

They interpreted Kirkconnell's speech to mean that Galicia should be a part of Poland and accused the UCC of supporting such a position because it published the address, in spite of the fact that there was a foreword clearly stating that the opinions expressed were the individual views of the speaker.

As the war was drawing to an end, the Ukrainian nationalists became increasingly concerned about the fate of Ukraine in the post-war settlement. Even though the political climate was unfavourable for any serious consideration of the question of Ukrainian independence, Hlynka again raised the question of the post-war status of Ukraine and other nations of the USSR. Rising in the House of Commons, he pleaded "on behalf of millions who cannot now speak for themselves" and proposed that "submerged nations" should have opportunities "to make representations . . . at any and all world conferences to which all free nations are invited" and suggested that:

> the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America be asked to send their delegations to any and all world conferences for the purpose of presenting the Ukrainian case.[23]

The immediate reaction of the Canadian press, which preceded the communist reaction, was more hostile than it had been to previous nationalist proposals on Ukraine. One daily blasted the speech in an editorial entitled "Mr. Hlynka's Outrageous Proposal".[24] In another, a columnist wrote:

> The proposal will leave most Canadians agape with amazement . . .The suggestion is preposterous. . . . For certainly such an action would be a tremendous invasion of Soviet sovereignty. . . . For to entertain it even for a moment is to offer an unwarranted affront to a powerful ally to whom Canada owes much.[25]

The Ukrainian communist press, not to be outdone, declared that:

> The Ukrainian people waged a titanic struggle for its freedom. In that struggle . . . it chose not only freedom and independence but also, union of all its territories. And here appears a UCC, or rather, a Social Credit frog which despises that struggle of the Ukrainian people.[26]

As a result of the popularity of the Soviet Union and the effectiveness of communist propaganda, the nationalists were almost completely isolated. One daily wrote in their defense that "any at-

10. Ukrainian communist comment on the Ukrainian Canadian Committee's campaign for Ukraine's independence. The cartoon is titled: "Play as your master orders." Reaction is cranking the gramophone. The speaker, labelled "Ukrainian Canadian Committee", proclaims: "Ukraine is not independent", while Professor Kirkconnell gleefully looks on. *UZh, May 31, 1945.*

tempt to brand the Ukrainian Canadian Committee as a Hitlerite outfit does not stand examination".[27] But the response of the na-

tionalists and the few voices raised in their defense were drowned out in the flood of denunciations, exposes and attacks against them emanating from or inspired by communist sources.

This course of events had a demoralizing effect on the nationalists, encouraging individuals to drift to the pro-Soviet camp. This movement began among peripheral elements who had not been too closely attached to any nationalist organization but eventually affected members themselves, especially in smaller communities. They subscribed to the communist press and participated in communist-sponsored public activities. A few contributed articles to the Ukrainian pro-communist press and several even became members of Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

This trend was sparked by a series of about sixty lectures delivered during July and August 1942, in Western Canada by Myroslav Sichinsky of Rochester, New York. As a student in Lviv in 1908 he had assassinated the governor of Galicia for injustices against the Ukrainian population. Consequently Sichinsky became a national hero who commanded considerable respect and influence in some sections of the Ukrainian community.

In his lectures, Sichinsky directed his attack against Germany and emphasized the need for cooperation of the allies, including the USSR, to defeat Hitler. He very carefully presented the Soviet Union in a rather favourable light, taking some of the edge off the sharp anti-Soviet sentiment prevalent in the Ukrainian community. The impression he left was that perhaps the Russians were not as bad as was generally believed, thus preparing the ground for further pro-Soviet propaganda.

As the war progressed Sichinsky, who had a strong anti-German bias, veered more and more to the left and assumed a definite pro-Soviet stand. On February 11, 1945, he spoke in the Labor Lyceum in Toronto on behalf of the campaign for funds to aid Ukraine, which was initiated by Ukrainian communists and boycotted by the nationalists. The chairman of the meeting was William Yarmey, a Toronto physician from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church group.[28]

Other prominent Ukrainians were also influencing the pro-Soviet trend by their contributions to the communist press. The first of these was H.N. Kostash, a member of the Orthodox Church and superintendent of schools in Alberta. He wrote a series of articles entitled, "Education and Democracy".[29] The fact that they ap-

peared in the pro-communist press was of great significance. Kostash's example was followed by I.S. Dubeta, school principal at Warspite, Alberta, whose series was entitled, "Outline of Problems of Canadian Education".[30]

Another factor that weakened the nationalist camp and accelerated the drift of individual nationalists to the pro-communists was a rift in the UCC. Suddenly, in May, 1943, after the appearance of the Bohomolets and Tychyna articles and on the eve of the UCC congress, Wasyl Swystun resigned from the vice-presidency of, and membership in, the Ukrainian National Federation and from the chairmanship of the coordinating committee and vice-presidency of the UCC. He opposed calling the congress, arguing that since there was an alliance between Canada and the USSR such a step was an act of disloyalty to Canada.[31]

Swystun had been active in Ukrainian politics all his adult life. He was a founder of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and one of the most prominent nationalist leaders. After his resignation from the UCC, he withdrew from all political activity. When the war was drawing to a close and victory over the Axis powers appeared certain, he suddenly and unexpectedly broke his silence. The occasion was a public lecture which he delivered on February 18, 1945, in Winnipeg in the Prosvita Institute, an independent Ukrainian cultural society. The address, coming after the Yalta Agreement of the Big Three, proved to be a bombshell.

He spoke, to quote his own words, "as a person to whom the Ukrainian national problem, Ukrainian national culture and Ukrainian statehood are dear . . . as a Ukrainian who had all his life regarded the national problem as most important for the Ukrainian nation" and felt that not being a member of any political group he was able to assess more objectively the events of the war in relation to the Ukrainian problem. He described the two hostile camps into which the immigrant Ukrainians were divided and declared that "the time has come to consider whether it is not possible to eliminate the hostility".

He described the general disappointment among nationalists caused by German failure to recognize the principle of Ukrainian independence and declared that Ukrainians did not revolt against Soviet power but stood firmly against the Germans in support of the Soviet government which they had chosen for themselves.

The speaker expressed the conviction that its federation with other Soviet republics did not preclude Ukraine from achieving full nationhood. He declared that a Ukrainian state, whose powers were enlarged during the war by the acquisition of two new ministries, foreign affairs and defense, already existed but with room for further development. Swystun called for toleration and understanding between the two opposing Ukrainian camps and concluded with the remarks that "on the Ukrainian lands the Ukrainian nation lives and will continue to live, is developing and will continue to develop its state. . ."[32]

The speech was obviously a clear indication that the course of events had frustrated his hopes. The failure of the Germans to show any sympathy for Ukrainian national aspirations, the astounding Soviet military successes, and the general trend of events led Swystun to reassess his stand. His life had been dedicated to the Ukrainian movement for independence which he believed would be achieved through the defeat of the USSR in a war. That war was being fought, but instead of being defeated the USSR was emerging victorious. What other prospects were open for attaining Ukrainian independence? He could hope that another conflict would involve the USSR in a new cycle of wars. But if Swystun, who had passed the half century mark, was to play a role in Ukraine's achievement of independence its realization must come much sooner.

He searched for a new solution to an old problem and saw hope in a situation that had previously been regarded with despair. Ukraine had not achieved independence through war. Perhaps it could achieve independence through evolution. Nominally Ukraine was in a federation with Russia. He interpreted her acquisition of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the revival of Ukrainian national sentiment during the war, and the glorification of Ukraine's past as the beginning of the expansion of the state powers of Ukraine within the federal framework of the USSR. This process would continue, he felt, especially if there was an understanding and cooperation between the USSR and the West in the post-war.

Whereas previously he had hoped for war, he now opted for peace as the best gurantee of Ukraine's further state development. The role of the Ukrainians in Canada in this process, in Swystun's view, was to help promote closer ties and understanding between the two blocs.

Another consideration prompted him to seek contact with Soviet Ukraine. Swystun was concerned that Ukrainians in Canada should maintain their national identity. He was convinced that without the establishment of close relations with Ukraine this was not possible. Prior to 1939, Ukrainians in Canada had maintained ties with and received cultural sustenance from Western Ukraine. With the unification of Ukrainian territories there was only one source for such sustenance, the Ukrainian SSR.[33]

Swystun's appeal to Ukrainians of both camps to end their hostility appeared very conciliatory. In reality, it was a call to nationalists to abandon their anti-Soviet position and their efforts on behalf of Ukrainian independence and to recognize Ukraine as a constituent republic of the USSR.

The Ukrainian community was stunned by the speech. Two influential nationalist newspapers, *Ukrayinsky Holos* and *Novy Shliakh*, chose to ignore it. The independent weekly, *Kanadysky Farmer*, published it without comment.[34]

The speech was a great moral victory for the Ukrainian communists. They interpreted it as an important milestone in what they believed would be the decline and rapid collapse of the nationalist camp. Both communist papers carried the full text. One of them commented: "We are convinced that other public figures will follow this example".[35] Moreover, the speech provided a rationalization for those nationalists who had been moving into the pro-communist camp and a strong appeal to others who were being influenced by Soviet victories and the crescendo of Soviet propaganda.

Several Ukrainian nationalists shared Swystun's conclusions. Among them was a Toronto barrister, Mykyta Romaniuk. He was a founding member of the Ukrainian National Federation but had been ousted from the leadership during the war. Romaniuk disagreed with the nationalists on the role of the Ukrainians in Canada, maintaining that it should be limited to disseminating information on Ukraine. When the Ukrainian SSR received the right to representation in the United Nations, the nationalists condemned the step as a Russian move to obtain an additional vote. Romaniuk felt that regardless of the Russian motive, a Ukrainian representative in the UN meant recognition of Ukraine as a nation, even though it had not achieved full independence. The representatives were Ukrainians, albeit they may only have been figureheads.

Romaniuk was prepared to accept what had been achieved and proceed to build on it.[36]

Like Swystun, he belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox faith. The two were close friends who met on frequent occasions. It is more than likely that Swystun had consulted with Romaniuk before delivering his Winnipeg speech.

On April 29, two months after his first speech, Swystun addressed an audience in Toronto. The meeting was sponsored by a group of Ukrainian professional people. Dr. Yarmey was chairman; Romaniuk introduced the speaker. Swystun expanded on the subject of the status of Ukraine which he had broached in his first speech.

He declared that a Ukrainian state already existed "not in a rudimentary but in a quite advanced form" as a member of a federation with Russia. Swystun drew a parallel between Ukraine and Canada, each of which, according to the speaker was independent; but at the same time each was a member of a larger union. He added that whereas Tsarist Russia pursued a policy of Russification and assimilation of non-Russians and did not even recognize Ukraine as a separate nation, this was not the case in the USSR because "the basic law guarantees the individuality and inviolability of the language and culture of each peoples in the union".[37]

While the Ukrainian nationalists were stunned by Swystun's first speech, they were aroused by his second. Although their press still refrained from publicly criticizing him, privately he and Romaniuk and their followers were subjected to sharp condemnation, social ostracism and professional boycott by the nationalists.

Swystun further developed the theme that Ukraine was a state in another speech on August 12, 1945, in Edmonton. He emphasized that the Ukrainian people had achieved the desire to unify all their territories; that "Ukraine has the right to complete separation from other Soviet republics, but regards it beneficial to itself to remain within the framework of the union"; that for the first time Ukraine had emerged on the international arena "as a full nation in the circle of other nations of the world, having received recognition from the international organization of states in San Francisco as a fully competent, independent and sovereign state".

Swystun also reacted to the growing nationalist hostility toward him. He attacked the pre-1939 policy of the nationalists of promoting the independence of Ukraine through armed conflict be-

tween the West and the USSR, their denial of the existence of Ukraine as a state and their charge that Ukraine was a colony of Russia.[38]

Swystun's stand made it even more difficult for the nationalists to work on behalf of Ukrainian independence. In spite of this the UCC sent a delegation to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, composed of Rev. Dr. Kushnir and John Solomon, who addressed a memorandum to the Canadian delegation. It expressed gratitude to the latter for its vote in favour of the *de jure* recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation and its admission to the UN. It pointed out, however, that the Ukrainian representatives were not delegated by an elected government of Ukraine but by "a government set up by the Kremlin". The memorandum declared that the establishment of a free and independent Ukrainian state within ethnographic boundaries was the only just solution of the Ukrainian problem.

The UCC delegates were well aware that such a solution was beyond the power and competence of the UN. They suggested the incorporation of a Bill of Human Rights with a Protective Council which would be charged with the duty of seeing that the bill's provisions were adhered to by the members.[39]

The Soviet government, sensitive to efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists on behalf of Ukrainian independence, countered the nationalist memorandum. Manuilsky declared at the UN conference that Ukraine

> enjoys national state sovereignty, has its own constitution . . . parliament . . . government and military formations . . . commissariat for foreign affairs, possessing the right to enter into direct relations with foreign countries, to conclude . . . treaties and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives.[40]

Manuilsky's pronouncement put an end, for the time being, to further nationalist efforts on behalf of Ukrainian independence. To all outward appearances Ukraine enjoyed a large measure of national sovereignty. The failure of the nationalists to win at least some diplomatic support on the issue of Ukraine was even more demoralizing than their failure to keep the ULFTA temples they had purchased during the war.

The prestige and influence of the Ukrainian pro-communists was greatly enhanced by the frustration of nationalist efforts. With

the initiative still in their hands they resolved to take advantage of the favourable political climate by launching a new offensive to expand their popularity and their cause. The means they adopted were public displays of their impressive cultural ensembles through the staging of music festivals.

The nationalists sought to undermine Ukrainian communist influence by attempting to hinder and frustrate their various endeavours. When the AUUC proceded with preparations for their festival in Edmonton in 1946, the nationalists attempted to have it stopped. When the Edmonton city council made a grant of $300 to the festival committee, the nationalists lodged a protest. In Toronto, a nationalist made a public attack on the Ukrainian children's school in the labor temple in New Toronto. When the AUUC displayed handicrafts in the Toronto Art Gallery, the nationalists again protested.[41]

Preparations by the AUUC to unveil the monument of Shevchenko at Palermo also evoked numerous protests from the nationalist camp. The UCC even sent a delegation to Ottawa to urge the Canadian government to bar the statue which had arrived from the USSR. The delegates declared that the monument would be a "trojan horse", a "Mecca for avowed communists" and a means of raising funds for the communists.[42]

In spite of nationalist intervention, the Ukrainian pro-communist festivals were crowned with success. Attempts to curtail them seem to have increased their popularity and enhanced the Ukrainian pro-communist cause.

Swystun also tried to take advantage of the favourable climate in the immediate post-war period to gain support among the nationalists for his pro-Soviet views. He could have joined the AUUC and worked through it, but this would have isolated him from his nationalist base. He remained a member of the Orthodox Church and undertook to propagate his views and crystallize his influence among nationalists through a new organization with broader appeal.

Ukrainian communist circles in Canada were convinced that pro-Soviet influence could be extended to Ukrainian nationalists through contact with Soviet Ukraine. At a meeting in Winnipeg on January 13, 1946, during the Second Convention of the AUUC, Swystun announced the formation of a new organization, the Society for Cultural Relations with Ukraine. It was to be organized

in local branches and made up of "progressive-minded" professional people who wished to promote ties with scientific, cultural and educational institutions of Ukraine. The national executive was composed of Swystun, president; Yarmey, vice-president; Shatulsky, secretary; Romaniuk and Prokop, members.

Swystun, who was concerned about the further development of Ukrainian statehood, hoped to use the society's influence with Soviet authorities, through cultural exchanges, to expand the powers of Ukraine. In this way he also wished to promote interest in the Ukrainian language and culture among Ukrainians in Canada.

Swystun had always enjoyed a large following in the Ukrainian community. He was confident of winning wide support for his new organization. It soon became clear that his hopes were unfounded. The centre of the society was to be in Winnipeg, but the majority of the executive lived in Toronto. In Winnipeg, Swystun could not even recruit one nationalist for the national executive. Steps were taken to set up branches in Toronto and Winnipeg, but they never functioned. No other branches were ever formed.

There were a number of reasons why the Society failed to attract members. Had it been organized with the sole objective of promoting contact with Ukraine it might have found some support among those nationalists who wished to facilitate travel withUkraine, or to reestablish contacts with relatives, or for other reasons. Although Swystun could not recruit prominent nationalists for his society, he might have been able to bring in less well-known professional people on the fringes of the Ukrainian pro-communist movement who had never publicly committed themselves. Some of these were regarded as neutrals among the nationalists and may have been acceptable to them. But with the inclusion of two prominent communist leaders, the society was immediately branded as another communist-controlled body.

The new society was also bound to suffer because of Swystun's general approach. Instead of patiently and tactfully presenting his point of view, he often resorted to strong charges and attacks on individual nationalist leaders. It seemed to many that he was carrying on a personal vendetta against some of his former colleagues. In addition, the timing of the announcement of the formation of the society was ill advised. Coming during the convention of the AUUC, it left the impression that the society was sponsored by

the convention. Identification with it would be equated to outright association with the pro-communists.

There were other reasons why the society failed. The Ukrainian nationalists were suspicious of the Soviet regime. They remembered the great hopes generated among Ukrainians outside the USSR in the 1920s and how these had been destroyed by the bloody purges in the thirties. These suspicions were soon confirmed by two developments: the Soviet policy of forcible repatriation of refugees and the arrival of letters from refugees in Europe to their relatives in Canada, describing the conduct of Soviet authorities after they entered Western Ukraine in 1939.

The failure of the Society to develope was the first setback for the pro-communists. It indicated that the nationalists were not easily swayed and dashed communist hopes of a rapid decline of nationalist influence. It was closely associated with another serious defeat for the communists: their failure in 1946 to stop the admittance of Ukrainian displaced persons to Canada.

After the two reverses the Ukrainian pro-communists lost some of their confidence and initiative, and ceased predicting the rapid demise of the nationalists. They were elated by the success of the unveiling of the monument of Shevchenko in Palermo in 1951 but their confidence was badly shaken by the reception they were receiving at their public meetings from the newly-arrived refugees.

After the death of Stalin and the gradual easing of the cold war, the Ukrainian pro-communist hopes for the growth of their influence were revived. In February, 1956, Swystun, who had been in Ukraine in 1954, went on a tour of the large cities of Western Canada to report on his trip. In each locality he visited, committees were set up which were to proceed with the organization of branches of the Society for Cultural Relations with Ukraine.

The Ukrainian pro-communist press was confident that Swystun's tour would promote the extension of pro-Soviet influence among the Ukrainian nationalists.[43] Events seemed to lend justification to their optimism. Some in the nationalist camp hoped that Krushchov's speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU condemning Stalin's terror signalled the dawn of a new era for their brethern in Ukraine. As a result there was a blunting of hostility toward the pro-communists among some nationalists.

In addition, the Soviet Union appeared to be making rapid progress. Khrushchov was promoting detente and predicting that the USSR would overtake America. The communists were convinced "that our view of the world and our activity have been justified in the light of history, that basically we have been vindicated and that today we are following the correct road". The communist leaders were so confident that they announced their readiness to allot space in their press to partisans of both Ukrainian camps to discuss Swystun's views.[44] Their self-assurance seemed to receive further support when on October 5, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first sputnik followed by a second a month later, ushering in the space age.

However, Swystun's tour failed in its objective. The nationalists were not swayed by his oratory or influenced by Khrushchov's promises and the USSR's space achievements. Furthermore, the strength of the pro-communist forces had been slowly declining. Consequently, by 1956 the nationalists were able to challenge more effectively and to thwart the activities of the pro-communists and their supporters. When Swystun arrived for his meeting in Vancouver, he was greeted by a group of Ukrainians with a truck on which they had erected a gallows and a hanged effigy, as a symbol of the repressive Soviet regime.[45] Swystun's Society for Cultural Relations was condemned by a convention of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League.[46] This was especially significant as Swystun was one of its founders.

The nationalists also stole a march on the pro-communists by honouring Franko on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the poet's birth, at the fifth congress of the UCC in 1955. The feature guest at the event was Franko's daughter, Anna Kluchko, who refused an invitation to the pro-communist commemoration. At the UCC congress she declared:

> Had my father lived the communists would have killed him, as they have killed others, or would have sent him to Siberia as they did my brother.[47]

As the strength of their movement declined, the attitude of the communist leaders to the nationalists became ambivalent, alternating from criticism and attacks to appeals for cooperation. Any condemnation of Russian hegemony in Ukraine or action on be-

half of Ukraine by the nationalists evoked immediate denunciations by the pro-communist press. The UCC was accused of being "against Ukraine and its people", the nationalists were branded "inveterate enemies of Ukraine" whose only purpose was "to besmirch Ukraine and its people".[48]

The most frequent attacks in the pro-communist press in the late 1950's were made by Krawchuk under the pseudonym, Marko Terlytsia. The articles became the basis for two books published in large editions in Ukraine.[49] In 1957 Swystun also contributed a lengthy series of articles, which were published in booklet form in Canada and in Ukraine.[50] He derided nationalist claims to being a significant force in Canadian politics and accused the nationalists of supporting political parties in order to secure government appointments. Swystun criticized the UCC's intervention on behalf of Ukraine at international gatherings and declared that because the UCC neglected to place emphasis on the importance of maintaining their native language, the Ukrainians were losing their national identity in Canada. He concluded that the UCC was an "unhealthy phenomenon in the Ukrainian community".[51]

Swystun used the labor temples and the pages of the Ukrainian pro-communist press to attack the nationalists on a number of occasions. The audiences and readers were made up of members and supporters of the pro-communist organizations. His speeches and articles helped to buoy up the sagging spirits of his listeners and readers, but they had little if any influence on the nationalists.

Since attacks on them did not diminish the influence or activity of the nationalists, the communist leaders offered on several occassions to cooperate with the "inveterate enemies of Ukraine", hoping thereby to extend their own influence in nationalist ranks. In 1959 the AUUC declared its readiness in a letter to the UCC "to enter into negotiations for the elaboration of concrete conditions for cooperation" in erecting the proposed monument to Shevchenko by the nationalists in Winnipeg, on the centenary of the poet's death.

When their offer of "cooperation" was ignored and the project was completed without them, the pro-communist press accused those who unveiled the monument of "dirty slanders against the Ukrainian nation because it chose for itself the socialist system of life".

As the strength of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations declined and as they too became concerned with the problems of Russification in Ukraine, and preoccupied with acquiring Soviet visas to native villages for their members, criticism of their opponents became less frequent and more subdued. They still engaged in periodic attacks on the nationalists as part of their effort to maintain their status with the Soviet authorities. However, these were usually repetitions of stereotyped Soviet propaganda, lacking in conviction and substance. On the whole, the Ukrainian communist leaders became reconciled to their failure to undermine their rivals and to advance their own influence and the communist cause in the Ukrainian community.

Польський спец проф. В. Кирконнелл викладає історію України делегатам конгресу КУК.

11. How the Ukrainian pro-communist press interpreted Professor Kirkconnell's speech at the founding congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. The cartoon is titled: "Polish specialist Prof. W. Kirkconnell is lecturing the delegates to the UCC congress on Ukrainian history. Bisecting the map of Ukraine, he says: "The Ukrainian nation is not one. The Galicians are Arians. Ukrainians along the Dnieper are Asiatics. Consequently, Western Ukraine belongs to the Polish lords." Note a swastika on the lapel of the delegate on the extreme right. *UZh, October 28, 1943.*

V

Communists and the Ukrainian Refugees

THE failure of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations to successfully promote the communist cause in the Ukrainian community was influenced by developments affecting Ukrainians in Europe during the war, and the subsequent influx of thousands of Ukrainian refugees into Canada.

After its defeat in 1939, Poland was incorporated into the Third Reich as the General Government, with its centre in Krakow. Ukrainians in the annexed area, numbering about 700,000, consisted of local inhabitants and refugees from Galicia who had fled in advance of the Soviet forces. Among them were many prominent members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, a militant underground movement in Western Ukraine. The rapid succession of events in 1939-1941 found the latter confused and divided on the question of their relationship with the Germans and on the strategy and tactics to be adopted in the struggle for an independent Ukraine.

Sharp differences developed between the older and more staid members of the leadership council of the Organization, who had been living in exile and were headed by Colonel Andriy Melnyk, and the younger and more aggressive activists, who had been carrying on illegal work in Western Ukraine under Polish rule. Many of the latter, among whom the most prominent were Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko, had been released from Polish prison after the German invasion.

In February, 1940, the younger activists met at a secret session in Krakow and elected a new leadership council with Bandera as leader. On June 30, a week after the German attack on the USSR,

members of the Bandera group proclaimed the independence of Ukraine in Lviv with Stetsko as head of state. The Germans then proceeded to arrest and intern Ukrainian nationalists, including the members of the self-proclaimed government.

Meanwhile, other Ukrainians in the German-occupied areas of Poland, including a number of intellectuals, began to form local national committees. On April 13-15, 1940, representatives of these groups met in Krakow and set up the Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the interests of the Ukrainians in the area of the General Government. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, a noted geographer and professor at Krakow University, was elected president.

The committee directed relief work throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical areas, promoted educational and cultural activities and published books, school texts and a daily newspaper, *Krakivski Visty* (Krakow News).[1] In February, 1942, after the German invasion of the USSR, the authority of the committee was extended to include Western Ukraine with headquarters in Lviv.

Developments in the territories wrested from the Red Army aroused Ukrainians against the new occupying forces. Bands of German soldiers roamed the countryside requisitioning supplies and plundering the peasants. In the spring of 1942, the Germans proceeded to conscript and transport young Ukrainians to Germany under guard, to augment the dwindling ranks of the German labour force.

Early in 1942 in the northern province of Volhynia, Ukrainians initiated the formation of local armed self-defense groups against the Germans. By the end of 1942 some of these groups had developed into a permanent underground military formation, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[2] By 1943, according to German estimates, the UPA had grown to about 40,000.[3] Its detachments operated in many regions of Ukraine engaging German security forces, Soviet partisan groups, which first made their appearance in 1943 with nocturnal raids on villages, and occasionally small detachments of the regular German and Soviet forces. In one encounter beyond the Dniper River, members of the UPA wounded General Vatutin, the Russian commander of the Soviet forces on the Ukrainian front, who later died of his wounds.

The official Nazi policy was opposed to recruiting Ukrainians for military service, although there was a scattering of Ukrainians

in various branches of German army. However, in 1943, after their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad, the German authorities in Western Ukraine resolved to organize military formations composed of Ukrainians. This placed the Ukrainian Central Committee in a dilemma. It was clear by then that the fate of Germany was sealed. They were aware that their participation in the organization of Ukrainian military formations of the German army could compromise them with the Western Powers after the cessation of hostilities. However, the members of the committee believed that after the collapse of Germany another armed conflict would develop between the Western Allies and the USSR. They hoped that conditions might then be favourable for the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. In that case it was indispensible for Ukrainians to be in command of regular forces which, under existing conditions could only be formed, armed and trained as part of the German army. They reasoned that Ukrainians would be recruited by the Germans in any event. If the committee cooperated it could have some measure of control over such military formations.[4] On April 28, 1943, with the active participation of Kubiyovych and other members of the Ukrainian Central Committee, the Germans proclaimed the formation of the Waffen SS Division Galicia of Ukrainian volunteers.

The division was sent to the Eastern front where, on July 18, 1943, it suffered heavy casualties. Of its original component of 11,000, only 3,000 returned to the German lines after breaking out of encirclement. It was then reformed and sent to the Austrian and Hungarian fronts where, in April, 1945, it constituted itself as the First Ukrainian Division.[5]

When the war ended, there was a mass of Ukrainian refugees in Western Europe. They included officers and soldiers of the division; members and officials of the Ukrainian Central Committee; leaders and members of both wings of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, many of whom emerged from German internment; participants in the UPA; persons who had served in the German occupation forces in various capacities; adherents of political groups hostile to the Soviet regime; members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia; former inmates of Nazi concentration camps; prisoners of war; labour conscripts and masses of the civilian population, fleeing in terror before the advancing Red Army. About one mil-

lion of the five million Soviet nationals in Western Europe were Ukrainians, most of whom were accommodated in 220 refugee camps in the Allied zones.[6]

They had good reason to fear returning to their homes. Many from Western Ukraine had been witnesses to the mass arrests and deportations to Siberia of nearly half a million Ukrainians after the annexation of Western Ukraine in September, 1939, or the cold-blooded executions of prisoners who had not yet been transported to Siberia when the Germans invaded in 1941.[7] Those from Eastern Ukraine had experienced two decades of Soviet terror: religious persecution, collectivization, mass famine, purges, wholesale arrests and deportations to Siberia. Some were survivors of torture and imprisonment in various Soviet penal institutions. Even Soviet prisoners of war were afraid to return. According to a Red Army field manual, surrender was tantamount to treason and, according to decree No. 270, "a prisoner captured alive by the enemy is *ipso facto* a traitor".[8]

The attitude of the Allied powers toward the refugees was determined by an agreement signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, by representatives of the USSR and the USA. The agreement provided that the nationals of the two signatory powers:

> Will *without delay* after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately . . . until they have been *handed over* . . . at places agreed upon . . . and that repatriation representatives will have the right of *immediate* access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country. (Italics in original)[9]

Soviet nationals were not to be given any opportunity to become acquainted with the Western world but were to come under immediate control of Soviet authorities and be repatriated without delay and without choice.

Repatriation proceeded rapidly. In five months, between May and September 1945, the Western Powers handed over to the Soviet authorities a total of 2,034,000 persons. Repatriation was accompanied by widespread adamant refusals to return home and numerous suicides. The military authorities became perplexed by the number who preferred to die rather than return to their native land.

The Americans had not been applying the policy of forced repatriation to displaced persons from areas that had been absorbed by the USSR since 1939. By 1947 repatriation was abandoned completely, leaving about half a million displaced persons from territories embraced by the USSR, who did not wish to return home.[10]

Soviet authorities, however, were determined to repatriate these persons at all costs. They realized that such people could create a strong anti-Soviet force in the West, influence world public opinion, set up centres from which they could fan the flames of discontent within Ukraine and lend strong encouragement to the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. The USSR embarked on a campaign to minimize the influence of the displaced persons and to guarantee their return.

The plan, apparently, was to discredit them and to force their repatriation as war criminals. A campaign was initiated on January 6, 1945, by Manuilsky, who launched an attack on the refugees in a speech to a conference of teachers in Lviv. He branded them "Ukrainian German nationalists... a traitorous band of spies, diversionists, terroristic criminals for whom no laws, morals or rights ever existed... paid agents who served the Germans and hated their own people".[11]

When forcible repatriation was halted, Soviet authorities adopted a softer approach. In November, 1948, the government of the Ukrainian SSR issued an appeal to Ukrainians to return home. It made a distinction between the mass of displaced persons and the "fascist henchmen, traitors and mercenaries" and announced that Soviet citizens who had not committed war crimes, prisoners of war who did not participate in enemy punitive operations, women who had married foreigners, and former kulaks, who had been sentenced under Soviet law and later taken for forced labour by the Germans, would not be prosecuted.[12]

The Ukrainian nationalists in Canada had been aware of large numbers of Ukrainian refugees in Western Europe. Their plight was first publicized by Ukrainians serving in the Canadian armed forces who came in contact with the refugees as the Allied armies advanced into German-occupied territories. Realizing the urgency of their situation, the nationalists gave top priority to rendering their compatriots material assistance, to preventing their forcible

repatriation and to assisting in their resettlement in the Western world.

On January 12, 1945, the UCC initiated a Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund registered under the Canadian War Charities Act to function by authority of the Department of War Services for the purpose of providing assistance through and under the auspices of the Red Cross. In August, a Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) was formed in London on the initiative of Ukrainian service men with Flight Lieutenant G.R.B. Panchuk, an intelligence officer with the RCAF, as director, and Captain S.W. Frolick, who served on the staff of the Allied Control Commission for Germany, as secretary.[13]

CURB was adopted by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and its American equivalent, the Ukrainian Congress Committee, as their European agency for channelling aid from Ukrainians in North America to their compatriots in Western Europe. Members of both committees joined CURB as directors.

Subsequently, CURB set up committees in centres with large refugee concentrations. It distributed relief, acted as an intermediary between refugees and relatives and friends in North America and elsewhere, issued identity papers which saved many from repatriation to the Soviet Union, often intervened to prevent forcible repatriation of individual refugees, countered Soviet propaganda denouncing the refugees, appealed to world public opinion, and lobbied various agencies on behalf of the displaced persons.

When it was revealed that the refugees were being forcibly repatriated, Hlynka raised the matter in the House of Commons on September 24, 1945. He requested that the Canadian government appeal to Great Britain and the United States to condemn the practice and grant representatives of Ukrainian relief committees permission to visit the camps where Ukrainians were found.[14] A month later, a total of thirty-five MPs, representing all four parties, signed a petition to the Prime Minister urging him to intervene against forceful repatriation.

In January, 1946, Rev. Dr. Kushnir went on a tour of the refugee camps. Simultaneously, CURB issued an appeal to the delegates to a session of the United Nations Organization deploring forced repatriation. On a motion by Eleanor Roosevelt, the assembly resolved to condemn the practice.[15]

12. Ukrainian communist portrayal of Hlynka's campaign to bring Ukrainian refugees to Canada. The cartoon is titled "UCC ambassador Hlynka is going to Europe for refugees." The square-wheeled, swastika-spoked vehicle is labelled "Hlynka and Co. Taxi". Professor Kirkconnell and Walter Tucker (Liberal MP for Rosthern, Saskatchewan) are pushing; Solon Low (Social Credit MP for Peace River, Alberta and party leader), mounted backward, is twisting the nag's tail; Allister Stewart (CCF MP for Winnipeg North) is tugging on the nag's ears. *UZh, December 13, 1945.*

The Second Ukrainian Canadian Congress, which met in Toronto on June 4-6, 1946, authorized the UCC to appoint a special committee of five members to confer with the Canadian Government in the matter of the settling of polical refugees on land in Canada. It also demanded that the government broaden the immigration laws to admit Ukrainian refugees, and resolved to continue the campaign for contributions to the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund which had already reached a total of $106,051.54.[16]

The Ukrainian pro-communists, on the other hand, were vehemently opposed to the admission of refugees to Canada. In addition to supporting the vociferous Soviet campaign against the displaced persons as a matter of course, the Ukrainian communist leaders had their own considerations. When the war ended their star was in the ascendency and they were well aware of the threat posed by the refugees. Many of the latter had friends and relatives among the members and sympathizers of the pro-communist organizations on whom they could exert an influence through correspondence, as soon as postal service was established. If the refugees were allowed into Canada, they would become an even more serious threat. Consequently, the purpose of the Ukrainian communist campaign was to discredit the refugees, block their admission to Canada and force their repatriation.

So intense was the campaign conducted by the communists that not one issue of their press appeared when the refugee question was current without venomous articles by local and Soviet writers attacking them as "traitors", "enemies of the people" and "war criminals". In one article they were described as those "who betrayed their nation, who served the German Nazis and helped them to plunder and pillage, to torture and to hang their own brothers and sisters".[17] Kubiyovych, president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, was branded a "Quisling" who "served landlord Poland and Hitler Germany, helping to destroy the population of Ukraine in order to populate those areas with racist Aryan colonizers".[18]

In addition to the campaign in their press, the Ukrainian communists directed propaganda to the Canadian public. They published as a separate pamphlet a translation of Manuilsky's speech to the teachers in Lviv together with an article from the nationalist paper, *Krakivski Visty*, describing the formation of the Waffen

SS Division *Galicia*[19] and distributed the pamphlet widely. Simultaneously, the communists exerted pressure on the government to refuse the refugees admittance to Canada, and worked to block every effort of the nationalists to assist them.

On November 12, 1945, the NEC of the Ukrainian pro-communist organization, sent a resolution to the Prime Minister against the admittance of refugees. It noted the agreement signed by the Allied powers at Yalta for the repatriation of Soviet citizens and declared that failure to comply meant a disregard of the accord, and asserted that the refugees were, for the most part, "disgraceful Ukrainian fascist leaders, Ukrainian Quislings and traitors of the Ukrainian people who willingly and ardently served the German fascist aggressors and, together with the Germans, fought not only the Red Army in the East but also the allied armies in the West and consciously committed grave crimes against the Ukrainian people". The resolution also drew attention to the amnesty proclaimed by the Ukrainian SSR on November 27, 1944, and to the article describing the organization of the Waffen SS Division *Galicia.*[20]

The Second Convention of the pro-communist association in January, 1946, also sent a strongly-worded resolution to the Prime Minister condemning the displaced persons and opposing their admittance to Canada. When CURB, claiming to represent two million Ukrainians, addressed an appeal to the United Nations Secretariat in January against the forcible repatriation of refugees, the NEC of the AUUC, the Executive Committee of the WBA and the two Ukrainian pro-communist newspapers sent letters condemning the appeal. George Krenz, secretary of the WBA, sent a cable to the United Nations protesting the Bureau's claim to represent two million Ukrainians and branded the action of its members (two of whom were officers in the Canadian Armed Forces on active duty) during the war as "anti-Ukraine and fascist".[21]

The solution for the refugee problem, according to the communists, was,

> to advise them all to return home as millions have already done. Those who are innocent have nothing to fear. He who has human blood on his hands deserves neither assistance nor mercy.[22]

Swystun also joined the campaign with a series of speeches, delivered in the USA and Canada, directed against the refugees. On

December 19, 1945, speaking in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Toronto, he charged that a group of Ukrainian nationalist leaders in Canada was using the question of the refugees to drive a wedge between Canada and the Soviet Union. Swystun added that the nationalists were dissuading refugees from returning home because they wished to keep them in Western Europe "as an advance force for intervention against Soviet Ukraine and other Soviet republics in the war which they so openly declare is coming."[23]

In another address on January 16, 1946, in Winnipeg, entitled "Ukraine and the Refugees" he classified the displaced persons into two groups: those who were forcibly taken to Germany and those who "collaborated with the Germans".[24]

Swystun avoided the degrading epithets of the communist press. Instead, he presented reasoned arguments based on the assumption that the Ukrainian people had freely chosen their form of government. He refused to recognize the efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists on behalf of their nation's independence. The Ukrainian armed resistance against the Germans and the Russians he described as a struggle against Ukraine and asked:

> . . . Who is dear to us: The Ukrainian who collaborated with the German Nazis and non-Nazis, who are a completely alien nation for us, or the Ukrainian who collaborated with Ukrainians, communists and non-communists, our kin by blood, who fought for Ukraine?[25]

The agitation against the displaced persons by the communists and their sympathizers exerted a strong influence on many prominent citizens. Dailies in Toronto and Edmonton expressed various degrees of opposition to the immigration of refugees to Canada. On January 2, 1946, the Edmonton Journal charged in an editorial that the displaced persons were afraid to return home because they had collaborated with the Germans, and declared:

> As immigrants, these men would be wholly unacceptable. Their fascist, pro-German taint would prevent them from ever becoming good Canadian citizens. And, having betrayed their own country in its hour of peril, what guarantee is there that they would not prove equally faithless to Canada?

Communist propaganda was so effective that three of the thirty-five MPs who had signed a petition to the Prime Minister on behalf of the refugees, D.M. McIvor, Fort William, Walter Little, Temiskaming, and Ronald Moore, Churchill, withdrew their signatures, the latter through a letter to the press, the others by personal com-

unications to the NEC of the Ukrainian pro-communist association. In his letter, Little wrote:

> Thanks for your booklet in connection with "the truth about Ukrainian Refugees" in Germany. . . . I have now finally reached the conclusion that these war refugees are, and were, supporters of the Hitler regime and voluntarily offered their services in his aggression against humanity.[26]

The general attitude of hostility towards the refugees, generated by communist propaganda, began to change after a public confrontation between communists and nationalists on the issue. In May, 1946, the Senate resolved that the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour be authorized to examine the desirability of admitting immigrants, the type preferred, their availability, the facilities to absorb them and the condition of their admission. On May 29, the committee heard briefs from the two opposing groups – the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, introduced by Anthony Hlynka, and including John Solomon, MLA for Emerson, Manitoba, Bohdan Panchuk, Rev. Dr. W. Kushnir and Rev. Dr. S.W. Sawchuk, and a communist contingent led by John Boychuk and including Stepan Macievich, Peter Prokop, George Krenz and John Navis.

Solomon outlined the contribution of the Ukrainian settlers to the building up of Canada and to the war effort, expressed Canada's need for immigrants, explained the suitability of the Ukrainian displaced persons and, describing the predicament of the refugees, declared:

> The people on whose behalf our committee appears here today are the innocent refugees who have no place to go – people who know that back home they will not be able to worship God in their own way, people who know that to differ with the government in their own land would mean banishment and death.[27]

The testimony of Panchuk, one of the first two RCAF officers to land in Normandy on D-Day, was decisive. He had assisted the military government and UNRRA in setting up camps for the displaced persons and had been in constant touch with the Ukrainians among them. Panchuk revealed that there were still between 300,000 and 500,000 Ukrainian displaced persons in Europe. He described his first contact with them seven days after D-Day in France. They were people who had been forcibly transported by the Germans for forced labour but at the first opportunity had deserted and

joined the French underground, forming the famous Taras Shevchenko unit of the Free French Forces. As the Allied forces moved eastward, he met others – "long streams of people pushing carts, pulling little wagons and carrying their belongings . . . making a general exodus westward". At Belsen concentration camp six miles from which he was stationed for a time, he found that about thirty per cent of the prisoners were Ukrainians. Panchuk declared that among the displaced persons were people of various backgrounds, all of whom "have gone through various hardships and who have measured up to the demands" and who now looked "westward as the only hope for their future". He also appealed on behalf of the 10,000 members of the Ukrainian Division whose members "marched 150 miles to lay down their arms before our present Governor General".[28]

Rev. Dr. Kushnir, who had returned on May 4 after four months in Europe where he visited all the Ukrainian refugee camps, testified that:

> The British and American authorities and the people in UNRRA, and those supervising the camps are prepared to accept these people . . . and I do not see any reason – any substance for labelling displaced persons as collaborators or naming them as Nazi war criminals.[29]

Rev. Dr. Sawchuk who had served as chaplain for four years, one of them overseas, described the religious persecution by Soviet authorities and declared that if the displaced persons "do not want to go back to their native land they should be given an opportunity to migrate where they could get . . . work and bring up their families in freedom. . . ."[30]

The brief from the Ukrainian communist organization was presented by Macievich. He branded the displaced persons as:

> (1) War criminals, (2) former collaborators with German occupation authorities in Ukraine; and (3) a small group of people who have been beguiled into believing that they can escape the hardships of post-war restoration in their war-shattered native land by emigrating to Canada. . . . They are nearly all professional politicians, lawyers, doctors, teachers and even priests, who would not practice their professions in Canada, and some business men without capital and students who have not finished their studies.[31]

He suggested that "immigration from these occupation groups would, in all probability, soon constitute a serious problem and a burden to the state" and urged the rejection of "any proposal that

13. One of the Ukrainian communist objectives during World War II was to discredit the Ukrainian refugees and those endeavouring to assist them. In the cartoon the refugees are portrayed as collaborators of Hitler with blood on their hands. The declaration reads: "The Allied Powers will apprehend the war criminals even in the remotest corners of the earth and will subject them to a just trial." (Signed) Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill. On the left the UCC is appealing to Ottawa: "Save our finest and most outstanding Ukrainians." The cartoon is titled: "How the UCC is 'defending' Ukraine." *UZh, February 10, 1944.*

immigration from this source be considered in terms of asylum for political refugees as wrong in fact and prejudicial to the interests of Canada".[32]

The brief opposed any suggestion of accepting the Ukrainian displaced persons as immigrants to Canada because,

> the government of Ukraine has repeatedly extended amnesty to all with the exception of those who are directly on the war criminal list and who would be required to stand trial for their crimes . . . to permit these people to come to Canada and give the appearances that former war criminal and collaborationist records are viewed favourably by the authorities would create sharp discord and enmity within our country in general and the Ukrainian Canadians in particular.[33]

The members of the committee were apparently not impressed by the communist brief. After Macievich, a member of the Communist Party from the early 1930s and a graduate of one of tis courses in political education in 1939, presented his brief, they subjected him to prolonged and embarrassing questioning. He denied that the organizations he represented were pro-communist and evaded the question as to whether they supported the LPP in

elections. Macievich had no scruples about prevaricating before the committee. But the senators were not convinced by his testimony as is clear from the following comments:

> Hon. Mr. Crear: I am bound to say to you as a witness that I prefer to take the judgement of the Flight-Lieutenant rather than your own. He was present and saw the conditions there. . . .
>
> The Chairman: We would like to know what is in the back of your mind and the minds of those for whom you speak. There seems to be some particular influence that this Committee has not been given the benefit of, I think.[34]

The Senate Committee Report, adopted on August 19, 1946, concluded that "it is desirable that immigrants be admitted to Canada in substantial numbers and commencing as soon as possible".[35] It dashed all Ukrainian communist hopes of blocking the admission of refugees to Canada and marked their first serious setback in the rising Ukrainian communist fortunes since the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941.

The nationalists took advantage of the report to intensify their campaign on behalf of the refugees. The UCC immediately sent a memorandum to Prime Minister Mackenzie King suggesting that 300,000 Ukrainian displaced persons could be resettled in Canada.[36]

Their efforts soon bore fruit. On June 6, 1947, the government issued the first of a series of orders-in-council, admitting refugees from Europe.[37] They began arriving toward the end of 1947. By 1955, over 33,000 Ukrainians were admitted. (Table IV)

Most of the refugees eventually settled in industrial centres, the very communities where the Ukrainian pro-communists were strongest. Since forcible repatriation excluded those who had not been Soviet citizens prior to 1939, the majority of Ukrainian refugees coming to Canada were from Western Ukraine.

The Ukrainian communists had waged a relentless campaign to prevent the admittance of the refugees to Canada. Having failed in that endeavour, they mounted a second campaign after the refugees began arriving. What the communists feared most was the effect the newcomers would have on the members of the AUUC and the WBA. Consequently, the campaign's main purpose was to discredit the refugees in the eyes of the members and supporters of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

In this phase, the campaign against the refugees was conducted mainly through the pages of the Ukrainian pro-communist press.

Table IV

NUMBER OF UKRAINIAN DISPLACED PERSONS ARRIVING IN CANADA 1946–47 to 1954–55

1946 – 1947	103
1947 – 1948	3,386
1948 – 1949	10,498
1949 – 1950	5,865
1950 – 1951	3,559
1951 – 1952	7,435
1952 – 1953	1,448
1953 – 1954	963
1954 – 1955	692
Total	33,949

Sources:

a Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration* For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1950, Ottawa, 1951, p. 36;
b Ibid., For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1951, Ottawa, 1952, p. 37;
c Ibid., For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1952, Ottawa, 1953, p. 29;
d Ibid., For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1953, Ottawa, 1954, p. 27;
e Ibid., For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1954, Ottawa, 1955, p. 34.
f Canada, Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 1954-1955, Ottawa, 1955, p. 31.

Note: There is some duplication here as the last statistics are for the calendar year 1954. The previous data covers the period from March 31, 1953, to March 31, 1954.

It consisted of numerous charges, accusations and personal attacks from various sources. Both Ukrainian pro-communist papers published letters sent in by subscribers from their relatives in Ukraine describing purported mass murders of the civilian population by bands which were reported to be nationalists. According to one such letter, members of a Bandera gang "cut people to pieces" in a certain village. In another, received by a subscriber, a cousin in Western Ukraine reported that in his district "700 people died at the hands of the Bandera gang".[38]

They also published articles by Soviet reporters. In one of these Bandera was described as a "major war criminal whose hands are smeared with the blood of women and children tortured to death during the war". Stetsko was accused of having "led punitive expeditions of Hitlerites against Ukrainian peasants who did not want to submit to German rule but wished to see Ukraine free and happy".[39] The editors of the Ukrainian pro-communist press chose to ignore the fact that both men spent the greater portion of the

war years in a German concentration camp, where Bandera's two brothers perished.[40]

Numerous articles denouncing the refugees were also written by the editors. One of those specializing on the subject was Shatulsky who used various pen names. Among his contributions was a series entitled: "The Bandera and Melnyk Groups in the Service of the Enemies of the People".[41] He was surpassed in both volume and venom by Krawchuk, one of whose series was entitled: "The Nationalist Quagmire" and another, "Always with the Enemy Against Their Own People".[42] In his addresses to the third and the fourth conventions of the AUUC in 1948 and 1950, Prokop devoted nearly half of each report to attacks on the refugees.

In addition, there were denunciations of the refugees by contributors from various localities in Canada. One correspondent described metaphorically a speech delivered by a refugee professor to the parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Atikokan, Ontario, in the following language:

> The Kiev professor vomited stinking German goulash. The parishioners stopped their noses with their fingers in order not to hear that drivel.[43]

In their campaign against the displaced persons the Ukrainian communists also attempted to exploit the prevailing economic conditions in the early post-war years. There was strong public feeling that incoming refugees were putting Canadians out of work. The Ukrainian pro-communist press fanned such sentiments. It wrote of "streets crowded with unemployed in every large city" while "companies continue to bring in displaced persons".[44]

The relations between the Ukrainian pro-communists and the refugees were further aggravated by the communist glorification of Soviet power as the source of all virtue and righteousness. What irritated the newcomers most was the degrading language used in describing them.[45]

It was not long before the new arrivals, provoked by the incessant and irresponsible communist attacks, began to retaliate. In Val D'or, Quebec, they invaded a membership meeting of the AUUC and the police had to be called to eject them; in Kingston they were accused of smashing the windows in the Ukrainian Labor Temple.[46]

After his return from Ukraine, Teresio went on a tour to report on his trip. In Kuroki, Saskatchewan, the newcomers disrupted his

meeting; in Saskatoon the police were called after refugees challenged the speaker's remarks; in Edmonton a stink bomb was exploded in front of the platform; in Spedden, Alberta, a group of residents, led by a local refugee, attacked W. Hluchaniuk, the administrator of *Ukrayinske Slovo.*[47]

Krawchuk, who followed Teresio on a lecture tour after spending two years in Ukraine, also experienced the ire of the incensed refugees. Intimately acquainted with the situation in Ukraine, they fired a barrage of questions at him, which he could not answer, at a meeting in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Winnipeg. The questioners, one hundred of the seven or eight hundred present, were interrupted, fighting ensued and the police were called to quell the riot.[48]

Three weeks later, displaced persons organized another reception for Krawchuk. The AUUC branch in Timmins called a meeting in the local labor temple for Sunday evening November 11, 1949, at which he was to speak. As a precaution against the possibility of disruption by the refugees, it was closed to all but those with invitations. There was considerable ill feeling between the refugees and the communists in Timmins. Unemployment among the native population was quite high and the communists explited this to generate hostility toward the displaced persons. On March 4,1948, *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* declared editorially that in Timmins there were three hundred employed refugees and three hundred unemployed Canadians.

The newcomers intended to challenge Krawchuk at the meeting. Denied admittance, they gathered in front of the AUUC hall. Other citizens who were also hostile to the communists, joined them, forming a crowd about two hundred persons. Some began throwing bricks and stones through the windows, others ripped off the railing along the stairs leading to the front entrance and battered down the door. Nine people were injured by missiles or personal assault. Among them was Nick Hubaly, president of the local branch of the AUUC, and Tom Kremyr, a member and a life-long resident of Timmins, who was dragged down the stairs, kicked and severely beaten.[49]

The communists were greatly disturbed by the attacks and launched sharp protests to the government, demanding deportation or punishment of the perpetrators of the assaults. They were soon faced with new cause for alarm.

The nationalists had been pressing the Canadian government to increase the number of refugees to be admitted. They were especially concerned about the survivors of the First Ukrainian Division. In May, 1945, its members had surrendered to the British in the vicinity of Gratz, Austria, and were interned at Rimini, Italy, not as prisoners of war but as Surrendered Enemy Personnel. They were visited in March, 1946, by the Rev. Dr. Kushnir, in January, 1947, by Hlynka and in April, 1947, by Panchuk. In May began their transfer to England where they were first interned and employed as agricultural labourers and later released.[50]

On June 15, 1950, in reply to a question by John Decore, Liberal MP for Vegreville, as to the possibility of admitting members of the division as immigrants, the Honourable Walter Harris, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, replied that "we are quite prepared to accept them".[51] The AUUC immediately protested the government decision. As the former members of the division began to arrive in Canada, the pro-communist organizations proceeded to mount a vociferous campaign against them.

The climax of the reaction to the communist campaign came on Sunday evening October 8, 1950. A children's concert was in progress before a packed house at the Ukrainian Labor Temple at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto. At approximately nine pm, there was a flash followed by a terrific explosion that knocked out a portion of a brick wall and a steel window framing and hurled railroad spikes into the ceiling and shattered glass into the crowded auditorium. Eleven persons were injured, none seriously.

Acting Chief Constable M. Mulholland reported that either dynamite or nitroglycerine bomb, to which railroad spikes were fastened, had been placed on the window ledge over the exit doors on the south side of the building. He posted a reward of $1,500 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons responsible. The communists blamed the members of the First Ukrainian Division. Prokop even declared: "We know who these people are but we can't put our finger on them right away".[52] They held a protest meeting in Toronto at which 5,000 were present, and sent a delegation to the city council demanding that the leaders of the terrorists be brought to trial and punished. However, no one was ever charged and the crime remained unsolved.

Subsequently there were other less dramatic incidents of violence against Ukrainian communists and their property for which

the newcomers were blamed. At 7:00 am on Christmas morning, 1951, an intruder broke into the Vancouver residence of John Dubno, the provincial secretary of the AUUC, and attacked him. On January 3, 1952, five windows were smashed in the Ukainian Labor Temple in Vancouver.[53] A year later, on January 13, outsiders disrupted a meeting in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Sudbury at which Krenz, the secretary of the WBA was to speak.[54]

As passions cooled, such incidents became less frequent. A few refugees who found the initial years in Canada somewhat difficult were even prevailed upon by pro-communists to attend events in the labor temples and subscribe to the Ukrainian pro-communist press. The leaders saw this as the beginning of the extension of their influence among the refugees. At the Fifth Convention of the AUUC in 1952, Krawchuk declared that there were "problems and interests around which we can and must find a common language with them". He advised the delegates "to invite them to our affairs, invite them to our meeting . . . give them our newspapers".[55]

Communist hopes of winning over the refugees were short-lived. As the newcomers found permanent employment and became established, they were less inclined to frequent the labor temples. Moreover, new developments placed the pro-communists on the defensive. Khrushchov's revelations, in 1956, of the crimes of Stalin and the visits of members of the pro-communist organizations to their native land disillusioned many with Soviet reality. The Ukrainian communist leaders faced the problem of holding members who were realizing that there could be some truth to what the displaced persons had been saying.

As they became integrated into Canadian society, the refugees exerted a growing influence on the Ukrainian community that had far-reaching consequences for both the nationalists and the communists. A fair proportion of the newcomers possessed a higher education which enabled them to enter business and the professions. Some achieved prominence in their chosen fields, raising the prestige of the Ukrainian community. Many were politically conscious with wide experience in community affairs. Their arrival injected new life into and raised the morale of the nationalist camp, revitalized their organizational life, established new Ukrainian institutions and provided a mass of enthusiastic young recruits and leaders. Their first hand accounts of experiences in the USSR chal-

lenged the pro-Soviet propaganda of the communists, intensified nationalist opposition to the USSR, checked the leftward trend that had been developing in Ukrainian ranks under the influence of Soviet popularity during the war, and reestablished the nationalists as the dominant force in the Ukrainian community.

For the communists, the refugees presented a challenge with which they could not cope effectively. The personal experience of the newcomers with Soviet reality made it impossible to counter their criticism of the USSR. The attacks on their meetings alarmed the communists, placed them on the defensive and forced them to abandon open public meetings. The refugees also undermined the morale and the strength of the pro-communist organization by the influence they exerted individually on relatives and friends in the communist movement. Their presence proved to be one of the most important factors in checking the growth of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations and in contributing to their decline.

VI

Ties With the Fatherland

THE German attack on the USSR in 1941 made possible the reestablishment of relations which had been severed in 1939 between the Ukrainian pro-communists and the Soviet Union and Ukraine. Within weeks of the German onslaught the newly formed Ukrainian Committees to Aid the Fatherland sponsored mass meetings at which resolutions of solidarity with the USSR were forwarded to Moscow. Contacts were reestablished when M. Kalinin, President of the USSR, replied on September 26, 1941 to the Winnipeg committee's resolution and expressed his thanks for "the sincere fraternal solidarity with the Soviet people and its Red Army".[1]

The Association proceeded immediately after its formation to organize a campaign to raise relief for the embattled Soviet forces and the war victims. On July 26, it issued an appeal to Ukrainians in Canada "to render every possible aid to our fatherland, Soviet Ukraine, in the struggle against the bloodthirsty Nazi aggressor" and "to our adopted fatherland, Canada, in the conduct of the most effective war against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy".[2] Supported by its press, the Association plunged enthusiastically and energetically into every campaign designed to provide assistance to the USSR and raised nearly three quarters of a million dollars. (Table V) In addition, the NEC of the Association provided ten operating tables with instruments for hospitals in Lviv and Chernivtsi.*

Simultaneously, relations between the Ukrainian pro-communists and Soviet authorities expanded. Contacts were maintained

*Although many Ukrainians from Canada have visited both cities, no mention has ever been made of the receipt of this equipment by any official in either city.

through the Slav Committee which was formed in Moscow on August 11, 1941, to mobilize Slav support for the USSR in the war.

Table V

SUMS RAISED BY UKRAINIAN PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II IN VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS TO AID THE USSR

Red Cross Fund for Medical Aid	$132,226.00[a]
Medical Aid to the Red Army	102,466.51[b]
Red Cross Campaign for New and Used Clothing	100,000.00[c]
Aid to Russia Fund	300,000.00[d]
Fund for Rebuilding Hospital in Kiev	25,000.00[e]
Fund to Rebuild Hospitals in Lviv and Chervivtsi	63,475.35
	$723,167.86

Sources:
a *UZh*, March 26, 1942;
b *Kanadski Ukrayintsi dopomahayut narodam Radianskoho Soiuzu* (Canadian Ukrainians Aid to the Peoples of the Soviet Union) Toronto: National Executive Committee, Association of Canadian Ukrainians, 1941-1943, p. 64;
c *US*, December 29, 1943;
d Ibid., November 3, 1943;
e Ibid., September 6, 1944.

After postal connections were renewed, Soviet propaganda began arriving in quantity. There were articles especially written for the Ukrainian press outside the USSR, frequent news releases and a variety of books, pamphlets, journals and newspapers from all of which the Ukrainian pro-communist press often reprinted material.

Simultaneously, Soviet films with Russian dialogue and English subtitles made their appearance in Canada. In larger towns and cities they were screened in commercial movie theatres, in smaller towns, they were shown in local community centres under the sponsorship of Ukrainian pro-communists. Theatres and halls across Canada reverberated to the sound of Russian speech, generating a feeling of sympathy for and identity with the people of the Soviet Union.

In June 1942, diplomatic relations were established between Canada and the USSR. In October, Fyodor Gusev, the Soviet ambassador, arrived. This opened a new channel of contact and introduced a new chapter in relations between Ukrainians in Canada and the USSR.

On November 7, there were coast to coast rallies to greet the USSR on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russian revolution. Gusev was invited to address the meeting in Montreal. On November 25, he appeared at a rally in Maple Leaf Gardens to launch the Aid to Russia Fund.

The Ukrainian pro-communists were quick to exploit the precedent set by the Soviet diplomat's appearance at public meetings. Their Association, which had joined the Red Cross campaign, pledged a quota of $100,000 and sponsored a concert in Massey Hall in Toronto on December 26 to raise money for the fund. They invited the Soviet embassy to send a representative. Aware of the large Ukrainian population in Canada, the Soviet government had included Ukrainians on its embassy staff. Among these was Ivan Volenko, the press attache, who was assigned to represent the embassy. His address to the meeting, with its moving description of Nazi barbarities in Ukraine, raised the emotions of those present and enhanced the appeal for funds.

After this auspicious appearance, embassy representatives were frequent guests at Ukrainian pro-communist gatherings, not all of which were organized to raise funds for the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1943, the second anniversary of the invasion of the USSR, Gusev was a guest at a rally at Maple Leaf Gardens. On the same date, Volenko spoke on the need for a second front at a meeting in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Winnipeg.

Although other members of the embassy staff also appeared, Volenko was the most frequent guest at Ukrainian pro-communist affairs. On October 24, 1943, at a mass meeting in Massey Hall, Navis presented him with a jubilee book of greetings from Ukrainians in Canada containing 20,000 signatures and $25,000 for rebuilding a hospital in Kiev. The press attache addressed another gathering on January 9, 1944, in the Fort William Ukrainian Labor Temple. Volenko was again a guest, along with noted local civic and provincial dignitaries, at a meeting in the Civic Auditorium in Winnipeg on June 11. A week later Volenko was at a meeting in Edmonton to celebrate the union of all Ukrainian lands.

The Soviet guests were always very formal, restrained and correct. In their addresses they dealt with the devastation caused by the war, the Nazi atrocities, especially in Ukraine, the urgency of a second front, the indispensibility of friendship of the Allied powers in the post-war, or simply expressed thanks and gratitude for the

aid given to the Soviet Union. There was generally a great deal of emphasis on Ukraine and an appeal to Ukrainian patriotism, designed to win sympathy and support for the Soviet regime.

The Soviet spokesmen were greeted with reverence and awe as representatives of a heroic people fighting for its life against great odds. Everywhere they made deep impressions on their listeners; inspired their audiences to make greater contributions to the war effort and the financial campaigns to aid the USSR; broke down many prevalent anti-Soviet prejudices and enhanced the influence of the USSR, which they represented, and the prestige of the Ukrainian pro-communists, who acted as their hosts.

The Ukrainian communists visualized the post-war period as one of peaceful development and cooperation between nations in which Ukraine would advance "to new heights of human happiness and prosperity".[3] As Ukrainians, deeply attached to their native land, they were anxious to make their contribution by expanding relations and promoting cultural ties and exchanges. As communists, they planned to capitalize on such relations to undermine the influence of their opponents, the nationalists, and to advance their own organizations and further the communist cause.

These objectives coincided with the interests of the USSR. After emerging from the war as a victorious world power, it embarked on a program to extend its influence for the avowed purpose of promoting peace, which it desperately needed to heal the wounds of war, and to provide security against future attacks, which it greatly dreaded. The more than half million Ukrainians in Canada were regarded as potential sympathizers and the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations as a convenient beachhead for extending Soviet influence.

Consequently, relations between the USSR and the Ukrainian communists expanded as the war was drawing to an end. In May 1944, postal service between Canada and the Soviet Union was re-established, making it possible for the Ukrainians in Canada to correspond with relatives and friends at home. The following year the Ukrainian pro-communist press began publishing letters to its readers from Ukraine. They followed a common pattern, indicating a common source of inspiration and purpose.

Sometimes a correspondent, wishing to inform the addressee of his or her unenviable plight, but afraid to describe it openly, would use Aesopian language, or lavish exaggerated praise to emphasize

the opposite of the real situation. In one case a woman wrote, shortly after the war ended and Ukraine lay devastated that: "Now everything is fine since the Moscovites have come. . . . I have received one horse and a cow." A youth wrote that "my parents work on the collective farm. They earn a very great deal. . . . We live well." A nephew, who wished to inform his aunt that his father was exiled to Siberia after his return from Germany, wrote that his father had been taken to Germany for forced labor but now "is still working far away in the Soviet Union".[4]

Anyone acquainted with Soviet reality would immediately understand the meaning that the correspondents were trying to convey. The Ukrainian pro-communist press published the letters as evidence of the well being of Soviet citizens.

Postal service between Canada and the USSR was expanded by an agreement, signed on June 24, 1955, to provide for direct parcel post shipments between the two countries. Three months later the Ukrainian pro-communist press carried an advertisement announcing that a newly-formed enterprise, *Ukrainska Knyha,* located at 1162 Dundas Street West in Toronto, was empowered by the USSR to transmit parcels to the Soviet Union with all charges, including Soviet customs duties, prepaid by the sender.[5] Subsequently, branches were opened in other cities (Further details in Chapter II).

Early in 1958, Knyha's Toronto branch moved its parcel division to 962 Bloor Street West. A bookstore, dealing in current Soviet literature (a great deal of it Soviet propaganda) was opened at *Knyha*'s former location. The bookstore was eventually expanded to handle musical instruments, phonograph records, ceramics, perfumes and limited quantities of canned foods and sweets. Book sections were also added to *Knyha* stores in other centres.

Literature was supplied by Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga, the Soviet book exporting firm in Moscow, at sixty per cent less than the Soviet retail price. A great deal of Soviet literature was sent free of charge by the Society for Cultural Relations in Kiev. The recipients were the branches of the Society for Cultural Relations With Ukraine in Winnipeg and Toronto, the Ukrainian pro-communist newspapers, the provincial committees and the NEC of the AUUC.

The literature included current Ukrainian and Russian newspapers, journals and magazines; Ukrainian dictionaries and school

Всесоюзное Объединение
«МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ КНИГА»
СССР, Москва, Г-200

Vsesojuznoje objedinenije
MEZHDUNARODNAJA KNIGA
USSR, Moscow, G-200

ВД

Счет-фактура № Invoice facture 19/3620

№ дела / Reference No. 546/20

Фирме / To the firm: Ukrainska Knyha, 1162 Dundas St. West, Toronto, Ont. Canada

Отправлено в адрес / Forwarded to the address

Род упаковки / Kind of packing

Количество мест / Number of parcels

№№ трансп. документов / Transport documents: 9 boxes, № 272-280

Дата отправки / Date of shipment

Основание заказа / Your order	Шифр литературы	Заказ-наряд	Автор, название книги / Author and Title	Издательство / Publishers	Год издания / Publication date	Количество / Number of copies	Цена одного экз. / Price per copy	Сумма / Amount
			УКР. ЯЗ.					
078625 8 6 66	304	5566	Украинский Советский Энциклопедический словарь. В 3 том. Том 3. "Н-Я".	УСЭ	1968	25	3,90	97,50
						25*		97,50*
						Скидка	60,00%	58,50-
								39,00*
							01 Ам. долл.	

14. Invoice from *Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga,* the Soviet book exporting monopoly, to the *Ukrainska Knyha* bookstore in Toronto indicating a discount of sixty per cent off the Soviet retail price on an order of books. Other Canadian importers of Soviet books are charged inflated prices with only forty per cent discount.

15. Ukrainian supporters in Toronto packing clothing for the USSR purchased with money collected for the Aid To Russia Fund in 1943. Second from the left is the author's mother.

texts; sheet music for orchestras and choirs; Ukrainian classics and current literary works; books on social and natural sciences; books on politics ranging from the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (until 1956) to political tracts and speeches of Soviet government and party leaders, and a variety of other propaganda pamphlets.

In November 1960, the Society for Cultural Relations With Ukrainians Abroad, in Kiev, launched a semi-monthly newspaper, *Visti z Ukrayiny* (News From Ukraine), and mailed it out free of charge. It was filled with articles describing the "great achievements" of the Ukrainian people under the Soviet regime and was designed to influence Ukrainians abroad. In 1964 the Society began publishing a parallel paper in English, *News From Ukraine.*

Radio contact was established when Kiev Radio started beaming programs on short wave to North America in both Ukrainian and English. On March 5, 1958, it had a special one-hour program of greetings on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the ULFTA-AUUC.[6]

There was one particular group of Ukrainians in Canada with whom Soviet authorities seemed eager to establish closer relations. In October 1945, the consular branch of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa announced that all former citizens of Western Ukraine and Byelorussia living abroad, who had Polish citizenship, should, in accordance with a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, register as Soviet citizens no later than December 31, 1945, in embassies and consulates of the USSR.[7]

The displaced persons in Europe generally refused to register, but hundreds of Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian pre-1939 immigrants in Canada who were members and sympathizers of pro-communist organizations, influenced by Soviet propaganda and filled with nostalgia for their homeland, applied in person and accepted Soviet citizenship. In British Columbia alone about 700 registered.[8]

Those who heeded the Soviet appeal interpreted the procedure as a first step in arrangements to return home. Their anxiety was revealed by the following incident. In July 1946, about 170 of those who had registered in British Columbia assembled at a banquet in a Vancouver hotel. Their spokesman, Victor Shpihun, a 41-year old shipyard worker who had recently been laid off for seven

weeks, explained with smiles which revealed his gold-filled teeth that they wished to return to build "an orchard for the people of the USSR". Although he had done well in Canada, Shpihun was convinced that there were better opportunities for himself and his children in the USSR. The gathering requested the Canadian government to assist them in getting to the Soviet Union. Shpihun expressed the impatience of the group: "We want to go soon; we don't want to wait too long".[9] *

While the Soviet government wished to entice the Ukrainian displaced persons to the USSR, it did not appear anxious to issue visas to pre-1939 immigrants in Canada who, by Soviet standards, enjoyed a high standard of living. A group of thirty-five families was permitted to return to Ukraine in the spring of 1948.[10] However, in spite of repeated applications, it was ten years before others received Soviet entry visas. In the meantime, many lost their ardour for returning to Ukraine but they remained Soviet citizens.

Among those who went back were men with wives and families still at home, older people who wished to spend their last years with relatives and friends in their native land and those who became dazzled by Soviet propaganda about the glories of the new society.

While some Ukrainians were returning home, Soviet authorities intensified their efforts to influence those that remained. In addition to representatives of the Soviet embassy who appeared at Ukrainian pro-communist gatherings with increased frequency and sometimes under unprecedented circumstances, there were delegations and tourist groups of prominent personalities from Ukraine. Their visits usually coincided with some pro-communist event. Eventually individual artists and groups of performers arrived for stage appearances before Ukrainian and Canadian audiences.

In January 1946, Volenko was a guest at the second convention of the Ukrainian pro-communist organization in Winnipeg. This was the first time that a Soviet diplomat had attended such an event. There were also greetings from Mykhailo Hrechukha, the president of the Ukrainian SSR, and others.[11] Not since the Tenth Convention of the ULFTA in 1929 had a gathering of Ukrainian pro-communists in Canada received so many greetings from Ukraine.

After the defection of Igor Gouzenko in 1946 and the subsequent revelations of a Soviet spy network in Canada, which created a

*According to reports, Shpihun died in Vancouver.

hostile public sentiment toward and strained relations with the USSR, representatives of the Soviet embassy did not appear at pro-communist gatherings. Khrushchov's revelations in 1956 of the crimes of Stalin, and his policy of peaceful co-existence mellowed Canadian public attitude toward the USSR. Lester Pearson, the Secretary of External Affairs, visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and relations once more became cordial. Representatives of the Soviet embassy again appeared as guests at Ukrainian pro-communist events usually attending several each year.

On January 25, 1958, D. Chuvakhin, the Soviet ambassador to Canada, spoke at the eighth convention banquet of the AUUC in Toronto, setting another precedent. Chuvakhin's successor, A. Arutiunian, an Armenian, showed considerable interest in and sympathy for the Ukrainians in Canada. Accompanied by his wife, he attended the eighth anniversary celebrations at Palermo on June 28, 1959.

The first delegation from Ukraine, made up mostly of literary figures, arrived in Canada in 1961. Its members participated in the annual celebrations at Palermo on July 9 and later spent two weeks touring several cities and places of interest.

The following year, Soviet authorities made renewed efforts to woo Ukrainians in Canada. In the somewhat relaxed climate ushered in by Khrushchov's speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, a group of young writers known as "the people of the sixties", emerged in Ukraine. Led by Ivan Dzyuba, an able and outspoken literary critic, they levelled some bold criticism at the excesses of the past and the abuses of the present. Some nationalists, hoping that this was a prelude to the relaxation of the Russian grip on Ukraine, began to mellow somewhat in their attitude to the USSR. Soviet authorities apparently felt that the time was most opportune for extending Soviet influence among them.

In May 1962, the first group of performers, the internationally famous Virsky Dance Ensemble from Kiev, arrived in Canada for a number of appearances. In October of the following year, Dmytro Hnatiuk, the outstanding Ukrainian tenor from the province of Bukovina, made a concert tour of larger Canadian cities.

The tours were followed by a new Soviet move to influence Ukrainians in Canada: the appointment of a Ukrainian, I.T. Shpedko, as Soviet ambassador. Relations with Ukrainian pro-communists

reached their peak during his tenure. On June 30, 1963, he was at the annual Palermo celebration. The following year, Shpedko spoke at the Shevchenko concert in Winnipeg on March 8. The next day he placed a wreath at the statue of Shevchenko erected on the grounds of the Manitoba Legislative Building by the nationalists in 1961. He also visited a display at the University of Manitoba, organized by the Slavic Department and the Society for Cultural Relations With Ukraine to commemorate the Shevchenko anniversary.

The crowning effort in Shpedko's campaign to influence Ukrainian nationalists was a visit to Canada by a group of twenty, carefully-selected Ukrainian "tourists", headed by Kateryna Antonivna Kolosova, the able and ambitious president of the Society for Cultural Relations in Kiev. The group made a tour of the main Ukrainian centres in Canada in December and January of 1964-5, during which they sought meetings with the nationalists in each of the cities they visited. In Winnipeg, two of the visitors made contact with the UCC.[12] However, the nationalists were not as easily influenced as Soviet authorities had hoped. Their suspicions were particularly aroused when they learned that Kolosova's husband was a Russian. Her encounters with the nationalists were often quite heated. In one instance, when questions became highly embarrassing, Kolosova, who, according to rumours in Kiev, was being groomed as ambassador to succeed Shpedko, walked out and was followed by the other Soviet guests.[13]

Relations with Ukrainian pro-communists became somewhat routine after Kolosova's visit, and meetings with nationalists declined. Virsky's ensemble again toured Canada in October 1966, and a tourist group arrived in November led by I.P. Haidayenko, an author from Odessa. He was highly embarrassed when nationalists in Toronto asked for the titles of his works and Haidayenko, a Ukrainian, was forced to admit that he wrote in Russian. In Winnipeg, when questions became provocative, he walked out of an interview.[14]

Shpedko continued his public contacts with the Ukrainian pro-communists. He appeared at Palermo at a commemoration of the centenary of confederation on July 2 and again on June 30, 1968, before he left his post in October to return to Moscow. He was replaced by another Ukrainian, B.P. Myroshnychenko. The new ambassador was a guest at a reception in his honour in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Toronto in January 1969 and at the Dominion

Day celebration in Palermo. However relations with Ukrainians were not as warm as under Shpedko. Myroshnychenko did not possess the charisma of his predecessor and relations between Ukrainian pro-communists and Soviet authorities had become strained over the issues of Russification and visas.

Exchange was a two-way process. While Soviet representatives visited Ukrainians in Canada, Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Soviet leaders were invited to Ukraine and the Soviet Union, at first individually and later also in groups as "delegations".

Since travel to the USSR has always been strictly controlled, foreign guests came only on invitation from a sponsor who covered all expenses and was responsible for the guests. Ukrainians were invited either by the Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, if their tours were confined to Ukraine, or by the Slav Committee in Moscow or by both societies if the guests' itineraries were wider.

In each case, a representative of the sponsoring society met the guests at the point of landing on Soviet territory, accompanied them on a predetermined tour and closely supervised their activities. Sometimes the guides were secret police agents assigned to keep a close watch on the guest and often to elicit information.

The first to be invited was Prokop who left in the second half of July 1946 "to acquaint himself with the life of the Ukrainian people and to view the consequences of the German fascist occupation".[15] Early in September, Shatulsky and Weir went to Belgrade as delegates to the All-Slav Congress. On December 11, they left for Ukraine where they remained nearly four months.

Shortly after their return, representatives of Ukrainian and Carpathian organizations of Canada and the USA met in Toronto on April 19-20, 1947, and launched a drive to raise $250,000 for the purchase of food and medicine for the orphans of Ukraine. The collection was officially launched at a mass meeting in Massey Hall on May 25. After M.V. Dekhtiar of the Soviet embassy described the devastation in Ukraine, the members of the audience donated nearly $35,000.[16] Simultaneously the Society for Cultural Relations With Ukraine initiated a campaign to collect English books for the educational institutions of Ukraine.

Over $200,000 was raised in Canada and $65,000 in the USA for the orphan fund.[17] In November, the Soviet ship *Rossiya* left New York with medicine, food and clothing for the orphans and

over 6,000 books for the educational institutions. In the meantime, a delegation made up of Teresio and Krawchuk from Canada and Mykhailo Rakochy from the USA, flew to Ukraine to distribute the gifts. Teresio returned in May. Krawchuk remained as correspondent for nearly two years, visiting many regions and returning in September 1949.[18]

In October 1950, a year after Krawchuk's return, Hrynchyshyn was dispatched to Ukraine. He remained a year, returning in September 1951.[19] In 1953, Stepan Macievich, editor-in-chief of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* was sent to Ukraine as a correspondent, returning a year and a half later.[20]

Beginning in 1954, the number of invitations extended to Ukrainians, both individuals and groups, increased. But, whereas previously the guests usually came on special mission, after 1954 Soviet authorities began extending invitations to individuals as a reward for loyalty and service to the communist movement and/or because they wished to influence and win them to their cause. Invitations for groups of Ukrainians, usually for some anniversary or special event, were forwarded to the NEC of the AUUC specifying the number invited. The latter decided who was to go.

Soviet authorities regarded 1954 as having special significance. It marked the 300th anniversary of the agreement signed at Pereyaslav, a small town in central Ukraine, between Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Cossack leader and head of the Ukrainian state, and Muscovy (Russia). The agreement provided for the union of the two countries as sovereign states. The Russians, the more numerous and powerful of the two, soon imposed their rule on the Ukrainians. Anxious to establish the legitimacy of Russian presence in Ukraine and to counteract the demands for independence by Ukrainians abroad, the Soviet government attempted to utilize the anniversary to glorify the Pereyaslav Agreement as an act of voluntary and "eternal" union of the two nations, with grandiose celebrations to commemorate the anniversary.

Two delegations representing the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations in Canada attended the celebrations. The first, consisting of nine, arrived in May and included Kardash, Boychuk and three provincial secretaries of the AUUC: Maksym Roshko of Quebec, George Solomon of Alberta and John Dubno of British Columbia. After three weeks in the USSR they left for Bulgaria. The

second, a youth delegation of five, led by Michael Mokry, the provincial secretary of the AUUC in Manitoba, came on the invitation of the Slav Committee.

Since 1954, at least one delegation from the AUUC and WBA has visited the Soviet Union each year. In 1959 there were three: a women's group of seven, which included the widows of Navis and Shatulsky; another group headed by Eugene Dolny; and a delegation of five to the twentieth anniversary celebration of the "liberation" and union of Western with Soviet Ukraine, led by Krawchuk.

The Soviet Union also had a special guest in 1954, Wasyl Swystun, the former nationalist leader, who was invited by the Slav Committee and the Society For Cultural Relations for a two month visit. His tour took him to various parts of Russia and Ukraine. On June 5 he had an audience with Khrushchov.[21] The special invitation by two societies for a two month visit (invitations were usually for a month or less) and the interview with Khrushchov indicated that Swystun was highly regarded. The visit had undoubtedly been arranged on the highest level.

Accompanied by his wife, Swystun was in the USSR for a second two-month visit in 1957 and had another audience with Khrushchov.[22] He made a third and last trip to the USSR in 1961 and again had an interview with the Soviet premier and first secretary.[23]

In 1950, arrangements were made whereby the Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries sponsored members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations to study in Kiev, for periods ranging from several months to five years. The Society specified the number (it reached as high as six) to be sent each year and the AUUC selected the students from its ranks. These were approved by the Ukrainian National Party Committee with the representative of the NEC of the party present. The list was reviewed by the sponsoring Society in Kiev.

The purpose was to train personnel for the AUUC such as editors, administrators, organizers, choreographers, teachers and dance instructors. Students under this arrangement were enrolled in post-secondary school programs in the arts, culture or politics at various higher educational institutions in Kiev: the university, conservatory, choreographic and pedagogical institutes or the Higher Party School of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Regardless of the course of study or the institute, each student received at least a minimum of instruction in Marxism-Leninism which included the history of the CPSU, political economy, the Soviet constitution and other political subjects.

The society provided each student with a monthly stipend ranged from 120 roubles for those attending the party school to ninety for those in other institutions[24] (Stipends for Soviet university students began at twenty roubles). Lodging, for all except those at the university, was provided free of charge in a dormitory of the party school.

Originally the policy of the AUUC was to send mature and adult personnel, who had already proven themselves. Not all who could have profited were able to go. When the list of older members was exhausted, the NEC began selecting younger and generally untried candidates, eventually reaching down to the teenage level.

The first to profit from these courses were three able young men who had distinguished themselves in the cultural work of the AUUC: Walter Balay, dance instructor and choreographer from Toronto, and Eugene Dolny and Myron Shatulsky (son of Matthew), musicians from Winnipeg. They arrived in Ukraine in the summer of 1950. Balay returned after eight months, Dolny after two years and Shatulsky after three.[25]

Since then, the AUUC has been sending a group of students annually for training in Kiev. In the 1964-65 school year there were ten in various higher educational institutions, including the Higher Party School.

Nearly all the leading younger AUUC personnel, engaged in cultural and organizational work, have had training in Kiev. Among them are Mykola Hrynchyshyn, Stanley Dobrowlsky, Michael Mokry, John Chitrenky, Constantine Kostaniuk, William Chomyn, William Philipowich and Mary Skrypnyk.

The provision for training its personnel in Soviet institutions, with free tuition, stipends for the students and excellent instruction, was a great asset to the AUUC. Each year several graduates returned to augment its cadres and new students were sent for training. It gave the communists an advantage over their nationalist rivals who could not provide comparable training for their personnel.

After 1956, Ukrainians were also sent by the CPC to the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow.

Among them were Walter Makowecki and Harry Strynadka from Edmonton and Peter Boychuk and Helen Weir of Toronto. However, only Helen Weir was active in the pro-communist organizations. The others were party functionaries.

In 1952, special arrangements were made whereby Ukrainian communist leaders who were chronically ill, could receive extended medical care in the Soviet Union. The first to benefit from the arrangement was Matthew Shatulsky who underwent treatment in Kiev for arteriosclerosis from March to May in 1952. Navis, who suffered from a bad heart and cirrhosis of the liver, followed him in June 1953. After undergoing treatment for nearly a year he died on the *Empress of Britain* on his way back to Canada. Since then several Ukrainian communist leaders have made trips each year to the various plush rest homes and sanatoria of the USSR for medical treatment and rest cures.

There was no tourist travel to the USSR from Canada until 1956 when arrangements were made by *Intourist,* the Soviet travel agency, to provide special tourist visas, usually for a month, through Overseas Travel Limited in Toronto. For 1956 there were fifteen different tours and five classes of service in the classless Soviet society: de luxe, superior, first, second and third.[26]

Tourists were taken on tours under close supervision of *Intourist* guides to selected sites and institutions designed to glorify the regime. Excursions were planned to fill each day so that a tourist did not have time for unescorted wanderings where he might see and hear things which could make an unfavourable impression on him. To visit his relatives in a village a tourist required special secret police permission.

The AUUC organized tourist groups to Ukraine made up of its members and supporters and headed by an AUUC leader. The first such group, numbering fifteen, left Canada in October 1958. The following year, Ukrainian communist leaders in Winnipeg organized their own private company, Globe Tours, to promote and facilitate travel to the USSR. (discussed in detail later)

Great preparations were made by Soviet authorities to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the death of Shevchenko in 1961. Ukrainians from abroad were encouraged to participate and special arrangements were made to accommodate them. Globe Tours organized several excursions under the auspices of the AUUC. Two small parties left from Winnipeg by plane, 125 sailed on the

Polish liner Batory and another 300 left under the leadership of Mary Kardash.

Although fewer Ukrainians from Canada visited Ukraine in 1962, the number increased in subsequent years. Shpedko publicly invited Ukrainians to visit Ukraine in 1964 for the commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth.[27] In 1965, Ukrainian nationalists began visiting Ukraine in considerable numbers. From then on, as tourist facilities in the USSR increased, the trek of Ukrainians of various political persuasions became an annual phenomenon.

The expanding relations between the USSR and Ukrainians in Canada produced some rather paradoxical developments. Hopes that contacts would facilitate the extension of Soviet influence and advance the communist cause among Ukrainians in Canada proved hopelessly disappointing. On the contrary, it hardened the hostility of the nationalists to the Soviet regime and transformed many communists and pro-communists into strong critics.

VII

Organizational Life

THE AUUC emerged after the war as the successor of the ULFTA, inheriting the latter's traditions, structure, members and property. Like its predecessor, it was the parent organization. But whereas, the ULFTA had two subsidiaries, the AUUC inherited only one, the WBA. The other, TODOVYRNAZU, was disbanded after the USSR absorbed Western Ukraine in 1939-1940.

There was nothing in the constitution of the AUUC regarding its ideological character or political role. However, Prokop emphasized that it was "a worthy heir which continued the better traditions of the ULFTA",[1] among which was the promotion of the communist cause.

The nature, structure and activities of the AUUC facilitated the promotion of its ideology. Its membership consisted mainly of workers and less prosperous farmers, critical of the existing social and economic order and sympathetic to the Soviet regime. Its structure was hierarchical, modelled on the Soviet and other communist parties. Direction of the organization and the control of its property was vested in the National Executive Committee.

The basic unit was the branch. The minimum number required to form a branch was seven, making it possible to set up a wide network and initiate activity in many localities. Where there were only a few members, all belonged to a general branch. In localities with sufficient numbers, separate men's, women's, English speaking and youth branches were formed to facilitate the work among the different groups. Special senior citizens' clubs were also set up.

In localities where there was more than one branch, the executive of each had a representative on the executives of each of the

other branches. Women's and youth branches planned their own activities, but in co-ordination with the men's branch. The women's branches did not make any decisions on general organizational questions. Such matters, as well as the management of the labor temples, were under the jurisdiction of the men's branches.* In order to co-ordinate the work in centres with several branches, the fourth convention, in 1950, resolved to form local AUUC councils, to be composed of the executives of each branch.[2]

Cities with larger branches were divided into wards, or sections, to achieve maximum involvement of the members and better results in the various campaigns. The members in each ward were responsible for working with Ukrainians residing therein to recruit new members, collect renewals and new subscriptions for the press, solicit donations and promote all campaigns sponsored or supported by the AUUC. In each campaign branches were assigned a quota which was divided among the wards.

Branches were encouraged to report periodically on the progress of each campaign. When the final results were all in, they were published in the press with the names of collectors, donors and the amounts contributed. The province that achieved the best results in terms of percentage of its quota was given, in the case of press campaigns, the honour of receiving a banner that passed each year to the province with the highest achievement. To encourage greater effort, photos of the leading achievers were published in the press. In addition, prizes such as books from Ukraine were awarded.

The provinces of Ontario and Alberta were organized into districts each of which had a committee elected at an annual conference. Ontario had six districts with centres in St. Catharines, Hamilton, Windsor, Timmins and Fort William. District committees coordinated and reviewed the work of the branches in their areas. Above the districts stood the provincial committees, elected at biannual provincial conventions. Each province, from British Columbia to Quebec, had a provincial committee (Nova Scotia was attached to Quebec). The structure was crowned by the NEC, composed of thirteen members, an audit commission of three and an Advisory Council of twenty-five, which was later renamed the National Committee (NC).

*The practice was based on tradition and realism. The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations had been initiated by men. In addition, the men's branches were usually the largest in each locality, the most stable and the most active.

The NC was composed of the key full-time functionaries of the AUUC and other leading activists across Canada. It included editors, the president of the Workers Benevolent Association, the provincial secretaries, organizers and others. The NEC was made up of functionaries in the national office, one or more of the Toronto editors, the administrator of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* and at least one leading Toronto activist who was not a full time functionary of the AUUC. Women always held two, and for a time three of these positions.

The organization was guided by the NEC which was scheduled to meet at least once a month but usually met bi-weekly. It formulated new policies and drew up plans which were presented for approval to the plenums of the NEC, held semi-annually in Toronto, and to the bi-annual conventions, held alternately in Winnipeg and Toronto.

The NEC had national sub-committees for work in the educational, cultural, organizational, women's and English speaking sectors. Each provided leadership in its specific field and acted in an advisory capacity to the NEC. There was also a junior council and a youth council.

Through its officials, the treasurer, the national secretary and the latter's two assistants, one in charge of women's work and the other the Canadian-born sector, the NEC was in constant touch with the provincial and district committees and the branches. From time to time the NEC sent out organizers, speakers, cultural directors and other leading personnel to check on and assist the provincial committees and the branches. The provincial committees also sent their organizers and secretaries on tours of the branches. Locally, the teacher, if there was one, and the executive, which met weekly, directed activities, checked on the progress of campaigns and reported to the centre.

The supreme organs of the AUUC were the bi-annual conventions. Delegates to the conventions were elected from the floor at branch meetings, one for each twenty-five members or major fraction thereof. They were usually leading local activists and members of the CPC.

The structure of the WBA was not as involved as that of the AUUC. It functioned through branches, composed of both sexes. Many of the WBA branches consisted of only a few members in localities where there were no branches of the AUUC. Their activi-

ties generally included visiting the sick, paying monthly dues and participating in campaigns for the pro-communist press. Since its scope was limited, the WBA did not own property (with the exception of the former ULFTA temple at the corner of Pritchard and MacGregor Streets in Winnipeg which it took over in 1942 because of default on mortgage payments). The work of the WBA was directed by its NEC and Board of Directors, each composed of seven members; and an audit committee of three, elected at tri-annual conventions. Contact with the branches was maintained through correspondence and periodic visits by provincial organizers.

There was close liaison and co-operation with the AUUC through inclusion of WBA functionaries, who were also members of the AUUC, on the various AUUC committees, local and national, and the inclusion of Prokop on the Board of Directors of the WBA.[3] All decisions on broader questions affecting the Ukrainian pro-communist movement were made at joint annual plenums of the NECs of both organizations.[4]

The effectiveness of the AUUC in promoting the communist cause was due, in no small measure, to the dedication and diligence of the leadership. At the second convention in 1946, Dushnitsky and most of the other members of the NEC, who had provided leadership during the war, were dropped. The tried and tested pre-1939 leaders of the ULFTA were re-elected to the posts they had held before the war, with the exception of Popowich, who had died, and Shatulsky, who remained in Winnipeg as editor-in-chief of *Ukrayinske Slovo.* Navis, who held the reigns of power, became the administrator of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia.* Prokop resumed the key position of secretary and Boychuk that of treasurer. Two younger men assumed leading positions in the press: Macievich as editor-in-chief of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* and Krawchuk as assistant editor.

To expand the organization among the Canadian-born, measures were taken to give the AUUC a native Canadian facade. Younger men, mostly Canadian by birth, who had a good command of the English language, were promoted to various leadership posts. William Teresio was elected national president, Stanley Dobrowolsky, George Solomon, John Dubno, Anthony Bilecki and later Michael Mokry and John Chitrenky were appointed provincial secretaries. A promising young industrial worker and union official, William Harasym, was first appointed provincial organizer in Alberta and

later elected assistant secretary to Prokop. Hrynchyshyn became the editor-in-chief of *Ukrayinske Slovo* on the death of Shatulsky. Two younger women, Mary Skrypnyk and Helen Weir, also attained prominence in the national leadership of the AUUC. In the WBA, George Krenz and Michael Seychuk and later Anthony Bilecki, occupied the leadership posts.

The younger cadres were carefully selected and proved to be wise choices. All turned out to be reliable, energetic and loyal; all worked well as a team with the older leaders. The result was stable leadership by professional functionaries who had worked their way up through many years of devoted if not outstanding service in the ranks.

Turnover in the membership of the NC of the AUUC was confined to activists rather than full time officials, assuring the organization of stability. The secretary and the treasurer, and until recently the president and the vice-president of the AUUC, remained in their posts until retirement or death. The same applied to the editorial staffs of the newspapers and the key people in the WBA. If any of the more permanent members of the NEC, Dobrowolsky, Krawchuk, Macievich or Skrypnyk, was not re-elected for a term, it was because of a prolonged stay in the Soviet Union.

As older leaders retired or passed away, younger men – William Harasym, Eugene Dolny, Ray Dowhopoluk, William Malnychuk and William Morris (Marushchak) – were elected to the NEC. However, only Harasym was repeatedly re-elected. The others were dropped because they did not wish to continue or because they came into conflict with the older leaders.

In spite of the promotion of the Canadian-born to leadership, the bulk of the membership of the AUUC and WBA was made up of adults who had migrated to Canada in the inter-war years. Although membership was limited to Ukrainians, exceptions were made in the case of individual Slavs who lived in localities where branches of their national pro-communist organizations did not exist or in cases where such Slavs were married to Ukrainians.

No statistics are available on the breakdown of AUUC membership according to sex and age. However, the data on the number recruited, the number of branches in each category and the number of convention delegates of each sex indicated an overwhelming preponderance of adult male members. Thus for the years 1953-1955,

there were 253 new members recruited to the men's and the general branches and only seventy-one to the women's branches (Table VI). From the period from July 1962 to April 1963 the number recruited to men's branches was thirty-two, to women's nine and to youth twenty.[5]

Table VI

NUMBER OF MEMBERS RECRUITED TO THE AUUC FOR THE YEARS 1953 – 1955

	Men's & General	Women's	English Speaking	Total
Que	3	5	2	10
Ont	38	16	72	126
Man	44	33	38	115
Sask	40	2	3	45
Alta	76	6	58	140
BC	52	9	15	76
Totals	253	71	188	512

Source: *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* December 15, 1955.

Clearly, the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were more successful in recruiting men than women. This was probably due to the fact that most women already had a double burden, outside employment and housekeeping duties, which left them little time for other interests.

The majority of the members lived in the industrial and mining centres. Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta had the greatest number, with Toronto, Winnipeg and Edmonton being the centres of largest concentration.

The mass movement of Ukrainians from the rural communities of Western Canada into the war industries in the early forties, shifted the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian radical movement from Western to Eastern Canada. Consequently, Toronto became the centre of the AUUC rather than Winnipeg, which had been the hub of Ukrainian life and the headquarters of the ULFTA before 1939.

One of the most effective agencies through which the Ukrainian pro-communists carried on their work and propagated their ideology was their press. It provided a quick and easy means of contact between the national centres and their members and sympa-

thizers. Although important directives to the branches were communicated by mail through circular letters, more general instructions, appeals, exhortations and reports were published in the press.

The press was also important as a means of formulating the opinions and moulding the ideological outlook of the members. The news was carefully edited to convey the desired impression. Communist activities and successes both in Canada and abroad were emphasized out of all proportion to their importance.

The editors were all qualified to promote the communist cause. Most had lived in the USSR for extended periods. Some had studied at the Higher Party School in Kiev. Each had a favourite topic on which he expounded. Krawchuk specialized in denouncing the Ukrainian "bougeois nationalists"; Macievich editorialized on the "bright future" of the Soviet regime; Hrynchyshyn rhapsodized on its "great achievements".

Like the ULFTA, the AUUC strove to promote its ideology through cultural and educational work. There were no more full-time political courses or group readings for the immigrant members. Educational programs for them generally consisted of lectures on subjects varying from politics to literature and health, and propaganda meetings on issues of the day. There was a lack of the pre-war enthusiasm for education and the lectures were not always too well attended. The speakers were usually leaders of the AUUC, although sometimes outside personalities were featured. They included leaders of other communist front organizations and prominent sympathizers of the communist movement.

The month to month educational work among the Canadian-born was limited to "educationals", short discourses on current topics, usually delivered by the branch educational director, if there was one, at the monthly membership meetings. Some branches attempted to promote reading and made efforts to build up a stock of books consisting mostly of Soviet novels and propaganda literature.

One aspect of educational work with which the AUUC preoccupied itself for a time was the promotion of the study of the Ukrainian language. There were several reasons for this policy. Language was a means of maintaining the national heritage and an interest in the organization. A knowledge of the language also made it possible for a person to keep in touch with developments in

Ukraine where the new society was being built and to receive inspiration from it. The fifth convention in 1952 resolved to establish evening classes for adults in grammar and conversational Ukrainian. The twelfth proposed a series of night school courses for the Canadian-born to include history and geography of Ukraine as well as language and literature.[6] Attempts were made to set up such courses in several centres but they were not successful due to lack of interest among the members and a lack of trained teachers. Another means of promoting the study of Ukrainian among English-speaking members was through the press. In April 1957, the *UC* began a series of bi-weekly lessons that continued for a year.

The AUUC also devoted considerable effort to teaching children the native tongue. The second convention in 1946 called for the organization of Ukrainian schools wherever circumstances permitted. The subject was reemphasized at several subsequent conventions. The fourth, in 1950, proposed the organization of schools during the summer holidays in smaller communities, especially rural areas where there were no Ukrainian schools. The seventh resolved to initiate a campaign to explain the importance of maintaining Ukrainian schools and the need for their extension. The tenth called upon the members to recruit children for Ukrainian schools and to facilitate their efficient functioning.[7] The Ukrainian pro-communist press exhorted parents at the beginning of each school year to enroll their children. Various articles also appeared periodically in the press, emphasizing the importance of the Ukrainian language.

In addition to promoting the study of the native tongue in their own halls, the Ukrainian pro-communists advocated its introduction into the public educational institutions. The third convention in 1948 went on record in support of the teaching of the Ukrainian language and history in colleges and universities.[8]

When the UCC presented a brief to the Manitoba Royal Commission on Education in November 1957, proposing that the teaching of Ukrainian be introduced into grades 10, 11 and 12, the AUUC greeted it and called for united action of all Ukrainians in its behalf.

In December 1957, Swystun presented a brief to the commision, urging that Ukrainian and Polish be introduced into the elementary and secondary schools of Manitoba. In January 1958, he sent a

greeting to the eighth convention of the AUUC in which he called upon all Ukrainians to initiate a campaign for the maintenance of the Ukrainian language and culture in Canada and urged the convention to initiate a plan which would form the basis for possible coordinated mass action of all Ukrainian cultural organizations regardless of their political or religious ideologies.

The convention welcomed the establishment of courses of Ukrainian in universities and in secondary schools of Saskatchewan and added its support to the requests that it be introduced in elementary schools in areas with a high concentration of Ukrainians.[9] The convention added that its members aspired to united action of all Ukrainians in efforts to preserve the Ukrainian language in Canada.

In November 1958, the Alberta provincial convention of the AUUC greeted with enthusiasm the announcement of the provincial government that it intended to introduce Ukrainian in high schools. After this was accomplished, the Ukrainian pro-communists called for a campaign to introduce Ukrainian into the elementary schools at least at the grade two or three level. Mary Kardash, a member of the Winnipeg School Board, urged that it be introduced into the elementary schools of Winnipeg.[10]

The AUUC also emphasized other aspects of educational work. During the 1930s, the ULFTA trained scores of activists and leaders through local, district and provincial courses in political indoctrination, some lasting as long as six months. The AUUC undertook to repeat the process with the youth. These courses lasted from a weekend to a month or longer and were held during the summer. The students were mostly high school seniors.

Indoctrination was carried on by prominent Ukrainian and other communist leaders and fellow travellers. Among the lecturers at a provincial course in Manitoba in 1960 were Jacob Penner, communist alderman in Winnipeg, and Don and Sylvia Currie, leading CPC functionaries.[11] A two-week youth seminar at Palermo in 1956 was addressed by Stanley Gray who taught at McGill University and was prominent in the New Left.

Periodically there were courses of longer duration organized by the NEC of the AUUC to train teachers, cultural directors and functionaries who could combine teaching with the propagation of the communist ideology. The first was held in Saskatoon from July 1 to September 22, 1946, with eighteen students. Other courses,

16. Graduation banquet for students and instructors of the AUUC Leadership Training Course at Palermo in September 1950. Among the graduates were Eugene Dolny, William Chomyn, Myron Shatulsky and William Harasym. Second from left in the second row facing camera, is John Boyd, a former member of the Central Committee of the CPC who resigned from the party over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. *Photo, courtesy Multicultural History Society of Ontario.*

lasting from six weeks to four months, were conducted in 1950, 1952 and 1954.

The core subjects were Ukrainian language and literature, music and folk dancing combined with lectures on organizational work, the left-wing movement and other political subjects. Among the teachers and lecturers were prominent Ukrainian communist leaders: Prokop, Teresio, Korol, Weir and others.

As in the pre-1939 period, the labor temples provided a rich and varied program for the children. In the 1948-49 school year the Toronto hall at 300 Bathurst Street held classes in the evenings and on Saturdays. In Winnipeg over 150 children attended such classes. The content of the programs was designed to instill the desired political attitudes and concepts.

The junior and senior ensembles and the drama circles staged performances in the labor temples, usually on Sunday nights. Each fall the local cultural committee met and formulated a tentative plan of events for the season. The schedule adopted in Toronto consisted of twenty major events (Table VII). Similar programs were planned by other large centres.

The combined cultural forces of the AUUC of a district, a province or several provinces staged concerts and festivals on special occasions. The Association's ensembles also entertained Canadian audiences, participated jointly with other Slav groups in the staging of annual Slav concerts and often toured smaller Ukrainian communities which did not have their own groups. The women organized special events: afternoon teas, Mother's Day programs, handicraft exhibits and annual concert meetings on March 8, International Women's Day.

The plays, dramas and concert numbers were carefully selected for their content. Many of the songs, being of Soviet origin, glorified the USSR and its regime. The communist message was also presented by propagandists who addressed the audiences during intermission. Often, especially at the annual festivals at Palermo, the speakers were Soviet guests.

A popular form of entertainment in the labor temples, that also served as a means of indoctrination, was the showing of Soviet films. They often attracted people who had become tired of the usual concert programs and others who would not readily attend other events in the AUUC halls.

Table VII

TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF EVENTS FOR THE 1958 – 59 SEASON IN THE LABOR TEMPLE, 300 BATHURST STREET, TORONTO

Ukrainian Handicraft Display	Sun. Nov. 16, 1958
Fortieth Anniversary Concert	Sun. Nov. 16,
Drama, *Dvanadtsiatka* (The Twelve)	Sun. Nov. 30,
Variety Concert	Sun. Dec. 14,
Operetta, *Kozak za Danaiem* (The Cossack Beyond the Danube)	Sun. Dec. 28,
Children's Concert	Sun. Jan. 4, 1959
Concert by the M. Popowich Choir	Sun. Jan. 18,
All Slav Concert	Sat. Jan. 31,
UC Concert	Sun. Feb. 15,
Youth Concert	Sun. Mar. 1,
International Women's Day	Sun. Mar. 8,
Schevchendo Concert (Massey Hall)	Sun. Mar. 15,
Children's Concert	Sun. Apr. 5,
Concert by Women's Choir, *Hahilka*	Sun. Apr. 12,
Drama	Sun. Apr. 26,
Concert by M. Popowich Choir	Sun. May 3,
Concert by Shevchenko Male Chorus	Sun. May 10,
Franko Concert	Sun. May 31,
International Children's Day Concert	Sun. June 7,
Annual Palermo Celebrations	Sun. June 28, or Sun. July 4,

Source: *UC* October 15, 1958.

In addition to educational and cultural, the AUUC promoted recreational activities. The most common were parties at which bingos and raffles were held. Several times a year the Association sponsored banquest, followed by dancing, usually on Saturday nights, to commemorate some event or anniversary, or to wind up some campaign. Occasionally there were dance parties on special dates such as New Year's. In summer the members gathered at outdoor picnics which usually included a concert program. The localities with camp grounds organized summer programs for the youth and children.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations faced various problems that affected their activities. One of these was the constant lack of funds. Money was required to pay the salaries of as many as seven or more full-time officials in the national office, eight or more provincial officers and twenty or more on the editorial staffs and in the printing shops of the three newspapers.[12] Locally, in addition to the cost of upkeep and maintenance of the halls, there

were the salaries of the full-time teachers. Money was also required for special purposes such as the purchase of camp grounds and the erection of new buildings. In Southern Ontario, in addition to the regular campaigns for money, there were special collections to construct a swimming pool, a pavilion and an amphitheatre at Palermo Camp. Festivals also entailed heavy expenses in preparations and transportation of the performers. Money to conduct various schools and summer courses and other special needs added to the burden.

Funds were raised from members and supporters through direct contributions and special events such as concerts, bazaars, raffles and lotteries. A lucrative source was the sale of beer and liquor at parties and banquets. However, the funds from these and other sources were limited and inadequate.

Another problem was the heavy burden of work imposed on the members. Activities for centres with a hall and camp grounds included the following:

May-June – Preparations for the summer program at camp.
July-August – Participation in Camp activities.
September-October – Planning and preparations for the winter and spring season.
November-December – Campaign for the Ukrainian press.
February – Campaign for the *Ukrainian Canadian.*
March-April – Campaign for organizational funds and new members.

These campaigns were in addition to all the regular day-to-day work of the Association. The participation in the various cultural activities, the fulfilling of the financial obligations, the attendance of the monthly branch, weekly executive and frequent meetings of the various committees made heavy demands on the members.

Mary Prokop, assistant to the national secretary in the field of women's work, described the involvement of the members of the National Women's Committee:

> Two days, and . . . often at nights, I perform the duties of secretary . . . and prepare materials for the women's page. . . We attend the meetings of the NEC. . . When you add to this the meetings of the National Women's Committee, the branch meetings, and during the press campaign, the ward meetings and the organizational gatherings on Saturdays and Sundays . . . and the obligations on the general field, there is always a shortage of days in the week. . .[13]

These problems were further complicated and aggravated by the unfavourable political climate. With the unfolding of the Cold War,

public opinion turned against the communists and their organizations. Newspapers stepped up their anti-Soviet propaganda. George Drew, the Premier of Ontario, declared at a public meeting on March 31, 1946, sponsored by the Ukrainian nationalists, that "I intend to do everything I can to prevent this ugly thing, Communism, from raising its head in Canada".[14]

The Ukrainian pro-communists soon felt the effects of the new wave of public hostility. Canadians involved in the communist movement, among them Ukrainians, were barred from entering the USA. In Quebec, the police raided the AUUC quarters on April 16, 1948, and carted away books and other materials.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were also subjected to various forms of discrimination by the authorities. When the National Folk Arts Council was formed in 1964 to organize and coordinate the participation of ethnic groups in the commemoration of the jubilee of confederation in 1967, the AUUC was not invited to participate.[15]

After 1955, attitudes to the Ukrainian pro-communists became somewhat more tolerant. The easing of international tensions created, according to a report at the Ninth Convention of the AUUC, "more favourable conditions for work than in the past years".

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian communists had been altering their attitudes to Canadian society. The hopes of post-war co-operation aroused by the Teheran and Yalta Agreements, the emergence of the USSR as a super power and the establishment of "People's Democracies" under its tutelage in countries of Eastern Europe were interpreted as indications of the superiority of the socialist camp. These developments, according to the communists, made possible the economic transformation in capitalist countries by peaceful means.

Furthermore, the prejudices of the Ukrainian communists against everything capitalist had been dulled by the friendly relations established with men of wealth and influence during the campaign for the return of the ULFTA properties. They also aspired to maintain and cultivate the co-operation with various organizations, institutions and different levels of government, developed during the war.

Consequently, the Ukrainian communists proceded to improve their public image in order to make themselves more acceptable.

In place of representatives of the Communist Party, as in the pre-1939 years, they invited government officials to their conventions and other functions. They recognized Canadian national holidays and instead of the "*Internationale*", they sang "O Canada". At the concert, opening the seventeenth WBA and the fifth AUUC conventions in Winnipeg in 1952, the delegates observed a two-minute silence in memory of the late King George VI[16] and in 1957 the Ukrainian pro-communist press carried a front page photo of Queen Elizabeth on the occasion of her four day visit to Ottawa.[17] Labor temples, after undergoing alterations and remodelling, suddenly emerged as "cultural centres". The salutation "comrade" was replaced by "friend" at conventions, although "comrade" was still used at branch meetings and between individuals. There was also a new emphasis in the education of the younger generation. It was to be brought up "in the spirit and consciousness of Canadian patriotism, defending the peace, independence and democracy of Canada. . .".[18]

The Ukrainian pro-communists also tried to gain public acceptance by sporadic participation in community work. In Port Arthur, Ontario, they collected $500 to equip and furnish a private room in the General Hospital and in Lachine, Quebec, they raised $1,500 to expand the local infirmary.[19] In Edmonton and Calgary, the youth provided skating rinks and in Newcastle, Alberta, members of the AUUC initiated a fund for a rink.[20]

In spite of their tightly-knit and disciplined organization, the well-organized programs of cultural, educational, recreational and other activities, the growing public tolerance towards them after 1955 and their persistent efforts to make themselves accepted by the public, the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations experienced a continual loss of influence and momentum. Numerous new developments, which were beyond their control, not only worked against their further growth but set the stage for their inevitable decline.

VIII

Relations with the Communist Party

THROUGHOUT its history, Ukrainians had always played an important role in the Communist Party in Canada. They constituted a large proportion of the members, provided many activists and leaders and contributed a major portion of the party's funds. Their mass organizations supported party activities and acted as "transmission belts" through which the party maintained contact with the Ukrainian community, and stepping stones into the Party for many of their members.

Support of the Ukrainian organizations was of the utmost importance to the party in its struggle to regain its legality. After Germany attacked the USSR, both the party and the ULFTA aspired to regain their legal status. However, it was much easier for the Ukrainian organizations than for the party to win public support. Consequently, the campaign for the lifting of the ban on the ULFTA was initiated first. It was launched in Toronto in July 1941, at a mass meeting which called for the release of "anti-Nazi Ukrainian leaders".[1] In October, it was given a new impetus when a National Council for Democratic Rights was set up in Toronto to campaign on behalf of the illegal pro-communist organizations. The council organized a drive for signatures to a petition requesting that the ban on "anti-fascist organizations" be removed, their properties returned and all "anti-fascists" released.[2] There was no specific mention of the Communist Party.

It was not until February 1942, at a conference in Ottawa called by the same council *after* the campaign on behalf of the ULFTA had gathered momentum, that the party was specifically mentioned. Thereafter, the drive for the release of party leaders and

for the lifting of the ban on the party was linked with the more popular campaign on behalf of the ULFTA.

Ukrainians also participated in party-sponsored activities that led to the reconstitution of the outlawed party. Early in 1942, in an attempt to assist in the war effort and at the same time to popularize their own cause, the communists set up Tim Buck Plebiscite Committees whose task was to campaign for a "Yes" vote in the forthcoming referendum on the question of compulsory military service. Members of the Ukrainian mass organizations worked with the committees both directly and through their own groups, which had been set up to campaign among Ukrainians.

After the referendum was over, the communists planned to maintain some form of legal organization. Representatives of the plebiscite committees met in Toronto on May 30-31, 1942, and formed a new national body, the Communist Total War Committee. Ukrainians participated in the formation of the new organization and Kardash became its president.

As communist activity increased, the interned members were gradually released but the ban on the party continued. More than 500 delegates from local Total War Committees, among them many Ukrainians, met in Toronto on August 20-22, and launched a new communist political organization, the Labor Progressive Party (LPP), to replace the outlawed Communist Party. Ukrainians, who played an important role in the formation of the new party, also made up a large proportion of its membership.

The basic unit of the new party was the club, which usually consisted of five to twenty members. There were territorial, language, industrial, factory, professional and what the party called closed clubs. Basically, a Ukrainian in a larger centre belonged to a language club. If he worked in industry, the party could direct him to a factory or industrial club; if he was a professional, he most likely would belong to a professional club; if his membership in the party was to be a guarded secret, he belonged to a closed club whose members were known to only a few top leaders. In smaller centres, where there were only a few members, all belonged to a territorial club.

Of seventy-three in the Toronto area in 1951, nine were Ukrainian language clubs. They included the Star, New Toronto, West Toronto, East Toronto, Sunnyside, Ossington, Bathurst, Spadina

and St. Andrews clubs. Another, Alexandra Park, located in Ward 5, was made up of Canadian-born Ukrainians. The members of the Ukrainian clubs had a three-fold role: to work among Ukrainians in the mass organizations, to canvas specified areas in elections and other campaigns, and to raise funds for the party.

Ukrainian members ran regularly in municipal, provincial and federal elections as official or unofficial party candidates. They were often drafted in constituencies with few Ukrainian voters when no one else with greater appeal to a non-Ukrainian electorate was available.

In the Alberta provincial elections on August 17, 1944, of the thirty LPP candidates, five were Ukrainians: William Halina, Mike Hayduk, D. Semeniuk, William Teresio and P. Tymchuk. Among the sixty-five LPP candidates in the federal election on June 11, 1945, three were Ukrainians: William Halina, Nicholas Hrynchyshyn and John Weir. Of the 100 LPP candidates in the August 10, 1953, federal election six were Ukrainians: John Boychuk, Andrew Bileski, William Berezowski, Stanley Dobrowolsky, Constantine Kostaniuk and John Paliuk.

Most of the full-time functionaries of the Ukrainian mass organizations ran as party-sponsored candidates in one or more municipal, provincial or federal elections.

Many of the communist electoral successes were due to the support of the Ukrainians, especially in the areas where they were heavily concentrated, such as Ward 5 in Toronto and Ward 3 in Winnipeg. There were also Ukrainians among the communists elected: John Weir and John Boyd in Toronto; William and Mary Kardash and Andrew Bileski in Winnipeg; Michael Korol in Timmins; William Halina in Vernon.

Some Ukrainians moved back and forth as full-time functionaries between the party and the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. Weir, Boyd, Sago and others alternately occupied posts in the CPC-LLP and the ULFTA-AUUC. Ukrainians also provided many party leaders on the local and provincial levels. This was not true of any of the other Slavic groups.

The proportion of Ukrainians in the party and their importance declined somewhat during and immediately after World War II. As industries expanded, the trade unions became the main base of the

party's operations. Ukrainians had played an important role in advancing communist influence in industry. But as the party gained popularity and ascendency in the labour movement, the proportion of Anglo-Saxon exceeded the proportion of Ukrainian recruits. Furthermore, the new party cadres were usually drawn from the ranks of the Anglo-Saxon members.

The ratio of Ukrainians in the party in the various cities and provinces varied. It was larger in Toronto, Winnipeg and Edmonton, and in the corresponding provinces. According to rough estimates by former party leaders (there are no statistics), from one fifth to one quarter of all party members in Canada in the late 1940s were Ukrainians.[3]

Even though their proportion declined, the Ukrainians, as members of long standing, formed a core of reliable, experienced and stable veterans. Their dedication to the party was an example and a source of inspiration to the mass of the newer members. They carried out much of the recruiting and soliciting of new subscriptions for the communist press, performed a great deal of the footwork such as canvassing in elections and distributing various leaflets, and formed a large segment of the audiences and the most enthusiastic participants at mass meetings sponsored or supported by the party.

The most important contribution to the party that the Ukrainians made in the post-war period was financial. As members and leaders of large mass organizations, whose members were sympathetic to the party, they had a large base to draw on for party funds. Money was raised as individual contributions, solicited by the party members, and as donations in various forms by the mass organizations and the business enterprises, such as co-operatives, controlled by Ukrainian communists.

After the establishment of *Ukrayinska Knyha* in 1955 and Globe Tours in 1959, part of the profits of the two enterprises, both of which prospered, were siphoned off to assist in the financing of the party and the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. This was done through the insertion of regular weekly advertisements by both firms in the *Canadian Tribune* and the Ukrainian pro-communist press and the payment of salaries of people who were not employed by the firms but who worked as full-time functionaries

in the communist movement. Thus Globe Tours paid, among others, the salaries of Prokop, the national secretary of the AUUC, and Mokry, its secretary for Manitoba.[4]

Leading Ukrainian members were always placed on fund raising committees of the party. When a campaign was launched in 1947 for $250,000 to make the *Canadian Tribune* a daily, Navis was placed on the board of trustees of the foundation fund. The Ukrainian pro-communist press called for support for the new communist daily. Ten years later when the Canadian Tribune found itself in a precarious financial position, the Ukrainian pro-communist press called on its readers to subscribe to the party organ and to assist it financially.[5]

After the controversy in the party over Buck's leadership and the mass defections in 1957 (described in detail later), the party became more dependent on the Ukrainians for the source of its finances than at any time since the end of World War II. Because they were such a vital source of the party's finances, a report of party work among them, delivered by one of the Ukrainian representatives, was often on the agenda of party committees. especially the NC and the NEC.

The language organizations were committed as units and their members as individuals to participation in campaigns sponsored by the party and its other front organizations. The AUUC, for example, sent delegates to the Peace Congress and two of its leaders, Prokop and Korol, were elected to its National Council. The members participated in the campaigns of the congress such as collecting signatures for the banning of atomic bombs. In some localities the members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were the only participants in such campaigns. Women members of the AUUC were active in various drives sponsored by the Canadian Congress of Women, one of the party's front groups. In dozens of smaller centres the only contacts the party had were members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. In some, the communist movement was made up entirely of Ukrainians, supported by their mass organizations.

The migration of Ukrainians in Canada after 1945 affected the party clubs in many localities. In the prairie provinces there was a shift of population from the rural to the urban areas. As mining declined, there was also an exodus from the coal mining areas of

Alberta and the gold mining centres of Northern Ontario. In many farming communities, especially in Alberta, and in coal and gold mining towns, the communist movement seriously declined or even ceased to exist after the Ukrainian members of the party and the mass organizations moved out.

The Ukrainian pro-communist newspapers, whose circulation was always larger than that of the official party press, also played a vital role in promoting the party and the communist cause. They supported the party line on every issue, reflected the party position on every event, reported party activities, published party documents and publicized party campaigns.

They always appealed on behalf of party candidates and those sponsored by it. Their attitude to other candidates coincided with the party position. In the Grey North by-election on February 5, 1945, *Ukrayinske Slovo* supported General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Liberal candidate. The CCF, which opposed him, was charged with serving "black reaction". In the 1945 federal election, when the party campaigned under the slogan, "Liberal-Labor Coalition", *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* advocated the election of "a large block of farmer-labor candidates who could form a progressive coalition government with reform liberals led by King". By 1948 the party slogan was: "Unite at the Polls – Elect a CCF Government". The Ukrainian pro-communists again went along with the new line. *Zhyttia* even published the LPP program for the August 17, 1948 Alberta provincial elections. The new party slogan, "Put Canada First", in the 1953 federal election, did not include support for the CCF. *Zhyttia* called for the election of "all the candidates of the LPP".[6] After 1956 the attitude of the Ukrainian pro-communist press became more favourable to the CCF in keeping with the new party policy. By 1963 it was calling for the election of NDP candidates.

The treatment of the Fred Rose case provides a good example of how closely the Ukrainian pro-communist press followed the party line. In its propaganda the party tried to convey the impression that he was an innocent victim of an international anti-Soviet conspiracy. The Ukrainian pro-communist press described him as a "victim of terror" who was sentenced "only because he . . . desired Canadian-Soviet friendship".

Equally rigid was its adherence to the party line on international events. It supported the Soviet Union in its controversy with Yugo-

slavia in 1948. It reprinted the June 28 resolution of the Communist Information Bureau denouncing the leaders of the Yugoslav party. Laszlo Rajk the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and seven other Hungarian communist leaders who were put on trial in 1949, were described as "conspirators". After the trial, an article reported that three of the accused, including Rajk, had been sentenced to death as "spies". A week later another article described the outcome of the trial as "the just verdict of the Hungarian people". After the death sentence was imposed in Czechoslovakia on eleven party and government leaders, among them Rudolph Slansky, the secretary of the CC, and Vladimir Clementis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Ukrayinske Slovo* announced in a glaring headline that: The Enemies of the People Have Been Sentenced.[7] *

The party was able to promote its line in the Ukrainian pro-communist press and organizations through its members who occupied key posts at all levels. In the early 1930s, after the "turn to the path of general revolutionary struggle", party control over the mass organizations was strict. It was maintained through party fractions inside the mass organizations. The party found these necessary to maintain its control for a number of reasons. The Ukrainian Labor Farmer Mass Organizations had not yet been welded into disciplined bodies, there had been several revolts in the ranks against the leaders and considerable factional strife among the leaders themselves, the party had not yet achieved uncontested control over the mass organizations and the leaders did not always support the party line.

By the end of 1935, factionalism had been routed out and a cohesive group of disciplined leaders, committed to the support of the Comintern and the party line, had attained firm control. Fractions continued to function for a time after 1935 but in a progressively diminishing role.

A factor in the decline of party fractions was the changed concept of how socialism was to be achieved. In the period prior to World War II, communists had argued that socialism could only be achieved through the seizure of power by force. However, in 1943, the LPP proclaimed that:

> The perspective is now before the Canadian labor movement of so consolidating its parliamentary strength, in cooperation with farmers, as to

*The Ukrainian pro-communist press had used similar language in denouncing the innocent victims of the Soviet purges in the 1930s.

> elect majorities to the governments of Canada . . . so as to establish labor-farmer governments which can lead the nation in effecting profound democratic reforms in the economy and law of Canada.[8]

As a result, the party was no longer to be made up of a select few, dedicated to promoting revolutionary action, but was broadened to include anyone who was ready to work for the achievement of power through parliamentary means. Consequently, discipline in the party became considerably more lax.

As a result, the party no longer proclaimed hegemony over the mass organizations as in the pre-war years. Control over them was relaxed and fractions were not revived in the post World War II period. Ukrainian party members pursued their work in the mass organizations as they had done in the 1920s before the "turn to the path of general revolutionary struggle" in 1931. There was little or no interference from the party as long as they integrated the membership in the party campaigns and raised the alloted sums in the financial drives.

This did not mean the abandonment of control by the party over the mass organizations. They still remained subsidiaries to be guided and exploited for the purpose of advancing party and Soviet interests. The practice still prevailed that if a member was expelled from the party, he was in turn almost inevitably expelled from the mass organizations. But there were no more fractions or fraction meetings of party delegates to conventions or party representatives to supervise convention proceedings.

The party coordinated the work and maintained control over the Ukrainian mass organizations in two ways: through the membership of leading Ukrainian communists on party executive bodies and committees and through Ukrainian party committees or bureaus.

In Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver, where the party was strong, it had city committees made up of the leading cadres in each city. Party work in the local Ukrainian mass organizations was directed by a Ukrainian city party committee or bureau, which was responsible to the city committee of the party. One of the members of the Ukrainian committee was also a member of the city committee of the party. In Toronto, this position was filled by Tom Chopowick until his death in 1962.

In smaller centres, a general membership meeting of all Ukrainian party members would be called two or three times a year when-

ever an issue related specifically to Ukrainians arose, such as how best to promote a new turn in the party line in the mass organizations, or how to mobilize the members of the mass organizations for a specific party campaign. As the war receded such meetings became fewer and fewer.

Each province, from Quebec to British Columbia, had a provincial party committee which included leading Ukrainian communists, among them the provincial secretaries of the AUUC. Their number was larger in the Prairie provinces where the party was weak among Anglo-Saxons and where the membership was, in fact, predominantly Ukrainian, than in the more industrialized provinces. Thus Quebec and British Columbia each had one Ukrainian on the provincial party committee – Anthony Bilecki in Quebec (later president of the WBA in Winnipeg) and John Dubno, the AUUC provincial secretary, in British Columbia. Manitoba, however, had three: Kardash, the provincial leader of the party, Andrew Bileski and Mitchell Sago, later editor of the *Ukrainian Canadian*.[9]

Ukrainian leaders also served on the National Committee (formerly Central Committee) and the National Executive Committee (formerly Polit Bureau). At the first convention of the reconstituted party in 1943, five Ukrainians: Boychuk, Kardash, Korol, Navis and Weir, were elected to the NC, the latter two also to the NEC and Kardash as provincial leader in Manitoba.

There was a high degree of continuity maintained in the selection of Ukrainian representation on the NC and NEC. Boychuk, Navis and Weir were members of the NC, and the latter two also of the NEC, from the reconstitution of the party in 1943. Navis remained a member until he died in 1954, Weir until he left for the Soviet Union in 1963, and Boychuk until he retired in 1966.

The selection of Ukrainians for the NEC was generally guided by two considerations: the candidate had to be a leader who always put the interests of the party first and unfailingly supported the party line in the mass organizations and/or held the reins of power in the mass organizations. Weir belonged to the first category, Navis to both. In keeping with this policy, Prokop was added first to the NC and later to the NEC after he assumed the key role of secretary of the AUUC in 1946.

Even with this addition, the Ukrainians were still under-represented in the NC and the NEC of the party. However, of all the

ethnic groups Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Finns, Hungarians, Jews, Macedonians, Poles, Slovaks and Slovenes, who had their own pro-communist organizations, only the Ukrainians and Jews had members on the NEC. Representation from the mass organizations was based on concentrations of power. With the exception of the Ukrainian and the Jewish, the pro-communist ethnic organizations were too weak to warrant representation on the NEC. The Jews, who were over-represented, were not all on the NEC as members of the Jewish organization. They were generally more cosmopolitan, had a better command of the English language (some were born in England) and many sat on the NEC as party and trade union leaders.

The Ukrainian members of the NC of the party were also members of a sub-committee of the NEC of the AUUC, the organizational committee. It varied in number from six to eleven members (all full-time functionaries of the AUUC). It met weekly and directed the work of the Association. The committee had a secretariat of three which functioned as its daily operational and executive body. It was composed of Teresio, the president, Prokop, the secretary, and Boychuk, the treasurer of the NEC of the AUUC. After Teresio's death in 1954, he was replaced on the secretariat by Krawchuk.

This organizational committee was simultaneously the Ukrainian National Party Committee, a sub-committee of the NEC of the party to which it was responsible. Thus a sub-committee of the NEC of the party directed the work of a supposedly non-political mass organization, the AUUC, and its subsidiary, the WBA.

For years the NEC of the party checked on the work of the Ukrainian mass organizations through its representative who attended the meetings of the Ukrainian National Party Committee. The post was held by Paul Phillips from 1948 to his death in 1956, by Harry Binder from 1956 to his resignation from the party in 1957, and lastly by Misha Cohen (brother of Sam Carr). None of the three were Ukrainians, although Phillips and Cohen were quite fluent in the language and Binder had a partial understanding of it.

The arrangement worked quite well. In 1956, however, a sharp controversy developed in the NEC of the party in which Ukrainian communist leaders also became involved. For several years tension and restiveness had been growing among the party's top leaders

over two issues: the abrogation of Jewish cultural institutions and facilities in the USSR, and the suitability of Buck as party leader.

The Jewish question came to a head in 1952 with the sudden disappearance of the members of the Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, formed in 1942 to rally world Jewry in defense of the Soviet Union. Most concerned with the fate of the Jews was J.B. Salsberg, a member of the Ontario Legislature and one of the party's most sophisticated and able leaders. He had been attempting to obtain party approval to go to the USSR and investigate the Jewish question since 1949 and was finally permitted to make the trip in 1955.

In Moscow, he learned unofficially through guarded hints ("Everyone was afraid to talk") that the members of the committee had been liquidated and that the position of the Jews "was worse than I thought it was". He then wrote a series of articles for the *Vochenblatt* (Weekly), the Jewish pro-communist weekly, which were widely reprinted by other Jewish papers and journals.[10] His reports served to escalate growing doubt and resentment in the party.

Disenchantment with Buck's leadership among members of the NEC had been growing for many years. His election slogans: "Liberal-Labor Coalition" in 1945, "Elect a CCF Government" in 1948, and "Put Canada First" in 1953, as well as the launching of a daily *Tribune* in 1947 ("Our answer to the spy scare"), all ended in disaster for the party. Buck further discredited himself with his extra-marital escapades, and lost the devotion and respect of most members of the NEC who worked closely with him. They accused him of having become two-faced, of lacking in loyalty or devotion to his associates, whom he was capable of completely destroying, and of being devoid of all virtues except a steely resolve to serve the Moscow masters to whom he had committed himself.

The content of Khrushchov's speech, delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, came as a traumatic shock to the members of the NEC of the party. It undermined their faith in the infallibility of the Soviet leadership and prompted some of them to challenge Buck who stood for continued subservience to the Soviet party. Commanding a majority in the NEC, the rebels adopted a resolution in which they questioned Khrushchov's explanation for the party's failure to curtail Stalin's excesses and added:

> The Communist Party is the guardian of the rights of the working people. How did it happen that the guardianship failed to be exercised and the crimes stopped long before the death of Stalin?[11]

In spite of all attempts by Buck and his followers to stem the tide, new events only stoked the fires of revolt. When the Soviet press attacked Poland, the NEC dispatched a telegram to Gomulka on October 22, expressing its surprise "at the reported attempts by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to interfere with the independent course the Polish Workers Party had taken".[12]

Simultaneously, it sent another cable to the CC of the CPSU, declaring that the Polish party and its people "must have full freedom to decide independently all matters that concern them and we condemn any attempts at interference with this right".[13]

The Ukrainians ranged themselves solidly against the majority in the NEC and in support of Buck and the hard liners. The Ukrainian National Party Committee, meeting on October 23, the day following the dispatching of cables to Warsaw and Moscow by the NEC, "unanimously agreed . . . to vigourously protest" against the assumption of powers by the NEC to speak on behalf of the party as a whole and termed the telegrams "presumptuous interference in the affairs of fraternal parties" and condemned "the opening of doors . . . to attacks on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, directed towards splitting and ultimately liquidating the Canadian Workers party of scientific socialism. . . ."[14] This was followed by a statement from the Ukrainian party committee in Winnipeg urging that:

> All those elements who . . . disorientate and disunite our own party, tend to split it and sow distrust in the socialist future of the world . . . should be rooted out from the leadership in our party.[15]

With the solid support of the Ukrainians, Buck regained control at the NC meeting held from October 28 to November 9, 1956, and at the sixth convention on April 19-22 the following year. One Ukrainian leader was able to boast that:

> . . . there have been no resignations from membership or positions among the membership, that our members have not succumbed to pressures of hysteria and liquidationism.[16]

The reasons for the steadfast Ukrainian support for Buck and the Soviet position were varied and complex. Through his many years of loyal and dedicated service to the party and to the com-

munist cause and his soft, smooth ingratiating manner, Buck had endeared himself to thousands as a leader of and a martyr for the working class. With the exception of Weir, who would never do anything that might adversely affect his standing with Moscow, the Ukrainians did not know Buck as well as the other leaders who worked more closely with him, and consequently were still under the spell of his charm.

The Ukrainians were as shocked as other party members by Khrushchov's revelations. But they considered Stalin's excesses an unfortunate interlude in the struggle to fulfill the promises of the Revolution. Furthermore, the position of the rebels whom the Ukrainian communists characterized as "right opportunists" and "liquidators", was an absolute negation of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in which the Ukrainian communists had been steeped for decades and which recognized the indispensibility of a Leninist party of a "new type" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as absolute prerequisites for the achievement of socialism. The rebels had also rejected the recognition of the primacy of the USSR at the very time when relations between the Soviet authorities and the Ukrainian communists in Canada were reaching their apex and developments were converging to bind them closer to the Soviet Union.

A few of the top Ukrainian leaders, especially Prokop and Krawchuk, were quite disturbed by the wide prevalence of the Russian language in Ukraine, but Russification had not yet become officially sponsored and publicly proclaimed state and party policy, and had not reached the degree of intensity of later years. They considered it a temporary phenomenon and it did not yet affect their attitude to the Soviet party and government.

The Hungarian uprising and the subsequent Russian intervention only solidified their support of Buck. The Ukrainian communists considered the participants "counter revolutionaries" and the revolt a "fascist insurrection". They also had a strong antipathy to the Hungarians for the latter's excesses on Ukrainian territories occupied by them during World War I.

The crisis wrought a fundamental change in the relationship between the party and the Ukrainian communist leaders. The Ukrainians had consistently recognized the leadership of the party and willingly submitted to its authority. They had participated in the

party's activities and campaigns with enthusiasm and anticipation, convinced that the wartime growth would continue, accompanied by dramatic electoral successes. Their zeal began to wane, however, as party influence declined and election results proved hopelessly disappointing.

The disintegration of the party in 1957, while the Ukrainian ranks remained relatively firm, shattered the faith of the Ukrainians in the party's stability and questioned its primacy over the Ukrainian mass organizations. Moreover, their prestige in Moscow enhanced by their firm stand in the crisis, the Ukrainian communists were no longer willing to submit unquestioningly to party domination.

They announced to the NEC of the party that the Ukrainian National Party Committee did not need a commissar to supervise its work. As a result, in 1957, the representative of the NEC of the party ceased attending meetings of the Ukrainian National Party Committee. Liaison between the committee and the NEC was maintained through Ukrainians on the NEC and through meetings between the secretariats of the Ukrainian National Party Committee and the NEC of the party.

After the defeat and resignation of the rebel leaders from the party in 1957 and the mass defections from party ranks, the proportion of Ukrainians in the party increased. They were drafted to fill some of the vacant posts. To the four Ukrainians who had been on the NC – Boychuk, Kardash, Prokop and Weir – several others were added including John Boyd, Paul Pauk, a local Toronto activist, and Peter Boychuk, a YCL and later a party functionary.

The number and proportion of Ukrainians increased on the city and provincial committees and among party and party-sponsored candidates. Of the nine entered in the Toronto municipal elections in December 1956, three were Ukrainians: Paul Pauk, Paul Pawliuk and William Repka, all of them little known.

Several other Ukrainians were transferred to party posts, among them John Boyd who was released as business manager of the *Ukrainian Canadian* to become an editor of the *Canadian Tribune*. More Ukrainians appeared on various party delegations, sometimes even as heads. In August 1965, Hrynchyshyn led a party group to East Germany and in July 1968, Kostaniuk headed a party delegation to the USSR.[17]

The role in the party of the top leadership of the Ukrainian mass organizations underwent a complete change after 1957. As they became more and more preoccupied with Palermo camp and involved in business ventures with *Ukrayinska Knyha,* Globe Tours and other enterprises, their role in raising money for the party increased. However, these preoccupations diminished their interest in and left them less time for political activities and their political role in the party declined. Eventually they were elected to the NC and the NEC of the party mainly because of their money-raising capacities.

The role of the Ukrainian rank and file members also gradually decreased. Few Canadian-born Ukrainians joined the party and most of those who did failed to remain. Those who did remain were mostly older veterans. Slowed down by the weight of their advancing years, they became less and less eager to perform the role of foot soldiers of the party. Furthermore, they no longer had the energy to carry the "double burden" of party and AUUC work. Their place was gradually taken over by the younger recruits from the ranks of the new wave of immigrants: Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, East Indians, Caribbeans and others.[18]

The relationship between the Ukrainians and the party leaders remained cordial through the 1950s. Periodically there were differences over the division of the profits from *Knyha* and Globe Tours. When the party was short of functionaries, friction sometimes developed over the disposition of Ukrainian cadres. Occasionally party leaders levelled criticism at Ukrainian party members for spending too much time on mass organization and too little on party work. This prompted one leading Ukrainian communist to declare that work in the mass organizations "rarely gets an acknowledgement, often is derided as secondary and unimportant".[19] But generally differences were amicably settled. In the 1960s, however, more serious misunderstandings developed that led to an almost complete estrangement between the party leaders and the top Ukrainian communists.

IX

Differences with the USSR

DISENCHANTMENT with aspects of Soviet policies began to develop among Ukrainian communist leaders in Canada. Soon after the end of World War II it increased as ties with the USSR and Ukraine were expanded and Ukrainians became acquainted with Soviet reality.

The first cause of friction was the reluctance of Soviet authorities to allow unhampered correspondence between Ukrainians in Canada and their relatives in Ukraine. According to one leader, some of the reasons were "incomprehensible" and "it was necessary to exert a great deal of effort" by the NEC "to resolve this problem".

Another source of misunderstanding was the desire of Ukrainians from Canada to return home. The problem "remained a sharp and painful one . . . for a number of years". It was never completely resolved "for many Ukrainians . . . are still waiting for permission to return to Ukraine".[1]

A third source of considerable friction was the question of setting up a parcel post agency for transmitting parcels from Canadians to their relatives in Ukraine. Eventually *Ukrainska Knyha* was formed, but only after a great deal of procrastination on the part of Soviet authorities, causing undue irritation for the applicants.

These were comparatively minor issues. A more serious problem that became a fundamental cause of disillusionment was Russian repression of the Ukrainian language and culture in Ukraine. Eventually two other issues – Soviet refusal to grant visas, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries – served to widen the schism and deepen the alienation.

In the pre-1939 period, there had never been any serious discussions in the Ukrainian pro-communist ranks regarding the future of the Ukrainian language in Canada. The main emphasis was on the extension of communist influence among Anglo-Saxons. There was little encouragement or incentive for the youth in the ULFTA to take a serious interest in the language. Consequently, the Canadian-born often lacked a knowledge of Ukrainian and rarely had any proficiency in its use.

Interest in it was aroused in Ukrainian pro-communist ranks during World War II. In an endeavour to promote greater effort in the war against the invaders, the hard-pressed Soviet government appealed to the national sentiments of the various nationalities of the USSR and especially the Ukrainians, who bore the brunt of the initial German attack. Soviet propaganda glorified Ukraine's past with its legendary Cossack heroes and stimulated Ukrainian national consciousness. A special military medal, named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, famous seventeenth century Cossack leader and head of the Ukrainian state, was created. Leading Ukrainians in the armed forces, the sciences, literature and the arts were honoured. The Soviet press gave full recognition to the important role Ukraine was playing in the war. Ukrainian literature was able to reflect the great agony caused by the devastation and suffering and give expression to a profound feeling of love and attachment to Ukraine.

The glorification of Ukraine at home was eagerly and enthusiastically taken up by the Ukrainian pro-communist press in Canada. Ukraine, much more than the USSR, became the centre of emphasis, with considerable attention to all aspects of her culture, customs and history. Shevchenko was idolized more than ever before as a great national poet and a new interest was aroused in the language.

The Ukrainian communists envisaged a great future for Ukraine and were convinced that the course of post-war development would provide added encouragement for the study and maintenance of the Ukrainian language in Canada. The Second Convention of the AUUC in 1946 expressed this conviction in a resolution to the effect that the admittance of Ukraine to the United Nations and the prospects of the development of friendly relations between Canada and Ukraine created the need for a knowledge of Ukrainian.[2]

Interest in its study was further influenced and encouraged by the establishment of contact with and the opening of tourist travel to the USSR and the admission of members of the AUUC to various educational institutions of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian communist leaders also noted that the Canadian-born who lacked a knowledge of the Ukrainian language generally exhibited less interest in the AUUC. They concluded that propagation of Ukrainian was also necessary to guarantee the continued growth and existence of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizattions.

In addition, some of the AUUC leaders were uncompromising partisans of the Ukrainian language. Swystun, for whom the preservation of the native tongue and culture was basic to his national creed, also placed a strong emphasis on the propagation of the Ukrainian language and culture.

However, neither Swystun nor the Ukrainian communist leaders in Canada seemed to realize that the Soviet emphasis on national languages and cultures during the war was but a temporary expedient. Just as the campaign of the Ukrainian pro-communists in Canada to revive the study of Ukrainian gathered momentum, Soviet leaders embarked on a drive to complete the ongoing process of Russification by speeding up the replacement of the national languages in the non-Russian republics with Russian.*

The campaign began after Khrushchov achieved supremacy in the Central Committee by ousting the so-called "anti-party" group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and others in June 1957. The basis was laid by a number of theoretical articles in Soviet Russian journals, according to which there was a drawing together of the nations of the USSR which would eventually lead to the merging of all languages into one – Russian. This was followed by a plan to abolish the non-Russian schools. In 1959, a new school law was passed in each republic, against strong open opposition, to give parents the right to choose to what school – with what language of instruction, Russian or the local native tongue – the parents

*On the subject of Russification in Ukraine see: Michael Browne (ed.), *Ferment in Ukraine, Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukianenko, V. Moroz and others,* New York: Praeger, 1971; Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1968; John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*: Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968; Valentyn Moroz, *Report From the Beria Reserve.* Edited and translated by John Kolasky. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1974.

wished to send their children. The idea was, of course, that they would "choose" the Russian schools.[3]

The Ukrainian pro-communist leaders in Canada, in the meantime, vehemently denied all nationalist charges of Russification in Ukraine. After spending nearly two years in Ukraine (1947-1949) Krawchuk declared that the Bolshevik revolution had liberated the peoples of the Tsarist empire from "national slavery" and consequently the Ukrainian youth were able to study at Kiev University in their native tongue.[4]

As proof that there were no restrictions on the Ukrainian language, Hrynchyshyn, who had followed Krawchuk to Ukraine, quoted R.V. Babiychuk, the Minister of Culture and a graduate of an agricultural institute, that "instruction in schools and higher educational institutions is basically conducted in the Ukrainian language".[5]

Swystun also took special pains to counter nationalist charges that there was discrimination against the Ukrainian language. In a report on his second trip to the USSR in 1957, he described his own experiences at Kiev University where he was examined for a law degree after completing the course by correspondence. He reported that the oral examination was conducted in Ukrainian and cited this as proof that the charges of the nationalists "that everything in Ukraine is Moscovized are false and dishonest". In an article written for a Soviet journal and reprinted in Canada he wrote:

> The national policy of the Soviet Union has secured to every people the possibility of all round development of its culture in the native language. . . I could not find even the slightest trace of national discrimination in the Soviet Union.[6]

The Ukrainian pro-communist press also carried articles by Soviet authors which proclaimed that Ukrainian was flourishing, that it was the language of "all state organs and institutions, all public organizations, as well as schools, higher educational institutions, the press, publishing houses, theatres, clubs and other cultural and educational institutions".[7]

The myth that the Ukrainian language was freely flourishing in Ukraine was propagated so effectively by Soviet agencies and repeated so convincingly by their supporters abroad that it became generally accepted not only by radicals but also by liberals and non-communist intellectuals. Even such an uncompromising critic of

the USSR as Watson Kirkconnell wrote as late as 1961 that:

> Ukrainian today is the official and educational language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[8]

While the Ukrainian communists in Canada emphasized the promotion of Ukrainian and denied the existence of Russification they became themselves the unwitting tools of Russification. *Ukrainska Knyha,* the agency through which parcels were sent by Ukrainians and others from Canada to their relatives at home, placed an ad which read:

> Required men and women who can type in Russian for addressing and typing invoices.[9]

Invoices for parcels to "united, independent, sovereign" Ukraine were to be typed in *Russian.*

There was also the transliteration of surnames. The Russian alphabet does not have a letter for the *h* sound. Consequently the Ukrainian *h* in a surname becomes *g* in the Russian transliteration. Thus Honchar becomes Gonchar in Russian. When Ukrainian names are transliterated into English by Soviet translators it is not from the original Ukrainian but from their Russian equivalents. The Ukrainian communists in Canada adopted this policy of Russification of Ukrainian surnames in English translations. Thus Halahan became Galagan, Hrabovsky – Grabovsky and T. H. Shevchenko – T. G. Shevchenko.

The Ukrainian pro-communist press even distorted reports to cover up the existence of Russification in Ukraine. On one occasion it informed its readers that outstanding cultural figures of Ukraine had received Stalin prizes, one of whom was Volodymyr Belaev (not a Ukrainian), who obtained it for the novel *Stara Kripost* (The Old Fortress). The title of the novel was given in Ukrainian, conveying the impression that it was published in that language, whereas it was actually published in Russian.[10]

Another case concerned the reprinting of a report from the Soviet press. After the death of Stalin in 1951, Beria, in a manoeuvre to gain the support of the non-Russians in his struggle for power, sent a memorandum to the CC of the CPSU criticizing the national policy of the party as anti-Leninist and proposing that the national republics be given more freedom in developing their languages and cultures. In July a plenum of the CC of the CPU relieved L. G. Melnikov, its first secretary, for, among other reasons,

replacing Ukrainian with Russian in the lecture rooms of the higher educational institutions of Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian communist papers in Canada listed all the reasons given for Melnikov's demotion with the exception of Russification.[11]

There were a number of reasons why the Ukrainian communist leaders so vehemently denied charges of Russification. Not only were they duty-bound to defend Soviet policies but they approached the question from the point of view that the Ukrainian language had attained great privileges since Tsarist times when it had been proscribed. While the nationalists saw the increased use of Russian in Ukraine since 1945 as a planned Russian encroachment on the gains made by the Ukrainian language and culture during the 1920s and early 1930s, the communists viewed it as a temporary and spontaneous phenomenon brought on by the war with its influx of Russian troops and administrators. Furthermore, to the nationalists the USSR was an imperialist power and Russification was Russian colonial policy. To the communists the USSR was a federation of free states building a socialist society. What the nationalists termed Russification, the communists regarded as errors and abuses in the application of Lenin's national policy that would eventually be corrected as the new society was constructed.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian communist leaders in Canada were appalled and disturbed by the wide prevalence of the Russian language in Ukraine. Most chose to discuss their feelings only in narrow circles of their closest associates. However, two of them, Krawchuk and Prokop, favoured raising the question with Soviet officials in Ukraine after their first trips to the USSR. They were restrained by the hesitancy and timidity of such senior leaders as Navis and Shatulsky who were categorically opposed to criticizing any aspect of Soviet policies.

By 1956, the situation had radically changed both in Canada and the USSR. Shatulsky and Navis had both died and Prokop and Krawchuk had become senior leaders. In the Soviet Union the aura of infallibility of its leaders was rapidly dissolving in light of Khrushchov's revelations of the crimes of Stalin, making it easier to voice criticism. On their visits to Ukraine, both Krawchuk and Prokop raised strong objections to the dominance of the Russian language.

When the situation in Ukraine did not improve, the Canadian-Ukrainian communist leaders realized it was more serious than they

had been led to believe. They were not acquainted with the articles on the merging of Soviet nationalities which had appeared in the Russian journals, nor did they seem to realize the implications of the new school law or wonder why Ukrainians had to choose whether to send their children to Ukrainian or to Russian schools.

In 1960, they received a sudden shock which completely modified their conception of the national problem in Ukraine. The occasion was the appearance of an article entitled, "V. I. Lenin on Russian and the National Languages of Our Country", by I. Kravtsev, a senior official in the apparatus of the CC of the CPU. He attempted to justify the increasing prevalence of the Russian language in Ukraine and declared that "in the process of the building of communism there is an intensification of the drawing together of socialist nations" which would lead to "the process of consolidation of national languages around the Russian language".[12]

The publication of Kravtsev's article had far-reaching effects on Ukrainian communists in Canada. It substantiated nationalist charges of a planned policy of Russification which the communists had consistently denied, dealt a serious blow to their pride and prestige, and marked a turning point in their relations with the Soviet government and party.

They suddenly realized that what had been deplored as a spontaneous development was official government policy. The official acknowledgement of Russification alarmed them. The smouldering fires of resentment which they had nurtured over the increasing dominance of the Russian language in Ukraine were suddenly fanned into sharp criticism.

Their position was difficult. As loyal and devoted communists they supported the USSR in the belief that it was the vanguard in humanity's march to a universal socialist order. As Ukrainians, however, they could not reconcile themselves to the demise of their mother tongue and their native culture.

Led by Krawchuk and Prokop, the Ukrainian leadership condemned Kravtsev's article in a proposed protest to the Soviet government which was presented to a closed meeting of the NEC of the party for approval. After lengthy discussions in which John Weir strongly opposed the protest, the NEC refused to support it and it was never dispatched. Instead, five months after the appearance of Kravtsev's article, one of the Ukrainian pro-communist papers published an editorial (in all probability written by Kraw-

chuk). It denounced the nationalists for "distorting the facts" because they had cited Kravtsev's article as evidence that Russification was official policy since it had appeared in an organ of the government and the CC of the CP of Ukraine. The editorial declared that Kravtsev had made false assertions which were his personal opinions, in spite of the fact that the editors knew that personal opinions on such subjects could only be expressed by leading members of the Politburo of the CPSU. It added that as a result of the revolution the Ukrainian nation had achieved statehood, children were receiving instruction in Ukrainian, the national culture was flourishing and Ukrainian was the official language.[13]

In the meantime there was irrefutable evidence of the validity of Kravtsev's claims, not only in Ukraine, but on Canadian soil. When the Virsky Dance Ensemble arrived in Canada from Kiev in 1962, Ukrainian Canadians came in contact with a cast almost completely made up of Russians and Russianized non-Slavs who spoke Russian.

The communist leaders were faced with a loud outcry from the nationalists and the growing disenchantment of their own members over the issue. Nourished for three decades or more on the propaganda that Ukraine was a free and independent nation within the framework of the USSR, many pro-communists were stunned to find Russian, which they did not understand, dominant in nearly all spheres of life in Ukraine. A general feeling of resentment, and in some cases outright hostility, developed. Numerous letters of sharp criticism, none of which were published, reached the NEC of the AUUC and the editors of the communist press.

Anonymous articles, condemning Russification, by persons claiming to have visited Ukraine as members of tourist groups sponsored by the AUUC, found their way into the nationalist press. A well-written and detailed series in *Ukrayinsky Holos* by a correspondent who claimed to be a member of the AUUC and the WBA, ran for several weeks in 1960-1961. The author claimed that he had first sent his articles to the communist press which refused to publish them. He complained against the almost universal prevalence of the Russian language in Ukraine and the presence of large numbers of Russian officials.[14] A second correspondent, who also claimed to have been a member of an AUUC-sponsored tourist group visiting Ukraine, wrote a similar but less detailed complaint for another nationalist paper.[15]

Members of the AUUC who had been studying in Ukraine since 1950 added fuel to the smouldering fires of resentment. Since their courses lasted for a year or more, they were in a position to become well acquainted with conditions. They often discussed what they saw and experienced in closed circles. When one student returned in 1956, after two years, she made a report to the Ukrainian National Party Committee in which she expressed bitter disillusionment over conditions in the USSR. No one was shocked. What she said was simply taken for granted by the members of the committee. Other students also made similar reports after their return.

The issue of Russification reached a critical stage in Canada after the twenty-second congress of the CPSU in October 1961 proclaimed a new program which declared that in the future communist society in the USSR "the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved. . . ."

There were members in the AUUC who declared that: "Unless this question of the Ukrainian language is resolved there is no future for our organization in Canada".[16] The problem was highlighted in 1965, when a Canadian student at the Higher Party School in Kiev was arrested and subsequently expelled for involvement with opponents of Russification in Ukraine. Nicholas Oleniuk, a party member and a delegate from Toronto, then raised the question at the Twelfth Convention of the AUUC in Winnipeg on March 21, 1966. He declared that the Russian language dominated nearly all Soviet institutions in Ukraine, termed Russification an "historical error" and demanded action on the part of the AUUC.[17]

Krawchuk attempted to reassure the delegates. He replied that mistakes had been committed in relation to the national question, especially the Ukrainian language, that the NEC of the AUUC had taken a stand on the matter several years ago and that the latest pronouncements of Soviet leaders indicated that the problem was under consideration.[18]

There was every indication that the situation was far from reassuring. Even the Ukrainian communist leaders found it difficult to refrain from criticism. When Korol reported on his impressions of Expo '67, he expressed regret that "Ukraine does not have a pavilion, or even a Ukrainian section in the pavilion of the USSR".[19]

The Ukrainian leaders finally applied to the NEC of the party for permission to send an official delegation from the AUUC to

raise the problem with Soviet authorities. Because Ukrainians formed a large and important sector of the communist movement, the party was also concerned. Tim Buck knew how disturbed the Ukrainians were over the issue. Probably fearing that they might create an embarrassing situation if they were not restrained, he suggested that a delegation might have more authority if it was sponsored by the party.

The decision by Ukrainian and party leaders to raise the national question with Soviet authorities may appear as a bold move. However, it must be viewed against the background of events. In Canada there had been a growing tendency in party circles, for several years, to subject Soviet policies to a critical examination. Ukrainians became disturbed over the arrest and persecution of opponents of Russification in Ukraine. Other non-Ukrainian party members were annoyed by the harsh sentences meted out to Daniel and Sinyavsky. Several letters, highly critical of Soviet policies and practices and of the prevailing conditions in the USSR appeared in the *Canadian Tribune.* Among them was one by Nicholas Balan, presumably a Ukrainian.[20]

In Ukraine, through circumstances, as yet unexplained,* several writers, as well as P. Yu. Shelest, the first secretary of the CC of the CPU, condemned Russification and spoke up in defense of the Ukrainian language and culture at the Fifth Congress of the Union of Writers of Ukraine held in Kiev on November 16-19, 1966.[21]

Thus AUUC and party leaders undertook to raise the national question with Soviet authorities when certain Soviet policies were being questioned by a number of party members in Canada and *after* it had been raised publicly by writers in Ukraine. After prolonged discussion in the NEC and negotiations with the CPSU for permission, the plenum of the CC of the CPC sponsored a delegation composed of Tim Buck, the national leader; William Ross, the leader of the party in Manitoba; Anthony Bilecki, president of the WBA; George Solomon, secretary of the AUUC in Alberta; William Harasym, national president of the AUUC; and Peter Krawchuk, editor of *Zhyttia i Slovo.* Their purpose was to visit Ukraine "on a mission of inquiry and discussion concerning the policy and the experience of the Communist Party and the Government of Ukraine in dealing with the national question".[22]

*The move to promote Ukrainianization was probably fostered by Shelest.

The delegation, which left on March 30, 1967, by Soviet plane, was met in Moscow by A. D. Skaba, the third secretary of the CC of the CPU in charge of agitation and propaganda, Yu. I. Dudin (a Russian), ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR to Moscow, and others. The delegates spent twenty-two days in the USSR, visiting ministries, institutions and enterprises, and interviewing officials in various cities and towns.

The hosts were well prepared with glowing descriptions and imposing statistics of great achievements, designed to impress the delegation and disprove charges of Russification. When confronted with embarrassing evidence of Russification they resorted to subtle distortion, misrepresentation, outright denial and prevarication. Some of their answers might lead one to believe that they considered the delegates naive and uninformed.

At the Ministry of Education the delegates were told that, whereas Ukrainians constituted seventy-seven per cent of the population of Ukraine, eighty-two per cent of the pupils were enrolled in schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, that ninety-five per cent of all text books published in Ukraine were Ukrainian and that the main language of instruction in technical schools was Ukrainian.*

Babiychuk, in whose ministry most of the key posts were held by Russians, declared that the circulation of journals published in Ukrainian had increased by twenty percent since the end of 1965 while the circulation of those published in Russian had not increased, that fifty-two of sixty-one professional theatres in Ukraine were Ukrainian and that "those who believe that there is Russification in Ukraine are either badly misinformed or are denying reality".

In the State Planning Commission and several ministries which they visited, the delegates were informed that all minutes of meetings and all correspondence were in Ukrainian.†

*The eighty-two per cent figure was first quoted by Allan Bondar, then Minister of Education, in 1966 as the percentage of *elementary schools* in Ukraine which are mostly rural and included grades 1 to 4, and not as the percentage of *Ukrainian pupils* in all schools in Ukraine. For the school year 1963-1964, three of the forty-one million textbooks published in Ukraine were in Russian. In addition seventeen million Russian textbooks were imported. Thus twenty of the fifty-eight million textbooks used in Ukraine were Russian. The main language of instruction in technical schools in Ukraine is actually Russian. For further details see Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, pp. 52, 61, 90.

†They are usually in Russian. See Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, Chap. 4.

At a meeting with leaders of the writer's union a delegate asked: "Why is it that writers have been arrested in Ukraine?" O. Komiychuk, a leading dramatist and president of the Ukrainian SSR, replied:

> They were arrested because they were engaged in an attempt to distribute anti-Soviet propaganda printed in West Germany, not because of something they had written.

The director of radio and TV broadcasting stated that ninety-five per cent of all domestic broadcasting was in Ukrainian.† A delegate asked him: "When will you at last start to produce records in the Ukrainian language. People in Canada have been waiting for them until they have grey beards." The director replied: "Very soon now. Construction of our plant for making records is almost complete. We expect to start production very soon."**

At the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, I. K. Bilodid, head of the Institute of Linguists, reassured the delegation that the Ukrainian language was flourishing and that Russian did not enjoy any privileges. When asked why so many Russians came to Ukraine he replied: "In our Union there cannot be a law against moving from one republic to another. . . ."††

After the delegates returned and proceeded to write a report on their mission, disagreements developed between the Ukrainians, who favoured a strong condemnation of Soviet policies, and Buck, who proposed a more conciliatory approach. (Ross sided with the Ukrainians.) eventually a compromise report was published. Its greatest significance lay in the fact that for the first time since 1956, party leaders dared to level open criticism at policies and practices of the Soviet government and party.

The report indicated that the delegates were far from satisfied with the replies and explanations they had received to their queries. They found "instances of gaps between declared policy and practice" and were critical of charges of "bourgeois nationalism"

†Most of the broadcasting in Ukraine is in Russian. See W. Veryha, *Communication Media and Soviet Nationality Policy*, New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1972.

**In 1978 there was still no factory for producing records in Ukraine.

††Migration of citizens is strictly controlled. In order to live anywhere in the USSR, a citizen must obtain police permission in the form of registration. Only those who are transferred by an official agency are readily registered.

("The term was never defined.") against writers who were imprisoned as "enemies of the people" on charges that were not specified.

The sharpest criticism was levelled at the Soviet national policies. The report rejected the assurances of some of those interviewed that the national question had been solved and the assertion of others that language was of secondary importance. It condemned the sole use of Russian on signs and in restaurant menus and telegrams, and the absence of language rights for Ukrainians living in compact areas outside Ukraine. In reply to a question as to why there were no Ukrainian schools in Moscow where there are large concentrations of Ukrainians, the delegates were told that there was no demands for such schools and that no one forced these Ukrainians to go to Moscow.

The delegation was not satisfied with the reply, compared it to statements made years ago that there had been no demand among Jews for the study and publication of books in Yiddish, and asked:

> In what way are Ukrainian workers in other republics different from Russian, Polish and others who desire to continue with their native language in Ukraine? Are national feelings among Ukrainians weaker than among other Soviet nationalities? Or is it possible that Ukrainians living in Moscow or elsewhere outside Ukraine, hesitate to request schools in the Ukrainian language lest they be branded as nationalists?

The report did not raise the basic question of the dominance of Russian in all spheres of life in Ukraine and was careful not to lay the blame for Russification at the door of the central government but to treat it as if its origin and solution lay in Ukraine itself. Nor was the national policy itself criticized. There were only "problems" and "mistakes" in connection with its application. Although the report did not spell this out, the theory of merging of the nations of the USSR, which had so alarmed the Ukrainian communist leaders when it was propounded by Kravtsev, had apparently been one of the central topics of discussion.

Mykola Bazhan, one of the few older writers who had miraculously survived Stalin's purges of the thirties, declared that "it is necessary to press the fight against Russian chauvinism". He announced that the concept of the merging of nations had been rejected and confidently added: "I don't think we shall have any more trouble with the question."

Shelest, with whom the delegates carried on discussions, assured them that "mistakes" and "problems" were being overcome and explained that erroneous ideas on the merging of languages had been expressed but "only a fool could imagine that there is any possibility of the Russian language taking over in Ukraine".

The mission and the subsequent report were designed to pacify the rank and file members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations, blunt the sharp edge of nationalist accusations of Russification and, above all, influence Soviet authorities to amend the national policy in Ukraine. The delegation felt certain that its mission had been necessary and valuable and that it had made a contribution to the solution of the problem. So confident were the delegates of the positive effects of their report that they proposed it be publicized and discussed as widely as possible.

Unexpected events challenged the report's conclusions that the national problem in Ukraine was in the process of being solved. Barely a month after the publication of the delegation's report, a book entitled, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification,*[23] came off the press. Its author, a member of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations and the CPC for over thirty years, had been a student at the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1963-1965. Disillusioned with Soviet reality and incensed by Russification, he had collected materials which revealed the nature of the Soviet national policy and had surreptitiously channelled them to Canada.

The book was based on a mass of Soviet documents, statistical and other data and unpublished materials not available in the West. It was a comprehensive study which revealed a planned drive by the central authorities in Moscow to impose arbitrarily the Russian language and culture on non-Russians.

Coming out at a time when the question of Russification had aroused considerable interest, the book became an instant sensation. A Toronto daily in a front page review described it as "a time bomb . . . designed to explode the myth of Soviet impartiality and equality in policies towards minority nationalities in the USSR".[24]

It was no longer possible to deny the existence of planned and arbitrary Russification. The book caused considerable confusion among the members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations and consternation among their leaders. While the Ukrainian na-

tionalist and other press discussed at great length the evidence presented in the book, the Ukrainian pro-communist paper remained silent. A year later it reprinted an attack on the book from a Soviet journal "for the information of our readers" but deleted the phrase "at the expense of imperialist moneybags"[25] which it probably regarded as libelous and which referred to the supposed source of funds for the book's publication.

Meanwhile, members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were further disturbed and confused by new evidence of Russification which had been smuggled out of the USSR and published abroad.[26] It substantiated and supplemented the evidence in *Education in Soviet Ukraine* and indicated that Russification was being intensified. To pacify the activists, who were clamouring for explanations, a closed AUUC membership meeting was held on Sunday, March 3, 1968, at 300 Bathurst Street to discuss Russification. The report, delivered by Krawchuk, alternated between praise for and criticism of Soviet policies. He enumerated the achievements in Ukraine and declared that "only Soviet power brought national freedom for Ukrainians". He dismissed the recent arrests of dissidents with the statement that: "We cannot be judges of whether they have the right to arrest in Ukraine," but criticized the refusal by Soviet authorities to grant visas and permission to visit native villages.[27]

In the meantime, officials in Moscow in charge of relations with Ukrainians in Canada were highly disturbed over the report. One official of the apparatus of the CC of the CPSU indignantly asked a Canadian party leader, visiting Moscow, how Tim Buck could have signed his name to such a document. Through the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, pressure was applied on the party to withdraw the report and Buck was called to Moscow.

The Ukrainian communist leaders became somewhat concerned over Moscow's displeasure with the report. Fearing the consequences of their role in its publication, they reaffirmed their loyalty to the Soviet regime in a resolution passed at the Thirteenth Convention of the AUUC, held April 12-15, 1968. It declared that "if today we are overly sensitive to some phenomena in Ukraine, it is due to good intentions. . . ."[25]

A month later, the leadership of the AUUC took another step to ingratiate itself with the Soviet hierarchs. On May 21, 1968, a month after he had been expelled from the CPC and over two years

after his return from Ukraine, the author of *Education in Soviet Ukraine* was indicted before the NEC of the AUUC. The charges were never presented to the accused in writing but were read to him. He was charged with conduct in Ukraine that was incompatible with membership in the AUUC, conduct that included the covert collection and transmission to Canada of materials on the national policy which Soviet authorities wished to suppress. With Krawchuk acting as prosecutor and the other members as judges, he was expelled from the AUUC. Thus an organization which prided itself on being democratic and boasted a Canadian charter, expelled one of its veterans for participating in acts designed to expose Russification against which its leaders had only recently protested in a report.

At the same time, the Ukrainian communist leaders would not back down on the report. After Buck returned from Moscow, a discussion and controversy that lasted over a year ensued in the NEC over the report. A majority, including Buck, were in favour of complying with Moscow's demand that it be withdrawn. The Ukrainians, however, were adamantly opposed. Krawchuk was not a member, but he attended meetings of the NEC when the report was discussed, as one of the delegates. He vowed to fight against its withdrawal to the bitter end.

New pressure was applied from Moscow. In November, an open letter appeared in an organ of the CPC, signed by Weir. It condemned the report and its authors, insisting that the national problem in Ukraine had been solved and urged that the report be reconsidered.[29]

When this did not produce the desired results, another open letter, signed by twenty-eight public figures in Ukraine who had participated in discussions with the delegates, was addressed to the NEC of the CPC and to the delegates. It termed the report "sensational and astonishing", claimed there was incongruity between the factual material cited and the conclusions, and drew attention to the fact that the arguments and assertions in the report were used by "enemies" of the USSR (i.e. the nationalists). Gently chiding the delegates, the authors expressed the hope that their letter would facilitate a better understanding of life in Ukraine in the field of national relations.[30]

In spite of the new pressure, the Ukrainian communist leaders would not compromise on the report. When the situation reached

an impasse in the NEC, William Beeching, Don Currie and Mark Frank favoured a showdown with the Ukrainian "nationalists". Soon after, however, the party leaders called a truce in an attempt to settle their differences with the Ukrainian leaders. Over the opposition of all members of the delegation except Buck, the report was then withdrawn at the plenum of the CC of the party, held October 4-6, 1969.[31]

The withdrawal of the report amounted to full acquiescence towards Russification. The Ukrainian communist leaders were placed in an unenviable predicament. They did not publish the announcement of the withdrawal or make any mention of it in their press. Nor did they dare to declare publicly their opposition to the action. By raising the national question with Soviet authorities and the publication of the report, they had hoped to appease their followers and enhance their prestige in the Ukrainian community as staunch defenders of the Ukrainian language and culture. But instead of emerging as heroes, the Ukrainian communist leaders were branded as traitors. Moreover, they were forced to bear the censure in silence. They felt betrayed by Buck and the other party leaders. Prokop became especially bitter and alienated. The relatively harmonious relations that had prevailed between the party and the Ukrainian leaders were severely strained.

Meanwhile, the tensions between the Ukrainian communist leaders and Soviet authorities were further aggravated by the difficulty Ukrainians experienced in obtaining permission to visit their native villages. The matter was the subject of numerous discussions between representatives of the AUUC, Globe Tours and various Soviet officials, both in Canada and in the Soviet Union, generating considerable tension and misunderstanding between the two sides.

The reason given for the refusal to provide visas was the presence of military installations in the restricted areas. On analysis it turned out that the villages, which tourists were not allowed to visit, were located in all parts of Ukraine. Moreover, while one applicant would be refused, another, often a nationalist, would be granted permission to visit the same village or a neighboring one. What made it more galling was the fact that within Poland there were no travel restrictions. Moreover, nationalists, who did not expect to find utopia and consequently would not be disillusioned with what they saw, were often more readily given Soviet entry visas than AUUC and WBA members of long standing.

The problem of obtaining tourist visas to the USSR and permission to visit native villages was an even greater irritant, especially to the rank and file members and sympathizers, than Russification. In 1964, at the eleventh convention of the AUUC, John Dubno, former provincial secretary in British Columbia, complained that AUUC activities were hindered by the "anti-Soviet attitude of certain people who are disatisfied because they could not go to their native villages".[32]

By 1968 the problem had become so acute that it could no longer be ignored. Krawchuk condemned Soviet authorities for such refusals in his report to the closed membership meeting of the AUUC on March 3, 1968, declaring that:

> Everyone has a right to go to his native village. . . . It should not be necessary to beg on one's knees to go to Ukraine.

At the thirteenth convention of the AUUC on April 12-15, 1968, Krawchuk, in his report again raised the question of tourist visas to villages. He underlined the gravity of the problem when he declared that it was "the subject of everyday conversation and discussion . . . in every locality across Canada where Ukrainians live".[33]

In the name of the convention presidium and the resolutions committee, Krawchuk, who was not a member of either, read the text of a letter addressed to M. V. Pidhorny, president of the USSR, and D. S. Korotchenko, president of the Ukrainian SSR, requesting that steps be taken to resolve the problem. It was adopted unanimously. The letter complained that members were refused visas to visit their native villages and advised to apply again in twelve months and added bitterly:

> Some have applied five and more times and each time received the standard reply: "Make a new application in twelve months." Many people who are advised to wait twelve months are seventy or more. It is true that some of them were sixty when they first applied. . . . It is incomprehensible to us that twenty-three years after the end of the war people cannot visit their birth place.[34]

In spite of the appeal, refusals by Soviet authorities to grant visas to members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations to visit villages continued. It was again the subject of heated discussion at the fourteenth convention of the AUUC in March 1970. One delegate enumerated the "complaints of those, who cannot visit their relatives in Ukraine". Another reported that it was "an acute prob-

lem with which we are confronted at every meeting" and urged that the AUUC "should do everything possible to resolve this problem".[35]

Prokop reported that the NEC had received a verbal reply to the thirteenth convention's letter to Pidhorny through a representative of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. The letter confirmed the refusal to grant travel visas to those areas which were closed to tourists for reasons of security and stated that no changes in this respect were anticipated.

He further added that on their visits to the branches the leaders were constantly reproached by members over the matter of visas. The NEC also received numerous complaints blaming it for not taking steps to improve the situation. He declared that everything possible had been done by the leadership to solve the problem but without success.[36]

The rift that had developed over Russification and visas between the Ukrainian communists and the USSR deepened over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. When Alexander Dubcek embarked on his attempt to liberalize and give socialism in Czechoslovakia a "human face", John Boyd, a member of the CEC of the CPC, was stationed in Prague as the Canadian member on the editorial council of the *World Marxist Review.* He was caught up in the wave of popular enthusiasm for the new course and transmitted these sentiments to communists in Canada through his dispatches to the *Canadian Tribune.*

He described the broad program of democratization, the spontaneous outburst of popular enthusiasm for the new course, the wide participation in free and open discussion, and the high hopes for "a greater degree of democracy . . . that in one form or another will have to take place in every socialist country".[37]

The articles received great publicity in the paper and were instrumental in developing a deep sympathy among communists in Canada, including Ukrainians, for the Dubcek experiment. The Ukrainian pro-communist press reprinted some of Boyd's articles and other reports on Czechoslovakia, placing special emphasis on the process of democratization.

The Ukrainian communist leaders were convinced, like so many others, that the events in Czechoslovakia heralded the beginning of a process of reform that would engulf the whole Soviet bloc and add political democracy to economic security. They believed like

Otakar Sik, a leading Czech economist and member of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, that the democratization would "truly become attractive to all working people in all capitalist countries and . . . immeasurably influence the development of the entire left-wing movement in the Western countries".[38]

When the Warsaw Pact troops entered Prague on August 20, Tim Buck was in Moscow and a number of other members of the NEC of the party were away on holidays. Twelve of the seventeen members of the NEC met. The majority were opposed to the invasion but disagreed on what stand to take. Half of them favoured outright condemnation, the others were hesitant or opposed. A compromise statement was issued on August 21, declaring that the NEC was disturbed by the situation which had developed and strongly urged the early withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovakia, the preservation of her sovereignty and independence, and the extension of socialist democracy embarked upon by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in its decisions of January, 1968.[39]

The Ukrainians were among the strongest opponents of the invasion. Their attitude to the USSR had undergone considerable change since 1956 when they had supported the Soviet intervention in Hungary. At a general party meeting in Toronto on Sunday, September 5, 1968, there were some sharp exchanges between the Ukrainians, some of the Jewish leaders and other opponents of the invasion on the one side, and those who supported it on the other. When one supporter of the invasion called the Czechs who protested the invasion, "hooligans", one of the Ukrainian leaders retorted: "You are a hooligan" and branded the invasion: "Russian aggression".[40]

Two weeks later a meeting of the CC of the CPC, with Buck present, rejected, against strong opposition of the Ukrainian and other members, that part of the NEC statement "which gave expression to the false position that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia was not in the interests of socialism".[41]

The Ukrainians continued to oppose the invasion even after the CC statement. They condemned it at a plenum of the NC of the AUUC on September 22, 1968, in Toronto. Of over thirty top leaders and full-time functionaries in the AUUC, WBA and the press, only three: William and Mary Kardash and Constantine Kostaniuk, supported the invasion.

The Ukrainian stand caused alarm in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa and among party officials in Moscow. Sergei Molochkov, formerly in charge of relations with the CPC in the apparatus of the CC of the CPSU and the liaison between the Soviet party and the CPC and the ethnic mass organizations, had been in Canada as an employee of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa since 1967. He made a trip across Canada to persuade the Ukrainian leaders to alter their stand in the hope of finding support for the Soviet position.

When he failed in his mission, John Weir, who had migrated to the USSR in 1962 to take up permanent residence there, was sent back to Canada in 1969 to lead the fight among the Ukrainians for the party line. Weir had alienated the other Ukrainian leaders by his opposition to the protest against the Kravtsev article in 1960 and to the delegation's report in 1968. He was also unpopular in the NEC of the party and had become completely estranged from his family in Canada. In spite of the fact that he was an emissary of the Soviet party, the Canadian party leaders completely ignored him and no one even met him at the airport when he arrived. Krawchuk refused to shake hands with him when Weir came to the newspaper office and the Ukrainian communist leadership rejected him completely. After failing in his mission, he served as editor of the *Canadian Tribune* for a period and then returned to Moscow.

The opposition of the Ukrainian communist leaders to the invasion of Czechoslovakia further aggravated their strained relations with the Soviet and Canadian parties. The tension became so great that there was almost a complete break. Normally opposition to the party line is punished by swift condemnation and summary expulsion. However, the Soviet authorities, having failed to win support among the Ukrainians for their intervention in Czechoslovakis, called a truce. Any disciplinary action on their part could have alienated the remaining dwindling sympathies for the Soviet regime among Ukrainians in Canada. The leaders of the CPC readily acquiesed: they could not afford to lose their largest base of financial support. Fearing the loss of their lucrative business enterprises, dependent on Moscow, the Ukrainian communist leaders also compromised. The Ukrainian pro-communist press then published without comment the statement of the CC of the CPC supporting the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The party suffered serious repercussions as a result of its support of the invasion. Some members wavered, some became disillusioned

and some defected. In British Columbia, a group of over thirty leaders and activists resigned from the party over the issue. There were no Ukrainians among them. In Toronto one lone Ukrainian, John Boyd,* a prominent party leader, resigned from the CPC. The leaders of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations remained. The rank and file members, however, were slowly dropping out, gradually eroding the Ukrainian base which had been the main source of party support for half a century.

*Boyd apparently did not break with the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. Since leaving the party, he has contributed to the AUUC press and lectured at a WBA-sponsored meeting.

X

Seeds of Decline

THE decline of the Ukrainian pro-communist movement began almost immediately after the end of World War II. One of the first signs of the slackening of the tempo of organizational activity was a decrease in the number of new recruits entering the ranks of the AUUC. Their number rapidly declined from a high of 2,579 in 1945 to 48 in 1969. (This is the last year for which the AUUC issued statistics.) (Table VIII)

Another indication of the instability in the AUUC was the rapid turnover in membership, especially among the Canadian-born. In the first few years after the war, their numbers had grown steadily. At the Third Convention, in 1948, there were thirty-two English-speaking branches with one thousand members. However, Prokop noted in his report at the next convention that there had been a great turnover in that category. By 1952, the number of English-speaking branches was declining. In 1954, there were only sixteen with 401 members.[1]

The AUUC had a similar experience with the Youth Section. In 1954, it had only thirteen branches. Little, if any, improvement was made in subsequent years. Prokop declared at the Eighth Convention in 1958 that "the younger sector is numerically small and organizationally weak". Harasym reported to the Twelfth Convention in 1966 that the largest drop in the rate of recruitment had occurred in the youth division and that "overall and numerically-speaking we have not grown in the past two-year period in the Canadian-born organizational sector". Two years later, Prokop admitted that "little is left of the Youth Section which was still functioning a year ago".[2]

Table VIII

DISTRIBUTION BY PROVINCE OF NEW MEMBERS RECRUITED ANNUALLY OR BI-ANNUALLY INTO THE AUUC

Year	BC	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que.	NS	Total
1944	137	417	108	451	706	30	51	1900[a]
1945	306	362	346	428	912	210	15	2579[b]
1946								1773[c]
1947								1211[c]
1952–3	66	85	47	149	194	13		554[d]
1954–5	76	140	45	115	126	10		512[e]
1956–7	97	163	42	105	179	14		600[f]
1958–9							nearly	600[g]
1960–1							over	600[j]
1962–3	75	214	38	79	187	41		634[i]
1964–5							about	300[i]
1966–7							about	150[j]
1968								98[k]
1969								48[k]

Source:
a *U Zh*, July 6, 1944;
b Ibid., July 19, 1945;
c *Narady i ukhvaly tretioho... zyizdu...* p. 55;
d *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho... zyizdu...* p. 24;
e *U S*, January 18, 1956;
f Ibid., December 11, 1957;
g *Narady i ukhvaly deviatoho... zyizdu...* p. 54;
h *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho... zyizdu...* p. 66;
i *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho... zyizdu...* pp. 76-77;
j *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho... zyizdu...* p. 33;
k *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho... zyizdu...* p. 45.

The Junior Section also proved unstable. Of 266 members recruited between the eleventh and twelfth conventions, 143, in six localities, dropped out. At the thirteenth convention Harasym produced additional statistics to reveal the seriousness of the situation. There were 128 fewer new members recruited in the period between the twelfth, in 1966, and thirteenth convention two years later than between the eleventh, in 1964, and the twelfth. The youth and junior sections accounted for 109 of this deficit.[3]

The decrease in the ranks of the Canadian-born was reflected in the organization as a whole. According to official reports, the number of members at the end of 1945 was over 13,000. No further statistics were ever published – an indication that it was not increasing. As a matter of fact, there were numerous admissions that membership was declining. In his report to the ninth convention, in 1960, Prokop reported that the AUUC had as many members as did the ULFTA in 1939. This was an open admission of a decrease in membership, since the ULFTA had only about 10,000 members before World War II. At the twelfth convention, in 1966, Joseph Petelko, the secretary of the men's branch at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto, reported that the membership of his branch had decreased through death, migration to Ukraine and inactivity. Harasym declared at the same gathering that "if we reported to you the number of members in good standing . . . there would be a few explosions on the floor of this convention. . . ." Mary Prokop, reporting to the thirteenth convention on work among women, stated that what "disturbs us most is the fact that our branches are not augmented by younger women". Prokop admitted at the fourteenth convention, in 1970, that the 150 new members recruited in 1968-1969 did not replace those who had died or dropped out.[4]

The data on the number of branches give some indication of the extent of the decline. From 315 at the end of 1945, the number of branches dropped to 176 in 1952 and 152 in 1954. The greatest decrease was in Alberta, from 105 in 1945 to 23 in 1954 (Table IX). The number of branches also declined considerably in Ontario. They were mostly in smaller communities – many in the Fort William district.[5] No further statistics are available on the number of branches for subsequent years, but it is possible to follow the decline by calculating the number of branches repre-

sented at conventions. This data is incomplete because some branches, such as youth, junior and many smaller ones, were not represented. It does, however, indicate an almost continuous decline in the number of branches represented at conventions, and consequently a decline in membership. Thus from 168 branches represented at the Third Convention, in 1948 (the first post-war convention for which we have data), the number dropped to sixty-one at the fourteenth in 1970 (Table IX). The number of delegates also declined from 350 at the Fifth Convention, in 1952, to 124 at the fourteenth, in 1970, and 110 at the next convention in, 1972.[6]

The decline of the WBA began much later and continued at a much slower rate. Its membership had grown from 5,154 at the end of 1942 to 7,757 at the end of 1945, a gain of 1,603 for a three-year period or an average of 534 per year (Table X). At the end of 1948, the membership stood at 9,317. This was an increase of 1,560 from the end of 1945. However, the 1,560 new members were not all Ukrainians. The WBA began organizing branches of Russians in 1946 and Carpatho-Russians in 1948.* About 600 of the new members recruited in this period were from these two ethnic groups,[7] leaving 960 Ukrainians, or an average of only 320 per year, as against 534 per year in the 1942-1945 period. In 1951, the WBA began organizing Polish branches.

In 1953, of the 12,478 members, 11,000 were Ukrainians. This was an increase of over 3,200 from 1945. The membership seems to have continued to grow until at least 1954, after which the overall membership began to decrease. Thus the decline in membership in the WBA not only began much later than in the AUUC, but it was still growing while that of the AUUC was already declining. This is further borne out by a comparison of the number of branches in the two organizations. The number of Ukrainian WBA branches increased from eighty-seven in 1942 to 146 in 1953. The number remained fairly stable, dropping to 142 by 1965 but rising again to 144 by 1968 (Table X). The decrease in the number of branches in the AUUC began shortly after the end of the war (Table IX).

*The so-called Carpatho-Russians were actually Ukrainians from the Carpathian area of Ukraine. Many of those who formed the Russian branches were also Ukrainians from the province of Volhynia and the central areas of Ukraine. Each group had its own pro-communist mass organization similar to the AUUC.

Table IX

NUMBER OF AUUC BRANCHES REPRESENTED AT BI-ANNUAL CONVENTIONS AND THE NUMBER CLAIMED (IN BRACKETS) BY PROVINCE, 1943-70

Year	BC	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que.	NS	Total
1942								(200)[a]
1943		(92)[b]		(49)[c]				(248)[c]
1944		(101)[d]						
1945		(105)[e]						(315)[f]
1946		(95)[g]	(41)[h]					
1948	13	37	12	24	67	13	2	168[i]
1950	10	30	15	16	58	10	1	140 (227)[j]
1952	10	25	13	19	54	11	1	133 (176)[k]
1954	11 (14)	16 (23)	11 (16)	17 (26)	49 (62)	8 (9)	0 (1)	112 (152)[l]
1956	12	15	7	11	44	6	0	95[m]
1958	10	15	6	12	41	7	1	92[n]
1960	12	18	9	10	41	5	1	96[o]
1962	13	23	7	10	38	5	1	97[p]
1964	12	19	6	11	37	6	1	92[q]
1966	12	14	7	10	32	5	1	81[r]
1968	14	15	6	11	32	4	0	82[s]
1970	11	12	3	8	23	4	0	61[t]

Sources:

a *CT*, May 20, 1942;
b *US*, December 29, 1943;
c *PAC*, W. L. M. King Papers, MG26, J1, Vol. 362, pp. 313509, M. Kaschak to W. L. M. King;
d *US*, March 23, 1944;
e Ibid., November 14, 1945;
f Ibid., January 23, 1946;
g Ibid., April 10, 1946;
h *UZh*, April 4, 1946;
i *Narady i ukhvaly tretoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 7-9;
j *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 11-12, 67;
k *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 10-13, 73;
l *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 4-6, 21;
m *Narady i ukhvaly somoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 40-41;
n *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 4-5;
o *Narady i ukhvaly deviatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 4-5;
p *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 5-6;
q *Narady i odynadtsiatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 17-18;
r *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 17-18;
s *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho... zyizdu...*, pp. 10-11;
t *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho... zyizdu...*, pp.17-20.

In 1963, the WBA took over the Independent Mutual Benefit Federation, a fraternal society composed of Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs and a few Germans, Macedonians, French and others. The WBA also reported a Finnish branch of eleven members.[8] With the addition of these non-Ukrainians the membership rose from 11,953 in 1962 to 13,551 in 1963. Two years later it was down to 12,886, a loss of 665 in two years. A consistent annual decline followed, with a loss of 4,412 members or over 34 per cent in the ten-year period between 1965 snd 1974 (Table X).

The third pro-communist organization, the Society for Cultural Relations With Ukraine, which was to have played a decisive role in extending pro-Soviet influence among the nationalists, proved to be still-born. It established two embryonic branches with three ex-nationalists as members. Two of these soon faded from the picture. Romaniuk lost his enthusiasm after hostile nationalist reaction to his articles in the pro-communist press in 1946. Dr. W. Yarmey also became inactive. Swystun carried on alone, attempting to expand the society as late as 1956. During his last trip to the USSR in 1961, he became completely disillusioned with the Soviet national policy in Ukraine.[9] After his return from the Soviet Union, he withdrew from all participation in pro-Soviet activity.

Of the nationalists who had been attracted to the Ukrainian pro-communist movement during World War II, only one, Mykhailo Sribniak, remained after the Cold War set in. He began writing for the Ukrainian pro-communist press in 1945 and continued to contribute quite regularly. He also became a member of the AUUC. The issue of Russification and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led him to reassess his position.

He expressed disillusionment in a poem written in the form of an allegory, entitled "To My Brother". In it, he wrote of "that which has for years weighed upon our hearts" and asked: "Where is that equality . . . that has been set down on paper . . . ?" He replied that there was none. Instead there prevailed "coarse brutality". Sribniak concluded his poem with the question: "How long will you continue to keep us, your younger brothers, in subjection?"[10] Since the Russians regarded themselves as the elder brothers of the Ukrainians, the reference in the poem was obvious.

Sribniak took the poem to Krawchuk, who refused to have it published. A week later, when the latter was away, he took it to

Table X

DISTRIBUTION OF WBA MEMBERS BY PROVINCE AND COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF UKRAINIAN MEMBERS AND BRANCHES TO TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS AND BRANCHES, 1942–74

Year	BC	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que.	NS	Total members	Ukr. members	Total branches	Ukr. branches
1942								5,154	5,154	87	87[a]
1945				1,847				7,757[b]	7,757[k]	98[k]	98[k]
1948				2,240				9,317[c]			
1949				2,402				10,209[d]		153[m]	126[m]
1953				2,881				12,478[l]	11,000[n]	193[n]	146[n]
1954				2,294				12,852[b]			
1955				2,949				12,811[g]			
1958				2,770				12,305[h]			
1962				2,698				11,953[i]			
1963				2,625				13,551[j]			
1965	1,212	1,793	738	2,484	5,602	1,012	45	12,886	9,709[o]	193[o]	142[o]
1968	1,068	1,615	653	2,081	4,936	887	36	11,276	8,394[p]	195[p]	144[p]
1971	928	1,385	536	1,834	4,243	757	32	9,717			
1974	831	1,205	446	1,586	3,714	664	28	8,474			

Sources:
a *US*, October 22, 1947;
b *Manitoba, Report of the Superintendent of Insurance*, Winnipeg, 1946, p. 60;
c 1948, p. 50;
d 1950, p. 50;
e 1954, p. 56;
f 1955, p. 56;
g 1956, p. 60;
h 1959, p. 65;
i 1963, p. 56;
j 1964, p. 48;
m Friends in Need, pp. 219, 251;
n *Report of the 22nd Convention*, p. 25;
o *Report of the 23rd Convention*, p. 27;
p *US*, March 29, 1950.
The breakdown by provinces for the years 1965-1974 are from WBA reports to the provincial superintendents of insurance.

Mykola Chachkowsky, an associate editor, who accepted it for publication. The poem's appearance caused quite a storm. Readers wrote to the paper, some complimenting and others criticizing it. Although the paper did not publish the letters, Chachkowsky wrote an explanation, accepting full responsibility in the absence of a meeting of the editorial board, for the poem's publication. The editorial board declared in a statement that it had been a "mistake" to publish the poem.[11] As a result of the storm over his poem, Sribniak was completely alienated from the Ukrainian pro-communist movement.

There were other indications of decline in the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. For a short period after the war the number of AUUC temples was still increasing while the number of branches was declining. It was not long before it became evident that many localities were having problems in maintaining their halls. As the membership decreased, they became a burden and many were offered for sale. By 1950, the halls in Mundare, East Toronto and Grimsby were sold, and by 1954 those in Simcoe and Sandwich. By 1960, the temple in Dunnville, which had been opened in 1953, was up for sale. The Ottawa hall, which had been the headquarters for every communist delegation that came to Ottawa and the centre of all communist activities in the area, and which had been remodelled and enlarged after the war, was listed for sale in 1965. From 112 in 1952, the number of halls dropped to ninety in 1954 and to forty-three by 1973 (Table XI). The greatest drop in the number of halls was in Alberta, from fifty-four in 1944 to thirty-nine in 1954.

In many of those that were left, little, if any, organizational work was carried on. They were maintained by income derived from rent for weddings, meetings and bingo games. Some remained unsold after the local branch ceased to exist. In Alberta, in 1954, there were twenty-three branches (Table IX) and thirty-nine temples (Table XI).

As the membership declined, some of the picnic grounds and summer camps that had been inherited from the ULFTA or purchased by the AUUC and WBA jointly or singly, where formerly large crowds of Ukrainians had gathered on Sundays and holidays, also became a tax burden and were sold. Among these were the grounds in Timmins, Ontario, and Haney, British Columbia.

Table XI

NUMBER OF LABOR TEMPLES OWNED BY THE ULFTA-AUUC, BY PROVINCE, 1939–1973

Year	BC	Alta	Sask	Man	Ont	Que	NS	Total
1939		.....				.....		113[a]
1944		54[b]				.....		.....
1949	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	108[c]
1950	5	51	9	16	26	2	2	111[d]
1952	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	112[e]
1954	5	39	4	14	25	2	1	90[f]
1973	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	43[g]

Source:
a Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli*, p. 300;
b *US*, March 15, 1944;
c *UC*, November 15, 1949;
d *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho. . . zyizdu. . .* p. 68;
e *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho. . . zyizdu. . .* p. 73;
f *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho. . . zyizdu. . .* p. 21;
g AUUC data obtained unofficially.

The cooperative enterprises followed the general trend. In Thunder Bay, the International Cooperative Stores Limited, with a bakery and a chain of grocery stores in the metropolitan and the surrounding area, found itself in serious difficulty. In February 1971, it was forced into bankruptcy. In Northern Ontario, the Workers Cooperative, which once had a bakery, a dairy and a chain of grocery stores, dwindled to one small store.

The circulation of the Ukrainian pro-communist press held up better than the membership of the mass organizations. Many continued to subscribe even after they had severed all other ties with the Ukrainian pro-communist movement. *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* was even transformed into a semi-weekly in 1954 although many subscriptions were not being renewed, especially in Western Canada.[12]

It soon became clear that the press was in difficulties as well. Readers began to fall away. One subscriber complained that *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* contained only "advertisements . . . various pictures from Ukraine and a whole page of reports of the press campaign.

The news in it is old, I heard it three or four days ago on the radio".[13] In 1960, *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* reverted back to a weekly.

By 1962, the problem of the press had become so critical that the tenth convention was forced to review the situation. The following convention, in 1964, resolved to reduce *Ukrayinske Slove* from twenty to sixteen pages and *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* from twelve to eight. In November 1965, the two Ukrainian papers were merged into a single twenty-four page weekly tabloid, published in Toronto as *Zhyttia i Slovo* (Life and Word).

The reported circulation of the two Ukrainian papers in 1946 was 25,000, approximately 15,000 for *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* and 10,000 for *Ukrayinske Slovo*. Five years later it was down to 9,100 and 8,000 respectively. The circulation of the two papers in 1962 was reported to be 11,000. In 1969 the circulation of the new tabloid barely reached 7,000; by 1973 it was down to 4,500.[14]

The Ukrainian Canadian, which had reached a circulation of 5,000 in 1950, dropped to 4,800 the following year. Three years later its circulation manager announced that subscribers who had been in arrears since 1951 were being taken off the mailing list. In 1962 it was reported to have a circulation of 4,000.[15]

The decline in renewals for the Ukrainian Canadian was so great that by 1962 the number of readers lost was exceeding the number of new subscribers. The total number of renewals and new subscriptions collected that year in the February campaign was 2,465, a drop of 273 from the previous year's high of 2,738.[16]

At the Twelfth Convention of the AUUC, in 1966, Harasym reported that the Ukrainian Canadian showed

> . . . no over all growth. This is reflected by the great difficulty we have gaining new readers, in holding old ones and in achieving successful sustaining fund drives.[17]

By 1968 the number of renewals and new subscriptions collected in the press campaign was down to 1,167. The *Ukrainian Canadian* then changed its format from a semi-monthly paper to a monthly journal, publishing ten issues annually.

Various other organizational activities were also showing signs of slowing down, among them the raising of funds. Prokop reported at the fourteenth convention that

> . . . the general condition in this respect is not such as to cause rejoicing. In a whole number of localities there have been changes for the worse.

> The general result. . . is such that in a whole series of branches even the revised quotas for the organizational fund have not been achieved. . . . And with this we wish to make it known that the general receipts of the organizational fund for the work of the NEC and the provincial committees has decreased and there are no prospects for their increase.[18]

Although the press fund quotas for the maintenance of the two Ukrainian papers were fulfilled each year, this was not the case with the *Ukrainian Canadian*. Its press fund dropped from $19,916.42 in 1960 to $15,340 in 1961 and continued to decline annually thereafter.[19]

The AUUC's financial predicament was further complicated by an unexpected development. Annually it realized nearly $100,000 through a lottery held at each Dominion Day festival at Camp Palermo. After the draw was made on June 28, 1964, police carried out a raid, seized the tickets and laid charges against Korol, Prokop, Dobrowolsky, Harasym and Boychuk, putting an end to one of the Association's most lucrative sources of funds.

Another aspect of the problem was the lack of cadres. All attempts to train personnel for the editorial staffs of the papers failed. In one case a young man, after returning from school in Kiev, was employed by the *Ukrainian Canadian*. He stayed a few days, produced one cartoon and then left not only the paper, but the organization. As editors passed away, there were no replacements which eventually contributed to the merging of the two papers.

There was an even greater shortage of cadres for organizational work. Each year the Association sent several students to Kiev, some of whom were trained for organizational work. Yet there were no replacements for those who retired or passed away.

In three years, 1966 to 1969, the WBA lost four organizers, three died and one returned to Ukraine. The Board of Directors of the WBA could not find replacements.[20]

The AUUC had similar problems with cadres. The provincial committees each had at least one paid functionary – the secretary. The Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba committees each also had at least one organizer. In addition, the national office sent out organizers and speakers from time to time to tour the branches.

Beginning in the 1950s the tours became less and less frequent. The provinces also lost their organizers and secretaries through death, resignations and reassignments to new posts. In 1954, Do-

browolsky, the provincial secretary in Quebec, was transferred to Toronto to become assistant to the national secretary in the Canadian-born sector. In 1962, Harasym, who had been provincial organizer in Alberta of the English-speaking sector, since 1954, was elected assistant secretary to replace Dobrowolsky, who was being groomed to replace the aging John Boychuk as treasurer. Ray Dowhopuluk, organizer in Manitoba, became the manager of Globe Tours, Zane Nykolyshyn, the English-speaking sector organizer in Manitoba, was transferred to Montreal. Saskatchewan also lost its full-time secretary when Ivan Alexiewich suffered a heart attack and was transferred to Calgary where he was put in charge of the local branch of *Knyha.* In 1962, it was decided to review the question of the continued existence of the Ontario provincial committee and reorganize the Quebec committee. Both were eventually disbanded.

The decrease in the number of full-time functionaries in the organizational field further weakened the Association. Contact between the centre and the branches, especially the smaller and less stable ones, became more tenuous. Without the assistance, inspiration and supervision provided by organizers from the national and provincial centres, the branches not only failed to fulfill their quotas in campaigns, but many even ceased to function.

The problem was complicated by a shortage of personnel to direct the cultural and educational work. According to Prokop, prior to the war there had been over sixty-five full-time teachers and a number who worked part-time. In 1948 there were only thirty, and not all of these were full time.[21] The AUUC held various teacher training courses and in addition sent students to Kiev. Very few persevered as teachers for any length of time. The ablest and most promising who had studied in Kiev: Walter Balay, Myron Shatulsky, and Ted Kardash (son of William), were among those who left.

The lack of teachers seriously curtailed the educational and cultural work of the Association. Already in 1948 it had forced the disbanding of the orchestra in Coleman and the closing of the Ukrainian school in Drumheller, Alberta. By 1950 such a large centre as Hamilton lacked a teacher; by 1954 most of the centres in Northern Ontario were without teachers; by 1962 Fort William, a district centre, was pleading for a teacher. Montreal, which had

acquired a labor temple in 1962, no longer had a teacher in 1966. In other centres teachers asked to be relieved and replaced.[22]

Some localities had all the necessary prerequisites for the existence of Ukrainian schools – accommodation, children and the desire on the part of parents – but no teachers. Generally, however, the Canadian-born had less interest in sending their children to Ukrainian schools than their parents had and their children had less interest in attending. Consequently, Ukrainian schools rapidly diminished in number. In 1952 there were still twenty-four. Two years later there were only twenty. In 1969 they functioned in only three centres: Toronto, Winnipeg and Edmonton, with eleven, seven and fifteen pupils respectively.[23] Eventually, even these ceased to exist.

The teaching of music in the temples suffered almost as much as the teaching of language. In 1950 Prokop raised the alarm over the decline of junior mandolin orchestras. In 1949 there had been thirty-seven; by 1952 there were only twenty-seven. The number of choirs dwindled to twenty-one. The situation had become so desperate by 1966, with only fourteen conductors (six of them full time) that the twelfth convention urged the localities with no instructors to hire any qualified person, "not necessarily of Ukrainian descent, in order that those groups continue to function".[24]

Ukrainian folk dancing fared better. There appeared to be more interest in it and more instructors, many of whom were trained in Ukraine. Dance groups seemed to survive even after orchestras and choirs were disbanded. In 1969, the six main AUUC centres west of the Great Lakes: Thunder Bay, Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton, Calgary and Vancouver, still had thirty-eight dance instructors and assistants.[25]

Perhaps the sharpest decline in the AUUC's cultural work was in dramatics. The staging of a play required a great deal of time and preparation. It was much simpler to obtain Soviet films which were readily available and often drew larger crowds. Boychuk noted in 1949 that very few plays were being staged. By 1954 there were only ten drama circles.[26] These were in the larger centres which usually staged one or two plays annually, generally Ukrainian classics.

There was a similar decline in what was termed "educational" work. In 1950, Prokop declared that "lectures . . . discussions and

especially short courses are rarely held except in the larger cities unless someone occasionally comes from the centre. . . ."[27]

There was a corresponding decline in other aspects of organizational activity. Harasym complained at the fourteenth convention that there were "greater difficulties in getting any committee to function" and that membership meetings were being held less frequently. Some branches were falling behind in the collection of monthly dues payments and members were slow to pay assessments levied to cover the cost of conventions.[28]

The decline of a branch generally followed a pattern. When the cultural work ceased, members became discouraged. This prompted a feeling that there was no justification for the further existence of the branch. Organizational activity slackened and eventually the branch fell apart.

The decline in membership affected the AUUC's other activities. The number of festivals, concerts, lectures and other public gatherings, and the number attending them, also decreased. The AUUC was never again able to organize festivals on the scale of those in 1945 and 1946 nor draw the crowd that assembled at Shevchenko Park in 1951.

By the 1950s the future of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations was becoming a matter of serious concern to the leadership. At the eighth convention in 1958, Prokop chided members who declared that the AUUC had "outlived its period" and no longer filled a need for Canadians. He admitted at the eleventh in 1964 that:

> The greatest problem which troubles all of us is the problem of the future of our organization.

At the fourteenth in 1970, he declared that there was a widespread feeling among the membership which was manifested in such questions as:

> How long will our organization continue to exist? What are its perspectives, or does it have any perspectives whatsoever for further work?[29]

Predictions of doom were common even among the leaders. One declared: "The organization is dying before our very eyes."

There were numerous and complex reasons for the rather rapid decline of a once formidable movement. Internal and external, local and international, psychological and sociological factors converged to influence the future of the Ukrainian mass organizations.

Their decline began soon after the war with the dissipation of the euphoria generated by Soviet victories.

The catalyst that precipitated the decline was the sharpening of antagonisms between the USSR and the Western Powers over post-war policy and spheres of influence. It was given a strong impetus by the dramatic defection of Igor Gouzenko and his startling revelations of a Soviet spy network operating in Canada, the arrest and conviction on spy charges of Fred Rose, the only Communist in the House of Commons, and the influx of the displaced persons.

The consequent anti-Soviet sentiment, fanned vigorously by the press, was soon having its effect. Communists who held elected posts in various levels of government began losing their seats. Stewart Smith was not reelected to the Toronto Board of Control and John Boyd was unsuccessful in his bid for a third term to the Board of Education in January, 1947; A.A. MacLeod failed in his bid for reelection to the Ontario Legislature in 1951 and J.B. Salsberg in 1955. Other communists also lost their seats.

An anti-communist drive was initiated in the trade unions in 1947. It was boosted by the defection of J.A. (Pat) Sullivan, a founder of the communist-dominated Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) and secretary-treasurer of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). At its annual convention in September 1949, the TLC expelled the CSU and passed a resolution which called for the removal of communists from union posts. By the early fifties the communists had been ousted from the leadership of most unions.

These developments were accompanied by a rapid growth of anti-Soviet and anti-communist feeling that often bordered on hysteria. It became highly unpopular to voice pro-Soviet or pro-communist sentiments.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations soon felt the effects of the new turn of events. They lost their wartime popularity and many doors were suddenly closed to them. They were forced to be on the defensive which restricted their freedom of action and made it more difficult to carry on their work.

Although the hard core of long standing members remained firm, some of the peripheral elements were effected. Most were new recruits in outlying areas and smaller communities, where there was not the moral support provided by leaders in the larger centres.

Their recruitment had usually followed a common pattern. An

organizer would arrive and address a meeting arranged by a local sympathizer, or a member of the Association from a neighbouring locality. He would arouse the audience against the Nazis and awaken the sympathies of those present for their suffering brethern in Ukraine. After the speech there would be an appeal to join the Association, which the organizer would describe as the only Ukrainian organization in Canada that supported the war effort and the defense of the native land.

The listeners, often under the momentory spell of the speaker, and out of a sense of patriotic duty to Canada and Ukraine, applied for membership. The organizer would assist them in conducting the first membership meeting and in electing an executive. Generally, most, if not all, of the new members lacked experience in organizational work.

After the organizer's departure there would be little or no activity until he returned again. When the Cold War set in and it became unpopular to be pro-Soviet, they left the organization, and the branch ceased to exist.

Another development contributed to the exodus of a number of newer, and in some cases older but more independent, members from the AUUC. One group, among whom the pro-communists made considerable inroads during the war, was located in Alberta. It consisted of members of about two dozen Ukrainian congregations of the Russian Orthodox Church that recognized the Russian Patriarch in Moscow. It was easier for them than for the nationalists to find a common ground with the pro-communists. Firstly, they were not anti-Russian. Secondly, they were in competition with the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada which was anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.

They joined the communist anti-nationalist campaign, merged in the popular mass surge of support for the Soviet Union's effort against the German invaders and often became members of the pro-communist organization. One of the priests, Reverend M.N. Cependa, of Smokey Lake, Alberta, who was also the publisher of *Holos Pravdy,* took an active part in the communist campaigns to collect aid for the USSR.

The pro-communist sympathy of this group began to wane as Soviet popularity declined. The situation was further complicated for the pro-communists by Reverend Cependa. Incensed because

Hrynchyshyn had left as editor and the Ukrainian pro-communists had withdrawn their support of his paper, he began to take his revenge.

In 1943, The Ukrainian pro-communist organization had published a report of money collected in the Red Cross campaign for medical aid to the USSR in 1941-1942, listing the names of the donors and the amount each had donated.[30] Shortly after the second AUUC convention in 1946, letters began to appear in *Holos Pravdy* from readers who complained that their donations had not been included in the report. Reverend Cependa appealed to all those whose names had not been published in the report to present evidence that they had donated and give him power of attorney to sue. He claimed to have had already received such power from over 100 donors.[31]

In the meantime, *Holos Pravdy* had published an open letter to Navis, signed "donor". The writer claimed he had donated fifty dollars to the Red Cross fund at a mass meeting in Spedden, Alberta, where Navis took up the collection, and that his donation was not recorded in the report. The "donor" asked Navis and his associates "to give an accounting of the campaign and to tell the donors how much you benefited from the fund".[32]

Cependa's paper then proceeded to publish numerous examples of what he cited as discrepancies in the report. The figures piled up. By the end of the year he estimated that $48,229.60 was unaccounted for. Two and a half weeks later the sum rose to $87,822.72.[33]

The attacks had their effects on members and sympathizers of the AUUC. In a letter dated March 20, 1947, a committee, representing members of the AUUC and other donors in Vernon, British Columbia, complained that there had not been a full report of all monies collected to aid the USSR. It asked how much money had been collected in all campaigns, what expenses were involved, and how much was actually sent to the USSR and Ukraine.

Another committee was elected at a public meeting of donors in New Westminster, British Columbia. In a letter to Boychuk, the gathering asked: "Are we only to make donations but not to know how much money was sent to Ukraine?" Boychuk did not allay suspicions when he replied: "We are absolutely not obliged to answer you because the NEC is responsible for its work to its organization and its membership".[34]

Meanwhile, Navis sued Rev. M.N. Cependa for $10,000 damages, claiming that the latter had "exposed him to hatred, contempt and ridicule" by the publication of the open letter.[35] *Holos Pravdy* made light of the action and referred to Navis as Naviz (from *Navizivsky*) which in Ukrainian means animal fertilizer.

The Ukrainian pro-communist press carried several attacks on the priest and a long editorial reply to his accusations. It charged that he had falsified figures by simply subtracting the amount collected in the second campaign from the amount in the first to arrive at his statistics. The editorial also cited several cases of persons who complained that they had donated but their names were not entered into the report issued in 1943. The editorial explained that these people had made their contributions to a later campaign, after the report was published.[36]

On March 15, 1949, Navis discontinued his action, a step which only lent further credence to Cependa's charges. The latter followed up his advantage with a small pamphlet in which he claimed that even the addition in the report was inaccurate.[37]

The whole episode was a serious blow to the efforts of the Ukrainian communist leaders to maintain the war-time momentum of their movement. Cependa's sniping discredited them with a section of the membership and was a factor in subsequent defections from the ranks, especially among the newer members. It was probably one of the major causes of the decline in the number of branches in Alberta from 105 in 1945 to 23 by 1954 (Table IX).

The Ukrainian pro-communist movement had weathered other periods of more vicious anti-Soviet agitation, the sniping and attacks of stronger opponents than Cependa and more determined and more numerous voices of revolt within its ranks, and still continued to grow and flourish. But times had changed. The factors promoting growth had been replaced by copious seeds of decline which, by the end of the 1940s, had sprouted and were flourishing like unattended weeds.

When the war ended, there had been a great sense of relief and jubilation in the ranks of the pro-communist organizations, but also a sense of exhaustion. The leaders hoped to maintain the war-time enthusiasm and tempo. The huge festivals in Toronto in 1945 and in Edmonton in 1946, attended by Soviet guests, played a great role in this respect, but only temporarily. Eventually the members began to slacken their pace. Some became completely inactive.

Many who moved during the period of post-war economic readjustment did not apply for a membership transfer to the branch in the new locality and ceased to be members. If they did transfer, care was taken not to become too involved in the new branch.

The movement was also considerably weakened by the migration of many of its local activists to Ukraine. There is no data on the total number who returned but every large and many small localities lost members in this way. . . . Although none of the top leaders was involved, many local activists went. In 1956, Hamilton lost Yuriy Myhaychuk, the local leader who presided over the AUUC branch and the district committee, taught folk dancing and conducted the choir. With him went Roman Benko, a Toronto leader who was also a member of the NEC of the AUUC; Semen Boyko, chairman of the Toronto press committee; Stepan Hasiuk, chairman of the Montreal press committee; and M. Strutynsky, for many years president of the Welland branch of the AUUC. Another important and irreplaceable loss was caused by the passing away of the old guard and some of the younger leaders. Shatulsky died in 1952; Teresio and Navis in 1954; Ivan Klybanovsky, WBA organizer in Alberta and one of the founders of the ULFTA, in 1958; Philip Lysets, an editor of *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* in 1959; and Tom Chopowich in 1963. Many of the older, more experienced and more dedicated activists were also dying.The death toll in the AUUC in the five-year period between 1948 and 1953 was 115.[38]

There was no source of replacement for those who passed away or became too old to be active. Immigration of Ukrainians to Canada had all but ceased with the onset of the Great Depression. Ukrainian refugees began streaming into Canada in 1947, but their hostility to the Russians and the USSR made them inveterate enemies of anything pro-Soviet. Their arrival only complicated the problems and hastened the decline of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

The adult members looked to the younger generation to replace them. The Canadian-born were viewed as "the most important reservoir of the AUUC". But they did not justify the hopes of their elders and did not provide recruits in adequate numbers to replace the older members.

As the young people grew up, a generation gap developed which gradually widened. The Canadian-born had not experienced poverty and hardship, discrimination and alienation, or "passed through

the school of class struggle". They could not understand their parents' preoccupation with politics and the parents could not lead them across the gap from cultural to political activities.

The attitudes of the younger people to the USSR were more often influenced by school and society than by their parents. Some became indifferent and others hostile to anything pro-Soviet. They lacked what Prokop called "our ideological approach to matters" and "raised questions regarding the character of our organization... its general aims and tasks, its general direction and relationship to political reality... attitude to Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Union and to various questions. . . ." Harasym complained that the Canadian-born had no confidence "in the correctness of our policies".[39]

Some drifted away during the Cold War. They felt no kinship with the USSR and saw no reason to risk persecution over association with an organization which held little or no attraction for them and did not fill their needs, as it had those of their parents. Others were lost through the inexorable process of assimilation.

Those of the Canadian-born who remained had less interest in the organization than their parents had. Similarly, the younger music teachers had less motivation than their predecessors. Furthermore, they were obliged to work under conditions that were becoming more difficult in an organization that was losing its drive and with people who were losing interest and conviction. Eventually it became impossible to train new teachers because of the lack of candidates. One of the reasons for the failure to attract and hold teachers as well as other personnel was the small remuneration. When promising opportunities were beckoning elsewhere, *Ukrayinske Slovo* was paying its editors between forty and fifty dollars per week.[41]

Those of the Canadian-born who remained in the AUUC often chafed under the restrictions imposed by the leadership, to whom they sometimes referred as "The Mafia". The most active of the Canadian-born in Toronto were grouped around the Shevchenko Ensemble, directed by Eugene Dolny. After protracted negotiations with Soviet authorities, arrangements were made for the ensemble to visit Ukraine in August 1979, with a series of concerts in several cities.

The Soviet hosts were apparently not anxious that the local Ukrainian population become aware of the freedom to cultivate

their language and culture that their kinfolk enjoyed in Canada. Consequently, in most cities, admittance to the concerts was by invitation which was extended only to select officials.

The members of the ensemble, most of whom had never visited the USSR, were irritated by the red tape, the restrictions and the constant surveillance. Their disillusionment with the regime reached its climax when their relatives in Western Ukraine could not obtain tickets to the performances. Eugene Dolny and his assistant, Myron Shatulsky, refused to conduct. As a result, the organizers of the tour were forced to arrange a special performance which relatives of the members of the ensemble could attend.

The experience of the performers in the Soviet Union further undermined their respect for the leaders who had always lauded the Soviet regime. They also felt that government grants would be easier to obtain without the AUUC millstone around their necks. Artists sponsored by the AUUC were not given visas by the Canadian government. They hoped, as an independent group, to be able to sponsor artists from Ukraine. What role each of these factors played in the subsequent decision of the members of the ensemble is difficult to assess. However, for these and other reasons they decided to leave the AUUC, wishing to part on friendly terms with the blessings of the leadership. The latter, in true communist fashion, opposed any steps that would limit their control over the ensemble. In spite of this, in 1972, the members incorporated the ensemble as a independent entity and in 1977 purchased separate premises to accommodate the ensemble, steps which caused consternation among Ukrainian communist leaders.

Failure to hold the Canadian-born members and cadres had a most demoralizing influence on the older members, and contributed to the decline of the organizations. Each year the average age of the members increased and each year their capacity to maintain the tempo and carry out the tasks required of them decreased.

However, the primary factors in the steady decline of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations, were economic and sociological. Full employment and the relative prosperity during and immediately after the war made it possible for Ukrainians to improve their economic and social status. As industrious and reliable workers, many moved upward from unskilled to the more skilled and better paying positions. Through their thrift and careful management

most were able to acquire comfortable homes, the modern amenities of life, and a relative sense of security.

Some fared even better, amassing modest fortunes through various business enterprises. Want and poverty no longer conditioned their thinking or drove them to seek a radical transformation of society. Their improved status eliminated for them the condition which had been one of the root causes of their radicalism.

A party leader complained that many party members and sympathizers had become "small businessmen, landlords, and a good many enjoyed high incomes" with the result that some found it "more convenient to become less active, less outspoken and spend more time enjoying their new economic positions".[42]

This applied in no small measure to many members of the AUUC, a fact which had a whole series of adverse effects on the Association. In many cities, Ukrainians lived in compact areas giving their community what might be termed cohesiveness. This was gradually destroyed by the growing prosperity of the members. As their material status improved they moved away from the areas of Ukrainian concentration with their modest dwellings to the more pretentious and exclusive subdivisions with people of similar financial means. Even if such members still had an interest in the organization, distance separated them from the labor temples and their appearances there became less and less frequent.

Moreover, as their English improved, they became more integrated into the Canadian community, their feelings of alienation gradually dissipated and the need for an exclusively Ukrainian environment decreased. Economic advancement also raised their social status and made it easier to merge into Canadian society.

In spite of all the factors adversely affecting the pro-communist organizations, a hard core of mostly older members remained steadfast and, at great personal sacrifice in time, energy and money, continued to maintain the pro-communist movement and its press. Their material conditions had vastly improved and they were no longer driven by want and poverty to seek economic redress. However, they were still bound to the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations by their faith in the USSR as the great Utopia and Stalin as the new Messiah.

The first great shock that rocked the faith of these remaining members in the Soviet Union and its leadership was Khrushchov's

indictment of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. The Ukrainian communist leaders tried to play down the magnitude of the crime. Their press did not publish the speech as the *Canadian Tribune* had done.[43] It limited itself to a modest news item that in Moscow a new assessment of Stalin had been made indicating that he lacked modesty which developed into a cult of the individual with harmful consequences.[44] Nor was the speech ever discussed at any Ukrainian pro-communist forum. Nevertheless, the effects on the membership were no less traumatic. For some the revelations were too much and they simply drifted away. Most members still remained faithful to the cause but their faith in the infallibility of the Kremlin leaders was irretrievably shattered.

The faith of the Ukrainian pro-communists was gradually undermined in the Soviet Union itself after tourist travel was opened to the USSR and they saw in Ukraine at first hand the poverty, shortages, inefficiency, bureaucracy, lack of individual freedom and the dominance of the Russian language. However, most were reassured for a time by the spectacular Soviet space achievements and Khrushchov's promises of a "bright future".

The visit of large numbers of Ukrainian pro-communists to Ukraine in 1961 produced a new wave of criticism and complaints that could not be stemmed by any promises of a bright future. The Soviet government's subsequent refusal to grant visas to tourists to visit their native villages added fuel to the already smouldering fires of discontent. New evidence from Ukraine, indicating that Russification was official policy and was being intensified, assumed greater credibility when, in August 1968, Czechoslovakia was suddenly invaded by half a million troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, led by the USSR.

These events created another crisis in the already dwindling Ukrainian pro-communist ranks. The hard core of members had persevered through many adversities, sustained by their belief in the Soviet Union as a just society. The new developments shattered for many of the remaining stalwarts this last pillar of communist faith, further undermining communist influence in the Ukrainian community.

XI

The Great Dilemma

THERE was little possibility in the 1930s for the Ukrainian communists in Canada to penetrate the facade and grasp the nature of the carefully camouflaged Soviet propaganda. A few were privileged to visit the Soviet Union before World War II. But, alienated from the society in which they lived, and searching for a promised land, they were only too eager to accept the feverish construction of industrial complexes that they saw on their carefully chaperoned and specially guided tours, as the foundations of a new just society.

After Stalin's death, the borders of the USSR were gradually opened to tourists. Members and sympathizers of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were issued visas for visits with families, often lasting several months. A few select members and leaders even remained for extended periods to travel and study.

This gave a considerable number of people an opportunity to become acquainted with Soviet citizens and to scrutinize more carefully the building of the loudly-acclaimed socialist society. Many rank and file members travelling as tourists acquired a fairly good understanding of the nature of the regime through personal observations and the accounts of relatives and friends. The youth of the Ukrainian mass organizations had even better opportunities than the older members, through their wide associations with Soviet young people who, not having experienced the Stalinist terror, were less inhibited than their elders and consequently spoke more openly of the prevailing inequities. The leaders were in a special category. Most of them had been in the Soviet Union for prolonged periods of time as correspondents, students or guests and

had subsequently made many visits. Some had been there almost every year for the past decade or more.

They came into contact with or were made aware of the shortages, the inefficiency, the deadening weight of the bureaucracy, the degrading poverty, the paralyzing fear of the dreaded secret police and, above all, the Russification. Some were even introduced to underground literature. One leader, while in Ukraine in 1959, was given a whole collection of such materials, which he presumably brought to Canada.[1]

What they saw and heard in the Great Utopia left most of them disturbed and confused. Some became completely demoralized. Macievich never got over the shock of Khrushchov's revelations of the crimes of Stalin. When he had had a few drinks his face would become distorted in an expression of great pain and agony, tears would well up in his eyes and he would cry out in the author's presence: "I worshipped him. How could he have done such things?" The person in question was, of course, Stalin. Macievich died completely broken and disillusioned.

Some tried to evade facing the unpleasant reality. When a member described to one of the leaders of the AUUC some of his disturbing experiences in Ukraine, the latter protested that he did not wish to hear of such things as it gave him headaches and insomnia. "All I live for each week," he added, "is for Friday to come so that I can go to the cottage to get away from it all."

Nearly all the leaders disliked Russification and were greatly disturbed by it. But they were in a dilemma, pulled in opposite directions by two irreconcilable forces. On the one hand, they were driven by an inner urge to express publicly their opposition to Soviet policies and practices. On the other, they were influenced by many factors that paralyzed their will for action.

Some peripheral members, who had never become fully committed to and integrated into the organization, drifted away. However, there was no organized defection or protest. A few individual members spoke out publicly, but they received little support.

Some of those who had left still continued to make financial contributions and to subscribe to the press when canvassed and to attend cultural and social events in the labor temples where their life-long friends and acquaintances gathered. Even though they

had terminated their memberships and drifted away, they failed to make a complete break. The social life of the organization continued to attract them. When one such member was asked why he attended when he no longer agreed with the organization's support of the USSR, he replied: "Where am I to go at my age?"

A hard core of members continued to maintain their membership and to participate actively in the organization. It is possible that some might not have been fully aware of the situation in Ukraine, but they all sensed that things were not as they should be. There were many influences that restrained them from breaking with the organization and its policy of support for the USSR.

The organization had drawn them to its bosom in their youth, had taught them to read and write if they were illiterate, had integrated them into its ranks and provided them with the training required to fill the numerous posts and perform the various functions in its branches. It was in the organization that they experienced a sense of strength and fulfillment. It had provided a social life and a haven in a strange and often alien environment, developing in the members a deep feeling of dependence. They identified themselves with the organization completely and looked to it for everything, including the meaning of life. In return such members dedicated themselves unreservedly to the cause it sponsored.

Just as the organization filled a social need, so the Marxist philosophy provided a simple logical and understandable explanation for the complex social and economic processes that proved baffling to even the greatest scholars. The communist imperatives of class struggle and revolution that promised to usher in a new society seemed all the more convincing with the rise of the post-war revolutionary fervour and the spread of communist power over new areas. Even the revelations of the crimes of Stalin could not shake the faith of many of the members.

A further restraint was the fact that the organization operated on faith and blind acceptance of directions from above, rather than reason and independent thinking. The local members looked to their branch executive. The latter received directions from the NEC which followed policies set down by the leading organs of the party in line with directions from Moscow. Any expressions of doubt or criticism of the accepted dogmas were regarded as rank heresy and those guilty of such transgressions were forthwith con-

demned and expelled. Those who remained, submerged their individuality to become mere cogs. Such conditioning made the members incapable not only of acting but even of thinking independently.

For decades they had denounced the Ukrainian nationalists and praised the Soviet Union as a just society. To go back on everything they had supported and admit that their lives had been spent in vain would be painful and traumatic. Only personal experience of the injustices in the USSR could force them to alter their attitudes.

By the early 1960s, when Ukrainian radicals were reaching an awareness of the true state of affairs in the USSR, they were long past middle age. Even if they were ready to admit openly the existence of injustice in the Soviet Union, it was difficult at that age to embark on another crusade, and especially one which would condemn that which they had supported all their lives. Many quietly accepted the state of things in Ukraine and made the best of it.

Furthermore, while the members may have been disappointed and even disillusioned with what they saw in Ukraine, they had been born there and many of their relatives still lived there. Hundreds visited Ukraine after the USSR opened its borders to tourists in 1956. They not only derived a great deal of satisfaction from seeing their relatives and visiting their birthplaces, but also from the attention and receptions they received. In spite of Soviet propaganda to the contrary, the people of the USSR have a glorified conception of the wealth of North America and its citizens. Tourists, who at home are ordinary folk, in their native villages are treated like royalty. Many wish to repeat the visits, not only for the sake of seeing their relatives but also for the great uplift it gives them. There is a genuine feeling of apprehension that public criticism of the USSR might be met with Soviet refusal to issue entry visas. Consequently many strive to maintain friendly relations, not because they approve of the regime, but out of a desire to keep in touch with friends and relatives at home, and to leave the door open for future visits.[2]

The young Ukrainian Canadian students in Kiev had other reasons for hesitating to voice open criticism of Soviet reality. They were provided with the best tuition and dormitory accommodation available in Kiev and stipends that equalled those awarded the Soviet elite. Each summer they were sent to a plush resort on the Black

Sea for a month. During the school year, they were taken for a two-week tour of the southern part of the USSR as well as on several shorter excursions, lasting a day or more, to various cities.

They had been brought up in relative security and had never experienced hardships or poverty. The condition of the collective farmers and the discrimination of the Ukrainian language and culture did not have the impact on them that they had on their parents. Going to Ukraine was regarded as an exciting experience to be enjoyed to the full. They had a strong tendency to view everything in terms of how it affected them personally. Andrew Markow, who spent five years in the Kiev Conservatory, wrote: "I am very well taken care of."[3] That was what really mattered. That was the criterion by which many judged the regime.

There were also extra dividends if one conducted oneself correctly, maintained good relations with the right people and, above all, voiced praise for the regime, especially at the right time and place. Such students were given extra benefits. They were allowed to travel on their own, asked to appear on radio broadcasts beamed to North America and invited to write articles, glorifying the regime, for the semi-monthly *News From Ukraine*, for which the remuneration was adequate by any standards.

Privately they often complained to each other about the inconveniences, the shortages, the line-ups, the red tape and the bureaucracy. But they would never publicly condemn Soviet practices.

Once a student returned home he was back in the closed circle of the organization. He would immediately come under the influence of the leaders, who had been instrumental in selecting and sending him to Ukraine, and the parents who were usually devoted members of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations.

Another factor was the student's desire to visit Ukraine again. As trained cultural and political workers they would occupy leading posts at least in the local branches. As such they would be eligible to go on delegations, attend special anniversaries and possibly be selected to go for a rest cure to a choice rest home or sanatarium in the USSR. Even if a former student ceased to be active he might still be very careful not to jeopardize his chances of visiting Ukraine on his own.

There were numerous reasons why the leaders remained silent. Most of them had either grown up in the pro-communist movement from childhood, or had entered it in their youth.

Prokop, who had studied for the priesthood in his native Western Ukraine, came into full-time work in the ULFTA from the mine pit as a young man. In 1930, he was sent to the ULFTA's six month higher educational course in Winnipeg for political schooling. After graduating at the top of his class, he was sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv, Ukraine, for further training. The new communist dogmas replaced for him the old religious canons. On his return to Canada, he became the political watchdog, unquestioningly supervising the purity of the new faith. When Lobay drew attention to the mass purges of Ukrainians and the encroachments on their culture, Prokop led the attack and supervised the witch hunt to root out the heresy.

Another of the leaders, Krawchuk, came to Canada as a youth from Western Ukraine to escape Polish persecution for his radical activities. He immediately entered the ranks of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations where he worked full-time with zeal and dedication all his adult life. With only a minimal formal education and a six-month higher educational course he emerged as one of the top Ukrainian communist leaders and journalists in Canada.

The foremost of the younger leaders, Harasym, was drawn into full-time work in the AUUC, from industry, as a young man and sent to a four-month higher educational course at Palermo in 1950. Subsequently, full of energy, enthusiasm and dedication, he was appointed organizer of the AUUC in Alberta. In his work with younger people, he combined modesty and diplomacy with tact and an understanding that drew the youth to him. He put everything he had into the task. It is difficult to visualize anyone being able to do more to build the organization among the Canadian-born.

The backgrounds of the other leaders were similar in many respects. Michael Korol arrived from Ukraine an illiterate orphan at the age of thirteen. He learned to read and write his native tongue in the labor temple in Winnipeg. In 1930, Korol attended the ULFTA's higher educational course and has worked full-time in the communist movement nearly all his adult life. Stanley Dobrowolsky was orphaned at the age of eleven and grew up in the WBA orphanage near Winnipeg. Most of the others, such as Ziniuk, Teresio, Hrynchyshyn, Solomon and Mokry were also brought up in the labor temples.

All their associations were with people connected with the com-

munist movement. Their understanding of public affairs, concept – of the world and philosophical outlook were all forged in the organization. Nearly all of them received training in one or more special courses for teachers and functionaries. Many attended political schools of several months duration, organized by the party in Canada. Some received advanced political training in the USSR at the Lenin School in Moscow, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv or the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Kiev. Most of them had not had any work experience other than as full time functionaries in the communist movement. All had served loyally and with dedication, if not always with distinction. The communist movement had been their life and they identified with it completely.

Their background and training thus rendered them incapable of an objective approach to and an unbiased analysis of the Soviet phenomenon. They saw in the USSR only "great achievements" but failed to see the lack of human rights and the great cost in human lives and human suffering at which Soviet progress was achieved.

Their outlook was further coloured by the incessant Soviet propaganda which championed the USSR as a brotherhood of nations.

They loudly condemned penetration, political or economic, of any region or country by a capitalist state as imperialism, but they could not equate Russian economic, political and cultural domination of Ukraine with foreign penetration of other countries.

Furthermore, they were hypnotized by the apparent size, might and prestige of the post-war Soviet colossus. Its huge military build-up appeared to them to give it superiority while the United States, which was popularly denounced as "imperialist", seemed to be losing the initiative and the power of offensive.

Even though they were highly disturbed by Russification in Ukraine, they noted compensating factors. Nearly all Ukrainian territories had been united. There were notable achievements in education, culture and the arts, marked advances in industrial development and a significant rise in the standard of living, with convincing promises of further progress in the not too distant future.

Furthermore, the failure of nationalist attempts to promote Ukrainian independence and Ukraine's inability to defend her sovereignty against aggressors in the past, led them to conclude that there was no alternative for Ukraine but union with Russia.

Other factors merged with the ideological to bind the Ukrainian pro-communists, and especially their leaders, to the USSR. In Canada they received invitations to the annual November 7 anniversary receptions at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa where they mingled with foreign diplomats and influential members of Canadian society and public life.

There were also annual invitations from the USSR to the Ukrainina pro-communist organizations in Canada to send delegations for holiday tours and special invitations to various anniversary celebrations and commemorations. All expenses were paid from the moment such delegates set foot on the Soviet ship or plane in Montreal, until they landed in Canada on their return trip. Once in the Soviet Union, their sponsors, usually the Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, looked after all the arrangements. They were taken on tours and visits to places of interest, to the theatres, operas and museums. The top leaders received the kind of attention that is accorded only representatives of foreign powers.

There were also a number of fringe benefits. Each year several younger members of the AUUC were enrolled in various educational institutions in Kiev. Special arrangements were made in hospitals, sanatoria and resorts to accommodate those members who required medical treatment or rest.

Several of the leaders, Krawchuk, Macievich and Weir, had articles and books published in the Soviet Union. The honoraria and royalties were deposited in the authors' savings accounts. The roubles could not be converted into hard currency and taken abroad but the recipients could use them on their succeeding visits to purchase Soviet paintings, expensive Persian lamb coats for their wives and other rare and expensive items.

There were other special rewards for faithful service to the communist movement and loyalty to the USSR. In 1961, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of his death, the Shevchenko State Jubilee Committee in Ukraine issued a special bronze medal to honour those who had made a contribution to the popularization of the works of the poet. The medal was awarded to Weir for his translation of selected poems of the great bard which had been published in the USSR;[4] to Hannah Polowy, author of a 112-page booklet on Shevchenko's boyhood;[5] to Mary Skrypnyk, who translated Shevchenko's 750 line poem, *Kateryna* (Catherine) into English; and to Krawchuk who wrote a short treatise on the inter-

est of Ukrainians in Canada in Shevchenko, which was published in Kiev.[6] Krawchuk also received the Halan prize "for better journalistic works".[7]

Other leaders received rewards of a different nature. As the international communist movement, behind which loomed the Soviet Union, expanded after the war, it spawned numerous front organizations designed to advance Soviet interests. Their frequent international gatherings – peace assemblies, women's gatherings. Slav congresses – attracted delegates from all continents and all walks of life, among them men and women of world renown.

Delegates from the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations never missed a gathering (Table XII). The fact that they, men and women of obscure and underprivileged backgrounds and undistinguished careers, mingled and rubbed shoulders with people of great distinction could not help but inflate their impoverished egos. Shatulsky described the impression made on him by the All-Slav Congress, held in Belgrade in December 1946, to which he and Weir were delegates:

> They gave us a reception such as we could never have expected and which can never be forgotten. At the state reception in the Officers' Building in Belgrade present were Marshal Tito, Marshal Tolbukhin, generals, men of science and the most outstanding figures of the Slav peoples.[8]

A young Ukrainian Canadian who spent four years as a student in Kiev described his summer holidays. He and a friend flew from Kiev to Simferopil in the Crimea and then proceeded by bus over the mountain roads to Yalta. After a month at a rest home, they went by boat to the famous resorts of Sochi and Sukhumi in Georgia. As their plane flew between the mountains of the Caucasian Range, they could see the peaks above them. After visiting interesting sights in Tbilisi they travelled by the military highway, along which stood ancient castles, to Gori, Stalin's birthplace. On the return trip the two vacationers spent three days at Sukhumi and visited Ritsa Lake, 3,000 feet above sea level in the mountains. From there they flew back to Kiev, stopping on the way at Rostov-on-the-Don and Kharkiv.[9]

George Solomon, who was on the AUUC delegation to Ukraine in 1954 to participate in the 300th anniversary celebrations marking the union of Ukraine and Russia, described the overwhelming reception the delegates were accorded. Their tour covered numerous cities in Russia and Ukraine. In Lviv they were hosts at a special

gathering in the university and welcomed at the city hall by the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee. In Kiev they were invited to the special jubilee session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. John Boychuk, the leader of the delegation, addressed the session. The members of the group were also guests at a state banquet.[10]

Boychuk, accompanied by Tim Buck, was again in Kiev in November 1957 for the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. They were met at the station by several members of the CC of the CPU, among them Petro Shelest, the First Secretary.[11]

In the summer of 1962, John Boyd, then editor of the *Canadian Tribune*, described with great relish to a small group his trip to Moscow that spring. The occasion was *Pravda*'s fiftieth jubilee celebration to which editors of Communist Party newspapers from around the world had been invited.

Between the seminar sessions, which lasted several days, they were treated to a visit to a nuclear power plant, a sight-seeing trip down the Moscow-Volga canal and box seats at a performance of the Bolshoi Ballet.

Each day the editors were wined and dined. As a climax to the celebration, they were hosted at a banquet in one of the Kremlin palaces. An army of waiters, one to every three guests, served a twelve-course dinner. The china and silverware were imprinted with the Soviet state emblem in 22-karat gold. The dozen hand-cut crystal goblets before each diner were kept filled from a seemingly inexhaustible supply of choice cognacs, wines and liquers.

After dinner the guests were treated to an hour-long, off-the-cuff and off-the-record speech by Khrushchov. Following that, they all retired to a magnificent hall for more toasts and speeches at which Boyd was invited to offer a toast on behalf of Canadian communists. During the evening the Canadian editor was honoured by a ten-minute interview with Khrushchov, as well as brief informal chats with Khrushchov's wife, with Suslov, Ponomaryov, Voroshilov and other Soviet state and party dignitaries.[12]

Other Ukrainian communists were accorded similar recognition and given equally lavish receptions. Having failed to achieve distinction elsewhere, these leaders were overwhelmed by the attention they received. But perhaps even more decisive in influencing their attitudes and behaviour toward the USSR, were their Soviet business connections.

Table XII

SOME INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST-SPONSORED GATHERINGS ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES AND MEMBERS OF THE AUUC AND WBA

Date	Gathering	Place	Delegates
1946 Dec.	All Slav Congress	Belgrade	Shatulsky Weir
1949 April 20–25	World Peace Congress	Paris	Boychuk
1949 Sept. 5–10	All American Congress of Partisans of Peace	Mexico City	Weir
1950 Nov. 16–21	Second World Congress of Partisans of Peace	Sheffield–Warsaw	Korol Boyd
1951	Youth Festival	Berlin	Skrypnyk Berketa Dobrowolsky
1952	Asian-African Peace Conference	Peking	Boyd
1952 Dec. 12	World Congress of the Peoples for Peace	Vienna	Krenz
1953 Aug. 26	Third World Congress of Women	Copenhagen	Helen Weir
1955 June 22–29	World Peace Assembly	Helsinki	Kateryna Stefanitsky
1955 July 7	World Congress of Mothers	Lusanne	Kateryna Stefanitsky
1957 July 7	Sixth World Youth Festival	Moscow	92 young Ukrainians

1957 Sept. 1–10	International Congress of Slavists		Weir
1958 June 1–6	Fourth Congress of Women for Peace	Vienna*	
1958 July 16–22	World Congress for Disarmament and International Cooperation	Stockholm	
1958	Fourth Congress of Slavists	Moscow	Weir
1960 April 21–24	International Assembly of Women for Full Disarmament	Copenhagen	Helen Weir
1962 July 9–14	World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace	Moscow	Maria Prokop Krenz
1963 Jan. 11–15	Inter-American Congress of Women	Havana	Mary Skrypnyk
1965 June 24–29	World Congress of Democratic Women	Moscow	
1965 July 10–15	World Congress for Peace National Independence and General Disarmament	Helsinki	Korol
1969 June 14–17	World Congress of Women	Helsinki	Maria Prokop
1969 June 21–24	World Assembly for Peace	East Berlin	
1971 May 13–16	World Assembly for Peace	Budapest	Korol
1972 March 11–13	World Assembly for Peace and Independence of People of Indo-China	Versailles	
1973 Oct. 25–31	World Congress of Peace Forces	Moscow	Korol Hrynchyshyn
1975 Oct. 20–24	World Congress for International Womens Year	Berlin	

*The names of the AUUC representatives to some gatherings were not available to the author.

The Ukrainian communist leaders first established commercial relations with the USSR in 1955 when they founded *Ukrayinska Knyha* as a local business enterprise operating under a Metropolitan Toronto license. Among those who have been on the board of directors are Peter Krawchuk, Stanley Ziniuk, Mary Skrypnyk, Mary Prokop, Michael Korol and others.[13] They were given a monopoly on the export of parcels to the USSR, and in return were obliged to collect import duties for the Soviet government on the parcels they forwarded. Thus, although they were Canadian citizens, domiciled in Canada and operating a business on Canadian soil, the directors became agents of the Soviet government, collecting Soviet custom duties.

Ukrainians in Canada, both pro-communists and nationalists, were anxious to assist their relations in Ukraine. Parcels moved in a steady stream and *Knyha* prospered. Sub-agencies were established in a number of localities, among them Montreal, Hamilton, Sudbury and the Lakehead.[14] Branches were also opened in several others.

In Winnipeg *Ukrainska Knyha* was registered in March 1956 and incorporated under the Partnership Act of Manitoba by Michael Mokry, the provincial organizer of the AUUC, and others. The partnership was dissolved in December 1959 and the enterprise was re-registered in February 1960 as Globe Trade Limited with Anthony Bilecki as president and Michael Seychuk as secretary. It was again re-registered in July 1965 as *Ukrainska Knyha* with a third partner, Raymond Dowhopoluk.[15] From Winnipeg *Knyha* set up a branch in Saskatoon in 1958 and an agency in Regina.

Knyha opened branches in Edmonton and Calgary in 1957. On May 5, 1960 it was incorporated provincially as a private and limited company with a capitalization of $20,000. The application was signed by George Solomon and William Demchuk who became directors along with Mike Kotyk and Dmytro Ursuliak, local AUUC activists.[16] In 1969, all the leading AUUC personnel in Alberta and several of the more prominent Edmonton activists were listed as shareholders (Table III).

A Vancouver branch of *Knyha* was opened in 1957 and incorporated provincially on August 29, 1960 as Globe Export and Import Limited by John Dubno, the provincial secretary of the AUUC, and John Chitrenky, the teacher in the Vancouver temple, as joint owners. The authorized capital was $50,100.[17]

Table XIII

SHAREHOLDERS OF UKRAINSKA KNYHA IN EDMONTON, THEIR OCCUPATIONS AND THE NUMBER OF SHARES OWNED BY EACH IN 1969

Name of Shareholder	Occupation	Number of Shares
Nick Alexiewich	Businessman	10
John Alexiewich	Businessman	10
William Chomyn	Businessman	35
Olga Chomyn	Housewife	10
Alex Shewchuk	Businessman	60
Emma Shewchuk	Housewife	10
Louise Solomon	Housewife	10
Marshall Diachuk	Businessman	35
Eileen Makowecki	Housewife	10
Helen Lezanski	Housewife	10
George Solomon	Businessman	100
Mike Kotyk	Retired	50
Dmetro Ursuliak	Retired	50

Source: Province of Alberta, Department of Consumer Affairs, Records, File: Ukrainska Knyha.
Note: Nick Alexiewich was provincial organizer of the AUUC; William Chomyn was a music teacher in the labor temple in Edmonton; Marshall Diachuk was an employee of East-West Travel.

After tourist travel had been established with the USSR, the Ukrainian communist leaders formed another enterprise, Globe Tours, to provide travel facilities for those wishing to visit the Soviet Union. It became the official representative of the Soviet travel agency, *Intourist,* and obtained a monopoly on group travel to Ukraine.

Globe Tours was incorporated in Manitoba in November 1959 as a private company under the name of Globe Trade Limited. Bilecki became president and Seychuk, secretary. In 1963, Dowhopoluk replaced Seychuk as secretary. The name of the company was changed in 1963 to Globe Trade and Travel.[18]

In Vancouver, Globe Tours began operating as Global Tours in 1961, changing to Globe Tours in 1963. It was registered provincially on August 17, 1966, as ARX Travel Agency Limited. (The *A* stood for *A*nthony Bilecki, the *R* for *R*aymond Dowhopoluk and the *X* for Chitrenky. The letters *ch* are pronounced like

ch in the Scotch *loch* and written in Ukrainian like the Latin *X*). Its capitalization was $10,000.[19]

Travel between Canada and the USSR was expanded in 1966. By agreement between the two countries, Air Canada obtained landing rights in Moscow and *Aeroflot* in Montreal. The Soviet ocean liner, *Pushkin,* established a regular route between Leningrad and Montreal. Simultaneously, Globe Tours expanded. It opened an office in Edmonton in 1966 under the name, East-West Travel, as a branch of Globe Tours in Winnipeg.

The same year Globe Tours obtained a license to operate in Ontario. Two years later the company moved its headquarters to 962 Bloor Street West in Toronto. The board of directors was enlarged to include Anthony Bilecki as president, Ray Dowhopoluk as vice-president and manager, Stanley Ziniuk as secretary, Peter Krawchuk as treasurer and Michael Seychuk, Michael Mokry, Peter Prokop, John Chitrenky and George Solomon as directors.[20]

In most localities *Knyha* and Globe Tours conducted their operations from buildings purchased by the Ukrainian communist leaders for that purpose. In Toronto they formed a syndicate, Taras Investments, on October 31, 1957 "to invest in real estate mortgages and other securities". The charter was issued to Stanley Ziniuk, Peter Krawchuk, Mary Prokop, Mary Skrypnyk and John Boychuk who became the directors. Boychuk also held the position of manager. The authorized capital of the private company was $300,000. On October 7, 1966, Boychuk retired as manager and on December 29, 1967, as director. He was replaced by Harasym who also became vice-president.[21]

Taras Investments acquired a two-storey structure at 1162 Dundas Street West on March 19, 1959 for the sum of $51,663.50 in cash.[22] The building housed *Ukrayinske Zhyttia* and its print shop. It had also been the location of *Knyha.* On May 26 of the same year, Taras Investments purchased, for $83,515.56, the two-storey building at 962 Bloor Street West to which *Knyha* had moved in 1958.[23] On May 13, 1969, Taras Investments added a third property to its holdings, the building at 1066 Bloor Street West where Globe Tours was located. The purchase price was $130,000.

In February 1970, *Knyha* purchased a parcel of land at the rear of 43 Northumberland Street, adjoining to the rear of Knyha's building at 962 Bloor West, for a cash sum of $12,500, from the

Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. In December 1971, after erecting a warehouse on the property, *Knyha* sold the land, building and fixtures to Taras Investments for $103,000 in cash.

In Winnipeg, property was acquired for carrying on the operations of *Knyha* and Globe Tours by the syndicate, Zem Holdings Limited, which was registered as a private company on October 9, 1959. Its capital stock was valued at $50,000.[26]

Zem Holdings purchased a two-storey brick building at 613 Selkirk Avenue on January 6, 1960, and a one-storey adjacent structure at 615 Selkirk on May 12, 1961.[27] The first was occupied by *Knyha,* the second by Globe Tours.

In 1967, the board of directors consisted of Andrew Chamchuk, former employee of the printshop of *Ukrayinske Slovo,* president; Constantine Kostaniuk, vice-president; Alice Bilecki (wife of Anthony), secretary; Dolly Mokry (wife of Michael and sister of Anthony Bilecki) and Roman Bilecki (brother of Anthony), members of the board.[28]

In Edmonton, *Knyha* purchased on May 6, 1960 the two-storey stucco building at 10803-95th Street in which it had been carrying on its operations since 1957.[29] East-West Travel was originally located in the same building as *Knyha.* In 1968 it moved to rented quarters at 10553 A-97th Street.

On November 2, 1967 Global Export-Import in Vancouver purchased a building at 2643 East Hastings Street[30] where *Knyha* and Globe Tours had been located since 1961. The market value of the property was assessed at $40,000. In November after selling the property at 2643, Chitrenky and Dubno acquired another building at 2677 East Hastings to which *Knyha* and Globe Tours had moved in 1968. The assessed market value was $43,376.[31]

Having established themselves in the business world through Soviet monopolies, the Ukrainian communist leaders proceeded to extend their operations. George and Louise Solomon, John and Alice Chitrenky and Walter and Eileen Makowecki embarked on a new business venture. On January 6, 1971, they formed in Edmonton, on the basis of equal partnership, a holding company, Chimo Holdings Limited.[32] On December 14 of the same year, a new enterprise, Heritage Foods Limited, was incorporated in Alberta. The largest shareholder, 256 of the 500 shares, was Chimo Holdings.[33] Heritage Foods produced Ukrainian cheese dumplings (pyrohy or pero-

gis) with a machine which had been imported from the USSR. The product was retailed through various food stores and super markets.

What emerged was a modest but increasingly prosperous commercial empire, owned and operated by the Ukrainian communist leaders. Thus they functioned in a double role, as leaders of pro-communist organizations participating in a movement for the economic transformation of Canadian society and as business men operating profitable enterprises through hired labour. While the organizations they led declined in strength and influence, the establishments they operated prospered in an almost inverse ratio. As a consequence, their roles as business men increased. Furthermore, as the financial resources of their organizations decreased, they became more and more dependent on the income from their business enterprises. Some even went on pension and others resigned from full-time positions in the pro-communist organizations to devote more time to their business ventures.

In all fairness to the Ukrainian communist leaders, especially Prokop and Krawchuk, it must be noted that while they enjoyed the privileges and luxuries afforded by the Soviet connection, and the incomes from their enterprises, they were also deeply disturbed by Russification in Ukraine, irritated by the refusal of Soviet authorities to issue visas to members to visit their native villages and disillusioned by the Soviet regime. Most of them sincerely wished to use their influence to mitigate Soviet policies, especially in regard to the Ukrainian language and culture. After having visited the USSR as a delegation to study the national question in 1967, they even issued a report that was uncomplimentary to Soviet policies. It was intended as friendly criticism. They soon learned that Soviet leaders did not appreciate criticism, friendly or otherwise.

As soon as their report had aroused the displeasure of the Soviet hierarchs, the Ukrainian communist leaders took steps to reestablish good relations. They opposed Russification but not to the extent that it might cause the loss of *Knyha* and their privileges.

In the crisis over the invasion of Czechoslovakia, they took a stand critical of Soviet action at closed meetings, but they would not risk an open rift with the Soviet authorities by taking a public stand. Moreover, they muzzled the whole organization so that the membership could not publicly express its views on Soviet policies lest this jeopardize their business relations with the USSR. In the past they had held open meetings on current issues and welcomed

discussion. After the report they resorted to closed meetings for members only, where discussion was limited. They also refused to publish articles by members on Russification and the invasion of Czechoslovakia lest it annoy Moscow authorities. The result was an almost complete paralysis of what was left of a once formidable organization.

It might have been possible to revitalize the organization by taking a bold public stand. The leaders could have thrown open the pages of the press and given the disillusioned members an opportunity to express their opinions. They could have reprinted policy statements on human rights of the Italian, British and other communist parties and materials from dissident sources in Ukraine, without comment, "for the information of the readers".

Such a stand would have attracted the support of many Ukrainians from the nationalist camp. Since about one third of the membership of the CPC was made up of Ukrainians, it would have caused a serious crisis in the party. In Ukraine it would have given added courage to those carrying on the uneven struggle for the preservation of their language, culture and human rights. It might even have forced the Soviet authorities to slow down, at least temporarily, their relentless drive of Russification.

If they were afraid to go that far, they could have stopped publishing misleading articles in their press glorifying the Soviet regime. If they could not muster the courage to print what was true, they could at least, have refrained from publishing what was false.

The promises given the party delegation to investigate the national question in Ukraine in 1967, that "errors" in the application of the national policy would be corrected, had not been carried out. Shelest who gave the promise was himself purged and new measures were introduced to speed up the process of Russification. Among them was a program designed by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine to expand and intensify the teaching of Russian in the Ukrainian schools to prepare the youth of Ukraine for the world of work.[34] Apparently young Ukrainians entering the labour force in Ukraine must be proficient not in Ukrainian but in Russian. This is brazen admission of Russification. There has not even been a whimper of protest from the Ukrainian communist leaders.

But to remain silent was not sufficient. Any failure to publish articles lauding the USSR and its glorious leader, or even any sign of diminishing enthusiasm for the Soviet regime in the pro-com-

munist press could court loss of their special privileges. Their business interests not only blinded them to many of the iniquities in the USSR, but prompted them to curry favour with Soviet authorities. They even denounced current victims of Soviet repression, just as they had joined the Soviet chorus of condemnation of the innocent victims of the purges in the 1930s.

They were well aware of the injustices in Ukraine, but they were also aware that their security and "fringe benefits" depended wholly on their Soviet connection and the continued goodwill of the Kremlin authorities. Any public criticism of Soviet policies could cut off their privileges and the source of their salaries and render them ordinary citizens in search of employment. Not a bright prospect especially when one is long past one's prime. Consequently, Krawchuk denounced the nationalists as "implacable enemies of Ukraine and its people" and wrote books condemning the nationalists which were published in the USSR and used against those who were fighting Russification in Ukraine.

When the Berlin Wall was erected by the East Germans to stem the human flow from East to West Germany, Hrynchyshyn wrote that it was erected as an obstacle "to the penetration of various criminal elements, subversives and saboteurs from West to East Berlin for various acts of sabotage". Two years later, after spending a year at the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine where students often discussed among themselves the famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, Hrynchyshyn could deny in an editorial that there had ever been a famine.*[35]

Another communist leader, Anthony Bilecki, who received income from an enterprise that employed hired labour, was able to declare in Ukraine while on a visit, that: "Together with the working class of Canada we fought and continue to fight for the improvement of the fate of the worker." He described the fate of the Ukrainian immigrants in Canada as: "exploitation, harsh treatment and hard work in the most isolated corners of Canada".[36] The remarks, of course, were meant for Soviet consumption only and appeared in a local paper that was not allowed out of the USSR.

*After the editorial appeared, a prominent Kiev citizen expressed amazement. "He was here a whole year," the person remarked to the author, and asked: "Did he not learn anything?"

The Ukrainian communist leaders had been born into poverty. All their lives they had struggled and worked for and dreamed of a brighter future. With the establishment of *Knyha* and Globe Tours the struggle was over, the bright future with its material security had arrived. In addition, there were numerous fringe benefits such as all-expenses-paid trips to the USSR, sumptuous receptions hosted by Soviet officials, holidays at plush summer resorts at Yalta and Sochi with the Soviet elite and other luxuries for which they developed a strong taste. For some the trips were frequent and their duration lengthy.

The paramount interest of the Ukrainian communist leaders was to maintain their privileges and their security which they have striven to safeguard at all costs. In June 1971 the branch managers of Globe Tours met and suggested that the enterprise be reorganized and branch managers and select qualified personnel be given shares in the enterprise. The directors reacted immediately to protect their interests by firing Dowhopoluk, the general manager, who had presented the proposal to the directors. The branch managers and most of the other personnel then resigned and joined rival travel agencies taking most of the business with them.

In 1975, the Ukrainian communist leaders were faced with a more serious threat to their security. *Vneshposiltorg,* the Soviet agency through which parcels were forwarded to the USSR, informed *Knyha* that in future all shipments of parcels from Canada would be terminated. Several Ukrainian communist leaders immediately flew to Moscow and a compromise agreement was worked out. The Soviet import duties were increased considerably and the *podarok* system whereby Canadian citizens could purchase Soviet goods for their relatives in the USSR for Canadian currency was limited.

The revolt in Globe Tours disrupted its operations for some time. The increase in Soviet import duties on parcels from Canada and the limitations on the purchase of Soviet goods for citizens of the USSR curtailed *Knyha's* transactions.

The reasons for the Soviet intention to terminate the shipment of parcels from Canada, which would have meant the death of *Knyha,* are not clear. What price the Ukrainian communist leaders paid for a stay of its execution is also a mystery. However, there have not been any more protests against Russification or other

Soviet policies and the Ukrainian pro-communist press faithfully follows the Soviet line.

In spite of these developments, both operations continued to be viable, providing profits for their owners, while the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations continued to decline. Their cultural ensembles were no longer the best in the Ukrainian community. There were no more classes in Ukrainian language, literature or history in the labor temples, and the amphitheatre at Palermo, "the only one of its kind in Canada", has been dismantled and the hollow where it was located has been filled in. The Ukrainian pro-communists could no longer stage mass festivals or draw record crowds.

Meanwhile, one by one, the Ukrainian communist leaders disposed of the many halls that were built by the honest labour and sweat of thousands of eager hands. The proceeds that rolled into the National Executive Committee swelled their trust and pension funds to provide them with security in their retirement. However, philosophically and morally, the Ukrainian communist leaders were left completely disillusioned. The organizations they had built rolled on inexorably to their inevitable end. They themselves ended up betrayed by the regime they had supported, disenchanted with the ideology they had propagated and condemned by the followers they had misled, by the Ukrainian patriots they had defamed and by the Ukrainian nation whose subjugation and oppression they had so shamelessly acclaimed.

The Balance Sheet

A number of factors had converged to provide the fertile soil for the emergence and growth of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations. Among these, the most important were the hardships, chauvinism and discrimination which non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants had encountered in the new land, their inability to integrate into Canadian society because of language, and the existence of a militant ideology with its promise of a brighter future.

Launched by a small group of alienated immigrants, these organizations, the largest pro-communist ethnic associations in Canada, expanded quite rapidly into seven of Canada's ten provinces to play a significant role in the Ukrainian community and the communist movement. The hierarchical structure which was patterned on the model of the communist parties, the unquestioning acceptance of decisions by the membership from above and the strict discipline, facilitated the pursuit of their aims.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations flourished under one name or another for over four decades, in a society to whose destruction they were dedicated. There were occasional strains in relations with Canadian authorities: they were banned during the early period of the war and generally kept under careful surveillance. Otherwise, the attitude of the authorities toward them was marked by considerable restraint. They could not have existed, much less functioned and flourished, without the degree of tolerance accorded by Canadian society to associations holding politically deviant views.

Their struggle to maintain themselves was greatly facilitated by their flexibility and adaptibility. The Ukrainian pro-communists supported calls for revolution in Canada, but when it suited their purpose they became staunch partisans of democracy. In support of their cause, they could even involve sincere but often naive men of wealth and influence who would be the first to suffer under a communist regime.

In spite of numerous factors that favoured their growth, the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations attracted only a small percentage of the Ukrainian population to their cause. Nevertheless, they exerted a significant influence on their ethnic community. They were a source, although not by any means the only one, of constant discord among Ukrainians. Their polemics with the nationalists engendered considerable ill-feeling and consumed a great

deal of time, energy and resources which could have been expended to more positive ends. They also compromised the Ukrainian community with the Canadian public and the authorities by their support of communist causes.

They are a classic example of how small organizations, whose members are motivated by a crusading ideology, bound by strict discipline and led by dedicated cadres, are able to exert an influence and play a role out of all proportion to their numbers. For decades they formed the main base of the Communist Party of Canada and were the chief source of its funds.

This close association made it easier for the party to recruit Ukrainians than Anglo-Saxons into its ranks. The relationship created certain problems for the party. Since a large proportion of the members and the middle echelon leaders was Ukrainian, there was a tendency in the party to concentrate on Ukrainian affairs. The high proportion of Ukrainian and East European members left the party open to charges of being made up of "foreigners".

Their involvement in the Canadian communist movement drew the Ukrainian pro-communists out of their isolation in the labor temples into the whirlpool of Canadian radical politics. In the new environment they were forced to learn English which speeded up their assimilation into Canadian life.

The very nature of their ideology involved the Ukrainian pro-communists in relations with the USSR and Soviet Ukraine, which they tried to exploit to advance Soviet influence and promote the communist cause in Canada. In spite of Soviet moral and other support, they failed to maintain their war time momentum when the Soviet Union was popular. After the Cold War set in, and especially after the Ukrainian displaced persons began to arrive, identification with the USSR progressively isolated them from the Ukrainian community, narrowed their base of support and limited their field of action. Personal contact with Soviet reality after tourist travel to the USSR was arranged, caused widespread disillusionment among the members and seriously affected their attitudes to the Soviet regime.

One of the main issues was Russification. The Ukrainian pro-communists had always believed that the Ukrainian language and culture had full freedom to flourish in Soviet Ukraine. Their disenchantment over Russification, when they became aware of it, is an indication that national feelings are a potent force. This strong attachment to national traditions contributed to the development

of a crisis within their organizations and imposed serious strains on their relations with Soviet authorities and the CPC.

The fortunes of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations were considerably influenced, especially in the period following World War II, by their close association with the USSR. Their popularity varied almost directly with the rise and fall of the prestige of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the USSR's sudden loss of popularity after 1945 was not the decisive factor in their decline. The Soviet Union had been no less in disfavour during the early 1930s when the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations flourished. The un-unpopularity of the USSR and later the disillusionment of many members with what they saw in Ukraine were factors that only speeded up the irreversible trend.

The primary cause of the post-war decline of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations was the disappearance of the conditions that originally provided such a strong incentive for their emergence and growth – poverty and alienation, combined with the absence of sources of new recruits and the assimilation of the Canadian-born.

As the members prospered and achieved security in the boom years following World War II, their interest in the organizations waned. As their proficiency in English increased, the need for language associations decreased. Consequently, there was a gradual loosening of bonds with less frequent attendance at meetings and a general waning of organizational activity, followed by the inevitable drop in membership. Thus organizations that had flourished in periods of hardship declined in times of prosperity.

The decline was aggravated by the failure to hold the Canadian-born. Prior to 1939, the Ukrainian pro-communists had placed a great deal of emphasis on the propagation of the Marxist ideology, participation in the communist movement and the extension of communist influence among Anglo-Saxons. Although the Ukrainian language was taught in the schools, there was little insistence on its cultivation and use. The maintenance of national traditions was almost completely neglected. The Ukrainian language was regarded merely as a means of transmitting ideas to those they were attempting to influence.

Consequently, the labor temples produced a whole generation which did not attach any great importance to the maintenance of their Ukrainian identity. Some, embarrassed by the pro-communist views of their parents and wishing to avoid public ostracism, even tended to disassociate themselves from their Ukrainian roots.

What made the decline of their organizations more painful and galling for the Ukrainian pro-communists was the fact that the nationalists, whose early demise they had so confidently predicted, continued to flourish. They held their members through greater identification with national traditions and religious customs. They were also able to recruit new members from the ranks of the refugees who began arriving in 1947. Through the cultivation of the language and culture and the preservation of their national identity, the nationalist youth acquired a deeper interest in Ukrainian history, customs and traditions. As a result, a larger proportion of them remained in the various nationalist organizations than was the case of their opposite numbers in the AUUC.

The changed conditions after World War II had a profound affect on the Ukrainian communist leaders. They had begun their careers full of enthusiasm for and faith in the Soviet regime. Within three decades, these men and women who had consecrated themselves to the communist cause, were occupying themselves with the promotion of their private interests and compromising their integrity. From revolutionaries they became business men and customs agents of a foreign power.

Their loss of integrity was gradual; it began during the years of dedication. The Ukrainian communist leaders regarded themselves as the guardians of the ultimate truth, their cause as sacred and the use of any means for its realization as justified. Consequently, all objectivity was abandoned. From this it was but one step to the rejection and the distortion of facts in the interest of their ideology. They failed to realize that a just cause does not need base means for its realization and that the end does not *justify* the means, but rather that the means too often *determines* the end.

Compromise in the interests of ideology led to other compromises. When they came face to face with Soviet reality, they were disillusioned by it. Ukraine was not an equal member in a voluntary federation and the Ukrainian language and culture were not free to flourish. They had been misled and betrayed by the very regime they had so faithfully supported. What they believed to be a new Utopia turned out to be an old tyranny. In the meantime, they were introduced to many fringe benefits in the USSR, while in Canada they had obtained Soviet monopolies. To condemn Russian domination of Ukraine would have caused the loss of these privileges. The Ukrainian communist leaders were faced with a

choice between principle and their personal comforts and material interests. Betrayed and disillusioned themselves, they did not have the courage to expose the Soviet regime to their followers. Instead, they continued to write glowing reports on the USSR and to promote the cults of Khrushchov and Brezhnev as they had promoted the cult of Stalin.

The character of the relations of the Ukrainian communist leaders with the USSR gradually changed. Their frequent trips to the Soviet Union, originally intended to provide ideological inspiration, eventually turned into holiday excursions. As their business relations increased, their ties with the USSR became commercial.

They attempted to justify their compromises and relations with the Soviet authorities with the argument that it was imperative to maintain contacts with Ukraine. Contacts were essential, but it was a question of the purpose for which these contacts were maintained. It may be necessary to make personal compromises in the interests of a nation, but it is traitorous to compromise a nation in one's personal interests.

The attitude of the Ukrainian communist leaders to Canadian society also changed. When they had been outside Canadian society, they condemned everything bourgeois. Gradually they acquired a grasp of the language. During the war, in the campaigns on behalf of their temples, they were introduced to and mingled with many of Canada's elite. As *Knyha* and Globe Tours prospered, their material position improved. From total outsiders, they gradually became part of Canadian society. Middle class standards were no longer alien to them. Bourgeois concepts became wholly acceptable.

Consequently, since the depression, which they had so confidently predicted, did not develop, the Ukrainian communist leaders diverted their efforts from transforming capitalist society to partaking of its benefits, by graduating into the ranks of those they had previously so vociferously condemned. As a result, men who began as revolutionaries opposed to the exploitation of labour, became themselves employers of hired hands.

As they achieved security, their militancy waned and their attitude towards Ukrainian culture changed. It was no longer to be a means of promoting revolutionary consciousness but to be cultivated for its own sake and merged in the general stream of Canadian culture. Preoccupation with their business interests left them little

time for work in the organizations they led. Furthermore, disillusionment with the great Utopia which they had worshipped, destroyed their incentive to promote the communist cause.

Instead, they turned to days gone by when they had possessed faith and integrity, and dwelt on past achievements and past glories, dreaming of the time when they had commanded a large following and shared the public spotlight. Their celebrations of past events developed into an anniversary syndrome and became the highlight of their activities.

An ever dwindling number of faithful rank and file members continued to maintain the shrinking pro-communist organizations, but, unlike the leaders, they did not receive free holiday trips to the USSR or profits from *Knyha* and Globe Tours to compensate for their years of sacrifice and their disillusionment.

The history of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations includes an even stranger irony. The Ukrainian communist leaders had opposed the admittance to Canada of Ukrainian refugees. Yet these very refugees, among them some of the staunchest Ukrainian patriots, have become the very people whose patronage of *Knyha* has made possible the profits that are used to promote the communist cause in Canada and to enrich the Ukrainian communist leaders. The latter can draw considerable consolation from their failure to stop the influx of the Ukrainian displaced persons into Canada.

In drawing up a balance sheet one should not overlook the contributions of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations in raising the educational and cultural level of their members, or the positive work with children and youth, especially in the field of music. Nor can the fact be ignored that, during the depths of the depression, many who had lost all hope received a faith that carried them through the years of economic crisis. It was also the members of these organizations who laid the foundations for many of the unions in the mass production industries in Canada.

On the other side of the ledger are huge debits. Many lives and vast resources were wasted in promoting hatred and strife. Activities and programs were carried out, not for their intrinsic value, but as a means to an end. Culture was exploited in the interests of an alien and a hostile ideology; the various ensembles were merely resources used to promote the communist cause and win support for the USSR.

In the 1930s, blinded by faith, the leaders and their followers joined the Soviet chorus of condemnation of the innocent victims of Russian imperialist policy and lauded the Russian presence in Ukraine as a new deliverance. After becoming disillusioned with the Soviet regime and losing their faith, the leaders continued their support of Ukraine's subjugation and the persecution of new generations of her finest sons, motivated no longer by faith, but by personal privileges and economic interests. There can be no greater betrayal than the support of oppression of one's own nation by a foreign aggressor and especially when this is done for personal gain.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations, once dynamic and aggressive, have lost their drive and their support. Those who received their early training in music in the labor temples have deserted them. The halls have gradually been sold and adapted for other uses. The unions which the Ukrainian pro-communists initiated are thriving, but under non-communist leadership. The political party that they largely built, which was to lead the workers in the building of a Soviet Canada, has declined to a handful of diehards. Unlike European communist leaders, who have attempted to adapt to new conditions with Eurocommunism, the Ukrainian communist leaders in Canada were unable to act independently because of the business interests that bound them to the USSR.

The Ukrainian pro-communist organizations emerged in the unsettled period after World War I; they are coming to an end in the unstable atomic age, their members disillusioned with the Soviet regime, a phenomenon presently characteristic of many communists and pro-communists throughout the world.

The experience of the Ukrainian pro-communists in Canada has a lesson. Through the ages, individuals have dreamed of an ideal society. However, life is a constant struggle. As old problems are solved, new ones emerge in endless succession. As it progresses, society undergoes continuous conflicts of interests and experiences periodic upheavals. Since it does not remain static, there can never be an ideal society. Utopia is an illusion. Those who follow prophets on a crusade to transform an existing order into an ideal society can only end up, as have the Ukrainian pro-communists, betrayed and disillusioned.

Notes

Chapter I

1. *Ukrayinska Radianska Entsyklopedia* (Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia), 15, 1964, pp. 108 and 220.
2. Petro Krawchuk, *Piatdesiat rokiv sluzhinnia narodu* (Fifty Years of Service to the People), Toronto: *Ukrayinske Zhyttia,* 1957, p. 61.
3. M. Volynets, *Piatnadtsiat rokiv TURFDim, 1918-1933* (Fifteen Years of the ULFTA, 1918-1933), Winnipeg: Labor-Farmer Publishing Association, 1933, p. 33.
4. *Iliustrovany Robitnycho-Farmersky Kaliendar na Perestupny Rik 1928 (Illustrated Labor-Farmer Calendar for the 1928 Leap Year), Winnipeg:*
4. *Iliustrovany Robitnycho-Farmersky Kaliendar na Perestupny Rik 1928* (Illustrated Labor-Farmer Calendar for the 1928 Leap Year), Winnipeg: Labor-Farmer Publishing Association, n.d., p. 332.
5. Petro Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli* (In the New Land), Toronto: National Executive Committee, Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, 1958, p. 303.
6. *Zvit i Rezolutsiyi Semoyi Konventsiyi Robitnychoho Zapomohovoho Tovarystva* (Report and Resolutions of the Seventh Convention of the Workers Benevolent Association), n.d., p. 4.
7. Volynets, op. cit., p. 67.
8. Ibid., p. 167; *Robitnytsia,* April 15, 1930.
9. *Sprovozdanie z Chetvertoho Zyizdu Stovaryshenia Ukrayinsky Robitnychy Dim, 15, 16 i 17 sichnia, 1923 roku* (Report of the Fourth Convention of the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association, January 15, 16 and 17, 1923), p. 3.
10. Peter Krawchuk, *We and Ukraine: Address to the 13th National Convention AUUC, April 12-15, 1968,* mimeographed, n.d., pp. 6-8.
11. Ibid., p. 10.
12. *NH,* March 22, 1939.
13. *The Worker,* January 10, 1931.
14. *URV,* January 27, 1931.
15. *Za Bilshovyzatsiyu,* I, No. 2, (June 1931): p. 38.
16. *Zvit i Resolutsiyi Dvanadtsiatoho Zyizdu . . . 15-20 Lypnia, 1931,* p. 6.
17. Ibid., p. 36.
18. *URV,* May 14, 1931.
19. Interview with Stewart Smith.
20. *Zvit Odynadtsiatoho Zyizdu . . .* Data on a separate sheet.
21. *Zvit Piatnadtsiatoho Zyizdu . . .* p. 8.

22. *Zvit Dvanadtsiatoho Zyizdu* . . . p. 26.
23. *Zvit Trynadtsiatoho Zyizdu* . . . p. 34.
24. *NAM,* VIII, No. 11(November 1951). p. 461.
25. The number deported from Canada as "communist agitators" in 1931 was 16, in 1932 – 49, and in 1933 – 13. The total number of all deportees in 1931 was 4,248 and in 1932 – 4,484. There is no classification according to nationality. *PAC,* Records of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, RG 26, Vol. 16, File: Communist Agitators, 1931-1937.
26. Interview with Nicholas Oliynyk.
27. *Visti* (News), Kiev, December 11, 1934.
28. *Narady Ukrayinskykh Robitnycho-Farmerskykh Masovykh Orhanizatsiy, 11-ho bereznia, 1935 roku* (Deliberations of the Ukrainian Labor-Farmer Mass Organizations, March 11, 1935), p. 32.
29. *Pravda,* Winnipeg, March 16, 1936.
30. Macievich stated that "about 60,000 adults belong to our organizations or read our papers". The senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, May 29, 1946,* Ottawa, 1946, p. 48.
31. Volynets, op. cit., p. 173.

Chapter II

1. *Clarion,* November 11, 1939.
2. Interview with Stewart Smith.
3. *Canada Gazette,* Government Notice, November 21, 1939.
4. Ibid., Vol. LXXIII, No. 50 (June 8, 1940): 3860.
5. Ibid., No. 53, June 20, 1940, 4029.
6. Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953, p. 495.
7. *Narodna Gazeta,* March 19, 1944.
8. Besides the Ukrainians, only one other member of a pro-communist language organization was interned, Joseph Nyerki, a Hungarian.
9. Krawchuk, *Na Novity zemli,* p. 303.
10. *Zh i S,* August 23, 1971.
11. *UZh,* March 19, 1942.
12. The call was issued as a separate leaflet.
13. *CT,* July 2, 1941.
14. *UZh* October 9, 1941.
15. Ibid., December 28, 1944.
16. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .* , p. 49.

17. *UZh*, August 6, 1942.
18. Ibid., November 13, 1941.
19. *CT*, March 7, 1942.
20. Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 11 (March 6 and 9, 1942): 1,094 and 1,117. Henceforth cited as *Debates*.
21. *TS*, July 18, 1942.
22. Ibid., October 14, 1942.
23. Canada, House of Commons, *Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, July 7, 1947*, Ottawa, 1947, p. 323. Henceforth cited as *Standing Committee*.
24. Ibid., p. 324.
25. *Debates*, I (February 10, 1942): 467; V (July 5, 1943): 4334.
26. Ibid., V (July 15, 1943): 8446-8447.
27. Ibid., 4862.
28. Ibid., 4859.
29. *TS*, January 10, 11 and 12, 1944.
30. *Standing Committee*, p. 548.
31. J. Boychuk, *Borotba za lehalizatsiyu TURFDim* (The Struggle for the Legalization of the ULFTA), Report to the XVII Convention of the ULFTA, January 11-12, 1946, Winnipeg, Manitoba; p. 20.
32. PAC, *Orders-in-Council*, RG2, Series I, Vol. 2257.
33. Boychuk, op. cit., p. 22.
34. Ibid., p. 20.
35. The article was reprinted in full in the *CT*, January 17, 1942.
36. *TS*, August 7, 1943; *G&M*, November 6 and 20, 1943.
37. Cited in *CT*, February 27, 1943.
38. *G&M*, September 22, 1942.

Chapter III

1. *UZh*, March 21 and June 26, 1946; February 6, 1947; December 1, 1949.
2. *UC*, July 15, 1948.
3. *UZh*, August 25, 1949; November 26, 1953.
4. Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli*, pp. 324-325. His claims for the number present were not corroborated by independent sources.
5. *UZh*, July 12, 1945.
6. *US*, July 11, 1945.
7. Ibid., July 4, 1945.
8. Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli*, pp. 331-334.

9. *UZh*, September 19, 1946 and January 16, 1947; *Narady i ukhvaly tretioho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 50.
10. *Nardy i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .*, p. 58.
11. Ibid., pp. 69, 85-99.
12. *Narady i ukhvaly tretioho . . . zyizdu . . .*, pp. 109-110.
13. *UZh*, July 5, 1951.
14. See John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968, p. 85.
15. *UZh*, July 3, 1952.
16. Kolasky, op. cit., pp. 156-157.
17. *US*, February 12, 1947.
18. Ibid., November 28, 1945.
19. *UZh*, May 8, 1947.
20. Ibid., June 10, 1948.
21. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .*, p. 19.
22. *UC*, January 15, 1948.
23. *UZh*, October 18, 1956.
24. Ibid., July 12, 1961.
25. *US*, July 16, 1952.
26. *UZh*, April 15, 1948.
27. *US*, November 6, 1957.
28. Ibid., November 2, 1960.
29. *UZh*, January 21, 1959.
30. Ibid., January 31, 1959.
31. Ibid., January 31, February 28, May 2, November 7, 1959.
32. Ibid., November 23, 1957.
33. Ibid., April 19, 1961.
34 *US*, August 9, 1961; *UZh*, August 16, 1961.

Chapter IV

1. *NSh*, October 11, 1938.
2. Ibid., March 30, 1939.
3. Ibid., December 12, 1940.
4. *CT*, July 12, 1941.
5. This was quite typical of communist reasoning. *URV* even had an editorial entitled, "He Who Is Against the Communists Is For Fascism", August 13, 1935.

6. Davies, op. cit., pp. 87-152.
7. *A Program and a Record,* Saskatoon: Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, 1943, p. 29.
8. Debates, (February 2, 1942): 234-235.
9. The resolution was published in leaflet form.
10. Debates, (February 13, 1942): 577.
11. *New York Times,* February 25, 1943.
12. *Memorandum of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to the Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs,* Canada, March 23, 1943.
13. *UZh,* April 8, 1943.
14. *PAC,* Records of the Department of External Affairs, RG2, GI, Vol. 1896, File 165 — 39c, Part III, N.A. Robertson: Memorandum for the Prime Minister.
15. Bohomolets' article appeared simultaneously in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on May 20, 1943. Tychyna's appeared in *Izvestia* on May 14, 1943.
16. *Windsor Star,* April 1, 1943.
17. Elmore Philpott, *Vancouver Sun,* June 25, 1943.;
18. *CT,* May 22, 1943.;
19. *US,* June 23, 1943.;
20. *First Ukrainian Canadian Congress, June 22, 23 and 24, 1943, Winnipeg; Ukrainian Canadian Committee,*
Ukrainian
Ukrainian

17. Elmore Philpott, *Vancouver Sun,* June 25, 1943.
18. *CT,* May 22, 1943.
19. *US,* June 23, 1943.
20. *First Ukrainian Canadian Congress, June 22, 23 and 24, 1943, Winnipeg;* Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1943, pp. 42, 175 and 177.
21. *WFP,* June 23, 1943.
22. *US,* July 7; *UZh,* July 15, 1943.
23. *Debates* (March 26, 1945): 229.
24. *Edmonton Bulletin,* March 28, 1945.
25. Harold L. Weir, *Edmonton Journal,* March 29, 1945.
26. *US,* April 11, 1945.
27. *WFP,* June 2, 1943.
28. *US,* February 28, 1945.
29. Ibid., February 2 to March 8, 1944.
30. Ibid., May 17 to June 14, 1944.

31. From interviews with two former officials of the UCC who prefer to remain anonymous. The argument was not valid since Tracy Philipps, who worked with the Canadian government, assisted in the organization of the congress.
32. Wasyl Swystun, *Ukrayinske pytannia v svitli voiennykh podiy* (The Ukrainian Question in the Light of Developments During the War), Winnipeg, n.d., pp. 3-16.
33. Based in the author's numerous discussions with Swystun.
34. *Kanadysky Farmer,* March 12, 1945.
35. *UZh,* March 8,; *US,* March 14, 1945.
36. Interview with Marshall Romanick.
37. Wasyl Swystun, *Ukrayinska derzhava i Ukrayintsi poza mezhamy Ukrayiny* (The Ukrainian State and Ukrainians Outside the Borders of Ukraine), Toronto, n.d. pp. 2 and 18.
38. , *Ukrayinska derzhava v svitli istoriyi i tradytsiyi* (The Ukrainian State in the Light of History and Tradition), n.d., pp. 3, 7 and 18.
39. *Memorandum to the Canadian Delegation at the United Nation Conference on International Organization from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee,* Winnipeg, Canada. The document was accompanied by a covering letter dated May 18, 1945.
40. Cited by B.T. Richardson in a despatch from San Francisco, *WFP,* May 23, 1945.
41. *UZh,* June 5, 12 and 27, 1947.
42. *Time,* June 18, 1951.
43. *UZh,* March 8, 1956.
44. Ibid., September 21, 1957.
45. Ibid., March 1, 1956.
46. *WFP,* July 4, 1956.
47. *Time,* July 16, 1956.
48. *UZh,* December 26, 1956; June 19, 1957; August 24, 1959.
49. Marko Terlytsia, *Pravnuky pohani* (Evil Great-Grandsons). Kiev: Radiansky Pysmennyk, 1960; *Natsionalistychni skorpiony* (Nationalist Scorpions), Kiev: Radiansky Pysmennyk, 1963.
50. "Ukrayinsky patriotyzm v Kanadi na slovakh i na dili" (Ukrainian Patriotism in Canada in Word and in Deed), *UZh,* June 15-September 21, 1957; *US,* June 12-September 4, 1957. The booklets were published under the same title, Winnipeg: Tovarystvo Kulturnoho Zviazku z Ukrayinou, 1957; Kiev: Radiansky Pysmennyk, 1957. The Soviet edition was 20,000 copies.
51. Canadian edition, p. 104.

Chapter V

1. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 2nd ed., New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963, pp. 50-51, 58, 79-83.
2. Petro Mirchuk, *Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya 1942-1952,* (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1942-1952), Munich, 1953, p. 30.
3. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 156.
4. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, *Meni 70* (I Am Seventy), Paris-Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1970, pp. 59-60.
5. Wolf-Deitrich Heike, *Ukrayinska Dyviziya "Halychyna"* (The Ukrainian Division "Galicia"), Toronto-Paris-Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1970, pp. 96, 251.
6. *Novy Shliakh.* January 2, 1946.
7. Mylena Rudnytska, ed., *Zakhidna Ukrayina pid Bolshevykamy* (Western Ukraine Under the Bolsheviks), New York, 1958, pp. 451-492.
8. Cited in Mark Elliot, "The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-1947", *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (June 1973): pp. 258-259.
9. Cited in Julius Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present,* Old Grenwich: Devin-Adair, 1973, p. 23.
10. Elliot, op. cit., pp. 253, 256, 269.
11. D.Z. Manuilsky, *The Truth About Ukrainian Refugees in Germany,* Toronto: National Executive Committee, Ukrainian Canadian Association, 1945, p. 13.
12. The appeal was reprinted in *US,* February 16 and 23, 1949.
13. Stanley W. Frolick, "A Lost Page of History", *Review,* 1974, p. 23.
14. *Debates* (September 24, 1945): Ottawa, 1946, 384-386.
15. Frolick, op. cit., p. 28.
16. *Second Ukrainian Congress, Toronto, Ontario, June 4, 5, 6, 1946,* Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, n.d.
17. *US,* August 22, 1945.
18. Ibid., November 7, 1945; *UZh,* March 28, 1946.
19. See footnote 11.
20. *US,* November 28, 1945.
21. *Edmonton Journal,* February 5, 1946.
22. *US,* September 4, 1946.
23. *TS,* December 21, 1945.
24. Wasyl Swystun, *Ukrayina i skytaltsi* (Ukraine and the Refugees), Toronto, n.d., p. 11.
25. Ibid., p. 61.

26. *WFP*, February 26, 1946.
27. The Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, Wednesday, 29th May 1946*, Ottawa, 1946, p. 34.
28. Ibid., pp. 38-41, 54.
29. Ibid., p. 51.
30. Ibid., p. 53.
31. Ibid., p. 43.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 44.
34. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
35. The Senate, *Journals of the Senate of Canada*, 87 (14 August, 1946): 497.
36. *Resettlement of Displaced Persons*: Memorandum by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Representing Canadian Citizens of Ukrainian Origin to the Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, and the Government of Canada, September, 1946.
37. Order-in-council PC 2180 granted authority for admission of 5,000 displaced persons. Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch, *Annual Report*, 1947-1948, Ottawa, 1948, p. 239.
38. *US*, April 23, 1947; *UZh*, April 8, 1948.
39. *US*, July 30, 1947.
40. Over 1,200 former inmates of German concentration camps registered with the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners between 1945 and 1947. There is no data on how many Ukrainians perished. P. Mirchuk, *V nimetskykh mlynakh smerty* (In the German Death Mills), New York-London: Ukrayinsky Souz Politychnykh Viazniv, 1957, pp. 217-236.
41. *UZh*, December 2 to 23, 1948.
42. Ibid., April 3 to May 8, and October 9 to November 6, 1947.
43. *UZh*, March 4, 1948.
44. Ibid., March 4 and 11, 1948.
45. Ibid., December 23, 1948.
46. Ibid., December 23, 1948.
47. *CT*, December 27, 1948.
48. *US*, October 26, 1949.
49. *CT*, December 19, 1949.
50. Evstakhiy Zahachevsky, *Beliaria, Rimini, Angliya*, Chicago-Munich: Bratstvo Kolyshnikh Voiakiv I UD UNA, 1968, pp. 234-292.
51. *Debates*, 4 (June 15, 1950): 3696.
52. *TS*, October 10, 1950.
53. *Pacific Tribune*, January 4, 1952.

54. *UZh*, February 19, 1953.
55. *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho . . . zyizdu . . .*, pp. 127-128.

Chapter VI

1. Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli*, p. 30.
2. The call was issued as a four-page leaflet.
3. *UZh*, August 29, 1946.
4. *US*, October 10, 1945; August 9, 1950; October 12, 1955.
5. *UZh*, September 29, 1955.
6. Ibid., March 5, 1958.
7. The announcement was carried as an advertisement in *US*, October 17, 1945.
8. *Time*, July 22, 1949.
9. Ibid.
10. *US*, May 15, 1948.
11. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . .zyizdu . . .* pp. 72-79.
12. *UZh*, March 3, 1965.
13. The incident was related to the author by some of those who were present.
14. The information was obtained from a person who was at the reception.
15. Krawchuk, *Na noviy zemli*, p. 334.
16. *UZh*, May 29, 1947.
17. *US*, November 12, 1947.
18. Ibid., September 18, 1949.
19. *UZh*, September 26, 1951.
20. *US*, December 22, 1954.
21. Ibid., June 16, 1954, quoting *Pravda*.
22. Ibid., October 30, 1957, quoting a CBC news broadcast of October 24.
23. Ibid., September 6, 1961.
24. Andrew Markow, a Canadian who studied at the conservatory in Kiev, writing in *News From Ukraine*, No. 6, March, 1966.
25. *UC*, June 15, 1951; *US*, June 11, 1952 and August 26, 1953.
26. *US*, June 6, 1956.
27. Ibid., March 18, 1964.

Chapter VII

1. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 68.

2. *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 102.
3. The members are listed in the reports of the WBA conventions.
4. *UZh,* February 6, 1957.
5. Ibid., April 10, 1963.
6. *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 158; *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 110.
7. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 73; *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 116; *Narady i ukhvaly siomoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 36; *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 10.
8. *Narady i ukhvaly tretioho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 119.
9. *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 11-12 and 75.
10. *US,* December 3, 1958 and September 6, 1961.
11. *US,* September 7, 1960.
12. *Ukrayinske Slovo* had eleven full-time employees: four editors, one administrator, two assistants and four in the print shop. *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 30.
13. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 100.
14. *Toronto Telegram,* April 1, 1946.
15. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 45.
16. *US,* February 13, 1952.
17. Ibid., October 23, 1957.
18. *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 107.
19. *UC,* February 1, 1948; *UZh,* August 5, 1948.
20. *Narady i ukhvaly tretioho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 73.

Capter VIII

1. *CT,* July 12, 1941.
2. Ibid., November 1, 1941.
3. Interview with Stewart Smith.
4. Letter from general manager of Globe Tours: To All Members of the Policy Committee and Branch Managers, June 25, 1971.
5. *CT,* May 21, 1947; *UZh,* January 7, 1947 and September 25, 1957.
6. *US,* February 14, 1945; *UZh,* June 7, 1945, August 11, 1948 and July 9, 1953.
7. *US,* July 7, 1948, September 21 and 28, October 5, 1949 and December 3, 1952.
8. *CT,* August 28, 1943.
9. Ibid., August 13, 1943.

10. Interview with J.B. Salsberg.
11. *CT*, July 2, 1956.
12. Ibid., October 29, 1956.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., October 29, 1956.
15. Ibid., December 3, 1956.
16. *NAM*, March 1957, p. 14. Cited after Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975, p. 264.
17. *Zh i S*, August 15, 1965 and July 15, 1968.
18. An Italian communist newspaper was launched in Toronto in 1977 just as in 1919 a Ukrainian radical paper was founded in Winnipeg. But while the latter had the support of several thousand Ukrainians, the Italian paper has the support of only a handful of Italians.
19. *NAM*, March 1957 p. 15. Cited after Avakumovic, op. cit., p. 202.

Chapter IX

1. Peter Krawchuk, *We and Ukraine: Address to the 13th National Convention of the AUUC, April 12-15, 1968*, Toronto, Mimeographed, (n.d.), p. 12.
2. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 93.
3. John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification*, Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968, pp. 26-39.
4. Petro Krawchuk, *Shistsot dniv na Ukrayini* (Six Hundred Days in Ukraine), Toronto: Ukrayinske Zhyttia, 1950, pp. 82 and 93.
5. *US*, October 23, 1957.
6. Wasyl Swystun, *Moia druha poyizdka na Ukrayinu* (My Second Trip to Ukraine), Winnipeg: Canadian Society for Cultural Relations With Ukraine, 1959, p. 7; *UC*, February 1, 1955.
7. *UZh*, July 27, 1957; *US*, August 7, 1957.
8. *WFP*, July 7, 1961.
9. *UZh*, October 27, 1955.
10. *US*, March 26, 1952. Vldimir Belaev, *Staraia krepost*, Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiya, 1953.
11. *US*, June 24, 1953; *UZh*, June 25, 1953.
12. *Radianska Ukrayina*, April 13, 1960.
13. *UZh*, September 21, 1960.
14. *Ukrayinsky Holos*, December 7, 1960-March 29, 1961.
15. *Kanadysky Farmer*, February 5, 1962.
16. "Report of the Delegation to Ukraine", *Viewpoint 5* (January 1968): 13. Henceforth cited as Report.

17. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 28.
18. Ibid., p. 32.
19. *Zh i S,* June 19, 1967.
20. *CT,* March 6, 1967.
21. *V zyizd pysmennykiv Ukrayiny* (Fifth Convention of the Writers of Ukraine), Kiev, 1967, pp. 15-28.
22. Report. Subsequent material on the delegation is drawn from the Report.
23. See footnote 3.
24. *Telegram,* February 17, 1968.
25. *Zh i S,* February 10, 1969.
26. Ivan Dzyuba, *Internatsionalizm chy Rusyfikatsiya?* (Internationalism or Russification?), Munich: Suchasnist, 1968; Vyacheslav Chornovil, *Lykho z rozumu* (The Misfortune of Intellect), Paris: Persha Ukrayinska Drukarnia u Frantsiyi, 1967.
27. The account is based on notes taken by the author at the meeting.
28. *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 72.
29. *Viewpoint* 5 (November 1968): pp. 20-22.
30. *Communist Viewpoint* I (September-October 1969): pp. 57-61.
31. *CT,* October 9, 1968.
32. *Narady i ukhvaly odynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 12.
33. *We and Ukraine,* p. 12.
34. *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 54-55.
35. *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 8 and 14.
36. Ibid., p. 50.
37. *CT,* April 1, 1968.
38. Quoted by Boyd in *CT,* April 1, 1968.
39. *CT,* September 24, 1968.
40. An incomplete report of the meeting was published in the Toronto *Telegram,* September 26, 1968.
41. *CT,* September 24, 1968.

Chapter X

1. *Narady i ukhvaly tretoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 69; *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 49; *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 25.
2. *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 40; *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 77, 79; *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 34.
3. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 33-34, 77.

4. *US,* January 23, 1946; *Narady i ukhvaly deviatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 55; *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 34, 78; *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 40; *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 45.
5. *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 18.
6. *US,* February 20, 1952; *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 18; *Narady i ukhvaly trynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 25.
7. Anthony Bilecki, William Repka, Mitch Sago, *Friends in Need: The WBA Story,* Winnipeg: Workers Benevolent Association 1972, p. 243.
8. Ibid., pp. 267-269.
9. Swystun expressed his disillusionment to a prominent citizen of Kiev with whom the author was acquainted.
10. *Zh i S,* December 27, 1968.
11. Ibid., January 6 and 27, 1969.
12. *UZh,* October 21, 1954.
13. Ibid., February 6, 1957.
14. *Narady i ukhvaly druhoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 19; *PAC,* Department of Citizenship and Immigration, RG26, Vol. 20, File: Foreign Language Press, 1946-1961; *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 76; The 1969 and 1973 statistics were obtained from confidential sources.
15. *UC,* May 15, 1950 and July 15, 1954; *PAC,* op. cit.
16. *UC,* November 1, 1961 and June 15, 1962.
17. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 82.
18. *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 56.
19. *UC,* May 15, 1960 and November 1, 1961.
20. *Report of the 22nd Convention, Workers Benevolent Association of Canada,* March 23, 24, 25 and 26, 1966, Winnipeg; n.d., p. 34.
21. *Narady i ukhvaly tretoho . . .zyizdu . . .* p. 58.
22. *US,* October 13 and November 3, 1948; *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 96; *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 25; *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 18; *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 27 and 61.
23. *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 166; *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 21. The data for 1969 was divulged at the Fourteenth Convention of the AUUC in 1970, but was not published.
24. *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 59; *UC,* November 15, 1949; *Narady i ukhvaly piatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 73; *Narady i ykhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 79, 107.
25. *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 48.
26. *US,* March 16, 1949; *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 21.
27. *Narady i ukhvaly chetvertoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 84.

28. *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 67, 85, 87; *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 22-23.
29. *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 40; *Narady i ukhvaly odynadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 54; *Narady i ukhvaly chotyrnadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 46.
30. *Kanadski Ukrayintsi dopomahaiut narodam Radianskoho Soiuzu* (Canadian Ukrainians Aid the Peoples of the Soviet Union), Toronto: National Executive Committee of the Association of Canadian Ukrainians, 1941-1943.
31. *HP,* September 9, 1946.
32. Ibid., March 19, 1946.
33. Ibid., December 31, 1946 and January 18, 1947.
34. Both letters and Boychuk's reply were published in *HP.* May 10, 1947.
35. The statement of claim was published in *HP,* March 26, 1949.
36. *UZh,* May 22, 1947.
37. M.N. Cependa, *Chervona dolarokhapna perezva* (The Red Dollar-Snatching Escapade) Smokey Lake: Holos Pravdy, 1949, p. 57.
38. *Narady i ukhvaly shostoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 23.
39. *Narady i ukhvaly desiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 71; *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . . zyizdu . . .* pp. 55, 86.
40. *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 16.
41. *Narady i ukhvaly dvanadtsiatoho . . .zyizdu . . .* pp. 26-26; *Narady i ukhvaly vosmoho . . . zyizdu . . .* p. 30.
42. *NAM,* December 1956, Cited after Avakumovic, op. cit., p. 181.
43. *CT,* June 18, 1956.
44. *US,* April 4, 1956.

Chapter XI

1. The material came from a Ukrainian dissident in Kiev with whom the author was acquinted.
2. A Vancouver newspaper reported that: "Some AUUC spokesmen maintain that, the association's efforts to retain friendly relations with the Old Country do not signify approval of the present Ukrainian government — just a desire to keep in touch with friends and relatives there. *Province,* June 24, 1967.
3. *News From Ukraine,* No. 6, March 1966.
4. Taras Shevchenko, *Selected Works,* trans. and ed. John Weir, Moscow: Progress Publishers, n.d.
5. Hannah Polowy, Little Taras: *The Story of Taras Shevchenko's Boyhood,* Toronto: The Ukrainian Canadian, 1961.

6. Petro Krawchuk, *Taras Shevchenko v Kanadi* (Taras Shevchenko in Canada), Kiev, 1961.
7. *UC*, December 1, 1967.
8. *US*, December 26, 1946.
9. *UC*, December 15, 1952.
10. *UZh*, June 3 and October 21, 1954.
11. Ibid., December 7, 1957.
12. The author was present at the gathering.
13. Metropolitan Toronto Licensing Commission, *Records*, File: Ukrainska Knyha.
14. Advertisements of these sub-agencies appeared in *UZh*, April 3, 1957.
15. Province of Manitoba, Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, *Records*, File: *Ukrainska Knyha.*
16. Province of Alberta, The Registrar of Companies, *Records*, File: *Ukrainska Knyha.*
17. British Columbia Gazette, Vol. L, No. 36, September 8, 1960, p. 1662.
18. Province of Manitoba, Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, *Records*, File: Globe Tours.
19. British Columbia Gazette, Vol. LVI, No. 34 (August 25, 1966): p. 2089.
20. Province of Ontario, Department of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Companies Branch, *Records*, File: Globe Trade and Travel.
21. Ibid., File: Taras Investments; Ontario Gazette, Vol. XC (November 23, 1957): p. 2438.
22. Land Registry Office for the Division of Toronto, *Abstracts.*
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Province of Manitoba, Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, *Records*, File: Zem Holdings.
27. City of Winnipeg, Land Titles Office, *Abstracts.*
28. Province of Manitoba, op. cit.
29. Province of Alberta, North Alberta Land Registration District, *Abstracts.*
30. Vancouver Land Registry Office, *Abstracts.*
31. Ibid.
32. Province of Alberta, Registrar of Companies, *Records*, File: Chimo Holdings Limited.
33. Ibid., File: Heritage Foods Limited.
34. Radianska Osvita (Kiev), November 11, 1978.
35. *US*, August 23, 1961 and October 23, 1963.
36. *Vilne Zhyttia* (Free Life), May 28, 1973.

Appendices

Appendix I

Ukrainian Communists Interned between 1940 and 1942

Bailiuk, Anton	Moysiuk, D.
Bidulka, M.	Navis, John
Bilecki, Tony	Perozek, John
Bileski, Andrew	Petrash, D.
Billings(ky), Joseph	Pindus, N.
Biniowski, M.	Popowich, Matthew
Boychuk, John	Procak, J.
Boychuk, T.	Prokop, Peter
Chopowich, T.	Repka, W.
Dubno, John	Sago, Mitchell
Hucaluk, N.	Sawiak, M.
Kerewega, Peter	Shatulsky, Matthew
Kolisnyk, Wasyl	Stefanitsky, I.
Kostaniuk, Myron	Weir, Charles
Krawchuk, Peter	Weir, John
Krechmarowsky, M.	Woytyshyn, A.
Lysets, P.	

Source: *CT*, November 22, 1941.

Appendix II

Dates of the Conventions of the AUUC

1 June	4 – 6, 1942	8 January	23 – 26, 1958
2 January	12 – 15, 1946	9 March	3 – 6, 1960
3 February	12 – 15, 1948	10 July	2 – 5, 1962
4 January	25 – 29, 1950	11 April	9 – 12, 1964
5 February	14 – 17, 1952	12 March	19 – 23, 1966
6 February	18 – 21, 1954	13 April	12 – 15, 1968
7 February	2 – 5, 1956	14 March	5 – 8, 1970

Note: The first two conventions were held in Winnipeg, the others were held alternately in Toronto and Winnipeg.

Appendix III

Location and Number of Ukrainian Labor Temples in 1940

Nova Scotia (2)

Dominion, Sydney

Quebec (2)

Lachine, Val D'Or

Ontario (22)

Ansonville, Crowland, Fort Frances, Fort William (203 Ogden St.), Fort William (1001-3 W. Frederica), Hamilton, Kenora, Kirkland Lake, Oshawa, Ottawa, Port Arthur, Sault Ste-Marie, South Porcupine, St. Catherines, Sudbury, Thorold, Timmins, Toronto (281 Royce Ave.), Toronto (300 Bathurst St.), Townsend (Norfolk Col), Windsor (1457 Drouillard Rd.), Windsor (3466 Harris St.)

Manitoba (20)

Arborg, Brandon, Broad Valley, Brokenhead, Brooklands, East Kildonan, East Selkirk, Gimli, Hyak, Kilkenny, Libau, Medika, Portage la Prairie, Shorncliffe, Springwell, St. Boniface, Transcona, The Pas, Winnipeg (591-3 Pritchard Ave.), Winnipeg (197 Euclid Ave.)

Saskatchewan (12)

Alticane, Bienfait, Carrot River, Kamsack, Moose Jaw, North Battleford, Veregin, Prince Albert, Prud'homme, Regina, Saskatoon, Swift Current

Alberta (39)

Anton Lake, Bellevue, Bellis, Brosseau, Bucacz, Cadron, Calgary, Darling, Downing, Coleman (E.), Edmonton, Glendon, Goldsbro, Gratz, High Prairie, Hillcrest, Hillock, Hines Creek, Lake Eliza, Lanuke, Lethbridge, Lincoln, Medicine Hat, Mundare, Myrnam, Nestow, Newcastle, New Kiev, North Kotzman, Pakan, Sexsmith, Shandro, Slawa, Spedden, Spruce Valley, Stry, Ukalta, Waugh, Whitelaw

British Columbia (4)

Canyon, Lulu Island, Mount Cartier, Vancouver

Total 101

Source: Return tabled in the House of Commons on June 9, 1943. PAC, House of Commons, Unpublished Sessional Papers, RG 14, D2, Vol. 452, Sessional Paper 285A.
Note: This does not appear to be a complete list of all the halls taken over by the Custodian. Boychuck stated (UZh February 8, 1945) that sixteen halls had been sold and ninety-two returned, making a total of 108. However, in addition, several other halls were not registered as property of the NEC of the ULFTA. Among them was the hall in Vernon, B.C. Since Boychuck reported earlier (UZh, June 22, 1944) that altogether the ULFTA had 114 halls, there must have been an additional six that were not registered with the NEC of the ULFTA.

Appendix IV

Chronology of Important Events

1919, Feb.	Ukrainian social democrats in Winnipeg completed the first Ukrainian labor temple in Canada.
" March.	The weekly, *Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty*, established in Winnipeg.
1922	The WBA founded.
1924	The ULFTA obtained a dominion charter.
1931, July 15-20.	Twelfth convention of the ULFTA resolved to make "a turn to the path of general revolutionary class struggle" initiated by the Comintern.
1935, January.	*Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty* became a daily.
" March.	Danylo Lobay broke with the Ukrainian pro-communist movement.
1939, July 15.	National Festival of Ukrainian Music and Dance staged in Toronto.
1940, June 4.	The government banned the CPC, the ULFTA and other organizations under the Defence of Canada Regulations.
1941, July 26.	Former members of the ULFTA launched the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland.
" August.	A Ukrainian pro-communist weekly, *Ukrayinske Zhyttia*, established in Toronto.
1943, Oct. 14.	Ban on the CPC and ULFTA lifted by order-in-council.
1945, February 18.	Swystun delivered in Winnipeg the first of a series of lectures in which he expressed his pro-Soviet stand.
" June 29.	Delegates of the Ukrainian SSR to the UN Conference in San Francisco stopped off at Edmonton and were hosted by Ukrainian communist leaders.
" June 30-July 1.	Ukrainian pro-communist Victory Festival in Toronto.
1946, January 13.	Swystun announced the formation of the Society for Cultural Relations with Ukraine.
" July 26-28.	Western Canadian Festival of Ukrainian Music, Song and Dance attended by guests from Kiev.
1947, September.	A semi-monthly paper in English, the *Ukrainian Canadian*, established in Toronto.
1948	Ukrainian displaced persons began attacking Ukrainian pro-communist meetings.
1950	Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries began sponsoring members of the AUUC for study in Kiev.

1951, June 30-July 1.	National Ukrainian Music Festival in Toronto and the unveiling in Palermo of the first monument of Shevchenko in Canada.
1952, June 28.	Opening of the Shevchenko Museum in Palermo.
1955, September.	Ukrainian communist leaders founded *Ukrainska Knyha.*
1956, October 23.	Ukrainian National Party Committee condemned the NEC of the LPP for its criticism of the CPSU.
1957, October 31.	Ukrainian communist leaders formed a real estate syndicate in Toronto, Taras Investments.
1958, October.	First Ukrainian tourist group visited Ukraine after World War II.
1959, March.	Ukrainian communist leaders established Globe Tours.
1961	Over 400 Ukrainian pro-communists visited Ukraine during the summer.
1965, November.	The two Ukrainian pro-communist papers merged.
1966, March 21.	Nicholas Oleniuk raised the question of Russification at the twelfth convention of the AUUC.
1967, March 30.	A CPC delegation left for the USSR "on a mission of inquiry . . . regarding the national question".
1968, January.	The delegation published its report.
" March 3.	Refusal of Soviet authorities to grant entry visas to members of the AUUC prompted Krawchuk to criticize the policy at a closed AUUC membership meeting in Toronto.
" April.	The thirteenth convention of the AUUC appealed to Pidhorny regarding the problem of visas.
"	Ukrainian communist leaders opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia at closed meetings.
1969, October.	Report of the delegation withdrawn by a plenum of the CC of the CPC over the opposition of Ukrainians.
1971	The Shevchenko Ensemble, at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto, incorporated as a separate group independent of the AUUC.
" January 6.	Ukrainian communist leaders formed a holding company in Edmonton, Chimo Holdings Limited.

Selected Bibliography

Although a great deal of material was read and used in the writing of this treatise, only the basic sources are included in the bibliography. Others, quoted in the text, are cited in the footnotes.

ARTICLES, BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

An Appeal for Justice, Civil Liberties Association of Toronto, 1944.

Avakumovic, Ivan, *The Communist Party in Canada*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.

Bilecki, Anthony, Repka, William and Sago, Mitch, *Friends in Need: The WBA Story*, Winnipeg: The Workers Benevolent Association of Canada, 1972.

Cependa, Rev. M. N., *Chervona Dolarokhapna perezva* (The Red Dollar-Snatching Escapade), Smokey Lake, Alberta: Holos Pravdy, 1949.

Davies, Arthur Raymond, *This is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler*, Toronto: Progress Books, 1945.

Elliot, Mark, "The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens 1944-1947", *Political Science Quarterly* 88, June 1973, pp. 253-275.

Frolick, Stanley W., "A Lost Page of History", *Review*, 1974.

Iliustrovany Robitnycho-Farmersky Kaliendar na Perestupny Rik 1928 (Illustrated Labour-Farmer Calendar for the 1928 Leap Year), Winnipeg: Robitnycho-Farmerske Vydavnyche T-vo, nd.

Kardash, William A., *Hitler's Agents in Canada*, Winnipeg, 1942.

Krawchuk, Petro, *Na noviy zemli* (In the New Land), Toronto: Tovarystvo Obiednanykh Ukrayinskykh Kanadtsiv, 1958.

, *Piatdesiat rokiv sluzhinnia narodu* (Fifty Years of Serving the People), Toronto: Ukrayinske Zhyttia, 1957.

Lobay, Danylo, "Komunistychny Rukh Sered Ukrayintsiv Kanady (The Communist Movement Among Ukrainians in Canada)", Kovbel, Semen (editor), *Propamniatna Knyha Ukrayinskoho Narodnoho Domu u Vinnipegu* (Jubilee Book of the Ukrainian People's Home in Winnipeg), Winnipeg, 1949, pp. 749-763.

_____, *Za disne vyiasnennia polozhennia na Radianskiy Ukrayini* (For a Valid Explanation of the Situation in Soviet Ukraine), Winnipeg-New York, 1935.

Shatulsky, M (Volynets, M.), *Piatnadtsiat rokiv TURFDim, 1918-1933* (Fifteen Years of the ULFTA, 1918-1933), Winnipeg: Robitnycho-Farmerske Vydavnyche T-vo, 1933.

Swystun, Wasyl, *"Ukrayinsky Patriotyzm" v Kanadi na slovakh i na dili* (Ukrainian Patriotism in Canada in Word and in Deed), Winnipeg: Tovarystvo Kulturnykh Zviazkiv z Ukrayinoiu, 1957.

CONVENTION AND OTHER REPORTS

Convention Reports of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians titled: *Narady i Ukhvaly* (Deliberations and Decisions), followed by the number of the convention and the date and place of the proceedings.

Convention Reports of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association titled: *Zvit* (Report), followed by the number of the convention and the date and place of the proceedings.

Convention Reports of the Workers Benevolent Association titled: *Zvit* (Report), followed by the number of the convention and the date and place of the proceedings.

Kanadski Ukrayintsi dopomahaiut narodam Radianskoho Soiuzu (Canadian Ukrainians Aid the People of the Soviet Union), Toronto: Kraievy Vykonavchy Komitet Tovarystva Kanadskykh Ukrayintsiv, 1941-1943.

Narady Ukrayinskykh Robitnycho-Farmerskykh Masovykh Orhanizatsiy u Vinnipehu, 11 bereznia, 1935 roku (Deliberations of the Ukrainian Labor-Farmer Mass Organizations in Winnipeg March 11, 1935), nd.

Report of the Delegation to Ukraine, *Viewpoint*, 5, No. 1, January 1968.

Stan TURFDim v mizhchasi 12 i 13 zyizdu vid chervnia 1931 r. do kintsia travnia 1932 r. (The State of the ULFTA in the Interval Between the 12th and 13th Conventions from June 1931 to the End of May 1932), nd.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

British Columbia Gazette, 1966.

Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration For the Fiscal Year Ended March 31*, for the years 1950 to 1954, Ottawa, 1951-1955.

Canada Gazette, 1939-1940.

Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, Ottawa, 1941-1947.

_____, *House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, May 30, 1947*, Ottawa, 1947.

Manitoba, *Report of the Superintendent of Insurance.* Annual reports for the years 1924-1963, Winnipeg, 1925-1964.

NEWSPAPERS

Holos Pravdy (Smokey Lake, Alberta) 1941-1950

Narodna Gazeta (Winnipeg) 1941

Narodna Hazeta (Winnipeg) 1937-1940

Pravda (Winnipeg) 1936-1940

Ukrainian Canadian (Toronto) 1947-1978

Ukrayinske Slovo (Winnipeg) 1943-1965

Ukrayinske Zhyttia (Toronto) 1941-1965

Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visty (Winnipeg) 1919-1937

Zhyttia i Slovo (Toronto) 1965-1978

Note: Occasional references to other newspapers and periodicals are credited in the text and the footnotes.

PUBLIC ARCHIVES AND RECORDS

City of Winnipeg, Land Titles Office, *Abstracts.*

Land Registry Office for the Division of Toronto, *Abstracts.*

Metropolitan Toronto Licensing Commission, *Records.*

Province of Alberta, North Alberta Land Registration District, Edmonton, *Abstracts.*

_____, Registrar of Companies, *Records.*

Province of Manitoba, Department of Consumer, Corporate and Internal Services, *Records.*

Province of Ontario, Department of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Companies Branch, *Reports.*

Public Archives of Canada, House of Commons, *Unpublished Sessional Papers,* 1943.

_____, *Orders-in-Council, 1939-1945.*

_____, *Records of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.*

_____, *Records of the Department of External Affairs.*

_____, *W.L.M. King Papers.*

Vancouver Land Registry Office, *Abstracts.*

SPEECHES

Boychuk, I., *Borotba za lehalizatsiyu TURFDim: Zvitna dopovid XVII Zyizdovi TURFDim iaky vidbuvsia 11-12 sichnia 1946 r. u Vinnipehu, Man.* (The Struggle for the Legalization of the ULFTA. Report to the SVII Convention of the ULFTA which Took Place January 11-12, 1946 in Winnipeg, Man.), Toronto: TsVK, TURFDim, 1948.

Krawchuk, Peter, *We and Ukraine: Address to the 13th National Convention AUUC, April 12-15, 1968,* (mimeographed), nd.

Swystun, Wasyl, *Moia druha poyizdka na Ukrayinu* (My Second Trip to Ukraine), Winnipeg: Tovarystvo Kulturnoho Zviazku z Ukrayinoiu, 1959.

_____, *Ukrayina i Skytaltsi: Dopovid vyholoshena v Pleihavz Teatri u Vinnipehu, Kanada, 13-ho sichnia 1945 roku* (Ukraine and the Refugees: Speech Delivered in Playhouse Theatre in Winnipeg, Canada, January 13, 1946), Toronto, nd.

———, *Ukrayinska derzhava i Ukrayitsi poza mezhamy Ukrayiny: Doklad vyholosheny v nediliu, 29 kvitnia, 1945 r., v zali im. Masaryka v Toronto, Ont.* (The Ukrainian State and the Ukrainians Beyond the Borders of Ukraine: Speech Delivered on Sunday, April 29, 1945 in Masaryk Hall in Toronto, Ont.), Toronto, nd.

———, *Ukrayinska derzhava v svitli istoriyi i tradytsiyi: Doklad vyholosheny v Memorail Hall v Edmontoni, Alberta, v nediliu, 12 serpnia* 1945 r. (Ukrainian State in the Light of History and Tradition: Speech Delivered in Memorial Hall in Edmonton on Sunday, August 12, 1945), Toronto, nd.

———, *Ukrayinske pytannia v svitli voiennykh podiy: Doklad vyholosheny v Memorial Hall v Edmontoni, Alberta, v nediliu, 12 serpnia* 1945 Question in the Light of Events of the War: Speech Delivered at the Prosvita Institute on Sunday, February 18, 1945), Winnipeg, nd.

———, *Voziednannia Ukrayiny – prysmerk skytalshchyni: Dopovid vyholoshena v Ukrayinskim Robitnychim Domi v Vinnipehu, 18 hrudnia 1949* (Unification of Ukraine – The Twilight of Refugeeism: Speech Delivered at the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Winnipeg on December 19, 1949), nd.

Manuilsky, D.Z., *The Truth About Ukrainian "Refugees" in Germany*, Toronto: National Executive Committee, Ukrainian Canadian Association, 1945.

Index

The Shattered Illusion
The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada

John Kolasky

The Shattered Illusion is an absorbing book which combines thorough scholarship, original research and dramatic narrative to tell the story of the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations in Canada as their fortunes have waxed and waned over three generations.

In his summation, John Kolasky says, "In spite of numerous factors that favoured their growth, the Ukrainian pro-communist organizations attracted only a small percentage of the Ukrainian population to their cause. Nevertheless, they exerted a significant influence on their ethnic community. They were a source, although not by any means the only one, of constant discord among Ukrainians. . . . They are a classic example of how small organizations whose members are motivated by a crusading ideology, bound by strict discipline and led by dedicated cadres, are able to exert an influence and play a role out of all proportion to their numbers."

The Shattered Illusion is a study in depth of one special element of the Canadian mosaic. But it mirrors vividly the larger concerns of the whole society. And it is rewarding reading on both counts.

John Kolasky is the author of four widely-read books on Ukraine and East European affairs. Resident in Toronto, he travels extensively and is a well-known speaker and lecturer.

ISBN 0 88778 190 X