

# Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine

AN ANTHOLOGY OF  
UKRAINIAN THOUGHT  
FROM 1710 TO 1995

Edited by Ralph Lindheim  
and George S.N. Luckyj

## TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE

This volume presents a collection of major Ukrainian documents dating from 1710 to 1995, with an informative introductory essay by volume editors Ralph Lindheim and George S.N. Luckyj. The texts, many of them translated for the first time and some perhaps unfamiliar even to Ukrainian readers, explore issues that intellectual history has traditionally set out to examine and explain. They touch on religious, philosophical, aesthetic, ethical, sociological, historical, and political ideas, and thereby illuminate significant attitudes, values, ideological commitments, and systems of thought that have crystallized at central moments in the development of Ukraine. Leading Ukrainian writers, scholars, intellectuals, political figures, and statesmen present their views on Ukrainian history, especially as it pertains to relations with Russia, and also discuss their society, literature, culture, and the slow but dramatic formation and growth of a national identity.

The texts gathered here reflect the transformation of Ukraine, in the face of formidable obstacles, into the modern nation that declared its independence in 1991. They serve, therefore, as a guide to a complex period of several hundred years, which, until now, has too often been considered only as a part of Russian history.

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Published in association with the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc.,  
New York.

Edited by RALPH LINDHEIM and  
GEORGE S.N. LUCKYJ

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History of Ukraine:  
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Published by the University of Toronto Press  
in association with the  
Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc.

Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1996  
Toronto Buffalo London  
Printed in Canada

ISBN 0-8020-0871-2 (cloth)

ISBN 0-8020-7855-9 (paper)



Printed on acid-free paper

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### Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Towards an intellectual history of Ukraine : an  
anthology of Ukrainian thought from 1710 to 1995

Articles translated from Ukrainian.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-8020-0871-2 (bound)      ISBN 0-8020-7855-9 (pbk.)

I. Ukraine – Politics and government.    2. Nationalism –  
Ukraine.    I. Lindheim, R. (Ralph).    II. Luckyj, George,  
1919– .    III. Naukove tovarystvo imeny Shevchenka.

DK508.4.T68 1996

947'.71

C96-931274-1

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University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial  
assistance to its publishing program of the  
Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council.



# Contents

PREFACE	ix
Introduction	3
1 The Bendery Constitution (abridgment)	53
2 Sermon on Royal Authority and Honour (excerpt) TEOFAN PROKOPOVYCH	65
3 A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia (excerpt) SEMEN DIVOVYCH	69
4 A Submission to the Legislative Commission (excerpt) HRYHORII POLETYKA	71
5 The Serpent's Flood (excerpt) HRYHORII SKOVORODA	74
6 <i>Istoriia Rusov</i> (excerpts)	82
7 Letters (excerpts) NIKOLAI GOGOL	88
8 The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People (excerpt) MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV	94
9 Preface to an Unpublished Edition of <i>Kobzar</i> TARAS SHEVCHENKO	101

# vi Contents

10	Epilogue to <i>The Black Council</i> PANTELEIMON KULISH	105
11	Two Russian Nationalities (excerpts) MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV	122
12	A Letter to the Editor of <i>Kolokol</i> MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV	135
13	The Science of the Human Spirit (excerpts) PAMFIL IURKEVYCH	146
14	The Lost Epoch (abridgment) MYKHAILO DRAHOMANOV	152
15	Polish Policy towards Rus' (excerpts) STEPAN KACHALA	162
16	The Problem of Denationalization (excerpt) OLEKSANDER POTEBNIA	167
17	Draft Constitution for the Ukrainian Society in the Free Union MYKHAILO DRAHOMANOV	171
18	Ukrainianism versus Russianism (excerpts) IVAN NECHUI-LEVYTSKY	184
19	Letters from Dnieper Ukraine (excerpt) BORYS HRINCHENKO	188
20	Beyond the Limits of the Possible (abridgment) IVAN FRANKO	193
21	An Independent Ukraine (excerpt) MYKOLA MIKHNOVSKY	201
22	On the Issue of a Distinctive Ukrainian Culture (excerpt) BOHDAN KISTIAKOVSKY	216
23	A Free Ukraine MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY	227

24	Speech on National Minorities (excerpt)	239
	MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY	
25	The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada	243
26	The Rebirth of a Nation (excerpt)	248
	VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO	
27	Letters to My Brother Farmers (excerpts)	251
	VIACHESLAV LYPYNSKY	
28	Nationalism (excerpt)	260
	DMYTRO DONTSOV	
29	Pamphlets (excerpts)	269
	MYKOLA KHVYLOVY	
30	Speeches (excerpts)	278
	MYKOLA SKRYPNYK	
31	Ukrainian Reality and the Task of Women (excerpt)	284
	MILENA RUDNYTSKA	
32	Dontsov's Nationalism (excerpts)	287
	OSYP NAZARUK	
33	The Manifesto of the OUN	291
34	Declaration of the Ukrainian National Council	295
35	Our Teachings about the National State	297
	PETRO POLTAVA	
36	Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia (excerpt)	303
37	Little-Russianism	316
	IEVHEN MALANIUK	
38	Internationalism or Russification? (excerpt)	330
	IVAN DZIUBA	

viii Contents

39	Program of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine (excerpts)	341
40	Constitution of Ukraine: Draft (excerpts)	363
41	The Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia	394
42	Ukraine without Ukrainians? MYKOLA RIABCHUK	400
	DATES IN UKRAINIAN HISTORY	405
	SOURCES AND PERMISSIONS	407
	INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES	411

# Preface

The work and thought of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, important in their time, are relatively unfamiliar to those who cannot read Ukrainian, and even to some Ukrainian readers. Now, after the appearance of a number of popular historical studies on Ukrainian themes by younger Canadian and American scholars, it seems appropriate to offer all interested readers an opportunity to discover the writers and thinkers who voiced the concerns of their times and contributed significantly to the drama of their country's history.

We therefore provide here an anthology that surveys Ukrainian thought from the eighteenth century to the present. We did not choose an earlier starting-point even though a vibrant intellectual life in Ukraine was stimulated by the religious struggle following the incorporation of most of Ukrainian lands into the Kingdom of Poland in 1569. Catholic and Orthodox forces competed for the minds as well as the hearts of the people by engaging in public debate, promoting the publication of literature both polemical and inspirational, encouraging the flowering of the plastic arts, and establishing schools and academies of higher learning. Yet at that time much of Ukrainian intellectual life was directed by ecclesiastics, whose energies were devoted to spiritual and church matters. Only in the eighteenth century did the ranks of the intelligentsia begin to grow as more educated people turned from religious to secular questions about their country's past, present, and future and about their identity and role in its social, political, and cultural development.

Another aim of the editors was to offer their readers a collection that illustrates the scope as well as the nature of Ukrainian thought over the course of three hundred years. The collection consists of diverse texts, many of them excerpts from the writings and speeches of artists and schol-

ars, lawyers and legislators, journalists and politicians, scientists, theologians, and philosophers. These selections may seem preoccupied with questions of national identity, national character, national history, and national destiny. Nationalism has indeed been inextricably linked with the different 'isms,' from rationalism to environmentalism, and with the various movements, from Romanticism to communism, to which Ukrainians have committed themselves over the centuries. Yet even as Ukrainians have voiced their national concerns and advanced their ideological causes, they have grappled with many of the major issues of their day and ours: the structure and construction of the Ukrainian social system, and the conflict among its component parts; the political and cultural pressures and influences exerted by the West and the East; the function of art and the nature of its evolution; and the nature and role of the rational and the non-rational, and our fascination with both. Even the trendiest of post-modern considerations of colonialism and its discontents was anticipated by many in the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who had to contend with the reality, not just the theory, of foreign domination and its debilitating effects. Paradoxically, those not lobotomized by the colonial experience were energized by it. Encouraged or compelled to live their daily lives in a language other than their own, Ukrainian thinkers defiantly dreamed in their own language, and the threat of intellectual circumscription, if not starvation, only made them hungrier for ideas, to have ideas and to entertain ideas. They understood that the mind must be nourished along with the body and that the want of ideas and of a language with which to generate, explore, and evaluate them enervates a nation, a society, each individual. Whatever restraints foreigners attempted to impose could not long hold them back from exploring vast realms of thought for themselves, from defining their place in the world and clarifying their relations with others, and from leaving behind the routines of everyday existence in order to encounter the more rarefied but essential questions and riddles of human life.

The introduction offers some comments on the documents themselves, relevant data about the authors, and some general background. For more detailed information we refer readers to the studies of Ukrainian history and literature listed in the bibliography. The selections in the anthology translated by the editors, who were more concerned with the readability of the selections than with pinpoint accuracy, appear unsigned. The selections translated by others, whose work we may have altered slightly, are followed by the name of the translator. Unless specifically listed as the comments of others, the notes have been supplied by the editors, who have also supplied most of the material in brackets. Throughout the book

a modified version of the Library of Congress transliteration system has been used.

Finally, we are pleased to acknowledge all who helped us put this book together. First, we must thank especially Professor Marc Raeff, the eminent Russian historian, for his encouragement of this project, for his estimable book *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology*, which served as our touchstone, and for his permission to use an excerpt from one of the pieces in his anthology. Professor George Shevelov made many useful suggestions about the selection of texts and responded graciously and speedily to pleas for help in locating materials and solving linguistic difficulties. Professor Bohdan Budurowycz, in addition to supplying a model English version of one of the items most difficult to translate, advised us on a number of matters efficiently and professionally. Judge Bohdan Futey guided us through the labyrinth of various drafts of Ukraine's new constitution. Ron Schoeffel and Darlene Zeleney encouraged our project and helped us over some obstacles. Larysa Onyshkevych and her colleagues read carefully the entire manuscript, and their generous assistance is deeply appreciated. The services of Halyna Friland, Ukrainian Legal Foundation, Kiev; Natalia Zitzelsberger of the New York Public Library; Olga Bakich of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto; and Rachel Lindheim are also gratefully noted. A special note of thanks goes to Theresa Griffin for her expert editing of the entire volume. All errors of fact and interpretation, however, are the responsibility solely of the editors.

R. L.

G. S. N. L.

TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL  
HISTORY OF UKRAINE



# Introduction

This anthology may be used as a supplement to any study of Ukrainian history. There are several histories of Ukraine available in English, but they do not contain the actual documents offered in this book. Without the documents the history itself remains an uncorroborated account. The forty-two documents collected here serve as direct evidence of the evolution of Ukrainian *intellectual* history. They were produced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia over the last three centuries and provide the underpinning of history without which the serious student will be at sea. For the ideas expressed in these documents lie at the heart of the events of which history is woven.

True, sometimes events preceded thought. Such was the case with respect to the first document – the ‘Bendery Constitution’ of Pylyp Orlyk. It was composed in exile, after the crucial event in Ukrainian history – the defeat of Hetman Mazepa’s forces, in alliance with the Swedish king, by Peter I of Russia at Poltava in 1709. The defeat put an end to the dreams of Ukrainian autonomy for more than a century. The Hetman State on the Left Bank continued to exist, in restricted form, only until 1764, and the stronghold of the Cossacks on the Dnieper, the Zaporozhian Sich, was destroyed on the orders of Catherine II in 1775. The last vestiges of the Cossack power which Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky had established after the uprising of 1648 were gone. In 1783 serfdom was introduced into Ukraine by Catherine II, who two years later granted some members of the Cossack *starshyna* (officer corps) the titles of Russian nobility or gentry (*dvorianstvo*). After the partition of Poland in 1772, Western Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia) came under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The division of Ukraine between Russia and Austria continued through the nineteenth century.

The first decade of the eighteenth century, represented in this book by two very different documents, indicates that though Ukraine turned from Poland towards Russia with the treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, its links with the renaissance of the West were not so easily severed. To begin with, there is the so-called Bendery Constitution (from the Moldavian town of Bendery), which Mazepa's successor, Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, proclaimed after Mazepa's death. Appalled at Russia's failure to live up to its treaty obligations and opposed to its expansion at the expense of the Hetman State, Orlyk committed the Cossacks to alliances designed to halt the Russian march westward, and proposed a structure for the liberated state that resurrected and instituted many of the practices of the recent past. The primitive democracy promoted by the document would be considered radical for its time were it not modelled on the *pacta conventa* which the Polish nobility usually made with their newly elected kings. Not only was the hetman, like the Polish king, to be elected by the elite of the officer corps, but the leader also had to agree to adhere to a lengthy list of articles limiting drastically his powers and guaranteeing the rights and privileges of the officers, including total control over the Sich when it was restored to the Cossacks and cleared of all Russian troops. Provisions were also made for triennial meetings of a governing body of officers, who were to advise the leader and approve his decisions and policies. Emergency action could not be initiated by the hetman without his consulting a general committee chosen from the military staff. Moreover, the officers, like the Polish nobility, were given the right and the duty to criticize the hetman. A guarantee of tolerance, the most important of the Polish principles – honoured more often in the breach than in the observance – was not, however, enshrined in the Bendery Constitution; instead, the hetman and his followers were directed to establish Orthodoxy as the state religion and to be ruthlessly intolerant of all non-believers, especially 'the adherents of deceitful Judaism,' who were barred from living in the Hetman State because they, in the eyes of the Cossacks, were allies of the Poles and exploited the peasants.

The constitution, signed by Orlyk and the Cossack *starshyna* in April 1710, was also approved by King Charles XII of Sweden. The document was written in Latin – Charles XII and Mazepa conversed in Latin – and is, to modern readers, not entirely intelligible without further study. A simplified modern Ukrainian translation has recently been rendered by Valerii Shevchuk. According to one authority, Orest Subtelny, the document 'consisted of 16 articles ... which dealt with the practice of politics rather than its principles. Nonetheless, implicit in these stipulations were the political views and values not only of the Mazepist émigrés but of many of

their like-minded compatriots who remained in Ukraine. Despite the fact that the document was formulated by a small group of dissidents abroad, it was not meant to be simply an exercise in wishful thinking' (Subtelny 1:65). Subtelny also points out four thematic categories in the constitution: 1) issues concerning Ukraine in general; 2) issues of concern to the Zaporozhians; 3) issues concerned with the hetman's authority; and 4) social and economic abuses in the Hetmanate. Other scholars such as Omelian Pritsak have pointed out that Orlyk's Cossack state, as envisaged in the constitution, moved away from expressing the original role of the Cossacks as the bulwark of the Orthodox faith towards the idea of a secular state in which the Cossacks were to defend the rights of a free people against the tyranny of absolute tsardom.

In the spring of 1711, Hetman Orlyk, with a Cossack army and the support of the Tatar khan, tried to reconquer Right-Bank Ukraine. It was only after the failure of this initiative that he fled abroad; and for a long time, with his son Hryhor, he led an active Mazepist opposition to Moscow's rule over Ukraine. Their fascinating story ends with Hryhor's service in France as a lieutenant-general of King Louis XV. The Orlyks and other Mazepist émigrés were the first to promote the idea of an independent Ukraine from outside the borders of the country.

In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the events in Ukraine connected with Mazepa found an echo in Western Europe. In 1729, Voltaire, in his history of Charles XII, wrote that 'l'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre.' He was not alone among Western writers in pointing out the struggle of Ukrainians against Muscovy.

Teofan Prokopovych's 'Sermon on Royal Authority and Honour' may be regarded as the very opposite of Orlyk's constitution. It is representative of an entirely different segment of Ukrainian society, which sided with the Russian tsar against the 'traitor' Mazepa. Prokopovych was a leading Ukrainian churchman, a professor, and, later, the rector of the Mohyla Academy in Kiev (Ukr.: Kyiv). Prior to Mazepa's defection to the Swedes he staunchly supported the hetman, dedicating his play *Vladimir* to him. After the battle of Poltava, however, Prokopovych transferred his loyalty (and his dedication) to Tsar Peter I. 'Ukrainians,' we read in a recent book on the Ukrainian impact on Russian culture, 'had made their mark on the Russian church. They were protagonists of Patriarch Nikon's mid-seventeenth-century modernization, and executors of Peter the Great's church reforms. Peter's ecclesiastical agents, Teofan Prokopovych and Stefan Iavorsky, are probably the best known Ukrainians in Russian history. Migrant Ukrainians of the eighteenth century, however, differed from their

predecessors in that they were involved in every aspect of government activity, from international negotiations to the smallest detail of the civil infrastructure' (Saunders: 53).

Teofan Prokopovych was one of the first of hundreds of Ukrainian Orthodox clerics who left Ukraine to serve in Russia. This brain drain was damaging to Ukraine and was protested by some Ukrainians, though not by the many who welcomed better positions in Russia. Prokopovych's sermon, pleading for greater powers for the Russian autocracy, reflects a sentiment of the times. Counselling not just wholehearted support of a tsar more respected in Europe than at home but zealous labour on behalf of a modernized Russia, this well-educated, sophisticated cleric, attuned to all the realities of an up-to-date polity, nonetheless voices a rather old-fashioned notion of total submission to the will of God's anointed and then announces the catastrophic consequences if the tradition of loyalty – the 'former glory of faithfulness' – is not rigorously adhered to by all the subjects of the tsar. Similar sermons and exhortations were very often heard until quite recently.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the national consciousness of the Ukrainian elite was still at a very low ebb. There was, however, a great deal of local pride, expressed in literary verse. Semen Divovych's 'A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia' is no literary masterpiece, but it is an important document of the period. Little is known about the author, who studied at the Kiev Mohyla Academy, and the dates of his birth and death are unknown. He was a clerk at the military chancellery in Hlukhiv, a former capital of the Hetman State (after the Russians destroyed Baturyn) and in 1764 the seat of the Little Russian Collegium, the successor to the Hetman State. The author of this dialogue argues, first of all, for privileges for the Cossack *starshyna* equal to those enjoyed by the Russian *dворянство*. He bases this point on a more extended argument about the equality of Little Russia and Great Russia. This was the argument used by those descendants of the Cossacks who were regarded as 'autonomists.' It is interesting that similar arguments of equality with Russia were advanced much later, in the nineteenth century, by those Ukrainians who, while arguing for cultural autonomy, wanted a political accommodation with Russia.

One must constantly bear in mind that the very concept of nationality did not come into existence until the second half of the eighteenth century. Herder's idea of the *Volksgeist* was slow to penetrate Russia, and the old principles of autocracy and nobility still dominated the body politic. The historian Hugh Seton-Watson even argues that 'in this respect Russian his-

tory differs from that of all Western European countries' (Seton-Watson: 10). The supremacy of autocracy was unchallenged. Occasionally, however, it was reinterpreted by the monarch.

The Legislative Commission, set up by Catherine II, began work in Moscow in 1767. It was to lead to the compilation of a new Russian Code. Representatives of all classes except the serfs were called on to make submissions. By this time the last vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy, embodied in the Hetman State, had disappeared. The loss was felt acutely by the descendants of the Cossack *starshyna*. The chief representative of the Ukrainian autonomists at the Legislative Commission was Hryhorii Poletyka, a delegate of the Ukrainian nobility and a representative of the old Cossack regiment at Lubny.

One can clearly detect from Poletyka's submission that he was pleading for the restoration of Ukrainian autonomy. But the commission did not sit for long. Catherine's liberal enthusiasm soon cooled, and offering as pretext the need to focus on the coming war against the Turks she dissolved the commission in 1768. A recent study describes Poletyka's stand as follows: 'Poletyka not only attacked the *nakaz* (instructions) of the Little Russian College for violating local rights, but also attempted to prove that its proposals were unnecessary. Why introduce some foreign model for Ukrainian cities when they could be revitalized by reinstating the Magdeburg law and town autonomy? The separation of military and civilian offices could also be achieved in this way. It would be better to select worthy Cossack officers with military experience. Thus Poletyka emerged as an adamant opponent of the introduction of Russian imperial practices into the Hetmanate' (Kohut: 180-1).

But, to take a more critical perspective, one can note that Poletyka's submission questions the significantly reduced rights and privileges that the crown intends to confirm for all the nobles of the empire. He respectfully notes all that his constituents have enjoyed as subjects of the Polish kings, respectfully reminds Catherine that she and her predecessors have reaffirmed these rights of the Ukrainians ever since Pereiaslav, and respectfully asks for the restoration of all that has once been theirs. Divovych, too, complains that the Ukrainians, who have entered voluntarily into a union with Russia and have tendered the type of faithful service to the tsars that Prokopovych might have in mind, have been denied respect by the Russians. They have been refused recognition as a distinct, substantial, and legitimate estate. The obsessive concern of both men with the status owed their group serves as a pitiful reminder of the Russian flouting of Ukrainian expectations and aspirations. But the restriction of their vision to a small

elite should also be clear: the exclusive promotion of the interests of their own class blinded them or made them callously indifferent to the fact that the benefits and freedoms they sought would be paid for in the unjust exploitation of the lower orders of society. Moreover, by asking the sovereign to restore the superior status once bestowed on them and by reminding others that their superiority had been granted from above, the Ukrainians acknowledged their dependence on a royal favour which could be as easily withdrawn as extended. They could no longer uphold the political image that Orlyk had projected half a century earlier, the image of a powerful, self-sufficient, and self-confident group willing to stand opposed to the Russians.

One of the promising students at the still-prestigious Mohyla Academy in Kiev, and for a time a member of the court choir in St Petersburg, was Hryhorii Skovoroda. Unlike many of his countrymen who sought service in Russia, Skovoroda remained in his native land, though as a young man he travelled in Western Europe. He chose to be a tutor to various Ukrainian families, travelled a great deal in the Left Bank (beginning in the seventeenth century, Ukraine's position on the Dnieper [Ukr.: Dnipro] River gave rise to the commonly used terms Left Bank and Right Bank), and stayed with friends at their estates.

Hryhorii Skovoroda's philosophy is very much a part of the Ukrainian intellectual tradition. In a sense it is a philosophy of 'other-worldliness.' 'Skovoroda's image and concept of the world was motionless and ahistorical. Time did not exist or was to be disregarded' (Shevelov: 273). Historical upheavals of his time found no reflection in his work, and he referred to worldly events as 'pure rubbish' (*samaia drian*). In his philosophy existence consists of two 'natures' (the visible and the invisible) and three 'worlds' (the macrocosm, the microcosm, and the symbolic world of the Bible). The purpose of life is self-knowledge and congenial work. Skovoroda's ideal was non-attachment and indeed withdrawal from the world. And this saintly, wandering philosopher exemplified his moral precepts in his own life.

On the one hand, Skovoroda's teachings may be looked at in the light of the strong monastic tradition in Ukraine. On the other, they may be seen as reflecting an attitude of non-involvement ('my home stands apart' – *moia khata skraiu*) common among many Ukrainians. It may be argued that Skovoroda had little to contribute to the main issues of Ukrainian intellectual history: the relation of Ukraine to Russia, the Ukrainian national identity, and so on. But his example in influencing others to turn from the political to the personal, from the social to the spiritual, from the outer,

public arena to the inner, private life as the source of all that is relevant was significant nonetheless. Everything that in the eyes of the world had marked an individual, a group, or a nation as successful or unsuccessful was now seen as worthless, for only what transpired within – psychological, moral, spiritual illumination and growth – was considered valuable and creative. But the spirit of this Ukrainian Socrates and his search for spiritual and human rather than national values exerted a strong influence in Ukraine for many decades. Panteleimon Kulish, a major nineteenth-century writer, was attracted to Skovoroda; Pamfil Iurkevych, a professor of philosophy in Kiev, was a follower of Skovoroda; and a Soviet Ukrainian poet, Pavlo Tychyna, wrote a long poem about him. The philosophical teachings of Skovoroda also have affinities with the religious writings of Gogol and, more recently, with the writings of Dmytro Chyzhevsky (1894–1977), the author of a book in German on Skovoroda and of a history of Ukrainian philosophy and a study of the evolution of Ukrainian literature.

When Romanticism swept from West to East, the new current not only helped to restore the severed link between Ukraine and Europe but also began to bridge the chasm between the masses and the educated elites, which had widened and deepened in the eighteenth century. Of immense impact was the revolutionary reimagining of the shapes of nations, of the importance of culture, and of the future evolution of both. Under the influence of Herder, the older view of what constituted a nation – established geographical boundaries, a firmly entrenched political system, sovereignty over people, and independence – was altered if not replaced by newer attitudes and insights. Now, a nation was regarded as an ethnic community of people who shared the same instincts, habits, desires and fears, expectations and values, all of which rested upon and sprang from the solid foundation of a common set of laws, a shared religion, and, especially, a common language spoken by the folk masses and recognized by the educated class as their native tongue, even if they normally employed the more artificial and foreign-influenced language of high society, of the court, and of fashionable art.

The urge to establish the presence of a Ukrainian community and to promote its significant achievements turned the Ukrainian elite's attention to the past, and they began to search out and then display the political and cultural legacy of distant and not so distant eras. Legends, chronicles, and quasi-historical accounts of the former might and glory of Kievan Rus' as well as of the time of the Cossack Sich and the Hetmanate state revived the humiliated and disheartened Ukrainian nobility. *Istoriia Rusov*, probably

written in the second decade of the nineteenth century and distributed fairly widely in manuscript form in the 1820s before it was first published in 1846, idealized the Cossack era in order to project an image of Ukrainian history that would show it to be as impressive as Russian history and, at the same time, quite distinct from the history of its overwhelmingly powerful neighbour.

The author of *Istoriia Rusov* remains unknown; some scholars think there may have been more than one author. Throughout the nineteenth century this 'historical pamphlet' exerted a great influence on the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for it expressed a yearning for national independence and set forth certain ethical principles as intrinsic to the country and its people. According to Oleksander Ohloblyn, a prominent authority on *Istoriia Rusov*, 'the political principles alone would be insufficient to give the book permanent value, to make it a spirited expression of the Ukrainian national idea. Its chief power lies in its lofty ethical concepts, in the union of its political and moral principles' (Ohloblyn: 390). The author, in the tradition of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, holds truth, justice, and reason to be the ultimate values. All peoples are free to defend themselves, and no tyranny is permissible; and the Russian government is singled out as responsible for 'serfdom and slavery.' Though much of the account targets the Poles as the major foe of the Ukrainians and the work in general presents Bohdan Khmelnytsky as its hero, the selection in which Mazepa reveals and justifies his alliance with Poland and, especially, Sweden against Russia unobtrusively but unmistakably foregrounds the skill and intelligence of the hetman and thus his awareness of the grave threat posed by the Russians.

Quoting some passages from *Istoriia Rusov*, the American scholar Pritsak points out that its authors 'regarded the past of their native land as that of an independent Western European nation, which as a sovereign state had secured its neutrality through political alliances with its neighbours and by international treaties' (Pritsak: 251). The work's picture of the past is not characterized by historical accuracy, as is indicated by the the presence of hagiographical formulas and other literary conventions from the old chronicles in the account of Khmelnytsky's death. The silence in the work on the lack of support for Mazepa's wise strategy among rank-and-file Cossacks and the peasantry, whose religion bound them with Russia rather than Poland, is another indication of general inaccuracy as well as a manifestation of less attractive eighteenth-century attitudes and values, particularly, the notion of the importance of great leaders and powerful officer cliques. Yet the book was not read as a history of the Cossack wars, but as



the bearer of a message, a work preserving historical memory and the ideal of national unity and freedom. The remarkable fact that *Istoriia Rusov* was allowed to circulate freely even before its publication suggests that ideas of Ukrainian independence were not taken seriously by the confident Russian masters.

Romanticism not only enlarged and rejuvenated the literary languages of Ukraine and Russia but also stimulated interest in folk literature. Ukraine was a particularly rich reservoir of folk treasures, and Ukrainian nobles and intellectuals, together with non-Ukrainian academics, devoted much time and effort to ethnographic study – to describing the unique habits, customs, and beliefs of the common folk and to compiling and publishing collections of folklore and of other products of the folk imagination. Various impulses were behind this interest in the folk, ranging from a deeply felt need to give witness to a way of life threatened with extinction under the historical onslaught of a new Russian wave of history to a more optimistic faith in the possibility of renewal from below rather than from above, a faith that gave rise to a new, populist ideology in which the people (*narod*) and its mores and art were held to be emblematic of humanity. Whether they saw the future as bringing extinction or revival, many thinking Ukrainians, even Russianized Ukrainians, were drawn back to their roots. One of these intellectuals was Nikolai Gogol, or, in Ukrainian, Mykola Hohol, whose letters reveal a deep longing to return to Ukrainian cities and villages and to the culture of the masses, which are seen as incomparably richer and more diverse than Russian centres and than the culture of Russia's educated and sophisticated society.

Gogol's 'two souls' (*dvoedushie*, to use Gogol's own word) is well attested by his biographers. Born and educated in Ukraine, the son of a man who wrote simple comedies in Ukrainian, Gogol made a literary career in Russia and abroad. His prose style is considered seminal for modern Russian literature. Gogol depicts Russia in dark and sombre colours, but his early short stories based on Ukrainian folklore are full of humour and gaiety. Underneath the surface, however, he detects the pettiness of life – a theme more prominent in his later works dealing with Russian life. As an outsider in Russia who eagerly sought and eventually found complete acceptance, he was in a position favourable for observing and commenting. A moralist and a conservative at heart, Gogol was a Romantic artist, most gifted in the realms of fantasy, the grotesque, and humour. His achievements in these realms, not his ideas, are his greatest contribution to literature.

Both Gogol's philosophy and his art have a strong Ukrainian colouring,

and excerpts from his early letters, reprinted here, show his deep attachment to his native Ukraine. Later in life, however, this bond weakened, and, unlike his contemporary Shevchenko, he never expressed a belief in an independent Ukrainian literature and culture. Essentially, Gogol remained a 'Little Russian.' Recently, scholars in Ukraine have attempted to claim Gogol as a Ukrainian writer and point to his 'service' to Russia. One, Larysa Masenko, writes: 'There is no truth in the desire to make out of Gogol a banner of the indestructible unity of Ukraine and Russia. The example of Gogol shows how clearly an age-long forced rule over the language of an oppressed people led to a narrowing of its cultural scope, and prevented a great talent from having a proper ground for growth, forcing him to work for an imperial culture. Gogol became a great Russian writer, but his tragic split, the deep contradictions in his national consciousness, became the main cause of his spiritual exhaustion and led to a crisis in his creative work and an untimely death' (*Literaturna Ukraina* 23 [1992]).

Not only the situation in present-day Ukraine but also a new, revisionist approach to national literatures everywhere makes it more likely that writers who resort to using the language of a dominant culture will no longer be associated exclusively or primarily with that culture. The most striking example is the large body of literature written in English which is regarded by many as Irish. It is not inconceivable that future histories of Ukrainian literature (George Grabowicz has already started such a revision) will include not only Gogol but Kapnist and Korolenko. The multinational imperial culture of the former Russian-controlled empire may be divided into its constituent parts, like the empire itself.

Ukrainian Romantics were not just writing poetry. In 1845 a group of Ukrainians conceived of a secret society, the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius, with a political objective. The prime mover of the society was the young historian Mykola Kostomarov, a friend of Taras Shevchenko and Panteleimon Kulish, with whom he associated closely in Kiev. Without these three men the Ukrainian revival of the 1840s would not have taken place.

Kostomarov's *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* is a very different work from *Istoriia Rusov*, although some affinity is evident in the tone of the work and its reliance on Christian ethics. More attuned to the populist direction of Romantic thought than its predecessor, the *Books* publicized the main ideas of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius and laid out its vision of the past and of the future. In Kostomarov's reading of history, the Slavs in pagan times were undifferentiated and lived in peace with one another in egalitarian social and political configurations

(‘with neither king nor master’). After their conversion to Christianity the course of history changed. Civil conflict divided the once-united group; the ‘Tatar Yoke’ corrupted its victims, especially the Russians, who soon began to imitate their former oppressors; and the uncritical adoption of European feudal and hierarchical institutions and systems led many of the Western Slavs to betray their native democratic traditions. In more modern times the Cossack host was organized to restore the ancient ways, first in their Sich stronghold and later in all parts of Ukraine. The Cossacks also saw themselves, in Kostomarov’s interpretation, as defenders of the Orthodox faith, and their deep religious commitment tempered their militarism. Preferring a life of Christian virtue to one of power, they were restrained by their faith from helping to liberate Poland and Russia. Eventually, ceaseless Polish oppression of the Ukrainian people and persecution of the Cossacks provoked a Cossack uprising and, later, when the vanquished Poles refused to negotiate an honourable peace, a Ukrainian treaty with the ruler of Moscow. But the victimization of Ukraine did not end with the treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), for the Russian protectors soon joined with the Poles and partitioned Ukraine. The Cossacks’ struggle against the division of their country was unsuccessful, but the ancient Slavic ideals of brotherhood and equality which the Cossack host had represented and embodied could not be extinguished. ‘The voice of Ukraine,’ Kostomarov asserted, ‘was not stilled’ and cannot be silenced in the future. Ukraine will rise from its grave to remind all oppressed Slavic peoples of their common, idyllic past, to inspire them to overthrow despotic regimes, and to urge them to form a loose federation of self-governing republics.

Kostomarov’s pamphlet also shows the strong influence of Adam Mickiewicz’s *Księgi narodu polskiego i Księgi pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Books of the Polish Nation and Books of the Polish Pilgrimage, 1832), the bible of Polish messianism. Recently, Czesław Miłosz found Mickiewicz’s work ‘embarrassing reading’ (*Kultura* 9 [1991]). But for the small circle forming the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Kostomarov’s work exercised a powerful appeal. In the guise of history it propagated the idea of a Slavic federation with an autonomous Ukraine. The concluding sentence of the *Books* – ‘Then all the peoples, pointing to the place on the map where Ukraine will be delineated, will say: Behold, the stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone’ – has frequently been quoted, especially recently.

Kostomarov’s *Books* is the first modern Ukrainian political program. It goes beyond the ideal of more cultural autonomy to speak of a Ukrainian republic in a Slavic federation. In spite of the fact that the work was unpub-

lished and in its day remained known to only a few, and in spite of the arrest and exile of the members of the Brotherhood in 1847, the resonance of the program they espoused was to be heard for more than a century.

Another unpublished document of the 1840s is Taras Shevchenko's preface to his planned new edition of *Kobzar* (The Minstrel). This archival piece is, apart from his letters, the only specimen of Shevchenko's Ukrainian prose and bears the marks of a first draft. Yet the ideas expressed are important for an understanding of the new age. First, Shevchenko voices his great sorrow at the dearth of Ukrainian publications. He hopes that Ukrainian writers will not be intimidated by a few Russian critics who want them to write in Russian. The most outspoken of these critics was Vissarion Belinsky, who, adamantly opposed to contemporary Ukrainian writers' using their own language, attacked the Ukrainian almanac *Lastivka* (The Swallow), which contained a contribution by Shevchenko. Belinsky insisted that the Ukrainian literary language was a shallow, impoverished medium fit only for peasants and folkloristic works and thus was incapable of expressing the complexity of modern life. The better-developed and more sophisticated Russian literary language could express that complexity.

Yet more than Belinsky's blatant snobbery and patronizing linguistic imperialism draw Shevchenko's ire, for he also sees obstacles to the evolution of a Ukrainian literary tradition closer to home, roadblocks placed by Ukrainian writers rather than Russian critics. He criticizes the first work of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*, as 'mere ridicule in the Muscovite vein,' and he attacks later writers for creating nothing but exotic, picturesque, and sentimental scenes filled with peasant yokels speaking quaintly and simple-mindedly. Such stereotypical situations, characters, and language betray the writers' distance from their source material, total ignorance of the impressive achievements of folk poetry – Shevchenko offers the ancient Ukrainian *dumy* as a source for literary inspiration – and insensitivity to the sufferings, past and present, of their people, which must not, Shevchenko urges, pass unmarked. But he pleads with his countrymen to continue writing in Ukrainian rather than Russian. Although there are few exemplars (he belittles writers like Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko and Petro Hulak-Artemovsky), Shevchenko insists that Ukrainian literature is vital and offers a poem by Oleksandra Psiol as a model worth following.

All in all, this was a radical view of both the past and the present state of Ukrainian literature. Shevchenko, as a Romantic, yearned for something new and inspiring. His plea for an independent, vibrant Ukrainian literature was not the only issue of concern. In the 1840s he wrote several longer

political poems in which he attacked the tsar and the Russian domination of Ukraine. Shevchenko the poet was closely allied to Shevchenko the prophet. His 'message is conveyed eloquently, with great intensity. The human individual is the center of Shevchenko's philosophy, but he triumphs only as a part of a new and just national and social order ... The complexities of human existence are resolved within the apocalyptic vision of the future when "the day of truth will dawn." The secret of Shevchenko's appeal to the Ukrainian reader was and still is because his message remained unfulfilled. The great test of his poetry will come when Ukraine becomes a sovereign nation' (Luckyj 1: 190).

These words, written in 1971, underline the unusual importance and the nature of Shevchenko's contribution to Ukrainian intellectual history. Today his message is no longer an unfulfilled wish. Mykola Markevych (1804-60), a Ukrainian historian and poet who wrote in Russian, was ten years younger than Shevchenko. In a private letter written in the 1830s he claimed that 'the fatherland (*otechestvo*) is higher than the native land (*rodina*); the latter is merely a part of the former; but he whose soul has no native land has no fatherland either.' This was the attitude of many educated Ukrainians. The native land was Ukraine, the fatherland was Russia. The two were indissoluble. Shevchenko was the first for whom the Russian term *otechestvo*, which he regarded as signifying tsarist oppression, became one of opprobrium (cf. the poem 'The Dream,' 1844). Ukraine (Ukr.: *batkivshchyna*) was his sole parent. Yet for most people in nineteenth-century Ukraine, Markevych's dual concept was more acceptable.

Panteleimon Kulish was a close friend of Taras Shevchenko. Both were members of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius, and both were arrested in 1847. Kulish, like Shevchenko, defended himself with dignity during the interrogation by General Dubbelt. But the sentence he received (exile to Tula for three years) struck him as heavy and unjust. He implored Dubbelt to forgive his errors and became a classic 'penitent dissident.' A conformist and law-abiding citizen by nature, Kulish tried, during his exile, to curry favour with his Russian jailers. After his release he stayed in St Petersburg for some time, trying to re-enter literary life. Later, he acquired a *kbutir* (homestead) in Ukraine and, for a time, was friendly with Sergei Aksakov. He wrote the first biography of Gogol (1856) and published a valuable collection of folklore, *Zapiski o iuzhnoi Rusi* (Notes on Southern Rus', 1857). In the same year he finally published a novel written in Ukrainian a decade before, *Chorna rada* (The Black Council), in his own Russian translation. It is the epilogue to the latter work that is included in this collection.

The 'Epilogue' contains both a strong plea for an independent Ukrainian literature and words of praise for Gogol, who wrote in Russian on Ukrainian topics. Kulish's soberly and closely argued linguistic and literary case, not always convincing to the modern reader, was probably intended to allay the anxious suspicions of Russian intellectuals about Ukrainian separation that in the mid-1850s swept away much of their earlier sympathy for Ukrainian national aspirations. Yet he does counter effectively the claims of Polish scholars and ethnographers that the language of Ukraine was a variant of Polish, mirroring the reality of Polish domination after the collapse of Kievan Rus'. He also takes on fellow Ukrainians so anxious to curry favour with their masters that they proclaim Ukrainian to be a dialect of Russian. But just as unacceptable to Kulish as those who belittle the language and its literary creations are the superpatriots who inordinately praise only native linguistic and literary accomplishments and turn a blind eye to foreign influences and successes. Kulish's common sense suspects that the extreme positions, be they sceptical or chauvinistic, limit the possibilities for honest self-exploration and knowledge as well as for creative self-expression, and waste the opportunity for progressive change.

In a foreshadowing here of his later, post-Romantic view of Ukraine's political 'insignificance' and singular literary achievement, Kulish first announces that for both the Russians and the Ukrainians a giant step forward, morally as well as culturally, has been prompted by the prose of Nikolai Gogol. Writing in Russian and thus able to reach two audiences, Gogol turned the attention of his Russian readers to the beauty and poetry of the land and people to the south, and inspired his educated countrymen to look more critically at the documents and literary monuments constructing the image and meaning of their historical past. The thirst for historical research can all too easily be slaked by antiquarian delving. Hence Kulish makes a quick transition from the past to the present with a strong demand for more literature written in Ukrainian. He wants artists to allow the simplest people to speak in their own voices and to reveal their deepest, strongest psychological traits and moral strengths, everything that has proved immune to the blight of their material existence. Nothing written in any other language, no matter how close its linguistic tie to Ukrainian, could convey adequately the rich colour, the emotional strength, the religious fervour, and the moral purity of the masses.

Kulish could not mention the exiled Shevchenko's name, and his praise of Ukraine's greatest contemporary poet is daring and unexpected. In the three paragraphs devoted to the poet considered a criminal by many Russians, Kulish lists plainly the superior qualities of his poetry. Whereas other

writers described movingly the hardships suffered by the people, Shevchenko denounced the crimes committed against them and celebrated an apocalyptic future; whereas others glorified the endurance of the victims in maintaining their stability, Shevchenko illuminated the greater complexity and ambiguity of their inner experiences and of their actual responses to brutality and injustice. The uncanny ability of Shevchenko's verse to move both Ukrainian and Russian readers was, doubtless, intimately bound up with its powerful content, yet the impact was heightened by the language of his poetry. This language the poet had received from his predecessors but had deliberately and creatively altered, so that what he bequeathed to his successors was a language more flexible and resourceful and capacious than the one he inherited. The language he created was, according to Kulish, Shevchenko's greatest contribution, and it was a contribution made not just to his own culture, which no longer had to look to Russia for a means for artistic self-expression. Russians too were somehow drawn to and moved by Shevchenko's language. In the sounds and phrases and lines of his poetic works they were reminded of the ancient family resemblances among East Slavic languages, they rediscovered the core of their own literary language, shorn of the non-native excrescences accumulated over the past few hundred years, and once again they took pride in the expressive range of their native tongue.

It is interesting to note that Shevchenko expressed his appreciation of the 'Epilogue' in a letter to Kulish written on 5 December 1857. 'Your epilogue has turned out,' he wrote, 'to be very judicious (*rozumny*), except that you swing in my direction a great deal of sweet-smelling incense, so much of it that I almost suffocated.' But the last word suggests the possible irony of Shevchenko's response to Kulish's essay. The main thrust of the 'Epilogue' is not so much literary as political, and the essay is representative of the view of the later, post-Romantic Kulish, who was convinced that Ukraine's political 'insignificance' should not induce those who lament or gloat over its impotence to relegate the country to the ashcan of history. Its insignificance is counterbalanced by a cultural vitality and activity directly proportional to its autonomy. Through their culture, especially their singular literary achievements, Ukrainians are working for the well-being of all within their range and thereby contributing to the most important of labours, the enrichment and elevation of people, the unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the humanization of the historical process.

Kulish's later career hid a paradox. On the one hand, he wanted collaboration with Russia. He even scolded Shevchenko's 'half-drunken' muse in his three-volume work *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* (A History of the

Reunification of Rus', 1887). He railed against 'Cossack anarchy' and avoided contact with Ukrainian intellectuals. On the other hand, secluded on his *khutir*, he worked tirelessly on a Ukrainian translation of the Bible and Shakespeare's plays. He remained a controversial figure until modern times. In the 1920s he won the admiration of Mykola Khvylovy. Today he has been restored to a place of honour beside Shevchenko.

A very different picture of Ukraine's relationship with Russia from the one drawn by Kulish is offered by Mykola Kostomarov. In his 'Two Russian Nationalities' Kostomarov the historian looks at and compares the histories of Russia and Ukraine. He finds startling contrasts, especially between the 'preponderance of liberty' among the Ukrainians and the 'preponderance of communality' among the Russians. Although Kostomarov's intention in part might have been to set forth what Ukraine could therefore contribute to any union between the two peoples, his extensive description and analysis of antithetical types make the prospect of a viable, symbiotic relationship seem remote indeed. Whereas the Russians are characterized as intolerant, parochial ex-slaves concentrating on grabbing the autocratic power their former Tatar masters had relinquished, Ukrainians are presented as adventurous, cosmopolitan free spirits who value individual freedom and naturally incline towards federalism. The Cossacks are portrayed as the quintessentially Ukrainian type, and even their violence, usually disparaged by their critics, is justified as a reflex reaction to the outrages committed by foes who fail to live up to the Cossacks' high expectations and stringent moral demands.

In the mind of a nineteenth-century intellectual like Kostomarov, the all-important element distinguishing the nationalities was their oral poetry. Here again the Ukrainians had more to offer than the Russians. To be sure, Kostomarov's generalizations are sweeping: 'The Great Russians are deficient in imagination,' 'they are full of prejudices,' and so on. In the sphere of religion, the Ukrainians are more spiritual than the Russians. Kostomarov also considers favourably the absence of the Russian 'commune' (*obshchina*) and its values in Ukraine. He writes, 'The obligatory holding of land in common and personal responsibility to the village commune, or *mir*, are an unbearable form of slavery and injustice for the South Russian.' Kostomarov extols the Ukrainian *hromada* (community) in contrast, though he is prepared to admit the Ukrainians' propensity to 'lose their nationality.' It is strange and remarkable that Kostomarov's unqualified elevation of Ukraine over Russia could have been published in Russia.

The clear superiority revealed in almost all categories might be dismissed as ludicrously chauvinistic if one failed to appreciate Kostomarov's



study as an exercise in Romantic myth-making and self-compensation for the actual powerlessness of his compatriots and, more subtly and significantly, as an illumination of deeply felt deficiencies in the national character. The Ukrainians are not as ideal as they may seem; they lack the Russians' 'spirit of organization.' Thus, while it is theoretically possible for Kostomarov to offer some subliminal hope that the two peoples can interact profitably, with each tempering the flaws and excesses of the other, the distance pictured in this essay between the unimaginative collectivism of the Russians and the fanciful anarchism of the Ukrainians is too vast for any piously wished consummation of their union.

Kostomarov's contribution to Ukrainian intellectual history continued. In the thirty-fourth issue of the journal *Kolokol* (The Bell), published in London on 15 January 1859, Alexander Herzen wrote in an article on Russia and Poland that 'Ukraine must be recognized as a free and independent country.' The émigré Herzen, whom Isaiah Berlin regards as 'the most arresting Russian political writer in the nineteenth century' (Berlin: 186), was the rare Russian intellectual who acknowledged Ukraine's historical right to an independent existence. This comment by Herzen prompted Kostomarov to write a long letter to him, which Herzen published on 15 January 1860. After thanking Herzen for his sympathy for Ukraine, Kostomarov discussed Ukrainian history and admitted that the Ukrainians had failed to develop their own ruling class. However, the common people in Ukraine were neither Russian nor Polish and deserved to have a country of their own. Kostomarov gave an account of Russia's abolition of Cossack autonomy and described the unenviable conditions in which Ukrainian peasants and intellectuals had lived during the eighteenth century and continued to endure in the nineteenth century. He dwelt on the arrest of the Cyrillo-Methodians in 1847 and on his own exile. He ended by pleading for Ukrainian linguistic and cultural rights and some form of autonomy, one which would not, however, result in the severing of ties with Russia.

Written in Russian, Kostomarov's letter was the first example of Ukrainian protest heard in Western Europe, if one disregards the earlier political activity of the Orlyks. A few years later Mykhailo Drahomanov would make such protest a trend by publishing a Ukrainian journal in Geneva. That Herzen printed Kostomarov's letter is noteworthy given the almost totally negative attitude to Ukraine among Russian intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century. To be sure, the Russian radical critics Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Nikolai Dobroliubov praised the work of the writers Marko Vovchok and Taras Shevchenko. But the right to an independent literature was the only right they granted to Ukrainians. Herzen,

therefore, remains a true exception in his acknowledgement of Ukraine's separate history.

Kostomarov is most important in Ukrainian intellectual history as the founder of the populist school of historiography. His general views, springing from a conviction that the people (*narod*) were the makers of history, were later taken over by the historians Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908) and Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Essentially, Ukrainian historical populism was rooted in a belief in the values of the Ukrainian peasant community, which was characterized by a love of freedom and democracy. But after their return from exile, Kostomarov and other members of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius also inspired a number of younger Ukrainians to dedicated toil for the welfare of the peasantry. These young adherents of Ukrainophilism (*Ukrainofilstvo*), the term coined by the Russians and accepted later by some Ukrainians in the second half of the nineteenth century to designate the desire to cling to the Ukrainian language, customs, and culture, had no organization of their own but worked through the so-called Kiev Hromada, a circle of the intelligentsia dominated by university students. Their mission was to combat illiteracy and to raise Ukrainian consciousness through a network of Sunday schools and reading clubs. At first, the government authorities did not interfere with the Hromada's activities, but in the later 1870s came intense official opposition, including police surveillance of the Ukrainophiles – even though they were politically and ideologically pro-Russian – that eased only towards the end of the century. This pressure, coupled with the aging that dampens the ardour of most people, cooled the once-intense passion for Ukraine. In 1882 Kostomarov published an article, 'The Goals of Ukrainophilism,' in which he took a very moderate position. The Ukrainians, he argued, were still made up mainly of countryfolk and must struggle for recognition. Although Kostomarov supported the Ukrainophiles' goal of the full development of the Ukrainian language, he advised that the work of such development be undertaken slowly, methodically, and from the bottom up. He saw no point in Kulish's translation of Shakespeare into Ukrainian, since Ukrainians could read the plays in Russian.

Ukrainian populism as an intellectual current must be viewed as distinct from Russian populism, even though many Ukrainians (V. Debahorii-Mokrievych, M. Kybalchych, and S. Perovska, for example) took part in Russian populist organizations. In Russia, populism was partly messianic and allied to Slavophilism and partly inclined to socialist and radical solutions for Russia. The movement towards 'going to the people' was wide-

spread. Russian populists created revolutionary organizations such as Land and Freedom (*Zemlia i volia*, 1876) and The People's Will (*Narodnaia volia*, 1879), the latter being a terrorist organization responsible for the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Ukrainian populists, on the other hand, shied away from radicalism and terrorism (although some Ukrainians, such as Andrii Zheliabov, were members of The People's Will) and formed their own separate organizations (for example, The Taras Brotherhood, or *Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv*). Ukrainian populism had strong adherents among writers (such as I. Nechui-Levytsky). In general, Ukrainian populists stressed national enlightenment, while Russian populists focused on social action. On the whole, in Eastern Ukraine the debates between the conservative and radical wings of the populists (*narodnyky*) were mild, whereas in Galicia the populists (*narodovtsi*) fought bitterly against the conservative Moscophiles.

Ukrainians were not attracted to political extremism because throughout the nineteenth century the majority of them in the Russian Empire regarded themselves as Little Russians. Kateryna Kersten, a sister of the Cyrillo-Methodian Opanas Markovych, wrote to him:

I love Ukraine because I grew up here and I am bound to it by sacred memories. I love its way of life because there is much poetry in it. I love its speech, *jargon du peuple*, to which I have listened since my childhood. I love its sad melodious songs, which abound in something that stirs my heart. But this love of Little Russia does not blind me to the degree that I could call its past life independent.

... By patriotism I understand love of all the people and of the state, not of a single province.

The tsar appreciated her sentiments so much that he sent her a gift of a thousand rubles. The loyalty of other Little Russians was taken for granted.

It is a curious fact that not one of them, to our knowledge, wrote an articulate statement of the Russophile Little Russian position. There were prominent Galician Moscophiles, mentioned above, but they were marginal and represented a region of Ukraine which received some support from Moscow. Otherwise, the sentiment of loyalty to Russia remained widespread but hidden. Rarely did Little Russians praise 'Mother Russia' openly, and such praise was left to prominent Russian intellectuals (Peter B. Struve, for example), who expressed it by attacking the Ukrainian movement. A politically coloured denunciation was made by a Russian, S. Shchegolev, in the fat volume *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyy*

*etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma* (The Ukrainian Movement as a Contemporary Stage of South-Russian Separatism), published in 1912 in Kiev.

As well as Ukrainian activists such as Shevchenko, Kulish, and Kostomarov, many scholars dedicated primarily to their disciplines lived in Ukraine. Theirs too must be considered voices that defined and refined Ukrainian consciousness. Pamfil Iurkevych was educated at the Kievan Theological Academy, where he became a professor. An erudite philosopher of the idealist school, he developed his own theory of the 'heart' and in this respect bears some resemblance to Kierkegaard, whose works, published earlier, were unknown to him. His 'philosophy of the heart' also makes him akin to Skovoroda. Iurkevych was the teacher of the influential Russian religious thinker and poet Vladimir Solov'ev, who stressed the significance of his mentor's non-Russian origin, a point noted later by Chyzhevsky: 'Iurkevych's world outlook was akin to the philosophic currents prevalent on Ukrainian soil ... One can say that some of its features (some elements of his teaching about the 'heart,' the idea of a holistic philosophy) are typical of the Ukrainian outlook' (Chyzhevsky: 154).

In the excerpt translated here Iurkevych's argument is directed against Chernyshevsky's materialism and the utilitarianism that provided the foundation on which much contemporary Russian radical thought came to rest. The vigorous questioning of rational egoism and its cavalier dismissal of the spiritual dimension of all life may recall to some readers Dostoevsky's examination of similar issues in *Notes from Underground* and other works written late in the 1860s. But Iurkevych's attempt to describe human feelings that transcend an individual's immediate, personal concerns, feelings that are higher and greater than the protection and prolongation of existence, is impressive for its rigour and clarity of presentation. In his rebuttal Chernyshevsky dismissed Iurkevych's critique and compared it to the work of a seminarian, insisting that he was not interested in what Iurkevych was saying. Iurkevych's writings were banned in the Soviet Union, and he was derided as the founder of a new idealist philosophy.

A scholar of a very different orientation from Kostomarov or Iurkevych was Mykhailo Drahomanov. He began his academic career as a lecturer at Kiev University, where he taught mostly ancient history. At that time (the late 1860s) he was also active in the so-called *Stara Hromada* (Old Community), engaging in what the official critics regarded as Ukrainian separatism. Attacked in the Russian press, Drahomanov was forced to leave Kiev University in 1875. His dismissal coincided with other anti-Ukrainian measures enacted by the government, notably the so-called Ems ukase (decree) of May 1876, which banned publications in Ukrainian. The ukase was insti-

gated by an ethnic Ukrainian, Mikhail Iuzefovich, a government official whom Shevchenko once called 'a traitor.'

The Stara Hromada conceived a plan by which Drahomanov would be sent to Western Europe to become an 'ambassador' for the Ukrainian cause. With the organization's financial support guaranteed, Drahomanov left for Switzerland in 1876 and remained there for the next thirteen years. Two years later, the first issue of a Ukrainian 'thick' magazine, *Hromada* (Community), appeared in Geneva. Altogether, five issues of the journal appeared, in 1877, 1879, and 1882. An attempt to make the journal into a bimonthly failed. Further financial support from Ukraine was sporadic, and Drahomanov had to struggle with many difficulties, to the point where his health was impaired. In 1889 he took up a university appointment in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he continued working and writing until his death in July 1895.

Drahomanov, who like Herzen never returned home from abroad, was the first prominent modern Ukrainian émigré. His flair for languages and his awareness of and sensitivity to Western European developments enabled him to do much to acquaint the West with Ukraine. He also wrote several major works on Ukrainian history, literature, and folklore, in which he displayed a broad-mindedness and erudition hitherto unknown in Ukrainian scholarship. As a political theorist, Drahomanov was a democratic socialist, the spiritual father of the Galician Radical Party and of the search for an alternative to Russian socialism. In the words of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Drahomanov's years abroad 'constituted an epoch in Ukrainian life.' The best authority on Drahomanov in the West, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, wrote that Drahomanov declared himself 'in favour of evolutionary and gradual methods' (Rudnytsky: 265). He was an enemy of extremism and did not believe in an independent Ukrainian state. The weakness of the Ukrainian national movement and the general international situation were against such a development. In this Drahomanov agreed with other non-socialist members of Stara Hromada (such as V. Antonovych).

In 'The Lost Epoch' Drahomanov the historian analyses Russia's rule over Ukraine and concludes that 'Russian despotism gradually brought about the destruction of Ukraine's freedom.' As a patriot Drahomanov wanted to raise his country to the level of development of the advanced Western European nations. His goal and the strategies he devised were not as extreme as those dreamed of by the solitary visionary Shevchenko, yet they were still too radical for most of his peers, schooled by their experiences and those of the preceding generation of the intelligentsia to fear Russian reprisals against those with national aspirations and to rationalize

Russian dominance in Ukraine. Drahomanov fearlessly opposed all who would placate or accommodate Russia, all who were so impressed or depressed by its past, present, and projected future growth that they came to view Russia's power, influence, and movement through history as indomitable and progressive. The most that many of his contemporaries could suggest was for Ukraine to tie its wagon to the Russian engine and attempt to harness that engine's power to work for the good of all the passengers. A close look at the two hundred years since Pereiaslav, however, was sufficient to shatter all such myopic hopes. Federation with other Slavic peoples was still essential to the survival and flourishing of the Ukrainians, but this end could not be achieved in a union dominated by a single centralized, despotic country.

Drahomanov wanted to escape from the vicious circle of the past centuries, during which Russia had undermined the development of its Ukrainian colony by encouraging only the worst features of the revered Cossack tradition. In his indictment of the Cossacks, more scathing than those of most of his predecessors, Drahomanov scorned the elite's neglect of the masses they led and their consistent sacrificing of the people's interests in order to retain their own privileges and to preserve the power of an equally uncaring church establishment. Even fiercer than Drahomanov's anticlericalism was his castigation of the Cossacks' wilful ignorance of the needs and concerns of Ukrainians, some of them even Cossacks, living outside the areas of Cossack domination.

Drahomanov was undoubtedly impressed by the *Khlopomany* (Peasant-lovers) movement led by Volodymyr Antonovych. In the 1850s and 1860s this group of young populists descended from the Polonized nobility engaged in educational and cultural work among the peasants in Right-Bank Ukraine. Perhaps inspired by their compassionate help of the poor and uneducated, Drahomanov argued that the old horizons of national consciousness had to be extended to include all parts of Ukraine. The intelligentsia had to become more sensitive to the plight of all nationals, no matter where they lived, and then confront and solve their most immediate problems. Only after all had cooperated in tackling the grinding poverty and the illiteracy that devastated the lives of so many and precluded the prospect of change, could the intelligentsia proceed to larger, more complex political and national issues.

In the second piece presented here, Drahomanov the political theorist outlines his program for the constitution of a reconstructed Russian Empire. 'The most distinctive feature of Drahomanov's draft constitution was that (as in the constitutions of the United States and of Switzerland)

the number of states (regions) were to have a sphere of competence inviolable by the federal government ... What Drahomanov proposed here was ... the division of sovereignty between the federal union and the regions' (Rudnytsky: 244). These regions Drahomanov, without judging solely by ethnicity, geography, or hegemony, carved out of long-established nations and out of areas to which there were conflicting historical claims. He was soon made to feel the excoriating censure of nationalists of all stripes – not that their commendation had ever been his goal, since as a socialist he was openly disdainful of exclusiveness and eager to praise any solidarity forged between classes, between different parts of a country, and between groups in different countries. Drahomanov was remembered in both Western Ukraine, for which he showed great concern, and Eastern Ukraine as a constitutional liberal, a persuasive critic of imperialism, and a scholar of international stature.

An important contribution to the present anthology is a brief discussion of denationalization by the internationally known Ukrainian linguist Oleksander Potebnia. Just as Drahomanov argued against the centralization of power in Russian hands, so Potebnia took on the linguists who favoured the adoption of Russian by all non-Russian speakers. Many people believed that the development of so-called national minorities in the empire would be senselessly retarded if they were to agree with nationalistic arguments against accepting the language of the dominant, the wealthiest, and the most cultivated nation. Potebnia, however, pointedly insists on the irreparable damage that would result if the linguists, no matter how well-intentioned, were in charge. Children taught in a language other than their own, bureaucrats required to function in another language, and writers compelled to create in another language would begin to regard themselves in the way their language was regarded by the linguists, as inferior and primitive. The undermining of their psychological stability and the sapping of their moral strength would be accomplished all too neatly and non-violently. And how then could their progress be encouraged? Potebnia also elaborates on the unforeseen dangers to the dominant language. Linguistic unity, if realizable, would prove unfortunate to Russian, since the fire and force of the language, without the opportunity to interact with other active languages and dialects, would be starved rather than fed. If not totally extinguished, the dominant language would be altered in unpredictable ways, since speakers forced to abandon their own language would eventually introduce unanticipated changes into their adopted language. Indeed, the farther Russia spread its linguistic tentacles, the greater the likelihood that it could not sustain its power or its character.

Potebnia was no political or cultural activist, and he avoided politics after two of his brothers died fighting on the side of the rebels in the Polish uprising of 1863. Yet there are many indications from the people who knew Potebnia that he was at one time a fervent Ukrainian patriot. He published studies of Ukrainian folk-songs. His poetics influenced Russian symbolist poets. Dmitrii N. Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky (1853–1920) notes in his memoirs that Potebnia stopped believing in the effectiveness of the Ukrainian movement in Russia. Many others too lost their faith as a result of constant oppression.

Because many Ukrainian intellectuals were principally concerned with the relations between Ukraine and Russia, and also for reasons of space, some well-known figures have been omitted from the anthology. They include the economist Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky (1865–1919), the sociologist Maksym Kovalevsky (1851–1916) – both of whom, like Potebnia, wrote occasionally on Ukrainian topics but contributed mainly to the imperial culture of Russia – Serhii Podolynsky (1850–91), a socialist to the left of Drahomanov, and Volodymyr Antonovych, whose important *Moia ispoved* (My Confession, 1862), because of its polemics, would have required massive annotation.

The nineteenth-century Ukrainian prose writers were mostly populists. Lacking political parties and subject to the surveillance of all social and cultural activities by the authorities, they resorted to propagating their views in their novels and short stories. Because of the ban on Ukrainian publications on the Left Bank, their works often appeared in Austrian-held Galicia. Among these writers were Ivan Nechui-Levytsky and Borys Hrinchenko. Their literary works were mediocre, but some of their ideas, expressed in pamphlets, reflect the mood of the times. After years of shoring up the rickety bridge between their two cultures and countries, Ukrainian thinkers could no longer believe in and publicly testify to the value of a close relationship with Russia. Following the Ems ukase they abandoned the intellectual contortions involved in such an attempt to affirm the unaffirmable. Though at first Nechui-Levytsky, Hrinchenko, and others had no real alternative to propose, they insisted that their fellow Ukrainians turn away from Russia.

Ivan Nechui-Levytsky was a popular novelist of the realist school. In some of his novels he created the figures of young Ukrainian intellectuals of a populist persuasion and with markedly anti-Russian attitudes. In 1891 he published in Lviv, which was then in Austria-Hungary, a lengthy treatise entitled *Ukrainstvo na literaturnykh pozvakh z Moskovshchynoiu* (Ukrainianism's Literary Summons against Muscovitism), in which his



main thesis was that Russian literature had hindered the development of Ukrainian literature. It is a rambling work which at one point discusses Chinese and Oriental literature. The passage included in this collection underlines the author's conviction that the Russians can offer nothing but years of intensified Russification, during which the oppressed will feel on their backs and in their souls the intolerance of Russians towards all who neither share nor endorse their thoughts, actions, and beliefs. Also worthy of note is the blame Nechui-Levytsky casts on Ukrainians for their docile acceptance of the treatment visited on them by their occupiers.

Borys Hrinchenko was another realist novelist and the compiler of the first large Ukrainian dictionary. In the piece reprinted here, he presents himself as the ordinary, unscholarly type of Ukrainian who believes his country has a right to an independent existence. Lashing out at what he calls the 'Moscophilism' of the older generation, Hrinchenko directs his ire against Panteleimon Kulish, who argued in favour of Ukrainian-Russian collaboration. Especially galling were Kulish's muckraking assessment of the Cossacks and his assumption that Ukraine could turn away from the lawlessness of the past only if it found inspiration in the elevated culture and modern practices of statehood belonging to Russia. Hrinchenko's defence of the Ukrainian cause shows the vehemence of his response to the unconvincing arguments of Kulish and to those 'Ukrainophile' populists who 'believed that it was possible to be committed simultaneously to their "narrower" Ukrainian homeland and to the broader all-Russian society' (Subtelny 2: 284). His spirited attack is a sample of a kind of polemics that generally went unreported.

Ukrainian cultural life in Galicia, under Austrian rule, was flourishing in comparison to that in the Russian-dominated part of the country. Ukrainians in Galicia, who were usually called Ruthenians (*rusyny*), had the right to be educated in Ukrainian, to publish books and periodicals in Ukrainian, to organize reading clubs open to everybody, and to use Ukrainian in the courts and in government offices. And in the 1860s, Ukrainians began to participate in the political process by sending representatives to the provincial assembly in Lviv and to the national parliament in Vienna. While Moscow's autocratic regime stifled libertarian aspirations and the development of political trends and parties, the constitutional monarchy of Vienna promoted these manifestations of a national culture. Intellectually more alert and mature, Western Ukraine remains even today the source of a lively current of Occidental thought in Ukraine.

Not all obstacles to progress in Galicia could be overcome easily. The peasants could not surmount the overcrowded living conditions and pov-

erty; they could only escape from them, by emigrating or finding seasonal employment elsewhere. And the more privileged, better-educated groups split into factions, divided by clashing views of their identity and social, political, or cultural priorities. Some chose to ally themselves with Russia. Others, like Stepan Kachala, were drawn to Poland because of the historical involvement of that country with Ukraine. Ukrainian-Polish relations, which have recently been re-examined by Polish scholars, occupy far less space in this book than do Ukrainian-Russian relations, but the short excerpt from Kachala's book presents both the Ukrainians' grievances against the Poles and their desire to find accommodation with them. The final Galician group, represented here by Ivan Franko, was committed to Ukrainian nationalism; its goal was to work on behalf of a separate and distinct Ukrainian nation, which was at that time still divided and under foreign domination.

Ivan Franko is usually regarded as the second-greatest Ukrainian writer, after Shevchenko. The son of a blacksmith in Galicia, he studied at Lviv University. Early in his youth he became politically active among the Galician radicals. He was arrested several times for inciting the peasants to rebellion. He corresponded with Drahomanov and became an ardent socialist. He belonged to various groups and circles, ranging from populist to radical revolutionary. His early poetry is marked by revolutionary fervour, and some of his prose depicts conditions among the working class. For a time he collaborated as a journalist on several Polish newspapers. Along with Drahomanov, Franko founded the Ukrainian Radical Party in Galicia and, later, the National Democratic Party, but eventually he disagreed with his mentor over the latter's belief in a Ukrainian-Russian union. In 1893 Franko defended a doctoral dissertation at Vienna University, but his political reputation prevented his being granted an academic appointment in Lviv. Franko was well acquainted with the writings of Marx and Engels, whom he criticized. After 1894 he began a close collaboration with Mykhailo Hrushevsky in the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and was the de facto editor of *Literaturno-naukovy vistyky* (The Literary and Scientific Herald), which became the most prominent journal in Ukraine. After 1908 his health deteriorated. His funeral in Lviv in 1916 turned into a popular demonstration.

Franko left many poetic, prose, and dramatic works, and his scholarly activity was prodigious. His collected works amount to fifty volumes. He was an extremely gifted journalist, a keen political theorist and activist, and a creative artist of the first rank. His impact on his contemporaries was immense, and his later reputation in both Western and Eastern Ukraine

was never questioned. In the short piece printed here, which he wrote in 1900, Franko sees national factors as predominating over economic and social factors. Unlike Drahomanov, he believes that the people will be liberated from poverty if they stress political independence over economic growth. Attentive to the seductive argument of contemporary positivism that benefits from the entrepreneurial success of the middle and upper classes pass down to the people at large, he finds this early version of 'trickle-down economics' seriously flawed. Even in the Ukrainian context it is clear that the prosperous few, those Franko calls 'domestic tycoons,' are so preoccupied with enriching themselves amid the stability their positivist ideology has constructed that they show no concern for the general good of their country. An economic restructuring is needed in Ukraine but will occur only when the exploiters, foreign as well as domestic, are removed. But this purge depends upon an upsurge of interest in and support for vaster, more intangible dreams of nationhood and independence, and a concomitant decline in smaller, more practical and pragmatic projects aimed squarely at raising the standard of living. It is small wonder that the Soviet authorities later banned this piece, which also demonstrates Franko's vigorous journalistic style and keen insight into the history and character of Ukraine.

Notwithstanding the tsarist government's restrictive policies, the first Ukrainian political party, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), was established in 1900 in Kharkiv. Most of its members were students who were admirers of the young Ukrainian lawyer Mykola Mikhnovsky. At their request he wrote a tract, *Samostiina Ukraina* (An Independent Ukraine), in the form of a speech. The work is full of demands for political independence made on historical and legal grounds. Drawing on the perspective of modern legal scholarship and the contemporary understanding of international law, Mikhnovsky read the treaty of Pereiaslav as a contract-agreement signed by two separate, independent nations which later was abrogated by the unauthorized activities of one of the signatories. When Ukraine entered into the compact with Russia, it was a country neither conquered by Russia nor acquired by diplomatic means; Khmelnytsky sought and was willing to pay for Russia's protection, and had no intention – as the Russians so long had insisted – that his country become subject to the tsar. The consequent degradation and exploitation of Ukraine was the result not of a voluntary surrender of rights guaranteed in the treaty – a formal renunciation never occurred – but of the Russians' wilful disregard of their treaty obligations. Faced with such a mockery of justice and law, the Ukrainians would be justified in annulling the treaty and restoring their

independence. But they are criminally prevented from acting on their legal right. In fact, the Russians, like the devil quoting scripture, argue legalistically against the right of the Ukrainians even to complain about what has befallen them and their country.

Although Mikhnovsky's brochure proved too radical for RUP, it did reflect a radicalization among the intelligentsia at the beginning of the twentieth century, a process Mikhnovsky wanted to encourage. Speaking to the young, he expressed his delight and surprise at the emergence of a new, dynamic, and idealistic generation of concerned Ukrainians from a mass that evidently had not shared the demoralization of the old intelligentsia. To avoid the unenviable fate of the old, the young were urged to abandon their vision of the past, a limited vision the exhaustion of which was guaranteed by the inability of fathers to accept the new ideas and programs of their children. The young, therefore, ought to feel no obligation to their elders, to those who preferred to identify themselves as Ukrainophiles rather than Ukrainians. Instead, they ought to stand up for a free, united, and independent country of their own and commit themselves to a long and bitter struggle towards that end. Mikhnovsky's rousing conclusion, in which he rallies his young warriors for the rigours ahead, could perhaps also have been intended to deal with one major problem among the youth, the seductive drawing power of the activism of Russian revolutionary groups. One way of stemming the possible haemorrhage of support among the students who dreamed of a life of action was to devise a program of political change so drastic and substantial and desirable that the prospect of the years of intense dedication, labour, and sacrifice needed for success would appeal to them.

In the course of time RUP moved away from the idea of national independence, and it transformed itself into the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party. In 1900 Mikhnovsky's brochure was printed in Lviv, in Galicia, where he was often called the 'father of Ukrainian nationalism,' despite the fact that the Galician Iulian Bachynsky had laid a claim to that title five years earlier. 'With regard to the separatist concept, its earliest literary expressions are to be found in the pamphlets *Ukraina irredenta* by Iulian Bachynsky and *An Independent Ukraine* by Mykola Mikhnovsky. Starting from different premises, each author reached the idea of Ukrainian statehood independently. Bachynsky employed economic arguments within a Marxist frame of reference, while Mikhnovsky reasoned from historical and legal standpoints' (Rudnytsky: 391).

Not all the younger generation answered the call to pledge themselves above all to the Ukrainian cause. Bohdan Kistiakovsky, the grandson of a

village priest and the son of a jurist and professor of criminal law at Kiev University, followed in the footsteps of his distinguished father in his significant service to both Russian and Ukrainian intellectual history. Representative of the growing but still numerically weak Ukrainian intelligentsia, he and his father were driven for many reasons to participate in a culture not their own – and for them the significance and high level of achievement of Russian culture was as important as the rewards for high performance in it – but were also stirred to explore the roots of Ukrainian language, feeling, and thought and to encourage others in the schools, the professions, and the arts to establish the distinctiveness that so long had been denied them. Neither father nor son supported any extreme form of nationalism, but both were strong advocates of Ukrainian cultural autonomy.

Bohdan Kistiakovsky dallied briefly with Marxism, but he had rejected it by the end of the nineteenth century, when he was completing his education in Germany. Many scholars and thinkers, including Max Weber, found his work impressive, but an academic career seemed closed to him, for the Russian authorities could not forgive him his youthful commitment and sent his wife into exile for her political activities. After returning to Germany, Kistiakovsky joined with Peter B. Struve in editing the liberal Russian émigré journal *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation) and in working for constitutionalism in the Russian Empire, a goal that later led him to join the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party. Liberal reform in Russia would, he originally hoped, spur on Ukrainian cultural independence as well as the growth in number and self-confidence of an elite that would direct the intellectual life of Ukraine. His ultimate disappointment with Russian liberalism is perhaps adumbrated in the polemic in which Kistiakovsky criticized his friend and colleague Struve for a Russian chauvinism intolerant of Ukrainian and Belo-russian linguistic, artistic, and cultural aspirations. Struve predicted that the stature of Russia, the new country he saw rising from the ashes of a failed imperialist policy, would be unalterably diminished were its cultural unity to be undermined by nationalist movements. The single culture had to be an all-Russian culture, a position Kistiakovsky politely but firmly demolished by reminding his liberal friend that Russian language and culture had been and continued to be forcibly imposed and by predicting, as Potebnia had before him, the disastrous consequences of its continued imposition. Kistiakovsky's arguments, as well as those to which he responded, still resonate today, and not just in Eastern Europe.

The beginning of the new century saw great changes in Russia. The 1905 revolution brought political reforms. In Ukraine, censorship was abolished

and political activity resumed. In Ukrainian literature modernism successfully challenged realism and populism. Increasingly, the winds of change from Western Europe reached Ukraine. The Ukrainian language, which in 1903 in Kiev, according to Ievhen Chykalenko, was spoken at home by only eight families belonging to the intelligentsia, became more widely used. In February 1905 the Russian Academy of Sciences acknowledged Ukrainian as a separate language. Ukrainian publications and presses multiplied. The Duma debated Ukrainian affairs.

A new generation of national leaders came to the fore led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a towering figure in Ukrainian historiography and politics. A pupil of Antonovych, he was a professor of history at Lviv University from 1894 to 1914, although his main interest lay in Eastern Ukraine. He published scores of articles and collections and wrote the multivolume *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (A History of Ukraine Rus', 1898–1937). A product of the populist school of historians, he developed his own broad scheme of Ukrainian history, outlining its independent development from Kievan Rus' to the present.

Hrushevsky the politician was a populist liberal with socialist leanings. In March 1917 he returned to Kiev, where he was unanimously elected the head of the Central Rada, a representative body of Ukrainian political parties at that time. He was associated with the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, which had a majority in the Central Rada, and became a key figure in the development of the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–18) and the head of the Ukrainian government. After its collapse he emigrated to the West, but in 1924 he returned to Soviet Ukraine, where he continued his scholarly activity until his exile in 1931. He died in 1934 in Kislovodsk.

Hrushevsky's 'A Free Ukraine,' written after the fall of the Romanov dynasty, when power in Russia passed into the hands of the Provisional Government, demonstrates the liberating effect of the February Revolution on Ukrainian thought. He simply but exultantly exclaims, 'There is no longer a Ukrainian question.' No longer do Ukrainians have to seek recognition for their distinct identity, or plead meekly for the basic minimum needed to entrench their cultural differences, or labour vainly in another's vineyard. With the overthrow of the tsar and the collapse of the Russian Empire the time has come for Ukrainians to act, to act boldly and decisively. The time for moderate expectations has passed, and the old, modest desires are to be replaced with the extreme demands and radical prospects that hope for the future so often generates. And Ukrainian leaders, with their fingers on the racing pulse of a people exhilarated by the revolution-

ary pace of events, must project the country's new image of self-confidence and self-reliance. Without waiting for the Russian Provisional Government to decide the fate of their country, they must proclaim not just the autonomy of Ukraine but its sovereignty, and must present a realistic plan for the future operation of their new state. If they fail to announce forthrightly their status as a state within 'a democratic Russian republic' and are slow to begin setting in place governing bodies and procedures, then all the closet imperialists in the Provisional Government – and even the most liberal Russian, in Hrushevsky's eyes, was first and foremost a Russian centralist – will join with their less masked colleagues to doubt the sincerity of their rebellious Little Russian brothers and to question the practicality of any plan of theirs that allows for anything more than limited self-rule. These centralists, Hrushevsky bluntly states, must be made to realize that the only alternative to statehood Ukrainians are willing to consider is separation and total independence.

The final section of his article addresses an issue no leader or thinker before Hrushevsky had dared to formulate plainly or had needed to face squarely: the place of minorities in a free Ukraine. 'The defenders of Ukrainian nationality will be no nationalists' is the statement with which he assures others that Russian intolerance will not be replaced by Ukrainian chauvinism. Minorities will have the right to cultural and national self-determination, and in return they ought to support the Ukrainian bid for a broadly autonomous state and not obstruct the effort or remain neutral observers. But Hrushevsky is quick to point out that the rule of law will prevail in the new Ukraine and will protect everyone from being forced to support the Ukrainian cause or from being punished for failing to support it. The new laws will guarantee rights the lawmakers themselves had so long been denied. To contravene these laws would be both morally wrong and, given the Ukrainians' attempts to win sympathy and support from all enlightened nations, tactically stupid.

Hrushevsky explains in the second selection why he must solicit vigorously the support of other ethnic groups. Much of the support for Ukrainian nationalism was in the countryside; in all the major urban and industrial centres outside Austrian-controlled Western Ukraine the population was predominantly non-Ukrainian. Their lack of sympathy for and, at times, open hostility towards the idea of a Ukrainian state had to be confronted. The Russians living in Ukraine are therefore told by Hrushevsky not to doubt the Ukrainians' national intentions, but are also given time to decide whether to leave the country or to become citizens of the new Ukraine. The Jews, unlike the Russians, will neither leave nor assimilate,

but Hrushevsky explains why it is in their best interest to support the Ukrainian cause. Only if they accept all the responsibilities of citizenship will they enjoy full equality and thereby win a free hand in preserving and developing their culture and nationality.

Because the Jews too must be given time to decide their future, Hrushevsky denounces publicly the anti-Semitism that once again has surfaced in his country. He also informs the Jewish minority how to contribute to defusing the animosity and sporadic violence that has for centuries marked the relationship between them and the Ukrainians. Jewish prejudices against the majority must be admitted and eliminated, and their habitual, pragmatically driven leaning towards the richer, more influential Russians, whom they perceive as more open-handed, must be corrected. How the Ukrainians can help build a new understanding is not spelled out; Hrushevsky, who had Jews in his government, only urges his fellow Ukrainians not to blame all the Jews for the hateful actions of some Jewish Bolsheviks. He, of course, is not directing his remarks to the majority, which may explain why he insists the Jews understand the Ukrainian perspective that lays much of the blame for anti-Semitism on the attitudes and behaviour of the Jews themselves and, during the Khmelnytsky era, on the Poles. Yet without a more balanced, even-handed treatment that does not inculcate the victims – something to which we are more sensitive today – and does not minimize the responsibility of any of the parties, the important discussion initiated by Hrushevsky was fated to generate more heat than light. Today, fortunately, this issue is at rest.

Although the government led by Hrushevsky proclaimed independence in January 1918, Ukraine had clung to federation even through the days of the October Revolution of 1917. This was made clear by the proclamation of the Third Universal on 20 November 1917. The federalist tradition dated back to the 1840s. It had its ablest spokesman in Drahomanov, and it had the support of most intellectuals. Thus, a major historian concludes: 'In trying to assess the comparative influence of the federalist and separatist alternatives in pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thinking, one must admit that the former was by far the more important. Not only did federalism enjoy chronological priority, but its theories were more impressively elaborated' (Rudnytsky: 391–2). Only the whirlwind events of a revolution would finally tip the scales in favour of independence.

The second half of 1917 passed swiftly. The federalist concept (of the Central Rada) had already been undermined by the insincere and ambiguous policy of the Russian Provisional Government towards Ukraine. Then Bolshevik aggression delivered the deathblow to this traditional Ukrainian



ideology. Hrushevsky called this great upheaval in Ukrainian political thought 'purification by fire.' Faced by the invading Red Army to the north and the German army to the west, the Central Rada issued the Fourth Universal on 22 January 1918, proclaiming Ukraine an independent and sovereign republic. The government was to be the Council of People's Ministers. The Fourth Universal also called for new elections, immediate peace negotiations with the Central Powers, the dissolution of the army in favour of the militia, the 'transfer of land to the toiling masses, without payment,' and state control over all banks. Some of the language ('the toiling masses,' and so on) still harkens back to doctrinaire socialism, but, as many have pointed out, the most important sentence in the document was this one: 'Henceforth, the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes an independent, free and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people, subject to no one.'

A few days after this proclamation Kiev fell to the Bolsheviks, and the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic retreated to the west. On 9 February 1918 a peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was signed at Brest-Litovsk with the consent of the Bolsheviks. Soon after, the Germans entered Ukraine and supported the establishment of the new Ukrainian government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. Ukrainian independence was immediately threatened, but the Fourth Universal proclaimed on 22 January 1918 had made a deep impression on the Ukrainian psyche.

A prominent leader of the Central Rada was Volodymyr Vynnychenko. A complex personality and a leading prose writer and dramatist of the day, he espoused the motto 'honesty with oneself,' which did not help his activity as a politician to whom compromise was often a virtue. Standing well to the left of Hrushevsky and Symon Petliura (see Vynnychenko's diary, first published in Canada in the 1980s), Vynnychenko toyed with the idea of collaborating with the Bolsheviks. In a published letter in 1920, he praised communism as 'a higher harmony of the psychic and physical forces of man, an honesty with oneself,' but his offer of collaboration was rejected by Moscow.

A war of national liberation lasted in Ukraine until 1920. Divided among themselves (supporting Petliura, Skoropadsky, or the anarchist leaders Nestor Makhno, Matvii Hryhoriiv, and others) and unclear about their war aims, Ukrainians eventually fell under Soviet rule. A large but not decisive part in its establishment was played by the Ukrainian communists (the Borotbists and the Bolsheviks).

After 1920, a great many Ukrainian intellectuals (among them Vynnychenko and Hrushevsky) emigrated to Western Ukraine and Europe. As

before, they continued their work in exile, and their work often reflects a different intellectual milieu from that existing under the Soviets. One of the émigrés was Viacheslav Lypynsky. Many of the ideas of this critic of democracy and advocate of monarchy seem impractical today, especially after the mass destruction of the *kurkuli* (well-to-do peasants) in Ukraine, who were to be a possible leading class. But his impact on Ukrainian historiography and political thought was profound. 'The concept of the primacy of Ukrainian statehood as the prerequisite for the existence of the Ukrainian nation was re-introduced into Ukrainian intellectual thought by Viacheslav Lypynsky' (Pritsak: 260). This statement by Pritsak confirms that, after the reign of populism in nineteenth-century Ukraine, when the peasants (*narod*) were the focus of attention, the concept of other ruling classes (the Cossacks, for example, as represented in *Istoriia Rusov*) was reintroduced into Ukrainian intellectual history. What precisely Lypynsky's political ideology was we learn chiefly from the splendid volume of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (December 1985) devoted to Lypynsky, and from the writings of Rudnytsky, who believes that Lypynsky's value lay in perceiving that any future Ukrainian state would have to be pluralistic, with the leading role assigned to the agrarian or industrial classes. Lypynsky, like the American longshoreman and philosopher Eric Hoffer, distrusted intellectuals holding power. 'Ukraine's struggle for independence could not succeed without the support of a part of the historical nobility' (Rudnytsky: 450). How prophetic this insight was we can see in contemporary developments such as the 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence, which was supported by Leonid Kravchuk and other former communists who comprised the elite.

In the excerpts from *Lysty* (*Letters*) printed here, Lypynsky begins by grappling honestly with the distance between theory and fact, between ideal vision and actual accomplishment. He lists the various possibilities for Ukraine's future development presented by monarchists, socialists, Marxists, and others. The visions of all these groups are theoretically valid and viable, for they evolve logically and rationally from solid, unquestionable premises. But no matter how impressive or inevitable the contending possibilities appear, only the vision that seizes upon a body of people compelled by non-rational, elemental forces to establish themselves as a nation and captures their wholehearted commitment will actually emerge victorious. In addition to an inspiring vision, what Lypynsky calls a 'national aristocracy' composed of one or more elite groups is needed to oversee and organize the entire process of nationalization. No impersonal philosophical principles, historical forces, or socio-economic laws operate here. There are

too many ethnic communities with separate territories and distinct cultures that have never realized their national dreams because they have lacked activist elites determined to preside over the birth of a nation and to create, or at the very least articulate, its ethos.

Turning specifically to his native land, Lypynsky attributes the failure of the process of nation-building to the predominance of one elite group, the intelligentsia, who ascended prematurely and thus tragically to power after the country was first organized by a military elite but before it could prosper under the sway of its agrarian elite. The noble landowners once had a role to play but all too soon were denationalized, drawn into the orbits of Poland and Russia, and so remained too distant psychologically and morally from their roots to promote the productive socio-economic growth their counterparts had fostered in Europe. Yet buoyed somewhat by the Skoropadsky Hetmanate, Lypynsky hopes for the revival of a nationally conscious and concerned agrarian elite, widened in modern times to include landowning peasants, and for their organization of Ukrainian society into what he calls a 'classocratic' structure, that is, a traditional system of organically related classes which help one another but also work together harmoniously and idealistically to serve the best interests of the nation.

The classical conservatism of Lypynsky's thought, similar to Kulish's but broader, deeper, and more systematic, accounts for his high estimation of the farming elite and the best, the most aristocratic, of their values. It also explains why he prefers the classocratic structure to the crude, totalitarian rule of a few military strong men over an unorganized populace – the latter structure he labels 'ochlocratic.' Lypynsky also criticizes the democratic structure built by the modern intelligentsia, in which too many political parties vie to win and retain power by placating all lobby groups with hasty, ill-conceived compromises. Not only the ad hoc, chaotic, and unfocused activity of a democratic system is deplored, but also the unfortunate result of the modern intelligentsia's flirtation with populism and more radical movements. Like many sober conservatives, Lypynsky predicts the enslaving rather than liberating consequences of involvement with revolutionaries, the eventual restoration of tyranny, albeit in a new guise, rather than the inauguration of the promised and desired equality and liberty.

Another émigré was Dmytro Dontsov. Born in Eastern Ukraine, Dontsov developed his doctrine of 'integral nationalism' in Lviv, under Polish rule. He was a prolific journalist and essayist who began his career as a writer before the revolution of 1917. He was known for his impassioned style. As a political activist he moved from socialism to nationalism,

always extremely hostile to the Russia of the past and the present. His influence in Galicia, where he edited the literary journal *Vistnyk* (The Herald, 1933–9), was strongest on young people. His ideas laid the philosophical underpinnings for the activity of the underground political movement OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). His writings were regarded by some as fascist. The excerpt from *Nationalism* printed here offers a sample of Dontsov's militant voluntarism and commitment.

Depressed by the inability to establish a nation-state in a time of revolutionary upheaval, Dontsov blamed the modern liberal intelligentsia for the failure, like Lypynsky criticizing their faith in logic, rationality, and the inevitable progress of civilization. But all too soon he began to elevate and celebrate what his conservative contemporary had come to fear. Whereas Lypynsky had castigated the liberals for not being far-sighted enough, for not seeing the barbarity to which the violent, revolutionary sweeping away of the past would lead, Dontsov flailed them for not practising the violence they had theoretically accepted as necessary, for being weak and passive rather than strong and aggressive, for lacking fervour in the nationalist cause they espoused rather than committing themselves fanatically to victory at any price. Even though Dontsov hated with characteristic passion all Russians and all things Russian, he held up Lenin and his Bolsheviks as models, whose anger, lack of compassion, arrogance, and determination to impose their ideas and programs on others should be imitated. Not just the strength of the revolutionary radicals and their will were valued, but also their attitude towards the people; unlike the populists of the preceding century, who respected the masses, the new leaders of the twentieth century saw themselves as superior to the people, as the teachers and leaders of the masses, whom they would manipulate and even brutalize if the people failed to profit from their harsh education and failed to accept the higher good they were shown.

Dontsov was much admired by his readers both for his fiery political writing and for brilliant literary profiles of Lesia Ukrainka and Mykola Khvylovy, but his views nevertheless drew objections from some Christian and moderate Ukrainian writers. The seductiveness of his ideas to the politically disenchanted university students of the 1920s and 1930s was amply demonstrated, but the disastrous implications of his fierce brand of anti-democratic nationalism became apparent only later, when the terror he approved to free his nation of foreign occupiers was too easily directed against Ukrainians themselves in efforts to secure through intimidation the political dominance of one nationalist organization over another. Conceived as an answer to the communist dictatorship, Dontsov's ideas had a

potential for totalitarianism, and his ideology of integral nationalism drew some sharp criticism from his contemporaries (such as Osyp Nazaruk) as well as from later journalists in the diaspora (such as Bohdan Cymbalista and Mykhailo Sosnovsky). Sosnovsky's scholarly 'political portrait' of Dontsov, published in 1974, is the best account of Dontsov's life and work.

Curiously enough, Dontsov's style is reminiscent of that of a Soviet Ukrainian writer, Mykola Khvylovy, with whom he often tangled in a debate that raged in the 1920s. Khvylovy was a member of the Communist Party as well as a strong nationalist, and this charismatic figure dominated much of the literary life and, by implication, the political life in Soviet Ukraine. Both his fictional and his non-fictional writings brought to an end, unfortunately, an important phase in Ukrainian thought that had originated in the last decades of the preceding century. Like many of the illustrious predecessors and contemporaries praised in his pamphlets, Khvylovy rejected the Ukrainian populist legacy, especially the pressure placed on artists to depict the people's way of life, to expose the people's most pressing needs, and to illustrate through their artistic works the claims to national cultural distinctiveness. Khvylovy was too independent and too radical to support the national cause by upholding tradition. He looked forward rather than backward, wanting to renovate and revitalize the country, to modernize its art, and to broaden the horizons of Ukrainian thought. He urged young thinkers, artists, and activists to plunge into the European mainstream of the twentieth century. In the West they would find as models intelligent, civic-minded, dynamic women and men who were impressed by the presence and power of new ideas even though the interests of their own established groups were threatened by what the ideas suggested and sponsored. All these European types were variants of the Faust archetype, the perpetually unsatisfied, curious, and searching innovator whom Khvylovy wanted Ukrainians to emulate.

Khvylovy also addressed the important question of art's function in a revolutionary and post-revolutionary society. He opposed the parochial approach of the communists, who spoke of art as serving the proletariat but meant it to become a tool to inform and sway the uneducated masses. If Ukrainian art were reduced to propaganda, then the nation would be unable to overcome its cultural backwardness. And to the timid, who fifty years after Kostomarov still echoed the master's position that Ukrainians, because of the artistic advances of their Russian brothers, need not waste time and effort attempting to change the substance and status of what is basically a folk culture, Khvylovy opposed the desire he sensed in his people for total liberation; just as they have longed to become an independent

political power, so too have they desired to reach the artistic heights already scaled by European artists. Nothing less than the 'full flowering' of Ukrainian art was acceptable to Khvylovy, whose call for artistic quality, originality, and modernity matched the more subdued but no less revolutionary thought and practice of Panteleimon Kulish, a writer and thinker he considered the unacknowledged bright star shining out of the dark Ukrainian past.

His pamphlets, parts of which appear in this collection, contributed to the so-called Literary Discussion, which he initiated in 1925. The main issues in this debate, the last free debate for over fifty years, were whether art and literature should be created by the masses for the masses, and whether art should orient itself towards Russia or the West. Khvylovy attacked mass culture, preached cultural elitism, and called on Ukrainian writers to turn away from Russia and towards Western Europe. In colourful language he pointed out both Ukraine's provincialism and Russia's desire to dominate, and advanced some highly bizarre prophecies of the coming of an 'Asiatic renaissance.' In his insightful introduction to the first complete edition of Khvylovy in the West, George Y. Shevelov demonstrates that Khvylovy was under the influence of Oswald Spengler's cyclic theory of history and appreciation of the Faustian spirit of Western Europe. Shevelov also analyses Khvylovy's style, which, in his opinion, has something in common with the technique of the cinema. Khvylovy advanced a new theory of 'Romantic vitalism,' with emphasis on an experimental mixture of styles. He himself continually changed tone and technique in his pamphlets and surprised the reader with a deliberate use of Russian and foreign words. Because of the serious political implications of his pamphlets, the Party could not tolerate his preaching the cultural and political independence of Ukraine from Russia, and Stalin himself, in a private letter to the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Lazar Kaganovich, condemned Khvylovy for 'running away from Moscow.'

Khvylovy was hounded by the official press for some time after the end of the Literary Discussion in 1928. His recantations did not help him, especially as he continued to lead the forces of opposition to the party's cultural policies (in the periodical *Literaturny iarmarok* [Literary Fair, 1929]). His career came to an end in May 1933, when he committed suicide as an act of protest and defiance.

Khvylovy's suicide was followed a few months later by the suicide of Mykola Skrypnyk, an influential member of the Ukrainian Politburo. He was an old Bolshevik who, though a native of Ukraine, spent most of his time in Russia, where he played a prominent political role. In 1917, on

Lenin's orders, he went to Ukraine, where he soon took up a leading position in the Soviet government of Ukraine. The impact, by the way, of Lenin and the Bolsheviks on Ukrainian history and thought must be noted. Their recognition of Soviet Ukraine as a separate republic, albeit with their own puppet government, was a radical departure in Russian policy towards Ukraine. And Lenin's policy towards non-Russian nationalities offered an opportunity for a spurt of growth in Ukrainian national consciousness. But the intense discussions on the national project that began after Lenin's death in 1924 were crushed by Stalin a few years later.

As commissar of education Skrypnyk was responsible for the policy of 'Ukrainianization' sponsored by Moscow. He used his position to foil Russian influence and became a secret advocate of 'national communism.' The excerpts selected from his speeches reveal how much more tolerant Skrypnyk was of opposition from outside the ranks of the Bolsheviks than from within. Too many obstructions to the implementation of Lenin's national policy remained after the long discussions of and the firm resolutions on the Communist Party's role in shaping and directing the independent cultural development of Ukraine. Party discipline had to be enforced and solidarity established, especially since the adherence to Lenin's direction would neutralize powerful accusations from Western Ukraine and Europe about the prolonged presence of Russification in Ukraine, where it insidiously thrived under the assumed mask of Ukrainianization, and in key areas of Russia, where sizeable minorities were still denied basic national rights.

In the early 1930s, however, Moscow changed course in its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities, and Skrypnyk came under attack. In January 1933, Pavel Postyshev, a special emissary from Stalin, came to supervise the communists in Ukraine. Sharp conflict soon developed between Postyshev and Skrypnyk, who was relieved of his duties as commissar of education. As a protest against the new policy Skrypnyk shot himself. He was formally 'rehabilitated' in the late 1950s, but his works were never republished, even though, or perhaps because, no one more than Skrypnyk attempted to reconcile Bolshevism with Ukrainian national ideals.

A prominent place in Ukrainian literature and culture belongs to women. In the 1880s, both in Russian Ukraine and, even more, in Western Ukraine, a distinct women's movement developed, manifest in many women's organizations devoted to education, day care, and the liberation of women. Natalia Kobrynska (1851-1920), in Austrian-ruled Ukraine, is regarded as the originator of this movement, and her feminism, influenced

by J.S. Mill, was sometimes allied with socialism. But often engaged along with men in the struggle for national independence, many women shunned the policies of extreme feminism. The best statement of the position of Ukrainian women is found in a 1934 speech by Milena Rudnytska. Looked at from our current perspective, her words and sentiments are not startling, yet the deep concern they express for the masses of peasant women is both remarkable and moving.

It would be impossible to encapsulate the history of Ukraine under Stalin. Suffice it to point out the many minuses as far as intellectual history is concerned. The country was completely traumatized by Stalin's terror, by the man-made famine among the peasants in 1932-3, and by the wholesale destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s. The Ukrainian communist elite was itself decimated, and Ukraine was virtually run as a colony from Moscow. It was no wonder, therefore, that some Ukrainian villages greeted the invading German army in 1941 with flowers. The Germans, however, saw Ukraine as their new *Lebensraum* and suppressed and exploited the population. Thereafter, Ukrainians resorted to guerrilla warfare.

The UPA, or *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia* (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), was first formed in Polissia in 1941 under the leadership of Taras Borovets, who used the pseudonym Bulba. It fought both German invaders and Soviet partisans. In 1943 this group was disbanded by a rival group, which also called itself the UPA and was loyal to Stepan Bandera. The latter group was supported by the old network of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in Western Ukraine. Some elements loyal to Andrii Melnyk, another leading nationalist leader, joined it, and in 1944 a chief council of liberation under the name *Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada* was formed as a political arm and controller of the UPA. In 1944 the UPA reached an understanding with the Polish underground army (AK, or *Armija Krajowa*). The military leader of the UPA was General Roman Shukhevych, who used the nom de guerre Taras Chuprynka and who died in battle in 1950. In the mid-1940s the UPA fought against the Germans and Soviet partisans, and later against the re-invading Red Army. One of its exploits was the attempted assassination of the Red Army commander General M. Vatutin. The UPA acted as a well-developed guerrilla organization and conducted raids against the enemy. Many divisions of the Red Army were used in the final defeat of the UPA. The UPA also printed leaflets and issued proclamations, many of them resembling the manifesto of the OUN offered here.

The second underground document included in this collection was



issued by the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada), formed in October 1941 in Kiev on the initiative of the OUN leader, Andrii Melnyk. It was headed by Professor M. Velychivsky. At the end of 1941 the Reichskommissariat banned the Ukrainian National Council, which continued to exist underground. In April 1944 it was augmented by members from Galicia and Transcarpathia. Note that the proclamation printed here was co-signed by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.

Both documents reiterate a desire to see an independent Ukrainian state – although it was a very inopportune moment in history – and both are directed against German and Soviet rule. The activity of the UPA must be seen against the wider background of the German invasion of Ukraine. The Germans allowed no Ukrainian political activity. Late in 1943 they permitted the formation of a military unit, the SS Galizien, under German command. This, perhaps, may be regarded as the only episode of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany, not counting the activity of some Ukrainian policemen executing German orders in concentration camps. On the whole, Ukrainians remained aloof from the Nazis, and the UPA fought against the German occupiers. Some Ukrainians hoped, rather naïvely, that at the end of the war the Germans and the Western Allies would form a common front against the Russians.

The new nationalist views are ably expounded and neatly presented in the third document from this period, an article by Petro Poltava, a leading member of the UPA. His principled as well as elegant statement reveals why he was his organization's most effective ideologist. Unfortunately little is known about his life, and like many others he probably perished during the Russian offensive against the Ukrainian insurgents. Another intellectual, who died after serving in the UPA, was Iurii Lypa (1900–44), a poet and prose writer and the author of some rather eccentric semi-historical tracts.

An important Soviet document of the post-Stalin era is printed here in abbreviated form. It is an excerpt from the 'theses' of the Communist Party on the significance of the Pereiaslav treaty of 1654. It is the best statement of the official Russian view of Ukrainian-Russian relations since that historic date. The telling but tiresome pro-Russian rhetoric begins with the opening celebration of Pereiaslav as the inevitable reunion of peoples sharing the same Russian stock and dominates the succeeding recitation and interpretation of all historical events since 1654. Though the benefits of the union for Russia are briefly mentioned, the leading role played by Russia in all the great struggles and conflicts faced by both members of the fraternal alliance is emphasized: Russia always seems to lead and to inspire Ukraine

towards its inevitable destiny. Even the tsarist government is more often aware of what is best for the Ukrainian people than their own leaders, though the most magnificent of the latter, like Shevchenko, were all friends and close allies, if not disciples, of Russian revolutionary democrats and Marxists. In this century, of course, the Communist Party has been responsible for building the Soviet system, in which inordinate opportunities for political, economic, and cultural progress have been generously bestowed upon Ukraine.

Perhaps it is appropriate here to summarize briefly Russia's attitude to Ukraine. Throughout the centuries Russia regarded Ukraine as an integral part of its territory and culture. The Russian writer Georgii Fedotov put it well when he wrote that Russia's task was 'not only to keep Ukraine in the body of Russia, but also to absorb Ukrainian culture in Russian culture ... to give shelter to the Little Russian tradition within the common-Russian culture' (*Litso Rossii* [1967]: 290-1). This opinion of a Russian émigré was echoed, though with a very different emphasis, by the Soviet scholar Dmitrii Likhachëv: 'Over the course of the centuries ... Russia and Ukraine have formed not only a political but also a culturally dualistic union. Russian culture is meaningless without Ukrainian, as is Ukrainian without Russian' (*Reflections on Russia* [1991]: 74).

Ukraine occupied a prominent place in Russian literature of the early nineteenth century. From Russian travellers (such as Shalikov, Izmailov, and Levshin), to whom Ukraine appeared as a 'second Italy,' to the leading Romantic writers (such as Ryleev and Pushkin), who noted its dedication to freedom, Ukraine was seen as a treasure house of folklore and history. Belinsky somewhat grudgingly praised stories written in 'Little Russian dialect' but attacked the poetry of Shevchenko, while his more radical followers Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov had good things to say about the Ukrainians' 'love of freedom.' In the second half of the century interest in Ukraine was somewhat diminished (in the works of A. Tolstoy, Leskov, and Chekhov, for example) but it revived in the twentieth century (in those of Kuprin, Bunin, and Gorky). Many Soviet writers, such as Bulgakov, Bagritsky, and Kataev, wrote about Ukraine, which once again was found appealing for its picturesqueness and lyricism. Polish writers, by the way, responded to the same qualities, and Ukraine was equally well represented in Polish literature.

But this attention given to the country, its people, and its culture was of course superficial. Much too often the short shrift Ukrainians received from the governments of their Slavic neighbours was accepted with little or no opposition from the most astute, sensitive, and cultured citizens of these countries. Many writers and intellectuals used Ukraine for their own pur-

poses, but few bothered to accord it the honest concern and rigorous examination its problems and potential demanded. Fedotov honestly admitted Russian condescension towards Ukraine: 'The awakening of Ukraine and especially the separatist character of Ukrainophilism amazed the Russian intelligentsia and, to the end, remained incomprehensible. First of all, because we loved Ukraine, its land, its people, and its songs and considered it our own. But also because we were interested to a criminally small degree in Ukraine's history over the past three to four centuries, during which time it developed a nationality and culture different from that of Great Russia' (*Rossia i svoboda* [1981]: 213). And the *Theses* of the Communist Party certainly reveal that the highly eventful decades of this century have had little or no impact on the traditional Russian attitude.

After the Second World War the intellectual flame of Ukraine was kept alive in the emigration, though few would have predicted the publication and discussion today in their homeland of the writings of such prominent émigrés as Mykola Shlemkevych, Iurii Lavrynenko, and Iurii Sherekh-Shevelov. Our choice to represent émigré thought is the poet Ievhen Malaniuk. He had been an active participant in the revolution of 1917 and an officer in Petliura's army. After 1920 he lived mostly in Prague and Warsaw. His poetry reflected not so much nostalgia for the lost country as anger over its loss. He was vehemently anti-Russian but also a stern critic of the Ukrainians' weaknesses, chief among them their political immaturity, their 'Little-Russianism.' As an essayist, Malaniuk devoted his time to Ukraine's cultural, political, and literary history. His comments on Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s drew a sharp Soviet reply. As a prominent contributor of poetry to *Vistnyk* he was Dontsov's follower. His style had rhetorical sweep but also allowed for sharp intellectual insights. Malaniuk eventually emigrated to the United States.

In his analysis of the Little Russian mentality Malaniuk names heredity and environment as having given rise to what he often compares to a noxious, infectious disease or a chronic illness that has incapacitated the elites of his country for centuries. The Russified and Polonized nobilities and the modern intelligentsia with their various 'philisms' all manifest the same self-mutilating national inferiority complex. These groups have forgotten their proud distant history, when they were confident and self-reliant and neither submitted to others nor depended on others to decide their destiny. For hundreds of years, with the single exception of the Mazepa era, too many Ukrainians have capitulated not just to the demands and expectations imposed by others but to the demands and expectations anticipated from others. Their submission without struggle has undermined and eventually paralysed the will and the thought of the best of the Ukrainians.

National humiliation is bolstered in the writer's day by the constant vulgarization and denigration of the culture and ethos of Ukraine by Soviet Russia and its minions. If a Ukrainian achievement cannot be mocked as primitive or marked as quaint, then it is expropriated and proclaimed a Russian or Soviet triumph. Malaniuk gives a lengthy list of such expropriations, and goes on to say that expropriation, together with the imposition of rigid cultural controls dictating the form and content of modern art, is one of the means employed to marginalize the Ukrainians by transforming them into 'the people of Ukraine.'

Healing can begin only with courageous admission by the Ukrainians of their debilitating psychic malady. If they no longer deny the extent and complexity of the disease, then perhaps they will come to feel the shame that stirred Shevchenko and even the rage ignited in him whenever he used the word 'Little Russian.' Only after they confront fully the slave mentality imposed on them but also supported by them can they begin on the road back to statehood, though there may be little left in their country to claim.

The consequences of Ukraine's age-long provincial and colonial status have been perceptively discussed by George Grabowicz. In his view, which offers a contemporary twist to Malaniuk's study of Little-Russianism, 'the most obvious and universal (although not necessarily the most essential) feature and consequence of the Ukrainian colonial experience is a deeply ingrained sense of dependence and of derivativeness (*vtorynnist*)' (Grabowicz: 31). Throughout the nineteenth century there was in Ukraine 'the virtually all-pervasive sense of dual loyalties and contexts' (ibid.: 32). Grabowicz faults Ukraine's colonial status for the strength of Ukrainian populism, which became the touchstone of all cultural and political action. Later, in the twentieth century, 'the conflation of provincialism and totalitarianism is the final and greatest trial in the Ukrainian historical experience ... Therefore, to believe that independence would turn all of this around one would have to believe in the fairy godmother' (ibid.: 34). The present danger is that 'the utter devaluation of things Ukrainian under the Soviet system is now being replaced by their uncritical apotheosis' (ibid.: 36).

Ivan Dziuba's work *Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia?* (Internationalism or Russification?) was a document of the Ukrainian dissident movement in the 1960s. It was written as a learned treatise supported with many footnotes and was a demonstration of the gap which existed at that time in Soviet Ukraine between Leninist theory and Brezhnevite practice. It documented the extreme centralization of power in Moscow and the Russification of Ukraine. Although never published in Ukraine, the work was

translated into English, French, and Italian. Dziuba defended Ukrainian national and cultural rights within the more general scope of human rights. Today he is one of the leading intellectuals in Ukraine, where he served until 1994 as minister of culture. Dissidents of the 1960s like Dziuba demonstrated that the dissident tradition in Ukrainian thought, started by Khvylovy in the 1920s, continued to attract the best minds among writers and critics. But only some of the later dissidents were lucky enough to avoid the fate of their predecessors, who perished in the purges or disappeared in the GULAG.

In 1989, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a movement for reconstruction in Ukraine, called Rukh (The Movement), was founded in Kiev. The movement was headed by the writer Ivan Drach. The founding of Rukh marked an important landmark in Ukrainian intellectual history. Led mostly by writers, the movement gathered wide support and became the mouthpiece of democratic reform. The organization's program encompassed virtually every aspect of cultural, social, and economic life in Ukraine, and addressed not just ethnic Ukrainians but all people living in Ukraine. It had many safeguards against abuse of power and in favour of human rights. Even after the splintering and demise of Rukh in 1992, its program remains a most eloquent democratic document.

On 27 May 1993 the Constitutional Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament submitted its revisions of a draft of the Constitution presented by the country's Supreme Council about a year earlier. After months of discussion the experts unveiled a broad vision of Ukraine's future, the substance of which resembles the substance of the Rukh program. Many of the best features of Western democracies were incorporated in the Constitutional Commission's detailed proposals for defining and protecting individual liberties, establishing the basic rights – political, social, economic, cultural – and duties of all citizens, legalizing private ownership and a market economy, and describing the different functions of the separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. But the document also reveals the inability of the Ukrainians to escape their Soviet past. The rhetoric of the constitutional articles unfortunately recalls the pretentious scientism as well as the overbearing omniscience of earlier Communist pronouncements – for example, 'Remuneration shall not be lower than the minimum level set by the state in consultation with trade unions and shall ensure a minimum living standard for an employee and his or her family which corresponds to the scientifically based physiological and social-cultural needs of the human being.' Moreover, the Soviet tendency, which can be traced back to the Russian past, to endorse government interference

with and control over the lives of its citizens remains apparent, as does the Soviet tendency to make grandiose proclamations of the inalienable rights of the people to full employment, subsidized housing and medical care, economic bounty, ecological cleanliness, and cultural diversity. By guaranteeing citizens more than it can deliver, the new Constitution displays a commendable desire to affirm the highest aspirations of the recent past, to which most of the old Communist leaders only paid lip service. And continuity is preferable to sudden radical change and to the drastic consequences of a complete rupture with a familiar social, economic, and political model.

Later constitutional drafts, according to the comments on the February 1996 draft submitted to the Constitutional Commission to the Supreme Rada by Judge Bohdan A. Futey of the United States Court of Federal Claims, support the basic commitment to human rights with considerable discussion on negative and positive rights, although the emphasis placed on positive rights could weaken Ukraine's ability to protect rights in general. Great attention is still devoted to the establishment of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, but Judge Futey notes that some 'fine tuning' may still be needed to provide an effective system of checks and balances, to guarantee the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, and even 'to clarify who ... has ultimate responsibility over the executive branch – the President, the Prime-Minister, or the Cabinet of Ministers.' Many improvements over earlier drafts are noted, including the recognition of the Supreme Court of Ukraine as the highest court of general jurisdiction, although a separate Constitutional Court is empowered to interpret laws and to determine whether laws and executive acts conform with the Constitution. The articles establishing the country's 'symbols of sovereignty' – the flag, anthem, capital city, and official language of the state – are unusual yet necessary constitutional provisions 'given Ukraine's experiences in the past.' And Judge Futey concludes his remarks judiciously, but with a hint of understandable and justifiable impatience, by calling on the country to celebrate the fifth anniversary of Ukraine's independence by adopting a Constitution: 'After an exhaustive drafting process, as well as commentary on those drafts, the time has come to act.' His impatience must have been shared by many Ukrainian legislators, for the Parliament did finally adopt a new Constitution on 28 June 1996.

The road from the Bendery Constitution to the new Constitution, ratified when this volume was going to press, is winding and uneven. What began as a desire to protect Cossack autonomy in the eighteenth century gained a new dimension in the nineteenth century, as it grew into a movement among Ukrainian intellectuals to articulate their cultural demands and

to define their own identity as an emerging nation. For a while the development of the literary language and of a historical consciousness were regarded as ends sufficient in themselves. Yet soon political demands, most of them formulated by poets and historians, propelled the intelligentsia, who came from all corners of Ukraine, into a new arena, where they articulated a national credo that was above regional and local loyalties. They were still split into federalists and nationalists when the revolution of 1917 broke out. It brought no lasting independence, and it led to the Sovietization of the greater part of Ukraine for seven decades. Once again it was mostly the writers who continued to debate the means and the ends of the Ukrainian historical experience. Today, after the vote for Ukrainian independence in December 1991, this debate continues, unhampered by the strictures of the last seven decades. It seems that the traditional view of Ukrainian society as consisting of Ukrainian people has given way to the concept of a multinational Ukraine. Perhaps this more recent concept reflects political reality (twelve million Russians live in Ukraine today), but the old ethnocentric concept is not yet dead (see the articles on Ukrainian nationalism today by Leonid Pliushch and Volodymyr Kulyk in *Suchasnist* 3 [1993]).

Recently, in fact, much thought has been devoted to the bitter paradox that the vision of a modern, multinational Ukraine prolongs rather than undermines the colonial process Soviet Russia pursued even more vigorously than its imperialist predecessor. Only months ago, in the autumn of 1995, the 'Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia' protested that after five years of independence a small but entrenched pro-Russian establishment continued to frustrate, if not actually to sabotage, the national dream, disparaging all nationalists as bigoted, politically incorrect isolationists and separatists out of tune with the expectations and demands of a post-modern, liberalized era of coexistence and cooperation among nations. Yet this painful, perceptive glimpse into the heart of the problem, as Mykola Riabchuk has suggested in his response to the manifesto, 'Ukraine without Ukrainians?', may undermine the national cause it defends because of the catastrophist tone of the writing, because of its facile generalizations and exaggerations, and because of its reiteration of tired accusations of betrayal of the people by privileged intellectual and government cliques. The basic complaint of the intelligentsia is certainly still valid, but what it rages against cannot be tackled seriously and rigorously unless, Riabchuk indicates, a more level-headed, clear-sighted analysis of the problem is attempted. An awareness of the similarities between Ukraine and other nations which the Russians do not now and never have dominated could very well contribute to a new and more trenchant understanding of

Ukraine's current situation and, perhaps, to more disciplined and committed action for a renewed nationalism.

And, perhaps, this volume can contribute to the current debate by suggesting the value of the rediscovery in Ukraine and elsewhere of the documents of Ukrainian intellectual history, with which many people at best are only vaguely familiar. It is out of a re-evaluation of the past and of the needs of the present that a new sense of Ukrainian identity will gradually arise. There are signs that a new and sober debate on Ukrainian history and identity has begun (see the article by Volodymyr Bazylevsky in *Dnipro*, 1996, 1–2). Such discussion will likely continue despite or perhaps because of the present economic and political adversities. It will undoubtedly reinvigorate the centuries-old quest by supplying it with new ideas, which may or may not hearken to the past.

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## The Bendery Constitution (abridgment)

*The original document of the Bendery Constitution was written in intricate Latin. There exists also a translation into old Ukrainian. The newly elected Hetman Pylyp Orlyk succeeded, in exile, the late Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who had fled to the Moldavian town of Bendery (or Bender) after the defeat of his forces and those of Charles XII at the battle of Poltava in 1709. Orlyk, with the remnants of the Cossack starshyna (officer corps), represented a Cossack 'government in exile.' The constitution confirms the status of the 'ancient Cossack nation' and its struggle against Moscow. The Cossacks, defenders of the Orthodox faith, nevertheless are guaranteed the supremacy of a Kievan metropolitan, one independent of Moscow's influence. Many rights of the Cossacks are provided for, and the protection of the Swedish king is assured.*

TREATY AND COVENANT OF LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF THE ZAPOROZHIAN HOST, AGREED UPON BETWEEN HIS HIGHNESS PYLYP ORLYK, THE NEWLY ELECTED HETMAN OF THE ZAPOROZHIAN HOST, AND THE GENERALS, COLONELS, AND ALSO THE SAID ZAPOROZHIAN HOST, DULY PROMULGATED BY BOTH SIDES AND AFFIRMED BY A FORMAL OATH IN A FREE ELECTION BY THE SAID HETMAN AT BENDERY ON THE FIFTH DAY OF APRIL, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1710 ...

In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, God glorified in the Holy Trinity. Let it be to the eternal glory and memory of the Zaporozhian Host and the Ruthenian [*Rossiaca*]<sup>1</sup> people.

<sup>1</sup> The passages in brackets, some quoting the Latin original and some clarifying it, are provided by the translator.

God, who is wondrous and unfathomable in his judgments, merciful in forbearance, just in punishment, has ever since the beginning of this visible world elevated some kingdoms and peoples according to his most equitable judgment and humiliated others because of their offences and iniquities, reduced some to slavery and liberated others, exalted some and cast down others. In the same way, the valiant and ancient Cossack people, formerly called Khazar, was at first exalted by immortal glory, spacious territory, and heroic exploits which inspired fear both at sea and on land not only among neighbouring peoples but even in the Eastern Empire, so much so that the Eastern emperor, wishing to make lasting peace with it, joined his son in matrimony to the daughter of the Khagan, that is to say, the Cossack prince. Then, the same God, the most righteous judge glorified in the highest, chastised that Cossack people with many punishments for its multiple iniquities and sins, degraded and humbled it, and reduced it to a state of almost perpetual ruin. Finally, he made it subject to the Polish kingdom, through the victorious arms of the Polish kings Boleslaw the Brave and Stephen Bathory. But though God, unfathomable and incomprehensible in his righteous judgments, had punished our ancestors with innumerable calamities, he was not unceasingly angry or bearing ill will for ever, for, wishing to restore the aforementioned Cossack people to its original freedom from the heavy Polish yoke, he brought forth a fervent defender of the Orthodox religion and of the rights and liberties of our fatherland, the valiant Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of eternal memory, who, with divine help, with the invincible assistance of His Most Serene Majesty Charles X, King of Sweden, of immortal and glorious memory, and with the support of the Crimean state and the military might of the Zaporozhian Host, as well as through his own astute diligence, care, labour, and magnitude of spirit, liberated the Zaporozhian Host and the oppressed Ruthenian [*Rossiaca*] people from Polish servitude. He also voluntarily submitted himself and his people to the authority of the Muscovite tsardom in the hope that, being of the same religious faith with us, it would abide by the obligations contained in treaties and covenants and confirmed by oath, and would for ever preserve inviolably under its protection the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host and the free Ruthenian [*Rossi-acam*] people. However, after the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory, the Muscovite tsardom attempted by many ingenious means to weaken and utterly destroy the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host that it itself had confirmed and to place the yoke of slavery on the free people whom it itself had never subdued by force of arms. Then, whenever the Zaporozhian Host suffered that violence, it was forced to defend the

integrity of its laws and liberties with its own blood and courage, with God the avenger supporting it in defence of those laws and liberties. Finally, in recent years, during the tenure of His Highness Hetman Ivan Mazepa of blessed memory, the aforementioned Muscovite tsardom, intent on carrying out its evil designs and repaying good with evil instead of with gratitude and esteem for the many loyal services the Cossacks had been forced to perform at an utterly ruinous cost and number of losses, and for innumerable acts of heroism and bloody military exploits, wanted to transform them into a regular militia, to place their towns under its sovereignty, to destroy their rights and liberties, to eradicate the Zaporozhian Host on the Lower Dnieper, and to extinguish its name for ever. Of the truth of all these facts, there were and are now available general indications and documentary evidence. Then, the aforementioned Illustrious Hetman Ivan Mazepa of blessed memory, inspired by just zeal for the integrity of the laws of our fatherland and the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, and burning with a fervent desire to see our fatherland and the Zaporozhian Host in the towns and on the Lower Dnieper enjoying their liberties not only intact but even increased and enlarged, both during the days of his hetmanate and after his death, for the sake of the eternal memory of his name, placed himself under the invincible protection of His Most Serene and Mighty Majesty Charles XII, King of Sweden, who, guided by a special act of divine providence, turned with his armies into Ukraine. Thus, he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, the most valiant Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory, who, receiving no lesser help in his designs to deflect Polish military power, reached an agreement and came to a meeting of minds concerning military plans with the Most Serene King of Sweden Charles X, the namesake and grandfather of His Royal Majesty, in order to liberate his fatherland from the Polish servitude then oppressing it. And although God's unfathomable judgments not only did not fulfil the late Hetman's ardent desire, owing to the unfavourable turn of military fortunes, but also subjected the Hetman himself, here at Bendery, to the laws of mortality, the Zaporozhian Host, orphaned after the death of its foremost commander-in-chief, without abandoning its desire for freedom, and placing its firm confidence in God's help, in the protection of the Most Serene and Mighty King of Sweden, and in its just cause, which was always wont to triumph, decided, in order to further it and to improve the military administration, through the council of general officers and with the approval of our Most Serene Protector, His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden, to elect a new hetman and to set the time of the election and the place suitable for this electoral act near Bendery, where they had convened

for the public council with their leader, Chief Ataman Konstantyn Hordienko. Then all, without any dissent, with their generals, their officers, and the envoys sent by the Zaporozhian Host in the Sich, in accordance with old customs and ancient laws, elected in a free vote as their hetman His Grace Pylyp Orlyk, worthy of that dignified position, and able, with divine help, with the support of His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden, and with his keen intelligence and knowledge gained by experience, to shoulder the office of the hetman, burdensome and dangerous as it is in the present confused state of affairs, to take solicitous care of the public affairs of our fatherland, to consult, guide, and direct. Since, however, some of the former hetmans, attached to the despotic Muscovite tsardom, had dared to usurp absolute power, beyond the limits of reasonableness and law, thereby violating ancient rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host and imposing heavy burdens on the common people, we, the general officers present here, and we, the Chief Ataman with the Zaporozhian Host, in order to prevent such lawlessness, especially at this most opportune time for such an action, when the Zaporozhian Host for no other reason has sought the protection of His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden, and now is abiding by it steadfastly and unwaveringly merely for the purpose of restoring and promoting its suppressed rights and liberties, have entered into an agreement and decided with the newly elected Hetman, His Excellency Pylyp Orlyk, not only that His Excellency, during what we trust will be his auspicious tenure as Hetman, should observe inviolably the treaty and covenant expressed in the following articles, which he has affirmed by his oath, but also that they should be unchangeably observed and preserved by his successors, the future hetmans of the Zaporozhian Host. They are as follows:

## I

Whereas among the three theological virtues faith is the first, one should in this first article deal with the Orthodox faith of the Eastern confession, with which the valiant Cossack people was enlightened under the rule of Khazar princes by the Apostolic See of Constantinople, and to which it has remained unwaveringly faithful then and now, without straying from it to any alien religion. It is no secret that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory, with the Zaporozhian Host, took up arms and began a just war against the Polish Commonwealth for no other reason (apart from rights and liberties) except their Orthodox faith, which had been forced as a result of various encumbrances placed on it by the Polish authorities into

union with the Roman church. Similarly, after the alien new Roman religion had been eradicated from our fatherland, he, with the said Zaporozhian Host and Ruthenian [*Rossiaca*] people, sought and submitted himself to the protection of the Muscovite tsardom for no other reason than that it shared the same Orthodox religion. Therefore, if God our Lord, strong and mighty in battle, should assist the victorious armies of His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden to liberate our fatherland from the Muscovite yoke of slavery, the present newly elected Hetman will be bound by duty and put under obligation to take special care that no alien religion is introduced into our Ruthenian [*Rossiacam*] fatherland. Should one, however, appear anywhere, either secretly or openly, he will be bound to extirpate it through his authority, not allow it to be preached or disseminated, and not permit any dissenters, most of all the adherents of deceitful Judaism, to live in Ukraine, and will be bound to make every possible effort that only the Orthodox faith of the Eastern confession, under obedience to the Holy Apostolic See of Constantinople, be established firmly for ever and be allowed to expand and to flourish, like a rose among thorns, among the neighbouring countries following alien religions, for the greater glory of God, the building of churches, and the instruction of Ruthenian [*Rossiakis*] sons in the liberal arts. And for the greater authority of the Kievan metropolitan see, which is foremost in Little Russia [*Parva Rossia*], and for a more efficient administration of spiritual matters, His Grace the Hetman should, after the liberation of our fatherland from the Muscovite yoke, obtain from the Apostolic See of Constantinople the original power of an exarch in order thereby to renew relationship with and filial obedience to the aforementioned Apostolic See of Constantinople, from which it was privileged to have been enlightened in the holy Catholic faith by the preaching of the Gospel.

## II

Since every state exists and is made stable through the inviolability and integrity of its borders, it will be the duty of His Grace the Hetman to endeavour and take care to the best of his ability to ensure, whenever necessary during the negotiations for a [peace] treaty by His Majesty the King of Sweden, that Little Russia [*Parva Rossia*], our fatherland, will remain within the borders confirmed by the treaties of the Polish Commonwealth, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and the Muscovite tsardom, especially the territory extending to the river Sluch, which was ceded, restored for ever, and confirmed by treaties in the possession of the Hetmanate and the

Zaporozhian Host under the rule of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He should also entreat His Royal Majesty, his most gracious lord, guardian, defender, and protector, not to permit anyone to violate or appropriate not only our rights and liberties but also our ancestral borders. In addition, it will be the duty of His Grace the Hetman to obtain, after (we trust) a successful end of the war, such a treaty and guarantee of security from His Majesty the King of Sweden that His Majesty and his successors, the Most Serene Kings of Sweden, will enjoy in perpetuity the title of protectors of Ukraine [*Ucraina*] and indeed remain as such for the future defence of our fatherland and for the preservation of its integrity in rights, privileges, and borders. It will equally be the duty of His Grace the Hetman to petition His Royal Majesty to attach to the treaties concluded by His Majesty with the Muscovite tsardom the provision both that our prisoners who are now residing in the Muscovite tsardom be set free after the end of the war and that just compensation be made for all the war damages suffered by Ukraine. His Grace the Hetman also should especially entreat His Royal Majesty, and make efforts to this end, that our prisoners in His Majesty's kingdom be set free and allowed to return to their fatherland.

### III

Whereas the people formerly known as the Khazars and later called Cossacks trace their genealogical origin to the powerful and invincible Goths, and, moreover, whereas the laws of friendly neighbourhood connect and join together that Cossack people by the deepest ties of affectionate affinity to the Crimean state, with which the Zaporozhian Host many a time entered into military alliances, and from which it obtained assistance for the protection of its fatherland and its liberties, His Grace the Hetman shall endeavour, as far as is possible at present, to renew through his envoys to His Most Serene Highness the Khan the old brotherhood and military alliance with the Crimean state and to confirm perpetual friendship, so that the neighbouring countries, taking note of it, will not dare to strive to subjugate Ukraine or inflict any harm on it. And after the end of the war, when, with God's help and blessing, the peace prevails which we desire and which will be favourable to us and the newly elected Hetman establishes himself in his residence, he shall exert all his strength and discerning diligence, and be obliged by the duty of his office, to ensure that the alliance and fraternity with the Crimean state will not be in the least damaged or violated by unrestrained and frivolous people on our side, who, being accustomed to wrongdoing, are not ashamed to break



and violate either the laws of neighbourhood and friendship or the covenants of peace.

#### IV

The Zaporozhian Host on the Lower Dnieper, which won immortal glory through its innumerable heroic exploits on land and at sea, was also rewarded with generous privileges and grants for its common advantage and use. However, the Muscovite tsardom, devising various means to oppress and despoil it, erected on its own grounds and estates first the Samara towns and then the fortresses situated on the Dnieper, thereby hindering the Zaporozhian Host in its fishing and hunting and inflicting on it damage, injury, an infringement of the law, and oppression. Finally, it destroyed in an armed attack the military base Sich, the stronghold of the Zaporozhians. Therefore, after what we trust will be a successful end of the war, if the aforementioned Zaporozhian Host should not reclaim its lands and the Dnieper from the violent occupation of the Muscovites, it will be the duty of His Grace the Hetman to take care during the negotiations for a peace treaty between His Majesty the King of Sweden and the Muscovite tsardom that the Dnieper and the lands of the Zaporozhian Host be cleared of Muscovite towns and fortresses and restored to the original ownership of the said Host. As for the future, His Grace the Hetman must not only refuse to grant anyone permission to build fortresses or found towns and villages with a predetermined term of freedom, or despoil the lands of the Zaporozhian Host in any other manner, but also give the Zaporozhian Host all possible support in their defence.

...

#### VI

If autocratic states maintain in both war and peace the praiseworthy and useful practice of holding private and public councils to deal with matters important for the general welfare of the country, in which even the autocrats themselves take part and do not hesitate to comply with the joint opinion and decision of their ministers and advisers, why cannot such a beneficial system be maintained by a free people? Indeed, such a practice was formerly maintained and continued in the Zaporozhian Host under the rule of hetmans in accordance with old rights and liberties; however, some hetmans of the Zaporozhian Host, having unjustly or illegally usurped absolute power, established through their own authority this law:

'I wish so, and so I order.' This despotic law, unbecoming to the hetman's office, has resulted in the introduction into our fatherland and into the Zaporozhian Host of many abuses, violations of rights and liberties, public burdens, arbitrary and venal dispositions of military offices, and a low regard for general officers, colonels, and our distinguished comrades-in-arms. Therefore we, the general officers, the Chief Ataman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, have concluded an agreement and decided together with His Highness the Hetman, on the occasion of his election, to adopt a law, which is to be preserved for ever in the Zaporozhian Host, that general officers should be [elevated to the position of] foremost councillors in our fatherland, both as a mark of respect for their original offices and because of their continuous residence at the Hetman's side. They are to be followed in the usual order by colonels in command of town regiments, who should be honoured in a similar manner as public councillors. In addition, there shall be elected to the general council, with the Hetman's consent, one distinguished, old, judicious, and worthy man from each regiment. The present Hetman, and his successors, shall consult these general officers, colonels, and general councillors concerning the integrity of the fatherland, its common weal, and all public affairs, and shall not undertake, establish, and execute anything through his personal authority without their prior advice and consent. Therefore now, on the occasion of the Hetman's election, in accordance with the unanimous decision of all, three general councils are scheduled to be held every year at the Hetman's residence: the first one at Christmas, the second one at Easter, and the third one on the day of the Protection of the Most Blessed Mother of God. They shall be attended not only by the colonels with their officers and captains, and not only by general councillors from all regiments, but also by the representatives of the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnieper, who, having received the Hetman's summons, shall arrive at the specified time to take part in the deliberations and consultations. Whatever agenda His Highness the Hetman will submit to the general council must be discussed by all conscientiously, without anyone seeking private advantage for himself or anyone else, without any nefarious envy or vindictiveness, and in such a circumspect manner that nothing could occur during these deliberations that would reflect upon the Hetman's honour and could result in public detriment or even lead to the ruin and destruction of our fatherland. And if some public affairs demand speedy action, amendment, and expedition outside the aforementioned terms set for the meetings of the general council, then His Highness the Hetman will have full power and authority to manage and direct such affairs with the advice of the general officers. Also,

if any letters should arrive from foreign kingdoms and countries addressed to His Highness the Hetman, then His Highness shall inform the general officers and show them his response, without concealing any letters, especially those from foreign countries and those which could bring harm to the integrity of the fatherland and to the public welfare ... And if anything adverse, devious, harmful to rights and liberties, and disadvantageous to our fatherland should be observed in the conduct of His Highness the Hetman, then the general officers, the colonels, and the general councillors will have the authority to express freely their opinion, bring it to the attention of His Highness, and voice their objections against the violation of our ancestral rights and liberties, either privately or, if an extreme and urgent need should arise, publicly in the council, without, however, detracting in the least from the Hetman's high honour; [on his part,] His Highness the Hetman must not show indignation at or take revenge for these reproofs, but should rather attempt to correct such deficiencies ... And just as the general officers, colonels, and general councillors are obliged to treat His Highness the Hetman with due respect and show him appropriate honour and loyal obedience, so His Highness the Hetman should also show them reciprocal respect, and regard them as his comrades-in-arms and not as servants and subordinate helpers, and do so without obliging them intentionally to demean themselves by remaining standing in front of him in public, in an unseemly and indecorous manner, except when this is required by necessity.

## VII

If any one of the general officers, colonels, and general councillors, distinguished comrades-in-arms, or other officials in authority over the common people should dare to commit the crime of affronting the Hetman's honour, or should appear guilty of any other offence, His Highness the Hetman shall not himself punish such a defendant with his personal revenge and power, but shall refer such a criminal or civil case to the general court, where justice will be administered to everyone without favouritism or hypocrisy.

...

## IX

Since formerly there were always general treasurers in the Zaporozhian Host, who managed the public treasury, the mills, and all the revenue

and duties pertaining to the treasury and administered them with the Hetman's knowledge and approval, now likewise the same arrangement is being made by general agreement and established by an immutable law that, after the longed-for liberation of our fatherland from the Muscovite yoke, a general treasurer be elected according to the Hetman's judgment and with public consent – a prominent, meritorious, prosperous, and honest man, who will take responsibility for the public treasury, administer the mills and all the revenue, and direct them, with the Hetman's knowledge, to the public need and not to his private gain. His Highness the Hetman himself, however, shall have no claim to the public treasury and to the revenues pertaining to it and no right to direct them to his personal use, but must be satisfied with the income and revenues allocated to the Hetman's office and person ... Colonels shall likewise have no interest in regimental treasuries and shall be satisfied with the income and estates pertaining to their office.

## X

Just as His Highness the Hetman should direct and look into the arrangements in our fatherland and in the Zaporozhian Host in accordance with the duties of his office, so also should he carefully and vigilantly see to it that no excessive burdens, taxes, seizures, and violent extortions are imposed on military and common people, who, forced by such impositions, are wont to move to foreign kingdoms and seek a more comfortable, easier, and more peaceful life outside the borders of their own country ... And all the burdens and abuses weighing down the miserable common people have their origin in the greed for power of office buyers, who, without relying on their own merits but prompted by an insatiable appetite to secure military and private offices for their private gain, corrupt and ensnare the Hetman's heart with illicit gifts and, thanks to them, thrust their way, without a free vote and against law and equity, into the rank of colonel and into other offices. Therefore, let it be solemnly resolved that His Highness the Hetman must not be guided by any gifts and favours and must not appoint anyone to the rank of colonel or other military or civil office in return for a bribe, nor assign anyone arbitrarily to these positions, but that both military and civil officers, especially colonels, must be elected by a free vote and, after the election, be confirmed by the Hetman's authority; however, the election of these officers should not take place without the Hetman's consent. The same law should also be observed by colonels, who must not appoint captains and other officers in return for bribes and

other private favours without a free election by the whole century, and may not remove them from office at their personal discretion.

...

### XIII

Be it decreed and confirmed by the authority of this electoral act that the chief (mother) city of Rus' [*Metropolis Urbs Rossiae*], Kiev, and other cities of Ukraine [*Ucrainae*] preserve inviolable all the rights and privileges they have legally received, and that their confirmation is entrusted at the appropriate time to the Hetman's power.

...

### XVI

... This treaty and covenant is entrusted [to the Hetman] for its effective enactment, and His Highness will deign to confirm it not only with his own signature and public seal, but also with a formal oath, which runs as follows:

I, Pylyp Orlyk, the newly elected Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, swear to our Lord God glorified in the Holy Trinity that, having been elected, proclaimed, and raised to the supreme office of Hetman by free vote, according to the old laws and customs of our fatherland, with the consent of His Majesty the King of Sweden, our protector, by the general officers and the whole Zaporozhian Host, both that staying here at His Majesty's side and that remaining on the lower banks of the Dnieper and represented by its envoys, I will unfailingly fulfil all the compacts and covenants appended hereto and unanimously accepted, made into law, and confirmed in all articles, commas, and periods by me and the Zaporozhian Host in the act of the present election. I [further] pledge to love my country Rus' [*Roxolanae*], our mother, to be loyal to and take solicitous care of her, and to strive, as far as my strength, wisdom, and ability allow, for her common weal, her public integrity, and the extension of the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host. I pledge never to conclude any agreements with foreign countries and peoples or within our fatherland that could bring ruin or any harm to it, and pledge to make known to the general officers, colonels, and other appropriate persons secret messages from other countries harmful to our fatherland and to the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host. I promise and pledge to treat with respect worthy and

meritorious persons in the Zaporozhian Host, to have affection for all the comrades-in-arms of higher and lower rank who behave appropriately, and to mete out punishment to lawbreakers in accordance with the articles of laws. So help me God, this inviolable Gospel, and the passion of Christ. I validate and confirm all this with my own signature and with the public seal.

Enacted at Bendery, on the fifth day of April, in the year of Our Lord 1710.

[This constitution was ratified by King Charles XII of Sweden on 10 May 1710.]

*Translated by Bohdan Budurowycz*

## Sermon on Royal Authority and Honour (excerpt)

TEOFAN PROKOPOVYCH

*Teofan Prokopovych (1681–1736) was born in Kiev and educated at the Mohyla Academy and in Rome. He became a teacher at and eventually the rector of the Mohyla Academy. His sermons were famous for their eloquence. Before the battle of Poltava, Prokopovych was a staunch supporter of Hetman Mazepa, to whom he dedicated his play Vladimir in 1705. In the same year he wrote De arte poetica. After Poltava, Prokopovych transferred his loyalty to Peter I and vilified Mazepa. He was rewarded in 1716 by being offered a bishopric in Russia, where he soon became vice-president of the Synod. He was one of over a hundred leading clerics who left Ukraine for service in Russia. He assisted Peter I in establishing the reforms which led to the tsar's complete domination of the church. During his lifetime Prokopovych amassed a private library of over thirty thousand volumes.*

But let my words be directed to you, honourable and noble men, glorious in rank and deed, even you who can be called by the name of the whole nation: O Russia! I doubt that the poverty of the preacher will greatly lessen the importance of the sermon, and I confess that I am unworthy of such listeners. But I beg you, when you hear the Gospel read by any man whatsoever, do you not believe? So here, too: look not at the face of the speaker but at the Word of God, and converse not with me, but let each man converse with his own understanding.

Since God has so commanded us with regard to the supremacy of the state, what reasons will excuse us, if someone dares not to be obedient to the state! And if one is actually resisting God himself when he resists powers that are perverse and do not know God, then what word can we call it, not merely resisting, but even more, daring against the true-believing mon-

arch, even him who has so benefited Russia, so that from the beginning of the All-Russian state, however many may be found by historians, they cannot point out one equal to him. All state obligations depend on these two things, on the civil, I say, and the military. Who in our land has ever managed these two as well as this man? Renewed Russia in everything, or rather given her a new birth? What then, is this to be his reward from us? For it was by his providence and his own labours that everyone received glory and freedom from care, while he himself has a shameful name and a life full of misery. What a scandal this is! What a shameful blemish! Terrible to his enemies, this man is forced to fear his subjects! Glorious among foreigners, dishonoured among his own! And when by his many cares and efforts he is bringing untimely old age upon himself, when for the integrity of his fatherland, disregarding his own health, he is hurrying toward death as though at a gallop, why, some think he is living too long! If the law of God did not hold us back, the very shame of such ingratitude would be strong enough to hold us back. All nations refuse to suffer this one accusation against themselves, that they are unfaithful to their rulers, for, on the contrary, they all consider it a great glory to die for their sovereign! Are you alone, O Russia, going to lag behind all nations in this? The foreign writers of yore, even though they made fun of our nation for many things badly done, yet have praised us for faithfulness to our sovereigns so much that they have presented us as a model for others. And exactly when Peter had already wiped out all former mockery by such glory, then the former glory of faithfulness began to fade! Is such the fortune of Russia, not to have full glory? Our most furious enemies are amazed at this, and although this news about us is pleasant for them (for it pleases their jealousy), still they curse such madness and spit upon it. And let us watch that this saying does not grow up about us: the monarch is worthy of so great a country, but the country is not worthy of such a monarch.

But this sin is not rewarded by shame alone. It brings after it a storm, a gale, and a terrible cloud of innumerable woes. Kings do not descend from the throne easily when they descend involuntarily. At once there is a tumult and quaking in the country, bloody private quarrels among the great, but among the small men of good conscience, wailing, weeping, affliction, while evil men, like fierce beasts loosed from their bonds, attack in waves everywhere, plundering and murdering. Where and when has the scepter been transferred by force without a great deal of blood, the sacrifice of the best men, the destruction of great houses? And just as it is difficult to keep a house whole when the foundation is undermined, so it is here too: when the higher powers are overthrown, all society shakes on the verge of



collapse. And it is rare that this disease in states is not unto death, as can be seen from the historians of the world. But what historians do we need? Is not Russia herself witness enough? For I think that she will not soon forget what she suffered after the misdeeds of Godunov<sup>1</sup> and how close she was to final destruction. Oh, even if (again I say) we did not know God's law, would not just this one most trying vision of the things that followed be enough? But it is an evil that is hard to doctor, when demented men neither look on the past nor deliberate about the future, while, delighting in some alluring illusion, they rush blindly to their ruin.

Therefore, finally, let us put it to every man that in all our doings and makings, first, last, and always, we must realize that this present doctrine is needed, like a special seal: this is the unerasable and inescapable judgment of God. Let us not deceive ourselves, orthodox men! The doctrine presented here that one should honour the government powers is a true one; for also Holy Scripture is the true Word of God himself, witnessed by its internal explanations and powerfully effective strength and the fact that its great prophecies have come to pass.

Let us not doubt, therefore, that the judgment of God is coming also to those who resist his word. And when will this be? Grieve not, the Lord will come and he will not delay. Say not, 'The Lord is late.' For lo! the judge is standing at the door; only watch what word you give him in this. For if he judges deserving of fiery hell those who blame their brethren for foolishness, what judgment will he give those who are displeased with their sovereigns and tremble not to speak evil of dignities? If he condemns those who have not been merciful to one of the little ones as though they had not been merciful to him himself, how then will he condemn those who scheme against his own representative, who partakes of the divine name, the anointed of the Lord? Oh, what utter callousness, if anyone is not frightened by this! For here it is not only those who oppose the powers who must tremble, but also those who are obedient out of fear of wrath, and not for the sake of conscience.

Now such men will escape the sword of the king, for they have been obedient for fear of his wrath; yet they will not escape the judgment of God, for they have not been obedient for conscience' sake. Where then will you be, you who have despised both the wrath of the king and your own conscience and are daring to stand against the scepter and the health of the powers? Are you terrified or not? We are all terrified that this might hasten

<sup>1</sup> Boris Godunov (1551-1605), traditionally regarded as a usurper, was crowned tsar in 1598.

the wrath of God with his vengeance in this world against our fatherland.

But provide the best for us, the best, O God! Guard us by thy mercy! To our great ingratitude we have added this, too, that we have not recognized many of thy good deeds, shown forth to us in Peter; we confess therefore that we are unworthy and have been ungrateful. Yet our sins and thy mercy are not in this world alone. Do not deal with us according to our lawlessness, but reward us for our sins. Lord, save the Tsar and hear us! Make him glad in thy salvation! Guard him by thy gracious blessing! May thy hand be on all his enemies, may thy right hand find out all them that hate him. Be thou exalted, Lord, in thine own strength; so will we sing and praise thy power. Amen.

*Translated by Horace G. Lunt*

1718

## A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia (excerpt)

SEMEN DIVOVYCH

*Semen Divovych (dates of birth and death unknown) was an eighteenth-century Ukrainian writer. After being educated at the Kiev Mohyla Academy, he worked as a translator in the General Military Chancellery in Hlukhiv. He wrote a dialogue, Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei (A Talk between Great Russia and Little Russia, 1762), in which he described the history of the Cossack wars. The work was written in syllabic verse in old Ukrainian, close to Russian. It was published in Kievskaiia starina (Kievan Antiquities, vol. 2, 1882), with an introduction in which Divovych was described as a Ukrainian patriot 'trying to show that Little Russia, with an open heart, united with the Muscovite state' and did not deserve to be blamed for Mazepa's treason, and that Ukraine 'has a right to her own distinctiveness, inherited from earlier times.'*

I have become subject not to you, but to your lord,  
Under whom you were born since the time of your ancestors.  
Do not think that you yourself are my ruler,  
But your lord and my lord in command of both of us.  
And the difference between us is only in adjectives,  
You the Great and I the Little live in bordering countries.  
That I am called Little and you Great  
Is neither a small nor a strange thing to you or to me.  
For your borders are wider than mine,  
And my expanses are less than yours,  
Yet we are equal and form one whole,  
We swear allegiance to one, not to two lords –  
Thus I consider myself equal to you,

Do not say that I am subject to you as to a community!  
Your master and mine sends you and me,  
Only he summons us from the march,  
But you do not order me as if I were a republic.  
I am in no way ranked lower by the emperor in comparison with you,  
I am also left with all my ranks,  
I am ensured that they will henceforth remain in force for me.

*Translated by D.G. Huntley*

## A Submission to the Legislative Commission (excerpt)

HRYHORII POLETYKA

*Hryhorii Poletyka (1724–84) was born near Romen, Lubny regiment, and educated at the Kiev Mohyla Academy. A scholarly man (he translated Aristotle into Russian), he worked as a translator at the Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg. In 1767 he was elected to Catherine II's Legislative Commission of 1767–8 as the representative of the Ukrainian szlachta (gentry) from Lubny. Poletyka defended Ukrainian autonomy and the rights of the Ukrainian szlachta before the commission. What follows is an excerpt from a speech he delivered on 21 August 1768.*

My opinions on the aforementioned articles, just heard by you, honourable deputies, were presented by me as a representative in this esteemed assembly, as your co-member and co-worker according to the assent of Her Imperial Majesty, as a Russian citizen obliged to promote and assist the motherly solicitude of our most gracious Sovereign for the well-being of Russia. But while submitting my opinion on the forty-third and last article, I, as a deputy of the Little Russian *szlachta*, want to know whether the aforementioned rights belong only to the Great Russian nobility, or also to other areas united under the Russian sceptre, including those populated by my co-citizens, the Little Russian *szlachta*. If they belong also to other areas, I have the duty to report to you that I find in these newly created rights for those of noble birth great discrepancies and deficiencies with respect to the rights and privileges of that *szlachta*. The difference between the newly proposed nobiliary rights and the rights of the Little Russian *szlachta* you, the distinguished members of the assembly, will see if you kindly listen to the following articles. (1) The direction of affairs in Little Russia should, after the highest imperial power, be in the hands of the

*szlachta*. (2) The *szlachta* has the right to set, cancel, and improve the laws and asks the Sovereign to confirm this. (3) The *szlachta* and local authorities have the power to create internal institutions, to impose and cancel taxes, to make requisitions, etc. (4) Local civil and military officials are to be elected by a free vote, and no one except native members of the Little Russian *szlachta* may fill these positions. (5) A member of the *szlachta* possessing land cannot be detained and put under arrest for any crime, even a capital crime, unless he is apprehended in the very act. For all such crimes he is to be called to trial and judged according to the letter of the law, and after the verdict, if it is the death sentence or another punishment, he will be dealt with without mercy according to the law. (6) The *szlachta* have full legal authority, including [the right of] trial, over their subjects. (7) The *szlachta* have the freedom to travel to foreign countries without permission and to dispose of their property in any way they want. (8) The *szlachta*, during their lifetime, control their chattels and real estate, family and acquired property, according to their will, so that they can remove close relatives and empower distant ones. (9) The *szlachta* have the free use of all benefits and profits which accrue from their property, so that all kinds of minerals, mines, and other acquisitions belong to the member of the *szlachta* on whose property they are found. (10) The property of the *szlachta* should not be subject to any taxes, except a small land tribute, that is, two Polish *groszy* from an inhabited land area which has at least twenty *desiatinas*, and, where there is no such large land area, one *grosz* from a house. (11) The *szlachta* are free to transform their vegetable gardens free of duty, and also to trade their cattle and domestic property, inside and outside the household. In that way they can order from other countries the goods and merchandise they require. (12) If a foreigner living on a *szlachta* estate should die without children, all his property would go to the member of the *szlachta*, not to the state treasury. (13) The army cannot be quartered on *szlachta* property; it should be stationed in cities or on state properties. (14) A *szlachta* manor is protected from violence, so that even criminals may not be apprehended without the consent of the landlord. Instead, they [the criminals] must be summoned to court. (15) The *szlachta* have the right to cut wood and catch wild animals in the forests as well as to fish in the rivers and lakes.

These rights of the Little Russian *szlachta* I have described very briefly, and only the most important ones. The more extensive reasons why they were so constituted will be seen by you, esteemed members of this assembly, in the rights and privileges of the Little Russian *szlachta* presented by me. You will see then that when Little Russia was under the rule of Poland,

all these rights were confirmed by the solemn oaths of the Polish kings. Since the *szlachta* became subjects of the Russian rulers, these privileges have been confirmed by solemn treaties and promises, made so that these privileges would not be violated. All these assurances were given not only to the *szlachta* but to all ranks in Little Russia, such as the clergy, the Little Russian Cossacks, and the burghers. All treaties and agreements were made at the time of the voluntary union of Little Russia with the Russian Empire, and were made with the agreement of all classes. If any changes are to be made, they should be made by general agreement.

For all the aforementioned reasons, I, a defender of the integrity of the rights, privileges, preferences, and freedoms of the Little Russian *szlachta*, confirmed by all Russian monarchs as well as by Her Imperial Majesty, our reigning Sovereign, cannot agree to the newly created rights of the nobility. If these new rights have no reference to the Little Russian *szlachta*, I am of the opinion that they should state that the Little Russian *szlachta* retain all their earlier rights, privileges, preferences, and freedoms. This was what I was instructed to take up before this honourable assembly in preference to other needs and burdens. This is what the Little Russian *szlachta* awaits from our generous and just monarch and from you, honourable deputies.

# The Serpent's Flood<sup>1</sup> (excerpt)

HRYPHORII SKOVORODA

*Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722–94) is the best-known Ukrainian philosopher. Of Cossack descent, he was a student at the Mohyla Academy in Kiev. In 1749, after travelling in Russia and Western Europe, he returned to Ukraine and taught sporadically in different schools. In 1769 he left pedagogical work and became a wandering scholar and a private tutor to various families. During these years he wrote philosophical treatises and also many verses in antiquated Ukrainian and in Latin. His poetical works were collected in Sad bozhestvennykh pisnei (The Garden of Divine Songs) and Basni Kharkovskie (The Kharkiv Fables). But it was his philosophy, based on ideas of non-attachment and other-worldliness and tied to allegorical readings of the Bible, that won him the title 'the Ukrainian Socrates.'*

## Chapter 1: Parable of the Blind and the Sighted

Two visitors came into the Temple of Solomon: one was blind, the other sighted. The blind man raised his eyes in vain and ran them along the walls of the temple. The sighted visitor looked at the wall depicting man, animals, birds, mountains, rivers, forests, fields, flowers, the sun, stars, and precious stones and, applying to all the immutable criterion, called draughtsmanship by painters, revelled in inexhaustible enjoyment. With a curious eye he beheld even the seven-lamp candelabrum and the canopy of the cherubim. 'I see no joy in this temple,' said the blind man. 'O, you poor man!' exclaimed the sighted one, 'go home and dig up your pupils, which

<sup>1</sup> The title comes from chapter 12 of the Revelation of St John the Divine, the source of a number of images employed by Skovoroda.



are buried in your bag. Bring them here. Then this temple will become new for you and you will feel a delightful bliss within you.'

## Chapter 2: Dialogue or Conversation

*Characters: Soul, Imperishable Spirit*

Soul: Everything unpalatable gives me some nourishing juice. If you would be so kind, O Imperishable Spirit, tell me, what do the two visitors signify?

Spirit: Everyone who is born is a visitor in this world, whether blind or enlightened. Is not this world a beautiful temple of the all-wise God? But there are three worlds. The first is the universal and inhabited world, in which all generated things live. It is composed of an infinite number of smaller worlds and is the great world. The other two worlds are partial and little worlds. The first is the microcosm; that is, the little world, the world-let, or man. The second is the symbolic world, that is, the Bible. In the inhabited world the sun is its eye, and the eye, therefore, is the sun. And since the sun is the head of the world, it is no wonder that man is called a *microcosmos*, that is, the little world. And the Bible is the symbolical world because the figures of heavenly, earthly, and subterranean creatures are collected in it to serve as reminders directing our thought to the understanding of eternal nature, which is hidden in that which is perishable [nature] like a picture in its paints.

Soul: What does it mean to dig up the pupils buried in the bag?

Spirit: The beginning of the sense of eternity depends on recognizing oneself first, on perceiving the eternity hidden in one's own body, and, as it were, on rooting out the spark from one's own ashes. This spark is the other worlds, and this thinking pupil will detect eternity in them.

Soul: But are eternity and God really the same?

Spirit: Of course, eternity is fixed, that which stands firmly in all things everywhere and always, wears all perishability like garments, and is free of division or limitation. It is truth and imperishability. You see, the light of wisdom enters the soul when a man recognizes two natures: the perishable and the eternal. There is a saying about those who do not understand: 'He can't count to two.'

Soul: But tell me, what is the advantage of seeing two natures instead of one everywhere? And what comfort does it give?

Spirit: I will show it to you with an image. A very skilful painter painted a buck and peacock very realistically on a wall. His infant son was inexpressibly delighted with these paintings. And his older son looked at them with admiration. After a time the painter wiped away the paint, and the

animals disappeared from sight. The little boy cried inconsolably at this, whereas the older one laughed. Now tell me the reason for the laughter and the crying.

Soul: I can't tell you, but I long to hear it from you.

Spirit: Of course, the little boy thinks the animals have perished and therefore cries.

Soul: But haven't they perished, if they have disappeared?

Spirit: O, don't call the paint the painting. It is only the shadow in the painting, while the power and heart is the picture, that is, the immaterial thought and the secret outline to which the paint sometimes adheres, like a shadow to a tree, and from which it sometimes detaches itself, and the paint is like the flesh, while the picture is like a bone in the body. For this reason, whoever does not understand the picture cannot apply the paint. The older son grasps this and laughs. The most real figures were ever in the mind of the painter before they appeared on the wall. They were not born and they will not perish. But the paints, by adhering to them, present them in material form, and by detaching themselves, remove their appearance from sight but do not remove their eternal being, just as the disappearing shadow of an apple tree does not destroy the apple tree. And when a picture agrees with the eternal criterion of the real images and the colours are in harmony with their essence, then a true picture comes into being.

Soul: I believe your words are not false, but they are somewhat unclear to me.

Spirit: Turn your attention to the second comparison! Draw a circle. Make one out of wood or clay. Then erase the first and destroy the other ones. Now tell me, has the *circle* perished?

Soul: The drawn, wooden, and clay ones have perished ...

Spirit: Your judgment is correct! The visible one, apparently, has perished, but the immaterial and real, imperishable *circle* exists in the treasury of the mind. Since it is not created, it cannot be destroyed. The material circles are not circles but, to put it simply, a false shadow and the garment of the true circle.

Soul: What are you getting at?

Spirit: That there are two natures in everything: the divine and the material.

Soul: And this concept leads where?

Spirit: That nothing can perish, it can only lose its shadow.

Soul: And what else follows from this?

Spirit: Nothing! Except fearlessness, an even temper, hope, courage, cheerfulness, and auspicious weather, that *peace* of the heart which accord-

ing to Paul surpasses all understanding. Distinguish in your own body what you distinguished in the paintings and circle just mentioned. Interpret the entire worldly substance as paint. But the eternal criterion and ever-existing hands of God support the entire shadow like a skeleton sustaining the flesh adhering to it, and are the head in everything and the tree of eternal life above its unstable canopy. Clearly not at lowly bones and hands does the Bible look with these words: 'Not one of his bones shall be broken'; 'Do not fear, Jacob, your walls are written on my hands! ...' And ancient Plato arrived at this when he said *Deos geometrei*, 'God measures the earth.' My soul, do not be one of those who take matter for essence. They do not believe in divine nature. They deprive the immaterial and good spirit of power and honour, being and glory, and instead attribute these to dead and gross elements. To do so is to condemn and sentence to death the master of eternal life and the universal life-giver of all creatures. It is impossible, obviously, to kill God. But divine justice calls judgment upon their impious thought. As soon as they attributed life and power to the perishable, they took them away from God. And as soon as they took away life from God, they gave it to perishability. Here is the court which enthrones the slave instead of the master, which pleads for the release of the robber Barabbas. These parricides and blind feelers of walls Plato calls baseness, which sits in a gloomy ditch in hell, sees only a dark shadow, and esteems nothing as certain truth except what it can touch and grab in its fist. This is the source of godlessness and the destruction of the city of the heart. This crawling and earth-eating baseness attached itself to the perishable, and itself became mud and the dust scattered by the whirlwind. Those who attach their heart to the Lord are of one spirit with him and boast with Isaiah: 'I am God's'; 'The way of the just is uprightness'; 'We do not fall, but all who live on earth fall.' All three worlds consist of two substances called *matter* and *form*, which constitute a unity. In Plato the forms are called *ideas*, that is, *visions*, *patterns*, *images*. They are the original worlds, that is, the secret strings not made by human hands that hold up the transient canopy, or *matter*. In both the great and the little worlds the material aspect reveals the forms concealed under it, or the eternal images. Similarly, in the symbolic or biblical world the collection of creatures constitutes the matter. But the divine nature, to which the creature leads as a sign, is the *form*. Thus, in this world there are *matter* and *form*, that is, flesh and spirit, shadow and truth, death and life. For example, the solar figure is matter or shadow. But since it signifies what has made a dwelling for itself in the sun, then thanks to this comes a second thought, that form and spirit exist there as though there were a second sun in the sun. Just as there are two scents

from two flowers, so from two natures come two thoughts and two hearts: perishable and imperishable, pure and impure, dead and living! O, my soul! Can we boast of this and sing, 'We are Christ's fragrance ...'?

Soul: O my soul! Blessed is that soul ... At least we can say about ourselves, 'We flow into the fragrance of your peace.' Finally, instruct me, what does the seven-branched candelabrum mean?

Spirit: It means the week of genesis, in which the whole symbolic world was created.

Soul: What do I hear? You have told me something wonderful and unknown.

Spirit: It has been said already that the solar figure is matter and shadow. Seven days and seven suns. In each sun there is a pupil: a second beautiful little sun. These little suns shine from their walls with the light of eternity, just as the burning oil shines from its lamps.

Spirit: O divine, O beloved, O sweetest little sun! Tell me one more thing, what are the cherubim?

Spirit: The week and the cherubim are the same as chariots and thrones.

Soul: About the cherubim, why are they thrones?

Spirit: The sun is the temple and palace of the eternal, and in the chambers where the Sabbath is celebrated there are chairs. And a chariot is a moving house. You see, the sun is a fiery sphere and never stands still, and the sphere consists of many circles, as if of wheels. For the sun is not only a palace and the eternally wandering tent of Abraham, but also a chariot used by our immortal Elijah, capable of carrying our eternal *little sun*. These solar Sabbaths or palaces and chambers of *eternity* are also called the seven cows or calves and the seven wheat heads, and, in Zechariah, the seven eyes. He who sits on the cherubim opens these blind and insightful eyes when from the inside their eternal pupils begin to shine with the imperishable light of resurrection like the *little suns* from the suns.

Soul: By the way, what is the cherubim canopy?

Spirit: The canopy, shadow, paint, outline, clothes, mask, which hides its form, its idea, its picture, its eternity – all this is the cherubim and the canopy together, that is, its dead exterior.

Soul: Why did Ezekiel give them all wings, to have bulls and cows flying above the eagles under the heavens?

Spirit: So that they might fly to the one *source*, that is, to the little sun. He did not give them wings but noticed that they all had wings.

Soul: What do the wings signify?

Spirit: Other and eternal thoughts that fly from death to life, from matter to form. Here you have Easter, that is, the arrival. O my soul! Can you

get from dead creatures and the cherubim canopy to your Lord and the form that gives you being? 'Love is as powerful as death.' 'Its wings are the wings of fire.'

Soul: O my father! It is difficult to snatch the heart from the sticky elemental mud. O, how difficult! I saw a painting of a winged youth. He strives to fly into the sky, but his leg, which is shackled with a chain to the earthly sphere, prevents him from doing so. This painting is a painting of me. I cannot [fly] but only desire to. 'Who will give me wings?' To comfort me, my heavenly father who sweetens my sorrows, continue the conversation. Disclose to me why David wants these wings? You have already said that only the suns are cherubim.

Spirit: The sun is the archetype, that is, the primordial and chief figure, while its copies and secondary figures are innumerable and fill the whole Bible. This figure was called the antitype (the prototype, the vice-image), that is, a figure standing for the chief figure. But all of them flow towards the sun as towards their source. These secondary figures are, for example, the dungeon and Joseph, the little box [the ark of bulrushes] and Moses, the pit and Daniel, Delilah and Samson, that is, the little sun, the skin and Job, the flesh and Christ, the cave and the lion, the whale and Jonah, the manger and the baby boy, the grave and the arisen one, the chains and Peter, the basket and Paul, the woman and the seed, Goliath and David, Eve and Adam. All these are the same as the sun and the little sun, the serpent and God. The solar figure is the most beautiful of all and the mother of the others. It is first blessed and dedicated to God's rest. 'God blessed the seventh day.' Because of this, the secondary figures of all the other creatures, as a result of the solar force, receive their being in the days of the holy week, since all the creatures are born during the week. The sun, however, is created before all the others.

'Let there be light!' – and there was light. Light, morning, day are always near the rays, and the rays are with the sun. And thus it is no wonder that David, being a copy of a cherub, desires wings, having the same power and thought as the week. 'I contemplated the first days and I recalled and studied the years of eternity.'

The holy week gives meaning and light to all creatures. 'This week of creation is the eyes of the Lord, looking at the whole earth.' If the eyes are blind, then the whole Bible is darkness and Sodom. Even David learns from it. There are seven suns, and David has eyes. The sun carries him who rests in the sun. And David says, too: 'Suffering, I suffered'; 'Raising, I raised up'; 'I will exalt you, Lord, since you lifted me up.' The sun is the setting shadow, but its power and being is in its little sun. And David's eyes are

disappearing dust, but their shadow flows there to be transformed, in disappearing, into the pupil of eternity, into the second reason, and into the life-giving Word of God: 'My eyes disappeared into your word.'

And Zechariah is also a cherub. He too looks at the week and thinks about what it means: 'I remembered the years of eternity ...' 'I have looked,' cries Zechariah, 'and behold a candelabrum all of gold!' One goes where one looks. Towards the years of eternity! There lies his path! He flies to the holy week and soars on eagle wings. And where are his wings? Here they are! 'The angel said, speaking within me.' His wings are inside. His heart is made of feathers. 'Love is as strong as death'; 'Its wings are the wings of fire ...'

The cherub is also the precursor. 'He was a burning and shining light.' 'He was' means not just what existed, but what was created and made a lamp. The stars are alluring and false morning stars: they burn but do not shine. But John is a true morning star.

Soul: Please, heavenly Father, tell me what the false morning star is, what does it mean? I am burning and all afire to know.

Spirit: The false morning stars are the same as the false cherubim.

Soul: But how are they like them? I don't understand this at all. Explain it!

Spirit: My dear friend! Jude the Apostle will explain it to you. Here are the false cherubim, here the false morning stars too! 'Angels who keep not their first estate'; 'alluring stars'; 'bodily, that is, animate or animal, having no imperishable spirit.' To put it briefly: those who strayed from the holy week, for I am a harbour to all. And this means: 'Who keep not their *first estate*.' God, the origin, eternity, light are all the same. This light has illuminated its habitation in the week. The week is the same as the title of a book. 'In the title of a book I am mentioned,' says Christ. The beginning and the title are the same. On this my Jude's word sparkles: 'angels who keep not their first estate'; 'seductive stars, for whom the deepest darkness has been reserved forever.' Here are the lucifers fallen from the heavenly week! In Latin the morning star is called *lucifer*; that is, the carrier of light or the leader of the day. For the morning star is the precursor of the sun and the herald of the day. Look! This is the beautiful morning star for you! 'In the morning John saw Jesus approaching him and said: "Behold the lamb of God!"' Where is your *day* for us, our dear morning star? Give it to us! O star, who have fallen in love with darkness, you are not alluring. The loathsome night has sickened us by now.

'After me comes a man who was before me ...' And thus the son of Zechariah is the lantern or lamp that contains burning and light-giving oil

and is created like the eye that contains its pupil inside it. Among the ancients the sun was called a candle, a lamp, and the eye of the universe. 'He himself was not the light, but he came to testify to the light.' Here, my daughter, is the true cherub for you! And because of this you see his winged image in the temples.

*Translated by Taras D. Zakydalsky*

1791

## *Istoriia Rusov* (excerpts)

*Istoriia Rusov came to circulate in manuscript copies in Ukraine in the early 1820s. Its author was at first thought to be the Belorussian archbishop Georgii Konysky. Even Osyp Bodiansky, who published the work in 1846, attributed it to Konysky. Later, however, scholars agreed that the author was unknown. This 'History of the Russes' presents a legend rather than a history of Ukraine. While it glorifies the Cossack era, it also reflects, in Ohloblyn's words, 'the rationalist philosophy of the eighteenth century,' and it is permeated with deep patriotism. It pleads for justice and the rule of law. The first excerpt translated here depicts Bohdan Khmelnytsky's death; the second presents a speech by Mazepa, to whom the author's attitude is rather ambivalent. The work represents the ideology of the descendants of the Cossacks.*

Feeling his death approaching, Hetman Khmelnytsky called to Chyhyryn military and government officials and the most distinguished Cossacks, and to all of them, gathered in his home, he reported on the condition of the nation and all the ministerial matters of the time. After that, having recounted the attacks on his native land and the heavy wars which followed, in which they had fought so bravely and overcome evil days with their valour and praiseworthy unity, he ended by saying that, seeing his death near, he was leaving them alone and advising them not to lose heart, to hold together in unity and brotherly love, without which no kingdom or society can exist for long. 'I thank you, brethren,' Khmelnytsky continued, 'for obeying me in wars and for having me as your hetman. I thank you for the honour you have shown me and for the confidence you always entrusted in me. I am returning to you all insignia and chains of office which signified my power, and I am asking you to forgive me if, as a man, I



have hurt or injured anyone. My intentions with respect to the general welfare were sincere and honest, and I sacrificed myself for our native land, not sparing my health and life itself. But no one has been born yet who could satisfy everyone. Therefore, for the general good let me ask you to do me one last favour: elect your hetman while I am still alive, so that I can disclose to him the necessary secrets and give him useful advice about government. Because in these critical times a hetman is needed who is a skilled, brave, and experienced man, I recommend to you the Pereiaslav colonel Teteria, the Poltava colonel Pushkarenko, and the secretary-general Vyhovskiy. Elect the one whom the general council prefers.'

Having heard the hetman's words, which moved them deeply, the officials and the Cossacks wept bitterly, especially when they spoke of the approaching death and of their being left orphaned. They lamented: 'Whom shall we elect in your place? Who is worthy to repay your fatherly care for us and the loss we suffer? Let your son Iurii succeed you in your post. Let him be our commander, and we shall elect him as hetman. We would be cursed, without conscience or shame, if, forgetting your great benefaction and bravery in the cause of our native land, we chose someone else in his stead.' The hetman thanked the officials and soldiers for their confidence but opposed their choice of his son, saying that he was still very young and could not, in these critical times, carry the great burden of his office. 'You can show your gratitude in a different way. He, too, can serve his native land in another post, one in accordance with his abilities and years. But for the office of hetman a mature man, able and experienced, should be chosen.' Those assembled tried to contradict the hetman by arguing that his youthful son might be strengthened by good counsel and wise advisers, whom the hetman himself could choose, and voted unanimously, 'We will never allow him to be deprived of his father's honoured position.'

Pressed by the stubborn assembly, the hetman agreed to their demand and, having invited his son Iurii to join him, recommended him to the assembly with these words: 'He is entrusted to God's protection and your care. And I cast an anathema on anyone who leads him astray from the true path and makes him a butt for and a laughing-stock among the people. I would renounce him myself if he followed an untrue path and forsook righteousness, honour, and Christian virtues. I call on him to serve his native land faithfully and sincerely, to safeguard it like the pupil of his eye, and to shed all his blood for it if that would be of use and prove its salvation. I do not ask more of him than this sacrifice, and let him always remember my appeal and admonition. And I ask and implore all of you to strengthen him with good advice and steady manliness, which is the char-

acteristic, inherited trait of our Slavic tribe from time immemorial.' Having said this, the hetman handed to his son the military insignia and the national seal with all official documents and writings. The son, as is customary, was greeted and decked by banners and fur caps by the officials and by his Cossack comrades, and proclaimed hetman with artillery salvos and the firing of rifles, and by the military band, which played at all the intersections and squares in the city, and special couriers were dispatched with the proclamations. This election took place on the seventh day of August 1657.

The old hetman, before his death, held a council with his officials and comrades-in-arms, and the general-secretary Vyhovsky and the Poltava colonel Pushkarenko, each of whom had taken part in campaigns as 'assigned hetman,' were selected as advisers and protectors of the young hetman. The old hetman, having spent several hours with his son and his advisers during the last day of his life, died in the afternoon on 15 August. The laments and weeping and the firing of the palace gun announced the hetman's death to the city. The soldiers and people of all ranks at once filled the hetman's house and encircled it. Weeping and lamenting rent the air, and the general grief was immeasurable. All cried for him as for their own father, and all said: 'Who will protect us from our enemies now? Who will rout them? Our sun has been extinguished, and we are left in the dark at the mercy of insatiable wolves.'

The achievements of this hetman gave rise to national grief, for such men are born rarely, every few centuries, by God's providence to serve his special purposes and design. In possession of an unusual intellect, he was magnanimous and just, a consummate politician in national affairs, and a fearless and determined leader in war. His bravery was matched by his indifference; he never boasted about his victories and was not saddened by defeats. He could always rely on his patience in the most difficult undertakings. He bore hunger and thirst, cold and heat, with full equanimity. He loved his native land and his people so much that he sacrificed his peace, his health, and his very life without the slightest complaint. In a word, he was the best ruler of his people and an exemplary military leader.

...

... Having crossed the river Desna and made camp between the cities of Starodub and Novhorod Siversky, near the town of Semenivka, in the place now called Swedish, [Mazepa] made a proclamation to his soldiers and the Little Russian people and delivered the following speech to all the assembled officials:

Brethren, we stand now between two precipices, which are ready to swallow us if we do not select a path for ourselves in order to avoid them. The monarchs, who are fighting each other, have moved the theatre of war near our borders; they are so angry at each other that peoples under their rule are suffering, and will suffer more boundless misery, and we, between them, are the target of all this misfortune. Both of them, through their usurpation of limitless power, behave like terrible despots, the likes of which were scarcely known in Asia or Africa. Therefore, the one who is defeated will also ruin his state and destroy it.

Fate has decreed that these states should decide their future on our native land, before our eyes. Should we not, having seen the danger hanging over our heads, think about ourselves? My judgment, free of all passions and evil intentions, follows. If the ever-victorious Swedish king, whom all Europe respects and fears, conquers the Russian tsar and destroys his tsardom, then we, by the will of the victor, inevitably will be turned over to Poland and enslaved by the Poles and his favourite, King Leszczyński, and there will be no room for negotiating our rights and privileges. The earlier treaties will be automatically cancelled, because naturally we shall be treated as conquered or subdued by force of arms, and hence we shall be helpless slaves, and our fate will be worse than that suffered by our ancestors, a fate such that the mere mention of it still awakens fear.

If, however, the Russian tsar should be the victor, then our misfortune will come from this same tsar because, though you see his descent from the elected members of the *dvorianstvo* [nobility], he has usurped absolute power and punishes people at will. And not only freedom and the national welfare but life itself is subject to the tsar's will and whim. You saw the results of his despotism, which destroyed many families by means of the most barbarous punishments, for misconduct alleged by denunciations extracted by tyrannical tortures, which no people can suffer and survive. I myself have experienced some of these penalties. You know that because I refused to agree with his plans, which would be disastrous for our native land, I was struck on my face like a contemptible harlot. Who will not see that a tyrant who has acted in so deeply offensive a manner to the representative of a nation of course considers the members of that nation dumb cattle and excrement? That he really regards them as such [was evident] when the people's deputy Voinarovsky was received with slaps on the face and put in prison. The tsar intended to send him to the gallows (from which he fled) because he complained about the atrocities committed by the Muscovite army and asked the tsar to conform to the agreement made by Khmelnytsky, which the tsar did not confirm but should have confirmed according to the treaty [of Pereiaslav].

Therefore, my brethren, we must choose the lesser of the evils which have befallen us, so that our descendants will not burden us with their curses because we abandoned them to slavery. I do not have and cannot have descendants and there-

fore am indifferent to the interests of inheritance, and I do not seek anything [for myself] except the happiness of the people who have honoured me with the title of hetman and have entrusted me with their fate. I would be cursed and completely without conscience if I repaid good with evil and betrayed [the common good] for personal advantage! It is time to tell you what I have chosen for the people and for yourselves. My lifelong experience in political affairs and my knowledge of national affairs have opened my eyes to today's ministerial matters and how they affect our native land. In such cases secrecy is regarded as a great gift. I kept this secret to myself [because of the importance of these negotiations], and this secrecy is justified.

I have seen both warring kings, the Swedish and the Polish, and I have used all my skill in an attempt to persuade the first of them about the protection of our native land from military attacks and the ruin that would result from a future invasion; and as far as Great Russia is concerned, which is of the same faith and tribe as we, I have extracted a promise of neutrality. That is, we should not fight the Swedes, the Poles, or the Russians, but, having gathered our forces, should stand fast and defend our native land against anyone who makes war on it. This we should presently announce to the tsar; and his boyars, who are not yet infected with German leanings and still remember the innocent blood of their relatives, have been told about it, and agree with me. We should provide food for all the warring armies, with compensation so that we do not become poor ourselves. During any possible period of peace in the future among all the warring states, it was decided to return to the past, to the condition of our land before Polish rule, with its own princes and with all those former rights and privileges belonging to a free nation. France and Germany, the foremost European powers, pledged themselves to endorse this. The latter of them was in favour of such a state even during the days of Hetman Zinovii Khmelnytsky, during the reign of Ferdinand III, but it did not come about because of the strife between our ancestors.

These terms were set with the king of Sweden in writing, signed by both sides, and publicly proclaimed in both states. Now we must regard the Swedes as our friends, allies, and benefactors, sent to us by God to free us from slavery and humiliation and to elevate us to the highest degree of freedom and independence. It is well known that we were at one time what the Muscovites are now; the government, supremacy, and the very name Rus' came to them from us. But now we are like a byword among the heathen for them.<sup>1</sup> Our negotiations with Sweden are not new; they confirm earlier terms and alliances which our ancestors made with the Swedish kings. It is well known that the grandfather and father of the present king

<sup>1</sup> This expression from Psalms 44:14 suggests that the Cossacks, like the Israelites, were scorned and derided by their primitive neighbours.

of Sweden, having received great help from our soldiers in the war with the Livonians, Germans, and Danes, guaranteed [the borders] of our land and often defended them against the Poles. After [Ukraine's] union with Russia, Hetman Khmelnytsky sent a strong Cossack division, led by the 'assigned hetman' Adamovych, to assist the King of Sweden, Gustav, and they helped him in the conquest of the Polish capitals of Warsaw and Kraków. Our present negotiations with Sweden are thus a continuation of former ones and are similar to those practised by all nations. For what kind of nation does not care for its advantage and does not try to forestall danger? Such a nation, in its helplessness, is indeed like [a herd of] dumb animals despised by all peoples.

## Letters (excerpts)

### NIKOLAI GOGOL

*Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol, 1809–52) is a major Russian writer of Ukrainian origin. A native of Poltava province, he was educated at the gymnasium in Nizhyn, which was later upgraded to a lyceum. After moving to St Petersburg he published his collections of Ukrainian short stories, Vechera na khutore bliz Dikanki (Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka, 1831) and Mirgorod (1835), as well as a historical novel, Taras Bulba (the second edition of 1842). He also wrote a brilliant comedy, Revizor (The Inspector General, 1836), and the novel Mërtvye dushi (Dead Souls, 1842), for which he became famous. In an 1844 letter to A. Smirnova, Gogol stated that a Ukrainian and a Russian soul 'were united in his nature.' Some Russian critics (K.A. Aksakov, for example) attributed the qualities of Dead Souls to Gogol's 'Little Russian origin.' His humour and his religiosity were often thought to be Ukrainian. In the excerpts from the little-known letters published here, Gogol's commitment to Ukraine is very clear. At the same time, Gogol must stand as a representative of the many Ukrainians who were absorbed by Russian imperial culture, assisted, in his case, by a regular annuity from the imperial family.*

[1] To M.A. Maksymovych<sup>1</sup>

St P[etersburg], 2 July [1833]<sup>2</sup>

... I am sorry that you are ailing. Give up your lousy Russianness [*katapiin*] and go to the Hetmanate. I myself am thinking of doing the same

1 Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–77), the most important Ukrainian scholar in the Russian Empire at that time, went to Kiev in 1834 to become rector of the new university.

2 All the information in brackets about the dates of these letters and of the places where they were written has been added by earlier editors of the writer's letters.

and going off from here in the coming year. We really are fools, if you give it any thought. For what and for whom are we sacrificing everything? Let's go! How much stuff we're going to collect there! We'll dig up everything. If you are in Kiev, then look up Belousov, the former professor. This man will be useful to you in many ways, and I want you to become friends. So, you'll also catch the fall in Little Russia. The fragrant, fabulous fall with its fresh, inimitable bouquet. You're lucky. But I'm living here at the height of the summer and don't feel the summer. It's stifling, but its essence is missing. It's a real bathhouse; the air wants to destroy you, not revive you. I don't know if I'll write anything for you. I've lost interest now, become so stale. I've become so prosaic that I don't recognize myself. Soon it will be a year since I wrote a line. No matter how I force myself, simply nothing comes of it ...

...

[2] To M.A. Maksymovych                      9 Nov. [1833] St P[etersburg]

I received your letter, dear fellow countryman, through Smirdin. I am devilishly annoyed at myself for not having anything to send you for *Dennitsa*.<sup>3</sup> I have a hundred different beginnings but neither a story nor a single, full excerpt ready to be published in an almanac collection. Smirdin acquired from other sources an old story of mine, about which I had almost completely forgotten and which I am ashamed to call my own. By the way, it's so large and clumsy that it will in no way suit your almanac. Don't be angry at me, my dear countryman loved with all my heart and soul. I will certainly prepare what you want at another time. But not now. If you knew what a terrible upheaval befell me, how everything inside me was violently torn to pieces. O Lord, how much have I lived through, how much have I suffered! But now I hope everything will become calm, and I will be active, be mobile again. I have now begun work on a history of our unique, poor Ukraine. Nothing is so soothing as [the writing of] history. My thoughts are beginning to flow more quietly and in a more orderly fashion. I think I will finish writing it, and that I will say much that has not been said before me.

I was very glad to hear from you about the rich supplementary collection of Chodakowski's<sup>4</sup> songs and works. How I would like to be with you

3 *Dennitsa* (The Dawn) was an almanac published by Maksymovych in Moscow.

4 Zorian Dołęga-Chodakowski (1784–1825) was a Polish ethnographer who collected and published Ukrainian folk-songs.

now and to look them over together in the quivering candlelight between walls covered with books and the dust of books, with the avidity of a Jew counting his coins. My joy, my life! You songs, how I love you! What are all the stale chronicles, in which I now burrow, compared to these ringing, vital chronicles!

...

[3] To M.A. Maksymovych [After 20 Dec. 1833, Petersburg]

Thank you for everything: for the letter, for the thoughts in it, for the news, and so on. Imagine, I too was thinking: 'There, there! To Kiev! To ancient, beautiful Kiev! The city is ours; it is not theirs.' Am I not right? There, or around there, took place all the events of our past.

I am working now. I am employing all my strength, but fear comes over me: perhaps I will not succeed. Petersburg bores me, or, better, not the city but its damned climate, which is baking me. Yes, it will be fine if we take up chairs at Kiev University. There we can do much good.

...

[4] To A.S. Pushkin<sup>5</sup> 23 December 1833 [Petersburg]

...

I am carried away in anticipation when I imagine how my work will begin to boil in Kiev. There I will unload into the light of day many items, some of which I have not yet read to you. There I will finish my history of Ukraine and the south of Russia and will write a Universal History, a type of work which unfortunately has not yet appeared in Russia or even in Europe. And how many legends, popular beliefs, songs, etc. will I collect there. Incidentally, Maksymovych writes me that he wants to leave Moscow University and go to Kiev University. The climate is bad for him. That's a good idea. I love him ...

[5] To M.A. Maksymovych St P[etersburg] 12 February [1834]

...

... Examine well the character of our countrymen: they are lazy, but then once they begin to learn something, it remains forever. To be sure, there is

<sup>5</sup> Alexander S. Pushkin (1799–1837) is considered Russia's greatest writer.



much decisiveness here – once something is started, it is seen through ... The press will be nearby. And what else? Why, the air! And the mushrooms! The bulrushes! The sunflowers! The nightshade! The onion plants! And the *bread wine*, as our friend Ushakov says. The poplars, pear trees, apple trees, plum trees, apricot trees, the cherry trees, and the *vareniki* (dumplings), borshch, burdosh! ... It's simply splendid! It is the only city of ours which was worthy somehow of being the cell of a scholar. Up to now I haven't been able to obtain *Zaporozhian Antiquities* anywhere. This Sreznevsky<sup>6</sup> must be a fool of the first order ...

...

[6] To I.I. Sreznevsky

St P[etersburg] 6 March 1834

... I am happy with whatever appears about our country. And if I were to find out that at this minute someone else is preparing a history of Ukraine, I would hold up my edition for the time needed by him for the marketing of his book. The more attempts by others, the better it will be for me; the more complete my History will be. I am sure I have not encountered anyone who thinks like me, and I seek no monetary gain from the project – therefore, I have no competitors. You have already done me a great service with the publication of *Zaporozhian Antiquities*. Where did you dig up so many treasures? All the *dumy* (lyric epic songs) and, especially, the stories of the *bánduristy* (players of the stringed instrument the *bandura*) are dazzlingly good. Only five of them were known to me before; all the others were completely new. I had grown cool to our chronicles, having tried in vain to find in them what I would have liked to find. Nowhere was there anything about that period which must have been richer in events than all the other periods. The people, whose whole life consisted of movement, who, even if they had been inactive by nature, have been spurred on to deeds and heroic feats by their neighbours, the location of their land, the dangers of existence, this people ... I am dissatisfied with Polish historians. They talk very little about these feats; however, they can know well only what happened after the time of the Union,<sup>7</sup> but even from that period there is no chronicler with an uncalled heart and thoughts. If the

6 Izmail I. Sreznevsky (1812–80) was a Russian Ukrainophile who compiled multivolume collections of Ukrainian folk literature and historical documents. He became an important Slavist and celebrated philologist.

7 Gogol refers to the Union of Lublin of 1569, when the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania formed a commonwealth.

Crimeans and the Turks had had a literature, I would be sure that not a single independent nation at that time in Europe would have a history as interesting as the Cossacks'. And therefore each note of a song speaks to me more vibrantly about the past than our apathetic, mild chronicles, if one can use the word chronicles not for contemporary notes but for later extracts, begun when memory had already yielded to forgetfulness. These chronicles resemble the owner who nailed a lock on his stable after the horses were stolen ...

...

[7] To M.A. Maksymovych

12 March, St P[etersburg] 1834

... But, by the way, it's not very good that you are not deigning to write to me. You're a fine lad, inciting me to go to Kiev but sitting there and not thinking of it yourself. Whereas I am on the verge of departure. Well, are you going or not? Have you really fallen in love with that old, fat baba Moscow, from whom one hears about nothing but *shchi* [cabbage soup] and motherly things? Listen: judge according to your pure conscience how hard it will be for me to be alone in Kiev. The land and the region are good, but the people, I do believe, better, although not more useful. *Nota bene* for unhealthy people, like you and me.

We must print the songs without fail in Kiev. Joining forces we will put out an edition like one no one has ever done before. Spring and summer we should rest there in grand fashion, we should collect the materials, but towards autumn we should set to work ...

[8] To M.A. Maksymovych

27 June [1834. Petersburg]

Today I received your letter of 23 June. So, you're on the road. I bless you! I am sure you will have a good time, a very good time, in Kiev. Don't give in beforehand to doubts of any kind and to health worries. I will come to you, come without fail, and together we will begin to live. The devil take everything else! I am managing my affairs in such a way that I will be ready to go to Kiev without fail, though no earlier than fall or winter. But, no matter what, I will go. I pledged it to myself, and firmly pledged it; consequently, everything is settled. There is no granite that human strength and desire cannot break through.

For God's sake, do not give into sad thoughts; be merry, as merry as I am now that I have decided that nothing on earth is worth a straw. With patience and equanimity you will achieve everything. One more request: in

the name of everything we share, for the sake of Ukraine, for the sake of our fathers' graves, don't sit over your books. The devil take them if they are of no service to you other than to obscure your thoughts. Be what you are, speak your own mind, and say it as succinctly as possible ...

...

[9] To M.A. Maksymovych                      22 March [1835. Petersburg]

...

I am sending you *Mirgorod*. Perhaps it will be to your liking. At the very least I would like to drive away that splenetic humour of yours, which, as far as I can observe, sometimes comes over you, even in Kiev. All of us, really and truly, have fully estranged ourselves from our primordial elements. We, especially you, can in no way get accustomed to looking at life as not worth a straw – the way the Cossacks always regarded it. Have you ever tried, after getting up in the morning from your bed, to dance a jerky *tropak* about the room in only your nightshirt?

1833-5

# The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People (excerpt)

MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV

*Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85) was a prominent historian and writer. His father was a Russian landowner, and his mother a Ukrainian serf, whom his father married. Kostomarov was educated at Kharkiv University, where he belonged to a circle of poets. In 1846 he was appointed adjunct professor at Kiev University, and it was there that, together with some friends, he organized the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius. In 1847 he was arrested with other 'brethren,' tried, and exiled to Saratov. In 1859 he moved to St Petersburg, where he became a professor of history at the university. His historical works include many monographs on Ukrainian history, and he is considered the founder of the populist school of Ukrainian historians. Kostomarov is represented in this collection by three different pieces of political journalism, showing his early messianism and his later, more moderate views.*

61. The Slavic tribe even before the acceptance of the faith had neither kings nor masters and were all equal and there were no idols, but the Slavs worshipped one God,<sup>1</sup> omnipotent. Thus writes a Greek historian concerning the Slavs.

62. When the older brothers, the Greeks, Romans, Germans, became enlightened, then the Lord sent two brothers, Constantine and Methodius, to the younger brother, the Slavs; the Lord invested them with the Holy Spirit, and they translated into the Slavic language the holy scrip-

1 Svaroh is probably the deity Kostomarov mentions. Procopius states that the Antes and the Slovenes worshipped Svaroh, god of heaven. [Notes are provided by the translator, though we have made a significant addition to note 10. – Eds]

tures and determined to perform the divine service in that language, which all spoke; and this was not so among either the Romans or the Germans because they performed the divine service in Latin so that the Romans understood a little but the Germans understood nothing of what was read to them.

63. And the Slavs quickly accepted the Christian faith, as no other people had accepted it.

64. But the Slavs had two misfortunes – first, the discord among them and, second, they, as the younger brother, adopted everything from the elders, the necessary and the unnecessary, not realizing that their own was better than that of their elder brothers.

65. And the Slavs accepted kings and masters from the Germans, but before this their kings had been elected leaders and did not boast before the people but sat down to dine with the simple as equals, and they themselves tilled their land; but afterward there came amongst them magnificence, vanity, the guards, the court.

66. And there were no masters among the Slavs but there were patriarchs; the one who is older in years and who is wiser than the others besides, him they listened to at the popular assembly, but afterward there were masters among them, and the masters had slaves.

67. And the Lord punished the Slavic tribe more cruelly than the other tribes because the Lord himself hath said: to whom more is given, from him more is demanded; and the Slavs fell captive to the foreigners: the Czechs and the Polabians to the Germans, the Serbs and the Bulgars to the Greeks and the Turks, and the Great Russians to the Tatars.

68. And it seemed the Slavic tribe will perish because those Slavs who dwelled near the Elbe and the Baltic sea-coast were destroyed in such a way that no trace of them remained.

69. But the Lord was not completely angered at the Slavic tribe, because the Lord planned that the scripture should be fulfilled in this tribe. The stone that the builders rejected is become the cornerstone.

70. After the lapse of much time there took shape in the Slavic land three independent kingdoms: Poland, Lithuania and Muscovy.

71. Poland was made up of Poles, and the Poles boasted: we have freedom and equality, but they made masters of themselves, and the Polish people were foolhardy because the simple people fell into captivity, the most grievous which ever was on the earth, and the masters without regard for law hanged and killed their slaves.

72. Muscovy was made up of Great Russians: and a great republic existed among them – the Novgorod republic, free and equal although not

without masters, and Novgorod perished because even there masters appeared, and the Muscovite tsar rose above all the Great Russians, and he arose by bowing down to the Tatars, and he kissed the feet of Khan, the Tatar Mussulman, in order that he might aid him in holding the Great Russian Christian people in fiendish captivity.

73. And the Great Russian people lost their senses and fell into idolatry because they called the tsar the earthly god and everything the tsar said they considered to be good, so that when Tsar Ivan in Novgorod strangled and drowned tens of thousands of people a day, the chroniclers relating this called him Christ-loving.

74. And Lithuania united with Poland and in Lithuania there were Lithuanians and Ukraine belonged to Lithuania.

75. And Ukraine united with Poland as a sister with a sister, as one Slavic people with another Slavic people, indivisible and separate in the image of the Trinity, divine, indivisible, and separate as in the future all Slavic people will be united amongst themselves.

76. Ukraine loved neither the tsar nor the Polish lord and established a Cossack Host amongst themselves, i.e., a brotherhood in which each upon entering was the brother of the others – whether he had before been a master or a slave, provided that he was a Christian; and the Cossacks were equal amongst themselves, and officials were elected at the assembly and they all had to serve according to the Word of Christ, because they accepted the duty as compulsory, as an obligation, and there was no sort of seigniorial majesty and title among the Cossacks.

77. And they resolved to preserve their purity, therefore the old chroniclers say of the Cossacks: thievery and fornication are never named among them.

78. And the Cossack Host decided to guard the holy faith and free their neighbours from captivity. The Hetman Svyrhovsky<sup>2</sup> moved to defend Wallachia and the Cossacks did not take the platter with the gold pieces which were offered to them in thankfulness for their services; they did not take them because they had shed their blood for the faith and for their neighbours; they served God and not the golden calf. And Sahaidachny<sup>3</sup> ravaged Kaffa and liberated there several thousand slaves from the underground prisons.

79. And there were many knights who acted thus; their exploits are not

2 Ivan Svyrhovsky was a Cossack hetman of the sixteenth century.

3 Petro Sahaidachny, a Cossack hetman, captured the city of Kaffa in 1616.

inscribed in the books of this world but are written in heaven, because the prayers of those whom they had freed from captivity interceded for them before God.

80. And day after day the Cossack Host grew and multiplied and soon all people in Ukraine would have become Cossacks, i.e., free and equal, and there would have been neither a tsar nor a Polish lord over Ukraine, but God alone, and as it would be in Ukraine, so it would also be in Poland and then also in the other Slavic lands.

81. For Ukraine did not wish to follow in the path of the nations, but held to the law of God; and each foreigner coming to Ukraine was amazed because in no other country of the world did they so sincerely pray to God, nowhere else did man so love his wife and the children so respect their parents.

82. And when the priests and Jesuits wished to subordinate Ukraine forcibly to their authority in order that the Ukrainian Christians might believe all that the pope says is true and equitable, then in Ukraine there appeared brotherhoods such as there were among the first Christians; and each person enrolling in the brotherhood, whether he had been a master or a slave, was called a brother. And this was so that all might see that in Ukraine the ancient faith remained and that in Ukraine there were no idols and for this reason no types of heresies had appeared there.

83. But the masters perceived that the Cossack Host was growing and soon all people would become Cossacks, i.e., free, and they forbade their slaves to join the Cossack Host and they wished to beat the simple people down as cattle, so that there should be no feeling in them, no sense, and the masters began to strip their slaves; they handed them to the Jews, to such torture the likes of which they had inflicted only on the first Christians; they flayed the skin from living people, boiled children in cauldrons, forced mothers to suckle dogs.

84. And the masters wished to make of the people a tree or a stone, and they did not allow them to go to church; they forbade them to christen their children, to be married, to accept the sacraments, to bury the dead, and all this in order that the simple people should lose even their human form, and then it would be easier to manage them.

85. And the masters began to torture and annihilate the Cossack Host because such a free Christian brotherhood hindered the masters much.

86. But it did not come to pass as the masters thought; because the Cossack Host rebelled and all the people rose up with them and destroyed and drove out the masters, and Ukraine became a Cossack land, i.e., free, because all were equal and free – but not for long.

87. And Ukraine wanted again to live fraternally with Poland, indivisibly and separately, but Poland in no way wished to renounce her *nobility*.

88. Then Ukraine joined Muscovy<sup>4</sup> and united with her as one Slavic people with another Slavic people, indivisible and separate in the image of the Trinity, divine, indivisible and separate, as in the future all the Slavic people will be united amongst themselves.

89. But Ukraine soon perceived that she had fallen into captivity; because of her simplicity she had not realized what the Muscovite tsar signified and that the Muscovite tsar meant the same as an idol and a torturer.

90. And Ukraine seceded from Muscovy and did not know, the poor one, where to shelter herself.

91. For she loved both the Poles and the Great Russians as her own brothers and did not desire to break up the brotherhood, but wished that all should live together united as one Slavic people with another, and that these two should unite with the third and that there should be three Republics in one union, indivisible and separate in the image of the Holy Trinity, indivisible and separate as all the Slavic people in the future will unite amongst themselves.

92. But neither *Liakhy*<sup>5</sup> nor Great Russians understood this. And the Polish lords and the Muscovite sovereign saw that they could do nothing with Ukraine and they said amongst themselves: Ukraine will not be for the Polish lord nor the Muscovite tsar; we will sunder her in two parts along the course of the Dnieper which divides her in half; the left bank will belong to the Muscovite tsar for profit and the right bank will belong to the Polish lords for pillage.<sup>6</sup>

93. And Ukraine fought against this for about fifty years: this was the most holy and most glorious war for freedom, one to which there is probably nothing similar in history, and the partition of Ukraine is the most odious affair one can find in history.

94. Ukraine lost strength; and the Poles forced the Cossack Host from

4 Bohdan Khmelnytsky, after a series of wars with Poland, accepted Muscovite intervention and the offer of a protectorate over Ukraine. Accordingly, in 1654, at Pereiaslav, the Cossacks took an oath of loyalty to the tsar. Khmelnytsky died in 1657 aware that what was intended as an alliance on his part had become a territorial acquisition on the tsar's part.

5 This is a rather contemptuous term used for the Poles.

6 Left-Bank Ukraine, under Ivan Briukhovetsky, was subordinated to Moscow; Right-Bank Ukraine, under Pavlo Teteria, was under the protection of Poland. After a series of incursions by both sides, Right-Bank Ukraine succeeded in gaining independence under Hetman Petro Doroshenko. He defeated Briukhovetsky and united both banks in 1668.



the right bank of the Dnieper and the Polish lords reigned over the poverty-stricken remnants of a free people.

95. And on the left bank the Cossack Host held on longer but hour by hour they succumbed to the fiendish captivity of the Moscow tsar and afterwards of the Petersburg emperor, because the last Moscow tsar and the first Petersburg emperor<sup>7</sup> destroyed hundreds of thousands in the canals and built for himself a capital on their bones.

96. And the German Tsarina Catherine [II], a universal whore, atheist, husband slayer, ended the Cossack Host and freedom because having selected those who were the *starshyna* in Ukraine, she allotted them nobility and lands and she gave them free brethren in yoke; she made some masters and others slaves.

97. And Ukraine was destroyed. But it only seemed to be so.

98. She was not destroyed; because she wished to know neither a tsar nor a master, and although a tsar was over her he was a foreigner, and although there were nobles they were foreign, and although these degenerates were of Ukrainian blood they did not yet soil the Ukrainian language with their foul mouths and they did not call themselves Ukrainians; but the true Ukrainian – whether of simple origin or noble – must love neither a tsar nor a master but he must love and be mindful of one God, Jesus Christ, the king and master of heaven and earth. Thus it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be.

99. And the Slavic people, although they endured and endure captivity, had not themselves created the captivity because the tsar and nobility are not an invention of the Slavic spirit but of the German and the Tatar. And now, although there is a despot-tsar in Russia, he is not a Slav, but a German, and his officials are German. Hence, although there are nobles in Russia they soon turn into Germans or Frenchmen, while the true Slav loves neither the tsar nor the lord, but he loves and is mindful of one God, Jesus Christ, King of heaven and earth. Thus it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be.

100. Ukraine lies in the grave but did not die.

101. For her voice which called all the Slavic people to freedom and brotherhood was heard throughout the Slavic world. And this voice of Ukraine resounded in Poland, when on the third of May<sup>8</sup> the Poles decided

7 Peter the Great is the ruler here condemned.

8 On 3 May 1791 the Polish Sejm accepted a new constitution under which the monarchy became hereditary, the *liberum veto* was abolished, the king's acts were to have the approval of his council, and his ministers were to be responsible to the Sejm.

that there should be no masters among them, that all were equal in the republic, and this Ukraine had desired already one hundred and twenty years earlier.

102. And they did not allow Poland to do this; they ravaged Poland as before they had ravaged Ukraine.

103. And Poland deserved this because she had not heeded Ukraine and had destroyed her own sister.

104. But Poland will not perish because she will be awakened by Ukraine, who does not remember evil and loves her own sister as though nothing had occurred between them.

105. And the voice of Ukraine resounded in Muscovy when after the death of Tsar Alexander [I] the Russians wanted to banish the tsar and destroy the nobility, to found a republic and unite all the Slavs with it in the image of the Trinity, indivisible and separate;<sup>9</sup> and this Ukraine had desired and striven for, for almost two hundred years before this.

106. And the despot did not allow this: some ended their lives on the gallows, others were tortured in mines, and still others were handed over to be slaughtered by the Circassians.

107. And the despot rules over three Slavic peoples; he rules them by using Germans; he poisons, cripples, destroys the good Slavic nature, but it will avail him nought.

108. Because the voice of Ukraine was not stilled. Ukraine will rise from her grave and again will call to her brother Slavs, and they will hear her call and the Slavic peoples will rise and there will remain neither tsar, nor tsarevich, nor tsarevna, nor prince, nor count, nor duke, nor excellency, nor highness, nor lord, nor boyar, nor peasant, nor serf, neither in Great Russia, nor in Poland, nor in Ukraine, nor in Czechia, nor among the Khorutans,<sup>10</sup> nor among the Serbs, nor among the Bulgars.

109. And Ukraine will be an independent Republic in the Slavic Union. Then all the peoples, pointing to that place on the map where Ukraine will be delineated, will say: behold, the stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone.

*Translator unidentified; reprinted from  
B. Yanivs'kyi, Kostomarov's 'Books of  
Genesis of the Ukrainian People'*

1846

9 The reference is to the Decembrist uprising of 1825.

10 In the past, translators have applied this term to the Croats, but it actually refers to the Slovenes.

## Preface to an Unpublished Edition of *Kobzar*<sup>1</sup>

TARAS SHEVCHENKO

*Taras Shevchenko (1814–61) is Ukraine's greatest poet. Born a serf, he became a page-boy to his landlord-master and travelled with him to Vilnius and St Petersburg. In 1838 his freedom was purchased, and he enrolled at the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts in St Petersburg, where he received a good education. A talented painter and a pupil of K. Briullov, he started to write poetry and in 1840 published his first collection, Kobzar (The Minstrel). A long poem, Haidamaky, followed in the next year. Although some Russian critics welcomed Shevchenko's poetry, V. Belinsky, the most influential of them, attacked it. In the mid-1840s Shevchenko travelled several times to Ukraine and wrote some political poems not intended for publication. For his involvement in the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius he was arrested in 1847 and sent into exile for the next ten years. After his release he returned to St Petersburg, where he wrote more poetry and where he died, unmarried, in 1861. Shevchenko's poetry has, apart from pure lyricism, a strong political and social message. He has always been regarded as a prophet of an independent Ukraine and an advocate of social justice. Unlike his friend Panteleimon Kulish, he firmly believed in the separate development of Ukrainian literature, a belief he expressed in the preface printed here.*

<sup>1</sup> Shevchenko wrote this preface in 1847, shortly before his arrest. Neither the preface nor this edition of the book was published.

Shall we never rise against foreign fashions:  
 So that our wise and good people  
 Would not consider our speech as German?

A. Griboedov<sup>2</sup>

I am sending out among the people the second edition of my *Kobzar* and, so that it doesn't come empty-handed, I am giving it a preface. My words are addressed to you, my dear Ukrainian brethren.

A great sorrow has enveloped my soul. I hear and sometimes I read: the Poles are printing and the Czechs and the Serbs and the Bulgarians and the Montenegrins and the Russians – all are printing. But from us not a peep, as if we were all dumb. Why is this so, my brethren? Perhaps you are frightened by an invasion of foreign journalists?<sup>3</sup> Don't be afraid; don't pay attention to them. They clamour, why don't we write in Russian? But why don't the Russians write anything, and why do they only translate the devil only knows how and what? They overuse all sorts of 'individualisms' and things that one's tongue will prove stiff in pronouncing. They clamour about brotherhood but fight among themselves like rabid dogs. They clamour about the uniqueness of Slavic literature, but they don't want even to look at what the Slavs are doing.

Have they at least dissected Polish, Czech, Serbian, or even our books? After all, we do not write in German. No, they haven't analysed them. And why? Because they have no clue. Whenever a Ukrainian book falls into their hands, they praise in it what is worst. And our homestead patriots agree with them. Most charming [they say] is this sorcery,<sup>4</sup> which is full of Jews, taverns, pigs, and drunken old women. Perhaps this suits their refined natures and is good for them. However, in our peasant eyes this is very bad. It is true that we ourselves are to blame. For we do not see our people as God created them. In a tavern our man and a *moskal'*<sup>5</sup> and even a German all look like pigs, and in enforced serf labour in the fields even worse. It is impossible to go to his house or to invite him in as a friend

2 The quoted lines are from Alexander S. Griboedov's popular Russian comedy *Woe from Wit*.

3 'Foreign journalists' may refer, among others, to Vissarion Belinsky, who criticized Shevchenko for writing in Ukrainian.

4 A reference to a play by Kyrylo Topolia, *Sorcery* (1837), highly praised by the Russian critic Nikolai Polevoi. The play is based on Ukrainian themes but depicts Ukrainians as rather primitive.

5 A contemptuous term for a Russian.

because he will take fright and think the one wearing a coat is a fool.

They have read the *Eneida*<sup>6</sup> syllable by syllable and have loitered at a tavern, thinking that in it they will recognize their peasants. No, brethren, you should read the *dumy*<sup>7</sup> and songs; you should listen to how these are sung, and to how the peasants talk among themselves without taking off their hats, or at a friendly feast. They recall old times and cry as if they were indeed in Turkish captivity or were trailing the chains of their Polish magnates. Then you would say that the *Eneida* is good, but still ridicule in a Muscovite vein.

So here we are, my dear brethren. In order to get to know people, one must live with them. And in order to write about them, it is necessary to become human and not waste ink and paper. Then you can write and print, and your labour will be honest.

Do not pay attention to the Russians. Let them write as they like, and let us write as we like. They are a people with a language, and so are we. Let the people judge which is better. They give as an example Gogol, who wrote not in his own language but in Russian, or Walter Scott, who did not write in his own language. Gogol grew up in Nizhyn, not in Little Russia, and does not know his own language, and Walter Scott in Edinburgh, not in [highland] Scotland. Perhaps there were other reasons why they renounced their languages. I do not know. But [Robert] Burns is nevertheless a great poet of his people. And our Skovoroda would have been one, if it had not been for the bad influence of Latin and, later, Russian.

The late [Kvitka-] Osnovianenko<sup>8</sup> was a good observer of people, but he did not listen to their speech, which he might not have heard in his mother's cradle. Hulak-Artemovsky,<sup>9</sup> on the other hand, heard peasant speech but forgot it when he became a lord. Woe to us! The loathsome and godless lords have made us lose our senses. It would have been better if all these pettifogging, spineless characters had been destined by God to pay for their terrible sins before their conception in their mothers' wombs and then to languish and putrefy in ink. But no, they are wise men and scholars.

6 Shevchenko's ambivalent attitude to Ivan Kotliarevsky's classic travesty of Virgil, *Eneida* (first published in 1798), was probably dictated by his dislike of the burlesque genre.

7 The *dumy* are lyric and epic songs composed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about the Cossacks and chanted to the accompaniment of the *bandura* or the *lira*.

8 Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko (1778–1843) was a Ukrainian classicist prose writer.

9 Petro Hulak-Artemovsky (1790–1865) was a professor of literature at Kharkiv University and the author of Ukrainian fables.

They have exchanged their own good mother for a useless drunkard, and they have added a *v*<sup>10</sup> to their surnames.

Why have not V.S. Karadžić,<sup>11</sup> Šafařík,<sup>12</sup> and others become Germans – it would have been so convenient for them – but instead remained Slavs, true sons of their mothers, and gained good fame? Woe to us! But, my brethren, do not despair, and work wisely in the name of Ukraine, our ill-fated mother. Amen.

So that you know your labour is not in vain, and so that the Russians do not extol their Rostopchina,<sup>13</sup> look at ‘Holy Water,’<sup>14</sup> which was written by a beautiful young lady whom I will not name because she is still young and shy. You can pore over the thick journals if you like, but you will not find there, as God is my witness, anything equal to ‘Holy Water’!

1847

10 It was a common habit for Ukrainians to appear Russian by adding to their surnames the ending *-(o)v*.

11 V.S. Karadžić (1787–1864) was one of the founders of modern Serbian literature.

12 P.J. Šafařík (1795–1861), by origin Slovak, became a prominent scholar of Czech literature.

13 Ievdokia Rostopchina (1811–58) was a Russian poet, well known for her ‘salon’ poetry.

14 ‘Holy Water’ was a poem by a young Ukrainian poet, Oleksandra Psiol, whom Shevchenko, perhaps mistakenly, considered promising.

## Epilogue to *The Black Council*: On the Relation of Little Russian Literature to Common-Russian Literature

PANTELEIMON KULISH

*Panteleimon Kulish (1819–97) was a prominent writer, ethnographer, and historian. A descendant of the Cossacks, Kulish had practically no university education. For a time he worked as a teacher. In the mid-1840s he, together with Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Kostomarov, and Vasyl Bilozersky, formed a circle out of which the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius evolved. Although not directly involved with the activities of the Brotherhood, Kulish was arrested in 1847 and spent three years in exile in Tula. After his release he lived mostly in St Petersburg, where he collaborated on the journal Osnova (The Foundation, 1861–2). Kulish was the author of the first Ukrainian historical novel, Chorna rada (The Black Council, 1847), which he later translated into Russian (1857); he also produced many valuable folkloristic works and translations of Shakespeare and the Bible. Always a loner, he spent his last years on a khutir (homestead). A controversial figure, Kulish was a great master of the Ukrainian language, and unlike Shevchenko he believed in the close relation of Ukrainian literature and culture to what was then known as a common-Russian heritage.*

I first wrote *The Black Council* in the south-Russian, or Little Russian, language. Here a free translation<sup>1</sup> of this work is printed. In this translation are passages which are not in the original, and there is much in the original which is not in the translation. This is owing to the different spirit of the two literatures. Moreover, when I wrote the original, I had a different point of view, and when I translated the novel, I looked at the same subject as someone belonging to a specifically literary milieu. In the past I followed as

1 Kulish refers here to his Russian translation.

much as possible the tone and manner of our popular rhapsodes and storytellers; at the present time I maintain the approach of a writer indebted to the established literary manner. I think, therefore, that the original and the translation, while depicting the same thing, are in tone and spirit two separate works. In any case, I consider it important to explain why a Russian writer of our time, in order to portray Little Russian legends, customs, and manners, turned to a language unknown in northern Russia and little known among the south-Russian reading public.

My book, having appeared in an unfamiliar literary language, may lead many to misunderstand the concepts and aims of the author. They may think that I write under the influence of a narrow local patriotism and that I intend to create a separate literature to the detriment of common-Russian literature. Such conclusions would be offensive to me, and I have therefore decided to forestall them by explaining the reasons on the basis of which I chose the south-Russian language for an artistic re-creation of our chronicled legends.

When south Rus', or, as it is usually called, Little Russia, united with northern or Great Russia, the intellectual life in the north was immediately enlivened by the influx of new forces from the south, and later south Rus' continually took a most active part in the development of north-Russian literature. Everyone knows how many Little Russian names appear in the old chronicles of Russian literature. The people bearing these names appeared in the north with their own language – no matter whether it was pure south-Russian or, as some maintain, half-Polish, or whether it was a vital popular language or a dry academic one – and introduced this language, an educated language no stranger to general European scholarship and capable of expressing scientific and abstract concepts, into the Russian literature of that time. Native Muscovites abandoned the language of their ordinary books and writings for this discourse, and in the Russian state, side by side with the popular north- and south-Russian languages, there was formed a language consisting of the middle ground between them and equally comprehensible to both Russian groups. Having achieved clarity and fullness, this language began to rid itself of old words and expressions, those formed in schools and foreign to popular taste, and substituted for them the words and expressions of the living language spoken by the people – and here the influx of the north-Russian element became almost exclusive. In turn, the Little Russians renounced their mother tongue and, along with the enlightenment spreading over the empire from the two great craters, Moscow and St Petersburg, adopted the forms and the spirit of the north-Russian language.



It would seem, therefore, that by these mutual influences the development of the literary language in Russia should have been completed. But it turned out that the forces of the creative Russian spirit had made far from full contact. At the time when Pushkin brought Russian poetry to the height of perfection, to the *ne plus ultra* of plasticity and harmony, out of the depths of the Poltava steppes there appeared in the north a writer with a superficial formal education and incorrect speech, whose deviations from the widely accepted literary norms issued clearly from his inadequate knowledge of them. He appeared, and the admirers of the artistic, clear, harmonious Pushkin were delighted by his steppe speeches. What does that mean? It means that Pushkin had not yet mastered all the treasures of the Russian language, that in Gogol's language the Russian ear heard something native and somehow forgotten since childhood, that in the land of Russia was discovered a source of language from which our northern writers had long ago ceased to draw ...

Judging by the similarity of old customs among the Great Russians and the Little Russians, one can conclude that in the deep past all Rus' spoke one and the same language, or dialects similar to each other. And it is probable that the Russian language was best developed primarily in the land which was then the focal point of the people's power, the Kievan land. The farther from this land, the clearer were the regional differences and deviations from south-Russian speech, and these were reflected, in part, in north-Russian chronicles. By right, the language of the Kievan land ought to have served as the model for the entire ancient Russian world. But, as a result of political turmoil, the civic order slowly weakened within the borders of the ancient Kievan principality, and the Russian people developed its state power mainly in the north, first in Vladimir, on the Kliazma river, and later in Moscow. Here the ancient Russian language, whatever it had been at the time of Vladimir and Iaroslav, followed a special path, so that it began to include the resources of its native soil, in accordance with its particular state and social circumstances. The Muscovite land became a strong kingdom which drew everything to itself and created new forms of life and a language expressing those forms. Thus was reached that level of development found by the southern Rus' people, who united with the north-Russian people after having been divided from them by the Tatars.

What did *they* do with their language during the time they were divided from northern Rus'? Some of our scholars, without a moment's hesitation, have maintained that they forgot the *proper Russian speech* and fell under the influence of the Polish language, which, having mixed with the language of the southern Rus' people, created a blend today called the Little

Russian language. Somehow, it seems, the Little Russian language developed from Polish. But the monuments of south-Russian folk literature, constantly being discovered by ethnographers, give rise to an important, in this instance, question: Which of the two languages could have been the father of the other – the one which has folk-songs rich in beauty, containing ethnographic and religious details reflecting deepest pagan antiquity, or the one which has no such folk-songs? The Polish language is not only poorer in folk creations, but younger than the south-Russian. If we find Polish words in the contemporary Little Russian language, it means that these words were borrowed by the Poles from the southern Russes and became common to both.<sup>2</sup> The south-Russian people did not forget the language of their princes and retinues; it continued to live its own life despite the Khanate invaders and the Lithuanians, who were uninterested in the customs and language of the occupied people. What is borrowed by one people from another bears the features of its prototype and inevitably is inferior to it in vitality and beauty. But here the opposite has happened. Polish oral literature, even in the opinion of its most ardent adherents, is far behind Little Russian literature in its vitality, diversity, glitter, and plastic beauty. How then can the opinion exist in Rus' that the poor literature has given birth to the rich one? There are many reasons [for such a view], but I will point to only one. Our scholars, especially our historians and philologists, are mostly at a remove, too distant to be able to make a direct study of the people, especially the south Russians. They necessarily repeat one another, and, to the detriment of scholarship, there are some among them who want to play the role of Russian patriots by demeaning one Russian group in front of another. What are the consequences of the dearth of first-hand observation, and where does this tribal exclusiveness in regard to Rus' lead us? On the one hand, it breeds among the youth, who trust these scholarly authorities, contempt for a subject worthy of the most diligent, specialized study; on the other, it nourishes a sense of tribal alienation, expressed in Little Russians either as an indifference to everything which is not Little Russian or by outrageous caricatures of reality.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps some-

2 I am thinking of the words that form the beauty and not the ugliness of the language – the words which are used in folk-songs and by our poets, and not the ones which one happens to hear from people bearing the sad imprints of a foreign nationality. [Author's note]

3 I will point to some passages in Osnovianenko's story 'A Soldier's Portrait,' to those works of Hrebinka in which Great Russians are characters, and, finally, to *Dead Souls* by Gogol, in which the Russian peasants, in my opinion, are depicted as true caricatures but are not very satisfactory from the point of view of the deep inner bond which must exist between a writer and the people. [Author's note]

one gains by this situation, but it is not society. Society needs love, and where there is no love there are no successes in life. Those of our scholars who, guided by simple-minded or feigned patriotism, therefore, limit the scope of their specialized study of the people and its speech to the so-called *genuinely Russian man*, thereby in their blindness excluding millions of south Russians from participating in the process of self-cognition and self-expression, are blocking the progress of Russia's moral development.

Fortunately the character of the Russian man is stronger than the delusions of learned and unlearned fanatics, and however much it is oppressed by the moribund influences of people without heart or reason, it revives under favourable circumstances. Some time ago, educated south-Russian society began to admire its native poetry and language, but by no means as a result, as some assume, of the general movement among Slavic peoples to define their national identities, a movement which is quite recent. This admiration was expressed by works which, in our opinion, have no great value, but their influence on common-Russian literature was salutary. Gogol was first prompted to depict Little Russian life in his stories by his father, the author of and an actor in several dramatic pieces in the Little Russian language. The circle in which Gogol found himself and the influence of various people he met showed him the form of discourse which would make his works accessible to society, and he began to write in Great Russian. Many Little Russians are sorry he did not write in his native language, but I regard this circumstance as most fortunate. Owing to his education and the era in which he passed his childhood he could not master the Little Russian language to the extent of not having to stop at each step in his creative evolution because of linguistic deficiencies, an inability to find colours and forms. However great his talent, under such conditions he would have had a weak influence on his countrymen and no influence whatsoever on Russian society. But by speaking about Little Russia in a language accessible to both groups, on the one hand he showed his own people the beauty they had, and on the other he discovered for the Great Russians a distinct and poetic people, whom they had known previously only through literary caricatures. Strictly speaking, Gogol's Little Russian stories contain scant ethnographic or historical truth, but they convey the general poetic tone of Little Russia. They are more akin to our folk-songs than to the reality reflected in these songs. One cannot say that Gogol's works explained Little Russia, but they provided a powerful incentive for such an explanation. Gogol was unable to study his native people in the past and present. He attempted a history of Little Russia, a historical novel *à la* Walter Scott, and ended up by writing *Taras Bulba*, a book in which he

revealed an extreme lack of information about the Little Russian past as well as an unusual gift at *divining the past*. Rereading *Taras Bulba* now, we often find the author in the dark, but whenever a song, a chronicle, or a legend casts a glimmer of light in his direction, he uses its feeble rays with incomprehensible skill in order to make out neighbouring objects. Because of this, *Taras Bulba* impresses the connoisseur with the incidental fidelity of its colours and with the glitter of fantasy, although its historical and artistic veracity is far from satisfactory. Here again many Little Russians regret that Gogol did not continue to study Little Russia and did not dedicate himself to the artistic depiction of its past and present. But again I see in his inclination to Great Russian elements the most fortunate instinct of a genius. In his time it was impossible to know Little Russia better than he did. Moreover, the study of those aspects of Little Russia by means of which we, the successors of Gogol in the process of self-knowledge, attempt to clarify its past and present life, had not yet presented itself as a goal. Let us suppose that Gogol could have researched Little Russian archives and chronicles and collections of songs and legends, could have travelled throughout Little Russia in order to see with his own eyes the real life that makes it possible to draw conclusions about the past, and in the end could have studied the political and international relations of Poland, Russia, and Little Russia. These preparations for a literary work would have occupied all his time, and we would not, perhaps, have received anything from him. Having turned towards contemporary Russian life, however, he breathed more freely. The materials were always on hand, and only the realization of his inadequate development impeded his creative process. All the same, he left us a memento of his talent in some short stories, comic plays, and, finally, *Dead Souls*, his great attempt to create something colossal. Those committed to the development of Little Russian elements in literature have lost nothing in him, and all Russians jointly were the winners. And did so little that is Little Russian really enter into *Dead Souls*? 'The Muscovites themselves,' writes Aksakov, 'admit that if Gogol were not a Little Russian he would not have created anything like that.'<sup>4</sup> But the creation of *Dead Souls*, or, rather, the striving to create it expressed by Gogol in his 'Author's Confession' and many letters, has a different, higher meaning. Gogol, a native of the *gubernia* of Poltava, which was the site of the last efforts of a well-known party of Little Russians (the adherents of Mazepa) to break the state bond with the Great Russian people; a writer

4 See K. Aksakov, *Neskolko slov o poeme Gogolia Mërtvye dushi*, Moscow, 1842, pp. 17-18.  
[Author's note]

brought up on Ukrainian folk-songs; a passionate – to the point of delusion – *bard* of Cossack antiquity, rose above the love directed exclusively towards his native land and became inflamed with an ardent love of all the Russian people, such as a native of northern Russia could desire but hardly expect from a Little Russian. Perhaps therein, with all its ramifications, lies Gogol's great achievement, and perhaps this great spiritual feat justifies the intimation of his early childhood that he would do something for the general good.<sup>5</sup> Since Gogol's time the view of the Little Russians held by Great Russians has changed. They sensed in his nature unusual, striking abilities of mind and heart; they saw that the people among whom such a writer had appeared lived a vigorous life and were perhaps designated by fate to fulfil the spiritual nature of north-Russian man. Having implanted this belief in Russian society, Gogol accomplished a feat more patriotic than that of people who in their books praise north Rus' alone and avoid south Rus'. For their part, the Little Russians were called by him to become conscious of their nationality and were directed by him towards a loving union with north Russians, whose greatness he felt with all his soul and made us feel too. Gogol's mission was to lay the foundation of a deep and all-embracing sympathy between two groups, tied materially and spiritually but separated by old misunderstandings and an insufficient number of mutual bonds.<sup>6</sup>

I said that the Little Russian works of Gogol prompted an exploration of Little Russia, and I said it not without good reason. Everything written before him about Little Russia in both languages, north- and south-Russian, could not, without him, have caused the kind of intellectual movement he initiated with his stories on Little Russian mores and history. *Taras Bulba*, based on the writings of Konysky<sup>7</sup> and Beauplan,<sup>8</sup> created a new interest in those writers. In them was sought what was not captured by Gogol's Cossack poem, and the recorded legends of antiquity preserved by them offered the minds and imaginations of readers the charm of a mag-

5 See 'Avtorskaia ispoved,' *Sochineniia i Pisma Gogolia*, vol. 3, p. 500. [Author's note]

6 The names of Shakespeare, Byron, Walter Scott tie the English and the Scots into one people, scattered across the world. Gogol's name is just as precious for a Great Russian as for a Little Russian. Beginning in Gogol's time Russian literature became more kindred to Little Russians. They saw themselves in it, in the present and the past. For their part, the Great Russians, with the help of Gogol's works, have, anew as it were, come to know, to love, and to possess Little Russia spiritually. [Author's note]

7 In Kulish's day Archbishop Georgii Konysky was considered the author of *Istoriia Rusov*.

8 Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan (1600–73), a French army engineer and cartographer, was the author of *Description d'Ukraine* (1660), a work widely known in Europe.

ical fairy tale. This sense of enchantment was extended to other chronicles, which had been obscured by Konysky's popularity. Familiarity with them resulted in their being collated, and the contradictions revealed by them created the need to know the truth. Thus arrived the moment for the historical research which had been unavailable to the author of *Taras Bulba*; indeed, the need for such research had been far from the mind of the author of *Taras Bulba*, as has been best demonstrated in Pushkin's article on Konysky (*Sovremennik* [The Contemporary], 1836), in which there is not even a hint of his shortcomings as far as veracity is concerned. *The Chronicle of Samovydyts*, discovered by me and published by Professor Bodiansky, has no equal among Little Russian chronicles. A new view of the history of Cossack Little Russia began to appear in published and manuscript writings. A distrust in our own sources, generated all the more by the aforementioned chronicle, forced us to turn to Polish sources. The lively contact between those expert in native legends and impartial Polish scholars, above all, the late Count Swidziński and Michał Grabowski, have confirmed the sensible views of Little Russian writers as to historical events in Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper. Professor Bodiansky, however, published Konysky's well-known chronicle, *Istoriia Rusov*, which became a reference book for everyone who treasured the memory of his ancestors in Little Russia, and what had been decided upon and settled, though for fortuitous reasons not yet published, by south-Russian scholars was set forth by a Moscow professor, Solov'ev, in his *Outline of the History of Little Russia*. The sacred mantle of the historian was removed from Konysky. He was shown to be, first of all, a fanatical patriot of south Rus', who out of love for her and contrary to the truth was merciless towards Poland and the Muscovite state, and second, an unusually talented poet of chronicles and stories and an accurate depicter of events only when he had no ulterior motive or preconception. The merit of Solov'ev as a critic of Konysky's chronicle is great, but it has not, until now, been recognized by the Little Russians, who, predictably, viewed the humiliation of their Titus Livius as expressing ill will towards their country. But the time of deliberate ill will has passed; it is felt only by those writers who, as individuals, are equally alien to north- and south-Russian society and whose names should not be mentioned when one is speaking of elevated aspirations for truth. A better defender of Solov'ev against certain simple-minded Little Russians will be their own writer M. Kostomarov, whose works have remained unknown to scholars for too long, but now will be received by society with a sympathy and respect all the greater.

This is one side of the movement which Gogol strengthened with his

concern for Little Russian nationality. But at the time when abstract science was doing its work in the area of the historical and ethnographic study of south Rus', society was experiencing more consciously its earlier desire to examine its people in the native language. It ceased searching for what was ridiculous, simple-minded, and even cunningly naïve in the people. The perception of the common man became deeper and more sympathetic. We began to listen more attentively to folk-songs. The inner image of Little Russia appeared in the beauty, the tenderness, and the dark energy of the language and music of these songs. There appeared new collections of epic and lyric works of art reflecting the spirit and feeling of the people. Ethnography crossed from the hard soil of the chronicles to the living, fertile soil of national poetry. History, with surprise, saw itself in the colourful and radiant apparel of a folk-song. We wanted to enter the houses of the descendants of the Cossacks, who, in their own words, 'won glory throughout the whole world, on land and on the sea.' We wanted to hear their speech without a translator, the role played by Gogol for Russian literature. We were sufficiently grown up to be able to understand everything tender and harmonious in the original. And Hryhorii Kvitka, who wrote under the pseudonym Osnovianenko, led us into the peasant house. His short story 'Marusia' has not, until today, been properly appreciated. Others saw in it a captivating painting of simple folk customs, a warm feeling, and many authentically pathetic scenes, but they missed the point that a simple Little Russian, bereft of any contact with educated people except in the area of religion, had never before appeared in a literary work in all his magnificent moral simplicity. He was not an unskilled ploughman, but a *human being* in the full sense of the word. He was not improved by contemporary education. He saw nothing apart from his village. He was illiterate, engaged only in field and house work. The word of God, which he heard in church, was instilled in him only by the phenomena of nature, which he loved unconsciously as a child loves his nurse. But in all his thought and actions, from his view of himself to his conduct with his neighbours, we are struck by some greatness in which we feel the natural nobility of human nature. No one can say that this is an affectation. If it were, then Kvitka's villager would not evoke sympathy; he would not impress himself on the soul and would not be lovingly prized by it. The heart cannot be fooled, and the tears shed in Little Russia during the reading of 'Marusia' are a fact which should not be neglected by literary critics. Kvitka wrote several stories in the Little Russian language, parts of which are equal to 'Marusia,' but not one of them can compare with it. Yet these other works are permeated by the more or less expressive features of the

magnificent image of the Little Russian simple man, this profoundly moral character whose roots lie in a society unknown to us ... The reader's mind, struck by this moral grandeur, sees in it the forces of history, acting more seriously here than in Cossack or Haidamak times or in all that fills our historical works. The soul feels here a strong element of folk life, developed by fortunate circumstances unknown to us and continuing to live in and for itself despite wars and the artificial moral awakening so common in civic-minded society. This element brings to Ukrainian folk poetry, in the new era of its development represented by writers akin to Kvitka, a dignity of expression far from commensurate with the material circumstances of the people. It adds to the poetry a softness of expression, a fine feeling of decorum in human relationships, an awareness of the nobility of its moral nature which other nations acquire only as a result of the long tenure of society as an independent, privileged, superior class respected by others. I will not exaggerate if I say that Little Russian simple folk, that is, the best among them, who resemble some of Kvitka's characters in their customary relations with each other – as godparents, as son-in-law with father-in-law, as daughter with godmother, as daughter-in-law with her new family, or simply as a host with his guests or in his behaviour at weddings, christenings, funerals, wakes, and agricultural festivals – conduct themselves with a proud dignity and grandeur that inspires involuntary respect. We know the people very little, and we look at them from the economic point of view. We keep ourselves aloof and do not mix with them socially. But I had the good fortune to be in circumstances in which social and educational differences were forgotten, in which my presence was not noticed, and I was astounded by what I observed ...

Kvitka's short stories offer a warm, sincere picture of the mores of our villagers, and their charm is not only in the content but in the very language in which they are written. They are almost untranslatable into Russian, because there is no way in Russian to convey the appropriate flavour of the characters' dialogue. The Great Russian simple folk, not having the characteristics of the Little Russian people, are sharply distinguished from them by the character of their language. The Russian literary language, even in Gogol's works, poorly conveys the domestic talk of our simple people, their caresses and griefs, their ridicule and sarcasm. This was demonstrated, best of all, by Kvitka himself, when, at the request of journalists, he translated 'Marusia' and several other of his stories. Little Russians cannot read them because they are so unlike the original. One Russian writer, for Kvitka a great authority, persuaded him to abandon completely a language accessible to only a small circle of readers, and, following Gogol's example,



to write in the accepted [Russian] literary language. Kvitka wrote some stories and printed them in the journals but – lo and behold! – the same writer who had made his countrymen laugh and cry with his Little Russian tales became as dull for them as for the Great Russians. What does that indicate? Why did the author of the charming ‘Marusia’ not enjoy in Russian the success the author of *Evenings on a Farm* had enjoyed? Because he thought in Little Russian, and, trying to speak in Russian, was as clumsy in his phrases as a Little Russian lad would be who wanted to play the part of a Russian fine fellow. The journals’ critics have justifiably considered him a mediocre storyteller, and the public stopped reading him, preferring garrulous writers whose names should not be mentioned side by side with the name Kvitka. But Little Russia has not forgotten his first stories and, regardless of the fact that he is little known in Russia, ranks him with such great painters of mores and passions as Sir Walter Scott, Dickens, and our Gogol. Kvitka is inferior to them in the diversity of his subject matter, but in his own genre, which presents a formidable challenge to a contemporary writer, he far surpasses every one of them.

It is a remarkable fact, which we cannot but dwell on here, that the same writer who left a deep impression on readers when he wrote in Little Russian was ignored when he wrote in Russian. We see therein evidence of the close bond between the language and the creative faculty of the writer, and of the inadequate transmission by one language of concepts which it has not worked out itself and which are the property of another. Just as music in a song, so language in a book is the crucial part of the artistic work, and without language the poet does not fully have an impact on the reader’s soul. I have heard from several natives of the Great Russian provinces, who have made some small study of the Little Russian language, that it is easier for them to follow our folk *dumy* in the original than in translation. In other words, in the original a harmonious link between the language and the subject is preserved, which in translation is constantly violated. In accordance with this law, true for all literatures, each independent poet has his own native language, which is good only for his unique view of life, his distinctive cast of mind, his own emotional dynamic. Translate his words into the language of another poet, and they will lose much of their charm. In Little Russia, Kvitka is not alone in being unable to express his Little Russian concepts in Russian. Hulak-Artemovsky, who represents a transition from Kotliarevsky, has written several excellent comic and satirical poems, which we know by heart, but he has remained unknown in Russian literature, despite his great efforts at writing Russian prose and verse. Hrebinka, a contemporary of Kvitka, has left fresh and true pictures of Little

Russian nature and life in his *Proverbs*, but the same Hrebinka wrote clumsy tales and tasteless poems in Russian ...

Finally, the greatest talent of south-Russian literature,<sup>9</sup> who sang of the injustices suffered by the people and of his own fervent tears, astonished his admirers upon publishing a short poem in the Great Russian language, not only by the colourlessness of the verse but also by the flabbiness of its thought and feeling, whereas in Little Russian he created or found forms which no one before him had anticipated, and fashioned out of local life a whole new world of poetry unperceived by anyone before. In his poems our language took that great step forward which is normally accomplished by the common efforts of a whole nation over the course of many years, or by the magical power of a genius who in himself embodies the inherent artistry of his native people. These poems, like a song, flew from one end of south Rus' to the other; they were loved by every class, age, and sex, and their publication became almost unnecessary. There is no one in Little Russia moderately literate and sensitive to poetry who would not know them by heart and would not keep them in his heart of hearts as a treasured possession.

But what is most astonishing and important in these poems is that they, more than our folk-songs or anything else written in Little Russian, approach the Great Russian language without losing the pure character of Ukrainian speech. The mystery of this phenomenon lies, perhaps, in the fact that in an inexplicable revelation of the past, which informs the prophetic soul in the present, the poet has divined the happy middle ground between the two separate languages, which was the essential principle guiding the development of each. Little Russians, reading his verses and admiring the unusually daring re-creation of their language and the closeness of his forms to those of Pushkinian verse, do not feel the unpleasant discord which strikes them when other writers borrow words, phrases, and constructions from a related language. On the contrary, one experiences in the poetry a fascination difficult to explain, which no other Slavic literature has. Whatever the explanation, it is undoubtedly true that our poet, drawing with one hand the content of his laments, songs, and prophecies from the spirit and language of his own people, stretches his other hand towards the treasure-house of the north-Russian spirit and language. But he has his own way of approaching it and its secrets. For him none of the foreign forms of speech assimilated by the Russian writers from the very beginning

9 Kulish refers to, but does not name, Taras Shevchenko, who was still in exile when Kulish wrote this essay.

of their contact with Europe exist. Native linguistic forms are so firmly entrenched that he is not derailed by the artificial shell of Russian literary works. Behind the infinite combinations of words created by non-popular influences, he sees the Russian word in its original state and masters it because of his blood tie with the north-Russian people. But at the same time a miraculous instinct, which only great poets possess, drives him to take from the other language only what is common to both peoples. That is why the language of his poems is richer than all his predecessors'. That is why this language expresses universal human concepts and, though the most perfect instrument for the expression of the Little Russian mind, feeling, and taste, is more comprehensible to the Great Russians than our folk-songs or the works of our other writers.

Those who see in his works some unconditional hostility to the north-Russian group are wrong. He protested against human injustices, regardless of who committed them, Great Russians or Little Russians. He was carried beyond the bounds of historical truth in depicting the bitterness of the human heart. But that no tribal enmity ruled him can be seen from the fact that no one has laughed as bitterly at the glory of the Little Russian Cossacks as he; no one has doubted the authority of our national patriotism as much as he; no one has better put to shame and ridicule what we so long prided ourselves on than he. They call him an insane patriot, but he was the one who struck the first blow against that harmful patriotism which elevates one's own heroes, certified by history, but turns its eyes from the virtues of a neighbouring people; that type of patriotism that glorifies not the achievements of the whole country but the triumph of one party or another, or even of a few individuals, at the expense, at times, of the population as a whole. Yes, he was driven mad while pouring out his wrath against human injustice; he was furious when he appealed to heaven and earth against those whom he regarded as guilty of their neighbours' suffering. But who is to judge a poet who, out of unbearable heartache, did not place limits on his howling? ... Self-educated morally, without predecessors or models for his literary activity, appearing suddenly out of the blue amid the stagnant moral life of Little Russia with his hot tears, his novel songs, and innate strivings borrowed from no one, he could not be esteemed by the critics immediately. He himself knew it. He talked about it in his first poems and sought his sole reward in the tears of sympathy from native beauties – and in this he was not disappointed. Not only women wept at his tender and bitter words. Whoever had long ago forgotten youthful strivings for truth and virtue, whoever had sunk into indifference to all bad actions and had accepted accidental forms of life as the indisput-

able law for his thoughts and actions – it was he who was shaken by these poems to the depths of his soul, and the tears which could not be held back showed him the youthful image that long ago had been abandoned in his cluttered soul. Yet whatever the evaluation of our poet made by his contemporaries, however few the people able to share his groans and to comprehend the lofty meaning of his works, the time will come when north and south Rus' will include him among the beneficent geniuses who have put an end to group hostility, which can be destroyed by nothing except a mutual striving for what is equally precious to both sides.

From this short characterization of three poets with different fates, who strove to exalt the inner image of the south-Russian people, the reader will see that south Rus', since Gogol's time, has not stopped expressing itself in progressively more definite forms and has made a great step forward in the art of self-expression. For there is an immense distance between the half-Great Russian jokes of the village youth in *Evenings on a Farm*, or an appeal, taken from a folk-song, to a beautiful girl by a young lad in love, and the expression of the emotional conflict in Marusia's father or the poetic speeches of a bereaved mother. An immense distance exists between *Taras Bulba*, which pleases the imagination but explains little about the life of the people, and the soul-rending howling of our prophetic poet, who is steeped in the spirit of his own people and expresses his feelings in words truly of the people. South Rus' was not left behind north Rus' in successfully reaching towards self-knowledge and, sharing civic-mindedness with its neighbour, has devised elements from which a distinctive nationality is being created. However these patriots, who limit the flight of the Russian spirit to the frontiers of the Muscovite state, would look at this [Little Russian] literary activity, it clearly strives for integration with north-Russian literature. It is not averse to the purely Slavic element in this literature, which is kindred to both groups, but, feeling the one-sided development of the literature and the lack of distinctive, purely Russian forms, it tries to cultivate from its own moral soil a language that is complete, strong, truly original, able to express the profound and subtlest features of the character of south-Russian man. It is not our fault if the natives of the northern provinces do not include our language in the number of things they are inquisitive about. We, for our part, are not behind the Great Russians in our knowledge of their native language, and let a dispassionate judge decide which side should be given preference. We are advised good-naturedly to abandon the development of the Little Russian language by means of our literary works. But this advice is given by people who do not know how strong an influence the highly developed power and beauty of language can

have on the moral as well as material well-being of a whole people. Some argue seriously that ours is not even a language but a dialect, like the Novgorod, the Vladimir, and the other dialects [of north Russia]. But it is strange how these advocates forget that folk poetry in the Novgorod and Vladimir provinces is in no way different, either in spirit or content or form, from the folk poetry of the Moscow province, whereas south-Russian folk poetry has nothing similar to Great Russian folk poetry, and nothing of equal value can be found in all the Great Russian provinces. We are, finally, persuaded by undeniable facts that a Little Russian joining the Great Russian writers has a wide circle of readers and thus better reaches the goal of every active mind, that of propagating his views in society. It is true that this goal is very enticing, but not one of the Little Russian poets, not even Gogol, has been satisfied with his works in the north-Russian language. Each of them has had in his soul the agonizing awareness that he has not fulfilled his purpose – *to be of use to his neighbour*; and truly he has not fulfilled it as completely as he would have in his native language. Let us assume that a poet receives much attention from readers of another community, that his voice penetrates many hearts. Will he leave with them the impression he would leave with his countrymen in addressing them in the incomparable language of his childhood – in that sacred language with which his mother instilled in him the precepts of honour and virtue? I know that friends who meet later in life may fervently and tenderly love one another, but will their talk be as lively as the talk of friends whose childhood is linked by common memories, common raptures, common torments and joys? And will you talk as well and engagingly, without the artifice of rhetoric, with a man whom you may like and respect but who was educated under different influences, as you would with one whose heart has long ago grown used to beating in time to yours? What can one say about the number of people who fall under our moral influence? Numbers do not matter when one talks about the highest commitments of the human soul. What is important is the quality of the soil on which our words fall; what is important is the force that impresses the minds and hearts of the listeners. When you ease with inspired words the mind of a man who doubts the immortality of the human soul, when you lift up your neighbour from depravity, you serve God and people better than if you were to supply light and pleasant but fruitless reading to a large number in society. How strange it is to call absurd the need of the soul, which can in this and no other way communicate to another soul its life-giving force. Philosophizing will not help here. This striving is conceived deep in the soul, deeper than ordinary common-sense reasoning. The point here is not

the difference between the two languages; the point is the peculiarities of their inner beings, which show themselves in the way thoughts, feelings, and the movements of the soul are expressed, the peculiarities which cannot be expressed in a language not native to the author. At least, the one writing these lines, having undertaken to depict faithfully the ancient Cossacks in *The Black Council* for the benefit of his neighbours, has tried in vain to substitute for south-Russian speech the literary language which is accepted in Russia. Reading over the finished chapters, I felt that readers would not receive from my book a true idea of how the past is reflected in my soul and therefore would not fully receive a sense of either my historical or my Christian convictions. Willingly and unwillingly, I had to bypass the common literary path and turn onto a road barely paved and thus presenting many terrible difficulties for such a work as a historical novel. I was forced to it by the agonizing feeling of an artist and man trying in vain to struggle with the impossibility of expressing his innermost thoughts. I will not hide the fact that turning onto this road cost me great effort and sacrifice. I had to renounce the pleasure of being read by the Great Russian writers whose judgment I value and whose friendship bade me provide them with serious and satisfactory reading. I had to limit myself to a small circle of readers, because only a few of my countrymen can appreciate my labours on behalf of the development of the south-Russian language and its elevation to the high level of historical narrative. I had to bear the reproaches of people who think that everything they do not know is nonsense but who, by virtue of their authority, have an influence on inexperienced and unformed minds. With all this, I published my book in the south-Russian language. I had studied it for a long time in the written literary monuments of the past, in folk-songs, in legends, and in daily intercourse with people who know no other language. And the beauty, harmony, force, energy, and diversity of the language revealed to me gave me the opportunity to carry out a task which could not be addressed until now by any Little Russian, namely, the writing in our native language of a historical novel which would adhere strictly to the forms characteristic of works of this kind. I say here a *novel* because this was my task. But having explored the mores of the Little Russians in the seventeenth century, so different from today's (in a particular social stratum, of course), I became convinced that a writer must look at things through the eyes of the society of those times past. I submitted completely to the past, therefore, and that is why my work turned out to be not a novel but a chronicle in a dramatic vein. I did not intend to amuse an idle imagination. Apart from everything else, which does not require explanation, I wanted to represent in all the

clarity of history incarnate the causes of the political insignificance of Little Russia and to convince every wavering mind, not by a dissertation but by the artistic re-creation of an antiquity either forgotten or distorted by us, of the moral inevitability of the merger into one state of the south-Russian community and the north-Russian. I wanted also to show, however, that it was not an insignificant people who in the middle of the seventeenth century united with the Muscovite tsardom. It consisted for the most part of independent characters proud of their human dignity. In its mores and concepts it preserved and still preserves today the principles of higher civic-mindedness. It gave Russia many new and energetic public activists, whose influence in no small measure helped the development of the state power of the Russian people. Finally, it brought to Russia, with which it shares the same religion and race, a language rich in distinctive merits, which in the future formation of literature should help improve the linguistic instrument of Russian emotion and thought, that mighty instrument of language by the development of which nations are judged by history.

## Two Russian Nationalities (excerpts)

MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV

We have seen how even in its childhood, when it was centred in Vladimir, and later, in its youth, when it was centred in Moscow, the Great Russian [despotic] element was inclined to subdue and absorb various neighbouring regions.

The same thing occurred in the religious and intellectual sphere. The Great Russians developed an intolerance of other faiths, a disdain of other nationalities, a very high opinion of themselves. All the foreigners who visited Muscovy in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries were unanimous in saying that the Muscovites looked down on other faiths and nationalities. Even the tsars, who in these matters were marginally better than the masses, washed their hands after having touched foreign ambassadors of the various Christian faiths. The Russians disdained the Germans who were allowed to live in Moscow, and the clergy cried out against dealing with them. A patriarch who in an unguarded moment had given them his blessing later demanded that they thereafter be distinguished by their external appearance so that it could not happen again. The Great Russians regarded the Latins, Lutherans, Armenians, and members of all other faiths which differed from Orthodoxy as cursed. The Muscovites thought of themselves as the single chosen people and were even ill-disposed towards other peoples of the same faith, such as the Greeks and the Little Russians. Everything which did not accord with their nationality was subjected to their disdain and considered heretical. They haughtily looked down on everyone.

The Tatar yoke unavoidably strengthened their views. Lengthy abasement under the rule of foreigners of a different religion bred a haughtiness towards and consequently gave rise to the abasement of outsiders. Moreover, a liberated slave readily grows proud. Accordingly, the liberation of



Muscovy from the Tatars is what brought on all that enthusiasm for foreign things which took the shape of the reforms carried out during the reign of Peter I. Extremes are expressed in the opposite extremes.

There was nothing of this kind among the South Russian ethnic group. From ancient times Kiev – and, later, Vladimir-in-Volhynia as well – was a common gathering place for foreigners of different religions and different ethnic backgrounds. From time immemorial the South Russians had been accustomed to hearing foreign languages and to associating with people belonging to different groups and holding different beliefs. People from South Rus' travelled to Greece beginning in the tenth century and probably even earlier. South Russians carried on trade in foreign lands, and some served in the armies of foreign rulers. After Southern Rus' had accepted its new faith from the Greeks, the South Russians did not adopt the hostility to the Western church which had developed in Greece. The hierarchs, who were foreigners themselves, tried to transport this hostility to the virgin soil of Southern Rus', but they were not completely successful. As a result, a Catholic did not have the profile of an enemy in the imagination of the South Russians. Peoples from principally South Russian families married people from ruling houses of the Catholic faith. Probably the same type of thing happened among the common people. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Germans, Poles, and Hungarians had free access to the cities of Southern Rus' and mixed with the inhabitants. The Poles who had come to the land of Kiev to give succour to Prince Iziaslav were entirely captivated by Southern Rus'.

This spirit of tolerance, this absence of national exclusiveness later entered the character of Cossackdom, and it remains in the people to the present day. Anyone could enter Cossack society. No one asked about one's faith or nation. When the Poles murmured that the Cossacks accepted various vagabonds and that among these were some heretics fleeing the judgment of the ecclesiastical court, the Cossacks replied that the acceptance of such refugees had long been their custom and that everyone could come and go as he pleased. The hostile acts against Catholics at the time of the Cossack uprisings took place as the product not of a hatred of Catholicism but of oppression, and out of frustration at the violation of Cossack consciences. The expeditions against the Turks and Crimean Tatars were motivated, on the one hand, not by blind fanaticism against the 'unbelievers,' but by a desire for revenge for their Tatar raids and the taking of Russian hostages, and, on the other, by the spirit of bravado and the desire for plunder which inevitably develops in every military society no matter what its ethnicity or the land on which it was organized. The mem-

ory of bloody enmity with the Poles has not disappeared from among the people to the present day, but specific enmity against the Roman Catholic faith unrelated to Polish nationality does not exist among them. The South Russian is not vindictive except out of caution born of the past.

The South Russian never regarded either Catholic churches or Jewish synagogues as impure places. He did not spurn eating or drinking or making friends with Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Tatars. But he became more hostile even than a Great Russian if he thought a foreigner had insulted his religion. Just as he accorded respect and liberty to others, so too did he demand liberty and respect for himself.

...

The difference between the two Russian nationalities, which arose at a time quite distant from us, can be seen from this brief historical sketch. The South Russian group had in its specific character a preponderance of personal liberty, while the Great Russians had a preponderance of communal-ity. The root idea among the South Russians was mutual agreement, which could fall apart if disagreements arose; the Great Russians, meanwhile, strove for a predetermined form which, once set up, could not be abolished. They credited the very establishment of such forms to God, and the forms were consequently above human criticism. In various specific public institutions, the South Russians stressed the spirit, whereas the Great Russians tried to create forms. In the political sphere, the South Russians were able to form a voluntary association which was tied together only in so far as was absolutely necessary and which lasted as long as it did not disturb certain inalienable rights and personal freedoms. The Great Russians tried to form a durable common body which would last forever and was permeated by a single spirit. The South Russians approached federation but were unable actually to form one; the Great Russians actually produced autocracy and a strong state.

The South Russian group had often shown its inability to deal with autocratic state life. This group was dominant in the land of Rus' in antiquity, but when it came to forming a centralized state or perishing, the group disappeared from the scene and made room for another.

In the Great Russian element there is something grand, something creative; there is a spirit of organization, a consciousness of unity, and the rule of practical judgment, which can withstand difficult circumstances. The Great Russian element can seize the moment when it is necessary to act and make use of the opportunity when it is useful to do so. Our South Russian group has not shown itself able to do that kind of thing. Its free institutions have either given rise to a dissolution of public ties or led into a whirlpool

of conflicts which have distorted the national historical life. Our past has revealed these things to us about the two Russian nationalities.

...

In its attempts to create a solid and lasting body which would incorporate certain fundamental ideas, the Great Russian ethnic group has always shown an inclination towards the material and yields to the South Russian on the spiritual side of life and in poetry, which the latter group has developed more fully, more widely, and more vitally. Merely listen to the songs, consider the literary works, and look at the images created by the imaginations of both peoples. I do not say that Great Russian songs are without poetry. Their high poetry lies in their strength of will and in their depiction of the sphere of action, and especially in what they posit as necessary for the attainment of a given goal; it lies in how this people has defined itself in the historical flow of political life.

The better Great Russian songs are those which depict the moments when the people gather their strength, or attain victory, or suffer a mitigated defeat. Accordingly, everyone loves the songs about the robber-heroes who fight both against circumstance and against the social order. Destruction is their element, but a destruction necessary for reconstruction. The latter is expressed by the very structure of the robber bands, which form a certain kind of social unit. And therefore it is not strange when contemplating these robber songs to see the same communalism and the same attempt to incorporate statehood which we find in every expression of the historical life of the Great Russian ethnos.

The Great Russian people is practical and pre-eminently material and rises to poetry only when poetry arises out of the course of daily work. The Great Russians work without enthusiasm or distraction. They apply themselves to details and particular parts, and lose the general idea which makes up the essential poetry of every action and every thing. Accordingly, while Great Russian poetry often tries to reach the realm of a grandeur exceeding the naturally possible, it often sinks to the level of simple amusement and distraction. Historical memory becomes transformed into epic and then merely into a tale. Meanwhile, in contrast, the songs of the South Russians hold to reality more firmly and often do not need to be transformed into epic in order to shine forth as brilliant poetry. There is nostalgia and reflection in Great Russian song, but Great Russian song lacks the South Russian pensiveness which seizes us so, which transports our spirits away into the realm of imagination, and which lights our hearts with a kind of supernatural fire.

Nature plays a small role in Great Russian song but a very great one in

South Russian song. South Russian poetry is inseparable from nature; it brings it alive and makes it a part of the joy and the grief of the human spirit. The grasses, the birds, the animals, the heavens, morning and evening, spring and the snow – they all breathe, think, and feel together with mankind. Sympathy, hope, and judgment are all echoed in nature's charming voice. Amorous feelings, which usually make up the soul of folk-song, rarely overcome materialism in Great Russian songs. Such feelings, however, reach the highest expression, purity, and grace in South Russian songs. In comic songs even the carnal side of love is depicted with a convivial anacreontic grace, which conceals triviality and ennobles sensuality.

In Great Russian songs woman seldom rises to her human ideal; her beauty is seldom taken beyond motherhood; amorousness rarely goes beyond the corporal; and the valour and worth of the feminine spirit are rarely expressed. By contrast, the South Russian woman of folk poetry reaches the spiritual beauty which in her very fall poetically expressed her pure nature, and displays modesty in the midst of decadence.

The contradictions between the natures of the two ethnic groups are vividly expressed in their playful and comic songs. In South Russian songs of this type, nobility of word and expression is worked out and reaches true artistry. The man who breathes in nature is not satisfied by simple amusements but recognizes the necessity of giving nature an artistic form which not only distracts but elevates the soul. Happiness seeks to embrace nature with verses of beauty and to sanctify the thought of it.

By contrast, Great Russian songs of this genre arise out of nothing more than the desire of a man tired of his daily chores to forget himself for a moment; such songs neither puzzle one's head nor touch one's heart or imagination. Song exists not for itself but rather as a decoration for a purely material satisfaction and therefore often reaches the point of cynicism.

One can more or less see that Great Russian home and social life lacks the poetry of South Russian life, just as the latter has little that makes up the essence, the strength, and the value of the first. The Great Russian cares little for nature. One very rarely sees flowers around the cottage of the Great Russian peasant, whereas one can find them around every house belonging to a South Russian. Moreover, the Great Russian is often an enemy of vegetation. I have seen peasants cut down all the trees around their houses in the belief that the houses would not look well among the trees. In the villages belonging to the state, when the authorities recently planted some bushes close to the houses, it was very difficult to see them come to bloom, to preserve them, and to prevent them from being torn up by the roots. In the 1820s, when the government ordered that trees be

planted along the highways, this was apparently such a hateful novelty in the eyes of the Great Russian people that to the present day one can find their laments and complaints expressed in folk-songs of the most trivial type. There are many orchards in Great Russia, but they are almost all meant to bear fruit for commercial purposes; very seldom are there forest-type trees which are not useful in material life. One rarely meets a Great Russian who recognizes and is charmed by the delights of the countryside, who is carried away in observing the heavens, who is lost in admiration of the reflection of the sun or moon in the crystal waters of a clear lake, or gives thought to the forest when it comes alive with a choir of birds in the springtime. All this is almost completely foreign to the Great Russian, who is immersed in his concerns and the petty needs of his material life. Even among the educated classes, as far as we have been given the opportunity to see, there remains the same coolness to the beauty of nature; moreover, this coolness is sometimes most unsuccessfully and comically hidden by an imitation of the ways of the foreign West, where, as is well known, good manners require one to display a certain love and sympathy for nature.

The Great Russians are deficient in imagination; they have few superstitions but many prejudices. It is at once apparent, however, that the South Russians too have many superstitions, particularly in the western part of the South Russian land (perhaps owing to its distance from Great Russian influences). There, in almost every house you can hear a poetic tale about how the dead come to life in different disguises. These tales vary from a touching story of how a mother who has died comes to life in order to bathe her children, to a dreadful story of vampires who rise at midnight around the crosses of cemeteries and wildly scream, "We want meat!"

To the tales scattered in such abundance throughout a land rich in history should be added the legends of misty ancient times; a complex web woven from the best of the popular imagination can be discerned in these legends, traces of which have been written down by the ancient chroniclers. Quaint customs, assorted charms, the world of ghosts in varying shapes, and apparitions to make the hair stand on end all blend into one artful picture. Sometimes the people themselves do not believe in the stories they tell, yet as long as these stories impart a sense of beauty the people will continue to transform the old content into an ever-newer form.

None of this exists in the case of Great Russia. As we have already stated, there are only prejudices there. The Great Russian believes in devils and in witches because he has had this belief passed on by his forefathers. He believes because he does not doubt their reality; he believes in them just as he believes in the existence of electricity or celestial phenomena; he

believes because belief is necessary for the explanation of phenomena which cannot be understood, and not to satisfy a desire to raise grey material life to the sphere of free creativity. In general, he has few fanciful tales. His devils, his spirits gathered about the home, are highly material. The Great Russian is little occupied with the other world and the world of spirits and tells very few stories about life beyond the grave. If one does encounter one, it has been taken out of a book, either old or new; and most likely the story has an ecclesiastical rather than a folklorish ring to it.

The Great Russian is very persistent in his prejudices, however, and this accords with his spirit of intolerance. I have known a highly characteristic case wherein a certain gentleman was accused of atheism and profanity because he had a scornful attitude towards belief in the existence of devils.

Among literate people interested in books, one can observe what kind of book the Great Russian is interested in, and, in particular, what in these books attracts him. As far as I have been able to see, his interest is either in serious books directly related to his occupation and, indeed, what he can make most immediate use of, or in light, entertaining reading which occupies him for a while without affecting his disposition or his ideas. Poetry is read simply to pass the time (and in this case is liked for what can be extracted easily from the variety or uniqueness of its composition) or just to show that the reader is cultured enough to read what is considered good. One can often find a person enthralled with the beauty of poetry, but on close look one sees that this is mere affectation and not a true feeling. The affectation itself is a sign of the absence of a true understanding of poetry. Such an affectation is exceedingly common in our educated society. For this reason, it seems, we have a noticeable sympathy for the French, much more so than for other nations, because that people has shown itself to have little that is poetry about it, and in literature, in art, and even in scholarship does a lot for effect.

If among the Great Russians there has been a truly great and original poet and a man of genius, it was Pushkin. But in his eternal masterpiece, *Eugeny Onegin*, he outlined only half the Great Russian nationality, the so-called educated and secular class.

There have been successful Great Russian writers who have dealt with manners and morals, but they have not been creative poets who spoke the language of the masses, and said what the masses would have wanted to say, and expressed what their true feelings would be, and done it for each one of them, and, moreover, said it in poetry rather than prose. We repeat, however, that we are very far from saying that there is no poetic element in the Great Russian people. On the contrary, it might be that they have a

poetic element loftier and deeper than that of the Little Russians. But, it is not oriented towards the spheres of imagination and feeling, and it deals instead with will and clear thinking. Great Russian songs are not immediately likeable. One has to study them and penetrate their spirit in order to understand their original poetry. Such poetry is not immediately accessible because it still awaits grand souls who will turn it into works of great artistic merit.

In the sphere of religion we have already shown the sharp difference between the South Russian and the Great Russian nationalities. This difference lies in the fact that the former has taken no part whatsoever in schisms and desertions from the church on the basis of ritual and formula, whereas the latter certainly has. It would be interesting to resolve the question of where the Great Russians originally got this disposition. In other words, where did they get the tendency to argue about the literal and give dogmatic import to what is often no more than a simple question of grammar or ceremony? It seems that this tendency arises from the same practical, material character which is the essence of Great Russianness. By the same token, when we observe the great Russian people and all strata of Great Russian society, we often meet individuals of true Christian morality whose feeling for religion is directed towards the practical application of Christian goodness, but who, nonetheless, have little 'internal' piety. We also meet hypocrites and fanatics who closely follow external rules and rituals but are also without internal piety; they follow external forms because it is their custom, but they give little thought to why they are doing so. Finally, there are the people of the so-called educated classes, people who have either little faith or no faith at all. They are not like that because they have undergone a deep intellectual struggle; instead, they are enthusiastic about their unbelief because it seems the mark of an enlightened man. (In general, a truly pious disposition is the exception among people, and piety itself, spiritual contemplation, is no indicator of nationality or of a general national character, but rather a result of one's individual and personal character.)

We meet the exact opposite among the South Russians. In other words, the South Russians have exactly what the Great Russians lack. The South Russians possess a strong sense of the ubiquitous presence of God, know an internal turning towards God, and have spiritual affection; they secretly reflect on Divine Providence and themselves; they have a heartfelt attraction to the unknown, secret, and comforting spiritual world. The South Russians follow rituals and respect formulas, but do not criticize them. It would not occur to them to think about whether to sing the 'Alleluia' two

or three times or to make the sign of the cross with this finger or that finger. And if such a question arises, it is enough for them to listen to the explanation of the priest, who has been given the authority to discuss these things by the church. If the question arose of some kind of change in the external forms of the Divine Liturgy or in the translation of the Holy Scriptures, the South Russian would not object to it and would not see it as some kind of distortion of the things he holds sacred.

The South Russians understand that the church has set forth these externals and that they have been established by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which has tried not to change the essentials. They understand that the laity must follow these changes. That is because if one or another external represents one and the same essence, the external itself is not so important as to become the subject of discord.

We have had the opportunity of speaking with religious people of both these nationalities. The Great Russian, on the one hand, displays his piety in discussions concerning externals and letters and places great importance on them; if he is firmly Orthodox, this Orthodoxy consists primarily in the external side. The South Russian, on the other hand, will stress his religious-moral feeling and, rarely embarking on an analysis of the Divine Liturgy, rituals, and church festivals, will give only his pious impression of the liturgy, the majesty of the ritual, and the great significance of the festivals and so forth. Moreover, the educated class among the South Russians does not treat the faith as lightly as does that of the Great Russians. Scepticism enters the soul of the South Russian only after a long and deep struggle. In contrast, we have seen Great Russian young people who have been brought up in the strictest piety from childhood on and who have adhered to all the prescribed church rules, but who at the first slight attack, and often as a result of a few sharp words, discard the banner of religion, forget the teachings of their childhood, and without a struggle directly turn to the most extreme disbelief and materialism.

The South Russian people are a deeply religious people in the broadest sense of the term. Somehow, circumstances made them such. Though they adopted one form of education after another until the sum of the principal traits which form the essence of their nationality came into existence, through it all they preserved the principle of religion. This was inevitable given the poetic bent that marked their spiritual composition.

In the realm of social ideas, history has made an impression on our two nationalities and given them ideas which are completely contradictory. The urge to unite individual parts into a whole, the denial of personal interests in the name of social good, the belief in an indestructible common will



based on a keen sense of a hard, mutual lot – all these features manifest themselves in the large family life of the Great Russians and the engulfing of personal liberty in the idea of the *mir*, or repartitional village commune. These things are expressed in the national way of life – in the indivisibility of family and of common property – and in the division of responsibility in the villages, where the innocent pay for the guilty and the industrious work for the lazy. One can see how deeply embedded these ideas are in the Great Russian mentality in the fact that Great Russians of various points of view have in our times, under the influence of old Muscovite Slavophilism and modern French socialism, spoken in favour of the communal institutions of the enserfed peasantry.

There is nothing more difficult or more objectionable for the South Russian than this communal family system. South Russian families divide and go their separate ways as soon as their members find it necessary to establish an independent life for themselves. Parental care for grown children seems unbearable despotism to the South Russian. The pretensions of older brothers over younger ones, and of grandfathers over their relations, arouse an enraged hostility between them. Blood ties and common lineage seldom bring agreement and mutual love to the South Russians. On the contrary, modest, gentle, and likeable people often are separated from their relations by an implacable enmity. Family quarrels are a common occurrence among both the lower and the upper classes. Family ties among the Great Russians, in contrast, often lead a man to live in a friendly and amiable way with his relations even when he does not display friendliness and amiability in his relations with outsiders generally. In Southern Rus', to preserve love and concord among them, it is necessary to separate close relations so that they will have as little contact as possible with one another.

Reciprocal duty, based not on free agreement but rather on preordained necessity, is a burden for the South Russian, whereas more than anything else it is a calming element for the Great Russian and tranquillizes his personal desires. Out of obedience to duty, the Great Russian is ready to force himself to love his close relations; he submits to them simply because they are related to him and even though they are not sympathetic to him. He is ready to make personal sacrifices for them while recognizing that they are not worth it – they are, after all, his blood relations.

In contrast, although the South Russian, apparently, is prepared to love those close to him because they are his relations, such relations are less tolerant of his weaknesses than they are of those of an outsider. In general, a common origin prompts the South Russian not to strengthen something

that is good, but to weaken it. Some Great Russians who have acquired estates in Southern Rus' have resolved from time to time to introduce a Great Russian cohesiveness and indivisibility of property into their Little Russian families, and the consequence has been frightful scenes. Not only have brothers been ready to come to blows, but sons have pulled their fathers out the door by the hair. The more the principles of familial authority and blood ties are put into effect, the more they produce an effect opposite to the one intended.

The South Russian is a respectful son when his parents accord him full freedom, and in their old age such parents even submit to his will. Brothers live well together when they live as neighbours, as friends, and hold nothing in common. The rule 'To each his own' is observed within families. Not only do grown members of the family not share their clothing with one another, but even the children each have their own. Among the Great Russian peasantry, however, very often two sisters do not know to which of them a certain sheepskin coat belongs, and the children have no sense of private property.

The obligatory holding of land in common and personal responsibility to the village commune, or *mir*, are an unbearable form of slavery and injustice for the South Russian. His history has not taught him to suppress his sense of private property or to regard himself as the servant of an abstract village commune, or *mir*, and be responsible for other members of it. The *bromada*, or society, of the South Russian is absolutely not the *mir*, or commune, of the Great Russian. The *bromada*, or society, is a voluntary gathering of the people. Whoever wants to, participates; whoever does not want to, leaves. Thus in Zaporozhe, whoever wanted to, entered the brotherhood of the Cossacks, and whoever wanted to, voluntarily left it.

According to the popular conception, every member of the *bromada* is an independent personality in and of himself; he is an independent proprietor. His duty to the *bromada*, or society, is only in the realm of those affairs in which there is a tie among the members for the sake of common security and the usefulness of the tie to each member. Meanwhile, according to the Great Russian idea, the village commune, or *mir*, is a kind of abstract expression of the general will which incorporates the personality of each member. The principal difference here, of course, arises from the communal holding of the land. As soon as a member of the *mir*, or repartitional village commune, cannot call the land he works his own property, he is no longer a free man. The structure of the Great Russian *mir* imposes a restriction, and its form, which was introduced by the authorities, has affected the dominant spirit and logic of Great Russia.

The roots of the repartitional village commune lay in the depths of national life. It arose naturally from that very striving for close unity in a single social and state form which, as we have seen, is a distinct trait of the Great Russian character.

...

In Southern Rus' the peasant could not acknowledge that his landlord embodied the sanctified will of a higher power because he did not understand the idea of specially invested rights in which he did not share. A higher will could not be personified by the landlord because the landlord was simply a free man. Naturally, the slave too wants to attain freedom at the first opportunity. But in Great Russia the peasant could not wish for such a thing because there his lord too was dependent on someone else's will, higher than his own, just as the peasant was dependent on him.

It rarely happened among the South Russians that a peasant was sincerely devoted to his lord and was tied to him without a necessity for his being so. Among the South Russians there was nothing of the filial love we often see in the world of the relations of lord and peasant or lord and servant in Great Russia. We find moving examples of this kind of thing among the Great Russians. The Great Russian serf, servant, or slave is often devoted heart and soul to his landlord, even when the landlord places no value on his devotion. He looks after the landlord's goods as he would his own, and he rejoices when he has an ambitious lord who is granted some honour. On occasion we have seen servants to whom all manner of business properly the landlord's has been confided. These trusted servants were themselves rogues and were ready to dupe anyone if it was to the master's benefit, but in their relations with the master they were honourable and straightforward.

The Little Russians, in contrast, justify themselves by the proverb 'No matter how well you feed the wolf, he always has an eye on the forest.' If the enserfed peasant does not deceive the lord, it is because he deceives no one. But if he has a taste for deception, he will deceive his lord before anyone else. How often we hear complaints against the Little Russians from those landowners who are of Great Russian origin and have acquired populated estates in the South Russian region. In vain have they tried to win their serfs' trust by good and just treatment of them. Work for the landlords has always been done reluctantly, and that is why the conviction has spread among us that the Little Russians are a lazy people, that they are neither sincere nor loyal, that only fear works with them, and that therefore a good landlord is a severe one. These imported landlords usually try to surround themselves with Great Russians and keep

their distance from the Little Russian peasants, as though they were a foreign people.

But what is even worse for the Little Russian is the *mir*, or repartitional commune, which is widespread in Great Russia. The accusation of laziness usually levelled against the Little Russians is most often made when they are subjected to social conditions which are foreign to them, such as serfdom or the *mir* communal organization. For the Little Russians, who are not chained together by narrow communal forms of property holding, the *mir* binds together various social strata and limits personal freedom and the free disposition of goods. In general, the accusation of laziness is unjust. One might even say that the Little Russian loves to work more than the Great Russian does and will in fact do so if he finds a free outlet for his activity.

...

The fate of the South Russian ethnic group has been such that those who have risen above the masses have usually lost their nationality. In earlier times they turned into Poles, and now they turn into Great Russians. The South Russian nationality always has been and today remains the possession of the common people. If fate protects those who have raised themselves above their ancestral nationality, then it will also reabsorb them into the masses and deprive them of their newly acquired dominance.

*Translated by Thomas Prymak*

1860-1

A Letter to the Editor of *Kolokol*<sup>1</sup>

MYKOLA KOSTOMAROV

Dear Sir:

In the thirty-fourth issue of *Kolokol* you expressed a view in regard to Ukraine which for a long time has been kept by the thinking part of the South Russian people as a precious sanctum of the heart. Please accept our heartfelt gratitude. Along with the store of the many truths you have been the first to utter in print in the Russian language belongs what you said about your native land. Allow me to convey to you, for all to hear, our heartfelt convictions.

The majority of the Great Russian and Polish public are not accustomed to regard us as a separate people, to acknowledge in us those elements of a distinctive life which were cultivated in the past; they are accustomed to doubt the existence of our distinct language and the possibility of its literary development, and in general posit our characteristics as one of the provincial nuances of Russian or Polish nationality. This mistaken view arose from the fact that, to the credit of our South Russian church, everything marked by nobility and privilege was chipped away from our South Russian church and anathemized by that same church. There are no Little Russian nobles, with the exception of a few who lately, realizing the bankruptcy of the institution of the nobility, are turning to the purely native source. But even before, there were no nobles [in our country]; they were foreign, although they were of our blood. Formerly they became Poles, and now they become Great Russians. The Little Russian nationality, as the officials of [Tsar] Aleksei Mikhailovich nonchalantly got used to

1 *Kolokol* (The Bell) was a journal founded in 1857 by Alexander Herzen (1812-70), the famous Russian socialist and publicist in exile in London.

calling it, forever remained the property of an oppressed social stratum, which with its sweat and blood fattened the Vyshnevetskys and the Rozumovskys.<sup>2</sup> Can the peasants be recognized as a people? Is it possible to grant them the right to a distinct existence?

Many thought so and still think so, following an old habit. We have had occasion to hear from the liberal Poles that there can be no doubt about Volhynia and Podolia's belonging to Poland because the whole educated class of the population are Poles and are drawn towards Poland heart and soul. And as far as the solid mass of the common people is concerned, it is not proper to ask them, because they cannot answer, being ignorant concerning questions of state and nationality. As for the liberal Great Russians, they either, having heard enough of the Polish arguments and being accustomed to consider as nations only those peoples with sovereigns, courts, and diplomats, magnanimously present these lands to the Poles or, under the influence of the patriotism developed by Ustrialov,<sup>3</sup> consider them the indisputable property of Russia. And thus the question of where the lands inhabited by our people belong creates conflict between the freedom-loving people of both Slavic communities. But the solution is quite simple. The contested lands do not belong either to the one or to the other; they belong to the people who have inhabited them since the earliest times and now inhabit and till them.

Ukraine, or South Rus', has its own very significant and instructive history. We shall not delve deeply into the twilight of the times of appanages, when South Rus', connected to North Rus' by the federal ties of the princes, returned to its separate existence soon after the liberation from the Tatars with the help of the Lithuanian Prince Gedimin (1320). This period could become an important subject for study, but, alas, we can look at it only through the monastic eyes of the chroniclers. At the time of the Cossacks there began a new life for our land. The Cossacks, whose significance for the Slavs is well known to you, were the seed-bed of freedom and of opposition to two kinds of despotism: the external, half-savage, eastern Muslim despotism on the one hand, and the inner, aristocratic, subtle, civilized despotism which developed monstrously among the Poles under the influence of old Roman and papal concepts on the other. Beginning at the

2 The Vyshnevetskys and the Rozumovskys were well-known old Ukrainian families. The first became Polonized, the second Russianized.

3 Nikolai Ustrialov (1805-70) was a Russian historian and author of school texts on Russian history with a very conservative orientation.

end of the sixteenth century there was a series of uprisings against the Polish nobility.

Because the Rzeczpospolita<sup>4</sup> was disturbed by the raids of predatory hordes, it could not do without an armed force on the Turkish-Tatar borders, and it therefore needed the Cossacks and was forced to offer them, in accordance with the concepts of the time, the rights of free men along with military rank. But it recognized the title of the Cossacks only by limiting the number of those registered and keeping the rest of the people enslaved to the elders of the crown villages and to the landowners. The people, however, wanted to enjoy the rights of the free men. They all wanted to be Cossacks, and those who were registered wanted to share their rank with everyone. The people did not want overlords. They wanted self-government, their own justice system, equality in the performance of social responsibilities, and a free choice of a way of life for everyone. According to the view of the people, everyone was allowed to live in Ukraine, and nowhere else in the seventeenth century were human rights, regardless of creed, origin, nationality, or convictions, so well respected. When the Poles reproached the Cossacks for giving shelter to all kinds of adventurers, imposters, political exiles, and heretics, they answered that it was an old custom with them to allow everyone to come and go without being asked by them where he came from and where he was going. The Cossacks themselves were defenders of the faith, tireless enemies of everything un-Orthodox in war, but at home they cordially welcomed Catholics, Arians, and Muslims. Nowadays the Little Russians show less religious attachment than the Great Russians, but inwardly they are incomparably more pious.

The Ukrainian people, notwithstanding the external similarity of many of their mores and customs to those of the Poles, saw themselves in the seventeenth century as the complete antithesis of the Poles. When the Poles, undergoing the influx of ideas developed when they venerated the Roman republic and under the general influence of Western Europe, talked of freedom, they regarded it as the sole property of men of noble estate (*ludzi szlachetnego stanu*), who trampled on the mass of enserfed peasants, the people of base estate. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, hated all elevation in rank and privilege and sought from the Poles rights and freedoms not for a handful but for all their people. That is why the Poles willingly granted the rights of free men to six or seven thousand Cossacks; but these six or seven thousand, instead of being satisfied with their exceptional status,

<sup>4</sup> This was the name of the commonwealth formed by the 1569 union of Poland and Lithuania.

received into their ranks three times as many and took up arms not only for themselves but also for those who had not been granted the rights they enjoyed. This solidarity in the strivings of the people constituted their strength. The people were well aware of this, and expressed it in their historical *duma*:

Therefore the mighty Cossack power became famous  
Because we, the young men, had a united will and thought.

True, the poison of Polish aristocratism managed to penetrate Cossack ranks and bred among them many Polonophiles, who, according to another song,

For the sake of great lordship,  
And for unfortunate greediness,

betrayed their people's convictions, but this poison was powerless to infect the Cossack masses. In Khmelnytsky's day the registered Cossacks, on whom the Polish landlords so relied that they had sent them to fight their fellow countrymen, killed their Polonophile officers and joined Bohdan, who at that time was still marching under the banner of freedom for all the people.

Unfortunately, the people who led the national movements and stood higher than the masses by virtue of their education received along with this education all the pretentious prejudices which were so offensive to Ukrainians. Freedom as conceived by the masses took – in its broad outlines rather than its details – the Polish form, as consisting in the rights of a privileged class, though in a model attenuated by popular concepts. Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself, however, having defeated King Jan Kazimierz at Zboriv with the help of all the people, concluded a peace treaty according to which only forty thousand men received Cossack rights and the remaining people were turned back into subjects. Honourably, but with unfortunate consequences, the people energetically resisted. A year later Khmelnytsky had to demand openly from the Poles the wholesale abolition of serfdom. Of course the consequence of such a strange – in contemporary Polish opinion – demand was war, and the war ended unhappily for the Cossacks. From that time on fortune either favoured or failed Khmelnytsky, until he finally submitted to the Muscovite tsar in exchange for protection under the conditions of the Pereiaslav treaty (1654).

The brilliant successes of the Cossacks and the Muscovites forced the



Poles to offer [Tsar] Aleksei Mikhailovich the crown when their king should die. Tempted by this arrangement, the Muscovite court committed its first glaring injustice regarding Ukraine. Instead of guarding the country which voluntarily had turned to Muscovy for protection from its enemies, the tsar vaguely expressed his intention of restoring it to Poland after the acquisition of the crown. Khmelnytsky died of heartache.

Then, in 1658-9, in order to secure a proper place for their native land during the impending upheaval of states, the Ukrainians concluded the treaty of Hadiach, according to which Ukraine, under the name the Grand Duchy of Rus', as an independent republic preserving the separateness and distinctiveness of its internal government, its judiciary, and its religious, civil, financial, and military structures, was united with Poland in a federated Rzeczpospolita. In this way a union of Slavic states was formed: Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania-Rus', the Grand Duchy of Rus', and, if a union with Muscovy should be completed, the Tsardom of Muscovy. This was the first attempt to form the Slavic union which we, as well as you, are now considering. It would not be amiss to observe that the creators of the Hadiach treaty had in mind the enlightenment of the people and freedom of speech. The establishment in Ukraine of two universities, schools, and a printing press was agreed upon, and the freedom to publish, even on subjects touching on faith, was envisaged.

But the most important and vital question was not resolved satisfactorily by the treaty. The creators of the treaty attempted to harmonize the old prejudice in favour of the need for a privileged class with the people's demand for equality, and thought they could achieve this harmony by providing for easy access to noble status.

According to the treaty the Rus' hetman had the right to present to each session of the Sejm a hundred newly ennobled Cossacks from each regiment. True, this would have resulted in the ennobling of all the people, but the mass of the people were unable to acknowledge and accept a measure of such subtlety; the masses were instinctively intolerant of the notion of noble status. The treaty, which in this last respect outstripped the Polish constitution of 3 May 1791, was broken immediately by the Poles and the Russians. The Poles, finding themselves in an awkward situation, had agreed to it, but many of them, having invoked by the Sejm oath God's wrath on their country in the event of any violation, under the influence of Jesuitical logic openly expressed their desire to deceive the Cossacks nevertheless. Their clergy was tempted [to do likewise] by the requirement that it sit together with the Orthodox church leaders, and the nobility was outraged by the granting of their title to those they usually called peasants.

Conversely, the people, having heard of the agreement, understood it as an attempt to create a *szlachta* in Ukraine, which in their imagination took its hated Polish form. The creators of the treaty – among whom [Iurii] Nemyrych, a Rus' landlord who had fled to the Cossacks from Poland on account of his religious convictions, distinguished himself – were slaughtered. One Pole justly remarked at the Sejm: 'If you want to grant nobility, then grant it to the entire Rus' people, who treasure their equality. But who will want to cast ancestral treasure in order to lure the vulgar rabble? And to whom do you offer nobility? To those who laugh at our patents and coat of arms' ... The people fought long and very stubbornly for external independence and internal equality. But Poland and Muscovy, realizing that neither of them separately would get the better of an obstinate people, decided to rip Ukraine into two halves, so that the left bank of the Dnieper would remain under Muscovy and the right bank, with the exception of Kiev, Trypillia, Stavy, and Vasylkiv, under Poland. This diabolical partition of a people was first decided by the Andrusovo treaty of 1668 and then, eighteen years later, confirmed by the peace treaty of Moscow. All this time the Ukrainians struggled desperately for their independence, and were forced to fight the Russians and the Poles at once, even while stretching out their hands to the one or the other in an attempt somehow to preserve the wholeness of their country. Everything was in vain. Even [Hetman] Doroshenko's desperate move of calling for Turkey's assistance did not help. The inhabitants of Podillia and the Kiev region, unwilling to serve the Polish lords, almost all left their land and settled in the steppes, occupied now by the Kharkiv, Voronezh, and Kursk provinces. Others joined the Don Cossacks. The unfortunate ones did not know that for a hundred years their descendants would find no escape from serfdom there. The fertile lands they had left were seized by the Poles, and the people, having multiplied in the course of the eighteenth century, found themselves in conditions similar to those of the seventeenth century. Old times were remembered. The Kolii rebellion<sup>5</sup> was the last, convulsive attempt to regain freedom for a dismembered Ukraine. In vain! Soon both Ukraine and hated Poland, with her lords and *szlachta*, came under the rule of the Russian sovereigns.

Left-Bank Ukraine, having preserved the Cossack form of government, was dying in Muscovite chains. The philoprogenitive mother of the country, Catherine II, destroyed the Cossack system and, in order to pacify and

5 The Kolii (also known as Haidamak) rebellion (1768) in Right-Bank Ukraine, which was led by Ivan Honta and Maksym Zalizniak, was suppressed by the Russian army.

win over bureaucrats already significantly demoralized by Muscovite influence, introduced serfdom into Little Russia. She thus enserfed a free people which with great tenacity had once liberated itself from serfdom in its Polish garb. In 1782 she deigned to enserf also the people of Slobidska Ukraine, the descendants of those who, as I said above, had fled there, from Podillia and the Kiev region, from Polish serfdom.

From that time on Ukraine remained silent. Ukrainian nationality was regarded with contempt. The name 'khokhol,' given by the *moskali* to the Cossacks on account of their tufts of hair (*oseledets*), became a synonym for fool. Ukraine's poetic language became the object of disparagement and ridicule. Often the Little Russians themselves blushed when their pronunciation betrayed a southern origin. The study of Ukrainian history was either abandoned or presented from a distorted perspective in accordance with the beneficent aims and attitudes of government.

The awakening of the Slavic nationalities quickly prompted stirrings in Ukraine and roused national thought and feeling from lethargic sleep. A yearning arose to regenerate a nationality dying under the Muscovite knout and the St Petersburg bayonet, and to reconstitute a distinctive literature.

But the idea of Panslavism taken up in Ukraine was different from that taken up in Moscow, where it revealed itself in the desire to comprehend the meaning of troparions and primers,<sup>6</sup> or in rhetorical praise of old Muscovite Rus', to which was timidly added the hopeful prospect of the all-Russian throne extending its regal hand to the Slavic peoples and preparing for them the desirable fate of Ukraine and Poland. In Ukraine the idea at once assumed the radiant form of a federal union of Slavs, in which each nationality would preserve its characteristics, with universal personal and social freedom. Simultaneously came the conviction that in this way and this way alone could Ukraine rise from having fallen and preserve her image so unjustly and mercilessly trampled. Young people from the Kharkiv and Kiev universities were quickly imbued with these ideas. Could all this escape the notice of the vigilant persecutors of all ideas during the reign of Emperor Nicholas [I]?

In 1847 in Kiev, after a denunciation by a student named Petrov, who was a gendarme's son, several persons who belonged to a circle of Little Russian writers<sup>7</sup> were arrested. Among them was the poet Taras Shevchenko, whose outstanding poems are known by heart not only by almost

6 Kostomarov mockingly refers to the Russian preoccupation with religious books and hymns such as troparions.

7 Kostomarov refers to the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius (1845-7).

all literate Little Russians but also by many Great Russians and other Slavs. All those arrested were dragged to the Third Section, where they were incarcerated. From their papers and letters it was clear that all of them were imbued with the idea of Slavic unity, with a love for all Slavic national peoples in general and for Ukrainians in particular, with a loathing of serfdom and of religious and national animosities, and with a sympathy for the ignorant common people. At the same time, some of them had expressed in writing the idea that it would be very useful to create a scholarly society in order to draw together the intellectual activities of Slavic peoples and to spread education among the people. The idea of having such a society was in no way connected with an intention to form a so-called secret society. This can be seen clearly from the papers of the accused, who rejected the principle that 'the end justifies the means.' How, then, in these circumstances could they be accused of a political crime, when their society existed only as a supposition and not in fact, and the thought of the federal union of Slavs was presented only as an ideal for the distant future? Was it possible to accuse and to punish them for all this, and so harshly at that? But what was impossible for ordinary folk was possible for Dubbelt.<sup>8</sup> He saw at once that here was ready material for what could be represented as a discovery of a secret political society, and he baptized his creation the Ukrainian-Slavonic Society. Nicholas I, a man of form [that is, who inordinately valued form], attributed greater significance to ideas he opposed when they were arrayed formalistically, so the destruction of the society was in his eyes a great service. Dubbelt could expect the highest decoration and goodwill in consequence.

Under the moral torture of incarceration in the fortress they coerced the accused to slander one another, to admit that there indeed was a society. For its part, the Third Section allowed them to represent the imaginary society in as pardonable a light as possible. Accordingly, they wrote that their society was concerned solely with the Western Slavs, and not with those resting under the gentle hand of the all-Russian monarch, who alone could liberate them from German and Turkish chains. However inept the fabrication, which contradicted everything found in the papers of the accused, the case was nonetheless laid out in such a fashion. The newly baked state criminals received punishment, softened, however, by fatherly

8 General Leontii Dubbelt (1792–1862) was the officer in charge of the criminal investigation of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius. He was known for his severity, but Herzen considered him 'the most intelligent man in the Third Section.' The Third Section was the Chancery unit that controlled Russia's state and security police from 1826 to 1880.

clemency. Some of the chief accused were incarcerated, some for a year and others for three years, and then sent to serve in the Great Russian provinces, but all were put under strict police surveillance.

The poet Shevchenko was sent, as a private, to Orenburg and then to the fortress of Novopetrovsk. Nicholas I strictly ordered that he not be allowed to write or to sketch (the poet was also an artist). Shevchenko spent more than ten years in such moral torture, in a terrible land on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, on salt marshes where even the grass does not grow, all the time under the surveillance of corporals vigilant lest he write or sketch something. How they treated the others may be understood from the following. One of the political criminals, the former Kiev professor Kostomarov, was exiled to Saratov. There an unusual murder occurred: two young boys were found tortured to death and thrown onto the ice of the Volga. Suspicion fell on the Jews. An investigator from St Petersburg demanded through the governor that Kostomarov appear, and commissioned him to write a report as to whether there was a possibility of a sect among the Jews which used human blood in its rituals. Having spent several months on the case, Kostomarov presented a report to the investigator in which he expressed his view that the existence of such a sect was possible. Governor Kozhevnikov, however, wanted to prove the opposite. He summoned Kostomarov and, disregarding the fact that he himself had asked him to comply with the request of the investigator, threatened to put Kostomarov in prison, asserted his right to imprison a political prisoner in exile, and pointed out that Kostomarov in his report had found bloody incidents even in biblical stories and in completing his report had used prohibited books. And the general opinion as to this governor was that he was a liberal! When, soon after, he was replaced not by a liberal but by a nonentity incarnate, and the investigator, owing to Kostomarov's report – which the investigator sent to the ministry as his own – was appointed vice-governor in Saratov, the chief of police, newly arrived with fresh gubernatorial powers, asked to see on an appointed day all who were under police surveillance in Saratov. He summoned Kostomarov along with the Polish bookseller Zawadski and several other Poles, placed them together with people who were under police surveillance because of the boys' murder, and began to give a fatherly, moral admonition, telling them to lead a sober life and not to knock about taverns and houses of ill repute.

These details are sufficient to show what it meant to be a political prisoner under police surveillance at the time of Nicholas I. But for the sake of the honour of Russian society it is necessary to say that everywhere the Emperor exiled our countrymen their disgrace served as a kind of diploma

certifying them as worthy of sympathetic interest, respect, and trust. All the disgraced ones, without exception, by their honourable conduct while serving their sentences and by their private lives demonstrated the strength of their moral convictions. To complete the account of the shameful investigation of the Kievan case, it is necessary to add that Petrov, as a reward for his denunciation, was kept in the service of the Third Section with the pay and rank of the twelfth class, which he, as a second-year student, did not in the least deserve. But Petrov betrayed his patrons for money: after he sold some documents of the Third Section, he too was exiled.

Following the Kievan case all the writings of the accused were banned, and censorship and spying began to rage against Little Russia. Not only were Little Russian books barred from publication, but even scholarly articles written in Russian about Little Russia were proscribed. The very names Ukraine, Little Russia, and the Hetman State became reprehensible.

The beneficent influence of the spring (even though inconstant, and interrupted by severe frosts) during the reign of Alexander II has also awakened Little Russia. Suddenly, some very fine works in the Ukrainian language have appeared. The [prospect of the] liberation of the peasants has given us hope for our poor, subjugated people, deprived of everything they have fought for with determination and self-sacrifice all their lives. We are grateful to Emperor Alexander II, and we ask only that the liberation of the peasants be not in name only, but that they enjoy before the law the same rights the nobility enjoy. Any other type of freedom is incomprehensible for Ukraine, which clings to her old convictions.

Moreover, we desire that the government not only will not hinder us, Ukrainians, in the development of our language, but also will show some support for it. It should issue a directive that in schools, which, as it has already announced, are to be created for the people, subjects are to be taught in the native language, in the language understood by the people and not in the official Great Russian language. Otherwise, the Ukrainian people will only learn words, without developing their own concepts. We shall not demand and desire for ourselves anything more that is any different from what all Russia in general desires. No one among us thinks about tearing South Rus' from its connection to the rest of Russia. On the contrary, we would like to see all other Slavs unite with us in one union, even under the sceptre of the Russian sovereign, if that sovereign will become a sovereign of free peoples and not the ruler of an all-devouring Tatar-Germanic Muscovy. In the future Slavic union, in which we believe and for which we hope, our South Rus' should form an independent, civic entity on all the territory where the people speak South Russian. It should preserve a unity,

based not on a ruinous, lifeless centralization but on a clear awareness of equality and of its own interests. May our descendants see what no Simeon of our generation has been fated to see – the Slavs purged of their old prejudices.

Let neither the Great Russians nor the Poles call their own the land inhabited by our people.

15 January 1860

# The Science of the Human Spirit (excerpts)

PAMFIL IURKEVYCH

*Pamfil Iurkevych (1826–74) was a distinguished teacher of philosophy at the Kievan Theological Academy and, after 1861, a professor at Moscow University. He represents the idealist school of philosophy in his stress on the importance of ‘the heart.’ He was the teacher of Vladimir Solov’ëv, who valued him highly. Iurkevych wrote many philosophical and pedagogical works, and his teachings have been linked by Dmytro Chyzhevsky to those of Skovoroda and Gogol. In the excerpts printed here Iurkevych attacks the materialism of the radical Russian literary critic and thinker Nikolai Chernyshevsky.*

After these general remarks we shall analyse the author’s<sup>1</sup> teaching about the human spirit, which may be divided easily into the teaching on the theoretical and that on the practical aspects of the spirit.

The author frequently reminds us that questions which arise here do not present any difficulty, that ‘they ceased to be questions for contemporary thinkers because they are very easily decided with certainty with the first application of scientific analysis.’ He demonstrates this by means of an example which should interest us in its connection with the author’s teaching about the moral activity of man. ‘One proposes,’ he says, ‘a head-splitting question: is man a good or an evil being? Many sweat over the solution of this question ... But with the first application of scientific analysis the entire issue turns out to be extremely simple. Man loves what is agreeable and hates what is disagreeable – there seems to be no doubt about it – because, here, in the predicate is simply repeated the subject: A is A.

1 The author referred to is Nikolai Chernyshevsky.



What is agreeable to man is agreeable to man; what is disagreeable to man is disagreeable to man. Good is he who does good things for others; bad is he who does bad things for others. It is clear and simple. Let us join, now, these simple truths and, in result, we shall get this: Man is good when in order to please himself he must please others; he is bad when he is forced to derive pleasure for himself by inflicting unpleasantness on others. Here, human nature cannot be either blamed for one or praised for the other, because everything depends on circumstances. Therefore, we may find that Ivan is good and Peter bad, but these judgments refer only to individuals and not to man in general, just as the ability to be a carpenter or a blacksmith, etc., refers only to individual people and not to all men. Ivan is a carpenter, but one cannot say what man in general is: a carpenter or not a carpenter. Peter can forge iron, but one cannot say about man in general that he is a blacksmith or not. The fact that Ivan became a carpenter and Peter a blacksmith shows only that in the circumstances that occurred in Ivan's life a man becomes a carpenter, and in the particular circumstances that occurred in Peter's life he becomes a blacksmith. Just so, in some circumstances man becomes good, and in others bad.'

We have already had an opportunity to show the logical merits of the articles under review. Now once again we come across an example of logical merit. That man is good or bad 'depends on circumstances.' That Ivan is a carpenter 'depends on circumstances; but it is impossible to tell what man in general is: a carpenter or not.' Is it really impossible? Remember [Benjamin] Franklin's saying: 'A man is an animal which makes a machine.' Remember the saying, repeated a thousand times, that all of man's machines are only an extension, a development, and a branching out of one basic and original machine, his hands. Indeed, it depends on circumstances whether Ivan becomes a carpenter and Peter a blacksmith. But if no circumstances can permit Ivan, with folded hands, to build houses exclusively by his desire to build them, if no circumstances can give Peter the ability to forge iron simply by moving his tongue to make the iron obey him, then you can easily understand that all the circumstances in the world will not produce a carpenter or a blacksmith from a being without hands or without the natural ability to use them. So, you can repeat after Franklin: a man, not Ivan or Peter, is an animal building a machine. That is why we can understand why, in certain circumstances, a man becomes a carpenter, and in other circumstances, a blacksmith. When a naturalist speaks of objects falling along an incline, falling vertically, making a parabola during the fall, then he explains thoroughly these particular actions of falling bodies according to their circumstances and relations. But will he assert such an

absurdity that it is altogether impossible to tell whether a body is falling or not, whether it is heavy or not? On the contrary, he will tell you that if particular circumstances condition the fall of bodies in different ways, they may do it only because a body is, as a rule, heavy, because it, as a rule, weighs or *falls* to the centre of gravitation.

The second allogical phenomenon in the example under discussion consists of the fact that the author places good and evil in the same reciprocal relationship as the relationship of carpentry and blacksmithery. It would appear that according to the principles of logic such a relationship should apply only to particular aspects of good, not of good to evil. We reason that justice and magnanimity are aspects of one morally good activity, just as carpentry and blacksmithery are aspects of one technical activity. But since the particular never issues directly from the general, because in the particular the general changes its form and takes on one particular form, and not another, out of a number of many possible forms, it is imperative to take into consideration the circumstances which in one instance embody a moral striving in the form of justice and, in another, [a moral striving] in the form of magnanimity similar to the particular circumstances that make Ivan a carpenter and Peter a blacksmith. But if we raise the question of the relationship of good to evil, then it is possible to compare it to the relationship between two of Ivan the carpenter's activities: one, when he cleaves with his hatchet a piece of wood, and the other, when with the same hatchet he splits the head of his comrade. The latter activity, though resulting from the *means* of carpentry, does not come from its *end*, or from its *idea*. That is, although evil comes from the *means* of human nature, it does not come from its *end*, not from the purpose of these means. A carpenter splits the head of his comrade. This is not the idea of carpentry; he does what he *shouldn't* do, according to the idea of his craft. Consequently, a man does evil when he violates his duty, when he does what he *shouldn't* do, considering his purpose in so far as he knows about it from different sources.

With these brief remarks we do not intend to explain the profound problem of evil. But we wanted to show how attention to simple rules of elementary logic contributes to a clear formulation of the questions and to a definition of their real meaning.

...

Besides, in order not to cite facts which in any case could be explained in one way or another, we shall ask, in general, *which conditions* inform the human spirit, which can explain its capacity for doing good, for disinterested love and truth? If there are no such conditions, then each man must

look at the happiness of others only as a means to his own happiness, and all the others see in his happiness only the means to their happiness. Or, each wishes good for himself only and is indifferent to the happiness or unhappiness of others. He treats the other [person] as a thing, in which what interests him is not whether the other is happy or unhappy, but only how much of an advantage he can derive for himself from the different situations of the other thing. Such is the true meaning of the teaching that man acts only according to his egoism. There is a mechanism in the field of human culture, and man acts like a stone, that is, occupies a place fit for its weight and volume. Whether this tendency causes pressure and breakage in the immediate environment or whether it introduces order and correct movement is of no interest to either stone or man.

Let us assume that this is so, that man is interested only in his own happiness and has no sympathy for someone else's happiness or unhappiness. However, if the history of mankind shows that everywhere where there have been people there have also been concepts of justice as a foundation for general happiness, if people at the very lowest rungs of civilization have recognized that in order to satisfy one's own advantage it is necessary to be concerned about the advantage of others, then we see here some *wise power* which pressed egoism, which was indifferent to the happiness and unhappiness of others, into the cold, involuntary, and insincere service of others to satisfy its own advantage. We can understand this fact only because we have grown used to it. Predatory birds and animals live alone because they cannot share their prey. Egoism, as such, cannot share its prey. And yet it does share and, contrary to its frank desire, does care about the interests of others. If one suggests that through experience it was made aware of the necessity of such a mode of conduct, that in the historical struggle it has comprehended itself and found in the service of someone else's advantage the most sound, though an unpleasant, means of acting in one's own interests, then the structure of society and the idea of the general good as arising out of the necessity for egoism to do unwillingly what it does not want to do willingly and what is incompatible with its understanding would explain only the carrying out or the manufacturing of some one else's advantage, but not that living, immediate, and sympathetic involvement in someone else's fate, which is known even to a scoundrel in his better moments. It is likely that here we must refer to the heart, as our author has done in another instance.

The history of mankind begins with the direct involvement of people in the community, in the tribe, in the family. For a long time man did not want to and was unable to separate himself and his interests from the com-

munity. His morality was the mores of his tribe. His knowledge was based on the authority of elders. He experienced joy and sorrow not personally but as a member of his people, and their luck and misfortune was his. He related to himself the accomplishments and weaknesses of the whole, as if the spirit of the whole were his own spirit. The common good was so near his simple heart, it directly affected him so immediately that for a long time he could not conceive of his personal advantage. He even endowed the objects of inanimate nature with the worth found in himself; he animated them, and subordinated to them his own soul and its needs, and sympathized with them. He contemplated things not as they were, but as they might become if all the world partook of universal happiness. Every human child begins its development with such a mythological awareness. The living needs of a loving heart, still unspoiled by experience, impel it to see and love life even where the experienced mind sees nothing living or inspirited. Man begins his moral development from the movements of his heart, which would like to see goodness, happiness, the sweet play of life everywhere. It would like to meet people who are happy, who warm one other through the cordiality of love, who are bound together in friendship and mutual sympathy. Only in this form of *realized universal happiness* does the world appear as something worthy of existence. And so we, the developed egoists, cannot behave impartially and coldly, according to some calculation of personal gain, not only towards man but also towards inanimate nature. When you see that the flowers in your garden are dying, you are overcome by a feeling resembling pity; you would not want this life to suffer. Everything which reminds you of the suffering of living creatures evokes sadness, sadness not for yourself but for life which is completely alien to you. Thus, inanimate nature engenders in you, with its impressions, not only egotistical feelings but also moral feelings. Your heart experiences a slight agitation at the *idea of the common good*, the realization of which you would like to see everywhere your eyes turn.

...

In the human spirit there is something similar to what the Catholics call the supernatural deeds of their saints; that is to say, there exist means and forces superfluous to the purpose of physical self-preservation. Revelation calls this spirit, since it does not serve sensual instincts, God-like. Earlier we saw that man registers his impressions not only as his own immediate advantage requires, that he knows about the world not only as the sum total of means necessary to his survival, that he elevates himself above the level of animal consciousness and animal knowledge of the world. By the very nature of his self-consciousness he recognizes the *right* of things in

themselves. He is interested in knowing the means of their origins and changes, in knowing the general laws and rules which govern the world, regardless of how all this affects his immediate advantage. That is how human knowledge oversteps the boundaries of egoism and utilitarianism in which animal knowledge is subsumed ...

# The Lost Epoch: Ukrainians under the Muscovite Tsardom, 1654–1876 (abridgment)

MYKHAILO DRAHOMANOV

*Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), regarded as the father of Ukrainian democratic socialism, was a prominent scholar and political thinker. He studied at Kiev University, where he later became a lecturer in history. As a result of his cultural and political activities in the Kiev Hromada he was dismissed from the university in 1875. On behalf of the Hromada he went the following year to Geneva and there became editor of the journal Hromada (The Community, 1878–82). Later, in the 1880s, a rift developed between him and the Kiev organization, and in 1889 he became a professor at the University of Sofia, where he died. According to Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Drahomanov's thought represents 'a blend of liberal-democratic, socialist and Ukrainian patriotic elements.' After an eclipse during the Soviet era, Drahomanov was recognized as a leading political theorist of nineteenth-century Ukraine.*

To weep over the past and wish for its return is always useless, especially for us, the servants of the Ukrainian people. We know that what we ultimately want has never yet been achieved, and will come to pass only in some distant future when the human race is far wiser than it is now. Nevertheless, we must look back in order to find out why our lot is as bitter as it is, so that we will avoid making the mistakes of our predecessors. The Ukrainians must take a good look backward and review the two hundred and twenty years that have passed since 1654, when, under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian people came under the protective arm of the 'Eastern Tsar of Muscovy' ...

The first thing that strikes one in comparing Ukraine today with Ukraine in the days of Khmelnytsky is that then there was a Cossack State;

today there is none. Learned folk who write history, foreigners as well as some Ukrainians, usually say that this development was necessary. A Cossack way of life is not for civilized man. The Cossack State appeared when the lot of the Ruthenian people was bitter indeed, when they were enslaved by both the Tatars and the Poles. The Cossack organization served its purpose; it defended Ukraine from invaders as long as it was able, until the time when the powerful, brotherly Muscovite tsardom entrenched itself in the north. Then the Cossacks united with the Russian Empire, which took over their historical mission of protecting Ukraine, and transferred them to the Kuban, where they were still needed to wage war against the infidels. Another type of government had to be organized in Ukraine, say these learned folk, one that would suit the country in times of peace, when industrial, commercial, and scholarly pursuits take precedence over warlike ones. They say that only the stubborn fighters, enamoured of chivalrous exploits, the shiftless, the adventurers, and the traitors goaded on by foreign agents were really against the Moscow government and its administration in Ukraine.

Discussing the 'fine' way of life that was created in the steppes of the lower Dnieper by the Empress Catherine, who gave away lands to the aristocrats and to the German colonists, Professor Solov'ev of Moscow states that the Zaporozhian Cossacks pleaded to be allowed to retain their lands, but that to permit that would have amounted to turning 'New Russia into a desert.' In other words, the Empress had no choice but to destroy Zaporozhe by force of arms. These are the ideas our children are taught in the schools, and they retain them, unable to find out whether they are true or not, whether these mad Cossacks were really determined to turn the land into a desert. Is it true that all good things were brought by the tsars, who had to exterminate these brigands, and that we really live in the happiest of conditions? ...

Long ago intelligent Ukrainians ceased to weep over the old Cossack ways and the Hetmanate. Somehow, Ukrainians are not in the habit of boasting about their ancestral traditions, probably because their independence and their aristocracy disappeared long ago, and there has been no one to teach them to take pride in their glorious past. For one brief moment, in the thirties and forties of this century, when enlightened Ukrainians began finding out about their heritage, a handful of people boasted loudly about the glories of Cossack Ukraine, but they were quick to discover the stains on the escutcheon ...

We are ready to agree with this critical attitude. It is proper that peaceable pursuits replace warlike exploits in the steppes. But let us consider

whether we have made much progress in these peaceable pursuits, and whether we have obtained even half that for which we fought the Poles and the Tatars. Although, as is the case with all peoples, some of our forefathers loved fighting for its own sake, or fought the 'unbelievers' because they were 'unbelievers,' these were not the main reasons for the eternal warfare on the steppes. Our ancestors were forced to gallop over the steppes to defend their land from Turk and Tatar invasions, which, after all, were the principal obstacle to the development of peaceful pursuits in Ukraine. And these Cossack exploits did not prevent Ukraine from being the land from which Muscovy, in the time of Peter the Great's grandfather, of his father, and of Peter himself, drew its teachers and clergy. Russian scholars admit this, but they fail to draw the logical conclusions. Nor are they so hostile to military exploits when they are the exploits of tsarist armies, even, for instance, in Prussia and Switzerland, where, God knows why and for whom but certainly not for the defence of the homeland, Peter's successors sent soldiers, Ukrainians among them.

Let us look at the conditions in Ukraine after the Cossack way of life was abolished and see what we got in its place. If Ukraine did not entirely waste these last two hundred years, was it because the old order was abolished and a new introduced from Moscow and St Petersburg? We shall leave aside the pertinent question of why, if the Cossack way of life was a menace to peaceful life in our land and in the Russian state, the Cossack organization was suppressed only in Ukraine, and not in the Don region also. Are the steppes of the Don not as essential to 'peace and enlightenment' as those of the Dnieper and the Dniester? The answer is not difficult: the Don is more closely related to the Muscovite empire and is more loyal, though if truth be told, the Don too was deprived of some of its freedom, for it also rose in rebellion on occasion. We are not jealous of the 'quiet Don.' May it prosper, may it nurture the grain of freedom that yet remains until the day the seed grows into a flourishing tree. It will then recall that once upon a time, when both the Don and the Dnieper were self-governing, they knew more about each other than when both were ruled by offices in St Petersburg, and not by their own Cossack councils. They will recall that there was a time when the Ukrainian *kobzari* [minstrels] sang 'glory to the Zaporozhian and to the Don hosts with all the folk, for many years, till the end of time' (from the epic about Otaman Kishka and his escape from a Turkish prison).

But let us pass on to our own affairs and find out what we gained during these two hundred years, after the 'disastrous' old ways perished and the new, supposedly European but really Muscovite, ones were introduced.



No European is to be found in our time who thinks that a country can prosper under an arbitrary government and without the cooperation of the governed, or that it can be governed well by bureaucratic officials appointed from above by an absolute monarch. Almost everyone agrees that a large country cannot be governed by decrees issuing forth from a far-away capital, where the opinions of the governed are not known. Even in the Russian Empire, the *zemstvo* and city self-government have been introduced, so that at least minor matters can be regulated by the inhabitants rather than by officials who are in one place today and another tomorrow.

If these ideas are correct, what advantage has Ukraine gained from two hundred years of rule by Moscow? Shall we find it in the cruelties of Peter I, in the greed of Menshikov<sup>1</sup> and Biron's<sup>2</sup> Germans, in the madness of Paul I? Or in the bestialities of Arakcheev<sup>3</sup> and the cool, calculating despotism of Nicholas I? The Ukrainians cannot even say that these were 'our own dogs,' fed and raised by us. In our annals there is no Ivan IV. These despots from St Petersburg, these perverters of human nature, did not even consider the Ukrainians their kin. At every turn they oppressed us with even more venom – with less pity for the 'stubborn khokhols' – than they did their own people. Or shall we say that because the 'Little Russian brethren' suffered, the Russians profited, they whose forefathers had promised to aid their brethren, even at the expense of life itself, when Khmelnytsky gave his allegiance to the 'Eastern Tsar'? Why destroy those local laws, the old elective offices which once existed in Ukraine, when all civilized people are of the opinion that self-government and elective offices are essential? Thus two hundred years of history were lost, and of these more than a hundred were years of intolerable suffering until the tsars succeeded in putting an end to the traditional Ukrainian ways.

Everything the Russian government did in Ukraine from the days of Khmelnytsky until the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775 was aimed at the dissolution of the Ukrainian order. What cunning on the part of the boyars from Moscow and the officials from St Petersburg, what suffering on the part of the Ukrainian peasant, what pressure on the Ukrainian

1 A. Menshikov was one of the men of low social origin who acquired influence, power, and great wealth during the reign of Peter the Great.

2 Ernst Johann Biron (or Bühren) was a minor court official who became the lover of Empress Anna. She ruled from 1730 to 1740, and he was the power behind the throne.

3 Deeply religious but also rude, dissolute, and sadistic, Alexei Arakcheev was a trusted confidante of Alexander I and an important administrator in the tsar's government.

nobility until it learned to kowtow – all to discover that these ‘new’ ways are worse than useless! ...

[In the original, the text of the Articles of Pereiaslav, 1654, under which the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the tsar of Moscow, follows here.]

We do not consider the Articles of Pereiaslav as the ultimate in statesmanship. Today we seek more than simply the re-establishment of what our ancestors have lost since then. The treaty was drawn up by the Cossacks and was concerned with the Cossacks’ welfare. To them Ukraine was not all the territory inhabited by the Ukrainians (Ruthenians, or Little Russians, as they were then called), but only that where, according to agreements with Poland, the Cossacks lived. Ukraine did not extend to the San River in Galicia in the west, and to the Dunajec River and the Tisa in the Carpathians, but only to the Sluch River; that is, it consisted of the provinces of Chernihiv, Kiev, and Bratslav ...

The nobles in Khmelnytsky’s chancellery and the ‘Father of the Cossacks’ himself, also a nobleman, did not forget to include in the Articles of Pereiaslav provisions that the nobility should ‘preserve its possessions as they were under the Polish kings, and that noblemen should continue to be elected to the country and city courts, as they were under Poland.’

As was the case with the Cossacks and the nobility, rights and freedoms were granted to the clergy and the monks, who were allowed to retain the privileges they had obtained under the Polish kings, including their lands and the peasants thereon. The burghers were allowed to choose their mayors and city councillors. Thus by the Pereiaslav treaty the old inequalities were perpetuated. Little thought was given to the well-being of those poor devils the peasants. The thirteenth article of the treaty is the only one that might be interpreted as having them in mind, for it reads that ‘the rights accorded to clergy and lay persons by the kings and princes must not be touched’ – only nobody had ever granted any rights to the peasants. They remained provisionally free only on the lands from which the Polish nobles fled. Since these lands were not recognized as their property, they were gradually once again brought into a state of ‘obedience’ ... The development was towards a new serfdom, and the Moscow government not only did nothing to stop it, but actually nurtured the seeds of evil in the Cossack order and destroyed the seeds of good that were latent there.

In the Pereiaslav Articles there were, however, some sound ideas on a kind of government towards which all enlightened people aim today. The agreement stated that foreigners should not meddle in the country’s affairs, that every office should be elective, that no one should be punished without trial, and that Cossacks, nobles, and burghers should all be judged by

their peers. The nation's freedom was thus at least partly guaranteed against the abuses of tsarist despotism ...

When we compare the rights which were guaranteed to the Ukrainian Cossacks with the despotism that existed in the Muscovite tsardom, there is no doubt that the Cossack constitution had more in common with the free European constitutional governments of today than the Muscovite tsardom had, or than even the present Russian Empire has.

Everybody knows that the liberties of the English grew from a very modest beginning. Comparing the rights the English lords obtained from King John in 1215 in Magna Carta, we find that they were not much more extensive than the freedoms of our Cossacks as established in 1654, and that they benefited a smaller group of people than did those of the Cossacks.

The English charter was drawn up after an uprising against the king. That is why on some points it is much clearer with regard to the rights of subjects against the king, especially in matters of taxation: there was to be no taxation without the consent of Parliament. But when it comes to personal and communal liberties, the English charter is no more explicit than ours ... In the English charter, moreover, it was principally the rights and freedoms of the barons, lords, and knights which were guaranteed. Full rights were gradually extended to the whole gentry, which corresponded to our Cossacks, and still later to the burghers; now they are the rights of the entire English people. Throughout Europe it was the nobility which first obtained rights that later were extended to most of the people. It is true that equality of rights for all inhabitants did not progress at the same rate as liberty itself. Those lower on the social scale, the townsmen and peasants, were often willing to aid the king in abridging the rights of the aristocracy so as to free themselves of their masters. This in turn gave rise to a bureaucratic type of rule, which for a time replaced, though not entirely, the elective type. Some measure of the old representative traditions remained – here and there a diet or assembly – to be renewed and strengthened later on. The countries in which these old representative traditions and institutions remained in place the longest were best able to reconstruct their constitutions into modern liberal ones, in which the power of kings and their officials is limited, not only in local affairs but also nationally, being dependent on the consent of elected bodies. In these modern liberal states we find that not only the lords but all people are safeguarded against arrest and punishment without trial (which is still not the case in Russia), and that every individual has the right of free speech, publication, and movement.

Two hundred years ago Ukraine was in a rather advantageous position

in that, as a result of the wars against the Tatars and the uprisings against Poland, it was able to retain a free native military class and elective institutions at a time when in most of Europe the army had ceased to be a chivalrous order and had become mercenary, owing obedience only to kings and princes, and when bureaucratic rule had replaced elective rule. In addition, because of the wide open spaces and the colonization of the steppes, most of the peasants were *de facto* free. But those were also the days when Europe had already evolved republican governments in Holland and Switzerland, and for a time in England too. There, it is true, monarchy was restored, but of such a kind that absolutism and arbitrary rule became impossible. The old English freedoms bore fruit. The king could not govern without the consent of Parliament, nor could he in any way abrogate the rights of individual Englishmen.

When our Ukraine united with Muscovy, liberty was based not only on the ancient traditions of local self-rule, as, for instance, in the pre-Tatar city-republics of Pskov and Novgorod, where princes were elected and dismissed according to 'old custom.' No, two hundred years ago ideas concerning the rights of man were encouraged by education and the reading of books about Greece and Rome. The progress of civilization was responsible for the diminishing of serfdom in Europe. In Ukraine the people had just put an end to it in a revolutionary uprising against the Polish lords.

That is why it is quite conceivable that in Ukraine the traditional chivalrous freedoms might have fused with the new rights of men for which so many enlightened people in Europe were then striving. It could have been expected that the freedoms which had developed organically would be reinforced by rational thought. For instance, the example of Holland was known, a country which had freed itself from the Spanish kings just as Ukraine had freed itself from the Polish kings.

We can say with assurance that if, after the separation from Poland, Ukraine had become an independent principality or kingdom, or even a Cossack republic, in time the predominance of the ruling classes over the common people nonetheless would have increased, as was the case everywhere. But without foreign pressure from Moscow, the Ukrainian noble would hardly have been able to destroy the traditional popular freedoms in the course of a hundred years, for only 130 years after the Articles the fall of the absolute monarchy in France was universally known.

The traditional Ukrainian liberties reaffirmed under Khmelnytsky were destroyed by the old-fashioned oppressive regimes of the countries to which the fate of Ukraine was linked: aristocratic Poland and autocratic tsarist Russia. In the latter, Ukraine encountered not only a way of life pat-

terned by the nobles, as was the case in Poland, but also an absolutist autocracy not much better than that which existed in Turkey.

We cannot say that the Muscovite or Great Russian people is incapable of being free. In earlier times, free cities existed in the north as they did in Kievan Rus', later Ukraine. It is unimportant in this connection whether the original inhabitants of Pskov and Novgorod were Ukrainian colonists or not. In any case, in the fourteenth century, when these great city-republics were at the height of their power, they were already Great Russian. The Don and Ural Cossacks, whose governments were almost the same as that of the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks, were also Great Russian.

The Great Russians have retained an old custom whereby the land is owned by the villages and periodically redivided. This custom has probably continued because Russian territory is very extensive, and there has been plenty of land for everyone. Also, although the Great Russians are as ancient as other European nations, all the settlements are of recent origin, for the people were always obliged to move from one place to another in their flight from the Tatars, the Poles, or their own government. In every instance it was a community which occupied the new land, cut down the forests, and so on. Few people are as capable in organizing cooperatives with elected leaders as are the Russians. However, in Muscovy such democratic ways have persisted only at the local level, in the small villages, settlements, and cooperatives. In national affairs, in matters involving the country as a whole, Russia has long been in the hands of the absolute tsars and the bureaucracy. At the lowest level, in the villages, Muscovy is still a land in which the people have retained the old art of self-government. At the top, as a state, Russia is as old as France, for example. The dynasty of the dukes and tsars of Muscovy continued uninterrupted for a long period, and it was indigenous, not Lithuanian or Polish as in our country. The church hierarchy too was indigenous, and it taught the people to obey the tsars as the anointed of the Lord. Moreover, at first the Tatars supported the dukes of Moscow, and after they had rebelled against the Tatars, the people's homage only increased and the admonitions of the priests to obey grew more intense. The Great Russian people continued to spread out over its immense land, in which each village was so far from the next that unity was preserved only by the idea of Little Mother Moscow and Little Father Tsar. The Great Russian people forgot that for all the people of Russia, including the Great Russians, Moscow was and is not a heart but a spider.

Moscow's history, like that of France from the twelfth century to the eighteenth, is the story of an increase in the power of the monarch over the

traditional communal liberties, and in that of the centralized appointed bureaucracy over elected bodies. We thus have the development of a strange and not always understood aspect of government and national life in Russia: in the villages, at the local level, where tsarist bureaucrats did not dominate, we have self-rule and a community spirit similar to that of the cantons of Switzerland; above the village level we have tsarist absolutism and arbitrary bureaucracy of a type never seen in Europe, not even in the days when the kings and bureaucrats were at their mightiest, under Louis XIV of France and the Fredericks of Prussia. There is another great difference between Muscovy and France or any other Western European country. In Europe the pursuit of knowledge helped keep royal absolutism at bay by encouraging people to investigate what was of value in other regimes. Muscovy, far from the countries of old civilization, in the midst of forests and steppes, remained at a semi-barbarous stage, its learning limited to ecclesiastical literature. In these volumes the Russian people read not about the republics of Greece and Rome but about biblical kingdoms. They saw the examples not of the Italian city-republics or of England, Holland, and Switzerland, but of the khanates of the Kazan and Astrakhan Tatars.

Throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the kings got stronger and tried to destroy the old self-government in their lands, but nowhere was there as mad a murderer as Ivan IV. While the European kings were curtailing the elective offices of the aristocracy, they were at least reducing serfdom among the common people. The tsars of Russia legalized serfdom in their country at a time when it was disappearing in Europe ...

It is this sort of an empire that our Ukraine joined in 1654, when it was a free and reborn land. It is true that some seeds of evil, such as the beginnings of serfdom, were present, and that the idea of freedom had not been rooted deeply enough by education to show the people how to remain free.

No wonder that, during the years when Ukraine was united to Muscovy, with its autocratic tsar and legal serfdom and non-existent education, Russian despotism gradually brought about the destruction of Ukraine's freedom. Moscow's boyars helped reintroduce serfdom in Ukraine, while education and enlightenment were halted, all the more since the few educated Ukrainians were scattered over the whole of the new empire. A wall of tsarist and bureaucratic despotism was erected to prevent the free political ideas then current in Europe, which Ukraine had always welcomed, from penetrating. Even if the Ukrainian people had been able to stage an uprising against the increasing enslavement of their own country, they

would have met with opposition not only from those among their compatriots who benefited from serfdom, but also from the Russian government, its army, and even the Russian people, who regarded disobedience to 'our Tsar' as treason on the part of the Ukrainians.

Instead of seeing the good that was inherent in the Ukrainian Cossack way of life being encouraged, we see it trampled on by the Russian tsars from the days of Khmelnytsky to Catherine II. The evil was cunningly nourished.

circa 1878

## Polish Policy towards Rus' (excerpts)

### STEPAN KACHALA

*Stepan Kachala (1815–88) was a Galician priest and political activist. He represented the Ruthenians at the Slavic Congress in Prague (1848) and was a member of the Austrian parliament. In 1879 he published, at his own expense, a book in Polish, *Politika Polaków względem Rusi* (Poland's Policy towards Rus'), from which the following excerpts are taken. The book was devoted to a review of the historical relations between Ukraine and Poland. Although highly critical of Poland, Kachala was pleading for Ukrainian-Polish understanding.*

#### 1. Introduction

Whenever an important issue comes up before us, two opposing camps face each other: on the one side the Poles, on the other the Ruthenians.

To be sure, this happens not only with us but in every land and parliament of the Austrian crown. If it is sad that the Germans cannot live in peace with the Slavs, it is much sadder that in Galicia two peoples of Slavic origin not only quarrel in parliament but bring their disputes before the highest state councils and ask the world to be their judge.

It is difficult to approve of such a procedure. We see discord and we complain, but has anyone asked impartially, what are the roots of this evil? No, even today we do not ask what the results of this discord will be, or what its sources are. No one wants to know the real sources.

The sources for our discord are not new. They originate in old policies which have not changed to this day. One must search for them in history. It is obvious that the Polish-Ruthenian question has not been clarified, even though both Ruthenians and Poles have written about it.



The Poles trace the Ruthenian question in Galicia to 1848, as if it did not exist before. They claim that it arose as a result of social conditions and German or Russian agitation, which may seem possible but is basically false. Whatever has been written on the question by the Polish side has aimed to persuade the Ruthenians that they are really Poles and should remain so. It is not necessary to prove that such arguments are tendentious and betray little knowledge of Polish history. Indeed, one can say that we know the history of Greece and Rome better than the history of Poland and Rus'. There is nothing remarkable about this. After the fall of Poland many pointed out the weaknesses which had brought about the country's downfall, and some Poles tried to search in their history only for bright spots, and to cover up the weaknesses. But the wound is no less dangerous if concealed. The danger is no smaller if we shut our eyes to it. Yet no one has stopped to analyse these questions ...

Thus we were taught not to face the truth but to live in a pleasant atmosphere of falsehood arising from a glorification of the past. In this way the weaknesses which brought about the Polish collapse have been maintained. The time has come to say that the Poles have neither learned nor forgotten anything. Today they continue to colour their past, write inspired apologies for it, proclaim the glories of the Union of Lublin,<sup>1</sup> Polish tolerance, the constitution of 3 May, and so on ...

I do not intend to write about bitter truth in a moment of misfortune for Poland, but it is well known that a true friend does not countenance faults but reveals them without rancour or hatred ... I am forced to do so because the policy of our [Polish] friends has not changed. Should we fight for ever to please our enemies, and to our own disadvantage? I have already spoken to the Ruthenians; now it is time to speak a few words of truth to the Poles. For the moment I wish to avoid sensitive issues, for they are beside the point. I care about the Polish policy towards us and its consequences. Is it not time to come to a mutual understanding in our land? *Clara pacta faciunt claros amicos*. The old illness requires radical medicine, and a bitter pill is a hundred times better than sweet poison. When I took up this pen, it was not in order to open old wounds or to push someone over a precipice, but to warn all wanderers of the precipice and to avoid it as much as possible ...

I am writing this in Polish so that the Poles can be persuaded to look for the sources of evil and to understand the Ruthenian point of view ...

1 The treaty of Lublin (1569) created the union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Unwillingly, perhaps, we must turn to the past because only then shall we understand what has happened and what is happening. One must pay special attention to the different histories of Rus' and of Poland.

...

## 2. [Kachala's analysis of Khmelnytsky's war against the Poles]

...

None of the uprisings before Khmelnytsky succeeded because the Cossacks, putting aside the interests of the people, strove only to secure their own rights. Having realized this, and in order to succeed, Khmelnytsky issued a proclamation calling upon the entire Ruthenian people to rise against Poland, promising to extend the Cossacks' rights to everyone and to liberate the people from heavy bondage. ... In the struggles of the people against the [Polish] *szlachta* not only the poor and the riff-raff sided with the Cossacks; well-to-do peasants and burghers joined them, too. And if there were many ragged ones who followed the Cossacks, whose fault was it that they were so numerous in Rus', and that hundreds of them welcomed the Cossacks and supported Khmelnytsky, from the Dnieper rapids to the Vistula? Moreover, as we know from the testimony of Stanisław Radziwiłł, when Khmelnytsky reached Zamość, the Catholic folk around Warsaw were ready to join him. If even one Cossack regiment had reached Warsaw, all the mighty lords would have run away from it ...

What did Khmelnytsky ask for? Only that the Cossack rights and the freedom of the [Orthodox] faith be guaranteed. The [Polish] King attempted to persuade the Senate not to spill more blood, but in vain. Seeing no positive response, Khmelnytsky secretly asked Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich for protection.

Today's Polish moralists castigate the Cossacks, as a free and knightly people, for not becoming members of the *szlachta*. The idea of the *szlachta* was foreign to the Cossacks and to the masses of the [Ukrainian] people. It is true that later some Cossacks did become members, but that marked the beginning of the decline of the Cossacks.

Similarly, the Polish moralists, defending the landlords, point to a decline of civilization brought on by the Cossack uprisings. It is true that Polish civilization suffered, but that civilization did not care for the economic and cultural needs of the masses, only for the development of one class at the expense of the others, and the consequence was the demoralization of all society. Without prejudice we ask: What kind of civilization was it, which offered property, power, and freedom to some while depriving

others? Polish cultural life was such that many fled into the steppes or across the Dnieper, leaving Ukraine deserted. Polish culture was inseparable from the enslavement of the people. Serfdom was the ideal of the [Polish] cultural life which the lords introduced in Ukraine.

In the meantime Khmelnytsky divided his army into several parts and crossed the whole of Little Russia westward from Novhorod Siversky, clearing the country of the Poles and Jews. It was then, in 1648, that King Władysław IV died. After King Władysław's death Khmelnytsky undertook nothing against Poland until the election of a new king, and was ready equally for war or for peace. The Polish government, however, could make no useful offer to the Cossacks that would also have benefited Poland. The convoked Sejm made a proposal to Khmelnytsky so humiliating it was as though the Poles had defeated him. At the same time the Polish army was sent against the Cossacks and was defeated at Pylavtsi, leaving the field to Khmelnytsky's forces. At that point Khmelnytsky could have overrun the whole of Poland, and the Poles wondered why for three weeks he was inactive. Some called it a miracle; others attributed it to the blindness of the hetman. But Khmelnytsky was waiting for the election of a new king. He was no rebel and had no thought of conquering Poland. He defended what is dearest to men: ancestral life and faith. At the same time he hoped that having won his rights he would be able to maintain the union with Poland.

The newly elected King Jan Kazimierz sent envoys to Khmelnytsky with an offer of peace. In Pereiaslav the Cossack leader spoke thus to Adam Kisiel: 'All sorts of people can live in Ukraine, even magnates and lords, and own land as long as they are subject to law and have renounced their ancestral privileges.' Khmelnytsky spoke of the new king with respect but reprimanded the Polish landlords and clergy for oppressing the Cossacks. In the end he made a peace proposal to the Poles with the following principal points:

- 1 The return of all privileges to the Cossacks;
  - 2 The expulsion from Ukraine of Jesuits and Jews;
  - 3 The abolition of the Union [of Brest];<sup>2</sup>
  - 4 The establishment of a regular complement of 40,000 Cossacks;
  - 5 The guarantee of a seat for the Kievan Orthodox Metropolitan in the [Polish] Senate;
- 2 The attempted union of Catholic and Orthodox churches at a church council at Brest in 1596 failed and resulted in even greater disharmony, with the separation of the Uniate or Greek Catholic church from the Orthodox.

- 6 The institution of a requirement that all officers and dignitaries in Rus' be Orthodox.

It is clear from these points that Khmelnytsky was not seeking personal retribution. Nevertheless, the Polish senators refused to listen to the proposals, and the Polish army was sent against Khmelnytsky. At the battle of Zboriv the Cossacks routed the Poles and could have captured the King. Yet Khmelnytsky ordered, 'Do not touch the royal person.' The King concluded a peace on the aforementioned conditions, with an added condition that the Polish army could not be quartered on lands inhabited by the Cossacks.

## The Problem of Denationalization (excerpt)

OLEKSANDER POTEBNIA

*Oleksander Potebnia (1835-91), a Ukrainian linguist of world reputation, was a professor at Kharkiv University who wrote in Russian. His major works dealt with the philosophy of language, and his theories resulted in the formation of the Kharkiv school of poetics and had a strong influence on Ukrainian and Russian symbolists. A staunch though hidden Ukrainian patriot, Potebnia occasionally wrote on the Ukrainian language and its status in Russia. A believer in the 'uniqueness of each language,' he defended the Ukrainian language with views on language and nationality that have been characterized by George Y. Shevelov as 'romantic.'*

The mistake consists in identifying nationality only with its content. In fact, nationality is real because of its relation to the past. But as an established totality of means for acting upon new trends, it is operative to the degree that a complete though gradual renunciation of its former content is truly conceivable. Language, in this context, is not so much one of the elements of nationality as its most perfect image. Just as it is unthinkable to have a point of view which would reflect all sides of a subject, just as it is impossible to express in a word a concept that would exclude other concepts, so is it impossible to have an all-embracing nationality which is indisputably the best. If the unification of mankind in language and in nationality were possible, it would be disastrous for human thought, just as would the replacement of many senses by one, even if the one were not touch but sight. Other people are necessary for the existence of man. Other nationalities are necessary for one nationality. Consistent nationalism means internationalism. Just as infinite numbers are expressed by a few signs, just as there is no language or dialect unable to express varied and

profound thoughts, which, however, may never be equal to what is known, so every nationality, even if less developed, is a priori capable of endless, unilateral development.

This is not to argue, quite wrongly, that every nationality must inevitably complete the full course of its development. There is a *memento mori* for the victors and encouragement for the vanquished, as long as they are still breathing; 'he who is wounded is of two minds, but he who is killed already sleeps.'

There are two kinds of nationalists: those who swallow – A – and those who are swallowed – B. Morality and truth are more on the side of the latter. The former, for the most part, may be characterized by the saying 'Perhaps you, *moskal*, are a good man, but in theory you are a thief.' The former are carried along by the consciousness of their superiority; they think their path to the ideal of human development is better. He who doesn't want to go where they drive is sinning against Providence, against the rationale of history. They are sufficiently flattered to consider success a measure of worth. But from the viewpoint of B it is possible to argue that weeds choke grass and wheat:

The top of the tallest tree withers,  
God gives no fortune to the brightest child.<sup>1</sup>

There is no truth in anyone,  
Only in God alone!<sup>2</sup>

Group A reproaches group B with preferring 'a provincial jargon' to the language of the educated, ruling classes, and with willingly narrowing the horizon of its thought, thereby depriving the world market of its intellectual products. Here an admonition is directed predominantly to those who know the language intimately, and the judge in this emotional matter is a stranger to whom it can be said, 'Don't bother.' The one who really has something to say (*wenn einem ernst ist was zu sagen* – Goethe) is the one who, better than anyone else, will choose a word handier to him, if only he is not disturbed. And it works out not badly. The least that can be said positively, referring to the testimony of thinkers and artists themselves, is that among them, precisely because they are interested in the birth of their thought, there are no foolish enthusiasts for speaking in the argot of ped-

1 These lines are from Ukrainian songs quoted by Iakiv Holovatsky, whose work is being reviewed here by Potebnia.

2 Potebnia here quotes Kostomarov.

lars or in a language deliberately distorted so as to be comprehensible only to those who belong to the speaking group; that many thoughts and images far from empty of general significance would not have been born without those 'provincial jargons.' As far as exporting to the world market is concerned, we know that in its presence one's own people can swell up from hunger, and the elimination of that hunger is the best means of establishing normal external trade.

Group A reproaches group B, as the leaders (for the most part, *in potentia*) of the lowest classes, for wanting to stupefy the common people by denying them the use of the language of the ruling classes, and for wanting, but being unable, to subvert the people in response to the preventive measures taken by the government, and also in response to the good sense of the people, for whom 'the provincial jargon in school and in print is repugnant.' But this is blaming someone else for their own fault, for consistent nationalism does not want power supported by coercion and therefore has no interest in preserving present ignorance and poverty, in keeping the people from the sources of knowledge. It desires only the observance of the fundamental pedagogic rule: not to ignore the means available to the pupils but to use these means and to develop them.

In general, one can say that denationalization equals *bad education*, leads to moral sickness. It leads to an incomplete use of the available means of perceiving, mastering, and exerting influence; to the weakening of the energy of thought; to the abomination of desolation in place of the ousted but irreplaceable forms of consciousness; to the weakening of contact between the generations growing up and those already grown, a contact replaced only by a weak link with strangers; to the disorganization of society, to immorality, and to degeneracy. Even when the oppressors are fairly close to the oppressed and the latter are not deprived forcibly of property and do not become slaves, denationalization leads all the same to economic and intellectual dependence and becomes a source of suffering. For a school in a foreign language, whether simply a school or a boot camp or a school of life, is bound to make of the consciousness of the pupils a kind of palimpsest, by virtue of which, all other conditions being equal, its pupils will stand out from those who did not have to forget their past and could just learn, that is, add school bits of knowledge and other things to the store acquired before they began school and outside of it. It is well known how deleterious for future success is a depression aroused by the consciousness, even if imaginary, of the impossibility of advancing from the last rows of seats. For a people who are being denationalized, intellectual and moral subjection alone creates a series of unfavourable conditions of existence ...

Not a principal but a quantitative difference exists between the relations of nations distant from each other (Germans and Slavs) and the relations between Slavs and Russians. Accordingly, one can quote here one theoretician from group A about the Russian language: 'There are thousands of dialects and they cannot all become literary languages. One of them emerged victorious from the "*struggle for survival*"; the others support and enrich it, while using it for their own formation. So it was everywhere; so it was in our country until recently' (Budilovich).<sup>3</sup> This seems to me altogether unclear. If the 'provincial jargons,' as this scholar calls them, should 'support and enrich,' then they must live and develop, which today is impossible without schools and literature. In this case one must not talk of a struggle for survival but turn instead to the well-known formula: 'The Russian language takes its power and wealth from folk dialects ... The greatness of the whole depends on the right *development* of the parts' (Metlynsky).<sup>4</sup> And if one talks of the struggle for survival itself and of the victory of one side, then one must speak of the defeat of the other side and of how badly the vanquished are treated, as purely ethnographic material. If one seeks to justify this state of affairs by saying that it is what has happened, then one could justify cannibalism.

The more or less slavish condition of the swallowed nationality is likely to end sometime. Some day the vanquished are likely to learn the language of the victors. But in Humboldt's words, which so far, to my knowledge, have not been disproved, 'no people can enliven and enrich a foreign language with its own spirit without changing that language into another.' A nationality swallowed by another, after losing its strength, nonetheless finally brings about the demise of the other. The Russian literary language of today can preserve its relative unity only as long as it remains the organ of an insignificant minority. At the moment it becomes truly common-Russian and, even more, common-Slavic, it will split into dialects.<sup>5</sup> So according to this view there is no way out of the circle of mutual influence, and the whole question is whether the national forces will be preserved by it, or wasted for unattainable goals ...

1880

3 Anton Budilovich (1846–1908) was a Russian linguist who advocated the use of Russian by all Slavs.

4 Amvrosii Metlynsky (1814–70) was a Ukrainian poet and ethnographer.

5 That is what happened to the language of liturgical books. Until recently, 'for ever and ever' (*i v veki vekov*) was read in south Russian churches as *i vo viky vikou*, and differently in Great Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian. [Author's note]



# Draft Constitution for the Ukrainian Society in the Free Union

MYKHAILO DRAHOMANOV

## Part I: The Aims of the Society

I. A Society, in the Free Union, should be formed on Ukrainian territory to work for the political, economic, and cultural emancipation and progress of the Ukrainian people and of the other races living among them in settlements.

*Note.* Because the Ukrainian people live in various States – Russia, Austria (in Galicia and Bukovyna), and Hungary (in the eastern Comitats) – and under varying political conditions (even though under significantly similar social and cultural conditions), different methods should be employed in each of these. For this reason, separate political societies – completely independent rather than branches of a single organization – should be formed in each of the above areas. The very nature of things would cause these societies to agree on a certain degree of solidarity.

The present draft, worked out with the help of Ukrainians from Russia, has Russian Ukraine almost exclusively in mind.

II. The Ukrainian Society in the Free Union should cooperate with similar societies among other peoples whose interests are similar to those of the Ukrainian people.

*Note.* In order to facilitate such cooperation, the Free Union should allow persons of various nationalities to become members, should found its own chapters in Ukrainian settlements in other lands, and should help form similar societies among peoples with related interests.

III. The Free Union's most important task in Russia at present and in the near future should be to reorganize the State on the basis of *political freedom* on approximately the following principles:

1. Political freedom should be construed as:

A. The rights of man and citizen:

(a) Immunity of the person from degrading punishments and capital punishment.

(b) Immunity of the person and home from the police if they have no warrant from the court.

*Note 1.* A person apprehended *flagrante delicto* can be arrested by anyone, but must be turned over to the judiciary authorities immediately.

*Note 2.* No one should be tried by a special court. Criminal courts, except for magistrates courts, should provide trial by jury.

(c) Freedom of residence and occupation.

(d) Inviolability of private correspondence and telegrams.

(e) Inviolability of nationality (recognition of the native languages in private and public life).

(f) Freedom of conscience (belief and disbelief) and of any public religious services and rituals which do not offend the public sense of decency.

*Note.* This freedom implies the abolition of the State church and the transformation of all ecclesiastical institutions into private organizations, to be maintained solely by voluntary contributors and administered according to their wishes, without any aid or interference by public authorities.

(g) Freedom of speech, the press, the theatre, and education.

(h) Freedom of assembly, petition, and manifestation (through posters, banners, processions, etc.), provided public order and security are not disturbed or threatened.

(i) Freedom to form societies and associations.

(j) The right to bear arms and hold military exercises provided public order and security are not disturbed or threatened.

(k) The right to take action in civil or criminal courts against officials and public institutions for illegal infringement of the rights of the individual.

(l) The right to resist illegal acts by officials.

(m) The equality of all in civic rights and duties.

*Note 1* to section A. The rights of man and citizen may not be abrogated or restricted by any law or decree, except for restrictions

legally imposed in time of war. Even in such circumstances no person who is not in the army may be tried by a military or any other special court.

*Note 2* to section A. The preservation of the above rights is the responsibility of local justices of the peace, who should be authorized, under their own responsibility, to request the cooperation of nearby troops, whose duty it is to give such help.

B. Self-Government:

(a) Local:

Communal (village and town);

*Volost* [group of villages];

*Uyezd* [district]; and

Regional.<sup>1</sup>

(b) State

2. This self-government should be vested in *meetings* or in elected *assemblies*, to which all officials should be responsible, except judges, whose status should be specially defined.

*Note.* In general the present judicial system, according to the statutes of Nov. 20, 1864, can be considered satisfactory.

3. All persons 21 years of age and over should have the right to vote and to be elected to various representative assemblies and to communal, *volost* and district offices. However, only persons 25 years of age and over should have the right to be elected to regional and state assemblies or offices.

*Note 1.* The laws on electoral colleges and districts should be such that those elected would represent not only the inhabitants of all the localities, but also, as far as possible, all types of occupations, and minorities as well as majorities.

*Note 2.* Voters should have the right to give mandates to their delegates.

4. Village affairs should be administered by the *village meeting* and by the *executive committee* and *chairman* elected by it.

5. In cities and towns, *volosti* [groups of villages], districts, and regions, *councils* should be created to administer public affairs. These councils

<sup>1</sup> The regions into which the Russian Empire should be divided, with geographic, economic, and ethnographic conditions *all* taken into consideration, are more or less as follows: the Northern, Lake, and Baltic regions, Lithuania, Poland, Belorussia, Polissia, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, Moscow, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan, Urals, Saratov, Caucasia, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, Cossack lands (Don, Kuban, and Terek), and Central Asia. [Author's note]

should be elected on the basis of special laws on electoral colleges and electoral districts, in accordance with III. 3. The councils will elect *Executive committees*.

6. Village meetings, as well as city, *volost*, district, and regional councils, should have the right to delegate the execution of their decisions not only to the chairmen and executive committees, but also to special individuals or committees.

7. Village meetings, as well as city, *volost*, district, and regional councils, should have the right to charge their executive committees with taking action in civil or criminal courts against any officials who commit illegal acts.

8. In their territories the communal, *volost*, and district authorities described in paragraphs 4 and 5 should administer the local public economy (public property, markets, fairs, etc.), public works (means of communication, public buildings, post offices, etc.), welfare (sanitation, food supply, charity, insurance, epizootic control, etc.), and public elementary education as well as secondary education if possible.

9. The regional councils, executive committees, and other bodies appointed by them should: legislate for and administer the regional public economy, public works, and welfare where they are beyond the means of a single district; supervise all economic activity in the region (agriculture, mining, forestry, crafts, industry, etc.); and take measures for the conservation and proper exploitation of the region's natural resources. They should also take measures for safeguarding and increasing the wealth of the inhabitants of the region, supervise public education in the region, and administer secondary schools maintained at the expense of the region, as well as higher educational and learned institutions (academies, etc.).

10. On all matters within their competence, village meetings, as well as *volost*, city, district, and regional councils, should have the right to issue binding decrees (not contrary to the laws and common interests of the State union), to fix taxes in order to meet public requirements in their competence, and to enter into relationships and agreements with similar institutions within the State in order to satisfy their common needs.

*Note 1* to paragraphs 4–10. The details of the relationships among the institutions listed above, with their varying degrees of competence, should be determined by special statutes. It is essential, however, that these statutes should provide, in so far as is possible, that institutions with wider competence should not become superior to those with more limited competence, but that each should have a maximum of independence in its own field, particularly in matters financed by it.

The supervision of education referred to should consist of research and advice rather than command.

*Note 2* to paragraphs 4–10. Similarly, the relationship between representatives of the government of the whole State (ministers and regional governors) and agencies of local self-government should be determined by special statutes. In order that local self-government be real, it is essential that the representatives of the State be able to override only such decrees and acts by the agencies of local self-government as are contrary to the fundamental laws and common interests of the State union, and that disagreements arising in this manner be settled by the Senate (Supreme Court). The State official in question should be legally responsible for overriding these decrees and acts.

11. The police in the cities, districts, and their subdivisions should be under the jurisdiction of the respective councils. Local police officials should be responsible to these regardless of the manner of their appointment.

12. In addition to the functions in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11, the local elected authorities should control the assessment and allocation of direct State taxes. The regional councils should also conduct a preliminary study of all drafts of financial laws for the State as a whole and should express their opinions on these to the state legislatures. They should also legislate on local affairs: the application of electoral laws, territorial divisions, codifications of customary law, etc.

13. Affairs concerning the entire Russian State union and the legislation of the State as a whole should be in the hands of two councils:

A. The State Council, whose members should be chosen by electoral colleges in the electoral districts, according to a special law on the basis of paragraph 3, and

B. The Union Council, whose members should be elected by the regional councils.

*Note.* The regional councils should give mandates to their representatives in the Union Council and should have the right to replace these representatives at any time.

14. Both these councils should appoint an interim committee to act while they are not in session.

15. Ministers, appointed by the Chief of State, should be responsible to both councils, which should also have the right to impeach them.

16. In addition to its role in the legislation and administration of the whole State, the Union Council, as the representative of the regions, should in particular manage the State property, a resource common to all the

regions. The Union Council should administer these resources for the common good, on the basis of laws enacted jointly with the State Council, after consultation with the district and regional councils. The latter should inform the Union Council of the need to be served by the use of aforementioned resources.

17. All the councils should be required to convene at definite periods for regular sessions. Special sessions of these councils may, however, be convened by the respective executive committees and the interim committee or at the request of one-third of the council members. In the event of war or regional rebellion, the State and Union Councils should convene automatically if not convened by either the Chief of State or the interim committee. They should remain in session until they themselves decide on a recess.

18. The Chief of State can, with the consent of the Union Council, dissolve the State Council. In such a case, however, the Union Council will also be dissolved, and the proclamation to this effect should also set the date for the election of new members to these councils. The publication of this proclamation should be accompanied by the convening of the regional councils, which should remain in session until the convening of the new Councils of the whole State.

19. In the event of usurpation of State power, the regional councils should meet on their own initiative and should take measures to restore law and order. In such an event the troops stationed in the regions should obey the regional councils.

20. In the case of impeachment, a High Court, composed of members of the criminal department of the Senate (Supreme Court) and the Union Council, should meet to try ministers for abuse of office and to try members of the State and Union Councils for treason.

21. The Chief of State should appoint Senators (Supreme Court Justices) for life terms, selecting them from candidates recommended by the Union Council. These candidates must have an advanced degree in law and should previously have served in the courts or as representatives to the regional or State Council.

22. The district and regional councils, as well as the Chief of State, should have the right to challenge the constitutionality of the laws passed by the State and Union Councils. Such cases should be decided by the Senate in a joint session of all departments.

23. The Constitution of the State should not be amended without the approval of two-thirds of the State and Union Councils and without ratification by the State Assembly.

24. The State Assembly should be composed of all the members of the

State and Union Councils, with the addition of sufficient special deputies, elected by the regional councils, that the number of special deputies plus members of the Union Council be equal to the number of members of the State Council.

25. It should be the duty of the Chief of State to make public the laws passed by the State legislatures, Senate decisions annulling them, and the decrees of the State Assembly; to see to the execution of these laws and decisions; and to prosecute violations.

*Note.* The Chief of State may be a hereditary Emperor or an elected President of the All-Russian State Union elected for a fixed term. In the first case the ministers should be responsible for his actions as indicated in paragraphs 15 and 20, while in the second case he himself should be responsible according to these paragraphs.

IV. The most important of the principles listed above for the political reorganization of Russia are (1) the rights of man and citizen and (2) local self-government. Any attempt to govern all Russia through a central representative assembly without the recognition and safeguarding of these rights and without local self-government must be considered as giving as little protection to the cause of freedom in general and to the interests of Ukraine in particular as does the present organization of the Russian Empire.

V. After all or the most important parts of this plan or a similar one for the political reorganization of Russia are fulfilled, members of the Free Union must strive to alleviate the social injustices now oppressing the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine and to guarantee *each* of these inhabitants a means of livelihood and opportunities for development. With this in mind, members of the Free Union should, acting in freedom through agencies of self-government, take all steps toward:

1. Alleviating the burdens of military duty until such time as international relations make it possible to replace the standing army with temporarily recruited militias.

*Note.* One way of alleviating the burden of military duty would be to reduce the size of the State army and the period of service in it; create regional militias; and divide military duty between the State army and these regional militias.

2. Changing all taxes into direct, graduated income taxes.

*Note.* It is obvious that the present taxes and levies, such as the poll tax, identity document tax, excise taxes, etc., are a crying injustice and

should be either abolished or completely revised at the first opportunity.

3. Making elementary, secondary and higher education accessible to all. Elementary education should be free for children from poor families. In addition there should be partial, or if necessary, complete allowances from public funds to cover the living expenses of the school child. More capable students should receive similar help in attending secondary schools and universities.

4. Establishing orphanages, old people's homes and homes for the care of the sick and crippled at public expense; and establishing public pension funds for disablement and old age benefits.

5. Limiting the number of working hours per day, especially of women and children, to the amount compatible with health and physical and mental development.

*Note.* Factory work by children under 14 years of age should be unconditionally prohibited.

6. Establishing boards to mediate between employers and workers. These should be chosen to represent both parties.

7. Improving workers' housing, reducing their rent and facilitating the purchasing of houses by workers' families and by workers' cooperatives.

8. Providing every peasant, in so far as is possible, with a share in the use or ownership of land or forests, through the allocation of State lands, emigration to unoccupied territory, facilitation of the purchase of small holdings through public credits and grants, public purchase of great private estates in land or forests, etc.

*Note 1.* The contracts, based on the Peasant Statutes of Feb. 19, 1861, which deprived the peasants of their due share of the land or gave them the so-called one-fourth share, should be re-examined and provision made for compulsory sale to the peasants if necessary.

*Note 2.* In localities where the purchase agreements reached after 1861 impose payments on the peasants on the basis of overvalued land, general State funds, equal to the amount of overpayment, should be used to supplement the special peasant tax funds.

9. Increasing the income from the land and the earnings of the workers through the organization of public supply stores and through placing contracts for public supplies directly with the farmers and workers. These contracts should be administered by public (preferably communal) institutions.

10. Supporting and developing communal and cooperative ownership or leasing of land, and supporting and developing all other cooperatives.



11. Repurchasing of mines, water resources, forests, railways, etc., as non-profit public utilities by the State, the regions, districts, *volosti* [groups of villages] or communes, using the cooperative method of production and operation wherever possible.

VI. The economic measures outlined above constitute the minimum program for members of the Free Union after the foundation of political freedom has been established in Russia. Following the establishment of political freedom, members who consider these measures insufficient can honourably leave the Free Union. They can then act according to their own judgment.

**Conclusion.** The aims of the Ukrainian Society in the Free Union can be summed up as follows:

1. General civic aims:

(a) *The rights of man and citizen – the indispensable condition for personal dignity and development.*

(b) *Self-government – the basis for progress toward social justice.*

2. Specific national aim:

*Political freedom – as a means for the return of the Ukrainian nation to the family of civilized peoples.*

## Part II: The Society's Means of Action

**Introductory note.** In every social question the issue of means is subsequent to that of ends. Means depend on constantly changing circumstances, and hence it is impossible and unnecessary to determine them fully in advance. The most important thing in every political society is to gather together as many members as possible who are clearly aware of their goal. These members will then find the most expedient means of attaining their goal. Therefore the following recommendations make no claim to completeness; they are merely an attempt to indicate certain methods, primarily for disseminating the fundamental ideas of the Free Union among various strata of the population.

I. To achieve the aims set forth in the first part of the *Draft Constitution*, it is essential to found throughout Ukraine chapters of the Free Union<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Federal organizations are what Drahomanov means.

composed of adults having, as far as possible, definite occupations and representing all present classes of the population.

*Note.* It is clear from what has been said that members of the Free Union should refrain from inciting young people to political struggle before they are prepared for it and to acts which might prevent them from being conscious and influential political figures in due time when they have obtained general and professional training.

II. It should be the unconditional duty of members of the Free Union, in addition to all other duties they assume under the present statutes, to work to improve their intellectual and ethical standards, and to strive to occupy as prominent a place as possible in all causes benefiting society.

*Note.* Familiarity with the political, social, and cultural life of the Western European peoples, as well as the most detailed knowledge of their native land, should be recommended as particularly desirable for members of the Free Union.

III. All Free Union activity should be in accord with the aims outlined above, in detail and in spirit. They should also be in accord with the general rules of morality.

*Note 1.* All theft and public fraud should be strictly unacceptable to members of the Free Union.

*Note 2.* Murder (an act contrary to the fundamental rights of man and citizen) should never be the aim either of the Free Union or of any of its chapters. If, however, a member of the Free Union commits a political murder, in self-defence or as a result of incitement by extreme injustices on the part of the government and its servants, he must assume full personal responsibility for it.<sup>3</sup>

IV. Never losing sight of their principal goals – the uniting of all inhabitants of Ukraine in action for the freedom and welfare of their native land, as well as the union of all present classes of the population of Ukraine in a single whole, all parts of which enjoy equal rights – members of the Free Union should also seek out in every locality and in every class, ways of life, traditions, and aspirations which might serve as a natural basis for introducing the aspirations of the Union; i.e.:

3 'Theft' and 'murder' here refer to political 'expropriation' and to assassination by terrorists.

1. Members of the Free Union should seek out in various localities and classes of the population of Ukraine recollections of former freedom and equality such as, for example, the self-government of the *povits* [districts] under the Lithuanian Law, the self-government of the cities under the Magdeburg Law, the secular and ecclesiastical self-government of the villages and *volosti* [groups of villages], the brotherhoods [lay orders], Cossack self-government [in the hundreds, regiments, and the entire Hetmanate], the congresses of the various estates during the Hetmanate, the Sich, and the autonomous territory of the Zaporozhian Host, etc. They should strengthen these traditions and relate them to present-day concepts of liberty and equality among civilized peoples.

2. Inasmuch as even the imperial Russian laws (e.g., the 1787 Patent of Nobility) protected noblemen from deprivation of their liberty and property without due process of law and stipulated that noblemen had the right to petition the crown concerning their needs and privileges, members of the Free Union who are nobles should rouse their class to demand the abolition of such things as exile without trial and the emergency statutes on security, and also to demand general reorganization of the political structure of Russia. In addition, Ukrainian nobles who are members of the Free Union should call the attention of their peers to the recent popular origin of the Ukrainian nobility from the originally elective Cossack elders. They should point out that the seizure of the people's land by the elders was unjust in the extreme and that this seizure confers an even greater moral obligation upon the Ukrainian noblemen to speak out against autocracy and to redeem themselves before the common people for the injustices done them.

3. Members of the Free Union who come from the classes of artisans and from the peasantry, as well as all other members, should, in their dealings with these classes, focus and give direction to their dissatisfaction with their present situation. At the same time, they should spread the realization that the tsarist bureaucratic autocracy is unable to provide for the material welfare of the working classes, even if the tsar and the officials really desired to do so. In addition, members of the Free Union should spread the awareness that political freedom would bring advantages for the workers, even if present economic relationships were not to change immediately. They should also prove that political freedom is necessary to enable the working classes to begin to change these relationships themselves.

4. Working among the peasants and townspeople, members of the Free Union should devote special attention to the evangelical brotherhoods (the so-called *Stundists*, *Molokans*, Men of God, etc.), seeking to explain to

them the relationship between freedom of conscience and political freedoms and striving to foster their inclination to free thinking, to weaken their mysticism, to channel the idea of religious brotherhood toward that of civic and economic solidarity, and to extend the idea of such solidarity beyond denominational limits.

*Note.* The best means for this last could be the familiarizing of our sectarians with the related development of Protestant sects and the cooperative movement in Western Europe, particularly in Holland and Great Britain, from the Anabaptists and Socinians (whose teaching reached Ukraine in the 16th and 17th centuries) to Robert Owen and the present-day workers' unions.

5. With persons of the military profession, members of the Free Union should seek to expand the notion held by that group that it is the soldier's duty to defend his homeland against outside enemies into the conviction that it is necessary to defend the homeland against all that harms it, including disastrous internal administration. At the same time, military personnel of Ukrainian origin should be reminded that their true homeland is now enslaved by a power harmful and alien to it. While they encourage military personnel to refuse support to a despotic government and to render real aid in the liberation of Russia, and especially of Ukraine, members of the Free Union should propagate the notion that, in the interests of true fraternity and development, the army should not seize power, even in the event of a struggle against the government, but only overthrow violators of civil liberty and protect civil self-government against all attempts upon it.

V. Members of the Free Union should make special efforts to be elected to various offices and assemblies of peasant, noble, or *zemstvo* institutions in the villages, cities, districts and provinces in order to direct the course of public affairs according to the aims of the Free Union, and in particular in order

1. to promote public meetings and assemblies for petitions to the government on the need to reorganize Russia on principles of political freedom;

2. in the event the government is obdurate, to incite the meetings and assemblies to refuse it support, e.g., to refuse to perform the duties of taxation and recruitment, etc., now required of them under the law, and finally to incite these meetings to direct attempts to remove tsarist officials from the administration and to attempts to bring about self-government on their own initiative, calling upon the representatives of other areas to do the same.

VI. The main concern of the Free Union at present and in the near future should be to unite in all strata of the population sufficient forces to compel the autocratic government of Russia to concede to its enslaved population the rights of man and citizen and to grant self-government. This would necessitate first of all the coordination of *zemstvo* and military forces. Even before these forces are fully assembled, however, members of the Free Union, as circumstances allow, can undertake various types of action against the government: manifestos, disobedience, and even attacks to arouse the people and spread among them the conviction that the government of Russia must be changed in accordance with the ideas of the Free Union. Its members can also participate in similar actions initiated by other groups.

*Note.* When members of the Free Union incite others to actions such as those described above, they must not fail to share in the responsibility for them.

### Part III: The Society's Inner Organization

This will largely depend on fortuitous circumstances and therefore cannot be precisely determined in advance, and of course cannot be made public.

*Translated by I.L. Rudnytsky*

1884

## Ukrainianism versus Russianism (excerpts)

### IVAN NECHUI-LEVYTSKY

*Ivan Nechui-Levytsky (1838–1918) was a major novelist in the realist and populist tradition, best known for his novel of peasant life, Mykola Dzheria (1878), and his novel about the intelligentsia, Khmary (The Clouds, 1874). In 1891, under a pseudonym, he published in Lviv (then in Austria-Hungary) a long treatise, Ukrainstvo na literaturnykh pozvakh z Moskovshchynoiu (Ukrainianism's Literary Summons against Muscovitism), from which the present selection is taken. In this treatise Levytsky argued mainly that Ukrainian literature needed no help from Russia in order to develop. At the same time he complained bitterly about the Russification of Ukrainian life, and in his defence of Ukrainian life ranged as far as discussing the indigenous culture of China.*

Moving from Western Europe to the East we find more evil. Crossing the Prussian-Russian border we will see that in Russia the policy of forced denationalization is running wild. In Russia, Russification is advancing not by the day but by the hour, as though destined to bring salvation not only for Russia but for all the world from some sort of scourge. There, people are spending all their energy in fulfilling this good and blessed task. The autonomy of provinces and peoples is being broken; nationalities are being bent and twisted. Everywhere national languages and literatures are being destroyed. Everywhere we see the Great Russian national onslaught, which aims at the complete destruction of all nationalities in Russia and at their Russification. The heaviest pressure of this system has fallen on Ukraine, Poland, and Moldavian Bessarabia. In Ukraine, Russian has been introduced as the language of instruction even in primary schools. The Bible in Ukrainian has been banned, and after 1876 Ukrainian literature was sen-

tenced to death. The publication of Ukrainian books was forbidden, except for so-called popular ones. In fact, only thin booklets, fables, short stories, and vaudevilles were allowed. Scholarly books were banned.

The same is happening in Poland, except that there the publication of literature is still allowed, in the hope that Great Russian literature will triumph over it (a vain hope!). Russian has also been introduced into the Moldavian Bessarabian primary schools. Such 'privileges,' which have made Ukraine and Poland so happy with Russification, have been extended to the Moldavians because they inhabit Slavic lands, are the brethren of the Russians, and are likely to be Russified all the quicker. The Bessarabian Moldavians, like the Russians, are of the Orthodox faith. Other nations in Russia – the Tatars, the Georgians, the Estonians, the Lithuanians, and the Latvians – at least have primary schools in their own languages.

So we can see that in Europe only the Latin race follows the dictum 'Live and let live!' Austria and Prussia follow the dictum 'Live and let live a little!' In Russia the maxim is 'Live and don't let anyone else live!'

The quick destruction of nationalities in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia, is marching on swiftly, even with love and relish, as though eager to confer thereby a historic benefit on other peoples. In reality, however, neither the Prussians nor the Russians are thereby bringing any benefit to themselves or others. We consider the Great Russian national intolerance a rather primitive characteristic of their race, similar to the religious intolerance of some peoples, an intolerance still flourishing among the Muslims. This primitive Russian trait was noticed long ago by the better Great Russian scholars and poets. Griboedov, the author of *Woe from Wit*, having visited the Crimea in 1825 and having observed Crimean life and the historic cities ruined by Russia, wrote from Feodosia to his friend in St Petersburg, 'After the Goths and the invaders from Genoa and others, we came as their successors and brought with us the spirit of destruction.' Griboedov went on to say that in order to make peace with the peoples beyond the Caucasus, Russia should use civilized means, such as good courts and the like. Mr Pypin,<sup>1</sup> in his article on Griboedov in the *European Messenger* (January 1890), had this to add: 'Alas, the spirit of destruction very often followed our movements in the East and the West. In olden times it was brought by national intolerance, which knew no bounds, and by the patriarchal mentality. Later these notions were absent, and the destruction was caused by bureaucratic uniformity. Disrespect for the human personality, which developed in [Great Russian] family relations, was transferred to the

<sup>1</sup> Alexander Pypin (1833–1904) was a major Russian literary scholar and critic.

newly conquered countries and peoples. Unnecessary hostility, which prevented a merger [*sic*], was fostered, and this hostility was altogether avoidable.'

Want of respect for other nationalities – disregard for and even hatred of them – is still alive among the Great Russians and shows itself in actual pressure on the nationalities dependent on Russia. This national hatred and intolerance has been caused not only by the despotic family structure, pointed out by Pypin, but also by history. Having developed, in olden days in the East, in isolation from the civilized nations of Europe, and having spent whole centuries apart, in contact with only the half-wild, primitive, pagan peoples of the north and Siberia, who were inferior to the Great Russians attempting to assimilate them, those Great Russians got used to despising and disregarding foreigners. Having conquered lands and peoples in the European West much more civilized than they, the Russians treated them with an equal disregard and even with hostility. These characteristic tendencies were real in some highly educated Great Russians, like the critic Belinsky, the novelist Turgenev, and even the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin, who ridiculed things Ukrainian. Even worse are the Great Russian administrators, who show this primitive national intolerance of other peoples in a severity that is shameful. The esteemed Mr Pypin writes of a 'merger.' Discussing with great sympathy our literary and national affairs, he has shown in the article concerned that nevertheless he does not want to see our point of view. Having relegated the latest Ukrainian literature to provincialism, he is in fact in agreement with the 1876 *ukase*, which allows the publication in Ukrainian only of ethnographic works and popular literature, as well as Ukrainian theatre. That is all we get! With the exception of the beginning of his article, in which Mr Pypin shows some sympathy for Ukrainian ethnography, the article demonstrates an attitude similar to that of the Russian conservatives and Slavophiles, although he rarely draws any conclusion ...

...

To the Slavs, these [Russian] tendencies are no secret. It is no secret to them that Ukrainian literature was oppressed by the Russian government, just as Czech literature was made to suffer by the Germans after the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. It is no secret that classes in primary schools in Ukraine and Poland were taught in Russian out of Russian texts. It is no secret that in Ukraine the publication of the Bible in Ukrainian translation was proscribed, and that other Ukrainian books were banned. Perhaps it is still a secret that in Ukraine all higher administrative posts – those of governor, archbishop, council president – all important posts are filled by Great Russians. In the Kiev school district even the directors of



gymnasiums are Great Russians. So are almost all the rectors of theological seminaries ... All these appointed foreigners oversee the Russification of the language and of the administration, in addition to exercising their police-like surveillance of the country.

Whenever one of us Ukrainians is chosen for a higher administrative post, it is someone who in obedience and obsequiousness with respect to matters of Russification will surpass the most avid follower of Katkov.<sup>2</sup> He will try so hard for his career's sake that his hair will be wet with the effort, and he will practically shout in the streets against the Ukrainians, as though saying: 'Take me and promote me! I'll serve you faithfully.' And he will do it, even though in his soul he feels no such dedication, for souls such as his care only for a career and money. These countrymen of ours are worse than the Russifiers from Great Russia ...

1891

<sup>2</sup> Mikhail Katkov (1818–87) was an influential political journalist and the editor of the conservative Russian journal *Russkii vestnik* (The Russian Herald).

## Letters from Dnieper Ukraine (excerpt)

### BORYS HRINCHENKO

*Borys Hrinchenko (1863–1910) was a writer, ethnographer, and publicist. A teacher by profession, he was one of the founders in 1892 of a secret group, Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv (The Taras Brotherhood), dedicated to cultural and political activity. Later he founded the Ukrainian Radical Party. He was an able journalist and a prolific writer. Among his realistic novels were Soniashny promin (The Ray of Sun, 1890) and Sered temnoi nochii (In a Dark Night, 1900). His major accomplishment was the editing of a dictionary of the Ukrainian language (1902–9) in four volumes. He also wrote some poetry and translated foreign classics into Ukrainian. Hrinchenko was a tireless worker for and promoter of Ukrainian culture and a fierce nationalist. Lysty z Ukrainy Naddniproianskoi (Letters from Dnieper Ukraine, 1892–3) appeared first in Bukovyna under Austro-Hungarian rule.*

Speaking of Kostomarov, of Kulish in his first period, and of *Osnova*,<sup>1</sup> the author of these unwise letters allowed himself to disagree with some of their national-historical views. Here, while speaking of the Kulish of the latest period, he will do the same. One might think it strange that a man unknown in literature, who has no right (he would himself admit it) to call himself a historian, should fight with such experts on history as Kulish and Kostomarov, who could smother the author (if they were to notice him) with their historical erudition. Kulish himself says of such opponents that before criticizing him they must present their scholarly works.

This author cannot show any historical or scholarly works of his own.

<sup>1</sup> *Osnova* (The Foundation) was a Ukrainian periodical published in St Petersburg from 1860 to 1862, to which Kulish was the principal contributor.

Nevertheless, he dares not remain silent, but will speak out. He is not a historian, but he does not want to be a historian. He is simply a Ukrainian, who recognizes his nationality and knows with his heart and mind what it means to love one's native land. He believes that he does love his native land, that he feels himself a member of the Ukrainian nation, and that that gives him the right to speak. Not as a historian, from the eminence of his chair of history, but – if only he dares to use the name – as a Ukrainian patriot.

The author is indifferent to all clever and not so clever historical theories and hypotheses. He loves his native land not because certain theories and hypotheses exist about it, but because he loves it. Whether our history has been glorious or shameful, whether our fighters for freedom were bandits or not, is of deep interest to him, but it will not increase or decrease his love for his native land and for its language. The author is living now and loves his native land as it is now. He is ready to share its sorrows, suffer its wounds, and enjoy its joys. Regarding himself as a member of the Ukrainian nation, the author, out of love for this nation, will defend its national rights and oppose anything that may harm it.

We have arrived at the ground on which the author stands. He says that a nation has its rights, and that no one can take them away. The Ukrainian nation has the same rights as all other nations. Therefore, should anyone try to take away its rights, the rights of a nation, a conscious Ukrainian will protest, even if his opponent has written not a handful but a whole pile of books. The author of these letters knows that the rights of nations are not prescribed by the heads of historians, but by real life. And what is given by life cannot be taken away by papers, historical or other. After this general and perhaps over-long, but necessary, foreword the author can come to the point.

It is remarkable that, at a time when Kostomarov's latest views, which reeked of Moscovophilism, had not evoked, if I am not mistaken, any protests, Kulish's view created a great echo in the Muscovite and Ukrainian press. Kulish, while writing his unfortunate *History of the Reunification of Rus'* and, later, *An Easter Egg*, published his verse translation of the Psalter and the Book of Job in 1870, his translations of the Four Gospels in 1871, and his version of the entire New Testament in 1880. In 1882 he also gave us a volume of translations of Shakespeare. And despite all this he is called a traitor. Kostomarov has said in a well-read Russian journal that he wants the Ukrainian people to be Muscovized but is against doing it by force. At the same time, for the last thirty years he has written nothing in Ukrainian, yet he is called a 'Ukrainian father.' This is an interesting matter for discussion in our press.

We are not going to report in detail on the turmoil, which is well known. But we shall point out, briefly, the facts.

Why the turmoil?

The Ukrainian writer Panko Olelkovych Kulish, a famous fighter for our nationality, second after Shevchenko, the most beloved and the most excellent son of his native land, published a pamphlet in four volumes entitled *The History of the Reunification of Rus'*. It was followed by similar works. In them, as well as providing original and incisive thoughts, he said that the leading Ukrainian historical figures, beginning with the hetmans and ending with the last haidamak, were common bandits and enemies of culture. The best of them, such as Sahaidachny, were not much good – Sahaidachny was 'a pirate of genius and an invader.' The history of the Ukrainian Cossack era is a history of 'Ukrainian banditry,' which destroyed Ukrainian power and brought Ukraine into an inescapable situation in which she could not but fall into the embrace of her Muscovite brother. So far we see nothing anti-patriotic in such views. We hold a different opinion of the Cossack era in our history, but so what? Is our entire nation to be reduced to the Cossacks? Were all our historical exploits performed by the Cossacks alone? Is there only one period, the Cossack one, in our history? No, even if we reject the Cossacks as our national movement, we shall be rich enough to be called a nation and to have a memorable past. Both Prince Volodymyr<sup>2</sup> and Taras Shevchenko belong indisputably to us. Even if in the past we were bandits, today we do not want to be such, but an educated and cultured nation. So far, in Kulish's writings, there is nothing anti-Ukrainian. If he had stopped there, even if many disagreed with him, no one would dare to call him a traitor. But he did not stop there.

Not having found the characteristics of statehood in the Cossack movement, he went to search for them where he ought not have ventured. He went not to Kiev but to Moscow. He ought to have gone to Kiev, because it and not Moscow was the capital of Ukrainian statehood. And he ought to have looked from this point of view on all of Ukrainian history. But he went to Moscow and began to look at Ukrainian affairs with a Muscovite boyar's eye and has thereby 'reunited' all Rus'. From there came all his hymns to the Muscovite statesmen, beginning with Ivan III and ending with Catherine II. That is why he could write odes to Peter I and Catherine II and praise them for abolishing Ukrainian autonomy, which in Kulish's

2 Volodymyr the Great was the first impressive grand prince of Kiev, who ruled from 980 to 1015. He was responsible for the conversion of Rus' to Orthodox Christianity in 988.

imagination was like an 'insatiable snake.' That is why he forgot that if the Hetman State and the Sich were so damaging to Ukraine, yet they saw to it that a Ukrainian, not a Muscovite, order was introduced in Ukraine. If the Muscovite rulers, having abolished the Hetman State and the Sich, had not spilled so much blood in Ukraine, had not sent Kalnyshevsky<sup>3</sup> for thirty years to the Solovky Islands, had not given away Ukrainian lands to their favourites and turned the Ukrainian people into serfs; if they had not abolished Ukrainian autonomy, then these odes could have been written. Then Kulish's own words would have had some weight, when he said in the *The Retouched Haidamak Era*: 'We must not consider the Human tragedy<sup>4</sup> a national cause, for then the punishment of the haidamaks by Catherine II would be considered an act against the people. What will happen if we take away from Peter's successor the title "Our Most Radiant Mother"? Then we would have to consider everything done by Moscow for Rus' unity something directed against our people.' That is what frightens Kulish. But we are not afraid of it. What will happen to history? Nothing terrible; it will be as it was, a great deal of lies but also much that is true. Ought we to declare everything done in the name of Rus' unity as being against our national interest? We ought, because what was done in Muscovy was done not for Rus' unity, but for Muscovite unity. We understand as Rus' unity a Russian and a Ukrainian living in the same house, each following his national life. If not, we want no 'unity,' because it means not unity but the 'swallowing' of the one by the other. Now we see the results of this 'unity' clearly, and Kulish himself knows it, because he says in 'A Letter of Appeal to the Ukrainian Intelligentsia' that the Russians 'have crossed us out of the book of living nations, and have appropriated our national heritage.' He himself tells us that the Russians, in thanking us for military and moral help, 'want to obliterate our face among the nations, want us to forget who we are and what our national rights are, want us to have no good fortune, honour, or dignity in this world.' That is what is being done in Muscovy for Rus' unity, and with these words Kulish, better than anyone else, destroys his paeans in honour of the tsars. Kulish himself demonstrates that the thrust of his *History of the Reunification of Rus'* is a colossal historical and national lie. For if Moscow were truly concerned with 'unity'

3 Petro Kalnyshevsky (1690–1803), the last *koshovy* otaman of the Zaporozhian Sich, was exiled to the Solovets Islands a year after the Sich was destroyed in 1775.

4 Human is a town in Right-Bank Ukraine near which the rebellious haidamaks had their headquarters in 1768. When the town was taken by the haidamaks, they massacred thousands of Catholics, Greek Catholics, and Jews who had sought refuge there.

and not with 'swallowing,' there would be no such consequences as are mentioned by Kulish. Moscow's policy towards Ukraine has always been the same, and such were the tendencies during the reign of Catherine II, who put Kalnyshevsky in prison, and Nicholas I, who had Kulish, Kostomarov, and Shevchenko incarcerated. We can only wonder how it is possible for a Ukrainian writer in one book to sing shameful odes to despotism and at the same time to warn us 'not to call the *moskal* our uncle.'

## Beyond the Limits of the Possible (abridgment)

IVAN FRANKO

*Ivan Franko (1856–1916) was a major poet, scholar, and journalist. Born in Western Ukraine, he studied at Lviv University, where he became politically active. Though he was arrested and imprisoned, he continued to preach political radicalism and socialism. He pursued his studies at Vienna University, where he defended his doctoral dissertation. In the 1890s he was active in the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. An outstanding poet, he wrote some poems on social and revolutionary themes, but also love lyrics. In prose he excelled in stories about peasant and worker life and in social and historical novels. Some critics consider his long poem Moisei (Moses, 1905) his masterpiece. After 1908 his health began to decline. Franko's works were published in Soviet Ukraine in fifty volumes, but these did not include several of his important works, among them the one published here.*

When we approach from afar high mountains crowned by steep, bare cliffs and glassy glaciers, our hearts are involuntarily gripped by fear, and we think, 'To go there, to stand on this peak of ice, would be impossible!'

When Europeans began to dig up in the ruins of ancient Nineveh clay bricks, vases, and utensils covered by cuneiform writing and saw that the writing was in an unknown alphabet, according to an unknown system (was it alphabetical, syllabic, or ideographic?), in an unknown language long dead, they decided, after lengthy, wasted efforts, that to decipher the writing was impossible.

When you tell an ordinary man that the sun is twenty million miles distant from the earth and that a ray of the sun travels forty thousand miles in a second, he, if he wants to be open with you, will ask in disbelief: 'And

have you been on the sun? Have you travelled on a ray of the sun? It's impossible for you to know these things.'

Shall we recall those moments in history when views as to what was possible or impossible drew people into comic or tragic conflicts? Some Greek philosophers argued with subtlety that all motion is impossible. The French historian and politician Thiers tried to demonstrate the impossibility of a steam engine ...

Yet experience has shown and shows every day that all these 'impossibilities' are false and fictional and are the products of old, oft-repeated tradition or a subjective state, or else are the fruit of the activity of our imperfect senses uncircumscribed by critical reason based on detailed study and the comparison of facts and phenomena.

The whole history of our material and spiritual civilization is nothing other than a gradual, systematic, and constant pushing away of the frontiers of the impossible. What was impossible for our ancestors, what made their hands and heads recoil before a glass mountain, is for us quite possible and even relatively easy to perform. Among the foremost men of our time one can sometimes see, to the contrary, a certain overestimation of human powers and abilities, a belief that there are no boundaries of the possible, that the limitless field of the unknown, unexplored, unclear, and enigmatic is no glass mountain, no impossibility, but only a huge and unknown steppe which awaits courageous spirits and sharp eyes to discover in it new paths, offering to human perseverance new, unspeakably rich treasures ...

Nevertheless, we see phenomena of quite a different character.

Try to explain to someone with a 'healthy peasant mind' that a witch cannot fly on a broomstick, cannot change into a dog, and cannot milk frogs and lizards. He may say 'yes' to you, but deep in his soul he will be firmly convinced that if, at midnight on St George's day, he finds a witch in his yard and strikes her with a whip or a halter, then in the morning milk will flow from the whip or halter ...

To someone with a 'simple peasant mind' it seems entirely possible that money buried in the soil burns and comes to the surface, that water at mid-day on the feast of Jordan changes momentarily into wine, that at the midnight before Christmas oxen speak a human language, that a snake bites with its fangs, that thunder strikes like an arrow, that rainbows drink water from the wells and rivers, sucking up fish and frogs, that a vampire walks about after death and sucks human blood without leaving a wound or a trace, and so on. And yet for an intelligent person all this is impossible, something about which it is ridiculous even to argue and not worth demonstrating that the 'simple peasant mind' is wrong.



The 'simple peasant mind,' therefore, may not constitute any criterion when discussing the limits of the possible and impossible, or any other question requiring careful research and wide criticism. This is a known human weakness long ago characterized by Spencer in his sociological studies. Whereas in mathematics, physics, medicine, and astronomy the 'simple peasant mind' is not accorded any competence – professional knowledge being required – in questions of social life, politics, and sociology we often call on this 'simple peasant mind' as a witness or even a judge. I, however, do not think this mind 'simple,' because it is twisted by thousands of prejudices and limitations, or 'healthy,' because it is the product of thousands of generations and currents often sick and defective.

These rather banal comments came to my mind in reviewing a discussion in our press on some fundamental problems of our national development. What is the meaning of a national revival? What material and spiritual spheres of life does it embrace, and what is to be excluded from it? What goals should or should not a national movement pursue? Which ideals are within the limits of the possible, and which go beyond? Should one accept these limits as something given and fixed, or should one, with one's head and hands, push them farther and farther away?

I shall not go into the details here of the polemic between *Dilo* and *Moloda Ukraina* on the one side and the Chernivtsi *Bukovyna* on the other. I will only note that if the arguments in the first two periodicals persuaded no one, the counter-argument in *Bukovyna*, based on the poor arsenal of the 'simple peasant mind,' brilliantly showed the inadequacy of that arsenal for deciding such broad and complex questions. I do not wish to condemn the poor journalists of *Bukovyna* for their arguments, for they spoke what they knew, but I consider this case as offering a good lesson for these journalists that all such phenomena must be dealt with carefully, in the widest possible context. The position taken by a cool and practical politician may sometimes be not so cool and practical, and all theorizing, especially by journalists, has meaning only in so far as it expresses interests and feelings which are coming to the fore in society. Without close contact with life the type of reasoning demonstrated here becomes fruitless, grey doctrine which in some cases, when the doctrinaires have power and influence, may cause incalculable damage to national life.

Let us examine methodically the question, or rather the whole row of questions, which gave rise to this journalistic polemic. There is nothing more amusing than to watch sudden jumps from one position to another by the advocates of the 'simple peasant mind.' Today they pour out their contempt for those who point to the importance of the economic factor in

national life, the importance of 'the stomach,' and then tomorrow – watch out! – they bring out against the ideal of political independence the very same idea about 'the stomach.' 'Our people,' they say, 'are poor; they are exploited by all kinds of usurers and scalpers. Let us save our poor people, let us raise them economically, and don't let us waste time on dreams about ideals which are distant and impossible to realize.' And the day after tomorrow the same people, in order to satisfy some polemical need, will change sides yet again and thunder against the idea of 'the stomach' without turning a hair.

However frivolously these questions are raised by such people, the matter itself is worth discussing. The economic question is so important and so basic that it cannot be bypassed but must serve as the starting-point of any discussion of the political independence of any nation. For every social struggle of our time has been confined largely (though not exclusively) to the removal of economic exploitation in all forms. In formulating the issue thus, we see a clear and simple prospect. Surely, the striving to remove economic exploitation must, by the same token, be a striving to get rid of the exploiters, one's own or foreign, and, if there is a choice, first of all the foreign and then one's own. What about a nation which, as a last resort, must allow itself, without resistance, to be exploited by another nation, which must sacrifice the fruits of its labour for purposes which have nothing in common with its development and security? That means that the idea of 'the stomach,' that is, national economic problems in themselves, forces each nation, with an iron necessity, to strive for political independence, because, if its opposite comes about, the nation will face inevitable economic slavery, decay, pauperization, and cultural decline. It is true that our (and foreign) adherents of the 'simple peasant mind' do not formulate this issue in all its ramifications. The removal of all exploitation is a utopian notion, an impossibility! The main thing is to keep political and social peace, during which the ladder on which some go up and some go down will function smoothly. In other words: 'Don't ask for trouble. Let us quietly occupy our positions and grow rich, and when we and our children prosper, the whole nation will be better off. Because when I and my neighbours are safe and secure, our nation will also be secure. Economic progress consists of this part of the nation becoming more and more secure.'

To be sure, these gentlemen don't say this in so many words, because doing so would expose their own class and personal egoism, their reluctance to engage in any struggle, their want of idealistic (or national) striving if the goal is to be hard won and not arrive ready-made like the mythical

pie in the open mouth. A sociologist must grant egoism some place in the series of factors influencing the development of a people. But this egoism should not be a dark cloud obscuring the sun. It should not deflect attention from the idea of general progress, because then it becomes not a useful factor but an enemy against which all the honest elements must struggle. The social dynamics of our time show that the enrichment of individuals stands in direct proportion to the impoverishment of the masses, and the number of wealthy individuals stands in direct proportion to the number of the poor. The more wealthy people there are at the centre, the more poor ones there are around them; the greater the concentration of wealth on the one hand, the greater the impoverishment of the masses on the other. Social peace is a guarantee of safety for leeches, who suck their victims. One does not have to demonstrate that, from a wider perspective, from that of the purely economic interests of a nation, such social peace or economic progress is undesirable. The fact that these great social leeches, having sucked their fill, may not stir a finger for the welfare of the nation whose juices they have drunk may be attested by the examples of our domestic tycoons and their ilk.

On a much higher level than this egoistic and materialistic view must be placed the view which the late Drahomanov criticized fiercely and condemned as 'non-political culture.' The name does not fit the thing itself, because the very term 'culture' contains reference to numerous political factors (the cultivation of language and literature, schools, education, etc.). Accordingly, 'non-political culture' is a *contradictio in adiecto*. I have in mind here a way of thinking of which the following is characteristic: 'Let us cultivate our native language, literature, education, science; let us lift the national consciousness among the people, but let us not mix in day-to-day politics.' In order to understand this way of thinking properly, one must add that it originated in a place that was not politically free, where any participation in day-to-day politics was considered illegal. In Galicia, where active participation in politics by every citizen is not only allowed but encouraged by law, such a way of thinking did not and could not develop. Where it did exist, and still exists today, it was not a conscious program but an expression of actual circumstances: the political usurpation of power on the one hand and political lawlessness on the other. That is why Drahomanov's criticism of this trend was only partly justified, because it was actually confronting a general apathy and a disbelief in the success of the Ukrainian national cause hiding behind this slogan.

One cannot deny that responsibly conducted literary and cultural work, even without mixing in active politics, in the course of time could win for

Ukrainians some small political significance, and that all such idealistic movements, when spread to the masses, tend to reflect a greater number of economic and political interests as they take the people into an ever-widening arena of struggle. Battling against the very concept of 'non-political culture,' Drahomanov did not analyse how cultural work should be conducted so as to bear fruit rather than be amateurish and a waste of time. He did not analyse why, after the *ukase* of 1876, a strange apathy and unwillingness to participate in Ukrainian activities was born and found expression in the slogan 'non-political culture.' A careful analysis would have shown Drahomanov, who in this matter was at fault, that the doctrines proclaimed in the early 1870s led precisely to these consequences. Let us recall that Drahomanov's main political belief during his 'Kiev period' was based on his conviction that the Ukrainians, politically and culturally, were to seek a common roof with Russia. Ukrainian literature was to be popular, for 'domestic use.' Everything else, following Gogol's and Kostomarov's example, should be written in Russian and thus contribute to the common all-Russian treasure. Drahomanov tried to spread these views in Galicia, too, but found decisive opposition, even from such Drahomanovites as V. Navrotsky. Drahomanov hardly modified his views when he was forced to seek protection for a free Ukrainian press abroad. True, in the 'Foreword' to *Hromada*<sup>1</sup> he outlined the ethnographic boundaries of the Ukrainian nation, and in his most valuable folkloristic studies he argued again and again that Ukraine should be an independent nation and should develop independently its ties with [the peoples of] the West and the East, the South and the North. But in his political writings Ukrainians appeared always as South Russians, and he thought they should remain so. He even tried to tie the Ukrainians and the Russians closer together in the struggle with a common enemy, absolutism. And in his programs, especially in 'A Free Union,' he gave an example of a completely denationalized Russian federation, basing it on the same territorial division that he wanted to see in Austria as early as 1875. He did not cease until the end of his life to protest against Ukrainian separatism not only *pro praeterito* but also *pro futuro*. In a word, his strong and deep belief in Western European ideals of social equality and political freedom obscured the ideal of national independence, an ideal which contains both those earlier ideals and can offer them scope for full development. And, indeed, those without this national ideal, the best Ukrainian forces, sank in an all-Russian sea, and those who did not sink but clung to their own ground fell into despair

1 *Hromada* (The Community) was the journal Drahomanov edited in Geneva.

and apathy. Now we have not the slightest doubt that this lack of faith in the national ideal, taken to its logical conclusion in political life, was the chief source of tragedy in Drahomanov's life, was the source of the impotence of his political strivings, because surely one cannot stimulate people to political activity by theories about river basins or the sphere of economic interests.

It is important to pay attention to the characteristic change which took place at the end of the nineteenth century in our understanding of the principal driving forces in human history. The last decade of the nineteenth century especially may be called a reaction against one-sided Marxist materialism or fatalism. For Marx and his followers the history of human civilization was, first of all, a history of production. Out of the production of material goods, like branches from a tree trunk, grew the social and political forms of society, its likes and dislikes, scientific concepts, ethical and all other ideals. During the last few years the question has been turned around. What is it that drives man to produce, to create material goods? Is it only his stomach? Of course not; it is the totality of his physical and spiritual needs, which must be satisfied. Production and ceaseless and intensive cultural work are the outcome of the needs and ideals of society. Only where these ideals are alive, developing and striving forever higher, do we get progressive and ever-greater material production. Where there is no growth, development, struggle, and competition in the sphere of ideals, production falls into Chinese-like stagnation.

If the ideal of an individual's fulfillment must be recognized as the driving force in the sphere of material production because it moves people to invent, to search, to work hard, to serve, and to associate, the ideal of social and political fulfillment has an even greater importance. Here the synthesis of all idealistic striving, the building holding all the bricks in place, will be the ideal of the full, unfettered, and unlimited (leaving aside concessions demanded by good relations with one's neighbours) life and development of a nation. A concern with anything outside the framework of the nation reveals either the hypocrisy of people who under the cover of international ideals want to hide their striving for the domination of one nation over another, or the sick sentimentalism of fantasists who want to cover up with 'universal' phrases their spiritual alienation from their own nation. Perhaps in the future the time will come for a consolidation of some free international unions to achieve higher international aims. But this can happen only when all national strivings have been fulfilled and when national grievances and injustices have receded into historical memory. In the meantime, we must agree with the Czech poet Jan Neruda:

Amid the heavenly stars there is one great law,  
 Written there and cast in gold.  
 A law above all laws: you will  
 Love your native land above all.

Every ideal is a synthesis of wishes, needs, and strivings, easy or difficult to achieve, and strivings and desires which seem to lie beyond the limits of the possible. 'Mit einem Stich ins Unmoegliche,' as Chamberlain<sup>2</sup> says – that is what distinguishes the cultural ideals and strivings of European civilization. The fact that such ideals can arise, can inflame the hearts of wide circles of people, can lead them to heavy trials and sacrifices, can give them strength in the midst of terrible sufferings is perhaps a characteristic of the Indo-Aryan race alone, for we do not find this phenomenon among other races.

The ideal of total national independence, political and cultural, lies for us, from our present perspective, beyond the limits of the possible. So be it! But let us not forget that thousands of paths leading to its achievement lie directly under our feet, and that only our awareness of this ideal, our pursuit of it, will determine whether we follow paths leading to it or turn into other paths. Fatalism, begotten by a materialist outlook which maintained that certain social and political ideals must be reached by means of the 'immanent' force of the development of production alone, without regard to whether we want to welcome such a future or not, today belongs with such superstitions as a belief in witchcraft, in evil places, and in unlucky days. We must feel this ideal in our hearts; we must use all our means and all our energy in order to approach it. Otherwise it will not exist, and no mystical fatalism will create it, while the development of material relations, like a blind machine, will trample and crush us.

1900

2 Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927) was a British-born, Germanophile political philosopher, whose *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* was published in 1899. The book exalted the German element in European culture.

# An Independent Ukraine (excerpt)

MYKOLA MIKHNOVSKY

*Mykola Mikhnovsky (1873–1924) became a political activist after studying law at Kiev University. He was one of the organizers of the Ukrainian People's Party, in the program of which he defended the idea of Ukrainian independence. Earlier he had supported RUP (the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party), for which, in 1900, he had published a brochure, in the form of a speech, Samostiina Ukraina (An Independent Ukraine). The brochure presented highly charged demands based on historical and legal grounds. Although the brochure was later repudiated by the RUP membership as too chauvinistic, it provided the impetus for subsequent expressions of political thought in the Ukrainian national movement. Active during the revolution, Mikhnovsky was later persecuted by the Soviet government, and he ended his life in suicide.*

The end of the nineteenth century is marked by events that can be characterized as representing a new turn in the history of mankind. The fifth act<sup>1</sup> of a great historical tragedy, the 'struggle of nations,' has begun, and its conclusion is fast approaching. These events are the armed uprisings of enslaved nations against the oppressor nations, as witnessed by the bloody rebellions of the Armenian, Cretan-Greek, Cuban, and Boer peoples. When we observe the fluctuating course of this fierce battle, which is in its initial stages in the struggle between the forsaken people of Austria, Russia, and Turkey and their aristocratic oppressors and in a stage of mortal antag-

1 The 'fifth act' refers to the fifth great national conflict: 1) the Armenians; 2) the Cretan Greeks; 3) the Cubans; 4) the Boers; and 5) the Ukrainians. [All notes are provided by the translator, though they have been slightly revised by the editors.]

onism between the Germans and the French and between the English and the Russians, and when we notice the tremendous mass of regular forces maintained by nations antagonistic to one another, it is quite obvious that the universal national question has come to fruition, though it remains far from a necessary, realistic, and just solution. And yet the only possible, reliable, and fruitful drive towards the resolution of this problem has been shown by the newly liberated nations that have risen against all forms of foreign domination. This path is contrary, however, to the resolutions of the Hague conference.<sup>2</sup>

We know that our people also are in the position of an enslaved nation.

Consequently, it must be recognized that whenever any nation desires to attain independent and sovereign statehood, it can do so only when acknowledged on the basis of international relations. It must also be recognized that only an ethnically homogeneous state can provide its citizens with full and comprehensive spiritual development and the best possible material well-being. When it is recognized that the unhampered development of an individual is possible only in a state whose goal is the cultivation of individuality, then it will become quite obvious that state sovereignty is the main determinant of the existence of a nation and a national ideal realizable only within the sphere of international recognition.

Having said this, let us pose the question, Is our national liberation possible?

The fifth act of the drama has yet to arrive for our nation, which is now living through a long and harsh interlude in its history. Behind the stage some kind of activity is taking place, and from time to time thunder rumbles, but still the curtain does not rise. In fact our interlude began in the year 1654, when the Ukrainian Republic joined the Muscovite monarchy in a political union.<sup>3</sup> Since then the Ukrainian Nation has been gradually dying both politically and culturally. Old forms of life are disappearing, republican freedom is decaying, and the nation is losing its strength and perishing. But it is awakening again, and from

2 This refers to the codification of laws regarding war instituted by the Hague Conference of 1899 (and later in 1907). Mikhnovsky stresses here that national liberation struggles take a violent course and thus go against the aims of peaceful settlement of international disputes as spelled out by the Hague Conference.

3 Up until this time, Left-Bank Cossack Ukraine was under the Polish Commonwealth. A number of fierce rebellions by the Ukrainian Cossacks under their hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, resulted in an alliance with the tsarist government of Muscovy, in the treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654.



the ashes of history is reappearing the idea of a new Ukraine, an idea that must be transformed into body and blood if it is to reveal itself in concrete forms.

From the inception of the Pereiaslav Constitution to this very day, two hundred and forty-seven years have passed. Russia will soon celebrate the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the act. Meanwhile, we must attend our meetings under the inquiring gaze of an entire phalanx of government spies. A Ukrainian is not free to acknowledge his nationality. One who loves his fatherland is regarded a traitor to the [Russian] state. This unenviable situation prompts an indignant question: By what right does the tsarist government treat us on our own territory as if we were its slaves? By what right was the law of 17 May 1876<sup>4</sup> proclaimed against us, the natives of this land, to sentence our nationality to death? On the basis of what law are Russians (Muscovites) or Muscovized renegades exclusively appointed to all levels of government in our country? By what law are our children educated in the schools to be implacable enemies and detesters of our nation? Why does the language of our oppressors predominate even in the church?<sup>5</sup> By what right does the Russian government spend money stripped from us for the benefit of the Russian nation, cultivating and supporting its scholarship, literature, industry, and the rest? Finally, and most important, does the tsarist government at all have the right to issue laws, manifestos, and administrative principles binding upon us without exception?

Is the tsarist government's authority over us based on law, or only on strength or force? It is a well-known fact that our political union with the Muscovite State and its representatives came about as the result of an act of our own free will. In the opinion of our enemies, however, the fact that it was voluntary prohibits us from complaining about the inequity enforced upon us, for we supposedly chose this government ourselves. Let us review and assess the nature and character of the 1654 agreement.

The formula of that period states that the government of our ancestors linked us with the Muscovite State as 'an equal among equals' and as 'free among the free,' in other words, as one of two countries with their own

4 The Ems ukase of 1876 was a secret order signed by Alexander II forbidding printing in the Ukrainian language, importation of Ukrainian periodicals from abroad, and stage performances in Ukrainian.

5 Church Slavonic was the common liturgical language; however, sermons were to be given only in the Russian language.

governments, the one totally independent of the other in its internal organization, uniting only for the attainment of certain common international goals.<sup>6</sup>

The following questions arise: After unification did both these states disappear, and in their place a third political entity, a successor to both of them, come into existence, or, on the contrary, did both governments continue to exist side by side regardless of the unification? If the latter, then from the point of view of international law what impact did the unification have on both governments? Contemporary scholarship dealing with international law teaches us that a state may be both simple and complex. It holds that two or more states may join with one another and form a 'confederation of states' (*Staatenbund*). A confederation is a form of unification according to which the respect for and adherence to joint institutions does not exclude the internal and external independence of the union of states; on the contrary, the preservation of independence becomes a goal of the union of states.

A confederation of states allows its members the right to maintain independent international relations and also represents the entire union. All have the right to establish individual conventions and send delegates. The sole restriction would be that they do not aim to harm the interests of the union or of its individual members. This is a conceivable form of union not only among states that have the same political system but among states with various governmental systems. The union does not cease to exist even when one of the states changes the system of governance or when the controlling dynasty dies out. Above all, a 'confederation of states' differs from what is called a 'real union of states' in that it can exist only among monarchical states and can have its existence shortened if the dynasty dies out. A union of states arises from a mutual agreement of states striving towards union. Examples of state unions are the North American United States, the Swiss Confederation, and, most important, the German Confederation.<sup>7</sup>

6 A great deal has been written on the implications of the Pereiaslav treaty of 1654. The loss of the original text has made possible many interpretations, varying from one Russian point of view that it meant total incorporation (V. Miakotin) to one Ukrainian view that it was only a loose alliance giving the Ukrainian Cossacks a great deal of independence, the position obviously taken by Mikhnovsky in this tract. A most interesting work produced by a Soviet Ukrainian historian but never published in the Soviet Union is Mykhailo I. Braichevsky (translated and edited by G. Kulchycky), *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception* (Munich, 1974). It provides a dissenting Ukrainian reply to the treaty.

7 The German Confederation (1815–66) was an attempt at national unification of all German lands.

How then did the Muscovite State join with the Ukrainian State? By way of the agreement embodied in the so-called Pereiaslav articles.<sup>8</sup>

The Pereiaslav contract formulated the joint and reciprocal relations of the [two] states (here we provide the more important provisions and give them substance by using contemporary expressions).

- 1 The legislative and administrative authority belongs to the Hetmanate government without the participation and interference of the tsarist government.
- 2 The Ukrainian State has its own separate and independent army.
- 4 A subject of non-Ukrainian nationality cannot serve in the government of the Ukrainian State. The only exceptions are the controllers who ensure the collection of the tsar's taxes.
- 6 The Ukrainian State has the right to select its head of state according to its own wishes. The state is required only to notify the tsarist government of its selection.
- 13 The inviolability of ancient laws affecting persons of both secular and sacred background and the non-interference of the tsarist government in the internal life of the Ukrainian Republic is guaranteed.
- 14 The Hetmanate government has the right to engage freely in international relations with foreign governments.

When we analyse the clauses of the Pereiaslav Constitution, it is evident that it contains all the characteristics of a 'confederation of states.' Our opponents endeavour to prove that our goals are hopeless because we have never had a state of our own and, consequently, have no historical foundations for our claims. Such an argument shows an ignorance of history and law. Throughout its historical existence our nation has made the greatest of efforts to form a free and independent state. Should we disregard the period of the appanage principalities, when separate branches of our nation existed as independent states, or overlook the Lithuanian-Rus' principality,<sup>9</sup> in which the genius of our nation happened to be the chief cultural

8 An English translation can be found in George Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 131-7.

9 After the fall of the Kievan Rus' state in 1240, caused by the Mongol invasion, a Galician-Volhynian principality gained importance in the southwestern part of the Kievan Rus' realm. In the fourteenth century the Lithuanian leader Gedimin united all the Lithuanian lands and eventually conquered Belorussian and Ukrainian lands. Gedimin named himself King of Lithuania and Rus', and during his time there was a strong Ruthenian cultural influence in the realm.

force, or, perhaps the most important period, that of the Galician-Ruthenian Kingdom,<sup>10</sup> which attempted to unite all branches and limbs of our nation into one cohesive state? The attempt was repeated much later by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and again by Ivan Mazepa.

The Ukrainian State, in the form established and constituted by Khmelnytsky, was, according to international law, a *de facto* state. The following reproach, however, is made by our adversaries: that the Ukrainian Republic, as formulated by the Pereiaslav agreement, was not an independent state, because it paid 'tribute' to the tsarist authorities. If this is the case, then even from their point of view the Ukrainian Republic was, nevertheless, a semi-independent state on the model of Bulgaria and, at one time, Serbia and the other Balkan states. Semi-independent states are distinguishable by their not having the right to conduct their own international relations with the outside world. The Ukrainian State, however, secured this privilege through the Pereiaslav Constitution. How was this 'tribute,' which the Ukrainian Republic paid the Muscovite monarchy, to be understood? The answer to this question must be found in contemporary teachings on international law. The law did not know nor could it imagine a state having the attributes of independence that would be required to pay 'tribute.' Similarly, on the other side of the issue one cannot assume that the semi-independent state took advantage of the right to send envoys. An explanation can be provided if we can accept the fact that 'tribute' according to the text of the constitution was provided not for the Muscovite State but for the Muscovite tsar as a protector of a special kind, and that as a result of the union with the Muscovite State the Ukrainian State clearly desired only 'protection' and not submission. From this point of view, the aim of the tribute was the investment of funds in a common treasury designated for international relations of importance to each. Since the Ukrainian State was not conquered by the Muscovite monarchy, nor acquired through diplomatic means as was Poland, this feature is affirmed all the more. The Ukrainian State was united with the Muscovite monarchy and did not waive any of its state or republican rights. The regime of the Muscovite monarchy was totally indifferent to the Ukrainian State. The Pereiaslav Constitution was sanctioned by both parties, the people of Ukraine and the Muscovite tsar, for eternity. The Muscovite tsars or emperors did not fulfil their obli-

10 In 1199, the principalities of Volhynia and Galicia were united under Prince Roman Mstyslavych. From around the year 1240 to approximately the year 1350 the Galician-Volhynian state acted independently under the leadership of a series of princes who ruled according to dynastic succession.

gations according to the Constitution of 1654. Today they deal with us as if our nation forfeited its state rights and surrendered itself to the goodwill of the Russian emperors, agreeing to share the same fate as the Russians who themselves chose the tsars. But neither our nation nor its rulers ever agreed to renounce the rights that belong to it as a consequence of the Pereiaslav Constitution. It is binding for both contracting parties, the Muscovite monarchy and the Ukrainian Republic, and is based on the principle that agreements cannot be destroyed or altered by the unilateral desire of one party without the expressly stated agreement of the second. For this reason a 'one and indivisible Russia' does not exist for us! We are obligated only to the Muscovite State, and the all-Russian emperor is of less importance to us than the Muscovite tsar. So the law states! In actuality, however, the Pereiaslav Constitution has no importance, and the all-Russian emperors are our absolute lords, the Pereiaslav Constitution being only a 'historical act.' From the standpoint of the law, how can one assent to this mockery of justice? The law states that when one of the contracting parties exceeds the contract, then the second party is left with a choice: either to demand from the other party the fulfillment of the contract as it was agreed upon by both parties, or to recognize that the contract has been broken and thus is void in all its parts, and so sever all relations with the other contracting party.

Hence, we see rule by force and not by law.

Our opponents may respond that because the contract was turned into a meaningless document by force, deception, and the intrigues of one of the contracting parties, the second party by his age-old silence has lost not only the right to be in control of his own destiny but even the right to protest. The second party sanctioned the illegal act, which was achieved through injustice and made legal through neglect. For this reason, the time is past for seeking [redress under] former laws.

In such an interpretation, however, there is not a bit of truth. First, what has been acquired by robbery and plunder cannot fall into the category of law known as 'title by negative prescription.'<sup>11</sup> Second, an interpretation of

11 'Title by adverse possession' is the Anglo-American term used for the acquisition of title to property by possession for a statutory period under certain conditions. By the international law standards of the time, title by prescription would also fit. According to T.J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law*, 7th edition (Boston, 1923), 'long-continued possession of territory gives a good title to it when no other ground can be clearly shown, and even in cases where possession was originally by illegal and wrongful acts. The same reasons which justify, and even compel, the recognition of prescription as a source of title to private property by the municipal law of all civilized peoples, support its admission into International Law.'

negative prescription cannot be applied to [or have bearing on] the suppression of freedom. Negative prescription can have bearing only in lawful relations, not in unlawful ones such as currently exist between the Muscovite monarchy and the Ukrainian Republic. In international relations negative prescription may have meaning only for those peoples who are dying out, who have lost their vital power. The law of negative prescription cannot be applied to nations full of vital strength. Besides, a discussion about negative prescription has no place in relation to the Ukrainian people since that people has demonstrated a number of times its will to free itself from Muscovite domination (Doroshenko, Mazepa, the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Shevchenko, the peasant uprisings in the eighties, etc.). [These acts] have interrupted the course of the prescription. It has taken steps towards the settlement of the argument over the Pereiaslav Constitution's obligations. As it turns out, the only real and seriously possible means of resolution is strength. But even during those times in our history when we did not incessantly protest, our dignified endurance was a protest against the coercion enforced not only on us but also on our ancestors. This coercion interrupts the course of the prescription and places upon us an obligation to break the shackles of servitude so that as heirs of Bohdan Khmelnytsky we can by right take advantage of the opportunity provided by our inheritance.

When legal grounds exist for the return to the Pereiaslav Constitution and we regain our stolen freedom, would the question about using physical and material means for achieving our goal still stand?

Our adversaries say that the logic of events and the direction of life invincibly push us towards total extinction, towards a total loss of our nation's identity.

Over us hangs a black banner on which is written: 'Political death, national death, cultural death for the Ukrainian Nation?'

These are not mere words; their thrust provides the answer.

When the right to statehood was taken away from the Ukrainian government, the individual members of the former republic lost all their elementary political human rights. The former Ukrainian republican has fewer rights than today's lowest Muscovite servant. The administration, consisting of foreigners on the territory of the former Ukrainian Republic, is in a position of command comparable to that in a newly conquered land! It exhausts any remaining strength, exhausts the best fighters, and strips away any funds left over from the impoverished nation. Foreign administrators surround Ukraine and disregard the people at whose expense they feed. Insubordinate natives are unreservedly scorned, and the outspoken

ones are exiled to Siberia. The laws of the Russian Empire disregard the right of conscience. They neglect the right to individual liberty and dishonour the inviolability of the body. The former protector of the Ukrainian Republic has transformed himself into a lawful tyrant with unlimited right over the life and death of all Ukrainians. The tsarist decree of 17 May 1876 placed a sweeping prohibition on the language of the inheritors of the Pereiaslav Constitution. It proscribed its use in the schools and courts, church and administration. The progeny of Pavliuk, Kosynsky, Khmelnytsky, and Mazepa are at present denied the right to have their own literature and their own press. They are even required to serve their lords in the spiritual sphere. In this manner, the Ukrainian Nation pays 'tribute' not only materially but also with its psychological and intellectual capabilities, which are exploited for the benefit of the foreigners. Not only does a foreign tsar rule over Ukraine, but God himself has become a stranger and does not know the Ukrainian language. Education is neglected. Culture is mutilated. Darkness rules all across Ukraine. Two hundred and forty-seven years after the Pereiaslav Constitution the 'free and equal' Ukrainian is even worse off than a former helot, because the helot was not required to pay intellectual 'tribute.' He was not required to love and to show friendliness towards his oppressors. Whereas the helot understood his oppression, the Ukrainian only feels it in all spheres. Such is the logic of events, and such are the results. So, in the midst of distressing circumstances a small number of us gathered together. We joined into one family, filled with great pain and sorrow for the sufferings that enveloped the soul of the people. Contrary to the logic of events, we wrote on our banner, 'One, single, indivisible, free, and independent Ukraine from the Carpathian mountains to the Caucasus.'

Are we infatuated?

Is this ideal the only one not to be realized out of the magnificent and holy illusions with which humanity lives, from which hope springs and at this moment overflows?

Has our passionate love for Ukraine perhaps prompted our absurd, groundless ideal?

Can we also hope for the sympathy of the general Ukrainian public?

Above all else, will the realization of this goal be of value to our nation?

Ultimately the principal argument against our right to a national existence and to independent statehood will be that we have no past. We reject this false argument, as stated earlier. The want of a historical state in the past can have no meaning for a vigorous and energetic nation that senses its own strength and desires to take advantage of its own 'right of the strong.'

The second argument, the reproach that our nation is powerless, without culture, and inert, is far more important. Are we to be told that an ignorant, unorganized, and divided mass, devoid of a spirit, is incapable of creating a history within the framework of the present adverse circumstances of life? Does this mass feel national or political oppression? A throng of the insane can only ridicule; they cannot elicit sympathy even among the intelligentsia; for the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia, along with the nation's more cultured strata, willingly and without protest follows the course of our denationalization. Finally, perhaps Ukrainian nationality is simply a variety of the Russian? Even if it were to be proved that we are only a variety of the Russian nation, our inhuman treatment at the hands of the Russians would sanctify our hatred of them and our moral right to crush the ravisher by defending ourselves from coercion. Blood spilled by a brother's hand brings even stronger cries for revenge, for it is a brother's blood. Let the educated discover who gave birth to whom. Because of the insults and injustices felt by the nation, the entire people are loath to admit any moral ties with the Russian nation! We are able to judge, therefore, only the means and ways of the struggle.

And so we are without culture. The indisputable truth is that our nation is without culture. Strictly speaking, its culture belongs to history, for it faded away at the stage of development it reached in the seventeenth century. Our nation has shown very little progress in general cultural terms since the period of the 1654 constitution. In many of its aspects it had to return to lower forms of life in the political as well as the social sphere. All the religious-cultural movements that showed a promise of becoming a source of freedom of conscience and political freedom were the fruit of the higher standard of education that stimulated our society in the seventeenth century. All these movements were crushed by force. Even such elementary political rights as the right to personal freedom (taken away by the *corvée*, or forced labour) were violated. The nation was thrown into an abyss of darkness. The ancient culture of the Ukrainian Nation was destroyed, a culture so highly developed that several of its rays enlivened and strengthened the nation of our present-day masters.

Well! Today our masses are without culture. Nonetheless, in our very backwardness we find the best, most powerful, most intensive argument and grounds for accepting the political liberation of our nation as our ideal! Is the evolution of our nation's progress and enlightenment possible, when the nation enjoys no right to control its destiny, when darkness has become a means of holding our nation in bondage? We will have the opportunity to settle the state of affairs in our own home to our own liking only when we



win political and state rights for ourselves. Now, our masters' interests are in conflict with our own, since the opening of slaves' eyes is dangerous to slaveholders. The national intelligentsia, therefore, must take upon itself this final assignment. That is its right and its obligation.

The intelligentsia has now and again played an ignominious and shameful role in the history of the Ukrainian nation. The intelligentsia never considered its interests compatible with those of the entire nation. Nor did it ever take notice of the commonality of those interests. In the eyes of history the powerful, educated, and cultured intelligentsia of Ukraine accepted Polish nationality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All these Chetvertynskys, Chartoryskys, Vyshnevetskys, and Tyshkevyches<sup>12</sup> are flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone. Later, with a strong and vigorous effort, the Ukrainian people gave birth to a new intelligentsia. This second group accepted Russian nationality over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. All these Bezborodkos, Iavorskys, Troshchinskys, and all those Hohols, Hnidiches, Potapenko, Korolenko,<sup>13</sup> and 'they are numberless,' are of our blood. The people were once again left without an intelligentsia. The intelligentsia abandoned the people in the worst and most difficult periods of their existence. It is impossible to compare even war and epidemics with this mass withdrawal of the intelligentsia. War and disease mow down without distinction both the educated and the unenlightened, the poor and the wealthy. This retreat took the flower of the nation, its most cultured layer.

These two losses were so great that it is difficult to find parallels in the history of any other nation. The Ukrainian people somehow acquired within themselves enough strength that even in the worst political, economic, and national circumstances they were able to re-create a new, third intelligentsia. The evolution of the intellectual of the third formation has yet to be completed. But in essence [this third intelligentsia] must serve its own people, from whom it derives its vitality. Accordingly, now that the third intelligentsia has organic ties with the Ukrainian nation and is the defender

12 Ukrainian nobles who converted to Roman Catholicism and eventually became Polonized. An excellent article dealing with this phenomenon is Frank Sysyn, 'The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569-1648,' in I.L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 29-102.

13 Often of petty Cossack gentry background, many families became Russified in order to improve their position in the Russian Empire. For a closer study see Zenon E. Kohut, 'Problems in Studying the Post-Khmelnitsky Ukrainian Elite (1650s to 1830s),' in I.L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 103-19. See also Z. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy* (Cambridge, 1988).

of the Ukrainian people and the only conscious part of the Ukrainian nation, the rudder of the national ship belongs to it. Is the statement fair that the mass of Ukrainian society has nothing in common with the final formation of its intelligentsia? In actual fact, the Ukrainian intelligentsia is itself a microcosm of society. The aspirations of society are the aspirations of the intelligentsia. The spontaneous movements of the intelligentsia are the spontaneous movements and sympathies of the entire society.

If this is the case, then we stand eye to eye with the following question: If the Ukrainian intelligentsia exists, struggles, and is the defender of society, why do we not hear about this struggle? Why do we not see its results, nor even give the new intelligentsia anything in return for its righteous struggle?

Among the many specific responses to all these questions, one is that Shevchenko, the initiator of contemporary political Ukrainianism, could not be understood by his generation or even by those close to him. With his sufferings and death Shevchenko was the only one who sanctified the path of struggle for the political, national, and economic freedom of the Ukrainian people. The generation so close to him, the so-called Ukrainophile camp,<sup>14</sup> wrote on their banner, 'Let us work in such a way that no one will ever see our work!' These generations of 'white turtle-doves' with their pseudo-patriotism demoralized the entire Ukrainian public over the course of half a century. The frightening sufferings of Shevchenko and the aggravation suffered by his fellows fostered among these generations a whole cult of the cowardly. They produced an entire religion of loyalty. With unparalleled servility, total want of idealism, and uncommon inertia, these generations rejected a whole range of youth movements grounded on Ukrainian nationalism. They turned the Ukrainian movement into something shameful, ridiculous, and obscure! They gave Ukrainophilism the character of a premature concept in ethnographic theory. These generations best named themselves Ukrainophiles, that is, people who only sympathized with Ukraine. They did not even want to call themselves Ukrainians. The tactics and politics of the Ukrainophiles resulted in their being rejected with antipathy by all the youth of Ukraine, and the young generation consequently had no sympathy for old Ukraine. Thus the Ukrainophiles remained without progeny. Contemporary Young

<sup>14</sup> Mikhnovsky is probably referring to the intelligentsia belonging to the Stara Hromada (Old Community), established in the 1870s. Its members (among others, V. Antonovych, T. Vovk, M. Drahomanov, O. Rusov, and O. Levytsky) studied Ukrainian history, language, and ethnography and took no political stance owing to the conditions in the empire (i.e., the Ems ukase of 1876).

Ukraine<sup>15</sup> considers itself the direct heir of Shevchenko. Its traditions go back to Mazepa, Khmelnytsky, and King Danylo, passing over the Ukrainophiles. There are no ties between Young Ukraine and the Ukrainophiles, except for one frightening and fatal tie, which is to pay with its blood for the mistakes of its predecessors.

The era of embroidered shirts, peasant overcoats, and whisky has passed, never to return again. The stand taken by the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the third formation points towards a bloody and relentless struggle for its people. The intelligentsia believes in its own personal strength and in the national will to fulfil its obligation. The intelligentsia writes the following on its banner: 'One, single, indivisible, and independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.' For the sake of this magnificent ideal the Ukrainian intelligentsia will not lay down its weapons as long as even a single foreigner rules on a solitary strip of Ukrainian territory. All generations of Ukrainians will go to war. The battle will be carried out using all possible means, with the cultural battle considered just as appropriate as the physical. The fact of our national existence necessitates a battle. Though our history may be both sad and distressing, and though we may be without culture and our unenlightened masses fooled, we exist and we desire to continue to exist. Moreover, we do not just exist as living creatures. We want to live as people, as citizens, as members of a free nation. We are numerous – a total of thirty million. The future belongs to us. It is inconceivable that an entire nation consisting of one-thirtieth of all humanity could have disappeared and suffocated, when it is capable of doing battle with the entire world! We exist. We sense our existence, our individual national 'I.' In its historical process our nation was often not united among its separate parts. Today, however, the flowering of our nation across all parts of Ukraine is animated by one thought, one dream, one hope: 'One, single, indivisible, free, and independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.' Today we are united, for we understand why the Berestechkos<sup>16</sup> and Poltavas<sup>17</sup> happened to us. We were revived by the earth, which was thoroughly drenched by the blood of our ancestors, shed in battle for a free

15 In 1897 a Ukrainian student group was formed in Kharkiv. One of the founding members was Dmytro Antonovych, son of the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr. It was this group which asked Mikhnovsky to write *An Independent Ukraine* and which would later form the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party.

16 The battle of Berestechko took place in 1651 and was fought between the Ukrainian Cossacks under Khmelnytsky and the Poles under King Jan Kazimierz. The battle took on religious overtones as a holy war for the faith on both sides. The Poles came out victorious in the battle.

17 The battle of Poltava took place in 1709.

Ukraine. We suckled with our mother's milk an ancient love for our nation, the native land, and its freedom. We developed a hatred for the coercive measures imposed upon us. Just as the flow of a river cannot be stopped when the ice, having been broken during the spring, is carried violently out to sea, so a nation cannot be stopped. Once having broken its chains it awakens to life. Our nation has entered a new way of life. We must place ourselves in the lead so that it may be directed to the realization of a great ideal. We must remember, however, that we may only declare its strength, for we are but its intermediaries. True greatness lies in the entire Ukrainian nation.

As a party of struggle and also of practical action that grew on the basis of history we are obliged to point out our immediate goal, the restoration of our rights under the Pereiaslav Constitution of 1654 and all the wide-ranging implications it has for the entire territory of the Ukrainian people in Russia. We declare that what rightfully belongs to us but was taken away by force we accordingly will take back by force. Our nation has long been misled, but today it rises to the struggle. The first step towards achieving total freedom will be the Pereiaslav Constitution.

We understand that the struggle will be long and fierce and that the enemy is both strong and ruthless. But we also know that this is the final battle, that another, more opportune moment, for a new battle, will never arrive. The night has been long, but the dawn is approaching and we will not slacken, for the rays of freedom for all nations are shining on our servile chains, and we will break them to greet the rising sun of freedom! We appear on the historical arena for the last time, and we will either overcome or die ... We will no longer endure the domination of foreigners or contempt in our own land. We are numerically small, but we are strong in our love for Ukraine! Sons of Ukraine! We, as Antaeus<sup>18</sup> when touching the earth, will gather greater strength and courage. We are few but our voice will resound all across Ukraine, and everyone who is not dishonourable at heart will respond to us. But to him whose heart is dishonourable, we will respond to him in our own way!

Just as in the past, let the cowards and apostates go to the camps of our enemies. Their place is not among us. We shall declare them enemies of our native land.

All those in the whole of Ukraine who are not for us are against us.

18 This refers to the ancient Greek giant strong man. When the hero Antaeus was stricken during a battle, he touched the earth and rose from it to do battle with fully renewed strength.

Ukraine for Ukrainians! As long as even one enemy foreigner remains in our territory, we have no right to lay down our weapons. Let us remember that glory and triumph is the destiny of fighters for the people's cause. Forward! May every one of us remember that when he fights for the people, he must care for the entire nation, in order that they not perish as a result of his carelessness. Forward! For we cannot place our hope in any one else, or look back.

*Translated by Zenon Wasyliw*

1900

## On the Issue of a Distinctive Ukrainian Culture (excerpt)

BOHDAN KISTIAKOVSKY

*Bohdan Kistiakovsky (1868–1920) was a well-known legal scholar and sociologist who was appointed to the chair of law at Kiev University in March 1917. His dissertation, Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen (Society and the Individual), was published in book form in 1899. He also wrote a history of the constitutional movement in Russia. Philosophically an adherent of neo-Kantianism, he edited the works of Drahomanov, for which he provided an introduction. In 1919 he was made a full member of the newly established Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The selection here is a polemic with Peter B. Struve, excerpted from an article Kistiakovsky wrote under the pseudonym 'A Ukrainian.' The author's son, George Kistiakovsky, emigrated to the United States, where he became a professor at Harvard University and a scientific adviser to President Eisenhower.*

In your comments entitled 'On Various Themes' in the January issue of *Russian Thought*,<sup>1</sup> you consider it necessary on the occasion of V.E. Zhabotinsky's<sup>2</sup> lively and colourful article 'The Jewish People and Their Attitudes' to decide once and for all the question as to the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian culture by the complete flattening of the latter. Most startling is that, in expressing such drastic opinions, you offer no reservations in favour of even some of the cultural aspirations of the

<sup>1</sup> *Russian Thought* was a monthly journal of literature, scholarship, and politics published from 1880 to 1918, when it was suppressed by the Soviet government. Struve attempted to revive the journal in the 1920s, and for the few years of its publication it became the leading journal of the Russian emigration.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Zhabotinsky (Jabotinsky) (1880–1940) was a writer, journalist, and Zionist activist.

Ukrainian people and no objections to the violence committed against them. I will not touch on the fact that much of what you say proceeds from the materials and arguments given by the author of the article on the Jewish people, as you promised in your introduction. In any case, in Zhabotinsky's article there are no data on which to judge the significance of Ukrainian cultural development. You, however, do not need such evidence. You assume the point of view of the narrow, egoistic interests of the social group to which you belong, that is, the Russian intelligentsia, and from this perspective you predetermine the question of the fate of the cultural development of the popular masses, consisting of more than several million people. To a set of ethnographic terms – 'Great Russian,' 'Little Russian,' 'Belorussian' – you oppose an immense historical fact – the existence of the Russian nation and of Russian culture. But the 'Russian nation and Russian culture' exist nowhere but in the Russian intelligentsia and its consciousness; whereas in the ethnographic terms listed above lie hidden the folk masses who comprise the peoples of Russia. In *Landmarks*<sup>3</sup> and in a whole series of articles for *Russian Thought* you yourself have subjected to merciless critique the self-sufficient cultural existence of the Russian intelligentsia. Your comrade in *Landmarks* and close colleague in *Russian Thought*, A.S. Izgoev, has often defined the mission of *Landmarks* as, having moved aside the intelligentsia, to bring forward into the arena of political and cultural life the popular masses. And it seems to me that, as far as the social tendency of the magazine is concerned, the goal is absolutely correct. Another comrade of yours on *Landmarks* and also a collaborator in *Russian Thought*, who cannot be accused of lacking patriotism, S.N. Bulgakov,<sup>4</sup> indicates in his article 'Reflections on Nationality' that the nationalization process in Russia and the development in the country of patriotic feelings must be considered with greater complexity by taking into account the development of both local nationalism and local patriotism. But you, because of the existence and dominance of a special, rootless, extra-nationalistic, and unpatriotic culture of the intelligentsia, now want to determine the future cultural development of the popular masses of Russia.

3 *Landmarks*, printed in 1909, was a major collection of articles by prominent political and philosophical writers, including Kistiakovsky, vigorously criticizing revolutionary parties, mass revolutionary movements, and the growing fascination with revolution on the part of the Russian intelligentsia. The intelligentsia were encouraged to turn from materialism, to support the government, and to uphold the rule of law and enlightened nationalism.

4 S.N. Bulgakov (1871–1944) was a Russian economist, priest, theologian, and religious philosopher.

Further on you write: 'High school and university education are conducted in the so-called Great Russian language not by chance and not as a result of any coercion but because in the realm of universal culture this language is the natural, essential medium of creativity and communication for all the Russian communities that form the common nation ... The hegemony of Russian culture in Russia is the result of the entire historical development of our country and is a completely natural fact.' Evidently, your opinions have been formed under the influence of official Russian history. As is well known, from this official perspective the historical mission of Little Russia consists in serving the glorification of Great Russia, and the Little Russian masses are seen as material to be influenced by Great Russian culture. In any case, your construction of the 'history of Russia' is chronologically incorrect: the history of Russia is extending into its second millenium, but the process of the Russification of Little Russia is barely two hundred years old. Russification arose only in the first half of the eighteenth century, when the Synod<sup>5</sup> began to prohibit the Kiev academic press from printing sacred and theological books in its own language, with local [i.e., linguistic] differences, and began to remove from circulation old editions of such books printed in Kiev and to replace them with the editions of the Moscow Synodal Press. But this relates only to Little Russia on the left bank of the Dnieper, including Kiev on the right bank. In the rest of Right-Bank Ukraine, that is, in all the Kiev region, Volhynia, and Podolia, Russification would appear later, since those areas were tied to Russia only in 1772. If you now consider completely natural the fact of the undivided sway of Russian culture in Little Russia, then it is only because forced Russification intensified without interruption over the last hundred and fifty years. But why do you think that the nature of cultural development over these last hundred and fifty to two hundred years should determine the future direction of the cultural development of all the peoples who make up Russia? For the genuine culture of Russia, the culture of the popular masses, has not yet come into being. Only now, today, can it be conceived. Neither you nor anyone else can predict, even approximately, how the cultural development of Russia will proceed in the next fifty years, and what will be in two hundred years is not accessible to any type of prevision.

But what is most staggering is your statement that high school and university education in Ukraine is conducted in the 'so-called Great Russian language' 'not as a result of any coercion,' and that you see this phenome-

5 The Holy Synod was established by Peter the Great as the supreme administrative body of the Russian Orthodox Church.



non as nothing but completely natural and necessary. With the same assurance you might have said, seven to eight years back, that the Little Russian people read the Bible only in Church Slavonic or Great Russian rather than in Ukrainian 'not as a result of any coercion,' although at that time the Bible in Ukrainian, printed by the London Bible Society, was an illegal publication which was confiscated during searches and for the smuggling of which one could be punished with internal exile. However, these phenomena, in their own fashion 'natural and necessary' for the historical period before the manifesto of 17 October,<sup>6</sup> were completely natural afterwards, when in 1906 the Bible, just the Gospel according to St Matthew, was first published in Ukrainian with 'the blessing of the Holy Synod,' and the hundred thousand copies printed sold out in the very first year. In exactly the same way, your statement about the nature of high school and university education in Ukraine will remain unsubstantiated, an ungrounded assertion, until all the coercive force brought to the resolution of this issue is removed. You evidently do not know that in the academic year 1906-7 Professor N.F. Sumtsov of Kharkiv University and A.S. Grushewsky, an assistant professor at Odessa University, taught courses in Ukrainian, but that afterwards such courses were prohibited. The same befell attempts to establish Ukrainian high schools; but for us even private gymnasiums could open only with the permission of the authorities, and only those of the prescribed type. You have also not taken into account that under normal conditions, out of purely pedagogical considerations, a portion of high school and university teaching will have to be done, completely naturally, in Ukrainian. I hope you do not deny the need to establish elementary schools with instruction in Ukrainian for the Little Russian population, although in regard to them you have offered no opinion. But if you recognize the need for them, then you will have to recognize the need to create Ukrainian teachers' schools and a contingent of teachers to staff them, that is, to offer secondary and higher learning in the Ukrainian language.

You wrongly fuse the issue of introducing instruction in Ukrainian in high schools and universities with the issue of Ukrainians studying Russian. At this time, nine-tenths of the so-called Russian intelligentsia, living permanently in Ukraine and raised in its school system, really don't know

6 The October Manifesto, issued in 1905 by Tsar Nicholas II, promised a measure of representative government. The document prepared by Count S. Witte granted civil liberties and a broadened franchise, and called for the creation of a Duma, a national assembly with true legislative power.

Russian. That, of course, is well known to you from personal observation. The explanation is that the Ukrainian language is ignored in modern official schools, and to learn a foreign language well, even one closely related to your own, is very difficult if the native language is ignored. And I think that in Ukrainian schools of all types, beginning with local schools for the masses, the Russian language would be better and more expediently taught than in modern 'Russian' schools.

You are horrified by the thought that the 'Little Russian' and 'Belorussian' nations will be on the same terms with the 'Great Russian' nation as the Czechs with the Germans or the Austrian 'Ukrainians' with the Poles. This thought even draws from you the exclamation, 'But this means that the "Little Russian" and the "Belorussian" cultures will be consciously created.' Allow me, however, to note in answer that in our age of machine manufacturing not only material culture but every kind of spiritual culture is 'consciously' created. 'Russian' culture too is 'consciously created,' especially under the strong influence of the Russian autocratic and bureaucratic government. You yourself, with all your good and bad sides, are the best proof of this. Is it not really an irregular manifestation of the 'consciously created' Russian culture that you, one of the most eminent of contemporary Russian publicists, having done, in my profound opinion, the greatest service to the Russian liberation movement, have no conception of the cultural needs of one of the communities comprising almost a third of the whole population of Russia, and that you consider it possible to ignore them? Unlike 'Russian' culture, Ukrainian culture is 'consciously created,' not for the military and bureaucratic needs of the state, but for the most essential needs of the broad popular masses. It is created, resting only on democratic forces, and supported only by them.

Later you confuse the question of whether "Little Russian" culture and "Belorussian" culture should be created' – in your opinion, they do not yet exist – with the question of whether these cultures are equal in worth and significance to the culture which lovers of ethnographic terminology call 'Great Russian.' Earlier, at the beginning of this article, I mentioned my profound conviction that of all the Slavic cultures only Russian (Great Russian) has and will have true world significance. But, generally speaking, no beginning has yet been made in a study of the comparative worth and significance of different world cultures. Even you and I cannot now decide the question of the significance and value of an independent Ukrainian culture. This decision must be left wholly to the future. Will Ukrainian culture serve only for 'domestic use,' the formula devised to characterize its signif-

icance by I.S. Aksakov<sup>7</sup> in the middle of the nineteenth century, when he was still a sincere Slavophile and before he became, to put it tersely, a Katkovite?<sup>8</sup> Or will Ukrainian culture satisfy a higher popular demand? Only life itself can decide this, and theoretical arguments on the issue for the time being are completely superfluous.

But you judge the assumption that Ukrainian culture will be 'consciously created' from another angle. You think that connected with it is the possibility of completely 'overcoming and destroying' the hegemony of Russian culture. You write: 'In any case, such a project will, in my eyes, always be a colossal waste of the historical energy of the population of the Russian Empire. For there can be no doubt that making Russian culture the equivalent of others equal in value – the creation in the country of a multitude of cultures of equal stature, so to speak – will consume a vast amount of means and energy, which in different circumstances could go not for the nationalistic multiplication of cultures but for the elevation of culture in general. I am profoundly convinced that, for example, the establishment of secondary schools in Ukrainian would be artificial and a totally unjustified waste of the population's psychic energy.' Saying all this, you, in my opinion, proceed from a completely one-sided conception of the process of a culture's creation and development. You lose sight of the fact that the destruction of the old plays a major role in the ceaseless evolution of culture and in the creation of new cultural benefits. Long ago Heine said that the same customs rule in literature as among the savages in the forests, since in both locales children kill their parents. The most recent philosophy, giving so much attention to the problems of culture, has already begun to work out this issue. The popularizer of all the latest philosophical ideas touching on problems of culture, Nietzsche, offered a formula for the definition of this situation which has become current opinion. Who among today's educated people has not heard that the cultural-historical process consists of a transvaluation of values, that is, the destruction of old values and the creation of new? You, of course, know all this very well, since you have laboured on the creation of new values and the destruction of the old. If, when you judge Ukrainian culture, you nevertheless forget all this, it is because you are blinded by your own intellectual egoism. You sense that the development of an independent Ukrainian culture could be somewhat disadvantageous to the 'Russian' members of the intelligentsia, and there-

7 Ivan S. Aksakov (1823–1886) was a Slavophile poet, critic, and essayist who became an influential journalist in his later life.

8 See note 2 to the selection by Ivan Nechui-Levytsky.

fore the possibility is unacceptable to you. A prominent Russian writer often told me jokingly that he was against the development of the Ukrainian press since it would reduce the sale of Russian works. This charming joke is very telling.

You mourn the waste of psychic energy in the creation of Ukrainian secondary and higher schools of learning. But it does not occur to you even to utter in passing a word of sympathy, regret, and commiseration to the unfortunate Little Russian children from the masses who are taught to read and write in a foreign language. Is this not a waste of psychic energy? Moreover, you ignore the even more terrible waste of psychic energy that takes place when the intelligentsia is torn from the rest of the people. In its development Russian social thought often dwelt on the cultural injury to both sides resulting from this division. And recently it was precisely your *Landmarks* that with new vigour, arguments, and evidence raised this issue and placed it high on the agenda. Can you imagine a greater barrier between the people and its intelligentsia than when they speak, not figuratively but literally, different languages? But that is what is happening in Little Russia. Or is it your opinion that to have an intelligentsia kindred in spirit and language is a privilege only for the Great Russian people?

Finally, glance at the 'Russian' intelligentsia in Little Russia. Why, half of them speak some disgusting artificial Russian-Little Russian mixture, because both the Russian and the Little Russian languages are equally foreign to them. And that is one of the most terrible manifestations of the waste of psychic energy. About myself I can tell you that I was born in one of the largest and consequently most Russianized cities of Ukraine, that I come from a very intelligent and therefore considerably Russianized family, that I have a command not only of Russian and Polish but also of foreign languages, that I even write in them. And yet to this day I curse fate for my not having been educated in a native school, for my having rarely heard native songs and melodies during my childhood, for my not having native fairy tales grip my imagination, for my becoming acquainted with literature not in my native language, and for my growing up feeling alien to the people among whom I lived, alien to my native people. Only in the years of my young manhood did I begin to study the Ukrainian language seriously, only then did I come to know Ukrainian songs, poetry, and prose literature, come to love Ukrainian theatre. And I hold and have always held that only from that time did I begin to develop as an educated and cultured person. The emotional experiences connected with that period of my life greatly broadened my perceptive capacity. Only from that time did Russian and European poetry begin to make a profound, irre-

sistible impression. Only then did I suddenly penetrate the essence of drama and form a completely new view of literature. You maintain that Ukrainian culture does not yet exist. Perhaps you are right. But is it not strange that those elements from which Ukrainian culture should be formed or is already being formed made me an educated and cultured person? This paradox was created by life itself.

Evidently, you have not turned your attention to that 'waste of psychic energy' which explains the circumstance that Little Russians have played such an insignificant role, a role not proportional to their numbers, in the collective creation of 'Russian' culture. If one leaves aside that man of exceptional genius Gogol, who, incidentally, wrote in Russian illiterately – regrettably, historians of literature have not yet studied how one can be a great writer and write illiterately – then none of the Little Russians has risen to the top rank. Korolenko,<sup>9</sup> in this case, cannot be counted, since by origin he is as much a Ukrainian as he is a Pole, and this opposition of ethnic influences likely created for him that inner freedom which gave him the opportunity to become a first-class creator of the culture of a third, kindred people. Whenever one of the Little Russians has risen to the top, it has been like Kostomarov among the historians, for example: he rose precisely because he was a creator not just of Russian but chiefly of Ukrainian culture.

Aware of the greatness and immeasurable worth of Russian culture, you do not doubt that Ukrainian culture, insignificant in comparison with Russian, is doomed to insignificance for all time. We, the cultured Ukrainians, respect and value Russian culture no less than you. I need only point to that most remarkable Ukrainian publicist and political activist M.P. Drahomanov, who, contending that even for Ukrainians Russian culture has enormous significance, all his life waged a struggle for Russian culture among the Russian Ukrainians and the Galician Ukrainians. For his efforts he even earned the title 'Russifier' from his nationalistic fellow countrymen. But, in our opinion, from the overwhelming greatness of Russian culture one need not deduce that Ukrainian culture stands no chance of becoming a distinct, complete, and valuable culture, no matter how self-evident that inference seems to you.

As for myself, I say that the manner in which and the degree to which Ukrainian culture can develop is a mystery. Only the future can clarify it. By the way, not only the future but the past of Ukrainian culture is myste-

<sup>9</sup> Vladimir G. Korolenko (1853–1921) was a short-story writer and journalist, whose works express deep compassion for the downtrodden.

rious to me. I cannot explain to myself in any satisfactory way how, under the terrible conditions in which Ukrainian literature existed, Ukraine could produce in the course of the nineteenth century more than eighty poets, prose writers, and dramatists. You can become acquainted with them in the three-volume anthology in Ukrainian entitled *Vik* [The Century]. I attempted to seek the solution to this phenomenon by drawing parallels with the development of other nationalities. Recently – to be exact, last spring – I met in a south German university town an eminent German academic and social activist and asked him how he explained the fact that in Germany, during the prolonged period in which it was politically fragmented, given to strong political particularism, and without religious unity, no noticeable striving for cultural particularism sprang up. Why, for example, did the population speaking Low German, having produced several major poets reflecting the life of their community in that community's language – I will mention only the best-known of them, Fritz Reuter<sup>10</sup> – not strive for the full reconstruction of its independent culture? 'Luther's Bible and education accomplished that,' he answered. 'Then what can explain,' I asked, 'that in Holland one of the dialects of Low German developed into an independent literary language, used in all kinds of literature and as the language of instruction in the whole school system, even the universities?' 'The Dutch language,' the professor explained to me, 'very early became the language of trade and government.' 'But the same,' I objected, 'happened in Hamburg and Bremen, where the population spoke Low German, and yet High German became the ruling literary language. Why, finally, in the German areas bordering on Holland, where the population speaks the same language as in Holland, does High German reign as the language of culture, and not Dutch, and why is the population not attracted to the kindred literature and press on the other side of the border?' In response, my interlocutor could tell me much that was instructive about the struggle with dialects in German schools, about the use of dialects in the colloquial language of several courts of German royalty and in the gathering of officers of several Guards' regiments, but could not give me a direct answer. From his information I learned nothing that could explain what was taking place in my homeland. Southern and western Russia also used the Bible and theological works written in one and the same Church Slavonic or Old Russian, and these works are much older than Luther's Bible. Neverthe-

<sup>10</sup> Fritz Reuter (1810–74) was a writer famous for a six-volume collection of tales, *Olle Kamellen* (Old Stories of Bygone Days), written in the *Plattdeutsch* dialect of the author's home.

less, one common cultural language for Great Russia and for Little Russia was not created thereby. On the contrary, differentiated languages evolved, and in both places the literary language began to draw closer to the popular language. Ukraine lost education in its language more than a hundred years ago, and its literature was long under a ban. But that did not lead to cultural union with Great Russia. Is it not truly remarkable that the specific response to the 1876 ukase<sup>11</sup> banning Ukrainian literature was the beginning of publicistic and scientific literature in Ukraine, even though this literature was forced to lead an illegal existence and made use of foreign presses?

From the south German town I moved to a neighbouring Swiss university city, where I spent a whole day with an acquaintance of mine, a professor of philosophy. He directed our conversation to cultural-philosophical themes. He told me that, although he had not been in Russia, he was interested in the country and thought a great deal about it. To him, Russia, with its boundless expanses and large, heterogeneous masses of peoples, was the exact opposite of Switzerland. The characteristic feature of Switzerland and the Swiss, in his opinion, is particularism. And he told me a number of the most curious facts (which, unfortunately, I cannot relate here) which attest that particularism in Switzerland permeates not only each canton and each province, but each city, each section of the city, each neighbourhood, each generation, and each individual family. 'I have lived in this city,' my acquaintance said, 'eighteen years, and I am a complete stranger to the local population because they speak a dialect and I High German.' 'But having lived with them eighteen years,' I rejoined, 'you should have learned their dialect. Why do you not speak with them in their dialect?' 'They never speak to me in their dialect,' he explained. 'Talking among themselves, the Swiss use only their dialect, but as soon as even one German appears among them, they immediately switch to High German.' 'Why then,' I asked, 'don't the Swiss, who speak one and the same German dialect in which literature has already been written (the most remarkable writer in this dialect is not, however, the Swiss Hebel<sup>12</sup>), change their language in the interests of total cultural interaction?' 'The need for that,' the professor told me, 'was pointed out by the Swiss patriot Hilty,<sup>13</sup> but his proposal got no response. The Swiss dialect remains the everyday language, and not the

11 Kistiakovsky refers here to the infamous Ems ukase.

12 Johann Peter Hebel (1760-1826) was a priest and writer whose idyllic poetry written in dialect was widely read.

13 Karl Hilty (1833-1909) was a Swiss historian and member of the Swiss National Council.

language of high culture. In the press and in school the Swiss use High German.' Once again I was given information about a situation contrary to the situation observed in my native land which therefore could not serve to explain it.

Perhaps it will be said that the striving of Ukraine for cultural distinctiveness is explicable as a centrifugal movement in opposition to the centralism and despotism of the Russian government. But why in that case in France, where there is greater centralism and more pressure against the regions, does the new Provençal movement not go beyond literary and artistic boundaries? Even an organized group of pirates in no way differs in its goals from a purely literary and artistic movement.

In the end, one must acknowledge that the Ukrainian people is inherently endowed with a specific will and a certain mystical force that impels it to uphold its distinctive, national individuality. This will is manifested in various representatives of the Ukrainian people in different forms: in some with greater force, in others with lesser force. Having admitted this, we have not, of course, solved the cultural-historical mystery, only formulated it differently.

Accordingly, if the striving of Ukraine for its distinctive culture is a divine cause, then no earthly force can overcome it. The words of Gamaliel,<sup>14</sup> from the Acts of the Apostles, about emerging Christianity may be applied to all cultural movements. Each genuine cultural movement is a manifestation of the divine spirit in man, and therefore it is sacred, and violence against it a sin.

I am writing to you about all this to invite you to respond more thoughtfully and dispassionately to the Ukrainian cultural movement. I repeat again that I myself attempt to take the most objective position possible on this question and look only for a just resolution of it. And since I play no role in the Ukrainian movement and my name is of interest neither to you nor to your readers, allow me to sign as I signed last time,

A Ukrainian

1911

14 Kistiakovsky is recalling the following passage from 'a Pharisee named Gamaliel': 'So I advise you to keep away from these men and leave them alone; for should this plan or movement be merely human, then it will go to pieces; but if its source is God, then you will be unable to crush them. You might even find yourself fighting against God' (Acts 5:34-9).



## A Free Ukraine

### MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY

*Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), Ukraine's greatest historian, was also a prominent political activist. He studied at Kiev University and was professor of Ukrainian history at Lviv University from 1894 to 1914. He was elected president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv in 1897, and a year later he became co-editor, together with Ivan Franko, of Literaturno-naukovy vistnyk (The Literary and Scientific Herald). He also wrote the monumental nine-volume Istorii Ukrainy-Rusy (A History of Ukraine-Rus'). Following the 1905 revolution he moved to Kiev, where he continued his scholarly, editorial, and political work. In 1917, on behalf of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party, he was unanimously elected head of the Central Rada, which became the government of independent Ukraine. He emigrated to the West in 1919 but returned to Soviet Ukraine in 1924. After hard years spent in internal exile he died in Kislovodsk. Today, Hrushevsky is widely honoured for his achievements as a scholar and a statesman. The pieces selected for this anthology, the article below and, following it, a portion of one of Hrushevsky's speeches, best summarize his later political program.*

#### A Great Moment

A great moment has arrived! Ukraine is free of the chains placed on her by the cunning policy of the Muscovite tsars, and the Ukrainian people, freed as a result of their great efforts, have themselves taken charge of their newly won freedom.

As soon as the real basis of Muscovite policy became apparent – its intention of treating the Ukrainians not as free partners but as subjects of the Muscovite tsar and the property of the Muscovite state – the political

leaders of Ukrainian society loudly and clearly protested. As far back as 1658, four years after their surrender to the tsar, they declared their submission invalid and their union with Moscow broken. But the tsarist government, having once subjugated the Ukrainian people, did not want to restore to them their liberty and the right to make their own decisions. Taking advantage of every internal conflict in Ukrainian society, the class and other contradictions which prevented a united Ukrainian policy, it wove, strand by strand, a strong leash with which to hold the Ukrainian people and forced them into the state of helpless submission in which they found themselves a hundred years later.

All the heroic efforts, all the sacrifices and attempts on the part of the best sons of Ukraine during later decades were unsuccessful. The Russian leash firmly held its prey, and only the Russian revolution, having destroyed the nerve centre of tsarism, has freed us. We have become citizens once more, not mere subjects. We have become free and have been given full rights to make our own decisions, to make our own laws, and to build the fortune of our people on our own land. A free Russian republic cannot hold peoples who are not free!

This profound change in the condition of our people and of us, as its representatives, must be deeply felt, and all the necessary consequences must be drawn from it. Gone are the days when we wrote petitions, supplications demanding acknowledgment of our right to cultural development, to such elementary things as the use of our language in schools, government offices, and courts. Only last year the Ukrainian community tried to persuade the government to abandon its attitude to Ukrainian problems in Russia by recognizing these basic demands: the lifting of repression, the reinstatement of Ukrainian newspapers, journals, and organizations banned at the beginning of the war, and the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the schools and public administration. Neither the government, which during the war still aimed for the annihilation of everything Ukrainian, nor Russian parliamentary circles, nor Russian progressive social circles listened to our pleas. Ukrainians were left condemned to repression until the last moment. The system of repression, which was extreme, reached its zenith, unparalleled since the shameful ukase of 1876, just before the revolution, which moved the Ukrainian question into a different context and set of circumstances.

There would be no greater error now than to pull out the old Ukrainian petitions and present them to the government as our demands. It would be a gross misunderstanding to regard our old requests as a measure of our needs today and to consider their fulfillment as satisfying the requirements of Ukrainian life today. What we fought for five, four, or even three years

ago, if granted, would have been received by the Ukrainian community with heartfelt gratitude, and could have been a good thing for our people, could have spared it the hard experiences of the last few years, could have made its cultural progress easier. We need it even now, and it should be granted immediately with a generous hand, free from limitations and reservations. But it cannot be regarded as satisfying Ukrainian needs, as a 'solution of the Ukrainian question,' today. That must be said with special emphasis respecting the last proclamation of the Provisional Government, respecting the sympathy it expressed for 'the cultural and national self-determination of the nationalities of Russia.' At the moment that is of interest to no one in Ukraine. There is no longer a Ukrainian question. There is a free, great Ukrainian people which is building its fortune under new conditions of liberty.

The great events which we have all experienced have removed the brakes on the hidden energies of our people. They, like a compressed spring, are now rising in front of the astonished eyes of foreigners and of themselves.

The needs and demands of Ukraine are expanding and enlarging. The greatest misfortune at the present moment, for the government and the public leaders, would be not to keep pace with this unfolding of Ukraine's demands.

The tsarist government has written its own death warrant because it was unable to keep pace with life and deluded itself with the notion that it could halt, postpone, or subvert the moderate demands made of it. Its successors may follow in its path if they are guided by old memories of the minimal demands made under the former conditions of snaillike progress characteristic of those times.

Let them beware! We are not going to make these mistakes. We must hold our fingers on the pulse of the life of the people and follow its rhythm. This is the law for us, and we shall obey and proclaim it to all, whether they like it or not.

The demands we now make may be a sore surprise for many. But there is no other way out. We must make these demands gently, if possible, and tactfully, but also decisively, decisively, decisively! As our old proverb has it, hard as to content, soft as to form.

Before this important moment and the responsibility it places on us, all other considerations must give way. The will of our people must be fulfilled.

### **There Is No Way Back**

The resolutions made at people's assemblies, at civic and party confer-

ences during the last few weeks, leave no doubt as to the political platform uniting all active elements of the Ukrainian population. This is our old demand for the broad national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine within a Great Russian federal republic, for a Ukraine based on democratic principles and maintaining powerful safeguards for the national minorities of our land.

It could not be otherwise. The demand for a government by the people and a democratic order in Ukraine in the form of a separate, autonomous nation connected by federal ties to other nations of the Russian state – this is our old slogan. It was first raised in the 1840s by Ukraine's leading sons, Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Kulish, Hulak, Bilozersky, and others,<sup>1</sup> and ever since that time it has been a leading theme in Ukrainian political thought, in its organizational, cultural, and social work. At times it was not openly proclaimed owing to the censorship and repression with which the old regime of Russia answered the calls for autonomy and federation. But as soon as Ukrainian society was allowed to express its thoughts, it repeated this message everywhere and always – from the platform of the first and second Duma,<sup>2</sup> in the press, and so on. Now it can be proclaimed not only in print, but in assemblies of large groups, in demonstrations, and in all kinds of public declarations, as well as in Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian local gatherings confirming their solidarity with the demands of the entire Ukrainian community and all the politically conscious strata of Ukrainian society.

Without doubt this will remain the common-ground of a political platform which will unite the population of Ukraine, regardless of strata and nationalities. A common-ground compromise between cultural and national self-determination and the demand for political independence.

The program of cultural self-determination which the head of the Provisional Government, Prince Lvov, carelessly accepted in one of his speeches as representing the totality of Ukrainian demands will now satisfy no one in Ukraine. Gone forever are the days when Ukrainian society had to reckon with the old regime, with its inability to express the will of the Ukrainian people for a full national life, and with Russian society's lack of faith in Ukraine. The will of the people could not be expressed except in

1 All those named were members of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius in Kiev (1845–7).

2 The Duma was the parliament Tsar Nicholas II was forced to establish after the revolution of 1905.

modest demands formulated in 'rational' arguments. They were repeated over a long period, and if they had been listened to in time, they would have created a lasting moral bond between Ukrainian society on the one hand and a progressive Russian society on the other.

But, regrettably, these demands were not listened to in time. They were not listened to even at the critical moment when the Russian government, taking advantage of the war, tried to destroy everything Ukrainian in Galicia and in Russia, not hesitating to use the most brutish and barbarous means. The Ukrainians found no support or help in Great Russian society, except from some socialist groups.

This, it must be said, created among the Ukrainians profound disillusionment with Russian progressive democracy as well as with the possibility of their union with it. The Ukrainians had faith in such a possibility before the war, when they seem to have established strong ties with Great Russian progressive society. But those ties did not withstand the test of war. Consequently, the conviction grew ever greater of the absolute necessity of safeguarding Ukrainian rights by acting on the right to form a state in the federal Russian state or, if not that, by establishing complete Ukrainian independence. Only full statehood came to be regarded as constituting a true safeguard of the political and national evolution of the Ukrainian people. It has come to pass and cannot be reversed. There is no going back from this position, to the past stages of mere cultural distinctiveness or cultural autonomy.

A broader autonomy for Ukraine with state laws for the Ukrainian people in a federal context – this is the program for the present moment, from which no retreat can be made. Any obstacles to, any hesitations in satisfying it on the part of the leaders of the Russian state or the leading circles of Russian society can have only one consequence, the shifting of the focus of attention in favour of Ukrainian independence. Russian leaders of the Duma talked about Ukrainian independence even before the war. But they themselves provided it with fresh weapons by their shilly-shallying policy towards Ukraine during the last years of Ukraine's misfortune. At the present time, those who favour an independent Ukraine are in agreement as to the common platform of broad national and territorial autonomy and federal safeguards of Ukraine's state laws. So far the flag of an independent Ukraine stays furled. But will it be unfurled when all-Russian centralists take from our hands the banner of a broad Ukrainian autonomy in a federal and democratic Russian republic? We must be very careful. That should be made clear to the leaders of the Russian state!

## From Word to Deed

Autonomy – Federation! A broad autonomy for Ukraine within her ethnographic boundaries in a federal union with a democratic Russian republic. This is our platform, our slogan under which unite endless rows of Ukrainian soldiers, peasants, workers, young people, and the intelligentsia, whose ranks are being joined by ever-fresh groups of other nationalities, other non-Ukrainian minorities, in our land. So far these minorities are few and far between, but they will grow in number when they realize the growing power of Ukraine and its true character: that it contains no violence, no exclusiveness, no aggression, no appetite for overlordship or oppression, no intention to limit the rights of other nationalities.

What path must we choose to reach our goal? What is the best method to realize our slogan?

The establishment of autonomous order in the national territories as well as of the federal government in the Russian republic and of the Russian republic itself has to be decided by the constituent assembly of the Russian state. The Provisional Government assures us of its desire to call this assembly as soon as possible, but it makes no secret of the difficulties connected with it at a time when the great mass of the most valuable and active male population is at the front, in the trenches, or abroad as prisoners of war. In the end it is unclear how soon the assembly may be called together, whether it will be possible to call it before the end of the war and demobilization. Are we, until such a time, going to preserve the program of autonomy and federation only in the form of a declaration, and should we and other nationalities busy ourselves with more agitation and preparation for the elections to the constituent assembly? Perhaps not. That would mean inexcusable passivity, criminal neglect, a position not consonant with the spirit of our times, a behaviour reminiscent of the pre-revolutionary way of thinking, which we must firmly reject.

The great revolution we experienced brought relief not only from tsarist despotism but also from that bureaucratic formalism which stifled all initiative and activity in individuals and in society. Society, having become accustomed to walk like an ox in a yoke, cannot at once form new habits of activity and initiative and is still waiting for orders from above – that it be allowed to do something (according to the old principle that what was not allowed was forbidden), that it be called upon to act or to declare something. In the meantime, the new order expects from society that it will organize itself as soon as possible according to the new principles of freedom and self-help, adjusting to the new conditions of local life, to the

demands of the given moment, in order to strengthen the new, free order and to defend it against evil plots and hidden enemies of freedom and democracy.

This is how it should be. Before, it was obviously impossible to govern and guide a Russia of two hundred million people, with all its national variety and different regional, cultural, and economic conditions, even during a period of relatively peaceful conditions and regular forms of government. How can we now expect the Provisional Government to issue orders and decrees about everything, when this government is torn between fortifying the front neglected by the old regime, which is disintegrating behind the front, and strengthening the successes of the revolution? How can one expect, in addition, that it organize local life? Of course, the Provisional Government cannot do all these things. It waits for the defenders of the new order, freedom, and democracy to organize things by themselves, and it is ready to sanction and to allow everything that is being done in this respect locally. Life races ahead; whatever does not keep pace with it decays and perishes. One must create new forms of organization in accordance with the new conditions. This can be done only by local forces. The Provisional Government understands this.

The Provisional Government has made several moves sanctioning the demands of the nationalities. One hears from all sides that local national majorities are taking it upon themselves to organize their countries on a new, autonomous basis, in agreement with the national minorities and with the Provisional Government.

In the middle of March we heard that Lithuanian national organizations had decided to form a committee consisting of the representatives of the Lithuanian majority as well as of the national minorities in their country (the Jews, the Belorussians, the Poles, and the Great Russians) in order to organize an autonomous order in the Lithuanian *gubernii* and that they had received approval in principle from the Provisional Government. A week later we read of a similar decision by the Belorussian national congress, which elected an executive committee and empowered it, in consultation with the Provisional Government, to organize the government in Belorussia. Similar efforts were made by the Estonians, who demanded the exclusion of their national territory from being divided into *gubernii* and the appointment of a general commissar. Not long ago we heard similar news about the Latvians and Moldavians. Other nationalities of Russia are making efforts in the same direction.

In the large Ukrainian territory more time is needed so that we can communicate with other peoples and work out with them a common program

of organized work. But our main goal will remain the same. We cannot sit with folded hands and wait for the constituent assembly – that is, for whichever tendency, centralist or federalist, will prevail there – to recognize our autonomy or not.

More than any other people in Russia we have learned from bitter experience how firmly embedded are the centralist tendencies even in the more progressive representatives of the Russian intelligentsia. We must also take into account that all our present declarations concerning the need for full national and territorial autonomy, while they remain declarations only and amount to no more than demands for local self-government, will give rise in those circles to doubts as to and sceptical reflections on the realism and practicality of the demands themselves. In this response the Great Russian centralists will find allies in some stateless nationalities.

In such circumstances we cannot risk what is a matter of life and death for our people and for the entire country – its full autonomy. We cannot make our demands conditional on whether a centralist or an autonomist-federalist majority prevails in the constituent assembly, or on whether the autonomist-federalist majority persuades the others to follow them. We must be certain ourselves.

Only by making everyone face the facts can we dispel the doubts, just as the Ukrainian demonstrations of the last few weeks have forced into silence those who said that Ukrainian ideas have no support among the masses, and the like. Only by creating the autonomy of Ukraine, by Ukrainianizing or creating new organs of local self-government in contact with and sharing an understanding with other nationalities, uniting them in common organizations, and crowning all this with a plan for a state structure for the country (I am referring to a general plan, not to a timetable for how the work should proceed from below and above), shall we demonstrate the reality, practicality, and usefulness of these demands. Upholding the new order by all the means available to this organization, making it a strong fortress, supporting by means of it the Provisional Government in everything that fosters freedom and democracy, we shall march forward together in our work. And at last having confirmed the new organization of our land by the united will of the Ukrainian representatives, the organization which expresses the will of the entire population of our land, we shall not await in fear the results from the constituent assembly, as if it were an all-Russian lottery, but shall know for certain what they will give us.

They will give us what they should because what we will present will accord with their own ideas: the final juridical sanction of a governing order which will be created locally, in national and regional areas, accord-



ing to the principles of freedom and democracy, with the consent of local national groups. The constituent assembly will receive this program for its final approval.

## To the Nationalities of Ukraine

We are demanding the right to statehood for the Ukrainian people in a federation of the peoples of Russia, a full autonomy for Ukraine in its ethnographic boundaries, a full political, cultural, and national Ukrainian life. But all this cannot be and should not be and will not be a threat to other nationalities who inhabit Ukraine. We are striving for a statehood for the Ukrainian land not in order to rule over national minorities in Ukraine. We ask for full autonomy for her not in order to use these rights for ourselves alone. The full national life which we demand for the Ukrainian people should not swamp other nationalities and limit their strivings for the free development of their cultural and national vitality.

Not in the least! We did not fight for generations and suffer for the rights of our people in order, as soon as these rights are achieved, to have another goal – the enslavement of weaker nationalities and domination over them in the great Ukrainian land. We did not argue for the rights of every nationality to self-determination, regardless of their ‘maturity or immaturity,’ their historical rights or lack of them, their cultural achievements and their small or large size, in order to deny these rights to any nationality. We did not oppose the ‘national ethos,’ the inflation of national chauvinism, the principle that ‘all means are justified for the end of national success,’ in order to step onto this path ourselves.

We shall not follow the example of the Hungarians, who appeared before Europe as champions of liberty but, having gained their rights in Hungary, enslaved all the other nationalities there. We shall not follow the Poles, who wrote on their banners ‘For our freedom and for your freedom’ but used their advantage against weaker groups – against the Ukrainians in Galicia, against the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland. We shall not hypocritically call great our past fighters for freedom and, at the same time, deny freedom to our non-Ukrainian citizens in the so-called national interest. That will not happen.

We, who carried the banner of liberation in the darkest days of oppression, shall remain under it and shall firmly oppose any deviation from the principles emblazoned on that banner. We shall fight with determination all chauvinist trends, if they spring up in our society or if they are provocatively forced upon us from outside. We shall oppose all efforts to

embroil us in quarrels with our co-citizens of other nationalities. And we are convinced that Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian people, in whose political wisdom we firmly believe, will support us in this endeavour solidly and sincerely. The defenders of Ukrainian nationality will be no nationalists.

We want, of course, to believe that the representatives of the national minorities in Ukraine will also understand their situation and will meet Ukrainian political demands, thus strengthening the position from which we can defend the national rights of the minorities. Their national tact and the understanding of their own interests ought to tell them that in this great historic moment, when the Ukrainian people is trying to build a free Ukraine on its territory, they should be with it and not stand apart as neutral witnesses waiting to see how the work will end before joining either the centralists or the autonomists. Those who, with openness and courage at this critical moment, decisively support the Ukrainians will create for the future a lasting spiritual link between themselves and the Ukrainian people. Those who stay aloof or are hostile will not, of course, merit sympathy from the Ukrainian side. But the law must prevail regardless of sympathies and antipathies. The rights of national minorities will be protected!

The Belorussians, where they form a minority on the Ukrainian territory, are our closest brothers, comrades in long hardship and struggle for national life. Great Russians by origin or education, Poles who preserve their Polish culture, Jews, the most numerous of the non-Slavic minorities who deserve special attention, Czechs, Moldavians, Muslims, and other nationalities must receive and, I am certain, will receive proportional representation in our autonomous organs. Their languages will be recognized in dealings with government and local authorities in those districts where these national minorities make up a certain national minimum. Ukrainian school boards will certainly see to it that in those localities with a certain number of pupils of this or that nationality these pupils will have the opportunity to learn in their native languages. All the national and religious groups will have the right to form their own cultural or religious societies and institutions and to receive for them assistance from the autonomous treasury of Ukraine.

All this will be worked out in the near future by a committee for the autonomous status of Ukraine organized by a congress with the participation of the representatives of all the nationalities of Ukraine. The Ukrainian community, in the meantime, must carefully avoid doing anything which conflicts with the rights of non-Ukrainian nationalities in Ukraine, anything which might frighten them concerning their fate in Ukraine and cause

them to doubt the full respect given their rights, national and cultural, by the Ukrainian side.

All expressions of Ukrainian chauvinism, exclusiveness, and intolerance regarding other nationalities are undesirable, no matter when and how. Now, in present circumstances, when tact and thoughtfulness along with mutual understanding and solidarity are needed for the achievement of the great goal, chauvinism, exclusiveness, and intolerance are utterly inadmissible. They must be branded national crimes and fought with every force.

### Is Ukraine Only for Ukrainians?

From all sides people come to me with anxious questions whether it is with our knowledge and consent that everywhere it is said Ukraine is only for Ukrainians, that the *katsapy*<sup>3</sup> must get out of here, that all administrative posts in Ukraine are to be filled by the Ukrainians alone, and that others have no business here. Such talk makes a very bad impression on people who are favourably disposed to us, and some progressive non-Ukrainians, who have tried to do what they could for the country, take the talk seriously and want to leave Ukraine for other parts. Not being able to answer the questions one by one and thus calm all the questioners, I take up this pen once more in order to answer with all decisiveness, No!

Neither I nor my comrades, the organized Ukrainians, have agreed with such views or held such ideas, and we have fought and will fight against them because they are incompatible with our principles and with Ukraine's interests.

To the contrary, we think that Ukraine is not only for Ukrainians but for all who live in Ukraine and for all who love her and want to work for her welfare and her people, to serve the country rather than exploit her for themselves.

Everyone who shares these views is our dear co-citizen, regardless of whether he or she is a Great Russian, a Jew, a Pole, or a Czech. Whoever wants only to exploit the people's work, to be a parasite guzzling tasty tidbits, is not needed here, regardless of whether he is a non-Ukrainian or a Ukrainian.

The slogan 'Ukraine for Ukrainians' has been heard before today. But formerly it issued from individuals or small circles who remained outside the mainstream of organized Ukrainians, who were openly opposed to it.

Ten years ago our leading writer Vynnychenko sharply ridiculed people

3 *Katsapy* (goats' beards) was a pejorative Ukrainian name for Russians.

who even in Ukrainian jails could not suffer *katsapy* and bade them go back to Muscovy. The irony had a deeper layer. As long as Russia was the 'dungeon of peoples,' Ukraine was a narrow cell therein, and the prisoners, forced together and deprived of freedom and initiative, with no way out, blamed their co-prisoners, seeking among them the weak ones who were even more miserable than they. This gave rise to chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and other aberrations of social thought. But in the spacious house of an autonomous Ukraine, which we are now building on the solid foundations of the Russian revolution, there should be enough room for all active workers who wish to help society, without regard to their nationality, party views, or ideology.

The slogans which run counter to our principles often come from people beaten down by a long history of hard times, by government persecution, and by the hostility of both Russian society and the Russianized society. I do not want to excuse them in any way, but to see some mitigating circumstances when we encounter such people who in the past have suffered for being Ukrainian. It happens very rarely. As far as I can judge, such chauvinist slogans are more often raised by people who sat quietly during the past persecution of the Ukrainians and came to the fore only when the situation changed. They are ready to shove off the *katsapy* and take their places, with all the perks that go with them. But such schemes are not condoned by the circles of organized Ukrainians.

On the contrary, we want to keep in their places all useful and devoted workers who favour freedom and democracy and are ready to respond to the needs of the new Ukrainian life and the whole of Ukraine. If we place conscious Ukrainians in leading positions, we do so to indicate the new direction for and orientation in the activities of the institutions concerned. We do so for our comrades, who accept their new positions not as a fat privilege but as a not so pleasant duty at a historic moment.

The need for Ukrainian national activity – organizational, literary, political – is now so great that we are trying to gather all forces around it and are ready to make room for those who are sympathetic to us and who can defend the interests of the country and its population, the rights and needs of the Ukrainian majority, while securing the rights of the minorities. The greater the number of those non-Ukrainians in solidarity with us, the easier will be the task of the Ukrainians, and accordingly the former will be welcomed here in Ukraine.

## Speech on National Minorities (excerpt)

MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY

No matter how highly we may value the role of the peasantry in our future life and in the building of a state, we should not turn our backs on the cities or on the towns. Although they are not Ukrainian in population and are often centres of anti-Ukrainian feeling, demonstrations, and manifestations which undermine our statehood and therefore evoke dismay in Ukrainian society, we should think even harder of ways to incorporate these heterogeneous and foreign bodies into our life and bring about their integration, thereby neutralizing their alienness and foreignness.

This issue is a heritage of our history, a heritage of the economic and national policies of states of which we had the misfortune to be a part. The old Poland gave us Jewish cities and towns as a result of a bad social and national policy, which strangled our Ukrainian towns and their population and failed to replace them with a Polish population. Cities and towns, unable to cope with economic and administrative conditions, were occupied by the Jewish population, which was the best able to survive all the disadvantages and the best equipped to accept the social and economic absurdities. That is how the dualism between the Ukrainian village and the Jewish town arose, as they were when Right-Bank Ukraine came under the Russian regime. In the towns this regime added a Russian bourgeoisie to a Polish bourgeoisie and created great nests of Russian workers in the industrial centres. So a pattern emerged which reminds me most of Bohemia at its rebirth, where the cities and the aristocracy were German, just as in Ukraine they were Jewish, Russian, and Polish. Of these elements it is the Jews who deserve the greatest attention.<sup>1</sup> They are

<sup>1</sup> Until now I have used the Ukrainian term *zhyd* (Jew). But when the Jewish representative in the Central Rada told me that this word is felt to be pejorative, I started to use the word *ievrei*. I will continue to do so, but I want to draw attention to the fact that in our literature the word *zhyd* has no pejorative meaning. [Author's note]

the most numerous, the most resilient, and the most rooted in our country.

Among the Russian bourgeoisie in Ukraine there are many unstable elements, some of them denationalized Ukrainians (Little Russians) and Russians who were born in Ukraine and are tied to its life, but who now, caught unprepared by historical developments, have found themselves members of the 'Russian Union'<sup>2</sup> and similar organizations. Probably many of them will go back to Russia, or they may merge with the Ukrainian element. One must watch this process patiently, without unnecessary provocation, avoiding rapid Ukrainianization and responding wisely and softly to their demands as long as the Ukrainian state and language are protected. I am aware that at this moment there are many psychological factors which exacerbate the tensions between us and them. There is a state of war between Ukraine and Russia which places many Russians in Ukraine in the position of citizens of an enemy state. Some matters are for the courts to decide. But one should prevent all hostilities and neutralize possible collisions. Here, as in politics, one must wait and not force matters which need time in order to mature and settle themselves.

I could also give some advice to the Russian side, if it does not want to undermine Ukrainian statehood and in the interests of good relations: Do not exacerbate the situation by declarations and protests, or take upon yourselves the defence of a 'one and indivisible' Russia in Ukraine, and do accustom yourselves to the principles of Ukrainian statehood. In our approach to the Russian element in Ukraine we must beware of a transitional stage, but in our approach to the Jewish element we must realize that their process is not transitional and would mean that Jewish society in Ukraine would not denationalize or assimilate but, on the contrary, develop its own culture and life. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for the Jews to live in harmony with the Ukrainians. Such harmony would provide them with conditions favourable to their national life. Through the Central Rada the Ukrainian people gave a striking and concrete example of their desire to allow all national minorities the opportunity to pursue their own national development and the preservation of their culture. So that much is clear. There is no desire to denationalize the Jewish population in a democratic Ukrainian state. For their part, the Jewish population therefore should be interested in having power remain in the hands of a Ukrainian democracy. The latter has only one demand: that the Jewish and other

<sup>2</sup> The 'Union of Russian People' was a nationalist and anti-Semitic organization created in 1905.

nationalities should not feel themselves foreigners or colonized people in Ukraine, and that their interests should not lie beyond the borders of Ukraine; that they should feel themselves citizens of the state, accepting not only their rights but also their responsibilities on equal terms with citizens of Ukrainian nationality; that they should defend the rights and freedoms of Ukraine and not remain neutral. It is clear that only under such conditions can the full equality of both the non-Ukrainian and the Ukrainian nationalities and full cultural and national self-determination be possible. I am convinced that on such a basis a strong understanding, a solidarity, and even a mutual friendship between Ukrainians and Jews is possible. In order to bring the city and the village closer together, thereby eradicating their antagonism, our political task should be to bring about their unity as soon as possible. Both sides must attempt to remove the barriers and antagonisms between these two elements.

On the Ukrainian side everything must be done to neutralize and uproot anti-Semitism, which has flared up lately, stimulated by vulgar nationalism on the one side and Jewish participation in Bolshevik excesses on the other. It must be noted that the latter did not proceed from Jewish organizations, so participation by the Jews in anti-Ukrainian uprisings has nothing to do with organized Jewish life, which bears no responsibility for it. But anti-Semitism – this ‘socialism of fools’ as German socialists have justly called it – obfuscates the consciousness of the real relations between classes and social interests, serves the interests of reaction, and from the point of view of Ukrainian democracy is definitely harmful. During the Khmelnytsky era anti-Semitism was spread by the Polish lords among the peasant masses and the Cossacks. Now it may serve other bourgeois and reactionary interests. But it does not serve the interests of the Ukrainian working masses.

For their part, the politically conscious and responsible Jewish elements should not make things difficult, but should facilitate the cause of national mutual understanding. Jewish society should free itself as soon as possible from the old centralist habits, from an ideology of all-Russian unity, and from the role of servants of Russification, which the Jews have filled until now. We realize that it is not easy to shed these old habits, the habit of using the Russian language and culture as an intermediary to world culture. Jewish children have studied in Russian schools, and their fathers protest against the Ukrainianization of the schools. Jewish bureaucrats do not want to learn Ukrainian, protest against Ukrainian’s becoming a state language, and so forth. All this is understandable from the psychological point of view, but the inability to rise above old habits and to look to the future

does a disservice to them and to us. This short-sightedness places the Jews among those who are obstructing the creation of a new Ukraine, who are among the opponents of our state, and it naturally evokes dissatisfaction, suspicion, and accusation.

In the interests of establishing good relations, the leaders of the Jewish community should influence their members to become used to the new conditions, to learn Ukrainian, to acquaint themselves with Ukrainian literature, art, history, and tradition. They will find much to their liking there if they approach it without the prejudice they have inherited from the Russians about Ukrainian poverty. On the basis of mutual understanding the old suspicions and stereotypes will disappear.



## The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

*The Fourth Universal was an edict issued by the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic on 22 January 1918. It called for elections and established laws respecting banking and land, which was to become social property. It also urged the people to resist the Bolshevik invasion. The most important item was the sentence proclaiming the independence of Ukraine. In its historical context the Fourth Universal had only a symbolic importance. Days after its proclamation, the Bolshevik forces occupied Kiev, and the Ukrainian government fled to the west. Yet the document retained its significance for the future.*

To the People of Ukraine:

By your strength, will, and word there has arisen in the Ukrainian land a free People's Republic. An age-old dream of your forefathers, champions of the freedom and rights of the toiling masses, has been realized. But the freedom of Ukraine has been regained at a difficult time. Four years of destructive warfare have weakened our land and exhausted our people; plants have been closed and factories have ceased to produce; railways have been disrupted and money has lost its value; harvests have declined and the land is threatened with famine. The countryside has been infested with bands of robbers and thieves since the collapse of the front, and these marauding soldiers have caused bloodshed, confusion, and destruction in our land. Owing to these circumstances, the election to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as prescribed by the previous Universal could not be held; hence that Assembly, scheduled for today and expected to take over from us the supreme revolutionary authority in Ukraine, to

establish laws in the People's Republic, and to organize a new government, could not be convened. In the meantime, the Petrograd Government of People's Commissars has declared war on Ukraine in order to place under its control the free Ukrainian Republic. It has ordered into our land its troops – the Red Guards and the Bolsheviks – who are taking away grain from our peasants and dispatching it to Russia without having made payment; even the grain set aside for sowing has been confiscated thus. They are killing innocent people and spreading anarchy, lawlessness, and crime everywhere.

We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, have done all in our power to prevent the outbreak of this fratricidal war between the two neighbouring peoples, but the Petrograd Government has refused to consider our proposals and is continuing to wage a bloody war against our people and the Republic. Moreover, the same Petrograd Government of People's Commissars is beginning to dally with peace and is calling for a new war, which it terms holy. Blood will be shed again, and once more the hapless toiling people will have to lose their lives.

We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, elected at the congresses of the peasants, workers, and soldiers of Ukraine, cannot agree to this. We cannot support any wars, because the Ukrainian people desires peace; and democratic peace must be made as soon as possible. Therefore, in order that neither the Russian Government nor any other regime place any obstacles before Ukraine in her efforts to establish peace, and in order to stabilize the country, to promote creative labour, to strengthen the revolution, and to uphold our freedom, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, announce the following to all the citizens of Ukraine:

*Henceforth the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes an independent, free, and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people, subject to no one.* We wish to live in peace and friendship with all the neighbouring states: Russia, Poland, Austria, Romania, Turkey, and others; but none of them has the right to interfere in the life of the independent Ukrainian Republic. The power in it shall belong only to the Ukrainian people, in whose name we, the Ukrainian Central Rada – the representatives of the toiling masses of the peasants, workers, and soldiers – will govern the country through our executive organ, which henceforth will be called the 'Council of People's Ministers.'

First of all we instruct the Government of our Republic, the Council of People's Ministers, to conduct from this day forth the previously initiated peace negotiations with the Central Powers, completely independently, and bring them to a conclusion regardless of obstacles or objections from

any other part of the former Russian Empire, and to achieve peace so that our land can develop its economy in harmony and tranquillity.

As for the so-called Bolsheviks and other invaders who are plundering and destroying our land, we instruct the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic to launch a firm and determined struggle against them, and we appeal to all the citizens of our Republic to defend the welfare and freedom of our people, even at the cost of their lives. Our Ukrainian People's State must be cleared of the invaders sent from Petrograd, who trample on the rights of the Ukrainian Republic.

The long and difficult war launched by the bourgeois regime has wearied our people, devastated our land, and destroyed its economy. We must put an end to all this. As the army is being demobilized, we recommend that some men be released now; and following the acceptance of the peace treaties, the army should be completely dissolved. Further, instead of a standing army we envisage the establishment of a people's militia; our troops should be defenders of the toiling masses and not a tool of the ruling classes.

Localities destroyed by the war and demobilization shall be rebuilt with the assistance and at the expense of the state treasury. As soon as our soldiers return home, people's councils – in villages, districts, and municipalities – shall be elected again at the prescribed time, so that the soldiers too will have a voice in them. In the meantime, in order to establish an authority entitled to enjoy the general confidence, and one based on all the revolutionary-democratic classes of the people, the Government should invite the cooperation of the locally elected councils of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies.

In regard to the land question, a commission elected at our last session has already drafted a law on the transfer of land to the toiling masses without payment, basing this on the decision taken at our eighth session to abolish private property and to socialize land. This law shall be considered several days from now at a meeting of the entire Central Rada. The Council of People's Ministers shall take all the necessary measures to ensure the transfer of land to the farmers with the assistance of land committees before the spring sowing gets under way. Forests, streams, and natural resources of the land are the property of the Ukrainian toiling masses; they shall be administered by the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The war has also adversely affected the labouring forces of our country. Most of our plants, factories, and workshops were forced to produce the necessary war materiel, and the people were left without essential goods. Now the war is at an end. We are ordering the Council of People's Minis-

ters to take immediate steps to convert all plants and factories to peacetime production to supply the toiling masses with goods of prime necessity.

The war has also produced hundreds of thousands of unemployed and disabled. In the independent People's Republic of Ukraine there should not be a single workingman in need and distress. The Government of the Republic has been instructed to revitalize the industry of the state, to resume activities in all branches of the economy in order to provide work for the unemployed, and to take all measures necessary to protect and provide for the disabled and other victims of the war.

Under the old regime, the merchants and middlemen used to exploit the poor oppressed classes and reap huge profits therefrom. From now on the Ukrainian People's Republic shall administer the basic branches of trade and business, and all the profits from these activities shall revert to the people. Foreign trade, both imports and exports, shall also be placed under state control to forestall the possibility of the poor masses being forced to pay exorbitant prices to speculators. The Government of the Republic is accordingly instructed to draft appropriate laws on these matters, as well as to prepare legislation against monopoly in the production of iron, leather, tobacco, and other such products and goods, categories in which profits used to be unusually high – an arrangement that was especially unfair to the working classes and benefited those not engaged in productive labour.

We also order the establishment of the people's state control over all banks which used to contribute to the exploitation of the working classes by advancing loans and credits to the non-working elements. From now on, credit assistance from banks shall be provided above all to the toiling population, to promote the development of the national economy of the Ukrainian People's Republic and not for purposes of speculation or other exploitative banking practices.

Owing to anarchy, general unrest, and the shortage of goods, discontent among certain segments of the population has increased. This discontent is being exploited by various dark forces among the uninformed people for the purpose of restoring the old order. These dark forces are aiming at the return of all the free peoples under the united yoke of Tsarist Russia. The Council of People's Ministers should resolutely combat all the counterrevolutionary forces; anyone who advocates rebellion against the independent Ukrainian People's Republic and the restoration of the old order should be tried for high treason.

All democratic freedoms guaranteed in the Third Universal are hereby confirmed by the Ukrainian Central Rada. We further declare that in the

independent Ukrainian People's Republic all nations enjoy the right to national and personal autonomy as provided in the law of 22 January.

Obviously, it will not be possible for the Central Rada to realize all the programs of this Universal in a few weeks' time; these programs will be further developed and fully implemented by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. We therefore order all our citizens to carry out the election to this body most carefully and to make every effort to complete the tabulation of votes as soon as possible. This will make it possible for the Constituent Assembly – the supreme authority and ruler of our land – to convene within the next few weeks in order to uphold and confirm, through a constitution of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic, freedom, order, and well-being for all the toiling people, now and at all future times.

This supreme organ of ours shall also rule on the federative relationship with other people's republics of the former Russian state.

In the meantime, we appeal to all citizens of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic to uphold and guard unwaveringly the newly won liberty and the rights of our people and to use all possible means to defend their freedom against all enemies of the independent Ukrainian Republic of peasants and workers.

The Ukrainian Central Rada  
Kiev, 22 January 1918

*Translated by Oleh Fedyshyn*

## The Rebirth of a Nation (excerpt)

VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO

*Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951) was a major prose writer and dramatist whose works were popular in Ukraine and were translated into several foreign languages. Before the revolution he participated in radical politics (RUP) and became a leading member of the Social Democratic Party. During the Ukrainian revolution he became a member of the Central Rada and was head of the Secretariat of the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Already at that time he differed in his views from Hrushevsky and Symon Petliura. His tendency to criticize the Central Rada from the left is reflected in the excerpt printed here, from his account of the revolution, Vidrodzhennia natsii (The Rebirth of a Nation, 1920). Following an unsuccessful return to Soviet Ukraine, Vynnychenko emigrated once again and lived in Germany and France. Late in life he developed a philosophical concept of world order based on 'concordism.' After his death he became more respected as a writer than a politician.*

### The Only Way Out

There were fewer and fewer adherents of the Central Rada among the wide masses. The very name of the Central Rada began to be unpopular. If we had been more far-sighted, we would have understood that neither the 'red-capped fur hats' nor religious services of supplication, nor even secret killings, would be able to crush these spontaneous elements. We needed to change ourselves radically.

Such a radical change among us was advocated by the Bolsheviks and by some of us as well. We needed to re-elect the Central Rada. Let all the local workers', peasants', and soldiers' councils hold congresses and elect new

people in place of the old ones. New times had arrived, a new atmosphere had emerged, as well as a new situation. The central organ, therefore, needed new people, not those elected in quite different circumstances.

That demand was wise and just and not at all harmful to the Ukrainian national revival. For our soldiers, who were our main force then, told us: We are Bolsheviks, but we are Ukrainian Bolsheviks and we do not want to be ruled by Moscow. Let the old Central Rada go and rest. We will elect a new one and, whatever it is, we are sure it will not include the bourgeois.

That was the only way to keep the power in Ukrainian national hands. Those hands would not be so favourable to tsarist generals, bureaucrats, landowners, and other lords. But those hands would direct the national cause, in any event no worse than the old Central Rada.

Unfortunately, that only way out was rejected by the majority of the Central Rada. It was rejected because (1) if we had agreed to the new election of the Central Rada, we would have admitted that our policy was wrong; and (2) the new elections would have given the Bolsheviks a majority in the new Rada, and since the Bolsheviks drew their support from the Russianized working class, all power would have passed into the hands of the Russians.

Such considerations were without foundation. It was clear to everyone, whether we agreed with it or not, that our policy did not satisfy the wide masses. Even a blind person would have seen that the masses demanded a change. In the name of democracy, which we so defended, it would have been better to step aside and make room for a policy demanded by the majority. That was only logical.

Equally unfounded was the fear that power would pass to the Russians. Most soldiers' groups were Ukrainian and were nationally aware. They would have elected a sizeable number of nationally conscious deputies. Even more would have come from the peasantry. The majority would have been pro-Ukrainian, and so the entire soviet socialist government in Ukraine would have been national. That in itself would have led to the cessation of hostilities with the Russian soviet government, and Ukrainians would not have been following the path of world counterrevolution. The Ukrainian idea would not have been so discredited and debased among the active elements of proletarian democracy.

I know that the enemies of socialism, our 'red-capped fur hats,' will at once oppose me by asking, 'Was the power in Ukrainian hands during the soviet government?' And: 'Were not the Bolsheviks as nationalistic, chauvinistic, and imperialistic as all other Russians?' 'Did not the Bolsheviks destroy Ukrainian culture?'

I can answer only that if soviet government in Ukraine had come as a result of peaceful electoral struggle in villages, barracks, and factories, if the Ukrainians had not shown hostility to the social aspirations of the masses, if the old Central Rada had voluntarily stepped aside, if our policy had not provoked and been hostile to the socialist revolution, then, under such conditions, the situation in Ukraine would have been quite different.

True, the struggle of Ukrainian and Russian ideology would go on. But Ukrainian ideology, harmonized with the social aspirations of the masses, would certainly have been stronger. It could not be as weak as when every Ukrainian regarded himself as an enemy of Bolshevism, that is, of the wide (in the opinion of some, unreasonable) social strivings which were dominant at that time among the masses. We failed to understand that at that time. The tendency to a 'decisive, uncompromising' attitude prevailed. To carry on to the bitter end! Not to surrender! Such firmness and decisiveness some found impressive.



## Letters to My Brother Farmers (excerpts)

### VIACHESLAV LYPYNSKY

*Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) was a prominent historian, sociologist, and political theorist. A descendant of the Polish szlachta, he studied in Kraków and Geneva. In 1912 he published his monumental work Z dziejów Ukrainy (From the Annals of Ukraine). During the First World War he served in the Russian army, and in 1917 he took part in organizing the Ukrainian Democratic Farmers' Party. A convinced monarchist, he later supported Hetman Skoropadsky, whom he served as ambassador in Vienna. After the revolution he lived in Germany and in Austria, where he died of tuberculosis near Vienna. He formulated his political doctrine in Lysty do bratriv khliborobiv (Letters to My Brother Farmers, 1926), which devoted much attention to the problem of political leadership. A severe critic of Ukrainian social democracy, Lypynsky was a conservative who hoped for the solidarity of all classes and the Ukrainianization of the Russified dominant class in Ukraine. The events of 1991 proved him a good prophet.*

#### Part III

... The subject of these letters was to be our political tactics, our political self-organization, and our relations with other political groups active in Ukraine as well as with outside political forces influencing Ukraine. In other words, I wanted to outline the methods which, in my opinion, should be used in politics for organization and for increasing one's strength, and for the achievement of its tasks by the active part of the farmer class, which has the will to create and organize Ukrainian national life.

But here, more than in my earlier *Letters*, I encountered great difficulties

expressing my thoughts. I think these difficulties confront every Ukrainian writer and publicist for whom writing is not an aim in itself but only a means, who would like through his writing to bolster national creativity and not just provide his countrymen with yet more 'rational' advice on the subject of 'how to build Ukraine.'

Such advice, more or less logical and more or less rational, may be offered abundantly. But what is the benefit of such publicistic stylistics? What is the use of various written prescriptions for Ukrainian national politicians, if, in fact, no people will be found in Ukraine who have the will and the capacity to form a Ukrainian national policy? And are these numerous Ukrainian political prescriptions, with their proposed methods, not weakening rather than strengthening the elemental wish and the irrational force without which Ukraine cannot be created?

Any social-political theory may be very wise, rational, and logical within the boundaries of the preconditions on which it is based. Among the various theories or visions of Ukraine – the democratic-republican Ukraine, the proletarian Ukraine, the communist-republican Ukraine, the labour-monarchist Ukraine, and the farmers' Ukraine – with all their prescriptions for an Eastern or Western orientation, there is no logical or rational difference. All these differently constructed and differently oriented Ukraines are theoretically possible, for they are the product of pens on paper, operating according to the laws of logic that underlie all theory. The conclusions are all based on certain preconditions and thus are logically inevitable.

But from all these theoretical, rational, and logical Ukraines, in real life only one truly real Ukraine may be created: the Ukraine which will be created by the irrational and elemental wish of the people, who, believing in such a Ukraine, will have the strength and ability to transform their wish into living action. Only the real action of living people will show which of the Ukrainian political parties is true and which, notwithstanding rationality, logic, and scientific quality, is false.

The circumstances in which I live and, above all, my poor health allow me to work for the realization of our state and national convictions by pen alone. But I do not wish to be a mere *littérateur* or advice-giver or the author of works to be listed in catalogues. I wish that Ukraine were a fact and that the Ukrainian nation existed in real life, not on paper. I wish that people who live in the land where I was born and grew up would create a strong, wise, well-organized, and responsible nation and stop being a dark mob which depends on other nations, hates itself, and is scattered and treacherous. I wish that the Ukrainian farming class, so dear and near to me

in blood and spirit, would first of all organize itself and fulfil its duties to the Ukrainian nation, taking up its proper place. Therefore, when I write and publish I desire in this way by an intense effort to pass on my thoughts on how to promote the realization of this elemental wish, which unites all of us who believe in it.

...

The word, if it is to be creative, should serve life and not try to bend life to its laws. Rational laws of the word, the laws of logic, and dialectics can acquire creative force when they serve not themselves but the irrational, illogical, elemental striving which generates all life, including the word itself. The temptation to become Ukraine's wisest men, prevented by unfortunate circumstances from doing anything good, must be resisted by those writers who have bound up their fate with Ukraine's fate and desire to create this Ukraine, knowing that it is impossible to do so by means of written advice to a literary, metaphysical nation of forty million people. For this 'forty-million-strong nation' exists only in the imagination of writers; and only in their works does it live according to logical laws, according to some kind of automatic progress built on bookish knowledge.

The Ukrainian nation is not outside us, but in us. It is being built all the time by the creative work of each of us. On our own work, on its value, depends our inner strength, by virtue of which each of us and all of us together can express ourselves and defend ourselves against all collective social forces or their temporary, politically expedient combination. All tense moments of struggle between different groups, whether they are wars or revolutions, show only the degree and quality of the everyday work which each group has done and are a just indication of the inner substance and strength of these groups.

It is impossible to find an objectively true social law which would automatically, without any inward effort, make a nation out of us. To tie the 'Ukrainian cause' to the victory of social theories created by other nations, or to think that works resting quietly in libraries, outlining the scientific progress of mankind, will do for Ukraine what we ourselves are unable to do for it with our work, is to conceal under literary charlatanism our inner insignificance, timidity, and disability.

We absolutely refuse to believe that wise professors of an institute of sociology, having read millions of sociological works, could find an objective law according to which the Ukrainian nation could be created. If people in Ukraine show no desire to create a nation, no scientific laws will help. We believe even less that professors of sociology could, like chemists, find a law which would make this desire possible or, like astronomers, tell

us when it will appear in our land. But if such an elemental, irrational wish already exists, we can, observing our life and the life of other nations, discern what promotes and what hinders it. Therefore, getting to know the conditions under which this wish develops and transforms itself into a subjective but conscious will and active force will be more useful than searching for rational and objective social laws, which would make our effort unnecessary.

...

When, in order to learn about the methods of political organization of state-national movements, we look closely at the lives of different societies, we see that the existence of a collective with some distinct characteristics, such as a different spoken language, a separate character, and distinct customs, nevertheless does not make for national individuality. National individuality, and not ethnographic or provincial separateness, is the product of historical development and of the social life of a given collective; it is a formation of history, as all researchers into the national question tell us.

Yet all forms of human cohabitation are products of history. They cannot be imagined outside the categories of time. Not only a nation but a political party, a professional trade union, a musical or scholarly society is a formation of history. What is more, the working of history can be seen in what unites and divides people: their birth, their life, and the growth of a nation as well as its decline and death.

If by the concept of a nation one understands quite separate individuals living together for generations, then a nation is not only a product of history but of historical growth, and a distinct ethnic collective a product of constructive and not destructive political values. To create and maintain these constructive political values, beginning with some political organization and ending with the highest form of national organization, a national state, means to realize and organize a given human collective, bound together by one irrational will into a single conscious whole, which openly strives for its existence and growth, for the realization of its common national desire.

As long as a human collective exists physically, and, on the basis of external similarities such as a spoken language or a common territory, as long as this physical type and character develops its individual binding political values, a nation exists and is developing. When the collective perishes physically or stops developing the political values that unify its existence, the nation decomposes, dies, and ceases to exist.

Who is the leader in this process of organization and unification of a given ethnically distinct collective on its territory? Who creates these

higher civic and national constructive values? Who, to use an image, is the yeast for the passive ethnographic dough of this collective, which turns it into a nation?

That it is not achieved automatically, as a result of some compelling social law, may be seen in the case of ethnically separate collectives, having their separate types, territories, and spoken languages (e.g., the Provençals, the Bretons, the Scots, several German tribes, the Kashubians, etc.), who did not become nations. This means that it is not the ethnographic masses as such, not a special type or character, not the language or a separate territory that creates a nation, but some active group within these ethnographic masses, a group which leads in the development of the unifying, organizing political values which build a nation.

We can see that such a group or groups really exist if we carefully observe the lives of nations. Each of them has a greater or smaller group of people heading its political institutions, creating certain cultural, moral, political, and civilizing values, which are absorbed by the nation and give it life and sustenance. Who are these 'divinely chosen people' of the nation? What are their outer and inner features? What is their historical evolution? What methods are used by them for achieving their ends? These are but some of the questions which may not be bypassed by anyone who cares about the being or the non-being of his nation, who with the sweat of his brow wants to find a way out of the ruin in which his nation has found itself.

In order to avoid lengthy descriptions let us call these groups of people the national aristocracy. I consider this term better than others because in its original meaning it defined the best people in the task of organization and unification. Later it was used for the hereditary aristocracy as distinct from the aristocracy that was not hereditary. But since the hereditary aristocracy or its heirs are unlike their forefathers and play no role in the organization and unification of nations, those who do become a new aristocracy are the originators of a new national aristocracy.

I stress again that I am using the word 'aristocracy' not in the satirical sense given the term by the democratic intelligentsia of today, not to designate the heirs of this or that social stratum with a history of its own – it should be called by its own name, *szlachta*, the Cossacks, the patricians, the knights, the *samurai* – but in the original, grammatical so to speak, meaning of the word, to designate at a given historical moment the best people in a nation, who are the best because they appear at that moment as its organizers, rulers, and leaders.

The deciding factor here is that they stand at a given moment at the head of a nation, which recognizes their leadership and thus thrives and devel-

ops. It means that these people are the best in the nation, regardless of whether, by comparison with aristocracies of other nations, they stand on a higher or lower moral and political level. Accordingly, the feudal lords, the French court during the era of absolutism, Napoleon's officer corps, the Junkers of Germany, the financial bourgeoisie of contemporary France or America, the Russian bureaucracy of the St Petersburg empire, the English trade unions, which play an ever-increasing part in the national life of England – all are aristocracies. The same could be said of the Soviet Russian Peoples' Commissars, if they would only stop plundering the Russian people and try to organize and develop them, and of the contemporary Ukrainian socialists and democrats, if they could transform the Ukrainian ethnographic mass into a nation, that is, if they became what they want to be: the leaders and organizers of a nation – a national aristocracy.

...

The specific tragedy of the Ukrainian intelligentsia has been the fact that it came to power not, as in Europe, in an organized and mature nation, but in a nation which, amid difficult strivings against internal and external destroyers, was just being organized, just being born as a nation. The intelligentsia came to power in a nation which had not yet formed the basic farmer class, which is the foundation for growth in every nation.

Coming to power, therefore, our *déclassé* intelligentsia has not found (1) a Ukrainian state and a military apparatus created by the old monarchical, landed aristocracy which could be taken over for a new use once the monarch and the aristocracy were overthrown; (2) a Ukrainian or Ukrainianized middle class which, after the fall of the monarch and the landed aristocracy, would support and finance Ukrainian revolutionary democracy; or (3) a unified concept of a nation, created under the rule of a monarch and landed aristocracy, which would allow the *déclassé* intelligentsia to cover its political power with slogans of patriotism and national welfare.

It has not found these things for one very good reason: the foundation of each nation, the landed aristocracy, has never, with the exception of a few years of the great Bohdan's [Khmelnysky's] rule, reigned over and governed Ukraine. The Varangian ochlocracy,<sup>1</sup> which ruled at one time

1 V. Isajiw writes: 'Lypynsky distinguishes three methods of organizing aristocracy, calling them ochlocracy, classocracy, and democracy. These become his three basic forms of political rule, or three basic forms of national development. They are, in effect, three stages of national development; ochlocracy represents the stage of underdevelopment; classocracy, the stage of high organic development; and democracy, a stage of degeneration or decay.' ('The Political Sociology of Lypynsky,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, December 1985, p. 297). For Lypynsky's own definition of these terms see later in this text.

under the Kievan princes, collected tribute but did not own the land. The later ochlocracy, after Bohdan's death, was destroyed by Ukrainians who, while taking possession of the land of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the *szlachta*, fled to the protection of the Polish and Muscovite states, and this resulted in a long period of rule not by a landed classocracy<sup>2</sup> but by an armed ochlocracy.

...

In this mortal Ukrainian duel between the nomad and the farmer there was an opposition between the more ochlocratic organization of the nomads and the iron classocratic organization of the farmers. To speak figuratively, to the mass raids of the steppe mob, driven against the farmers by hunger and a desire to loot, to this mob held together by the iron whip of their leaders, one must counterpose a farming phalanx united by iron moral discipline. This Spartan phalanx, slowly, step by step, man by man, and without retreat, mercilessly destroyed the horde. It was like an unbroken wall, defended by its own swords drawn in defence of the plough and strengthened by heroic moral discipline, which destroyed the fury of the nomadic raids and rendered powerless the most terrible weapon of the nomads, the mass hypnosis that drew the mob to battle.

The only possible form of organization for this phalanx was a classocratic labour monarchy. These people, united by the same methods of work and ways of thinking, commanding the same means of production, and threatened with certain death by the destruction of these means of production, had to be organized so that no one would dare leave the ranks, so that there would be no traitors among them, so that no one on his own initiative, even if well-intentioned, would leave the ranks, because this would create a breach through which an enemy nomadic mob could jump inside. The classocratic organization of farmers rested on knightly honour, on obedience to their leaders and a sense of responsibility, on the ability to unite under the one who personified this unbreakable unity, in a word, on a monarchic principle.

Can such an iron organization be given to farmers by the democratic intelligentsia who, for their political purposes, will divide them into small, middle, and large landed parties? They, as leaders, will try to set one of these parties against the others. They will present tens of candidates for the supreme national leadership and will do everything to ensure that the victorious candidate will not be the one who with his own authority and hard work, his determination and dedication to the common cause, will intro-

2 See note 1, above.

duce true discipline, will compel everyone to respect and listen to him, and will make everyone take an example from him and work very hard, but the one who will be most 'democratic' and 'popular,' who will most please his constituents and will promise them whatever they want, and, finally, who for the price of patriotic empty verbiage will release the patriotic windbags from real patriotic work.

It is not for the democrats to lead to battle the small, middle, and large farmers against the nomads, a battle which will decide the farmers' life or death. For a democratic group which aspires to power by all means, which wants at any price to become the national aristocracy while pretending before the people that it does not really want power, that it is not an aristocracy, creates in fact a worse type of aristocracy. It offers to the nation leaders who, instead of perfecting themselves, try to enlighten their constituents and throw the responsibility for their mistakes, their impotence, and their insignificance onto the people who elected them.

...

The actual moral authority of the national aristocracy depends on the relationship of two factors: (1) the quality of civic morality of those who want to organize and govern, that is, the civic morality of the national aristocracy; and (2) the degree of absorption by the governed of such forms of social organization as are created by the active national aristocracy in accordance with their moral qualities.

Accordingly, in the various forms of internal relationship (whether racial, material, numerical, or moral) of the active and passive elements of a given nation one must look for the causes of their differences in the various methods of organization employed by the national aristocracy. Apart from that, if we look at the lives of nations from a historical perspective, in their already distant pasts, we shall see that the differences in the methods of organization of the national aristocracy are closely related (1) to the condition of the technology and culture of a given nation in a given historical era; and (2) to the individual spiritual characteristics which are created by the influence of a mixture of human types and races, different in each nation, on a given national territory. This means that if we want to define the differences in the methods of organization of national aristocracies according to external evidence, that is, if we want to classify them, then the basis for such a classification we shall find in accessible forms of material culture and economic life, as well as in the individual racial characteristics of a given nation in a certain historical era. On this basis I divide the different organizations of national aristocracies into three principal types, which in their essential features repeat themselves constantly and without change in



different nations at different times of their existence. These types I call ochlocracy, classocracy, and democracy.

Ochlocracy is a method of organization of the aristocracy of a nation which in the process of its primitive material and racial development, or under the influence of previous material and racial decay, has not yet created classes firmly moulded by their material production and their racial kinship, and which is divided only into the politically formless and economically and racially undifferentiated mob (*ochlos*, from which we derive ochlocracy) and those who govern this classless mob with the help of an armed and tightly controlled organization. This governing ochlocratic aristocracy is drawn from the external nomads or from the local *déclassé*, materially unproductive, and racially and economically diverse elements. Such a nation, organized by the ochlocratic method, when it exists as a nomadic or semi-nomadic tribe can hardly be called a nation in the contemporary Western European sense of the word. Nevertheless, I am using the term 'nation' throughout, and also in this instance, because every human community and therefore also a nomadic community, in which an indigenous aristocracy appears, may under its leadership not only create a state organization but also settle on a certain territory and move, under the influence of some factors, from a merely mechanical form of state to the organic form of national state entity.

I call classocracy a method of organization of the aristocracy of a nation which in the course of its material and racial development has been clearly divided into organic classes, controlling personally and directly their means of production and firmly united internally by the same method of material labour and the same psychology, derived from the common method of labour, common internal racial origins, and a common historical tradition.

Finally, democracy is a method of organization of the aristocracy of a nation which, under the influence of inorganic and chaotic material development and its own or foreign colonial expansion, represents a class and racial mixture in which the natural groupings of working people, drawn from the related classes, have fallen apart and a racially and psychologically unstable type of mixed race has come to the top. And instead of a division into organically united classes there has appeared a chaotic conglomerate of democratically 'equal' individuals who are alien to each other, hate each other, and are bound together in a single national whole by the remnants of the national state organization which arose under the rule of former classocratic or ochlocratic aristocracies, which themselves were subverted by democracy.

## Nationalism (excerpt)

### DMYTRO DONTSOV

*Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) was an outstanding journalist and essayist. The main theoretician of Ukrainian ‘integral nationalism,’ Dontsov studied law in St Petersburg and Vienna and joined the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. His strong nationalist and separatist stand drew Lenin’s ire. During the early era of the revolution he lived in the West, but in 1918 he was active in Kiev. From 1922 to 1939 he lived in Lviv, where he edited the journal Vistnyk (The Herald). Having abandoned socialism, Dontsov became the prophet of a militant and anti-democratic nationalism bordering on fascism. His seminal works, among them Natsionalizm (1926) and Nasha doba i literatura (Our Era and Literature, 1936), had a great following among young people.*

#### Instead of a Preface

Our lives see the twilight of the gods to whom the nineteenth century prayed. The catastrophe of 1914 has not shattered our minds in vain; all the unshakeable foundations and ‘eternal’ laws of social evolution crumbled into dust, opening limitless vistas before human will.

Only one law was left intact in the catastrophe. It is the law of struggle, which Heraclitus called the beginning of all things, the law of eternal antagonism between nations which dominates the world now just as it did in the earliest history of nations and states.

The pampered age which received a bloody summing-up from the First World War, the age of superstitious ‘laws’ and lawful superstitions, had forgotten this central law of life. Especially in its second half, our age began to forget what will is and remembered only reason, began to forget what

struggle is, to forget what a nation, the most beautiful emanation of the will to struggle and the fight for freedom, is. Reason, evolution, cosmopolitanism – these were the central values of the nineteenth century, which, fortunately, were dealt a terrible blow by the events of 1914.

That year reminded us of the forgotten truth that the world belongs to those who are able to will, that the only living factor in international life is the nation, regardless of which class leads it. To be sure, some problems which faced the nations were solved, but others took their place. A new series of new tasks arises before us, which will be carried out by our descendants. Tsarism is dead, but Russian imperialism is alive and well, just as are its opponents, the Anglo-Saxon world and Japan. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy has broken apart, but not its spirit, which lives on in successor states. The Ottoman Empire has vanished but was followed by a regeneration of Islam, whose explosive force is well known in history. The life-giving spirit of the West is blowing in the Far East, where events of heavy consequence are unfolding. And as the second- and third-rank continents declare their right to equality or even to hegemony, Europe's position becomes shaky in the headlong rush of nations and countries.

Just as centuries ago, during the Thirty Years' War and the Hundred Years' War, just as in 1648 and 1709,<sup>1</sup> and as at Salamis,<sup>2</sup> the idea which will set right the arising conflicts will be the idea of the nation, the idea of a human community which exists or wants to be organized as a separate political unit.

At such a moment our people stands bereft of will and mindless, *decerebré* [sic] as Barrès<sup>3</sup> would say: without a national credo and without a strong will to fight for it. Instead of a national ideal, they have a broken table of commandments containing old, eroded wisdom, the murky mess of 'progress,' 'evolution,' 'international brotherhood,' and other 'internationalisms' – poisons for a healthy national organism, principles well fitted for provincial peoples and their Provençal<sup>4</sup> ideologists, but not for nations.

1 The year 1648 saw the beginning of the Cossack war of liberation led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. 1709 is the year of the battle of Poltava, where Charles XII and Mazepa were defeated by Peter I.

2 Near the island of Salamis the Greeks defeated the Persians in a naval battle in 480 B.C.

3 Maurice Barrès (1862–1923), a French writer and politician, was a proponent of vehement nationalism. Dontsov rarely provides footnotes, and when he does they are often incomplete and inaccurate.

4 Provence is a province of France with an ancient history, culture, and language of its own. In the nineteenth century it experienced a literary revival, led by Frédéric Mistral (1830–1914). The Ukrainian national awakening was often compared to the one in Provence, but here Dontsov uses 'Provençalism' as a term of political immaturity, since it signifies an emphasis solely on literary achievements.

In this book I want to define the concept of Ukrainian nationalism as I understand it. I understand it not as any program, not as an answer to today's tasks – let no one who wants to find an orientation or an argument for a party program open this book – but only as a *Weltanschauung*. Accordingly, I oppose here my concept of nationalism to our concept of nationalism in the nineteenth century – the nationalism of defeat, or 'Provençalism.' Along with this 'Provençalism' I include, with certain exceptions, the strange mixture of the teachings of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius and of Drahomanov; the legalized Ukrainophilism and populism along with their extremes, Marxism and communism, on the one side and 'es-erism'<sup>5</sup> and radicalism on the other; and, finally, the ideologies of the right, beginning with Kulish and ending with neo-monarchism.

All these trends were different in many respects and were even hostile to one another, yet all were rooted in the same *Weltanschauung* of defeat, to which I oppose here a different and essentially hostile world view.

What I expound here I have written about earlier, ever since I started writing, and what I am writing now does not differ from what I wrote earlier. Only now I am trying to write more systematically than before, when I often wrote sporadically. What is the aim of this book? It is to influence the formation of a Ukrainian national ideology, which, I believe, will emerge victorious from the intellectual chaos of our times and will affect the course of future events. He who doubts this kind of influence should recall Emerson's words that 'all revolution was first of all a thought in the mind of one man.'

## The Ukrainian Idea

What the Ukrainian idea lacks is a wholly new spirit. Our wanderings in the desert are not yet over, because we have had a thousand different wills instead of one, and a thousand vague thoughts instead of the brilliant one that would unite all of us. For what is a nation if not a gathering of millions of wills around one common ideal, the ideal of the rule by one ethnic group over a territory, which it received as a legacy from its parents and which, perhaps a little enlarged, it will bequeath to its children?

Fichte defines the process of crystallization of an idea as a transformation of our subconscious desires into clear concepts. These two parts form the Ukrainian idea: a clearly formulated goal, the ideal itself for which the

<sup>5</sup> The party of Socialist Revolutionaries, known by the acronym SR (pronounced 'es-er'), was active in Ukraine from 1905 to 1917.

national will is striving; and the will itself, the emotional side, the national Eros or, as Barrès says, its 'emotiveness.' The latter consists of feeling which motivates action and of thought which gives it a clearly defined form (Spencer).

Our own underdeveloped 'emotiveness' was the precise cause of our latest catastrophe. The ardour of the 'Marseillaise' would have remained a simple *jacquerie* without the men of the Convention, who gave it form and content. But the slogans of 1789 would have been empty without the ardour of the 'Marseillaise.' The Ukrainian idea lacked this powerful passion.

Ukraine does not yet exist, but we can create it in our souls. We can and we must sanctify this idea with the fire of fanatical commitment, which will then dispel our shyness, which is destroying us as the shyness of the French aristocracy destroyed it, as the ideology of the repentant nobleman has destroyed the Russian nobility, and only then will foreign idols perish in the fire. Then and only then. Because as long as we will not create within us the desire to fashion a world out of outer chaos – as long as Werther-like softness is not replaced in us by love of possession, theories by dogmas, shyness by brutality, Skovoroda by Savonarola, Kostomarov by Mazzini, the spineless love of the people by aggressive nationalism – for just as long will Ukraine not be a nation. This is the 'subjective moment,' disregarded by us hitherto, without which neither material riches nor the large population nor any 'evolution' will help us. 'Nationality,' writes Kjellen,<sup>6</sup> 'has first of all a subjective side.' This is the element of will which can rise to a fever but also fall below zero. In the last analysis, a nation needs no objective preconditions in order to wrest from history its claim to be a state. This is the centre of gravity in the problem of Ukraine.

Until now these considerations were neglected. Instead of firing this 'emotiveness' red-hot, we extinguished it. Never in Ukraine did the national demands link with the 'iron force of enthusiasm.' They spat on the word 'nationalism.' They were ashamed of it. Vynnychenko writes that 'a tie to what gave Ukrainians life was considered as ridiculous as all instincts and feelings.'<sup>7</sup> The nationalist idea did not dare to have anything to do with 'religious fanaticism' or the 'fervour of struggle.' One had to live so that reason reigned over emotion. To smother ecstasy, to kill the very nerve in an idea, to make it into a dull party program – that's what we wanted. The tense emotionalism of national strivings was condemned as a vestige of the

6 R. Kjellen, *Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges*. [Author's note]

7 V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*. [Author's note]

uncultured past, as a 'sick phenomenon.' Drahomanov thundered against 'the spirit of old intolerance,' ascribing it even to Shevchenko. He forgot that the intolerance of foreign idols is but the reverse side of a strong faith in one's own.

Until now Ukrainians failed to generate a great yearning. Their yearning was tantamount to 'a gentle love of neighbour'; it had no will to force itself on one's environment and the outside world, or to deny foreign ideas so as to shake their foundations. 'Why are we so worthless?' asks one divided Ukrainian soul, and provides an answer: 'Because we have no will, and even if there is a will, it is as worthless and weak as we are.'<sup>8</sup> This is the worthlessness of will in which Ferrero<sup>9</sup> sees the central malaise of our age.

One cannot say that the Ukrainian idea is completely devoid of emotional colouring, only that it has been 'worthless and weak.' It froze at an early stage of development. Our affirmation of our national character has not reached the stage of denying it to others, to the consciousness that 'everybody has only that which he tore away from others.' We loved what was ours and felt soft about it. This 'emotiveness' in Ukrainians was undeveloped, passive, only defensive. 'In national problems we never crossed the border defined by self-defence. Polish and Muscovite nationalism appeared ugly to us because they had instincts of state coerciveness.'<sup>10</sup> We hated instinct, without which any idea is dead, which was dear to the Poles and the Russians. We could not understand those who could not imagine a 'new order' without a 'new slavery'; we thought it paradoxical to conclude that every idea which wants to be victorious must win the world.

A Ukrainian does not wish his idea to win if winning requires violence, if the triumph of the idea is bought at the price of 'cruelty towards men' or 'compulsion, deceit, and plunder of someone.'<sup>11</sup> The victory of an idea should come without an appeal to 'national hatred,' which is not a constructive element. Anger against the enemy, the fiery desire to destroy hostile ideas at their inception, the call to the 'dark instincts of the masses' – these were emotions which had to be harnessed. Even against an enemy one should not fight using something unjust.

Even when Ukrainian passions contradicted what was alien, they were half-hearted and incomplete. Even Ukrainian revolutionaries knew what they did not want better than what they wanted. Their desire to destroy the

8 A. Holovko, *Mozhu*. [Author's note]

9 Guglielmo Ferrero (1871–1942) was an Italian historian and sociologist.

10 From a speech by P. Zhytetsky. [Author's note]

11 V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*. [Author's note]

existing order was an expression of the feeling that violence in general should be destroyed. They never thought far enough to visualize an organization of new violence. They did not want to lord it over anybody. Theirs was an unproductive, purely defensive hatred of slavery.

All this was not enough! All this gentleness and respect for oneself will not give rise to victorious ideas, will not rally the people behind them. The Latin [Roman Catholic] church with a foreign language, just as the Eastern church with its Church Slavonic language, managed to rally the masses. And what devastation among the Ukrainians was created by Russian Bolshevism, which is foreign to us. Gentleness and respect for one's own will not give us a victorious idea. Something else is needed. This 'something,' which makes the masses rally subconsciously around it, this kernel of the idea, is the instinct of domination, of power, of the desire to force oneself on foreigners and the outside world, to lead, to manage life, even by force if need be. The masses are sensitive to this instinct of violence, and they often accept it, even if it is foreign, in preference to their gentle and timid instinctual feelings.

Our passion was a yearning for a pure, humane, and peaceful life. But life is not only yearning; it is anger. It is not only pure, but also dirty. Not peace, but also war! The basis for Ukrainian rebirth was 'sincere wishing' and not 'force, deceit, or ravage of the enemy.' But in order to be victorious the passion of the new idea cannot do without force, deceit, and sometimes the ravage of the enemy. For what is one's own has been appropriated by the enemy. Even on one's own territory one is 'in our but not one's own land.'<sup>12</sup> The old name of the country and the German place-names in southern Tirol have been Italianized, made 'foreign.'

The instinct of forceful domination is inherent in any great idea, and without this instinct the idea will not gain its right to existence; not through the 'gentleness' of Vynnychenko, the cow-flute of Fedkovych,<sup>13</sup> the anti-eagle philosophy of Franko,<sup>14</sup> the 'anti-fanaticism' of Drahomanov, the 'musicality' of Tychna,<sup>15</sup> or the socialist love of the people. It is not enough to displace a will; it is necessary to replace it with one's own will instead.

Foreign ideas were resisted by us only in the name of humane 'gentle-

<sup>12</sup> A line from a poem by Shevchenko.

<sup>13</sup> Osyp Iurii Fedkovych (1834-88), a prominent poet known for his bucolic verse, was a native of Bukovyna.

<sup>14</sup> Ivan Franko (1856-1916) was the leading writer of Western Ukraine.

<sup>15</sup> Pavlo Tychna (1891-1967) was an eminent poet whose lyrical poetry had a musical quality.

ness.' 'I do not believe,' someone wrote, 'in the cruel treatment of man. The human being is for me an end in itself.' How blind can you get? Every resistance must be cruel to those who oppose it. If militant fascism and Bolshevism had not had that spirit, they would never have become victorious. Christianity, which came out of the catacombs, led to Torquemada, and if his spirit had not been alive even in the earliest Christians, the Roman eagles would not have bowed before them.

Drahomanov thundered against all those prophets who showed little humanity and altruism but much anger. How blind he was! An idea based only on altruism and not on anger against the enemy is powerless. Here are the words of a Bolshevik: 'RSFSR is not just five letters but five fiery signs proclaiming new truth to the world. To defend them I, who hate killing, will take up a gun and will kill.' Referring to the death of those who did not share his teaching, Calvin said, 'It is God's will that all humanity be forgotten if it is necessary to fight for his glory.' His is the passion which the Ukrainian idea lacks, because it knew an enthusiasm for one's own but not a denial of the enemy.

Foreign ideas, familiar to us, always had what we lacked. Russian spiritual leadership is permeated by the instinct I am talking about. 'Whatever I may wish to be,' we read in Dostoevsky, 'whatever I would like to accomplish, whether I do something good or become a spider sucking foreign juices, I know only that I wish to dominate, and that's enough for me.' And in another place: 'The great law of history says that we shall never be a great nation unless we cultivate a degree of self-importance (*samomnenie*), the consciousness of our importance for the world ... All great nations developed in this way because they were arrogant, because they were certain they served mankind by proudly and consistently remaining as they were.'<sup>16</sup> What is this if not a passion for command, which not only defends itself from others but also forces them to respect its proud and arrogant national visage?

This passion was shared by Pushkin, Tiutchev, Blok, and Maiakovsky in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. One of the enemies of the Bolsheviks writes that they were different from obedient folk, that the communists were all shaven, in leather jackets and high boots. They spoke curtly and briefly. Their gestures were decisive. They were in command. So again we see the passion for commanding, no 'heartfelt wishing' but the knowledge that in order to triumph over foreign ideas and one's own passive masses, courage, energy, and force are necessary. This will does not have to be con-



scious. Neither Khmelnytsky nor Washington, in beginning an uprising, thought at first of an independent state; nor did Mussolini think of usurping the state by fascism. But they had the combative spirit, the courage to draw extreme conclusions, and the will to power, for which there is no substitute. This is what the emotional side of 'Provençalism' lacked.

It lacked it in relation to foreign ideas to be conquered, as well as in relation to its own environment, in which the Ukrainian idea was born, and to the inertia it must overcome. In all cases compulsion is necessary, and that is why all the bearers of new ideas, despite their democratic language, refused to recognize the masses as a creative agent but believed in leadership. They were free of the saccharine sympathy for the masses and demonstrated a violent brutality, like the love with which a sculptor deals with his material. The ideologists of powerful ideas in Russia were convinced that the people would accept what they were told or ordered to do. 'Who is better,' writes Dostoevsky, 'we or the people? Should the people follow us, or we the people? We should bow our heads before the people, but only on one condition: that the people accept what we brought them. We cannot be overcome by their truths, we cannot abandon what we brought even for the sake of a happy union with the people.'<sup>17</sup>

The creator of Bolshevism was a believer in the ideology of force. The masses were never for him the measure of truth; the will of the people or a majority never forced him to renounce his position. His idea was to win in the struggle with the elemental masses, who would have to be deflected from their usual course. Quite undemocratically he maintained that ten wise men are better than a hundred fools. 'In order to leave the state of infancy,' writes Lenin, 'the movement should be impatient with people who are halting its growth by following their elemental yearning.'<sup>18</sup>

Such are the words of the prominent ideologists of Russian nationalism. The 'friend of the people' Marat<sup>19</sup> also regarded them as 'cowardly egoists.' And the following is what we read in a work by the Polish nationalist Roman Dmowski:<sup>20</sup> 'To gather society under the banner of one idea is not possible by resolving contradictions, by mixing water with fire, but by gathering all those who support the idea and forcing all others to accept it.' What a striking similarity! And, in comparison, here is the Ukrainian

17 F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary*. [Author's note]

18 V.I. Lenin, *Chto delat*. [Author's note]

19 Jean-Paul Marat (1743-93) was a leader of the French Revolution.

20 Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) was a Polish political leader with a marked anti-Ukrainian orientation.

answer to the same question, Are we for the people or the people for us? 'We bowed to the people as an elemental force which would heal all the wounds of our existence, which must provide answers to all our questions about individual and social freedom, about individual and human happiness ... Wherever the people go, we will follow'<sup>21</sup> ...

The arrogance which colours the emotional side of all great ideas is nothing other than an unqualified belief in oneself, the desire *s'imposer* over passive matter. An idea which in its emotional side is not aggressive will never triumph over matter.

If the Ukrainian idea wants to dominate others, it must first of all conquer the cursed legacy of the time of slavery. We must re-evaluate everything. Fanaticism, instincts, emotionality should replace reason. The spirit of old-fashioned national intolerance should replace everything that was spat upon, should rehabilitate young Ukraine. In place of *amor intellectualis* should stand passion, which knows no 'whys.' The esteem of what is one's own must be supplemented by the will to leave one's mark on what is foreign. We must carry our gospels courageously, not bowing before foreigners or those of us with little faith. We must gain faith in the grand mission of our idea and spread it aggressively. A nation which wants to rule must have the psychology of a lordly and ruling people. Fanaticism and compulsion rather than gentleness fulfil a necessary function in social life, and their place must not be left unoccupied. If we don't take it, someone else will. Nature abhors a vacuum.

1926

## Pamphlets (excerpts)

### MYKOLA KHVYLOVY

*Mykola Khvylovy (pseudonym of M. Fitylov, 1893–1933) was a prominent prose writer and literary personality. The leader of the group VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature, 1925–8), he combined a communist and romantic ideology with strong nationalism. His literary reputation rested on collections of lyrical short stories, the unfinished novel Valdshnepy (The Woodcocks, 1927), and a series of brilliant pamphlets – Kamo hriadeshy (Whither Are You Going?, 1925), Dumky proty techii (Thoughts against the Current, 1926), and Apolohety pysaryzmu (The Apologists for Scribbling, 1927). In these pamphlets he boldly criticized communist graphomaniacs and called on Ukrainian writers to turn away from Russia, pointing instead to Western Europe as the source of real culture. His attitude prompted a rebuff from Stalin. In the end, hounded by officials, he committed suicide. His works and ideas were banned until 1988. As a writer and charismatic leader Khvylovy remains the most striking figure of modern Ukrainian literature.*

[From *Thoughts against the Current*]

These elementary premises concerning the human being's role in history need restating so that we may ask ourselves:

*Has Europe not provided some type of creation which – in the measure with which the so-called 'variable relation' endows it – makes history?*

You ask, 'Which Europe?' Take whichever you like, 'past or present, bourgeois or proletarian, eternal or ever changing.' Because, to be sure, Hamlets, Don Juans, and Tartuffes existed in the past, but they also exist today; they used to be bourgeois, but they are also proletarian; you can

consider them 'eternal,' but they will be 'ever changing.' Such is the coquettish path the dialectic takes when it wanders through the labyrinth of superstructures.

Here, finally, we come upon the *ideal of a civic person*, who over the course of many ages has perfected his biological or, more accurately, his psycho-physiological nature, and who is *the property of all classes*.

In this sense we have nothing against equating Lenin with Peter the Great; both belonged to the civic person type, the ideal one, that Europe has given us. The Roman Emperor Augustus, the bourgeois philosopher Voltaire, and the proletarian theorist Marx – all in this sense resemble one another.

This does not at all mean that each of them, taken in his concrete setting and in his concrete time, constitutes a supra-class phenomenon. The first, and the second, and the fifth served their own class. However, in so far as their service, while raising the culture of their class, summoned the development of new forces that characterized the concept of progress, that superseded them and sometimes constituted their antipode – thus far one can place equation marks between Lenin and Peter the Great. Both the priest Luther and the workers' leader Bebel belong to one and the same type of European civic person. The first, and second, and fifth, and tenth did not divorce themselves from their social base, but they were all the motive forces of history in the degree that the same 'variable relation' permitted. Their intellects and natures were conditioned by their socio-economic and political order. We conceive of this classic type as being in a permanent intellectual, volitional, and so forth, dynamic. This is the person whose biological nature is always troubled, always fully engaged.

*This is the European intellectual in the best sense of the word. This, if you like, is the sorcerer from Württemberg who revealed a grandiose civilization to us and opened up limitless vistas to our gaze. This is Doctor Faust, if we conceive of the latter as the inquisitive human spirit.*

And Spengler<sup>1</sup> is quite mistaken: it is not Faust that he is carrying on his catafalque, but the 'third estate,' because the Württemberg doctor is immortal, as long as strong, healthy people exist ...

1 Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) was best known for his book *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918–22), which argued that European culture had exhausted its potential and that the next great cultural flowering would come from elsewhere. [Unless other source is given, the notes are by the translator, though they have been slightly altered by the editors.]

## Cultural Epigonism

The task of Marxist analysis is to take into account all features of development, all the complex interrelationships among protagonists and influences. – *The ABC of Communism*

We have received an astonishing literary inheritance; we, Communists, have a tremendous responsibility for the literature that the new Russia will provide, after Pushkin, Gogol, and Tolstoy.

This is the note trumpeted by *Krasnaia nov*<sup>2</sup> throughout the length and breadth of the USSR. Here in Ukraine we also cry out at the top of our voices, though the tune is somewhat different.

To the past belong extraordinary works of art. The 'third estate' gave us the age of the Renaissance, Byron, Goethe, Hugo, and so forth. We, communards, carry a tremendous responsibility: it depends entirely upon us what kind of art the proletariat will produce in the period of its dictatorship.

This responsibility becomes all the more difficult when we realize that this art must be created by a culturally backward nation.

Until now no one has taken the trouble to explain the confused situation with which we are confronted in *Ukrainian* culture.

Naturally, it is not particularly difficult for some *smenovekhovets*, some Professor Kliuchnikov,<sup>3</sup> to divide the sphere of ethics into morality, law, and politics, come up with the basic universal programs, and in such a fashion defeat the irrationality of history. Because this is all done with the ultimate purpose of emphasizing on some page 177 that 'Russia is the world's first liberator.' Neither is it difficult for some thick-headed Petliurist<sup>4</sup> to offer his solution to this problem. But for us, who do not view the national factor as an end in itself, the questions wrapped up with this factor become even more complicated.

We are faced with this *fundamental and unexplained* dilemma:

*Are we going to approach our national art as fulfilling a service (in the*

2 *Krasnaia nov* (Red Virgin Soil) was a Soviet Russian literary journal, the influence of which waned in the late 1920s.

3 A *smenovekhovets* was a member of *Smena Vekh* (Changing Landmarks), a group which admired Russian Bolshevism for its continuation of the tradition of Russian nationalism. Iu. Kliuchnikov was a member of the group and a contributor to its journal.

4 This refers to the followers of Symon Petliura (1879–1926), a central member of the Ukrainian government that took power at the end of 1918. As commander-in-chief of the army he fought unsuccessfully against the second Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine. In 1926 he was assassinated in Paris.

*given instance, serving the proletariat) and as forever subordinate, forever a reserve for those of the world's arts that have attained a high level of development?*

*Or, on the contrary, while retaining the service role shall we find it necessary to raise its artistic level to that of the world's masterpieces?*

We believe that this question can be resolved only in this way:

Since the Ukrainian nation has striven for its liberation over a period of several centuries, we consider this to be its irresistible desire to *express and realize fully* its national (not nationalistic) features.

These national features express themselves in its culture and – in conditions of free development, in conditions similar to those prevailing in the present situation – do so with the same verve, the same will to achieve parity with other peoples that we witnessed in the Romans, who in a relatively shorter period of time narrowed the gap with Greek culture. This national essence has to play itself out in art as well.

If our opinions in this case bear a resemblance to the anguished cries of our petty bourgeoisie and even the fascists, that does not at all mean that we are mistaken.

Because in fact national features are nothing but the ordinary features of the culture of a given nation. They are made use of by all classes. The 'third estate' made better use of them than any other. And, if the petty bourgeoisie seizes upon our idea, we must say first that that is because it sees in our idea a *nationalistic* essence; and second, to the extent that their critique is justified, we sometimes have to deal with anti-Soviet positions that contain legitimate grievances.

In short, when the 'national-Bolshevik' Ustrialov<sup>5</sup> accepts the Communist Party's program, that does not imply that the program needs correction.

*Our formulation of the question flows logically from our Party's policy on the national question.* Through such a formulation we can finally – in the realm of art – solve this 'accursed problem,' which is holding back the class differentiation in Ukraine, and, as a result, humanity's progress towards a communist society.

But now, if we are to turn our attention to the actual state of affairs, we must say:

Our formulation will lead to real results only if our society begins to view our art in the context of artistic collisions on a world scale. In other

5 N.V. Ustrialov (1890–1938) was the leader of the Smena Vekh group.

words, without for one moment losing sight of all relevant achievements of other countries, *we must find the shortest of all routes to a full flowering*, because otherwise the way we have posed the question is pointless. As for the fact that we exhibit more tendencies to backwardness – the entire history of our nation speaks for this.

...

Ukrainian art must find the highest aesthetic values. And on this path the Voronys and Ievshans<sup>6</sup> were a phenomenon of social importance. For us the eminent 'muzhik' Franko, who considers Flaubert to have been a fool, is less dear than (let this not be *personalia*!) the aesthetic Semenko,<sup>7</sup> this tragic figure against the backdrop of our backward reality.

As for an ideal revolutionary and citizen, you will find none greater than Panko Kulish. As far as we can make out, he is the only bright light shining out of the dark Ukrainian past. He alone can be considered a true European, a man who came close to being the type of the Western intellectual. And we fail entirely to understand why Comrade Doroshkevych<sup>8</sup> considers him a representative of 'black Europe'; in our opinion this is precisely red Europe. Because we see in 'red' nothing other than a symbol of struggle.

Kulish was, in essence, an ideologist of a strong 'third estate,' and had he not come up against the dead wall of cultural epigonism in the contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia, during the civil war we would never have had the kind of leaders who invariably followed the tail of the masses. *Just as in the history of humanity national wars were a revolutionary, red phenomenon in their day, so for our country Kulish was the progressive red Europe.*

1926

[From *The Apologists for Scribbling*]

### Moscow's Zadrypanky<sup>9</sup>

If the Russians can boast a few poetical talents, they owe this above all to the prox-

6 Mykola Vorony (1871–1942) was a prominent modernist poet. Mykola Ievshan (1889–1919) was a literary critic who attacked the populist, civic literature of his day and called for a more individualistic, more modern literary art.

7 Mykhail Semenko (1892–1938) began as a symbolist poet but became the chief founder and theoretician of Ukrainian futurism.

8 Oleksander Doroshkevych (1889–1946) was a historian of literature, a critic, and a teacher.

9 The pejorative term *zadrypanky* is difficult to translate. Perhaps 'slatterns' best conveys what the author intends. [Eds]

imity of their history to the history of Europe and to those elements of life assimilated from Europe. As for the Little Russians, it is ridiculous even to think that something might develop from their poetry. One could set it (Little Russian poetry) in motion only if the best, noblest sector of the Little Russian population gave up the French quadrille and began dancing the *trepak* and *hopak* once again. – V.G. Belinsky

With his eloquent and piquant quotation we do not at all intend to accuse Belinsky<sup>10</sup> of chauvinism; we wish to underline the extent to which hatred of Ukrainian poetry saturates that literature from which our Moscovophiles advise us to learn. That does not at all mean that we dislike this literature; it means that we are organically incapable of educating ourselves on it. Besides, we are joking; we did not cite the passage for this reason either. We wanted only to say that Comrade Burevii<sup>11</sup> was wrong; Belinsky ‘made a mistake’ not only ‘concerning Shevchenko.’ He made it ‘concerning the whole of Ukrainian literature.’ Before advising ‘our critics,’ in his pretentious brochure, to ‘read Belinsky,’ therefore, it would not be such a bad thing for him to drop in on a Moscow bookstore himself when the opportunity arises.

This will serve as an introduction whose purpose is to spur our Moscovophile ‘Europenko’ into an immediate fast gallop.

Once again, therefore: in the brochure being considered it is not those theses which play a variation on Pylypenko’s<sup>12</sup> memorandum that interest us, it is the ‘Europenko’s’ advice to our young people to learn from the Russians.

Allow us first of all to introduce you to the ‘views’ of this Moscovophile, who ‘has his place of residence in the town of Moscow.’ In his opinion ‘the life of contemporary Ukraine lags behind Moscow’s by about two or three years.’ He never doubts this because in examining any phenomenon he is above all else concerned with finding a parallel. Where is the identical fact or factor in the ‘life of Moscow’? Khvylovy has come out with a challenge? Aha – Voronsky!<sup>13</sup> It doesn’t fit? Well, all right then, let Voronsky be Kost

10 Vissarion Belinsky (1811–48) was the leading literary critic in Russia around the middle of the nineteenth century.

11 Kost Burevii (1888–1934) was a writer and political activist. In 1926 he wrote the pamphlet *Evropa chy Rosiia?* (Europe or Russia?). Soon after, he became a strong supporter of Khvylovy’s position, and he was liquidated in the 1930s.

12 Serhii Pylypenko (1891–1943) was a writer of fables who was ordered by the Communist Party of Ukraine to form the union of peasant writers that came to be known as Pluh.

13 Alexander Voronsky (1884–1937?) was a leading Marxist critic of the 1920s and editor of the Party’s leading literary journal, *Krasnaia nov.*



Burevii. That is exactly what is written in the information sent from Russia: 'Kost Burevii, the Ukrainian Voronsky.' Pilniak?<sup>14</sup> Aha, we have a Khvylovy here. Doesn't fit? You don't say, how strange! Well, in that case, let Kopylenko<sup>15</sup> be Vsevolod Ivanov.<sup>16</sup> *Amerykantsi* by Dosvitnii?<sup>17</sup> No problem, we have a Sinclair<sup>18</sup> here in Moscow ... Well, actually it's only a translation into Russian, but essentially they're one and the same thing; you wouldn't be able to read the English anyway. *On Guardism*?<sup>19</sup> Oh, yes, we have a Pluh here. Voronskyism? Fine, we'll find you a Hart<sup>20</sup> as well.

We are not trying to deny by this that Khvylovy is a 'Ukrainianized Little Pilniak' – God forbid, on the contrary even – or that one set of phenomena or another in the 'life of Moscow' have their corresponding reflection in the contemporary life of Ukraine. We wish to emphasize thus how our Moscovophiles have simplified and vulgarized this method, to what absurdities they are reduced when they sing the praises of Russian wares, the Russian school, saying, You should go, 'we have wonderful translations of the works of world writers there' (we quote from the brochure), as though this was the first we had heard of it, as though we were incapable of 'creating' such a literature of genius at home. Just think, what a claim to wisdom: they translate a foreign work and then go around bragging!

You're barking up the wrong tree, Comrade Burevii! You will not tempt us with translations. You will not even tempt us with original literature, because *today, when Ukrainian poetry is carving out a completely independent path for itself*, you will not tempt it to Moscow for love or

14 Boris Pilniak (pseudonym of Boris A. Vogau, 1894–1937) was a Russian novelist and short-story writer of the 1920s and 1930s.

15 Oleksander Kopylenko (1900–58) began to publish in Ukrainian in 1921, mainly on themes taken from the civil war.

16 Vsevolod Ivanov (1895–1963) was a Russian writer noted for his treatment of passionate characters embroiled in the stormy conflict of the civil war.

17 The author of *Amerykantsi* (Americans) was Oles Dosvitnii (pseudonym of O. Skrypka, 1891–1934), a novelist and a founding member of both Hart (see note 20, below) and VAPLITE.

18 Upton Sinclair (1878–1968) was an American writer and reformer with Communist sympathies.

19 *Na postu* (On Guard) was a Soviet Russian journal that favoured a militantly proletarian art.

20 Pluh (The Plough) and Hart (Tempering) were associations of workers and peasant writers in Ukraine. The first group was inclined to follow the leadership of literary currents in Moscow, and the second was both concerned with the linguistic quality of the art produced by its writers and attentive to indigenous Ukrainian communist trends.

money. You will not find parallels in the 'life of Moscow' for our discussion. And this is not in the least because one participant or another in the Ukrainian dispute is more talented than one or another in the Russian (God forbid!), but because Ukrainian realities are more complex than the Russian, because we are faced with different tasks, because we are the young class of a young nation, because we are a young literature which still has not had its Lev Tolstoy and which must have them, which is not in 'decline' but in the ascendant.

Of course, the development of culture is 'dictated by economic relations.' But the point is precisely that these relations are not at all 'the same in both countries.' They are the same in so far as they are the same in the world economy and in so far as a common front is required against the bourgeoisie. The Ukrainian economy is not the same thing as the Russian economy, and cannot be the same thing, because for one thing, Ukrainian culture, which grows out of its own economy, has a reciprocal influence on the latter; hence, our economy acquires a specific form and character. In a word, the Union nevertheless remains a Union, and Ukraine is an independent entity. We advise Comrade Burevii to come here and take a closer look. We fear only that he will cry 'Wolf!' For, indeed, Little Russia long ago disappeared 'into the realm of legend.' Under the influence of our economy, we are applying to our literature not the 'Slavophile theory of originality,' but the theory of communist independence. True, this theory might alarm our Moscovite 'Europenkos,' but we communards will not take fright at all – on the contrary. Is Russia an independent state? It is! Well, in that case we too are independent.

Since our literature can at last follow its own path of development, we are faced with the following question: By which of the world's literatures should we set our course?

*On no account by the Russian.* That is definite and unconditional. Our political union must not be confused with literature. Ukrainian poetry must flee as quickly as possible from Russian literature and its styles. The Poles would never have produced Mickiewicz<sup>21</sup> had they not stopped orienting themselves towards the art of Moscow. The point is that Russian literature has weighed down upon us for centuries as master of the situation, as a literature that has conditioned our psyche to play the slavish imitator. And so, to nourish our young art on it would be to impede its

21 Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) was a poet of great range and versatility who was considered the national bard of Poland.

development. The proletariat's ideas did not reach us through Muscovite art; on the contrary, we, as representatives of a young nation, can better apprehend these ideas, better cast them in the appropriate images. Our orientation is to Western European art, its style, its techniques.

*Translated by Myroslav Shkandrij*

1926

## Speeches (excerpts)

## MYKOLA SKRYPNYK

*Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933) was a leading Ukrainian Bolshevik. Much of his youth was spent in revolutionary activity, and he was first arrested in 1901. Subsequently he joined the Social-Democratic Workers Party and, later, its Leninist wing. During the revolution he was a member of the revolutionary committee in Petrograd. In December 1917, on Lenin's orders, he went to Ukraine, where he became a leading member of the Soviet Ukrainian government. From 1918 to 1920 he worked in Moscow, but he returned to Ukraine in 1922 to become commissar of justice and, from 1928 to 1933, commissar of education. He was one of the initiators of the policy of 'Ukrainianization' in the 1920s and a proponent of what was later labelled 'national communism.' Hounded by Stalinist henchmen, especially the special emissary to Ukraine, Pavel Postyshev, Skrypnyk committed suicide in July 1933.*

## [1]

It would be well to put a full stop after all these quarrels facing the Party. One must realize that such phenomena follow a dual path. On the one hand, the Party understands the needs of life, explains the relations of classes, designates the tasks of the proletariat in the whole historical process, and marches forward step by step. One can see here an uninterrupted line from the pre-October era, through 1917–18, to the present moment. The Party provides us with a short résumé of it in the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine concerning the completion of the Ukrainianization process.<sup>1</sup> The Party is not afraid of self-criticism. The proletariat

will never allow a cover-up of the mistakes of its avant-garde. This self-criticism is one of the principles of proletarian activity. The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine would not maintain the required level of historical tasks if it did not promote self-criticism. If the Party wants to shoulder all the historical tasks placed before us by the historical development of our country, it cannot afford not to criticize. It should criticize the previously mentioned mistakes of its workers and leaders. The theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine explain clearly the mistakes that were committed by the Party.

I quote:

The specific conditions of historical development in Ukraine, which caused, on the one hand, the Russification of Ukrainian cities and of a large part of the proletariat and, on the other, the fierce struggle with counterrevolution led by the Ukrainian social-chauvinist parties, as well as the presence in the views of some comrades, who during the first years of civil war led our Party, of [Rosa] Luxemburg's opinion on the national question<sup>1</sup> – all this caused the entire Party organization to misunderstand the importance of the national question in the revolutionary struggle in Ukraine. And some comrades even came to deny the very existence of the Ukrainian nation. This gave rise to the misunderstanding of the Leninist solution of the national question, to the undervaluing of the Ukrainian language and of Ukrainian culture as the mighty means for the cultural elevation of the masses, as the instruments for cementing the union of workers and peasants, and as a necessary precondition for the building of socialism.

Further on, the resolution of the CC of the CP(B)U notes the following development: 'Whereas the Party has admitted the aforementioned mistakes, there appeared in the arena the incorrect, un-Marxian, and un-Leninist theory of the struggle of two cultures, the Ukrainian and the Russian, and the Party and Soviet government were supposed to be neutral or even were to promote Russification, which was deemed inevitable.'

Later, theses of the CC of the CP(B)U characterize the further work of our Party on the solution of the national question in Ukraine. We know

1 Ukrainianization was the official policy of the Soviet Ukrainian government in 1923. Its object was the support of the use of Ukrainian in education and public administration. After the policy's initial success, it was abandoned in the 1930s.

2 Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919) held that the idea of national self-determination was harmful to the international solidarity of the proletariat.

this process because we were participants in it. With great difficulty, the Party proceeded step by step on the path of solving the national question in Ukraine. One achievement was followed by another and demanded still another; one struggle gave rise to another, as it encountered new difficulties. Taking into account the entire development of Party policy, one can see the uninterrupted line of its determined, practical, and principled work in this area.

But another characteristic feature must be noted. Apart from the fact that the Party policy developed according to the Leninist view on the national question and established it as a practical task, there was at the rear of the Party, so to speak, a force which pulled it back.

At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 the obstacle to the correct implementation of the Leninist view came from the pre-revolutionary vestiges of the ideology planted by tsarism and the bourgeoisie as well as by the pre-revolutionary governing class, which denied to the Ukrainian nation the right to separate existence and development. These remnants of old views obstructed the very question about the formation of a Ukrainian state of workers and peasants.

In 1919, when life overcame these erroneous views, the implementation of the Party line on the national question was obstructed for a long time by several other erroneous views, and these were destroyed only in December 1919 by the well-known Party resolution and Lenin's famous letter 'To Ukrainian Workers and Peasants.' Later, there followed the theory of the struggle of two cultures by Lebed,<sup>3</sup> the doubts about 'Ukrainianization,' and so on. Again and again, after every principled resolution of the entire Party, after a new step taken on the Party's advice, there arose before the Party obstacles in the form of some comrades' views, which, although almost agreeing with the Party, added something contrary and disagreed with the Party's resolution. They accepted the resolution in theory but gave it a different, often contradictory, meaning in practice.

Recently, a new 'Literary Discussion'<sup>4</sup> was conducted. The Party has gone through a great deal, has set gigantic tasks, placed by history before the proletariat and the Communist Party. The Communist Party has not only aimed at directing the development of Ukrainian culture, but through the resolutions of the plenum of the CC of the CP(B)U in all matters of

3 Dmytro Lebed (1893-?) was a Ukrainian Bolshevik who maintained that in the 'struggle of two cultures' Russian culture would triumph over Ukrainian.

4 The Literary Discussion (1925-8), prompted by Mykola Khvylovy, was the last free debate in Ukraine before the onset of Stalinism.

principle has perfected the path of the development of Ukrainian culture, has mapped out the relationship in which Ukrainian culture must and should stand with other cultures, primarily with Russian culture, and has sketched the general directions of the development of great and responsible social, political, and cultural work.

It was during this discussion that an article appeared on the pages of one of our newspapers which offered nothing good but was characterized by all the old features already rejected by the Party. A great deal of time has passed after the plenum of the CC of the CP(B)U and after the printing of its resolutions on the paths of the development of Ukrainian culture. It would be futile to seek on the pages of our newspapers an article by Comrade Romanovsky in which he corrects his erroneous views and supports the Party line as it was resolved and without his reservations, which in fact only distort the Party line, making it different from the accepted one.

No! Comrades like Romanovsky are convinced that they not only hold to the Party line but represent it fully, and therefore they burden the Party with the mistakes committed by many comrades who have not jettisoned some of the old views already rejected by the Party. How well it would be to end this here. But it is impossible. The process of consolidating Party views is not a direct line; it is a struggle. Again and again the Communist Party is influenced by those social circles which border on the working class and which follow it, but which bring to it their own baggage and views, for the most part heavy with antiquated bourgeois and landowning influences. It is not enough to proclaim a Party resolution; it is necessary to fight for it and to preserve the Party line from old vestiges of grey and mouldy antiquity.

1926

[2]

Comrade Stalin remarked in one of his speeches that the implementation of correct Leninist nationality policy in Ukraine offers us the opportunity to exert a revolutionary influence as far as the oppressed nationalities of Western countries are concerned and is therefore very important. It is also obvious that any failure on our part to implement correct Leninist nationality policy in the Ukrainian national question would offer a weapon against us. This, in fact, is what has happened. The 'Ukrainian question' has become popular in Western European circles. During the last one and a half to two years their press, inimical to the USSR, has spoken with great agitation

about Ukraine, about the implementation of the national question regarding the Ukrainians, and has wanted to prepare in Ukraine the platform for the future attack of enemy forces against the Soviet Union. The awakened hostile petty-bourgeois elements in Ukraine itself are also striving in this direction. An echo could be heard in the so-called Shumskism<sup>5</sup> in Soviet Ukraine and in the treason of the former leadership of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine.<sup>6</sup> The underlying issues these traitors raise are formulated as 'Moscow's intervention,' 'the implementation of Ukrainianization as a fiction,' 'national oppression,' 'Russification,' and so on. All this is taken up by the hostile nationalist and fascist Ukrainian and Polish press. One must agree that the 'Ukrainian question,' the question about the actual implementation of a correct national policy in the Ukrainian national question, has become a political weapon, which we are using to beat the enemy and, in the case of the errors on our part, which the enemy is using against us. It is sufficient, for instance, to read the symposium on the Kuban published by the Kuban activists in Prague. It carefully and conscientiously selects and uses data on educational policy in the Kuban, the district of Tahanrih, and so on. The Ukrainian nationalists of Western Ukraine do not lag behind. The organ of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance,<sup>7</sup> *Dilo* (no. 96, 2 May 1923), in an article entitled 'Between Hammer and Anvil' makes the following declaration:

Six million Ukrainians (according to official Soviet data) in the RSFSR do not enjoy elementary national rights. They are abandoned for the sake of complete denationalization in general and Russification in particular. The Ukrainian Kuban has a thin network of Ukrainian elementary schools and some theatrical performances. The Ukrainian language, the language of forty million, which strives for cultural heights in the darkness of Russian reality, the third-largest language among the Slavs, is allowed only side by side with Russian.

5 Oleksander Shumsky (1890–?) was a Ukrainian Bolshevik leader of nationalist persuasion and, from 1924 to 1927, commissar of education. After his views, labelled 'Shumskism,' were condemned by the Party, he was sent into exile.

6 The Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), founded in 1923 as a branch of the Polish Communist Party, sided with the views of Oleksander Shumsky. On the initiative of the CP(B)U it was dissolved in 1928, and many of its leaders, who fled to the USSR, perished in the GULAG.

7 The Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) did not advocate extreme nationalism. It is interesting that Skrypnyk quotes here its organ *Dilo* (The Deed), ostensibly critical of it but, in fact, approving of the information it printed about the Ukrainians in the RSFSR.



And so on and so on. We shall not persuade our enemies, and in our practical, political moves we cannot be guided by what the enemy says about us, but we should anticipate and prevent individual mistakes or a whole series of mistakes from happening, because these will be used against us by our enemies. In any case, it is necessary to admit that the incorrect policy of local workers and organs in the RSFSR territories bordering on Soviet Ukraine is a strike against us and undermines the force of the correct Leninist nationality policy enacted by us, as well as weakening our revolutionary influence on the oppressed masses of Western Ukraine, Bukovyna, Bessarabia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, and so on. At the same time we must note that in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic itself enemy forces are raising their heads and are using well-known facts about the real state of affairs in Kursk, Kuban, and Tahanrih. We can see the effect of these errors in Ukraine, the effect of the impermissible policy followed locally in the Kursk and Tahanrih areas.

## Ukrainian Reality and the Task of Women (excerpt)

MILENA RUDNYTSKA

*Milena Rudnytska (1892–1976) was a leader of the Ukrainian women's movement in Western Ukraine and later in the diaspora. For almost a decade she was president of the Union of Ukrainian Women (Soiuz ukrainok) in Lviv. She was also a member of the Polish Sejm. An accomplished politician and journalist, she often defended Ukrainian causes in the international arena. The excerpt printed here from her speech to the First Ukrainian Women's Congress in Stanyslaviv in 1934 exemplifies the ideology of Ukrainian feminism. There exists a valuable study in English of Ukrainian feminists by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak.*

We hear another accusation that the women's movement and women's organizations want to cordon off women into a separate society and that this would be harmful for women themselves and for the whole community. Our answer is that the Ukrainian women's movement has never called for the isolation of women from society. On the contrary, from its very beginning the movement has striven for Ukrainian women to become a vital and most active part of the nation as a whole. Not as an empty gesture did Natalia Kobrynska, in as early as 1887, reject a division into separate men's and women's ideologies and programs when she wrote, 'We do not wish to separate from men in the area of general goals and to isolate the women's question from common social tasks.' Following Kobrynska, we have affirmed this position tens and hundreds of times. It is solidly entrenched in the statutes of women's organizations, in the annual resolutions of the conventions of the Union of Ukrainian Women, in many lectures and articles. Out of this position came our slogans: 'Women – Fight against illiteracy!' 'Women – Organize day care!' 'Women – Join political

parties!' 'Women – Vote!' It is the women's organizations that prepare Ukrainian women to take up civic duties and mobilize their energies. All national actions and needs have found support among women's groups. Women often form the most active element in any social work. We have never put forward the view that women should be free of civic duties and work only for themselves. On the contrary, the program of the women's movement has always called for participation in social institutions and political parties. The purpose of a separate women's organization has been to prepare women for the fulfillment of their role in the strivings of our nation. It has always advocated cooperation with men in social and political organizations. Women's organizations have been but a bridge to social, organized life for the masses of our peasant women.

Equally unjust is the accusation that the Ukrainian women's movement is guilty of egoism. At no time has our movement had the narrow, selfish interests of women at heart. We have always placed duties before rights. When we have demanded rights for ourselves we have done so with the deep conviction that without them we would be unable to become active and useful citizens of our nation. These 'rights' we have understood as the right to be of service to the people, to our nation. We still believe that such a service is imperative for our people. Service to our nation has been and still is the leading idea of our women's movement, its main ethos and justification.

This charge of 'egoism' has an odd ring coming from men who judge everything from the men's point of view, and ignore the second half of the human race – women. Just as unjust is the charge of 'internationalism' hurled against us. No other women's movement derives its strength from the national idea as the Ukrainian women's movement does. When they accuse us of favouring feminism per se and neglecting national interests, they are just as wrong as when they say we are interested in national affairs alone and neglect women's issues. Within Ukrainian women's associations there is a balance between national and feminist ideas. There is no contradiction between the idea of national liberation and feminism. On the contrary, by enhancing all the potentialities of women, we increase the living potential and the energies of the nation.

We have read recently that the women's movement aims at aping men and masculinizing women. But the starting-point of our feminism is a belief in the distinctiveness of the female psyche and its ability to enrich our humanity. That is why our movement tells woman to follow her own path and not be a man's satellite. We would rather not imitate male genius, or male follies and crimes. We want to be ourselves. Perhaps we would

govern the world better than men do. Women's participation in social life will be of value only if we bring our personality to it.

We must vigorously protest against the charges that our movement preaches 'physiological emancipation' and sexual freedom for woman. When we postulated sexual equality we did so not in order to debase women to the level of men but to raise the latter to the height on which women stand. We are for equality in morality – that is, the equal responsibility of men and women for the number and well-being of children, their health and education.

We protest against those who say that the women's movement leads to moral decay. It was not women who created the social order in which women are treated as prostitutes. We were the first to fight against it. And it is not women who are responsible for all the manifestations of humanity's biological degeneration, nor women who are responsible for the decay of family life. Our Ukrainian women's movement is a disciplined and ethical movement, and it defends the highest moral values. Just as 'the river cannot rise above its source,' so a nation cannot rise higher than its women. We hold in our hands the highest moral values of our nation.

## Dontsov's Nationalism (excerpts)

### OSYP NAZARUK

*Osyp Nazaruk (1883–1940) was a prominent journalist and activist in Western Ukraine. He took an active part in the creation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918. Upon the collapse of its government he travelled widely in Canada and the United States. After returning to Galicia in the mid-1920s he became editor of the Catholic newspaper Nova zoria (New Dawn) in Lviv. Nazaruk's attack on Dontsov was written in the late 1920s but published in 1934 under the title Natsionalizm Dontsova i inshi myshugizmy (Dontsov's Nationalism and Other Myshugisms).<sup>1</sup> In violently opposing Dontsov's ideas Nazaruk chose a style as emotional as his opponent's rather than one that was cool and controlled. He was a great admirer of Lypynsky, and their correspondence has been published in Ukrainian in the United States.*

Although Dontsov cockily assures us in his *Nationalism* that he opposes his view of the world to all others, this simply is not true. Dontsov does not have a view of life of his own; he never had one. Arrogance alone does not create a *Weltanschauung*, and his is supported by nothing but quotations torn from books by mediocre philosophers. Dontsov was unable to skim through them, let alone read them ... Dontsov's dishevelled and conceited writings may appeal for a while to high school students and seminar-ians because of the multitude of foreign words he uses. Whenever he has an opportunity to use a less flashy word to denote a concept, he chooses the

<sup>1</sup> The title refers to L. Myshuha, a prominent civic activist in the United States. But because the last *h* in the name has been replaced with the consonant *g*, the Yiddish word for 'craziness' is suggested.

most florid (e.g., *risorgimento*), which is the one least understood by the reading public ...

...

It is certainly clear that Dontsov is an imitator, a sick plunderer of philosophy and of nationalism. His mind is like a crushed worm wriggling helplessly under the mighty roots of a large oak and thinking itself capable of knocking the oak over. Such is the relation of Dontsov's work to the mighty creation of Lypynsky. It does not help Dontsov that he labels [Lypynsky] a Don Quixote of monarchism ... It won't help him, because monarchism is an old idea of mankind which, after each ruinous war, comes to life again as day follows night. He who goes to the people with Dontsov's empty and amoral nationalism will be ridiculous. Or, even more, he who goes among the peasants, because the proletariat, in Dontsov's opinion, cannot be the 'carrier' of nationalism.

Lypynsky has grounded his deep concepts in his own humility and spirit, on the basis of his faith and the Christian church. He teaches all classes of the Ukrainian people that nothing will be created on its own, but that it is necessary to desire to create a state, which state will then make a nation of the people of Ukraine. He is right when he says that the state is not created by a nation, and that, on the contrary, a nation is created by the state. His teaching is based on his great knowledge of the past and of the present of Ukraine, on the realization that the building of the Ukrainian state and nation is impossible without a recognition of and a respect for the legally elected and traditional hetman. The recent past has proved Lypynsky right.

Dontsov does not even see the magnificent dish which Lypynsky has gathered from Ukrainian fields of the last millennium and offered as food for Ukraine's present generations. Dontsov, who is foreign to us in spirit, does not even understand the various foods offered us, and demands a toothbrush as necessary for enjoyment of a meal. He declares that no morals and no united class effort are needed for the task of building; desire alone will suffice.

No one before Dontsov has so preached the happiness supposedly offered by 'knife and blood.'

...

Can such Ukrainian demagogic nationalism last long? A movement without any foundation, except demagoguery? A movement based on boasting and irresponsibility, which claims to 'follow the people' and leads to complete ruin? ...

Only now, after the First World War and the appearance of Lypynsky's

work, has it become evident that Ukrainian nationalism is not a serious idea. That is why it has come to show itself in alien forms. For that nationalism (1) was developed by an intelligentsia unfit to build a state or even a press of its own, and (2) was established not on a state and territorial principle, embracing all citizens of the country, but on the sounds of the language and the songs of one group of the people, and on their customs – which have not created and never will create a state.

It is now clear why the most cultured members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia deserted to the Poles or the Russians. Those who went to the Poles did so because logic told them that the Poles have a literature greater than that of the Ukrainians. The others, who went to Moscow, had even better logic: If nationalism is rooted in language, then the Russian language, developed by our Gogols, has a literature even greater than that of the Polish language. Why should one develop a new language and literature? Russian will do, and with it you can travel in Europe and Asia. You will be respected as a member of a great nation. So why want a separate language? ... Were not such the arguments of our 'Moscophiles,' who considered themselves 'Ruthenian nationalists'?

...

... Today's Bolshevism may also be regarded as the fulfillment of empty Ukrainian nationalism. In its theory and practice so-called Soviet Ukraine fulfils everything that empty and demagogic Ukrainian nationalism desires. Even more! (1) Soviet Ukraine and Moscow recognize the Ukrainian nation. (2) They recognize the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian songs. For the former they fund an Academy (although it was founded by Pavlo Skoropadsky), universities (founded by the same hetman), many schools, theatres, the press, and so on. They also fund a Ukrainian opera. (3) If Dontsov says that a nation 'must be heard,' then it is true that, under Bolshevik rule, Ukraine is 'being heard,' even in mighty England. (4) No Ukrainian intellectual who went to serve the Bolsheviks has died of hunger. He has good shelter and eats caviar and can have many wives. What more does he want? (5) If Khvylovy and others would not oppose Russian culture, Ukrainians would earn high honours ... (6) Have not the Bolsheviks realized the idea of Ukrainian nationalism by giving land to the people (true, later they took it back)? To be sure, times are hard in Ukraine, but times are hard everywhere. (7) Ukrainian nationalism wanted to give Ukrainians a good life. The Bolsheviks want to give all peoples a good life. Therefore Ukrainian nationalism cannot successfully oppose Bolshevism.

...

Whoever has studied the subject well will come to the conclusion that

Ukrainian demagogic nationalism is a broken tree. It is a dead corpse. But for some time, perhaps even a long time, it will rot, and befoul and poison the air with a bad odour ...

...

No organism can live without a head or an idea. Our national organism will not live without them. In order to breathe life into our organism we must (1) get rid of all the demagoguery; (2) recognize that so-called Ukrainian nationalism is the worst kind of demagoguery, and that it leaves our country at the mercy of foreign forces; (3) recognize that without a state the Ukrainian nation will never be born, and the state will not be born without the head; (4) recognizing all this, organize in order to implant in our people the idea that our people are all those who live in Ukraine, regardless of language and creed ... Having rid ourselves of the corpse of Ukrainian nationalism, we will strive to build our state. Only then will we become a great and strong nation.



## The Manifesto of the OUN

*The manifesto of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was written in December 1940, before the German attack on the USSR. Its rather grandiloquent tone expresses the passionate commitment of the many young men and women in Western Ukraine who, a few years later, joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). It is hardly a political program, more a call to arms. A certain political immaturity on the part of the writers of the manifesto went hand in hand with their unquestioned devotion to their cause.*

The existing political order in the world, which forcibly oppresses important and vital peoples, is threatened by movements for liberation.

The Moscow-dominated empire of the USSR today is a part of this world order.

We, Ukrainians, are raising the flag of our struggle for the liberation of peoples and mankind.

By destroying forever this terrible prison of nations – the Muscovite empire – we are creating a new order and building the foundations of a new political system in the world.

### I

We are fighting for the liberation of the Ukrainian people and all other peoples subjugated by Moscow.

We are fighting against Muscovite imperialism of all types, especially Bolshevism, which has brought national, political, religious, cultural, social, and economic enslavement to its most extreme limit.

## II

We are bringing a new order to Eastern Europe and the part of Asia which is under Moscow.

We are bringing to all peoples subjugated by Moscow freedom to create their own lives on their native lands according to their own will.

We are bringing protection to all peoples threatened by Moscow.

## III

We call on the revolutionaries of all peoples subjugated by Moscow to join in a common struggle and to collaborate with Ukrainian revolutionary nationalists.

Only Ukraine is a true ally of all peoples subjugated or threatened by Moscow in their struggle against Muscovite-Bolshevik imperialism.

## IV

By force of circumstances Ukrainians are in the vanguard of all peoples subjugated by Moscow in their struggle for total liberation.

Ukrainians on the lands subjugated by Moscow are in the first ranks of those engaged in revolutionary struggle.

We call on all Ukrainians, wherever they live, to join the ranks of the Front of Ukrainian National Revolution.

## V

We are creating in Ukraine a common front of struggle among the peasants, the workers, and the working intelligentsia against Muscovite-Bolshevik oppression and exploitation.

We stand for one's own government, for the land, and for human life.

## VI

We are fighting

against the complete degradation of human beings in their work and in their homes;

against depriving the individual of all joy in living;

against the general impoverishment of all citizens;

against burdening women with heavy responsibilities under cover of the lie of 'equality';

against the criminal miseducation of young people with Bolshevik 'science,' with the lies of the press, the cinema, radio, the theatre, meetings, and all the idiotic propaganda of the Stalinist regime.

We are fighting

for human dignity and freedom;

for the right to express one's opinion openly;

for the freedom of all religions;

and for complete freedom of conscience.

## VII

We are fighting

against the tyranny and terror of the Bolshevik clique,

against the horrible regime of the NKVD in collective farms, in factories, in the army and navy, in the Party, in the Komsomol, in school, and at home.

We are fighting

for the right of working people to express their political convictions openly in words and in print, to attend public meetings freely, and to create political, social, and professional organizations.

## VIII

We are fighting

against the economic exploitation and plunder of Ukraine and all the peoples subjugated by Moscow;

against the slavery in the collective farms, state farms, and factories;

against the plundering of the earnings of citizens gained through hard work;

against the forced resettlement of people from their native lands.

We are fighting for the right of every people subjugated by Moscow to use the riches of their native lands and to enjoy the fruits of their daily labour.

## IX

We believe and we know that the time is approaching when the dreams of our fathers will be realized, and from the blood of many heroic generations there will be ignited a fire of national wrath.

Ukraine will rise and will disperse the darkness of slavery!

Only through the complete destruction of the Muscovite empire and through the Ukrainian National Revolution and through the armed uprisings of all peoples subjugated by Moscow shall we attain a Ukrainian state and free the peoples subjugated by Moscow.

Ukrainians and all peoples subjugated by Moscow!

Join the merciless struggle against the Muscovite-Bolshevik yoke!

Destroy the Muscovite prison of nations!

Freedom to all the subjugated!

## Declaration of the Ukrainian National Council

*The Ukrainian National Council was formed in 1941 in Kiev on the initiative of the OUN<sup>1</sup> leader, Andrii Melnyk. It was soon banned by the Germans, but it continued to exist underground. Its declaration, printed below, reflects Ukrainian political opinion of the time. It is significant that the declaration was signed by the Galician Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky (1865–1944). This prominent cleric was no friend of the Germans and sent a letter to Himmler protesting the extermination of the Jews. He also denounced Ukrainian internecine strife in a public letter entitled ‘Do Not Kill’ (1942).*

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people a sovereign united Ukrainian state was created after the First World War.

2. As a result of aggressive wars by its neighbours the Ukrainian state was forcibly occupied and divided among Soviet Russia, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.

3. For twenty years [1919–39] the Ukrainian people conducted a ceaseless struggle for liberation under the occupation.

4. In March 1939, after the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic, the population of Carpatho-Ukraine created an independent Carpatho-Ukrainian state, which, after bloody battles, was occupied by Hungary.

<sup>1</sup> The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, established in 1929, was an underground, army-like group dedicated to the ends of integral nationalism. Centred in Galicia, the OUN was very attractive to Ukrainian youth, and much of its terroristic action was directed against the Polish state and its supporters. In 1939–40 the organization split into two factions, a moderate wing led by Andrii Melnyk and a militant wing commanded by Stepan Bandera.

5. In September 1939, with the collapse of Poland, the Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Western Volhynia, and Polissia were occupied by Soviet Russia, and the western borderlands (the Lemkivshchyna, Posiannia, Kholm, and Pidliashia regions) by Germany.

6. In June 1940, Ukrainian lands occupied by Romania were transferred to Soviet Russia.

7. Under all these occupations the Ukrainian people did not cease in their struggle for liberation and conducted it on all fronts of national life. Such conditions prevailed until the outbreak of the German-Russian war.

8. When the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiev and out of Right-Bank Ukraine, on 5 October 1941, a Ukrainian National Council was created by the Ukrainian people in Kiev, which consisted of the representatives of all the lands of united Ukraine and all strata of the Ukrainian population.

9. Because of the attitude of the German authorities the Ukrainian National Council could not be active.

10. At the present, decisive stage of the Second World War, when the greater part of the Ukrainian territory is occupied by Soviet Russia and smaller parts by Germany, Romania, and Hungary, we, the Ukrainian National Council, representing the will and the unity of the Ukrainian people, declare in its name that our struggle for liberation will continue until the complete realization of the principle of self-determination of the Ukrainian Nation through the creation of a sovereign, united Ukrainian state.

Lviv, 22 April 1944

MYKOLA VELYCHKIVSKY, Head of the Ukrainian National Council  
METROPOLITAN ANDREI SHEPTYTSKY, First Deputy  
AUGUSTYN SHTEFAN, Second Deputy  
IVAN DUBYNA, Secretary

## Our Teachings about the National State

PETRO POLTAVA

*Petro Poltava (the pseudonym of Petro Fedun, 1919–52) was a leading member of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Little is known about his life. A native of Western Ukraine, he served as a young conscript in the Red Army on the Finnish Front in 1940. Later he studied medicine in Lviv. In 1944–6 he was chief of political education in the UPA, and later he became vice-chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). He held the rank of major. Poltava left several articles and is regarded as a leading ideologist of the UPA. He was killed in battle in the Carpathian mountains.*

Just as in the case of our doctrine with regard to the nation, our doctrine with regard to the state has grown out of the ideological and political struggle that we have been waging on two fronts – against the imperialist views voiced by representatives of the great powers and against Marxist views of the state.

The views of the representatives of the dominant great powers have consisted in an overt, grossly imperialist denial of the right of small peoples to their own independent states. We have already discussed these views in our writings concerning the position taken by representatives of the dominant great powers on the national question in general.

The Marxists have taken a different approach to this issue. They attempt to ground their hostile attitude to the state in supposedly scientific arguments. According to their views, the state always has been and continues to be nothing more than a tool of oppression in the hands of the dominant, economically superior social classes. In the Marxist view, the state came into existence at the same time as classes of exploiters and oppressors were

created within tribes. In order to safeguard their positions as exploiters as well as their economic and political dominance, these classes also established a state organization which, with its enormous apparatus of coercion – prisons, the police, the army, the bureaucracy, a subservient judiciary – is nothing more than a machine of oppression. This whole machinery of oppression not only enabled the exploiters to keep the working masses in a state of slavery, but imposed a heavy economic burden on those masses. In order to maintain this state machine, workers have been compelled to pay huge taxes, undergo military service, sacrifice their lives in wars, and fulfil all sorts of other obligations. From all these facts, the Marxists draw the following conclusion: The state must disappear, for it is unnecessary. Only when the state is destroyed will humanity live a truly free and happy life. This is, in short, the Marxist view of the state.

This view of the state, like the Marxist-Bolshevik view of the nation, is false and tendentious. In the first place, it is mistaken in its analysis of the rise of the state. In the second place, while the Marxists are correct in criticizing the shortcomings of the state in various historical periods, they have used this criticism to draw improper conclusions about the character of the state as a whole. Their view that nations will be able to manage without states in the future is utopian, fantastic, and lacking any basis in reality. In all Marxist theory about the state there is a clear effort to deny that the state has any significance for the people and for humanity in general, as well as an attempt to present history as nothing more than a class struggle – which, as we have already stated, is totally incorrect.

The state arose as a natural way of organizing first clans, then tribes, and finally nations. Clan and tribal organizations constitute a rudimentary form of the state, its prototype. Clan and tribal organizations had two main purposes: to organize and impose order on life within the clan or tribe, and to organize the defence of the clan or tribe against external enemies. All scholars who study the subject agree on this point. Clans and tribes had their own forms of government, their own laws, and their own means of enforcing these laws. And this was at a time when within the clans – or, in some cases, tribes – there was not yet any division of the population into classes of exploiters and exploited, when neither the one nor the other existed. Even the Marxists do not deny this. Thus, given these historical facts, it is clear that *the state arose not as a tool of oppression in the hands of the wealthy classes to be used against the economically weak classes, but in response to the natural need to bring order into the life of society and to defend that society against external enemies.*

With the passage of time, we know that the population came to be



divided into classes of exploiters and exploited. *From that time on the exploiting classes have in fact been attempting to transform the state organization into a tool of their economic and political rule. Their success in this regard has varied according to time and place. Consequently, one can speak of the state as a tool of class oppression only from the time when class society came into existence.* This is how things are at present, to a degree that varies from one country to another.

The ruling classes make use of the state organization for more than just oppressing their own working masses. To an even greater extent they use it to conquer foreign territories, to subjugate other nations. That is how, as a result of the grasping policy of imperialists, *multinational states* have been established. *A multinational state in which society is also divided into classes of exploiters and exploited is a double tool of oppression.* In the first place, it is a tool of *social* oppression of the working masses of the dominant nation. In the second place, the multinational state is a tool of *national* oppression and exploitation of the subjugated nations. *Obviously states of this type should not exist; they should be restructured as soon as possible.* Single-nation states which serve as tools of oppression and exploitation used by the ruling classes against their own working masses should also be restructured socio-economically and politically.

But can mankind exist without any states?

It cannot. For the human race to exist and develop, it must be organized in some way. On this point there is no doubt.

Given that (1) the human race is divided into different nations; (2) nations, as we demonstrated in the preceding section, are *the highest* form of human society; and (3) the yearning for an independent state is a *natural* desire of *every* people, *only a system of free national states of all peoples of the world can provide the organization that is required for human life and development.* Any system that fails to take these facts into account will always *stand on shaky ground.* For this reason, a system of free national states of all peoples represents not only the most *just* solution to the problem of international order, but also the most *viable*, the most *suited to reality.*

The establishment of a system of free national states *will destroy the multinational state and thus put an end to national oppression and exploitation.* That will be mankind's first major step forward. Furthermore, in order to take the state out of the hands of the ruling social classes, to prevent the state from being a tool of exploitation and oppression employed by the wealthy classes against their own working masses, *it is necessary to rebuild the present social order on the basis of a classless society.* When the

national state ceases to be composed of exploiters and exploited, *it will cease to be a tool of oppression and will become, as it was at its very beginning, simply a form of organization of the internal economic and cultural life of the nation and a tool of defence against external enemies.* Furthermore, should the world reach a state of development in which there no longer exists any threat of attack by one nation against another, or in which any attack of this sort can be repelled by the forces of a capable international organization established on the principles of justice, then the national state would no longer need to be a form of defence against external enemies; it would retain the function only of organizing the internal economic and cultural life of the nation. *But the state can never disappear as a form of organization of the internal economic and cultural life of the nation. In that role the state is essential and cannot be replaced by anything else.* In that role, it is an institution of great social value. Were the state to function in this way, the apparatus of coercion would be limited to the minimum degree necessary for maintaining internal order; the maintenance of the state would no longer require any great material sacrifices from the people; all the nation's material and moral wealth would be geared to its economic and cultural development. However – and we stress this again – that would be possible only if the nation could be certain of not being threatened by any external danger. As we know, at present we are nowhere near such a state.

We nationalists believe in this eternal truth – *that an independent national state is the only form of political organization that guarantees a people the best conditions for all-round development of its spiritual and material resources.* Without its own national state, that is, without a state extending over all its ethnic territory, a people cannot fully develop. Furthermore, without its own national state, a people is doomed to extinction. A stateless people must always endure oppression and exploitation from invaders, who invariably strive for the political, cultural, and even physical destruction of the people they subjugate, whatever slogans they may use to disguise their intentions. That is obvious from all of Ukrainian history and the histories of all other subject peoples. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century we Ukrainians were oppressed by aristocratic Poland, which strove for our destruction; from the seventeenth to the twentieth century tsarist Russia sought to destroy us; after 1920 we were oppressed by the Muscovite Bolsheviks, Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Hungarians, and Germans. Now the Muscovite Bolsheviks are once again attempting to destroy us. We nationalists have taken into account the whole historical experience of the Ukrainian and other subject peoples. For this reason we consider

that the first and most essential condition of a people's existence and healthy development is its own independent national state. We must decisively reject and oppose states of the type of the Bolshevik Soviet Union, which serves only as a cover for Muscovite-Bolshevik imperialism. We also reject and oppose all other forms of multinational states built upon national oppression and exploitation.

The idea of having one's own independent national state springs from every people's deepest desires and national feelings. Peoples want to be their own masters on their own land; they want to be free and to rule over their own territory. Their sense of national honour, national pride, and patriotism demands that it be so. Peoples despise subjugation; they strive ever for liberty. And only an independent national state can give them true and complete liberty. This desire on the part of individual peoples, as we have already stated, springs from their very essence. Nobody can change this or stifle these feelings in a people.

But a system of independent national states would not only coincide with the interests and respond to the needs of individual peoples. It would also suit the interests of all peoples as a whole, of mankind in general.

We nationalists believe that the highest calling of all peoples of the world as a whole and of every people in particular should be the greatest degree of development of spiritual and material human culture. Mankind's general progress is the sum of the achievements of individual peoples. If humanity today is legitimately proud of the high level of its culture, of that culture's *wealth and diversity*, it should bear in mind that human culture today is the result of a process in which *many different peoples* have taken part. Present-day culture would be even more advanced, even richer and more diverse if all those peoples that have been in a state of subjection and thus have not been able to make their contribution to this process of cultural development had been able to participate fully. For the greatest development of mankind's spiritual and material culture, for the greatest progress of humanity, all peoples of the world must participate fully in the cultural process. Were they to do so, human culture in general would be incomparably richer and more diverse than it is today. For such participation by all peoples in the cultural process to be successful and to yield the desired results, it is essential that all peoples of the world enjoy the possibility for maximum development of their own resources and capacities at home in their own countries. As has already been indicated, peoples are best able to develop their own resources when they live in their own independent national states. Accordingly, a system of free national states is in the best interests of the development of humanity as a whole.

As we see, peoples and nations, the products of both the natural process of differentiation in the human race and of historical development, are entities mankind should strive to preserve and foster. The path of human progress lies not through an artificial or, even worse, coercive uniting of peoples, not through the policy of melting and recasting various peoples into a single whole, but only through granting each people full freedom to create and develop. This development, can take place only in a system of independent national states. Any people that oppresses other peoples, prevents their development, or destroys them undermines the foundations of human progress and is an enemy not only of the peoples it subjugates but of humanity as a whole. At present, the Bolshevik USSR is an implacable enemy of individual subject peoples and of humanity in general.

Taking into account, on the one hand, the natural desires and interests of each individual people and, on the other, the interests of humanity as a whole, we nationalists are struggling for a system of free national states of all the peoples of the world. The immediate goal of our struggle is the realization of the age-old dream of the Ukrainian people – the establishment of an independent united Ukrainian state on Ukrainian ethnic territory. We regard the struggle for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state on Ukrainian territory as the major task facing the whole Ukrainian people today.

*Translated by Z. Keywan*

1950

## Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia (excerpt)

*On the three-hundredth anniversary of the Pereiaslav treaty in 1954 the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued theses, parts of which are reprinted here. They reaffirm in the most decisive terms the union of Ukraine with Russia and repeat ad nauseam the slogans about the friendship of the two peoples. The content speaks for itself. This document was included because it illustrates well the Soviet view of Ukrainian history, but it would be wrong to regard such a view as strictly Soviet Russian. All the documents in this anthology are of Ukrainian origin, and this one indicates the accommodation of Ukrainian Communists of the postwar period to the Party line.*

Three hundred years ago, by the powerfully expressed will of the Ukrainian people at the Pereiaslav Rada (Council) in January 1654, the reunion of Ukraine with Russia was proclaimed. This historic act culminated the long struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against alien enslavers for reunion with the Russian people in a single Russian State. The three-hundredth anniversary of that outstanding historic event is a grand jubilee not only for the Ukrainian and Russian but for all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The reunion was of great importance for the further historic development of the two great peoples, which are 'so close in language, in habitation, in character, and in history' (Lenin).

By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign subjugation and ensured their national development. On the other hand, the reunion of Ukraine with Russia helped considerably to strengthen the Russian State and to

enhance its international prestige. The friendship between the working people of Russia and Ukraine grew firmer and stronger in the joint struggle against their common enemies – tsarism, the serf-holding landlords, the capitalists, and foreign invaders. In the epoch of imperialism this struggle was headed by the Russian working class, the most revolutionary in the world, guided by its militant vanguard – the Communist Party. The Russian working class led the Russian peoples to an epoch-making victory over the autocracy, and then over the landowners and capitalists.

The great October Socialist Revolution put an end once and for all to the social and national oppression of the peoples of former tsarist Russia, created the conditions for the formation of socialist nations, and laid the foundation for their close cooperation in the building of a communist society.

The friendship and fraternal alliance between the Ukrainian, Russian, and other peoples of our country were strengthened and steeled in the stern years of civil war and foreign intervention, in the process of socialist construction, and in the historic battles of the Great Patriotic War against the nazi invaders. Unbreakable friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is one of the principal pillars of the multinational Soviet Socialist State and the chief condition for all the achievements of the fraternal Soviet Republics.

The Communist Party is the inspirer of the unbreakable friendship among the free and equal peoples of the U.S.S.R. Leading the struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the victory of communism, it strengthens the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, which is the foundation rock of Soviet society. The Party is constantly concerned for the development of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, wages an implacable fight against manifestations of bourgeois nationalism, and educates the Soviet citizens in the spirit of friendship among nations, of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The whole history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is graphic evidence of the momentous importance of their friendship with the great Russian people, of the invincible strength of the fraternal alliance and close cooperation among all the peoples of our country, who under the leadership of the Communist Party, have built socialism and are now confidently marching onward, to the triumph of communism.

## I

1. The reunion of Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was the natural corollary of the entire preceding history of the two great kindred Slavic peoples – the

Russians and the Ukrainians. It was determined by the long centuries of development of economic, political, and cultural relations between Ukraine and Russia and accorded with the fundamental interests and aspirations of the two peoples.

The Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples sprang from a common stock – the ancient Russian people who set up the ancient Russian State of Kiev Rus'.

The social and economic development of Rus' in the period of feudalism and the difficult times of the Mongol-Tatar invasion brought about the dispersion in separate parts of the land of the ancient Russian people. From the single ancient Russian people there were gradually formed three kindred peoples, the Russian, the Ukrainian, and the Belorussian, each with their own distinctive features in language, culture, and way of life. Notwithstanding all the vicissitudes of history and severe trials, the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples preserved and retained through the centuries the consciousness of their common origin, of the kinship of their languages and cultures, and of their common destiny.

2. With the weakening of the ancient land of Russia, largely owing to the conquests of the Mongol-Tatar Khans, the Ukrainian territories were severed from Northeast Rus' and broken up into parts, falling a prey to the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian feudal lords, to the Turkish Sultans and their vassals, the Crimean Khans.

In the sixteenth century a large portion of Ukraine was seized by feudal Poland. This was facilitated by the treacherous policy of the Ukrainian feudal serf-owners, who sought, in an alliance with the Polish gentry, to suppress the struggle of the masses against feudalism, to strengthen and extend their feudal, serf-owning class privileges, and to intensify the exploitation of the working people.

The Polish feudal aristocracy and squirearchy (the magnates and the *szlachta*) established a cruel and inhumanly oppressive system of serfdom in conquered Ukraine. The whole weight of feudal and national oppression fell upon the peasantry, the urban poor, and the Cossack masses. The Polish *szlachta* looked upon the Ukrainian peasants as animals and grossly trampled upon their dignity. With the help of the Vatican and by measures of brutal coercion, they implanted Catholicism in Ukraine, strove to establish a Uniate church, pursued a policy of forcible Polonization of the Ukrainians, and defiled the Ukrainian language and culture in an effort to reduce the Ukrainian people to spiritual slavery and to break their ties with the Russian people.

The severe plight of the Ukrainian masses was further aggravated by the feudal anarchy in the Polish State, a manifestation of which was the unbridled tyranny of the magnates and the *szlachta* in methodically plundering and devastating the Ukrainian territories.

Oppression by the Polish feudal state and the unrestricted tyranny of the Polish gentry were a serious impediment to Ukraine's economic and cultural development. In addition, the Ukrainian population was constantly harried by robber raids of the Turks and the Crimean Khans.

The Russian people, in a long and selfless struggle against the Mongol-Tatar and other alien conquerors, overcame feudal division, upheld their national independence, and established a powerful centralized state with Moscow as its capital. Moscow became the basis and initiator of the Russian State, its political, economic, and cultural centre.

The centralized Russian State played an immense role in the historical destiny of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and other peoples of our country. From its very inception it was a centre of attraction and bulwark of the fraternal peoples in their struggle against foreign oppression.

3. Threatened with extermination, the Ukrainian people waged an unceasing struggle against foreign oppression, for liberty and independence, and at the same time for reunion with Russia.

The struggle of the Ukrainian masses against feudal-serfdom and national oppression and against the Turkish and Tatar robber raids brought into being an armed force, the Cossacks. In the sixteenth century the centre of that armed force was the Zaporozhian Sich, which played a progressive role in the history of the Ukrainian people. Whereas, at times, a section of the wealthier, upper ranks of the Cossacks made their peace with the Polish *szlachta*, the rank-and-file Cossacks, together with the peasants and the urban poor, waged a relentless struggle against feudal-serfdom and national oppression. Ukraine and Belorussia were shaken by a continuous succession of peasant and Cossack revolts against the Polish *szlachta* and local exploiters. The biggest of these popular uprisings in Ukraine at the close of the sixteenth and the early half of the seventeenth centuries were led, among others, by Kosynsky, Nalyvaiko, and Taras Triasylo.

An inspiring example to the working people of Ukraine and Belorussia in their struggle against the alien tyrants and their own oppressors was the peasant revolt in Russia led by Ivan Bolotnikov (1606-7), in which Ukrainian peasants took an active part.

The popular struggle against social oppression by the Polish and Ukrainian feudal landlords was closely interwoven with a struggle for



emancipation from national oppression. A powerful spur to the struggle was given by the glorious victory of the Russian people, led by Minin and Pozharsky, in the war against the Polish and Swedish invaders at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

In fighting for national liberation, the Ukrainian people strove for reunion with the Russian people. Economic and cultural relations between Ukraine and Russia grew broader and firmer in spite of all obstacles. That helped to bring the two kindred peoples closer together and had a beneficial influence on the development of their cultures.

4. For the Ukrainian people, liberation from the yoke of the Polish *szlachta* and elimination of the danger of annexation by the Sultans of Turkey were a historical necessity, a fundamental question of their national existence.

One of the most glorious pages in Ukrainian history was the people's war of liberation of 1648-54. The chief and decisive force in this war was the peasantry, which was fighting both social oppression by the Polish and Ukrainian feudal landlords and alien subjugation. The broad masses of the Cossacks and the urban population, as well as the upper ranks of the Cossacks, fought together with the peasants in this war of liberation.

But whereas the peasants and Cossack masses were waging a heroic struggle against social and national oppression, the Ukrainian feudal elements (the upper ranks of the Cossacks and the small landlords) took part in the war of liberation with a view to preserving and strengthening feudal relations and serfdom in Ukraine.

In the war of liberation of 1648-54, the Ukrainian people fought both for emancipation from the yoke of the Polish gentry and for reunion with the kindred Russian people in a single Russian State.

5. In this war of liberation the Ukrainian people were led by an outstanding statesman and soldier, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The historic merit of Bohdan Khmelnytsky lies in the fact that, while expressing the age-old aspiration and hope of the Ukrainian people – close unity with the Russian people – and while giving leadership to the process of building Ukrainian statehood, he correctly understood its purposes and prospects, realized that the salvation of the Ukrainian people could be achieved only through unity with the great Russian people, and worked perseveringly for the reunion of Ukraine with Russia.

In the course of the people's war of liberation led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, there was built up in Ukraine a powerful armed force, which scored a series of brilliant victories over the army of the Polish *szlachta* and liber-

ated a large part of Ukraine. Besides Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the insurgent Ukrainian people produced from their ranks Kryvonos, Nechai, Bohun, and other outstanding military leaders and national heroes.

Together with the Ukrainians, the kindred people of Belorussia waged a struggle against the yoke of the Polish and Lithuanian feudal lords and for reunion with Russia.

The peasants of Moldavia also took an active part in the Ukrainian people's war of liberation.

The struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Polish gentry found broad sympathy and responses among the Polish peasants, who were also suffering heavily from the feudal yoke. Under the influence of the mounting liberation struggle of the Ukrainians, peasant actions took place in several parts of Poland, undermining the strength of the Polish feudal state.

The constant assistance and support of the Russian masses and of the Russian State helped to broaden the scope of the Ukrainian people's war of liberation and contributed to its outstanding victories. Many Don Cossacks and Russian peasants and townspeople fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.

In fighting the Polish *szlachta* and repelling the robber raids of the Crimean Khans, Ukraine was backed by the continuous economic, diplomatic, and military aid of Russia. Transports of grain, arms and ammunition, salt and metal wares were sent from Russia to Ukraine. Russian diplomats protected the interests of Ukraine in negotiations with foreign states, and so on. Ukrainian peasants and townspeople, whom the incursions of the soldiery of feudal Poland or of the Crimean Khans forced to flee from their homes, found asylum on Russian territory.

The tsarist government, in the interests of strengthening the state, gave its support to the Ukrainian people's desire for reunion with Russia. On 1 (11)<sup>1</sup> October 1653, the Zemskii Sobor in Moscow, responding to the repeated requests made by representatives of Ukraine, and mindful of the danger offered to the existence of the kindred Ukrainian people by Polish, Lithuanian, Turkish, and Tatar invaders, gave its consent to the admission of Ukraine into the Russian State and to a declaration of war on *szlachta* Poland for the liberation of Ukraine and Belorussia. In addition to boyars,

<sup>1</sup> The first of the two dates is given according to the Julian or Old Style calendar, to which Russia and Ukraine adhered until February 1918. The second date is given according to the Gregorian or New Style calendar, adopted at the end of January 1918.

nobles, clergy, and tsarist officials, the Zemskii Sobor, as the documentary records testify, was attended by representatives of the Russian cities, the merchant class, the peasantry, and the *streltsy*.<sup>2</sup>

This decision of the Zemskii Sobor was an expression of the will and desire of the entire Russian people to aid their Ukrainian brothers in their struggle for liberation from foreign enslavement.

6. The reunion of Ukraine with Russia was publicly proclaimed on 8 (18) January 1654, at the Rada in Pereiaslav (now Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, Kiev Region), which was attended by representatives of various social strata of all the Ukrainian territories liberated from the Polish *szlachta*. Envoys of the Russian Government were also present. Addressing the Rada, Bohdan Khmelnytsky recalled the severe trials and tribulations suffered by the Ukrainian people and their grim struggle against the oppression by the Polish *szlachta* and the robber raids of the troops of the Turkish Sultans and the Crimean Khans. He urged the Rada to vote for reunion with Russia. The Rada decided unanimously in favour of reunion, 'so that we may thus be one forever' ('Reunion of Ukraine with Russia,' Documents and Materials, vol. 3, 1953, p. 461).

The decision taken at Pereiaslav was enthusiastically received by the Ukrainians. 'All through the Ukrainian land the people manifested their gladness,' wrote a contemporary, the chronicler Samovydet (Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky).

The Pereiaslav Rada's decision crowned the people's struggle for the reunion of Ukraine with Russia; it realized the age-long hope and aspiration of the Ukrainian people, and marked a turning-point in their history.

Though Russia in those days was governed by the tsar and the landlords, the reunion was of immense progressive importance for the political, economic, and cultural development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.

The historic importance of the Pereiaslav Rada's decision for the Ukrainian people lay primarily in the fact that union with Russia within a single state, the Russian State, saved Ukraine from subjugation to the Polish *szlachta* and from annexation by the Turkish Sultans.

By the act of reunion, the Ukrainian people sealed their historically evolved, close and intimate tie with the Russian people, thereby acquiring a

2 The *streltsy* were permanent regular army regiments in Muscovy. The seventeenth century saw a significant increase in their size and in the scope of their wartime and peacetime duties. Peter I disbanded the regiments in 1698, after what some historians consider more an act of disobedience than a rebellion.

great ally and a firm friend and defender in their struggle for social and national emancipation.

Reunion with the strong centralized Russian State facilitated Ukraine's economic and cultural development. In the latter half of the seventeenth century the Ukrainian economy became an integral part of the newly evolved all-Russian market. The reunion facilitated the expansion of the productive forces both of Russia and of Ukraine and the mutual cultural enrichment of the two kindred peoples.

The entry of Ukraine into the Russian State was also of supreme international importance. It was a blow to the aggressive designs of the Turkish Sultans and the Polish *szlachta*.

## II

7. Combinations of the economic resources of Russia and Ukraine multiplied the strength of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in their common struggle against foreign invaders.

The Swedish invader was routed at Poltava in 1709 by a Russian army which included Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian people rose unanimously against the despicable traitor and Jesuit fosterling Hetman Mazepa, who tried with the help of the Swedish and Polish invaders to sever Ukraine from Russia and restore the detested foreign yoke.

As a result of Russia's signal victories over the Sultans of Turkey in the latter half of the eighteenth century, in which the great Russian soldier A.V. Suvorov played an outstanding part, the Crimea and the southern Ukrainian territories were liberated from Turkish rule. That helped substantially to develop the productive forces of the whole country, which had now secured an outlet to a sea that had been closed to it before. Big Ukrainian commercial and cultural centres, such as Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, sprang up on the Black Sea coast.

The Ukrainian territories west of the Dnieper (the Kiev, Volyn, and Podolia regions), which until then had been under the yoke of the Polish *szlachta*, were reunited with Russia towards the close of the eighteenth century.

In the Patriotic War of 1812, the peoples of our country, including the Ukrainians, led by the Russian people, destroyed Napoleon's invading armies.

8. The reunion of Ukraine with Russia strengthened the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples in their joint struggle against social oppres-

sion by the Russian and Ukrainian serf-owning landlords. The anti-feudal rebellions led by Stepan Razin and Iemelian Pugachëv in Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which the peasants of many nationalities took an active part, found a broad response among the oppressed Ukrainian masses. The struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry against feudal-serfdom and national oppression produced such popular leaders as Zalizniak, Dovbush, Karmeliuk, and others.

Despite their spontaneous, unorganized, and sporadic character, the anti-feudal movements, in which the peasant masses of various nationalities of Russia were involved, shook the feudal system and united those masses for the struggle against their common enemies.

The heroic struggle against feudal-serfdom oppression and alien invasion cemented the fellowship-in-arms between the working people of Russia and Ukraine.

9. The bitterest enemy of the Russian, Ukrainian, and other peoples of Russia was the tsarist autocracy. Relying on the reactionary upper strata of local landlords and bourgeoisie, tsarism pursued a policy of brutal national and colonial oppression of the non-Russian peoples. In Ukraine, tsarism abolished local self-government, savagely suppressed the national-liberation movement and frustrated the desire for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, conducted a policy of forcible Russification, and hampered the development of the Ukrainian language and culture.

10. In the revolutionary struggle for emancipation from tsarism and serfdom which developed in Russia in the nineteenth century, the great Russian people played the leading role.

The first generation of revolutionary fighters against tsarism were the Decembrists, who carried on the revolutionary tradition of Radishchev, and who in 1825 raised revolts in St Petersburg and Ukraine (mutiny of the Chernihiv Regiment). Following the Decembrists, the struggle against tsarism and serfdom was taken up by the great Russian revolutionary democrats: Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov.

Despite the reactionary tsarist policy of brutal national and colonial oppression, the finest sons of the Russian people recognized the right of Ukraine to national independence and, together with progressive-minded Ukrainians, rose up against the shameful policy of inciting the peoples of Russia against one another, a policy pursued by the Russian and Ukrainian landlords and bourgeoisie and their servitors, the Russian dominant-nation chauvinists and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. In recognizing the

right of the Ukrainian people to free national development, the revolutionary minds of Russia associated its possibility with the overthrow of tsarism and the emancipation both of the Russian and of the Ukrainian and other peoples of our country.

The great son of the Ukrainian people, the poet and revolutionary democrat T.H. Shevchenko, fought tsarism and serfdom in close union with the Russian revolutionary democrats. Through his writings, with their deep hatred of the oppressors, Shevchenko played an immense part in the development of the national and social consciousness of the Ukrainian people. The high road to the emancipation of the Ukrainian people, as he saw it, was a revolutionary union of all the Slav peoples with the Russian people. Shevchenko was an implacable foe of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and bourgeois liberalism.

The Polish revolutionary democrats joined the Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries in opposing tsarism. The best elements of the Polish people always sympathized with the struggle for emancipation of the Ukrainian people.

11. The development of capitalism in Russia gave rise to a new class, the proletariat. In the Russian proletariat, the working people of all the nationalities of our country acquired for the first time in history a reliable leader in their struggle for the abolition of social and national oppression.

With the development of industry, a working class grew up rapidly in Ukraine, from among both the Ukrainian and the Russian population. The working class of Ukraine was an integral part of the proletariat of Russia. The working-class movement in Ukraine developed in intimate unity with the general working-class movement of Russia. Already in the 1870s and 1880s, there began to be formed in Ukraine, as in Russia, revolutionary working-class organizations which made it their object to fight autocracy and capitalism. The Ukrainian working class was one of the biggest and most militant detachments of the proletariat of Russia.

Towards the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries the centre of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. Russia was then a nodal point of all the contradictions of imperialism, where feudal-military, colonial, and capitalist oppression were combined. Oppression of the working people by tsarism, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie was supplemented by the imperialist plunder of Russia by West-European monopoly capital. At the same time there was in Russia an effective force capable of resolving all these contradictions by revolutionary means. That force was the proletariat of Russia.

The tasks confronting the growing working-class movement in Russia urgently demanded the organization of a revolutionary proletarian party. In the 1880s, the association of the first representatives of Marxism in Russia, the Emancipation of Labour Group headed by G.V. Plekhanov, laid the theoretical foundations for the revolutionary working-class movement in Russia. In the 1890s the great Lenin assumed the leadership of the working class of Russia. The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded by V.I. Lenin in St Petersburg in 1895, was the first rudiment of a revolutionary proletarian party in Russia. Lenin's League of Struggle exerted an immense influence on the revolutionary movement throughout the country. Similar Leagues were founded in Iekaterinoslav, Kiev, and other Ukrainian cities. In Ukraine, as in Russia, the Social-Democratic organizations of the Leninist trend led strikes, passed to agitation among the masses, and thus combined socialism with the working-class movement.

12. At the Second Congress of the RSDLP<sup>3</sup> in 1903, a Marxist party of a new type was founded, based on the ideological and organizational principles elaborated by V.I. Lenin. In a struggle against the separatist and nationalist elements in the working-class movement, V.I. Lenin upheld the internationalist organizational principle of the Marxist party. The RSDLP embraced revolutionary workers of all the nationalities of Russia. It came forward from the very first as the standard-bearer of the ideology of proletarian internationalism and friendship among nations. The Second Congress of the RSDLP adopted Lenin's programmatic demand on the national question – the right of nations to self-determination.

The Russian workers were in the vanguard of the struggle against the landlord-bourgeois system. They roused and united the proletariat and all the working people of the border nationalities to fight for social and national emancipation.

Together with the heroic Russian proletariat, the working people of Ukraine waged a devoted fight against their class enemies in the first bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905–7). Big uprisings took place in this period in a number of Ukrainian cities and *gubernii*, as well as revolts in the Black Sea Fleet. During these uprisings, the workers of the Ukrainian industrial centres followed the example of Moscow, St Petersburg, and

3 These are the initials of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which was founded at a congress of Marxist groups in Minsk in 1898.

other Russian cities and set up Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the forerunners of Soviet power. The revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian workers and peasants played a prominent part in the general course of the 1905-7 revolution.

In the period of the Stolypin reaction, of the new revolutionary upsurge, and of the First World War, the workers of Ukraine, as of all Russia, rallied still more closely around the RSDLP(B)<sup>4</sup> in the struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary movement in Russia stimulated the struggle of the working people of the West-Ukrainian territories, which were under the yoke of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, for national emancipation and reunion with all the Ukrainian people.

The great Lenin, for the first time in the history of Marxism, elaborated the Party's theoretical program and policy on the national question. He showed that the national question was a component part of the general revolutionary struggle of the working class for the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was Lenin who inspired the policy of equality and friendship of nations, and it was he that guided the practical implementation of that policy. The precepts of Lenin's program on the national question were, on the basis of a generalization of the experience of socialist construction, further creatively developed in the works of J.V. Stalin and in decisions of the Party. Upholding the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Party emphatically stressed the necessity for unity of action of the proletarians of all nations and their union around the Russian proletariat.

'Given united action of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletarians,' V.I. Lenin wrote, 'a free Ukraine is *possible*; without such unity it is out of the question' (*Works*, vol. 20, p. 14).

The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who were bitter enemies of internationalism and of fraternal alliance between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, endeavoured to infect the working people with the virus of nationalism, to foster in them a spirit of enmity towards the Russian people, to deflect them from the common class struggle against the oppressors, and thus harness them ideologically to the selfish class interests of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landlords. In order to deceive the masses, the nationalists preached the unscientific reactionary 'theory' that the Ukrainian nation had no classes and no bourgeoisie, and the 'theory' of the 'single stream.' In doing so, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists acted as

4 These initials refer to the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP, led by Lenin.



allies of Russian tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and as agents of foreign imperialism.

Leading the revolutionary movement of the working people of all Russia, the Communist Party waged a determined struggle both against Russian dominant-nation chauvinism and against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.

The Communist Party worked for the merging of the national-liberation movement of the oppressed nationalities of Russia with the struggle of the workers against the bourgeois-landlord system and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

13. Unity of the revolutionary struggle for emancipation made for stronger cultural ties between the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples. Russian progressive culture had a beneficial influence on the development of all branches of Ukrainian culture (literature, drama, painting, music). Ukrainian progressive culture, in its turn, enriched the culture of the Russian people and contributed greatly to the promotion of world culture.

The development of progressive social ideas since the close of the nineteenth century in Ukraine, as throughout the country, was influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The appearance in the historical arena of the proletariat of Russia, the most revolutionary in the world, and of its militant vanguard, the Communist Party, was of decisive significance for the further development of the Russian, Ukrainian, and all other peoples of Russia.

*Translated by the Foreign Languages  
Publishing House, Moscow, 1954*

1954

## Little-Russianism

IEVHEN MALANIUK

*Ievhen Malaniuk (1897–1968) was a major poet and essayist. A native of the Kherson province, he studied in St Petersburg. During the revolution he was an officer in Petliura's army, with which he retreated to Poland. After 1920 he lived in Prague and, periodically, in Warsaw. He wrote many volumes of poetry, devoted mostly to Ukrainian historical and philosophical themes, and his essays have been collected in Knyha sposterezhen (A Book of Observations, 2 vols., 1962). Malaniuk was the most important poet contributing to Vistnyk (The Herald) during Dontsov's editorship. The dynamism of his poetry was matched by the outspokenness of his essays. After the Second World War Malaniuk emigrated to the United States. His work has recently been republished in Ukraine.*

### I

The notion of 'Little-Russianism,' as used here, is not limited to a Ukrainian context. In every multinational state, not excepting even the best-ordered empires, there has been created during its historical existence a certain type of imperial man. We can mention here the memorable type of the Austrian who, without much difficulty, could at the same time be a Czech or a Croatian, a Pole or a Ruthenian-Ukrainian. The political sagacity of the old Roman Empire, which never 'Romanized' its colonies, was still respected in the Viennese empire of the Habsburgs. To be sure, in the course of the nineteenth century there was a tendency in Austria-Hungary towards Germanization, or the so-called *Gleichschaltung*.<sup>1</sup> But such instances were few and unplanned. The Austrian or supra-national

<sup>1</sup> *Gleichschaltung* (synchronization) was a term from electrotechnology appropriated by the

type of the citizen of this Danubian empire arose automatically. More complex but similar developments could be seen in the formation of the Britisher or the Frenchman. Somewhat different were analogous developments in Germany-Prussia. But we see a very different picture in Eastern Europe.

On the territories now officially called the USSR but also referred to as 'Russia' the development of the imperial man had a radically different character, because the Muscovite state did not recognize and today still does not recognize any private, social, regional, or national individuality. The development of the imperial man, a 'Russian' (*rossiianin*), therefore simply did not take place. This word, used in the eighteenth century, has now been replaced by a false coinage: *russkii* [also translated as *Russian*].<sup>2</sup> The Russian imperial type was a mechanical product, made by the terrorist police machine of a totally centralized state. Because it was created mechanically, as a result of tearing up the living organisms of the subjugated nations, the Russian (*rossiianin*) imperial type, even if theoretically possible, did not materialize. By mixing together the concepts of the nation as an ethnic entity and the nation as an imperial state, the state apparatus in practice has mechanically moulded old national organisms with the ethnic Muscovite mass, with the aim of creating an 'indivisible people' – the Russian (*russkii* or *rossiiskii*) and Soviet people (*narod*), in the specifically Russian meaning of that word.

As a result of this forced and planned activity on the part of the state machine there appeared not a Russian type, but a Little-Russian, a Little-Pole, a Little-Georgian, even a Little-Siberian ...

What is a Little-Russian?

It is a nationally defective type, maimed psychologically and spiritually, and even racially.

In our native land, its main breeding ground, it acquired pathological characteristics which belie first impressions. Owing to the historical process in our land, the type of the Little-Russian became (at least in towns and cities) a mass phenomenon and, to say the worst, very traditional. One must assume that Moscow's methods of Little-Russian production were not perfected in a single century, but have a solid, scientific base. Contemporary Soviet methods, armed with terror and Pavlov's scientific achievements, took careful lessons from the archives of the tsarist departments of

German National Socialists to refer to the conformity of all states, political parties, associations, organizations, and, of course, individuals to national directives and policies.

2 It is interesting that Boris Yeltsin in our day chooses to use *rossiianin* rather than *russkii*.

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Little-Russian Collegium<sup>3</sup> of the eighteenth century, and the Third Section<sup>4</sup> and the Okhrana [secret police] of the nineteenth century.

We are still naively convinced that a Little-Russian is an uneducated, primitive, underdeveloped Ukrainian without a national consciousness – in a word, one of the dark masses. It is believed that it is sufficient to enlighten him in a Prosvita<sup>5</sup> sponsored club, to persuade him, and that that's enough to make him a Ukrainian. But anyone who has studied the problem knows how unrealistic such a course of action is.

Little-Russianism, though often met and though widespread, has touched our peasantry least of all. That is nothing to be happy about, because peasant masses do not make history. With us Little-Russianism has invariably been a disease of the intelligentsia (and semi-intelligentsia); it has affected the stratum which should have been the brain centre of the nation. That is the crux of the problem.

One must, therefore, at once exclude the sort of ordinary man who held himself aloof from all activities, or who called himself by his regional or village name during conscriptions, or who gives his nationality as 'Russian' during the Soviet census enumerations. That is nothing but mimicry and self-defence, hiding centuries of bitter experiences.

It must be stated briefly and succinctly that the problem of Ukrainian Little-Russianism is one of the most important problems, if not the central problem, connected with the issue of our statehood. What is more, it will be the problem one day facing the statesmen of the future Ukrainian state. And for a long time during the stabilization of statehood the problem will be of prime importance and will stand as a dire warning for our state.

Little-Russianism is, therefore, our historic disease – V. Lypynsky<sup>6</sup> called it the disease of statelessness – an age-long chronic illness. No temporary injections, not even surgery, will help. It must be overcome for many decades.

3 This name refers to two different tsarist administrative bodies, the first created by Peter I in 1722 and the second by Catherine II in 1764. Both usurped the autonomous rights of Ukrainian hetmans. The second body was headed by Count Rumiantsev, who was also governor-general of Ukraine.

4 The Third Section, founded by Nicholas I in 1826, was responsible for censorship and for the activities in all of Russia of the state and the security police. It was dissolved in 1880.

5 Prosvita, founded in 1868 in Lviv, was a cultural and educational organization which, after 1905, spread to eastern Ukraine.

6 Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) was a prominent scholar and political theorist and the father of Ukrainian conservatism.

## II

In attempting to be concise on this subject, or even scholarly, I find it difficult to formulate my thoughts so as to make them easy to grasp and comprehend. That is owing to the complexity of the subject itself. I shall therefore return to examples taken from history or literature.

We shall not reach back to prehistory. But we must note that the natural wealth and favourable climate of our unique native land have fostered Little-Russianism from time immemorial. Smudges of future Little-Russianism may be seen as early as in the Middle Ages ('we are Tatar people'), and they were prominent in the Lithuanian and Cossack eras. During Vyhovsky's<sup>7</sup> hetmanate and during the following period of the 'Ruin,' Ukrainian Little-Russianism became a political factor and entered the historical arena.

The treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 legalized the factor, which, at first a purely psychological shortcoming, later gave rise to a paralysis of the national will and, even later, to a 'fifth column' of Moscow [in Ukraine]. Hetman Briukhovetsky<sup>8</sup> on the one side and Hetman Teteria<sup>9</sup> on the other are the two faces of Little-Russianism during the period of the 'Ruin.' The colonel from Poltava, Martyn Pushkar,<sup>10</sup> becomes an evil symbol of Little-Russianism after the time of Khmelnytsky,<sup>11</sup> a symbol of the denigration of the victory at Konotop,<sup>12</sup> a symbol which recurs in our history until the catastrophe at Poltava. There the Kochubei<sup>13</sup> syndrome was alive for decades. If ever a history of Little-Russianism is written, Martyn Pushkar will be its father. I repeat that, contrary to popular opinion, Little-Russianism is not Moscophilism or any other philism. It is a disease, an illness, a

7 Ivan Vyhovsky (died 1664) was a hetman of Ukraine (1657-9) with an anti-Russian, pro-Polish orientation.

8 Ivan Briukhovetsky (died 1668) was hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine and pursued a pro-Russian policy.

9 Pavlo Teteria (died ca. 1670) was hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine, and his orientation was pro-Polish and pro-Tatar.

10 Martyn Pushkar (died 1658) was colonel of Poltava and the chief opponent of Hetman Vyhovsky.

11 Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657) was hetman of Ukraine from 1648 to 1657 and the leader of the Cossack national war of liberation.

12 The battle of Konotop in 1659 ended in a victory of Hetman Vyhovsky's Cossacks over the Russians.

13 Vasyi Kochubei (ca. 1640-1708) was a noble whose daughter Motria was in love with Mazepa. Hoping to succeed Mazepa, Kochubei denounced him to the tsar when he heard of Mazepa's dealings with the Polish king. The tsar, however, believed Mazepa's story and had Kochubei executed.

national lameness. It is national defeatism. To use the official Muscovite language of the seventeenth century, it is Cherkassian<sup>14</sup> unsteadiness (*shatost cherkasskaia*), or in the words of such an expert as Catherine II, it is Little-Russian self-repudiation (*samootverzhenost malorosiiskaia*). There is a logical progression: a shift in commitment, a betrayal, and collaboration. Right up until the present time.

Moscophilism – or another type of philism, for there have been many in our history – is a possible direction of our national policy. In this sense the Pereiaslav treaty was an expression of the Moscophilism of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as were the long decades of the national policy of Ivan Mazepa. Hetman Vyhovsky was forced into Polonophilism, and so, in our time, was Symon Petliura.<sup>15</sup> All these are examples of political tactics.

But Little-Russianism is not politics or tactics; it is always an a priori, total capitulation. Capitulation before battle.

Moscophilism (and other philisms) in theory may be placed within a national state policy. Little-Russianism, as a striking example of the paralysis of political will and thought, is always outside the limits of any national policy.

The leaders of the Central Rada were no Little-Russians. They were called ‘conscious Ukrainians’ (in 1918 the somewhat ambiguous label was ‘convinced Ukrainians’). But a future historian will be unable to explain the policy of the Central Rada in other terms than by the presence of political Little-Russianism, which poisoned the people of that generation. They lacked the most elementary national instinct, and their political will was often paralysed.

From the brief memoirs of General Wrangel,<sup>16</sup> who in the Imperial Guard was under the command of Pavlo Skoropadsky,<sup>17</sup> it is evident that the future hetman thought about the philosophy of history in Ukraine.<sup>18</sup>

14 ‘Cherkasy’ was the official name the Russian government used in referring to Ukrainian Cossacks.

15 Symon Petliura (1879–1926) was the leader of the national forces (Directory of the Central Rada) in Ukraine in 1917–19. In 1920 he gained Polish military assistance against the Bolsheviks by agreeing to renounce Ukraine’s claim to eastern Galicia.

16 Peter Wrangel (1878–1928) was a Russian general who commanded the White army during the civil war.

17 Pavlo Skoropadsky (1873–1945) was hetman of Ukraine in 1918 with the support of the German army of occupation.

18 I quote, alas from memory, the dialogue: Wrangel: ‘Is Ukraine anything serious?’ Hetman: ‘Completely. All I think about is whom she should join: the East or the West?’ This episode, citing an honourable man and a descendant of a Swedish-born baron, contradicts the well-known saying by General Denikin that the hetman wanted ‘to place Ukraine at the tsar’s feet.’ [Author’s note]

But this meditation took place in the summer of 1918 and was therefore belated and abstract. History was then in the making, and power, no matter how limited, should have been used at every moment, for time was precious. Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky stood much higher than the leaders of the Central Rada in some respects, but he was the son of his era and a member of his generation. If not the Little-Russian syndrome, then Gogol's syndrome pressed heavily upon him. Skoropadsky left for us an example of Ukrainian political Hamletism, which is closely tied to Little-Russianism. Therein lay the tragedy of his native land and of the man himself, its unlucky son, who in emigration remained faithful to Ukraine.

### III

In a normal, non-Little-Russianized psyche belonging to a Ukrainian exist some reflexes of a national instinct: black-white, good-evil, true-false, pure-impure, divine-diabolical. In Little-Russianism these reflexes fade and weaken, and sometimes disappear entirely. Under such conditions the work of the intellect itself is ineffectual; it is invariably delayed. Even national and political thought, studied and preserved in the archives, cannot substitute for this instinctual reason, which is sometimes called the 'peasant mind' and which is tied up with will and character. This innate reason cannot be replaced by education, title, or a diploma. The historical Little Russianism has either reduced this reason to very simple dimensions or has narcotized it by all kinds of myths (a common religion, a common tsar, a common socialism, or the lack of geographic borders), or else simply destroyed it, as a microbe destroys a healthy organism.

What then is Little-Russianism? It is the deadening, the weakening, and, in time, the disappearance of historical memory. That is why the former St Petersburg and today's Moscow, which has at its command a centralized educational system, stressed and still are stressing the great importance of the teaching of history, which together with selected works of literature (Volodymyr Antonovych has already pointed out the demoralizing effect of Russian literature) kills the historical memory of a Ukrainian child from the first day of school.

Let us look at how this is done in contemporary Soviet historiography. What a minutely thought out program of perverted history has been devised! This is the most important part of the laboratory of Little-Russianism.

Little-Russianism, as experience has shown, has been cultivated at the same time by the systematic inculcation of an inferiority complex ('they never had a state'; 'the dark peasant masses'; 'the stupid *khokhol*') and by a

constant ridiculing of national values and treasures. Here we have a systematic ridiculing, anecdotizing, and outright mockery of customs, traditions, national ethics, language, and literature, a mockery of the national style, which is invariably hampered by systematic obstacles planned and supported by terror. Inevitably, whenever it is impossible to ridicule a song or a dance, the song or dance is vulgarized and primitivized ('the songs of the peoples of the USSR'), so that a *hopak* unnoticeably becomes a *Kamarynskaia*. The *bandura*, in various ensembles, is close to the *balalaika* or *garmon*. Whenever in the field of scholarship or art there is created a work in the Ukrainian national spirit that is accepted without dispute, then a simple requisition or 'socialization' takes place, and the work is declared to be 'Russian' or 'Soviet.'

To Shevchenko's contemporaries the nationality of the great mathematician Mykhailo Ostrohradsky<sup>19</sup> was obvious. Today he is a 'Russian scientist' before all the world. We know that one of the founders of structural mechanics, Stepan Tymoshenko,<sup>20</sup> is a son of our people and a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, but for the whole world he is not even an American but a Russian, and his textbooks, translated in the USSR, proclaim him a genius of the 'Soviet people.'

Yet another fresh example. Our prominent artist Oleksander Dovzhenko,<sup>21</sup> who would have fulfilled his genius in a state of his own, until his death saw to it that his works were 'translated from the Ukrainian.' As soon as he died, his testament-like *The Enchanted Desna* was published in a large edition in Moscow, and the English translation, provided simultaneously, noted only that he was a 'Soviet' writer. If the devil continues to prevail, in twenty or thirty years Dovzhenko, like Tymoshenko, Bohomolets,<sup>22</sup> Bortniansky,<sup>23</sup> Borovykovsky,<sup>24</sup>

19 Mykhailo Ostrohradsky (1801-62) was a distinguished mathematician, educated in Russia and France. A friend of Shevchenko, he always regarded himself as a Ukrainian.

20 Stepan Tymoshenko (1878-1972) was a prominent Ukrainian-born scientist, the author of many works on strength materials and engineering mechanics. After 1922 he lived in the United States, where he was a professor at the University of Michigan.

21 Oleksander Dovzhenko (1894-1956) was an internationally acclaimed film director, and the author of the autobiographical novel *The Enchanted Desna* (1956) and revealing war diaries.

22 Oleksander Bohomolets (1881-1946) was a prominent pathophysiological and endocrinologist, and president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

23 Dmytro Bortniansky (1756-1825) was an eminent composer. He studied in Italy, where some of his operas were performed, and later became court conductor in St Petersburg. He wrote secular as well as religious music but is known for his liturgical works.

24 Volodymyr Borovykovsky (1757-1825) was a renowned classicist portrait painter.



Gogol, Mechnikov,<sup>25</sup> Kuindzhi,<sup>26</sup> Samokish,<sup>27</sup> Aivazovsky<sup>28</sup> will be ... [Russian].

The All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev has been transformed into a branch of the Moscow Academy, with publications in the 'generally understood language' [Russian]. The famous Kiev Academy of Art became a provincial 'artistic' institute, and its founder, the graphic artist of genius Iurii Narbut, was simply crossed out of the history of art. The memory of him was just liquidated. The same happened in music and opera. One of the prominent avant-garde theatres of the twentieth century, led by Les Kurbas<sup>29</sup> and Mykola Kulish,<sup>30</sup> was completely destroyed, and in its place was reinstated an old ethnographic theatre, which could not, however, be compared with our classic ethnographic theatre of Kropyvnytsky<sup>31</sup> and Karpenko-Kary.<sup>32</sup> In the Ukrainian SSR the theatre 'in the Ukrainian language' has become the equivalent of Vynnychenko's<sup>33</sup> comic figure Harkun Zadunaisky.

A recent episode involving the poet Lina Kostenko<sup>34</sup> is rather typical. After publishing only two collections of poems she found herself with a gag in her mouth. Not because of the subjects on which she wrote (V. Tkachenko<sup>35</sup> is not hindered from singing of love and nightingales). Kostenko was careless enough to write about the sea, forgetting that the theme of the sea was banned for Ukrainians as early as the late 1920s. The problem was the tone, the particular intonation, and the striking literary quality which retrospectively harkened back to the 1920s, to the Neoclassicists,

25 Illia Mechnikov (1845–1916) was an eminent biologist and professor of zoology at the University of Odessa. After 1888 he worked in the Pasteur Institute in Paris.

26 Arkhyp Kuindzhi (1842–1910) was a painter of Greek descent famous for his renditions of Ukrainian landscapes.

27 Mykola Samokish (1860–1944) was a prominent painter known for his depictions of battle scenes.

28 Ivan Aivazovsky (1817–1900) was a prominent painter of Black Sea seascapes. He, like the seven men listed immediately above, was born in Ukraine.

29 Les Kurbas (1887–1942) was the director of the *Berezil* theatre.

30 Mykola Kulish (1892–1937) was the leading Soviet Ukrainian dramatist.

31 Marko Kropyvnytsky (1840–1910) was a prominent actor, director, and playwright. He was the creator of the first professional Ukrainian theatre.

32 Ivan Karpenko-Kary (1845–1907) was a well-known actor and playwright. His realistic plays based on Ukrainian peasant life were very popular.

33 Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951) was a prominent modernist playwright and novelist.

34 Lina Kostenko (b. 1930) is the leading poet in Ukraine today.

35 Valentyna Tkachenko (1920–70) was a 'socialist realist' poet.

Pluzhnyk,<sup>36</sup> even Ianovsky,<sup>37</sup> which, quite simply, betrayed an unbroken literary tradition. To make matters worse, Kostenko was a real poet, with her own style. All this sealed her fate. She has been strangled before she blossomed. The case of Lina Kostenko proves very well the satanic vigilance of the Soviet apparatus of Little-Russianism.

All these phenomena give a measure of the Little-Russianization of our culture and show the degree of Little-Russianism. In our native land today, officially there is no Ukrainian people – instead, for the past two decades, the ‘people of Ukraine,’ that is, not a nation but a population, a people, or, as they now say, the inhabitants of this ‘republican’ colony of the ‘Soviet state.’

#### IV

Only against the background of a nebulous, treacherous, double-edged, and at times simply Judas-like Little-Russianism can one feel and understand why the very name of Hetman Mazepa<sup>38</sup> pierces the enemy like a fiery arrow, why the name makes him shake like the biblical aspen on which Judas hanged himself, why the very mention of Mazepa puts the enemy into a cold sweat.

Our history mentions the rivers of blood in ruined and ransacked Baturyn<sup>39</sup> in 1709. History tells us how our bishops were herded into a church at Hlukhiv to proclaim there, with their Ukrainian lips trembling in the face of death, a blasphemous and truly diabolical anathema against Ivan Mazepa, the founder of that and other churches. That was an open rape, perpetrated by the barbarous invader, of the most sacred traditions of the nation, against its church and religion. And since the time of the crowned executioner Tsar Peter, whom the better part of his people and his son, the heir to the throne, justly regarded as an ‘Antichrist,’ for a period of two and a half centuries there has taken place the falsification, the besmirching and defiling as well as the uprooting and eradication of the slightest trace of Mazepa and his era. Today we cannot even find a portrait of him, who must have been painted often in his lifetime. As long as there is Russia and

36 Ievhen Pluzhnyk (1898–1936) was a prominent poet who perished in the GULAG.

37 Iurii Ianovsky (1902–54) was a prominent Soviet Ukrainian novelist.

38 Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) was the hetman of Ukraine (1687–1709) who formed an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden against Tsar Peter I.

39 Baturyn, the capital of Hetman Mazepa’s Ukraine, was destroyed in 1709 on the orders of Peter I.

Moscow there will be no, not even a historiographic, rehabilitation of Mazepa, even if more February or October revolutions should follow. The enemy, whose national instinct, with all its barbarism and bestiality, was and will be alive and self-assured, an enemy who for centuries experienced no disease like that of Little-Russianism, is utterly irreconcilable as far as Mazepa and Mazepism are concerned.

The enemy is right. Because Mazepism is the most striking antithesis of Little-Russianism, the most merciless exposure of Little-Russianism, the best remedy for Little-Russianism. Mazepism is, after all, the active consciousness of a nation and the political and military will, instinctually connected with it, to be a nation. Even at the price of Baturyn or Poltava.

In the splendid novel *Death* by Borys Antonenko-Davydovych<sup>40</sup> – in which, though it is totally dedicated to the problem of Little-Russianism, nowadays some people search for pornography – there is a vivid scene. A commissar of the occupying power, a nationally conscious Ukrainian forced to play the role of a Little-Russian, finds, during a school inspection, a portrait of Mazepa next to a portrait of Drahomanov. A storm of feelings aroused by Mazepa's portrait is at once extinguished by the presence of a schoolteacher, also a Ukrainian but a politically blind Little-Russian. The scene ends predictably; in a Soviet school there is no room for counterrevolution!

Alexander Pushkin, who was terrorized by the Third Section, sweated rather a lot in order to write, on the orders of the tsar, the long poem 'Poltava' and in it to portray the hero of Byron's poem [Mazepa] as a 'thief,' as though he were following the canon of 'socialist realism':

That he does not know sanctitude,  
That he never has gratitude,  
That he does not love anything,  
That blood he is ready to shed like water,  
That he despises liberty,  
That there is no fatherland for him.<sup>41</sup>

One can only imagine how, on the instructions of the ministry of education, these scurrilous and satanic lines were learned by heart and recited by

<sup>40</sup> Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (1899–1984) was a prominent novelist.

<sup>41</sup> In his poem 'Poltava' Pushkin's attitude to Mazepa is ambivalent. While describing Mazepa as a traitor, he also puts into his character's mouth words proclaiming Ukraine's independence.

the pupils of tsarist high schools. Today the same lines must be learned and recited by our youth in the schools of so-called Soviet Ukraine. The lines, however, were written not by a Surkov<sup>42</sup> or an Erenburg<sup>43</sup> but by the pre-eminent classical writer, the Mozart of the Russian literary language which he created and developed. One description of the battle of Poltava in Pushkin's poem is worth ten Stalin Prizes.

The machine of Little-Russianism worked well in tsarist days, poisoning Ukrainian souls. Today it is still working, even more primitively, brutally, and openly, with the aim of 'mastering the virgin soil' in Asia, by casting the shadow of a gun on the wall.

## V

The only radical cure for the disease of Little-Russianism is Ukrainian statehood. The decline of statehood, beginning with the period of the 'Ruin' in the seventeenth century, offered fertile soil for the growth and flowering of Little-Russianism.

The enemy is deliberately exploiting the present 'Ruin' in a calculated and accelerated manner because time is of the essence. It would be unforgivable and criminal to be naïve enough not to recognize this fact or to dismiss it with a pseudo-patriotic phrase or belief in the automatic progress of history.

This is not the place to offer a cheap prescription. All the more so since such a prescription would normally be reduced to the traditional and vulgarized 'enlightenment' which was fought by some political theorists, men of national wisdom and instinct, who paid no attention to the conductor's baton but were ready, as Khvylovy wrote, to dare independently in this area. An intense effort to generate spiritual sovereignty is the most difficult but the best prescription. It excludes imitation, declaration, patriotic posturing, the baroque 'surrender or cessation of being,' and every other 'threatening gesture by a big toe in a boot.'<sup>44</sup>

If we consider the area of national instinct, taking into account all scientific achievements (including Pavlov), we must recognize that the fostering of this instinct depends on two important factors: time and circumstances. It is the preserve of the family, the national (not the ethnographic) style, the magic of national ritual, the atmosphere of national ethics and aesthetics. It

42 Aleksei Surkov (1899–1983) was a prominent Soviet Russian writer of socialist realism.

43 Ilia Erenburg (1891–1967) was a well-known Soviet Russian writer.

44 Malaniuk uses here the proverbial expression *pohrozhuvannia paltsem v choboti*.

has to do in the first place with behaving and acting on behalf of the nation, because in the field of instinct, faith without deeds, as the Holy Scriptures proclaim, is dead.

When we consider the area of national intellect, we immediately encounter the concept of knowledge, that is, research, studies, conclusions, and formulations. Our knowledge must not be abstract and must lead in the end to know-how, that proverbial knowledge many of our countrymen lacked when, rubbing the back of their necks, they complained *post factum*, 'If only we had known!'

It is this knowledge which is joined harmoniously in the national psyche with national wisdom to produce, as a synthesis, national will. That, at least, is the ideal. In reality, as recent historical experience tells us, these two basic psychological categories, owing to Little-Russian paralysis, led in the emotional sphere to otomanship<sup>45</sup> and Makhnovism,<sup>46</sup> and in the national sphere to dead and belated formalism, empty 'standing on principle,' many useless discussions deteriorating to the level of Gogol's tale 'How the Two Ivans Quarrelled.'

The very awareness of the Little-Russian syndrome is a step forward, just as the issuing of a diagnosis is the beginning of a cure.

In his superb artistic and intellectual creativity it was Mykola Hohol (Nikolai Gogol), now the canonized 'Russian writer' and a standard-bearer of Little-Russianism, who gave us unsurpassed material for the study of the decomposition of the national psyche and its transition to Little-Russian rot. Gogol's life and psyche, that of a Ukrainian at the turning-point of two eras, prompted a clash with St Petersburg and a flaring up of almost revolutionary [Ukrainian] nationalism (see his letters to Maksymovych). In 1836 he de facto emigrated as a result of his weak character and 'the care and watchful eye' of the government and began, as an act of propaganda, to confuse Rus' with Russia. In part 1 of his *Dead Souls* he unexpectedly placed our historic Rus' on a Muscovite *troika* with a Russian driver. In this way Gogol (surprising himself) became the founder of the Rus'-Russia myth and, politically, provided a specific ideology for Little-Russianism. This topic deserves separate treatment.

Gogol, the son of his era and of his half-dead society, provided its terrible panorama in *Dead Souls*, laughing 'through tears.' He was still half sympathetic, half mocking in his attitude to the heirs of the heroic Khmel-

45 The Ukrainian *otamanshchyna* refers to the following of a local otaman or military leader.

46 Malaniuk alludes here to the ideas and actions of the followers of Nestor Makhno (1884-1934), the anarchist Ukrainian leader in the 1917-18 revolution.

nytsky era and tried to create before the dead souls of his contemporaries the figures and accomplishments of the Cossack *Iliad* [*Taras Bulba*], in which his famous ancestor Ostap Hohol, the colonel of Bratslav and an indomitable warrior of the period of the 'Ruin,' took part.

Shevchenko, a slightly younger contemporary of Gogol, the author of an eloquent epistle to him ('You are laughing, but I cry ...') did not share Gogol's indulgence. Shevchenko's images are of outrage, contempt, scorn, and biting sarcasm: 'the bad grandsons of famous grandfathers'; 'slaves with cockades on their foreheads, lackeys in gold livery'; 'The father will not kill his son; he will sell him to a *moskal*' – these are the portraits of the complete Little-Russians of the nineteenth century.

Shevchenko was the first to use the term 'Little Russia' with scorn and shame. 'I will not travel to Ukraine,' he wrote in a letter, 'there is only Little Russia there.' It was Shevchenko who [in his works] put forth a diagnosis and defined the condition of a national cripple, which was later developed by Ivan Franko<sup>47</sup> in his 'On Babylonian Rivers':

Although freedom sometimes attracts the soul,  
In my blood I am a slave; in my mind I am a slave.

This all-Ukrainian formula by Franko was offered at the very beginning of our century. It did not prevent the century-old Ruthenian Little-Russianism from playing a fatal role in the decisive years 1917, 1918, and 1919, especially in the wasted months of the spring of 1917.

Inasmuch as Franko was not generally accessible and therefore easy to vulgarize, Shevchenko, who was known 'under thatched roofs,' became the subject of Russia's concern and efforts no less than Mazepa. From critics like Belinsky on the left to the generals of the secret police on the right, everything was done to ridicule the poet and, when that did not succeed, to reduce him, with the help of censorship, to the status of a 'peasant poet,' the minstrel of 'village misery.' Local Little-Russians helped in this, too. They had an interest in Little-Russianizing Shevchenko.

The Little-Russian syndrome is complex and involved. It has many facets. It has often been masked, especially in the last decades, when, as an instrument in foreign hands, it has disguised itself in pseudo-populist jargon and ethnographic patriotism. For decades this Little-Russianism, manipulated by alien hands, has been 'adapting' Shevchenko. Not without success. The leader of the militant Kievan Little-Russians, Vasili

47 Ivan Franko (1856–1916) was the leading writer in Western Ukraine.

Vitalievich Shulgin,<sup>48</sup> declared proudly before 1917 that there are two Shevchenkos, 'ours,' as he put it, 'the heir of Bohdan,' and 'theirs,' the Mazepist. The terminology is telling.

During the tsarist era the Little-Russians intensely *kobzarized* [reduced to minstrelsy] Shevchenko, if a little primitively in comparison with Soviet industrial planning. The very emotion a reader feels while reading Shevchenko was anaesthetized. Everything was done surgically to excise Shevchenko from the Ukrainian national psyche. If not, then at least to equate him with the Provençal Mistral or the Scottish Robert Burns.

Recently, a brief Soviet publication appeared: *Taras Hryhorovych Shevchenko: A Literary Portrait* by O. Biletsky and O. Deitch. There Shevchenko is described as great – but not as having the stature of Pushkin or Lermontov – and 'all-Russian' (*obshcherusskii*), since he wrote in both Ukrainian and Russian and greatly loved the common fatherland (*otechestvo*) and 'great Russian literature.' The effect of this book on a Komsomol youth is obvious.

How important it is to realize the extent of the Little-Russianization of Shevchenko may be seen from a recent episode. The late Maksym Slavynsky, a friend of Lesia Ukrainka,<sup>49</sup> confessed in the mid-1920s that he could not quite understand the meaning of the following terrible prophecy by Shevchenko:

It is not all the same to me,  
If evil men will lull Ukraine  
To sleep, and then, all plundered,  
Wake her amid the flames.

Why 'all plundered'? How is it possible to plunder the entire country and its people? At first Slavynsky simply could not understand this line. But after 1917–20 it became clear to him what prophetic warning these lines contained. I recalled this episode in order to give yet another definition of Little-Russianism; it is the equivalent of being plundered.

1959

48 V.V. Shulgin (1878–1976), a conservative journalist and political leader, was a White Russian émigré who came to accept the Soviet state because of its adoption of imperialist policies.

49 Lesia Ukrainka (pseudonym of Larysa Kosach, 1871–1913) was a modernist poet, whose lyric and dramatic poetry is of European stature.

## Internationalism or Russification? (excerpt)

IVAN DZIUBA

*Ivan Dziuba (b. 1931) is a prominent literary critic and journalist. Of peasant origin, he was educated in Donetsk and Kiev. In 1959 he published a collection of essays, Zvychna liudyna chy mishchanyn? (An Ordinary Man or a Philistine?). In the mid-1960s, when he belonged to a new wave of writers called the shistdesiatnyky (writers of the sixties), he presented the secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Petro Shelest, with a typescript of Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia? (Internationalism or Russification?) in response to the arrest of Ukrainian intellectuals. The manuscript, which incisively analysed Soviet policy in Ukraine, was never published, and its author was arrested. After a recantation Dziuba was released. Today he is a leading intellectual and a co-editor of the journal Suchasnist (Contemporaneity). Until 1994 he was Ukraine's minister of culture.*

### I. Culture

In keeping with firm instructions by Lenin, the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1923 determined clearly and precisely:

Talks on the subject of the advantages of Russian culture and propositions concerning the inevitable victory of the higher Russian culture over the cultures of more backward peoples (Ukrainian, Azerbaidjani, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc.) are nothing but an attempt to confirm the domination of the Great Russian nationality.

Today talks and notions of such a character are not only legalized and dominant in everyday civic and Party life, but diverse 'allegorical' variants



of these 'talks' have also long become stereotyped in official theory and propaganda, and have even found their way into textbooks for Ukrainian children as the alpha and omega of truth. What is more, today everything is apparently being done so that this 'superiority of Russian culture' should be not only the subject of talks but the *manifest reality* in Ukraine. At the same time a rare, pitiful helplessness, unheard of anywhere else in the world, is displayed every time it is necessary to support Ukrainian publishing, Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian language ... (Not to mention the implementation of the Party's old and well-known resolutions concerning its responsibility for the development of Ukrainian national culture, concerning the necessity of leading it within the shortest possible term to the highest level on the world scale and of making it the culture of the proletariat: today one can mention only actions running counter to those resolutions.) Up until the present, Lunacharsky's<sup>1</sup> expectations have not been fulfilled: 'We can expect the most gratifying results from the independent cultural development of the Ukrainian people, for there is no doubt that it is one of the most gifted branches of the Slavic tree.'<sup>2</sup>

Our literature is far from being on the level on which it should and could be. The Ukrainian theatre is in obvious decay. The Ukrainian cinema is virtually non-existent in spite of the existence of two studios, in Kiev and Odessa: the films they make are either unbelievably bad or (with very few exceptions) not Ukrainian at all.

Anything that is interesting and promising usually receives not support but the opposite ...

What is the matter? Could it be that the Ukrainian land has lost its energies and talents? Hardly, if you observe the extent to which it is bestowing these upon Russian culture and learning. Surely there are other serious causes, both subjective and objective.

The strength, abundance, health, and future of any national culture depends directly on its position in society, on how much this society is interested in it and devoted to it, and on how large a mass of this society is permeated by it and contributing to it, actively or passively, linking their conscious spiritual existence with it.

In discussing these matters, Lunacharsky in his time approvingly quoted a German Marxist:

1 Anatolii Lunacharsky (1875-1933) was a Soviet leader and the commissar of education of the RSFSR (1917-29).

2 A. Lunacharsky, 'O natsionalizme vobshche i ukrainskom dvizhenii v chastnosti,' *Ukrainskaia zhizn* 10 (1912), pp. 10-11. [Author's note]

What does the strength and greatness of a nation depend on? asks Braun, and answers: It depends on whether its national body is healthy and whether its whole people are permeated by their culture. Capitalist exploitation destroys the strength of a nation, robbing of its health the class which constitutes the majority and blocking its access to national culture. Nonetheless the nationalists are quite often defenders of capitalism. They thereby prove at once that they are not fighting for their nation but represent the interests of its ruling classes. Only socialism will allow the whole nation to be definitively permeated by its national culture. But the struggle for this culture against the bourgeoisie must and does proceed only in an international framework. The conclusion is clear: the socialist international is the best champion of genuine nationalism.<sup>3</sup>

The Ukrainian communists of the 1920s understood the direct and constantly active interrelation between the strength of a national culture and its hold over society. That is why they placed such emphasis on the task of drawing all strata of the working population of Ukraine (and especially its proletariat) as speedily and closely as possible into the process of assimilating and creating Ukrainian national culture. That, they felt, was necessary for the development and spiritual health both of Ukrainian culture and of the Ukrainian proletariat ... Finally, they intended to raise Ukrainian culture from its secondary position in Ukraine and to overcome the inequality existing between Russian and Ukrainian culture, and the actual domination and preponderance of that Russian culture in Ukraine.

'In the short time the Soviets have been in power in Ukraine ... much has already been done to aid the development of Ukrainian culture, schools and publishing,' reads the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. 'But this work has been unable to eliminate the inequality of cultures that has been created by centuries of oppression.

That is why it must be the immediate task of the government to eliminate this inequality in the sphere of national culture.'<sup>4</sup>

The suppression of Ukrainianization, however, put an end to the measures that were to make national Ukrainian socialist culture the culture of the whole of Ukrainian society.

As a result, Ukrainian culture not only has failed to take its rightful leading place in Ukraine but has not even caught up with Russian culture,

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 124. [Author's note]

<sup>4</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR* (Kiev, 1959), vol. 1, p. 243. [Author's note]

remaining a poor second and a makeweight. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the working class, of the scientific, technical, engineering, and other intelligentsia, and of the town population in general remains beyond the sphere of Ukrainian culture, which for them Russian culture has supplanted completely. This is borne out by the actual position of Ukrainian books, the Ukrainian press, Ukrainian schools, the Ukrainian theatre, and so on, as well as by the degree of interest shown by society in Ukrainian culture in general. We all know what a miserable proportion of the culturally most active of the aforementioned strata is interested in Ukrainian culture and links the satisfaction of its spiritual needs with it. And this cannot pass without leaving its mark. It continues to drain the lifeblood from Ukrainian culture, undermining it materially and spiritually. Narrowing the circle of readers, listeners, and users is not simply a mechanical but a complex psychological process, which on the one hand diminishes the spiritual current flowing out to the reader and on the other weakens the force of the spiritual current flowing back to the creators – not to mention the fact that this limits and silts up catastrophically the sources providing national culture with new creative forces, which are drawn more and more into the already incomparably more powerful stream of Russian culture.

But even that is not the end of the story. Most poignant of all, the forces that even in these arduous conditions selflessly remain faithful to their national culture are not helped as they should be, and on the contrary are very often hindered by all sorts of obstacles and bedevillments.

It is not so much that brilliant talents and innovative experiments are discouraged as that they simply run up against an impenetrable line of bayonets in the official press. We need only remember the witches' sabbath which not so long ago broke loose around the work of certain young poets who were falsely accused of formalism. Let us remember that a good many poets, from Lina Kostenko to Vasyl Stus, from Hryhorii Kyrychenko to Mykola Kholodny, from Ihor Kalynets to Borys Mamaisur, have for years been unable to publish their collections. Let us remember that the Czechs in their anthology of young Ukrainian poets print those who for years have been denied recognition in our country, and that even older, honoured writers get into trouble as soon as they say more than one is accustomed to hear from them (thus Iu. Smolych could not publish his memoirs about the literary life of the 1920s).

The situation is no better in the Artists' Union, where the work of a number of original young artists is being suppressed and discredited in various ways.

The situation in the Ukrainian theatre is almost catastrophic. The Kiev Franko Academic Dramatic Theatre is in a state of permanent helplessness and drabness, and at the same time the talented young producer Les Taniuk was refused work until in the end he was forced to leave Ukraine. Now that he works in Moscow, he is happily invited to the best Moscow theatres, where the shows he directs enjoy tremendous popularity.

The young Ukrainian composer Leonid Hrabovsky, whom Shostakovich places among the most original talents, has for years been unable to get his innovative works performed in Ukraine. Meanwhile they are happily being performed by the leading ensembles of Moscow and Leningrad. Even his wonderful 'Four Ukrainian Songs,' which won an award at an all-Union competition and were recorded in Leningrad, have not been performed in Ukraine to this day.

And how many difficulties are being placed in the way of the talented choir master and producer Ihor Poliukh's organizing of a national instrumental-vocal variety ensemble, which is being forced into the rustic mould!

Serhii Paradzhanov's film *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors* marked a turning-point for the Kiev Dovzhenko Film Studio, which in latter years had enjoyed the worst possible reputation, and regained for it international recognition. And here Paradzhanov is being hindered in the production of his second film and is virtually being turned out of the studio. A threat also hangs over other brilliant films being prepared in the studio, and one hears that it is necessary to 'tighten up' somewhat ... There are countless similar examples.

One's impression is that whenever new forces appear in some sphere of Ukrainian culture and some sort of revitalization begins, the bureaucrats pass sleepless nights and lose all tranquillity until this revitalization is repressed and everything returns to the 'normal' artistic level. A few years ago the young editorial staff of the Kharkiv magazine *Prapor* [The Banner] began to produce a fresh, interesting journal. A brutal 'dressing-down' was not long in coming, and now *Prapor* has become a commonplace, boring, little provincial magazine. Two years ago, an energetic man of good taste, R. Bratun, became the editor of the Lviv magazine *Zhovten* [October]. The formerly languid magazine soon became one of the best in Ukraine, gained great popularity, and showed a steep increase in its circulation figures. And before long the Lviv Provincial Committee of the Party decided to remove Bratun from his post as chief editor and condemned his activity. Admittedly, for the time being the Writers' Union has succeeded in vindicating R. Bratun, but in such a situation it is difficult to expect from an editor great daring and initiative. In any case, everything is being done to eliminate

these qualities. And how often the editors of *Ranok* [Morning] and *Dnipro* [Dnieper] 'catch it,' just because these journals are better than others. It is precisely for the best material that the appropriate departments 'give them the treatment.'

Thus our culture is being deliberately held back and impoverished by various measures, by administrative brutality, by a caveman cultural level, by a 'deeply echeloned' bureaucratic 'vigilance,' and by an automatically repressive reflex. Our culture is being compromised in the eyes of a mass public which has no opportunity of seeing this concealed 'restricting' mechanism in action and therefore attributes all the backwardness of our culture to its own innate traits.

A second factor limiting the appeal of Ukrainian culture for millions of readers is the artificial impoverishment of its past attainments and traditions, a pillaging, in fact, of Ukrainian cultural history.

What other nation in the world can boast a state of affairs in which its greatest scholars in the field of the social sciences, M. Hrushevsky and M. Drahomanov – men of worldwide reputation – are unknown in their own country? The name of the former is still banned, while an undeclared ban has only recently been lifted from the latter. But the works of the two remain equally unpublished and inaccessible.

A paradoxical fact: prior to the revolution, under the conditions belonging to the openly anti-Ukrainian policy of tsardom, epoch-making records of Ukrainian historical and social thought were published, such as *Istoriia Rusov* and the Cossack chronicles of S. Velychko, H. Hrabianka, and Samovydet. They have not been republished now for several decades, although they have long since become bibliographical rarities, which even scholars cannot lay their hands on.

The same holds true of the monumental collections of Ukrainian folklore by P. Chubynsky, M. Drahomanov, V. Antonovych, Ia. Holovatsky, and others, published in the nineteenth century.

As for the works of Ukrainian historians – V. Antonovych, M. Maksymovych, O. Bodiansky, M. Kostomarov, O. Lazarevsky or those of P. Kulish, a more than remarkable figure – where are they? (Meanwhile in Russia S.M. Solov'ev and V.O. Kliuchevsky have been republished in full.)

And where are the works of Ukrainian social scientists, sociologists, and economists – M. Pavlyk, S. Podolynsky, F. Vovk, O. Terletsky, M. Ziber (whom Marx esteemed so highly), and many others?

But why talk of this, when the private Shevchenko Scientific Society in Galicia [Western Ukraine], completely unsupported financially and rather hampered by the Austrian and, later, the Polish, authorities, managed in

the several decades of its existence to publish a quantity of literature on Ukrainian studies – particularly history, folklore, statistics, and the study of documents; a quantity such as, in the conditions at present obtaining in the Ukrainian SSR for this kind of work, all its State Publishing Houses would probably require several centuries to produce, to say nothing of the scholarly level of execution and selection of material involved?

As for the works of dozens of great Ukrainian scientists in various branches of the natural sciences, if they are published, it is only in Russian.

Should we be surprised then that the documents and personalities of the national-political struggle at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century are consigned to oblivion? As a slavish tribute to anti-scientific, chauvinist conceptions all this has been assigned to 'zoological nationalism.' This runs counter to Lenin's direct indication of the necessity for distinguishing on principle between the aggressive nationalism on the part of a ruling nation and the defensive nationalism of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of *any* oppressed nation having a general democratic content. It also runs counter to the clear definition of the role even of the 'nationalist petty bourgeoisie' given by the Central Committee of the CP(B)U in 1927: 'Before the October Revolution its movement had an undoubted revolutionary importance and played its role in the overthrow of, first, tsarist and, then, bourgeois imperialist power.' Only after the October Revolution did this movement become anti-Soviet. In our case it is not even a question of the 'nationalist petty bourgeoisie' but of national-liberation radicalism on the part of the intelligentsia or 'revolutionary democratic nationalism,' as Lunacharsky defined Shevchenko's ideology, basing his definition on Lenin's thesis of two nationalisms.<sup>6</sup>

Even a number of works by I. Franko – *Ukraina irredenta*,<sup>7</sup> *Shcho take postup* [What Is Progress] – are being concealed and withheld from publication. The journalistic works of B. Hrinchenko (*Lysty z Ukrainy Naddnyprianskoi* [Letters from Dnieper Ukraine]), I. Nechui-Levytsky, and others are printed with great excisions, because they formulate sharply the question of the colonial oppression of Ukraine and the necessity of struggling for its liberation and national state independence.

5 V. Koriak, ed., *Shliakhy rozvytku ukrainskoi proletarskoi literatury* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 343. [Author's note]

6 A. Lunacharsky, *Stati o literature* (Moscow, 1957), p. 429. [Author's note]

7 *Ukraina irredenta* (1895) was written by Iulian Bachynsky and then reviewed by Franko, who headed his remarks with the book's title. The title echoes an Italian phrase, *Italia irredenta*, used by nineteenth-century nationalists calling for the unification of Italy.

Likewise concealed are the literary-political writings of the 1920s and works on the nationalities question by M. Skrypnyk and others. The resolutions on the Ukrainian question passed by the Comintern, the RCP(B), and the CP(B)U in Leninist and early post-Leninist times, and in particular their ideas about national cultural construction in Ukraine, are also not made available to the general reader.

Huge breaches have been made, and still gape wide, in Ukrainian literature and art both of pre-Soviet and Soviet times. Whereas in Soviet Russia Bunin has long been recognized and published, in Soviet Ukraine there can be no question of recognition for V. Vynnychenko, who was incomparably more 'left' in pre-revolutionary days. In the 1920s, however, his collected works were published perfectly calmly without the Soviet system being rocked to its foundations. After all, how can the history of Ukrainian literature be written without the inclusion of Vynnychenko?

Whereas in Soviet Russia the works of Averchenko, Mandelshtam, and Maksimilian Voloshin are being prepared for publication, and you even hear some mention of Gumil'ev, who was executed as a White Guard, in Soviet Ukraine there can be no question of publication for Hryhorii Chuprynka (who, by the way, was also published in the 1920s) or M. Ievshan, or even for V. Pidmohyl'ny, M. Khvylovy, O. Slisarenko, M. Ivchenko, M. Iohansen, and many others. Mykhailo Semenko, Geo Shkurupii, and many others of the avant-garde are mentioned only to be denigrated and are represented in anthologies by only a few carefully selected little poems. P. Fylypovych and M. Drai-Khmara are virtually non-existent for our literature. The same can be said about the encyclopaedic M. Zerov, since his few 'restored' poems represent merely a drop in the ocean of his literary and scholarly work. Even in the case of Bazhan, Tychyna, Sosiura, and others, far from everything is being reprinted that was published in their books of verse and in the periodicals of the 1920s.

And what about the literary scholarship of the Soviet period? Not a trace of the academician S. Iefremov, or of the brilliant student of Western literatures A. Nikovsky, or of M. Kalynovych, or of the communist V. Koriak, or of many, many others ...

And what about translation? What about bringing the Ukrainian reader the wealth of world culture in his own language? This is one of the great undertakings to which every civilized nation has devoted the maximum attention and effort. In the 1920s, Ukrainian publishing houses were successfully carrying out a far-reaching plan for complete multivolume editions of the world's literary classics and of the most outstanding works of philosophical, political, sociological, and historiographical thought, and art

criticism, in good translations, with critical apparatus and with the participation of eminent specialists. Now these translations have become such bibliographical rarities that it is virtually impossible to get hold of them. New translations are being produced on a miserable scale, so that we have only individual books from the world's classics. Some of our most brilliant translations – Goethe's *Faust* (translated by M. Lukash), Dante's *Commedia* (translated by P. Karmansky and M. Rylsky), and others – are being published in such pitifully small editions that it is impossible to acquire them no matter how much one may want to. The publication of the world's philosophical and sociological literature in Ukrainian translation is out of the question. But these are the things that must make up the tangible cultural life of a modern nation, if it is not to fall into a state of spiritual inferiority. If we failed to provide these for the Ukrainian nation, and if we suggested that it could reach the world's intellectual life through the medium of Russian culture rather than directly, we would actually refuse it one of its most basic rights, and transform into parasitism and dependence what should and could be friendly reciprocal help. We would also actually increase the backwardness of Ukrainian culture and push the Ukrainian language yet further into the background, since translations are not liabilities but rank among the greatest assets of every culture.

The Ukrainian reader wants and must have in his own language the achievements of universal culture, particularly the literary classics of the world.

In our country there is a great demand for world classics in translation.

Experience has shown that the editions of good translations of world literature into Ukrainian, such as Homer's *Odyssey* (translated by Borys Ten), Dante's *Commedia* (translated by M. Rylsky and P. Karmansky), Goethe's *Faust* (translated by M. Lukash), or Aesop's *Fables* (translated by Iu. Mushak), were sold out very quickly

It is time to bring greater method, scope, initiative, and persistence to this matter, which is so important for the development of the culture of the people.

In our opinion it would be worthwhile creating a special publishing house that would bring out works from foreign literatures and from the literature of the peoples of the USSR in Ukrainian translation. Such a publishing house could rally to itself highly qualified translators and could meet the demands of Ukrainian readers more fully.<sup>8</sup>

8 M. Humeniuk, 'Vid rozmov - do dila,' *Literaturna Ukraina* (September 24, 1965).  
[Author's note]



To this day, however, unfortunately there have been more words than action on this matter. In the sphere of translation we have only a miserable part of what we actually had in the 1920s.

Nor do we treat the achievements of the Ukrainian people well in other spheres of culture and art.

In music we have almost forgotten the great Ukrainian composers Maksym Berezovsky and D. Bortniansky as well as the Galician composers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Until recently no mention was made of the great and celebrated singers Solomiia Krushelnyska, Oleksander Myshuha, and Modest Mentsynsky, and even now we do not have their recordings, although such recordings exist in the West, where they enjoy great popularity. We make no mention of the Koshyts choir or of a number of other famous groups and do not have their recordings.

In our entire republic there is not a single record factory.

In painting and sculpture we do not know such a giant as Archipenko, whom the artistic world places alongside Picasso. We do not know M. Butovych, M. Parashchuk, or P. Kholodny; we almost do not know P. Obal and O. Novakivsky. To this day silence covers a whole constellation of talented artists, the 'Boichukists,' who created an original school in Ukrainian art in the 1920s. Only now are we beginning to mention A. Petrytsky ...

Insufficient attention is paid to Ukrainian folk art, which has long been recognized throughout the world as one of the finest and most beautiful jewels of human culture. As a result the renowned centres of folk art in Opishnia, Petrykivka, Kosiv, and other villages are, to put it mildly, not in the best state ...

Is it not a fact that Pavlyna Tsvilyk, whose products are so highly valued in the artistic world, was without the basic facilities for work? The same is true of Prymachenko and a number of other folk artists.

In our museum galleries too much space is given to imposing hackwork and the dreary output of honoured time-servers, while the latest artistic strivings of less 'comfortable' contemporary talents are not represented. Many brilliant works from earlier periods, especially the 1920s, are languishing in storage. In Lviv hundreds of first-rate examples of Ukrainian icon art of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries lie virtually buried in the Armenian Cathedral. These icons could adorn many a museum (or why should not a special museum of ancient Ukrainian art be created?); they could provide material for a wonderful art album, which would sell all over the world (and how many themes for such albums Ukrainian art could provide!) ...

We could quote so many more similar examples of how our artistic attainments are belittled and our spiritual history is diminished.

But even the things which have not come under official or unofficial taboo, things that seem to have been given a place among the assets of Ukrainian culture, are being disseminated among the mass of the public most insufficiently. As a result, large sections of the population know very little about the enormous riches of Ukrainian culture, show no interest in it, and consider it beneath their notice. Let us recall how seriously the CP(B)U in the 1920s concerned itself with the absorption of Ukrainian culture by the broad working masses, and how it considered national culture and language a powerful instrument of communist cultural construction and education. Now we are faced with the total antithesis of this: Ukrainian culture, and in particular the printed word, is being steadfastly ignored and replaced in its entirety by Russian culture and Russian books. That is what is happening, if not everywhere, at least among considerable sections of the city populations, and especially in the 'upper strata' of society. The case is the same with the public authorities, who do nothing to disseminate Ukrainian culture among the population, especially among its younger members. This deliberate neglect takes on such egregious forms that it cannot fail to shock anyone who feels the least concern for Ukrainian culture. Worried voices percolate even into our press, which, mildly speaking, tends to be rather cautious on such matters. If we look through *Literaturna Ukraina* [Literary Ukraine], *Kultura i zhyttia* [Culture and Life] (formerly *Radianska kultura* [Soviet Culture]), *Robitnycha hazeta* [The Workers' Gazette], and others, we will find a good many voices raised in concern and protest against the manifestations of the openly neglectful and scornful attitude towards the popularization of Ukrainian books and culture, voices which complain of the complete absence of any organized dissemination of them.

In the Ukrainian Soviet state the responsible authorities, first and foremost the government itself, in no way endeavour to make Ukrainian Soviet culture truly accessible to the whole nation.

## Program of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine (excerpts)

*The Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine, known as Rukh (The Movement), was born early in 1989 in Kiev. It was established by scholars and writers, who remained in its leadership after the founding congress of Rukh in September 1989. This congress was attended by 1109 delegates of all the nationalities inhabiting Ukraine (944 delegates were Ukrainians). They elected the poet Ivan Drach as their president. It was this founding congress which adopted the program, reproduced here. More than two years later, in 1992, Rukh held another congress, at which a split into several political parties was prevented. Today, Rukh's role is diminished.*

### Preamble

Our society is entering the last decade of the twentieth century in a state of deep political, economic, social, ideological, and moral crisis. This critical phase is the result of the violent introduction of the Stalinist model of totalitarian pseudo-socialism; the usurpation of the power of the Soviets by the bureaucratic apparatus; the alienation of the individual from the means and the output of production; the brutal and absurd dictates of the central government bureaus; the castration of the sovereignty of the republics and the conversion of local self-rule into fiction; the treacherous policy of denationalization, conducted under the guise of 'internationalism'; the unification of nations; and the mechanical mixing together of various peoples, while their vital interests are ignored.

In all its aspects this crisis, while Union-wide, has acquired additional features specific to each of the Union republics.

The twentieth century has brought the Ukrainian people great hopes for a renaissance of its statehood and national culture as well as grave national tragedies. After the dissolution of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, national statehood in Ukraine was renewed by the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and, later, of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. The formative process of Ukrainian statehood under complex historical conditions led to the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which, in signing the 1922 Union treaty, united with the Soviet republics of Russia, Belorussia, and Transcaucasia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the early days of Soviet Ukraine, conditions were created that were conducive to the national-cultural development of the Ukrainian people and the genuine safeguarding of its statehood. With the emergence of the Stalinist administrative-command system, however, the structural principles of the Soviet federation began to be brutally violated. The sovereignty of Ukraine was crushed. Ukraine and the other Union republics were transformed into faceless administrative-territorial units of an ultracentralist state.

These are just some of the crimes committed against the Ukrainian people by the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist-Brezhnevite leaders: the removal of activists who were conducting the nationalities policy, as formulated by Lenin, from the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government of the republic; a campaign of terror waged against the peasantry under the false slogans of 'de-kulakization' and forced collectivization; the artificial famine of 1933, with its millions of victims; the almost total destruction of the national intelligentsia in the period of Stalinist repressions; the suppression, under the guise of 'the struggle against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism,' of any manifestation of national self-consciousness; repeated deportations of millions of Ukrainians; gross violations of human and national rights; the appropriation, falsification, and defamation of Ukraine's national history and culture; the plundering of the most sacred historical treasures of the Ukrainian people and other nations; the pursuit of a systematic policy of migration and resettlement designed to reduce the proportion of Ukrainians within the general population in Ukraine; the complete removal of the Ukrainian language from nearly every facet of social life in the republic; the indifferent and even hostile attitude towards the national-cultural development of Ukrainians living outside Ukraine; the irreparable destruction of the environment in many areas of Ukraine; the tragedy of Chornobyl.

When one adds to this list the destruction during the civil war, the famine of 1921-2, the atrocities committed by the fascist German occupiers, and the famine of 1946-7, one begins to realize the scale of the losses the Ukrainian people have suffered in the twentieth century.

It is impossible to prevent a national catastrophe without the joint efforts of all patriotic forces and of all those in Ukraine who are imbued with a sense of historical responsibility, regardless of their place of residence, national, religious, or political affiliation, party membership, social status, cultural and educational level, sex and age. The Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine can and should be the form for such a joint effort.

Analogous forms for the consolidation of the forces of restructuring have emerged or are now emerging in many republics and regions of the USSR. This is but additional proof of their vital necessity, a manifestation both of the general and of specifically national features of restructuring. The Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine was created on a wave of increased civic activity brought forth by the restructuring processes in the Soviet Union and aimed at overcoming the crisis and ensuring a better future for the peoples of the USSR.

## Principles, Goals, Guidelines, and Methods of Activity

1. The Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine (hereafter Rukh [The Movement]) conducts its activity according to the principles of humanism, democracy, openness [*glasnost*], pluralism, social justice, and internationalism, proceeding from the interests of all the citizens of the republic, regardless of nationality. Rukh encompasses their patriotic energy, expressing their desire for the political, economic, and cultural rebirth of Ukraine. Rukh supports the principles of radical social renewal, as proclaimed by the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

2. *Rukh* designates as its main goal

the construction of a democratic and humane society in Ukraine, one in which the genuine rule of the people, national prosperity, and the conditions necessary for dignity in the life of the individual will be assured, as well as the rebirth and comprehensive development of the Ukrainian nation, the safeguarding of the national and cultural needs of all ethnic groups in the republic, and the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state,

which will build its relations with the other republics of the USSR on the basis of a new Union treaty.

### 3. The aims of Rukh are

a) to promote, in all ways possible, the rebirth of the individual as a morally responsible person;

b) to promote the development of national-state construction, directed at the transformation of the Ukrainian SSR into a democratic state under the rule of law which is called upon to guarantee the free development of the individual, the defence of human and national rights, and the unhindered actualization of basic democratic freedoms;

c) to demand the radical restructuring of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR according to the principles of economic independence and self-rule, taking into account the regional and structural particularities of the economy of Ukraine and the economic accountability of all economic entities, regardless of their form of ownership;

d) to wage a relentless struggle against the policy of denationalization and demand the creation of all conditions necessary for the unfettered development and self-preservation of the Ukrainian people on the territory which has been theirs from time immemorial; to foster the spiritual rebirth of the Ukrainian nation on a foundation of state protection of the Ukrainian language, the comprehensive development of Ukrainian culture, the forming of a historical and national consciousness in its citizenry, and the inculcation of feelings of national dignity;

e) to foster the all-round development of the languages and cultures of those national minorities and ethnic groups which live on the territory of the republic, and to safeguard their vital rights and interests.

### 4. The fundamental guidelines of Rukh's activity are

- the protection of human rights and freedoms and national rights, the moral healing of the individual and society;
- the democratization of social and state life in the USSR;
- the endowment of sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR with real content by means of radical transformations in the Soviet federation;
- the fundamental revitalization of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR;
- social justice;
- the ecological protection of society;
- national-cultural development;
- ethics and religion;
- health care and sports;
- active participation in the struggle for peace.

5. *Rukh* conducts its activity in the following manner:

a) it cooperates with state institutions, with Soviet and Party organs, and with other civic organizations in resolving questions anticipated by the Program and the Charter of Rukh;

b) it takes part in election campaigns by nominating Rukh candidates for the position of deputy and supporting other candidates whose election platforms are not at odds with the goals of Rukh; brings up questions regarding the recall of deputies who have not proved worthy of the confidence of the voters; and takes part in the public monitoring of election campaigns;

c) it formulates, develops, and presents to the state organs proposals which emanate from the tasks outlined in the Program of Rukh; and presents to local councils of people's deputies drafts of decisions concerning various questions of local significance;

d) through legislative initiatives, it presents to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR proposals concerning the passage of new legislation and regulations and the repeal or amendment of existing ones;

e) it organizes public opinion polls and publishes their results, introduces proposals for referendums, and helps conduct them;

f) it resorts to any legal means of influence upon state and government organs;

g) it monitors the observance by the Ukrainian SSR of the principles outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international agreements concerning the defence of human rights;

h) it takes part in public monitoring efforts;

i) it observes important national historical dates and holidays, and fosters the rebirth of national traditions and customs;

j) it conducts its own economic activities, organizes various forms of public works, and looks after memorials of the historical and cultural heritage and natural preserves;

k) it organizes exchanges of opinion, debates, colloquia, and conferences on urgent issues; forms committees of experts; organizes lectures; and conducts discussions;

l) it publishes its own newspapers, bulletins, informational leaflets; and disseminates information by means of leaflets, posters, appeals, and open letters, as well as through the mass media;

m) it organizes and conducts rallies, assemblies, demonstrations, marches, processions, and picketing.

6. *Rukh* conducts its activities in accordance with its Program and Charter, within the framework of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the laws of the Ukrainian SSR.

## The Fundamental Direction of the Activity of Rukh

### *Human Rights and National Rights*

1. The political and legal system of society should guarantee the freedom and civil rights of the individual. All people are born free and equal in dignity and rights. The inviolability of the individual and his dignity are protected by law.

2. *Rukh* will struggle to bring the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and republican legislation fully in line with the principles outlined in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975); the final document of the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1989); and other documents pertaining to all-European processes.

*Rukh* believes that the Ukrainian SSR must sign the optional protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. *Rukh* will demand the publication of reports presented at the UN concerning the adherence to this pact on the part of the Ukrainian SSR.

3. *Rukh* defends the principle of the complete equality of every citizen and every organ of power or its representative before the law. *Rukh* believes it obligatory that the protection of the interests of any national group or individual be juridically guaranteed.

*Rukh* will seek to secure the consistent exercise in the Ukrainian SSR of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the individual to inviolability of the person and his domicile; to confidentiality of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegram messages; and to the protection of the privacy of citizens' personal lives.

*Rukh* believes that no institution or organization has the right to collect any information about any person to which that person would not be entitled.

Persecution on political, social, racial, national, or religious grounds, or any restrictions of civil and political rights, is not to be tolerated.

*Rukh* takes upon itself the task of protecting the civil rights of the indi-



vidual in cases where the state organs or civic organizations violate applicable existing legislation.

4. Rukh defends the right of any civic organizations and independent associations to conduct legal activities allowed by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.

5. Rukh defends the right of the individual to practise the religion of his choice or not to practise any, to perform religious rites, and to conduct religious or atheist propaganda. Rukh supports tolerance of religious belief.

6. Rukh demands that the state declare Stalinist crimes to have been crimes against humanity and humaneness, and, furthermore, that they not be subject to any statute of limitations.

7. Rukh will demand the genuine exercise of the principle of freedom of expression and information. Every citizen must be guaranteed the right of access to information and protection from disinformation.

Rukh is in favour of liquidating the vestiges of the practice of censorship, exclusive of cases of state and military secrets. Rukh supports the right of any organization or group of citizens acting according to constitutional requirements to issue its own publications and the legislative protection of the rights of journalists.

8. Rukh considers the existing practice of KGB and MVD intervention in the sphere of ideology, convictions, and freedom of conscience a vestige of totalitarianism and something not to be tolerated in a state under the rule of law.

Rukh will demand the creation of a permanent human rights commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for monitoring the activities of the organs of state security and internal affairs, the state prosecutor's office, and other republican organs.

9. Rukh will demand the revocation of all regulations that restrict civil and political freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.

10. The rights and freedoms of the individual should not contradict the right of the nation to self-preservation and rebirth. Without the freedom of the people and the nation, the safeguarding of the freedom of the individual is impossible.

11. Every nation has the right to determine the forms and methods of its existence, its political status and state system. In particular, every nation must have the following rights:

- the right to existence;
- the right to its uniqueness, respect for its national-ethnic, racial, cul-

tural, and religious dignity; freedom from national and racial discrimination;

- the right to political self-determination; the right to choose its own economic and social system;
- the right to peace;
- the right to dominion over territory it has settled from time immemorial;
- the right to a sound environment;
- the right to its natural resources;
- the right to economic security, which is the guarantee of the stable development of the nation and of every individual;
- the right to a democratic order which serves the interests of the entire population;
- the right to development, to participation in the progressive process of human civilization; the right to utilize the universal heritage of mankind;
- the right to its own artistic, cultural, and historical treasures;
- the right of the nation as an ethnic community to achieve self-preservation on territory which has belonged to it from time immemorial, by securing the primacy of its language, national traditions, and customs – everything which composes the culture of the *ethnos*;
- the right of all citizens to be informed of the intentions of their government.

### *Society and the State*

1. Rukh actively supports the construction in Ukraine of a society founded on the principles of humanism, democracy, and social justice. This should be a society characterized by a high standard of living; all power vested in the people; the plenary exercise of human rights; superior dynamism of production made compatible with social justice; economic efficiency based on a diversity of forms of ownership; openness of the national economy of Ukraine on the basis of economically justified relations in intra-Union and international exchange, division of, and cooperation in labour; the creation of a civil society and a state under the rule of law; the development of democracy and political pluralism; spiritual freedom; conditions conducive to the unfettered development of the Ukrainian people and the satisfaction of the vital needs of nationalities living in the republic; and openness to the outside world and cooperation with all nations, based on the principle of the equality of the members of the world community of nations. It is thus that Rukh envisages a renewed socialist society.

2. Rukh advocates the creation in the Ukrainian SSR of a civil society that guarantees the securing of the economic foundations of the political and social freedom of every individual. The personal independence of every individual is impossible without the decentralization of state ownership and the dismantling of the Stalinist-Brezhnevite administrative-command system.

An indispensable condition of the functioning of a renewed society is the securing of a minority's right to express its own opinion and to criticize decisions approved by the majority.

3. The creation of a civil society in the Ukrainian SSR requires the restriction of state interference in economic and socio-cultural life; the assurance of conditions favourable for the functioning of voluntary associations and unions as forms for the actualization of the creative energy and initiative of citizens; and the reduction to a minimum of the paternalistic function of the state vis-à-vis the people. The state must serve society and be under its complete control.

Ultimately, the creation of a civil society should dissolve the adversarial relationship between the individual on the one hand and society and the state on the other, and make possible the realization of the principle that 'the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all.'

4. Rukh supports the dismantling of the 'Stalinist model of socialism,' which is still in existence in the Ukrainian SSR, and the transformation of the republic into a democratic state under the rule of law, built with considerations for the national and historic traits of Ukraine.

Rukh will aspire to have governance over the people in the Ukrainian SSR exercised by the people themselves.

The principles of a state under the rule of law in the Ukrainian SSR should be

- the primacy of law over politics;
- the rule of law in all spheres of social life;
- the binding nature of the law upon the state itself and upon its organs in their relations with the citizen;
- the fulfillment of the principle that 'everything which is not forbidden is allowed' in relations between citizens and the state and between lower-level and higher-level organizations;
- the creation of a legislative mechanism whereby drafts of laws are formulated directly by legislative organs, with the most important drafts submitted for referendums and public discussion;
- juridical guarantees of maximum openness [*glasnost*] in the activities

of state organs and civic organizations, of accessibility of statistics, of the wholesale communication of information to the citizenry, of real opportunity to express one's opinion in questions concerning the life of the state, and of a procedure for having such opinions taken into account;

- the juridical guarantee of state protection for human rights and freedoms and national rights;
- mutual responsibility of the state and the individual;
- independent courts and the legal defence of all civil rights without exception.

5. National and state construction in the republic should be conducted with the goal of confirming the Ukrainian SSR's state sovereignty. The achievement of this goal should be served by the approval of a new Constitution for the Ukrainian SSR; the transition to full economic accountability within the republic; the legalization of the Ukrainian language as the state language of the Ukrainian SSR; the endowment of the institution of Ukrainian SSR citizenship with juridical content; the legislative safeguarding of all rights of other national groups on the territory of the republic; the establishment in the Ukrainian SSR of an organ for constitutional oversight which would act as a constitutional court; and so on.

Elections in the Ukrainian SSR should be held according to the principle of universal, equal, and direct electoral rights, with secret balloting on a choice of candidates.

The legislative process in the Ukrainian SSR should emanate from the primacy of universal human values, the rule of law as a guarantee of equal rights for all individuals, and the primacy of local authorities in the resolution of issues relegated to their competence.

Rukh will seek the genuine separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

6. Rukh advocates the realization of constitutional reform in the Soviet Union whereby the USSR will become a union of genuinely sovereign states governed by the principle of the complete equality of all its constituent parts. A new Union treaty should be the juridical basis of this Union.

...

### *The Economy*

1. Rukh will promote the economic rebirth of Ukraine, the growth of the prosperity of its people, and the creation of a humane, balanced, and efficient economy.

Rukh will seek the revitalization of the economy of Ukraine, which is characterized by a flawed, colonial-type production structure, a lack of balance, production methods that are increasingly disproportional and irrational, and disproportion in the across-the-board development of the economy of the districts (the cities), the regions, and sections of the country, as well as of the republic as a whole. It will also strive for a reorientation of the economy from its current emphasis on raw materials, fuels, and energy to high-technology production designed to serve the goal of satisfying human needs.

2. Rukh believes that only with the dismantling of the command economic system and the establishment of the economic sovereignty of the republic will it be possible to overcome the economic crisis and to secure prosperity and unfettered, all-dimensional human development. The only alternative to bureaucratic high-handedness is to have Ukraine switch to economic accountability whereby the people of Ukraine would have the legal right to appropriate the results of their labour and be the masters on their own land.

In order to achieve this goal, the republic must be freed from the dictates of the centre and from the rule of Union organs on its territory, as well as of the numerous ministries and agencies. The economy must be freed from all the shackles that fetter the initiative of labour collectives, individual workers, districts, regions, and sections of the country and that undermine their desire to work more productively, more efficiently, and more effectively and to exploit resources rationally.

3. Rukh condemns the immoral and counterproductive management practised by institutional monopolies and considers it a manifestation of economic separatism, a threat to the economic integrity of Ukraine, a usurpation of the rights of Ukraine's people, and incompatible with the principles of the federative structure of the USSR.

Rukh believes that overcoming the separation of workers from ownership of the means of production and from the output produced by these means is the pivotal issue in the economic sphere. The resolution of this question is tied to the privatization of the means of production (a certain portion), the decentralization of administration, the democratization of economic life, and the granting to workers and farmers of the right to dispose freely of the results of their labour.

The guarantee of a continuous rise in the standard of living should be an economic system based on a variety of forms of ownership enjoying equal rights – state, cooperative, individual, equity, private, and mixed – and on the liquidation of the agency system of management.

The economic sovereignty of the republic should be secured by endowing it with political freedom; by the establishment of a new system of production relations based on a republican form of ownership; and by engaging not only enterprises, associations, and their internal economic subdivisions (guilds, brigades, sectors, and subsectors) but also cities, districts, sections of the country (Podillia, Galicia, Volhynia, Tavria, Bukovyna, Polissia, et al.) and the republic as a whole in the sphere of active management on the basis of economic accountability.

The republic should enjoy the constitutionally confirmed right of the people of Ukraine to ownership of the land, its mineral wealth, its waters, its forests, all its natural resources, its air space, the continental shelf, factories, plants, mines, electric power stations, and all the wealth that is created and is located on the territory of the republic.

The right to choose forms of ownership and management should belong exclusively to the Ukrainian SSR.

The transfer of individual industrial, transport, and other enterprises for use by Union agencies should be based on negotiated agreements.

4. Rukh is in favour of economic independence for Ukraine, the fundamental principles of which are

- independence in matters of economic legislation, pricing, finances, credit, circulation of currency, wages and salaries, foreign economic activity, etc.;
- independent planning and self-financing of Ukraine's social and industrial/technological development;
- direct correlation between the standard of living in Ukraine and its sections and the fruits of its workers' labour;
- complete economic accountability by all independent economic units, with state regulation of their production activity conducted with the help of economic levers. The activity of enterprises can be subject to limits of a historical, demographic, or ecological nature only ...

### *Social Justice*

1. The humanization of society is one of the most important tasks of Rukh. Rukh is in favour of introducing in the Ukrainian SSR a system of guarantees for the realization of the socio-economic rights of citizens, as proclaimed by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.

Rukh will strive to enable every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to realize his capabilities by receiving just remuneration for his labour, socially beneficial ideas, innovative technological decisions, and enterprise.

2. Rukh supports the right of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR to choose freely their place of residence and a place for applying their energies and capabilities. Rukh also defends the right of social mobility and equal initial opportunities for members of various social strata.

3. Rukh believes that an economically justified minimum living income must be established in the republic, with the regular publication of data on this minimum respecting the income of various groups in the population and price indices. A system of compensation for inflation increases should be introduced in the republic. Pensioners and people with incomes lower than the poverty level should receive supplements to bring them up to this level.

4. Rukh states that a renewed society should be one in which all citizens enjoy equal rights, where there are no overt or covert class privileges and benefits based on *nomenklatura* [the ruling elite] status. Rukh supports the liquidation of the very category of *nomenklatura* workers. Appointments to all positions should be made exclusively on a competitive basis and according to professional competence.

Rukh will struggle systematically and implacably against the acquisition of wealth through illegal, non-labour means, first of all against the activity of mafia groups, and against social conditions that favour the formation of a separate social class aspiring to the monopolistic division of wealth and power.

5. Rukh considers it necessary to introduce in the Ukrainian SSR an independent system of social insurance, care and charity work, and material security for old age, taking into account the growth of the economic potential of the republic resulting from new management methods and the transition to economic accountability.

Rukh will demand the eradication of the unacceptable social inequality that exists among certain localities of the republic, between administrative centres and the periphery.

...

### *The Ecology*

1. Rukh believes that the actualization of a people's right to a sound environment is the most important factor in safeguarding the physical and moral health of a people. To ensure a rational exploitation of the natural resources in the republic and the protection of the environment in Ukraine, a concept and a state program of measures for ecological safety should be formulated. Rukh considers it essential that constitutional and other judi-

cial guarantees be developed for the protection of a sound environment for the people of Ukraine.

2. Rukh insists on a fundamental review of energy policy in Ukraine and demands that the construction of new units at existing nuclear power stations be halted, and that the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Station, as well as all RBMK-type nuclear reactors located in Ukraine, be shut down and dismantled as structurally flawed. Alternative, ecologically safe technologies for utilizing energy sources should be introduced in the republic, together with the expansion of the network of 'secondary energy sources.'

The entire population of Ukraine (the Kiev, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, in particular) should be medically examined to determine its state of health following the Chornobyl disaster. Long-term monitoring must be set up and the entire program provided with all the necessary personnel and vital foreign equipment.

Rukh seeks and will promote the development of a program of rehabilitation for the population suffering from the effects of the Chornobyl disaster. Furthermore, it will demand from relevant ministries and agencies of the USSR full compensation for losses suffered by the people and the republican economic complex.

3. Rukh feels that final decisions concerning the completion of large-scale projects in the hydroelectric, chemical industry, energy, metallurgy, and other sectors should be approved only after consultations with competent experts and subsequent public discussion and, when necessary, following a referendum.

4. Rukh demands that the construction of ecologically unsafe enterprises in densely populated zones and areas of industrial saturation be halted ...

...

### *The Nationality Question*

1. Rukh considers one of its most important tasks the democratic and just resolution of those problems that concern the existence and development of the Ukrainian people and the safeguarding of its equality with other peoples, as well as the fulfillment of the national needs of the Belorussians, Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, Germans, Greeks, Gypsies, Hungarians, Jews, Moldavians, Poles, Russians, Slovaks, and other nationalities that reside in the republic.

Rukh believes that the right of a nation to self-determination and the right to national-cultural autonomy for those ethnic groups and national



minorities that reside in the republic should be the juridical principles of a nationalities policy in Ukraine.

2. Rukh understands the national question in Ukraine as the foundation of the existence and development of the Ukrainian nation and of ethnic groups and national minorities, and of their integration into a single society in the republic, the core of which is the people who have given their name to the national state.

The national and the international can exist undeformed only in indivisible unity. There is no true internationalism where national rights and interests are ignored. And there is no genuine patriotism where only narrow national rights and interests are considered.

3. The drawing together and mutual enrichment of nations have nothing in common with their forcible 'fusion,' assimilation, denationalization, and obliteration. Nations, as subjects of social life, make up universal human civilization.

Rukh considers all kinds of artificial, forcible methods of integrating nations a crime against humanity and an attack on the spiritual wealth and variety of the universal human community.

4. In the opinion of Rukh, the state of national existence in Ukraine is critical. The very existence of the Ukrainian nation and its statehood is threatened. All necessary foundations for the national existence of the Ukrainians – political, socio-economic, cultural, and ecological – have been gravely damaged. The threat of extinction hangs over the ethnic identity of members of other peoples in Ukraine.

Rukh expects that Russians living in the republic will become a genuine base of support for the contemporary Ukrainian national rebirth. While respecting the Russian language and culture and the historical affinity between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, Rukh believes that the Russians can evolve as an independent segment of the society of the republic under conditions of the full flowering of the Ukrainian nation. Any other path will lead to disastrous consequences for both peoples.

Historical circumstances were such that Ukraine became the cradle of a new Jewish culture, with Jews contributing greatly to the development of many spheres of life of the Ukrainian people. Rukh supports the rebirth of the Jewish community in Ukraine and its cultural-national autonomy and rejects anti-Semitism.

Rukh believes that the major responsibility for the fate of all the national minorities of Ukraine and their independent development rests with the Ukrainians and with the largest national groups living in the republic, i.e. the Russians and the Jews.

5. With respect to the nationality question, Rukh postulates that

- the nationality factor is a mighty engine of social progress, particularly in a multinational country;

- nations are the basic units of human civilization, human communities with a historical future. National diversity is the foundation of the multifarious development of humanity, of its vitality and endurance, and that their unfettered development is the guarantee of civilization;

- a higher level of maturity for a nation is national statehood. Only under conditions of political, economic, and cultural sovereignty is the free development of nations possible. The preservation of a nation is guaranteed under conditions of the coordinated development of the political-state, socio-economic, cultural, and ecological aspects of existence;

- the actualization of the gamut of national rights of the various ethnic groups residing in Ukraine is inseparable from their comprehension of the fact that the Ukrainian nation holds the status of the historical master in the republic. Ukraine is the only territory in the world where the full-value existence and development of the Ukrainian *ethnos* are possible;

- an important integrating factor in ethnic communities is language and national consciousness. A national language is the foundation and the primary source of a culture, the basis of the national existence of a people, and a universal human value. When a national language dies, the people perish as a nation.

In advocating respect for national dignity and rejecting national nihilism, Rukh considers the propaganda of racial and national exclusivity and chauvinistic and nationalistic views incompatible with its principles.

### *Culture, Language, Learning*

1. Rukh will strive for the integrity and continuity of the development of national cultures and will oppose the vulgarizing reduction of those goals to an ideology and the simplistic division of national cultures into progressive and reactionary.

As a result of tsarist colonial policies and the subsequent gross violations of the universal human principles of national existence in Stalinist and Brezhnevite times, the destruction of a significant part of the creative and the scientific Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the artificial narrowing of the sphere of utilization of the Ukrainian language, the culture of the Ukrainian people lost its integrity, its developmental processes were destroyed, and the cultural continuity between generations was broken. Today, the

Ukrainian people are faced with the necessity of the rebirth of the national culture and the comprehensive development of the Ukrainian language, the distinguishing factor in the existence of the nation.

2. The issue of a cultural rebirth in Ukraine can be resolved successfully only through the affirmation of the statehood of the Ukrainian people. Rukh defends the right of the indigenous people of the republic to preserve on its ethnic territory its historical way of life, culture, language, and distinct identity.

Rukh favours the development of the national cultures and languages of all nationalities residing in Ukraine. The members of all national groups should have a genuine opportunity to create cultural autonomy. It is their right to open schools with their native language as the language of instruction, to form societies and organizations of their compatriots, to have their own theatres and press, and to propagate the spiritual values of their people. Rukh will seek the concrete actualization of this right.

3. Rukh is convinced that genuinely amicable relations among peoples can be attained only on the basis of shared respect for the culture, language, history, and traditions of every people. Rukh will encourage closer communication among the citizens of the republic on the basis of cultural interest and will help members of various nationalities join the common process of creating spiritual and material values on the territory of Ukraine.

4. Rukh will seek affirmation of the cultural sovereignty of Ukraine and the decentralization of cultural life in the republic. The question of the culture of Ukraine should be strictly the prerogative of the republic.

Rukh will promote the rebirth of a genuinely scholarly study of the history of Ukraine and of the history of its education, culture, and science, and the genuine renewal of the popular oral tradition (in all its myriad forms), rituals and customs, folk teachings and medicine, agronomy and horticulture. Cultural policy must be directed so as to aid the rebirth of local cultural centres in order to eradicate the opposition between the centre and the periphery with regard to the level of development and intensity of cultural life.

It is necessary to see to the study of the history and main principles of national ethnopedagogy and the introduction of their basic elements into the process of upbringing and education. The methods and the methodology of teaching the entire cycle of humanities in the high schools as an integral system which secures the succession of the principles of world-view, ethics, and aesthetics that are peculiar to the Ukrainian people require study and development.

Rukh assumes the responsibility for ensuring the development of a network of courses in the Ukrainian language and Sunday schools where the history of Ukrainian culture would be studied and propagated.

A plan for the development of Ukrainian culture, prepared with the participation of Rukh, is to be presented to the public for discussion.

5. Rukh supports the idea of free and direct cultural, scholarly, and athletic cooperation with all countries of the world and with all international organizations. Rukh is in favour of forming the closest possible contacts with Ukrainians abroad and considers such activity to be the pledge of the indivisibility of the Ukrainian people and their culture. The cultural achievements of Ukrainians living abroad are an important element of the national culture and should be widely utilized in cultural development in Ukraine.

6. Rukh believes that the openness of Ukrainian culture, its receptiveness to all the spiritual achievements of mankind, and its inclusion in the universal cultural process is an important prerequisite for a genuine national renaissance.

7. Rukh is convinced that rights to national-cultural autonomy should be bestowed also upon those Ukrainians living outside the borders of the republic in the USSR – in the Kuban, Stavropol, the Don River region, Moldavia, Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East, Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities and areas. The fulfillment of their spiritual needs should be the state responsibility of the republican government and its civic and creative organizations and associations, as well as of Union institutions and the governments of other republics.

8. Rukh will seek the establishment of a system of national education in Ukraine. Learning and upbringing in school should be organized in complete accord with the political, economic, ecological and cultural interests of the republic. Schools are the property of the republic, and the educational process should be carried out according to plans and programs formulated in the republic on democratic principles.

Urgent measures must be adopted for rescuing preschool training, public education, and the entire cultural-educational sector from the grave crisis and condition of extreme impoverishment they are now in. Schools should be fully computerized. Institutions of higher education should be reformed, and their autonomy, as well as the self-management of the faculty and the student body and an improvement in the quality of teaching, should be secured.

9. Rukh is cognizant of the close interdependence of the material wealth of the republic and the level of development of culture and believes that the

development of a national culture requires significantly more favourable economic conditions and financial support from the state. Rukh insists that the practice of subsidizing culture with nothing but leftover funds be abolished.

...

14. The question of the Ukrainian language is one of particular concern for Rukh. As a result of a perverted nationalities policy and Russification, the Ukrainian language has been forced out of almost every vital sphere of social activity. Its return to its rightful place requires great efforts on the part of the state and the broad support of the public.

Rukh believes that the first step towards resolving the problems of national-cultural rebirth should be to endow the Ukrainian language with the status of the state language of the Ukrainian SSR. In striving towards this goal, Rukh insists that the state, through legislative and practical means, secure the renewal and affirmation of the functioning of the Ukrainian language in the areas of state, Party, and civic activity, science and culture, production, office management, jurisprudence, information, data-processing, communications, and secondary and higher education and in preschool facilities.

A comprehensive state program for the development of the Ukrainian language should be developed and introduced in the Ukrainian SSR.

...

### *Ethics*

1. In order to develop and build its future, a society should be cognizant of the primacy of universal values over the ethics and morality of classes and groups. A morally healthy universal human community is created only by conscious and civilized nations. Adherence to universal human moral principles is possible only in a society where every person has a sense of national allegiance and dignity. Rukh recognizes that the moral renewal of the individual is an extremely important link in the process of restructuring.

2. Rukh supports the moral rebirth of Ukrainian society according to universal human ideals through the spiritual essence of a people and its healthy traditions, which have been characterized by love of freedom and the capacity for self-sacrifice for the good and honour of the people.

3. The aim of Rukh is to promote the rebirth of the individual as a morally responsible person, citizen, and master who is convinced that the norms of his life in society should be such virtues as a sense of human dig-

nity, duty, and justice; respect for people and for all nations and nationalities; truthfulness; conscientiousness; nobility and industriousness; civic activism and courage; charity and mercy.

4. Rukh is in favour of the subordination of politics to moral principles. The individual and the people are not the means but the goal of all political activity.

5. Rukh rejects violence in all forms and injustice and arbitrariness on the part of organs of power and denounces the use of terror against citizens, social groups, and nations, considering it a crime against mankind and humaneness.

...

### *Religion*

1. In Ukraine, religion has been an important source of spirituality, ethics, and morals. Throughout the ages it has consecrated Ukrainian national-liberation struggles as the people's will to life and provided a moral-legal justification for these struggles. Religion also served as the basis of the platform of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius in the nineteenth century. Religious centres were the bastions of Ukrainian literature and culture. Religion ensured the Christian basis of the family, family morals, and tradition.

Rukh will strive for the unfettered fulfillment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience for religious communities of all denominations in Ukraine, and for the normalization of the legal status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which were destroyed in Stalinist times. The normalization of the status of these churches should proceed according to the principles of international law and, specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2. Rukh advocates a review of all illegal acts committed by the state against the church and of violations of its rights since the establishment of the Ukrainian SSR.

3. Rukh advocates the normalization of the status of the church in society and the concrete protection of the right of the church to conduct its own affairs according to its own internal laws.

4. Rukh advocates the genuine separation of church and state and the state's abnegation of organized atheist propaganda and recognizes the equal right of believers and atheists to defend their convictions. Neither

the state nor any individuals or societies or institutions have the right to impose upon any person a world-view that is alien to him or to force him to act contrary to the dictates of his conscience.

...  
8. Rukh believes that the instigation of hostilities among the people on a religious basis is not to be tolerated.

### *Health Care and Sports*

1. Rukh asserts that the state of medicine and national health care in Ukraine is unsatisfactory. The nation's better specimens (physically, morally, and intellectually) have been destroyed. Owing to the Stalinist repressions and wars, to an aggressively extensive approach to the economy, and to the destructive impact of the Chornobyl disaster, the genetic bank of the people has been severely damaged. A constant imbalance in the national diet (with respect to both quantity and quality), together with significant contamination of foodstuffs with harmful additives, poses a catastrophic danger to the health of today's and future generations. Under these conditions, a radical improvement in health care in Ukraine is an urgent necessity.

2. The system of health care requires fundamental restructuring and complete decentralization. Local councils should determine the structure, profile, and financing of the organs of health care in the localities.

3. Rukh advocates a significant strengthening of the material base of health care and an increase in monetary appropriations for the acquisition of imported medical equipment and medicines.

4. Rukh advocates the creation of medical institutions of the cooperative, private, and insurance type, alongside state institutions and those financed by charity. Rukh considers indispensable the renewal of folk medicine traditions raised to contemporary scientific levels and the creation of a public centre of folk medicine in the republic.

...

### **Final Propositions**

In designating as its goal the building of a democratic society in Ukraine, Rukh recognizes that continued social progress may contribute to a change in Rukh's position and function as a civic-political entity. In such a case, Rukh, with the approval of its all-Ukrainian assembly, can terminate its

activity, as designated by its Charter, and other civic entities in the socio-political life of Ukraine can assume its mandate.

This program was approved by the Founding Congress of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine.

*Translated by Marta Olynyk*

9 September 1989



## Constitution of Ukraine: Draft

(Submitted by the Constitutional Commission of the Parliament of Ukraine after additional consideration as a result of public discussion)

(excerpts)

*Together with later submissions, the draft of Ukraine's Constitution dating from May 1993 was long debated by the Ukrainian parliament. The sections of that draft reprinted here, and edited by us from the June 1993 official English translation, deal with guarantees of political freedoms the Ukrainians had never possessed. They emphasize human rights, liberties, and the rule of law, by which all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality or religion, will be protected. They illustrate amply the legitimate fear of the re-emergence of a Soviet-style regime. At the same time the proposed draft shows some fear of a capitalist system in its providing for full employment, housing, and health protection. Much attention is given to the definition of judiciary and legislative powers. All in all, today's Ukrainian nation-state displays in its proposed Constitution, which to our knowledge is not radically different from the final draft, a nationalism tempered by humanism and a concern with the ideal of a civil society.*

### THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| EXPRESSING  | their sovereign will,   |
| RELYING     | on the centuries of the history of Ukrainian national state building,             |
| RECOGNIZING | the freedom and the natural rights of the individual as the highest social value, |
| STRIVING    | for the preservation and strengthening of social harmony,                         |
| FOSTERING   | the growth and development of civic society,                                      |
| DESIRING    | to live freely in a democratic, rule-of-law state,                                |

GUIDED	by the Act of the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine of 24 August 1991, confirmed by the nation-wide referendum of 1 December 1991,
CONSCIOUS	of the responsibility before present and future generations,
ADOPT	this Constitution and declare it to be the <b>Fundamental Law of Ukraine.</b>

## Part I: General Principles of the Constitutional Order

Article 1. The constitutional order of Ukraine is based on the recognition of the individual; of the individual's life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and safety as the highest social value; and of the priorities of the individual's rights and liberties.

The establishment and ensuring of the rights and freedoms of the individual is the principal responsibility of the state.

The state is responsible to the individual and society for its actions.

Article 2. Ukraine is a democratic, rule-of-law, and social state.

Article 3. Ukraine is a republic. All power in Ukraine belongs to the people.

The Ukrainian people, who consist in the citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, is the only source of power and self-governance.

The power of the people (the sovereignty of the people) is exercised on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine directly and through the system of state organs and the bodies of local self-governance.

State power is exercised according to the principle of its division into legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The unity of state power is guaranteed by the coordinated action of all powers.

Each power, in fulfilling its functions, acts within the set framework of the Constitution.

The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine, within the framework of the Constitution of Ukraine, has the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the people of Ukraine.

No segment of the people, no political party, civic organization, or other grouping or individual person, can appropriate the right to exercise state power.

Article 4. The Constitution recognizes and guarantees local self-governance. The relations between the bodies of state power and those of local self-governance are regulated by law.

Article 5. The elections to state organs and bodies of local self-governance provided by the Constitution of Ukraine are free and are held regularly and on the basis of universal, equal, and direct election rights by a secret ballot.

Voters shall be guaranteed the right freely to express their will.

Article 6. Ukraine adheres to the principle of the supremacy of law on which this Constitution is based.

The Constitution has the supreme judicial power. Norms of the Constitution are the norms of direct actions. Laws and other legal acts should not contradict the Constitution and constitutional laws of Ukraine.

The citizens of Ukraine exercise their rights in accordance with the principle that 'everything that is not prohibited is permitted.'

The state bodies, bodies of local self-government, and officials exercise their powers in accordance with the principle that 'only that which is stipulated by law is permitted.'

Article 7. The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.

In areas of dense concentration of one or several national groups, along with the state language one may also use, as an official language in state bodies, organizations, and institutions, the accepted language of the majority of the population of the particular area.

Article 8. The state encourages the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation and its historical consciousness, traditions, and cultures, and the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities of all the national minorities.

Ukraine fosters the satisfaction of the national-cultural, spiritual, and linguistic needs of Ukrainians who are living beyond the borders of the state.

Article 9. Social life in Ukraine is based on the principles of political, economic, and ideological pluralism.

The equal right of citizens and public associations to participate in the affairs of the state and politics shall be guaranteed in Ukraine.

The law shall guarantee to all the equality of various forms of ownership and forms of entrepreneurship, and the social orientation of the economy.

No ideology shall limit freedom of conviction, opinion, and thought or be recognized as the official state ideology.

Article 10. The territory of Ukraine is one, inviolable, and indivisible.

Article 11. Ukraine recognizes the primacy of universal human values and respects universally accepted principles of international law.

The foreign policy of Ukraine is aimed at ensuring its national interests and security through the maintenance of peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with the members of the international community on the basis of strict adherence to the principles of respect for state sovereignty and sovereign equality; of the non-use of force or threat of force; of the inviolability of state borders and the territorial integrity of the state; of non-interference in internal affairs; of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; of cooperation between states; of the diligent fulfillment of international obligations; and of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Duly ratified or adopted and officially published international treaties entered into by Ukraine shall comprise part of its legislation and are binding on all governmental organs, legal bodies, and physical persons.

Article 12. The citizens of Ukraine shall have the right to resist and oppose all who attempt forcibly to destroy Ukrainian statehood, to destroy the democratic constitutional order established by this Constitution, to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine, or to undertake actions aimed at seizing state power.

## **Part II: Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Individuals and Citizens**

### *Chapter 1. General Principles*

Article 13. All people are born free and equal in their dignity and rights. The natural rights and freedoms of the individual are inalienable.

Article 14. The rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, confirmed under this Constitution, are not exhaustive and constitute the basis for any other individual rights and freedoms.

Constitutional rights and freedoms cannot be revoked.

Article 15. The citizens of Ukraine have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law regardless of their origin, social and

economic status, office, sex, race, nationality, language, religion, political and other convictions, occupation, place of residence, participation in citizens' affiliations, and other circumstances.

No one shall use benefits and privileges not established by law.

The exercise by an individual of the individual's rights and freedoms shall not violate the rights and freedoms of other persons.

Article 16. All persons shall have the right to preserve and defend their national heritage.

## *Chapter 2. Citizenship*

Article 17. A single citizenship is established in Ukraine.

A citizen of Ukraine may not be stripped of citizenship or of the right to renounce Ukrainian citizenship.

The grounds for acquiring and losing Ukrainian citizenship are defined by the constitutional law on citizenship of Ukraine.

Article 18. A citizen of Ukraine may not be expelled from its borders or extradited to a foreign state.

Article 19. Ukraine guarantees to its citizens care and protection beyond its borders.

Article 20. The legal status of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship within the territory of Ukraine shall be defined by law.

Foreign citizens and persons without citizenship may be granted political asylum.

## *Chapter 3. Civic and Political Rights*

Article 21. Every individual has an inalienable right to life and cannot be arbitrarily deprived of it.

The law shall protect the life of the individual from any illegal encroachments.

Every individual has the right to defend his or her life and the life of other persons by all legal means from any illegal encroachments.

Capital punishment, until its complete abolition, may be used in accordance with the law as an exceptional method of punishment for intentional murders and only by a verdict of the court.

Article 22. Every individual has the right to freedom, inviolability of person, and respect for his or her dignity.

Arrest, detainment in custody, or any other restriction of personal freedom in any form whatsoever shall not be permissible except on the basis of a motivated decision of the court or a procurator's sanction, which can be appealed to the court, and shall be permissible only in cases foreseen by law.

In urgent cases, conditioned by the necessity to prevent or stop criminal acts, authorized bodies may detain suspects and, within twenty-four hours, must notify a justice of the peace.

If the justice of the peace, within the next twenty-four hours, does not make a motivated decision to detain in custody, the detainee shall be immediately released.

Every detained or arrested individual must be informed immediately of the reasons for his or her detention or arrest and be advised of his or her rights.

Article 23. No one may be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

No individual may, without his or her free consent, be subjected to medical, scientific, or other experiments.

Article 24. Every individual is guaranteed inviolability of dwelling. Invasion of the dwelling or other premises of an individual, and the conducting of a search and examination of it, is not permitted except by a motivated decision of the court.

In urgent cases, involving the direct pursuit of persons suspected of the commission of a crime, or involving the rescue of life and property, other procedures may be established by law for the invasion of a dwelling or other premises of the individual or the search and examination of them.

Article 25. Every individual shall be guaranteed privacy of written correspondence, telephone conversations, telegram and other correspondence. Exceptions may be allowed only by decision of the court or by procurator's sanction in the attempt to prevent crimes or to determine the truth during investigation and review of criminal cases.

Article 26. The citizens of Ukraine are guaranteed freedom of movement and free choice of residency, except for limitations set by law in the interests of the protection of health, the control of epidemics, protection from natural disasters, and crime prevention.

Every citizen has the right to leave freely the territory of Ukraine and to return to it after complying with duties stipulated by law.

Article 27. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary intrusion into his or her private and family life.

It is not permissible to gather, keep, use, or disseminate confidential information about any person without his or her consent.

Every individual shall be guaranteed judicial protection of his or her rights to disprove non-credible information and to seek compensation for material and moral damage caused by the publicizing or use of such information.

Article 28. Each individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes the freedom to confess a religion, to change one's religion, and to participate, individually or collectively, without any interference, in religious cults and rites, and to conduct religious or atheistic activity.

It is unlawful to demand from the clergy disclosure of information obtained in the confessional.

No one shall be exempt from discharging his or her duties to the state or shall refuse to obey laws on the basis of religious beliefs, except with respect to the performance of military duty. In cases where the performance of military duty is contrary to the religious beliefs of a citizen, this duty shall be replaced with alternative (non-military) service.

Article 29. Every individual has the right to freedom of speech, and the free expression of views and convictions in any form.

Every individual has the right freely, regardless of state borders, to seek, obtain, record, preserve, use, and disseminate information in oral, written, printed, or any other form of his or her choice.

An abridgment of this right shall be stipulated only by law and shall be only for the purpose of protecting state or other legally protected secrets as well as the rights and freedoms of other individuals.

Article 30. Every citizen has the right, in accordance with procedures established by law, to gain access to information about himself or herself and to gain access to any information in state organs and institutions, and in local self-governance bodies, which pertains to his or her rights and interests and which is not a state or other legally protected secret.

Article 31. The citizens of Ukraine have the right to freedom of association for the realization and protection of their rights and freedoms and the satisfaction of their economic, political, social, cultural, or other interests.

No one may be forced to join an association or have his or her rights abridged or gain privileges because of an affiliation or non-affiliation.

Citizens do not have the right to form associations in the cases stipulated by Article 86 of this Constitution.

Article 32. Citizens have the right to elect freely and to be elected to appropriate state organs or local self-governance bodies on the basis of universal, equal, direct election rights by secret ballot.

Article 33. Every citizen has the right to participate in the consideration of social and state matters either directly or through his or her representatives elected to governing bodies. The direct participation of citizens in the administration of social and state affairs is realized by referendums, by general discussions of draft legislation and of important questions of state and local affairs, by participation in the work of local self-governance bodies, and by other methods stipulated by law.

Article 34. The right of the citizens of Ukraine to assemble peacefully without weapons and to conduct assemblies, rallies, marches, and demonstrations is recognized.

State organs or local self-governance bodies shall be notified concerning the holding of assemblies, rallies, and demonstrations in public places.

The law establishes requirements for procedures for the realization of this right in order to ensure public order, security, and the rights and freedoms of other individuals.

Article 35. Every citizen of Ukraine who has the right to vote may exercise an equal right to hold state office and also offices in bodies of self-governance.

The qualifications and other requirements of candidates for the respective positions are established by law. The filling of these positions as a rule is carried out on a competitive basis.

Article 36. All have the right to send individual and collective written petitions to state organs, to local self-governance bodies, and to their officials regarding proposals for improvement of their activity and criticisms of shortcomings in their work.



State agencies, local self-governance bodies, and their officials must review the petitions of citizens, give judicially motivated replies within periods prescribed by law, and take necessary measures regarding same.

Prosecution for criticism is punishable by law.

#### *Chapter 4. Economic, Social, Ecological and Cultural Rights*

**Article 37.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to private property, that is, the right to own, use, and manage their property, means of production, and natural resources, which belong to them pursuant to laws in effect, and the results of their intellectual work.

No one in any circumstances may be illegally deprived of his or her property.

The exercise of the right of ownership by citizens must not violate the rights of other individuals.

The inviolability of private property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed by law and secured by judicial protection.

Every individual has the right to protect his or her property by all legal means.

**Article 38.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to use publicly owned natural and other objects to meet their needs in accordance with the laws of Ukraine.

**Article 39.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to entrepreneurial activity that is not banned by law and that is directed at obtaining profits.

The conduct of entrepreneurial activity is prohibited for deputies of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine; deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Republic of Crimea and oblast (land) radas; officials of state executive organs, local self-governance bodies, the judiciary, the procuracy, the investigation service, the security service, and internal affairs; and military personnel.

**Article 40.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to the work which they freely choose or agree to.

The state shall create conditions for the full employment of the able-bodied population and for equal opportunities for citizens to choose trades and occupations and shall realize programs for the vocational training and retraining of workers.

Every employer shall secure working conditions which meet safety and

hygiene requirements and are not harmful. Appropriate working standards are established by law.

The use of forced labour is prohibited. Military service, alternate non-military service, or work or service performed by an individual according to a court verdict or in accordance with laws regarding a state of emergency or of war is not considered forced labour.

Remuneration shall not be lower than the minimum level set by the state in consultation with trade unions and shall ensure a minimum living standard for an employee and his or her family which corresponds to the scientifically based physiological and social-cultural needs of the human being.

Every individual is guaranteed protection from unlawful dismissal from work and material support not below the minimum living standard in the case of unemployment caused by factors beyond the individual's control.

Article 41. The citizens of Ukraine shall have the right to rest and leisure.

The maximum number of work hours and minimum time of rest as well as annual paid leave and other basic provisions for the realization of this right shall be *stipulated by law*.

Article 42. The right of employees to strike is recognized for the purposes of defending the collective economic and social rights and interests of the citizens of Ukraine.

Strikes shall not be permitted if they directly endanger human lives and public health.

No one shall be forced to participate in a strike.

Any restriction of the rights of or any persecution of an employee or any dismissal for participation in a strike held in conformity with the law shall be prohibited.

Judges; personnel of the state administration, the procuracy, the preliminary investigation services, the communication and transportation services, the security services, and internal affairs; and military servicemen are prohibited from striking.

Article 43. The citizens of Ukraine shall have the right to social security in old age; in the case of disease, full or partial disability, handicap, accident, loss of the principal wage earner, and unemployment for reasons beyond their control; and in other cases stipulated by law.

This right shall be guaranteed by mandatory state social insurance through insurance contributions by state and private institutions, budget, or other sources of social security.

Pensions and other forms of social assistance which are primary sources of existence shall ensure living standards for individuals not lower than the minimum living standard established by law.

**Article 44.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to housing.

The state and local self-governance bodies shall provide housing construction, encourage and support private housing construction, and create other conditions for the realization of the right to housing.

Individuals requiring social protection shall be provided with a dwelling free of charge or at rates affordable to them through government, municipal, or other housing funds in accordance with the norms set by law.

No one shall be deprived of housing illegally, and such deprivation shall be only by court decision.

**Article 45.** The citizens of Ukraine have the right to health protection.

Health protection shall be provided by the governmental financing of the specific socio-economic, medical-sanitary, and recuperative prophylactic programs and the broadening of the network of state and municipal medical institutions and enterprises.

Private medical institutions may be formed in accordance with law.

In state and municipal health protection institutions, medical care is provided free of charge through budgetary allocations, insurance contributions, and other sources.

**Article 46.** The citizens of Ukraine shall have the right to education.

General and free access to elementary, general secondary, and vocational secondary education in state and municipal educational institutions is guaranteed.

The level of compulsory education shall be set by law.

The state shall provide free of charge higher education for children from lower-income families and orphans, and shall provide them with state scholarships.

**Article 47.** Every individual has the right to an environment, food supplies, and household items which are ecologically safe for life and health.

The law guarantees each individual the right to free access to reliable information about the environment, about living and working conditions, and about the quality of food supplies and household items, as well as the right to disseminate of such information.

The concealment or intentional fabrication of information by officials

regarding situations that may cause harm to human health is punishable by law.

Article 48. The citizens of Ukraine shall be guaranteed freedom of scientific, artistic, technological, lecturing, or other creative activities and research, and general access to reserves of national and world science and culture which are maintained by public funds.

### *Chapter 5. Guarantees of Rights and Freedoms*

Article 49. The citizens of Ukraine shall be guaranteed equal protection under the law.

All rights and freedoms of persons and citizens are protected by the judiciary.

Every individual has the right to respond by lawful means to violations of his or her rights and freedoms.

Article 50. The right of every individual to know his or her rights and duties is guaranteed. For this purpose, the state, within a term established by law, shall publish and make accessible all laws and normative acts.

Laws and other normative acts which have not been publicized in due course are deemed invalid and shall not be implemented or enforced.

Article 51. No one shall be forced to obey clearly criminal instructions or orders even under conditions of martial or emergency law.

The issuance or execution of obviously criminal instructions or orders shall carry legal accountability.

Article 52. The legal accountability of the individual has an individual basis.

No one shall be prosecuted twice for the same offence.

Article 53. The principle of the presumption of innocence is guaranteed.

The individual shall be presumed innocent until his or her guilt is established through a legal procedure and is confirmed by a guilty sentence by the court, which has the force of law.

No one must prove his or her innocence.

An accusation may not be grounded on illegally acquired evidence or suspicions. All doubts are interpreted in favour of the suspected, arrested, or accused person.

No one may be subjected to criminal punishment by any means other than a court verdict.

If a court verdict is vacated as unlawful, the state must compensate those affected by means of a decision for material and moral damages.

**Article 54.** An individual bears no responsibility for a refusal to testify or give a statement against himself or herself, or against a family member or close relative, whose degree of relation is set by law.

A suspect, accused or indicted, has the right to a defence; to an attorney or other qualified legal assistance; to become acquainted with those documents regarding his or her indictment and/or investigation; to confront those witnesses testifying against him or her; to subpoena witnesses and to call expert testimony; to become acquainted with questions put to expert witnesses; to question expert witnesses; and to acquire written conclusions regarding them.

A suspect, accused or indicted, has also other guarantees set by law.

**Article 55.** An individual found guilty by a court is entitled to all rights of the individual and citizen, with the exception of those restrictions resulting from the sentence of the court and the laws which regulate its execution.

The state guarantees humane treatment of incarcerated individuals in places of detention and is responsible for their security.

**Article 56.** Law cannot be retroactive, except when it improves the situation or reduces or revokes the accountability of the individual.

No one may be prosecuted for actions which, at the time of their commission, were not recognized as offences. If, after an unlawful act was committed, the penalty for it is repealed or mitigated by a new law, the new law applies.

**Article 57.** Every individual is guaranteed the right to appeal to a court those actions of state organs and local self-governance bodies, of public associations, and of officials, which violate or abridge his or her rights and freedoms.

Every individual shall have the right to compensation by the state or local self-governance bodies for material and moral damages caused by the unlawful actions of state organs and local self-governance bodies or their officials in the course of their duties.

Damages caused as a result of criminal attempts are subject to compen-

sation at the expense of the state in cases where the criminal is unidentified or insolvent.

Article 58. Everyone has the right to legal assistance. In cases set by law, this assistance is provided free of charge.

Every individual detained, taken into custody, or indicted has the right to use the services of a legal counsel from the moment of his or her detention, being taken into custody, or indictment.

Article 59. Constitutional rights and freedoms shall not be restricted, except in cases stipulated by this Constitution and in laws adopted on its basis with the aim of defending the rights and freedoms of other individuals, protecting health, and ensuring public security and social morality.

Such restrictions must be minimal and must correspond with the principles of a democratic society.

In cases of martial law or states of emergency, the rights stipulated by Articles 24, 25, 26, 29, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Constitution can be limited and restricted only for the time period and to the degree which is necessitated by the severity of the given situation.

### *Chapter 6. Principal Duties [of the Individual]*

Article 60. Every individual must fully comply with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and not make attempts on the rights and freedoms, honour and dignity of other individuals.

Ignorance of the law does not exempt an individual from legal responsibility for his or her actions.

Article 61. The defence of the motherland is a duty of every citizen of Ukraine.

The citizens of Ukraine shall perform military service in accordance with the law.

Article 62. Every individual must pay taxes and duties according to procedures and amounts set by law.

Article 63. Every individual must refrain from damaging nature, the historical and cultural heritage, and historical and cultural monuments and must pay compensation for any damage he or she has caused.

### **Part III: Civic Society and the State**

#### *Chapter 7. General Principles*

Article 64. Civic society shall be based on the principles of the freedom and equality of individuals, of self-organization, and of self-regulation.

Article 65. The state shall be subordinated to the service of civil society and shall direct its activity to the securing of equal opportunities for all as a basis of social justice. The state shall serve civil society.

Legal regulation in civil society shall be achieved within the framework established by this Constitution and shall be directed to the ensuring of the interests of the individual.

#### *Chapter 8. Ownership*

Article 66. Ownership in Ukraine shall be private and public.

Private ownership is held by individual citizens, their associations, and worker collectives.

Public ownership shall be state and municipal.

The law guarantees the social function of ownership.

For the purpose of ensuring universal state interests, the law shall establish the complete list of objects of ownership which may be the exclusive property of the state.

Article 67. In Ukraine, in accordance with the law, there may be ownership of objects by foreign states, their citizens, and international organizations.

The right of private ownership of land is granted only to citizens of Ukraine on grounds and within limits stipulated by law.

Article 68. The expropriation of private property can occur only as an exception in cases of social necessity and can be carried out only by the state with prior and full reimbursement of the market value of the property.

The expropriation of private property, with subsequent full reimbursement of its market value, shall be allowed only under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency.

The confiscation of property may take place only in the case, scope, and manner specified by law and only in connection with transgression of the law.

*Chapter 9. Entrepreneurship*

Article 69. The law guarantees freedom of entrepreneurship, agreements, and fair and non-excessive competition.

State organs shall not interfere in the direct economic activity of enterprises except in cases of martial law or a state of emergency.

...

*Chapter 10. Ecological Safety*

Article 73. In Ukraine, the priority of the ecology over the economy is recognized. The state shall pursue an ecological policy aimed at ensuring ecological safety through the reasonable use of nature, the preservation of the environment and the genetic stock of the animal world, and the promotion of the ecological education of the population.

...

*Chapter 12. Education, Science, and Culture*

Article 80. The state shall ensure conditions for the free, universal multifaceted development of education, science, and culture, and for familiarization with the spiritual heritage of the Ukrainian people and world culture and its development.

The law guarantees to all national minorities the right to use and to study in their native language or to study their native language in state educational institutions or through national cultural societies; to develop national cultural traditions; to celebrate national holidays; to profess their faith; to create national cultural and educational institutions; and to perform any other activities in the national and cultural sphere which are not contrary to the law.

Article 81. State and municipal educational, scientific, and cultural institutions shall be independent of political parties and other public associations, and shall have a global character.

...

*Chapter 13. Public Associations*

Article 85. Public associations include political parties, mass movements, labour unions, religious organizations, voluntary associations, foundations, and other non-profit public associations.



The activity of public associations is based on democratic principles and respect for the constitutional rights and freedoms of their members and other individuals, and must satisfy the demands of openness and *glasnost*.

All public associations are equal under the law. No public associations shall have benefits and privileges which are not established by law.

Article 86. The creation and activity of public associations that pursue the goals of changing the constitutional order through force; establishing a totalitarian regime and the dictatorship of any class or party; seizing state power; violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine; undermining its security; creating illegal military formations; warmongering; using violence; inciting national, racial, or religious hatred; and encroaching upon individual rights and freedoms, health, and social morality shall be prohibited.

Public associations may be banned and dissolved only through judicial procedure.

...

Article 89. The law shall defend the right and interests of religious organizations.

All beliefs, religious organizations, and confessions are equal under the law. The establishment of any privileges for or restrictions upon any particular religion, belief, religious organization, or other confession is not permitted.

#### *Chapter 14. Freedom of Information*

Article 90. Freedom of information is guaranteed in Ukraine. The law guarantees equal rights and opportunities to gain access to information.

Article 91. The means of information are independent. The censorship of information is not permitted.

The founders of means of information may be individuals and legal entities.

The monopolization of any form of information is not allowed.

Article 92. The information media shall have the right to obtain any news from state organs, public associations, local self-governance bodies, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials as well as accurate information on their activities.

The information media should truly and realistically present events and fairly reflect diverse points of view on the events.

The use of the mass information media for dissemination of information consisting of state or other legally protected secrets; for appeals for the overthrow of the constitutional order or the seizure of power; for violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine; for warmongering; for the use of violence; for the incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred; for encroachment upon human rights and freedoms and social morality shall be prohibited.

**Article 93.** The placement of any obstacles in the way of the legal professional activities of journalists and other workers of the information media shall be prohibited.

Forcible suspension of the activity or liquidation of the mass information media shall occur only as the result of a court procedure.

#### **Part IV: Direct Exercise of the Power of the People**

**Article 94.** The basis of the power of the people in Ukraine shall be the sovereign will of its people, which is freely expressed through referendums, elections, the exercise of the people's legislative initiative, and other forms of direct democracy.

**Article 95.** The right to participate in referendums and elections belongs to citizens of Ukraine who have reached the age of eighteen years at the time of the holding of the referendum or election.

Citizens declared incompetent by a court shall not have the right to vote.

**Article 96.** Referendums and elections shall be called by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of the Republic of Crimea, or oblast (land) rada and local self-governance bodies on their own or on the people's initiative in accordance with the constitutional laws on referendums and elections.

An all-Ukrainian referendum shall be called upon the demand of no fewer than two million citizens of Ukraine who are eligible to vote or by no fewer than half the deputies of each chamber of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

In the case stipulated by Article 146 of this Constitution, the referendum is called by the President of Ukraine.

Oblast and regional referendums shall be called upon the demand of no

less than one-tenth of the citizens of Ukraine who are eligible to vote and who permanently reside in the territory concerned and have the right to vote, or upon the demand of no fewer than half the deputies of the oblast rada or of council members of local self-governance bodies.

Article 97. Questions regarding territorial changes to Ukraine and the joining of international unions shall be decided exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum.

Oblast (land) and local referendums shall be mandatory for resolving questions regarding changes in administrative and territorial composition and for renaming administrative units.

The organization of referendums on the questions of the establishment of prices, taxation, governmental budget expenditures, the appointments and dismissals of government officials, and the declaration or suspension of a state of emergency or of martial law, as well as on issues regarding judicial power, shall not be allowed.

Article 98. The electoral process is realized on the principles of

1. the free and equal nominations of applicants and candidates;
2. *glasnost* and openness;
3. the absence of prejudice to the candidates by state organs, institutions, and organizations and local self-governance bodies;
4. equal opportunities for all candidates to conduct election campaigns;
5. freedom of campaigning;
6. control over sources of financing and election expenditures.

Article 99. The people shall exercise legislative initiative by the submission to the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of draft legislation.

Draft legislation is submitted on behalf of no fewer than three hundred thousand citizens with the right to vote.

Draft legislation concerning changes and amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted on behalf of no fewer than one million citizens with the right to vote.

## **Part V: The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine**

Article 100. The body of legislative power in Ukraine is the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine.

Article 101. The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) is authorized to

decide any matters of state for Ukraine, except those which are decided exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum or which are mandated by this Constitution to the authority of the President of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine, other state bodies, the Republic of Crimea, or local self-governance bodies.

*Chapter 15. Composition and Formation of the National Council  
(Vsenarodna Rada)*

Article 102. The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) is made up of two chambers:<sup>1</sup> the State Rada and the Rada of Territories, which are permanent acting bodies.

Article 103. The State Rada, consisting of two hundred deputies, shall be elected for a term of five years from constituencies of approximately equal size.

Any citizen of Ukraine who has the right to vote, has attained the age of twenty-five years at the date of the polling, and permanently resides on the territory of Ukraine may become a deputy of the State Rada.

Article 104. The Rada of Territories shall consist of deputies who are elected from constituencies for a term of five years on the basis of equal representation – three deputies from each oblast (land), the Republic of Crimea, the city of Kiev (option: and the city of Sevastopol).

Any citizen of Ukraine who has the right to vote, has attained the age of twenty-five years at the date of the polling, and has resided in the territory of the constituency for at least five years may become a deputy of the Rada of Territories.

...

Article 108. The mandate of a deputy of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) may be terminated simultaneously with the expiration of the mandate of the chamber to which he or she is elected, or in case of his or her death.

Premature termination of the mandate of a deputy of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) according to the decision of the corresponding chamber may be ordered in the following cases:

<sup>1</sup> The option of a one-chamber National Assembly is presented in the annexe of the draft.

1. resignation by issuance of a deputy's personal statement;
2. non-performance of a deputy's mandate duties for over two months without valid excuses;
3. conviction by a court sentence directed against a deputy which has come into force;
4. declaration by a court of a deputy's incompetence or status as a missing person;
5. loss of a deputy's Ukrainian citizenship or permanent change of his or her residency to outside the borders of Ukraine;
6. recall of a deputy by the electorate.

A decision of the chamber on the pre-term termination of the mandate of a deputy of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) may be appealed to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

#### *Chapter 16. Powers and Organization of the Work of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada)*

Article 109. The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall introduce changes and amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine subject to their approval by an all-Ukrainian referendum.

The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine shall enact constitutional laws of Ukraine, which are foreseen by Articles 17, 97, 106, 141, 157, 169, 183, 184, and 194 of this Constitution, as well as other laws of Ukraine, shall introduce changes and amendments to them, and shall officially interpret them.

Article 110. The Constitution and laws of Ukraine have exclusivity over the following matters:

1. the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, and guarantees of these rights and freedoms;
2. citizenship, the legal rights of citizens, and the status of foreigners and persons without citizenship;
3. the principal duties of individuals and citizens;
4. the rights of national minorities;
5. the status of languages;
6. demographics and migration (including immigration and emigration) policies;
7. the principles of budgetary, financial, price, credit, tax, and investment policies; the principles for establishing a taxation system; the types of taxes, duties, and mandatory payments; taxpayers and objects of taxation;

currency, assaying, the value and denomination of national coins, and the order and sanctioning of the issuance of bank notes;

8. units of weight, size, and time;

9. the principles and fundamental directions of foreign policy;

10. the principles of the organization of defence, state security, and the provision of civil order;

11. the principles of external economic and customs policy;

12. the legal status of state borders;

13. the principles of the Ukrainian state-territorial structure and the basis of regional policy;

14. the principles of the organization of local self-government;

15. the establishment of free economic zones;

16. the principles of the use of natural resources, the exploration of space, and the organization and use of energy systems; air, maritime, river, rail, auto, and pipeline transportation and communications;

17. the legal status of ownership and the protection of property rights;

18. the general provisions and guarantees of entrepreneurship;

19. ecological policy and ecological standards;

20. the principles of social policy, the social security of citizens, marriage, the family, the protection of health, upbringing, education, and culture; the principles of scientific and technical policies;

21. the principles of the formation and activity of public associations and the functioning of the mass media;

22. the organization and procedure of elections and referendums;

23. the organization and activities of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada); the legal status of the deputies of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada);

24. the principles of the organization and activities of the state executive bodies, the general provisions of the civil service, and the collection of state statistics and information;

25. the definition of crimes and administrative violations; the determination of punishment for them and amnesty;

26. the judicial system, court procedures, court expertise, the procuracy, the pre-trial investigation, and the notary public; the penal bodies and institutions; the principles of the organization and activity of the advocacy;

27. the methods of use and protection of the state flag, emblem, and anthem; the legal status of the capital;

28. legal regimes of martial law and state of emergency;

29. the establishment of state awards and special titles.

Exclusive prerogatives of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada)

include the approval of first principles, codes, and other codifying acts in all spheres of legislation, including corrections and additions.

The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) may approve laws involving other issues within its jurisdiction.

**Article 111.** The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall

1. approve the state budget and report on its execution;
2. elect, appoint, and approve state officials in cases stipulated by this Constitution and the laws of Ukraine;
3. implement parliamentary control over executive power and local self-governance bodies by methods and within the scope stipulated by this Constitution;
4. ratify, adopt, approve, denounce, or suspend international, intergovernmental treaties or decide Ukraine's adherence to them.

The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) may carry out investigations and hold hearings on any matters relevant to state and public interests.

**Article 112.** The sessions of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall be organized in the form of joint and separate meetings of the State Council (Rada) and the Rada of Territories and their standing and ad hoc commissions.

**Article 113.** Joint sessions of the State Council (Rada) and the Rada of Territories shall be called for the following purposes:

1. to commence and adjourn the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada);
2. to make changes and amendments to the Constitution and the constitutional laws of Ukraine;
3. to announce the decisions of the all-Ukrainian referendums;
4. to ratify, adopt, approve, denounce, or suspend international, intergovernmental treaties, or adoption of decisions regarding Ukraine's participation in such treaties;
5. to set the date of the election of the President of Ukraine and of the declaration of the act of election of the President, and to administer the presidential oath; or to recognize or reject the resignation of the President of Ukraine;
6. to announce the dissolution of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) or separate chambers and to set the date of regular or extraordinary elections to the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) or its chambers;
7. to approve decisions regarding the holding of an all-Ukrainian referendum on the pre-term termination of powers of the President of Ukraine

upon the demand of no fewer than two million voters or upon the initiative of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) itself;

8. to approve the membership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;

9. to hear the President's reports on the domestic and foreign state of Ukraine;

10. to appoint the Chairman and seven judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; to administer the oaths of the Chairman and the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; to accept or reject the resignation of the Chairman and the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine who are appointed by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada); to appoint the Chairman and members of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Economic Court and the Procurator General of Ukraine;

11. to determine the structure, size, and procedure of use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, and Border Guards of Ukraine;

12. to proclaim a state of war on the recommendation of the President and to approve the President's decision to use the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other types of military formations in case of armed attack;

13. to approve presidential decrees which impose martial law and states of emergency in Ukraine or in specific localities, or impose total or partial mobilization;

14. to hold a second hearing of legislation vetoed by the President and to impose a parliamentary veto on presidential decrees which contradict the laws of Ukraine;

15. to review the reports and proposals of joint ad hoc investigative commissions and chambers and to discuss and adopt appropriate decisions;

16. to remove from office through the procedure of impeachment the President, the Prime Minister, and officials who have been appointed or approved by the Chambers of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) in cases of their criminal violation of this Constitution and laws of Ukraine;

17. to adopt resolutions, statements, declarations, and appeals;

18. to hear the answers and to adopt the decisions presented upon the request of the deputies of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) regarding issues which are being discussed at joint sessions of their chambers;

19. to hear the second reading of draft legislation, submitted by the arbitration commission of the chambers;

20. to pardon individuals sentenced by the courts of Ukraine in relation to the application of impeachment.



All other questions pertaining to the authority of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall be decided, as a rule, at the separate sessions of the chambers.

...

### *Chapter 17. Legislative Process*

Article 127. The right to initiate legislation in the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall be vested in the people, the deputies, the standing commissions, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the Verkhovna Rada of the Republic of Crimea.

Draft legislation submitted to the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine at the initiative of the people shall have priority of consideration.

The legislative initiative is exercised by the introduction to the appropriate chamber of a motivated proposal regarding the preparation of the draft legislation or the text of the draft legislation as well as the changes and amendments to them.

Article 128. Draft legislation submitted to the chambers first shall be reviewed by the appropriate standing or ad hoc special commission and then shall be submitted for consideration by the chamber. Consideration of the issue shall be organized in a manner to determine precisely the real will of the majority of its members.

Consideration and adoption of draft legislation by a chamber shall follow the procedure of:

- general enactment of the principal provisions; and
- enactment by article and in its entirety.

Article 129. A draft law which requires a financial expenditure shall be submitted to sessions of the chambers with the condition that it is accompanied by the necessary estimates from the State Auditing Committee and a study from the relevant standing commissions specifying the means of financing it.

Adopted legislation which requires new or additional funding shall include the means of financing it.

Article 130. A law, after it is discussed and voted on article by article and its entirety, is approved by the number of votes designated by Article 121 of this Constitution.

Article 131. After approval of draft legislation in its entirety by one chamber, it shall immediately be submitted to the other chamber for consideration. If the draft legislation is approved in its entirety by that chamber, or in the absence of a negative vote (veto) within a month, the legislation is considered adopted by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

A veto by the chamber of a draft law requires the same number of votes required for the adoption of the respective draft law in its entirety.

In the case that draft legislation is adopted in its entirety by a chamber but with changes or amendments to it, it shall immediately be returned to the chamber which adopted it initially. Acceptance of the changes or amendments by the chamber which adopted the legislation initially shall result in the enactment of the legislation by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

To resolve the differences resulting from the consideration of the draft law by the chambers, an arbitration commission of the chambers is established on the basis of parity. A draft law submitted to the arbitration commission shall be reviewed by a joint session of the chambers. If, during a joint session of the chambers, a draft law is not approved, it is considered rejected by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

In the case of disagreement between the chambers, final decision regarding budgetary and financial matters is determined by a second round of votes by the State Council (Rada), and issues pertaining to a change of the legal status or the territories of the oblasts (lands) and the Republic of Crimea are resolved by a second round of votes by the Rada of Territories.

Article 132. Ratification, approval, and confirmation of international, intergovernmental treaties or Ukraine's participation in them, and also the denunciation or suspension of them, is accomplished by the adoption of the relevant resolution if no other procedure is specified by the treaty itself.

The draft resolution for ratification, approval, confirmation, denunciation, or suspension of international, intergovernmental treaties shall be prepared by the Rada of Territories, having been duly discussed and approved in a general procedure.

Article 133. Legislation shall be signed by the Chairmen of the chambers of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) and shall be immediately sent to the President.

The President shall accept it for implementation, endorse it with his or her signature, and officially publish it within fifteen days from the date of

reception. During this term, the President may exercise his or her right to veto the legislation and return it, with his or her proposals, to the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) for its second consideration.

If during the second consideration of the legislation two-thirds of the constitutional membership of each chamber votes on the legislation, the President must sign and publish it within ten days.

In the case that the President does not return the legislation for second consideration within the required time frame, the legislation shall be considered endorsed by the President.

In the case that the President exercises his or her right of veto after the recess of the session of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), an extraordinary session for second consideration of the legislation shall be immediately convened.

Legislation shall come into force ten days from its publication, unless it contains a different provision, but in any case no earlier than that date.

...

## **Part VI: The President of Ukraine**

**Article 142.** The President of Ukraine is the head of state and acts on its behalf.

The President of Ukraine is elected by the citizens of Ukraine on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of five years.

The procedure for electing the President of Ukraine is established by the Law 'On Election of the President of Ukraine.'

A citizen of Ukraine who has right to vote, is at least thirty-five years of age, has lived on the territory of Ukraine no less than ten years, speaks the state language, and is in good health enabling him or her to fulfil presidential responsibilities may be President.

The same person cannot be President for more than two consecutive terms.

The President cannot be a deputy of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), have other representative duties, hold any other post in state bodies or public associations, or engage in other remunerative or entrepreneurial activity.

**Article 143.** The President assumes office from the moment he or she takes the oath of office during a joint session of both chambers of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) no later than fifteen days after the official announcement of the results of elections.

The oath is administered by the Chairman of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

The President shall take the following oath:

'I solemnly swear to the Ukrainian people to serve Ukraine faithfully, to adhere strictly to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, to respect and defend the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, to protect the independence of Ukraine, and to perform conscientiously the important duties entrusted to me.'

The President shall have parliamentary immunity as defined by Article 107 of the Constitution.

#### Article 144. The President

1. shall be the guarantor of state unity and the independence of Ukraine; shall take steps to ensure the defence readiness, the national security, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine;

2. shall represent Ukraine in international affairs;

3. shall address the people and submit for review to the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) annual reports on the domestic and foreign policies of Ukraine and the implementation of state programs;

4. shall have the right to veto laws approved by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) and return them for second review by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada);

5. shall carry out the general leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and shall direct its executive activities;

6. shall nominate the Prime Minister of Ukraine and, according to his or her request, form the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; shall submit for the approval of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) of Ukraine the membership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; may dismiss Ministers and Heads of other bodies of state executive power from their positions;

7. shall appoint and dismiss, with the prior approval of the People's Council, Heads of diplomatic representations of Ukraine in other states, Chiefs of missions of Ukraine to international organizations, and other appointed individuals specified by the Constitution;

8. shall direct the implementation of foreign policy, conduct negotiations and sign international treaties on behalf of Ukraine, accept credentials and letters of recall of accreditation of diplomatic representatives of foreign states;

9. shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; shall preside over the National Security Council of Ukraine; shall appoint and dismiss the high command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

10. shall promote individuals to higher military and diplomatic ranks and other special ranks and positions;

11. in the event of a threat of attack on Ukraine or a threat to the state independence of Ukraine, shall make a decision on general or partial mobilization or imposition of martial law in Ukraine or in its separate areas, subject to confirmation by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) within two days;

12. shall make decisions, subject to confirmation by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) within two days of such decisions, regarding the declaration of war and the deployment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in cases of military attack on Ukraine;

13. shall declare, if necessary, particular areas of Ukraine as ecological disaster zones, subject to confirmation by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) within two days of this decision;

14. shall declare, if necessary, a state of emergency in Ukraine or in its particular areas, subject to confirmation by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) within two days of this decision;

15. shall annul acts of ministers, directors of other central organs of the executive power, and the government of the Republic of Crimea in cases of their inconsistency with the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine and the decrees of the President;

16. shall decide questions regarding the granting of citizenship or loss of citizenship of Ukraine, the granting of asylum, and the deportation of foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship;

17. shall submit for review to the Rada of Territories proposals on the pre-term termination of the authority of oblast (land) radas and individual organs of local self-governance, and the scheduling of new elections to them in accordance with Articles 201 and 212 of this Constitution;

18. may pardon individuals convicted by the courts of Ukraine, with the exception of individuals who have been impeached;

19. shall grant state awards and present honorary titles of Ukraine; and

20. shall exercise other powers stipulated by this Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.

**Article 145.** The President may not delegate his or her authority to other individuals or bodies.

For the performance of his or her duties, the President shall establish all necessary administrative, controlling, and consultative bodies within the expenditure limits stipulated for the staff and maintenance of the state executive power.

Article 146. The President shall have the right to schedule an all-Ukrainian referendum regarding non-confidence in the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada).

If in the referendum the people of Ukraine do not vote non-confidence in the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) at a joint session can make a decision regarding the removal of the President of Ukraine from office within a two-week period after the official results of the referendum have been announced.

Article 147. The President, on the basis of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and for their execution, shall issue decrees and orders within the limits of his or her powers.

Article 148. The President of Ukraine shall perform his or her duties until a newly elected President assumes office.

The powers of the President shall be terminated before the expiration of his or her term of office in the following cases:

1. violation of rules regarding conflict of interest between the role of President and other forms of activity, as stipulated by paragraph 6 of Article 142 of this Constitution;
2. acceptance of his or her resignation;
3. inability to perform his or her duties for reasons of health;
4. recall from office by the people through a vote of non-confidence expressed through an all-Ukrainian referendum;
5. removal from office through an impeachment procedure;
6. loss of Ukrainian citizenship or change of permanent residency to outside the borders of Ukraine;
7. a decision made by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 146 of this Constitution.

Article 149. The President's resignation shall be accepted and shall take effect on the condition that his or her resignation statement has been announced by him or her, has been considered at a plenary session of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), and has been accepted by a simple majority of votes of the constitutional membership of each chamber.

Article 150. The inability of the President to perform his or her duties for reasons of health shall be determined at sessions of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) on the basis of a written request of the Supreme Court of Ukraine which has been based on a medical diagnosis and the conclusion

of a specially formed ad hoc parliamentary commission and been approved by a majority of votes of the constitutional membership of each chamber.

Article 151. A decision regarding the date of an all-Ukrainian referendum to recall the President, if demanded by at least two million voters, shall be adopted by the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) by a majority of votes of the constitutional membership of each chamber.

Article 152. A decision to hold an all-Ukrainian referendum on the suspension of the powers of the President before the expiration of his or her term of office on the initiative of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) shall be adopted by a majority vote of no less than two-thirds of the constitutional membership of each chamber.

If, in the course of the referendum on the initiative of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), the people of Ukraine do not vote to recall the President, the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada) may be dissolved by the President within two weeks after the results of the referendum have been officially announced.

Article 153. In the event that the President of Ukraine criminally violates the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine in the performance of his or her duties, the matter of his or her removal from office through an impeachment procedure shall be initiated by the State Council (Rada). The National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), at a joint session, shall adopt the decision to remove the President from office through an impeachment procedure by no less than a two-thirds vote of its membership as stipulated by the Constitution.

Article 154. In the event of the President's death, the suspension of his or her powers before the expiration of his or her term of office, or his or her removal from office in the cases stipulated by Articles 148 or 153 of this Constitution, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, by a decision of the National Council (Vsenarodna Rada), shall be authorized to perform the duties of the President pending the election of and assumption of office by a new President. The election of a new President shall be held no later than ninety days after the day the office becomes vacant. The newly elected President has authority for the term stipulated by Article 142 of this Constitution.

## The Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia

*In October 1995, on the initiative of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, a committee was formed which turned into an organizing committee to prepare a congress for the defence of Ukrainian culture. Joined by other organizations, it issued, later that month, the 'Manifesto' printed here. On 11 November 1995 a congress of the Ukrainian intellectuals was held in Kiev with hundreds of scholars, writers, and artists in attendance. It constituted another organization, the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia; selected Ivan Drach to head the Congress; and called for the creation of branches all over the country. At about the same time a meeting of 'the creative unions of Ukraine' was held, at which President Kuchma together with many other high government officials promised to listen to the demands of the 'Manifesto.'*

Now, in the fifth year of independence, at the time of Ukraine's acceptance into the Council of Europe, events have taken place which threaten the material basis of the existence of the Ukrainian state and nation, as well as its language, culture, and spirituality.

External and internal forces, which in the course of the last years have blocked and sabotaged in every way the process of Ukraine's transformation into a strong, rich, socially just, and sovereign state, have today launched an all-out assault aimed at our 'Belorussianization.' They, indifferent to those who feed them while disposing of their national wealth, want to deprive us again of what is most important – one's own fatherland – and turn us into rabble without kin.

Everything is being done consistently, in a planned fashion, and in secret from society to prevent the Ukrainian people from becoming mas-



ters in the land of their ancestors. Artificially and deliberately, 'debts' of Ukraine to its neighbours are being created worth billions of dollars; the most valuable products are being exported abroad on unfavourable terms; large enterprises and branches of industry which form the basis of our economy (aircraft manufacturing, the commercial fleet, the chemical industry, metallurgy, machinery companies, the military-industrial complex, the oil and gas industry and pipelines) are being sold very cheaply to Russian capital and to other foreign countries; economic and military agreements are being made with Russia on an unequal basis; foreign armies are not being removed from Ukraine; the scientific centres are decaying; the finance and credit system is paralysed; the technological, industrial, and scientific potential is ruined; unemployment is growing, prices are rising steadily, and wages, pensions, and scholarships are continually being held up.

All this is not the result of a natural catastrophe, or of developments which cannot be controlled, or of incompetent managers. Ukraine is being ruined carefully and professionally by those governing it today and directing it from another country [Russia]. Everything is being done to undermine the ability of the Ukrainian armed forces to protect the state and the people. Everything is being done to set criminal elements and the governmental ruling structures against the people.

Who is to gain from all this? High officials keep silent about the unfriendly and, lately, openly hostile and aggressive policy of official Russia towards Ukraine. Why? A large proportion of the government leaders seem to be protectors of Russia's national interests in Ukraine and make their actions conform to the Kremlin's strategic plans. These plans, secret until recently, were cynically revealed by the president of the Russian Federation in his ukase no. 940 of 14 September 1995 concerning Russia's strategic path in regard to the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], according to which Ukraine is a Russian province, a 'zone of Russia's national interests.'

At a time when in Russia all political forces without exception are adopting imperialistic attitudes, when even the government is counting on an ideology of fierce chauvinism – of Russian exclusiveness, messianism, superiority to other peoples – today's political leaders [of Ukraine] are ignoring such a universally recognized concept as the national dignity of their own people and are allowing themselves openly to abuse and humiliate it before the entire world. Today, not only outside the borders of Ukraine but in Ukraine itself there has re-emerged the centuries-old policy of 'Ukraine without Ukrainians' – a policy aimed at the destruction of the

Ukrainian nation under cover of the 'pan-democratic,' 'pan-Slavic,' 'pan-Orthodox' demagoguery which has always served our oppressors.

A part of this policy is the intensified devastation of Ukrainian culture. We, the representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, testify that, with the exception of the 1930s, when the Bolsheviks destroyed virtually every activist in Ukrainian culture, scholarship, and science and annihilated one-third of the Ukrainian nation, there has never been a similar de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine.

On the fifth anniversary of independence Ukrainian book publishing is dying – only 3 per cent of books written in Ukrainian are published. At the same time, without restriction and free of customs duty, low-quality literature in Russian is being imported from abroad; the number of Ukrainian newspapers and journals has been curtailed; Ukrainian kindergartens and schools are being closed; and documentation in many branches of government, including the highest ones, is not conducted in the state language [Ukrainian]. In many areas attempts to open new Ukrainian cultural centres are blocked, Ukrainian newspapers and journals are closed down or their circulation is forcibly stopped, and Ukrainian culture is excluded from radio and television.

Basic science is in ruins. The National Academy of Sciences, which gave the world such prominent names as Vernadsky, Hrushevsky, Palladin, Paton, and Hlushkov is in truth being destroyed. Scholars, scientists, teachers, doctors, and cultural researchers are struggling for survival. All this allows us to conclude that national culture and the state language irritate the governing organs in the capital and in the oblasts and are actively opposed and persecuted by them. An absurd state of affairs is being created. Our people have for centuries, despite prohibitions and persecutions, defended and lovingly preserved their language. Now, in an independent state, they must struggle for its salvation. This is unprecedented: the people have their language, but the majority of officials speak the language of a foreign country, thereby demonstrating with impunity their 'independence' from their own people. Can one imagine government representatives in Russia speaking a language other than Russian? Or in any other country in the world? After all, as an apostle said, 'When I pray in a foreign language, then even if my spirit is praying, my understanding remains barren.'

The fierce pressure of the anti-Ukrainian forces is growing at all levels of government, especially in the southeastern and some central oblasts of Ukraine. They are making us into a country unique in the world. Higher officials are encouraging and propagating an anti-Ukrainian 'regional'

approach in the sphere of culture in order to split up and disunite our nation. The 'law on language,' passed in imperial times,<sup>1</sup> is not only not implemented but constantly threatened by revisions proposed by Russian nationalists in Ukraine.

The Writers' Union, the National Academy of Ukraine, creative and social organizations, [political] parties, and churches have repeatedly turned to the president, the Supreme Rada [Parliament], and the cabinet of ministers with proposals to take measures to support the state language and Ukrainian book publishing, education, science, literature, theatre, and cinema. They have been received with total and contemptuous silence. This silence conceals a real, anti-Ukrainian psychological terror and the beginning of a political repression of national issues in some regions. Ukrainian patriots are being dismissed from the army and left without work. Everything is being done in the training of cadres to attain a 'critical mass' of those who hate Ukraine in the state apparatus, just as is advocated by the strategists of Russian nationalism. Ukrainian patriots are being prevented from entering the sphere of administration in all walks of social life. Militant Russian nationalism dominates all levels of the state administration, particularly in the southeastern oblasts of Ukraine. In fact, anti-Ukrainian ethnic cleansings are already being conducted in Ukraine. We respect the Russian language and culture, but we are vexed when they are made into tools of aggression, when they are supported by tanks and war-planes, when other cultures are crushed, and when in their name the riches of other nations are barbarously plundered.

It is no longer possible to regard the anti-Ukrainian attitude of the higher officials as ignorance, want of culture, or the result of a mistake. We have fresh in our memory the brutal beatings by armed youths of the participants in Patriarch Volodymyr's funeral – when young men armed to the teeth beat old people, women, children, and priests, fiercely shouted, 'Beat the khokhols,' and trampled the state flag stained with the blood of the innocents. What kind of cages and what spiritual grub did it take to train such rabid storm troopers, punishers of their own people?! How mutilated a soul must one have in order to permit such openly anti-state parties and groups, these armed underground formations of Russosfascists, to act in our state, and at the same time, without trial or inquest, to ban and persecute legal Ukrainian social organizations?

<sup>1</sup> The law making Ukrainian the state language was passed by the Supreme Soviet of Soviet Ukraine in October 1989.

Ukrainian international-careerists are hoping to turn their native land into a Russian colony once again, since without Ukraine Russia cannot dictate her will to the world. They, together with officials in the Kremlin, have started a genuine, bitter, and as yet still 'cold war' against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia resolutely condemns the provocative and destructive policy of the anti-Ukrainian forces in our ancient land. We categorically reject the notion that the Ukrainian idea is exhausted in Ukraine. This notion is a fraud perpetrated by those who regard the proclamation of the sovereignty of our state as marking a 'temporary phenomenon.' The concept of the national idea, honourable in itself, is alive and, as in every civilized country, will unite all the citizens of Ukraine in an all-national movement to take their destiny into their own hands, to recover economic power and native culture, and to attain the flowering of our hard-working, talented people.

We understand the defence of one's own culture, science, and spirituality as the defence of the rights of every citizen of Ukraine to use a part of the national heritage, the right to live a full working life, and to enjoy a merited well-being, which our highly developed native land, rich in natural resources, can provide.

We understand the defence of culture and science as an assertion of the goal of equal, mutually convenient, but not predatory or exploitative relations with all countries and peoples.

We understand the defence of culture and science as a guarantee of human and individual rights. We regard culture as reflecting the profound respect of the government for its people, a government which would not dare to defame the Ukrainian state and to humiliate its people.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia understands the inevitable objective difficulties of the first years of our independence. But we cannot in any way agree with the attempts to drive us into a blind alley of national non-being. We have enough perseverance and self-sacrifice, as had those of us in earlier generations, not to allow the great Ukrainian nation, which in population ranks fifteenth among the nations of the world, to be swept from the face of the earth. A fear is felt by the Ukrainophobic officials, who change only their anti-national rhetoric and not their policy against the people. We have retreated for a long time, and we have lost some ground – we have been forced to disarm and to see our economy ruined – but there will be no further retreats. We are defending what is most sacred and most dear – Ukraine and its people.

Feeling great historical responsibility, we, the representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, call on everyone to unite for Ukraine's rescue,

summon all her political forces, social organizations, workers and peasants; those active in the fields of culture, science, education; the entrepreneurs and farmers, religious congregations, veterans' and women's organizations, youth and student movements, citizens of all nationalities, resolute patriots, and all who treasure our thousand-year-old and contemporary Ukraine, all who want to see it free and prosperous.

We, the members of the organizing committee, call on all Ukrainian intellectuals, all patriots of our land to work to create such committees in oblasts, raions, cities, and villages. The national, democratic, and patriotic forces have experience in forcing the government to reckon with the will of the people, who on 1 December 1991 voted for a sovereign, independent Ukrainian state.

Let us show such will again!

Members of the organizing committee: Ivan Drach (chairman), Viacheslav Briukhovetsky, Anatolii Hryshchuk, Viktor Iesikov, Larysa Kadyrova, Vitalii Karpenko, Volodymyr Kovtun, Stepan Kolesnyk, Platon Kostiuk, Oles Lupii, Pavlo Movchan, Kostiantyn Morozov, Volodymyr Muliava, Iurii Mushketyk, Petro Perebyinis, Anatolii Pohribny, Iurii Pokalchuk, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Viktor Tsymbaliuk, Volodymyr Cherpak, Viacheslav Chornovil, Halyna Iablonska, Iaroslav Iatskiv.

## Ukraine without Ukrainians?

MYKOLA RIABCHUK

*Mykola Riabchuk (b. 1953) is one of Ukraine's leading editors and critics. He has taught in the United States at Pennsylvania State University and the University of Texas. This piece, which closes the anthology, is a slightly enlarged version of an article that appeared in the newspaper Svoboda. It assesses critically but not unfavourably the 'Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia,' published in 1995, and offers a striking reminder of the unresolved problems in Ukraine which have recently resurfaced.*

Not long ago we used to hear the contrary slogan – 'Ukraine for Ukrainians.' Not because many, apart from a few extreme right-wing groups, defended it, but because all the ruling post-communist *nomenklatura* and the ideologically united national democrats vehemently opposed it. Everyone wanted to appear modern, European, tolerant, and, of course, democratic. No one wanted, God forbid, to offend national minorities, to repel them from the process of building a democratic, pluralist, multinational country. Instead of the exclusive 'Ukraine for Ukrainians,' everyone hoped to build an inclusive Ukraine for all the nationalities which live in it. It was a beautiful project, and it would have been stupid indeed not to support it.

But, as a Ukrainian proverb has it, it has not happened as it was intended (*ne tak stalosia iak hadalosia*). While Ukrainians were fiercely opposing the extremist slogan 'Ukraine for Ukrainians' and were trying quite sincerely to build a Ukraine for all its citizens, some of these citizens successfully started or rather continued the well-known Soviet project – to build 'Ukraine without Ukrainians.' Did they not vote for this project on 1 December 1991, when they supported Leonid Kravchuk and not Viacheslav Chornovil in the presidential elections? It is this vision of 'inde-

pendence' – something reminiscent of South Africa, where an imperial white minority ruled for decades over the native black majority – that prevailed.

Ukrainians are not black, and this makes it simpler for the ruling colonizers. First of all, no one in the world will rise to their defence, because, after all, they have their own state, their own state language, and a government democratically elected by the majority of the native population. If anyone needs defending, then it is the Russian, Jewish, and other minorities, which need defending from the well-known Ukrainian nationalism of ill repute.

Second, the 'black skin' of the Ukrainians is, above all, their language, which it is not so difficult to change under the conditions of linguistic apartheid. The colonizers have been changing it for the last two centuries, long before independence, and they are not about to give that up. Of course, not everyone becomes 'white.' Some remain 'grey,' since the dominant Russian minority needs natives to do the dirty work. The percentage of educated Russians in Ukraine is twice as high as that of educated Ukrainians. But the Ukrainians provide many more of 'their own' garbage collectors, street sweepers, maids, and other unqualified workers. The Ukrainian natives get in 'Ukrainian' cities the kind of work that immigrants from the Third World receive in Western countries.

It is precisely this situation which the imperial ruling minority in Ukraine wishes to preserve. This Russian minority has traditionally occupied and still occupies today the key positions in government, the army, education, culture, industry, and now private business. Of course, it will never proclaim openly the slogan 'Ukraine without Ukrainians.' It is wrapped up in such tactical passwords as 'East Slavic unity,' 'integration with Russia,' 'official bilingualism,' 'dual citizenship,' 'world integrationist process,' and so on. Also, all this neo-colonial policy is conducted under cover of the 'struggle against national (Ukrainian) narrow-mindedness' and 'against compulsory (?) Ukrainianization.' We know, of course, that no forced or unforced Ukrainianization is being implemented in Ukraine today.

The authors of the 'Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia,' published in the summer of 1995 in *Literaturna Ukraina* (*Literary Ukraine*), stress that

there has re-emerged the centuries-old policy of 'Ukraine without Ukrainians' – a policy aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation ... A part of this policy is the intensified devastation of Ukrainian culture ... On the fifth anniversary of independence Ukrainian book publishing is dying – only 3 per cent of books written in

Ukrainian are published ...<sup>1</sup> Ukrainian kindergartens and schools are being closed; and documentation in many branches of government, including the highest ones, is not conducted in the state language. In many areas attempts to open new Ukrainian cultural centres are blocked, Ukrainian newspapers and journals are closed down or their circulation forcibly stopped, and Ukrainian culture is excluded from radio and television. Basic science is in ruins. The National Academy of Sciences ... is ... being destroyed. Scholars, scientists, teachers, doctors, and cultural researchers are struggling for survival ... Ukrainian patriots are being dismissed from the army and left without work. Everything is being done in the training of cadres to attain a 'critical mass' of those who hate Ukraine in the state apparatus ... In fact, anti-Ukrainian ethnic cleansings are already being conducted in Ukraine.

There is no doubt that the 'Manifesto' loses a great deal by its exalted, half-hysterical tone, especially when it refers to a comparable era of de-Ukrainianization in 'the 1930s, when the Bolsheviks destroyed virtually every activist in Ukrainian culture, scholarship, and science.' Those signatories who in the 1970s sometimes served the Party have personal reasons for idealizing the Brezhnev era in comparison with the present one, but surely Ie. Sverstiuk and V. Chornovil, who also signed the 'Manifesto,' understand the difference between 'de-Ukrainianization' then and now.

The 'Manifesto' would have gained a great deal if it were calmer and more laconic, and, above all, more analytical, operating with facts and figures rather than with exclamations and metaphors. It sees a conspiracy aimed at Ukraine's destruction where there may be none. In many Third World countries the oligarchies act in similar self-interest without incitement from the Kremlin.

Empty rhetoric and hyperbole diminish the value of this document and its correct and timely observations and conclusions. A good idea – to alert society and government to serious dangers – has been once more spoiled by primitive and *kbutir*-like execution. It is doubtful whether the 'Manifesto' will be read by the wide masses of the people, considering its length and style and also the small number of copies published. It is also doubtful whether our president and our statesmen will take any notice of it, considering their indifference to all sorts of 'Ukrainian tricks,' and con-

1 Vice-Premier Ivan Kuras clarified later that Ukrainian book production was not 3 per cent but 43 per cent. This could not be independently confirmed.



sidering, to tell the truth, its analytical poverty. We should be reminded, however, that Leonid Kuchma, when prime minister, asked in parliament what kind of state he should build. Today, as president, he could give his answer.<sup>2</sup>

1995

2 The headnote to the 'Manifesto' in this volume reports that several prominent officials in the Ukrainian government have said they would respond to the demands of the intelligentsia.

# Dates in Ukrainian History

- 1648–50    The uprising of Ukrainian Cossacks led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky
- 1654        The treaty of Pereiaslav between the Cossacks and the Russian tsar, their protector
- 1658        The Cossacks' attempt to form a union with Poland at Hadiach
- 1685        The subordination of the Kievan Metropolitan to the Moscow Patriarch
- 1708        The alliance of Hetman Ivan Mazepa with Charles XII of Sweden
- 1709        The defeat by Peter I of the Swedish and Ukrainian armies at the battle of Poltava
- 1720        The first tsarist prohibition of the printing of Ukrainian books
- 1764        The abolition by Russia of the Ukrainian Hetmanate
- 1775        The destruction by Catherine II of the Zaporozhian Sich
- 1780s       The introduction of serfdom in Ukraine
- 1793        The annexation of Right-Bank Ukraine, under Polish rule, to Russia
- 1798        The publication of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*

## 406 Dates in Ukrainian History

- 1805 The opening of Kharkiv University
- 1840 The publication of Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar*
- 1847 The arrest and trial of the members of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius
- 1848 The abolition of serfdom in Western Ukraine, under Austrian rule
- 1861 The abolition of serfdom in Russia and Ukraine
- 1863 The Valuev circular restricting the use of Ukrainian
- 1876 The Ems ukase banning Ukrainian publications
- 1900 The founding of the first Ukrainian political party, RUP
- 1905 The abolition of censorship in Ukraine
- 1918 The proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian People's Republic
- 1920s 'Ukrainianization'
- 1933-4 The great famine
- 1939 The incorporation of Western Ukraine into the USSR
- 1941 Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union
- 1943-4 The reoccupation of Ukraine by the Red Army
- 1953 Stalin's death, followed by the 'cultural thaw'
- 1991 The referendum in favour of an independent Ukraine on 1 December
- 1996 The ratification of the Constitution by Parliament on 28 June (to be celebrated as a national holiday)

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# Index of Names and Places

- Abraham, 78  
Adam, 79  
Adamovych, 87  
Aivazovsky, Ivan, 323n28  
Aksakov, Ivan, 221n7  
Aksakov, Konstantin, 88, 110n4  
Aksakov, Sergei, 15  
Alexander I, 100, 155n3  
Alexander II, 21, 144, 203n4  
Alexei Mikhailovich, 135, 139, 164  
Andrusovo, 140  
Anna, Empress, 155n2  
Anteus, 214  
Antonenko-Davydovych, Borys, 325n40  
Antonovych, Dmytro, 213  
Antonovych, Volodymyr, 20, 23, 24, 26, 32, 212n14, 213, 321, 335  
Arakcheev, Alexei, 155n3  
Aristotle, 71  
Augustus, Emperor, 270  
Averchenko, Arkadii, 337  
  
Bachynsky, Iulian, 30, 336n7  
Bagritsky, Eduard, 44  
Bandera, Stepan, 42, 295n1  
Barabbas, 77  
  
Barrès, Maurice, 261n3, 263  
Bathory, Stephen, 54  
Baturyn, 6, 324n39, 325  
Bazhan, Mykola, 337  
Bazylevsky, Volodymyr, 50  
Beauplan, Guillaume Le Vasseur de, 111n8  
Bebel, August, 270  
Belinsky, Vissarion, 14, 44, 101, 102, 186, 274, 311, 328  
Belousov, Nikolai, 89  
Bendery (Bender), 3, 4, 48, 53, 55  
Berestechko, 213  
Berezovsky, Maksym, 339  
Berlin, Isaiah, 19  
Bezborodkos, 211  
Biletsky, Oleksander, 329  
Bilozersky, Vasyl, 105, 230  
Biron, Ernst Johann, 155n2  
Blok, Alexander, 266  
Bodiansky, Osyp, 82, 112, 335  
Bohomolets, Oleksander, 322n22  
Bohun, Ivan, 308  
Boichuk, Mykhailo, 339  
Bolesław the Brave, 54  
Bolotnikov, Ivan, 306  
Borovets, Taras, 42

- Borovykovsky, Volodymyr, 322n24  
 Bortniansky, Dmytro, 322n23, 339  
 Braichevsky, Mykhailo, 204n6  
 Bratslav, 156  
 Bratun, Rostyslav, 334  
 Bremen, 224  
 Brest, 165  
 Brest-Litovsk, 35  
 Brezhnev, Leonid, 356  
 Briukhovetsky, Ivan, 98n6, 319n8  
 Briukhovetsky, Viacheslav, 399  
 Briullov, Karl, 101  
 Budilovich, Anton, 170n3  
 Bulba. *See* Borovets, Taras  
 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 44  
 Bulgakov, Sergei, 217n4  
 Bunin, Ivan, 44, 337  
 Burevii, Kost, 274n11, 275, 276  
 Burns, Robert, 103, 329  
 Butovych, Mykola, 339  
 Byron, Lord, 111n6, 271, 325  
  
 Calvin, John, 266  
 Catherine II, 3, 7, 71, 99, 140, 153, 161, 190, 191, 192, 318n3, 320  
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 200n2  
 Charles X, 55  
 Charles XII, 4, 5, 55, 64, 261, 324n38  
 Chartoryskys, 211  
 Chekhov, Anton, 44  
 Chernihiv, 156, 311, 354  
 Chernivtsi, 195  
 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, 19, 22, 44, 146, 311  
 Cherpak, Volodymyr, 399  
 Chetvertynskys, 211  
 Chornobyl, 342, 354  
 Chornovil, Viacheslav, 399, 400, 402  
 Christ, Jesus, 64, 78, 80, 96, 99  
 Chubynsky, Pavlo, 335  
 Chuprynka, Hryhorii, 337  
 Chuprynka, Taras. *See* Shukhevych, Roman  
 Chykalenko, Ievhen, 32  
 Chyzhevsky, Dmytro, 9, 22, 146  
 Cymbalisty, Bohdan, 39  
 Cyril, St, 12, 13, 15, 20, 94, 101, 105, 141n7, 208, 230n1, 262, 360  
  
 Daniel, 79  
 Dante Alighieri, 338  
 Danylo, King, 213  
 David, 79  
 Debahorii-Mokrievych, Volodymyr, 20  
 Deitch, Oleksander, 329  
 Delilah, 79  
 Denikin, Anton, 320n18  
 Desna, 84  
 Dickens, Charles, 115  
 Divovych, Semen, 6, 7, 69  
 Dmowski, Roman, 267n20  
 Dnieper (Dnipro), 3, 8, 55, 59, 60, 99, 112, 140, 153, 154, 164, 165, 218, 310, 335  
 Dniester (Dnister), 154  
 Dobroliubov, Nikolai, 19, 44, 311  
 Dołęga-Chodakowski, Zorian, 89  
 Don, 154, 358  
 Donetsk, 330  
 Don Juan, 269  
 Don Quixote, 288  
 Dontsov, Dmytro, 37, 38, 45, 260, 287, 288, 289  
 Doroshenko, Petro, 98n6, 140, 208  
 Doroshkevych, Oleksander, 273n8  
 Dostoevsky, Fëdor, 22, 266, 267  
 Dosvitnii, Oles, 275n17  
 Dovbush, Oleksa, 311  
 Dovzhenko, Oleksander, 322n21, 334



Drach, Ivan, 47, 394, 399  
 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 19, 22, 23, 24,  
 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 152, 171, 179n2,  
 197, 198, 199, 212n14, 216, 223, 262,  
 264, 265, 335  
 Draï-Khmara, Mykhailo, 337  
 Dubbelt, Leontii, 15, 142n8  
 Dubyna, Ivan, 296  
 Dunajec, 156  
 Dziuba, Ivan, 46, 47, 330

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 216  
 Elbe, 95  
 Elijah, 78  
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 262  
 Ems, Bad, 22, 26, 203n4  
 Engels, Friedrich, 28  
 Erenburg, Ilia, 326n43  
 Eve, 79  
 Ezekiel, 78

Faust, 39, 270  
 Fedkovych, Osyp, 265n13  
 Fedotov, Georgii, 44, 45  
 Fedun, Petro. *See* Poltava, Petro  
 Ferrero, Guglielmo, 264n9  
 Fitilov, M. *See* Khvylovy, Mykola  
 Flaubert, Gustav, 273  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 147  
 Franko, Ivan, 28, 29, 193, 227, 265n14,  
 273, 328, 334, 336  
 Futey, Bohdan, 48  
 Fylypovych, Pavlo, 337

Gedimin, Prince, 136  
 Geneva, 19, 23, 152, 251  
 Godunov, Boris, 67n1  
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 168, 271,  
 338  
 Gogol, Nikolai, 9, 11, 15, 16, 88, 103,

107, 108n3, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,  
 115, 118, 119, 146, 198, 211, 223, 271,  
 289, 321, 323, 327  
 Goliath, 79  
 Gorky, Maxim, 44  
 Grabowicz, George, 12, 46  
 Grabowski, Michał, 112  
 Griboedov, Alexander, 102n2, 185  
 Gumilëv, Nikolai, 337  
 Gustav, King, 87

Habsburgs, 316  
 Hague, The, 202n2  
 Hamburg, 224  
 Hamlet, 269  
 Hebel, Johann Peter, 225n12  
 Heine, Heinrich, 221  
 Helsinki, 345, 346  
 Heraclitus, 260  
 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 6, 9  
 Herzen, Alexander, 19, 23, 135n1,  
 142n8, 311  
 Hilty, Karl, 225n13  
 Himmler, Heinrich, 295  
 Hlukhiv, 6, 69, 324  
 Hlushkov, Viktor, 396  
 Hnidiches, 211  
 Hoffer, Eric, 36  
 Hohol, Mykola. *See* Gogol, Nikolai  
 Hohol, Ostap, 328  
 Holovatsky, Iakiv, 169n1, 335  
 Holovko, Andrii, 264n8  
 Homer, 338  
 Honta, Ivan, 140n5  
 Hordienko, Konstantyn, 56  
 Hrabianka, Hryhorii, 335  
 Hrabovsky, Leonid, 334  
 Hrebinka, Ievhen, 108n3, 115  
 Hrinchenko, Borys, 26, 27, 188,  
 336

- Hrushevsky, Mykhailo, 20, 23, 28, 32,  
 33, 34, 35, 219, 227, 248, 335, 396  
 Hryhoriiv, Matvii, 35  
 Hryshchuk, Anatolii, 399  
 Hugo, Victor, 270  
 Hulak, Mykola, 230  
 Hulak-Artemovsky, Petro, 14, 103,  
 115  
 Humboldt, Wilhelm, 170  
 Humeniuk, M., 338n8  
  
 Iablonska, Halyna, 399  
 Ianovsky, Iurii, 324n37  
 Iaroslav, 107  
 Iatskiv, Iaroslav, 399  
 Iavorsky, Stefan, 5  
 Iavorskys, 211  
 Iefremov, Serhii, 337  
 Iekaterinoslav, 313  
 Iesikov, Viktor, 399  
 Ievshan, Mykola, 273n6, 337  
 Iohansen, Maik, 337  
 Isaiah, 77  
 Isaiiw, Vsevolod, 256n1  
 Iurkevych, Pamfil, 9, 22, 146  
 Iuzefovich, Mikhail, 23  
 Ivan III, 190  
 Ivan IV, 155, 160  
 Ivanov, Vsevolod, 275n16  
 Ivchenko, Mykhailo, 337  
 Izgoev, A., 217  
 Iziaslav, Prince, 123  
 Izmailov, Vladimir, 44  
  
 Jan Kazimierz, 138, 165, 213n16  
 Job, 79  
 John, King, 157  
 Jonah, 79  
 Judas, 324  
 Jude, 80  
  
 Kachala, Stepan, 29, 162  
 Kadyrova, Larysa, 399  
 Kaffa, 96  
 Kaganovich, Lazar, 40  
 Kalnyshevsky, Petro, 191n3, 192  
 Kalynets, Ihor, 333  
 Kalynovych, Mykhailo, 337  
 Kapnist, Vasili, 12  
 Karadžić, Vuk, 104n11  
 Karmansky, Petro, 338  
 Karmeliuk, Ustym, 311  
 Karpenko, Vitalii, 399  
 Karpenko-Kary, Ivan, 323n32  
 Kataev, Valentin, 44  
 Katkov, Mikhail, 187n2, 221  
 Kersten, Kateryna, 21  
 Kharkiv, 29, 94, 140, 141, 167, 213n15,  
 219, 334  
 Kherson, 310, 316  
 Khmelnytsky, Bohdan, 3, 10, 29, 34,  
 54, 55, 56, 58, 82, 85, 86, 87, 98n4,  
 138, 139, 152, 155, 156, 157, 161, 164,  
 165, 202n3, 206, 209, 213, 256,  
 261n1, 267, 307, 308, 309, 319n11,  
 320, 328  
 Khmelnytsky, Iurii, 83  
 Kholodny, Mykola, 333  
 Kholodny, Petro, 339  
 Khvylovy, Mykola, 18, 38, 39, 40, 47,  
 269, 274n11, 280n4, 289, 326, 337  
 Kierkegaard, Søren, 22  
 Kiev (Kyiv), 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 20, 22, 32, 35,  
 43, 47, 63, 65, 69, 71, 74, 88, 89, 90,  
 92, 93, 94, 123, 140, 141, 143, 152,  
 156, 186, 190, 198, 201, 214, 218, 227,  
 243, 247, 260, 295, 296, 305, 309, 310,  
 313, 330, 331, 334, 341, 354, 382, 394  
 Kishka, Otaman, 154  
 Kisiel, Adam, 165  
 Kislovodsk, 32, 227

- Kistiakovsky, Bohdan, 30, 31, 214,  
     226n14  
 Kistiakovsky, George, 216  
 Kjellen, R., 263n6  
 Kliazma, 107  
 Kliuchevsky, Vasilii, 335  
 Kliuchnikov, Iurii, 271n3  
 Kobrynska, Natalia, 41, 284  
 Kochubei, Motria, 319n13  
 Kochubei, Vasyl, 319n13  
 Kohut, Zenon, 7, 211n13  
 Kolesnyk, Stepan, 399  
 Konotop, 319n12  
 Konysky, Georgii, 82, 111, 112  
 Kopylenko, Oleksander, 275n15  
 Koriak, Volodymyr, 336n5, 337  
 Korolenko, Vladimir, 211, 223n9  
 Koshyts, Oleksander, 339  
 Kosiv, 339  
 Kostenko, Lina, 323n34, 324, 333  
 Kostiuk, Platon, 399  
 Kostomarov, Mykola, 12, 13, 18, 19,  
     20, 22, 39, 94, 105, 112, 122, 135,  
     141nn6,7, 143, 168n2, 188, 189, 192,  
     198, 223, 230, 263, 335  
 Kosynsky, Kryshstof, 209, 306  
 Kotliarevsky, Ivan, 14, 103n6, 115  
 Kovalevsky, Maksym, 26  
 Kovtun, Volodymyr, 399  
 Kozhevnikov, Governor, 143  
 Kraków, 87, 251  
 Kravchuk, Leonid, 36, 400  
 Kremlin, 402  
 Kropyvnytsky, Marko, 323n31  
 Krushelnytska, Solomiia, 339  
 Kryvonos, Maksym, 308  
 Kuchma, Leonid, 394, 403  
 Kuindzhi, Arkhyp, 323n26  
 Kulish, Mykola, 323n30  
 Kulish, Panteleimon, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17,  
     18, 20, 22, 27, 37, 40, 101, 105, 188,  
     189, 190, 191, 192, 230, 262, 273, 335  
 Kulyk, Volodymyr, 49  
 Kuprin, Alexander, 44  
 Kuras, Ivan, 402  
 Kurbas, Les, 323n29  
 Kursk, 140, 283  
 Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Hryhorii, 14,  
     103, 108n3, 113, 114, 115  
 Kybalchych, Mykola, 20  
 Kyrychenko, Hryhorii, 333  
  
 Lavrynenko, Iurii, 45  
 Lawrence, T. J., 207n11  
 Lazarevsky, Oleksander, 335  
 Lebed, Dmytro, 280n3  
 Left Bank, 3, 8, 26, 98, 140, 202n3  
 Lenin, Vladimir, 38, 41, 260, 267, 270,  
     278, 302, 313, 314, 330, 336  
 Leningrad, 334, 358  
 Lermontov, Mikhail, 329  
 Leskov, Nikolai, 44  
 Leszczyński, Stanisław, 85  
 Levshin, Aleksei, 44  
 Levytsky, Orest, 212n14  
 Likhachev, Dmitrii, 44  
 London, 219  
 Louis XIV, 160  
 Louis XV, 5  
 Lublin, 91n7, 163n1  
 Lubny, 7, 71  
 Luckyj, George, 15  
 Lukash, Mykola, 338  
 Lunacharsky, Anatolii, 331nn1,2,  
     336n6  
 Lupii, Oles, 399  
 Luther, Martin, 224, 270  
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 279n2  
 Lviv, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 37, 184, 193,  
     227, 260, 284, 287, 318n5, 334, 339

- Lvov, Prince, 230  
 Lypa, Iurii, 43  
 Lypynsky, Viacheslav, 36, 37, 39, 251, 256n1, 287, 288, 318n6
- Magdeburg, 7, 181  
 Maiakovsky, Vladimir, 266  
 Makhno, Nestor, 35, 327n46  
 Maksymovych, Mykhailo, 88n1, 89n3, 90, 92, 93, 327, 335  
 Malaniuk, Ievhen, 45, 46, 316  
 Mamaisur, Borys, 333  
 Mandelshtam, Iurii, 337  
 Marat, Jean-Paul, 267n19  
 Markevych, Mykola, 15  
 Markovych, Opanas, 21  
 Marx, Karl, 28, 199, 270, 335  
 Masenko, Larysa, 12  
 Mazepa, Ivan, 3, 4, 5, 10, 45, 53, 55, 65, 69, 82, 84, 110, 206, 208, 209, 213, 261, 310, 314n13, 324n38, 325  
 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 263  
 Mechnikov, Illia, 323n25  
 Melnyk, Andrii, 42, 43, 295  
 Menshikov, Alexander, 155n1  
 Mentsynsky, Modest, 339  
 Methodius, St, 12, 13, 15, 20, 94, 101, 105, 141n7, 208, 230n1, 262, 360  
 Metlynsky, Amvrosii, 170n4  
 Miakotin, Venedikt, 204n6  
 Mickiewicz, Adam, 13, 276n21  
 Mikhnovsky, Mykola, 29, 30, 201  
 Mill, John Stuart, 42  
 Miłosz, Czesław, 13  
 Minin, Kuzma, 307  
 Minsk, 313n3  
 Mistral, Frédéric, 261n4, 329  
 Morozov, Konstantyn, 399  
 Moscow, 7, 21, 27, 35, 40, 41, 42, 46, 53, 90, 92, 99, 106, 107, 119, 140, 141, 146, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 190, 228, 249, 274, 275, 282, 289, 291, 292, 293, 294, 317, 319, 321, 322, 325, 334, 358
- Movchan, Pavlo, 399  
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 326  
 Muliava, Volodymyr, 399  
 Mushak, Iurii, 338  
 Mushketyk, Iurii, 399  
 Mussolini, Benito, 267  
 Mykolaiv, 310  
 Myshuha, Luka, 287n1  
 Myshuha, Oleksander, 339
- Nalyvaiko, Severyn, 306  
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 310  
 Narbut, Iurii, 323  
 Navrotsky, Volodymyr, 198  
 Nazaruk, Osyp, 39, 287  
 Nechai, Danylo, 308  
 Nechui-Levytsky, Ivan, 21, 26, 27, 184, 221n8, 336  
 Nemyrych, Iurii, 140  
 Neruda, Jan, 199  
 Nicholas I, 141, 142, 143, 155, 318n4  
 Nicholas II, 219, 230n2  
 Nikon, Patriarch, 5  
 Nikovsky, Andrii, 337  
 Nizhyn, 88  
 Novakivsky, Oleksa, 339  
 Novgorod, 95, 96, 119, 157, 159  
 Novhorod Siversky, 84, 165
- Obal, Petro, 339  
 Odessa, 219, 310  
 Ohloblyn, Oleksander, 10, 82  
 Opishnia, 339  
 Orlyk, Hryhor, 5, 19  
 Orlyk, Pylyp, 3, 4, 5, 8, 19, 53, 56, 63  
 Ostrohradsky, Mykhailo, 322n19  
 Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky, Dmitrii, 26

- Owen, Robert, 182
- Palladin, Oleksander, 396
- Paradzhanov, Serhii, 334
- Parashchuk, Mykhailo, 339
- Paton, Borys, 396
- Paul, 77
- Paul I, 155
- Pavliuk, Pavlo, 209
- Pavlov, Ivan, 317, 326
- Pavlyk, Mykhailo, 335
- Perebyinis, Petro, 399
- Pereiaslav, 4, 7, 13, 24, 29, 43, 83, 85,  
138, 156, 165, 202n3, 203, 294n6,  
205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 214, 302, 304,  
319
- Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, 309
- Perovska, Sofia, 20
- Peter I, 3, 5, 65, 66, 68, 99, 123, 154,  
155, 190, 218n5, 261n1, 270, 309n2,  
318n3, 324n38
- Petliura, Symon, 35, 45, 248, 271n4,  
316, 320
- Petrograd, 278
- Petrov, Oleksii, 141, 144
- Petrykivka, 339
- Petrytsky, Anatol, 339
- Picasso, Pablo, 339
- Pidmohyl'ny, Valerian, 337
- Pilniak, Boris, 275n14
- Plato, 77
- Plekhanov, Georgii, 313
- Pliushch, Leonid, 49
- Pluzhnyk, Ievhen, 324n36
- Podolynsky, Serhii, 26, 335
- Pohribny, Anatolii, 399
- Pokalchuk, Iurii, 399
- Poletyka, Hryhorii, 7, 71
- Polevoi, Nikolai, 102n4
- Poliukh, Ihor, 334
- Poltava, 3, 5, 53, 65, 83, 84, 88, 106,  
213, 261n1, 310, 319, 325
- Poltava, Petro, 43, 297
- Postyshev, Pavel, 41, 278
- Potapenko, 211
- Potebnia, Oleksander, 25, 26, 31, 167
- Pozharsky, Dmitrii, 307
- Prague, 45, 162, 282, 316
- Pritsak, Omelian, 5, 10, 36
- Procopius, 94
- Prokopovych, Teofan, 5, 6, 65
- Prymachenko, Maria, 339
- Psiol, Oleksandra, 14, 104n14
- Pskov, 157, 159
- Pugachëv, Iemelian, 311
- Pushkar (Pushkarenko), Martyn, 83,  
84, 319n10
- Pushkin, Alexander, 44, 90, 107, 112,  
266, 271, 325, 329
- Pyliavtsi, 165
- Pylypenko, Serhii, 274n12
- Pypin, Alexander, 185n1, 186
- Radishchev, Alexander, 311
- Radziwiłł, Stanisław, 164
- Rakushka-Romanovsky, Roman, 309
- Razin, Stepan, 311
- Reuter, Fritz, 224n10
- Riabchuk, Mykola, 49, 400
- Right Bank, 5, 8, 24, 218, 296
- Romanov dynasty, 32
- Romanovsky, Comrade, 281
- Rome, 65
- Romny, 71
- Rostopchina, Ievdokia, 104n13
- Rozumovskys, 186
- Rudnytska, Milena, 42, 284
- Rudnytsky, Ivan, 23, 25, 30, 34, 36,  
152, 211n12
- Rumiantsev, Peter, 318n3

- Rusov, Oleksander, 212n14  
 Ryleev, Kondratii, 44  
 Rylsky, Maksym, 338
- Šafařík, Joseph, 104n12  
 Sahaidachny, Petro, 96n3, 190  
 Salamis, 261  
 Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail, 186  
 Samara, 59  
 Samokish, Mykola, 323n27  
 Samovydyets, 335; *see also* Rakushka-Romanovsky, Roman  
 Samson, 79  
 San, 156  
 Saratov, 94, 143  
 Saunders, David, 6  
 Savonarola, 263  
 Scott, Sir Walter, 103, 109, 111, 115  
 Semenivka, 84  
 Semenko, Mykhail, 273n7, 337  
 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 6, 7  
 Sevastopil, 382  
 Shakespeare, William, 18, 20, 111, 189  
 Shalikhov, Peter, 44  
 Shchegolev, S., 21  
 Shelest, Petro, 330  
 Sheptytsky, Andrei, 43, 295, 296  
 Sherekh, Iurii. *See* Shevelov, George  
 Shevchenko, Taras, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 28, 44, 46, 101, 105, 116n9, 141, 143, 190, 192, 208, 212, 230, 264, 274, 312, 322, 328, 329, 335, 336  
 Shevchuk, Valerii, 4  
 Shevelov, George, 8, 40, 45, 167  
 Shkurupii, Geo, 337  
 Shlemkevych, Mykola, 45  
 Shostakovich, Dmitrii, 334  
 Shtefan, Augustyn, 296  
 Shukhevych, Roman, 42
- Shulgin, Vasilii, 329n48  
 Shumsky, Oleksander, 282n5  
 Sich, Zaporozhian, 56, 59, 132, 155, 181, 191, 306  
 Simeon, 145  
 Sinclair, Upton, 275n18  
 Skoropadsky, Pavlo, 35, 37, 251, 289, 320n17, 321  
 Skovoroda, Hryhorii, 8, 9, 22, 74, 103, 145, 263  
 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 40, 41, 278, 337  
 Slavynsky, Maksym, 329  
 Slisarenko, Oleksa, 337  
 Sluch, 156  
 Smirdin, Alexander, 89  
 Smirnova, Alexandra, 88  
 Smolych, Iurii, 333  
 Socrates, 9, 74  
 Sodom, 79  
 Sofia, 23, 152  
 Solomon, 74  
 Solovets Islands, 191n3  
 Solov'ev, Sergei, 112, 153, 335  
 Solov'ev, Vladimir, 22, 146  
 Sosiura, Volodymyr, 337  
 Sosnovsky, Mykhailo, 39  
 Spencer, Herbert, 195, 263  
 Spengler, Oswald, 40, 270n1  
 Sreznevsky, Izmail, 91n6  
 Stalin, Joseph, 40, 41, 42, 269, 314, 326  
 Stanyslaviv, 284  
 Starodub, 84  
 Stavy, 140  
 Stolypin, Peter, 314  
 St Petersburg, 8, 15, 71, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101, 105, 106, 141, 143, 154, 185, 188n1, 260, 311, 313, 316, 321, 327  
 Struve, Peter, 21, 31, 216  
 Stus, Vasyi, 333

Subtelny, Orest, 4, 5, 27  
 Sumtsov, Mykola, 219  
 Sumy, 354  
 Surkov, Alexei, 326n42  
 Suvorov, Alexander, 310  
 Sverstiuk, Ievhen, 399, 402  
 Svyrhovsky, Ivan, 96n2  
 Swidziński, Konstanty, 112  
 Sysyn, Frank, 211n12

Tahanrih, 282, 283  
 Taniuk, Les, 334  
 Tartuffe, 269  
 Ten, Borys, 338  
 Terletsky, Ostap, 335  
 Teteria, Pavlo, 83, 98n6, 319n9  
 Thiers, Louis Adolphe, 194  
 Tisa, 156  
 Titus Livius, 112  
 Tiutchev, Fedor, 266  
 Tkachenko, Valentyna, 323n35  
 Tolstoy, Alexei K., 44  
 Tolstoy, Lev, 271, 276  
 Topolia, Kyrylo, 102n4  
 Torquemada, Juan de, 266  
 Triasylo, Taras, 306  
 Troshchinskys, 211  
 Trypillia, 140  
 Tsvilyk, Pavlyna, 339  
 Tsybaliuk, Viktor, 399  
 Tuhan-Baranovsky, Mykhailo, 26  
 Tula, 15  
 Turgenev, Ivan, 186  
 Tychyna, Pavlo, 9, 265n15, 337  
 Tymoshenko, Stepan, 322n20  
 Tyshkevyches, 211

Ukrainka, Lesia, 38, 329n49  
 Ushakov, Vasilii, 91  
 Ustrialov, Nikolai, 136n3

Ustrialov, Nikolai V., 272n5

Vasylkiv, 140  
 Vatutin, Mykola, 42  
 Velychkivsky, Mykola, 43, 296  
 Velychko, Samiilo, 335  
 Vernadsky, George, 205n8  
 Vernadsky, Volodymyr, 396  
 Vienna, 27, 28, 193, 251, 260, 346  
 Vilnius, 101  
 Vistula, 164  
 Vladimir, 107, 119, 122  
 Vladimir-in-Volhynia, 123  
 Voinarovsky, Andrii, 85  
 Volga, 143  
 Volodymyr, Patriarch, 397  
 Volodymyr, Prince, 190n2  
 Voloshin, Maximilian, 337  
 Voltaire, 5, 270  
 Voronsky, Alexander, 274n13, 275  
 Vorony, Mykola, 273n6  
 Vovchok, Marko, 19  
 Vovk, Teodor, 212n14, 335  
 Vyhovsky, Ivan, 83, 94, 319n7, 320  
 Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, 35, 237, 248, 263n7, 264n11, 265, 323n33, 337  
 Vyshnevevskys, 136, 211

Warsaw, 45, 87, 164, 316  
 Washington, George, 267  
 Weber, Max, 31  
 Werther, 263  
 White Mountain, 186  
 Witte, Sergei, 219  
 Władysław, King, 165  
 Wrangel, Peter, 320nn16, 18  
 Württemberg, 270

Yaniv's'kyi, B., 100  
 Yeltsin, Boris, 317n2

Zalizniak, Maksym, 140n5, 311

Zamość, 164

Zawadski, 143

Zboriv, 138, 166

Zechariah, 78, 80

Zerov, Mykola, 337

Zhabotinsky, Vladimir, 216n2, 217

Zheliabov, Andrii, 21

Zhytetsky, Pavlo, 264n10, 268n21

Zhytomyr, 354

Ziber, Mykola, 335