



Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine

Peter J. Potichnyj



Die Meinungen, die in den vom BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR
OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN
herausgegebenen Veröffentlichungen geäußert werden, geben
ausschließlich die Auffassung der Autoren wieder.

© 1994 by Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und
internationale Studien, Köln

Abdruck und sonstige publizistische Nutzung – auch auszugsweise –
nur mit vorheriger Zustimmung des Bundesinstituts sowie mit Angabe
des Verfassers und der Quelle gestattet.

Bundesinstitut
für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien
Lindenbornstraße 22, D-50823 Köln , Telefon 02 21/57 47-0, Telefax 02 21/57 47-1 10

ISSN 0435-7183

Content

	Page
Kurzfassung.....	I
Introduction.....	1
1. Origins of the Parties.....	1
2. Classificatory Schemes.....	5
3. Political Space.....	9
4. Parties and Public Opinions.....	12
5. Elections and Party Politics.....	15
6. Political Attitudes and Political Struggle.....	19
7. Presidential Elections.....	19
8. Rating of the Parties.....	22
9. Electoral Chances and Bloc Formation.....	25
Diagrams.....	28
Appendices.....	34
Notes.....	39
Summary.....	43

Stand: September 1993

Der Verfasser dieses "Berichts" ist Professor für Politische Wissenschaften an der McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario/Canada.

Redaktion: Christel Dittmann

Peter J. Potichnyj

Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine

Bericht des BIOst Nr. 1/1994

Kurzfassung

Im einleitenden Teil des Berichts gibt der Autor einen allgemeinen Überblick über die heute bestehenden ukrainischen Parteien und - soweit möglich - macht er Angaben über deren Entstehung, Registrierung, Parteiführer und die Zahl der Mitglieder. Im Anhang werden die weniger bedeutenden politischen Parteien, regionalen Bewegungen und verschiedenen Bündnisse genannt.

Danach folgen verschiedene Klassifizierungsmodelle, die versuchen, die Parteien in ein Rechts-Links-Schema von Anarchisten und Neo-Kommunisten bis zu radikalen Nationalisten einzuordnen. Die vergleichende Analyse dieses Ansatzes zeigt, daß die evolutionäre Natur des Parteiensystems selbst, die Parteiprogramme sowie die einzelnen Auffassungen der verschiedenen Autoren Einfluß darauf hatten, wie die Parteien klassifiziert worden sind.

Um den "politischen Raum" der Parteien besser zu verstehen, wurde versucht, die Parteien auf einer X-Y-Achse einzuordnen und so ihre Positionen in zentralen politischen Fragen wie Demokratie, Autoritarismus, nationale Selbständigkeit, Föderalismus, Plan- und Marktwirtschaft, Privat- und Staatseigentum, die Rolle des Staates bei der sozialen Absicherung, ökologische Probleme, Inhalt und Kontrolle des Bildungssystems, Gewissensfreiheit und Kirche-Staat-Beziehungen, das Nationalitätenproblem und die Streitkräfte einschließlich Kernwaffen deutlich zu machen. Dieser neue Ansatz vermittelt eine klare Übersicht über die Situation und bietet dem Leser eine interessante Gruppierung der Parteien in klar definierten programmatischen Gruppen im Hinblick auf eine Vielfalt politischer Probleme. Diese Art der Klassifizierung der politischen Parteien kann auch benutzt werden, um künftige Entwicklungen der politischen Parteien zu prognostizieren, insofern als es hier auch um Wahlblöcke und Bündnisbildungen oder vielleicht sogar um eine mögliche Verschmelzung geht.

Das Umfeld, in dem die Parteien agieren und das Ausmaß, in dem sie die Meinungen großer Teile der Bevölkerung widerspiegeln, sind schwer zu beschreiben, weil die Parteien keine Möglichkeit hatten, ihre Programme in direkten Wahlen (außer den Nachwahlen von 1992) zu testen. Einige Meinungsumfragen, die teilweise im Bericht wiedergegeben werden, zeigen, daß sich die allgemeinen Sorgen über Wirtschaftsprobleme in den letzten zwei Jahren in bedeutendem Maß verstärkt haben. Die Massenstreiks im Donbass sind der beste Beweis für diesen Wandel. Doch die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung wahrt den gesunden Menschenverstand und die Selbstbeherrschung, hat große soziale Explosionen wenigstens bis jetzt vermieden und kann daher ein relativ stabiles Umfeld für den Aufbau eines lebensfähigen Mehrparteiensystems bieten.

Der nächste Abschnitt des Berichts beschäftigt sich mit den Folgen der Wahlen von 1990, der Situation in der Verchovna Rada und den Versuchen der verschiedenen politischen Gruppierungen und Bündnisse, neue Parlamentswahlen durch eine forcierte Auflösung der alten gesetzgebenden Versammlung herbeizuführen. Dann

II

folgen eine Einschätzung des Einflusses des Referendums und der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom Dezember 1991 und eine Beurteilung des Wahlpotentials der verschiedenen Präsidentschaftskandidaten.

Welche praktischen Auswirkungen solche Erwartungen haben können, wird aus den jüngsten Umfragen deutlich, die zeigen, daß alle politischen Parteien in der Ukraine gegenwärtig einen großen Popularitätsverlust erleiden und daß mit Ausnahme von Präsident L. Kravcuk, der weiterhin den ersten Platz bei der Bevölkerung einnimmt, alle anderen aussichtsreichen Kandidaten einen schweren Popularitätsverlust in den Meinungsumfragen hinnehmen mußten.

Dann folgt die Einschätzung der Wahlchancen der verschiedenen politischen Parteien, die mit einer Betrachtung über die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Wahlblöcken und Bündnisbildungen im Vorfeld der bevorstehenden Wahlen endet.

Introduction

An attempt to discuss political parties in Ukraine is fraught with numerous difficulties. Ukraine achieved independence on August 24th, 1991. The multi-party system came into being officially only after the removal of the infamous Article 6 of the Soviet Ukrainian Constitution in 1990, and is still in a formative period. Moreover, most of the parties have been able to test their strength in the electoral contest only indirectly and with less than conclusive results. The by-elections which were held in the beginning of 1993 were not seriously contested by the existing parties and most of the candidates presented themselves as non-party or independent candidates.

My task, in brief, is to discuss the origins and the main stages of development of the multi-party system in Ukraine, to offer a classification of the existing parties, to use Giovanni Sartori's expression, according to their "ideological space", and finally, to offer some general observations about possible bases of social support for the fledgling party institutions, and their further evolution.

1. Origins of the Parties

The development of the multi-party system in Ukraine went through roughly two periods, the Communist and the post-Communist. The Communist period can be further subdivided into two segments - 1987 through elections of March 1990, and March 1990 through August 1991. The post-Communist stage began with the Ukrainian declaration of independence on August 24, 1991 and continues to this day. Although I will concentrate on the second period, I feel that a few words about the earlier stage of development might be in order here.

Between 1987 and March 1990, we see attempts to organize a broad forum of democratic forces. This period was characterized by the mushrooming of political clubs and of the people's front, which in turn provided a basis for the formation of political parties. A very important factor in this development was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHS), whose activity was typically political in nature. In this connection, the formation of the Ukrainian Democratic Union (UDS) should be mentioned, whose roots can be traced to the Ukrainian Culturo-

logical Club (UKK). As well the activities of various organizations such as People's Unions (Spilky) in Support of Reconstruction in Vinnytsia, Khmel'nyts'ke e.t.c. are also important. In the fall of 1988, the Writers' Union of Ukraine decided to create the Peoples' Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction popularly known as the RUKH.

To be precise, the RUKH as an institution came into being on 8-10 September 1989. Ivan Drach became its head, while Mykhailo Horyn', one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHS) took charge of the Secretariat. From the very beginning the RUKH united within its ranks individuals of various political persuasions (from Communists to members of the UHS). It was natural, therefore, that quite soon, within its ranks we saw the appearance of various political tendencies which provided the impetus for the formation of several political parties.

In the fall of 1989 attempts were made to create the Green Party (PZU), and somewhat earlier, in Riga, Latvia, partially on the foundation of the Ukrainian Democratic Union (UDS), the Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UNDL) came into being. Finally, in October 1989, in L'viv, the Ukrainian National Party (UNP) was founded, one of the most radical parties in Ukraine at that time. The first period ends with the elections of March 1990, in which the RUKH with the help of the Democratic Bloc that was set up for this purpose, was able to win a significant number of deputies to Verkhovna Rada and to create the Narodna Rada as an opposition group to the ruling Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU).

The second segment of the Communist period (March -August 1990), is characterized by further differentiation of various groups within the RUKH, and by the appearance of new parties on the scene. Even though the RUKH was not as yet transformed into a political party, out of its midst there appeared the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), while on the basis of the UHS, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) was formed.

During this period, largely as a result of the removal of Article 6 from the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, we see the appearance of a large number of political parties and groups. During this time came into being the All-Ukrainian Political Union "State Independence of Ukraine" (DSU), the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UKhDP), the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU), the

Unified Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (OSDPU), the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party (USelDP), the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party (UNDP), People's Party of Ukraine (NPU), the Green Party of Ukraine (PZU), the Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine (LDPU), the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDVU), the Ukrainian Liberal Democratic Union (ULDS), the Confederation of the Anarchists of Ukraine (KAU), the Party of Slavic Rebirth (PSV), the Marxist Party of Ukraine (MPU), the Alliance of Socialist, Workers and Left Forces of Ukraine for People's Selfrule or Left Alliance (AL).

This process of party creation continued in the second or the post-Communist period. The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), which was organized in place of the banned KPU as well as many other political parties, groups and alliances came into being during this time. One of them, for example, is the Ukrainian Christian Party of Women (UKhPZh). But there are others as well, both on the national but also regional level, especially in Crimea (See: Appendix I and II). The Ukrainian multi-party system has been enriched in 1992 by several new organizations such as the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP) of Stepan Khmara, an offshoot of the URP, the Ukrainian National Conservative Party (UNKP) of Viktor Rodionov, (from a merger of UNP and UNDP), the Ukrainian Party of Justice (UPS) of Afghan fighters and veterans, the Party of Labour (PP), the Labour Congress (TK), the Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice (UPSSP), the Party of Economic Rebirth of Crimea (PEVK), the Peasant Party of Ukraine (SelPU) and the Ukrainian Party of Lovers of Beer (UPLP).¹

It is in the second, or the post-Communist period, and after the banning of the KPU, that establishment of a certain political balance within the country became possible. The new Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) that was formally organized on June 19, 1993 at its First Congress (some insisted on calling it the 19th Party Congress), was officially registered on October 5, 1993 with an alleged membership of 128,000. This makes it the largest political party in Ukraine, and the 29th party in order of registration.

The array of the existing parties, with some basic information about them, can be seen in Table I.

TABLE I
Ukrainian Political Parties

PARTY	ORG.DATE	REG.DATE	MEMBERS	VR DEP.	LEADERS
1. UNP	21.X.89	-	100	?	H.PRYKHOD'KO
2. RPU	3.IV.90	-	?	?	V.PEKARS'KYI
3. DSU	7-8.IV.90	yes	650	?	V.SLEMKO (I.KANDYBA)
4. UKhDP	23.IV.90	14.XI.91	7000	?	V.SICHKO
5. URP	28-30.IV.90	5.XI.91	12000	10	M.HORYN'
6. KAU	1.V.90	-	?	?	?
7. SDPU	25-27.V.90	1.XI.90	1500	2	O.SUHONIAKO
8. OSDPU	25-27.V.90	15.XI.90	1300	1	V.MOSKOVKA
9. USelDP	9.VI.90	15.I.91	4000	1	S.PLACHYNDA
10. UNDP	16-17.VI.90	-	1811	?	IE.CHERNYSHOV
11. NPU	22.IX.90	28.VIII.91	4200	1	L.TABURIANS'KYI
12. PZU	28-30.IX.90	24.V.91	10000	10?	V.KONONOV
13. PSS	X.90	-	?	?	?
14. UNS	XI.90	-	1000?	?	? (SNUM, May 1990)
15. ULDS	24.XI.90	-	?	?	?
16. LDPU	24-25.XI.90-	1000	?		V.KLYMCHUK
17. PDVU	1-2.XII.90	27.IX.91	4000	36	V.FILENKO
18. DPU	15-18.XII.9	28.VI.91	4000	43	V.IAVORIVS'KYI
19. PSV	VII.90	-	100	?	IU.CHEMERYS
20. KDPU	18-19.V.91	-	?	?	V.ZOLOTARIOV
21. LPU	12.IX.91	10.X.91	40,000	?	I.MARKULOV
22. SPU	26.X.91	25.XI.91	50,000	30	O.MOROZ
23. UKhPZH	23-24.XI.91		2000	?	O.HORYN'
24. MPU	91?	-	?	?	? (Marxist Party)
25. AL	91?	-	?	?	? (Alians Livykh)
26. Monarch	?	-	?	?	?
27. UNRP	?	-	500	?	M.STASIUK
28. SelPU	25-27.I.92	-	?1 mil.	?	S.DOVHAN' (Sel.Spil.)
29. KRPU	30.I.92	-	?	?	?
30. PSIE	18-19.IV.92	-	500	?	O.BAKHTIAROV
31. PriP	29-30.V.92	-	?	?	H.DOBRYNS'KYI
32. UNSP	?		?	?	?
33. UKRP		yes	?	1	S.KHMARA
34. UNKP	30.VI.92	yes	300	?	V.RODIONOV
35. UPS		-	?	?	M.PAVLOVS'KYI
36. PP	26.XII.92	yes	?	?	V.LANDYK
37. TK	26.XII.92	27.I.93	?	?	?
38. UPSSP		-	?	?	?
39. UPLP		yes	?	?	V.IERMAKOV
40. KhDPU		yes	6000	?	V.S.ZHURAVS'KYI
41. PEVK		yes	?	?	E.KOPYLENKO
42. TKU	24.IV.93	24.IX.93	2000	?	A.MATVIENKO
43. KPU	19.VI.93	5.X.93	128000	?	P.SYMONENKO

Source: Various sources compiled by the author. UNP=Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Partia; RPU=Respublikans'ka Partia Ukrainy; DSU=Derzhavna Samostiinist' Ukrainy; UKhDP=Ukrains'ka Krystians'ko-Demokratychna Partia; URP=Ukrains'ka Respublikans'ka Partia; KAU=Konferentsia Anarkhistiv Ukrainy; SDPU=Sotsial-Demokratychna Partia Ukrainy; OSDPU=Ob'iednana Sotsial-Demokratychna Partia Ukrainy; USelDP=Ukrains'ka Selians'ko-Demokratychna Partia; UNDP=Ukrains'ka Narodno-

Demokratychna Partiiia; NPU=Narodna Partiiia Ukrainy; PZU=Partiiia Zelenykh Ukrainy; PSS=Partiiia Sotsial'noi Spravedlyvosti; ULDS=Ukrains'ka Liberal'no-Demokratychna Spilka; LDPU=Liberal'no-Demokratychna Partiiia Ukrainy; PDVU=Partiiia Demokratychnoho Vidrozhennia Ukrainy; DPU=Demokratychna Partiiia Ukrainy; PSV=Partiiia Slav'ians'koho Vidrozhennia; UKhPZh=Ukrains'ka Khristians'ka Partiiia Zhinok; SPU=Sotsialistychna Partiiia Ukrainy; MPU=Marksysyts'ka Partiiia Ukrainy; AL=Al'ians Livykh; UNRP=Ukrains'ka Natsional-Radykal'na Partiiia; UNS=Ukrains'ka Natsionalistychna Spilka; SelpU=Selians'ka Partiiia Ukrainy; KRPU=Komunistychna Robitnycha Partiiia Ukrainy; UNSP=Ukrains'ka Natsional-Sotsialistychna Partiiia; UKRP=Ukrains'ka Konservatyvna Respublikans'ka Partiiia; UNKP=Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Konservatyvna Partiiia; UPS=Ukrains'ka Partiiia Spravedlyvosti; PP=Partiiia Pratsi; TK=Trudovyi Kongres; UPSSP=Ukrains'ka Partiiia Solidarnosti i Sotsial'noi Spravedlyvosti; UPLP=Ukrains'ka Partiiia Liubyteliv Pyva; PSie=Partiiia Slovians'koi Iednosti; PriP=Partiiia Robitnykiv i Promyslovtsiv; PEVK=Partiiia Ekonomichnoho Vidrozhennia Krymu; TKU=Trudovyi Kongres Ukrainy; KPU=Komunistychna Partiiia Ukrainy.

2. Classificatory Schemes

Anatolii Sliusarenko and Mykola Tomenko in their pamphlet "Novi politychni partii Ukrainy" in addition to classifying various groupings according to their stand on the future statehood of Ukraine (Federalists, Confederalists and Proponents of independence), also grouped them into Liberals, Social Democrats and Communists (Socialists).²

Valentyna Drach in her interesting article³ also divided the parties into three categories: a) National-Democratic; b) Liberal-Social; c) Communist. In her opinion, the first two groupings viewed themselves in opposition to the Communists, but they differed among themselves on the statehood for Ukraine. The National-Democratic wing stood for an independent, unified Ukraine outside of the USSR. The Liberal-Social grouping preferred a sovereign Ukraine within some association of republics, while the Communists, in line with Gorbachev's thinking, expressed themselves in favour of a sovereign Ukraine within a renewed Union.

Still another classification was offered by Artur Bilous.⁴ Unlike Sliusarenko and Drach, he sees five main tendencies in the political spectrum of Ukraine, which he labeled as Integral-Nationalist, National-Democratic, General Democratic, State-Bureaucratic and Socialist.⁵

Among the Integral-Nationalists he places the UNS, UNP, DSU, UNA, SNUM and partially UKhDP, as well as the radical wing of the URP.⁶

The National-Democratic grouping, according to him, encompasses DPU, SDPU, URP, and RUKH.⁷ The social basis of these parties is found among the creative intelligentsia, peasant masses of Halychyna and among the workers who only recently arrived in the cities from the villages.

The General-Democratic grouping includes the PDVU, PZU, OSDPU, SDPU, and USDP, all of whom in 1992 have come together in the coalition known as the "New Ukraine".⁸

The State-Bureaucratic tendency is actually the strongest but least capable of a clear definition. The majority of representatives of this grouping are not members in any political party, yet they are in positions of power. For this reason this "non-party bureaucracy" is also known as the "party in power" with Leonid Kravchuk at its head. The old structures of trade unions, of military - industrial complex and of state administration provide the social foundation for this "Kravchuk's party".⁹

Bilous sees the Socialist tendency as being represented solely by the SPU.¹⁰ Its social basis is provided by unqualified workers, some peasants, and the orthodox Communists and Soviet veterans.

Volodymyr Lytvyn, on the other hand, speaks of five groupings of parties: Left, Left-Centrist, Centrist, Right-Centrist, and Right parties in Ukraine.¹¹ Unlike other analysts, he correctly identifies these groupings as proto-parties.¹² He also feels that the multi-party system usually reflects the society in which it exists and, therefore, one should treat these organizations as they are without making them either too important or too comical. He strongly feels that a proper diagnosis of the contemporary political situation requires a careful analysis of the activity of all existing parties as well as their leaders, and not merely the large ones. In his opinion, it is those groupings, largely "decorative, or even theatrical, which demonstrates the chimerical and limited nature of democratic procedures that are being introduced, the freedom of thought and political tolerance - the potential, in other words, of the 'human material' that eventually will decide the fate of the state".¹³

Mykhailo Pashkov, on the other hand, in his unpublished paper, classifies existing political groupings into Left, Moderately Left, Left-Centre, Liberal-Centre, Right-Centre, and Right categories.¹⁴

A comparison of these classification schemes clearly shows the evolving nature of the political spectrum in Ukraine. While earlier classifications saw only three major ideological orientations the subsequent ones already show five or six such groupings. V. Drach did not account for the existence of the "Party in Power", while Bilous tended to overemphasize the importance of both the integral-nationalist and the socialist tendencies. At this stage of development, it is probably closer to the truth to regard the "integral-nationalists" as simply a radical wing of the National Democrats, although this categorization would hardly be acceptable to some of these groups. This may be the reason, in addition to their small number, that very little attention is being paid to their activities either in Ukraine or outside its borders.¹⁵ Also, while the SPU and KPU, are numerically the largest parties, they are definitely only two of a number of socialist groupings on the left, most of whom, including the SPU and the KPU, are not very popular with the electorate.

Generally speaking, the National-Democratic wing was encompassed within the RUKH, a movement which stood first and foremost for a parliamentary road to power. Its political image came from the fact that a number of its leaders won parliamentary seats either in the Republic or on an All-Union level. Likewise, as a result of the March 1990 elections, RUKH supporters held the reins of power in all three western provinces.

It was not, however, a politically homogenous grouping, and could be viewed as being composed of three sectors: 1. The National-Democratic grouping, that was bent on compromise even with the Communists. The prominent representatives of this point of view were Dmytro Pavlychko, and Volodymyr Iavorivs'kyi; 2. The National-Centrist grouping, represented by the URP. Its leaders, like Levko Lukianenko, and Mykhailo Horyn', almost all former political prisoners, had and continue to have a large amount of authority; 3. The National-Radical wing that was politically organized within the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly (UMA-presently Ukrainian National Assembly-UNA), and which declared itself in opposition even to RUKH itself.¹⁶

For the reasons mentioned above, the URP should be considered the most influential party among the National Democrats. However, the party discipline with its echoes of democratic centralism, prevented it from becoming a leading party. It also lacked a solid economic programme and was emphasizing the principles of "democratic nationalism".

Politics, however, allows for a periodic change in the existing alignment of forces, and therefore, a possibility of an alliance between the URP and UNA in certain circumstances should not altogether be excluded. The other coalition between the DPU, the PDVU, and more centrist forces, which was in the making for some time, resulted in the alliance of parties known as "Nova Ukraina".¹⁷

The KPU, or at least its Parliamentary wing, was divided into several groupings. But the two main wings came to be known as the "Sovereign-Communists" and the "Empire-Communists". The "Sovereign" group encompassed the Demoplatform (some 14 deputies in VR), which gave rise to PDVU and DPU, the Non-aligned (some 89 deputies) and the Group of 239 (later split into two factions 113 and 126). Now that the KPU is once again in operation it will be interesting to see how many Verkhovna Rada deputies will declare themselves as members.¹⁸

Among the national-radicals a small step in the direction of consolidation took place when the two oldest political parties, the UNP and the UNDP decided to unite and to create the Ukrainian National-Conservative Party (UNKP) under the leadership of Viktor Rodionov.¹⁹

As is clear from this brief résumé, a process of the creation of parties and groups continues unabated, and encompasses a full array of political persuasions from anarchists, camouflaged communists, socialists, social-democrats, "greens", liberals, peasant and christian democrats, national democrats, monarchists, to national-socialists. In fairness, it should be pointed out that in Ukraine, unlike in Russia, there are no strong political groupings of fascist or neo-fascist persuasion. However, small groups do exist. On January 10, 1992 in Volyn came into being a National-Socialist organization whose slogan is: "Ukraine for the Ukrainians", which offers a familiar promise that "we shall have order no matter what the price, even if we have to achieve it by brute force".²⁰

More recently (July 1992) a Socialist-Nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU) came into being in L'viv which is labeled by at least one newspaper as a "fascist" organization.²¹ In Poltava, on the other hand, there exists the National-Socialist Party of Ukraine (NSPU).²²

3. Political Space

Let us now turn to the political/ideological space of the parties we have been discussing. A classification of parties offered by various analysts has been mentioned earlier. A more traditional positioning of the parties on a left-right continuum combined with additional dimensions in order to see party clustering is also possible. This was done in a number of diagrams appended to this report. An authoritarian-democratic clustering of parties can be seen from Diagram I. This ordering presents us with five clusters Left-Democratic, Left-Authoritarian, Centrist, Right-Democratic and Right-Authoritarian. It should be clearly understood that this positioning is based entirely on the political programmes of the parties and, therefore, can be regarded only as approximate.

Another interesting dimension that can be constructed, represents the position of the parties on the Ukrainian statehood. Until very recently the SPU/KPU with its satellites, strongly argued for the creation of a renewed union, which placed them among the supporters of some form of a post-Soviet federation.²³

In the earlier period of their formation, the OSDP, the LDPU, and the PDVU could be classified as supporters of a confederal solution. Most of the other parties supported full independence for Ukraine, however, even here, two subgroups could be identified. One of the subgroups strived for independence via the parliamentary road, and the existing political institutions. The SDPU, the DPU, the URP, and the UKhDP belonged to this category. The second subgroup, did not recognize the legitimacy of the existing political structures and considered the Union Treaty of 1922 as illegal. These parties, for example, the UNP, the UNDP, the USelDP and some others, became members of the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly (UMA). Some of them even called for a boycott of the December referendum, although, in the end, they fully supported its outcome.²⁴

After the attempted coup d'état of August 1991, and after the proclamation of Ukraine's independence on 24 August 1991, the positions of the parties on this crucial question have shifted considerably. The KPU became illegal and experienced considerable loss of membership. Its belated support for independence did not seem to help it out of its crisis. The new party was organized in its place which called itself the SPU. Among other groups and parties, the supporters of the confederal solution have also undergone considerable reorientation in their views. Now many among them also support the idea independence, but definitely not all of them. They continue to differ with the UNA, but also other parties on such issues as the necessity of an economic union among the successor states of the former USSR, as well as on the need to maintain existing political institutions in Ukraine which were inherited from the past. This "socialist" position is not very popular in Ukraine. The new coalition of parties on the left which called itself "Nova Ukraina", prudently declared itself a "right-center coalition". The positions of the parties on the question of Ukrainian independence can be seen from Diagram II.

It is worthwhile as well to look at the party positions on a variety of questions, such as the need to create armed forces, organization of the economy, ecology, church-state relations, welfare, education and the nationalities.

Diagram III represents the stand of the parties on the economy. The supporters of the planned economy are the remnants of the former KPU and its satellites. The rest of the parties are strongly for private property and the market economy, with a number of parties that are proponents of a mixed system of plan and market economy.

The question of social protection is extremely important in a country where the former state monopoly in this field prevented the development of any private or charitable organizations or schemes which would cater to human needs. The positions of the parties on this question are plotted on Diagram IV.

The ecological principles, the conditions of life of the population and the danger of nuclear and chemical pollution is very high on the agenda of political parties, as can be seen from Diagram V.

The position of the parties on the question of education is represented in Diagram VI and on the relation of church and state and the freedom of conscience can be seen from Diagram VII. One exception to the two clusters on this question appears to be the DSU which proposes some controls for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine as an imperial institution.

Another very interesting point has to do with inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine. The stand of the parties on this issue is represented in Diagram VIII. Majority of the parties tend to support the principles of national-cultural autonomy for the minorities. This is true for radical nationalists and even neo-communists, although there are also significant differences among them. Ethnic peace in Ukraine is probably the outcome of the widespread consensus on this potentially explosive issue.

Finally, it is worthwhile to look at the position of the political parties on the question of the Armed Forces of Ukraine which is represented in Diagram IX. This question has been in the forefront of attention for a long time and to this day seems to be a bone of contention between the Russian leadership that would have preferred to retain unified control over the armed forces, and Ukraine which opted for its own defence.

The party political programmes do not contain any information on the question whether Ukraine ought to be armed with nuclear arms. However, a survey of party activists (N=85) in Kiev in November 1992 did produce an interesting although a limited response on this question.²⁵

About one third (33 per cent), declared unequivocal support for the retention of nuclear arms, while 15 per cent declared themselves unequivocally for the rejection of nuclear arms. The largest group, some 48 per cent felt that Ukraine should give up its nuclear weapons but only if it obtained proper security guarantees from the Western powers. The rest (4 per cent), either did not respond or gave various unclear answers.

The nationality breakdown on this question provided the following outcome: some 45 per cent Ukrainians felt that the nuclear arms should remain in Ukraine but only 5 per cent of Russians thought so. About an equal portion of Ukrainians (15 per cent) and Russians (16 per cent), and 33 per cent of others were in favour of the unconditional removal of nuclear arms. A conditional removal of nuclear

arms tied to strong security guarantees was supported by 78 per cent of Russians, 40 per cent Ukrainians, and 67 per cent of others.

The party breakdown on the question of nuclear arms produced the following results:

TABLE II

Party	Nuclear Ukraine	Uncond. Removal	Removal w. Guarantees
UKhDP	100%	-	-
URP	88%	-	12%
SDPU	60%	20%	20%
SelPU	60%	-	40%
Rukh	50%	-	50%
Nonp.	36%	14%	50%
PDVU	22%	11%	67%
SPU	17%	17%	66%
PZU	-	50%	50%
LPU	-	27%	73%
UNKP	-	-	100%

Source: Aster, H., Potichnyj, P.J., Cowan, E., The Pragmatics of Democratic Society Project: Campaigns and Elections. Final Report Submitted to the Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe, External Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada. March 12, 1993. See also: Solchanyk, R., "Ukraine's Search for Security", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, No. 21, May 1993.

4. Parties and Public Opinions

As was pointed out earlier the existing parties had no real opportunity to test their programmes in direct elections. It is, therefore, difficult to state that their positions reflect the views of the population at large. One approach to answer that question would be to use survey data. However, the opinion polls, although conducted in Ukraine by various organizations, are not readily available to us and quite often are difficult to assess as to their reliability. Therefore, only a limited view of what the people think can be obtained from the surveys that were carried out in Ukraine in 1992 and 1993.

One of the surveys in 1992, for example, attempted to test the intensity of concern among the population to a number of socio-economic problems and the readiness to accept various elements of a market economy, and especially, the level of support among various social strata for the introduction of privatization schemes and of the free prices.

At that time, on a scale of 0 to 10, the ecological situation received the highest concern (10), followed by the consumer market (9), social justice (7), medical services (6), and the wages and housing (5).²⁶

The population was most ready for the introduction of the privatization of housing (8), followed by the privatization of land (7), denationalization of enterprises (6), freedom for private enterprises (5), and the free prices (4).²⁷

Various social strata of the population, however, reacted differently to the question of introducing free prices or denationalizing of the state enterprises. The entrepreneurs, for example, strongly supported the policy of denationalizing the enterprises (8), followed by the intelligentsia (6), engineering-technical workers (5), workers (4.5), peasants (4), economic managers (3.5), and pensioners (3.5).²⁸

The introduction of free prices again received strongest support among the entrepreneurs (8), followed by economic managers (6), intelligentsia (5), peasantry (4.5), engineering-technical workers (4), workers (3.5), and pensioners (3).²⁹ A more recent survey shows a clear shift in the attitudes of the population on the question of food, prices, ecology, and crime, among other issues, and the potential for social protest.

TABLE III

Distribution of Responses in Different Regions of Ukraine to the Questions: 1. In what case do you think most people in your locality may take to the streets to stage a violent protest? 2. What can force you personally to take to the street?

CAUSES	REGIONS							
	ZAKARPATTIA		LVIV		KRYM		KIEV	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
No basic food staples	40	36	50	33	65	60	60	46
Prices cont. to grow	34	26	44	35	51	44	49	37
No heat in apartments	15	13	15	7	32	28	48	37
Crime becomes rampant	28	26	27	3	39	38	44	39
No public transport	9	7	17	9	22	18	43	25
Wage freeze imposed	19	17	33	21	37	33	36	25
Rent is raised sharply	12	9	16	12	30	28	32	27
Environment deteriorates	20	17	14	16	20	22	27	30
Human rights violated	13	17	16	16	24	31	23	26
Trains do not run	9	6	12	8	15	10	14	9
Discrimination b.of lang	7	6	1	2	27	28	13	11
Econom. reform hindered	17	12	14	11	8	8	10	10
Travel Russia not free	5	3	4	3	33	33	8	9
Ostankino broadc. disc.	5	3	4	3	30	26	6	6
Verkh. Rada not dissolv.	4	5	6	4	2	4	4	3
Auth.deaf to natl.idea	7	3	10	9	2	2	3	5
Planes do not fly	1	1	3	2	5	4	3	3
Econ.reforms speeded up	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	1
Verkh.Rada dissol.early	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Other reasons	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	4
Will not take to street	24	35	13	26	9	10	13	21
Hard to say	20	14	15	17	10	9	10	12

Source: Postfactum News Agency: Ukraine Newsletter # 4 (Postfactum Analytical Series No. 59), 1993, p. 17; See also: Rhodes, Mark, "The Former Soviet Union and the Future: Facing Uncertainty", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. II, No. 24, June 1993, pp. 52-55.

The economic difficulties, price growth, wage freezes, municipal transport interruptions, lack of heat and rampant crimes are issues that concern the people very much, and many are quite willing to engage in some form of social protest. Table IV shows proportions of inhabitants in four regions of Ukraine and various forms of protest they are willing to support.

TABLE IV

Proportion of Inhabitants in Different Regions of Ukraine who Support Some or Other Acts of Social Protest (in Percentages)

FORM OF PROTEST	REGION			
	ZAKARPATTIA	LVIV	KRYM	KIEV
Critical reports in the press	55	72	64	67
Authorized rallies and processions	44	64	68	57
Collecting signatures for petitions	39	60	53	40
Participation in electoral campaigns	41	59	48	34
Threat of strike action	16	35	41	27
Boycotting orders of authorities	14	21	35	24
Unsanctioned rallies and processions	8	12	21	19
Picketing of government buildings	11	21	24	19
Protest hunger strikes	7	17	16	12
Illegal strike action	8	9	16	12
Raising illegal armed groups	8	15	9	7

Source: Postfactum News Agency: Ukraine Newsletter # 4 (Postfactum Analytical Series No. 59), 1993, p. 18.

The overall conclusion from the study is that despite a high degree of readiness for participation in social protest demonstrations, (known in political science literature as 'elite-challenging' modes of participation³⁰), majority of the population keep their common sense and self-control, which has made it possible for Ukraine to avoid massive social explosions at least until now, something that may give hope for peace in the future. In this relatively stable environment it should also be possible to build a more viable multi-party system.

5. Elections and Party Politics

Let us turn now to Parliamentary (Verkhovna Rada) elections of March, 1990 and the Presidential elections of December 1, 1991. What do they tell us about the relative party strength in the electorate? Table V represents the national and gender distribution of the elected deputies as compared with the national composition of the population.³¹

TABLE V

Nationality and Sex of Deputies

Oblast'	Ukrainian	Russian	Belo-russian	Jewish	Bulgarian	Armenian	German
Kiev city	20(1)	2					
Vinnitsia	15	2					
Volyn	8	1					
Voroshylivhrad (Luhans'ke)	14	10		1			
Dnipropetrovs'ke	22	12					
Donetske	26	17(2)		1			1
Zhytomyr	10(1)	2	2				
Zakarpattia	10	1					
Zaporizhzhia	12	6					
Ivano-Frankivs'ke	12						
Kiev	16(2)	1					
Kirovohrad	7	4					
Sevastopol city		4					
Krym	7	9	1	1			
Lviv	24(1)						
Mykolaiv	9	2					
Odessa	15	6(1)		1	1		
Poltava	14	2					
Rivne	9	1					
Sumy	9	4					
Ternopil	10(2)						
Kharkiv	19	6	2			1	
Kherson	8	2					
Khmel'nyts'ke	12(1)	1					
Cherkasy	13(1)	1					
Chernivtsi	6	2					
Chernihiv	11(1)	2					
Total	338(10)	100(3)	5	4	1	1	1

Note: Figures in brackets denote women deputies.

Source: "Narodni deputaty" (Kyiv, 1990). Ukrainskoi RSR obrani v berezni 1990 roku.

Already, during the election of March 1990, there was a visible difference between various political forces. The Western region and some of the larger cities in East-Central Ukraine, such as Kiev and Kharkiv, ran the elections under an umbrella of a "Democratic Bloc", while South-Eastern regions were very much under the influence of the conservative Communist forces. The result was that out of 450 deputies to Verkhovna Rada some 125 who ran under a democratic label

constituted themselves into a Narodna Rada (People's Council) and became an opposition, but neither very strong, nor very effective. The strength of the opposition Narodna Rada in various regions of Ukraine as a percentage of Parliament seats can be seen from Table VI, which compares it with the support of the electorate in these regions for the Union and Republican referendum questions of March 1991 and the Independence question of December 1991.

TABLE VI

Referendum Results in Ukraine

Oblasti	Core Rada Deputies (%of seats)	Union Question (% yes)	Republican Question (% yes)	Independence Question (% yes)
Vinnytsia	18	81.2	89.2	95.4
Volyn'	67	53.7	78.0	96.3
Dnipropetr.	15	77.5	85.1	90.8
Donets'ke	7	84.6	86.2	76.8
Zhytomyr	21	81.8	88.5	95.0
Zakarpattia	9	60.2	69.5	92.5
Zaporizhzhia	17	79.8	86.6	80.7
Ivano-Frank.	92	18.2	52.1	95.8
Kiev	6	66.9	84.6	95.2
Kiev City	73	44.6	78.2	92.8
Kirovohrad	27			93.8
Krym	5	87.6	84.7	54.1
Luhans'ke	0	86.3	88.8	83.8
L'viv	100	16.4	30.1	97.4
Mykolaiv	0	84.2	87.7	89.4
Odesa	0	82.2	84.5	85.3
Poltava	7	78.8	88.7	94.9
Rivne	50	54.3	79.6	95.9
Sumy	15	78.8	87.1	92.6
Ternopil'	80	19.3	35.2	98.6
Kharkiv	36	75.8	83.9	75.8
Kherson	10	81.0	87.4	90.1
Khmel'nyts'	15	77.7	87.9	96.3
Cherkasy	7	77.3	88.8	96.0
Chernivtsi	0	60.8	83.2	92.7
Sevastopil'				57.0

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, March 23, 1991, p. 1; Arel, D., op. cit., p. 139; Potichnyj, Peter J., "Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine", Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, 1991, pp. 123-138. "Narodna Rada v parlamenti Ukrainy", Literaturna Ukraina, 14 June, 1990; Martyniuk, Jaroslaw, "Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. I, No. 13, March 1992, pp. 64-68, and his "Roundup: Attitudes Toward Ukraine's

Borders", *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. The Union question asked the voters: "Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be equally guaranteed?" The Republican question asked: "Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a union of sovereign states based on the principles of the declaration on state sovereignty of Ukraine?". The Independence question asked: "Do you support the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine as proclaimed by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on August 24, 1991?"

A highly suggestive profile of deputies' groups which constitute the "radical", "centrist", and "conservative" blocs in the Ukrainian Parliament has been provided in D. Arel's unpublished paper. (D. Arel, "Voting Behavior...", *op.cit.*) However, to this day it was not possible to describe with any degree of precision the numerical strength of party factions in Verkhovna Rada.

The remaining 325 deputies split into two groups: 1. a disciplined majority bloc of about 239 deputies that voted in unity on major issues and 2. the uncommitted group of about 86 deputies. More recently some 237 deputies signed a petition which called for allowing the Communist Party of Ukraine to function legally³², and as was reported earlier such a party did come into existence recently. This suggests that the Communist majority in the Verkhovna Rada, in some circumstances, is capable of functioning as a group, even though the proposition that the KPU does not have to reorganize and register was not supported.

With Kravchuk's election a "Bloc For a Sovereign Ukraine" was born, also known as the "Parliamentary Majority", but nicknamed the Group of 239 and later after the defection of Oleksander Kotsiuba as the Group 239+1.³³

This composition of the Verkhovna Rada even after the realignments that took place after the attempted coup of August 1991, makes it less capable of dealing with all the important questions that are facing the new Ukrainian state. Perhaps it would have been better to hold the elections in March of 1991 in line with students' demands who went on a hunger strike and managed to topple the Masol government. Now, however, the calls for new elections may not be so propitious and the failure by various opposition forces to collect a sufficient number of signatures for the dissolution of Verkhovna Rada in 1993 shows that even though such calls may be popular, the action itself was probably not properly organized or handled by the opposition. Also, as the new Constitution, and the new electoral law are not yet ready, and will not be introduced until later in 1993 or even 1994, holding of the elections is fraught with additional difficulties. The widespread strikes of June 1993 in Donbas and the crisis of confi-

dence in Verkhovna Rada showed, that the Parliament would not serve its full term. After the referendum which was scheduled for September 26, 1993, was rejected, largely under pressure of Moscow events, the elections to the new Verkhovna Rada will take place on March 27, 1994.³⁴

The tug of war between the executive branch as represented by the President and his structures and the legislature continues. The Cabinet of Ministers is an exceedingly weak institution suspended between the Presidency and the Parliament and without a real contact with the local structures of power. The temporary right to issue decrees that was granted to the Cabinet, but without any real means to implement them proved to be nothing more than "revisionism" without teeth, as was so aptly stated by Ivan Pliushch during the latest government crisis.

6. Political Attitudes and Political Struggle

As was shown earlier, in party political activities to this day there are several strongly visible, ecological, socio-economic, national, democratic, and anti-communist factors. This political conflict is being waged not so much on a rational, but rather on an emotional level, and is likely to continue for some time.

Tied to some of these questions, over a period of time a number of alliances came into being, such as RUKH, Demobloc, UMA/UNA, Spilka Demokratychnykh Syl, "Nova Ukraina", Kongres Natsional'no-Demokratychnykh Syl (KNDS), Anticommunist Antiimperialist Front (AAF) and others.³⁵ It is, however, very difficult to say how closely these activities are related to popular attitudes in relation to issues, performance, personalities, values, and ideology.

7. Presidential Elections

Let us now turn to the presidential elections of December 1, 1991 and see, in a rather impressionistic manner, how these results may be tied to and influence party politics in Ukraine.

The following table in addition to voting results gives us an ethnic breakdown in various oblasti.

TABLE VII

How Ukraine Voted in the Referendum

Oblast'	I Tot.pop.	II %Ukr.	III %Rus.	IV %oth.	V Yes	VI No
Vinnytsia -	1,820,783	91.6	5.9	2.5	95.43	3.03
Volyn' -	1,058,438	94.6	4.4	1.0	96.32	2.29
Dnipropetrovs'ke -	3,869,858	71.6	24.2	4.2	90.36	7.71
Donets'ke -	5,311,781	50.7	43.6	5.7	83.90	12.58
Zhytomyr -	1,537,604	84.9	7.9	7.2	95.06	3.58
Zakarpattia -	1,245,618	78.4	4.0	17.6	92.59	4.49
Zaporizhzhia -	2,074,018	63.1	32.0	4.9	90.66	7.34
Ivano-Frankivs'ke -	1,413,211	95.0	4.0	1.0	98.42	1.03
Kiev City -	2,572,212	72.5	20.9	1.9	92.88	5.28
Kiev -	1,834,369	89.4	8.7	1.9	95.52	2.87
Kirovohrad -	1,228,093	85.3	12.0	3.0	93.88	4.38
Krym -	2,430,495	28.5	67.0	4.5	54.19	42.22
Luhans'ke -	2,857,031	51.9	44.8	3.3	83.86	13.41
L'viv City -					97.50	
L'viv -	2,727,410	90.4	7.1	2.5	97.46	1.86
Mykolaiv -	1,328,306	75.6	19.4	5.0	89.45	8.17
Odesa -	2,624,245	54.6	27.4	18.0	85.38	11.60
Poltava -	1,748,716	87.8	10.2	2.0	94.93	3.67
Rivne -	1,164,241	93.3	4.6	2.1	95.96	2.56
Sevastopol' City -					57.07	39.39
Sumy -	1,417,498	85.5	13.3	1.2	92.61	4.90
Ternopil' -	1,163,974	96.8	2.3	0.9	98.67	0.78
Kharkiv -	3,174,675	62.8	33.2	4.0	86.33	10.43
Kherson -	1,236,970	75.8	20.2	4.0	90.13	7.20
Khmel'nyts'kyi -	1,521,564	90.4	5.8	3.8	96.30	2.62
Cherkasy -	1,527,353	90.5	8.0	1.5	96.03	2.76
Chernivtsi -	940,801	70.8	6.8	22.5	92.78	4.13
Chernihiv -	1,412,770	91.4	6.8	1.8	93.74	4.10

Categories: I=Total population; II=Per cent Ukrainians; III=Per cent Russians; IV=Per cent Others; V=Per cent "yes" vote; VI=Per cent "no" vote.

Source: 1. Central Electoral Commission, Tuesday, December 3, 1991. Reprinted in The Ukrainian Weekly, vol. LIX, no. 49, December 8, 1991, p. 1; 2. Vitalii Boiko, Central Electoral Commission, Tuesday, December 3, 1991. Reprinted in Svoboda, vol. XCVIII, no. 232, p. 1; Ukrains'ki Visti, December 8, 1991, p. 3; Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia, Chast' II, Informizdattsender, 1989; "O natsional'nom sostave naseleniia Ukrainskoi SSR", Mimeo, 14.VI.1990.

No less important is to look at the vote in support of individual candidates because these results continue to be used in party politics. This is true of all candidates save Leonid Kravchuk, who prefers to present himself as being above party politics. Table VIII gives us the electoral support for all presidential candidates.

TABLE VIII

Results in Presidential Elections

CANDIDATE	VOTE FOR	%	VOTE FOR OTHERS	%
Hryniiov, V.B.	1,329,758	4.17	29,791,360	93.41
Kravchuk, L.M.	19,643,481	61.59	11,477,637	35.99
Lukianenko, L.H.	1,432,556	4.49	29,688,562	93.09
Taburians'kyi, L.	182,713	0.57	30,938,405	97.01
Chornovil, V.M.	7,420,727	23.27	23,700,391	74.31
Iukhnovs'kyi, I.R.	554,719	1.74	30,566,399	95.84

Source: Ukrinform as reprinted in *Ukrains'ki Visti*, No. 47, December 8, 1991, p. 3; Potichnyj, P. J., "The Referendum...", op.cit., p.132; Potichnyj, P. J., "Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine", *Aktuelle Analysen*, No. 6/1992, 3 February, 1992, p. 5.

For example, Mr. Lukianenko on several occasions pointed out that the strength of the URP is about 1.5 million, because that is how many people voted for him in Presidential elections. Similar claims were made by Hryniiov and Taburianskyi for DPVU and NPU. However, the most vociferous in this regard was Viacheslav Chornovil. His support in the elections was considerable, approximately 7.4 million votes, in all regions of Ukraine, but primarily concentrated in the West and South-West.³⁶

It was primarily as a result of Presidential elections and the claims of party strength among the voters, that on the eve of a Third Conference of RUKH, the reassessment of the role of RUKH has been launched, which has resulted in the split and the creation of the *Vsenarodnyi Rukh Ukrainy* and the *Rukh-Party* led by V. Chornovil.³⁷

The proponent of the second view was, of course, Viacheslav Chornovil who ran as the Presidential candidate from RUKH. This move by Chornovil did split a very important organization that was able to unite all forces, irrespective of the

region, national or religious denomination, party membership, social status, cultural or educational level, sex, or age. The leadership of RUKH attempted to paper over these differences but failed to postpone the inevitable. The creation of the RUKH-Party may also be viewed as an interesting attempt to create a mass party not unlike the parties in North America.

Much more importantly, expectations that the referendum and the presidential elections would foster organizational and programmatic development of the political parties were not realized. The question of independence was clearly predominant and tended to overshadow all of the other political, economic and social issues.

8. Rating of the Parties

In 1993 we observe a decline in party popularity in Ukraine. The evidence for this is decline in party membership, slowdown in local party activity and loosening of party discipline. This may suggest, that there is a serious lack of enduring partisan commitment by voters, and that they may be more concerned about particular issues, political personalities, and government performance.³⁸

A division of parties along regional lines is also noticeable thus making it possible to talk of Western Ukraine, Central Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, Zakarpattia and Krym.

The UKhDP, DPU, and the URP recruit almost half of their members from Western Ukraine. The centrist and leftist groupings are predominantly based in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Because of greater political activity more recently in East-Southern regions, it is possible to say that "the epicentre of political life is moving from the west to the east, from L'viv to Donetsk'ke".³⁹

It is important to remember, however, that the total membership of all political parties is slightly more than 200,000, or less than 1 per cent of the Ukrainian electorate. This underscores a very vexing problem, namely the lack of solid social base and, therefore, a lack of social identification for the existing parties.⁴⁰ Most of the parties, therefore, can only talk about a potential support among the population. The Liberals tend to orient themselves at the enter-

preunerial elements and the newly born national bourgeoisie. The USelDP sees itself as a spokesman of the future farmer. The Socialists and Communists present themselves as defenders of the socially disadvantaged. The Party of Labour (PP), despite its name, sees itself as the spokesman of the state sector economists. The PDVU is orientated toward a Russian language middle intelligentsia, while the Party of Justice wants to organize the Afghan veterans and the post-military youth.⁴¹

A survey of party activists (N=85) during a Pragmatics of Democratic Society seminar in Kiev, in November 1992, conducted by the author, offered the following assessment of party electoral strength: some 25.0 per cent felt (some "regrettably") that the SPU had the best chance to win the elections. An interesting detail was that the SPU had only 9.0 per cent of participants in the survey. Some 28.0 per cent were undecided.⁴²

However, as can be seen from a recent survey in Kiev, all parties, with the exception of DPU have suffered a considerable drop in popularity.

TABLE IX

Rating of Political Parties and Movements in Kiev

FOR WHOM KIEV RESIDENTS WOULD CAST THEIR VOTES	MAY 1992	SEPT. 1992	JAN. 1993
RUKH	7.5	7.2	6.8
SPU	12.8	6.1	3.0
PZU	9.7	5.0	1.6
URP	7.4	4.2	2.6
DPU	3.2	2.8	4.8
PDVU	6.2	4.2	1.9
"NEW UKRAINE"	1.9	7.0	1.9
OTHER PARTIES & ORGAN.	9.6	3.0	1.6
NON-PARTY CANDIDATE	17.8	9.6	20.3
CONCRETE HUMAN BEING	23.8	49.1	55.5

Source: L. Finberg, *Ukraine*, Mart 1993, p.15.

The question of leaders' election potential at the Pragmatics seminar in November 1992 gave the best chance to President Kravchuk (20.0 per cent), followed by Chornovil (12.0 per cent), and Luk'ianenko, presently Ambassador to Canada (10.0 per cent). A rather interesting detail - O. Moroz, the leader of the SPU was thought to have a winning chance by only 5.0 per cent of the respondents, slightly behind V. Hryniov and I.Iukhnovs'kyi with 6.0 per cent of respondents.⁴³

A more recent survey gives us rating of selected political leaders in five regions of Ukraine.

TABLE X

Rating of Popularity of Selected Political Leaders

POLITICAL LEADER	LVIV	ZAKARPAT.	KIEV	KRYM	DONBAS
Leonid Kravchuk	3.26(2)	2.92(1)	2.75(1)	1.94(2)	2.09(4-5)
Leonid Kuchma	2.99(6)	2.56(2)	2.72(2)	2.21(1)	2.90(1)
Ivan Pliushch	3.10(5)	2.21(3)	2.59(4-5)	1.48(5)	2.09(4-5)
I.Iukhnovs'kyi	3.53(1)	2.19(4)	2.69(3)	0.93(9)	1.86(4-5)
V. Chornovil	2.98(7)	2.12(5)	2.52(6)	1.56(4)	1.86(7)
V. Iavorivs'kyi	3.15(4)	1.75(7)	2.60(4-5)	0.91(10)	1.94(6)
V. Hryniov	2.43(10)	1.66(8)	2.29(8)	1.60(3)	2.61(2)
S. Khmara	3.25(3)	1.58(11)	2.37(7)	1.19(6)	1.59(10)
I. Drach	2.77(9)	1.61(9)	2.23(9)	0.98(8)	1.70(8)
V. Durdynets'	2.09(11)	2.05(6)	1.95(10)	1.16(7)	1.68(9)
L. Skoryk	2.85(8)	1.60(10)	1.92(11)	0.69(12)	1.49(12)
O. Moroz	1.82(12)	1.33(12)	1.80(12)	0.92(10)	1.55(11)

Note: Popularity rating is on a 5 point scale with a position in a given locality indicated in brackets.

Source: L. Finberg, *Ukraine*, Mart 1993, p. 15-16.

The results of the above survey show that Kravchuk continues to be a leading candidate, followed by Kuchma, Pliushch and Iukhnovs'kyi. V. Chornovil's popularity has slipped considerably especially in L'viv, where even S. Khmara is ahead of him, and he is almost on par with V. Iavorivs'kyi, and in Zakarpattia, where Iukhnovs'kyi is slightly ahead. The leader of the SPU O. Moroz is in the last place among the 12 leaders.

The outcome of the forthcoming elections to Verkhovna Rada, scheduled for March 27, 1994, however, may depend to a large extent on the voters' perception of the electoral context, which is inevitably highly specific, and which has a significant influence on the way voters translate their preferences into votes. It is, therefore, highly questionable that voters' preferences will be tied to one single party to the extent that they will vote only for their most preferred party.

9. Electoral Changes and Bloc Formation

There is some evidence to suggest that the Alliance of Communists of Ukraine (SKU), the SPU, and the SelpU have come to a tactical agreement in local activities. The major contradictions among them continue to exist, however. This pertains especially to the question (which appears to have been at least partially resolved) of whether the KPU (former CPSU) should be viewed as have been reestablished or whether a new party ought to have been created. There are other problems as well of concern to SPU leadership. The right wing of the SPU is quite close to the Alliance of Communists of Ukraine. The future electoral coalition among the SPU, KPU, and SKU is quite possible, especially if the socio-economic situation in the country undergoes further dramatic decline. A strong support by the SPU contingent in Verkhovna Rada for allowing the KPU to exist legally may bring the membership of both parties closer together or perhaps even to effect a merger. In some localities, as was shown earlier, the KPU and SPU can hardly be distinguished as separate parties.

The center-left grouping of parties consists of the SDPU, Ukrainian Party of Justice (UPS), Labour Congress (TK), and the future Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice (UPSSS). Again the electoral alliance of these parties is quite possible although quite a lot will depend on the situation in the "New Ukraine", and the formation of an independent centrist coalition.

The Liberal-Democratic center is quite numerous. Here belong the LDPU, LPU, PDVU, PZU, NPU, PP and the Party of Economic Rebirth of Crimea (PEVK). The strength of this grouping centers on Donets'ke and especially on Markulov's LPU and Landyk's PP. The PZU will probably proceed alone while LDPU, PDVU, and NPU because of their small size might have to enter some electoral coalitions. The electoral chances of the Liberal center are quite considerable and probably much better than of other parties or coalitions. This view is based on the proposition that the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine are becoming quite active politically and are inclined to move in a Liberal-Democratic direction. The parties in this grouping also have a more solid financial base, and their platforms appear to unify the national idea with an emphasis on personal liberty. The electoral slogans which emphasize freedom for business, priority of private ownership, human rights, federal structure, and the economic and social westernization could and probably will play an important role in the forthcoming electoral campaign.

The most serious opponents for the liberal democrats appear to be the parties of the Center-Right orientation. The URP, DPU, RUKH-Party, SelDPU, UKhDP, and the KhDPU belong to this group. In this grouping the URP and the DPU are especially important as the creators in 1992 of the Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS). However, the national idea, their main political slogan and the anti-communist stance appear to be on the wane as can be clearly seen in a disappointing showing of the AAF. Nevertheless, these parties have an excellent chance of carrying the three Western oblasti and as a coalition might be able to get a clear majority of votes also in Central Ukraine. The Krym as well as the East is not readily open for their political activities. But the supporters of a national idea are quite widely distributed also in the South-East and a wise and moderate use of this idea might result in some solid support for those parties also in these areas.

The Radical Right composed of the URKP, UNKP, and the DSU will probably receive support from the UNA, UNS, UNSO, and KUN. Their electoral success is rather doubtful unless there are visible geopolitical changes that appear clearly to threaten Ukrainian sovereignty. This is especially so if the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation becomes a real possibility. In a relatively calm and stable situation these parties can count only on individual victories. Some support of these


groupings for the parties of Center-Right orientation also should not be excluded.

Most of the parties, however, are not as yet ready for elections. They lack electoral programmes, electoral technologies such as the electoral staffs, and most importantly a solid financial base. Up to now no electoral coalitions have been established, and even the informational support is completely lacking. In addition, the electorate is becoming more and more disillusioned and as was indicated earlier, the parties are enjoying a very low popular support.

What will happen in the immediate future on the Ukrainian party scene? The external forces, or to be quite blunt about it, Russian pressure on Ukraine in the near future will become even greater, and this pressure might tend to consolidate Ukrainian political forces. The Elections of 27 March, 1994, will be a very important indicator of the direction that political parties will take.

In the long term the political parties will continue to be born and to die, and a variety of combinations will come into play. But this is possible only when they become legitimate spokesmen for social groupings in Ukraine and in order to obtain power, find it necessary to appeal for support of the electorate in truly democratic elections.


DIAGRAM I



Source: Haran', O. V., *Ukraina bahatopartiina*. Kiev, Pamiatky Ukrainy, 1991; Haran', O. V., *Vid stvorennia Rukhu do bahatopartiinosti*. Kiev, "Znannia", 1992; Sliusarenko, A. H. & Tomenko, M.V., *Novi politychni partii Ukrainy*. Kiev, Znannia, 1990; Sliusarenko, A., Tomenko, N., "K probleme klasifikatsii novykh politicheskikh partii Ukrainy", *Filosofskaia i sotsiologicheskaia mysl'*, No. 5, 1992, pp. 3-10; I.H.Burkut & Ia.S. Kurko, *Novi hromads'ko-politychni tovarystva Chernivets'koi oblasti: Dovidnyk*. Chernivtsi, Znannia, 1991. Ideolohiia i taktyka URP: *Materialy teoretychnoi konferentsii*. Kiev, URP, 1991; V. Drach, "Narod i partiia iedyni?", *Vitchyzna*, No.7, 1991, pp. 129-136; V. Lytvyn, "Ukrains'ka Narodno-Demokratychna Partiia", *Polityka i Chas*, No. 15, 1991, pp. 54-59; Lytvyn, V., "Asotsiatsiia 'zelenyi svit' i Partiia zelenykh Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 9, 1991, pp. 53-57; Lytvyn, V., "Demokratychna partiia Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1991, pp.56-68; Lytvyn, V., "Liberal'na partiia Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 16, 1991, pp.62-64; Lytvyn, V., "Narodna partiia Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 10, 1991, pp. 66-69; Lytvyn, V., *Novitni politychni partii Ukrainy i robitnychi rukh: Ukraina*, *Ibid.*, No. 13, 1991, pp. 41-46; Lytvyn, V., "Suchasni sotsial-demokratychni partii Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1991, pp. 44-49; Lytvyn, V., "Sotsialistychna partiia Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, Nos. 17-18, pp. 80-92; Lytvyn, V., "Suchasni politychni bloky ta ob'iednannia na Ukraini", *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1991, pp. 58-62; Lytvyn, V. "Ukrains'ka respublikans'ka partiia (URP)", *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1991, pp. 74-78; Lytvyn, V. "Ukrains'ka selians'ko-demokratychna partiia", *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1991, pp. 57-61; Lytvyn, V. "Ukrains'ka khrystians'ko-demokratychna partiia", *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1991, pp. 62-65; Lytvyn, V. "Livi, pravi i tsentr: Pro partii i rukhy Ukrainy", *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1992, pp. 65-71; Mykhailiv, V., "Politychne ob'iednannia 'Derzhavna samostiinist' Ukrainy'", *Ibid.*, No. 3, 1992, pp. 72-75; "Demokratychna partiia Ukrainy", "Narodna partiia Ukrainy", "Ob'iednana sotsial-demokratychna partiia Ukrainy", "Partiia zelenykh Ukrainy", "Partiia demokratychnoho vidrozhennia Ukrainy", "Ukrains'ka narodno-demokratychna partiia", "Ukrains'ka natsional'na partiia", "Ukrains'ka respublikans'ka partiia", "Ukrains'ka selians'ko-demokratychna partiia", "Ukrains'ka khrys-

tians'ko-demokratychna partiia", "Liberal'no-demokratychna partiia Ukrainy", *Komunist Ukrainy*, No. 5, 1991; "Novye obshchestvenno-politicheskie organizatsii, partii i dvizheniia na Ukraine", *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, No. 2, 1991, pp. 61-68; "Politychna mozaika: Liberal'no-demokratychna partiia Ukrainy", *Moloda Hvardiia*, 13 May, 1991; "Politychna mozaika: Respublikans'ka partiia, Ukrain's'ka narodno-demokratychna partiia, Demokratychna partiia Ukrainy, Ukrain's'ka selians'ko-demokratychna partiia", *Moloda Hvardiia*, 5 February, 1991; *Obrashchenie Uchreditel'nogo s'ezda Parti Truda k Prezidentu, Verkhovnomu Sovetu, politicheskim partiiam i dvizheniiam, narodu Ukrainy*, Donetsk, 26 December, 1992, a leaflet; *Statut Partii Pratsi*, adopted on 26 December, 1992; "KPU", reprinted from *Ukrinform* in *Ukrains'ki Visti* (Detroit), July 4, 1993, p. 1.


DIAGRAM II



Source: See Diagram I. It should be pointed out that on the question of possible federal structure for Ukraine the alignment of parties might be considerably different. See: Arel, D., "Voting Behavior in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor". Paper presented at the CAS Annual Meeting, Carleton University, June 5, 1993; See also: Aster, H., Potichnyj, P. J., Cowan, E., *The Pragmatics of Democratic Society Project: Campaigns and Elections. Final Report Submitted to the Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe, External Affairs and International Trade*, Government of Canada. March 1993.

DIAGRAM III


Economic Questions



Source: See Diagram I.

DIAGRAM IV


Social Questions



Source: See Diagram I.

DIAGRAM V


Ecological Questions



Source: See Diagram I.


DIAGRAM VI

Educational Questions



Source: See Diagram I.


Religious Question




Source: See Diagram I.

DIAGRAM VIII

Nationality Question



Source: See Diagram I.



APPENDIX I

Less Prominent Political Parties

1. Ukrain's'ka Natsionalistychna Spilka (Kiev)
2. Partiiia Komunistiv Ukrainy (Dnipropetrovs'k)
3. Konservatyvna Partiiia Nezalezhnosti Krymu (Simferopol')
4. Pidkarpats'ka Respublikans'ka Partiiia (Mukachevo)
5. Partiiia Iednosti Trudovoho Narodu (Simferopol')
6. Rukh "Komunisty Ukrainy" (Kiev)
7. Sotsial-natsional'na (Natsionalistychna?) Partiiia Ukrainy (SNPU) (L'viv)
8. Spilka Komunistiv Ukrainy (Donets'k)
9. Sotsialistychna Partiiia Trudiashchykh (Kerch)
10. Kyivs'kyi Komitet VKP(b) (Kiev)
11. Sevastopol's'kyi Mis'kyi Komitet VKP(b) (Sevastopol')
12. Spilka Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv (L'viv)
13. Hromads'ka Zhoda (Donets'k)
14. Natsional-Sotsialistychna Partiiia Ukrainy (Poltava)
15. Robitnycho-Selians'ka Sotsialistychna Partiiia (Odesa)
16. Spilka Komunistiv Trudiashchykh "Za Sotsial'nu Spravedlyvist" (Chernihiv).
17. Respublikans'ka Partiiia Krymu (Simferopol')
18. Ukrain's'ka Konstytusiino-Demokratychna Partiiia (Kiev)
19. Komunistychna Robitnycha Partiiia (Donets'k)
20. Khrystiians'kyi Suspil'nyi Soiuz (L'viv)
21. Orhanizatsiia Kryms'ko-Tatars'koho Rukhu (OKND) (Simferopol')
22. Komunistychna Partiiia Ukrainy (KPU-KPSS)
23. Russkaia Partiiia Kryma (Simferopol')
24. Economic Freedom Party (Simferopol'). For market economy. (18 J1 92).
25. Transnational Radical Party (Simferopol). Has 7,000 members in 58 countries. Pro-Ukrainian and pro-Tatar in orientation. (21 N 92).
26. Crimean Communist Party of Workers (Simferopol). Changed its name from Socialist Party of Workers. (23 D 92).
27. Union of Communists (Simferopol'). (23 D 92).
28. Labour Party (PP) (Luhans'k)(26 D 92 Congress). Unites plant managers of Donets'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia. (27 D 92).
29. Russian Party of Crimea (RPK) (Simferopol'). Pro-Russian and anti-Tatar and anti-Ukrainian. (25 F 93).
30. Slavic Unity Party (Simferopol'). (1 D 92).
31. Party of Economic Revival of Crimea (PEVK) (Simferopol'). (11 Ja 93).
32. Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovskii)(Simferopol').
33. Party Civic Union (Partia Grazhdanskii Soiuz)(PHS) (Donets'k) (3 O 92).

APPENDIX II

Regional Movements

1. People's Opposition Bloc (Organized by the Republic Movement of Krym -RDK). Unites: "20 January", Christian Democratic Union, Democratic Taurida etc. It has a parliamentary faction of 17 members in the VR of Krym. Strongly anti-Ukrainian in orientation. (15 J1 92).
2. Congress of Crimean People (Simferopol). Strongly pro-Russian. (18 J1 92).
3. Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKNR). Simferopol). (2d Congress J1 92). On 30-31 Ja 93 constituted itself into a party. Pro-Ukrainian in orientation.
4. All-Crimean Ukrainian Congress. Iu. Kolesnikov, head. (11 O 92).
5. Committee for Protection of Citizen's Rights (L'viv). Called for resignation of oblast leaders and ban on sale of enterprises to foreigners. (19 O 92).
6. Association of Ukrainian Nationalist Forces. (V.Moroz?). (L'viv). Called for resignation of oblast leaders. (20 O 92).
7. Union of Donbas Entrepreneurs (Donets'k). Opposed to existing taxing policy. (31 Mr 92).
8. All-Crimean Bloc of Democratic Forces (Dzhankoi). Unites: URP, DPU, RUKH, Prosvita, Officers' Union. Pro-Ukrainian and opposed to Krym independence. (13 My 92).
9. All-Crimean Electors Association for Public Peace and Interethnic Accord. (Simferopol). Pro-Ukrainian. (31 My 92).
10. Democratic Crimea (Yalta). Pro-Ukrainian. (4 Je 92).
11. Crimea with Ukraine Bloc. (Simferopol). Pro-Ukrainian. (15 Je 92).
12. For Civic Peace and Interethnic Accord (Simferopol). Unites: Crimean and Ukraine's legislators such as Democratic Crimea, Nova Ukraina, Rukh, SPU, Land and Freedom Faction of VR, Agrarian Deputies Faction of VR, Faction of Industrialists of VR, PDVU, DPU, URP factions. (19 Je 92).
13. Crimea with Ukraine Society of Scientists (Simferopol). Pro-Ukrainian and against RDK. (2 J1 92).
14. Democratic Bloc (Luhans'k). Unites: PDVU, Rukh, URP, SUS, Nova Ukraina, Association of Voters, "Memorial", Association of Persons who have been subjected to Judicial Injustice (Svavillia). Active against "Iedinstvo", All-Ukrainian CP(b), People's Rukh of Luhans'k Oblast, Civic Congress, Working Donbas etc. organizations that are anti-Ukrainian. (31 D 92).
15. Rada Hromads'koi Zlahody (Kiev). Unites some 18 organizations who support L. Kuchma. Rukh, SPU, UKRP refused to Join. (6 Ja 93).
16. National Salvation Front (Krym). Pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian. (11 Ja 93; 10 Mr 93).
17. Russian Popular Assembly (Krym). Pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian. (11 Ja 93).
18. All-Crimean Movement of Voters for Crimean Republic. (Pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian). (11 Ja 93).
19. Referendum 92 (Kharkiv). Unites citizens only who collect signatures to disband the VR. (28 J1 92).
20. Civic Congress (Kharkiv). Unites: Civic Forum, LPU, DVDonbassa. Wants federal structure, Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, equality of forms of ownership, and alliance of Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. (5 D 92).
21. Coalition of Democratic Forces (Mykolaiv). Unites: Various political parties and movements with a purpose to bring about early elections to VR. (28 Ag 92).
22. Civic Congress (Donets'k). Opposed to Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS. (14 S 92).

23. Parties for Fokin's Resignation (Poltava). Unites: Rukh,URP,DPU and 12 other political parties. (17 S 92).
24. Ukrainian Civic Congress (Donets'k). Opposed to present Ukr. authorities. Delegates from 18 regions attended. Want federal structure, Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, parliamentary system, human rights emphasis in the new constitution. (5 O 92).
25. Trudova Ukraina (Kiev). Unites: SPU, Worker's Union, Union of Veterans. October 92. Celebrated October revolution. (9 N 92).
26. Christian Social Union (Ternopil). Delegates from UKhDP of Ivano-Frankivs'k, L'viv, Odesa came together. Support christian ethics in state policy, national idea and principles of patriotism. (11 N 92).
27. Voters for the Republic of Crimea (Izbirатели за Respubliku Krym). Anti-Ukrainian, anti-Tatar and pro-Russian. (17 Ja 93).
28. Coordinating Council of Parties, Movements and Social Organizations (Ivano Frankivs'k). Unites URP, DPU, UKhDP, DSU, USDP, Rukh, KNDS (with its 12 organizations), KUN, VNRU, "Prosvita", "Memorial", Spilka Khrystians'koho Vidrozhennia, Bratstvo Voiakiv UPA. (1 Je 93, Biuleten' URP, vyp.23,93; Novyi Shliakh, 3 July, 93, p. 6).

APPENDIX III.

Alliances

1. RUKH - all socio-political and cultural groups in Ukraine, including national minorities with the exception of communists, and radical nationalists.
2. Democratic Bloc - (January 1990) - all socio-political groups with the exception of communists and radical nationalists.
3. UMA - on July 1, 1990 - UNDP, UNP, USelDP, RPU (Respublikans'ka Partiiia Ukrainy).

UNA - on September 1991 - UNP, SNUM, D.Dontsov's Club, UNRP (Ukrains'ka Natsional'a Radykal'na Partiiia), USelDP?, SeldP?.

UNA - at the VIII Session in 1992 - UNSO Prydnistrov'ia, UNSO Ukrainy, Ukr.Katolyts'kyi Komitet (KUKM), Natsional'nyi Komitet Ukrain's'kykh Molodizhnykh Orhanizatsii (NKUMO), Chornomors'ke Kozache Viis'ko, UKRP, UKhDP, UNS, Spilka Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv (SUN), UNDP, Spilka Ofitseriv Ukrainy (SOU), Spilka Ofitseriv Ukraintsiv Diaspory (SOUD), UPTs Kyivs'kyi Patriarkhat. "VIII Sesiia UNA", Zamkova Hora, 8(15), 1992, p.2).

4. Spilka Demokratychnykh Syl - Fall of 1990 - URP, SDPU, UNDP, DS, (Demokratychnyi soiuz-all-union party), USDP, PZU.

This association signed a declaration calling for Ukraine without nuclear power. Not active since then.

5. Lukianenko coalition - Summer 1991 - URP, All-Ukrainian Society of Formerly Repressed People, Union of Ukrainian Students, Ukrainian Youth Association, "Prosvita".

6. "Nova Ukraina" - January 8, 1992 - PDVU, DPU, SDPU, LDPU, Ukrainian Confederation of Entrepreneurs, Ukrainian League of Enterprises Using Foreign Capital, directors of state owned enterprises, representatives of trade unions and the press. V. Filenko was elected head. The Union of Ukrainian Cooperators and Entrepreneurs will join the group. An All-Ukrainian congress to be held in February in Kiev. Holos Ukrainy, No.9, January 22, 1992, p.6.

"Nova Ukraina", in its declaration supported the Coordinating Council of Democratic Russia and the latter condemned two of its parliamentarians who created problems around the Black Sea Fleet.

7. Kongres Natsional'no-Demokratychnykh Syl (KNDS). Organized on 2 August 1992 in Kiev. United 16 parties, among them URP, DPU, UKhDP, Prosvita and others with a purpose of supporting the President. Rukh did not join.

Regional alliances were organized as well:

KNDS (Luts'k)-United 30 political parties and organizations - URP, DPU, UPA, Ukrainian Women. Called for early elections. (12 S 92).

KNDS (Dnipropetrovs'k) - United URP, DPU, Prosvita, Cultural Center "Vil'na Dumka", "Memorial". (6 O 92).

KNDS (Chernivtsi)- United URP, DPU, PZU, Prosvita, Ukrainian Women, Society of the Repressed, Students, UPA. (2 N 92)

8. All-Ukrainian Association of Working People's Solidarity. Called for rejection of CIS, government of national salvation, dissolution of VR, suspension of privatization until inventory is completed. (5 Ag 92; 19 O 92).

9. New Parliament for New Ukraine Coalition. Kiev, 1 September 1992. United some 20 parties and organizations. Rukh, KNDS, Nova Ukraina, PZU participated. Called for dissolution of VR. (1 S 92, 18 S 92).

10. All-Ukrainian Workers' Solidarity Association. Against Crimean independence. (6 My 92).

21.Civil Congress of Ukrainian Democratic Forces. Delegates from Kiev, Donets'k, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Luhans'k, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and L'viv met on 21 My 92. United: Civil and Fatherland Forum of Ukraine, Rus' Society, International Movement, and Socialist Party. Opposes current leadership. (21 My 92).

22.Anti-Communist Anti-Imperialist Front (AAF). Opened in Kiev on 21 February 1993. Represents 30 parties and civic movements. Chairman was Mykola Porovs'kyi. UNA and UNSO also joined. Opposed to Communists taking over power. (21 F 93).

AAF (Kiev)-Regional 16 organizations created this alliance on January 16, 1993. (19 Ja 93).

23.Kongres Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv (KUN). Organized on 17-18 October 1992. United 25 various political parties and groups. Rejects racism, chauvinism, fascism, marxism, and leninism. Intends to wage political struggle within the laws and constitutional provisions of Ukraine. (18 O 92).

Notes

- 1 A monarchist grouping that supports the claim to the Kievan throne of the King Olel'ko II (Alexis, Prince d'Anjou), who in the last couple of years also managed to offer himself as a ruler of Russia and Serbia is also in evidence. On a more serious note, one should mention a recent visit to Ukraine by one of the Hetman Skoropadsky's daughters. Her visit there was in connection with a scholarly conference. In Ukraine we also see several political parties that were created in Russia. Thus, for example, there exists "Iedinstvoza leninizm i kommunisticheskie idealy" led by Nina Andreeva, "The Liberal-Democratic Party" of Zhirinovskii which must give nightmares to all genuine liberal-democrats, and local structures of "Soiuz". These organizations, it appears, should not be able to function legally in Ukraine
- 2 Sliusarenko, A.H. and Tomenko, M., *Novi politychni partii Ukrainy*. Kiev, Znannia, 1990, pp. 5-6.
- 3 Drach, V., "Narod i partiia iedyni?", *Vitchyzna*, No. 7, 1991, pp. 129-136.
- 4 Bilous, A., "Bahatopartiinist' v Ukraini: Porivnial'nyi ohliad", *Suchasnist'*, June 1992, pp. 108-119.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 118.
- 11 V.Lytvyn, "Pro suchasni ukrains'ki partii, ikhnikh prykhyl'nykiv ta lideriv", *Politolohichni chytannia*, No.1, 1992, p. 67.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 14 M.Pashkov, unpublished and untitled paper, p. 7.
- 15 Unlike the right wing radicals in Russia, the Ukrainian radical nationalists are few in numbers, are much less xenophobic and their slogans "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" stresses the need to build Ukrainian cultural values rather than to restrict the activities or to discriminate against the non-Ukrainians in Ukraine. It should, however, be pointed out that the ideological content of their writings has a sharp anti-Russian orientation.
- 16 The VIIIth Session of UNA sees three paths of development. 1. A "socialist revenge" led by the SPU which orients itself to Moscow; 2. Privatization and democratization detrimental to state building led by "Nova Ukraina"; 3. Creation of a social system which can support the state led by UNA. These three forces are growing while all the other parties are in a crisis and can only fill spaces between those three. Only UNA is capable of creating a Ukrainian state. *Zamkova Hora*, 8(15), 1992, p. 2.

- 17 This alliance united PDVU and DPU as its left wing, SDPU and LDPU as the center, and the Ukrainian Conference of Entrepreneurs, Ukrainian League of Entrepreneurs Using Foreign Capital and the Union of Cooperatives and Entrepreneurs. (Source: Holos Ukrainy, No.9, January 22, 1992, p. 6; B. Kravchenko, FAX, January 27, 1992 talks about the coalition of "old democrats" and industrialists and the formation of a "shadow cabinet"; Some sources incorrectly included in the coalition also OSDPU and PZU. See: Ukrains'ki Visti, January 26, 1992, p. 1.
- 18 Source: D. Arel, "The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?", Journal of Soviet Nationalities, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter 1990-1991, pp.108-154. "Demoplatform" had about 14 deputies. On 6 March in Makiivka, Donetsk'ka oblast' at the All-Ukrainian Conference of Communists, the 318 delegates from 23 oblasti decided to revive the KPU. Several deputies to Verkhovna Rada such as Borys Oliinyk, O. Kotsiuba, E. Marmazov, N. Bashkirov, V. Petrenko, V. Matveev, also participated in the conference.
- 19 D.Iatsiuk, "UNKP proty URSR", Moloda Hvardiia, 14 August, 1992, p. 2.
- 20 The core of this group, seems to have been recruited from "Varta RUKHu", and appears to have a particular attraction to members of the Native Ukrainian Faith (RUNVIRA), an insignificant sect, which claims to profess a pre-christian religion of the Aryans which, centuries ago, the Aryans carried to India on their departure from the territories that are now Ukraine. This group was active earlier also in Halychyna, but very little was known about them. Their leader in Halychyna was Iurii Kryvoruchko. The name of the Volyn leader was not disclosed. The members of this organization disclaim any ideological propinquity to Nazi or Fascist movements. "V Ukraini", Svoboda, January 15, 1992, p. 1.
- 21 "'Sieg Heil' v Halychyni", Ukraina Moloda, 14 August, 1992, p. 2.
- 22 Mykola Bepalyi and Vasyl' Masal's'kyi, "Formuvannia bahatopartiinosti v Ukraini i Rosii: porivnial'nyi analiz", Paper at the Donetsk'k conference. See also: Viktor Leshchenko, "Ukrainskii integral'nyi natsionalizm: proshloe i nastoiashchee", paper at the Donetsk'k conference; Arkadij Kireev, "Die ukrainischen Ultra-Rechten", Aktuelle Analysen, Nr. 18/1993, 16 March, 1993, BIOst, Koeln. These last two contributions appear much too general to be of great value. See also: Leonid Pliushch, "Chy maie perspektyvy ukrains'kyi fashyzm?", Suchasnist', No. 3, 1993, pp. 138-149; Volodymyr Kulyk, "Novyi ukrains'kyi natsionalizm: Try poverkhy vertepu", Suchasnist', No.3, 1993, pp. 150-167; See also letter of Anatolii Shcherbatiuk, "Ziasuvannia pozytsii", Suchasnist', No. 6, 1993, pp. 166-167.
- 23 That these ideas are not completely forgotten can be seen from materials of a local meeting of the SPU. Demianiuk, I. and Krychyl's'kyi, S., "Shcho pokynuly bil'shovyky: Pro druziv, vorohiv ta 'otiechestvo'", Volyn', No. 9(73), 5 February 1993, p. 2.
- 24 Various disagreements have surfaced in this grouping, and consequently, the UNDP left the Assembly recently. Also, as was indicated already, the UMA has changed its name. Now it is called the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA).

- 25 Aster, H., Potichnyj, P. J., Cowan, E., The Pragmatics of Democratic Society Project: Campaigns and Elections. Final Report Submitted to the Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe, External Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada. March 12, 1993.
- 26 Source: Public opinion survey, 1992.
- 27 Ibid..
- 28 Ibid..
- 29 Ibid.; A survey conducted in eight republics of the former Soviet Union by Gallup UK Organization in November 1992 found that respondents were quite unhappy about their economic plight, and many questioned the relevance of the market economy for their own countries. See: Rhodes, Mark, "The Former Soviet Union and the Future: Facing Uncertainty", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. II, No. 24, June 1993, pp. 52-55.
- 30 Inglehart, R., The Silent Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 299.
- 31 It should be noted that Russian deputies (100 men and 3 women) represent almost exactly the percentage of Russians in the population of Ukraine and majority of them come from the oblasts with a large number of Russians. This is also the case with other nationalities (5 Belorussians, 4 Jews, 1 Bulgarian, 1 Armenian, and 1 German) with the exception of Jews and Armenians. The city of Kiev with the largest concentration of Jewish population did not elect a single deputy, while the Armenian deputy from Kharkiv could not have been elected by the Armenians. See: "Ob izbiratel'nykh okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov Ukrainskoi SSR", Pravda Ukrainy, December 4, 1989, pp. 4-5; "Spisok narodnykh deputatov Ukr.SSR, izbrannykh 4 marta 1990 g.", Pravda Ukrainy, March 13, 1990, pp. 2-4; "Spisok narodnykh deputatov Ukr.SSR, izbrannykh pri povtornom golosovanii: Po sostoianiiu na 18 marta 1990 g.", Pravda Ukrainy, March 24, 1990, pp. 2-3; "Narodni deputaty Ukains'koi RSR obrani v berezni 1990 roku." Kyiv, 1990; Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia, Chast' II. Informizdattsender, 1989; "O natsional'nom sostave naseleniia Ukrainskoi SSR", Mimeo, June 14, 1990; Potichnyj, P. J., "Elections in Ukraine", Berichte des BIOst, No. 36, 1990; and especially his, "Elections in the Ukraine", in Gitelman, Zvi, ed., The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR, St. Martins Press, 1992, Appendix 4, p. 200.
- 32 Raisa Rudenko, "Komunistam Ukrainy dozvoleno stvoriuvaty partii", Svoboda, No. 97, May 22, 1993, p. 2.
- 33 For an interesting analysis see: Arel, D., "The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?", Journal of Soviet Nationalities, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter 1990/1991. See also his "Voting Behaviour in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor", an unpublished paper. Unfortunately a detailed study of party factions in the Verkhovna Rada has not been made.

- 34 "Ukrainian Miners Agree to End Strike", Agence: AFP, No. 22037, 19 June, 1993; Canadian Press, No. 18012, 19 June, 1993. The proposal by President Kravchuk to hold elections rather than a referendum was rejected by the Verkhovna Rada. Nahaylo, B., "Kravchuk Shocks Parliament With Call or Referendum on Presidency", RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 111, 15 June 1993. Deputies in Verkhovna Rada voted 228 to 18 to hold a referendum on September 26. Canadian Press, No. 5060, 17 June, 1993. The Verkhovna Rada also decided that the new parliamentary body will be composed of 450 deputies and will continue to be unicameral in structure.
- 35 The listing of these alliances is provided in Appendix III.
- 36 See: Potichnyj, P. J., "The Referendum...", op.cit., pp. 133-134.
- 37 Two points of view have emerged on this issue among RUKH activists. The first maintained that the RUKH must continue to be a union of all socio-political forces that support the idea of state independence and are building a democratic civil society. The second felt that RUKH has exhausted itself as a form of a union, has become a separate political force, and must transform itself into a political organization - a party of parliamentarian type similar to western parties. "Statement by the Political Council of the RUKH", Narodna Hazeta, No. 1(30), January 1992, p. 2.
- 38 From the rational model of voting behaviour we know, that though analyses suggest a great deal of variation from place to place, from time to time, and across subgroups of voters, the general pattern of findings suggests that economic performance is more influential than policy preferences, that retrospective evaluations are more influential than prospective, that attitudes towards the government are more influential than attitudes towards opposition, and that sociotropic evaluations are more influential than egocentric.
- 39 M. Pashkov, unpublished paper, p. 2.
- 40 The sociological model of political participation and voting behaviour claims that each social group votes for the party that serves its interests. This model focuses only on social context and voting choice, and it may provide sufficient explanation of voting behaviour in a society that is highly polarized along class, religious or ethnic lines. It is doubtful that Ukraine fits this model or the dominant ideology model used mostly by Marxist scholars to explain why a simple class-interest model is not sufficient.
- 41 Ibid., p. 3.
- 42 See: Figure - Party Election Potential in Aster, H., Potichnyj, P.J. and Cowan, E., op. cit..
- 43 See: Figure - Leaders Election Potential in Aster, H., Potichnyj, P.J. and Cowan, E., op. cit..

Peter J. Potichnyj

Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine

Bericht des BIOst Nr. 1/1994

Summary

The introductory part of the essay presents a general review of the number of national parties which are in existence today and where possible, provides the information on their founding, registration, the names of their leaders and the size of their membership. The Appendices list the less prominent political parties, regional movements, and various alliances.

This is followed by various classificatory schemes that attempt to locate various parties on the left-right continuum from Anarchists and neo-Communists to Radical Nationalists. The comparative analysis of these classificatory approaches show that the evolving nature of the party system itself, the party programmes, as well as individual perceptions of different writers, had an impact on how the parties were classified.

In order that a better appreciation of the parties' "political space" is possible, an attempt was made to locate the parties on an X-Y axis by plotting their stand on such issues as democracy, authoritarianism, national independence, federalism, planned and market economy, private and public property, the role of state in social protection, ecological concerns, the content and control over educational system, the freedom of conscience and church-state relations, the nationality question, and the armed forces, including nuclear weapons. In addition to providing an obvious, convenient view of the situation, this novel approach offers the reader an interesting grouping of parties into clearly definable programmatic clusters on a variety of political issues. This manner of classifying political parties can also provide a prognostication on the future evolution of political parties, by way of electoral bloc and alliance formation, or perhaps, even a potential merger.

The environment in which the parties operate and the extent to which they reflect the views of large portions of the population is not easily demonstrated, because the existing parties had no opportunity, outside of limited by-elections of 1992, to test their programmes in direct electoral competition. A number of public opinion surveys, partially reproduced in the essay, indicate that an important shift in the popular concerns about the economic issues did occur in the last two years. The massive strikes in Donbas region are the best indication of this change. However, the majority of the population keep their common sense and self-control, have avoided massive social explosions at least until now, and therefore, may provide a relatively stable environment for building a more viable multi-party system.

The next section of the essay deals with the consequences of 1990 elections, the resulting situation in the Verkhovna Rada, and the attempts of various political groupings and alliances to bring about new parliamentary elections by forcing a dissolution of the old legislative assembly. This is followed by the influence of the referendum and of the presidential elections of December 1991, and the assessment of vote getting potential of various presidential candidates.

How practical such aspirations might be can be seen from recent surveys which show that in recent times all political parties in Ukraine have experienced a great decline of popular support and that with the exception of President L. Kravchuk, who continues to hold first place in the mind of the population, all other hopefuls have experienced bad slippage in the opinion polls.

This is followed by an informed guess about the electoral chances of different political parties that ends up in a speculation about the likelihood of electoral blocs and alliances being formed in anticipation of the forthcoming elections.

Neuere Arbeiten aus dem Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien

Aufbruch im Osten Europas

Chancen für Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft nach dem
Zerfall des Kommunismus.

Hrsg. vom Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche
und internationale Studien.

Carl Hanser Verlag, München/Wien 1993, 388 S.

Schriftenreihe des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien

Band 22:

Radko Bráč

Die Außenpolitik der Tschechoslowakei zur Zeit der
„Regierung der nationalen Verständigung“.

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1992, 177 S.

Band 23

Oleg Bogomolow/Heinrich Vogel (Hrsg.)

Rußland und Deutschland –

Nachbarn in Europa.

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1993, 238 S.

Band 24

Marlis Sieburger

Die Finanzautonomie der Unternehmen im Kontext der
sowjetischen Wirtschaftsreformen.

Auswirkungen des „Gesetzes über das staatliche
Unternehmen“.

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1993, 199 S.