S. HRG. 98-982

UKRAINIAN FAMINE OF 1932 AND 1933

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2456

A BILL TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO STUDY THE 1932-33 FAMINE CAUSED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE

AUGUST 1, 1984

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UKRAINIAN FAMINE OF 1932 AND 1933

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1984

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is being held on the Ukrainian Famine Commission bill, S. 2456, which is before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee now. I would like to give a little background on this hearing and what brought it about.

A little more than 50 years ago one of the largest preventable mass deaths among any modern people occurred in the Ukraine. Fittingly, this tragedy is called the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33, just as we sometimes refer to the Great Depression, which was the deepest in the history of the modern world, the global depression which began in 1932 and 1933 also.

In the late 1920's, Stalin had returned in earnest to a policy of eradicating the peasantry and working livestock and of enforced collectivizing and mechanizing of agriculture. The result of this ill-conceived and ineptly administered policy was less land under cultivation and lower crop yields. Nonetheless, a political requirement existed to demonstrate that Stalin's policies were working.

Rural districts took to inflating their crop yield reports and, of course, Moscow was encouraged to levy ever higher and more unrealistic grain delivery requirements. This process had reached disastrous proportions by 1932-33 as government teams and local informers stripped the country's grain-growing regions of grain and even of seed grain to meet the arbitrary quotas.

Famine followed on a horrendous scale. While the Don and Volga River grain-growing regions were also affected, the brunt of the famine fell on the Ukraine, then the Soviet Union's major granary. We may never know for sure how many children, elderly, and working adults perished. Responsible scholars have put the death toll at some 7 million in the Ukraine alone.

But the Ukraine's misfortune was not only in being the country's principal granary. The Ukraine was also the largest and most nationalistic minded of the peoples the Russian Bolsheviks were then trying to subdue. And the Ukrainian peasant was at the core of the Ukrainians' sense of national heritage.

Moscow was aware of the extent of the famine in the Ukraine in the winter and spring of 1933, but allowed the grim extermination

to run its course, doing nothing to relieve it with the food supplies under the central government's total control.

Today we are met to pay tribute to both the Ukrainian dead and to the courageous surviving Ukrainian heritage in a hearing on S. 2456, a bill to establish a Ukrainian Famine Commission to report to the Congress and the world on the extent of this famine and the Soviet role in it.

I am very supportive of efforts to commemorate the Ukrainian famine, both in the sense of honoring their sacrifice and also in the present practical sense of the wise saying: "Those who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it."

I do have some concerns about specific provisions of the bill as drafted, especially about funding for the Commission and its study. In these days of crippling Federal deficits and many conflicting demands on the Federal Treasury, none of us can afford to be other than rigorously prudent with the taxpayers' money.

I look forward to hearing testimony on this bill.

[Text of S. 2456 follows:]

98TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2456

To establish a commission to study the 1932–1933 famine caused by the Soviet Government in Ukraine.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 21 (legislative day, MARCH 19), 1984

Mr. BRADLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

To establish a commission to study the 1932–1933 famine caused by the Soviet Government in Ukraine.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Commission on the Ukraine Famine Act".

ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 2. There is established a commission to be known as the "Commission on the Ukraine Famine" (in this Act referred to as the "Commission").

PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 3. The purpose of the Commission is to conduct a study of the 1932–1933 Ukraine famine in order to—

(1) expand the world's knowledge of the famine; and

(2) provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the Soviet role in the Ukraine famine.

DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 4. The duties of the Commission are to—

(1) conduct a study of the 1932–1933 Ukraine famine (in this Act referred to as the "famine study"), in accordance with section 6 of this Act, in which the Commission shall—

(A) gather all available information about the 1932–1933 famine in Ukraine;

(B) analyze the causes of such famine and the effects it has had on the Ukrainian nation and other countries; and

(C) study and analyze the reaction by the free countries of the world to such famine;

(2) provide interim reports to the House of Representatives and the Senate as the Commission deems necessary;

(3) provide upon request any available information about such famine to Congress, the executive branch, educational institutions, libraries, news media, and the general public;

(4) submit to Congress a final report on the results of the famine study no later than three years after the organizational meeting of the Commission held under section 6(a) of this Act; and

(5) publish the results of the famine study for the use of Congress, the executive branch, educational institutions, libraries, and the general public.

MEMBERSHIP

SEC. 5. (a) The Commission shall be composed of twenty-one members, who shall be appointed within thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act, as follows:

(1) Four members shall be Members of the House of Representatives and shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Two such members shall be selected from the majority party of the House of Representatives and two such members shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the House, from the minority party of the House of Representatives. The Speaker also shall designate one of the House Members as Chairman of the Commission.

(2) Two members shall be Members of the Senate and shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate. One such member shall be selected from the majority party of the Senate and one such member shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, from the minority party of the Senate.

(3) One member shall be from among officers and employees of each of the Departments of State, Education, and Health and Human Services and shall be appointed by the President, after consultation with the Secretaries of the respective departments.

(4) Twelve members shall be from the Ukrainian-American community at large and Ukrainian-American chartered human rights groups and shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Commission in consultation with congressional members of the Commission, the Ukrainian-American community at large, and executive boards of Ukrainian-American chartered human rights groups.

(b) The term of office of each member shall be for the life of the Commission.

(c) Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise employed by the United States Government shall be paid the daily equivalent of the rate of basic pay payable for

GS–18 of the General Schedule for each day, including travel time, during which he or she is performing duties of the Commission. A member of the Commission who is an officer or employee of the United States Government or a Member of Congress shall serve without additional compensation. Each member of the Commission shall be reimbursed for travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for persons in Government service employed intermittently.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

SEC. 6. (a) Not later than sixty days after all members have been appointed to the Commission, the Commission shall hold an organizational meeting to establish the rules and procedures under which it will carry out its responsibilities.

(b) The Commission shall hire experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, from the academic community to assist in carrying out the famine study. Such experts and consultants shall be chosen by a majority vote of the Commission members on the basis of their academic background and their current involvement in research on the Ukraine famine. No person shall be otherwise employed by the Federal Government while serving as an expert or consultant to the Commission.

(c) The Commission shall have a staff director, who shall be appointed by the Chairman.

POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 7. (a) The Commission or any member it authorizes may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act, hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, request such attendance, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission or any such member may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it.

(b)(1) The Commission may issue subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation by the Commission. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(2) The subpenas of the Commission may be issued by the Chairman of the Commission or any member designated by him and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such member. The subpenas of the Commission shall be served in the same manner provided for subpenas issued by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts.

(3) If a person issued a subpena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey such subpena, any court of the United States within the judicial district within which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial district within which such person is found or resides or transacts business may (upon application by the Commission) order such person to appear before the Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony relating to the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished as a contempt of the court.

(4) All process of any court to which application may be made under this section may be served in the judicial district in which the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(c) The Commission may obtain from any department or agency of the United States information that it considers useful in the discharge of its duties. Upon request of the Chairman, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission to the extent permitted by law.

(d) The Commission may appoint and fix the pay of such personnel as it considers appropriate. Such personnel may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of

chapter 51 and subchapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates. No individual so appointed may receive pay in excess of the maximum annual rate of pay payable for GS–18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.

(e) The Commission may solicit, accept, use, and dispose of donations of money, property, or services.

(f) The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the United States.

(g) The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis such administrative support services as the Commission may request.

(h) The Commission may procure by contract any supplies, services, and property, including the conduct of research and the preparation of reports by Government agencies and private firms, necessary to discharge the duties of the Commission, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and to the extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.

TERMINATION

SEC. 8. The Commission shall terminate sixty days after the report of the Commission is submitted to Congress under section 4(4) of this Act.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 9. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hawkins, who cannot be with us today, has requested that her opening statement be inserted in the record. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record at this point.

[Senator Hawkins' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA HAWKINS

Mr. Chairman, if you ask the average man on the street what the Holocaust was, there is a good chance that he will be able to tell you that it was the result of a program of mass extermination conducted by the Nazi German Government during World War II. Altogether 6 million Jews and millions of Poles, Gypsies and others were killed in Hitler's death camps. About the time Hitler was taking power in Germany, 1932-33, another atrocity was taking place further to the east—the Great Ukrainian Famine. It is called a famine because there was no food, and people were starving to death by the millions, but it was more accurately a program of extermination, no less intentional, no less premeditated than the terror Hitler was to show the world only a few years later. Before it was over, 7 million Ukrainians and others were dead. In the spring of 1933 when the previous year's supplies were gone and before new vegetation brought relief, people were dying by the thousands—some estimate the rate to be as high as 25,000 per day, 1,000 per hour, 17 per minute.

I would like to read into the record a statement by Malcolm Muggeridge concerning the Ukrainian Famine. In the thirties, Malcolm Muggeridge was the Manchester Guardian's correspondent in the Soviet Union. Although he is now a devout Christian, Muggeridge had come to the Soviet Union as an enthusiastic supporter of the Soviet regime. At one time he and his wife had planned to settle permanently in the Soviet Union to help build communism. Of the Famine Mr. Muggeridge wrote, "to say that there is a famine in some of the most fertile parts of Russia is to say much less than the truth; there is not only famine, but, in the case of the North Caucasus at least, a state of war, a military occupation. In both the Ukraine and the North Caucasus the grain collection has been carried out with such thoroughness and brutality that the peasants are now quite without bread. Thousands of them have been exiled; in certain cases whole villages have been sent to the North for forced labor; even now it is a common sight to see parties of wretched men and women, labelled kulaks, being marched away under armed guard.

The fields are neglected and full of weeds; no cattle are to be seen anywhere, and few horses; only the military and the GPU (the Secret Police, predecessors of the KGB) are well fed, the rest of the population obviously starving, obviously terrorised."

The Ukrainian Famine was a man-made famine. It was a political program that hid behind the slogans of collectivism and the industrialization of agriculture. It was a political program designed to destroy Ukrainian nationalism and identify and impose a foreign system in much the same way the Cambodian Communists have sought to build a new socialist society on the blood of millions of their fellow Cambodians.

Some may wonder why the Foreign Relations Committee is holding a hearing on a topic that is 50 years old, but I believe that the topic is relevant. It is relevant because in it we are reminded of the nature of the Soviet system, a system that destroyed the Prague spring, a system that shoots down helpless airliners, a system that smothers solidarity and invades Afghanistan, and the list could go on and on.

All too often we seem shocked at Soviet behavior, but that is only because we forget. We forget how they have behaved in the past. That is why hearings such as this are important, because we cannot afford to forget—too much is at stake. I want to commend Senator Bradley for raising this issue in the form of his bill, S. 2456. I have some questions about the bill, but I believe he has done us a service by helping keep this issue before the public.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very honored indeed to have the Senate sponsor of S. 2456, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, here to present his bill. Senator Bradley, I am pleased to have you before the committee this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL BRADLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator BRADLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be here and to have a chance to testify in support of S. 2456, the Ukraine Famine Act. I commend the committee for holding these hearings. They have been long in coming and I appreciate the distinguished chairman's attention to this and willingness to thoroughly look at this issue.

There is a real need for a commission to study the Soviet-induced famine of 1932-33. I am privileged to have this opportunity to speak on a subject I know to be of great concern to many Americans, particularly those with families destroyed in this Ukrainian genocide. In little over a year, as you have said in your opening statement, as many as 7 million people perished by starvation in what was clearly a man-made famine. It was premeditated, politically motivated. Indeed, it was a peacetime genocide.

Let me assure you, however, that I believe the importance of the atrocity is not limited to the Ukrainian community. Its significance transcends the suffering of those immediately affected. Its lessons go to the heart of our own humanity. We must not ignore them.

Unfortunately, we as a people and a government have a tendency to forget about history. That is dangerous. Scrupulous and unblinking attention to the history record is essential if we are to avoid repeating the tragedies of the past.

The Ukrainian famine is a compelling example. In the year following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the Ukrainian peasants struggled valiantly against the Soviets as a single, unified national political force. In an effort to break their will, the Soviet regime under Stalin ordered the deportation of kulaks, the better-off peasants, and collectivization of the Ukrainian peasantry.

Between 1930 and 1933, poor harvesting techniques in the Ukraine meant that Moscow's crop estimates for the region were consistently higher than the actual harvest. In addition, collectivization reduced production by over 30 percent. Yet Stalin made little or no adjustments for the discrepancies between the actual harvest and the target level of production.

By 1931 it was impossible for the Ukraine to meet the grain quotas Moscow imposed. Notwithstanding this fact, the Soviet Government halted all deliveries of consumer items to those regions blacklisted for not meeting the quotas. The result was mass starvation.

Hundreds of thousands of peasants died of starvation in 1933; tens of thousands more fled their homes and endured great hardship. Entire regions were turned into wastelands. People went mad with hunger and even turned to cannibalism. Although few actual figures exist, there are numerous eyewitness accounts of the suffering and devastation.

Even the most conservative estimates project that 5 million people died during the spring and summer of 1933. That would be almost 25,000 people every day. Deaths from famine amounted to nearly 20 percent of the entire Ukrainian population.

By crushing the peasants and intimidating the intelligentsia, the Soviets were able to stamp out, apparently, Ukrainian nationalism.

Russification of the country began soon after. Thus, the famine played a crucial role in the Soviet suppression of the Ukrainian nation, and that suppression continues to this day.

Because of their complicity in creating the famine, the Soviets took great measures to conceal it. The accounts of the famine which did reach the West failed to persuade many people of its existence or severity. Unfortunately, the U.S. press, with America in the midst of a great depression, did not give the Ukrainian famine the attention it deserved. That is still the situation today.

So far, only the Ukrainians themselves officially recognize the magnitude and significance of the famine. The Soviet Government continues to deny its occurrence, further obstructing an accurate account of the famine. Most Americans are not even aware that this tragedy ever took place. Seven million people died, and most Americans were not aware of it. Seven million people starved, and most Americans are not aware of it.

It is my hope that this legislation, S. 2456, will preserve the memory of those who suffered and died and secure a place in history for this important but neglected event.

S. 2456 will create a commission to gather evidence and study the famine. The purpose of the study is twofold: First, to expand the world's knowledge of the famine; and, second, to provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the brutal role of the Soviet Government in this famine.

Within 3 years of the formation of the Commission the results of the study will be sent to Congress and later published for the benefit of educational institutions, libraries, and the general public.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that a letter from the chairman of Harvard University's Ukrainian Studies Fund in support of this legislation be included in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be incorporated at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
UKRAINIAN STUDIES FUND,
Cambridge, MA, July 11, 1984.

Hon. BILL BRADLEY,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR BRADLEY: We commend you for the introduction of a bill, S. 2456, which proposes to establish a special commission to study the man-made famine in Ukraine perpetrated by the Soviet government in 1932-33. We understand that hearings on this bill are scheduled to take place in the Foreign Relations Committee on August 1, 1984.

The Ukrainian Study Fund, which was established in 1957 for the purpose of underwriting the formation and maintenance of Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (founded to provide scholarly information about Ukraine to the general public), has an inherent interest in the success of your project.

Realizing the importance of your legislation, S. 2456, we are prepared to do whatever necessary to assist you in this endeavor. Recently, we have written to all members of the United States Senate urging them to support your bill and join as cosponsors. In addition, we have asked members and friends of our institution to seek support from their senators for this bill.

Although one of the founding members of the United Nations, Ukraine is practically in total isolation from the rest of the world. Communications and information must go through Moscow thus giving unabated license to the Soviet government to manipulate the news emanating from Ukraine. This was the case in 1932-33 when the famine occurred. Unfortunately, many Western correspondents stationed in Moscow at the time of famine, whether through a lack of information or of an un-

willingness to call the Soviet government to task, remained silent about this tragedy. The Congressional commission established through your bill will in part rectify this injustice by exposing the true nature of the Soviets.

With Best Wishes,

STEPHAN CHEMYCH, *Chairman.*

Senator BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, we cannot alter the fact that millions of Ukrainians died in 1933, but we can at least remove this tragedy from obscurity. Only by remembering atrocities like the Ukrainian famine, the Jewish Holocaust, the Armenian genocide can we hope to prevent their reoccurrence. As Eli Weisel, a survivor of Auschwitz, once said, "Memory is our only shield, our only shield," to protect mankind against its own inhumanity.

Mr. Chairman, again I thank the committee for holding hearings on this important issue and I hope the bill could be reported out shortly so that all Senators might have the opportunity to express their support for this very important project, and I thank the committee for its attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Bradley. I just have a couple of questions to ask of you.

In the State Department's letter of June 13 the letter comments on this bill and opposes a federally sponsored and funded commission to study the Ukrainian famine on the grounds that the subject is too narrow, maintaining that a study of any one Soviet Union nationality should be privately funded.

Yet the scale of suffering and death in the Ukrainian famine, perhaps 7 million dead as both of us have said, puts this tragedy in terms of numbers of people killed in the ranks of any of the mass murders of modern history. Certainly it is comparable somewhat to the World War II Holocaust of the Nazis against Jews, and certainly we have never let the world ever forget that tragedy. It is a constant reminder that mankind simply cannot allow that to ever, ever happen again.

Rather than focusing on just one single nationality, would it be better to put it in terms of the scale of the extermination as a criteria rather than just one nationality? Possibly what other atrocity of man against his fellow man has occurred of a consequence and size of that one single tragedy?

Senator BRADLEY. I do not think that you can divorce this particular atrocity from others that have occurred around the world, but the point is that this is one of those events that has just been obscured. People do not have any interest in it. They do not appear to know much about it.

In my view, I think it is the proper role of the Congress to call attention to these events. The dimension of their inhumanity should be known. The source and the cause should be known, and I think it is fully proper for the Congress of the United States to establish this Commission.

Again, I would argue that this is established by the Congress of the United States, which represents the people of this country and the people of this country, I think, believe in certain values that were not only contradicted and repudiated but insulted in the most fundamental way by the action of the Soviet state in the early 1930's. So I find this a very appropriate act, and the Commission very appropriate for congressional sponsorship.

The CHAIRMAN. I will put the same question to the administration.

Finally, for you, Senator Bradley, because we all are under budget restraints now, could you respond to the question that would be certainly asked, is a federally funded commission to study the Ukraine famine desirable rather than a study financed by universities, foundations, or other private funding?

Senator BRADLEY. I would argue, as I did earlier, that yes, it is important to fund the Commission federally, and as to the amount, I think that we can talk about that, as to whether it should be open ended or whether there should be a specific amount. I think that is negotiable. But the principle is one that we want to stand firm on, which is that where this inhumanity to man occurs, and in this case, where it is state sponsored, it is very important to call attention to it and to get the information to the American people.

And that is in part one of the functions of the legislative branch—to communicate facts to the American citizenry.

Thinking back to your first question, I really think if you take the Ukrainian famine, if you looked at that very carefully as opposed to lumping it in with 10 or 15 other comparable actions, I think you would actually get greater attention, greater detail and there would be a greater impact than if we simply made general assertions about brutality on the part of the Soviet state.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. We will move this bill along just as rapidly as we can.

Senator BRADLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is R. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Mr. Palmer, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF R. MARK PALMER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Senator.

The Department of State welcomes congressional interest in this terrible chapter in human history. Insufficient attention has been paid in the United States to the Great Famine of 1932 and 1933, and to most Americans it remains a little known event in the early history of the Soviet Union. The most horrible aspect of the Great Famine is that it was largely manmade and exploited by the leadership of the Soviet Union for its own political gain.

It is now generally recognized that the seriousness of the famine was purposely aggravated by Stalin.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Mr. Palmer. Would you suspend for just a moment? There is a telephone call that I must take.

Mr. PALMER. Sure.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Palmer. Please continue.

Mr. PALMER. It is now generally recognized that the seriousness of the famine was purposely aggravated by Stalin to subdue resistance by the peasants to collectivization and to establish firmly his unquestioned rule.

The leaders of the Soviet Union, although fully aware of the situation in the Ukraine and having complete control of food supplies

within its borders, failed to take relief measures to check the famine or to alleviate the catastrophic conditions resulting from it. In complete disregard of international opinion, they ignored the appeals of international organizations and other nations to do otherwise.

Despite a drop in food production in the Ukraine, harvests continued to be exported, food was confiscated from granaries and homes, food imports were banned, and the death penalty was imposed for hoarding food. Internal controls were imposed on travel to keep peasants from going to cities to search for food and to prevent them from leaving the Ukraine. Resisting peasants were deported to Siberia.

Some historians estimate that more than 7 million Ukrainians, and millions of others, died as a result of this callous and deliberate act. The devastation of these years continues to leave its mark on the Ukrainian people, and has affected their economic, social, and political development to an enormous extent.

The Department of State welcomes efforts to expand our knowledge of the Soviet Union, including its dark history under Stalin. Under appropriate circumstances, we could support the establishment of a Commission to examine that history, if there were no better alternative methods at hand. However, we believe there are a number of matters to be considered with regard to the present proposal to establish a Commission on the Ukrainian Famine.

First, the mandate of this Commission seems overly narrow. The legislative history of S. 2456 would appear to indicate that the primary purpose of the Commission would be to focus on the plight of the Ukrainian people to the detriment of the millions of others who also suffered from the famine.

It should be noted that the effects of the famine were felt keenly in areas outside the Ukraine, including the grain-growing areas of the Northern Caucasus and Volga regions. In addition to the Ukrainians who died, perhaps as many as 3 million to 4 million others died as well. We would hope that any study undertaken would analyze the effects of the famine in all areas of the Soviet Union.

Second, the Commission, as presently envisaged, seems to us to be somewhat topheavy bureaucratically. The creation of a 21-member Commission, all paid at the GS–18 level strikes us as excessive. It is not clear why the Commission could not be composed instead of the one to two people who actually did the research and produced the report.

Third, we would note that the work envisaged for the Commission is already being performed in the private sector. For example, Dr. James Mace of the Harvard Ukrainian Institute has just prepared a very creditable and widely praised study of the Ukrainian famine; and other renowned scholars, such as Dr. Robert Conquest of the Hoover Institution are engaged in active research on this topic.

Creation of a Commission, therefore, appears to be needlessly duplicative of work already being performed at private expense.

Fourth, we believe it likely that the creation of one such commission would lead inevitably to suggestions that other commissions be created—at ever-growing expense to the taxpayer—to examine

issues involving the Soviet Union not covered by the narrow mandate of the first commission. For example, the substantial Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian communities might seek the creation of a commission to study the sufferings of the Baltic people under Stalin. The American Jewish community might seek the formation of a commission to study the plight of Soviet Jews under Stalin and after.

These subjects, and many others, are legitimate and necessary subjects for study if we are better to understand the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that all of these studies are more appropriately funded and undertaken by the private sector.

Therefore, while the Department fully understands the considerations which have impelled the introduction of S. 2456, we would recommend against favorable consideration of the bill at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Palmer.

I will put to you, then, the question I put to Senator Bradley, to differentiate and distinguish this from, as you say, a multiplicity of commissions that could be set up, to put this on the scale and magnitude of an atrocity compared, say, to the Holocaust, which is extremely well known, and has even within the last year or so had a major memorial constructed for that purpose.

But this particular atrocity is not well known. There is not another one of its magnitude that I can think of that would be in the same category. Would it be best to have sort of a guideline on the magnitude of the atrocity and as a means of differentiating that from, say, a multiplicity of commissions which could be costly and burdensome?

Mr. PALMER. There is no question that this ranks on the same order of horror and tragedy as the Jewish Holocaust. We, as my testimony indicates, do believe that it is worthy of the kind of attention that you mention. We strongly support efforts to enhance public knowledge of it, and if appropriate ways can be found we will be fully supportive of those efforts.

There are other tragedies of similar proportions. I think the whole gulag in the 1930's which involved perhaps 20 million people overall in the Soviet Union is one that is comparable, but certainly this has to rank as one of history's darkest chapters.

The CHAIRMAN. I will put to the public witnesses the questions that you have raised in your testimony about what you consider to be almost a top heavy commission. Then we may want to submit some questions to you following that to be answered for the record.

I would like to ask you just one unrelated question, but it is in your area of responsibility. Is there anything further that you can tell the committee, can you update us about the possibility or the probability of a September 18 meeting being held on arms control?

Mr. PALMER. We have had further contacts with the Soviet Union recently, in the last day or so. The President I think will want to say something about that later today. The Soviets are being very inflexible. The administration continues very much to want to have a meeting at Vienna and we are showing, I think, great flexibility; we are setting no preconditions.

But at the moment the Soviets are not making it easy to have that take place.

The CHAIRMAN. In the absence of Ambassador Dobrynin, who is on holiday, I think—is he in the process now? Are we in communication with him or is it done entirely with the Chargé of the Embassy now?

Mr. PALMER. Here in Washington it is done entirely with the Chargé. In Moscow we have had contacts with others. Ambassador Hartmann saw Ambassador Dobrynin in the last few days for a discussion, so Ambassador Dobrynin is still involved in the process.

The CHAIRMAN. He is?

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I express the hope on behalf of this committee that we can work out something so that this paramount issue for mankind can be taken up, as proposed with the Soviet Union. Certainly it is reasonable to think that people coming together would talk about several aspects of it, rather than just so narrowly defining the scope of it. I think it would be important that we continue our best efforts to bring it about, and I thank you very much.

Mr. PALMER. Senator, may I just mention one thing with regard to the Ukrainian famine issue? It occurred to me coming up here this morning that there is one possible source of funding for this effort that the committee might want to consider—the Lugar-Hamilton bill, with which you are familiar—which is designed to generate considerably expanded funding for studies of Eastern European and Soviet matters.

If it passes—and the administration strongly supports its passage—that would be a significant means of support for this kind of effort. I would just draw the committee's attention to that possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being with us this morning.

Next we will hear from our public witnesses. First is Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Ukrainian National Association of De Kalb, IL and a long-time friend of mine, and Mr. Ihor Olshaniwsky, coordinator, Americans for Human Rights in the Ukraine, of Newark, NJ.

Dr. Kuropas, we will be very happy to hear first from you.

STATEMENT OF MYRON B. KUROPAS, SUPREME VICE PRESIDENT, UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, DE KALB, IL

Mr. KUROPAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the Ukrainian National Association, I want to thank you very much for this opportunity.

Last year, the Ukrainian American community commemorated the 50th anniversary of a famine engineered by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in which some 7 million Ukrainian men, women and children perished.

Today, the Ukrainian American community is supporting the creation of a U.S. Commission to investigate the Great Famine because they want their fellow Americans to know the full story of this horrible tragedy and to understand its terrible lesson.

The Ukraine was the first victim of Soviet Russian imperialism and the first nation to experience Moscow's final solution for nationalist aspirations. Ukrainian Americans want the American

people to be aware of the foundation upon which Soviet power has been built and the brutal means the Soviet Union will utilize in order to achieve its goals.

The greatest threat to American security today is not the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Rather, it is American public ignorance of the consequences of Soviet expansionism. Stalin's heirs are still very much alive today and their handiwork can be observed in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Central America.

Few Americans have ever heard of the Great Famine in Ukraine. This lack of knowledge is due in part to one of the most successful news management operations in history. Stalin denied the famine ever took place and such Moscow-based American correspondents as Walter Duranty of the New York Times and Louis Fischer of The Nation sent dispatches to America during the heights of the famine which tended to confirm the denial.

On December 30, 1933, the Literary Digest, then a prestigious American periodical, reported that the Soviet grain harvest that year was larger than expected and all but praised Stalin for refusing "to compromise with the so-called kulaks." With the kind of disinformation which emanated from Moscow at the time, it is not surprising that so few people believed the Ukrainian American community when it protested Moscow's genocidal policies.

Thanks to some members of the free press and some others who were interested in portraying the U.S.S.R. as a humanitarian "worker's paradise," the Great Famine in Ukraine was ignored. Small wonder that it is often called the forgotten Holocaust.

Today we have an opportunity to place the events of 1932-33 in their proper historical perspective. Today we can document the relationship which exists between unbridled imperialism and national genocide. Today we can sensitize the world to the importance of an unbiased and free press in preventing a reoccurrence of the horrors which befell the Ukrainian people under Stalin.

Neither our scholarly institutions nor the Ukrainian American community has the resources and prestige to conduct the kind of famine investigation which could produce a complete and dispassionate recapitulation of the events which precipitated the Great Famine and the human suffering which resulted.

Some research has already been conducted, but according to Prof. James Mace, a Soviet expert at Harvard University, there is much vital information that remains untapped. Hundreds of famine survivors and Soviet defectors now living in the United States, Canada, and the State of Israel still need to be interviewed. Hundreds of U.S. Government documents still need to be examined.

There are, of course, some Americans who have urged our community to forget the past, to turn the page on events which transpired 50 years ago, and to concentrate on the future. To those well-meaning friends, our answer is simple. We cannot. We must not forget. As citizens of the one nation in the world which always has been a beacon of truth and humanitarian endeavor, we Ukrainian Americans have a moral obligation to speak on behalf of those who cannot speak.

We remember because our memory can immunize the world against a repetition of the terrors of the Great Famine. Only a full

understanding of this great tragedy and its consequences can ease our pain and set our sorrow at an endurable distance. Until we have made every effort to discover what happened in Ukraine and why, we Ukrainian Americans cannot properly mourn. Until we are satisfied that the world is aware of the Ukrainian tragedy and is determined to condemn such horrors whenever and wherever they occur, we cannot heal.

In the words of Elie Wiesel, chairman of the President's Holocaust Commission and a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald: "Memory is our shield, our only shield. To forget is no solution."

For the record, Senator, I would like to introduce three publications in support of my brief statement. They are "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," by Dr. James Mace; "The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine," a publication of the American Enterprise Institute; and the last article, "America's Red Decade and the Great Famine Cover-up."

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

[The publications referred to follow:]

[From USIA's Problems of Communism, May-June 1984, Vol. XXXIII]

Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine

By James E. Mace

After the harvest of 1932, millions of Ukrainians starved to death in one of the world's most fertile regions. The local population had produced enough food to feed itself, but the state had seized it, thereby creating a famine by an act of policy. The areas affected were demarcated by internal administrative borders in the Soviet Union, leaving immediately adjoining areas virtually untouched. Thus, the famine appears to have been geographically focused for political reasons. Since it coincided with far-reaching changes in Soviet nationality policy, and since the areas affected were inhabited by groups most resistant to the new policy, the famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a "final solution" on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union. According to internationally accepted definitions, this constitutes an act of genocide.[1]

Information About the Famine

Once an event of this magnitude fades from public consciousness, official efforts to deny that it had occurred are reinforced by a human tendency to disbelieve that such a thing could ever have happened. For this reason, it is necessary to sketch briefly what we know about the famine and how we know it.

The most obvious source for what happened is the memory of those who survived the famine. Eyewitnesses to any event of half a century ago become fewer in number with each passing year, but there are still hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them living in the West. A few managed to flee across the Prut River into Romania at the height of the famine, but most left the Soviet Union during World War II. Soon after the war, they formed organizations which published their testimony in their native Ukrainian or still imperfect English.[2] Others were interviewed as part of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project.[3] Still others published individual accounts. Most, of course, remained silent.

There are also individuals who may broadly be classified as perpetrators of the famine, and who have told their story in print. Lev Kopelev was a young communist who was sent into the Ukrainian countryside to procure grain in 1933, and he has written with regret about those whom in his youthful enthusiasm for the communist system he condemned to death by starvation.[4] Victor Kravchenko, a Soviet trade official who defected at the end of the war, has also written about what he did and witnessed as a young Ukrainian com-

James E. Mace is author of Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933 *(1983) and of several articles on Soviet policies in Ukraine. He is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, where he is a member of a project to study the famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine.*

[1] The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the Soviet Union signed in 1954, defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such" by the following means, among others:

- Killing members of the group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part

See Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, Eds., *The Human Rights Reader*, New York, New American Library, 1979, pp. 201–02.

[2] The largest collection of this type was published by DOBRUS, a Ukrainian acronym for the Democratic Association of Ukrainians Formerly Repressed by the Soviets, *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book*, Toronto-Detroit, DOBRUS, 1955. Other sources of various types are analyzed in Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932–34," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 3, 1964, pp. 250–84 and No. 4, 1965, pp. 471–74. The best bibliography is by Alexandra Pidhainy, "A Bibliography of the Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933," *The New Review. A Journal of East European History* (Toronto), No. 4, 1973, pp. 32–68.

[3] The files of this project, which include transcripts of interviews with famine survivors, are housed at Harvard University.

[4] Lev Kopelev, *The Education of a True Believer*, New York, Harper and Row, 1980, pp. 224–86.

munist.[5] Nikita Khrushchev, who was not in Ukraine at the time, remembered how he learned about it:

Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said: "Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin—for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo—know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with the corpses of people who had starved to death. It picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev. . . .[6]

As we shall see, Stalin knew perfectly well what was happening. He had ample warnings that a famine would result if his policies were carried out, and received continuous appeals to change the policies once the famine had started.

A number of foreign journalists reported the famine, among them Malcolm Muggeridge of the *Manchester Guardian*, William Henry Chamberlin of *The Christian Science Monitor*, Eugene Lyons of United Press, and Harry Lang of the Jewish daily *Der Forvert*.[7] Others, most notably Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* and Louis Fischer of *The New Republic*, seemed to have been perfectly aware of it, but actively aided the Soviet state in suppressing the story.[8]

Soviet historiography sporadically refers to the famine by using euphemisms such as "a severe shortfall of edible produce," caused partially by the "incorrect planning of the grain procurements campaign."[9] In the Soviet Union, what purports to be fiction is often more forthright than what purports to be history. Ivan Stadnyuk, a recipient of a Lenin Prize whose fiction portrays Stalin in a relatively positive light, wrote about the famine in a 1962 novel called *People Are Not Angels*. Set in Vynnytsya oblast near what was then the Soviet border with Poland, this work gives the following eloquently simple description:

The first to die from hunger were the men. Later on the children. And last of all, the women. But before they died, people often lost their senses and ceased to be human beings.[10]

Demography can aid us in deriving approximate numbers of those who died. Sergey Maksudov has demonstrated that at least 9.1 million people in the Soviet Union died prematurely between 1926 and 1939, that 8.5 million of them died before 1935 (i.e., during the period of collectivization and famine), and that 4.5 million died in the Ukrainian SSR.[11] Since his analysis assumes the absolute accuracy of the 1939 census and does not take into account the effects of interrepublic migration, the figure for the Ukrainian SSR probably underestimates the loss of life suffered there, by not making allowances for the policy of resettling villages depopulated by the famine in the Ukrainian SSR with villagers from other republics.[12]

A more accurate estimate of Ukrainian population loss can be derived by examining the 1926 and 1939 censuses on the basis of nationality, since the new settlers were not ethnic Ukrainians. In the 1926 census, the USSR contained 31.2 million Ukrainians, while the 1939 census lists only 28.1 million, an absolute decline of 9.9 percent or 3.1 million individuals.[13] On the basis of official Soviet administrative estimates of the natural rate of population growth for the Ukrainian SSR up to 1931, we can project a probable Ukrainian population total of 34,165,000 on the eve of the famine (1931).[14] Yet, because Ukrainians were concentrated in the countryside, where the natural

[5] Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official*, New York, Scribners, 1946, pp. 91-131.

[6] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, p. 74.

[7] Malcolm Muggeridge, *Winter in Moscow*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1934, pp. 39-57, 150 et passim; idem, *Chronicles of Wasted Time. One: The Green Stick*, New York, William Morrow, 1973, pp. 205-76. William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1934, pp. 367-69, 377-78. Eugene Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937, pp. 488-93, 572-80. English translations of Harry Lang's reports were published in *The New York Evening Journal*, Apr. 15–23, 1935.

[8] James William Crowl, *Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937. A Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1982, pp. 133-80. Marco Carynnyk, "The Famine the 'Times' Couldn't Find," *Commentary* (New York), November 1983, pp. 32-40, and Myron B. Kuropas, "America's 'Red Decade' and the Great Famine Cover-Up," *The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust*, Jersey City, NJ, Svoboda Press, 1983, pp. 38-45.

[9] *Istoriya selyanstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (A History of the Peasantry in the Ukrainian SSR), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1967, Vol. 2, p. 175.

[10] For an English translation, see Ivan F. Stadnyuk, *People are not Angels*, tr. by P. A. Spaulding and J. Antonenko, London, Mono Press, 1963, p. 119. First published in Russian in *Neva* (Leningrad), December 1962.

[11] S. Maksudov, "Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR in 1918-1958," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* (Paris), No. 3, 1977, p. 235; idem, "Population Loss in Ukraine, 1926-1938," unpublished paper, University of Alberta, 1983.

[12] Numerous eyewitness accounts of such resettlement are confirmed by a document in the Smolensk archive, ordering local officials to recruit settlers for this purpose. See Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*, New York, Vintage Books, 1958, p. 444.

[13] Figures on the ethnic composition of the USSR are taken from a table in V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR (Etnodemograficheskiy obzor)* (Nationalities of the USSR [Ethnodemographic Overview]), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 249.

[14] The rate of natural growth of the population in the Ukrainian SSR was 2.4 percent in 1926, 2.25 percent in 1927, 2.15 percent in 1928, 1.77 percent in 1929, 1.56 percent in 1930, and 1.45 percent in 1931. See V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naselennya Ukrainskoi RSR: Statystyko kartohrafichne doslidzhennya* (The Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR: Statistical Geographical Analysis), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1965, p. 84.

rate of population growth was higher at the time, this is a conservative estimate.[15] We may then project back from the 1939 figure to ask how many Ukrainians would have had to have been alive in 1934 to result in 28.1 million half a decade later. Since the natural rate of population growth was declining up to 1931 (when it reached a low point of 1.45 percent annually) and we lack similar statistics for the later 1930's, we have little choice but to project back from the natural rate of population growth observed for Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR in 1958–59 (1.39 percent), which gives us a 1934 population estimate of 26,211,000.[16] If we subtract our estimate of the post-famine population from the pre-famine population, the difference is 7,954,000, which can be taken as an estimate of the number of Ukrainians who died before their time. Again, this is a conservative estimate because it assumes that no one was born in the years 1932 or 1933. From this figure one must subtract victims of unnatural deaths not related to the famine. Some 200,000 farms in the Ukrainian SSR were "dekulakized." Estimating five persons per family on average, this makes for a total of 1,000,000 individuals of whom perhaps 250,000 were either executed or died in the harsh conditions of exile.[17] Let us assume that another quarter of a million Ukrainians were executed or died in exile in 1936–39. This still leaves almost 7.5 million Ukrainians who died in the famine.

This is only a rough estimate. The figure might be lower, because some persons who were counted as Ukralnian in the 1926 census could have been listed as Russian in 1939. It could also be significantly higher, because the circumstances surrounding the 1939 census indicate that its figures were inflated. A

[15]On rates of natural growth of the rural population, see ibid.

[16]The 1.39 percent figure was taken from ibid., p. 85.

[17]The number of dekulakized families is taken from *Kommunist* (Kharkiv), Dec. 21, 1934. I. I. Shyn'ko states that as of Mar. 10, 1930, in 309 rayons of the Ukrainian SSR, 11,374 families consisting of 52,660 individuals had been exiled as kulaks. See his *Sotsialistychne perebudova i tekhnichna rekonstruktsiya sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrainy, 1927–1932 rr.* (The Socialist Transformation and Technical Reconstruction of Agriculture in Ukraine, 1927–1932), Kiev, Akademiya Nauk Ukrains'koi RSR, 1961, p. 190. These fragmentary figures from the first wave of dekulakization show an average of just under five persons per exiled family. Eyewitnesses maintain that about 25 percent of those exiled perished.

Frozen bodies of the starved at a Kharkiv cemetery in 1933.

—From Stephen Skoklin, *The Agony of a Nation*, London, Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., 1953, p. 88.

census was taken in 1937, but it was never published. Instead, an announcement was made that the officials in charge of preparing the census were participants in a plot to discredit the progress of socialism by deliberately undercounting the Soviet population.[18] Since the census officials were shot for not finding enough people in 1937, we may safely assume that their successors made every effort to avoid any perception that their own work suffered from similar shortcomings.

Another way to estimate the famine losses is to compare the Ukrainians' demographic fate with that of the Byelorussians—a closely related nation that had a somewhat lower rate of natural population growth before 1931; went through similar political campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism" and similar pressures to assimilate; and had a lower level of literacy and weaker traditions of national self-assertion, which might have made them more prone to assimilation. However, Byelorussia did not go through the famine, and the number of Byelorussians in the USSR increased 11.5 percent in the time that the number of Ukrainians decreased by 9.9 percent. If Ukrainian population growth had matched that of their Byelorussian neighbors—and by every indication it would have surpassed that of Byelorussia but for the famine—there would have been almost 6.7 million more Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in 1939 than were recorded.

Census data is also helpful in tracing the geography of the famine. Maksudov has shown how this could be done on the basis of the 1959 census. Since birthrates decline and infant mortality soars during a famine, we have clear evidence of extraordinary mortality in areas where the number of rural women (the least mobile segment of the population) is exceptionally small in age groups born immediately before or during the famine. Since the 1959 census provides age data for five-year periods, this yardstick can only provide information about areas where mortality was exceptionally high from the beginning of forced collectivization through the famine, that is, for the years 1929–1933. Areas that show evidence of high mortality in this period are Ukraine, the then heavily Ukrainian and Cossack North Caucasus kray, Kazakhstan, some areas of the Volga basin, and parts of Western Siberia, where collectivization was carried out in a particularly harsh manner.[19] If we exclude areas where mass mortality can be attributed to the years before 1932 (Kazakhstan and Western Siberia), we are left with areas containing Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Germans, the last being affected somewhat less than the two others.[20] What is particularly striking is the sharp contrast between contiguous oblasts along the border between Ukraine and Russia proper. For example, Kharkiv oblast on the Ukrainian side of the border shows demographic evidence of being one of the most devastated areas, while Belgorod oblast, contiguous to it on the Russian side, shows no evidence of exceptional mortality. Both oblasts have the same sort of farming and weather, while the cities of Kharkiv and Belgorod are only about 35 kilometers apart. The fact that one was affected and the other was not can only be attributed to a deliberate policy to concentrate the famine geographically for political ends.

The State and National Communism

A key to understanding the geography and motive of the famine is to recall events that took place immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power. During the 1918 German occupation of Ukraine, even Mennonite German communities welcomed their conationals and provided volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks, despite old pacifist traditions. (Later, in 1941, the Volga Germans as well as those in Ukraine were deported en masse as a possible security threat.) The Cossacks attempted to establish a separate state under General Alexey Kaledin and later provided the most important base for the anticommunist forces of Anton Denikin. The Ukrainians not only formed their own nation-state but—after their military defeat and incorporation into the USSR—became what Poland would become in the Soviet bloc after World War II: that part of the larger entity that was most conscious of its national distinctiveness, most assertive of its prerogatives, and least willing to follow Moscow's model in arranging its own affairs. Not coincidentally, it was the territories inhabited by Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Germans that were affected by the famine in 1933.

[18] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1937. See also Boris Souvarine, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1939, p. 669, and Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny*, New York, Harper and Row, 1981, pp. 205–09.

[19] S. Maksudov, "Geography of the Famine of 1933," *SSSR: Vnutrenyye protivorechiya* (New York), No. 7, 1983, p. 5–17.

[20] On mass starvation in Kazakhstan, which began around 1930 but continued until virtually the end of the decade, see Martha Brill Olcott, "The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan," *Russian Review* (Stanford, CA), No. 2, 1981, pp. 136–37. Western Siberia was an area where Stalin personally supervised the initial collectivization drive, which was notorious for its brutality. Along the Volga the dead seem at least to have had coffins, whereas mass graves were widespread in Ukraine, indicating differing magnitudes of mortality for the two areas. See the brief account of Mikhail Alekseyev, "Sower and Protector," *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 9, 1972, p. 96.

In order to understand the function that this famine performed in Soviet history, it is first necessary to comprehend that the Soviet leadership perceived an additional link between nationalism and the peasantry in the so-called borderlands *(okrainy)* outside ethnic Russia. Stalin wrote: "The nationality question is *in the essence of the matter* a question of the peasantry."[21] Like much else in Stalin's writings, the aphoristic form encapsulates a commonplace idea. As early as the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in March 1919, the nationality question was discussed as an aspect of the regime's relationship with the peasantry.[22] Since the borderlands by and large consisted of Russian-speaking cities surrounded by non-Russian speaking villages, this was little more than a matter of simple observation. National resistance to Russian rule came primarily from the countryside, and coming to terms with non-Russian national aspirations meant of necessity coming to terms with the peasants who formed the mainstay of the national movements.

In Ukraine, the Soviet state was plagued by what the newspapers called "kulak banditism"—actually guerrilla bands of Ukrainian nationalists who harassed the Bolsheviks from rural areas. The Ukrainian national government, an anticommunist but thoroughly socialist people's republic *(Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika)*, had been pushed out from Ukrainian territory by the end of 1920, but thousands of individuals loyal to it continued to fight for independence.[23] Since the Soviet state proclaimed in Ukraine, as in other so-called borderlands, had been imposed by the Bolsheviks, and such support as it had came mainly from Russian or Russified urban dwellers, the Soviet state was viewed in the countryside as an occupation regime. As time went on, even the Bolsheviks came to realize this.

The wars of the Russian Revolution had ended in military victory and socio-political stalemate for the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks had attempted to impose a completely new structure on society from top to bottom, but their attempts to regiment society through the policy of War Communism had failed. Peasants would not join communes. Intellectuals who did not find themselves in complete accord with the party's views could not be immediately dispensed with by the Bolsheviks. Guerrilla fighters for national self-determination could not be defeated as easily as conventional forces.

Lenin realized that a period of respite, a domestic equivalent to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was necessary for the survival of his government. In 1921 he proclaimed the New Economic Policy, designed to appease the peasantry by replacing forced requisitions of foodstuffs with a tax in kind and allowing the peasants to sell their surplus produce on a free market. Peasants were assured that they had secure tenure on their individual farms. Intellectuals were allowed to express themselves quite freely, as long as they were not openly disloyal. With regard to the nationalities, a policy more attuned to their national aspirations was introduced.

In 1923, the 12th Party Congress formally adopted the policy of *korenizatsiya*, which literally means "taking root," but whose meaning is better conveyed by the word "indigenization." Ukrainization, the Ukrainian version of korenizatsiya, was designed to give the Soviet Ukrainian state a veneer of national legitimacy by actively recruiting Ukrainians into the party and state apparats, switching official business to the Ukrainian language, and supporting Ukrainian cultural activities.[24]

Ukrainization went much further than comparable policies elsewhere in the USSR, further than Moscow evidently ever intended. Prominent Ukrainian socialists were invited to return from exile. Many did, including Ukraine's ex-president Mykhaylo Hrushevsky. In 1924, the Declaration of the Sixty-Six, among whose signatories were former cabinet ministers of the Petlyura government, pledged loyalty to the Soviet state on the grounds that Ukrainians had always been an oppressed people with a natural affinity for socialism and that it was only early Bolshevik hostility toward Ukrainian culture and aspirations that had prevented Ukrainians from cooperating with the Soviet state. Now that the Bolsheviks had repudiated their past errors, the declaration concluded, Ukrainians were willing to be loyal Soviet citizens.[25] The document had the character of a national covenant: those who felt themselves to be the natural leaders of the Ukrainian people declared their loyalty to communism on the grounds that this was compatible with loyalty to their nation.

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[21] I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol. 7, 1946, p. 72.

[22] Frantisek Silnicky, *Natsional'naya politika KPSS v period s 1917 po 1922 god* (The Nationality Policy of the CPSU from 1917 Through 1922), Munich, Suchasnist', 1979, pp. 196–97.

[23] As of April 1921, the Soviet government estimated that 102 armed bands were operating in Ukraine and the Crimea, each with from 20 to 800 men, in addition to Nestor Makhno's anarchist force of 10,000 to 15,000. O. O. Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutrishn'oi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraini u 1921–1923 rr.* (Destruction of the Armed Internal Counterrevolution in Ukraine in the Years 1921–1923), Kharkiv, Vydavnytstvo Kharkivs'koho Universytetu, 1972, p. 18.

[24] See, for example, Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 56–58.

[25] *Visti VUTsVK* (Kharkiv), May 19, 1924.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia made use of the relative freedom and state sponsorship of the 1920's by creating something like a golden age in Ukrainian letters, a period later called the "executed rebirth," *(rozstrilyane vidrodzhennya)* because of its abrupt and violent termination. What the party more prosaically called the "Ukrainian cultural process" posed a direct challenge to party legitimacy, and the issue of what to do about this development was one of the dominant political issues of the 1920's. Ukrainian communists, many only recently recruited from Ukrainian non-Bolshevik socialist parties, became prominent in official cultural life and extremely vocal in protesting the constraints on Ukraine's culture imposed by its association with Russia.

Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, the most popular Ukrainian communist writer of the day, created a sensation by constructing a whole theory of national cultural liberation. He called on Ukrainians to develop a literature based on West European models. In order to do this, Khvyl'ovyi insisted that Ukrainian literature repudiate Russian culture and turn to West European culture, so that it could then promote an "Asiatic renaissance" by serving as a conduit transmitting the highest achievements of European culture to the rising colonial peoples of the East. Ukraine's Commissar of Education, Oleksander Shums'kyi, who had originally been leader of a Ukrainian revolutionary group that was admitted to the Bolshevik Party only in 1920, led a delegation of West Ukrainian Communists to Stalin in 1925, demanding that Ukrainization be speeded up and that the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine be headed by a Ukrainian. In 1928, another high official in the commissariat of education, Mykhaylo Volobuyev, argued that Soviet Ukraine was being exploited by the Soviet government in a manner virtually indistinguishable from prerevolutionary times; that its economic development was therefore being distorted; and that the only solution was for Soviet Ukraine to be given control over its economic resources and develop them in a relatively autarkic fashion.[26]

Although Stalin personally insisted on the condemnation of such "national deviations" (and condemned they were), in 1927 he withdrew his personal satrap, Lazar Kaganovich, from Soviet Ukraine and left a relatively autonomous national communist leadership in charge. After Kaganovich was replaced as First Secretary of the CP(B)U by Stanislav Kossior, the real political strongman in the Ukrainian SSR became Shums'kyi's successor as commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk. As an Old Bolshevik who had been closely associated with Lenin—one of the few ethnic

A 1931 photo of Mykola Skrypnyk, Ukrainian party leader in the late 1920's and early 1930's, promoter of the policies of Ukrainization.

—[illegible] 1972, p. [illegible]

Ukrainians to have such credentials—Skrypnyk was able to extend his authority over anything touching on the nationality question—which meant practically everything—in Ukraine. He became the chief advocate of his republic's national interests and chief defender of its prerogatives at Union councils. One of his first acts as education commissar was to chair an orthography conference, which brought together experts from Europe, Russia, and Ukraine, to standardize Ukrainian spelling and purge the language of Russianisms. He took it upon his office to satisfy the "cultural needs" of Ukrainians in Russia on the grounds that the Russian Soviet government was not devoting adequate resources to them. On one occasion, he stated that Russia's record in this area was so abysmal that it was giving political ammunition to the anticommunist Ukrainian nationalists in Polish-ruled Western Ukraine. In his view, the only solution was to transfer to the Soviet Ukrainian republic certain border areas of the Russian republic with Ukrainian majorities. In other words, a Soviet Ukrainian leader was demanding territorial concessions from Soviet Russia. His demands did not meet with success.[27]

[26] See my *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983, pp. 86-191.

[27] Ibid., pp. 192-231.

The period of Skrypnyk's dominance (1927–1933)—while marked by the same cultural restrictiveness characteristic of this period in Soviet history as a whole—was the high point of Ukrainization, to the extent that urban inhabitants who did not speak Ukrainian began to feel like foreigners in the cities where they had been born. Industrialization flooded the workplaces with Ukrainians from the countryside to a point where Ukrainians became an absolute majority in the industrial work force by 1930. Many daily newspapers switched from the Russian to the Ukrainian language. By early 1933, 88 percent of all factory newspapers were in Ukrainian. All university lectures had to be delivered in Ukrainian.[28] The original constituency of Soviet rule in Ukraine, the Russian and Russified urban dwellers, was being severely undermined.

Collectivization and Ukraine

Nevertheless, the state's relations with the Ukrainian countryside remained uneasy. For one thing, Soviet power there continued to depend largely on a barely changed reincarnation of the old committees of poor peasants (*kombyed*, renamed *komnezam* in 1930) abolished in the Russian SFSR before the end of the Civil War. In fact, the Ukrainian village *komnezam* was until the end of 1923 empowered to "dekulakize" villagers by seizing and redistributing (usually to *komnezam* members) any "surplus" land and property it wished. It retained state power in the village, often in the absence of a village soviet, until well into 1925. Kept in a sort of limbo thereafter, the *komnezam* returned to prominence when the state turned once again to compulsory grain collection after the 1927 harvest. Those who participated in these "procurements" were allowed to retain a share of the booty. The *komnezam* would also play an important supporting role in the collectivization and famine, but almost always under the leadership of an outsider. It was abolished only in 1933.[29]

Even at the height of the state's "honeymoon" with the countryside in the mid-1920's, there were occasional frank admissions that its few rural supporters were an isolated and despised minority. One high Soviet Ukrainian official addressed a group of village newspaper correspondents in 1926, openly sympathizing with the fact that they were a small minority whose lives were often made difficult by "kulaks" and even by state functionaries.[30]

In 1928–29, Stalin began his "socialist offensive," consisting in the abandonment of Lenin's New Economic Policy in favor of a crash program of rapid industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, and the subordination of all societal resources to this "socialist transformation." In many hastily collectivized villages, the kolkhoz meant only that implements and livestock were brought to the center of the village and dubbed "socialized property," while the peasants were told to plant and harvest as a group. This did nothing to raise output or benefit the rural population, but bringing the entire harvest to a common threshing room made it much easier for the state to "procure" a larger portion of the harvest. Collectivization was thus extractive, recognized by the peasants to be such, and could only be carried out as a program to subjugate the rural population in its entirety.

Ukrainization had tilted the ethnic balance of power toward the nation that was dominant in the countryside. This was a political necessity as long as the state felt that it needed to secure at least the tolerance of the countryside. Once the state felt strong enough to initiate the forced collectivization of agriculture, the political equation was radically altered.

The drive for the immediate and total collectivization of agriculture meant a return to civil war. Although the opposition remained leaderless and uncoordinated, Stalin himself admitted that this war was more difficult to fight than World War II.[31] It was a war of town against country, and, in Ukrainian terms, this implied a war of what remained of the non-Ukrainian city against the Ukrainian countryside. Once the state embarked upon this struggle, policies to placate the countryside became irrelevant.

Forced collectivization was carried out by means of dispatching individuals from the cities to the villages. There were various waves of this invasion, but the most important one was that of the "twenty-five thousanders," so called because of a 1929 decree authorizing the recruitment of 25,000 proletarian volunteers to help carry out collectivization. We do not have official figures on the national composition of those "thousanders" who worked in Ukraine, but the evidence suggests that relatively few were Ukrainians. Many—the Soviet sources do not give a precise figure

[28]Ibid.; and Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Impact of Ukrainization on the Social Structure of Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto), No. 3, 1980, pp. 338–57.

[29]For a lengthier discussion of this institution, see my "The *Kombedy* *Nezamozhnykh Selyan* and the Structure of Soviet Rule in the Ukrainian Countryside, 1920–1933," *Soviet Studies*, No. 4, 1983, pp. 487–503.

[30]V. Zatonsky, *Leninovym shlyakhom* (On Lenin's Path), Kharkiv, Radyans'ke selo, 1926, p. 21.

[31]Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 498.

but indicate that the number was substantial—were sent from the Russian SFSR to Ukraine. Seventy-five hundred of those sent to the Ukrainian countryside were recruited locally, but since over 75 percent of them had been workers for over 12 years, this would indicate that few of them were Ukrainians.[32] Mass Ukrainian migration to the cities and factories was too recent a phenomenon, and most urban Ukrainians were undoubtedly still too close to their village origins to take part in a campaign to force the villagers to give up their private farms. This of necessity introduced an ethnic factor into the collectivization campaign in Ukraine. Meanwhile, official statements asserted that collectivization in Ukraine had a special task, namely, as the newspaper *Proletars'ka Pravda* put it on January 22, 1930, "to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism—individual peasant agriculture."[33]

Ukraine was designated as a priority area for collectivization, and the policy was carried out more rapidly there than in Russia, as the following figures show:

Date	Percentage of farms collectivized	
	Ukraine	Russia
December 1929	8.6	7.4
March 1930	65.0	59.0
Mid-1932	70.0	59.3

The trend continued. By 1935, 91.3 percent of all peasant farms in Ukraine were collectivized, while the 90 percent mark was not reached in Russia until late in 1937.[34]

Ukrainian peasants (like their Cossack counterparts) resisted collectivization with particular determination. Soviet Ukrainian historians record that the number of "registered kulak terrorist acts" (and any anti-Soviet act was by definition "kulak") grew fourfold from 1927 to 1929, with 1,262 such acts recorded for the latter year. In the first half of 1930, the number rose to over 1,500.[35] Later figures are unavailable, perhaps because the authorities could no longer keep count. The memoir literature is filled with accounts of killings of those enforcing collectivization. Instances where the women would forbid their men to fight and take it upon themselves to drive the local Soviet administration from the village became proverbial as "babas' revolts."

Collectivization provoked a crisis within the Communist Party of Ukraine and a rapid turnover of personnel. Newspapers carried daily denunciations of "opportunists" who failed to fulfill their tasks. Village communist organizations lost almost half their membership as a result of the 1929–30 purge, declining from an already weak 40,000 party members in January 1929 to 21,000 members a year later.[36] Between January 1930 and July 1932, 80 percent of rayon party secretaries were removed.[37] Since the vast majority of those purged were excluded because of opposition to or inadequate results in carrying out collectivization, it is logical to assume that the new raykom secretaries were chosen for their devotion to collectivization rather than for their loyalty to the Ukrainization policy and the Skrypnyk leadership. In short, collectivization not only undermined the political basis for Skrypnyk's policy; it also undermined his personal political base.

Politics of Hunger

When Skrypnyk turned 60 in January 1932, the official celebrations in the Ukrainian capital of Kharkiv rivalled those of the Stalin jubilee of 1929 in Moscow. For days the newspapers were filled with official biographies and expositions of his ideas. His picture was visible everywhere. Yet, his actual position was already extremely weak. Ukrainization had become secondary to the policy of collectivization. Some of his past actions had already been attacked implicitly by denouncing as nationalistic sabotage similar actions committed by others.[38]

The famine of 1932–33 came about primarily as a result of excessive grain procurements. Since the Ukrainian harvest of 1932 was better than that of the worst NEP year, it is clear that without the forced pro-

[31] F. Hanzha, I. I. Slyn'ko, and P. V. Shostak, "The Ukrainian Village on the Road to Socialism," in V. P. Danilov, Ed., *Ocherki istoru kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khozyaystva v soyuznykh respublikakh* (An Outline History of the Collectivization of Agriculture in the Union Republics), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1963, p. 177.

[32] Quoted by F. Pigido, *Ukraina pid bolshevyts'koyu okupatsiyeyu* (Ukraine Under Bolshevik Occupation), Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956, p. 107.

[33] Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Causes of the 1932–1933 Famine," *Vpered Ukrainskyi robitnychyi chasopys* (Munich), No. 10, 1958, p. 5.

[34] A. F. Chmyga, *Kolkhoznoye dvizheniye na Ukraine* (The Kolkhoz Movement in Ukraine), Moscow, Izd. Moskovskogo universiteta, 1974, p. 302, and O. M. Krykunenko, *Borotba Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy za zdiysnennya leninis'koho kooperatyvnoho planu* (The Struggle of the Ukrainian Communist Party for the Realization of the Leninist Cooperative Plan), Lviv, Vydavnytstvo Lviv's'koho Universytetu, 1970, p. 55.

[35] *Natsional'naya politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh* (The National Policy of the All Union Communist Party [bolsheviks] in Numbers), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1930, pp. 144–45.

[36] Myroslav Prokop, *Ukraina i Ukrains'ka polityka Moskvy* (Ukraine and Moscow's Ukrainian Policy), Munich, Suchasnist', 1981, p. 32.

[37] Most blatantly in the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine show trial, where evidence was fabricated in order to link Ukrainian purism in linguistics with treason to the Soviet state. Skrypnyk had been a vocal and public advocate of linguistic purism.

curements of grain there would have been no starvation. The procurement quotas that were being imposed by Union authorities on Soviet Ukraine in conjunction with collectivization were clearly discriminatory. Thus, in 1930 the Union insisted that 7.7 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain be procured, a third of that year's exceptionally good 23 million ton harvest. By contrast, in 1926, the best year before collectivization and compulsory procurements, only 3.3 million tons had been acquired by the state, 21 percent of that year's harvest.[39] In 1931 the harvest was poorer than in 1930 because of the disorganization accompanying collectivization, a heat wave during the growing season, and hard rains at harvest time.[40] Thus, the 7.7 million ton quota could not be met from an 18.3 million ton harvest, in spite of tremendous pressure from Moscow.[41] Yet, fully seven million tons were ultimately collected. According to official Soviet statistics, the 1932 grain harvest in Soviet Ukraine was 14.4 million tons, which should still have been adequate to feed the population and livestock but which would have left few reserves. In spite of this, the high quotas were retained. Ultimately, only 3.7 million tons were actually procured, despite the draconian collection measures.[42]

The Ukrainian party leadership appealed for lower quotas to the delegates from Moscow at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932. Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov listened to one official after another tell of the hardships the quotas had caused. Kossior, Skrypnyk, and Panas Lyubchenko all told of villages where everything had been taken and where there was no longer anything to eat. Molotov responded that the quotas, which had already been lowered by 18 percent from the previous year (to 6.6 million tons), would remain in place, and the party conference duly included the figure in its resolution.[43] However, Ukrainian warnings about the dire consequences of what Kossior called the "mechanistic" enforcement of quotas, without regard for areas where the harvest had been poor, show that officials on the scene were giving Moscow ample warning of what was to come. When the predictions came true, officials on the scene pleaded for relief. For example, one obkom secretary told Stalin to his face that there was mass starvation.[44] Admiral Fyodor Raskolnikov, of the Black Sea Fleet, and General Yona Yakir, the commander of the Kiev Military District, both sent Stalin letters of protest.[45] Moscow was warned of the danger before the harvest and had accurate information throughout the famine.

Stalin's public response was to disbelieve the reports. Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to export grain. Net Soviet grain exports during the famine years were 1.54 million tons in 1932 and 1.77 million tons in 1933.[46] These exports were possible only because of such measures as the law of August 7, 1932, which provided for the execution (or ten years' imprisonment in extenuating circumstances) of anyone caught pilfering collective farm property or encouraging others to leave the collective farms. Fully 20 percent of all cases in Soviet courts in 1932 were tried under this decree, and Stalin himself referred to it as "the basis of socialist legality at the present moment."[47]

The Ukrainian Soviet government adopted additional harsh measures. A November 1932 decree prohibited collective farms from creating any reserves or distributing any food to its members until the quota was met.[48] A decree of December 6, 1932, assigned an initial six villages to a "blacklist" *(chorna doshka)* subject to the following measures: 1) the immediate closing of state and cooperative stores, and the removal of all goods in them from the village; 2) a complete ban on all trade (including trade in essential commodities such as bread) by collective farms, collective farmers, and individual farmers; 3) the immediate halting and compulsory repayment of all credits and advances (including bread); 4) a thoroughgoing purge of local collective-farm, cooperative, and state apparatuses; and 5) the purge of all "foreign elements" and "saboteurs of the grain procurement campaign" from the collective farm.[49] On December 13 the blacklist was extended to 82 rayons, and at the same time a special system of local prosecutors was established to prosecute those held criminally responsible for nonfulfillment of the quotas.[50]

Portraits of village life during succeeding months emerge from the files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, which was conducted during the early 1950's. It should be stressed that the inter-

[39] Molubnychy, loc. cit., p. 5.

[40] Slynko, op. cit., pp. 286-88.

[41] See, for example, the lead editorial in *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1932, insisting Ukraine could and must liquidate its "backwardness" in procuring grain.

[42] Manzha et al., loc. cit., p. 199.

[43] *Visti VUTsVK*, July 11-15, 1932.

[44] Roman Terekhov, who actually lived to write about this (See *Pravda*, May 26, 1964) was secretary of the Kharkiv obkom.

[45] Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, pp. 40-41.

[46] *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1918-1940 gg.* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR for the Years 1918-1940), Moscow, Vneshtorgizdat, 1960, pp. 144, 360.

[47] Robert Conquest, Ed., *Agricultural Workers in the USSR*, London, Bodley Head, 1968, pp. 24, 25.

[48] Slynko, op. cit., p. 297.

[49] *Visti VUTsVK*, Dec. 8, 1932.

[50] Slynko, op. cit., p. 298.

viewers were not particularly interested in the famine and that the information was therefore given without any prompting while the respondents were relating their life experiences. One rather typical account (Case 128) is the following:

... there was the famine in the Ukraine in 1933. We saw people die in the streets; it was terrible to see a dead man, when I close my eyes I can still see him. We had in our village a small church which was closed for services and in which we played. And I remember a man who came in there; he lay down with his eyes wide open at the ceiling and he died there! He was an innocent victim of the Soviet regime; he was a simple worker and not even a kulak. This hunger was the result of Soviet policy.

Other accounts are more graphic, as this one by a Russian woman (Case 373):

Well, in 1933–34 I was a member of a commission sent out to inspect wells. We had to go to the country to see that the shafts of the wells were correctly installed, and there I saw such things as I had never seen before in my life. I saw villages that not only had no people, but not even any dogs and cats, and I remember one particular incident: we came to one village, and I don't think I will ever forget this. I will always see this picture before me. We opened the door of this miserable hut and there ... the man was lying. The mother and child already lay dead, and the father had taken the piece of meat from between the legs of his son and had died just like that. The stench was terrific, we couldn't stand it, and this was not the only time that I remember such incidents, there were other such incidents on our trip....

Nor were such horrors confined to the countryside. Cannibalism occurred even in the cities, as a worker (Case 513) described:

I remember a case in 1933. I was in Kiev. I was at that time at a bazaar—the bazaar was called the Bessarabian market. I saw a woman with a valise. She opened the valise and put her goods out for sale. Her goods consisted of jellied meat, frozen jellied meat, which she sold at fifty rubles a portion. I saw a man come over to her—a man who bore all the marks of starvation—he bought himself a portion and began eating. As he ate of his portion, he noticed that a human finger was imbedded in the jelly. He began shouting at the woman and began yelling at the top of his voice. People came running, gathered around her and then seeing what her food consisted of, took her to the militsia (police). At the militsia, two members of the NKVD went over to her and, instead of taking action against her, they burst out laughing. "What, what, you killed a kulak? Good for you!" And then they let her go.

The main victims, however, were not "kulaks," who had long since been exiled, or even the individual farmers, who were by then a minority. Figures cited at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932 indicate that at that time 81 percent of all tilled land was either in collective farms or state farms and that over 70 percent of all farm families were in collectives.[51] This means that the majority of the victims were collective farmers.

The All-Union Central Committee weighed in with

[51] *Vsia VUTsVK*, July 14, 1932

Pavel Postyshev, a secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) who in March 1933 was elected second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and who enforced Moscow's brutal policy of grain procurements in Ukraine.

—Cover photo of E. Yu. Sivak's biography, *P. P. Postyshev*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1982.

two decrees, on December 14, 1932, and January 24, 1933, the first demanding that Ukrainization be carried out "properly" and that "Petlyurists and bourgeois nationalists" be dispersed, the second declaring that Ukrainian authorities were guilty of laxity in failing to meet the procurement quotas. The January decree was tantamount to Moscow's taking direct control of the Ukrainian party apparatus by appointing Pavel Postyshev (a non-Ukrainian former obkom secretary who had been transferred to Moscow some years earlier) as second secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and obkom secretary in Kharkiv; and by appointing new obkom secretaries in Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk. Ukrainian Commissar of supplies and Odessa obkom secretary Mikhail Mayorov, Dnipropetrovsk obkom secretary Vasiliy Stroganov, and Kharkiv and Donets obkom secretary Roman Terekhov, the second-tier officials who had protested the procurements most vigorously, were removed from their posts.[55] This meant placing Ukraine directly under Moscow's control through the person of Postyshev, who acted as Stalin's viceroy.

Postyshev immediately ruled out any aid to the countryside and even sent procurement brigades to seize what was left—mainly that part of the harvest that had been distributed to collective farmers. This could not have been large, because only 22.7 percent of the collective farms had distributed any grain whatsoever to their members.[56]

Demise of Ukrainization

While the published sections of the January decree referred only to the failure of the Ukrainian procurement campaign to meet its quota, Postyshev later indicated that the decree also dealt with nationality policy. Other Soviet officials never contradicted him on this. In any case, a campaign against an initially unidentified Ukrainian national deviation was begun, and it was conducted in a manner reminiscent of the campaign against a "right deviation" that had preceded attacks on Nikolay Bukharin in 1929. On February 28, 1933, a major government reshuffle was announced, transferring Skrypnyk from his post as commissar of education to that of deputy premier and head of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission.[64] On March 4, *Pravda* carried a self-critical letter from the leadership in Soviet Byelorussia, confessing to "errors in the nationality question." A few days later *Visti VUTsVK*, the daily newspaper of the Soviet Ukrainian government, published a lead editorial informing its readers that the Byelorussians' letter was relevant to Ukraine as well.[65] In late April a special conference on nationality policy was held under the sponsorship of the Ukrainian Central Committee and served as a forum for denouncing national deviations in educational and linguistic policy.[66] Clearly, a final assault against Skrypnyk was being prepared. This came at the Ukrainian Central Committee's June plenum. Skrypnyk's speech was never published, but according to accounts that leaked out, he denied that hitherto loyal communists were guilty of national deviation and of intentionally sabotaging the grain procurement campaign. He asserted that opposition was the inevitable consequence of the policies imposed by Moscow, the restrictions on Ukraine's autonomy, and the famine, for which he laid the blame squarely at Moscow's door.[67]

Postyshev's speech, on the other hand, was published under the telling headline: "We Are Mobilizing the Masses for the Immediate Delivery of Grain to the State." He defended the compulsory procurements policy and made it clear that it was Skrypnyk who had been the target of his campaign against "national deviations." He portrayed Skrypnyk as a leader of nationalist heretics, the protector of "nationalistic wreckers" responsible for the inadequate fulfillment of grain procurements. Interestingly, the only specific charge against Skrypnyk in Postyshev's stream of abuse was Skrypnyk's advocacy of orthographic changes tending to make Ukrainian spelling more distinct from Russian, something that "served only the annexationist designs of the Polish landlords."[68]

A few days later Skrypnyk's erstwhile colleagues joined in a rather unsavory competition in denunciations. Andriy Khvylya, the post-Skrypnyk deputy commissar of education, declared:

The fundamental cause of errors in the procurement of grain during the past year consists in the fact that many of Ukraine's party organizations did not exercise the requisite Bolshevik vigilance and uncompromising attitude toward hostile elements, which is rooted in the very fact that they sabotaged us at every turn of

[55] Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 135. Decree of the CC of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of January 24, 1933, and the Tasks of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine," *Bil'shovyk Ukrayiny* (Kharkiv), No. 3, 1933, p. 3.

[56] Hanzha et al., loc. cit., p. 202.

[57] *Visti VUTsVK*, Mar. 1, 1933.

[58] Ibid., Mar. 11, 1933.

[59] Ibid., May 1, 1933.

[60] Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1936, pp. 122-23.

[61] *Visti VUTsVK*, June 22, 1933.

our activity.... And our commissariat of education not only failed to expose wrecking, but, on the contrary, sheltered wrecking elements. Worse, the commissar himself ... Comrade Skrypnyk, made it possible for these elements to conceal their activities in linguistics....[59]

Panas Lyubchenko, then a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and destined to become head of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars within the year, linked Skrypnyk with the cultural "wrecking" exposed at the 1930 trial of members of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, and held him responsible for "kulak Ukrainian nationalist deviations" in linguistics, literature, literary scholarship, and historical writing.[60]

Skrypnyk, who committed suicide on July 6, 1933, was no longer alive when Nikolay Popov, a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee since March 1933, linked the struggle to extract grain to the struggle against Skrypnyk, both apparently being equally necessary to transform Ukraine into a model Soviet republic:

The task of raising our agriculture cannot be accomplished unless we correct errors which have been permitted in the national question, unless we purge our party, our state, cultural, agricultural, collective-farm and other institutions of bourgeois nationalists, without mobilizing the entire party mass to fight nationalism, without strengthening our efforts to bring the masses up in the spirit of internationalism.... Bolshevik nationality policy, most intimately connected with all our party's tasks ... will be a mighty weapon for the consolidation of Soviet Ukraine as an indivisible part of the Soviet Union.... We face here and now the task of making Soviet Ukraine into a model Soviet republic.[61]

By then Postyshev had already set about making Soviet Ukraine a model Soviet republic. In March 1933, the Ukrainian deputy secretary of agriculture and 22 others were shot for alleged attempts to sabotage agriculture. Other alleged conspiracies were connected with the old revolutionary Ukrainian parties, the Poles, and the underground Ukrainian Military Organization in Western Ukraine.[62] Virtually all prominent communist dissenters from the past were arrested at this time in what became known as the "Postyshev terror." Arrests of writers became a wholesale process; and of the 259 Ukrainian writers whose works were published in Soviet Ukraine in 1930, only 36 had their works still printed after 1938.[63]

Visible reminders of Ukraine's distinctiveness began to disappear. For example, Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny had been revered as a sort of founding saint of Ukrainian proletarian literature. His statue stood at a principal intersection in Kharkiv—until one day a truck ran into it. The statue was not replaced.[64] As

Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, a communist writer active in the Ukrainization of the 1920's and early 1930's; he committed suicide in May 1933 as a result of Moscow's policies of grain procurement and repression of Ukrainian intellectuals.

—Frontispiece of Vol. 2 of Khvyl'ovyi's collected works, Tvory, Ellicott City, MD, Smoloskyp, 1980.

[59]Ibid., June 30, 1933.

[60]Ibid., July 7, 1933.

[61]M. M. Popov, "On Nationalist Deviations in the Ranks of the Ukrainian Party Organization and Tasks of Struggle with Them," *Chervonyi shlyakh* (Kharkiv), No. 7, 1933, pp. 110, 126.

[62]Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study in the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929-1939*, London, Atlantic Books, 1960, pp. 46, 85.

[63]Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainians*, London, Minority Rights Group, 1981, p. 8.

[64]Kostiuk, op. cit., p. 47.

time passed, not only statues but also artistic and architectural monuments to the Ukrainian past either fell prey to trucks or were removed to make way for new projects, many of which never materialized.[65]

In the remaining months of 1933 many of the organizations and individuals that had been central to Ukraine's intellectual life in the 1920's simply disappeared. Linguists, fiction writers, historians, poets—virtually everyone who had anything to do with creating a distinctly Ukrainian cultural scene in the 1920's—disappeared. Ukrainization became a dead letter. Concessions to Ukrainian national identity came to an end.

Postscript

A changed ideology in the national sphere made itself felt in late 1934 with the publication of a decree denouncing the hitherto dominant Marxist historical school in Russia, the followers of M. N. Pokrovskiy, who had narrated Russian history as the history of an oppressive empire, a prison of peoples.[66] Instead, a new history of the USSR portrayed the extension of the Russian empire as a progressive process. Tsars were rehabilitated as state-builders. This interpretation was intended to be the basis for a new national ideology, Soviet patriotism, which held that national differences within the Soviet Union were secondary to the shared history and loyalty that united all Soviet citizens. A German scholar, in describing the new self-definition of the USSR, called it "a kind of *Reichsidee* for a new Soviet imperialism."[67] Others have likened it to the prerevolutionary slogan of "Russia one and indivisible."

Ideology mirrored politics. By the time the 1936 Soviet Constitution was adopted, the Soviet Union had become a state in which the administrative competence of its constituent republics had been sharply reduced and that of the Union greatly enlarged.[68] The ideology of Soviet patriotism dominated by Russian culture and centralism was in no small part a legacy of the Ukrainian famine. While the suppression of national self-assertion and the introduction of centralization were principal features of overall Soviet policy in the 1930's, the Ukrainians, as the largest and most self-assertive non-Russian nation, seemed to be singled out for special treatment. Only they had to suffer the loss of several million villagers to starvation in an artificially contrived famine. Placed in this context, the famine of 1933 makes sense as one of a series of policies designed to neutralize Ukrainians as a political factor, indeed, as a social organism in the Soviet Union. These policies entailed the destruction of the spiritual and cultural elites of Ukraine and the subordination of the Ukrainian structures to central ones; the destruction of the officially sanctioned Ukrainian Communist political leadership as a distinct force in Soviet politics (almost all of those who turned on Skrypnyk perished as well in the 1937–38 purges); the abandonment of Ukrainization and the gradual abolition of structures designed to prevent the assimilation of Ukrainians entering Russified urban and industrial environments; and a body blow against the main constituency of Ukrainian nationalism—the peasantry. In sum, one cannot understand the famine without understanding the turnabout in Soviet nationalities policy—from seeking to foster to seeking to absorb national cultures. By the same token, one cannot understand how this policy was imposed without reference to the famine. The famine must therefore be understood within the context of an attempt to impose a final solution on the "Ukrainian problem" as it had hitherto existed.

Nevertheless, the Soviet state never solved its "Ukrainian problem," which still haunts Soviet leaders. Stalin himself helped to undermine his policy by annexing Ukrainian territories from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Western Ukraine never went through such devastation as the famine and related repressions of the 1930's, and it was inevitable that the traditional cross-fertilization of ideas between Western and Eastern Ukraine would flourish when the two parts became united. In the 1960's a dissident movement arose that included Ukrainians from all Ukrainian territories and combined demands for national and human rights, while even the Soviet Ukrainian government under Petro Shelest edged a little further away from Moscow for a brief moment. Shelest was removed and the dissidents were arrested. Yet, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a Helsinki Monitoring Group, similar to and connected with counterparts in other parts of the Soviet Union, was formed in Kiev. Attempts to

[65] Thus Heweyk, *The Lost Architecture of Kiev*, New York: The Ukrainian Museum, 1982; and B. Mikorsky, *Razrushenie kul'turno-istoricheskikh pamyatnikov v Kieve v 1934–1936 godakh* (Destruction of Cultural and Historical Monuments in Kiev in 1934–36), Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1951.

[66] A good selection of Pokrovsky's works in translation, introduced by a useful exposition, is M. N. Pokrovskii, *Russia in World History: Selected Essays*, tr. and ed. by R. Szporluk, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1970.

[67] Erwin Oberländer, *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte: Dokumentation* (Soviet Patriotism and History: Documentation), Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967, p. 21.

[68] The process of increasing Union competence at the expense of Republic authority is traced by V. Sadovs'ky, *Natsional'na politika Sovetiv na Ukraini*, Prats' ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu (National Policy of the Soviets in Ukraine: Works of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute), vol. 39 (Warsaw, 1937), pp. 102–16.

abolish the Ukrainian national churches have succeeded only in changing the official affiliation—not the spiritual essence—of Ukrainian Christianity.**

**The USSR banned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1930 and the Uniate Catholic Church in 1946. One measure of the continued strength of the Ukrainian Catholics is the fact that the region of their traditional dominance, Western Ukraine, now contains one fourth of all officially sanctioned Orthodox parishes in the USSR, which are kept open only to prevent a greater portion of the population from attending underground Uniate churches.

Only a few years ago there were Western scholars who argued that the USSR would assimilate the Ukrainians in a relatively brief period of time. No one makes such predictions today. It is difficult to see how the problem of the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations, having defied the most brutal attempts at solution, can ever be solved to the government's satisfaction.

American Enterprise Institute
Studies in Religion, Philosophy, and Public Policy

The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine

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Michael Novak

I am delighted to welcome all of you here on behalf of the American Enterprise Institute for this seminar discussion on the immense famine that took place fifty years ago. We meet in a century of great bloodshed, of many massacres and terrors. Even as we meet, the radio talk shows are dominated by comments on the plight of 269 persons who plunged to their death in a Korean airliner in twelve minutes as they hurtled down from 35,000 feet. In these talk shows, many callers express their disbelief that rational people could contrive the shooting down of a passenger plane. Reasonable people, they say, could not do such a thing; it must have been an accident. It has always—and not only in our age—been difficult to plumb the meaning of reason and the capacity of human beings to do evil. Yet it is impossible to discuss foreign policy as a reasonable way of conducting human affairs without addressing subjects that force such questions upon us. Today we will concern ourselves with one such subject.

I will introduce the speakers now in reverse order. Dr. Dana Dalrymple, our third speaker, is appearing as a private individual, not as a representative of the U.S. government, although he is an agricultural economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Dr. Dalrymple wrote the first comprehensive essay on the great famine of the year 1933 almost twenty years ago.[1] A specialist in international agricultural research, he earned the bachelor of science and master's degrees at Cornell University and took his Ph.D. at Michigan State University, concentrating on agricultural economics with a minor in Soviet studies. Intrigued by how little was known in the West about the great famine of 1933, Dr. Dalrymple undertook research on his own time and on his own initiative and has continued to follow literature on the famine.

We are also privileged to have with us Dr. James Mace, who is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research

1. Dana G. Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-34," *Soviet Studies*, January 1964, pp. 250–84; "The Soviet Famine of 1932-34: Some Further References," *Soviet Studies*, April 1965, pp. 471-74.

Institute. He is collaborating on research for a most important book by Dr. Conquest on the Ukrainian famine that will appear next year. Dr. Mace took his baccalaureate at Oklahoma State University and his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, where he wrote a doctoral dissertation on national communism in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. He has studied with the noted Ukrainian author and historian Professor Roman Szporluk. Dr. Mace has written many articles and is currently investigating documents in the Ukrainian language on the famine.

Dr. Robert Conquest, who will be our first speaker, is currently senior research fellow and curator of the Russian and East European collection at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a research associate at Harvard University, and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. Born and educated in Great Britain, Dr. Conquest holds degrees from Oxford University. He is a member of the editorial board of *Continent* and also sits on the advisory board of the Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies in London. He has served as a United Kingdom delegate to the United Nations and has received the Order of the British Empire. He has written many scholarly books and articles. He is currently completing the book on the Ukrainian famine that I mentioned earlier. In the meantime Dr. Conquest continues to write a column that appears each month in the *Daily Telegraph* and elsewhere.

Robert Conquest

Since time is limited, I will simply review events and our present state of knowledge, because I find that people do tend to muddle the sequence slightly; I did so myself until I started studying the subject.

During the winter of 1929, there occurred the first wave of dekulakization, the arrest in this case of all the worst so-called kulaks—the ones who had been somehow involved in an anti-Soviet regime or army or demonstration or who were accused of having done so at some time. Such people were many in a country that had had a great civil war. Once arrested, they were shot or sent to prison camps. From January to March 1930, there occurred the crash collectivization of virtually all farms and the second dekulakization, the sending off to the north and to Siberia of millions of people who were simply the more affluent peasants. There ensued endless revolts, strikes of the peasantry, the slaughter of the cattle, and the failure of the campaign.

In March 1930, Stalin issued the famous article "Dizzy with Success," ordering the authorities to allow the peasants to leave the collective farms. Most of them did so. During the following eighteen months or two years, pressure was brought to bear less abruptly but just as relentlessly, and they were gradually forced back into the collectives again. When the peasants left, they could not in any case take their implements. By mid-1932, after several other waves of deportation of people alleged to be kulaks—that is to say, influential villagers of any sort—the main parts of the countryside had been almost totally collectivized, in particular in Ukraine, about which we are now talking.

Thus the events of 1933 had nothing to do with dekulakization, which had already taken place. The two episodes are often confused.

In August 1933, however, grain delivery requirements for Ukraine were set far in excess of the region's capacity. This was the key moment.

Perhaps the best short account of the whole fate of the peasantry is one chapter in Vasily Grossman's book *Forever Flowing*, which was published here by Harper and Row. The story is in fictional form. Grossman wrote a great novel that was seized in the early 1970s, and

afterward he dashed off this one just before he died. It is not as good as it might be; but the chapter on the peasantry is outstanding, and even the translation is quite good. Grossman writes, "I think there has never been such a decree in all the long history of Russia, not the tsars, nor the Tartars, nor the German occupiers, ever promulgated such a terrible decree. For the decree required that peasants of Ukraine, the Don, and the Kuban be put to death by starvation, put to death along with their little children."

By the beginning of the winter, all the grain, including the seed grain of the farms in Ukraine, had been seized by the government. The peasants lived on the last remaining potatoes, killed their last remaining livestock, they slaughtered cats and dogs, ate nettles and linden leaves. The acorns were all gone by about January, and people began to starve. By March no food at all remained, and they died. The children died first, mostly the younger children, followed by the older people, then usually the men before the women, and finally everyone else. Death did not overtake the entire population, but it occurred on a very large scale and eliminated many whole villages.

The people who died included those who had remained poor despite the fact that land had been divided and given to them twice in two different cycles in twelve years. These so-called "poor peasants" were mostly the village rabble whom the regime had used to extract the grain and who had searched with great rods in every bit of the land and in every house. Their efforts did not do them very much good.

I have given only a very brief outline of events. Now we must consider why they happened. One factor that of course does not apply only to Ukraine was that the Bolsheviks hated the peasantry. In this respect the Bolsheviks were not alone. Very much the same feeling was to be found among all those people who wished to modernize the old Russian Empire, including the Russian territories. They could not bear the "dark people"; they considered peasants to be holding Russia back. Maxim Gorki speaks, for example, of his hope that the uncivilized, stupid people in the villages would die out; a new race of literate, rational, energetic people would take their place. As it turned out, the "rational," "energetic" people made a worse hash of agriculture than the stupid, uncivilized ones.

The modernizers were deluded as well as cruel. The peasant with all his faults was producing more with his wooden plow in 1914, as Khrushchev publicly observed in 1953, than the half million tractors and the modern fields did thirty or forty years later. The modernizers thought, "How modern we are. The countryside can be turned into a factory. Everything is rational; agriculture can be planned." They

knew nothing about agriculture. They were totally uninformed. The planning idea resulted in ridiculous notions. By 1932, for example, the whole staff of the meteorological office had been arrested on the charge of falsifying weather forecasts in order to damage the harvest. The forecasters should have gotten their predictions right; it is a scientific matter. Marxists can always be scientific.

The other Marxist-Leninist doctrine that caused damage was simply the notion of class struggle, which Lenin introduced into the villages. Everything must proceed by class war. As a result, any villages that lacked class struggle had to find some. The peasants were therefore divided into kulaks, middle peasants, and poor peasants and laborers. The term "kulak" as it was used by the Communists was utterly spurious. The kulak was, in its original meaning, the moneylender, the grasping figure in the villages. This was not, however, an accurate description of prosperous peasants, and all the poor peasants of course tried to become prosperous.

The first wave of prosperous peasants was wiped out in 1917–1921. In 1921–1922 with the advent of the New Economic Policy (NEP), when the peasants had temporarily defeated the government, they began to have freedom to operate on the land and in the market, and of course a new lot of "kulaks" emerged. The poor peasant who worked hard became richer, so he became a kulak. Then, after the dekulakization of such people, many of whom had successfully fought in the Red Army, there were no longer any kulaks. There was no longer a stratum that fitted any of the old definitions of class. But the Party held that the kulak still existed though he could no longer be defined. Moreover it invented the category of "subkulak," which could be applied to any peasant.

Then, too, as James Mace will develop at greater length, Stalin and the Bolshevik leaders felt a hatred for the Ukrainian nation as a troublemaker. Jim Mace has aptly remarked that the position of Ukraine in the 1920s was rather like that of Poland with regard to Moscow today. The local Communists were not reliable; the Bolsheviks had to use local left-wing Social Revolutionaries. The Bolshevik regime had no roots except in the slightly Russianized cities, and it had to make concessions to Ukrainianization, as Jim Mace will note. They did not like making these concessions any more than they liked making concessions to the peasantry or accepting the New Economic Policy. And the result was a "Ukrainianization" which produced a great flowering of Ukrainian culture.

Now, I have spoken of motivation in a general sense where the Bolsheviks are concerned, but we are not accustomed to great events depending on attitudes and dogmas. We think in terms of social

forces, not crazy doctrines that lead people to take action for irrational reasons. We may ask what rationale there can possibly be for ruining the countryside, for half destroying a people, or for reducing the fields to nettles and thistles. From our point of view, there can be none; yet Stalin pursued a course that in one respect has not been uncommon in history if we look far enough back. No one wondered why Genghis Khan laid waste an area, why the Mongols destroyed the agriculture of Mesopotamia. This was common practice even for Wallenstein in the Thirty Years' War. Conquerors lay waste the countryside, kill a lot of people, take the crops, perhaps burn the villages.

Such a strategy, pursued for reasons of power, is not irrational. It has adverse economic results—in particular, when it ruins a great agricultural country—but it is not irrational as a way of imposing the will of the victorious party and crushing the nationhood and the peasantry of a country. Peasantry and nationality are related matters. As Dr. Dalrymple will no doubt mention, Stalin on several occasions expressed the view that the peasantry stands at the center of nationalism.

The peasant Ukrainian-speaking populace was the great force of nationality. During the famine, Ukrainian leaders time and time again said that they were crushing the kulaks, a bastion of nationalism. They simultaneously crushed the Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian Independent church. They were crushing the Ukrainian nationality not only physically but also spiritually and culturally. We must see the picture in its entirety.

Michael Novak commented that the famine has not properly entered the consciousness of the West or of the world generally. In this connection we should consider Stalin's responsibility. Stalin was a much more devious man than Hitler. Even now, there are people who say, "Ah, but perhaps he didn't know," or "After all it's a famine, famines happen—natural events." It must be proved that this one was artificial. He never admitted that there was a famine, just as he never admitted that the Moscow trials were faked. He pretended he thought the accused were guilty. Stalin's direct knowledge and responsibility are clear. First of all, the Ukrainian Communists tried to have the disastrous grain deliveries reduced in August 1932 and were prevented from doing so. Then several of his leading people, such as Molotov and Kaganovich, went to the disaster areas. We also know that high officials approached him, for example a leading Ukrainian Communist, Terekhov, is quoted in *Pravda*, in 1964, as having said to him directly, "There is a famine in the Ukraine." Stalin is quoted as replying, "No, there isn't, you're a fantasist, go and join the union of writers." Indeed, Stalin's wife told him about it; she knew various

students who had seen it. He knew perfectly well there was a famine. He wanted a famine. We can return to this important point later.

The other major point that we should consider concerns the death toll. I think we should briefly discuss the derivation of the figure of 7 million, which naturally does not represent 100 percent accuracy but is a soundly based general estimate. In the past it has been difficult to find accurate data. The census of 1937 was suppressed, and the census takers were all shot. A new, fake census, more satisfactory to the authorities, was produced in 1939. From material being published in the Soviet Union, however, we can now deduce the true figures of the suppressed census.

We now know that between 1926 and 1937 there was a population deficit of about 14 or 15 million. If we exclude 2 or 3 million babies unborn because their parents were no longer around, we have a figure of 11 or 12 million unnaturally dead. This estimate includes both the dekulakization and the famine, and it is not possible to determine how the deficit is divided between the two. Even if we disregard the 1937 census, however, and accept the faked 1939 census, we find that Ukraine then had only slightly more than 28 million people, far fewer than it had had in 1926. If the Ukrainian population had increased in the same proportion as the rest of the Soviet Union, the figure would have been higher by 7.8 million. Now, some of that missing increment would of course have been Ukrainians lost in the dekulakization, and, as I noted earlier, the 1939 census is wrong, probably exaggerating the Ukrainian population by 800,000 to a million. (In general, we are also omitting peasants who were in labor camps in 1935 and who later died; there were probably about 4 million of these people from the whole Soviet Union, so perhaps a million from Ukraine died in the camps during the next period.)

Finally, we may ask why the famine has been forgotten. First, as I have noted, Stalin was devious and clever and managed to evade responsibility. He denied that there was a famine, but it is not true that it was not reported in the West. Many of the Western papers—*Figaro*, the *Manchester Guardian*, some of the American papers—reported it fully. Many of the great papers printed perfectly clear reports. The famine was not suppressed by the press, but Stalin persuaded Édouard Herriot, Sir John Maynard, and other well-known people to go to the Potemkin villages and declare that there was no famine. As a result the man in the street could say, "Oh, well, perhaps there isn't a famine; perhaps this is just propaganda. Stalin denies it; you've got to prove it." Second, of course, there was the left in general, laying the odds in favor of the Soviet Union. George Orwell remarked that momentous events such as the Ukrainian famine are

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simply not known, are suppressed in the minds of people who are pro-Soviet. Third, the idea that Ukraine was a nation, that its people had national feelings, had not established itself in the West as Polish nationhood had done, simply because Ukraine had had only very brief periods of independence. It had never become a nation in Western eyes, and as a result it wasn't clear that there was a people against whom Stalin could commit an act.

I do not know whether anybody in particular can be blamed for such sheer ignorance. Nowadays we are in a better position. Western economists about ten years ago started writing about the whole peasant problem in a way that no longer presupposed rationality of the type that economists have been inclined to attribute to Stalin. Much research has now been done, and much piecemeal information is available in the Soviet Union. We are unlikely to forget the famine again. Michael Novak referred earlier to the killing of 269 people. A Ukrainian friend of mine observed that to match the slaughter that occurred in Ukraine, it would be necessary to shoot down an airliner with 269 passengers every day for seventy-five years. I will leave you with that thought.

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James Mace

Let me first mention the size of the area of which we are speaking. Soviet Ukraine today is about as large as France. The Soviet Ukraine of 1933 was somewhat smaller because perhaps a quarter of the country to the west was then under Polish rule. According to the Soviet census of 1926, which seems to have been a good one, there were 31.2 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. In 1939, according to the very inadequate census we have from that year, which is actually only a slim, one-volume summary, there were only 28.1 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. Comparison of the figures gives us an absolute drop of 3.1 million Ukrainians.

Now, Ukrainian statistical journals in the 1920s and early 1930s included administrative estimates of the natural growth rate of the population as late as 1931. Using these rates, we find that in 1931 there should have been 34.2 million Ukrainians, assuming that the growth rate figures are correct. If we take the rate of population growth shown by the Ukrainians in the late 1950s and work backward from the number of Ukrainians in 1939, we can estimate that there were only 26.3 million Ukrainians in 1934. So the difference between our estimates of the 1934 population of Ukrainians and the 1931 number of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union amounts to 7.9 million. About 200,000 Ukrainian families were dekulakized and exiled. We can assume that about a quarter of a million people probably died in the very harsh circumstances of exile, so we can subtract a quarter of a million right there. If we allow another 100,000 or 200,000 Ukrainians for the purges, we still have a figure of more than 7 million people who died unnaturally, probably because of famine. That figure accounts for about half of all the unnatural deaths in the Soviet Union during the period.

The reason why so many Ukrainians perished becomes clearer when we turn to some recently published research by a Soviet immigrant demographer who writes under the name Maksudov on the geography of the famine of 1933. He has analyzed the age structure of rural females by oblast (region) in the 1959 population. He shows that

since there is a lower birth rate and since infants tend to die first in famine conditions, there is a trough in the age structure corresponding to the famine. This trough—demographic evidence of massive mortality in this period—appears in fifteen of the sixteen oblasts of Soviet Ukraine, except in the far north, where there are a number of streams and more people were probably able to survive, by fishing or whatever, and throughout the Kuban, which certainly at that time was considered a non-Russian area. There were more than 3 million Ukrainians in the Kuban, according to the 1926 census. Only about 150,000 Ukrainians remain there today. In addition, the Kuban Cossacks, who had tried to set up their own state at the time of the Russian Revolution, were a strong, nationally self-assertive population that in its way can be seen as having threatened the Soviet Union somewhat as Ukrainians did. Finally, there is spotty evidence of unnatural mortality during the same period in the Volga region. As we know, the Volga Germans were later exiled en masse. We do not know as much about the Volga as we know about Ukraine and the Kuban.

To understand why millions of people died in these particular areas we must realize that the Bolsheviks hated not only the peasantry, not only nationalities, but basically everything that did not fit into their blueprint for restructuring society. In 1921, with the adoption of the New Economic Policy, the Bolsheviks momentarily ceased their attempt to restructure society completely. In 1928, with the beginning of the cultural revolution, and in 1929, with the beginning of collectivization, the Bolsheviks were in a sense once again trying to finish business remaining from the civil war period—that is, they were basically trying to eliminate everything they did not like in society. The things they did not like included the peasantry, the so-called bourgeois intelligentsia, and any nationally self-assertive national groups.

To understand why Ukrainians were perceived to be a threat, we must go back in time to the 1920s. The Ukrainians had declared their independence in January 1918; Ukrainian governments had managed to survive territorially until 1921. In 1923, the Bolsheviks adopted a policy called indigenization, or "taking root," as a way of coping with Ukrainians and other national groups. The Russian word is *korenizatsiia*. The new policy was designed to confer a veneer of national legitimacy on the regimes that the Bolsheviks had established in the so-called border lands. In the Ukrainian case the policy worked too well. Prominent Ukrainian national leaders started to return from exile. The most prominent was the first president of Independent Ukraine, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who came back to the Ukrainian Academy of

Sciences, edited a historical journal, and worked on his *History of Ukraine-Rus*, probably the centerpiece of Ukrainian scholarship. Creative national energies burst forth, and Ukrainian writers flourished.

Ukraine is a nation whose very language had been illegal in the Russian Empire from 1876 until 1905. It was very difficult to publish anything even in the years after 1905. In the 1920s, when the fetters had been taken off, there was an unprecedented cultural flowering that began to affect the Ukrainian party organization, the Communist party of Ukraine. Now as Mr. Conquest has observed, Moscow could not trust the local organization in Ukraine. Ukrainian Communists in the 1920s were arguing that it was time for a Ukrainian to be first secretary of the Communist party of Ukraine, that Stalin should withdraw the lieutenant who held that particular post at the time, that Ukraine should emancipate itself from Russian cultural influence, and that Ukraine was being exploited economically by the Soviet Union and by Moscow. Stalin in particular found these demands very difficult to accept. In 1928 he was finally forced to compromise with the Ukrainian organization. In order to defeat Bukharin, he needed the support of the largest Soviet party organization, which happened to be the Ukrainian organization. To secure it he withdrew Kaganovich and allowed the Ukrainians to chart their own course for a time. A political strongman emerged, a sort of Gomulka figure named Mykola Skrypnyk.

Soon after Stalin had defeated Bukharin, he began a sort of political siege against Skrypnyk. With the beginning of the cultural revolution on an all-union stage, we see, in the Ukrainian political arena, the fall of Skrypnyk's political clients and ideological watchdogs. The major Communist Ukrainian historian of the period, for example, is condemned and purged for—and this is quite interesting—treating the history of Ukraine as a distinct process, for asserting that Ukrainian history is different from Russian history and is a legitimate field of study. Removing this person produced a certain ideological provincialization of Ukraine within the Soviet context. In 1930 there was a massive purge of Ukrainian cultural and spiritual elites. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, which had been set up in 1917, was abolished in 1930. Many of its leaders went in the dock in a show trial involving something called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. At the same time, members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were brought in, including people who had returned from exile in the 1920s, and were accused not only of plotting to assassinate Stalin—of leading a rebellion—but also of attempting sabotage by giving words a spelling that differed from the Russian and by interpret-

ing history in a certain way. People actually confessed to these crimes and were sent into the Gulag. These political developments culminated in the great famine of 1933.

Now, as Bob Conquest mentioned, Ukrainian officials in 1932 were going to Moscow, telling Stalin and anyone who would listen that people were starving to death. There is even a passage in *Khrushchev Remembers* where Khrushchev recalled that Demchenko, one of the oblast secretaries in Ukraine, had come to Mikoyan saying that the trains were pulling into Kiev loaded with dead bodies that had been picked up all along the route. Stalin knew what was going on. He took the opportunity to accuse the Ukrainian organization of criminal laxity in failing to meet the grain quotas, and he took charge. He sent in another satrap, this time a man called Postyshev, ostensibly to make sure that the grain quotas were met. They could not be met; people were already starving to death, so obviously no crops remained in the countryside. The grain procurement brigades went around once again with their long pointed sticks and tried to find hidden supplies. In addition, Stalin and Postyshev started a campaign against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. In March 1933 Skrypnyk was demoted, and in June he was denounced by name. Postyshev announced that the agricultural problems reflected insufficient vigilance; Skrypnyk was charged with having hidden nationalistic deviationists and wreckers—people responsible for failure to meet the grain quotas. Skrypnyk was purged and driven to suicide.

To understand the Ukrainian famine, in other words, we must view it not only in the context of collectivization but also in terms of political developments. Let us consider why the people died where they did. Let us look at the famine in a different context. The peasantry, the social basis of the Ukrainian nation, was more than decimated. The nation lost 7 million people. Ukrainianization ended, paving the way for the eventual re-Russification of the cities in eastern and central Ukraine. The spiritual and cultural elites were destroyed. In 1930, 259 Ukrainian writers were publishing in Soviet Ukraine. By 1938, only 36 of them continued to publish—in other words, more than 80 percent were eliminated in this period. The Ukrainian intelligentsia was destroyed; the official national Communist leadership was destroyed. The famine was thus not only the outcome of collectivization but also an important tactic in nationality policy, an attempt by the Soviet regime to solve its Ukrainian problem once and for all.

Dana Dalrymple

In speaking today, I will be presenting my own personal views. As a government employee I enjoy being called a scholar, and I certainly am delighted to take part in today's discussion. In a sense I have waited twenty years for this day. When I first started investigating the famine, there was no community of scholars and no opportunity for a session of this sort. On the other hand, I did not anticipate that twenty years would pass before interest in the famine built to its present level, but fiftieth anniversaries do have a way of bringing matters into sharper focus.

Articles that have recently appeared in the Ukrainian press have aptly called it the *great* famine. It was real, vast, and terrible—and it was of course basically man-made. Jim Mace has spoken of the famine's impact on Ukraine, but it of course had far broader consequences. Virtually all of the southeastern Soviet Union seems to have been caught up in it in one way or another, and of course some Ukrainians lived in these areas. Thus we need to raise our estimates of the mortality. Jim Mace gave the figure of 7 million; to this we should add an unknown number of deaths elsewhere in the southern part of the Soviet Union.

As today's other speakers have indicated, the famine was virtually unknown at the time despite the vast mortality and despite the fact that a number of accounts were published. Curiously, general histories of the Soviet Union still make little mention of the famine. In retrospect, the famine certainly seems to represent one of the most successful news management stories in history. It seems incredible now that Stalin could have pulled off such a feat.

Still, as we have seen, it is possible to assemble basic information about the famine, and many more pieces have become available in recent years. Differing perspectives on the famine can be taken. We might look at the famine solely in Ukraine, where of course it was the worst. In my article "The Soviet Famine of 1932-34," I took a somewhat broader perspective. I will continue to do so, but irrespective of geographic focus, the basic story of the famine is much the same: It

was a man-made event producing widespread mortality and involving a cover-up by the government.

Let us consider the background for disaster. Several basic tenets guided Soviet policy toward agriculture. Moshe Lewin mentioned the special importance of grain. He wrote: "During the so-called era of the first Five-Year Plans in the Soviet Union, and indeed during the whole of Stalin's rule, grain (and ways of securing it) played a crucial role in the Soviet system. It was a strategic raw material indispensable to the process of running the state and industrializing it."[2] In addition, the Soviet leaders were, of course, motivated by a basic desire to control the countryside. The tools for this process, which have already been mentioned were principally collectivization and dekulakization.

The collectivization process was facilitated by mechanization, which played a curious role. The Soviets regarded tractors as giving them a way to achieve the modern capitalist type of agriculture that they wanted in some ways. Yet the process of collectivization was both helped and hindered by mechanization. Collectivization brought about the killing of much livestock, which increased the need for mechanization. The problem was that the Soviets had few tractors and virtually no tractor industry. They therefore had to import tractors and the wherewithal to build plants. Both steps increased the need for procurement from the countryside to pay the costs of foreign exchange. So one problem fed on the other.

The procurement system seems to have been the major direct factor in bringing about the famine.The government under the five-year plans had relied on procurements for exports partly to pay for industrialization and partly to import the tractors. Procurement was also made for domestic purposes, for cities, for factories, and particularly for the military. As Lewin noted, "The Politburo . . . supervised closely all the stages of the campaign and constantly intervened in it. For a good quarter of a century, extracting grain from the peasants amounted to a permanent state of warfare against them and was understood as such by both sides."[3] Grossman stated the matter even more succinctly: "I came to understand that the main thing for the Soviet power is the Plan. Fulfill the Plan."[4]

As a result, the situation in the countryside by 1931–1932 was

2. Moshe Lewin, "'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements before the War," in C. Abramsky, ed. (assisted by B. J. Williams), *Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr* (London: MacMillan, 1974), p. 281.

3. Ibid., 281–82.

4. Vasily Grossman, as cited by Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin, The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 346. The quotation is taken from the Russian text of *Forever Flowing*, published in West Germany in 1970, p. 123.

largely a disaster. Collectivization had resulted in mass disorganization, mass resistance among the peasants, and the destruction of livestock. The machinery on which the Soviets had placed so much emphasis was breaking down, and they did not know how to repair and maintain it. Agricultural production was a shambles, in short.

At the same time, procurement levels showed continued growth from the mid-1920s. It is possible in part that some misinformation may have been involved. Grossman made an interesting comment on this subject. He wrote:

> After the liquidation of the kulaks, the amount of land under cultivation dropped very sharply and so did the crop yield. But meanwhile people continued to report that without the kulaks our whole life was flourishing. The village soviet lied to the district, and the district lied to the province, and the province lied to Moscow. Everything was apparently in order, so Moscow assigned grain production and delivery quotas to the provinces, and the provinces then assigned them to the districts. And our village was given a quota that it couldn't have fulfilled in ten years! In the village soviet, even those who weren't drinkers took to drink out of terror.[5]

The results were predictable. Production dropped in 1931, and the procurement level increased. The increase in the procurement level seems to have been made possible by the drop in livestock numbers, which reduced the amount of grain used for livestock feed.

In retrospect, collectivization was really a massive failure, and indeed Miller suggests that there was a net inflow of material products into agriculture during the first Five Year Plan.[6] During the period, then, collectivization did not provide a substantial source of economic growth for the country; instead it was a burden. Because of the poor agricultural production, the procurement process imposed an even greater burden.

The events of the 1932–1933 crop year were also then fairly predictible. There was once again a short crop, though not a disastrous one, and procurements continued at a high level, but not as high as in the previous year, largely because the cupboard was bare. In addition, some produce may have been directed into the private market, where prices were much higher. The response by the government was pre-

5. Vasily Grossman, *Forever Flowing*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 149.

6. James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," *Slavic Review* (December 1974), pp. 759–66.

dictable: It increased terror in the procurement process. The result was famine. The situation during 1933-1934 was somewhat the same but less severe. The famine clearly was man-made.

The Soviet government perhaps inadvertently set the stage but then did nothing to avert the famine. The government could certainly have lessened the severity of the famine, and could perhaps avoided it, by relaxing procurements. It could have reduced grain exports—they did not play such a major role in the foreign trade situation. The government could have used some of its own stocks, those that had been established for the military, to alleviate famine. The Soviets could have gone further, importing grain. They could even have allowed outside famine relief. As we know, they did none of these things. The big question is why, and the answer inevitably involves Stalin.

Clearly Stalin did not have a good attitude toward the peasants; they had resisted his efforts at collectivization. They also threatened the sanctity of the plan and of the procurement process. He presumably desired to conceal the fact of the famine for the sake of prestige and possibly for diplomatic reasons. The Soviets were trying to gain U.S. recognition at the time, and they also sought admission into the League of Nations. Then, too, Stalin had a malignant nature, which Dr. Conquest has eloquently described.

Does the information now available justify the recently leveled charge of Ukrainian genocide? The answer is debatable. The general events that I have described, particularly collectivization and procurement, took place throughout the Soviet Union. Many of the actions that we hear about in Ukraine were also taken in Smolensk, for example, although with far less disastrous results in terms of human lives.[7] Famine, as I indicated earlier, occurred over a wide area of the southern part of the Soviet Union. Events of course were most severe in Ukraine, which was the breadbasket and the area where resistance was greatest. As Grossman wrote: "It was clear that Moscow was basing its hopes on the Ukraine. And the upshot of it was that most of the subsequent anger was directed against the Ukraine."[8]

Some observers would view the events in Ukraine as the most terrible chapter in a larger story, but it may be that the coincidence of the famine and other forms of repression against the Ukrainians warrant the more severe charge of genocide. Perhaps in the discussion Drs. Conquest and Mace will address this question further.

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7. Daniel R. Brower, "Collectivized Agriculture in Smolensk: The Party, the Peasantry, and the Crisis of 1932," *The Russian Review* (April 1977), pp. 151-66.
8. Grossman, *Forever Flowing*, p. 149.

Virtually all our information, however, is from the outside. We have essentially no inside official or semiofficial documentation from Soviet archives. If Soviet documents exist, there is probably no chance that they will ever be revealed. Public memoirs are not common in the Soviet Union, and in this case it seems unlikely that Stalin would have said anything about the famine.[9] Thus our knowledge of the famine, as overwhelming as it is, is incomplete and is likely to remain so.

In future assessments of the famine, it would probably be useful to broaden the scope of research beyond Ukraine to encompass the whole area of famine. It is to be hoped that the efforts now under way, and possibly other work yet to be undertaken, will bring to light the full story of this terrible period in Soviet history.

9. Khrushchev's memoirs are an exception. He provided only a brief reference to the famine. See *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 74.

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Discussion

MR. NOVAK: The shooting down of the Korean airliner has caused greater outrage than the immense man-made famine of 1933 partly because it is relatively easy to imagine a planeload of people. We have all been on airplanes; we can imagine what the experience involved. Furthermore, it is very difficult to penetrate a closed society. If 269 peasants and their children in a single village had been annihilated on September 1, 1933, we would perhaps be more readily shocked. Alternatively, if 100,000 people in Ukraine—or 400,000 or 1 million— had been starved to death deliberately in 1933, our horror would be similarly immense. The larger the number, however, the harder it is to imagine. Yet psychologically it is crucial somehow to understand what it was like. Did survivors who were witnesses leave testimony describing the catastrophe for a given family? What material is available?

DR. CONQUEST: Much material has been produced in a number of books, edited mostly by members of the Ukrainian community. They tell story after story of village after village and family after family. There is some variation, as Jim Mace notes. Areas with fish fared better than areas without, and if woods with acorns were nearby, people fared better than they would have otherwise. Certain areas were slightly better off than others. Some villages saw total destruction; nobody was left at all. There are quite a number of accounts by people who looked in and saw the last dead child lying on the floor or clasped to the breast of its dead mother. I must have read between 500 and 1,000 such accounts at least, and probably more exist.

MR. NOVAK: One that particularly gripped me concerned a young girl of about four who asked her father to come with her to visit her friend because the other child's father had taken the friend away in a mood she did not understand. They went and found no one in the cottage of the friend's family, but as the man moved behind the door, he felt what turned out to be the body of a child hanging, saliva dripping on the chest, and then discovered that the father had hanged the younger daughter too. The dead children were ten and eleven, and

the visitor fled in terror with his young daughter, thinking that they might be murdered too. When they met the father of the dead children, he begged them, beseeched them, not to tell his wife, who was away on a two-day trip looking for food. She had been feeding the children, and he was starving. He feared for his life and feared for the misery of the children; he would even have hanged the third child. The man had, the account says, gone mad with hunger. Is there a collection of these stories that we might mention?

DR. MACE: There are a number of them. When Ukrainian survivors first immigrated after the war, one organization published much material of this kind, often in rather imperfect English. The organization is called Dobrus, a Ukrainian acronym for the Democratic Association of Ukrainians who had been suppressed by the Soviets. Dobrus published in 1953 and 1955 a collection of eyewitness documents called the *Black Deeds of the Kremlin*, perhaps not the best title but certainly conveying what the Ukrainians felt. It included hundreds of stories. Dobrus and other organizations also put out a number of collections in the Ukrainian language. *Black Deeds* is probably the most available and complete.

In addition there are numerous unpublished eyewitness accounts, a hitherto fairly untapped resource. In the early 1950s, Harvard University in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force carried out a project to interview people who had recently immigrated during the war from the Soviet Union. About a third of the people interviewed by Harvard University refugee interview project were Ukrainians, and they all had famine stories to tell. There were many of them, and the interviewers were not particularly interested in the famine. Notations appear in the transcripts, which still exist, that the interviewer just stopped the recorder when the respondent began talking about the famine of 1933. The person became very emotional, and the interviewer became very sympathetic. Once they had finished with the subject, the interviewer again started asking questions and recording. But there is much eyewitness material from such projects, and a number of individual accounts have also been published.

MR. NOVAK: What about the mobilization force itself? It must have been huge—including all the people who were sent to find, procure, and collect the food. Do we have any idea about the numbers or any accounts from participants?

DR. MACE: Yes, a campaign began in 1930 and called itself the Twenty-five Thousanders, and there were other campaigns of 10,000 and 5,000 people who were sent to the Soviet countryside initially to force

the peasants into collective farms, to identify kulaks, to organize the local activists to go out and seize them, and to carry off their possessions and to throw them out of their houses. There were about 7,000 of these Twenty-five Thousanders in the Ukraine and who knows how many people with other titles, plenipotentiaries of the Central Committee and party workers, thousands of them. Now, in the Ukrainian case, most of the Thousanders of whom we have the greatest knowledge seem to have been non-Ukrainian workers. We have no nationality breakdown but find that the majority of these people were workers with more than ten years' seniority, which usually meant Russian or Russified. Under Ukrainianization, the situation resembled somewhat that which presently exists in Montreal: The character of Montreal is becoming more and more French, and English people who have lived in the city feel more and more foreign. Some of them are having trouble learning French.

The Ukrainian cities were pretty well Russified in eastern and central Ukraine at the time of the revolution. With Ukrainians coming in during the 1920s and with a policy favorable to Ukrainian language and culture, the character of the city began to change. So there was national antagonism, and many who volunteered to go into the countryside already had a grudge against Ukrainians. Many of the accounts mention so-and-so, a Thousander who came into a village and adopted the Russian slogan *vplot do pechenogo,* which literally means "even the baked"—that is, even if you see half a loaf of baked bread on the stove, you take that too. People were available who were quite eager to carry on this particular task. At the same time a great many Ukrainians were involved. The support organizations in the Ukrainian villages were of course composed of Ukrainians.

DR. CONQUEST: A very large number of books by defectors of every possible type describe experiences during the famine. Some people came from Ukraine or had been in Ukraine. In addition, many people worked as activists. Lev Kopelev, who is now in Washington, was a young Communist sent to the Ukrainian village, as were Leonid Plyushch and Kravchenko. There are many very good firsthand descriptions told from the point of view of the man who was working as a Communist in the villages. One remarkable aspect of these accounts is that they are all completely consistent with each other. Although one of them might initially seem exaggerated or invented, they complement each other to a very large degree. Grigorenko was also in Ukraine and wrote a book. As Jim Mace noted, the Young Communists and the Young Pioneers, the Leninist Boy Scout-age organization, were called out.

Children—25,000 of them—were used to guard the crops in Ukraine, not to guard them physically with rifles, but to watch them, to report to the police and to the military, and to raise the alarm. We have heard a horrible story of children being hanged by their father. There are many stories of a similar type, not necessarily quite the same, of people killing their children to end their misery or just turning them out of the house to fend for themselves. A mother is said to have abandoned a boy of six by the railway, saying he could manage better by joining a gang—and so on. I think one of the general horrors of the whole episode is that, for the most part, children under six or seven died. They could not manage. Children between, say, six or seven and about fourteen went off in large numbers to join gangs and became criminals. Others were rounded up in children's camps or just died. Still others were rounded up in yards and in railway wagons, guarded and not given enough to eat and starved. Some went to homes, and some trained as secret police officers. This group of children was a resource of the present secret police.

Although the physical sufferings of the children were intense, I think the spiritual suffering also deserves consideration. An American girl recently went to Russia and was taken to the Komsomol headquarters in Moscow where she was shown the statue of Pavlik Morozov. Pavlik Morozov denounced his father for hoarding grain. Thereafter the father suffered the fate of grain hoarders, and Pavlik, who was thirteen or fourteen years old, was killed by angry villagers and so became a martyr. I wonder whether it is worse to have children die with the family or go out and become Pavlik Morozovs. The regime has that crime on its conscience even more than the killing, in my view.

MR. NOVAK: What kept the peasants from fleeing? Was there a passport system?

DR. MACE: Yes, passportization, as it was called, was first introduced in late 1932 in Soviet Ukraine and at various times in various other parts of the Soviet Union. People who lived in cities or in certain border areas had to have a passport. The peasants therefore could not leave the land, and they could not live off the land. Passportization juridically tied the agricultural population to the land.

MR. NOVAK: That policy sounds like a reversion to serfdom.

DR. MACE: Very much so. In fact, it is not possible in Ukrainian, but in Russian some people used the party's initials, VKP, for the all-union

Communist party in Russia, to mean *vtoroe krepostnoe pravo*, "law of the second serfdom." They were looking at collectivization, which physically was very much like serfdom. It eliminated small private farms, creating large estates and tying the peasants to the land so that they could not leave. In addition, certain labor obligations were introduced in the 1930s for which workers were not paid—an arrangement similar to the French *corvée*. Second, in the Ukrainian case, there were efforts to prevent villagers from leaving the republic and to prevent people from carrying food in, even bagmen: A person carrying a sack of potatoes was not allowed to cross the border. The Soviets stopped the trains at the border, according to numerous eyewitness accounts, including some from people who were at that time in fairly high positions. Guards would seize any food found on the train, and the person carrying it was usually arrested on charges of speculation, an offense that carried the death penalty. At the same time, the railroads were forbidden to sell tickets to Russia to people who obviously came from the Ukrainian villages.

MR. NOVAK: In other words, the wagons went into the village to take all the grain that could be found. Searchers went into houses, barns, sheds, and even fields. Then, in addition, food could not be brought in.

DR. MACE: Right. That is precisely what happened.

DR. CONQUEST: This supports Dr. Dalrymple's theory about the localization of the famine. Not only were peasants not allowed out to find food, but when they did leave, they were not allowed to return with food. A physical blockade prevented anybody from bringing even a few loaves into Ukraine. This is a clear sign that there was a definite intention to localize the famine in Ukraine, and there was no famine on the other side. Naturally, no one in Russia was living well after collectivization, but the grain requisitions in other areas were not physically destructive, though the Russians to the north in fact lived in a more rural, not a less rural, area than Ukraine. Between 1926 and 1939—I am using the official figures, and in both cases there may be some slight error—the Ukrainians went down by 9.9 percent, the Byelorussians went up by 11.3 percent. There is total difference on either side of that border.

MR. NOVAK: It is about 20 percent.

DR. CONQUEST: The Russians went up by 28 percent in this period

when the Ukrainians were going down by maybe 10 percent. It was not localized totally in Ukraine; there were other areas which suffered, but the Kuban was largely Ukrainian speaking and the inhabitants considered themselves Ukrainian. But the famine also raged in the lower Volga: The Volga Germans were mainly Mennonites and Evangelicals, very strongly so, like some of the Amish. Their 100,000 letters to the West went to Lutheran and other organizations, and some of these letters were published. I have no figures for the Germans, and it is very difficult to determine what happened, but the stories are much the same. I have not, indeed, come across cannibalism stories, though.

There was much cannibalism in Ukraine. We have a decree or instruction by the deputy head of the Ukrainian secret police saying that there was nothing in the penal law against cannibalism. Of course there was nothing. You would not find anything in American law against cannibalism. So the official declared that cannibalism should be regarded as a state crime. Suspects were arrested by the secret police, and cannibals were usually shot. Still, as Vasily Grossman observes, Who caused women to eat their children? They were driven mad.

MR. NOVAK: Could you say a few words about the question of inadvertence and deliberate intent? If there was a blockade, if there was a large-scale mobilization, if the initial decree was impossible and punitive in its very structure, can we still speak of inadvertence?

DR. CONQUEST: Well, it would involve the life or death of 20 percent of a people. The margin seems to me to be too great to be dismissed in that way.

MR. NOVAK: Why didn't Stalin or someone else appeal to the American Relief Administration—a famine relief agency headed by Herbert Hoover—which had been so successful in the very early days of the revolution within Russia itself?

DR. CONQUEST: That question contains its own answer. The Soviets did not want the famine to be coped with successfully.

DR. MACE: Even in the case of the ARA, it's significant that the initial request for relief was solely for the Volga. Efforts were made for a while to keep relief from Ukraine quite simply because food was perceived to be a weapon.

MR. NOVAK: My point was that the ARA was an available precedent.

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DR. MACE: Certainly, the precedent was there. What was not there was the desire to use it.

MR. NOVAK: Describe the picture as journalists saw it. Malcolm Muggeridge is justly famous for his honesty at the time. What did a person see who traveled by train or went into the villages as an outsider?

DR. MACE: At every train station, first of all, people were lying down, begging, and people died. The train stations were literally overflowing with people. The peasants tried to flee to train stations.

MR. NOVAK: To make contact with the outside world?

DR. MACE: Right. Some villages totally died out and became deserted. One great Russian engineer was sent in, I believe it was into the north Caucasus, the Kuban, to inspect wells, and she entered a village that had completely died out. She speaks of the stench and some of the scenes she saw. In every village there were people who had swollen from hunger. Literally everyone in the village swelled with starvation. Bodies lay in the street, even in the cities. Photographs published in the 1930s show Kharkov, then the capital of Soviet Ukraine, with dead bodies on the street and people walking past them because corpses had become an everyday sight by that time. In the villages, the situation was of course much worse, and it was no longer even possible to give people decent burials. Bodies were just loaded on a wagon that went around.

MR. NOVAK: Are there collective graves?

DR. MACE: Mass graves? Yes, there are.

MR. NOVAK: Are there collections of photographs in existence?

DR. MACE: Yes, I think there is one collection in the Longworth Building that was part of the exhibit recently held in Cannon House Office Building.

MR. NOVAK: How complete is the photographic record?

DR. MACE: There are two principal sources of photographs. An American journalist, Thomas Walker, published photographs in the old Hearst press in 1935. The Hearst press covered the story rather tardily because Hearst became angry with Roosevelt in 1935, but a great

many of the photographs were published in the Hearst chain—in the *New York American*, the *Evening Journal*, and the *Chicago American*.

MR. NOVAK: Didn't the United States first learn of the famine in 1934?

DR. MACE: The year was 1933, I believe. The second source of photographs is the German-language edition of Ewald Ammende's *Muss Russland Hungern*. The English translation, *Human Life in Russia*, took some photographs from the Walker account and omitted some that appeared in the German edition, which was published in Vienna in 1935. Most of the photos that I have seen come from these two sources.

MR. NOVAK: I understand from a comment made earlier that we have reports from people who participated in the mobilization. Were there widespread feelings of guilt? Do the participants still have latent feelings of guilt?

DR. CONQUEST: My impression is that most of the participants at the time, or at least all of those about whom I read, adopted an attitude like that of the gas chamber operators. They had convinced themselves, as Grossman notes, that the kulak was not human. Grossman, who was himself a Jew, makes the comparison. Just as the Germans felt that the Jew was not human, so the participants learned that a kulak was not human. Second, the participants were carrying out orders even if they had to brace themselves to kill people; it was the will of history. Even Mikhail Sholokhov, the Kremlin's favorite novelist, writes of how poor and defenseless the kulak family was, and he has Communist activists who cannot and will not do their fearful job. This is what Bukharin meant, I think, when he said that the party had become brutalized by the killing of men, women, and children who had done nothing; once Communists started wavering, the party got rid of them. Such people were purged on a very large scale. They could not bear to continue, but some of the people, like Kopelev, at the time thought, "It's a bit odd, but this is what the party says. The party is always right; history is cruel." He did not feel the shock at the time, and now he does.

MR. NOVAK: Did the famine intimidate? Is there a noticeable scar on the population, perhaps visible even much later, where the famine was concentrated? Part of Ukraine was in Polish hands at the time. Is there a detectable pattern of intimidation?

DR. MACE: Certainly the traditional centers of Ukrainian nationalism and self-assertion were Kiev and Poltava. I think most people would say that now the main center of Ukrainian activism outside the city of Kiev is Galicia, which was under Poland at the time of the famine in Soviet Ukraine. Now, the people who did the Soviets' bidding were also intimidated. The Soviet Ukrainian newspapers during the period carried editorials against "opportunists" who did not want to see the kulaks in their midst. Local officials were being removed right and left; hundreds of collective farm managers and thousands of members of the boards running collective farms were purged. Their fate is unknown but is fairly easy to imagine. There was certainly a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the people who were carrying out party instructions as well. As for the Ukrainians, I think it really did crush them for a number of years. In the Second World War the Ukrainian insurrectionary army (UPA), center of Ukrainian resistance activity, was based in western Ukraine, not in eastern Ukraine.

MR. NOVAK: Is the famine remembered in Ukraine today? Are there signs of bitterness?

DR. MACE: There are some. Vitaly Shevchenko, a Ukrainian political prisoner, for example, was sentenced for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda—among other things, for mentioning the famine. People who come out, former dissidents and the like with whom I have spoken, state that the younger generation has appallingly little knowledge of the famine. The older generation knows about it but is often afraid to speak; it is something people do not really want to remember, a very traumatic experience. People never hear about it in the schools. People who were educated during the Khrushchev period found small mentions in the books of things like great errors and abuses. Professor Conquest has, I believe, some extracts from a Soviet demography textbook stating that progress toward lower mortality rates was not linear, that there were setbacks, and that the harvest failure of 1932 in Ukraine probably caused a very temporary rise in the mortality rate.

DR. CONQUEST: This mention appears in a Soviet demographic work three or four years old. In judging the various data and discussing the lowering of the death rate during the creation of socialism, the authors said that certain areas of the country did not keep pace. "The 1930 decrease in the number of cattle in Kazakhstan, for example, and the crop failure of 1932 in Ukraine may even have given rise to a tempo-

rary increase in mortality." This is not what you might call a very great admission.

DR. MACE: There are mentions of things like a "severe shortfall in edible produce" that caused "difficulties." Some Soviet fictional literature deals with the famine. Soviet Union fiction, or what purports to be fiction, can actually be much truer than that which purports to be history, because only in fiction is it possible to talk about some things. It is almost impossible to talk now about what happened in Soviet Ukraine, but a few writers can mention what went on in the Volga, where the situation seems to have been not quite as bad. I believe Mikhael Alexeev recently published a novel in the mass circulation *Roman Gazeta* about the famine, and he was in fact a famine survivor from the Volga region. A few years earlier he was able to publish a brief autobiography in the journal *Nash Sovremennik* (no. 9, 1972) in which he mentioned the traumatic experience of seeing his parents' coffins being carried away. In Ukraine and in the Kuban—I hate to sound callous—there were no coffins simply because too many people were dying. This was death on a different order of magnitude.

MR. NOVAK: There are euphemistic treatments in the more or less classic books of Russian history that are assigned reading for a liberal education today. The work of E. H. Carr is one example. Have any Soviet official texts, encyclopedias, or other books gone further, offering at least a vague description?

DR. CONQUEST: As far as I know, there is no reference whatever to the famine in any encyclopedia or any reference book of that sort.

MR. NOVAK: Is there a total blank?

DR. MACE: It is not total; we are not saying that there has never been a slight mention.

DR. CONQUEST: Still, it is pretty small.

DR. MACE: We searched far to find the example we gave, which is not very much.

MR. NOVAK: In other words, can we say that this audience has been privileged to hear freshly translated one of the most explicit admissions?

DR. CONQUEST: I think that it was explicit. The Soviets are cracking down on people who speak of the famine, the fiction writers. In the last eighteen months or so, they have been in trouble.

MR. NOVAK: Was there then and for a time thereafter, and is there now, some effect that this famine has exerted on agriculture in the Soviet Union?

DR. DALRYMPLE: There certainly was an effect at the time, but just how long it lingered is hard to say.

MR. NOVAK: Can we see this effect in figures for cattle and grain, for example?

DR. DALRYMPLE: Yes, it is true for each. The famine was sometimes more severe in areas where there was monoculture in grain; families could not fall back on a diversified agriculture. The draft cattle had been killed and were no longer available for slaughter. Once the grain was gone, nothing remained. Many years passed before the livestock numbers increased in the Soviet Union. They may not really have recovered until the 1940s or later. Grain production of course recovered faster, but then we have only the Soviet statistics for grain production, which may not be accurate. In addition, the biological unit of yield was introduced sometime after the famine.

MR. NOVAK: What was that?

DR. CONQUEST: It began in 1933, I think. The biological yield was denounced by Khrushchev in 1953. For a biological yield, rather than counting the actual grain collected, people estimate it in the field. Someone looks at a field and says that is has fifty tons of grain. The real amount is determined later. According to Khrushchev, the 1952 crop officially consisted of 8 billion puds and the true crop was 5½ billion. Quite a large exaggeration is involved. For about ten or fifteen years, the Soviets gave the real amount, but some years ago they adopted a different form of overestimate that means counting the grain in the combine harvester, with its earth and stones and water. This method is supposed to overestimate by only 20 percent.

MR. NOVAK: Would you, Dr. Dalrymple, tell us about the characteristics of Ukraine as a grain-producing area? I have always thought of Ukraine as the breadbasket of the world.

DR. DALRYMPLE: Famine was not new to the Soviet Union. Ukrainians and Russians had suffered in previous famines, particularly in the 1800s. Part of the problem is that much of the Soviet Union is not really very well suited to agriculture. In many areas farms operate on the margin in terms of growing season and rainfall. It does not take much to set agriculture back. The Ukraine, although it is the breadbasket of the country, is not immune to climate problems, but the soil itself is extremely fertile. I remember years ago seeing vast areas that had never been fertilized. Somebody from the West might have difficulty believing that productivity could be maintained without fertilizer, but the soil was very good.

MR. NOVAK: Is that the black soil, the black earth we read about?

DR. DALRYMPLE: Yes. But more was involved in the case of the famine. The land was largely used for grain, and the Soviets were preoccupied with grain. The statistics for other crops indicate that the story was not quite as severe except in the case of livestock.

MR. NOVAK: Collectivization has always puzzled me. I had the impression that because the growing season is relatively short, a large collective effort had always been made at harvest time. True?

DR. DALRYMPLE: I am not so sure. If there was a joint effort, it was certainly a voluntary collective, which is quite different from a forced collective.

MR. NOVAK: No, I understood that it was voluntary but that resources had to be concentrated within a limited span of time.

DR. CONQUEST: Under the old system, which was the same as the medieval system in England, there was strip farming and the three-field system; every peasant had one, two, or three separate strips in one vast field and the same in the second and third fields. The strip in the third field had to lie fallow one year in three. The peasants had to coordinate the system of rotation. The village commune, which Marx misunderstood, served a productive purpose by facilitating coordination and the selection of a field for cultivation the following year. The system was certainly cooperative, and although the Leninists and Gorki denounced the individualism of the peasant, the peasant had both individualism and cooperation, because cooperation implies individualism. It is not the same as collectivism. It may have been a

primitive way of operating, but it did show concern to protect the fertility of the land and to avoid overcropping. Lack of such concern in part accounts for the failure of the modern fertilizer-cum-tractor approach in the Soviet Union. People will not be bothered, and the man in charge of a province—like Larionov in Ryazan—will say, "I'll produce twice as much meat this year as they did last year." Then he slaughters everything in sight and imports meat and has to commit suicide, but the average official hopes for a transfer before the debacle so that his successor will take the blame. A bureaucrat cannot be a farmer.

DR. MACE: We should make one distinction, though. The Ukrainians did not cooperate with one another to the extent that the Russians did. The Ukrainians agriculturally had a much more individualistic tradition. Ukrainians did not have the village commune.

MR. NOVAK: Did this difference account for some of the antagonism between the Russians and the Ukrainians when people tried to identify kulaks?

DR. MACE: That is hard to say. "Kulak" is such a nebulous term. In some places anyone who had a piece of corrugated tin to keep the rain out would be a kulak, and the poorest person in the village might be called a *pidkurkulnyk, pobichnyk hlytaya,* roughly meaning kulak running dog, kulak henchman.

DR. CONQUEST: "Kulak" also refers to mentality, doesn't it?

DR. MACE: Yes, kulak mentality. It is really as much a political as a social phenomenon.

MR. NOVAK: And someone might be called a kulak even for psychological or spiritual reasons?

DR. MACE: Yes. A kulak was basically anyone the Soviets wanted to punish, for whatever reason.

MR. NOVAK: Do the deliberateness and the man-made nature of the famine seem explainable as a personal aberration or as a consequence of doctrine? The famine required an immense mobilization. To what extent would you attribute it to the character of Stalin and others like him and to what extent to a doctrine that is likely to express itself again in some fashion or another?

DR. CONQUEST: The famine cannot be regarded as the inevitable result of even a Stalin-type, collectivized, peasant economy. The Stalin-Kaganovich-Molotov leadership did have a decisive influence. We are somewhat in the position of asking whether a country would have gone to war if so-and-so had been prime minister. Perhaps it would not have; perhaps it would. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian peasantry did represent a special threat. Grigorenko takes the view, slightly different from ours, that the Stalin leadership felt hostility toward the Ukrainian peasantry because the Ukrainian peasantry had spoiled the first collectivization, the January-to-March crash collectivization. There certainly does seem to have been (at least this is my impression, and perhaps Jim Mace will correct me) much more resistance from the Ukrainian peasant, more rebellion, than appeared elsewhere. But the Ukrainian peasantry had been fighting the occupation for some time. The first Soviet governments operated only in the cities. Throughout the countryside were peasant rebellions, with peasant chiefs leading peasant armies of as many as up to 40,000. A very large number of the Ukrainian peasants had served in these armies; it might be fair to say that the majority supported the anti-Soviet armies. There was definitely what the British call bloody-mindedness among the Ukrainians against the regime.

MR. NOVAK: In other words, the motive was to punish as well as to subdue.

DR. CONQUEST: Yes, of course. The punishment of people who are troublemakers stems partly from a desire to subdue them as troublemakers.

DR. MACE: It was much harder for the Soviets to conquer Ukraine in the first place than to take control in Russia proper. The city of Kiev had twelve changes of government from 1917 to 1921. Not only did Denikin and the White Russian armies and the counterrevolutionaries and the Bolsheviks pass through, but there were also the Ukrainian nationalists, Petlyura, and the anarchist, Makhno. The Ukrainian revolution brought the largest area in history under anarchist sway.

The peasantry had an entirely different national tradition that was not based on a long history of serfdom. Serfdom came only at the time of Catherine the Great. The Russians had serfs far back in time, and certainly the system became universal, gaining legal sanction in 1649. Considerably more than 100 years passed before it reached the Ukrainian countryside. The basic national tradition in Ukraine centered on the Cossacks, who are very individualistic and fight back

when things do not suit them. The structure of Soviet rule in the countryside in the 1920s indicates that the Soviets were more afraid of the Ukrainians than they were of the Russians. They retained the old Kombedy, the committees of the village poor, in the Ukrainian countryside until 1933, abolishing them in Russia in 1920. Ukraine was a sore spot, a place culturally, agriculturally, mentally, and spiritually very different from Russia and very self-assertive. The Soviets wanted to crush it.

MR. NOVAK: What was the effect of the famine on the nationalities within the Soviet Union?

DR. MACE: The famine—in fact, this period—is a watershed in Soviet nationalities policy. There is considerable difference between a history textbook from the 1920s and a textbook from the late 1930s, which is in many ways similar to textbooks being written today. In the 1920s, first, there was an apologetic attitude toward the different nationalities. The Soviets were sorry about Russian imperialism. They were saying, "All these peoples have achieved national liberation. We recognized that they have their own histories, that they do things their own way. We're all brothers, but they're different." Immediately after the famine, in 1934, there was a total turnabout in the way that the Soviet Union saw itself and in the way that Soviet history was taught. It was taught as Russocentric Soviet history, and something called Soviet patriotism, which is not very different from Russian nationalism, became the dominant ideology of the state. In the 1920s, the ideology held that the USSR was a more or less loose, heterogeneous confederation of nations banded together against imperialism, if you accept the rhetoric; after 1934 the Soviet Union was, even ideologically, basically Russia writ large. So the famine was crucial in the history of Soviet nationalities policy.

MR. NOVAK: Could you describe the feelings of national identity that are present, if suppressed, in Ukraine today? Do we know enough about the matter to comment on it?

DR. MACE: We have various sources of information. There is the Ukrainian dissident movement, including the Ukrainian Helsinki movement, which never disbanded. The Ukrainian Helsinki movement—it can be said—is alive and well and living in New Jersey. Most of its members are in the Gulag, but a few members are in the West now, and they formed an external group that represents the Ukrainian Helsinki movement. There was a period of official national self-asser-

tion under the regime of Petro Shelest in the 1960s lasting until 1971. Shelest was purged, and there were massive arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals as part of what Ukrainians call the "general pogrom."

MR. NOVAK: The imprisonment of Moroz and others.

DR. MACE: Right, and there was imprisonment of a lot of people who are still there. Some of the statements coming from the Gulag are quite radical in the national sense, denouncing the Soviet government as a government of Russian occupiers of the Ukrainian nation. In one Ukrainian dissident publication in the early 1970s there was a call for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Ukrainian people until there could be a plebiscite. The Ukrainians do not like the Russian rule very much.

MR. NOVAK: In other words, there is still a very powerful political motive for continued silence about the famine?

DR. MACE: Oh, certainly.

MR. NOVAK: Before we turn to the cover-up, to its nature and its persistence, are there any more comments on the discussion thus far?

DR. CONQUEST: Compared with dissidence in Moscow, Ukrainian dissidence is remarkable in extent. It is found not only among literary intellectuals. Some of the people denounced are in the party's cultural apparatus.

Then there were two great riots in Ukraine. One had an economic cause, but the other involved nationalist slogans, as did the riots in Georgia. We have only very small pieces of evidence, but the potential for rebellion seems fairly high still, and this is certainly so in western Ukraine. In western Ukraine there are frequent complaints about people who have been sent to camps and who come back, that tens of thousands of them are still behaving badly. That complaint is very common. Western Ukraine still abounds with nationalists. Even the east has quite a few.

DR. MACE: The Soviets still occasionally uncover old cells of Ukrainian partisans, who are executed. These people are members of the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the executions are announced in the Soviet press from time to time.

MR. NOVAK: Has there ever been, to shift now to the cover-up, a full-

dress investigation of who said what in the Western press and why and what happened? Fifty years have now passed. Emotions should have cooled. What happened in the Western press?

DR. MACE: J. W. Crowl's *Angels in Stalin's Paradise,* a dissertation done at the University of Virginia that was published as an academic book not too long ago, is a study of Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer, two American journalists who were pivotal in suppressing the knowledge of the famine. The entire Western press corps knew about the famine. Malcolm Muggeridge said on many occasions and has written in his memoirs that *the* topic of conversation among the press corps was events in the South and the North Caucasus, and in Ukraine in particular. Duranty shocked his colleagues by telling them that things were even worse than they had heard, that millions of people were dying. Then Duranty, who was a *New York Times* correspondent and had just received a Pulitzer Prize for his own generally sympathetic reportage of Soviet life, proceeded to publish articles skeptical of the "famine scare," in which he asserted that there was some hunger but no starvation in south Russia. Most of the Western correspondents, particularly in the English-speaking world, did not report what was going on even though they knew about it.

DR. CONQUEST: There was quite a lot of reporting. The Hearst press had sources—very good sources, not just correspondents. Some of these sources were American Communists who had been there, like Tawdul, who gave very clear firsthand accounts. These were people who had been around for months. Chamberlin, for example, reported very accurately. Even the pro-Soviet people such as Hindus give us an account that is not altogether sympathetic, nearer truth than falsehood, at least. Duranty was described in his citation for the Pulitzer Prize as "unprejudiced," but in fact he misreported. Still, Muggeridge was writing for the *Manchester Guardian*. The *Daily Telegraph* certainly had reports, the *Times* had reports, and there were also reports in *Figaro*. Many of the great papers in the West printed reports. The answer to your question "Was the story suppressed in the Western press, was it unavailable?" is no. Still, as Susan Sontag points out, if the Hearst press is automatically dismissed from consideration, then the story was not available to Americans.

DR. DALRYMPLE: The press seems not to have pursued the story with the same ferocity that it would show today. The accounts seem to have been more isolated and did not add up.

DR. CONQUEST: At a certain point, reporters were not allowed back in Ukraine. I forget the date.

DR. MACE: That was a danger too, of course. The reporters had very little chance to travel in Ukraine, and if they violated the rules they were given no further chances, so there was really very little chance for on-site investigation that was not rigged ahead of time.

MR. NOVAK: It's true too, isn't it, that if you intended to stay as a reporter in Moscow . . . ?

DR. MACE: You did not report the famine.

MR. NOVAK: Your visa could be revoked because of unfavorable reporting. It appears that the general facts of the matter were reported accurately enough, but the reports did not change public perceptions.

DR. MACE: No, that is true. Still, we must first understand how people saw the Soviet Union during this period. These were the years of the Great Depression, and stories about human suffering were not considered big news. You or I could go out on any street corner and see people suffering. To the extent that people took a great interest in the Soviet Union, they did so thinking that maybe this was an alternative for the West, that maybe the Soviets were trying to build a future that would work. There was a certain pro-Soviet bias in many of the English-language newspapers. Generally, the farther east in Europe, the better the reporting. The English and Americans did not have much material on the famine, although it was possible for readers to find out what was going on. There was more in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. The Polish press had significant coverage, and of course the best was the western Ukrainian press. Very detailed and very graphic accounts appeared in *Dilo*, which was the main Ukrainian-language newspaper in Polish-ruled western Ukraine.

MR. NOVAK: Again, the reason was that western Ukraine at this point was in Poland.

DR. MACE: Right. The newspaper was heavily censored, but it was censored in the Polish style, which was more authoritarian than totalitarian. Blank spaces indicated deletions. The copy was not censored from the very outset, however. Much could also be learned from the Ukrainian language press in the West, in this country and in Canada.

MR. NOVAK: How do you react to the Soviets' repeated assertion, which I heard often enough in my short stay at the United Nations, that they lost 20 million people in the war and that this loss establishes the Soviet Union's commitment to peace?

DR. MACE: It is tragic that the Soviets lost 20 million people in the Second World War, but when we compare that figure to the number of people who died in the 1930s, it seems not quite as immense. The two numbers are not so very different in order of magnitude, and we are comparing wartime losses with peacetime.

DR. CONQUEST: There is rather more to the matter, according to Maksudov. I reached the same figure that he did, but by a different method. The actual number killed by the Germans was probably about 15 million. The war casualties are given by Stalin as 7 million—I mean the soldier casualties. The same number of civilian casualties is about the most we can assume. The Soviets invented the figure of 20 million; it has never been documented, even in speeches. It does not matter particularly. Maksudov, however, takes the view that another 15 million died in the Soviet Union in the same period through Soviet action. Certainly, between, say, 1937 and 1953, there cannot have been fewer than 1 million a year dying in the labor camps. So these figures, as Jim Mace says, are comparable to those for deaths in peacetime or from Soviet action. Whether the figure for war losses is 7 million or 15 million, it far exceeds the number of Western casualties; the British casualties were about half a million. But oddly enough, the ruling bodies show a completely different incidence of death. Only one member of the Central Committee was killed, but the number on the memorial in the House of Commons is twenty-nine. (One Central Committee member went over to the Germans—but we exclude him.) Given that the leaders were spared, why should the Central Committee mind war?

DR. MACE: Stalin once told Churchill that the war itself was in no sense as big, as difficult, for him personally as collectivization had been.

MR. NOVAK: Before we conclude, are there any other matters that we should address?

DR. DALRYMPLE: Dr. Conquest commented earlier that the accounts of the individual survivors show a remarkable degree of consistency. The same is true on a larger scale with respect to other accounts of the

famine. Much of the reading matter is rather terrifying, yet it all seems to fit one broad pattern. I have read very little that does not somehow fit. This consistency is remarkable. Most major public events inspire very different opinions or points of view on the course of events.

DR. CONQUEST: You made a point about proof. In this sort of history we do not have proof. We will not have the memoirs of Kaganovich, but this is the normal state of affairs in history except for the very recent history of a few countries in the West. In writing about practically any historical event almost anywhere in the world, we necessarily proceed on the evidence of odd particulars. The evidence is not complete, and some people reject conclusions, saying that they cannot be proved—they say, for example, that we cannot prove Hitler ordered the Holocaust. David Irving says so. No, it cannot be proved in the sense that we have unfortunately come to expect in certain other sorts of scholarship; we do not necessarily have documentary proof. Yet we do not have to have proof in the same sense; historical proof is different. Gibbon discussed this matter extremely well in his *Vindication*. The incontrovertibility of the evidence can be plain even when it is not documentary or complete.

MR. NOVAK: We have been talking about one of the saddest events of recent history, one that occurred during the lifetime of many of the people present in this room. It seems appropriate to end with the thought that a most important function of the human spirit is to remember, both to recall and to learn. The exercise of remembering is part of our obligation to our fellows everywhere. The work of historians therefore plays a crucial function in the life of the human spirit.

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The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine

Robert Conquest, Dana Dalrymple, James Mace, and Michael Novak

Between August 1933 and spring 1934 more than 7 million peasants were starved to death in Ukraine by deliberate Soviet national policy. This immense man-made famine was the final effort of Stalin to gain political control over the peasantry. On the fiftieth anniversary of this horrible event, details of the famine were discussed at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., by

- Robert Conquest, of the Hoover Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown
- Dana Dalrymple, of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
- James Mace, of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

Michael Novak, who holds the George Frederick Jewett Chair for Public Policy Research at AEI, moderated the discussion.

"The decree required that peasants of Ukraine, the Don, and the Kuban be starved to death together with their little children. By the beginning of the winter, all the grain, including the seed grain of the farms in Ukraine, had been seized by the government. The peasants lived on the last remaining potatoes, killed their last remaining livestock, slaughtered cats and dogs, ate nettles, and chewed linden leaves. The acorns were all gone by about January, and people began to starve. By March no food at all remained, and they died. The children died first, mostly the younger children, followed by the older people, usually the men before the women, and finally everyone else."

—ROBERT CONQUEST

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[From the Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust. Published by the Ukrainian National Association, Jersey City, N.J., 1983]

America's "Red Decade" and the Great Famine cover-up

by Dr. Myron B. Kuropas

In 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Before his death in 1945, some 16 million civilians, including 6 million Jews and from 9 to 10 million Gypsies, Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other untermenschen, were slaughtered to fulfill a diabolical dream.[1]

When World War II ended and the full extent of Hitler's horrors was finally revealed, the civilized world demanded justice. Thousands of Nazis and Nazi collaborators were hunted down, tried and executed for crimes against humanity. The criminals were punished, but the Nazi nightmare lingered on in hundreds of books, magazine articles, films and TV docu-dramas. Even today, in 1983, Nazi collaborators are being brought to trial to demonstrate that no matter how long it takes, no matter what the price, genocide shall not go unpunished. It is in remembering that we assure ourselves that the Holocaust shall never again become a policy of national government.

For Ukrainians, however, the Nazi Holocaust is only half of the genocide story. The other half is the Great Famine, a crime orchestrated by Joseph Stalin in the same year Hitler came to power. No one has ever been hunted down for that crime. No one has ever been tried. No one has ever been executed. On the contrary, many of those who willingly and diligently participated in the wanton destruction of some 7 million innocent human beings are alive and well and living in the Soviet Union.

Since the system which initiated the abomination is still very much intact, there is little likelihood that they will ever have to face an international tribunal for their barbarism. Nor is there any reason to believe that Communists have eschewed genocide as one of their strategies. Cambodia and Afghanistan have proven that.

While there is little the free world can do to punish Bolshevik criminals, the past can teach us to be wary of those contemporary religious and intellectual

1. See Bohdan Wytwycky, *The Other Holocaust* (Washington: The Novak Report, 1980).

leaders who urge us to "trust" them.[2] One of the forgotten aspects of the Great Famine story is the role played by respected American clergy, diplomats, journalists and writers who, by defending Stalin in 1933, indirectly prolonged his reign of terror. Some were innocent dupes. Others were unconscionable conspirators. Almost all went on to pursue distinguished careers in their chosen professions without so much as a backward glance at the incredible human misery they helped conceal from world view. It is in remembering their actions that we can best assure ourselves that, in America at least, genocide shall never again go unnoticed.

The Red Decade

During the 1930s, the United States found itself in the throes of the worst depression in its history. Banks failed. Businesses collapsed. Factories closed. Homes and farms were repossessed. Large city unemployment reached 40 percent. Bread lines and soup kitchens multiplied. The American dream, so real and vibrant during the 1920s, was shattered.

While America suffered, the radical Left reveled. Exploiting the economic turmoil and uncertainty which plagued the nation, Communists and their fellow travelers pointed to the "success" of the great Soviet experiment. Suddenly, thousands of despairing clerics, college professors, movie stars, poets, writers, and other well-known molders of public opinion began to look to Moscow for inspiration and guidance. As millions of jobless war veterans demonstrated in the streets and workers "seized" factories in sit-down strikes, the 1930s became what Eugene Lyons has called America's "Red Decade,"[3] a time when romanticized bolshevism represented the future, bankrupt capitalism the past.[4]

In the forefront of the campaign to popularize "the Soviet way" were American intellectuals, correspondents and even government officials who grossly exaggerated Bolshevik achievements, ignored or rationalized myriad failures, and, when necessary, conspired to cover up Bolshevik crimes. Especially impressed were those who traveled to the USSR during the 1930s, almost all of whom, it seems, found something to admire.

Some found a Judaeo-Christian spirit. Sherwood Eddy, an American churchman and YMCA leader, wrote: "The Communist philosophy seeks a new order, a classless society of unbroken brotherhood, what the Hebrew prophets would have called a reign of righteousness on earth." A similar theme was struck by the American Quaker Henry Hodgkin. "As we look at Russia's

2. See Sydney Lens, "We Must Trust the Russians," *Chicago Sun-Times* (January 10, 1983). Also see Myron B. Kuropas, "Trust the Russians? C'mon!," *Chicago Sun-Times* (January 26, 1983).

3. Lens, *Radicalism in America* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 297.

4. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval*, (Boston: Houghton-Miflin Company, 1960), pp. 183-185.

great experiment in brotherhood," he wrote, "it may seem to us that some dim perception of Jesus's way, all unbeknown, is inspiring it..."[5]

Others discovered a sense of purpose and cohesive values. Corliss and Margaret Lamont concluded that the Soviet people were happy because they were making "constructive sacrifices with a splendid purpose held consciously and continuously in mind"despite some "stresses and strains" in the system.[6]

Still others found humane prisons. "Soviet justice," wrote Anna Louise Strong, "aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better...the labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed."[7]

The Soviet Union had something for everyone. Liberals found social equality, wise and caring leaders, reconstructed institutions and intellectual stimulation.[8] Rebels found support for their causes: birth control, sexual equality, progressive education, futuristic dancing, Esperanto. "Even hard-boiled capitalists," wrote Lyons, an American correspondent in Moscow, "found the spectacle to their taste: no strikes, no lip, hard work..."[9]

Contributing to the liberal chorus of solicitous praise for Stalin's new society were American diplomats such as U.S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies who argued that Stalin was a stubborn democrat who insisted on a constitution which protected basic human rights "even though it hazarded his power and party control."[10]

Like most liberals, Davies never accepted the notion that Stalin's purge trials were staged. "To assume that," he wrote, "...would be to presuppose the creative genius of Shakespeare and the genius of Belasco in stage production."[10] Nor did he believe Stalin — whom he described as "clean-living, modest, retiring" — was personally involved in the elimination of his former colleagues.[11] Even though he had personally met and dined with many of the purge victims, Davies later concluded that their execution was justified because it eliminated Russia's "Fifth Column" which, in keeping with "Hitler's designs upon the Ukraine," had conspired to "dismember the union..."[12]

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5. Cited in Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, 1928-1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 124.
6. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 127.
7. Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
8. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 106.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
10. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 164.
11. Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), pp. 191-192.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

In the United States, meanwhile, the liberal press was equally enamored of Stalin. Writing in Soviet Russia Today, a monthly journal, Upton Sinclair, Max Lerner and Robert M. Lovett wrote glowing accounts of Moscow's important role in defending democratic principles.[13] In the words of Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, a charter member of the Soviet defense team:

> "The great cleavage between contemporary societies is not between 'capitalism' (democratic or fascist) and 'communism' but between those (whether in Manchester, Moscow, Marseilles or Minneapolis) who believe in the mind and in the government of, by and for the people, and those (whether in Munich, Milan or Mukden) who believe in might and in government of, by and for a self-appointed oligarchy of property and privilege."[14]

For the Nation, Russia was the world's first true democracy and anyone who didn't believe it was "either malicious or ignorant."[15] For the New Republic, communism was "a false bogey."[16] When a group of 140 American intellectuals associated with the Committee for Cultural Freedom included the USSR in its list of nations which deny civil liberties and cultural independence, some 400 liberal Americans — including university presidents, professors and such prominent names as Langston Hughes, Clifford Odets, Richard Wright, Max Weber, Granville Hicks, Louis Untermeyer and James Thurber — signed and agreed to have published an "Open Letter" branding as "fascists" all those who dared suggest "the fantastic falsehood that the USSR and the totalitarian states are basically alike." Joining the condemnation with pointed editorial comments were the Nation and the New Republic.[17]

How the press corps concealed a famine

In January 1928, Eugene Lyons, the newly hired correspondent for United Press arrived to take up his duties in Moscow. Although he had never actually joined the Communist Party in America, Lyons came with impeccable Leftist credentials. The son of an impoverished Jewish laborer on New York's Lower East Side, he joined the Young People's Socialist League in his youth. Beginning his professional career as a writer for various radical publications, Lyons eventually became the editor of Soviet Russia Pictorial, the first popular American magazine about the "wonders" of Soviet life, and a New York correspondent for TASS, the Soviet news bureau.[18]

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13. Frank A. Warren III, *Liberals and Communism: The "Red Decade" Revisited* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 105.
14. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 109.
15. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 105.
16. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 149.
17. Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), pp. 342-351.
18. Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1937), pp. 3-49.

"My entire social environment in those years," he later wrote, "was Communist and Soviet...[19] If anyone ever went to the Soviet realm with a deep and earnest determination to understand the revolution...it was the newly appointed United Press correspondent...I was not deserting the direct service of the cause for the fleshpots of capitalism," he reasoned, "I was accepting, rather, a post of immense strategic importance in the further service of that cause, and doing so with the wholehearted agreement and understanding of my chiefs in TASS and therefore, presumably, of the Soviet Foreign Office."[20]

As an enthusiastic member of Stalin's defense team, Lyons consistently penned dispatches which glorified the Soviet Union. "Every present-tense difficulty that I was obliged to report," he wrote. "I proceeded to dwarf by posing it against a great future-tense vision."[21]

The longer Lyons remained in the USSR, however, the more disillusioned he became with Soviet reality. Eventually, his reports began to expose the sham of Bolshevik propaganda, and Moscow demanded his recall.

Returning to the United States in 1934,[22] he wrote about his experiences in "Assignment in Utopia," a book published by Harcourt-Brace in 1937. In a chapter titled "The Press Corps Conceals a Famine," Lyons described how he and other American correspondents conspired with Soviet authorities to deny the existence of the world's only human-engineered famine. The most diligent collaborators in the sordid affair were Walter Duranty, head of The New York Times Moscow bureau, and Louis Fischer, Moscow correspondent for the Nation.

The first reliable report of the catastrophe to reach the outside world was presented by Gareth Jones, an English journalist who visited Ukraine in 1933 and then left the Soviet Union to write about what he had witnessed. When his story broke, the American press corps — whose members had seen pictures of the horror taken by German consular officers in Ukraine — was beseiged by their home offices for more information. Angered as much by Jones's scoop as by his unflattering portrayal of Soviet life, a group of American correspondents met with Comrade Konstantine Umansky, the Soviet press censor, to determine how best to handle the story. A statement was drafted after which vodka and "zakuski" were ordered and everyone sat down to celebrate with a smiling Umansky.

The agreed-upon format was followed faithfully by Duranty. "There is no actual starvation," reported The New York Times on March 30, 1933, "but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition." When the famine reports persisted over the next few months, Duranty finally admitted "food

19. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 607.

shortages" but insisted that any report of famine "is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda."[23]

Duranty, of course, was aware of the situation in Ukraine and confessed as much to The New York Times book critic John Chamberlain, himself a Communist sympathizer. Believing, as he later wrote, that "the Russian Revolution, while admittedly imperfect, needed time to work itself out," Chamberlain was distressed by Duranty's casual admission that "3 million people had died...in what amounted to a man-made famine." What struck him most of all "was the double inequity of Duranty's performance. He was not only heartless about the famine," Chamberlain concluded, "he had betrayed his calling as a journalist by failing to report it."[24]

Fortunately, not all members of the American press corps in Moscow were involved with the cover-up. A notable exception was William Henry Chamberlin, staff correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, who traveled to Ukraine in the winter of 1933 and reported that "more than 4 million peasants are found to have perished..."[25] In a book titled "Russia's Iron Age" published that same year, Chamberlin estimated that some 10 percent of the population had been annihilated by Stalin during the collectivization campaign.[26] In describing his journey to Ukraine Chamberlin later wrote:

> "No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest desire to learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the Ukrainian countryside had experienced a gigantic tragedy. What had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were allowed to pass the Soviet censorship, but stark, outright famine, with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad."[27]

First to provide extensive coverage of the Great Famine in the American press was the Hearst newspaper chain which, unfortunately, placed the event in 1934 rather than 1932-33.[28]

By that time, however, Stalin's American defense team was already busily denying the Chamberlin and Hearst reports. The most outstanding example was

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 572-580.

24. John Chamberlain, *A Life with the Printed Word* (Chicago: Regnery, 1982), pp. 54-55.

25. *Christian Science Monitor* (May 29, 1934).

26. William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1934), pp. 66-67.

27. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 60.

28. See *Chicago American* (March 1, March 4 and March 6, 1935).

Louis Fischer who in the March 13, 1935, issue of the Nation reported that he had visited Ukraine in 1934 and had witnessed no famine! Even though he was aware of it, Fischer made no mention that the famine had occurred a year earlier. Problems with collectivization could not be denied, however. In his book "Soviet Journey" Fischer described the process in the following simple terms:

> "History can be cruel...The peasants wanted to destroy collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization. The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government used the best means at their disposal. The government won."[29]

With help from certain members of the American press corps, the Bolsheviks succeeded in their efforts to shield the truth about Ukraine's Great Famine from the world's eyes. Concealing the barbarism until it was ended, they generated doubt, confusion and disbelief. "Years after the event," wrote Lyons in 1937, "when no Russian Communist in his senses any longer concealed the magnitude of the famine — the question whether there had been a famine at all was still being disputed in the outside world:"[30]

The "need" for a famine

The famine story, however, would not die. Even Time magazine eventually admitted the possibility of 3 million Ukrainians dead.[31] None of this bothered Stalin's American defense team. In a 1933 publication titled "The Great Offensive," Maurice Hindus wrote that if the growing "food shortage" brought "distress and privation" to certain parts of the Soviet Union, the fault was "not of Russia" but of the people. Recalling a conversation he had with an American businessman, Hindus proudly wrote:

" 'And supposing there is a famine...'continued my interlocutor... 'what will happen?'

" 'People will die, of course,' I answered.

" 'And supposing 3 or 4 million people die.'

" 'The revolution will go on.' "[32]

If a famine was needed to preserve the revolution, so be it. "Maybe it cost a million lives," wrote Pulitzer Prize novelist Upton Sinclair, "maybe it cost 5 million — but you cannot think intelligently about it unless you ask yourself how many millions it might have cost if the changes had not been made...Some people will say that this looks like condoning wholesale murder. That is not true; it is merely trying to evaluate a revolution. There has never been a great social change in history without killing."[33]

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29. Cited in Lyons, *The Red Decade*, p. 118.
30. Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia*, pp. 577-578.
31. *Time* (January 23, 1939).
32. Cited in Hollander, p. 120.
33. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Although Svoboda reported on the famine[34] and thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in New York City, Chicago, Detroit and other cities to protest Stalin's terrorism,[35] the White House remained indifferent. On November 16, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formally recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik regime.

Commenting on America's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, The Ukrainian Weekly reported that some 8,000 Ukrainians had participated in a New York City march protesting the move and added that while the protest was "not intended to hinder the policies...of the United States government — we Ukrainians are as anxious as anyone else to cooperate with our beloved president" — nevertheless, "we look dubiously upon the value of any benefits which America may obtain from having official relations with a government whose rule is based on direct force alone," a government which is unable "to provide for its subjects even the most ordinary necessities of life, and which has shown itself capable of the most barbaric cruelty, as evidenced by its reign of terror and the present Bolshevik-fostered famine in Ukraine."[36]

Fifty years later, The Ukrainian Weekly is still warning a largely indifferent America about the perils of trusting Soviet Communists. If docu-dramas such as "The Holocaust," in which the USSR was portrayed as a haven for Jews fleeing Nazi annihilation, and "The Winds of War," in which Stalin was depicted as a tough but benevolent leader whose loyal troops sang his praises in three-part harmony, are any indication of current media perceptions of the Stalinist era, then the legacy of the Red Decade lives on.

The world has been inundated with a plethora of authoritative information regarding Hitler's villainy and has become ever vigilant in its efforts to prevent a repetition of his terror. This is good, but it is not enough. Hitler was not this century's only international barbarian, and it is time we recognized this fact lest we, in our single-minded endeavors to protect ourselves from another Hitler, find ourselves with another Stalin.

Dr. Myron B. Kuropas has served as special assistant for ethnic affairs to President Gerald R. Ford and as a legislative assistant to Sen. Robert Dole. At present he is supreme vice president of the Ukrainian National Association. The article presented here was originally published in The Ukrainian Weekly's March 20, 1983, special issue on the Great Famine.

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34. See *Svoboda* (February 6, May 25, June 11, and July 14, 1932).

35. See *The Golgotha of Ukraine* (New York: The Ukrainian Congress Committee, 1953), p. 5.

36. *The Ukrainian Weekly* (November 23, 1933).

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kuropas. And now, sir, would you pronounce your name for me?

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. It is Ihor Olshaniwsky.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. If you would care to proceed, you may summarize your statement, of course, if you would like, and your full statement will be incorporated in the record.

STATEMENT OF IHOR OLSHANIWSKY, COORDINATOR, AMERICANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE, NEWARK, NJ

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am extending my gratitude to Chairman Charles Percy for scheduling these hearings on S. 2456, a bill to establish a Commission to investigate the Famine in Ukraine in 1932-33. I am also thankful to the sponsor of the bill, Senator Bradley, and the 17 additional Senators who are cosponsors of this important measure.

It is a great honor for me to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine and the Committee To Commemorate the 1932-33 Genocide Victims in Ukraine, which represent a total of over 500,000 Ukrainian Americans.

On October 2, 1983, 15,000 Americans of Ukrainian descent marched in Washington, DC, and focused attention on the genocidal famine, willfully created by the Soviet Government during which more than 7 million people perished. The demonstration was not only a reminder of this unspeakable crime but also addressed itself to the persistent claim of the Soviet Union that it never happened. The Ukrainian Americans are coming back to Washington this coming September 16 to demonstrate their awareness of the tragedies of the past and protest the injustices of the present in their former homeland.

During the commemorative week last year, Congressman James Florio introduced H.R. 4459, the House version of S. 2456, which up to the present time has gained 111 cosponsors in the House. The initiative of the past year to disseminate famine information among the many Americans who never heard of it gained momentum. More and more Americans are coming to the realization that if they continue to remain silent about this tragedy, history will be altered forever due to the Soviet coverup and indifference prevailing in the Western World.

There are many reasons why we think that the creation of a congressionally chaired Commission is of vital importance to the American people. Some of the most significant of them are:

(*a*) This genocidal famine of 1932-33 singularly affected untold numbers of Americans having their roots in Ukraine. Almost every family lost someone: brothers, sisters, parents, grandparents, children, cousins and so on.

There are thousands of American citizens who are survivors of this genocide. How can we ignore the nightmare, the suffering, and the loss of dear ones of so many of our countrymen?

(*b*) In spite of Soviet denials that this famine occurred, we must not allow the falsification of history by the Soviet Union to prevail in the annals of mankind. The old men of the Kremlin who were involved in this coverup are still in power. These are the same men

who in their youth were the perpetrators of this horrible crime against humanity. We must pinpoint the inner workings of our present day adversary in order to develop a correct perception of the Soviet system without illusions. We can hope to prevent repetitions of political genocides in the future by applying the hard lessons of the past.

(*c*) Although we have gained immeasurable knowledge from the studies of the Nazi-imposed holocaust, we must also learn about the Soviet use of food as a political tool which aims to create genocidal famines in order to subjugate and overcome the resistance of Soviet enslaved nations.

Civilized nations must remember not only the glories of the past but also must be willing to recognize its horrors if we are to prevent their recurrence.

(*d*) From a practical point of view, the study of Soviet behavior and its methods is of paramount importance to all of us, especially to the Department of State and our policymakers. It is an educational process vital to our understanding of the international dilemmas facing us and is an important part of our national defense.

Only through a well-informed American public can we develop a reliable long-term national policy toward the Soviet Union. In a democratic country such as ours, it is a near impossibility to develop a foreign policy without the support of the general public.

(*e*) We believe that an impartial study with unbiased conclusions can be better achieved through a congressional study group with its many resources than by special interest private association. Furthermore, the bill provides the congressional Commission with subpoena powers, a call to all available eyewitnesses—willing and unwilling—and access to the archives of governmental agencies not available to private institutions.

(*f*) Reacting to the Soviet Government's methods, deeds, and strategies, we are not about to criticize those in our Government who believe in a strong national defense. However, we do not believe that our defense posture should consist solely of a buildup of military hardware, but should be educational as well.

In this age of advanced weaponry, with the threat that it poses for the total annihilation of mankind, we must stress the need for settling our differences through peaceful means. Yet, we must be realistic and well informed, and use the factual data available to us to our advantage.

The Soviet Union starts indoctrinating its people in elementary schools and continues beyond with erroneous information about the United States being the most imperialistic nation and a threat to world peace. We can counter this in a true democratic manner by presenting authentic information not only to the American public but to the people of the Soviet Union as well via Voice of America and Radio Liberty.

This endeavor should not be merely the concern of one ethnic group. It should be a job that concerns all Americans, including the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, with its State Department.

We do not feel that this Commission, together with its functions, is merely a community project. The results of this study will be of value to virtually all people of the United States.

As we envision it, the duties of the Commission will be as follows: (1) To hold hearings and subpoena eyewitnesses and survivors; (2) to examine the archives of the U.S. agencies; (3) to search all available documentations in other countries, primarily in Europe; (4) to conduct a demographic study of population in the years of the famine in Ukraine and analyze available Soviet documents; (5) to prepare an analysis of the political situation before and during the famine and the reasons for the Soviet Government's action; (6) to study U.S. and international news media for its reports on the famine; (7) to analyze the reaction of the U.S. Government at the time of the famine in Ukraine; and (8) to print these findings which would be made available to the Congress of the United States, governmental agencies, universities, libraries, the news media and interested citizens' groups, and also inform the Soviet people about the results of the study through Voice of America and Radio Liberty.

Having given you what we consider valid reasons for establishing this Commission and briefly describing its functions, we urge the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to act favorably on S. 2456 and report this bill out of committee with a recommendation for an authorization ceiling of $4 million, part of which would be used by the Commission to contract out various portions of this study to qualified scholars.

Thank you very much.

I would like your permission, Mr. Chairman, to include in the record a statement by Dr. Mace of Harvard University, which refers to the scope of the research problems, to information which is presently available in the West on the famine, to it being sufficient for the investigation and whether it is realistic to expect to obtain any additional useful information.

I would also like to include "Boiling the Ocean," an editorial in the Wall Street Journal dated June 18, 1984, which compares the present Soviet policies in Afghanistan to the circumstances leading to the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33; a statement by Metropolitan Sheptytskyj in 1933 which was an appeal to the people of the world to help the starving Ukrainians; and a book published by Harvard University, "Who Killed Them and Why?" by Miron Drobot.

The CHAIRMAN. I have looked through those exhibits. I think they will be very helpful in completing the record and they will be incorporated then at this point in the record. Thank you.

[The material referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES MACE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

One of the major problems with a project of this kind is that of source materials. Since the Soviet government persists in its denial of what it did in 1932-33, it is unrealistic to expect cooperation from that government in the form of access to archival materials. Yet, even in the matter of archives, we are not completely without resources. The Smolensk archive, carried off by the Germans during the Second World War and now housed in the United States, contains numerous police reports detailing the reactions of local peasants to the plight of Ukrainians who had fled their own starved villages for areas in Russia, like the Smolensk oblast, where food was available. Archival materials from the rayon (county) of Krynychansk near Dnipropetrovsk also reached the United States, and these materials contain a partial death register and minutes of local official discussions on grain seizures. Similar materials from the secret police archive of Chornukhy raion, Poltava oblast, were

published in the 1950's from materials carried out of Ukraine by Ukrainian refugees during the war.

Far more abundantly available in the West are various organs of the official Soviet Ukrainian press during the period. The famine was, of course, not mentioned in the Soviet press, but the measures that caused it had to be announced before they could be carried out, and the offical press described these measures in fascinating detail. This can be supplemented by later historical and census data.

The press of the United States, Canada, and Europe carried much information on the famine, often belatedly. Materials published by Ukrainian communities in Western Ukraine (then under Polish rule), the United States, and Canada, are particularly important in revealing how much about the famine was known outside the Soviet Union and when it was known. These reports played a critical role in activating the Ukrainian communities outside the Soviet Union in both their efforts to make the plight of their countrymen known and in organizing relief efforts (the latter in the face of official Soviet resistance, mitigated to some extent by the profiteering of the Soviet torgsin apparatus).

The most important source of information about the famine is, of course, the memory of those who witnessed it. A few Western journalists and former members of the Soviet apparatus of food extraction have told what they saw, and more information of this type must be sought out and collected. Thousands of Ukrainians who survived the famine came to North America and Western Europe after the Second World War. They are now dispersed throughout the Western world, many deeply traumatized by their experience under Soviet rule. Some have had the courage to talk about their experiences, and others would undoubtedly do so if the commitment were made to locate them.

Much declassified material regarding the famine resides in the archives of various governments, including the government of the United States. One question that must be asked is this: how much did the governments of the free world know and why did they do so little?

Recent work by scholars such as Dr. Robert Conquest of the Hoover Institution and Dr. James Mace of Harvard University has helped to indicate how much information about the famine is available to trained scholars. They have increased our knowledge a great deal. But the scope of the problem is beyond the resources of private institutions and individual scholars.

This nation has long held that government exists to do for individuals what they cannot do for themselves. Individuals cannot locate and interview the remaining witnesses of the famine in the span of time necessary. Those who witnessed an event over half a century ago diminish in number with such passing year. Only government can provide the resources to reach them before their knowledge is lost to us forever. Only government can allow us to discover what the agencies of our government knew and what decisions were made on the basis of that knowledge. Only government can provide the resources to enable us to learn all that can be learned about and from this tragedy.

Americans of Ukrainian descent are like American Jews in their attachment to their shared legacy of suffering, a commonality of experience based on their having suffered the ultimate crime against humanity, the crime of genocide. Our government has widely committed its resources to the study of the Holocaust suffered by the Jews in recognition of the fact that it is only through knowledge that we may fortify our resolve that such things will never again take place. Americans of Ukrainian descent now ask a similar commitment from our government. We know that it is only through a greater sensitivity to the issue of genocide based on knowledge that all Americans can make firm our stand in all places and for all time; never again.

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1984]

BOILING THE OCEAN

News from Afghanistan is both exhilarating and tragic. The Soviets have failed to crush the Afghan resistance in their largest offensive to date. But they may take their vengeance on the Afghan population with an induced famine that competent Western observers think may rank among the most spectacular disasters of the last few years.

The Soviet invaders staged a massive march this spring into the strategic Panjshir Valley stronghold of the mujahedeen, the Afghan freedom fighters, northeast of the capital city of Kabul. Military observers have marveled at the Russian's coordi-

nated use of ground troops, helicopters, paratroops and saturation high-altitude bombing (as well as poison gas). Yet the guerrillas have bounced back. Afghan exile headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan, claim that Soviet troops have withdrawn from the upper half of the Panjshir under increasing harassment. One Russian outpost is currently cut off. A 900-man unit of Afghans, including an Afghan general and a number of Soviet officers, surrendered in a side valley and is being brought back to Pakistan. The Soviet forces, 16,000 strong, have now concentrated in the towns of Bazared and Bukha, famous for an ice cream parlor made by Afghans out of a downed Soviet supply helicopter.

It remains to be seen whether this withdrawal is a classic anti-guerrilla tactic, designed to draw the mujahedeen out in the open, part of a Soviet plan to hold only the lower valley, or simply a retreat. But there is growing agreement that Soviet hopes of a military victory have been frustrated, and possibly at higher cost to the Russians than to the mujahedeen. Ahmad Shad Massoud, the Panjshir Valley commander who is deservedly becoming a legend, evacuated troops and civilians before the assault and left his abandoned strongholds heavily mined. Afghan sources think this tactic alone caused 400 to 500 serious injuries among elite Soviet paratroops.

In short, the Afghans appear to have kept pace with the improved soviet military. In spite of scandalously inadequate Western aid, a network of local commanders, some of whom equal Massoud in ability if not fame, has brought the resistance to its highest level yet of coordination and organization. In turn, the Soviets appear to have decided that if they can win a military victory, they will have a demographic one by eliminating the population that gives the resistance its base.

Warnings of this strategy came last year from Claude Milhuret, executive director of the Paris-based Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), a volunteer group that maintains six hospitals in mujahedeen-controlled parts of Afghanistan. If guerrillas move among the population, in Mao's words "like fish in the water," then the Soviet response is to boil the ocean. Anti-guerrilla wars aren't decided by the Western strategy of winning over the population, Dr. Malhuret concludes glumly, but by "making terror reign." Over the years his group has seen this Soviet approach firsthand several times. In the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, the populations of villages and towns were driven into Somalia. In Cambodia after the Vietnamese invasion, grain was bottled up in Kompong Som until the population that might support the resistance had starved or fled. Now it's Afghanistan's turn.

More than four million Afghans, maybe half the population under mujahedeen control, have fled to Pakistan and Iran, helped along by indiscriminate Soviet bombing, massacring and sowing of mines. (These mines are designed to maim rather than kill, French doctors from several groups report, and some have been disguised as toys.) A million more Afghans may have been driven to cities under Soviet control. The Soviet invaders are working hard to centralize the food-distribution system, and they are now trying to destroy crops they can't buy up. Afghans report Russian bombing of the irrigation system in the rich Shomali plain and napalming of storage bins to destroy the wheat harvest.

The parallel often cited is Stalin's man-made famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33, when communist confiscation of the harvest caused at least five million to seven million deaths and wiped out the entire nationalist strata of that society. So far, Afghans have escaped the worst, but danger signs are already up. The British group Afghan Aid recently released a nutritional and economic survey by Frances D'Souza of the Food Emergencies Research Unit of London University. To its shock, field examinations in remote Badakshan revealed severe malnutrition among more than 20% of the children, worse results than in Biafra. Not by accident, Badakshan sits on important Soviet supply lines; mujahedeen attacks have been intense, and earlier reports say the Russians have tried to terrorize and drive out its inhabitants by dropping "yellow rain."

The mujahedeen are deeply aware that their most important battle now may be to feed their population. Some commanders have delegated units to help with the harvest and repair the irrigation system. Emissaries to the West now plead for food aid as urgently as they ask for antiaircraft missiles. They deserve both. But if the West lacks the nerve to send them SAMs (or Stingers), it has no excuse to stint in shipping humanitarian aid. The Soviet famine strategy can be frustrated if sufficient grain supplies are made available in Pakistan to the mujahedeen distribution network. Perhaps even more so than the fight in the Panjshir Valley, the economic battle will be critically important. Will the West sit this one out too?

Галицької Церковної Провінції, в справі подій на Вел. Україні до всіх людей доброї волі.

Митрополит Андрій Шептицький
Metropolitan Andrej Sheptytskyj

UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE GALICIAN CHURCH

PROVINCE in regard to the events in Central Ukraine, to all people of good will.

Ukraine is in premortal convulsions! The population is dying out from starvation. Based on lies, deceit, ungodliness and depravation, the cannibalistic system of state capitalism has brought a recently wealthy land to a complete ruin. Three years ago the Head of the Catholic Church, the Holy Father Pope Pius XI protested energetically against everything in bolshevism that is anti-Christian, anti-God and anti-human nature, warning of the terrible results of such crimes — and all the Catholic world, including us, joined in that protest. Today we see the results of the deeds of bolsheviks: the situation becomes more terrible with each day. The enemies of God and humanity discarded religion — the basis of social order: took away freedom — the greatest good of man; out of free citizens-peasants — they made slaves, and lack the intelligence to feed these people for the hard labor they perform.

Seeing such crimes — one becomes speechless, blood freezes in one's veins.

Being helpless to give any material help to the dying brothers, we ask our believers, that with their prayers, fasting, national mourning and all the possible good Christian deeds, they ask for heavenly help, when there is no hope for any human help.

And before the whole world we again protest against the persecution of the young, the poor, the weak and the innocent; the wrongdoers we accuse before the Judgement of the Almighty.

The blood of the workers, who, while starving, plowed the fields of black soil of Ukraine, is crying to Heaven for revenge, and the voice of the hungry harvesters has reached the ears of Lord Sabaoth.

We ask all the Chistians of the world, all the believers in God, all the workers and peasants, and especially all our countrymen to join in the voice of protest and pain and spread it to the farthest countries of the world.

We ask all the radio stations to carry our voice to the whole world: perhaps it will reach even the poor dwellings of the dying, starving peasants.

Before the terrible death in cruel suffering from hunger, let them have at least small comfort in the knowledge that their brothers knew about their terrible fate, sympathized and suffered with them, and prayed for them.

And You, who suffer, starving and dying Brothers, call on the Benign God and Saviour Jesus Christ; you endure cruel torture — accept it for your sins, for the sins of the whole nation and repeat with Jesus Christ: „Let Your will be done, Heavenly Father!" A death accepted because of the will of God is a holy sacrifice, which is connected with the sacrifice of Jesus Christ; it will bring You Heavenly Kingdom, and will bring salvation to the whole nation.

Our hope is in God!

Given in Lviv on the day of St. Olga, July 24, 1933 AD.

Andrej Sheptytskyj, Metropolitan; Hryhorij Khomyshyn, Bishop of Stanislaviv; Josafat Kotsylovs'kyj, Bishop of Peremyshl'; Nykyta Budka, Bishop of Patar; Hryhorij Lakota, Aux. Bishop of Peremyshl'; Ivan Buchko, Aux. Bishop of Lviv; Ivan Liatyshevs'kyj, Aux. Bishop of Stanislaviv.

Famine

Crime Against Humanity


WHO KILLED THEM AND WHY?
MIRON DOLOT
IN REMEMBRANCE OF THOSE STARVED TO DEATH DURING THE FAMINE OF 1932-1933 IN UKRAINE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY UKRAINIAN STUDIES FUND

Miron Dolot

WHO KILLED THEM AND WHY?

In remembrance of
those killed in the Famine of
1932–1933 in Ukraine

CONTENTS

Author's Note

Seven million Ukrainian farmers perished during the Famine of 1932–1933. Their extermination was an element of an official policy. It was genocidal famine, brought about by the Russian Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a means of subduing and annihilating the Ukrainian people as a nation.

History knows no other crime of such a nature and magnitude.

I

Famine by Command

The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine stands out among all others. It was genocidal famine caused by the Soviet Communist Party and government as a means of subduing the Ukrainian people as a nation. During this famine, millions of Ukrainian farmers were deliberately starved to death. It is ironic that this, one of the most monstrous crimes of genocide in the history of mankind, is still officially ignored in the Soviet Union, and has never become known in most of the outside world. Ukrainians alone recall this tragic event—few others remember it, or even seem to care.

The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was not the result of any natural disaster. On the eve of the Famine Ukraine had a normal crop. Nor was this famine a direct result of the collectivization of farms, as is generally believed. Although collectivization provided favorable conditions under which the Famine could occur, it was not the direct or major cause. If it were, as some believe, then why didn't mass starvation also occur in Russia?

There can be no doubt today that the Famine of 1932-1933 was manmade. W. H. Chamberlin, a perceptive observer of the Soviet scene for the *Christian Science Monitor* at that time, writes the following:

> Famine was quite deliberately employed as an instrument of national policy, as the last means of breaking the resistance of the peasantry to the new system where they are divorced from personal ownership of the land and obligated to work on the conditions which the state may dictate to them and deliver up whatever the state may demand from them.[1]

Continuing, he writes:

> This famine may fairly be called political because it was not the result of any overwhelming natural catastrophe or such a complete exhaustion of the country's resources in foreign and civilian wars as preceded and helped to cause the famine of 1921-1922 . . . The government was determined to teach the peasants a lesson by the grim method of starvation,

1. Chamberlin, W. H. *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 82.

to force them to work hard in collective farms.[2]

A contemporary German historian and authority on the Soviet Union, George von Rauch, states that the Famine of 1932–1933 was "Government-planned,"[3] and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn calls it ". . . a famine that came about without drought and without war."[4]

Dr. V. I. Hryshko, who personally experienced the Famine and has been a life-long student of it, writes in his book *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1932–1933* as follows:

> This was the first instance of peacetime genocide in history. It took the extraordinary form of an artificial famine deliberately created by the ruling powers. This savage combination of words for the designation of a crime—an artificial, deliberately planned famine—is still incredible to many people throughout the world, but indicates the uniqueness of the tragedy of 1933, which is unparallelled, for a time of peace, in the number of victims it claimed.[5]

A Concise Encyclopedia of Russia states that the Famine "was created artificially by the authorities as a means of breaking the resistance of the peasants to the collectivization of agriculture."[6]

In *The Golgotha of Ukraine*, a collection of eyewitness accounts of the Famine, compiled and edited by Dmytro Soloviy, it is stated that the Famine was "arranged purposely by the Kremlin regime to suppress the opposition of the freedom-loving Ukrainian peasants to collectivization."[7]

In *Special Report #4 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression* (U.S.A. House of Representatives), it is noted that when all the Communist Party methods of subjugating the farmers to Communist rule failed, "Stalin decided upon a still more drastic device—the

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

3. Rauch, George von, *A History of Soviet Russia*, p. 221.

4. Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., *The Gulag Archipelago*, p. 55.

5. Hryshko, Vasyl I., *The Ukrainian "Holocaust," 1933*, p. 11.

6. Utechin, S. V., *A Concise Encyclopedia of Russia*, p. 175.

7. Soloviy, Dmytro, *The Golgotha of Ukraine*, p. 3.

starvation of Ukrainian villages. This was carefully planned and worked out in the greatest details."[8]

Another document, *Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of the Non-Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R.*, includes a statement by the late F. M. Pigido, an economist, who lived and worked in Ukraine during the Famine of 1932–1933, and testified that

> Moscow employed the famine as a political weapon against the Ukrainians in the years of 1932–1933. This famine was in its entirety artificially induced and organized.

and that the Famine was actually the culminating point of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their existence as a nation.[9]

And finally "The Memorandum of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords," which was published by the dissident movement in Kiev, in December 1976, gives the following description of the Famine:

> In 1933, the Ukrainian nation, which for centuries had not known famine, lost over six million people, dead by starvation. This famine, which affected the entire nation, was artificially created by the Government. Wheat was confiscated to the last grain. Even ovens and toolsheds were destroyed in the search for grain. If we add the millions of "*kulaks*" who were deported with their families to Siberia, where they died, then we have a total of more than ten million Ukrainians who in the short span of some three years (1930–1933) were destroyed with premeditation.[10]

Indeed, had Moscow so desired, the Famine could have been easily averted. There was ample food in the country for everyone. The Soviet government was aware of the desperate state of the Ukrainian people in the spring of 1932 and in the winter of 1932–1933; it knew well that there was no food left in the villages of Ukraine. Yet Moscow categorically refused to offer any assistance and did not even attempt to organize any relief at the local level. On the contrary, the requisitioning of foodstuffs from the farmers went on relentlessly. The grain collection brigades and commissions, as well as a multitude of Party and government emissaries, continued to criss-cross Ukrainian villages in search of "hidden" agricultural products. Moreover, throughout the Famine, the Soviet government was exporting huge quantities of

8. *The Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine*, Special Report #4, p. 17.

9. *Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of the Non Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R.*, p. 35.

10. *The Ukrainian Movement for Human Rights and Justice*, p. 68.

foodstuffs from Ukraine and selling them abroad at low prices. Meanwhile, Ukrainian men, women and children were dying of starvation.

During the long and violent history of relations between Ukraine and Russia, nothing has provoked so much Ukrainian hatred of Russians as the Famine of 1932-1933. The inhumanity of expropriating food from people already starving cannot be justified, forgotten or forgiven.

The exact number of victims who died of starvation during the Famine of 1932-1933 will never be known, for no records of those who died were kept. Even if they had been kept, they could not have been accurate, for many victims died and were buried wherever they happened to be while searching for food. Some died in the fields, in forests, at riversides, in ditches along the roads, far away from their homes and alone. Others met their death on city streets and squares. Their bodies were transported and thrown into ravines or refuse dumps outside the cities, or were buried in common graves in the city cemeteries. Many victims of starvation collapsed around railroad stations, in empty freight cars and along railroad tracks. Even if accurate records of the dead did exist, they would not be available because details of the Famine are still one of the most strictly guarded state secrets of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, some reliable calculations of the number of people starved to death can be made on the basis of the normal rate of population growth during the pre-Famine years.

V. I. Hryshko maintains that according to the analysis of Soviet statistics of population growth, the casualties of the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine total 7.5 million.[11]

Juriy Lavrynenko came to the conclusion that "during the period of the Famine at least 6 million people died in Ukraine as a result of it, and about 80 percent of the Ukrainian intelligentsia . . . also perished,"[12]

F. M. Pigido testified that "as to the number of victims of the Famine in Ukraine, according to various computations, it is from six to seven million."[13] *Special Report #4*, contains the following statistical summary of the Famine:

> The most conservative estimate is that there were about 4,800,000 dead, although there are many recognized scholars who have placed the number at between 5 and 8 millions. In addition, there was the loss to

11. Hryshko, V. I., *op. cit.*, p. 11.

12. *Investigation of Communist Takeover . . ., op. cit.*, p. 116.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

> Ukraine of that part of the population which did succeed in getting out of the country and securing work in other sections of the Soviet Union.[14]

A plausible estimate of the number of famine victims in Ukraine was given by Petro Dolyna in his work *Famine as a Political Weapon* which was published as part of *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book.* His computation is based on the 2.36 percent population increase in Ukraine in 1924–1927. As of 17 December 1926, Ukraine had a population of 29,042,934. Taking the natural population increase to be 2.36 percent, the Ukrainian population should have been approximately 38,426,000 people by 1 January 1939. But, as the census taken on that day shows, the actual figure was only 30,960,221. Thus 7,765,000 people were missing.[15]

The English historian Bernard Pares, speaking about the victims of the Famine said:

> There are no sure estimates on the subject, and there was no Government admission and organized foreign help; but the loss of life is generally held to have been as much as five million.[16]

Von Rauch, the German historian, writing on the Famine, stated that "The number of victims of catastrophic famine is estimated at between ten and eleven million."[17]

Finally, V. P. Timoshenko, analyzing the Famine and its consequences, used the censuses of 1926 and 1939 to compute the number of famine victims. He discovered that, according to statistics of 1939, the population of the Soviet Union had increased between these two censuses by 15.9 percent. Moreover, the 1939 census indicates that the total number of Ukrainian nationals was 28,070,000 compared to 31,200,000 in 1926. Assuming that during 1926–1939 the national growth of the Ukrainian population was equal to the average growth of the total population in the U.S.S.R., a population of 36,200,000 Ukrainians should have been expected in 1939. It can be concluded, therefore, that 8,000,000 Ukrainians disappeared between the two censuses.[18]

Though the exact number of victims cannot be determined, the magnitude of Ukraine's losses in the Famine is obvious.

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14. *The Communist Takeover and Occupation . . ., op. cit.*, p. 20.

15. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book*, Vol. 2, p. 127.

16. Pares, Bernard, *Russia*, p. 103.

17. Rauch, George von, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

18. *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956*, p. 49.

II

Back to Serfdom

Now to the question of how the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine came about, and why those millions of innocent farmers had to die.

In order to understand the nature of and the reasons for the Famine, one must consider the three official policies adopted and pursued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union before and during it. First was the State Grain Collection. Second came the Policy of Compulsory Collectivization of Agriculture. Finally, Moscow began its offensive against the Ukrainian national movement. These policies were inseparable. They interacted like cogwheels in an intricate machine. The Policy of State Grain Collection gave rise to the collectivization of agriculture, which was meant to allow easy grain collection by the state. The *History of the CPSU* claims that the policy of total collectivization was decided by the Fifteenth Congress (December 1927), that this decision was preceded by a long period of careful preparation; and that collectivization had no purpose other than to liberate farmers from capitalism, to improve their living standards and to bring progress and prosperity to the countryside. But in fact, the policy of total and compulsory Collectivization was not a creation of the Fifteenth Congress: this policy came later, at the end of 1929, as all the Party resolutions and government decrees indicate. There actually was no preparation for its introduction at all: it came abruptly and unexpectedly, on Stalin's whim. It was brought about to hasten industrialization and to subordinate the farmers to the dictates of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The procurement of agricultural products had been a problem for the Communist government since its inception. At first, during the Civil War in 1918–1921 it had been done through requisition. In 1921, when NEP was introduced, taxes in kind were imposed. In 1923 the Communist government decided to go to the free market for food. But the free market, with its fluctuation of prices, could not satisfy the state's gargantuan appetite. Having adapted the policy of industrialization, the Communist Party made great demands upon agriculture, or, to be more precise, upon farmers. Agricultural products actually were the only solid basis for industrialization. The countryside was to supply the ever increasing industrial population and the army with foodstuffs.

There was a great need for more grain, more meat, more dairy products and more and more agricultural raw material, both for the needs of the country's population and for export. In fact, agricultural produce was the only commodity that the Soviet Union could trade on the foreign markets in order to acquire the foreign currency needed for development of industry.

But the procurement of agricultural products was not an easy task. Being the only grain purchaser, the government forced the farmers to sell their produce at the prices which it was willing to pay. These prices were shamefully low. For example, in 1927–1928, in the USSR as a whole, free market prices of grain stood 60 percent above the government prices, and a year later they increased to 100 percent, and even to 170 percent in Ukraine.[1]

Needless to say, this differential in prices, and also the fact that the government failed to supply farmers with manufactured goods, brought about embittered and often violent conflict between the government and the farmers. Stalin feared that the shortage of foodstuffs would prevent him from carrying out his ambitious industrialization program, and thus endanger his standing as undisputed Party leader, the position in which he was entrenching himself at that time. It became clear to him that as long as the farmers were economically independent they would be able to circumvent the government's demands. At the end of 1927, or in the first half of 1928, Stalin came to the conclusion that the farmers' independent economy was intolerable and had to go. Farmers had to be collectivized, and in place of an independent farmers' economy another system had to be established, a system in which the collective farmers would deliver all of their marketable grain to the state and cooperatives. Thus during this 1927–1928 growing season the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decided to crush the independent farmers by any means available.

At about this time, in 1928, an acute grain shortage actually did develop. The procurement of grain for the state on the free market was becoming costly and more difficult. On 21 July 1928, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decreed the introduction of a new system of foodstuffs procurement for the state, namely, contracting (*kontraktatsiia*) for farmers' sales in advance.[2] The contracting was to be done through village cooperatives, which were actually state commercial enterprises, and which now became official government grain collecting agencies. Farmers now had to legally bind themselves to deliver a given amount of their products, based on the size of the independent farm, or collective farm. The state in its turn was to pay

1. *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy*, p. 96.

2. *Istoriia Kolkhoznogo Prava*, Vol. 1, p. 142.

for these deliveries at fixed prices, which, as already mentioned, stood almost 100 percent below the free market prices of early 1929. It is no wonder that contracting failed for the same reason as the previous attempts did, namely, the economic independence of the farmers and their ability to avoid the government's monopolistic prices by refusing to deal with the government.

The harvest of 1929 came and passed, but grain procurement remained a nagging problem for the government. This was the year when the final version of the First Five Year Plan was adopted (April 1929), and the government badly needed foreign currency. The government had to do something to facilitate and to speed up grain procurement. On 21 July 1929, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree which allowed the grain procurement agencies (village cooperatives and village Soviets) to collect foodstuffs not only from farmers who were under contract, but also from those who were not. It ordered them "to start an aggressive campaign for collection of noncontracted grain."[3] In reality this was the reestablishment of the policy of compulsory requisition of agricultural products; the same policy which the Communists pursued during the Civil War in 1918–1921. It is important to note that it was during this time, in the summer and autumn of 1929, that special Bread Procurement Commissions (Brigades) were set up in all villages throughout Ukraine. Controlled by the Communist Party, these commissions and brigades were organized with the single purpose of securing the collection of grain quotas. Later, when total collectivization and the policy of "liquidation of the *kulaks* as a social class" was announced, these commissions and brigades became the major force in organizing collective farms and in expropriating *kulaks*. In fact, they became the arbitrary rulers of the countryside.

On 7 November 1929, Stalin published his article "Years of Great Change" in *Pravda*. He announced that a radical change had taken place in agriculture, which had evolved from primarily small, backward individual farming, to large scale, advanced, collective agriculture, and finally to cultivation of land in common. It was probably around this date that compulsory collectivization of farmers became an official policy. The decision to this effect was made at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 10–17 November 1929. The plenum adopted a resolution which made total and compulsory collectivization of agriculture an immediate, practical goal. The plenum called for extraordinary measure against the *kulaks*; it established an All-Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture; it resolved to mobilize at least 25,000 Party members, who eventually became known in the

3. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

villages as the "Twenty Five Thousanders" or simply "Thousanders," to be sent to villages as organizers of collective farms.

Finally, on 27 December 1929, at the First Conference of Marxist Agricultural Economists, Stalin announced the introduction of collective and state farms, the transformation of the countryside along a new socialist pattern, and the "liquidation of *kulaks* as a social class."

The trap had now snapped shut, and the farmers found themselves firmly bound to the collective farms, just as their grandfathers had been bound as serfs to the feudal estates less than seventy years before.

III

"A Terrible Struggle"

The introduction of collectivization in Ukraine was followed by a long and exhausting struggle between the forces of the Communist Party and its government on the one hand, and the farmers on the other. It was truly a struggle for life and death. The government's aim was to wear down, exhaust, and finally destroy the farmers as independent householders and free individuals. All of the government's forces and resources were mobilized with the single purpose of breaking the farmers' innate resistance to being herded into the collective farms.

The farmers themselves thought resistance was only a matter of endurance. They would just have to persevere against all odds in order to reserve their independence and freedom. They resisted collectivization efforts by flatly refusing to join the collective farms, by wrecking the machinery, by slaughtering their cattle and horses, by killing Communist officials and burning down collective farm buildings, and by fleeing from their villages to the cities in desperation . . .

On one occasion Winston S. Churchill asked Stalin whether the stresses of World War II had been as difficult for him personally as carrying through the policy of collectivization. Stalin answered that the latter was more difficult and called the collective farm policy a "terrible struggle" lasting four years and involving ten million men.[1]

Now let us comprehend the context of this statement. Stalin said this in August of 1942. At that time the Soviet Union was undergoing one of the most spectacular military disasters in history. The army had been routed. Millions of soldiers had already been killed or captured, and the most populated and important industrial and agricultural areas had been lost to the enemy. The city of Leningrad was besieged, its population dyng of starvation, and enemy troops stood less than fifty miles from Moscow. The entire country was on the verge of collapse. And yet, at this moment, Stalin says that carrying through the policy of collectivization was more of a struggle than waging World War II.

But what Stalin failed to tell the Prime Minister was the fact that the "terrible struggle" against "ten million small men" had taken place mainly in Ukraine; that the reason for that struggle was not merely the forcing of the farmers into collective farms, as is generally believed now, but was mainly an attempt at thwarting the Ukrainian people's aspirations toward independence. He concealed the fact that

1. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 489.

simultaneously with the introduction of collectivization policy, Moscow had initiated a full-scale campaign against anything that could identify Ukraine as a separate nation. And it is precisely to this aspect of the struggle that we must address ourselves in order to fully understand what transpired during those years, the most tragic in modern Ukrainian history.

Ukraine has always been, and still is, a source of grave anxiety to Russia. Although it had been under Russian occupation for a considerable time, it had been neither assimilated nor subdued. At the root of the hostilities between Ukrainians and Russians lies the question of nationality. In spite of the long years of Russian domination, and the corresponding attempts at Russification, the Ukrainians have refused to give up their language, literature, history, art, music or customs, and above all the notion of their national independence. There was especially clear evidence of this in the last decade and a half before the Famine of 1932–1933. At the time of Russia's October Revolution, the Ukrainians rebelled against Russian rule and declared their independence. But, as was to be expected, Russia could not tolerate the loss of such a rich country, and Ukraine was soon invaded and reoccupied. The Ukrainian revolution was thus put down with savagery, and Russia—this time Soviet Russia—once again established herself in Ukraine as a colonial ruler.

But the revival of Ukrainian national life could not be stopped. The process of Ukrainization, started during the short period of independence, was to continue. Ukrainian became the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Education, science, literature, and art acquired a national Ukrainian character in terms of both form and content.

The national revival went far beyond the sphere of culture. At this time the Ukrainians formed their own national church, independent of Russia's—the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. A new kind of national consciousness developed, and a highly patriotic intelligentsia began to take over the leadership of the economic, cultural, and political life of the country. Some politicians defended the rights of the Ukrainian people to practice their national way of life. Others openly opposed Russian Communist rule in Ukraine, and demanded Ukrainian independence. Certain men of letters advanced the concept of the essential incompatibility of Ukrainian and Russian culture, and proposed that Ukrainian intellectual and cultural life be based on European and Western, rather than Russian, models. A popular writer and sincere Communist, M. Khvylovyi, went so far as to call on Ukrainians to go "away from Moscow!" Khvylovyi was supported by many other prominent writers and critics, and also by O. Shumskyi, then Commissar for Education, who was later dismissed

from his post by Stalin and eventually liquidated.

Some economists also dared to argue openly that it was time to stop treating Ukraine as a colony; that Ukraine was not merely the southern part of the USSR—but a country in its own right, with a distinct people and historical roots reaching back thousands of years.

When the collection of foodstuffs for the state ran into trouble, and when the policy of collectivization met the violent resistance of the Ukrainian farmers, Moscow sensed the danger and became alarmed. The Ukrainian national movement has always been identified with Ukrainian farmers. In 1926 nearly 90% of Ukrainians lived in the countryside. The farmers' refusal to deliver their assigned foodstuff quotas to the state, and especially their violent opposition to collectivization, was looked upon as a nationalist rebellion. Ukrainian nationalism was now blamed for all difficulties which the Communists encountered in Ukrainian villages. Stalin stated this openly when, in his "Marxism and the National-Colonial Question" he wrote:

> Farmers present by themselves the basic force of the national movement . . . Without farmers there can be no strong national movement. This is what we mean when we say that the nationalist question is, actually, the farmers' question.[2]

Another time, speaking elsewhere about Ukrainization, Stalin accused the Ukrainian cultural movement of assuming the proportions of a general struggle against Moscow, against Russian culture, and against its highest achievement—Leninism.

> Yes, the danger in Ukraine is becoming more and more real. . . At a time when Western-European proletarians and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyi is unable to say anything but to call upon Ukrainian leaders to run away from Moscow as fast as possible.[3]

Thus Ukrainization became dangerous for the Russian Communist Empire, i.e., the Soviet Union, and as such it became outright treason. Moscow could not tolerate such dissent, and, not unexpectedly, struck Ukraine with all its might. It used the policy of collectivization and the state grain collection campaign as vehicles of war against the Ukrainian national movement, and the Famine was to be the weapon with which Moscow dealt its final blow.

2. Stalin, J. V., *Marksism i Natsional'no-Kolonial'nyi Vopros*, p. 152.

3. Stalin, J. V., *Sochinenia*, Vol. VIII, p. 152.

IV

The Administration that Paved the Way for the Famine of 1932–1933

To insure the fulfillment of state grain quotas, and to implement the policy of collectivization, the Communist Party sent multitudes of its faithful members to the countryside. In addition to the Thousanders (25,000 in all) who were ordered to the villages by the November (1929) Party plenum, hundreds of thousands of various Party and Government emissaries were sent to the countryside with the express purpose of overwhelming the independent farmer. They were to extract from him whatever foodstuffs he still had. They were to break his will and spirit, and, finally, herd him into a collective farm. In the years of 1928–1930 alone, at least a quarter of a million Party members were sent to the countryside. The majority of them were Russians.[1]

It must be emphasized, that the Party Central Committee sent no fewer than 30,000 city workers into Ukrainian villages in order to reinforce the membership of the Communist Party, which in the Ukrainian countryside totalled only about 40,000 members in the beginning of 1930. This was in addition to a contingent of Thousanders assigned earlier to expedite the policy of mass collectivization. The number of emissaries dispatched to Ukrainian villages to enforce collectivization equaled, if not exceeded, the total of native Communists in those villages.[2] Upon arrival in their assigned villages, the first move of the Party emissaries was to establish a new administration through which the Party would then be able to take complete control. By means of this administration the Party was able to detect and destroy any opposition to its policies, easily extort foodstuffs and rapidly collectivize the farmers. Initially, the new administrative system did not arouse any suspicion among the villagers because it appeared to be non-threatening and simple. The villages were to be divided into units and subunits. The larger villages would be divided into Hundreds, Tens and Fives. The smaller ones were only divided into Tens and Fives. Some other villages preserved their old subdivisions, the *kutky*—a number of houses clustered together and officially registered under a certain name.

1. *Voprosy Istorii*, 1949, #5, p. 17.

2. *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956*, p. 44.

Let us take a village with 800 households and 4,000 inhabitants and see what kind of administration it would have. It would be divided into 8 Hundreds, 80 Tens and 160 Fives, or a total of 248 units. Since each unit had an individual in charge assigned to it by the Village Soviet, this village would have 248 subdivisional functionaries or officials. In addition, a special Propagandist was assigned to each Hundred, and one Agitator to each Ten and to each Five, doubling the number of functionaries to 496. Also, a Bread Procurement Commission would be appointed to each Hundred. This Commission consisted of ten or more members, increasing the number of village subdivisional functionaries by 80 to 576. Finally, there were three permanent *vykonavtsi*, locally appointed militia deputies, for each Hundred, or 24 in all. The permanent *vykonavtsi*, who actually performed the function of local police, could make arrests without any legal formalities. This made 600 subdivisional functionaries. Thus, each unit of a hundred households was controlled by 75 persons. This number can be increased if the members of the Village Soviet and the collective farm officials are included.

The majority of the appointees to these subdivisional positions were selected from among the ordinary farmers and as such, they found themselves in a precarious situation. There was nothing they hated as much as collective farming, yet they became the instrument of its implementation. They were appointed to tasks much as soldiers are. Individuals with any function in such organizations and institutions were looked upon as officials, regardless of whether they were actually government employees. The title "official" meant a great deal, for it secured almost unlimited power for those who bore it. Anything with the slightest ring of officialdom to it was dreaded by the ordinary villager, until the attainment of such status gave this same person a tremendous advantage. According to the Communists, to be a Soviet official was an honor. Anyone who refused to accept the honor of an official appointment, or who opposed an official's activity, incurred a severe penalty as an "enemy of the people." Obviously, few dared to refuse an appointment or show opposition.

In order to be able to demand the fulfillment of obligations to the state, an official had to meet them himself and set an example. Failure to do so would lead to an accusation of disobedience to the Party and government. Since the task of these officials was collectivizing and gathering foodstuffs, they thus had to collectivize themselves and deliver their quotas.

Previously, there had been only one authority in the village—the Village General Meeting. At this meeting, the Village Soviet ("Council") was elected for a two-year term. The Soviet chose the Village Executive Committee with its chairman and clerk. Political

organizations such as the Communist Party and *Komsomol* did not yet play an important role within the village administrative system, for membership in these organizations was still a rarity in the Ukrainian countryside. This kind of village self-government was abolished by the Thousanders on their arrival in the villages to which they were assigned. Both the Village General Meeting and the Village Soviet lost their power to the Communist Party, the membership of which increased rapidly among the villagers. The Communist Party organization, replacing the Village Soviet in all its former functions, also became master of the village by dictating its will to the Village General Meeting, which lost its power and became merely the curtain from behind which the Communist Party pulled the strings. Only Party or Komsomol members or persons of unquestionable loyalty to the Party and the government could be elected or appointed to executive offices.

About the time of the Thousanders' arrival, two new institutions were introduced: the Special Section and the Workers-and-Farmers-Inspection.

The Special Section was a branch of the GPU, the political secret police. Officially, the Special Section was represented by only one man who occupied an office in the building of the Village Soviet and wore a full dress GPU uniform at all times. The recruiting that went on behind its doors, as well as the identity of secret agents, remained a mystery. It was generally believed, however, that one agent was planted in each Hundred to inform the GPU of the activities of each villager in that particular Hundred.

The Workers-and-Farmers-Inspection was a local branch of a Commissariat of the same name. Today it is known as the Commission of State Control. It was in charge of checking the practices of the Government agencies, and the loyalty and efficiency of officials. When total collectivization was decreed the Party and government charged the Commissariat with controlling the fulfillment of this policy.

The Workers-and-Farmers-Inspection was also represented in villages by one man. He was an outsider, of course. A commission of five local people would be appointed to assist him. He also maintained his own secret agents who spied on the local officials. Serving as the antenna of the government, this representative of the Workers-and-Farmers-Inspection checked, and thereby controlled, the functions of village government officials. When he found "discrepancies," he assumed the role of both arbiter and judge. His decisions were final and he was feared as much as any secret policy officer.

The local officials were supported by all the military and civilian forces of the state and, in effect, by the whole complex of institutions and organizations headed by the Communist Party. The *Komsomol*, the *Pioneers*, and the *Komnezam* were particularly active and effective forces

in the hands of the local Communists.

Komsomol is the abbreviation for the "Young Communist League," the training ground for future Party cadres, which is accorded second place in the Soviet political hierarchy. Controlled and directed by the Communists, these youths proved to be most vigorous and effective. Their responsibilities and positions were second only to those of the Communists themselves. They served as a source of trusted agents for the secret police. The leader of a village *Komsomol* organization was usually a party candidate sent to the village by the county (*raion*) center.

The *Pioneers* is a political organization of school children between the ages of eight and fourteen. Members of this children's organization served as both messengers and agents. They did not hesitate to inform on their own parents. Denunciation was considered a heroic, truly Communistic deed, and the Pioneers' best expression of Soviet patriotism.

Komnezam is the abbreviation for the "Committee of Poor Peasants." Created by the Communists during the Revolution, and revived in the late Twenties, this organization became one of the most powerful tools of collectivization.

V

Village Administration in Action

The monstrous machine of collectivization, composed of human parts, was set in motion. It ground, it pulled, it pushed, and it kicked. It was run by human beings, and it worked on human beings. It was merciless and insatiable. Once it was set in motion, it could not be stopped, and it consumed more and more victims. The Hundreds, Tens and Fives with their commissions, propagandists, agitators, executors, and many other functionaries; the *Komsomol*, *Pioneers*, and *Komnezam*; the governmental institutions: the Village General Meeting, the Village Soviet, and the Village Executive Committee—all these subdivisions, organizations, and governmental institutions and establishments, became cogwheels in this ugly machine, and the Party its skillful operator. It puffed and squeaked and screeched, but it moved on and on, leaving behind blood, misery and tears.

The officials never left the farmers alone. There was no end to meetings: there were General Meetings, Hundreds', Tens' and Fives' meetings. Meetings took place every day, even on Saturdays and Sundays. Meetings were held in the morning, at noon, and in the evening, continuing late into night. No one could ignore them, since doing so would result in being declared an enemy of the Communist regime. Thus the farmers were forced to listen to long harangues about the merits of collective farming and of delivering grain quotas to the state.

There was no end to officials' making visits to farmers. The Bread Procurement Commission would come almost every day. The Propagandists and Agitators talked incessantly about how wonderful life would be on a collective farm. The officials of Hundreds would stop at houses to remind the farmers that their Hundreds were lagging behind in delivery of grain quotas to the state. Then the officials of the Tens would come to plead with farmers to join the collective farm, for otherwise they, the officials, would be considered saboteurs. As soon as they left the house, the Fives' officials would arrive with the same plea, and with tears in their eyes. The farmer would be told again that if he did not join the collective farm, they, the officials, would be blamed and might be banished from the village forever.

A group of *Pioneers* would visit the farmers next. They too had been given the assignment of collectivizing a certain number of households. The *Pioneers* would be followed by a group of *Komsomol* members and the latter by the *Komnezam.* Sometimes a group of teachers would stop by at the farmers' houses, or groups of laborers from the neighboring cities would come, or even farmers from neighboring villages. The procession went on endlessly.

After these initial cajolings, brute force was applied. The first blow was Stalin's campaign to liquidate the *kulaks* in the first few months of 1930. A wave of unexpected arrests swept over the countryside. The *chekists* combed the villages, usually at night, forcing their victims into vans and disappearing with them before dawn. The most prominent villagers—school teachers (traditionally the most popular people in the village), village clerks, store owners, priests, lay church activists—were the first arrested. These people comprised the village intelligentsia. They distinguished themselves as community leaders and activists, as organizers of village cultural life, of theaters, folk choirs, educational establishments, such as *Prosvita* ("Enlightenment"), and sport clubs.

The villages were deprived of their leadership overnight. The farmers, many of whom were illiterate and ignorant, were left to fend for themselves.

The arrests were a prophylactic measure, preparation for an all out offensive against the *kulaks.* The regime wanted to rid the villages of potential leaders in case of farmers' uprising. All those people rounded up during the first assault on the farmers were liquidated. Not one of them ever returned home.

A week or two later, another wave of arrests swept across the same villages. This time the arrested were those who were labeled as *kulaks.* Since the *chekists* alone could not handle this, the entire new administration was mobilized for the job, and the thousanders and other emissaries were put in charge. It had been proclaimed that the *kulaks* must be destroyed as a class. No pity and no mercy were to be shown them. The *kulaks* were not to be regarded as human beings. The Party propagandists invented the most derogatory names for them, calling them vermin, hyenas, sharks, snakes and the like.

According to a decree, issued on 8 February 1929, the number of "the richest *kulak* households should not exceed 3 percent of the entire rural population."[1] Thus, if the number of independent farmers in Ukraine in 1928 was 5,200,000,[2] then 3 percent would make 156,000 independent farmers. If, on the average, an independent farmer's

1. *Istorila Kolkhoznogo Prava*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-128.

2. *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 13, p. 163.

household consisted of 5 members, then 780,000 persons in Ukraine were officially labeled *kulaks* and thus doomed to extermination in the first days of 1930. These were the most active and productive element of the farm population.

This was only the beginning of the liquidation of the *kulak* families. After being rounded up, they were driven to railroad stations where freight trains with empty boxcars were waiting for them. Men, women, children and infants; young and old, healthy and sick—all were indiscriminately loaded into cattle cars and sealed up. No heat or food was provided for them. All this was done under the close supervision of the GPU and militia guardsmen, as if those people were common criminals. Needless to say, countless people died of hunger, exposure and disease during the long journey, lasting for weeks, to the cold Russian north. Those who survived the transport were further decimated by the severity of the Arctic regions where they were usually left in the forest to fend for themselves. Only the sturdiest were able to start a new life there under the most primitive conditions.

Not all of the arrested and deported *kulaks* and their families were what could be called "well-to-do peasants." Here is what Roy Medvedev, a dissident historian, writes about those who were arrested during the campaign against *kulaks* at the beginning of 1930:

> Many low-middle peasants, poor peasants, and even some day laborers, who had never hired labor . . . were given the senseless label of "*subkulaks*" and were banished. In some districts up to 20 percent of the peasants were banished; for each *kulak* evicted, three or four middle or poor peasants had to be arrested.[3]

An offensive of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against the Ukrainian national movement was synchronized with the attack on the farmers.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was the first to go, being formally dissolved in January 1930. During the same year, all of the bishops of the Church, as well as most of the prominent priests and outstanding laymen were arrested and exiled or executed. About 90 percent of the church buildings were either destroyed or turned into warehouses, barns, clubs, dancing halls, museums and so forth.

> Altogether, according to Ukrainian Orthodox sources, the Bolsheviks killed two metropolitans, 26 archbishops and bishops, some 1,500 priests, 54 deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay members of the regional and parish councils, as well as an undetermined number of rank-and-file believers.[4]

3. Hryshko, V. I., *The Ukrainian "Holocaust," 1933, op. cit.*, p. 36.

Simultaneously with the campaign against the Church, a policy of an all-out Russification of Ukraine was renewed and intensified and the teaching of the Russian language was introduced in all schools throughout Ukraine. The entire propaganda machine was mobilized to glorify the Russian language as one superior to Ukrainian, as "Lenin's language, the language of advanced revolutionary proletarians." Only those who spoke Russian were assigned to leadership posts; high positions were closed to Ukrainians.

The most ruthless attack was directed against the intelligentsia. Beginning with 1930, a string of trials rigged by the secret police, was set up. These trials resulted in complete liquidation of the Ukrainian national leadership. First to be tried were the members of the so-called "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine." Forty-five of the most prominent Ukrainian cultural figures were accused of attempting to separate Ukraine from the Soviet Union. All of them were convicted and exiled to far away Arctic regions from which they never returned. After this trial was over a witch-hunt was directed against a great many other people active in local communal arrested and exiled.

Moreover, the Ukrainians were astonished to learn that many other "nationalist subversive organizations" had been "uncovered," and many more men and women were arrested under the pretext of belonging to organizations such as the Ukrainian National Center, the Ukrainian Military Organization, the Union of Ukrainian Youth, the Brotherhood for Ukrainian Statehood, and the like.

4. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, p. 171.

VI

Battle for the Ukrainian Crop of 1932

Nineteen thirty-two witnessed the last battle of the war against the farmers. The government used every possible method of extracting as much agricultural produce from the countryside as it could, without any regard to consequences. The farmers, already on the verge of starvation, desperately tried to keep what food they had left, and in spite of governmental efforts to the contrary, stay alive.

The long, cold winter of 1931–1932 slowly gave way to spring. By April the snow had already melted, and the weather became damp and drizzly, with a heavy fog frequently descending upon the villages. Intermittently cold winds chased away the fog and brought cold, torrential rains in its place.

Around this time the plight of the villages became desperate. This was the spring of 1932—the spring of haunting memory, when the Famine broke out and claimed its first casualties. An endless procession of beggars wandered the roads and paths, going from house to house. In various stages of starvation, dirty and in rags, they humbly begged for food, any food—a potato, a sliver of beet, or a kernel of corn. They were the first victims of starvation.

Some of the starving still tried to earn their food by doing chores in or outside the villages. Sullen, emaciated men walked from house to house with an ax, or a shovel, in search of work, hoping that someone would hire them to dig up a garden, or chop some firewood in exchange for a couple of potatoes. But they had no luck.

Crowds of destitute women and children could be seen all over the potato fields, looking for any potatoes left over from the preceding year's crop. Others roamed the forests in search of something edible. The riverbanks, surrounded by new greenery—young shoots of reed and other plants, were also crowded with people who would also try to catch something in the water.

But the majority of those seeking help went into the cities, much as they had done before. It had never been difficult to find work such as gardening, cleaning backyards, or sweeping the streets. Now, however, hiring farmers for any work whatsoever in the cities was officially prohibited throughout Ukraine.

There were some villagers who saw their salvation in the cities' marketplaces, where they tried to sell their best clothes, from pre-revolutionary times, as well as family heirlooms, handicrafts, women's jewelry, homemade shirts, towels, and tablecloths embroidered with traditional Ukrainian designs, handwoven rugs, and so forth. They sold these treasures for next to nothing, or traded them in for something edible. But many of the hungry villagers did not go to the marketplaces with the intention of selling or bartering—they had nothing to sell, and no money to buy anything. These public places were their last hope of finding some scraps of food, and they became almost permanent residents there. With outstretched hands and tears in their eyes they wandered in the midst of the market crowds, begging passers-by not to let them die.

At night they slept right in the marketplaces, under tables and benches, in the bushes or in corners of neighboring backyards. Some of them would be mugged, or even murdered during the night; others were picked up by militiamen on night duty, taken out of the city limits and dumped out somewhere to fend for themselves, with strict orders not to return. Yet many of them would return, in spite of everything, while others would go back to their villages in dejection, having resigned themselves to death. Some were in such a weakened state that they died wherever the militia had abandoned them.

Still other villagers tried to survive by descending upon the railroad stations and tracks. Those who had something of value to sell came with their valuables in hopes of finding buyers among the travelers and passengers. Others came empty-handed, simply to beg for a piece of bread. A few brave souls came to the stations with the intent of traveling to some distant cities, usually to Russia, where there was no famine. Such an undertaking was a very risky and difficult one, however, for train tickets were sold only to those who had written permission from collective farms. The GPU-men and the militia were constantly checking the travelers' documents making it difficult to elude them and travel illegally. Even those returning from Russia to Ukraine with legal travel documents were carefully searched. Any food found among their belongings was confiscated.

By this time deprivation had spread to all the villages in Ukraine. Death from starvation had become a daily occurrence. Everywhere, on roads and paths, in gardens and in fields, one would encounter dead human bodies, left unburied for days like those of stray animals.

Burials were constantly occurring in the village cemeteries. One would see strange funeral processions: children pulling homemade handwagons with the dead bodies of their parents in them, or the reverse, parents carting the bodies of their children. There were no coffins, for the villagers had no boards, no nails, and certainly not the

strength to build anything. The bodies of the starved were simply deposited in large common graves, one on top of another. These common graves would serve as the best proof of the veracity of this document.

Starvation notwithstanding, the state grain collection campaign continued in full force. Toward the end of May 1932, the Party mobilized and sent an additional 112,000 Thousanders to the villages. This latest group of Thousanders was instantly given the nickname "Morticians," or "Comrade Morticians." A better nickname could not have been invented, for the villages were full of starving farmers—some already dead, others about to die. The specter of death was obvious to anyone entering the villages. Yet the Thousanders, and a multitude of various Party and Government representatives, continued their search for "hidden grain," house after house, unabatedly, in spite of the countless victims of starvation which they could see with their own eyes. In their pursuit of the fulfillment of grain delivery quotas they stopped at nothing. They resorted to physical violence, imprisonment, eviction, banishment to concentration camps, and so on. They would break into homes and search everywhere, in trunks, ovens, stoves, and chimneys. Even little sacks of seeds that the women had carefully preserved for their spring sowing were taken away. Often during their search, in place of grain the Thousanders would find only the bodies of starved farmers and their families.

There are two Soviet documents which help to estimate, at least tentatively, how many people died in 1932 in Ukraine. The first is a book by M. Grin and Kaufman, *Ekonomicheskaia geografia SSSR po oblastiam i respublikam* (Moscow, 1933), in which the population of Ukraine as of 1 January 1932 was given as 32,548,000. The second one is "*SSSR—Strana Sotsialisma*" (Moscow, 1936), in which the population of Ukraine as of 1 January 1933 was fixed at 31,902,000 people. Taking the difference between the data given for 1 January 1932 and 1 January 1933, 646,000, and adding the normal population increase of 858,000, a total of 1,504,600 persons who disappeared in 1932 can be calculated.

June 1932 brought some relief, and deaths from starvation became less frequent. Early fruits and berries began to ripen, and many kinds of vegetables were ready for consumption. Those who could not plant their gardens for lack of seeds simply helped themselves now by stealing from others, including from collective farms, whatever and whenever they could. At nightfall the collective farm vegetable fields would be swarming with villagers, ravenous with hunger, who grabbed everything they could find in the darkness, digging up potatoes, pulling out young cabbages and root vegetables. Though unripe, the milky grain of new wheat helped satisfy the hunger of the starving

farmers.

But farms soon proved to be an unreliable source of food, because the "Morticians" eventually put an end to it. They organized brigades of "Communist Vigilantes," and entrusted them with guarding the collective farm fields. Armed with shotguns, the vigilantes watched the fields day and night from tall watchtowers erected for this purpose. Moreover, the collective farmers working in the fields were bodily searched at the end of each working day as well. The officials were afraid that they might succeed in hiding some vegetables or wheat under their clothing.

To safeguard the crop of 1932 the government passed several drastic laws. The cruelest of these laws was passed on 7 August 1932, and made all collective farm properties "socialist property." The punishment prescribed by this law for stealing "socialist property" was execution by firing squad and confiscation of all possessions. To glean the already harvested fields, to fish in the rivers, to pick up a fallen dry twig in the forest, or even to collect dry weeds along the roads for fuel was an unpardonable crime equal to state treason. There was not anything that was not considered "socialist property." One could forfeit one's life by picking up a single potato or ear of wheat in the field.

The last group of Thousanders, the Morticians, were sent to the villages with explicit orders to prepare and conduct the harvest of the new crop and to secure its swift and smooth requisitioning and delivery to the state. Sometime in the middle of July villagers throughout Ukraine witnessed the arrival in their villages of units of soldiers and teams of students and industrial laborers, all sent there to "help" the collective farmers with their harvest. On the appointed day, all the newcomers, and those villagers still able to stand on their feet left the villages for the fields, following the military trucks with red banners and communist slogans. But the 1932 harvest, which began with such fanfare and parades in the Ukrainian villages, proved to be a bitter one for the farmers. All the crop harvested was taken straight from the threshing machines to collection points, usually at the railroad stations. The state delivery quota had first priority, and no one even dared mention the needs of the farmers. From the very start of the harvest to the end, not a single pound of wheat was distributed to the villagers.

By the end of August, the state grain collection campaign was reopened with even greater intensity and vigor. The farmers were constantly reminded that their villages were lagging behind in the fulfillment of grain delivery quotas. Endlessly long meetings were conducted daily, during which the farmers had to listen to political harangues about the virtues of delivering foodstuffs to the state. All of this was beyond the farmers' comprehension. In fact, it would have been ridiculous were it not so serious. The farmers had been members

of collective farms for more than two years now, and they no longer had any land of their own. Since the start of collectivization, the State Bread Procurement Commission had criss-crossed the villages several times, taking all the grain reserves the farmers still had. Now, in August 1932, the villagers' subsistence depended entirely on vegetables, fruits, and the bread rations they were receiving while working on the collective farms. Nevertheless, the Communist officials continued to search the farmers' premises, taking away every single kernel of grain they could discover.

Finally, sometime during September, the collective farmers received their advance payment in kind, a meager ration of an average of half a pound of grain per labor day. It must be noted here that the livelihood of the rural population in Ukaine depended almost exclusively on bread, for the villagers were completely deprived of any other food such as meat, eggs, fat, and dairy products. There were no groceries, bakeries or any other food stores in the villages. Moreover, it was officially prohibited to sell or to buy food in the villages in any way. To compound the farmers' hardship, the Government passed a law, according to which the farmers who had not met the grain delivery quotas were prohibited from buying goods of general consumption such as salt, kerosene, soap, matches, and other items in the stores.

VII

Ordeal by Hunger

The meager allotment of food received from the collective farms as advance payment in kind was soon consumed and starvation again set in. Before 1932 the farmers actually lived off their private gardens. Even in the winter of 1930–1931, when there was a great shortage of bread, they managed to survive because they had their own vegetables and fruit. But the year of 1932 was different. During the massive famine in the spring most of the people consumed even the seeds usually reserved for planting. Now they were left with no seeds, and the gardens remained unplanted, overgrown with weeds.

As a result, by the end of November the villagers began to experience horrors incomparably greater than those of the spring famine. In the spring they could at least hope for a new crop of vegetables and fruits. But now, as winter approached, the situation was different because the villagers were totally deprived of their resources. The dried and preserved wild berries, edible roots, cabbages and pumpkins, beets and fruit had already been consumed. They had no more food, and no hope of receiving any, either. Now they faced a severe winter, with freezing temperatures and great snowstorms which would last until the end of March or longer, more than four long months. And they would have to wait more than seven months for the next harvest.

Just as during the famine of the spring, multitudes of beggars again roamed the villages, pleading for food. Once again one could see the famished, dressed in rags and tatters, all over gardens, orchards, and forests, searching for something edible. Again they went to neighboring towns, to the railroad stations and tracks, in hopes of getting some scraps of food from the passers-by, or from passengers. Those villagers who could again tried to go farther away, mainly to Russia, in search of food. But as their exodus increased, so did the government's determination to keep them confined to their villages. It was strictly forbidden for the farmers to appear in any city or town, or even in any village other than their own, without a proper certificate from their collective farms. Travel to any part of the Soviet Union was also strictly forbidden. In order to prevent the starving farmers from leaving their villages, the government introduced a single-passport system for the entire country at the end of December, 1932. A person without this

passport was not permitted to live in any city or town, or be employed and receive food rations there. Only the farmers did not receive such passports.

In early 1933 the cold was severe. Snow piled up many feet high on the network of paths and roads in and around the villages, shutting them off from the rest of the world even more than the government's restrictions. The farmers' initial bewilderment and helplessness gave way to panic. Desperate attempts by individuals to find salvation outside the villages continued, but without much success. The roads to towns and cities, and to distant parts of the country were tightly closed to them. The militia and GPU-men checked every farmer on trains and on city streets demanding to see their passports and questioning them about their destination.

For the majority of the farmers who were less daring there was nothing left now but to recognize the hopelessness of their situation in the face of such great obstacles. They gave up entirely, and stayed in their villages. Gradually weakened by lack of food, freezing for lack of fuel, they took to their beds and sank deeper and deeper into resignation, mental apathy and stupor. Some were convinced that starvation was a well-deserved punishment from God for their support of the Communists during the Revolution.

Nor was there any hope for outside help. The starvation of the Ukrainian people did not disturb Moscow in the least. The Soviet regime was only worried by the ever decreasing delivery of grain from Ukraine. An article in *Pravda*'s issue of 7 January 1933 accused the Ukrainian Communist Party and government of permitting "class enemies" to sabotage the grain collection. This was an unmistakable sign of changes to come. A decree of 19 January 1933, issued jointly by the Party and government, abolished the system of contracting for foodstuffs and introduced taxes in kind in its place.[1] It must be noted that the Party and government were dealing with *collective* farms this time, not with independent farmers, as before. In other words, the collection of grain did not present any difficulties now: it was simply a matter of taking the grain directly from the threshing machines and transporting it straight to the collection points, as had already been done during the harvest of 1932. This law was only "legalizing" the expropriation of grain from the collective farmers, giving the various collecting agencies—the cooperatives and the Village Soviets with their commissions and brigades—the right to make use of all available government law enforcement agencies in requisitioning the new crops from the collective farms and their members.

1. *Istoriia Kolkhoznogo Prava*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 19.

A week later, on 24 January 1933, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union established Political Departments (*politotdely*) in the MTS (Machine-Tractor Station) and ordered the Party's organizations to commandeer an additional 15,000 Thousanders to the countryside. The major purpose of setting up the *politotdely* was to strengthen the collective farms. Their first task was to enforce the grain delivery quotas, the taxes in kind, regardless of whether the crop had been satisfactory or not. This new enforced grain collecting contributed greatly to the horrible Famine of 1932–1933. According to official statistics, the crop yield, though not large, was sufficient to feed the population of Ukraine, had it not been for the excessive grain delivery quotas.

At the January plenum of the Central Committee the Ukrainian Communist Party was accused of failure to carry out its obligations in meeting the grain procurement plan. This allowed P. Postyshev, appointed by the same plenum as Moscow's "Viceroy" in Ukraine, to start a purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Almost all the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine were liquidated. A great number of rank-and-file Ukrainian Communists, especially those who did not hide their national identity, were expelled from the Party and either executed or banished. Postyshev admitted that he purged one-fourth of the members and candidates of the Ukrainian Communist Party as a hostile class element, by which he meant people with nationalist sentiments. He purged hundreds of secretaries of district Party committees, and hundreds of chairmen of district executive committees. This constituted a complete and total liquidation of the Ukrainian national element in the Communist leadership. After this purge, the Communist Party of Ukraine became an obedient tool in the hands of Postyshev, the Russian Communist dictator of Ukraine, who was now able to enforce any edict of Stalin, even if it resulted in the death of millions of Ukrainians.

The purges were not limited to the Party. Almost all those who were in any way rightly or wrongly identified with the national movement for freedom and independence were hunted down and eliminated. Some committed suicide, out of despair, or in protest, as did M. Khvylovyi, on 3 May 1933, and M. Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, who ended his life on 6 July 1933.

Of the approximately 240 writers and poets active in Ukraine, about 200 were liquidated. The same fate met prominent Ukrainian philologists, three-quarters of whom were murdered.[2] The number of Ukrainians eliminated by the regime increases to incredible proportions when one considers that the middle and low echelons of the

2. *Communist Takeover and Occupation....* p.19.

intelligentsia, including white-collar workers, teachers, agriculturists, engineers, were also purged.

Toward the end of March 1933, famine struck the villagers with full force. Life for them had sunk to an almost animal-like struggle for survival. The villages ceased to exist as coherent communities. Those inhabitants who managed to stay alive shut themselves in within the walls of their dwellings. There was little, if any, communication, even between immediate neighbors, who ceased to care about one another. Friends, and even relatives became strangers. Mothers abandoned their children, and brothers left their brothers.

Then came the late, cold spring of 1933. The snow melted slowly. Ice cold winds blew continually, often bringing heavy clouds, snow and rain, causing the villages to sink deeply in mud and slush, which would then freeze into dirty knobs.

Starvation reached a point at which death was desirable. Many houses were standing with no signs of life, the dead or dying still inside them. As the snow melted away, human corpses were exposed everywhere: in backyards, on the roads, in fields—wherever death had caught up with them. As the weather got warmer, the bodies started to thaw and decay.

Special Burial Brigades were set up in the villages for the purpose of collecting and burying the corpses of the starved farmers and their families. Horse-drawn carts went through the villages, stopping at each house to collect dead bodies, much the way garbage collectors collect garbage in the cities.

"Any dead?" the cart driver would shout as he approached a house.

Someone would appear at the window and shake his head. No, no dead ones in this house.

The cart moved on to another house.

"Any dead?"

Silence. There was no need to repeat the question. The driver broke into the house and started dragging the corpses out: one, two, sometimes an entire family.

The physical condition of those still alive was indescribable. They were unkempt and haggard, and so weak that they could hardly drag their feet. Many of them sat or lay silently, too feeble even to talk. They could only whisper if they wanted to say something. The bodies of some were reduced to skeletons, with grayish-yellow, sagging skin. Their faces looked like rubber masks: large, bulging, immobile eyes sunk deep back into the skull. Their necks seemed to have shrunk into their shoulders. The look of their eyes was glassy, a sign of approaching death. The bodies of others were swollen, yet another mark of the final stages of starvation. Their swollen faces, arms, legs and stomachs

resembled the surfaces of rubber balloons. The swollen tissues would soon begin to crack and burst, followed by a rapid deterioration of the body.

The thaw brought with it a new wave of beggars. Old and young, mostly women and children, slowly moved from house to house, dragging their rag-covered feet. With protruding, frightened eyes and outstretched hands, they would approach people, but now they did not plead—they were voiceless, so they just cried. Their heavy tears were often mixed with fluid slowly oozing out of cracks in their swollen faces. They would beg for a potato peel, or for a single kernel of corn.

The plight of the children was the most heart-rending of all. Not many survived the winter. Those who had were reduced to mere skeletons, too weak to cry. No words can describe their suffering. Their heads resembled inflated balloons, and their arms and legs were like sticks protruding from their bodies. Their stomachs were bloated out of proportion, and water flowed uninterruptedly from their genitals. Their faces were prematurely aged and twisted, and they looked like old people: wrinkled, listless and very, very sad. No longer able to cry, they were in that constant stupor that is peculiar to those dying from hunger.

In the midst of all this suffering the Thousanders, along with their Bread Procurement Commissions, continued their activities, demanding the delivery of grain quotas and searching for "hidden" foodstuffs—disregarding the mass starvation evident all around them.

After visiting Ukraine in the spring of 1933, the Englishman Malcolm Muggeridge, wrote that he saw something of the battle going on between the government and the farmers:

> On the one side, millions of starving peasants, their bodies often swollen from lack of food; on the other, soldiers, members of the GPU carrying out the instructions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they had shot or exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they hd reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert.[3]

By the end of July 1933, the villages of Ukraine had become desolate places, deathly quiet and silent, as if the Black Death had passed through them. No sound of human voices could be heard—no talking, no laughter, not even crying. The boisterous voices of children were stilled. Dogs and cats had been killed and eaten.

3. Malcolm Muggeridge, "War on the Peasants," *The Fortnight Review*, London, 1 May 1933.

By this time the starvation had abated somewhat. There were plenty of new vegetables and fruits everywhere. In order to save the grain crops, the authorities needed farm workers, and they had no choice but to supply collective farm members with sufficient food rations to sustain their existence.

It was a beautiful July, warm and sunny, with flowers in full bloom and a bumper crop of grain, fruits and vegetables. But the abundance and fragrance of nature could not be fully appreciated. The empty farmhouses amid their ruined surroundings, and the unbearable stench of the unburied bodies of people deliberately starved to death, would not allow the horror the farmers had gone through to be forgotten.

GLOSSARY

Chekist was a member of the original Soviet secret police, *Cheka*, which is an abbreviation for Extraordinary Commission, or more precisely, All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (1917–1922). It was succeeded by the GPU. The old title, *Chekist*, is still being used, and even today's members of the KGB are often referred to as *Chekists*. Communist propaganda eulogizes them as national heros.

Commissariat was the name given to central government departments from 1917–1946. In 1946, these "People's Commissariats" were renamed ministries.

GPU is the abbreviation for *Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie*, or State Political Administration. It is the name of the Soviet secret police which took the place of the *Cheka* in February 1922. In 1923, the GPU was renamed OGPU, which meant United State Political Administration. But the acronym GPU continued to be used popularly even after 1923. OGPU remained a separate institution until 1934 when it was absorbed into the NKVD, The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. After several reorganizations and name changes, in March 1954 the secret police or state security agency emerged as the KGB, which is an acronym for *Komitet Gosudarstvenno Bezopasnosti*, the Committee for State Security.

Komnezam is the abbreviation for the Ukrainian *Komitet Nezamozhnykh Selian* which means Committee of Poor Farmers. Such committees were first set up in Russia in the summer of 1918 by the local Party organizations from agricultural laborers and poor farmers, were soon extended to Ukraine, and were known by the Russian acronym *Kombedy*. In Russia the *Kombedy* were soon dissolved (in November of 1918, by the decision of the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 6–9 November 1918), but in Ukraine, these *Committees of Poor Farmers* renamed *komnezany* lasted until 1933 and became the most effective instruments of the aggressive Communist policy in the Ukrainian countryside, where the *Komnezam* was an important feature of every Ukrainian village. Its purpose was twofold: to introduce the Revolution into the village, and to assist in the enforcement of food deliveries to the state. In

Ukraine, the Communists also used these Committees as instruments in the collectivization of agriculture.

Komsomol is the Russian acronym for Communist Youth or Young Communist League, established in 1918. Young people between fourteen and twenty-six years of age may be members of this organization. The *Komsomol* played a decisive role in carrying out collectivization.

The Russian word *kulak*, Ukrainian *kurkul*, originally meant village usurer. Any farmer who employed hired labor, possessed heavy machinery, hired out such machinery, contracted to work on other farms, or leased land for commercial purposes, etc., was later branded as *kulak* (*kurkul*). This definition found ready recognition in the West, and consequently it is customary here to believe that *kulak* means a rich or well-to-do farmer. Such a translation or interpretation of this epithet can be wrong and misleading because the Communists applied this label indiscriminately to all farmers, even to genuine paupers. During collectivization the label *kulak* was widely used, and it became an epithet of abuse for all those farmers who refused to join the collective farm. The policy of "liquidation of *kulaks* as a social class," introduced by the Communist Party in 1929, resulted in the disapperance of millions of farmers labeled as *kulaks*. Many of them were simply murdered; others were starved to death during the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine; and still others were deported to the "corrective labor camps" or to the concentration camps. The label *kulak* was attached to anyone, even to nonfarmers who showed the slightest sign of disagreement with or opposition to the Communist agricultural policy during that time. The possession of a one-room house, a cow and a few chickens, or the possession of a house with a tin roof or board floor was enough for a person to be labeled a *kulak*.

MTS is the abbreviation for Machine and Tractor Stations, a state enterprise which, until 1958, supplied all machine works for collective farms and received payments in kind for their services. Since January 1933, when the political sections were established, the MTS became the main force behind the expropriation of agricultural products from farmers.

Soviet is a Russian word, and it means council and/or assembly. It denotes the organ of government, central and local. There is a Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and Supreme Soviets in each constituent republic. There are also regional and local soviets.

Ukrainian National Republic. On 27 March 1917, during the Russian Revolution, the Ukrainians established the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) which declared the autonomy of Ukraine on 23 June 1917, and established the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on 20 November 1917. On 22 January 1918, the Ukrainian National Republic was declared an independent and sovereign state. Moscow could not tolerate the loss of Ukraine, a country rich in natural resources, and soon Ukraine was invaded by the Soviet Russian armed forced. For almost four years, from March 1917 until the autumn of 1920, the Ukrainian people fought to preserve their freedom and independence. But Ukraine lost the unequal struggle and was conquered. Ukraine was proclaimed the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" and a Bolshevik regime established.

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The CHAIRMAN. I would like both of you to comment on the funding and on the comments of the administration as to the so-called topheavy nature of it and whether a Commission of that size is necessary. We are all interested in not spending money that does not need to be spent. Is there any other way that you can think of, say universities or foundations, from which partial funding could be obtained to reduce the cost to the Federal Government?

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. First I would like to comment on the question of the topheavy Commission. The number of public members of the Commission could be reduced.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a part of the administration's recommendation.

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. As I understand the bill, the commissioners' job would also be to get testimonies from the eyewitnesses. There is a problem of logistics of getting some of the witnesses to Washington. My interpretation of the bill is that some of the commissioners living in locations like Chicago or Los Angeles could conduct hearings of testimonies of eyewitnesses living in that area. This would solve the problem of logistics that might develop.

The second question, as a matter of fact, was answered already by many Congressmen and Senators. An impartial study should be conducted and funded by the U.S. Government since the private groups' study conducted by Ukrainian-Americans would not have the same credibility as the congressional study. Since the Ukrainians are the people who suffered, their study might be considered biased.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to take the same question, Dr. Kuropas?

Mr. KUROPAS. Senator, I think when we were talking about a GS-18 salary that was a part-time salary. Obviously not all of the members of the Commission would be full time. It would only be for those times when they did conduct the hearing and certainly not all of them would be at the hearing at the same time. So when we are talking about GS-18 salaries, we are talking about a day or two for two or three people at that salary.

Second, I think Senator Bradley has responded very well to that particular question in stating that the financing is still open to negotiation. I think that is the consensus among most Ukrainian-Americans. Our major concern is that a Commission be formed and that seed money, if you will, be provided so that we will have an opportunity to have a dispassionate and unbiased investigation with all of the prestige that a U.S. Commission could bring to that investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Would both of you comment also on what the creation of this Commission would actually mean to the Ukrainian-American community and what it would mean also to Ukrainians still living in their homeland under Soviet rule?

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. I answered this question partially in my statement. The Soviet Union attempts to indoctrinate its own people at a very early age with erroneous historical information. With the prevailing fear and oppression in the Soviet Union, news is not disseminated very readily. I learned from many eyewitnesses that survivors of this famine rarely talked to their children about it be-

cause of fear of disseminating information which could be considered "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and would result in long incarceration in accordance with the Soviet criminal code.

For the people of Ukraine, and especially the younger generation, it could be the first time that they are informed via Voice of America and Radio Liberty what happened in their homeland 50 years ago.

As I pinpointed in my testimony, practically every American family of Ukrainian descent was affected by this famine. Many of their loved ones perished in this horrible manmade famine. I just cannot imagine that the Ukrainian Americans would want us to forget, would want the world to forget about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. KUROPAS. Senator, I think the formation of such a Commission would have a tremendous impact on the people in the Soviet Ukraine. You, as a very strong supporter of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe over the years, know what impact those particular programs have had on the people behind the Iron Curtain.

Just the announcement of a Commission of this type over Voice of America and Radio Free Europe would have a significant impact because it would reinforce in the minds of the people living under Soviet totalitarianism the idea that they are not forgotten, that the crimes of the leaders of the Soviet Union have not been forgotten and that the free world is aware of their plight.

For the Ukrainian-American community such a Commission would reinforce their belief and faith in the United States, and of their belief and faith that the truth, no matter how long it takes, will always come out. Fifty years have passed. For 50 years the Ukrainian Americans in the United States have tried to make their fellow Americans aware of this. For 50 years they have not succeeded.

If this is done now this will be a tremendously heartening experience for them and will demonstrate to everyone that the United States is indeed the beacon of truth in the world today.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. I think that helps us a great deal, and also the comments that you made on the flexibility of working out something so that we can get started.

We will do the very best we can. We thank you very much for your very informative and helpful testimony. I hope that this is the beginning of the process of recognizing that we are not going to forget what did happen. We are never going to let anything like that happen again. The best way to prevent it is to show what could happen and what did happen.

It is just unimaginable to think how a people could calculate and cause the death of 7 million of their own people, a country that itself lost 20 million of its own people during the World War. There were 20 million killed in that tragedy, but here you had 7 million who were killed in a much more cruel way, it seems, under Stalin. People were just weakened so that they literally did not have any resistance and gradually died off.

That is one of the worst tragedies that has happened in the world. I thank you for putting it on this record so that we will not simply forget it.

Mr. KUROPAS. Senator, thank you very much for this hearing and thank you very much for all of the support you have given the Ukrainian American community over the years.

Mr. OLSHANIWSKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank the Committee for giving me this opportunity to express my support for S. 2456, a bill to establish the Commission on the Ukraine Famine.

In 1929 Josef Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party embarked on a brutal agricultural "collectivization" campaign. Its objective was to feed rapid industrialization by bleeding the farm sector of the economy. Throughout the country the regime forcibly seized crops and crushed any resistance. Ukrainian opposition, fueled by traditions of fierce nationalism and independent land ownership, proved particularly intense.

The Soviet government responded to Ukrainian resistance by imposing even harsher repressive measures. In 1932, while crop production dropped 12 percent below average, state food procurements increased 44 percent. The Kremlin sent thousands of agents to confiscate grain and execute peasants who attempted to keep some food for themselves. Soviet border guards turned back Ukrainians who tried to escape the starvation, pneumonia, typhus, and tuberculosis. In the Ukraine, Stalin went beyond his coercive agricultural policy to a policy of extermination in an effort to wipe out all vestiges of nationalism and resistance.

These policies, of course, resulted in widespread death. Estimates of the holocaust range from 4.5 to 10 million. Most of those who perished died a tortuous, agonizing death by starvation. British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge reported from the scene, "If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert; fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched. . . . They will tell you that many have already died of famine and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the government and hundreds of thousands exiled."

The Soviets attempted to murder a nation.

Mr. Chairman, the study commission proposed by this legislation will perform the extremely valuable service of informing the world about the genocide of the Ukrainian people. While the Soviet government was committing this atrocity, it staged a cover-up by barring reporters from the region. Even today the Soviets deny the famine occurred. I urge the adoption of S. 2456 to bring to light the Soviets' criminal behavior and the needless suffering of millions of Ukrainians.

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