

# WESTERN UKRAINE

AT THE  
TURNING POINT OF EUROPE'S HISTORY



by  
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# **WESTERN UKRAINE**

**AT THE TURNING POINT OF EUROPE'S HISTORY  
1918–1923**

Vol. I

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# **RULES ON THE TRANSLITERATION OF THE NON-ENGLISH PERSONAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL NAMES**

(Adopted by Shevchenko Scientific Society)

1. All topographical names in languages which use Latin alphabet, adjusted to some peculiar sounds unusual in English, are here used in the original spelling of the languages concerned (French, German, Czech, Slovak, Polish, etc.). An exception to this rule occurs only when some geographical names of these languages are for centuries fully anglicized, e. g. Warsaw (not Polish *Warszawa*), Moscow (not Russian *Moskva*), Rome (not Italian *Roma*) etc.

2. The same rule is used in the transliteration of personal names in the languages with Latin alphabet (French, German, Polish, Czech, Slovak, etc.).

3. Ukrainians use in their language s. c. *Cyrillic alphabet*. (It is really Greek alphabet adjusted to some peculiar sounds of the Ukrainian language). Therefore the Ukrainian personal and topographical names must be transliterated in English alphabet on the basis of the following principles:

A letter in Ukrainian names is always to be pronounced like in English:

|                                  |            |                                 |
|----------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>a</b> (Rada)                  | in English | <b>a</b> in father              |
| <b>e</b> (Verkhovyna)            |            | <b>e</b> in led, red, bed, met  |
| <b>i</b> (Ihor)                  |            | <b>ee</b> in to meet, to see    |
| <b>u</b> (Buh)                   |            | <b>oo</b> in food, good         |
| <b>y</b> after consonants        |            | <b>i</b> in ill, bill, this     |
| <b>y</b> before or after a vowel |            | <b>y</b> in yes, year, way, buy |
| <b>zh</b> (Zhabye, Zhuravno)     |            | <b>s</b> in treasure, measure   |
| <b>kh</b> (Khotyn, Khoma)        |            | <b>ch</b> in Scottish loch      |
| <b>ts</b> (Tsetsora, Kotsko)     |            | <b>ts</b> in let's sing!        |

4. The rules of the transliteration of Ukrainian names is here given for the general use in Ukrainian publications of all kinds with the exception of the strict linguistics. Therefore these rules of the transliteration are only approximate and simplified.

5. Here are some examples of the transliteration of Ukrainian names: Petrushevych, Yuriy, Petlyura, Hrushevskyy.

6. Some living Ukrainian authors in earlier years had published their works under their names on principles of the Slavic spelling. In this case their names in present publications should be preserved in Slavic spelling in order to avoid misunderstanding of their identity.



## A FOREWORD

Of all the Ukrainian territories only Western Ukraine, especially its two component parts—Galicia and Bukovina—had the best opportunity to develop its cultural life, to form an organized socio-economic life, and to transform itself into a political force. This possibility arose from the roots of the “spring of nations,” from the Austrian Revolution in 1848 which provided within this monarchy a short period of constitutional freedom and, from 1860 until the end of its existence, a constitutional era. At the same time the remaining territories of Ukraine, consisting of 845.5 thousand square kilometers in Europe, were under the control of Russian autocracy which decided in 1905, without the participation of various nationalities, to grant a constitution with very limited civil and political rights. It was only then that the Ukrainian literature and press, previously forbidden and now limited by censorship, could show signs of development. With the outbreak of war in 1914, the Tsarist government again prohibited the printing of the Ukrainian word and ordered the closing of all Ukrainian organizations. This move denied the mass of the Ukrainian people the right to legally form political organizations and to become participants in the social and state life from 1848 until 1914. This part of Ukraine had limited political freedoms for less than nine years.

In comparison with Eastern Ukraine, Western Ukraine, a part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was small in area: Galicia measured 55,700 square kilometers; Bukovina, 5,300 square kilometers; and the Carpathian Ukraine, ruled by Hungary, accounted for 16,700 square kilometers. The entire area of Western Ukraine, 77,700 square kilometers, formed only a twelfth part of the entire Ukrainian national territory in Europe, excluding the colonies in Siberia. Here, however, the density of population was considerable; with its six million, Western Ukraine formed approximately an eighth part of the population on the entire national territory of Ukraine.

Regardless of the insignificant area and population number, during the critical period of European history, 1918-1919, Western Ukraine was able to play a decisive role in the fate of the entire Ukraine and also in the future fate of Europe and the world. At the end of October and in the beginning of November 1918, the two Central European Monarchies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, collapsed as a result of revolutionary blows brought about by their

military defeat. In the previous year, and as a result of the same causes, the end came for the Russian Tsarist government, and step by step the peoples who until this time were enslaved by the Russian autocracy, began to form the basis of their national republics. Among them the Ukrainian nation, second largest in Eastern Europe, also engaged in the political struggle for the reconstruction of its state rights. But by the end of 1917, on November 7, the democratic government of Russia, headed by Alexander Kerensky, was toppled by an armed revolt of the Bolsheviks. Having established their hold in the European part of Russia, the Bolsheviks immediately began to realize their program: to re-establish the old Russian empire in Europe and Asia and then, step by step, to expand their empire throughout the world. The Bolshevik leadership did not make any special efforts to hide this program; it often stated that the goal was to form a world Soviet republic with Moscow as its center. The means for fulfilling this aim was the propaganda of social revolution in every country and especially in those closer to Russia. By organizing rebellions in those countries, under the guise of world social and communist revolution, Moscow planned to dispatch at that stage its regular armies, supposedly to help the revolutionaries. The true goal, however, of these forces was to transform the given country into a colonial domain of Soviet Russia.

This was the time when Eastern Ukraine also concluded its struggle for statehood, eliminating Russian military formations and Russian civil authorities with its own military force in a contest which lasted for several days. Then the entire government was taken over by the Ukrainian Central Council (*Ukrayinska Tsentralna Rada*) as the parliament of Ukraine and its executive body, the General Secretariat (November 12, 1917). Then the Central Council constitutionalized the Ukrainian state into Ukrainian National Republic. But the Republic immediately became a victim of military aggression by Soviet Russia which, with the ultimatum of December 17, 1917, declared war against Ukraine because the Republic refused to subordinate itself to the authority of Soviet of People's Commissars of Russia. Although the armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic were in the stage of formation, nevertheless this young army, through its own efforts, held a defensive line for two full months, until the middle of February, 1918. Faced by the danger of complete annihilation, the government of U.N.R. concluded a peace treaty with the Central Powers on February 9, at Brest Litovsk, and turned to the Central Powers for aid in clearing the Ukrainian territory of the invading Russian Red armies. The army of U.N.R., supported by the formations of the Central Powers, especially the Austrian regiments which were made up of Ukrainians,



managed to accomplish this task by the middle of April, 1918.

However, the Rada and the government of U.N.R. were, for the most part, of democratic composition and social democrats in orientation. Such a government could not find, in the area of practical politics, a common language with the government of Germany or Austria-Hungary, still dominated by the conservatives and aristocrats. Thus the governments of the two powers conspired with the opposition in Ukraine, made up of aristocrats and bourgeoisie, and came in support of a coup, led by General Pavlo Skoropadskyy. He was proclaimed the *Hetman* of Ukraine with complete authority until new elections could be held to the parliament of Ukraine. The armies of the Central Powers which came to Ukraine as allies began to conduct themselves as occupants, although formally no effort was made to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. But actually they did prevent the formation of a considerable regular Ukrainian army. As a result of this strategy, on November 11, 1918, when Germany capitulated and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy already had collapsed, the Hetmanate had only a small military force which could not successfully oppose a new Soviet aggression.

The internal national and political causes led to the formation of the Directory of Ukrainian National Republic on November 14, 1918. It was a product of a union of all national democratic organizations which raised the flag of insurrection against the Hetmanate. In the course of a few days the Directory had gained control of the country with the exception of the capital, Kyiv.\*) The Hetman, being aware of the hopelessness of further resistance, capitulated and his government formally turned the affairs of the state over to the hands of the Directory and its government (December 15, 1918).

However, the position of the Directory became complicated from two sides. On December 1, 1918, Soviet Russia began its aggression from the North and Northeast, a move which the Bolsheviks had contemplated since November 11. From the Southeast, Ukraine was attacked by the army of General Denikin who sought to continue the program of reconstruction of the old Tsarist Russia. Hastily the Directory organized an army of 100,000 but it included a large number of poorly trained insurrection formations and the rest of the army was still in need of training. Only the Sich Riflemen Corps (*Sichovi Striltsi*), made up mostly of volunteers from Galicia, had a properly disciplined organization.

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\*) Kyiv is the Ukrainian spelling; the accepted English form of the name of this city is Kiev.

The second military aggression of Soviet Russia against Ukraine in December 1918 launched a long defensive war for the Ukrainian National Republic. Through its own efforts and even in face of a blockade by the West, not only of food, equipment, needed supplies, but even of medical supplies, the army of U.N.R. held until the end of December 1919. Soviet Russia made every effort to conquer Ukraine as the needed base for further war to regain an empire and to expand that empire further into Europe and then the world. Ukraine was the storehouse of bread and sugar, it held considerable stock of domestic animals, coal, and manganic iron ore which was easily obtainable.

The Ukrainian National Republic could have defended itself successfully if the following conditions would have been met:

1. At this time Western Ukraine had formed an independent Western Ukrainian National Republic which, from December 1, was negotiating with the Directory of U.N.R. concerning the unification of the two Republics. Western Ukraine, being better developed politically and better organized as a result of the existing constitutional regime in Austria, was able to form in December, 1918, an army of 100,000 disciplined troops. If the restored Polish state, led by Józef Piłsudski, had not sought to destroy the Western Ukrainian state by war and had not tried to take away from Eastern Ukraine the vital territories of Pidliashya, Kholmshchyna, Volyn, Polisia, and a significant part of Podillya, then the Ukrainian Galician Army would have been free to defend Eastern Ukraine against Russian invasion. In this case the unified Ukrainian state would have been able to present, in December, an army of 200,000, a sufficient force to halt the advance of Russian regiments.

2. From December 1918, the re-established Polish state also accelerated the organization of its military force. If this army had not been thrown against the united Ukraine, then it could have been used to form "the sanitary belt" on the eastern frontiers of Poland against the threatening Bolsheviks. Being thus deployed, the Polish army would have given the opportunity for Beylorussia and the Baltic countries to develop their armed forces. This would have created a block of states, from the Baltic to the Black seas, which would have been able to shut the Bolsheviks within the boundaries of Russia proper.

3. In this situation the non-Bolshevik Russian political and military forces were sufficient to deal with the Russian Reds. In December 1918, a large anti-Bolshevik army of Admiral Kolchak was located on the Volga, consisting of Russians and the Czecho-Slovakian Legion. In the Don region there was a well-organized force of Don Cossacks and, in addition, Generals Alexiev and Denikin were forming the Russian Volunteer Army in that area. If the



military forces of various nationalities would have pressed the Bolshevik forces at their frontiers and at the same time the Russian non-Bolshevik armies had made their attack, the power of the Soviets would have collapsed by the summer of 1919. This would have provided Eastern and Central Europe with a different political map and, under the auspices of Wilson's League of Nations, the world probably would still be enjoying peace.

The above mentioned is not merely a hypothesis. The hard facts of economics in Russia proper and in the territories which in December 1918, were under the control of non-Bolshevik governments, fully convince us that a common front of these states would have made the complete toppling of the Soviet regime a certainty. For the existence and continuation of military operations against these governments the Bolshevik regime in Russia proper had to have the necessary raw materials to run the industries within Russia or the finished product. But the resources needed in industry and by the army were outside the control of Bolshevik People's Commissars.

In the case of coal supplies they were located:

1. Donets Basin in Ukraine made up that time 85% of all reserves of the former Russian empire;
2. The Ural Basin — 4.2%;
3. The Kuznets Basin — 2.7%;
4. Eastern Siberian region — 1.9%;
5. Karaganda and Middle Asia — 1.5%;
6. Moscow area — 1%;
7. Other areas — 0.5%.

The remaining coal of imperial Russia fell into the hands of Poland. From this list it is apparent that Russia proper, controlled by the Bolsheviks in December 1918, possessed only 1% of the entire coal supply of the former Russian empire and sometime later together with the Ural Basin, 5.2%. That quantity was not sufficient for the operation of industry or for the heating in the cities.

Petroleum, also needed in industry and in war, at that time was completely lacking in Russia proper, either in prospect or supply. Without this product, the planes and the machines could not move and the use of alcohol for the purpose could not be realized because the needed industry for producing spirits was lacking in the Bolshevik territory. The new regime also lacked the needed raw materials, grain and potatoes; adopting the gas powered generators to wood was a time consuming operation and the regime would have collapsed under the pressure of the populace of the cities once the winter of 1919 set in.

The third category of materials needed for the conduct of war was iron ore and food. If the entire Ukraine were removed from the complex of Russian empire of 1913, which would contain Congress Poland and Finland, then Ukraine's economic relation to the rest of the empire was as follows:

Production of sugar in Ukraine — 88%;

Production of salt in Ukraine — 53%;

Production of steel in Ukraine — 60%;

Production of manganese in Ukraine — 613.7 million lbs.  
 $\frac{1}{6}$  of the world production at that time;

Production of wheat in Ukraine — 60%;

Grain produced for export — 27% and only 2% was produced in the rest of the empire.

The matter of food supplies for the larger cities in Soviet Russia, especially the two capitals—St. Petersburg and Moscow—was in a dangerous state. In December 1918, the Soviet regime was one year old in Russia proper. During this time the industry became considerably limited due to the shortage of raw materials, and the supplies that were left over from the Tsarist times and those of Provisional Government were used exclusively for military needs. Light industry, at that time, almost ceased to exist and the village could not obtain even the most essential goods such as cloth, agricultural implements, or even a needle. The village ceased to produce for the market because the paper currency could not purchase anything. The cities failed to receive the necessary agricultural products while the forced requisition in form of natural tax (i. e. in agricultural products), did not bring the desired results. At that time all supplies of bread were located outside Russia proper: in Ukraine, Siberia, upper Volga region, and the Caucasus area. In this situation, a blockade of Bolshevik controlled Russia would have easily led to the overthrow of the regime by the people themselves. A pre-condition for such a blockade was the existence of non-Bolshevik national states and their friendly co-operation and solidarity in regard to Soviet dictatorship in Russia. This solidarity would have saved Russia from Bolshevism and at the same time, the world peace, having prevented also the growth of the future militaristic movement in Germany.

Unfortunately this actual opportunity to save world peace was not realized as a result of the appearance of non-Bolshevik imperialism within two camps needed to form the cordon against the Bolshevik threat. This imperialism appeared in the re-constructed Polish state and within the anti-Bolshevik movement of Russians themselves.

In Poland, in December 1918, and in the following months of 1919, the political elements gained supremacy which were not

satisfied with having a Polish state within the ethnographic territorial boundaries. In the East, they wanted to expand at the expense of Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine, and in such a fashion as to prevent their existence as independent states. What would be left of their territories was to be used as a peace offering to Soviet Russia. They did not consider Bolshevism to be a mortal threat to themselves and to the world. As a matter of fact, they believed Bolshevism to be the weakest form of government in Russia and, therefore, least dangerous for Poland. And so the Polish imperialists, guided by the theories of Roman Dmowski, pushed Poland into war with Western Ukraine and, later, with the unified Ukrainian state. This prevented Ukraine from offering effective resistance to the advancing Bolshevik armies. A war on two fronts made the victory of Ukraine a debatable question. The chances for such a victory grew even dimmer when the third front opened against the White Russian Army, commanded by General Denikin who was supported militarily, financially, and diplomatically by the Entente. The three fronts succeeded in bringing about the debacle of the Ukrainians in December, 1919. The tardy and partial measures of Poland after this debacle, in spring 1920, could not prevent the developments which occurred as the product of Polish policy toward Ukraine throughout 1919.

Ukraine, the largest country in Eastern Europe after Russia, was finally defeated by Soviet Russia which, from then on, grew into a world threat which we all now feel.

The authors of this historical work, Professor Dr. Matthew Stachiw\*\*) and Professor Jaroslaw Sztendera, probably approached their task with a heavy heart. From the contents of their joint work, it appears that they were inspired by an idea of common effort by all peoples of Central and Central-Eastern Europe for their peaceful development as sovereign states, but in a close democratic bloc of states between the two seas—the Baltic and the Black.

If this work deals with a protracted struggle between Poland and Ukraine, it is not for the purpose of evoking dislike or animosity but to create a mutual understanding and, having achieved this, to follow through with mutual efforts in correcting the errors of the older generation. It seems fitting to recall the very same thought of the Ukrainian greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, who described one moment of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict' *Haydamachchyna*. In the foreword to his poetic work *Haydamaky*, filled with bloody scenes of national and social struggle in the style of the first half

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\*\*) The name is in Slavic transliteration; in English it is: **Matvly Stakhiv**.



of the 18th century, Shevchenko confessed before his readers, Ukrainians and Poles alike:

Thank God, it passed! And especially if you remember that we are children of the same mother, that all of us are Slavs. The heart is aching but it should be told: let their sons and grandsons see that their fathers were mistaken, let them become brothers again with their enemies...

This joint effort of the two authors appears to be an indication that in the field of historical research the truth should be sought in a friendly co-operation of historians of two generations—the older and the younger.

Matthew Stachiw has spent several decades in the area of sociological research and as a social and historical investigator of Ukraine's past, especially with the period of the Great Ukrainian National Revolution and the reconstruction of Ukrainian sovereignty in the years of 1917-1923. He has written a considerable number of volumes as well as hundreds of scholarly articles. Jaroslav Sztendera belongs to the new generation of researchers. The joint effort of the two authors is a significant contribution to the historiography of this period. In this work the authors have utilized the basic sources of Ukrainian, Polish, French, British, and American writers. The factual background of the work has been checked objectively and the interpretation of the events is creative and challenges the reader to a more thorough interest in the basic problem of the former and present period: the peaceful co-operation of nations on the basis of equality of national states and the respect of just international law.

One hopes that this work will hasten the re-examination and new evaluation of that period in the American historiography and in the history of international relations.

January 22, 1969.

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**PART I**

**UKRAINIANS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES  
OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND FUTILE ATTEMPTS  
TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH POLES**





## CHAPTER 1

# FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE RULE OF POLISH ARISTOCRATS

### The land and people of Galicia


Historically, Western Ukraine at the peak of its development, consisted of the Galician-Volynian state (*Halytsko-Volynska Derzhava*) which at one time, circa 1254 A.D., held the rank of kingdom during the reign of Danylo and his successors. This state consisted of lands that stretched eastward from the Polish ethnographical, as well as political, borders: the land of Lemky (*Lemkivshchyna*) up to the Poprad River\*), and the territory beyond the Syan River (*Zasyanya*) as far as the city of Ryashiv. From there, the borders ran northeastward and encompassed Pidlyasha and the provinces of Kholm, Volyn and the territory of Polisia. From the Syan River eastward this state also contained the provinces of Belz, and Galicia (*Halychyna*), reaching far to the east up to the mouth of Dnister River. In the southeast, this Ukrainian state dominated vast territory between the Dnister River and the Carpathian mountain to the Danube River and the Black Sea (in the XI-XIII centuries). In the northeast, this state, at one time, also controlled the territory Kyiv. The capital of the Galician-Volyn state was located successively in Halych, Kholm, Volodymyr and finally in Lviv.<sup>1)</sup>

In 1340, the last ruler of the Galician-Volodymyr state, Yuriy Troydenovych, died unexpectedly. His demise signaled the end of Ukrainian rule of this kingdom. Shortly thereafter, Poland conquered one part of the kingdom and the Lithuanian great princes the other part. In the sixteenth century, Poland was finally able to annex all of the Galician-Volodymyr provinces to the Kingdom of Poland.

At the First Partition of Poland in 1772, Austria had demanded from Poland and was given "The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria." The term "Lodomeria" was purely diplomatic. It was together with "Galicia" in the title of the Hungarian Kings who had pretended the legacy of this kingdom. "Lodomeria" was actually a

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\*) The ethnographical border is given here in the general terms. It should be remembered that at present there are large islands of Ukrainian population even in the foothills of the Tatra Mountains.



Boundaries of the Galician-Volynian State. Eastward of it are other principalities of Ukraine-Rus.

badly spelled original Ukrainian name, "Volodymyria," from the name of the capital of Volyn—Volodymyr. In the 18th century, the Austrian monarch was also the King of Hungary and on the basis of the said title of the Hungarian kings Austria pretended from Poland the "Kingdon of Galicia and Lodomeria."

However, Austria did not get, at that time, the entire territory of the Kingdom of Galicia and Volodymyria. On the other hand, Austria was given in 1772 also a territory which was ethnically Polish and had always belonged to the Great Principality of Cracow. This territory was on the right bank of the Vistula River up to the city of Sandomierz.

The Third and last Partition of Poland in 1795 brought to Austria the rest of the Ukrainian territories of the former Kingdom of Galicia and Volodymyria on the left bank of the Buh River and in addition, new ethnically Polish lands to the right bank of the Vistula River and the mouth of the Buh River. This new area included 47,000 square kilometers of land.

The Napoleonic victories erected in 1807 the Warsaw Principality. As a result of the creation of this new state, Austria lost to this new state, the entire area gained in the Third Partition of Poland and, in addition, a part of the area taken in 1772. Besides this loss, Austria had to pass over to Russia a part of Eastern Galicia—the area of the Ternopil district.

These boundaries were arranged anew by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Warsaw Principality was renamed the Kingdom of Poland but, at the same time, it was deprived of its sovereignty. The Congress of Vienna decided that this Kingdom would be united with the Russian empire and that the Russian Tsar would be the King of Poland. To the Austrian Kingdom of Galicia and Volodymyria was annexed the district of Ternopil, up to the Zbrutch River. The city of Cracow with a small region became the Free City of Cracow.

Northeastward, Austria took territories that included the towns of Tomashiv and Zamostya up to the Buh River, and then on the western bank of the Buh River to the south to the town of Sokal. One may see on the map that Austria took all of Galicia but only a small part of Volodymyria or Volyn because from Sokal the frontier was drawn to Brody and then to Zbarazh. From there the line ran on the right bank of the Zbrutch River to the Dnister River and included the districts of Kolomyia and Kossiv. The entire territory taken by Austria from Poland in 1772 included an area some 81,000 square kilometers.

Besides the territories Austria took from the Kingdom of Poland's domination in 1772, in 1775 Austria took from Turkey Bukovina.

After the Polish uprising in western Galicia in 1846, Austrian troops occupied the Free City of Cracow and shortly there after the Austrian government proclaimed the annexation of this region to Galicia. This artificial union of Ukrainian and Polish lands in the Kingdom of Galicia and Volodymyria with the Grand Principality of Cracow remained until 1918 and encompassed an area of 79,080 square kilometers.

These provinces were joined administratively with the area taken from Poland,—Cravow and Oswiecim, and given the name of the Kingdom of Galicia and Volodymyria with the Grand Principality of Cracow, Oswiecim and Zator.<sup>2)</sup>

"Galicia" (*Halychyna*) is an old Ukrainian Duchy that lasted up to 1340 as a component part of the Galician-Volynian Kingdom. The end of the Ukrainian dynasty caused lengthy wars among several neighboring states which ended in 1366 when this part of Rus-Ukraine was conquered by the Polish King, Casimir, and joined to Poland as a completely separate unit, with a legal and administrative system completely different from that of Poland proper.

"Volodymyria" was the name of the old fief state of Volhynia, so named because of its capital Volodymyr. The union of Galicia and Volynia with the Great Duchy of Cracow by the Austrian government was to be the cause of intermittent and sporadic disagreements between Poland and Ukraine and after 146 years of continuing struggle, it culminated in a war that exploded November 2, 1918.

The ethnographic border between the Galician-Volynian state and Poland corresponded, approximately, to the political border.<sup>3)</sup> It stretched along the western borders of the later Austrian Counties (*povit*) of Hrybiv, Yaslo, Bereziv, Ryashiv, Lantsut, Perevorsk, Yaroslav, Chesaniv and, in the north, it was more or less along the line of Lublin, Lukiv, Sidlets, and Dorohychyn. The union of Galicia and Volodymyria with the Polish Cracow district was a purely mechanical creation of the Austrian bureaucracy, although the view was held from the beginning that not one but two nationalities were involved, Poles and Ukrainians, and that each of them occupied, in the newly formed province, a separate area.

This fact was also apparent to the international opinion of Europe. When Napoleon, on the basis of agreement with Prussia, Austria, and Russia, renewed the Polish state in 1809 as the Duchy of Warsaw, only Polish lands were included in this state. After his defeat, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 joined the Warsaw Duchy to Russia under the name of "The Polish Kingdom" with the understanding that it would receive autonomous rights but be ruled by the Russian tsar who held the title of "Polish King." The Cracow district was incorporated into Austria with Cracow becoming a free city (it was occupied by Austria in 1846 in violation of the

Vienna agreement). Following the Congress of Vienna, the Austrian government joined the Polish Cracow district again with Ukrainian Galicia and Volodymyria into one administrative unit. Its official name was a long one: "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodemery," with Grand Princedom of Cracow, Oswicim and Zator. In the complete title of the Emperor of Austria was included also the title, "King of Galicia." At the head of this unit stood the governor of Galicia with his headquarters in Lviv.<sup>4</sup>)

The population of this artificially conceived country was sharply divided into two nationalities: Ukrainians and Poles. The name "Galicia," in agreement with history, should have belonged only to the greater eastern part of the new country; that is, only to the old Rus-Ukraine districts as well as to the districts of Belz, Peremyshl, and Syanik. The western, smaller part of the country, should have been called the Cracow Kingdom or its districts. (In short, the western part was Polish and the eastern part was Ukrainian). To simplify the matter, let us use the term Galicia to designate the whole, newly created Austrian province, stretching from the Zbruch River up to the eastern border of Silesia. In the west, we shall refer to the Polish part of the province as Western Galicia, while the term Eastern Galicia will designate the Ukrainian part. This terminology was also used officially in the statements of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919-1920.


At the time of the Congress of Vienna, according to the Austrian administration, the population of Galicia was over three million, with a ratio of 2:1, in favor of the Ukrainians. This ratio remained stable until the 1840's when the free city of Cracow and its vicinity, with its strictly Polish population, were added to Galicia. In addition, many Poles were attracted to Austria from Prussia and Russia and this influx upset further the 2:1 ratio.

In Eastern Galicia, there were a number of large estates (*latifundia*), a fact which caused land hunger, as well as more than a little real hunger, among the peasants. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a great number of peasants leaving the homeland in search of a better future in America, Canada, Prussia, France, and even in Eastern Ukraine under Russian tsar. A high mortality rate among children in the villages and this large emigration had, by the time of the crisis of 1918, almost equalized the population.

Differences between the two nationalities were considerable. The Ukrainian language differs more from Polish than it does from Slovak and Serbo-Croatian. Even in the border villages, there was a marked difference in customs and traditions, a factor which was influential in limiting the number of mixed marriages.

Religion was another factor which separated the two nationalities in Galicia. The Poles, in the western part of Galicia, were





UKRAINIAN ETHNOGRAPHIC TERRITORY  
 — BOUNDARIES OF SOVIET REPUBLICS AND SATELLITES  
 Ukrainian ethnographic territory in Europe.

Roman Catholics while the Ukrainians owed their allegiance to the Eastern rite, using the old Slavonic language in church services. Originally, the Ukrainian Church owed its allegiance to the Byzantine Patriarchate. In 1596, at a conclave of bishops in Brest\*), a majority of the clergy decided to change their allegiance to Rome but, at the same time, they retained the canonical law, customs and the rites of the Eastern Church. Only two Galician bishops then did not agree to the union with Rome, the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl, and they continued to be in contact with the Byzantine Patriarchate until the 17th century. Then they accepted the union with Rome.

The bulk of the Ukrainian population in Galicia remained faithful to the Eastern Uniate Church, regardless of the fact that the Polish ruling aristocracy and its clergy employed all forms of administrative and economic pressure to convert them to the Latin rite, and to the Polish Church. Not infrequently the Polish gentry registered their serf workers by force into the fold of the Roman Catholic Church. By 1918, 9.9% of the population of the Galician villages was so "converted." Nevertheless, these Ukrainian Roman Catholics, from the time of the Austrian constitutional reforms, were ordinary members of the Ukrainian national community; they spoke only Ukrainian (some of them did not even understand Polish), and they participated in Ukrainian cultural and political organizations. But in the Austrian statistics, compiled by the Austrian-Polish officials, these Romanized Ukrainians were considered to be Poles.<sup>5)</sup>

## **The difference between Polish and Austrian regimes**

The change of Galicia from Polish to Austrian rule involved not only a change in regime but also a change in social, cultural and economic life. To have a better understanding of these changes and their effects on the people it would be helpful to sketch separately the conditions under Polish and Austrian rule.

In Galicia, during the rule of Ukrainian princes, land was the basis of the economy and, in addition, it also had a social meaning. The ownership of the land was divided into three categories: land owned by the ruler (state ownership); land owned by nobility; and land owned by free peasants who not only held land as individuals but also had holdings in communal property such as forests, ponds, grazing land and meadows.<sup>6)</sup>

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\*) In current American political publication the name of this city has the form "Brest Litovsk." The Ukrainian name of this city is Berestya.


The first step taken under the newly established Polish rule in Ukrainian districts after 1366, was to seize the land of the Ukrainian nobility and award it to the Polish nobility. By means of armed raids on the weaker Ukrainian nobility, the Poles managed to expand their holding. Acquisition of Peremyshl land can serve as an example for the customary "legal" extension of Polish property. Upon an invitation of the Poles, the Ukrainian nobility gathered in Peremyshl for what was supposed to be a council. An ambush was prepared and the Ukrainians were murdered and their lands confiscated. This process of acquisition continued in the 15th and 16th centuries, a fact substantiated by a petition of the Ukrainian nobility to the Polish Diet in 1551, which asked the Polish government to end "the assaults, raids, killings, land grabbing and robbery which are being perpetrated by the Poles.")

Communal land was next on the list of the Polish nobility and it was also successfully acquired. Land of the free peasants followed suit. Obtaining legal protection from Polish administrative bodies proved to be a hopeless task. Anyone who lacked the strength to protect his own property lacked the chance to win his case in court. And, even if the verdict was against a rapacious Polish nobleman, the Polish government would do nothing to enforce it. This is not surprising because at this time in the Polish Kingdom the entire governmental administration and courts were exclusively in the hands of the nobility. The Polish historian Wladyslaw Lozinski in his work, "*By Right and Left*,"\*) present a tragic picture of complete judicial and legislative deterioration in Poland, a state of affairs which continued in the 17th century. "Killings were done in the open and in secret, in houses, on the roads and in the market places of the cities, at assemblies and gatherings, during feasts and also in courts; killing was done for the slightest reason, but it was done without punishment." In essence, there existed a state of arbitrary rule of Polish aristocracy toward the entire community. The pleas for reform by a Polish minority were completely disregarded.

Nor did the land of the Ukrainian Church and clergy escape the fate of the secular holders. In fact, the process of "legal" takeover by means of royal decrees was facilitated by the fact it was the land of the Ukrainian Church. How this was done and the manner in which the legal system worked may be seen from the following example. The Galician metropolitan received the area of Perehynsko as a gift from the prince Fedor Lyubart and the property remained in the hands of the Church until 1637. At that

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\*) This is a literal translation. It means: **By Right and Wrong.**



Ukrainians inside boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Tsarist Russia as well as Poles, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Hungarians (Magyars) in August, 1914.

time this land was given by the Polish king to his subordinate, Stanislaw Jablonowski. With the king's grant in his possession and supported by a gang of armed servants, Jablonowski arrived at Perekhynsko to take over his gift but the administrator of the property offered resistance. Jablonowski was forced to lay siege to the castle, a siege which was made even more effective by the use of several cannons. But the defenders held on until relief arrived and Jablonowski beat a hasty retreat. The castle was reenforced and the rest of the relief retired. Once again Jablonowski appeared, this time four companies strong, and with an even better armament. The castle was taken by storm, the surviving defenders were murdered, and their bodies were carried to a pasture and guarded to prevent proper burial. The bodies fed the dogs until only the bones were left. And so Jablonowski not only became the "owner" of the land but was also the "owner" of movable property worth 60,000 zloty.\*)

Seeking justice, the Ukrainian bishop took his case to court and the king appointed a commission to handle the case. The defense presented witnesses as well as documents issued by Polish king Zygmunt I which testified to the legality of ownership. To avoid an unpleasant situation, the commission declared itself incompetent to sit in judgement. The clergyman appealed again, this time directly to the king. The latter issued a decree in 1661 which finally put the matter to rest. According to its terms, the land was confirmed in the possession of Jablonowski. It also made the prelate subject to a 5,000 zloty fine if he should attempt any further appeal.

Such cases were not isolated and the final result was a loss of vast tracts of land formerly held by the Ukrainian Church. The case in point also serves as an example of the hopelessness of obtaining justice for the Ukrainian gentry, if a prelate of the Church could not protect his proven ownership.

Land ownership was not the only weapon used by Poland to destroy Ukrainian society. Pressures were brought to bear which prevented Ukrainians from holding administrative offices. It was not surprising to learn that some Ukrainian aristocracy, in order to remain at the top of the social ladder, became Polish on the surface while their descendants became completely Polonized. It was only the small gentry that remained true to their people, although economically their class differed little from the average peasant. Although this group was very numerous, it had little if any political or social influence in Poland's politics.

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\*) The value of the property is listed in terms of zloty used in Poland in the XVII century.



The middle class (population of the towns) also had its problems. Gradually it was forced out from the heart of the city to suburbs with the aid of the same legal procedure as in the case of land titles. Once in the suburbs, the population turned to petty craftsmanship or to agriculture for their livelihood.

Related to the topic of confiscation of clerical lands was the position of monasteries during the Polish regime. In the time of the Ukrainian statehood, the monasteries of the Basilian Order were the patrons of education and scholarship, since, of the bulk of the population, only the clergy and the upper stratum of society had an education of any significance. Under Polish rule, a planned campaign was staged to destroy this monastic order. The first step called for stripping the order of property which was the means for supporting education. The second method used was to appoint favorites of the king as superiors and archimandrites of monasteries although they were seldom qualified. Such positions were considered lucrative enough to make a career of them. With the decrease of material means of the monasteries, the quality of education and schools also declined. As a substitute, the Poles presented the Jesuit Order and, thus, in Ukrainian territory this order's role was more political than religious.

In the attempts to weaken the Ukrainian Church, and especially its clergy, Polish kings and their representatives (*voyevodas* and *starostas*) thought it beneficial to interfere in the internal matters of the Church. Kings provided candidates for bishops and more important clerical posts. But at the same time, the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church was denied the same rank as that of the Polish Church. Whereas every Polish bishop was a member of the Senate, the same right was denied Ukrainian bishops on the grounds that only Catholic bishops could hold this post. But when the majority of the Ukrainian Orthodox bishops accepted Catholicism (Union of Brest), neither the uniatic metropolitan nor any of the bishops were admitted to the Senate. The implication of this policy was obvious. No Ukrainian element, regardless of the rite, would be allowed to represent its people in the Senate. A few exceptions were made where one *voyevoda* of Ukrainian nationality was allowed to sit in the Senate but this was of no significance.


Parallel to the process of land robbery in Ukraine's regions, another process just as vicious was taking place,—that of making serfs of the Ukrainian free peasants. As still another method of undermining the spiritual authority of the Ukrainian Church, the Polish nobility began, in the 17th century, to make servile demands on the village priest equal to the demands made on the enslaved peasants. In this matter the Polish kings called upon the nobility to

relent, fearing a peasant rebellion. But the frequent proclamations (especially those of the king Jan Casimir in the middle of the 17th century) did not have any special positive results since such demands of the nobility continued to be made. It can be easily understood why, with the increase of every nobleman's absolutism in his territory the candidate for parish priest would be designated not by the people but by the nobility. But the greatest martyrdom was suffered not by the Ukrainian gentry nor the clergy but by the bulk of the Ukrainian population, the peasants.<sup>6</sup>)

At the time of the conquest of Ukrainian territory, there existed a sharp distinction between the public and private rights in Rus-Ukraine and Poland. Poland had established an order in which the society was divided into classes which were rigid social and closed states. The society was made up of five social states: royal family, nobility, clergy (Catholic), townsmen and peasantry. In the middle of the 14th century, the Polish peasantry was deprived of any public rights while the townsmen in the king's cities had a self-government in regard to their own affairs but had no voice in the affairs of the kingdom. Nevertheless, they were free individuals and they could move from one place to another. Only the nobility and the clergy had political rights. The position of the Polish peasantry in the 17th century was the worst in Europe. As early as the 12th century, the belief had been established that only the monarch could own land. It was his prerogative to grant the right to own land to individuals or institutions,—to nobility and the Church.

This practice was codified in 1454, and the peasants were excluded, by law, from the right to acquire land as their own. According to Polish legislation, the peasant could not leave his land without the approval of his lord, and such permission was not granted, since the land would be worthless if there were none to cultivate it. The lords also managed to withdraw the peasantry from the jurisdiction of the state authorities and thus they deprived the peasant of having a place or means to state his grievances. The lord became the ruler, the legislator, and the judge over his village. It is not surprising, therefore, as late as the 1920's for signs to still exist stating, "The state (name of village or town) of such and such a lord." The only limiting factors to the lord's absolutism, after 1454, was the threat of a revolt or an escape to the east, where such despotism over peasants still did not exist.

In contrast to the Polish law, Ukrainian law had more democratic principles. The society of Rus-Ukraine did not have such a strict and rigid social division. It is true that social classes did exist but change from one social status to another was not limited by law in any way. The social class of an individual depended upon



Ancient Lviv (Woodcut from XVII century).

his means, rather than his hereditary rights. Ukrainian *boyars* (nobility) evolved from the more distinguished citizens and not from the performance of military obligations since the right to carry arms was extended to all levels of the free community. In Poland, conversely, only nobles were allowed to carry arms.

As the Polish law began to be established in Ukraine, so also did serfdom. Polish law was first entrenched in the border areas—Zasyanya, Lemkivshchyna,—and then moved eastward effecting Kholmshchyna, Galicia, and Volynia. By the second half of the 15th century, Poland was able to establish her laws in Western Ukraine in relation to the peasantry.

This conflict of Polish law with Rus-Ukraine law had important consequences. Ukrainians conceived a hatred of the Polish law which was extended to everything Polish. The Polish law, in the eyes of the people, had no moral basis and hatred for this law was kept alive by the memories of the older times, of the Rus-Ukrainian state, through both oral and written forms of transmission.

The feeling of injustice and the unbearableness of the situation which resulted from the Polish law led to protests and, finally, to defensive action being taken in Eastern Ukraine where more favorable conditions existed. In the 16th century, a community of Zaporozhian Sich was formed, the aim of which was to retain its governmental sovereignty and at the same time to defend the rights of Ukrainian people against the Poles as well as against the Turks. Ukrainians of all social levels ran away from the Polish rule and joined the Zaporozhian Sich which was located far on the Dnieper isle. Its strength increased rapidly and it made war on Polish rule. These warriors in the Zaporozhian Sich had the name “Zaporozhian

Cossacks.”<sup>7)</sup> Simultaneously, in the eastern Ukrainian border regions, other Cossacks were organized who were outside Sich. By 1648, the Polish oppression reached its limits and the Sich, under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, began a general uprising against Poland and spread its rule almost into every territory that was ethnically Ukrainian. Ukrainians in Galicia and Volhynia rose en-masse in support of the liberation war of the Sich. But later the new Ukrainian state found itself too weak to support the independence of all Ukraine. Khmelnytsky was forced by the treaty of Zboriv and later by the treaty of Bilatserkva to recognize Polish retention of Western Ukrainian lands although these agreements were not ratified in the Polish Diet. The struggle for freedom continued, weakening the Polish state. The beginning of the final act of Polish tragedy was the First Partition of Poland in 1772 when Galicia and Volynia were given to Austria.\*)

It should be remembered that when the Ukrainian lands east of the line of the Sluch River were able to throw off Polish oppression for a long time to come, the Ukrainian lands in the west (Kholmshchyna, Galicia and Volynia) were freed only for a short time in 1649 and 1655. After this, these lands were constantly under Polish rule up to 1772.

Finally in respect to Polish oppression, it is sufficient to examine Ukrainian folklore, literature, songs and proverbs to find evidence of the bitter taste left by lawlessness of Polish nobility. Needless to say, there were exceptions when a Polish noble possessed moral and cultural traits which were praiseworthy, but in general, the basic thought of Ukrainians (discounting some of the conservative elements of the Ukrainian nobility) was clearly shown in the motto “Let it be even worse, if only it is different.”<sup>8)</sup>

In 1772 Austria gained Galicia, Kholm, Belz and part of Volhynia and in 1775 she acquired Bukovina\*\*) from Turkey, another Ukrainian province which had been ruled by Rumanian princes since the fall of the Galician-Volhynian state. The Austrian

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\*) The analysis of the history of relations between Ukraine and Poland up to the 18th century shows that an independent Poland can not exist if there is no strong and independent Ukraine. The existence of an independent Poland in the 16th-17th is an exception that cannot be repeated. Having destroyed the Ukrainian state that had been weakened by Tartars, Poland still retained its independence through historical circumstances, since the neighbors of Poland were in the process of reorganization. But as Prussia emerged as a world power and Sweden's military power developed and the Rumanovs became established on the throne of Russia, the situation of Poland changed. Diplomatic understanding of the Cossacks with the Tartars, Turkey, and Muscovy provided another threat for Polish independency.

\*\*) This other province was the Moldavian state and the rulers had the Ukrainian title of “Voyevoda” or “Hospodar.”

occupation was a welcome relief as a substitution for Polish evil, although Ukrainians, as a mass, had no knowledge of the social or political system of the new master. In the minds of the Ukrainian community, there could be nothing worse than the hell created by the Polish nobility. Such was the psychological mood of the Ukrainian people when they first encountered the Austrian government.<sup>9)</sup>


In 1780 Joseph II, one of the most representative figures of "enlightened absolutism," became the ruler of the Austrian empire. One of his first acts as a ruler "of Galicia and Lodomeria" was to take the peasants away from the jurisdiction of the gentry and place them under the jurisdiction of the government. Thus the peasants became subject-citizens of the state without the mediation of the feudal lords. Joseph II also ordered a detailed investigation of the economy of the newly acquired province, especially the burdens of the peasants. After examination, he issued a decree on April 16, 1786, reducing the existing obligation of six days labor per week on the lord's fields to only three days per week. All other exactions were forbidden and the lords who did not comply were subject to court action. After some years of study into the economy of his realm, Joseph II signed a revolutionary decree on February 10, 1786, which almost completely abolished servile obligations since all of the peasants who possessed their property became completely free from obligatory service. Labor was restricted to those who did not possess property. Unfortunately, the decree, though signed and promulgated, could not be applied because its author died four months later. His successor Leopold II and later Francis II preferred to follow the conservative path. But it should be mentioned that they made some attempts to limit the demands of the gentry and the burdens of the village.\*)

Naturally the reforms instituted by the Austrian monarchy evoked a friendly reaction on the part of the non-aristocratic population of Western Ukraine toward the Austrian government. It was a distinction between a state which protected its subjects against lawlessness and, on the other hand, the former Polish state, which in practice offered no protection. Therefore no propaganda was necessary on the part of the Austrian bureaucracy to evoke sympathy toward the regime it served. This mood prevailed among the peasant masses not only of Western Ukraine but also of the part of Poland which was then under Austrian rule.<sup>10)</sup>

Another act of the Austrian government was to grant full equality to the two Churches in Galicia. The first group the Austrian

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\*) For more information concerning the reforms of Joseph II, see Dr. Matthew Stachiw's essays about the social and national movement in Galicia (in Ukrainian) in the symposium "Zbarazhchyna," pp. 9-160.



"High Castle" on the top of the hill (built by the King Lev in the XIII century).

bureaucracy called "Greek Catholics" while the other group was referred to as "Roman Catholics."\*) The Austrian government also moved into the sphere of education. In Galicia, where during the period of Polish rule, only private and monastic schools were allowed to exist, a complete system of public education was established two years after Austria took control: parochial grade schools in villages and smaller towns, high schools in large cities, and a university in Lviv. In addition to placing the Ukrainian language on the same level as Polish, the government also made one more important reform: compulsory attendance at primary schools.<sup>11)</sup>

The governmental activity in the sphere of education did not sit well with the Polish nobility who were against the education of the masses. Therefore they began to work behind the scenes and in later years they managed to abolish the order for compulsory school attendance in Galicia. Even more determined was the Polish effort to suppress the permission to use the Ukrainian language in schools. Through their efforts, these Polish noblemen were able later to convince the Austrian government to do away with the equal status of the two languages.

Nevertheless under the new governmental system, albeit an absolute monarchy in character, Ukrainians found some measure of relief. Now they could develop more freely in the area of education and religion. The base of the population, the peasants, became half-

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\*) In Bukovina there existed a union of the Church with the Eastern Patriarch in Constantinople. This Church was called "Greek Orthodox."

free from the despotism of the Polish gentry, but even under this new system, the people did not obtain equality with the minority group,—the Poles. The reason for this was that in Austria there were some groups that were more privileged than others. Only the nobility and higher clergy had rights of political representation and they made advantage of it. Since the upper level of the Ukrainian aristocracy had been destroyed, the monarch and his governor could approach Ukrainians only through the metropolitan of Lviv and the bishop of Peremyshl.

The gentry, on the basis of Austrian law, elected its own representatives to the provincial "consultative" diet, which in fact did not have any power to legislate, but only the right to decide on proposals and on petitions to the monarch. This diet was composed of all the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic bishops, which meant that only two Ukrainian prelates were in this diet and their's was a voice in the wilderness among compact majority of the Polish members of this diet. The importance of this diet stemmed from the fact that it offered basic opinions concerning provincial matters. Although under the system of absolute monarchy no political parties could exist, the Polish gentry found means to overcome this fact. The Polish gentry had the opportunity through these provincial meetings provided by the elections to the consultative diet to plan the defense of its class and, at the same time, of its national interests. Such possibilities were denied the Ukrainians.<sup>12)</sup>

### **The Polish aristocracy comes to power**

The first positive reforms of the Austrian government in Galicia in the social and educational spheres were not continued by succeeding rulers. Francis proved from the first to be responsive to the wishes of large landowners. Actually, he retreated from the positions of Joseph II by not enforcing the almost total abolition of serfdom. But it is to his credit that he retained the reforms of his predecessor dealing with the equality of the languages in schools as well as the equality of Churches. In the beginning of his reign, his government had to consider the influence of the ideas of the French Revolution which declared equality under the law and called for national independence. The Austrian armies suffered constant defeats in battles with the French and Emperor Francis was forced to make concessions in peace treaties. Also there were times during the Napoleonic wars when the Poles with Napoleon's troops occupied part of Galicia and the Ukrainian metropolitan was forced to flee to avoid captivity. A reaction against the Ukrainians signaled a change in the policy of Francis I's government after Napoleon's march on Moscow failed in 1812. The danger of a revolution in



Austria diminished with the fall of Napoleon. The Austrian monarch, who always cherished sympathy for the old order, began to show openly his favoritism for the gentry, especially the Polish gentry in Galicia. This was quite natural since the upper and the middle Ukrainian aristocracy did not exist in Galicia and, therefore, only the Polish gentry was on hand to benefit from his favorable attitude. During this second period of Francis' long rule, the Polish gentry used the influence that it had gained by having access to the ruler's palace and his high officials to further the causes of interest to the Poles.

One gain, of the Poles, was in the sphere of economy: the decree of Joseph II was not carried out. Another gain was in the sphere of education. Since it was to the advantage of the Polish nobility to keep the peasants in ignorance, the decree dealing with compulsory education was withdrawn. Thus after 1812, the village schools existed only in the form of private parochial school, with open interference from the Polish gentry. Damage was also done in the field of secondary and university education. Since the time of Joseph II, the Ukrainian language had been used in the secondary schools while in Lviv University only the Ukrainian and German languages were used. Now in the second period of Francis I's reign, these privileges of the Ukrainian language in the secondary schools and the University were abolished and this situation lasted until 1848. Only a seminary for Greek Catholics retained the privilege of lectures in Ukrainian.

The imperial house in Vienna and its lieutenant in Lviv, in essence, had friendly cooperation and contact only with the gentry; in the case of Galicia, only with the Polish gentry. The Austrian bureaucracy let itself be gradually convinced that in Galicia and Bukovina no Ukrainian people existed at all. The Poles kept trying to convince the Austrian regime that those whom the Austrians considered to be Ukrainians were in essence Poles, and the language of Eastern Galicia was only a dialect of Polish without any historic or artistic literature. This plan obtained results. In the last three decades before the revolution of 1848, the Austrian central government entertained the view that both parts of Galicia were populated by one Polish population which embraced two rites. It is not surprising that the Ukrainian population remembered the epoch of Joseph II as a period of law and justice.<sup>13)</sup>

## CHAPTER 2

### LEGAL STRUGGLE OF UKRAINIANS FOR NATIONAL RIGHTS IN GALICIA

#### The developments in Austria and in Galicia and Galician "elections"

The conditions of life of the Ukrainian population in Galicia, Bukovina, and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine led first to ideological and, later, to political resistance. In Galicia, the Polish aristocracy ruled over a mass of Ukrainians even though it was done in the name of the Austrian government. In Bukovina, the ruling class consisted of Rumanian nobility, and the administration of the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine was in the hands of the Hungarian aristocracy. The mass of the Ukrainian population lacked any political rights and the cultural development of the Ukrainians encountered serious obstacles not so much from Austria as from the ruling class in the given area. Polish pressure in Galicia was responsible for creating a sense of injustice among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and it was also responsible for producing people of dedication and devotion to their subjugated nation. The situation was to be conducive to the growth of democratic ideas and ideals which would champion equal opportunity for all.

Principles of democracy were also implanted by the past,—the era of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Finally, Western Europe too made a contribution to the establishment of democratic principles in Ukraine through the French revolution. These factors provided a focal point and rationale for the modern democratic movement among the Ukrainian intelligentsia which was discernible as early as the 1820's. In Lviv this ideological movement was given formal expression by Markian Shashkevych, Yakiv Holovatsky, and Ivan Vahylevych—the so called "Ukrainian Trio of Galicia." Because of the absolutism and reactionary character of the existing Austrian regime, this democratic movement could not develop freely. The more important opposition came from the Polish aristocracy and its political lackeys. Nevertheless the movement grew not only in number of sympathizers but also in respect to its active followers.<sup>14)</sup>

Even before the events of 1848 had rocked the Austrian empire, an incident occurred which influenced further developments in Eastern Galicia. In 1846 the Polish nobility in Western Galicia, in

agreement with the free city of Cracow and Congress Poland, decided to stage an uprising which would produce an independent Poland. The aristocracy formed armed bands which were to act simultaneously in the district cities. They were to disarm the weak Austrian garrisons and proclaim the resurrection of the Polish state. Just before the plan was put into operation, local Austrian officials received news of the conspiracy and, in order to neutralize the threat, began an extensive propaganda campaign among the Polish peasantry. The crux of the argument was this: if Poland should be restored, the nobility would again return to its lawless ways. The Polish peasants, led by Jakob Szela, armed themselves with axes and scythes and attacked the detachments of nobility. Many such units of the peasants recognized it as an opportunity to shake off the peasants forced the aristocrats to flee to the larger cities where better protection was available. The loss on the part of the aristocrats was considerable: 152 estates were burned down and 1484 persons were killed.

These events evoked a response from the Ukrainian peasants in Eastern Galicia. The peasants near Lviv (village of Horozhanna) also attacked the estates of the gentry to prevent return of the Polish rule. But by the time the movement had reached the eastern parts, the aristocracy had had enough time to obtain the protection of the Austrian government and so a general Polish uprising was prevented.\*)

This movement to stop the return of Polish aristocratic rule, even though it failed to gain the proportions of a general uprising, did stimulate the growth of democratic sentiments in both Ukrainian secular and ecclesiastical circles. The atmosphere thus engendered caused an explosion in 1848 when the news of the revolutions in various parts of Austria reached Galicia.<sup>15)</sup>

The revolution in Vienna of that year gave an impetus to broad national movements of all subjugated nations under Austria (Czechs, Slovenians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Italians, and Croats). At the same time, it also awakened hopes among the ruling classes of Hungary and Poland for a rebirth of their own states founded upon the repression of other nationalities. The disorders in Vienna which began on March 13, 1848, were started by university students who were joined by professors and intellectuals and finally by the middle class and the workers. The cause of the disturbances was the emperor's refusal to comply with the students' petition which asked

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\*) The slaughter of nobility in Western Galicia performed by the Polish peasants is the greatest massacre of nobility by their own peasants of the 18th and 19th centuries. It serves as another example of the extent to which the rule of the aristocracy was hated even by their own peasantry.



Rev. Markian Shashkevych

for the establishment of a constitutional order with representation of the people. As the impetus of the revolution grew, some of the military detachments joined the rebel ranks. Considering the situation to be dangerous, the emperor issued a proclamation which granted some personal freedom, promised that general election to the parliament would be held in the near future, and authorized the formation of a national guard (March 15, 1848).

The events in Vienna had considerable repercussions among the Ukrainians in every part of the Austrian empire. The majority of the peasants recognized it as an opportunity to shake off their chains of servitude once and for all. This recognition was manifested by walking off the fields of their lords. A rumor spread through the villages that the peasants would have the same rights in the community and state as the upper classes. In short,—the slogans of political and social democracy for the Ukrainians also meant national freedom and equality.

The revolutionary spirit of 1848, for the first time since the days of Khmelnytsky, caused the Galician population to enter the political arena. In Galicia, the Ukrainian nation, as a mass, began to demand the rights of statehood in all spheres of life that were enjoyed by the other national groups in the Austrian empire. This spirit was embodied in the slogan: Ukrainians are to have their own rule in the eastern part of the country while the Poles are to rule only in the western part. In order for this slogan to become a reality it was necessary to develop the proper political organiza-

tion which did not and could not exist under the previous conditions of absolutism and serfdom. As far as the Ukrainians were concerned, everything had to start from the beginning.

The Poles, even in the era of absolutism, had had the opportunity to develop a political organization in Galicia. This was accomplished by the aristocrats when they gathered for the consultative diet and through the efforts of the middle class which had survived from the days of Polish statehood. The Poles were able to create an impression that the entire Galicia was populated only by the Poles by using their influence at the emperor's court and in the governor's office. Their policy was only partially successful, however, because the Ukrainian clergy (the most numerous group of the Ukrainian intelligentsia) had, even before the revolution, been constantly calling attention to the special privileges granted by the Austrian government to the Polish administration in Eastern Galicia, and to the secondary position to which Ukrainians were assigned. However, the Poles did manage to accomplish one thing: official circles in Austria came to doubt whether the Ukrainians in Galicia did represent a potential political power. Therefore, the government was more willing to make certain concessions to the strong Polish gentry. As soon as the news of the events in Vienna reached Lviv, the Polish leadership of the three influential classes demanded in a petition not only constitutional rights for the Poles but also a plenitude of power for themselves. In this petition Polish leadership failed to mention the fact that in Galicia there were Ukrainians who made up  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the country's population and that they should also have some political rights.

At the same time, as mentioned before, the Ukrainian peasantry was in an uproar and was demanding equal rights. A great danger seemed to loom that there would be a repetition of the events which had occurred in Western Galicia in 1846. On the other hand, the gubernatorial administration in Lviv observed that the Polish gentry and middle class were preparing an uprising against Austria. A similar movement was in the air in Hungary. Also in Northern Italy, which at that time was a part of the Austrian empire, there was an anti-Austrian current. Facing such threats, the Austrian government came to the conclusion that it would be beneficial to enlist the aid of the subjugated nations: Slovenians, Croats, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The government promised them the freedom and equality they sought if they would not support the Hungarian and Polish revolts. But even without these promises it was hardly possible that these people would be on the side of the oppressors. Therefore the Ukrainian political leadership (mostly clerical intellectuals and some professional people) at that time did not have any choice but to seek their opportunity on the side of

the government against the Hungarian and Polish aristocracy and bourgeoisie.

It is necessary to realize that in 1848 there were two opposing political programs in the struggle for independence. One of these programs called for immediate separatism from Austria. This program was advocated by Hungarians who wanted to make Hungary an independent state, but with the old frontiers encompassing Croatsians, Slovaks, and Trans-Carpathian Ukrainians.\*) Italians within the borders of Austria fought to achieve the unification of their territory with independent Italy. The Poles also wanted to be separated from Austria and at a convenient time to be united with the Polish territory held by Russia. The only catch to their program was that it included Eastern as well as Western Galicia.

The other program for reconstruction of political life in the Dual Monarchy was based on the federal principle and envisaged a federation of all nationalities inhabiting the Monarchy. The affairs of every province would be entrusted to the provincial parliament, (*diet, soym*) and the administration would be in the hands of a provincial government headed by the viceroy. His administration would be responsible to the *soym*. In matters concerning all nationalities, the authority would be vested in the Council of State. Elections to the Council of State and the provincial *soyms* were to be held on the basis of general, equal, secret and direct suffrage. The Council of State, once elected, was to approve the constitution for the whole empire.

This federalistic program was worked out and propagated by the Czechs since they were forced to this position by a realistic appraisal of the situation which confronted them. Surrounded by Germans on three sides, they could neither obtain effective aid from the Slovaks nor eliminate the German and Hungarian influences by their own efforts.

The Czechs, considering the might of Austria, could not envisage Polish success in freeing themselves simultaneously from both Austria and Russia and therefore thought the Poles might favor a federation. In regard to the Ukrainians, the Czechs took a similar attitude. They reasoned that the constitution of 1848 would guarantee national rights whereas a struggle on the part of that nation to unify with Eastern Ukraine under Russia would fall under the same social and national subjugation which Ukrainians on the Dnieper had suffered for a long time.

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\*) Also called Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, Ruthenia and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine.

This program of Austrian federation was expounded very convincingly and ably by the Czech historians (especially František Palacký) and it was warmly supported by the Czechs and Slovaks. It was Palacký who declared that "if no Austrian state existed, then one should be created under the given European economic and political conditions." Ukrainians in Galicia, Trans-Carpathia and Bukovina readily accepted the program of the Czech federalists. The matter of peaceful coexistence between Ukrainians and Poles would have been settled at that time if the Polish leadership had either accepted the Czech program or, if the Poles had decided their goal was to be the complete separation from Austria of only the Polish territories, i. e. Western Galicia and Austrian Silesia, and not attempted to include other territories too.

But the Poles did not follow either of these courses; they remained faithful to the old imperialistic program which preached renewal of the Polish state from the Baltic to the Black Sea ("from sea to sea"), a state which would include Byelorussians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians. The Polish leadership in 1848, however, did not totally reject the interim program of federation, though they provided modifications to suit Polish imperialistic aims. In discussions the Poles agreed to a reconstruction of Austria on a federalistic basis but they rejected nationality as the basis of federation. In essence, they did not want to agree that the Austrian province under the name "Kingdom of Galicia" should be divided into its historical and national parts. Polish political leadership strove, at all costs, to retain its rule in Eastern Galicia. Since this could not be accomplished by legal democratic means, the opposite tactics were tried. As early as March of 1848, it became apparent that the Poles had decided to employ a hostile policy toward the Ukrainians. At that time the Ukrainian leadership proposed to add a paragraph to the Polish draft of a petition to the emperor; this proposed paragraph expressed agreement with the emperor to a division of Galicia into two administrative units. The Polish leadership rejected this proposal without discussion, considering the Ukrainians too disorganized politically to offer any resistance.<sup>16)</sup>

Contrary to the Polish expectations, the Ukrainians began to form their organization very quickly. The organization rapidly attained a mass character when the peasants joined the movement on the basis of the opportunity for legal participation they had enjoyed since April 18, 1848. On that day, the governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion, took upon himself the abolition of servile obligations of the peasants and thus freed them from any dependency on their lords. By June 2nd of that year, in the quarters of the Metropolitan consistory in Lviv, the first meeting was held of the



first legal political organization, the "General Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Council."\*)

More than 300 delegates participated in the meeting, representing various occupations, although the majority of the delegates were clergy. The Polish leaders also sent their delegate who proposed that the Council should agree not only to keep Galicia as a unit but also suggested that the Council support the Polish program of reconstructing the old Poland with the pre-partition frontiers of 1772. Needless to say, the "proposals" of the Poles created a general furor in the assembly as well as a feeling of depression, since the policy of Poland was now clear.

The Council approved a resolution to support ideological unity with the Ukrainians under Russian rule and in political matters it decided to support the principle of Austrian reconstruction as a federation of nationalities. Because of international circumstances, the Council decided not to pursue a program of simultaneous separation from Austria and Russia, since such a program of struggle for an independent state was considering to be untimely. In a separate resolution and in various memorandums the Council declared itself to be the representative of Ukrainians in Galicia as well as of Ukrainians in other parts of the Habsburg empire, and underlined the differences that set them off from Poles or Russians.

On April 25, 1848, Ferdinand promulgated a temporary constitution to be in effect until the Council of State, which was to be chosen in the general elections, should work out a permanent constitution.<sup>17)</sup>

## **Anti-Slavic positions of Poles The attitude and further tactics of the Poles**

Before the Council of State could meet, the Czech political leaders sought to coordinate the political action of the Slavs who populated the Austrian empire. By organizing a well co-ordinated political maneuver, the Czech leadership sought to eliminate the German and Hungarian voices as the predominant political in-

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\*) **Holovna Ruska Rada.** In the middle ages, the term "Rus" was used to denote the Ukrainian people. In the 11th century, however, the term "Ukraine" was introduced into literary works too. Both terms were used simultaneously but "Rus" predominated in literary works while "Ukraine" was used more by the folk culture. After the advent of the 17th century, "Ukraine" became slowly the accepted term in Eastern Ukraine while it was not considered such in the literary circles of Western Ukraine until the first half of the 19th century. It should be pointed out, however, that the name "Rus" is not identical with "Russia." The true Latin name for the Rus people was "Ruthenian" and it was this terminology that the Austrian administration accepted.

fluences in the Council of State. Such was the goal of the Pan-Slav Congress which met on June 2, 1848, in Prague. The Ukrainian delegation was sent by the General Ruthenian Council while the Poles countered with a puppet delegation which they introduced as the real representatives of the Ukrainian people. Of the six puppets the Poles sent, only three were Ukrainians while the other three were drawn from the ranks of Polish aristocracy.\*) This trio played the part of Ukrainian aristocrats with supposedly democratic sympathies. The goal of the puppet delegation was to convince the gathering that everything was just perfect in Galicia and that no changes were wanted or needed. However, this maneuver failed to work. The real Ukrainian delegation presented instead a true picture of the social situation in Galicia, as well as of the hostile policies of Poles.

The Czechs played a leading role at the Congress as they tried, by all means, to bring about an understanding among the Slavic delegates and to consolidate and present a common united front against the Hungarian and German domination of the empire. It is not surprising to find that as early as the beginning of the 19th century the Czechs were responsible for the Slavophile movement. Since they were basically interested in the affairs of all Slavs, they were quite familiar with the Ukrainian position in Galicia as well as with the position of Poles and Russians. Under the circumstances, they could do nothing but support the platform of the General Ruthenian Council since the Ukrainians did not attempt to violate any rights of other peoples in Austria.

The opinion of the Congress forced the Polish delegation to make some concessions. It was agreed that Poles and Ukrainians would have equality. Furthermore, the Ukrainian language was to be used in administration and schools of Ukrainian districts and in all governmental offices. The Ukrainian language was to be used in all public elementary schools in Eastern Galicia, and high schools and university were to have parallel chairs. Finally, general elections were to be held as quickly as possible to elect a provincial *soym* that was to solve the question of Galicia's division.<sup>18)</sup>

The first attempt to reach an agreement between the two nationalities in Galicia was concluded on June 7, 1849. If this agreement had been realized at once, the history of Eastern Europe could have taken an entirely different course. Unfortunately, it was never put into practice because at that time the leadership of the Poles in Austria was in the hands of incorrigible chauvinists. The

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\*) Those aristocrats were prince Sopiha, prince Lubemirski, and count Diduszycki.

Prague Agreement had been necessary to the Polish gentry and bourgeoisie in order to preserve the good reputation of Poles among Slavs. The agreement also had a secondary aim: to lull the Ukrainians into a state of complacency and inactivity. The validity of this agreement was demonstrated not only in Galicia but also at a new wave of revolutionary activity; the Council of State was reconvened in Kremsier on December 22, 1848, and remained in session until March 4, 1849.

Although in 1848, the major emphasis in Polish policies was the attack directed against Austria, the Poles used every opportunity available to make secret reports and send memorandums to the Austrian government that informed on and distorted the national movement of the Ukrainians. This system of playing two sides against the middle had been used successfully in 1775 by Archbishop Sierakowski, who made a special visit to the Empress Maria Theresa in order to warn her that the Ukrainian Catholic Church was a masked Orthodoxy which had designs of separating Galicia from Austria and turning it over to Russia. The charge of Russophilism, which was said to have been prevalent among the Ukrainian clergy in Galicia, was never taken off the Polish check list of weapons and the chauvinists continued to use it until the fall of tsarist Russia.\*)

Before 1848, when only the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy could speak for the nation, these reports had one aim—to slander the whole Ukrainian Catholic Church and to cause its destruction at the hands of Austrian absolutism, which at that time settled all church matters by authoritative means. After 1848, when conditions of political freedom made possible a national movement among Ukrainians in Austria, the reports had the aim of discrediting this movement on the basis of its purported dangers to the Austrian monarchy. When the movement, under the influence of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko and his followers, became more radical, then the Polish informers injected another cause for alarm: a threat of *haydamachyna*.\*\*)

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\*) Between 1848-1870 the Polish leaders made 58 such reports. For more details see M. Stachiw: *Na Khvylyakh Revolyutsyyi: Part II*, (Lviv, 1938).

\*\*) A series of Ukrainian peasant revolts occurred against the Polish rule between 1730 and 1768. Some of them were limited, as the one led by Oleksa Dovbush in 1738-1745 which operated in Carpathian Hutsul country, while others assumed massive proportions, such as the one led by Maxym Zaliznyak in 1768 in the region of Uman.

## **The difficulties of the Ukrainians with Austria and Poles**

During the period of absolutism between 1812 and 1848, the Polish gentry made some important gains. Through their influence at the emperor's court, the Poles were named as representatives in high and important administrative offices, such as courts and regional administration, in addition to securing representation in the gubernatorial offices. By one means or another, the positions thus obtained were further utilized to force their candidates into the Council of State from the Ukrainian part of Galicia. Of the 96 seats which were allocated to Galicia, 48 should have been given to the Ukrainians. But through the influence of the Polish elections machine, the Poles managed to get 10 Ukrainian places. Although the Ukrainians thus had only 38 seats in a body of 383 members, they were a considerable political force which had to be taken into consideration by the Austrian government. But their political influence was less than it should have been, considering their numerical strength. This loss of influence was attributed to two factors: in the first place, all of the positive proposals made by the Ukrainian representation were ardently opposed by the Polish delegates who held a superiority in numbers (they also controlled delegates from Silesia). In the second place, the majority of Ukrainian delegation consisted of peasants who, although they possessed a deep political instinct, lacked parliamentary experience. Only ten clerical members of the delegation had higher education.

Against them stood the Polish delegation, not only superior in number but consisting of aristocracy and professional people, a group much better versed in parliamentary political maneuver than Ukrainian peasants.

In the local districts the hostility of the Poles toward the Ukrainians was apparent during the elections and this animosity was even more pronounced in the parliament. Here it could not be explained by evoking a reference to a supercharged election atmosphere since, in the parliament, it was necessary to take a definite stand on this or that proposed law which pertained to the organization of the whole Austrian empire and the new constitutional foundations. The Czechs and other Slavic delegates tried to enact a constitution which would be based on the federation of the national regions. By means of various parliamentary tactics, the Poles fought decisively and ably against this national principle. In this way, they clearly broke the agreement made with the Ukrainians in Prague. since now, in parliament, they fought against Ukrainian equality with other peoples of the monarchy.

The relations between the two delegations were sharpened even more after the Poles, by means of behind-the-scenes intrigues,

managed to get the emperor to recall Count Franz Stadion from the post of governor in Lviv. Stadion's "crime" was that he tried to be an impartial administrator of the province. He was replaced by Count Wacław Zaleski, a Polish aristocrat. The new governor immediately began to fulfill his role, but not as an Austrian representative whose duty it was to preserve legality and peaceful co-existence. From the beginning he considered himself to be an exponent of Polish nationalist or even chauvinistic interests.

Having received the nomination from the emperor in June, 1848, Count Zaleski used his influence in the central government to obtain certain desired reforms from Minister of Education. The minister, by a decree of September 29, 1848, made the use of the Polish language compulsory in all high schools of Eastern Galicia, while the university in Lviv, designed especially for Ukrainians, was converted into a Polish institution. The move, an obvious violation of the Polish-Ukrainian agreement of Prague, was the final straw for the General Ruthenian Council whose members organized petitions of protest against this decree. In view of the fact that the Poles did not intend to keep their bargain, the leader of the Council, Bishop Hryhoriy Yakhymovych, who was also the leader of the delegates to the Council of State, organized similar mass petitions to the Council of State in favor of a final constitutional settlement that would divide Galicia into two separate parts: Ukrainian and Polish.

As a result of these petitions and the initiative of the Czech parliamentary delegation, the matter of the division of Galicia had by December of 1848, become the subject of sessions of the constitutional commission of the Council of State. The members of the Polish delegation opposed, as a block, such a division. In order to weaken the realistic arguments of the Ukrainian delegation, the Polish leadership again presented a puppet delegation with several persons of Ukrainian descent and the remainder of Polish. Once again the puppet delegation declared before the commission that they represented the Ukrainian people of Galicia and Bukovina and that the people did not wish to have any changes made in Galicia. Other Slavic delegations, especially the Czechs led by such well-known Czech politicians as Palacký and Rieger, came out in defense of the Ukrainian cause. In reply to this pro-Ukrainian argument the Poles, with a certain amount of agitation, continued to declare from the speaker's rostrum that no Ukrainian people existed. They saw only two nations in Eastern Europe: Poles and Muscovites. The fact that there was an elected delegation in the Council of State representing Ukrainians was explained by asserting that it represented people who were Polish but only of another religious rite. These attempts of the Polish delegation to confuse the issue must

have been macabre, indeed, especially since the 38 elected deputies would appear to represent someone non-existent.

However, the Polish maneuvers in the Council of State failed. The constitutional commission decided by a considerable majority on a just settlement of the Ukrainian-Polish dispute and came forth with a project to divide Galicia into two separate units. The decision of the commission was not carried out, however, since the commission itself had a short life. On March 4, 1849, the emperor, not waiting for the prepared constitution, promulgated a constitution of his own, dissolving the Council of the State by a decree. The new elections, on the basis of the new constitution, were not held since even this constitution remained a paper measure. It was also eliminated formally by a decree of December 31, 1851, after the central government had further consolidated its position. This date opened a new era of Austrian absolutism.<sup>19)</sup>

### **The situation in the era of new absolutism and new "constitution"**

However, during the period that the constitution was in effect (Emperor Franz Joseph I\*), guided by the opinions of the former constitutional commission of the Council of State, issued a decree proposed by the Bach ministry. This decree was couched in a spirit of justice although it still fell short of the mark. It divided Galicia and Bukovina into three administrative provinces: Cracow, Lviv, and Stanyslaviv. Each of the provinces was to elect its own diet while administrative matters common to all Galicia and Bukovina were to be settled in a common provincial assembly to which each diet would send five delegates. But this division did not last long. With the return of absolutism such an organization became unrealistic and therefore abandoned.<sup>20)</sup>

In the new era of absolutism Ukrainians lost again in every respect. The people were plebeians, without aristocracy and without large landowning and industrial classes. The new ruler, Franz Joseph I, continued to follow the former policy of supporting, whenever he could, the aristocracy and the new capitalist class. The burdens of the state and provinces were placed on the shoulders of the working people of Galicia, mainly Ukrainians. The bureaucracy, with the governor at the head, was Polish and therefore it is not

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\*) Ferdinand I abdicated his throne in favor of his nephew, Franz Joseph, who was eighteen years old at that time. He was soon under a strong reactionary influence which strove to renew absolutism. It is not surprising that Polish aristocrats were also able to exert their influence down to 1916, i. e. to his death.



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City Hall  
in Lviv

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surprising to find a planned campaign of Polonization in Eastern Galicia during this period.

In secrecy, the Polish leadership was planning a revolt, this time against Russia. The Poles decided not to vex Austria and Germany since they needed a base for recruiting and for operations. This fact was exploited by the central government in Vienna. In view of the fact that Austrian policy in the Balkans clashed with that of Russia, it was beneficial to the Austrian regime in Galicia to support the Poles in their anti-Russian projects since Russia would then have to divert her attention from the Balkans to her domestic scene. At the same time, the Austrian government also made overtures to the Ukrainians, promising to protect them from the Polish threat. But this was only a political move, based on the Roman principle: "Divide and rule."

The machinations of the Polish upper crust in Vienna bore fruit when the absolutist regime had to make concessions again in the direction of a constitutional order. This occurred after the unhappy war of 1859 which found Austria fighting Italy and France. The Austrian defeat considerably weakened the prestige of absolutism, and at the same time, the internal faults and weaknesses of the administration and the lack of popular support became obvious. The war forced the emperor to issue a diploma on October 20, 1860, which once again established a constitutional order, although in a limited form. Fearing a revolution with its democratic slogans, the ruler established a federalistic constitution. But it did not endorse the creation of a national federation but rather retained the old Austrian creations—the Kingdom of Galicia and the Grand Duchy of Cracow. It is apparent that Austria sought to achieve two goals by this action. The first was to appease the Polish aristocracy and

middle class in their imperialistic designs on Ukrainians, thus gaining their support for the Austrian monarchy. On the other hand, the Austrian monarch wished to have a situation in Galicia which would permit him to play one nation against the other and, under those circumstances, Vienna could act as an "impartial judge." Another and probably decisive factor in the Austrian decision not to divide Galicia was the social structure of the Poles and Ukrainians. As mentioned before, Ukrainians were for the most part plebeian people. The monarch with his entourage was definitely conservative and aristocratically minded and, therefore, could not sympathize with the plebes regardless of their education or their place in the clerical hierarchy. It was different in the case of Poles. They had an aristocracy well suited for "life at court" and with the same social views as the imperial court.

The principle of keeping Galicia united was retained in the next constitution, adopted after Austria's defeat in 1866 at the hands of Prussia. Issued in December, 1867, this constitution divided the Hapsburg realm into the Austrian empire and the Hungarian Kingdom with separate administrations. Unfortunately for the Austrian Germans, they did not form a majority of the population in their half of the monarchy; therefore, the regime was forced to seek alliance with the Poles and to make certain concessions in order to secure their loyalty. The first such concession was the agreement to keep Galicia undivided under the new constitution of 1867.<sup>21)</sup>



### CHAPTER 3

## THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLES OF THE UKRAINIANS

### The "autonomy" and "elections" to the provincial soym

The October Diploma of 1860 divided the Austrian empire into autonomous provinces and established a central parliament which was to be composed of deputies chosen by the provincial assemblies. The power of the central parliament extended to external affairs, finances, military matters, and tariffs, while the power of the provincial assemblies for the most part was restricted to local affairs. In the provinces, the central government was represented by the viceroy, the executive officer of the federal administration. The enforcement of federal laws and the supervision and scrutiny of local laws for political soundness were in the hands of each district's officer, the *starosta*, who was directly responsible to the provincial viceroy.<sup>22</sup>)

The administration of Galicia was in control of the Provincial Department whose chiefs were elected by the provincial *soym* and responsible to it. The district office of the Provincial Department was the direct link between the individual communities and the provincial government. This system could have created bearable conditions for cultural, economic and political life if the policies of the central and provincial governments had been impartial or responsive to the wishes of the people thus governed.

The deputies to the Galician diet (*soym*) were chosen by three groups of electors—*curiae*. The first group consisted of the large landowners, who in practice were the Polish aristocrats. The second category of electors was made up of the representatives of industry and commerce. Since the industry in Galicia was virtually nonexistent, the middle class composed this category. The final group of electors was made up of the peasants. There existed still another group of a few select individuals who had their parliamentary seats assured without election and therefore did not have to indulge in any campaigns or political activity. This elite group consisted of all the bishops of both Churches, the rectors of the universities in Lviv, and Cracow, and of the Polytechnical Institute in Lviv, and the president of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow. Percentage wise, the aristocrats were assigned 31.7% of the seats and

the peasants were allocated 42.8%. That is to say, 3235 families controlled a third of the parliament while the millions of peasants could not elect even half of the representation. The question of representation was further complicated by the shrewd regulations dealing with the method of elections.

Of all the categories of electors, only the peasants were to have an indirect voting system. This system was both cumbersome and complicated. Each village, on the basis of its population, was charged with electing an appropriate number of electors who were to meet with other village electors in the district city. There, under the auspices and watchful eyes of the electoral commission, which was dominated by the district officer, the electors would cast an open vote for their candidate. This system of voting was quite favorable to the Polish administration since it was easier to commit certain voting irregularities. It was a frequent occurrence that the village elector would be intercepted by various agents of this Polish administration and held a virtual prisoner long enough to render the elector's vote useless at the convention of electors. Even when the villages began providing escorts for their electors, it was found that the administration could circumvent the spirit of the law by arresting and detaining not only the elector but his escort as well.<sup>23)</sup>

This lack of representative balance can not be fully appreciated unless it is viewed in the national aspect.\*) The first category of electors was comprised of the large landlords. There may have been one or two Ukrainians or Jews in this category but their political significance was zero. The same thing was true of the second category which was composed of the township voters. In the group with the established (without election) parliamentary membership there were only two Ukrainians—the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl. Under such circumstances only the peasants could elect their own Ukrainian deputies to the provincial parliament (*soym*). But since 42.8% of the seats allotted to the peasants were for the

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\*) Polish statisticians presented with great delight the figures dealing with Galician population in such a manner that all Jews were considered to be Polish and thus increased the Polish population. The Ukrainians of Roman Catholic rite were also included in their midst. Nevertheless they could not gather more than 58% of the total population in 1910. But if one should subtract from the "Polish number" the "Poles of Moses' faith," then the total figure would drop 13% and thus the percentage of the Poles is reduced to 45%. Eliminating the Romanized Ukrainians decreases the Polish percentage to 40% of the total Galician population. In addition to population statistics, it is well to remember that this artificially created union of Ukrainian Galicia with the Grand Duchy of Cracow comprised a land area of 70 080 square kilometers while the Ukrainian ethnic area consisted of 55,700 square kilometers and the Polish area the remaining 23,380 square kilometers.



**The building of the Galician Soym (Parliament).  
Now there is Ivan Franko University.**

whole province, it was possible for them to elect only a third of the total number of deputies and thus the Poles had their parliamentary majority assured. The system of control was given to the Poles in the Imperial Patent for Galicia which stipulated that any changes, especially those concerning the elections, had to be approved by the majority of *soym*. Therefore the Ukrainians could not hope for any changes legally since the Poles would never allow them. The only factor that could change this system would have to be a revolution beginning from the roots. There was one other solution available but it required Polish cooperation. Previous experiences with "Polish co-operation" had proved to be very disappointing; however, this approach was not yet abandoned, as will be shown later.

The first elections to the provincial parliament were held without any significant interference on the part of the administration. The Ukrainians managed to send 49 deputies, who immediately lodged a formal protest against the election rules and demanded that the provincial patent be changed. However, they hastened to declare their willingness to co-operate with the Poles even within the established framework. The Poles pretended to show considerable interest but they failed to make any concrete concessions which would give the Ukrainians equality under the law. This murky situation continued to exist for several years.

### **The Polish uprising of 1863 and the consequences**

In 1863 the Poles decided once again to break away from the protective custody of Russia but their move had disastrous consequences. Among the many reasons for the failure of the insurrec-

tion was the fact that the leadership placed too many hopes on various elements. In the first place, the leadership failed to get the expected support from their own peasants. Unable to muster popular support, their small partisan detachments were hardly a match for the Russian superiority in manpower and material. Another Polish miscalculation was in respect to the Ukrainian peasants living under Russia. Polish agitators offered these peasants various material gains and greater happiness in the "new" Poland but, at the same time, the Poles made it clear that the boundaries of the new state would reach the Dnieper River.\*) Unfortunately for the Poles, the Ukrainian peasants had one national characteristic—a memory of their historic past and traditions. To replace one evil with another did not seem worthwhile enough for them to stick their necks into the tsarist noose and so they declined the offer to become comrades in arms.

The Poles also placed high hopes on international intervention from France or possibly Great Britain to aid their cause. Polish emigres in France went so far as to claim in their messages to Congress Poland that Napoleon III promised the full military support that he had offered Italy in 1859. However, these hopes also proved to be wishful thinking and Paris limited itself only to a diplomatic inquiry of the situation.<sup>24</sup>)

When the preparation for the insurrection were in progress, the expectations of the Ukrainian support had some influence in Galicia. The Poles in provincial parliament showed some desire to reach an agreement but as the insurrection fizzled out, the Polish leadership decided to establish a new policy to be followed for the next few decades. It was decided that they should consolidate their position in Galicia, a move which met with response in Vienna since the regime had discovered a few weak spots in its constitutional armor. One of the problems facing Vienna was the large block of Slavs in the central parliament,—the Council of State. The regime was forced to maneuver in such a manner as to prevent any solidarity from developing among the Slavs or, otherwise, this Slavic block could possibly destroy the national balance between the Slavs and Germans in Austrian Empire. To obtain a decisive majority in the central parliament, Vienna sought Hungarian support at the expense of the Slovaks, Rumanians and Croats. In the Austrian part of the empire, the Poles were needed for a decisive majority. While the Poles and Austrian Germans were courting behind the scenes,

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\*) The name of this main Ukrainian river is anglicized. The real Ukrainian name is Dniipro.

the Ukrainians still believed that the Galician patent would be changed to agree with the spirit of the constitution, and that the principle of real national equality would be recognized.

### **The Defeat of Austria in Prussian War and new "constitutional" change in Austria**

All the attempts on the part of the Ukrainians to reach a settlement in Galicia were led astray in Lviv and Vienna by delaying tactics. Meanwhile the Austrian army proved to be no match against Prussia and the war ended in disaster for Austria (1866). Fearing new disturbances, Franz Joseph broadened the constitutional freedoms (December, 1867) and at the same time concluded an agreement with the Poles at the expense of the Ukrainians. That the Poles were satisfied with the agreement was apparent from the statement made by the Poles in the provincial Galician parliament, in which the Poles pledged their support and loyalty to the "Most Illustrious Lord."<sup>25</sup>)

This low bow on the part of the Polish aristocrats was not made without reason. If we consider the gifts they received from Austria in the form of the 1860 constitution and the provincial patent of later date, their reason is obvious. By making such a bow, they could rightly expect additional changes which would coincide with their interests. That this manifestation of loyalty was warmly received in Vienna was proven by the Austrian minister Beust, who made a formal promise in 1867 that Vienna would in no way interfere with the question of constitutional equality of the Ukrainians and Poles. The established patent of Galicia would remain in force as long as the Poles so desired or would be changed when the Poles agreed to another. Thus the equality of the Ukrainians would depend on the good will of the Polish parliamentary leadership. "The solution of the question whether and to what extent the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in Galicia are to exist is left up to the Galician parliament," declared the generous Beust. In his bureaucratic mind, he saw the existence of nations based on artificially created means, even though it might be in opposition to the will of the majority.

### **Polish-German agreement has created Russophilism**

Future events would prove that both partners of the agreement were in error: contrary to the will of the Polish Galician parliamentary majority, the Ukrainians continued to exist and grow in strength. However, the agreement did have one immediate and apparent effect—a momentary drop of Ukrainian spirit. A part of the

Ukrainian intelligentsia, in view of the difficult political situation, fell into helplessness and despair. The government which was expected to guarantee constitutional equality sold the Ukrainians for the sake of political expediency to the arbitrary rule of the Poles. Since the Poles held the position that the Ukrainians were only "misera contribuens plebs," the Ukrainians would in no case be allowed to have any political rights nor any educational or cultural privileges. It was painfully obvious that both sides sought to destroy the Ukrainians even though this process was to be "legal."

This conviction was further driven home by the declaration of the representative of the Polish majority in the *soym*. "There is no Ukraine. There is only Poland and Muscowy," declared deputy Leszek Borkowski. This declaration had only one meaning for the Ukrainian representatives: they were presented with a choice of Polonization on one side or Russification on the other. Thus the agreement of the Poles with Austria and the Polish position in regard to Ukrainians in Galicia planted a seed of Russophilism. This sentiment affected only that small segment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that was weak in spirit and had lost its energy in the little appreciated struggle with the Polish administration for the rights of the Ukrainian people.

However, this group, even in a moment of despair, did not seek Polish favors but hoped that the Russian power might free them from the Polish despotism. This illogical and apolitical orientation was explained by the group in this way: "If we are to perish as a nation then we prefer to drown in the large Russian sea rather than to suffocate in the Polish marsh."

And so in Eastern Galicia the Poles managed to foster not only a deep hatred between the two nations but also encourage a Russophilic sentiment in some circles. In Transcarpathian Ukraine the same sentiment was accredited to the despotism of the Hungarian rule. This Russophilic disease remained active until the first decades of the 20th century. However, its presence gave the Poles an excellent opportunity to use it effectively in the last quarter of the 19th century even though its effectiveness diminished as years went by.<sup>26)</sup>

### **The activities of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in social field**

Even in this political blind alley formed by the Austrian-Polish agreement the majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued to work for the people. The main concentration was in the field of education where they helped to establish club libraries in most communities. In 1868 the central educational society *Prosvita*

(Enlightenment) was established in Lviv and it rapidly became a massive organization with libraries and reading rooms in almost every village and town throughout the province. The society's membership grew to hundreds of thousands of informed people, who were aware of nationality, history, and culture. Political and economic-cooperative organizations were established to help the peasants. This renewed activity among the Ukrainians convinced the Austrian Germans and Poles that they were dealing with the masses rather than with a small group of lay and ecclesiastic leaders.

Before this realization came to pass, the Ukrainians decided once again to reach some understanding with the Poles. This time the idea was embraced by Yulian Lavrivskyy, member of the *soym* and a judge by profession. He approached the situation from the judicial point of view which suggested that any conflict could be solved by means of compromise. This proposal he made public in the *soym* on October 27, 1869, with the support of thirty other Ukrainian deputies. His motion proposed the equality of the Ukrainian language in offices of the government and schools and by means of law to stabilize the autonomy in political, educational and church matters separately for the two nations in the province. If the proposals were accepted by the Poles, the Ukrainians would abandon demands for separation of Galicia into two parts.

The response of the Polish leadership was very enthusiastic. Lavrivskyy was elected *vice-marshal* (vice-president) of the *soym* and a commission was elected, consisting of 15 members, and charged with the responsibility of finding methods of legislation to put the motion for agreement into effect.

The commission was told to make its proposals before the parliament only if they had the unanimous approval of its members. This was the first hint as to the true position of the Poles. Since the commission was composed of  $\frac{2}{3}$  Poles and  $\frac{1}{3}$  Ukrainians, there would be a Pole present at all times who would discuss endlessly the matters which were already obvious in order to prevent any agreement on a more practical motion of the commission. For two years the topic of discussion was whether the Ukrainians existed at all. Finally all but two of the members agreed to the independent existence of the Ukrainians. The holdouts clung to Borkowski's thesis that only Poland and Muscovy existed in Eastern Europe. The recognition of the Ukrainian existence was the formal basis for debates on the question of the Ukrainian language for use in schools and governmental offices. The endless debates did not exhaust Lavrivskyy's patience. He remained convinced that eventually the Poles would acknowledge the Russian threat to the Poles themselves and therefore they would agree to the cooperation necessary to protect the common interests of the Ukrainians and Poles. As late as 1871,

he continued to stress that since it was the Ukrainian side which made the motion for an agreement, the Ukrainians should wait patiently for the Poles to take a clear stand on this matter.<sup>27)</sup>

### The sterility of the new Ukrainian attempt to peace

But the patience proved to be as sterile as the waiting since the Poles did not consider the Ukrainian political development strong enough to take any action. With the death of Lavrivskyy, the hopes of the Ukrainian deputies for any understanding also died. No proposals on the motion were accepted by the *soym* and it became apparent that other methods had to be used to achieve the desired progress.

Thus the Ukrainian leadership turned to the masses, intensifying its work in the sphere of education and organization. The doctrine of organization in every aspect of life was worked out by the representative of the new political emigration from Eastern Ukraine, Professor Mykhaylo Drahomaniv, and his disciples Ivan Franko and Mykhaylo Pavlyk. By the second half of the 1870's, this doctrine found more and more support in Galicia. This process of organization forced the Poles to take a closer look at the movement since such reconstruction threatened the Polish denials of the Ukrainian existence. But before this growing giant would be permitted to make even the slightest gain in the affairs of the province, the Polish gentry decided to capitalize on its position in Galicia which had been given it as a gift by Austria. Obviously, such gains would be made at the expense of the Ukrainians.


The most important gain was in the form of taxation which was obtained without any special screen. First of all, the Polish aristocracy obtained remunerations for the abolition of serfdom. The total cost, including the interest and administration of the funds, reached up to 225 million in Austrian value.\*) Considering the fact that the nobility did not exceed a population of about 3500, this sum was like a prize won in a lottery at the expense of the province. As was customary, this added burden was placed mostly on the shoulders of the peasants.<sup>28)</sup>

Another act of robbery committed against the peasants was the manner in which the government dispensed with the peasant's right to use the meadows, pasture grounds, and woods. These vital areas were held in common—that is the lord owned the property while the peasant had the right to use it. The nobility managed to get a decree which ordered them to buy out peasant rights of their

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\*) In this time the amount had the value of \$90,000,000.





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**Ivan Franko**  
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
grounds. Since the nobility controlled the commissions that evaluated the value of the peasant right to use these properties, the prices were set next to nothing and thus the aristocracy gained complete control of an important instrument of pressure. All at once, the peasants were deprived by "legal means" not only of their free ground rights (ground servitudes) but, in addition, their social and political opponents became the absolute masters of properties which the peasants needed in order to operate their holdings properly. This method was used for a long time by the Polish aristocracy to keep the peasants mute in political affairs.<sup>29)</sup>

There was another abuse of the taxpayer's money, probably the only one like it on the European scene. In the days of the Polish statehood a noble was granted the right to be the sole producer and distributor of alcoholic beverages in his village. In 1875, the aristocrats passed a law which entitled them compensation for the abolishment of this monopoly to the sum of 66 million of Austrian value.\*) The payment of this "indemnity" was placed on the prov-

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•) In that time the amount was equal to \$26,400,000.

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**Mykhaylo Pavlyk**  
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ince, even though the nobles still retained ownership of taverns and distilleries which were rented to someone else only part of the time. Since the provincial laws were signed by the emperor and approved by the central government, this situation only serves to underline the degree of understanding which the two partners had made. The Polish aristocracy profited from the bargain by receiving these tidy sums of money and the German part of Austria's payment consisted of keeping Galicia without industries, thereby providing the German Austria with an available and non-competitive market. Thus it was not surprising to see that in 1914 only a few industrial works existed in Galicia, usually involving mining (coal, salt, petroleum).<sup>30</sup>)

### **The poverty of the people and especially of peasants**

The industrial backwardness of Galicia created a surplus of workers and this caused suffocating conditions in the villages. Already small holdings of land were split into even smaller plots, making the province one of the most agriculturally overpopulated areas in the world. The situation can be better appreciated if we consider the fact that the smallest holdings, which had less than two hectares of land, made up almost a half of the peasant farms (48%) although they covered only 9% of the total area in Galicia. Holdings consisting of 2-5 hectares made up 38% of the total farms, while

only 3235 families of aristocrats held almost half of the land in Galicia.

The lack of land and industry created a mass of idle workers. This state of poverty was in the interest of the nobility who in this way could have all the cheap labor it needed. It was not by choice but by necessity that the peasant agreed to work the land of his former master for next to nothing. The going wage for a day's work, from sunrise to sunset on his own food, was 25 hellers (5 cents at that time).

Keeping in mind such conditions of the peasant, it is not difficult to see that the struggle of the Ukrainians in Galicia had economic as well as political connotations. Since the Poles were reluctant to make any reforms, this struggle became more radical, sharpening the antagonism between the Ukrainians and the ruling class. To avoid any open explosion and to neutralize and weaken the organizational effort of the Ukrainians, the Poles by 1890 decided to reach some agreement with the Ukrainian leadership.<sup>31)</sup>

### **A project of agreement initiated by Polish gentry**

Both previous attempts (in 1848 in Prague and 1869 in Lviv) to reach an agreement with the Poles were initiated by the Ukrainians. This time the initiative was taken by the viceroy of Galicia, Polish Count Badeni, on November 24, 1890. Theoretically, he represented the central government but in reality he considered himself to be a representative of Polish interests. His latter role was further strengthened by the presence of a Pole in the cabinet of ministers in Vienna since 1871—a minister without portfolio—whose chief duty was to defend the Polish interests in Galicia, and more especially, to dwarf the attempts of the cabinet to grant the Ukrainians legal equality in their own land.

Badeni invited the Ukrainian parliamentary leaders to a conference during the course of which he proposed that they should cease their parliamentary opposition to the administration and, in return, the administration would comply with some of the Ukrainian demands in the fields of culture and economy. The question of Galicia's division should be removed as a topic from any discussion. The conference made it very apparent that the government wished the Ukrainian conservative leadership to sever its connection with the radical wing, led by the eminent writer of Western Ukraine, Ivan Franko, who had established the wing as a separate political group—the Ukrainian Radical Party.<sup>32)</sup>

The proposals of the viceroy were obviously quite tempting to the majority of the deputies. Examining the situation in Galicia

realistically, the deputies saw that the prospect of Galician division was far away since such a policy was not only opposed by the Poles but also by the Austrian regime which needed the Poles for its political machinations. At the same time, the chance to accomplish cultural reconstruction was quite appealing, considering the pitiful state of affairs existing in that area. Up to this time, the Polish administration allowed only the most primitive type of Ukrainian public elementary education, consisting of one grade which could not possibly provide sufficient background for a student to enter any sort of secondary school. In the larger cities there was not even a secondary school which allowed the use of the Ukrainian language. However, there were available secondary schools which used the Polish language. This offered another means of Polonization of the Ukrainian middle class and workers. The province lacked even one teacher's training institute which used Ukrainian as the language of instruction. There existed in Lviv only one Ukrainian high school and it taught only four grades instead of the usual eight. The Ukrainian attempts up to that time, to open a separate university in Lviv, were fruitless and the use of the Ukrainian language was restricted to the faculty of theology, philosophy, and the law. Therefore, it is obvious why it was accepted.

The Ukrainian conservatives still entertained hopes for an agreement which would eventually lead to political equality. However, the hopes did not meet with the expectations. After several years of waiting for the cultural improvements, the administration allowed only four new high schools to be established and the 4-year high school in Lviv was expanded to 8 years, while the Poles, through the taxes of the province, had 17 high schools just in the eastern part of Galicia. Reminded of the promises and the slow process of improvement of the Ukrainian position, Badeni declared that no promises had been made and no demands would be considered. Under the circumstances the Ukrainian conservatives had no choice but to close ranks with the Radicals in a common front against the Polish rule under the Austrian eagle.<sup>33</sup>)

## CHAPTER 4

### INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GALICIA

#### "Galician methods" of Austrian administration

Frustrated by the overfailure to reach an agreement with the Poles, the Ukrainians decided that they should reexamine their own program. By 1895, the majority of the Ukrainian leaders had decided to adopt a policy calling for the complete independence of all Ukraine.\*) These under Austrian regime united with those Ukrainian territories under Tsarist regime. To put such a program into operation, it was necessary to establish political and socio-economic organizations for that purpose. The peasants were grouped around produce, credit, and commercial co-operatives, while the city population was organized on professional basis. Considerable attention was given to the educational system by establishing libraries, reading clubs, private elementary and secondary schools. This educational structure was headed by the Shevchenko Scientific Society, which fulfilled the functions of an academy of sciences.

On the political front, the Ukrainians followed two programs. One called for the continuation of the struggle for constitutional equality, while the other sought to obtain economic reforms for the village in order to raise the standard of living. The latter program became a unifying element for all Ukrainians regardless of their party affiliation. The political sentiment of the people found its expression in the four Ukrainian parties of Galicia. The conservatives were represented by the Ukrainian Christian Social Party. It was founded in 1896, drawing most of its support from the clergy; it had influence upon approximately 1% of the population.\*) The Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP), established in 1899, represented the political center. With its roots reaching back into the 1889's, it was the strongest and the most influential party, enjoying the support of approximately 60% of the voters. The Ukrainian Radical Party (URP) represented the left. It was organized in 1890, although its evolution began in the 1870's, and was led by the most prominent writer of Western Ukraine, Ivan Fran-

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\*) There remained a handful of Ukrainian Populists, led by deputies O. Barwinsky and N. Vakhnyanyn, who continued to "honor the agreement" of 1890. Their influence, however, was negligible since the Poles failed to provide them with any concrete benefits to be taken to their constituents.

ko.\*) It was a party of the common man seeking basic reforms in society, economics, and politics. It acknowledged the full equality and dignity of any man who performed a socially useful function. It had the support of about 30% of the population. In 1897, the URP was split when the Marxist doctrine was accepted by a minority. This minority later formed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. In principle it followed the program of Social Democrats of other countries, enjoying popularity with 9% of the total population.<sup>34</sup>)

The struggle for economic reforms in Eastern Galicia assumed a national character, since the large estates were in the hands of the Poles. Exploitation of peasants increased the radicalism of the movement and the solidarity achieved by this program resulted in a general strike of agricultural workers in 1902, the first general strike of this kind in European history.

The rebellious spirit prevailed in other parts of the Monarchy, and in the 1890's, a voting category reform was instituted. A new voting category was established, the general *curia* whose members had, up to that time, been excluded from voting. Although this concession on the part of the regime temporarily released some of the political tension in the empire, the Ukrainians, by means of demonstrations, continued to demand an equal, general, secret, and direct vote in the elections to the Council of State. By achieving this aim, they hoped to create a more favorable atmosphere in the Galician province that would lead eventually to a change in provincial voting regulations.

It was felt that only after Galicia was divided into the two parts would the struggle be completed. With this growth of Ukrainian political organization, the Poles, as one might expect, increased their resistance to the Ukrainian demands. As the work of various educational organizations began to take hold among the peasants and as the use of pressure and bribery of voters became less effective, the Polish administration was forced to rely more and more on terror tactics and theft of ballot boxes to assure their candidate's victory. These methods reached serious proportions in 1897 when Polish Count Badeni was appointed to the post of Minister-President of the Austrian Empire. The elections to the Council of State which were to be held that year promised defeat for much of the Polish block in Eastern Galicia. To avoid this unpleasant situation, Badeni ordered his district chiefs to "gain seats by any means." This order was taken literally. The election was turned into

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\*) His views of other political parties as well as of their leaders can be found in Voznyak M. S.: *Z ZHYTTYA I TVORCHOSTI IVANA FRANKA*, pp. 136-157, Kyiv, 1955.



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**Dr. Kost Levytskyy**

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a bloody battleground which left 10 Ukrainian peasant voters dead and 30 seriously wounded either by bullets or bayonets. Almost a thousand voters were arrested. Thus a day of voting which, in most democratic countries, becomes a national holiday became a day of mourning in Eastern Galicia.

The true face of the "election," when presented to the rest of the empire, caused a furor in the newly elected Council of State. A large number of deputies representing the Czechs, Slovaks, Italians (and a few from Austria proper) took a definite stand against Badeni, especially when he employed similar tactics against the workers in the western parts of Austria. In the face of such strong opposition, Badeni was forced to resign, even though he was supported by the emperor and the majority of the newly "elected" deputies. Though this resignation did not change the basic situation in Galicia, it did force some bureaucrats to abandon the rule of the province by "a storm of bayonets." Yet the Poles retained their influence in the Council of State, frustrating all attempts to change the Galician patent.<sup>35</sup>)

The reason for Slav solidarity against Badeni was not based on humanitarian principles alone. The other Slavs in Austria, while trying to get the most benefit of the constitution, found it advantageous to rid themselves of Badeni since his "methods in Galicia" threatened their own provinces. Therefore, a common front among the Slavs had to be formed and constant pressure had to be exerted on



Old citadel in Lviv the place of fierce battles for its possession  
in November 1918.

Vienna if the desired constitutional reforms were to be obtained. By 1905, especially after Russian autocracy established a fairly democratic electoral system with the First Duma,\*) Vienna had no choice but to follow suit. The Poles, hoping to retain *status quo* in Galicia, bitterly resisted the proposed legislation but, finally, they accepted compromise legislation which passed by a slim majority.


The new legislation established a general and direct ballot throughout the Austrian empire for elections to the Council of State. However, special provisions were made in the case of Galicia to assure the Poles a sufficient number of seats for them to retain control of matters pertaining to the province. One of these provisions established two types of electoral districts in Eastern Galicia, village and city districts, with small towns included in with the city districts. By means of such gerrymandering, the Ukrainian vote from towns would presumably be wasted against the Polish majority in the city. The Poles hoped that the large Jewish population of the cities would travel a separate political path from that of the Ukrainians and that they would never achieve enough unity to elect their candidate.<sup>36)</sup>

Another provision designed especially for Eastern Galicia dealt with the number of candidates to be elected from the village districts. The law called for one of the candidates to be elected by

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\*) Duma = council.





Prof. Mykhaylo Drahomaniv

a majority of votes while another seat would go to the candidate who would, in the first voting, collect over 25% of the total vote. The purpose of this provision was to give the Poles an opportunity to elect their own candidate from the Ukrainian districts or to help some "black sheep." Needless to say, this provision did not apply to the city districts in which Ukrainians and Jews could elect a candidate of their own.

A third provision dealt with the number of votes required to elect a candidate in the village districts. A Ukrainian deputy represented 110,000 people, while a Pole represented 51,000, a number corresponding to an average Austrian district of 38,000-55,000 people. Under established rule, the Ukrainians could, at the most, elect 28 deputies, while the Poles could send 78 representatives, even though the population at that time was in the Galician province fairly evenly balanced.

The elections of 1907 and 1911, based on the new voting law, brought surprising results. The Ukrainians showed an amazing cohesion of political organization and discipline with the result that the Poles failed to gain even one seat in the village districts of Ukrainian part of Galicia. In 1911 Polish meddling helped to elect two "doubtful" Ukrainians. The remaining 26 seats were occupied by 19 National Democrats,<sup>37)</sup> 5 Radicals, and 2 Social Democrats. When the Ukrainians sent 5 more deputies from Bukovina, their total strength in the Council of State consisted of 31 deputies. This body was able to obtain some concessions from Vienna but none strong enough to prevent corruption and ruthlessness in the rule of Galicia.

As Ukrainian demands and complaints continued to be heard

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**Dr. Dmytro Levytskyy**

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more frequently by the Council of State, Poles increased their hostility, enveloping themselves in a fog of hatred for everything not of Polish origin.\*) Administrative efforts to discourage Ukrainian desire to cast ballots failed to produce the desired effect. In 1908, the viceroy decided to "make" the elections by ordering strong police measures against Ukrainian opposition and, to assure complete success of his plans, he quartered detachments of Hungarian cavalry in the villages. Once again the elections turned into a battlefield while the administration performed "miracles" with the ballot boxes.

This time the violence had a price, paid by the viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki. A young Ukrainian student, Myroslav Sichynskyy, shot the viceroy while shouting, "This is for the murders committed during the elections." The assassination had two immediate results: it provoked "the Ukrainian debate" in the Council of State which made public the methods of the Galician administration, and it widened the gulf between the Polish and Ukrainian nations to such an extent that no proposal for cooperation was possible. It should be mentioned that some segments of the Polish society supported the idea of cooperation on the basis of equality and self administration. These elements, composed mostly of Social Democrats led by Ignacy Daszynski, admitted in parliament that the Ukrainian de-

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\*) Most of the complaints dealt with voting irregularities such as the arrest of the Ukrainian candidate M. Petrytskyy and his secretary, M. Semkiv, on a charge of vagrancy. The only crime of Petrytskyy was that he was campaigning for a seat sought by a Pole, Count Golochowski. A similar incident occurred in Sambir, where a peasant leader, Mykhas, caused the loss of a seat sought by a Pole. The district chief paid him a visit, warning him that unless he stopped his campaign work, he would be arrested. Nor was there any action taken on the violence committed during the elections.



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Jozef Pilsudski  
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mands for self-administration were justified. But, since the Polish Social Democrats held only four seats in the Conucil, they could hardly exert any significant influence.<sup>38)</sup>

### A new concept of Polish nationalism

Some of this new friction between the two nations was caused by the new spirit of nationalism preached by the Polish National Democratic Party (PNDP). Led by Roman Dmowski, a chemical engineer, this party strove to establish a "national egoism," which was to be sacred, and the supreme goal of the political activity. The supreme goal was the reunion of Poland under the sceptre of the Russian tsar, but with complete autonomy. This would be a personal union of the two countries, based on dynastic ties. Here was a pleasant wedding song for the Polish middle class, especially for commercial and industrial segments, that considered agrarian Russia a vast market for their products.<sup>\*)</sup>

Intellectuals were enchanted by ideological tenets such as the one preaching that national aim purifies and excuses everything, even crimes. Dmowski's brand of nationalism had a clear stamp of imperialism, since it sought to subjugate other nationalities—the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians. In the "new Poland," these nationalities would have no national rights but would become a labor force from which Poland would draw her strength.<sup>39)</sup>

This "historic right" was based on the previous conquests of


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<sup>\*)</sup> Popular name of this Polish nationalistic movement was **Pan-Poles** or **All-Poles**.

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**Roman Dmowski**

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the Polish kings and thus legalized these nations as Polish property in spite of the fact that these peoples had, at one time, formed independent states. And so this Dmowski plan introduced into the political arena a new orientation which was pro-Russian and anti-German. Polish Socialists and a segment of the Polish intelligentsia opposed this plan, since practical experience showed Russia to be somewhat reluctant in granting autonomy. They saw Poland as a Russian puppet rather than a partner. Therefore they favored Poland as a completely independent state, which could be achieved only with the cooperation of Austria and Germany. Although the tenets of the Polish National Democrats were only of political-ideological significance, they could, however, be put to practice in Galicia. A majority of the Polish press, especially, spared no effort to depict Ukrainians as people who did not exist except as a product of "German intrigue." Their demands for rights were unconditionally rejected and Dmowski advised them to either become Poles or to create an independent state which would be able "to protect its independence not only from us but also from the Russians."

In response to the Polish "suggestions" Ukrainians redoubled their efforts in organization and education. The feeling of injustice in the Polish "purgatory" reached a point which could not have been achieved by even the best of propagandists. The alternative proposed by the ideology of Dmowski—to become a part of the "new" Poland—was never considered, since it represented hell not only for Ukrainians but for other minorities as well. All of them could see on its gate the prophetic words of Dante: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here."<sup>40</sup>)

## **PART II**

### **UKRAINIANS AND POLES DURING WORLD WAR I**



## CHAPTER 1

### POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS

#### The complicated situation of the Ukrainians in Austria

Until the events of August 1, 1914, which brought about unexpected and far-reaching changes, neither Austria nor Germany had taken any positive steps to solve the Ukrainian problem. Throughout the preceding period, Austria had sought to neutralize the growing political force of the organized Ukrainians by granting important concessions to the Poles. However, there was a fresh political current in Austria which could have influenced the conservative policies of the empire if it were given the opportunity to develop. This current was embodied in a group gathered around the successor to the Hapsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand. Politically, it embraced the doctrine of trialism which was to take the place of the Dual Monarchy. It called for the separation of Croatia from Hungary and for the establishment of a third monarchy composed of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. By establishing a South Slav kingdom inside Austria, Ferdinand and his group sought to neutralize the Serbian anti-Austrian propaganda and, at the same time, to create a "magnetic field" which would attract the other Southern Slavs and, thus, counteract the Russian influence. They also hoped that such a kingdom would eliminate some of the national frictions which existed in the Hapsburg empire.

The Hungarian leadership, threatened with a possible loss of influence, opposed such trialism just as it opposed the idea of annexation of Congress Poland in case the Russians were defeated. Therefore, the Hungarians were inclined to support the Polish program which hoped to propagate the creation of an independent Poland since such a creation would also eliminate Polish influence in Vienna. The fact that the "new" Poland would include the whole Galicia was of no importance for the Magyars. The Austrians reacted less enthusiastically to this proposal since it entailed the loss of an area with natural resources and a second loss in the form of a readily available commercial market.

In this shuffle for influence and gain, the Poles held the most advantageous position. Their leaders in Austria were quick to realize that the aid of the German military machine was essential if Russia was to be defeated. Therefore, the Poles agreed to remain silent in regard to the Polish territory held by Germany as the

price for the formation of Poland from the lands stripped from Russia. The Poles in Congress Poland, guided by the ideology of Dmowski, also envisioned a "new" Poland, but the hopes were pinned to a state formed by Russia, since they correctly predicted British and French participation in war as allies of Russia. But regardless of the two opposing policies of the Poles, no matter which bloc would lose, the Poles would still be victorious.<sup>41)</sup>

The Ukrainians, on the other hand, could not anticipate such promising prospects. The possibility of a Russian victory did not promise any change for the better since the conditions in Eastern Ukraine did not provide any basis for such expectations. Under Austria, the Ukrainians were entitled to some rights, even though most of them were on paper; but through stubborn insistence they could make some progress toward further improvements. Under such circumstances, the Ukrainians lacked, in case of war, the choice available to the Poles and could only hope for a total Russian defeat. If the Russian autocracy were destroyed, it would be possible to consider the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. Therefore, eventually they had to declare themselves on the side of the Central Powers, i. e., Austria and Germany.<sup>42)</sup>

## **The military preparations of the Poles**

In the first part of the 20th century, the balance of power in Europe hinged on two blocs with conflicting interests. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy was counterbalanced by Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia. A conflict of interests involving any two countries from opposing blocs made it apparent that it could develop into an armed clash. One such point of interest, in which the policies of Austria and Russia were constantly in conflict, was the Balkan situation. Its seriousness becoming apparent during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

The Poles, realizing the importance of the situation, had, since 1908, been busy organizing their own military force which would, in case of war, fight on the Austrian side. The chief propagators of this scheme were the Polish Socialists and the liberal Demoracts. Józef Pilsudski, one of the socialist leaders, became the driving spirit of the movement for military preparations when he formed an organization of Polish Socialist Party in Russia. Pilsudski was convinced that the Poles would be an important political factor only if they possessed their own military force which they could commit on the side of one of the belligerent powers.

Being well informed of the internal affairs of Russia, Pilsudski and his circle had no difficulty in establishing relations with the intelligence section of the Austrian General Staff. For the informa-



tions he supplied, the General Staff prevented the interference by the central government in Vienna with the organizational work of Pilsudski, and offered assistance whenever possible. Pilsudski's organization developed under the name of "Riflemen" (Polish — "Strzelcy"),\*) gaining its largest support from the students and workers who believed in the Socialist doctrines. Pilsudski, needless to say, received full cooperation from the Galician administration. Without any difficulty the organization was able to obtain a military character, equipment that included arms and ammunition, and the necessary ranges for practice. The network of the "Riflemen" grew steadily, its membership in the tens of thousands. Other organizations were also formed—"Falcons" and "Bands of Bartosz"—but they were established for the purpose of physical training and lacked the military character of the "Rifleman." Another trait which distinguished them from the latter was their domination by Dmowski's brand of nationalism.

In view of the Polish attempt to establish a military force, the Ukrainians could not remain idle. As early as 1902, the Ukrainian Radicals under the leadership of Dr. Kyrylo Trylovskyy began an intensive campaign to establish an organization designated as a physical fitness program. The result was the formation of "Sich" with a membership that also reached tens of thousands in the first quarter of this century. However, when the Ukrainians attempted to obtain a charter similar to the one granted the Polish organization, they met opposition from the provincial administration and received their charter only after many appeals at the expense of much effort in Vienna. Even with the charter, the Ukrainians did not have the same opportunities as those given to the Poles, for the Ukrainians had to buy the necessary equipment with their own funds. The reaction of the people toward this unit is reflected in the small but numerous contributions donated to equip the "Sichovi Striitsi" (Riflemen).<sup>43)</sup>

There were other areas in which the Poles had a head start in the area of military preparedness. In August, 1912, the Polish parties in sympathy with the independence of Poland held a conference and formed the Temporary Commission of Independent Parties,\*\*) a body which was definitely aligned with the Central Powers. The Commission also supported the Polish "Riflemen" who by this time were receiving considerable aid from Austria, according to the testimony of Wacław Gąsiorowski, historian of Polish military organization prior to World War I.

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\*) "Strzelcy" literally — sharp shooters.

\*\*) From this point on it shall be referred to as "Commission."

In June, 1913, the Commission announced that, in conjunction with the military organizations, it would take the side of Austria against Russia in order to free the Polish people from Russian occupation.<sup>44)</sup> The statement also revealed that all of the Polish organizations in United States, which had gathered for a General Congress, also recognized the authority of the Commission and fully supported it. The same position was taken by the Polish Parliamentary Representation in the Council of State in Vienna, declaring:


...in case of war, we, Poles, would be ready to fulfill our solemn duty in a war which would decide the fate of Austria as well as the fate of Poland. The fervor and the military enthusiasm which would be shown under such circumstances by the Polish youth and with it by the entire population would be amazing. And even today we are ready to fulfill all of our obligation before the wise and just Monarch who places his trust in us and also in the future if there should be an armed conflict between the great power of the north and the state in which our people found their legal confirmation, we will be ready to make for this country greatest sacrifices.

A similar declaration was made by the leader of the Social Democrats,<sup>45)</sup> I. Daszynski, although his statement was interwoven with references to the Polish proletariat.

In accordance with the pro-Austrian policies of the Commission, Pilsudski's work was not limited to Austria alone but was also extended to Russia, France, and the United States. In 1913 he went to France to drum up support for his program while his followers in the United States were able to convince the majority of Poles to come out in his favor. Since the insurrections against Russia of 1831 and 1863 were still alive in Polish literature, it is not surprising to see that the majority of Poles were leaning toward Austria. Considering such a conglomeration of political and social groups, one is less surprised to find in the Polish camp a curious mixture of socialistic, nationalistic and democratic slogans.<sup>46)</sup>

### **Political tactics of the Ukrainians in case of war**

The public declaration of Poles in favor of Austria made it impossible for the Ukrainians to keep silent on their political stand. As mentioned before, their choice was simple for various reasons. Russia as an autocracy and as a "constitutional" monarchy since



**A platoon of the Ukrainian Riflemen (Sichovi Striltsi)**

1905, directed her policies toward the destruction of every sign of a Ukrainian national movement. The same was true of her foreign policy, which was dominated by the Pan-Slav movement that preaches "freedom for all Slavs" and union under the sceptre of the Russian tsar. This offer of leadership injected within the framework of Pan-Slavism another idea, an idea which propagated Russian supremacy. The protagonists of the movement argued that Russia had to be united and indivisible; within her borders Ukraine and Byelorussia would be included without question. (The same policy was retained by the Bolsheviks, though with some modifications for the sake of appearance). This Pan-Slavic orientation of tsarist Russia also called for the unification of Western Ukraine, Bukovina, and Transcarpathian Ukraine. This "unification" was necessary for Russia since the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by the Ukrainians under Austria compromised the Russian policy of terror in Eastern Ukraine and quite naturally could give birth to a sympathetic attitude toward Austria among the Ukrainians under Russia. In peacetime, Russia spared no effort to undermine the Ukrainian movement in Galicia by financially supporting the Moscovophilic groups. Such groups of misguided Ukrainians became festering sores on the Ukrainian national body, to be excised in the early part of the 20th century.

The pro-Russian groups among Ukrainians found unexpected support from the Polish administration in Galicia. Terror and

executions of peasants who were active politically were relied upon the win seats for pro-Russian candidates in the provincial parliament and the Council of State. This strategy of the administration was expected to accomplish two aims: to split the Ukrainian movement from within, and to use the Moscovophiles for propaganda purposes. By encouraging the pro-Russian group to oppose the designs of the Ukrainian nationalists in the provincial parliament, the Poles would have an opportunity to strengthen their position in Vienna and, at the same time, to be able to eliminate the growing pressure for social and political reforms in Galicia.<sup>47</sup>)

This in-fight would benefit the Poles since this factionalism would serve to compromise the Ukrainian nation in the eyes of the Slavs and Austria by presenting the Ukrainian people as sympathetic to the Russian regime. If the viceroy could convince Vienna that such a state of affairs truly prevailed in Galicia, then Austria would have to rely on the Poles exclusively and would justifiably support Polish demands while ignoring those of the "Russophilic" Ukrainians.

There was a third consideration involving Russia and the All-Polish nationalists in Warsaw and St. Petersburg. By overemphasizing the weak pro-Russian sympathies in Galicia, the Poles hoped to gain a stronger bargaining position with Russian officialdom. Unfortunately, the support of the Poles by the Ukrainian renegades encouraged the Russian Pan-Slav designs on Galicia. In the 1880's the Russian government designated 3 million rubles through the Agricultural Credit Institution in Lviv to further the cause of Russophilism. The influx of Russian money continued to grow until the outbreak of World War I.

It should be mentioned that the Polish aristocrats of Galicia had another motive for making friendly overtures toward Russia. Since the ancient Polish occupation included the Ukrainian territory up to the Dnieper River, many Polish aristocrats, including the Galician viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki, owned vast estates in Volyn and Podilya, areas held by Russia. As practical people, the aristocrats realized that an active anti-Russian policy could endanger their rights to these holdings. Thus the selfish interests of the Poles provided Russia with secret allies within the Austrian empire, even though this alliance, in its overt expression, was directed against the Ukrainian national movement.

Ukrainian leadership also took a realistic view of the Russian designs. Judging from the existing order in Eastern Ukraine, it was clear that a Russian victory over Austria meant the loss of national gains in Galicia and Bukevina. It was also apparent that Polish attempts to present the Ukrainians as an element strongly pro-Russian would serve, in case of war, as a sufficient excuse for

the Austrian government to suppress the political organizations of the Ukrainians because they would become "Russian agents."

Even in the face of such a serious threat, Ukrainian leadership remained silent on the position it would take in case of war even though in 1908 the Polish "Riflemen" were organized to complement the Austrian army. As a matter of fact, the opposite was true. When the administration refused to act on the complaints of Ukrainians, the deputies in the Council of State had no choice but to become the opposition and they went so far as to use filibuster as a method of obstructionism.

Nor were there any significant changes on the Galician front. Dr. Bobrzynski, who took the place of Count Potocki, continued to follow in his predecessor's footsteps. In the provincial diet, the Ukrainians were forced to rely on technical opposition by using horns, sirens, and drums during the session in 1910, thereby making it impossible to conduct any business. The press of the two major parties clearly came out against any open declarations in favor of Austria or Russia.

"Not Vienna, not Petersburg... but Ukraine, separate and independent. We, Radicals, stand pat for an independent Ukraine. We want our people to obtain independence, that they should have an independent state," wrote the official paper of the Ukrainian Radical Party in the article of its chairman, Mykhaiylo Pavlyk. By 1912, however, in view of the Polish military and political preparations for the eventualities of war, Ukrainian leadership considered it essential to clarify its position. On December 7, 1912, five months after the public declaration of the Polish Commission, all of the political parties in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina declared that the Ukrainian people would fight on the side of Austria with the aim of freeing the major part of Ukraine from Russian occupation. However, the organization, which would represent all of the Ukrainian parties, was not to be formed until the beginning of the war.

## CHAPTER 2

### WORLD WAR I AND THE ALIGNMENT OF UKRAINIANS AND POLES

#### Position of the Polish parties at the outbreak of war

The hope that the military conflict between the Hapsburg Monarchy and Serbia could be localized were shattered when Nicholas II of Russia ordered the general mobilization of Russian military forces, an act which precipitated mobilization of Germany, Austria's ally. The German Kaiser and his ambassador in St. Petersburg, through last minute efforts, tried to dissuade the tsar from mobilizing. These efforts failed, however, and the military circles in Russia carried the day by allowing the German ultimatum to expire without an answer. Thus, on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, setting in motion the war machines of those countries bound by either the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente. On August 3, the war between Germany and France became a fact and on the following day, Great Britain, too, joined the conflict. On August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.<sup>46)</sup>

As soon as Austria declared herself to be at war with Russia, Pilsudski formed the Polish Legion from the existing para-military groups of *Strzelec* (Rifleman). With the concurrence of the leading members of the Polish Socialist Party, he proclaimed the existence of a National Government, seated in Warsaw, which, in exchange, made Pilsudski the commander in chief of all Polish volunteers fighting on the side of the Central Powers. With the onset of the military operations, Pilsudski's force crossed the eastern frontier and occupied the district town of Kielce. This force operated as a component part of the German army, having extensive freedom in military and administrative matters behind the front lines.

The German government also had a positive program for the political aspect of the Polish question. Germany planned to form, from the Polish territories recaptured from Russia, a buffer Poland, headed by a king who would have familial ties with the German dynasty and thus would be under the German sphere of influence. According to this plan the German Supreme Command on the Eastern Front made an appeal to the Poles. This appeal pointed out the fact that it was the German army that brought the Poles

their freedom. Berlin was aware that if the new Poland fell under the Austrian sphere of influence, Austria's position might be strengthened and there would be a possibility that Austria might become independent of German influence. This consideration caused Germany to be the first to make positive proposals in regard to Poland.<sup>49</sup>)

With the appearance of Pilsudski's National Government, other establishments made their bid, such as the Temporary Commission of Independent Parties. Thus Pilsudski's Legion found support from the side of the Central Powers. Opposed to this program were the National Democrats led by Dmowski, the aristocrats, and some Populists. Had they silently accepted the program of National Government, they would have had to subordinate themselves to Pilsudski's dictatorship, in both military and political matters. In order to counter the influence of Pilsudski and his followers, the National Democrats and their satellite parties formed the National Council, which assumed political leadership of their party for the duration of war. In order to end this split and eliminate the existence of the opposing camps, the presidium of the Polish Parliamentary Representation at the Council of State in Vienna called a meeting to be held in Cracow. Taking part in this gathering were all the members of the Council of State, as well as the members of the Galician parliament. Representatives of all parties were also invited.

The meeting produced a compromise between the various political parties and it was decided to establish a central body, the National Executive Committee, which was to represent Polish national interests during the war. Professor Jaworski, a conservative who enjoyed popularity among all groups, was elected the Committee's president, and I. Daszynski was chosen vice-president. It was further agreed that the Committee would take charge of all military and political affairs. Thus this Committee became a substitute for the Polish government. The Committee was to operate within the framework of Austria while, at the same time, it was to represent the Poles who were under Russia. Naturally, the Polish Legion subordinated itself to the Committee's authority. The National Government, which was created for Pilsudski's propaganda, ceased to exist. The Committee appointed a retired general, Baczynski, to the post of the Supreme Commander of the Legion and Pilsudski became his subordinate. It also unanimously reiterated its support of the Central Powers. The Committee also appealed to the Polish youth to join the Legion.

Although the National Democrats accepted the leadership of the National Executive Committee, they were not pleased with the fact that the dominant factions in this body were the Socialists

and Liberals, the National Democrats' former opponents. Nor did the National Democrats care for the idea that General Baczynski was the Supreme Commander, since it was obvious that Pilsudski, the leader of the Socialists, was the actual commander of Polish forces at the front. Although the National Democrats accepted this situation because of the martial state in the country, they continued to seek a pretext to break their dependence on the Committee, and to regain a free hand for their party. The pretext was found with the oath which was to be taken by the Legion. The Committee made an agreement with the Austrian Supreme Command that the Legion would be separated from the German army in Congress Poland and joined with the Austrian army. Austria assumed the responsibility for providing the Legion with arms and equipment as well as provisions and pay. However, the Austrians demanded that every Legioneer take an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Kaiser which would make the Legion an integral part of the Austrian forces.<sup>50</sup>)

Some of the members of the Committee found this demand somewhat harsh and attempted, without success, to remove this provision. Finally, keeping in mind that the existence of a purely Polish military body was more important than the formality of the oath of allegiance, the Committee agreed to the Austrian demands. Austrian insistence on this formality stemmed from the desire to have the Legion tied to Austria and, thus, to prevent any political maneuvers of that body between Austria and Germany. As the Legion had taken the oath of allegiance, the Nationalists, i. e., the National Democrats declared that their followers who comprised the majority of the *Sokols* (Falcons) and Bartosz Bands, could only take an oath of allegiance if that oath were to be binding on any future Polish state for which they were to fight. Since the majority of the Committee refused to support the stand of the Nationalists, all of the Nationalist representatives left the Committee. As they saw it, the Committee had a simple choice: either to bow down to the Austrian demands or to disband the Legion. The legionnaires, headed by Pilsudski, refused the second alternative, considering the Legion more important than the oath. The existence of the Polish Legion had still another political importance. By serving with the Austrian forces as a combat unit, the Austrian government had the opportunity of informing the Russian government that the Legion was a combat unit and entitled to treatment prescribed by the Hague Convention.

Having left the Committee, the Dmowski group in Austria, however, did not deny the pro-German orientation to which they had agreed previously. They declared that although they did not support the Legion, they were in favor of an Austrian-German vic-



tory. The break with the Committee occurred, according to the Nationalists, because of a "political cooperation" in a struggle to achieve "the broadest statehood for Poland." The president of the provincial *soym* and a member of the National Democratic Party, Niezabitowski, in his message to the Austrian ruler on the occasion of the latter's birthday, reaffirmed the Polish loyalty and subservience, as well as, an expression of faith in the Austrian arms.<sup>61</sup>)

## Difficulties of the Ukrainians

Although the Ukrainians had to work under the same political circumstances as the Poles, they, in addition, had to consider still another factor. Whereas the Poles were concerned with their relations with Austria, Germany, and Russia,—the Ukrainians also had to deal with the Poles, since the administration of Galicia was virtually in their hands.

From the military point of view, the position of the Ukrainians worsened with the outbreak of war since from the start the war was conducted on Ukrainian territory, and any contact with the military authority had to be made through Polish administration.

To discuss the problems, a meeting was held of the leading political parties, including the representatives of the *Sichovyy Soyz* (Sich Union) and Ukrainian *Sokil* (Falcon). It was decided to form, on the basis of proportionate representation of the political parties, the Ukrainian National Council (known as the General Council) which was to remain in operation for the duration of the war. Dr. Kost Levytsky, the leader of the Ukrainian National Democrats, was elected president of that body and Mykhaylo Pavlyk, a writer and leader of Ukrainian Radicals, assumed the post of first vice-president. The Council was composed of seven National Democrats, four Radicals, and four Social Democrats. The Council was charged with the responsibility of directing Ukrainian policies in Austria-Hungary. It was to be the sole representative organ of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia before the Austrian government and any other foreign powers. As an additional function, the Council was to organize a Ukrainian military force, *Ukrayynski Sichovi Striltsi* (Sich Riflemen). In order to accomplish the last goal, the Council elected the Military Directorate, led by Dr. Trylovskyy. Although the Council resembled the Polish National Executive Committee, it differed from it in the fact that the Council did not speak for the entire Ukrainian nation but only for Ukrainians under Austrian rule.<sup>62</sup>)

On August 3, the General Council made public a proclamation which expressed regret over the war but also called upon the people to unite in common action in the struggle against Russia.

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**Dr. Kyrylo Trylovskyy**

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The proclamation, in addition made it known that the Council had been formed as a spokesman for the Ukrainian people. The next proclamation of the Council called for volunteers for the Sich Rifle-men.

The call to arms was answered by approximately 28,000 volunteers, all between the ages of 18-20, the age group which was still not subject to the general mobilization, and those who were excused from military service as unfit. Although this group could have been a considerable help to Austria, not only because of the youth but also because of the motive for joining the colors, Austrian government, under Polish influence, rejected this potential. Only a regiment of 2,500 volunteers was allowed to put on the uniform. By weakening the size of the Ukrainian formation, the Austrian General Staff also weakened its Russian front.

### **Terror against the Ukrainians**

The Polish interference in the creation of a Ukrainian military unit angered the Ukrainians, since the Poles had decided to play politics instead of concentrating on the mortal struggle with a common enemy, tsarist Russia. The existing gulf between the Ukrainian and Poles was widened even further by new acts of the

latter directed against the Ukrainians. Under the pretext of war, the Polish aristocracy decided that the day had come to stage a "new Berestechko,"\*) as promised by the former viceroy Potocki. On the first day of war, mass arrests were made in all districts and among all the strata of Ukrainian population, according to the viceroy's orders. The excuse for this action was provided by the phrase "internment of Moscovophiles and Russian agents." Although some leaders of the pro-Russian faction were included among those incarcerated, the bulk of those "agents" consisted of innocent people. At first the arrests were made according to the carefully prepared lists. Later, especially during the retreat of the Austrian forces, arrests were made indiscriminately, often motivated by personal dislike, disagreement, or on the basis of false information. Since the main body of troops on the Eastern front consisted of German and Hungarian units, the army was unable to communicate with the people or to understand the internal situation of Galicia. Searching for a scapegoat on which to blame their defeat, the soldiers chose the "treachery of the local population" rather than the incompetency of the generals or the enemy's superiority in numbers. This choice was also facilitated by the available information that the Ukrainians were imbued with pro-Russian feelings and that the countryside was saturated with Russian spies and agents.\*\*)

The victims of the early wave of arrests were placed in concentration camps in Western Austria and subjected to the hardships which accompany such places—cold, hunger, and disease. At some point they had a chance to reach the ear of justice and prove their innocence.

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\*) Berestechko was the place of a two-day battle between the Ukrainian and Polish forces. At the peak of the battle, the Crimean Khan, ally of the Ukrainian Hetman Khmelnytsky, left the field of battle and thus created disorder in the Ukrainian ranks. While retreating, the Ukrainians were attacked by the Poles, losing approximately 30,000 soldiers. (June 20-30, 1651).

\*\*) At the beginning of the war, the viceroy of Galicia, W. Korytowski, made it a point to inform the Vienna government that the Ukrainians, once under Russian occupation, became warm supporters of Russia. The national movement, according to this report, was a dream of a few, lacking in followers. To remedy this situation, he suggested that "a hangman should sweep the country" to wipe out all traitors. Later special laws were to be passed which would "prepare ground for Ukrainism". Nor did the Church hierarchy escape his attention. He suggested that Ukrainian Metropolitan Sheptytsky was a weak man, surrounded by Russophiles, and should have been considered of doubtful loyalty. Korytowski also mentioned the Ukrainian Legion, but once again he omitted the facts. He suggested that the Ukrainians were reluctant to serve at the front, even though the record showed various commendations came from the General Staff and the fact that the Sich Riflemen participated in all major operations.



The Ukrainian peasants were forced in such a position to await their verdict of an Austrian martial court.

Those, however, who were arrested later, were tried by military tribunals and were, usually, hung. The position of the defendants was made even more difficult by the fact that the judges and other court officials often were chauvinistic Poles. One of such military judges, captain Zagórski, allegedly was responsible for the death of several thousands Ukrainians. Altogether in the first weeks of the war about 36,000 Ukrainians were hanged by military courts of that kind. It is estimated that about the same number died in concentration camps from hunger and diseases.<sup>53)</sup> Considering the fact that the total Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia was about 4 million, this was a serious loss.

It is interesting to note that this drive to destroy the "spies and "agents" failed to uncover a single guilty person among the Poles, although, before the war, many of the Poles openly advocated a union of Poland with Russia. The Polish delegate to Russian State Duma, Jaronski,\*\*) on August 8, 1914, called for a united front of Slavs under Russian leadership and "to present the Teutons with another Grunewald."<sup>54)</sup> To such duplicity Austrian government chose to close its eyes and consider the Poles as its most loyal subjects among the Slavs.<sup>55)</sup>

The repressions of the Galician provincial administration at the hands of the Poles further widened the possibility of any understanding between the Poles and Ukrainians but, at the same

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\*\*) Jaronski was one of the leaders of the Polish Nationalist movement,<sup>55)</sup> the National Democratic Party.



**The execution of a court martial verdict behind the Austrian Front in Galicia.**

time, the repressions produced one positive result. The disagreement which existed between the *starorusyns* (old Ukrainians or old Rusyns), the faction which placed its hopes on Russia, and the nationalistic elements disappeared, thereby allowing the Ukrainians to present a common front during this crucial period.

### **Ukrainian political program**

After having declared itself to be on the side of Austria, the Ukrainian General Council attempted to organize a military force similar to that of the Polish Committee, and suggested a program of liberating Ukrainian territories held by Russia and of forming from these territories an independent state. In regard to the territory held by Austria, the Council suggested the formation of an autonomous Ukrainian land, connected to Austria. By this program the Council thought it would gain a sympathetic ear of Austria and, at the same time, protect the people from military repressions. A similar stand was taken by the political emigrees from the Dnieper Ukraine, who at that time were to be found in Austria and Switzerland. Through the efforts of the leadership of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Workingmen's Party, this emigration formed the Union for Liberation of Ukraine (August 4, 1914), with the aim of establishing an independent Ukrainian state in the area regained from Russia.<sup>56)</sup>

In contrast to the response to the Polish proposals, the Central Powers met the Ukrainian General Council's program with

a rather cool reception. While accepting and helping the Polish Legion, the Austro-German Command rejected the main body of Ukrainian volunteers and allowed the formation of only one regiment. Just as the Germans and the Austrians showed sympathy toward the Polish struggle with Russia, it was conspicuously lacking in sympathy when it came to the Ukrainians. Instead of encouragement, they were treated to mass executions. It is true that in some cases the Austrian officials took a more realistic view of the Ukrainian potential. The Austrian prime minister, Count Stuerghk, tried to justify the lack of positive commitment on the part of Austria, promising a more favorable attitude during the victorious stages of war. He went as far as to promise the division of Galicia, but this, too, had to wait until the end of war. This promise was made more frequently from the spring of 1915, onward, when the Russian front began to crumble.<sup>57)</sup>

### **Austrian government versus Ukrainian program**

During this period, for the first time since 1848, the Austrian Kaiser nominated a professional soldier of Austrian German extraction, rather than a Pole, to the post of Galician viceroy. So appointed to hold this post was General Collard, who chose to remain impartial in the fulfillment of his duties. His successor, General Huyn, tended to lean toward the Polish side. But regardless of this change, after the Russians were expelled from Galicia, the administration once again was handed over into Polish hands. Not a single Ukrainian received a post of district administrator although there was a number of qualified persons who could have filled such a position.<sup>58)</sup>

The earlier promises were forgotten and from the political point of view, the situation deteriorated. The provinces regained from Russia were divided between Germany and Austria, with the result that Austro-Polish administration was extended to Ukrainian province—Kholm, Polissya, and Volyn. Once again the solution of the Ukrainian question was subordinated to the creation of a Polish state, a move intended to remove the Poles from German influence. Yet the Poles, in their political machinations, continued to claim that Vienna was supporting the Ukrainians at their expense. This propaganda was to be found not only in the immediate arena of political battles but also in other countries in Europe and America. It was not difficult for a reader of the Polish press in France or the United States to form an opinion that the Ukrainian national movement was simply an Austrian intrigue, mostly against the Poles and to some extent, against Russians.

Under these circumstances, the situation of the Ukrainians was not an enviable one. They were caught between two warring powers, Austro-German Bloc and the Entente, with little hope for a positive solution of their problems by the Austrian government. On the other hand, the Entente, in the East, was represented by Russia and the victory of the Western Allies meant a victory for Russia and, at the same time, the complete submergence of the Ukrainians.

The decision of the Ukrainians to support Austria was also influenced by the fact that, had the Ukrainians taken anything but a clear pro-Austrian position, they would have been exposed to genocidal repressions on the part of the Austro-Polish administration. But although the declarations of the Ukrainian political parties were sincere and quite modest in their assumption, the Austrian government decided to ignore the Ukrainian problem and favor the Poles.<sup>58)</sup>

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## CHAPTER 3


### TWO EMPERORS PROCLAIM A POLISH STATE AND NEW POLITICAL POSITION OF UKRAINIANS

#### Policies of the warring camps toward Poland and Ukraine

In 1916, Berlin once again attempted to solve the Polish question. Having defeated the Russians on the Eastern front, the German armies were unable to end the war successfully in the West. The Central Powers were running short of various supplies, including men. To replenish this shortage, Germany decided to form a Polish state from Congress Poland, where it would be possible to recruit new divisions to fill the gaps in German units at the fronts. This development was to the advantage of the Austrian Poles, who then pressed the Austrian emperor for a promise that Galicia would not be divided into two parts but would remain an entity, ruled by Poles, with autonomous rights further extended. The plans for the establishment of the Polish state under the Austro-German protectorate had been already prepared when a Viennese Social Democrat, Dr. Fredrick Adler, succeeded in killing the prime minister Stürgkh (21.X.1916).

It was left up to the new prime minister, Dr. Körber, to carry out the prepared plans. On November 5, 1916, the Austrian and German rulers proclaimed the creation of the Polish state. The Austrian imperial decree also mentioned that the Crown Land of Galicia was to receive, after the war, broader autonomy so it could have a "special position" in Austria. With this "special position" thus to be established at a future date, the Ukrainians in Galicia would have found that Galicia would be completely under Polish domination and that no appeal would be available for the Ukrainians living there. For this reason, the decree of Franz Joseph meant the end of the pro-Austrian orientation of Ukrainians under Austria. It became obvious especially to Ukrainians, that this decree favoring the Poles had been under consideration for some time and that Stürgkh willfully misled the parliamentary delegation of the Ukrainians with the claim that the emperor had made plans for the division of Galicia in such a manner as to make the constitutional equality of the Ukrainians possible. He also promised that this decision would soon be put into effect.<sup>58)</sup>





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**Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych**

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In protest to this decree and to show a complete change of policy of the Ukrainians toward Austria, Kost Levytskyy resigned his presidency of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation, and Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych, leader of the opposition inside this representation, took his place. Having lost all hopes for Austrian support, the Ukrainian political leadership decided to return completely to the doctrine that they must carry on their struggle for greater equality through their own efforts instead of relying on Austrian government for help. A similar position was taken by the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, which declared that since the Central Powers failed to present a positive solution to the question of Ukrainian liberation, Ukraine under Russia should rely only on its own strength.<sup>60</sup>)

This was the beginning of a program which was based on Ukraine's own strength and which hoped for drastic changes, such as a revolution within the Russian empire where a more significant majority of Ukrainians lived.

### **Situation of the Poles under Russia**

In 1914, Russia held the largest part of Polish ethnographic lands since it held the very center of Poland. This so called Congress Poland was given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna and the tsar of Russia was also the king of Poland. Up to 1831, this area had broad rights and privileges as compared to Russia proper. It possessed its own legislature (*sejm*), military force, and administration. The tsar was represented in Warsaw by a viceroy.

Since the Poles strove for complete independence, politically they were oriented toward France. In 1830-31, they precipitated an insurrection against Russia, with friendly neutrality on the part of Austria and Germany. The rebellion failed and most of the privileges were taken away. In 1863, the Poles tried again to regain their independence, hoping for French and British intervention. As previously, the main elements involved in the rebellion were the aristocrats and the middle class. The majority of the peasants were either hostile or had taken a passive attitude, as they remembered the social oppression prevalent during the existence of Polish statehood. This was one of the reasons why the revolt of 1863 also failed. In retaliation, Russia stripped Congress Poland of all vestiges of an autonomous kingdom and began to enforce a policy of Russification, but allowed the Poles a certain degree of cultural and self-organization freedom.<sup>61)</sup>

These failures forced the Poles to re-examine their political orientation. Discarding their former hopes for a French and British intervention, the Poles developed a program for an independent Polish state to be achieved with the aid of Germany and Austria. The new Poland, in addition to the Polish territory held by Germany and Austria, was also to include lands taken from Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine. This program had the support of the majority of the political factions.

Only one major group refused to support this platform and retained its pro-Russian orientation, endowing their position with Slavophilic slogans. Developed by Roman Dmowski, it became, after several changes in name, the ideology of the National Democrats. His original program called for a federal union with Russia. Such a union, according to Dmowski, would strengthen the Poles to an extent that Russia would be forced to grant them a broad autonomy. He was also hopeful that such a union would provide the Poles with economic and national influences on Ukrainian territories as far as the Dnieper River.<sup>62)</sup>

This doctrine had two sides: one was directed against Austria and Germany and the other side was pointed against the eastern neighbors of Poland. The platform of the National Democrats detested any and all movements for self-determination of the Polish neighbors, seeing in them an obstacle to Polish expansion. Whenever such a movement would appear, it became, in the eyes of National Democrats, an intrigue by the enemies of Poland. However, the pro-Russian orientation, despite of the intensive propaganda by the leadership, failed to gain massive support either in Congress Poland or outside its borders. The majority of Poles placed their hopes on Austria and Germany as the architects of a new Polish state.

Dmowski and his followers did not oppose the existence of an independent Polish state in principle but they did not believe that it would be possible for the Central Powers to defeat Russia, which was supported by the Western Entente. For this reason, the pro-German tendency, on the part of Poles, was considered by Dmowski to be a dangerous one and it should be eliminated. On the other hand, he was aware of Russia's plans for expansion, not only in Asia, but also in the Balkans and in the West. Dmowski was hopeful that, in case of war, Russia would gain East Prussia, Pomerania and Poznan districts and possibly Silesia. From Austria, Russia was to gain Galicia. Considering this result of the war as a mathematical certainty, Dmowski thought it prudent to make his program known at the right time. He believed it must be clear enough to convince the Russians of his loyalty. He saw Russia as the protector of the Slavs and their future benefactor.

The majority that opposed Dmowski's program saw, on the other hand, that Russia would be doomed militarily. They had the prophetic vision to see Russia, in case of prolonged war, breaking down internally, as it happened during the Russo-Japanese war, and thus losing the war. For this reason the National Executive Committee propagandized the victory of the Central Powers not only over Russia but over the Western Allies. It stated that after the war Germany will need "booty and gain":

If the Germans will not join Belgium to their Reich and if they will not get any colonies, then annexation in the East will become a necessity. For this very reason it is in our interest not only to break Russia apart and thus facilitating her more significant partition... A victory of Germany over France and England is also to our interest... It would provide (Germany) with Belgium and new colonies and they would have to be quite sizable.<sup>63)</sup>

The pro-German faction was well aware of the German interest in rebuilding a Polish state from area regained from Russia. Such a move would weaken Russia as a power which, if unchecked, would eventually threaten the very existence of Germany.

### **"Polish Policy" of Russia**

The true policy of Russia toward Poland had been apparent as early as 1815, when Russia demanded the entire Polish area. However, this demand was successfully resisted by Austrian and German diplomats. It would have been to Russia's advantage to

enclose within her boundaries the entire Polish nation, especially in the period when the movement for independence was very pronounced among the subjugated nations. If successful, Russia would have eliminated the pro-German and pro-Austrian factions and thus would have removed a threat of national insurrection. Dmowski was also aware of this possibility and stressed its importance in his demand for Polish autonomy within Russia.<sup>64)</sup>

Russian official conservatives, however, were restrained in making concessions to Polish autonomy outside the sphere of the local self-government, *zemstvo*. For this reason, even after the loyalty declaration of the National Democrats in the State Duma, at the time when Russia was engaged in war in August, 1914, the Russian government did not hurry with promise for Congress Poland. It was only for propaganda purposes that the Supreme Commander of Russian armies, Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich, issued the manifesto of August 14, 1914. While it sketched a rosy future for the Poles under Russia, it failed to mention specific concessions. To a realistic politician it was obvious that, in case of a Russian victory, the Poles would lose the rights and privileges which they enjoyed in Austria and Prussia. The document served to confirm the belief that Poland's future was tied with the fortunes of the Central Powers. It would be a state consisting of Congress Poland in union with Galicia and tied to Austria.<sup>65)</sup>

## Central Powers and Poland

The planners of the German foreign policy were also aware of Russia's intention in regard to Poland and for that reason neither Germany nor Austria was in a hurry to make an official commitment concerning the Polish question. It was obvious that the two countries were waiting for the developments at the front. Thus, when after the initial victories over Russia in 1915 and 1916 the Central Powers found themselves short of manpower, they decided that the time was ripe to re-establish Poland. The price for the new state was the formation of the "Polish Auxiliary Corps," which were to be tied in with the armies of the Central Powers.

By decree of November 5, 1916, the Germans and the Austrians, for the first time during the war, placed the Polish question in the international arena, a move which would be of great value to Polish politicians not only at that time but also later at the Peace Conference. In evaluating this decree, Polish historian declared:

It was of value because for the first time, officially, one side established the principle of Polish independ-

ence as a state. From now on others had to consider this fact. Finally the Polish matter became an international problem. It is true that Russia, and later other nations of the Entente, protested against the acts of November 5 as acts issued contrary to the practice of international law and issued in time of war, before agreements (which were made) would decide the question of belongingness of these territories.<sup>66)</sup>

Of significance, here, is the fact that the new Polish state was established by an act of an occupying power rather than through a national revolutionary effort.

### Reconstruction of the Polish state

On November 6, 1916, General Beseler, the German governor general in Warsaw, issued a patent regarding the formation of the first Polish state organ, the Council of State. It was to be a legislative body consisting of 25 members who were approved by the German and Austrian governors general. The president of this body, *marszałek koronny*, Crown Marshal, was to be selected by the members themselves. The Council of State began its activity on January 14, 1917, with the assistance of German and Austrian commissioners.<sup>67)</sup>

In the meantime, Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph had passed away and his successor, Karl I, had little taste for war. His partiality for peace was even more pronounced when Russia was rocked by the revolutionary activity in 1917, fearing that similar events would take place in Austria if the war were continued. His fears were shared by the minister of international affairs, Count Czernin. The latter, in agreement with the new emperor of Austria, approached the German emperor with a plan. It called for coming to terms between Germany and the Allies, with Alsace-Lorraine returning to France and Belgium being restored to its legal authority. As a compensation, Austria was prepared to add Galicia to Congress Poland, and as such it would become a German kingdom, such as Bavaria or Saxony. Berlin, however, rejected this plan, being confident of a victory.

The new Poland was proclaimed as a monarchy but it still lacked a ruler. Vienna and Berlin could not reach an agreement as to who would sit on the Polish throne, an Austrian or a German prince. The Poles would have preferred the first choice but the Germans insisted on their own choice. In the meantime a Regency Council was established to act in place of the monarch (September

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**Antin Chernetsky**

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12, 1917), consisting of three members, nominated by the rulers of Austria and Germany. For a while the nominations were hindered by the bickering by the two monarchs over the candidates but by October 15th an agreement had been reached.\*) Then the Regency Council formed its government of nine members, headed by Jan Kucharszewski, the prime minister, and a partisan of Austria. The next step taken by the new government was to hold elections to the Council of State. The representatives to this body were chosen by the cities and district self-governments. To this organization the governors general gradually handed over the separate sectors of administration, with the exception of public safety.<sup>68</sup>)

### **Activity of the Polish government**

This system of government lasted in Congress Poland until Germany capitulated. Although this establishment was active in the sphere designated by Austria and Germany, its recognition by the Central Powers and some neutrals paved the way for the eventual recognition of the Polish state by the Provisional Government of Russia, and still later, after the capitulation of Germany, by Allies. And though the government changed its composition several

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\*) The first members of this body were Prince Z. Lubemirski, Archbishop A. Kakowski, and J. Ostrowski, a financier.

times, depending on the internal developments, it remained loyal to its benefactors to the end.

The elements, collaborating with the Central Powers, called themselves the "activists." Their goal was to re-establish the Polish state with the aid of Central Powers. They were composed of all political groupings with the exception of a segment of National Democrats. Among the "activists," the most active parties were the two extremes: the Conservatives and Socialists. The leader of the Socialists, Józef Pilsudski, was especially active, having formed the first brigade of the Polish Legion and serving in the temporary Council of State. He also formed a conspiratory organization, Polish Military Organization, which was of Socialist affiliation. In the summer of 1917, a misunderstanding occurred between the Germans and the Polish Left concerning the oath of allegiance. Pilsudski instructed the Polish volunteers for the new Polish Corps to refuse to take the oath, a move for which he and his adjutant were arrested on July 21, 1917, and detained in protective custody until the end of war. However, this misunderstanding did not have any serious consequences on the German-Polish cooperation.<sup>69)</sup> The non-activists remained completely passive and in no way interfered with the reconstruction. The National Democrats were active only in areas held by Russia and later in the West.<sup>70)</sup>

There was some dissatisfaction on the part of Poles during the peace conference at Brest, first concerning the treaty with Ukraine (February 9, 1918) and later with Soviet Russia (March 3, 1918). Polish leadership felt slighted for not being invited to participate. However, it was the Soviet delegation that objected to the presence of Poles at the conference rather than the Germans<sup>71)</sup> The Poles were also unhappy with the fact that the Central Powers agreed to return to the Ukrainian National Republic the areas which they had occupied,—the province of Kholm, Polisia, and Volyn. They made their protest official in the Austrian parliament although, in the case of the disputed areas in Kholm province, the treaty specified that the boundaries would be drawn according to the desire of the local population.







### **PART III**

## **SELFDETERMINATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION**



## CHAPTER 1

# FORMATION OF WESTERN UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

### Constitutional setting of the state

When the Central Powers had erected a Polish state, it became obvious to the Ukrainians in Galicia that any national and international recognition would have to be based on their own efforts. The same conclusion was reached by the Ukrainians under Russia, since neither Russia nor the Entente had ever mentioned the question of autonomy for Ukraine, let alone independence. Hopefully Ukrainians waited for the moment of weakness within Russia, encouraged by the military setbacks of the Russian forces in 1915-16 and by the internal decomposition. By March, 1917, the conditions within Russia were such as to warrant a revolution. The Ukrainian National Congress, which met in Kiev on April of that year, in its spirit and resolutions laid the foundations for the later establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic in November, 1917.<sup>72</sup>)

The reestablishment of the Ukrainian National Republic in Eastern Ukraine created even more friction among the Ukrainians under Austria since now they had a point of orientation. The situation became complicated when Soviet Russia, by the attack on the new and still weak state forced the Ukrainian National Republic to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers on February 9, 1918, in order to liquidate two front situation. One of the gains made by the peace treaty was a secret agreement on the part of the Austrian government to divide Galicia by July 20, 1918.

Although the Ukrainian National Republic maintained friendly relations with the Dual Monarchy, the position of the Ukrainians in Galicia did not cease to be critical. There was a strong anti-Austrian feeling among the Ukrainians in Galicia. A major cause of this hostility centered around Austria allowing the Poles to have complete control of the administration of Galicia. Any attempt of the Ukrainian leadership to organize the population for an overt bid for independence would be opposed and blocked by the Poles. The leadership was also aware that in case of Polish pressure, the Austrian government would be more prone to side with the Poles rather than with the Ukrainians. To establish proper perspective of the situation, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Repre-

sentation called for March 25, 1918, in Lviv for a meeting of delegates of all Ukrainian political parties to discuss the matter of constitutionality of a Ukrainian state body in Austria and the matter of organizing a Ukrainian military force. The meeting was presided by Prof. Yulyan Romanchuk. Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych presented the topic of constitutionality while Dr. Yevhen Levytsky dealt with the subject of military force.<sup>73)</sup>

About 500 delegates were present at the meeting. Its presidium included besides the above mentioned National Democrats, Martyn Korolyuk and Dr. Mykhaylo Vorobets from the Radical Party, Ivan Zhovnir and Ivan Kushnir represented the Social Democrats, and Olexander Barvinsky was the representative from the Social Christian Party. The gathering approved unanimously a resolution which recognized that the proposals of the Brest Peace Treaty of February 9, 1918, were the first steps in the realization of the national self-determination and demanded their immediate fulfillment, especially on the part of Austrian government. It also called for the immediate severance of administrative ties between Polish and Ukrainian territories, and for the formation of a new state body from Ukrainian Galicia and Bukovina. The resolution also, while demanding Ukrainian statehood, recognized the rights of national minorities, in regard to their security, national autonomy, and political equality.\*) The final point of the resolution was the demand that Austria return immediately the territories of Kholm and Pidlyashya to the Ukrainian National Republic.

During the discussion of military organization, it was agreed that such a formation was a necessity and it should be formed on a non-party basis. The latter point was endorsed by the Ukrainian Radical Party only while the National Democrats and the Social Democrats supported the idea of quasi-military organizations to be established by the political parties and other national organizations themselves. It was also decided to turn to the people for contributions to such a military fund, designed to provide the necessary equipment for the future force.<sup>74)</sup>

The leadership was well aware that the Austrian government, even at the last moment, would try to retain its control of the empire by means of "reconstruction" at the expense of the Ukrainians in order to gain the favor of the Poles and Hungarians. For that reason, when Austria had accepted the Fourteen Points of President Wilson as the basis of talks with the Allies, the Ukrainians considered it to be the proper time for direct action in their struggle for national self-determination.

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\*) The resolution of all Ukrainian parties to this meeting acknowledged the Jews as a nationality.



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**Most Reverend Andriy Sheptytsky,  
Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop of Lviv  
and Metropolitan of Halich.**

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On October 10, 1918, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation decided to convene in Lviv the Ukrainian National Council,\*) consisting of all deputies to the Austrian State Council, the representatives to the Galician and Bukovinian *soym*, and the members of the Austrian Upper House (House of Lords,\*\*) as well as delegates from Transcarpathian Region.<sup>75)</sup>

The meeting of the Council was scheduled for October 18, 1918; it would present Austria with *fait accompli* that the Ukrainians under Austria were proclaiming their will through their duly elected representatives. In the meantime the Austrian emperor issued his manifesto (October 16) which proposed to reconstruct the Austrian empire on a national federative basis. For this purpose he called for the formation of appropriate representations from among the deputies to the Council of State. These groups were to confer with the Crown in order to reach some sort of federal constitutional agreement. Thus, the manifesto provided a legal basis for the formation of the Ukrainian National Council, which on October 10 was initiated in a revolutionary way. At the meeting of the newly formed Council, all of the political parties were also represented by three delegates. The political leadership of Transcarpathian Ukraine sent a statement expressing their wish to join Galicia and their solidarity with the Council. Having proclaimed itself as Constituent Assembly, the Ukrainian National Council

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\*) The Ukrainian National Council will also be referred to as the Council or U.N.C.

\*\*) The three representatives from the House of Lords were Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, Prof. Dr. Horbachevsky, and Prof. Olexander Barvinsky.

turned its attention to the most important matters to be considered. It was decided to unite all of the Ukrainian territories, still held by Austria, into a separate state:

Following the principle of national self-determination the Ukrainian National Council, as a constitutive body, resolved:

1. The entire ethnographic area in Austria-Hungary, especially Eastern Galicia with its boundary on Syan River and with the inclusion of the area populated by Lemky, northwestern Bukovina with the cities of Chernivtsi, Storozhynets, and Seret, and the Ukrainian area of northwestern Hungary, make up the whole Ukrainian territory.

2. This Ukrainian territory is constitutionalized forthwith as the Ukrainian State. It is resolved that appropriate measures will be taken to put this decision into effect.

3. The national minorities on the Ukrainian territory—the Jews are recognized as a separate nationality—are urged to constitutionalize immediately and send their representatives to the Ukrainian National Council in proportion corresponding to their population strength.

4. The Ukrainian National Council will prepare a constitution for the state which had been formed in this fashion on the basis of general, equal, secret, and direct voting right, with a proportional representation and with the right for a national cultural autonomy, and with the right for a representation in administration for the national minorities.

5. The Ukrainian National Council demands that this territory which has been organized into a Ukrainian State, shall have unconditionally its own representatives at the Peace Conference.

6. The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Burian, is deprived of the right to conduct talks in the name of this Ukrainian territory.<sup>76)</sup>

Having dispensed with the problem of formation of the Ukrainian State, the meeting heard reports of Dr. Y. Levytsky and Dr. Stepan Baran which dealt with the future course of foreign policy of the new state. The central point was whether it should strive for an immediate unification with the Ukrainian State on

the Dnieper or whether it should, for the time being, remain an independent state. After eleven hours of discussions, the problem was put off for future consideration.<sup>77)</sup>

On the following day, October 19, another meeting took place in Lviv. This one consisted of representatives from various Ukrainian organizations in Eastern Galicia. Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych familiarized the assembled delegates with the actions and the resolutions of the Ukrainian National Council. He also explained the justification for provisionally declaring Western Ukraine a separate Western Ukrainian State, apart from the Ukrainian State on the Dnieper River.\*)

The arguments presented by Petrushevych were connected with the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, especially the Tenth. It was considered that Wilson's program secured every nation in Austria-Hungary a place in the community of nations, i. e. that every nationality was guaranteed the right of statehood, joined together by some sort of a loose union. The old and artificial structure of "Crown land" of Austria-Hungary was to be destroyed.

The subjugated nations were especially hopeful that Wilson would have enough strength and support to put his program into effect. Although the leadership of the Ukrainian National Council subscribed to this program without reservations, it was also disturbed by the Sixth Point which dealt with Russia. Because Wilson's concept of Russia was incomplete, the Ukrainians were fearful that the Russian reactionaries at the Peace Conference would utilize this fact to save the Russian empire as a unit. And if the newly formed state would have joined immediately the existing Ukrainian State in the East, then it too could have fallen into the Russian hands. By retaining an independent and separate statehood, at least for a while, the Ukrainian National Council hoped to have a more definite position against the Polish and Russian pretensions. Also, the decision to remain independent and separate was considered by all members of Ukrainian National Council to be a temporary one, lasting only until the government of the two Ukraines were firmly entrenched.<sup>78)</sup>

The decision made on October 18 was influenced by another factor as well. At that time Eastern Ukraine was occupied by a strong German force, pressuring the Hetmanate into a Russophilic and a reactionary direction. Therefore Hetman's regime was stub-

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\*) In his memoirs Sydir Yaroslavyn states that Petrushevych had also mentioned that Vyacheslav Lypynsky, the representative of Ukrainian government in Vienna, advised to leave the question of unification an open one because of the unclear situation in the Hetmanate. See NASHA META (Toronto), No. 43, 1957.



**Col. Dmytro Vitovskyy**



bornly opposed by political organizations of the radical democratic orientation. The situation prophesied a political crisis and a possible revolt. The leaders of the Ukrainian National Council did not want to get involved in the internal civil struggle in Eastern Ukraine, preferring to wait for a solution to this crisis.

Having proclaimed officially its decision to the thousands of the assembled representatives (October 19), the Ukrainian National Council met again in the evening at the National Home in Lviv for further consultations. At this meeting, Petrushevych was elected President of the Ukrainian National Council and three committees were appointed: for Galicia, chaired by Dr. Kost Levytskyy, a committee for Bukovina, presided by Prof. Omelyan Popovych; and one Executive Committee.\*)

## Preparations for military action

The decision of the Ukrainian National Council to re-establish Ukrainian statehood would have been one of the many empty declarations in Europe were it not for the fact that it took some steps to execute the plan into action. Many groups including the Polish circles considered this declaration to be one of several "reservations" and "declarations" of the Ukrainians which lacked means of execution.

The Poles had another argument for convincing themselves that this threat could be ignored. Their leaders, who had decided to take over Eastern Galicia at the proper moment, had at their disposal all of the local Austrian administration and the sympathies of the Galician viceroy, General Huyn. In case of trouble Huyn could rely on the help of the military regiments made up for the most part of non-Ukrainians. The last factor was earlier successfully arranged through the efforts of the Poles.

The Ukrainian National Council was faced with a difficult situation. A premature attempt on the part of the Ukrainians to take over the power in Eastern Galicia would have ended in a catastrophe on the same day. There was no other possibility but to form, in secrecy, military formation in all administrative centers, that is in larger cities, and mainly in Lviv, Peremyshl, Ternopil, Sambir, Drohobych, Sokal, and Stanyslaviv. This matter was de-

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\*) The Galician committee, constitutionalized on October 27, was made up of the following members: K. Levytskyy (National Democrat)—the chairman; Ivan Kyvelyuk (National Democrat) and Dr. Ivan Makukh (Radical)—vice-chairman; Dr. Volodymyr Bachynsky (National Democrat), Dr. Stepan Baran (National Democrat), and Dr. Osep Nazaruk (Radical)—the secretaries.

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**Dr. Osyp Nazaruk**  
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legated to the General Military Committee, headed by Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyy. This organization represented the consolidation of all Ukrainian social and political groups. Vitovskyy represented the Radicals, Lieutenant Lyubomyr Ohonovskyy was from Christian Social Party, Lieutenant Volodymyr Starosolskyy represented the Social Democrats, Lieutenant Theodor Martynets was a National Democrat, while Second Lieutenant Dmytro Poliyiv and other members of the committee belonged to no specific party.\*)

The leadership of the Ukrainian National Council also decided to continue its efforts on a more convenient plan to take over the power in Eastern Galicia. It involved negotiations with Vienna to instruct Huyn and the military commander to place the authority in Eastern Galicia in the hands of the Ukrainian National Council, in accordance to the Emperor's decree of October 16th.

Nor were the Poles sluggish in planning their program. On October 28, 1918, the Polish Liquidation Commission was formed

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\*) Other members of the Military Committee were First Lieutenant Dr. Ivan Rudnytskyy, Sergeant Babyak, Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, and several others. At first the Committee referred to itself as "General," later "Central," and then used the two names interchangeably. At first its organization was quite loose, lacking a chairman and secretary. In time Vitovskyy was elected its President and Paliyiv assumed the post of the Secretary.<sup>79)</sup>



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**Capt. Dr. Ivan Rudnytskyy**

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in Cracow,\*) performing the functions of the Polish National Council. Its purpose was to liquidate in a formal way the Austrian rule of Polish territories and to become the governmental authority in that area. The Commission instructed all Austrian administrative officers throughout entire Galicia to surrender their authority to the Commission and henceforth these offices were to function in the name of the Polish State. Obliging, General Huyn issued a memorandum to his subordinates in which he recognized the authority of the Commission. But the same memorandum instructed the officials of Eastern Galicia to conduct business in the name of Austria since, according to the emperor's manifesto, it belonged to Austria.<sup>80)</sup>

On October 30, the Galician Committee of the Ukrainian National Council issued a declaration protesting the interference of the Poles in Ukrainian matters in Eastern Galicia and issued orders of its own.\*\*\*) It directed all administrative offices on Ukrainian territory to regard all directives of the Commission as illegal. It instructed the citizens to ignore orders issued by anyone representing the Commission and even offer resistance if necessary.<sup>81)</sup>

It became apparent that an armed conflict was unavoidable. Although there were several Ukrainian anti-Austrian organizations,

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\*) For simplification purposes we shall refer to it as "Commission."

\*\*) The protest was signed by Kost Levytskyy and Ivan Kyvelyuk.

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**Aspirant Dmytro Paliyiv**

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made up mostly of former officers, they lacked coordination and a definite plan of action. For this reason it was necessary to bring to life the Ukrainian Central Military Committee. All business of this organization was conducted in secrecy. Its main difficulty lay in the fact that in Eastern Galicia was stationed only a small percentage of Austrian military formations made up of Ukrainians. The regiments containing a significant number of Ukrainians were stationed in Western Austria or elsewhere, outside the reach of the Military Committee. As it was, the Military Committee had, at its disposal only a limited numbers of trained men. To supplement this force the Committee had to form a volunteer organization, consisting for the most part of high school students, in order to equalize the superior number of Polish formations, especially in Lviv. By the end of October, the organizational work of the Military Committee was only half finished and would have promised better results in the early part of November, when it would have been possible to transfer a regiment of Sich Riflemen from Bukovina to the site of action. However, the rapid developments forced the Ukrainian National Council to set the night of October 31 as the date of the coup.<sup>82)</sup>

The efforts in Vienna for a peaceful takeover failed to produce positive results. Polish influence at the Viennese court was still considerable. Dr. Lamasch, the last Austrian Prime Minister, agreed to hand over the administration of Western Galicia to the Poles. This was the theme of his speech in the Council of Ministers on October 31. But when the Ukrainians made similar demands, the Austrian government took a different position, giving rise to speculations that perhaps Austria was ready to instruct the viceroy to comply with the demands of the Polish Commission or to agree

with the counterclaims of the Polish Regency Council in Warsaw.<sup>83)</sup>

In addition, the Ukrainian National Council had still another problem. It had received information that the representatives of the Commission, with the aid of its military organization, were preparing a coup for the night of November 1. Warsaw even sent a general to insure success of the venture\*)<sup>84)</sup>

### **Creation of the Ukrainian State by own will and force of the people**

As a last effort for peaceful settlement, the Ukrainian delegation appeared before the Viceroy Huyn in the evening hours of October 31, demanding control of the civil and military power. Failing to accomplish this, the matter now passed into the hands of the Ukrainian military authorities. Colonel Vitovskyy issued orders to occupy at midnight the administrative and strategic points throughout the city. The viceroy and the military commander were to be arrested. The plan was carried out smoothly, taking by surprise not only the Austrians but the Poles as well. On November 1, the people of Lviv awoke to find proclamations plastered throughout the city while at the same time similar announcements were sent to the districts.<sup>85)</sup>

#### **TO THE PEOPLE OF LVIV:**

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people on the Ukrainian territory of the former Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy a Ukrainian State has been established.

2. The highest authority of the Ukrainian State is the Ukrainian National Council.

3. As of today, the Ukrainian National Council has taken over the government in the capital city of Lviv and in the entire territory of the Ukrainian State.

4. Further orders will be issued by the civil and military organs of the Ukrainian National Council.

5. The population is requested to observe order and to comply with these instructions.

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\* On the basis of Polish sources it was confirmed later that the information had been correct.

6. Under such conditions the security of public order, of life and property as well as the provisioning of foodstuff is completely guaranteed.

**Ukrainian National Council**

Lviv, November 1, 1918.

Another proclamation was directed to the entire Ukrainian people in this area:

**Ukrainian nation!**

We are announcing your freedom from the age-long serfdom.

As of today you are the master of your own land, a free citizen of the Ukrainian State.

On October 18, because of your will, on the Ukrainian territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy a Ukrainian State has been formed and its supreme authority is the Ukrainian National Council.

As of this day the Ukrainian National Council has taken over the power in the capital city of Lviv and in the entire territory of the Ukrainian State.

**Ukrainian nation!**

The fate of the Ukrainian State is in your hands. You will stand like an unconquerable wall by the Ukrainian National Council and will push back all hostile attempts on the Ukrainian State.

Until the organs of the state government are established in a lawful manner, the Ukrainian organizations in the cities, districts, and villages are to take over all state, district, and local government and in the name of the Ukrainian National Council carry out its authority. Where this has not yet been done, the existing officials, hostile towards the Ukrainian National Council, are to be removed.

All soldiers of Ukrainian nationality are henceforth subordinated exclusively to the Ukrainian National Council and to the orders of the military authority of the Ukrainian State. All of them have to defend it. Ukrainian soldiers at the front are called back with this order to their native land and to the defense of the Ukrainian State.

The entire Ukrainian population, able to bear arms, is called upon to establish military formations which will either join the Ukrainian army or will pre-

serve peace and order locally. Especially, protection should be given to the railroad, post office, and the telegraph.

All citizens of the Ukrainian State, regardless of their nationality or religion, are assured their citizenship, nationality, and their religious freedom.

National minorities of the Ukrainian State,—Jews, Poles, and Germans,—are to send their delegates to the Ukrainian National Council.

Until the Ukrainian State will issue its own laws, the existing laws are to remain in effect if they do not contradict the foundation of the Ukrainian State.

As soon as the position of the Ukrainian State is secured and entrenched, the Ukrainian National Council will call for a meeting of a Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of general and equal, direct and secret ballot. It will decide the future of the Ukrainian State.

The membership of the Cabinet formed by the Ukrainian National Council and its program shall be made public at a later date.

**Ukrainian nation!**

Sacrifice all of your strength, sacrifice everything to entrench the Ukrainian State!

**Ukrainian National Council**

Lviv, November 1, 1918.<sup>66</sup>)

## **The first government of the new state: The State Secretariat**

The formation of the governmental bodies began on October 18, 1918, with the formation of the Ukrainian National Council as the constituent body to function until general elections could be held.\*)

On October 19 the Ukrainian National Council chose its first presidium to deal with the current business. In view of the growing conflict with Poland, the Ukrainian National Council met on November 7 to form a regular state administration. On November 9 the resolution, establishing the provisional State Government

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\*) The U.N.C. was considered to be a parliament and the ministers were responsible to this body.

under the name of State Secretariat, was adopted; the Secretary (minister) was to head a specific department.\*)

The Secretariat was formed on the basis of complete national consolidation since all of the political parties were represented according to their strength in the last general elections. Dr. Kost Levytsky,\*) a prominent National Democrat, was elected President of the Secretariat and also was the Secretary of Finance. His position was the same like a Prime Minister in Britain. Dr. Ivan Makukh and Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyy, from the Radical Party, headed the Department of Public Works and Armed Forces. Antin Chernetsky, a Social Democrat, was the Secretary of Labor and Welfare. Dr. Vasyl Paneyko headed the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and his fellow National Democrat, Dr. Sydir Holubovych, was directing the Secretariat of Justice. Department of Religious Affairs and Education, reserved for the representative from Bukovina, was headed by Professor Olexander Barvinskyy, a Christian Socialist. Other departments were headed by Dr. Lonhyn Tsehelsky (National Democrat)—Ministry of Internal Affairs; Dr. Stepan Baran (National Democrat)—Secretary of Agrarian Affairs; Yaroslav Lytvynovych (no party)—Commerce and Industry; Dr. Ivan Kurovets (National Democrat)—Secretary of Public Health; Ivan Myron (no party)—an engineer by profession, was the Secretary of Roads; Alexander Pyasetsky—Post and Telegraph; and Dr. Stepan Fedak (National Democrat)—Food Administration.\*\*)

It should be mentioned that the posts were filled without any party struggles because the party leadership agreed to a democratic division of influence, i.e. the party with most votes in the last election should hold the more influential posts, and have more portfolios in the government. Also the fact that the country was in a state of emergency tended to dampen the possibility of the party squabbles.<sup>87)</sup>

The Secretaries were sworn in on November 10, in the former palace of the viceroy. The oath was administered by Professor Yulian Romanchuk, the oldest representative in the Ukrainian National Council and witnessed by the people from all walks of life. Perhaps the problems which faced the new government were another factor which discouraged party competition. The country was ruined economically by the world war fronts and several mountain areas were threatened with starvation. The lack of trained

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\*) In the middle of December Dr. K. Levytsky left his post voluntarily and did not participate in the government. His duties were taken over temporarily by the Secretary of Justice, Dr. Sydir Holubovych.

\*\*) The needs of the war-torn country necessitated the formation of the Secretariat of Public Works and the Food Administration.





Dr. Ivan Makukh

personnel to administer the various departments was yet another problem facing the newly formed Secretariat.<sup>88)</sup>

The business of the Ukrainian National Council and that of the Secretariat was conducted in Lviv even though from November 2 the Ukrainian forces were involved in a bitter fighting with the Polish rebels within the city. Then Colonel Hnat Stefaniv,<sup>\*)</sup> in view of the front's fluctuation, suggested that the government move out of Lviv to some secure district. But the Secretariat refused to retreat from the capital on the grounds that it would create a negative impression on the troops and the population not only in Lviv but in the districts as well.<sup>89)</sup>

As soon as the Secretariat was sworn in, the U.N.C. charged it to "make all necessary arrangements for the unification of all Ukrainian territories into one state." The Secretariat had no find means to retain contact with Kyiv,<sup>\*\*)</sup> even though the conditions there were not the most favorable. There Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy held conservative views, which were also shared by his ministers. His government voided all reforming legislation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, including the land reform, and evoked sharp opposition from the majority of the political parties. It was considered by some circles that a German defeat would change the

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<sup>\*)</sup> During this period, the first Commander-in-Chief, Col. Vitovskyy, was nominated Secretary of Military Affairs, and Col. Hnat Stefaniv was nominated Commander-in-Chief.

<sup>\*\*)</sup> The name of capital of Ukraine in Ukrainian language is Kyiv. This name in anglicized form is Kiev.

views of Skoropadskyy's government, making the unification possible. However, the matter took a different turn. On November 14, the Hetman formed a new and still more reactionary government, headed by Gerbel, a Russian. By this move Skoropadskyy hoped to gain Entente's recognition of the Ukrainian State on the Dnieper and, at the same time, to win the friendship of the Russian anti-Communist leader, General Denikin, who had the sympathy of the Allies and a considerable force in the Caucasus. However, these expectations were interrupted by an armed revolution against Hetman and once more the question of unification was put aside.<sup>90)</sup>

It should be mentioned that the U.N.C. and the Secretariat were determined to overcome these difficulties, as well as those in Western Ukraine. On November 13, the Provisional Fundamental Law (a temporary constitution) was adopted to give the new state a basis for law and order. The first article designated the name for the state: Western Ukrainian National Republic. Article II defined the borders of the Republic which encompassed Ukrainian Galicia, the Bukovina and the Ukrainian parts of the former Hungarian districts as shown on the ethnographic map of the Austrian Monarchy by Karl Freiherr Czernig. The following article established the sovereignty on the above mentioned territory. Article IV dealt with the general elections:

The right of rule in the name of the Western Ukrainian Republic is performed by the entire population through its representation, elected on the basis of general and equal, direct and secret and proportional right to vote, without regard for sex. The Constituent Assembly is to be elected on this basis. Until the Constituent Assembly can meet, all authority is in hands of the Ukrainian National Council and the State Secretariat.\*)

The last article established a golden lion on a blue field, facing the right, to be the coat of arms of the state and the seal. This crest had been used by the Kings of Galicia in the XIII and XIV centuries.<sup>91)</sup>

Two additional laws were passed to aid the administration of the country. The law of November 16, dealt with the district administration. It retained the former organization and procedures as long as they did not oppose the foundations of the new state. The law also retained the local self-governments but it was to be re-

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\*) The elections to the Constituent Assembly were to be held in the early spring of 1919.

organized on the basis of general and equal electoral law. And it eliminated the special privileges of the Polish nobility, enjoyed during the Austrian regime. The other law, passed on November 21, dealt with the temporary organization of the judicial system. It retained the laws and procedures of the old regime but these were to serve the new order.<sup>92)</sup>

A point should be made that, from the middle of November 1918, the administration of the Ukrainian National Council extended only over Eastern Galicia. The Rumanians conquered Bukovina while the Transcarpathian Ukraine fell to the Hungarians. Lemkivshchyna, which expressed desires to unite with the Western Ukrainian Republic, was occupied by Polish troops in the middle of November. Thus the Ukrainian National Council controlled 49 districts of approximately 40,000 square miles, with a population of 4.5 million. The Ukrainian population showed loyalty and obedience to the laws of the state and the country was able to avoid civil disorders or violent upheavals which were not infrequent in other parts of Central Europe (Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Germany).<sup>93)</sup>

It should be emphasized that in Western Ukraine not one program was enacted that was discriminatory of the Poles or Jews. Although this was a time of revolutionary excitement and the scene of a war of aggression conducted by Poland against Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian population was obedient to the orders of their government to honor the civil rights of the Polish minority. This same situation was also found in regard to the Jews. The Western Ukraine was the only country in 1918-1919 in Central Europe where there were no riots against the national minorities (Poles, Jews, Germans, Armenians) or no pogrom of any kind.

### **Efforts and problems to organize a regular army**

One of the most difficult tasks faced by the new administration was to form and develop the military forces of the new state. Practically every able-bodied man had been mobilized by the Austrian government and the regiments with a Ukrainian majority were scattered at the front in Italy, Albania, or in Eastern Ukraine as a part of the Austrian Army stationed there from April 1918. The training cadres of these regiments were, in most cases, outside the Ukrainian Galician territory. For this reason, on October 31, the Military Committee commanded a very limited number of well trained men; even this number had to be dispersed throughout Eastern Galicia. The force assigned to Lviv, at the beginning of November, consisting of no more than 1500 officers and men, was the most numerous, since the city was the center of the Polish

minority and, thus, most obvious location for revolt. Peremyshl, an important railroad junction, was held by 1,000 troops.\*)

When the revolt did take place, the Poles in Lviv were able to match numerically the Ukrainian force and, at the same time, to hold one additional advantage. Their force was familiar with the terrain while the majority of Ukrainian troops came from the provinces and did not know either the locale nor the strategy of city fighting. While the Command of the Ukrainian Army, which was still in an embryonic stage of development, had to send for reinforcements from the districts, the Poles could draw on their manpower in Lviv. At this time, the city had approximately 250,000 inhabitants, half of them were Poles and the other half was made up of Ukrainians and Jews. Lviv was a Polish island in the middle of a Ukrainian sea and for this reason no other location could offer open Polish opposition to the Ukrainian government.

However, the districts could offer little support since the limited force at their disposal had to perform a number of tasks in this crucial period. The railroad lines were filled with Austro-Hungarian troops returning from the Eastern front. It was necessary to protect these lines and provide security for the districts as a whole, and at the same time, special attention had to be given to the district centers so that they were protected from possible pillage by these foreign troops. Among the returning troops were also Polish regiments which had to be disarmed in order to prevent them from establishing a foothold on territory of the Ukrainian State.

Also there were sizable clusters of Russians, former prisoners of war, returning eastward. In conjunction with security, the districts had to provide for their further transport and provision. In addition, the Ukrainian troops in the districts were former soldiers who had been classified by the Austrian government as unfit for the front line duty and, therefore, were of little use for battle in Lviv. For this reason the districts could not send any significant re-enforcements until the end of November. Nor the

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\*) Accusations have been made that the Military Committee failed to prevent the Polish revolt in Lviv by not securing a sufficient force which would have discouraged this occurrence. However, it seems that all possible steps had been taken to gather sufficient number of men on such a short notice.

The preparations were in the hands of the political leadership, especially of the Ukrainian Democratic Party. As late as September 18, the matter of reserves was still a subject of discussions by the members of the National Committee, established to deal with this problem. Some members of this Committee showed undue optimism that the needed force could be obtained readily and for this reason they failed to establish an early date for organization of such forces.

State Secretariat issued mobilization orders until November 5, since it was believed that the Allies, having accepted Wilson's program of self-determination of nations, would not allow a military conflict and would order the Polish government in Warsaw to cease its interference into the internal affairs of the Western Ukrainian Republic. The Secretariat was also optimistic because the Polish leadership, following the instructions of the Commission in Cracow, which, in turn was following orders from the government in Warsaw, approached the Ukrainian National Council concerning a truce in Lviv, around Peremyshl, and Yaroslav. Indeed, fighting did stop around Peremyshl "until the matter is decided by the Entente," and the Syan River became the line of demarcation (November 3).

The situation in Lviv improved for the Ukrainians in November, when they received help from two battalions of Sich Riflemen, transferred from Bukovina. However, Polish troops also obtained re-enforcements from the mobilized population and by November 9 both sides achieved equal strength. The Poles knew, however, that eventually the Ukrainians would raise sufficient strength to dislodge them from the city. Therefore truce talks were resumed and the Ukrainian National Council, still hopeful of obtaining satisfaction from the Allies, signed an armistice on November 10. The Poles were first to break the truce by sending a regiment of the Legion, commanded by General Roja, with armored trains and artillery against Peremyshl. The sudden attack surprised the defenders and the city was lost to the Poles. Later this regiment, consisting of about 1,950 men, used the armored trains to break through to Lviv, providing the Polish rebels with significant re-enforcements.

This development caused the Secretariat to speed up the mobilization process, calling in men between the ages of 18 and 35.\*) This task was in the hands of the District Military Reserve Boards. The mobilization was carried out without significant difficulties or draft dodging. However, since most of the trained men were still in the ranks of the Austrian army and, therefore, outside Galicia, the efforts of mobilization began to show results only in the first days of December. By this time the conflict between Poland and Western Ukraine assumed the scope of regular military operations.<sup>64)</sup>

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•) Only Ukrainian nationals were subject to the mobilization orders.

## CHAPTER 2

### POLISH WAR

#### Bid for power of the Ukrainians

As it often happens, Polish aggression against Western Ukrainian National Republic is "justified" in many ways, not only in propagandistic writings, but in historical volumes as well. Some claim that Eastern Galicia is Polish territory and, therefore, it must be under Polish rule. Admittedly, this claim asserts, Ukrainians comprise a majority but these people are completely unsuited for self-government since most of them are peasants and workers. Others claim, as soon as mention is made of national self-determination for the Ukrainians, that the entire affair is the invention and the tool of Vienna and Berlin, directed specifically against the Polish nation. Ukrainian demands to achieve equality as provided by the Austrian constitution, and even the slightest recognition of these rights, became a flagrant favoritism on the part of the Austrian government.\* <sup>95)</sup>

However, little has been said of the Austro-Polish co-operation, which led to the establishment of the Polish administration in Eastern Galicia, and the formation of the Polish Legion.

The matter of Austrian protection was also self-explanatory when the Austrian government agreed to hand over to the Poles the government of Western Galicia while the Ukrainians had to get it with force in Eastern Galicia.

The conflict itself is often described in melodramatic terms. It has been said that after Austria, supposedly, relinquished her authority in favor of the Ukrainians, Polish women and children of Lviv rose to defend this city against the "haydamaky" and "savages." Others claim that the Ukrainian rule in Galicia was made possible because an army from Eastern Ukraine was sent to help.<sup>96)</sup>

However, the matter stood on a different level. The Polish leadership in Cracow and Warsaw failed to evaluate properly the

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\*) Even the father of the Polish Socialist movement Boleslaw Limanowski, in his works recognizes the theory that Vienna had invented the matter of Ukrainian nationality in 1848. See his book STODWUDZIESTOLETNIA WALKA NARODU POLSKIEGO O NIEPODLEGLOSC, Krakow, 1916.



Col. Hnat Stefaniv (later General)

force of the Ukrainian nationalistic movement in Eastern Galicia. Having convinced the people and itself that the Ukrainians were an Austro-German invention, they had confidence that the administration of Eastern Galicia was ready to take over the control of government from the viceroy, when so directed. At the time, the U.N.C. was making preparations for the night of October 31, Poles were also in a huddle, planning to do the same but on November 1. Captain Czesław Mączynski\*) was appointed the supreme commander of Polish military formations, numbering about 1,500 men, all well-trained and familiar with the terrain.<sup>97)</sup>

Once the Poles were faced with *fait accompli* of the Ukrainians, the military organizations turned to street fighting, dislodging Ukrainian forces from the area of the central railroad station. By November 2, the Poles expanded their perimeter since some of the Ukrainian troops were used to protect a number of government buildings, and thus unable to participate in the combat. On November 3, after the Ukrainians were re-enforced by the two battalions of Sich Riflemen from Bukovina, the Poles had to retreat. But soon the other side was strengthened and the military might again was equalized. With the prospect of a prolonged struggle, the U.N.C. requested assistance from the districts, and on November 5, issued a mobilization proclamation, which, with patriotic phrases, was designed to appeal to the peasants. On November 8, the Secretariat

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\*) Polish pronunciation: Monczynski.

of the Armed Forces issued a separate decree, concerning the details of the mobilization. Additional directive of the Secretariat of Armed Forces, issued on November 13, divided the country into 12 military districts to facilitate the mobilization procedures.<sup>98)</sup>

The weak position of the Ukrainians did not escape the Poles. Hoping to lull the U.N.C. into a sense of security, the Poles opened peace negotiation to gain enough time to bring fresh forces from Western Galicia. The U.N.C. still trusting the political wisdom of the Entente, accepted this proposal and agreed to a truce which was to last from November 10 to November 18.<sup>\*)</sup> The acceptance of the truce was not solely a political move. Ukrainian forces in Lviv were exhausted too and, in order to function as an effective fighting unit, needed relief. The Lviv front line, about 10 kilometers, was in the beginning defended by 150 rifles per kilometer.<sup>\*\*) 99)</sup>

One, who did not agree to the truce, was the supreme commander of Ukrainian forces, Colonel Hnat Stefaniv. Although he was aware of the difficult position of his forces, he was convinced that the battle should continue by using reserve units. When the State Secretariat decided to explore the truce possibility, Stefaniv demanded that the Poles lay down their arms in exchange for free passage from Lviv. However, the truce was accepted without this condition.<sup>\*\*\*)</sup>

The military struggle at Peremyshl had a slightly different aspect. Among the garrisoned troops there was a considerable number of Ukrainians. It would have been relatively easy to occupy Peremyshl by October 30 when the voluntary demobilization of the Austrian garrison took place. However, the soldiers, disregarding their orders, dispersed to their homes. The Poles, using this opportunity, took over the city and the fortress without firing a shot. Only with the help of fresh forces, formed by the peasants of the immediate area, was it possible to regain the city, disarm the Polish troops, and arrest their commander, General Puchalski. Then the district representative of the U.N.C., Dr. Theofil Kormosh, made a truce with the Poles. Both sides were to refrain from military operations until the matter was decided by the Peace Conference.

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<sup>\*)</sup> Appeal for truce was also made by the Ukrainian Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky and the Polish Archbishop Bilczewski. Their appeal was directed to both sides in the two languages. The intervention of the Metropolitan influenced the Ukrainian side because he enjoyed among the leading Ukrainians considerable respect.

<sup>\*\*) In the middle of November the Ukrainian armed forces numbered circa 3,500 men (350 rifles per kilometer).</sup>

<sup>\*\*\*)</sup> Members of the Ukrainian delegation of the truce talks were Dr. S. Vytvytsky, Dr. L. Tsehelsky, Dr. M. Lozynsky, Dr. R. Perfetsky, and Dr. Lev Hankevych. Four of these men were National Democrats and the last one, Hankevych, was a Social Democrat.



However, he failed to blow up the bridges across the Syan River as directed by the supreme commander and, thus, made it possible for the Poles, in a sudden attack, to force the river and capture the railroad line leading to Lviv.<sup>100)</sup>

Having broken the truce to settle the contest with iron and blood, the Poles continued their drive on Lviv. Once this group reached the city, the situation changed drastically. Once again fighting broke out in the city and the Ukrainians were threatened with encirclement. For this reason it was decided on the night of November 21-22, to withdraw the troops from the city. This truce violation heralded a new Polish approach a full pledged war against the W.U.N.R., to gain control of all Eastern Galicia.<sup>101)</sup>

### **Formation of the Ukrainian Galician Army**

The mobilization of Ukrainian forces in W.U.N.R. was carried out in the months November and December 1918, calling men up to the age of thirty-five. The growth of this force was slow, partly due to the weak organization of the mobilization apparatus. Another reason for this was due to the slow return of the soldiers from the Austrian army, some of them returning from the front while others were coming from the training centers in Austria. Still soldiers were in various prison camps, especially in Italy. The mobilization touched only the Ukrainian ethnic nationals and, because of the existing conditions, it excluded Lemkivshchyna, the Sian area, Bukovina, and the Carpathian region. By the end of December, approximately 100,000 men were mobilized. This significant force, created at such a short notice, should be credited to the unusual energy and administrative ability of Col. Dmytro Vitovskyy, the Secretary of Military Affairs.<sup>102)</sup>

The Secretariat was then faced with the difficult task of equipping this force. The W.U.N.R. possessed only limited supplies of rifles and ammunition which came from the former Austrian storehouses in this part of Galicia. The armament was supplemented by the weapons taken from the foreign troops passing through the area from the eastern front. However, this method of provisioning was inadequate and the troops felt immediately the shortage of rifles and ammunition. A shortage of ammunition for machine guns and artillery was especially acute.\*)<sup>103)</sup>

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\*) From experience it can be stated that the infantrymen had with them 250 cartridges and 100 were held in reserve. The artillery had, on the average, 300 shells and none in reserve. During the entire operation of the group, not a single soldier received new footwear to replace his old worn out ones. Shirts were changed only when a villager made a gift of his own. (M.S.)

The Ukrainian Galician Army, besides being short of equipment, also felt from the beginning the lack of officers, especially of the higher ranks. By April 17, 1919, the Galician Army counted only 1,412 officers of all ranks. Of this number a considerable portion held administrative and staff posts, thus depleting even more the already limited officers corps at the front. The shortage of officers of lower ranks was at times solved by assigning platoons to the more experienced non-commissioned officers.<sup>104)</sup>

However, the loss of field grade officers was more serious. Although the Austrian Army had contained enough Ukrainian intelligentsia from which officers of all ranks could be trained, these people had lacked sufficient pro-Austrian sympathies to make the army their career. The main body of Ukrainians in the service were draftees, who, under these circumstances, could be trained as non-commissioned or reserve officers, depending on their education.


In peace time, the reserve officers usually ended their service as ensigns. With additional service, usually involving several training exercises, they would eventually be promoted to the rank of second lieutenant and, more seldom, to the rank of the first lieutenant. As a rule, there were very few Ukrainian reserve officers before the war since only a small number of high school and university graduates were drafted. The Polish officers serving in the Austrian army also did their best to eliminate the able Ukrainians from practical training which could pose a treat at a critical moment. Captaincy was even more difficult to achieve since a candidate for this rank, even in time of war, could be transferred to a provincial guard unit, *Landsturm*, thus depriving him of an active command.

There was a small number of officers of low rank who were more advanced in age and their number would increase only in case of war, when more intellectuals were drafted regardless of political considerations. But only half of these officers were able to serve in the Ukrainian Galician Army. The other half of the officers were prisoners of war in Italy and Serbia.\*)

It should be also mentioned that the shortage of officers was made even more critical because the army organization of the U.G.A. followed very closely the Austrian model, causing various

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\*) Because of this shortage the W.U.N.R. was eager to enlist officers of other nationalities, with the exception of Russians and Poles. Nor were the German staff officers acceptable because of the situation in the Eastern Ukraine, and also because of the deep antagonism of the Allies toward Germany. However, after January, 1919, a few officers of German extraction but who were born in Galicia joined the U.G.A. as well as several Czechs from German Austria.



General M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko


commands to be too diversified. The U.G.A. could ill afford such a system and some officers of the staff would have been useful serving at the front.<sup>105)</sup>

### U.G.A. at the front

The Polish army, in conflict with the U.G.A., did not have to worry about these problems. The Polish leadership, by its pro-Austrian orientation, had assured itself of a sufficiently expanded officers corps, including the rank of general. For the young Poles, a career in the Austrian civil service or in the Austrian army, was much more readily attainable and more frequently realized. Therefore, the Polish army was not only well staffed but it was also better trained and equipped. It was well supplied with arms and ammunition and did not have to worry about the number of expended shells. It also had at its disposal a large number of armored trains which the U.G.A. completely lacked.<sup>106)</sup>

However, the U.G.A. retained high morale since in Western Ukraine there was no room for intra-party warfare. However, the patriotic feeling among the Ukrainian soldiers was not sufficient to overcome the numerical superiority of the enemy. The planned retreat from Lviv on November 21-22, 1918, developed into a series of reversals for the Ukrainians. The Poles, drawing on their manpower in Lviv as well as being re-enforced by troops from Con-

•  
Dr. Stepan Vytvytskyy  
•



gress Poland, especially by elements from the Legion, were able not only to gain control of Lviv but also to begin an offensive in two directions. The first group pushed southwest, hoping to gain control of the petroleum fields around Drohobych. The other push was in the northwesterly direction, toward the communication center of Rava Ruska. These offensives, which started from Lviv, had the approval of the Polish General Staff which, at the same time, sent two combat groups in the same directions from the opposite side. One of them was to reach Drohobych through Nove Misto and Khyriv, while the other was to approach Rava Ruska by way of Yaroslav and Zamostya.

The Polish army made considerable progress in their push but, as the mobilization in W.U.N.R. progressed and re-enforcements became available, their march was stopped at Khyriv and Rava Ruska. The Poles were successful, however, in expanding the rail corridor between Peremyshl and Lviv, re-enforcing it with armored trains.<sup>4)</sup> Their efforts to break through to Sambir and Drohobych failed; nor were the Poles able to establish railroad ties with Lviv from Yaroslav and Zamostya. By January, 1919, both sides were able to commit more forces to the front. Although the numerical superiority was on the side of the Poles, it was their training and equipment that, in time, would give them a definite advantage.<sup>107)</sup>

The political situation in Eastern Europe also favored Poland. While no nation threatened Poland seriously in the West, her northeastern borders were protected by the German army, which remained in the Baltic area until the summer of 1919. Poland was free to consolidate her power internally and to develop an army which could deal decisively with W.U.N.R.



Col. Viktor Kurmanovych (later general)

The Ukrainians were not permitted such an opportunity. Eastern Ukraine, engaged in a decisive combat with the Russian Bolsheviks, was hardly in a position to send significant help into Galicia. And the small Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia could not, even under favorable conditions, form and equip an army which could match that of Poland. For this reason the U.G.A., extended over a 300 km long front, had to limit its action to defensive operations, and the Polish victory was a matter of time. This hopeless situation could have changed if any of three conditions had been fulfilled. The first and the most obvious one involved military support from Eastern Ukraine. Second, the W.U.N.R. could have managed to survive if it had received political if not military support from the Western powers. The essence of the third condition was for the Ukrainians to conclude an alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks against Poland. Although the formation of W.U.N.R. was only in a transitional stage, with plans for total unification of the two parts of Ukraine, the actual steps toward this union were to be taken after the internal situation in Eastern Ukraine became clarified. W.U.N.R. was also concerned with the attitude of the Peace Conference toward the Ukrainian question. Because of the collapse of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky and the internal struggle in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainians in Galicia could not expect the needed help from that source. As a matter of fact, further development in Eastern Ukraine were to influence the fate of the two parts of Ukraine and a union between them was unavoidable.<sup>108</sup>) \*)

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\*) History of formation of the Ukrainian State on the Dnieper River (1917-1918) will be soon published in the Ukrainian Studies in the framework of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

## CHAPTER 3

### INTERNAL POLICIES OF WESTERN UKRAINE

#### Western Ukraine looks toward the East

The plan for unification of the two parts of Ukraine did not evolve on the basis of military considerations alone. On November 10, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council, still in Lviv, by a special declaration authorized its cabinet, the State Secretariat, to take the necessary action which would lead to the formation of a unified Ukrainian state. The U.N.C. was hopeful that once peace had been established on the European scene, the democratic movement which would follow its footsteps, would also influence the government of the Ukrainian State on the Dnieper River, thus making the union more desirable and easier to conclude. The State Secretariat sent Prof. Hryhoriy Mykytey to Kyiv to establish diplomatic relations with the Hetman and to take steps which would lead to the eventual unification.\*)

The State Secretariat sent another mission to Kyiv to seek military aid for the defense of Lviv. Dr. O. Nazaruk and V. Shukhevych left on November 5, 1918, to obtain from the Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy a detachment of *Sichov: Striltsi*, which was made up of volunteers of Galicia and was considered to be the elite formation of the Ukrainian army.\*\*)

However, the planned talks between the Hetman and Prof. Mykytey did not materialize.

Arriving in Kyiv later than expected, Prof. Mykytey found the situation somewhat changed. On November 14, the Hetman issued a proclamation which announced the federation of Ukraine with future non-Communist Russia and the formation of a new government which did not include Ukrainians. Since this development changed the character of the state, Mykytey decided not to

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\*) The need for every qualified man to remain in Lviv prevented that state from sending a commission to deal with this question. For this reason Prof. Mykytey was instructed to ask the East Ukrainian government to send a mission to Lviv to discuss this matter.

\*\*) The Commandant of this formation was Col. Yevhen Konovalets and its ideological and patriotic outlook was chiefly the work of *Striletska Rada* (Council of the Sich Rifleman), made up of talented officers and men. (Col. Dr. R. Dashkevych, Lieutenant Col. Chmola, Col. Andriy Melnyk, Capt. Mykhaylo Matchak and others).



●  
**Prof. Hryhoriy Mykytey**  
●

present his credentials to the new government and sent the message to the State Secreariat in Lviv for further instructions, since any negotiations could have been interpreted as support of the Hetman's new government. This situation was further complicated by the insurrection of the Directorate against the Hetman's regime on November 15. The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was under the leadership of V. Vynnychenko as President and S. Petlyura as the generalissimo of the Armed Forces.\*)

Because the private telegraph communication between Lviv and Kyiv was then virtually non-existent, as of November 1, the Ukrainian National Council knew nothing of the events in Kyiv up to November 18, inclusively. Nor was it aware of the Hetman's proclamation of November 14 or of the insurrection against his regime. If the U.N.C. had expected these developments, it would not have sent two separate delegations. And being occupied with the defense of the new state, the State Secretariat was unable to consider the matter of unification until November 18, 1918. The W.U.N.R. planned to achieve this union by constitutional means to avoid weakening of its position as well as the administrative chaos which might have followed.<sup>110)</sup>

Having worked out a draft of elementary conditions for the union, the State Secretariat sent its delegation to the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic (U.N.R.) which, at that time, had its headquarters at Khvastiv.\*\*)

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\*) The Ukrainian title is: **Holovnyy Otaman**.

\*\*) The delegation of W.U.N.R. consisted of Dr. Dmytro Levytskyy and Dr. Lonhyn Tsehelskyy.

Having considered the problems connected with the projected union, the two sides reached a preliminary agreement on December 1, 1918. The Western Ukrainian state agreed to give up its independent existence and its territories, and the population would become a part of the U.N.R. The Ukrainian National Republic also expressed its desire for the unification and agreed "to accept all of the territory and the people of W.U.N.R. as a component part of the state of U.N.R." It also agreed that the two governments will strive to bring about the union in the shortest time possible. Because of the historic circumstances which had led to a different cultural and social development of Western Ukraine, it was granted territorial autonomy in the future union. Its size was to be established by a joint commission as soon as possible before the merger became a fact. The decision of the commission was to be ratified by the competent legislative bodies of both republics. The more detailed conditions for the union of the two states were to be worked out also at that time.<sup>111)</sup>

The Khvastiv agreement was an agreement of political nature, without establishing even a framework for any concentered action. To the authors of this agreement, it was evident that such cooperation should follow the principle of mutual and national interest; nor did they foresee any major differences of opinion in the field of foreign policy. As a token of good will, both governments exchanged troops to manifest unity and common interest in their defensive struggle. The Directorate was able to send only small formations of troops and artillery. The State Secretariat agreed to have volunteers join the U.N.R.'s army and thus strengthen the nucleus of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. This agreement was officially communicated to the foreign powers on March 30, 1919.<sup>112)</sup>

In the meantime, the State Secretariat took further steps to bring the document closer to reality by asking the meeting of the Ukrainian National Council to ratify the agreement. On January 3, 1919, the plenary session of the Council ratified the preliminary agreement and directed the State Secretariat to conclude the process of unification as soon as possible. Until this was done and a Constituent Assembly of the unified republic met, the Ukrainian National Council retained the legislative powers and its State Secretariat executive power over the territory of Western Ukraine. The Council also had elected a large delegation which was to notify the Directorate of the resolution. The State Secretariat of Military Affairs also issued a proclamation to the soldiers of U.G.A., informing them of the Council's resolution. In a patriotic spirit the proclamation reviewed the bleak past of subjugation and called for sacrifices to achieve a unified Ukraine. The Ukrainian National



Council in its resolution had changed the name of the Western Ukrainian National Republic as Western Area of the U.N.R. after unification.

## **Union of two parts of Ukraine**

On January 22, 1919, the Directorate, during an official gathering in St. Sophia Square in Kyiv, read the Proclamation which ratified the agreement and so made the union a fact. On the following day, the Council's delegation took part in the session of the Congress of Working People of Ukraine,\*) which unanimously accepted the resolution of January 3 and the Proclamation of the Directorate.\*\*\*) In passing on various matters, the Congress also acted on establishing relations between the two territories. In view of the state of war, the authority and the defense of the country was placed in the hands of the Directorate of the U.N.R. However, the membership of the Directorate was to be enlarged to include not only 5 former members of the U.N.R., but also the representative from Western Ukraine, i. e., W.U.N.R. This body was to constitute the supreme authority in the united country, with the power to enact laws necessary for the defense of the country. The Congress also specified that the authority of the Directorate would be valid until its next session. Neither the joint commission, charged with the task of working out the legal basis of the union and the limits of autonomy, nor the Constituent Assembly, which was to ratify the union, were able to meet since some parts of Ukraine were already occupied by the Red Army of Soviet Russia while the rest was defending itself against Poland and the troops of White Russia. Thus the matter of legalization of the union was put off until the end of war.<sup>113)</sup>

## **Governmental considerations for the united state**

The architects of the new Ukraine, led by Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, decided to form the Ukrainian state on the basis of internal federalism as practiced in Switzerland or in the United States.<sup>114)</sup> As early as January 1918, Prof. Hrushevskyy had made

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
\*) The Congress of Working People of Ukraine was elected after the victory of the Directorate over the Hetman. The elections provided the right to vote for all citizens who did not exploit the labor of other people. It proclaimed a Provisional Constitution of U.N.R. and declared that in the near future general elections to the parliament should be held.

\*\*) The delegation was led by Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, the first vice-president of the Ukrainian National Council.

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Volodymyr Vynnychenko


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public a project which divided the Ukrainian territory into new administrative units, *zemli*, (lands) which regarded economic and communication factors that would be needed for the development of a given territory. The *zemli* were to replace the former system of provinces (gubernia) which had been formed by the tsarist government. Hrushevskyy's project envisaged 30 such units, each of them sharply defined territorially.<sup>115)</sup>

The Constitution of U.N.R. of April 29, 1918, answered the question of whether there was to be a centralized or decentralized organization. The fifth paragraph of "general principles" provided for self-rule of territories, districts, and local governments "according to the principle of decentralization." Paragraph 26 of the section dealing with the organs of authority of U.N.R. stated that matters of local nature are to be settled by the local councils and administrations, while the ministers of the U.N.R. are to check and co-ordinate their activities through their representatives, or state officials. Disputes between the local and central authority were to be settled by the Supreme Court of U.N.R. However, the Constitution did not contain the details for putting the principle of autonomy into operation since its execution was left to a special legislation.

The authors of the Constitution, with its provisions for decentralization and regional autonomy, were motivated not only by purely theoretical but also by practical consideration. They were concerned with providing a constitutional basis for unification of the Kuban and the Crimean regions. These areas had their own peculiarities and, therefore, had to have their own autonomy, approaching the federal principle.<sup>116)</sup>



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**Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy,  
President of the Ukrainian Central  
Rada and then first President of the  
U.N.R.**

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During the regime of the Directorate, no steps were taken to deal with the problem of establishment administration of the state; nor was there a machinery for enforcement of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Central Rada. The administration of the Republic had been in this period performed by the representatives of the central government in gubernias and districts. The autonomy of communities, areas and districts provisionally functioned on the basis of the laws of Ukrainian Central Rada with some adjustments to the new situation. The Directorate failed to prepare a "temporary constitution" for the Congress of Working People of Ukraine. It was only an initiative of the Western Ukrainian Republic that the Directorate signed the agreement of December 1, 1918, on the basis of the federative principle. With the manifesto of January 22, 1919, the Directorate accepted the resolution of the U.N.C. as binding. This was ratified also by the Congress of Working People of Ukraine.<sup>117)</sup>

However, among the ministers of the U.N.R. there were some persons who supported the principle of centralization. In favor of this principle were ministers from the Social Democratic Party on the basis of the Marxist doctrine of centralized state. Nevertheless they did accept the terms of the agreement. The Social Democrats of Western Ukraine also opposed the union of the two parts of Ukraine on the basis of decentralization. They were a minority in the Ukrainian National Council and could not hope for a definite

victory in the future elections. Their opposition to the State Secretariat was motivated by the existence of a socialist government in Kyiv. By removing the State Secretariat from power and by having a centralized system, they hoped to gain greater influence in the region. These feelings became more apparent on January 22, after the Unification Act had been made public. That evening a meeting was held by the Council of Ministers and members of the Directorate, presided by V. Vynnychenko.\*) The meeting was also attended by the delegation of the Ukrainian National Council. In the course of the proceedings, the floor was given to Mykyta Shapoval, the minister of agriculture. Criticizing sharply the agreement between the Directorate and the State Secretariat, as well as the decision of the U.N.C. he proposed a resolution which would have made the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, which was scheduled to meet on the following day, the legislative body for the entire Ukrainian territory, including Western Ukraine. His resolution called for the abolishment of the State Secretariat and the Ukrainian National Council and for the formation of a joint government in Kyiv, which would appoint, from among the eastern Ukrainians, a governor-general for the western territory and which would also form a joint military command.

Although his proposal was supported by Galician Social Democrat Semen Vityk, the proposal was opposed by the fellow-ministers. Olexander Mytsyuk, the Minister of Internal Affairs, defended the action of the Directorate and pointed out that the principle of federation and self-government would be more proper. The meeting failed to take any action on Shapoval's proposal since the commitment had already been made.<sup>118)</sup>

## Joint diplomatic efforts

In practice, there was only the desire and the intent to form one state, a political and a military alliance. In reality, these efforts were significant in the matters of foreign policy, since now both governments had to work for the common good, especially at the Peace Conference in Paris. For this purpose an agreement was worked out between the two sides, which was approved by the State Secretariat on March 20, 1919, and which was likewise ratified by the Council of Ministers of the U.N.R. In April, 1919, this agreement was presented to the foreign powers. It provided for a

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\*) V. Vynnychenko at that time was the chairman of the Directorate. He resigned on February 15, 1919. Later on had been elected as chairman of the Directorate Symon Petlyura.



**Dr. Vasyl Paneyko, Arnold Margolin, and Alexander Shulhyn  
in Paris during the Peace Conference in 1919.**

concerted action except when "special interests" demanded a separate representation of the Western Area of the U.N.R. A joint mission was to represent all the Ukrainians at the Peace Conference but it also provided that matters "concerning the Western Area, its international recognition, and the legalization of its statehood" were in the hands of a delegation appointed by the State Secretariat.

Section V of the document contained the names of the delegates to Paris: H. Sydorenko—the chairman, V. Paneyko—the vice-chairman, Professors Olexander Shulhyn, Borys Matyushenko, Serhiy Sholukhyn, and Arnold Margolin. The notion of two diplomatic missions and yet a joint delegation to the Peace Conference was based on the premise that the Western Ukrainian question had



A bill of Ukrainian National Republic. According to the rights of national minorities on the bill is indicated the value in the languages of minorities including Jewish.

a different legal status at the Peace Conference than the U.N.R. This fact was obvious from the confusion among the diplomats concerning Ukraine in general. At the time when Western Ukraine, as a former component of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, became a subject of debates in the Council of Ten and later in the Supreme Council, Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, was discussed within the framework of reconstruction of the Russian empire. Strongly supported by France, the idea of indivisible non-communist Russia complicated the activities of the U.N.R. delegation.<sup>119)</sup>

## CHAPTER 4

### ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

#### Propaganda against Ukraine

The existence of an independent Ukraine was an alarming development for a number of Ukraine's neighbors. The entire Russian non-Bolshevik camp, from Kerensky to Kolchak, as well as the Bolshevik leaders could not envisage Ukraine as not being a part of the Russian empire. The Polish government viewed the emergence of Ukraine as a threat to its extensive territorial claims. The possibility of extending their rule to Ukrainian lands was also the reason for the hostile neutralism of Rumania, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia.\*) And although some of these countries found themselves in opposition to the policies of the Russian Sovnarkom, in respect to the independent Ukraine, they concurred with the Bolsheviks, establishing a silent understanding to prevent the survival of this new state.

However, the neighbors were not the only ones to object. Fearful of the rebirth of German militarism, France was completely dedicated to the idea that Poland must be strong while France's former ally Tsarist Russia remained a sick state, and thus Poland was to provide France with a strong ally in the east against Germany.

The fact that such states could have formed a future powerful alliance against France did not occur to the French leadership, and in this political climate France proved to be a fertile ground for the work of Polish and Russian propaganda. The seeds bore fruit, especially among the French military men, who were to form a front against the Bolsheviks on Ukrainian territory. It wasn't until later, when the extinction of the Ukrainian army occurred, that the French Command slightly modified its negative position towards the Ukraine state.

One of the weapons used by the "silent alliance" was to fabricate or distort the news from Ukraine. The purpose of this maneuver was to put Ukraine in a negative light for the people in the given country, thus, to prevent the government from pursu-

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\*) From 1918-1939, there was a tendency within the ruling group in Prague to consider the Czechs and Slovaks as an ethnic group. Therefore, the names of these two nations were absorbed by the Republic into the one word Czechoslovakia replacing the two-word Czecho-Slovakia.

ing an "un-popular" course. Such a strategy was even of greater importance since this was the period of preparation for the Peace Conference and a news release from East Europe would receive worldwide publicity. These release concerning Ukraine presented the country in a state of chaos and conflicts, thus, helping to prevent any serious consideration of Ukraine's recognition. These reports were eagerly received by some intellectuals who saw the Bolsheviks as the builders of a new world. The news was often contradictory or grossly exaggerated. While some sources informed the people of the world that Hetman Skoropadsky proclamed a federation of Ukraine with Russia, others brought news that Russian Astrakhan forces had taken Kyiv\*) and had deposed the Ukrainian Hetman's regime and that General Denikin had formed a temporary government in Kyiv. Not infrequently these releases would comment that with the passing of the Ukrainian government also came an end to the "German intrigues in Ukraine." Similarly twisted information reached the Western Powers concerning the formation of the government in Lviv, "supported by the Austrian and German regiments."<sup>120</sup>)

Boris Bekhmetev, the ambassador to the United States from the Kerensky government which had subsequently been toppled but was recognized by Washington, informed the American press on December 30, 1918, that he saw the possibility that the people of Ukraine and other areas believed that the help of the Allies might be needed to help the anti-Bolshevik forces. He also mentioned that the national movement in Ukraine was, from the very beginning, inspired by Austria, and that Petlyura, a "Ukrainian peasant leader," was supported by the Central Powers. This situation, maintained Bekhmetev, posed a difficult task for the Russians who were collecting in Odessa to fight the Bolsheviks. Such an interview could not help but confuse the issue. It suggested that Petlyura, while ruling Ukraine from Kyiv where a large number of Bolshevik troops were present, was a leader of Bolshevik followers. As early as November 22, 1918, the press reported a push of Allied forces on Kyiv and that "General Skoropadsky gave up his leadership and nominated General Denikin as his successor." However, it wasn't until the middle of December, that the first landing of the Allies took place in Odessa. The pattern of this information was to present the Ukrainian leadership as the tools of Germany or as partners of the Bolsheviks.<sup>121</sup>)

Another area where the news was falsified or distorted dealt with the population of Ukraine. While some reports spoke of

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•) Kiev.



pogroms of the Jews by "the special detachments of the Ukrainian Army," other information presented the population as overcome by the doctrines of Communism.

The slander campaign of the silent partners, the Polish and the Russian diplomats and press media, brought considerable results. The average reader saw Ukraine as a region of chaos and, therefore, she could not be considered in the well-defined plans of European politics. This was the atmosphere in which the government of the U.N.R. and W.A.U.N.R. had to work to find the means of communicating with the Allied statesmen and politicians. When the Soviet aggression against the U.N.R. became a fact, the Directorate sought to obtain political, material and finally military support from the Allies. To accomplish this, talks were initiated with the Allied representatives in Jassy (Rumania) and Bukharest and with the French Command of the expeditionary forces which landed in Odessa and Mykolayiv.<sup>123)</sup> Such talks were conducted with the Allied representatives in Jassy (Rumania) and Bucharest and with the French government, while other missions were sent to discuss this matter with other members of the Entente. The struggle carried off by the W.U.N.R. against the Polish aggression was mainly oriented toward President Wilson.

The Ukrainian mission to Paris was still faced with another difficulty. The French government, having been influenced by the Russian and Polish representatives, had already selected an anti-Ukrainian policy. For this reason there was opposition to the Ukrainian participation at the Peace Conference, and the evasive tactics taken there caused the Ukrainians to arrive in Paris quite late.

## United States program at the Peace Conference

The faith of the W.U.N.R. delegates at the Peace Conference was based on Wilson's formula to establish a lasting peace in the world. The promise of democracy based on the right of self-determination of all nations, large and small, offered hope to the new state even though the opponents of this formula attacked the program as too general and unclear.<sup>124)</sup> Nor did this hope diminish after President Wilson has sent his representative, Colonel House, to clarify his plan to the other representatives of the Entente, since Wilson clearly stated the necessity for the Peace Conference to recognize the independency of the non-Moscow states, including Ukraine.<sup>125)</sup>

In regard to the nationalities problem in Austria-Hungary, this interpretation did not restrict the Ukrainians in joining with the Eastern Ukrainian State.

However, the high hopes and faith of the W.U.N.R. delegates in Wilson's program did not coincide with those of Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. In place of Wilson's formula to deal with Russia, Lansing presented the President with his own program for the future Peace Conference. He also saw the German threat to the Orient and recommended that "territorial barriers be placed which would prevent Germany, through political and economic penetration, becoming dominant in that area." One condition needed to achieve this was the "complete negation of the Brest Litovsk Treaty." Another was to establish the Baltic lands as autonomous states of Russian confederation. Lansing hesitated about Finland, recommending that a careful study should be made whether that country should be given the status of a sovereign state. Poland was to be an independent state, consisting of Polish territories held by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and given the port of Danzig. Slovakia, Moravia and Czechs were also to form one independent state.<sup>126</sup>) Ukraine, however, was to be a state of Russian confederacy, joined with the part of Austria-Hungary in which the Rusyns were dominant.\* ) <sup>127</sup>)

From this limited sketch of the Secretary of State, it is obvious that there were considerable deviations from Wilson's concept. Although he did not openly deny the right of national self-determination, he, nevertheless, remained faithful to the doctrine of the European diplomats who were primarily concerned with the economic and strategic considerations for the establishment of the "new order." Lansing's proposals quite agreed with the French policy which considered its primary objective to isolate Germany, by reconstructing a new Russian empire. Faced with the existence of independent states in the East, Lansing limited their right of self-determination. Only Poland was considered by him to warrant a complete independency. In time, under the influence of Polish and Russian representatives, his proposed idea of confederation of non-Russian states was replaced by the idea of federation. Eventually even this concept was discarded for a proposal to create one and indivisible Russia.<sup>128</sup>)

However, Wilson did not accept the elaborate plan prepared by his Secretary of State. He continued to cling to the idea of national self-determination for as long as he remained President of the United States. In November, 1918, Wilson was presented with a memorandum from "The Committee of Free Russia," which had been formed by the political emigres in New York. The note

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\*) Rusyn—a term applied to a Ukrainian in Eastern Galicia, and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

demanded that Wilson assure the representation of Free Russia a seat at the Peace Conference and that the United States recognize the Omsk regime of Admiral Kolchak as the legal government of all-Russia. In response, Wilson wrote to Lansing that such recognition and permission to participate at the Peace Conference was impossible, since the former Russian empire included five distinct units, Finland, Baltic provinces, European Russia, Siberia and Ukraine.<sup>129</sup>) Although Lansing noted that "it is necessary to protect the interests of Russia as an entity and not the various parts of the present, disintegrated Russia," he did concede that such recognition of the Omsk government was impractical. Such government, in Lansing's view, can be formed only by the constituency of Russia.<sup>130</sup>)

## **Influence of Russian diplomats on the State Department**

Unfortunately for the Ukrainian diplomats, the course established by President Wilson in his efforts to create a "new order" did not coincide with those of the State Department and its agencies, which were under strong political pressure by the opponents of the principle of national self-determination. Boris Bekhmetev continued to cultivate the idea among the officials of the State Department that the former Russia was still alive and that the United States government should recognize the Omsk government of Kolchak. He argued that the Allies were not in alliance with the tsarist government but with the Russian people. And since these people continued to exist, it was the obligation of the Allies to defend them. To Bekhmetev, the Russian people included the population of the former Russian empire minus the Poles. To discourage the American diplomats from taking up the cause of non-Russian nations, Bekhmetev argued that "the Allied and Associated Powers" could not act in this domain because it would be an interference with the internal affairs of Russia. This argument demanded military and material support from the Allies to aid Denikin and Kolchak in their fight against the newly established states, excluding Poland.<sup>131</sup>)

The idea of an indivisible Russia was also supported by the Polish nationalists, and their pressure on the State Department achieved success. Thus surrounded by such a diplomatic atmosphere and confronted by "documents," Wilson began to modify his policy. Such documents tended to present the situation in Ukraine as one of chaos, while, on the other hand, they stressed the necessity for keeping Russia's empire intact. The latter idea was based on economic considerations which later became the "cannons" of the State Department. The underlying reason for preserving this empire was the fact that Great Russia "has never produced neither food

nor resources in sufficient quantity to provide for her own needs." Therefore, it was necessary to include Ukraine, Western Siberia and Caucasus within her borders if she was to retain her self-sufficiency. This questionable information was presented on December 10 by A. A. Berle in the hope of establishing that the economic survival of Russia depended on the existence of a centralized Russian government.<sup>132</sup>) This was also what Bekhmetev, ambassador of a non-existent government, was striving to achieve when he pressured the United States government to recognize Kolchak's regime in Omsk as the central government of Russia.

On January, 1919, there was also a meeting in Paris of former ambassadors of Russia with the "leading political leaders of Russia" and it was decided to send all Allied governments a memorandum concerning the participation of the Russian delegation at the Peace Conference. The memorandum proposed that Russia should participate as an equal to other participating powers. This contention was not only based on her right, but also world interests demanded this, and until such time that the Peace Conference would recognize the Omsk regime as the formal government, Russian interests at the Conference would be represented by the Council of Russian Ambassadors.<sup>133</sup>)

Thus it is not surprising to see that this atmosphere of pressures had firmly established the concept of "unified Russia" within the State Department apparatus by December, 1918, and convinced its leading representatives that the delegates of the newly formed states should not have equal access to the Conference. The presence of the Ukrainians did not coincide with their plans since their state was an established fact and, after Soviet Russia, it represented a formidable, potential force. Whereas it was possible for these diplomats to skip over the Baltic countries as well as the states in the Caucasus, the Ukrainian state with its 40 million population presented a problem to the idea of indivisible Russia. For this reason the high official of the State Department, Miller, in a note clarifying the State Department's policy, mentions the concept of a federated Russia, basing the idea of the federation on the proclamation of the overthrown Hetman Skoropadskyy. Miller's note explained also that it was necessary to accept the French proposal that an inter-allied commission was needed to protect the interests of Russia. The commission was to have the assistance of Russian advisors. It was also pointed out that everything depended on future developments, that is, if Ukraine and other nations would be able to survive despite this policy, then the Conference would have to recognize them as equal partners. Regarding Ukraine the note states: "In view of the last declarations of the Ukrainian Republic favoring a federation of Russia, (in favor of a single Russian

representation) such a development might be realized even before the beginning of the Peace Conference."<sup>134</sup>)


In this position the United States brought to the Peace Conference two policies in settling the Eastern European question. The first one was espoused by President Wilson and the other, in opposition to the Fourteen Points, was quietly propagated by State Secretary Lansing. Of the entire American delegation, only Col. House supported the President.

## **The French attitude toward Russia and Poland**

The French policy regarding Eastern Europe was motivated from the start by the fear of German power. For this reason, all of the diplomatic maneuvering and scheming was designed to weaken Germany, and all means were justified if they produced the desired results.<sup>135</sup>) Germany, according to the French government, could be held in check only by a strong Russia, a French ally. However, since Russia, as a power, did not exist after the Bolshevik revolution and since the former empire was fragmented by the formation of various national states as well as several bidders for supremacy in Russia herself, France wanted Poland to take the temporary place of the Franco-Russian alliance. Therefore it was in the interest of France to see Poland as strong as possible.

Such conditions could exist, suggested Polish and Russian representatives, only if France would oppose the establishment of independent states in Eastern Europe and support the concept of one Russia. On the basis of their considerations, the French government supported the Polish demands, making it possible for the Poles to make considerable gains. The Polish National Committee in Paris, with Dmowski as chairman, was able to obtain the Entente's recognition of independence and membership in the Entente even before the war came to an end. The same political considerations led France to support Polish reconstruction as much as possible at the expense of other nations, especially Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories. The Polish demand at Paris to include several millions who were Ukrainians and Byelorussians was considered to be in the interest of France since her ally would gain so much more manpower.<sup>136</sup>)

This policy was in complete agreement with the slogan of French ministers that the security of France and lasting peace demanded "grande, tres grande Pologne."<sup>137</sup>) On the basis of this concept the French military circles were working out strategic plans to turn the idea into reality. Headed by Marshal Foch, the French Command supported the Poles in their aggression against Ukraine, Lithuania, and Byelorussia. The attack from the West



**The Big Four at the Paris Peace Conference 1919: Lloyd George, V. E. Orlando, George Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson.**

was designed to stamp out the newly established Ukrainian state. By supporting Gen. Denikin, it was hoped to achieve the destruction of the Ukrainian Republic on the Dnieper River, and thus facilitating the establishment of the unfragmentated Russia, which would also contain the south, including Ukraine, Don area and the Caucasus.

### **Unfavorable climate for Ukrainian diplomacy**

Under these circumstances it was impossible for the Ukrainians to obtain a positive response from the French Command at Jassy, Bucharest, and Odessa. Dealing with the French government in Paris was even more difficult. When President Wilson arrived in Paris, he was presented with the French program for the Peace Conference and, after some debate and modification, it was accepted. The first part of the French program suggested that the Conference should settle the problems of the recognized states and those in the process of formation, i. e., Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic on one hand and Yugoslavia, Hungary, and (German) Austria on the other. Another part of the program dealt with the territorial problems of these states. And although the wording of the program presented by France as a champion of the right to national self-determination and offered justice and protection to national minorities, the opposite was to be observed after Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic had been established.

The Russian problem was also settled in a similar manner. The French government opposed the recognition of the existing national states and offered them time for "organization;" and once normalcy was restored, they would reach an agreement among themselves.<sup>138)</sup> The desire of the French to eliminate non-Russian delegations from the scene was underscored by the refusal to grant them the necessary visas. It wasn't until later and because of the intervention of President Wilson that such delegations were able to reach Paris.

## Principles of policies of Western Ukraine

Although the Western Ukrainian Republic was an independent state from its very beginning, its name implied that the unification with Ukraine on the Dnieper River was the eventual goal of the government. Efforts to achieve this goal became the cornerstone of the Ukrainian National Council's policy and of the State Secretariat. Gradually steps were taken to implement this policy. On November 10, 1918, the Council directed the State Secretariat "to make the necessary effort needed to unify all of the Ukrainian territories into one state."<sup>139)</sup> However the progress of these efforts was mullified by the Proclamation of Hetman Skoropadskyy on November 14, 1918.

The pieces were picked up on December 1, 1918, when an agreement was reached between the State Secretariat and the Directorate concerning the unification. On January 22, 1919, the unification became a fact when the Directorate issued the Proclamation of Unification which was later approved by the Congress of Working People of Ukraine.

The act of unification was not a political maneuver but a conscious desire of a divided nation to take its place once more among other nations as an equal. However, it cannot be denied that the State Secretariat was hopeful of receiving military and economic support from the Dnieper area. Efforts to obtain aid from the Hetmanate produced no results while the new regime of the Directorate was too hard pressed by the Russian Bolsheviks to send any substantial help.\*) In fact, the developments at the front were

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\*) At the end of October Dr. Paneyko was sent to Kyiv to ask for military aid from the Hetmanate. In his memoirs he stated that all of his arguments fell on ears.<sup>140)</sup> The Lviv government also sent an official delegation to negotiate this matter, led by Dr. Shukhevych and Dr. Nazaruk.<sup>141)</sup> The Directory did send a detachment commanded by Col. Dolud. Later another formation with several batteries of artillery under the leadership of Col. Kravchuk was sent to Galicia. However, Kravchuk's troops were of practically no use.

such that the Commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi* and several members of his staff appeared in Galicia in the first days of January, 1919, to recruit volunteers for his formation in Kyiv.

However, the Galician government still hoped to obtain some financial aid which it desperately needed. The burdens of war were heavy and the tax receipts were slow in coming. This request was satisfied in terms of a loan and the *hryvnya* were used side by side with the Austrian *korona*.\*)

The concept of a unified Ukraine also required a co-ordinated foreign policy. Although the W.U.N.R. had no common border with Russia and thus could not be directly threatened by the Russian Bolsheviks, nevertheless the State Secretariat, at home and abroad, pursued an anti-Bolshevik policy which was in agreement with the position of the Ukrainian National Republic. This policy did not change even in April-June, 1919, when the Russian Red troops were approaching the Zbruch River. At that time the Bolsheviks offered Western Ukraine their help against the Poles if that government would desert the Directorate. Obviously this proposal was rejected.<sup>142</sup>)

It has been suggested by some that the union of the Directorate with Galicia was a needless invitation to a war between the U.N.R. and Poland. Such a conflict was unavoidable since Polish territorial claims extended not only to Eastern Galicia but also demands were made for Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashya, Polisia, Volyn as well as the Proscuriv district in Podillya and the Kamyanets district in the South. If the Directorate would have decided to avoid an armed conflict by giving these areas to Poland, its existence would have been considered shortened because by April, 1919, its troops would have reached "Polish" Volyn.

The efforts to unify the two Ukrainian states were considered by the State Secretariat not only as a matter in internal policy but in relation to the international scene as well. Although the Eastern Ukrainian state came into existence through legal means, it was, nevertheless, regarded by the Allies as a problem to be settled by the Peace Conference. Since the "Russian problem" was yet to be formulated, the task of the non-Russian nationalities was to obtain from the Conference the right to a complete national recognition. Thus the U.N.R. was faced with the unenviable task not only of protecting its boundaries but also of gaining recognition of its sovereignty which was based on the principles of international law.

In comparison, the position of Western Ukrainian National

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\*) In U.N.R. the money unit used was the *hryvnya* which was worth about one Austrian crown (or in Ukrainian *korona*).





Post stamps of the U.N.R.



Republic was somewhat different. The "Austrian problem" was solved even before the war was ended. President Wilson and, following his example, the Entente decided to break up the Dual Monarchy according to its national composition. Guided by the principle of self-determination, the State Secretariat considered Western Ukraine to be internationally recognized and only the matter of frontiers was to be dealt with.

The recognition of Western Ukraine's legality at the Peace Conference was complicated only by the territorial claims of Poland, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia. For this reason, the domestic and foreign policies of the two Ukraines after January 22, 1919, were well co-ordinated but not unified. One of the reasons for pursuing such a policy was the firm belief on the part of the State Secretariat that the pronouncements of President Wilson would be binding on all members of the Entente. It was a question of bringing the case of Ukraine before the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, i. e., the International Tribunal. And since the Democracies had the moral duty to follow the principles which they preached, nothing but a favorable verdict could be expected. It was hardly imaginable that in the process of establishing the "New World" the Great Powers had decided to do so without regard for weaker nations, or to settle those nations fate without their consent.

In hoping to find a new order and a unified, independent nation, the State Secretariat was facing a reality. Considering the resources and the military capability of the Entente, it was difficult

to imagine that a newly formed state could survive if this was against the wishes of the established order. And although there were occasions when the State Secretariat had acted contrary to the will of the Allies, it had followed a path which would not unduly annoy the Great Powers.

Another cornerstone of the W.U.N.R.'s policy was its determination to follow the principles of democracy. This principle was not a lofty ideal but a guide for action. Fully expecting to be recognized on the principle of self-determination, the government applied this same idea to other nationalities. The Constitution of Western Ukraine guaranteed the national minorities civil rights of citizenship and a voice in the affairs of the state through an assured representation. To protect this system, the Ukrainian National Council refused to experiment on the domestic scene with Soviet methods as was being done in other countries. This anti-Bolshevik position was retained even when it became apparent that the Western powers lacked the proper understanding of the Ukrainian problem.

In relation with the neighboring countries, the U.N.C. also attempted to follow a policy of negotiation rather than of a confrontation or strife, even though some of the Ukrainian territory, by this time, was held by force under foreign occupation. Rumania invaded and occupied the Ukrainian part of Bukovina and Hungary held Carpathian Ukraine. Czecho-Slovakia was also making attempts to gain a portion of that area. These territorial disputes the State Secretariat hoped to settle also at the Peace Conference and did not attempt to regain the lost parts through force of arms. Nor did the State Secretariat wish for the demise of its enemy, the imperialistically oriented Poland. While defending its territory against Polish aggression, the government of the W.U.N.R. could not agree to the Soviet plan to form a common front, thus opening a gateway into Hungary. Such an alliance would have meant an end to Polish independence. The State Secretariat did not consider the cause of Western Ukraine as lost and for this reason the Soviet proposal was rejected. Poland was granted a twenty year lease on life at the expense of the Ukrainians. If the W.U.N.R.'s policies has succeeded, the West would have been spared the Soviet Russia march into Germany and their later conquest of the rest of Europe.<sup>142)</sup>

## CHAPTER 5

### EFFORTS OF WESTERN UKRAINE FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

#### Western Ukraine seeks recognition in U.S.A. and Great Britain

The United States as well as the members of the Entente were aware of the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic in Eastern Galicia even before the Central Powers were defeated. A memorandum sent to President Wilson on October 26, 1918, informed him of the formation of the Western Ukrainian State and outlined its policies and its aspirations.<sup>143)</sup> Appropriate telegrams notified the western powers of Polish aggression against the young Republic. A note from President Petrushevych to President Wilson reiterated the desire of Western Ukraine to abide by the principle of self-determination and called attention to the fact that Poland, Hungary, and Rumania were in the process of violating his formula for the New Order. The note asked President Wilson to intervene and arbitrate in the dispute.<sup>144)</sup>

For Western Ukraine, a state as yet to be recognized by a foreign power, to enter the diplomatic arena was no easy task. In this case the good offices of a neutral country, Sweden, were very helpful.\*) While the Ukrainian National Council was providing the outside world, including the United States, with first hand information concerning the developments in Western Ukraine, Wilson was also receiving information from the American Ukrainians. Initiated by Tomas G. Masaryk, a meeting of immigrant organizations was held in Philadelphia, Pa., on October 23, 1918. The assembled Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Poles, and Ukrainians prepared a resolution, demanding freedom for their nations. The resolution was sent to the White House and the State Department.\*\*)

On January 14-16, 1919, "Ukrainian Congress" met in Washington. Composed of representatives of all Ukrainian organizations in the U.S.A.—the assembly prepared another resolution

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\*) Perhaps this gesture was in remembrance of the diplomatic ties between Sweden and Ukraine, established by Charles XII and I. Mazepa.

\*\*) The Ukrainians were represented by the "Federation of Ukrainian Organizations in America."

which was sent to the White House. It demanded the formation of an independent and united Ukrainian Republic, in which the rights of national minorities were to be assured. The resolution envisaged the existence of an independent Ukrainian state not only on the basis of international justice but also as a condition for peace in Eastern Europe. It made a reference to a formation of united states of Europe, organized on the basis of equality and agreement among the independent states and not by force as represented by the former empires of Russia or Austria.<sup>145)</sup>


One of the first major powers which had favorably received the emergence of the Western Ukrainian state was Great Britain which took steps, through diplomatic channels, to intervene in the Polish aggression against the W.U.N.R. On November 15, 1919, British charge d'affaires, Barckley, informed the State Department that "the representative of the Polish National Committee in London was notified that His Majesty's Government will view with serious dissatisfaction all military and other actions of the Polish Government in Eastern Galicia or any place else, to decide by force before the decision of the Peace Conference."<sup>146)</sup>

Obviously the Polish National Committee in Paris as the representative of Poland before the Allies, did not remain inactive at the time of Polish aggression against the W.U.N.R. Dmowski and Paderewski presented their version of the war in such a manner that the Western Ukraine became the aggressor, by seeking to conquer Eastern Galicia which, according to them, was Polish territory. The Poles were presented to the Allies as victims of the Austrian rule while the Ukrainians were, allegedly, aided constantly in their opposition to the Poles. However, the Polish leaders did not mention the fact that at least one Austrian cabinet post, and sometimes several, was held by a Pole. Polish propaganda also asserted that the Ukrainian bid for power in Galicia was supported by the Germans and the Austrians.\*) The supposed presence of the German and Austrian troops was also given as the reason for the slow progress of the Polish troops.

After a barrage of propaganda and falsified information, the Poles turned to diplomacy. On November 18, 1918, the Polish National Committee in Paris handed a note to the American embassy protesting the "occupation" of Lviv and Peremyshl by the Ukrainian troops, who were, supposedly, often commanded by the Germans. This committee also lodged a protest against the German machina-

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\*) Often such "press release" appeared in the newspapers throughout Europe, very coloured by intriguing details. One of them stated that the Austrian Archduke Wilhelm himself was conducting the operation against Poland.



●  
**Ignacy Paderewski**  
●

tions which were designed to prevent the unification of Galicia with Poland.<sup>147)</sup>

The Polish cause received a boost from other sources as well. While visiting the United States, Ignacy Paderewski had managed to make a number of influential friends who, directly or indirectly, molded and influenced the opinion in Polish favor. Even more effective work for Poland was done by the information officers from the United States and Great Britain, who returned with Paderewski to Warsaw in the first part of January, 1919. Colonel William Grove sent to Washington a very favorable evaluation of the Polish government and some additional information concerning the war with the W.U.N.R. In discussing the battle for Lviv, he advised Washington that the Germans were helping the Ukrainians with arms.<sup>148)</sup>

Lieutenant Foster, the U.S. Red Cross representative, was also active, gathering political information for the State Department and for the American delegation at the Peace Conference. Although low in rank, his information was considered quite valuable and was often presented to the President.

### **The question of armistice**

The British government made the first attempt to reach peace in Galicia. It sent a mission, headed by Colonel Wade, to Warsaw to arrange an armistice between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The British proposal called for the two armies to remain at their position, with a neutral strip between them, until the Peace

Conference could determine the boundaries between the two sides. General Stanislaw Szeptycki, the Chief of the Polish General Staff, seemingly agreed to the proposal. Captain Johnson, Wade's adjutant, received authorization from Szeptycki to go to Lviv and work out an agreement with General Rozwadowski, the Commander of Polish forces in Lviv. However, Johnson's peace mission proved to be fruitless. Gen. Rozwadowski rejected the proposal, stating that only a direct order from Pilsudski would make him comply with the proposal. When Colonel Wade approached Pilsudski in this matter, he was told that such an order was sent to Rozwadowski. Furthermore, since Rozwadowski held property which was now under the rule of the Ukrainians, and, therefore, could not be impartial during the peace talks, this duty was delegated to General Lesniewski who, coming from the Russian army, would be more conscientious.

In practice, however, Pilsudski's willingness to negotiate appeared to be a performance before the foreign representatives. For as soon as the discussion reached the actual conditions of armistice, Pilsudski changed the topic of the conversation. In essence, he rejected Wade's proposal. According to Lt. Foster's report, Pilsudski wanted Lviv liberated and surrounded by a free territory of 20 kilometers in radius. The three railroad lines from Lviv to Warsaw, Cracow, and Peremyshl should be exclusively for Polish disposal. Lviv, for Pilsudski, was a Polish city, the "center of Polish life" in Galicia; its loss would have a terrible effect on the entire Polish population.

Later Pilsudski made remark that Polish occupation of Drohobych was also essential if armistice talks were to take place. Foster was convinced that should the Peace Conference decide against Poland in this matter, the population would not abide by the decision and it would lead to civil disorders. Pilsudski also indicated that it would be more appropriate to conduct talks with Petlyura in Kyiv.\*) On January 15, Col. Wade personally went to Lviv but he too was unable to achieve any results.

## **The work of the Allied Mission**

The situation remained basically unchanged at the time of the arrival of the Allied Mission to Warsaw, in the second part of January. As an agency of the Peace Conference, its task was to bring about an armistice on the basis of studies made on the spot.

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\*) It is difficult to imagine why Pilsudski would want to mention Petlyura since at this time Petlyura was not in a position to make any decisions in this matter. The foreign policy of the U.N.R. was in the hands of Volodymyr Chekhivskyy.

The previous efforts of Colonel Wade to bring about peace were impartial and in complete agreement with the policy of the British government, discussed at a meeting in December, 1918, concerning the future of the Austro-Hungarian empire. In discussing the newly formed states, mention was made of the Western Ukrainian National Republic. It was pointed out that the relation of that state with the one on the Dnieper River had yet to be defined. In the proposal, to be followed at the Peace Conference, the Foreign Office suggested the recognition of the accredited National Assemblies and the National Councils. In regard to the W.U.N.R., the report stated that "the Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia and Northern Hungary have to be recognized as a separate state entity or they should be considered as a unit with the government in Kyiv without regard whether the latter will be recognized as a separate state or only as a part of Russia, on federative or other basis..."<sup>150</sup>) This was the basis of the action taken by Wade and, regardless of Polish propaganda, he remained impartial in his efforts.

It was a different matter in the case of Colonel Carton de Wiart, the chief of the British military mission, and the American, Lt. Foster. The latter, under the spell of Polish propaganda and an elite society, repeated the biased opinions of the Polish aristocrats. The lack of land reform, for instance, was justified by the excuse that the peasants were too ignorant to cultivate it by themselves. In the case of the anti-Jewish pogroms in Poland, Foster minimized them by placing the blame on "bandits" for whom the government could not be held responsible. For Foster, Poland was the sole bulwark against the Communists and he recommended that the Entente provide her with economic and military aid as much as possible. He also mentioned the struggle of the Poles with the Russian Bolsheviks, which at that time was non-existent. Concerning the fight for Lviv, Foster presented a rather dramatic picture:

Three quarters of Lviv are surrounded; only the railroad is open. The trains which use this line are constantly bombarded. In effect, the city is without food, the water supply is cut-off, and there is no coal. Women and children are defending the city along with the men because it is clear that, if the city should fall, the conquerors would rob it. Tales of death and tortures, that are committed by the Bolshevik troops to those who get in their way, are unbelievable in their barbarity.<sup>151</sup>)

Having thus advised his government of the "Bolshevik threat" to Poland, Foster suggested that a military unit, even if small, should be dispatched to help relax the dangerous situation. Foster even

thought of an available army to do the job, the army of General Haller which, at that time, was located in France. Foster also confirmed the myth that the Ukrainians were commanded by the German officers and, to magnify the threat to the Allies, he reported an interception in Cracow of a train of 200 freight cars from Ukraine loaded with wheat and destined for Germany.

The representatives of the Polish government too did their best to discredit the case of the Ukrainians. In a compromise arrangement between the Polish Left and the Right, Paderewski was called upon to serve as the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. Paderewski considered the gaining of Eastern Galicia for Poland one of his primary objectives. He and Dmowski opposed the existence of the Ukrainian state in general no matter where it was located, and against the Western Ukrainian Republic in specific. This opposition was based not only on the plans of Polish territorial expansion; Eastern Galicia for Dmowski, was a bastion of Ukrainian national consciousness and, therefore, it represented a base for a military force of a unified Ukraine. On January 12, 1919, Paderewski, in a letter to Colonel House, explained the Polish situation and asked for assistance. Colonel House forwarded the letter to President Wilson, recommending that favorable action be given to Paderewski's request. On January 21, at the meeting of the Supreme Council, Wilson placed the letter on the agenda. The letter makes several interesting points:

Contrary to the reports of German propaganda, the Poles are not the aggressors at any point... Surprised by the murderous Bolshevik army of the Ukrainians, the women and children of Lviv took the weapons and defended the city. At the present moment the Ukrainian force of about 80,000, armed and equipped by the German and Austrian officers and commanded by the Austrian Archduke Wilhelm Habsburg, is at the gates of Lwow,\*) and the number of Polish soldiers, who lack ammunition and food, does not exceed 18,000...

The Bolshevik army has already occupied Wilno. The cities of Grodno and Bialostock are in immediate danger. In a few days the invasion of this part of Poland will be an accomplished fact. Poland cannot defend herself. She lacks food, ammunition,

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\*) Paderewski used the Polish name for Lviv and also the German form Lemberg.



uniforms, and arms. We only have people, 500,000 of them want to defend themselves, their country under the leadership of a strong government. The existing government is weak and dangerous; it consists almost exclusively of radical socialists. I was asked to form a new cabinet but what can I accomplish only with the moral support of the country and without the material support of the Allies and the United States of America?

If there is any possibility for my country to receive any sort of material aid, then I would propose:

1. To send a collective note to Messrs. Petlyura, Vynnychenko, and Shvets, ordering them to cease hostile activities in Eastern Galicia and to evacuate the Boryslav district where the American, English, and French interests are threatened;

2. To send an inter-Allied military commission to Warsaw to check the situation and possible means of help;

3. To send as soon as possible some artillery and plenty of ammunition for the German rifles.

If this action is delayed then the entire civilization may cease to exist. The result of this war can have its conclusion only in victory over barbarism throughout the entire Europe."<sup>152</sup>)

Paderewski, relying on his artistic talents, managed to transform Poland, even though engaged in a truly aggressive war, into a poor unwilling victim of Ukrainian attack. The defensive war of the Ukrainians was presented as an Austrian and German intrigue, hoping to move the Allies into some sort of action against the still dreaded foe. Nor did he hesitate to distort the Bolshevik threat to Poland. At that time the Russian Reds were concentrating their efforts on Eastern Ukraine, Don, and Kolchak; in regard to Poland they were quite passive. In the Baltic region the Bolshevik forces were moving forward only after the German army had been withdrawn. In the case of Wilno, it was taken over by the Poles as soon as the Germans had left the city, and only later was it taken over by the Bolsheviks. According to the testimony of Jan Dąbski, a contemporary Polish statesman, the Polish forces did not come in contact with the Red Army until February 1919, when the Polish forces moved toward the Niemen River.<sup>153</sup>) At that time the Bolsheviks followed a policy of peace in regard to Poland. From February 8, 1919, until April, 1919, peace talks were conducted

in Moscow between the two sides, with Alexander Więckowski\*) heading the Polish mission.

Although the letter created some impression on the Conference, not all of the members were convinced. Lloyd George questioned Paderewski's claim to Eastern Galicia. He also stressed that the proposed note to the Directorate should be also sent to the Poles, restraining them from invading the disputed territories such as Eastern Galicia.

The Conference was still concerned with this matter on January 24, at which time it was decided to follow the course suggested by Lloyd George. A note, requesting to cease hostilities, was sent to all parties engaged in war. "If they (the parties involved) are awaiting justice, then they must restrain from violence and place their pretentions, in good faith, into the hands of the Peace Conference," was the concluding paragraph of the note, made public immediately.<sup>154</sup>)

It was decided to send an Allied mission to Poland and Eastern Galicia to bring about armistice between the two warring sides. In view of its task, it was composed of military as well as civilian personel. Most numerous was the French delegation, led by General Barthelemy. The entire mission was under the command of the French diplomat Noulens, the former ambassador to Russia.

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\*) Pronounced Vientskovski.

**PART IV**

**THE QUESTION OF ARMISTICE WITH POLAND  
AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS**



## CHAPTER 1

### THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ALLIED MISSION IN WARSAW AND LVIV

#### The direct "negotiations"

The Poles were the first to ask for armistice in November, 1918, since their forces were as yet not fully prepared for a total campaign against the Western Ukrainian Republic. The Ukrainian side accepted the proposal and two distinct pacts were made. The first concerned the fighting in the Syan River district. The other, negotiated by the central government in Lviv, applied to the hostilities within the city itself. Both of these agreements were broken by the Poles when they felt strong enough to break up the connection between Lviv and Peremyshl. When it became apparent that no significant victory could be achieved, Count Skarbek, representing the Cracow Commission, again proposed a truce. The State Secretariat replied that it was willing to discuss the proposal under the condition that the Poles recognize the W.U.N.R. while the remaining agenda of the truce talks should deal only with the line of demarcation between the two sides and other technical points. This reply was something of a shock to the Poles since they hoped to postpone the battle rather than to cease the hostilities completely.<sup>155</sup>) This was the last of the direct talks between the two sides; other talks were initiated through the insistence and mediation of the Allied representatives. At first these talks were held in Western Ukraine and later in Paris.

The stiff resistance of the Ukrainian Galician Army\*) against Polish aggression was very obnoxious to the Polish government in Warsaw as well to the Polish National Committee in Paris.\*\*)

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\*) It may be referred to, for the sake of space, as U.G.A.

\*\*) Roman Dmowski emigrated to Western Europe and in August, 1917, he organized in London the "Polish National Committee." This Committee represented the Polish cause before the governments of the Entente and the U.S.A. Since the Provisional Government of Russia aimed to undermine the Austro-German proclamation of the formation of a Polish state, the new Russian government made Russia's intentions clear with a declaration about recognizing the Polish striving for independence. Therefore, Dmowski, at this time, dropped his plans for a Polish federation with Russia and now campaigned for a "Grand Independent Poland." He persuaded Paderewski to become a leader in this Committee.

The Polish National Committee had considerable success in its political

was also an unpleasant development for the Allies, especially for France and for President Wilson. Warsaw needed a pause to re-enforce its formations engaged with the Ukrainians, and sufficient time to re-organize the entire army. Formation of the Polish Army was interrupted by the inter-party disputes for power. It was hoped that through an armistice the Polish side could achieve political success which the Polish army had failed to bring about on the field of battle, namely, a large portion of Eastern Galicia, including the petroleum fields of Drohobych and Boryslav. The French government was displeased with the opposition of the U.G.A. since it deprived Poland of the victory which was needed to strengthen this ally of France. President Wilson, having lost the Congressional elections, needed a diplomatic victory to compensate for his domestic problems. Such were the circumstances which facilitated the appointment of the Allied Mission to obtain peace in Eastern Europe.\*)

Although the Mission was sent by the Peace Conference as a unit, no detailed instructions were given as to how the armistice should be achieved. Each delegation was acting on instruction from the government concerned. Since the French delegation was composed of trained diplomatic personnel and since the entire Mission was led by a Frenchman, the dominance of the French soon became apparent. At first Noulens, an experienced diplomat, misled the other members of the Mission concerning the route of their train. Originally he proposed to travel through Vienna but later, without notifying other delegates, he went to Prague. With this maneuver, he made it impossible for the U.S. delegation to obtain the much needed facts from the information center in Vienna and thus the Americans arrived in Warsaw without the pertinent data concerning Western Ukraine and Poland. From the mass demonstrations and ovations which met the Mission at various stops, it was obvious

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campaign, especially in France and Great Britain. It was able to organize a volunteer Polish Army under the command of Gen. Jozef Haller. After the capitulation of Germany November 11, 1918, the Polish National Committee was recognized as the sole representative of the Polish State and was invited to participate in the Peace Conference in Paris as an equal partner with the governments of the Entente.

Dmowski did not recognize the Warsaw government under Pilsudski and his Prime Minister, the Socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski. However, in January, 1919, an agreement between the Polish National Committee and Pilsudski was made. Pilsudski, in return for the Committee's support, nominated the members of the Committee as official delegates of the Warsaw government and in February, he nominated Paderewski as Prime Minister.

\*) The activity of this Mission is vividly described by John Foster Bass, an American journalist who accompanied the American delegation. Although his information concerning the Ukrainians is sketchy, it is obvious that his desire to present truth is sincere.<sup>156)</sup>



General Barthelemy

that the Poles knew the exact itinerary of the peace Mission. Noulens, in his orations to the demonstrators, spoke only of France and her contribution to Polish freedom while the other Allies, especially the United States, were never mentioned.\*\*)

In Warsaw, the Mission was greeted by an impressive demonstration and immediately the Polish government proposed separate accommodations for the member-delegations. The French and the Italians accepted the proposed palaces while the British chose to reside in the building of their former mission. The Americans, hoping to remain completely neutral, moved to the Bristol Hotel, a place where the new Polish Prime Minister, Paderewski, also had his quarters. When the French realized that the Americans were neighbors of the Polish Premier, thus having a free hand to investigate and perhaps even to influence Paderewski, they abandoned their palace and moved also to the Bristol. The lack of accommodations for the French was solved very quickly: they moved the belongings of the Americans into the corridor and moved into the quarters themselves. This dilemma was finally solved by Paderewski, who found temporary apartments for the Americans.<sup>157)</sup>

Bass also confirms the fact that the French purposely presented the Americans in an unfavorable light before the Poles in order to create distrust for the Americans and thus preventing them from gathering the needed information freely. Nor were there any joint meetings of the delegations and the French. While holding talks with the Polish officials, the French did not inform the other members of the delegation as to the content or results of these talks.<sup>158)</sup>

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\*\*) General Kernan was the chief of the American delegation. His political advisor was Professor Lord, already influenced by the Polish propaganda in the United States.

After several weeks it was decided that the Mission should go to Lviv. But this trip, since it concerned an armistice, was restricted to military personnel only.\*)

That the French general, the head of this armistice commission, had already made up his mind concerning the matter is obvious from his comments to Bass:

...Poland has to be formed as a strong buffer state and all of her disputes with the surrounding neighbors over territories, small or large, have to be decided in her favor... She has to be made a great and powerful allied military state in Eastern Europe...<sup>159)</sup>

It is apparent that the French general was acting more as a lawyer of a French client than a judge of the Peace Conference. As in Warsaw, the Poles in Lviv were also prepared in advance for the arrival of the commission, including a company of armed women.<sup>160)</sup> Then the armistice commission took up residence in the palace of Count Potocki, as guests of the Polish government.

The French also had a preconceived notion in regard to the task of the Mission:

Although the members of the Mission were in close contact on the train, Gen. Barthelemy did not discuss with them the conditions of the armistice. Several hours after our arrival to Lviv, the General presented a long document which set the conditions for armistice. Obviously he had brought it from Warsaw. He presented the conditions which were to be sent across the line to the Ukrainian Supreme Command\*\*) Professor Lord took the position that he has to read all of them before they could be sent.<sup>161)</sup>

The document showed that the petroleum fields in Eastern Galicia were placed under Polish government and under Allied control and French administration. Some objections from the British and the American delegates to the conditions caused the document to be rewritten.\*\*\*)

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\*) Lord represented the Americans since, for some reason, General Kernan did not go. Other members of the commission were General Barthelemy, representing France; General Wiart, British representative; and Major Stabile from Italy.

\*\*) Bass, following the Polish example, used the term Ruthenian (Rusyn) instead of Ukrainian.

\*\*\*) While the Allied representatives met with the Ukrainians, Bass also listened to their story. The Ukrainians stated that Barthelemy was unacceptable for them as a mediator. On his previous visit to Lviv in the role of a peacemaker, he also had brought for the Poles several cars of ammunition, protected by the French flag.



In his evaluation of the armistice project, Bass states that it was unfair to the Ukrainians since it would take away from them the petroleum fields, give up the siege of Lviv, and give up half of Eastern Galicia. Since the Ukrainians were, at that time, stronger than their opponents, it was not a proper time to make such conditions. Later the Peace Conference recognized the Ukrainian claim to these territories and even more.<sup>162)</sup>

## **The talks between the Commission and the Ukrainians**

On February 22, 1919, General Barthelemy demanded that Ukrainians cease military operations as a precondition to peace talks. A threat was also made if the Ukrainian Galician Army would not comply with the demand, it would be interpreted that the Ukrainians did not wish to accept the intervention of the Peace Conference in settling the conflict with Poland. Then the responsibility for the continuation of war would fall on the Ukrainians.<sup>163)</sup>

General Pavlenko, the Supreme Commander of the U.G.A., had the following impression of the commission: Having notified the Ukrainian Supreme Command in Khodoriv of its intention to negotiate a truce, the Peace Mission of the Allies arrived there at noon. The Mission consisted of General Barthelemy, General de Wiart, Major Stabile, and Professor Lord.\*) General Pavlenko was given five minutes to accept the proposal or face a conflict with the Entente. Pavlenko explained that such a step could be taken with the approval of the State Secretariat. A telephone call to the latter arranged a truce for the duration of armistice talks. The truce would go in effect on February 25.<sup>164)</sup>

At that time the military situation of the Ukrainians was more favorable since Poland was in the process of developing its military potential after the internal struggle for power. With the exception of a corridor to Lviv, the U.G.A. held Eastern Galicia up to the Syan River. Nevertheless, the State Secretariat agreed to participate in truce talks since it did not want to break its relations with the Peace Conference. At 6 A.M. the guns fell silent and a delegation was dispatched to Lviv.\*) In the evening of the same day, the Allied representatives held their first meeting with the Ukrainians. The Allied Mission established the following procedure for the talks. The

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\*) Lt. Foster also accompanied Professor Lord.

\*) Members of the Ukrainian mission were Osyp Burachynskyy, the Secretary of Justice; Dr. Stepan Vytvytskyy, the secretary of the Ukrainian National Council; Dr. Mykhaylo Lozynskyy, Dr. Volodymyr Temnytskyy, Colonel Gutkovskyy, Major Rozhankovskyy, Colonel Slyusarchuk, Colonel Fidler, and Reverend Bonne, the translator.

first meeting with the Ukrainian delegation was to be of informative character, to find out the position of the W.U.N.R. in regard to armistice talks. Then a joint meeting of the Ukrainians and Poles was to be held in hope that some understanding could be reached between the two sides. If this could not be achieved, then the commission would dictate the conditions to both sides.

On the following day the Ukrainians met with the Commission, providing it with all of the necessary explanations and information concerning the position of W.U.N.R. In the course of the meeting, the Ukrainians became convinced that the Allied representatives had already decided on the course of action favorable to Poland and that it would be impossible to obtain a just and impartial judgment.<sup>165</sup>) The conduct of the Mission left much to be desired: its conduct included pounding on the table, slamming of doors, and threats to break off the talks.

The Ukrainians were aware that in the course of the truce talks the question of the demarcation line between the two sides dealt in reality with the establishment of a definite border. The formal reservation of the Peace Conference that the boundaries would be settled later was not taken very seriously. Therefore, the Ukrainian side demanded that the demarcation line should follow the flow of the Syan River with the diviation in the north where the ethnographic boundary of Poland began. Such line would leave the Syan region and Lemkivshchyna in the Polish hands.

The same evening a meeting was held between the Polish and Ukrainian delegations.\*) The Poles proposed to postpone the meeting because they could not, supposedly, form a delegation in such a short time and because the present members were too tired. The Ukrainians rejected the proposal since they were aware that the Poles wanted to use the respite to resupply their troops in Lviv. At the meeting, the Poles proposed that the Zbruch River be the line of demarcation. Such a condition could not have been given serious consideration because it meant the liquidation of Western Ukrainian National Republic and the total capitulation of Ukraine to Poland. To avoid further slaughter on the battlefields, the Ukrainian side proposed the Syan River as the truce line, leaving the settling of permanent boundaries to the Peace Conference. In turn the Poles presented a "compromise": the line of demarcation was to stretch from the Popadya Mountain in the Carpathians to Kalush, Halych, Rohatyn, Peremyshlyany, and Berestechko. The Ukrainians rejected the "compromise" and the talks between the two opponents came to an end. Knowing ahead of time of the

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\*) Count Skarbek headed the Polish delegation.



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**Symon Petlyura**

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commission's decision, the Polish participation in the talks was just another role in a political comedy.

While at Khodoriv, the Allied representatives also met with Symon Petlyura, then the chief of the Directorate.\*\*\*) The commission's interest in Petlyura was limited to the military strength of the Active Army of U.N.R. fighting the Bolsheviks. In his explanations, Petlyura stressed the potential of the Ukrainians if they were given financial and military aid. When the topic of Eastern Galicia was mentioned, Petlyura pointed out that the entire Ukrainian force could be turned against the Russian Reds if the national existence of the Ukrainians could be secured from the west. Before meeting with the Allied representatives Petlyura met with President

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\*\*) The Commission demanded that a Polish officer-translator be included.

Petrushevych and Sydir Holubovych, then the chief of the State Secretariat. They advised Petlyura to inform the Commission, should the opportunity arise, that retention of Eastern Galicia within the ethnographic boundaries was a requirement for the unified Ukraine. This, however, Petlyura failed to do in definite terms.<sup>166</sup>)

On February 28, the Commission presented the two sides with its own conditions for armistice.

But before the conditions were handed to the Ukrainians, General Barthelemy made the following speech to them:

"We, the representatives of the Entente Powers, that is England, France, United States, and Italy, conscientiously and thoroughly have investigated the matter which we have to decide. We demand sacrifices from both sides. These sacrifices will be temporary, until the decision of the Peace Conference. It is true that your position is good today but it can change tomorrow to your disadvantage. The Poles and the Czechs have already concluded an armistice and the Poles can transport ammunition through Czech territory. Soon the armistice between the Poles and the Germans will also be concluded. The Bolsheviks have not advanced to any part of Polish territory and nothing forces Poles to send an army directly against the Bolsheviks. The Poles are aware of all these factors and this gives the Poles hope and strength. If you will not accept our proposition then you will have a war with the Poles, who will have in support the brave and well organized army of General Haller, consisting of six divisions. We, in France, are convinced of the courage of this army. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks are advancing and they already have Kyiv and a major part of your territory, and they are found before your gates. If you will accept our proposition, we will make efforts to have your sovereignty recognized. The fact that we talk to you and turn to you with this proposition is, to a certain extent, a recognition of your statehood because one does not talk with someone, who does not exist. Then with our help you will be victorious over the Bolsheviks, you will regain the occupied area, and you will not appear at the Peace Conference empty handed. Our decision will influence the outcome of the talks of the Directorate with Entente representatives in Odessa because our authority is more extensive than that of representatives in Odessa. We will make efforts that your delegates be allowed

at the Peace Conference. We will send a mission to you which will remain with you and will notify our countries of your needs. We will establish relations between your government and the Entente Powers. Remember the proverb: Help yourself and Heaven will help you. This heaven is the Allied Powers. Your decision will be the beginning of new life for you and for your national happiness. You will never again have a better opportunity as today. This moment is great and festive. The fate of your nation is in your hands."<sup>167</sup>)

This speech was designed to intimidate the Ukrainians with the Polish strength and that of the Entente and at the same time to offer some hope if the Ukrainians would accept the dictated conditions of armistice. The speech also confirms the fact that the Poles, until the end of February, were not in contact with the Bolshevik forces in the East. It also shows the duplicity of the French general since his mission had no other authorization except to bring about peace armistice between the two warring sides. His point of view could be considered to be representative of the French government. From the recorded statements of Clemenceau, it can be seen that the French proposals were definitely hostile toward W.U.N.R., which he desired to join to Poland while Eastern Ukraine was to be a part of "indivisible" Russia. Thus the statements of the French general for the benefit of the Ukrainian delegation were obvious falsehoods. From the proceedings at the Peace Conference as well as from the memoirs of the participants, it is known that the French military circles also took a negative stand toward Eastern Ukraine. Marshal Foch had plans to defend the Polish interests not only with the army of General Haller but also with the troops of the Entente.

After the opening remarks to the Ukrainian delegation, then the two sides joined in one room and were presented with the project\*) of armistice which read:

Lviv, February 28, 1919

After the cessation of hostilities between the two sides the Allied Commission, having taken into consideration the military views of both warring sides, has the honor to present you with the decision which it has reached in the matter of establishing armistice between them in the course of four days, counting from March 1, 1919, at 8 a.m.

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\*) Translation from the French.

The Commission reminds you that the Peace Conference reserves itself the definitive decision of political and territorial questions which at present divide the sides and that it gave its delegation only the authorization to achieve the cessation of hostile steps and also to establish a temporary armistice, exclusively military, conditions of which will have no influence on the final decision of the Conference. The Commission shall wait in Lviv till March 5, 1919, 8 a.m. for the representatives of the two warring sides, who will have authorization to sign this armistice. We, the representatives of the Four Great Powers — United States, England, France and Italy — call your attention, in case of refusal, to the unusual responsibility which you will take upon yourself and to the difficulty of your position before the Peace Conference, which we represent.

The document was signed by Robert Lord, representing the United States; Carton de Wiart, the British representative; General Barthelemy, representing France; and by the Italian representative, Commandant Stabile.<sup>168)</sup>

In addition, the Commission considered it to be necessary to make a special reservation for the Ukrainian delegation in a separate note:

The Allied Commission in Lviv to the Ukrainian Delegation:

Lviv, February 28, 1919.

"The Allied Commission considers it its duty to add one word in the matter of the project of the additional agreement, which is included with the armistice agreement. This project is only a sketch, given for the sake of information. It will be definitively worked out by the Allied Commission only after an interview, conducted on the spot."

This note was also signed by all of the Allied representatives.<sup>169)</sup>

The third document, included with the two notes, dealt with the terms of the proposed agreement:

In order to stop the shedding of blood and to put an end to the hostile activities, the signed delegates (here a space was provided for the names of the delegates), properly authorized for this by their

governments, signed this agreement, with the following conditions:

Article 1. The armistice is purely military and its conditions can in no way influence the decision accepted by the Peace Conference.

It will begin on the second day after signing and will end after the Peace Conference will make known its decision concerning Galicia.<sup>170)</sup>

Article 2. The military line of demarcation, which will separate the existing military forces of the two sides during the armistice, is given on the included map 1:200 000.

It follows along the Buh River from the Galician border to the mouth of the stream which flows by the Yasenytsya Polska; then along this stream to the iron bridge Kholoyiv-Kaminka; then along this railroad line (part of this line belongs to the Ukrainians) till the bridge on the Buh River; then along the railroad line (part of this line belongs to Poland) from this last bridge to the bridge on the Kaminka River; then along this river to the boundary which divides the political district of Zhovkva from Kaminka district; then along this boundary; then along the boundary line between the Lviv and Kaminka district; then along the boundary between the political districts of Lviv and Peremyshlyany up to the railroad line Lviv-Peremyshl; from here along the boundary between the political districts of Bibrka and Peremyshlyany up to Solova (this locality belongs to the Ukrainians, Mykolayiv belongs to the Poles); then along the stream of Bilyy to Sokoliv (this locality belongs to the Ukrainians); then along the Sokolivka road to the railroad in Vybranivka (the station and the locality belongs to the Poles); then along the road from railroad station at Vybranivka to Huta Shchyretska (this area belongs to the Ukrainians) and from here along the southern boundary of the political district of Lviv and then along the eastern boundary of the political districts of Drohobych and Turka.\*)

Article 3. The Ukrainian forces have to be removed behind this line in the course of 14 days from

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\*) All names of cities, villages, rivers, and mountains are in French original in Polish.

the beginning of the armistice. After this term, during the time of armistice, there may not exist any concentration of troops on one and the other side of the demarcation line in a strip 3 kilometers distant from the line. The two sides may not leave in this strip anything except detachments, needed for the local police, without artillery. An Allied Commission, foreseen below, will regulate the details of execution and will decide in the last instance.

Article 4. All prisoners of war of both sides have to be freed. Their return will be the subject of an agreement which has to be concluded by the warring sides immediately after signing of armistice.

Article 5. Interned persons, taken as hostages, detained or imprisoned during the war for political reasons shall be freed immediately.

Article 6. It will be improper to hamper the return to the place of their residence of pre-war time, or in utilization of all rights of persons of one or the other side, as well as for citizens of Allied or Associated Powers, even if they have participated in the war; all confiscated properties have to be returned to them or they are to be given compensation.

Article 7. Nobody may be violated or troubled in their rights nor property because of their nationality or participation in war.

Article 8. Will be forbidden and recognized void in advance on the territories of Eastern Galicia, placed under control of both sides for the duration of armistice, all transactions concerning properties belonging to the enemies of Allied or Associated Powers: properties movable and immovable, participation in interests, rights, income from any contracts, etc. with the exception of operations necessary for direct needs of exploitation of these properties (the buying of raw materials, the sale of products, etc.).

Article 9. On the same territories during this armistice no concessions will be given for the right to exploit the petroleum fields outside the realm of private property.

Article 10. With the reservation that the petroleum installations and all of the railroad lines were not subjected to any serious damage, the Polish military authorities during the duration of armistice will be obliged to supply the Ukrainian authorities month-



ly for a payment by rail and to the railroad station in Stryy a certain tonnage of raw petroleum and its products. This tonnage and the net price for the sale of raw petroleum, its products, goods which have to be supplied with a bill of sale and the conditions for regulating this transaction, will be the subject of an additional agreement, obligatory for both sides, which will be established by the Allied Commission for execution of the armistice after an interview on the spot. They have to be such that the Ukrainians during the armistice term would have those benefits which they had during January while in control of the petroleum fields which they gave up.

Article 11. The Ukrainian army will have the duty to protect during the evacuation the evacuated strip, and especially the exploitations and petroleum installations against any attempts, any destruction and any kind of damage; after its withdrawal it will turn over the maintenance of order to the local civil authorities.

Article 12. An Allied Commission, composed of 1 military member and 1 technical member from every Allied and Associated Power, will supervise the execution of this armistice and will have the complete authority to decide in the last instance all questions which may be raised and which are not covered in the above given resolutions.

It may delegate to subcommissions which, in case of need, may deal with separate matters.

Article 13. The French text of the above given 12 articles is the sole official text.<sup>171)</sup>

In addition to this project of agreement, there was additional project of agreement concerning the petroleum, establishing the details of the points dealt in the armistice agreement.<sup>172)</sup>

Some observations are necessary concerning the text of the agreement. It is an obvious falsehood that it was written after hearing the two sides and after on the spot inspection had been made. From the writing of Mr. Bass, it is known that the project of armistice agreement was available in Warsaw and as such it was brought to Lviv. The schedule of the Commission did not allow for its rewriting. However, correction was made in regard to the petroleum provision, as demanded by the American and the British representatives. This matter was of special interest to the British; the rest of the text held no particular interest to those represent-

atives, especially to Lord, who was known for his pro-Polish sympathies.<sup>178)</sup>

On the night of February 28, the Ukrainian delegation departed to present the proposed agreement to State Secretariat for consideration. Since the ultimatum-like proposal was considered by the government of W.U.N.R. and Supreme Command of the U.G.A. as unacceptable, hostilities were resumed on March 1, in order to prevent the Poles from strengthening their positions. The State Secretariat, addressing the Allied and Associated Powers, sent the following reply to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in Paris:

Stanyslaviv, March 4, 1919.

The State Secretariat of Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic in Stanyslaviv has the honour to inform you of the following:\*)

From November 1, 1918, we are in a state of war with the Polish state, which wants to conquer and annex our territory. Up to this time the Polish army is able to show only insignificant success. In its hand is only a narrow corridor along the railroad line from the border town of Peremyshl to the capital of our state, located 93 kilometers east of Peremyshl; the mentioned line is constantly under our fire and the city of Lviv is surrounded from all sides by our troops. In addition, the Poles hold only an insignificant strip of our territory in the North West.


On February 22, when our operations around Lviv were at best in their development, to our Supreme Command arrived from Lviv an Entente Mission, consisting of (list of names), delegated by an Entente Mission to Lviv to stop the war actions on the Polish Ukrainian front.

The Mission declared that it wants to present to us and the Poles an armistice project and for this reason desires a truce, adding that in case of refusal, it would mean a break with the Entente.

Although in the existing conditions of the operations which were mentioned, the truce for us was not favorable for strategic reasons, nevertheless we ag-

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\*) After the unification of the two Ukraines, the Western Ukrainian National Republic became the "Western Area of the Ukrainian National Republic."



"Demarcation" line dictated by general Barthelemy in Lviv

reed to it with the hope that a just decision of the Mission will put an end to the war which was forced on us by the Poles.

The truce began on February 25, at six in the morning. On the same day, our delegation appeared in Lviv to conduct talks and to conclude an armistice. On February 26, a conference was held between the Allied Mission and our delegation in Lviv. On February 27, the Entente Mission left for the headquarters of our Supreme Command, where it held a conference with the Head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Army, Petlyura, and also with the President of the Ukrainian National Council of Western Area of U.N.R., Dr. Petrushevych, and the President of the

State Secretariat, Dr. Holubovych. On February 28, the Mission of the Entente presented our delegation with the project of armistice with the Poles, desiring our answer for March 5."

After presenting the proposed line of demarcation, the reply explained why the hostilities were resumed:

"Considering the fact that the project is handing over into Polish hands a good half of our territory, and because without further talks it could not become a basis for armistice, our Supreme Command cancelled the truce, considering its continuation to be harmful for strategic reasons.

To this the Entente Mission sent us an ultimatum of March 1, stating that if we should begin military operations, then all talks concerning armistice are broken off and that the Ukrainian government will carry all responsibility before the four Great Powers of the Entente for further continuation of war which the Entente ordered to put to end."

Then the State Secretariat turned to the Great Powers with a complaint and a protest concerning the conduct of the Mission:

"The Mission of Entente received its information about our cause from Poles in Warsaw and Lviv. To come for an extended visit to the Government of our State and here to gather information concerning our cause, the Mission disregarded several of our requests which it considered to be impossible. The Polish press, even before the decision of the Mission, presented the matter in such a fashion as though the Mission arrived to order the Ukrainians to accept the Polish demands.

During the conference with the Mission our delegation became convinced that all information concerning us came from the Polish source, obviously, very hostile for us.

Corresponding to this came the decision of the Mission.

The demarcation line, as designated by the Mission, is not a military but a political line. The front follows from north of Peremyshl slightly eastward. Only from Peremyshl to Lviv does it follow along the railroad line in a narrow corridor, held by the Poles.



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**Dr. Sydir Holubovych**

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The temporary demarcation line designated by the Mission reaches far eastward from Lviv and hands over to the Poles large tracts of our territory which is firmly held by our army. This demarcation line corresponds to political wishes of the Poles, who officially and unofficially had declared that they have to annex to Poland at least to the Buh River line and Stryi, in order to assure for themselves the possession of Lviv and the petroleum fields in Boryslav.

This political wish of the Poles was fulfilled by the Mission of the Entente, ordering us to turn over to the Poles a good half of our territory with the capital, Lviv, and Boryslav. With this decision half of our territory and our citizens would fall under the administration of Polish occupational government, which showed itself, above all measure, to be inconsiderate toward the Ukrainian population.

By this decision our State is deprived of such a considerable part of its territory and with such sources of income as the petroleum fields in Boryslav, that it would lose a population and economic base of its existence and would not be able to fulfill the tasks of state development, especially it would not be able to organize its army needed to secure the boundaries of the Ukrainian National Republic in the East and generally those tasks which are set for the Ukrainian Na-

tional Republic in the talks between the Directorate of U.N.R. and Entente.

With this decision the Mission has trampled the principle of self-determination of people and took the side of Polish imperialism.

With this decision the Mission has sown among our people distrust toward the Entente and for the high principles which it had declared.

In the name of these principles we protest the decision, and especially we protest the ultimatum-like declaration of the Mission that we bear, before the Powers of the Entente, the responsibility for the further conduct of war.

We are forced to fight with the Poles in defense of our land. We want to live in peace and friendship with the countries of the Entente and were hopeful to receive from them aid against the Polish invasion.

Therefore we request the governments of France, England, United States, and Italy to send to our State a special Mission which, not being influenced by the Poles, would impartially investigate our relations.

We are ready at any time to stop the military action against the Poles but on the basis of a just decision which will free our territory from Polish invasion."

Signed:

Dr. Holubovych

President of State Secreteriat

The declaration of the State Secretariat presented all of the basic arguments that could have been made against the crushing terms of the Commission since it was aware of the Polish military goals and the general policy of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. It was a protest against the violation of the right of self-determination as proclaimed by the Entente to achieve peace in Europe because half of the Ukrainian territory, even by this temporary decision, was handed over to Poland. The reply also protested the ultimatum-like decision of the Mission, letting it be known that a compromise still could be reached but not quite to that extent. It pointed out that the area left for the Western Area of U.N.R. was too small for the area to survive economically; nor would it have sufficient manpower to raise an army to engage in successful warfare against the Russian Bolsheviks. Such a situation would lead to the eventual destruction of the existing army. There-

fore, the reply was couched in terms of a plea for justice and suggested new talks, this time with a truly neutral mediator. The tone and the wording of the note was designed to create a positive impression on those members of the Great Powers which were still vacillating in their views as to the solution of the Eastern and Central European problems, and especially on Lloyd George.

It should be pointed out that the note made two mistakes. One of them dealt with the goals of the Polish policy. The aim of the Polish efforts was not the same as Pilsudski had stated to Colonel Wade in January and which basically corresponded to the wishes of Barthelemy. It was only a screen for more ambitious schemes, reaching far beyond the Zbruch and Sluch Rivers and at times extending to the shores of the Black Sea. That this was the case can be seen from the documents of the Polish delegation at the Peace Conference at the very time when the Mission of Barthelemy was engaged in "negotiations" in Lviv.<sup>174</sup>) This line of reasoning was already developed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, very much influenced by the doctrine of the French General Staff.\*)

The second mistake was made in the evaluation of the attitudes of some members of the Great Four as the leaders of the Peace Conference. The French delegation at the Conference had violated the principle of self-determination in the case of the Near East and Germany. The Italian delegation even caused a crisis by demanding non-Italian areas formerly held by Austria. Obviously, in such an atmosphere it was useless to expect justice from these Powers. Although President Wilson and Lloyd George held to the self-determination principle, it would be a matter of time before they would capitulate before various pressures and influences.

Not enough was done to explain to the Great Powers the need for holding back the Russian Bolshevik expansion, if not their destruction. Perhaps it would have been more productive to explain the role which Ukraine could have played in the fight against Russian Bolshevism; and the danger to Europe, if in desperation, the country would have joined the Reds to form a "partnership."

Later in July, 1919, when the army of Western Area of U.N.R. was forced, by the Poles, to cross the Zbruch River, the State Secretariat was accused of a political blunder because it did not accept the armistice terms of General Barthelemy. The critics claimed that by accepting these terms the state would have been allowed to exist, even though in a very limited area, until a more

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\*) Some of it came to light in the conversation between John Foster Bass and General Barthelemy.

favorable distribution of forces in Eastern Europe took place. At that time, the Peace Conference would have made a permanent decision more favorable for Western Ukraine. This argument is, in part, answered by the quoted note of the State Secretariat. Dr. Mykhaylo Lozynskyy, member of the Ukrainian delegation to the armistice talks, presented still another argument. He stressed that "the position of the State Secretariat matched the mood of the entire Ukrainian population on both sides of the front, and especially the mood of the *troops*. A general conviction prevailed that the military situation did not force us to accept such an armistice, and that today or tomorrow we would take Lviv and then we would receive different armistice terms... Such a mood prevailed also in the government.\*) <sup>175)</sup>

Dr. Lezynskyy presented still another argument of political nature. It concerned the position of the Head of the Directorate and the Supreme Command of the Army of U.N.R., Symon Petlyura, who at that time enjoyed considerable authority. If he would have demanded that in the interest of the entire U.N.R. it was necessary to end the war with Poland and, therefore, unconditionally accept the demands of the Commission, this would have been a serious argument for accepting the conditions. However, Petlyura failed to take a definite stand probably because he still lacked a clear definition of his later concept "through Poland to Entente at any cost."<sup>176)</sup>

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\*) Obviously Dr. Lozynskyy was writing on the basis of informations received from the Secretary of Military Affairs and the Supreme Commander of Ukrainian Galician Army. It is necessary to point out that this was not true of the entire military forces. Commanding a battalion at the front between Sudova Vyshnya and Mostyska, I was aware of the feeling among my and other officers and myself. At that time, before the hostilities were resumed, the Supreme Command requested that all commanders, down to battalion level, ask their troops whether the armistice terms should be accepted, or whether fighting should continue until better conditions were offered. For such a position to be taken by General Mykhaylo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko was rather surprising. It was his duty to seek the best means to achieve a victory while the question whether to fight or not was a decision of the government. Also the Supreme Command was best qualified to judge whether the army had sufficient means to continue the struggle. My answer to the query was that if the Supreme Command had the necessary reserves of troops, ammunition, and equipment then the war could be continued. If such reserves were lacking, then the conditions should be accepted.

Concerning our own sector, according to our information, we lacked the reserves needed for success. It should be noted that during that time every soldier had 250 cartridges and 100 in reserve. One was allowed to shoot at a definite target only. Artillery had on the average 200 shells per cannon. Thus from the military point of view the Supreme Command had no choice but to advise the acceptance of the armistice terms, although they were unjust and very hard. (M.S.)



It was not without reason that Dr. Lozynskyy considered it to be questionable whether the acceptance of the terms would have, in the final analysis, benefited the defense of the remaining part of Western Ukraine as well as the entire United Ukrainian State. He suggested that Poland would not have observed the terms of the armistice and, at the first favorable moment, would have begun a new aggression. *Wilno* and the surrounding area provided later a graphic example of this possibility. Poland agreed to respect the freedom of that city and to its annexation to Lithuania. Having formally recalled the troops, Pilsudski and his subordinate, General Zeligowski later arranged for a "rebellion" within the city. Then Zeligowski and his division occupied the city, and after appropriate "elections" the city and its vicinity was joined to Poland. Later Poland agreed to abide by the decision of the League of Nations in this matter. However, nothing ever developed since that body accepted the situation as *fait accompli*.

The same fate very probably awaited the remaining Eastern Galicia even if the proposal of the Allied Mission were accepted. The Polish plans called for joining borders with Rumania and they had the stamp of approval from the French government. This also would have happened as soon as the international situation altered to Ukraine's detriment.

Such a change occurred in two months when the Bolsheviks reached the Zbruch River and the government of Ukrainian National Republic and its remaining troops found themselves in Galicia and Volyn. In this situation, the Poles would have attacked and overcome the Ukrainians, using the pretext of protection against the Bolshevik advance.

The crux of the matter was that if the armistice terms of the Barthelémy's Commission were accepted, the U.G.A. would have lost half of its strength. Half of its troops came from the area through which ran the front line and which, according to the terms, was to be occupied by Poland. It was hardly imaginable that these troops would have chosen to remain on the other side of the demarcation line, away from their families. Even if they did chose to remain with the U.G.A., their combat efficiency in Eastern Ukraine would not have been the same. Also the government of the Western Area of U.N.R., by accepting such terms, would have lost its popularity and the loyal obedience, needed for the military.

There is also the question of what effect this armistice would have had on the fate of Eastern Ukraine. After July, 1919, the entire Galician Army crossed the Zbruch River and there it engaged the Russian Bolshevik army. The Active Army of the U.N.R., with the aid of a Special Mission of the Active Army, concluded a brief armistice with Poland which lasted until the end of 1919. However,

this fact did not alter in any way the final outcome of the U.N.R.'s struggle against the aggressions of Soviet Russia and the Army of General Denikin. U.N.R. received no aid from the Allies. As a matter of fact, they chose to support Denikin against Ukraine. This support resulted in the debacle of the Active Army of the U.N.R. in December, 1919.

### **Testimony of the British representative in regard to the value of the Allied Mission**

A fitting epilogue to the activity of the Mission is provided by one of its own members. Colonel Carton de Wiart.<sup>177</sup>) In his memoirs he admitted that he knew little about Poland when he went to arrange an armistice and, obviously, he knew nothing of Ukraine. He had an idea that Poland was "close to Russia, where the Bolsheviks were fighting." He formed his concepts concerning the matter he was to deal with on the way to Warsaw and in the city itself, which he reached on February 2, 1919. When the Mission stopped in Prague and called on President Masaryk, the meeting with this gentleman failed to create any impression on Colonel Carton de Wiart. Thus it is not surprising to see that his encounter with Petlyura also failed to impress him, and he characterized General Pavlenko as "a simple man."

It was another matter with the Polish officials. Paderewski and especially his hair styling made 'an unforgettable impression' on de Wiart. The same was true of Mrs. Paderewski. In Warsaw Colonel de Wiart and his adjutant joined the Hunting Club, a gathering place for Polish aristocrats. Here the Polish nobility not only made the best impression on him but also they filled the gaps in his sketchy knowledge of Polish geography and provided him with such a picture of the Ukrainians that he could not help but consider them to be a "herd of pigs." Nor did the Ukrainian delegation to the armistice talks escape this characterization. It is doubtful that Colonel de Wiart was aware of the fact that the armistice project was prepared in advance by the French. He admitted that nothing concerned him but the time he wasted. This is not surprising since his stay in Lviv during the siege was not as comfortable as the Hunting Club in Warsaw. To utilize his time for the settlement of the dispute on the basis of justice did not occur to him in 1919, when his memoirs were published.

Then Colonel de Wiart did take time, however, to investigate and, later, to make a report to Lloyd George on the matter of Jewish pogroms in Poland in general and in Lviv in particular, at that time held by the Poles. He stated: In Lviv there are many Ukrainians

and Jews. The Jewish question has no answer... There were reports that pogroms of Jews had occurred but he considered reports of this type as being quite exaggerated because there was no visual proof of mass slaughter of several thousands of Jews.

The slaughter of the Jewish population occurred on November 22, 1918, after the Ukrainian troops had left the city. Even the official Polish history textbooks do not deny this.<sup>178)</sup>

Obviously there could be very little "visual proof" after the span of three months since there was enough time to bury the dead Jews.

### **Allied landing in Odessa and the talks of the French with the Directorate of the U.N.R.**

For a better understanding of the spirit of the talks between the Allied Commission of General Barthelemy, formed to achieve a truce between Western Ukraine and Poland, it would be helpful to examine the progress of discussions between the French Command in Odessa and Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic.

After the revolution in Russia proper, which took place on November 7, 1917, the Western Powers had lost hope that the new government of Russia, the Soviet of People's Commissars, would continue to fulfill the obligations previously belonging to the tsarist regime. In addition, the Entente did not believe that the Soviets would even observe neutrality and was convinced that the new Russian regime was and would continue to be a tool of the Kaiser's imperialism in the war against the Western Powers of Europe and the United States. The Allies sought to solve this problem by attempting to open a new anti-German front with the help of forces also hostile to the Bolsheviks and which were readily available on the territory of former Tsarist Russia.<sup>179)</sup>

Toward the end of 1917, the French and British governments began to consider Russia, or what remained of it after the fall of the tsar, to be a "sick man," a title previously reserved for Turkey. The care of the patient was considered not on any humanitarian basis but for a definite price. In the old framework, the ailing Russia was to be cared for by two great powers, France and Great Britain. The planned cure called for a division into spheres of influences for these two nations and the entire body was to retain some sort of unity. This was to occur only after the disposal of the Soviet regime. This future unity of the former empire was yet to be clearly defined, but it was generally accepted that it should be based either on the principle of confederation or federation between the various peoples making up the former Russian empire. Poland was to be excluded from the proposed unit and was to be allowed to exist

as an independent state. This vision for the future clearly contradicted the program of President Wilson—the right of national self-determination. However, this detail did not trouble the French and British diplomats.

On December 23, 1917, a secret meeting in Paris was held between the representatives of these two countries. The result of their discussion was a signed agreement concerning the division of the spheres of influence. Premier Clemenceau and Pichon, the minister of Foreign Affairs, signed for the French government, while Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Alfred Milner signed for the British side. Also present were the military experts of the two countries as well as the Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Section 2 of the agreement dealt with the “future action of Great Britain and France in South Russia.” In other words, the agreement concerned Ukraine, the territory of the Don Cossacks, and the Caucasian area. Ukraine and the Don region were recognized to be in the French sphere of influence, while the Caucasus fell under the influence of the British.<sup>180)</sup>

Since it was decided that the other Allies should not have any voice in this matter, the agreement was held in strict secrecy, especially from the countries which might have had some interest in that area. General Denikin, the commander of the Russian “Volunteer Army” first heard of the agreement in December, 1918.<sup>181)</sup>

The Ukrainians became aware of its existence in the first days of January, 1919, while the United States learned of it only at the Peace Conference.<sup>182)</sup>

The goal of the “White” Russian movement was to reconstruct the former Russian empire but without the ethnographic Poland. In order to realize this project, an army was organized in the “southern part of Russia,” in the Don region, and the Caucasus. The training of this army, which from the spring of 1918 was commanded by General Anton Denikin, had the tacit support of the German authorities.<sup>183)</sup>

It should be noted that in August, 1918, within the framework of Denikin’s White Army, a Polish volunteer formation was also established. In October, 1918, the command of this formation was given, on orders of General Haller, to General Lucian Zeligowski. The Polish formation quickly grew in strength as a result of the mobilization of Polish soldiers serving in the Russian army and of legionairs who, in protest to the Brest Litovsk Treaty,\*) had deserted Austria in favor of Russia. In November, following Germany’s

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\*) In Ukrainian: *Berestya* (Treaty).

capitulation, this formation was reorganized to form a separate Polish Brigade. On November 16, 1918, Pilsudski asked Marshal Foch to dispatch Polish troops, still serving as part of the French army, as quickly as possible to Poland. Foch used this request as a pretext to consider the Polish troops in the Kuban area—North Caucasus—as a component part of his army. He immediately ordered Denikin to send the Polish Brigade to Odessa, a port belonging to Ukraine and then under the authority of the Hetmanate.\*\*\*) The Polish Brigade was quickly moved to Novorossiysk for embarkation to Odessa.<sup>184)</sup>

Foch's order seems to indicate that the Polish Brigade was to have been used as the initial invading element of French forces in Odessa. Later it was to have spearheaded the invasion into Ukraine and eventually it would have joined the Polish army of the eastern front. At least this was the conviction of the military leadership within the Brigade.

After Germany's capitulation, the Ukrainian fleet on the Black Sea was claimed by the French as war booty and some of these ships were turned over to Denikin.<sup>185)</sup> In Novorossiysk, the Polish Brigade was loaded on one of these ships, renamed *Suvorov*, which reached Odessa on December 1, 1918. The city and the port were still under the rule of the Hetmanate.<sup>186)</sup> The Brigade immediately occupied the port and thus gained control of the entire city. At that time the Polish formation consisted of 2500 officers and men and it was a decisive factor in retaining Odessa and the surrounding area for the representatives of Denikin's regime and for his military detachments, formed in Odessa. In essence, the Polish Brigade was at war with Ukraine since it was fighting on the side of the "White" Russian imperialists. By December 6, elements of the Brigade were sent to the front against units of the Ukrainian Army which were sent to regain Odessa from the Russians. The White Russian units that had been formed in Odessa were also dispatched to halt the advance of the Ukrainians.<sup>187)</sup> These units, however, were completely scattered by the Ukrainian troops. Polish battalions, sent to support the Russian formations, also failed to stop the progress of the Ukrainians. The Russian units retreated to Odessa and, lacking the strength to hold the city, they withdrew to the protective cover of the Polish Brigade. On December 15, 1918, the entire city, with the exception of the port, was in the hands of the Army of U.N.R.<sup>188)</sup>

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\*) This was the time when the Directorate began its insurrection against the Hetmanate.

Three days later, on December 18, a number of French ships appeared in Odessa, bringing one French brigade as well as several Greek brigades. Under the cover of naval guns formations of the Russian Volunteer Army and the Polish Brigade, at once began their attack on the city with the French brigade leading the charge. The consideration that the Ukrainian defenders would not fire upon the French proved to be correct: the Ukrainian commander ordered his troops to hold their fire.<sup>189)</sup> Thinking that perhaps the French invasion was taking place with the understanding of the Ukrainian government, he decided to await specific instructions from Kyiv. However, his troops, having left the city, kept a tight ring around it as in a state of siege.\*)

In time, other French and Greek brigades disembarked in Odessa. By the middle of January, the invasion force consisted of two French divisions and two Greek divisions. Also by this time the Polish Brigade had grown in strength through volunteers. This Brigade was renamed an infantry division even though it only contained 2,832 men and 827 horses for artillery, officers and supplies. All together the Expeditionary Forces numbered about 50,000 soldiers.\*\*)<sup>190)</sup>

From the facts mentioned concerning the landing operations in Odessa, it appears that the French command, following orders of Marshal Foch, was carrying out a definite program. Its aim was to reconstruct the former Russian empire from the south, a state which would include Ukraine, Don region, and Caucasus. The French authorities did not bother to obtain an agreement from the Ukrainian National Republic. And it was the Ukrainian government, rather than the French, who was first to express, by means of talks, the

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\*) There seems to be some confusion as to the date of the actual landing. Denikin sets the date on December 10 and Churchill lists December 20. December 18, as used here, is based on the personal notes of General Hrehiv, the Supreme Commander in that area of Ukraine, who was the first to have contacts with the French in Odessa. Polish historian, Henryk Baginski, also used this date on the basis of original documents.

\*\*) The Polish division in Odessa was exceptionally well organized. By March it contained 1,758 men, 475 non-commissioned officers, and 717 officers.

In deciding the total number of soldiers in the Expeditionary Forces, we use the state of the combat division of World War I where one infantry division equals 2 infantry brigades; one brigade equals two regiments; one regiment equals four battalions with about 800 men each. This, then means that one brigade equals 6,400 men. According to this estimation, the four known divisions equal about 30,000 men and at least twice as many Russian Volunteer Army units. In addition, we must recognize that there were artillery units and crews of several warships not included in the previously listed numbers. In conclusion, it seems reasonable to suppose that 50,000 men of all units is a moderate estimation of the strength present in the Expeditionary Forces.



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desire for the establishment of political and military co-operation in the fight against the Bolsheviks in Russia proper. Obviously such an agreement could have been reached only if France agreed to recognize the existence of various national republics.\*) But the French and the British, represented by their generals, chose to deal with and support only General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak in Omsk.

After several delays on the part of the French Command in Odessa, the first meeting between the delegates of the Directorate and the French took place on January 23, 1919. The French were represented by the Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Forces, Colonel Freydenberg rather than the Commanding General, d'Anselme.<sup>191</sup>) Freydenberg remained in charge of those and subsequent talks. The Directorate was represented by Dr. Osyp Nazaruk and Professor Serhiy Ostapenko, both of ministerial rank.

The French representative curtly stated that the Ukrainian National Republic, in political and military matters, must obey the orders of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. As a condition to any actual talks he demanded the resignation of the Head of the

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\*) Among them were the republics of Ukraine, Don, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.

Directorate, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the head of the government, Volodymyr Chekhivskyy, and the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian forces, Symon Petlyura. The conduct of Freydenberg also suggested that he was dealing with a savage tribe in Africa rather than with the representatives of an independent government in Europe.\*\*)

One doesn't need to be an experienced political analyst to recognize the fact that the actions of the French Command in Odessa were strengthening the hand of the People's Commissars in Moscow. The program of Russia's reconstruction under the leadership of reactionaries such as General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak was the best trump for Bolshevik propaganda. With some justification the Bolsheviks were able to claim that the Allies, by means of the invasion, were helping the gentry to regain land from the peasants and to sell out the industry to foreign capital. Whoever was supporting the Allies was also helping to hand over Ukraine and Russia to foreign interest. The exploitation of peasants and workers would follow as a matter of consequence. That this approach was incorrect was also pointed out by some of the circles in France.<sup>193</sup>)

The Allied Command also failed to give any help to the only promising anti-Bolshevik force in Eastern Europe, the Active Army of the U.N.R., which at that time, was locked in mortal combat with the Russian Red aggressors. And by treating the Ukrainian National Republic as a colony, the Allies disenchanted the democratic circles of Ukrainian government in Kyiv (Kiev), and therefore cut off any possible co-operation.

From this sketch of the talks between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Allied Command in Odessa it appears that the conduct of General Barthelemy in Lviv was more diplomatic. However, the two missions seem to have a common goal: eliminating Ukraine from the international scene.

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\*\*) During one of the meetings the representative from a country of culture shouted that these high ranking officials "should be driven out like dogs."<sup>192</sup>)



## CHAPTER 2

# THE RE-ESTABLISHED POLISH REPUBLIC AND ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

### Military potential of the new Poland

In a brief sketch we have presented the military potential of Western Ukraine during the first months of its existence as an independent state. In order to have a better understanding of the course of the war between the two countries and, especially, to have an idea as to how it was possible for Western Ukraine to defend its sovereignty for such a long time, it would be helpful to examine the social-political and the military potential of Poland, also in the early period of its statehood. To dispense with such an inquiry would mean to call the successively waged defensive war of Western Ukraine, lasting for eight months, an enigma.

By comparison, the population of ethnographic Poland in 1918-1919 was almost homogeneous. The Poles had only one numerous minority—the Jews.\* They were scattered throughout the various towns and lacked the aspiration to be joined, with a certain section of Poland, to another neighboring country. All that they asked from the new Poland was to be recognized as an ethnic minority and to have their civil rights and some degree of cultural-national autonomy assured. Until the time that Poland was granted Silesia at the expense of Germany, there was only a slight German minority located, for the most part, in the Lodz district.

Western Ukraine, on the other hand, had a more significant number of Jewish population, 11.9% of the total population. Also the Polish minority in Western Ukraine was significant, making up 14.6% of the total population. The German colonists, whose presence in Western Ukraine dates back to the XVIII century, made up 2.7% of the population. Altogether, the minorities made up 29.2% of the population in Western Ukraine.<sup>194</sup>)

The Germans were scattered throughout the country estates, surrounded by the Ukrainian peasants. For some time they had been

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\*) In comparison with Western Ukraine, the percentage of Jews in Poland was small. For example, in Western Galicia (Polish) the percentage of Jews was only 7.8% while in Eastern Galicia (Ukrainian) the percentage was 11.9%.

absorbed into the stream of the Ukrainian cultural life while their nationality had been preserved by their religion, Protestantism. Thus the political and administrative problem was caused by the two other minorities, the Jews and the Poles. Both of them were concentrated in the cities and, therefore, increasing their significance. While the Jews, in regard to the war, had declared their neutrality, the Polish leadership was hostile to the idea of self-determination for Western Ukraine and defended the policy of joining the entire Western Ukraine, by means of force if necessary, to Poland.

This fact caused considerable hardships for the administration of the W.U.N.R. Although the rank and file of Polish nationals, with the exception in Lviv, did not make any overt defiance of the Ukrainian government, there did exist conspiratory organizations, dedicated to subversion, in a number of cities, including Zolochiv, Drohobych, and Ternopil. Once discovered, they were scattered by the government.

In Poland the social mosaic was defined by Polish national characteristics. From social considerations, the Polish nation was divided by social strata and basically every social stratum or class, from ethnic consideration, was Polish. The peasantry and labor was exclusively Polish while the middle class was tinged with the Jewish population. The huge land tracts were in the hands of Polish aristocrats and, to some extent, by Polish industrialists who were turning from industry to land owning. The capital was also in the hands of the Poles although considerable investments of the French and the British were to be found in the larger enterprises.

In Western Ukraine only the peasantry was almost completely of Ukrainian nationality while the large land holdings were in the hands of Polish nobles. Half of the middle class in larger cities was Polish and only in the smaller towns was the majority of the middle class Ukrainian. The more significant industry, although very limited, was in the hands of non-Ukrainians. The total population of Poland was about five times larger than of Eastern Galicia. Hence came the numerical superiority of Poland.

Poland possessed, within its borders, coal mines necessary for industry and the railroads. The textile industry in the Lodz area provided the country with necessary wool and cotton goods and produced enough to be used for export. Thus Poland could rely on her own resources to clothe her troops while Western Ukraine, lacking coal, textiles and a leather industry, was unable to care for its troops properly. Within the Polish borders there were considerable stores of equipment of the German army as well as all types of weapons and ammunition. The Austrian army did not have such stores on the territory of Western Ukraine. What the Ukrainian troops did obtain came from the small supplies of the cadres and

from the disarmed Austrian formations, coming back from Eastern Ukraine.<sup>195)</sup>

Poland was also protected along the eastern border, the Baltic countries and Byelorussia, by the German army which, at the request of the Polish government, was ordered by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference to remain there and prevent the advance of the Red army into Poland. From north to south, from Polisia to the borders of Ukrainian Galicia, the Polish state was protected by the army of Ukrainian National Republic, actively engaged in an effort to stop the advance of the Bolsheviks westward. Under these circumstances the Polish state, from its formation until April, 1919, could rebuild its military force without any external pressure. But regardless of Polish superiority in military potential, Western Ukraine was able to conduct without a major effort, defensive operations against Poland until the Polish offensive of May, 1919. Furthermore, in February and April, 1919, Poland felt so weakened that it was necessary to pressure the Supreme Council to intervene with the Ukrainian offensive operations which threatened the Polish front. Also the Polish diplomats made every effort to convince the members of the Supreme Council to send several divisions of Haller's army for the supposed defense against the Bolsheviks but in reality destined for the destruction of the Ukrainian Galician Army. Only after the Polish Supreme Command had committed the newly arrived army of General Haller, did the position of the Ukrainians worsen. In the second half of May, the Poles managed to break through the defensive positions of the Ukrainians.

### **Political weakness of the Polish Republic in the first months of its existence**

The reason for the delayed development of Polish military potential is to be found in the political debilitation of the Polish state during the early period of its existence.

On November 1, 1918, when the General Ukrainian Military Committee made its revolutionary appearance, the Republic of Western Ukraine was led by one government, the Ukrainian National Council, headed by President Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych. In Poland, on the other hand, there were two competing governments: the Liquidation Commission in Cracow and the Regency Council in Warsaw. The Commission's authority extended to the Polish part of Western Galicia and the Austrian Silesia.\*)

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\*) The Polish power was then in Silesia in one section only; the other part was in the hands of the Czechs.

The Regency Council, and its government headed by Prime Minister Jozef Swierczynski, nominally controlled the territory of the so-called Congress Poland, an area formerly held by tsarist Russia. The actual power, however, was still in the hands of the two Governors General—the German governor, who still had a considerable occupational force to enforce his authority, and was located in Warsaw; and the Austrian governor, also with a military force, who had his residence in Lublin. The authority of the Regency Council extended to civil administration and local self-government. The military rule remained in the hands of Germans and Austrians. Swierczynski was called to serve as prime minister at the end of October. He came from the camp of the Pan-Polish nationalists, led by the ideological tenets of Roman Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski. Because of his political affiliation, the cabinet of Swierczynski was opposed by the Polish Socialist Party and the political groupings of the peasants. The leader of the Polish Socialists, Ignacy Daszynski, gathered in Lublin the opposition to the cabinet and the Regency Council itself.\*) On November 7, Daszynski formed the "People's Government of the Polish Republic" and assumed the post of the Premier. The military formations, faithful to the Regency Council, were disarmed while forces loyal to the new regime were being formed. The country was threatened by a civil war over the control of Congress Poland.<sup>196)</sup>

In this situation, while Poland was ruled by three governments, came the capitulation of Germany on November 11. Also Pilsudski made, at that time, his appearance in Warsaw and the Regency Council called on him to serve as the Premier. But this move still failed to satisfy the Left and the Center. Although the Regency Council turned the full executive power over to the leader of the Socialists, Jozef Pilsudski, the reactionary and conservative elements in the Council remained the nominal representatives of the Polish state. Therefore, the Socialists and the Left Populists stirred up street demonstrations in Warsaw, demanding the resignation of the Regency Council. Since the Council, because of its former Germanophile orientation, failed to find support either to the Left or Right, it had no other choice but to comply. With the resignation of the Regency Council on November 14, Pilsudski became the dictator of Congress Poland, with the remaining powers of the Council in his hands. In order to extend his authority throughout all of Poland, Pilsudski invited Daszynski to assume the post of his Premier and to form a cabinet. However, the efforts of the new

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\*) Lublin was selected as the site for the new government because the Austrian Governor General was sympathetic toward the Polish cause and in case of need, could offer protection.

premier failed and his cabinet managed to survive only for a few days. As a spokesman of the extreme socialist tendencies, Daszynski was opposed by the conservative and nationalistic elements from Dmowski's camp. This opposition took the form of bloody demonstrations in Warsaw and other cities.<sup>197)</sup> Pilsudski was forced to make some sort of a compromise and his next premier, Andrzej Moraczewski, although also a Socialist, belonged to a more moderate faction. Moraczewski was more successful in forming a government; it survived until January, 1919. The Cracow Liquidation Commission relinquished its authority to the government in Warsaw on the grounds that the Warsaw government was the sole representative of all Poland.

However, the combination of Pilsudski and the new premier failed to gain general acceptance. The elements of the Right turned to conspiratory work in order to remove Pilsudski and his new cabinet from the government. The preparations went on until the end of December and during the night of January 4, the armed conspirators struck. Most of the ministers were arrested while Pilsudski managed to escape a similar fate by having the protection of a loyal military unit. The rebellion was led by Prince Eustachy Sapieha and Jerzy Zdziechowski, a nationalist. The military force, used in the coup, was organized by a colonel of the Legion, Januszajtis. However, General Stanislaw Szeptycki, loyal to the dictator, ably liquidated the rebellion by the use of troops. The leaders of the aborted rebellion were arrested but were released at a later date. \*) It wasn't until February 1919, with the meeting of the newly elected *sejm* (parliament), that the truce between political parties was achieved. In the parliament, the Center and the nationalistic Right had the advantage, depending on the course of the foreign and domestic policy.<sup>198)</sup>

The inter-party struggle in Poland during November and December was one of the reasons for that country's failure to develop fully its military potential. The other reason, related to the first, was to be found in the numerous social disorders in several districts. The somewhat chaotic conditions in the provinces are colorfully described by the Polish historian Wladyslaw Pobóg-Malinowski. Concerning the situation in Poland during the government of Moraczewski he writes:

"The Polish society on the territory of the Kingdom Congress Poland and Galicia lived, if not in a carefree disregard then in any case, in a deep underestimation

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\*) In 1920 Sapieha even served as a minister.

of the danger from the East... Its attention was focused on the internal matters which resounded in the acute struggle of opposing parties, groups, and individuals. The cabinet of Moraczewski was supported only by the following parties: the Polish Socialist Party, *Wyzwolenie* (Liberation) Party, liberal peasants, Stapiński's group, a small part of peasants from Western Galicia, and by the radical intelligentsia; but it was attacked and fought from many sides. Passions grew quickly, dangerously sharpened. The internal situation, especially during the first weeks, was close to anarchy. Parts which were joining to form one state unit were filled with mutual reservations; they grew angry at each other. Administration was formed through an accidental influx of people or through a chance choice of people who were, for the most part, unprepared for their tasks, without a system in their work, often with a lack of feeling for discipline. In the interior of the country in many localities, the established governmental apparatus did not, as yet, possess authority; it was weak, and helplessly retreated to the face of a rebellion or banditry... This confusion was overcome only by the end of January, 1919... The Social Democrats and the Communists managed to gain control of quite a few city establishments and, especially in Lublin and Chelm provinces, they formed Soviet Committees... In the labor centers—factories and mines—instances of sabotage were constantly repeated; also the directors and the engineers were willfully arrested, beaten, and sometimes thrown alive into the mines. At the countless meetings of labor, sudden armed clashes between the Communists and Socialists were daily events... Not a day passed without bloody demonstrations "for" or "against" the government. More often it was in opposition to the government. This state of constant and growing boiling was, in addition, stirred by the press which did not recognize any moderation in regard to sowing anti-governmental ferment in the society... Blatant accusations and the most far-reaching slander was thrown at the head of state."

"Before the troops were organized," writes Professor Michal Bobrzynski, "the Polish lands were the arena of banditry, pogroms, and disorder... Bands were formed, made up chiefly of army deserters, who robbed villages and towns, but first of all, the Jews. Even separate republics were established in various parts of Poland

which were, more or less, the expression of a type of Bolshevism and banditry. One such republic, which lasted for a long time, was in Tarnobrzeg and another was located in Pinczów..."<sup>199</sup>)

It is apparent why, in the existing situation, it was impossible for the government of Moraczewski to conduct a general mobilization. Such an order would have been obeyed, though, by the recruits from Western Galicia, where the ideas of the Bolsheviks had no influence. Also Warsaw was cautious not to include into the ranks of its army the subversive elements. The pro-Bolshevik feelings had been brought from Russia by the returning soldiers who, for the most part, were responsible for the ferment which was decomposing the society in the provinces. For this reason Pilsudski decided to organize in the first weeks an army based on volunteers and trained by the Legionairs. Only after such an army had been formed and could be used as cadre would it be possible to order a general mobilization.<sup>200</sup>)

For this reason several months would pass before Poland could utilize her military potential fully. This provided an opportunity for Western Ukraine, where social order and law prevailed, to mobilize the available manpower and, by January, 1919, to present a 100,000 man army which could hold its own against Poland. On January 15, the strength of the combatants was almost the same: on that day Poland had an armed force of 110,532 men. However, from that point on the Polish force continued to grow daily while the manpower of Western Ukraine was completely exhausted. From the military point of view, and under such circumstances, after several months of preparations by the Poles, it would be impossible for Western Ukraine alone to hold against the pressure of a united Poland.<sup>201</sup>).

## CHAPTER 3

### NEW BATTLES AND NEW OVERTURES FOR PEACE

#### Let steel and blood be our judge

Twenty-four hours after the hostilities were resumed, the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army issued a proclamation to its troops explaining the reason for the cessation of hostilities and the progress of the armistice talks. Having mentioned the proposed line of demarcation, it also pointed out the terms of the agreement forbade the division of large land owned by the Polish nobility until the final decision of the Peace Conference. In patriotic but realistic terms it informed the soldiers of the U.G.A. of the difficult struggle ahead of them, since Poland, in quest of Ukrainian territory, was willing to use the aid of the Entente Powers. The proclamation still held hope for the struggling nation since "the representatives of the Allied Powers were able to see with their own eyes our troops and our people and to hear the limitless love and desire for a new life, which lives in the hearts of our people." The rest of the proclamation called on the troops for new sacrifices and expressed hope that their dedication would bring victory and freedom for the new state.

The primary task of the Supreme Command after the hostilities were resumed was to obtain a strategic victory: to liquidate the corridor between Lviv and Peremyshl and to regain Lviv, thus shortening the front line. The Ukrainians began the offensive on March 10, 1919, and, by breaking through at Horodok on the Lviv-Peremyshl line, they were able to surround completely their capital. As the offensive began to gather momentum, the story of talks was repeated again.

This development was due to the situation as it appeared to the government and the military leadership of the W.A.U.N.R. At that time Dr. Vasyl Paneyko, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had left to attend the Peace Conference. Unable to reach Paris immediately because the French government was reluctant to issue the necessary visa, Dr. Paneyko was forced to spend some time in Switzerland. From there he sent a telegram to President Wilson in which he not only presented the activities of General Barthelemy's Mission but also touched upon new political eventualities.

The telegram, sent on March 13, first enumerated the transgressions of the Mission. General Barthelemy made no attempts



to conceal the fact that with his good officers he had also brought ammunition for the Polish side. The general also participated in military parades of the Poles and made an inspection of the Polish front lines. In his speeches, he constantly stressed the brotherhood between the Poles and the French. In respect to the Ukrainians, the general was guilty of ignorance and arrogance. Nor did he hesitate to send false reports which were openly hostile to the Ukrainians, describing their soldiers as "Bolsheviks, bandits, killers of women and children."

Paneyko also pointed out that the truce could have been successful if the boundary dispute between Poland and Ukraine would have been in line with President Wilson's principle, i.e. based on ethnography and self-determination of the people. Not only did General Barthelemy disregard this principle, but he made his proposal at the time when the Ukrainians had the military capability to regain Lviv. The proposal of the general concerning the territorial changes were designed to strengthen the Polish position. Obviously, such terms had a disquieting effect on the population and the resumption of hostilities was a political necessity. "The Ukrainian government regretfully declares that it is unable to send its armed forces to the Eastern front," the telegram continued, "against the Bolsheviks, but in fact, it must transfer some of its troops from the eastern to the western front, to defend the country against the Poles. If the boundaries of Western Ukraine are not settled, then not only the Ukrainian question will not be solved, but the matter of the entire Eastern Europe as well. This is the reason why the government of Ukraine, lacking the means to fight on two fronts, feels forced to concentrate all of its forces for the defense of the country against the Polish invasion and only later for the systematic liberation of other territories of Ukraine in the East. If our efforts fail to achieve the desired success, the guilt must fall chiefly on General Barthelemy who, obviously, never intended to devote himself to solving the difficulties between the Poles and the Ukrainians; to the contrary, he attempted to paralyze the struggle of the Ukrainians to help the Polish interests."<sup>202</sup>)

For the first time the official documents and declarations of the State Secretariat presented a political concept which placed Ukraine within the European scheme to fight the Bolshevism. Obviously, this concept could not be realized as long as Ukraine's existence was threatened by Polish imperialism. However, this concept was explained by Dr. Paneyko in very general terms and without more convincing arguments. The same could be said of other notes of the two Ukrainian governments.

## Polish efforts to halt the Ukrainian offensive

Paneyko's telegram was answered by the personal secretary of President Wilson:\*)

"President Wilson received your telegram of March 13, which dealt with the Ukrainian-Polish relations and the Mission of General Barthelemy. The President wants to assure you that he is quite aware of the situation and for that reason another Allied Mission will be sent immediately to investigate the entire matter on the spot. The President is certain that while waiting for the Mission and in general interest, Ukraine will immediately halt the military operations. The President hopes that Ukraine will have faith in the good will of the Allied governments in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement between Poland and Ukraine and that they will eliminate, by a joint settlement of this matter, the conflict between the two nations."<sup>203</sup>)

Paneyko sent the happy news immediately to Stanyslaviv, the provisional capital of W.A.U.N.R. It was considered to be a happy turn of events because President Wilson was considered to be a leader of a mighty power, both politically and morally. It was a sign that he, in essence, recognized the objections of the State Secretariat as valid and promised to provide a new and impartial mission to settle the conflict.

However, from the documents available it can be seen that either Wilson's secretary was slightly too optimistic in his wording, or the President was promising more than he could deliver, or had the intention to fulfill. But at that time the government of Western Ukraine had no way of knowing this since it had no access to the secret meetings of the Big Four at the Peace Conference in Paris.

In the meantime, while the Ukrainians were conducting an offensive to cut off Lviv, the friends of Poland were making every effort to aid Poland. Their effort were channeled in two directions. The first was to demand that the Peace Conference allow the transport of General Haller's army into Poland. The other was to obtain the cessation of the Ukrainian offensive until Haller's

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\*) Retranslation into English from the Ukrainian translation which was made by Dr. M. Lozynskyy, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

army could get there. Eventually their efforts were successful in both respects, it meant that the promise of President Wilson to the Ukrainians had no validity. The fact is clear from the documents behind the scene of the Peace Conference.

The Mission of General Barthelemy having failed in Lviv, returned to Paris on March 12, and presented its report to the Commission for Polish Affairs of the Peace Conference. It stated that the situation around Lviv was critical and, unless the Poles receive immediate aid, they are threatened with a defeat. The loss of Lviv would be a terrible blow for Poland, the report explained, because it would be interpreted as a defeat of the Entente. This would strengthen the Bolsheviks and "would encourage all German agents who are active against the Entente in Eastern Galicia."<sup>204</sup>)

Jule Cambon, the chief chairman of the Committee for Polish Affairs at the Peace Conference, immediately sent a note to the Supreme Council which presented the report of the French general and urged the Supreme Council to dispatch Haller's army immediately to Poland.<sup>4</sup>) On March 14, he sent another note to the Supreme Council in which he called attention to the importance of the situation around Lviv and demanded immediate steps to save Lviv for Poland.<sup>205</sup>)

The efforts of friends of Poland in Paris were supported by the chief of the Inter-Allied Mission in Warsaw, French diplomat Noulens. In his telegrams of March 5, 8, 11, and 12, he stressed the seriousness of the Polish situation at Lviv. He informed the Peace Conference that the loss of Lviv meant the collapse of Poland, a supposed ally of the Entente. The defeat of Poles in that area would cause the collapse of the Polish government which in turn would lead to anarchy in the entire country, threatened from three sides—the Germans, the Bolsheviks, and the Ukrainians. For these reasons, Noulens suggested that Lviv should receive immediate assistance from the Allies. It should be in terms of Haller's army and the Polish formations which, at that time, were attached to the French troops in Odessa. Noulens suggested that the Polish troops be sent through Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. Meanwhile, to save Poland, it would be necessary to use at least ten Rumanian divisions. The Rumanian government, in principle, agreed to such an arrangement, provided the Allies would arm and equip these formations.<sup>206</sup>)

All of these pains in Poland's behalf remained a mystery to the Ukrainian military and civilian intelligence, including the plans to use Rumanian troops. As a result, the government made no practical preparations to protect the U.G.A. from a possible attack from that quarter. In fact, in view of Wilson's telegram concerning new truce talks, the Ukrainian diplomats were quite optimistic.

## Supreme Council halts the Lviv offensive

On the heels of the good news from Dr. Paneyko, another telegram, dated March 19, was received by the Ukrainians from the Supreme Council. It was addressed to General Pavlenko, inviting him to join the Poles in putting a stop to fighting around Lviv. It also suggested that the railway between Lviv and Peremyshl be left unhampered in provisioning the city. Then the Supreme Council offered to mediate between the two sides in order to achieve an eventual armistice. The immediate cessation of hostilities was the condition made if the services of the Supreme Council were to be used in settling the conflict. The telegram was signed by Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando.<sup>207)</sup>

The State Secretariat was aware that the existing military advantage could not last long. With every day the Polish state grew stronger since its manpower potential was considerably higher than that of W.A.U.N.R. This potential changed into reality as arms and supply shipments were received from the Entente. On the other hand, the Ukrainians were exhausting their reserves and even if a new levy of recruits was made, they could not be armed and equipped since there were no sources of supply. In addition, the Ukrainians took note that the entire matter would be reconsidered by the Peace Conference, obviously disregarding the recommendations of General Barthelemy. Faced with such reality, General Pavlenko after consultation with President Dr. Petrushevych sent a telegram to the Supreme Council, accepting the proposition of the Supreme Council.<sup>208)</sup>

On March 22, the government of Western Ukraine also sent a special message to Paris agreeing to stop military operations around Lviv, with the understanding that such action applied to the entire Polish-Ukrainian front. \*) The message also contained the names of the Ukrainian delegates who were to be sent as soon as it was known that the Poles had also accepted the proposal of the Supreme Council.<sup>209)</sup>

Relying on the telegram from the Supreme Council, the Supreme Command of the U.G.A. approached the Poles concerning the truce. However, the Poles, oriented by the army of Haller, were now in no hurry to begin negotiations. It was necessary for General Kernan, the American member of the Inter-Allied Mission in Warsaw, to intervene in order to have the Poles formally accept the talks.

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\*) This reservation was necessary because the telegram of the Supreme Council spoke only of truce around Lviv.

## The talks at Khyriv

The talks between the two combatant sides were held in Khyriv. The Ukrainian side was represented by General Gembachiv, the commander of the Third Corps; Colonel Fiedler; Major Dolezhal; Colonel Maletskyy; Dr. M. Lozynskyy, representing the State Secretariat, and Rev. Francois Xavier Bonne, the translator. The Poles were represented by Colonel Kulinski, Major Marianski, Captain Rozwadowski, Lieutenant Korotniewicz, and Count Skarbek, the political representative. General Kerman and his adjutant also took part in the discussions.

However, these talks were fruitless because the Polish side refused to accept the wording of the telegram from the Supreme Council. The Poles chose to follow the line established by General Barthelemy. When the Ukrainians pointed out that for the present it was a question of truce while other matters would be decided in Paris, the Poles replied that they could not conduct talks on this basis without proper authorization from their government. Since this was an obvious rejection of negotiations, the State Secretariat notified the Supreme Council of this development and the Poles were to send a special parliamentarian to inform the Ukrainians of the outcome of their own consultations.<sup>210</sup>)

The failure of the talks, sabotaged by the Poles, did not upset the Polish government. By that time it was a certainty that half of the votes in the Supreme Council would support the conquest of Eastern Galicia, thus extending the Polish frontiers to the Rumanian border. The other half of the Council members would be faced with *fait accompli* and powerless to do anything about it. Haller's army was already on the way to Poland and six fresh divisions at the front meant an obvious advantage if not a complete victory. Therefore, the Poles could afford to demand the acceptance of Barthelemy's project of armistice, being well aware that such terms would never be accepted by the Ukrainian side.

In the meantime, the Ukrainians had selected their delegation to Paris so it could, through direct participation at the Supreme Council, obtain peace on better conditions than those offered by General Barthelemy. The delegation consisted of Dr. Mykhaylo Lozynskyy, the Deputy of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the leader of the delegation; Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyy, the military advisor; and Dr. Olexander Kulchyskyy, the secretary. Because of the travel difficulties, the delegation did not reach Paris until May 7, 1919.

Meanwhile the army of Haller had reached Poland and on April 30 the Poles were able to welcome the general in Lviv. In response to the greetings, Haller answered: "Like birds from foreign

lands we have flown to you in order to build a nest in this city; and from here we shall fly to the east in order to determine the boundaries of our state where they will have to be recognized."<sup>211</sup>)

On April 25 the State Secretariat of W.A.U.N.R. received a telegram from Dr. Paneyko in Paris. It was badly transmitted by the French Post and Telegraph Office but it was possible to make out that the Supreme Command of U.G.A. should make one more truce effort, as directed by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. On May 1, the offer was made as directed but the Poles failed to make a definite commitment. On May 7, a courier from Ukrainian Embassy in Vienna delivered a correct text of Dr. Paneyko's telegram to the State Secretariat of W.A.U.N.R. in Stanyslaviv:

"Paderewski, in the name of his government, informed the representatives of the Supreme Council that the Poles accept the proposal of the Supreme Council of March 19 to the warring sides in Galicia to be on the defensive and refrain from an offensive. Therefore I propose, on the good advice of the United States delegation, for the State Secretariat to order the command of our army to cease shooting at a specified time and all hostile action, and to inform the Poles that the Ukrainian formations will refrain from hostile moves as long as the Polish formations will conduct themselves likewise. Also I suggest you send to Paris immediately an officer from our General Staff, if possible Tarnawskyy or Kurmanovych, who would be informed of the situation at the front. Visas and the necessary traveling papers for the Orient Express will be provided by the American Mission in Lviv. Following the cessation of hostilities, the talks concerning a definite armistice will begin next week in Paris."<sup>212</sup>)

As instructed by Dr. Paneyko, the State Secretariat ordered the Supreme Command to offer truce to the Poles. This was done on May 9, proposing that the hostilities should cease on May 14. To this proposal the Poles answered neither orally nor in writing. At dawn on May 14, they began a general offensive on the entire Ukrainian front, since at that time the army of Haller was ready to provide the needed decisive assistance.<sup>213</sup>)

The communication between Western Ukraine and Paris was very complicated since a telegram had to travel through several countries and also because the French authorities were in no hurry to accept messages from Ukraine or to deliver them promptly to the Ukrainian delegates. Having received no reply by May 7, con-

cerning the steps taken by the State Secretariat, Dr. Paneyko was able to arrange for the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference to send another telegram to Stanyslaviv, of the same content as Dr. Paneyko's previous telegram. The telegram made an additional request: to instruct the Supreme Command of U.G.A. not to be provoked by the Poles into some sort of offensive because the talks concerning the armistice in Galicia had already begun.<sup>214</sup>) Although Paderewski later claimed before the Supreme Council that the Polish offensive was only a counter offensive against the Ukrainian attack, the Ukrainian side did not conduct any military operation up to May 14.\*)<sup>219</sup>)

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\*) The order of the Supreme Command to refrain from an offensive was directed to corps and brigades of U.G.A. However, it was obvious that the Polish side, from May 1 to 13, was making preparations for an offensive. In my sector, between Mostyska and Sudova Vyshnya, the Poles had brought in new artillery and were zeroing it. The intelligence brought reports that a significant number of regiments had arrived in the district. A few days before the Polish offensive, a Polish deserter gave more detailed information concerning the troops in the area. It was obvious that a large scale operation on the part of the Poles was inevitable in the very near future.

I sent this information to the Group Command in Krukenychi and it was relayed to Sambir, the location of the command of the Brigade. On May 12, I received an order to make an attack on the following day in the direction of the Lviv-Peremyshl railroad line. It was obvious that if this plan was carried out in face of a superior force, a large hole would be created for the Polish advance. I decided to check on the order since, obviously, there had to be some misunderstanding. Having consulted with Commander of the Krukenychi group Colonel Shepel concerning this matter, we decided to take the problem to the command of the Brigade. Later that night I received a message that the order for the offensive was a misunderstanding and should be disregarded.

After the war, it was revealed that the before mentioned order had been arranged by a Polish master spy-officer who was attached to the staff of Brigade. This was an obvious provocation. (M. S.)

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**Dr. Matthew Stachiw as officer of  
the Ukrainian Galician Army in 1919**

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## CHAPTER 4

# UKRAINE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

### Crosscurrents in Paris

Ukraine in general and Western Ukraine in particular were discussed mainly behind the scenes at the Peace Conference. The opponents of a Ukrainian independent state were hard at work on this problem by holding private talks with the influential delegations and through letters and memorandums. No one escaped their attention; the matter was discussed with the individual delegates of the Great Powers, with their advisors and experts, and their secretaries.<sup>215)</sup>

In addition, Western Ukraine was often discussed at the meetings of the Supreme Council. The matter came into the open only when some decision of the Supreme Council was made public and which also was related to Ukraine, as, for instance, the question of giving recognition to Admiral Kolchak or a declaration concerning the Polish-Ukrainian armistice.

The French government and the French General Staff, especially Marshal Foch, were basically in favor of an active warfare against the Bolsheviks in Russia. From this aspect the Ukrainian question should have emerged as an independent factor in the French plans if it was not for a previous decision to support the two enemies of the Ukrainian state: Poland with her imperialistic designs and indivisible Russia. The position of the French government toward the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper can be seen in practice from the dictates of the French staff in Odessa.

In regard to Western Ukraine, Foch also opposed its existence and favored its annexation to Poland. On January 12, 1919, at the meeting of the Supreme Council, Foch presented a plan to combat the Bolsheviks from the west. It called for the Germans, as a part of the armistice agreement, to hold and maintain in good conditions the docks in Danzig and the railway to Torun which would be used by the Allies to transport troops into Poland. He also proposed to form an impressive army consisting of American and Polish units, as well as of units formed from the anti-Bolshevik Russian troops which were still in Germany as former prisoners of war. The task of this army was not only to protect Poland from the Red threat but also to conduct an offensive war against Soviet Russia. In this plan

there is no mention of the Ukrainian National Republic or the Western Area of the Ukrainian National Republic, making it obvious that Foch favored liquidation of W.A.U.N.R. in favor of Poland. However, the plan was rejected by the Supreme Council, since neither Woodrow Wilson nor Lloyd George wanted to send their troops to new fronts.<sup>216</sup>)

On February 15, among the problems dealt with by the Council of Big Four was also the question of Ukraine. At the meeting Winston Churchill, in the name of Great Britain, discussed the situation along the Russian Bolshevik front. His review began with Finland where the military situation was favorable. According to Marshal Mannerheim, the Finns were in a position to take St. Petersburg by themselves, thus cutting off the Bolsheviks from the Baltic Sea. But they could do it only if the Allies assured them support, especially in provisioning that large city. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were also fairly secure; the Bolshevik force of 20,000 was facing an army of 32,000.

In his discussion about Ukraine, he listed the Bolshevik gains up to that time: Kyiv (Kiev), Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and a significant part of the Donets basin. Obviously Churchill was misinformed because on that date, when the Directorate was still in Vynnytsia and the regrouped forces of the Active Army of U.N.R. began a counteroffensive, he stated that the Ukrainian troops "supposedly scattered or for the most part had gone over to the Bolsheviks." Concerning the "Directorate of Vynnychenko and Petlyura," he knew only that "they are ready to run away to Galicia." No mention was made of the need to support the Directorate in the fight against the Reds.<sup>217</sup>)

As mentioned previously, since February, 1919, Warsaw was the headquarters of the Inter-Allied Mission which was to bring about peace between Poland and Ukraine. It wined and dined in the capital for some time, without sending any definite information concerning the progress of truce talks. At a meeting of February 10, the American delegation took up the matter of the mission's inactivity and was somewhat surprised when Marshal Foch showed no inclination to intervene in this matter. The Americans decided to ask the Supreme Council for an explanation, becoming aware that some sort of political intrigue surrounded this matter.<sup>218</sup>)

It is probable that as a result of this activity on the part of the American delegation, Colonel House issued an order to his adjutant, Lt. Col. Steven Bonsal, to prepare a report of the situation in Ukraine and concerning the Ukrainian matter in general. The produced report was extensive and generally correct. It began with a review of the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council), its policies, including the Third Universal. Written in sympathetic terms, it

was well informed of the activities of the Ukrainian Central Rada and especially in regard to its President, Professor M. Hrushevskyy, S. Petlyura, and V. Vynnychenko.\*) It mentioned the fact that after the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic, numerous Allied representatives appeared in Kyiv (Kiev). "But they brought with them only advice and no ammunition," was the evaluation of the role played by these diplomats. The Allied representatives demanded the continuation of war against the Germans but did not propose any realistic aid, wrote Bonsal. Then he reviewed the difficulties of Ukraine, struggling against the Bolshevik invasion, and concluded that Ukraine was forced to sign a peace treaty with Germany at Brest Litovsk. In this desperate situation Vynnychenko asked the Allies, who were not sending aid, to arrange for an armistice with the Germans on the Ukrainian front in such a manner as to enable him to reorganize his forces against the Bolsheviks. Then the report discussed the treaty, the formation of the Hetmanate, and the uprising of the Directorate and its anti-Bolshevik policy up to that time. The matter of Western Ukraine was discussed separately.<sup>219</sup>)

Lt. Col. Bonsal was quite sympathetic toward the Ukrainian people. Concerning the Western Ukrainian matter, he wrote in his diary: "The Ukrainian problem is the most complicated of all which the Conference has encountered. To its misfortune, few delegates know this problem..." In his notation the Ukrainians were presented as being courageous and interesting, and he expressed his regrets that the nation was under a foreign rule. The efforts to achieve independence were called a noble ideal, and he foresaw great difficulties which would have to be overcome. He spoke highly of Hrushevskyy, Sydorenko, the chief of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris, and on his own initiative promised Sydorenko, should he give Bonsal a proper memorandum, to present it to President Wilson, Clemenceau, and to all members of the American delegation. It is highly probable that if Wilson and other American representatives knew something of the existing situation in Ukraine, it was due to the efforts of Lt. Col. Bonsal. At that time he justifiably expressed fears that Ukraine was too rich not to have interested candidates to rule over her wealth.

However, the favorable influence of the impartial members from the American delegation was exceptional. The dominant influence was of those who strove to destroy Wilson's doctrine, especially to prevent the establishment in Eastern Europe of the principle

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\*) Henceforth the Ukrainian Central Rada will be designated by U.C.R.

of national self-determination. These elements found strong support among the Poles and the Russians. The Polish and "White" Russian representatives understood quite well that while the heads of states make formal decisions, the actual adjudication was in the hands of experts of each delegation, who prepared the background information as well as the actual resolutions of their chiefs. This group was made up of diplomatic personnel and military specialists, concerned with strategic and intelligence matters. Such experts were expertly dealt with in Paris by the Polish representatives just as the Allied Mission in Warsaw was receiving similar treatment. Although no record of the actual operation is available from the members affected, some idea can be had from the representatives who did not completely succumb to the brainwashing.

### **Social gatherings as methods of political persuasion**

One of the means for exerting political pressure was the friendly receptions, breakfasts, lunches, and dinners. On February 27, at the time Barthelemy's Mission was in Lviv, the Poles in Paris gave a reception for the American representatives. From the atmosphere at the gathering, one must conclude that the Poles were aware of the truce terms carried by General Barthelemy and that the Ukrainian side would reject them. Being aware that the matter, on complaint from the Ukrainians, would be placed before the Supreme Council, it was necessary for the Poles to make new efforts, especially on the American experts, so that they would support the Polish designs. Professor James T. Shotwell, who kept a diary during his association with the Peace Conference, provided interesting details of that reception.<sup>220</sup>)

The entry of February 27, tells of a splendid breakfast at the apartments of Mr. Pulaski, also the headquarters of the Polish Committee in Paris. The treatment accorded to the Americans was that reserved for full-fledged diplomats. In the guest room the Americans met about twenty Polish leaders who, after formalities, began to present various phases of Polish demands. Neither the available maps nor the charts with statistics failed to erase the impression that the entire affair was somewhat overtaxed. Professor Shotwell noticed the special composition of the Polish assembly. By selecting people from various non-Polish territories, this gave them a better qualification to claim "from experience" that a given area was really a part of Poland. For example, Eugeniusz Romer, professor of geography from Lviv, had the task of explaining Polish pretensions to Eastern Galicia.

Obviously, during the five hour session with the Americans, the Poles used all of their ammunition to shatter the Ukrainian

cause. Although this method evoked in Shotwell some feeling of irony, he and Mr. Young, also present at the reception, were convinced that the Danzig\*) corridor should be Polish. The social contact seems to have affected Dr. Bowman also, the leader of the American specialists. While initially he was objective in the Ukrainian-Polish dispute, later he began to pay tribute to the Polish representatives and Paderewski. On May 1, Shotwell mentioned, Bowman honored Paderewski and Dmowski with a dinner in a hall decorated with white and red flowers which are Polish national colors. All members of the advisory section were present, including Professor Lord who was attached to Barthelemy's Mission in Warsaw. Bowman, according to Shotwell, approached objectively the Polish demands and limited them on the basis of ethnographic investigations which he made conscientiously. Professor Lord was characterized as a man who tried to obtain everything that was demanded by those who recognized "the tragic history of Poland."<sup>221</sup>)

Thus it can be easily understood how the American experts, representatives, and President Wilson, for various reasons, strayed from the path of good intent. The Americans were aware, noted Shotwell in his diary, that Eastern Galicia did not belong to Poland. However, they lacked the fortitude to transfer this knowledge to actual projects and to resist the pressure of Polish imperialistic pretensions. "The city of Lviv," he wrote, "has a Polish majority but it is surrounded by Ukrainians who form a majority population of the land in this part of Galicia. This is further complicated by the fact that many Poles are Jews\*\*) and, on the other hand, much of the land in the country of Ukrainians is owned by Polish aristocrats. The two peoples cannot decide this question and for this reason they are at war. What is to be done?"

He left the question without an answer even though he was aware that the majority of the population was Ukrainian. Later the question was left unanswered by the entire American delegation and allowed itself to come to terms with the imperialistically minded answer of the French government.

While General Barthelemy was handing over more than half of the Ukrainian territory of East Galicia to Poland, Marshal Foch was enlarging on his plan to fight the Bolsheviks. On February 25,

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\*) Polish spelling of this city — Gdansk.

\*\*) The number of such Jews was small. It was made up of persons who left the Jewish faith for Roman Catholicism. The rest, about 99%, did not call themselves Poles even though they were registered as Poles against their will. On the initiative of the German and Polish reactionaries and anti-Semites, the Austrian law did not recognize the existence of the Jewish nation but only the "faith of Moses."

1919, he proposed to form an army which, commanded by the French, would go into action against the Reds. It would be made up of Greeks, Rumanians, Serbs, Czechs, Poles, and Estonians, and Foch added that only the "army of South Russia" was considered.<sup>222</sup>) The plan did not include either of the two Ukraines. The plan, submitted for evaluation to the Big Five, failed to yield results. President Wilson had left for Washington on February 15, and Lloyd George was also away from Paris. Having considered the possibility that his plan might not be approved by the Great Powers, Foch took measures which would justify the formation of the army and its intervention against the Soviet Russia. He proposed very harsh terms to be imposed on Hungary in favor of Rumania, terms which the Hungarians could not accept without precipitating a coup. The project was approved by the Council of Allied Ministers. However, Foch managed to delay the presentation of the project to Budapest, waiting to see whether his plan for the formation of anti-Bolshevik army will be rejected.<sup>223</sup>)

The French and their satellites formulated their plans not only through their diplomatic and intelligence agents. They were also aided by the American civilian and military experts. Lieutenant Foster, strongly influenced by the Poles in Warsaw, was more helpful to Marshal Foch and his plans than for his own government. His reports disregarded truth as long as the Polish government, led by Paderewski, was presented in the best light. In March, 1919, after the State Secretariat of West Ukraine rejected the terms of General Barthelemy and it was of utmost importance for the Poles to speed up the transport of Haller's army, Foster appeared in Paris to plead their case personally. On March 13, Foster managed to obtain an invitation to the meeting of the American delegation, held by Secretary of State Robert Lansing in Wilson's absence. This provided Foster with an opportunity to distribute to the delegates copies of his report concerning the situation in Poland and some of his recommendations. He proposed that Allied officers should occupy the railroad lines leading from Hungary to Eastern Galicia in order to stop the alleged ammunition supplies which came to Ukraine through Hungary.

Such action must be taken, he stated, to convince the people of Ukraine of the seriousness and power of the Allied governments and not conduct themselves in such a manner that completely ignores the power of those states.

To evoke the proper anti-Ukrainian atmosphere, Foster read a newspaper which claimed that the significance of Allied occupation



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**Marshal Ferdinand Foch**

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is re-emphasized where it does exist. No mention was made of the name or the origin of the paper.\*) As the result of the recommendations, Foster was sent to Norman Daves who was in charge of supervision over the Hungarian railways. Foster also suggested that the Americans do everything possible to expedite Haller's army to Poland. General Bliss, also a member of the U.S. delegation, agreed with this recommendation. The matter had been already decided by the Allies and the delay was due to the difficulties with the sea transport, he added. Foster also suggested that Poland should be given, immediately, ammunition and military equipment. On this point, however, the delegation was uncertain whether this could be done without an act of Congress. General Bliss was appointed to get the necessary information from Washington.<sup>224</sup>)

### **France acts for Poland**

On March 14, Wilson returned to Paris and on March 17, the Supreme Council held its meeting. The second point on the agenda was the presentation of Foch's plan. At first Foch reviewed

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\*) Foster made one short trip to Western Ukraine.

the situation in Poland. From January, 1919, there was an Inter-Allied Mission in Warsaw, headed by Noulens, which reported in telegrams of March 5, 8, 11, and 12, that the very existence of Poland was threatened. The greatest danger was to the city of Lviv,\*) attacked and besieged by the Ukrainians. Only an immediate action on the part of the Allies can save Poland and Lviv. The action which he mentioned involved the transfer of Polish troops from Odessa to Lviv, if the situation in Odessa permitted this. The forces to be thus used should be strengthened by a transport of Rumanian army; for this purpose it is possible to obtain a contingent of at least 10 to 12 divisions in good physical and moral condition.

From Foch's presentation there was no question of an armistice between the Poles and the Ukrainians. It was a plan for the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state and annexation of the entire Eastern Galicia to Poland. Foch was not only a good strategist, but according to Clemenceau, he was also a good diplomat. At the meeting he did not discuss the true aim of his plan but only the "defense" of Lviv. However, during the debate concerning this plan it became apparent that Foch fooled no one. Lloyd George suggested that the plan be rejected because such force was being established for the invasion of Russia. Also, Lloyd George wanted to know who would finance such an operation? He also objected to the transfer of troops from Odessa. At the time when the Bolsheviks were making gains, when the grain belt was being occupied by the Reds, the planned transfer meant aiding the enemy since Petlyura, who was fighting them, was offered for destruction. Even the matter of Lviv did not satisfy Lloyd George, since no one has proven to his satisfaction that the city was Polish. Therefore, he did not see any reason why the matter should be decided in Poland's favor. In conclusion he proposed negotiations to settle the Ukrainian-Polish conflict rather than to have this question decided by force.<sup>225</sup>)

Marshal Foch was unable to counter the sharp criticism of Lloyd George but repeated his original proposal. He claimed that the loss of Lviv meant the collapse of the Polish government in Warsaw. Obviously he did not see the weakness of his own argument since it testified to the superficiality of Paderewski's support. One military setback seldom signals the collapse of a strong government.

However, Foch's argument did not fail to impress some statesmen, and it was later used not only by the French but even by Paderewski. At the end of his proposal, Foch presented still another argument: such was also the opinion of the Inter-Allied Commission since it demanded that aid be sent to Poland immediately.

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\*) The Polish name, Lwow, or the German name, **Lemberg**, were used because such spellings were on the maps.



Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, was also present at the meeting. He presented the resolution of the Commission of the Peace Conference for Polish Affairs of March 14, calling on the Supreme Council to approach the Ukrainian government in the matter of truce, through the offices of the Inter-Allied Mission in Warsaw.\*) For the proposal to be successful, the truce terms should take into consideration the existing situation and especially the present possession of the petroleum fields. Pichon was convinced that the Ukrainians would agree to a truce if they were given these fields. This proposal was conveyed to General Barthelemy and Carton de Wiart, and it was accepted by all experts with the exception of Marshal Foch.

From Pichon's declaration it was apparent that the experts accepted seriously the views of the Inter-Allied Commission in Warsaw in regard to Lviv's importance for the Poles. Since the fall of the city meant the collapse of the Polish government in Warsaw and, obviously, the Poles were unable to defend Lviv by themselves, the offering of more favorable terms for the Ukrainian side was in order.

Foch also did not believe in the Polish might and therefore pressed for the immediate involvement of the Rumanians and the army of Haller. Jule Cambon, the head of the Commission for Polish Affairs and a member of the French diplomatic staff, was also present at the meeting to explain, in detail, the Commission's decision:

The Commission in Poland recently visited Petlyura and he (Gen. Barthelemy) was received somewhat badly.\*\*\*) As a result, the conclusion was made that the Ukrainians will not be satisfied with the proposal of armistice unless they are given some benefits, such as the temporary possession of the petroleum fields. To make the acceptance of armistice more certain, it would be necessary for Poland to make some sort of a show of force. For that reason, in his opinion, Poland should be given the needed aid, that is the return of the Polish troops which now are in France (i. e. Haller's army).

The speech makes it obvious that Cambon was a more able diplomat than Foch. He spoke of the necessity for armistice and even

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\*) Commission for Polish Affairs was created by Supreme Council. It consisted of representatives—specialists of the Great Powers but not of Poland.

\*\*) The meeting occurred in Khodoriv. The reference to a "hostile reception" is based on an obvious misinformation, sent by General Barthelemy to his government.

of concessions to the Ukrainians, even if they were "temporary." In essence, however, he supported Foch since he also suggested the transport of Haller's troops to Poland in order to obtain the armistice "by show of force." Cambon must have made the right impression since the rest of the meeting dealt with the technical matter concerning the transportation of Haller's army to Poland.

Lloyd George pointed out the difficulties in obtaining free shipping space since it involved the British fleet. Wilson proposed that the matter of sea transport be turned over to the Navigation Commission and Clemenceau expressed his agreement with the proposals of the Commission for Polish Affairs.

Foch did not want to leave his efforts in Poland's behalf without definite gains. He asked for an authorization from the Supreme Council to study the matter of transportation of the Polish troops from Odessa and the French and Rumanian troops from Rumania. Lloyd George agreed to such a study but expressed his objections for these troops to be sent to Lviv. To him it was inconceivable to grant Foch permission to plan an attack on the Ukrainians at Lviv while General Louis Franchet d'Esperey received instructions to do everything possible to help the Ukrainians against the Bolsheviks.\*)

During the discussion, President Wilson was silent. After his arrival from Washington, he was once more getting involved in the atmosphere of the trickery of French diplomacy. The long speeches of the French diplomats and specialists bored and upset him; it was his opinion that "the French will talk us to death." At the end of the discussion, he did agree with Lloyd George concerning the plans to attack Lviv. This feeling was also shared by the Italian representative, Orlando.

Although the Supreme Council formally rejected the use of Haller's army and the Rumanian troops against the W.A.U.N.R., Foch and his staff did not drop the plan. It would be carried out even if it was against the wishes of the Supreme Council.

At the conclusion of the session, it was decided to study the question of transport for Haller and his army but it was to be used only against the Reds and in no case against the Ukrainians. In addition, it was determined to call upon the Inter-Allied Commission in Warsaw to bring about a truce as proposed by the Commission for Polish Affairs.<sup>226</sup>)

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\*) The instructions to help the Ukrainians were never carried out by General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, the Commander of Allied troops in Orient.

## Supreme Council discusses how to save Lviv for Poland

At that time, the Supreme Council considered the problem of Eastern Galicia to be a pressing one. At the meeting of March 19, attended by all heads of states and their foreign ministers, one point of the agenda dealt with this matter. It was presented by Cambon. His Commission, stated Cambon, had prepared two documents; one was a letter to be sent to the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian forces in Galicia. Cambon added that his Commission had interviewed Professor Lord who was of the opinion that the Mission in Warsaw was not capable of arranging an armistice between the Ukrainians and the Poles. He suggested that the Mission in Warsaw be instructed to work for a truce while the question of an armistice should be settled in Paris, under the direct authority of the Supreme Council and with the direct participation of the representatives of the two concerned states. Then Cambon invited Lord to explain his views before the assembly.

Taking the floor, Professor Lord emphasized that the views he wanted to express were his own and not necessarily those of the American Delegation. Since his return to Paris, he was convinced that a forceful action, a military action, as recommended by the Mission in Warsaw, could not take place and it was necessary to look for a diplomatic solution of the conflict. He proposed that the Peace Conference invite the two sides to arrange a cessation of hostilities. The second point of his proposal called for the cessation of hostilities to be affected through a truce, based on the existing military *status quo* but with the condition that Lviv and the railroad line between Lviv and Peremyshl be given to Poland. If the two sides agreed to an immediate truce, then their representatives should be invited to Paris to discuss the terms of armistice with an Inter-Allied Commission, formed for that purpose. The armistice was to last until the Peace Conference settled all of the territorial matters pertaining to Eastern Galicia. The armistice agreement, prepared by the Inter-Allied Commission in co-operation with the representatives of the two belligerent nations, was to be submitted to the Conference; if approved, it would be handed down to the two sides as a mediatory proposal of the Conference.

Lord considered it necessary to stress that his recommendation was based on the conviction that Lviv was very seriously threatened by the Ukrainians. Its fall would lead to serious repercussion in Poland. A peaceful settlement could be achieved only by the Peace Conference since the efforts of the Commission in Warsaw were fruitless. And even if the Commission did exert new efforts, by that time Lviv would fall into Ukrainians hands. By com-

plying with his proposal, the loss of Lviv could be prevented. The project would be acceptable to the Ukrainians, he assumed, because until now, they were unable to present their case before the Peace Conference, something they very much desired. Since there was a general consensus that the fall of Lviv would bring down Paderewski's government, Lord suggested that Haller's army be dispatched to Poland. Appropriate telegrams, signed by the Supreme Council, should be sent to the involved parties.

It is very interesting to note that Professor Lord, after the failure of the Commission in Warsaw, suggests that the Ukrainians should also have an opportunity to state their case before the Peace Conference. Even at best, his proposal appears to be a tactical maneuver rather than a sincere intent. His discussion of Lviv and the consequences its fall might have on the government of Paderewski was intended to impress Wilson and Clemenceau, since they had high regards for Paderewski and preferred to retain a conservative government in Poland rather than a socialist one. When Lloyd George asked for the Lviv's population composition, Lord gave the Ukrainians 10-12%, the Poles received 50% and the rest were Jews. Lord also considered the city to be Polish because it was defending itself for four months in a bitter house to house fighting. In reality, Lord quoted statistics which were purported to be Austrian official statistics but in reality falsified Polish ones. At that time, the population of Lviv was 20% Ukrainian, and 40% Jewish and Polish alike. Even Secretary Lansing had to remark that Lviv was a Polish island in the midst of a Ukrainian sea. Lord was forced to concede the point.

President Wilson suggested that it would be more practical to settle the matter by having the respective delegations notify their governments to cease hostilities. The side ignoring the order should not be heard at the Conference. Although Lord agreed with the practicality of the suggestion, he still urged for the acceptance of his proposal.

When Balfour of Great Britain raised the question that perhaps with the truce the Conference should also examine all of the boundaries between Ukraine and Poland, Lord was decidedly against this because a truce was the immediate urgency for Eastern Galicia. Lansing suggested that the truce should be made on the basis of existing front line. Again Lord objected to this proposal. He wanted the Ukrainian troops away from the vicinity of Lviv lest they "rob the city." And he thought it was necessary to re-establish the railroad line between Lviv and Peremyshl, obviously to be held by Poland.

After Lord's explanations Clemenceau, as the chairman of the meeting, asked for Foch's comments on Lord's suggestions. Foch

commented that if the Ukrainians did not accept the conditions of the Peace Conference, it would compromise the Supreme Council before the entire world. He asked the meeting what was the relationship between the Supreme Council and the Ukrainians: "Are they our friends or enemies?"

The point was well taken since the Big Four never did consider the question of how to deal with the second largest nation in Eastern Europe:—Ukraine. No one answered to Foch's question. However, the British Foreign Minister, Balfour, allowed himself a note of sarcasm concerning the French policy in regard to Ukraine in general and toward Eastern Galicia in particular. While sharing Foch's doubts, he asked Foch another question: Could Foch explain how the Ukrainians, whose country was said to be completely occupied by the Bolsheviks, form an army to invade Poland? Foch could not find an explanation for this "phenomenon." After some thought he added that perhaps the Ukrainians have some sort of understanding with the Bolsheviks.

The answer did not flatter the character of the Supreme Commander of the Allied armies. It would have been sufficient to examine the dispatches of foreign reporters concerning the attacks of the Bolsheviks and the counterattacks of the Active Army of the U.N.R. Under these circumstances it is difficult to imagine the existence of any agreement between the Ukrainians and the Bolsheviks. He should have been informed of the talks between the staff of General Phillippe d'Anselme, Foch's subordinate, and the government of the Ukrainian National Republic in Odessa.

It is more probable that Foch was well aware of the situation in Ukraine. His obvious misrepresentations of facts before the heads of states was based on the desire to support, at all costs, the imperialistic policy of Poland, a move which, supposedly, was in the interest of France.

At this point Lloyd George took the floor. Until now, he said, the Conference had heard only from the Poles. According to the information available, most of Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian. The principles of the Great Powers should also apply to them if no cause to do otherwise existed. It should be assumed, he stated, that the troops advancing on Lviv were from the immediate area and were fighting for their independence. If the Allies were supporting the Ukrainians in the South, why shouldn't they support them in the North?\*) The report of the Commission for Polish Affairs showed that the Poles were capable of demanding more than they were en-

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\*) Once again Lloyd George mentions some sort of Allied resolution which instructed the Allied command in Odessa to help the Ukrainians.

titled by right. They did this in regard to the borders with Germany and Russia and it was possible that they were doing the same in that area. Lloyd George suggested that the Conference be impartial, pointing out that Polish interest in that area was in the petroleum fields.

Balfour supported Lloyd George. He criticized the Commission for Polish Affairs for not investigating the eastern and southern boundaries of Poland, a step which would have helped to decide the status of Lithuania and Ukraine. In his opinion the Commission should look into this matter immediately and when the question of Lviv and the petroleum fields would come before the Conference, it would have an impartial information to base its decision.

Cambon tried to defend the role of his Commission, pointing out that he asked the Conference whether his organization had the authority to interview the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians. The Conference was convinced that its permission was necessary but at that time it did not know with whom it was dealing.

As it often happened at the meeting of the Supreme Council, the discussion proved to be desultory since no decision was taken concerning the discussed matters. On Wilson's suggestion, Cambon was authorized to prepare the telegram to the warring sides, with the stipulation that the side rejecting the truce proposal, would not be heard at the Peace Conference. Lloyd George and later Clemenceau agreed to this without reservations. Sonnino, the Italian representative, looked favorably on the Polish pretensions to Lviv.<sup>227</sup>)

In regard to the army of Haller, the French obtained the Supreme Council's consent to send it to Poland but with a definite limitation: the army was to be used to maintain order in Poland and for the eventual struggle with the Bolsheviks. According to the minutes of the Supreme Council, at no time was it to be used against the Ukrainians.<sup>228</sup>) This condition was accepted by Foch, Paderewski, Pilsudski, and General Haller. It was Foch's responsibility to see that the conditions of this decision were carried out.

### **New truce efforts**

As the efforts to bring about truce were made in Eastern Galicia, the delegates of the Entente Powers to the Peace Conference in Paris were not as misinformed as it is generally accepted in their defense. The notes of the American Delegation show that this delegation possessed information which showed that the truce was being delayed by the Poles, who were now expecting the arrival of Haller's army. Notes of April 10 and 12, accused the Poles of breaking the truce resolution of the Supreme Council.

On April 19, the Americans noted again that the matter of truce had not progressed in the Polish camp. On April 23, General



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**General Jozef Haller**

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Bliss reported that a telegram was received from the Ukrainian representative in Switzerland, expressing fears of the Ukrainian government that the army of Haller will be used against Ukraine. The Americans decided to inform President Wilson of the telegram's content.<sup>229</sup>) It read as follows:

"The goal of the war which the Polish army began in the beginning of November 1918, is the conquest of Eastern Galicia in favor of historical "Greater Poland" even though this territory is actually Ukrainian. The army of Haller can serve this purpose in two ways: directly—to strengthen the anti-Ukrainian front in Eastern Galicia, indirectly—making it possible for the Polish command to send its regiments from Poznan area to the Galician front."<sup>230</sup>)

The telegram also explained that the pretext of the Polish struggle against the Bolsheviks was nothing but a maneuver since the Polish army had not engaged them but continued to fight only the Ukrainians. Because of this situation the Ukrainians must transfer their better formations from the Bolshevik to the Polish front. "The Ukrainian delegation," continued the telegram, "categorically protest against the aid which the Allies gave Poles in the form of Haller's army ahead of the general truce in Galicia."

In the meantime, Dr. V. Paneyko arrived in Paris and began to act for Western Ukraine among the delegations to the Peace

Conference, especially among the American and British representatives. The latter showed more sympathy toward Western Ukraine, as reflected by the personal secretary of the Prime Minister. The British attempted to arrange direct negotiations between Paneyko and August Zaleski, the Polish representative, who avoided such confrontation, claiming to have no authorization for such talks. On April 17, Paneyko met with General Bliss, who wanted to know whether the Ukrainians were sincere in wanting to end the war. Having received an affirmative answer, Bliss made his proposal in the name of the Allies: notify the Polish High Command that on a given date and a specific time the Ukrainian troops would cease all hostile operations, and demand that the Poles do likewise. Paneyko agreed to the proposal and asked if General Bliss could guarantee that the Poles would not use the respite to prepare for a future offensive. General Bliss agreed to do so and Paneyko sent the necessary message to Stanyslaviv.<sup>231)</sup>

The Supreme Council, having sent the truce and armistice proposals to the two sides, pursued the matter further. On April 12, it was decided to turn the matter of Ukrainian-Polish relations over to a commission, formed immediately, to hold talks between the Polish and Ukrainian representatives in Paris concerning armistice in Eastern Galicia. The new commission was to have one military and one civilian representative from the four Allied and Associated Powers interested in the matters of Galicia. The commission was to recommend such steps as it deemed necessary for the establishment of a cease fire while discussing the conditions of armistice.<sup>232)</sup>

On the same day, the Supreme Council decided to send a message to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, i.e. to Paderewski. It reviewed the efforts of the Peace Conference to arrange cease fire in Eastern Galicia and informed the Minister of the plan to form an armistice commission to discuss the matter. It suggested that the Polish delegates be selected from among the Polish representatives already present in Paris. The telegram also cautioned that the conditions for truce should not contain anything that may prejudice the planned armistice. The telegram was signed by the heads of the Big Four Powers.<sup>233)</sup>

On April 18, the armistice commission was finally selected. United States was represented by Bowman and from May 12, by Lord and Colonel S. D. Embick. General Louis Botha and Lt. Col. F. H. Kish represented Great Britain. France sent General Le Rond and Legrand, and Italy was represented by Bromoli and Pergolini. Later, the participation in the meetings of the Commission was extended to Captain Brebner from Great Britain and Dr. Englenburg, and Essofier from France, who also acted as the secretary of the commission, and P. Mayer, the translator. The commission was





**Captain Mykhaylo Matchak**

headed by General Botha from South Africa. On May 8, the commission appointed a subcommittee to work out the armistice project.\*) The commission held nine meetings on this matter and the subcommittee two. On April 29, May 6, 12, 13 it interviewed the Polish representatives, including Paderewski and Dmowski, and General Rozwadowski. The Ukrainian side was presented on April 30, May 8, 12, and 13.

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\*) The subcommittee consisted of Col. Embick, Col. Kish, Gen. Le Rond and Pergolini.

## CHAPTER 5

### POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

#### Change in the Government of Western Area U.N.R.

After the Ukrainians had decided to evacuate Lviv, the seat of the government was, at first, located in Ternopil and in December, 1918, because of the more convenient communications system, it moved to Stanislaviv. In December, Dr. Kost Levytsky left his post as the president of the State Secretariat and in his place came Dr. Sydir Holubovych, a lawyer and a leading member of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party. Although the reason for the change of prime ministers is not clear from the memoiristic literature, it was probably due to the intra-party fractionalism, one segment supporting Dr. Kost Levytsky while the other siding with Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych.

In the process of forming a new cabinet, the size of Secretariats was reduced. The moving spirit for this action was Dr. Ivan Makukh, representative of the Ukrainian Radical Party, who supported this idea even while the government was located in Lviv. His move was based on the fact that various organizations and commands had been formed, involving a good number of people who could be put to better use at the front.

A new plenary session of the parliament—the Ukrainian National Council—was called for January, 1919, to be held in Stanislaviv. The purpose of this meeting was to provide the country with the urgently needed basic laws which would complete the legal organization of the state. On January 3, the Council passed a resolution, with the power of a law, concerning the unification of the two Ukrainian states. On January 4, the law pertaining to the Executive of the Council was passed. Following the existing tendencies of democracy, the Ukrainian National Council did not trust the concept of concentrated power in the hands of one individual, such as the head of state, i. e., in a republic, its president. It was decided to let the chief of state retain the basic representative functions.\*) The other duties usually delegated to him were turned over to the

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\*) Until a permanent constitution was approved, the president of the U.N.C. was also the head of state.

collegiate body, especially formed for that purpose, the Executive Committee of the U.N.C.<sup>234</sup>)

The following was this interesting law dealing with the Executive Committee:

1. The Ukrainian National Council selects from its members an Executive Committee of nine, headed by the tenth member, the President of the Council. In case of his disability, the oldest member will be his substitute.

2. The sphere of activity of the Executive Committee shall be:

- a) to nominate members of the government;
- b) accept or order their resignation;
- c) to exercise the right of amnesty and abolishment on recommendations of the Secretariat of Justice; in matters of military justice, the Executive Committee may transfer the authority to grant amnesty to the Council of State Secretaries;
- d) to nominate chiefs of civilian and military branches of state administration;
- e) certify and promulgate laws.

3. The Executive Committee is convened when necessary by the President of the Ukrainian National Council, and in case of his disability, this will be done by the oldest member, his substitute.

He represents the Executive Committee and signs its documents.

4. The Executive Committee is elected by the Ukrainian National Council for the duration of its term and its authority ceases with the election of a new Committee by the new Council.

5. The decisions of the Executive Committee are made by the majority of votes; in case of a tie, the decision is valid for which the President has cast his ballot. To make a decision legal, at least six members of the Board have to be present.

6. This law is in force with the moment of its approval.<sup>235</sup>)

A Presidium of the Council was elected on the basis of new law and the President of the U.N.C. was re-elected. The Executive Committee consisted of the President, Dr. Y. Petrushevykh, National Democratic Party; Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, Radical Party; Semen Vityk, a Social Democrat; Dr. Antin Horbachevskyy, a National

Democrat; Hryhoriy Duvirak, a Radical; Dr. Mykhaylo Novakivskyy, no party affiliation but sided with the Radicals; Dr. Teofil Okunevskyy, a National Democrat; Professor Omelyan Popovych, a National Democrat; Andriy Shmigelskyy, a Radical; and Rev. Dr. Stepan Bryk, a National Democrat.

The law dealing with the re-organizational statute of the Ukrainian National Council provided for the Presidium to conduct the business which consisted of the president, four vice-presidents, two secretaries, and one elected alternate secretary. Thus the president of the U.N.C., Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych, also became the president of the Presidium, Dr. L. Bachynskyy, S. Vityk, Prof. O. Popovych, and A. Shmigelskyy were elected to the vice-presidency. Dr. Stepan Vytvytskyy and Omelyan Siletskyy were elected secretaries and Osyp Ustymovych from the Social Democratic Party, became the alternate secretary.

On January 4, a law was passed dealing with the publication of laws and executive orders. All laws, approved by the Ukrainian National Council, and the executive orders of the State Secretariat, were to be published in "Vistnyk (Herald) of the State Laws and Executive Orders." The laws of the U.N.C. were to be signed by the President and one member of the Executive Committee. The executive orders had to have the signature of the State Secretary concerned.

In order for the U.N.C. to function as an independent legislative body and be able to express freely the will of the people, a law was passed granting immunity to the members of the Council.

After the Executive Committee had been established, Dr. S. Holubovych formally presented his resignation. It was accepted by the Executive Committee but it gave him the authority to form a new Council of the State Secretariat. The new Council of State Secretariat included S. Holubovych, National Democrat as its president; Dr. V. Paneyko, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the National Democratic Party; Dr. Lonhyn Tsehelskyy (also a National Democrat), was selected to be a Secretary without portfolio and the administrator of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Ivan Makukh, a Radical, became the Secretary of Internal Affairs; Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyy, from the Radical Party, was chosen to be the Secretary of Military Affairs; Osyp Burachynskyy, a National Democrat, became the Secretary of Justice; Dr. Agenor Artymovych, another National Democrat, became the Secretary of Education and Religious Affairs; Ivan Myron, a non-party professional, headed the Secretariat of Post and Telegraph; a National Democrat, Mykhaylo Martynets, became the Secretary of Agrarian Affairs; Maryan Kozanevych, the Secretary of Public Works, did not belong to a specific

party but did co-operate with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.<sup>236)</sup>

On February 13, Colonel Vitovskyy left his post to be replaced by Colonel Victor Kurmanovych who, at the same time, was also the Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Galician Army. For this reason, at the Council of State Secretaries, his place was taken by Major Petro Bubela, who was called "a deputy of the State Secretary," in Ukrainian the title was actually "a colleague of the Secretary." Dr. L. Tsehelskyy also gave up his post and was replaced by Dr. Mykhaylo Lozynskyy who, in addition, served as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. From March 10 on, Lozynskyy directed the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs because Paneyko was away at the Peace Conference. This was the composition of the Council of Ministers.

On February 15, the Ukrainian National Council passed a law concerning the official language to be used in the government and state enterprises:

1. The official language of the W.A.U.N.R. is the Ukrainian language.

2. This language is to be used in internal and external administration by all state authorities, agencies, public institutions and state enterprises.

3. The legally recognized national minorities have the right to use, orally and in writing, their native language in their official relations with the state administration and government, public institutions and state enterprises.\*)

4. This law takes effect on the day of its publication.<sup>237)</sup>

In a separate resolution passed by the Ukrainian National Council while still in Lviv, the political rights of the Polish minority were guaranteed by inviting them to participate, on percentage basis, in the National Council and the State Secretariat. Since the Poles took a negative position to the very existence of the Ukrainian state they did not accept the offer. The Jews, who received a similar proposal, did not accept because they feared Polish retaliation in case the Western Area of the Ukrainian National Republic lost the war with Poland. But after the November pogrom of Jews, which was carried out by the Polish mobs and even some troops, in Lviv, the young Jews organized a Jewish formation in the ranks of the Ukrainian Galician Army to oppose the Polish invasion. The

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\*) Germans, Jews, and Poles were the minorities recognized by law.

older Jewish professionalists changed their stand and joined the administrative service.

The law of February 15, clearly provided for the use of native language by the national minorities at all levels of the government. A law, passed on February 13, dealt with the education, providing the minorities with the right to public education in their native language.

In another session of the U.N.C., extending from March 25 until April 15, several important matters were dealt with. One of them was the question of *soym* (parliament) and the elections.\*) Finally an agreement was reached by all factions of the Ukrainian National Council in regard to the content and the law was accepted unanimously at the plenary meeting of the Council. The commission also invited the Jewish and Polish representatives in order to assure the protection of the national rights of these minorities. The Jewish representatives accepted the invitation and participated in the work while the Poles again boycotted the efforts of the Ukrainian government.

The law of April 14, established the parliament to be a unicameral legislative body. Its representatives were to be elected on the basis of a general and direct, equal and secret and proportional voting right. Thus the Ukrainian National Council firmly followed the principles of democracy, rejecting every concept of limited participation of electorate, as practiced in many countries.\*\*\*) Everyone who was 20 years of age had the right to participate in elections. The right to run for office was limited to those who had reached the age of 28. The number of representatives to the parliament was established in a manner which allowed the national minorities a just number of deputies, with a guarantee that they would not lose to the Ukrainian majority. The parliamentary representation was set at 226 members.

From this total, 160 seats were to be elected by the Ukrainian electorate which formed 70.8% of all mandates; the Poles received 33 seats (14.6%), the Jews were given 27 (11.9%); and the Germans, 6 (2%). For each minority separate districts were created where the right to elect was in the hands of the given minority. In this fashion the law finally eliminated national conflicts stemming from the elections. In each election district of every nationality, several seats were available as to permit competition among the existing political parties and to prevent one party, with a slight majority, to gain all the mandates. The seats in parliament were

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\*) Since this matter required extensive study and hard work, a special commission of U.N.C. was established to deal with this question.

\*\*) Women were also given the right to vote.



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**Dr. Lev Bachynskyy**

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apportioned to specific parties in proportion to the obtained votes.

The law set the election time for June 1919, and the parliament was to be convened by the president of the Ukrainian National Council immediately following the election. At that time, the authority exercised by the Council was to be transferred to the parliament (*soym*). But the Polish offensive, which began in May, prevented the planned elections and the governmental authority remained in the hands of the Council.<sup>238</sup>)

On April 8, the Council passed the citizenship law. According to its provisions, each person had the right to belong to one of the communities of W.A.U.N.R. and, by the very essence of the law, became a citizen of the Republic. Each adult person had the right, for himself and his dependents, to notify the government if he chose not to accept the citizenship. Then the individual became an alien and had the right to leave the territory of Western Ukraine. This provision was included for the benefit of Poles, giving them an opportunity to leave, if they desired, so that they could reside on

Polish territory. In case an alien chose to remain, he had the protection and care of the law.

In view of the unification agreement between the two parts of Ukraine, the law, in 2, stated: Persons who, on the basis of laws issued by the Ukrainian Central Council, are citizens of the entire Ukrainian National Republic will execute the citizen's rights and duties in the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic on the equal basis with all citizens whenever one of the communities in that Area will accept them according to the laws of that Area concerning the admittance to the community.

### **The land reform of Western Area U.N.R.**

The most extensive efforts of the Ukrainian National Council dealt with the question of land reforms. The project was worked on by all of the political parties and a special commission of U.N.C. The work on the project began in January and on April 14, 1919, it was signed into law. The text of the law is as follows:

§ 1. The Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic wishes to provide land for all of the agriculturalists, peasants, who do not have any land at all or whose possession is insufficient for the existence of their family, and also to conduct their own enterprise in the forests located on the territory of the entire state.

§ 2. For this purpose ownership is deprived regardless whether their owners are physical or corporate;

a) From all properties which are excluded from the community unity and form, according to the law of August 12, 1866, Herald of Regional Laws № 20, estate lands to which the rural lands are included.\*)

b) All possessions of a dead hand, that is those lands belonging to foundations, monasteries, episcopal, church and (parochial) erection.

c) Lands which the present owners have obtained for the purpose of speculation.

d) From all properties which the owners or the occupiers do not cultivate them with their own forces, even though they (the properties) do not fall under condition "a".

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\*) This point of law deals with the big estates of aristocrats.



e) From all possessions which in their dimensions overstep the designated limits if they do not fall into above listed categories.

The properties quoted in "a, b, c" are appropriated in the entirety and the extent of appropriation of properties under "e" will be determined by a separate law.

The extent of appropriation under "d" will be decided by District Land Commission after hearing the Local Commission concerned.

§ 3. The District Land Commission may retain tracts of land, sufficiently large to fulfill the tasks of general economy for the state in the following areas: for communities; for useful economic, cultural, and charitable institutions; for the formation of model estates; for agricultural schools; for commercial, educational, benevolent, and, in general, useful institutions.

§ 4. The properties subject to expropriation in § 2 are to be arrogated without regard for their culture, together with their forests, waters and their natural resources.

§ 5. The expropriation of the landed property described in § 2 of this law does not interfere with the hypothetical mortgages and other obligations secured on the expropriated land but the interest from the monetary hypothetical mortgages are to be lowered to the interest rate which, from August 1, 1918, were paid on the savings.

A special law will decide the means and rate of payment of these obligations.

§ 6. The lease contracts, concluded without the permission of the government after November 1, 1918, are void.

The older leases will be dissolved on the day of expropriation.

In both cases, the claims of the lessee for planting, meliorations, and other land improvements form obligations of the estate in context of § 5 of this law and the manner of their settlement will be decided by a special law.

All other claims, with the exception of claims for damages for the lost planting, the lessee retains against the present owner.

§ 7. All expropriated land, as long as it does not, on the basis of this law, become a state property,

will form the Land Fund of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic, which, until the time of division among the needy, is administered by the Area, District and Community Land Commissions according to the regulation of this law.

§ 8. The Area Land Commission consists of 9 members, 5 of them elected by the Ukrainian National Council and 4 members elected by the Representatives of the District Land Commissions.

The head of the Area Land Commission is elected by the members of the Commission from among themselves.

The Secretary of Agrarian Affairs or his representative has the right and the duty to participate in the meetings of the Area Land Commission and should the decisions of the Commission be contrary to the law, he has the right to veto the decisions of the Commission. In such case the head of the Commission has the right to appeal to the Ukrainian National Council.

§ 9. The District Land Commissions consist of:

a) Six (6) members and three (3) alternates, elected by the representatives of all Community Land Commissions, one from every Commission;

b) Three (3) members appointed by the Government of Western Area from among agricultural, technical, and legal circles.

§ 10. The Community Land Commission consists of seven (7) members and three (3) alternates. Six (6) members and three (3) alternates are elected by all members of the given community by a general, equal, direct, and secret ballot, and the seventh member is the chief of the Community. The members of the Commission elect from among themselves the head and his substitute.

§ 11. The Area and District Land Commissions are in office for the term of three years while the Community Land Commission serves one year.

Further details concerning the formation, rights, and activity of the Land Commissions will be determined by a regulation of the entire State Secretariat of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic.

§ 12. From the Area Land Fund, awards will be made to the Ukrainian citizens of Western

Area of Ukrainian National Republic who are landless and who have small landholdings and who were agriculturalists before this law was made public; this will be done in the following order:

Soldiers-invalids who have lost their health in wars conducted by the Ukrainian National Republic;

Widows and orphans of those who had fallen in these wars or who died as a result of them;

Soldiers-invalids of World War, conducted from 1914-1918;

Widows and orphans, whose parents or husbands had lost their lives in this war or as a result of it;

Orphans and widows not connected with war;

Other landless or with small holdings agriculturalists who did not serve in the army and who did not become invalids;

Finally, proper expropriated land tracts are designated, according to the need, for general community economy, as specified in § 3.

Persons punished for desertion from the Ukrainian Army or for avoidance of service in this Army, and then persons punished for crimes committed against the Ukrainian state and its Armed Forces and also the persons who became accomplices to these crimes or were responsible for these crimes and for this were punished, and finally the citizens of foreign countries do not have the right to receive the expropriated land.

§ 13. Grazing lands and mountain pastures (*Polonyny*), if they on the basis of § 2 of this law do not remain with private owners, as well as the expropriated land tract, designated by the Land Commissions for pastures, become the property of communities or a joint ownership of neighboring communities, which, in their use, have to consider partnership of small cattle growers.

§ 14. Confiscated forests are not subject to grants. They become the property and immediate concern of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic. An executive directive of the State Secretariat of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic will determine the means of utilization, need and scope of all other services for the benefit of the

population in the expropriated forests and in forests already belonging to the state.

Expropriated forests which did not form and do not form the complex which can be used for rational or protective forest economy, can be left by the Land Commissions in the hands of private owners.

§ 15. The Land Commissions can retain an appropriate tract of confiscated properties for forestry and to turn it over as a property of the state, subject to its administration, especially in cases where there are no forests or where very few of them do exist. For this purpose it is necessary to use unusable areas, inclines, ravines, and the shores of the rivers which can be thus used and also those belonging to the communities—the latter with proper compensation.

§ 16. From the confiscated properties the following transfers are made:

a) Streams and unnavigable rivers to the communities through which they flow;

b) Ponds, lakes, and swamps to the communities where they are located or to joint ownership of several communities with which they border.

§ 17. The regulations concerning the method and the time of division of expropriated land (§ 12 and § 13), concerning the amount of land distribution in every district or *volost*\*) of the country, concerning the price and the means of payment, concerning the taking over and exploitation of natural resources by the state, and finally concerning the limitations of freedom of disposition with documents of properties of private owners between those alive and in case of death, is subject of a special law or laws.

§ 18. The division of land cannot take place before the end of war and before the return of soldiers and warprisoners to their homes.

§ 19. The question of compensation of the present owners or possessors of the confiscated land will be decided by the legislative body of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic, which will be elected on the basis of the new election law.

§ 20. Regardless of the fact that the question of compensation of the present owners or possessors

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\*) *Volost*—community composed of several villages.

of confiscated land (§ 19) is yet to be settled, the confiscated land is now being transferred under the control of the State and it shall transfer this control, though its organs, to the Community Land Commissions.

Until the time of issuance of the foreseen laws (in § 17) and until the question of land division is decided, the Land Commissions can, with the approval of State Secretariat of the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic, permit the present owner or lessee to use such tract of confiscated land that is necessary for the maintenance of the owner, his family and servants and for the conduct of commercial enterprises, which exist on the confiscated property.

In transferring the confiscated land to the state control, it is necessary to establish the exact state of its condition and its inventory.

§ 21. Unauthorized seizure, division of lands, confiscated on the basis of this law, destruction of forests, buildings, inventory, and crops, as long as they are not subject to criminal law, are to be punished by the administrative authorities with a confinement up to 6 months, and a fine of 10,000 crowns may be added to it.

In addition the right to receive land may be deprived.

§ 22. This law is in force on the day of its publication.

§ 23. The execution of this law is delegated to the entire State Secretariat of Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic.<sup>239)</sup>

The land question was settled in a completely different manner than was done by the Directorate of the U.N.R., by the law of January, 1919. The differences occurred because the agrarian conditions in Western Ukraine were distinctive from those in Eastern Ukraine, and because the Directorate's law left some areas unclear and would have led to confusion if applied in Western Ukraine. The promulgation of the land reform by the Ukrainian National Council evoked sharp criticism from some of the Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary Parties, especially from the Socialist Revolutionaries. Mykyta Shapoval, the author of the Directorate's land reform, published the more critical attacks on the Council's land program.<sup>240)</sup>

Although both laws completely agreed in regard to land ownership, they diverged on the matter of compensation for the confiscated cultivated land. The Directorate did not compensate for the expropriated land nor did the peasant, receiving it, have to pay for it. The U.N.C. left the solution of this matter for the future parliament, *soym*.

The *soym* was to have established the price of the granted land; obviously arrangements for long term loans and low interest rates also had to be made. Indecisiveness of the Council was motivated by the desire to have a duly elected legislative body deal with the problem in more detail, presumably after the war. Under those circumstances, the parliament would have expressed the views of the people more clearly. It was the Council's hope that the war with Poland would be settled at the Peace Conference and the major issues facing the parliament would be of economic nature. Also the confiscation of land without compensation and the transfer of this land to the peasants could have been used by the Polish propaganda to show the Entente that Western Ukraine was transforming itself into a Bolshevik state. This consideration played an important role in the decision made by the majority of the Secretaries and Council members. Otherwise the problem of land reform, in all probability, would have been dealt with differently.

The declaration and the speeches of the Council members should be examined from this position also. Only then it is possible to see the feeling of responsibility for the fate of the nation and the absence of consideration of party popularity in the internal inter-party struggle. From the available information concerning the behind-the-scene meetings of the Peace Conference, it can be shown that the steps taken by the authors of the land reform were correct.\*) The motives which guided the leadership were well understood by the peasantry, indicating a political maturity on their part: the peasants did not succumb to the demagogues of the left who sought to instigate a movement for an immediate take over and division of land, as had occurred in Russia. The village understood the motives and accepted the law with the complete confidence in its strength, to be demonstrated at the time of the parliamentary elections.

The remaining provisions of the land reforms were well thought out and the entire land reform was to be carried out lawfully. The administration of the land affairs was to be in the hands of peasant self-government, clearly defined to be democratic. In the

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\*) The draft of this law was made by the vice-president, Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Radical Party and the most outstanding speaker of the parliament.



**A peasant dwelling in a village in Galicia  
ruined by the World War I**

election to the Community Land Commission every citizen participated rather just a select group. Higher land administrative bodies were based on the Community Land Committees, elected in this manner; the final word in settling the disputes was to be with the representatives of the people in *soym*, also elected in general elections.

The question of payment for the distributed land was, for the authors of the land reform, an important matter. The administration of such reforms entailed considerable cost: surveying, establishing and keeping of the new land books, as well as the administration of the commissions. This cost, in all fairness, should have been borne by those receiving the land. The amount of the payment was not set; delaying the question until the end of war since the most important group of people to be granted land were at the front and were unable to attend to the matter on the spot,—was fully justified.

The Ukrainian National Council also approved a law establishing an eight hour work day and set May 1 as a state holiday, honoring labor.

### **The question of economic reconstruction of the country**

The question of socialization and nationalization in the field of industry could pertain only to the underground resources: petroleum, natural gas, coal, salt, etc. The industrial production was limited to distilleries, brick, cement, and wood industry.<sup>241</sup>) All other production was either of the artisan type or limited to a very small scale production and, therefore, would not be the subject of socializa-

tion. In addition to the natural wealth, the state could have considered the establishment of new state-run industries, such as leather and leather goods, textiles, and others.

The economic reconstruction was of utmost importance to the new state because World War I had destroyed strips of villages and small towns. The evacuated population, having survived the war, returned in 1918 to live in bunkers.\*) In addition to the shortage of building material, there was not enough grain for planting. Thus it surprised no one that in the spring of 1919, starvation threatened some parts of the country.

### **Civil administration of Western Area of U.N.R.**

The organization of the state administration was conducted in most difficult circumstances in comparison to other, newly established states. At a time when Poland had already an administrative apparatus in some of her territories (Western Galicia, Silesia, and Congress Poland), the pre-war administration on Ukrainian territory consisted of foreigners, the Poles.

Western Ukraine had to form its state apparatus from scratch. The matter was further complicated by the fact that in the Eastern Galician administration during the Austrian regime, not a single district chief or his immediate subordinate was a Ukrainian and, as a rule, even the lower administrative posts were held by a very small number of Ukrainians. Not only was it necessary to establish a new administration but it had to be formed with people without any experience in this sphere. Nevertheless, the state and autonomous administration was quickly formed and, generally, with competent and responsible people.

The State Secretariat of Internal Affairs, the highest institution of state administration, was headed by the Secretary of Internal Affairs. The staff of this ministry was quite modest, consisting of about ten officials and about the same number of clerks.<sup>242</sup>) Secretary Dr. Ivan Makukh held that the civil apparatus should be staffed only by the most necessary people and everyone had to do the work of three. The rest of the intelligentsia should be utilized in the armed forces, where the need for officers was more pressing. This view led to clashes with other ministries, especially with the Secretariat of Military Affairs, which had a more elaborate and numerical personnel. For its activity the State Secretariat of In-

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\*) Over 500,000 dwellings were destroyed or seriously damaged, almost a third of all dwellings. Stanislaw Rubicki, the Polish economist, calculated the loss to the Galician economy to be 900,000,000 Austrian gold crowns. This was a very large loss for such a small country to sustain.



ternal Affairs was responsible to the Ukrainian National Council. The internal policy was conducted with the help of a state administrative unit in every district and, on the lowest level, by the community head. The division of the country into districts was the same that had existed during the Austrian rule. This was the division to which the population was accustomed and it was pointless to make changes in time of war.

The District Commissioner, who headed the district administration, was initially nominated by the District National Council, which consisted of representatives of all important district organizations and representatives of the communities. From 1919, the Commissioner was nominated and removed from office by the Secretary of Internal Affairs. However, the District National Council remained the supervising agency of the Commissioner's activity as well as the advisory body and the forum of public opinion.<sup>243</sup>) In this fashion the state administration was made up of three levels: the State Secretariat, the District Commissioner and the Community head who brought the administration closer to the people.

## Internal affairs of the country

The internal security of the state and public order were in the hands of state gendarmerie. The formation of this body was also difficult since during the Austrian regime it was in the hands of Poles and Germans; only enlisted men and a few non-commissioned officers were Ukrainians. At first the order and security was maintained by the Community Militia, armed with weapons taken from the Austrian gendarmerie posts. With the collaboration of the Supreme Command of the Army, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv decided to establish the Ukrainian State Gendarmerie Corps, subordinated to the Secretary of Military Affairs. In addition to the former members of the Austrian service, the Corps recruited and trained new members.\*) With a law of February 15, 1919, the Council changed the Austrian regulations concerning the gendarmerie which were still in effect and the entire police force was subordinated to the Secretary of Internal Affairs.

In addition, the Inspectorate of the State Gendarmerie was established and the Inspector headed a special section in the State Secretariat of Internal Affairs. In the spring of 1919, the numerical strength of this formation consisted of six staff officers, twenty-five

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\*) The Austrian gendarmerie was not a political police as in Russia but performed general law enforcement functions.

company and platoon officers, 1,000 active members, 4,000 probational members, and about 3,000 militia men. This small force was responsible for law and order of the country.<sup>244</sup>)

## **The local self-government**

The independent administration was to be found on one level only—the local community. During the Austrian rule, the community self-government was limited by the voting rights of the community members. The property of a given individual was the determining factor for his participation in the government. The property qualification divided the electorate into groups in such a fashion as to give the wealthiest group the control of the community. It was much easier for the Austro-Polish administration to execute a pressure on smaller groups.

From the start, the Western Ukrainian government had to take drastic steps to stop the functioning of community councils elected in that manner and remove from office the chiefs of the communities elected by such councils. The District Commissioner established the Community Commissioners and the Advisory Councils. In January and February 1919, instructed by the State Secretary of Internal Affairs, the District Commissioners began to conduct elections to the Community Councils. The former electoral circles (“curia”) were voided and the right to vote was given to all citizens who reached the age of 20. The sphere of authority remained the same as previously. The head of the community acted with complete independence in matters pertaining to the community, but his actions were controlled by the Community Council.

The community chiefs were also the representatives of the state administration in the spheres prescribed by law. In this sphere of administration, they were subject to directives and controls of the State District Commissioners.

The district self-government was not put to practice because there was no time to develop it. The role of the former District Councils was taken over by the District National Councils. Their scope of activity differed from district to district. The District National Council was an intermediary between the state and the autonomous administration.

The complete organization of the state system in Western Ukraine was accomplished at the last session of the U.N.C. in the middle of April, 1919.

The state was provided with a temporary constitution, the national minorities were given realistic guarantees, and the society

was offered functional legislation.\*) Poland, during the offensive against Western Ukraine, approved a resolution calling for autonomy for Eastern Galicia. However, the resolution was only a promise to enact such a law. This promise was never fulfilled by the Poles even when the Great Powers had accepted the boundaries of the Riga Peace Treaty, based on similar obligation.

It should be also pointed out that no other new state had approved a constitution before the Western Area of Ukrainian National Republic. The Czecho-Slovakian constitution dates from February 29, 1920, and the Polish constitution was adopted in March, 1921. Thus Western Ukraine was the first new state to establish a legal organization of its governmental system.

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\*) No other state provided such guarantees for their more numerous minorities, including Czecho-Slovakia for the Slovaks, Germans, and Hungarians; Poland for the Germans and the Jews.



## CHAPTER 6

### POLITICAL LIFE IN WESTERN UKRAINE

At the time of unification of Western Ukraine with U.N.R. and afterwards, the political activity remained, in general, in the hands of the same political parties that were active during the Austrian regime: The Ukrainian Radical Party—the oldest party (1890); The Ukrainian National Democratic Party—second to be formed (1896); The Ukrainian Christian Social Party (1896); and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (1899).\*) Three of them, the U.R.P., U.N.D.P., and U.S.D.P., had their representatives in the Austrian State Council; these representatives had been chosen in general elections.

As previously mentioned, the Ukrainian National Council was formed from deputies to the Austrian parliament (“State Council”) and to the *soyms* of Galicia and Bukovina. The deputies to the “State Council” were elected in a general election in 1911, and to the *soym* in “curial” elections.

In the Austrian Parliament there had been 29 Ukrainian deputies and three members of the House of Lords (Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, Prof. Olexander Barvinsky and Prof. Horbachevsky). Besides these, there were 26 Ukrainian deputies to the *soyms* of Galicia and Bukovina. In the “State Council” elections of 1911, the three Ukrainian parties reached in Galicia the following percentages of the total Ukrainian mandates:

U.S.D.P. — 4%

U.N.D.P. — 68%

U.R.P. — 28%

U.S.C.P. no mandate because they had no candidates.

Of the two lay-Lords, Barvinsky was a U.S.C.P and Horabcksky — U.N.D.P.<sup>245</sup>)

These parties formed the spine of the Ukrainian National Council and in this fashion the Council represented the general electorate. According to the strength shown in the elections to the

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\*) The names of the political parties will be used, for the most part in their abbreviated form: U.R.P., U.N.D.P., U.S.C.P., and U.S.D.P.

Austrian State Council, the National Democrats were in the majority in the U.N.C. The Radicals held the second place, the Social Democrats — the third, and the Christian Social Party was the smallest in its representation.\*)

The first State Secretariat included all of the political parties. After the resignation of Dr. Kost Levytsky and the formation of the new State Secretariat, only two of the larger parties were represented in the government—the State Secretariat. The Social Democrats refused to participate in the new government and the Christian Socialists could not provide a qualified candidate in Stanyslaviv. The opposition of the Social Democrats gradually grew in intensity but they did not offer a clear and constructive domestic or foreign policy which would have been basically different from the program of the coalition. The opposition of the Social Democrats to the government was, for the most part, in terms of leftist common place slogans.\*\*)

The matter of defense of the state and the problems connected with the organization of administration prevented the party leaders, party congresses, district and local meetings, or other party functions. Only after the more important matters of the state had been dealt with, was their attention turned to party congress and party program.<sup>246</sup>)

Dr. Kyrylo Trylovskyy, a leading member of U.R.P., using the pretext that the party did not convene a congress immediately, organized his own "Peasant-Radical Party". He managed to attract to his party a number of party leaders from Hutsulshchyna and H. Duvirak and P. Shekeryk from the Ukrainian National Council. The meeting of the splinter party was held in Kolomyia on February 16, 1919. Formally this was to be a meeting of the entire U.R.P. but the Congress decided to adopt the new name. Obviously

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\*) The U.C.S.P., with the exception of the bishops, had one representative in the House of Lords, Professor Olexander Barvinskyy. One bishop, Most Rev. Hryhoriy Khomyshyn took part in the meetings of the U.N.C. in Stanyslaviv while the other two bishops were under Polish occupation.

\*\*) In one of his speeches at the Ukrainian National Council, the leader of the Social Democrats, Osep Bezpalko, urged, "We must follow the path to the left and once more to the left!" Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, the leader of the Radicals, interrupted him with: "Easy, friend, or the wagon will turn over."

The Social Democrats were also suffering from leadership problems. When the Ukrainian troops withdrew from Lviv, the entire central leadership of the S.D.'s was left accidentally behind to suffer Polish occupation, including Dr. Lev Hankevych, Antin Chernetskyy, Dr. Volodymyr Starosolskyy, Mykola Hankevych, Profir Bunyak, and Ivan Kvasnytsya. The ones who charted the course for the S.D.'s in the W.A. U.N.R. were Semen Vityk, Osep Bezpalko, and Volodymyr Temnytskyy.

Trylovskyy was elected the leader of the party but no new program was adopted; only directives for the immediate future were accepted. Since Trylovskyy did not have the authority to convene such a meeting, his membership in the Radical Party was terminated.\*)

The central leadership of the Radical Party, at that time, headed by Dr. Mykola Lahodynskyy, called for the regular Congress of the party, to be held in Stanyslaviv March 22-23. The Congress approved a program which included the demand to confiscate land of big landowners and to divide it among the peasants with small holdings and those without any land. First consideration had to be given to those who took active part in the war.\*\*)

The Congress also passed a resolution concerning the economic life of the state:

"In the economic sphere in the Ukrainian National Republic there has to be a planned and systematically prepared socialization of all branches of national economy ready for this process as well as of large industry, commerce, banks, and insurance companies; the influence of workers and service people on administration of these enterprises has to be assured as well as participation in profits of the business. In the question of labor the U.R.P. demands the establishment of an 8 hour work day, broad legislation to provide protection for the worker and social security for the worker in case of disability and old age."<sup>247</sup>)

On February 20, the first number of "*Narod*" ("Nation") the daily newspaper of the Radicals, appeared in Stanyslaviv.\*) It was published by Mykola Balytskyi who was also the publisher of the prewar party newspaper in Lviv "*Hromadskyy Holos*" ("The Voice of the People"). The paper supported the democratic tendencies in Ukraine and sharply opposed all deviations in favor of any socialist system with the dictatorship of the proletariat or a system of a limited form of democracy, such as the "workers' democracy."<sup>248</sup>)

In the editorials, "*Narod*" stressed that the Congress of Working People of Ukraine in Kyiv did not correspond "to our

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\*) After the war Dr. Trylovsky was again accepted into the ranks of Ukrainian Radical Party.

\*\*) The preference for veterans was a sore point for M. Shapoval in his criticism of U.N.C.'s land reform. "Everything strives to force the peasantry to an active fight for the "National Democratic Party," the title which he gave the Ukrainian National Council.

\*) *Narod* had an impressive list of contributors, including Dr. L. Bachynskyy, I. Makukh, O. Nazaruk, K. Koberskyi, Rost. Zaklynskyi, Prof. Antin Krushelnyskyi, Mykola Yewshan, and Dr. Mykhaylo Novakivskyi.

democratic demands because it was not convened on the basis of general and equal elections."

On March 28-29, the Ukrainian National Democratic Party also held its meeting in Stanyslaviv. This party in the pre-Revolutionary period held to strict tenets of democracy but, nevertheless, did not give up its capitalistic orientation. During the revolutionary period, it altered considerably its views and program. The Congress changed the name of the party to the Ukrainian National Labor Party and also changed the essence of its economic program. Some of the main points of the new economic policy were:

1. To confiscate land from the large estates and land speculators and to turn it over to the landless and those with small holdings. The soldiers of the Ukrainian Army and their families must be given first consideration.

2. Through proper legislation, to establish the minimum and maximum of land holdings.

3. By means of nationalization and voluntary association, to transform the existing branches of industry and commerce, credit and realties for the benefit of the people; to secure for the worker a proper participation in the profits and protection from exploitation.<sup>249)</sup>

The party seemed to have adopted the minimum socialist program of the Radicals, without committing itself to the socialistic dogmas. It should be remembered that the party contained within its ranks socially active Ukrainian Catholic clergy, which was well represented at the Congress. Like the Radicals, the National Labor Party clung firmly to the democratic platform.

The Social Democratic Party during the existence of W.A. U.N.R. did not hold a party Congress but did meet for a Conference, immediately preceeding the Congress of Peasant-Labor Union, in which the leadership of the S.D.'s played an important role.\*) In the Ukrainian National Council, the S.D.'s were represented by seven members, including the three leaders of the party: Vityk, Bezpalko, and Ustymovych. At the Council, Vityk spoke little. He held the post of commissioner in the Drohobych district. In the social-economic field, the party failed to present a specific program.

In essence, the traditional parties formed a unified political system, supporting the Ukrainian statehood based on democratic foundations. They rejected all temptation for Communist experiments or unplanned "economic revolutions." If differences did exist, they were in the slogans and in the area of foreign policy.

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\*) The Conference of the Social Democrats was held on March 29, 1919.

In regard to foreign policy, the coalition of the Radicals and National Democrats held the view that in the existing situation no consideration could be given to any type of co-operation with Soviet Russia, even for tactical purposes. Although on this point the leadership of the two parties was in agreement, in the practical aspect there existed some differences. The National Democrats held the view that they would be able to obtain a just settlement at the Peace Conference. They were confident that, by presenting their cause before the Peace Conference, the Entente would order Poland to stop her military aggression. These hopes were based on the existing conditions in Eastern Europe: Western Ukraine was a state where order prevailed and, as a unified country, it could offer a large army to fight the Bolshevik threat.

The Radicals did not deny the need to seek support from the Allies who, at that time, were providing Poland with ammunition and moral support. However, the Radicals did not fail to notice and point out that the Allies were concerned with power and recognized the right of the winning side. They stressed the fact that the strength of the Ukrainian state was in the people of that state, the peasant masses. Therefore, every effort should be made to organize them and to develop an army which would be capable of dealing with any hostile force.

This difference of opinion was brought up during the public debates concerning the foreign policy at the meeting of the National Council on March 25. The debate began with the speech of Dr. M. Lozynskyy, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in which he outlined the policy of the government. He saw a more favorable stand of the Entente toward the Ukrainians; obviously this interpretation was based on the telegram from the Supreme Council of March 19, without knowing the circumstances for this move. Having reviewed the relations of Ukraine, especially of W.A. U.N.R., with the neighbors and their territorial pretensions to Ukraine, Lozynskyy turned to Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks, in his view, were bringing for Ukraine enslavement, exploitation, and Russification. Even some of the Leftist groups,\*) opposing the Directorate, had to join the

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\*) In January, 1919, in Eastern Ukraine a part of the leadership of the Ukrainian Party of the Social-Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party lost its faith in the policy of its own Ukrainian forces and the expectation of aid of the democratic West—the Entente. These leaders proposed a policy of agreement with Soviet Russia and alliance with her against the "capitalistic West." They formed left wing organizations of these respective policies which later became independent parties—1) Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries—Borotbists and 2) Ukrainian Independent Social-Democratic Party. Both of these leftist parties were minorities. They instigated resistance against the Directorate of U.N.R. in February, 1919.



common front against the Bolsheviks. Therefore, it was important for the Ukrainians to retain very close contacts with the Entente, now and in the future.

In the debate that followed, the Social Democrats urged the government to hold talks not only with the Entente states but also with Soviet Russia as well.

Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, the first vice-president of the U.N.C., presented the views of the Radicals:

"We find ourselves between the hammer and the anvil. The Entente has not won any faith among us. Its mission in Odessa wants to interfere in the internal affairs of our state and the second mission (in Lviv), concerning the settlement of the Ukrainian-Polish dispute, presents a plan which provokes us. The Bolsheviks oppose the independency of our Republic. We do not have faith in our own forces and therefore we want to rely on some external force. On this basis, a plan was developed to remove the existing State Secretariat from office and substitute it with a Social-Democratic Secretariat.\*)

Bachynskyy opposed such a plan since its execution would not necessarily gain the friendship of the Russian Bolsheviks. He called for reliance on own strength and for the retention of the coalition in power. But he also wanted the government to turn to the people for aid and support and to explain to them the far-reaching social reforms it planned to make. The speaker cautioned against possible internal struggle since it would only invite a foreign invasion.<sup>250</sup>)

His remarks concerning the civil war were directed toward the restless spirits, common at that time throughout the European scene, who sought to solve the social problems by violence rather than by debate and legal means. This group included the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers, and the advocates of "direct action." As in other countries, such elements were to be found among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and pseudo-intellectuals. As soon as a proper political center was established, they joined to form one party. In the beginning of 1919, such center of dissatisfaction coalesced under the name of Peasant-Labor Union. The leaders of the new

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\*) At that time the S.D.'s were suggesting the resignation of the existing coalition in the State Secretariat. Its place was to be taken by a government composed exclusively of Social Democrats and which would open talks with the Bolsheviks.

group were people hitherto unknown on the political scene. Dmytro Demyanchuk, one of the first leaders to emerge within this organization, in addition to being unknown, also had little education. Volodymyr Gadzinsky was known to a narrow circle as a music critic. Osyp Ustyianovych, a member of the U.S.D.P. and formerly connected with the railroad union in Stanyslaviv, was more familiar to the social scene.

The first "Initial Organizational Committee" of the Peasant-Labor Union was also made up of people unfamiliar to the political stage: Ostap Oliynyk, Teodor Cherniavskyy, Ivan Kabarovskyy, Vasyl Bryndzey, Ivan Oryshchuk, and D. Demyanchuk. The group entered the public arena with the appearance on January 1 in Stanyslaviv of their party paper, "*Respublykanets*" ("The Republican"). Gadzinsky and Ustyianovych, the initial leaders of the Committee, did not appear in public view but remained active behind the scenes. Mykola Yewshan-Fediushka, a literary critic, also contributed articles to the paper although he was not an organizer of this political faction.\*) Around the organizers of this group there were to be found the emissaries of the Social Revolutionaries from Eastern Ukraine who lacked a well defined social and political program. The trend of these "silent influences" was to push the organizers on the path of social revolution. In their effort, they failed to consider the nature of Galicia's economic condition: with the exception of the petroleum industry in Boryslav, no other major industry existed.

The slogans of "*Respublykanets*" were demagogical and insincere. The editorial of the first issue demanded that "only the peasants and only the workers should legislate for themselves." It was obvious that the editorial was written by an intellectual rather than a peasant, who overestimated the intended reader.\*\*) Once in a while the slogans were of patriotic and nationalistic nature. In an obituary written for a soldier, killed in war with Poland, the paper wrote that "death for freedom of Ukraine erases class distinction." The editorial of the first issue also had high praise for the National Council, calling it "the soul and the brain of the people."<sup>251</sup>)

It appears that at first the organizers of this group were either at a loss of what path to follow or they chose to mask their colours for tactical reasons. By the middle of February, their op-

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\*) His political views, which included a mixture of socialism and nationalism, did not forsake conservatism or revolutionary and democratic views.

\*\*) It appeared as though the peasants and the workers were to legislate separately. Nothing was mentioned in regard to the other social groups nor was it made clear why they should be excluded from representation.

position to the State Secretariat was more defined. On February 16, "*Respublykanets*" published the program of the Peasant-Labor Union. According to its provisions, the task of the Union was to transform the "existing capitalistic society and bureaucratic order" into a socialistic system, "destroying the privileges of classes, political, national, and religious oppression and economic exploitation."

The government of the entire Ukraine was to be based on "a coalition of Ukrainian labor democracy, proletariat, peasants, and workers, without any participation of the bourgeois classes." The suffrage law, however, was to be the same for everyone, including the bourgeois. In the economic field, the program is somewhat sketchy. It demanded:

"Nationalization of financing and commerce, domestic and foreign. The industry, without compensation, becomes the property of the state. The land of those with large holdings is to be confiscated and the land of small holders remains, in limited form, their property."

Nationalization of commerce would have created a bureaucracy which the Union supposedly opposed. Outside the "coalition" it was impossible to discover what was meant by "working democracy" since the organization also proposed the slogan of general suffrage.

From February, 1919, the newspaper also began to praise the "proletarian revolution" which formally had occurred only in Soviet Russia. The reader was led to conclude that the faction favored Bolshevism. On March 30, "*Respublykanets*" stated that

"...only a government of peasants and workers will save the Revolution and with it—Ukraine... To stand firm on socialization of land, nationalization of factories, to municipalize the enterprise, etc. because such a solution to these question will give complete freedom to labor and will bring death to capitalistic system and its inseparable companion: militarism, war and others, which destroys humanity and culture."<sup>252</sup>)

Stanyslaviv, at that time, had a number of emigres from Eastern Ukraine. Some of them were the people who, until recently, held important posts in the government,\*<sup>1</sup>) and remained in the city until they could obtain visas for their westward trek. In "*Respublykanets*," they found a tribune for their views concerning the social revolution in Galicia.

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\*<sup>1</sup>) M. Shapoval headed the list of former ministers.

The leadership of the Peasant-Labor Union, in its opposition to the State Secretariat, was not always rational. "Why is the Ukrainian National Council conducting armistice talks with Poland and why is it accepting mediation from the Entente?" asked "*Respublykanets*." The answer was quite simple:

"Because the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, instead of handing the government to the peasants and the workers who would defeat Poland, prefers to shake hands with the Polish and the Entente bourgeoisies. The policy of Ukraine should not be oriented on the Entente bourgeoisie but on the international revolutionary proletariat whose avant-garde is Soviet Russia. It is not the Entente who will protect us from Poland but an alliance with the Bolsheviks who will help us defeat Poland."<sup>253</sup>)

The leadership of the Union did not put to practice the phrases of revolution, as can be seen from the proceedings of the party's Congress, held in Stanyslaviv on March 30.\*)

A few days prior to the Congress, a Bolshevik coup took place in Hungary and the leaders of the Union were hoping to bring about a similar development in W.A. U.N.R. The Soviets, encouraged by the revolutionary phrases, were expecting the coup to occur on the day of the meeting. The radio in Moscow prematurely informed the people that on March 30, a coup of the workers did take place in Stanyslaviv and the State Secretariat had been arrested. However, during the meeting of the Union neither demonstrations nor attempts to overthrow the government took place. Nor did the peasants and the workers, following the meeting, rise in rebellion against the State Secretariat. The preoccupation of the people with the preservation of the Ukrainian statehood, law and order, was too deep for the subversion to be effective.<sup>254</sup>)

It should be mentioned that the meeting failed to contribute anything new to the economic program, already made public in "*Respublykanets*." The assembly did, however, make news on the political front. It demanded the immediate addition of the 61 members of this assembly to the Ukrainian National Council. In the field of foreign policy, the meeting approved two resolutions: the first called on Soviet Russia to stop the war against Ukraine; the

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\*) The preparations for the Congress and the sessions of such occurred without any interference from the government as the government was confident that the compact majority of the peasants would not follow these demagogic slogans of the Union.

other stated: "The Congress wishes to enter into close relation with the Ukrainian Soviet government and for that purpose it is sending three representatives to Kyyyiw (Kiev)"\*)

The demands made at the meeting were impossible to fulfill because of the existing laws, as in the case of land reforms, or they were simply ignored and the fanfare around the Union came to an end.\*\*) The meeting, however, did find a response at the plenary session of the U.N.C. The Labor (formerly the National) Democrats and the Radical representatives criticized the activities of the Social Democrats within the Peasant-Labor Union, accusing them of espousing revolutionary slogans which favored the overthrow of the government. Dr. O. Nazaruk, at that time a Radical, read the Council his speech which he delivered at the Congress.<sup>255</sup>)

Characteristic was the speech of Dr. L. Bachynskyy, the leader of the Radicals, because it also formulated a policy of his party against a revolution within the country. On April 5, the semi-official organ of the State Secretariat, "*Respublyka*," published the highlights of the speech in the National Council:

"Dr. L. Bachynskyy placed all of the blame on the Social Democrats. All parties, claims the speaker, agree that the Ukrainian National Council may contain representatives of small land owners but they should be admitted on the basis of the 5 point election\*\*\*) law rather than by threat of terror. Criticizing the Social Democrats who are moving toward a revolution, against its own state, the speaker declared: The Radical Party will never make a revolution against its own state; it made revolution against foreign states."\*\*\*\*)

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\*) The leading spirits of the meeting were the Social Democrats, Volodymyr Temnytskyy, Osyp Bezpalko, and Roman Yarosevych. S. Vityk did not appear. Although they completely agreed with the resolution several months later they changed their political orientation. Temnytskyy became Minister of Foreign Affairs of U.N.R. and conducted a policy of complete orientation toward the Entente. Nothing happened with the plan to send a mission to Kyyyiv since the State Secretariat did not grant the needed passports.

\*\*) After the Poles occupied Eastern Galicia in July, the political parties continued their activities in secret. After the state of war was recalled, the parties continued their activities openly. Only the Peasant-Labor Union was silent, it simply disappeared.

\*\*\*) A "five point election law" usually means one that is general, equal, direct, secret and proportional.

\*\*\*\*) V. Gadzynskyy, later a Communist leader, gives the following evaluation of Bachynskyy's remarks. "This phrase should remain in the history of the Radical Party as proof of its treacherous ideology, worse than of the S.R.'s, and also as proof of the complete collapse of revolutionary thought among the Galician Radicals."<sup>256</sup>)

The question of political orientation also stirred others, not necessarily in sympathy with "the social revolution" as propagated in unclear terms by the publicists of the Peasant-Labor Union. This question was troubling some of the leaders of the two major parties, the U.N.D.P. and the U.R.P. The majority of the leadership, however, decisively rejected the idea of co-operation with the policy of the Bolsheviks, observing that the Russian Bolsheviks did not seek any agreement with the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic but made every effort to destroy it. Only a small number of writers and publicists, affected by the Polish-Ukrainian war, began to show in April pro-Bolshevik orientation but in the political rather than the social sense.\*) They were convinced that if Galicia would declare itself to be sympathetic to Soviet Russia, she would immediately conclude an alliance with Western Ukraine and, as equals, they would march against Poland.\*\*)

Pachovskyy\*\*\*) and his colleagues were convinced that neither

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\*) Among them were the outstanding poet Prof. Vasyl Pachovskyy and the literary critic Prof. Mykola (Yewshan) Fedyushka.

\*\*) This dogma was also supported by some of the new arrivals from Eastern Ukraine, borothisty (fighters) and the leftist faction of Social Democrats as well as of Socialist Revolutionaries. The latter were grouped around the daily *Nove Zhyttya* (New Life), which appeared in Stanyslaviv on January 1, and was edited by Roman Zaklynskyy. Eventually it fell under the spell of M. Shapoval. The published articles in no way helped to strengthen the Ukrainian statehood or its defense against the two aggressors. On April 11, in an article entitled "What to do with civilization" one was able to find out that: "Land lords, priests, and lawyers are the apologists of private property. It would be strange if it were different. The land lords are for private property because they are the exploiters. The priest is also because he, through his authority from heaven, blesses the robbery of people. The lawyers too because if no intrinsic property exists, what would he do, who would need him?"

The article failed to explain the meaning of "land lords." This term was used by the people to designate wealthy peasants and Cossacks but not necessarily those who relied on exploitation of others.

In regard to the clergy, the great majority adhered to democratic principles and there were some who sympathised with radical social reforms. The same held true for the lawyers who shouldered the struggle of the people against exploitation and injustice.

On April 12, the publication attacked the National Council: "Capitalistic bourgeoisie in contents and a police state in form,—this is the ideal of these representatives who make up the National Council." The fact that such accusations were freely published in time of war, made obviously such charges groundless.

\*\*\*) Poet V. Pachovskyy, who was arrested on April 16, under accusation of subversive agitation in time of war, and released on the following day, was also able to publish a poem:

Ukraine, my beloved Mother,  
I burned for You from early years,  
All that I could give for You,

an agreement nor a compromise was possible with Poland since that country carried for Ukraine complete national and socio-economic ruin. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, in official declarations, was bringing only a social transformation, without endangering the national cause. "The Bolshevik flood will not be able to do anything to Western Ukraine," wrote Pachovskyy, "because the naked man does not fear a robbery. Let Poland and the Entente states fear this flood; we are convinced that this mighty river, this mass religion, this huge transformation, we no longer can oppose. There is nothing left for us but to join this movement and direct it in such a fashion as to have it cause us least harm..." From here, Pachovskyy tried to prove that Bolshevism also carried seeds of democracy.<sup>257</sup>)

To counter the Bolshevikophile propaganda, disseminated by the Pachkovsky-Yevshan faction, the State Secretariat decided to act on the basis of war time demands; in the interest of effective defense of the country, it was necessary to have internal order rather than revolutionary efforts. On order of the Secretary of Justice, this group was arrested for spreading unrest. After two days, the defendants

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I gave You my soul's best bloom.  
I prophesied for You a state:  
I was first to feel with my heart,  
That You will appear dressed in proud glory  
To a festivity of nations, bright like the snow.  
With this word I spent my life in glory  
In countries of the tsars they did not touch me,  
But when I found myself in Your state  
In prison for my fiery word.

In the weekly *Strilets (Rifleman)* which was published for the troops of which Pachkovskyy were similar editor, it also relied on the "fiery words." In the issue of February 12, the article entitled "The Feeling at the Front" concluded: "We shall see how the gentlemen will lead," said the soldier to the author of the article. "If they sell us out, we shall make short work of them!..." having said that, he made a motion at his throat and struck the table with his fist... The "gentlemen" whom the author for some reason suspects of treason, were the officers at the front.

In the issue for March 19, there was an appeal of the Peasant-Labor Union organizers:

"Friends, Peasants, and Workers!

In this difficult moment when the foundations of the world capitalism are collapsing, when the working people are seizing the government of the country into their own hands, and when the flags of proletariat wave on the former thrones of tsars and kaisers, we urge you to attend the regional meeting of the Peasant-Labor Congress in Stanysyaviv on March 30 of this year... The largest possible participation of guests from the front is invited."

The article was a subtle attempt to have the troops desert the front as guests of the Congress.

The reason that such negative articles could appear in a journal designed for the troops was to be found in the atmosphere of the editorial board which included V. Gadzinsyy, A. Babyuk (M. Irchan), Dr. Volodymyr Gerynovych—all of them later became Communists.

were released, after having promised to refrain from such or similar activity.\*)

Western Ukraine proved to be the only country in Eastern and Central Europe where law and order prevailed at all times. Not a single practical attempt was made to overthrow the government; nor was there any outbreak of rebellion among the people, or any formation of a "district republic." Nor is it possible to find a single anti-Jewish outburst.<sup>258</sup>) The law of the land functioned on all levels and the Polish minority was given the protection and recognition of rights accorded to all citizens. Besides the democratic principles imbued in the Ukrainian nation, the respect for law was also stimulated by the national liberation efforts made not only by the army but by all strata of society. These efforts were wrapped in idealism and belief in human beings, often producing a high level of patriotism and sacrifice among the soldiers and the population alike. The common goal made the subversive activities of Polish and Russian provokers useless.

Unfortunately, this fact came to Western European's view only after Poland, through the aid of the Entente, destroyed the foundations of a democratic system in Eastern and Central Europe. During the existence of the Western Ukrainian statehood, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, as a rule, was misinformed about that state, gathering its information from Polish sources or from a pro-Polish intelligence net.

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\*) Among the arrested was M. Shapoval, former Minister of Agrarian Affairs in U.N.R. Having resigned his post in the middle of February 1919, he came to W.A.U.N.R. Here he constantly expressed his dissatisfaction that no social revolution had taken place in Eastern Galicia. After his release on the promise to leave the Western Area, he did not return to Eastern Ukraine but, instead, he went to Budapest and there waited for a visa to Austria. The claims that Shapoval was deported to Hungary are not true since he left the Ukrainian state voluntarily. His detention also lasted two days, April 16-18.

The attempt to develop a new political orientation in Western Ukraine and to form a new political party lasted a very short time. This attempt, espoused in Eastern Ukraine by the *borotbistly*, was firmly rejected by the population and restricted to a small circle of political dreamers or inexperienced political adventurers.

Concerning the growth of the press in Western Ukraine, their listing can be found in the memoirs of Dr. I. Makukh, "In the Service of the Nation," and in a monograph by V. Bachynskyy, published in *Novyy Chas* (New Time) in Lviv, running from July 21 until August 6, 1938, under the title of *The Press of W.A.U.N.R. for 1918-1919*. Interesting details of political life are provided by Gadzynskyy in his book *Revolutsionnoye Dvianie v Vostochnoy Galitsii—Konyets 1918-ovo nachalo 1919 godov*. Moskva-Petrograd, 1923. He also provides information on the subversive activities in Western Ukraine that were carried out by a Communist cell which was working in the Stanyslaviv section of Central Information Bureau of U.N.R. Members of this cell included Savrych (Maksymovych), Hutsaylyuk, Yalovyry, and others. Through their efforts, the Bureau subsidized their activities from the state funds of the Directorate.



## CHAPTER 7

### JEWISH MINORITY IN GALICIA

#### Some statistical data

After the Poles, the Jews were the most numerous minority in Eastern Galicia. According to official statistics, the "Faith of Moses"\*) had 658,721 followers in 1910, or 12.3% of the population in Ukrainian Galicia. In the Polish part of Galicia, 213,173 or 7.9% of the population were Jews. Although there were three times as many Jews in the Ukrainian part of Galicia, the percentage inequality can be explained by the fact that Eastern Galicia was more populated than the Polish part. In Eastern Ukraine, the percentage of Jewish population was low, 7.6% or 2,991,000 people. After adding to this number the Jewish population of Bukovina and Carpathian Ukrainian region (151,000) the Ukrainian territories in 1914, contained 3,784,840 Jews, ranking Ukraine second in Jewish population in the world.<sup>259)</sup>

The history of the Ukrainian liberation movement indicates the desire on the part of the Ukrainians to maintain a spirit of co-existence and good relations with this minority. For an understanding of the role the Jewish minority played in Western Ukraine, one should consider its distribution and occupation. Most of the Jews in Eastern Galicia lived in the cities. Only 10.6% of the Jewish population were agriculturalists; 34.4% were in commerce; 52.4% were in trade and transportation; and 12.8% formed the professional class.<sup>260)</sup>

Although Yiddish was the language used at home, the Jew in the village spoke Ukrainian in his outside contacts. The language situation was somewhat different in the cities. In the small towns, the majority of Jews used Yiddish, while the higher stratum, in an attempt to acquire the social graces of the Polish high society, spoke Polish in and outside their homes. In the district cities and the larger cities this process of Polonization was rather rapid. Although they retained the Jewish faith and Jewish national tradi-

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\*) This was the Austro-Polish name for the believers in Judaism. The Austrian authorities, in general, and the Polish authorities, in particular, did not recognize a Jewish ethnic group until 1919.

tion, the use of the Polish language gave their quarters in larger cities an external Polish character. After 1918, almost half of the Jewish population had forsaken Yiddish for Polish; newspapers and books were printed in Polish and the Jews actively participated in the cultural life of the Poles. This tendency was viewed with dissatisfaction by the Ukrainians who demanded that the Jews use Yiddish or Hebrew instead.<sup>261</sup>)

Such a numerous minority was an important factor in local politics. The Jewish leadership had to seek an understanding with the rightful owners of the country—the Ukrainian people; it had to recognize the strivings of the Ukrainian nation and together work for a new order in the revolutionary period 1917-1920. A similar task faced the Ukrainian leaders.

### **Jewish policy of the Western Area of U.N.R.**

Following the footsteps of the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kyiv (Kiev), the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv in its first constitutional act of October 18, 1918, took a position toward the Jewish minority, unmatched by any other state in Central and Western Europe. The resolution of October 18, recognized the Jews as a distinct nationality with all rights due to any other national minority. They were given the right to form their own Jewish National Council which, according to the population proportion, would send its representatives to the Ukrainian National Council. The language of the Jews was also given proper recognition in the Ukrainian state life. The first declarations of the government were published not only in Ukrainian but also in the Jewish and Polish languages. Later even the proclamations to the people were printed in Jewish, a step taken by no other government where the Jews formed a considerable minority as in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.<sup>262</sup>)

During the reorganization of the educational system, the government made provisions to provide the Jews with schools, using Yiddish or Hebrew as the languages of instruction.<sup>263</sup>) These schools were to be supported by the state and had the same rights and prerogatives as those of the Ukrainians. The government also offered to support private courses in Hebrew.

Following the proposal of Representative Baron Mykola Vasylo, the State Secretariat (according to the principle of cultural autonomy of the Jewish minority in Eastern Ukraine) suggested the formation of a ministry for Jewish affairs which was to deal with any and all Jewish matters.<sup>264</sup>) Because of their neutrality, the Jews did not accept this proposal.

The State Secretariat also issued an executive order concerning the administration of Jewish affairs, establishing a Jewish section "to protect the interests of the Jews." The representative of this section participated in the meetings of the State Secretariat whenever the discussion dealt with any Jewish problem or interest: he could intervene in any pertinent matter and especially on the behalf of the Jewish National Council. The nomination to this post was made by the president of the State Secretariat on the recommendations of the Jewish National Council.

From November 1918, the government, seeking to protect the Jewish interests, gave permission for the formation of a Jewish militia, organized on the pattern of a police force. This unit was a disciplined military formation; in case of a crime or disturbance the accused was handed over to the Ukrainian Military Court.<sup>265</sup>)

The extent and the means offered by the government to protect the rights of a minority were necessary in view of the revolutionary times and the political climate of Eastern Europe. The State Secretariat was considering the use of offices of the Jewish National Council to request a contingent of Allied troops for maintenance of law and order in Western Ukraine, especially to protect the Jews from any violence. The proposal called for the Jews to send their representatives to Budapest, where the Entente's Military Mission had just arrived, to accomplish this purpose. Obviously the true reason for this maneuver was a political rather than practical one since the Ukrainian government could provide complete protection against any anti-Jewish outbreaks. It was hoped that the intervention on the part of the Entente would prevent further Polish aggression. However, the Jewish leaders failed to act on this matter and nothing was ever achieved.<sup>266</sup>)

The Jews were also provided for in other areas. At that time the provisioning of the population was a difficult problem for the government because half of the countryside was destroyed during World War I and the peasants were in a state of semi-starvation. However, the State Secretariat took every measure to provide for the city population and especially the Jews. In anticipation of the Jewish Paschal holiday, the State Secretariat authorized an export of a special shipment of petroleum for the benefit of the Jewish National Council and thus to provide the Jews with several thousand tons of wheat for Passover *Matzos*.<sup>267</sup>)

The task of maintaining law and order as well as the security of national minorities can be appreciated fully only if one considers the existing conditions in the country. First, the government had to rebuild the entire administrative system, starting from the very foundations. Then the country was the scene of movement for hundreds of thousands of demobilized men, some of them returning East

to Russia from the war prisoners' camps and others going westward to Hungary, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia. Among this teeming mass of humanity were the residents of Western Ukraine who, returning from Russia, had been subjected to Bolshevik propaganda seeking to demoralize the returnees.

Under such circumstances, the crime rate was expected to be higher than normal; there was a better climate for its development and the temptation was greater, especially in the beginnings when the authority of the government had not been firmly established. To this conditions, which was also shared by the neighboring countries, still another factor was added: the planned subversive activity of the Poles and the Bolsheviks. Both of these elements were striving to create on the domestic front an atmosphere of chaos—a diet of disorders—to weaken the defensive position of the military forces. The subversives were able to gain control of the criminal elements in Ternopil and Drohobych and attempted to carry out anti-Jewish pogroms in those cities. The government immediately responded with firm action and neutralized the planned outbreak at the very beginning. Dr. I. Makukh, the Secretary of Internal Affairs, ordered a thorough investigation in Ternopil. It proved beyond any shadow of doubt that the pogrom attempt was organized by the Polish and Bolshevik agents. One of the leaders was a Pole, Pichurski, while another leader was a Jew, Lakover. As a result of the trial, three leaders of the planned pogrom were sentenced to death and executed and the rest received various prison sentences.<sup>268)</sup>

There are a number of contemporary and even later Jewish publications which give a positive evaluation of the efforts of the State Secretariat and its agencies to prevent criminal attacks on any specific group. High praise is given to the leaders of the Ukrainian state such as Dr. Ivan Makukh, Dr. Sydir Holubovych, and Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, the first vice-president of the U.N.C.<sup>269)</sup>

In regard to specific directives concerning anti-semitism, one could mention the one of President of the State Secretariat Dr. Sydir Holubovych, dated March 3, 1919, № 464-19 which resolved not to permit any anti-Jewish agitation. Anyone convicted of this violation would be criminally prosecuted.<sup>270)</sup> Directive of March 21, № 445-10, gave the Jewish National Council the authority to nominate a representative to the Presidium of the State Secretariat.<sup>271)</sup>

The two leading Ukrainian political parties in their press and through their representatives clearly placed themselves in the defense of the right of national minorities for cultural autonomy and social equality, showing special sympathy for the Jews. The positive stand toward this minority was also discussed at the plenary sessions of the Ukrainian National Council.<sup>272)</sup>

It is interesting to note that the extremist leftist factions in the Peasant-Labor Union and their press, "*Respublykanets*," indulged in anti-Jewish demagoguery. The more serious political press fought against these tendencies.

### **The position of the Jews to the Ukrainian statehood**

From the beginning, the Jewish National Council in Eastern Galicia had taken a loyal position to the re-establishment of the Ukrainian statehood in Western Ukraine. It recognized the Ukrainian state and promised, unofficially, to fulfill the obligations of citizenship and acclaimed the autonomy they were granted. But with the passage of time, this loyalty did not develop into an open and lasting co-operation with the Ukrainian government. As a matter of fact, this sympathetic stance took a different turn; on November 11, 1918, the Jewish National Council approved a resolution stating that the Jews in Eastern Galicia would not actively support the government and during the Polish-Ukrainian war they would maintain a neutral position.<sup>273</sup>) With this resolution the Jews, in essence, refused to fulfill their duties as citizens of the state, including the duty to serve in the armed forces in defense of the state. This resolution can be considered to be a political victory for the Poles. One may understand the situation the Jews of Western Ukraine found themselves in. A considerable number feared that in case a Polish victory over Western Ukraine occurred, bloody revenge against the Jews would take place if the Jews actively participated in a military defense against Polish aggression. The position of the Jews made them exterritorial citizens with the rights and privileges of the native population but without any desire or intent to fulfill the obligations, needed to defend the country from the enemy. Such a stand of Galician Jewish leadership in Galicia did not meet with the approval of the more thoughtful Jewish leaders abroad.

The "*Yiddische Arbeiter*," a publication of Jewish workers in Vienna, stressed the efforts of the Ukrainians for the Jewish cause and recognized the need to support the struggle of the Ukrainians for freedom.<sup>274</sup>)

A Jewish historian admitted that the neutrality of the Jews in Western Ukraine was an unprecedented case in international law where a group of people, in time of war, had declared themselves to be neutral, indifferent to the enemy's attack on their country.<sup>275</sup>)

A special Eastern Galician Jewish Committee was formed in Vienna to protect Jewish interests before foreign agencies. All propositions of the State Secretariat of W.A. U.N.R. to have the Jewish leaders accept a post in central administration proved to be fruitless. Dr. Straucher, the former representative in the Austrian State

Council from Bukovina, refused the post of Deputy Minister of Justice. Dr. Isreal Waldman was forbidden by the Jewish Council in Vienna to take the post of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>275)</sup>

In the early part of 1919, a Jewish World Congress was held in Switzerland, including the Jewish representatives from Western Ukraine. It is interesting to note that some of the delegates opposed the policy of Jewish neutrality in Western Ukraine. Delegate Wechsler pointed out that such a policy made the Jews second class citizens and worked against their interests in long range planning. He advised them to participate actively at least in the administrative system. Wechsler also held the view that it was difficult for the Jews to fight with the Ukrainians against the Poles.

Dr. Reich from Western Ukraine defended the policy of the Jewish National Council even though it did seem strange; however, he did not see any possibility of accepting Wechsler's formula.

Dr. Mekhel Ringel stressed the fact that the Poles did not and still do not have an understanding of the neutrality. Therefore, he thought, if the Ukrainian National Council would demand a tribute in blood from the Jews, then it should be paid with the reservation that the Jewish troops would be used any place except against Poland.

Dr. Waldman urged an active co-operation in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian statehood but, in the existing situation, it should be a private, rather than an official effort.

It is interesting to note his arguments for such a co-operation; Ukraine was the only country where the Jews can exist in the society in which they are on a higher cultural level than the natives. This offered the Jews a better chance of survival as a nation since there was no danger of assimilation. On the other hand, argued Waldman, the Jews can expect nothing from the Poles. Thus it was in the interest of Jews to support and preserve the Ukrainian state.<sup>276)</sup>

The responses at the Congress confirmed the fact that the pogroms of Jews in Lviv and other cities, occupied by the Poles, turned the Jewish sympathies on the side of the Ukrainians.<sup>277)</sup>

The slaughter of Jews in Lviv which occurred after the Ukrainian forces left the city, in November 1918, was a crucial moment among Jewry in its orientation. The Jewish youth began to show interest in joining the Ukrainians at the front. Individuals were voluntarily enlisting in formations which were departing to the front. Lieutenant Solomon Leinberg organized a combat unit, at first within the framework of Jewish militia in Ternopil and later as the Jewish Battalion which became an element of the First Corps of the U.G.A. This battalion went through combat in the Ukrainian

counteroffensive in June-July, 1919, and later played a significant part in the struggle east of the Zbruch River.<sup>278</sup>)

However, the activity of the youth did not effect the political line of the Jewish National Council. It remained faithful to the policy of neutrality and passive loyalty to the end. The State Secretariat made neither official nor unofficial accusations in behalf of this policy. Isolated expressions of some individual politicians hostile against this policy did not gain control of the Ukrainian population and did not develop into hostility toward the Jews as the result of this policy. This especially became apparent during the U.G.A.'s retreat to Strypa and during the Ukrainian offensive in the direction of Lviv-Stryy, and finally during the climactic withdrawal across the Zbruch River in July 1919. Jewish historians admit that the retreat was orderly and no violence of the soldiers was ever perpetrated against the Jewish population.<sup>279</sup>)

Although not infrequently during a movement of large military forces, especially during a retreat after a defeat, the troops lose some discipline and at times even an old army has cases of attacks on civilian population, especially against people of another nationality, however, the Ukrainian Galician Army in retreat retained its discipline and did not trouble either the neutral Jews nor take any lawless measures against the Poles, who were hostile to the idea of the existence of an independent Ukrainian state.

The conduct of the advancing Polish army was somewhat different. The savage acts committed on the Ukrainian population have filled a number of official documents. Nor did the Jews in their neutrality escape the fury of revenge; the men from Haller's army and the formations from Poznan were especially known for their hostile anti-Jewish activities.

### **Polish Policy toward the Jews**

The policy of Poland toward the national minorities can be seen from Paderewski's memorandum which he submitted to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. Its purpose was to discourage the Peace Conference from placing on Poland the obligation of protection of national minorities. Such protection was sought by the Jewish delegates, especially those from the United States, Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch. They made every effort to have Poland, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia formally accept the responsibility for the national minorities in their states, including the Jews.

Paderewski's memorandum, while conceding the importance of having the recognition of Polish sovereignty by the Great Powers, offered a reservation "against the insertion of Article 93 into the

treaty with Germany, according to which Poland has to agree to the intervention of the Great Powers into internal affairs of Poland."

Paderewski emphasized that Poland had already experienced the evil effects which occur when a foreign state or states protect ethnic or religious groups. The Polish people had not forgotten the result of intervention on the part of foreign powers in matters of their religious minorities and this painful memory caused Poland to fear foreign intervention into internal affairs of the Polish state more than anything else. This fear was confirmed again by the Polish *sejm* by the unanimous resolution. The *sejm* demanded that the government initiate a project of laws for the protection of minorities but, at the same time, the *sejm* declared itself opposed to foreign intervention. A memorandum from Paderewski further underlined the stand that Poland would grant all the rights of citizenship to its subjects but would also demand from all its citizens that they be conscious of their duties toward the state. This could not be achieved if the granting of rights for minorities were forced upon Poland and, if those minorities, feeling an external protection, were encouraged to make complains before a foreign court of appeals against the nation they belonged to. This unavoidably would cause resentment toward the minorities and would become the cause of unrest.

The memorandum also dealt with the Jews specifically; it said that it should be noted with regret that the relations between the Jewish and Polish population in Poland had become strained in recent periods. For those who know the evolution of the Jewish question in Poland, this is not a surprising occurrence. The Polish nation in which the Jews, driven out some centuries ago, from Germany, had found protection and a lifetime opportunity in the course of several centuries to organize their religious life, wanted to free the Jews at the end of 18th century from their ghettos and even after the loss of independence tried to give them the full measure of citizen's rights. Polish-Jewish relations in the course of the entire 19th century were marked by exceptional understanding. The present disagreement was caused by the position of those Jews who, having considered the Polish cause as lost, had helped the enemies of Poland on many occasions. This policy of the Jews created the change of public opinion against them. But the reconstruction of the Polish state, which the Jews have recognized as an accomplished fact, will allow the Polish nation, existence of which will not be threatened by their hostility, to return to its former principles concerning the Jewish question. The relations between the Jews and the Poles will be restored in a short time through normal means to the satisfaction of both sides. Therefore the protection for Jewish population, offered by placing this question on the international basis, can lead only to difficulties.



Paderewski assured the Supreme Council that the Polish constitution would provide equal rights to all citizens regardless of origin, language, or religion. But, he pointed out, the Polish representatives would oppose all clauses of agreement which would predetermine the sovereignty of the state by placing obligation, in essence and form, on the constitution which would permit the League of Nations to approve the final modification of the constitution. By placing a specific part of the Polish constitution under the supervision of the League of Nations, the Polish people, according to the memorandum, were being considered "a nation which is —of lower degree of civilization and which has no concept concerning the duties of a modern state."

The memorandum pointed out the extensive efforts of the constitution to guarantee equal rights to all its citizens and, where a minority is numerous, provisions were made to grant those minorities a broad autonomy. The suggested supervision of the League of Nations "puts in doubt these leading ideas which until now have guided the Polish state."\*)

The use of the Jewish language, as proposed by the terms of the treaty, Paderewski considered as impractical because this subject is a topic of a lively discussion among the Jewish population. While some Jews consider it necessary to revive Hebrew, others want to use the Jewish language, considered by a majority to be a corrupted German dialect of the Middle Ages, "unsuitable for the new intellectual problems."<sup>280</sup>)

It is obvious from the note, handed to the Supreme Council on June 15, 1919, that Poland was not willing to accept any obligation to protect the rights of national minorities; nor were the special provisions for the Jews acceptable. In essence, Paderewski considered them to be members of a religious faith rather than a nationality. It is also apparent that Polish nationalists, under the leadership of Dmowski, while waiting for the boundaries of Poland to be defined and secured, were dedicated to the deception of an international forum in regard to the equality of citizens of Poland and the guarantee of rights for the national minorities. Such a position of Paderewski differed very little from the views of his predecessor Prime Minister Andrzej Moraczewski, a Socialist. On December 31, 1918, Moraczewski stated: "I wish for Poland to be settled only by Poles. I am not for giving Jews autonomy and schools and I only think that they should be given the rights of citizens if they will fulfill the obligations of citizens."<sup>281</sup>)

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\*) Paderewski's memorandum mentioned the constitution of Poland as real fact, although it was enacted two years later—in March, 1921.

## **Discriminatory action of Polish Nationalists toward the Jews**

The declarations and the diplomatic statements of Paderewski in Paris concerning the Jews in Poland were considerably different in practice. From the very beginning of the new independent Polish state (November 11, 1918) it was raked by a series of anti-Jewish pogroms, organized not only by the criminal elements but also by the political organizations of the Polish nationalists.\*) This matter was a subject of extensive discussion at the Peace Conference. It was very difficult for Polish diplomats to deny the occurrence of pogroms since the Jews from Poland brought the proof to Paris. Therefore, the Polish representatives, unable to deny these outbreaks, were forced to give them an untrue interpretation.

An example of such diplomacy can serve the following excerpts from a declaration of the Polish National Committee in Paris, of December 8, 1918:

In some parts of Western Galicia the hungry population attacked the stores of speculators who were hoarding the foodstuffs and raised their prices. These merchants were, on the average, of the Jewish faith but they did not suffer for their faith.

In Kielce, in the Polish Kingdom, three hundred Jewish youth took to the streets with shouts: "Long live Lenin and Trotsky! Down with Poland!" The population attacked them and in this event 40 members of the demonstration lost their lives but not as Jews but as Bolsheviks.

When the Polish troops were passing through Uscielug, a Jewish formation of about 500 persons, armed with rifles, began shooting at the Poles. The Poles returned the fire, scattered the attackers, killing 14 and wounding 47...

...Major Belina sent to Wlodawa a Polish military unit. At night the Jews attacked the Poles. Several attackers were killed and one Polish soldier lost his life. These events cannot be called pogroms of the defenseless Jewish population...

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\*) Here "nationalist" means a "nationalist extremist" and does not imply every nationalist, in general.

The Poles also had an explanation of pogroms which occurred on the territory gained from the Ukrainians:

“In Lviv these elements (criminals released by the Ukrainians) at the time when the Poles were gaining control of the city, caused suffering not only to the Jewish population. The Polish Command, having gained the city, on the basis of military tribunals ordered the shooting of 60 participants in these activities and approximately 1,500 were arrested and put to prison. As it was shown later, 60% of this number were Rusyns, 30% Poles, and 10% Jews...”

Professor Bobrzynski, in his university textbook on the modern history of Poland, confirms the fact that the pogrom in Lviv was arranged by the Polish elements. Dmowski and Paderewski, who were editing the official statements, were well aware of these facts but they were hopeful that the readers would not compare their releases with other sources and safely place the blame on the Ukrainians.\*)

The news of pogroms in Poland found a vociferous response throughout the world. The Jews in the United States, many of them from Poland, initiated a wide protest and a defensive action on behalf of their compatriots in Poland. Their delegation to Peace Conference, headed by Felix Frankfurter and Bernard Baruch, was able to exert considerable influence on the American Delegation and representatives of other countries. Because of the efforts of the Jewish representatives, the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, from the very beginning, was occupied with the anti-Jewish outbursts in Poland and Rumania. The documents show that these outbursts not only occurred at the time of the formation of Polish statehood but they also extended into 1919. The Americans considered the matter of pogroms at the meeting of May 31, June 5, June 13, and 14, 1919. The matter was once more raised on June 17, at which time it was planned to send a Special Commission to Poland to conduct on the spot investigations of the pogroms. The same topic was discussed again on July 1, 1919.

However, the diplomatic finesse of the Polish leadership at the Peace Conference managed to dull the sharpness of this matter.

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\*) The prison in question was on the front line and soon was taken by the Poles. They held the prison for two weeks before gaining complete control of the city. If anyone was in the position to release the prisoners, it had to be the Polish side. Bobrzynski states that the reason for the pogrom was the “hostility of the Jews toward the Poles.”

In the final analysis, the anti-Jewish pogroms were able to hurt the Polish cause only to the extent that the Poles lost their battle concerning the protection for the national minorities on the Polish territory.<sup>282)</sup>

But the guarantees provided in the treaty concerning the equality and the religious freedom for the national minorities and especially of the Jews were common place only and nothing was mentioned concerning a cultural autonomy. What the Jews obtained from Poland through the intervention of the Peace Conference could not be compared to what they were granted by the Ukrainian government voluntarily.

### **Pogrom of Jews in Lviv in November, 1918**

During the Ukrainian-Polish war the Jews in Lviv received permission from the Polish Command in Lviv to form a Jewish Militia.\*) Its function was to protect the Jewish population from the excesses of the military. On November 10, the officers of the Militia went to the Polish Headquarters in Lviv to present their findings concerning the robberies and killings. The following events were pictured by the eyewitness, Jewish officer Apfelbaum. His testimony was printed in the Jewish daily "*Forverts*" (New York) and repeated in the Ukrainian paper "*Narodna Volya*" (Scranton, Pennsylvania) in the July 12, 1919 issue. "When we were near the Polish trenches," testified Apfelbaum, "with the white flags in our hands, the Poles greeted us with machine gun fire and we had to hit the dirt to protect ourselves from bullets. But then the Poles gave us a sign to approach. And when we were about thirty steps from them, treacherously they began to shoot at us again, killing two of our officers and taking the rest of us prisoners."

Then the Polish Commander of the occupied part of Lviv, instead of holding a hearing, chained the prisoners and locked them up. On the following day, they were interrogated as well as beaten and cursed, and sentenced to death by a firing squad. As they were about to be shot, a Polish officer, Skolski, arrived and ordered the execution delayed. They were returned to prison and only through the effort of a Jewish committee were they fed for the first time in three days.

On November 21, the Poles were re-enforced by fresh troops from Cracow and Warsaw and managed to gain the control of Lviv; they celebrated the event by a slaughter of Jews, says Apfelbaum

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\*) This was done specifically in Lviv to counteract the sympathies of the Jews in Lviv for the Ukrainians.

and continues that "the Jewish homes burned for two days to the rejoicing of anti-Semitic Poland." He also recalled some of the activities of the troops:

"Twenty to thirty soldiers attacked the Jewish homes, broke down the doors, forced their way inside and began their work. Some tortured the people, beat them, raped the young women and girls, others robbed and took everything that could be taken. And what they could not take was either destroyed or thrown out on the street. The women were stripped naked to make sure that they had no money. The sick women were dragged off their beds by the hair and the babies were thrown out of their cribs...

Whoever appeared on the street was shot immediately. And in addition, the entire Jewish quarter was surrounded by a cordon of Polish troops so no one could escape."

The same thing was taking place in the Jewish stores. It took two hours to empty them of merchandise and what was left behind was broken and destroyed. On November 22, having terrorized and robbed the Jewish population, the quarters were set on fire. "Specially organized arsonists went house to house, setting fire. Not only did they burn houses but people as well. By the burning houses a guard was placed to prevent anyone from coming out. Whoever came out was shot... Many people burnt..."

A similar fate was met by the synagogues. After robbing them, they were demolished and burned. One such building was four hundred years old and of artistic value. The gang set fire to another synagogue where a number of Jews were seeking sanctuary. The building failed to burn down but the people were discovered and the gang demanded a ransom of two thousand crowns, the attackers erected inside the building a scaffold and began to hang people. Then they burned all of the holy books. A guard by the door saw to it that no one escaped.

The newspaper carried testimony of others, substantiating and supplementing the testimony of Apfelbaum. S. Sonntag, a young girl, told of an attack on her home in which a Red Cross nurse participated. During the attack Sonntag's brother-in-law and her sister were killed, her old mother was beaten, her brother was shot. The family was also robbed of 1,500.00 crowns.

"Forverts" reported that during the pogroms, Jewish representatives asked for help from the Commander of Polish troops but without success. The commandant accused the Jews of "shooting at

the troops and other nonsense." The same result was achieved when the Jews turned to the civilian authorities. "We were sentenced to robbery, killing, arson, rapes, and could not find salvation from any place. On November 22, the Jewish Militia was disarmed and the Polish Militia, instead of maintaining order, participated in the robbery and killing and for two days the Jews were helpless," continued the testimony. Only after 48 hours of carnage did the commandant order a halt.

The testimony in "*Forverts*" presents some figures for the 48 hours in question. Among those killed were 36 merchants, 2 professionals, and 34 without any profession, 433 were seriously wounded. The people were robbed of 11,000,000 crowns and more than 400,000 crowns were lost in fire. The total loss was calculated to be 103 million crowns.

According to the findings of a Jewish committee, 494 robberies were committed by groups in which an officer was present, 391 cases of robbery involved soldiers and civilians, 6 robberies were committed by officers only, and 6 involved only civilians. There were 2,815 cases of robbery and this figure, pointed out the committee, is only an approximation. The testimony ended with the comment: "This is the way the Polish freedom army is fighting with the Bolsheviks..."

It should be remembered that only short excerpts from the testimony concerning the pogrom in Lviv were published.\*) It should be also kept in mind that the pogrom did not occur in some provincial town where the ignorant elements could not be checked. In Lviv there was a possibility for an intervention on the part of Polish intellectual elite, intelligentsia, and the command of the troops. But, according to the said Jewish report, no voices of protest or intervention were heard from any quarter.

## Entente protects the Jews

Although during the Peace Conference in Paris the Jews already possessed considerable political influence in America and could exert serious pressure on the United States Delegation in Paris, they were unable to gain those rights in Poland which were granted to them in the West Ukrainian state. The Polish government, by signing the treaty, was forced to guarantee protection for the national minorities although this treaty was of little use. There are some interesting provisions in the treaty which was signed on June 30, 1919. In the preamble the point was made that the Polish state was being rebuilt because "the Russian government, by proclamation of

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\*) The second pogrom occurred in July, 1919.

March 30, 1917, agreed to the reconstruction of an independent Polish state."

Article 2 obligated Poland to protect the life and the freedom of all residents of Poland, regardless of origin, nationality, language, race or religion.

Article 3 prevented Poland from withdrawing, arbitrarily, the citizenship from persons who, during a certain period, resided on the territory assigned to Poland.

Article 7 granted equality to all Polish citizens and the right to enjoy all the privileges and political rights regardless of race, language, or religion. Nor could the religious belief be a stumbling block in pursuit of rights, in public or commercial life. Nor could the language of the citizen be restricted in private or public life. "Even if the Polish government should establish an official language, Polish citizens of non-Polish nationality are to have the possibility to use their language, orally and in writing, before the courts."

Article 8 provided for the Polish citizens from various minorities to be treated and to have the same rights and security as the native born Poles. They could establish and control benevolent, religious, and social institutions, private schools and other educational organizations. There they could use their language and hold their rituals freely.

Article 9 directed Poland to make appropriate considerations in the public schools systems in areas with a larger non-Polish population. These considerations were to assure education for them in their native language. This provision did not deny the right of the government to teach Polish language as a required subject. In the cities and districts with significant minorities, it was directed to give the equal opportunities in any project paid by public funds.

Article 10 and 11 protected the Jewish holidays.

Article 12: Poland agreed to the supervision of the League of Nations in regard to the rights of the minorities. In case of a dispute, Poland would, on demand from the League of Nations, appear before the International Court, and its decision will be final.

Some remarks should be made concerning the treaty. The Polish government used all of the diplomatic means to reject these provisions from the treaty. That the Supreme Council forced Poland to accept the terms, was due chiefly to the pressure of the American Jews.

The treaty provided for neither territorial nor cultural autonomy for the minorities, even if they formed a majority in a given area. The only semblance of "autonomy" was granted to private organizations, supported by private funds.<sup>283</sup>)

The treaty also failed to provide for an independent development of churches. This proved to be a painful oversight, especially

for the Jews; the Poles would later appoint commissars to take the place of the elected organ of Jewish religious denominations.

The language provision was also quite general and no specification was made in regard to the language to be used in relations between the minorities and the administration of the Polish state.

The provision dealing with the use of language in schools was also very general. In practice, the Jews never did obtain public schools with Yiddish or Hebrew as the language of instruction. Such schools had to be supported by private funds. In reality Poland did not observe any of these provisions.

The question of autonomy for the Jews had a completely different aspect in Western Area of U.N.R. The degree of autonomy offered cannot be compared with any other state, at that time or later.

The Ukrainians were also sympathetic to the question of a Jewish state in Palestine, even after the Poles had occupied the entire Western Ukraine. On May 4, 1920, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv sent the following note to the Jewish National Council:

"We, the representatives of the nation who were first to recognize the rights of the Jewish nation, in the name of the Ukrainian people of Eastern Galicia, express our joy that the centuries old dreams and efforts of the Jewish people have been fulfilled concerning the re-establishment of their statehood, and that through the decision of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference there will be in Palestine an independent Jewish state."

The note was signed by Dr. Roman Perfetsky and Volodymyr Tselevych.<sup>284</sup>)

From the Ukrainian side, the sympathetic position toward the Jews in Western Ukraine did not deteriorate. It was, however, a different matter with the policy of the Jewish official leaders. As soon as the Poles had completely occupied Western Ukraine, the outlook of Jewish leaders in Lviv changed drastically. The Jewish organization in Lviv, led by Dr. Reich, began a gradual collaboration with the Polish chauvinists rather than considering the co-operation with the weaker Polish Democratic forces. In 1922, when the Ukrainian National Council decided to boycott the elections as a sign of protest against the actual annexation of Eastern Galicia to Poland, against the decision of the Peace Conference, the Galician





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Jewish leadership of Dr. Reich ordered Jews to participate in the elections and, afterwards, initiated talks with the leader of the Polish nationalists, Stanislaw Grabski, concerning co-operation.

However another Zionist faction, led by Isaac Greenbaum from Warsaw, chose not to follow the policy of Dr. Reich but remained in close co-operation with the Ukrainians, and Byelorussians in their struggle, and the Jewish Socialists, of both wings, closely collaborated with the Ukrainian Socialists.

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<sup>95)</sup> These allegations may be found even in the text books for university students, for instance: — M. Bobrzynski's (Vol. II, p. 390) or — S. Kutrzeba's (p. 98), and especially in all writings and memoranda of Roman Dmowski to the Peace Conference in Paris 1919.

<sup>96)</sup> The official press organs of almost all Polish trends and parties not only during the Polish war against Western Ukraine but also years after the termination of this war defined the Ukrainian Galician Armed Forces as "invasion army from the (Eastern) Ukraine".

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## SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. DR. MATTHEW STACHIW

**Matthew Stachiw** (Ukrainian form of the first name is *Matviy*) born on November 30, 1895.—LL.D. (law and social-economic sciences) of Charles University in Prague, Czecho-Slovakia (January 20, 1923).—Scholarship Winner of the Masaryk Foundation for Social-Historical Studies (1923-1924).—Lawyer and editor in Lviv (1925-1939).—Director of the National University *Samo-osvity* (Self-Enlightenment) in Lviv (1930-39).—Full-fledged member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1941).—Associate Professor and then Ordinary Professor of Political Sciences and Government Law at the Ukrainian Free University (1945-1969).—Full-fledged member of the International Free Academy of Sciences in Paris (1965).—Member of the Editorial Board of the Ukrainian Encyclopedia of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1948-1969).—Member of the Editorial Board of "The Ukrainian Quarterly" (1951-1969).— President of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, USA (1969).

## SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. JAROSLAV SZTENDERA

**Jaroslav Sztendera** was born in 1934 in Western Ukraine. After a three year service with the United States Army, he enrolled at the University of Texas from which he received his undergraduate and master's degrees. Since 1964 he has been teaching languages at the University of South Dakota.



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## THANKS AND APPRECIATION TO THE SPONSORS OF THIS PUBLICATION

This historical study of the Ukrainian independence movement in recent times could appear in English edition only because of the generous support from several benefactors. All of them, with one exception, emigrated to the U.S.A. and Canada from Western Ukraine before World I. They, without reservations, adopted their new countries. Accepting the citizenship, they joined the mainstream of the social and economic life of their adopted countries. Within the measure of their abilities, they supported the laws and helped defend their adopted countries against external and internal enemies.

But, they did not forget their origin, their faith, and their ties with thousand year old family traditions in the old country. They treasured the cultural heritage of their forefathers. Besides the Bible, they carried with them also writings of Ukrainian bards Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko. They rapidly assimilated the culture and language of the English speaking environment to partake more fully in the community life of the host country. But at the same time, they were not lax in their efforts to develop in the Ukrainian oversea communities Ukrainian culture that would enrich their spiritual life and contribute measurably to the cultural diversification of the English speaking host society.

They saw that most of the English speaking society knew very little about their rich Ukrainian heritage and Ukraine. On every step they encountered either total ignorance, or misformed concepts of their land of origin and its culture. Even in books that their children studied in American and Canadian schools they did not find a true picture of their homeland. Therefore they decided to support generously this publication of historical studies on Ukraine in the English language. Although they were not well versed in international politics, they were convinced what they had witnessed taking place at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1918-1919, was the result of complete ignorance of East European affairs on the part of the American and Canadian public. They were certain that this would lead to a second world war, which indeed took place a short time thereafter, and whose sorry effects are still very much around us.

The benefactors whose donations made this publication possible came from families of farmers and small town craftsmen. Before emigrating, they could at most obtain a grade school education. They

arrived in U.S.A. and Canada mostly as workers unskilled in industrial trades, fit only for menial jobs. But their native intelligence permitted them soon to become qualified in any skill needed in industry. Some of them, after mastering the English language and needed technical skill, started with very meager funds their own small enterprises. All their economic gain were the results of their and their spouses toil. The savings grew penny-wise for their earnings were small, measured in those days in pennies. On speculation for gain they looked with distain, as befitted their puritanical ethics nurtured in the Christian traditions brought from Ukraine.

Every free minute they utilized for selfeducation; they voraciously read Ukrainian and English newspapers and books and on weekends they attended lyceum type lectures organized by tireless circuit riding Ukrainian educators. This self-education gave them the foundation for future successes in their efforts, both in gaining livelihood as well as in organizing fraternal associations for raising their own cultural level. With passage of time, they became the leaders of their local Ukrainian communities. In local communities, these benefactors were very active and generous with their time and financial contributions.

They helped to build schools, churches, organized kindergartens, amateur groups and choirs, and arranged scientific and political lyceums. As can be seen from the following biographies of some of them, they performed on a national level and reached leading positions in Ukrainian political and social organizations. Especially in the critical years of 1917-1921, they showed their mettle by withstanding the global propaganda effort of Soviet Russia for a Communist take over in the new world. This propaganda, not unlike today, was aimed at racial, ethnic and economic class minorities with whose help Russia hoped to introduce revolutionary ferment into the social fabric of America. Unlike the misguided college students and blacks of today, they saw the imperialistic talons of Moscow through the thin veil of Marx-Lenin internationalism and not only resolutely set out to stamp out its effects in their midst, but to warn their fellow Americans and Canadians about the mortal danger within their midst.

The group of financial benefactors who endowed the publication of this book with their generous donations can be divided into two categories depending on the magnitude of the donation. Those who endowed the publication with at least \$100.00 are considered the endowers, while those who contributed \$1000.00 or more are the patrons of this publication. To patrons belong Mr. and Mrs. Ivan Kalmuk, the initiator of the publication endowment; Mr. Mykola Kravchuk; Mrs. Evdokia Stashkiv; Mr. Ivan Boychuk; Mr. Lev Tyahnybik; Mr. Danylo Lobay; Mr. Yuriy Lesyuk; Mr. Vasyl Hry-

horchuk; Mr. Dmytro Mykytyuk; Mr. Mykhaylo Polohnyuk; and the oldest one Mr. Wasyl Gnus.

The more numerous endowers are Mr. Wasyl Droboty, Mr. Mykhaylo Pyrskyy, Mr. Vasyl Kuchkuda, Mr. Dmytro Tkachuk, Mr. T. Kobzey, Mr. M. Kruk, Mr. Ivan Atamanets; and the chapter of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in New Brunswick, N.J.



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**Mr. Ivan Kalmuk**

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Born in the village of Doroshiv, Lviv county, Western Ukraine, on July 1, 1893. He left his native village in 1910, to work in the industrial centers of Western Europe. In 1912, he arrived in New York, U.S.A. From his meager earnings he soon saved enough capital to open his own restaurant which he successfully operated until his retirement. He was very active in all Ukrainian social organizations in New York and Brooklyn. Very soon he became one of the officers of "Haydamaky," a Ukrainian fraternal mutual assistance insurance society. When this society merged with "Ukrainian Workingmen's Association," a similar fraternal insurance society, he became one of its leaders also. Through the years he exerted a guiding influence on this fraternal insurance society as a perennial member of the Convention (law giving organ of the Society) and as member of the Executive Committee of chapters making up the Society in New York and Brooklyn.

Besides being active in social work among Ukrainians, he was also active in politics. Already as a delegate he attended the first

Congress of Ukrainians in America in 1915, and subsequently belonged to the leadership of Federation of Ukrainian Organizations in America. When during the First World War there was founded the Ukrainian Federation of Socialist Party in U.S.A., he also was part of its leadership. Within the framework of that party he spearheaded the successful attack against the Communist elements that attempted to take over the control of the party. When a group of anti-Communist democratic workers left this organization and organized a new workingmen's association "Ukraine's Defense" with socialistic-democratic ideals, Mr. Kalmuk was one of its inner leaders also. After Second World War, he was on the executive committee of "Ukrainian Free Society" which had several chapters in the larger American cities. He always supported generously Ukrainian national projects, and scholarly publications, in particular. He also showed great ability as a writer of articles for the press. His eyewitness account about facts of life in present Ukraine under Soviet Russian occupation was so outstanding that all the Ukrainian press in the Western World reprinted it. He was the first member of the endowment at the Shevchenko Scientific Society for publication of English translations on the history of Ukrainian statehood in recent times. He donated also large sums of money for the Shevchenko monument in Washington, D.C., and other Ukrainian community projects.





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**Mrs. Ksenya Kalmuk**

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Wife of Ivan Kalmuk. Born in Torky, Peremyshl county, Western Ukraine, on June 2, 1897. Mrs. Kalmuk arrived in U.S.A. prior to the First World War in 1914. She settled down in New York City and there married Ivan Kalmuk. With her husband, she took an active part in all Ukrainian organizations of political, mutual aid, social and cultural character. She, in particular, supported social and cultural organizations of Ukrainian women in New York, being herself a charter member and subsequently the president of the "Lesya Ukrainka Society for Ukrainian Women." Through this Society she maintained close liaison with the Ukrainian Feminist Movement in Western Ukraine. She organized collections for the press fund of "Zhinocha Hromada," the bi-weekly journal of Ukrainian Workingwomen's Association that was the central organ of the Ukrainian Democratic Feminist Movement in Western Ukraine. There she published also her many articles and reports on the life in U.S.A.

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**Mr. Mykola Kravchuk**  
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Born in Malyshevtsi, county of Ternopil, Western Ukraine, on December 15, 1890. He lived in his homeland to his 23th year. Beginning at the age of 18, he began to participate in the social and educational organizations, particularly in the local chapter of the fraternal educational association "Chytalnya Prosvity," and its county wide co-ordinating committees. He arrived in U.S.A. in 1913 and settled down in the city of New York. He married here and worked as hired help until he and his wife saved enough capital to open their own restaurant. Even though extremely busy in his own thriving business, he always found free time to assist the work of Ukrainian religious, cultural, and social organizations in New York, whose efforts he also supported generously with financial contributions. Ukrainian schools and educational institutions in New York, in particular, owe a great debt to his support that did not waver in zeal over the period of many years.



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**Mr. Ivan Boychuk**

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Born in Steven, Province of Saskatchewan, Western Canada, on April 27, 1915, in the time of economic depression. His parents Vasyi and Oksana emigrated to Canada from Bukovina in 1908. They homesteaded about 20 miles from Canora, Sask. Together with other pioneer farmers they cleared the primeval forest and created the village of Steven. The clearing of forests was hard times for the family, and particularly for the children who had to walk long distances to the log school built by the pioneer farmers. With only grade school education behind him, he had to leave the homestead and find a job in industry as an unskilled worker because the farm just could not support the very large family during the depression. From his very meager earnings he saved every penny with the firm resolution to open some day his own family business. In 1945 he married a girl of his own choice and together they started a grocery in their own home for lack of capital. By thrift and hard work consisting of 16 hour long work days they prospered. Their business grew until it became a large modern supermarket occupying its own spacious building in Flin Flon, Manitoba. But even with the demanding responsibilities that the large business required, they spend considerable time in community work supporting generously both Ukrainian and Canadian community activities.

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**Mr. Danylo Lobay**

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Born on December 30, 1893, as a son of a farmer in the village of Ulvivok, Sokal county, Western Ukraine. In the spring of 1913, he arrived in Canada as a 19 year old boy and immediately went to work as a helper on construction jobs. While still in Ukraine, he became interested in political and social problems. By 1914, he had become a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Winnipeg and from that time on he belonged without any interruptions to political and educational workingmen's organizations. In 1915, he was invited to become the associate editor of "Working People" newspaper. It was a work of love for the pay was only \$25.00 a month and he had to moonlight in order to keep body and soul together. By 1916, he was the sole editor of that newspaper. In 1919, was founded a larger newspaper, the "Ukrainian Labor News." He edited it until 1935. At the same time he was also active in the society which was publishing this newspaper. When this society fell under Communist influence, he split it wide open in 1935 with the

help of his friends (Kobzey, Elendiuk, Lilitsak and others) and formed a new democratic organization under the name of "Federation of Ukrainian Organizations" (S.U.O.). The press organ of the society was "Truth" which he edited from 1936 to 1940. In 1940, the "Federation of Ukrainian Organizations" changed its name to "Ukrainian Labor Organization"—"Ukrayinska Robitnycha Orhanizatsiya" (U.R.O.), and became one of the charter members of the central representation of all Ukrainians in Canada—Committee of Ukrainians in Canada (K.U.K.). Together with T. Kobzey, head of U.R.O., D. Lobay was the perennial member of the K.U.K. Presidium until 1965. In 1948, he was invited to be a staff member of "Ukrainian Voice" in Winnipeg and there he worked until his retirement in 1965. At the request of K.U.K., he wrote and K.U.K. subsequently published a book "Invincible Ukraine." In that book he collected invaluable material on the condition of Ukrainian people in U.S.S.R. and the politics of the Soviet occupation regime in all areas of national life. Died on December 27, 1966.

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**Mrs. Evdokia Stashkiv**  
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Born on July 21, 1894, in Ternopil, as a daughter of Vasyl Kryvyy and Maria Branitska. Already in her youth she was active in the community activities at raising the educational level of Ukrainian inhabitants in Ternopil. She arrived in U.S.A. in September 1910. Initially she settled in New York, but after having gained command of the English language and of American customs, she moved West to Detroit. There in 1917, she married Mykhaylo Kutsipak who unfortunately made her a widow in 1926. After four years of being alone, she married again, this time to Kostyantyn Stashkiv with whom she lived until 1944, upon which time she became again a widow. Through prudent management of savings, she acquired sufficient real estate in Miami, Florida, to provide her with income for the sunset years. Everywhere she took active part in the Ukrainian community life. Even though her income was always less than overabundant, she generously supported Ukrainian community and religious causes. Her special generosity was reserved, however, for Ukrainian publications, like the press fund of "Narodna Volya" and publications of books by "Svoboda," and Ukrainian community

projects, like Shevchenko monument in Washington or Ukrainian National Home in Miami. She is an active member of Association of Ukrainian Women in U.S.A., supports the care of Ukrainian waifs, and is a benefactor of Ukrainian School. But foremost she was always interested in the education of the new generations through learning the history of Ukraine and because of it, she always supported historical publications dealing with Ukraine's history.

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**Mr. Lev Tyahnybik**  
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Born on July 22, 1890, in Novyy Yarychiv not far from Lviv. He came to U.S.A. in 1910, and settled down in Chicago, Illinois, where he immediately entered the Ukrainian community life. Soon he became a member of a church choir while at the same time helped to organize a secular orchestra. Besides performing in the orchestra, he furthered his own studies in music. In 1914, he volunteered to serve in the American Army and was assigned to a military band. After five years of service, three of which he spent in Tien Tsin, China, he was honorably discharged. In 1920, he married Tekla Tkachuk and both settled down in Kansas City, Kansas, to operate their own meat packing plant. In 1924 they moved again, this time to Chicago where they opened a small meat processing plant specializing in production of high quality sausages and smoked meat products. Because of his experience in meat processing and good business acumen, the enterprise prospered so that today it employs more than 60 workers and the trade name of Leon's Sausage, Inc., is respected by others in the meat processing field. One of their sons received a



business administration degree from Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois, and today works with his brother besides the father in the same business enterprise. The Tiahnybiks are active Ukrainians who, with their efforts and finances, support the local and nationwide Ukrainian activities. Lev Tyahnybik is an active member of the Ukrainian Fraternal Insurance Associations, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and was a member of "Ukraine's Defense." With his generous donations he contributed significantly to the construction of Ukrainian Catholic School in Chicago. He also generously supported the educational and political efforts of "Prosvita," "Ridna Shkola" and of other Ukrainian organizations in Western Ukraine before it was occupied by Nazi and, subsequently, Communist conquerers. With him is active in all these fields of life his wife Tekla, who is very devoted to enlarging her educational horizons.

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**Mr. Vasyl Gnus**  
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Born in the village of Pakist, Mostyska county, Western Ukraine, on January 13, 1880. Already in his native country he was experienced cabinet maker, wood carver, and gilder. In 1907 he arrived in New York City, N.Y., and worked as a carpenter. Soon that year he was invited by the sculptor Eugene Vasylenko to co-operate with him in building an iconostasy in the church in Simpson, Pa. Then in 1908 he came to Scranton, where he married Miss A. Holovchak. He settled down in Taylor, near Scranton. Professionally he worked as carpenter, wood carver and gilder until his retirement. Already in Western Ukraine, especially in Peremyshl and Lviv, where he worked professionally, he was active in all fields of Ukrainian national and professional life. In Taylor, Scranton, and this vicinity he played always a leading role in the Ukrainian life; he had been founding member of Ukrainian Workingmen's Association (1910), a fraternal aid and insurance organization—which at the present time numbers some 24,000 members with over \$8 million

own funds; he has been active co-organizer of the Ukrainian Catholic parish in Scranton; he created in Taylor an educational organization—"Ukrainian Workingmen's Association" (Ukrayinska Robitnycha Hromada) which for years maintained a school; until now, he has served as president of this association which owned a "Ukrainian National Home" until 1967 when it was donated to the "Ukrainian Workingmen's Association" in Scranton for the Ivan Franko Scholarship Foundation.

On the threshold of his 90 anniversary of birth he together with his wife Antonina donated (besides \$1,000.00 for this publication) \$2,000.00 for several cultural, religious and social goals (among them another \$1,000.00 for the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., in New York, N.Y.). He is an active member of all central Ukrainian national organizations: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Ukrainian-American Relief Committee, aiding member of Shevchenko Scientific Society.

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**Mr. Yuriy Lesyuk**  
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Native of the village of Volytsya, Zhydachiv county, Western Ukraine. After graduation from the local school and while still in his village, he participated in the Ukrainian co-operative movement and learned how to build, through his own efforts and with help of family members and friends, his own business. For some time he went to Lviv to gain more experience in trade. Soon thereafter, he emigrated to the United States and settled down in Philadelphia, Pa. (1913). In the beginning he worked on the water front, later, using his savings, he and his brother organized a tailor trade enterprise. After some years of prosperity, he changed this business and established a cafeteria which prospered until his retirement. All this time he was active in Ukrainian social life and generously supported his Ukrainian churches and their schools, and relief and social work in the framework of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee.



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Mr. Dmytro Mykytyuk  
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Born on August 8, 1899, in the village of Rakivchyk, Kolomyia county, Western Ukraine. His father Fedir, a small farmer, in spite of economic difficulty, decided to give his son a higher education and therefore sent him after his distinguished graduation from the local grammar school, to the high school in the city of Kolomyia.

While Dmytro Mykytyuk was still in high school, World War I broke out (August, 1914). He felt that it was his national duty to join as a volunteer in the legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (*Sichovi Striltsi*) and to fight the oppressor of Ukraine, — Russian Tsardom. In the ranks of this military formation he distinguished himself in the famous winter campaign in the Carpatian Mountains (1914-1915) and then in the battle on the Strypa River (near Semykivtsi) he was wounded (November, 1915).

During the Polish War against Western Ukraine in 1918-1919, he was a combatant in the ranks of the Second Kolomyia Brigade. For his distinguished service on the front and for his

abilities as a leader of a platoon, he was assigned as an aspirant for officer and was sent to the officers' school of the Ukrainian Galician Army (U.G.A.) from which he graduated (October, 1919).

The Supreme Command of the U.G.A. then nominated him first grade officer (*khорунжий*). Later he suffered, together with the U.G.A., the entire unfortunate winter campaign of 1919-1920, including the mass typhus outbreak. During the alliance of the government of the U.N.R. with Pilsudski (April, 1920) he fought against the Russian Bolsheviks in the ranks of the Fifth Kherson Division of the Active Army of the U.N.R. He was released to rest in his home village because of health and here he remained until the end of the war in November, 1920.

During the aftermath of the years of the Polish regime in Western Ukraine, Dmytro Mykytyuk was active in many fields of Ukrainian national life and participated in the resistance. He was under great suspicion from the Polish regime because of his membership in the conspiratorial Ukrainian Military Organization and for his activities against the occupational regime during the "elections" to the Polish Sejm in 1928.

Nevertheless in spite of the political conditions present during the time that Western Ukraine was ruled by means of an informal state of siege by the Polish government, Dmytro Mykytyuk followed his idea to which he dedicated his spiritual and material efforts: to gather documents, memoirs, essays, descriptions and other material relating to the history of the Ukrainian Liberation War and especially relating to the Ukrainian Galician Army; then to study them, edit and publish them. For this task, a free spiritual and political climate was needed. Therefore, he emigrated in May, 1930, to Canada and settled in Winnipeg, Man. Here he was very active in all areas of the life of the big Ukrainian community in this city; especially he dedicated his activities to the organization of Ukrainian Combatants (*Striletska Hromada*). Then he helped to establish a Relief Committee for political prisoners in Western Ukraine. In 1938, thanks to his efforts, there was established in Winnipeg the fourth branch of the Ukrainian Association of Former Combatants for which he acted as executive director for 15 years, and has continued to the present as its president. In 1936, he initiated the erection of a symbolic tumulus to honor every year, on Memorial Day, the Ukrainian War heroes. He is also active in the local branch of the Committee of Canadian Ukrainians and is an active member and generous supporter of the Cathedral parish of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

In addition to all these national and social activities, he dedicated himself as much as possible to the study of the history of Ukrainian Armed Forces and especially of the Ukrainian Galician Army. He accomplished a remarkable success by editing and

publishing four volumes of "Ukrainian Galician Army" (1574 pp. in big 8°) where are gathered all available materials needed for a history of this army; he published also an outline of the history of the Army of U.N.R. (author gen. Olexander Udovychenko). Besides this he has been active as a correspondent for the Ukrainian daily newspapers—"Svoboda" and "America"—and several weeklies.

His generosity in donating financial support for the Ukrainian historical publications one may see from these figures: \$15,000 for publication of four volumes of "Ukrainian Galician Army" in the Ukrainian language; \$14,000 for publication of the systematic history of "Ukrainian Galician Army" in English (in the framework of Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., New York); \$2,000 for publication of history of the Army of the U.N.R.; \$4,000 for publication of the correspondence of Vyacheslav Lypynskyy with Dmytro Doroshenko; \$1,000 for publication of the History of the Ukrainian Kobzars organization; \$1,000 for the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome.

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**Mr. Mykhaylo Polohnyuk**  
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Born in village Sheshory, Kesiv county, December 10, 1902. That county, and the village in particular, were even prior to World War I the scene of Ukrainian independence movement spearheaded by Ukrainian Sich Society. As a child he became imbued by the ideals of that movement and subsequently stayed true to them all his life. As an adult he took active part in the local chapter of "Prosvita," the largest and most important Ukrainian educational society. He also took active part in Ukrainian economical and political movement aiming at improving the living standard as well as political rights of Ukrainian farmers. As a member of Ukrainian Radical Party under the leadership of Dr. Lev Bachynskyy, the previous Vice-President of Ukrainian Western Republic, he fearlessly fought the administration of Polish occupational regime. In addition he took part in the cultural activities by being an active member of the local amateur theatrical group performing the plays of Ukrainian playwrights forbidden by Polish occupational forces.



The World War II laid its harsh hand also on Mykhaylo Polohnyuk. His uncompromising stand against dictatorships, be it of Fascist or Communist flavor, made him a target for Communist sympathizers and subsequently by German occupational forces. As a result he was inducted into the infamous forced labor brigades and deported to Germany where he was forced to perform heavy physical labor.

Liberated with many others from Forced Labor Camps by the victorious American Army he spent several years in Displaced Person Camps, recuperating from his wartime deprivation. Even there, in rather bleak material circumstances, he formed with other camp inmates amateur theater groups that performed a repertoire of Ukrainian plays traveling from one camp to another. The activity of these groups, contributed immeasurable to the morale of the camps and raised their cultural level.

In 1959 he immigrated to USA where he settled permanently in Grand Blanc, Mich. In the atmosphere of freedom found in USA he threw himself with full vigor into the political, social, and cultural life of Ukrainians. Beside financially supporting organizations associated with the Ukrainian Congress Committee he contributed heavily time and effort whenever it is required in the Ukrainian community.

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**Vasyl Hryhorchuk\***  
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Народився, як син Миколи і Марії Гуцуляк, 14-го лютого 1895 р. в Слобідці Лісовій, пов. Коломия, Західня Україна. Він змалку виявив охоту до дерев'яного майстерства. Тому, коли він закінчив народню школу, батько віддав його до майстерні місцевого діди́ча, де він учився столярства. На початку Першої Світової Війни війська царської Росії почали скоро займати цю частину Галичини. Австро-угорські війська, відступаючи на захід і південь, брали в місцевих українських господарів вози і коні для підвод. Тоді забрано також 19-літнього Васи́ля, як візника на підводі, і незабаром його рекретували до війська. Він перебув в австрійській армії на різних фронтах аж до кінця Австро-Угорської Монархії.

В часі українського революційного виступу в Галичині, в листопаді 1918 р., він встиг своєчасно прибути до свого повіту і

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\*) It is the sponsor's wish to have his autobiography printed in Ukrainian.

тут був придлений до державної військової жандармерії, яка утримувала правопорядок у заплілі. Хоч по закінченні українсько-польській війні він був ще молодим хлопцем, то все таки він грав провідну ролу в національній русі в своїй громаді, обороняючи права свого народу в зв'язку з безправними способами адміністрування польського режиму.

Незабаром по війні одружився з Анною Костюк і пробував налагодити господарство, але в умовах тодішнього режиму це було нелегко. Щоб мати можливість вільнішого життя, він виїхав 1928 року до Канади сам з наміром пізніше спровадити свою дружину. Спершу він заїхав до Альберти, але там тоді була велика депресія й він не міг знайти праці. З трудом переїжджав до кількох міст, аж вкінці дістався до Торонта, де також панувала важка економічна ситуація. За столярську працю тоді платили йому по 25 центів на годину. Проте він успішно пробивавсь крізь труднощі й навіть йому вдалося заощадити стільки грошей, щоб спровадити дружину. На жаль, їй не довелося довго прожити з мужем у вільній Канаді. Вона захворіла, пробула майже три роки в лікарні і померла. Депресія кинула незабаром його в ряди безробітних. Прийшлося йому жити з дарованої "зупи" і кільнацяти центів денної допомоги. Однак ці страшні відносини духово не зламали його. Він жив твердою надією на краще завтра й активно співпрацював з українськими організаціями: з Культурно-Освітнім Товариством ім. І. Франка та з 263 відділом Українського Робітничого Союзу, що давало йому також життєву енергію витривати часи депресії. Його надія не зрадила. Він перетривав депресію, здобув належну фахову працю та своїми здібностями й ошадністю йому пощастило загосподаруватися, набути дім і відложити конечну готівку на старість.

З замилюванням він одночасно працював у всіх ділянках українського життя в Торонті, присвячаючи цій справі свій вільний час від зайняття зарібковою працею. Зокрема він брав активну участь у своїй парохії Української Католицької Церкви, в культурних імпрезах та в братських русі. Всюди давав безінтересовно свою працю і фінансову підтримку. За це члени цих організацій любили й шанували його. З нагоди 50-річного ювілею Українського Робітничого Союзу в Скрентоні, Па., ЗДА, Виконавчий Комітет цього Союзу наділив його окремою грамотою, щоб таким чином виявити своє високе признание за його успішну працю у відділі, як його провідник-урядник.

У приватнім житті він не міг зажити щастя. Після смерти першої дружини, яка померла в наслідок туберкульозу, він ще два рази одружувався, але ці обидві його дружини також померли в наслідок невилікувальних недуг. З Анастасією він прожив 3 роки, а з Олександрю — 12 років.

Не дивлячись на ці нещастя, його суспільно-національне почуття ніколи не послабло. Він тепер, у недугі, розпорядив своїм майном як справжній суспільний меценат: половину свого майна він записав для Української Католицької Церкви в Торонті, а другу половину призначив по рівній частині на фундацію імені Тараса Шевченка у Вінніпегу і на Пансіон Старших Віком імені Івана Франка в Торонті. При тому він не забув бути меценатом-тисячником видання цієї англомовної праці з історії відновленої української суверенної, ні від кого незалежної, соборної, народноправної державности. Як у молодих роках він боровся із зброєю в руках за волю країни своїх предків, України, так пізніше він завжди давав українській національній справі підтримку своєю працею і матеріальною пожертвою.

(Написав Яків Остафійчук)

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