

stephen oleskiw

**the
agony
of a
nation**

R. HLUYKO

**foreword by
malcolm muggeridge**



Stephen OLESKIW

THE AGONY OF A NATION

**THE GREAT MAN-MADE FAMINE IN UKRAINE
1932-1933**

Foreword by

Malcolm MUGGERIDGE

LONDON, 1983

Published by
The National Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary
of the Artificial Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933

49 Linden Gardens,
London W2 4HG

ISBN O 950 8851 OX

Cover design by **Rostyslav Hluyko**

Printed by Ukrainian Publishers Ltd.,
200 Liverpool Rd., London N1 1LF



The geographical position of Ukraine

CONTENTS

Foreword by Malcolm Muggeridge	5
Introduction	7
The great man-made famine in Ukraine 1932-1933:	
Political, social and economic reasons for the famine	13
Collectivization and famine 1932-1933	32
Resistance of the Ukrainian peasants to collectivization	44
Purges of the cities and the intelligentsia	47
Results of the famine	54
Conclusion	58
Appendices: Eyewitness accounts	61
Bibliography	71



Ukraine — a land of natural abundance

FOREWORD

Reading Stephen Oleskiw's well researched, lucid and truthful account of the appalling famine which in 1932-33 afflicted Ukraine, deliberately brought on by Stalin's insistence on collectivising agriculture, stirred up my memories of half a century ago. I was then in Moscow as correspondent there for the Manchester Guardian. Though no first-hand reports of the famine were getting out of the country, there was much talk about it in Moscow, especially among foreign journalists. So much so, that I decided to make my way to Ukraine and see what was actually happening in the way of a food shortage, if not downright starvation.

I very particularly did not report my projected journey to the Press Department of the Foreign Office, as was expected of foreign journalists, but just procured the requisite railway tickets to get me to Kyiv, with the possibility of getting on and off the train en route. What I saw I reported in three articles dispatched to the Guardian by courtesy of a diplomatic bag, but I knew perfectly well that the publication of my articles would lead to my visa being withdrawn, and so make it impossible for me to stay on in Moscow. By the manipulation of visas the Soviet authorities have been able to control foreign journalists in the USSR almost as rigorously as domestic ones. Witness the case of Walter Duranty, Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, who found it convenient to deny reports of famine in Ukraine, where, he insisted, agriculture was flourishing. A Moscow date-line looks well in a newspaper, but can often be the hallmark of the Party Line.

For my part, the scenes of suffering and desolation that I witnessed remain a vivid and tragic memory. Two scenes in particular stand out in my mind. One was on the occasion of my stumbling into a small railway station in the grey, early morning light. Peasants with their hands tied behind them were being loaded into trucks at gun-point. They were supposed to be kulaks, or better-off peasants, but if so there was no sign of their affluence; they just looked famished and battered and terrified. Then, in Kyiv, on a Sunday morning, I turned into a church. A service was in progress, and the church was crowded. I managed to squeeze myself against a pillar whence I could see the congregation and look up at the altar. Of course I could not follow the words of the service, but somehow I knew that all those present — young and old, peasants and towns-people, even a few soldiers in uniform, were feeling that every possible human agency had been found wanting, and that now there was nowhere to turn but to God. So, to Him they turned, with a dedication and a humility impossible to convey in words.

What I realised was that the utter ruthlessness of the Soviet regime in dealing with nationalities like the Ukrainians far exceeded that of the Tsarist regime. Lenin promised the peasants their land, only to take it from them, making them helots of the State; just as he promised the proletariat the vote, only to subject them to the most brutal and all-embracing dictatorship the world has yet seen. Such ironies ultimately explode themselves, and mankind learn once more that they cannot make their fellows happy and free through the exercise of power, but only through love. That is what the Crucifixion was about, and what the woes and conundrums of our world today are about.

Malcolm Muggeridge


INTRODUCTION

This year, 1983, marks the 50th anniversary of the most tragic event in Ukrainian history — the great man-made famine of 1932-1933. According to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the famine in Ukraine was among the worst ever recorded in human history and claimed the lives of between 5 and 7 million Ukrainians. And yet, a tragedy of such an immense scale is scarcely acknowledged in the West either by politicians or scholars, and is virtually unknown to the general public.

For half a century now the Russian Communist Party has attempted to keep this criminal deed hidden and with remarkable success. For despite the abundant evidence presented in the reports of visiting foreign diplomats and correspondents as well as eyewitness accounts, little has been said in the Free World about the famine. So far no major study has appeared which would combine all the available evidence and facts about this dreadful deed of Moscow. These various sources of information make it quite clear as to who was responsible for the famine and why it occurred.

The famine of 1932-1933 can perhaps be best viewed as a desperate attempt by the Russians to totally subjugate the Ukrainian nation. By liquidating the intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Church, and by forced collectivization destroying the very fabric of Ukrainian society, the Bolsheviks assumed that they would achieve their aim.

The purpose of this paper is to make a brief study of this tragic event on its 50th anniversary using relevant source materials, documents, photographs and eyewitness accounts in



order to inform the general public. It attempts in a concise form to place this tragedy in its proper historical perspective, giving it its true significance and consequences for the Ukrainian nation and the relationship between Russia and Ukraine in the 20th century. It was not an isolated occurrence but part of a whole series of attempts by Russia to subdue the Ukrainian nation in its constant struggle for national independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the famine was not an isolated event and not merely an attack on the rural population of Ukraine. It was part of an overall assault on the entire Ukrainian society. In the cities there was a simultaneous campaign against the nationally-minded intelligentsia. Throughout Ukraine there was a campaign against any independent development of Ukrainian religious, civic or cultural life.

The historic event which occurred in Ukraine in the terrible years of 1932-1933 should at least on its 50th anniversary be portrayed in its true context to remind the World of the many crimes committed by Russia throughout the 20th century. Moscow's crimes against entire nations desiring to free themselves from Russian hegemony have gone unnoticed and unpunished for too long. After fifty years they should be revealed, once and for all, and their instigators made known to the whole world in order to prevent similar policies of mass extermination from occurring ever again.



Ukraine is one of the largest countries on the European Continent. It is situated in Eastern Europe, north of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

The area of the present-day Ukrainian SSR is 232,800 sq. miles (603,000 sq. km.), making it the second largest country in Europe.

In regard to population, Ukraine is the 6th largest nation in Europe with 49.6 million inhabitants living within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR as shown by the census of January 17th, 1979. It is surpassed only by Russia, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and France.

Ukraine has always been known as the 'bread basket' of Europe and is renowned for its 'black earth' belt and mild

continental climate which is ideal for the favourable development of agriculture.

Ukraine is also fortunate to possess an abundance of mineral deposits on its territory. Some of the largest iron and manganese ore deposits in the world are located in Ukraine as well as the largest coal basin in Europe, substantial deposits of oil and natural gas and major resources of water power. There are also large supplies of many other minerals and building materials. The deposits are in most cases favourably located, for example, iron and manganese are found close together and are also in close proximity to the coal fields, thereby being of considerable advantage to the development of industry.

All these natural resources, if properly utilised and developed, could also make Ukraine one of the richest and most prosperous countries in Europe.

The favourable economic position of Ukraine made it the prize possession of Tsarist Russia and an essential area to be conquered by Soviet Russia, if Moscow was to expand its power and control over Eastern Europe and the Eurasian land mass.

In the years of 1917-1921, the Ukrainians fought a national war of liberation to free themselves from over 200 years of Russian rule since the beginning of the 18th century. Taking the opportunity that Russia was embroiled in its own revolution and civil war, the Ukrainians formed a Central Rada or Constituent Assembly in 1917, headed by Prof. M. Hrushevsky, which proclaimed, on January 22nd, 1918, the independence of the newly-established Ukrainian National Republic. However, soon after this, Soviet Russia mobilised its forces and declared war on the new Ukrainian republic. Faced with overwhelming military strength and without adequate military and medical supplies the Ukrainian army was defeated. The Ukrainian National Republic was then replaced by the Kremlin's puppet regime known as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Although militarily defeated, the Ukrainian nation continued its resistance to Soviet Russian rule. This was done in the form of underground activities of organisations such as the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM). Resistance to Russian rule was not limited

to the underground organisations, however, but included wider circles of the intelligentsia, the Ukrainian Church and the peasantry who actively resisted Russian attempts of total control, collectivization and Russification.

Fearful of the ever-growing national movement, Moscow reverted to the policy of terror, mass executions, deportations and forced collectivization. To subdue the largest segment of the population, the Ukrainian peasantry, Russia decided to break the resistance by any means, even by mass starvation which, after the years of liquidation and deportation of the wealthier peasants, the so-called 'kulaks', engulfed the entire Ukrainian peasantry in 1932-1933. As millions of Ukrainian peasants were starving, their requisitioned grain was being exported abroad to get the capital needed to finance the industrial development and economic expansion of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the famine in Ukraine was a direct result of Russia's socio-political and economic policies towards the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine. The famine was Russia's ultimate economic weapon of mass destruction to subdue the people of Ukraine. Moscow perpetrated this great crime of genocide against the Ukrainian nation in order to drive the peasants into the collective farms, and Ukraine, one of the richest agricultural countries in Europe at that time, lost millions of its people through enforced starvation.

In 1932-1933, just as at many other times throughout its history, Russia was not prepared to lose its wealthiest colony and would go to any extremes to retain it causing the deaths of millions of innocent people. Moscow's policy remains unchanged. The natural resources and economic wealth of Ukraine are vital to the existence and further expansion of Soviet Russia and the Russians are continuing to use their old methods to retain it.

However, the will of the Ukrainian nation to fight for its rights has never been broken. Ukraine took every opportunity to express its will for national independence as was the case with the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukrainian state on March 14, 1939, and the renewal of Ukrainian independence on June 30, 1941. This was followed by the armed struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought

against both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia during the Second World War, and continued to fight against the Russians well into the 1950's. The 1960's saw the active protests of Ukrainian intellectuals against Russification and Russian oppression, and a general revival of national consciousness in particular among the young generation. Despite arrests, assassinations and deportations, the movement for an independent Ukraine continues until this day and involves all strata of Ukrainian society. The Russians are unable to cope with the Ukrainian Liberation Movement which remains to-day the most crucial problem in the USSR. This battle will continue until the Ukrainian nation achieves its ultimate goal — sovereignty and national independence.



*The Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv
The symbol of Christian Ukraine, built in the 11th century*


THE GREAT MAN-MADE FAMINE IN UKRAINE 1932-1933

Political, Social and Economic Reasons for the Famine

"The great Ukrainian famine of 1933 is best understood as an integral part of Stalin's solution to the Ukrainian problem, and its roots go back to 1917. Any attempt to explain it outside the context of the Ukrainian experience from 1917 to 1933 or to view it merely as a particularly harsh application of general policy towards the Soviet peasantry is doomed to failure."¹ Such was Dr. James E. Mace's appraisal of the artificial famine in Ukraine which took place from 1932 to 1933. His statement corresponds with historical fact, because the Ukrainian people have for centuries struggled for their national independence and sovereignty against the Tsarist empire and later the Russian Communist empire.

With the fall of the Russian Tsarist empire, the Ukrainians started in March, 1917, the process of independence which culminated on January 22, 1918, with the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic. Faced with insurmountable odds, the Ukrainian State was short-lived. By 1922 the Russians had reconquered Ukraine, this time under the banner of communism, and re-established their control over their wealthiest colony. Having a vastly superior military force, the Soviet Russians

1) Dr. James E. MACE: *Why Did the Famine Happen?* 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1982, p. 47.



*Mykhailo
Hrushevsky
(b. 1866, d. 1934)
President of the
Ukrainian
Parliament
(Central Rada);
Head of State
1917-18; Ukraine's
leading historian.*



*Symon Petlura
(b. 1879, d. 1926)
President of Ukraine
and Supreme
Commander of the
Ukrainian forces
1918-20; murdered
by a Russian agent
in Paris.*

brought with them not only once again foreign rule, but also a new and totally alien system of government.

Although the Ukrainian armies were defeated after four years of war, resistance of the Ukrainian people continued in the form of underground organizations, peasant revolts and the activities of the intelligentsia. After the Soviets had arrested, executed or deported the leaders of the underground organizations and almost the entire intellectual elite in 1929-30, the primary role of resistance to Russian rule was played by the Ukrainian peasantry.

In the late 1920's, the newly created Soviet Union was recovering from a World War, a particularly harsh series of civil wars and national revolutions. Stalin felt that the situation was precarious and decided that it was necessary to strengthen his own position in power, consolidate the dictatorship further still, and increase the fragile Russian control of the Soviet Union. A key factor in achieving these aims was the development of heavy industry. Thus, towards the end of the 1920's the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party launched the first Five-Year Plan (1928-1933) for the development and expansion of industry. The Party would have to take complete direct control of all the material resources of the USSR in order to accelerate the development of industry. The huge amount of capital required for this task would have to come from agriculture and from the economic exploitation of the colonies, in particular Ukraine, with its abundant natural resources and agricultural potential. Since the industrialization was to be achieved in the shortest possible time, Stalin decided to increase the pace of collectivization of agriculture and to initiate the extermination of the wealthier peasants, labelled as 'kulaks', from whom the major opposition to a collective system of agriculture was envisaged.

Collectivization was also viewed as a means of imposing the total central control of Moscow over the Ukrainian peasantry and the agricultural production. The peasants would be brought together into collective farms or 'kolkhozes', where they could be easily supervised and forced to concentrate all their energies on the production of grain for the state. This was essential because

the export of grain was to provide the needed capital for the purchase of machinery and tools to implement industrialization. This was not, however, merely a fight against the 'kulaks' who were destroyed by 1930. The terrorization of the entire peasantry of Ukraine continued and resulted in the extermination of around 6 to 7 million Ukrainian farmers by organized famine in 1932 and 1933.

Since collectivization could not be achieved by persuasion, propaganda and agitation, Stalin and the leadership of the Russian Communist Party did not hesitate to employ inhumane methods of mass extermination in order to force the Ukrainian peasants to comply with the directives and join the collective farms. This plan had several objectives: to break the resistance of the peasants to the forced collectivization, as well as the will to resist; to break the social and economic basis of support for the underground organizations; to liquidate private ownership of land, and, finally, to annihilate completely all those who resisted collectivization and Soviet Russian rule in general.

Robert Conquest sums up the reason why this famine occurred in Ukraine, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, in 1932-1933: "The main reason for the operation was dogma: the independent peasantry was a bugbear on Marxist guards, and the market economy it generated was against the principle of the fundamental evil of 'commodity' relations. At the same time the Party was committed to carry out this 'revolution from above' by the method of class war against the 'kulak' element — which in Bolshevik terms meant extreme measures. Stalin also, and especially in Ukraine, had a commitment against 'bourgeois nationalism'. And of course he never had any objection to mass slaughter as an instrument of policy.

Collectivization, dekulakization and the man-made famine are separate matters. It would have been possible to collectivize without dekulakizing; to collectivize and dekulakize without the famine (this last was indeed the mode outside Ukraine, Kuban, Lower Volga and Kazakhstan). The decision to inflict all three was a political one. The general aim was the destruction of market, relations and of the last bourgeois or petty bourgeois classes; the

particular aim in Ukraine was all those, but also the devastation of a hostile area.²


The famine, then, occurred not only for economic reasons, but also for political ones as it was part of the Soviet Russian regime's nationalities policy towards Ukraine. The ideal of national independence of the Ukrainian nation continued to exist under the Soviet occupation. This ideal was kept alive and fostered by the work of organizations such as the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) and many others.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia through education, the publication of numerous academic, literary, cultural and artistic works also played a major role in sustaining the national ideal. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was especially significant in this movement. The use of Ukrainian liturgy, the return to the traditions of the Ukrainian Church, the activities of its bishops, priests and laymen in the cities and rural communities, permeated all social strata of the Ukrainian nation which took full advantage of this period of Soviet rule known as NEP (New Economic Policy).

The Ukrainian language was being used in all aspects of community and social life: schools, churches, courts, theatres, scientific institutes, post service, railways, the army and even in government administration. This national revival and 'Ukrainization' in the early years of the 1920's was increasing its momentum and posed an ever mounting threat to Russian control.

However, even without these organizations the peasants formed a large force of opposition to collectivization and the forceful imposition of foreign rule because of their very nature and character. Whereas the Russian peasant was used to collectivized life of one form or another, through the existence for centuries of the 'mir-obshchina' system, the Ukrainian peasant was a strong individualist with respect to private ownership and property. The Ukrainian peasant was dedicated to the ideal of personal freedom, the direct legacy of the very strong Cossack tradition which was implanted in the Ukrainian nation for hundreds of years. This tradition despite years of tsarist rule was never eradicated. Any

2) Robert CONQUEST: *Harvard project on the Famine of 1933*. Article in 'America', 4th October, 1982.



*Serhiy Yefremov
(b. 1876, d. ?)
President of the
Union for the
Liberation of
Ukraine (SVU),
Vice-President of
the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences;
sentenced to death
in 1930 and died
in a Russian prison.*



*Mykola Pavlushkov
(b. 1903, d. ?)
Graduate of the
Institute for National
Education, leader
of the Ukrainian
Youth Association
(SUM); sentenced
to death by
Russians in 1930
and died in prison.*

form of alien rule affecting his household, and thus breaking the ancient traditions of his forefathers, would cause the Ukrainian farmer to resist the imposition of such a system. The opposition of thousands or even millions of such individual households would form a potential resistance to Moscow.

The ideology of Russia — that of communism, was in principle opposed to all forms of private ownership and would not tolerate the farmers of Ukraine running the agricultural system on an individual basis. The peasantry of Ukraine formed the majority of the population, and as had been the case throughout the world, through the years would provide the major source of supply of manpower for the armies should the need arise. Since the SVU, SUM and the intelligentsia were making attempts to make the rural population realize that without a Ukrainian independent state their well-being and political and economic rights could not be guaranteed, they had to be prevented from doing so. The fact that the Ukrainian peasants were opposed to the imposition of the Russian system meant that they had to be made to conform.

Stalin realised this problem as he wrote in 1925 that "the nationality question is by its basis a peasant question,"³ and understood that the suppression of the Ukrainian nation could not be accomplished unless its social and economic basis, the Ukrainian peasantry, was also suppressed. Russia was aware of the power wielded by the peasants of Ukraine. This power was a constant threat to the regime. The peasants had merely to cease or reduce their grain deliveries to the Ukrainian cities, and particularly those of Russia, for all the plans of the Communist government, in relation to the development of the 'socialist industry', to become untenable. Food deliveries to the cities and the army of Russia depended on the reliability of the Ukrainian peasant who was not prepared to see the grain which he produced going to a foreign occupant. In addition, the raising of the peasants economic level and their total commitment to the ideal of national freedom only reinforced their resistance to the Russian

3) MACE, p. 49.

occupier. The Russian leadership had to cope with this growing economic, political and national power.

Moscow realized that without a victory over the Ukrainian farmers, total victory and control over Ukraine was impossible. The peasants would have to be brought under the central control of the government and become imbued in the system. If they refused or showed signs of resistance they would have to be destroyed. Stalin increased the rate of collectivization in Ukraine to achieve his goal. Collectivization was the weapon chosen to bring the Ukrainian peasant under the control of Moscow. This centralization, as planned, would bring the separate individual households together into communal production where the implements, the means of production, the land, the seed and grain and the peasant himself could be directly controlled. This would supposedly give Moscow the necessary supplies of grain for internal consumption, for the army food reserves, and for export, which would provide the capital needed for the implementation of the drive for rapid industrialization, called for by the Five-Year Plan.

Collectivization was then primarily a means of fighting and controlling the largest segment of the Ukrainian population, and was directly aimed at the decrease of their prosperity to insure the Soviet Russian government of additional capital.

In the words of Khataevich, Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Committee and member of the Central Committee of the Party, there was a 'ruthless struggle' going on between the Ukrainian peasantry and the Russian Communist Party... 'a struggle to the death'.⁴ "This year (1933 — author's note) was a test of our strength and their (the Ukrainian peasants' — author's note) endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective system is here to stay. We have won the War."⁵

This statement shows very clearly that the famine in Ukraine was no mere accident, but a deliberate, premeditated policy of mass genocide designed to destroy the major force of a possible revolt — that is the Ukrainian peasantry.

4) Victor KRAVCHENKO: *I Chose Freedom*, p. 130.

5) Ibid, p. 130.

Dr. E. Ammende in his report about the famine entitled "Must Russia go hungry?" states that "...An important role in the hunger problem is played by the national problem, which is not solved to this day. In the USSR as in Czarist Russia, there exist the state people (Russians), who wage a struggle against the other nationalities, above all the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The purpose of this struggle is to impede their independence aspirations. I must say with all determination, clearly and openly, that on the basis of present great differences and antagonisms with respect to the Ukrainian people, Russia aspires directly towards the extermination of a great part of the present generation in Ukraine..."⁶

As can be seen, the Ukrainian famine was based on social reasons as well as political ones and was an important asset to the Russian regime which by its very nature required the strengthening of the dictatorship and central government. The imposition of collectivization was the best way that the Russian regime could force the Ukrainian farmer to produce the grain that was vital not only to feed Russia itself, but was at the same time instrumental to provide the necessary capital to acquire the vital equipment and products needed to complete the Five-Year Plan.

This imposition of collectivization in Ukraine at that time was totally opposed by the Ukrainian farmers. It was not only an opposition by the wealthier farmers but it included the poorer farmers as well, who valued their small strips of land as much as the larger farmers valued their land. In addition, this deliberate economic exploitation of Ukraine was deeply resented not only by the villagers but also by the workers and city dwellers as well.

Added to this factor was the policy of the Russians, who had a historical animosity toward the Ukrainian nation and its very existence. Adopting the policy of the Tsars, and that of their ministers, now under the guise of the USSR, the Russians continued to uphold the standard Russian policy of assimilation

6) Mykola HALIY: V. I. Lenin, *Natsyonalny Vopros (The Nationality Problem)* in *The 25th Anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine*, p. 3, New York, N.Y., September 1958.

or extermination. This proved to be the final justification of the artificial famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933.

The national and cultural revival in Ukraine during the years of independence and in the 1920's, and the continued striving for national freedom posed a direct threat to Moscow's policy of subduing the nationalities in the Soviet Union. To break this whole process in Ukraine, Stalin and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party decided on a policy of breaking the backbone of the Ukrainian nation. The Russian attack was two-pronged. One blow was directed against the intelligentsia of Ukraine, the other against its rural population. The intelligentsia — the leaders of the peasantry — were to be exterminated by political trials of members of various national organizations as well as purges of the Communist Party of Ukraine and of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, and cultural purges in the Academy of Sciences and similar institutions.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as the religious and spiritual source of unity and instrumental in the cultural and national awareness of the population was completely decimated by the extermination of its leadership. At that time about 40 Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops of the UAOC, headed by the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, and about 20,000 priests and monks were annihilated.⁷

The peasantry — the basis of support of the intelligentsia — was to be brought under control and virtual enslavement by enforced collectivization. Once this was seen to be impossible, then it was to be achieved through famine as the ultimate weapon. Since it would be impossible to impose collectivization unopposed, the peasants would have to be starved into submission. It was not merely an attack against the wealthier farmer for he had been already destroyed by 1931. After that date the terror against the peasants still continued. They would be forced to conform and give more grain to the state or they would die of starvation. The peasants were not, however, given much choice to give up more grain, since Russia deliberately estimated high yields to

7) Fedir BULBENKO: *The Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Moscow: Rebirth and Golgotha* in 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XXIX, No. 4, 1973.



*Vasyl Lypkivsky (b. 1864, d. ?)
Metropolitan of Kyiv and of all Ukraine; arrested by the GPU
in 1927 and died a martyr's death.*

be able to demand a greater delivery under a legal pretext because the official figures showed that harvests were far higher than they actually were. The grain producers could then be accused of hoarding, stealing or deliberately sabotaging the harvest and so be punished accordingly. The peasants, unused to a new system and reluctant to give their full capability to an occupying regime, were unable to produce as much grain as under an individual system and to produce enough to meet the unrealistically high quotas.

Moscow, however, in total disregard of these factors proceeded to implement further policies which became the direct cause of the famine. In the summer of 1932, when the grain ripened, watch towers were erected in the fields and armed guards, along with Komsomol members and the Komnezam (the village poor), were

posted to protect the grain from the peasants.⁸ In August, 1932, upon Moscow's orders, the puppet government of the Ukrainian SSR was compelled to pass the following drastic measures: possessions of the collectives and cooperatives were to be considered state owned, the watch was to be increased, and by the law of August 7th, 1932, the stealing of state property was to be punishable by firing squad or deportation.⁹ These measures were passed because already by the autumn of 1931 shortages of food had become serious in Ukrainian villages and the peasants were forced to find some means of acquiring food. Some travelled to regions in the Russian Republic where state exploitation of the peasant was milder, others gleaned the harvested fields.

In the spring of 1932, people began to die, and when the spring planting started, the peasants began to steal the seeds to take home to their children or to eat themselves. When the grain ripened the people began to eat the heads of wheat for nourishment. The Russian leadership knew about this and was determined to prevent the peasantry from getting their hands on the grain and thereby reducing fulfilment of the set quotas for delivery. If they ate they would have the strength to resist. The above measures, especially the harsh law, were designed to prevent the peasants from taking the grain which they sowed and nurtured by their own efforts. The peasants were obviously meant to starve since they were shot for merely gleaning grain. The Party demanded that the law be applied without exception. To prevent the starving population of Ukraine from travelling to those areas of the USSR not so badly affected by drastic state measures and where the food shortage was not acute, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party decreed that only those with written permission could purchase train tickets. Those travelling without permission were taken off the trains and any food that they might have been carrying was confiscated. To add to the already immense hardships faced by the Ukrainian peasantry, a decree of August 22nd, 1932, labelled the carrying of loaves of

8) 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, p. 11.

9) Anna BOLUBASH: *The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 as an Instrument of Russian Nationalities Policy*, 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1979, p. 35.

bread as 'speculation.'¹⁰ As a result of Moscow's actions, huge piles of grain lay in the open fields serving no useful purpose. This was happening while the population of the Ukrainian villages starved to death by the millions.

Victor Kravchenko, a party official, came across one such store at a local railway station in the autumn of 1933. It remained untouched despite the fact that half of the people living in his village died of starvation the previous winter. He noted that such reserves existed "in many other parts of the country, while peasants in those very regions died of hunger."¹¹ It is thus clear that the Russian Communist Party kept such stockpiles intact deliberately, and allowed untouched grain to lay idle and rot while millions of people died. Such action only signifies once more that the famine was caused intentionally by Moscow for a specific purpose. Harry Lang of the New York 'Jewish Daily Forward' wrote in 1933: "As we travelled through the vast expanses of Ukraine... we saw fumes rising up out of the huge stacks of grain in the fields — the grain was rotting..."¹²

According to official sources, about 2 million tons of grain destined as provisions for the peasants had been requisitioned in 1932 and 1933.¹³ Therefore, if at least half of the grain exported for foreign exchange (3.54 million tons) had been retained in the areas struck by famine, millions of lives could have been saved without affecting industrialization or the 'success' of the Five-Year Plan.¹⁴ Instead, the Kremlin preferred to let the grain rot if not all could be exported rather than feed the grain producers who would then be able to produce more efficiently if they were fed. Thus, the production of grain for export to aid industrialization could not have been the only purpose in Moscow's policy. A greater factor was present which required the deaths of millions of innocent men, women and children of the Ukrainian countryside. Russia was set on the extermination of the Ukrainian

10) Dmytro SOLOVEY: *On the 30th Anniversary of the Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine*, reprinted from 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 and 4, 1963, p. 20.

11) KRAVCHENKO, p. 129.

12) Harry LANG: 'Le Courrier Socialiste', No. 19, 1933.

13) BOLUBASH, p. 46.

14) Ibid, p. 46.


population which posed a direct threat to the imposition of Russian rule in Ukraine.

Russia kept quiet about the famine while it was still in progress and has denied its existence ever since. The foreign press in the Soviet Union was forbidden to write about the famine, the starving population was not allowed to travel without permission to get food and report the true situation to those regions not affected by the famine. The word *famine* itself was declared counter-revolutionary and as the death rate increased, physicians were forbidden to divulge the real cause of death of the famine victims i.e. starvation.

Unlike the famine of 1921, when foreign aid was accepted by the Bolsheviks, in 1932-1933 they denied the very existence of famine, and called it the propaganda of counter-revolutionary elements abroad, and refused all outside help. Soviet press, radio, literature and indeed all means of communication were subjected to censorship and addressees of aid from abroad, in the form of food parcels, were compelled by the OGPU to refuse them and say that they were not needed. All such parcels were sent back. A campaign to remove the bodies of dead and dying people from the cities, roads, railways and waysides was launched to clear away the evidence which showed that a mass extermination of the Ukrainian farmer population was at that time in progress.

If the famine had occurred as a result of natural causes there would have been no need to conceal its existence and indeed every effort would have been made to relieve the situation. However, Russia was not only concealing the famine but was also trying to increase the scale of the famine to destroy a population opposed to its rule. By concealing the famine the Kremlin could continue the policy of genocide without the protests of the other nations of the world and, thus, not lose the credibility and diplomatic acceptance on the international scene that it wanted to achieve.

In order to stay alive the peasant had to steal his own crop, grown by his labour and possibly on his own land from the state which robbed him of the land by force, and often shot him in accordance with the law of 1932 for stealing the grain he grew.



Execution of Ukrainian peasants in the 1920's

Attempts to find some form of nourishment were punished by death. Therefore, it was intended that the peasant should die of starvation. Shock brigades were organised to carry out the grain delivery plan and houses were searched for food. The ground was probed with iron rods, the floors of homes were ripped up, ovens wrecked, walls broken and holes dug. Everything edible, including pumpkin seeds, potatoes, beets and so on, was confiscated. The Ukrainian peasant did not want to submit voluntarily to the collective yoke so the Soviet Russian authorities

organised deportations, confiscations of food supplies and executions.

Postyshev, who was sent by Moscow to Ukraine to implement its plans, summed up the attitude of Russia towards the Ukrainians in his address to the plenum of the oblast Committee of Kharkiv in the summer of 1932: "The Bolsheviks always fought and are continuing to wage an implacable struggle against Ukrainian nationalism, burning out with a heated iron all chauvinistic Petlurite elements, no matter under what false national banner they might be found..."¹⁵ By this statement he clearly showed what the struggle was about — the rooting out of Ukrainian nationalism and its supporters.

In a second statement on January 11th, 1934, Postyshev carried it further by saying that: "The year 1933 brought the complete defeat of the nationalist and Petlura elements as well as of the other hostile elements (in Ukraine) which have infiltrated into the various sectors of the socialist structure."¹⁶ In these few words Postyshev summarised the whole period of the late 1920's and 1930's — the struggle that was going on between Moscow and the Ukrainian people for hegemony over their territory, which was crowned by the ultimate famine of 1933 when the resisting peasant population of Ukraine was decimated by it. The nationalist elements mentioned by Postyshev were purged by 1933, and the other hostile element, the peasant population, was destroyed by enforced man-made starvation.

Postyshev, one of Stalin's emissaries in Ukraine, in an address to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine also stated what the famine was really about and by what methods it was to be implemented. He said: "...comrades, the Party and Comrade Stalin have ordered us to terminate the process of collectivization by the spring. The local village authority needs injections of Bolshevik iron. You have to begin your work without any manifestations of rotten liberalism. Throw out your bourgeois humanitarianisms on the garbage pile and act as

15) Symon Petlura was the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian National People's Republic in 1918-1920.

16) Pavel POSTYSHEV: *Fight for the Leninist-Stalinist Policy*, Kiev 1935, p. 112.

Bolsheviks. Destroy kulak agents wherever they raise their heads. The kulaks, as well as the middle-class peasants and even paupers, do not give up their wheat. Your task is to get it by any and all means. You must squeeze it out of them. Do not be afraid to employ the most extreme methods.”¹⁷

The most extreme method applied was an organized famine, and this famine, in the words of Belov “...was the most terrible and destructive that the Ukrainian people have ever experienced. The peasants ate dogs, horses, rotten potatoes, the bark of trees, grass — anything they could find...

The people were like wild beasts, ready to devour one another. And no matter what they did, they went on dying, dying, dying. They died singly or in families. They died everywhere — in the yards, on streetcars and on trains. There was none to bury these victims of Stalinist famine. People travelled thousands of kilometres in search of food — to Siberia, the Caucasus. Many perished on the wayside, or fell into the hands of the militia.”¹⁸

Malcolm Muggeridge, who managed to travel through Ukraine despite the ban on foreign correspondents from carrying out such tours of areas affected by famine clearly epitomizes the situation in Ukraine in 1932-1933. It is therefore worth quoting him at some length to be able to fully grasp the scale of the dreadful occurrences in Ukraine at that time.

He writes: “...as in the North Caucasus, the population is starving. ‘Hunger’ was the word I heard most. Peasants begged a lift on the train from one station to another (in search of food — author’s note), sometimes their bodies swollen up a disagreeable sight, from lack of food... it was the same story (as in North Caucasus — author’s note) — cattle and horses dead; fields neglected, meagre harvests despite moderately good climatic conditions; all the grain that was produced taken by the Government; no bread at all, no bread anywhere, nothing much else either: despair and bewilderment. The Ukraine was before the Revolution one of world’s largest wheat-producing areas, and even Communists admit that its population, including the poor

17) HALIY, p. 5.

18) Fedir BELOV: *The History of a Soviet Collective Farm*, p. 12-13.

peasants, enjoyed a tolerably comfortable standard of life; now it would be necessary to go to Arabia to find cultivators in more wretched circumstances. Here too (as in North Caucasus — author's note), there are new factories, a huge new power station at Dnieprostoi, a huge new square at Kharkov with huge Government buildings — and food being exported from Odessa.”¹⁹

The Central Committee of the Communist Party saw that both the economic and political aims could be attained at the same time. Ukraine and the other major grain producing areas would have to bear the brunt of the procurement of grain since it was first necessary to break the resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry and that of all Ukraine. For this reason the famine was most severe in the grain producing areas of the Soviet Union — Ukraine, North Caucasus, the lower Volga, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. William Chamberlin comments: “The unquestionable fact is that collectivization wrought greatest havoc, in the main, just where the peasants were more intelligent and more progressive in farming methods, where the pre-war standard of living was the highest... The worst famine regions in 1932-1934 were in many cases the most fertile and prosperous districts... the rich North Caucasus, the German colonies on the Volga, and in Ukraine, where the population were always noted for their good farming — the fertile ‘black-earth’ Ukrainian provinces of Kyiv and Poltava. It was not the more backward peasants, but the more progressive and well-to-do, who usually showed the greatest resistance to collectivization, and this is not because they did not understand what the new policy would portend, but because they understood only too well.”²⁰

From the above descriptions of men who witnessed the tragic events of 1932-1933, there can be no doubt that the famine in Ukraine was organised deliberately, because every measure taken by the Russian government was intended to increase the difficulties of the peasants and prepare them for destruction. Every measure was taken to make it increasingly more difficult for the events

19) Malcolm MUGGERIDGE: *The Great Famine in Ukraine — A Journalist's Eyewitness Account*, ‘The Ukrainian Review’, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1979, p. 93.

20) William CHAMBERLIN: *Russia's Iron Age*, pp. 76-77.



A starving Ukrainian youth

that were occurring to become known outside the USSR. Clarence Manning states that the whole period of "...the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1931 and the famine of 1932-1933 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy."²¹ As one of the starving victims told visitors from America: "...it is they (the Soviet Russian government) who are killing us. They want us to die. It is an organised famine."²²

21) Clarence MANNING: *Ukraine Under the Soviets*.

22) *Visitors Describe...*, 'New York Times', August 29th, 1933, p. 6.

Collectivization and the Famine of 1932-1933

Although a full description of the events in Ukraine during the famine cannot be given in the short scope of this pamphlet, however, a brief summary of what took place is necessary.

In order to prevent further upheavals among the subjugated nations, Lenin recommended a very cautious and gradual introduction of collectivization, especially in Ukraine, because of the strong individualism of the peasants and the expected resistance on their part to communal agriculture. By 1928, after a campaign of propaganda and agitation on behalf of collective farms, only 9,734 'kolkhozes' were in existence in Ukraine, controlling only 2.5% of all farms and 2.9% of all the land.²³ According to the First Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian SSR collectivization was to have reached 12% by the end of the duration of the Five-Year Plan.²⁴ Such a slow rate of collectivization, however, was not in keeping with the Kremlin's new plans. Their aim was to subdue the Ukrainian population in the shortest possible time.

Therefore, it was first necessary to destroy the resistance of the Ukrainian peasants and with it that of Ukraine, and then to secure the necessary funds and supplies to carry out the new economic policy of rapid industrialization. These funds could only be acquired by the ruthless exploitation of the peasants, but since they were not prepared to give up their grain for low prices to a foreign occupying power, and even sabotaged Moscow's attempts to procure the grain, it was necessary for Stalin to deprive the Ukrainian peasants of the private means of production and drive them into the collectives. Finally, it was vital to the Russian authorities to smash the Ukrainian will to resist, as it

23) V. HOLUBNYCHY: *Collectivization of Agriculture*, 'Ukrainian Encyclopedia', Vol. II, Book 3, Paris—New York, 1959.

24) Ibid.

posed a constant threat to the Kremlin throughout the 1920's in its attempts to consolidate Russian rule over Ukraine.

With this in mind the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party resolved to accelerate collectivization. This was done by the decree of November 17th, 1929, which stated that Ukraine should provide an example of the organization of the socialisation of agriculture on a large scale in the shortest time.²⁵ Although the November plenum of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the government of the Ukrainian SSR resolved to bring collectivization to 21.6% of all the land by October, 1930, this did not please Moscow. The Russian leadership by the resolution of January 5th, 1930, decreed that collectivization should be accelerated and completed within a span of 1 or 2 years time.²⁶ Simultaneously a campaign under the slogan of the 'liquidation of kulaks' was launched in order to achieve the annihilation of all peasants who opposed collectivization and not only of the wealthier 'kulaks'. This slogan was merely a façade designed to give the Russian authorities a pretext to clear the Ukrainian countryside of all opposition under the guise of a policy of class warfare to destroy the wealthier classes of peasants, and to place in confusion the rest of the peasantry as to what really went on. This directive was later legitimised by the government of the USSR by the resolution of January 30th, 1933, 'On the Consolidation of Kolkhozes', permitting the confiscation of all property and deportation to Siberia of all the peasants who refused to join the 'kolkhozes'.²⁷

On December 27th, 1929, Stalin launched his new policy which aimed at the wholesale destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry and not merely limiting the activities of the rich peasants by economic and legal means. Now the peasants had to face banishment from their native villages, evictions of whole families in winter or face execution. On February 1st, 1930, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a law,

25) According to HOLUBNYCHY. Also Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee, Moscow, 1960.

26) Communist Party of Ukraine in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences 1918-1956, Kiev, 1958.

27) Vasyi PLYUSHCH: *Genocide of the Ukrainian People*, p. 14.

dispossessing the rich peasants of Ukraine and making it legal to exile them. It becomes clear that the policy of annihilation was aimed at all the Ukrainian peasants and not only at those labelled as 'kulaks' because the terror continued until May 8th, 1933, when new instructions from Stalin and Molotov suspended any further mass deportations of peasants, and the elimination of the real 'kulaks' had already been accomplished by 1930.²⁸

During 1930, Russia increased all requisitioning plans by 115% in comparison with 1926-1927 with the credit going mainly to private owners, but the peasants still continued to leave the collective farms en masse, taking back their cattle, equipment and property which had been requisitioned into the collective system.²⁹ If this trend continued then not a single collective would have remained in Ukraine. Therefore, after the brief period of easing the collectivization, Russia mobilized its forces once again and recommenced collectivization on a more intensive scale and by more brutal methods than before, following the principles of Stalin's new policy of mass extermination of the peasantry. Throughout 1930, peasants previously classified as 'kulaks' were arrested along with their families and sent into exile far from the territory of Ukraine, to Siberia, northern Russia or Central Asia. Those who put up any show of resistance faced execution or imprisonment in concentration camps, established by the government of the Soviet Union on February 18th, 1928.³⁰ When collectivization was renewed in 1931, however, everyone who resisted was classified as a 'kulak' or an accomplice of the 'kulaks' — a 'podkulachnyk', and met with the same fate as the real 'kulaks' in 1930. Not less than 650,000 men, women and children were either exiled, imprisoned or killed, and 350,000 fled to the cities in order to hide from the terror and to find work and food.³¹

The tempo of collectivization in Ukraine can be clearly seen from the following figures: By October 1st, 1928, 3.4% of all

28) Volodymyr KUBIJOVYČ: *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 816-817.

29) HOLUBNYCHY, Vol. II, Book 3.

30) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 817.

31) *Ibid*, p. 817.

homesteads and 3.8% of all land had been collectivized. A year later, by October 1st, 1929, 8.6% of homesteads and 8.9% of land had been collectivized. By March 10th, 1930, the rate had risen to 65% and 70% respectively and also 70% of all the working cattle had been collectivized.³² Such a rapid rate of collectivization ruined the agriculture of Ukraine and led to increased resistance and even peasant uprisings. Stalin realised that such rapid attempts at collectivization could endanger internal stability and so he criticised the 'overzealousness' of party workers in the speech entitled "Dizziness from success" on March 2nd, 1930.³³ As a result the collectivization was slowed down and some peasants were even allowed to leave the 'kolkhozes'. Consequently the rate of collectivization dropped again to 36.4% of land and 30.4% of households by July 20th, 1930, and remained at that level until December 1930, when Moscow issued new orders stating that the rate of collectivization was to be doubled during the spring of 1931 and completed by 1932. The new push in collectivization caused 61.9% of land and 58.4% of households to be collectivized by April 1st, 1931, and 73% of land and 72% of households to be collectivized by January 1st, 1932.³⁴

Although Ukrainian industries outstripped all production targets of the original Five-Year Plan they still fell short of the new and unrealistically high Russian imposed annual requirements. Due to the shortage of capital, the USSR had to export more agricultural produce which led to a new push in collectivization. The alternative was to slow down industrialization, but the Russian leadership could not afford to see this happen because of the economic goals they set in the Five-Year Plan. The obligatory grain delivery quotas on non-collectivized peasants was between 5.0 and 7.5 metric tons per household, which

32) V. HOLUBNYCHY, Vol. II, Book 3.

33) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 816.

34) Figures denoting the total rate of collectivization:

April 1st, 1931	55.4% households; 61.9% land.
January 20th, 1932	70.0% households; 73.5% land.
June 1st, 1933	69.5% households; 86.1% land.
June 1st, 1934	78.0% households; 90.6% land.
October 1st, 1935	91.3% households; 98.0% land.

From HOLUBNYCHY: *Collectivization of Agriculture*, Ukrainian Encyclopedia, Vol. II, Book 3.



constituted more than 100% of the harvest output. The peasants were presented with an alternative in the collective farm where the delivery quotas were 3 times lower. The total grain procurement for Ukraine as a whole was increased by 2.3 times the amount required during the period of the New Economic Policy. The elicited 7.7 million metric tons of grain from Ukraine were a deliberate overestimation by Russia of the ability of the collective system to produce the set amount of required grain, and Moscow once again set the same total of grain to be procured for 1931. The success of the deliveries in 1930 were due to an above average harvest and all previous stocks and reserves, as well as the requisition of all seeds as part of the procurement for that year.³⁵

It is at this time in 1931 that one can see the appearance of the factors that caused the famine. Although the harvest in this year was only 18.3 million metric tons instead of the 23 million called for by the Five-Year Plan, collectivization reached 70% by that time and the procurements of grain were intensified. The peasants, forced to join the 'kolkhozes', were neither willing nor able to work in a collective system, which was both new and alien to them. As a result of opposition on the part of the peasants, and their inability to work well in a new system, 30% to 40% of the grain was lost during harvesting. Russia, however, refused to lower the established quota and applied pressure on the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government of the Ukrainian SSR to fulfil the amount required by the Plan. By the spring of 1932, 7.0 million metric tons were exacted from Ukraine, representing only 91% of the planned total, although it was by itself over half of the total harvest. This left an average of 112 kg. of grain per capita for the Ukrainian rural population, spelling disaster for the peasants whose staple diet for centuries was grain.³⁶

By late spring of 1932, famine had already broken out and

35) In 1926 Ukraine delivered 3.3 million metric tons of grain. In 1930 it delivered 7.7 million metric tons of grain, which amounted to 33% of the Ukrainian harvest and 27% of the total harvest of the USSR in 1930. However, the Ukrainian delivery quota was 38% of the total grain procurements of the USSR. (From KUBIJOVYČ, Vol. I.).

36) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 820.



Horrors of the Famine in Ukraine, 1933

was beginning to take effect. As a result, a mass movement of the rural population to the cities began in an attempt to find food and work. Many peasants travelled or walked, which was more often the case, to Central Russia where there was no famine at all. Due to the factors mentioned earlier, the plan for the autumn seeding was unfulfilled as well. Thus, instead of the 14 million hectares called for to be put under cultivation, only 6.5 million were actually sown, and the collection of seed for the spring sowing of 1932 only managed to cover 55% of the amount required.³²

In 1932 Ukraine faced a general economic crisis since there were difficulties in the metallurgical industries and the Donbas region failed to produce the quota for the coal output causing a fuel shortage. L. Kaganovich and V. Molotov, Stalin's representatives in Ukraine, put the blame for the failure on the leadership of the Ukrainian communists and stressed that the fulfilment of the plan for 1932 should be achieved at all costs. At the 3rd All-Ukrainian Conference of the Communist Party of Ukraine held in Kharkiv on July 6th-9th, 1932, the appeals of Kosior and the other speakers to Moscow that the new grain quota of 6.6 million metric tons was still too exorbitant were to no avail.³⁸ After this conference, which was the last effort of the Ukrainian communists to dissuade Moscow from continuing its harsh campaign against the Ukrainian rural population at this time of economic difficulties, a full-scale struggle began for the possession of the 1932 harvest between the Ukrainian peasantry on the one hand, and the leadership of the Communist Party on the other. The Central Executive Committee of the USSR issued the new law of August 7th, 1932, which talking about the preservation of 'socialist property', gave the OGPU the right to shoot all those who tried to steal from the collectives.³⁹ This law was immediately applied throughout Ukraine, even against peasant children gleaning a few ears of corn in the fields after harvesting. Again up to 40% of the harvest was lost during reaping, but this time due not only to the inefficiency of the

37) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 821.

38) Ibid, p. 821.

39) BOLUBASH, p. 35.

peasants unused to collective work, but also to the shortage of manpower and draft animals, sick from undernourishment. The tractors from the established Motor Tractor Stations (MTS) only managed to bring in 14.6 million tons of the reported harvest.⁴⁰

Since it became apparent that the set figures for procurement could not be met, the All-Union Communist Party abolished proportional quotas for the 'kolkhozes' in August and ordered instead that as much grain as possible should be taken from the peasants. Upon Moscow's instructions, the government of the Ukrainian SSR acted on November 20th, 1932, to remedy the grain situation since collections began to lag behind the schedule.⁴¹ Thus, orders were issued discontinuing all payments of wages in kind to collective farmers and reclaiming the grain already distributed where possible. In addition to this, on December 17th, 1932, the government ended all trade in food and consumer goods in the villages which had not adequately fulfilled their obligations to the state. Despite these measures the government was still only able to collect 72% of the planned quota by January 1933, that is 4.7 million metric tons of grain, leaving an average of 83 kg. of grain per capita per year for the Ukrainian population, or 250 gr. a day for 1933.⁴²

The reason that years of a merely below-average crop were turned into famine was that the procurement of grain drained off from the population the last possible reserves of food, leaving them to starve. As mentioned above, any attempt to acquire food was immediately punished by death and sentries were placed in the fields to prevent the peasants from getting any grain. All supplies of food that the peasants possessed were also removed. As a result, the famine became increasingly severe in the late autumn, winter and especially so in the spring of 1933.⁴³

The number of deaths from starvation reached massive proportions. The press was forbidden to report anything about the famine and the foreign correspondents obligingly followed the

40) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 821.

41) Ibid, p. 821-822.

42) Based on the official figures of the *People's Commissariat of Official Grain Purchases Bulletin on Grain Affairs*, Moscow, 1932-1934.

43) Dana G. DALRYMPLE: *The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934*, 'Soviet Studies', Vol. XV, 1963-1964, p. 252.

Russian instructions since the entire foreign press corps was located in Moscow and the correspondents could stay in the Soviet Union only so long as Moscow allowed them to. In the case of foreign visits like that of M. Herriot, the former French Premier, the visitors would be given 'Potemkin-like' visits of the countryside in the areas not directly affected by the famine, and remained unaware as to what was going on several miles away. Some foreign correspondents, however, managed to slip away and go on secret tours of the areas ravaged by famine, at great risk to their own safety.

Malcolm Muggeridge was one of those who saw what was happening and reported the following about the forceful removal of grain and food: "They (the officials who collected the grain) had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they shot and exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they have reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert."⁴⁴ F. Belov complements M. Muggeridge by stating: "That autumn (following the 1932 harvest) the red broom passed over the kolkhozy and the individual plots, sweeping the 'surplus' for the state out of the barns and corn cribs. In the search for 'surpluses' everything was collected. The farms were cleaned out even more thoroughly than the kulak had been."⁴⁵

Because the procurement was so harsh and the famine so severe, the peasants attempted to flee to the towns in the hope of finding food. To prevent this migration, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, introduced an internal passport system, on December 27, 1932, and the mandatory registration of individuals in their place of residence.⁴⁶ In addition, as of March 17th, 1933, collective farmers were forbidden to seek employment in factories and mines. In the future they were to be drafted for such jobs in an organized manner.⁴⁷ This was part of the campaign of the Soviet Russian authorities to conceal the existence of the famine in clean-up operations to remove dead

44) Malcolm MUGGERIDGE: "Fortnightly Review", May, 1933, p. 564.

45) BELOV, p. 12.


46) KUBIJOVÝČ, p. 822.

47) Ibid. p. 822.



Dying together ...

...and alone



and dying peasants from the cities, road sides and along railway lines. It was designed to prevent foreigners from coming into unnecessary contact with the real situation.

In the summer of 1933, an obligatory delivery system to be assessed by hectares was established. The harvest was then organized in the form of a military operation involving detachments of the army, which were placed in the fields to guard the

grain from the peasants. If the set quota was not delivered then those officials and peasants responsible were dealt with in accordance with Stalin's decree of August 7th, 1932, as enemies of the people. All that they could look forward to then was execution or deportation.⁴⁸ Such was the case of an alleged conspiracy in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and State Farming. The accused were charged with using their authority to wreck tractors and to disorganise sowing, harvesting and threshing 'to create famine in the country'. As a result 35 were shot and 40 deported.⁴⁹ When the period of famine was over, the grain requisitions for the period 1933-1934 became even higher than for 1931-1932 and approximately 24% above the rate for 1932-1933.⁵⁰ Although the harvest was better in 1933-1934, the Ukrainian rural population continued to suffer further hardship until 1934 because of the unduly increased procurements.



To obtain complete control over agriculture, Moscow placed great emphasis on state and collective farms in conjunction with the Machine Tractor Stations. Only one problem remained, however, the recalcitrance of the Ukrainian peasants. They were not interested in joining the collectives for reasons mentioned earlier. When the unheeding recalcitrance of the peasantry to submit was enhanced even more by further requisitions of food, it soon became apparent to the leadership of the USSR that the ensuing famine could provide a useful means of driving them into the collective or else into their graves. If conditions were hard in the 'kolkhoz' then they would be made even harder for the individual household.⁵¹

Moscow, then, was prepared to use the famine as a weapon to compel the Ukrainian peasantry to obey its directives. The procurements were accompanied by the cessation of grain deliveries to the regions hit by famine, suspension of trade by the state and

48) BOLUBASH, p. 38.

49) 'Izvestia', March 12th, 1933, p. 2 and Merle FAINOLD: *How Russia is Ruled*, p. 364.

50) BOLUBASH, p. 38.

51) CHAMBERLIN, pp. 81-82.



*Dying in
the fields . . .*



*. . . and at the
railway
stations*

the cooperatives, the closing down of the state sales stores, confiscations of grain supplies and food, an embargo on the purchase of staple products and the suspension of loans by the state to the peasants. These measures were responsible for the deaths of 1.5 million people between June and December 1932 alone.⁵² To make certain that the will to resist of all the peasants

⁵²) Vasyl ORELETSKY: *Starvation of Ukraine by Moscow in 1921 and 1933*, 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. X, No. 3, 1963, p. 22.

was truly broken, the same policy was applied in the regions of Ukraine only partly hit by the famine. Since all other means to force the Ukrainian peasantry to join the collectives proved ineffective then Moscow was prepared to use mass genocide of the rural population of Ukraine in order to achieve its goals.

W. H. Chamberlin regards that: "The famine was used exclusively and intentionally as an instrument of Moscow's national policy. For it was the last possible means of breaking the resistance of the Ukrainian farmers against the new system."⁵³

Resistance of the Ukrainian peasants to collectivization

As the collectivization and food shortages increased in intensity, Moscow was confronted with a widespread non-cooperation movement on the part of the Ukrainian peasants. Stalin considered this as a deliberate sabotage of the grain delivery and was not prepared to lower the grain quotas. Not all resistance was passive and during the period of collectivization many acts of violence and mass uprisings took place.

The first phase of the struggle was passive resistance to collectivization, especially a determined sabotage of all the ordinances of the Soviet Russian government concerning the raising of the productivity of agriculture and the increase in the rate of delivery to the state of food products and agricultural raw materials. This resistance caused a substantial decrease in the delivery of agricultural products to state store houses. Russia was threatened with a decrease or even complete depletion of food reserves which were being stockpiled as supplies for the cities. Now the Ukrainian peasants began to cultivate only as much as was necessary to feed themselves and enough to sell only to Ukrainian cities.

This was answered by Russia with a further intensification of collectivization and the introduction at the same time of drastic measures, including special taxes, confiscation of property, land,

53) CHAMBERLIN: *Russia's Iron Age*.

food reserves and terror. Not only 'kulaks' but also all peasants were burdened with contributions beyond their capacity to fulfil. Mass deportations of the so-called 'kulaks' and reasonably prosperous peasants to the north of Russia, Siberia and Kazakhstan were initiated which were coupled with various types of terror and the extermination not only of adults but also of children.

The intensification of collectivization and terror led to large scale opposition to the Russian authorities. Peasants began to dissolve the 'Societies of Conscientious Cultivation of Land' and the 'kolkhozes' only several days after their establishment. They took back their own farms, agricultural implements, their horses and cattle, which had been forcefully requisitioned from them by the state. When there were no more adult males left in the village to carry out this task, the women carried out the liquidation of the 'Societies of Conscientious Cultivation of Land' and the collectives, during the so-called 'women's rebellions' throughout the whole of Ukraine. Grain and other agricultural products were concealed from the authorities in underground caches on farms, in orchards, gardens, fields or in the woods. According to the statements of the Soviet press and statistics of that time hundreds of thousands of poods of grain were hidden from the state. V. Holubnychy states that in 1930 out of 23.1 million metric tons harvested, Russia was able to remove only 7.7 million metric tons.⁵⁴

To prevent their cattle from being taken by the state, the peasants slaughtered them. In July 1928, on the territory of the USSR there were 33.5 million horses, 70.5 million cattle, 26 million hogs and 146.7 million sheep and goats. Six years later, in July 1934, only 15.6 million horses, 40.7 million cattle, 17.4 million hogs and 51.9 million sheep and goats remained.⁵⁵

The peasants also engaged in the destruction of agricultural implements and the burning of agricultural buildings and houses. Machinery and ploughs were destroyed as well. Much of the destruction of agricultural implements was directly due to the

54) HOLUBNYCHY, Vol. II, Book 3.

55) Ya. SHUMELDA: *From Marx to Malenkov* on the basis of information from H. SCHWARZ.

mismanagement in the 'kolkhozes', resulting from the enforcement of a totally new and alien form of agriculture on a hostile population.

Once it became apparent to the peasants that the pressure on them was not being eased but that the terror was being systematically increased, the Ukrainian rural population turned to armed opposition. Initially such resistance consisted only of local retaliatory actions against Soviet Russian officials, members of the secret police and local communists. However, when the terror assumed a mass character and brutality of the utmost forms such as the eviction of whole families and villages in wintertime, then uprisings began to take place all over Ukraine. To name but a few examples, there were revolts in Tarashcha of the Kyiv region, in the Mykhailivka, Pereschepyna and Pavlohrad districts of the Dnipropetrovsk region, in the Drabova and Holo-Prysten districts of the Kherson province, in the regions of Kamenets-Podilskyi and Vynnytsia, as well as many other places. As the authorities fled to the large towns, the peasants began to take apart the collectives.

In the province of Chernihiv, peasant uprisings had the support of the 21st Chernihiv Regiment and were only crushed after mass concentrations of OGPU and regular troops were deployed against them.⁵⁶

Resistance to collectivization was also widespread in other non-Russian republics and areas of the Soviet Union, especially in Kuban, Caucasus, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.⁵⁷ During this show of opposition thousands of party officials were killed and tens of thousands of rebels executed or deported.

Uprisings at this time were doomed to failure. The differences in resources between the two protagonists were too great. At one end stood a vast empire with its huge imperial system, a large army, an extensive government apparatus, a network of secret police, a large party structure with its auxiliary organisations;

56) BOLUBASH, p. 39.

57) Detailed account of resistance in Hryhory KOSTIUK: *Stalinist Rule in Ukraine*, pp. 10-17; Robert CONQUEST: *Agricultural Workers in the USSR*, pp. 19-30; W.E.D. ALLEN: *The Ukraine. A History*, pp. 324-333.

at the other end was the Ukrainian peasant, weaponless, starving and exhausted. However, it was the stubborn will of the peasant that made him stand up to his mighty adversary in an utterly hopeless battle. The strong convictions of the peasant gave him the will to continue fighting rather than submit to Russian oppression and the enforced collectivization. The peasant preferred to resist all the encroachments on his freedom and rise up in opposition against overwhelming forces and face almost certain death in defence of his traditions and cultural heritage, handed down from father to son through many generations.

Purges of the cities and the Intelligentsia

'De-kulakization' and collectivization were initiated together with an overall stiffening of political pressures in Ukraine. When the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical industries faced shortages in 1927 and 1928, the OGPU arrested a group of administrators and engineers from the Donbas area in February, 1928. They were branded as saboteurs in the pay of foreign intelligence services and tried in the city of Shakhty on fabricated evidence. After the Shakhty trial every technician and administrator in whose scope of work something went wrong was suspected and accused of sabotage. In the first half of the 1929-1930 business year, industrial quotas once again were not fulfilled. The OGPU immediately increased its arrests. The summer of 1930 saw the arrest of employees of the food industry on the charge of sabotaging the food supply. In the autumn of the same year some specialists of the Ukrainian SSR's Commissariat of Agriculture and some members of the All-Ukrainian Agronomic Society, indicted as alleged saboteurs, were arrested. A campaign of public criticism of non-Marxist scientists was also initiated. In April, 1929, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was compelled to elect for the first time members of the Communist Party such as Zatonsky, Skrypnyk, Yavorsky and Shlikhter. From 1930, the Academy became subject to government supervision and its activity was incorporated into the programme of the Five-Year

Plan. At the same time writers' and artists' organizations of Soviet Russia and the Russian Academy of Sciences became renamed All-Union organizations giving them the right to control and have authority over corresponding institutions in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union.

The period of the Five-Year Plan witnessed the development of an increasingly centralized government in the Soviet Union, which led to limitations on independent actions of the Ukrainian SSR. On December 7th, 1929, the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Agriculture became subordinated to the newly created Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR. On 5th January, 1932, the Supreme Councils of Economy of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR were abolished and replaced by the Union Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

This change brought about a huge reduction in the control of Ukraine over its industry. Whereas in 1927 the government of Ukraine had direct or indirect control of over 81.2% of Ukrainian industry, in 1932 it only controlled 37.5%, with the rest falling under the full control of Russia. The long cherished aim of Moscow to identify the Soviet Union with Russia and control the separate development of the non-Russian republics of the USSR was being put into practice. Centralization was eradicating what little independent development the Ukrainian SSR had.

Russia was trying to pacify the rural communities of Ukraine and extinguish all resistance from the peasantry. In addition it wanted to gain control over industry, political, cultural, religious and academic institutions of Ukraine. The countryside, therefore, was being purged by famine, and the urban life of Ukraine by purges of its government, Communist Party, and of all walks of life which could develop the republic as a separate entity.

This centralization of power and growth of Russian chauvinism led to new and more intensive attacks on Ukrainian nationalism. In April 1929, the OGPU allegedly discovered a group of small underground organizations, among them the National Party of Liberation of Ukraine operating in the Vynnytsia region. In the same year public attacks on renowned academics, among them Hrushevsky and Yefremov were launched, accusing them

of nationalism. July, 1929, saw mass arrests of alleged members of the Union of Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), and the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM). It is stated in some accounts that about 5,000 people were arrested during this wave of arrests but only 45 were actually brought to an open trial from March 9th to April 19th, 1930, in Kharkiv. Most of those arrested were older Ukrainian intellectuals and members of former anti-Soviet political parties, like the Socialist-Federalists and Social Democrats. Included in their number were well known academics such as Yefremov and Slabchenko, distinguished teachers, lecturers, scientists and writers such as Durdukivsky, Nikovsky, Chekhivsky, Hermaize, Starytska-Cherniakhivska and Hantsov. All of them were sentenced to long periods of exile in concentration camps, the Solovki Islands and Siberia.⁵⁸

The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Youth Association were said to have had cells in all the major cities of Ukraine and were reported to be working on the preparation of insurrections to restore an independent Ukrainian state. Stalin was aware of the continuing work of the underground organisations and expressed his fears as early as April 26th, 1926, in a letter to Kaganovich, where he said that the Ukrainian stand could "assume the character of a struggle for the alienation of Ukrainian culture and social life from the common Soviet cultural and social life, of a struggle against Moscow and the Russians in general."⁵⁹ Thus, the struggle against the peasantry very clearly indicated national and political traits in dealing with collectivization and resistance to it. The policy against the political and cultural fields applied simultaneously with the removal of food and grain from the Ukrainian villages merely pointed to the direction in which the Russian leadership was heading — the destruction of all forms of independent activity in Ukraine, total control by Moscow, and the extermination of nationalistic elements and intelligentsia, who could lead the Ukrainian nation in an insurrection against the Russians. The peasantry would also have to be pacified even if millions were

58) KUBIJOVYČ, pp. 817-818.

59) Joseph STALIN: *Sochinenia (Works)*, VIII, pp. 157-163.

to perish from starvation, and their resistance to collectivization would have to be resolved.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was also accused of nationalism and subsequently the Church as the source of national religious leadership was dissolved and thousands of its officials and clergy were either shot or deported.

In February, 1931, a new round of arrests was launched. This time more Ukrainian intellectual leaders were charged with membership of the underground Ukrainian National Centre. Moscow planned to eliminate those who were capable of organising the peasants and of organising leadership to a new national revolution or peasant uprisings, as a result of the growing peasant resistance to collective forms of agriculture. The Kremlin in total disregard of whether the victims of the political and cultural terror were loyal to Moscow or not, gave orders that a campaign of wholesale and systematic destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and leading cadres was to be commenced. Here, as in the villages, Moscow resorted to draconic measures of conscious mass extermination of the Ukrainian population as the best means to crush opposition to the enforcement of Stalinist rule. As a result of the new terror — Shershel, Mazurenko, Holubovych, and other politicians were shot, and many more deported.⁶⁰

Moscow often attempts to put the blame for the famine on the Ukrainian communists, but it was not they, who instituted the destruction of their own rural population and the campaigns to smash independent national, cultural, religious and other systematic development. The Ukrainian communists were placed in a very precarious position. On the one hand they were forced to carry out Moscow's directives to increase procurements of grain and foodstuffs and carry out attacks on 'deviating' intellectuals, and on the other to try and continue the policy of 'Ukrainization' of the 1920's and to slow down and decrease the rates of collectivization and forced procurements. Their frequent appeals to Moscow for aid and for the reduction of the scale and rate of delivery quotas were seen by Russia as clear manifestations

60) KUBIJOVYČ, p. 819.

of Ukrainian nationalism. The leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine were accused of placing local particular needs above those of the Five-Year Plan and the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. But those who initially put their faith and trust in Moscow, and who aided Russia in her policies, realized their mistake when it was already too late. Then unable to face further destruction of Ukraine, the Ukrainian communist leaders, Skrypnyk and Khvylovyi committed suicide.⁶¹

On December 14th, 1932, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party passed a resolution which accused the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine of tolerating a national deviation in its ranks. A second resolution on January 24th, 1933, accused the Ukrainian communist leadership of being unable to cope with the agricultural situation and blamed it for the failure of Ukraine to fulfil the required grain quota. To solve the problem, the resolution appointed Pavel Postyshev as First Secretary of the Metropolitan Kharkiv party provincial committee, and Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He arrived in Ukraine with Vsevolod Balitsky, who became the chief of the OGPU in Ukraine, with Sarkis, the plenipotentiary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party for grain collection, a large staff of Russian officials, and 1,340 members of the newly created 'political departments' of the MTS, who were also officials of the secret police.

Postyshev's first achievement after his arrival in Ukraine was the enforced public admission by the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on February 3rd to 7th, 1933, accepting sole responsibility for the breakdown of agriculture in Ukraine, and that it had been possible to fulfil all the grain quotas since 1931. The plenum was also forced to agree with Postyshev's demand to organise a mass purge of the Communist Party of Ukraine and call on the OGPU to carry out this new attack at all enemies of the state. Thus whilst a devastating famine was decimating the countryside of Ukraine, a new wave of terror was initiated in which the Communist Party of Ukraine was the first to suffer. For between June 1st, 1932, and

61) *Russian Oppression in Ukraine*, London, 1962, p. 75 and pp. 98-99.

October 1st, 1933, 75% of all officials of the local soviets and 80% of the secretaries of local party committees were dismissed from their posts. Most of those dismissed were arrested. By this latest wave of purges the total membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine was reduced from 520,000 on June 1st, 1932, to 470,000 on October 1st, 1933. The purged members of the Party were either shot or deported to concentration camps.

Postyshev followed the purge of the Ukrainian communists with a purge of the government of the Ukrainian SSR. On March 1st, 1933, Liubchenko was appointed as the Vice-Premier, Skrypnyk was replaced by Zatonsky in the Commissariat of Education and appointed instead as Head of the Planning Commission, and Andrei Khvylya became Deputy Commissar of Education.

March, April and May witnessed increased arrests by the secret police of leading Ukrainian personalities associated with Ukrainization, and who expressed dissatisfaction with Russia's agricultural policy in Ukraine. In connection with this M. Khvylovyi, a leading literary figure and prominent communist, committed suicide on May 13th, 1933. At the June, 1933, plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Skrypnyk was openly attacked for the first time by Postyshev. On July 4th, 1933, at the meeting of Ukrainian Marxist research workers, Shlikhter and Zatonsky accused Skrypnyk of being at the head of a Ukrainian nationalist deviation in the Communist Party, of introducing 'compulsory Ukrainization' and misinterpreting Marxism in his theory of the nationalities problem. As a result, a meeting of the Kharkiv Party was summoned to examine Skrypnyk on July 7th, 1933, but in anticipation of his fate he committed suicide and was found dead that same morning.

Skrypnyk's death signalled the intensification of the terror for it removed the last important source of opposition to the enforced Russification within the Communist Party of Ukraine. By October 15th, 1933, 27,000 Communists were expelled from the party in Ukraine and immediately arrested. By the end of 1933, 29% of the total membership of the party had been affected by the purge. In 1934 an additional 15% were expelled.

At the same time, a simultaneous purge was organized in the Commissariat of Education by Zatonksy. His own figures state that 2,000 teachers and 1,650 lecturers of the institutions of higher education were expelled in the second half of 1933. Additional purges were launched in the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, in the Scientific research institutes, and in the editorial boards of magazines and newspapers. In March 1933 officials of the Commissariat of Agriculture, headed by Komar-Palashchuk, were shot for alleged sabotage, and in August of the same year Slipansky and other agricultural economists at the Academy of Agricultural Sciences were charged with organizing the famine and arrested. Preventive police terror became legalised in 1934, when on June 8th, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decreed that treason was punishable by death. The definition of treason included attempts to escape abroad, and attempts at the violation of the integrity of the territory of the Soviet Union. This was in direct contradiction to Article 4 of the Soviet Constitution which clearly stated that the composite republics of the USSR had the right to withdraw from the Union. The charges against the Ukrainian intellectuals in 1930-1934 were mostly fabricated and falsified. 'Ukrainian nationalism' now became an offence punishable by death or else long-term sentences and deportation to concentration camps.

As a result of the Russian terror in Ukraine, the policy of Russification and the extension of Russian control over all walks of life in Ukraine had a marked effect on the number of pupils in schools where Ukrainian was the language of instruction. The proportion declined from 88.5% in 1932-1933 down to 85.5% in 1934-1935, 83% in 1935-1936 and 78% in 1938-1939. The proportion of Ukrainian students in higher education decreased from 66.7% in 1930-1931 to 60% in 1934-1935 and 54.2% in 1937-1938. Ukrainian schools and the Ukrainian press were closed down completely in the Russian SFSR in 1934.⁶² The Russification also brought about the reduction of the teaching of Ukrainian subjects in schools. A good example is the teaching of Ukrainian history. Until 1930 Ukrainian history was still being taught in

62) KUBIJOVYČ, pp. 822-825.

schools throughout Ukraine, but after that year this practice was ceased and only Russian history was taught.

Results of the famine

As a consequence of Russia's policies towards Ukraine throughout the whole period of 1929-1933, the enforced collectivization, the raging terror and the artificial famine, no less than 5 million Ukrainians perished. The various sources quoted in the studies and documentary works on the theme of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933 all vary in their figures and range from 3 million to 8.5 million, in some cases considerably higher. For example, unofficial estimates of the death toll state that at least 10% of the Ukrainian populace (over 3 million) perished. Dmytro Solovey mentions the figure 6.5 million, Otto Shiller (the former German agricultural attache to the Soviet Union) claims 7.5 million, Balitsky (the former head of the OGPU in Ukraine) states 8.5 million, Richard Sallet says 10 million and Robert Conquest — 14 million (for all the affected areas). Even Stalin himself admitted the death of 10 million people during the enforcement of collectivization from 1929 to 1933 in a conversation with Churchill at Yalta on 15th August, 1943.⁶³

The fact is, however, that it is impossible to give a genuine figure for the total of deaths during this period since Russia has concealed the official figures which have never been published in fifty years, in an attempt to cover up all evidence of Moscow's crime against the population of Ukraine. Thus, it is only possible to present an average figure based on sources which present various estimates. Using this method, the total of Ukrainians to perish during this period amounts to about 6.5 million.

Taking the official data of the Ukrainian population to be 29,494 000, according to the census of December 17th, 1926, and 30,960 200, according to that of January 17th, 1939, and the

63) For a more complete table of estimates of the total deaths during the Famine see Anna BOLUBASH 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1978, p. 18. See also Winston CHURCHILL *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, book 2, chapter 5.

natural increase before collectivization (1924-1927) to be 2.36% per year, it can be computed that the territory of Ukraine at that time, excluding its ethnographic areas, lost 7.5 million people between the two censuses. Such a high figure is accounted for by the number of those who died of famine, those killed and exiled during the terror and repression and the decrease in the number of births.⁶⁴


This figure can only be reliable if the population data for 1939 was not inflated and if the colonists from the RSFSR and other areas of the USSR were not brought in between the two censuses. Some 3.7 million Russian colonists, however, were settled in Ukraine between 1926 and 1959 with no less than 1.5 million arriving between 1926 and 1939. The total loss, therefore, would probably have been in the range of 8.5 to 9 million and of these at least 6.5 million died of starvation.⁶⁵

This had far-reaching effects and severe consequences for Ukraine. The destruction of such a large part of the population stifled the biological growth and weakened the demographic structure of the Ukrainian nation. The separate development of Ukraine, in the national, cultural, political and religious fields, was halted by the purge of a large proportion of the national and religious leadership and the educated elite, and all forms of independent life were disrupted. The peasantry — the backbone of the nation — and the major support for the elite — was either destroyed, or driven into communes and thus made into slaves of the state.

The reduction of population also aided the further Russification of Ukraine. Since whole areas were devastated and whole villages depopulated, those who died had to be replaced as there were not enough people to work on the collectives. To solve this problem Moscow brought in colonists from Russia and other republics of the Soviet Union into Ukraine to take the place of the deceased peasants of Ukraine. In this way an even more mixed society could be established in the towns and villages of Ukraine. This was designed to stifle further development of the Ukrainian nation and to disrupt all forms of independent life.

64) SOLOVEY, 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XIX, Nos 3 and 4, 1963.

65) Ibid.



Cemetery in Kharkiv, 1933: the frozen bodies of the starved

Collectivization and the famine brought about the complete destruction of almost the entire privately owned agriculture of Ukraine in 1930-1933. All the land belonging to the peasants was confiscated, all the means of production, including the cattle, were seized and the farmers themselves were brought under the full control of the state and compelled to concentrate their labour and efforts on the needs of the state.

Ukraine was not to have a separate existence from Russia in any aspect of life, whatsoever, and Moscow was trying to make sure that Ukrainian resistance and opposition would not have an opportunity of resurgence again. Thus, everything that had been achieved in Ukraine since the National Revolution of 1917-1921, and during the national and cultural revival of the 1920's was temporarily ground to a halt.

It has taken a long time for Ukraine to recover from the terrible blow delivered to its population by Russia in the late 1920's and the 1930's, especially during the organised famine of 1932-1933, which took its toll of millions of innocent victims, who died in a struggle of opposition to Russian control of Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

The immediate cause of the famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 was the seizure of all the grain and other agricultural products, as well as all the foodstuffs from the rural population of Ukraine, by the representatives of the Soviet Russian regime. However, the famine cannot be understood on its own but becomes intelligible only in the context of the Russian plan to find a solution to the nationality question in the Soviet Union. Those nationalities, which were considered to be the most serious real or potential threats to the plans of Moscow — Ukraine, the Don and Kuban Cossacks and the Volga Germans, were precisely those nationalities whose territories were to suffer the most in the artificially caused famine in 1932-1933.

In Ukraine, the largest of these nations, and the one which presented the greatest impediment to Russian plans to achieve a centralised and Russian dominated Soviet Union, the famine cannot be understood without reference to the simultaneous policies towards the Ukrainian elites and occurrences in the cities of Ukraine. In the context of the mass destruction of the national, cultural and religious leadership, the fall of Skrypnyk, the Postyshev terror, the end of Ukrainization and the beginning of Russification, all these events fall into place as the Russian plan to solve the nationality problem in Ukraine.

In Ukraine the collectivization of agriculture and the resulting famine were not only a means of enserfing the rural population in the collectives, to push them into harder efforts and make the individual collective workers produce greater amounts of foodstuffs for the state, they were also part of a general plan of the

leadership of the Russian Communist Party to destroy all Ukrainian independent development and the struggle for sovereignty and independence from Russian control. They provided a weapon of revenge against a rebellious population and a device to strangle potential opposition.

It must also be said that Stalin alone cannot be blamed for the famine. The whole Russian Communist Party bears responsibility for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation, as well as that of the other nationalities in the Soviet Union in 1929-1933. The events have never been revealed by Moscow and have been kept quiet for half a century and are still officially denied.

Although Khrushchev exposed and denounced Stalin's crimes at the 20th and 22nd Party Congress, he said very little and nothing concrete about the genocide in Ukraine in the early 1930's. He spoke of Stalin's proposals to deport the entire Ukrainian population and his plans to destroy the intelligentsia of Ukraine but made little mention of the millions who died as a result of the deportations, the political terror and the other persecutions of 1929-1932. and the artificial famine of 1932-1933. These events are still 'officially unknown'. Khrushchev felt that he could not place the blame for these mass crimes entirely on Stalin's shoulders, for he was well aware that the responsibility lay with the whole Russian Communist Party and himself as one of its functionaries.

The famine and collectivization were designed to drive the Ukrainian peasantry into the 'kolkhozes' and thus turn them into slaves of the state. These policies also had a far reaching aim to break the resistance of the Ukrainian nation to Russian occupation and solve, once and for all, the problem of the Ukrainian struggle for the preservation and further development of their national culture and political and economic independence from Russian control.

Although the famine of 1932-1933 was only one of the stages in the struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry and workers and intellectuals against the Russian occupation, it was the climax of this struggle and the greatest tragedy ever suffered by Ukraine. It was Moscow's answer to the inflexible struggle of the Ukrainians

for the right to their own land and the freedom to till it, and for the right to their native language and independent national existence.

As a result of the famine the peasants suffered a terrible blow but their very nature was not changed and their resistance was not completely broken. The peasants have never accepted the new and completely alien system of collectivized agriculture enforced on them by Moscow. The agriculture itself has never recovered from the ruin afflicted on it by collectivization and consequently to this day it is unable to provide enough agricultural products to feed the population of the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainians continued to fight for their freedom after 1933, throughout the thirties and the Second World War in the form of the underground activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the armed struggle for liberation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The fight was continued into the 1950's and 1960's and even to this day the Ukrainian people are not giving up the struggle for independence and national sovereignty which is still going on by whatever means possible.

The Ukrainian nation will never forget the huge crime of genocide committed against its people by Russia and remembering those who perished through the organised famine in 1932-1933, will carry on fighting against the Russian invaders in order to attain such conditions in a free Ukraine that the future generations of its inhabitants would never again experience the horrors of a famine and could live a normal and decent life.

Let the holocaust in Ukraine serve as a warning to the countries presently occupied or threatened by Russia, that Moscow is prepared to employ any means whatsoever to achieve its aims, regardless of the cost in human lives, even the extermination of a large proportion of the population of nations unwilling to submit to Russian occupation, by deportations, executions, and finally by man-made famine.

APPENDICES

Eyewitness Accounts of the man-made Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933

Mykola SHTEFAN

THE LETTER

I was ten years old when armed bands called 'cheka' began to raid villages in Ukraine. One day these 'chekists' suddenly appeared in our hamlet.* Our neighbours ran away from their homes, but our family for some reason was caught in the cottage. It was hard to understand them, not only because they spoke a different language, but because they were drunk. Shouting insults they shot at the ceiling or the floor and then fell upon my father and elder brother and began to beat them. My mother tried to protect my father and brother. The result was that soon all three of them lay insensible on the floor in their own blood, beaten by the thugs' gun butts. Having taken all those things which caught their fancy, the chekists departed.

After some time my mother and my brother regained consciousness and, a little later, my father. He had a large white beard which seemed to have become still whiter now; it looked like a white poster with a large red spot of dried blood.

After this incident we were almost sure that the chekists would not disturb us again, but we were wrong. They did come again, —

* Hamlet of Chervy-Bychky in the county of Kozelsk in Poltava province.

the same gang. They set fire to our cottage and other buildings, took my father and elder brother and departed. On the way my brother was ordered to get off the wagon and take 50 steps to one side. They were getting ready to shoot him, but just before the command to fire was given my brother dashed away in the evening twilight, and vanished in the nearby ravine. Hundreds of shots failed to reach him. Then they fell upon my father, beat him up on the way and then, in the cheka quarters in Kreminchuk, they killed him. They threw his corpse into the street and ordered the village soviet authorities of Pryhariw to take it back to our hamlet. We were glad that my brother had escaped, but on the Saturday before Whit Sunday the cheka detachment caught him together with his friend Ivan Kuzmenko, by Sytnyk pond in the county of Kozelsk. They were shot on the spot. I saw their bodies, mutilated and shot many times.

Now only my mother, my two younger brothers and myself remained. I went away. There were many such waifs and strays as I was at that time. After a while I went back and helped my mother to build a small cottage, and by 1929 we again had a horse and cow, and began farming again in cooperation with a neighbour.

Then they came again, — a different gang this time. I did not wait to be caught, and ran away before they arrived. My mother and brothers managed somehow till 1932 when all of them were driven out of the cottage, the horse and the cow confiscated and the elder of my two brothers was sent as a 'class enemy' to a concentration camp in northern Russia. He was not alone, Maksym Bychok, Trokhym Cheremys, Pavlo Khvydrya, Semen Starchyk and many others kept him company. The menfolk exiled, the grain swept away, my mother and brother wandered from house to house.

I obtained forged documents, changed my name and worked at the railway station in Donbas. By sending a letter through other people I received one in return from my brother:

"Greetings, dear brother!

"We were very glad to receive a letter from you. Maybe you will remain alive. Mother and I lead a very hard life. Mother has become so thin and weak that she can hardly walk, and we

are in dire straits, walking from one collective or state farm to another from morning till night, but they drive us away and will not give us work. Mother's legs have begun to swell and it makes me very sad to think that soon I shall be left all alone. My legs have not swollen yet, but they are aching. The pain is so sharp sometimes that I have to try very hard not to cry, because mother may feel bad about it. To add to this it is getting colder and we have no clothes, mother has no shoes at all and mine are almost gone. No money to buy them, and yet there are no shoes in the stores. Collective and state farms are about to finish threshing and all the grain is hauled to the railway station. When it gets much colder and the snow covers the ground then we have not a single grain to keep us alive in winter. Even now we are so hungry that sometimes I faint. We ask you, dearest brother, to send us a loaf of bread if you have money to buy it, if not please send us all the crumbs and small pieces of bread that may be left from your meal. It does not matter if they are very small or are burned, we'll eat them here, because mother and I are so hungry. I will remain grateful to you for this help until I die!

Your brother Fedir and Mother”.

Having read this letter I sold everything I could, got permission to stay away from work for a few days, bought food and went to visit my mother and brother. But before I even entered my native hamlet I was arrested, because they had been hunting for me for a long time and were ready. They took me to the county seat and thence, with three others, to a deportation camp near Kiev, called Lenin's Smithy. Then we worked on Trukhaniv island, near Kiev, building a bridge across the Dnieper and at the end of 1932, we were sent in sealed boxcars beyond Baikal to build new mines and dig coal.

Ten long dreary years passed thus. Very few of those comrades who had arrived with me in the sealed cars were still alive. But I returned.

When I came to Chervy-Bychky I could not find anything. The site where our cottage had stood was plowed up. My mother and my brother died waiting for me to bring them food, — died from hunger, — and no one could tell me where their grave was.

From *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*. A White Book, Vol.1.

SPEAK RUSSIAN OR STARVE

I am a native of Kiev province, from the village of Bridky in the administrative unit of Parada.

In June, 1931, I was drafted by the bolshevik government for compulsory work in the city of Marupil to build the Lenin Factory named "Azovatel". There were many others brought here from Ukrainian villages, about 400 people, and we were lodged in the former Theological Seminary building under the watchful eyes of the NKVD.

The living conditions in that place were dreadful. Our daily ration consisted of 11 ounces of bread and some thin soup (balanda). Dirty rags on the bare floors, full of crawling lice, served for beds. We did heavy work under these conditions, dug ditches and carried bricks.

Close to the seminary was a separate enclosure, protected by barbed wire, in which 4,000 priests and 36 'deviationists' were being detained. They fared even worse than we did. All of them were completely naked, hungry, and during hot spells they were not allowed enough water to drink but were forced to do the heaviest work. Numbers of them died every day.

At the first opportunity that presented itself, after three months of this living hell, I ran away. To remain at large I had to work at some very heavy jobs, and be constantly on the lookout for NKVD men.

I came home on April 5, 1932, and there learned that the NKVD was again looking for me as a traitor and deviationist. I had to go away. I thought that I might get some work in Donbas and lose myself there. But when I came to the railway station on April 11 I was not able to buy a ticket to the place I wished. The only way left was to go to Moscow to work at the construction of the Moscow-Donbas railway line.

There were others in the same predicament. We were told by the employment agent: "You have two alternatives, to go and work at railway construction, or starve".

Ten days later we made up our minds. Transportation charges, amounting to 34 rubles per person, had to be paid in advance. That night we were loaded in boxcars with a double row of bunkbeds. Each car had to accommodate 110 men and we were rather crowded. The next day our train with a human load of 4,000 was dispatched to Moscow. Not an ounce of bread or a drop of soup was given us while we were on the way and the result was that by May 1 eight had died. They died from hunger.

We were not allowed to get off the train in Moscow, but were taken to the town of Kashira 75 miles away. Since we were such a long time without food 370 more died on the way.

We spent four days in Kashira being organized for work, but still there was no food. Then we began to beg, but those who could not speak Russian did not get any help. The Russians would say: "I won't give you any bread if you cannot ask in Russian. Go back where you came from, and perish there from hunger!"

Twenty-five others and I were sent with the railway survey party from Kashira back to Moscow. We surveyed 67 miles in 30 days, and each night stayed in a different village.

I had an opportunity to observe the life of the 'muzhiks' in the Russian villages. It was different from life in the Ukrainian villages. Each farmer had, on the average, 4 horses, 6 cows, sheep and pigs, while in Ukraine the people had been deprived of all their possessions and were starving. The Russians had bread, meat, and potatoes were rotting in the farm yards. No one dreamed of any famine here!

I worked here for a year. Towards the end I lived in a Moscow suburb, and saw Ukrainians come to buy bread, which they tried to take back to their dying families in Ukraine.

I left Moscow on April 20, 1933, after having provided myself with 79 pounds of bread. When about to leave I met two women from my native village who had come to Moscow to buy bread. Our journey was uneventful until we reached Bakhmach on the Russian-Ukrainian border. Here, all the passengers were ordered by the NKVD to go to the customs office, where the officials took away my bread, leaving me only 9 pounds. This was in

consideration of the fact that I had been working in Moscow, but my countrywomen were not only robbed of their bread but were themselves detained for 'taking' bread away from Russia.

These two unfortunate women left hungry children at home. Their husbands died from hunger, and the children were alone. They never came back.

After my arrival in my native village I was ordered by the village soviet chairman, a Moscow henchman, Klym Komiychenko, to oversee a brigade of women, swollen from hunger, whose task it was to sow and weed sugar beets. Practically all the people in the village were suffering and swollen, many were already dead from hunger. The work these hungry women were doing was too hard for them, and they would fall down and die. It was terrible to look at them, the skin cracked and water oozed out. The peak of mortality was reached just before the harvest.

Then another man and I were ordered to roam over the village and gather up the corpses...

...The hot weather hastened the decomposition of the bodies and the stench in the village was unendurable. About twenty people died every day and there was no one to bury them. Four men were steadily employed at the cemetery, digging graves. We brought in the dead on the wagon like logs. No one lamented their deaths because their families or relatives lay sick or were already dead. The NKVD agent, a Russian, was telling us what to do. People were buried worse than cattle. If I should, by some miracle, return to my native village I would be able to find all those holes where more than half the people in the village were buried.

I worked at this collection of the dead for two months, and then myself swelled with hunger. All I had to eat during that time was $3\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of bread and a small potato a day and lack of other foods, especially meat and fats, began to affect my body. I ate nettles, lambs quarters, locust flowers and drank water. My body swelled so badly that I could walk no longer, I could only crawl along.

But luckily for me, the ears of rye began to fill with a milky substance. I greedily sucked the ears and the swelling abated.

In Moscow I had weighed over 200 pounds, but now I was only 106. Slowly my strength returned. I could walk, and in four weeks was out of danger, thanks to the ears of rye.

Then I managed to get hold of some forged documents, and I went to Donbas. I never went back to my native village.

From The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book, Vol. 1.

Sava SHYNKARENKO

BLACKLISTED

The village of Verbky lies about 3 miles north of Pawlohrad, in the province of Dnipropetrovsk, on the river Samara. Of considerable size, it is cut almost in half by the highway leading to Lozova and by the railway in the western end.

It was the autumn of 1932. Almost all the villages in Ukraine, like Verbky, failed to fulfil the grain quotas, which were raised impossibly high just for this purpose.

At this terrible time Verbky was one of those very backward villages whose names appeared on the country's black list. All the villages were decorated by huge black boards on which the names of people, of whole villages, or of industrial plants appeared. Everyone and everything that was regarded as backward and harmful to administration plans was thus branded by the bolshevik leaders. All those blacklisted were subject to public abuse, received less food and were persecuted at every step. Briefly, they were candidates for prison terms and all the other forms of punishment.

At this time the village was teeming with 'commissioners' sent by the higher party organs to do a thorough job of successful grain collection. They were strangers from the central provinces of Russia: Bugrov, Pukhteyev, Avtomonov, army commissar Teplov, Senin from the militia, and others. They were loyal pets of Stalin, who had no mercy for the poor people in the county.

The brigades they organized cleaned out the collective farms of all their grain. But the quantity collected fell far short of the plan. Then these brigades invaded the homes of the members of the collective and began to 'collect' everything, the grain the

people received as their yearly wage for work in the collective, as well as handfuls raised in their gardens. All windmills were closed, the only village store was closed, and the people were forbidden to leave the place. Watchmen encircled it and a boycott of the village was proclaimed. The county seat, Pavlohrad, was decorated with posters urging people to "Boycott Verbky" and stores displayed the warning: "Verbky people stay out!"



Mr. Pukhteyev sits at the table. He is drunk and in a belligerent mood. Banging his fist on the table he shouts at the widow, Anna Solod:

"Only till tomorrow! If you don't deliver 220 bushels of grain by tomorrow we'll scatter all your rubbish heap to the winds!"

"Where can I get it? Even now we have nothing to eat."

"You first of all deliver to the state, and then think about yourself!"

The next day a sign appeared on the white walls of the widow's cottage: "Shame to the saboteur and enemy of the grain collection plan!" It was illustrated by a cartoon. A whole brigade of seven men went to search for grain. They scattered everything in the cottage, demolished the oven, dug the earthen floor, but there was no grain hidden anywhere. The widow fainted from grief and despair and the children ran away.

The whole village groaned in the Russian talons. Seeing no way out from the unbearable situation Dmytro Chapla, Pavlo Volyn and Petro Yavtushenko hanged themselves. The latter scribbled before committing suicide: "I cannot live any longer in this hell."

These dreadful events were followed by many arrests. More than 200 men were put in prison or sent to concentration camps in Siberia. Those who gleaned in the fields because they had nothing to eat, those who did not welcome the officials, those who had little hand mills, in short all whom the Russians disliked for one reason or another — all were arrested. They were charged with "counter-revolutionary activities." The Moscow bullies were assisted by Ukrainian turncoats: Havrylo Lytvynenko, Ilko Moronets and Petro Trotsenko.

Later, in the fall, the whole management of the collective 'Lenin's Memorial' was arrested for trying to protect people as much as they could. Their names were: Roman Kolisnyk, Yakiv Lytvynenko, Yukhym Shpurenko and Ivan Trotsenko (Mamay). They were sentenced to 6, 8, and 10 years in the far concentration camps.

Others also received similar treatment: Oksana Vasylichenko was sent for three years to a concentration camp for gleaning; Danylo Demchenko, Sofron Kotenko, Panko Shynkarenko and Tyshchenko and many others were sent away for being politically unreliable, — they talked 'counter-revolution' — when all these people did was to complain that life had become much harder since they were forced to join collective farms.

These persecutions were followed by a terrible famine which lasted till the next harvest. The toll was 997 persons out of a total of 7,000. There were only two births.

I cannot forget the date April 30, 1933. A beautiful sunny day, cherry orchards in bloom. Only to live! But a wagon loaded with the dead moves slowly and all is gone. That day 20 villagers were buried in a common grave.

I remember some of their names: Maria Buzoverya; Matviy Kolisnyk and all his family: Ivan, Pelagia and Dmytro; Khoma Ponomarenko; Ilko Ryabukha and his family: Petro, Maria and Ulyana; Panas Tkachenko; and many others.

That year the whole family of the young poet Hryhoriy Chapla died. His father, one of the poorest in the village, was the first to join the collective farm 'Zirka'. When the poet, who taught public school in the village of Khandeleyivka in the neighbouring county, came home to help his kin he found all of them dead. The thatch on the cottage was half gone, windows broken. The number of such deserted cottages grew and grew.

The people in Verbky were dying out. The same thing happened in the neighbouring villages. It was at a time when government granaries were bursting with grain.

From The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book, Vol. 1.

THE APPEARANCE OF A DEPOPULATED VILLAGE

Description of a journey through the village of Sotnykivka in the Yahotyn District, Poltava Province. She passed through the village on her way to work on beet-raising collective farms in the spring of 1933.

...The streets and houses were overgrown with weeds. There were no signs of any living thing, human or animal, on the streets, not even a cat or a dog. In some of the houses the doors and windows were open, while in others they had been removed to fire the stoves and there were only black spaces showing. In the weeds around the houses and evidently in the houses themselves decomposing human corpses were lying about, because an incredibly putrid odour, intensified by the warm weather, permeated the village...

From *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book*, Vol. 2.

V. BOKOVSKY

TRAGEDIA NATSIYI (THE TRAGEDY OF A NATION)

...The villages were reduced to a wasteland. All the fruit had been eaten while it was still green and the gardens had all become completely overgrown with weeds. In the deathly silence nothing at all could be heard, neither the chirping of sparrows, the croaking of crows, nor the barking of dogs since all of these living creatures had long since been eaten up. Those people who still had the strength to move, wandered around in search of any roots or the seed of weeds they could find so that they could, at least, boil these for their dying children, wailing and begging for something to eat...

From *Vyzvolny Shlakh (The Liberation Path)*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 1983, London.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALLEN, William E. D.: *The Ukraine. A History*. Cambridge, The University Press, 1940.
- AMMENDE, Dr. Ewald: *Human Life in Russia*. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1936.
- The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book*, Vol. I, Toronto, Canada, The Basilian Press, 1953. Vol. II, Detroit, USA, Globe Press, 1955.
- BOLUBASH, Anna: *The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 as an Instrument of Russian Nationalities Policy*. 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1978, pp. 11-23 and Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1979, pp. 31-59, London, The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain.
- CHURCHILL, Sir Winston S.: *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, London, Cassell, 1951.
- CONQUEST, Robert: *Blood on Kremlin Walls*. 'Daily Telegraph' (Saturday Column), November 13th, 1982.
- CONQUEST, Robert: *Harvard project on the Famine of 1933*. 'America', Philadelphia, USA, October 4th, 1982.
- DALRYMPLE, Dana G.: *The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934*. 'Soviet Studies', XV, 1963-1964, pp. 250-284.
- HALIY, Mykola: *The 25th Anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine*. 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', New York, USA, Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1958, pp. 204-214.
- KALYNYK, Oleksa: *Communism the Enemy of Mankind*. Documents and Comments, London, Ukrainian Youth Association, 1955.
- KAPUSTA, Fedir: *The Early Holocaust in Europe: Collectivization and Man-Made Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933*. 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, 1981, pp. 369-382.
- KHRUSHCHEV, N. S.: *Khrushchev Remembers*. London, Sphere Books, 1971.
- KUBIJOVYČ, Volodymyr (editor in chief): *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1963.
- MACE, Dr. James E.: *Why did the Famine Happen?* 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1982, pp. 47-49.
- MANNING, Clarence: *Ukraine Under the Soviets*. New York, Bookman Associates, 1953.
- MAZEPA, Izaak: *Ukrainians Under Bolshevik Rule*. 'The Slavonic and East European Review', Vol. XII (1933-1934), pp. 323-346.

- MUGGERIDGE, Malcolm: 'Manchester Guardian' (London), March 25, 27th and 28th, 1933. Reprinted in 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1979, as *The Great Famine in Ukraine — A Journalist's Eyewitness Account*, pp. 87-97.
- MYKULYN, Andriy: *The Russian Terrorist Regime and the Artificial Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933*. 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. V, No. 2, 1958, pp. 10-25.
- ORELETSKY, Vasyl: *Starvation of Ukraine by Moscow in 1921 and 1933*. 'The Ukrainian Review', Vol. X, No. 3, 1963, pp. 18-26.
- PIGIDO-PRAVOBEREZHNY, F.: *The Stalinist Famine. Ukraine in the Year 1933*. Ukrainian Youth Association in Great Britain, London, 1953.
- PLYUSHCH, Vasyl: *Genocide of the Ukrainian People. The Artificial Famine in the Years 1932-1933*. Munich, Ukrainian Institute for Politics and Education, 1973.
- Russian Oppression in Ukraine*. (Reports and Documents). Ukrainian Publishers, London, 1962.
- SOLOVEY, Dmytro: *The Golgotha of Ukraine*, (Eyewitness Accounts of the Famine in Ukraine), Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, USA, 1953.
- SOLOVEY, Dmytro: *On the 30th Anniversary of the Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine*. 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 and 4, 1963.
- SULLIVANT, Robert S.: *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962.
- 'The Ukrainian Quarterly', Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, 1982, Editorial — *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Holocaust in Ukraine*, pp. 5-13.
- WALKER, Thomas: *Six Million Perish in Soviet Famine*, Chicago, February 25th, 1935. *Hunger, Despair, Death in Ukraine Agony*, Chicago, March 4th, 1935, 'Chicago American' (Special news feature).
- WOROPAY, Olexa: *The Ninth Circle. Scenes from the Hunger Tragedy of Ukraine in 1933*. Ukrainian Youth Association in Great Britain, London, May, 1954.

