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COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION AND ON SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY UNITED STATES SENATE

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room SR-328A, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms and Boschwitz.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today we begin the second in our series of hearings into the state of Soviet agriculture. We are particularly interested in the productivity and the total output of Soviet agriculture.

The gap between Soviet food needs and the Soviet ability to produce food has created a vast new export market for the American farmer. We must ask ourselves whether the Soviet food shortfall is the result of poor technology, underinvestment and lack of training, or whether it is the result of some inherent defect in the Soviet system.

The first three might be overcome, but if there is an inherent defect, then we can expect Soviet food shortages to be permanent.

The experts assembled here this morning will be able to demonstrate, I believe, that the Soviet shortages are not the result of 66 years of bad weather. Rather, the Soviet shortages are the result of a political system so inhumane that it destroys the individual incentive to produce. It encourages waste of capital and machinery and is unable to distribute efficiently the little that is produced.

What we can expect to find here is that collectivization, as such, is the systematic and systemic poison that shrivels Soviet agriculture at the roots.

Our witnesses today will focus on the Ukraine, once known as the breadbasket of Europe. Yet, 50 years ago this year, this bounty was scattered forever by a political decision of the Soviet Government—the decision to force the Ukrainian farmers off their private plots and onto collective farms.

The evidence which will be presented here this morning will show that the Communist government in Moscow adopted a deliberate and diabolical plan to starve the Ukraine into submission.

Despite abundant harvests in 1932, the Soviets stripped the Ukraine of its food, removing over 4 million metric tons of grain alone. In the winter of 1932–33, over 6 million persons died in this Communist holocaust.

A little over 2 months ago, I arrived in Seoul, Korea, 20 minutes after the Soviets had deliberately shot down a planeload of 269 innocent men, women, and children. Now, many were shocked at this dramatic illustration of the Communist contempt for human life. But 50 years ago, the Soviets did the same thing to 6 million Ukrainians who got in the way of their consolidation of power.

Americans today are deeply concerned about the confrontation between the so-called superpowers. They hope that we can reduce the level of nuclear arms on both sides, and I join in that hope. Our trust in arms control is based upon the assumption that the Soviets will have enough concern about the welfare of their people to refrain from a first strike attack, with the resulting retaliation that would be visited upon the Soviet people.

Yet, when we see that the Soviets were willing to sacrifice 6 million of their own people to install an agricultural system that will not work, what sacrifice are they willing to make to achieve world domination through nuclear power?

What is the meaning of "an unacceptable risk" to the Soviets when history shows that they deliberately sacrificed 6 million human lives to an abstract ideology?

Czarist Russia produced 80 million metric tons of grain. After the holocaust in the Ukraine, it was not until the 1950's that the Soviet Union achieved stable levels equal to the czarist times, and even today it is hardly more than twice as much as the czarist period. Today we will have some specific comparisons with U.S. productivity.

At this point, I will insert a statement from Senator Zorinsky.

[The following statement was received by the committee:]

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD ZORINSKY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing today and, in particular, for focusing on the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33. The Ukrainian-American community is this year commemorating the famine's 50th anniversary. So there could be no more appropriate time for us to review the events of this Soviet-induced holocaust, which took the lives of 7 million people.

The famine was engineered by Stalin in an attempt to crush the Ukrainian people, secure collectivization of Ukraine's rich farmland and insure the industrialization of the U.S.S.R. All land and possessions were declared state property and all foodstuffs in the hands of the rural population were confiscated. Left with nothing to subsist on, millions of Ukrainians starved, even as the Soviet government denied the famine's existence. Sadly, this genocide is today largely unknown to the general public.

Mr. Chairman, the recent Soviet attack on an unarmed Korean passenger jetliner is a chilling reminder that the U.S.S.R. is still capable of atrocious brutality against innocent people. And there are disturbing parallels between this recent event and the famine of half a century ago. Today's hearing takes on a special meaning with the Korean plane incident as a backdrop.

I might add that I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Senate resolution commemorating the Ukrainian famine and demonstrating solidarity with the Ukrainian-Americans who are observing the 50th anniversary of the tragedy. The resolution also calls on the President to focus world attention on the famine through public and diplomatic channels. This hearing fits right in with the goals of that resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let us turn to the witnesses. Our first witness today was indeed an eyewitness of the Ukrainian holocaust, the distinguished British journalist, Malcolm Muggeridge. Mr. Muggeridge was just about the only Western correspondent to tell the truth about the manmade famine.

Now, unfortunately, Mr. Muggeridge was not able to accept our invitation to travel to Washington in person to give his testimony because he is getting on in years like some of the rest of us.

However, he consented to make a videotape for us in London which will be shown on the monitor in a moment. For the benefit of the reporter, I will say that a transcript of the TV commentary will be available and will appear in the record.

Mr. Muggeridge will be interviewed by Marco Carynnyk, who is here this morning to give a brief introduction of the circumstances of how the tape was made.

Mr. Carynnyk, if you will come forward and have a seat, we welcome you to the committee.

STATEMENT OF MARCO CARYNNYK, RESEARCH FELLOW, KENNAN INSTITUTE

Mr. CARYNNYK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for your invitation to present my interview with Malcolm Muggeridge at this hearing about the famine of 1932–33 in the Ukraine.

As a writer who has spent the last 4½ years studying the causes, course, and consequences of that famine, I am very pleased by your decision to take a look at a vitally important and long concealed episode in history.

When Stalin abandoned Lenin's New Economic Policy in favor of head-long industrialization and collectivization, he embarked on a second revolution directed solely and exclusively from above, which in its reach and strength was far more devastating than the revolution of 1917 or the civil war.

The dictator's blows fell most heavily on the peasantry. One hundred million peasants were compelled, often at gunpoint, to abandon the holdings they had won under the NEP, the New Economic Policy, and to join collective farms.

Several million, labeled as kulaks or kulak henchmen, were shot, exiled or absorbed into the rapidly growing network of concentration camps. The most horrible fate was reserved for Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, where some 6 million people were starved to death.

Stalin's heirs have not acknowledged his greatest crime. Denouncing his predecessor's mistakes in his famous secret speech in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev argued that as one of Stalin's great services, collectivization had to be carried to its logical end, and studiously avoided mentioning the killing of the peasants.

In the West, apologists for Stalin have denied that the famine occurred or have blamed it on peasant stubbornness. Even the New York Times, in a dispatch from Moscow in March 1933 when the famine was at its height, claimed that "there is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."

The atrocities of 1933 in the Ukraine, which are so inadequately termed the manmade famine or the great famine, constitute one of the most horrifying crimes of our brutal century. Yet the fact that this crime was perpetrated has been met in many quarters with an indifference bordering on cynicism and in some with a conspiracy of silence that is itself little short of criminal.

The primary reason for the conspiracy of silence, of course, is the calculated campaign of what is now called misinformation that the Soviet authorities mounted to keep their doings secret. Declaring the Ukraine out of bounds to reporters in order to hide the destruction they had wreaked, Stalin and his minions made concealment of the famine an integral part of Soviet foreign policy.

The fact that they did so was not in the least surprising. If the Soviet Government were to acknowledge the famine and accept relief, it would be making a concession to the peasants. But since the government was effectively at war with them, such a compromise would amount to an admission of defeat and a drop in international standing precisely at a time when the Soviet Government was propagandizing the economic and social triumph of the 5-year plan.

Striving for diplomatic recognition by the United States, admission into the League of Nations and nonaggression treaties with European powers, the Soviet Government could not indeed either tolerate criticism of its 5-year plan or admit that people were dropping dead of hunger in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Poltava.

This Soviet campaign was largely successful. Nazi and anti-Nazi, left and right, Stalinist and anti-Stalinist are arguing to this very day whether a famine occurred, and if so whether it was not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves.

But the Soviet lie would not have been so widely believed if many Western quarters had not tacitly accepted it. Malcolm Muggeridge, who was the Moscow correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in 1932 and 1933, is no doubt the most highly qualified witness to testify about both the Soviet cover-up of the famine and Western complicity in it.

In the course of research for a book and a documentary film about the famine of 1933, I filmed an interview with Mr. Muggeridge at his home in Sussex, England. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now show excerpts from that interview and I am prepared to submit a transcript of the entire interview, as well as an article of mine entitled "The Famine the 'Times' Could Not Find." The article has just appeared in the November issue of Commentary and deals with the disgraceful concealment of the famine by Walter Duranty, the long-standing correspondent of the New York Times in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. You are making an immense contribution, for which I and the committee are grateful.[1]

We will now see the videotape. Where is it?

Mr. CARYNNYK. The monitor is right behind you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

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[1] See p. 37 for the prepared statement of Mr. Carynnyk and p. 43 for a reprint of the transcript of the interview with Mr. Muggeridge. A reprint of the article, "The Famine the Times Could Not Find," appears on p. 72.

[A videotape was shown.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say, sir, that I certainly envy the privilege that you had of interviewing Mr. Muggeridge. You certainly are a good interviewer.

Mr. CARYNNYK. You are very kind, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming here this morning and furnishing this insight.

We welcome Senator Boschwitz. I am sorry you did not get to see all of the interview, but as I say, the entire interview with Mr. Muggeridge will be available to you.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I have some familiarity with all this, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And I have someone on my staff who is of Ukrainian descent, with whom I have discussed this. I am interested to hear the next panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Our next witnesses will be a panel of two very distinguished scholars: Dr. Robert Conquest, a senior research fellow of the Hoover Institution, and Dr. James Mace of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University.

Now, these gentlemen are experts in the history and demographics of the Ukrainian holocaust and I ask that their biographies appear in the record with their testimony.

If you two gentlemen would come forward and have seats, I would say to you that because we have so many distinguished witnesses here this morning I would ask that you summarize your remarks with the understanding that the entire statements will be made a part of the printed record, and perhaps you could respond to some questions from Senator Boschwitz and me and other Senators who would appear.

I would explain that this is the last week of the Senate session; we think it is the last week. Every committee is meeting and every Senator has 14 commitments simultaneously, and they know that they will be able to read the record so you will see them coming and going, trying to attend three or four meetings during the same period.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I will be leaving for a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, on which you also serve and I know that you would like to be there as well as here.

But unless some of us are there, we have another little holocaust over there if we are not careful.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So if I leave after a bit, I hope that the witnesses will understand. I will have my staff assistant, Nadia, summarize all this for me. She has really an intimate familiarity with all of this; her family was involved in it.

So she will see that I am aware of all the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you for giving as much time as you can.

You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES E. MACE, POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW, UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Dr. MACE. The Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 which followed the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture is much more than the most appalling event in the Soviet Government's war against the peasantry.[1]

Persuasive evidence suggests that it was also a function of Soviet nationalities policy, carried out in tandem with the campaign to crush every manifestation of Ukrainian national life and constituting an attempt to crush the social basis of that life.

In 1925 Stalin wrote, "The nationalities question is, according to its base, a problem of the peasantry." Like much else in Stalin's writing, only the aphoristic form of the idea is original; the idea itself is not.

As early as the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1919, the nationalities question was discussed within the framework of the Soviet Government's perceived need to placate a broader stratum of the rural population. Decisions within this sphere were adopted and justified on the same basis in succeeding years.

There is not much doubt about the broad outlines of what occurred in 1932 and 1933. What Soviet historiography has sporadically referred to as the harvest failure of 1932 actually produced more grain than did the harvest of 1928. Since no one died of starvation in 1928 and millions perished in 1933, the difference between life and death clearly was not the result of any inability of the countryside to feed itself. Rather, the famine was produced by the government's policy of seizing foodstuffs and leaving the rural population to starve.

Foreign correspondents knew of the starvation even though many failed to report what they knew. Nevertheless, there were a number of courageous journalists who reported on the starvation; for example, Mr. Muggeridge. There are thousands of accounts recorded from survivors who came from the Ukrainian countryside.

We even have accounts from those whom we can classify as among the perpetrators of the famine. Victor Kravchenko, a Soviet trade official who defected to the West at the end of the Second World War, and Lev Kopelev, the Soviet dissident now living in West Germany who had earlier served as the model for the saintly Communist portrayed in Solzhenitsyn's "The First Circle," were both sent into the Ukrainian countryside and later wrote about what they did and what they witnessed.

The famine even found its way into Khrushchev's unofficial memoirs. He heard about the following conversation between a high Ukrainian Communist official and Anastas Mikoyan: "Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here is what Demchenko said: 'Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin—for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo—know what is going on in Ukraine. Well, if not, I will give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with the

[1] See p. 82 for the prepared statement of Dr. Mace.

corpses of people who had starved to death. It picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev.' "

Stalin, of course, was quite well aware of what was happening. For one thing, a Ukrainian Communist official told him to his face and lived to tell the tale in Pravda in the 1960's.

The military commanders of the Black Sea Fleet and the Kiev Military District both lodged personal protests to Stalin. In public, Stalin rebuffed those who told him about the famine, but if he had really doubted what they told him, he had ample means of independent verification. The dictator was not only aware that millions were dying; he did everything in his power to exacerbate the situation.

What makes this famine unique is that it was man-made, brought about as a deliberate act of policy. One can trace the policy through official Soviet sources. In the late 1920's, the Soviet Union abandoned the policy of procuring grain by voluntary purchase and adopted a policy of compulsory seizure.

In the early stages of forced collectivization, thousands of urban dwellers were sent to the countryside to seize what produce the state required. Those who lived in the villages remembered how these outsiders organized local support organizations to go around to individual farms and search for concealed grain. Individuals were given metal-tipped pikes to probe the earth for buried foodstuffs.

At the same time, collectivization made extraction easier for the state. While simply seizing the farmers' implements and livestock, taking them to the center of the village and proclaiming them socialized property, did nothing to raise output, forcing the peasants to sow and harvest together made it much easier for the state to take a larger amount of produce more easily directly from the floor of a single threshing room.

During the famine, the supplementary procurement of early 1933 meant that even what the collective farms had been given for their labor days was taken by the state. The Ukrainian countryside was literally stripped bear.

It is possible to measure the devastation, albeit in crude fashion. Maksudov, a Soviet demographer who emigrated in 1981, has shown that it is possible to trace the geographical extent of the famine through the number of rural women, broken down by age and region in the 1959 census.

Since mass starvation produces low birth rates and causes high mortality among infants, one looks for regions where the number of people who would have been born during and immediately before the famine is abnormally small. Since women are less likely than men to change their residence, he examines only the age structure of rural women.

By this method, Maksudov has found evidence of massive mortality in the late 1920's and early 1930's in the following regions: throughout Ukraine, the heavily Ukrainian cossack territories of the North Caucasus, a few regions along the Volga River and lower Ural region, and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan suffered a devastating famine in 1930, and while it may provide a model for later events, lies outside the scope of the famine of 1933.

Collectivization was also carried out in the Urals with extraordinary brutality, and population losses there can also be attributed to the earlier period. The Volga Basin, however, was devastated by the famine of 1932, albeit to a lesser extent than the North Caucasus and Ukraine. It seems likely that the Volga was singled out because of the large German population there, considered suspect by Stalin and later deported to the East en masse, while the heavily Ukrainian North Caucasus was also home to those cossack populations which provided the initial basis of support for the so-called counter-revolution in 1918.

Interestingly, while the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was devastated by famine, there is no evidence of extraordinary mortality in areas bordering on it to the north and northeast. Maksudov has shown that the famine stopped at the Russo-Ukrainian border, which means that it was deliberately geographically focused against these areas.

Now, in estimating the number of victims, it is difficult to accomplish this with much precision, but we can come up with a ballpark estimate. Those who claim to have spoken to Soviet officials off the record usually report they were told around 10 million.

If I may bring your attention to the chart over here, we can see a comparison between the three Slavic populations of the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1939. While both the Russians and Belorussians grew substantially in this period, and Belorussians were under many of the same national pressures to assimilate as Ukrainians, the Ukrainian population went down roughly 10 percent, an absolute drop of 3.1 million.

Now, if we factor in observed population growth from the early 1930's—and there is a statistical blackout in 1931, so we have to extrapolate for the late 1930's. But if we extrapolate on the basis of later trends for that period, we can come up with a ballpark estimate of over 7 million people who died before their time—really, between 7.8 and 7.9 million.

Now, if we subtract from that people who died because of other repressions—dekulakized peasants, purged party members, writers who were shot, priests, et cetera—we still come up with a figure in the ballpark of around 6 or 7 million people.

Now, this might be a little bit high because, for one thing, it is possible that some people who were counted as Ukrainians in 1926 were counted as Russians in 1939. On the other hand, it may be too low and the reason for this is the 1939 census.

There was also a census in 1937 and it was not released. It was announced in Pravda that those who were taking part in it were participating in a plot to discredit the idea of socialism in one country by deliberately under-counting the population. In other words, they shot the census-takers for not finding enough people.

Those who prepared the census of 1939 were well aware of the fate suffered by their predecessors and it is reasonable to assume that they took measures to avoid any perception of similar shortcomings in their own work.

Thus, if we say 7 million Ukrainians, we are really dealing with an order of magnitude. We will likely never know the precise number who died. We do know that we are dealing with a number

of lives on the same order of magnitude as the number of Jews who perished during the holocaust of the Second World War.

Figures, of course, cannot measure human suffering and there are as many tales of suffering as there are people who survived it. They live not only in Soviet Ukraine, but here as well.

I will skip my transcriptions from some earlier eyewitness testimony because we will be having an eyewitness with us today. This brings us to the question of why did the Soviet Government do it.

The policy of forcing the peasants to give up their individual farms and join collectives, which were virtually indistinguishable from the preemancipation estates where their forefathers had worked, naturally produced much resistance in the countryside throughout the Soviet Union.

The policy of industrialization, paid for largely by grain exports, gave the regime a strong motive to seize as much as possible from the villages. But these considerations do not explain why the famine was geographically focused so as to stop precisely at the Russo-Ukrainian and Belorussian-Ukrainian borders. The famine can be explained only if we ask why Stalin wanted to devastate those territories which were, in fact, affected by the famine.

Now, at the time of the famine the Soviet Union was in the midst not only of social and political transformation, but a transformation of its national ideology. The party line in the 1920's was that Russian imperialism had been evil and the revolution had abolished it. National cultures were officially encouraged.

In November 1934, immediately after the famine, a decree on the teaching of history in the U.S.S.R. completely reversed the official notion of what sort of entity the Soviet Union was. Russian history was rehabilitated, czars and all, and took the place of national histories.

To emphasize that this revived imperial schema of history was obligatory for all, it was labeled "history of the U.S.S.R." Programs to encourage national diversity were replaced by a policy of Russification.

Every manifestation of national self-assertion was labeled bourgeois nationalism and ruthlessly suppressed. If one were to ask which peoples would constitute the greatest threat to this new Russocentric Soviet Union that Stalin was building, one would have to answer Germans, because they had shown affection for their homeland during the 1918 German occupation of Ukraine, and they were later deported en masse; cossacks, because they had been the first to fight the Communists arms in hand in 1918; and Ukrainians, the largest non-Russian nation in the U.S.S.R. and by far the most self-assertive.

One can say that Soviet Ukraine in the 1920's played a role in the Soviet Union analogous to that which Poland plays in the post-Stalin Soviet bloc. Both constituted that part of the larger assemblage that was most nationally conscious, self-assertive of its prerogatives, and least willing to follow blindly after Moscow in arranging its internal affairs.

Realizing that stability was impossible unless the Soviet regimes imposed outside of Russia proper were given some veneer of national legitimacy, the Communist party proclaimed a policy of indigenization in 1923, providing for the recruitment of non-Russians into

the party and for the official sponsorship of non-Russian cultural development.

None of the local variants of this policy went so far as Ukrainization. Even Ukrainian Communists could not remain immune to the national revival taking place around them and Stalin perceived in this a political threat.

Yet the Soviet leadership never reconciled itself to the apparent liberalism of the 1920's which had been forced on it. In 1928, Stalin began his so-called second revolution. A cultural revolution managed to suppress every manifestation of the independent life of the mind.

In 1929–30, the total collectivization of agriculture on the basis of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class was carried out. Peasants were forced to give up their farms and join collectives. Ukrainian Communists thought to be too attached to their national heritage were purged. A show trial orchestrated a massive assault on Ukrainian intellectual and spiritual life. The Ukrainian Church was outlawed. Ukrainian scholars were accused of aiding the class enemies by asserting their nation's distinctiveness in such fields as history and linguistics.

To give you an idea of the extent of this, there were 259 Ukrainians publishing in Ukrainian in the Soviet Union in 1930. In 1938, there were only 36 of them left. That means a drop of 84 percent.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. What publishing houses? What did you say? What was the number?

Dr. MACE. 259 Ukrainian writers.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Writers.

Dr. MACE. They were publishing in literary journals, having books published by the state publishing house in Ukraine, publishing in the Ukrainian language.

Now, if we put it in this context, if we are to understand the famine of 1933, we have to place it in the context of Stalin's policy toward the Ukrainians.

One, in 1933 there was a destruction of the Ukrainian Communist leadership designed to neutralize the Ukraine S.S.R. as a political factor in Soviet life; two, the destruction of the Ukrainian spiritual, intellectual, and cultural elite and institutions, designed to decapitate the nation.

Three, in 1933 the Ukrainization policy was supplanted by a policy of Russification, designed to push Ukrainian culture out of the cities and back to the countryside whence it had come.

Four, the famine, a policy designed to crush the social basis of Ukrainian nationhood, was carried out. Understood in this context, the famine becomes intelligible as an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor, as a social organism, to destroy the Ukrainian nation as such. Millions of Ukrainians died as a result of this policy. The only word which can adequately describe such a policy is genocide.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mace, thank you very much.

Dr. Conquest, we welcome you, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT CONQUEST, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD, CA

Dr. CONQUEST. Mr. Chairman, my formal submission naturally overlaps Dr. Mace's a good deal, and with your permission I will make a few extra points and be very brief indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir, and your full statement will be printed in the record.[1]

Dr. CONQUEST. I think that the point about it being an artificial famine is important to everybody because this was one of the ways in which Stalin succeeded in blurring the issue to the West.

When you have a famine you have to prove that it is an artificial famine. So even when it was known that it was a famine, it was not necessarily known it was done on purpose by the government.

We have to emphasize that not merely were the people starving, but there were granaries full of grain being guarded from them in the Ukraine. It was rather like one vast Belsen, with people with their bellies swollen, their limbs like sticks, and well-fed guards patrolling and generally terrorizing them.

As to the numbers, I am in agreement with Dr. Mace and I think we can put that in perspective. You mentioned, sir, the Korean airliner. It would require, roughly speaking, the Soviet Union to shoot down one airliner a day for about 70 years to match the Ukrainian famine.

The point about it being confined to the Ukraine—I think we can make that point a bit more strongly. There was an actual blockade. There were checkpoints at the Ukrainian-Russian border, and peasants who managed to get over and buy bread in Russia had the bread taken from them when they reentered the Ukraine. It was a definite policy decision to keep the famine in the Ukraine and certain other areas to which we have spoken.

The decree on starving the Ukraine—I would like just to quote the Soviet novelist, Vasily Grossman, a Stalin Prize novelist, one of the chapters in whose book, called in English "Forever Flowing," is perhaps the best single description available in the West about not only the famine, but collectivization as well.

He describes the decree in the following terms: "I think there has never been such a decree in all the long history of Russia. Not the Tsars nor the Tatars * * * ever promulgated such a terrible decree. For the decree required that the peasants of the Ukraine, the Don, and the Kuban, be put to death by starvation—put to death along with their little children."

Dr. Mace has not, and I will not, describe the actual horrors of the famine, but we do have to remember that among the number killed by the famine there are, it is estimated, between 2 and 3 million children, most of them under the age of 7. And it also resulted, if we are talking about later results, in large numbers of children, running into millions—orphans wandering the countryside in gangs or being put into very unpleasant children's homes.

There was a further destruction, if you like, of the spirit of the children in that they became, they were forced to become, they

[1] See p. 94 for the prepared statement of Dr. Conquest.

were brainwashed into becoming narks ("informers") against their parents.

The great hero of the Young Communist League, Pavlik Morozov, of whom there is a statue at their headquarters in Moscow, earned his fame by denouncing his father for hoarding grain; that is, for keeping enough food to eat. The effect on childhood is part of the effect on the present generation.

The other point I would like to make about the present generation, about these effects, is that the present leadership of the Soviet Union got into political life as young adults at that time, the time when the party was being brutalized, as some of the older Bolsheviks complained.

This was when their careers started. They were young Communists and they were somewhat directly involved in inflicting the famine. And others then joined the party, which was the party of famine infliction.

Dr. Mace mentioned the census of 1939. The present figures seem to show that, over the whole Soviet Union, it exaggerated the truth by approximately 4 million, of which probably about 1 million were Ukrainians, which adds an extra million of Ukrainians lost.

Then, the point about Stalin's knowledge of what was going on. Stalin played his cards very close to his chest and in all these matters—collectivization as well—is difficult to prove, if you want absolute proof. You remember that David Irving thinks Hitler did not order the holocaust, because we do not have any documents signed "A. Hitler": and similarly with Stalin and the famine.

Now, the other thing I would like to address is the fact that Ukrainians refer to this as the forgotten holocaust, and I think this is true. It has not entered the Western consciousness, in part because of the way it was reported, which perhaps we will probably want to discuss later, but I think in part because people do not realize in the West, perhaps, the strength of Ukrainian nationhood.

We see it on the map now, and our grandfathers saw it on the map at the beginning of the century, as part of Russia, and now, it is part of the Soviet Union. And the languages are similar. Dutch is similar to German; that does not make the Dutch Germans.

I do not think the immense strength of Ukrainian nationhood, which really gained its present power and came to its present consciousness early in the century, is rightly understood in the West.

We try to write them off in the way we might not write off the Poles, and I think it is very important to stress the major importance to the world of Ukrainian nationhood.

On the question of the West's knowledge: as Malcolm Muggeridge said, there were the Walter Durantys who simply misled the West. But it is not true that only Malcolm Muggeridge reported; there were full reports in the West by a very large number of journalists, if often not until they got out.

But the great papers of the West—the Neue Zuericher Zeitung, the London Times, Le Matin, and so on reported fully. In America, there were huge, full-page reports, but they were in the ring-wing press mostly, so they could be dismissed by people who preferred Walter Duranty.

Second, Stalin had people who were not at least openly liars, like the famous French moderate-left leader, Eduard Herriot, who was

taken down to the Ukraine and shown phoney farms. Cities were cleaned up for him, and so on, like Vice President Wallace when he went to the great labor camps.

Then Stalin denied it all, so there were two stories. It was not up to the ordinary intellectual in the West to decide between them. It had not been established that there even was a famine. At last Duranty to a certain extent admitted it, finally, when everybody knew there was a famine. But he said a few million people may have died, but it is not a famine.

So, Stalin not admitting it, even though the story came out, worked against the compulsive ignorance, you may say, of the West.

I would like to stress one very last point on this side of things, and that is that academics come out of this extremely badly. A leading expert on Soviet agriculture, Sir John Marynard, went to the area and reported there was no famine.

Perhaps the leading social scientists of the whole West, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their book "Soviet Communism," go into it at great length and decide there was no famine.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Dr. CONQUEST. They believed the people they wanted to believe. Besides, I think the Webbs believed in paper, official paper. Anything they read in an official document, they believed, because they were great experts in English official documents which are, on the whole, reasonably true.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are being very charitable, Dr. Conquest. I cannot imagine an intellectual leaning on that slender reed.

I am trying to catch up on our schedule. I am not going to ask any questions, but I would like the privilege of submitting questions in writing to complete the record. Bear in mind that the real purpose of this hearing is to produce a record which does not now, in my judgment, exist and so that it can be given wide distribution.

This is sort of a leading question. You agree, then, with Malcolm Muggeridge that this was not the finest hour of journalism in terms of making the West aware of what went on?

Dr. CONQUEST. Well, as I say, there were plenty of good journalists and there were plenty of papers which printed the stories by individuals who were not journalists who had been there. But there were enough bad journalists to cause trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. But where are the good journalists today? .

Dr. CONQUEST. Well, one is Malcolm Muggeridge, who was on the screen today.

The CHAIRMAN. But he is out on the end of the limb by himself. The media has created an atmosphere where a little girl can be taken over to Russia in obviously a propaganda trip, and it is virtually headlined all over the country that they are just like us, when any journalist with even a modicum of sense knows that that is not so.

This is a problem. We see it in terms of Grenada. I have not seen the liberal media refer, except in a scoffing manner, to the Monroe Doctrine yet with respect to Grenada. I come from the media; I spent most of my life in the media. But I am ashamed of the way

the major media in this country operates. They are misleading the American people.

They are causing concern in the wrong areas and they are absolutely politicizing, in my judgment, the very survival perhaps of this country. When this country goes, the West is going.

Do either of you have any further comment? I did not mean to get off on my own sermon here.

Dr. CONQUEST. May I add one last sentence?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Dr. CONQUEST. I think your point about thinking they are the same as us is crucial to the whole thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Dr. CONQUEST. The famine shows that their motivations are quite different from our own, and I absolutely agree with you that this is the crux of everything connected with studying the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I thank you. This has been an intriguing experience for me and I personally express my gratitude to both of you. Thank you very much.

Dr. MACE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Millar. If you will come and have a seat, sir?

Dr. James R. Millar is a native of San Antonio and a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Texas. He earned a Ph.D. at Cornell in economics after special study at Harvard University in Russian area studies. He has held Woodrow Wilson and Ford Foundation scholarships and has traveled and lectured in the Soviet Union. I do not see any bullet holes.

He has also conducted research in the U.S.S.R. twice for extended periods. I am going to ask that the balance of this biographical sketch of Dr. Millar be printed in the record.

[The following information was received by the committee:]

BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES R. MILLAR

Born San Antonio, Texas, July 7, 1936. Received B.A. from the University of Texas, Austin; Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1965. He also conducted research at the Harvard Russian Research Center. Professor Millar has undertaken a number of trips to the Soviet Union, his most recent being as an Ampart sponsored by USIA in May, 1983. His last extended research stay was during the spring and summer of 1979, when he was attached to the Central Institute for Mathematical Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union under the US-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement. Professor Millar is currently teaching in the economics department of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and has published articles in scholarly journals on many aspects of Soviet economic history and performance. He was editor of the Salvic Review 1975–80. His most recent book is "The ABC's of Soviet Socialism" (University of Illinois Press: 1981).

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you, sir, and thank you very much for coming. You may proceed, and if you will summarize your statement, with the understanding that the full statement will be made a part of the printed record.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I do have to leave and I notice that the Reverend Wolodymyr Bazylevsky, as I begin to read his statement, was an eyewitness to the happenings. Would it be out of order to ask that we take the witnesses out of order because I do want to get to the Foreign Relations Committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he has stepped out for a moment, so why do we not ponder that when he gets back?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. MILLAR, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Dr. MILLAR. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have prepared a statement which I will submit and I will try to keep my presentation short.[1]

My interest in this issue is more general than simply the Ukraine. As an economist, my concern is with the whole process of collectivization and, in particular, the consequences of collectivization mainly in the long run.

The story that we have just heard is largely the story of the immediate consequences of collectivization for the Ukraine. There is a peasant saying that many people who have tried to explain collectivization use, which is that one must crack eggs to make an omelette. It is an old peasant saying and has been used to cover a multitude of sins.

There is another peasant saying which is more relevant to an economist, and that is that you cannot expect to get a chicken and an omelette from the same egg. One of the problems, then, in looking at collectivization as an economist is the question of what economic benefit, if any, was, in fact, derived from collectivization.

I shall argue that there was no economic rationale, at least not in the strict sense of evaluating it today, for collectivization; that, on the contrary, collectivization was a serious economic error, whatever may have been its other purposes.

One may well wonder what difference it makes today whether a viable economic rationale existed for mass collectivization. I think there are two reasons why it is important.

One reason is that Soviet development in the 1930's has been touted as a possible model for development of less-developed countries from time to time, and many countries have, in fact, attempted to model their development on the Soviet model, which includes collectivization.

If collectivization was an economic error, whatever may have been its political purposes, then it is clear that we can do a service to less-developed countries by pointing out that it was, in fact, an economic mistake; that it did not succeed in generating the kind of resource transfer to the urban areas that had been anticipated and that many have claimed for it.

The second reason is that the kinds of attitudes and beliefs and understandings that produced collectivization and the structure of agricultural procurement in the 1930's still persist in the Soviet Union today, and many of the problems that some of my colleagues will be talking about later today in the contemporary economy, in fact, go back to the structures that were created and/or to the attitudes that lay behind the construction of those structures for the procurement of agricultural products.

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[1] See p. 97 for the prepared statement of Dr. Millar.

That structure essentially stands today that was created in the 1930's. As someone pointed out, the peasanty was the object of revolution in the 1930's. It had been a sort of unwitting participant in 1917.

One way to think about collectivization was as a sort of preemptive war against the peasantry based on a number of concerns that the Bolsheviks and others had. Collectivization, from an economic standpoint, was incomplete. It ended in a compromise.

The state was unable to collectivize agriculture completely. The resistance created by the peasantry, the destruction of one-third of the capital stock, and the general disruption of agricultural production led to a compromise, and that compromise really did not satisfy either party, either the state or the peasantry.

The compromise resulted in control over the bulk of agricultural production by the state and the control over marketing of agricultural production. But it still provided for small, private plots for agricultural producers, contingent upon their working on the farm satisfactorily.

It did, therefore, leave a small window for private agricultural enterprise and for private marketing of agricultural products. Collectivization was therefore, less than complete and it produced a peculiar kind of division of labor between the large farms created as collectives and the tiny plots that individuals were able to work upon privately.

That compromise can be seen today in the fact that something like 25 percent of the value of agricultural products sold to consumers is, in fact, marketed on the private, collective farm market.

What was created in the 1930's is kind of ironic in that it looks a great deal like what happened following the emancipation of the serfs in the 1860's; that is, it created these small plots, which in the 1860's were called hungry plots. A hungry plot was a plot that was too small to live on, but too big to give up.

It created a mutual dependency between the peasantry and the collective that really continued a pattern that went back centuries in Russian experience.

The settlement that followed the compromise, as I called it, between the peasantry and the state—a compromise forced by the fact that the consequences of continuing to try to achieve 100 percent collectivization were obviously more than the Bolsheviks could risk because of the negative implications for total production—also led to a crystallization or an institutionalization of a special protectorship attitude of the state toward the urban industrial workers—a preference for that sector. That is, the state became the guarantor of grain and food supplies for this preferred sector.

As 85 percent of the Soviet population was peasantry at the time we are talking about, the choice to prefer the urban industrial sector was a choice that, in fact, meant that the Bolshevik party would remain a minority party in the Soviet Union for the indefinite future. It was therefore a political decision at the same time.

In terms of the consequences that remain to this day, one of them is the fact that the role as guarantor of food supplies and preferential treatment for urban industrial workers in the Soviet Union has led to a huge gap between the price at which agricultural products are sold in state retail outlets and the price that these

same products sell for in the collective farm market, in the free market.

That involves, therefore, an enormous subsidy of food products for Soviet citizens that produces two characteristics. One is the fact that items that are very badly underpriced in state stores tend never to be there. If they do appear, they disappear within a very short period of time.

But it also tempts private individuals to try to collect the difference between what the price at the state retail store is and what the collective farm market price is, and it lures people into illegal activities in what is sometimes called the second economy.

It also has led to the fact that the major preoccupation or major avocation of any adult Soviet is queuing for agricultural products that are in short supply. This all goes back to a division of labor which, despite the attempt to create a totally collectivized agriculture, retained private agricultural enterprise as well as public agricultural enterprise.

Now, there is not much question that by the end of the 1930's, the Soviet Government had created in the agricultural procurement system and collectivized agriculture a rather efficient, effective device for forcing output out of the agricultural sector.

However, it took a number of years to establish that mechanism and I personally do not believe that collectivization itself was initiated in order to attain that kind of structure. I think that structure was imposed when they realized what a disaster collectivization had turned out to be.

The famine had general implications for the country at large, and the loss of capital stock in agriculture, which resulted from peasant resistance, created a situation in which some way of maintaining food supplies for the cities became necessary.

A system was built upon that and I will not try to describe that system, for it has to a large extent been dismantled by this time.

The important thing is that recent scholarship indicates that as an economic policy, collectivization cost more to establish than it yielded. There has been an argument that whatever else may have been behind collectivization, at least it generated resources which made rapid industrialization possible.

That has been challenged recently, and I think challenged, as far as I am concerned, successfully. The economic rationale that has been put forward for collectivization simply will not stand up.

In economics, unlike a poker game, everyone can lose from a mistake. Collectivization was an economic policy mistake in the short run, I think, on some of the grounds of what we have heard today and will hear.

In the long run, the evidence is that it was a mistake also. There were no longrun gains. The notion that you could neglect one sector, advance the other sector more rapidly or modernize it very rapidly, and then turn around and modernize the backward sector is an idea that economists have played around with for quite a while, but has turned out in practice, I think, not to work very well and the Soviets give a good example of that.

Mass collectivization really produced losses without anyone deriving economic benefit, whatever may have been the other benefits. The idea that the suffering, the famine, the brutality, the grief

that collectivization occasioned really went for economic naught is difficult for many people to accept. It is somehow easier to accept if it did produce some useful consequences.

Let me talk just briefly about what the longrun consequences have been. Many reforms have been proposed and implemented since the 1930's, and many of them since Stalin's death in 1953.

Western observers of these reforms and the investment in agriculture that has taken place agree that they were necessary reforms and they were essentially in the right direction.

Agricultural output has increased substantially. When you consider that output per capita in 1953 was approximately what it had been in 1928 before collectivization and, of course, the devastation of World War II, and that in 1928 output was about the same as had been attained prior to World War I, then the fact that output of agricultural products has doubled since 1953 is something of an accomplishment.

So in that sense one can say that Soviet agriculture has not failed to feed the population in the sense that the population does not face famine today and the Soviet economy can, barring some long series of bad harvests, feed its population at a minimum level.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Millar?

Dr. MILLAR. Yes?

The CHAIRMAN. Please forgive me, but I have a leadership meeting that I must go to and I am going to ask my chief legislative assistant, Dr. James P. Lucier, to preside. This is permissible under the committee's rules.

I am so regretful that I have to go, but I must go because we have some matters coming up that demand my presence. I do thank you and all the other witnesses.

Dr. Lucier, if you will take over and preside, I will be grateful to you, sir. Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. Please proceed, Dr. Millar.

Dr. MILLAR. I just have a couple of more points to make.

When one looks at what has happened since 1953, the reforms have greatly modified the structure of agriculture that was created in the 1930's, but have not eliminated the division of labor mentioned earlier. One cannot say they have failed when you look at the successful increase in per capita production.

But when one looks at the cost, the economic cost of trying to reconvert agriculture back into a reasonably productive sector, and when one looks at the irrational structure of prices in retail markets which lead to queuing and to misallocation of these goods, then I think that we can say that Soviet agricultural performance has been quite disappointing because it has been so difficult to reverse the consequences of collectivization.

Finally, radical changes in agricultural tenure and production systems have rarely taken place in history. The margin of error is usually very small and the consequences of failure are horrendous.

The Soviet experiment with mass collectivization is clearly a case in point. It was based upon a false economic premise, insofar as it was economically motivated, that rapid development would require squeezing the peasantry, and it therefore failed to provide the resources that were anticipated.

It failed in the short run to feed the population, and a terrible famine ensued. In the long run, Soviet agriculture has gradually been overcoming the persisting adverse consequences of collectivization, but the end is not yet in sight.

The Soviet population is not hungry and it is very unlikely to suffer serious famine again, in the absence of some major catastrophe. At the same time, it is not satisfied with the performance of Soviet agriculture and it will not find satisfaction soon. It complains about queues, but it complains even more about rising prices.

The fact is that collectivization was founded upon a mistaken premise, one that has been abandoned by Soviet leadership today.

Economic growth need not be an exploitative process. I quoted several peasant proverbs at the beginning. If the Soviets had noted another proverb, perhaps at least on economic grounds economic policy in the 1930's would have been more rational.

This is a peasant proverb that does not imply that economic growth need be predatory. It states, "one hand washes the other." This is the kind of relationship that contemporary Soviet policy is seeking to reestablish between agriculture and industry.

Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Millar, thank you very much. You have made a very important contribution to the overall picture of the record here and I hope that some of our other developing nations will take note of the facts which you have outlined with regard to the Soviet Union. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is the Very Reverend Wolodymyr Bazylevsky, St. Vladimir Ukrainian Orthodox Church in New York City.

Father Bazylevsky, would you come forward, please?

STATEMENT OF THE VERY REVEREND WOLODYMYR BAZYLEVSKY, PASTOR, SAINT VLADIMIR UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, NEW YORK, NY, ACCOMPANIED BY JURIJ DOBCZANSKY

Father BAZYLEVSKY. I ask Mr. Dobczansky to read my statement.

Dr. LUCIER. Certainly.

I think we should tell the audience that Father Bazylevsky was an eyewitness to the situation in the Ukraine in 1932–33, and came to this country in 1950. Is that correct?

Father BAZYLEVSKY. Yes, sir.

Dr. LUCIER. And it is really a great honor and privilege to have you here with us today.

Father BAZYLEVSKY. Thank you, sir.

Dr. LUCIER. I would ask your assistant to identify himself for the record.

Mr. DOBCZANSKY. My name is Jurij Dobczansky of Washington, DC. I will be reading a summary of selected excerpts from the main testimony, with your agreement.[1]

Dr. LUCIER. Right. Could you spell your name for the record, please?

Mr. DOBCZANSKY. Yes. J-u-r-i-j, D-o-b-c-z-a-n-s-k-y.

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[1] See p. 102 for the prepared statement of Father Bazylevsky.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you. You may proceed.

Mr. DOBCZANSKY. I was a young man in my late 20's living in eastern Ukraine. I was an eyewitness to all that was happening. Ukraine is known as the breadbasket of Europe, its soil being one of the richest in the world. Ukrainian farmers found joy in working their fields. Their toil and harvest was their life. Suddenly, a new form of life was being foisted off on them—collective farming, kolhosps. The freedom-loving farmers resisted.

Communist Moscow used varied methods in order to repress and terrorize the Ukrainian people's resistance. They levied unbearable quotas on grain. When the farmers were not able to pay, their property was confiscated and the owners were imprisoned and sent to Siberia.

The Communist government decided to step up the process of collectivization by taking away land from persons who owned more than ten hectares under the pretext that the owners were exploiters of the masses. They, too, were sent to Siberia.

Another method of fighting resistance was by staging trials. I witnessed such a mockery of justice in the early 1930's. This took place in the village of Barvinkowo, province of Izium, near Kharkiv, where I was employed as a school teacher.

One fall day all the teachers were instructed to attend a court case where enemies of the people would be on trial. We saw an old, sickly man, Ivan Medvid, being brought before the tribunal, held in a classroom.

The so-called judge, Mr. Shulha, was also the principal of the school. In actuality, he was a half-literate, former factory worker. The judge took out a blank piece of paper and read from it as if there were something written, a verdict.

Due to the fact that Mr. Medvid did not comply with the government's previously imposed quota of grain to be donated to the government, he was subject to arrest and prosecution. His house and property is to be confisicated and auctioned off.

Mr. Medvid was arrested immediately by officer Pazushko and led away to the police station. Meanwhile, all the people that were made to witness this mockery of justice were further invited to attend the auction.

The belongings that were being sold were tattered. Mr. Medvid was the only remaining male member of his family, which consisted of about 10 members, women and children. They collectively had owned over 10 hectares of land, hence the punishment.

The following day, Mr. Shulha, the judge, jokingly related to us how he read the verdict from a blank piece of paper to the kurkuls. The kurkuls were rich landowners who supposedly lived off the poor people. What could one do when there were so many court cases and no time to write the verdicts?

A few months later, at night, all the teachers were called to the party headquarters and were informed that we would be further obliged to carry out the party decision to liquidate the kurkuls.

Each one of us was to go to the surrounding villages and arrest the kurkuls and send them to a desolate railroad station in Yazykovo. Suddenly this order was changed and only Communist party and Komsomol members were obliged to carry out this action. We, the nonparty people, were sent home.

We later found out from people who took part in this action that hundreds of Ukrainian farmers were brought by wagons and loaded into cattle trains. This included small children as well as old people. They were permitted only a small bundle each. They were loaded 40 to 50 persons per car, no food and water. Some died during the journey; the rest froze or starved in Siberia.

To carry out this plan, they mobilized 25,000 workers, mainly from Moscow and Leningrad, who were sent to Ukrainian collective farms as advisers to instruct Ukrainian farmers on how to be more efficient.

In truth, these people organized the local party members into brigades which went from farm to farm, taking away every last bit of grain. Later, they went from house to house in the villages, taking potatoes, sauerkraut, pickles, even cooked food off the stoves. They pierced clay floors to make sure no food was buried, often demolishing ovens and walls.

Inhabitants of villages were virtual prisoners. In order to travel anywhere or to buy a ticket at a railroad station, one was required to have a passport, and no passports were being issued. They had to stay at home and wait for the unavoidable, terrifying death from starvation. This was compounded by the fact that it took place during the winter months.

People started to die in masses. There were dead bodies in the streets, in houses, in yards. From time to time, stronger people would go from farm to farm to collect the dead and sometimes even the dying so as not to have to come back for them.

There were villages in which everyone died or very few survived. I saw such a village in the spring of 1933. It was Khrushtchova Mykytivka in the district of Bohodukhiv, province of Kharkiv. I was staying in that part of the country. I also saw dead or dying people at train stations, at forest outskirts, by the roads which I walked.

I lived on the outskirts of Kharkiv in a town named Pisotchyn. Every morning I arrived at the southern railroad station in Kharkiv and this is where I saw the most starved to death bodies. Trucks came and removed them and dumped them 20 to 25 kilometers from town into gulleys.

No matter how the militia tried to prevent the hungry people from coming to Kharkiv, many villagers managed to get through and beg in the streets. I will never forget a family who, judging from their clothing, had seen better days.

A husband, wife and four or five children were sitting in the Blahovishtchenskyj Bazaar Square, all of them with outstretched hands begging for charity. People gave them money, but the militia quickly arrested them.

I will never forget when I saw a woman giving birth in the street on Kholodna Hora. It was winter and none came to her help. People were probably afraid because although the press never mentioned the famine, at collective meetings it was said that the people who were starving were enemies of the people who refused to work at collective farms and brought this disaster on themselves.

The great famine was directed against the Ukrainian farmers. It did not affect blue- and white-collar workers very much. They received food in exchange for ration cards. Although this was not very much, these people did not die from hunger.

On the average, bread was sold at 1 pound per person. There was also the so-called commercial bread available at much higher prices. It was very hard to get, however. One had to stand in line, at times for 12 hours. One 4-pound loaf of bread cost 25 rubles and the average wage was 100 rubles per month.

It may be of interest that during the famine in Kharkiv and other cities, a new type of store appeared, known as Torgsin, trade with foreigners. Actually, these stores were designed to dig every last cent from the starving people. In exchange for gold or silver, one could buy everything—food, clothing, vodka, et cetera.

At the time, the U.S.S.R. press diligently suppressed any news of the famine. This was not surprising. However, what is curious is that the Western press at the time failed to report what was happening in Eastern Europe.

And the most disturbing thing of all is that to this day it is played down as an alleged happening. The eyewitnesses are dying out. Very soon, the whole thing will be swept under the carpet and 7 million people would have died for nothing.

In 1933 Edouard Herriot, Prime Minister of France, visited the U.S.S.R. He also visited Ukraine. At that time, he was shown a "Potemkin" kolhozp which, of course, was set up for just such a visit.

It is unfortunate that this misguided head of state announced to the world that there was no famine in Ukraine. I wonder if the country involved was other than Ukraine, whether the world would have been satisfied with the opinion of just one man.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you, Father Bazylevsky. That is a very deeply moving statement.

Father BAZYLEVSKY. Thank you very much. I am privileged to be a witness today.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you very much.

For our next testimony, I would like Dr. Karen Brooks and Anton Malish to come forward. Dr. Brooks is assistant professor of economics at the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota.

Mr. Malish, of course, is familiar to this committee as the Chief of the Eastern European-U.S.S.R. Branch, Division of International Economics of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Dr. Brooks, I understand that you are going to discuss some of the geographic areas of production in the Soviet Union.

STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN BROOKS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, ST. PAUL, MN

Dr. BROOKS. Yes; I will be talking about productivity in Soviet agriculture in the more recent period than the one that we have heard about for the most part today.

Dr. LUCIER. Would you begin, please?

Dr. BROOKS. Fine, thank you. I am very pleased to have been asked to address you on the subject of productivity in Soviet agriculture. Much of the material presented by other speakers today deals with the tragic period 50 years ago when failures of agricul-

tural policy and weather combined and many people lost their lives.

I am going to say a few things about more recent developments in agriculture in the Ukraine and in the rest of the Soviet Union.

Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, one of the stated goals of agricultural policy has been achievement of self-sufficiency in food. In the days when the U.S.S.R. was a net food exporter, this goal was met automatically, although sometimes at great hardship to Soviet citizens.

Since the early 1970's, the goal of self-sufficiency in food has been retained, but it has been put into the background by the recognized need to improve the diet of Soviet consumers. The Soviets have become a major agricultural importer. In 1981, the U.S.S.R. was the largest net importer of agricultural products in the world.

The fact that a country that strives for self-sufficiency in food is such a large importer focuses attention on these imports as a sign of the failure of agricultural policy and performance.

I think that if you asked the average person either in the Soviet Union or in this country about the health of Soviet agriculture, you would get a response something like "Soviet agriculture is in terrible shape; the country cannot even feed itself."

This perception is, in some sense, true. A country with the agricultural endowment and the resources invested in agriculture that the Soviet Union has should be able to feed itself.

But one must then ask, feed itself what and at what cost? The fact that the country must import food is not what is really wrong with Soviet agriculture. The problem is not primarily that too little food is produced.

Two more important dimensions to the Soviet food problem are that price policy distorts demand for food, and that what is produced comes at a very high cost. It is this high cost of domestic production that limits the amount and the quality of food available to Soviet consumers, and that takes away resources from the rest of the economy.

So, in my view, it is much more important to focus on the cost of production in Soviet agriculture than to look at the imports as an index of the economic health of the sector.

How high are the costs of Soviet agricultural production, and from where do these high costs come? D. Gale Johnson of the University of Chicago and I asked this question and we set about answering it in the following way.

We chose areas outside the U.S.S.R. that are quite similar in climate and in soil conditions to the agricultural regions of the Soviet Union. We then compared output per unit input in these places to the same productivity measures in the Soviet areas.

Now, our sample outside the Soviet Union included the North American areas of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Colorado, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. We also used the country of Finland.

The areas outside the Soviet Union were chosen so that each part of the Soviet Union had a rough analog for a comparison outside the country. You can see, for example, if you look at the map included in the briefing book for the Senators, that the Ukraine

corresponds most closely to the State of Nebraska in North America.

With a few exceptions, all of the areas outside the Soviet Union that we used for comparison have well-developed commercial agriculture. In many of these places, weather imposes severe trials on agricultural production, but farmers nonetheless cope with these conditions.

Some of the most valuable farmland in the United States, though, that of the Corn Belt States, is not well represented in the Soviet Union except for limited areas in the Ukraine. In that sense, the Soviet Union does have a relatively poor natural endowment for agriculture, but the problems imposed by climate should not, in my view, be exaggerated.

When we compared agricultural productivity in our two climatically similar samples, we found several interesting things. Productivity in Soviet agriculture appears to be a bit lower than in Finland, but not very much so. But productivity is about twice as high in North America as it is in climatically comparable areas of the Soviet Union. This means that agricultural production costs roughly twice as much in the Soviet Union as it does in comparable parts of North America.

What accounts for these higher costs? The biggest difference in resource use in Soviet and in North American agriculture is in labor. If we count only the prime age male agricultural labor force in the Soviet Union, there are about five times as many workers per hectare or per acre in Soviet agriculture as there are in North America. And even this comparison understates the true productive labor force in Soviet agriculture, since there are many able young women working on farms, particularly in animal husbandry.

The costs that I have been talking about are only in agricultural production. In addition, there are sizable costs incurred in transportation and in the processing of food products.

The major body of agricultural policy for this decade is the Food Program for the 1980's that was announced in 1982, and in the Food Program the losses that come in transport and processing are singled out for special attention, suggesting that these additional costs are thought to be quite high.

The high cost of Soviet agriculture is, in my view, due to policy, not to weather or climate. However, the Soviet Union is not the only place in the world that maintains a high-cost agriculture for reasons of domestic policy. In both Europe and Japan, agriculture is highly protected and domestic costs of production are higher than in North America.

The Soviets have a need for labor and investment in other sectors of the economy, however, and they would have much to gain from reducing costs of production and transferring labor out of agriculture. This would necessitate economic and political reforms that they have so far been reluctant to undertake.

The Soviet Union imports food not because it cannot feed itself, but because it cannot now produce the diet demanded by consumers at a cost acceptable to those who allocate resources. If we take an historical view, the current food imports are certainly not a sign of economic health, but they certainly show a much healthier concern for the welfare of Soviet citizens than did the grain exports in

the period of the 1930's that we have heard much about this morning.

The Soviet Union exported grain in 1932, even after the famine in the Ukraine, southern Russia and Kazakhstan was quite evident. Clearly, exports in and of themselves are not necessarily a sign of a healthy economy, just as imports are not necessarily a sign of trouble.

We can expect Soviet food imports to continue until they make significant progress in bringing down the costs of production. Another way of stating this is that the Soviets do have a large potential to improve their agriculture and to reduce their need for imported food.

If we as an exporter want to protect ourselves against unforeseen shocks in demand for our products, we must continue to pay attention to developments in Soviet agricultural policy and performance.

Long-term trading agreements like the one that we signed in August are useful in some respects, but they are not a substitute for continued monitoring of domestic developments in Soviet agriculture.

Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you very much, Dr. Brooks. I wonder if, in your opinion, the fact that you have large fluctuations and swings in Soviet agricultural output from year to year—that this results in a failure to organize themselves for the varying kinds of weather which may come in a particular year.

Dr. BROOKS. I think that there are a number of things that could be done to reduce the variability in agricultural output in the Soviet Union. There are many agricultural practices that are followed by farmers in comparable parts of North America that are comparable climatically to areas in the Soviet Union that also have to deal with these severe weather fluctuations.

We do not see these practices adopted to the same extent in the Soviet Union. The most obvious practice used in North America is the greater use of fallow land. Fallowing land every other year or every third year allows the land to store moisture as a kind of insurance policy against a drought or shortfall in moisture in the following years.

The Soviets do not use fallow as much as farmers do in comparable parts of North America. The area under fallow has increased somewhat in recent years, but not certainly to the extent that it is currently used in North America.

Dr. LUCIER. And why would they fail to provide the fallow land?

Dr. BROOKS. Well, I am not sure. I think some of it comes from the pressure to keep production high this year—the extreme pressure on current production relative to production in current years.

Also, whenever you change a policy there is an element of risk involved. There has to be some way of spreading that risk or making sure that the people who will undertake implementation of that change in policy are not penalized if things do not go exactly as has been foreseen.

Dr. LUCIER. I wonder if you have any materials that perhaps you could supply for the record that would compare Soviet productivity with other less-developed countries.

Dr. BROOKS. I do not for less-developed countries. I do have a more detailed outline of the work that I have done comparing Soviet productivity with comparable parts outside of the Soviet Union.

I think it is very difficult to make the kind of comparison you are suggesting because it is important in comparing to standardize for weather and climatic factors, and we decided that parts of North America are the ones that are most suitable for that kind of comparison.

Dr. LUCIER. Well, we would be very happy to have your material for the record.

Dr. BROOKS. Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you.

Mr. Malish?

STATEMENT OF ANTON F. MALISH, CHIEF, EAST EUROPE/U.S.S.R. BRANCH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS DIVISION, ERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. MALISH. Thank you very much, Dr. Lucier. It is a pleasure to be here and to follow such a distinguished list of previous witnesses.

At USDA, of course, we closely monitor the Soviet agricultural outlook and situation and I would today like only to briefly summarize the statement that is being made available for the record.[1]

One thing I would point out before we get too far, and perhaps before you expect too much of me, perhaps is that no matter how closely one follows Soviet agriculture, one is never too certain of the actual intentions or sometimes, even of the outcome.

This would be the third year in a row, for example, that the Soviet Union has not reported such a basic piece of information as domestic grain production. In the field of agricultural policy issues rise, periodically surface, and disappear later. The current emphasis on private plot production is a good example. It tends to appear when food supplies are tight, and gradually fade away as improvements occur.

So, with that kind of a warning, I will be glad to go ahead further.

Dr. LUCIER. Proceed.

Mr. MALISH. We think our agricultural exports to the Soviet Union represent an important element in strengthening our own domestic economy. And at various times our grain exports to the Soviet Union have represented up to one-fifth of our corn exports and up to one-sixth of our wheat exports.

We cannot separate that trade, however, from the wide range of influences that affect it, but probably the most important economic element is the inability of the Soviets to support a very large animal inventory from their domestic crop production.

Soviet statistics will show that Soviet citizens are among the world's best fed people, and yet shortages of meat and dairy products, fruits and vegetables abound. At the end of 1980, we found some Western analysts saying that the Soviet Union could be

[1] See p. 106 for the prepared statement of Mr. Malish.

facing its worst food crisis in 20 years. The Western press reported instances of work stoppages that seemed to be related to food shortages.

A series of events were taking place, one of which was the rise of Poland's Solidarity Union, that made these events too much for the Soviet leadership to ignore.

So it is about that time, in October 1980, that we begin to see references to a new agriculture policy, called the Food Program, in the Soviet Union. That program ultimately was formally adopted in a plenum in May 1982.

This program is touted as a radical solution to the Soviet food problem, although it addresses some of the same questions that have been really at the center of Soviet government attention since at least 1965.

It envisages creating in the Soviet Union an integrated agro-industrial complex that would coordinate the planning, financing and management of the agriculture sector and of those industries serving it, and the downstream production and marketing facilities.

The major elements, I will just tick off here, but they are elaborated in great detail in my statement: First, the Soviets are taking some management reorganizations that include creating at the Council of Ministers level, a Commission for the Agro-industrial Complex. We consider that important because in some other areas of high priority to the Soviet Union—the military-industrial, for example—they have a similar commission at this level that meets regularly.

Further down the line at the republic, oblast and rayon levels, there are agro-industrial associations, nicknamed in the Soviet acronym RAPO, that you may have heard about. They are to break down the bureaucratic barriers that have compartmentalized Soviet agriculture.

Second, there are a series of farm-level reforms taking place, probably the most important one being the creation of collective contract teams to more closely tie farm workers' wages to harvest results.

I mentioned the private plot initiative. One of the points there that is worth stressing is that under a decree that goes back to about January 1981, a private plot-holder now can have as many animals as they like so long as they contract the output of those animals back to the state and collective farms, and those farms in turn can count that produce towards their own procurement goals.

Third, a series of price reforms is being implemented, and, lastly, I think the Food Program has an agriculture trade policy implication that relates to the actions that the United States took in January 1980. A domestic response occurred in the Soviet Union to minimize its exposure to pressures of foreign grain sales.

We are aware of the economic and social problems that might hamper the implementation of that program, but the Soviets seem to be taking actions, and it is best expressed through a series of decrees, that suggest that the Food Program should be a positive influence on their agriculture for the remainder of this decade.

We expect, for example, Soviet statistics for this year to show that their gross agricultural output this year will exceed the record of 1978. We think meat production will be a record. We think the

livestock sector, in general, will show good results, and our USDA estimate of grain production is 200 million tons. That would be the largest crop since 1978.

Digressing for a moment, it strikes me as difficult for the Soviets to attribute a good deal of success to the Food Program, however, and not report grain production again this year. So we will be watching for that carefully.

We anticipate that Soviet grain imports will be decreasing in this 1983–84 marketing year, perhaps 29-or-so million tons, but that the U.S. share of the total, when compared to that of the last marketing year, will increase.

We think that in the previous marketing year, the Soviets probably tried to improve their negotiating position for a new grain agreement by holding back their grain imports from the United States, so that they imported only about 6.2-or-so million tons; currently, with a smaller market, we would be able to sell 8 to 9 million tons to the Soviets, the minimum required in the new grain agreement.

For the remainder of the decade, we would expect the Soviets to be a generally declining grain import market, but we would expect them to increase their imports of agriculture technology items embodied in machinery, pesticides and herbicides; techniques and components for the manufacture of those items; hybrids, breeding stocks, and particularly high-protein feeds.

We think that this kind of change will show itself in gradually increasing efficiency in the feed-livestock sector and in expanded use of nongrain feeds. And we would expect that this shift toward imports of agriculture technology would become more evident in the latter half of the decade.

I would be glad to answer whatever questions I can.

Dr. LUCIER. You spoke of the reforms and the Food Program. Do you think that there is still a commitment to collectivization, as such, or is this trying to fine-tune the system?

Mr. MALISH. I am pretty positive that there is no weakening in that commitment to socialized agriculture. But I think that in the Food Program you are seeing a response to a combination of things—a declining economic performance in the latter part of the 1970's; probably some real concerns over the food situation in the Soviet Union then, that are carrying forward today.

I was reading an older book from the early 1960's called "Soviet Agriculture, the Permanent Crisis," and one of the writers in that book makes the point that you cannot run an industrialized society on a diet of black bread and pickles.

That is probably something the Soviets are thinking about; that is, they have a recognition that their position as a superpower rests primarily on the military sector and that they are not willing to see the economic base erode out from under it.

So I think that is probably why the Food Program came to prominence when it did.

Dr. LUCIER. Do you see a trend away from or toward the private plot as a source of market vegetables and things?

Mr. MALISH. Well, the Food Program highlights that component of that policy rather dramatically. So far, on the basis of 1 year's

experience, we have not seen an improvement in private plot production.

Professor Millar mentioned some percentages of what this private plot sector represents. It represents about one-third of all meat production, for example, in the Soviet Union. One of the things that some writers point out is that the Soviet Union, like all industrialized countries, is facing a migration away from rural areas. This migration reflects changing life styles, and so a program seeking a willingness of people to devote more of their free time to animal husbandry might be an idea whose time is already 25 years too late, perhaps.

Dr. LUCIER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Malish. Your expertise is always welcome here at the committee and it is very much appreciated in our work here.

Mr. MALISH. Well, thank you for the invitation.

[The following information was subsequently submitted by Mr. Malish:]

NOVEMBER 30, 1983.

The CHAIRMAN,
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The East Europe-USSR Branch has recently obtained information that helps explain one of the heretofore more puzzling aspects of the Soviet Food Program, viz.: the apparent decrease in capital investment planned for 1981–85 in the USSR's agro-industrial complex (and especially in those industries serving agriculture), at the very time when those industries were the subject of increased attention.

The concept of an "agro-industrial complex" (APK) as a separate planning entity in the USSR is a new one, dating back only to the beginning of the current 5-year plan period. Previously, published data on capital investment centered on agriculture alone, or industry alone, etc. For this reason, data provided in "Finansy SSSR (Soviet Finance)" July 1982 (No. 7), were particularly valuable since they showed capital investment in the APK for 5-year plan periods going back to 1961–65. This data showed a decline in planned investment for the APK, from 242 billion rubles in 1976–80, to 233 billion in 1981–85. The information was given special credence since the accompanying article was authored by the USSR Minister of Finance. Furthermore, since an increase in investment in the agricultural sector alone had been widely publicized (from 171 billion rubles to 190 billion rubles for the same period) one could only conclude that the investment in the industries serving agriculture was about to undergo a major reduction, from 71 billion to 43 billion rubles.

This decrease in planned investment in the APK was repeated in "Ekonomicheskiye nauki (Economic Science)" February 1983, (translated by JPRS in "USSR Report," Agriculture, No. 1381). Coupled with numerous articles dealing with the need to improve efficiency in the APK, the apparent decrease in investment, especially in the very sectors expected to be at the forefront of improved agricultural efficiency, was an oddity that focused attention on the Food Program's rhetoric rather than on its substance.

Two new publications, however, contain data which conflict with the original sources. The first of these is "Ekonomicheskaya gazeta" (Economics Gazette)" No. 19, May 1983, which reported a "growth of capital investment for the APK as a whole" of 9.6 percent over that in the 1976–80 period. Obviously, such a growth would be impossible under the Finance Minister's figures from nearly a year earlier. More recently, *Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v. 1982* (National Economy of the USSR), which was sent to the press August 12, 1983 and just now obtained, reported that capital investment in agro-industrial complex during 1976–80 was 213 billion rubles, 29 billion rubles less than originally reported. This new number would be consistent with a 9–10 percent growth rate, and since investment data for the agricultural sector alone was essentially unchanged, investment in the industries serving agriculture would show a small gain, from 42 billion rubles in 1976–80 to 43 billion rubles during 1981–85.

The new data no longer show the puzzling reversal of investment trends that complicated earlier analysis. Nonetheless, Food Program continues to represent a signif-

icant claim on limited investment funds for 1981–85. Whether it is enough to enable the Program to reach its 1990 goals is still in doubt.

Since I noted this confusing aspect of Soviet investment trends in my statement before the Committee on November 15, 1983, I would like to call this new number in the Soviets investment data to your attention. If possible, you might attach this letter to my statement in the record.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

ANTON F. MALISH,
Chief, East Europe-U.S.S.R. Branch,
International Economics Division.

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Brooks, thank you again for your contribution.

Dr. BROOKS. Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. For our final panel today, we have two witnesses, Dr. Iwan Koropeckyj and Dr. Katherine Kochno.

Is Dr. Kochno here?

[No response.]

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Koropeckyj?

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Yes.

Dr. LUCIER. I should say that Dr. Koropeckyj is professor of economics at Temple University, and I hope that he can kind of be the concluding framework for our session here this morning.

STATEMENT OF DR. IWAN KOROPECKYJ, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, PHILADELPHIA, PA

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Thank you, Dr. Lucier, for inviting me to appear before this committee. I will try to be brief.

In a study to be published next year, I compare the economy of the present-day Ukraine with the economy on the same territory prior to World War I. At that time, the Ukraine was divided between the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary. Basically, I ask the following two questions: How has the Ukraine fared relative to other regions under the czarist market economy and under the Soviet socialism? And what were the underlying reasons for the treatment of the Ukrainian economy by the central government under both regimes? Obviously, to answer the latter question only variables affecting the Ukraine differentially relative to other regions need be considered. The systemic factors of equal importance to all regions need not be included in our analysis.

I have already submitted the introduction, summary and conclusions of my study to this committee for the record.[1]

Dr. LUCIER. It will be printed in the record.

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Since there were 10 minutes allocated to me, my remarks will be limited to some of my findings in that study which highlight the consequences of Soviet socialism in the Ukraine, of which the tragedy of 1932–33 was not an insignificant factor. Specifically, I shall comment on the following aspects of the Ukrainian economy: the degree of integration in the U.S.S.R. economy; geographical distribution and commodity structure of external trade; national income loss and its effect on the level of investment; and finally, population, national income and its structure, and national income per capita prior to World War I and at the present.

[1] See p. 114 for the prepared statement of Dr. Koropeckyj.

In view of the available information, the degree of economic integration of the Ukraine into the U.S.S.R. can be measured by the export-national income ratio. In two benchmark years, average for 1909–11 and 1972, the Ukraine exported 23 and 38 percent of its national income, respectively. Before the revolution, other regions of the empire absorbed 54 percent of Ukrainian exports and supplied 77 percent of its imports. At the present time, 80 percent of Ukrainian exports goes to other Soviet Republics, mainly to the Russian Federation, while no information is available on the geographical distribution of imports. It follows that the degree of integration of the Ukrainian economy with other Soviet Republics rose during the past 70 years.

The structure of Ukrainian external trade changed somewhat during this period of time. The Ukraine is no longer an exporter of agricultural raw materials, mainly grain. It now exports processed foods, industrial materials, and machinery to other Republics. To other countries of the world, primarily to the COMECON members, it exports various industrial materials, indispensable for Soviet-type industrialization. The Ukrainian imports consist primarily of processed goods and oil and timber. The emphasis on the export of less processed commodities and on the import of more processed commodities is, no doubt, detrimental to the long-run development of the Ukrainian economy—a fact recognized and criticized even by the Soviet Ukrainian economists.

During various periods before the revolution, the Ukraine's payments to the state budget exceeded the disbursement from the budget by an amount ranging from 40 to 50 percent of the payments. These excesses amounted to a transfer of about 3 percent of the Ukrainian net material product to the empire's other regions. After the revolution, the transfers of the portion of the national income from the Ukraine to other Soviet Republics not only continued but even increased. Depending on the period analyzed and the methodology utilized by individual researchers, 10 to 20 percent of the Ukraine's net material product was annually transferred outside its boundaries. In terms of the gross national product, the percentage would be slightly lower. These transfers took place without asking for the population's approval, without payment of interest, and without intention of repayment.

While consumption in the Ukraine was, in general, related to the level of national income, the transfer of a part of the national income found its reflection in the relative lowering of investment. The Ukraine's share in U.S.S.R. investment has been consistently lower than its population share, which has been slightly less than one-fifth throughout the Soviet period. Only during the period of reconstruction after World War I and II did the Ukraine's investment share approach its population share. In recent years, investment share has been particularly low. For example, it amounted to 13.7 percent in 1981. Needless to say, the relatively low investment did not allow the Ukrainian economy to take advantage of technological progress adequately and to modernize its production structure. The result was detrimental to economic growth.

The most comprehensive indicator of economic development and the level of population welfare is national income and national income per capita. In order to derive these indicators, the popula-

tion base has to be estimated. The Soviet population estimates for recent years are, in general, reliable. However, the estimate of the 1913 population within the present boundaries of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, amounting to 35.2 million people, appears too low. I estimated this population at 39.1 million. It seems to me that the official estimate is deliberately maintained in order to blunt implicitly tremendous losses of the Ukrainian population under the Soviet rule.

In addition to the 1932–33 famine to which today's hearings are devoted, the Ukraine suffered the following demographic losses during the period under discussion: World War I; Ukrainian struggle for independence between 1917 and 1921; famine in 1921–22; collectivization in 1928–34; Stalinist terror, 1936–38; World War II; guerrilla fighting in 1945–51; deportation to Siberia after World War II; and the flight to the West after the Second World War.

Assuming that my estimate is acceptable, the Ukraine's share of 24.7 percent in the empire's total population in 1913 decreased to 18.7 percent of the Soviet population in 1981. One has to keep in mind that this decrease was also associated with the lower population growth in the Ukraine as compared with other Republics, especially those in central Asia in recent times.

The Ukrainian national income accounted for about 21 to 22 percent of the 1913 total for what are now U.S.S.R. territories. It dropped to 18.3 percent in 1970. Because of considerable deceleration of the Ukraine's economic growth rate during the 1970's, the Ukrainian share in U.S.S.R. net material product declined to 16.8 percent in 1980.

Individual sectors of the Ukrainian economy behaved differently with respect to their respective U.S.S.R. totals during the period under consideration. Between 1913 and 1970, the share of Ukrainian industry decreased by 2 percentage points, no doubt reflecting the industrialization of the Asiatic regions of the U.S.S.R. Agriculture retained its share, according to my estimates and, according to the official sources, increased its share by 2 percentage points. A significant decline of 6 percentage points can be observed for the total of such branches as transportation, communication, construction and trade. The share of the Ukraine's service industries remained largely unchanged, except housing, in which the share decreased.

With respect to the national income per capita, this indicator for the Ukraine was equal to 87 percent of that for the czarist empire in 1913. Because of a faster national income growth than population growth relative to the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainian national income per capita by the latter year had risen to 94 percent of the U.S.S.R. income per capita. However, as a result of recent slowdown, the Ukrainian national income per capita relative to the U.S.S.R. dropped back to about the prerevolutionary level.

In comparison with Western developed nations, the Ukraine improved its standing with respect to the national income per capita between 1913 and 1970. On the other hand, relative to other Soviet Republics, the Ukraine's ranking dropped from the usual fifth place after the three Baltic Republics and the Russian Federation to the seventh place, following also Belorussia and Georgia.

These are some of the indicators of the development of the Ukrainian economy during the last years of its membership in the czarist empire and during the most recent years under the Soviet regime. In view of demographic losses and the continued drain of the national income, one can but conclude that the policy of the czarist and Soviet regimes was detrimental to the Ukrainian economy. There is no doubt that in the absence of such policies, the growth of the Ukraine's economy and the improvement of its population's welfare would have been faster than was the case.

Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Koropeckyj, before the revolution Russia was a grain exporter. Now, was this because there were real surpluses, particularly in the Ukraine, or was it because there were quotas set by the czarist regime that the peasants had to fulfill whether they were starved or not?

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Under the czarist regime, the economy was a market economy and there were no quotas. However, as a result of the liberation of peasants in 1861, they had to pay not only taxes, but payments for obtaining their freedom. Therefore, there was an economic pressure on the one hand, and the pressure to pay taxes on the other hand. However, these payments were suspended in the 1890's, and since then the pressure on the population to sell grain decreased.

Dr. LUCIER. Well, even today you speak of an underinvestment in the agricultural economy. It is typical for the Ukraine. Is it typical for the country as a whole? In other words, is there, generally speaking, underinvestment in the agricultural sector in the Soviet Union?

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Well, in general, yes. But relatively speaking, in the Ukraine the underinvestment is higher because the emphasis is on the development of the Asiatic regions of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in order to provide a food base for the industrial workers over large distances, despite not very good economic conditions, the emphasis is on development of agriculture.

Dr. LUCIER. Speaking as an economist, would it not make more sense economically to develop your agricultural resources in an area which has more favorable climatic conditions?

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Well, because of transportation, that depends. For example, while, in the past, before the revolution, the Ukraine was exporting grain and other agricultural products, right now it exports primarily processed products, like sugar and other foods.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you very much, Dr. Koropeckyj.

Dr. KOROPECKYJ. Thank you.

Dr. LUCIER. The hearing record will remain open to receive further material or answers to questions which may be submitted. I also ask that a staff report on the situation in the Ukraine, including tables and charts, also be printed as part of the record.

Dr. Kochno, I am informed, is here. Would you please come forward?

Could you summarize what you have to tell us this morning? And we will see that the whole record is printed.

STATEMENT OF DR. KATERHINE KOCHNO, STATE COLLEGE, PA

Dr. KOCHNO. Honorable Senatorial Committee, I would like to testify as a victim of the Soviet holocaust and genocidal famine in Ukraine. I am an eyewitness of this famine. Moreover, I also would like to testify as an adviser and senior consultant to the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression that conducted hearings in Europe and the United States, and investigated the famine.

I would like to present the facts. The first stage of genocide in Ukraine related to the famine that preceded total catastrophe of the Soviet holocaust imposed on the Ukraine. On January 5 of 1930, the Soviet Government conducted a secret meeting in the Kremlin with the Politburo and declared that there was a necessity to intensify and complete collectivization.

They published the most cruel law which stated that the Soviet Government should proceed and declare the total liquidation of the Ukrainian kulaks as a social class—the best economic producers of the Soviet Union that supply agricultural production, 65 percent, to the whole Soviet Union, and the best agricultural producers and the most important national class in the Ukraine.

The Soviet statistics indicate that during the registration of the kulaks in the year 1929, there were 5,618,000 kulaks in the Ukraine and in the Soviet Union. After total confiscation of their properties, throwing their children at night in the snow, deporting them to Siberia to die at the mercy of not only the Siberian climate but definitely execution—execution and famine resulted—registration of the kulaks in 1934 revealed that only 149,000 Ukrainian kulaks were left alive in Siberia and the Ukraine.

Moreover, Stalin, during the Yalta Conference, declared personally to Churchill that collectivization was worse than World War II, and admitted that it had involved the destruction of 10 million lives. The source is "Since Stalin," which is the book I have in front of me.

It is obvious that Stalin did not mention the famine in the Ukraine and coverup the Soviet holocaust before Churchill and the world.

The second fact: The famine was deliberately imposed in order to annihilate and destroy the strongest opposition inside of the Soviet Union of the Ukrainian people in their struggle against communism.

Fact: in 1942 the central Soviet Government in Moscow ordered to create iron military blockades around the Ukraine. You cannot find this fact in any history of mankind. The territory of Ukraine on all borders was surrounded by secret police, red army, and 25 red brigades trained in Leningrad and Moscow.

On December 6, 1933, another order was issued to prohibit the supply of food and agriculture to Ukraine, and completely stop all economic trade and close all state and cooperative stores with food.

Next order: The people who will try to get out of the Ukraine, even teenagers and children, will be sentenced to 5 years in prison, Siberia, or will be destroyed by firing squad.

My mother went to Moscow in search of food, and she was also in Belorussia. Some of my friends in other Soviet Republics said there was no famine in any Soviet Republic, especially in Moscow.

Then, according to the testimony of the well-known Soviet economist, Dr. Menjeha, who was a member of the Soviet Ministry of Economics and Food Industry—and we are absolutely aware that the Soviet Government later published another cruel decree which related to the destruction of Soviet children, youngsters and Ukrainian mothers, since they were the main target to destroy in order that they would not perpetuate the existence of our nation, and to destroy the future generation of the Ukraine. They succeeded, destroying youngsters and school children, 40 percent.

They declared a decree that if any child or teenager will be able to pick up in the fields of now state farms, collective farms, one piece of agricultural or a few pieces of wheat, they will be executed on the spot. They were executed and such trials were constantly conducted in the Soviet Union.

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Kochno, excuse me.

Dr. KOCHNO. I will summarize.

Dr. LUCIER. We are required to vacate the room by 12:30.

Dr. KOCHNO. Fine.

Dr. LUCIER. I wish we had more time. This is very stirring.

Dr. KOCHNO. I would like to also testify why the results of the catastrophic famine were not brought to attention. The Soviet Union in 1933 requested that 434 million bushels should be transported to Moscow.

In 1933, they requested 536, and the Ukraine produced only 140 million bushels of grain. But most important, Stalin is not only responsible for a famine. He sent Kahanovich, Mikoyan and Khrushchev to execute the famine. And to our shock and surprise, they collected 95 percent of the grain in the Ukraine.

I would like in my conclusion to focus attention on the shocking facts of which I am an eyewitness, and I was a victim of this. Destruction of the children: the villages disappeared. About one-third of the population was destroyed and annihilated.

My father was an arch priest in Kharkiv and conducted mass funerals, especially for the children. Because Kharkiv was the capital of the Ukraine, he was able to send pictures and material to the consulate, which reached the League of Nations and the Vatican.

Then the Soviets decided to invite the Premier of France, Herriot. But before they decided to clean the mountains of bodies, and especially to remove the children that were flooding every city—they were coming from all over—Stalin issued the decree that he had mercy upon the children and ordered built Stalinist children shelters.

In reality, my friends, they were barracks of death. Ten thousand children were placed in that concentration camp outside of Heiko (phonetic). Another eyewitness, Dr. Mishenko, a well-known psychiatrist, also proved that it was 40 percent of the mortality and destruction of the children and youngsters in the Soviet Union.

Dr. LUCIER. Dr. Kochno, could I ask you to supplement your testimony? It is very moving, but we do have to leave the room. I thank you very much for coming today.

Dr. KOCHNO. Yes. Can I conclude?

Dr. LUCIER. We will print it in the record as read and I will recess the hearings.

Dr. KOCHNO. The transports came from abroad. One was drown in the Black Sea for our salvation, and other transports that came from the United States, France, and England, together with Ukrainian food, gold, and silver, flooded the international market for the purpose to continue and to contribute to American depression.

And then the ultimate goal was, in the long term, to create a proletarian revolution in the United States. This aspect has never been considered before.

Dr. LUCIER. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF MARCO CARYNNYK, RESEARCH FELLOW

KENNAN INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members, I am grateful for your invitation to present testimony at this hearing at the Soviet-induced famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine. As a writer who has spent the last four and a half years studying the causes, course, and consequences of that famine, I am very pleased by your decision to take a look at a vitally important--and concealed--episode in history.

When Stalin abandoned Lenin's New Economic Policy in favor of head-long industrialization and collectivization, he embarked on a second revolution, directed solely and exclusively from above, which in its reach and strength was far more devastating than the Revolution of 1917 or the Civil War. The dictator's blows fell most heavily on the peasantry. A hundred million peasants were compelled, often at gun-point, to abandon the holdings they had won under the NEP and to join collective farms; several million, labeled "kulaks" or "kulak henchmen," were shot, exiled or absorbed into the rapidly growing network of concentration camps. The most horrible fate was reserved for Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, where some six million people were starved to death.

Stalin's heirs have not acknowledged his greatest crime. Denouncing his predecessor's mistakes in his famous "secret speech" in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev argued that as

one of Stalin's "great services" collectivization had to be carried to its logical end and studiously avoided mentioning the killing of the peasants. In the West, apologists for Stalin have denied that the famine occurred or have blamed it on "peasant stubbornness." Even the New York Times, in a dispatch from Moscow in March 1933, when the famine was at its height, claimed that "there is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition." "This amazing sophistry," wrote Eugene Lyons, himself a correspondent in Moscow at the time, "characterizes sufficiently the whole shabby episode of our failure to report honestly the gruesome Russian famine of 1932-33."

Partly because they lack clear evidence and partly because of widespread but unexamined assumptions, historians have also glossed over the famine of 1933. Leonard Schapiro's The Communist Party of the Soviet Union refers to it in only a few oblique sentences; Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism relegates its victims to footnotes; and even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago mentions it only in passing. In an age when "genocide" and "holocaust" have firmly established themselves in the political lexicon, the horrors of the famine of 1933 are only beginning to be chronicled.

Yet the contours of the calamity are clear. Intent on carrying out the collectivization of agriculture required by his first Five-Year Plan, Stalin liquidated, as the ugly euphemism has it, opposition to his scheme within the Party and then declared a ruthless war against the peasants. The industrialization of the Soviet Union called for by the Five-Year Plan required Western machinery and expertise that had to be paid for with hard currency. Taking an example,

perhaps, from the Tsarist government, which had exported grain even when those who produced it were starving, Stalin wrested away the peasants' food to feed the cities and to dump on Western markets (thus, incidentally, harming American and Canadian wheat farmers, who had already been hurt by the Depression) and sent millions of peasants to cut timber in the Far North and then undersold Western producers (thus causing grave loss to Scandinavia and Canada). Anxious to crush the resistance that Ukrainians had shown to Sovietization by armed rebellions well into the 1920s and then by growing demands for cultural and political autonomy, Stalin blockaded Ukraine to prevent peasants from fleeing to Russia (where there was no famine), blacklisted entire regions to keep them from receiving any consumer goods, forbade foreign relief and initiated a massive campaign of misinformation.

Starving peasants who dug up seeds or snipped a few were punished for their "crimes against socialist property" by being exiled or executed. A political police formed from city workers and Party members and helped by air patrols was given the task of watching over the fields. When hungry policemen joined the peasants in stealing from the crop, Komsomol members were brought in to keep an eye on their elders. And when even these measures failed, brigades of children armed with sticks were sent to protect state property. Called upon to denounce their own parents, the children were rewarded with food, clothing and medals. In an extension of Russia's historic drive to absorb Ukraine, the land of the dead was colonized by Russian settlers (some of whom fled home when they could not stand the stench in cottages where corpses had lain untended). Then, in the purges of the mid-thirties, the activists who had brutalized the countryside were destroyed. Finally, their executors

were themselves executed to ensure the safety of the supreme assassin.

Drought, pestilence and war have been at least contributory causes of most famines. The famine of 1933, however, was entirely man-made, entirely the result of a dictator's genocidal policies. Even Soviet statistics, unreliable as they are, indicate that the grain harvest of 1932 was only 12 percent smaller than the one of 1927, but deliveries of grain to the state, enforced by ten thousand party workers who were mobilized to implement the Iron Broom technique of Civil War days, were stepped up by 44 percent.

Otto Schiller, the agricultural attache at the German Embassy in Moscow, who visited the North Caucasus in May 1933, correctly reported the regime's refusal to help: " The Soviet Government itself does nothing. I was told of many cases of sufferers, swollen from famine, who implored help from the village soviets. They were told that they should eat the bread which they had got hidden away, and that no famine at all existed. In fact, the authorities explain the present situation by insisting that there is no lack of grain, that the peasants hide it, and it is only a matter of finding it.... A million people could be fed, though poorly, upon 100,000 tons of grain from the beginning of the year until the end of July--a million saved from death by starvation. The Soviet Government exported 1,500,000 tons of grain from last year's crop."

These policies of "squeezing" the peasants of Ukraine and the North Caucasus for as much food as possible--party activists often confiscated even baked bread and emptied pots of porridge--and doing nothing to alleviate the resulting starvation--led to one of the greatest famines in history. Estimates by observers range from one to ten or, in one

case, even fifteen million deaths. If we accept the commonly cited figure of six million, that is still three times as many deaths as in the Irish potato famine. And if we include the peasants who were executed or deported to labor camps, then the total population loss may well approach ten million.

These atrocities, which are so inadequately termed the "man-made famine" or "great famine," constitute one of the most horrifying crimes of our brutal century. Yet the fact that this crime was perpetrated has been met in many quarters with an indifference bordering on cynicism and in some with a conspiracy of silence that is itself little short of criminal.

The primary reason for the conspiracy of silence, of course, is the calculated campaign of misinformation that the Soviet authorities mounted to keep their doings secret. Declaring Ukraine out of bounds to reporters in order to hide the destruction they had wreaked, Stalin and his minions made concealment of the famine an integral part of Soviet foreign policy.

The fact that they did so is not in the least surprising. If the Soviet government were to acknowledge the famine and accept relief (it could not very well acknowledge the famine and then reject aid), it would be making a concession to the Ukrainian peasants.

But since the government was effectively at war with them, such a compromise would amount to an admission of defeat and a drop in international standing precisely at a time when the government was propagandizing the economic and social triumph of the Five-Year Plan.

"When it is a matter of inflicting suffering upon individuals or classes which block the realization of their

dreams," remarked William Henry Chamberlin, an American correspondent who had visited the famine regions, "dictators are hardboiled to the last degree. But they are as sensitive as the most temperamental artist when the effects of their ruthless policies are criticized, or even when they are stated objectively without comment."

Striving for diplomatic recognition by the United States, admission into the League of Nations and non-aggression treaties with European powers, the Soviet government could not indeed either tolerate criticism of its Five-Year Plan or admit that people were dropping dead of hunger in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev and Poltava.

The Soviet campaign was largely successful. Nazi and anti-Nazi, left and right, Stalinist and anti-Stalinist are arguing to this day whether a famine occurred and, if so, whether it was not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves.

But the Soviet lie would not have been so widely believed if many Western quarters had not tacitly accepted it. Malcolm Muggeridge, who was the Moscow correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in 1932 and 1933, is no doubt the most highly qualified witness to testify about both the Soviet cover-up of the famine and the Western complicity in it. In the course of research for a book and a documentary film about the famine of 1933, I filmed an interview with Mr. Muggeridge at his home in Sussex, England, in May 1982. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now show excerpts from that interview, and I am prepared to submit a transcript of the entire interview, as well as an article of mine entitled "The Famine the 'Times' Couldn't Find." The article has just appeared in the November, 1983 issue of Commentary and deals with the disgraceful concealment of the

famine by Walter Duranty, the long-standing correspondent of the Times in Moscow.

STARVATION DELIBERATE, DIABOLICAL

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE ON STALIN'S FAMINE IN 1933

BY MARCO CARYNNYK

"The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind, without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering," Malcolm Muggeridge said. He was talking about the genocidal famine that swept Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, two of the most abundant lands in all of Europe, in the winter of 1932 and the spring and summer of 1933.

The harvest of 1932 had been a fair one, no worse than the average during the previous decade, when life had seemed a bit easier again after three years of world war and five years of revolution and famine. But then, as the Ukrainian peasants were bringing in their wheat and rye, an army of men advanced like locusts into every barn and shed and swept away all the grain. The few stores that the peasants managed to put away were soon gone, and they began eating leaves, bark, corn husks, dogs, cats and rodents.

When that food was gone and the people had puffed up with edema, they shuffled off to the cities, begging for bits of bread and dying like flies in the streets. In the

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spring of 1933, when the previous year's supplies were gone and before the new vegetation brought some relief, the peasants were dying at the rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an hour, or 17 a minute. (In the First World War, by comparison, about 6,000 people were killed every day.) Country lanes and city streets were littered with corpses--"stacked in the snow like logs," one eyewitness told me--and special brigades hastily dug mass graves in remote areas where they doused the bodies with gasoline and set them on fire. By the time the famine tapered off in the autumn of 1933, between five and six million men, women and children had died.

Malcolm Muggeridge was there that that terrible winter and spring. As a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Moscow, he was one of the few Western journalists who circumvented Soviet restrictions and visited the famine regions and then honestly reported what he had seen.

Shortly before Muggeridge's articles appeared in the Guardian the Soviet authorities declared Ukraine out of bounds to reporters and set about concealing the destruction they had wreaked. Prominent statesmen, writers and journalists--among them French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, George Bernard Shaw and Walter Duranty of the New York Times--were enlisted in the campaign of misinformation.

The conspiracy of silence was largely successful. For years to come Stalinists and anti-Stalinists argued whether a famine had occurred and, if so, whether it was not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves. Today, as Ukrainians throughout the world (except in the Soviet Union, of course. where the subject cannot even be mentioned) commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the famine, the events of 1933 are still largely unknown.

Muggeridge and I talked at his cottage in Sussex,

England. My first question was about his views of the Soviet Union before he decided to go there as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.

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You have to remember that I was brought up in an early socialist home, so the orthodoxy of my childhood was socialist--not Marxist, but socialist. I believed implicitly that if only you could bring about these changes, human beings would live in a brotherly and prosperous and peaceful way together. My father was a very good man, and I used to listen to him and his friends talking all this over on Saturday evenings, and I bought the whole thing.

Then, when I was in my twenties, in the time of the Great Depression, I went to work on the Manchester Guardian. MacDonald, the leader of the Labor Party, had formed this national government, and from the point of view of people like myself betrayed the whole cause. I felt that the corruption of parliamentary government, plus the complete, as it seemed to me, and still seems to me, break down of capitalism, as a basis for human beings to live together, this had gone. Therefore, the alternative seemed to be what was going on in the USSR.

How did you see that alternative before you went?

I visualized that they were creating a society on a completely different basis, not on a basis of individual greed, but of collective well-being. And also on the basis that war would be impossible and that you wouldn't waste an enormous amount of your economic resources on building up weapons. The character of Lenin, as I'd read about it in adulatory books, seemed a very attractive one. And we had every reason to assume that Stalin was a true follower of Lenin.

Therefore I expected to go into a society in which the things that I abominated and still abominate in a capitalist society--money and everything that arises from it--would be different. I didn't really plan to go there as a journalist. Representing the Guardian, which was a very pro-Soviet paper, and also, of course, my wife being a niece of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who were enormously highly regarded there, was a way of getting a visa and settling down to study the whole thing and, as I thought, to live there for the rest of my days.

You went to the Soviet Union in September 1932. What was life like in Moscow then?

Even on the journey there--we went on one of their boats--even then one began to see the fraudulence of the whole thing. And also the brutality of it, the fact that the government ruled more than any other government, not excepting the British Raj, which I remembered from working in India. It ruled by fear.

How did this fear manifest itself?

You could sense it in talking to people, the fact that they were frightened to talk openly with you. You could even sense it in the streets. I remember one incident that made a great impression on me as a journalist there. Of course I got to know all the other journalists there. There was one there called [Ralph] Barnes, who was later killed in an aircrash with [Cholly] Knickerbocker. He managed to get an interview with a man in the GPU [the political police], and he told me afterwards that the question he asked him, which produced a most emphatic response, was why the GPU arrested innocent people.

This man, to his amazement, began to laugh at such a question. "But of course you have to arrest innocent

people," he said, "because it's only if you do that that other people are frightened. If you simply arrest people for having committed this or that crime, then other people will think, 'Well, I'll avoid this or that crime, and I'll be secure.' But if you create the feeling that any citizen at any time is open to a charge, then you really have got social discipline worked out."

Is the system, then, based on fear, on what the Soviet dissident Valentin Turchin calls the "inertia of fear"?

This was exactly the impression that one got. I'm a tremendous streetwalker. When I go into a city I moon about the streets, and I did an enormous amount of walking about in the streets of Moscow. Looking at the faces going by, I had the feeling that there was fear, apprehension, in them. I got to know other people who were living there, particularly one of the correspondents who became an intimate friend of mine, now alas dead, A. T. Cholerton, who I thought and still think had grasped the sense of the thing better than almost anybody, and from him too I learned it. But you couldn't be a journalist there and not realize the way the censorship worked, for instance.

How did the censorship work?

If you wrote a message, you had to take it along to the Press Department. The telegraph company wouldn't accept it unless it was stamped by them. They would read it through and say, "You can't say that." However horrible the regime may be, curiously enough, my memory of Russia--I managed to go back there quite a number of times, too--is one of great affection for the people--very nice people, kindly people, interesting people. Perhaps the fact they've been through this terrible experience has in a way purified them. One always had the sense that they were very nice, but they were

being brutally, cruelly persecuted.

Podolsky was one of the people in the Press Department. I can mention him because he's long since been shot. Every single one of the people in the Press Department who dealt with foreigners was sooner or later shot. I remember handing Podolsky a message. He looked up at me and said, "You can't say this because it's true." Glorious moment.

What was the standard of living, the quality of life, for these people in Moscow?

In materialistic terms, the quality of life simply couldn't be more appalling. For instance, I had a secretary who used to go over the papers with me. I couldn't read Russian, although I could spell it out a bit, and I needed someone. The papers, from the point of view of foreign correspondents, were the only source of news. You couldn't go wandering about looking for news, because you'd very soon be in trouble. You could only deal with things that appeared in Pravda and dish them up in a way that would relate them to the readers of the paper abroad.

This girl didn't want any money. All she wanted was food. And foreigners then had enormous privileges they haven't go now. They were able to buy food in unlimited quantities. Therefore we were in an extremly strong position in that sense. And she always wanted food.

Everybody who had anything to do with any sort of financial transaction wanted food. And of course you could see in people's faces--I know the signs from India--that they were very hungry. You only had to look in their shops and to notice the enormous queues. The word would go round that in such a shop there were some apples or in such a shop there was some bread, and the queue would form. It was quite obvious, as was the complete absence of the ordinary things

of life.

I'll tell you an example of it. One of the strong left-wing people in England, Fenner Brockway, wrote a book [Hungry England] about the appalling life on the dole and gave a family budget on the dole. This was translated into Russian and was being run in one of their papers, but they had to stop it because the budget was so much superior to anything that a full-time worker in Moscow would get that it became dangerous anti-Soviet propaganda.

No, it was a very, very low standard. People say it's better now, and I suppose it is a bit, but even now I think it's pretty low. However, I don't believe that the j'accuse, the charge against the regime, is simply the low standard of lie or the fact that it doesn't conform to the materialistic view of the quality of life, because it's not only that. It is the fact that they live in fear, that they have to watch what they say and even what they dream.

Should not the accusation also take into account the tremendous inequality, the disparity between the classes, between the privileged and the eighty or ninety percent of the population made up by workers and peasants? After all, equality is a fundamental value in all socialist ideologies.

I entirely agree with you. The disparity is greater than in any country I've ever been in, not excepting countries in the east like India. The difference between the high executive in the television set-up, say, with his motor car and all the rest of it, and an ordinary worker is utterly fantastic. Moreover, the difference is fixed. It can't be corrected. With all its faults in a capitalist society it's possible to correct that disparity, but nothing can be done there. After all, the system that appalled me more than anything almost was having different shops. The

people in the Lubianka [prison] had one of the best shops in Moscow, but only they could shop in it. And similarly with life in the television places, where people could buy in special shops.

What I thought was capitalism at its most diabolical was the Torgsin shop, in which you could buy anything for gold or foreign currency. If people had a relative abroad who would send them money, they could spend it in the shop. And then to arrange in the window the things that were quite unobtainable in the ordinary shops, in order that anybody who had a bit of gold would find it almost irresistible to go there and sometimes would get arrested for going in and thereby disclosing that he had a hoard which he kept quiet about--those things were unthinkable, absolutely unthinkable.

But you as a journalist were privileged.

For journalists in Moscow it was a very soft and even affluent existence. Partly, of course, because of the ruble. You paid for a lot of things, like traveling and telephoning, in rubles. The official rate was something like twelve to the pound, but journalists used to get up to three or four hundred rubles to the pound, such was the craving for foreign currency. You could also very easily, if your fancy lay that way, set up with a Russian mistress, whom the authorities would also kindly make available. So it was the most unegalitarian society that I've ever lived in.

Who were the other members of the foreign press corps at that time?

I mentioned A. T. Cholerton, to whom I was devoted and who made some of the most succinct remarks about the regime. I remember one that particularly took my fancy. At that time there was a man in the Press Department called Umansky, whom

we all very much disliked and who afterwards became ambassador, in America as a matter of fact, and was killed in an aircrash. We were with some tourists, one of whom asked Umansky whether there was such a thing as habeus corpus in the Soviet Union. Hearing this, Cholerton broke in and said, "My dear fellow, there may be no habeus corpus, but by God there's habeus cadaver," which I thought put the matter very succinctly.

That used to get him into trouble. I once said to Podolsky, "Why is it that you put up with Cholerton? You know what he thinks and what he says and what he writes up to a point. Why do you put up with it?" And Podolsky said, "You see, it's no good pretending. We love him. He reminds us of one of the intellectuals in the good old days." Pretty good that, from an official in the regime. But it was true. He had all the characteristics of people in a Dostoevsky novel, like The Devils. He was a perfect example.

The most abhorrent of them all was Walter Duranty, the correspondent of the New York Times. He rated very high, and foreigners who came to Moscow always wanted to see Duranty and hear what he had to say. But I think that he was the greatest liar of any journalist that I have met in fifty years of journalism. We used to wonder whether the authorities didn't have some kind of hold over him, because he so utterly played their game. But it didn't worry the New York Times, which featured his reports very prominently, and he afterwards received Pulitzer prizes for them. And when they were discussing the question of the United States recognizing the Soviet Union, Duranty's articles were considered as very valuable evidence on the side of recognition.

How do you explain the respect and popularity that Duranty won?

First of all, the prestige of the New York Times. Secondly, he was quite a good writer and made it all sound plausible. Thirdly, there were a lot of people who wanted to hear that, who wanted to believe that all was well. And he simply conveyed the party line. When it came to the great famine in Ukraine, brought about by collectivization, that was when his reporting was particularly disgraceful because he denied that there was any famine.

It's awfully hard to understand someone like Duranty. He wasn't a very nice man. He was of Liverpool Irish descent. Some people believed that the authorities had a hold on him because he had been involved in some business with money that would have made difficulties for him. I don't know about that, but I do know that he wanted to stay there, and the way to stay there was to dish up the party line in terms that the Times would find acceptable. It paid off, because by constantly echoing the party line he would get an interview with Stalin or various privileges that journalists treasure because they help them to be more effective in their work.

I remember coming across a note in the Foreign Office correspondence concerning Duranty's interview with Stalin. The note said, "It is unusual for Stalin to give interviews to journalists, but Duranty might be expected get favorable treatment in this respect." What I find difficult to understand, however, is the discrepancy between the Times' editorial position and Duranty's reporting. After all, the Times kept him on as a correspondent for many years while at the same time taking an anti-Soviet position in its leaders. Editorially, for example, the Times was talking about the Ukrainian famine, even though its terms of reference were all wrong, at a time when Duranty was doing his utmost to

deny the famine.

I think the anti-Bolshevik leaders were very unimportant compared with news stories because people don't attach much importance to leading articles, to editorials. The editorials were for the people who owned the paper, and the news, which was much more important, was for the liberals. By sucking up to the Soviet authorities Duranty got all sorts of things that other correspondents didn't: interviews with Stalin, easy travel, access to wherever he wanted to go or whomever he wanted to see. And the paper liked that.

They do to this day. I bet you a million pounds that within the next year some journalist from a paper like the Guardian or the New York Times will get permission to go to Afghanistan. Then he will be billed as the first foreign journalist who's been able to go and look at the situation in Afghanistan. But he'll only be allowed to go and look at the situation insofar as he falls in with what they want said. There's nothing people in newspaper offices love more than a dateline from some place. "We've got a story from Moscow, therefore our story must be better than the one that's come from Helsinki." The opposite is almost always true. This is why people don't understand that the foreign press is, for the most part, as much under the Soviets' thumb as their own.

What can you say about William Henry Chamberlin, the correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor? He wrote graphic accounts of the Ukrainian famine in several articles and in his book Russia's Iron Age.

I knew him particularly well. He covered for the Guardian, and the pretext on which I got to Moscow was that he would be away and I would stand in for him. Also, I stayed in his flat when he away. It was a rather nice old-fashioned

flat, much nicer than being in a hotel. William Henry was one of the most intelligent men that I've known, and I liked him. He was very good company, very shrewd.

His prime assignment was for the Christian Science Monitor, and he used his very minor association with the Guardian--he was simply a stringer for it--to cover the criticism that he put into the Monitor. He was able to survive by balancing these two things, although he did send a certain amount of criticism to the West. He simply gave the Guardian the party line, but it was what the Guardian wanted. And when I started sending them other things, they cut them around.

The Guardian passes for being the most truthful paper that's ever been. I've worked for many papers over fifty years, and in my opinion it's certainly the most untruthful. Not because it wants to lie, but because like these liberals who go there and see what they want to see, it sees in the world what it wants to see, and the people who write for it also see the world in that way. So for anybody who wants to look up in a newspaper what was going on the most fatal thing would be to do it in the Guardian.

You had a great deal of trouble with the Guardian--your articles were censored and cut.

Yes, they disliked my whole attitude. First of all, they were very frightened when I went there that I was too left for them. And when I started sending messages, giving what I conceived to be the truth, they found they were much too hostile and started slashing them about. Still, the message was there, and I was blackguarded afterwards in the correspondence columns of the Guardian. This made it impossible for me to stay and to learn Russian properly, although I would have loved to do so because I was fascinated by the

implications of all this. But I couldn't because they wouldn't have me anymore. And I'd been very severely criticized by Umansky's Press Department. It was like going to the headmaster. You go to him, and he says, "I didn't like that article that you put into the Guardian the other day. If you go on like this, you're going to get expelled from the school." That was how they dealt with it, and if you were a correspondent, you had to accept this very humiliating position.

What articles in particular displeased Umansky?

As I began to be very critical of the whole set-up and to criticize the use of terrorism in government, I would undoubtedly have had to leave because of the articles that I wrote on the famine, but I sent those over in a diplomatic bag. They would never have got out of the country otherwise, and I left before they had appeared. But they disliked the temper of everything that I was writing.

One of the things people don't sufficiently realize is that the Russians have been able to control the foreign press just as well as their own. You can't stay there as a resident correspondent unless you are on goof terms with the authorities, which then was the Press Department of the Narkomindel [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs]. It was then manned almost exclusively by Jews because they were, in those early days, the only supporters of the revolution. Most of them had come back from America and could deal with the foreign press. Compared with the hard-faced Soviet officials, they were much easier to deal with because they did speak one's own language.

What about your articles on the famine in Ukraine? Why did you decide to write about it?

It was the big story in all our talks in Moscow. Every-

body knew about it. There was no question about that. Anyone you were talking to knew that there was a terrible famine going on. Even in the Soviets' own pieces there were somewhat disguised acknowledgements of great difficulties there: the attacks on the kulaks, the admission that the people were eating the seed grain and cattle.

You didn't have to be very bright to ask why they were eating them. Because they were very hungry, otherwise they wouldn't. So there was no possible doubt. I realized that that was the big story. I could also see that all the correspondents in Moscow were distorting it.

Without making any kind of plans or asking for permission I just went and got a ticket for Kiev and then went on to Rostov. The Soviet security is not as good as people think it is. If you once duck it, you can go quite a long way. At least you could in those days. Having all those rubles, I could afford to travel in the Pullman train. They had these old-fashioned international trains--very comfortable, with endless glasses of hot tea and so on. It was quite pleasant.

But even going through the countryside by train one could sense the state of affairs. Ukraine was starving, and you only had to venture out to smaller places to see derelict fields and abandoned villages.

On one occasion, I was changing trains, and I went wandering around, and in one of the trains in the station, the kulaks were being loaded onto the train, and there were military men all along the platform. They soon pushed me off. Fortunately, they didn't do more. They could have easily hauled me in and asked, "What the hell are you doing here?" But they didn't. I just cleared off. But I got the sense of what it was like. Solzhenitsyn in his Gulag book

gives the figures of the intake in the Gulag at the time of the famine. It runs into hundreds of thousands. And the people were dying.

I'll tell you another thing that's more difficult to convey, but it impressed me enormously. It was on a Sunday in Kiev, and I went into the church there for the Orthodox mass. I could understand very little of it, but there was some spirit in it that I have never come across before or after. Human beings at the end of their tether were saying to God, "We come to you, we're in trouble, nobody but You can help us."

Their faces were quite radiant because of this tremendous sense they had. As no man would help them, no government, there was nowhere that they could turn. And they turned to their Creator. Wherever I went it was the same thing.

Then when I got to Rostov I went on to the North Caucasus. The person who had advised me to go there was the Norwegian minister in Moscow, a very nice man, very well-informed, who said, "You'll find that this German agricultural concession is still working there. Go and see them, because they know more about it than anybody, and it'll be an interesting experience." So I went there. It was called the Drusag concession.

What difference did you see between Drusag and the collective farms in Ukraine and the North Caucasus?

The difference was simply that the agriculture in the concession was enormously flourishing, extremely efficient. You didn't have to be an agronome, which God knows I'm not, to see that there the crops, the cattle, everything, was completely different from the surrounding countryside. Moreover, there were hordes of people, literally hordes of

people trying to get in, because there was food there, which gave a more poignant sense to the thing than anything except that service in the church. The German agronomes themselves were telling me about. They'd been absolutely bombarded with people trying to come there to work, do anything if they could get in, because there was food there.

I have read in a dispatch from the British Embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office in London that Drusag employed five people simply to pick up bodies of peasants who had come in and died of hunger.

Yes, that's what I'd heard too, if not more. The peasants staggered in and dropped dead.

Were the Germans able to do anything for the peasants?

They could help them with a little food--they were quite charitable in their attitude--but of course they couldn't do more than that flea-bit.

To add to the drama of my visit, it was the day Hitler assumed power in Germany, and all these people had their wireless on, listening. I in my innocence thought that as agricultural experts, university people, they would find this the most abhorrent thing. I was amazed when I realized that they rejoiced over it. They said, "This is wonderful. It's our only chance. Of course we shall lose all our money, but it doesn't matter. Germany will recover." When I saw that these very educated and nice agronomes were absolutely overjoyed that Hitler was taking power, I realized that there must be a second world war.

I realized that I wouldn't be able to stay because the Guardian didn't like my coverage. I had no more money, and I was certain that when my pieces on the famine were published, even in a mutilated form, which was likely, I would be finished. When I left Russia, not very long after that, I

went via Berlin, where I had some friends, and stayed there a few days. I don't share the admiration of people like Isherwood for the Weimar Republic. It was a very decadent and disgusting society. When I stopped over on my way back from the Soviet Union, they were marking the Jewish shops by scrawling "Jude" on the windows and beating up people, and Hitler's own special militia were marching through the streets.

I realized that they were the same people that I'd seen in Moscow, that it was the same phenomenon in German terms. So much so that writing with a friend of mine a satirical book called Next Year's News, I predicted that there would be an alliance between Russia and Germany. Everybody thought I must be mad--until the Nazi-Soviet pact came along. When it did come, it was a very happy time for both countries. It was the only treaty that Stalin scrupulously kept. Solzhenitsyn in his book about Lenin makes the point that that was the only time when the perfect sort of alliance occurred between two countries. Then after the war I edited Ciano's diaries, and of course Mussolini was saying the same thing. "When we meet these Russians it's like the old days when the party was being formed," he says quite nostalgically.

The Metro-Vickers affair was just beginning then, in the spring of 1933. Eugene Lyons wrote in Assignment in Utopia, his account of his years as a journalist in Moscow, that correspondents were told that if they wanted access to that trial, they had better not file reports about food shortages and famine.

I'm sure that's true. It didn't actually happen to me, but I believe Gene Lyons when he says it, because that was another way they did it. They held out baits to people, and they do it still.

What were you thinking and, more importantly perhaps, what were you feeling when you saw those scenes of starvation and privation in Ukraine? How does one respond in such a situation?

First of all, one feels a deep, deep, deep sympathy with and pity for the sufferers. Human beings look very tragic when they are starving. And remember that I wasn't unaware of what things were like because in India, for instance, I've been in a village during a cholera epidemic and seen people similarly placed. So it wasn't a complete novelty.

The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was not the result of some catastrophe like a drought or an epidemic. It was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind which demanded the collectivization of agriculture, immediately, as a purely theoretical proposition, without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering.

That was what I found so terrifying. Think of a man in an office who has been ordered to collectivize agriculture and get rid of the kulaks without any clear notion or definition of what a kulak is, and who has in what was then the GPU and is now the KGB the instrument for doing this, and who then announces it in the slavish press as one of the great triumphs of the regime.

And even when the horrors of it have become fully apparent, modifying it only on the ground that they're dizzy with success, that this has been such a wonderful success, these starving people, that they must hold themselves in a bit because otherwise they'd go mad with excitement over their stupendous success. That's a macabre story.

How do you explain that famine?

First of all, there was the utter incompetence and sometimes corruption of the people in authority, people who knew nothing about agriculture. They were simply party bosses who were directing the thing. Secondly, the fact that the people working on the farms got nothing. The food that was produced was taken away and sent off to feed the towns, and therefore they had no incentive. Thirdly, in factories--and don't forget the Chinese had exactly the same problems with agriculture--you can terrorize the workers quite easily. They come in, clock in in one place. People scattering out into the fields can't be terrorized.

There were kulaks throughout the Soviet Union, and they were "liquidated" as an entire class. Collectivization also took place throughout the Soviet Union. And yet the famine occurred at the point when collectivization had been completed, and it occurred not throughout the Soviet Union, but largely in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. How do you explain that?

Those were the worst places. They were also the richest agricultural areas, so that the dropping of productivity would show more dramatically there. But they were also places, as you as a Ukrainian know better than I, of maximum dissent. The Ukrainians hated the Russians. And they do now. In Kiev, the Germans were received with enthusiasm as liberators. There's no doubt about it. The Russians deny it, but there's an enormous amount of evidence to that effect. Therefore, insofar as people could have any heart in working in a collective farm, that would be least likely to occur in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

The system has never worked, and it doesn't work now. Two and a half percent of the population of America are engaged in agriculture. They feed two hundred million peo-

ple, and they feed half the world as well. Forty percent of the Soviet population are still engaged in agriculture, and they cannot feed themselves. The collective farm, as a way of producing, does not work, and I don't think it ever will. You can't get out of people the effort that's required if some advantage doesn't accrue to them as a result. All they do is produce crops which are then taken over and disappear, and only a very scanty supply is left for them.

I've been over once or twice doing some filming there, and just driving through the country you can see quite easily where the plot is that belongs to the peasant because the crops are better. I'm sure if you put yourself in the same position of being a peasant, on that little plot, you could produce crops which you could take to the free market and sell for their true value. The other is something that's got no connection with your life at all. Absolutely none. The countryside, even if you just drive from West to East Berlin, is the same story. You see derelict agriculture all around you.

Given the deliberate nature of the famine in Ukraine, the decision on Stalin's part to proceed with collectivization and to eliminate resistance at any cost and to get rid of the kulak, vaguely defined as that category was, and given the fact that food continued to be stockpiled and exported even as people dropped dead on the streets, is it accurate to talk about this as a famine? Is it perhaps something else? How does one describe an event of such magnitude?

Perhaps you do need another word. I don't know what it would be. The word "famine" means people have nothing whatsoever to eat and consume things that are not normally consumed. Of course there were stories of cannibalism there.

I don't know whether they were true, but they were very widely believed. Certainly the eating of cattle and the consequent complete destruction of whatever economy the farms still had was true.

I remember someone telling me how all manners and finesse disappeared. When you're in the grip of a thing like this and you know that someone's got food, you go and steal it. You'll even murder to get it. That's all part of the horror.

How does one rank the famine of 1933 with other great catastrophes?

I think it's very difficult to make a table of comparison. What I would say with complete truth and sincerity is that as a journalist over the last half century I have seen some pretty awful things, including Berlin when it was completely flat and the people were living in little huts they'd made of the rubble and the exchange was cigarettes and Spam.

But the famine is the most terrible thing I have ever seen, precisely because of the deliberation with which it was done and the total absence of any sympathy with the people. To mention it or to sympathize with the people would mean to go to the Gulag, because then you were criticizing the great Stalin's project and indicating that you thought it a failure, when allegedly it was a stupendous success and enormously strengthened the Soviet Union.

What sort of response did you encounter when you came back from the Soviet Union and published your findings, particularly from people close to you, like the Webbs?

The Webbs were furious about it. Mrs. Webb in her diary puts in a sentence which gives the whole show away. She says, "Malcolm has come back with stories about a terrible

famine in the USSR. I have been to see Mr. Maisky [the Soviet ambassador in Britain] about it, and I realize that he's got it absolutely wrong." Who would suppose that Mr. Maisky would say, "No, no, of course he's right"?

This is precisely the attitude that the British government was taking at that time. L. B. Golden, the secretary of the Save the Children Fund, which had been very active during the famine of 1921-22 in Russia and Ukraine, approached the Foreign Office in August 1933. He'd received disturbing information about famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, but the first secretary of the Soviet embassy had assured him that the harvest was a bumper one, and so Golden asked the Foreign Office whether a public appeal should be put out. The Foreign Office told him not to do anything, and he did not. The Soviet authorities were not admitting to a famine, and therefore it was agreed that nothing should be said.

Absolutely true. The other day I had occasion to meet Lord March, the representative of the laity on the World Council of Churches. "Why is it that you're always putting out your World Council complaints about South Africa or Chile?" I asked. "I never hear a word about anything to do with what's going on in the Gulag or with the invasion of Afghanistan. Why is that?"

He said, "Whenever we frame any resolution of that sort, it's always made clear to us that if we bring in that resolution, then the Russian Orthodox Church and all the satellite countries will withdraw from the World Council of Churches."

"Then do you not pursue the matter?" I asked. And he said, "Oh yes, we don't pursue it because of that." I was

amazed that the man could say that. But there it was, and it's exactly true of the Foreign Office.

You published Winter in Moscow when you got back from the Soviet Union, and you were attacked in the press for your views.

Very strongly. And I couldn't get a job.

Why was that? Because people found your reports hard to believe?

No, the press was not overtly pro-Soviet, but it was, as it is now, essentially sympathetic with that side and distrustful of any serious attack on it.

Some of the articles you wrote on your return, including one called "Red Imperialism," were rejected.

The only paper that would publish my articles was the Morning Post, the ultra-right-wing paper with which I had no particular sympathy. But they were prepared to publish my articles and did.

Just branching aside for a moment, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. told me when he was writing his book on Roosevelt that when the question of recognizing the Soviet Union was being discussed my articles were brought up and did delay the decision for a little while, but not for long, because Duranty and all the others were writing in an opposite sense.

Anyway, the only paper that would publish my articles was the Morning Post, but they wouldn't publish this particular one because it seemed to them to be absurd. What the article is about is simply this: I point out that the most likely development of the regime will be toward the resumption of the old Slavophile Russian position. The Russian Orthodox Church had provided a good excuse for going into constantinople in order to restore the Church of Saint

Sophia to the Christians. So liberating the downtrodden and oppressed proletariat will provide a good basis for exactly the same thing. Of course, that's precisely what has happened.

Have you ever seen the conversation that Molotov had with Hitler when Russia was seriously thinking of joining in an alliance with Germany? They had to have it in a bunker because there was a British air raid on at the time. Hitler wanted to know the terms on which the Russians would definitely ally themselves with him, and those terms were exactly the same terms as the ones on which we brought the Russians into the First World War. Exactly the same aspirations.

And of course this is the truth of it. Stalin instituted a counterrevolution and destroyed the revolution, destroyed the revolutionaries and resumed Russia's traditional aspirations. And that article seemed to be fanciful even to the Morning Post, the extreme right paper. Litvinov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was constantly proposing total disarmament in Geneva, and so they thought that I was right out of my mind. But it's come exactly true.

How do you explain this sympathy?

It's something I've written and thought about a great deal, and I think that the liberal mind is attracted by this sort of regime. My wife's aunt was Beatrice Webb, and she and Sidney Webb wrote the classic pro-Soviet book, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization. And so one saw close at hand the degree to which they all knew about the regime, knew all about the Cheka [the secret police] and everything, but they liked it.

I think that those people believe in power. It was put to me very succinctly when we were taken down to Kharkiv for

the opening of the Dnieper dam. There was an American colonel who was running it, building the dam in effect. "How do you like it here?" I asked him, thinking that I'd get a wonderful blast of him saying how he absolutely hated it. "I think it's wonderful," he said. "You never get any labor trouble."

This will be one of the great puzzles of posterity in looking back on this age, to understand why the liberal mind, the Manchester Guardian mind, the New Republic mind, should feel such enormous sympathy with this authoritarian regime.

You are implying that the liberal intelligentsia did not simply overlook the regime's brutality, but actually admired and liked it.

Yes, I'm saying that, although they wouldn't have admitted it, perhaps not even to themselves. I remember Mrs. Webb, who after all was a very cultivated upper-class liberal-minded person, an early member of the Fabian Society and so on, saying to me, "Yes, it's true, people disappear in Russia." She said it with such great satisfaction that I couldn't help thinking that there were a lot of people in England whose disappearance she would have liked to organize.

No, it's an everlasting mystery to me how one after the other, the intelligentsia of the Western world, the Americans, the Germans, even the French, fell for this thing to such an extraordinary degree.

One man who didn't fall for it was George Orwell. Did you discuss your experiences in the Soviet Union with him? I ask because Orwell mentioned the famine in his essay "Notes on Nationalism." "Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people," he wrote,

"have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English Russophiles."

We discussed the whole question. George had gone to the Spanish Civil War as an ardent champion of the Republican side. In Catalonia he could not but realize what a disgraceful double-faced game the Communists were playing there. He was in a thing called POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista, the United Marxist Workers' Party], which was allegedly Trotskyist. Those people were not being knocked off by the Franco armies, they were being knocked off by the Communists. And he was deeply disillusioned. He then wrote what I think is one of his best books, Homage to Catalonia.

And so what brought us together was that we were in the same dilemma. People assumed that because he had attacked the Communists, he must be on the Franco side. Just as people thought that because I'd attacked the Communist side, I must be an ardent member of the right wing of the Conservatives. And so we had that in common, and we became friends. He had a feeling that I also had strongly, that the Western world is sleepwalking into becoming a collectivist, authoritarian society. And that's really what 1984 is about.

Where do you think that Orwell got the idea for Animal Farm? His fable of the revolution betrayed is so accurate that it even portrays the famine. Food falls short, and the animals have only chaff and mangels to eat. Napoleon (Stalin) conceals the facts and orders the hens to surrender their eggs so that he can procure grain to keep the farm going. The hens rebel and Napoleon orders their rations to be stopped, decreeing that "any animal giving so much as a grain of corn to a hen shall be punished by death."

It's his masterpiece. It is one of the few books written in the twentieth century that I would say will always be

read. It's a beautiful piece of writing. If you show it to children, they love it and don't understand the other part of it. I think that he had a deep hatred of intellectuals as people. He felt that they were fortunate, and in Animal Farm he was illustrating how a revolution can be twisted into its opposite. It is a superb allegory of the whole thing.

But it's difficult to explain. He wasn't a man who discussed political theories. He had an instinct that these intellectuals were somehow double-faced, and he never tired of railing against them. If you had asked him about the Soviet Union, he would have just said, "It's a dictatorship, and they behaved disgracefully in Spain." So he'd write the whole thing off in that way. He still called himself a socialist.

To the very end.

To the very end of his life. He actually went canvasing for Anuerin Bevin, and I've always wondered what particular line of talk he would have fallen into. He wasn't a person with whom you could exchange ideas as such. He was kind of impressionistic in his mind.

Absorbed things without actually analyzing them.

That's right. And in 1984, all that business about Newspeak and doublethink is beautifully done. And it is the kernel of the whole thing. And the terrorism and the fact that you drift into a situation in which people are in power with no program except to remain in power, which is very much the state of affairs that's come to pass. The people in the Kremlin at this moment are not in power because they've got plans to do this or the other thing. All they want is a policy which will enable them to stay in power.

All that you've said about the image of the world that liberals have and about reporting, in this case from the

Soviet Union, leads to a rather large and difficult question about the reliablity of the image of the world that we are given.

Yes, indeed. I believe that this is how posterity will see it. We are a generation of men who have become completely captivated and caught up in false images. Television and all these things are splendid instruments for keeping them going. Splendid. And I would say that the collapse of Western civilization will be much more due to that than to anything else.

False images?

False images. And it's enormously difficult to correct them. Children who grow up now have been looking at television and hearing the voice of the consensus, and they know nothing else. So I can't myself believe that there's any escape from this except that the whole show will blow up sometime or other. But I think that Orwell's position was rather different. He looked back on the past with nostalgia, which is peculiar in a man of his attitude of mind and temperament.

He was very conservative and very English in many ways.

Deeply conservative. The most conservative mind I've ever encountered. But let's take this much more sinister thing we were talking about now, this complete imprisonment of people at all levels into images which are fantasy, bringing about in them a kind of unanimity, a consensus, which is very dangerous and which is really the party line. For instance, I know a great many people in the BBC. I would have the greatest difficulty in finding any people there, more than a handful, who would have other than the consensus views on things like abortion, euthanasia or overpopulation. There's a consensus, and the consensus seems to be true, and

the images over which people spend a high proportion of their lives shape, color and dominate all their thoughts.

What is your way to overcome these images?

As a Christian, I believe that you can, if you want to, find reality, which is what people call God. You can relate yourself to that reality, and as a person belonging to what's called Western civilization you can find in the drama of the Incarnation everything that's come therefrom, you can recover contact with reality. That is in fact the only way. The ordinary man gets up and spends four, five or six hours of his day looking into these pictures and being subjected to this fantasy view. I often think that like Caliban's island, full of sounds and sweet airs, when we wake, we cry to sleep again. But if people ever do wake, and I don't believe they wake much anymore, they cry to sleep again. And crying to sleep again is turning on the apparatus.

* * *

MARCO CARYNNYK has published poetry and criticism as well as edited and translated ten books, among them Leonid Plyushch's History's Carnival (1979) and Victor Nekipelov's Institute of Fools (1980). He has recently received grants from the Kennan Institute in Washington and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Edmonton and is writing two books and filming a documentary about the famine of 1933. Clips from this interview with Muggeridge have been shown on several Canadian public affairs programs about the famine of 1933.

THE FAMINE THE "TIMES" COULDN'T FIND

(By Marco Carynnyk)

My editor was dubious. I had been explaining that fifty years ago, in the spring and summer of 1933, Ukraine, the country of my forebears, had suffered a horrendous catastrophe. In a fertile, populous country famed as the granary of Europe, a great famine had mowed down a sixth, a fifth, and in some regions even a fourth of the inhabitants. Natural forces—drought, flood, blight—have been at least contributory causes of most famines. This one had been entirely man-made, entirely the result of a dictator's determination to collectivize agriculture and prepare for war by crushing even potential opposition. The consequences of this famine, I said, are still being felt.

Erudite, polyglot, herself a refugee from tyranny, the editor remained skeptical. "But isn't all this. . . ." She leaned back in her chair and smiled brightly. "Isn't all this a bit recondite?"

My face must have flushed, Recondite? Suddenly I knew the impotent anger Jews and Armenians have felt. Millions of my countrymen had been murdered, and their deaths were being dismissed as obscure and little-known.

Later I realized that the editor had said more than she had intended. The famine of 1933 was rationalized and concealed when it was taking its toll, and it is still hidden away and trivialized today. George Orwell need not have limited his observation to British intellectuals when he remarked that "huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English Russophiles."

Still later, after I had set about uncovering the whole story by delving into newspaper files and archives and talking to people who had witnessed the events of 1933, I came to understand how Walter Duranty and the New York Times helped Stalin to make the famine "recondite."

Walter Duranty, an Englishman by birth, worked for the New York Times from 1913 to 1934, and then continued with the paper on a retainer basis until 1945. One of the best-known journalists in the world, he was certainly the most famous correspondent to be stationed in Moscow. The books that he wrote about the Soviet Union sold enormous numbers of copies—the revealingly titled "I Write As I Please" became a bestseller—and influenced both public attitudes and government policies. In April 1932, Duranty was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his "dispassionate, interpretative reporting of the news from Russia." The announcement said that his dispatches were "marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity" and were "excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence." An Englishman who spent a decade in Moscow spoke for many admirers when he dedicated a book to Duranty, "the doyen of Moscow correspondents at whose feet we all sit in matters Sovietic."

Not everyone agreed with the Pulitzer jury. Indeed, controversy began to surround Duranty within a year after he arrived in Moscow, and continues to this day. Eugene Lyons, then the United Press correspondent in Moscow, accused Duranty of "amazing sophistry." Malcolm Muggeridge, who was reporting for the Manchester Guardian at the time, thought that Duranty was "the greatest liar of any journalist that I have met in fifty years of journalism." The American journalist Joseph Alsop also charged Duranty with "lying like a trooper."

Yet none of Duranty's critics has furnished proof that he deliberately misrepresented the facts about the Soviet Union. Now such evidence is at hand. It has to do with Duranty's reports about the nature and extent of the famine in Ukraine. And it raises disturbing questions about the reliability of even the most distinguished newspapers.

Until the famine struck Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus (much of which had been settled by Ukrainians), foreign correspondents were able to travel there as they chose. Malcolm Muggeridge explained to me that when he decided to investigate the famine everyone in Moscow was talking about, he simply bought a train ticket and without informing the authorities set off for Kiev and Rostov.

Muggeridge's blunt account—which he got past the censor by sending it out in a diplomatic bag, only to have it "multilated," as he told me, by his editors—appeared in the Manchester Guardian in March 1933:

"The population is starving. "Hunger" was the word I heard most. Peasants begged a lift on the train from one station to another, sometimes their bodies swollen up—a disagreeable sight—from lack of food. . . . The little towns and villages seemed just numb and the people in too desperate a condition even actively to resent what had happened. . . . Cattle and horses dead; fields neglected; meager

harvest despite moderately good climatic conditions; all the grain that was produced taken by the government; now no bread at all, no bread anywhere, nothing much else either; despair and bewilderment."

Muggeridge's articles produced no response beyond virulent attacks by Soviet sympathizers (an argument about whether a famine had occurred heated the correspondence columns of the Guardian for several months). Moscow nonetheless began to discourage journalists from visiting Ukraine. Sir Esmond Ovey, the British ambassador to the USSR, reported the restriction to London on March 5, 1933:

"Internal situation is not promising. Conditions in Kuban [in the North Caucasus] have been described to me by recent English visitor as appalling and as resembling an armed camp in a desert—no work, no grain, no cattle, no draft horses, only idle peasants or soldiers. Another correspondent who had visited Kuban was strongly dissuaded from visiting the Ukraine where conditions are apparently as bad although apathy is greater. In fact all correspondents have now been "advised" by the Press Department of Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to remain in Moscow."

Although the travel ban remained in effect all spring and summer, Western correspondents in Moscow did not report the restriction on their journalistic freedom for over six months. Only on August 21, 1933 did William Henry Chamberlin announce in the Guardian that he and his colleagues had been ordered not to leave the capital without submitting a detailed itinerary and obtaining authorization from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

"Your correspondent received personal evidence that this rule is no empty formality when he was refused permission today to visit country districts in Ukrainia and North Caucasus regions, which he visited several times in previous years without objection from the central or local authorities. This in not an isolated case of restriction, as your correspondent knows of an instance that occurred some time ago when two American correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukrainia . . . and several correspondents of various nationalities were warned not to leave Moscow without special permission."

The London *Times* correspondent in Riga verified Chamberlin's account. "One of the chief purposes of this [ban]," he wrote on August 21, "Is to screen the real conditions in the countryside from foreign eyes. . . . [Journalists] can still undertake journeys, but only after obtaining a special permit for an approved route, and they are always escorted by Communist officials. Permits for some of the chief grain areas are now very difficult or impossible to obtain."

The Associated Press also confirmed Chamberlin's report. Although the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was claiming a bumper crop, it had refused permission to Chamberlin to observe the harvest in Ukraine and the North Caucasus:

"Mr. Chamberlin, one of the best-known American correspondents, who has lived here eleven years, has often traveled in those regions. There was a food shortage there the past winter. Several months ago two other American correspondents were forbidden to make a trip to Ukraine."

And Frederick Birchall, the New York Times reporter in Berlin, related on August 24 that a correspondent for his paper in another capital who had applied for a tourist visa to the Soviet Union was turned down on the grounds that journalists were forbidden to travel as tourist, while an American correspondent stationed in Moscow who had asked for a visa to return there via Odessa was told it would be granted to him only if he pledged not to leave the train en route.

In September 1933, as the new harvest was brought in, compulsory grain deliveries to the state were reduced; the famine began to taper off because the farmers were finally allowed to keep some of their produce, and the travel restrictions were lifted. Edward Coote, a member of the staff of the British chancery in Moscow, commented on the lifting of the ban in a dispatch to the British Foreign Office on September 12:

"The foreign press has, I hear, reported that the ban on journeys in the interior by foreign journalists has been lifted, but this is not the whole truth Mr. Duranty, the New York Times correspondent, whom the Soviet Union [is] probably more anxious to conciliate than any other, returned from abroad in August, having heard that journeys in the interior by foreign correspondents had been prohibited, and thereupon addressed a letter to M. Litvinov protesting against this prohibition and stating that he intended to tour in the grain districts of the Ukraine on a certain date in September, accompanied by a colleague. In due course he received orally from the Press Department an assurance that he might travel on a certain fixed date later in the month. Dr. Duranty professed to be much irritated by this action, which he felt had cut the ground from under his feet by obliging him to recognize a ban upon his movements which infringed the liberty of the press. Nevertheless, he and his colleague have set out happily enough, and I have no doubt that, as a total-

ly unqualifed agricultural observer, he will have no difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantitative experience in tour hours to enable him to say whatever he may wish to say on his return."

Duranty had in fact determined what he would say about the "famine scare," as he repeatedly called it, long before this trip to Ukraine. In March 1932, when Eugene Lyons reported an early sign of famine to New York, Duranty apprised the Times that there was no famine anywhere, although "partial crop failures" occurred in some regions.

By November, the year's harvest had been brought in and Communist activists were roaming the countryside, stripping the farmers of their grain. Duranty admitted that there was a shortage of food, but insisted that "there is no famine or actual starvation, nor is there likely to be." And the food shortages that did exist, he argued, were the fault of the peasants, who had fled from the villages to the towns and construction sites, leaving the harvest unreaped and the grain rotting in the fields. But it would be a mistake, concluded Duranty, to exaggerate the gravity of the situation:

"The Russians have tightened their belts before to a far greater extent than is likely to be needed this winter. If there is no international disturbance to complicate matters, remedies doubtless will be found, and the Soviet program, though menaced and perhaps retarded, will not be seriously affected."

Then in April 1933, when the famine was raging in full force because repeated grain collections by the government had stripped the countryside bare (although they claimed to be fulfilling the state grain quotas, the collectors often confiscated baked bread, emptied pots of porridge, and removed kitchen utensils, clothes, and furniture). Duranty rebutted a report brought out by Gareth Jones. A young Welshman who had studied under the eminent historian of Russia, Sir Bernard Pares, and served as an aide to Lloyd George, Jones investigated the famine by the simple expedient of packing a knapsack with as much canned food as he could carry and setting out on foot to explore the villages in the Kharkov region. On his return from the Soviet Union, Jones announced his ghastly findings at a press conference in Berlin and a lecture at Chatham House in London.

Like Muggeridge before him, Jones found severe famine. Everywhere he went he heard the cry, "There is no bread, we are dying." Millions of lives were being menaced:

"The villages which I visited along on foot were by no means in the hardest-hit parts, but in almost every village the bread supply had run out two months earlier, the potatoes were almost exhausted, and there was not enough coarse beet, which was formerly used as cattle fodder but has now become a staple food of the population, to last until the next harvest. . . . In each village I received the same information—namely, that many were dying of famine and that about four/fifths of the cattle and the horses had perished. . . . Nor shall I forget the swollen stomachs of the children in the cottages in which I slept."

Duranty quickly dismissed Jones' "big scare story." Yet he scoffed so cleverly that he both denied and confirmed Jones' eyewitness account. On the one hand, Duranty implied that Jones' story had been inspired by British sources in retaliation for the Soviet arrest of six Englishmen who had been employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Company on construction projects in the USSR. On the other hand, Duranty agreed when Jones said that "there was virtually no bread in the villages he had visited and the adults were haggard, gaunt, and discouraged."

Several paragraphs later Duranty set about justifying the famine:

"But—to put it brutally—you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevist leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialization as any general during the world war who ordered a costly attack to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviki are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical convictions."

Having admitted that the regime was waging a war against the Ukranian peasants, Duranty proceeded to explain away the casualties. Jones, he said, had based his report on a tour of the villages. Duranty, however, had more reliable information: he had inquired in Soviet commissariats and foreign embassies and tabulated the impressions of both Russian and foreign friends. And here were the facts:

"There is a serious food shortage throughout the country, with occasional cases of well-managed state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition. . . . In short, conditions are definitely bad in certain sections—Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower

Volga. The rest of the country is on short rations but nothing worse. These conditions are bad, but there is no famine."

Duranty, to be sure, did not act alone in trying to discredit Jones. The home offices of the American correspondents had all cabled urgent queries after Jones announced his findings. But preparations were under way for the Metropolitan-Vickers trial, and gaining access to the courtroom was more important for the Americans than reporting the famine. As Eugene Lyons put it, "The need to remain on friendly terms with the censors, at least for the duration of the trial, was for all of us a compelling professional necessity."

Meeting the correspondents in one of their hotel rooms, Konstantin Umansky, the head of the Press Department of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, worked out with them a formula for denying Jones' account. Before the evening was over, vodka and snacks had been ordered. The "celebration"—the word is Lyons's—lasted until early morning. By the time the trial had ended (all the Britons were released), the American correspondents had forgotten that they no longer needed to remain on "friendly terms" with the censors and did not bother to retract their attack against Jones. "Throwing down Jones," Lyons lamented.

"Was as unpleasant a chore as fell to any of us in years of juggling facts to please dictorial regimes. But throw him down we did unanimously and in almost identical formulas of equivocation. Poor Gareth Jones must have been the most surprised human being alive when the facts he so painstakingly garnered from our mouths were snowed under by our denials."

In early April 1933, Duranty again bruited prosperity and abundance. "In the excitement over the spring sowing campaign and the reports of an increased food shortage," he announced,

"A fact that has been almost overlooked is that the production of coal, pig iron, steel, oil, automobiles, tractors, locomotives, and machine tools has increased by 20 to 35 percent during recent months. That is the most effective proof that the food shortage as a whole was less grave than was believed."

The issue of the New York *Times* that carried this sophism [1] also brought a plea for help from a Katherine Schutock in Jackson Heights, New York, who pointed out that Duranty's denial of starvation was contradicted by letters from Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the the Lower Volga region. "The people who write such pathetic letters," noted Schutock,

"Are not looking for help because it cannot reach them. Money cannot reach them, and if it does they receive only half of what they sign for. Receipt of help from America only gets them into trouble with the Cheka [secret police]. Most of the letters I have seen end thus: 'If you do not hear from us again, you can be sure we are not alive. We are either getting it for [writing] this letter, or we are through. The agony of living and dying of hunger is so painful and so long. What torture it is to live in hunger and know you are dying slowly of hunger."

Throughout the spring and summer of 1933, demographers have estimated, Ukranian peasants were dying at the rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an hour, or 17 a minute. (In World War I, by comparison, about 6,000 people were killed every day.) Country lanes and city streets were littered with corpses—"stacked in the snow like logs," one eyewitness told me—and special brigades hastily dug mass graves in remote areas where they doused the bodies with gasoline and set them on fire. Ukraine that year was one vast hell. The New York *Times*, however, made absolutely no reference to the situation for more than a month, when it published a letter from Jones replying to Duranty's denial of the famine.

Standing by his claim that a severe famine was in progress, Jones pointed out that he had spoken with foreign journalists and technical experts, hundreds of peasants, and between twenty and thirty diplomats, all of whom had agreed that starvation was widespread:

"But [the diplomats] are not allowed to express their views in the press, and therefore remain silent. Jounalists, on the other hand, are allowed to write, but the censorship had turned them into masters of euphemism and understatement. Hence they give famine the polite name of "food shortage" and "starving to death" is softened down to read as "widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."

Duranty, undaunted, continued to pooh-pooh reports of starvation. Visiting Odessa, he asserted that the food situation was "undoubtedly better" than had been

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[1] A sophism because by referring to "the food shortage as a whole" and by not specifying a geographic location, Duranty concealed the fact that the Ukranian countryside was starving. Workers and civil servants in the cities were undernourished, but in order to maintain production the regime did give them ration cards entitling them to a bowl of soup and about two pounds of bread a day.

reported. In a town near Kiev peasant women were offering roast chickens; in Odessa the bread ration had been increased, and peasants were marketing eggs and vegetables:

"It is an old story, which the writer first heard on the Volga during the famine in the summer of 1921. Everywhere they said, "Things here are desperate, and unless we get relief we will die before Christmas"—which was true enough. Then we asked them, "But are people dying here now?" And they replied, "No, not here yet, but if you go to the village of So-and-So you will find hardly anyone alive." We went to said village and heard exactly the same story. "Here we are desperate, though not yet dying, but at So-and-So conditions are frightful. . . ." Though conditions are terribly hard, there is no sign of real famine conditions or that people are dying in the streets, as is reported in Moscow."

In June, when he was forced to defend himself against a charge of receiving concessions from the Soviet government, Duranty took the opportunity to deny an account in the London newspapers that the victims of the famine were fleeing to Moscow in search of food and dying in the streets. Seeing in the reports of famine "a campaign of calumny that has scarcely been equaled since Nero raised Rome against the Christians—or Hitler's Germany against the Jews," Duranty called the talk about corpses in the streets of Moscow "utterly untrue." Yet the diplomats whom he cited as a source for his claim that there were no deaths from starvation confirmed the exact opposite. "Even in Moscow itself which is favored above all places in the Union in the matter of food, there are deaths from starvation," the British charge d'affaires reported on July 17. "An English lady, who is studying Soviet hospitality and welfare work, has herself come upon two corpses in the streets of persons who had just died as a direct result of lack of food."

Moreover, when a newspaper in Riga reported in August that the starvation and suffering were comparable to the famine of 1921, Duranty denounced the assertion as a "fundamental absurdity." Duranty also managed to slip into this story the standard Soviet insinuation that the famine reports were inspired by Nazi Germany: "The accession of Adolph Hitler to power brought new hope—and in some cases new money—to Russian émigré circles in Germany, the Baltic States, and elsewhere. These émigrés—like some other more disinterested observers of Soviet affairs—cannot see the woods for the trees and are only too ready to confuse causes and effects."

Yet even as he ridiculed the increasingly frequent eyewitness accounts of a devastating famine, Duranty half-heartedly admitted that the "food shortage" had taken a toll and, salting his articles with such cautious euphemisms as deaths due to "lowered resistance" and "malnutrition," ventured to estimate the losses:

"The excellent harvest about to be gathered shows that any report of a famine in Russia is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda. The food shortage which has affected almost the whole population in the last year, and particularly the grain-producing provinces—that is, the Ukraine, North Caucuses, the Lower Volga region—has however caused heavy loss of life. . . . The death rate rose during the winter and early spring to nearly four times the normal rate, which runs about 20 to 25 per 1,000 annually for the Soviet Union. Among peasants and others not receiving bread rations, conditions were certainly not better. So with a total population in the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower Volga of upward of 40 million the normal death rate would have been about 1 million. Lacking official figures, it is conservative to suppose that this was at least trebled last year in those provinces, and considerably increased for the Soviet Union as a whole."

The careful reader (and how many of Duranty's readers cared to untangle these sentences?) will note that he avoided giving an absolute figure of famine losses. But since he announced that the normal death rate would have been about 1 million and that this was trebled, we must assume that he was hinting at 2 million famine victims.

In September 1933, when he received the privilege of being the first correspondent to be allowed into the famine regions after the travel ban was lifted, Duranty set out by car for Rostov in the North Caucasus and Kharkov and Kiev in Ukraine. His public view of the "famine scare," which he presented in seven articles in the Times between September 11 and 20, 1933, was not changed by what he saw.

"Whatever the situation was here last winter or spring," Duranty cabled on September 11, "There is no doubt Rostov-on-Don is a busy flourishing city today. Local officials and newspaper men scout [deride] the stories of hunger epidemics and a much increased death rate earlier this year. They emphasize that half the city's population now receives at least one meal daily in factory and other "mass restaurants."

Two days later Duranty suggested that the North Caucasus was a land of milk and honey:

"The use of the word "famine" in connection with the North Caucasus is a sheer absurdity. There a bumper crop is being harvested as fast as tractors, horses, oxen, men, women, and children can work. . . . There are plump babies in the nurseries or gardens of the collectives. Older children are watching fat calves or driving cattle. . . . Village markets are flowing with eggs, fruit, poultry, vegetables, milk, and butter at prices far lower than in Moscow. A child can see that this is not famine but abundance."

This makes it all the more inexplicable that the Moscow authorities have restricted freedom of travel for any correspondent, even on the plaintive grounds that "some correspondents earlier wrote most distressing articles. . . ." For the writer's part, he believes the distressing facts were exaggerated. He thinks he himself exaggerated in saying the death rate in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and Lower Volga regions in the past year was three times above normal—at least as far as the North Caucasus was concerned.

Whatever his new estimate was (he again avoided citing absolute figures), Duranty maintained it for only two days. "Early last year, under the pressure of the war danger in the Far East," he wrote from Kharkov,

"The authorities took too much grain from the Ukraine. Meanwhile, a large number of peasants thought they could change the Communist party's collectivization policy by refusing to cooperate. Those two circumstances together—the flight of some peasants and the passive resistance of others—produced a very poor harvest last year, and even part of that was never reaped. The situation in the winter was undoubtedly bad. Just as the writer considered that his death-rate figures for the North Caucasus were exaggerated, so he is inclined to believe that the estimate he made for the Ukraine was too low." [That estimate was three times the normal death rate.] [2]

Let us give this passage our attention. In the first sentence Duranty implied—quite correctly—that the authorities had caused the famine by stripping Ukraine of its grain. But they did so, he said, because they needed to stockpile food in case war with Japan broke out. Duranty presented this cause as if it were well known and needed no explanation. In fact, he was sending up a trial balloon. He had only hinted at fear of war with Japan as a cause of the famine in previous articles, and he mentioned it again only eleven years later, when he argued that the "man-made famine" (he used that phrase, although he enclosed it in quotation marks), if anything like a famine had taken place at all, was entirely due to the Red Army's need for food reserves.

In the second sentence of the passage, however, Duranty adroitly shifted the blame for the famine onto the peasants, who had produced a very poor harvest by fleeing or putting up passive resistance. "Peasant hatred of new ways, peasant conservatism, and peasant inertia," as well as outright sabotage—those were the real causes of any food shortages, Duranty insisted again and again.

As in his August dispatch, Duranty carefully avoided giving an absolute figure of famine losses. Earlier he had estimated that the normal death rate of 1 million in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Lower Volga, taken together, had trebled, thus implying that the famine had killed 2 million people. Now he announced that this figure was too high for the North Caucasus and too low for Ukraine. But since he did not give a population figure for Ukraine or estimate its losses, we cannot tell what figure he had in mind. The conclusion presented to the readers of the Times, however, was clear; if there was a famine (Duranty's evidence on this point was highly ambiguous), it killed no more than 2 million people, and any such losses were entirely justified by the success of collectivization. A bit of suffering on the part of a few ignorant, anti-social kulaks had assured abundance for all.

In the remaining three articles in the series, Duranty resumed scoffing at the famine scare. "The writer has just completed a 200-mile auto trip through the heart of the Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous," he assured his readers on September 17, 1933.

"Summing up the impressions of a ten days' trip through North Caucasus and Ukraine, where this correspondent traveled with greater freedom and absence of supervision than had been expected, I repeat the opinion that the decisive engagement in the struggle for rural socializaiton has been won by the Kremlin," Duranty concluded on September 19. "The cost in some places has been heavy, but a generally excellent crop is already mitigating conditions to a marked extent."

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[2] The bracketed passage is in the original Times story.

Returning to Moscow, Duranty continued to gibe at the reports of famine. In mid-December the Soviet government announced that the state grain collections had been completed two-and-a-half months earlier than ever before. "This result," said Duranty.

"Fully justifies the optimism expressed to the writer by local authorities during his September trip through the Ukraine and North Caucasus—optimism that contrasted so strikingly with the famine stories then current in Berlin, Riga, Vienna, and other places, where elements hostile to the Soviet Union were making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert American recognization by picturing the Soviet Union as a land of ruin and despair."

Duranty's denials proved useful to Soviet spokesmen. When a group of Ukrainian women in the United States appealed to Congressman Herman Kopplemann of Connecticut to intervene with Moscow, Kopplemann forwarded their brief to Maxim Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. "There is any amount of such pamphlets full of lies circulated by counterrevolutionary organizations abroad, who specialize in the work of this kind," Litvinov replied, not eloquently but clearly. "There is nothing left for them to do but to spread false information or to forge documents."

The Ukrainian memorandum had cited Duranty's August estimate of a trebled death rate. Boris Skvirsky, the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, who was instructed by Litvinov to answer the Ukrainian charge in detail, found Duranty's later retraction of his estimate a handy rebuttal:

"The pamphlet does not add that in the Times, September 13, writing from Rostov-on-Don in the course of a personal inspection trip through those sections, Duranty stated that his estimate of July 24, before he had made his personal inspection, was exaggerated. He said that the poor harvest of 1932 had made for difficult conditions in certain sections, but there had been no famine. . . ."

Kopplemann had second thoughts about the cause he had supported. Forwarding copies of Litvinov's and Skvirsky's replies to the Ukrainian women, he wrote:

"Because the facts contained in the pamphlet you submitted to me conflict to a large extent with the report from the Soviet officials, I am asking you to make further investigation of the charges you have presented to me."

Stalin appreciated Duranty's effort to make the news fit to print. "You have done a good job in your reporting of the USSR, although you are not a Marxist, because you tried to tell the truth about our country and to understand it and explain it to your readers," he told Duranty nine days after the latter filed his story of hostile elements making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert U.S. recognition.

More tangible expressions of Stalin's pleasure followed. Duranty triumphantly accompanied Litvinov to the United States in November 1933 when the latter came to negotiate diplomatic relations and on his return took with him in his dispatch case, as Alexander Woollcott of the New Yorker put it, the first American ambassador to Moscow. And late in the year, Duranty was granted an hour-long interview with the Great Helmsman himself. It was featured on the front page of the New York Times and summarized in other papers. "It is unusual for M. Stalin to give interviews with journalists," a Soviet specialist in the British Foreign Office commented dryly, "but W. Duranty might be expected to get favorable treatment in this respect."

American liberals were equally appreciative. George Seldes, author of Freedom of the Press, among other works, claimed that America would have nothing but objective and reliable news if all the editors chose correspondents of Duranty's caliber. The journalist Alvin Adey observed that "there is no American correspondent, or for that matter any other non-Russian writer on Soviet affairs, who surpasses Walter Duranty in knowledge and understanding of Russia." And Woollcott described the scene when United States recognition of the USSR was celebrated with a banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in late 1933 and the honor roll of those who had contributed most to the rapproachement was called:

"For each name in the roll, whether Russian or American, there was polite applause from the 1,700 [guests], but the one really prolonged pandemonium was evoked by the mention of a little Englishman who was an amused and politely attentive witness of these festivities. Indeed, one quite got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty."

Another award for Duranty came from the Nation, which annually published an honor roll of citizens and institutions. In 1933 the honors went to the New York Times for printing and Walter Duranty for writing, during the previous decade and a half of Soviet rule, "the most enlightening, dispassionate, and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world."

But Western correspondents who knew Duranty in Moscow did not share the regard in which he was held in New York. They called him Walter Obscuranty, and

said that the impressions he conveyed privately did not even remotely resemble the impressions he purveyed to the readers of the Times.

Malcolm Muggeridge drew a devastating sketch of Duranty in his novel Winter in Moscow (the identifying tag is Duranty's egg-and-omelette line). In an article written in 1934 he also called Duranty's collected reporting from the Soviet Union an "essay in untruth":

"I shall never forget Mr. Duranty. There was something fantastic, fairy-like about the spectacle of him dancing his Roger de Coverly hand in hand with the Bolshevik bosses on a prostrate Russia. How jauntily the dance proceeded! What spirit in the steps and capers! And no confusion. No flagging. If, occasionally, a dancer withdrew, the figure did not suffer. Still a partner to bow to, still hands outstretched for a giddy twirl, still the dance going merrily on. . . . The remarkable thing is that Mr. Duranty has—to use one of his favorite expressions—'gotten away with it.' Readers of the New York Times adore him; the Brain Trust and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat have lain down together, and Mr. Duranty has led them; his name is honored amongst the righteous in all parts of the world. In these circumstances, does not the dust-cover of Russia Reported show unusual moderation in describing the book as a 'supreme triumph of modern reporting'?"

Eugene Lyon's criticism was more specific. The blockade on news from Ukraine and the North Caucasus that lasted through the spring and summer of 1933, he recollected, was lifted in "easy stages":

"The first to be given permission to travel in the forbidden zones were the technically 'friendly' reporters, whose dispatches might be counted upon to take the sting out of anything subsequent travelers might report. Duranty, for instance, was given a two weeks' advantage over most of us.

"On the day he returned, it happened, Billy [Lyon's wife] and I were dining with Anne O'Hare McCormick, roving correspondent for the New York Times, and her husband. Duranty joined us. He gave us his fresh impressions in brutally frank terms and they added up to a picture of ghastly horror. His estimate of the dead from famine was the most startling I had as yet heard from anyone.

" 'But, Walter, you don't mean that literally?' Mrs. McCormick exclaimed.

" 'Hell I don't. . . . I'm being conservative,' he replied, and as if by way of consolation he added his famous truism: 'But they're only Russians. . . .'

"Once more the same evening we heard Duranty make the same estimate, in answer to a question by Laurence Stallings, at the railroad station, just as the train was pulling out for the Polish frontier. When the issues of the Times carrying Duranty's own articles reached me I found that they failed to mention the large figures he had given freely and repeatedly to all of us."

Yet the most damning evidence against Duranty has never been presented. In a memorandum that he wrote for Muggeridge in December 1937 Lyons revealed the figure he had heard from Duranty:

"In Assignment in Utopia, I tell how Duranty, returning from a tour of inspection after the 1932–33 famine, told Anne O'Hare McCormick, myself, and others that the famine had killed many millions. His estimate, I say, was the largest I had yet heard. In the book I didn't mention the figure he used, but it was 7 million! Having passed on that figure to us in private conversation, he went home and wrote his famous dispatches pooh-poohing the famine."

Several days after his meeting with Lyons, Duranty gave the British chancery in Moscow an even more revealing account of his impressions in the North Caucasus and Ukraine. William Strang, the chargé d'affaires, summarized Duranty's findings for Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, on September 26, 1933:

"According to Mr. Duranty, the population of the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga has decreased in the past year by 3 million, and the population of the Ukraine by 4-5 million. . . . From Rostov Mr. Duranty went to Kharkov, and on the way he noticed that large quantities of grain were in evidence at the railway stations, of which a large proportion was lying in the open air, Conditions in Kharkov were worse than in Rostov. There was less to eat, and the people had evidently been on very short commons. . . . Supervision over visitors was also stricter in Kharkov. During the year the death rate in Kharkov was, he thought, not more than 10 percent above the normal. Numerous peasants, however, who had come into the towns had died off like flies. . . . The Ukraine had been bled white. The population was exhausted. . . .

"At Kharkov Mr. Duranty saw the Polish consul, who told him the following story: A Communist friend employed in the Control Commission was surprised at not gettng reports from a certain locality. He went out to see for himself, and on arrival he found the village completely deserted. Most of the houses were standing empty, while others contained only corpses. . . .

"Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year."

Neither this figure nor the one he had cited to Lyons ever appeared in any of Duranty's articles or books.

This was not the end of the concealment.

According to the British Foreign Office, Duranty's companion on his trip to Ukraine and the North Caucasus was Stanley Richardson of the Associated Press. On September 22, Richardson cabled an astonishing dispatch.

Early in 1933, Moscow had thoroughly reorganized the Ukrainian party, purging and arresting many members, and established "political departments" at each state farm and machine-tractor station. Staffed by trusted urban workers and party members—at least a third of them Russians brought in from outside Ukraine—these political departments were given unlimited authority over the peasants and extensive powers over local Communists, many of whom had proven themselves too faint-hearted to carry out the party's murderous policies. As the head of the political departments throughout Ukraine and as one of the highest party officials in the republic, Alexander Asatkin was well placed to have an accurate picture of the destruction wreaked by the famine.

In his dispatch, Richardson reported that Asatkin, whom he had formally interviewed in Kharkov, had confirmed the famine and had even "estimated the percentage of deaths in his area last winter and spring from causes related to undernourishment." The censor in Moscow, however, had banned the transmission of Asatkin's figures on the grounds that they were not official. Although the Times carried other Associated Press dispatches from Moscow a few days before and a few days after the September 22 cable, it never published the report of Richardson's interview with Asatkin. A highly placed Communist official had confirmed the famine, and the Times had ignored the news. (And not only the Times. I have been able to find Richardson's dispatch in only three North American newspapers—the New York American, the Toronto Star, and the Toronto Evening Telegram.)

But even this was not the end of the concealment.

Harold Denny, who replaced Duranty as the Times correspondent in Moscow in April 1934, proved to be no more honest a reporter of the famine than his predecessor. On July 23, 1934, for example, Denny announced that "a winter of hunger and perhaps of actual famine has been averted in the great grain region of the Ukraine." The fair crop that was being expected, he fancied, would be "a victory for collectivized agriculture which will induce many remaining individual peasants to enter the fold."

Throughout 1933 and 1934 Ewald Ammende had been trying almost singlehandedly to draw public attention to the famine. A Baltic German, Ammende had briefly worked for the government of independent Estonia in 1919 and then moved to Western Europe, where he threw himself into relief work. In September 1933, when Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna established a famine relief committee (the members included the Chief Rabbi of Vienna, the head of the Lutheran church, and the leaders of other denominations in Vienna), Ammende became its General Secretary. In late June 1934, Ammende arrived in New York with a mission to obtain the support of churches and humanitarian organizations in the United States and Canada. In interviews and letters to editors Ammende announced that wide starvation was impending again and asked whether Western grain surpluses could not be used to bring relief to the starving districts in the Soviet Union.

In response to queries from his editors about Ammende's assertion, Denny visited Ukraine in July and again in October. Echoing the articles in which Duranty had attacked Jones, Denny claimed to have seen no signs of famine. "This correspondent is traveling through the principal grain regions to check reports published abroad that a new famine exists or impends," Denny cabled from Ukraine on October 7, 1934. "Thus far no famine has been found nor an indication of famine in the year to come, though many peasants must draw in their belts and eat food they do not like until the 1935 harvest."

Although peasants in southern Ukraine, by his own admission, told him that they were in "grave danger," Denny reported that he had feasted on "milk from contended collectivized cows and honey fresh from the hives of Bolshevik bees":

"These delicacies were served at the end of a meal of a tasty salad of tomatoes, pickles, and onions, roast duck, and fluffy potato souffle, much better prepared than in Moscow hotels, washed down with the Ukrainian national drink, slivyanka, a liquor made from plums, tasting non-alcoholic though with a mule's kick in every swallow."

Eight days later Denny again announced that he had found no signs of famine. He had deliberately sought, he said, "the sections where the worst conditions had been reported in the outside world and the localities that peasants on trains had told him were the most seriously affected." Despite all this searching, however, he had found no famine. "Nowhere even fear of it." [3]

"The hunt for famine in Russia," Denny concluded, borrowing a line from Duranty, "was like chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. It was always somewhere further on."

Thus the damage was done. The famine was a will-o-the-wisp. Nazi and anti-Nazi, Right and Left, Stalinist and anti-Stalinist, would argue for years to come whether anything like a famine had happened at all, while the less polemically minded shuddered with distaste and turned to more substantial issues. My erudite editor justified silence on the grounds that the famine is little known. Another came to the same conclusion from the opposite starting point: the broad facts of the case, she opined, are so well known and so widely acknowledged that nothing more need be added. The Soviet press attache in Ottawa displayed a touching like-mindedness. In whose interest is it to bring up an "alleged famine," he indignantly asked an interviewer, when East and West are facing so many unresolved problems?

These are only three examples. Their perceptions still shaped by Duranty's and Denny's lies, many otherwise well-informed people know only that Stalin did something nasty to the "kulaks" in the course of collectivization, and many assume that the peasants themselves were to blame. Two recent studies of mass murder are cases in point. Leo Kuper, in Genocide, argues that the liquidation of the kulaks was not genocide but only a "related atrocity," and devotes to the famine precisely half a sentence:

"Estimates of the numbers who perished range from 5 million to 15 million, and this is without taking into account the many millions of peasants starved to death in the artificially induced man-made famine of 1932-33."

Richard L. Rubenstein, in The Age of Triage, giving the matter just a bit more attention, manages to confuse the causes, chronology, and geography of the famine:

"Millions of peasants resisted [Stalin's collectivization] violently and killed their own livestock rather than permit them to become state property. A man-made famine, the first of a series, ensued which compelled Stalin to retreat temporarily. Nevertheless, by 1932 he had broken the back of his country's Peasantry."

The famine of 1933 was one of the greatest crimes of the 20th century. Yet it has been met in most quarters with an indifference bordering on cynicism and in some with a conspiracy of silence (this proverbial phrase was first applied to the famine of 1933) that is nothing short of criminal. In an age when "genocide" and "holocaust" have become a part of every journalist's lexicon, the horrors of 1933 in Ukraine are still dismissed as recondite, are still being made fit to print. Orwell had it right:

"The fog of lies and misinformation that surrounds such subjects as the Ukraine famine, the Spanish civil war, Russian policy in Poland, and so forth, is not due entirely to conscious dishonesty, but any writer or journalist who is fully sympathetic to the USSR—sympathetic, that is, in the way the Russians themselves would want him to be—does have to acquiesce in deliberate falisfication on important issues."

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[3] Such denials were as convenient for Soviet apologists as Duranty's had been. When William Randolph Hearst mounted a campaign against Roosevelt's Soviet policy in 1935 and ordered his editors to reprint eyewitness accounts of the famine that had appeared in 1933, the American Communist party attacked Hearst by citing Denny's finding that there was no famine anywhere.

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The Man-Made Famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukrainian S.S. R.

The Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, which followed the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture, is much more than the most appalling event in the Soviet government's war against the peasantry. Persuasive evidence suggests that it was really a function of Soviet nationalities policy, carried out in tandem with a campaign to crush every manifestation of Ukrainian national life and constituting an attempt to crush the social basis of that life. In 1925 Stalin wrote, "The nationalities question is according to its basis a problem of the peasantry."[1] Like much else in Stalin's writing, only the aphoristic form of the idea is original; the idea itself is not. As early as the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1919, the nationalities question was discussed within the framework of the Soviet government's perceived need to placate a broader stratum of the rural population.[2] Decisions within this sphere were adopted and justified on the same basis in succeeding years. This made sense, because the so-called borderlands, that is, the colonies of the Russian Empire, consisted of Russian and Russified cities surrounded by non-Russian countryside. National movements drew their strength from the village, while Russian colonialism was based on the city. The famine represented an attempt to crush the Ukrainian countryside as the social basis of Ukrainian national life.

There is not much doubt about the broad outlines of what occurred in 1932 and 1933. What Soviet historiography has sporadically referred to as the "harvest failure" of 1932 actually produced more grain than did the harvest of 1928.[3] Since no one died of starvation in 1928 and millions perished in 1932-33, the difference between life and death was clearly not the result of any inability of the countryside to feed itself. Rather, the famine was produced by the government's deliberate policy of seizing foodstuffs and leaving the rural population to starve.

Foreign correspondents knew of the starvation, even though many failed to report what they knew. Nevertheless, there were a number of courageous journalists who reported on the mass starvation: among them were William Henry Chamberlin and Eugene Lyons in this country as well as Malcolm Muggeridge and Gareth Jones in Britain. There are thousands of accounts recorded from survivors who came

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from the Ukrainian countryside. In addition to individual memoirs, Ukrainian organizations collected and published compendia of eye-witness accounts in their still imperfect English during the first half of the 1950s.[5] The unpublished files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, a program which interviewed thousands of emigrants from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, also contains much eye-witness material on the famine. Those who carried out the interviews received so much information of this kind that, when one reads transcripts made in the latter stages of the project, notations are encountered to the effect that the interviewer turned off the tape when the respondent began to talk about the famine, became sympathetic, and resumed taping only after the respondent had finished telling about the famine and regained his or her composure.

We even have accounts from those whom we can classify as among the perpetrators of the famine. Victor Kravchenko, a Soviet trade official who defected to the West at the end of the Second World War, wrote about how he went into the Ukrainian countryside to help carry out the collectivization of agriculture before the famine and about the starving peasants he later encountered.[6] Lev Kopelev, the Soviet dissident now living in West Germany who had earlier served as the model for the saintly Communist portrayed in Solzhenitsyn's The First Circle, was sent into the Ukrainian countryside during the famine and has written about what he did and witnessed.[7] The famine even found its way into Khrushchev's unofficial memoirs. Although Khrushchev was in Moscow at the time of the famine, he heard about the following conversation between a high Ukrainian Communist official and Anastas Mikoyan:

> Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said: "Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin -- for that matter, does anyone in the Politburo -- know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with the corpses of people who had starved to death. It picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev..."[8]

Stalin, of course, was quite well aware of what was happening. For one thing, a Ukrainian Communist official who told him to his face lived to tell the tale in Pravda in the 1960s.[9] The military commanders of the Black Sea Fleet and the Kiev Military District both lodged personal protests with Stalin.[10] In public, Stalin rebuffed those who told him about the famine, but if he had really doubted what they told him, he had ample means of independent verification.

The dictator was not only aware that millions were dying, he did everything in his power to exacerbate the situation.

What makes this famine unique is that it was man-made, brought about as a deliberate act of policy. One can trace the policy through official Soviet sources. In the late 1920s the Soviet Union abandoned the policy of procuring grain by voluntary purchase and adopted a policy of compulsory seizure. In the early stages of forced collectivization, thousands of urban dwellers were sent to the countryside to seize what produce the state required.[11] Those who lived in the village remember how these outsiders organized local support organizations to go round to individual farms to search for concealed grain. Individuals were given metal-tipped pikes to probe the earth for buried foodstuffs.[12] At the same time, collectivized agriculture made extraction easier for the state. While simply seizing the farmers' implements and livestock, taking them to the center of the village, and proclaiming them socialized property, did nothing to raise output, forcing the peasants to sow and harvest together made it much easier for the state to take a larger amount of produce more easily directly from the floor of a single threshing room. The collective farmers were supposed to receive a share of the harvest based on the number of labor days they had accumulated during the course of the year, but the state's failure to provide the collective farmers even enough to eat led to a massive flight from the collective farms even before the famine. During the famine, the supplementary procurement campaign of early 1933 meant that what the collective farmers had been given for their labor days was taken back by the state. The Ukrainian countryside was literally stripped bare.[13]

It is possible to measure the the devastation caused by the famine, albeit only in crude fashion. Maksudov, a Soviet demographer who emigrated in 1981, has shown that it is possible to trace the geographical extent of the famine through the number of rural women, broken down by age and region in the 1959 census. Since mass starvation produces low birthrates and causes very high mortality among infants, one looks for regions where the number of people who would have been born during or immediately before the famine is abnormally small. Since women are less likely than men to change their residence, he examines only the age structure of rural women. By this method, Maksudov has found evidence of massive mortality in the late twenties and early 1930s in the following regions: throughout the Ukrainian SSR and the then heavily Ukrainian cossack territories of the North Causasus, a few regions along the Volga River and lower Ural region, and Kazakhstan.[14] Kazakhstan suffered a devastating famine in 1930 and lies

outside the scope of the problem discussed here. Collectivization also was carried out with extraordinary brutality, and population losses there can also be attributed to the earlier period. The Volga Basin, however, was devastated by the famine of 1932-33 along with the North Caucasus and the Ukrainian SSR. It seems likely that the Volga was singled out because of the large German population there, considered suspect by Stalin and later deported to the East en masse, while the heavily Ukrainian North Caucasus was also home to those cossack populations which provided the initial basis of support for the so-called counterrevolution in 1918. Interestingly, while the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was devastated by famine, there is no evidence of extraordinary mortality in the areas bordering on it to the North and Northeast. Maksudov thus shows that the famine stopped precisely at the Russo-Ukrainian and Belorussian-Ukrainian borders, that the famine was deliberately focused on territories containing large and self-assertive national (or in the case of Russian-speaking cossacks, proto-national) groups which could plausably be seen as the greatest potential threat to the new regimented and Russocentric Soviet Union Stalin built after the famine.

Estimating the number of victims of the famine is difficult to accomplish with much precision, and all we can hope for is a "ballpark estimate," an order of magnitude. Those who claim to have spoken to Soviet officials off the record usually report that they were told ten million as the number of victims, eight to nine million of which were from the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasus.[15] Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether the Soviet government was able to keep an accurate count. They tried to do so by promulgating regulations prohibiting unregistered burials, but according to eye-witnesses, these were widely violated as people buried their own dead.[16] This then leaves us with Soviet demographic data, and such data for the late 1930s is notoriously unreliable. For this reason there is a wide variation in estimates of the number of unnatural deaths which occurred in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, but most estimates agree that half or more were Ukrainians. Maksudov, whose strict reliance of territorial results from the 1939 census results on estimates which are almost certainly too low, estimates eight to nine million unnatural deaths in the USSR between 1926 and 1939, about four to five million in the Ukrainian SSR. Since the famine was followed by a program to resettle villages depopulated wholly or in part, Maksudov's reliance on territorial population figures certainly understates the loss of life suffered in the Ukrainian SSR, the population of which remained relatively stable because new settlers were brought in from Russia and other parts of the Soviet

Union.[17]

The devastation wrought by the famine comes more sharply into view when we look at the decline of numbers suffered by Ukrainians between 1926 and 1939. The highly accurate Soviet census of 1926 shows 31.2 million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union. The next -- and far less reliable -- census of 1939 shows 28.1 million, an absolute drop of 3.1 million or 9.9 percent. During the same period the population of the Soviet Union as a whole increased 15.7 percent. The Belorussians, whose lower literacy rate and relatively weaker tradition of national self-assertion would tend to make them more likely to be assimilated, whose birth rate in the period was lower, who were under the same purely political pressures for assimilation as were the Ukrainians, but who did not suffer famine in 1932-33, increased 11.5 percent during this same period.[18] Soviet demographic studies cite administrative estimates of population growth in the Ukrainian SSR from 1926 through 1931 which allow us to calculate a Ukrainian population of 34.2 million in 1931. After that date there is a virtual statistical blackout in Soviet sources, but we can apply the natural rate of population growth reported for Ukrainians in the late 1950s (lower than that recorded in the late twenties and thirties) to read back from the 1939 figure so as to estimate that there were 26.3 million Ukrainians in the USSR in 1934. Thus, even if there were no births in the years 1932 and 1933 -- and, of course, there were -- 7.9 million Ukrainians died before their time in this period.[19] From this figure we must subtract victims of other persecutions. About a quarter of a million Ukrainians died as a result of the liquidation of the so-called kulaks as a class. Perhaps another quarter of a million died in various purges of political and cultural elites. This still leaves over seven million Ukrainians who died from starvation. This figure could be a bit high, because it is possible that some persons who were counted as Ukrainians in 1926 were counted as Russians in 1939. It might also be too low, not only because it assumes no births in 1932-33, but also because the 1939 census figures are inflated. The 1939 census is not a complete census at all, but rather a summary of a census. There was a census conducted in 1937, but it was never released. The press announced that those in charge of the census were found to be participants in a plot "to discredit the idea of socialism in one country by deliberately undercounting the population." In other words, they shot the census takers for not finding enough people.[20] Those who prepared the census of 1939 were well aware of the fate suffered by their predecessors, and it is reasonable to assume that they took measures to avoid any perception of similar shortcomings in their work.

Thus, if we say that seven million Ukrainians starved to death in 1932-33, we are dealing with an order of magnitude: we will likely never know the precise number who died. What we do know is that we are dealing with a number of lives on the same order as the number of Jews who perished in the Holocaust.

Figures, of course, cannot measure human suffering. There are as many tales of such suffering as survivors, and survivors of the famine of 1933 live in every major Ukrainian community of North America. They tell of the number of the dead exceeding the capacity of the living to give them a decent burial, of outbreaks of cannibalism, of villagers leaving their homes to seek food in the cities and of their trying to cross the border into Russia where food was available. Some tell of being turned back at the border or of being deported back to their starving country. Some tell of trains being stopped on their way from Russia to Ukraine and of food being seized from those who tried to carry it with them. It is impossible to do justice to what happened except in the words of the eyewitnesses themselves.

Graphic portraits of the horrors of village life emerge from the files of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project (HURIP). A rather typical account (HURIP, case 128) is the following:

> ...there was the famine in the Ukraine in 1933. We saw people die in the streets; it was terrible to see a dead man, when I close my eyes I can still see him. We had in our village a small church which was closed for services and in which we played. And I remember a man who came in there; he lay down with his eyes wide open at the ceiling and he died there! He was an innocent victim of the Soviet regime and not even a kulak. This hunger was the result of Soviet policy.

Other accounts are more graphic, as this one by a Russian woman (HURIP, case 373):

> Well, in 1933-1934 I was a member of a commission sent out to inspect wells. We had to go to the country to see that the shafts of the wells were correctly installed, and there I saw such things as I had never seen before in my life. I saw villages that not only had no people, but not even any dogs and cats, and I remember one particular incident: we came to one village, and I don't think I will ever forget this. I will always see this picture before me. We opened the door of this miserable hut and there...the man was lying. The mother and child already lay dead, and the father had taken the piece of meat from between the legs of his son and had died just like that.

Nor was cannibalism confined to the countryside, as a worker (HURIP, case 513) makes clear:

> I remember a case in 1933. I was in Kiev...at a bazaar...called the Besarabian market. I saw a woman with a valise. She opened the valise and put her goods out for sale. Her goods consisted of jellied meat, frozen jellied meat, which she sold at fifty rubles a portion. I saw a man come over to her -- a man who bore all the marks of starvation -- he bought himself a portion and began eating. As he ate of his portion, he noticed that a human finger was imbedded in the jelly. He began shouting at the woman and yelling at the top of his voice. People came running, gathered around her, and then seeing what her food consisted of, took her to the militsia. At the militsia, two members of the NKVD (secret police) went over to her and, instead of taking action against her, they burst out laughing. "What, you killed a kulak? Good for you!" And then they let her go.

Why did the Soviet government do it? The policy of forcing the peasants to give up their individual farms and join collectives, which were virtually indistinguishable from the pre-emancipation estates where their forefathers had worked, naturally produced much resistance in the countryside throughout the Soviet Union. The policy of industrialization, paid for largely by grain exports, gave the regime a strong motive to seize as much as possible from the villages. But these considerations do not explain why the famine was geographically focused so as to stop precisely at the Russo-Ukrainian and Belorussian-Ukrainian borders. The famine can be explained only if we ask why Stalin would want to devastate those territories which were affected by the famine.

At the time of the famine the USSR was in the midst of not only social and political transformation. The national ideology of the state was about to undergo a complete reversal. The party line of the 1920s was that Russian imperialism had been an evil which the revolution had abolished. National cultures and national diversity were officially encouraged. In November 1934 a decree on the teaching of history in the USSR completely reversed the official notion of what sort of entity the Soviet Union was. Russian history was rehabilitated, tsars and all, and took the place of national histories. To emphasize that this revived imperial schema of history was obligatory for all parts of the Union, it was labelled "history of the USSR."[21] Programs to encourage national diversity were replaced by a policy of Russification. Every manifestation of national self-assertion was labelled "bourgeois nationalism" and ruthlessly suppressed. If one were to ask which peoples would constitute the greatest threat to the new Russocentric Soviet Union Stalin was building, one

would have to answer: Germans, because they had shown their affection for their homeland during the 1918 German occupation of Ukraine, they were later deported en masse; cossacks, because they had been the first to fight the communists arms in hand in 1918; and Ukrainians, the largest non-Russian nation in the USSR and by far the most self-assertive.

One can say that Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s played a role in the Soviet Union analogous to that which Poland plays in the post-Stalin Soviet bloc. Both constitued that part of the larger assemblage that was most nationally conscious, self-assertive of its prerogatives, and least willing to follow blindly after Moscow in arranging its internal affairs. In 1918 the Ukrainians established an independent state, and even after its defeat in 1921, guerilla fighters loyal to the idea of Ukrainian statehood continuted to fight on in the countryside. Realizing that stability was impossible unless the Soviet regimes imposed outside Russia proper were given some veneer of national legitimacy, the Russian Communist Party proclaimed a policy of indigenization in 1923, providing for the recruitment of non-Russians into the Party and state apparatuses and for official sponsorship of non-Russian cultural development. None of the local variants of this policy went so far as Ukrainization, which within a few years enabled Ukrainians to produce literary and cultural achievements unprecedented in their history. Even Ukrainian Communists could not remain immune to the national revival taking place around them, and Stalin perceived in this a threat.[22]

The Soviet Union of the 1920s was based on a series of concessions which the Party adopted after its initial failure to force society into the straight-jacket it attempted to create during the period of War Communism (1917-1921). Instead of forcing peasants into collectives and seizing their produce, the New Economic Policy meant allowing them to keep their individual farms and sell their produce on a limited free market. Non-communist writers, scholars, and artists were allowed to work in relative freedom. The former colonies were told that they had achieved their national liberation, and their cultural life was actually stimulated. Yet, the Soviet leadership never reconciled itself to the apparent liberalism which had been forced upon it, and in 1928 Stalin began his "second revolution," designed to accomplish what had earlier been postponed, the total regimentation of society. A "cultural revolution" managed to suppress every manifestation of the independent life of the mind. In 1929-30, the total collectivization of agriculture on the basis of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class was carried out. Peasants were forced to give up their farms and join collectives; those who resisted were labelled "kulaks" and exiled -- or worse.

At the same time, the relatively heterogeneous national-political life was attacked, particularly in the Ukrainian SSR. Ukrainian Communists thought to be too attached to their national heritage were purged. In 1930, a show trial orchestrated a massive assault on Ukrainian intellectual and spiritual life. The Ukrainian Church was outlawed; Ukrainian scholars were accused of aiding the class enemies by asserting their nation's distinctiveness in such fields as history and linguistics.[23]

The Ukrainian countryside, particularly the individual peasant proprietor, was seen as the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism.[24] It would seem to follow that the Ukrainians could not be definitively crushed unless a crushing blow were dealt also to the Ukrainian countryside. Accordingly, grain procurement quotas, disproportionate to the Ukrainian SSR's share of the total Soviet harvest, were were imposed at the time of forced collectivization in what already seems to have been a conscious attempt to bring the country's agriculture to disaster.[25] A bumper crop and reserves from preceding years allowed the quota to be met in 1930. The following year, even driving some localities to the point of starvation could not meet it. Ukrainian Communist officials insisted upon a lowering of the quotas and succeeded in getting small concessions. After the harvest of 1932 the official newspapers reached a new hysterical pitch in exhorting local official to use "resolute measures" and carry out the procurements campaign "like Bolsheviks." The countryside was stripped bare. Ukrainian officials protested to Moscow, sometimes to Stalin in person, that thousands upon thousands were dying.[26]

Stalin seized upon the pretext that the Ukrainian Communist organizations were guilty of "criminal laxity" in their failure to meet the grain procurement quotas. On January 24, 1933, he took direct control of the Ukrainian SSR by appointing one of his own Second Secretary and de facto dictator of the Ukrainian Central Committee.[27] His new satrap, Pavel Postyshev, immediately ruled out any slackening of the campaign to seize grain from the countryside and attacked the erstwhile Ukrainian political strongman, Mykola Skrypnyk, for shielding "national deviationists" responsible for the failure to meet the quotas.[28] It was under Postyshev, during the Spring and Summer of 1933, when most victims of the famine perished, and for their deaths Stalin bore direct personal responsibility. Meanwhile, the Ukrainization policy was abandoned, its place taken by a new policy of Russification; the Ukrainian Communist leadership associated with Skrypnyk was destroyed; hundreds of Ukrainian writers and scholars fell victim to what Ukrainians remember as the

Postyshev terror.[29]

If we are to understand the famine of 1932-1933, we must place it in the context of Stalin's policy toward the Ukrainians:

1) The destruction of the Ukrainian communist leadership, designed to neutralize the Ukrainian SSR as a political factor in Soviet life.

2) The destruction of Ukrainian spiritual, intellectual, and cultural elites and institutions, designed to "decapitate" the Ukrainian nation.

3) The replacement of the Ukrainization policy with a policy of Russification, designed to push Ukrainian culture out of the cities and back to the countryside whence it had come.

4) The famine, a policy designed to crush the social basis of Ukrainian nationhood.

Understood in this context, the famine becomes intelligible as an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor, as a social organism, to destroy the Ukrainian nation as such. Millions of Ukrainians died as a result of this policy. The only word to describe it is genocide.

Notes

1. I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1946), vol. 7, p. 72.

2. František Silnický, Natsionalnaia politika KPSS v period s 1917 po 1922 god (Munich, 1978), pp. 196-199.

3. I. F. Ganzha, I. I. Slyn'ko, P. V. Shostak, "Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsializmu," V. Danilov, ed., Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh respublikakh (Mosocw, 1963), p. 199.

4. James William Crowl, Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, A Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty (Washington, 1982), pp. 133-180. William Henry Chamberlin, Russia's Iron Age (Boston, 1934), pp. 82-91. Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York, 1937), pp. 572-580. Malcolm Muggeridge, Winter in Moscow (Boston, 1934), passim. Idem., Chronicles of Wasted Time (New York, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 205-276.

5. The best collection of this type was compiled by DOBRUS, The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book (Detroit and Toronto, 1953-1955). Useful bibliographies were published by Alexandra Pidhainy in The New Review: A Journal of East-European History, September 1968 and December 1973.

6. Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (New York, 1946).

7. Lev Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer (New York, 1980), pp. 224-286.

8. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and Toronto, 1970), pp. 73-74.

9. Pravda, May 26, 1934.

10. Leonid Plyushch, History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography (New York and London, 1977), pp. 40-41.

11. A. N. Timofeev, "Dvadtsatipiatitysiachniki -- provodniki politiki partii v kolkhoznom stroitel'stve na Ukraine," Iz istorii bor'by Kommunisticheskoi Partii Ukrainy za sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo sel'skogo khoziaistva (Kiev, 1961).

12. Kopelev, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

13. I. I. Slyn'ko, Sotsialistychna perebudova i tekhnichna rekonstruktsiia sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrainy (1927-1932 rr.) (Kiev, 1961), p. 299. Konstantyn Kononenko, Ukraina i Rosiia (New York, 1958), p. 281.

14. Maksudov, "Geografiia goloda 1933 goda," SSSR: Vnutrenie protivorechiia, No. 7, pp. 5-11.

15. Adam Tawdul first reports this estimate on the basis of Soviet inside information in The New York American, August 18-19, 1935. William Horsley Gannt reported he was told the figure was ten million and might even have been as high as fifteen. Jaroslaw Sawka, "American Psychiatrist: Fifteen Million Died in the Thirties' Famine," Ukrainian Quarterly, Spring 1982, pp. 61-67. John Kolasky, a Ukrainian-Canadian ex-communist who spent several years in Kiev, reports that shortly after Khrushchev's secret speech a prominent Ukrainian poet announced at a meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers in Ukraine that the ten million figure came from a unpublished statistic of the Ukrainian Central Committee. John Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine: A Canadian's Personal Account of Russian Oppression and the Growing Opposition (Toronto, 1970), p. 111.

16. Several respondents in the Harvard Project files refer to this.

17. Olexa Woropay, The Ninth Circle: In Commemoration of the Victims of the Famine of 1933 (Cambridge, MA, 1983), p. 36.

18. V. I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (Etnodemograficheskii obzor) (Moscow, 1975), p. 249.

19. Figures for the natural rate of population growth may be consulted in Vsevolod Naulko, Etnichni sklad naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR: Statystyko-kartohrafichne doslidzhennia (Kiev, 1965), p. 84-85.

20. Boris Souvarin, Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism (New York, 1939), p. 669.

21. See, for example, Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship (Chapel Hill, 1962).

22. For a survey of Ukrainian nationalism in the Soviet Union in the years see James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, MA, 1983).

23. The show trial of the so-called Union for the Liberation of Ukraine included testimony to the effect that certain trends in Ukrainian historiography and linguistics were actually planned to help bring about an anti-Soviet uprising. This was a way of identifying Ukrainian self-assertion through scholarship with the so-called class enemies.

24. Proletars'ka Pravda, January 22, 1930.

25. Although the Ukrainian SSR accounted for 27 percent of the total Soviet grain harvest, the procurement structure of the early 1930s made it responsible for providing 38 percent of all grain procured in the Soviet Union. V. Holubnychy, "Prychyny holodu 1933 roku," Vpered, January 1958, p. 5.

26. See my "The Ukrainian Famine of 1933: What Happened and Why," Israel Charny, ed., Papers of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, forthcoming.

27. Bil'shovyk Ukrainy, 1933, No. 3.

28. Visti VUTsVK, June 22, 1933.

29. Hryhory Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (New York, 1960), passim.

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The Soviet Union began, in 1930, the establishment of a system of agriculture which abolished the independent farmer. The "collective farm" was designed, above all, with a view to making the rural population work on meagre rations, while taking control of the crop out of their hands. This was enforced against almost total resentment and resistance, by means of terror. Its economic results included the massive destruction of livestock and the creation of a level of grain production as low, even twenty years later and with a large tractor park, as that of the peasant of Tsarist times with his wooden plow. Its human results were a massive loss of life, culminating in a vast genocidal operation against the most independent element of all, the peasantry of the Ukraine, at that time one of the most fertile lands in the world.

Fifty years ago the whole of the Ukrainian countryside, that great plain extending beyond the republic's borders into the Ukrainian-speaking areas of the North Caucasus, was like one vast Belsen, with millions of peasants with swollen bellies and stick-like limbs dying or near death, and thousands of well-fed and well-armed police and Party activists seizing the last of their food and guarding the granaries against them.

While the world was rightly deploring the killing of 269 innocent civilians in the Korean airliner incident, this might be put in profounder perspective by considering that the Kremlin would have to shoot down an airliner a day for about seventy years to match the death roll of Stalin's terror-famine in the Ukraine, remembered by many survivors now in the USA and elsewhere as though it were yesterday.

The 1932-1933 famine had a number of special characteristics of which the most striking was that it was entirely man-made. The food was there, and was removed. At any moment reserves of grain could have been released, and millions spared.

Again, the famine was completely localized, affecting only the Ukraine and the Ukrainian-speaking regions of the North Caucasus (with a few other lesser special targets such as the

Volga Germans). Check points on the Ukrainian-Russian border sought to prevent Ukrainian peasants leaving, and those who succeeded in doing so and came back with bread had the bread confiscated.

This was no longer part of the attack on private farmers which had killed or deported some ten million, the regime's main enemies over the whole USSR, in 1930-1932. By mid-1932 collectivization was virtually complete, and it was the poor, collectivized peasantry of the Ukraine which was now attacked.

The campaign started with a decree issued in mid-1932 setting grain procurement targets which could not possibly be met. Vasily Grossman, the famous Stalin Prize novelist, writes in his last, secret, book Forever Flowing, "I think there has never been such a decree in all the long history of Russia. Not the Tsars, nor the Tatars ... ever promulgated such a terrible decree. For the decree required that the peasants of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban be put to death by starvation, put to death along with their little children".

First all the grain was taken; then even the seed grain; then the houses and yards were searched and dug up, and any little store of bread seized. They lived on a few potatoes; then on birds and cats and dogs; then on acorns and nettles; and in early spring they died.

We have hundreds and hundreds of accounts of the horrors of the time, of infants dying in their mother's arms, of executions for taking a few ears of corn, of families and whole villages perishing, of cannibalism, of emaciated orphaned children -- the "nomeless ones" -- roaming the countryside in bands.

There is no doubt that this was a conscious act of terror against the Ukrainian peasantry. Stalin had called the peasants the crux of the national question, and over this period the Ukrainian villages were persistently denounced for harbouring nationalists. At the same time, the other strong-point of Ukrainian nationality, the country's educated elite, was attacked: the cultural institutions were purged, sometimes even dissolved, and hundreds of leading writers and academics made public or private "confessions" and went to the execution cellars or the

labour camps; and the independent Ukrainian Orthodox church was smilarly crushed.

Even on the inflated official Soviet figures of the faked 1939 census, there is a deficit of 10-11 million Ukrainians in this decade; and the actual deaths in the terror-famine can be estimated with reasonable accuracy as about 7 million, of which 2-3 million were children, mainly under six or seven years old.

Stalin's knowledge of what was going on has sometimes been questioned, just as there are those who hold that Hitler was unaware of the Final Solution. In fact, it is perfectly clear that he had accurate reports from a variety of sources: indeed in Khrushchev's time Pravda gave a clear account of such first hand reporting to him by a prominent Ukrainian Communist. His aim was to crush the Ukraine, his method that practiced by Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, the "laying waste" of the refractory nation.

Ukrainians in the West refer to the period as the "forgotten Holocaust". It was well reported at the time in the West -- by Malcolm Muggeridge, for instance -- but Stalin simply denied that there was a famine, and took in a few distinguished visitors with show farms, so that progressive Westerners could dismiss, or at any rate forget these events, as George Orwell complained.

One reason for this lack of attention is, I think, ignorance in the West of the power of Ukrainian nationhood, the strength of Ukrainian national feeling. In this century the country was only independent for a few precarious years, and we are inclined to think of it as always having been part of, even a natural part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. But this is historically and emotionally false.

An important continuity between the Ukrainian holocaust and our own time is provided by the fact that the USSR is ruled by the same regime and party, and that the present Kremlin leaders were young adults starting their political careers in the early thirties, just at the time when that Party was throwing its younger and more brutalized elements into the struggle with the men, women and children they regarded as class enemies, the starving peasantry of the Ukraine.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. MILLAR, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

"One must crack eggs to make an omelette."

"One cannot expect a chick and an omelette from the same egg."

Peasant proverbs

Introduction

The first peasant axiom quoted above is a statement about politics, about the need to mobilize forces to overcome political inertia. The second statement is about economics: in a world in which resources are scarce, one can increase egg production in the future only by foregoing an omelette today. Both concepts have been used to justify forced, mass collectivization of agriculture in the USSR. The conflict between the two statements is, however, obvious. The destruction and dislocation of population, production and capital that resulted from collectivization reduced the capacity of the economy to produce agricultural products both in the short run and the long run.

I shall argue in what follows that there was no economic rationale for mass collectivization, that it did not somehow contribute to growth of Soviet economic capacity. Quite the contrary. The justification for cracking eggs, if there is one, must be on political grounds, and I must admit that the case is yet to have been made unambiguously for political justification. As an economic policy collectivization was a mistake, pure and simple. The same may have been the case politically, but I leave that assessment to my political science colleagues.

One may well wonder what difference it makes today whether a viable economic rationale existed for mass collectivization. There are two main reasons why it does matter. First, Soviet economic development has been considered a possible model for economic development elsewhere in the less developed world. If it was a mistake economically, we can help other countries avoid a very costly error. Second, the institutions we regard as uniquely characteristic of Soviet socialism today were forged in the crucible of mass collectivization between 1928 and about 1935. This was the principal element of what is usually called the "second" Bolshevik revolution.

The peasantry was a participant, and thus an ally, albeit unwittingly, of the Bolsheviks during the Great October Revolution of 1917. The second revolution was carried out from above by the state against the peasantry. It was a kind of preemptive war in which the state and its urban supporters sought to impose control over the peasantry in the name of economic progress. The war ended in a compromise which still defines the fundamental relations between the countryside on the one hand and the state administration, party and the urban population on the other.

The Economic Consequences of Mass Collectivization

Collectivization created a structure, therefore, that still stands (although in modified form), and it was based upon a set of attitudes toward agricultural production, private enterprise and rural life that still prevails to influence agricultural policy today.

The compromise that ended peasant resistance to collectivization satisfied neither party. The state did attain collective ownership and management of the bulk of agricultural land and capital, and it was thus able thereafter to govern the application of land, labor and capital in the countryside and to command the main marketing channels for agricultural staples and raw materials. But one-third of the capital stock was destroyed in the process

as peasants preferred to destroy their animals rather than contribute them to the collective, and private agriculture was allowed to continue on small land plots collective farmers were awarded conditional upon the contribution of a minimum number of labor days to the collective. Peasant families were allowed to use their plots to grow products for their own consumption and for sale on private markets.

The compromise between the state and the peasantry meant, therefore, that collectivization was less than complete. It produced a division of labor between large-scale collective (and state) farms and tiny private plots not unlike the division of labor following emancipation of the serfs in the 1860s. The Bolshevik state ensured itself a labor force by offering the peasants what had been called "hungry plots" following the emancipation. Hungry plots were plots too small to live on, but too large to refuse. Thus the Bolsheviks succeeded in recreating in the 1930s the kind of interdependence between large-scale farms and small individual plots that had been characteristic under the tsars. Even today the economic interdependence between collective farm and private plot is such that restrictions placed on private plot agriculture reduce collective output too.

The compromise that was established by collectivization had other long run implications as well. The decision to permit continuation of private agricultural production implied continuation of private marketing of agriculrual products as well. Thus private enterprise, albeit very small in scale, and free markets were permitted to continue to operate. The collective-farm market still retails approximately 25% of the value of all agricultural products purchased by the population today, and it is the model for the second economy, where quasi-legal and illegal private transactions in nonagricultural products take place in contemporary Soviet society.

The settlement that followed collectivization also strengthened the role of the state as the protector of the urban-industrial population and thus the guarantor of food supplies from the agricultural sector. The quest for stable prices in state retail outlets in urban areas led the state to suppress price increases as a benefit to urban workers. The result over time has been to require huge subsidies to keep nominal prices low for urban consumers and thus to make queuing for food products a major activity of all adult Soviet citizens.

The Structure of Collectivized Agriculture in the 1930s*

By the end of the 1930s the structure of Stalinist agriculture was in place, and it remained essentially the same until 1958. The sovkhoz, or state farm, which was organized along the same lines as the state enterprise, with paid employees and state-financed investment outlays, worked only a trivial proportion of all agricultural land in the Soviet Union until the 1950s. Thus the system of agriculture that emerged from collectivization consisted of the kolkhoz, the state agricultural procurement system, and the private plot of the kolkhoznik. All capital of the kolkhoz was contributed to an indivisible fund, and it is called thus to this day because no member may claim any portion of it should he elect to withdraw from the collective — despite the fact that all members of the kolkhoz collectively "own" the capital stock. Unlike the state farm, the kolkhoz has always been obliged to finance all investment in the farm out of earnings or through long-term, interest-bearing loans from the state bank.

As I have indicated, one deleterious consequence of the way collectivization took place was the destruction of one-third of the capital stock of agriculture. As a result most kolkhozes began existence with a serious capital shortage. They had too little draft power to plow and cultivate the land, and they were seriously short of means of transportation as well. The state consequently was obliged to purchase tractors and trucks and to put them at the disposal of collective farms. A system of stations, called machine tractor stations (MTS), was developed for this purpose. Each was staffed with personnel who operated the equipment for the kolkhozes it served for an in-kind rental charge. Each station served several kolkhozes, and each was responsible for maintaining the equipment. The development of the

MTS system required much more agricltural equipment than had been called for in the first five-year plan, and acquistion of tractors involved spending precious foreign exchange.

Government procurement of agricultural products involved four principal channels once the entire system was in place. The MTS system, which persisted until 1958, was a creature of the state budget; and the in-kind payments it received from kolkhozes represented an important procurement channel. Norms based upon size and fertility of available land were established by government procurement agencies for each farm, and all were obliged to deliver fixed quantities of various products at very low prices. These deliveries were called obligatory deliveries. Once these targets and MTS rental payments had been met, collective farms were allowed to sell the remainder of their crops either to the government for prices considerably higher than for obligatory deliveries (this was call the "zakupka"), or to sell their surplus on the CFM at whatever price they could command. Finally, certain crops could be sold directly to state enterprises — such as those producing sugar beets or flax, for example — for prices negotiated in advance. This channel was called kontraktatsiia.

The government's sources of agricultural products included, therefore, these four channels, plus an in-kind tax on the products of private agriculture. The bulk of procurements was in kind, and this reflected the general depecuniarization of agriculture that was effected by collectivization. The average price received by collective farms for their products from the state was below cost of production, a fact which led many superficial observers to conclude that the government was acquiring agricultural products on the cheap, and from which it seemed to follow that collectivization had been an economic success. That the standard of living of the peasantry fell as a result of the establishment of the collective farm and the predatory state procurement system persuaded these observers that industialization was made possible by the "pumping of resources out of agriculture."

There is no question but that, taken together, the collective farm system and the state procurement system formed an effective device for forcing output out of the agricultural sector. The entire system was not in place, however, until well into the 1930s, and it was very costly to estabish. In addition, it was a system that depended more upon disincentives than upon incentives, and it was never able to stimulate productivity, efficiency, or even reliability in agricultural production. The notion that collectivization was initiated in order to create this particular system is without foundation. It is far more accurate to see the system that evolved by the end of the first five-year plan as one designed to minimize the cost of collectivization, to staunch the arterial loss, than to see it as the end which shaped a decision to collectivize. The evidence that we have on the contribution of agriculture to Soviet rapid industrialization shows that resources flowed on a net basis from nonagricultural sectors to the agricultural sector and not vice versa, as so many have assumed was the case during the first five-year plan.

Collectivization cost more to establish than it yielded. The loss of capital stock and the consequent sharp decline in total agricultural production was not made good until the end of the 1930s. State investment in the MTS system and in the development of state farms required a large flow of capital into the agricultural sector, but the state received no net return for it because even this large, unanticipated flow of capital failed to replace what had been destroyed in peasant anger. The transport of millions of peasant farmers (kulaks) to Siberia was also damaging, because the best farmers were the most likely to be singled out. Finally, the compromise that allowed the persistence of private farming on tiny hungry plots and that permitted private sales of products on the CFM left open a channel through which the peasants could shift a substantial proportion of the cost of collectivization to the urban population. The rise in prices on this market and the flow of goods through it, even though of small physical volume, ensured that the terms of trade would turn in favor of the agricultural sector, rather than the other way around as Preobrazhensky had proposed and Stalin claimed to have effected. The CFM tail wagged the dog during the 1930s.

In economics, unlike a poker game, everyone can lose from a mistake. Collectivization was an economic policy mistake in the short run, and the evidence we have on the long run suggests the same. Mass collectivization produced losses without anyone, including the state, deriving a benefit. The idea that all of the suffering, the famine, the brutality, and the grief that collectivization occasioned went for naught is more than many students can understand, but the evidence suggests that this was the case.

The system of collectivized agriculture remained essentially unchanged from the middle 1930s until the middle of the 1950s, and in many ways it represented the keystone of the Stalinist economy. It became an article of faith, and I believe that its importance for Stalin and others who might be called Stalinists today was threefold. First, the system put an end to private enterprise in the form the Bolsheviks most distrusted - peasant private enterprise. Second, the system of collectivized agriculture represented a large, essentially depecuniarized sector, and it appealed to those like Stalin who believed that the future of the Soviet system was one in which "commodity relations" and "commodity production," which Western economists call markets and pecuniary institutions, ought to be eliminated. Third, by structure and operation the sector reflected the state's preferential treatment of the worker and its predilection for industrial production. As a result of collectivization the rural population was isolated from the developing sectors of the Soviet economy, and its economy and population became even more backward relative to the urban-industrial than had been the case in 1928. The social, educational, and technical backwardness of both the people and the enterprises in the Soviet rural sector persists to this day and does not appear to be diminishing rapidly.

The Long-Term Consequences of Collectivization

Many reforms have been proposed and implemented since the 1930s, most of them since Stalin's death in 1953. Collective farms have been repeatedly consolidated into larger and larger units, and many have been converted into state farms. The MTS was abolished in 1958 along with the old four-channel procurement system. Prices paid by state procurement agencies have been raised many fold. In kind transactions have all but disappeared. Heavy investments have been made in plant and equipment and in human capital too. Pensions are available to farmers now, and a minimum annual wage is guaranteed.

Western observers of these reforms and investments have agreed that they were necessary and in the right direction. Agricultural output has increased substantially also. When you consider that output per capita in 1953 was approximately what it had been in 1928 before collectivization (and, of course, the devastation of WWII), and that 1928 output was about the same as had been attained prior to WWI and the revolution, the growth of output following Stalin's death is striking. Per capita consumption has more than doubled in value.

Soviet agriculture has not failed, but it has been disappointing in two respects. The rate of growth has stagnated in recent years and the cost of achieving the large increase that took place between 1953 and the 1970s was extraordinary. Rebuilding an agricultural sector that was badly damaged by collectivization and by relative neglect proved to be much more costly and difficult than had been anticipated. The theory of unbalanced growth, in which a sector is neglected in favor of development of a preferred sector which, when modernized, will turn about and pull the neglected sector up to date does not seem to work.

Huge quantities of resources have been devoted to agriculture since Stalin's death, but the population remains dissatisfied with the quantity, composition and quality of agricultural products available in state retail outlets. The situation presents a real dilemma for the Soviet leadership, a dilemma of its own making. Preferential treatment of urban-industrial population has led to enormous subsidies of food products sold through state outlets. Prices are

so low on some goods, such as red meat, that stocks disappear upon arrival. Clerks cannot but be tempted to collect the difference between what the market price would be and what is actually charged, which puts them in violation of the law. Farmers are tempted to purchase farm products retail and deliver them to the state for the higher wholesale prices it pays for procurements. The population at large complains about queues, but complains even more strongly (and sometimes riots) when price increases are threatened. Much of this pervasive and endless economic irrationality is a legacy of collectivization.

Conclusion

Radical changes in agricultural tenure and production systems have rarely taken place in history. The margin of error is usually small and the consequences of failure horrendous. The Soviet experiment with mass collectivization is clearly a case in point. It was based upon a false economic premise: that rapid development would require "squeezing" the peasantry and it therefore failed to provide the resources that were anticipated. It also failed in the short run to feed the population, and a terrible famine ensued. In the long run, Soviet agriculture has gradually been overcoming the persisting adverse consequences of collectivization, but the end is not yet in sight. The Soviet population is not hungry, and it is very unlikely to suffer serious famine again (in the absence of some major catastrophe). At the same time it is not satisfied with the performance of Soviet agriculture and it will not soon find satisfaction.

The fact is that collectivization was founded upon a mistaken premise, one that has been abandoned today by Soviet leadership. Economic growth need not be an exploitative process. Collectivization and its awful consequences might have been avoided had the Bolsheviks considered another old Russian proverb as the basis of the relationship between industrial and agricultural sectors: "One hand washes the other."

* This section has been adapted from my recent book, The ABCs of Soviet Socialism (University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp.26-29.

STATEMENT OF REV. WOLODYMYR BAZYLEVSKY, PASTOR

ST. VLADIMIR'S CATHEDRAL, NEW YORK, N.Y.

The Great Famine in Ukraine in the Years 1932-33

In the years 1932-33 more than 7 million innocent Ukrainian men, women and children perished in an artificially created famine. This attrocity was deliberately planned as repressive and terrorizing measure by the Communist government in Moscow.

I was a young man in my late 20's living in Eastern Ukraine. I was an eye-witness to all that was happening.

Ukraine is known as the "bread basket" of Europe, it's soil being one of the richest in the world. Ukrainian farmers found joy in working their fields. Their toil and harvest was their life. Suddenly a new form of life was being foisted off on them -- collective farming - "kolhospe". The freedom loving farmers resisted.

Communist Moscow used varied methods in order to repress and terrorize the Ukrainian people's resistance. They levied unbearable quotas on grain. When the farmers were not able to pay, their property was confiscated and the owners were imprisoned and sent to Siberia. The Communist government decided to step up the process of collectivization by taking away (rozkurkulennia) land from persons who owned more than 10 hectars, under the pretext that the owners were exploiters of the masses. They, too, were sent to Siberia.

Another method of fighting resistance was by staging trials. I witnessed such a mockery of justice in the early 1930's. This took place in a village of Barvinkowo, province of Izium, near Kharkiv, where I was employed as a school teacher.

One fall day all the teachers were instructed to attend a court case where "enemies of the people" would be on trial. We saw an old sickly man, Ivan Medvid, being brought before the tribunal, held in a classroom. The so-called "judge", Mr. Shulha, was also the principal of the school. (In actuality, he was a half-literate former factory worker). The "judge" took out a blank piece of paper and read from it, as if there were something written, a verdict. Due to the fact that I. Medvid did not comply with the government's previously imposed quota of grain to be donated to the government, ', he is subject to arrest and prosecution. His house and property is to be confiscated and auctioned off.

Mr. Medvid was arrested immediately by officer Pazushko and led away to the police station. Meanwhile, all the people that were made to witness this mockery of justice were further "invited" to attend the auction. The belongings that were being sold were tattered. Mr. Medvid was the only remaining male

member of his family which consisted of about 10 members - women and children. They collectively had owned over 10 hectars of land - hence the punishment.....

The following day, Mr.Shulha (the judge) jokingly related to us, how he read the verdict from a blank piece of paper to the "kurkuls".* What could one do when there were so many court cases and no time to write the verdicts?

A few months later, at night, all the teachers were called to the Party Headquarters and were informed that we would be further obliged to carry out the Party decision to liquidate the "kurkuls"*. Each one of us was to go to the surrounding villages and arrest the "Kurkuls"* and send them to a desolate rail-road station in Yazykovo. Suddenly this order was changed and only Communist Party and Komsomol members were obliged to carry out this action. We the non-Party people were sent home.

We later found out from people who took part in this action that hundreds of Ukrainian farmers were brought by wagons and loaded into cattle trains. This included small children, as well as old people. They were permitted only a small bundle each. They were loaded 40 to 50 persons per car - no food and no water. Some died during the journey, the rest froze or starved in Siberia.

However, when even these methods could not break the Ukrainian spirit and the opposition to a way of life which was unthinkable to them, Kremlin gave birth to a plan which would physically exterminate parts of Ukrainian population.

To carry out this plan they mobilized 25,000 workers, mainly from Moskow and Leningrad who were sent to Ukrainian collective farms as "advisors" to instruct Ukrainian farmers in how to be more officient.

In truth, these people organized the local party members into brigades which went from farm to farm taking away every last bit of grain. Later they went from house to house in the villages taking potatoes, sourkraut, pickles, even cooked food off the stoves. They pierced clay floors to make sure no food was burried, often demolishing ovens and walls.

Inhabitants of villages were virtual prisoners. In order to travel anywhere, or to buy a ticket at a railroad station, one was required to have a passport and no passports were being issued. They had to stay at home and wait for the unavoidable, terrifying death from starvation. This was compounded by the fact that it took place during the winter months.

People started to die in masses. There were dead bodies in the streets, in houses in yards... From time to time stronger

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* Kurkul - a rich landowner, who supposedly lived off the poor people.

people would go from farm to farm and collect the dead and sometimes even the dying, so as not to have to come back for them.

There were villages in which every one died or very few survived. I saw such a village in the spring of 1933. It was Khrushtchova Rykytivka in the district of Bohodukhiv, province of Kharkiv. I was staying in that part of the country. I also saw dead or dying people at train stations, at forest outskirts, by the roads which I walked.

I lived on the outskirts of Kharkiv in a town named Pisotchyn . Every morning I arrived at the Southern railroad station in Kharkiv and this is where I saw the most starved-to-death bodies. Trucks came and removed them and dumped them 20 - 25 kms. from town into gulleys.

No matter how the militia tried to prevent the hungry people from coming to Kharkiv, many villagers managed to get through and begged in the streets.

I will never forget a family who, judging from their clothing, had seen better days; a husband, wife and 4 or 5 children were sitting in the Blahovishtchenskyj Bazaar Square. All of them with outstretched hands, begging for charity. People gave them money, but the militia quickly arrested them.

I will never forget when I saw a woman giving birth in the street on Kholodna Hora. It was winter and none come to her help. People were probably afraid because, although the press never mentioned the famine, at collective meetings it was said that the people who were starving were "enemies of the people" who refused to work at collective farms and brought this disaster on themselves.

The Great Famine was directed against the Ukrainian farmers. It did not affect blue and white collar workers very much. They received food in exchange for ration cards. Although this was not very much, these people did not die from hunger. On the average, bread was sold at one pound per person. There was also the so-called "commercial bread" available at much higher prices. It was very hard to get, however. One had to stand on line, at times for 12 hours. One 4 lbs. loaf of bread cost 25 rubles and average wage was 100 rubles per month.

It may be of interest, that during the famine, in Kharkiv and in other cities, new type of store appeared, known as "Torgsin" - trade with foreigners. Actually these stores were designed to dig every last cent from the starving people. In exchange for gold or silver, one could buy everything - food, clothing, vodka...

At the time the USSR press dilligently surpressed any news of the famine. This was not surprising. However, what is

curious, is that the Western press at that time failed to report what was happening in Eastern Europe. And the most disturbing thing of all is that to this day it is played down as an "alledged" happening. The eye-witnesses are dying out. Very soon the whole thing will be swept under the carpet, and 7 million people would have died for nothing.

In 1933 Edouard Herriot, Prime Minister of France visited the USSR; he also visited Ukraine. At that time he was shown a "Potomkin" Kolhozp which of course, was set up for just such a visit. It is unfortunate that this misguided head of state announced to the world that there was no famine in Ukraine. I wonder if the country involved was other than Ukraine, whether the world would have been satisfied with the opinion of just one man...

STATEMENT OF ANTON F. MALISH,
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ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, U.S. SENATE
NOVEMBER 15, 1983

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to take part in this discussion of Soviet agriculture. At USDA, we closely monitor the Soviet agricultural situation and outlook. We think this information is useful in determining which economic factors motivate the Soviets to participate in the international trade of agricultural commodities.

Mr. Chairman, U.S.-USSR trade consists primarily of the flow of U.S. agricultural commodities from the United States to the USSR (table 1). In 1982, for example, agricultural commodities accounted for almost three-quarters of all U.S. exports to the Soviet Union. The mix of commodities remains heavily weighted in favor of wheat and corn; in 1982, these two commodities made up nearly 90 percent of the value of those agricultural exports.

The flow of these commodities, representing at various times up to a fifth of our corn exports and up to a sixth of our wheat exports, is affected by a wide range of influences. However, the most important of these now is the long-term Soviet goal of increasing meat consumption against a domestic feed production base often insufficient to sustain an animal inventory larger than that in the United States. We expect that this feed/livestock relationship, and the Soviet policies affecting it, will continue to be the primary force driving U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR in the 1980's.

One important factor likely to influence these trends is the USSR's recently adopted "Food Program." Since that term was first introduced at the October 1980 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the East Europe-USSR Branch members devoted considerable energies toward identifying the major elements of that program, analyzing its chances for success, and in converting that analysis to a context that serves the needs of U.S. policy makers at a variety of levels. 1/

The Food Program was closely connected with General Secretary Brezhnev. Its roots can be easily traced to the March 1965 plenum that marked the debut of Brezhnev's agricultural policies. Therefore, the new leadership could have quietly disassociated itself with the program. However, it has not done so. Instead, the Food Program was cited in General Secretary Andropov's speech celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR, and it remains a highly visible component of Soviet domestic policy.

1/ See, for example, USDA, Agricultural Situation: USSR, Review of 1980 and Outlook for 1981, (April, 1981); USDA, USSR, Review of Agriculture in 1981 and Outlook for 1982 (May, 1982); USDA, USSR World Agriculture Regional Supplement, Review of 1982 and Outlook for 1983, (May, 1983); U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Soviet Economy in the 1980's; Problems and Prospects, "The Food Program: A New Policy or More Rhetoric?" (December 1982); USDA, Farmline, "Soviet Food Program: A Feast of Optimism," (March 1983), The ACES Bulletin, "The Soviet Food Program: Prospects for the 1980's," (Spring 1983); and Foreign Service Journal,"Up on the Farm, the Soviet Food Program," (November 1983).

Although Soviet investment policy towards the program is still unclear, the program may represent a real commitment of Soviet assets. Portions of the program are being cited for this year's improved agricultural performance, and it seems unlikely that the program would continue to receive the fanfare that it does without the leadership taking the measures necessary to insure success. Thus, while there are ideological, economic, and social shortcomings that hamper the implementation of the program, it should be a positive factor in Soviet production for the remainder of the decade.

Background on the Food Program

On May 24, 1982, the Central Committee of the Communist Party approved a "Food Program" to be in place until 1990. It represents the latest step in a decades-old effort to raise USSR agricultural production. Its aim is to significantly increase per capita consumption of most high-quality food products, although even in 1990, supplies of meat, dairy, and fruits, would still fall short of the consumption norms established by the Soviet Institute of Nutrition (table 2).

The new Food Program addresses problems that have been at the center of Soviet Government attention in varying degrees since 1965. Insufficient returns on investment, neglect of agricultural technology, management problems, and inappropriate price policies for agricultural commodities were addressed in General Secretary Brezhnev's first major policy speech on agriculture (March 1965), and these same themes returned in his agricultural valedictory when the "Food Program" was adopted.

Although USSR statistics would indicate that Soviet citizens are among the world's best-fed people when total calories are counted, the Soviets have long been without the high-quality food products that their citizens desire. Shortages of meats, dairy products, and fruits and vegetables have been an increasing cause of consumer discontent. This situation seems apparently had become so prevalent that by 1981 even General Secretary Brezhnev admitted "...the problem of food is, on the economic and political level, the central problem of the whole [1981-85] 5-Year Plan." And, under Yuri Andropov, the emphasis remains on the "Food Program" as first priority in raising the standard of living of the Soviet people.

An Integrated Effort at Efficiency

Touted as a "radical solution" to their nation's food problem, the Food Program envisages creating an integrated agro-industrial complex to coordinate the planning, financing and management of the agricultural sector, those industries serving it, and the downstream production and marketing facilities. In short, it views the agricultural solution as a vertical one, embracing all activities "from farm to store."

Certain management elements suggest the Soviets may be borrowing from their more successful sectors. At the Council of Ministers level, for example, they created a Commission for the Agro-Industrial Complex, an organization that seems at least superficially similar to the Military Industrial Commission that coordinates the defense and civilian sectors in fulfillment of the USSR's defense plans.

At lower levels, they have been creating oblast and republic agro-industrial associations to overcome the bureaucratic barriers that currently compartmentalize agricultural management. Some 3,000 similar associations, called RAPO's in the Russian acronym, have been created at the rayon (i.e., county, level. The idea is an

integrated complex that can become an independent entity for planning. The structure allows for continued central control, while at administrative centers closer to production, the scope for local initiative and involvement is expanded.

On the state and collective farms themselves, the Soviets are establishing "collective contracting teams," groups of workers who would be assigned tracts of land, equipment, inputs, and so on, with wages paid in the form of an advance against the harvest. Formerly, workers were paid on a "piece rate" basis--a tractor operator on the basis of area plowed, for example--so that few individuals had any financial interest in the final outcome. Recently, Moscow News reported that contract teams routinely obtain 20-30 percent more produce per hectare than do workers paid in the traditional way.

As in the past when food supplies became short, the Food Program emphasizes the private plots and subsidiary holdings of enterprises as a quick way to increase production. Though the private plots represent only 1.4 percent of all Soviet farming lands, they produce about 30 percent of the meat, milk and eggs, 60 percent of the potatoes, and over 50 percent of the fruits and berries. Whereas individuals formerly risked stiff penalties for keeping excess livestock, a decree issued in January 1981 imposes no limitations on the number of livestock belonging to private plot holders, so long as the animals are raised under contract with state and collective farms. These farms, in turn, can sell this privately-produced output to the State procurement agencies and count it against their own plan fulfillment goals.

Other elements of the Food Program include revisions in the State procurement prices. While bonuses were once paid for above-plan sales, under price reforms undertaken in 1981, they now would be paid when sales exceed the average annual level obtained in the Tenth 5-Year Plan. This way, bonuses would correspond to increased output, and not necessarily flow to those who negotiate a easily-reached plan target. Finally, procurement prices were raised on January 1, 1983 for cattle, pigs, sheep, milk, grain, sugar beets, potatoes, vegetables and some other products. Additional payments will go to low-profit farms, and farm debts can be forgiven or rescheduled, all in hopes of providing more incentive and in making agriculture more productive.

The Food Program also has a trade policy connection originating in the partial U.S. embargo of 1980. That embargo, from the standpoint of U.S. government policy, placed a much larger burden on the U.S. domestic economy than it did on the Soviets. While a wide range of views can be found on the impact of the embargo on the Soviet economy, most assessments show that the embargo's effect on the USSR was more than trivial. It probably caused some short-term economic hardship, and altered Soviet policy -- generally to the detriment of the United States. Certainly the Soviets reacted in ways that indicated they considered the embargo a serious threat. They searched the world for additional grain, negotiated long-term agreements with alternative suppliers, reduced feed use in 1980, and drew down stocks. While the Soviets were understandably not anxious to reveal any difficulties the embargo may have caused them, General Secretary Brezhnev was quite frank in citing the Food Program as a necessary countermeasure to efforts by "some countries" to pressure Soviet foreign policy through grain sales.

Further, at the June (1983) Central Committee plenum, General Secretary Andropov noted that the Food Program's objective was to secure the population with quality foodstuffs "without any interruptions" and with the "greatest possible self sufficiency."

Negative Influences

Those who dismiss the Food Program's effect on future agricultural production see a number of shortcomings. First, those elements aimed at increasing money wages in the USSR may not actually bring forth much additional production. A central problem in the Soviet economy is that consumer goods have been so lacking that increased money incomes do not necessarily mean a better life. Second, the private plot initiative may be helpful, but as in most countries, the Soviet Union faces a strong outward migration from rural areas. This transition from a rural to an urban society continues in the USSR, and the accompanying fundamental changes in lifestyle are not easily countered by the opportunity to invest more of one's free time in animal husbandry. Third, Soviet ideology tends to run against the decentralizing theme of the Food Program. For example, Selskaya zhizn (September 14, 1983), reported that the aforementioned Commission for the Agro-Industrial Complex--this being the 15-man body headed by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and composed of the highest-ranking members of the national ministries and industries engaged in the production, planning, and marketing of food--recently approved work done by "amateur rabbit and fur-breeders' societies" at a very local (oblast, interrayon) level. In a program designed to bolster local initiative, this may represent the incapacity of central planners in Moscow to delegate any significant authority. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, published investment targets for the Eleventh 5-Year Plan (1981-85) call for a major reduction in investment in those industries serving agriculture -- from 71 billion rubles (about $99 billion in 1976-80), to 43 billion ($60 billion) (table 3). If the objective is increased productivity, one would expect investment in such areas as fertilizer production, farm machinery facilities, and food processing and packaging to increase.

On the other hand, the Food Program continues to receive such extended Soviet domestic coverage that it is hard to believe the leadership has not made the adjustments in resource allocation needed to insure that the Food Program shows progress.

Positive Influences

Perhaps of greatest significance is a series of decrees that signal a change in priorities favorable towards those industries serving agriculture.

On April 10, 1983, Pravda reported a Council of Ministers decree that addressed the wellworn complaints about the poor reliability and short service life of Soviet agricultural machinery. It directed ministries, which because of their overlap with the military typically enjoy the highest claims on Soviet resources -- the Ministries of the Aviation Industry, Ferrous Metallurgy, Electronics, Instrument Making, and others -- to ensure that better quality materials and subassemblies be delivered to the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building during 1984-1990. The decree calls the re-equipping of agriculture a "priority task of great economic and political significance."

A second decree on May 7th announced increased output of consumer goods in 1983-85. The consumer goods target for 1983 was apparently increased by 2.8 billion rubles. The Soviet press linked the Food Program with this planned increase in consumer goods calling the two "the pivot of the social program" ratified by the 26th Party Congress. Again, the press did not specify where the additional funding for the extra output would originate.

Most recently, on July 22, 1983, Pravda published still another decree that specifically establishes, as one of the main indicators of performance for enterprises and organizations serving agriculture, the actual increase in agricultural production on state and collective farms. Failure to fulfill contracts between the production ministries, the service enterprises, and the state and collective farms are to result in various financial penalties and fines.

Is the Program Showing Results?

If 1983 is primarily a year of putting the program in effect, then it would not be unreasonable to see a response in production beginning in 1984. However, the Soviet press is starting to attribute this year's improved prospects to the Food Program.

In speeches associated with "Agricultural Workers' Day," USSR Minister of Agriculture V.K. Mesyats noted the rapid expansion of the "collective contract" wage system. Since March, the number of collective contract teams apparently doubled, and are now responsible for 40 million hectares (about 18 percent) of arable land. The better coordination between farms and supply agencies--the reason for the creation of the RAPO's--is also being cited as having a good effect on this year's results.

More concrete statistics covering USSR industrial food and agricultural inputs for the January-September 1983 show significantly improved performance. Production of mineral fertilizer, for example was running 9 percent above that during the same period in 1982, tractors and agricultural machinery, 6 percent above, machinery for livestock and feed production, 6 percent, and pesticides, 5 percent. Output statistics for the industrial production of meat, milk, butter, and vegetable oil were also higher (table 4).

As a result of these improvements, a grain crop estimated by USDA to be about 200 million tons, substantially more forage, and record livestock numbers on state and collective farms, we expect to see Soviet statistics of gross agricultural output for 1983 surpassing the record of 1978. If the Soviet leadership is really interested in showing Food Program results, they might publish grain production for the first time since 1980.

Soviet Agricultural Production and Trade Prospects

In "U.S.-USSR Grain Trade," a paper prepared for the Joint Economic Committee's compendium, Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects, ERS East Europe-USSR Branch authors projected USSR grain supply and utilization through 1987/88. That paper forecast gradually increasing Soviet grain production, rapid stock rebuilding, and fairly large requirements for grain feed.

During the summer of 1982 when that paper was written, it seemed a reasonable assumption that the Soviets would take advantage of low wheat and corn prices, and would try to minimize their exposure to outside influences by a rapid replenishment of stocks. However, they generally did not do so. Perhaps the continued abundant world wheat supplies will cause rebuilding to take place at a more leisurely pace. The Food Program seems to be especially effective in expanding production of non-grain feeds--pasturage, silage and hay--and in the expansion of pulses, all of which suggests a modest reduction in the grain-for-feed projections, and a gradually declining grain-import requirement for the USSR.

Our projections show increasing domestic grain production with probable large year-to-year variations, although the increase in summer fallow should moderate the wide swings of the late 1970's. By the end of the the decade Soviet grain production could average 220-230 million tons.

A successful Food Program could alter the composition of Soviet agricultural imports in ways beside diminishing the demand for imported grain. For example, the Soviets seem to be taking measures to improve the protein imbalance in animal rations. Domestically, this is being achieved by the expanded production of pulses, and by expanded feeding of oilmeals. By 1990, the Soviets should be feeding about 9.5 million tons of oilmeal (soybean meal equivalent) of which probably more than 5 million would be imported as beans or meal. Now, they feed about 6.6 million tons, about 3 of which is imported. Similarly, expanded meat output should reduce Soviet meat imports going from about 900 thousand tons in the early 1980's to about half that much by the end of the decade.

The less-costly management changes incorporated in the Food Program could show generally short-lived results. To bring about long-term improvements it would seem essential to increase investment in the agro-industrial complex, particularly in the marketing and distribution areas, and in providing agriculture with more and better inputs. Imports of agricultural technology embodied in machinery, pesticides and herbicides, the techniques and components for their manufacture, hybrids and breeding stock, could come to the fore.

Under a 1973 bilateral agreement covering cooperation in the field of agriculture (still in force but generally dormant after 1980), the Soviets have been especially interested in U.S. research in genetic engineering, remote sensing, swine hybridization, poultry breeding, and soil mechanics. In contacts with private firms, the Soviets have been interested in learning more about the use of soybean meal in animal rations, the use of soy isolates as meat extenders, and specific application techniques for certain herbicides and pesticides. Finally, the recently completed "Agribusiness-USA" exhibition in Moscow provided further information on agricultural technology being sought by the Soviets. This exhibit, the first all-U.S. show of its type in 6 years, involved more than 100 U.S. companies. Soviet visitors to the exhibit included high-level officials from various ministries as well as a large contingent of end-users who normally would not have access to import-potential agricultural technology. Interests centered on a wide range of technologies dealing with cultivation and soil conservation; veterinary medicines, instruments, and methods for their production; mechanized equipment for cultivation, harvesting, and storage of grain, row crops, and fodder; irrigation and land improvement devices; agrochemicals, especially plant protectants and growth regulators; and processing and packaging equipment for meat processing plants and dairies.

These kinds of exhibits and interests suggest long-term considerations possibly beyond those of the Food Program itself. This interest in infra-structural development would probably rise to prominence in the Twelfth 5-Year Plan not expected to be announced before 1985. The degree to which the Soviets can acquire this technology and absorb it without sacrifices in other sectors is unknown.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, and I'm prepared to answer any questions you or any other Members of the Committee might have.

Table 1--U.S. trade with the USSR, 1972-1983*

Year	U.S. exports			U.S. imports		
	Total	Agricultural	Nonagricultural	Total	Agricultural	Nonagricultural
	(Million dollars)					
1972	542	430	112	88	4	84
1973	1,191	920	271	204	5	199
1974	607	300	308	334	9	326
1975	1,834	1,133	701	243	7	236
1976	2,306	1,487	819	215	8	206
1977	1,621	1,037	584	221	11	210
1978	2,249	1,687	563	530	12	517
1979	3,604	2,855	749	873	15	858
1980	1,510	1,047	463	431	10	421
1981	2,430	1,665	765	357	12	345
1982	2,589	1,855	734	229	11	218
1983**	2,200	1,600	600	350	10	340

* Not adjusted for transshipments. ** Projection.

Table 2--USSR: Rational consumption norms for and per capita consumption of basic food products, 1982 and 1990

Item	Rational per capita consumption norms issued in 1981 *	Per capita consumption in 1982 **	Planned consumption per capita in 1990 ***
	(kilograms)		
Meat and meat products	78	57	70
Fish products	18.2	18.4	19
Milk and milk products	405	295	330-340
Eggs (in units)	292	249	260-266
Sugar	40	44.5	45.5
Vegetable oils	9.1	9.3	13.2
Vegetables and melons	130	101	126-135
Fruits and berries	91	42	66-70
Potatoes	110	110	110
Bread products	115	137	135

* Planovoye khozyaistvo, No.10, 1981, p. 17.
** SSSR v tsifrakh (USSR in Figures), 1982, p.197.
*** Pravda, May 27, 1982, p. 1.

Table 3--Capital investment in agro-industrial complex, 1976-85

Period	Total Complex	Agricultural Sector *	Related Industries **
	(Billion rubles)		
1976-80 actual	241.9	171.0	70.9
1981-85 plan	233.0	190.0	43.0
1981-85 plan (annual average)	46.6	38.0	8.6
1981 actual	44.2	36.7	7.5
1982 actual	45.0	37.4	7.6
1983 plan	47.0	37.7	9.3

* Includes state and collective farms and intra-farm enterprises.
** Includes input industries such as farm machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, and preliminary processing industries such as sugar refining, cotton ginning and wheat milling.
Source: Compiled from official Soviet data by USDA and reported in USSR: World Agricultural Regional Supplement, Review of 1982 and Outlook for 1983.

Table 4--USSR industrial food and agricultural input performance January-September, 1980-83

Item	1980	1981	1982	1983
	(million metric tons unless noted otherwise)			
Mineral fertilizers (100 pct. nutrient basis)	NA	19.8	20.3	22.2
Pesticides, (standard units)	.359	.379	.398	.420
Agricultural machinery (billion rubles)	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.6
Machinery for livestock and feed production (billion rubles)	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
Meat (state resources)	6.6	6.8	6.7	7.3
Whole milk (state resources)	19.1	19.6	19.9	21.1
Butter (state resources)	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2
Vegetable oil (state resources)	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8

Source: Compiled from official Soviet statistics by U.S. Agricultural Attache, Moscow.

THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I AND AT THE PRESENT

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I

The Ukraine was integrated politically and economically into the Russian Empire in the middle of the eighteenth century. From that time up to the 1917 Revolution, the Ukraine was an integral part of the Empire's national economy. Since the Revolution, the Ukraine has been organized into a constituent republic of the USSR, and the Kiev government has, nominally, been vested with extensive political and economic prerogatives. In reality all decision-making powers have been concentrated to an extreme in the hands of the central authorities in Moscow. The republic has been unable to conduct its own economic policy as its interest have been subordinated to those of the USSR as a whole. Thus, the Ukraine continues to be an economic region of the integrated national economy of the USSR and will be considered as such in what follows.

As in the overwhelming majority of mergers between previously politically independent nations or through the absorption of one state by another, the integration of the Ukraine into the Russian Empire was undertaken for political reasons. For the USSR, the Ukraine was important for both political and economic reasons. Yet a political analysis is outside the scope of the present study. Of interest here is the effect of the Ukraine's membership in this larger political and economic entity on the region's economic development, particularly relative to the development of other regions of the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union and ultimately on the welfare of its population.

Ideally, in analyzing the effects of integration on the development of the Ukrainian economy, one of two investigations should be undertaken. First, economic development from the mid-eighteenth century until now should be simulated for the Ukraine as if it were an independent country. The obtained standard of living should then be compared with actual figures for the Ukrainian SSR. However, such an extrapolation would be extremely difficult to accomplish. For one thing, statistical data for the 18th and most of the 19th centuries are virtually nonexistent, and data for the most recent period are scarce. Furthermore, it would be necessary to include the effect on economic development not only of the growth of resources and technological progress, but also of various historical occurrences. The effect of the latter is quite difficult to estimate.

Second, an extrapolation might be undertaken in the opposite direction, from the present to the mid-18th century, comparing the results with the actual data for that period. For the same reasons as above, such an investigation is impossible.

There is, however, an element in the Ukraine's situation within the Tsarist Empire and its Soviet successor which allows us to focus our analysis. The Revolution of 1917 brought a radical change in political, social and economic structures within the former Empire's territory. With respect to economics, the market economy of a backward state had been replaced by a socialist or, more accurately, Soviet-type economy. At the same time, the Ukraine was retained within the jurisdiction of the new political and economic entity. In view of the continuing subordination of the Ukraine to the Moscow authorities, but taking into account the change in economic system, a modest question can be posed: What was the economic experience of the Ukraine under the new regime as compared with the prerevolutionary period? To answer this question, one must compare available variables for the Ukrainian economy for a year or a period before the Revolution and for the present period.

A direct comparison of variables for the Ukraine alone or of the changes in these variables for the Ukraine, other regions and other countries over a period of almost seven decades would not be methodologically sound. Such comparisons will be affected by the index number problem. To avoid the difficulty, following two questions can be asked: How has the Ukraine fared relative to other regions under the Tsarist market economy and under the Soviet socialism? And, what were the underlying reasons for the treatment of the Ukrainian economy by the central government in Moscow under both regimes? Obviously, to answer the latter question, only the variables affecting the Ukraine differentially relative to other regions need be considered. The systemic factors of equal importance to all regions need not be included in our analysis.

It is necessary here to emphasize that any relative improvement or deterioration found in the Ukraine's economic development or the welfare of its population cannot be attributed entirely to the change in the economic and political system. A host of factors occurring not only in the USSR but throughout the world could have differentially affected the Ukrainian economy. The following come readily to mind: the sectoral uneveness of technological progress, the discovery of new sources of raw materials, differential population growth, changes in consumer tastes at home and abroad, and economic and political objectives and policies of Moscow governments. The tools of economic analysis do not adequately allow for allocation of economic change to

individual factors in a given period. Therefore, for the purposes of this study we will have to assume that economic change in the Ukrainian economy, relative to that of other regions of the USSR, was primarily the result of the change from the Tsarist to the Soviet political and economic system. However, the possibility of the substantial influence of other factors must be allowed for.

Economic relations that exist among regions of the same country are manifold. We do not attempt here to discuss all of those relating to the Ukraine within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, no attempt is made to assess the effect of the Ukraine's political situation on its economy in the long run, for example, along the lines of the recent theories of structural and dependence imperialism. Our discussion is limited to the impact of the Ukraine's status on: the supply of public goods and on such issues of external trade as its volume, geographical distribution, structure, and economic rationality; the transfer of national income between the Ukraine and the central government in Moscow over the last one hundred years; and, finally, on the development of its economy and the welfare of its population, as shown by national income and national income per capita indicators.

The present analysis is undertaken on the basis of estimates prepared by the author and other researchers. The main purpose here is not so much the presentation of new estimates of relevant variables as an interpretation of the available evidence. Moreover, improvement on the available estimates cannot often be had in view of the lack of access to primary sources. To increase the reliability of our conclusions, we will base the discussion whenever possible not on a single estimate, but on the set of estimates of a particular variable prepared by various scholars. Therefore, no one estimate will be considered "correct," but confidence will be placed in the consistent trends among the estimates.

As indicated above, in this study the Ukraine is treated as an economic region. Geographical dimensions underlying the statistics presented here are specified when appropriate. Before the Revolution the bulk of the Ukraine was occupied by the Tsarist Empire. The remainder of the Ukraine was under Austria-Hungary -- East Galicia and Bukovyna directly under Austria and Transcarpathia under Hungary. The boundaries of the present-day Ukrainian economy are confined to the borders of the Ukrainian SSR, although it should be kept in mind that the republic does not encompass all Ukrainian ethnographic lands. The "Russia/USSR" denotes the political entities before and after the Revolution with central government in Moscow. The term "ethnic Russians" refers to

the Russian nationality, their territory is called "ethnic Russia" or "the Russian SFSR" after the Revolution. It should be noted that the RSFSR is home to a number of ethnic groups besides Russians.

II

In theoretical terms, an integration of two or more previously independent nations should facilitate the production of public and private goods at a cheaper cost than was possible in the separate nations. An increase in integrated area should decrease costs even further. A further integration of individual nations may not be pursued in order to avoid the tension in the increased number of ethnic groups with respect to their preferences for nationalistic public goods. In purely abstract terms, one could argue, the USSR halted its territorial expansion at the size smaller than economically optimal in order to be able to accomodate the preferences for nationalistic public goods of already included nationalities. But the historical record shows that such preferences of non-Russian nationalities were neglected or overruled by the Moscow government even within the existing boundaries of Russia/USSR.

It appears that the Ukrainians have anticipated that their preferences for nationalistic public goods (political autonomy, culture, tradition) would not be respected when the Ukraine becomes incorporated into the Russian Empire and subsequently into the Soviet Union; they fought against the incorporation. The force had to be used by the government of the Russian Empire and of the Soviet Union to overrule the preferences of Ukrainians for political independence as a public good. After the incorporation, the preferences of Ukrainians for nationalistic public goods were not only ignored, but those of Russians were often imposed on them with the force of law. Certainly, one cannot argue that the public goods supplied by the Moscow government have maximized the ulility of Ukrainians. But there were exceptions among them. Some members of the former Cossack elite, through their support of the Tsarist government, relinquished their preference for nationalistic public goods in exchange for wealth and power. By the same token, Ukrainian members of the Communist Party have benefited from the Soviet regime to the same degree as their Russian counterparts as long as they abandoned their preferences for this kind of public goods.

The supply of private goods in the Ukraine was also affected by integration with Russian/USSR. This relationship is studied here only with respect to Ukrainian external

trade. The degree of the Ukraine's integration, as shown by the export-to-national-income ratio, increased between the prerevolutionary and present periods. Ukrainian trade with the rest of the USSR also increased during this period. The relative increase in trade between the Ukraine and other Soviet republics does not necessarily indicate greater integration with the entire USSR. In fact, the Ukraine trades primarily with the European USSR and very little with other Soviet regions. It is not clear to what extent economic considerations, which are usually of a more permanent nature, and to what extent easily reversible political considerations are responsible for the increase in this trade.

The commodity composition of Ukrainian external trade did not change radically under Soviet rule as compared with the prerevolutionary period. The Ukraine is no more an important exporter of unprocessed agricultural products, mainly grain, to European nations, but has increased its exports of mineral raw materials and industrial materials (essential for Soviet-type industrialization) to the European members of Comecon. As before, Ukrainian imports from abroad consist mainly of machinery equipment, transportation vehicles and equipment, and other processed goods. Domestically, the Ukraine now exports processed foods and industrial materials mainly to the European parts of the Russian Federation and receives in return various products of light industry, mainly textiles, machinery and such basic products as timber and oil.

The structure and geographical distribution of Ukrainian external trade before the Revolution and at the present time has not been determined entirely by scarcity relations. Long before the Revolution, the Tsarist policies influenced Ukrainian trade. Tax and railroad policies stimulated the export of grain to foreign countries. Tariff policies protected the growth of Donbas industries and reoriented the Ukrainian demand for processed consumer goods (textiles) from abroad to the domestic producers in Russia proper. On balance, consumer welfare in the Ukraine probably suffered from such government intervention.

Of course, under the Soviet regime government control over Ukrainian external trade became complete. Trade like all other economic sectors, became subordinated to the overall objectives of the Moscow leadership. We can agree with some Soviet Ukrainian economists that the present trade structure of their republic has a detrimental effect on the productivity of its entire economy, on regional development, and on the base of nonrenewable raw materials. They advocate change in the production structure, a precondition for change in the trade structure, recommending greater attention to the

growth of the machine-building branch, in which technological progress advances faster than in other industrial branches. However, Ukrainian exports to the Comecon countries are the tool for binding their economies to the Soviet economy. On the other hand, the interrepublic trade of the Ukraine is subordinated to the overall economic objective of the Soviet Unions — a rapid build-up of the Asiatic regions of the Russian SFSR. Thus it appears that the structure of the Ukraine's economy and consequently of its external trade will remain unchanged as long as the geopolitical objectives of the Moscow leaders continue unchanged.

For about half of the century prior to the Revolution, a period for which data are available, the Ukraine's contributions to the state budget exceeded its receipts from it by about 3 percent of the region's net material product. The transfer of funds from the Ukraine is confirmed by its positive balance of trade with other countries of the world and with the rest of the Empire, at least for the few years for which such calculations can be made. After the Revolution both before and after the Second World War, the outflow of national income from the Ukraine continued. Transfers were now relatively greater than during the prerevolutionary period, ranging between 10 and 20 percent of the net material product, depending on the period and methodology of calculation. In contrast to other cases of transfers of funds from one country to another or from one region to another, the Ukrainian funds were appropriated outright by the Moscow government. Moscow did not ask the Ukrainian population's approval, paid no interest, and had not intention of returning the funds. The policies of the central authorities were primarily reflected in the declining Ukrainian portion of total USSR investment, which had been below the region's population most of the Soviet period.

One possible use for the transferred Ukrainian resources may have been in the development of backward regions of Russia/USSR. This consideration applies primarily to the Soviet period. During the postrevolutionary period until the late 1950s, an interregional equalization trend could be observed. The transfer of the investable funds from the Ukraine could have been of some importance here. Since the fifties, however, interregional inequality has again been on the rise. Another use of Ukrainian funds may have been associated with the effort to maximize output for the entire USSR. The data for the Ukraine, the Russian SFSR and Kazakhstan show that during various periods since the late 1920s republics with high productivity growth in industry or agriculture did not always receive investment shares greater than population shares in the total USSR.

Since neither interregional equalization not output maximization in Russia/USSR

seem to have been decisive for the Ukraine's loss of funds, some authors have sought the cause in ethnic considerations. They argue that the Moscow government, dominated by Russians, used Ukrainian resources for the development of Russian regions. This hypothesis can be questioned on various grounds. Before the Revolution, the excess of budget receipts over budget payments was registered by most of the border gubernias as well as the gubernia in which the country's capital was located. Most of the Russian gubernias, just as Ukrainian ones, paid more to the state budget than they received from it. After the Revolution, several Russian oblasts were shown to have the lowest standard of living in the country. The investment per capita was not higher in the Russian SFSR as a whole, but only in its Asiatic regions. Finally, Russians account now for about one-fifth of the Ukraine's population. Any economic discrimination against the Ukraine would affect its Russian minority to the same degree as ethnic Ukrainians.

It appears that the reason for the appropriation of Ukrainian resources by the Moscow government must be sought in the military and political concerns of the Tsarist Empire and subsequently of the USSR. Before the Revolution the Ukraine as an economic region supplied funds for the political integration of the far-flung Empire and for the build-up of the railroads for military purposes. For the same reasons, since the early 1930s, the USSR has turned its attention to the development of the Ural regions and, following World War II, to the development of Western and Eastern Siberia, Far East and North Kazakhstan. The determination to go on with such policies, to the continued detriment of Ukrainian economic development, can be seen in the construction of the Baikal-Amur Magistrale and the construction plans for several territorial production complexes in the Asiatic part of the Russian SFSR.

The effect of the Ukraine's incorporation into Russia/USSR and of its continuous loss of resources on total income and on income per capita in the Ukraine, relative to the rest of the country, is studied for 1913, 1970, and 1980. To compare these indicators in the two periods, one must establish the population base. While information on the present population of the Ukraine is reliable, the same is not true for the prerevolutionary benchmark year. The official estimates by TsSU of the 1913 population on the territories of the present Ukrainian SSR are about 10 percent lower than our estimates derived on the basis of Tsarist TsSK data and of the Leasure-Lewis methodology. Despite the fact that the latter estimates may be slightly inflated, they seem preferable to the TsSU estimates, for which no methodology of derivation is divulged. It is possible that the retaining of lower estimates for 1913 may be a

deliberate attempt by the Soviet authorities to blunt the tremendous population losses which occurred in the Ukraine under Soviet rule.

To facilitate our comparison, the Ukrainian national income for 1913 and 1970 was calculated according to the same methodology as the national income for Russia and the USSR, respectively, in these years. The reliability of derived indicators for the Ukraine is not the same for the two years. The statistical foundation, especially for the Western Ukraine, in 1913 is very poor compared with that for 1970. The 1913 result should be considered as preliminary. Our comparison should not end with the year 1970. The last decade witnessed a considerable deceleration in the Ukrainian growth rate relative to other Soviet republics. No independent estimation of the Ukrainian national income can be undertaken for the most recent years because of a considerable decline in the availability of statistical data for the Ukraine since the early seventies. Therefore, our analysis of the most recent year, 1980, must be made on the basis of Soviet national income data.

A comparison of our indicators for the Ukraine and Russia/USSR over sixty or seventy years would not be meaningful because of the index number problem. Therefore comparison is made between the situation of the Ukraine relative to the rest of the Tsarist Empire in 1913 and its present situation relative to the rest of the USSR. With respect to population, the Ukrainian share decreased by about 4 percentage points during the period under discussion. The Ukraine decreased its share in the Russia/USSR national income by 2 to 3 percentage points between 1913 and 1970. During the decade of the seventies the share dropped by additional 2 percentage points. With respect to individual sectors, Ukrainian shares behaved differentially: agriculture increased while industry decreased in importance within the USSR. An especially severe decline can be observed in the shares of other Ukrainian material production branches. The service sector's share declined in terms of fixed capital but increased slightly in terms of employment. The most plausible explanation for this behavior of Ukrainian economic sectors again concerns the emphasis of Soviet planners on the development of some Asiatic regions of the USSR.

Usually, the national income per capita is assumed to be an indicator of the public welfare and of productive capacity. In the case of the USSR, including the Ukraine, it is more an indicator of productive capacity, because of the relatively high share of investment and government expenditures in the total national income. Keeping in mind this qualification, one can say that the Ukraine's standing relative to the Western

advanced countries improved between 1913 and 1970 in terms of national income per capita. The lead of such countries as the United States or Great Britain over the Ukraine was cut by more than one half; in general, the Ukraine reached approximately Italy's level of economic development. With respect to the other union republics of the USSR, until 1970 improvement in the Ukraine's economic standing was achieved at the cost of a relatively greater decline of its population share than of its national income share in the USSR total. During the seventies the Ukraine dropped back to its 1913 levels in this respect. As a result, its ranking declined from its usual fifth to seventh place in income per capita among the fifteen union republics.

III

One can conclude that, particularly with respect to the Ukraine, the regional policy that existed under Tsarist capitalism before 1917 continued largely unchanged under the Soviet system. Under both regimes, this policy was guided by the geopolitical demands of the state as perceived and acted upon by the central leadership. This finding seems to confirm the prediction by Max Weber, made before the emergence of the first socialist state, as well as the conclusion reached recently on theoretical grounds, by Thomas Weisskopf that there should be no difference in defense economics between a capitalist and a socialist state. Furthermore, the relatively smaller drain on the Ukraine's economy before 1917 than after the Revolution suggests that a region can better defend its own economic interests against those of the central authorities under a capitalist than under a socialist system of government.

At various times during the last one hundred years, the Moscow leadership fostered the development of the Ukrainian economy, particularly its heavy industry. Some Ukrainian regions, mostly those with conditions favorable for heavy industry, benefited from this policy, and are now among the most advanced in the USSR. There are probably other economic benefits (noneconomic advantages or disadvantages are outside the scope of this discussion) which the Ukraine has enjoyed as a result of being a part of Russia/USSR. Those which come readily to mind are economies of scale, the opportunity for migration to Asiatic territories, and the relative certainty of supply of some key products (oil, timber). Yet it seems safe to assume that the Ukrainian economy, because it could not make its own decisions in such areas as external trade, economic structure, and disposal of national income, was harmed more than helped by these benefits. Had

the Ukraine been able to make these and other economic decisions with its own interests in mind, the growth rate of its economy and the welfare of its population would undoubtedly have improved. As part of the USSR, the Ukraine has on balance barely maintained the relative economic position it attained prior to World War I.

Were the Ukraine just another region in an ethnically homogeneous country, the most one could say would be that its treatment by the central government has been highly inequitable. But the Ukraine is inhabited mainly by Ukrainians, a people different from ethnic Russians, the dominant nationality in Russia/USSR. Furthermore, Ukrainians did not join either Tsarist Russia or the USSR voluntarily. There is an obvious need, then, to define the economic status of the Ukraine, as the country of a distinct ethnic community.

A rather general definition states that whenever there is "any relationship of effective domination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one country over another" (Benjamin Cohen), a case of imperialism exists. Of course, according to this definition the Ukraine has been Moscow's colony for more than three hundred years. Another, narrower definition helps to focus on the economic aspect of the Ukraine's situation. According to Kenneth Boulding, economic imperialism between countries exists when a transfer of national income takes place from the weaker to the stronger country under threat of force. Such an unequal relationship can also exist between regions inhabited by two different nationalities within a country. National income transfers from the weaker to the stronger region--which are legal though not legitimate--precisely characterize the economic relations between the Ukraine as a colony and Moscow as a metropolis.

Since the Ukraine has experienced an economic disadvantage relative to other regions of Russia/USSR, and in terms of national income an outright economic loss, the question is who, specifically, has gained from this situation. There is no conclusive evidence that other ethnic groups or especially ethnic Russians have benefited at the expense of Ukrainians. As for other aspects of social life, no single factor can explain such treatment of the Ukrainian economy. Undoubtedly, all the factors we have discussed have had a certain influence on determining the Ukrainian economy's role within Russia/USSR. But in view of the importance of defense considerations both for the Tsarist Empire and for the Soviet Union, one could argue that the state's geopolitical interests have dominated regional policy decisions, including those relevant to the Ukraine.

Neither the Tsarist nor the Soviet regime has been a parliamentary democracy in the Western sense. Their leaders have not been elected by popular vote, and the policies of these leaders have not represented a compromise among vested interests or the views of the population. Rather, in both regimes, policies reflected the interests of the ruling class or ruling elite. In the Russian Empire the ruling class consisted of a hereditary landed aristocracy and military establishment, which led Lenin and his followers to call the regime military-feudal. In the USSR the power to control every phase of human life has been monopolized in the hands of the multi-ethnic leadership of the Communist Party, a regime sometimes aptly described as a partocracy. In my view, the relationship between the Ukraine as an economic colony and the Moscow metropolis can be defined largely by the existence and interest of this ruling class or elite ("the new class," in Milovan Djilas' terms).

The government in Tsarist Empire and the USSR, as an exponent of the ruling class or the ruling Party, has used the Ukrainian economy and extracted its resources to provide a strong defense capability for the country. Being relatively secure from external threat, this class or elite has retained power in hands readily and has enjoyed considerable benefit from its position.