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HORIZONS

UKRAINIAN STUDENTS' REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

The unknown has always intrigued man. The desire to create and to express himself has brought him ever closer to the realization and understanding of the unknown. Although it is impossible to undestand or to fathom much that is still a mystery in life, the combination of creativity and desire to learn is itself a great achievement and impetus. It is even more so an impetus to youth.

Thus, we think, that it is fitting to call this publication—a student's journal, a tribute to youth—by the name of *HORIZONS*. The name suggests the limitless expanses of life yet to be explored, the great tasks and adventures that lie ahead and the optimism with which youth always faces them. Moreover, it is symbolic of a force, transcending all physical boundaries, that can bring together youth or students of the world through a free flow of ideas, thus fostering understanding and mutual respect among the youth and peoples everywhere.

It follows, therefore, that despite the fact that the Federation of Ukrainian Students' Organizations of America, Inc., is the publisher of this journal, the pages of our English issue should be open to all present and recent students, regardless of nationality. Within the following pages are works by Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian students dealing with topics of a Ukrainian as well as of a more international scope. It is hoped sincerely that this, our first English issue, will serve as a well-rounded introduction, a representation of our Ukrainian issue and a call for future contributions and constructive criticism from non-Ukrainian as well as Ukrainian student readers.

The Editors

STATEMENT OF THE PUBLISHER

Founded in the Spring of 1953 at Columbia University, New York City, the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America can now claim the membership of over 1000 students organized in more than 20 associations and university clubs, most of which are located in the eastern and midwestern states of the country.

Proud of our Ukrainian heritage and at the same time eager to be truly useful and loyal citizens of the United States, we set ourselves the tasks which are both manifold and important. We can contribute to the better understanding of the menace of Bolshevism and thus render a service to both American security and the struggle of the Moscow-enslaved nations behind the Iron Curtain. We are in the best position to promote the appreciation of the Ukrainian question in the American academic world, and in cooperation with other American students of the East European descent we can do much to help our colleagues in this country as well as in other parts of the Free World to gain better insight into the general East European problem.

We firmly believe in genuine international cooperation and are ready to work for it, but are deeply convinced that a lasting international order can be based only on the fulfillment of national aspirations of all the peoples to the greatest possible extent. By "all the peoples" we mean the Moscow-enslaved nations as well as those peoples of Asia and Africa who are still under the colonial domination, without necessarily putting them in the same category.

In the global struggle for people's minds, the outcome of which may very well prove to be more important than the struggle of arms or technologies, no one can really remain indifferent or "neutral." Taking a definite stand on the basic issues of our day does not mean losing one's independence. On the contrary, it is one of the best manifestations of its existence.

Our publication "Horizons" is to help us present our position on these issues, and to enable our friends to present theirs. We may not always see eye to eye with them, but believing in dissent as much as we do in agreement, we want to create a free forum for the exchange of ideas on a broadest possible basis. This is the spirit in which we hope our journal will be received.

New York, May 10, 1957

Executive Board
Of the Federation of Ukrainian
Student Organizations of America, Inc.

NATIONALISM REEXAMINED

by OLEH S. FEDYSHYN*

Recent events in Hungary and Poland came as a surprise to many on both sides of the "Iron Curtain." The violent upsurge of the hitherto seemingly mildly-stirring forces and its aftermath have not yet been fully appreciated in many quarters. A closer look at these forces, however, is an indispensable prerequisite for any valid appraisal of the future line of development not only in the East European Satellites but also in the Soviet Union itself, especially in such Soviet republics as Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, and the Caucasian republics.

It is generally agreed upon by students of the Soviet Union that the main force behind the Polish and Hungarian "October Revolutions" was nationalism. Professor Henry L. Roberts of Columbia University termed it ". . . a working alliance between a leading faction of the Polish Communist Party and Polish nationalism against Soviet interference and control."[1] Isaac Deutscher concluded similarly by stating that "the upsurge of nationalist emotion, the yearning for political freedom, and despair at the economic plight in both countries were common to workers, intelligentsia, students, civil servants, army officers, and the still numerous survivors of the old bourgeoisie."[2] In both cases all the forces of discontent were united by their common national conscience and a dislike of foreign domination and exploitation. In Hungary the so-called national communist forces were much weaker than were similar forces in Poland, but it may be argued that Polish national communists were not as strong as it is often claimed, and that the fear of Soviet intervention, the security of Polish western frontiers, and an advance declaration by the West of "hands off" policy, were decisive elements in Gomulka's ability to keep things under control when this seemed to be almost impossible. Whatever differences or similarities between the Polish and Hungarian "revolutions", one thing is certain, namely that nationalism is still dominant a force behind all these developments, and that it is nationalism alone which is guiding the East European peoples and other Moscow-enslaved nations in their struggle against the Soviet Russian domination.

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However, only recently such eminent authorities on nationalism as Professor Hans Kohn were beginning to question the positive value of nationalism, refering to it as "once a great force of life" which may now become " a dead weight upon the march of humanity."[3] E. H. Carr went even further and stated flatly that the nation was neither recognizable nor universal, that it was not "natural", and that the majority of people feel no allegiance to anyone.[4] A typical current Western view of nationalism is still negative. Nationalism is regarded as essentially a force of division which contains no "universal principle of unity of international order," a force which is morally inadequate and socially destructive."[5] The most recent events in Eastern Europe, however, give us ample right to repeat the statement made by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes many years ago, but which, nevertheless has lost none of its validity. Professor Hayes stated that nationalism "commands today, as it had for a number of decades," the highest loyalty of people, and that it surpasses all religious movements in its intensity.[6] He further maintained that some form of nationalism was to continue indefinitely, because gregariousness and attachment to a certain place are universal and have "always" existed.[7]

If we are to accept nationalism as the only force capable of weakening or even destroying the Russian communism in Eastern Europe and other Soviet-dominated areas, how are we going to reconcile it with our aversion to the more extreme forms of "perverted" nationalism, like the one which we witnessed in pre-World War II Italy, Germany, and other totalitarian countries? We may even go further and ask: what would be the fate of the international order and cooperation, with which the hopes of people everywhere are tied, in case nationalism were to triumph in its struggle with communism?

Nationalism, however, is a universal phenomenon and its significance is much greater than merely being one of the most vigorous forces which can successfully oppose communism today. It is futile to debate whether nationalism is a "positive" or a "negative" force. It can be both, depending on our particular interest. There is one thing that most of us will agree upon, and that is the fact, that nationalism is now more than ever one of the strongest forces behind people's actions everywhere. The real question to which we should try to find an answer is where can nationalism lead us, i.e. how can it contribute to the creation of a better, above all a more peaceful world.

Nationalism is a fact of life, and it will stay with us for a long time to come. We cannot simply make all people alike, no matter how desirable this may seem in the interest of international peace and cooperation. This does not mean, however, and this must be made clear beyond any doubt, that we cannot go beyond nationalism. On the contrary, *we not only can but also must go beyond nationalism.* Nationalism cannot be suppressed or disregarded, however, it is just as wrong and dangerous to regard it as an end in itself. It is for this very reason that nationalism is all too often viewed as a negative force which can contribute little to the creation of a more stable world order. Nationalism should be regarded as an absolutely necessary element in making a more stable international order, based on a genuine international cooperation, and it is in this that the real value of nationalism lies. John A. Hobson, an eminent British scholar of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, pointed out half a century ago that there could be no internationalism without nationalism. "Nationalism," said he, "is a plain highway to inernationalism, imperialism —perverted nationalism, destroys this development."[9] Hobson further elaborated on this saying that "internationalism is no more opposed to the true purposes of nationalism than socialism within the nation, rightly guided, is hostile to individualism."[10] By discussing the difference between internationalism and cosmopolitanism Carlton J. H. Hayes indicated the impossibility of going from nationalism to cosmopolitanism because the latter rejects local and national distinctions and patriotism. "To go from nationalism to internationalism," according to Hayes, "is merely to take a well-marked turn on the very highway on which the modern world is travelling."[1] Sir Alfred Zimmern held essentially the same view at an earlier period (1918-1919) by indicating that the road to internationalism lies through nationalism, and not through leveling men down to a "gray indistinct cosmopolitanism."[12]

By way of conclusion we may add that nationalism, i.e. the aspiration of peoples for national self-determination, should be viewed as an immediate, and internationalism as the ultimate objective. By "ultimate objective", I do not mean some vague ideal to be realized in the indefinite future. Believing in and working for peoples' self-determination wherever it is desired, we must simultaneously think of the next step—the establishment of an international order, but it must again be repeated that no genuine, just and lasting internationalism can be created without prior fulfillment of legitimate national aspirations of all

those who crave for it. In this there can be no short cuts, and only these regional arrangements or even broader international projects which grew up organically on a voluntary basis can be regarded as a step in the right direction.

Just as a happy marriage or a lasting friendship can exist only by mutual consent and the interplay of interests, so a stable and genuine international order can be based only on the fulfillment of the national aspirations of all the peoples to a greatest possible extent. This road may not be an easy one, but the development of true internationalism is one of the processes where no substitutes and short cuts can be used. If it is to work on a more or less permanent basis, this internationalism must be a real thing. The considerable success of such international organizations as the British Commonwealth of Nations, West European Coal and Steel Community, or even NATO, and complete failure of such "international" projects as the French Union or the Warsaw Pact, clearly show that there is only one road to internationalism, and true internationalism, in which all the nations of the world shall be directly represented on the basis of full equality, seems to be the only hope of warweary mankind for a better and a more peaceful world.

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1 *Foreign Affairs,* January 1957. p. 192.

2 In *Reporter* Magazine, November 15, 1956. p. 14.

3 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism.* (1944). Ch. 1. The Introduction.

4 Edward H. Carr, *Nationalism and After.* (1944). p. 39.

5 Christopher Dawson. See a series of his articles on nationalism in the London *Tablet,* September, 1956.

6 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism.* (1937). p. 129 ff.

7 *Ibid.,* pp. 247-248.

8 Kohn, Hayes, and Zimmern, all subscribe to this view.

9 John A. Hobson, *Imperialism.* (1948 edition of the work originally published in 1902.) p. 9.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 189.

11 Hayes, *op. cit.,* p. 271.

12 Alfred Zimmern, Sir, *Nationality and Government.* (1919). p. 77.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY

by VOLODYMYR STOYKO*

It was during and after the Second World War that the old constellation of international political powers collapsed and the polarization of international relations developed. On the one end there was the U.S.S.R., and on the other, the United States rose to the leadership of the free world. Not until that time, despite over two decades of the tremendous influence of the Wilsonian Principle of self-determination in Eastern Europe, did this area become an important factor in United States foreign policy.

It was here that the first clash had occurred between the two leading powers. It happened, when, as a result of the almost naive belief in partnership or at least cooperation with Communist Moscow, by the Western Allies, that the Soviet Union had expanded its control as far west, as to include almost half of Germany and Austria; Czechoslovakia; and even Albania.

The dreams of Tzarist Russia, and then of the Provisional Government—the expansion to the southwest, was being realized by Communist Moscow. The action of the British Army in Greece, and later of the Truman Doctrine had stopped the Soviet expansion, but it was not until the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia and then the aggression in Korea that the danger of Russian imperialism was fully realized. During that time, our policy towards the Soviet Union became widely debated, and Eastern Europe became a vital part of it. Since, here, not only both sides met directly, but also the conflict of ideologies, represented by them, clashed with much stronger force than any place else. The Soviet Union backed its views with force. In the United States, meanwhile, the policy of containment was formulated, and with the change of administration, the policy of liberation proclaimed.[1] The essence of this policy, adopted after the election of President D. Eisenhower, was reaffirmed by Secretary of State J. F. Dulles in his speech recently when he told the Associated Press luncheon, on April 22, 1957, that "We condemn and oppose their (Soviet) imperialism. We seek

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the liberation of captive nations. We seek this however, not in order to encircle Russia with hostile forces, but because, peace is in jeopardy and freedom a word of mockery until the divided nations are reunited and captive nations are set free. We revere and honor those who as martyrs gave their blood for freedom. But we do not ourselves incite revolt. Rather we encourage an evolution to freedom."[2] The aims are plain. But are they? For the exploration of this question let us start at the time when the new setup of Eastern Europe was established.

It was World War I that presented the opportunity to the peoples of the multi-national empires of Austro-Hungary and Russia to overthrow the foreign oppression and to become creator and master of its own future.

Unfortunately, these noble aspirations of the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, in their desperate effort not to loose this historical moment for liberation, unwillingly became very often tools of major powers that were engaged in war. Regrettably, not always justice and ideals of freedom and peace prevailed, but favoritism according to the personal liking and naked power politics. From the perspective of almost four decades, shrewdness of some politicians of that time seems nothing but ignorance without the ability to grasp the meaning of the great changes that were occuring in the world, and in Eastern Europe in particular.

The old world of the few, crumbled; the whole region was undergoing completion of spiritual emancipation and national rebirth. And the developments presented opportunities for adoption and deeper exploration of the Wilsonian Principles, and to lay down the foundations in this area for a harmonious and a better world, based on equality of all nations. Probably it was premature, but it was a trial of great statesmanship, imagination and daring undertaking. But instead, what was the result? — many new oppressions, new seeds of discontent, hatred and miseries. On the ruins of Romanov's prison of nations, a twentieth century creation was erected—the concentration camp of nations. And on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though many of the oppressed nationalities had rightfully gained their independence, with the encouragement or with the silent agreement or disagreement of the victorious Allies, the imperialistic circles of this area exploited their advantageous position for incorporation of large minorities, by invasion into their states or by other means. Thus at the beginning, the possibility for creating a better understanding and peaceful cooperation with the neighboring nations was undermined.

Even very discriminating American historians had to remark: "No one expected a boundary which would separate exactly the mosaic of national settlements which exists in some of these areas; yet, the exclusion of 1,800,000 Magyars who lived in compact settlements in territory bordering Hungary was ... an unnecessary violation of the principle of self-determination."[3] And later, Rumania "emerged from Paris Peace Conference double in size and population .... received the Bukovina from Austria and Transylvania from Hungary without getting into any serious dispute with the Allies ... Bulgaria was again forced to turn back to Rumania the southern part of Dobruja .. although this territory was inhabited almost completely by Bulgars, Turks and Tartars. Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia."[4] Incorporation of some Bulgarian territory into Yugoslavia was, as one writer puts it, because "strategic reasons dictated the secessions" though the population was "predominantly Bulgarian."[5] "The Ruthenians (Ukrainians) are indeed the majority in Eastern Galicia; the majority ought to rule; but it was very difficult to apply this principle in this particular case"[6], we were told by two American diplomats of that time.

There were quite a few more territorial controversies, as between Poland and Lithuania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, etc. Thus, Eastern Europe was rebuilt, by the after-war treaties, on privileged and unprivileged nations. And, if the western statesmen were conscious of that, they were hoping that this way, by making their selected friends bigger, they were making them stronger. But do you make the rubber dummy stronger by blowing him up more and more? In two decades history had furnished the answer. Antagonism between the states and within the states only contributed towards the crises and weakened these coutries. As for example, the strength which Poland supposedly should have gained with the incorporation of the alien territiries showed to be her weakest side. Not counting, that the minority question was used as a justification for the aggression by German and Russian imperialism. This, also was one of the most important causes that this region was not able to build any effective regional defence alliance.

The causes of difficulties and crises in Eastern Europe, between the two wars, are still in dispute. Some blame almost everything on the realization of the principle of self-determination, including totalitarian tendencies, economic nationalism, etc. What they usually omit from consideration in their arguments is—were these phenomena characteristic only to Eastern Europe?

Was really the principle of self-determination realized, or only partly realized? Was not Eastern Europe rather a reflection of general international crises; and finally, was not the imperialism, power politics and lack of good will the center of East European and international crises as well? As for the much publicised problem of "balkanization", Mr. B. Newman, in his book on the Balkans, has supplied some answers. He writes: "The very name of the peninsula was transformed into a verb, and to 'balkanize' a region meant to divide it into a series of petty warring states, completely unstable, alive with corruption." and then he comments, "The picture is completly distorted. Every one of the Balkan wars was impelled from without, not within: the Great Powers tended to 'adopt' the young states, and to use them as puppets in their machinations of power-politics: if Russia became the protector of Bulgaria, then Austria imposed an alliance on Roumania. Of the wars which have devastated the Balkans during the last century and a half, only two were caused by quarrels between the free Balkan states. Both these were directly due to foreign intervention... The instability of Balkan regimes was almost invariably the result of foreign influences, and the corruption was an unfortunate Turkish legacy which the new 'protectors' took no trouble to correct."[7]

II

The fate of that part of Eastern Europe, which was under the oppression of Tsarist Russia, was much worst. Not only that these nations had to go through much more hardship, but also, because the struggle of non-Russian nations for independence did not get proper recognition nor support from the Western Allies. Since there was among the allies an agreement about the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the stand on Russian Empire was entirely different. The spirit of their policies was given by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, as it was reported by the Ukrainian delegate to the Peace Conference Mr. A. Margolin, "Mr. Lansing brusquely declared that Austria and Hungary were our enemies in this war, whereas Russia was our ally. He added that he recognized only a single, indissoluble Russian nation and that this nation ought to be federated along the lines of the United States of America."[8]

In a way, it is not surprising. The limited knowledge about the Russian Empire, which generally prevailed in the West, was continuously further confused by the imperialistic Russian sources and even by some confused or pro-Russian western newspaper-

men and writers.[9] And when there was an objective presentation of the problem, which ran contrary to the prevailing views, as it was with the report submitted by Lawrence Martin of the General Staff of the U.S. Army it was branded as "limited".[10]

The Provisional Government of the Russian Revolution was not capable to free itself from the traditional Russian imperialism.[11] It was not able to provide any proper base for cooperation with non-Russian peoples and to save and expand the gains of the March Revolution in Russia and in the National Republics of non-Russian nations. The Western Allies, on the other hand, by supporting imperialistic circles of the "one-united Russia" lost the chance to stop, this time, the imperialism of Communist Russia right at the beginning.

The poor knowledge of the Russian Empire and interest in Russian economy of France and Great Britain, probably would explain their policies towards Russia, but could it justify the statemanship of those great countries?

The mistakes of the Provisional Government and the Allies only contributed to the Bolshevik victory, who proved to be much more foresighted than their predecessors. Although they never intended to dismember the Russian Empire, their tactics were more flexible. To achieve a goal, Lenin asked, "It is not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and therefore inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that at times we might have to go zigzag, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes abandoning the course once selected and trying various others?"[12] And Stalin reaffirmed his master. "Tactics change according to flow and ebb."[13]

"The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" of November 1917, was one of the first "zigzag". It proclaimed equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russian Empire, their right to free self-determination, including separation and formation of independent states, etc.[14] In reality it was nothing more than a timely move to undermine national, democratic forces and to lay foundations for propaganda purposes, which is exploited successfully even today, as in relation to Asian and African peoples.

As for self-determination, according to Stalin, it was all right to seced for "India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and other colonies from the Entente, because seccession in this case would mean the liberation of those oppressed countries from imperialism thus undermining the position of imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here

involve imperialistic servitude from the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia. . . . "[15] The meaning of Stalin's dialectics about the 'border regions', etc.; how and who intended to exploit and colonize was given by *Pravda* on February 6, 1919, "In difficult and bloody battles, the Red Army has erected the road to bread, having conquered Ukraine; It has established a road to coal by having seized three quarters of the Donetz basin; it has broken the wall which separated us from cotton by clearing the path to Turkestan."

The National Democratic Republics, in addition to being "young", and not having any support from the outside, had to fight two or more enemies. The Ukrainian National Republic, for example, fought the Red Armies, the reactionary army of Gen. Denikin (equipped and supported by the Allies), and Poland (supported by France). The freedom was short lived. But, though the non-Russian nations were conquered, they never submitted to the Russian rule. The struggle for liberation never ceased. It continued with arms, passive resistance, cultural nationalism, and even wide spread deviations within the Communist Party, etc... And when some western scholars, even with considerable reputation, fall for the Soviet claims that they have "solved the nationality problems", it was, or is for the lack of ability to analyze the developments under Soviet-Moscow, and the lack of ability to penetrate the smokescreen of Soviet propaganda.[16]

Some additional light was shed on this problem when Germany invaded the USSR. Thousands of soldiers surrendered,[17] and the majority were non-Russians.[18]

III

Soviet difficulties with the non-Russian nations were properly recognized by most of the German experts on the Soviet Union. According to some students on the Second World War, Count von Schulenburg, German Ambassador to Moscow, had submitted a few months after the outbreak of the German-Russian war the following proposals on the future reorganization of the Russian Empire:

"1. The German Government agrees to permit the establishment of self-governments in all conquered countries of the Soviet Union, i.e. for all nations of the U.S.S.R.

2. The German Government declares it has no territorial claims in the East.

3. Germany will treat governments as her allies."[19]

But this plan, as well as other similar ones, were rejected by the Nazi hierarchy. Blinded by their own propaganda, and their

initial victories, they disregareded the desires of the people of Eastern Europe, and the Nazi policy of racism and that of "Lebensraum" was in full swing.[20]

The Soviet Government was only too happy to capitalize on Germany's mistakes. All means of Soviet propaganda went into action. On the one hand, German plans and German behavior in the occupied territories were exploited to the utmost, and on the other, to appease national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples, one "concession" was followed by another. The Southern Fronts were designated—Ukrainian Fronts, and the armies which were included there were named Ukrainian Armies. Similar changes were made in the Central and Northern parts of the fronts where Byelorussian names were adopted. In 1943, a high military decoration was established—the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytski, a seventeenth century Ukrainian hero and leader. In February 1944, the Soviet constitution was amended to give each Union Republic its own Commissariat of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs. Soviet demands for Ukrainian and other representation in the U.N., as was expressed by Stalin himself, was in the appeasement line also.[21] Very outspoken in this respect were the works of literature. Some were almost nationalistic in content, as for example the poem by V. Sosyura "Love the Ukraine". In 1944, the poem was rewarded the Stalin prize and was reprinted many times, but in 1951 it was condemned by *Pravda* and branded as "fundamentally defective in its ideology ... and openly nationalistic".[22]

But did the "concessions" buy the loyalty of these people? The best qualified answer was given by Mr. Khrushchev. He said: "at the end of 1943 ... a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all Krachai from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December, 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March, 1944, all Chechen and Ingush were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April, 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardins-Balkar Autonomous Republic, and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardinian Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them."[23]

Who was then, a staunch supporter of the Soviet Regime during World War II? Stalin at the reception held in the Kremlin in honor of the commanders of the Soviet Army on May 24, 1945, pointed out in his speech, explicitly: "I drink primarily to the

health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding of all nations that constitute the Soviet Union. I drink to the health of the Russian people, because during the war, it has earned universal recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country."[24]

Does it mean that the non-Russian people switched their loyalty to Germany? The strong underground movements, with their uncompromising demand for independence, that have developed against Germany, especially in the Ukraine, with the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.), is the best answer to this question. Their contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe, as well as their continuos heroic struggle against Moscow still awaits a proper recognition in the West. That this struggle, in various forms, including armed, has never ceased is shown not only by anti-Soviet sources, but also confirmed by the Soviets themselves. Very helpful in this respect are the Government proclamations directed towards the underground. The latest of the proclamations appeared in the Soviet press as late as on the eve of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. It appeared in the Ukrainian newspaper "Red Banner" under the title "The Motherland Forgives," and called upon "armed anti-Soviet partisan bands" in the Rovno region to surrender and to "admit their guilt."[25] The high points of the wide-spread struggle after the Second World War, like in Germany, Vorkuta, Karaganda, Tiflis, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, etc. had captured the headlines in the press all over the world. Pictures with signs—written on the walls, windows, trains give the essence of the discontents—*Russki poshlii domoii*—Russians go home. More elaborated demands appeared in the press, magazines, letters, books, etc., but the essence remains the same, as for example in the editorial reply to *Pravda, Szabad Nep,* Hungarian Communist Party Newspaper from October 29, 1956, stated—"... the first national demand, is formulated thus: that Hungary be a free independent country..."[26] In their open letter, that was smuggled out of the camps and the U.S.S.R., to the United Nations, Human Rights, and the entire Civilized World, Ukrainian prisoners in the camps in the U.S.S.R. declared: "We Ukrainians are in favor of any movement whose aims are freedom and truth: we advocate cultural progress in all walks of life, and we stand behind self-determination for all nations, including the United Ukrainian State... Our Ukrainian nation, like a number of other nations, has come under the conquering heel of Red Russia. We have been deprived of the basic rights of existence... We do not ask for mercy or pardon. We demand our rights to live

under laws that should be recognized by the entire civilized world..."[27]

Dr. J. Scholmer, Vorkuta prisoner until 1953 writes, "the West must adopt these peoples' demands as its own. It must develop a clear cut social program and identify itself with the subject nationalities' demand for independence."[28] "The Tifilis riots last March," writes the *N.Y.T.* from October 10, 1956, in its editorial, "were widely interpreted as a Georgian revolt against Russian domination . . . "

IV

The struggle for freedom, independence and a better future, as the latest developments in Eastern Europe indicate, stubbornly continues. The United States foreign policy, as was pointed out in the speech by the Secretary of State John F. Dulles (quoted at the beginning of this article) strongly favors the demands of the enslaved nations. But, having in mind some of the past policies of the Western powers towards Eastern Europe, one cannot help but to ask—what do we mean by "captive nations", and further on by "Soviet imperialism"? Is it that we regard the Soviet Union as an entity, and that we are following a policy—that of denial of the rights for self-determination for millions of peoples enslaved by Russia? Does it mean that we favor the pre-war status of division of Eastern Europe, and the "small" and "big" nations imperialism in this area?

The desire for freedom lives with equal vitality within the satellite countries, as well as within the non-Russian nations of the U.S.S.R.. And the reluctance to formulate our policy clearly not only does not help these people, but it is harmful to our foreign policy in relation to Eastern Europe, as well as to the other parts of the world.

It enables the Soviet Union, on the one hand, to pose, before the peoples within the Iron Curtain and of the outside world, as a real defender and champion of national freedom, and on the other, to picture the Western powers as the representatives of imperialism and exploitation. One has only to examine the comments of the Soviet press in relation to the latest developments in the Satellites, and the Middle East, to see to what extent this issue was exploited.

As for the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, let us take for the purpose of illustration—the Ukraine. The tremendous amount of propaganda published during the year 1954, the year of celebration of Russian and Ukrainian "unity", had stressed the partnership of these two nations, of counrse, with the

reminder that the "sovereignty of the Ukraine is only possible under the spell of the 'older brother'," and in a way of further appeasment to Ukrainian nationalism, Crimea was passed from the Russian to the Ukrainian Republic. How Ukraine is portrayed before the world, the best illustration could be found in the May issue of the magazine *USSR*. The whole issue is dedicated to the Ukraine (as some other issues to the other Republics) where Mr. N. Kalchenko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, is trying to convince his readers that at the present time Ukraine is a "sovereign state". He writes, "As a Union Republic of the USSR, the Ukraine is a sovereign state with its own constitution, parliament and legislation, as well as its own coat of arms, flag and national anthem. The Ukraine is a people's state administered by the people themselves."

To undermine the Soviet propaganda within the iron curtain and the outside world, we not only have to expose the double talk of Soviet propaganda by presenting the true picture of the relations between Moscow and the conquered people, but also we have to take a positive stand on the self-determination of all the peoples of that area.

The necessity of a clear formulation of our stand, in this respect, is not only desirable on the account to win these people to our side in political or psychological or in shooting warfare, but it is even more vital to our long-range policy. The policy is how to help establish a better future for these people, to establish stability and peace in Europe and in the world.

Former President Hoover once said: "The cooperation tion of independent nations is the only foundation upon which international peace can be permanently built and sustained... In self-government lies the safety and guarantee of individual rights."[29]

There is no doubt that the struggle for national independence and freedom, all over the world is one of the most dynamic forces behind the changes of our time. In some places the process is slower, and in another, more rapid and violent. But, as with emancipation from slavery, it is possible to delay it, but it is impossible to supress completly the historical processes of liberation from oppression.

As for Eastern Europe, the times of big brotherism (or as Russians call themselves—the older brother) are gone, and the problem of national independence holds the key to many other problems of this area.

Freed from the burden of fighting for national liberation, these people would concentrate on solving their social and

economic difficulties. A comparatively just solution of the frontiers would contribute toward the unity of this region. As is shown by the developments in Western Europe, only unity based on free will of the independent nations could contribute towards improvements of living conditions, peace and understanding.

Speaking in terms of international relations, a regional alliance of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic Countries, would create a balancing force in the "heartland", thus relieving the tension in Europe created by the Russian Empire and Germany.

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[1] Presentation and critical analysis of the containment and liberation policies is given in the following books: George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* 1900-1950, Chicago, 1951; James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?*. New York, 1953; William Henry Chamberlin, *Beyond Containment,* Chicago, 1953; Henry L. Roberts, *Russia and America, Dangers and Prospects,* New York, 1956.

[2] For full text of the Address see *The New York Times,* April 23, 1957.

[3] C. E. Black and E. C. Helmreich, *Twentieth Century Europe,* New York, 1950, p. 151.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 152.

[5] John C. deWilde, "The Struggle for the Balkans," *Foreign Policy Report,* December 15, p. 233.

[6] Charles H. Haskin and Robert H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference,* Cambridge, 1920, pp. 194-95.

[7] Bernard Newman, *Balkan Background,* New York, 1945, pp. 1-2.

[8] Arnold D. Margolin, *From A Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine and America* 1905-1945, New York, 1947, p. 48.

[9] The book by Robert Wilton, *Russia's Agony,* New York, 1919, might serve as an example.

[10] Mr. L. Martin "termed the Directory Government (Ukrainian Government—V.S.) competent and effectual and remarked that the differences between Russians and Ukrainians were distinct enough to make independence desirable. This report was forwarded from Paris to Washington in June but with a note that it should be read with reserve since Martin's information was supposedly limited." Note by John S. Reshetar, Jr., in *The Ukrainian Revolution,* 1917-1920, Princeton, 1952, p. 286.

[11] "Foreign Minister Milyukov's statement to the representatives of the press on April 5, that Russia looked to the coming peace conference for confirmation of its claims to 'the Ukrainian lands of Austro-Hungary' to Constantinople and Dardanelles, the acquisition of which had always been considered 'an ancient national problem of Russia' ". W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* 1917-1920, Vol. 1., p. 108.

[12] Nikolai Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder,* New York, 1934, p. 52.

[13] Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism,* New York, 1939, p. 92.

[14] For the text look: J. H. Meisel and E. S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System,* Ann Arbor, 1953, pp. 25-26

[15] J. Stalin,*Works,* Moscow, 1948, Vol. IV. pp. 385-6.

[16] A detail treatment of the Soviet nationality problems is given by: Roman Smal-Stocki, *Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism,* Milwaukee, 1952; Fredrick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism,* New York, 1956; Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine* 1918-1953, New York, 1956.

[17] Prior to March 1, 1942 there were 3,600,000 prisoners, according to G. Fischer,*Soviet Opposition to Stalin,* Cambridge, 1952, p. 3.

[18] Lev Shankovsky, "Nazi Occupation of Ukraine", *The Ukrainian Review,* Vol. II. No. 2, London, June 1955, p. 13, and Dr. Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin,* 1939-1945, Bonn, 1950. Ch. II.

[19] R. Ilnytzky, *Russian World Ambitions and World Peace,* Croydon, 1953, p. 15-6; see also G. Fischer, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[20] Dr. Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin,* 1939-1945, Bonn, 1950. Ch. II.

[21] "the President told me that evening at Yalta that Stalin felt his position in the Ukraine was difficult and insecure. A vote (in the United Nations) for the Ukraine was essential, the Marshal had declared, for Soviet unity.". Edward R. Stettinus, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians,The Yalta Conference,* Garden City, N.Y., 1949, p. 187.

[22] *Pravda,* July 2, 1951.

[23] For full text see Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost,* New York, 1957, p. 88 ff.

[24] N. Mikhailov, "The Sixteen Republics of the Soviet Union," Published by the *Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.,* Washington 1951, p. 16.

[25] "Our Country Forgives"—Appeal to the Ukrainian Underground to surrender, printed in *Cherwony Prapor* (Red Banner) of February 12, 1956 in Rivne, Ukraine, quoted by Mr. Ansel E. Talbert, *N. Y. Herald Tribune,* February 16, 1956.

[26] For full text see *The New York Times,* October 30, 1956.

[27] For full text see *National Review,* August 1, 1956, pp. 13-15.

[28] Joseph Scholmer, *Vorkuta.* Translated from the German by Robert New York, 1955, p. 229.

[29] *The New York Times,* December 2, 1951.

BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S SMOKESCREEN

by JAY B. SORENSON*

> "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
> "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master — that's all."

Humpty Dumpty's retort to a poor, bewildered and inquiring Alice is akin to Khrushchev's Marxist answer to the confused and unhappy Togliatti. Humpty Dumpty's advice helps to penetrate Khrushchev's smokescreen of contradictions. It enables us to see that the principal question at hand is one of power and of who is to be master.

Khrushchev's statements disclose the nature of the power problems. He displays a fear of an ever-widening gap betwwen the Communist Party and the people, and of a weakening of the Communist Party's effectiveness as a result of unchecked centralism and bureaucratism. These, Khrushchev contends, are the "negative features" which are the consequences of the cult of the individual. In his February philippic against Stalin and in his Marxist explanation of the Stalin cult he urges that these corrossive characteristics must be checked. He insists that the estrangement of the people and the emasculation of Party power be dealt with by "liquidating the consequences of the personality cult," by "enforcing" the law, by decentralizing, by rehabilitating the local Soviets, by "realizing" widespread "criticism and self-criticism." Khrushchev's program of reforms indicates that he and his aspiring equals fear the inexorable consequences of Stalin's iron glove policies.

Khrushchev's proposals do not mark the shelving of the police state or a shift to a democratic multi-party state where the primary values are freedom, the rule of law, and a people who possess sovereignty and dignity. Khrushchev's propositions ring with a shrill clarion call for the refinement of the monolithic state. Unlike the Western democracies, where the state's power is limited and is a means to the development and protection of its citizens, the Soviet state is a leviathan to which all Soviet citizens are obliged to dedicate their endeavors. Unlike the West where the citizen grants powers to the state, the rights of the Soviet citizen are conferred on him by the state. The Soviet citizen does not have rights which we call absolute or inherent or which are guaranteed by positive law or natural rights. The law of the Soviet state protects the state not the

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individual; it equates justice with conformity. In terms of Western democracy the rights of the Soviet man are paper rights. He has no free choice in elections. There is no government by consent. He has no real representative government. He posesses no minority rights. He is denied the right to organize a political opposition or political parties. He is not protected by "due process". He is subject to double jeopardy and to law by analogy (permits punishment of acts deemed socially dangerous by analogizing the crime to the most nearly similar act defined as a crime by the criminal code). He has no right of habeas corpus. He has no right to counsel before indictment. He and his family are subject to collective guilt. He is duty bound by law to defend and protect the established order. He is free only to conform and thus to live, or to dissent and to die. In terms of the West, he is not free, sovereign, protected by law, nor is he the end for which the state exists. This is the significance of the fact that the Communists have proposed no alteration of the monolithic one-party system since the death of Stalin.

The current changes in the Soviet Union give testimony to the intentions of Stalin's heirs to maintain rather than to change the one-party state. Stalin's beneficiaries are well aware of the fact that Stalin's use of the whip rather than proffering the carrot to achieve his goals produced rifts, hostility, despair and apathy. His heirs hope to improve conditions and to ease the tensions wrought by the depraved incubus. Since the death of Stalin they have upgraded pensions a bit, introduced a minimum wage law, cut the work week by two hours, decentralized highly centralized functions and ministries like the Ministry of Justice, granted more leeway to the various Republics and to the municipal Soviets, introduced a drive to "enforce" the law, ended imprisonment for leaving a job without permission, etc. The very nature of these reforms suggests that they are geared to improve the function of the Soviet colossus rather than to alter it.

Along with Khrushchev's promise to strengthen the Soviet state and to ease tensions is his pledge to reintroduce "Leninist democracy". It is his constant emphasis and reemphasis of "Leninist democracy" that unveils his Bolshevik soul. Two essentials of "Leninist democracy" which Khrushchev has placed in the forefront are collective rule and inner-party democracy. Yet, a study of history during Lenin's day reveals that collective rule was always more fiction than fact, that "inner-party democracy" —a synonym for "democratic centralism"—produced only conformity and orthodoxy.

From 1903 to 1921, we find, Lenin fought all who opposed a small highly centralized and disciplined Party; all who opposed the one-party dictatorship; all who resisted leadership by specialists and who rejected Lenin's contention that "the will of a class . . . may be carried out by a dictator". Lenin's personal rule rather than collective rule—which existed somewhat during the feverish days of the Bolshevik coup d'etat—stands out boldly. By stages the Party and the Soviets were bureaucratized. By stages all collective decisions and democratic rights were emasculated by Lenin's rigorous demand for unity, discipline, centralism and conformity. Lenin always spoke in the name of collective rule and inner-party democracy but he was always a Corypheus.

The year 1921 and Lenin's resolution "On Unity" mark a milestone in the history of the Russian Communist Party. In 1921, Lenin's fight against his opponents reached a climax. Lenin, winning a bitter factional fight, leveled powerful blows against heresy, minority rights and the free expression of unorthodox views by crowning his victory with the resolution "On Unity". This resolution defined "inner-party democracy". It outlawed all organized expression of dissenting views, all opposition, and all organized minorities. It raised conformity and orthodoxy to the realm of Communist virtues. Dissent and disagreement were identified with treason and conspiracy. The consequence of ruling out the right to organize minority and opposition views was to make a farce out of criticism, rule out peaceful and legitimate change in the Party, and to prepare the way for Stalin and his future blood purges. Significantly, it is Khrushchev's solemn pledge that he will reintroduce the "guiding principles" on "inner-party democracy" found in the "On Unity" resolution of 1921.

Khrushchev's outstanding problem is to denounce Stalin and his heinous crimes without denouncing the system and himself. Khrushchev's principal attempt to solve this difficulty was presented as a rebuttal to Togliatti and others and as a "Marxist" explanation of Stalinism. His answer is as plausible as was the reconstruction of the smashed and thousand-pieced Humpty-Dumpty.

Khrushchev's final conclusion is that Stalin's megalomania and subjective inclinations combined with objective circumstances like "capitalist encirclement and an embittered class was" to produce the "negative features" of terror, centralism, restrictions, and the estrangement of the people. The difficulty with this conclusion is that Khrushchev has placed more empha-

sis on an individual and on subjective factors and less on a system and on objective factors than his "Marxist science" accepts. Khrushchev's exposition places him in the untenable position where he is a poor "Marxist" or a Communist who believes an individual can alter a system. This implies that a system can be made corrupt by a corrupt ruler. Khrushchev cannot afford this conclusion as long as he wishes to rule intact what he has inherited from Stalin. Khrushchev deals with this dilemma by contending that "even Stalin was not big enough to change the state", that "the personality cult. . . could not and has not changed the nature of the social order." One cannot help but wonder why Stalin had to be attacked and why the 20th Congress "deemed it necessary (sic!) to speak out...about the grave consequences of the personality cult (sic!) . . ." if he could not alter the system. Can an individual who cannot alter the system pose a real threat to it? Khrushchev's answer adds up to no. His denial negates his own "Marxist" explanation. What inexorably follows from Khrushchev's contention is that if Stalin could not alter the system and if excessive terror and bureaucraticim are evils of and threats to the system they are inherent in the very system itself. If the system is oppressive what can one, an individual who cannot alter the system according to his "Marxism", do about it? If the system is oppressive and its rulers are representative of it, then he must conclude he is a dictator and not a reformer. If he contends he is a reformer and that the system is oppressive then, according to his own premises, he must be prepared to reform it, even radically. The conclusions which flow from Khrushchev's own contentions are diametrically opposed to his own conclusions. All that he has said indicates he intends to conserve and to improve the system established by Lenin and Stalin.

Khrushhev says that they did not remove Stalin—which acknowledges their awareness of the crimes at the time they were committed—because it would have endangered the existence of the system. "Individual shortcomings seemed less important . . . than [would a stand which would have been] a stand against the cause of Socialism." In short, this means that Khrushchev and his cohorts believed that Stalin's removal would have hurt the system and that Stalin's policy of terror and monolithic rule contributed to the development of Soviet Socialism. After this admission how can he possibly claim that Stalin, the man, did not affect the system?

Khrushchev answers the question of what he was doing when the crimes were committed by saying that Stalin's outrages

became known only after his death. This is a clear attempt on his part to vindicate himself. His claim is absurd. Khrushchev and his entourage were Stalin's lieutenants. They implemented and checked the fulfillment of his orders. They could hardly have been unaware of his most obvious and flagrant crimes. They knew and they honored him.

They honored him. They kept Lenin's testament, which called for Stalin's removal as Secretary General of the Party, a secret in Russia until 1956. They knew they could not ignore Stalin's "Dizzy with Success" speech which pointed up the brutality and ruthlessness of forced collectivization. They were aware of Zhdanov's 1939 official Party admission that many purges were unjustified. They knew that the plenary sessions of the Central Committee were being held irregularly and that Stalin was amassing great power in his own hands. They honored him with only *one* admitted plea for collective rule. This came immediately after the German attack in 1941. Even after they had exerted individual authority during the war they turned the reins of power back over to a ruler they admit they knew to be insane. It is fantastic! Stalin's men knew.

Malenkov compiled purge lists. Khrushchev lauded the purges in 1939. In 1945 he conducted a thorough purge of the wartorn and ideologically "infected" Ukraine. He knew! Even while he disclaims awareness of the inequities and while he denounces the purges he contends that Stalin's use of terror was not wrong morally or poltically. Could he be more transparent? Could we ask for more warnings?

Today, the Communists call for the correction of all flagrant abuses of Soviet justice; yet they defend the use of terror. They are the exposers of their claim that they are men dedicated to reform and the well being of the Soviet man. Today they promise reforms because they realize they cannot continue with policies which produce despair and decay. To preserve power they are willing to make changes. Changes which will immunize their system from internal tensions, flare ups, and weaknesses. Changes which will enable them to successfully ward off external threats. Their changes will not be radical ones. They intend to preserve the one-party state. Whether the reforms will alter or strengthen the system remains a speculation of the future. The fact is, however, that Khrushchev and his cohorts felt it necessary to unmask the crimes of Stalin and to ostentatiously pledge to reform the regime. They would not have made these admissions if they did not have to!

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR: This article was written before the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian people on the Kremlin's command confirms the author's major contention that behind the smokescreen of reforms are the true motives of the communists. Though communist tactics for the Soviet Union and the Satellites are not identical, the events in Hungary and Poland provide the inescapable conclusion that men and reforms will be readilly sacrificed and suppressed if they threaten the communist rule, and Moscow's hegemony.

THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION: AN ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION

by VSEVOLOD HOLUB*

Article 121 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union as well as paragraph 12 of the Program of the Soviet Communist Party[1]—the two highest statutes of the social and political order of that country—guarantee the basic civil liberty of carrying out instructions in all schools and educational institutions "in the native language" of the nationalities of the USSR. Objectively, it is obvious that the existence of the numerous different languages in the multi-national federation of Soviet republics could be neither a hindrance nor a danger to the socialist order and political aims of the Communist Party. Therefore, there seems to be no objective reason for any suppression of peoples' languages from the purely Communist point of view. Moreover, since the openly stated basic political aim of education in the USSR is the development of a new man with the socialistic consciousness, the use of the native languages in instruction seems to be the most expedient means to that aim. Therefore, there seems to exist an objective reason for the maintenance of native languages in the Soviet educational institutions. All this means, then, that if things are to the contrary in the Soviet Union now, the civil liberties guaranteed there by the Constitution are hampered in this particular respect and the political aims of the education are no more only the socialism and world revolution, but also something rather remote from them.

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I

The *New York Times* recently reported that Prof. Abraham I. Katsh of the New York University had been promised by a high Soviet education official during his visit to Moscow that "henceforth Hebrew would be taught in Soviet schools if as many as ten students asked for it".[2] Similarly, when in 1939 Western Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union and the question of the language of instruction in schools arose there, a Soviet paper stated that the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian Republic ordered that "the problem of the language of instruction in every school shall be solved by the local city or country board of education according to the composition of students and the wishes of their parents".[3]

These two examples are sufficient to illustrate the essentially democratic way of solving the language problem that is theoretically possible under the ideal conditions of a multi-national state. However, as in many other fields, in this field too, the theory and practice are two different things in the Soviet Union. There are several significant factors that hinder the application of such a democratic rule in Soviet practice.

One of the most important of these factors is the *fear* on the part of students' parents (in case of primary and secondary school students) and of students themselves (in case of higher educational intitutions) to press too hard their demand for instruction in their native language because such a demand more often than not would be branded as the so-called "bourgeois nationalism" by the authorities.

The term "bourgeois nationalist" in Soviet usage means anybody who dares to emphasize in some way the fact of his belonging to some nationality. Such an emphasis *a priori* is considered by the authorities as offensive against some other nationality. However, in practice the term "bourgeois nationalist" is being applied in the Soviet Union almost exclusively to the members of the non-Russian minorities. In fact, in all the forty years of Soviet history there are known not more than 5 to 10 cases when a Russian was publicly accused of the "bourgeois nationalism", and not a single case when a Russian was persecuted for such an offense. On the other hand, virtually millions of members of non-Russian nationalities, among them thousands of well-known writers, artists, scientists, and intellectuals, including many Communist Party members and revolutionaries, were not only publicly accused of "bourgeois nationalism", but also severely persecuted, banished to the con-

centration camps, and even shot for this alleged offense. As a result of such experience and practice, the permanent fight against "bourgeois nationalism" in the USSR is nothing else but an expression of the very oppressive and terroristic *Russian nationalism and chauvinism.*

In practice the situation is the following. If someone demands the introduction of the native language of instruction in the given school, this would usually mean the demand for substitution of the native language for the Russian one which probably is the present language of instruction in the school. Or, in case of a new school opening, the demand for the introduction of the native language of instruction in it would mean the counter-opposition of this language to the other alternative—the Russian language of instruction. Depending on the local circumstances and especially on the personalities of the local authorities, such a demand obviously could be interpreted by the authorities as a show of disrespect toward the Russian nation and its language and therefore branded as the manifestation of "bourgeois nationalism". If the power in the local community is in the hands of the Russian chauvinists such a result is inevitable.

Another factor hindering the freedom of the non-Russian native languages in schools especially among the small national minorities such as the various peoples of the Caucasus or the Russian Federated Republic, is the lack of financial appropriations in the local budgets for the construction and opening of separate schools with the native language of instruction. The Soviet press sometimes acknowledges the existence of tension during the appropriation of local school budgets.[4]

Another very important factor is the lack of text-books in non-Russian languages. This factor is the matter of policy of the central government in Moscow which plans the publication of text books. Thus the plan for the 1955-56 academic year calls for the publication of 200.8 million text-books for public schools of the USSR; of these, however, only 31% is planned in languages other than Russian,[5] although the non-Russian population's share in the total population of the USSR is around 50%, according to the last census.

However, the most important factor hindering the development of the primary and secondary education in national languages is the fact that the majority of higher educational establishments and of secondary semi-professional schools conduct instructions in the Russian language exclusively. Moreover, even those establishments of higher education which conduct

instructions in the native languages require by the order of the Moscow government the Russian language on the entrance examinations. Thus, the knowledge of Russian becomes indispensable for persons aspiring to receive professional education, whereas the native language learned in secondary schools is practically good for nothing under such circumstances.

In primary and secondary schools of national minorities of the USSR Russian is being taught as an obligatory subject. The study of a foreign language is only a natural thing under the modern system of education, of course. Thus there could be no *a priori* objection against studying Russian. However, it is a well known fact that usually the study of a foreign language at the secondary school level seldom is supposed to go beyond just an acquaintance with such a language. Under the normal conditions an American high school student studies French not with the purpose to study in the French college because he has at his disposal his own American colleges. Similarly, a Chinese student in China studies English in his high school not in order to understand the laws of the Chinese government, because these are written in Chinese. But the Kazakh, the Armenian, or the Lithuanian student in the Soviet high school has to study Russian in order to go to the college and in order to understand the state language of the USSR. Hence, Russian is not just another foreign language in a high school. Along with the Russian language, English, French, or German is being taught as the proper foreign language in the non-Russian Soviet schools. But Russian is the master language of the state.

One can say that Russian is not very difficult to learn for the other Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union—the Ukrainians and Byelorussians; it is for them like French for Italians or German for the Dutch. But for the other numerous nationalities of the Union it constitutes very hard learning. This is a widely acknowledged fact even in the official Soviet press. For instance, a press report on the inter-republican conference of the educators of Russian language in the minorities' schools stated recently:

> The students in many Uzbek and other non-Russian public schools have not practically mastered to the necessary extent the oral and especially written Russian; they cannot use freely the literature in Russian, nor can they correctly express their thoughts in Russian. Therefore, many graduates of these schools encounter great difficulties in the farther improvement of their education, in the mastering of the modern techniques in industry and agriculture.[6]

The classic "therefore" in this quotation from *Pravda* shows clearly the reasons for the Uzbek and other non-Russian students' plight: having not mastered Russian, they are not able to continue their education because they have few or no universities and colleges with their own native language of instruction. And what is really shocking in this example is the fact that, in spite of the admitted hindrance of the Russian language to the study and mastering of the modern techniques and industrial progress by the non-Russians, instead of recommending the introduction of the native language in instruction that would facilitate the progress for the non-Russians, the conference recommended... further intensification of the instruction of Russian in the non-Russian schools. One cannot escape the conclusion that this conference was an assembly of the reactionary chauvinists who are more interested in the Russification of the non-Russians than in industrial and technical progress. It is certainly easier and more economical to teach 10,000 non-Russian instructors the teaching methods of modern techniques and knowledge and to let them then teach the same subjects in their native languages, than to torture 100,000 non-Russian students every year by instructing them in Russian.

The language of the Russian masters is being taught in the minorities' schools beginning with the first grade of primary school in some Asiatic and Caucasian regions[7] and with the second grade in the Ukraine.[8] Nowhere else in the world is a foreign language being taught to the primary school pupils on such an early stage of their education. From the point of view of the educational science such Procrustean measures are hampering child's psychology.

An American student of the Soviet educational system, Dr. Nicholas De Witt of Harvard University, in a book sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences and published by the U.S. government, concludes in our opinion quite correctly that —

> "an important factor in Soviet primary and secondary education is the cautious but persistent policy of linguistic and cultural Russification of national minorities in the USSR which exercises a great impact upon the educational opportunities of various nationalities in the Soviet Union." [9]

Indeed, nothing else but the presence of the conscious policy of Russification can explain the striking fact that whereas in 1951 the total enrollment of students in the minorities' schools in the Russian Federated Republic amounted to 11% of the total enrollment of students there, and altogether there were schools with 46 non-Russian languages of instruction,[10]

in 1956 there in the Russian Federated Republic, only 6% of all students are enrolled in the minorities' schools and there are only 45 non-Russian languages in them.[11] At the same time it is worthwhile remembering that according to the last census 22% of the total population of the Russian Federated Republic contituted various national minorities.

Another example of the policy of Russification may be seen in the case of Ukraine. There, in 1937, 82.8% of all the pupils attended primary and secondary schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction.[12] This corresponded pretty closely to the share of the Ukrainians in the total population of the Ukraine in her pre-war frontiers of the time. On the other hand, in 1956, only 73.5% of all the pupils in the Ukraine go to the Ukrainian schools.[13] The frontiers of the Ukrainian Republic have changed significantly since the war, and thus changed the national composition of its population. But the latter change was in the direction of increasing rather than decreasing the share of Ukrainians in the total population. By the most qualified judgement, the Russians do not constitute more than 15% and other minorities more than 3% of the population of the Ukraine at the present time. Hence the disproportional decline in the Ukrainian schools' enrollments obviously suggests the presence of an abnormal situation.

II

In spite of the slow process of Russification, however, the minorities' primary and secondary schools still persist in the USSR, and there is no reason to doubt that they can successfully resist the pressure of Russification still for a very long time to come. On the level of higher education, however, the situation is noticeably worse than on the level of primary and secondary education.

The language of instruction in the higher educational institutions of the Soviet Union, that is, in the universities and colleges (which are called the institutes there), is established in a decentralized way either by the deans and directors of the institutions themselves or by the ministries to which the institutions are responsible. In some cases, however, the authorities decide to leave the language question to the discretion of the instructors and professors. This is often the case in the univerities and colleges in the non-Russian republics which are under the jurisdiction of the republican ministries of education. There the professors are allowed to lecture either in Russian

or in the native languages of the students. In other words, this means that there is no general rule or order concerning the language of instruction in higher educational institutions in the USSR. But such a "freedom" allows again, like in the case of secondary and primary schools, for the prevalence of the "laws of the jungle" to exist. The stronger wins over the weaker. Professors and instructors in the national republics are often *afraid* to lecture in the native laguages because the Russians may accuse them of "bourgeois nationalist deviation", and this would mean at least the loss of job, if not of freedom and life.

However, the most important means of the introduction of the Russian language of instruction in the national universities and colleges has been the subordination of these institutions to the various centralized ministries of the Moscow government. Until 1946, all the universities and most of the colleges in the non-Russian republics of the Union had been under the jurisdiction of the local Republican Ministries of Education.[14] Although their curriculums had to be approved by the Moscow All-Union Committee For the Affairs of the Higher Educational Institutions, this Committee still had no power to decide on the language of instruction in them.[15] The remaining institutions in the republics, which were not under the jurisdiction of the republican ministries, were attached to various centralized All-Union ministries in Moscow. These were mostly various industrial and technical colleges. The Moscow ministries ordered them to introduce the Russian language of instruction throughout.

In 1946 the situation changed for the worse. A centralized All-Union Ministry of Higher Education was established in Moscow and all the national universities and most of the colleges were removed from the jurisdiction of the republican governments and transferred to the Moscow jurisdiction. Only such colleges as the teachers, medical, pharmaceutical, sports, and pure arts remained under the republican governments.[16] Such a division of authority in the field of higher education lasted until the end of 1954 when again a decentralization took place. But meanwhile, the Russification of the national universities and colleges placed under the Moscow jurisdiction made a substantial progress.

In the Ukraine, by 1954, 78% of all the students in the universities and colleges studied in the educational institutions responsible to the government in Moscow, and only 22%—in institutions responsible to the local government in Kiev.[17] The

most objective way of checking how many institutions were Russified is to see their announcements in the daily press on the eve of the new academic year. It is customary in the Soviet Union for the educational institutions to place their advertisements in the newspapers before the school year begins and to announce there the rules of admission of the students to the institution. Among other things these rules provide for the entrance examination in Russian language and literature as well as in the national lnguage and/or literature *if the language of instruction in the given institution is the local national one.*[18] Russian is required on all the entrance examinations throughout the Soviet Union because it is the state language. (It must be mentioned here, however, that the Constitution of the USSR does not provide for one state language; Russian is the state language in the USSR only *de facto,* by the right of the stronger). So, one cannot judge whether or not the given institution is Russified on the basis of the Russian requirement only. But there in the national republics where the universities and colleges still have instructions in the native language they require this language alongside with the Russian on the entrance examinations. There is also an intermediate case: in some institutions in the national republics only the knowledge of the native grammar is required on the entrance examinations, whereas at the same time a strong requirement is placed for the Russian grammar, composition, and even literature. Such institutions are probably Russified, too, and their mild requirement of the knowledge of the native grammar is not for the instruction purposes, but rather just to check on the literacy of those student candidates who graduated from secondary schools with the national language of instruction.[19]

Having in mind these distinctions in the language requirements on the entrance examinations, we have sampled the annoucements of the Ukrainian higher educational institutions in the Kiev daily press (dailies *Radyans'ka Ukraina* and *Pravda Ukrainy* for the years 1940, 1953, 1954, and 1956, and have established the following relationships:

Distribution of the Higher Educational Institutions in the Ukraine According to the Language of Instruction

(In percentages of the total)

	1940	1953	1954	1956
Ukrainian	44.2	22.3	36.8	45.8
Russian	55.8	77.7	63.2	56.2

The extent of the Russification of the Ukrainian universities and colleges is evident from this table: in more than a half of them Russian is the language of instruction. Undoubtedly, a similar, if not worse, situation prevails in all the other non-Russian republics of the USSR.

A certain limitation upon the moral and political implications of these facts can be put forward. Maybe, it is the international exchange of students among the republican universities and colleges that forces them to adopt Russian as the language of instruction. In fact, at the present time 60% of the students in Ukrainian higher educational institutions are the Ukrainians and the remaining 40 percent are students of other nationalities of the USSR.[20] Ukrainians, in their turn, can go and study in Moscow and other Russian cities. This is true, of course. But, first of all, it seems not to be incidental that the share of the Ukrainians in the total number of students in the Ukraine is substantially larger than the share of the institutions with the Ukrainian language of instruction in the total. This suggests that somehow Ukrainians are forced to study in the Russian language institutions in the Ukraine. And, secondly, large numbers of non-Russians have to go to study in Russian institutions beyound the borders of their own republics only because the latter institutions are financially privileged, wealthier, and provide better education than the local national institutions. That the national educational institutions are generally underpriviledged in comparison with the Russian ones, is a well-known fact often recognized even by the Soviet government press. Here is an example of a letter to the editors of *Pravda* by the director of the largest non-Russian institution in Soviet Asia, the Central Asiatic Polytechnical Institute of Tashkent:[21]

> The number of students in our institute increased five times since 1934 when the institute was established. However, this growth was going on without any improvement in the material and technical situation of the institute. The class space per student in 1934 was 15 square meters, and now it is not more than 3 sq.m. We are not able to open laboratories, museums, which are indispensable for students' education. We lack class rooms, we have no club room, no gymnasium. Classes are being held in the institute in three shifts. Two thirds of our staff members have no desks of their own..... All this means an extremely negative impact upon the quality of our educational and scientific work. The Ministry of the Higher Education of the

USSR knows all these facts, but it pays little attention to the financial situation of our institute.

So, it seems to be obvious that the problem we discuss here is much more complex than just the language of instruction problem. By itself, sometimes, the language of instruction may be considered not a problem at all. For instance, in many Dutch universities and colleges German is the language of instruction today, and nobody complains about this. In many Indian and Burmese universities English predominates as the language of instruction. But in all such cases the language of instruction is only the means of the technical expediency and not a part of the political policy of the governments. Dutch, Indian, or Burmese universities are financially independent from German or British governments, and they enjoy the protection and support of their own national governments. No one compels them to educate students on 3 square meters of floor space in 3 shifts, and no one forces them to accept German or English as a language of instruction because otherwise they might fall under article 58 of the Soviet Russian Criminal Code and be sent to Siberia for "bourgeois nationalism". In other words, in the Soviet Union the problem of the language of instruction in the schools and universities is only a part of the broad political problem of relations between the Russian and the non-Russian nationalities and must be understood only as such.

The problem of the language of instruction is a very live one in the Soviet Union today. The above table of the extent of the Russification of Ukrainian educational institutions shows a noticeable change in this situation over a period of time. One can see that by 1953 the Russification reached tremendous proportions, and then started to subside. The reason for this reverse trend are the policy changes that occurred after the death of Stalin. In June 1953 a small *coup d'état* took place in the Ukraine, and it is a remarkable fact that it had had a direct relationship to the problem of the language of instruction in the Ukrainian schools.

Till June 1953, since the very beginning of the revolution of 1917, at the top of the Communist Party of the Ukraine there always stood a non-Ukrainian. The last boss of the CP of Ukraine in 1953 was L.G. Melnikov, a Russian from Moscow. In Stalin's days Moscow never trusted the Ukrainian communists, suspecting them always of "bourgeois nationalist deviations". Then suddenly, after Stalin's death, on June 12, 1953, a meeting of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine took place in Kiev, and it ousted Mr. Melnikov from the party leadership,

accusing him of various inabilities and failures to deal with the political situation, as well as of the "factual introduction of the Russian language of instruction in the higher educational institutions of Western Ukraine".[22] In place of Mr. Melnikov the party elected Mr. O.I. Kirichenko, who is a Ukrainian by nationality. Thus for the first time in its history the CP of Ukraine is being led now by a Ukrainian.

The accusation of Mr. Melnikov of fostering the Russification became immediately headlined in the press. The editorial in the central organ of the CP of Ukraine, *Radyans'ka Ukraina,* stated:[23]

> It is quite natural that the introduction of Russian made study difficult for thousands of students and had a negative impact on their progress. It is necessary to end decisively the underprivileged position of the Ukrainian language in the higher educational institutions and to organize the instructions in the native language all over the country.

Since these events took place a slow process of the de-Russification of Ukrainian universities and colleges has begun and it is evidently reflected in the results of our sample above. The process has obviously still far to go, and Russian chauvinism can still put many blocks on its road. On January 1, 1955, however, a Ukrainian Ministry of Higher Education was again re-established and the corresponding Moscow ministry, decentralized. Most of the universities and colleges in the Ukraine were transferred back to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian ministry, and the latter regained the right to establish its own curriculum there.[24] The process of de-Russification has probably to go very slowly because the danger of being accused of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" hangs always like Damocles' sword over the head of Kirichenko and other Ukrainian communists and non-communists. And very much still depends on the general evolution of the Moscow's policies in the field of relations among nationalities.

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[1] *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK;* 7th ed., Part I ,Moscow, 1953, p.419.

[2] *The New York Times,* August 26, 1956.

[3] *Visti,* Kiev, September 24, 1939.

[4] *Narodnoye Obrazovaniye,* Moscow, no. 7, 1956, p. 13.

[5] *Pravda,* Moscow, June 14, 1956.

[6] *Pravda,* Moscow, August 22, 1956.

[7] *Narodnoye Obrazovaniye,* Moscow, no. 7, 1956, p. 10.

[8] *Radyans'ka Shkola,* Kiev, no. 5, 1946, p. 55.

[9] Nicholas De Witt: *Soviet Professional Manpower;* National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 55.

[10] *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta,* Moscow, April 4, 1951.

[11] *Kul'turnoye Stroitel'stvo SSSR,* statistical abstracts, Moscow, 1956, p. 187.

[12] *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy,* Kiev, no. 3, 1938, p. 7.

[13] *Kul'turnoye Stroitel'stvo SSSR,* op. cit., p. 187.

[14] *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v vysshiye uchebnyye zavedeniya SSSR v* 1947 *g.,* Moscow, 1947, pp. 36-48.

[15] *Visti,* Kiev, June 12, 1940.

[16] *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh . . . ,* op. cit., p. 36-48.

[17] *Radyans'ka Ukraina,* Kiev, June 17, 1954.

[18] *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh . . . ,* op. cit., p. 6.

[19] The author wishes to note here that this technique of analysis of the advertisements of Soviet higher educational institutions was suggested to him by the editors of *Vpered,* a Ukrainian monthly, published in Munich, Germany. Cf. *Vpered,* no. 6(34), September 1953, p. 4, and no. 10 (47), October 1954, p. 1.

[20] Institute for the Study of the USSR: *Ukrains'ky Zbirnyk,* Munich, no. 3, 1955, p. 158.

[21] *Pravda,* Moscow, July9, 1956.

[23] *Radyans'ka Ukraina,* Kiev, June 28, 1953,

[24] *Radyans'ka Ukraina,* Kiev, March 23, 1956.

[22] *Pravda,* Moscow, June 13, 1953.

SOME INFORMATION ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UKRAINE TODAY

The Ukraine, with her population of 40.6 million (as of April 1956), is the largest non-Russian republic of the Soviet Union. In 1955-56 there were 134 higher educational institutions in the Ukraine with a total enrollment of 325,851 students, which is 62% more than the total number of students in 1950-51. There were also 635 secondary technical and semi-professional institutions with another 374,642 students in 1955-56, which is 64% more than in 1950-51.

Most of the higher educational institutions in the Ukraine, like in the whole USSR, are highly specialized schools, called the institutes. Thus there are institutes of ferrous metallurgy, of railroad transportation, of nuclear physics, of law, etc., each one of them being completely independent of another one. Only the universities, of which there are seven, are the complex in-

tegrated institutions of the West European or the American type, with various semi-autonomous faculties and departments.

The following is a brief description of the seven Ukrainian State Universities as of the 1955-56 academic year.

The Shevchenko University in Kiev has a student body of 5,754. Its faculties together with the number of students enrolled are: history and philosophy — 656, philology — 1120, mathematics and mechanics — 656, radio-physics — 797, chemistry — 256, biology and soil science — 371, geology — 527, geography — 320, journalism — 497, economics — 305, law — 249.

The University of Dnipropetrovsk has a student body of 3,509 distributed among the faculties in the following way: history and philology — 519, physics and mathematics — 755, technology — 1362, biology — 287, geology and geography — 308, chemistry — 278.

The Franko University of Lviv has 3,838 registered students which are distributed among the faculties in the following way: history — 272, philology — 631, foreign languages — 640, physics — 343, mechanics and mathematics — 369, chemistry — 292, biology — 261, geology — 393, geography — 204, law — 222, journalism — 211.

The Mechnikov University of Odessa has 2,118 students: history — 208, philology — 386, physics and mathematics — 652, chemistry — 249, biology — 284, geology and geography — 339.

The University of Uzhgorod has a student body of 1,629: history — 122, philology — 443, physics and mathematics — 421, chemistry — 128, biology — 135, medicine — 380.

The Gorky University of Kharkov has 3,869 students distributed among the faculties in th following way: history — 284, philology — 542, foreign languages — 313, economics — 238, physics and mathematics — 1340, chemistry — 313, biology — 295, geology — 306, geography — 238.

The University of Chernivtsi has 2,417 students: history — 201, philology — 616, foreign languages — 198, physics and mathematics — 626, chemistry — 210, biology — 172, geology — 185, geography — 209.

In addition to the higher educational institutions, there were 158 scientific research establishments in the Ukraine in 1956. Both the educational and the research establishments employed 30,232 scientists in 1955. Among the latter 1,051 held the doctor of science degree and 10,573 the candidate of

science degree, which seem to be equivalent in value to the British Doctor's and Master's degrees. 19,961 scientists were teaching in 1955, and the rest were engaged in research.

(ED. This data was kindly furnished to us by the Commission For the Study of the Post-Revolutionary Ukraine and the Soviet Union, of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts & Sciences in the U. S., Inc., 11½ West 26th St., New York 10, N. Y.)

IUS: A TOOL OF MOSCOW

by MICHAEL POCHTAR*

"The challenge of our time is to work wholeheartedly toward the achievement of a peaceful world in which real freedom is secured to all peoples."

/Richard M. Nixon, Greeting to the 7th USNSA's Congress/

The international euphoria and overly cordial feelings between Western democracy and Moscovite communism during and immediately following World War II, paralleled with the disappearance of one sovereign nation after another in Eastern and Central Europe and Asia under the pretense of preservation of the so-called "Eternal Peace" and mutual co-existence, to a great extent also caught in its spirit students, who, after the war's end, began to develop a framework of international student cooperation. In this situation of appeasement and the domination of euphonic Soviet slogans, the international student forum met in Prague, in 1946, to form another international organization — "International Union of Students" (IUS).

The Moscovite communist students, represented at this forum by the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth, cleverly took the utmost advantage of this situation and occupied key positions in the IUS, thus misleading and curtailing the further growth of the newly formed organization.

That the formation of IUS under such circumstances was ill-fated became more than evident in a very short time. It was not long before the National Unions of Students came to realize that the formation of IUS with the executive empowered to speak for all the members, and with the Soviets in key-positions of the organization, served as an inviting signal toward the complete domination of IUS by the Soviets.

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Thus, the first attempt at student "co-existence" and co-operation with the Communists was disillusioning and proved to be a complete failure. In fact, it demonstrated that co-existence is Russia's idea of making everyone conform and surrender to its will. It also served as a conclusive warning that for non-Communists to join with Communists, for whatever purpose, is for the non-Communists to lose, for they merely would become bait in the Communist trap.

Being dominated by the Communists, and thus controlled by forces outside the student movement, and exposing a partisan political ideology, the IUS became the instrument of the Cominform, and as such ceased in reality to serve its purpose as an instrument promoting international student cooperation and understanding.

The Western Student Unions one after another began to limit their participation in activities sponsored by the IUS and through student meetings outside the IUS sought to change its existing policies. Still the IUS remained for a duration of a few years; a single, world-wide, communist-dominated organization of students. The Western Student Unions through conferences at Stockholm, Edinburgh, and Copenhagen, achieved a state of co-operation outside of the IUS, based on mutual respect and equality by means of the International Student Conferences. Even though a permanent Co-ordinating Secretariat (COSEC) came into being, and as such marked the beginning of the decline of IUS's influences, the appeasement through the complete surrender at Prague in 1946 gave the Soviet students an exceptionally convenient and useful starting point on the global student scale. And by means of the IUS, communist students, whose biased activities forced the majority of students to leave this organization, could still pose as defenders of student unity and integrity. Using the IUS, Soviet students hindered for a period of time the normal course of student co-operation, distracting their attention from vital student problems. With the IUS, Moscow obtained a means to influence youth's opinions in matters not only pertaining to students, but of a general and political nature. For Moscow, the IUS was a most favorable and valuable channel for the flow of Communist propaganda and infiltration into intellectual and academic institutions of the free world.

That the representatives of the Soviet students in IUS for the entire duration of this organization are leading a well-planned, destructive, and harmful action, from the point of view of common student interests and ideals, is more than evident

from the analysis and review of the activities of the IUS, which serve as a mirror of the prevailing Soviet foreign policy. Not the well-being of the constituent members, but Soviet interests underline and form the "leitmotif" of the entire activity of the IUS.

Before considering in detail the activities and nature of the IUS, let us briefly consider the forces that are influential on the Soviet students:

It is probably not a common secret that in the USSR, free and independent student unions as such do not exist, just as there is not one organization in existence which is not totally controlled by the CPSU and which does not serve as an instrument of the ruling clique for the exploitation and serfdom of the masses.[1] A Communist or any other kind of dictatorship can tolerate no real academic nor other type of freedom. Any such freedom would be a direct violation of the fundamental principles of the Communist dictatorship based on complete obedience of everyone to those in power and on complete control of the minds and thoughts of the subjugated people.

Officially, Soviet students form a section of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth which in its turn is an offspring of the Komsomol (League of Communist Youth). Both the AFCSY and the Komsomol are in reality organizations where the future party-men are trained. Both these organizations are a "proving ground" for the party leaders. As such they are under strict party control and observation.

On the nature of the Komsomol and the scope of its activities *Radyanska Ukraiina,* the Soviet newspaper, had this to say on the eve of the 17th Congress of the Komsomol of Ukraine in December 1955: "The policy of the party, its decisions, and directives form an active and dynamic program of the activities of the Komsomol. In its party leadership lies its strength."

It could not be put more clearly. In a communist system youth is a blind tool, a zombi in the hands of the party.

In the light of the above statement it is more than evident, who is representing the Soviet students in the IUS. The same even more applies to the Soviet representatives in numerous International front-groups, organized by communists and their fellow-travellers, of which the IUS is but one distinctive cell.

Analyzing the Soviet-directed activities on the international youth scene, one finds ample evidence to the effect that the communists are making a desperately earnest effort to gain the allegiance of university students the world over.

"In some areas of the world, the Communists are giving students the highest priority in their propaganda work, higher than labor, and higher than professional men."[2]

According to the same article, Communists are spending 50 million dollars a year in propaganda and other activities designed to control the minds of students the world over. And yet when at the IUS's Council Meeting in August of 1954 in Moscow the delegation of the British National Union of Students attempted to inquire about the sources of finances of the IUS, that attempt had led nowhere. It was quite clear to the representatives of the BNUS that details of the enormous sums received and spent by the IUS were not for general information.[3]

Having practically unlimited finances and a numerous and well-equipped staff of full-time workers in its two imposing eight-story buildings in Prague which form the headquarters of Communist world student organization, the IUS is able to conduct an intensive and immense activity towards winning the youth for the communistic cause. Every possible channel of communication as well as every means is used to reach the widest possible area of the world. Radio, television, films, periodicals and magazines, book and "ad hoc" publications, including pamphlets, leaflets, and similar items of a nonperiodical and nonpermanent nature are intensively used.

That the IUS is a blind tool in the hands of the Kremlin is not only evident from such deeds as its complete silence during the victimization of students in Czechoslovakia at the coup d'état in 1948, the expulsion of the Yugoslav Union of Students in 1950, the Second Congress at Prague in the 1950 pro-Stalin en masse demonstration, condemnation of the United States' "intervention" in Korea and alleged use of bacteriological weapons by US forces, attacks in its publications upon American "imperialism", its turning of a blind eye to examples of infringements of human rights in Eastern Europe, whereas examples in the West are exploited to the full, but also in its forming an image of the Kremlin policies on the student scale. Even such cultural and, at first glance, apolitical events as sport olympiads, various professional gatherings, and youth festivals are saturated to the utmost with familiar Communist catch phrases and slogans for unity on a national and international scale, for lasting peace and democracy, disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons, etc. An abundance of evidences to this effect may be found in the IUS publications on the events as well as in the reports of individual participants.[4]

The most frequently used catch-phrase by the IUS is that for lasting peace. This word stands out in all publications. It serves as a motto for almost every international gathering and youth festival. And at the same time the IUS is totally blind to the very fact that the only disturber of international harmony and peace is the USSR.

A strong and powerful asset in the hands of the IUS, particularly in its relations with the students in undeveloped and colonial countries, is its pretense to pose as a champion of national freedom and independence. This theme is constantly repeated, and not even the minor events escape the proper attention for its usage in IUS propaganda. Joining the students in colonial areas in their pleas for national independence, the IUS cherishes hopes for winning their sympathy and favorable response to its various one-sided policies

No one from the IUS seems to notice that in the USSR the subjugated nations do not possess any possibility for national development and cultural growth.[5] A complete silence on the part of the IUS embraces the heroic, gallant, and everlasting struggle for national liberation of the Ukrainian, Baltic, Georgian, and other peoples. The IUS also is silent on recent student demonstrations and unrest in Riga (Latvia), Kiev (Ukraine), Tiflis (Georgia), Prague (Czechoslovakia). We do not hear of protests by the IUS against forcible mass deportation of youth and students from Ukraine and Byelorussia to Kazakhstan and other remote regions of Siberia for the development of the virgin lands despite the fact that more than often such action is conducted in the middle of the academic year.

We do not hear of any protests of the IUS against enforced juvenile labor in Ukraine, which indirectly is present in the decree of the Kremlin to the effect that every high school student is required to work regularly on state-farms.[6]

Is it not a paradoxical fact that searching for members even among the splinter groups outside of the Soviet orbit of influence, Moscow's representatives in the IUS are oblivious of students from countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia as well as representatives of students from numerous nations subjugated by Moscow?

Prior to the Poznan riots, the Polish (Communist) Union of Students rejecting the USNSA's belief that colonialism does exist in Eastern Europe[7] emphasized the enjoyment by the Polish people of prosperity and freedom.[8] The Poznan riots with their demands for "Bread", "Liberty", and "Russians Go

Home!" disproved the validity of the statements of the Polish Students dictated by the IUS.

It is fruitless to search for sympathy on the part of the IUS for the freedom fighters of Poznan.

The Hugarian Revolution shows even more that the IUS is nothing but a mere tool of the Kremlin leaders. In times when world-over freedom-loving students have condemned Moscow's butchery of Hungarian youth and freedom, the IUS as well as the Anti-Fascist Committee of the Soviet Youth constantly repeated after the Kremlin that it was brought about as an aid by the "brotherly" Russians to defend Hungarian freedom against the forces of "international reactionaries" and "fascist elements".[9] The communistic understanding of moral values was once more baptized in the innocent blood of Hungarian victims. The case of Hungary shows to the fullest extent the true nature of the IUS pleas toward national independence and its role as defender of colonial students. For this reason alone it would be most improper for the Western Unions of Students to cooperate with the IUS even on the basis of the so-called practical student projects, even if it would not be questionable that such projects are within the scope of the activities of the IUS and in the plans of the Kremlin.

Due credit must be given to the observers of the National Union of Norwegian Students, who, as early as 1954, in reporting on the IUS Council Meeting, made this statement of caution on the subject of cooperation with the IUS: "All the time one must bear in mind the political nature of the IUS, and that every form of cooperation, be it as non-political as it may, involves a certain acceptance of the organization, and thereby a concession to the system."[10]

Stating it more clearly, the road to cooperation with broad masses of students in Eastern and Central Europe does not lead through the IUS. How much the IUS has in common with the students it pretends to represent may be seen from the latest developments behind the Iron Curtain. That the youth and students of nations subjugated by Moscow clearly disassociated itself with the belying slogans, policies, and practices of the Kremlin is undoubtedly demonstrated by the unceasing struggle for the national independence of Ukraine, the Baltic Countries, and Georgia. It is evident from the student riots and demonstrations at various universities, the prisoners' strikes in the Slave Labor Camps at Karaganda and Vorkuta (mostly composed of students and youth). It is proved by the recent developments in Poland as well as by the gallant Hungarian

freedom-fighters, as also by the fact that the students and youth formed the driving force of the revolution.

The recent events behind the Iron Curtain manifested a fact of paramount importance that despite unceasing efforts by the Kremlin, the youth and students remained faithful in their just devotion to truth and freedom, and their aspirations to national independence.

Therefore, a desire for cooperation and student unity from a global aspect must be manifested clearly by the Western Students with equal devotion to the truth and principle of freedom for all people. Thus, to re-emphasize, the desire of many students to find the link with the students in Eastern Europe could be most successfully achieved through ignoring the IUS. The condemnation of the practices of the Kremlin under the guise of the IUS would serve as a forceful memento and as a moral support to the students subjugated by the Kremlin, and clearly manifest itself in a unity of interests of all the students, creating a most constructive and stable bond of co-operation, based on the devotion of students to the principles of equality, fraternity, and freedom. The spiritual co-operation based on the common beliefs in the integrity and final triumph of freedom cannot be hindered by artificially constructed Iron or Bamboo Curtains, nor by any other deeds of the Kremlin. Spiritual and moral values are beyond the reach of the destructive forces of man.

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[1] "Student Life in the Soviet Union," *University News,* German National Union of Students, June 1953.

[2] "Student War Against Reds", *Des Moines Tribune,* (August 27, 1954).

[3] Frank Copplestone, *Report of the NUS Observer to the Council Meeting of the IUS* (Moscow, 1954).

[4] See also the Cominform journal, *For Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy.*

[5] A Symposium of a Conference on "Academic Freedom Under the Soviet Regime" (New York, April 3-4, 1954), pp. 77-113.

[6] *Radyanska Ukraiina,* September 26, 1956.

[7] Letter sent by the United States National Student Association to Organizations Participating in the International Preparatory Committee for the IUS Seminar on the Problems of Students in Colonial Countries.

[8] USNSA's Ninth Congress Publications containing the copies of both letters.

[9] "Letter from the USSR," *Information Bulletin,* COSEC, April 1957, pp. 14-17.

[10] *Report on the Council Meetings of the IUS,* Moscow, August, 1954, from the Observers of the National Union of Norwegian Students.

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE CRIMEA IN WORLD WAR II [1]

by MICHAEL LUTHER*

Although the Ukrainians were numerically only the third largest group in the Crimea,[2] still they posed a problem for the Nazi statesmen in World War II. On the one hand, as a strategic appendage of the Ukrainian mainland, the Crimean peninsula had long been regarded by the Ukrainian national movement as a component part of a future Ukrainian state. On the other hand, its location in the Black Sea and its large Tatar population made the area one of direct concern to the Turkish government. It therefore figured prominently in Germany's wartime relations with Turkey.

The Nazi leaders were in disagreement concerning the future status of the Crimea. Hitler and Himmler were the chief exponents of direct annexation of the Crimean peninsula into the Third Reich. The new Reichsgebiet was to comprise, in addition to the peninsula proper, the southern "Tauride" districts of the Ukrainian mainland, thereby providing the Crimea with a defensive land cordon against any possible future attack from the north. Rosenberg, however, openly pursuing a pro-Ukrainian policy, preferred seeing the Crimea made a part of a future Ukrainian state. But barring this, he protested, albeit unsuccessfully, against the transfer of the above mainland districts to the Crimea, pointing out to Hitler, in December 1941, the predominantly Ukrainian character of these districts.[3]

Had Rosenberg been given jurisdiction over the Crimea, then undoubtedly the fortunes of the Ukrainian national cause in the peninsula would have fared better than was the case. Administrative jurisdiction over the Crimea and the Tauride provinces to the north, however, was placed in the hands of A. E. Frauenfeld, an Austrian Nazi, who presumably had some knowledge of nationality problems and who was counted upon to be obedient to the wishes of his superiors. Since the Crimea was never too far from the front lines, all real power in the peninsula proper was exercised by the Wehrmacht and the Security Service branch of the SS. Neither of these organizations was well disposed to the Ukrainian national cause. The

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former feared stirring national emnity by catering to any one national group, and therefore sought to treat with all national groups on a basis of equality. Nevertheless, towards the end of the German occupation, they openly favored the Russian (and hence "All-Russian") element as the largest single group in the peninsula. This latter attitude was especially manifested in the encouragement which the military occupation authorities gave to the recruiting campaign for the Vlasovite "Russian Liberation Army" in the spring of 1943.[4]

Diametrically opposed to the Wehrmacht's policy of conciliation was the policy of the Security Service, which sought to curb any and all political manifestations of the several national groups in the Crimea. As pointed out above, the basis for its policies in the Crimea was the eventual evacuation of the population from the peninsula, which would then become the home of SS men turned farmers.[5] But the exigencies of war, and especially the demands of foreign policy (the Foreign Office's attempt to gain the entry of Turkey on the side of the Axis) forced the Security Service into a pro-Tatar policy.

In spite of the absence of any explicit Ukrainian orientation among the German forces occupying the Crimea, the Ukrainian population did enjoy some of the German concessions in the cultural sphere which were granted to the Russian and Tatar groups, albeit on a reduced scale. In Simferopol, which contained a large Ukrainian population, a Ukrainian "Bureau for the Aid of Ukrainians" was established with the permission of the German "Kommandatura," as a branch of that city's administration. Also, although Russians predominated in that administration, certain leading posts were occupied by Ukrainians. The Bureau itself was assigned the task of organizing material aid for the Ukrainian population and of servicing its cultural needs. With regard to the first of these tasks, the Bureau aided in the evacuation of Ukrainians from the chiefly coastal areas of the Crimea which were severely stricken by famine in the early months of 1942. To this end, a Ukrainian "Konsum" was organized by the Bureau to obtain food from the northern areas of the peninsula for distribution among the Ukrainians suffering from the famine.[6]

The Bureau was no less active in the cultural sphere. As a result of its efforts, a Ukrainian elementary school was established in Simferopol, followed by the establishment of elementary schools in other Ukrainian populated areas of the Crimea. Many of these, chiefly four-year schools, had been opened by the Soviet government before the war, and after a

brief period of remaining closed during and soon after the end of hostilities in the peninsula, were gradually being reopened with the permission of the local German authorities. Some seven-year schools also appear to have been reopened. Teachers for these schools, using Ukrainian as the language of instruction, came from the Pedagogical Institute in Simferopol, which contained a large Ukrainian student body. Many of these were finding employment not only in the Ukrainian, but in the Russian and Tatar elementary schools as well, as also in the various bureaus of the occupation administration.[7]

In addition to the opening of schools, a "Shevchenko Music and Drama Theater" was organized in Simferopol in early 1942, and by the following April, performances were given of several Ukrainian folk operas including "Zaporozhian Beyond the Danube." When not performing at the theater, the performers gave their talents to Ukrainian language programs broadcast by the radio station in Simferopol. The theater's productions had become so popular not only among the Ukrainian population of the city, but among the other national groups of the city as well, that it soon began touring the peninsula. Perhaps the popularity of the theater was becoming too great, for by late 1943, its activities were sharply curtailed by the German authorities.[8]

Religion was the one sphere of activities openly encouraged by the military authorities, and especially by their commander, Gen. Manstein. Therefore, along with the opening of Russian and Tatar (Moslem) houses of worship, the Germans permitted the opening of a Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous) church in Simferopol.[9]

The resurgent Ukrainian cultural life could not but serve as an impetus for Ukrainian political activity. The above cultural activities, the presence of Ukrainians in the administrative apparatus of the Occupation forces, and the appearance of Ukrainians as burgomeisters of some of the towns and villages in the peninsula, were factors which favored such activity. But only a well organized political group of disciplined cadres, which could give direction to such activity, the existence of a mass basis of support, and most important, a cooperative attitude on the part of the German authorities in the Crimea, could guarantee the success of such activity. However, the negative attitude of these authorities from the very beginning of the occupation, sealed the fate of any Ukrainian political movement.

Given German assent to such a movement, ample support from some part of the Ukrainian population would have been

forthcoming. Allowing for those Ukrainians who identified themselves with the Russians or with an "All-Russian" orientation, there is evidence of a large group of Ukrainians who would have welcomed a Ukrainian political organization. Among this group were many young people, chiefly of the technical and cultural intelligentsia, as also those who had been dekulakized and consequently evacuated from their farms in the Ukraine to towns in the Crimea.[10]

Undoubtedly open and active support for such a movement among these sectors of the Ukrainian population would have been more readily forthcoming in the spring of 1942, when the economic situation in the peninsula became more stabilized and when Soviet military fortunes appeared at their lowest. Yet even prior to this period, in the severe winter of early 1942, when thoughts of political activity seemed irrelevant to a population faced with starvation, the Ukrainian Bureau in Simferopol offered to organize several Ukrainian defense companies, analogous to those of the Tatars, for use against the Soviet partisans in the Crimea. The offer, however, was rejected, although Ukrainians, along with others in the Crimea, were recruited for work in the intelligence apparatus of the Wehrmacht and the Security Service.[11]

Ukrainian political activity was also, in general, favored by the spokesmen for the Crimean Tatars, who saw in Ukrainian-Tatar cooperation a means of effectively countering any Russian political activity. Realizing that any attempt to create a Crimean Tatar state, the cardinal point in the program of the Crimean Tatar emigrés, would have to be based upon a prior undestanding with the leaders of Ukrainian nationalism, a Cumeak Tatar emigré leader, Kirimal, met several times with Andrew Mel'nyk, the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Mel'nykites). However, no Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian understanding on this question resulted from these talks. If conflicting political aspirations hindered any effective Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian cooperation on the organizational level, religious differences hindered any union on the popular level. While the Ukrainians could distinguish between religion and nationality, no such nice distinction was made by the Crimean Tatar population especially of the older generation. For these, friend and foe were classified by religion, and the Ukrainians, as Orthodox Christians were, together with the Russians, regarded as enemies of the Moslem faith.

As pointed out above, the greatest obstacle to the development of Ukrainian political activity was the Security Service.

To the fear of this organization lest such activity take hold among the Ukrainian population must be ascribed their above mentioned refusal to permit the creation of Ukrainian anti-partisan units, as also their refusal to permit the publication of a Ukrainian newspaper in the peninsula. Playing upon their apprehension was the knowledge that Ukrainian partisans belonging to the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists were arriving in the Crimea and organizing clandestine activities against the German occupation forces. In December, 1941, four Bandera partisans were arrested upon their arrival in the peninsula from their organizational center in Lviv. In January, 1942, the Germans learned of the plans of Bandera partisans to gain employment in various bureaus of the German occupation government or to be appointed burgomeisters and chiefs of local militia units in order to use their positions for agitation in behalf of their political program and to enlist the Ukrainian population for their cause. Some had already been apprehended in such activity: the Ukrainian commandant of the Kherson militia who sought to transfer the troops under his command to Simferopol in order to carry on conspiratorial work there; his aide who planned to move to Sevastopol upon the occupation of that city by German forces, for the same purpose. The Germans learned that such groups, having once established their bases of operations in the towns, would then be augmented by six-men teams sent from other parts of the Ukraine. The above, and it would seem, all other Ukrainian partisan activity was frustrated by the Security Service in the early period of occupation. Whatever activity by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) did occur, appears to have been confined to the Kherson-Nikolaev area on the mainland.[12]

Supporting the Security Service in its repression of Ukrainian political activity were the many anti-Ukrainian elements, chiefly Russian monarchists who had lived in Bulgaria after the Bolshevik revolution, who were brought to the Crimea to work in various German occupation bureaus. These elements were quick to discern and report even the slightest manifestation of Ukrainian political activity to the German authorities.[13]

The fortunes of the Ukrainian partisans in the Crimea were further prejudiced by their own unfamiliarity with the area and lack of ties with the local Ukrainian population. Generally coming from outside of the Crimea they could not easily orient themselves with local conditions. Consequently, once the Security Service undertook its repressive measures,

the Ukrainian partisans found thmselves unable to become fused with the local population, and thereby escape detection.[14] Given these above enumerated obstacles, a Ukrainian national movement in the Crimea remained still-born.

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[1] The following information is based primarily on German documents from the series *The Trial of the Major War Criminals* (TMWC) and the International Military Tribunal (IMT), as also on a manuscript dealing with Ukrainian activities in the Crimea in World War II. The author should like to thank Mr. Myroslav Prokip for having made the manuscript available to him. The following study will limit itself only to Ukrainian affairs, omitting from discussion problems concerning economic, military, and diplomatic affairs, and the status of the Crimean Tatar population. For these latter problems, see the author's monograph "Die Krim unter deutscher Besatzung im zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Forschungen zur Osteuropaeischen Geschichte,* Band 3, S. 28-98, West Berlin, 1956.

[2] As of 1936, the Russians comprised 43.5% and the Crimean Tatars comprised 23.1% of the population in the peninsula. (*Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia,* 1st edition, Vol. 35, p. 295). Though German figures for the population of the Crimea are available as of December 1942, these figures have not been categorized by nationality.

[3] Doc. L-221, TMWC, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 87; Doc. 1517 PS, TMWC, Vol. XXVII, p. 289; Kordt, Erich, *Wahn und Wirklichkeit,* Stuttgart, 1948, p. 304. As part of their plan of incorporating the Crimea into the Third Reich, Hitler and Himmler called for the evacuation of the entire population from the peninsula prior to its settlement by German farmers. The evacuation of the Ukrainians was proposed in the summer of 1942, at a time when Germany's permanent occupation of Eastern Europe seemed assured. The proposal, however, was rejected because of the adverse effect which the consequent decrease in local manpower would have on the harvesting of the peninsula's crops. Doc. Wi/ID 2.602-b (IMT).

[4] *Chasovoi,* Brussels, February, 1950.

[5] Doc. NO-5711 (IMT).

[6] Manuscript furnished by Prokip.

[7] *Ibid.;* Savka, Jaroslav, "Z Ukraiins'koho zhyttya na Krymu" in *Krakivs'ki Visty,* 18 June 1942.

[8] Manuscript offered by Prokip.

[9] *Ibid.;* Savka, *op. cit.*

[10] Manuscript offered by Prokip.

[11] United States Military Tribunal; Case of Otto Ohlendorf, pp. 530-531.

[12] Doc. NO-3159 (IMT); Doc. NO-2659 (IMT); Doc. NO-3279 (IMT). On Ukrainian partisan activity in the Kherson-Nikolaev area, see Armstrong, John, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 1939-1945; New York, 1955, pp. 270-271.

[13] Manuscript furnished by Prokip.

[14] *Ibid.*

AMERICAN LAND-COLLEGES AND THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

by FRANK WILHOIT*

Since the end of World War II, American colleges and universities have not only played a key role on the domestic scene; they have increasingly taken the initiative in a great variety of international movements. Indeed, American institutions of higher learning have traditionally been more international-minded than perhaps any other segment of the nation.

Typical of the spreading international understanding on the campuses of our educational institutions is the cooperative relationships which our so-called land-grant colleges have recently established with universities in less developed areas of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. The significance of such inter-university cooperation was underscored not long ago by Mr. Alvin Roseman, Director of the Office of Public Services, Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), in an article he wrote for *Higher Education.* In this article Mr. Roseman asserted: "The cooperative relationship by which one nation assists another to achieve its economic development goals is not confined to governmental .... Educational institutions obviously have a most important role, not only because technical cooperation is basically an educational process, but also because better education is one of the great aspirations of all countries." The activities of American farm organizations, labor unions, and professional societies in the foreign aid program have been widely publicized. It has not been generally appreciated, however, that American colleges and universities have likewise been active in carrying out this phase of our foreign policy.

What kind of institutions are the land-grant colleges which have been participating in the foreign aid program? What is their history? What are their goals and purposes?

A unique American phenomenon, the land-grant institutions were made possible by the Morrill Act, which the federal Congress enacted in 1862, and which was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. This Act granted federal land to each state "for the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object should be ... to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." Each state, under the provisions of this Act, received about 30,000 acres for each senator and representative then in Congress. The land was usually sold; and the funds thus acquired were invested in securities, the income from which was used to operate the institutions.

Today there are 69 land-grant colleges and universities, with at least one in each state and 17 exclusively for Negroes in the Southern states. They are attended by approximately one-sixth of all resident college stu-

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dents in the United States. And though they were formerly dependent upon the federal (national) government for financial support, they are now supported mainly by the states in which they are located. Federal aid today amounts to less than 10% of total operating income.

The land-grant institutions are commonly regarded as primarily agricultural colleges. This is no longer true, for they regularly produce more graduates in other academic fields than in agriculture. Last year they awarded a total of 61,000 degrees.

These institutions are particularly well equipped to cooperate with universities in underdeveloped countries, since they have long been noted for their university extension services, demonstration programs, and general advisory services to agriculture, industry and government. They have, in brief, precisely the skills and techniques that are needed by the peoples in emerging areas of the world.

Mr. Harold Stassen, the former director of the Foreign Operations Administration, laid the foundations for the land-grant colleges' participation in the foreign aid program, for he felt that technical cooperation on an interuniversity basis would be more acceptable and effective than such cooperation on a government-to-government basis. It would appear to be true that assistance rendered by universities and their agencies is less open to objections in such areas as Latin America, Asia, and Africa than aid rendered directly by political bodies. In the case of interuniversity cooperation there seems to be less fear of strings being attached to the aid.

In order to formalize this interuniversity cooperation, the FOA let contracts to those land-grant institutions willing to help administer the foreign aid program. These contracts were normally written for 3-year periods. In the words of Mr. Roseman, "This permits the two universities to plan for the exchange of faculty, to work out programs for curriculum and staff development, to undertake demonstration and pilot projects, and to develop a solid foundation for future growth." The fact that underdeveloped countries are chiefly agricultural is sufficient explanation for the policy of assigning contracts to land-grant institutions.

The FOA has always insisted that along with agricultural improvements should go improvements in education. And, in fact, this insistence has been heartily welcomed in all parts of the world. American views on teacher training and the organization of vocational courses have especially been sought. From its inception, FOA's philosophy was that if education can be improved in underdeveloped areas, the local universities will in the future be qualified to plan their nation's development programs with a minimum of foreign aid and guidance. Every nation has its national pride, and quite understandably prefers its own engineers, chemists, and doctors to foreign ones—no matter how brilliant the latter may be.

Of course, before interuniversity cooperation under the foreign aid program could be initiated, foreign governments in the underdeveloped countries had to request technical assistance. When this was done, FOA's local mission would review the request and then forward it to Washington for final approval. If the foreign university requested a specific American university, as was often done, this request was generally granted. The

program finally agreed upon normally included these things: faculty exchanges between the two universities concerned, advanced training of foreign graduate students in the United States, inspection trips to the foreign country by American project directors, and the assurance of American technical aid in developing such programs as public works, public health, and transportation facilities. Certainly the heart of the program was the provision that the American university would maintain a team at the foreign institution, while the latter in turn would send a number of kits, key faculty members and graduate students to the American university. In all instances of such cooperation to date the foreign university or government being assisted has contributed part of the costs of the undertaking, with FOA guaranteeing payment of the remainder.

Perhaps the most outstanding example of this type of direct university-to-university relationship were the activities of Cornell University in the Philippines and Purdue University in Formosa.

Cornell's foreign counterpart under the program was the College of Agriculture of the University of Philippines. Almost completely destroyed by the Japanese during the war, this great college was reestablished with Cornell's advice and assistance, and is now once again rendering valuable services to the community on the grass roots level. Cornell, which is one of America's largest and most influential land-grant institutions, was helpful in getting the Philippine educators to put the main emphasis on practical research rather than on the academic education of farmers. This emphasis has already paid off in inproved agricultural yields and income.

In similar fashion, Purdue University successfully cooperated with Taiwan College of Engineering in Formosa. According to Mr. Roseman, "Senior members of the faculty, including the president of the college, spent time observing and studying in the United States." And in addition to strengthening the college's teaching facilities, "effective relationships were established with the industrial community of Taiwan." The results of all this have been most satisfactory.

Another example of interest is the case in which a Western land-grant college, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, helped the Ethiopian Government set up a new Imperial Agricultural College. Among other activities, Oklahoma A & M helped establish vocational trade schools, aided in developing a country-wide system of agricultural extension services, and even assisted in designing a sewage disposal system in the capital city of Addis Ababa.

Mr. Roseman reports that there were 36 FOA financed university contracts in effect as of July 1, 1954. Over the 3-year period, foreseen by the program it was anticipated that expenditures by the United States Government would be around 40 million. But virtually all Americans agree that this is a small price to pay for promoting international understanding, good will among people, and the material well being of underdeveloped areas.

The advantages, of course, have not been entirely on the side of the foreign institutions. The American universities participating in the program

have benefited enormously from the exchange of ideas and faculties; and their enthusiasm for the program attests this. There can be no doubt that their own faculties have become more competent as the horizon of their campuses has been broadened by this interuniversity cooperation. International cooperation is ever a two-way street; it is mutually advantageous to all parties.

Few international activities in which American colleges have been privileged to participate have done so much to refute Communist stereotypes about America as have the activities of the land-grant colleges in the foreign aid program. This participation, enthusiastic as it has been, illustrates to what a great extent our colleges and universities are conscious of the need for sharing their technical skills with less fortunate areas. It also illustrates the growing cooperation between government and the university communities in the United States. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the technical aid program has nothing to do with military aid. It is wholly non-political and non-military, and there are no strings attached.

The United States National Student Association (USNSA), which has chapters at many of the land-grant colleges, has from its foundation strongly encouraged inter-university cooperation at every level. Moreover, by personal meetings, attendance at international conferences, and by seminars in international relations, NSA has urged continuing and broadened cooperation between the peoples of all continents. At its Eighth Congress in August of last year, NSA advocated a greatly increased foreign student exchange program, full support of the World University Service, and the formation of an Asian Sub-Commission to gather inormation on the student life and conditions in Asia. While it is true that these things have no direct effect on American foreign policy, they form the groundwork, as it were, for that type of fruitful interuniversity cooperation which the FOA has sponsored in the last two years.

We agree with Dr. Lewis Webster Jones, the president of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, who recently observed that "education has always been our main lever for constructive social change." And in the field of education no groups have been more active—both at home and abroad—in promoting such change than the land-grant institutions. Thy have been the agencies through which science tackled the problems of everyday work and living. In this respect they have more than justified their foundation under the presidency of the great Emancipator, Abraham Lincoln.

They deserve to be better known abroad.

SKETCHES OF KIEV

by YAROSLAVA SURMACH*

Olha seemed to flutter toward me. From her cupped hands she presented me with a tiny bundle of crushed paper. In it was a *pysanka.* She explained with great excitement that she had brought this decorated egg herself from *Bukovyna*[1] where she had been on an ethnic research expedition a few months earlier. Now she wanted me to have it.

I was in the office of the department of Folklore and Ethnography in the *Akademiya Nauk*[2] in Kiev. Olha was one of the assistants to the head of the department and was working for her doctorate. She was pleased by my interest in Ukrainian folk art and especially Easter eggs which was her favorite subject —and mine.

Olha spoke beautiful Ukrainian to which I listened as though it were a song. I actually found it hard to concentrate on what she said. Until now I had heard only Russian on my trip. In Riga, Leningrad and Moscow I had of course expected it. But when I arrived in Kiev and was again greeted with "Zdravstvuyte," I was bitterly disappointed.

However, here in the Akademia, as in an oasis, Ukrainian was spoken exclusively. It was as though a thirst was being quenched. A boy from Poltava came in and greeted me. Such a beautiful accent! Rumor of my visit must have spread to neighboring offices. The room filled with people curious to see a "capitalist" from America. I was kept busy answering questions and barely squeezed in a few of my own. They wanted to know if Ukrainian is spoken in America. Is the language taught, and where? Where have the Ukrainians settled? Are there many Ukrainian periodicals and other publications? I mentioned as many newspapers and publishing houses as I could recall. They seemed genuinely surprised to hear about organizations in America such as N. T. Sh. (Shevchenko Scientific Society) and U.V.A.N. (Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.). They were also amazed to learn that their publications could be obtained in America whereas they had none of ours. They said they wanted to request books but were not sure the books would be received.

Their lack of knowledge of what was going on outside the Soviet was typical. But I also met a number of people who

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

Photo Y. Surmach

Main Gate of the Pecherska Lavra (Monastery) in Kiev

questioned me about other Soviet cities I had visited. Several young people wanted to know if Stalin's body was still in the mausoleum in Moscow. (It was when I was there.)

On another visit to the Akademia, I was invited by a young sculptor to visit the Fine Arts division. He asked if I knew the Ukrainian sculptor in America, Archipenko. I did. He then handed me a catalog of Archipenko's work, printed in England some years ago. I thumbed through the catalog, recognizing and commenting favorably on some of the pieces. I felt the others in the room stir uneasily. Apparently they had expected me to ridicule the modern works. I tried to make a few seemingly intelligent remarks and was tersely answered with some stock Soviet opinions on modern art. There followed a heated dispute for some tense moments. It seems they were taught that modern art has never existed in the Soviet, ignoring the facts about the modernists who had had a strong foothold there in the early part of the century.

On another occasion, and another discourse with a group of artists on modern art, I was surprised to find one young man who spoke out bravely against his colleagues and sided with me. Although I never saw actual examples of experimental work by young moderns, I was made aware of the fact that they did exist.

One evening I went for a stroll with Shura, an *Intourist* guide whom I had befriended. (I did not use the services of a guide, much to the frustration of the *Intourist* director whose duty it was to assign guides to all tourists.) Shura was pleasant and avoided the ritual chatter of memorized propaganda. I accepted her invitation to a movie and walk. It is very difficult to get into a movie alone. The line forms early in the day for the evening performance and only an *Intourist* guide can get a visitor in ahead of everyone. (I recall the complaints hurled at us because those waiting in line did not believe I was a tourist.) After the movie (an Egyptian film with Russian sub-titles) we strolled down to *Khreshchatik* (Kiev's main avenue) and over to *Shevchenko Boulevard.* We passed a gang of young boys dressed astonishingly like our "zoot-suiters" with peg pants and pompadour hair style. (The cheapest of Soviet suits costs about 1300 rubles, or over $300, which is the price of a small TV set. These "zoot-suits" had to be made to order by unauthorized tailors and probably at considerable cost.) "These boys are *stelyagy,*" Shura explained to my query about them. They are the children of well-to-do parents and were proving to be problem delinquents. There were other groups too, rather

shabbily dressed in the typical bell-bottomed trousers. These were known as the *huligany,* or lower class delinquents.

As we walked Shura pointed out where she lived with her mother and 6 year old daughter but she did not invite me up. She was divorced. Her former husband was a Muscovite who did not like children and had treated her and the child cruelly. She said he was "grown up" now, and came often to visit, but she had had enough of marriage!

I met Leonid in a book store. I had gone to inquire about old books on Ukrainian Folk Art. Any purchase in a Soviet store is a very complicated matter. An *Intourist* guide can get you quick service but since I had chosen to be alone, I had to go through the same irritations about poor service as the rest of the Ukrainians. I was being completely ignored by the unenthusiastic salegirls, and I abhorred wasting precious time on such a simple matter as an inquiry about a book. A young fellow was standing nearby, evidently observing my anxiety and quietly asked if he could be of help. I explained my plight and he took command of the situation and got the salesgirl's attention. I didn't get the books I sought but I did make a friend.

Leonid was a student at Shevchenko University in Kiev. School would not begin for several weeks but students were already busy preparing for examinations. We chatted for a while and agreed to meet the following day. I arrived on time to find Leonid waiting. He was frankly surprised to see me, he said.

That day a statue of *Ivan Franko* was to be unveiled in a park near the *Franko Theatre.* We walked to the theatre. Workmen and women were busy arranging flower beds in preparation for the unveiling ceremonies. We were several hours early it seemed, so Leonid suggested a boat ride on the river. We started a leisurely walk down to *Dolyna* and the banks of the beautiful Dnieper. On the way we argued a great deal about politics (quietly).

Near the end of *Khreshchatik,* before it dips down towards the river, a hotel was being built. The ever-present cranes were at attention near the building. (Although I saw scores of such cranes againt the skylines of all the cities I visited, I never saw one in use.) A few women were about, carrying bricks and mixing mortar. Women too, were repairing the streetcar rails in *Kirov Street* nearby. Everywhere I had noticed women doing strenuous work, from street sweeping to unloading freight cars. The preponderance of men in uniform seems to account for the lack of civilian manpower.

Leonid and I passed through *Pershoho Maya Park.* There is a large playground for children and an outdoor bandshell. Leonid said sadly that there are no jazz orchestras in the parks of Kiev as there are in Leningrad and Moscow. Here they have a symphony which is free, but Leonid loves jazz. So do most young Soviets, I observed. He listens to music from Munich, Tangiers, BBC, Armed Forces Network and Voice of America. (He told me that listening to foreign broadcasts was not forbidden; however the government jamming made it very difficult.) Leonid tapes this jazz on a tape recorder he built himself. I was amazed at his knowledge of American name bands. He had memorized the tunes of many old popular songs and asked me to write out the words in English. American records are impossible to obtain and even Soviet records were difficult to get. This is true of most luxury items.

Leonid insisted on bying the tickets for the boat. He blushed beet red when I even offered to pay. The boat went across the river to the lovely white sand beach, then between the scattered islands lined with smaller beaches. I noticed many bathers in scant bikinis and some small motor boats. A militiaman stayed uncomfortably close to us for some time but finally disappeared. On the return trip our boat, which was the size of a small ferry, hit a tiny motor boat. Everyone watched, transfixed as the inexorable tragedy occured. Somehow my reflexes worked enough for me to set my camera and snap a picture at the moment of impact. Fortunately, the little boat did not sink, but someone nearby remarked in Russian, "Oh you Americans, you love the sensational!"

On Sunday, just before the service at the tremendous Cathedral of St. Volodymyr, an urchin-like girl took me by the hand and led me up the stairway to the vaulted balcony. She had seen me come in and my camera fascinated her. She followed me around as I snapped a few pictures and then offered to show me the interior view from above. On the balcony several people protested my taking pictures. A woman in nun-like dress came up to me and angrily informed me it was forbidden to take pictures. She led me down to the *starosta* where I again was scolded, and told to wait until after the service to photograph.

A woman came up to me. She said I reminded her of her daughter who had left home 12 years ago and was now living in Brazil. The mother spoke more to herself than to me, recalling things from long ago. She began to sob and kissed me, then left. The service had begun. It was in Church Slavonic. The choir was magnificent and I felt they were singing with

great sincerity. I was overwhelmed. I found a dark corner and cried.

I spent much time at the *Pecherska Lavra,* the 11th century Monastery of the Caves. One church is still open for services on the grounds. On the holy day *Uspeniye*[3] thousands of Ukrainians made a pilgrimage to this sacred spot. But I found very few young people among them. One boy, Sashko, had come all the way from Crimea. A very pretty but timid girl, Natashka, in a lovely shirt she had embroidered herself, had traveled for two days to reach Kiev from her village. Mostly there were old people, very poorly dressed and many without shoes. They sat on the ground with their little bundles of food and drank water from the sacred twin wells of Sts. Antoniy and Feodosiy. They crowded into the small church and overflowed into the crowds outside. They went down into the cool black catacombs, many without even a tiny candle. Along the passages lined with the mummified bodies of monks who walked there nine centuries ago, they chanted their prayers and kissed the holy objects. I followed them through the hallowed darkness.

As I was leaving the monastery, a relatively well-dressed woman whom I had noticed earlier, came up to me. In what seemed like a prepared oration, she began to expound the greatness of the Soviets for the evident freedom of religion. I excused myself and turned towards the gate. I faced a row of maimed beggars. The sightless eyes of one nearest me reflected many things.

I got an opportunity to visit a collective farm with a busload of Norwegian economists. We were driven about 100 km. from Kiev, past *Bila Tserkva.* Here the people, as in all rural areas, spoke Ukrainian. Our group walked along the muddy road through the village and I hung back to speak to a young mother and her baby. She was visibly shocked but pleased when I spoke in Ukrainian and invited me into her home. It was a tiny whitewashed hut with a thatched roof, just like most of the village houses in Ukraine. In the entry was a *peech,* a large stove with deep shelves on which people could sleep. It was painted light blue. The inner room had a table with a bowl of undersized fruit which she offered me. Benches lined the walls. "Ikons" of the ubiquitous Lenin and some soldiers draped in embroidered towels hung on the wall. I inquired about real Ikons but she only pointed to these. A few neighbors followed us in and asked me where I was from. When I told them America, they were astonished. They asked if conditions

were better in my country than in theirs! They wanted to know whether we had churches! I in turn learned that they still color *Krashanky* (solid color Easter eggs), eat *kutya* and go to church on holy days. The nearest church is 30 km. but they often go all the way to Kiev. I was soon missed and an official came to ask me to rejoin the group.

Word seemed to have spread that I was Ukrainian, because as I walked people pointed at me and whispered, but with smiles. So many nice-looking people, beautiful children... but dressed in rags and barefoot in ankle-deep mud. A boy followed along, hiding behind houses as I walked. I caught a glimpse of his plaid shirt every now and then. Suddenly he confronted me by an apple tree and produced a small camera. He stammered a request to be allowed to take my picture. I complied and in turn took his. I then asked if it was possible to get a few sunflower seeds. Every house was surrounded by a garden full of these flowers. I thought it would please my mother to bring some back for her to plant. He immediately ran to the nearest garden and cut off a huge sunflower and presented it to me.

I was invited by some students to attend a concert in honor of the 100th anniversary of Franko's death. The *Dumka* mixed chorus of 56 voices was featured. Their repertoire was in both Ukrainian and Russian. The commemorative speech was in Russian. The students were embarrassed by this, after having heard my long laments on the lack of spoken Ukrainian in Kiev. But the chorus sang beautifully and I was most impressed. During the second half of the concert, songs could be requested from the audience. Titles were written on slips of paper and handed to the conductor. In my honor the students requested *Slavka* by Glinka. They asked if I had a request and I wrote *Shche ne vmerla Ukraina.*[4] It was not granted.

Most of all I loved to walk along the steep bank of the Dnieper.

In the evening after the sun had set behind Kiev and only the golden domes of St. Sofia still reflected its last rays... and the vast steppe to the east was slowly being covered by the darkening diamond-sprinkled sky... and the cool delicious breeze whispered to me of my ancestors...

Then I came close to understanding the longing with which former Kievans had spoken to me of their beautiful city. Not until I would re-enter my hotel and be greeted by the ominous portrait of Stalin would I be rudely shocked out of my dream and back into reality.



Photo Y. Surmach

Ruines of the Cathedral of Assumption (east side of the Pecherska Lavra)

[1] Southwestern Ukrainian province, formerly under Rumania.
[2] Academy of Arts and Sciences.
[3] Assumption Day.
[4] "Ukraine has not died yet" — Ukrainian National Anthem.

THE UKRAINIAN BAROQUE

by ARCADIA OLENSKY-PETRYSHYN*

The golden era in Ukrainian architecture is centered around the Ukrainian or Kozak Baroque style which originated in the seventeenth century.

This style, though an original creation of the Ukrainian people, with only an initial influence of the baroque of Western Europe does not receive recognition of its value and greatness as such mainly because it is too little known in world architecture. Yet the importance of The Ukrainian Baroque should be recognized not only because of its beauty and uniqueness as a style and of its rich contribution to the world treasury of architecture but also because it represents the true character of the spirit of the people of that age, particularly in regard to their appreciation and progress in the arts, especially in architecture.

The baroque was the second great style in Ukrainian architecture. The first was the Byzantine which was especially prominent from the tenth to the twelfth century in Ukraine. During the Byzantine period, which like the baroque, flowered at a time of national self-government, many famous structures were erected, most of which were ruined during the destruction of the Kievan State by invaders from Asia in the thirteenth century. A few centuries after the downfall of Kiev, the inhabitants of Ukraine were too occupied with their struggle against the continuous invasions from the East and North so that the interest in architecture gradually declined. These conditions remained until the seventeenth century during the period of the Kozaks when, with the introduction of the West European baroque, large scale building was again resumed.[1]

Soon after the West European baroque was accepted in Ukraine, and stimulated by it, a new character, that of the

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Ukrainian Baroque, was shaped. The two major influences on the formation of the unique character of this style were the old traditions of the stone architecture and the wooden national architecture. The stone architecture consisted of a combination of many styles including the Greek, a certain amount of the Asiatic and most significant, the Byzantine style.[2] The other important influence on the development of the Ukrainian Baroque was that of the local wooden architecture which developed prior to the baroque and was especially prominent in Southern Ukraine — in the Karpaty region. These wooden structures with the "noble simplicity, refined linear proportions and harmony of form,"[3] rightly have been called one of the most original phenomena of European architecture.

The Ukrainian Baroque developed in a period characteristic for its warlike, dynamic, and exuberant qualities. These features together with the existing cultural tradition of the nation were especially favorable to the development and formation of a definite character of the arts and left their mark especially on the unfolding architecture. With the regaining of national freedom and security, the appreciation and interest in art was again revived. Available wealth financed the construction of magnificent structures. Kozak officers, especially Hetman Mazepa, rendered great services to the unfolding of the arts by donating large sums of money towards the construction of many buildings, most of which were churches.[4]

Many qualities of the West European baroque were retained in Ukraine. Among these is the emphasis on spiritualism, a significant baroque trait strongly noticeable in Ukrainian architecture. The use of a supernatural scale in building as well as overdecoration are other qualities which have become popular in Ukraine. The use of rich, curved forms in general is a feature characteristic of both styles. The ornamentation in the Ukrainian Baroque is also extravagant, though to a much lesser degree than that of the West. Many of the ornaments used are those typical of the baroque of the West such as scrolls, horns of plenty and others. The decoration of areas around openings, especially around main doorways, has also been accepted in Ukraine. Yet many of the forms used in the West European baroque have been modified here in their general shape and decorative use. Among these are the domes which have an entirely different form and are more frequently used in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Baroque also uses columns, but here they are usually only half-columns.

Although there was a great deal of West European influence, the baroque in Ukraine assumed such distinct forms and

was otherwise so original that it is rightfully considered a distinct style in architecture. One of the most interesting features of the Ukrainian Baroque, not noticable in the structures of the West, is the verticality of the buildings. The vertical churches are like a contrast to the horizontal planes of the steppes.[5] This upright quality represents a system of worship of the incomprehensible, a striving toward unattainable heights. The verticality is emphasized by high columns or half-columns which are placed along the walls as well as by upward pointing domes. In wooden churches, domes were often built one on top of another to attain the effect of height.

The construction, popular in the Ukrainian Baroque, was on a square base, though a cross plan was also used.[6] The external appearance of the pure baroque buildings corresponds to the interior much more so than in the West, where one can not as easily determine the interior of a building by looking at it from outside. The structures in the Ukrainian Baroque are very symmetrical. There is good harmony of form and the proportions are agreeable. The repetition of the construction on all four sides of the building symbolizes the equality of all people before God. Although there is a great deal of ornamentation, the constructive and functional principles always are dominant.[7]

A very interesting feature of the Ukrainian Baroque is the dome. Churches constructed in the pure baroque style have three or five domes (later developing into nine), the five domed churches being the most characteristic.[8] Most attention was given to the dome in the center of the building, the highest power dominating the other domes. The domes of the Ukrainian Baroque churches, which are extremely typical and vary largely from other styles, are built on a narrow cylinder, and their tips point upward. They are rather gracious structures usually of much smaller proportions than the domes of the West. Just as in the wooden churches, here too, the domes are sometimes placed on top of one another to attain greater height. A good example of the use of domes in the Ukrainian Baroque is the St. George Church of the Vydubecki Monastery.[9]

Although full of ornaments, the designs of Ukrainian architecture are much more quiet and balanced in form than are those of the West. The decoration is always in good taste and individual motifs harmonize with each other. In addition to the West European baroque designs, many original designs were used. The most interesting among these are the unique floral designs, particularly those found in the churches of

Lavra Monastery, which have mostly ornaments of local flowers.[10] Also interesting are the purely traditional designs of towels used as decorations around windows which were derived from an old Ukrainian custom of placing embroidered towels around holy pictures.

Another remarkable feature of the Ukrainian Baroque is the use of color. The colors, which constituted an important element of the designs, were most often gold and green, the former used in the interior on the ikonostasis and outside on the domes. An axample is the "golden-roofed St. Michael," a Byzantine church reconstructed in the baroque style, showing in particular the wealth of the period.[11]

The first period of the Ukrainian Baroque, shortly after the introduction of the style, shows a great deal of West European influence. An example of this type is the church of the Holy Trinity in Chernihiv.[12]

Of similar character are many rebuilt and reconstructed old buildings. An example of a reconstructed Byzantine church in the baroque manner is St. Sophia in Kiev. New structures were added on the outside of this chruch in such a way that the interior space cannot be visualized from an outside view. Thus, in principle it is very different from later, pure baroque buildings. The church has many domes of various sizes that do not form one unit but rather look like the domes of many churches. Some ornaments on the outside of the church are also purely baroque additions.[13]

Many buildings in the Lavra, a city of churches, were reconstructed during the baroque period. There are usually more ornaments here than in St. Sophia, though still far from being overdone. The combination of the original baroque ornaments with the traditional is interesting.[14]

The second period of the baroque in Ukraine is of the purely Ukrainian type. Buildings constructed in this style show the original qualities of the Ukrainian Baroque, following the old architectual traditions. Especially unique is the type of the five-domed church, in which the highest artistic purity is displayed.[15]

One of the finest specimen of this period is the St. Nicolas War Church. This church shows especially well the vertical quality of Ukrainian structures. The walls are flat, except for the richly decorated facade. There are five domes and a central construction. The little ornamentation that is used on the outside of the church is very delicate and harmonious.[16]

The bell tower of St. Cyril is another good example of the baroque in Ukraine. This tower shows a balance of proportion especially well. Among the decorations used are half-columns which are ingeniously arranged along the walls of the structure.[17]

The arch of Zabrowski consists of one facade, very lavishly decorated. Although there are many forms combined in the motifs of the structure, there is an overall harmony nevertheless.[18]

The Lavra churches constructed in this period are especially rich in decoration. The most lavishly decorated areas are around the West side openings and the capitals of columns. Decorations around windows are not very typical of the Ukrainian Baroque, and if they are used at all, the ornaments are usually very simple.[19]

The secular buildings of the Ukrainian Baroque retained more characteristics of the West European styles than did the churches. The office buildings of Mazepa in Chernihiv are interesting examples of secular buildings in that style.[20]

The attractive forms of the Ukrainian Baroque appealed to the neighboring countries and the style soon spread widely, especially throughout Russia. After the defeat of the forces of Hetman Mazepa and the Swedish King Charles XII in the battle of Poltava, the power of the hetmans was gradually reduced by the Tzarist occupation forces, the Ukrainian nation again was forced to struggle for its existence. With the decline of national independence the unique Ukrainian culture and art slowly declined. The foreign government, not only did not favor further development of the arts, took away Ukrainian artists, but also ruined many significant specimens of the Ukrainian Baroque.[21] As there was no development of the arts, the influence of West European architecture increased and the purely national character in architecture was lost.

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[1] Georgii Lukomsky, *Kiev* (Munich Orkhis, 1923) p. 15.

[2] Jaroslav Hordynsky, ed., *Ukrainian Quarterly,* (New York: Congress Committee, 1948), p. 42.

[3] Olga Dmytriv, *Ukrainian Art,* (New York: Youth League, 1952), p.148.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 130.

[5] Hordynsky, *Op. cit.,* p. 344.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 42.

[8] Volodymyr Kubiowych, ed., *Ukrainian Cultural Encyclopedia,* (New York: Young Life, 1950) p. 809.

[9] *Ibid,* p. 810.

[10] Lukomsky, *Op. cit.,* p. 28.

[11] Dmytriv, *Op. cit.*, p. 132.
[12] Hordynsky,*Op. cit.*, p. 43.
[13] Lukomsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[15] Hordynsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
[16] Lukomsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 39.
[17] Kubiowych, *Op. cit.*, p. 808.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 809.
[19] Lukomsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 24.
[20] Hordynsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
[21] Volodymyr Sichynski,*History of Ukrainian Art I* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1956).

Books also used: Mathey, Johann. *Russische Kunst.* Einsideln: Verlagsanstallt Benzinger und Co., 1948.

Milikov, Serhey. *Russian Culture.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942.

CELEBRATION OF CENTENNARY OF THE BIRTH OF IVAN FRANKO IN SOVIET UKRAINE

by IRYNA FEDYSHYN*

Ivan Franko, one of the foremost figures in modern Ukrainian literature, is also known as a great champion of Ukrainian national independence, an uncompromising fighter for social justice, and a sincere defender of human rights and dignity everywhere.

In public life he was regarded as a controversial figure; in literature, however, his position is such as to put him side by side with Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and awakener of Ukrainian national consciousness.

In 1956 Ivan Franko's centennial was widely celebrated among all the Ukrainians everywhere. This article deals primarily with the celebration which took place in Soviet Ukraine and other Soviet Republics. Naturally, the Soviets tried to present Ivan Franko as a true Marxist and a Russophile, an advocate of the unity of "two brotherly nations" — Russia and Ukraine, although Franko's critical attitude towards Marxism is a generally known fact.[1]

The Soviet press without exception asserted that Ivan Franko's social, economic, and political views were formulated

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under the strong influence of Russian literary, social and political thought. The Soviets point to Franko's recognition of the Russian cultural and spiritual superiority over the Ukrainian nation. For example, *Radyanska Ukraiina* of August 27, 1956, p. 2, states: "Ivan Franko was fully aware of the role of the more advanced Russian literature in the development of that of Ukraine." The same source further claims that he also well appreciated the strong influence of the Russian literature on the formation of the creative genius of Taras Shevchenko, the greatest poet of Ukraine. Another Soviet source said that Franko eagerly watched all the developments of the 1905 Revolution in Russia connecting with its success the fate of the Ukrainian nation, its freedom, and fulfillment of its national aspirations. The Soviets go even further by saying that Franko hoped with all his heart to see his wishes fulfilled—the union of new Russia and Ukraine.[2]

Radyanska Ukraiina of July 25, 1956, p. 3, noted that Franko opposed such "reactionary ideas" as cultural separation of Ukraine from Russia, and hostility towards Russian cultural leadership. It quotes Franko as follows: "We must remember and do not dare to forget that the main strength, the kernel of our nation, lies in Russia..." In reality Franko rejected any kind of dependence of Ukraine upon Russia or Poland. (His spirited song "Ne Pora"—"We shall no longer serve the Muscovite or the Pole"—is still popular, although no one, to be sure, would dare to sing it in Soviet Ukraine today!)

Franko was active in socialist and labor movements in Western Ukraine. Taking advantage of Franko's interest in socialism and labor problems, the Soviets tried to stress this above all to play down his devotion to the Ukrainian national cause. He was sympathetic to all liberal movements which advocated amelioration of the life of workers and peasantry everywhere. He spoke thus of himself: "As the son of a peasant folk, brought up on the peasant's coarse fare, I have always felt myself under an obligation to devote my life's work to the plain people. I have always laid utmost stress on the attainment of common human rights, for I know that in so doing the nation will best conquer national rights for itself..."[3] As we see this had nothing to do with ideas of Russian Communism. Franko's social and political views were formulated under the strong influence of Western ideas—liberalism, democracy, individualism, socialism, theories of national sovereignty, ideals of humanism, Darwinism, rationalism, positivism, etc.[4] In his

criticism of Marxism Franko said prophetically: "The program of 'state socialism' smells too much of state despotism and uniformity which, once introduced into life, could become a great barrier to development or the source of new revolutions."[5] It was Drahomaniw's ethical socialism which exerted a great influence on young Franko.

A man of letters and a scholar, thoroughly acquainted with world literature, Franko did much to popularize it among the Ukrainians. He made great efforts to show the Ukrainian in-

I. Franko as a student

telligentsia the broad horizons of the world and tried to lead them out of their narrowness and ethnographic primitivism.[6] This the Bolsheviks use skillfully in depicting Franko as a great internationalist, a Marxist and a Russophile; distorting the real meaning of his national feelings. Equally false are Soviet allegations of Franko's indebtedness to Russian liberals such as Chernyshevsky, Dobrolubov, Belinsky.[7] Franko was critical

of those Russian liberals who while criticizing Western leaders became "reactionary Katkovs" rather than companions of liberal Hertzen. He also pointed out that Western ideas when transplanted to Russian soil lost their vigor and became merely empty doctrines. (Ivan Franko: "Breaths of Spring in Russia")[8]

The Soviet press time and again emphasizes the influence of Russian revolutionaries and writers such as Lenin and Gorky on the formulation of Franko's mentality as a writer and political thinker. *Radyanska Ukraiina* of July 25, 1956, p. 3, regrets very much that Franko did not live up to see his ideals realized—the victory of the October Revolution with all its "blessings." No doubt, Franko was sympathetic with all oppressed peoples struggling for their national freedom and social justice. Soviets try to belittle Franko's interest in the struggle of Ukrainians for their independence and claim that he was fighting Ukrainian nationalists and their attempts to separate Ukraine and its culture from Russia.[9]

Ivan Franko is too great to be ignored, and too popular to be prohibited. For this reason his centennial has been widely celebrated in Soviet Ukraine and other Soviet Republics. The general line of interpretation of Franko's position, just described, has been centrally formulated and no one dared to deviate from it. All the celebrations were carefully planned and well executed. His native village, Nahuyevychi, now bears his name. People from all over the Soviet Union were coming to see the places where the great writer and poet lived and worked. Writers, poets, composers, and artists participated in commemoration of the centennial according to the prescribed formula. Franko's plays were revived and played in almost all Ukrainian theatres; his poetical works recited, read and interpreted in cities and villages. The Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic prepared and edited a great number of various monographs on Franko. Approximately ten million copies of his poetic and dramatic works were published and illustrated.[10] A jubilee album was edited. The academician Bilecky edited a collection of essays on Franko's literary works. New biographies were written. Lectures and concerts were givn throughout the country. An institute devoted to the studies of Franko and his works was established. In all, 3,600 volumes of his works were collected and edited.[11] The University of Lviv prepared a whole series of monographs and other scholarly works devoted to Franko. In all municipal museums and libraries Franko's works, letters and other materials were exhibited.

A special conference was held in Kiev on August 26, 1956, in which the Committee for the Celebration of the Centennial, writers from other Soviet Republics, and the representatives of the World Peace Organization took part. On August 27, 1956, Franko's birthday, the plenary session of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine and the general conference of the members of the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukr.SSR were held in Kiev.[12] In Lviv, where Franko lived most of his life, a monument in his honor was unveiled in front of the University which also bears his name. "Decision of Great Importance," as *Radyanska Ukraiina* of July 26, 1956, names its article, is the decision of the World Peace Organization to commemorate Franko's centennial all over the world, Franko as a fighter for the progress and happy future of all the proleteriat, and as a great literary figure and scholar not only of Ukraine but of the whole world. In Moscow, too, concerts and recitations of Franko's works were held on his birthday. The celebrations of his centennial took place also in other Soviet Republics and satellites including China. His works were translated into Russian (70,000 copies, most of them for the first time), Byelorussian, Georgian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Finnish, Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian, Moldavian, Tartar, Chuvash, Armenian, etc.[13]

In all these celebrations Franko was shown as a great internationalist, almost a communist, who fought against "harmfull bourgeois national tendencies," i.e. liberation of Ukraine and its culture from Russian domination. He was also represented as a great friend and follower of the "great Russian culture". "Love of Ivan Franko for Russian literature," says *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of August 21, 1956, "is symbolic—it is the love of a son of the Ukrainian people for his 'brother', the Russian people; and a firm belief in successful unity and cooperation of the Russian and Ukrainian literatures."

As we can see, these overwhelming celebrations of Franko's centennial throughout the Soviet Union once more show how Soviet political and cultural imperialism distorts facts and makes use of a popular national figure for the advancement of Russian Communist ideas. Despite all these distortions and misinterpretations of the true meaning of Franko, despite all the ommissions in Franko's writings, people who read his works will, no doubt, grasp the true meaning of Franko's message, the message of high humanitarian ideals which are valid today as much as they were in Franko's days.

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[1] Illya Vytanovych, "Political Views of Ivan Franko," *Ukrainian Quarterly,* June 1956, Vol. XII, No. 2, p. 129.

[2] *Radyanska Ukraiina,* July 25, 1956, p. 3.

[3] Percival Cundy, *Ivan Franko's Selected Poems* (His notes in Biographical Introduction), New York Philosophical Library, 1948., pp. 81-82.

[4] Illya Vytanovych, *op. cit.,* p. 126.

[5] *Ibid,* p. 128.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 129.

[7] *Radyanska Ukraiina,* July 25, 1956, p. 3.

[8] Illya Vytanovych, *op. cit.,* p. 128.

[9] *Radyanska Ukraiina,* July 27, 1956, p. 3.

[10] *Ibid.,* August 7, 1956, p. 3.

[11] *Radyanska Ukraiina,* July 20, 1956, p. 3.

[12] *Literaturna Hazeta,* August 9, 1956, p. 1.

[13] *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* August 2, 1956, p. 3.

"MOSES"

by IVAN FRANKO

PROLOGUE

My people, tortured, overpowered,
And like that beggar at the cross-roads
With human scorn, as if with scabs, all covered!
Your future frightens me and my soul renders:
From shame, which will incense next generations,
I cannot sleep — my bed is one of cinders.
Is it inscribed on some gigantic metal tables
For you to be the muck of all your neighbors,
The teams for pulling them all dressed in sables?
Are you forever destined with this vial
Of hidden anger, meekness, resignation
To those who have betrayed you in your trial,
Who swore you into treacherous alliance?
Are you not fated with that precious moment:
The day of your unmeasured might's defiance?
Have all those many hearts in vain been burning
For you with love, the noblest they could offer —
That sacrifice from which there's no returning?
Have heroes shed their blood just to be praised in story?
Will not your prairies bloom with health and beauty,

And everlasting freedom shine in glory?
Are all your sayings to be thought as sterile,
When power, mellowness, and wit is present
And all which any soul needs to be virile?
And are your songs which ring with laughter, sorrow,
To be forgotten with their loves' misgivings
And hopes and rays of a happy gay tomorrow?
Oh, no! You are not doomed just to dejection
And tears! I still believe in will, its power,
In your uprising day and resurrection!
If one could but create a moment's fraction,
And then a word which would in such a moment
Inflame the people into life and action!
Or just a song with fire and living passion
Which would grip millions and lend them wings
For action leading them to self-expression!
Yes, If! . . . But we on whom all worries settle,
And torn apart with doubt, with shame inflicted,
We are not fit to lead you into battle!
But the time will come, once obstacles are hurdled,
When you will shine among the greatest nations:
Will shake the Cauca's[1] *while with Beskid*[2] *girdled.*
Black Sea will echo with your liberation
And you'll behold, once being your own master,
A home of joy and fields of consolation.
Therefore accept this song, which, although cheerless,
Is full of faith — and frank although not pleasant;
A debt to your great future, though not tearless.
To your great genius this is my humble present.

June 20, 1905.

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1 Caucasus Mountains
2 Mount Beskid of the Carpathian Mountains

LITERATURE OF MARGINAL SITUATIONS

by JURIJ A. LAVRINENKO*

GENERAL OUTLINE

Here, in the United States, one cannot use the term "marginal situations" without having previously explained its meaning. This term cannot be found in an American dictionary, as there just hasn't been any such "marginal situation" in America.

On the European continent, however, this term is used in everyday life—as a synonym, more or less, for "total catastrophe." Karl Jaspers, an existentialist philosopher, developed the term "marginal situation," (die Grenz-Situation), and employed it with a broader philosophical meaning, which we, however, shall not take as a basis here.

We concern ourselves here not only with an exclusively individual catastrophe, but rather with a total, universal one. The "marginal situation," as used here, connotes total destruction and ruin of a given human society or nation, of man in general. Devastating fires in the midst of a quiet night, when people in other countries do not hear the S.O.S. signal.

In the moments of such a catastrophe the wise father does not offer any advice to his children, but rather, having blessed them, tells them to act upon their own risk, their own judgement, with their own mental powers.

The problem is this: what are the possibilities that exist for the individual to take the right and true moral attitude in this critical, so-called "marginal situation," when his own society, as well as the strength of world opinion, have ceased to exist as positive influential factors?

This question of the individual's decision in a critical situation was raised more then once by intellectuals in all corners of the world. In the first part of my essay I shall speak of the "marginal crisis" as a phenomenon known both in the West and in the East, and then proceed to point out the differences.

The second part, concerned with some of the aspects having a direct bearing on the activity of the creative mind, will be illustrated by specific examples taken from Ukrainian literature.

It was in Austria, in 1947. After having come back from a 15-year long Odyssey through the vast spaces of Soviet

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Eurasia, and still haunted by harrowing memories of the Great Eastern Crisis, I came upon a small newspaper publication which revived my interest in the problem. This was until then an unpublished account of a conversation which in 1932 took place in Munich between five German intellectuals (one of whom was the German philosopher Oswald Spengler). In the course of the discussion the contemporary historic moment—the eve of Hitler's ascent to power—was characterized as an impending catastrophe both for Germany and for Western Europe, and the question arose: What exactly could be done in this predicament? What should be the mental attitude of a conscious, self-reliant individual? Since everybody seemed to look up to Spengler for an answer, the latter outlined his conception of the problem and said that from the viewpoint of expediency it may be too late to offer direct resistance, not only physically, but also spiritually. In special circumstances the futility of sacrifice permits the individual to suspend his duty.

Here one of the guests contradicted Spengler stating that in the moral sense there was no such thing as vain sacrifice. Spengler disregarded the remark and continued to develop his reasoning. There are moments - he said - when an active opponent may do a greater service to the enemy than a follower. Within a powerful vortex all components act towards intensifying the whirling motion. Then it is not even possible to distinguish the restraining force from the driving force. This is a moment when —as is the case of a defeated army—the whole burden of responsibility is shifted from the group to the individual. As a consequence of this the individual's responsibility transcends itself. The human being enters the moment of *last decision*. Here things may happen which border on the miraculous. The individual's last decision may enter as a powerful factor into the very density of historic reality. It belongs to the future. Moral decision at this stage may be transformed into physical energy.

However, a prerequisite for this type of decision is exact orientation. There are moments when even approximate orientation becomes absolutely impossible. Then all is supported by faith - a faith which is the result of the interplay of two powers within the individual: his moral strength and his power of perception. What matters here is not the individual's moral or cultural background considered as separate factors - but the faith and intuition born from the interaction of the two integral parts of his being. Only when all the faculties stemming from the ethical and traditional background of the individual, from his education and erudition, and from his way of life, are united

into one powerful whole - only then they may create a basis for the redeeming faith and an enduring particle in human existence.

Then there appear in the individual those original forces which are the very reason for the continuity and the ever-recurring rebirth of history. Man seems to acquire the ability to pierce with his vision the night of the contemporary historic moment and to grasp the new which so far had eluded him. The solution - Spengler concluded - lies in anticipating: just where, on what line of demarcation the dying brushes against the newborn.

This inspired improvisation struck me by the fact that Spengler had apparently conquered the pessimistic fatalism of his earlier book "Decline of the West" and that this was happening at the very moment when his own culturally - historic group was on the verge of collapse. Thus he himself served as an example of his theory (although physically he did not survive the crisis). Yet Spengler's theory limited by the life experience of Western Europe does not seem to offer an adequate elucidation of the problem as it arose in the countries of the Soviet Union or even, recently, in the so-called "people's democracies".

In Spengler's theory the "new" and the "old", "birth" and "death" do not occur together. He does not know what is the death of the newborn. Evidently the crisis of the West in comparison with the East has not yet reached a truly marginal situation. The totalitarianism of the West - so far the apex of the Western crisis - was, in reality, only a cancerous growth removed by the surgery of the Second World War. Neither the illness, nor its operation constituted basically a "birth of the new", but rather a self-defense of the "old".

Furthermore, Spengler is not familiar with a "marginal situation" as a continuously progressing crisis, as permanent fate. His "moment of last decision" is a dramatic climax and not a dynamic crisis curve. And then again Spengler's responsible individual does not yet face the division of personality - for the battle is still waged in the external world and not in the human soul. He does not have to confront the "compromise with the demon" as an iron command of history, as God's will.

Until the downfall of Stalin the situation in the satellites did not vary much from that described by Spengler, except in degree of intensity. Nothing "new" was born - only the "old" was defended, and defended rather successfully. For the individual could still hide his real face under a mask, remain neutral

and thus preserve the valuable heritage of the "old" in his soul. Yet, if compared with West European totalitarianism, this situation bore a closer resemblance to the true "Marginal Crisis" of the East. For, in spite of the proximity of the West there was a greater degree of insecurity in the air, a more intense presentiment of doom.

In 1945-46 the "White Eagle" (a Polish newspaper) published Richard Wraga's memoirs based on his impressions of Soviet Ukraine in the late twenties. When speaking of "The People's Prophet" (a play by Mykola Kulish) Wraga wistfully remarks that Poland would be very lucky if her enslaved by Bolshevism literature could produce a drama as powerful as Kulish's play - a work of art which would hit the occupant with a spiritual blow as vehement as that dealt by the Ukrainian Kulish. At that time I could not quite share Wraga's pessimism. It seemed to me that he underestimated the spiritual potentialities and the power inherent in the Polish nation. Therefore, when in 1953 Czeslav Milosz published his book "The Captive Mind" I was particularly struck by the following passage:

> "One should not wonder if the writer or painter doubts the wisdom of resistance. If he was sure that art opposed to the official line could have a lasting value - he would decide in favor of it and would not worry about printing or exhibiting. Yet he believes that such work would be artistically poor - and he is not far wrong." (page 14)

Let us take note — the essential factor is not outward resistance which indeed may be aimless, but the inability of the individual to come to terms with his own self. The writer, according to Milosz, "does not believe in writing for the bureau drawer". He thinks that his art will be stronger if subjected to official sterilization. In the light shed on the problem by the life experience of the writers of all Soviet Republics such an assertion appears almost paradoxical. For all national literatures of the USSR real art and opposition have become almost synonymous. Exceptions to this rule are insignificant. And this unwritten code has been in force in the USSR for almost forty years.

But no sooner had Milosz's book become known throughout the world when in Poland and in Hungary things came to pass which witnessed the upsurge of a new power - proving that Wraga's and Milosz's pessimism was unfounded and that both Poland and Hungary harbored a germ of the "new". I am not speaking of any kind of "victory". On the contrary I see here the most profound defeat and the inception of a marginal sit-

uation with its Eastern and dynamic implications. If one tries to imagine the emotional plight and the spiritual impasse of the writers from the Petefi club who have been abandoned by the West and are now in prison or have been "released" to continue their existence in spiritual bondage, one will understand what I have in mind. And yet - the smothered uprisings in Poland and Hungary showed the Hungarians that not all was lost - no external help could be expected either from the East or from the West, but there was the possibility of inner rebirth, a rebirth which could be generated in the soul, and only there.

This is the point from which the marginal situation of the closest coexistence of the newborn and of death takes its start. And it is also a stepping-stone to the full understanding of the great dilemma of the countries of Soviet Eurasia.

> "The fog is silent where death and beginning in one shroud do sleep".

This quotation from a poem by Todosiy Osmaczka originated in an actual situation in Ukraine, entirely independently from an analogous passage in T. S. Eliot's "The Four Quarters". But how precisely do Osmaczka's words define the situation in the East, where, from 1917 on the crisis of birth and the crisis of death have been rocking in the same cradle - both the "March" of the "Springtime of Nations" of the East, and the "October" of Bolshevism. These two rival powers, tremendous in their dynamic force, could not annihilate one another - and it seems as if, in their deathly grip, they grew together into one whole.

A series of historic circumstances caused the situation of extreme crisis to remain firmly established for decades, and it became the fate of the East. Man of this fate underwent two catastrophes: In the first (1919 - 21) the young independent Republics of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Caucasia, and Asia, were re-incorporated into the modernized Bolshevik empire. In the second (1931 - 1936) planned destruction hit not only national and cultural groups but also the very spiritual kernel of man. Forty years of marginal situation! Such things were not known to Spengler. In this new scale of dimensions human life seems shorter. Man can neither conquer fate nor outlast it. Painful compromises with the devil - even at the cost of partially surrendering the individual's soul - become inevitable. The ramparts of the last fortress of resistance, the fortress of the individual soul, crumble. The battle invades the territory of man's inner being. From now on he wages war not only with the external enemy, but also with a part of his own self. The marginal

situation assumes the likeness of a "ladder of perdition" stretching down into infinity. This ladder is the same for all, but each and everyone descends it absolutely alone and absolutely individually, like the doomed Spaniards in Hemingway's "For whom the Bell Tolls."

As if speaking on behalf of all Soviet - Ukrainian writers editor Kark, (a character from a story by Mykola Khvylovyi) declares: We shall destroy our souls for the sake of victory, but no one will understand *how* we destroyed them. I am going to show how four of the greatest literary personalities in post-revolutionary Ukraine, each in his own individual way, "destroyed their souls" for the sake of victory over evil.

I shall mention Pavlo Tychyna - the greatest lyric poet of the Ukraine of the XXth century, Mykola Khvylovyi - the most outstanding novelettist and essayist, Mykola Kulish—one of the more remarkable USSR playwrights, and Todosiy Osmaczka - a prominent poet and novelist. I have limited myself to these four examples in order to give at least an approximate typification of the last individual decisions - in Spengler's sense - arrived at, separately and individually, by 259 Ukrainian writers whose books were printed up to 1930 - and of whom only 36 were left after the crisis of 1931 - 1936.

I have chosen the following sub-titles for these 4 types of last decisions:

"Game with the Demon" — for Pavlo Tychyna
"Conquering Death through Death" — for Khvylovyi
"The Choice of the Road to Golgotha" — for Kulish, and
"Weakness as Last Resort" — for Osmaczka.

"GAME WITH THE DEMON" — Pavlo Tychyna

Pavlo Tychyna, 66, once next to Taras Shevchenko, the greatest poet of Ukraine, now only the President of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the USSR, belongs to the elité of the biggest empire of the world.

Quite independently from his qualifications as a statesman the poet-laureate Tychyna has an excellent command of several European and about ten Asian languages, is a fine translator of poetry, and a great music lover. Extremely sensitive in private life, he walks as if on tip-toe, speaks in a subdued voice, isolates himself from noises almost like Marcel Proust.

He rose to literary fame with the appearance of his first book of poetry: "The Sun-Ray Clarinets". The poetry of his "Clarinets" was so universal in its love, light and music, that

it seemed as if in one chord of any of his strophe sounded all strings of the micro-and macrocosm. The subsequent three books ("Instead of Sonnets and Octavs" - 1920-, "The Plough" - 192?-, "The Wind from Ukraine" - 1925-) established Tychyna as the universal master of the tragic lyric poetry. At that time he also began publishing fragments from his poem "Skovoroda" (a Ukrainian philosopher of the 18th century) which he had evidently conceived as a Ukrainian counterpart of "Faust". All this was published between 1918 - 1926. Fate was stingy with the poet and did not give him even ten years for authentic self-realization - but he worked so intensively that the next thirty years of his entirely conscious public suicide as a poet could not destroy the creative edifice of the first decade.

In the first half of this essay, I mentioned the "March" of Nations and the "October" of Bolshevism in the cradle of the Eurasian Revolution of 1917. With his ideal poetic seismograph, Tychyna could feel the most distant quakes and vibrations. After having played his "Sun-Ray Clarinets" to the Springtime of Nations, he was the first to signal that death had already settled in the cradle of the new-born:

"Open up the door — for the bride is coming
Open up the door — to the azure sky,
Eyes, heart, choráles have stopped, expectant.
And the door, it opened — on the dead of night,
And the door, it opened — all the roads in blood.
Through the darkness, unwept tears, streaming rain."

This was the first "marginal situation" of the East and with Eastern connotations: the year 1919. The catastrophe announced itself as unexpectedly and quickly as darkness falls at noon during an eclipse of the sun. In the midst of general terror and destruction, Tychyna steps forward with his forceful and openly tragic lyricism centered around the immortal image of the Mother of Sorrow and her crucified son - the people, the human being. Later Tychyna discards his golden-stringed Parnassian lyre and publishes his stirring book: "Instead of Sonnets and Octavs" - a classic example of the poetry of the marginal situation.

In his poem "There were Twelve", the excellent Russian poet Alexander Block does not hesitate to identify twelve Red Guardsmen, intoxicated with blood, with twelve apostles led by Christ himself. As if directly replying to this, Tychyna writes: "O, cruel aestheticism! When will you stop admiring the cut throat? The animal devours the animal." And to those who justified the terror by a great end in sight, Tychyna

replied: "A great idea needs sacrifice. But is it sacrifice when one animal devours another? All things can be excused by a great idea but not the emptiness of the soul." And further:"To play Scriabin to prison-overseers - this is not yet true revolution." "Instead of sonnets and octavs - I curse you all, I curse you all who turned to beasts."

But no one heeded the poet's alarms - neither at home nor in the West. Tychyna clearly foresaw the victory of evil, though everybody else was still hoping for the best. He knew that the moment of "last decision" - in Spengler's sense - had arrived. The advisability of open resistance - even in spirit - was doubtful. God himself seemed to dictate a compromise with the devil. The unforgettable strophe and antistrophe of his "Instead of Sonnets and Octavs" unexpectedly break off with a bitterly ironic question: "Shouldn't I, too, go and kiss the Pope's slipper?" (Here, of course, he speaks of the Pope of the Third Rome - the Rome of the Bolshevik empire).

"The Wind from Ukraine" is Tychyna's last book still showing signs of resistance - and it is the first where he already accepts a compromise. But if this compromise for Tychyna is a law to which he honorably conforms, for the modern devil it is only a period of rest, a spring-board for renewed pressures. In 1931 - 1934, 25% of the peasants and 75% of Ukrainian intellectuals perish under an unexpected blow from the Kremlin. The second "marginal situation" is there, and once again, the writers face a "last decision". And what *is* this decision? Most of them choose the road of destruction, like the captive maiden in a poem by Lesya Ukrayinka who proudly declares:

> "You may kill me if you wish, but to *live*
> you will not force me."

Only about 15% of the writers become "Stalinist poets" - and the first to answer the call is Pavlo Tychyna, the most profound, the greatest poet of Ukraine!

Tychyna's attitude has all symptoms of complete self-renunciation. True, Ukrainian literature already had a case when a poetic genius—Taras Shevchenko—wrote his poems for the drawer and in the underground of his soul cherished the spiritual sun of his condemned nation. On the court order sentencing Shevchenko to 10 years in Siberia, Tsar Nikolai I added in his handwriting: "And he should be forbidden to write and to draw". Tychyna's case was different - and more complex. He was not *forbidden* but *ordered* to write. So that the poet's soul would not become the shelter for a secret spiritual light, the occupant stuffed it

with his dross. Only then Tychyna entered the phase of a truly "marginal situation" which has now lasted for 25 years.

Will his existence outlast this crisis, transformed into permanent fate? And if not, then what sign or proof will he transmit to posterity that his spiritual destruction was not in vain? If he has no hope of ever writing "undercover poetry" for the future generation (like Shevchenko), then he indeed must find himself in an emotional state which defies description.

We do not know whether Tychyna's poetic spark still glimmers under the ashes of what once was the guiding light of our poetry. We do not know whether the existence of a sun in the occupied underground of the individual's soul is at all conceivable. Only the future can provide an answer.

"CONQUERING DEATH THROUGH DEATH" — Mykola Khvylovyi

This controversial personality was posthumously described by Stalin as a "literary bandit" and by a part of the Ukrainian emigration press as a "communist matricide". Actually Khvylovyi was an example of modesty, a devoted son, a faithful, almost self-sacrificing friend. On the other hand, the manly frankness of his creative work combined lyricism with cruel satire and irony. At the time when Stalin had not yet been made a "god" and no one suspected a new crisis, Khvylovyi proclaimed his slogan, "Long live the spirit of restlessness!" and threw all his great spiritual powers into the fight against the all-engulfing whirlpool. This was not only negation and criticism, but also a program and an act of a great "beginning". He was certain of two things: the victory of the young rebirth of the enslaved peoples of the East and his own premature destruction. From these two factors two conflicting feelings originated which run parallel in his literary style: the joy of rebirth and the painful yearning of the doomed.

Fate gave him only 6 years (1921 - 1926) in which to complete his work and to utter his credo. The following 7 years were a period of combat - at first by stubborn literary silence, then by firing a bullet in his temple. Seized by a furious creative force, Khvylovyi managed to publish nine books in this short period (the rest of his work - including two novels - was destroyed together with the writer), to form his own literary school and his own style. This style - the so-called "romanticism of vitalism", an "active romanticism", was opposed to the "social realism" of the Stalinists. He managed to demonstrate in his satires the ethical vacuity of communism, to tear away from

the influence of the party close to thirty of the best literary talents of Ukraine and to organize the strongest and the most radically oppositional literary group "VAPLITE". He threw a living seed into the soul of youth defining his program in four words: "to know how to think and feel". He denied Moscow's claim to cultural hegemony, made public his battle-cry: "Away from Moscow!", preached a connection with "Faustian" Europe, prophesying the advent of an "Asian renaissance" as a Springtime of Nations of the East. The Party threw its entire apparatus into the fight against "Khvylovism" - but Khvylovism spread into other republics of the USSR. Then Stalin intervened personally and Khvylovyi was condemned. The verdict reached him in Vienna where in January 1928 he was undergoing medical treatment. The writer stood before his "last decision". He could remain in exile - but this would be equivalent to deserting from the front-lines to which he himself had led his comrades - the better writers of Ukraine. While still in Vienna, Khvylovyi writes a "letter of repentance" to the Soviet press in which he turns himself over to the "mercy of the Communist Party". From that time on, Khvylovyi the writer, was dead.

But this was not yet the end. When he returned from the West it was not in order to bask in the sunshine of communist "mercy". The Central Committee of the Party ordered Khvylovyi to produce a new book in the spirit of partyist "Social Realism". Khvylovyi never published such a book. In the meantime, a new universal cataclysm burst forth and Ukraine was drowning under the avalanche. At the moment when mass arrests were starting among Ukrainian intellectuals, Khvylovyi, who had just returned from a trip across villages devastated by artificially induced hunger, invited his colleagues to his home under the pretext of reading his new book. This was on May 13th, 1933. Sparkling and gay as usual, he went into the adjoining room "to get the new book", and there shot himself. On the table were letters to his friends and to the Central Committee of the Party. The latter document, written with Khvylovyi's "own blood" was truly soul-searing. Thinking youth received it as a heroic declaration of independence. Ever since, for a quarter of a century, the Kremlin has followed Khvylovyi's shadow throughout Ukraine, every now and then rasing a hue and cry against the "bacteria of Khvylovism".

Tychyna, who did not belong to the party, took the road to Communism. Khvylovyi, a member of the Communist party since 1919, chose the road away from Communism. The whole

magnitude of the threat of Khvylovism lies in the fact that Khvylovyi had come forth from the nucleus of communism, and had the force and the courage to bombard this very nucleus without mercy.

In the novella "My Being", Khvylovyi gave a classic picture of the dramatic split of the individual's soul, on the territory of which the collision of the self-annihilating powers takes place. "I am a Chekist, but I am also a man" - states this "Being", the head of the Tribunal of the Cheka in 1919. All other personages of the novella only supplement the two halves of the hero's soul. On the line of the Cheka, there are the members of the tribunal: Dr. Tahabat, whose external appearance and cruel rationalism remind us of Lenin, and the sentinel who answers to the name of "Degenerate", and who represents the ultimate point of the Cheka line. On the human line there is Andriy - a young student with a pure naivé soul who rebels against his compulsory induction into the tribunal of the Cheka which he calls a "meat grinder". The human line ideally culminates in the hero's mother who in the eyes of her Chekist son, grows to the infinite heights of the "wondrous Maria standing on the verge of unknown ages". Quickly and inexorably unfolds the tragedy - the "Being" is split in two halves, torn between two magnetic poles. On one side — the ethics of the distant goal, the Utopia of the "unreachable communism behind the distant mountains", man-made paradise. On the other side - the loved and loving mother, behind whom stands the eternal Mary, the symbol of the divine origin of the world. Nietzsche's "love of the farthest" as opposed to Christ's "love thy neighbor" - two things which are irreconciliable and still find room in one human being. What is the solution? With the "Being" acting as chairman, the Tribunal of the Cheka sentences a group of nuns to be shot. The "Being's" mother is also in the group. Under the formidable pressure of the logics of Tahabat, the logics of his own dry reason, the "Being" shoots his mother with his own hands in a fit of hysteria pressing her to his heart. On a moon-lit night he retreats to the north under the pressure of enemy forces and the tragic glow of conflagrations of his native villages is transformed in his glassy eyes into the magic fires of the "unreachable communism".

This is the destruction of life itself, of its most essential, most profound root. In the novella, Khvylovyi split the nut of Communism and showed that it was empty - it lacked an ethical content. On the other hand, Khvylovyi stressed the central figure

of the mother, of the "eternal feminine", with which Goethe, too, ends the life search of Faust. Introduced by Tychyna and Khvylovyi, the image of the mother became a literary epidemic in Ukrainian literature of the twenties. Almost every writer in the Ukraine of that period had compositions in which the figure of the mother was a central one.

"THE ROAD TO GOLGOTHA AS LAST DECISION" — Mykola Kulish

Mykola Kulish (born 1892 - last heard of June 15, 1937 from the Solovki Concentration Camp) was a close personal friend of Khvylovyi, and resembled the latter by his inherent personal modesty and his chivalrous and ethical conduct. His membership in the Party also dated back to 1919. Both friends were pathetic in their literary style - only Khvylovyi's pathos was peppered by irony and sarcasm or fired with the pure flame of tragedy, and Kulish peppered his romantic pathos with warm humor or tragicomedy. From this subtle distinction of the two talents stemmed the difference in their "last decisions". Even externally Kulish's well-balanced appearance differed from that of his temperamental friend. Unlike Khvylovyi, Kulish only reluctantly entered into polemic arguments - but his comedies and tragi-comedies were endowed with a colossal force. He made his debut with the stage production of his play "97" where against a background of the mass hunger and bestiality of 1921 the human being remains on an incomparably high spiritual and ethical level, while the last flame of life burns out in his body. In the tragicomedy, "The People's Prophet" which in plot and in its profound insight left Giraudoux's "The Madwoman of Chaillot" 20 years behind, Kulish pictured schizophrenia bred by revolutionary social reforms. Like Khvylovyi, the communist Kulish pointed out the bankruptcy of communism in general and of Ukrainian communism in particular.

The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset says that at the time of crisis it is not known what a human being really is and what is his true ideology. The door is closed to true perception: what seems simple to all is actually a deeply perplexing problem, and vice versa.

In this chaos art is the first link of the human being with his own self as well as with reality. Khvylovyi's "My Being" and "The People's Prophet" of Kulish were the first powerful bursts of the Sovietman towards reality, towards the individual's ownself—an eruption which came from inside, tearing the petrified

crust of the communist dogma and system. No wonder they brought about a spiritual ebb of communism in Ukraine.

The party was ruthless in its attacks on Kulish. All premieres of his plays were accompanied by scandals and pogroms. Specifically, he was criticized for bringing into his plays the problem of nationalities in the USSR which was one of his chief preoccupations along with the exposing of the social and political prejudices of his time. This problem was the central thread of his "Pathetic Sonata" - a direct reply to Bulgakov's "The Days of the Turbiny Family" (a Russian play openly jeering at Ukrainian national renaissance). Paradoxically, the "Pathetic Sonata" had its premiere in Moscow under the direction of the Russian Tairow. (Its staging was prohibited in Ukraine.) The premiere was a resounding success but shortly afterwards the play was banned even in Moscow.

"Only he who will mount the scaffold and speak into the eyes of death will conquer through his ideas." These words belong to Marina, the heroine of the "Pathetic Sonata". On December 19th, 1931, they were heard at the Moscow premiere and only three years later Kulish was in MVD prison and had to substantiate by his own acts the proud "last decision" of his heroine. How did he do it? When after Khvylovyi's suicide in 1933, in an atmosphere of general terror and despair, Kulish's wife hid his revolvers, Kulish reassured her: "Don't worry, I shall not follow in Khvylovyi' footsteps. I shall find strength in myself and shall carry on to the end." Finally he was arrested, deported to a concentration camp in Solovki. He was known to exist there until 1937 - the year of the Yezov purge in concentration camps. Ever since, not a word has been heard from the great dramatist. For twenty years it was prohibited even to mention Kulish's name. Recently the Moscow "Literary Gazette" printed the following announcement: "A Committee has been formed to take stock of the literary inheritance of Mykola Kulish". In the jargon of the Kremlin, this signifies that the writer, whom the Moscow theater critics once called "the greatest dramatist of USSR", had been physically destroyed by his henchmen.

"WEAKNESS AS LAST RESORT" — Todosiy Osmaczka

Todosiy Osmaczka is only one of the four personalities chosen by us who survived the ordeal both physically and as a poet. This truly invincible poet was one of the first candidates for execution — yet he did not accept even the slightest

compromise. With the stubbornness of the peasant he remained on his positions as the singer of individualism and the search for truth. At the time of general "self-criticism" of writers at the point of a gun, he did not utter one word. When arrested, he feigned mental illness. Tortured by his interrogators and by the madmen in the prison psychiatric ward of the MVD, Osmaczka went through an infernal period of many years, and it was only at the time of the German occupation of Kiev, in the fall of 1941, when he could leave the mental ward to return to himself, to humanity. He was free - but instead of the sun of liberty - he found the darkness of the most senseless of all wars. Then came his flight to the West - the fulfilment of his long-cherished dream - to escape, to carry into the wide world the message that man's marginal situation knows no boundaries.

One of the more remarkable poets at home, in exile he conquered the foremost place in the Ukrainian literature of our day by his three books of poetry and three novels. Both Osmaczka's poetry and his prose are unfathomable - as unfathomable as those infernal situations of the human being which he describes and which became forever a cursed property of his own soul. There are things which cannot be simulated with impunity. Armed by a dazzling sincerity, a fiery heart, and gigantic metaphors, he sank his teeth deep into the living flesh of the demon, and in his despair often shakes his fists at the entire cosmos or even at God himself. His is a terrible incredulity and hate intermingled with a cosmic yearning after lost love. These are flashes of genius but in the chaos of a dark night. This is, in any case, a truly indestructible power.

And it was this very power which in the marginal situation of the thirties resorted to "weakness". In the autobiographic novel, "The Rotunda of Murderers", the hero, the writer Ivan Broos, meditates in the night before his arrest: "Taking up arms against the danger would resemble the struggle of a man who fell from a plane onto the surface of the water's abyss and fights against the waves ... There is another power which can one thousand five hundred years... But what kind of weakness No one ever set out to wage war against it... But to assist it Christian civilization has been going on crusades for over one thousand five hundrer years... But what kind of weakness should one have? Clearly, only that which recurs in generations - to wit: insanity. And Ivan Broos decided to simulate schizophrenia... Then it will be even possible to get even with some people. .. and to feel like a soldier in trenches fighting against

historic injustice - though the pessimism born from real life will often prevail upon the heart to abandon resistance... And Ivan Broos nervously rubbed his forehead with both his hands... This will be *his* road of salvation and combat...".

Ivan Broos drained to the last drop the bitter cup of his "last decision". When all methods of torture failed to disclose his "simulation", the inquisitors, cruelly hit between the eyes by Broos' insane mockery and moral blows, transfer the "simulant" from the prison ward to a civilian insane asylum.

"Statistics of the 'Spiritual Man'"

Four writers, four types of "last decisions". Tychyna chose the game with the demon - the poet became a commissary. Khvylovyi substantiated his uncompromising attitude and through physical destruction conquered spiritual death! Kulish uttered his credo into the eyes of death and humbly bore his cross to Golgotha. Osmaczka concealed his immeasurable power under the mask of weakness. But behind these four, there are hundreds of other writers and thousands of other intellectuals.

On December 20th, 1954, the Association of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" dispatched the following telegram from New York: "To Moscow, USSR. To the Second Federal Convention of Writers. Ukrainian writers - political emigrants - salute the convention and express their profound compassion with the writers of all enslaved nations of the USSR. In 1930, the work of 259 Ukrainian writers appeared in print. After 1938, only 36 were left. Please investigate in the Ministry of Political Police where and why 223 writers disappeared from Ukrainian literature."

Since no reply was forthcoming, "Slovo" published the following communique in the press: "The number of missing Ukrainian writers in the Soviet Union can be deciphered as follows: executed: 17, committed suicide: 8, arrested, deported and removed from literature by other police methods: 175, disappeared without trace: 16, died a natural death: 7."

This piece of statistic research which probably is not yet complete and final, for it only refers to the more prominent among Ukrainian writers, could end our excursion into the general problem of the spiritual attitude of a human being in this utmost or marginal situation when his community disintegrates under the blows of destructive forces, when even the moral factor of world opinion ceases to exist, and when the

human being can only rely on his individual resources, on his own "last decision".

We discussed four examples as certain types of these "last decisions. In each type, there must have been hundreds of variations - for, as was mentioned before, each individual chose his own fate. Some were shot, some shot themselves, some accepted compromise, some chose "weakness" as their last weapon. Osmaczka's simulated insanity is a unique case. Others of the same type simply feigned death like the tiny ladybug which temporarily "dies" when touched. In his novel "Paradise" the poet and novelist Vassyl Barka described a "temporary dead" who in a marginal situation hides in a coffin in a church turned into a museum. Lying in the coffin, the "temporary dead" meditates: "If you want to put somebody on trial - then do something else under the same circumstances.. But after that, your trial will no longer be needed.. He started reading Skovoroda and came upon the image of the "spiritual man". Thus he had always conceived him, as the sage wrote: he, this man, is free,—untiringly soars into the height and into the distance, walks through closed doors; his sight penetrates infinity, mystery, past, and future; he has the eyes of the dove, the wings of the eagle, the faithfulness of the she-dove, the gratefulness of the stork, the humility of the lamb, the speed of the falcon, the endurance of the crane. Seven birds of God hover above him: the spirit of beauty, faith, hope, charity, sagaciousness, clairvoyance, purity of heart. The temporary dead put away the book, blew out the candle.

In the darkness even the stone over his head seems to have become immaterially translucent."

It was this "spiritual man" that we had been concerned with. Will he endure the ordeals of infernal situations? It is easy to nod an optimistic "yes", still easier to drop a skeptical "no". It is more difficult to pierce the inscrutable reality. As far as I am concerned there is one thing I never doubt: The "spiritual man" of the East not only perseveres in marginal situations but is reborn in death's embrace. As we have seen in literature he knew how to express the credo of rebirth. And for the sake of this rebirth he also knew how to "destroy his soul", all alone, in the pitch-dark night of Soviet Eurasia, "where death and beginning in one shroud do sleep."

New York, 4/27/57

Translated from Ukrainian by *Eugenia Wasylkiwska*

RHYTHM

When two slim girls walk by — and the red
poppy in their braids
— somewhere, far away! the young planets!

They swim. They're slender. The atoms of fatigue —
[into the world,
into the light out of the darkness! They dance,
[raising the dust.
The suns form a circle. Their light
spreads over the universe.

Antistrophe

She poured the hungry kids some milk — herself, she sat down and started thinking.

Down her cheeks, as though from blind eyes, the tears started rolling. One ahead, rushing. The other one slowly,
following
the first one . . .

Two girls.

EMPTINESS

I *wash myself. Water — metallic. The curtains — wind and banners!*

In the back yard poplars and women.
—But I tell you: the city is surrounded.
—Oh, my God! . . .

The window closed itself. The water trembles in the
[pitcher —
a fan on the ceiling . . .
—And yesterday, the workers in the factories . . .
/- - - one can distinctly hear the cannons/.

It's going to rain.

Antistrophe

City is covered with colored placards: a man is killing another man.
We read the lists of the ones who were shot, and we are surprised that the provinces are being raided.
Everything can be excused by a high ideal — except for the emptiness of soul.

Translated by *G.O.T.*

Todosiy Osmaczka

TO AN ARTIST

As a flood, streaming across the meadow, leaves on every blade of grass a drop of its element, so the night, parting from us at dawn, leaves by every object, by every plant, by every beast or man a particle of itself which we call a shadow. And if you have seen it and understood it — you are an artist.

And if you have noticed a little girl who sits in a garden and with her small hand tries to sweep away the shadow from under a spike of grass, and then full of wonder realizes that every spike of grass and every leaf and every object is surrounded by a shadow which cannot be swept away — then you are an artist.

And if you, becoming quite serious, follow the child as she twists her dress on her little belly with one hand, and with the other, points to the shadow and asks her mother to wipe it away, and if you hear the mother say: "This is a shadow, and nobody can wipe away shadows", and if you hear that the child goes on asking: "But is it not dirt?", and that the mother answers: "Child, you may wipe away dirt, but never a shadow" .... if you hear all this, and if you see and believe that all our deeds are nothing but grass, objects, and ears of wheat, and if you understand that evil is an element much darker than the dark ways of an autumn night, and that the wise heart is a light much brighter than the sun and the moon, because it lights up the core of things and not only their surfaces, and that we shall need this light until the last day of our consciousness, if you divine all this, — then indeed you are a great artist.

And because of this, your understanding everything that you paint shall look into our souls like the child, and our souls shall answer like the mother. And we shall know that your painting and we, are on great truth.

Translated by *Bohdan Rubchak*

Todosiy Osmaczka

LAUGHTER

The Mediterranean Sea is rumbling,
ringing with waves 'gainst the slopes of African
[pyramids,
rivers of blood gurgle in the valleys of ages
washing the steep shores of the bones of humanity...
And I hear through the murmur of elements over the
[bodies of slaves
the cracking of whips....
On the shores they are driven the sour-eyed, the un-
[washed, the naked,
they fall, perish like flies towards winter,
in the valleys of Egypt, of Hellas, of Rome,
in the valleys of the Middle Ages...
The cracking of whips!
With their fierce swishing are in one song united
our fires, and roars, and smoke, and fumes,
like the clangor of censers and the incense in temples..
The whips are cracking,
the sun blinks his eye,
and the blood squirts up to the ceiling of worlds;
stars grow out of the bloody drops,
and the stars in heaven
like cornflowers in the field are plucked by poets
and tied into garlands
for the white foreheads of their beloveds...
The sages uplift the oceans
in goblets of granite up to the hills 'neath the sun
and rivers entwine into the braid of the earth
but truth they will not discover...
Blood gushes into the sky and stars are in bloom...

O, earth !
I hear your diabolical laughter
in the whirring of millions of planets,
through millions of ages,
and I wish to spit from despair
on you, Mother Earth,
to burn a stain, a wasteland
on the back of your body
like an eternal brand of the captive,
and to vanish — a smoke in the abyss of time.

Translated by *Eugenia Wasylkiwska.*

Evhen Malaniuk

BIOGRAPHY

I

Always intense, for always against currents,
And always listening to songs and solitude,
I go without a way, a father, a forerunner
Directly to a goal which finally destroys.

To hear all, burn with all, to be one sharp anguish,
To be a cry that flames between clenched, bloody lips,
And then to realize I'll flicker out forgotten
And my last memory will be — my people's bones.

II

So, coming out of a dull prairie,
Born out of groans of hurt land
I'm sculpturing my wordless record
On the wild rock of centuries.

I'm building an eternal image
On the grey monolith of time,
And snake-eyed wisdom pierces beauty
With its sharp look, its cobra stare.

And wisdom calculates and whispers
And measures out my every step
And with its keen electric glances
Cuts through the lace of mysteries.

I become more and more entangled
Under this diamont hypnotism
And I see only stones and verses
And I hear only threatening shouts.

I fear my task shall not be finished
When the time comes to end my term,
And I shall float alone, unguided
Into the mist of dying days.

III

I must drink this cup to the bottom,
This absinthe of loneliness.
Oh, I burn with a merciless brightness,
Will Thou hear me? Oh, will Thou see?

The wind, like a beast being slaughtered
Shall weep through dreadful land,
There, where the wind is trampled,
There, where pestilence haunts.

And I must burn straight, unweary,
Torch - like for Thee alone;
I — apostle of blood - drenched high roads —
In the blue, in the nightless days.

Translated by *Bohdan Rubchak*

ASSOCIATION OF YOUNG UKRAINIAN ARTISTS

Notes on the Third Annual Exhibit Held from March 1 to March 17, 1957 at the Ukrainian Arts and Literary Club

At the present time, about twenty students, most of whom belong to the Association of Young Ukrainian Artists, are studying in New York or have finished studying art in American schools or colleges.

Three years ago the first organizational meeting for this association was held. Today we can speak of the association's work and of its goals for the future. An important moment in the life of the association was its first exhibit, which took place three years ago at the Ukrainian Literary and Arts Club in New York City.

Wolodymyr Baczynsky: Landscape Oil.

Borys Patchowsky: Prayer Woodcut.



Bohdan Pevny: The Prophet Oil.



Bohdan Tytla: Christmas Card Tempera.

The sponsoring of exhibits as well as the task of bringing together the student artists with Ukrainian artists and the recognition of the achievements of Ukrainian artists in the past are among the main tasks of the association. Three such exhibits have already been held, the success of which is shown by the large number of visitors. Evidence of the artistic level of the exhibits each time is given by favorable criticism coming also from the world-famous sculptor, Archipenko. The goal of the association is to unite all young Ukrainian artists in America and to work at raising artistic standards in order to sponsor very soon an exhibit in one of the New York art galleries.

The four illustrations on the preceding pages are reproductions of art work displayed at the Third Annual Exhibit by the Association of Young Ukrainian Artists at the Ukrainian Arts and Literary Club from March 1 to March 17, 1957.

Patricia Nell Warren

BANDURA

In a music store of downtown Manhattan
A bandura is being sold.

The instrument has many strings
Strung on the polished sounding-board.
People who enter the store
(In business or curiosity)
Sometimes touch the strings, evoking
A murmur of discord, or
They pluck a personal theme,
Or harmonies from unfamiliar epics,
And they move on.
Its full and imminent music is yet unheard
But on the folk-song records sold in the store,
Its ancient sound is like harp of wind,
Like harpsichord, like guitar;
It is not balalaika but bandura,
Flamenco of the Kherson steppe.
It lies on the show-case of glass,
Its transparent prison,
Creating its shadow in the window sunlight,
Creating its stillness in eternal noise of the street.

The strings shimmer,
O Ukraine.

LITHUANIAN LITERATURE UNDER THE SOVIETS

by FRANK R. SILBAJORIS*

The voices of individuals and of small nations have often been lost in the fury of World War II. However, it is important that these voices be heard, since the magnitude and global significance of contemporary Communist expansion can be best understood by studying concrete instances of Soviet cultural and military imperialism manifesting itself in the fate of each individual nation, however, small.

This article is an attempt to review one of such tragic experiences—the enslavement of Lithuanian cultural life as it is reflected in postwar Lithuanian literature. To be sure, that part of the Lithuanian nation and its intelligentsia which preferred exile to submission to Soviet domination has continued the native cultural tradition and developed a literature which, if it did not always reach the heights of the literary achievement during the years of independence, still has managed to create new and fascinating literary forms and incorporate the new experience of the nation in foreign lands, stimulated by alien cultures. There is an essential difference between stimulation by an alien culture and a forced imposition of it by means of both military and economic pressure. No nation can develop anything more than a parochial sort of primitive culture if it is to remain in complete isolation from foreign influences, for it is the mutual exchange of the achievements of different peoples that constitutes world civilization. However, the pressure exerted by the Communists in Lithuania could hardly be described as stimulation; rather it was a deliberate and well-coordinated effort on the political, military and cultural fronts to stifle any independent spark of creativity and to direct the energies of the Lithuanian people into channels chosen by their Soviet occupiers.

When the Soviets first occupied Lithuania in 1940, they found a young and vigorously developing culture, based on a rich and profoundly humanitarian peasant tradition. The early Lithuanian literature consisted mostly of earnest if sometimes unsophisticated attempts to develop a spiritual and historical profile of the Lithuanian nation. The first great work of Lithuan-

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ian *belles lettres* was written in the eighteenth century by a village pastor Kristijonas Duonelaitis in East Prussia. It was a classical epic poem called *The Seasons,* which described the daily life, work and sufferings of the Lithuanian peasants in East Prussia. The main notes of sober and diligent attitude toward life, of humility, patience and unbreakable determination to pull through were struck in this poem for the first time and remained as the main guiding traits of the Lithuanian peasant character as represented in literature. Later writers amplified and elaborated these main themes, gradually unfolding a kind of calm Lithuanian nationalism which does not need to resort to violence and bitterness in order to prove its worth. In the work of the "bard of Lithuanian national renaissance"—Maironis—these traits were overlaid with a romantic hue; the ancient legends of Lithuanian military prowess and glory acquired an almost Wagnerian mystical significance, and the whole people adopted the writer's simple but beautiful poems as songs of their own, which inspired them and prepared the country's young peasant generation for armed struggle to reestablish Lithuanian political independence immediately after the First World War.

When the country became independent in 1918, and the mentality of "national survival" was no longer as important as before, new writers began to strive for developing literature as an art, as a cultural value to be cultivated for itself. Going beyond the framework of national problems into the realm of personal, and consequently also universal, experience, these writers brought Lithuanian literature to a level where it was capable of creative interchange with other Western European countries. Among the most important writers should be mentioned: the poet Bernardas Brazdzionis, a contemplative and emotional writer on nature, love and death, deeply immersed in the Lithuanian Roman Catholic cultural tradition; Jonas Aistis and Mykolaitis-Putinas—two poets of a rebellious, highly individualistic nature who (especially Jonas Aistis) sought to evolve the Lithuanian literary language into a flexible and powerful medium for expressing an artist's creative experience; Vienuolis, a realistic novelist of the Lithuanian countryside, and Kreve-Mickevicius who wrote both as a realist and a romantic, establishing a living link between the past legend and the contemporary reality, thus making the legend more real and the present more romantic—a sort of living legend.

Another group of writers—the so-called "Third Front"—were mostly concerned with the social element in literature.

Leftists and iconoclasts, they believed that "art for art's sake" was nonsense, and that one should strive to depict the daily experience of those suffering under the "feudal-capitalist" system of the Lithuanian state and demand that their lot be improved. Their dissatisfaction with the achievement of Lithuanian independence was to some extent justified, since no young nation, with a political heritage that went from medieval feudal imperialism directly into slavery to Russian autocratic rule, could possibly be expected to establish itself firmly and immediately on the most liberalistic and highly developed level of democracy. Some of them did see how much was being done to direct the Lithuanian people firmly into democratic channels of development; some others, such as Petras Cvirka, a novelist, refused to see these efforts, preferring to think that it would be best to destroy that new Lithuanian political unit and start all over again under the banner of new, socialist and communist ideas coming from the Soviet Union. Petras Cvirka and those who agreed with him, although they made up quite a small minority of the Lithuanian writers, were used by the Soviets as the first "transmission belt" from the Party to the Lithuanian masses. Of course, when thy declared their allegiance to the occupying power, they at the same time lost their channels of communication with the bulk of the nation and found themselves in the position of Moscow puppets forcing upon Lithuania a new creed which, one suspects, was not exactly what these writers had imagined before the Soviets came.

The pattern for "sovietizing" Lithuania very much resembled that of the Soviet Union itself in the early years, except that it was much accelerated, and there was no time left for such creative experiments and manifestations of a not-yet-subdued independent spirit as the "fellow travellers," the early Sholokhov and the NEP writing. A Lithuanian Writers' Union was established immediately, with Petras Cvirka as its head, and it proceeded to dictate both literary ideology and esthetic standards to the rest of the Lithuanian writers. "Socialist realism" was already a developed creed, so that there was no need to "rediscover" anything—the Party provided inspiration and answers to the writers' creative questions; it told them what faith to live by and what ideas are important at the moment. All that the writers had to do was to create a literary version of Party manifestoes widely distributed throughout the country. Not much talent was required for this, and so, the level of literary achievement dropped catastrophically, even for those writers who, like Cvirka and Salomeja Neris, were glad to welcome the

"Stalin sun." Salomeja Neris was a poet of great lyrical warmth, whose leftist convictions did not prevent her from painting exquisite images of Lithuanian country and people. However, her first poem under the Soviet rule—an ode to Stalin—was a curious mixture of fine lyrical passages telling of her simple love for the nation, and of wooden clichés glorifying the "leader and teacher," which reeked of Communist posters blown about by the wind in the streets of Lithuanian towns.

From 1940 on, except for the interruption caused by war and the German occupation, Lithuanian literature was forced to follow a definite pattern, clearly established by the Party. Whatever was being done in the country—collectivization of agriculture, destruction of the old pattern of values, substitution of cooperative mentality for the old individualistic one—the Lithuanian writers were expected to cooperate to the hilt and to support each campaign with appropriate poems, sketches, novels and "public confessions" in the press.

The propagation of socialist agriculture was one of the most urgent tasks faced by Lithuanian writers. This was a complex problem, since Lithuanian agriculture during the years of independence had been organized on the principle of medium-sized independent households, and there had never been a collectivist tradition in Lithuania. The only "common labor" performed by Lithuanian peasants in the past was that of serf service to their foreign lords, and thus it could hardly evoke favorable associations in the course of establishing the collective farms. For the peasants this was serfdom all over again, with the state itself substituted for the landowner. Therefore, the Party-supervised attempts of Lithuanian writers to sell the collectivist idea to the peasantry were quite cautious at the beginning. Teofilis Tilvytis, a poet and satirist, who had himself exhibited rather sharp individualistic tendencies during the years of Lithuanian independence, now wrote the following of his literary plans:

> I am continuing the cycle of *Bilekiemio balandziai* (The Pigeons of Bilekiemis). In this book I am trying to depict the differences in the characteristics of villages and isolated settlements. . . . It seems to me that the inhabitant of the compact village possessed more positive characteristics than the farmer living on an isolated homestead. In such homesteads the social sense, the beauty of common labor and even our folk songs and tales disappeared. The features of the exploiter and the exploited are especially clearly expressed in the isolated settlements.
>
> This, then, was the first step: to make people feel that

"the beauty of common labor" truly belongs to the Lithuanian cultural heritage, is inextricably connected with the folk tradition and that, consequently, the nearest path back to that "beauty" is through the collective farms which the Party began to organize just at that time. The next step was to isolate two different kinds of community sentiment, to approve and encourage the "comradeship of the downtrodden" and to try to destroy the feeling of national unity, substituting for it the feeling of class hatred. The communist Lithuanian literary newspaper *Literature and Art* praised a young writer, J. Avyzius, for trying to convince the Lithuanian farmers that one should not love the *kulak*:

> J. Avyzius . . . clearly and courageously exposed one of the frequently occurring shortcomings among the Soviet workers: friendliness, neighborliness, in the name of which one often abstains from carrying out the clearly established Party policies toward the *kulaks*. . . .[2]

In the circumstances of the time, "*kulaks*" were those who could still maintain themselves economically without having to join the collective farms. Following the usual bolshevik pattern, the Party did all it could to ruin them to the point where they would lose their material and spiritual independence. Since the majority of Lithuanian farmers were in this position in 1946 or 1947, the Party policies clashed sharply with the will of the population, which finally brought about the eruption of a violent and tragic guerilla warfare that took on enormous proportions and at times almost completely disorganized the social and economic life of Lithuania. The life of the rural Party organizer hung in a precarious balance since the guerillas were especially anxious to shoot down the Lithuanian communists whom they considered traitors for cooperating with the foreign oppressor. Petras Cvirka wrote a short story about just such a "hero", from the Communist point of view, who, as a village Soviet chairman, tries to squeeze the last drop of blood from the independent farmers, and then one night finds himself surrounded by guerilla forces. In accordance with the canons of "Socialist realism," Cvirka makes the Soviet chairman win his battle single-handed against all the attackers, but a curious point is that even Cvirka himself does not say that the man found any help coming to him from either the village or the neighboring towns. This was an involuntary confirmation on Cvirka's part that, first, the whole countryside was behind the guerillas and, second, the organs of Communist law enforcement were them-

selves afraid to venture too deep into the village. Later, however, large contingents of army and MVD troops were sent to Lithuania, the guerillas were forced down at tremendous cost, and mass terror and repressions, deportations, arrests broke down any armed or even outspoken resistance.

With the path to collectivization thus laid open, the writers, again obedient to the Party, were ready to start on the second stage of their "psychological warfare"—to show what a joy it is to deny one's own personality in favor of Communism and to work with machine-like obedience on the newly established collective farms. A short story by the above-mentioned young writer Avyzius tells of the experience of a former small-scale *kulak* named Noreika who joins the collective farm, at first to sabotage it by stealing its property, but later to be transformed into a full-fledged "Soviet man." At the end of the story, Noreika sits down to write the following letter to Stalin:

> I will explain to him everything, down to the smallest detail. "Comrade Stalin," I shall write, "I was a bad man, I took advantage of my friends, but from this day on, chop my head off if you like, my eyes have been opened. Thanks to You we will leave to our children a large inheritance; they will enjoy a brighter future. I bow down to the ground before You for this, Comrade Stalin." The leader shall read my letter and shall know that there is in the world a man named Noreika who is much, very much indebted to Comrade Stalin.[3]

Since Lithuania is an agricultural country, the attack on the peasantry was the most important Party goal. Most of Lithuanian literature in the postwar period reflects that struggle between a way of life which had evolved through centuries and the inheritors of an ideology created by a bourgeois who had no understanding of the village and its problems. The Soviet species of Marxians were compelled to resort to the gun and the knout to have their "revolution from above" accepted in the village, but they may very well have expected to enlist the loyalty of the proletariat without using force. However, here, too, the Soviet occupiers ran into difficulties. Independent Lithuania was not a highly industrialized country, and the proletariat was neither numerous nor well organized. Communism found little support even among those factory workers who did exist in Lithuania. Consequently, when the Communists took over, they considered it very important to create a large proletarian force which would be loyal to the new regime. New factories were built, and Russians were brought in to occupy leading posts in

them and to supervise the development of the new Lithuanian Communist proletariat. In literature, the names of Communist factory directors, etc. remain mostly Lithuanian, but even a superficial leafing through the pages of *Tiesa* (Truth), the Lithuanian Communist Party newspaper, shows that the majority of "factory aristocracy" are Russians. At the same time all of those writers who were concerned with the problems of city life felt obliged (or were made) to play the midwife at the painful birth of the new Lithuanian proletarian and factory intellectual. J. Baltusis, another young writer who took up the pen under the Communist rule, wrote a short story in which he presented the transformation of the "bourgeois" worker's philosophy into a proletarian one. Skuodis, an old and experienced bookbinder, the only man in the shop who knows all the trade secrets, was doing his best to hide them from the rest of the workers. Being the foreman, he would so arrange the job that all important finishing details would have to be done by him personally. Then he would come to the shop at night, after everyone had left, to finish the job. He had learned this, J. Baltusis would have us believe, during the bourgeois rule, when he had to slave for thirty years before the old master taught him all the trade secrets. Therefore, it comes as a shock to him to be reprimanded for his unwanted "diligence." The factory manager, Tamulis, who is the new Soviet type of man—a carbon copy of the great Stalin—uses some clever amateur psychology and some not so clever crude pressure to make Skuodis learn two important lessons: one, labor discipline means that you overfulfill plans only when so authorized; two, there will now be quite enough work for him and for all those he could possibly teach, so that there is no need to protect one's job by artificially making oneself indispensable. The lesson that the reader is expected to draw from the story is that the capitalist system warps the souls of the working people, makes them hate and fight each other, so that they would be easier to exploit.

The Soviet system, on the other hand, brings out that which is best in every man, particularly the factory workers. J. Baltrunas wrote a short story called "On the River," in which we see the transformation of a simple and fairly illiterate factory girl into a skilled, cheerful and independent, class-conscious proletarian. The whole story is very similar to *Inga,* a play by the Soviet writer Glebov, written in the early years of Communist rule in Soviet Russia. Indeed, the problems are somewhat similar, too, since the Russians did not have a very large or

well organized city proletariat either until much later when the five-year plans were well under way.

The framework of this essay does not allow one to track down all the developments in the other spheres of life as represented in postwar Lithuanian literature. Not much evidence is available on the subject, but what there is amounts to a clear picture of systematic, ruthless transformation of all areas of life according to the Communist pattern. Force and persuasion are the two main weapons, and the Lithuanian writers' task, given to them by the Communist Party, is to cooperate in the "persuasion campaign." Where that fails, as in the case of the peasantry, force takes over.

There is indeed little point in asking what does all this do to literature as art. Art is something that the Communists never really undestood nor trusted very much. Sense of beauty, like sense of humor, are reserved for free societies which do not encumber themselves with fanatic "life-transforming" ideologies. The indigenous development of Lithuanian literature has been stopped in its tracks by the Soviet occupation. The Soviet critics, of course, do speak a good deal about "increasing the writer's mastery of his art," but the very phrasing of this demand betrays its purpose—art is not a creative search for meaningful esthetic experience; art is merely a branch of the Party propaganda office, and the better one can do the selling, the more skillfull he is at it, the "greater artist" he will be from the Communist point of view.

It is, however, important to point out that in any country where Communism takes power cultural imperialism will manifest itself to the same degree that an economic, military, political imperialism will. The Soviet Union pursues its purposes with deadly seriousness, and the free world is not to be distracted by the mask of a buffoon that the men who hold power in Moscow choose to put on from time to time. Khrushchev may very well drink too much and laugh too heartily, but the people who do not voluntarily make themselves his slaves in the Soviet Union will die just the same as under Stalin. And the spiritual death caused by the destruction of free culture may well be more tragic and irreparable than the physical death of martyrs of the most totalitarian and ruthless imperialism of any time.

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[1] T. Tilvytis, "More New Works," *Literature and Art,* organ of the Lithuanian Soviet Writers' Union, April 30, 1947, p. 4. A similar theme is developed in the novel *Kalviai* (The Smiths), reviewed in the May, 1948,

issue of *Literature and Art.* The novel, written by a young writer A. Beriozov, tells of a private-property-minded village smith's struggle against his son who moves out into a cooperative smithy and proves that he can work better that way.

[2] *Literature and Art,* May 1 , 1948, p. 4.

[3] J. Avyzius, "The Inheritance," *Victory,* Magazine of Literature, Art and Criticism, No. 3, March, 1949, p. 46.

UKRAINICA IN THE POLISH MONTHLY "KULTURA"

by MAGNUS J. KRYNSKI*

A great deal of attention is being given to Ukrainian problems by exile Polish publications. The Parisian liberal monthly, *Kultura,* in particular, is distinguished by the excellence of its articles on the various political and cultural aspects of the Ukrainian problem. It is the purpose of this sketch to provide a sampling of the contributions offered by this periodical.

In the November, 1953 issue, Yurij Sherech, in an article bearing the Kiplingesque title *Zachod jest Zachodem — Wschod jest Wschodem* (West is West and East is East), writes about the de-intellectualization and deliberate "popularization" (in the sense of the Russian *Narodnichestvo*) of Russian culture under the Soviets. Serech contends that the Western disability to understand the Soviet mentality is due to the fact that Westerners traditionally tend to consider Eastern Slavs more complex and "Dostoyevskian" than they really are instead of recognizing the fact that they are dealing with a pre-industrial, pre-historic society. As texts for his argument the author adroitly emloys such disparate sources as G. Blunden's novel, *The Time of Assassins,* and Andrij Malyshko's prize-winning poems on America.

Josef Lobodowski, the author of the next article under discussion deserves a brief introduction. A ranking Polish poet of the inter-war years, Lobodowski proudly stresses his Ukrainian origin and consciously attempts to revive in his poems the traditions of the Ukrainian school of Polish romantic poetry of the 19th century. In 1954, in Paris, Lobodowski published a collection of poems devoted to the Ukraine under the title *Zlota Hramota* (Golden Bull). Four poems of this collection appear in Ukrainian in the Appendix in translations by S. Hordynskij, L. Poltawa and J. Slawutych.

Lobodowski's article entitled *The Scylla and Charybdis of Ukrainian Poetry* appeared in two installments in the May and June issues of 1954. It surveys the Ukrainian poetry of the 20th century embracing Soviet Ukrainian poets as well as those of the territories of the pre-war Polish

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State. It also includes a survey of the Ukrainian emigre poetry. Lobodowski discusses the creative work of Mykola Zerow, Maxim Rylski, Pawlo Tychyna, Mykola Bazan, Mychaylo Orest, Malaniuk, Lypa, Stefanovych and many others. He treats Zerow and Rylski with particular warmth. A strong Westerner in his sympathies Lobodowski regards the programmatic classicism of these poets as an effective antidote to Russian nihilism, to "epileptic Dostoyevshchina," to the Stalinist "engineers of human souls" theory. As Lobodowski puts it, "A sonnet in his (Zerow's) hands is a weapon aimed at Moscow's rule in the Golden Kiev." This article written with the intensity of an outsider who is perhaps less interested in formal criticism than in the more transcendental national and cultural aspects of Ukrainian poetry.

In the June and July 1956 issues of *Kultura* Iwan Lysiak-Rudnycki attempts to debunk the Russian myths concerning the Pereyaslav agreement. Rudnycki regards Pereyaslav as merely an episode in Khmelnytzki's policy, as a tactical phase not different from his treaties with Poland, Turkey or Sweden. When Khmelnytzki accepted Moscow's protectorate he was motivated solely by the Ukrainian *raison d'etat* rather than by any ideal of Russo-Ukrainian unity. The 19th century myth proclaiming that the "Little Russians," under the leadership of Khmelnytzki, joined the Russian State of their free accord, legitimatized the Russian domination of the Ukraine and provided a rationale for a part of the Ukrainian society to serve the Tsar loyally.

Soviet policy, too, utilizes the symbolism of Pereyaslav. It is noteworthy that Soviet propaganda is not based upon the ideals of proletarian internationalism or social interests but appeals to Ukrainian patriotism and national traditionalism. This nationalism, however, has been directed solely against the West and its anti-Russian edge has been completely blunted. The basic difference between the Tsarist and the Soviet conceptions lies in the fact that while the Tsarist propaganda always insisted on the unity of the Russian nation, the Soviets stress "the friendship of the two fraternal nations" and are prepared to grant the Ukraine the status of junior partner in the imperial organization on condition of Moscow's political supremacy. Rudnycki's article also offers a survey of events in the Ukraine since Stalin's death.

In addition to the major articles, the Parisian *Kultura* in almost every issue presents short items concerning Ukrainian publications and scholarly and cultural activities as well as information on the community life in the major Ukrainian emigre centers.

BOOK REVIEWS

Eugene Pyziur, *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin,* 158 pp., The Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, Wis., 1956.

It is no accident that Michael Bakunin's personality and life have attracted more attention than his writings and ideas. Many elements coincided to make Bakunin an ideal model for the biographical historian: his meteoric rise on the Russian and European horizon; his active part in the 1848 upheaval and in a number of subsequent conspiracies and rebellions; his imprisonment in the redoubtable Peter-and-Paul fortress and his spectacular escape from Siberia through the Far East; finally, his much-advertised competition with Marx for leadership of the First International. The anecdotal interest in Bakunin is increased by the enormous oddities of his character, in which traits of the Russian grand seigneur, bohemian and demagogue were strangely mixed. The cynicism and ferocity of Bakunin the revolutionary were often mitigated by his almost childish naivete. Although the inferior of his rival, Marx, in intellect and force of will, Bakunin was Marx's superior not only in physical courage but also in flashes of a certain native generosity and kindliness, of which Marx's envious soul was completely incapable.

Bakunin's literary output was considerable. However, the form of his writings was sloppy; begun under the inspiration of the moment, they usually remained unfinished. They were also repetitious, full of a tedious grandiloquence, and often downright preposterous. It is no wonder that students of the history of political ideas have disparaged Bakunin's teachings as being a curiosity, devoid of intrinsic merit, and interesting only as illustrations of the strange and, probably, abnormal mind of the author.

Moreover, Bakunin's posthumous fame suffered from the eclipse of Anarchism, to which cause his name was so closely linked. Marx's prestige as a thinker has profited by his good fortune in being the acknowledged ideologist of a powerful movement. Bakunin's reputation, on the contrary, has dwindled along with that of the anarchist movement. Indeed, the reverence which the few remaining anarchists have continued to show for their teacher has scarcely been a service, as it has given him the label of patron saint of a sect often regarded as crackpot.

As these remarks show, the task which Eugene Pyziur set himself in his monograph on Bakunin as a theorist was not an easy one. Yet he solved it successfully. With this book Mr. Pyziur has made a valuable contribution to the history of political ideas in Russia. The study is thorough and systematic in the presentation of its difficult subject matter. It shows that the backbone of Bakunin's political ideas created his concept of revolution. For Bakunin, the revolution was to be the total destruction of the existing society and the formation of an entirely new social order. The movement was to be unlimited both in its scope and its duration, and was to fill an entire period of history. The convulsions

of the twentieth century give to Bakunin's apocalyptic vision an ominous ring of reality.

Bakunin gave much thought to the conditions, methods, and probably course of this all-encompassing, total revolution. He believed that the coming of revolution would be conditioned not only by economic factors, but also by the psychological readiness of the masses. He envisaged the revolution as an international movement spreading over a number of countries. He saw a potential revolutionary force not only in the factory workers but also in the peasants, especially in Russia and other countries with a depressed peasant mass, and urged an alliance of the workers and the peasants. Bakunin gave much attention to a third group destined to play a role in the revolution, to the uprooted marginal elements of modern society, the *declassé* among the bourgeoisie and the intelligentia, and even to the criminal fringe. He often repeated that in Russia the bandit was the only true revolutionary. The revolution was to appeal boldly to the evil passions of the masses, to their greed, envy and desire for vengeance, and to achieve the character of a wholesale conflagration, destroying the entire preceding order and its representatives.

Bakunin's most original contribution to the theory of revolution was his idea of the role of the *avant garde.*

Members of the organization were to be professional revolutionaries, completely and unconditionally committed to their tasks, who had severed any social or moral bonds which might draw them away from their service to the cause. Linked to this absolutely reliable kernel there was to be a wider group of "titular brothers" (fellow-travellers in present-day terms). These were to be men of social standing who, without being subjected to the rigors of the organization and without being initiated into its secrets, would use their influence on society in support of the aims of the organization.

Bakunin, like Marx, always evaded formulating a detailed plan for the new society which was to arise after the revolution. However, a general picture can be constructed from a number of incidental remarks in his writings. It would appear that the basis of the post-revolutionary society was to be the self-governing communes, under a "revolutionary council" composed of delegates elected by the population. The local communes were to unite into provincial federations, and the provinces were to form a national federation. Finally a universal federation of mankind was to be formed. Bakunin always stressed that the federation was to be "formed from the bottom to the top." This formula was supposed to prevent the concentration of power and the rebirth of the state, which was to have been destoyed by the victorious revolution. The secret revolutionary organization, however, was not to be dissolved but to be transformed into a watchdog, with the task of guarding against any revival of the previous order, and, especially, of the state.

Mr. Pyziur shows the unresolved tension between the libertarian and equalitarian sides of Bakunin's program. Bakunin starts as an advocate of the free human personality, as a rebel against the oppressions of contemporary society. However, his desire for equality quickly brings

him to a point of admitting the necessity of leveling down the differences between individuals, i. e., to the actual elimination of freedom. This same contradiction prevails on the level of collective life. In principle, Bakunin recognized the "right of secession" of each autonomous commune. But when discussing his revolutionary blueprints, Bakunin required the complete unity of all communes and the subordination of individual municipalities to the central authority. In case a unit refused obedience, it was to be proscribed and brought to reason by armed force.

> Despite Bakunin's verbal incantation of federalism, his whole federative system bore the imprint of prevailing elements of centralization. Indeed, if we may presume that his system were put into practice, it appears that these centralistic elements would completely outweigh the elements of local autonomy. (p. 133)

Similarly, notwithstanding Bakunin's diatribes against the state, the intrinsic logic of his reasoning indicates not the abolition or even the weakening of political power, but rather its reestablishment on a new basis. The crucial point here is the controlling position given by Bakunin to the secret revolutionary alliance.

Marx and Engels predicated the "dictatorship of the proletariat," not the dictatorship of the revolutionary party. But the Russian Bolsheviks, although theoretically disciples of Marxism, actually followed a course which was in this, as in many other respects, closer to Bakunin than to Marx.

During the 1920's there were some Russian Communists who tried to have Bakunin admitted to the Red Pantheon as an outstanding figure in the Russian revolutionary tradition, and as one of the native predecessors of Leninism. At that time a considerable amount of research was done on Bakunin in the USSR. In the 1930's, however, in connection with the liquidation of the "historical school" of the Old Bolshevik Pokrovskii, all these views were suppressed as unorthodox. Was it that relationship with Bakunin was regarded as too compromising for the Communist state? Did the historical uniqueness of Leninism-Stalinism have to be stressed at any cost? In any case, since Soviet historiography knows only two colors, black and white, once Bakunin was relegated to the outer darkness, his record had to be blackened without mercy. It is both amusing and shocking to see how Soviet historians apply the double standard in such cases. If a figure as historically "accepted," deviations from the right path are overlooked or "dialectically" reduced to mere trifles. For instance, in Herzen's case his conflicts with Marx are minimized, as are his illusions (which he shared with Chernyshevskii and most of the Russian radicals of that generation) about the peasant communes. For the "elect," such as Herzen, even personal failings or a lack of revolutionary steadfastness may be treated with indulgence. In Bakunin's case, on the contrary, every failing becomes a mortal sin. However, as these lines are being written, Soviet Russia is again starting on a re-evaluation of its past. It is possible that this trend may finally lead to a more objective assessment of Bakunin's role, and to his establishment as forerunner of Russian Communism.[1]

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[1] The interesting problem of Bakunin's posthumous career in the USSR, which lay outside of the scope of Mr. Pyziur's study, was recently given an excellent treatment by V. Varlamov, *Bakunin and the Russian Jacobins and Blanquists as Evaluated by Soviet Historiography,* Research Program on the USSR, Mimeographed Series No. 79 (New York, 1955).

Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.

Ilya Ehrenburg was recently quoted by the *New York Times* as declaring that Soviet policy is based on "respect for the national culture of any nation, large or small." The practice of that "respect" has been subjected to devastating and revealing inspection in Frederick C. Barghoorn's *Soviet Russian Nationalism,* a detailed inquiry into the content and ramifications of the patriotic sentiment shaped and manipulated by the Soviet regime. Prof. Barghoorn presents a penetrating analysis of the changing blend of Marxist-Leninist and traditional Russian components in "Soviet patriotism" and the use of national symbols for the purpose of "maximum integration at home and maximum disintegration in the non-Soviet world."

This dual aim of Soviet policy has led to the formulation of different yet complementary approaches to nationalism. Since the civil war the Bolshevik elitę has cleverly sought to win the loyalty of both the favored Great Russians and the non-Russian nationalities by claiming to represent their national interests and traditions. However, once incorporated, each of these nationalities has been subjected to the demands of a "higher" loyalty to a supranational entity, which in effect has meant complete subordination to the ideologically disciplined and monolithic Party elitę. The latter could tolerate no conflicting loyalties to nationality per se, for such sentiments are deemed "retrogressive" in a "socialist" society which asserts the right to transform cultural traditions according to the formula: "national in form, socialist in content." On the other hand, nationalism in non-Soviet colonial areas, in the Soviet view, is "progressive" because it forces the pace of "national liberation" and the break-up of capitalist empires. Finally, "proletarian internationalism" encourages the class struggle in non-Soviet states and promotes international support for the messianic role of the "Socialist Homeland" in its drive toward a Soviet world.

Despite the befogging Soviet jargon, it is clear from this study that manipulation is the key word in describing Soviet exploitation of the virtually universal sentiment of love of homeland. The Kremlin has displayed "an astutely instrumental attitude toward nationalism" and a flexibility capable of altering slogans and symbols as the situation requires. "In fact," Prof. Barghoorn asserts, "the capability of the communists in applied psychology and sociology may constitute their real 'secret weapon.'" Kremlin tactics have already "effectively eliminated some smaller Soviet nationalities and may eventually do the same to the Jews and even the Turkic peoples..." If systematically practiced, he concludes, this suppres-

sion of national indentity may seriously weaken the national consciousness of such groups, and, barring war with the West, "it seems likely that the process of integration will continue and will enjoy substantial success" inside the Soviet Union and even in the satellites, some of which "if and when it becomes expedient... may be incorporated into the Soviet state."

These ominous conclusions were written before the recent events in Poland and Hungary and the announcement of a rehabilitation of some of the "eliminated" non-Russian nationalities, developments which perhaps offer grounds for greater doubt as to the permanent effectiveness of sovietization than Prof. Barghoorn's conclusions suggest. Nationalism is a two-edged sword which, while it can be cunningly used by Soviet "social engineers," may equally turn out to be the "secret weapon" of a patriotically inspired anti-Moscow rebelliousness, if not outright anti-communism. Nevertheless, this comprehensive and scholarly study of a highly complex topic should give pause to any who would rush into overly optimistic expectations, especially with regard to the Soviet Union proper. Soviet nationalism, even if it be artifically contrived of a cynical manipulation of human sentiments and precarious deceit, is still skillfully geared to ambitions which are "bounded only by the realities of geography and counterbalancing power."

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Armstrong, John A. *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 1939-1945. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955. 322 p.

In this work a former student and current Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, presents for the first time a rather comprehensive picture of Ukrainian nationalism - a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State - during World War II. The study is based largely on primary sources secured from German archives made available to the public in connection with the Nurnberg trials, on published material, and on interviews with participants and observers following the war.

Speaking in broad general terms, the author describes and analyzes three main topics: 1) Emergence, nature and characteristics of Ukrainian nationalism; 2) German occupation and policy in the Ukraine, and 3) Activities of Ukrainian nationalists during World War II - forms, organization and channels of activity. While the Western part of the Ukraine is also considered at some length, the study is focused upon the Eastern part, thus subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system.

Reviewing the history of Ukrainian nationalism, Dr. Armstrong sharply but objectively criticizes those elements in Ukrainian nationalism of the period immediately before World War II and until 1943, which resembled authoritarian systems and so called "integral nationalism". Probably the best parts of the work—along with those treating nationalism and the

church, and nationalism and the East Ukrainian social structure—are those dealing with German policy in the Ukraine. Ill-conceived policies and blind actions of the German rulers are summarized in four points: inhuman treatment resulting in the death of innumerable prisoners of war; egoistic economic policy and inability or unwillingness to deal effectively with agricultural problems; the Ostarbeiter program; and ruthless repressions. To pursue a different policy and to act otherwise was beyond the political capacity of Erich Koch and his masters in Berlin.

In the course of analysis the author brings forth a great deal of illuminating information and discribes in detail the many-sided Ukrainian movement during the turbulent time between 1939 and 1945. As in the analysis of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism Dr. Armstrong is very critical in the exposition of the activities of Ukrainian nationalists. But if some of the author's interpretations and conclusions can be questioned and challenged, the fact remains that he demonstrated in this work his penetrating insight and knowledge of Ukrainian nationalism during that period. For the reader, at least for this reader, it is this fact that makes it so difficult to explain why one of the important and interesting aspects of activities of Ukrainian nationalists—military activities and the struggle of the UPA against German and Soviet forces in the period of 1943-1945—is left almost completely uncovered. The argument that there is no reliable material needed for a detailed exposition and analysis of this theme can hardly be accepted. Therefore in view of all that is good and valuable in this work, it is regrettable that this significant aspect did not get adequate treatment.

On the whole, however, Dr. Armstrong's work is an able study and an original and important contribution to the study of Ukraine and the problems of Eastern Europe. For years to come, it will retain its value as a guide for students interested in this field.

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Dmytryshyn, Basil. *Moscow and the Ukraine. A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy,* 1918-1953. New York, Bookman, Assoc., 1956. 310p., Notes. Bibliography. Index.

The first attempt to write a comprehensive survey of Ukraine's experience with Communism was *Ukraine under the Soviets* of Clarence Manning. It was based largely upon eye witness accounts and studies prepared by native Ukrainian scholars, and it is precisely that circumstance which accounts for both the strength and the weakness of the book. The book of Dr. Dmytryshyn, although covering the ground which is in many ways identical with that of Manning's book, is of an entirely different character: its author made a painstaking study of the primary source material, elusive and scattered as it is, checked his conclusions against those arrived at by other scholars who are active in this and

related fields, and produced a monographic study of Ukraine's turbulent history in the years 1918-1953 which in scope alone surpasses by far everything thus far published on that subject and in quality of research meets the high standards established by the works of J. Reshetar and J. Armstrong.

Dr. Dmytryshyn begins with a survey of the Communist nationality theory and its practical application (Capters I and II); then he gives the first comprehensive, scholarly treatment in English, known to the reviewer, of the controversial "Ukrainization" policy. It is interesting to note that in the author's opinion, "from the legal point of view the Ukrainization decree was an absurdity, because nationalization (no doubt Ukrainization is meant here, PH) of (all) activities within the UkSSR was presupposed by its constitution..." (p. 70). The author states further that the Ukrainization really was "a grave crisis of Bolshevism and above all... a vivid demonstration of the total bankruptcy of the Bolshevik nationality theories" (ibid.). There follows a detailed survey of the several "national deviations" which occurred in Ukraine during the 1920's and early 1930's: A section in that chapter is dedicated to Khvylovy, Shumsky and Volobuyev. The treatment of Shumsky is very informative (although hardly a final word), the more so as there exists little on Shumsky even in Ukrainian. The author considers his views to have been particularly dangerous from the point of view of Moscow. However, the ideas of Volobuyev are dismissed with a couple of pages. The interesting and somewhat enigmatic figure of Skrypnyk has received a "separate treatment" on p. 137 ff. It is possible that Skrypnyk's activities and party standing both put him somewhat apart from the other "deviationists", but then again some feel that his inclusion in Chapter IV would tend to help the reader to view the opposite tendencies in Ukraine as the spontaneous, continuous movement that it was. As is, one can only repeat with Dr. Dmytryshyn that "a correct appraisal of Skrypnyk... is very much wanting" (p. 137). Chapters V and VI constitute an attempt to tell the story of the UkSSR from 1929 till the death of Stalin. The author stresses the interplay of the political, economic and cultural factors. Soviet statistics are used frequently to illustrate individual points. A detailed discussion of the economic relations follows in Chapter VII. The reader obtains a vivid picture of the place of Ukraine in the Soviet economy as well as an evaluation of its potentialities. An analysis of the juridical and political nature of the Russian-Ukrainian federal ties is supplied in Chapter VIII; the centralizing nature of the Communist brand of federalism is brought in focus here. Chapter IX deals in much detail with the ethnic and social composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The conclusion of the author is that the CPU "from its very beginning has not only been a minority party, but also an alien one transplanted and imposed upon the Ukraine" (p. 249). This well-founded statement itself describes well the nature of the Communist policy toward Ukraine. The brief concluding chapter summarizes the conclusions obtained from an analysis of 35 years of history; their gist is—"the failure (of Communism) to win over the Ukraine" (p. 252).

In view of the most impressive erudition of the author it is a hard task indeed to point out factual mistakes in the book under consideration here. It may be said, for instance, that the sources speak of a Donets-Kryvyi Rih republic rather than the Kryvdonbass (p. 30); the Kharkiv Congress of Dec. 1917 clung to the tradition of the Ukrainian People's Republic; the Brest Litovsk treaty gave the Galician Ukrainians, in theory at least, a lot more than just "linguistic rights" (p. 37). However, to discover real mistakes or omissions in the mass of factual material used by the author is beyond the powers of this reviewer.

There is one aspect of the book which may draw some mild criticism from a careful reader: the author stresses throughout his book the phenomenon of change, the change of the Ukrainian people as such, of its social structure, its cultural level, and, perhaps not directly, its political ideology as well. The process of the change itself is well traced by the author, and a suficient amount of information on the state of the Ukrainian people *before* the change got under way can be obtained from other sources. But the question will remain open regarding the *results* of that change. That the Ukrainian nation has withstood 35 years of Soviet regimentation is obvious enough, but in what shape? What are the factors that hold it together at present? In what direction could they develop in the future? Did it acquire any positive qualities under the Soviet regime or was all of it a "lost epoch", to use Drahomanov's expression? To what degree could Ukrainian national ideals have penetrated into the Soviet hierarchy? There exist good precedents for this, and it would be naivé to assume that the Ukrainian-Communist relationship was just a one way street.

There can be no doubt that the book of Dr. Dmytryshyn constitutes, along with works of Maystrenko, Lavrynenko and Luckyi, a major contribution by Ukrainian authors to our knowledge of Soviet affairs. Years ago, while reviewing R. Pipes' *Formation of the Soviet Union* (a book, which, incidentally, is not mentioned in the bibliography), this reviewer was bemoaning the fact that Ukrainian authors seem to lack either energy or ability to write works of similar scope and quality. He is therefore the more pleased to see that he was wrong.

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The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia, by Dr. Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky, Philosophical Library, New York, 1957, 178 pp.

This is a well written book on the subject of Russia's economic expansion. The author, Dr. Nicholas Chirovsky, was born in Ukraine and thus has had many "opportunities" during and after the Second World War to witness the growth of Russian imperialism. Therefore, his book may be considered a first hand report.

While reading this concise and very well documented work, I unexpectedly recalled article "On the Problem of Ukrainian Economy" (*Bilshovyk Ukrainy,* Nos. 2 & 3, 1928), written by a prominent Ukrainian economist. The article was published under the Soviet Russian regime some twenty years ago. The author of the article, Prof. Volobuyev, stated on the basis of statistics, which were published and censored by Russian authorities, that Russia does not need Ukrainian pig iron or wheat or other natural recources in order to maintain her economic prosperity and growth. In other words, contrary to the old thesis that Russia in order to exist as an economic unit must have the land, the resources and the people of Ukraine, this learned economist showed very clearly and honestly that such is not the case, for Russia on her own ethnographical territory possesses all necessary resources. On the other hand, he also made clear that Ukraine has all the resources necessary to establish her economic independence as well.

I do not think that Prof. Chirovsky had a chance to study the article that I have just mentioned. But what is much more interesting, he, like Prof. Volobuyev, came quite independently and in a different environment to a similar conclusion. This is, that the core and source of the trouble in today's international, economic and political relations is nothing more than Russian imperialism.

As I understand it, Chirovsky's book presents a new approach by American writers on the subject matter of Russian history and economy. In other words, up to the present most writers, with very few exceptions, either have told us the partial truth or were misled by the theories and concepts that so-called Russian "broad nature" (shyroka natura)—which was at times demonically energetic and, at others, hopelessly passive or at one time, good natured and at another, cruel—cannot be easily understood. It is, so to say, almost unexplorable and characterized by many other fairy tales by Florinsky, Dallin and others. All those highly confusing theories are being developed in order to hide Russian naked imperialism.

Prof. Chirovsky is fully aware of these tendencies. On page 156 he says: "Of course, the ardent champions of the Russian cause, like Kennan, Don Levin, Dallin or Lyons, could not deny the imperialism of the Soviets. Yet they tried to explain in some way and manner that it was not a traditional Russian imperialism, which, according to them, actually never existed, but only a 'bad' Communism that was at work." The whole book which depicts in an economic-historical analytical way the economic aspects of Russian aggression in Ukraine (this is the exact title of Chapter VI, pp. 52-63), the conquest of the Baltic countries in Chapter V, the further expansion toward the south and toward the Near East and Central Asia, provides strong evidence of the "direct and organic connection between the old Tsarist Empire and the modern Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics." Even more so, "Russian political thinking and acting have for centuries exhibited an amazing continuity." Throughout the book, any objective student of Russian affairs may find many examples and cases of what the author stated in the following

words: "...economic, and especially the commercial and financial interests combined with the religious and nationalistic ambitions, contributed to the growth of the imperialist aggressiveness of the Tsarist government." On the other hand, "...the economic ideology of Communism was skillfully utilized for propaganda reasons to motivate the imperialism of the Soviet government." (p. xiii)

A huge mass of books, pamphlets and other primary sources was employed in this painstaking research by Dr. N. Chirovsky who is associate professor of economics at Seton Hall University. These sources, which are comprised of Russian, Polish, Ukrainian and German as well as English literature, formed a sound and many-sided basis for his remarkable analysis. The book, therefore, will serve as a very good guide for anyone who seeks an unbiased explanation to one of the most important problems of our generation, i. e. what are the elements of strength and what are the soft spots or elements of weakness of modern Russia. Economy and national psychology are interdependent. Both require a close watch by a diligent and intelligent eye. The book provides, not a magnifiying glass, but adequate tools and a new method for the hands of a Western economist, historian or diplomat.

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John Shelton Curtis,*The Russian Church and the Soviet State,* 1917-1950, Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1953, 387 pp.

The problem of religion in the USSR still does not receive due attention in the Western scholarly world. Those rare publications which appeared in the late twenties and early thirties (Cook's *Religion in Russia under the Soviets,* Spinka's *Christianity Confronts Communism,* Hecker's *Religion under the Soviets,* and others) in many respects were subjective readings into the events under consideration, rather than objective treatments of the subject. The early authors, some of them Protestant students of theology, were willing to see in the dissolving Russian Orthodox Church a revival of the true and uncorrupted Christianity. This wishful thinking prevented any acknowledgment on their part of the direct participation of the CP in these anti-church activities.

Shelton Curtis's book is devoid of such mistakes. However, it suffers from other shortcomings, namely, from the improper evaluation of the official Soviet sources. This observation is especially applicable to the last two chapters: Patriarch and Generalissimo and The Strange Alliance, in which Mr. Shelton Curtis discusses the post-war position of the Orthodox Church.

It seems to me that it is extremely risky to take the Soviet documents at their face value, and make such conclusions as "the church remained loyal to the Soviet government" (p. 299), "leading churchmen continued to give ardent support to Stalin" (p. 296), etc. Perhaps Mr. Curtis is formally right, but does this formality reveal a true reality? Or, how does he

(Mr. Shelton Curtis) know that "most of the Ukrainian clergy seemed to have supported the patriarchal church, so that Polikarp's efforts had little effect"; only because he was told so by Mr. Spuler in the *Ost-Probleme?* If this daring statement is at least comparatively objective, then it should be substantiated by some statistical data.

A complete lack of objectivity Mr. Shelton Curtis demonstrates regarding problems of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite. "In 1946", he says, "some five million Uniats renounced the papacy and asked to be received under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow—a request that was speedily granted." Does Mr. Shelton Curtis really believe that these five million renounced their own religion of which they have been so proud of for centuries? Why didn't they do it before the war in former Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, countries where people enjoyed religious liberties? In the *Journal of the Patriarchate of Moscow,* 1949, No. 10, p.5, we read the following: "This holiday was the result of the six months of stubborn work and activity of the Most Reverend Makarii who, during his first visit to Subcarpathia in 1948, found only *one* Uniate priest united, and in that time the matter of the reunion seemed almost hopeless." (Italics supplied, J. F.). On August 1949 we learned that the Ukrainian Catholics of the Subcarpatho-Ukraine suddenly renounced the papacy. How is it possible, let us ask, that in 1948 "there was only one priest who accepted Orthodoxy and the reunion seemed hopeless", and in 1949 the population as a whole renounced the papacy? Is human nature so unstable and subject to such rapid change? If in "the scanty sources available on this matter it is not indicated whether the missionary efforts of Archbishop Makarii were assisted by the power of the government" then, being afraid of unscholarly speculation, do we have to accept the validity of these sources? It seems to us that following such logic could lead not only to a full recognition of the Soviet reality as it is manifested through the Communist sources but also it would endanger our position as a whole.

Mr. Shelton Curtis believes that "it is impossible to determine why the Uniate bishops were arrested." Why is it impossible?

Is it perhaps because Soviet sources do not contain any implications in this respect? In 1947, for example, news reached the West that bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, the last Catholic bishop of the Byzantine Rite under the Soviets, while travelling on his inspection through his diocese "collided" with a Soviet tank and was killed. One who knew bishop Romzha and his absolute devotion to the Catholic cause is not perplexed by this "accidental collision." He knows that only such a brutal act could have stopped the bishop's religious activities.

The fact that the Soviet government has been violently liquidating the Catholic Church in the Ukraine and in other East European countries, and at the same time making far reaching concessions with the Russian Orthodox Church, is an additional indication that Bolshevism is a symbiosis of the vulgarized Marxism and the Russian historical past. The Russian Church, permanently a tool in the hands of Russia's rulers, has

helped the Bolsheviks to advance Russia's cause on territories where Orthodoxy has been the predominant religion. Catholicism, alien to all kinds of politico-religious pacts, had to be liquidated.

These shortcomings, of course, do not diminish the value of the book entirely. The book contains many interesting facts until now unpublished in the West. In this respect it definitely enlarges our knowledge and deepens our insight into problems of the Church-communism relationship. Had Mr. Curtis tried to evaluate rather than describe the Soviet documents, his book would have been a perfect example of scholarship, and a great contribution to the advancement of the Soviet studies in this country.

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Gregor, Joseph. *Der Schauspielfuehrer.* Stuttgart, A. Hiersemann, 1953-1956. 5v.

Der Schauspielfuehrer is one of the most eminent works today in the field of modern drama. Prof. Gregor is a well known German scholar and writer. His works include novels, short stories, biographies, and numerous histories of culture, such as "Das Russische Theater" (1927), "Weltgeschichte des Theaters" (1933 and 1944), "Geschichte des Österreichischen Theaters" (1948), "Kulturgeschichte der Oper" (1951) etc. Prof. Gregor was born in Czernowitz in 1881. While teaching at the University of Czernowitz (1912-1914), he came into contact with many prominent Ukrainian scholars and became deeply interested in Ukrainian literature, particularly in the lyric works of the Bukovinian poet O. Fedkovych. These early influences led him to undertake the study of Ukrainian drama, to which he dedicates a separate chapter in his "Schauspielfuehrer".

Der Schauspielfuehrer is primarily a bibliography and a guide to the dramatic works of the continent and America. It reaches, however, also into the literary history of each country, and thus brings out the essential unity of the history of the drama as a whole. The brief historical introductions to each chapter, take into account the three-fold influences exerted on the form of the drama in every epoch: the demands of actors, the shape of circumstances of the theatre of the time, and the changing prejudices of the contemporary audience. The synopses of plays are precise. The date of a play's publication, as well as the date and place of its first production is included.

I should like now to turn my attention to one chapter in Prof. Gregor's work, namely the chapter dedicated to Ukrainian drama. (Vol. 4, pp. 307-317) It is, to my knowledge, the first study of Ukrainian drama in a world survey of dramatic literature, which treats the Ukrainian drama as a unique element, independent and complete in its form, and incom-

parable to the dramatic literature of any other European country. The drama of Ukraine, as Prof. Gregor points out, stands alone! It is a drama without a stage, a drama almost without literature—it is pure folk-art! The author considers Kotlyarevsky the reformer, or rather the founder of the Ukrainian modern drama. Kotlyarevsky, in his opinion, not only established the use of popular Ukrainian as a literary language, but brought about the final unification of the people with their national art. In no country do we find such a complete unification of these two elements. This was primarily due to the unusual political conditions, in which the Ukrainian literature developed apart from other European literatures. Men, such as Nikolai Gogol, were forced to use the Russian language as media of their literary expression or to undergo ruthless persecution. The Ukrainian drama owned no national theatre, in fact, many of the dramatic works were first published abroad. Because of the political conditions of the 19th century, came about the Odyssey of the greatest poet of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko, a true Homerian in spirit, with his brilliant comedy "Nazar Stodolia", published in 1843. These strangely torn circumstances produced unusual results: the theatre in Ukraine came into a closeness with the common people as hardly anywhere else in the world. The unification of the folk-motives with fairy-land romanticism produced results, before which, one stands in awe and admiration, and which would be worth discovering by the stages of Europe. The works which Prof. Gregor uses as representative examples of the Ukrainian drama are: Ivan Kotlyarevsky's "Natalka Poltavka"; Taras Shevchenko's "Nazar Stodolya", Ivan Franko's "Vkradene shchastya" and "Son knyazya Svyatoslava"; Lesya Ukrayinka's "Lisova pisnia". As an example of modern social comedy, worthy of Gogol or Holbert, we find Ivan Tobylevych's "Martyn Borulya". Finally, as the representative play of the new trends under the Soviets, Prof. Gregor lists Alexander Korniychuk's "Platon Krechet." Synopses of these works are given.

It is most unfortunate that Prof. Gregor makes no attempt to analyze the recent developments of the Ukrainian drama under the Soviets. To consider the work of Korniychuk or Pervomaysky as a part of the study in Soviet problematics may find its justification, but to dismiss completely the deeply symbolic social and political dramas of Mykola Kulish, can be explained only by lack of research in this period of Ukrainian drama. Another obvious defficiency in Prof. Gregor's work, lies in his treatment of the 19th century dramatists. It would have been most gratifying to find such names as M. Starycky, M. Kropyvnycky or Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, included in his historical introduction to Ukrainian dramatic literature. However, omissions and abbreviations are to be expected in any general survey of literature. On the whole, *Der Schauspielfuehrer* is an important bibliographic contribution to the history of drama. The chapter on the Ukrainian theatre, should be of a lasting value to the student of Ukrainian drama and literature.

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CHRONICLE OF STUDENT LIFE

● Tenth National Student Congress meeting at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor from Aug. 20 through Aug. 30, 1957 will mark the completion of the first decade of USNSA's existence. This Congress is considered to be the major policy-making event of the Association and will bring together many outstanding student leaders of the past 10 years along with a number of prominent civic and educational leaders. As in the past years, the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America anticipates sending its representatives to this national Congress of the United States National Student Association.

● Being the host to the first Ukrainian Student Conference in the United States, Cleveland again this year will welcome the delegates of all local Ukrainian-American student organizations united under the charter of the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America. The Third Bi-annual Congress of the Federation, preceded by a Conference under the topic: "Ukraine's struggle for independence during World War II" will be held in Cleveland from June 13 through 16, 1957. Lectures read at the Conference will appear in the next issue of this magazine.

● As in the past two years, the Ukrainian Student Fund, Inc., is now accepting and processing the applications for scholarship for the academic year 1957/58. The deadline for mailing the applications was set for May 31, 1957 and the address is 302 West 13th Street, New York, N. Y.

● Five thousand Hungarian students, 10 per cent of the total number of the university students in Hungary, who in the course of the November 1956 events, had to flee their native country were very much aided in their settlement and resumption of studies in new universities by a special coordinating committee created by COSEC.

During the tragic days of the violent repression of heroic effort of the Hungarian people to restore independence and freedom for their country, Ukrainian students in the U.S. repeatedly expressed their sympathy for their fighting colleagues. The Executive Committee of the Federation voiced this sympathy in a series of letters sent out to leading personalities in the United Nations, United States Government and to the press. Members of the Student Organization in New York joined in the show of protest and picketed the U.N. building during the debates on the Hungarian question.

● In commemoration of the Battle of Kruty, where 300 Ukrainian students were killed defending the independence of

Ukraine against Communist Russian attack in 1918, special celebrations were held by most of the student organizations throughout the country. As a reminder of Ukrainian heritage, culture and arts, two valuable books were presented in Baltimore, Md., to H. Rovelstad, director of libraries at the University of Maryland by the president of the local Ukrainian Student Group.

● "Classical influences in Slavic Literature" was the title of lecture delivered by Dr. J. V. Rudnyckyj of the University of Manitoba at the Classics Club of the University of North Dakota. Classical tradition in Old Kievan Rus' and in modern Slavic literature as well as such authors as Kotlyarevsky, Shevchenko, Franko, Lesya Ukrainka and many contemporaries were characterized.

● Professor John A. Armstrong, Jr., who wrote a scholarly book on Ukrainian nationalism and is presently teaching at Columbia University, is working on another, tentatively called *The Soviet Bureacratic Elite—A Case Study On The Ukrainian Apparatus—The Communist Party.* This book is to be published next year.

● Professor Ihor Sevchenko has been appointed Associate Professor of History at Columbia University. He will teach courses in Byzantine History, Early Russian History and Polish Literature. Prof. Sevchenko studied in Belgium and had the privilege of being the student of a renown authority on Byzantine history, Professor Gregoire. Prof. Sevchenko was on the faculty of Michigan University and taught also at the University of California.

● The Ukrainian Students Club at CCNY, a very active student group, presented a film entitled "The Ukrainians" which reveals the harsh impact of Communist domination in Ukraine and the stubborn resistance with which it is constantly being met.

● The activities and social life of Columbia students who are of Ukrainian origin and of those interested in Ukrainian culture, are concentrated in the Ukrainian Circle of Columbia University, officially established in 1952. The program of the Circle for 1956 - 57 included a series of travelogues with color slides on recent tours of Ukraine. The lecturers were: Rev. Georges L. Bissonnette, two years Catholic chaplain at the US Embassy in Moscow and author of *Moscow Was My Parish;* Miss Gloria Surmach, art editor of the children's magazine, *Humpty Dumpty,* and an expert on Ukrainian Easter eggs; and Professor John A. Armstrong, author of *Ukrainian Nationalism.* Dr. Joseph L. Lichten, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of B'nai

B'rith and member of the Polish Embassy in Washington from 1941 to 1945, lectured on "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1945." A color film "The Treasure of Ukraine" and two other films on Ukrainian life were featured. Traditional Ukrainian Christmas dishes were served at one of the two Christmas parties sponsored by this student group.

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