


UKRAINE



AND THE EUROPEAN TURMOIL 1917-1919

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U K R A I N E
and
THE EUROPEAN TURMOIL
1917-1919

Vol. I

by

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RULES ON THE TRANSLITERATION OF THE NON-ENGLISH PERSONAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL NAMES

(Adopted by Shevchenko Scientific Society)

1. All topographical names in languages which use Latin alphabet, adjusted to some peculiar sounds unusual in English, are here used in the original spelling of the languages concerned (French, German, Czech, Slovak, Polish, etc.). An exception to this rule occurs only when some geographical names of these languages are for centuries fully anglicized, e. g. Warsaw (not Polish *Warszawa*), Moscow (not Russian *Moskva*), Rome (not Italian *Roma*) etc.

2. The same rule is used in the transliteration of personal names in the languages with Latin alphabet (French, German, Polish, Czech, Slovak, etc.).

3. Ukrainians use in their language s. c. *Cyrillic alphabet*. (It is really Greek alphabet adjusted to some peculiar sounds of the Ukrainian language). Therefore the Ukrainian personal and topographical names must be transliterated in English alphabet on the basis of the following principles:

A letter in Ukrainian names is always to be pronounced like in English:

a (Rada)	in English	a in father
e (Verkhovyna)		e in led, red, bed, met
i (Ihor)		ee in to meet, to see
u (Buh)		oo in food, good
y after consonants		i in ill, bill, this
y before or after a vowel		y in yes, year, way, buy
zh (Zhabye, Zhuravno)		s in treasure, measure
kh (Khotyn, Khoma)		ch in Scottish loch
ts (Tsetsora, Kotsko)		ts in let's sing!

4. The rules of the transliteration of Ukrainian names is here given for the general use in Ukrainian publications of all kinds with the exception of the strict linguistics. Therefore these rules of the transliteration are only approximate and simplified.

5. Here are some examples of the transliteration of Ukrainian names: Petrushevych, Yuriy, Petlyura, Hrushevskyy.

6. Some living Ukrainian authors in earlier years had published their works under their names on principles of the Slavic spelling. In this case their names in present publications should be preserved in Slavic spelling in order to avoid misunderstanding of their identity.

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UKRAINE THROUGH THE AGES

Introductory Outline

by

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Knowledge of certain paradoxes is essential to the understanding of Ukrainian history. For much longer than a thousand years the Ukrainians have inhabited one of the world's rich territories, which should have worked to their advantage. In reality, the abundant resources have been the cause of Ukraine's misfortune, for her covetous enemies have profited to the detriment of the Ukrainians, millions of whom in our own times have perished from starvation. Because of her position on the cross-roads between Europe and Asia, Ukraine has twice been the defender of European civilization of which she has always been an integral part. But having stemmed the irresistible tides of barbarous oriental invaders, she became so weakened that she lost her own freedom. Submerged and oppressed for centuries at a time, the Ukrainian people might have been expected to lose their identity. Even their original name was usurped by the enemy. Yet in the twentieth century the Ukrainians emerged still clinging steadfastly to their indigenous culture, although with an apparently new name. Subjugation invariably impresses upon a people the marks of inferiority, but the Ukrainians have proved their intellectual superiority by becoming the educators of their conquerors. Their kindly, hospitable, and peace-loving disposition has often turned into a lion-like fury. The very fact that the Ukrainians are a large European nation would seem to contradict the reality of their subjugation.

Situated in the southeastern corner of Europe, the Ukrainian ethnographic territory lies immediately north of the land-locked Black Sea, extending roughly from the Caucasus Mountains and the Don River in the east to the southern Dnister River and the western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains in the west, and to the Prypyat, Desna, and Seym Rivers in the north.*) This includes the regions known as Great Ukraine, Kuban, Galicia, Bukovyna, Volynia, Kholm (Pol. Chelm), and Carpatho-Ukraine (Carpathian

*) The names of rivers are used here in Ukrainian form: **Dnister** (Russ. Dniester), **Dnipro** or **Dnipr** (Russ. Dnieper), etc.

Ruthenia). Measuring over 1,000 miles across and approximately 500 miles in a north-south direction, Ukraine encompasses over 385,000 square miles, which are populated by over 50,000,000 people, approximately 38,000,000 of whom are Ukrainians. Although her area is exceeded in Europe only by Russia proper, Ukraine is about one-tenth the area of Canada or the United States. The greater part of Ukraine is located between 44° and 53° north latitude, within the same latitude as the populated part of Canada and the northernmost part of the U.S.A. The population of Ukraine is exceeded in Europe only by that of Russia, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Resources and Importance

Nature has endowed Ukraine with abundant and rich resources*) which, if it were not for exploitation by Russia, would easily make her selfsufficient and able to provide large exports of foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactured goods to countries in dire need of them. Without doubt Russia would be severely handicapped and greatly weakened as an aggressive power if cut off from these natural resources. The importance of Ukraine's economy in the world can be gathered from Tables I — III (for the year 1934).

TABLE I
World Industrial Production, 1934

Product	Ukraine's ranking	Percentage of U.S.S.R. production
Manganese ore	1st	75
Iron ore	3rd	70
Potassium salt	3rd	50
Pig iron	3rd	69.9
Sugar	4th	69.5
Coal	4th	69.8
Steel	5th	63.3
Rolled metal	5th	64
Table salt	5th	
Oil	7th	40.8

*) The following is an extract from a document attracting Polish landlords to Ukraine (1590): "Ukraine is the most precious possession of the Polish Crown. Her meadows are as beautiful as the Elysian Fields. They either stretch along plains or are intersected by hills, forests and woods. The prospect is pleasant and suggests abundant harvests. In Ukraine domestic and wild birds and animals are so plentiful that it makes one think that this is the place of Ceres and Diana. Her beehives are so full of honey that one forgets about the Silician Gela and Attic Hymethus. The vine also grows

TABLE II
World Agricultural Production, 1934

Product	Ukraine's ranking	Percentage of U.S.S.R. production
Rye	2nd	35
Millet	2nd	
Sugar beets	2nd	66.8
Flax	2nd	
Wheat	3rd	45
Barley	3rd	65
Potatoes	3rd	25
Corn	4th	80
Oats	6th	25

TABLE III
World Livestock Production, 1934

Product	Ukraine's ranking	Percentage of U.S.S.R. production
Swine	5th	32
Horses	5th	32.5
Horned cattle	7th	26.2
Sheep	11th	26.2

[Based on data found in M. Stsiborsky, *Ukrayina v Tsyfrakh* (Ukraine in Figures), pp. 23, 24, 28, 29, 34.]

It is little wonder that Hitler coveted the rich mineral, agricultural and industrial products, taken from the black earth steppes, the dense forests and in the waters of Ukraine, and launched the full weight of his infernal war machine in a *Drang nach Osten*. The master of this strategic position on the land and air route between Europe and Asia (particularly India) could hope to become master of Europe and perhaps of three continents. But just as in the past the Ukrainians had halted the huge invasion forces from the east and from the south, so in the Second World War they helped to drive back and vanquish the enemy from the west.

there and wine might easily be made. Italian nuts are so plentiful there that it makes one think that Ukraine was once upon a time Italian soil. It is impossible to make a list of all her lakes overflowing with fish. Oh, why waste words when one phrase expresses all! This is the Promised Land about which God spake to Israel! Rivers of milk and honey flow there! He who once has been to Ukraine can never leave her because she attracts men as the magnet attracts iron." Quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History*, p. 75.

Subsequently, due to Soviet exploitation, the relative importance of the Ukrainian economy declined percentage-wise considerably. Nevertheless, in 1964, Ukraine continued to be a country of tremendous economic potential which could easily maintain an independent existence, as is evident from the following statistics.

Economic Potentials of Ukraine relative to the economy
of the U.S.S.R. in 1964

Product	Percentage of U.S.S.R. production
Manganese ore	68.0
Iron ore	56.0
Pig iron	50.1
Steel	40.7
Gas	32.4
Coal	33.8
Tractors	35.0
Sugar	57.5
Meat	22.2
Milk	21.6
Eggs	23.9
Grain	50.4
Potatoes	22.6
Fruit	30.6
Sugar beets	57.4
Cattle	22.7
Swine	30.8

[Statistics based on *Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in the year 1964), published by the Statistical Bureau of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1965.]

Ancient History

Penetration into the dim past reveals that many people have inhabited the Ukrainian territory. From Persian, Arabian, Greek, and Roman historians and from archeological evidence we learn that the following peoples have occupied large sections of this rich land: Tripillians, of Iranian origin (3000 — 100 B.C.); Cimmerians, probably of Thracian origin (1000 — 600 B.C.); Scythians, probably of Iranian origin (600 B.C. — A.D. 300); Huns, of Turco-Finnish Mongolian origin (A.D. 370 — 453); Bulgarians and Avars, of Turco-Finnish origin (A.D. 400 — 650); Khazars, of Turkish origin (A.D. 650 — 850); and Pechenegs and Polovtsians (A.D. 850 — 1200).

The ancestors of the Ukrainians were the Slavs who for centuries occupied the region between the Upper Dnister, the Prypyat, and the Dniپر Rivers. In the centuries after Christ these peaceful agricultural people, who were divided into tribes known under various names, began to disperse before the attacking nomads and to expand in all directions. In time, because of segregation, there emerged the three great branches of the Slavs: Western Slavs — Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles; Southern Slavs — Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Bulgarians; and Eastern Slavs — Ukrainians, Byelorussians (White Ruthenians), and Russians.

The First State: — Rus'

The Ukrainians descend from the Slavic tribes known by the Greeks as Antae and later Ros, and by the Roman writers as Ruthenes. Originally, their country was known in their Slavic tongue as Rus' (not to be confused with the current name Russia). Several large tribes were consolidated under the rule of Ruryk, a Northman or Viking, who initiated the dynasty bearing his name in 862. Kyiv*) became the capital of the Grand Princedom (in fact a monarchy) of Kyivan Rus, the cradle of the Ukrainian state.**)

During the reigns of Volodymyr (Vladimir) the Great (980-1015) and his son Yaroslav the Wise (1010-54), Kyivan Rus' reached its zenith, becoming one of the foremost states in Europe. This mighty empire extended from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and from the Danube and the Carpathians to the Volga River and the Urals. Upon Volodymyr's adoption of Christianity from Constantinople in 988, Greek influence quickly and indelibly left its mark on all aspects of religious, social, and political life. In one generation the transformation of the country was so great that Kyivan Rus' could pride herself on having reached equality with the resplendent and powerful Byzantine Empire. The German bishop Thietmar of Merseburg, who visited Kyiv in 1017, wrote that the city possessed "four hundred churches, eight market-places, and countless masses of people."***)

Owing to her power, prosperity, and high level of civilization and culture, Kyivan Rus' developed wide dynastic and diplomatic relations. Emperor Yaroslav was married to the daughter of the Swedish king, Olaf, and later to the daughter of the Byzantine

*) **Kyiv** is the Ukrainian name of the capital city. The Russian form of this name is **Kiev**.

) The name **Rus' pronounce: **Roos'**.

***) V. Sichynsky, **Chuzhyntsi pro Ukrayinu** (Foreigners on Ukraine), p. 18.

emperor. One of his daughters was married to the Norwegian king, Harald Haardraade, claimant to the English throne. Another daughter, Anna, married King Henry I of France and ruled as queen during her son Philip's minority. Other marriages took place with German, Hungarian, Greek and Polish rulers. Before ascending the English throne King Edward the Confessor had sought refuge in Kyiv, as did many others. Later, Volodymyr Monomachus (1113-25), another powerful ruler of the Kyivan state, married Gytha, the daughter of King Harold of England, whose descendant in the 31st generation is the present monarch, Queen Elizabeth II.

The golden age of ancient Ukraine was not fated to last long, particularly after Yaroslav's decision to divide his empire among his sons. Continual warfare among the princes for supremacy at Kyiv, intervention by Polish, Hungarian, and German rulers, as well as by the newly formed Muscovite principality, and the struggle with the barbarous hordes from Asia, soon weakened the great state.

Beginning in 1223, the successive ferocious attacks of Jenghis Khan's Mongolian Tatar armies under the leadership of Batu brought a tragic end to Kyivan Rus'. In 1240, the proud capital of Kyiv, despite a heroic defence, was captured and almost completely destroyed. The Ukrainian princes fought savagely, but their scattered forces proved to be too weak. The barbarous invader ruthlessly plundered the country and destroyed or carried off into slavery tremendous numbers. Three centuries were to pass before the Ukrainians could recover from this disastrous and almost catastrophic blow.

Nevertheless, the plans of the pagan Tatar war lords of Asia to conquer Europe and destroy its civilization were foiled. Ukraine fell before the savage enemy, but her desperate defense weakened the ranks and the spirit of the marauders. The Tatars met with a set-back at Liegnitz, and Western Europe was saved.

The Rise of Muscovy

The Mongolian invasion caused a greater divergence between the Ukrainians of the Kyivan territories and the northern semi-Slavs who were known at this time as the Muscovites. Although the Muscovite regions were also under the Tatar yoke, they were comparatively free from plunder, and their princes turned their efforts towards uniting the semi-barbaric northern principalities under the rule of Moscow (founded in 1147). When the greater part of Ukraine lay in devastation and was not allowed to recover, the Muscovite princes took advantage of this impotency and proclaimed themselves successors to and rulers of Kyivan Rus' Ivan

Kalyta (1325-41) assumed the title "Grand Prince of all Rus." Claiming Rus' as their own, these northern rulers appropriated the culture and the history of ancient Ukraine.*)

Galician State

At the time of the fall of Kyiv, the Kyivan throne was in the possession of Danylo (Daniel), Prince (later King) of Galicia and Volynia (1237-64). These western provinces of the Kyivan Empire thereafter perpetuated the political, social and cultural tradition of Kyivan Rus'.

Galicia (the name is derived from the original capital of the province, Halych) had been incorporated into the Kyivan state by Volodymyr the Great in 981, while Volynia was united a little earlier.**) Because of its flourishing trade and commerce, Galicia had risen steadily to power and in prestige. The fearless Prince Roman (1199-1205) had united the two principalities under his rule in 1200, and shortly afterwards seized the throne of Kyiv. His son, Danylo, who received the crown from the Pope in 1253, did so much for the welfare of his people and his state that he ranks with Volodymyr and Yaroslav in Ukrainian history. He founded Lviv (Pol. Lwów, Germ. Lemberg), naming it after his son, Lev, and established it as his domains to include Sub-Carpathian Rus' (Ruthenia), wrenching it from the Hungarians. Under King Lev, Galicia-Volynia reached the peak of its power and development. This western Ukrainian state lasted until 1349 when it was conquered by Poland and Lithuania.

Lithuanian Rule

At the time the Ukrainian lands were being ravaged by the Tatars, Lithuania, being further removed from the dreadful enemy, gradually rose to power. Step by step the Lithuanian rulers drove back the Tatars from the Ukrainian lands. By 1350 Kyiv came under Lithuanian rule, which continued to expand to the south and east. Because of their benevolent policy of leaving undisturbed the

*) Aleksey K. Tolstoy, a Russian, wrote the following: "One Rus' has its roots in the universal, or at least in European culture. In this Rus' the ideas of goodness, honor, and freedom are understood, as in the West. But there is another Rus'; the Rus' of the dark forest, the Rus' of the taiga, the animal Russia, the fanatic Russia, the Mongol, Tatar Russia. This last Russia made despotism and fanaticism its ideal... Kievan Rus' was a part of Europe, Moscow long remained the negation of Europe." *Slavonic and East European Review*, XIX, 1939-40, 71-2.

) The name **Halych appropriated the Latin language in the form: **Galicia**.

Ukrainian institutions, laws, customs and language, the Lithuanian princes were gladly welcomed by Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians did not enjoy these privileges for long. In 1386, Poland achieved a dynastic union with Lithuania, and in 1569, a political union. In this way Poland came to dominate the Polish-Lithuanian state and gradually imposed her laws on the whole population. The Ukrainians lost their former privileges and the masses were forced into serfdom. In order to escape the heavily oppressive rule of the Polish landlords (*szlachta*) large numbers of Ukrainian peasants and squires fled eastward, beyond the limits of Polish rule.

Cossack State

Threatened with extinction by the Tatars, the Turks, and now by the Poles, the Ukrainians developed a remarkable means of defense and self-preservation. In the fifteenth century the Cossacks (*Kozaks*), who later revived the Ukrainian state, emerged from the hardy and fearless Ukrainian frontiersmen. From the Ukrainian peasants, hunters, fishermen, artisans and trusted gentry there was formed on the islands below the raging cataracts of the Dniper River a unique military organization known as the Zaporozhian Sich ("the fortress below the rapids"). The rank-and-file Cossacks, adhering to a democratic individualism, elected their officers and officials, including their leader, the *Hetman*. The Hetman was given the powers of life and death over the Cossacks; at the end of his term he was, none the less, held accountable for his actions. Although at first nominally acknowledging the Polish king, the Cossacks set down their own law and would permit no interference in their own affairs; they maintained a state within a state.

In the face of constant peril from the Tatars and the Turks, the Cossacks developed masterful skill in swordsmanship and musketry, in horsemanship and boatmanship, and in the art of attack and defense. Their daring raids won them admiration throughout the world and many foreign states sought their help. Supporting the cause of the freedom of the Ukrainian people and the defense of the Christian faith, the Cossacks kept up a continuous barrage of lightning attacks on the Tatar and the Turkish strongholds on the coast of the Black Sea, including Asia Minor and Constantinople. By this means thousands of Ukrainians were liberated from Turkish captivity and servitude as Turkish towns and cities lay smouldering in ruins. In 1621 the Turkish forces invading Europe were routed by the Cossacks under the Hetman Sahaydachnyy at Khotyn. All these blows served to weaken the powerful Turkish Empire in its advance on trembling Europe.

After several abortive uprisings against the tyranny of the Polish landlords, the Ukrainian Cossacks achieved complete freedom

and independence under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyy.*) In 1648, at the head of a well-disciplined army backed by the Ukrainian population, this military genius swiftly struck at the Polish armies, crushing one after the other at Zhovti Vody, Korsun, Pylyavtsi and Zboriw. Mighty Poland lay shattered at his feet and the Polish king was compelled to recognize the Cossack state. Khmelnytskyy refrained from invading Polish ethnographic territory, and this gave Poland an opportunity to recover and force later her rule on Ukrainian territory again.

Khmelnytskyy founded a Ukrainian state in the full meaning of the term. A government was set up and order was established. Diplomatic relations with European powers were opened and treaties were drawn up. The "Great Hetman" has often been compared to his famous contemporary in England, Oliver Cromwell, with whom he corresponded.**)

As Ukraine was surrounded by aggressive enemies, Bohdan Khmelnytskyy sought to protect her independence by entering into an offensive-defensive alliance with Muscovy in 1654, known as the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Although the treaty marked the downfall of Poland, it proved fatal to Ukraine, as it paved the way for Russian domination. The perfidious Muscovite rulers began to interfere in Ukrainian affairs even during the lifetime of Khmelnytskyy. In order to counteract Muscovite aspirations in Ukraine, the Hetman made a seven-power alliance against Russia. Before action could be taken, however, Khmelnytskyy passed away, at a time when Ukraine sorely needed his strong hand.

*) There is a biography of Bohdan Khmelnytskyy; see George Vernadsky, **Bohdan Hetman of Ukraine**.

***) The Polish historian, L. Kubala, has made the following interesting comparison of the two great leaders: "Foreigners have compared Khmelnytskyy to Cromwell. This was indeed very natural, especially at that time when they both held almost exclusively the attention of Western and Eastern Europe. Both were representatives of the country gentry, springing, so to speak, from the soil, found themselves at the head of an uprising, won victories, and making mock of the theories and experiences of the cleverist strategists and politicians, created strong armies. Almost contemporaneously, with the help of these armies, they won supreme political powers, holding it until death, and handing it on to their sons. We must acknowledge that Khmelnytskyy's task was by far the more difficult; his country had no natural borders, being open on all sides. In contradistinction to Cromwell, Khmelnytskyy had at his disposal neither experienced statesmen nor an old and powerful national organization. Army, finance, administration, national economy, relations with foreign powers all were brought into being by him, provided for and looked after. He had to find men, train them, and look after the smallest details. If his army was not starving, if he had arms, munitions, and spies, and clever agents, the merit was his alone. From every point of view he was a man of quite exceptional stature, and gifted far beyond the ordinary. We can say of him that he was a born ruler." Quoted by D. Doroshenko, **History of Ukraine**, p. 272.

Ukraine Partitioned

Ukraine was a thorn in the side of Russia and Poland. The insistence of the Ukrainian Cossacks on democratic rights and individual freedom was a menace to the feudalistic system of both these countries. Taking advantage of the internal strife among the Cossack leaders after Khmelnytsky's death, the two enemies of Ukraine came to terms and drew up the Treaty of Andrusiv (Rus. Andrusovo) in 1667. With the Dniپر River as a boundary, Russia and Poland divided Ukraine between them.

Russia's and Poland's re-establishment in Ukraine of the feudalistic aristocratic order, with the accompanying serfdom and severe restriction of liberties, resulted in constant revolts against these oppressive powers for over a century. Hetman Petro (Peter) Doroshenko, allying himself with the Turks, in the years 1672-76 almost succeeded in driving away the enemies and in uniting both sections of Ukraine. Hetman Ivan (John) Mazepa, in alliance with the great Swedish king, Charles XII, made a valiant effort to free Ukraine from the Muscovite yoke, and it was only by a narrow margin that he and his ally were defeated by Tsar Peter I at the decisive battle of Poltava in 1709. Over half a century later, in 1768, peasants led by the Cossack officers Maxym Zaliznyak and Ivan Gonta raised the banners of revolt against the Polish *szlachta* throughout Polish Ukraine, and the Polish king had to call upon Russia to help crush this *Haydamaky* uprising. (*Haydamak* is probably the Turkish word for outlaw). The last Cossack resistance was quelled with great severity in 1775, when the Zaporozhian Sich, the last stronghold of Ukrainian liberties, was destroyed by a large Russian army.

Khmelnytsky's unfortunate alliance with Russia in 1654 gave the Muscovite tsars the pretensions to Ukraine that they desired, and thereafter they pursued a consistent policy of absorption of the country into the Russian Empire and Russification of the Ukrainian people. In 1654, Alexis assumed the title "Tsar of all the Great, Little and White Rus," thus claiming to be the successor of the rulers of the Kyivan state. The Ukrainians were referred to as "Little Russians." After the fateful battle of Poltava in 1709, Tsar Peter, wishing to obliterate all differences between the Ukrainians and his people, designated himself as "Emperor and Tsar of all the Rus'." He officially adopted for his country in Russian the name "*Rossia*", or as we know it in English, "*Russia*", a corrupted form of the ancient Ukrainian name, "Rus'." Previously, the northern country had been known as *Muscovy*, *Muscovia*, or *Muscovitia*. The Russian tsars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attempted to eradi-

cate all differences between the two peoples, and in this they nearly succeeded as far as the outside world was concerned.

A sense of self-preservation led the Ukrainians to keep their identity distinct from that of their encroaching neighbours to the north. An old designation that was synonymous with their original name of "Rus'" came into use. This name "*Ukrayina*" (Ukraine), meaning country or region, first mentioned in the Kyivan chronicles in 1187, was already common among the Cossacks. Hetman Khmelnytsky used both "Rus'" and "*Ukrayina*" for his state and later on often the compound terms, "*Rus'-Ukrayina*" and "*Ukrayina-Rus'.*" After Mazepa's defeat, the Russian tsars forbade the use of "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" as well as the Ukrainian language, and officially designated the territory as "Little Russia" (*Malorossia*), a term which lasted up to the First World War.

Ukrainian Contribution to Russia

Prior to the seventeenth century Russia proper was a semi-civilized country. The small degree of western civilization that she possessed had come to her by way of the Ukrainian Kyivan state. However, after Khmelnytsky's alliance with Moscow (1654), cultural advancement received a new impetus. Beginning with Peter I, the Russian tsars embarked on a new policy — the Europeanization of Russia. In all these far-reaching Russian plans, the Ukrainians played a very prominent role. This is not to be wondered at, for Ukraine possessed high-ranking schools when Russia had none; for example — the university at Kyiv had its beginnings in 1631, while the university at Moscow was established in 1755 by Kyivan scholars. When the despotic tsars severely restricted educational advancement in Ukraine, many Ukrainian scholars declared themselves Russians and migrated north.

Just as the conquered Greeks had become the teachers of the Romans, similarly the subdued Ukrainians became the teachers of the Russians. With the substantial aid of the greatest Ukrainian scholars, Peter I and Catherine II were able to carry out their reforms. These scholars were instrumental in establishing Russian schools and printing presses. Most of the prelates of the Russian Orthodox Church were Ukrainians at this time. Many composers, writers, artists, and law-makers were of Ukrainian origin. In fact the evolution of the Russian literary language was influenced by Ukrainian-born men of letters.

An imposing list of famous Russians of Ukrainian descent could be drawn up, but it will suffice to mention a few of the more important men. Archbishop Smotrytsky, a great Orthodox polemicist,

was the author of one of the first grammars to be used in Ukraine and Russia in the seventeenth century. The historian Gizel's *Synopsis* was used as a text in Russian schools in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The closest advisers of Peter I were Ukrainians: Metropolitan Tuptalenko (Russ. Tuptalo), Metropolitan Yavorsky, and Archbishop Prokopovych. Gogol (Ukr. *Hohol*), the creator of Russian prose, was of Ukrainian origin, and the great Russian novelist Dostoyevsky had Ukrainian blood in his veins. The Russian masters of music Tschaikowsky, Bortniansky, and Vedel are definitely Ukrainians. The great Russian painters were Ukrainians: Losenko, Levitsky, Borovikovsky, and Repin.

Polish Rule

The rule of the Polish landlords in the Ukrainian lands west of the Dniپر after the partition in Treaty of Andrusiv in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was even more tyrannical than that of Russian overlords. Only in the 1680's did the Cossacks experience some relief. King John Sobieski was forced to muster the Cossacks to fight the Turks and it was with their aid that he routed them at Vienna in 1683, thereby stemming further Turkish advances in Europe. Shortly afterwards, however, the Ukrainians were forced to submit to a ruthless policy of Polonization, servitude and Polish colonization. Ukrainian Churches were ruthlessly persecuted. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Ukrainian identity had been almost obliterated.

Nevertheless Poland herself was shortly to encounter dire trouble. The selfish interests of her aristocracy brought about great dissension and strife in the eighteenth century. The aristocratic parliament (*Sejm*) not only forbade the elective king any effective power, but rendered itself powerless by the sanctioning of the "*liberum veto*", by which any one member of parliament could veto any measure. Poland's anarchy made her an easy prey to her aggressive neighbours, and in 1772, 1793 and 1795, Russia, Prussia and Austria partitioned the country, thus blotting Poland from the map of Europe. She fell victim to the same treatment that she had meted out to Ukraine in the previous century.

National Revival

By this partition of Poland Russia seized the greater section of Ukrainian lands, and Austria annexed Galicia, Kholm and Bukovina, which as a unit constitute the Western Ukrainian lands. The

Ukrainians under Russian rule were immediately subjected to persecution, but those under Austrian rule were allowed enough freedom to develop their national culture. In carrying out their consistent policy of *divide et impera*, the Habsburgs at first played off the Ukrainians against the Poles in order to keep the latter in check. A national Ukrainian revival had its beginnings in the first half of the nineteenth century and Lviv again became the centre of Ukrainian culture and national ferment. Later, after the humiliating Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Habsburgs yielded to the more powerful Polish pressure and concluded a secret agreement giving the Poles supremacy in Galicia in return for their promise of loyalty to the dynasty. The Ukrainians fought back against the subsequent Polish oppression and were able not only to hold their own ground but to make definite progress. The support received from Ukrainian leaders under Russian rule, many of whom took sanctuary in Lviv, served to strengthen the Ukrainian national movement. Austria's tolerance of Ukrainian activities in Western Ukraine caused great resentment and fear in Russian government circles, and was one of the main causes of the First World War.

The Ukrainian national revival was long if steady progress. The harsh repressions of the Russian government after the destruction of the last stronghold of the Cossack Sich in 1775, aimed, as we have seen, at extinguishing the independent Ukrainian spirit, and resulted in the almost complete Russification of the upper classes. Only the downtrodden and mute peasantry and the lower clergy clung to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian traditions. The embers were there, however, and all that was needed was the addition of fuel to kindle the flame of nationalism.

The first sign of revival came in 1798, when a petty Ukrainian nobleman of Poltava, Ivan Kotlyarevskyy, published his "travesty" on the *Aeneid* in the living Ukrainian language. It was a romantic poem glorifying the Cossacks and made a deep impression on the Russified gentry. Other works in Ukrainian followed, such as the opera *Natalka Poltavka*, all of which served to revive the Ukrainian language as well as the Ukrainian spirit. Ivan Kotlyarevskyy is regarded by all Ukrainians as the father of modern Ukrainian literature and the Ukrainian theatre.

Kotlyarevskyy was followed in the nineteenth century by a large number of Ukrainian writers in various fields.*) Mykola Kostomariv, historian, was the first ideologist of the Ukrainian national revival. Taras Shevchenko, born a serf, became the greatest Ukrainian poet, prophet, and martyr — the incarnation of the spirit

*) See C. A. Manning, *Ukrainian Literature: Studies of the Leading Authors*.

of his people and a recognized universal genius. Markiyan Shashkevych, a lyric poet, scholar and writer, championed Ukrainian literature and the Ukrainian revival in Galicia. The famous prose writer Marko Vovchok took up the cause of the oppressed peasantry before the liberation of the serfs in Russia in 1861. Mykhaylo (Michael) Kotsyubynskyy, an outstanding Ukrainian novelist and a stylist of world renown, deliberately brought out beauty and harmony in the unpleasant and sordid scenes of common life. Lesya Ukrayinka, inspirational poetess of Ukrainian liberty, began a new style of writing, known as neo-romanticism. The Western Ukrainian genius Ivan Franko ranks next to Shevchenko in poetry and has a place of honour in world literature; he was also a novelist, philologist and journalist and a political leader of his people. The most popular Ukrainian short-story writer was Vasyl (Basil) Stefanyk, a miniaturist in words, whose works realistically portrayed the despair of the downtrodden peasants. The father of modern Ukrainian historiography is Mykhaylo (Michael) Hrushevskyy whose greatest works are the ten-volume history of Ukraine to 1658 and the five-volume *History of Ukrainian Literature*; he was president of the Ukrainian National Republic. These men and women, and others, are the makers of the modern Ukrainian movement.

In time, this literary and educational movement took on a political, nationalist aspect which proved to be so irresistible that no measure of the enemy could stem it. The Russian government nevertheless attempted to suppress it outright. In 1863, the Minister of the Interior, Valuyev, issued a decree stating that "there never existed, does not exist, and never can exist a Little Russian language." Its use was banned. The prohibition of the printing and the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad continued until the Russian revolution of 1905. Some of the writers went to Galicia where there was comparative freedom for the spoken and printed word, while many others wrote secretly and sent their manuscripts to Lviv for publication. Ukrainian books were smuggled across the border into Russian Ukraine where they were circulated secretly. In such a way, Galicia became the Piedmont for Ukrainian independence, just as Sardinia had been for Italy.

Modern Ukrainian State

Ukrainian leaders anticipated the First World War, and knowing that Russia and Austria would be involved on opposite sides, they awaited the opportunity to strike out for their freedom. No such opportunity presented itself, however, during the first years

of the momentous struggle. On the contrary, the Russian government suppressed all Ukrainian institutions and all signs of Ukrainian life. The Russian invasion of Galicia made that region a battle ground for the duration of the war. Tremendous havoc was wrought. Worst of all, the Ukrainians were forcibly mobilized to armies of both combatants, i.e. they were forced to participate in a fratricidal war, not for their own cause, but for that of their oppressors.

The anxiously awaited moment came in 1917 when the Russian tsarist structure, "the prison of nations," came crumbling down during the March revolution. The Ukrainians immediately established at Kyiv their own government, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* (Council), which represented the various political parties and professional associations in Ukraine, with Professor Hrushevskyy at the head. Their demands for autonomy were flatly rejected by the Russian Provisional Government. When the Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky seized power in Russia in November, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* proclaimed the Ukrainian National Republic in federation with Russia, which should be negotiated. The new government was immediately recognized by France, England, and even the Russian Bolshevik government.*) However, when the Central *Rada* refused to recognize the supremacy of the Russian Soviet government, the latter retaliated by invading Ukraine. In opposition to the Ukrainian National Republic with its capital at Kyiv, the Bolsheviks in December 1917 proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its capital at Kharkiv; it received the recognition of no country except Soviet Russia. On January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian National Republic issued a Declaration of Independence. Shortly afterwards, the Central Powers gave recognition to the Ukrainian state.

The Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine and the capture of Kyiv found the Ukrainian republican government without a significant regular army. Aid was sought from the Central Powers and an ally was found in Germany and Austro-Hungary whose troops helped to drive the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. But when the German army began forcibly to requisition grain and other supplies for its own needs, the Ukrainian government protested. The German High Command then forcibly dismissed the republican government and gave support to General Pavlo (Paul) Skoropadskyy, a conservative and big land owner, who was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine. Six months later, in November 1918, the aristocratic regime of Skoropadskyy was overthrown and the German armies were driven out by Ukrainian republican forces, organized for this uprising by the Directorate

*) For the texts see Arnold D. Margolin, *From a Political Diary*, pp. 182-5.

of the Ukrainian National Republic. It was re-established with the Directorate at its head supported by a coalition of Ukrainian parties.

In the meantime, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovyna took advantage of Austro-Hungary's disintegration and, in accordance with the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, on November 1, 1918, established a Western Ukrainian National Republic with its capital first at Lviv and then at Stanyslaviv. The Polish army under General Haller, which had been equipped by the Allies to fight the advancing Bolsheviks, was instead dispatched by the Polish government to crush the Western Ukrainian National Republic. The Ukrainian Galician Army, lacking equipment and supplies, was forced to retreat before the Polish invasion to Great Ukraine. (On January 22, 1919, the Western Ukrainian National Republic united with the Ukrainian National Republic to form one independent Ukrainian state as in the days of Volodymyr the Great. This creation of a unified and independent Ukrainian state is considered by patriotic Ukrainians as the manifestation of the supreme will of the Ukrainian nation).

In the face of overwhelming odds, the Ukrainian republic could not hope to last long without outside aid. A ring of enemies immediately closed in on the struggling state from all sides. From the northwest came the Polish army backed by Allied aid. From the southwest the Rumanians overran Bukovyna. From the south and east advanced the White Russian forces of General Denikin, which received Allied support. From the north pressed the plundering Bolsheviks. The united Ukrainian armies under Symon Petlyura, ill equipped, half starved, and disease ridden, heroically defended their country for two years, and then were driven out to the territory occupied by Poland where they were disarmed.

Once again Ukraine was partitioned. By the Minorities Treaty of December 9, 1919, the Allies conceded Rumania's occupation of the Ukrainian provinces of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, inhabited by approximately 1,250,000 Ukrainians. The Treaty of St. Germain, September 10, 1919, allotted to Czecho-Slovakia the Ukrainian territory of Pidkarpatska Rus' (Carpatho-Ukraine) with its 655,000 Ukrainians. The Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, March 15, 1923, recognized Poland's occupation of Galicia and approved the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, between Poland and the Soviets, which had divided the other parts of Ukraine between them. Poland thus absorbed a large Ukrainian territory inhabited by 7,000,000 Ukrainians, while Soviet Russia took over the largest section of Ukraine with a Ukrainian population of about 32,000,000.

All these occupants of Ukraine were bound by treaties to guarantee civil, political, and cultural rights as well as self-government to the Ukrainians. Each of these powers broke its solemn

pledge. The only body that could have enforced the treaties was the League of Nations, but it never took any effective step to make the nations concerned live up to their promises.

Importance of New Book

Matthew Stachiw's and Jaroslaw Sztendera's two-volume work *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918 — 1923* attempts to present a definitive account of the important political and military events of the Galician part of Ukraine during the turbulent years at the end of and following the First World War. The history of this crucial period is reviewed from the perspective of the history of the total Ukrainian nation. As such, this documented, exhaustive study furnishes much new information and throws much new light on the events, the institutions, the policies and personalities of the period. It is the first thorough work of its kind in the English language. Consequently, scholars, students and readers can now expand their knowledge in this field and gain a better understanding of the complex problems of the Ukrainian people in their heroic struggle to establish and defend their own modern state in keeping with the principle of self-determination.

In the writing of this book, Dr. Stachiw and his collaborator, Professor Sztendera, have exhausted all the available primary sources as well as the memoirs of persons who participated, and the published works of various authors, mainly in the Ukrainian language. Dr. Stachiw was himself a participant in many of the events. Being an eye-witness, he is able to bring the reader closer to the happenings and the leading personalities. This enhances the value of his interpretations. Professor Stachiw has worked intensively on this subject for many years. He has published seven volumes of documents on Ukraine during the period of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and a volume on the Third Soviet Republic of Ukraine, both in Ukrainian. The reader will undoubtedly be interested in his English-language volume *Ukraine and Russia: An Outline of the History of Political and Military Relations, December 1917 — April, 1918*, published in 1967.

Now for scholars, students and those interested in modern European history a new work is presented by Dr. M. Stachiw, Dr. P. Stercho and Dr. N. Chirovskyy. It is documented history of Ukraine in the crucial years 1917 — 1919 on the background of the political turmoil in Europe in that time.

University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada.
February 29, 1972.

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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The purpose of this work

The task undertaken by the authors is the history of Ukraine in the period of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic (November, 1918 — November, 1920). This has been so aimed because the history of the reestablished Ukrainian State during the regime of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* (April, 1917 — April, 1918), and in the time of the regime of the *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadskyy (April 30, 1918 — December 14, 1918) has been broadly presented by Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko in his two-volume work (in Ukrainian), *The History of Ukraine 1917 — 1923*. Meanwhile, there is no broad and documented history of the period of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic in English. The only documented history of this period has been published in Ukrainian in seven volumes by Dr. Matthew Stachiw (*Ukrayina v dobi Dyrektoriyi U.N.R.*), published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York City. Several reviews of the history of Ukraine for the period 1917-1920 have been published in English, e.g., Prof. Reshetar's, Prof. Pidhaynyy's, and others, but only in one medium size volume which, naturally, could not be fully documented because of a lack of the necessary broadness of intent of the work. The need for a documented, extensive history of Ukraine in the indicated period is especially urgent. This is the epochal point when the fate of Europe and even the entire world stood at the crossroads as to the choice of its destiny. At this moment appeared the Russian Bolshevism which conquered power in Russia proper; threatened to conquer all of Eastern and Central Europe and eventually aimed to dominate the whole globe. One glance at the map of Eastern Europe shows that this task of the Russian Bolsheviks could be achieved only after the conquest of the second greatest Slavic nation, the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine could have built the barriers against the advancement of Bolshevism into Central Europe and then, with the cooperation of other anti-Communist forces, could have overthrown the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia proper and thereby restored a free democratic government therein. The best presentation of this viewpoint is found in the foreword by Prof. Roman Smal-Stotskyy to the *history of Western Ukraine* by Prof. M. Stachiw and Prof. J. Sztendera, edited by Joan L. Stachiw, D.Ed. (*Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History*, published by Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York). Hence, there is no need to repeat the analysis of that problem.

The contemporary student of the turbulent world affairs nowadays may not fully understand the responsibilities the rulers of the Western Great Powers in the years 1918-1920 must bear for the "no war and no peace" situation that faces the world today. It is with this in mind that the history of the era, and especially the history of Ukraine during that period, is presented.

In part one of this volume is found a short review of the first years of the reestablished Ukrainian statehood (April 1917 — November 1918) which serves as an introduction to the history of the next two years (November 1918 — November 1920). The entire work of this history encompasses four volumes. The task is not an easy one and, therefore, is the collective work of the three authors.

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It is virtually impossible to understand the presently prevailing conditions in Ukraine or in Eastern Europe without properly knowing the past history of Ukraine. This prompted the authors to work on this study and to fill the existing gap in the English language historical literature on Eastern Europe. This is especially so, since almost two generations had no opportunity to enjoy a well documented, objectively written study on the internal, administrative and political developments in the Ukrainian State during the era of the Great Ukrainian National Revolution for liberation. Out of necessity, two generations had to use only the published brief outlines or fragmentary materials in various related publications.

At the same time, the Russian occupational regime promoted publication of many works in which that era of the Ukrainian history is purposely distorted to serve the regime's subjective purposes. Lacking documented and objectively prepared publications, many authors in the free world have used, in good faith, the Soviet publications presenting a distorted picture of the Great Ukrainian Revolution for liberation, 1917-1920.

This study is based upon all known and available (to the authors) source materials published in Ukrainian and other languages. Also published, as well as not yet published, memoirs of influential participants in the historic events were consulted. Special attention was given to the preserved documentation in private and public archives.

It is to be emphasized that in this study along with presentation of the historical facts dealing with the internal, administrative and political developments in the Ukrainian State during that heroic era of the Ukrainian people, special attention is given to the interpretation of the events concerned.

The periodisation of the history of the Ukrainian National Revolution

The history of Ukraine has passed through three great periods. First, the Ukrainian monarchy of the Kyyivan Rus' era, the Galician-Volynian era, and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian era. Secondly, the Ukrainian Cossack State; and thirdly, the recent Ukrainian State in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The newly established Ukrainian State of 1917 was based upon the natural right of national self-determination. The constitutional acts of the Ukrainian National Republic specifically refer to the right of nations to self-determination. They do not claim the right of sovereignty for the Ukrainian nation on the basis of some historical right based upon the national sovereignty of any previous period of history, such as the Ukrainian Cossack State. In the broad sense, the right of self-determination has two aspects. With regard to the external aspect, it is a right of every nation to be free from any external rule, i.e. to be sovereign in relations with all other sovereign nations of the world. In the internal aspect, it is the exclusive right of each nation to determine its own governmental system as the supreme ruler over its own fate.

The thinkers of Western civilization have regarded, for centuries, the right of national self-determination to be superior to any other claim to rule people. Especially the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 recognized the principle of national self-determination as the foundation for a just peace in Europe, and thus laid it down as a principle of international law over and above the so-called historical right of the aggressor and occupier, regardless of the duration of foreign domination.

This sovereign right of the people was explicitly recognized by all basic acts of the various forms of the liberated Ukrainian state: the Universals, Constitutional Charter and other legal acts promulgated by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*; the Charters and legal acts promulgated by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy; and the Universals, Declarations and legal acts promulgated by the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic as well as declarations of the Ukrainian Working People's Congress.*)

Thus, there is a uniformity in the legal foundations of the newly established Ukrainian State, and, therefore, there is a direct continuation of this State regardless of the change in its governmental system. In the process of development of this Ukrainian State only the form of government changed, depending upon the socio-economic credo of the respective ruling groups.

*) **Rada** in Ukrainian means **Council**.

On this basis, we note three separate periods of the development of the modern constitutional systems, namely: 1) the era of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*; 2) the era of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy; and 3) the era of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic.

From the point of view of the constitutional development during this period of history, each above mentioned era has carved its own mark. This study is, however, concerned only with the constitutional development of the Ukrainian State under the rule of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. This particular era began November 15, 1918, and could be divided into four stages of development, namely:

a) November 15, 1918, to December 14, 1918: the civil war between the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy;

b) December 14, 1918, to January 27, 1919: stage of the formation of the basic foundation of the governmental system;

c) January 28, 1919, to November 21, 1920: stage of pursuing to establish a parliamentary governmental system;

d) After November, 1920: the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile.

As has been indicated above, this study shall concentrate upon the development of the constitutional, socio-economic, and political problems of the era. We shall attempt to analyze justifications for the respective governmental system in the various stages of development of the existence of the Ukrainian State. We shall pay due attention to the defensive war of the Ukrainian State against aggression by foreign powers. We shall try to analyze also the prevailing socio-economic conditions in Ukraine as well as the programs of various political parties and their mutual relations.

Without an acquaintance with historical events in Ukraine under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, as well as under the rule of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy, it would be difficult to understand the early events under the leadership of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Directorate continued the policy of national sovereignty as well as defended militarily and diplomatically the Ukrainian State developed by its predecessor regimes. Therefore, brief delimitation of the history of the earlier stages of the Ukrainian struggle for national sovereignty in the beginning under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, and later under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy is in order in this study.

Readers who desire to study more fully the era of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* are referred to the English language publication *Russia and Ukraine* by Dr. Matthew Stachiw. The early stages of

the war waged by the Soviet Russia against Ukraine, December 17, 1917, to April 15, 1918, as well as the history of the Hetman Skoropadskyy regime are treated by the same author in his Ukrainian language work titled *Het'mans'kyy rezhym v Ukrayini i yoho derzhavno-pravna yakist'* (The Hetman regime in Ukraine and its constitutional qualities.*)

The authors do hope that this work will be helpful to all seeking the historically true information on the developments in Ukraine during one phase of the Great Ukrainian Revolution for liberation. The need for this study is obvious because many historians still do not clearly distinguish the happenings in Ukraine from those in Russia. The oversimplification on the nature of the revolution is too great for objective treatment of the developments in the once sovereign countries subjugated by the Russian imperialism. They all tried to restore their national independent states and did not struggle for economic change only.

*) See also a two volume **Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrayiny, 1917-1919** (An illustrated history of Ukraine, 1917-1921) by Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko.



Ethnographical boundaries of Ukraine

PART ONE

**ONE YEAR OF THE FREE UKRAINIAN STATE:
NOVEMBER 1917 — NOVEMBER 1918**

CHAPTER 1

THE STRUGGLE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF OWN STATEHOOD

The right of national self-determination as the foundation of the Ukrainian State

The founding fathers of the newly re-established Ukrainian State, 1917-1918, based their liberation activities on the principle of national self-determination. A question may be asked, why did they not choose to base their action upon the last existing free Ukrainian State of the Zaporozhian Cossacks which concluded the well-known Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 with the Muscovite Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich. The answer is simple. Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, the leader of the founding fathers of the Ukrainian State of 1917-1918, as a historian, was aware of all the consequences of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, and, therefore, did not desire to burden the newly re-established state with any part of its provisions. However, there was another very important reason. The last existing entirely free Ukrainian State of the seventeenth century did not embrace all the lands of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, while following the principle of national self-determination the leaders of the Great Ukrainian Revolution for liberation aimed at incorporation of all Ukrainian ethnic territories into the single united sovereign Ukrainian state.¹⁾

While the references to the historical¹ past could have entangled Ukraine in conflict with her neighbors, the principle of national self-determination is a just principle in itself for the regulation of relations between nations as equal members of the family of nations in the world. Besides, a truly democratic system is incompatible with the violation of the right of people to determine their destiny. And, after the downfall of the Tsarist regime in Russia, the democratic forces for the first time in Russian history advanced to the decision-making position in that country. Also in international relations changes developed which indicated that the right of national self-determination might be established as one of the principles of international law.

On April 2, 1917, soon after the downfall of the Tsarist regime in Russia in March 1917, the United States of America entered the war on the side of the Entente.

At the very onset of a state of war between the United States and the Quadruple Alliance — Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria (also called the Central Powers) — the President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, in his address to the Congress on April 2, 1917, formulated as a basic principle of international law the right of people everywhere to choose their way of life and their citizenship. Hence, the United States was fighting this war for national self-determination of peoples everywhere. The war objectives of the United States and their allies were later formulated in the Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, and additional declaration of Woodrow Wilson of February 11, 1918.²⁾

Thus, the founding fathers of the newly re-established Ukrainian state were completely in line with the advanced thinking of the leading statesmen of the Western Democracies by accepting the principle of self-determination. As a matter of fact, they had adhered to that principle even before Wilson's declaration.


The foundations of the Russian Empire were shaken on March 15, 1917, when Tsar Nicholas II, under pressure from the Russian *Duma*, abdicated the throne on behalf of himself and his minor son in favor of the Grand Duke Michael, Nicholas' brother. Surprisingly to all concerned, the Grand Duke refused to accept the throne, stating in a declaration issued on March 17, 1917, that he would be willing to accept the throne only if this were the expressed will of the Russian Constituent Assembly.³⁾

The shaky foundation of the Russian Empire provided the opportunity for the Ukrainian patriots to seize this chance to develop the struggle for national liberation. The very same day, March 17, 1917, they organized in the ancient capital of Ukraine, Kyiv,^{*)} an all-national provisional representation, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*,^{**)} with the declared objective of defending the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian people until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly could be called.

Thus conditions were created for the free development of the Ukrainian political parties, as well as, various Ukrainian civic, cultural, and economic associations which were prohibited by the Russian Tsarist regime.⁴⁾

^{*)} Kyiv is the Ukrainian spelling of the name of Ukraine's capital. The accepted English spelling was Kiev.

^{**)} **Rada** means in Ukrainian **Council**.



Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy


The Ukrainian National Congress confirms the Ukrainian Central Rada

In order to exercise the right of people for self-determination on a broader basis, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* called a Ukrainian National Congress which was held in Kyiv on April 17-21, 1917. The provisional leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* reported to the delegates of the Congress on the progress of the development of the struggle for the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian people. After a thorough debate on the basic objectives of the Ukrainian nation, this Congress decided to elect the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as a definite national representation and the true representation of the will of the people of Ukraine. In addition to the members of the *Rada*, the Ukrainian National Congress elected Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy its President, and authorized the elected members of the *Rada* to expand the Rada's membership through the process of co-optation of representatives of various organized groups of peasant farmers, workers, military units, and national minorities.⁵⁾

The Ukrainian National Congress advised the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to establish an autonomous status for Ukraine until the final decision could be made by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly of the duly elected deputies of the people in equal general elections and to organize the autonomous administration of the country. The Congress demanded from the Russian Provisional Government, headed by Prince G. E. Lvov, recognition of international status for Ukraine and participation of her representatives in any peace conference after the end of the war.⁶⁾

Thus, the decisions of the Ukrainian National Congress, April 17-21, 1917, are to be regarded as the cornerstone in the exercise of the self-determination of the Ukrainian people. The Congress laid down the foundations for the permanent governing body of the autonomous Ukrainian state as expressed by the free will of the representatives of the people of Ukraine.

After the election by the Ukrainian National Congress, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* developed its own internal structure. While the basic policy making was reserved to the sessions of the entire membership of the *Rada*, the day-to-day operations were entrusted to an Executive Committee which, at a later time, was renamed the Little *Rada*. Due to obstacles in holding the plenary sessions of the *Rada* regularly, the Rules and Regulations of the *Rada* were amended in the sense that the Little *Rada* was given greater authority in the policy-making process. These were revolutionary conditions, and decisions often had to be made on very short notice. While it was relatively easy to call a session of the Little *Rada*, it was much more difficult to call the plenary sessions of the *Rada*. Therefore,



The first General Secretariat (Sitting from left: Ivan Steshenko, Fedir Baranovskyy, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Serhiy Yefremiv, Symon Petlyura. Standing, from left: Pavlo Khrystynuk, Mykola Stasyuk, Borys Martos)

the Little *Rada* was authorized to make all decisions between the plenary sessions of the *Rada*. Of course, all such decisions were to be presented for approval at the next plenary session of the whole *Rada*.*) The President chaired meetings of all organs of the *Rada* and provided active leadership in formulating policy.⁷⁾

Ukrainians believed in the changed attitude of the new Russian government

The leading members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* believed, in the early stages of the revolution that, after the removal of the Tsarist imperialistic oppressive regime, the foundations were laid for the complete reconstruction of the former Russian Empire along the lines of national freedom and equality. This reconstruction was expected to be based upon the principle of a free commonwealth of nations based upon voluntary membership in it. They expected that a decision would be reached along these lines among all democratically minded forces participating in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly to be held soon. Until that time, they expected that all non-Russian nationalities of the former Russian Empire would enjoy the fullest degree of territorial autonomy within their respective ethnic boundaries.⁸⁾

With regard to the legal status of Ukraine for the transitory period of time, the leading members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* proposed to introduce autonomy in that the Ukrainian Central *Rada* would perform the function of the legislative branch of government and it would appoint an executive organ to serve as the executive branch of government responsible to the *Rada*. The final decisions regarding the permanent constitutional system of Ukraine, as well as, concerning the principles of the external relations with the other nations of the collapsed Russian Empire would be made by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.⁹⁾

Since the war was still going on and the newly established Provisional Government of Russia continued to fight against the powers of the Quadruple Alliance and on the side of the Powers of the Entente, the Ukrainian leaders had proposed to introduce the federalization step-by-step in agreement with the Russian Provisional Government. The Ukrainians did not desire to weaken the forces of the entire Entente. More so, since the leading members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* undoubtedly supported an alliance with the Western Democracies and now formulated their foreign

*) This form of parliamentary functioning was incorporated into the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic of February 29, 1920.

policy accordingly. The victory over Germany and Austria-Hungary was their goal in order to re-order conditions in Europe.¹⁰⁾

Thus having formulated these principles for the introduction of autonomous status for Ukraine in federation with Russia and other nations of the former Russian Empire, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* sent a delegation, headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a well-known Ukrainian writer and a leading activist of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party, to negotiate settlement with the Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd.*) The representatives of all political parties active at that time in Ukraine were incorporated into the delegation. The tasks of the *Rada's* delegation was to induce the Provisional Government of Russia to recognize the autonomous status of Ukraine, as well as the right of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to be represented in the future peace conference as the spokesmen of the Ukrainian people.¹¹⁾

For the realization of Ukrainian demands for autonomy, the delegation proposed to the Provisional Government the introduction of the following moderate changes in the administration of the country immediately:

1. to establish a special Office for Ukrainian Affairs within the structure of the Provisional Government of Russia;
2. to establish a special administrative agency for Ukraine with the administrative autonomous authority over all ethnically Ukrainian *Gubernias* (Provinces) which would administer the country's affairs with the help of an Advisory Council composed of the freely elected representatives of the people;
3. to reorganize all military units in such a way that the Ukrainian officers and soldiers would be sent to special Ukrainian military divisions and regiments stationed in Ukraine or fighting as separate Ukrainian units on the fronts against the enemy; in the view of the delegation, this would tend to strengthen the military morale and discipline of the fighting units which started to lapse due to the demoralizing propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks;
4. to reorganize the administrative agencies of the Ukrainian *Gubernias* in such a way that new officials, who could command confidence of the people, would be appointed;
5. to introduce the Ukrainian language immediately as the official language in all governmental agencies in Ukraine as well as the language of instruction in the schools of Ukraine;

*) The original name of this capital city was **St. Petersburg** (a German form). During the war against Germany the name of the city was changed into Russian form: **Petrograd**. After the death of Lenin the name of the city was changed into: **Leningrad**.

6. to appropriate necessary funds as a special budget of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* out of the taxes collected in Ukraine to be used for the national needs of the autonomous country;
7. to free immediately all Ukrainians deported by the Tsarist regime from Galicia and Bukovyna and still held in captivity.¹²⁾


The Provisional Government of Russia, headed by Prince G. E. Lvov, first evaded the issues and after several weeks of protracted talks unanimously rejected all proposals of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*; thus, it rejected a very moderate basis for the establishment of a peaceful co-existence of autonomous Ukraine with Russia.¹³⁾

The autonomous status of Ukraine, April 22 to November 20, 1917

At the time of the downfall of the Tsarist regime, there were virtually no Ukrainian political, cultural, civic or social organizations legally in existence. They had been forbidden and therefore now they had to be organized from scratch. Therefore, at the time of the negotiations of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* with the Russian Provisional Government concerning autonomy of Ukraine, the organized Ukrainian forces were still very weak. They were by far weaker not only as compared with the organized political forces of Russia proper, but even weaker than the organized forces of the Russian and Russified minority in Ukraine. The reasons are clear. Virtually, only the Russians enjoyed the privilege of legal association under the Tsarist regime in Ukraine.¹⁴⁾

In spite of such conditions, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* decided to realize its program of re-establishing an independent Ukrainian State step-by-step based upon support of the existing organized forces of the Ukrainian people. The *Rada* carried out its political program over the protests of the Provisional Government in Petrograd.

In pursuit of her political objectives, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* adopted and published its *First Universal*, dated June 23, 1917, which can be regarded as a sort of constitutional law for the country. The title of the document, "Universal," is definitely to be related to the titles of similar documents issued in the Ukrainian Cossack State. The document emphasized the authority, as delegated by the Ukrainian people, to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to carry out the principle of national self-determination. The *Rada* declared, in the name of the Ukrainian people: "From now on, we ourselves shall govern our own life." For the realization of the immediate



Building of the Ukrainian Central Rada

objectives, the Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* ordered the Ukrainian activists in the villages, townships, counties, and the *gubernias* to take practical steps in establishing a Ukrainian administration in these units through a peaceful electoral process. One might deduct that the logic of this action indicated the assumption that after the establishment of the Ukrainian self-government on the local, regional, etc. level, the establishment of a national government of a free Ukrainian State, even against the will of the Petrograd government, would follow relatively easily.¹⁵⁾

In order to avoid a head-on collision with the Petrograd government, as well as to avoid accusation of open rebellion in time of war (World War I still raged), the Ukrainian Central *Rada* formulated carefully its plan of action of taking over the country's administration. Through the active democratic process, the *Rada* envisioned success with the participation in it of all social classes of people in Ukraine through deputies of the new organized political parties and all kinds of other organizations. The carefulness of the *Rada's* actions is also indicated in the Universal's establishment of a tax for the needs of the *Rada's* activities in that the tax was levied only upon the Ukrainians of the country and on a volutary basis.

In the focus of attention of the First Universal is the preliminary announcement of the calling the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly with the purpose of deciding upon a definite governmental and socio-economic system for Ukraine. The document does not contain the definite date of the elections of the delegates to this constituent

assembly. The Universal ascertains only the principle for the time being.

Otherwise, the Universal of the *Rada* still left the door open for the eventual negotiations with the Provisional Government of Russia concerning the friendly, neighborly relations between Ukraine and Russia. The document declared that under certain conditions, Ukraine might take part in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, one of the objectives of which should be the satisfaction of all outstanding questions concerning relations among the various nations of the collapsed Russian Empire. The Universal emphasized, however, that only the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly would have the power to adopt a constitutional system for Ukraine.

The First Universal of the *Rada* paid proper attention to the national minorities living in Ukraine. The *Rada* called upon the Ukrainian organizations and all Ukrainians to establish friendly relations with all democratically minded elements of these minorities, especially in the cities where they were concentrated, in order to achieve an understanding concerning development of a new and better way of life. This was an early attempt to establish foundations for a real equality of all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of the national origin, and to induce the leaders of the national minorities to actively cooperate with the Ukrainians in laying the foundations for the new autonomous status of Ukraine.

The First Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was received with enthusiasm by the broad masses of the Ukrainian people, and the *Rada* immediately took further steps toward establishment of self-government for Ukraine as soon as possible.¹⁶⁾ In accordance with the provisions of the resolutions of the Ukrainian National Congress, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* elected its own executive board under the name of the General Secretariat. This organ of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, established on June 28, 1917, had the purpose of performing the functions of the first autonomous government of the Ukrainian state. The General Secretariat consisted of the most active representatives of all existing Ukrainian political parties and it was headed by the well-known novelist, Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Among the distinguished members of this coalition government was later academician Serhiy Yefremiv.¹⁷⁾

Besides stimulating the activities of Ukrainian organizations in the various fields of national development, the General Secretariat immediately worked out a set of legal rules and regulations for the process of electing the representatives of the people to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as well as, setting forth the rules and regulations of the parliamentary procedures of the Assembly itself. It also initiated a call for a Congress of the non-Russian nationalities of the former Russian Empire, to be held in Kyiv.¹⁸⁾

Establishment of an autonomous body of the Ukrainian self-government stimulated the organization and growth of Ukrainian organized forces and their activities. Among the most important developments in this respect, was the organization of separate and nationally minded Ukrainian military force. Public opinion of the Ukrainian patriots demanded that the mutual relations between Russia and Ukraine not be based upon some sort of limited national autonomy but upon the principle of full national equality with weak federal ties between the two equal nations.¹⁹⁾

As has been indicated above, the Russian Provisional Government took an extremely negative attitude toward the Ukrainian national aspirations, and it sharply denounced the First Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. In order to undermine the authority of the *Rada* and the General Secretariat in the eyes of the Ukrainian masses, the Petrograd government issued a manifesto directly to the Ukrainian people on the very day after the General Secretariat as an autonomous government of Ukraine was formed. In its manifesto of June 29, 1917, the Provisional Government promised the Ukrainians the introduction of some reforms in the near future, in favor of the Ukrainians, with regard to local self-government, school system and the judiciary in Ukraine. However, the basic problem of Ukrainian autonomy, the Russian government proposed to defer to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The basic objective of the manifesto was to persuade the Ukrainians not "to divide the forces of the freed Russia," and not to split the common military forces. Accordingly, the central point of the manifesto was that only the Constituent Assembly of the whole former Russian Empire would have authority to decide upon the status of Ukraine and upon that of all of Russia.²⁰⁾

The attempt of the Provisional Government to discourage the process of establishing autonomous institutions in Ukraine failed. In failure also ended the campaign of the Russian imperialistically minded press and the threats made by the Russian bureaucracy in Ukraine against the Ukrainian national demands which were labeled an evil in themselves.²¹⁾ In spite of this campaign, the broad masses of the Ukrainian people expressed their solidarity with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its General Secretariat and rendered them their support.²²⁾

Facing this reality, the majority of the Russian Provisional Government decided to revise its previous decision concerning the demands made by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and decided to renew negotiations with the Ukrainians. A delegation of the Russian Provisional Government, consisting of its three ministers and headed by Vice Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky, arrived in Kyiv on July 12, 1917, in order to formally indicate willingness of the Petro-

grad government to grant some concessions to the Ukrainians. The Russian ministers found in Kyiv a different picture than they expected. Desire for self-government was visible everywhere. Therefore, after two days of negotiations with the General Secretariat (July 12 and 13, 1917) and the leaders of the *Rada*, the delegation of the Provisional Government concluded an agreement concerning immediate introduction of autonomy in Ukraine under the conditions that the autonomous bodies of self-government would be established in consultation with the Provisional Government.²³⁾

The *Rada* and the General Secretariat accepted face saving conditions of the delegation of the Petrograd government because, lacking sufficient military forces at their disposal, they were not prepared to enter into any open military conflict with the Russians. However, it should be emphasized that this was the last peaceful attempt to settle differences between Ukraine and Russia and to establish peaceful, neighborly relations between their peoples.

The contents of the agreement negotiated in Kyiv by the leaders of the *Rada* and the General Secretariat and the delegation of the Provisional Government of Russia was to be ratified by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, on behalf of Ukraine, and by the Provisional Government, on behalf of Russia. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* approved this agreement by a 100 to 70 votes majority almost immediately. The 70 votes opposition was based upon objections that the agreement had given too many concessions to the Petrograd government.²⁴⁾

Ratification of this agreement by the Provisional Government of Russia led to a governmental crisis. After the agreement was ratified by a 10 to 5 votes, all ministers belonging to the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party resigned from their cabinet posts in protest of the agreement's ratification. This included the head of the Russian Provisional Government, Prince Lvov. Thereafter, the Russian Provisional Government was immediately reorganized under the leadership of Alexander Kerensky, and that cabinet notified on July 16, 1917, telegraphically, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* about the ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian agreement concerning autonomy of Ukraine.

The very same day, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued and published its *Second Universal* in order to inform the people of Ukraine about the basic provisions of the agreement and to promulgate them as the law of the autonomous country.²⁵⁾

Provisions of the Ukrainian-Russian agreement

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* in its Second Universal declared that the Provisional Government of Russia officially recognized the

right of the Ukrainian people for national self-determination and it did not oppose any longer the efforts of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to establish an autonomous administration in Ukraine. In order to ascertain proper representation of the national minorities in all legislative and executive organs of the autonomous administration of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as well as its General Secretariat were to be enlarged by incorporating the proportional representation of all national minorities. This reorganization was to be carried out in consultation and by consent of the Provisional Government. Thus, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its General Secretariat in the enlarged form were recognized as the legal bodies of Ukraine by the *Rada* and the Provisional Government of Russia. However, the personal composition of the General Secretariat, as the autonomous government of Ukraine operating before the All-Russian Constituent Assembly could make the final decision, was to be appointed by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* with consent of the Provisional Government of Russia.²⁶⁾ Besides taking over control of all internal affairs of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* succeeded in getting the consent of the Petrograd government for the immediate organization of the Ukrainian military forces. Technically, this should have been accomplished by the representatives of Ukraine in the Ministry for the Military Affairs of Russia, as well as in the General Staff of the military forces of the entire former Russian Empire.

In the implementation of the provisions of the agreement with the Provisional Government of Russia, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* exercised maximum good will toward the national minorities in Ukraine. Acting as a legislative body of Ukraine, the *Rada* enlarged its total membership to almost one thousand and by a special act it also enlarged its interim legislative organ, the Little *Rada*, from 40 members of Ukrainian nationality to 68 members, thus adding 28 representatives of the national minorities. The plenary session of the *Rada* enlarged the interim powers of the Little *Rada* in that, besides delegating to it the law-making powers between the plenary sessions of the whole *Rada*, the Little *Rada* was given authority to make any necessary changes in the executive branch of the government of autonomous Ukraine, the General Secretariat. Of course, all acts of the Little *Rada* were subject to the approval of the full plenum of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* at the next session. Otherwise, these acts became void and null.²⁷⁾

The leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* went out of their way in order to secure cooperation of the national minorities. They were very patient in the prolonged negotiations with the representatives of the various organizations of the national minorities. As a

result, an agreement was reached on July 24, 1917, according to which the enlarged Little *Rada* had the following nationality composition: 40 Ukrainian deputies, 15 deputies representing various Jewish organizations, seven representatives of various Russian political parties, and six deputies of Polish nationality. The national minorities, especially the Jews, were better than proportionately represented in this very important government body of the autonomous administration. Along with the 15 representatives of the Jewish organizations, two additional Jewish deputies, M. Balabonov and I. Sklovsky, represented the Russian Social Democratic Party of Mensheviks and the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party respectively. It is interesting to observe that due to the political weakness of the Russian Social Democratic Party of Bolsheviks (later named the Communist Party) in Ukraine at that time, it agreed to be represented in the Little *Rada* by a single deputy.²⁸⁾

Formation of the autonomous government of Ukraine

In full conformity with the agreement with the Russian Provisional Government, the plenary session of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, including the representatives of the national minorities, was called for a session on July 25, 1917, in order to assume all legislative powers of the autonomous country. The enlarged composition of the Little *Rada* was approved and this body met in its first session on the very same day, too.

In its capacity as the supreme legislative body of the autonomous Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in this session amended the already existing constitutional acts by passing and promulgating the Statute on the Supreme Administration of Ukraine. In Article 21 of the Statute, the powers of the General Secretariat as the executive branch of government were defined and the provisions defining its composition along with the process of its formation were established. In the preamble to these provisions, the *Rada* referred to the agreement with the Provisional Government that the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its General Secretariat were required to prepare the convention of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly in the hope for a peaceful solution of the Ukrainian-Russian relations by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Until such a time, the *Rada* and Secretariat were to be the guardians of the autonomous status of Ukraine.^{29)*)}

*) Full texts of the First and Second Universal as well as the text of the Statute see on the end of this volume.

According to the provisions of the Statute, the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was the supreme executive body in Ukraine. The body was appointed by the *Rada*, and was subordinated solely to the *Rada*. However, its personal composition was subject to the approval of the Provisional Government, and it was supposed to control all agencies of the administration in Ukraine through 14 Departments each headed by a Secretary General. The fourteen member Government consisted of the following Departments: for internal affairs, finance, defense, food supplies, agriculture, justice, education, international affairs, industry and trade, post, telephone and telegraph communications, labor, and the road construction and maintenance. Other members of the cabinet were the Secretary General of the Cabinet, and the Comptroller General of the State.³⁰⁾

The nomenclature for the departments of the government was related to the nomenclature used in the Ukrainian Cossack State of the seventeenth century. In most countries of the world, departments of the government are designated by the words "the ministry" and "the minister" but in the Ukrainian Government the designation was such as "the General Secretariat of Internal Affairs" and "the Secretary General." The seventeenth century titles had been, such as "the Scribe General" and "the Comptroller General."

The structures of two particular ministries of the autonomous government of Ukraine merit special attention. First, in the General Secretariat for International Affairs, headed by the Secretary General for International Affairs, three separate Deputy Secretaries for affairs of the Russian, Jewish, and Polish minorities were established. Each of the three Deputy Secretaries was granted voting power in all affairs concerning the particular nationality. Secondly, according to the agreement with the Provisional Government of Russia, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* had been authorized to delegate a special Secretary General for Ukrainian Affairs as a member of the Council of Ministers of Russia with the expressed purpose of safeguarding the interests of the Ukrainian people in the activities of the Provisional Government. Thus, a basis for peaceful and neighborly relations between the Provisional Government of Russia and the autonomous government of Ukraine was established.

A special provision of the Statute on the Supreme Administration of Ukraine obliged the General Secretariat to resign in the case when, due to some activities, it lost the confidence of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. In such a case, the *Rada* would, after having accepted the resignation of the outgoing cabinet, appoint a new cabinet of the General Secretariat. The Statute also regulated that the laws and regulations of the general character adopted by the Provisional

Government would become valid on the territory of the autonomous Ukraine only if and after they have been published in the Official Herald of Ukraine (i.e. "Krayovyy Uryadovyy Vistnyk Ukrayiny.")³¹⁾

In accordance with the provisions of the Statute, on July 27, 1917, on the proposal of the Little *Rada* the plenary session of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* appointed a new General Secretariat headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko who was also put in charge of the General Secretariat of Internal Affairs. From among the national minorities, two members of the Ukrainian autonomous government were appointed. Alexander Zarubin, a Russian, was appointed Secretary General for post, telephone, and telegraph communications, while Moshe Rafes, a Jew, served in the cabinet as the State Comptroller General. To the post of the Deputy Secretary for Jewish Affairs was appointed Moshe Silberfarb, and Waclaw Mickiewicz became Deputy Secretary for Polish Affairs. The Russian minority interests were guarded by Alexander Zarubin who served as head of his department.³²⁾

It merits mentioning that the Ukrainian autonomous government was the first government of Central and Eastern European countries to grant full recognition to the Jews as a nationality rather than treating them, as others did, as a religious group only. The Jews were appointed to the cabinet posts also for the first time by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as Jews. On the other hand, there was no Jewish member of the Provisional Government of Russia throughout the duration of its existence. Not even a single Assistant to the Minister was appointed by the Russian Provisional Government from among the Russian Jews.

The Russian vested interests oppose the autonomy of Ukraine

The text of the agreement ratified by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the Provisional Government of Russia regulating temporarily relations between the two countries indicates that the leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* showed maximum good will in order to introduce autonomy in full cooperation with all national minorities in Ukraine. As indicated above, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* carefully respected these provisions and immediately implemented them in the process of reorganization of the autonomous governmental agencies of Ukraine. The leaders of the *Rada* sincerely sought to maintain peaceful relations among citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities and tried to share with them the legislative and executive powers of the state.³³⁾



St. Sophia Square in Kyiv (In background the St. Sophia Cathedral, built in XI cent.; in foreground Hetman Khmelnytsky monument)

In return, the Ukrainians expected from the Russian bureaucracy and the Russian civic and cultural organizations a similar attitude toward the newly established autonomous agencies of the Ukrainian State. However, reality proved to be different. Especially the Russian intellectuals who dominated the numerically largest of all Russian political parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party, unconditionally opposed the ratification of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement of July 12-13, 1917, and after the majority of the Provisional Government decided to ratify the agreement, their leader Paul Milyukov called off all members of the party from the Russian Council of Ministers.

The leading Russian newspapers criticized the very foundation of the agreement, the principle of self-determination of the Ukrainian people. Russian university professors, especially those in the field of constitutional law, led by Baron Nolde, declared that the Ukrainian-Russian agreement violated provisions of the Russian constitution because in reality it created a new independent state, Ukraine, and contrary to the law subordinated citizens of Russia to the authority of the government of the Ukrainian State.³⁴) Therefore, this agreement could not be recognized as valid, as far as the Russians were concerned. They criticized the three member delegation of the Provisional Government in that, lacking experience in preparation of similar documents, they were overwhelmed by the knowledge of constitutional law and of parliamentary procedures by Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. They openly criticized Alexander Kerensky, head of the Russian delegation, for permitting Hrushevskyy to formulate much more favorable articles of the agreement, as far as Ukraine was concerned, than his predecessor, Hetman of Ukraine Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 was able to do. So, the opposition was political rather than legalistic.

The withdrawal of all members of the Constitutional Democratic Party from the Provisional Government included also the first head of the Government, Prince Lvov. Immediately a new Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky was formed in Petrograd. Normally, the road was open for the mutual respect of the provisions of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement negotiated by the new head of the Russian Government. However, the situation was not so simple. The new Provisional Government was continuously under pressure from the Russian chauvinistically minded groups of intellectuals and it gave in to this pressure as much as its cabinet deferred granting its consent to the newly appointed General Secretariat as the autonomous government of Ukraine. The Russian government circles now conveniently accepted the

theory that the constitutional law of Russia might have been violated... They ignored the fact that the March revolution in Petrograd had established the Provisional Government itself in violation of the constitution of the Russian Empire. Therefore, that constitution ceased to exist. No new constitutional charter was promulgated applicable to all territories of the former Tsarist Empire after the downfall of the Tsarist autocratic monarch and his regime. However, this was a convenient way of continuing policy against the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people.

For the clarification of misunderstanding between the Russian and Ukrainian authorities regarding the implementation of provisions of the agreement, especially regarding the approval of the newly appointed General Secretariat as the autonomous government of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* sent Volodymyr Vynnychenko, General Secretary of Finance K. L. Baranowsky and Moshe Rafes to Petrograd. These negotiations with the Provisional Government failed to achieve the desired peaceful agreement because of the growing opposition of the Russian chauvinistically minded intellectuals. Finally, after three weeks of postponement, the Provisional Government of Russia refused to grant its consent to the newly formed General Secretariat of Ukraine.³⁵⁾

First, the Russian negotiators claimed that they were not in a position to recognize the General Secretariat due to political pressures. However, on August 17, 1917, the Provisional Government decided officially to break the already ratified Russian-Ukrainian agreement. First of all, it proclaimed direct incorporation of four Ukrainian *gubernias* into the integral administration of Russia proper, thus limiting the territory of the autonomous Ukrainian State to the areas of the *gubernias* of Kyiv, Volynia, Poltava, Podilya, and one half of the territory of Chernyhiv *gubernia*. This unilateral arbitrary act of force was accompanied by unilaterally issued provisional "Instruction of the Russian Provisional Government to the General Secretariat of Ukraine" dated August 17, 1917. The manner in which these two unilateral acts were carried out as well as the tone of the language of the "Instruction" clearly indicated that the Provisional Government of Russia unilaterally broke the provisions of the ratified agreement and tried to impose upon the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, unilaterally, entirely new provisions.³⁶⁾

In essence, the Provisional Government, through its "Instruction" attempted to change the very nature of the General Secretariat of Ukraine in that it treated it not as agency of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* but as agency of the Provisional Government of Russia. Thus, the "Instruction" attempted decisively to limit application of the principle of national self-determination of Ukraine

and restore full Russian control over Ukraine. This was contrary to the letter and spirit of the agreement in which the head of the Provisional Government of Russia, Alexander Kerensky, himself, had been so instrumental in negotiating, writing and ratifying.³⁷⁾

The basic provisions of the "Instruction of the Russian Provisional Government to the General Secretariat of Ukraine" of August 17, 1917, were as follows: 1. The General Secretariat shall be appointed by the Provisional Government on the proposal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, thus depending upon the Provisional Government. 2. The General Secretariat of Ukraine shall consist from now on only of the General Secretaries for the Internal Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Education, Industry and Trade, Labor, International Relations,^{*)} and the Scribe General. The "Instruction" provided for exclusion from the jurisdiction of the General Secretariat of Ukraine military affairs, food supply, administration of justice, the postal, telephone and telegraph services, and the construction and maintenance of the roads. 3. The jurisdiction of the autonomous agencies of Ukraine was limited to the regions of Kyiv, Volynia, Poltava, Podilya *gubernias* and one half of the Chernyiv gubernia. 4. The "Instruction" imposed an obligation that four members of this numerically much smaller General Secretariat were to be appointed from among the national minorities. 5. All laws and regulations adopted by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* were subject to the approval of the Provisional Government before they could be promulgated. 6. All public officials under jurisdiction of the General Secretariat should be appointed by the Provisional Government on proposal of the General Secretariat. 7. Finally, in case of emergency the Provisional Government was entitled to issue instructions and give orders directly to the bodies of the local government in Ukraine, bypassing the General Secretariat of Ukraine.

Thus, the Provisional Government of Russia decided to maintain its control in Ukraine and abridge the jurisdiction of the autonomous bodies to the bare minimum. More than that, it decided to maintain strong control over all law-making and administrative processes in Ukraine. In the opinion of the new Russian Prime Minister, Alexander Kerensky, there was little in his way of breaking the ratified Russian-Ukrainian agreement because the organized Ukrainian forces were still too weak for an open conflict with the much stronger Russian forces favoring Russian domination over Ukraine.³⁵⁾

^{*)} By the term "Secretary General of International Affairs" the Provisional Government of Russia meant only the interrelationship of the national minorities with the Ukrainian majority and not true foreign relations.

The Rada avoids an open conflict with Russia

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* in a special resolution declared that the Provisional Government of Russia broke their agreement and qualified this act of the Russian government as an act of flagrant Russian imperialism; therefore it sharply protested against it. At the same time, the *Rada* appealed to the Ukrainian people to intensify their preparations for the defense of their natural rights to be free and govern themselves in their own Ukrainian State.³⁹⁾ In this situation, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* did not feel morally or legally bound by the provisions of the Ukrainian-Russian agreement of July 15, 1917, any longer. However, the situation in Ukraine became complicated, and the existing balance of power forced the *Rada* to act very carefully. Therefore, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* decided to implement temporarily autonomy of Ukraine even in the limited form. Time was needed to organize the Ukrainian patriots for the effective independence of Ukraine.⁴⁰⁾

The formation of a new General Secretariat of Ukraine faced serious difficulties because radical opposition within the *Rada* developed due to the breach of the agreement by Russia and the Russian attempt to reassert own powers over Ukraine. Another factor which complicated the situation was the position of the Russified national minorities which, in essence, supported the view of Kerensky's government.⁴¹⁾ Many members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* called for resistance and the idea of full sovereignty of Ukraine gathered more and more open supporters. Finally, after debates which lasted for over two weeks, the newly formed General Secretariat, headed again by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, was approved by the *Rada* on September 3, 1917.

Upon presentation of the newly formed General Secretariat of Ukraine to the Provisional Government for approval, the Petrograd authorities again protracted, giving their consent only on September 14, 1917. This was one of the tactical ways to defer as long as possible the formal transfer of governmental powers into the hands of Ukrainian autonomous agencies of government. This tactics of the Kerensky's government limited the effective exercise of autonomous powers in Ukraine by the General Secretariat to a short period of time of less than two full months. The second revolution in Russia — the November Bolshevik revolution — created a new situation in Ukraine.

It merits mentioning that in that short period of time of autonomous rule in Ukraine the popularity of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and that of the General Secretariat considerably increased among the broad masses of the people of Ukraine and their governing authority gained full respect. At the same time, popularity of the

Provisional Government of Russia, headed by A. Kerensky, was rapidly decreasing due to the unpopular continuation of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the collapse of the summer offensive of the Russian army, the Russian Bolshevik propaganda succeeded in contributing to the considerable demoralization of the still sizeable Russian military forces.⁴²⁾

The Rada prepares the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly

In October of 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* intensified its work on preparatory steps for calling the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and at the end of that month the *Rada* was ready to adopt laws regulating elections of the representatives to the Assembly and attempted to set a date for its session before the end of the year of 1917. This attempt of the *Rada* was considered an unfriendly act by the Russian ruling circles, and the Provisional Government decided to abrogate the autonomy of Ukraine in its full entirety. Thus, even a limited autonomy of Ukraine was not acceptable to the Russians at that time.⁴³⁾

Kerensky's government instructed the Russian Attorney General to prepare an indictment against the leading members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat accusing them of treason against the Russian state, to arrest them for this crime, and to dissolve the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.⁴⁴⁾ Actually, only the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks on November 7, 1919, put an end to this new intrigue of the Provisional Government against the leading Ukrainian political activists in their struggle for the just right of the Ukrainian people for self-government.

The armed rebellion of the Russian Communists in Petrograd removed the Provisional Government almost without military resistance. Most members of the government were arrested, while Alexander Kerensky succeeded in escaping to Finland. After the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd, a new system of government in Russia was proclaimed and immediately the Soviet of People's Commissars, headed by Vladimir Lenin, as the new government of Russia, was established. Soon thereafter, almost all Russian cities followed Lenin and accepted his regime.⁴⁵⁾

CHAPTER 2
FORMATION
OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC

The Rada assumes sovereign powers in Ukraine

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, by an armed rebellion against the Provisional Government, the very same day the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its General Secretariat decided to take over full sovereign powers of Ukraine in the name of the people of Ukraine. Of course, they realized that for the time being they could establish their governing authority only in the Ukrainian ethnic territories east of the war's front line which ran, at that time, along the Zbruch River, through Volynia and Polisia to the Black Sea. The Russian military forces stationed in Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine at that time were still supporting the Provisional Government and their command opposed the idea of sovereignty of Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian military units loyal to the Ukrainian governmental authorities disarmed the Russian troops in virtually all cities of Ukraine, thus ending the remnants of the then still existing forces of the partial Russian governmental authorities on the Ukrainian territories. This operation ended in two days, and by November 9, 1917, the seemingly undivided governing authority of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Ukraine was established.⁴⁶⁾

However, the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people was opposed now by a new Russian imperialistic force. Some units of the Russian military forces stationed in Ukraine switched their loyalty to the newly established Soviet of the People's Commissars in Petrograd, and they attempted to establish the Soviet regime in Ukraine. After three days of bitter resistance, they were fully defeated by the Ukrainian military forces of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and by November 12, 1917, virtually all Russian government authority was abolished.⁴⁷⁾

In reality, on November 12, 1917, the sovereignty of Ukraine under the leadership of the democratic institutions of Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat was established because there remained no foreign governmental authority on the territory of Ukraine except for the war zones.

After the military victory of the Ukrainians over both the forces of the Provisional Government and those of the Soviet re-

Универсалъ Украинской Центральной Рады.

Народъ украинскій и всѣ народы Украины. Тяжело и трудно время переживаетъ Россійская республика. На сѣверѣ въ столицахъ идея междоусобная и кровавая борьба. Центральнаго Правительства нѣтъ. И по всему государству растетъ безвластiе, анархiя и разруха.

Нашъ край также въ опасности. Безъ власти сильной, единой, народной, Украина также будетъ повергнута въ бѣдну кровавой междоусобицы и подлаго уиатка.

Народъ украинскій, ты вмѣстѣ съ братскими народами Украины поставилъ насъ блюсти права, добытыя борьбою, творить порядокъ и творить будущее нашей земли. И мы, Украинская Центральная Рада, творя твою волю, во имя установленiя порядка въ нашемъ край, во имя спасенiя всей Россiи объявляемъ: **Отнынѣ Украина становится Украинской Народной Республикою.**

The Third Universal as published in official Russian translation

gime, on November 12, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* reorganized the General Secretariat of Ukraine to the level of the government of a fully sovereign country. The new government extended its authority and its administrative powers over all fields of governmental activities in Ukraine. Immediately, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* passed the law regulating the electoral process of the representatives of the people to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and on November 13, 1917, issued a proclamation concerning the territory of the Ukrainian State embracing all nine gubernias of Ukraine formerly under the Russian Tsarist rule.⁴⁸⁾

Facing the opposition to the full sovereignty of Ukraine by the Russian and pro-Russian national minorities in Ukraine, the leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* formally declared that the road remained open for the establishment of a federation of equally independent non-Russian nations of the former Russian Empire. This federation should enjoy equal sovereignty with the Russian state. This was a tactical move of the *Rada* in order to at least neutralize the unfriendly elements of national minorities.⁴⁹⁾

In order to formalize and consolidate the sovereign powers, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, in cooperation with the General Secretariat, drafted a new Universal announcing formally the existence of the Ukrainian State. On November 19, 1917, the draft of the *Third Universal* of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was presented for consideration to the Little *Rada*. After prolonged debates, upon the insistence of the representatives of the national minorities, there was incorporated into the document a declaration that Ukraine would be willing to join a federation of equal sovereign nations of the former Russian Empire.⁵⁰⁾

The federalistic concession given by the Ukrainians did not induce all representatives of the national minorities in the Little *Rada* to vote in favor of the text of the Third Universal finally passed on November 20, 1917. In favor of the Third Universal voted the Ukrainian and Jewish deputies as well as a single Polish minority member. Other national minorities deputies, including all Russian Mensheviks, all Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and the representative of the Polish Democrats, abstained, i.e. in essence they were against the approval of the Third Universal.

Upon approval, the Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was solemnly proclaimed after the Archepiscopal Liturgy at the St. Sophia Square in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, on November 22, 1917. The Third Universal formally proclaimed the existence of the Ukrainian State, the formation of which was accomplished by the will of the people on November 12, 1917. The Universal outlined the constitutional foundations of this (reconstructed after almost two centuries) Ukrainian State.

Constitutional system of the Ukrainian National Republic

The Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* legalized the governmental system of the Ukrainian State. In summary, it established the following constitutional provisions: the Ukrainian State was a Republic with the official name *Ukrayinska Narodna Respublika*, (or The Ukrainian National Republic). The foundation of the governmental system was the sovereignty of legally equal citizens of the country. However, the final constitution of the Ukrainian State establishing the definite form of government would be approved only by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly consisting of the freely elected representatives by the people of Ukraine.⁵²⁾

Until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly could be elected and met in its session, all legislative powers in Ukraine belonged to the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, while all executive powers should be exercised by the General Secretariat. The judicial powers in Ukraine should be vested in a system of independent courts, the organizational system and jurisdiction of which would be regulated by a special law.

The Third Universal ordered elections of deputies to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for January 9, 1918, and established January 22, 1918, as the date of the beginning of the session of the Assembly.

The Third Universal, as the constitutional act of Ukraine, guaranteed freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, associations, and strikes, as well as, guaranteed the inviolability of the individual and that of dwelling quarters. While Ukrainian was the official lan-

guage of the country, the national minorities were guaranteed the right to use their own languages in communication with the state and local governmental agencies. More than that, all national minorities, namely the Russian, Jewish, and Polish, were guaranteed cultural autonomy, the extent of which was to be regulated by a special law of the land. A broad degree of local self-government was accepted as the foundation of governing the country. Details of the system of local self-government were to be regulated by special legislation.

Based upon the principles of ethnic boundaries, the Third Universal, in its capacity as the temporary constitutional law, established the territorial boundaries of the Ukrainian National Republic. All territories of the former Russian Empire with a Ukrainian population majority were to be the integral parts of the Ukrainian National Republic. Therefore, the territory included all of the former *gubernias* of Kyiv, Podilya, Volynia, Chernyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, as well as Tavria without Crimea and the Ukrainian inhabited parts of the *gubernias* of Kholm, Kursk, Voronizh and the neighboring regions. In the mixed areas, the will of the people would be respected.

The basic socio-economic issues of the country were constitutionally regulated in the following way: All land in possession of the former family of the Tsar, aristocracy, and monasteries, as well as other land tracts over and above the family size farm should be transferred to the State Land Fund, without compensation, for distribution among the poor farming families. The new land ownership system would be regulated by a special legislation based upon the guarantee of the active participation of the village farmers in the land administration. The Universal established an eight hour working day for all hired employees effective immediately in all parts of the Ukrainian State. Also the governmental regulation of industrial production with an active participation of the organized labor was established.

Significantly, in those turbulent times of war the Third Universal abolished the death penalty effective immediately, and the Ukrainian Central *Rada* used the occasion for establishing this provisional constitution for granting a general amnesty to all political prisoners of the former regimes.

The Third Universal omitted explicit regulation of some questions of the governmental system because the law givers regarded them as established before the proclamation of the Universal. They regarded as self-evident the city of Kyiv as the capital of Ukraine and the President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to be the head of the Ukrainian National Republic. The U.N.R. accepted as its basis the parliamentary democracy through the established practice of

אוניווערסאל

ס'ן דער אוקראינער צענטראלער ראדע.

אוקראינער פאלק און אלע פעלקער פון אוקראינע
א ביטער-שווערע צייט לעבט איבער די רוסלענדישע רעפובליק. אין צפון און די ווייט-שטעט קומט
אאר א בלוטיגער ברודער-קאמף. קיין צענטראלע מאכט איז נישט און איבער דער גאנצער מלוכה וועקסט
ענארכיע און צערודערט.
אונזער קאנט איז אויך אין געפאר. און א מאכט א שטארקער, איינזייטליכער, און א פאלקס-מאכט
וועט אויך אוקראינע געווארען ווערן אין אמגורנט פון בלוטיגן ברודער קריג און פון פולן אונזער-
גאנג.
פאלק פון אוקראינע, די האסט און צוזאמען מיט אלע ברודערליכע פעלקער פון אוקראינע אונז-
געשטעלט אפצוהייטן די רעכט וואס וויינען ציווארבן געווארן דורך קאמף, צו שאפן ארדנונג און אריס-
ברען דאס גאנצע לעבן אויף אונזער ערד. און מיר, די אוקראינער צענטראלע ראדע, ערשילטריג ווין
רואן, לשם דער ארדנונג אין אונזער קאנט, לשם דער רעטונג פון גאנץ רוסלאנד, ערקלערן:
פון היינט אן וועט אוקראינע ווין אן אוקראינער פאלקס-רעפובליק.

The Third Universal as published in official Jewish translation

sub-ordinating all agencies of the government, including the head of the State and the cabinet, to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as the supreme legislative body of the country. The supremacy of the legislative body was signified by the fact of personal unity of the presiding officer of the *Rada* and the head of the State.⁵³⁾

As mentioned above, on insistence of the deputies of the national minorities, the Third Universal explicitly left the door open for the eventual formation of a federation of all equally sovereign nationalities of the former Russian Empire, as their alliance with Russia. However, the Universal stated it very clearly that as far as Ukraine was concerned, such federal ties between Ukraine and Russia could be bindingly established only by agreement between the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and the Russian Constituent Assembly.⁵⁴⁾

Along with the approval of the text of the Third Universal, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in a special resolution condemned the establishment of a dictatorial form of government in Russia by the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the *Rada* clearly implied that the Ukrainian government could talk about any sort of the federal ties with Russia only under conditions of re-establishment of a truly democratic system of government in Russia. Until such time, the mentioning of this possibility should be treated only as a theoretical norm and a means of attempting to gain support of the national minorities.⁵⁵⁾

Election act of the Constituent Assembly and the result of the elections

The legal acts of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as the supreme legislative body of the Ukrainian National Republic were published in the *Vistnyk Zakoniv i Rozporyadzhen* (The Collection of Laws and Executive Orders), especially after the proclamation of the Third Universal. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* assumed the law-making powers and became very active, thus passing special legal acts regulating various problems of the country. The problem of assuring the flow of the democratic process was one of the first among the various legal activities of the newly established legislative body of the people.

Among the basic constitutional acts of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was the Election Act of November 20, 1917, regulating the electoral process of the representatives of the people of Ukraine to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. According to the provisions of this Act, the representatives were to be elected according to the principle of proportional representation in a secret balloting in a general, equal, secret and direct election by all male and female citizens of the country. Thus, the Ukrainian National Republic was one among the first countries in the world establishing equal voting rights for women citizens.

The principle of proportional representation guaranteed a just representation to the national minorities in the country as well as to the smaller political parties which otherwise would not have been able to get representation. Therefore, the country was divided into relatively large electoral districts entitled to elect at least nine and a maximum 45 representatives depending upon the numerical size of the district's population.

The voting age was established for male and female citizens of Ukraine upon completion of the 20th year of life. This voting age was thus below the prevailing voting age in the countries of Western Europe and America. All citizens of Ukraine serving in the military forces of the country were granted the right to vote. The voting rights were guaranteed not only to the citizens of Ukraine having domicile in one of the communities on the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic but the active and passive electoral rights were assured to all individuals over 20 years of age who were in Ukraine at the time of passing the law, including the political refugees and the war deportees.

The liberality of the electoral process was guaranteed by granting the authority to nominate to any one hundred citizens filing a list of candidates through signed petitions. This nominating process



A bill of Ukrainian National Republic. According to the rights of national minorities on the bill is indicated the value in the languages of minorities including Jewish.

assured even the smallest groups the right to present their candidates on the official ballot.

The law established the total number of members of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly at 301 deputies. In order to assure the regularity of the electoral process, a Central Election Board, composed of the appointed judges, was established in Kyiv, and similar regional and local boards of election were called into existence in all administrative subdivisions of the country. The representatives of each list of candidates were to participate in the respective boards of election activities. Thus, provisions to guarantee complete regularity of a secret electoral process were fully established.⁵⁶⁾

While the Third Universal set the date of January 9, 1918, as the election day for the deputies to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, an additional law added also January 11, 1918, as the second election day in order to assure the opportunity for all citizens to take part in this very important free election of the nation. Prevailing conditions in various parts of the country required guaranteeing this opportunity of two days for the duration of elections.

The Provisional Government of Russia, headed by Kerensky, ordered on August 22, 1917, the election of deputies to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly for November 25, 1917. This election was to be held in all territories of the former Russian Empire. It was because of the upcoming election that the Russian Bolsheviks staged their *coup d'etat* against Kerensky's Provisional Government on November 7, three weeks before the date set for the election. The Bolsheviks believed that once they had established their dicta-

torial government and began using their propaganda machine that they could influence the voters and decisively win the election throughout the old Russian Empire. This is confirmed many times by contemporary participants of the strife.⁵⁷⁾ The Soviet of the People's Commissars of the Russian Socialist Republic, headed by Vladimir Lenin, did not change the electoral law nor the dates for the election set by the disbanded Kerensky government, being certain that by controlling the country from November 7, 1917, to election day the Bolsheviks would gain complete victory. Reality proved to be different. The Bolshevik Party suffered humiliation by not receiving a majority except in some industrial centers of Russia proper. The absolute majority of votes was received, in Russia, by the Russian Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.⁵⁸⁾

The Government of Ukraine did not call off the election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly on the territory of Ukraine either even after the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd. First of all, the leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* were absolutely certain that the political parties supporting the government of the Ukrainian National Republic would get an absolute majority of the votes. Secondly, the government of Ukraine did not want to explicitly declare the theoretical principle of federation null and void without consulting the electorate at this time because such an act of the Ukrainian government might have led to internal complications with the national minorities in Ukraine as well as to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the government of Soviet Russia.

Thus, the election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly was held on the territory of Ukraine as scheduled, and it proved to be a splendid victory for the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian National Republic. The lists of the candidates of the political parties supporting the idea of the sovereignty of Ukraine received over 80% of all votes cast. The Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks got less than 10% of all votes in spite of a very well organized campaign based upon luring promises to the people.⁵⁹⁾ However, when the All-Russian Constituent Assembly met in January at Petrograd, none of the Ukrainian deputies elected to this Assembly took part in its session. The boycott of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly by the Ukrainian deputies elected by the people signified the principle that the freely elected representatives of the Ukrainian people did not recognize the right of any Russian body to make decisions concerning Ukraine, as the Russians still expected to do. Besides, after the Constituent Assembly refused to recognize the dictatorship of the Soviet of the People's Commissars of Russia, the Assembly was dispersed by the armed units of the Bolsheviks in *sine die*.⁶⁰⁾

The election of the Constituent Assembly and the administrative measures

The actual election for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly was held, as provided by the law passed by the *Rada*, on January 9, 1918. Therefore, this election was 45 days later than the election for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks had ruled Russia for some 63 days, having gained control on November 7, 1917. During those 63 days, the Bolsheviks had used all methods at their command for propaganda and demagoguery. In short, they had promised paradise on earth. They should have gained a splendid victory in Ukraine. But the Bolsheviks failed to make any significant progress. They did win the votes of the Russian and Russified minorities. All these were opposed to the Ukrainian State and hoped that the Bolsheviks would save the unity of the former Russian Empire. Nevertheless, the general results of the election in Ukraine on January 9, meant for the Bolsheviks a clear defeat. In this election the Bolsheviks won only 21.95% deputies. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries had won 66.65%; the Ukrainian farmers, 9.95%; and Ukrainian Social-Democrats, 1.45%. All Ukrainian parties together had won almost 80% of all votes. The percentage of the Ukrainians of total population was 71.8%. Therefore, the Bolsheviks had won very few of the Ukrainian votes. Basically for the Bolsheviks came from the minorities.^{50a)}

The principle of the rule of law was laid down as the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic. All actions of the government were to be based on legal norms, and the individual inhabitants of the country were protected by the established legal norms. The rule of law was to be applied to individuals as well as to governmental officials. However, during the relatively short period of law-making activities of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, it was physically impossible to establish new laws of the Ukrainian National Republic regulating every sphere of the life. Therefore, the *Rada* declared that in the Ukrainian National Republic there remained in power all legal norms of the earlier Russian regime which were not explicitly overruled by positive law of the Ukrainian National Republic and which were not in conflict with the existence of the Ukrainian State. Besides the basic constitutional legislation, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, first of all, legally provided for an established judiciary system. The enforcement of justice required prompt action, therefore the Ukrainian Central *Rada* promulgated Constitutional Act concerning the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian National Republic as early as December 15, 1917. The Supreme Court (*Heneralnyy Sud*) of Ukraine was based upon the functional specialization of its sections. Thus, the Supreme Court was divided into three separate sections: civil,

criminal, and administrative. The names of the first two sections are self-explanatory, while the administrative section of the Court was authorized to act finally in case of the complaints against the acts of various governmental agencies and the governmental officials. Over and above, the Supreme Court served as the highest appellate court of the country from decisions of the lower courts as well as the top supervisor of all the judiciary system of the country. Until the final regulation of all constitutional questions by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly could be passed, the justices of the Supreme Court were appointed by the General Secretariat and approved by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. The capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, was established as the seat of the Supreme Court. Along with the Supreme Court in Kyiv, the Office of the Attorney General was established which was subordinated to the Secretary General of Justice. The Attorney General was authorized to supervise a subordinated system of District Attorneys as well as Regional Attorneys connected with the respective court levels in the country.^{60b)}

The next important field of governmental activity regulated by the law was the problem of public finance. A tax law was passed by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on December 22, 1917. At the same time, the Ukrainian State Bank in Kyiv was established, while a special law of January 6, 1918, regulated normal functioning of the emission of paper currency of the Ukrainian National Republic. This law established *karbovanets* as the unit of legal tender and normalized its value as equaling one unit of currency to pure gold. The value of currency in this ratio was guaranteed by the public wealth and the public revenues from taxation and various fees.⁶¹⁾ Later the *karbovanets* was changed to *hryvnya*.*)

The law established the highest quantity limits up to which the Ukrainian State Bank, in cooperation with the General Secretary for Financial Affairs, was authorized to issue *karbovanets* banknotes. The first banknotes of the Ukrainian National Republic were printed in the Ukrainian language as far as the main text was concerned; however, the text was also printed in the languages of the major national minorities in Ukraine, i.e. Russian, Jewish, and Polish. So, this was the first time in history, after the downfall of the Jewish State in the Second century A. D., that Hebrew letters appeared in the text of currency of any nation. Using the languages of the national minorities in the text of the currency, the Ukrainian government expressed its desire to cooperate with the national minorities and to respect their rights.⁶²⁾

*) One *karbovanets* legally represented 0.044 gr. of pure gold. One *hryvnya* represented $\frac{1}{2}$ of *karbovanets*.



Post stamps of the U.N.R.



Regulatory legislation in various other spheres of activities, especially in the field of social and economic policies of the Ukrainian National Republic, was basically prepared in this period of very fruitful activities of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, but it was promulgated and implemented only in the successive stages of the development of the Ukrainian State.

The first Soviet Russian aggression against Ukraine

The end objective of the *Sovnarkom*,*) i.e. the Soviet of the People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet State, was not limited to the establishment of the Communist regime in Russia alone. Its objective was not even limited to the domination of the territories of the former Russian Empire. Rather they aimed at the Communist domination of all of Europe as well as the whole world. The *Sovnarkom* was required to this objective by the program of the All-Russian Communist Party which directed the Communist leadership to continue activities of the Bolshevik revolution until a single World Soviet Republic, embracing the entire globe, would be established.⁶³⁾

As the first step in the realization of this ambitious objective, the Ukrainian National Republic was to be subjugated and incor-

*) The name is an abbreviation of three Russian words in the title of the Soviet Russian government: **S**oviet **N**arodnykh **K**omisarov = *Sovnarkom*.

porated into the Russian Soviet State as the inevitable territorial base for aggression against the countries of Central and Western Europe. According to the Leninist strategy, the expansion of Soviet Russian domination was to be developed in two stages. As the first stage of this world subjugation strategy, the Communist Party of each country was to conduct sabotage activities and lead to a general revolution against the established government in the proper moment; and in the second stage of this revolution, the regular Russian Bolshevick military units were to participate. Lenin's *Sovnarkom* applied this strategy first of all against Ukraine. Aggression, in a similar manner, against other countries followed.⁶⁴)

Active Russian Communist forces in Ukraine, openly supported by the *Sovnarkom*, decided to utilize for their aggressive purposes the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies called for a session to Kyiv for the middle of December, 1917. The Russian Bolshevicks hoped to control the majority at this Congress and thus proclaim the re-incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Soviet Republic. However, this plan failed because the great majority of the deputies at this Congress supported the democratic system of the Ukrainian National Republic, i.e. the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat.⁶⁵)

Surprised by the political composition of the deputies to this Congress at Kyiv, the Russian *Sovnarkom* decided to change the political decisions of the Congress by threat of war. On December 17, 1917, at the time of the duration of the first session of the Congress, the Russian Soviet government presented to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* an ultimatum demanding the right of transit and stationing for the Russian Bolshevick military forces in all parts of Ukraine. The Ukrainian consent was expected within twenty-four hours; otherwise, the Russian Bolshevicks threatened to begin war against Ukraine. The stationing of the Russian troops in Ukraine equaled her occupation.⁶⁶)

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* rejected the ultimatum of the Russian Bolshevicks and gathered the Ukrainian military forces for the defense of the sovereignty of Ukraine. The All-Ukrainian Congress of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies rejected, by a great majority, the motion of the Bolshevick deputies to the Congress to accept the terms of the Russian Bolshevick government ultimatum. Instead, the Congress approved the position of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and expressed the will of the Ukrainian working people to defend, militarily, the Ukrainian National Republic against the Russian Bolshevick war aggression which was to be inevitably expected after the refusal to capitulate.⁶⁷)

The poorly trained and even worse equipped, numerically small military forces of the Ukrainian National Republic defended



Coat of arms of the Ukrainian National Republic

their country heroically against the several times larger military forces of the aggressive Soviet Russia. The Russian Bolshevik aggression was carefully prepared in advance. Without consultation with the Ukrainian government, the Russian Soviet government opened negotiations with Austria and Germany on December 2, 1917, which ended successfully a few days later by signing an armistice agreement. Withdrawing their forces from the world war fronts, the Russian Bolsheviks freed their units for aggression against Ukraine.⁶⁸⁾

The Ukrainian government was not able in this situation to continue military operations on the side of the forces of Great Britain, France, and the United States against Austria and Germany and, at the same time defend the Ukrainian territories against the Russian Bolshevik aggression. Therefore, the Ukrainian government, too, entered into negotiations with Austria, Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey and as a result it signed a separate peace treaty with them on February 9, 1918, at Berestya.*) The Ukrainian military forces successfully defended Ukraine up to this time. When, however, the danger of the downfall of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, was imminent, the government of Ukraine concluded a treaty of military assistance with Austria and Germany in order to get Ukrainian military units stationed in the Austrian dominated Galicia for the defense of Ukraine against the Soviet Russian invasion.⁶⁹⁾

The military forces of the Ukrainian National Republic defended their territory against the Russian Bolsheviks for six weeks,

*) Berestya = Ukrainian name for Brest-Litovsk.

alone. Although they were forced to leave Kyiv on February 9, 1918, they remained on their own national territory until they succeeded, with the help of the military forces of Austria and Germany, to throw out the Soviet invasion forces from all territories of Ukraine by the middle of April, 1918.⁷⁰⁾

In the meantime, also, Soviet Russia signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers dated March 3, 1918. According to this treaty, Russia agreed to withdraw all of her military forces from Ukraine and conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine as a sovereign state.⁷¹⁾

Formal proclamation of the sovereignty of Ukraine

While all of these internal developments in regard to establishing the completely self-governing national Ukrainian State were in progress, the provisions concerning possible federation with Russia mentioned in the Third Universal were still not nullified by the Ukrainian State authorities. Two events finally led to their recall. First of all, the ultimatum of the Soviet Russian government of December 17, 1917, made it clear that the Russians wanted complete domination rather than federation. Secondly, the Russian Soviet government started first armistice and later separate peace treaty negotiations with Germany and Austria without consultation with the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic. Therefore, the Ukrainians came to the conclusion that the phrase concerning the eventual federation of Ukraine with Russia contained in the text of the Third Universal had to be formally nullified.⁷²⁾

After a thorough discussion in the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, especially among the Ukrainian deputies and the deputies of the national minorities, the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed by issuing the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. The basic provisions of the Fourth Universal were approved on January 22, 1918, while some minor changes in the final text were added on January 24, 1918. In order to establish the date of the proclamation of the complete sovereignty of Ukraine which would coincide with the previously announced day of the session of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, i.e. January 22, 1918, President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, moved and the *Rada* approved to date the document of the Fourth Universal by January 22, 1918, as the day of its proclamation. It should be mentioned that due to the military operations of the invading Russian Bolsheviks in various parts of Ukraine many elected members of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly were prevented from arriving on time in Kyiv, and the

opening of the session of the Assembly was postponed. The Ukrainian Central *Rada*, as the representative body, acted on behalf of the people of Ukraine in this critical for the nation situation.⁷³)

The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was carried out over vigorous opposition from the ranks of the national minorities. This time, the opposition was much sharper than that against the proclamation of the Third Universal. The deputies of the Little *Rada* inside the Ukrainian Central *Rada* representing the Russian and the Russified minorities strongly opposed the omission from the text of the document any mention of the federation of Ukraine with Russia in the future. They desired to retain, at least, the theoretical principle mentioned. However, the Ukrainian deputies who constituted the great majority, demanded complete sovereignty of Ukraine, and they were supported by the representative of the Polish Socialist Party. Two representatives of the Russian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, one deputy of the Polish Center Party, and the Jewish Democratic Union abstained from voting. Against the text of the Fourth Universal voted all four deputies of the Russian Mensheviks and one deputy of the Jewish Social Democratic Workers Party "Bund".⁷⁴) The fact that the representatives of the national minorities opposed openly the proclamation of the sovereignty of Ukraine indicated that they acted completely freely within the limits of the guaranteed liberties in the Ukrainian State as well as it proved the high degree of tolerance on the part of the Ukrainian majority. It might also indicate the lack of understanding for the quest of the Ukrainian people to be free and equal with other free nations of the world. The same might be said about those abstaining from voting in favor of Ukrainian independence.

The basic legal provisions of the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* dated January 22, 1918, are as follows: First of all, the Universal declared that the existing and *de-facto* independent Ukrainian National Republic was from that time on to be legally, in all respects, "a sovereign, independent from outside free State of the Ukrainian People." In its foreign relations, the Ukrainian National Republic would act completely independently, especially in her relations with the immediate neighbor countries — Russia, Poland, Austria, Rumania, and Turkey. The Ukrainian National Republic wished to live in peace and friendship with all of those neighborly countries, but none of them should attempt to interfere with the affairs of the sovereign Ukraine. In the same paragraph of the Fourth Universal, the *Rada* explained the reasons for the Soviet Russian military aggression against Ukraine and emphasized the strong will of the Ukrainian people to defend their country against any external interference in Ukrainian internal affairs, and especially against the military aggression of Soviet Russia. This

caused the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic to enter into the peace negotiations with Austria and Germany independently.⁷⁵⁾ *)

The Fourth Universal contained a provision concerning changing the name of the executive branch of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic from the General Secretariat to the Council of National Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic. In the field of socio-economic structure of the country, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* mentioned the preparation of the legal provisions for the general land reform, and at the same time the Fourth Universal declared that all forests, all waters, and all mineral resources of the country were immediately transferred to the ownership of the Ukrainian people and under the management of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine. In its fight against war speculation in basic necessities, the government would take over all trade, especially export to and import from foreign countries. The Government was authorized to establish regulations of bank credit and interest rates.

The Fourth Universal informed the people about passage of a special law dated January 22, 1918, concerning cultural autonomy of the national minorities within the constitutional system of the Ukrainian National Republic.⁷⁶⁾

Legal protection of the national minorities in Ukraine

The draft for the legal provisions concerning the cultural autonomy of the national minorities in Ukraine had been in preparation by the agencies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* since the summer of 1917. The promulgation of this law by the Ukrainian National Republic constituted a historical event because it was the first time in modern history that any sovereign state established, in legal form, the principle of the cultural autonomy of all national minorities within the country.⁷⁷⁾

Article One of this law provided that: "Each national minority residing in Ukraine shall have cultural autonomy compatible with the unity of the Ukrainian National Republic, i.e. it shall have the right to conduct the affairs of the national minority independently through the bodies of its own National Union whose authority extends over all members of that national minority regardless of the place of residence within the Ukrainian National Republic. This is an inalienable right of nations, and no nationality shall be deprived of this right nor limited in enjoying it." Article Two of this Act

*) The full text of the Fourth Universal see: the end pages of this volume.

granted cultural autonomy to the numerically large national minorities of the Russians, Jews, and Poles directly and immediately without any further action on their part. Other minor national minorities could enjoy similar autonomous rights upon presentation of a written petition of at least 10,000 citizens of the Ukrainian National Republic of a given nationality to the Supreme Court of the Republic. The law mentioned the Byelorussian, Czech, Moldavian, German, Tartar, Greek and Bulgarian national minorities within this category of minor ethnic groups.

According to the provisions of the law, the National Union of each national minority was to be regarded as a body of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic elected by the registered members of the respective national minority according to the provisions of legal regulations concerning election of the deputies to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Within the legal limits, the National Union was to serve in both the legislative and administrative capacities in the internal affairs of the minority. The National Union of each national minority had its own budget based upon the revenues from special taxation of its own members. Therefore, each citizen of the Ukrainian National Republic belonging to a particular national minority would voluntarily register as a member of the particular minority. The registers were to be deposited with the Supreme Court of the Republic as well as with the respective National Union agencies. All disputes between the organs of the Republic and the organs of national minority National Unions were to be decided by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian National Republic.

Immediately after the promulgation of the national minorities cultural autonomy law, the three major national minorities — the Russians, Jews, and Poles — began to organize their National Unions and to prepare registers of the members of their respective national minorities. Thus, the cultural autonomy was introduced immediately after the proclamation of sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. For the safeguarding of the national minorities' interests, a Russian, a Jew, and a Pole were appointed members of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic with full rights of the members of the government. Again, the Ukrainian National Republic was first in modern history among the free nations to have appointed a Jew as a Minister for Jewish Affairs as a member of the cabinet.⁷⁸⁾

However, not all was smooth and without misunderstanding. There were some difficulties in the relations between the Ukrainian majority and the national minorities. For instance, the Jews constituted about 10% of the total population of Ukraine and were basically concentrated in the cities. The heavy concentration of the

Jewish population in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Byelorussia was caused by the fact that during the Russian Tsarist rule in these countries the Jews were allowed to settle in their territories while they were prohibited from settling in the Russian ethnic territories. The Jews were allowed to settle in Russia only if they were rich tradesmen, industrialists or had university degrees. Therefore, they constituted only 0.3% of the total population of Russia proper. Thus, they were almost invisible there.⁷⁹⁾

However, the resentment of the Jews remained from the memoirs of the pogroms carried out by the Russian Tsarist authorities during the last few decades before the 1917 revolution. Of course, since the Jews were basically concentrated in the non-Russian ethnic territories, the Russian "Black Hundreds" carried out their pogroms in Ukraine, Moldavia, Poland, etc. which were under Russian absolute domination. The prerevolutionary "Black Hundreds" of the Russian pogrom forces remained in Ukraine after the revolution in a changed form. However, they continued to spread religious hatred against the Jews.⁸⁰⁾ The demoralized and self-demobilized Russian troops passing from the fronts to their native localities through the territory of Ukraine were often engaged in seizing property and terrorizing the local population, especially the Jews. For some people, it was not easy to distinguish between the Russian front returnees and the Ukrainian troops since they all were wearing the same uniforms of the former Russian military units.⁸¹⁾

For the protection of the life and property of all citizens, the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic and the newly organized Ukrainian National Army did the utmost possible in order to eliminate disorder of the revolutionary movements of the time.

The Ukrainian socio-economic legislation

Immediately after the proclamation of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918, the legislature of the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, moved into regulatory socio-economic legislation. The existing economic and social conditions of the country required immediate action. At that time, some 90% of the total ethnically Ukrainian population of the country was concentrated in family farming. There were many landless farm workers in the country who desired to own their own farms. The large latifundia in the country were predominantly owned by individuals ethnically belonging to the Russian, Polish, and German national minorities. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* was forced to speed up the land reform also

by the vigorous Russian Bolshevik agitation and promises of land to the landless peasants.⁸²⁾

Therefore, on January 31, 1918, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* promulgated the Land Reform Act as promised to the people in the Fourth Universal. The law in principle provided that all land, including the waters, forests, and the mineral resources in the Ukrainian National Republic, were to be regarded as the goods of the people under the jurisdiction of the legislative authorities of the Republic. The Land Reform Act provisions were to be enforced by the organs of the local government under the general supervision of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine.⁸³⁾

All land over the family farm size was declared to be nationalized without compensation and pooled into the national land fund under the control of the State Land Administration. The Land Administration distributed the accumulated land among the landless and poor farming families, for the development of new communities and for research purposes. The family farm units were granted the right of inheritance. The law authorized also the use of land by producing agricultural cooperatives.

The basis for the quantity of land to be legally protected as private ownership was taken the customary size of a family farm tilled exclusively by the members of the family in the particular region of the country. The quantity norm for the producing associations was limited to the extent of the farm to be tilled by the members of the association alone, without hired help. Particular extents of the land quantity were determined by the regional bodies of the self-government under the control of the government of the country. Special agricultural units, such as orchards, vineyards, etc. were not subject to the land distribution. A special executive order established the maximum of land to be retained by the former large landowners in the extent of 30 *desyatynas*.*)

The land reform in the Ukrainian National Republic was rather complicated from the point of view of its enforcement. However, it reflected the desires of the great majority of the Ukrainian peasant population and it was carried out in the interest of a smooth development of the economy in these turbulent revolutionary days. The Ukrainian land reform served as a model for the land reform legislation in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

After the Land Reform Act was passed, the Ukrainian National Republic legally established on February 7, 1918, the eight-hour working day with the distinction of being the first law of this nature in any democratic country.⁸⁴⁾

*) One *desyatyna* = 2.7 acres.

The new Ukrainian Currency Act of March 1, 1918, was definitely one of the most important pieces of legislation of the period when all offices of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic resided in the city of Zhytomyr after being forced by the invading Russian troops to temporarily leave Kyiv. The law provided that the new unit of the currency of the Ukrainian National Republic was to be *hryvnya* divided into 100 *shahy*. The value of one *hryvnya* was legally established at 8.712 *dolyas* of pure gold. The newly adopted name of the unit of currency was related to the currency of the Ukrainian-Rus' State in the 10th century.⁸⁵*)

Due to the existing food shortage everywhere in Europe at that time, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* legally established the Public Sugar Monopoly in order to prevent private speculation and to assure a supply of sugar to the broad masses of the population.

Special act of the legislature established the structural organization of the military forces of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Army and also the Navy. A law passed on March 1, 1918, regulated the provisions concerning the Coat of Arms of the Ukrainian National Republic as the Golden Trident on the blue base encircled by a golden wreath of laurel leaves. The Public Administration Act of March 4, 1918, divided the territory of Ukraine into 30 large administrative units of local self-government called "Zemlya" (the Land) instead of the previously used term *gubernia*. The lower self-administrative units of government were to remain the cities, rayons, and the villages. The enforcement of this new administrative reform was to be carried out after the end of the war. The operation of the public school system was regulated by the law which was enforced and remained in power until the downfall of the Republic.⁸⁶)

The Constitutional Charter of the Ukrainian National Republic

As has been indicated, the constitutional foundations of the Ukrainian National Republic were formulated step-by-step in several separate documents. Finally, all constitutional provisions were codified by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* into a single document, the Constitutional Charter of the Ukrainian National Republic dated April 29, 1918. The text of the Charter consists of eight chapters embracing 83 paragraphs. The titles of the Chapters are: I. General legal provisions. II. The rights of the citizens of Ukraine. III. Governmental agencies of the Ukrainian National Republic. IV. The Na-

*) One *dolya* = 0.044 gr. of pure gold.

tional Assembly. V. The Council of Ministers. VI. The Supreme Court. VII. The National Unions of the national minorities. VIII. On temporary suspension of the civil rights.⁸⁷⁾

In the chapter on general provisions, the Constitutional Charter defined the objectives of the Ukrainian National Republic in a manner resembling the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. First of all, it emphasized that the Constitution of the newly established Ukrainian National Republic was but the restoration of the ancient constitutional law of Ukraine who in this new form "declared herself as an independent and sovereign nation with the aim of defending the country from foreign interference and for the security of rights and liberties, the cultural development and the general welfare of her citizens."

The sovereign rights in the Ukrainian National Republic belonged to the people of Ukraine, exercising them through the elected representative body, the National Assembly of Ukraine. The change in the name of the supreme legislative body of the country from the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to the National Assembly of Ukraine was carried out in order to emphasize the principle of the sovereignty of the people. In no way did it attempt to break with the traditions of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* or its policies. The Constitution formalized the existing practice of the unitary form of the State. To the Council of Ministers in the Ukrainian National Republic were subordinated self-governing bodies of country's administrative subdivisions, the *zemlyas*, regions, cities and villages. Separate provisions of the Constitution regulated the degree of their autonomous self-government. Similar privileges of self-government were guaranteed by the Constitution to the representative bodies of the national minorities, the National Unions, in the cultural affairs of each minority.

As one of the most important civil rights and liberties, the Constitution declared the right to be a citizen of the Ukrainian National Republic. No citizen of Ukraine could be a citizen of any other country at the same time. The naturalization procedures were to be regulated by a special law. A citizen of the Ukrainian National Republic might renounce his citizenship. However, no body of the executive branch of government was to have the authority to deprive any citizen of his rights of citizenship. However, the courts of the country might do so if the government presented sufficient reasons.

The voting age was established at the age of 20 years which was to be also regarded as the age of full civil and criminal responsibility in courts. The Constitution established equal rights of the citizens of both sexes in every respect. Equal civil and political rights and liberties were guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens regardless of their religion, national origin, birth, social and

economic status, or tax payment. Some of the civil rights and political liberties, especially the voting age and the equality of both sexes, etc., were constitutionally guaranteed several decades earlier in Ukraine than in most of the established democracies of the world.

The Constitution guaranteed freedom from arrest, except for catching criminals red-handed, and even in such cases the courts were to decide if the alleged criminal was to be held in jail longer than 24 hours. The Constitution abolished the death penalty as well as any type of physical punishment degrading the human dignity. Also the penalty of confiscation of all property of an individual was prohibited constitutionally. The inviolability of the home was explicitly guaranteed, and no search was to be carried out without warrant of the court. Only in exceptional cases, were the law enforcing officers permitted to carry out home search without any court warrant but all findings were not acceptable in the court trial unless the warrant was secured within 48 hours after the search was carried out. This provision of the Constitution aimed at the protection of the society against the criminal acts of individuals.

The secrecy of the mail was explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Freedoms of speech, press, conscience, association, and strikes were guaranteed to all inhabitants of the Ukrainian National Republic as long as the exercise of these did not violate the criminal law of the Republic. Contrary to the practices of the former Russian Empire authorities, the Ukrainian Constitution explicitly guaranteed freedom of movement and residence.

The active and passive electoral rights and privileges were guaranteed to all citizens over the age of 20 years with regard to all elective bodies of the Republic as well as the bodies of local self-government. The electoral rights and privileges were not to be extended to the individuals legally found to be insane or those sentenced by the courts for criminal offenses as determined in the Code of the Criminal Law to be introduced by the Ukrainian National Assembly.

All governmental powers resided in the hands of the people of the Republic, thus maintaining the unity of governmental powers. While the only source of governmental powers were the people of Ukraine, these were exercised by the people through the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies of the Republic. The supreme body of the government was the Ukrainian National Assembly exercising the powers of the legislative organ directly as well as having authority to establish the executive and judiciary branches of government.

The supreme executive powers in the Ukrainian National Republic were vested in the Council of Ministers, and the highest judiciary powers of the Republic were vested in the Supreme Court. Within authorized limits, the bodies of the local self-government

exercised governmental authority directly, while the Council of Ministers directed, coordinated and controled their activities.

According to the provisions of the Constitution, elections of the members of National Assembly of the Ukrainian National Republic were to be regulated by the rules and regulations for the election of representatives to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly promulgated by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. For each 100,000 inhabitants, one deputy was to be elected to the Assembly. The deputies were guaranteed immunity from prosecution for any political action in carrying out their mandates as deputies. The regularity of elections was to be assured by the courts. They were obliged to carry out control over the elections and report to the National Assembly all noticed irregularities for final decision. The Assembly could seat the contested deputies or order new special elections in the particular electoral region.

Members of the Ukrainian National Assembly were to be elected for 3 years. However, the Assembly was authorized to call for new elections before the expiration of the three year term and it was obliged to order new elections if petitioned by at least three million voters. In any case of dissolution of the Assembly, the elections were to be held within three months but the mandates of the members of the dissolved Assembly remained in power until the newly elected members of the Assembly met in session. The National Assembly was chaired by its elected Head who performed this function until a new Head was elected.

Besides the usual legislative powers, the National Assembly had the authority to declare war and approve peace treaties, to ratify all treaties of Ukraine with other countries as well as to approve the budget and supervise all financial affairs of the country. A form of the direct exercise of the sovereign powers of the people was guaranteed by the Constitution through the provision that any body or bodies of local self-government representing at least 100,000 voters were authorized to present to the National Assembly a bill for consideration. A similar privilege was guaranteed to any group of at least 100,000 voters who would present a written petition signed properly and sent through the courts.

The National Assembly was a single chamber legislative body. The supremacy of the legislature over all other branches of government was signified by the unity of the functions of the Head of the Assembly and those of the President of the Republic. His prerogatives were not limited to the functions of representation. They included the power of summoning the ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the National Assembly, as well as the power to appoint members of the Council of Ministers. All decisions were legally made by the majority of the present and voting members of the Assembly,

provided that at least one half of all elected deputies were present. However, for the declaration of war and concluding of peace, there was the prerequisite that two-thirds of the elected members be present. For the amendment of the Constitutional Charter, the presence of three-fifths of all members was necessary. For the validity of constitutional amendments, the amendments had to be approved by the National Assembly and receive a positive vote again from the National Assembly after the next elections. Thus, the amendment could be an election issue and the will of the people indirectly expressed regarding it.

The parliamentary democracy in the Ukrainian National Republic provided that the supreme executive branch of government served at the pleasure of the National Assembly. According to the Constitution, the executive powers of the Republic were exercised by the Council of Ministers which as a whole as well as its individual members, had to enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. Otherwise, the cabinet had to resign.

The Head of the National Assembly, in his capacity as the President of the Republic, enjoyed the authority of appointing the Prime Minister as well as all other members of the Council of Ministers. In reality, he performed this function in cooperation with the leaders of the various groups in the National Assembly. The Ukrainian Constitution modified the straight parliamentary system of government in that it authorized the President to appoint members of the Council of Ministers also from among non-deputies of the National Assembly. All ministers had the privilege of addressing the National Assembly, but the ministers who were not, at the same time, deputies of the National Assembly had no voting rights.

The individual responsibility of the ministers was not limited to its political aspect in the form of a vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly. By a vote of two-thirds majority, the Assembly could order an investigation and court proceedings against a minister for cause.

The organization of the judiciary system in the Ukrainian National Republic was regulated by the legislation within the limits of the constitutional provisions. The constitution provided that the highest judiciary authority in Ukraine be vested in the Supreme Court whose members were elected for a term of 5 years by the National Assembly. The Supreme Court served basically as an appellate tribunal in the civil, criminal, and administrative cases. All trials were to be public and testimonies oral.

Independence of the judiciary was assured by the constitutional provision that neither the legislative nor the executive branch of government was authorized to change the decision of a court. The fixed term of office of the Supreme Justices for the duration

of 5 years was guaranteed, except in the case of impeachment, while the term of office of the National Assembly was only three years. Thus, the Supreme Court remained independent of the Assembly which had elected it.

The Constitutional Charter incorporated legislation concerning the cultural autonomy of the national minorities promulgated by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. Since no part of the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic was compactly inhabited by any single nationality of the existing minorities, the Constitution did not provide for territorial autonomy. The Ukrainians observed the principle of ethnic boundaries for their country.

The Constitutional Charter of the Ukrainian National Republic of April 29, 1918, was written and promulgated in that period of time characterized by revolutionary activities. Due to these conditions, the document contained legal provisions concerning the suspension of civil liberties in case of national emergency. However, such a state of emergency with the temporary suspension of civil liberties could be declared only by the National Assembly. Only when the Assembly was not in session, could such a proclamation be issued by the Council of Ministers but the executive order of this nature had to be subsequently approved by the National Assembly in order to maintain its legal validity.

The Constitutional Charter of the Ukrainian National Republic which codified all previously promulgated constitutional acts of the country as well as introduced some innovations, was deprived of the opportunity of being enforced as the supreme law of the land. On the very same day as the Charter was approved in its totality, during the night of April 29, 1918, a *coup d'etat* changed the governmental system of the Ukrainian State. General Pavlo Skoropadskyy, supported by the conservative elements of the country, consisting of a group of large landowners and industrialists with the military aid of the Austrian and German armed forces stationed in Ukraine after the conclusion of the peace treaty at Berestya*) succeeded in overthrowing the democratic regime and temporarily reestablished a dictatorship in Ukraine. Although General Skoropadskyy succeeded in asserting his rule only later, he proclaimed his own constitutional acts dated April 29, 1918. These acts were carefully prepared in advance by the supporters of the new regime.

Brief evaluation of the Ukrainian Central Rada regime

The Ukrainian State was reestablished in the Ukrainian ethnic territories of the former Russian Empire in accordance with the principle of national self-determination. The sovereign state

*) Berestya — Brest Litovsk.

was reestablished by the will and toil of the Ukrainian people alone, as represented by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, without any outside help.

The development of the sovereign Ukrainian State was characterized by strict observance of the democratic processes with special emphasis upon guarantee of human and civil rights and liberties of all inhabitants of the country. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* took pride in establishing the legal foundations for the broadest possible cultural autonomy for all national minorities, thus guaranteeing them development of their national cultures at the expense of the public treasury.

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the General Secretariat had done the utmost possible in their power to establish peaceful neighborly relations with the new democratic Russia ruled by the Provisional Government. The *Rada* had made a number of concessions in pursuit of this objective. However, it was not reciprocated equally by the Provisional Government of Russia. Lacking the good will toward the independence of the Ukrainian people, the Provisional Government consented to the autonomy of Ukraine only temporarily and due to its own shaky position at that time. Subsequently, the Russian government took preparatory measures for the abolishment of the autonomous status of Ukraine, thus broke its own agreement. Military actions of the Russian troops subordinated to the Provisional Government against the autonomous Ukrainian State developed in the days of the Bolshevik *coup d'etat* in Petrograd, i.e. November 7-9, 1917. Thus, only the events in Petrograd prevented the Provisional Government from carrying out its objective of total re-occupation of Ukraine.

The new Russian despotic regime of the Bolsheviks, headed by Vladimir Lenin, continued the aggressive policy of the former Russian regimes regarding the Ukrainian people. The Soviet of People's Commissars sent an ultimatum dated December 17, 1917, demanding the government of Ukraine to capitulate, upon refusal of which it developed military aggression against Ukraine. Thus, the newly formed military units of the Ukrainian National Republic had no choice but to defend their country against the Russian massive invasion by the remnants of the Russian Tsarist army and Lenin's new Red Guard units. The Ukrainian National Republic successfully defended its territory alone and without any external aid until the middle of February, 1918, when upon the conclusion of the peace Treaty at Berestya the Ukrainian Central *Rada* secured the military aid of Austria and Germany in the defense of Ukraine against the Soviet Russian aggression. However, the giant part of the burden of the counter-offensive was carried by the Ukrainians and not by their newly acquired allies.

The majority of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* consisted of the Socialist deputies. This majority introduced socio-economic reforms in the country which could be characterized as moderate. But, in the opinion of the contemporary conservative class of the large land-owners and rich industrialists and financiers, these reforms were extremely radical. Therefore, these conservative elements, especially those belonging to the national minorities, organized opposition to the socio-economic policies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the government of Ukraine. This opposition first was carried out by peaceful means, and, after these failed, the *coup d'etat* was resorted to.⁸⁸⁾

The commanding officers of the allied forces stationed in Ukraine after February, 1918, too, were conservatively minded. In their great majority they were of aristocratic or upper class origin. It should be emphasized that especially the German generals who were, at that time, factually also in charge of the Austrian military units vigorously opposed the policies of the moderately socialistic Government of the Ukrainian National Republic. They preferred to deal in Ukraine with representatives of the conservative classes, therefore they preferred to see in Ukraine a government with conservative leanings. Therefore, they actively sided with the local conservative opposition and decided to support it militarily against the established government of Ukraine headed by the leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.⁸⁹⁾

Temporarily, they succeeded.



CHAPTER 3

THE UKRAINIAN STATE UNDER HETMAN PAVLO SKOROPADSKYY

The causes of the coup

The proclamation of the independence of Ukraine and establishment of the parliamentary system of government in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic was accomplished by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* which had an absolute majority of deputies belonging to the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists Revolutionaries. In very close cooperation with the deputies of the Social-Democratic Workers Party, they constituted the so-called "revolutionary democracy" in Ukraine advocating sweeping socio-economic reforms and radical political changes when compared to pre-revolutionary reality under the Russian Tsarist regime. Other Ukrainian political parties supporting the national sovereignty of Ukraine also, advocated the democratic parliamentary system of government. However, they were more moderate in the sphere of socio-economic reforms. It should be stressed that the degree of "radicalism" or "moderation" must be viewed in relation to conditions in 1918 rather than from the point of view of presently prevailing philosophies.

The evaluation of the degree of radicalism, moderation, or conservatism advocated at that time by any political group was measured against the background of the social and political conditions in Ukraine before March, 1917. From that point of view, even the monarchists who advocated parliamentary representation in a constitutional monarchy were regarded to be radical even though they did not support any socio-economic reforms in the country beyond the program of the former Prime Minister of Tsarist Russia, Piotr Stolypin. The political parties represented in the Ukrainian Central *Rada* supported, undoubtedly, a parliamentary republic as a form of government and were all in favor of socio-economic reforms that went beyond Stolypin's program of communal land distribution among the individual villagers. To pay for this communal land Stolypin proposed the creation of a public land bank which would grant mortgages at low interest rates. Thus, there was a visible distinction in the degrees of the extent and the speed of those reforms.⁹⁰⁾

In the existing reality of that time in Ukraine, the basic differences between the political programs of the Ukrainian political

parties belonging to the majority and minority within the Ukrainian Central *Rada* centered on the questions of land reform and the control of big industries.

As it has been indicated, the majority in the Ukrainian Central *Rada* succeeded in passing a land reform law providing for the distribution of large land possessions among the landless villagers, without compensation, limiting the maximum size of a family farm to not more than 30 *desyatynas* of land. The minority parties in the *Rada* advocated land reform under the provision that the former big land owners be compensated for the land taken from them. With regard to the nationalization of industry, even the socialistic majority in the *Rada* was not prepared to carry it out due to the war devastation and existing uncertainty. They limited their program to the nationalization of the railroads and the sugar industry, and otherwise limited their action to the establishment of regulatory agencies over the manufacturing industries with the direct participation of the workers' representatives. Also foreign trade was regulated by the governmental agencies. However, even in these fields of economic activities, war shortage speculation was used as justification rather for introduction of government controls than any socio-economic philosophy or program.

The conservative coup d'état in Ukraine

The political and socio-economic reforms introduced in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the previously dominant conservatively minded social strata. Before the revolution in the former Russian Empire, the economic and political power was concentrated in the hands of the aristocratic landowners, industrialists, rich businessmen, and the conservatively minded intelligentsia. This bloc dominated the pre-revolutionary *Duma* as well as the bodies of local self-government, the *zemstvos* and cities, because election of representatives to these organs of the government was based on property ownership and tax payment.

In the course of the Great Ukrainian National Revolution and the government by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Ukraine, these once dominant classes lost their political power due to the promulgation of an election law based upon the principle of general, equal, direct, secret and proportional representation of all citizens of the Ukrainian National Republic. Due to the removal of property qualifications privileged classes did not succeed in electing a significant number of representatives to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* nor to the

Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. They retained some representation in the governing bodies of the gubernias and cities, but they lost control of these because they found themselves even there in the minority.⁹¹)

The land reform carried out by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* caused the land aristocracy to lose power and prestige along with many privileges possessed before the revolution. Although the manufacturing, finance or commercial big business were not nationalized, the rich owners felt endangered in the near future. Along with the socio-economic causes of the opposition to policies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* the nationality aspect was added. During the Tsarist regime, the dominant industrialists, aristocratic large landowners, bankers and rich business owners were predominantly non-Ukrainians in Ukraine — mostly Russians or Russified Jews and Poles. Thus, they all opposed political and socio-economic programs of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.

After the stabilization of the front between the Ukrainian army and the Russian Bolshevik troops upon arrival of the Austrian and German military units on invitation of the Ukrainian government, the secret opposition against the Ukrainian Central *Rada* turned into a well planned conspiracy to overthrow the government of the parliamentary democracy in Ukraine. Various conservative groups of Ukrainian nationality and national minorities developed common action program culminating in the forcible overthrow of the established Government of the Ukrainian National Republic and the immediate proclamation of a conservative system of government headed by the *Hetman* of Ukraine. Playing on the popular sentiments with regard to the traditional title of the elected military Head of the State in the era of the Ukrainian Cossack State, the conspirators proclaimed the head of the new regime in Ukraine to be the *Hetman*. Thus, they returned to the sentimental traditions of the form of government of the last historically existing independent Ukrainian State.⁹²)

The organized opposition to the policies of the *Rada* among the conservative aristocratic landowners united in the *Ukrayinska Narodna Hromada* (the Ukrainian National Community) but could not focus upon any single person who was to be proclaimed the *Hetman* of Ukraine. First they approached Yevhen Tchykalenko, a well known Ukrainian cultural and political leader who was, in his own right, a rich landowner in Ukraine. Yevhen Tchykalenko personally stood on a moderately democratic position and supported the sovereignty of Ukraine. He refused to cooperate with the conspirators in any way against the authority of the *Rada*. Only thereafter, they turned to General Pavlo Skoropadskyy with the proposal that he become the *Hetman* of Ukraine.⁹³)



Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky

An advantage of Pavlo Skoropadskyy in this effort was the fact that he was an offspring of the second last Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Skoropadskyy, who was a brother of Pavlo's direct line ancestor. Thus, the point of the legitimacy of the succession was of no minor importance in the contact with the Ukrainian people. Also Pavlo Skoropadskyy was well respected by the aristocratic class as well as among the military high command officers as an outstanding front line general of the Russian army in the First World War. Among the Ukrainian army officers, he was well known as an able and ardent organizer of the Ukrainian national military units under the direction of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. Therefore, General Pavlo Skoropadskyy was a successful choice of the opposition. And above all, he consented to head the group.⁹⁴)

The conservatives who planned to overthrow the regime of the *Rada* realized well that they did not command adequate support of the Ukrainian people for the successful *coup d'etat* and must have outside help. From the very beginning of their action, they counted on active help from the conservatively minded commanders of German military units that were stationed in Ukraine on invitation of the *Rada* as allies of the Ukrainian National Republic in defense against the military invasion of the Soviet Russia. And, they succeeded in securing support of German generals against the democratic regime of the *Rada*.⁹⁵)

The German commanding officers stationed in Kyiv developed a negative attitude toward the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic and especially toward the socio-economic policies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* soon after their arrival in the country. The monarchically minded German high ranking officers disliked the socialistic majority in the governing legislative and executive bodies of Ukraine, their new anti-Bolshevik ally. They regarded the socio-economic legislation of the Ukrainian National Republic as extremely leftist radical, and therefore, it was considered impossible to cooperate with the Government of the Republic on a basis of equal alliance.⁹⁶)

The same attitude was shared toward the government of Ukraine by the emperor's government in Berlin facing similar socialistic opposition at home. On the basis of political principles, the Imperial Government of Germany could not possibly support the Socialist dominated government of Ukraine as agreed to in the Treaty of Berestya, while at the same time suppressing the socialistic parties in Germany. The Germans especially disliked the policies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* concerning land reform and foreign trade. Berlin desired to have more or less free bread and other resources from Ukraine rather than to receive them in the course of regular foreign trade exchange. Also the Germans hoped to estab-

lish their dominant influence in Ukrainian industry. However, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic vigorously opposed these tendencies of the German desired relations with Ukraine.⁹⁷⁾ Therefore, the German officials in Berlin and the German military commanding officers in Ukraine were glad to see the development of a secret opposition into an open revolt against the *Rada*. They decided to support the *coup d'etat*.⁹⁸⁾

Both interested parties in the *coup d'etat* established cooperative contacts and agreed that after the overthrow of the existing government of Ukraine the newly established regime would formally maintain sovereignty of the Ukrainian State and Germany would formally respect this sovereignty in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Berestya. Both contracting parties agreed, in principle, that the socio-economic policy of the new regime would reverse the existing trend and return to the policies of traditional conservatism which would influence also the internal conditions in Germany in that it might discourage radical Socialist activities there. In international relations, the regime of the Hetman would manifest its friendship with Germany. Since the German official circles did not trust the broad masses of the Ukrainian people, they insisted that the new regime not organize an independent Ukrainian army.⁹⁹⁾

In order to achieve their objectives at the lowest possible cost, the Austrian and German ambassadors in Kyiv decided to try to convince the leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to change its socio-economic policies to a more conservative direction. To that effect, they presented their demands in conversation with the President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, and the Prime Minister of the government of Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovych, on April 24, 1918, a few days before the planned date of the *coup d'etat*. The government of Ukraine rejected these demands as an interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic. Thereafter, the Germans finally decided to overthrow the regime of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* but in such a way that it would appear externally as if it would be a *domestic coup d'etat*. Therefore, they found the conservative elements in Ukraine very convenient to be used for their own objectives.¹⁰⁰⁾

After the failure in conversation with the government officials, the very same day the Chief of Staff of the German Command in Kyiv, Gen. Groener, arranged for a meeting with General Pavlo Skoropadskyy in which they agreed upon the basic conditions under which the Germans agreed to cooperate with the future Hetman after the overthrow of the parliamentary democratic government of Ukraine.¹⁰¹⁾ In the meantime, the commander of the German military forces in Ukraine issued an order directed to the people

of Ukraine, over the head of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic, instructing them to start immediately the spring farming works also on the great latifundia. This order was purposely issued in order to antagonize the Ukrainian government, expecting that the leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* would not tolerate this intrusion in the internal affairs of the country without protest. The Ukrainian government protested vigorously, and the conflict between the Ukrainian authorities and the Germans was intensified.¹⁰²⁾

The Government of the Ukrainian National Republic rejected another attempt of the German military command to deal with the internal Ukrainian affairs. The Germans insisted now that due to the revolutionary war activities in the country, all accused of violence against the German military units or personnel on the territory of Ukraine should be tried by the German military tribunals. The government of Ukraine rejected this demand of the German military authorities insisting that the citizens of the Ukrainian National Republic were subject solely to Ukrainian jurisdiction in every respect, including the judiciary.¹⁰³⁾

Thereafter, the Germans decided to act against the government of Ukraine openly in order to spread fear among the people of Ukraine. While the local forces to overthrow the government were making their last arrangements for action, the German command sent military units to the plenary session of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to arrest there on the spot the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovych, and the Minister of Defense, Colonel Olexander Zhukivskyy, over the protest of President Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy.¹⁰⁴⁾ After the overthrow of the democratic regime of the Ukrainian National Republic, both arrested were tried by the German military tribunal for their activities against the collaborators with the Germans, and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Under these circumstances, on April 29, 1918, assembled the representatives of the large landowners in Kyiv and proclaimed General Pavlo Skoropadskyy as the *Hetman* of Ukraine. The former officers of the Russian army who did not join the Ukrainian army gave immediate support to the *Hetman*, while the German embassy in Kyiv extended German recognition to the newly proclaimed regime the very next day and offered general support. The factua seizure of power occured within the following three days after the several times stronger and much better equipped German military forces disarmed Ukrainian military units in Kyiv loyal to the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic. Thereafter, the unit of the Ukrainian army in the rest of the country subordinate themselves to the newly installed *Hetman* of Ukraine.¹⁰⁵⁾


Provisional regime of the Hetman

The foundations of the newly established governmental system were proclaimed by P. Skoropadskyy, the *Hetman* of Ukraine, in *Hramota do vsyoho Ukrayinskoho Narodu* (Proclamation to the entire Ukrainian People) dated April 29, 1918. This was a festive proclamation of the replacement of the hitherto existing regime of the Republic by the system of the traditional Hetmanate.¹⁰⁶

The *Hramota* attempted to justify the necessity of the *coup d'état* in order to eliminate anarchistic tendencies in the country as well as to restore a better socio-economic system. The Council of the Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic allegedly had proven unable to maintain order in the country or to secure proper development of the economy of the country. Thus, Pavlo Skoropadskyy honored invitation of "the working masses" and agreed to take over all governmental powers in the country in the capacity of the *Hetman* of Ukraine. The sole signer of the *Hramota*, Pavlo Skoropadskyy, thus proclaimed himself the *Hetman* of Ukraine.

Some observations are to be made concerning the basic principles expressed in the *Hramota*. First of all, the change is proclaimed in the structure of the supreme authorities of the Ukrainian State through the dissolution of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the elimination of the Council of Ministers of the U.N.R. All other bodies of the previously established central administration were retained in existence. Secondly, there is no mention in the *Hramota* about removal of the principle of the sovereignty of the people; neither is there any mention in its text about the abolition of the republican form of government in Ukraine. To the contrary, according to the text of this document, the primary aim of the change in the regime of Ukraine was the preservation of the existing Ukrainian State and maintaining order in it. Therefore, it could be interpreted that the *Hramota*, in principle, continued the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic only it temporarily changed the government and the directions of the socio-economic policies.

It is true that neither the *Hramota* nor the attached additional legal documents explicitly recognized the continuation of the constitutionally established title of the State, the Ukrainian National Republic. Rather they adhere to the use of the technical and unqualifying term *Ukrayinska Derzhava* (the Ukrainian State) which was used in the early stages of the national revolution by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, too. But, neither do these documents explicitly establish any change in the name of the State. However, the provisions of the *Hramota* declaring that only the legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* limiting private ownership, especially that of land,



Hetman's palace in Kyiv

was nullified while leaving other legislation unmentioned, might be construed as a sort of manifestation of the continuation of the previously existing Ukrainian State. Only the declaration concerning the restoration of free trade and the promise to carry out a new land reform based upon the principle of private ownership of property were the exceptions.

The fundamental significance of the text of the *Hramota* is that it proclaimed the new regime of the *Hetmanate* to be provisional because the permanent constitutional system of the government would be determined by a newly elected Ukrainian parliament. Therefore, one might characterize the newly established regime headed by General Skoropadskyy as a temporary dictatorship. The *Hetman* of Ukraine, as a sole ruler, was to govern the country with the aid of the Council of Ministers responsible solely to him in accordance with the temporary laws issued along with the text of the *Hramota*.¹⁰⁷)

Foundations of the provisional constitution

Along with the text of the *Hramota* were published basic laws of the country regulating the provisional foundations of the newly introduced governmental system in Ukraine. Besides the *Hetman*, the acts were signed by the *Otaman* of the Council of Ministers, Mykola Sakhno-Ustymovych.*)

The fundamental law was published as *Zakon pro tymchasovyy ustriy Ukrainy* (The Act Concerning the Temporary System of Government in Ukraine). This Act declared in its preamble explicitly that the provisions of the Act concerning the governmental system in Ukraine were provisional and were valid only until the new Diet of Ukraine could be elected and begin its legislative activities. Therefore, the *Hetmanate* itself was proclaimed as a provisional institution in Ukraine.¹⁰⁸)


The body of the Act is divided into seven parts which are subdivided into 44 successive paragraphs. The seven parts of the Act are: 1. On the authority of the *Hetman*; 2. On religion; 3. The rights and duties of the Ukrainian Cossacks and citizens; 4. About laws; 5. On the Council of Ministers; 6. About the Financial Council; and 7. About the Supreme Court.

According to this provisional Constitutional Act, all legislative and executive powers in the Ukrainian State were vested in the *Hetman* of Ukraine. The process of law making was carried out by the Council of Ministers appointed by and responsible to the *Hetman* in that proposed legal measures by this body were to be approved by the *Hetman*. The *Hetman* exercised his executive powers through the Council of Ministers whose members served at the pleasure of the *Hetman*. The *Hetman* was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian army and the Navy as well as the supreme director of the foreign affairs of the country. He solely was authorized to proclaim a state of emergency, as well as, a state of war for the country which would institute limitations of personal and civil liberties. The right to grant amnesty as well as the establishment of extraordinary judicial processes belonged solely to the *Hetman*. However, all orders and regulations issued by the *Hetman* were to be countersigned by the *Otaman* of the Council of Ministers or the responsible Minister.

Civil liberties were not specifically codified in the Act, except for religion. The Act declared the predominance of the Orthodox Christian religion, while it guaranteed freedom of belief and services

*) The title **Otaman** for the Prime Minister later was not upheld.

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Fedir Lyzohub
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to all other religions. Other liberties were not mentioned in the Act itself; however, they were guaranteed in connection with passing other legislation. To the group of such liberties belong the guarantee of the freedom of individual, the inviolability of the residence, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and associations. The Act explicitly guaranteed the right of private ownership of property, part of which could be nationalized only on the basis of adequate compensation. The citizens of Ukraine were guaranteed freedom of domicile and foreign travel. In this part of the *Hetman's* legislation was visible the change toward conservatism relative to the policies of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.

The Act explicitly emphasized the principle of the rule of law in the country, meaning: the agencies of the government as well as the citizens and foreigners in the country were obliged to act within the limits of the law. No legal norm had legal validity unless it had been properly promulgated, and the existing legal norms could be nullified only through proper promulgation of a new law. The bill drafts were prepared by the responsible minister and they were acted upon by the Council of Ministers. The bills approved by the Council of Ministers became laws of the country after they had been approved by the *Hetman* and properly published.

The executive powers of the government were exercised by the *Hetman* through delegation to the Ministers headed by the *Otaman* of the Council of Ministers. The individual ministers were responsible to the *Hetman* who solely had the power to appoint and to relieve them of their posts. The Act envisaged that a special law would regulate the criminal responsibilities of the ministers for actions in their official capacity. A special Financial Council, consisting of the *Otaman* of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Finance, the State Comptroller, and additional members appointed by the *Hetman* was established for the conduct of the financial affairs of the country, including the regulation of the national debt and fiscal and monetary policies.

The *Hramota* fundamentally retained the constitutional provisions of the Ukrainian National Republic regarding the judiciary with the modification that the members of the Supreme Court (later called the State Senate) were to be appointed by the *Hetman*. Otherwise, it should be observed that the *Hramota* used separate terms "the Cossacks" and "the citizens" rather than simply "the citizens." However, no distinction in the rights, of these two groups was mentioned in the document. Neither is there any definition of these terms. It might be assumed that the regime intended to regulate the legal differences between these two categories of the society.

Brief evaluation of the new regime

Obviously, from the point of view of the valid provisions of the Constitutional Charter of the Ukrainian National Republic, the *coup d'etat* and the establishment of the new regime in Ukraine was illegal. It is true, however, that the regime of the *Hetman* respected, in principle, the sovereignty of the people and promised to provide opportunity to the sovereign people of Ukraine to express their will regarding the permanent system of government in the Ukrainian State.

Should this promise in the *Hramota* have been respected by the *Hetman* and the elections of the representatives to the new Ukrainian Constituent Assembly have been held, the basis for legalization of the new regime in some sort of constitutional form would have been established. However, the *Hetman* failed to order elections of people's representatives to such an Assembly to the very end of the existence of his regime. Therefore, in reality it was a regime based upon the rule of force rather than the proclaimed principle of the rule of law.

Other basic legislation of the Hetman regime

Besides the basic fundamental law provisions of April 29, 1918, the *Hetman* of Ukraine, Pavlo Skoropadskyy, promulgated several other legal acts regulating the fundamental issues of the transfer of power in the Ukrainian State, the Regency powers, the legal regulations of the election process, etc. It is in order here to mention the basic provisions of at least some of these legal acts of the regime.

Among the most significant legal regulations of the *Hetman* regime was the *Tymchasovyy zakon pro verkhovne upravlinnya derzhavoyu* (The Provisional Act Concerning the Supreme Governing of the State) promulgated on August 1, 1918. According to the provisions of the *Zakon*, in case of the death or disability of the *Hetman* to perform his supreme governing functions, these powers would be temporarily exercised by the special College of the Supreme Regents consisting of three members. The Head of this Collegium was appointed at the time of the promulgation of the *Zakon* and the person's name was kept secret in a properly sealed and guarded envelope. The other two members of the College would be elected by secret ballot, one by the Supreme Court and one by the Council of Ministers. In case of the *Hetman's* temporary absence from the territory of Ukraine, temporary governing powers were to be carried out by a three member College of the Supreme Regents, with the difference that the *Hetman* should appoint the Head of the College without the provision of secrecy. The other two members would be elected as explained above.¹⁰⁹⁾

The law of July 8, 1918, changed some provisions in the legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* of December 2, 1917, concerning the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Ukrainian language terminology of the *Rada*, *Heneralnyy Sud* which remained in use under the new regime until that date was changed to *Derzhavnyy Senat* (the State Senate) and the title *Heneralnyy Suddya* (the Supreme Justice) was changed to the *Senator*. The Supreme Justices were to be appointed by the *Hetman* alone.¹¹⁰⁾

The legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* regulating the citizenship of the country was changed by the *Hetman* Act of July 2, 1918. There were no essential changes made in the existing provisions except for additional clarifications. Although the *Hramota* of April 29, 1918, mentioned the Cossacks and the citizens, this Act provided regulations with regard to single category of citizenship without any additional specifications of the differences between the two separately mentioned strata in the *Hramota*. However, a special Act of October 16, 1918, proclaimed the restoration of the Cossack social class, consisting of the offsprings of the erstwhile free Ukrain-



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ian Cossacks. They were to serve in special military units of the Ukrainian armed forces. Otherwise, they were granted no special privileges relative to the other citizens of the country.¹¹¹⁾

The election law of the bodies of local self-government promulgated by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was modified by the *Hetman* regime in that the principle of equal voting rights was substituted by provision of voting depending upon the size of the tax payment of the citizen. Due to this legislation, the character of the local self-government bodies changed in that the financially privileged classes were restored to power in these agencies.

Relations of the Hetman regime with Germany

The basic principles of the relations between the Ukrainian National Republic and the governments of the Austro-Hungarian and German monarchies were outlined in the concluded treaties between these sovereign countries. The most important of these was the Treaty of Berestya signed on February 9, 1918, as a peace treaty. Along with the signing of this treaty, a secret protocol was signed between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy concerning the establishment of an autonomous

Ukrainian Land within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the nearest possible future.¹¹²) The Ukrainian government concluded with Austria-Hungary and Germany another treaty with regard to military aid from the latter countries to the Ukrainian National Republic in her defensive war against the Soviet Russian invasion. This treaty provided explicitly that the military units of the two monarchies would be withdrawn from the territories of Ukraine at any time at the request of the government of Ukraine.¹¹³)

Thus, the Ukrainian relations with the Central Powers were normalized during the Ukrainian Central *Rada* rule on the principles of respecting mutual sovereignty. Otherwise, the Ukrainian National Republic took the position of neutrality as far as further conduct of the world war was concerned. There was a significant difference in Ukraine's relations to the Central Powers and the Powers of the Entente. Also the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic established diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany, while after the Peace Treaty in Berestya such relations were not established with the Powers of the Entente, because of the negative attitude of the latter.

Due to the temporary presence of the German and Austrian military forces in Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic was not in any position to establish diplomatic relations with France or Great Britain because the latter Powers were still in the state of war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Besides, the Powers of the Entente did not recognize, at that time, the Peace Treaty of Berestya between Ukraine and the Central Powers, nor that between Soviet Russia and these Powers.

However, the signing of a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers was not identical with the solidarity of the Ukrainian government in regard to the continuation of the war of Austria-Hungary and Germany against England, France, the United States, etc. This position of the leaders of the *Rada* was well known to the governmental authorities in Berlin and Vienna, and it gave one more reason for German dissatisfaction with the policies of the government of Ukraine. Therefore, they desired change.

Formally, the treaties concluded by the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic with the Central Powers were not abrogated after the *coup d'etat*, thus they remained valid under the *Hetman* regime. The Ukrainian State continued its neutrality as far as the war was concerned. However, secretly the Germans pressurized the *Hetman* regime to declare that while Ukraine remained neutral in war hostilities, her neutrality was of a friendly nature toward the Central Powers. And the *Hetman* yielded to this pressure.

The external manifestation of the new policy of the friendly neutrality was the state visit of the *Hetman* of Ukraine to Berlin on

September 4, 1918. The Emperor of Germany, Wilhelm II, and his government received the *Hetman* with the highest honors given only to the heads of the great powers. However, this state visit proved to be of a greater disadvantage than advantage to Ukraine. The diplomats of the Powers of the Western Entente in November, 1918 utilized this move against Ukraine in their negotiations not only with the representatives of the *Hetman* regime but also later with the envoys of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic which replaced the regime of the *Hetman* in the second half of November, 1918.¹¹⁴⁾ Unfortunately for the Ukrainian people, the victorious powers had not forgotten the policies of the *Hetman* regime when the fate of Ukraine was to be decided at the Paris Peace Conference. The efforts of the Directorate did not succeed in securing friendly support for the defense of Ukraine against the second war of Soviet Russia.

The peace negotiations with Soviet Russia

According to the provisions of the Treaty of Berestya signed on March 3, 1918, between the Central Powers and the Soviet government of Russia, Soviet Russia agreed to withdraw her military forces immediately from the territories of the Ukrainian National Republic and to conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Berestya.¹¹⁵⁾ How did the Soviet Russian Government treat this obligation?

First of all, in order to create an appearance of satisfying the obligation of the first provision, the Russian Bolshevik troops which invaded Ukraine were simply proclaimed to be military units of the newly installed Soviet government of Ukraine. This puppet group of the Russian Bolsheviks until that time had no military units of its own at all. Secretly again, the Russian *Sovnarkom* sent additional military forces into Ukraine in order to continue war against the sovereign Ukrainian State. However, the military units of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, with the aid of the allies, forced the armed forces of the Soviet Russia to leave the territory of Ukraine. But the Russian Bolshevik government, headed by Vladimir Lenin, did not abandon their policy of domination over Ukraine and at the nearest best opportunity they ordered a new invasion of Ukraine.¹¹⁶⁾

As far as the treaty provision regarding the obligation or the Russian *Sovnarkom* to conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine was concerned, Lenin's representatives adopted a tactic of postponement of the beginning of the negotiations, hoping that the Communist revolution would spread to the countries of all of Europe.

Its victory would eliminate the necessity of signing a peace treaty with Ukraine. First of all, the Russian *Sovnarkom* protracted negotiations with the Ukrainian government concerning the place of the peace negotiations.¹¹⁷) Finally, on April 14, 1918, the preliminary negotiators of Soviet Russia agreed to start the peace talks in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. However, the arrival of the Soviet Russian delegation was again delayed until May 10, 1918, thus until after the *coup d'état* in Ukraine and the establishment of the *Hetmanate*.¹¹⁸)

The Ukrainian delegation to negotiate the peace treaty was headed by Serhiy Shelukhyn, who served first as Minister of Justice and later as the Justice of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian National Republic and was reaffirmed in the last position also by the *Hetman*, and Ihor Kistyakovskyy as the Vice Chairman. The Soviet Russian delegation was headed by Khristian Rakovsky, formerly an obscure member of the Rumanian parliament who until his arrival in Kyiv never lived in Russia or Ukraine. His deputy was Dmytro Manuilskyy who was one of the foremost leaders of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks and belonged to that dozen party members who did not deny their Ukrainian nationality. Also the secretary of the Russian Soviet delegation, Petro Zaytsev, was a Bolshevik of Ukrainian nationality. Otherwise, the delegation was assisted by numerous experts in economic and international law affairs. However, Khristian Rakovsky enjoyed Lenin's unquestionable confidence and he alone made all the decisions of the delegation.

At the very beginning of the peace talks, the two delegations agreed upon the public conduct of their work. The concept of public negotiations of the peace treaties was initiated in that time by President of the United States Woodrow Wilson, and it soon became very popular in some international circles. The public character of the negotiations backfired at the attempt of the Soviet Russian delegation to protract negotiations indefinitely because public opinion, even among the Bolshevik sympathizers, reminded the negotiators of the very popular Russian Bolshevik slogan demanding "immediate peace without annexations or reparations."

Thus, under the pressure of public opinion, the Soviet Russian delegation was forced to abandon its delaying tactics in the work of the negotiations, and finally on June 12, 1918, the two delegations signed a preliminary peace treaty on behalf of Ukraine and Russia. Relevant parts of the text of this treaty read as follows:

The plenipotentiary representatives of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Khristian Yuriyevich Rakovsky and Dmytro Zakhariyevich Manuilsky, for the one part, and the plenipotentiaries of the Ukrainian State, the head of the



•
Serhiy Shelukhyn
•

Ukrainian Peace Delegation — Justice Serhiy Pavlovych Shelukhyn, the deputy head of the Delegation — State Secretary Ihor Oleksandrovych Kistyakovskyy... for the other part have met in the city of Kyiv for the purpose of peace negotiations on behalf of the two sovereign countries and as result of these talks they accepted on June 12, 1918, the following temporary but, for the durable peace, definitely binding provisions for the duration of continuing peace negotiations:

“1. Both contracting parties agree to cease military activities on the front for the duration of the peace negotiations between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian State. Everywhere where the military hostilities did not cease yet, they shall be ceased immediately on the basis of mutual agreements of the local commanding officers.

2. The Governments of the RSFSR and of the Ukrainian State agree not to interfere in any way with the freedom of travel, if possible without interchange, of the citizens of the opposite contracting country in their repatriation process, i.e. freedom to return of the Russian citizens to Russia and the citizens of Ukraine to Ukraine with their personal property, except for the consumer goods, but including stocks and obligations and precious stones and metals and the currency not exceeding the sum of 10,000 rubles per head of the family and additional

sum of 2,000 rubles per each additional member of the family. Transport of currency over the sum of 20,000 rubles with the maximum limit of 100,000 rubles is agreeable under conditions that the Ukrainian authorities will inform the Soviet Russian authorities about the extent of the transported sum of money...

3. a) Both contracting parties shall take necessary measures for the restoration of the mutual use and exchange of the railroad equipment in accordance with the provisions regulating this aspect of the activities of the Russian railroads before November 7, 1917.

[Subparagraphs b), c), d) and e) dealt with the details concerning the railroad properties].

4. The Governments of both contracting parties agree to establish consular relations for the mutual guarding of the interests of their citizens through the exchange of the consuls of the Ukrainian State and the consular commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

5. The agencies of the Russian and the Ukrainian Red Cross shall take immediately measures for speedier return of the prisoners of war citizens of both countries and for providing to them aid on their journeys to their homelands.

6. Both contracting parties take upon themselves obligation of simultaneous arrangement of the cease fire for the duration of the peace negotiations necessary for the earliest possible restoration of peaceful trade exchange in mutually needed products. In order to facilitate a speedy arrangement of the trade relations, a mixed commission based on equal representation shall meet within one week after signing this agreement...

Both Governments shall commence, immediately, negotiations concerning the final text of the peace treaty."¹¹⁹⁾

The treaty was proclaimed as going into force immediately. Soon thereafter, on the basis of the provisions of this treaty, an exchange of the consular representatives between Ukraine and Russia was carried out as well as the passenger travel across the boundaries of the two countries restored.¹²⁰⁾

As indicated above, the basic questions concerning the mutual relations between the Ukrainian State and Soviet Russia were included into this preliminary peace treaty with the provision of their permanent validity as far as the two contracting parties were concerned. Thus, only a few problems remained to be clarified and incorporated into the final draft of the peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia. As a matter of fact, the remaining open questions were of secondary importance with the sole exception of the delineation of the details of the boundaries between the two contracting states.

Other questions subject to further negotiations were the settlement of the property rights of the former Russian Empire and the problem of the Ukrainian compact settlements in Siberia and the Far East. However, it is to be stressed once more that the treaty signed on June 12, 1918, remained in full force as far as the contracting powers were concerned.¹²¹⁾

However, due to the delaying tactics of the Soviet Russian delegation, the negotiations were protracted and the final draft of the permanent peace treaty was never signed.¹²²⁾ The main reason for the inability to reach an agreement apparently was the Ukrainian insistence upon the full respect for the ethnic principles in the establishment of the Ukrainian-Russian boundary. In reality, the Soviet Russian revolutionary forces hoped for radical changes in the political structure of the European countries which would give them the opportunity to move on their conquests.

In actuality, the political situation in Western Europe was changing. First of all, signs were noticeable that not in the too distant future Germany would be forced to capitulate before the military might of the Entente Powers and would have to withdraw her military forces from the countries of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine. In the calculations of the Russian Communist leaders, the capitulation of Germany and Austria-Hungary would provide ample opportunity for the Communist revolutionary activities, with some degree of probability for success.

Therefore, on October 7, 1918, the head of the Soviet Russian Peace Delegation returned allegedly for further instructions to Moscow where the bodies of the Soviet state and Communist Party were moved from Petrograd in March, 1918. The Soviet Russian chief negotiator remained absent for several weeks and the negotiations in his absence were deactivated. Finally, the new Bolshevik rulers of Russia decided to seize once more the opportunity to subjugate Ukraine by force. On November 3, 1918, Lenin recalled the remaining members of his peace delegation from Kyiv without making any declaration to the effect of the breaking-off the peace talks with the delegation of Ukraine.¹²³⁾ But, the preliminary peace treaty of June 12, 1918, remained in force and the Russian consular mission in Ukraine as well as the Ukrainian consular missions in Soviet Russia remained formally unaffected.

However, the historical events occurring in the countries of Western Europe effected definitely the further developments in the countries of Eastern Europe. The end of World War I was approaching rapidly after the capitulation of the Imperial Government of Germany and the establishment of a new republican form of government on November 11, 1918. An entirely new situation was created in Europe, and in Ukraine, too.

Socio-economic policies of the Hetman regime

The land reform legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was declared null and void by the *Hramota* of April 29, 1918, issued by *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadskyy.

This regime restored then the principle of unlimited right of land ownership regardless of the land quantity or quality. The *Hramota* promised to carry out a different kind of land reform from the one legislated by the *Rada* but the regime of *Hetman* failed to fulfill this promise. Limited legislation of June 14, 1918, however was passed which regulated the acquisition of land in Ukraine by sale. The law created a State Land Bank with the power of buying land and selling it to the individual owners or associations. The only limitation established was in regard to a maximum of 25 *desyatynas* which the Bank was authorized to sell to any single individual land buyer. Otherwise, little was done in this respect.¹²⁴⁾

Other legislation dealing with the socio-economic problems of the country touched upon the normalization of the manufacturing, trade, credit and banking as well as the educational system. However, most of this legislation was of a provisional nature and concentrated on the liquidation of damages inflicted upon the Ukrainian economy by the war. Basically, the entire policy of the *Hetman* regime tended to redirect Ukraine to the pre-revolutionary socio-economic order.¹²⁵⁾

In summary, it should be emphasized that *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadskyy ruled the Ukrainian State from April 29, 1918, until November 14, 1918. The basis for his rule was his own arbitrarily issued *Hramota* of April 29, 1918, the provisions of which were never legalized, in any form, by the Ukrainian people. Even though the *Hramota* promised elections of the representatives to a new Ukrainian Parliament, such elections, which could have legalized Skoropadskyy's regime, were never held.

However, it should be emphasized that during the period of governing, the *Hetman* carefully respected two basic principles of the juridico-administrative foundations of the Ukrainian State inherited from the previous regime. First, formally and factually he supported the principle of full sovereignty of the Ukrainian State. And, second, formally he respected the principle of the sovereignty of the people of Ukraine regarding the determination of the permanent system of government in the Ukrainian State.

All governing activities of the *Hetman* regime were based upon these two fundamental principles, and the very establishment of the institution of *Hetman* and the course of his regime was proclaimed by the *Hramota* as provisional in nature. The permanent constitution of the Ukrainian State was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people.

CHAPTER 4
**THE CAUSE OF THE UPRISING
AGAINST THE HETMAN**

Pressure of the Ukrainian Democrats on the Hetman

After the successful *coup d'etat* at the end of April of 1918, the self-proclaimed *Hetman* of Ukraine, General Pavlo Skoropadsky, appointed to his Council of Ministers persons acceptable to his supporters in the overthrow of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic responsible to the *Rada*. All his ministers were of conservative thinking. Some of them could be even regarded as the most rightist reactionaries. This could be best seen from the type of legislation they passed for the approval of the *Hetman*. Virtually all legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* concerning the socio-economic affairs of the country was nullified by the *Hetman* regime. This is especially true with regard to the most important Land Reform Act of January 30, 1918.

Before the revolution of March 1917, General Pavlo Skoropadsky was not active in the Ukrainian national movement at all. He did not maintain any contacts even with the conservative groups of the Ukrainians striving toward the autonomy of Ukraine.¹²⁶) Obviously, after he became the head of the Ukrainian State, he appointed to his cabinet persons with similar past. When one adds the fact that he appointed to his cabinet a disproportionately large number of Russians as Ministers of the Ukrainian State, the reason for the great disappointment among the nationally minded Ukrainians is obvious. More so since many Russians were appointed also to various other decision-making administrative positions.¹²⁷)

Not only the political forces dominating the Ukrainian Central *Rada* opposed these policies of the *Hetman*, but also the moderately minded Ukrainian democrats who had not been too happy with some policies of the *Rada* were now very much disappointed. Thus, the regime of the *Hetman* faced, from the very beginning, a strong current of opposition among political leaders commanding the popular majority in the country.

One should bear in mind that this was the period of strong anti-monarchistic trends throughout Eastern Europe. Therefore, no political system which intended to get popular support could afford to stick to the basically pre-revolutionary foundations of govern-

mental and economic systems. The Ukrainians who succeeded in restoring their national sovereignty after centuries of foreign oppression were especially sensitive as to the nationality of the *Hetman's* appointees. They certainly did not want to be ruled by the Russians in the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian character of which they were willing zealously to defend. Therefore, the personal composition of the *Hetman* appointed government disappointed not only the ardent Ukrainian anti-monarchists but also those Ukrainian patriots who cultivated traditions of the *Hetman* system of government in the past Ukrainian Cossack State.

These disappointed Ukrainian nationally minded political activists organized themselves into the *Ukrayinskyy Natsionalno-Derzhavnyy Soyuz*, (The Union for the Ukrainian Sovereignty). The co-founders of *Soyuz* were the national democratic political parties and the Ukrainian trade unions.¹²⁸⁾ In this first stage of organization, it must be noted, that all democratic parties and trade organizations, except the Socialist parties and the trade unions dominated by them, contributed to the establishment of this *Soyuz*.¹²⁹⁾ Their early disappointment with the *Hetmanate* regime is signified by the fact that *Soyuz* was organized on May 19, 1918, i.e. 3 weeks after the establishment of the *Hetman*. The objectives of the *Soyuz* were formulated in its memorandum of May 24, 1918, presented to the *Hetman* demanding a complete change in the governmental policies based upon the principles of national democracy and, above all, the replacement of the Russian and pro-Russian members of the government by Ukrainian nationally minded moderate democrats.

In the middle of August, 1918, the *Soyuz* was strengthened when its ranks were joined by the strongest single political party in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and the second largest, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker's Party. As has been mentioned, these two political parties constituted the dominating majority in the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the government of Ukraine before the *Hetman's coup d'etat*, and in the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Through the joining of these political parties, the membership in the *Soyuz* gained such prominent Ukrainian political and cultural personalities as Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Mykyta Shapoval, Fedir Shvets, and other members of the overthrown government of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.¹³⁰⁾

Thus, the popular support and the prestige of the *Soyuz* was considerably enhanced because it consolidated now within its ranks almost all Ukrainian national political forces which were united previously in the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. The *Soyuz* now could rightfully claim to be the true representative of the will of the Ukrainian people since the member parties commanded the overwhelming

majority in the elections of representatives to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Accordingly, in its newly rewritten constitution the name of the organization was changed to the *Ukrayinsky Natsionalnyy Soyuz* (The Ukrainian National Union).¹³¹⁾

The objectives of the *Ukrayinskyy Natsionalnyy Soyuz* were defined in its constitution as: "a) the establishment of a strong sovereign Ukrainian State; b) the restoration of the legal government of Ukraine responsible to the Parliament; c) the struggle for the restoration of the democratic election law providing for the free, secret, direct, equal and proportional representation to all bodies of the government; and d) the defense of the rights of the Ukrainian people and of the Ukrainian State in international relations."¹³²⁾

To the post of the president of the *Ukrayinskyy Natsionalnyy Soyuz* was elected And. Nikovskyy, one of the prominent leaders of the *Ukrayinska Partiya Sotsyialistiv-Federalistiv** (The Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Federalists). At that time, this particular political party attracted the cream of the Ukrainian intellectuals as its members. However, after a short time, on September 18, 1918, Nikovskyy resigned from his post in favor of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats and former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic. A. Nikovskyy, Prof. Fedir Shvets, and Mykyta Shapoval were elected Vice-Presidents of the *Soyuz*, and Petro Didushok as Secretary.

The newly elected Secretary of the *Soyuz*, Petro Didushok, was a Ukrainian from Galicia which still was a part of Austria-Hungary. However, he represented in the *Soyuz* a sizeable group of Ukrainians from Galicia and Bukovyna who resided, at that time, in Kyiv and were organized in the *Halytsko-Bukovynska Rada* (The Council of the Ukrainians from Galicia and Bukovyna) which joined the membership in the *Soyuz*. They strongly supported the struggle for the Ukrainian State based on ethnic principles which would integrate all Ukrainian ethnic territories, including the Ukrainian provinces still under Austro-Hungarian rule.¹³³⁾

The new leadership of the *Soyuz* immediately developed vigorous political activities first in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and later in the provincial capitals, as well as other cities and in the

*) The term "Federalist" in the name of the party referred to the federal structure of the Ukrainian State rather than its federation with some other national state, i.e. Russia, etc. The party program advocated a federal union of the various autonomously governed *Zemlyas* (provinces) of Ukraine, similarly to the federation of the several states in the United States of America. In that time the socio-economic program of the party was similar to the Great Society program of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

country. Branches of the *Soyuz* were organized and popular support gained. Assured of popular support, the *Soyuz* presented its new demands to the *Hetman* concerning the removal of the anti-democratic and pro-Russian members of the government and the appointment of individuals enjoying popular support.

For a while it appeared as if the *Hetman* was inclined to accept proposals of the *Soyuz* and to initiate changes in policies and tactics. Apparently, at that time he understood what was going on in international affairs. These developments have clearly indicated the existing general tendencies toward the establishment of the democratic systems of government of national unity in various countries of Europe. Therefore, the situation in Ukraine could not be so terribly different.

The historic event of the capitulation of Bulgaria before the Powers of the Entente on September 29, 1918, forced soon Turkey to do the same within a short time. Capitulation of Bulgaria and Turkey opened the road for the forces of the Entente into Hungary. This fact, in turn, forced Austria-Hungary to seek peace with the Entente Powers and save what could be saved. In this situation, Germany had no choice but to follow the example of Austria-Hungary. Thus, the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary was obvious.¹³⁴⁾

These developments on the European scene created an entirely new situation in Ukraine. While the position of the Germans in Ukraine weakened rapidly, the danger of the repetition of the Soviet Russian invasion into Ukraine suddenly became a real possibility. The well disciplined German military units in Ukraine served as a real deterrent to the Bolshevik attempt to occupy Ukraine. Now, in the new situation, the deterrent was disappearing from the scene. Therefore, Soviet Russia now felt free to ignore provisions of the Treaty of Berestya as well as those of the preliminary peace treaty with Ukraine signed in Kyiv on June 12, 1918.

Meeting the demands for unity of all Ukrainians in order to succeed in defense of their national existence, the *Hetman* granted an audience on October 3, 1918, to the delegation of the *Soyuz* consisting of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Fedir Shvets, and Andriy Nikovskyy. Pointing to the dangers from the Russian reactionary forces as well as from the Bolsheviks, the delegation insisted upon reconstruction of the existing government on the basis of national unity with the restoration of democratic processes and liberties. According to the communiqué published after the visit, the *Hetman* agreed with the delegation in all basic points of their proposals. Therefore, the negotiations concerning reorganization of the cabinet were to start in the nearest future with Prime Minister Fedir Lyzohub.¹³⁵⁾

Opposite Russian counter pressure on the Hetman

However, the *Hetman* was subject to pressure also from the opposite side simultaneously. First of all, the forces controlling the existing government of Ukraine defended their vested interests. At the same time, a strong pressure was exercised upon the *Hetman* by the representatives of a very disciplined group of Russian political refugees who, escaping from the Bolshevik terror in Russia, found opportunities in the Ukrainian State under the protection of the *Hetman* and the monarchistic German military commanding officers. These Russians used their influence in order to persuade the *Hetman* to disregard the demands of the Ukrainian national forces. They wanted the *Hetman* to unite with the forces of General Anton I. Denikin for the restoration of the Tsardom in the Russian Empire which would, of course, include Ukraine.¹³⁶⁾

The Russian monarchists had a strong influence especially on Prime Minister Fedir Lyzohub who was charged by the *Hetman* to negotiate with the representatives of the *Ukrayinskyy Natsionalnyy Soyuz* concerning reconstruction of the government. While Lyzohub protracted negotiations for over two weeks, the members of his cabinet who were in favor of the restoration of the dismembered Russian Empire decided to place the *Hetman* himself before an accomplished fact. On October 17, 1918, ten members of the *Hetman* Government published a statement of their policy which they pledged to defend by all means. The statement of the majority of the members of the government, as published in the newspapers of Kyiv, was the following:

On the eve of the Peace Conference, Ukraine is obliged to fulfill a great mission. For the sake of the future, Ukraine has an obligation to come to the Peace Conference with a clearly formulated program of her relations with the other countries. In the first place, it is necessary to clarify immediately the relations of Ukraine with all newly established independent states after the dismemberment of Russia, and especially with Great Russia herself. There are two approaches that could be followed in this matter: either to develop and strengthen the Ukrainian State by taking advantage of the difficulties and chaos existing presently in Russia while being indifferent to the happenings in Russia; or to help Russia to rise again and to form an alliance with all those nation-states into which Russia was dismembered for the creation of a new Russia.

If Ukraine remains indifferent in the struggle against Bolshevism, she will cause such a fierce animosity to develop between herself and Russia because of the latter's inability to

forgive the fact that Ukraine did not help. If, on the other hand, Ukraine helps the Russians in their victory over Bolshevism, she will earn their gratitude and will secure for herself the right of free development in the federal union with Russia with which Ukraine is tied through her economic and other interests.¹³⁷⁾

This declaration was signed by ten Ministers of the *Hetman's* regime. All of them, it should be noted, were members of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (the *Kadets*).

The appearance of this declaration in the Kyiv newspapers created a sensation as well as it led to new developments. It encouraged the Russian national minority in Ukraine to apply heavier pressure on the *Hetman* to act in the Russian interests. At the same time, the pro-Denikin conspirators were encouraged to speed up their preparations for the overthrow of the *Hetman* regime in Ukraine altogether and proclaim the subordination to the White Russian forces of General Denikin in his effort to restore the Russian Empire.

Gathering of forces for the defense of the Ukrainian independence

Taken by surprise, the nationally minded Ukrainians were forced to a greater degree of open opposition against the *Hetman* regime whose majority of Ministers signed the pro-Russian declaration. The Ukrainian national leaders were not in opposition to the point expressed in the declaration favoring the stabilization of relations between the Ukrainian State and the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces. However, they were not prepared to sacrifice any part of the sovereignty of Ukraine. Therefore, the concept of re-incorporation of Ukraine into a united renewed Russian Empire, as expressed in the declaration, did hurt the national feelings of the Ukrainian people and it was harmful to the cause of the common Ukrainian-Russian interests in defeating the Bolshevik forces. Small wonder that a cooperation in the struggle against the common enemy never was established. It may have been decisive for subsequent historical events, not only as far as the fate of Russia and Ukraine was concerned, but also all of Eastern Europe, indeed, of the whole world.

Unfortunately, the Russian imperialists, under the leadership of Denikin, dreamed about the restoration of the Empire in full splendor with all the freed, non-Russian nations as part of it.¹³⁸⁾ Their followers in Ukraine followed completely in their footsteps, and the ministers who signed the declaration disregarded completely not only the interests of the Ukrainian people but also the reality

which could have saved both Ukraine and Russia from the future Bolshevik domination. Therefore, the conflict between the defenders of the Ukrainian national sovereignty and the *Hetman's* ministers became inevitable.

In order to inform the broad masses of the Ukrainian people about the position of the coalition of the Ukrainian national democratic groups to the declaration of the majority of the *Hetman's* ministers as well as to warn the *Hetman* himself about the consequences if the negotiations with Prime Minister Lyzohub concerning the reconstruction of the government failed, the leadership of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* issued its own declaration, signed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, President, and Petro Didushok, Secretary, and sent it to the branches of the *Soyuz* in the country as well as to the prominent Ukrainian political, cultural, civic, and economic leaders. This declaration is indicative in regard to the existing mood in the country; therefore, its parts are interesting to the reader. They read:

We do not regard the present government in Ukraine to be the fully mandated and legal representative of the Ukrainian State. The present government... is alien to the people in the national sense and hostile to them in political and socio-economic thinking, and it is being supported by a small group of landowners and industrial kings only...

Emanating from the circles of the Russian absolutistic Tsarist bureaucracy, personal composition of the present government as well as its thinking are in essence and in form strictly Russian centralistic. The majority within the present government is alien and hostile to the endeavours of the broad masses of the Ukrainian people who desire to live in their own national sovereign state. Through the use of deceiving verbal declarations and enforcing the most cruel repressions of censorship, the government is trying to create an impression that there is peace in the country. But all its activities lead the nation to downfall and ruin, and push the popular masses on the path of anger, despair and anarchy.

Therefore, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* declares that only a government enjoying support of the broad democratic masses of the Ukrainian people can be a real and legal representative of the Ukrainian State. Only a cabinet based upon coalition of the national and democratic forces should have a mandate to be in the leadership of the State activities until a truly constitutional government shall be formed...

On the basis of the right of every nation for self-determination regarding its own nation-state destiny..., and also according

to the historic and natural right of every nation to unite all torn-away parts, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* regards it to be perfectly natural and normal to unite into the single Ukrainian State organism all Ukrainian inhabited provinces which, due to historic and international conditions, until now did not join the Ukrainian State, i.e. Eastern Galicia, Bukovyna, Hungarian Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashya, the Ukrainian inhabited part of Bassarabia, the ethnically Ukrainian parts of Donshchyna, Chornomorya and Kuban.¹³⁹⁾

These are the essential parts of the declaration signed in the name of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*. The *Hetman* and his government were informed about the declaration. Actually, this was the last attempt on the part of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* to find a compromise and to come to an agreement with the *Hetman* concerning a peaceful solution of the state crisis. However, the text of the declaration could also be regarded as the outline of the ideopolitical basis for the eventual armed resistance in case the *Hetman* would fail to defend the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people and of the Ukrainian State.

The political platform of the declaration of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* is very interesting and does represent the basic thinking of its author, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, at that time. The emphasis is placed upon the preservation of the Ukrainian State as a sovereign entity of the Ukrainian people. The socio-economic issues of that time are treated with a lesser emphasis. Based upon the principle of the sovereignty of the people, the declaration emphasizes that a new government of Ukraine must have its foundation in the freely and democratically expressed will of the people. These were the fundamental points of political philosophy in the declaration.

However, from the point of view of the practical application of these political principles, the leadership of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* tried to be pragmatic. In its pragmatism, it did not demand that the powers of the government be transferred immediately into the hands of a cabinet consisting of a social-democratic majority. It was prepared to accept a compromise because the declaration proposed to create a government of the national unity which would include representatives of all nationally minded political groups, the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Socialists. It is clearly seen from the text of the declaration that the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* leadership sought a peaceful solution to the existing crisis of government. It did not call for armed uprising yet or not even for violent opposition.¹⁴⁰⁾

In spite of the "charged" atmosphere in the country which could erupt into a disorganized if not organized popular uprising against the regime any time, the *Hetman* rejected the platform of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* concerning cooperation of all Ukrainian political factions in the defense of the sovereignty of Ukraine and preservation of internal peace and order. However, he hardly could have remained passive in the existing situation, therefore his government underwent some reorganization in order to at least pretend that he attempted to solve the crisis.

On October 24, 1918, *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadskyy appointed a new cabinet of ministers headed again by Fedir Lyzohub, a big landowner. From the point of view of the political and socio-economic philosophy of its members, this cabinet was not much different from the previous one. More than that, Ministers Gerbel, Rzhetsky and Zavadsky were reappointed although they signed the pro-Russian declaration. Also other dismissed ministers, members of the Russian *Kadet* Party, simply were replaced by different individuals from the same political party, so that the Russian *Kadets* again constituted a majority in the government.¹⁴¹)

Minister of Interior S. Gerbel openly supported the organization of Russian military units in all parts of Ukraine, especially in Kyiv and Odessa. At the same time, he advocated reduction of Ukrainian military units while the Germans helped to keep these at a minimum. The units of the *Dobrovolcheskaya Armiya* (the Army of Volunteers) under the command of General Denikin were being organized freely in the Ukrainian State although their political program was the restoration of the pre-war united and indivisible Russian Empire with Ukraine as an integral part of it. Thus, the forces which had as an objective the destruction of the Ukrainian State were given support by at least some members of the government. Of course, this is a paradox but this was a historical reality.¹⁴²)

As has been indicated, one half of the newly appointed ministers of the *Hetman's* government of Ukraine were of Russian nationality and belonged to various "Great Russian" political organizations. They belonged, first of all, socially to the privileged classes of the rich landowners and industrialists. Politically, they were led by the Russian *Kadets*. As to how they treated the problem of Ukrainian sovereignty could be seen from a declaration of the leader of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (*Kadets*), Prof. Pavel Milyukov, dated October 20, 1918, thus during the negotiations concerning the reconstruction of the Ukrainian Government. Among other things, he said:

...In the opinion of the Central Committee of the (Kadet) Party, members of the (Kadet) Party may join the membership

in the (Ukrainian) cabinet only under condition that the whole cabinet will accept the principles stated in the declaration... and provided it will condemn principles of the narrow nationalistic local policy...

Thus, the leader of the Russian imperialistic forces demanded that the government of the sovereign Ukrainian State itself join the campaign against the sovereignty of Ukraine in favor of her colonial status within the future resurrected Great Russia. Although the Russian ministers in the Ukrainian government did not openly side with the forces led by Pavel Milyukov and General Denikin, they failed to do so only for tactical reasons, hoping that soon the situation would change in their favor.¹⁴³)

As we may see, the efforts of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* with regard to persuading the *Hetman* to reconstruct the Government of the Ukrainian State for the defense of sovereignty failed. Prime Minister Lyzohub protracted negotiations because most probably the *Hetman* waited to see the trend in the international situation. When the *Hetman* agreed under the pressure of the Ukrainian national forces to reorganize his cabinet, he had gone only half-way through. While he dismissed most of the Russian ministers who signed the anti-sovereignty of Ukraine declaration, he reappointed one of them to the post of Minister of Interior, the other to the post of Minister of Finance, and the third to the post of State Secretary. All of these ministerial portfolios were of the greatest importance in the existing situation of the country.¹⁴⁴)

In this situation, the President of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and his closest collaborators in the socialistic bloc lost hope that something positive could be expected in the attitude of the *Hetman*. Only now did Vynnychenko give serious attention to the proposal of Mykyta Shapoval, General Oleksander Osetsky and Andriy Makarenko that, due to the hopeless position of the *Hetman* as far as the defense of the sovereignty of Ukraine was concerned, nothing remained to be done except to organize an armed uprising against the regime.

Preparation of the armed uprising against the Hetman regime

The attitude of the *Hetman*, Pavlo Skoropadskyy, and especially that of the majority of his ministers toward the needs of the Ukrainian people was deemed by the leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* unbearable. Lack of real proofs that the *Hetman* cared for the Ukrainian people disturbed the nationally minded Ukrainians.

They felt obliged to organize an active defense of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State. Hence, the armed uprising was to be in preparation just in case the *Hetman* regime would openly violate the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian people.

All participants in the historic events of that time, as well as the passive witnesses, emphasize that some prominent leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* and its composing political parties hoped to the very end that the *Hetman* would actively join the forces of the Ukrainian national sovereignty. They hoped that sooner or later the *Hetman* would come to mutually acceptable agreement with the Ukrainian National Democrats and Socialists.

According to the testimonies of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Mykyta Shapoval, Pavlo Khrystyuk, and other prominent members of the Presidium of the *Soyuz* as well as those of other contemporary Ukrainian political activists, in the beginning only two prominent political personages almost lost hope for the possibility of coming to a compromising agreement with the *Hetman*. It was Mykyta Shapoval who lost hope first; he was followed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko. However, even these leading Socialists did not talk among their friends about the necessity of preparing an uprising against the regime until the second half of October, 1918. To most of their friends it soon became clear that the *Hetman*, through his tolerance of the anti-Ukrainian activities of the members of his government, unconsciously contributed to the loss of the independence of Ukraine. The conclusion was clear: if he cannot see the danger for the Ukrainian State, he must be removed from its control.

The actual initiative to organize a general popular uprising against the *Hetman* regime was taken by General Oleksander Osetsky, Andriy Makarenko, and Mykyta Shapoval. General Osetsky was then in charge of the armed railroad guards who could be used as an organized armed force in case of need. Makarenko was an official in the railroad management as well as an organizer of the railroad workers' trade union. Since membership in the union was limited to Ukrainians, the union members were in a position to perform valuable services of communication with the various parts of the country and, above all, bypass the postal services and save expenses. Shapoval served as the liaison officer of the Triumvirate with various political leaders and especially with the leadership of the *Soyuz*.¹⁴⁵⁾

Only in the second half of October, 1918, Mykyta Shapoval decided to initiate Volodymyr Vynnychenko into this very small conspiratory circle. Vynnychenko accepted the invitation and joined the group.¹⁴⁶⁾ The three-member initiative group invited first of all Volodymyr Vynnychenko to the conspiracy against the *Hetman* regime for two practical reasons. First of all, the Ukrainian intel-

lectuals, as well as the higher strata of the educated masses, had known Vynnychenko as an outstanding Ukrainian novelist. Secondly, during a considerable period of time in the era of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, he was Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic. During the *Hetman* regime, Vynnychenko worked as a columnist in the *Robitnycha Gazeta* (the Workers' Gazette), the organ of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party. Finally, after the resignation of A. Nikovskyy from the post of President of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* (September 18, 1918), Vynnychenko held that position. For the success of a popular uprising against the *Hetman* regime, participation of the *Soyuz* was an absolute necessity because it enjoyed support of the broad masses of the population.¹⁴⁷)

Although Gen. Osetsky, Shapoval, and Makarenko had undertaken preparatory steps for the organization of the uprising, they had not taken the final decision until after the efforts of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* initiated in the middle of October, 1918, failed to produce a full agreement with the *Hetman*. Only then President of the *Soyuz*, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, joined the preparatory group and became convinced that an uprising was inevitable.¹⁴⁸) Once he joined, Vynnychenko plunged into the conspiratory activities.

It should be emphasized that according to the testimonies of various active participants in the events of these turbulent times, most leading members of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* believed in the middle of October, in a possibility of finding a *modus vivendi* with the *Hetman* of Ukraine for the establishment of a *modus operandi* in the interests of national unity and Ukrainian sovereignty. Volodymyr Vynnychenko tried to collect information on the opinion of the leading activists of the *Soyuz*, and according to his statements, he received, at that time, definitely negative answers from the great majority of those questioned on the need for the immediate preparation of an uprising against the *Hetman*.¹⁴⁹)

Thus, according to the memoirs of Mykyta Shapoval, one of the foremost organizers of the anti-*Hetman* uprising, in the second half of October, 1918, only a few individuals belonged to the anti-*Hetman* conspiratory group. They were besides himself, Andriy Makarenko, Gen. Oleksander Osetsky, Col. V. Pavlenko, Colonel Khylobochenko, and Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Also some prominent members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, such as Prof. Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv and Ivan Lyzanivskyy, were informed about the preparatory steps for the uprising. However, one should stress that up to that time, the involved individuals concentrated basically upon theoretical discussions concerning possibilities of an uprising rather than around real preparation for the action itself.¹⁵⁰)

Only after all efforts of the *Soyuz* leaders to achieve a workable agreement with the *Hetman* regarding the defense of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people in their own independent Ukrainian State had failed, other prominent political and military leaders joined the group. First of all, at that time joined the anti-*Hetman* conspirators Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, the Commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, and other members of the *Striletska Rada* (Military Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi*). Still later, at the end of October, 1918, the Commander of the Zaporozhian Division, stationed on the left bank of Dnipro, Colonel Petro Bolbotchan, and the Commander of the Black Sea military units, Colonel Peleshchuk, joined secretly the anti-*Hetman* forces. However, even then only the commanders, as individuals, were informed of the preparations. Their subordinates, officers and soldiers, knew nothing about it yet. Neither was there any preparatory activity among the broad masses of the people going on yet.¹⁵¹⁾

For a mass participation in the anti-*Hetman* uprising, it was necessary to get support from the leaderships of all Ukrainian political parties and from other mass organizations, especially the trade unions and cultural societies, which constituted the membership of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*. And, until the end of October, 1918, not a single political party offered its support to initiators of the uprising. By the end of October, the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries decided to give its support to the cause, and in the beginning of November, 1918, it was followed by the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, after a long debate at the Central Committee meeting. Many members of the Central Committee of this party believed that Pavlo Skoropadsky would unite with other Ukrainian national forces for the common cause of the Ukrainian national sovereignty.

Five days before the *Hetman* issued the controversial declaration of November 14, 1918, in a meeting of the Presidium of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, it was established that only a minority of the Presidium was convinced that an armed uprising against the regime of *Hetman* was inevitable. Only after it became known that Pavlo Skoropadsky had definitely sided with the forces hostile to the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, did the leading members of all political parties accept the existing reality that an armed uprising against the arbitrary rule of a non-Ukrainian minority in the country was inevitable in order to defend the national interests. The appointment of the new cabinet of ministers by the *Hetman* on November 14, 1918, with completely pro-Russian orientation finally persuaded most of these leaders that nothing could be expected from Pavlo Skoropadsky. The decision was made by the *Hetman* himself.¹⁵²⁾

Certainly, the leading organizers of the anti-*Hetman* uprising, especially Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Mykyta Shapoval and others, would not have dared to call for a mass uprising without general support of the political and professional organizations united in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*. In the existing situation, they represented the will of the people. Without this popular support, an uprising against the *Hetman* regime would have been an arbitrary act similar to that of General Skoropadskyy of April 29, 1918, or his second arbitrary act against the interests of the Ukrainian State sovereignty of November 14, 1918. Of course, without active support of the organized military units, especially of the *Sichovi Striltsi* commanded by Colonel Yevhen Konovalts, and the broad masses of the population such an uprising would have failed. Popular support ascertained its success.

The great sense of responsibility in the preparation of the uprising, as well as an open call for it on the part of the leading conspirators, can be seen from the fact that, according to Mykyta Shapoval, they hoped for a compromise solution of the conflict to the very end. A few days before the fateful act of November 14, 1918, Volodymyr Vynnychenko formulated with his friends a compromise proposition to the effect that the *Hetman* should appoint a government consisting of all nationally minded Ukrainians; this cabinet should declare that it would order democratic and free elections in the country in which the Ukrainian national democratic parties would support the candidacy of Pavlo Skoropadskyy for the President of the Ukrainian State.¹⁵³) However, the events of November 14, 1918, prevented any action on this proposal.

It is clear now that Vynnychenko's last minute attempt to find a compromise with the *Hetman* had no real foundations. First of all, it was not compatible with the political philosophy and personal ambitions of Pavlo Skoropadskyy. Secondly, it was possible that at that time the *Hetman* had lost control to the clique surrounding and advising him. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to keep in mind because it proves the great degree of responsibility with which the leading individuals organizing the uprising behaved and acted.

After the act of November 14, 1918, there was no way back for the defenders of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State but to substitute military action for the attempts of political persuasion. The end of the *Hetman* regime in Ukraine approached rapidly.

PART II
POLICY OF THE WEST TOWARDS THE
“RUSSIAN COMPLEX”

CHAPTER 1

GERMAN PRESSURE ON THE HETMAN

German desire to restore the Russian Empire

While the Ukrainian nationally minded political forces tried to do their best in order to persuade the *Hetman* of Ukraine, Pavlo Skoropadskyy, not to give in to the pressures of the Russian nationalists, the commanding general of the German troops stationed in Ukraine pressurized him in the direction of the restoration of the fallen Russian Empire. Thus, the *Hetman* found himself between the Ukrainian forces striving to maintain the independence of Ukraine, and those with pro-Russian interests. The latter included the Russians themselves as well as the influential German diplomatic and military circles.

At the time of the Peace Conference of Berestya, the Austrians and the Germans were inclined to believe that it was in their interest to support the existence of the independent states of Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Georgia, Armenia, etc. which were established after the downfall of the Russian Empire and contrary to the desires of the newly established Bolshevik regime in Russia. They hoped that all of these states would cooperate with Austria and Germany and they would serve as the buffer force against the aggressive forces of the Russian Communist revolutionaries. However, this policy suddenly was changed after a few months due to their belief that the forces of Russian Bolshevism could not be confined within the Russian ethnic territories alone.

Contrary to the early expectations after the Treaty of Berestya was signed, the Russian Bolsheviks continued to propagate the idea of a permanent world revolution and tried to penetrate politically into the territories of the Central Powers themselves. Thus, by April, 1918, Berlin and Vienna came to the conclusion that only a complete destruction of Russian Bolshevism within the Russian Soviet Republic and restoration of some sort of democratic regime similar to that of the Provisional Government in the past headed by Prince Lvov would prevent the Russian export of Communist revolutions to European countries, including Austria and Germany. Therefore, they decided to change their policy in this respect.

In their analysis of the problem of how to defeat the Russian Bolshevik forces, the Germans and Austrians came to the conclusion

that in order to gather support of the Russian liberal and conservative anti-Bolshevik forces, they must support the program of restoration of the pre-revolution Russian state which would also integrate ethnic territories of the non-Russian nationalities, including Ukraine, but excluding Poland, Finland and the Baltic countries. Being aware of the dangers from a restored centralized Russian Empire of the pre-war type, the Germans proposed to unite all newly established national states with Russia in a kind of federation. Recognizing the strategic location, size of the population and territory of Ukraine as well as her rich natural resources, the Germans believed that Ukraine should enjoy a special status within that federation. That status had to be at least equal to the political status of Bavaria within the German Empire.

Thus, the policies of German and Austrian military and diplomatic circles were identical with the interests of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement. They pressured the *Hetman's* ministers in Kyiv in this direction, and through them also the *Hetman* himself. Since one half of the *Hetman* ministers were Russian *Kadets* anyway, it was not difficult to get their support; so that only the other half of *Hetman's* ministers had to be persuaded. It could be assumed that it was due to the pressure of these combined forces that Prime Minister Andriy Lyzohub declared to the German press in Berlin that the regime of the *Hetman* was prepared to re-unite Ukraine with Russia on conditions of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654.¹⁵⁴)

Negotiations of Milyukov with the Germans

While Prime Minister of the *Hetman* Government, Fedir Lyzohub, and some other members of the cabinet were prepared to unite Ukraine with Russia on the conditions similar to those of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the ministers of the same cabinet who were members of the Russian *Kadet* Party opposed even these conditions. They demanded the annexation of Ukraine by Russia without special reservation of rights for Ukraine. They supported the policy of reincorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state as an integral part completely subordinated to the Russian government directly. Their leading policy maker was Prof. Paul Milyukov who arrived in Kyiv secretly because he did not trust any Ukrainian government, even the *Hetman* regime was not an exception.

Professor Paul N. Milyukov was the head of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party. In the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov after the March, 1917, revolution he was Minister

of Foreign Affairs. After the "October" Bolshevik*) revolution in Petrograd, Milyukov escaped from the Bolsheviks to the independent state of the Don Cossacks, and later he joined the camp of General Denikin in Kuban. After establishing contacts with the pro-Denikin forces in Ukraine, Milyukov arrived in Kyiv in order to direct their policy and to work for the re-incorporation of Ukraine into the new and indivisible united Russian state.

Milyukov's program envisaged the defeat of the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia with the active help of the German military forces. At that time, neither Milyukov nor his followers believed in the victory of the Entente powers over the Central Powers; therefore, he based his program upon collaboration with Germany.

On June 17, 1918, the ministers of the *Hetman* regime wined and dined the German diplomats and generals stationed in Kyiv. On that occasion, the Chief of the Staff of the German Army in Ukraine, General Wilhelm Groener, and Prince von Hessen put a confidential question to Minister M. P. Vasylenko "whether it is not yet time to restore the unity of Russia?" They immediately proceeded to present their plan: in order to successfully restore "the unity," the action must begin in Kyiv, i.e. in Ukraine; within the united and indivisible Russian state, Ukraine would have a status similar to that of Bavaria within the German Empire. In their opinion, the new Russia must be again a monarchy.¹³⁵) Vasylenko informed the Germans that the head of the *Kadets*, Milyukov, favored restoration of monarchy in Russia, too.

In this conversation with Minister Vasylenko, the Germans expressed their desire to establish contacts with Milyukov in order to conclude an agreement concerning German intervention against the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Vasylenko soon connected the Germans with Milyukov, and the negotiations were conducted by a special envoy of the German imperial government, who arrived from Berlin, and the German ambassador in Kyiv.

Paul Milyukov welcomed the German military intervention in Russia in favor of restoration of the monarchy. However, he placed before the Germans a number of conditions. He stated:

The revision of the Treaty of Berestya in order to restore the old boundaries of the Russian Empire. Conditions: the unity, all-Russian citizenship, sovereignty of the central government... not the *Bundesstaat*, the integrity of the territory, i.e. not a

* In 1917, all of Russia used the old "Julian Calendar" which is 13 days different from the astronomical "Gregorian Calendar." In reality, the Bolshevik coup took place on November 7, 1917.

Staatenbund,...*) As a last resort, I am prepared to grant to Ukraine a special status; however, this cannot be as a rule for all of Russia, nor for all other integrated entities.¹⁵⁶)

These were the fundamental conditions for the conclusion of an agreement with the German government concerning the conduct of war against the *Sovnarkom* in Russia in order to re-establish the united Russian monarchy. The conditions laid down by Milyukov indicate that he was not prepared to accept the formation of a real federation, not even of the kind that existed in the German Empire at that time. Only as a last resort, he was prepared to recognize some degree of autonomy for Ukraine, however, in no way any kind of federation. Thus, Milyukov rejected even a status for Ukraine similar to that of Bavaria within Germany, as proposed by the Germans.

Milyukov also demanded that the Russian-German military co-operations in the struggle against the Bolshevik regime be carried out in such a way that it appeared to the masses of the Russian people that the military actions were being carried out by the Russian Volunteer Army of General Denikin, especially with regard to the liberation of the capital city of Moscow and other territories of Central Russia. The Russian nationalists desired to get credit for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime and the liberation of the Russian people. The Germans had to be in the background.

In the negotiations with the Germans, in addition to Minister Mykola P. Vasylenko and Milyukov, a Jewish member of the *Hetman's* cabinet, Minister Gutnik, participated. Gutnik maintained contacts with the Jewish owned banks in Germany as well as with the leading Jewish journalists in Germany. Through their publications, Gutnik made public his suggestions in Germany, on the one hand, while through him they made public their wishes in Ukraine. The foremost promoter, inside Germany, of this policy of restoration of the Russian Empire was the publicist Kohen-Reiss.

Negotiations between the representative of the Russian imperialistic forces, Pavel Milyukov, and the special envoy of the German imperial government, with active participation of the German Ambassador in Kyiv, Baron Mum, lasted until the end of June, 1918. Milyukov insisted upon the acceptance of the conditions he laid down at the beginning of the negotiations.

*) Milyukov used German terminology:

Bundesstaat in German terminology stands for a federal union of several states with a relatively great degree of local autonomy, but without sovereignty. The German Empire of that time was a **Bundesstaat**.

Staatenbund stands for a confederation. The composing parts, the states, enjoy a very great degree of autonomy; they are sovereign states, which limit their rights temporary on the basis of a voluntary treaty.

The negotiations were conducted in strict secrecy. Neither the leadership of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* nor the leaders of the Ukrainian political parties were informed about this German-Russian collaboration. Therefore, when after the defeat of the *Hetman* forces in Ukraine the Russian imperialistic activists accused the Ukrainian national movement of Germanophilism, the Directorate of the restored Ukrainian National Republic was not in a position to point to the Russians as Germanophiles. It seems that nothing was known about the German-Russian collaboration to Dmytro Doroshenko, a minister in the *Hetman* cabinet, because he does not mention this fact in his writing on history of that period of the Ukrainian struggle for national sovereignty.

Thus, the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State was in jeopardy long before the forces centered around the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* decided to act in defense of the sovereignty of Ukraine.



Initial in "Apostol," first book printed in Lviv 1574.

CHAPTER 2

THE ENTENTE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UKRAINE

Fear of separate peace between Russia and Germany

The actual development of the uprising in Ukraine against the regime of *Hetman* Pavlo Skoropadsky as well as the subsequent policies of the newly reestablished Government of the Ukrainian National Republic in the form of the Directorate were considerably influenced by the external as well as internal events. This chapter is devoted to the outline and analysis of the external developments effecting the independence of Ukraine, while the internal situation under the leadership of the Directorate is reserved to subsequent chapters.

Two basic factors in international developments predetermined the political and military actions of the second revolutionary government of Ukraine, the Directorate. First of all, it was the attitude of the Entente toward the countries of Eastern Europe, and secondly, the pronounced policies of the Russian oppression in the course of the revolutionary developments since March, 1917. Both of these factors in international politics have to be outlined in order to evaluate properly the events in Ukraine.

It should be emphasized that the Powers of the Entente regarded all historical events of that time in the countries of Eastern Europe as a sort of "Russian complex." Of course, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks was a part of this "complex" as well as the development, of the Russian anti-Bolshevik military activities. The latter will be given some attention because it complicated development of international policies toward the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and toward the liberated nations of the former Russian Empire, on the other.

The rumors about the inclination of the close circles to the Tsar's court at St. Petersburg to conclude a separate peace between Russia and Germany were circulating as early as the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917. These rumors were spread not only in Paris and London but also in Russia. It was suspected among the Russian nationalists that a "wonder working" monk, Grisha Rasputin, was connected with German spying agencies, and he influenced the superstitious Empress and the Tsar himself toward the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany at all costs. This was the single

most important reason for the plot to murder Rasputin in order to continue the conduct of the war on the side of the Entente to a victorious end.

The war objectives of the Russian imperialism were clearly defined, as far as the Russian Empire was concerned. First of all, their objectives were to seize Bosphorus and Dardanelles with the city of Constantinople (Istanbul); secondly, to establish Russian domination over the Balkan countries; and, thirdly, to annex, from Austro-Hungary, all Ukrainian ethnic territories as well as to incorporate into the Russian Empire all Polish ethnic territories which were under Austrian and German domination. Those Russian nationalistic circles were aware of the dangers of any separate peace with Germany at that time. Such a peace would not only jeopardize all war objectives of the Russian Empire but under unfavorable circumstances, the Russians might be forced to give up some of the territories which they had dominated at that time.*)

The time for a separate peace treaty was not favorable to the Russians because the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey) were enjoying the greatest success of the war by establishing their control over the Balkans and over a considerable part of the territory of the Russian Empire, i.e. the entire Polish ethnic territory, the Ukrainian ethnic territories up to the Prypyat River, one half of Byelorussia, as well as part of Lithuania. Thus, the Russians were in a poor bargaining position.

Instead of expanding the Russian imperialistic domination over non-Russian countries, the prolonged war had shaken the Empire itself. On March 12, 1917, the revolt of military units, primarily the regiments composed of Ukrainians, in Petrograd, had forced the Tsar to abdicate, and a Provisional Government was established. However, the Provisional Government of Russia, first under the leadership of Prince George Lvov and later headed by Alexander Kerensky, failed to stimulate popular support for its policies, and its popularity was decreasing.

After the downfall of the Tsarist regime in Russia, the governments of the Powers of the Entente were afraid that the Eastern front, defended by the Russian armies against the Austria-German advances, would collapse and, as a result, the Germans and Austrians would be in a position to reallocate several fighting divisions to the Western front. Therefore, the British and French diplomats tried to do everything in their power to persuade the Provisional

*) Full text of the agreements about the war aims: Roy Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*. Written from his unpublished and personal material. Vol. I. Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1960. Pp. 47 and fol.

Government of Russia to continue the war against the Central Powers. The task of these diplomats was not too difficult. The leaders of the Provisional Government themselves desired to continue the war in order to achieve the Russian imperialistic objectives. Therefore, they decided to retain their alliance with France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, etc.

While the Provisional Government decided to honor the Russian alliance with other Powers of the Entente, the Entente did not gain very much from it. The summer of 1917 offensive of the Russian army against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces failed. Thereafter, the remnants of the old Tsarist Russian army proved to be incapable of offensive warfare. However, the Russian military units still held the front, and this fact was relieving the forces of the Entente on the Western front. Thus, even the passive presence of the Russian military units on the front was better, from the point of view of the interests of the Western Allied Powers, than a complete collapse of the Eastern front. More so, since arrival of considerable forces of the American divisions were expected in Europe.

As far as the Ukrainian policy of continuation of the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary was concerned, it should be emphasized that the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, headed by Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, and the General Secretariat under the leadership of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, defended the policy of continuation of war on the side of the Entente to the victorious end. To this effect were issued many statements by the Ukrainian authorities. Actually, this policy of the autonomous governing bodies of Ukraine toward the Entente caused, to some extent, delayed formation of separate Ukrainian military units from the ranks of the undivided old Russian army. Formation of separate Ukrainian divisions would have caused immediate decomposition of the fighting units on the front, and at that time this would not have served the best interests of the Ukrainian people. Such was the opinion of the Ukrainian political leaders holding power in the country.

The Bolsheviks and the continuation of war

In order to secure their success, the Russian Bolsheviks applied entirely different tactics regarding the conduct of war. Vladimir Lenin, Lev Trotsky, Lev Kamenyev, Grigori Zinovyev, Yakov Sverdlov, Yosif Stalin, and all other leaders of the Russian Bolshevism came to the conclusion that the prevailing conditions on the fronts provided the best opportunity for them to seize political power in the country, provided that they could succeed in gaining the support of the millions of mobilized Russian army soldiers, in

90% peasants. They decided to achieve this objective by means of uncompromising and demagogic propaganda for immediate peace. This tactical maneuver had enormous influence on the mobilized rank and file soldiers who were tired of the losing war. Therefore, the Bolsheviks became popular among them because nobody desired peace more than the front soldiers who were facing death continuously.

Since the Russian Bolsheviks emphasized, at that time and for tactical reasons, the peace issue as the single most important issue while other political parties pursued the policy of ending the war through victory in alliance with the Powers of the Entente, the peace issue was confused by many uninformed individuals with the main objective of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Therefore, in their desire to end the war, many soldiers of the Russian military forces identified themselves with that objective of the Russian Bolsheviks, as well as regarded themselves as Bolsheviks. Thus, the peace issue gained great support from the tired rank and file mobilized soldiers for the leaders of Bolshevism.

This attitude of the Russian soldiers enabled the leaders of the Russian Bolsheviks to seize power in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, virtually without military resistance on the side of the Kerensky government and to establish their power over all of Russia proper. At the time of Lenin's seizure of power in Petrograd, there were virtually no significant military units in existence which were prepared and willing to defend the regime of the Russian Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, i.e. to defend the democracy in Russia. Thus, the task of the relatively small well organized armed group of Bolshevik was easy. Having no loyal troops on his side, Alexander Kerensky escaped from Petrograd in an automobile of the United States Embassy, while all other members of the Provisional Government were captured by the Bolshevik forces and arrested.

After the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia proper, the Western members of the Entente faced the question with regard to the future policy of the new Russian regime toward the continuation of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. For no logical reason, the leaders of the Western Democracies were dominated by the unfounded belief that the Soviet (Council) of the People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*), headed by Lenin and Trotsky, would continue to respect Tsarist Russia's obligations of her membership in the Entente. At least, it was hoped in the West that the *Sovnarkom* would not enter into separate peace negotiations with the Central Powers. A great many Westerners took, at face value, the Bolshevik declarations concerning their adherence to the principles of a "true and consequent" democracy and were not in a position to imagine

that the new Russian regime would conclude a separate peace treaty with the monarchic aristocratic regime of Germany to the detriment of other democratic powers of the world.

This naive hope of the Western Democracies, accompanied by a lack of certainty, was nursed until the end of November, 1917, when rumors were spread about peace negotiations between the *Sovnarkom* and Imperial Germany. The lack of proper action on the part of the Western Democracies resulted in the far-reaching consequences which have influenced the course of history.

Entente's first discussion on Bolshevism

After three weeks of complete inactivity, the representatives of the Powers of the Entente met in Paris on November 30, 1917, for the purpose of evaluating the trends of the action taken by the *Sovnarkom* in its international relations, as well as, deciding upon the course of action on the part of the Entente with regard to the policies of the newly established Russian regime. Besides French Premier Georges Clemenceau, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Arthur James Balfour, and Italian Foreign Minister Giorgio Sidney Sonnino, the personal representative of President Woodrow Wilson, Col. Edward M. House, and the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Vasili Maklakov, participated in this conference.

Balfour informed the participants of the view of the British ambassador in Petrograd who advised the British government not to oppose the attempt of the *Sovnarkom* to conclude a separate peace treaty with Germany. This attitude would establish foundations for good relations in the future. As a practical step in that direction, the British ambassador advised the Western members of the Entente to relieve Russia from her obligations, as a member of the Entente, not to act separately with regard to armistice, peace negotiations, or signing a separate peace treaty with the war enemies. Speaking for the British government, Balfour stated that being political pragmatists, the British would be willing to follow the line suggested by their Petrograd ambassador.

The United States representative, Col. Edward M. House, differed with the British firmly. He suggested doing nothing in this matter, as well as, not interfering with the internal affairs of Russia in any respect. Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino vigorously opposed the British as well as the American views, and the French Premier Clemenceau, joined the Italian position. In the face of these differences of their positions, the conference participants decided to ask for the opinion of the Russian ambassador who had not been dismissed by the Bolshevik regime yet. Ambassador Maklakov took the posi-

tion opposing the view of giving free hand to the *Sovnarkom* to negotiate a separate peace with the war enemies of the Entente. The new Russian regime should be bound to respect the obligations of Russia incurred by the previous regime of the country.

On the basis of the views expressed in this discussion, especially by the British and American participants, one can see in retrospect the complete lack of understanding of the proper nature of Russian Bolshevism, as well as, of its real objectives in that world situation. One could say almost the same about the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Maklakov, who officially still represented Russia in France and participated in this international conference with full rights. At that time, the previously appointed Russian ambassadors in foreign countries had not been replaced yet by the *Sovnarkom*, thus, they officially represented Russia in the respective capitals.¹⁵⁷⁾

This conference achieved nothing beyond an exchange of views concerning the matter under discussion. It could be regarded a victory for the *Sovnarkom* through default of the Western Democracies to adopt any positive course of action.¹⁵⁸⁾ Their inaction helped the Bolsheviks domestically and internationally.

German-Russian armistice and Entente's position

While the views of the Western Democracies were divided and their position concerning their attitude to the newly instituted policies of the Bolshevik regime remained unclarified, on December 2, 1917, it became publicly known that an agreement concerning armistice had been worked out between representatives of the *Sovnarkom* and those of the Central Powers meeting at Berestya.*) The initiative concerning armistice and negotiating the separate peace treaty between Russia and the Central Powers was taken by the *Sovnarkom*. The accomplished fact forced the Powers of the Entente to formulate their own policy regarding the activities of the Russian Bolshevik regime.

Information concerning armistice negotiations at Berestya reached the capitals of Western Democracies a few days before the armistice agreement was concluded. Therefore, they summoned the War Council for December 1, 1917, to Paris for the sole purpose of deciding what action to take in case the armistice between Russia and the Central Powers was achieved. At this conference, the initiative was taken by the personal representative of President Wilson, Col. House. In his opinion, Russia was no longer able to participate in the war operations against the Central Powers, and, under existing

*) Berestya = Ukrainian name for "Brest Litovsk."

circumstances, the best course of action on the part of the Entente Powers would be to keep hands off the Russian affairs and let the events in Russia develop without any outside interference.¹⁵⁹⁾ Edward House sent a special telegram to President Woodrow Wilson urging him to issue a public declaration to the effect that the United States would not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Russia.¹⁶⁰⁾ However, not all participants of this conference shared the views of the American representative.

As a matter of fact, it was at this meeting, held on December 1, 1917, that French Premier Georges Clemenceau initiated discussion concerning military intervention of the Entente Powers in Russia. However, at this time this initiative found little enthusiasm among conference participants and it remained unsolved.¹⁶¹⁾ Contrary to this, the dominant view among the discussants was that the Powers of the Entente should apply an attitude of understanding toward the *Sovnarkom* even in case of the signing and enforcing an armistice agreement between Russia and the Central Powers.¹⁶²⁾ For the time being, this was the Entente's policy regarding the unconvventional behavior of the Bolshevik regime in Russia.

Soon thereafter this policy was modified. It should be emphasized here that if the Powers of the Entente evolved a negative attitude toward the *Sovnarkom*, it was not due to the socio-economic and political program of the Bolsheviks. Rather they deplored the fact that the former member of the Entente decided, unilaterally, to stop war operations against Germany, Austria-Hungary and their minor allies, more so, since the Bolshevik regime did not deem it necessary to consult the Powers of the Entente first.

Only after the armistice agreement between the *Sovnarkom* and the Central Powers was signed and all war operations between Russia and the Central Powers were stopped, did the Powers of the Entente decide not to recognize the *Sovnarkom* as the legal government of Russia. In consequence, on December 6, 1917, the United States Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, sent a telegram to the United States Ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, ordering him not to maintain direct contacts of any kind, with the Soviet government. Similar orders were given to all American liaison officers stationed in Russia.¹⁶²⁾

Ukraine and the strategy of the Entente

After the armistice agreement between the Russian *Sovnarkom* and the Central Powers became an accomplished fact, the government of Great Britain decided against granting recognition to the *Sovnarkom* as the legal Government of Russia. British Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs Balfour expressed his view that the Powers of the Entente should face the changed situation on the territories of the former Russian Empire and turn to "Ukraine, the Cossacks and other nationalities in Russia," maintain relations with them, and since they were "in opposition to Lenin and his policy of collaboration with the Germans,"¹⁶³) the Powers of the Entente should cooperate with them. Thus, after centuries this was the first sign of serious British interest in the "Ukrainian problem." However, it seems that this momentary interest in the Ukrainian problem was not based upon the just demands of the Ukrainian people to be free from foreign domination. Rather, it was dictated solely by the military needs of the Entente Powers, namely, to continue war activities against the Central Powers on the Eastern front through engagement of the Ukrainian military forces as the main burden bearer.¹⁶⁴)

The United States ambassadors in London, Stockholm, as well as in Petrograd, developed interest in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national sovereignty. They informed Washington telegraphically of the political developments in Ukraine. In their reports to the Department of State, they indicated that Ukraine and other non-Russian nations fighting for their national sovereignties would be in the position to effectively resist the pro-German policies of the Russian *Sovnarkom* and they could at least partially maintain the Eastern front. It should be emphasized here that, strangely enough, the United States Ambassador in Petrograd, Francis, chose not to notice any of the efforts of the Ukrainian independence movement in its struggle for the sovereignty of Ukraine until the middle of December, 1917, when an open conflict between the *Sovnarkom* of Russia and the established government of Ukraine was in process.¹⁶⁵) Strangely enough, this notice occurred only after the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers to stop armed hostilities was an accomplished fact.

As can be concluded on the basis of the available documents and the applied practice, the Powers of the Entente treated Ukraine solely from the point of view of an instrument in the continuation of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary on the Eastern front. Unfortunately, at that time they were not willing to offer support to the Ukrainian people in their struggle for their national independence based on the right of national self-determination. In no way did the Powers of the Entente indicate their willingness to support the political concept of dismemberment of the former Russian Empire into a number of national sovereign states on the basis of ethnic principles as applied in the case of Austria-Hungary. The Western Democracies noticed the prevailing order in Ukraine, ruled by the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, as well as the considerable progress made in the organizational process in the forma-

tion of a disciplined army of the Ukrainian National Republic. But most of all, the Entente Powers were interested in exploiting the Ukrainian army for their military objectives.¹⁶⁶)

France and Great Britain were later aware of the fact that they had to offer to the Ukrainians something in return for the Ukrainian continuation of war against the Central Powers on the Eastern front. But, besides granting recognition to Ukraine as an independent country, organized in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic, there was little that they were able to offer. The only other kind of aid possible was some sort of financial aid and providing military advisers to the newly formed Ukrainian military units. Participation by the Entente's military units in sufficient numbers on the Ukrainian-German front was virtually impossible as there was no way to transport such troops because the path was blocked by the Central Powers' and *Sovnarkom's* control of the access.

Military advisers to the Ukrainian military units could have been assigned, especially from among the numerically small units of French military technicians remaining in Ukraine from the pre-revolutionary period. They were cooperating with the Tsarist military forces as well as with those under the Russian Provisional Government. From the point of view of the military need to maintain the front against the still well-disciplined forces of the Central Powers, however, the French technicians were of little significance. At any rate, they did not constitute a real force which was needed to conduct the war.

Neither were the Powers of the Entente in a position to provide the Ukrainian National Republic with military supplies because all roads to Ukraine were under the control of the Central Powers or their minor allies. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits were firmly controlled by Turkey and all previous attempts on the part of the Powers of the Entente to take them over met with failure. It is true that British military forces controlled Murmansk and through this port in the Arctic Ocean supplied the Russian Tsarist military forces, as well as those under control of the Provisional Government, with arms, ammunition, and medical needs from Great Britain and France. However, after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, even this road of supplies to Ukraine was closed because of the open hostilities of the Russian Bolshevik regime toward the Ukrainian National Republic. Thus, the Russians would not allow the Entente to transport supplies into Ukraine. Unless Great Britain and France were prepared to establish effective control over these avenues of transportation into Ukraine, no real military aid from the Entente to Ukraine could be expected.

The Powers of the Entente were primarily interested in continuation of the military operations against Austria-Hungary and Germany on the Eastern front, and, according to their calculations, only Ukraine alone could perform this task. In this situation, the governments of France and Great Britain extended *de facto* recognition to the government of the Ukrainian National Republic as a sovereign country. This step was taken by the two Entente Powers in order to prevent the government of Ukraine from concluding a peace treaty with the Central Powers which would have forced the Ukrainians to continue military operations on the front contrary to any sound military, strategic and political principles.

However, the rapidly changing developments in Eastern Europe altered all plans of the Entente Powers with regard to utilizing Ukraine solely for their own purposes. The Bolshevik regime of Russia declared war against the Ukrainian National Republic and developed aggressive military operations against the newly formed small army of the Ukrainian National Republic. This turn of events forced the government of Ukraine to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers (February 9, 1918) and to ask them for military aid against the Russian Bolshevik aggressors. This seemingly realistic act in the interest of self-preservation in the existing, very grave, situation in Ukraine was not in conformity with the plans of the Entente. It was not to the Entente's liking, and the Entente Powers did not forget it easily. Later, the Ukrainian people paid a high price for making an independent decision.*)

It should be emphasized at this point that even though Ukraine signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers which also contained provisions concerning trade and military aid of Austria-Hungary and Germany for Ukraine in her defense against the Russian Bolshevik aggression, Ukraine in no way became belligerent against the Powers of the Entente still at war with the Central Powers. The government of Ukraine committed no hostile act against the Entente Powers; Ukraine maintained complete neutrality in the con-

*) A noted historian of Russia, M. S. Florinsky, in his evaluation of the position of the Provisional Government of Kerensky and the position of Bolsheviks to the question of the continuation of war on the side of the Entente criticizes the Provisional Government for its stubborn continuation of war. Any realistic policy with the aim to save democracy in Russia against the evident struggle of Bolsheviks for their dictatorship demanded from the Provisional Government to quit the war by a separate peace with the Central Powers. By the continuation of war the Kerensky Government had helped the Bolsheviks in their propaganda for immediate and unconditional peace to win for themselves full support of the mass of the peasant-soldiers on front and in the rear. The same point of view was valid for the Ukrainian Central Rada. In retrospective evaluation of Rada's policy in the question of the continuation of war on the side of the Entente Rada risked to loose much of sympathy among the former Tsarist mobilized army.

tinuing war between the Entente and the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the Powers of the Entente were bitter toward the Ukrainian National Republic for signing the Treaty of Berestya on February 9, 1918.

The bitterness on the part of France and Great Britain was fully exploited against the Ukrainian National Republic by the Russian representatives of all political orientations. The still influential former Tsarist diplomats in exile discovered a scapegoat to blame for their policies of failure. They immediately branded all prominent Ukrainian national leaders as German agents. In this ignoble activity, they were fully supported by the exiled leaders of the Russian Socialists-Liberal Democrats, and especially Alexander Kerensky.



CHAPTER 3

THE ENTENTE'S ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE THE EASTERN FRONT

Soviet Russian delegation refused to recognize the self-determination of the non-Russian nations

The government of the Ukrainian National Republic successfully reached an agreement with the Central Powers in negotiations at Berestya and on February 9, 1918, a separate peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was signed. The *Sovnarkom* of Russia declined signing the peace treaty with the Central Powers at this time because it contained a number of clauses concerning the non-Russian countries which, up to the downfall of the Tsarist regime, were considered by the Russians as integral parts of the Russian Empire. The Central Powers insisted upon the Russian recognition of the right of national self-determination for Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Byelorussia which included their right to secede from the former Russian Empire and establish their sovereign states. The delegates of the *Sovnarkom* to the peace negotiations regarded these clauses to be unacceptable, and utilized all possible reasons to protract negotiations.

After the delegates of the Central Powers presented their proposals concerning the non-Russian nationalities of the former Russian Empire to the delegates of the Russian *Sovnarkom* in the ultimative form, the Soviet Russian delegation rejected these demands and on February 10, 1918, returned to Petrograd. As a result of this behavior by the Russian Bolsheviks, on February 17, 1918, the Central Powers formally declared the end of the armistice and developed military operations against Soviet Russia.

Entente offers aid to the Bolsheviks for continuation of war

The breaking-off of peace negotiations between the Russian *Sovnarkom* and the Central Powers renewed the hope held by the Entente that Russia would continue her war operations against Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, soon after the initial steps were taken by the British and French diplomats to induce Soviet Russia to continue the war, the *Sovnarkom* informed the Central Powers about Russian acceptance of their peace treaty proposals and on March 3, 1918, the peace treaty between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia was signed.¹⁶⁷⁾

Great Britain and France overestimated the strength of the German and Austro-Hungarian forces at the beginning of 1918. They were afraid that, being checked no longer in Eastern Europe, the Central Powers would immediately concentrate their military operations on the Western front. The relieved military forces of the Central Powers would move against the West, and France and England might find themselves in great difficulties. More so, since the American military forces could develop their military activities in France only after some time. This prompted France and Britain to approach the Russian Bolshevik regime.

British and French diplomats tried hard to persuade the Russian Bolsheviks not to conclude a peace treaty with the Central Powers. In their attempts to prevent the signing of the treaty, the British invited the Soviet representatives to visit Great Britain at the time when the negotiations at Berestya were in progress. Thus, on February 7, 1918, the Russian Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lev Kamenev, accompanied by comrade Zolkind arrived in the British capital, London. After polite conversations in London, Kamenev and Zolkind were invited by the French Government to visit France.¹⁶⁸⁾

After the *Sovnarkom* broke-off the peace negotiations at Berestya and the German military forces developed vigorous operations in the direction to Petrograd and Moscow, the British Government tried hard to induce the Russian Bolsheviks to continue the war against Germany as an ally of the Entente. Great Britain offered all possible aid to the Bolsheviks in the continuation of this war.¹⁶⁹⁾ Interestingly enough, British diplomats did not give up hope even after the separate peace treaty between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia was already signed.

On March 4, 1918, the British ambassador in Petrograd approached the *Sovnarkom* formally, presenting a note offering military aid to Soviet Russia. Two days later, on March 6, 1918, he repeatedly offered British aid to the Russian Bolsheviks and tried to induce the *Sovnarkom* to declare "the holy war of Russia" in defense of her land against German aggression.¹⁷⁰⁾ However, the Russian Bolsheviks acted according to their own interests and disregarded the British approaches.

After the delegation of the *Sovnarkom*, headed by Adolf Yoffe, signed the peace treaty with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, British and French diplomats still hoped to prevent ratification by the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets which was convened in Moscow for the middle of March, 1918. However, the hopes of the Western Democracies were ill-founded and their efforts remained without success.

Woodrow Wilson's message to the Soviets

Under influence of British and French diplomats, President Woodrow Wilson decided to use his influence in order to prevent ratification of the treaty of March 3, 1918, between the *Sovnarkom* and the Central Powers. In this sense, the President of the United States, who at that time enjoyed a great degree of popularity, decided to send a message to the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. Woodrow Wilson's message of March 11, 1918, was read to the Soviets on March 15th. The message reads as follows:

“May I take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust to interrupt and to turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia.

Although the government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct affective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia, through the Congress, that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia, once more, complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration of her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world.”⁷¹)

The American diplomats to Russia and especially the British ambassador tried their best to induce the Congress of the Soviets to reject ratification of the peace treaty with the Central Powers. Along with the official text of the message, they presented their own commentaries against the treaty. However, all these efforts remained in vain because the Russian Bolshevik leadership acted in accordance with previously established policy to achieve the ultimate objectives.

Pursuing their political objectives, the Russian Bolshevik leaders, headed by Lenin and Trotsky, adopted the line of a peaceful, and even a friendly, co-existence with the imperial government of Germany which had helped them to seize power in Russia. Although their end objective was the Communist revolution in the whole world, for the time being in order to preserve their power over Russia, the leaders of Russian Bolshevism tended to submissively cooperate with Berlin. Therefore, in this situation the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, who was not adequately familiar with the complex of the so-called “Russian problems” and even less familiar with the true principles of the Bolshevik doctrine became the subject of jokes among the leading Bolsheviks in Moscow.

The formality of reading the message of President Wilson to the Congress of the Soviets was carried out, but the Soviet

leaders completely disregarded Wilson's intentions. Instead, they decided to use the opportunity to declare their objectives with regard to the Communist revolution in the whole world and, as Grigori Zineviev stated, to send an answer which would be nothing else but "a slap in Wilson's face." Thus, Zinoviev's draft was read to the Soviets and approved in the following wording:

"The Russian Republic uses the occasion of the message of the President Wilson to express to all people who are doing and suffering from the horrors of this imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm conviction that the happy time is near when the laboring masses in all *bourgeois* countries will throw off the capitalistic yoke and establish a socialistic state of society which is the only one capable of assuring a permanent and just peace and wellbeing of all who toil."¹⁷²)

Carefully analyzed, this Russian Bolshevik answer to the message of President Wilson has to be classified as a rude provocation. The Congress of the Soviets ratified the Treaty of Berestya and passed several measures in support of the Bolshevik government in its cooperation with Germany. The Congress of the Soviets acted in the interest of strengthening the Bolshevik dictatorship. No price was too high for preservation and consolidation of power.*)

This action of the Congress of the Soviets and the prevailing attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward the representatives of Great Britain and France in Petrograd and Moscow put an end to the naive hope of the Western Democracies regarding the good will of the Bolsheviks. Shocked by the decision of the Soviets, the envoys of the Entente countries developed a fear that the Bolsheviks might hand them over to the Germans for some sort of bargaining purposes. Therefore, soon thereafter all diplomatic missions of the Entente countries closed their offices in Petrograd and Moscow and moved to the East in the direction of Vladivostok. On their way to the East, all of them stopped in Vologda and temporarily established there their missions.

Deterioration of the Sovnarkom-Entente relations

After the ratification of the Treaty of Berestya by the Congress of the Soviets in the middle of March, 1918, a peculiar situation developed as far as the relations between the Entente countries and the Soviet regime in Russia are concerned. While the countries

* Only a minority of the delegates in the Congress voted against ratification. This minority was comprised of all delegates of the Russian Party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries under the leadership of M. Spiridonova and Issac Z. Steinberg and a few left wing Bolsheviks.

of the Entente withheld recognition from the *Sovnarkom* as the legal government of Russia, at the same time their diplomatic missions continued to stay on the territory of Russia as ruled by the *Sovnar-kom*. Members of these diplomatic missions, especially the United States Ambassador Francis, started to emphasize on every occasion that their countries did not recognize the *Sovnarkom* to be the legal government of Russia. On the other hand, the *Sovnarkom* tolerated their presence on the territory of Soviet Russia as well as fully respected their diplomatic status.

The relations of the U.S. State Department toward the Soviet government in Russia at that time were cumbersome. The State Department was tortured by the questions: Is Soviet Russia now neutral since a separate peace treaty between Russia and Germany has been signed? Is Russia, or may Russia become, hostile to the Allies? Finally, on March 12, 1918, the State Department accepted the following stand:

“In the view of the Government of the United States, recent events have in no way altered the relations and obligations of this Government towards Russia. It does not feel justified in regarding Russia either as a neutral or as an enemy but continues to regard it as an ally. There is, in fact, no Russian government to deal with. The so called Soviet government upon which Germany has just forced or tried to force peace, was never recognized by this Government.

And the Government of the United States feels it is of the utmost importance as affecting the whole public opinion of the world and giving proof of the utter good faith of all the governments associated against Germany that we should continue to treat the Russians, in all respects, as our friends and allies against the common enemy.”¹⁷³)

Political and diplomatic logic of this document is somewhat different from general logic. It is anyway, a firm proof of a deep Russophile feeling in the U.S. State Department at that time. This logic and these feelings later had disastrous effects on the entire policy of all great Powers of the Entente.

It should be emphasized here that at the beginning of 1918 it was the problem of the separate peace of the Central Powers that was in the center of attention of the Entente countries' diplomats. They turned their attention to the problems of the socio-economic program of the Russian Communist Party, as well as, to the end objectives in the international relations, as far as the Russian Bolsheviks were concerned, somewhat later. The nationalization of the large business enterprises owned, up to that time, by foreign investors drew their initial serious attention because the *Sovnarkom* established the Soviet ownership without any compensation to the

foreign investors. On this occasion, diplomats of the Western Democracies planned to present a joint note of protest to the *Sovnarkom* but soon they realized that such a step would be useless.

The Bolshevik peace propaganda was seriously treated by the Entente diplomats as being more far-reaching in its consequences than the internal socio-economic and political system of Russia. Especially, the British ambassador in Russia was sensitive to the possible effects of the Bolshevik peace propaganda, and as early as January, 1918, communicated to the British government that, in his opinion, the Soviet Russia peace propaganda was threatening the integrity of the British Empire. He rightfully emphasized that this propaganda would endanger the British rule in India and Egypt.¹⁷⁴)

In this situation, after the ratification of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Congress of the Soviets, the *Sovnarkom* carefully followed diplomatic activities of the Entente Powers. The Russian Bolsheviks expected retaliation for their pro-German policies and feared that the governments of the Entente countries would initiate active support for the anti-Bolshevik forces inside Russia in their struggle against the Soviet regime. Therefore, the Soviet government carefully followed all activities of the Entente diplomats, especially their contacts with the Russian political leaders. The Bolshevik leaders regarded their victory over the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky as too easy one to be final. Besides, knowing their own weakness, they started to expect a general dissatisfaction among broad masses of the people with their dictatorship which might evolve into a general anti-Bolshevik mass revolution.

Soon thereafter the developments in Russia proved that the expectations of the Bolshevik leaders were correct. In the rural parts of Russia, anti-Bolshevik forces organized and developed their active resistance to the Soviet government.

There are two reasons why we should outline the policies and developments of this Russian anti-Bolshevik movement in this study. First of all, without analyzing the true nature of the Russian anti-Bolshevik parties and their political objectives, it would be impossible to properly understand the nature of the conflict between the Russian anti-Bolsheviks headed by Gen. Anton Denikin and the Ukrainian National Republic which defended its existence and liberty against the Russian Bolshevik aggression. Secondly, the analysis of the nature of the so-called White Russian movement of that time is inevitable for the proper understanding of the policies of the Entente countries toward "the Russian complex," which included in their view also Ukraine.

Let us digress into the direction of a brief treatment of these two vital problems.

The initial passivity of the Russian Democrats toward Bolshevism

The Bolsheviks seized political power in Petrograd from the Russian Provisional Government headed by Kerensky without any real obstacles.*) Due to their well planned and co-ordinated action, the power of the Provisional Government was overthrown in both major cities, Petrograd and Moscow, without serious resistance. The other ethnically Russian regions of the European part of the empire followed the example set in the major cities. The sole exceptions to this rule were the regions of the Don and Siberia which were dominated by the non-Russian ethnic elements.

All Russian anti-Tsarist forces believed that the Russian Constituent Assembly would decide upon the permanent form of the governmental system which in turn would restore law and order in the country. All non-monarchical political parties, including the "Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party of the Bolsheviks," had long fought for the calling of the Constituent Assembly as the supreme lawgiver of the country. The Provisional Government had, for some time, delayed the calling of the Assembly until the end of the war, but Kerensky's government yielded to popular demand and agreed to carry out elections of the delegates to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly while the war was still going on, setting the date for November 25, 1917.

In order to guarantee true representation of the will of the people in the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government of Kerensky promulgated a special election law regulating the electoral process of the delegates to the Assembly. The elections were to be based upon general and direct participation of citizens, equality, secrecy, and proportional representation. The multimember electoral districts made it possible even for the numerically small political groups to file a list of candidates with a great degree of probability of getting representation in the Constituent Assembly.

Being aware of the prevailing political climate in Russia at that time, the Bolshevik leaders had little hope of succeeding in electing a majority of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, they decided to seize control of the government of Russia by

*) As David Shub states in his study (*Lenin*, New York, 1948), an important role in the fall of the Kerensky government was played by the monarchist officers stationed in Petrograd and on the near to the capital city northern front. They stayed "neutral" in the struggle between Kerensky's government and Bolshevik coup for power. They were against both. But they believed they will quickly dispose of the Bolsheviks as well. This fact acknowledged also Trotsky, saying that "the majority of them were with us." (op. cit. pp. 262-263).

force a few weeks before the elections in order to be able to exert their influence on their outcome. Although in the time between November 7 and November 25, 1917, the Bolshevik leaders vigorously campaigned and organized their control on the electoral boards in the country, they failed to achieve anything close to a victorious majority. But, even though they lost the elections, they retained political power by using force.

In the face of the inability of the Bolsheviks to establish fully their dictatorship in the country, the elections were held in an atmosphere of relative freedom. The Bolsheviks received approximately 25 per cent of the total votes, while 62 per cent went to the moderate Socialists of various shades, with the Socialists-Revolutionaries receiving a predominant majority. The remaining 13 per cent were distributed among the Constitutional Democrats and other middle-class and conservative parties. Out of the total number of 36 million votes cast, the Socialists-Revolutionaries received almost 21 million, the Bolsheviks 9 million votes only, while the remaining 6 million votes were given for the lists of candidates of other political parties and non-Russian groups.¹⁷⁵) Thus, the Bolsheviks lost the first popular test.

The Bolshevik vote was concentrated largely in Petrograd, Moscow, and other industrial centers, while the Socialists-Revolutionaries gained great support in the rural districts where the Bolsheviks were not able yet to organize their apparatus of terror. The Bolsheviks were beaten even worse in Ukraine because they failed to get even 10 per cent of total votes cast in these elections.¹⁷⁶)

Being true to their principle of the dictatorship supported by force and condemning the principles of democracy, the Bolshevik leaders paid little attention to the loss of elections by their party. They were firmly determined to maintain political power in Russia by force of their newly organized loyal Red Guards. Therefore, the *Sovnarkom* made no statement to the effect of preventing the session of the Constituent Assembly which was to meet according to the law on January 18, 1918. However, they were preparing to force the Constituent Assembly to declare the Soviet form of government as the permanent constitutional form of government of Russia. Therefore, soon after the elections, the *Sovnarkom* began to persecute leaders of the opposition.

In the process of intimidation, a *Sovnarkom* proclamation of December 11, 1917, branded the Constitutional Democratic Party as "an organization of counterrevolutionary conspirators" and an "enemy of the people."¹⁷⁷) The same day, an order was issued to arrest leading members of the "Kadets" and to hand them over to the Revolutionary Tribunal. Lev Trotsky termed this action only as a modest beginning. On December 31, 1917, the already estab-

lished *Cheka**) arrested a large number of the active members of the Right Wing of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and the leading members of the Menshevik Party.**) Finally, the leading Bolsheviks used every occasion to threaten the delegates to the Constituent Assembly who would dare to act in the sessions contrary to the dictates of the *Sovnarkom*. They made no secrets about their intentions to disperse the Assembly if it failed to support their regime.¹⁷⁸⁾

It is difficult to understand the great degree of passivity on the part of the political forces of Russian Democracy in view of the ruthless threats of the Bolshevik power holders. They did not believe that the *Sovnarkom* would dare to disperse the Constituent Assembly representing the will of the people as expressed in elections under the governmental control of the Bolsheviks themselves. They simply believed that the will of the people was supreme, therefore the popularly elected representatives of the people would enjoy immunity as they would do so in any democratic country. Therefore, neither the Socialists-Revolutionaries, nor the Menshevik Social-Democrats or the Kadets had taken any preparatory steps to resist the *Sovnarkom* and its ruthless dictatorsip.

On January 18, 1918, the first and the only session of the Constituent Assembly took place at the Tauride Palace in Petrograd. The palace was heavily guarded and surrounded by trustworthy Bolshevik Red Guards. The Bolsheviks united with the Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries, but together they were able to muster only 136 votes while the Right Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries commanded 237 votes in adopting the agenda of the session and elections of the Constituent Assembly's officers. Having failed to gain the Assembly's majority to secure electing Vladimir Lenin, or some other Bolshevik leader, to the office of Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks and the Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries withdrew from the Assembly.

The Constituent Assembly, having the necessary quorum to transact business, remained in session under the elected chairmanship of Victor Mikhailovich Chernov and courageously continued to work until it was forcibly dispersed at five o'clock in the morning of January 19, 1918, *in sine die*. On the very same day, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was dominated by the Bolsheviks, issued a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly on the grounds that it served as a cover for "the *bourgeois* counter-revolution in its efforts to crush the power of the Soviets." That was the end of the Russian experiment in the democratic process.^{178a)}

*) In Russian: "Chrezvychaynaya Kommisia." From these two words comes the acronym "Cheka."

***) "Menshevik" = belonging to the minority of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party.

Chernov's attempt to organize resistance

After the Bolshevik Red Guards dispersed the Constituent Assembly meeting in Petrograd, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, commanding a majority of the delegates, felt the responsibility of carrying out the will of the electorate. In a secretly held meeting of the Party's Central Committee, it was decided that the cities of Moscow and Petrograd, as well as almost all other cities in Central Russia, were lost to the cause of democracy because the Bolsheviks had succeeded in organizing there trustworthy armed units. According to the decision of the Party's Central Committee, the anti-Bolshevik action center was to be established far away from the centers of the Bolshevik power in the peripheral districts of Russia. After proper analysis of the situation, the regions of the Ural Mountains and the Volga River Valley were chosen as the future seat of the action.¹⁷⁹⁾

A serious thought was given in the meeting of the Socialists-Revolutionaries to establishing the seat of the Russian Constituent Assembly in Ukraine where the Bolsheviks had virtually no stronghold at all at that time. However, it was established that the elected delegates from Ukraine did not participate in the Constituent Assembly of Russia because they aimed at the establishment of the sovereign Ukrainian State.¹⁸⁰⁾ Therefore, this idea was dropped. On the other hand, in the Ural-Volga region the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries were strongly organized and enjoyed genuine Russian popular support. Therefore, that region could best serve as the center of anti-Bolshevik activities in order to restore a truly popularly supported government of Russia.

In accordance with the plans of the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries, the elected delegates to the Constituent Assembly belonging to the anti-Bolshevik parties were to move secretly and settle in the Ural-Volga region, and at an opportune time the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly would summon the second session of the Constituent Assembly to continue its interrupted work. It was planned to appoint there the government of Russia responsible to the popularly elected representatives which would organize and lead the Russian people in their struggle against the *Sovnarkom*. From the legal and theoretical point of view, this was a viable plan. The leader of the Russian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, Victor M. Chernov, was duly elected Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and the majority of all delegates elected to the Constituent Assembly were Socialists-Revolutionaries. However, as long as the forces of the Constituent Assembly had no sufficient military power under their command to defend this popularly elected institution against the Bolsheviks, this plan remained purely theoretical.

The Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries and their political allies planned in January, 1918, not only to establish a government of Russia under their control, but their end objective was to preserve the Russian control over all ethnically non-Russian parts of the former Russian Empire as well as to seize Dardanelles and Bosphorus from Turkey and incorporate them into the new Russian state.¹⁸¹⁾ In order to achieve all of these end objectives, the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries needed military aid from the Entente countries. Therefore, they continued to advocate Russian participation in the war against Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria. Thus, Chernov and his followers embarked upon a very unpopular policy among the war-tired Russian masses, the policy of unconditional continuation of war against the Central Powers. It should be added here that the armistice between the Russian army and the military forces of the Central Powers was in force from the beginning of December, 1917, and after a span of peace on the battle front, the idea of restoring regular war activities was quite unpopular.

It was the idea of Russian imperialism that blinded the leaders of the Russian democratic forces. In this respect, they followed the policy of the Tsarist regime. The most important reason why they opposed the immediate ending of the war with the Central Powers was the application of the principle of national self-determination with regard to the non-Russian nations held previously in captivity by Russian Tsardom. The representatives of the Central Powers, in their peace negotiations with the delegates of the Russian *Sovnarkom*, insisted upon Russian recognition of the right of Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Byelorussia to establish their sovereign national states embracing their ethnic territories held previously by the Russian Empire.

Victor Chernov and other leaders of the Russian Constituent Assembly realized that they were helpless in pursuit of the realization of their end objectives without political, financial, and especially military support from the countries of the Entente. Therefore, they advocated the restoration of the Russian military operations against Austria-Hungary- Germany, Turkey, etc. even after the Treaty of Berestya was signed on March 3, 1918, by the *Sovnarkom* on behalf of Russia as well as after its ratification by the Congress of the Soviets less than two weeks later.¹⁸²⁾ Victor Chernov made no secrecy about his reasons for desiring a continuation of war against the Central Powers. The Entente, in return, was to assure the Russian continuation of their annexation of the non-Russian nationalities of the empire as well as help them to extend their domination over new territories.

In their planning of the uprising against the Bolshevik regime with the help of the Entente, the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries

tried to make sure that externally they would get all credit for the liberation of Russia from the Bolshevik yoke. While they expected technical, financial and later also military aid from the Entente Powers, the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries were on guard against any interference from the Entente in the internal affairs of Russia.¹⁸³) They expected the Entente Powers to respect fully Russian sovereignty and, therefore, would not agree to any action on the part of the Entente indicating characteristic of a protectorate over Russia or anything of that kind.

According to the plans of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the struggle against the Bolshevik regime in Russia was to be regarded as a purely Russian internal affair. Therefore, even though they realized that they could not succeed without Entente's military participation, Chernov and his followers insisted that the Russian anti-Bolshevik military units alone should be engaged in the direct battle against the Bolshevik forces while the troops of the Entente on the Russian soil should serve in the background of the front protecting the major roads, communications, and providing technical help. The leaders of the Constituent Assembly insisted upon a formal declaration from the Entente Powers, issued before the entry of their military units into Russia, promising that their military authorities would not interfere in any of the Russian internal affairs while on Russian soil and that the countries of the Entente would not retain any part of Russian territory after the end of their mission of helping the Russians to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.¹⁸⁴)

In the view of the leaders of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, the success of the struggle against the Bolsheviks was possible only if the struggle preserved its purely Russian character. The oppressive Bolshevik regime was to be abolished by the Russian people alone. An open participation of the military units of the Entente in the fight against the Bolshevik forces would have provided the Bolshevik propagandists with the emotional, nationalistic issue that the struggle against Communism was instigated by foreigners, and not by the Russian people.¹⁸⁵) Thus, these Russian leaders were cautious.

While Victor M. Chernov and his Socialist-Revolutionary followers pretended to speak on behalf of the majority of the Constituent Assembly, actually they were left alone in their attempts to organize military uprising and were limited to their own party followers. The Russian Social-Democratic Mensheviks did not have in mind supporting any military uprising against the *Sovnarkom*. They adopted a policy of a "loyal opposition" to the policies of the *Sovnarkom* as if the Bolshevik leaders were believers in the Western style parliamentary democracy. The leaders of the Mensheviks remained in Petrograd and Moscow, and limited their activities to

issuing statements to the foreign diplomats and journalists concerning their platform as the loyal opposition within the existing political institutions.¹⁸⁶)

Thus, even the Russian democratic Socialists were far from being united in their actions against the Bolshevik dictatorship.

The Russian middle-class leaders decide to collaborate with the Germans

The leaders of the Russian Constitutional Party headed by Prof. Pavel (Paul) Milyukov decided to fight the *Sovnarkom* immediately after the Bolshevik military seizure of power. The Kadets realized limitations of their own forces in a struggle with the fanatic Bolsheviks, therefore from the very beginning they hoped to include the military participation of the Entente in this struggle.¹⁸⁷) However, this party unity concerning the future struggle for liberation of Russia from Bolshevism soon changed.

After the Treaty of Berestya was signed and ratified, the leaders of "the Party of National Liberty," the new official name of the formerly established Russian Constitutional Democratic Party, tried to be pragmatic. While some of them still maintained contacts with the Western Democracies, especially with the American diplomatic representatives, others turned their attention to imperial Germany. More so since at that time the German and Austrian troops moved into Ukraine on the invitation of the government of Ukraine for the purpose of helping the Ukrainians to defend their national sovereignty against the Russian Bolshevik military invasion. Thus, the Kadet leaders split into two factions, one pro-Entente, and the other pro-German. Of course, both sought the same objective!

The Germanophile Kadet leaders secretly left the Russian ethnic territory dominated by the *Sovnarkom* and moved into Ukraine governed first by the coalition parties of the moderate democratic Socialists united in the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and after the April, 1918, *coup d'etat*, by Pavlo Skoropadskyy. The ideological leader of the Kadets, Paul Milyukov, sided with the pro-German faction of the party leadership and moved into Ukraine in order to establish contacts with the Germans. This new policy of a considerable faction of the Russian *bourgeois* democrats was observed with anxiety by the United States Ambassador in Russia, Francis, who informed Washington of the pro-German actions of the Russian "patriots."¹⁸⁸)

It should be emphasized at this point that the Constitutional Democratic Party associated within its ranks the elements of the centralistic Russian nationalism respecting to some extent the democratic processes. Among the party members were the leaders of

the Russian intellectual elite and a good number of the Russian university professors. It was especially this elite of the party that strongly favored the pro-German orientation at that point of Russian history. And, the contacts with the Germans, as well as the negotiations with the German military command, were headed by the party leader, Professor Paul Milyukov.¹⁸⁹⁾ Unfortunately, it was the very same group of Russian intellectuals who later blamed the leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* for collaboration with the Germans, when they were forced to do this because of the invasion by the Red army. As has been indicated already, the Ukrainians had then hardly any other choice.

In order to redirect attention of the interested observers of the activities of the Kadet leaders, the Central Committee members of the party residing in the Bolshevik ruled territories met secretly in Moscow on May 12, 1918, and issued a declaration stating that the Party Central Committee would not turn to Germany for help for overthrowing the *Sovnarkom* and establishing a non-Bolshevik government in Russia.¹⁹⁰⁾ This might have served two additional purposes of intensifying the interest of the American political circles, as well as to have on hand a document which might have proved some degree of neutrality of the party members in case of their apprehension by the Bolshevik *Cheka*.

The United States Ambassador Francis who maintained close contacts with the representatives of the Russian *bourgeois* political parties was well informed about the pro-German attitude of a considerable part of the Russian intellectuals and *bourgeoisie*. In this situation, Francis reported to Washington that having lost any hope of the Entente's intervention, the former pro-Entente circles were forced to switch to the pro-German camp in order to free their country from Bolshevism.¹⁹¹⁾ The United States Ambassador collected information not only in his direct contacts with the leaders of the Russian "patriotic circles," as he called the Russian nationalistic *bourgeoisie* and intellectuals, but also relied upon information gathered for him by the American Consul General in Moscow. According to the report of Ambassador Francis, on May 18, 1918, the United States Consul General informed him, via a coded telegram, that the dominant attitude of the Russian "patriotic circles" in Moscow was in favor of collaborating with the Germans who would intervene against the Soviet regime in Russia.¹⁹²⁾ This report indicates that the Kadet party declaration of May 12, 1918, passed in Moscow, was to serve only as a defense against ruthless Bolshevik persecution.

Ambassador Francis' report indicates the prevailing understanding among the American diplomats of the pro-German attitude of the Russian *bourgeoisie* in the spring of 1918. The pro-German

attitude of these Russian nationalistic circles, especially those intellectual elite of the Kadets, and their willingness to collaborate with the Germans in the struggle for liberation of Russia from the Bolshevik dictatorship, was not condemned by the Entente diplomats as morally or otherwise wrong under the existing circumstances. More so since they continued to honor these circles by calling them "the patriots." And yet, the war between Germany and the Entente was still going on.

The British diplomats applied somewhat different policies toward the situation in Russia. They concentrated their contacts with the Russian democratic Socialists commanding the majority in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. As it shall be outlined in this study later, they granted their financial and military support against the Bolshevik dictatorship to these political forces of Russia. Chronologically, this was realized during the summer of 1918. Therefore, we shall delay our treatment of this problem to a later chapter in this study.

At this point we shall turn our attention to the Russian efforts to secure German support in the struggle against the *Sovnar-kom*.



CHAPTER 4

THE RUSSIAN "WHITE ARMY"

Germany supports organization of the Russian "White Army"

After the November Revolution, i.e. the Bolshevik seizure of power in the major centers of the ethnically European Russian territory of the former Russian Empire, the supporters of the Kerensky government were dispersed completely and they never re-emerged, by their own efforts, as an organized force of any significance. The supporters of the restoration of the Tsarist Empire, on the other hand, were able to organize military units from among their followers who had escaped to territories not under the Bolshevik domination, especially Ukraine and the Don Cossack State. However, they were able to organize these forces (the Russian Volunteer Army) only with the open support of the German military authorities or with their tacit consent. The organization of the Russian Volunteer Army met with the objections of the national governments of the non-Russian nations.

The Russian "White Army" collaborated tacitly with the Germans, although Tsarist diplomats abroad collaborated with the Entente in the hope of gaining its help in the restoration of the pre-war Tsarist Empire.*)

The Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik front

Long before any serious attempt to organize the pro-Entente Russians to fight against Bolshevik tyranny was made, the struggle against Bolshevism was well organized among the nationally minded non-Russian nationalities claiming their national sovereignty. The leadership of resistance to this new form of Russian imperialism was assumed by the Ukrainians, the second largest nation among the freed nations of the former Russian Empire.

*) The formal name of this Army was "The Russian Volunteer Army." Later on, it was called the "Volunteer Army of the South of Russia." Much later and while in emigration, the Commander of this Army, General Anton Denikin, wrote the history of his Army, he himself gave the title of his book "White Army" (London, 1930).

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* formulated the constitutional rights of the Ukrainian people by establishing the Ukrainian National Republic through the Third Universal of November 20, 1917, and formally assumed full sovereignty of the Ukrainian State through the Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918. The independence of Ukraine was opposed not only by the Tsarist Russian imperialists but also by the new Russian imperialists under the leadership of Vladimir I. Lenin. This time, in the name of the "universal solidarity of the working class."

From the very beginning of its seizure of power in Russia, the Soviet of the People's Commissars (the *Sovnarkom*) of Russia wished to eliminate the existence of an independent national Ukrainian State. As soon as five weeks after the seizure of power in Petrograd, on December 17, 1917, Lenin's *Sovnarkom* delivered an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* demanding virtual capitulation. After the legally established government of Ukraine rejected Lenin's ultimatum, the Russian *Sovnarkom* immediately initiated the military conquest of Ukraine. The entire military power of Soviet Russia was turned against the relatively weak forces of the Ukrainian National Republic. Besides the specially organized units of the "Red Guards," almost all remnants of the pre-Bolshevik Russian military forces followed the orders of Lenin's war machine. They all were united in the desire to prevent the independence of Ukraine and to subjugate her to Russian domination.

Thus, the military forces of the Ukrainian National Republic were forced to conduct a defensive war on two separate fronts. After the armistice agreement between the *Sovnarkom* and the German Empire was concluded at the beginning of December, 1917, the military units loyal to the Ukrainian National Republic were the only military force holding the Eastern front against the German armies. Now, in the face of the lack of effective military support from the Entente Powers against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces in Ukraine from the West and the Russian Bolsheviks from the North, the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic decided to defend the sovereignty of the country through peace with the Germans and Austrians. After all, the Ukrainians fought for their national self-preservation and defended their country against the Russian reconquest.

Just as the *Sovnarkom* concluded an armistice with the Central Powers without consultation with the government of Ukraine, so was Ukraine forced to begin also peace negotiations with them at Berestya. In order to protect the sovereign interests of the Ukrainian National Republic, the government of Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers on February 9, 1918. Thus,

the Ukrainian National Republic was relieved of her military activities on her Western front. However, the activities on her North-Eastern front were intensifying from day to day. As a matter of fact, the invading Russian Bolshevik forces were at the gates of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, at the time of signing the peace treaty.

Facing the complete annihilation of the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian people by the invading Russian Bolshevik armies, the government of Ukraine decided to turn to the peoples of Austria and Germany for military support against the Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian offer was accepted, and a treaty of mutual military assistance against the Russian Bolshevik aggression was signed between Ukraine, Austria, and Germany. The treaty conditions were quite honorable for the Ukrainian National Republic and practical for her contracting partners. In defense for survival as a sovereign nation, Ukraine needed military support, while Germany and Austria were in great need of bread.

As a result of the mutual military assistance treaty, the military units of Austria and Germany supported the Ukrainian Army and they together stopped the Russian Bolshevik advance and then threw the Soviet armies back. By the middle of April, 1918, Ukraine was once again free from the Russian domination.

In the course of the counteroffensive by the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, supported by the allied forces of the Central Powers, the Russian Bolshevik invaders were forced to retreat not only from the territory of Ukraine but also from the territories of the Don Cossack State. As a result, the northern frontiers of the Don Cossack State were guarded against the Soviet Russian intrusions by the allied German military units. Thus, protected from the North, the Don Cossacks organized their military units, under the command of their supreme commander, Ataman Piotr Krasnov who succeeded the Don Cossack leader, Alexei Kaledin, who had committed suicide.

The German military forces cleared the territory of the Don Cossack State by the middle of May, 1918, of all organized military units of the Russian Bolshevik invaders. On May 8, 1918, they defeated Bolshevik troops at Rostov and occupied the city. In these German operations on the Don, a Russian anti-Bolshevik military unit under the command of Drozdovsky participated. This unit, consisting of 1,051 men, among whom there were 667 officers, and only 384 rank and file soldiers (along with some civil servant officials), retreated as an organized unit from the Rumanian front and succeeded in surviving as a unit.¹⁹³) This unit played an important role in the future developments in the Don Region.

Formation of the "Volunteer Army"

After the leaders of the defeated Russian Tsarist Army realized the true nature of Lenin's Bolshevik regime, they started to organize themselves for the restoration of the Tsarist Russian Empire. There were no attempts to organize such a "Volunteer Army" until January, 1918. Leaders of this movement were not in a position to organize supporters of their program in the Russian ethnic territories because of widely dominating pro-Bolshevik sympathies among the Russian popular masses. Thus, they faced no choice but to start their work on the territory of Kuban Region, within the Don Cossack State or in Siberia. Most of them escaped to these countries anyhow.

The objectives of the organizers of the Russian "Volunteer Army" were to reestablish the Tsarist régime within the restored "united indivisible Russia." Therefore, they could not possibly ask the government of the Ukrainian National Republic for permission to develop their actions in Ukraine. Their objectives were directed against the very existence of the Ukrainian National Republic and they could not have expected this government of Ukraine to support them unless they were willing to actually recognize the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. And, the organizers of the Volunteer Army were not willing to do this.

The only alternative for the Russian Tsarist officers remained to turn to the government of the Don Cossack State, headed by Ataman Kaledin who granted the request.

The leading initiators and organizers of the Russian Volunteer Army were Generals Mikhail Alekseyev, L. Kornilov, Alexei Lukomsky, and Anton Denikin. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was appointed in the person of General Lavrenty Kornilov.¹⁹³) During the first two months of their efforts, in January and February of 1918, the generals succeeded in organizing some four thousand volunteers to fight under the old Russian flag. Gen. Kornilov was killed on the front and his post assumed Gen. Denikin.

One of the basic principles of this organization was the voluntary participation of men who were willing to fight against the Bolshevik regime for restoration of the "one indivisible Russia." It is to be emphasized at this point that the Volunteer Army's purpose was solely the struggle for restoration of the pre-war Tsarist Russian Empire. Its leaders did not intend to maintain solidarity with the Powers of the Entente and to continue their operations at the "Eastern" front against the Central Powers. Struggle against the internal enemies of the "united indivisible Russia" and her old system was their only objective. Thus, the hopes of the Entente Powers were not realized.

The Russian Volunteer Army in the beginning consisted, in its majority, of the Tsarist officers. In the first months of the existence of this army the rank-and-file soldiers constituted a minority. Nevertheless, this Army was subject to demoralization. Hopelessness was the main cause of the disaster. In his memoirs, General Denikin attempts to minimize this problem by stating that the Army was not properly prepared for the very cold winter. Nevertheless, Denikin admits that this army "thawed, simply melted away, day by day."¹⁹⁴) Thus, the army in the beginning lacked stability in its composition.

When the Russian Bolshevik military forces intensified their offensive in January, 1918, not only against the Ukrainian National Republic but also against the Don Cossack State, the Don Cossack military units were demoralized to such an extent that they failed to resist the Bolshevik aggression and dispersed to their homes. This situation caused the Don Cossack Ataman Alexei Kaledin to commit suicide. Neither did the Russian Volunteer Army engage at that time in the fight against the advancing Bolsheviks in the Don Region. It decided to retreat to the South, toward Kuban, where its leaders hoped to establish a firm Army base. However, the Bolshevik units were advancing very fast and forced the Volunteer Army to fight near Katerynodar. In this battle, in April, 1918, the Army's Commander in Chief, General Kornilov, was killed and was succeeded by General Anton Denikin.

After the Germans cleared the Don Region of the Bolshevik forces in May, 1918, the independent Don Cossack State, headed by the newly elected *Ataman*, was restored and Ataman Krasnov resumed the authority of the head of the State. Ataman Krasnov granted, again, permission to organize the Russian Volunteer Army within the Don Cossack State. Thus, the Volunteer Army was organized and trained under the protection of the German military forces which protected the Don Cossack Region. It is beyond any imagination to think that Gen. Denikin intended, at that time, to fight against the Germans for the restoration of the "Eastern front" in collaboration with the Powers of the Entente. Quite to the contrary, it was the presence of the German military forces at the boundaries of the Don Cossack State that made it possible for General Denikin to organize his volunteers.

It was only later that General Denikin tried to distort the truth claiming that neither he nor his followers collaborated with the Germans at any time between November 1917 and November 1918. This was done by him in the interest of his new, pro-Entente policy. As a proof, he cited in his book, *The White Army*, his own order to the Volunteer Army given during the time of the presence of the German military forces in the Don Cossack Region, which read: "Have no dealing what so ever with the Commanding Staff

of the enemy power." If this order ever had been given, then we can read in it a sort of double-talk from the general, to say the least.

The Russian Volunteer Army was organized and trained fully under the protective wings of the Germans in the Don Region. General Denikin was fully aware of the fact that, without the generous protection of the Germans, his Army had no chance to be organized whatsoever. If for some reason Denikin ordered members of his higher command to avoid relations with the German Commanding Staff, then he still made it possible for the local units of the Volunteer Army to maintain contacts with the Germans because the Germans were there. Besides, the higher commanding officers of the Denikin army were relieved of the relations with the Germans anyhow, since all contacts with the German Staff within the Don Cossack State were maintained by the Don Cossack government.

Thus, the cited order of Denikin was meaningless in reality.

Denikin's pro-German attitude

The government of the Don Cossack State, headed by Ataman Krasnov, formally controlled the country. However, both the Germans and the Russian Volunteer Army influenced the Don Cossack government. About the pro-German tendencies of the Ataman Krasnov Government Gen. Denikin stated:

"Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Krasnov, was friendly inclined toward them [the Germans], thinking they would preserve that territory from Bolshevism."¹⁹⁵)

In his solemn letter to Kaiser Wilhelm, Ataman Krasnov asked for German protection for the Don Cossack State. At the same time, the Ataman supported the idea of the Don Cossack sovereignty in an alliance with the peoples of the North Caucasus. In his letter to the Kaiser, Ataman Krasnov wrote:

Friendship cemented by the bloodshed on the common battle fields by the warlike German and Cossack troops will become a powerful force for the struggle against all our foes.¹⁹⁶)

Denikin himself testified about this attitude of Ataman Krasnov. The expression "all our foes" in Krasnov's letter included not only the Russian Bolsheviks, but also the Powers of the Entente. The leaders of the Russian Volunteer Army collaborated with Ataman Krasnov and enjoyed his protection. Therefore, it might be concluded that without the German and the pro-German Don Cossack protection it would have been impossible to organize the Russian Volunteer Army of General Denikin.

Thus, General Denikin followed the mainstream of all other anti-Bolshevik forces in Eastern Europe which, in their fight against Bolshevik annihilation, were forced to cooperate with the Central Powers dominated by Germany. During these turbulent times of the struggle for survival, such a policy was followed also by the government of the Ukrainian State, as well as, by the moderate Russian political groups which had not yet abandoned their struggle against Bolshevism.

At the time of the advancement of German and Austrian troops to the East in the early spring of 1918, there was nothing in the way of the Russian Volunteer Army under the leadership of Generals Alekseyev, Kornilov and Denikin to fight against the German troops. However, the Volunteer Army remained inactive. Generals Alekseyev and Denikin realized that the advancing armies of the Central Powers still were in such a form that no Russian units were capable of successfully resisting them. Most Russian units which still were in existence at that time desired peace and to return to their families. Thus, psychologically they were not capable of fighting. On the other hand, the anti-Bolshevik Russian generals realized that any attempt to stop the advancing Austrian and German troops at that time would only strengthen the military positions of the Bolsheviks. Therefore, at that time, no anti-Bolshevik forces offered resistance to the advancing Austrian and German troops.

Ukraine, the Germans, Denikin and other non-Russian nations

The danger of Bolshevik annihilation was deemed by all existing decidedly anti-Bolshevik forces so great that they were willing to cooperate even with the devil for the sake of eliminating that danger. Unfortunately, later after the breakdown of the Central Powers, the Russian politicians attempted to blame only the anti-Russian national independence movement leaders for their pro-German attitude. The Russian, as well as, the Polish claimants of the Ukrainian lands concentrated their attacks against the government of Ukraine for having invited the Austrian and German troops to help Ukraine in her struggle against Bolshevism.

Defending their newly won sovereign rights in their independent national states, not only the Ukrainians but also other freed nations of the former Russian Empire were forced to turn for military support to the Central Powers which still were in a state of war with the Powers of the Entente. They freed themselves from the Tsarist Russian imperialism but after Lenin seized power, they were faced

with the imperialism of the Russian Bolsheviks. As mentioned above, the Entente Powers were not in a position, at that time, to render effective military aid to the newly established sovereign countries. Thus, they had no other choice because they realized the inadequacy of their own defensive possibilities.

Simultaneously with their military aggression against the Ukrainian National Republic in the second half of December, 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks attacked also militarily Finland, whose national sovereignty was proclaimed on December 9, 1917. The imperialistically minded Russian *Sovnarkom* sent the Russian Bolshevik troops into Finland from the Russian held territories, while at the same time, its agents organized an armed uprising from within the Finnish Republic. At that time, the Finnish military units were still only in the embryonic stage of their organization, and they were not able to defend their newly freed country against the fanatic Bolsheviks alone. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish military forces and the Head of the Government of Finland, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, had no choice but to appeal to the German Emperor for military support in the fight against the aggressors. Mannerheim's request was granted, and several German divisions together with the Finnish national units successfully repelled the invading Russian Bolshevik forces.¹⁹⁷⁾

In the spring of 1918, Georgia, too, found it inevitable to ask Germany for help in her self-defense against the Russian Bolshevik aggressors. It is true that Georgia was at that time still in somewhat a better position than Ukraine or Finland. Georgia enjoyed some Turkish support for some time and was in a position to organize her own military forces. Nevertheless, the Georgian military forces alone were too weak to withstand the Russian Bolshevik aggression. Facing grim reality, the social-democratic government of Georgia appealed to Germany for military support. The Imperial Government of Germany sent German troops to Georgia, as well as, its diplomatic mission. This action was approved by the German Parliament on June 24, 1918, which also granted diplomatic recognition to the sovereign Georgian Republic.¹⁹⁸⁾

Under the protective wings of the German military units defending the boundaries of the Don Cossack State, opportunity was given not only to organize the Don Cossack military units but also the military forces of Denikin's Volunteer Army as well as other military units on the territories between the Don River and Georgia. It is worth mentioning that in July, 1918, the Don Cossack army consisted of some 40,000 men and possessed 50 artillery cannons.¹⁹⁹⁾

Under the existing conditions in that area at that time, an army of 40,000 disciplined men constituted a meaningful force. It

should be pointed out that although the Don Cossacks externally claimed to defend their sovereignty, in reality, however, their government regarded itself as an integral part of the Russian White movement. It should also be pointed out here that the Don Cossacks, at that time, regarded themselves as an allied force with the Central Powers against the Powers of the Entente. The units of the Volunteer Army were no exception.

It is unfortunate that a man of the stature of General Denikin tried to deny the existing reality as far as his Volunteer Army was concerned, after the victory of the Entente Powers over the Central Powers. He emphasized that the Volunteer Army abstained from anti-German demonstrations, and maintained a position of "an armed neutrality."²⁰⁰) However, an objective observer must see that the then political reality was somewhat different than presented by Denikin.

Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Krasnov, performed almost dictatorial functions in the Don Cossack State from May 11, 1918, when he was authorized to carry out these powers by the Don Cossack Great Circle. The Ataman fully collaborated with Germany politically and with the German military forces stationed in the Don Cossack State militarily. With full consent of the Germans, Ataman Krasnov helped to organize the Russian Volunteer Army headed by General Denikin. Formally, the Germans helped to organize the Don Cossack military units, and Ataman Krasnov, the head of the Don Cossack State, in turn, helped General Denikin to organize and equip the Volunteer Army. Thus, in June, 1918, the Volunteer Army consisted of some 9,000 men and was equipped with 21 artillery cannons.²⁰¹)


Germany purposely helped to organize and arm the Russian Tsarist military units in the Don River region. At that time, they pursued a policy of cooperation with the Russian forces aiming at restoration of the Tsarist Russian Empire and turned their back on the newly established sovereign countries of the various non-Russian nations established on the ruins of the fallen Tsarist Empire. In the German official circles prevailed the political idea of Otto Bismarck that Germany should maintain friendly relations with Russia. This new attitude of the German official circles made it possible for the Russian supporters of the restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia" to organize considerable military power within the Don Cossack State. Not only the forces of Denikin, but also the forces under command of Ataman Krasnov were preparing to fight for the realization of that idea.

For the very same reason, the Germans hindered organization of the Ukrainian national military forces. The attitude of the Germans had not changed even after the regime of Hetman Pavlo Sko-

ropadskyy replaced the moderate socialistic regime of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* headed by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy in April, 1918. In spite of the friendly attitude of the Hetman regime toward Germany, the German military command in Ukraine prevented the serious organization of the Ukrainian national military forces. At the same time, they pressured the Hetman to grant permission to organize the Russian monarchistic military units loyal to Gen. Denikin. Thus, organized Denikin units in Ukraine later plotted to overthrow the government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy in their effort of subjugating Ukraine to the Russian domination.²⁰²)

In cooperation with the Germans, General Denikin tried to strengthen his influence in the Caucasus region. In September, 1918, he succeeded in concluding treaties of mutual assistance with the governments of Georgia and Kuban for their struggle against Bolshevism. Thus, Germany effectively helped to regenerate a sizeable Russian White Army which later on turned mainly against the newly established national states of the non-Russian nations which were previously oppressed by the Russian Tsarist regime. It was not only the Russian Bolshevik regime against which General Denikin led his newly organized forces. His Volunteer Army concentrated also in its aggression against the independent Ukrainian State.

This might have been the most tragic mistake of this century. Who knows? Probably, if united, the anti-Bolshevik forces of all nations could have defeated the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, history has shown that Denikin's White Army, organized in Ukraine, the Don Cossack State, and the Northern Caucasus regions, was destined to play a different role. A still different role was played by the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces organized in the territories of ethnic Russia and in Siberia.



CHAPTER 5

ANTI-BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA AND SIBERIA

The people of Siberia initiate struggle against Bolshevik regime

While the newly established independent nations in the European part of the former Russian Empire developed anti-Bolshevik resistance immediately after Lenin's seizure of power in Russia, the resistance to the Bolshevik regime within the ethnically Russian territories developed somewhat later. Independent Ukraine, Finland, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Don Cossack State, Kuban, etc. defended, first of all, their national sovereignty against the new form of Russian imperialistic aggression. However, from the very beginning, these independent republics also defended the democratic system of government against the threat of the imposition by the Bolsheviks proclaimed system of the dictatorship of the "proletariat."

The Ukrainian National Republic, the Byelorussian National Republic, Finland and other (newly established free) states defended their right to self-determination and carried out socio-economic reforms gradually within the limits of law based upon consent of the people. Also the peoples of Siberia, Turkestan, the Don Region, and other territories where the Russian ethnic element was not strong, rejected Bolshevism in defense of the newly-won democracy and socio-economic freedoms. The ethnically Russian element in these areas was mostly influenced by the strong opposition to the Bolshevik system by the non-Russians.

After their seizure of power in Petrograd and Moscow the Bolsheviks immediately tried to establish their control in the other parts of the former Russian Empire. First of all, they tried to establish their control in the vast territories of Siberia. They moved systematically from their centers of power, Petrograd and Moscow, into the Volga River regions and subsequently into Siberia. However, they encountered there resistance and were not able to subjugate these regions neither by the end of 1917 nor in the beginning of 1918. At that time, the European part of the ethnically Russian territories was already firmly under Lenin's domination.

The population of Siberia very strongly adhered to its tradition of free village farming and strongly rooted individualism. Lenin's Bolshevism desired to destroy these traditions. No wonder that the Siberians organized resistance to the dictatorship of Bolshevism. The regime was not able to subjugate the city of Vladivostok and the Pacific coast regions. A regional administration with the *Zemstvo* Assembly in Vladivostok was developed to defend the region against Bolshevism. The Assembly consisted of the delegates from the local and county *Zemstvos* and it emanated an Executive Committee to carry out governmental functions.²⁰³) This governing body did not recognize the authority of the Russian *Sovnarkom* and exercised self-government.

This Siberian self-governing administration enjoyed the moral support of the Entente diplomats who, in part, moved to Vladivostok after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd. They supported this Siberian anti-Bolshevik movement through personal contacts with the Vladivostok Government as well as through official relations. In addition, effective support was granted to the Vladivostok Government soon in the form of military aid in the struggle against the Bolshevik regime.

The military forces loyal to the Vladivostok Government were organized by Ataman Grigori Semyonov and General Kharvat. These forces were organized basically for the purpose of local self-defense rather than with an objective to developing an effective struggle for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime in Russia. No wonder then that when, on December 30, 1917, a Japanese military ship arrived in Vladivostok, the local authorities protested against its violation of the sovereign rights of the Russian Republic. Thus, the political objectives of the Vladivostok Government, at that time, were still not fully crystallized. Soon thereafter, on January 16, 1918, the official representatives of the United States and Great Britain, residing at that time in Vladivostok, notified the Vladivostok Government that the Allied Powers, including Japan, would maintain their war ships in the port of Vladivostok unless the security of the citizens of the Allied Powers could be effectively guaranteed²⁰⁴) The official notes protested against attacks on the citizens of the Allied Powers as well as their institutions in Vladivostok and the vicinity.*)

Soon thereafter, another Japanese war ship arrived in the port of Vladivostok to be followed by a British cruiser as well as by another Japanese war ship. This was the beginning of the Allied support of local authorities in the Far East in their defense against the Bolshevik threat.

*) Ataman Semyonov was of Buriat nationality.

The Ukrainian settlers of the Far Eastern part of Siberia, *Zelenyy Klyn*,*) vigorously defended their peasant traditions against the encroachment of the Bolshevik order. Their attitude influenced various Cossack formations, as well as, the Russian population of the region. This encouraged the ruling Russian political parties and the Vladivostok Government to reduce the existing Soviets of the Working and Village People's deputies to the status of private organizations. Thus, the Bolshevik organized Soviets were deprived of the status of the ruling councils. Such was the situation in that area at the beginning of March, 1918.²⁰⁵) No doubt, the presence of the war ships of the Allied Powers in Vladivostok encouraged the population to resist the Bolshevik claims.

However, it should be emphasized that while the Far Eastern Siberia defended its autonomy, it had no intentions of organizing a serious struggle against the Russian *Sovnarkom*, nor against its domination over the rest of Siberia. The Far Eastern Siberians regarded themselves least capable to lead the Russian people in their fight against the Bolshevik rule in the European centers of the former Russian Empire. Neither were they strong enough to carry out such an enormous objective, nor had they shown much inclination to mingle in affairs outside of their region.

Anyway, the Far Eastern Siberia was not able to serve as a center for the formation of an effective fighting force to continue the war against Germany as was so much desired by the Entente Powers. Only the European part of the fallen Russian Empire could have been realistically treated as able to reestablish the "Eastern front." Therefore, the Entente Powers decided to concentrate upon the Russian anti-Bolsheviks who had not given up hope for the restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia."

The only attempt to overthrow the Sovnarkon in Russia proper.

In the spring of 1918, the statesmen and diplomats of the Allied Powers finally concluded that the Russian Bolshevik forces in no way could be induced to re-enter the war against the Central Powers. Quite to the contrary, the Allied Powers feared that the Soviets might indirectly help the Central Powers in the war against the Entente. Finally the illusions of some diplomats of the Entente Powers who were still staying in Soviet Russia about the true

*) The Ukrainian name means literally — "green wedge," i.e. a triangular land.

intentions of the *Sovnarkom* disappeared. It was the United States diplomat D. Robins,²⁰⁶) whose illusions were taken for realities by many statesmen for some time. Even though the reality was shocking, it was the true reality that the *Sovnarkom* firmly refused to cooperate with the Entente in the war against Germany and Austria.

After they had lost hope for Bolshevik cooperation in the continuation of the war against Germany, the Entente Powers turned to the Russian anti-Bolsheviks with offers of cooperation. First of all, the British Secret Service established relations with the firmly anti-Bolshevik faction of the Russian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, headed by Boris Savinkov former minister in the government of Alexander Kerensky. It was Captain Sidney George Kelly, who was in charge of the British reconnaissance activities in Russia,²⁰⁷) who first approached Boris Savinkov, former head of a "Fighting Group" within the Russian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries still in pre-revolutionary time. Savinkov had the reputation of a courageous revolutionary who personally participated in several assassination actions against the officials of the former Tsarist regime. In the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky, Boris Savinkov served as Minister of Defense. Thus, the British contacted a man who meant business.

Savinkov returned to his pre-war activities. Just as he had fought the Tsarist tyranny, he turned now against the even more ruthless tyranny of the Lenin regime. With his followers, Savinkov organized the "League for the Rebirth of Russia" for the purpose of carrying out acts of terror against the leaders of the Bolshevik regime. These activities were aimed, first of all, toward the encouragement of the anti-Bolshevik feelings among the Russian masses. At the same time, Savinkov organized, secretly, his followers among the peasants and began preparing them for a popular mass uprising at the proper time.

To present a fuller picture about the internal developments in Soviet Russia at that time, it should be mentioned that also the Russian Party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries withdrew from the coalition with the Bolsheviks and from February 1918 had developed a strong opposition against signing the peace treaty with Kaiser's Germany. The Left Wing SR's who joined the Bolsheviks in the overthrow of the Provisional Government in November, 1917, were represented until that time in the *Sovnarkom*. They accused the Bolsheviks of treason against Socialism after the *Sovnarkom* signed the peace treaty with Kaiser's Germany for the sake of preservation of their dictatorial regime rather than with the advancement of Socialism in mind. These "purer than the Bolsheviks themselves" Socialists were dreaming about a *coup d'etat* in Moscow.

Thus, once again the objectives of the Right Wing Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries, now organized into the "League for the Rebirth of Russia," and those of the Left-Wing Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries coincided in their common opposition to Lenin's *Sovnarkom*.

The first known terroristic act was carried out by Savinkov's League in Petrograd on June 21, 1918. A member of the *Sovnarkom*, Volodarsky, was assassinated.

Soon thereafter, on July 6, 1918, the Left-Wing SR's killed the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach. As a result of this assassination, the government of Germany demanded from the *Sovnarkom* permission to station in Moscow a 400 man unit of German soldiers for the protection of the German embassy. The Bolshevik government deemed it unavoidable to grant this rather unusual request of Germany in spite of considerable loss of prestige among the Russian popular masses.

This episode was skillfully utilized against the *Sovnarkom* by both the Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries and the "League" headed by Boris Savinkov. Both developed propaganda among the Russian masses accusing the *Sovnarkom* of subservient servilism to the German Kaiser.

Soon thereafter, the Left Wing Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries sent a special squad of their terrorists from Moscow to Kyyiv with an order to assassinate the commander of the German military units in Ukraine, Field Marshal Eichhorn, aiming at the worsening of relations between the Germans and the Hetman of Ukraine, Pavlo Skoropadskyy. At the same time, this act of terror was to register the protest of the Russian SR's against the peace treaty signed between Ukraine and the Central Powers at Berestya.

On July 30, 1918, a young student, Boris Donskoy, killed Marshal Eichhorn, as well as his aid adjutant, in Kyyiv.

Anti-Bolshevik uprising in Moscow

As already mentioned, while the Left Wing SR's were preparing an uprising in Moscow, Savinkov's "League" was active among the rural region masses of the village dwellers in several "*gubernias*," with special concentration in the Yaroslavl' region, in preparing a mass uprising against Bolshevik rule.

The assassination of German Ambassador Mirbach was to serve as a signal for the general uprising in Moscow. The Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries implemented the methods they had learned from the Bolsheviks. They succeeded in infiltrating their agents into the units of the *Cheka* so that they would be able to take hold of

the leading members of the Bolshevik regime. They planned to take sudden action, unexpectedly, and to seize all members of the *Sovnarkom* along with the Bolshevik leaders from all parts of Soviet Russia assembled as deputies to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets in the halls of the opera house in Moscow.

The first stage of the seizure of power succeeded. The Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries conspirators, headed by an officer of the Bolshevik *CheKa* named Blumkin, arrested the top officers of the *CheKa*, including its chief Felix Dzierzynski, as well as some members of the *Sovnarkom*. Lenin himself was preparing to escape from Moscow in an airplane. The vast majority of the Russian Red Guards was shattered in these critical hours and declared their neutrality.

The Bolshevik regime in Moscow, at this time, was saved by one regiment of Red Guards consisting of Latvians. These Latvian units of the Red Guards were able to prevent the Socialists-Revolutionaries from dispersing the Congress of the Soviets and these units gave protection to those members of the *Sovnarkom* who participated in the sessions of the Congress of the Soviets. After the commander of the regiment of Latvian Red Guards declared that his troops would defend the Bolshevik regime to the very last man, Vladimir Lenin decided to stay in control of the events in Moscow.

Encouraged by the firm stand of the Latvian Bolsheviks, the Russian units of the Red Guards reappeared on the barricades and the uprising was brought bloodily to its end. The leader of the anti-Bolshevik conspiracy, Blumkin, succeeded in escaping.

Also the attempts to organize uprisings, at the same time, in the rural areas of the country under the leadership of Boris Savinkov were ruthlessly suppressed by the Bolshevik military units.²⁰⁸)

These attempts to overthrow the Bolshevik dictatorship indicated that there was no sufficiently strong internal Russian force which would be able successfully to fight the Bolshevik government.

Historical events have proven that only foreign intervention succeeded in inspiring the Russian popular masses to organize a serious anti-Bolshevik movement. Among these outside forces was, first of all, the Czecho-Slovak Legion organized by Prof. Thomas G. Masaryk during the Tsarist regime from among the Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality. However, by far the most important was the landing of the Allied Powers troops in the Far East regions, in Vladivostok, and in the region of Murmansk and Archangel.

CHAPTER 6

INTERVENTION OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK LEGION

Czecho-Slovak Legion retreats from Kyiv to Vladivostok

While the leaders of the Russian Constituent Assembly attempted to claim the authority granted them by the popular elections, even after they were ruthlessly dispersed on January 18, 1918, from the only session of this one and only truly democratically elected body in Russia, their organizational activities were developing very slowly. From January until June, 1918, only a small number of the Constituent Assembly deputies moved from Petrograd and Moscow to the Volga valley regions to join the planners of an uprising. After the Red Guards suppressed Savinkov's preparatory activities to organize a struggle against the *Sovnarkom* in the Yaroslavl' region, the hopelessness of the Russian anti-Bolshevik democratic camp became widely spread.

Unexpectedly the situation was changed due to worsening relations between the *Sovnarkom* and the Czecho-Slovak Legion which had been organized under the Tsarist regime from among the volunteer Austrian prisoners of war of Czech and Slovak nationalities.

At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, the units of the Czecho-Slovak Legion, organized by Prof. Thomas G. Masaryk, were stationed in various parts of the former Russian Empire. The largest concentration of its units was, however, in Ukraine. These units found themselves seriously threatened after the treaty of mutual military assistance between the Ukrainian National Republic, Austria-Hungary and Germany was signed in February, 1918. With the units of the Ukrainian National Army were also military forces of Austria and Germany which were advancing and clearing the Ukrainian territory of Bolshevik armies. If captured, members of the Czecho-Slovak Legion would have been treated by the Austrian military authorities as deserters and subjected to military justice. Therefore, the Czecho-Slovak Legion units retreated from the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic along with the Russian Bolshevik troops into Russia. Here, they reorganized themselves into larger military formations and prepared for their further retreat.

The leadership of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, headed by Thomas G. Masaryk, after the signing of the "Brest-Litovsk Treaty" by Russia, negotiated at that time with the *Sovnarkom* con-

cerning free passage of the Czech Legion through Siberia for the purpose of leaving for the countries of Western Europe. The Czech and Slovak ethnic territories were still under the Austro-Hungarian domination at that time. The negotiations failed. Fearing that the Austrians and Germans would implement reprisals for granting aid to the Czecho-Slovak Legion, the *Sovnarkom* rejected Masaryk's request. Thus, suddenly a completely new set of circumstances surrounded the Czecho-Slovak Legion. Its leaders realized that they were completely on their own, encircled by unfriendly forces in Soviet Russia.

The commanding officers of the Legion feared that, on request of the governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Russian Bolsheviks would disarm their units and turn these volunteers over to the Austrians. Therefore, the Legion decided to disregard the opposition of the *Sovnarkom* to the passage of its units through Siberia. On suggestion of the Entente agents, the leadership of the Czecho-Slovak Legion decided to use force in making passage through Siberia as well as to help the Russian anti-Bolsheviks along their road in their fight against the forces of the *Sovnarkom*.

On June 8, 1918, in swift and unexpected action, the Czecho-Slovak Legion disarmed the Russian Bolshevik forces in the seat of regional government, the city of Samara (presently Kuybyshev), and took the city under its control. The Legion abolished the Soviet authorities in almost entire Samara *gubernia* which was strategically of great importance. Soon thereafter the Czechs took from the Bolsheviks the city of Penza, some two hundred miles west of Samara and about 350 miles east of Moscow.

This unexpected success of the well-disciplined units of the Czecho-Slovak Legion encouraged the Russian anti-Bolshevik political leaders as well as the popular masses for action. Having now a territorial basis at their disposal, the Russian political forces, centered around the Russian Constituent Assembly leadership, started to organize their forces of resistance. Anyhow, it was the intervention of the Czecho-Slovak Legion that established the basis for gathering forces of the Russian moderate democracy in its struggle against the Bolshevik dictatorship.

Uprising in Siberia

After the successful overthrow of the Bolshevik authorities in the Samara and Penza regions by the Czecho-Slovak Legion, the leading members of the Russian Constituent Assembly who, at that time, temporarily resided in the Volga River valley regions, decided that the situation was suitable for calling for a general

popular uprising against the Bolshevik regime. These members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, mostly belonging to the Russian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, decided to establish in Samara a Committee of the Constituent Assembly with the purpose of gathering the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces for a struggle against the *Sovnarkom*. This Committee provided a constitutional character to the developing anti-Bolshevik movement because its members were elected representatives of the people.²⁰⁹)

Backed by the Czecho-Slovak Legion, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly immediately started to organize a "National Army" on the basis of voluntary participation in a general popular uprising. The "National Army" soon united some 8,500 volunteers and was placed by the Committee under the command of a Czech colonel. Thus, a military struggle against the Bolsheviks became a reality in an important part of ethnic Russia. The Committee succeeded in reaching agreements with the Ural and Orenburg Kazakhs as well as with the military forces of Idel-Ural for the common defense of liberties against Bolshevik rule. Thus, the uprising organizers were optimistic concerning their success. But they realized that without their allies the uprising in the Samara region would have failed very soon.²¹⁰)

Encouraged by the success of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in the Volga River valley regions, the freedom-loving population of Siberia took up arms in a general popular uprising. The local forces of the Russian and non-Russian settlers of Siberia succeeded in removing the *Sovnarkom* authorities in their respective regions, and by the end of July, 1918, the Bolshevik regime was removed from the territory of all of Siberia.

Unfortunately for the democratically minded leaders of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, the response of the Russian popular masses in central Russia to the Committee's call to the colors was minimal. Even in the regions in neighborhood of Samara and Penza, where the Czecho-Slovak Legion firmly maintained its basis, the Russian population almost ignored the general mobilization proclaimed by the Committee of the Constituent Assembly. This call for general mobilization actually failed, and to the units of the "National Army" reported first of all the Ural and Orenburg Kazakhs and national units of various non-Russian nationalities of the area.²¹¹) The Russian masses in European Russia remained, as pointed out, virtually inactive.

Nevertheless, in the summer months of 1918, anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia and the Volga River regions constituted a considerable military power. In August, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak Legion together with the various military units of the Kazakhs, Kalmyks, Buriats and the "National Army" commanded some 120,000 soldiers.

Considering the prevailing conditions, this was a serious military force under arms! More so, since the *Sovnarkom* was in command on this front of only some 80,000 men!²¹²)

Comparing the numbers of men under arms loyal to the *Sovnarkom* with those on the side of the combined anti-Bolsheviks, the balance was definitely in favor of the anti-Bolsheviks. However, it has been proven there that the larger number of soldiers does not always guarantee victory. Due to the lack of proper leadership among the members of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, the *Sovnarkom* was able to restore its control in some territories of the uprisings. Somehow, the Committee leaders failed to preserve high morale among the men in uniforms because oftentimes they lacked ideological and political communications. The idea of anti-Bolshevism alone, without a clear program, proved insufficient for lasting victory.

Formation of All-Russian Directorate

At the time when the territories from the upper Volga through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean were freed from Bolshevik control, political leaders of various Russian political parties initiated the formation of an All-Russian Government. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly maintained its authority only over a relatively small region of territory freed from the Bolshevik domination. There were several other centers of governmental authority simultaneously, and a need to bring them together became obvious.

Russian Socialist-Revolutionary members of the Constituent Assembly attempted to take over leadership of all Russian anti-Bolshevik movement. They encountered serious difficulties because they had "too many chiefs and too few Indians." There were many professional politicians among them, but very few young men of their party willing to join disciplined military units. Besides the Czecho-Slovak Legion, the military units of the anti-Bolshevik forces consisted basically of the members of various non-Russian nationalities.

The anti-Bolshevik movement in the area of Samara and Penza was joined by numerous officers of the Tsarist army and by a large number of former Tsarist administration civil servants. Both of these categories of former loyal Tsarist sympathizers were ideologically close to the elements attempting to restore the monarchy. Only a few from among them followed the leadership of the Constitutional Democrats. The Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries had almost no supporters among them. Therefore, the popularly elected Socialist-Revolutionary members of the Constituent Assembly de-

cided to seek a coalition with other political factions, especially with the moderate Democrats and the Constitutional Democrats, for the purpose of forming an all-Russian governmental body. With this objective in mind, a "State Conference" took place in September, 1918, at the city of Ufa, the capital of Bashkiria.²¹³)

The main objective of the Ufa State Conference was to unite all independently existing anti-Bolshevik governmental bodies, especially those in various parts of Siberia, into a single All-Russian Government to counteract the *Sovnarkom*. Besides the members of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly which was the Regional Government in Samara, the Siberian Government of Omsk, the Governments of Bashkiria and Turco-Tartaria, the Cossack Ataman Dutov participated. The head of the Far Eastern Government in Vladivostok, Ataman Semyonov, with encouragement from the Japanese authorities, refused to participate in the conference. Thus, almost all organized and active anti-Bolshevik bodies of the Siberia were there represented. Of course, absent were representatives of the newly declared independent states of the non-Russian nations of the European part of the former Russian Empire because they no longer regarded themselves bound with Russia in any form or to any extent.

As a result, at the deliberations of the State Conference, on September 23, 1918, all participants signed a document providing for establishment of All-Russian Government whose objectives were to free Russia from the Bolshevik usurpers of power and to govern the country until a new session of the Constituent Assembly could take place. The All-Russian Government was to be headed by a five member All-Russian Directorate.²¹⁴)

The participants in the State Conference elected all five members of the All-Russian Directorate. Since the Directorate was to be composed of the most respected leaders of the various participating forces, some were elected in absentia. In the meantime, their personal representatives were to perform their responsible functions. Actually, as of September 23, 1918, the All-Russian Directorate consisted of the following personages: V. Avksentiev, V. Zenzinov, General Boldyrev, Vinogradov, and V. Sapozhnikov. Two of them, Avksentiev and Zenzinov, were Socialists-Revolutionaries.

The protocol signed at Ufa reaffirmed, first of all, the principle that the only true representatives of the people were the elected members of the Constituent Assmbeby exercising their authority in the duly summoned sessions. Whenever at least one half of the entire number of the Constituent Assembly's elected members, excluding those belonging to the Bolshevik Party, would meet on the territories freed from the Bolshevik control, the session of the Constituent Assembly should be called to order. If this opportunity did not come

before February 1, 1919, the required quorum to legally transact business would be diminished to one third of the membership, the Bolsheviks excluding.²¹⁵⁾

The All-Russian Directorate would be obligated to present reports to the nearest session of the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly should adopt a suitable program for the liberation of Russia from the Bolshevik usurpers and pass a new law calling for new elections to the Constituent Assembly.²¹⁶⁾

New difficulties in maintaining a united front developed after the leader of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, Victor Chernov, arrived at Ufa after the meetings of the State Conference were over. Chernov was an orthodox Socialist-Revolutionary and he disliked the idea of making practical concessions in the political action platform to secure support from the "*bourgeois*" democrats in the struggle against Bolshevism. In the All-Russian Directorate and its government were members of such "*bourgeois*" democrats. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Conference, although the decisions were adopted with the approval of the Central Committee of his party²¹⁷⁾ A majority of the Central Committee members were present at Ufa during the Conference, and they were willing to cooperate with other groups in the formation of the new All-Russian Government.

The left wing members of the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries later decided to follow their dissatisfied leader. Of course, the unity of the struggle against Bolshevism had to suffer.

Some characteristics of the Directorate

Although the majority of the All-Russian Directorate members belonged either to the conservative or moderate democratic political groups, a Socialist Revolutionary, Zenzinov, was elected its President. The Siberian city of Omsk was designated as the seat of the All-Russian Directorate.²¹⁸⁾ The All-Russian Directorate appointed a new All-Russian Provisional Government responsible to the Directorate. Admiral Aleksander Kolchak was appointed Minister of War and Gen. Rodichev was given the post of Commander-in-Chief of all military forces.

According to Victor Chernov, only the Socialist-Revolutionary and Muslim members of the newly established anti-Bolshevik governing bodies adhered to the principles of democracy. All other members belonged to the "reactionary" groups. Thus, it could be concluded that the truly democratic elements in this movement constituted the non-Russian members of the Directorate and Government because among the leaders of the Socialists-Revolutionaries

there were many non-Russians, especially Jews. Lack of proper relations between the constituent parts of the governing groups and the chauvinistic tendencies among the Russian right wingers caused a relatively early downfall of this anti-Bolshevik movement.

While the broad popular masses disliked Bolshevik tyranny, they were not willing to fight for the reestablishment of the Tsarist or any other absolutism. At least for a short period of time, they tasted the sweet fruits of liberty in their villages. Hence, they were equally suspicious of the Russian reactionaries. Also the non-Russians demanded recognition of their newly won national liberties and pride. Lack of understanding of the significance of these processes on the part of the influential Russian anti-Bolsheviks contributed to the later final collapse of the whole effort in the fall of 1919.

The reactionarism of the commanding officers of the newly organized military forces and that of the civil servants in the system of the All-Russian Directorate and the All-Russian Provisional Government weakened the popularity of these institutions among the Russian popular masses in the Volga River valley regions as well as in Siberia. Simultaneously, the influence of the Bolsheviks was increasing.

Although military forces under the command of the All-Russian Directorate were numerically larger than those of the *Sovnarkom*, on that front, the Bolsheviks registered one victory after another. A few days after the Ufa Conference, the end of September, 1918, the Bolshevik forces had taken the cities of Kazan and Symbirsk. At the beginning of October, 1918, the Red Guards forced the Czecho-Slovak Legion to leave their center of operations, the city of Samara. Military units of the All-Russian Directorate retreated before the advancing Bolsheviks to Central Siberia. The National Army units began to fall apart. The defeat was coming faster than expected.

The All-Russian Directorate appealed to the people for support, emphasizing that it enjoyed the support of the Entente Powers, together with the United States, whose military forces soon would defeat the Bolsheviks. These appeals remained without adequate response. At this point, it is proper to turn our attention to the very facts, as far as the Entente aid was concerned.

CHAPTER 7

INTERVENTION BY THE ENTENTE AND THE PLANS OF THE RUSSIAN WHITE MOVEMENT

The beginning of the intervention by the Entente

The unexpectedly successful action of the Czecho-Slovak Legion against the Bolsheviks in the Samara and Penza regions considerably changed the attitude of the Entente Powers regarding the realistic possibility of succeeding in the struggle against Bolshevism and Germany. They decided to offer military support to those Russian anti-Bolsheviks who intended to preserve the unity of the former Russian Empire in some altered form, and as an allied power with the Entente. They decided to intervene militarily on their behalf.

Information about successful preservation of the Czecho-Slovak Legion as an independent military unit within the Bolshevik ruled territories of Russia indicated that the Bolsheviks were, after all, not as strong as previously thought. Their cooperation with the Germans was disliked by the Entente Powers, and now they came to the conclusion that an intervention by the troops of the Allies could change the course of the war in the West.

On initiative of Georges Clemenceau, the conference of the prime ministers of the Entente Powers in Paris officially decided on June 1, 1918, to send the Entente troops into the territories of the former Russian Empire with the purpose of helping the anti-Bolshevik forces to defeat the *Sovnarkom*. Official representatives of the United States and Japan were not present at this conference. Therefore, the conference decided to inform these two allied powers about the decision taken and to ask them to join the venture.²¹⁹)

The hope for an early defeat of the Bolsheviks increased after the population of Western Siberia followed the example of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in the Volga valley regions. The best indication of the high hopes for success in overthrowing the *Sovnarkom* might be the attitude of the United States Department of State. The Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, sent a telegram to the United States Ambassador, David R. Francis, dated June 12, 1918, in which he not only expressed his opinion that the *Sovnarkom* very soon would be deprived of power, but also gave him instructions concerning the nature of an appeal of the government of the United States "to the Russian people" that the ambassador should, on the occasion, publish.

Lansing made sure to instruct the ambassador to include in that proclamation a statement emphasizing that the United States of America never stopped regarding them ("the Russian people") as their ally against the Central Powers and the government of the United States would recognize that government of Russia which would be established by the Russian people and which would be elected in united action.²²⁰) Thus, the Allied Powers believed, at that time, that the defeat of the *Sovnarkom* would fall without major difficulties, and the newly restored anti-Bolshevik government of Russia would re-enter the war against the Central Powers.

Having this objective in mind, the Allied Powers landed their military units in the territories of the former Russian Empire, currently under nominal control to the *Sovnarkom*. Thus, on August 3, 1918, British military units landed in the region of Archangel, in the North, and in Vladivostok, in the Far East. Soon thereafter, on August 16, 1918, some American military units landed in Vladivostok, too. Foreign intervention in the Russian civil war became a reality.²²¹)

Almost from the beginning of the war, the British maintained their military base in Murmansk for better defense against the German submarines and to insure the deliveries of war material to the Russian army. After the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, this British garrison in Murmansk was considerably strengthened by adding more men and war material. In order to justify this action, the ambassadors of the Entente Powers in Russia issued a public statement that this had been done for the sake of a greater security of that Russian territory from a possible German invasion.²²²)

In the middle of August, 1918, British maintained in the regions of Archangel (Arkhangelsk) and Murmansk some 15,000 men under arms. The presence of the British troops in these northern territories of the Russian Empire provided opportunity to some anti-Bolshevik Russian units to survive. These numbered about 8,000 soldiers.²²³)

The Bolshevik leaders were seriously scared by the landing of the British troops in the North. These forces were regarded by them as dangerous to the security of the city of Petrograd and to the new capital of Russia, Moscow, too. Therefore, for the defense of these regions of the country the *Sovnarkom* assembled over 18,000 men of the Red Guards.²²⁴) The *Sovnarkom* feared a combined action of the British, marching on Moscow from the North, and the Czechs, together with the newly created "National Army" from the South-East. Lenin and his followers regarded their situation at that time as very critical.

The evaluation of the situation by the *Sovnarkom* was based on an overexaggeration of the British manpower recently landed in

Murmansk and Arkhangelsk because of the poor quality of the Soviet espionage. These agents estimated the presence of over 85,000 British troops, a figure at least six times the real one.²²⁵)

The *Sovnarkom* was so scared by the information gathered through its agents about the landings of the British troops in the North that it decided to appeal to the Imperial Government of Germany to send military help against the British. The Bolsheviks tried to emphasize that in case of a British seizure of Petrograd, German positions in the Baltic area would be endangered. The Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgiy Chicherin, sent on August 18, 1918, an official note dealing with this problem to the government of Germany. Possessing more accurate information about the British in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk than the Bolsheviks had, the German government declined the invitation of the *Sovnarkom*.²²⁶)

The Entente's plans to march on Moscow and Kyiv

Generally speaking, there was an objective reason for Lenin's fear for the future of his regime in the summer of 1918. Let us compare military strength of both participants in the civil war. In summary, in August of 1918, as indicated above, the All-Russian Directorate controlled virtually all of the former Russian Empire to the East of a line some 300 miles from Moscow. In that territory, the Directorate had a military force of some 120,000 men, while the *Sovnarkom* had only 80,000 Red Guards under its command to hold the line. In the North, the 15,000 British combined with some 8,000 anti-Bolshevik Russian troops stood against 18,000 Bolsheviks in that area. These combined 23,000 men in the North were additionally supported by the British Navy in that area. The advantage of the anti-Bolshevik forces was enhanced by the presence of additional British, American, and Japanese troops in the Vladivostok region.²²⁷)

What were the immediate objectives of the British authorities, and what were the strategic plans of the British command at that time? Contrary to the expectations of the *Sovnarkom*, the British had no intentions of advancing toward Petrograd and the Baltic basin. Rather, they decided to unite with the forces of the All-Russian Directorate in the North and then, together with these forces, to develop a march on Moscow and Kyiv. Facing a serious danger from the East, the Germans were expected to relocate considerable military forces for the defense of Moscow. Also they were expected to concentrate their military forces in the defense of Ukraine because Ukraine supplied bread to Germany endangered by a general famine.

Thus, the most important objective of this Entente strategy was the weakening of the German military might on the Western front from where the German troops soon were to be relocated to the East so vital for the supply of food. This would have relieved the war suffering population of the Western European countries and the center of the war activities would have been once again relocated to the countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, the Entente's superiority on the Western front would have been surely established.

As far as the Entente Powers were concerned, the number one objective was not, necessarily, the support of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia who were attempting to defeat the *Sovnarkom*. The real aim was to reactivate the Eastern front, extending from the Barents Sea to the Caspian Sea, and from there in the direction of the Dnipro River in Ukraine.

Objectives and military strategy of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks

While the Entente Powers were primarily interested in the reactivation of the Eastern front against the Central Powers, the abolishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia could be regarded, at best, as their secondary objective. The objectives of the Russian anti-Bolshevik political circles were quite different. First of all, they were aiming at the restoration of "united and indivisible Russia" ruled by themselves rather than by the Bolshevik *Sovnarkom*. They really were not interested in the reactivation of the Eastern front and continuation of the war on the side of the Allied Powers. Quite to the contrary, they tried to use both the Entente and Central Powers for their own objectives.

When in the course of the revolution, the non-Russian oppressed nations of the former Russian Empire established their own national sovereign states, France and Great Britain immediately established contacts with the governments of these independent nations in order to induce them to continue war against the Central Powers. At the same time, the leaders of the Russian White movement immediately declared themselves against the right of these nations to self-determination. The conservative, imperialistically minded Russian leaders reactivated their adherence to the Bismarck doctrine of the inevitability of a lasting alliance between a strong Russia and Germany. They reactivated the cultivation of contacts with the conservative German political circles.

First of all, the Russian reactionaries reached an understanding with the High German Command in Ukraine as early as in April, 1918. German generals who came to Ukraine with their troops as

military allies of the democratic government of the Ukrainian National Republic, in April, 1918, turned against the democratic forces of Ukraine and openly sided with the anti-Ukrainian Russian imperialists. The German protection given to General Denikin in organization of his Volunteer Army has been discussed previously.

During that period of time, the statesmen and politicians of the Entente Powers were not yet sure of what course to take in the developments on the territories of the fallen Russian Empire. For a long time, they were not able to decide whether to support the Bolshevik regime or to be against it. This indecision on the part of Britain and France disappointed the Russian conservative politicians and generals to the point that they started to talk openly about the inevitability of German intervention in Russia.²²⁸) In July, 1918, United States Ambassador Francis informed the State Department in Washington about the tendency among the Russians to favor German intervention in Russia. In his opinion, if the Germans would have decided to intervene, they would have been widely supported by the Russians.²²⁹) This is an interesting view because the ambassador reported this after the successful uprising in Samara region and in Siberia.

General Lavr Brusilov, who shared this attitude along with other generals of the former Tsarist army, informed Ambassador Francis of the pro-German orientation of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks. This pro-German orientation was strongly supported by the Russian Constitutional Democrats, headed by Paul Milyukov.²³⁰) General Alekseyev, one of the popular generals among the organizers of the Volunteer Army in the Don Cossack State, fully favored Milyukov's policy in this respect.

A radical change in political orientation of the Russian anti-Bolshevik imperialists occurred after the policy of intervention of Allied Powers was clearly defined and partially implemented. After the landing of British troops in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, on the one hand, and that of the British, Japanese, and American military forces in Vladivostok in the Far East, on the other, the Russian generals turned in favor of the Entente and her intervention. Now, they decided to cooperate with the Entente troops and to influence their attitude with regard to the restoration of a "united and indivisible Russia."

The leaders of the Russian anti-Bolshevism at that time were concentrated in the All-Russian Directorate. Therefore, political and military objectives and strategy were formulated there. In pursuit of the final objective of restoring the pre-war Russian Empire, the generals and politicians around the All-Russian Directorate decided to concentrate upon re-occupation of Ukraine and destroying all features of her national sovereignty. The existence of an inde-

pendent Ukrainian State was the very symbol of the downfall of the former Russian Empire. Therefore, in the minds of the Russian imperialists, the destruction of that Ukrainian State was the single most important political objective.

The strategy of uniting the British intervention troops in northern Russia with the forces of the All-Russian Directorate in the Volga River valley and Siberia was to serve the major purpose, that is after taking Moscow to march on Ukraine. With this sort of objective of the Russian monarchists, conservatives and even democrats, in mind, there was no basis for a coordination of military activities of the Ukrainian nation with the forces of Russian imperialism aided by the Entente.²³¹⁾

This could have been the greatest tragedy of our century.

Imperialism as the source of weakness of the All-Russian Directorate

The All-Russian Directorate enjoyed enormous support from the Entente Powers as well as from the United States of America. First of all, besides landing the British troops in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the intervention forces landed in Vladivostok. At the end of August, 1918, the following Allied intervention forces were active in Siberia: a Japanese military force of 70,000 soldiers constituted the single largest contingent of the intervention forces; along with these, there were 8,000 American, 7,000 British, and 1,500 Italian troops. This constituted a military force of 86,000 men, besides numerous French officers and military technicians.²³²⁾ All of these military units were well trained and well armed. Also the fighting morale of the men was good.

If the proper psychological and socio-economic climate would have been in existence among the broad masses of the Russian people, these Allied intervention forces would have been fully sufficient to defeat a much weaker Bolshevik military force and to establish conditions for a general popular uprising. It should be noted that at that time the All-Russian Directorate had at its disposal the well disciplined units of the Czecho-Slovak Legion as well as the less disciplined "National Army" numbering together 120,000 men. These troops, too, were relatively well armed because Great Britain delivered to them in August, 1918, alone, 100,000 rifles and 200 artillery cannons along with sufficient amounts of ammunition to help them.²³³⁾ Thus, the manpower was there to win the war over the Bolsheviks.

What, then, was in the way of the All-Russian Directorate striking victory over the disliked Bolshevik regime? The original sin of the Directorate was its reactionary policy of restoration of

the "united and indivisible Russia." Within the Directorate's administrative means, vigorous competition for influence was waged by the moderate forces of the Russian *bourgeois* democracy and the moderate wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the one hand; and the extreme Russian nationalist supporters of the old regime, on the other. The latter achieved an internal victory, and the moderate forces of the Russian democracy were, little-by-little, pushed out of the key positions of the policy making and to its implementation.

The reactionary forces, desiring the restoration of a "united and indivisible Russia" with a reactionary regime, firmly established control over the Directorate's agencies and, resorting to their pre-war practices in governing the people, they alienated the popular masses from the All-Russian Directorate and its anti-Bolshevik activities. The Russian masses themselves had no desire to restore all elements of the Tsarist pre-war oppression and deprivation of elementary principles of liberty and democracy.

The most elementary principle of the "united and indivisible Russia" was the complete subjugation of the non-Russian nationalities packed into the Empire through a long history of bloody conquest. The All-Russian Directorate leadership decided to follow this policy of many Tsars from the past. The very name of the All-Russian Directorate, *Vserossiyskaya Direktoriya*, (= All-Russian), indicated that its holders of power claimed to rule not only in the ethnically Russian lands, but also in the non-Russian countries of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, and other countries which freed themselves from the Russian Tsarist yoke.

As if all of the above would not have been enough to weaken the popularity of the Directorate, the reactionary forces within it were given also an outside helping hand. It might have been a coincidence, but the reality was such one that the Entente sent to the All-Russian Directorate in Omsk representatives of strongly conservative and even reactionary leanings. The chief commanding officer of the British troops in Siberia, General Sir Alfred Knox, the French military representative, General Janin, as well as the political leader of the Czecho-Slovak Legion, General Gajda, were well known for their reactionary views. They all disliked the moderately democratic majority in the personal composition of the Directorate and preferred to see at the head of a new regime a person of their liking.

For this trio, the most desirable person at the head of the All-Russian Directorate would be Admiral Aleksander Vasilevich Kolchak, the Minister of War in the above mentioned All-Russian Provisional Government.²³⁴) Kolchak had proven to be receptive to the idea of assuming the top leadership.

Kolchak's coup d'etat

Having at their disposal well disciplined military units, British General Knox and Czech General Gajda pointed out to Admiral Kolchak that they are in charge of a real force that would back him in his taking over the leadership of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement. It is very probably that General Knox acted in cooperation with British Minister Winston C. Churchill who was in charge of all British intervention activities in Russia.²³⁵) It was Winston Churchill who formulated British intervention policies with regard to Siberia and he implemented them through British representative, General Knox.

Both, Minister Churchill and General Knox, belonged to the most conservative group of influential personages in Great Britain, in this very critical time. Therefore, General Knox, like his superior, Winston C. Churchill, totally opposed Socialism in any form and shape not only in Great Britain but also in Russia. Being intolerant he disliked the moderate Socialists and Democrats in Russia. Therefore, he preferred a one man strong hand rule. To his thinking, Admiral Kolchak was the best man to be entrusted with dictatorial powers. This assumption of Churchill's action is in the analysis almost certainty.

General Knox believed that no Slavic nation was fit to be ruled in any other than a dictatorial way. More than that, he regarded the Slavs as an inferior race by nature. From among them, he respected but nobility. It is interesting that the basic views of his co-conspirator, General Gajda, were almost similar. The Czech general, member of a nation that was trying to win freedom from foreign oppression, openly degraded the Russian people as not being fit to be ruled democratically. In his conversation with General Groves, Gajda stated that the use of the whip is the single best method in relations with the Russians.²³⁶)

Enjoying the confidence of Knox and Gajda, along with backing of the troops under their command, on November 18, 1918, leading members of the Russian reactionary groups in Omsk, headed by Admiral Kolchak, seized the governmental powers and dissolved the All-Russian Directorate and its government. Admiral Aleksander Kolchak proclaimed himself "the Supreme Ruler of Russia" and alone appointed the new government of Russia.

Kolchak and his reactionery supporters declared that the "Supreme Ruler of Russia" was the dictator whose dictatorial authority extended to all parts of the former Russian Empire. The single exception to this rule was Poland whose national sovereignty was recognized by the Provisional Government of Russia, headed by Prince Lvov.²³⁷) Thus, Kolchak insisted upon subordination of all govern-

mental authority in the independent countries of the non-Russian nations such as Ukraine, Georgia, Byelorussia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc. to his dictatorship.²³⁸)

This attitude of Kolchak and his supporters, among whom were also the Russian Constitutional Democrats, toward the acute question of national self-determination did not win cooperation from the anti-Bolshevik non-Russians. The price Russia paid for it was the loss of liberties of the Russian as well as of the non-Russian peoples.

Entente's justification of the Siberian intervention

Although in the summer of 1918, the Powers of the Entente and the United States firmly decided in favor of intervention in Russia, they were acting very carefully and undecidedly with regard to the *Sovnarkom*. They tried to leave the door open for a possible understanding with the Bolshevik regime at some later time. President Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George were particularly hesitant. However, by far the greatest hesitation was expressed by President Wilson. Finally, he agreed with the landing of American troops in Siberia under the condition that the other Allied Powers would accept his diplomatic formula for the justification of the military intervention.

President Wilson had no clear cut opinion as to what to do about the Bolshevik regime in Russia. In one of his letters, he admitted that he was bloodily sweating over finding an answer to the question of what was correct and prudent, with regard to Russia.²³⁹) In his private correspondence, Wilson admitted to not having a firm answer because so many things were changing constantly. Finally, he came to the conclusion that there was a need for a justification of the American and the Entente intervention in Siberia.²⁴⁰) After long hesitation and soul searching by Woodrow Wilson, the United States Department of State issued a declaration justifying the intervention in Siberia. This declaration dated, August 8, 1918, has this content:

Military operations in Russia are presently permissible only for the purpose of providing all possible safety and support to the Czecho-Slovaks in defense against attacks by the Austrian and German prisoners of war [in Siberia], as well as for strengthening all efforts for the self-government and self-defense endeavoring by the Russians themselves with our help.²⁴¹)

After this statement of justification of intervention, the declaration continued with an appeal by the Government of the United States to "the people of Russia." This part of the declaration contained statements concerning the American policy with regard to

the developments in the territories of the fallen Russian Empire. It clarified also America's position concerning the application of the principles of national self-determination with regard to the non-Russian nations of the former Russian Empire. President Woodrow Wilson was credited with the advancement of that principle. Therefore, it might be of interest to some readers and a surprise to others what his government had to say in this part of the declaration. Here are the contents:

The Government of the United States wishes to state to the people of Russia in a most public and solemn manner that it has no intention to violate the sovereignty of Russia, nor to interfere in her internal affairs, and this includes even the local affairs of those regions that might be occupied by its military forces, and also in no way to violate her territorial integrity, neither at present nor in the future; what we presently intend to do, has its only purpose of giving such aid to the Russian people which is acceptable to themselves in their struggle to regain control over their own affairs.²⁴²⁾

In plain language, this declaration made it clear that the principle of national self-determination was denied by the United States Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, to the non-Russian nations of the Tsarist Empire. Lansing advocated the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire, thus he was in accord with the reactionary Russian circles fighting for the restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia." The declaration clearly disfavored the independence of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Finland, the Baltic and Caucasia countries. Of course, this stand could not have contributed to a united anti-Bolshevik front.

At the same time, Woodrow Wilson still adhered strongly to the principle of self-determination of the nationalities composing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This double standard policy of the American Government proved disastrous in the coming two decades. Also it contributed to the presently dramatic situation in Eastern Europe.

Some authors attempt to defend President Wilson from accusations of the double standards in his attitude toward the application of the principles of national self-determination by pointing out that in this case Wilson was interested primarily in the first part of the declaration aiming at justification of the American military intervention in Siberia. They express probability that the President did not read the full text of the declaration after his primary aim was stated in it to his full satisfaction.

Vladimir Lenin and his *Sovnarkom* used strong words in expressing their protest against the intervention of the Allied Powers in Siberia.²⁴³⁾

As far as the attempt to create the Eastern front against the Central Powers was concerned, the Siberian intervention remained without any effect upon it. Germany, at that time, was exhausted both militarily and economically. Lack of foodstuffs along with the shortage of war material constituted the greatest weakness of the German military power. Ever since the United States entered the war, the Allied superiority over the Central Powers was firmly established. Introduction of the tanks by the Western Allies had increased their superiority. Germany had no tanks in the battle fields. Thus, two months after the Allied intervention in Siberia, Germany capitulated anyway.

Now, the Allied intervention was limited to the internal affairs of the "Russian complex," as they used to call it at that time.

Disunity of objectives inside interveners

There was no clearly defined objective of the intervention in the so-called "Russian complex." This led to some differences in policies of the participating countries. More than that! Within the intervening countries' governments, disunity regarding the objectives of military intervention in Russia was clearly noticeable. Probably the most stable position concerning the intervention was maintained by the government of France. Premier Georges Clemenceau overwhelmingly influenced other French politicians, therefore a unity was prevalent in France.

Quite different situation was in Great Britain and the United States. The British War Cabinet consisted of the Liberals, headed by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and the Conservatives, under the leadership of Winston C. Churchill. There was a considerable difference in the views of these competing political parties concerning the British solution of the "Russian complex." Briefly stated, in the autumn of 1918, British Prime Minister Lloyd George supported the idea of restoring the Russian democratic forces, led by Alexander Kerensky, to power,²⁴⁴) while Winston Churchill favored the reactionary monarchists.

A sort of parallelism in the British policy on the "Russian complex" was clearly visible. While Lloyd George hosted Alexander Kerensky and promised him support for the forces of Russian democracy, Winston C. Churchill provided effective support to the forces of Russian reactionaries in their effort to restore a conservative regime in the "united and indivisible Russia." General Knox was Churchill's most trusted envoy in Omsk and his attitudes were mentioned above.²⁴⁵) After Germany capitulated on November 11, 1918, Churchill arranged that full support was given, by the British, to the Volunteer Army of General Denikin.^{245a})

Similar disunity of policy existed also in the official circles of the United States. Although the unity of policy is assured theoretically and constitutionally by placing its execution solely in the hands of the President, the reality has proven that a strong Secretary of State has many ways to circumvent the policy of the President. In this respect, Wilson-Lansing relations were classic. While Woodrow Wilson, as the President of the United State, pursued sincerely the policy of national self-determination, his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, secretly did everything he could do to prevent a general application of the Wilsonian doctrine. In his private notes, Lansing expressed his contempt for the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination.²⁴⁶⁾ This might have been the background of the above quoted part of the declaration of August 8, 1918.

British-French agreement on the “zones” of influence

One of the first British and French policy decisions concerning the “Russian complex” after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd was a general agreement on establishment of their spheres, or zones of influence in „Russia.” Although this agreement was made as early as December 23, 1917, it was not published until 1929 when Winston Churchill decided to print it in his memoirs. Thus, the interested parties knew nothing about the real objectives of the British and French presence on the territories of the former Russian Empire.

For an objective evaluation of the policies of the governments of Ukraine, — the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky as well as the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic — the fact that they had no information about the British-French agreement on spheres of influence, should be taken into consideration. Published documents as well as memoirs of the Ukrainian statesmen and politicians of the era prove beyond any doubt that the real political plans of Great Britain and France, with regard to the “Russian complex,” including Ukraine, were not known to them until December, 1918.

An interesting feature of this agreement was its secrecy. Great Britain and France maintained secrecy concerning the spheres of influence agreement even with regard to the other members of the Entente, i.e. Japan and Italy, as well as the United States of America. According to General Denikin, the leadership of the Russian White movement was able to collect some incomplete information about this agreement in December, 1918.²⁴⁸⁾ Their information was limited to the extent of the “demarcation line between the British and

French zones of military operations" against the Bolsheviks in the Black Sea basin.

Even then, the Ukrainian reconnaissance agents in the Russian White movement did not obtain any information concerning the spheres of influence. Therefore, the Ukrainian State officials knew nothing about the British-French agreement. The Ukrainians obtained some information on this problem only after the landing of the Entente troops in Odessa. The sources of information were the commanding officers of these military units themselves.

The agreement was a result of long lasting conversations of the British and French officials, first meeting in Paris almost immediately after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Petrograd. During the early stage of the absence of consolidated governmental power in the territories of the former Russian Empire, it appeared to the British and French governmental circles possible to establish their spheres of influence as they have done in the past in some other parts of the world, e.g. China.


On December 23, 1917, top representatives of both countries signed the final text of the top secret document. France was represented in the final meeting of these negotiations by Premier Georges Clemenceau, Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon and Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who was the Commander-in-Chief of all Allied forces in Europe. Great Britain was represented by Plenipotentiary Ministers, Lord Robert Cecil and Viscount Alfred Milner, being accompanied by British military experts.

The subject matter of this agreement was officially stated as dealing with the "regulation of the future activities of France and Great Britain in Southern Russia." Thus, the agreement was achieved concerning Ukraine, the Don Cossack State, and the countries of Caucasus.²⁴⁹) In reality, it divided territories of these countries into separate spheres of influence between France and Great Britain. According to the provisions of Article 3 of this agreement, the French zone included Bessarabia, Ukraine, Don Cossacks, and the Crimean peninsula; the British zone included the remaining territories of "the South of Russia," i.e., Kuban, Armenia, Georgia, Kurdistan, and other lands of Caucasus and "Transcaucasia."

Limiting their operations to the areas of the Black Sea basin hardly could be regarded as the measure against Soviets whose centers were in Petrograd and Moscow. The true nature of the agreement was best visible from the attempt to implement its provisions. After Germany capitulated on all fronts, the government of Great Britain immediately laid claims over her sphere of influence as agreed with France in December, 1917. Great Britain took steps two days after Germany's capitulation, i.e. on November 13, 1918, to establish her dominance in territories of her zone.²⁵⁰)

The leader of the Volunteer Army, General Denikin, had information about the spheres of influence in December, 1918. Thus, in planning his actions, he had an advantage at that time over the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic which lacked any information as to what to expect from the Entente Powers. He knew that the French zone line was to go through the northern part of the Don Region to the Volga River in the area of Tsaritsyn.

The entire territory of Ukraine was to be an exclusive French sphere of influence. The Ukrainian governmental officials later did not always experience a very friendly attitude from the French military command. However, the behavior of both partners in domination over the Black Sea basin deserves a more detailed treatment. It contributed to the shaping of the future of Eastern Europe. Unfortunately for the most concerned, it was not too glorious.



PART III

UKRAINE AND THE ENTENTE IN NOVEMBER, 1918

CHAPTER 1

HETMAN'S EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH THE ENTENTE

Basic blunder of Hetman's foreign policy

By August, 1918, the chances of Germany's winning the war on the military fronts changed. The arrival of U.S. troops on the battlefields of Western Europe and the overwhelming air power and tank forces were decisive factors leading to the eminent victory of the Entente. In addition, it was evident that the Western Powers would strongly intervene in the developments of the "Russian complex" with both military and diplomatic means.

In the midst of these international conditions, Hetman Skoropadskyy had to formulate foreign policy of his government. In the interest of survival of his own rule and the survival of an independent Ukrainian State, he was obliged to discontinue his friendly attitude toward the German war objectives and attempt to win a favorable position from the Entente Powers toward the independence of the Ukrainian State. However, the Hetman was ill advised by his experts. In September, 1918, he made a state visit to Berlin where he demonstrated his and his government's friendship for the Kaiser and his government, and emphasized his support for closer ties between Ukraine and Germany. In his answer to the Kaiser, he defined the policy of his government in this way:

"May I take the privilege of expressing in accordance with your Imperial and Royal Majesty the firm hope that the fortunately initiated political and economic relations between Germany and Ukraine will become still firmer for the well-being of both nations..."²⁵¹)

In the given international situation, this declaration by the Hetman and even his state visit to Berlin were gross political blunders. But he could have improved this situation, to some degree, after the capitulation of Bulgaria and Turkey if he had declared, in some way, his government's solidarity with and promise of full support by Ukraine for the Entente's struggle against the Russian Bolsheviks. Such a new political platform, in the first part of October, could have won a better international standing for the Ukrainian State.

But the Hetman, on the poor advice of his experts, accepted only a luke-warm position of "firm neutrality" toward all, i.e. toward the Entente, too. This meant that the Hetman government would remain neutral in the struggle by the Entente with the *Sovnarkom* of Russia. This was a serious blunder under such international conditions. The Hetman did not take into consideration the age old truth that in such a struggle on the territories of the former Tsarist Empire that the neutral participant would be beaten by all the fighting parties. Thus, if the Hetman's government desired a favorable attitude of the Entente toward the Ukrainian State, it could not send the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Doroshenko to Berlin to negotiate friendship with the Kaiser's government at one time, and the next minute send him to Switzerland to seek friendly relations with the Entente diplomats. At best, a "neutral" Ukrainian government, in this particular situation, was useless to the Entente Powers. After these general remarks about the Hetman's foreign policy conceptions, we should turn our attention to the details of this political action.

In October, 1918, the Hetman of Ukraine decided to turn to the Entente with an offer to enter into negotiations concerning economic and politico-military affairs. Hetman Skoropadsky had two ideas which he intended to present to the Entente Powers for consideration. First of all, he intended to propose that, even after armistice with Germany and Austria, their military units remain in Ukraine and other Black Sea basin regions for defense against the imminent Russian Bolshevik aggression. At the same time, he believed that the Ukrainian government would be able to develop rapidly a considerable Ukrainian military force which in the future would be able to defend the country.

Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky had no feeling that some of his ideas coincided with the plans of Georges Clemenceau and Lloyd George. French Premier Clemenceau initiated a proposal to include in the preliminary peace agreement with Germany a provision for maintaining, temporarily, German military forces in the territories of the Baltic countries, Belorussia, Ukraine, Poland, and in the Don Cossack region for participation in the defense against possible Russian Bolshevik aggression. In the meanwhile, under this shield of German protection, the military units of these countries would have a chance to be organized and sufficiently trained and armed for an effective self-defense. Thus, a *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevik expansion would be created, on the one hand, and the final defeat of *Sovnarkom* in Russia by the Entente, would be made easier, on the other.

In the meantime, radical changes within the German government system after the capitulation of Bulgaria on September 30,

1918. developed. On October 3rd, Prince Max of Baden was made Imperial Chancellor and the very next day he appealed for an armistice to President Woodrow Wilson with the hope for a tolerable peace. These efforts of the more moderate democratic government did not prevent an internal revolution in Germany and the forcible abdication of the Emperor on November 9, 1918.

Hetman Skoropadskyy believed that the more moderate government of Germany, headed by Prince Max of Baden, would be more willing than its predecessor to talk about more harmonious cooperation with Ukraine, and the imminent Bolshevik danger. He decided to send his Minister of Foreign Affairs, first, to Berlin and from there through Switzerland to Paris and London to offer his plan of saving Eastern Europe from Bolshevism.

Doroshenko's abortive mission to the Entente

Hetman Skoropadskyy's Foreign Minister, Dmytro Doroshenko, left the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, on October 22, 1918, for Berlin with intentions of continuing his trip through Switzerland to Paris and London with the mission to present the political plan of the Hetman. His mission to Berlin was to negotiate and sign an agreement with the German government providing for the stationing of German military forces in Ukraine after the future German armistice with the Entente. For the talks with the governments of the Entente Powers, Doroshenko had a commission to go to Paris and London.²⁵²)

According to Dmytro Doroshenko, he, in the capacity of the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, was authorized to establish contacts with the governments of France and Great Britain while the war was still going on between the Entente and Central Powers and to offer them the cooperation of the government of Ukraine. The basic principles of this cooperation were formulated in the following resolution of the Hetman within the limits of which Doroshenko was authorized to negotiate. The text reads as follows:

Ukraine wishes to preserve a firm neutrality, but she would be willing to consider an offer to cooperate with the Powers of Entente for the purposes of maintaining order and security in the country.²⁵³)

The Foreign Minister of Ukraine was still in Berlin at that time of the revolution in Germany and the abdication of the Kaiser on November 9, 1918. Thereafter, he immediately left for Switzerland for the purpose of establishing preliminary contacts with the Entente governments through their diplomatic envoys before going

to Paris and London. On arriving in Geneva, Doroshenko was presented with a telegram signed by the Prime Minister of the new Hetman's Government, S. Gerbel, informing him that he was replaced as the Foreign Minister by G. Afanasiev, a Russian.

Thereafter, Doroshenko could no more attempt to contact the governments of France and Great Britain²⁵⁴) and therefore he interrupted his diplomatic mission.

Second attempt of the Hetman to establish friendly relations with the Entente failed

In October, 1918, many events in Europe indicated imminent defeat of the Central Powers and their war associates. After an internal revolution in Bulgaria, the government of that country capitulated on September 30, 1918. In an attempt to save the crown, on October 17, 1918, the Emperor of Austria, Karl I, issued a manifesto granting the right to the nationalities to form their autonomous states within a federalized Austria-Hungary. This started a process of bloodless revolution which led to the complete fall of the Empire.²⁵⁵) The power of the Imperial Government in Germany was beginning to crumble, and the capitulation of German military forces was in the air.

Diplomats and generals of the Entente Powers were surer every day of their victory. At the same time, their arrogance of power was growing daily. An imminent German capitulation strengthened their sense of their omnipotence in the world. Especially, the French statesmen, diplomats, and generals were developing a sense of arrogance, because France would remain the single most powerful nation in Europe after the capitulation of Germany.

This behavior of the Entente diplomats and generals was very much in sight at Jassy, the temporary capital of Rumania. In this otherwise relatively little-known city, presently in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, assembled powerful representatives of the Allied Powers to plan the future status of Eastern Europe. Great Britain recognized the French preeminence in the "Russian South." Even the American representatives, who were not part of the British-French inner circle of understanding concerning the spheres of influence, did not disturb the prevailing atmosphere. Thus, they supported something they knew very little about.

No wonder that in an attempt to establish friendly relations with the Entente Powers, Hetman Skoropadskyy sent his envoy to Jassy. Hetman's special envoy, I. Korostovets, left Kyiv on November 3, 1918, more than a week before Germany capitulated. At the same time, as indicated above, Foreign Minister of Ukraine,

Dmytro Doroshenko, was still on his mission in Berlin. Korostovets was authorized to establish contacts with the Entente diplomats in Jassy on the same basis as Doroshenko should have taken if he ever would have had the chance to visit Paris and London. That means: he had to offer to the Entente's diplomats a "neutrality" of Ukraine.²⁵⁶)

The mission of I. Korostovets was destined to failure from the very beginning. Even if Great Britain and France would have been willing to offer serious support to the Ukrainian State, the lack of Hetman Skoropadskyy's orientation in the real world situation doomed his intentions to nothing. First of all, Hetman Skoropadskyy was known to have maintained close relations with Imperial Germany. But by far the greatest mistake of the Hetman of Ukraine was to send his envoy to the Entente Powers with an offer of "a firm neutrality" of Ukraine at a time when their victory was nearing every day. Also the statement that Ukraine "would be willing to consider an offer to cooperate with the Powers of Entente for the purpose of maintaining order and security in the country" at that stage of the war was not convincing enough.

Thus, the mission of I. Korostovets was doomed to failure by the formulation of the principles. The pride expressed in the formula of the offer to "cooperate in neutrality" was not acceptable to the mighty representatives of the victorious Powers of the Entente. One might ask a question, whether a complete switch of policy by the Hetman of Ukraine before the capitulation of Germany into the completely pro-Entente direction would have changed the hearts of British and French diplomats. The hard reality was such that the German military units were controlling the territory of Ukraine and Hetman Skoropadskyy was not free to act as he pleased. Besides, the British-French agreement concerning the spheres of influence was still in force.

According to the provisions of that agreement, Ukraine was to become a French dependency anyhow... So, why bother with the Ukrainian State? But let us allow the French to speak for themselves.

The French answer to the Hetman

The special plenipotentiary envoy of the Hetman of Ukraine was not allowed for long to go without learning the true attitude of the French influential circles in Jassy. As a matter of fact, the policy of the French officials was clearly stated to the Ukrainian envoy, I. Korostovets, during the very first contact with the French circles. Former French Consul in Kyiv, Emile Hénnot, in a private conversation with I. Korostovets stated:

Ukraine, or more correctly stated, Southern Russia, never had her own history, neither her own separate national or ethnic entity. She was created by the Germans, Forgatsch and Count Sheptytskyy, for dismemberment of Russia... The government of Hetman Skoropadskyy shall be abolished and taken over by the united Russian government.²⁵⁷⁾

Although Emile Hénot held no official position in Jassy at that time, he was regarded by the French officials there as an expert in "Russian" affairs and influenced them by his opinion. It would have been helpful to the Ukrainian interests to get individuals like Emile Hénot, a former Consul in Russia, even though in Jassy, as a private French citizen, on their side. Probably, a solidly united front of all Ukrainian national political forces could have impressed the French diplomats by offering them instead of "neutrality" a strong cooperation in the struggle against Bolshevism. On the other hand, one should not close one's eyes to the French opinion turning in favor of the restoration of the Russian Empire. It remained a possibility that the French might change their mind and consider the Ukrainian State, besides Poland, a strong element in the struggle against Bolshevism, if the Ukrainian government were in that time a Government of National Unity.

On November 7, 1918, Hetman's envoy was privately received by the French Ambassador, de Saint Aulairon, in the presence of the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir H. Barclay, on whose behalf he spoke, too. The French Ambassador simply stated to I. Korostovets that "Ukraine is a part of Russia"²⁵⁸⁾ and emphasized that he did not recognize the government of Hetman Skoropadskyy and that he received I. Korostovets as a private individual. Ambassador de Saint Aulairon continued on behalf of both Entente Powers as follows:

In our opinion, Ukraine cannot expect from us to recognize her neutrality, as the Kyyiv government would like it, because she is not a sovereign state. By her entry into the alliance with the Central Powers, Ukraine has broken simultaneously her [previous] alliance with the Powers of the Entente, and, therefore, we cannot presently trust her declarations which are being obviously made due to the change of political circumstances. Inconsistency and deception of the Ukrainian policy is visible from the fact that at the same time when Mr. Korostovets arrived in Jassy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Doroshenko, is in Berlin.²⁵⁹⁾

This was a statement noted by I. Korostovets himself. In his answer, the Hetman's envoy reminded them that in the past the

Entente Powers were interested in the support of the Hetman regime in Ukraine; not so much for humanitarian as for purely practical reasons. Further, he stated:

The Ukrainians were not in the position to organize their national army partially due to German interference. Therefore, if the Germans, who have taken over the defense of the country, would withdraw now from Ukraine, or would start to behave neutrally, then under the influence of the Ukrainian national party, hostile to the Hetman and very leftist in their attitude, an uprising will break out and the country would be ruined. Therefore, it would be very desirable that the Powers of the Entente would — on the basis of an agreement with the Ukrainian Government — send their military forces for the protection of the country after the withdrawal of the German military forces from there.²⁶⁰)

After reading this statement of I. Korostovets, two points stand out. First of all, he stated that the lack of a Ukrainian national army was only partially due to the German interferences. One might ask the question, what were the other reasons for it? Secondly, he openly admitted that there were strong Ukrainian national forces against the regime of the Hetman. Did he not provide reasons to his partners in the talks as to why the Entente Powers should support the regime of Hetman Skoropadskyy? He admitted indirectly that the great majority of the population of Ukraine was against the regime. Too bad for the Ukrainian cause that he did not state in his talks that the “hostile national party” consisted of a broad coalition of Ukrainian political parties, embracing a wide spectre of political philosophies but united by the idea of defending the independence of Ukraine as a sovereign country.

In summary, the British and French envoys in Jassy stated to the envoy of the Hetman that final decision concerning the future status of Ukraine would be made by their governments. They expressed their belief that for the restoration of order and peace in the territories of Russia, in the North as well as in the South (i.e. in Ukraine), the Entente would rely on the Volunteer Army, under the command of General Denikin. In their view, the Entente should treat Ukraine, depending on her behavior. However, it would be desirable to dismiss from the government all pro-German members and to replace them with individuals enjoying the trust of the Entente. Their party political affiliation did not matter; they might be Ukrainian Nationalists, Socialists, etc.,²⁶¹) as long as they are trustworthy.

The advice of the Entente Powers' ambassadors concerning the removal of the pro-German members of the government of

Ukraine was first of all related to the Hetman himself. General Pavlo Skoropadskyy seized the power in a *coup d'état* against the democratic forces of the Ukrainian Central Rada with the tacit help of the German military forces and in agreement with them. Also, he was the one who was the exponent of the solidarity with the policies of the German Imperial Government.

This was also the understanding of the ambassadors' statement by I. Korostovets himself. He clearly noted that the "hostility of the Entente and her diplomats is especially directed against Hetman Skoropadskyy."²⁶²)

Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko was saved the aggravation of being insulted by the Entente diplomats through his dismissal from the position as the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. Hetman Skoropadskyy did a service to history by sending his envoy, I. Korostovets, simultaneously to talks with the official representatives of France and Great Britain.

Skoropadskyy turns to cooperation with the Russian White movement

On the same day that Hetman Skoropadskyy sent his envoy to Jassy to establish contacts with the Entente representatives, November 3, 1918, he personally had a meeting with the Don Cossack Ataman, Piotr (Peter) N. Krasnov, in Skorokhodove, a town between Poltava and Kharkiv. After a secret conversation, there was a public reception at which Hetman Skoropadskyy in his courtesy speech praised the Don Cossacks. In return, Ataman Krasnov delivered a very emotional address in which he stated that the end goal of his own and Hetman Skoropadskyy's policy was the restoration of the old Russian Empire with a monarchical system of government.²⁶³) Ataman Krasnov's statement was not instantly denied by the Hetman of Ukraine and it became publicly known. The Entente's envoys in Jassy were informed about this policy statement of Krasnov, and made use of it in conversations with I. Korostovets.

After his return from Jassy, on November 9, 1918, Korostovets immediately informed Hetman Skoropadskyy of the attitude of the Entente toward the independence of Ukraine, and especially toward his person. The Hetman still had enough time to disassociate himself from the statement as to the apparent objectives of his policy, as outlined by Krasnov at Skorokhodove, which were not the defense of the independence of Ukraine but, rather, the restoration of the pre-war Russian Empire with Ukraine as a part of it.²⁶⁴) However, Pavlo Skoropadskyy failed to do so.

Until that time, the internal Ukrainian opposition was willing to tolerate the Hetman. But at this time, the cup was filled completely. The statement of Ataman Krasnov was shocking to the Ukrainian leaders fighting for the preservation of the sovereignty of Ukraine. The leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, Mykyta Shapoval, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Gen. Olexander Osetsky, Andriy Makarenko, etc., and the leadership of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, Col. Yevhen Konovalts, Capt. Andriy Melnyk and others, decided to overthrow the Hetman and his regime in order to preserve the independence of Ukraine. Skoropadsky's silence on Krasnov's statement induced them to speed up their preparation for the general uprising²⁶⁵) because they had lost hope that the Hetman would turn to the Ukrainian national camp defending the national independence.

Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky disappointed also his conservative Ukrainian supporters. While in cooperation with the Germans and the Don Cossacks, Gen. Denikin organized a sizable and well disciplined Volunteer Army, Pavlo Skoropadsky, as the Hetman of Ukraine, was late in preparation of military forces. His regime was still in the process of organizing the cadres of officers for a planned army of 79,000 men to be organized by March, 1919. According to Dmytro Doroshenko, at the beginning of November, 1918, there were only two divisions of the Ukrainian Army, *Serdyutska* and *Zaporizhska*, and a part of *Sira* along with a *Zahin* of *Sichovi Striltsi* in existence.²⁶⁶)

No wonder that I. Korostovets had little to offer to the Entente Powers determined to fight against Bolshevism in Russia. The Russian White movement was more appealing because it had at that time considerable military might willing to fight against the *Sovnarkom*. The differences were very well known to the British and the French.

Besides an army of 120,000 men in Siberia, under the command of Adm. Kolchak, the Russian Whites had at their disposal in November, 1918, an army of 52,000 Don Cossacks as well as 20,000 men of the Volunteer Army under the command of Gen. Denikin.²⁶⁷) Even in Ukraine, the Russian monarchists enjoyed freedom under Hetman Skoropadsky to organize their political parties with programs directed against the existence of an independent Ukrainian State as well as military units which were subordinated to Denikin's Volunteer Army.²⁶⁸) In addition, Hetman Skoropadsky had shipped large contingents of armaments and ammunition to the Don Cossacks and the Denikin units.²⁶⁹)

Official minutes of the Council of Ministers indicate that in the month of November, 1918, alone, the Hetman regime paid out from the treasury of Ukraine large sums for the support of various

Russian White military units. The sums were as follows: Gen. Denikin's Volunteer Army in the Don region, 10,000,000 karbovanets; the South-Western Army centered in Pskov, 3,000,000 karbovanets; the Northern Army, 3,000,000 karbovanets; and to the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army, i.e. to General Denikin himself, additionally 10,000,000 karbovanets. Thus, Hetman Skoropadsky's regime paid out from the treasury of Ukraine 26 million karbovanets to the Russian White units.²⁷⁰)

There is no doubt that Hetman Skoropadsky hoped to gain friendlier relations and a better understanding in these circles for the Ukrainian desire for a kind of statehood. All of his efforts remained without any success in this respect. The Hetman of Ukraine adhered to the idea of an active fight against Bolshevism. Accordingly, he granted asylum to the anti-Bolshevik refugees from Russia and did not limit their privilege to organize themselves for the future struggle against the *Sovnarkom* in Russia.

Generally speaking, the same attitude of the Hetman caused him to maintain very friendly diplomatic relations with the government of the Don Cossack State headed by Ataman Krasnov as well as with the latter's protégé, General Denikin and his Volunteer Army. Hetman Skoropadsky shipped to them armaments because he believed that they would be used against the common enemy, and not against the Ukrainian State. Unfortunately, the very same beneficiaries betrayed the trust of their benefactor. Behind his back, General Denikin and his associates were preparing the seizure of power in Ukraine themselves, because their objective was to transform the territory of Ukraine into their base for the decisive fight against Bolshevism in their efforts to restore the "united and indivisible Russia."²⁷¹) General Denikin himself admitted this in his memoirs.²⁷²)

Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky was guided in his actions not by his political objectives alone. He was subject to German pressures, too. After all, with their help he was able to overthrow the democratic regime of the Ukrainian National Republic and to proclaim himself the Hetman of Ukraine on April 29, 1918. And, the Germans had not been consistent in their attitude toward the "Russian complex." The Hetman had apparently little choice but to adjust to the new course of German policy. Of course, he could have tried to rely exclusively upon the Ukrainian national forces in their consolidated entirety. He would have enjoyed support of all Ukrainians firmly defending the independence of the Ukrainian State. But, he chose the other way and turned the Ukrainian consolidated forces against himself.

In pursuit of their objectives in Eastern Europe, in the middle of 1918, the government of Germany changed its basic policy re-

garding Eastern Europe. While at the end of 1917, Germany established a policy of recognizing the right of self-determination for the subjected nations of the Russian Empire, in the middle of 1918 her government returned to the doctrine of Otto von Bismarck advocating friendly cooperation with a strong Russian Empire. At that time, the once united Russian Empire was dismembered. A number of independent republics of the non-Russian nations developed during that period of time, on the one hand, and the internal struggle for power between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks in Russia proper was going on, on the other hand.

As indicated above, in the summer of 1918, the firm stand of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Samara and Penza regions encouraged the Russian anti-Bolsheviks to organize military action against the *Sovnarkom*. The developments in Siberia and the Caucasus regions were discussed above. They caused the German government to change to the Bismarck doctrine and switch support to the forces aiming at restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia." Simultaneously, the Germans turned against the nationalities defending their right to be free and independent nations.

This change in the German policy objectives was responsible for the German stand in Ukraine even though she was headed by a Hetman friendly predisposed to Germany. This was the reason for the German obstacles in the efforts of Hetman Skoropadskyy to organize a sizable Ukrainian national army. This action was in conformity with the wishes of the Russian imperialistic forces whose organization and armament were protected by the Germans.

Thus, in November, 1918, at the time of German capitulation, the Ukrainians had almost everybody against them. Both the Entente and the Germans turned to the support of Russian imperialism and its domination over Ukraine.

The victors and the losers were united in one common policy objective: they all were against national self-determination for the Ukrainians.



CHAPTER 2

THE ENTENTE REJECTED THE BID OF UKRAINIAN DEMOCRATS FOR COOPERATION

Attempts of Ukrainian democracy to persuade German Government and command in Kyiv to remain neutral in the conflict with Hetman

In the course of the rapidly developing events in September and October, 1918, in favor of the Entente's victory over Germany, the responsible leaders of the Ukrainian opposition parties against Hetman's regime were becoming aware of their responsibility for the future of the independence of Ukraine. They had seen the pro-German policy of Hetman Skoropadsky bankrupted, and felt that they, as the victims of the German instigated *coup d'etat* of April, 1918, should try to contact political leaders of the Entente in order to induce them in favor of the independence of Ukraine after the Entente's victory over Germany. The German power was diminishing from day to day.

In summary, after the capitulation of Bulgaria on September 30, 1918, the forces of the Entente opened the door to the Balkans and on October 30, 1918, Turkey followed Bulgaria's example. Simultaneous advancement of the Allied troops from the Balkans against Austria-Hungary, in the West against the Hindenburg line forced Erich von Ludendorff on September 29, 1918, to urge German political leaders to open peace negotiations. As a result, a new German government appeared with a new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden. On October 4, 1918, he appealed to President Wilson for an armistice. This was the beginning of the downfall of Imperial Germany. A mutiny broke out in the German fleet at Kiel on November 3, 1918, which set forces in motion that forced Kaiser Wilhelm II to abdicate on November 9, 1918. Capitulation of Germany followed two days later. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary disintegrated and an armistice was signed on November 3, 1918.

While all of these changes were progressing in Germany, the German military forces were still holding firm in Ukraine. Only the capitulation shattered them there, too.

As indicated above, in these eventful times, Hetman's Foreign Minister, Dmytro Doroshenko, left Kyiv on October 22, 1918, for Berlin and then he was to go to Switzerland, with Paris and London as his ultimate destinations to negotiate with the gov-

ernments of France and Great Britain regarding their relations with Ukraine. After the abdication of the Kaiser on November 9, 1918, the Ukrainian political forces opposing the Hetmanate decided to send Maj. Mykola Shapoval to Berlin to negotiate with the new German government, which consisted of a majority of Socialists, concerning the German forces in Ukraine. However, the capitulation of Germany followed two days later and, thus, Shapoval was deprived of success in reaching an agreement with the new Socialist Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Ebert, who succeeded, on November 9, 1918, Prince Max von Baden. Shapoval could not work out an agreement with this government for the generals in Kyiv to be neutral.

(Maj. Shapoval's mission to Berlin failed to neutralize the Germans in Ukraine during the popular uprising against the Hetman regime because, having no new orders from Berlin, German generals continued to support the Hetman against the revolting forces of the Ukrainian democracy. For these same reasons, the efforts of the Ukrainian Directorate in conversations of their representatives with the German command in Ukraine also failed. They failed to persuade the German generals to side with the Ukrainian national forces or at least to remain neutral.²⁷³) The Germans defended the regime of Pavlo Skoropadsky until the middle of December, 1918).

The Ukrainian democrats and the Entente

In the absence of a working parliament, it is very difficult for any organized opposition to operate and be heard. In this situation were the members of the overthrown Ukrainian Central *Rada* under the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky. Without any forum for immune expression, they started preparatory work for a general uprising against the Hetman after he has given them one reason after another. The opposition, headed by former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, decided in the second half of October, 1918, to take practical preparatory steps for a *coup d'etat* against Pavlo Skoropadsky.²⁷⁴) Of course, the preparations were made in strictest secrecy. Besides the secrecy, the preparations were made as "a last resort," i.e., Vynnychenko and Shapoval, the leaders of the conspiracy, hoped that the Hetman would change his mind in favor of the national consolidation of all Ukrainian political parties, and in this manner, there would be no necessity for an uprising.

While in the course of the preparatory work, other members of the leadership of the conspiracy were busy gaining support of various military formations, such as *Sichovi Striltsi* under the command

of Col. Yevhen Konovalets,²⁷⁵⁾ Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykyta Shapoval were in charge of formulating the future foreign policy of Ukraine. However, events were pressing them for an immediate contact with the Powers of the Entente. Thus, following the official envoys of the Hetman regime, Dmytro Doroshenko and I. Korostovets, the opposition sent its own representatives to establish contacts with British and French officials.

A great help was given to the opposition leaders in their foreign relations with the outside world by Dr. Artem Halip, a member of the Hetman government, who secretly cooperated with the opposition. A native of Bukovyna, Dr. Halip was a Democrat by conviction. As member of a masonic lodge, Halip was friendly with the Hetman's personal secretary, Stepan Morkotun, and other trusted personages of the Hetman who were masons too. Halip maintained close contacts with the Consuls of the Ukrainian State in Jassy, Krutykiv, and in Galatz, Biletskyy.

In cooperation with Dr. Artem Halip, the Ukrainian Consuls Krutykiv and Biletskyy held private conversations with the French diplomats in Jassy concerning the future stand of the Entente towards Ukraine. They reported to Halip, who in turn passed the first hand information to Vynnychenko and Shapoval. Dr. Halip suggested the sending of an envoy of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, to Jassy in order to establish relations with the representatives of the Entente.²⁷⁶⁾

Consuls Biletskyy and Krutykiv transmitted rather depressing information concerning the Entente's treatment of the Ukrainian State. In summary, they informed:

The Entente in principle does recognize the Ukrainian State, but it does not want to know anything about the Hetman, a Germanophile. Along with this, in some expressions is indicated an objective of the Entente to restore Russia. In their other words — the Entente will cooperate in Ukraine only with a democratic government.²⁷⁷⁾

As we may see, this information gathered from the French officials in Jassy by Biletskyy and Krutykiv was somewhat along the same line that later on was heard by the official envoy of the Hetman, — I. Korostovets — from the French and British ambassadors. Actually, their negative attitude toward the independence of Ukraine was stated by the Entente envoys to I. Korostovets more brutally than to the Consuls, Biletskyy and Krutykiv.^{277a)}

Thereafter, Vynnychenko and Shapoval decided to ask Consul Biletskyy to establish contacts with the diplomats of the Entente in Jassy immediately as a representative of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*. After Biletskyy accepted this secret mission, they authorized

him to communicate to the Entente diplomats confidentially the following position of the Ukrainian political forces united in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*:

Recognition of the full independence of Ukraine in her ethnic boundaries with detachment from Austria-Hungary of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathian Ruthenia; commercial relations [with the Entente]; some concessions [to the Entente]; an uprising against the Germans; deposing of the Hetman government; the future recognition of the democratic government and aid [to it]. ^{277b)}

Unfortunately, this platform presented to the Entente by Vynnychenko and Shapoval through Consul Biletskyy omitted any hint about their collaboration in the military operations against the Bolsheviks. Somehow, the platform concentrated upon the struggle against the Germans and the Hetman. And, yet, the Entente at that time was interested in an effective fight against Bolshevism, on the one hand, and was not interested in Ukrainian uprising against the Germans who were on the brink of capitulation on all fronts anyhow. The leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* had no idea that the Entente intended to keep some German troops in Ukraine even after their capitulation to be used in the defense against expected Bolshevik military aggression.

The notice of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, which outlined the above platform of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* for cooperation with the Entente, was delivered by Consul Biletskyy to the Entente diplomats in Jassy at the beginning of November, 1918, approximately at the same time when the envoy of the Hetman of Ukraine was on his mission there. Consul Biletskyy talked with several diplomats of the Entente there. However, the most active in these conversations was the Counsellor of the French Embassy, Marquise de Belois.^{277c)} The Entente diplomats advised Consul Biletskyy to transmit to the Presidium of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* their following answer:

The uprising against the Hetman regime should start before the landing of the Entente military forces on the coast of the Black Sea. The Entente favors the self-determination of all nations and is not against the Ukrainian State in principle, but she is basically for the restoration of Russia.²⁷⁸⁾

The above last part of the answer to the Vynnychenko proposal clearly indicated that the diplomats of France and Great Britain really opposed implementation of the principle of national self-determination to the subjugated nations of the former Russian Empire. However, they were not willing to state this publicly in

writing. Therefore, they had chosen this opportunity to state their position verbally to Consul Biletskyy. Nevertheless, they were interested in the Ukrainian fighting men in their planned decisive struggle against Bolshevism. Their advice to the leaders of the Ukrainian democracy continued as follows:

The Entente requests to organize a Ukrainian Army; however, until such time that the Ukrainian Army will be established, the defense of Ukraine against an anarchy shall be entrusted to the Volunteer Army [of Denikin]. Due to the shortage of the Ukrainian officers [in the process of army organization], the officers of the Volunteer Army have to be used. Also the list of members of the planned Ukrainian government should be presented [to the Entente].²⁷⁹⁾

In the answer of the Entente diplomats, Vynnychenko and Shapoval saw some contradictions. In the first answer to Consul Biletskyy, the Entente diplomats asserted that the Entente would recognize the independence of the Ukrainian State. They emphasized only that, in their opinion, it would be better to restore Russia. In the second answer, they expressed their opinion that the organization of the future Ukrainian Army should somehow be under the supervision of the Russian Volunteer Army of Denikin. In order to clarify these and other points, they decided to send another envoy to Jassy. In their search for a suitable and fully reliable individual, they concentrated first upon Col. Poplavko, well versed in all Ukrainian political affairs, who was the Ukrainian Central *Rada's* military commissioner in Odessa before Hetman's overthrow of the *Rada* regime. Family reasons forced Col. Poplavko to decline the offered mission, and the search for another trusted special envoy protracted the mission itself. Finally, Dipl. Engineer Hryhoriy Sydorenko accepted the assignment.²⁸⁰⁾

Hryhoriy Sydorenko arrived in Jassy on the 20th of November, 1918, after the general uprising against the Hetman and the Germans in Ukraine was in progress.²⁸¹⁾ His commission was limited to the clarification of some points in the Entente answer transmitted through Consul Biletskyy. Even then, Vynnychenko had not authorized Sydorenko to offer the Entente active participation by the Ukrainian military forces against the Bolsheviks. He might have taken this point for granted, but it seems more likely that he, like the Hetman, wanted to adhere to a neutral stand. However, the Entente Powers were concentrating upon this issue alone after the complete capitulation of the Central Powers and their war allies.

The only new point in the conversations between Sydorenko and the Entente diplomats in Jassy and Bucharest was Sydorenko's presentation of a list of members of the newly planned democratic

government of Ukraine. The list included names of the political activists from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party, the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and from the Ukrainian Party of Independentists-Socialists.²⁸²)

As one may see, the statesmen of the Entente, especially of Britain and France, had already firmly decided to support Kolchak and Denikin and their policy of the restoration of the Russian Empire. Sydorenko's counterparts of the talks in Jassy and Bucharest were only echoing positions of their superiors in Paris and London.

The absence of a strong Ukrainian Army was the weakest point in the efforts of the Ukrainian democracy to gain recognition from the Entente. The popular uprising against Hetman Skoropadsky was presented by the enemies of the Ukrainian independence as a pro-Bolshevik movement. Unfortunately, Vynnychenko and Shapoval failed to emphasize the strong anti-Bolshevik position of the Ukrainian democracy in their messages to the diplomats of the Entente. They envisioned "neutrality" of Ukraine exactly as the Hetman had in the previous declarations delivered by Doroshenko and Korostovets.

Thus, at the decisive turning point of history, France and Great Britain rejected the pleas of the Ukrainian democracy. Being colonial powers themselves, they decided to restore, in essence, the Russian colonialism, too. The great ideals of the Wilsonian principles of self-determination were to be applied in a discriminatory manner to the selected few *protégé* nations. The application of these double standards at that time led to complications after a short two decades. The world is still suffering from these mistakes.

The Russian White movement delegation at Jassy

Many Russian anti-Bolshevik activists enjoyed Ukrainian hospitality after their loss of homeland to the Bolshevik revolutionaries. They settled in various parts of Ukraine and organized themselves in a number, at times competing, organizations. Both the regime of Pavlo Skoropadsky and the German military command provided security for their activities. For a coordination of their activities, they established their central associations in Kyiv.²⁸³)

At the end of October, 1918, all central Russian organizations decided to consolidate their activities for a more successful struggle for the restoration of the Russian Empire. They decided to send their united delegation to Jassy to negotiate with the Entente diplomats there. Their delegation arrived in Jassy on November 1, 1918,²⁸⁴) thus a few days before the arrival of I. Korostovets on behalf of the Hetman of Ukraine, as well as, ahead of the conversa-

tions of the Counsuls Biletskyy and Krutykiv, in the name of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, and the Entente diplomats at Jassy.

The delegation of the united Russian central organizations in Kyiv consisted of a number of experienced politicians and former diplomats of the Russian Tsarist regime. Among the delegates were: former ambassador of Russia at Vienna, N. Shebeko; former member of the *Duma*, V. Gurko; representatives of the Association of Industrialists, V. Riabushinsky and von Ditmar; former member of the *Duma*, V. Demchenko; and former members of the government, Ministers B. Krivoshein and Paul Milyukov.²⁸⁵) Having pre-revolutionary contacts, they were immediately and at any time received by the ambassadors of France and Great Britain. Doubtlessly, this was their enormous advantage over their Ukrainian opponents.

This delegation presented to the Entente envoys a memorandum on behalf of the organizations they represented. In it we read:

The enumerated central Russian organizations stand for the restoration of the united indivisible Russian Empire. They do not recognize Ukraine. They request the Entente to occupy by its military forces immediately all seaports in Ukraine as well as all major railroad centers.²⁸⁶)

Thus, while the envoy of the Hetman of Ukraine was presenting a request for the Entente's recognition of the neutrality of the Ukrainian State, the Russian elite offered Ukraine to the Entente as the battlefield in its offensive against the Bolsheviks for "indivisible Russia." Protected by the Entente military forces, these Russians would have been free to concentrate upon systematic establishment of their administration in Ukraine and organization of their military forces. They intended to liquidate any attributes of the Ukrainian State as soon as possible.

Special memorandum to the Entente ambassadors in Jassy was presented by Milyukov, Shebeko, and Krivoshein. Authors of this letter were denying the very existence of the Ukrainian people as a separate national and even ethnic entity. This memorandum is the genesis of the widely spread myth that the Ukrainians as a nation are a German invention. They urged the Entente diplomats to eliminate from their use the very name of the country, the word *Ukrayina*, because the recognition of the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation would decrease the size of the Russian people by one-third.²⁸⁷)

The phraseology of these two documents of the Russian chauvinistic leadership was heavily used by the French officials in their conversations with Korostovets, Biletskyy, and Krutykiv.

After conversations at Jassy, Ministers Paul Milyukov and V. Krivoshein, as well as Ambassador N. Shebeko, continued their

journey to Paris to the conference of all former ministers and ambassadors of the Russian Empire which was summoned for the purpose of assuring a united Russian representation at the Paris Peace Conference.²⁸⁸) This conference took place, and its representatives pressured, through the French government, official delegations to the Peace Conference of other countries to admit the All-Russian Supreme Ruler, Admiral Kolchak, as the legal representative of the Russian Empire to participate in the decisions of the Peace Conference.

The delegation of the Russian political leaders in Jassy was followed by the visit of a special military representative of General Anton Denikin. General Shcherbachev headed a military delegation which offered to the Entente military cooperation in their Black Sea operations. The delegation represented the Volunteer Army of 52,000 men. Since willing to continue to fight military units at that time were a rare commodity, this offer was most welcome, as far as the Entente Powers were concerned.

General Denikin's delegation concluded a special eleven point agreement with the Eastern Command of all Entente military forces, headed by French General Barthelot. Point Eight of the agreement emphasized that both contracting parties should collaborate for the purpose of the restoration of a united Russian state; and the Volunteer Army was guaranteed freedom to organize and train its units for the future offensive against the Bolshevik regime. Point Seven stated that twelve military Entente divisions would militarily occupy Ukraine, taking control, first of all, over such population centers as Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Kyyiv, the region of Kuban, etc.²⁸⁹)

The above agreement between General Barthelot and General Shcherbachev was signed in the middle of November, 1918, after the capitulation of Germany, and between the proclamation of Hetman Skoropadskyy of the federal relation of his regime with Russia, dated November 14, 1919, but before the popular uprising in Ukraine began.²⁹⁰) General Denikin's envoy assured the Entente of full agreement with the platform presented by the Russian delegation of political leaders in Jassy a few days earlier.²⁹¹)

Even before their negotiations with General Shcherbachev were completed, the ambassadors of France and Great Britain sent the former French Consul in Kyyiv, Emile Hénnot, to Kyyiv for the purpose of assuring the leaders of the Russian organizations there that an effective Entente aid to them would arrive very soon. According to Gen. Denikin, the Entente officials in Jassy had done this on their own authority, without previous consent of their governments. They believed that the existing situation required their immediate action.²⁹²)

Since Emile Hénnot was dispatched to Kyiv from Jassy before the beginning of the uprising against Hetman Skoropadsky by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, some Ukrainian political leaders attempted to claim that the attitude of the Entente would have been more favorable to the Ukrainian State if the Hetman would have created a Government of the Ukrainian National Unity which could have rallied popular forces for the defense of the country. They emphasized the fact that the organized opposition was waiting to the very last moment for such a move on the part of the Hetman.

The formation of the Directorate and its proclamation of November 15, 1918, concerning the restoration of the Ukrainian National Republic, did not change the policy of the Entente toward the independence of Ukraine. Neither a swift rallying of the existing Ukrainian military units behind the democratic forces of the Directorate nor the decisive victory of the *Sichovi Striltsi* over the forces of the Hetman at Motovylivka on November 18, 1918, impressed the Entente. Even it had in some circles the opposite effect.*)

The Entente allowed the military forces of defeated Germany to defend Hetman Skoropadsky in Kyiv until December 14, 1918, when the Hetman was forced to abdicate under the victorious

* The responsible leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers, for the first time after Germany's capitulation, jointly deliberated in Paris on January 16, 1919, the "Russian complex." Although these Powers already had taken stand in favor of the Russian White movement having sent their forces and military supplies to Kolchak and Denikin, nevertheless they admitted they did not know anything practically important about "Russia." This may be seen from the statement of British Prime Minister Lloyd George:


"We did not know the facts about Russia. Differing reports were from our representatives in Russia and often reports from the same representative varied from day to day. It was clear that unless we know the facts we should not be in a position to form a correct judgement...

"As to the Ukraine: Where we had supposed a firm government had been established our information was that an adventurer with a few thousand men had overthrown it with the greatest ease. The insurrection had a Bolshevik character and its success made clear that the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism that we had imagined. The same movement therefore was beginning in the Ukraine which had been completed in Great Russia. The former government of the Ukraine had been a government of big landowners, only maintained in power by German help. Now, that the Germans had withdrawn the peasants have seized the opportunity. We are going to spend our resources in order to back a minority of the landlords against the immense majority of peasants?... (David Lloyd George: *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*. Vol. I. York University Press, 1939, p. 119).

As we see, Lloyd George and his listeners — President Wilson, Premier Clemenceau and Premier Orlando — were victims of such reports which were mentioned in his speech: there was truth mixed with untrue propaganda of the sympathizers of the restoration of the Russian Empire. We do not know whom had in mind Lloyd George when he mentioned "an adventurer": was this Vynnychenko or Petlyura?

forces of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. Meanwhile, General Denikin's forces, morally supported by the Entente, gathered their strength to fight but not so much against the Bolshevik regime in Russia as against the forces of the Ukrainian National Republic on the shores of the Black Sea.

The Ukrainians were once again completely alone in their defensive struggle on many fronts.



CHAPTER 3

HETMAN'S POLICY CHANGE SPARKS UPRISING

Threefold pressure on the Hetman

During the eventful months of the autumn of 1918, Hetman of Ukraine Pavlo Skoropadskyy was subjected to heavy political pressure from three separate forces. First, the diplomatic circles of the Entente Powers in the not too distant Jassy; secondly, the conservative Russified elements in Ukraine and their allies, the leaders of the Russian anti-Bolshevik organizations aiming at the restoration of the Russian Empire; and, finally, the organized Ukrainian democratic forces guarding the achievements of the Ukrainian national revolution, the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State.

The internal Ukrainian opposition against Hetman's regime was organized in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, headed by former Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Vynnychenko. To the very last moment, former leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and other defenders of the right of self-determination of Ukraine believed that Pavlo Skoropadskyy might maintain a reactionary regime in Ukraine, but they never would have thought that the Hetman would even consider the idea of giving up the principle of independence of the Ukrainian State. Therefore, from time to time they did meet him and talked with him about the national interests of Ukraine.

Subjected to the threefold pressures, the Hetman of Ukraine had great difficulties in following a straight and consistent policy line. When in the middle of October, 1918, a number of ministers of Hetman's government declared their solidarity with the Russian circles aiming at the restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia," Hetman Skoropadskyy accepted the advice of the Ukrainian National Union leaders in that he dissolved the whole cabinet and reorganized it in such a way that some representatives of the Ukrainian national democracy were appointed to the government posts.

Thus, it appeared that the Hetman was prepared to consolidate all Ukrainian national forces behind his regime which could unquestionably defend the Ukrainian State. The achieved compromise was expected to evolve into a solid coalition which in the time of crisis would have satisfied the most basic points of the platforms of both wings, — democratic and conservative, — toward advancing in the national interest.

The Entente and the conservatives pressure the Hetman

At the end of October, 1918, and during the first half of November, 1918, the Hetman became subject to continuous and intensive pressure from two forces which were aiming at the same objective. First of all, during these weeks of the crumbling military might of the Central Powers and the victory of the Entente on the horizon, every nation of Eastern Europe turned its attention to the decisive centers of the world power, Paris and London. Hetman Skoropadskyy, like virtually all other leaders of the nations still endangered by the Bolshevik aggression in the near future, carefully listened to the political winds from Jassy, the nearby center of the Entente diplomats.

Hetman Skoropadskyy was strongly influenced by the report given by his envoy to the Entente ambassadors in Jassy about the stated position of the Entente Powers regarding the future of Ukraine. Essential demands of the French and British ambassadors could be summarized in two points. First, they demanded from the Ukrainian people that they become an active participant in the common struggle against Bolshevism, and, secondly, they were insisting upon the restoration of the Russian Empire, in one form or another, but simultaneously they pointed out the need of consolidation of all Ukrainian forces even under Socialist leadership.

As far as the first demand was concerned, it created no problem for the Hetman. He always adhered to the position that the Bolshevik regime could be destroyed by military power only. He never believed that the Bolshevik danger to Ukraine and all Europe could be permanently diverted through diplomacy alone. He knew that in the struggle against the aggression of the *Sovnarkom's* Red forces on Ukraine, he could always count on support of all defenders of the Ukrainian State.

The Entente's support for restoration of the Russian Empire was directed against the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State. As the supreme ruler of the Ukrainian State, Hetman Skoropadskyy could not have a listening ear to this point of the Entente's program. Therefore, he tried to induce France and Great Britain to change their position on the sovereignty of Ukraine. This was the most important purpose of the mission of his Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, as well as his envoy, Korostovets, to Jassy. But, the victorious Entente Powers were very little inclined to listen to the needs of the Ukrainian people.

Policies of the victorious Entente Powers were very much to the liking of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, both the Russian refugees from Soviet Russia and their local supporters in Ukraine. The latter were very strongly supported by the Association of Man-

ufacturing, Commerce and Finance in Kyiv. For the war ridden economy of Ukraine, this was an important group, especially in the capital city of Kyiv, and the Hetman was obliged to withstand their pressures otherwise he would reap serious consequences. Sooner or later, he had to make his choice.

The above mentioned Association of Russians and the Russified non-Russians pressured the Hetman for breaking up all relations with the Ukrainian national democratic forces in the country. They advised the Hetman to dismiss all Ukrainian national democrats, even the most moderate ones, from any and all positions of influence, and to replace them with monarchists, preferably those supporting the idea of restoration of the Russian Empire.

The powerful industrialists, commercialists, and financiers pictured to the Hetman a splendid economic future for Ukraine within a renewed Russian Empire, restructured on federal principles of government. They misrepresented the real position of the Russian White movement by claiming that its leaders had agreed to the federal reconstruction of the future Russian Empire.

To a similar pressure was subjected the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Krasnov, who gave in to these pressures at the beginning of November, and delivered the before mentioned speech at the public meeting with Hetman Skoropadsky advocating their common struggle for restoration of the Russian Empire. The details of the secret conversations between Krasnov and Skoropadsky held on November 3, 1918, at Skorokhodove remained unknown. Anyhow, this could be regarded as the beginning of the Hetman's weakening resistance to the pressures by the Russians and the Entente. Finally, on November 14, 1918, the Hetman openly submitted to these pressures.

It could be assumed that the industrial and commercial circles knowingly deceived Hetman Skoropadsky as far as the guarantees for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire in the federal system of national states. They knew perfectly well that the leaders of the Russian White movement never agreed to the territorial decentralization of the Empire, let alone its reconstruction on the basis of free and equal federal states of all major nationalities.

Therefore, after the war, political philosopher of the Hetman Movement in exile, Vyacheslav Lypynskyy, claimed in his writings that the capitalistic leaders purposely deceived the Hetman. On the other hand, he rightly observed that it was a fatal mistake on the part of Hetman Skoropadsky that he did not properly investigate this provocation before making a decision on basic policy change.

After the German capitulation, the Hetman still had a chance to save peace and order in Ukraine if he had proposed a Government

of National Unity. A pattern for such a solution to the growing crisis was available in neighboring Poland. There, under German sponsorship, ruled a conservative and aristocratic Regency of Polish State which consisted of Prince Zdzislaw Lubomirski, Archbishop Aleksander Kakowski and industrialist Józef Ostrowski. From November 7, 1918, on Poland was threatened with a civil war between the government of the Regency and the rival People's Government created in Lublin under Prime Minister Ignacy Daszynski, a Socialist leader. Thus, the Regency on the exact same day as the German capitulation, November 11, 1918, transferred all its authority to another Socialist leader, Józef Pilsudski, and abdicated. Pilsudski, in turn, nominated Ignacy Daszynski his Prime Minister. In this way the crisis in Poland was solved and civil war avoided.^{293a})

Hetman Skoropadskyi did not follow this Polish pattern. He did not transfer full authority to the Ukrainian National Union (*Soyuz*) — either to Vynnychenko or Petlyura — to build a Government of National Unity — so as to avoid the civil war which, in fact, lasted from November 15 to December 15. In the revolutionary atmosphere present, this period of time was very long. If this civil war had been avoided, the time could have been used to peacefully organize a large Ukrainian Army on the basis of existing units of *Sichovi Striltsi*, *Zaporizhtsi* and *Siri*. In such a situation, the Entente Powers would have been forced to take a different stand toward the Ukrainian State. This supposition is fully plausible as shown by the fact that later, in February, 1919, when the Directorate survived with its significant Active Army, the Entente's representatives could not overlook the real fact of the existence of Ukraine as a political force. Without this civil war, there would undoubtedly have been a greater armed force and a firmer government in Ukraine.

But instead of following Poland's successful example, the Hetman took another path. He surrendered to the pressure of the Russophile circles which suggested to him that the Ukrainian democracy was all talk, without being an organized social force.

Hetman's coup d'état against Ukrainian sovereignty

On November 13, 1918, two days after the capitulation of Germany, a crisis in the Hetman's cabinet occurred. It was caused by a seemingly minor matter. The cabinet met to decide on an application of the Ukrainian National Union (*Soyuz*) for permission to hold the Ukrainian National Congress in Kyiv, planned for November 17, 1918. The forces of Ukrainian moderate democracy were to analyze the existing situation and to decide on their course of action in these turbulent days and weeks.

After the extreme conservative majority of the government decided to reject the application for the permit to hold the Congress, all ministers of moderate democratic trend favoring the call of the Congress resigned. At this time, under pressure of events, the position of the Entente's envoys in Jassy, and especially the influence of the capitalistic leaders, Skoropadsky decided definitely on a major change in his political objectives. He immediately on November 14, 1918, dissolved the cabinet headed by Fedir Lyzohub in its entirety and replaced it with a group of individuals openly hostile to the idea of the independence of Ukraine. The new cabinet, with S. M. Gerbel as leader consisted of individuals supporting the restoration of the Russian Empire.

At the same time, Hetman Skoropadsky issued a *Hramota*, a declaration, dated November 14, 1918, which reads:

The armistice between Germany and the Entente Powers has been concluded. The most bloody war ended, and the nations of the world face a difficult task of laying foundations for a new life.

From among all parts of much suffering Russia, the fate of Ukraine was comparatively luckiest of all. With the friendly help of the Central Powers, she preserved peace until today. Having great sympathy for all sufferings to which was subjected related to her Great Russia, Ukraine tried to do everything in her power to help her brothers, by offering them hospitality and supporting them in all possible ways in the struggle for restoration of the stable governmental system in Russia.

Today, we face a new national task. The Entente Powers have been for long friends of the former united Russian Empire. Now, after experiencing great upheavals in Russia, conditions of her future existence must inevitably change. On new principles, the principles of federalism, should be restored the old might and power of the All-Russian Empire. Within this federation, Ukraine shall take one of the most leading places because she preserved law and order in the country and within her boundaries for the first time regained their liberties all degraded by and suffering from the Bolshevik despotism citizens of former Russia. She initiated and established friendship and cooperation with the Omnigreat Don and with the glorious Kuban and Terek Cossackhoods.

Upon these principles, which, I am certain, are also supported by all allies of Russia, the Powers of Entente, and with which cannot be in disagreement any other nation, without exceptions, not only of Europe but of the whole world, should be based the future policy of our Ukraine. It behooves her to stand

out first in favor of the formation of an All-Russian Federation whose end objective shall be the restoration of a Great Russia.

In the achievement of this end objective is the guarantee for the well-being of entire Russia as well as for the economic development of the whole Ukrainian people based upon the foundations of their nation-state identity. Deeply convinced that all other ways would be deadly to Ukraine herself, I am calling upon all those to whom is dear her future, closely tied with the future and happiness of entire Russia, to unite with me and stand up for the defense of Ukraine and Russia by our chests. I believe that all of you, the citizens and Cossacks of Ukraine, as well as, the rest of population, will offer heartfelt and strong support to this holy and patriotic cause.

I order herewith the newly formed Cabinet to execute this great historical task in the shortest possible time.

Signed: Pavlo Skoropadskyy.*)

Simultaneously with the proclamation of this *Hramota*, the newly formed cabinet, headed by S. M. Gerbel, was announced. Personal composition of this cabinet consisted exclusively of individuals sharing the principles proclaimed by the Hetman in his *Hramota*. The newly appointed head of the cabinet, S. M. Gerbel, belonged to the extremely reactionary group of the Tsarist officials serving as the Governor of the Kharkiv *gubernia* before the revolution. Himself of Russian nationality, a rich landowner, he headed a cabinet of similar reactionaries.

The hostile attitude of S. M. Gerbel to the very idea of sovereignty of the Ukrainian State excluded in itself any cooperation of the Ukrainian national democratic activists now united in the Ukrainian National Union (*Soyuz*) with the new cabinet. This finally convinced all those leaders of the moderate Ukrainian national democracy who cooperated with previous Hetman's government headed by Fedir Lyzohub that there was no way of protecting honor and independence of the Ukrainian nation but to join the forces of revolution against Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy and his regime.

There was also a tactical blunder committed by the Hetman in forming his new cabinet. All members of the cabinet belonged to the extremely right wing political groups. In these revolutionary times, it was most inappropriate to ignore all changes in Eastern, as well as in Western Europe that were dominant in most of the countries. The Ukrainian people were no less sensitive, with regard

*) Full text in Dmytro Doroshenko, *Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrainy*, Vol. II, pp. 414-415.

to the socio-economic problems, than the peoples of other countries of the civilized world. They were favoring the socio-economic reforms introduced by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* which until now even the Hetman regime did not dare to abolish, except the land act.²⁹⁴)

Thus, the climate for a general popular uprising was created.

Brief analysis of the *Hramota* of November 14, 1918

Personal composition of Gerbel's cabinet was secondary to the political *credo* stated by Hetman Skoropadsky in his *Hramota* of November 14, 1918. Probably, the Ukrainian moderate Democrats and even Socialists would have endured, at least for some time yet, extreme conservative socio-economic policies of the Hetman regime. What all of them could no longer tolerate was his policy of the federalization of Ukraine with Russia without any guarantees for preservation of Ukrainian national, cultural and political entity. Let us evaluate the most important points of the *Hramota*, because its contents were used as justification for the popular uprising against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky.

First of all, any one familiar with the hitherto existing constitutional acts of the Ukrainian State and major public pronouncements of the Hetman himself, would immediately observe that Skoropadsky's *Hramota* of November 14, 1918, contradicted the basic provisions of the constitution as well as his own *Hramota* of April 29, 1918, assuming the authority of a dictator of the sovereign Ukrainian State. It also contradicted many pronouncements of the cabinet during the six-month tenure of the Hetman regime.

Constitutionally and factually, the Ukrainian State was fully independent from the day of the proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* dated January 22, 1918. Meanwhile, the new *Hramota* proclaimed an unconditional struggle of the Ukrainian State for the restoration of former Russian Empire with Ukraine within it on a not yet specified federal basis. In the view of constitutional law, this act of Pavlo Skoropadsky was nothing less than a *coup d'etat* against the Constitution of the Ukrainian State. It was nothing less than an attempt to destroy the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State itself.

No wonder that the very last single Ukrainian political organization which until that time supported the Hetman, the Organization of Ukrainian Landowners, condemned this act of the Hetman.

Theoretically speaking, in view of the then dominant principles of national self-determination, the authority to make decisions concerning the establishment of federal ties with the former oppres-


sor-nation or, as a matter of principle, with any other nation, belonged exclusively to the Constituent Assembly. Hetman Skoropadsky usurped the constitutional authority belonging to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly and acted dictatorially, supported only by a handful of his ministers who were appointed by him to these posts that very day.

The leaders of Ukrainian political parties as well as of cultural and civic organizations were appalled by this act of the Hetman's disregard for their personal intelligence and national pride. He had chosen not to consult any respected Ukrainian national leader on his intentions before he proclaimed the last *Hramota*. After all, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petlyura, Colonel Yevhen Konovalts, Col. Bolbochan, and other former leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and commanders of the still existing Ukrainian military units were in the country. They were most instrumental in the establishment of the sovereign Ukrainian National Republic. They were then supported by broad masses of the Ukrainian people, as represented in various congresses, through elected delegates.

Pavlo Skoropadsky chose to ignore their opinion.

The idea of a free formation of a confederation of free and equal nations on the territories of the former Russian Empire was considered immediately after the downfall of Tsarism very seriously. Basically, representatives of the non-Russian nations tried at that time to establish such ties among themselves as well as with the ethnographic Russia. This political structure was openly discussed and a number of nations, in the beginning of the revolution, proclaimed only their autonomous status rather than complete sovereignty of their respective nations. It was, however, the opposition not only of the democratic Russian Provisional Government but of all its Russian supporters to the idea of reconstruction of the former Russian Empire on the federal basis that forced one nation after another to proclaim complete national sovereignty, thus breaking all political ties with Russia. Lenin's *Sovnarkom* followed the same policy and tried to enforce it by sending its aggressive troops to subjugate these independent countries, but in a deceitful way claimed — he “defended the independence” of responsive “proletariat.”

Thus, there existed a distant possibility that the freely elected deputies to the Constituent Assembly of some nations would have seriously considered continuing ties with Russia on a well defined federal basis. Hetman Skoropadsky never considered presenting this problem to a freely elected Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. More than that. He had completely ignored the fact that, similar to the government of Prince Lvov in Russia, all leaders of the



A unit of the Sichovi Striltsi.

organized Russian anti-Bolshevik centers opposed any degree of federalization of the restored "united and indivisible Russia" in the future. This was their firmly pursued policy in November, 1918. By that time, they succeeded in gaining support of the Entente Powers for their centralistic political objectives.

Here again, Skoropadsky made a unilateral declaration in his *Hramota* because he already knew very well that neither the Entente Powers nor Admiral Kolchak's policy supported any degree of federalism. As the succeeding developments have proven, Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin firmly opposed federalism and fought to the very end for the restoration of a centralized Russian Empire with Ukraine as an integral part of it without any attributes of a recognized national entity even in a form of limited autonomy. It was in this period of time, that Paul Milyukov, Krivoshein and Shebeko insisted in their talks with the Entente diplomats in Jassy upon elimination of the very terms, Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, from their dictionary.

Finally, Hetman Skoropadsky's *Hramota* emotionally called people to arms for an intensified struggle against Bolshevism, for freedom of "great" Russia including Ukraine. The call to arms against Bolshevism was no innovation, as far as, the Ukrainian people are concerned. They followed the call of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* for such a fight when in December, 1917, Lenin's Russian armies invaded Ukraine. Then, the Ukrainian people were under arms and had been defended the newly won sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic from December, 1917, until Skoropadsky's *coup d'etat* on April 29, 1918.

Skoropadsky's emotional praise of the Russian people and sympathy for their sufferings under the Bolshevik rule in no way was answered by any responsible Russian anti-Bolshevik leader. Neither the "Supreme Ruler of Russia" Admiral Kolchak, nor the commander of the Volunteer Army, General Denikin, publicly responded in a similar manner. In no way did they pronounce that, after the common and successful struggle against the *Sovnarkom* were ended, would they consider a federal system of government. The good will with regard to the White Russians was not reciprocated.

If the major objective of the *Hramota* was to contribute to the consolidation of the anti-Bolshevik forces of all nations of the fallen Empire, then Hetman Skoropadsky failed to achieve that objective. First of all, the vocabulary and the tone of the *Hramota* contributed more to a disunity than to the consolidation of these forces. If the Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders would have been willing to recognize the equal rights to liberty and independence of the non-Russians as they were claiming for themselves, there would

have been no objective reason why a well defined agreement for cooperation in the struggle against Bolshevism would not have been possible.

However, the Ukrainian leaders regarded the Hetman's unconditional call to arms to fight for the restoration of the Russian Empire as an insult to national dignity. They refused to follow a call to fight for the replacement of one yoke by another. In their judgement, the *Hramota* was nothing more than a call for the re-establishment of the pre-war conditions in Ukraine with many duties and no national rights.

The phraseology of the *Hramota* created an impression among the Ukrainian people that the Hetman was more interested in the fate of Russia than in the future of Ukraine. After all war sufferings and sacrifices of the Ukrainian people, this was too much for them. Therefore, instead of rallying Ukrainian national forces behind his leadership, the Hetman turned them against himself and the cause he was trying to promote.

Proclamation of the *Hramota* created conditions that forced the Ukrainian National Union (*Soyuz*), to call upon the Ukrainian people to rise up against the Hetman regime. After the decisive battle when the *Sichovi Striltsi*, under the command of Col. Yevhen Konovalets, on November 18, 1918, at Motovylivka, won over the Hetman military forces, the popular uprising gained one success after another.

The German military units defended in and around Kyiv Pavlo Skoropadskyy as the ruler of Ukraine until December 14, 1918, when he had no other choice but to abdicate.



PART IV

UKRAINE UNDER THE RULE OF THE DIRECTORATE

CHAPTER 1

CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATE AND THE HETMAN

Crucial decision to produce uprising

The Ukrainian national democratic forces, which strongly adhered to the right of every nation to its own self-determination through popular participation, laid the foundations for the Ukrainian State. They were also instrumental in carefully channelling the Ukrainian national opinion toward the declaration of independence of Ukraine and establishing all three branches of the government: the legislative branch of government centered in the Ukrainian Central *Rada*; the executive, in the form of the General Secretariat which was subordinated to the *Rada*; and, an independent judiciary which was established by the *Rada*, too.

General Pavlo Skoropadskyy, in a *coup d'etat*, overthrew this democratic system of government in the Ukrainian National Republic, and at the end of April proclaimed himself provisional absolute ruler of Ukraine and assumed the traditional Ukrainian name for the ruler, the *Hetman*. There was no forum provided by the Hetman regime for the ousted political groups to exercise the right of a loyal opposition, thus to have influence on the affairs of the Ukrainian State they had established. They were forced to work in an extra-parliamentary way by maintaining contacts semi-privately. Sooner or later, these forces had to be organized, and finally they established the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* (Union) as the rallying point for all forces of the opposition.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the major efforts of the forces of the Ukrainian national democracy to find a platform for cooperation with the Hetman in the interest of the independence of the Ukrainian State. During these times of the struggle for national survival, leaders of the Ukrainian democracy and even the Ukrainian Socialists were willing to de-emphasize the issues of the socio-economic platform for the sake of finding a way to create a consolidated Ukrainian national front for the defense of the Commonwealth.

Therefore, the decision to organize a popular uprising against Hetman Skoropadskyy was made only after all efforts to unite him with the popular masses of Ukraine in the struggle for preservation of the Ukrainian sovereignty failed.

Establishment of Directorate and the uprising

Publication of the *Hramota**) of Hetman Skoropadskyy on November 14, 1918, was the last and single most important act of the Hetman which persuaded the leaders of Ukrainian National *Soyuz* that an armed popular uprising against the Hetman was inevitable. Until that very moment, not only the moderate democrats in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* were hesitant, but also the leaders of the Social-Democrats and the Socialists-Revolutionaries were not certain about the unavailability of the uprising. Also the trusted military leaders participating in the conspiracy did not believe that Hetman Skoropadskyy could not be persuaded to appoint a "Government of the National Unity," consisting of the representatives of all major Ukrainian national political parties.

Immediately after the publication of the *Hramota*, on November 14, 1918, the inner circle of the anti-Hetman opposition, led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykyta Shapoval, decided to commence the uprising preparations. This group realized that only an uprising proclaimed by the consolidated forces of all Ukrainian political and professional organizations united in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* could guarantee successful participation of the Ukrainian popular masses. In the absence of any popularly elected organ within the Hetman regime, the forces united in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* actually did represent the will of the people. Most of these leaders were previously members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and other popularly established and supported organizations.

The call of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* to arms against a Hetman who attempted to abrogate the full sovereignty of Ukraine would assume the legal characteristic of a national uprising in the defense of the Constitution of the Ukrainian State. Therefore, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, in cooperation with the inner circle of the conspirators, summoned for the late evening hours of the very same day a secret meeting of the Presidium of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, with active participation of some other members of the *Soyuz*. Also, representatives of the Military Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi* stationed in Bila Tserkva were called. Former Secretary General for the Military Affairs, Symon Petlyura, was absent but he consented in advance to be a member of the uprising leadership.

For security reasons, this conspiracy meeting was held in the offices of one of the ministries of the Hetman's regime. The participants in this meeting had no more doubts that, after the pub-

*) *Hramota* in English: diploma, edict.

lication of the Hetman's *Hramota*, the uprising was inevitable. They decided that for the leadership of the uprising a special body should be established, called the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, and should consist of five members. Members of the Directorate were instantly elected. They were: 1. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the Head; 2. Symon Petlyura, with special duty as Commander-in-Chief*) of all military forces; 3. Professor Fedir Shvets, of the University of Kyiv, representing the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and of the professional organization of the Peasants Union (*Selyanska Spilka*); 4. Andriy Makarenko, Director of a Department in the Ministry of Communications and Transportation; and 5. Panas Andriyevskyy, an attorney-at-law, representing the Ukrainian Party of the Independentists-Socialists.

The Directorate was vested with very broad authority. Its immediate task was to lead the Ukrainian people in their uprising against the Hetman, and to exercise all governmental powers in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic in all territories of Ukraine until the establishment of a permanent government through the democratic process after the victory over the Hetman and his supporters.

Before the night was over, Volodymyr Vynnychenko prepared the draft of a special Declaration of the Directorate which was approved by the newly established Directorate unanimously. The document was printed during the night of November 14th and before dawn of the 15th of November it was posted on the billboards all over the city of Kyiv. At the same time, couriers of the Directorate delivered the proclamation to all major population centers of the country. After explaining to the people that all efforts to reach an agreement with the Hetman had failed, the Directorate called the citizens of Ukraine to arms and to preserve order in the country.

After the historical meeting in Kyiv, members of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic immediately moved to Bila Tserkva under the protection of the *Sichovi Striltsi* stationed there. The *Sichovi Striltsi* units consisted of highly patriotic Ukrainian elements, former combatants of the Ukrainian Legion under the same name in Galicia, and were the most reliable military force to serve as the nucleus of the insurgents. For some time, the leaders of their Military Council were in contacts with the leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*.

*) In Ukrainian: **Holovnyy Otaman**. English literally: "Principal Otaman." Because the name Otaman in the military service of that time meant "general," the title may be translated as "Commander-in-Chief" or simply as "Generalissimo."

From Bila Tserkva, the signal for the popular uprising was sent to those commanding officers of the Hetman's Ukrainian military units who previously agreed to switch to the anti-Hetman insurgents. Thus, the popular dissatisfaction with the Hetman regime policies was provided an opportunity to be violently unloaded.

The last effort by Konovalets to avert disaster

On November 15, 1918, Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, stopped in Kyiv while passing through the city on his return journey from furlough. Here, he learned about the *Hramota* of the Hetman. Konovalets knew that unless Skoropadskyy declared the *Hramota* null and void immediately, the popular uprising was unavoidable. Therefore, he decided to make a last minute attempt to avert the Hetman from an imminent disaster. As a Ukrainian patriot, Konovalets was aware of the deep impact of the *Hramota* of Hetman Skoropadskyy upon the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, as a military man, he was equally well aware of the consequences of a popular uprising.

Col. Yevhen Konovalets decided to see the Hetman immediately for the purpose of persuading him to turn away from the newly declared platform and to avert the danger of a civil war inside Ukraine. In his memoirs, Konovalets registered the following conditions presented by him to the Hetman in their conversation on November 15, 1918:

1. Declaration of the *Hramota* null and void.
2. Summoning of the National Congress which was planned by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* but prohibited by the Hetman government.
3. Disbanding of all "Russian Volunteer" units.
4. Transferring the *Sichovi Striltsi* units from Bila Tserkva to Kyiv. In return, I promised to the Hetman to do everything in my power to persuade the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* to guide the planned National Congress in such a way that it would not declare itself against the person of the Hetman. The Hetman was moved, but rejected...²⁹³)

Thus, the last attempt to solve the problem peacefully and to save the Ukrainian State from the popular uprising and the bloodshed failed. Had the Hetman been willing, there is every reason to believe that Col. Konovalets would have succeeded in putting through his promise, and the Ukrainian people would have been spared a bloody civil war. Konovalets would have been able in this case to persuade the Directorate against the uprising because *Sichovi Striltsi* were the main military units which supported the Directorate.

A swift victory everywhere except Kyiv and Odessa

The armed uprising against Hetman Skoropadskyy's regime moved faster and with greater success than expected by most of its planners. The victory of the *Sichovi Striltsi* over the loyal military units of the Hetman at Motovylivka on the third day of the uprising was decisive for the outcome of the civil war. Thereafter, virtually all Ukrainian military units of the Hetman switched their loyalty from him to the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, and the civil war which started during the night of the 15th of November was almost ended on the 18th of November. Except for the capital city of Kyiv, on November 20, 1918, the authorities of the Hetman regime were swept away everywhere in Ukraine.²⁹⁴)

On the side of the Hetman remained his garrison as well as the German military units in Kyiv. Actually, the Germans were the major defenders of the Hetman, and their units there were sizable and still disciplined. In order to prevent unnecessary damages to the city, the Directorate decided not to use artillery forces against Kyiv. Instead, a blockade was ordered. After the Germans started to feel the consequences of the blockade, they proclaimed their neutrality in this Ukrainian civil war. In this situation, Skoropadskyy realized that his fight was hopeless and decided to end further resistance.

Exactly one month after the Hetman issued his *Hramota* which sparked the formation of the Directorate, a rivalling government of Ukraine, and the popular uprising, Pavlo Skoropadskyy signed on December 14, 1918, his *Hramota* of abdication. The last official act of Pavlo Skoropadskyy in his capacity as the Hetman of Ukraine reads as follows:

I, the Hetman of the entire Ukraine, have done everything in my power during the last seven and one half months in order to relieve the country of the difficult situation in which she lasts until now. God has not given me enough strength to succeed in achieving this goal, and, therefore, due to the circumstances which now exist, guided exclusively by the good of Ukraine, today I do abdicate all authority.

Pavlo Skoropadskyy

14th of December, 1918,
the city of Kyiv.^{294a})

Also the last cabinet of the Hetman regime, headed by S. M. Gerbel, issued a document which not only renounced any claim to governmental authority but also formally transferred all governmental authority to the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. This document reads as follows:

Having considered the demands of the Directorate the Council of Ministers decided to renounce all its authority and turn all governmental powers to the Directorate.

(Signed:)

Head of the Council of Ministers Gerbel
Minister of Commerce and Industry S. Mering
Minister for Internal Affairs Ihor Kistyakivskyy
Minister of Finance Rzhpetskyy
Minister of Public Education V. Naumenko
State Comptroller Petrov
Minister of Labor Kosinsky²⁹⁵)

The *Hramota* of abdication, signed by Hetman Skoropadskyy, as well as the documentary renouncement of all governmental authority by the Council of Ministers provided for an orderly transfer of all governmental authority to the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. Both the former Hetman and his government recognized the constitutionality of the authority of the Directorate.

After the *Hramota* of Skoropadskyy's abdication and the document of the former Council of Ministers renouncing any and all governmental authority in Ukraine were legally delivered to the Directorate, the latter decided to formally act upon them. In the minutes of the Directorate meeting held on December 17, 1918, we read the following special document:

At the meeting held on December 17, 1918, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, having considered the case of treason of former Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy against the Ukrainian National Republic and his crimes against the Ukrainian People and, having taken into consideration that there is no doubt about the guilt of treason against the Ukrainian National Republic and the crimes against the Ukrainian People committed by Skoropadskyy, decided: — for the above mentioned treason and crimes, to declare Pavlo Skoropadskyy an outlaw and to confiscate his property, tangible and intangible, existing within the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic.²⁹⁶)

This document was signed by all five members of the Directorate and was declared in effect immediately.

Meanwhile, Pavlo Skoropadskyy found a hiding place among the German military units in Kyiv. However, he saw no possibility for himself to stay in Kyiv after the city was firmly taken over by the *Sichovi Striltsi* and the Directorate moved in. Therefore, disguised as a German military officer, he went into exile to Germany with the withdrawing German troops.

Although Pavlo Skoropadskyy was declared an outlaw in Ukraine, the command of the *Sichovi Striltsi* had not really searched for him in order to capture him. It is believed that Col. Konovalts and Dr. Osyp Nazaruk decidedly opposed implementation of any method of political revenge during these turbulent times.²⁹⁷)

Was the uprising politically inevitable?

It is necessary to answer this question because during the past half century some Ukrainian conservative writers expressed doubt concerning the inevitability of the uprising against the Hetman. Some claimed that the uprising, under the leadership of the Directorate, was even harmful to the interests of the Ukrainian State.

Let us try to answer this question in view of the historical facts and the national objectives of the Ukrainian people. At the outset of this analysis, let us state here with emphasis that the national objectives of the Ukrainian people were very clearly defined through the democratic process of national self-determination during the months of March, 1917, through January, 1918. The Ukrainian people expressed their will clearly and undoubtedly that they wanted to manage all of their national affairs themselves, and this objective they would be able to achieve only in their own sovereign Ukrainian State. Such a State they established in the form of the democratically governed Ukrainian National Republic. For this objective, the Ukrainian people fought and shed their blood.

Willingly or unwillingly, Pavlo Skoropadskyy's acts of April through November 1918 obrogated these objectives of the Ukrainian people. First, he deprived the Ukrainian people of their individual and democratic liberties, and at the end of his dictatorship he signed an act which in effect gave up the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian State in favor of the Russians. Let us pay some attention to the major acts of the Hetman.

Following the *coup d'etat* against the democratic government of the Ukrainian National Republic on April 29, 1918, Pavlo Skoropadskyy proclaimed himself the Hetman of all of Ukraine and established a dictatorial system of government. He dissolved all democratic institutions established by the Ukrainian Central Rada and deprived the Ukrainian people of their rights to participate in governing their own affairs through the democratic process. In the forcible seizure of power, Skoropadskyy relied upon the German troops and the Russophile elements in the country.

As the self-proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine, Skoropadskyy appointed his reactionary cabinet consisting of a majority of non-Ukrainian members. To the first cabinet, consisting of 15 members,

Skoropadskyy appointed nine Russians, one Pole, and only two politically conscious Ukrainians plus three who previously had not considered themselves politically as Ukrainians. From among the Russian majority in the cabinet, 7 of its members belonged to the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party, the *Kadets*, one was a Russian *Oktyabrist*, and the ninth one belonged to no political party.

Not only before the Bolshevik revolution but also after it, the Russian *Kadets*, headed by Paul Milyukov, firmly advocated the policy of one united and indivisible Russia. Reluctantly, on some occasions, they expressed their willingness to recognize a limited autonomy for Ukraine within the Russian Empire. The Russian *Oktyabrists* pursued the same policy. The *Kadets* continued to pass resolutions to the same effect even meeting on various occasions in Ukraine during the Hetman regime.^{297a)}

Thus, in the first Hetman's Council of Ministers, a majority of its members pursued policies directed against the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, now headed by Hetman Skoropadskyy. They tried to do their best to subordinate also local administration to their appointees who shared the policies of the Russian *Kadets*.

Therefore, not only the Ukrainian moderate democrats and the Ukrainian moderate socialists were in opposition to such regime, but also the Ukrainian national conservative forces. They opposed the anti-Ukrainian character of the regime itself. The Ukrainian adherents to a monarchical system of government opposed the Hetman Russophile regime, too. Led by the Party of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarians, they sent a memorandum to the Hetman, dated May 21, 1918, protesting against the anti-Ukrainian composition of the cabinet and its Russophile policy. Thus, three weeks after the establishment of a seemingly conservative government, the Ukrainian conservatives deemed it wise to disassociate themselves from this culturally and politically anti-Ukrainian regime.^{297b)}

The defense of the culturally, nationally, and politically Ukrainian character of the Ukrainian State was the number one issue in the opposition to the Hetman regime. At least, at this time.

The socio-economic policies of the Hetman's regime were closely related to those mentioned above. The Hetman abrogated virtually all socio-economic reforms established by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and returned, in this respect, to the conditions existing in the Russian Empire before the war. Especially painful to the Ukrainian peasantry, who constituted the enormous majority of the Ukrainian people, was the repeal of land reform. Attempts of the Hetman regime to restore land which was given to the Ukrainian village farmers in the process of the implementation of the land reform legislation of the Ukrainian National Republic to the large landowners, mostly Russians and Poles culturally, oftentimes caused

armed resistance by the new family owners. A brutal use of force against these Ukrainian villagers intensified opposition to the Hetman regime.

The ruthless repressions against resisting Ukrainian villagers by the Hetman military units commanded by the former Russian Tsarist officers in the name of the Ukrainian State deepened the gap between the Ukrainian people and the regime. Their positions were diametrically opposed to each other. The socio-economic and nationally political issues here were blended.

However, the cup of the Ukrainian national tolerance was overfilled when Skoropadskyy, in his capacity as the Hetman of Ukraine, decided to resign from full sovereignty of the Ukrainian State and to fight for the restoration of the Russian Empire with Ukraine as a federated unit within it. The first announcement to this effect was made by Ataman Krasnov, the head of the Don Cossacks, on November 3, 1918, and the final shock to all nationally conscious Ukrainians was the proclamation of the *Hramota* of November 14, 1918, by the Hetman himself.

As indicated above, the last act of the Hetman was an open violation of the constitution of the Ukrainian State and a challenge to the national dignity of the people.

All of these major acts, as well as many minor ones, made the regime of Pavlo Skoropadskyy intolerable, and the uprising of the Ukrainian people was inevitable in defense of their national sovereignty and political liberty.

The question of the genesis of the anti-Hetman uprising

After the capitulation of Austria-Hungary at the end of October, 1918, and in view of the imminent capitulation of Germany, Hetman Skoropadskyy stood at the crossroads of his policies for the future. He faced the reality that in the very near future the major force which supported him, the German military units, would leave the territory of Ukraine. Also, he was aware of the negative attitude of the Entente political leaders toward the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State.

Under those circumstances, instead of sharing the fate of the entire Ukrainian people, he decided to join the forces fighting for the restoration of the "united and indivisible Russia." As a first step in this new direction, Hetman Skoropadskyy agreed with the Don Cossack Ataman, Gen. Peter N. Krasnov, to work together toward achievement of that goal. A well known Ukrainian historian, Professor Dmytro Doroshenko, who was at that time the Foreign Minister in Hetman's government, wrote the following:

On November 3rd (1918), a meeting was held at the Skorokhodove railroad station between the Hetman and the Don Cossack Ataman, P. Krasnov.

In response to the Hetman's toast "for the health of Ataman and the growth of the Don Cossack Army" as well as in response to the address of the Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, Colonel Slyvynskyy, at this meeting, Krasnov delivered a very poetic but politically not too tactful speech, hinting that the Ukrainian-Don Cossack alliance is the beginning of that great task which the Hetman has to accomplish," i.e. the reuniting the former Russian Empire into one entity.²⁹⁸)

This event was immediately reported in Kyiv and became the turning point in the preparation of the uprising by the Ukrainian national camp.²⁹⁹) Mykyta Shapoval, one of the earliest initiators of the uprising conspiracy, noted about this event in his memoirs in the spring of 1919 as follows:

We were very badly impressed by the meeting between Skoropadskyy and Krasnov at Skorokhodove. On the next day, we were familiar with the text of Krasnov's speech in which he bombastically honored Skoropadskyy as the gatherer of Rus' etc. It was clear to us that there was a conspiracy against Ukraine and the achievements of the revolution in the name of the united indivisible Russian monarchy in which Skoropadskyy might play the first role. From the documents, we were familiar with the main political idea of the Hetman regime. This provided us with opportunity to counterpoint our own idea more clearly, and those with weaker will we were alienating from "the adjustment to the evil." I do point out that the meeting at Skorokhodove was the turning point for the Hetman regime as well as for ourselves.²⁹⁹)

A note on the date of the origin of the idea to organize an anti-Hetman uprising is in order here. According to the writings of Mykyta Shapoval, the idea was developed in an incidental conversation between himself and Andriy Makarenko after Shapoval's return from the festivities of opening the Ukrainian University at Kamyanets Podilskyy which were held on October 22, 1918. Thus, as far as he remembered, the conversation was held one noon in Kyiv not before October 26, 1918. The very same day, in this evening Makarenko talked about the idea with Volodymyr Vynnychenko.

The following day, probably on October 27, 1918, a meeting was held between Shapoval, Vynnychenko, and later on all together with Makarenko, and Gen. Olexander Osetskyy. It was this small group of individuals that decided to initiate preparation steps for

an uprising against the Hetman regime. At that time, the purpose of the uprising was to put an end to the repressive measures of the German and Hetman units against the Ukrainian rural population as well as with the objective of restoring a democratic system of government in Ukraine. However, the change of political objectives of the Hetman regime, as declared by Ataman Krasnov at the Skorokhodove meeting added another, a more sensitive reason, for the organization of the uprising.

Not until this event, was the group of the initiators for uprising preparations enlarged. Now, the leaders of the Military Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, Col. Konovalets and Andriy Melnyk, as well as other military leaders, like Col. V. Pavlenko and Col. Petro Bolbotchan, accepted the invitation to join the conspiracy circle. Also, those active in foreign relations, like Consul Biletskyy and Dr. Artem Halip, joined the group. Functions of the executive secretary of this leading circle were performed by Petro Didushok who was the Secretary of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* and maintained contacts with the leaders in various parts of the country.³⁰⁰)

Only now were steps undertaken to include leaders of all political parties and professional organizations belonging to the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* into the secret circle planning the uprising. Before the Skoropadskyy-Krasnov meeting at Skorokhodove, only some leading members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, like Mykyta Shapoval, were members of the secret group. Vynnychenko's effort to induce leading members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party remained fruitless save for a single Central Committee member, Mykhaylo Avdiyenko. Even the majority of the Social-Democratic Central Committee was still convinced that it would be possible to find a common platform for cooperation with the Hetman.

The climate has changed after the event of November 3rd. The uprising conspirators decided that the time was ripe to talk once again with representatives of all political parties, members of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*. They decided to consider the imminent crisis for the first time at the meeting of the Executive Board of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* held in the offices of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists paper, *Nova Rada* (New Council). The following participated in this meeting: V. Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Sadovskyy, both Social-Democrats; Fedir Shvets represented *Selyanska Spilka* (The Peasants Union); Mykyta Shapoval represented the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (The Center); and Serhiy Yefremiv, Andriy Nikovskyy and Kost Matsiyevych, all Socialists-Federalists. ³⁰⁰) The major characteristic of this meeting was the deep sense of responsibility combined with a belief in the possibility of the return of Pavlo Skoropadskyy to

the Ukrainian national forces even after the meeting with Krasnov at Skorokhodove. Only Vynnychenko and Shapoval resolutely advocated popular uprising because they had lost hope in the good will of the Hetman.

The deliberations were initiated by Volodymyr Vynnychenko. After he referred to the Hetman's change in political objectives, Vynnychenko pointed out that in view of the imminent German capitulation, the Germans would soon leave the country. The regime was very unpopular among the Ukrainian popular masses due to "pacification" expeditions of his police units. Historically, it would be disgraceful not to rise against such a regime which, after all, had done it in the name of the Ukrainian State. To restore the good name of an independent Ukrainian State was the duty and obligation of the responsible Ukrainian political leaders. Therefore, an armed uprising was inevitable, said Vynnychenko.³⁰¹) At this time, Vynnychenko disclosed that there has been some preparatory work done by an inner circle and extended an invitation to those who were not familiar with it yet to join the group. He expressed his hope that for the defense of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, intelligentsia would unite with the popular masses in a common struggle against all foreign oppressors.³⁰²) Mykyta Shapoval informed participants about those armed Ukrainian military units that the initiators could count on from the very first day of the uprising. They were small. Probably enough to spark an uprising in the hope of a swift popular mass support. These forces included the 1,500 men unit of *Sichovi Striltsi*, 600 men of *Chornomortsy*, three regiments of the Zaporozhian Division of some 6,000 soldiers, and about 1000 Railroad Guards. In his view, these forces were sufficient to start a popular uprising because the anti-Hetman atmosphere was loaded.

Kost Matsiyevych and Serhiy Yefremiv, both representatives of the moderate Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Federalists which was the only truly Ukrainian political party represented in the Hetman's government at that time, cautioned the participants against the uprising. First of all, they expressed their belief that it would still be possible to persuade the Hetman to appoint a truly Ukrainian Council of Ministers. Yefremiv expressed his fear that the armed forces mentioned by Shapoval would not be sufficient to ensure any degree of success for the uprising. Matsiyevych, on the other hand, expressed his fear that a popular uprising against the Hetman might spark general anarchy in the country because the villagers would try first of all to secure land for themselves disregarding all rules and regulations. The third member of the Socialist-Federalist group, Andriy Nikovskyy, agreed with Vynnychenko that the prevailing situation forced the Ukrainians to rise against the Hetman and disagreed with Yefremiv that the Ukrainian

armed units were so desperately insufficient for a successful commencement of an uprising, as the latter believed. However, he pointed out the dangers of any armed uprising in those revolutionary times. Thus, he had difficulties in making up his mind.³⁰³) Professor Valentyn Sadovskyy, a party colleague of Vynnychenko, disagreed with the latter concerning the uprising. However, his argumentation was purely Marxian. He worried about the small numbers and the low class consciousness of the proletariat, the underdevelopment of the productive forces in Ukraine, the backwardness of the village farmers as well as their reactionary tendencies although they were opposing the Hetman regime. But, Sadovskyy did not believe in the possibility of finding a compromise with Pavlo Skoropadskyy. The seventh participant in this meeting, Prof. Fedir Shvets, resolutely supported the idea of uprising preparations.

In the final result of the discussion, the majority of the Presidium of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* resolved against the immediate preparations for the uprising in the existing situation.³⁰⁴)

In their concern for the future of the Ukrainian State, the leadership of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, which comprised all Ukrainian democratic forces, tried as late as November 10-11, 1918, to come to terms with the Hetman on a respectable basis. Through the intermediaries, S. Shemet and M. Mikhnovskyy, of the Ukrainian Party of the Democrats-Agrarians, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* offered to the Hetman full support in electing him the President of the Ukrainian State at the session of the Ukrainian Parliament in the future if, in return, the Hetman would immediately appoint a truly Ukrainian Council of Ministers.³⁰⁵) Skoropadskyy rejected this generous proposal of the Ukrainian democracy.

The Hetman had made up his mind by the beginning of November, 1918, and was just waiting for the proper opportunity to take an open and public stand. Such an occasion occurred when on November 12, 1918, his cabinet was considering the application of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* with the Minister of Interior Affairs for permit to hold the Ukrainian National Congress planned by the *Soyuz* for November 17th. The Minister of Internal Affairs presented the matter to the cabinet. The *Kadet* majority in the cabinet cast their eight votes against the permit, while seven Ministers who wished to rally all Ukrainian national forces in support of the State voted for the granting of the permit. After the rejection of this permit four ministers, Ukrainians, resigned from the cabinet in protest.

A splendid opportunity was provided to the Hetman by the resignation of several ministers from his cabinet to reconstruct the Council of Ministers on a broad consolidated basis of the Ukrainian national political groups. However, the Hetman chose to let the

opportunity pass by. Due to these developments, a meeting of the full Executive Board of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* was held on November 12th. All member organizations sent their representatives, including the Democrats-Agrarians who theoretically stood for the positions of a Ukrainian Hetmanate. After Hetman Skoropadskyy rejected their mediation, they, too, had lost hope for the consolidation of all Ukrainian political forces by the Hetman. There was no mention about the planned armed uprising at that meeting since it was a meeting of the regular board of the *Soyuz* rather than of the inner conspiracy group. Therefore, on November 12, 1918, there was another meeting held later at night at which the question, "What is to be done further for the preservation of the truly national Ukrainian State?" was discussed.

Contrary to the hopes of the Ukrainian political leaders, the Hetman seized this opportunity to carry out his conceived plans. On November 14, 1918, the Hetman appointed a new cabinet, headed by a Russian, S. M. Gerbel, and published the above discussed *Hramota*, which in effect abdicated the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian State in favor of an undefined future federation with Russia. The restoration of the Russian Empire was the Hetman's goal, as proclaimed in the same document.

The shock was so enormous in the country that at the secret meeting of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* held in the evening hours of the 14th of November there was no doubt expressed about the inevitability of an immediate proclamation of a popular uprising against the Hetman and his regime. What further happened, has been discussed above.

Bolshevik preparations for aggression overlooked

In retrospect of the developments, any objective historian would have to admit that the Ukrainian national camp fighting for the preservation of the newly won sovereignty of the Ukrainian State was forced into a situation without any other choice but to call for an armed overthrow of the Hetman regime. Hetman's unilateral call for a united military offensive for "restoration of a great Russia" without any well defined guarantees for preservation of political, economic, and cultural rights of Ukraine, was deemed to be not only a sort of "voluntary" subjugation to the Russian goals, but also a paradoxical help of the Ukrainians to restore the Russians to their ability to oppress the Ukrainian people again. Those who were controlling the centers of power of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement at that time, especially Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin,

gave no promises to the Hetman that they would seriously respect a well defined federal status for Ukraine within the new "All-Russian Federation" mentioned by Hetman Skoropadskyy in his *Hramota*.

It is of interest to underscore that there are texts of telegrams dispatched by the new government of the Hetman (Minister of Foreign Affairs Afanasiev) to Gen. Denikin and from Gen. Denikin to this Hetman's Minister in Kyiv and to the commanders of the units of the Russian Volunteer Army in Ukraine. The plan of these commanders to overthrow the Hetman's regime and to take over Ukraine in the name of General Denikin was dropped by Denikin after the *Hramota* of November 14, which concerned the struggle for a united great Russia. In his telegram of November 16, Denikin advised Afanasiev that all of Denikin's forces in Ukraine would coordinate their actions with the Hetman's government. In practical terms, this meant that all Denikin's forces in Kyiv, Odessa and other large cities would from that moment on, support the Hetman in his struggle against the Directorate.

If the objective of the Hetman was to unite all forces of anti-Bolshevism in Eastern Europe for the united effort to defeat the *Sovnarkom*, then he should have tried to persuade leaders of the defenders of the sovereignty of Ukraine to support his policy. Secondly, he should have done this in cooperation with other non-Russian nations of the area, and not to limit himself to the cooperation with the Don Cossack Ataman Krasnov and then with Denikin alone. Thirdly, he should have secured from the Russian political leaders full recognition of the right of Ukrainian people to their full national sovereignty. Fourthly, he should have signed a well defined agreement concerning the recognition of the independence of Ukraine by the Russians in advance, and, finally, he should have insisted that their common struggle against Russian Bolshevism should be based upon cooperation of the military forces of other equally sovereign nations. The question of a federation should have been postponed until complete victory over the Bolshevik regime was won and after the free elections of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as well as of the Russian Constituent Assembly.

No responsible Ukrainian political leader could have settled for less at that time without facing a popular revolution against him. In the case under consideration, not only all of these conditions and guarantees were not secured by the Hetman, but the most influential political leaders of the Russian White movement, like Milyukov, Krivoshein and Shebeko, openly campaigned in the diplomatic circles for the denial of the very existence of the Ukrainian nation as a separate national and political, and even ethnic entity.

The leaders of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* could not belittle their own national aspiration to such an extent as not to revolt

against the attempt of the Hetman to lead Ukrainian troops into bloody war for the restoration to power of the White Russian groups who did not even want to admit the very existence of the Ukrainian people.

The Hetman planned to cooperate with the military forces of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks in his efforts to restore "a great Russia." However, these forces were quite limited in November, 1918. And, yet, on the other hand, the Ukrainian national democratic forces overestimated the forces of General Denikin and Ataman Krasnov which were in immediate proximity to the Ukrainian territory. Concentrating upon the most immediate danger as well as upon the timely most emotional issues, leaders of the anti-Hetman conspiracy had forgotten, for a moment, the most serious danger of the Russian Bolshevik aggression.

It must be noted here that in the course of the discussions about the inevitability of the anti-Hetman uprising, the conspirators had not dealt with the possibility of a new Russian Bolshevik attempt to seize power in Ukraine at all. Their sensitivity in this respect might have been disintensified by the presence of the German troops and their effective deterrence from the Bolshevik offensive. Somehow, there was a greater concern about the German defense of the Hetman and their repressions against the Ukrainian people.³⁰⁶)

And, yet, at the time when the final decisions concerning the Ukrainian popular uprising against the Hetman were made, the danger from the Bolshevik side was a real thing. The Ukrainians did not know that the plans for the second Bolshevik invasion in Ukraine were being worked out to the last details. On November 11, 1918, after the news of the German capitulation broke out, Vladimir Lenin entrusted a special group to prepare detailed plan for a military offensive against Ukraine within ten days. A general plan for this aggression was worked out in advance.³⁰⁹)


Thus, the new Soviet Russian aggression against Ukraine would have occurred after the German withdrawal regardless of the system of government in Ukraine, of course, short of the Russian Bolshevik one. In case of reaching a sincere cooperation between the forces supporting the Hetman and those led by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, the Ukrainian people fully united would have been in a position to offer a much more effective military resistance to the aggressive Soviet Russian forces. On the other hand, a passive attitude of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* forces would not have helped the Hetman and his allies to defeat Bolshevism. Quite to the contrary; there is reason to believe that such a passivity would have indirectly helped the aggressors because the dissatisfied peasants probably would have sabotaged the defensive efforts of a reactionary self-proclaimed dictator and his Russian reactionary allies.

Most probably, the forces of the Hetman, without active support of the democratic camp, would have been defeated by the Bolshevik invaders very soon. The experience of the Don Cossacks who were defeated by the Russian Red Guards in December 1917 — February 1918 certainly would have been repeated in Ukraine. The fate of the Hetman was not envious anyhow, because in Kyiv the Russophiles themselves were planning to overthrow him in favor of Denikin.^{307a}) Only the uprising saved him these troubles, because the Russian group, in the meantime, decided that by fighting against the Directorate, the Hetman was doing their work anyhow.

Finally, one more speculative question. What would have happened, if after the proclamation of the *Hramota* by Skoropadskyy, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* had called upon the Ukrainian people to join the Hetman forces in the struggle for the realization of his goals? There is every good reason to believe that the popular masses of the Ukrainian nation would not have followed the call of their political leaders and intelligentsia. Neither the Ukrainian workers, nor the peasants would have followed the call to defend a regime they hated. They would not have offered support to a government headed by a Russian *Kadet*, S. M. Gerbel.

It must be concluded that the decision to organize and carry out a popular uprising against the Hetman who unilaterally gave up sovereignty was inevitable. Not only the principle of the Ukrainian sovereignty was defended, but also the existence of the sovereign Ukrainian National Republic was for the duration of the following three years, saved. The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was created when the nation was in distress and it led the Ukrainian people in their desperate struggle for preservation of their national sovereignty against the new Russian Bolshevik imperialism for the coming three years.

In their desperate struggle, they were left alone. Not quite so! The Red and White forces of the Russian imperialism were practically united in their effort to deprive the Ukrainian people of their God given freedom. Thus, the Directorate had to fight later against Denikin and Lenin alike.



CHAPTER 2

UKRAINE'S NEW SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT NOVEMBER 15 — DECEMBER 26, 1918

Establishment of the Directorate

In the process of the preparations for the popular uprising against the Hetman regime in Ukraine, political and revolutionary leaders decided to establish a ruling body which would lead the Ukrainian people in the civil war of liberation as well as temporarily govern the freed provinces of Ukraine until the establishment of a permanent form of government of the Ukrainian National Republic. Thus, this provisional body was to serve both as the leadership of the uprising and as a provisional government of the country holding the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the internal developments in the newly restored Ukrainian National Republic after the overthrow of the Hetman regime.

Leaders of the inner circle of the uprising conspiracy, Mykyta Shapoval and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, realized that there were some obstacles on the road to the restoration of the Ukrainian Central *Rada's* regime. First of all, the military operations against the Hetman's regime required a centralized leadership which they were not willing to entrust entirely to any single individual. Secondly, in the course of the struggle against the Hetman's regime, still supported by the Germans also, a united leadership was a necessity. At the same time, to ensure at least some degree of democratic process even in the course of the uprising, a collective leadership was deemed as the most desirable.

The Central *Rada* had a membership of almost 1000 deputies. Such a body was not adequate to lead a struggle during the prepared uprising in the civil war in the first time, before victory of the uprising. This body consisted not only of Ukrainian members there, but also of the deputies of the ethnic minorities among whom were some sharp opponents to the Ukrainian sovereign statehood. Even the Little *Rada* was not free from that difficulty.

Therefore, at the end of October, 1918, Shapoval and Vynnychenko decided to follow the example of the French Revolution. After the overthrow of the Jacobin tyrannical regime of Maximilien Franceois Mario Robespierre in 1795, a new constitution, providing for a strict separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary

powers in the French Republic, was adopted. The legislative powers were vested into a bi-cameral parliament. The upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate, elected a five member Directorate with the authority to carry out the executive powers of the French Republic. Each member of the Directorate was to be elected for the duration of five years in such a way that each year one member of the Directorate was to be replaced by the Senate. The chairmanship in the Directorate was rotated every three months. As a policy making body, the Directorate appointed heads of the various administrative departments on the merit principle to carry out the administrative functions of the government. However, the Directorate was authorized by the French constitution to suspend civil liberties for a limited period of time in case of national emergency. And, this provision soon led to the replacement of the Jacobin tyranny by the dictatorship of the Directorate. Due to the internal conflicts between equal members of the Directorate, the regime proved unworkable, and in 1799 was abolished by the *coup d'etat* of Napoleon Bonaparte.

According to Mykyta Shapoval, about two weeks before the commencement of the uprising, he and Volodymyr Vynnychenko developed the following platform for their activities:

Overthrow of the Hetman regime and the restoration of the Ukrainian National Republic; removal of the Germans from Ukraine; and, summoning of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. For the duration of the uprising, the leadership should be entrusted to a 3 - 5 person college (which we called: the Directorate). The Directorate should be elected by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, and after the successful ending of the uprising, the Directorate should summon the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.³⁰⁹⁾

This platform was fully approved later by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* in the hope that the newly created Directorate would serve only as a provisional ruling body of the Ukrainian people during the uprising. Analogically to the regime of the Directorate in France, which was established with the objective of abolishing the Jacobin tyranny, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was erected against an attempt of the Hetman's regime to subordinate their interests to the interests of the proposed new Russian Empire. After the preservation of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, the Directorate aimed to restore civil liberties, law and order, and to summon the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for the establishment of a permanent system of government based upon the popular will.

The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was not a self-created body established by its own members only. Neither

was it a product of a particular single party which would impose its will upon the people of Ukraine. The Directorate was a representative body elected by the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* which embraced within its framework all Ukrainian political parties, except the Party of the Agrarian Democrats, virtually all professional organizations and the Ukrainian labor unions. The political parties which were members of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* received about 80% of all votes cast in the elections of the deputies to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and almost all mandates held by the Ukrainians.

Thus, the constituent body which elected the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was fully mandated under these extraordinary circumstances to serve as the representative of the will of the Ukrainian people. More so, since the objective of the Directorate was to create such conditions in Ukraine under which the Ukrainian people would have full freedom to elect their representatives to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, the Directorate was free of any usurpation of power.

Ever since the democratic process was instituted in order to establish democratic governments in various countries in the world, the process was exercised through political parties. Political parties not only gather supporters for their political platforms, but play an important role in the popularly elected parliaments and in most well established democracies their existence as well as activities are protected by the laws of the country. More than that, in the most advanced democratic countries, internal organization of the parties and their participation in the democratic process is regulated by law.

Therefore, extraordinary developments in Ukraine after the proclamation of the *Hramota* of November 14, 1918, by Hetman Skoropadskyy, fully justified the action on the part of the existing political parties to act on behalf of the organized will of the people. Under the prevailing conditions, there was no opportunity to call a Constituent Assembly in order to express the will of the people. Political parties, united in the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* along with the professional and labor organizations possessed adequate attributes to take proper measures in the defense of the constitution of the Ukrainian State which was not only violated but abrogated by the *Hramota* of the Hetman. The representatives of the Ukrainian people, organized in their political parties, had a historical duty to act in the name of the people in defense of Ukrainian sovereignty.

According to the writings of Mykyta Shapoval³¹⁰) and those of Pavlo Khrystyuk,³¹¹) the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was elected by the representatives of the Ukrainian political parties and professional and labor organizations, united in the

Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, as well as the military leaders. Both Socialist political parties participated, namely the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party; the nationalistic Ukrainian Party of the Independentists-Socialists as well as the democratic conservative Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Federalists joined to. Among the professional organizations, members of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, were: *Selyanska Spilka* (the Alliance of the Peasants), the Association of the Jurists, the Medical Association, the *Halytsko-Bukovynska Rada* (the Council of the Ukrainians from Galicia and Bukovina), as well as a number of smaller organizations. From among the labor organizations were the National Council of the All-Ukrainian Post and Telegraph Workers and the Alliance of the Railroad Workers of Ukraine. Also a special right wing Ukrainian Labor Party belonged to the *Soyuz* and participated in the election of the Directorate.

The Ukrainian military forces were represented in the election of the Directorate through Major Yuliyayn Chaykivskyy, representing the *Sichovi Striltsi*, as well as by General Olexander Osetskyy, Colonel Vasyl Tyutyunnyk and Colonel Arkas, representing other military units.³¹²) The participation of Major Yuliyayn Chaykivskyy in the election of the Directorate was a mere formality because as early as October 30, 1918, the representatives of the Military Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, Colonel Andriy Melnyk and Captain Fedir Cherynyk, stated, on behalf of the Military Council, that the *Sichovi Striltsi* would participate in any planned uprising against the Hetman regime only under condition that Symon Petlyura would be a member of the future uprising leadership circle, as representative of the *Sichovi Striltsi*.

Thus, in the historical meeting of the Presidium of the *Soyuz* were represented the Ukrainian political parties, professional and labor organizations and the Ukrainian military forces.

Personal composition of the Directorate

Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a Social-Democrat and former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic, was elected Head of the Directorate.*) In accordance with the demands of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, Symon Petlyura was elected member of the Directorate

*) In the constitutional acts of the Ukrainian Central **Rada** was always used the term "head" (in Ukrainian "holova") for the post of the chairman or president of the **Rada** itself as well as of any other collective governmental organ. Never had been used the term "president" or "chairman" (in Ukrainian "prezident").

in charge of the military affairs with the military rank of *Holovnyy Otaman* which is equivalent to the rank of Generalissimo. He, too, until that time was affiliated with the Social-Democrats. The representative of the Socialists-Revolutionaries in the Directorate was Fedir Shvets, Professor at Kyiv University. The Ukrainian nationalists were represented in the Directorate through a jurist, Panas Andriyevskyy, while the fifth member of the Directorate, Andriy Makarenko, represented the professional and labor organizations of Ukraine. He was not associated with any political party at that time, but was a high official in the Ukrainian Railroad system.

The five member Directorate represented a coalition of different political parties, military forces and the professional and labor groups. A question is in order: why these particular individuals were elected? And, why such prominent leader as Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy and one of the initiators of the uprising against the Hetman regime, Mykyta Shapoval, were not elected members of the Directorate?

The candidacy of Mykyta Shapoval to membership in the Directorate was mentioned at the decisive meeting at which the Directorate was elected. However, Shapoval refused to accept the nomination giving poor health as one of the reasons. Besides, he explained that he did not feel able to hold such a high office of responsibility.³¹³)

Election of any revolutionary leadership is of great significance for the determination of the course of the revolutionary regime. Therefore, it merits dwelling upon the composition of the Directorate. First of all, why the composition of the Directorate was elected as it was? And, secondly, what were the circumstances of Symon Petlyura's election?

It should be emphasized that the inner circle of the uprising conspiracy could not in due time to contact former President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, at all. On April 29, 1918, the day of Skoropadskyy's *coup d'etat* against the Ukrainian Central *Rada* regime, there was an attempt to assassinate Hrushevskyy. From that time, Hrushevskyy had lived in hiding.

Thus, the most popular Ukrainian political leader, Hrushevskyy, who was the first President of the Ukrainian National Republic and one of the most experienced statesmen of Ukraine at that time, was deprived of membership in the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. The last Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Republic, Vsevolod Holubovych, was still in prison along with other members of his cabinet, namely Col. Olexander Zhukivskyy, Mykhaylo Tkachenko, Pavlo Bohatskyy and others, held by the Germans, since the *coup d'etat* of April 29, 1918, until

the time of formation of the Directorate. Therefore, none of them could physically be present at the formation of that body.

Some critics emphasize that instead of Professor of Mineralogy, Fedir Shvets, who was politically less experienced, it would have been much more advisable to elect to the membership of the Directorate Professor Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv, who was politically very active and well experienced. But, Prof. Shvets was active in the presidium of the Peasant Union which had been one of the most influential organizations among the compact majority of the Ukrainian peasantry. He was also a member of the leadership of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. Hence, he was more popular in the time of the election of the Directorate than Prof. Hryhoriyiv. Panas Andriyevskyy was a good jurist. He was nominated by the Ukrainian Party of the Independentists-Socialists which was popular among the military circles, especially the officers. Andriy Makarenko could have been usefully utilized in the Directorate as representative of the Ukrainian trade organizations.

Two of the total five members of the Directorate were very well known and very popular among the Ukrainian masses. They were, Petlyura and Vynnychenko. Also they were politically the most experienced.³¹⁶)

In his attempt to justify the personal composition of the Directorate, Volodymyr Vynnychenko wrote as early as 1919 as follows:

Why the Directorate was elected with such a personal composition as it was? Were there no other people available? Yes, they were not available at the moment of the election. Some did not come to the meeting... Only those present could be elected, or those that have previously given their consent but for some reasons did not come to the meeting (as, for instance, S. Petlyura). The Directorate was to leave the very same day for the place of the center of the uprising, for Bila Tserkva, in order to assume the military and political leadership of the uprising.³¹⁷)

The popularity of Symon Petlyura and his military activity decided easily in favor of his election to the Directorate. Although Petlyura was imprisoned by the Hetman regime and held under control by the German military forces until a few days before the uprising, his popularity among the masses of the people was great. After he was freed from prison, he immediately joined the military units of *Sichovi Striltsi* in Bila Tserkva.³¹⁸)

Petlyura's popularity rose high during the Hetman regime. After the *coup d'etat* of the Hetman, Petlyura became active in the *Soyuz Zemstv*, the alliance of the provincial and county self-administrations in Ukraine. He was elected its President and was very active

in the defense of popular liberties and local self-government. He was accused of anti-regime activities, and arrested by the Skoropadskyy regime.³¹⁹⁾ If Petlyura would have been personally present at the meeting, it is possible that he would have been elected Head of the Directorate. However, his primary interest was to serve the military needs of the country and he agreed to be a member of the Directorate and accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief of all military forces of the Directorate.³²⁰⁾

Although Vynnychenko claimed that Petlyura was elected as a member of the Directorate on demand of the *Sichovi Striltsi* only,³²¹⁾ Shapoval disagreed with that statement. According to Shapoval, the popularity of Petlyura was so great that the Presidium of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* had done everything in its power to secure his release from prison, especially after the Ukrainian forces were strengthened in the Hetman's cabinet.³²²⁾ Thus, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* itself valued the valors of Petlyura and its leaders were prepared to elect him to one of the most responsible positions of the Ukrainian leadership.

Neither Shapoval, nor Vynnychenko liked Petlyura personally. However, their personal views had to give way to political necessity,³²³⁾ and Petlyura became one of the most influential leaders in the following two years of Ukrainian independence.

Powers and structure of the Directorate

Historically, in times of emergency all governments have assumed greater powers than they exercise in time of peace. Usually, they establish some governmental body to solve the problems of the national emergency. Such a body acts usually centralistically and exercises some extraordinary authority. There is even greater need for such a leadership in case of an uprising against the existing government or in a war for liberation from foreign oppression. The proponents of a collective leadership of the uprising in the form of the Directorate were conscious that none of them could be pronounced the dictator of the uprising because they themselves were convinced democrats and also they knew that the dominant national opinion was against any form of personal dictatorship. Hence, they had chosen a leadership in the form of the Directorate.

Organizers of the uprising realized that their leadership must have broad military, legislative and executive authority during the uprising. Therefore, the Directorate was vested with very broad and centralized powers until the end of the victorious uprising. Centralization of powers was a necessity under the existing conditions because the Hetman's regime was now supported not only by the Germans but also by the Russian forces of restoration.

However, the Directorate was vested with these centralized powers only until the end of the victorious uprising. The provisional character of these powers was explicitly stated in the Declaration of the Directorate which was approved at its first meeting and published on November 15, 1918. As a matter of fact, all powers of the Directorate were to be terminated at the moment of the opening session of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly which the Directorate promised to call. Let us quote some parts of the Declaration of the Directorate:

Citizens!

The last traitorous act of the General-Hetman P. Skoropadskyy concerning the abrogation of the *sovereignty* of the Ukrainian State submits the Ukrainian people to the oppression of the reactionary forces of the landlords and bureaucrats and leads to complete *national subjugation*. The newly appointed government, consisting of the representatives of the reactionary classes, clearly indicates what the Ukrainian people have to expect if they will not decidedly rise and fight to the last man in defense of their life.*)

The Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, as the highest representative organ of the organized Ukrainian democratic forces, has done everything in its power in order to peacefully, without bloodshed and without disruption of peaceful life of the people, defend the rights of the people. However, all peaceful efforts of the Ukrainian democratic forces were rejected by the landlords and the *bourgeoisie*.

Therefore, the time has come to leave peaceful efforts alone.

In the name of the Ukrainian democracy and on behalf of all active representatives of the people who have elected us, herewith we, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, make it known:

General Pavlo Skoropadskyy is a tyrant and usurper of the popular authority. We declare his government null and void because it is anti-democratic and anti-national.

We suggest to General P. Skoropadskyy and his ministers to give up all governmental positions which they have seized through deceit and by force.

For the sake of preservation of peace and order in the Republic, we suggest they do this immediately, without bloodshed.

*) Italic added.

In the following parts of the Declaration, the Directorate called upon “the organizations of the Russian officers” and the German military forces to lay down their arms and abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. Those refusing to follow this call of the Directorate were to be subject to the consequences of revolutionary justice. The Directorate promised to the people of Ukraine the restoration of all civil liberties and the carrying out of needed socio-economic reforms in the renewed democratic system of the Ukrainian National Republic. This part of the Declaration reads:

All other [except the Russian officers and the German military personnel] honest citizens, the Ukrainians as well as the non-Ukrainians, should join us in the armed uprising against the enemies of and the criminals against the people, and, then all social and political achievements of the revolutionary democracy will be restored. These shall be definitely and steadfastly established by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly in the free country of Ukraine.³²⁴)

The Declaration ended with the call: “To arms, citizens, and for order!”

The above are the most important parts of the Declaration of the Directorate dated November 15, 1918, which called for a popular uprising. The Declaration provided ideological and legal foundations for the armed popular resistance to the Hetman’s new regime and offered a framework for the restoration of a constitutional government in the sovereign Ukraine. Let us summarize the main points of the Declaration. Besides the call for a popular armed uprising, the Declaration of the Directorate promised the following:

First, after the removal of the regime of Hetman Skoropadskyy, the previously existing democratic system in the Ukrainian State was to be restored. Hence, this was a promise to restore the regime of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* until such time that the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly would decide upon the permanent system of government in the country. The Declaration does not make it clear whether the Directorate would order new elections of the representatives to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly or would simply summon the previously elected deputies to the Assembly to a formal session. In the absence of any provision with regard to this problem, one could have assumed that the already elected deputies would be called upon at the nearest possible opportunity.

Secondly, the powers of the Directorate were temporary, for the duration of the uprising against the Hetman regime. However, during that period of time, the Directorate was vested with the powers of a revolutionary government.

Thirdly, although the Declaration made no clearly defined provisions concerning the structure of the administrative bodies of the Directorate in the liberated territories nor regarding the organization of the central agencies of the Directorate during the transitory period of time, the tone of the Declaration promised the restoration of the democratic organs similar to those in existence during the Ukrainian Central *Rada* regime.

The "founding fathers" of the Directorate and, especially, the authors of the Declaration of November 15, 1918, headed by a novelist, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, failed to embrace all important constitutional issues in the Declaration. There were great shortcomings in the document concerning the structure of the government, and the structure and organization of the local government. This could be explained, first of all, by the fact that they were primarily concentrating upon the military uprising against the Hetman's new regime. Besides, the Declaration was prepared in a great hurry, within a few hours after the Directorate itself was established.

Although the proponents of the establishment of the Directorate referred to the French model, they deviated from that model. The French Directorate performed only the executive functions of the government, while the legislative powers remained in the hands of the national assembly, consisting of the "Council of Five Hundred" and a 250 member "Council of the Seniors." The Ukrainian Directorate, on the other hand, concentrated all powers of the government in its hands, especially it performed the legislative as well as executive functions of the government. This was the situation in the beginning of its functioning.

This structure proved not to be the best possible one even for the given situation. Historically, virtually no collective leadership performing the functions of the collective head of the State and a collective centralized government has proven successful in dispensing legislative, military, executive and administrative authority in times of revolution. Within a collective body, friction between its members develop sooner or later. These frictions lead to delays in decision making as well as to dissent and there from deriving difficulties. While a collegial body is best suitable to serve in a legislative or advisory capacity, any central government functions best in times of emergency when it is headed by a single person who takes the final responsibility for any decision.

Due to the collective centralized power of the Directorate, the body faced serious frictions which led to weaknesses in performing its functions. The Head of the Directorate performed the usual powers of the chairman of any organized group: the summoning meetings and presiding at the meetings. The only other member of the Directorate whose powers were specified, were those of the

Holovnyy Otaman (Commander-in-Chief), Symon Petlyura, who was elected to this post specifically. Occasionally Shvets signed the documents of the Directorate as the secretary. The functions and powers of the other three members of the Directorate were not defined in any document at all. After the early success of the armed uprising, Vynnychenko, besides serving as Head of the Directorate, assumed the conduct of foreign relations.

Until December 26, 1918, the Directorate ruled the country collectively without any special legislative or executive bodies. Through a Declaration of December 26, 1918, the Directorate established the executive branch of the government by appointing the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic headed by Volodymyr Chekhivskyy. The Declaration also called for elections of deputies to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine to perform the legislative powers of the country. Until that time, however, the Directorate governed the country as a collective executive as well as the legislative body.

A question may be asked, why the Directorate failed to make use of the services of some sort of representative body of the people from the very beginning? It has been pointed out that the founders of the Directorate could have made use of a sort of pre-Parliament as a provisional representative organ of the government. For instance, the Western Ukrainian Republic established the Ukrainian National Council to serve as a representative body of the people. On October 19, 1918, the Council was created in Lviv by including all former Ukrainian members of the Austrian Parliament, representatives of all Ukrainian political parties, and the representatives of the Jewish, Polish, and German national minorities in Western Ukraine. The parliamentary system of government was established in the Western Ukrainian Republic immediately upon proclamation of her independence. The Ukrainian National Council served as a provisional legislative body of the country with the main objective of preparing democratic elections to the Parliament. In the meantime, the Ukrainian National Council promulgated, on November 13, 1918, the Provisional Constitution of the Western Ukrainian Republic in which the name of the newly established sovereign country, its boundaries, the legislative process, and the powers of the executive branch of the government, etc. were clearly defined. This was accomplished on the thirteenth day after the Ukrainian take-over of the governmental authority in the country.

The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic failed to make use of the services of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* which could have served as a temporary legislative body for the country. The *Soyuz* consisted of the representatives of the Ukrainian political parties, professional organizations and labor unions. Its base was

very broad, therefore it could have well served as a provisional legislative body. More so, the *Soyuz* had called the Directorate into existence.³²⁵)

It is true that at the beginning of its activities the Directorate regarded, at least theoretically, the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* as a sort of higher organ of popular representation. This could be concluded on the basis of the text of the solemn treaty signed between the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and the government of the Western Ukrainian Republic concerning the union of the two Ukrainian Republics into a single and united Ukrainian National Republic. The authority of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* is mentioned in this document in that sense. The respective parts of the document read:

In the name of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Directorate — Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petlyura, Fedir Shvets and Panas Andriyevskyy — and in the name of the Western Ukrainian Republic, Dr. Lonhyn Tsehelskyy and Dr. Dmytro Levytskyy, as the plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian National Council and the State Secretariat, herewith declare:

Guided by the most heartfelt desires of the Ukrainian People of both Ukrainian National Republics to be as soon as possible and forever united into a single national, independent, and sovereign Ukrainian State, and, carrying out the expressed will of the supreme and decision making provisional State organs, namely the will of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* and by it [the *Soyuz*] established Directorate on the one part, and of the Ukrainian National Council and the Council of the State Secretaries on the other part, to be united into one integrated State body, we do conclude this preliminary treaty concerning the union of the two States.³²⁶)

Although the Directorate in this important document referred to the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* as the supreme and decision making authority of the State, actually it never utilized its services in this way. From the day of the beginning of the anti-Hetman uprising, November 15, 1918, the Directorate constituted first of all a collegial head of the State, externally represented by the Head of the Directorate, although diplomatic acts were signed by all members of the Directorate. During its first period of activity, the Directorate executed its governmental authority directly, having no Council of Ministers. Although in the course of the victorious developments of the popular revolution, the Directorate appointed special managers of particular affairs for the administration of Republic, these managers did not constitute a Council of Ministers and were not author-

ized to act autonomously. They carried out decisions of the Directorate.³²⁷) But, in the strict analysis of the Directorate's actions, one should not ignore the fact that the Directorate was established in order to act in a revolutionary manner against the Hetman regime which did not abdicate the governmental powers until December 14, 1918. So, until that time, the Directorate was primarily concentrating upon the conduct of the military operations and establishing military control over the liberated territories. Actually, less than two weeks after Skoropadskyy's abdication, the Directorate appointed, on December 26, 1918, a twenty member Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic to carry out the powers of the executive branch of the government.³²⁸) At the same time, the Directorate ordered elections to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine to be held on January 5, 1919. For tactical reasons Vynnychenko persuaded the Directorate not to order elections to the Constituent Assembly which was promised in the Declaration on November 15. From that time of convening this Congress, the Directorate was to carry out the functions of the head of the State only. However, historical events changed these intentions. The changing war fortunes of the Ukrainian Republic imposed an obligation upon the Directorate to be at the head of the defense of the Ukrainian State against the various foreign invasions to the very end, in 1920.

Military organization and operations: November 15 — December 25, 1918

At the beginning of the uprising, the Directorate relied upon two numerically unequal military formations. The regular Ukrainian military units which sided with the Directorate from the very beginning, were the *Sichovi Striltsi*, *Sira Dyviziya* (the "Gray Division"), *Zaporizhska Dyviziya* (the "Zaporizhian Division"), and *Chornomorskyi Kish* (the Black Sea Camp). These military units constituted the initial fighting forces against the Hetman regime. They were immediately joined, spontaneously, by irregular units of the insurgents which organized themselves into new insurgent divisions, battalions, companies, etc. without strictly military structures. These insurgent formations were numerically larger than the regular military units. However, they lacked military training, discipline, and competent professional military leadership. Their zeal in defense of the freedom of Ukraine and for restoration of the democratic liberties balanced their professional military shortcomings.

After the initial success of the military units of the Directorate in the second half of the month of November, 1918, virtually

all military units of the Hetman regime, consisting of Ukrainian soldiers under Ukrainian commanding officers, switched their loyalty to the Directorate. Thus, in reality, on the side of the Hetman, only units consisting of Russians remained to the end.*) Hetman Skoropadskyy was also supported by the German military units in the capital city of Kyiv. However, the German garrisons in the country proclaimed their neutrality soon after the commencement of the insurgent operations. They could not resist the pressure of popular masses.

Due to the national division of military forces during the first few days of the Ukrainian civil war, toward the end of November, this civil war actually evolved into an international war. The war for the defense of the independence of the Ukrainian State was supported by virtually all Ukrainians, while on the side of the Hetman Skoropadskyy's regime remained military units formed from among the Russian minority in Ukraine or the units of Denikin's Volunteer Army consisting of the refugees from Soviet Russia. Thus, in its struggle to restore the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, the Directorate was supported by all Ukrainians regardless of their socio-economic philosophy.

The military leadership of the Directorate faced a serious problem of the proper formation of its military forces immediately upon the decisive victorious battle of the *Sichovi Striltsi* on November 18, 1918, at Motovylyvka. The leadership of the *Sichovi Striltsi* was of the opinion that only the existing regular military units should be systematically enlarged. On the other hand, the Directorate preferred to rely upon mass participation and proclaimed a general mobilization. In the development of the regular Ukrainian Army, this had its drawbacks.

The backbone of the uprising was composed of the *Sichovi Striltsi* and the *Zaporizhian* Division. The role of the *Sichovi Striltsi* has strongly been emphasized by the Head of the Directorate, Vynnychenko, who otherwise disliked them ideologically. According to Vynnychenko, without the participation of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, the uprising against the Hetman regime had no chance to succeed. Writing about the election of Petlyura to the Directorate, Vynnychenko admitted that he was "compelled by the demand of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, the only reliable military force on our side, to invite Symon Petlyura to participate in the affairs of the uprising."³²⁴)

Vynnychenko admits that the *Sichovi Striltsi* were morally entitled to present their conditions for the participation in the uprising. In all their actions, according to Vynnychenko, the *Sichovi*

*) See details: Краткая записка истории взаимоотношений Добровольческой Армии съ Украиной. Ростовъ Н. Г., 1919, ст. 2-15.

Striltsi exemplified extraordinary courage, endurance, zeal and military preparedness. Elsewhere, Vynnychenko stressed that the inner circle of the conspirators finally decided to call for the uprising against the Hetman only after Konovalets had definitely consented in the name of the *Sichovi Striltsi* to participate in the uprising.³³⁰⁾ This is very high praise, especially coming from a person who later disliked everything that the leaders of the *Sichovi Striltsi* were doing politically.

The *Striletska Rada*, the military and political leadership of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, was of the opinion that the new military forces of the restored Ukrainian National Republic should concentrate around two basic centers of regular military units. First, the forces West of the Dnipro River should be built up under the supervision of the *Sichovi Striltsi* stationed at the end of November, 1918, around the city of Kyiv and constituted a Corps. Secondly, all forces in the regions South-East of the Dnipro River should be centered around the *Zaporizhska* Division which were to be enlarged and re-organized into the *Zaporizhky* Corps. Instead of a general mobilization, they insisted upon a selective draft, basically of volunteers.

Col. Konovalets, stated in his memoirs that “the Military Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi* was against proclamation of a general mobilization.” He explains the reasons in the following passage:

For the carrying out a properly planned mobilization, the Directorate lacked proper apparatus, it lacked properly trained officers and sergeants in the necessary numbers, and it lacked the needed supplies of armaments and uniforms. In the opinion of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, a general mobilization under these conditions might lead to the establishment of ill-organized and ill-disciplined military units which, due to the lack of proper commanding leadership, might develop all sorts of unpredictable and uncontrolled actions. Our further opposition was based upon the assumption — which we very strongly emphasized — that in the course of a general mobilization the military units would be penetrated by unreliable and demoralizing element in large numbers which would be a considerable impediments to the formation of well trained and disciplined units. However, the Supreme Command overruled us and proclaimed the general mobilization.³³¹⁾

The proclaimed mobilization succeeded. But, it succeeded only in that sense that the people followed the call to arms by the Directorate and soon under the command of the Directorate was an army of some 200,000 men. Unfortunately, the fear of the *Sichovi Striltsi* leadership proved justified. The lack of a properly trained

corps of Ukrainian officers and sergeants, along with the lack of armaments and uniforms proved to be unsurmountable obstacle in the organization of disciplined fighting units. Moreover, the units which were organized but remained undisciplined were later disbanded only with great difficulties.

Sometime later, the Supreme Command succeeded: by the end of January, 1919, the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic was limited to about 50,000 well disciplined and willing to fight soldiers. This army defended the Ukrainian State against the Russian Bolshevik aggression from the North, against the Russian Volunteer Army of Gen. Denikin from the South, and against the additional aggression of the Poles from the West. Each of these three aggressions were advancing on the Ukrainian Army separately and with three separate end objectives. However, they all fought against those numerically small and poorly armed Ukrainian armed forces.³³²)

It should be stressed, however, that at the beginning of the uprising against the Hetman regime, the Ukrainian villagers joined the armed forces and served in well organized and disciplined units. Professor Solomon Goldelman, one of the leading Jewish members of the Social Democratic Party *Poaley Zion* in Ukraine, who arrived at the beginning of December, 1918, in the temporary seat of the Directorate, the city of Vynnytsya, for negotiations with the Directorate concerning the Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation, later described the mobilization as follows:

Anyone who closely observes the uprising; who observes all the masses of the villagers who day after day arrive from their villages to the city in order to join the Republican Army; the villagers who walk peacefully, serenely, armed and carrying their own foodstuffs and other necessities, maintaining fullest degree of order to an extent that one does not even hear that soldier cursing which we are accustomed to hear during the war in our localities near the front lines; the villagers who maintain fully correct behavior in contact with the population including the Jewish minority which they treat very correctly as compared with its treatment in the past as a "scape-goat" of all mobilizations, uprisings, revolutions, and counterrevolutions; anyone who sees all of this must be convinced that within the masses of the Ukrainian people there is a process of basic transformation; — the masses are being transformed into a nation which is developing self-consciousness as a separate national entity that presents its claims for a human existence as a newly self-determined national organism within a family of equal nations which are foreign to them.³³²)

Professor Goldelman attributed this transformation to the revolutionary events of the time. He was making the conclusions that the Ukrainian people had developed their national consciousness very rapidly in the process of the revolution from March, 1917. One might only add to this observation that in reality, the masses of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian villagers, had regarded themselves always as a separate national entity, in relations to the Russians, the Poles, the Rumanians, the Hungarians, etc., i.e. their immediate neighbors. The events of the revolution only provided an opportunity to the masses of the Ukrainian people to express their sentiments. They were deprived of such freedom before the war by the Tsarist regime.

It was the idea of the freedom of the Ukrainian people and the idea of the defense of their freedom and national independence that stimulated mass participation of the Ukrainian peasants in the uprising against the Hetman. The national enthusiasm stimulated discipline among the military units consisting of the peasants who otherwise tended to be disorganized and undisciplined, especially in times of revolutionary anarchy. The clear national objectives were the single most important element in the disciplined behavior of the village soldiers.

Therefore, only a few units were lacking discipline at the beginning of the mobilization. Undisciplined units were exceptions rather than the rule. However, the shortage of well trained commanding officers and the lack of necessary supplies soon led to a weakening of morale and discipline.

Success of the uprising and the Bolsheviks

The secrecy surrounding the preparatory operations for the uprising proved of great significance in the success of the early military operations of the forces of the Directorate. Not only the Russian Bolshevik leaders in Moscow were surprised by the mass uprising of the Ukrainian people led by the Directorate, but so were also the leaders of all pro-Bolshevik organizations in Ukraine. Since the official Russian Bolshevik historiography tried to share the success of the anti-Hetman uprising between the Directorate and the Bolsheviks, it is in order to quote here early sources of Bolshevik writers who credit the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic exclusively for the success of the uprising.

Rafes, leader of the Jewish "Bund" who later joined the forces of Russian Bolshevism, wrote in his memoirs (published in 1920 in Moscow), as an eyewitness and a historian, that "within a few days the entire territory of Ukraine was united under the

authority of the Directorate.”³³³) The same historical fact has been emphasized three years later in somewhat more careful language by an official historian of the Soviet power in Ukraine, Prof. Matviy Yavorsky. He stated:

The [Ukrainian] National *Sòyuz* supported by the *Sichovi Striltsi* and the railroad workers instantly organized the revolutionary Directorate... and on November 15th commenced the mass uprising against the Hetman. By the consent of the Directorate, Petlyura was at the head of the uprising command. The slogans of the uprising instantly embraced the entire Ukraine. The villagers and the workers organized their regiments and divisions, defeated the Hetmanites and disarmed the Germans. Within two weeks, the Directorate established full control in Ukraine... This time, the initiative was taken by the petty *bourgeoisie* and this explains its great success... Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and the Military Revolutionary Committee missed the opportunity, and the uprising began not under their slogans, but led by the Directorate, and it united spontaneously all of those who were in opposition to the Hetman.³³⁴)

In later decades, the Bolsheviks developed a legend that alongside with the uprising of the Directorate there was a parallel Bolshevik uprising against the Hetman. The above quoted statements of the eyewitnessing Bolshevik historians clearly disprove the later claim. Both Rafes and Yavorsky wrote and published their statements under the Bolshevik rule. However, they had done so before the Bolshevik leaders decided to claim credit for the successful uprising of the broad Ukrainian masses against the Hetman and the Germans.

Later a story has been spread and perpetuated that Vynnychenko negotiated with Rakovsky and Dmytro Manuilsky at Kyiv concerning the preparation of the uprising. As indicated above, the Bolshevik leaders in Ukraine as well as in Moscow were completely surprised by the sudden and successful uprising led by the Directorate. Therefore, there could not have been any attempt to organize a common military action of the Ukrainian national forces with those of the Russian dominated Bolsheviks. The leading initiator of the uprising, Mykyta Shapoval, emphatically denied the story that they negotiated with the Bolshevik leaders before the beginning of the uprising.³³⁵) First of all, the chairman of the Soviet Russian Diplomatic Mission in Kyiv, Rakovsky, returned to Moscow as early as on October 7, 1918, and never returned to Ukraine before the uprising. So did the deputy chairman, Dmytro Manuilsky, who represented the Soviet Russian regime after Rakovsky, left for Mos-

cow, by leaving Kyiv on November 3, 1918. Neither did Manuilsky return to his post in Kyiv. Secondly, as indicated above, this first conversation concerning the idea of a popular uprising against the Hetman was held between Mykyta Shapoval and Andriy Makarenko well in the third week of the month of October, 1918. Vynnychenko himself joined the conspiratory circle not before October 27th, and only on October 29, 1918, did he contact the *Striletska Rada* of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. Rakovsky could not have participated in any conversation concerning the uprising because he definitely left Kyiv before the idea of the uprising was even raised in the Ukrainian circles.

There is no probability that Vynnychenko was able to establish contact with Manuilsky after the idea of the uprising had developed some sort of shape and form and before the latter had left the capital of Ukraine. Simply, there was little time for such an action, especially at a time when both Vynnychenko and the Soviet Russian representatives were very carefully watched by the security agents of the Hetman regime. Even the alleged contacts of Vynnychenko's middleman, M. Avdiyenko with Manuilsky are most improbable for the reasons mentioned above.³³⁶)

It is true that Vynnychenko in his memoirs written in exile after he had broken relations with all leaders of the Directorate stated that "the initiators of the movement entered into negotiations with Rakovsky and Manuilsky."³³⁷) However, Mykyta Shapoval repeatedly stated that he was not aware of any such negotiations and explained that Vynnychenko told him later that these contacts were maintained through Avdiyenko who passed informations to Vynnychenko through Vynnychenko's wife, Rozaliya. Thus, even Vynnychenko never claimed to have maintained contacts directly with Rakovsky or Manuilsky. Nevertheless, Dmytro Manuilsky utilized this story in 1921 in his capacity as the Soviet prosecutor in the trial of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. Apparently, this story was needed by Manuilsky for that purpose.³³⁷)

Upon his return to Moscow, Rakovsky participated in the meeting of the top Soviet leadership for the preparation of the Russian Bolshevik invasion into Ukraine. If he or Manuilsky would have been involved in any negotiations with the Ukrainian conspiratory group preparing the popular uprising against the Hetman regime, Rakovsky certainly would have mentioned this at this meeting. Rakovsky did not mention anything of the sort. Moreover, if he or Manuilsky would have possessed any information about preparatory activities of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*, Rakovsky would have informed the Russian Bolshevik leaders participating in the meeting for the express purpose of preparing the strategy of the Soviet Rus-

sian invasion into Ukraine. This is another proof that there were no negotiations between Vynnychenko and Rakovsky or Manuil'skyy concerning the Ukrainian uprising against the Hetman regime.

Provisional administration of the Directorate November 15 — December 25, 1918

As the territory of the Ukrainian State was freed from the Hetman regime by the popular forces of the Directorate, a temporary administration of the country was set up. This provisional administration through the special commissioners responsible directly to the Directorate lasted until December 26, 1918, when a Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic, headed by Volodymyr Chekhiv'skyy, was appointed to carry out the executive functions of the government.

The temporary executive powers of the government were delegated by the Directorate to the Plenipotentiary Gubernial Commissioners; below that level to the Plenipotentiary Regional Commissioners. They acted in the name of the Directorate in internal affairs of the administrative units. Thus, the executive powers of the government remained vested in the Directorate directly until the end of December, 1918. Of course, there was an attempt to restore the previously existing self-governing bodies in the villages and towns, as well as the regional and gubernial *Zemstvos* as governing bodies on the higher levels of the local self-government of the people. The local administration, of course, was not fully organized during this short period of time.

The administration of the Directorate firmly extended in the beginning only to the cities and towns and villages along the main railroad lines where military troops were stationed and the republican police offices could enforce law and order. In the villages and towns located at some distance from the main railroad lines, the population enjoyed the most far reaching local autonomy. Law and order were maintained by their local governing and police units and the authority of the Plenipotentiary Commissioners of the Directorate was respected voluntarily rather than due to their granted powers. Thus, a very high degree of harmony between the bodies of the local and central government was maintained.

In the cities, the autocratic administration of the Hetman regime was replaced by the restoration of the City Councils which previously were democratically established during the administration of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. Thus, the arbitrary authorities of the Hetman regime were swiftly removed and the popularly elected local government bodies reestablished.

Subsequently, the technique of the Administration of the Republic was placed in the hands of a Council of the Administrators of the State Affairs which acted in the name of the Directorate rather than in its own behalf. This Council constituted the nucleus of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic, establishment of which began the second period of the Directorate's regime in Ukraine, beginning on Dec. 26, 1918.

The administration of the country during this first period of the Directorate's regime could be characterized as an extremely smooth one. The autonomous bodies of the local government supported the Directorate, and the early organizational difficulties were counterbalanced by the national pathos dominating the struggle against the new pro-Russian Hetman's regime headed by S. M. Gerbel. There were no registered cases of unsubordination by the local and city or regional governments to the orders of the Directorate's representatives. While the Ukrainian population wholeheartedly supported the restoration of individual liberties and national sovereignty in the democratic Ukrainian National Republic, the national minorities were surprised by the swift success of the uprising and were deprived of any opportunity to speculate as to which side to support. Thus, the Russian, Jewish, and Polish national minorities in Ukraine did not act against the forces of the Ukrainian popular uprising. In this period even the local Bolsheviks remained unactive until the invasion of the regular military units of Soviet Russia into Ukraine developed.

The socio-economic affairs in the early period of the Directorate, November 15 - Decemeber, 1918

The defeated regime of Hetman Skoropadskyy drew its support from two basically non-Ukrainian social forces. It relied upon the support of the German military forces, on the one hand, and upon the upper classes of the landlords, industrialists, and financiers who basically belonged to the Russian, Polish and other Russified national minorities in Ukraine, on the other. Thus, the regime relied internally as well as externally upon the non-Ukrainian forces. In addition, ever since Skoropadskyy's *coup d'etat* on November 14, 1918, the regime openly relied upon the corps of the Russian military officers.

It must be concluded that the internal as well as external policy of Skoropadskyy's regime in that period of time favored these non-Ukrainian elements. Moreover, these tendencies in the socio-economic affairs were clearly noticeable in the *Hramota* issued by Hetman Skoropadskyy on April 29, 1918, which declared null



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Symon Petlyura
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[Photography from 1918]

and void all legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* concerning land reform and labor laws of the Ukrainian National Republic. This legislation was aiming at the support of the interests of the Ukrainian village population and at the gaining of the support of the Ukrainian workers in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine and in the defense of the country against the Russian Bolshevik aggression.

By nullifying the socio-economic legislation of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Hetman regime instantly alienated the largest social class of the Ukrainian people, the village farmers, and the industrial workers as well. The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic decided to rely upon the support of these two social classes of the Ukrainian people. The most numerous social class,

the small village farmers, was almost totally Ukrainian in its character and it was regarded to be the single most important element in the Ukrainian national renaissance.

In its nature, the uprising of the Directorate was a Ukrainian national revolution. The Directorate appealed to all Ukrainian national and democratic elements to establish a united Ukrainian national front regardless of their socio-economic and political programs as long as they firmly supported the national sovereignty of the Ukrainian State and a democratic form of government in it. Therefore, the Directorate called upon the Ukrainian military units under the command of the Hetman to join in the uprising, and the Supreme Command of the Directorate military forces gladly incorporated those units which switched their loyalty.

The Directorate employed all public servants of the Hetman regime of Ukrainian nationality if they expressed their desire to serve in the newly organized administration of the new regime and promised to do so loyally and in the interests of the Ukrainian Republic. Those public servants who decided, on their own, not to continue their services to the Ukrainian State were left alone, free of any harassment. Only those Russians who were members of the last Council of Ministers, headed by S. M. Gerbel, and the Russian generals in the Hetmans forces were arrested for the conspiracy against the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State.³³⁸)

The national rather than social character of the uprising is clearly visible from the Proclamation of the Directorate of November 15, 1918. The proclamation justified the call for the popular uprising mainly by national reasons. In the center stood the idea of the defense of the national sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, against the federal ties with Russia as proclaimed by Hetman Skoropadskyy. The socio-economic issues were assigned only a secondary role in the Proclamation of the Directorate; even there they were closely linked with elements of Ukrainian nationalism. Without the dominating elements of the Ukrainian national pathos incorporated in the Proclamation of the Directorate of November 15, 1918, and in all appeals of the Ukrainian National *Soyuz* issued in the various cities and regions, the uprising would have failed. The socio-economic issues alone would not have stirred up the emotions of the broad masses of the Ukrainian people who so faithfully followed the call to arms. Neither would they have united all Ukrainian political parties.³³⁹) The element of Ukrainian nationalism alone was the single most important force for unity.

However, the lack of a clear socio-economic program by the Directorate during the first period of its regime, November 15 — December 25, 1918, had serious drawbacks, too. The greatest shortcoming of this period was the fact that the Directorate failed to



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Col. Yevhen Konovalts
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restore the validity of the socio-economic legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, and especially the land reform law. If this would have been done immediately in the course of the uprising, it would have eliminated the single most sensitive issue of the Ukrainian peasants who gradually were losing faith in the Directorate and became receptive to the slogans of the extreme social revolutionaries.

The Directorate in December declaratively more and more leaned toward the so-called "labor principles" in its socio-economic programs. Until the end of this period, the Directorate issued no legislation dealing with land reform, although the peasants constituted the most important social class supporting the Directorate.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the most important achievement of the Directorate of this period of time — besides overthrowing the Hetman regime — was the successful conclusion of negotiations and signing of the preliminary treaty of December 1, 1918, with the government of the Western Ukrainian National Republic concerning an amalgamation of the two Ukrainian independent Republics into one, united Ukrainian National Republic. By signing this treaty at Khvastiv, both contracting parties, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and the State Sec-

retariat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, agreed to sign a final treaty concerning the amalgamation of the two independent Republics into one, united Ukrainian National Republic with reservations of some autonomous rights for Western Ukraine.³⁴⁰⁾

Otherwise, the Directorate had little success in its foreign relations. Lack of the special Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic created some confusion externally and complicated the conduct of foreign relations internally. The practice of signing all documents related to the foreign relations of the Ukrainian State by all members of the Directorate proved impractical. The situation improved to some extent after the Head of the Directorate, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, assumed the powers of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. However, it was not only the technique of the foreign relations that was far from being perfect. Lack of the clear policy in this respect was the greatest shortcoming.

The victory over the pro-Russian government of S. M. Gerbel needed clear directions for the Ukrainian people. The Directorate failed to provide them in such a clear way as it was able to do in calling the people to rise against the Hetman regime. Disenchanted popular masses became more sensitive also to the slogans of the Communist agitators. Therefore, the defense of the Ukrainian National Republic against foreign invasions in the months to come became much more difficult.

However, the treatment of these problems are to be left to the subsequent chapters of this work.



PART V
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC

CHAPTER 1

WAVERING BETWEEN A FULL DEMOCRACY AND A LIMITED "LABOR DEMOCRACY"

General characteristic of the era

The fundamental principle, to be applied in the further process of building the statehood of independent Ukraine, was decided and formulated by the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic after the meeting of the State Consultation in Vynnytsya on December 12 — 14, 1918. The above State Consultation was attended by the representatives of all political and civic organizations, no matter whether they joined or did not join the Ukrainian National Union (*Soyuz*). Hence, also the representations of the Jewish political parties were there included.

At this very time (end of 1918) great revolutionary changes were taking place in all Europe, and in particular in its south-eastern and eastern corners. Even the victorious nations, such as France and Italy, experienced, at the time, some labor riots and rebellions of their military units. Some political and social leaders in Europe were willing to believe that the time of a global social revolution had already arrived, and were inclined to assay all contemporary developments from that very point of view. It was no wonder, therefore, that under the impact of those revolutionary movements, and especially, because of the skillful subversive tactics of the Russian Bolshevik agents in Ukraine, there also the revolutionary mood prevailed. Various political leaders and activists, no matter what political party they joined, gradually gravitated to the general idea of introducing in Ukraine the new system of the "council" or "Soviet" government, modeled by the Soviet rule in Russia. They thought, however, of a "council" system for the Ukrainian National Republic to be a Ukrainian one in its national character. Furthermore, the U.N.R. was supposed to be fully sovereign and independent, maintaining close and friendly relations with Soviet Russia, they thought. The concept of "council government," accepted at this time by some Ukrainian parties, provided for a democratic election system for all such councils — local and central. This democratic election was to provide equality for all voters — peasants, workers and other laboring people — and would include secret ballots and the proportional division of mandates. Thus, the Ukrainian "council system" was fundamentally different from the Russian "Soviet system" with its

unequal electoral voting system and with "the dictatorship of the proletariat" or, more practically, the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The followers and supporters of that kind of a political system were to be found among various political groups and parties, not only among the Socialist factions but also among some *bourgeois* circles and even extremely conservative parties, although among the rightest groups the principle of the "council" or "Soviet" government did not have too many enthusiasts. Nevertheless, the above principle was not in the program of just one or two particular political parties only; it was rather a non-partisan issue, as pointed out.

Several other aspects deeply affected the formation of the political mood of the time, too. Already some time before the German armistice on November 11, 1918, a strong revolutionary movement was spreading in Germany among the workers, petty urban *bourgeoisie* and the intellectuals. The prolonged war exhausted the patience of the people, who slowly were losing in their minds any sensible explanation, why actually the war had been waged for so long and what had been its purpose and reason. Hence, soon a revolutionary reaction flared up in the form of demanding "an immediate peace without annexations and reparations." The demand meant a complete and full stop of all hostilities among all nations concerned, on equal footing, without any distinction among the so-called victorious nations and the defeated nations. Then, since the American entrance in the war, the above peace slogan was supplemented by demand of a "national self-determination" for all peoples or nationalities, and subsequently a strong feeling was developed to make the call for national self-determination a binding rule of international law. The principle of "self-determination" did not include only the demand that all nationalities and peoples desiring a political independence should have it or receive it, but it soon also contained the prerequisite of their full freedom and sovereignty in concluding any international agreements or in joining any international conventions by any nation, free from any interference of any outside power. The international agreements were supposed, according to the interpretation of the above principle, to be concluded on an equal base among various nations concerned, without any differentiation among the big or small, victorious or defeated nations, as among equals. This was the international aspect of the principle of self-determination. The principle had also an intra-national aspect, too. It meant, according to some, a right to be given to each territorial component or community of a nation to arrange its internal affairs along its local needs and liking, without any central-national pressure.

Obviously, the revolutionary moods and movements developed earlier and more violently in those countries which suffered defeats

in World War I. The Russian Empire was the first in this respect. Having been badly defeated by the armies of the Central Powers, (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey), Russia became the prey of a revolution already in March, 1917. Yet, because the Russian Empire had included in its political boundaries many non-Russian, captive nations, which in fact constituted a majority of the empire's population, the revolution there had at the same time a national and a social character. In Russia-proper (ethnographical Russian territories) the revolutionary movement was of a strictly social nature, and it spread as the result of the continuous pressures of the antiquated socio-economic institutions of discrimination and exploitation of the lower social classes, and in the consequence of the tragically low intellectual and cultural standards of the Russian popular masses.

Of course, the revolutionary atmosphere was rapidly spreading in Ukraine, to begin with the first revolutionary developments there already in March, 1917. There, however, the matter of a national liberation was closely, but not exclusively, related to the social problems and social liberation of the people. The issue of land reform, for instance, was not only a social issue but a national one, as well, since the landowners of the *latifundia* estates throughout the country were prevaillingly non-Ukrainian; the owners were mostly Russians, Poles, Jews or otherwise, who were hostile to the Ukrainian cause in general. The Ukrainian village and countryside were largely dominated by the *latifundia* owners. Non-Ukrainian *latifundia* owners, mostly of Russian nationality, were hostile not only toward the peasants, as a class, but toward the mere reality of an existence of a separate and distinct Ukrainian people as well. They recognized only the one political fiction of one indivisible Russian nation, of which the Ukrainians or "Little Russians" were only a dialectal branch. Also in industry and commerce in Ukraine, the Russian and foreign capitalist and the Russian and foreign capital and credit prevailed, not serving the Ukrainian social and economic interests, but the Russian imperialism.

In Germany, in the period of military operations during the war, the Social-Democratic Party, until now the largest, strongest and most numerous worker's organization, had distinguished itself by solid theoretical foundation and party discipline, but split into two hostile factions. The radical faction under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, immediately adopted the tactics of aggressive opposition toward the government, and a while later, it began to organize revolutionary excesses among the workers. The faction called itself the Independent Social-Democrats. The split between the original and official majority faction of the Social-Democrats and the radical group of the Independent Social-Democrats went more deeply and

became more irreconcilable in Germany, than in any other Western European country. As a matter of fact, however, throughout all Western Europe a deep division within the Socialist movement was going on, dividing it into two opposite factions; democratic socialism, which planned to materialize itself by way of parliamentary and constitutional reforms, and "revolutionary socialism," which promoted the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be achieved by way of an immediate revolution in various national states. Yet, for example, in Germany, the new and distinct faction of the "Independent Social-Democrats," though they generally accepted the general principle of a social revolution, did not join the cause of the Communists of the Soviet style. They, however, considered the system of "councils" as a worthwhile one to bring about the desired social change. Nevertheless, soon a group of radicals left even the party of the Independent Social-Democrats and organized its own political faction of the so-called "Spartaks," who openly manifested its sympathy for Communism and Soviet Russia. The Spartaks were advised and financially subsidized by the Soviet of People's Commissars in Moscow.³⁴¹)

Already in November, 1918, the government in Germany was taken over by the Social-Democrats, who had a prevailing majority among the German working class. The Spartaks, having been also supported by the Independent Social-Democrats, began to organize and carry out in several cities and provinces violent and bloody revolts with plans to seize power. Even in Berlin, the capital of Germany, such pro-Communist revolts were gaining strength, hence many people at that time in Europe were almost convinced that Germany soon would become another victim of a general Communist revolution, like Russia, and that from there Communism would rapidly spread and dominate the whole globe. Germany, at that time, was already one of the most industrially advanced nations and had the strongest and best organized industrial working class (proletariat), having fulfilled in this way the two Marxian prerequisites for a successful Communist revolution. That made some people, even some members of the anti-Socialist camp, believe that such a revolution might succeed in Germany. Also in the newly established nations, which had developed by the end of October and the beginning of November, 1918, — post-war Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, — the Socialists managed to take over the governmental machines, although without any violent or revolutionary measures against any of their national regimes. The Socialist movements in Italy, France and England were growing substantially in strength too.³⁴²)

In addition, those socialistic and revolutionary moods were greatly enhanced by the general economic conditions which developed

in Central and Eastern Europe after the prolonged and unfortunate war. Immediately after the armistice, a grave economic depression spread all-over. Masses of soldiers and officers returned home, after the hostilities ceased, and there they could not find either work or any other way to earn a living. In Germany and Austria a semi-famine condition evolved. Obviously, these bad economic conditions only deepened social dissatisfaction and facilitated the revolutionary mood, skillfully exploited by various radical and revolutionary factions and groups to achieve this way their political ends. Most of those groups were leftist, but some of them were reactionary. The downfall of the traditional and well established monarchies produced a general feeling of anxiety at that time and a kind of indefinite expectation prevailed, that only some extraordinary and unusual developments might save the uncertain situation. The Russian Bolsheviks knew particularly well how to take advantage of that feeling of anxiety, and suggested their system of government by means of the "councils" or "Soviets of workers and peasants" as a solution. Many were misled by the deceitful Soviet propaganda from Moscow. The end purpose of the Soviet propaganda was supposed to be a full disintegration of the existing democratic systems, which temporarily succeeded against the monarchic orders in Europe, and were able to seize power for themselves. In order to make their political philosophy work, they raised a slogan: "All local and central power to the Soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers." Then, having well disciplined party ranks, the Russian Bolsheviks expected to be able to over-run and dominate such "Soviets" or "councils" easily, and to turn them into a simple "democratic" window-dressing of their dictatorship of the proletariat. In Russia, they really succeeded in this respect, while in the neighboring lands they achieved their political goals by Russian-Bolshevik military intervention to assist the weak Communist movements there.³⁴³⁾

Still another development facilitated the popularity of the "council" system in Central and Eastern Europe. After the armistice, the masses of demobilized military units and a great many war prisoners moved throughout wide territories. It was absolutely necessary to arrange for them some kind of orderly withdrawal. Hence, for example, the German occupational army in Ukraine attempted, on its own, and under the sponsorship of its supreme command, to organize the central and local soldiers councils to promote and to preserve some kind of order and safety among its ranks in the process of retreat.³⁴⁴⁾ Furthermore, the workers attempted to establish for themselves some workable living conditions amidst the spreading and growing depression by means of the "councils" system, as well. The German example was followed by others, and it certainly contributed to the popularization of the approach among various

political circles of Ukraine. In Poland, then, one of the first legislative acts of the new state, resolved to introduce the "councils" among the industrial workers and to organize an elective militia. Subsequently, in Germany, the new republican government began to work on an act for the election of the factory workers councils.³⁴⁵⁾

Several times in Western civilization's past such revolutionary obsessions had taken place. The advent of Christianity and its rapid growth inspite of persecutions in the Roman Empire had the powerful dynamism of a revolutionary revival of spirit. A similar revolutionary atmosphere prevailed also at the time of the Protestant Reformation. And finally, the end of the 18-th century brought about the mood of the revolutionary political liberalism, which powerfully spread from America and France over the entire Western world. The social revolution of the early 20-th century had also a similar spirit of change, which among the captive peoples of the old Russian Empire associated itself with the idea of a national liberation from foreign oppression. Exactly that happened in Ukraine.

Ukrainian politicians under impact of the events in Europe

By the end of 1918, Ukraine had experienced already almost two years of revolutionary turmoils and upheavals, while at the same time the Western Area of Ukraine, then Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Germany and Austria began to feel their impact after only a few initial weeks. Moreover, Eastern Ukraine had meanwhile also sustained the horrible era of the Bolshevik invasion from the end of December, 1917, to the middle of April, 1918. Also the occupational practices of the so-called "allied" German armed forces in Ukraine, beginning in May, 1918, were not exactly friendly and helpful, either. Those specific developments in Ukraine only intensified the revolutionary moods. Having considered all those aspects of the Ukrainian national life by the end of 1918, one can understand why the political leadership of the Ukrainian National Republic did not maintain normally a firm stand but instead frequently vacillated and exhibited a lack of decisivness in various political questions it often faced all-of-a-sudden. Even the political leaders of France, England, and America, the countries which did not experience that kind of intense revolutionary atmosphere like Eastern Europe, also frequently showed hesitancy and indecisiveness in their attempts to solve some grave political or non-political problems, too. It was particularly evident in the political and diplomatic moves of the Western leaders towards the Russian Bolsheviks, having been inconsistent and vacillating for the most part.

Of course, that kind of a general political atmosphere was not conducive to form a clear and decisive public opinion of the Ukrainian society in general, which might have developed the basis for the political stand of the Directorate during the State Consultation in Vynnytsya in December, 1918. The leadership of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats clearly favored a parliamentary constitution for the Ukrainian Republic, to come after the overthrow of the *Hetmanic* government. Largely the same attitude prevailed among the Socialists-Federalists, Agricultural Democrats and Laborists. So far, these factions were also supported by the Jewish Social-Democrats, the Poalei-Zion. At the same time, however, the Socialists-Revolutionaries of both wings, the Center, and the *Borotbists*, and the faction of the Independent Social-Democrats declared themselves against the parliamentary principle. The Peasants Union was at first in favor of the above principle and at the beginning of the debates argued for the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly. The Independent Social-Democrats openly and vigorously demanded an introduction of the "council system" in Ukraine. This same political philosophy was also represented by the *Borotbists* or the left wing of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. In fact, both of these last groups favored the system of a "dictatorship of proletariat" as a version of the "council" or "*Soviet*" approach. The majority of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the so-called Center, on the other hand, was in favor of the "council" system of the "laborist" version, which implied a government of equal partnership of all labor groups, of the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia and the elections on the basis of the equal vote of all these working people.³⁴⁶)

Finally, in the consequence of the discussions, the majority of the State Consultation in Vynnytsya rejected the "*Soviet*" system and accepted as the first step to parliamentarian system the laborist approach to government. The latter meant a system of local, regional and departmental councils throughout the country, headed by a central council of the land, the Council of the Working People of Ukraine, the top national government agency, while the right to vote for and to be elected to these bodies was, according to the principle, granted not to all adult citizens, but only to those who lived by income earned through their labor, and it was denied to those who lived by the so-called "unearned" income — the capitalists, large landowners, entrepreneurs and others like that.³⁴⁷) Vynnychenko himself and four other members of the Directorate accepted the "laborist" approach. Petlyura and Andriyevskyy argued decisively in favor of a full democracy for the Ukrainian National Republic to include the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly on the basis of general elections with equal right to vote for every adult citizen, to be then supplemented by a parliamentary system

of national government throughout. Yet, they were outvoted by the other three members of the chief body. Subsequently, the Directorate was able to secure a vote for its compromisory program at the State Consultation and among the particular political groupings to make it possible to announce the principles of the new temporary constitution. This was done by the second and fundamental Declaration of the Directorate on December 26, 1919.

The Directorate on the crossroads between East and West

In order to comprehend and understand properly the evolution of the political views and trends within the Directorate, it must be necessarily borne in mind, that the Head of the Directorate, Vynnychenko, either at that time or at any later period of the Directorate's rule was a Social-Democrat, who hated the so-called reaction. Until the middle of December, he never showed any inclination to accept the "council system." Thereafter, his speedy acceptance of the "laborist" principle, which generally meant a rejection of the idea of the dictatorship of proletariat, in its essence — paved his democratic convictions.³⁴⁸⁾

The opinions in the essential matter of the constitutional structure of the Ukrainian National Republic deeply affected the trends in foreign policies of the new government. The leading question of foreign policy called for a conclusive decision with respect to an alliance or a war. Where should the Ukrainian National Republic seek a political alliance — with the victorious Western Allies, — France, England, Italy and others; or with Soviet Russia? The decision to associate Ukraine with the Western Allies would have meant an inevitable war with the Soviets; the decision to ally Ukraine with Soviet Russia could have required a readiness to go to war with the Western Powers. Neither decision was easy nor pleasant in regard to possible consequences.

Moreover, Ukraine had already the horrible experience of the first Bolshevik invasion war at the beginning of 1918, and in all probability her government had to take into account the strong possibility of another Soviet-Russian aggression.³⁴⁹⁾ The aggressive attitude of Soviet Russia was apparent. The leftist naive views of some Ukrainian political activists restrained them psychologically from admitting the imperialist policies of Soviet Russia which was only nominally a follower of Karl Marx. Ideologically, it was too painful for the leftists to accept the truth. This was the very reason why all the Ukrainian leftist parties opposed the idea of an alliance with the Bolsheviks. They hoped against hope. The only reasonable policy, however, for the Ukrainian National Republic

at that time, with a new war invasion by Soviet Russia eminent, was an alliance with the Western Powers in order to gain their military and otherwise support against the Bolshevik imperialism which was disguised under the slogans of a world-wide proletarian revolution against the "capitalist oppression." Individual parties which were consolidated around the Directorate differed only in the question: Should the aid of the Entente be achieved for any price or were there limits for that price? Another thing was, however, whether the Western Allies were really willing to recognize and support Ukraine in her political aspirations. The information about the position of the Entente Powers, especially of France and Britain, which were obtained in November, were not encouraging: they were apparently inclined to restore the former Russian Empire, including all non-Russian nationalities (except Poland and Finland).

Yet, the Directorate chose to follow in its foreign policy a most irrational path of neutrality in the conflict between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia. The simple fact of accepting the political principle of neutrality meant continuous vacillations in order not to antagonize any of the opposing sides, and by the same token, the Directorate was losing any chance of getting a support or assistance from the Entente in case of war with Soviet Russia in the nearest future. Consequently, any political or diplomatic relations the Directorate tried to initiate with the Western Allies through the mediation of the French consul, Emile Hénot, were only lukewarm, halfhearted and inconsistent.³⁵⁰)

Festivities in Kyiv after victory

The *Hetmanic's* government resigned and transferred all official matters into the hands of the representatives of the Directorate of the UNR on December 14, 1918. This terminated the civil war in Ukraine between two governments: the *Hetmanic* one of conservative nature, largely relying on support from the German occupational forces and the White-Russian military circles as well as the Russian national minority in Ukraine, and the Directorate's one, which proclaimed a national uprising assumingly in the name of restoring the political sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. On this very day units of the *Sichovi Striltsi* entered the capital of Kyiv, and on the next day, December 15, a grand entry of the Corps of the *Striltsi*, which was supposed to maintain law and order in Kyiv, according to the official mandate of the Directorate, took place.

The Directorate did not come to the capital right away. This happened first on December 19. The city greeted its new government in a particularly solemn and festive way. The high point of the

celebrations was held on St. Sophia Square, attended by great masses of people, and initiated by a spectacular military parade.³⁵¹) Thereafter, the Ukrainian National Union honored the Directorate by an official reception in the premises of the Ukrainian Club. Mykyta Shapoval, the head of the Union, was the host and the toastmaster for the evening. The feelings of the Kyyivan upper and educated crest of the society, including also the leading elements of the provinces, have been best reflected by the opening speech by Shapoval, the excerpts of which are the following:

“Today, on the very day of the entrance of the Directorate to Kyyiv, the Ukrainian National Union is cordially greeting its leading members with their successful liberation of the Ukrainian people from foreign oppression. The Ukrainian National *Soyuz* knew very well that the working people would turn against the ousted regime, because they had in their hand a talisman which attracted everyone to follow. It contained three calls — for liberty, land and education.”

Then, the speaker underscored the grave meaning of the forthcoming revolution, carried out exclusively by the Ukrainian forces and amidst the most unfavorable developments for the political cause of the Ukrainian people. He continued his speech:

“We can boldly stand before the eyes of the world without any tears and any cries, since our strength is in our weapon. At this very time the brain of the Ukrainian people — its intelligentsia — led them to freedom. We are happy and proud that the Ukrainian democratic revolution is led by such people, who detected the threatening omen and boldly undertook the heroic effort. Amongst ourselves there are present those, whose names will be written in golden letters into the history of our struggle for a better future of our nation.

“For Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the protector of the Ukrainian people, from the Ukrainian National *Soyuz*: ‘Glory’.”

A loud “glory” and the sounds of the national anthem for a long time filled the premises. Shapoval continued:

“There are also amongst ourselves the knights of the sabers” he said and hinted toward Symon Petlyura, and then underscored the values of the national hero and his achievements in the struggle for liberation. Shapoval’s words caused resounding applause and unending calls “glory,” accompanied by the tunes of the national anthem, continuously played by an orchestra. Many people present had their eyes full of tears. Subsequently, Shapoval talked about the decisive role of the military leaders, such as Gen. Osetskyy, Coln. Konovalets, Coln. Peleshchuk, Coln. Bolbochan, Coln. Tyutyunyk, and others, in carrying out the successful revolution.³⁵²)

Nevertheless, though the principles of the constitutional structure of the provisional government had been formulated by the State Consultation in Vynnytsya before moving the Directorate to the capital of Kyiv, yet the official Declaration of the new government about the new temporary order in the Republic was announced, as pointed out before, first on December 26.³⁵³)

The delay in proclaiming the provisional constitutional structure of the restored Republic was due to long negotiations on forming of the government of national unity. This was in the time, loaded with explosive revolutionary moods, which have been briefly described above. No doubt, the lack of a well developed partisan organization in Ukraine at that time was also one of the fundamental causes of the difficulties in the political moves and actions of the Directorate and of the parties with respect to the basic state policy.

The organizational structure of the political life between November, 1918 and December, 1919

At the beginning of November, 1918, before the anti-Hetman uprising, the following political parties and organizations functioned in Ukraine:

1. The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker's Party (USDWP);
2. The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (UPSR);
3. The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists (UPSI);
4. The Ukrainian Party of Democrats-Farmers (UPDF);
5. The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists (UPSF);
6. The Ukrainian Labor Party (ULP).

The organizational structure of those parties was quite an inefficient one. They had neither in sufficient numbers an experienced personnel of proper number to run the party affairs in the countryside, nor had they any adequately large ranks of well disciplined membership to rely upon. The unsatisfactory situation had, of course, its objective reasons. Those parties openly could develop their political activities only after the revolution of 1917 and during the era of the Central *Rada*. Under the Tsarist regime, they were not allowed any legitimate activities of any meaning. Hence, some one and half years later, in November, 1918, the "card membership" of all Ukrainian parties scarcely exceeded 20,000 registered and disciplined people; a half of that number joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries; one third joined the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker's Party. Other parties, in fact, had a smaller membership and were limited mostly to the educated middle class of the society, and were little known among the broad circles of the peasants and workers in Ukraine.³⁵⁴)

Although the influence of those parties upon the political thinking of the masses was rather considerable, yet it was not a deep enough, since it was not founded upon the numerous ranks of well disciplined membership. At the elections to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly in January, 1918, the UPSR acquired a tremendous popularity and influence by capturing an absolute majority among all voters in Ukraine, while among the Ukrainian voters it obtained a two-third majority. However, that expression of the political views of some segments of the voting public in Ukraine could have changed later on, to some extent, because of the weak partisan organization in general.

It must be underscored at this point, that the majority of the cities and of the towns in Ukraine at that time were considerably Russianized by the immigrant Russian bureaucrats, commercial-industrial elements and the industrial proletariat, coming from Muscovy. Also, the Jewish population in Ukraine, which provided a substantial percentage of the townspeople, was in its majority in considerable percentage Russianized and suspicious of the cause of Ukrainian statehood in any form. Of the Jewish parties at the time, only three were favorably inclined to the Ukrainian cause at all and to the new republican government, in particular. These were the Jewish Social-Democratic Worker's Union "Bund" under the leadership of Moses Rafes; The Social-Democratic Poaley Zion under Solomon Goldelman and A. Revutskyy; and also the Jewish Popular Party (Folkspartei). Later, in January, 1919, the "Bund" became Bolshevikhophile.

The Red and the White Russian propaganda in the cities

In November, 1918, the Russianized Ukrainian cities in general showed a solid anti-Ukrainian attitude throughout, against any form of the Ukrainian political interest, and at this point all Russian and Russianized elements exhibited an amazing solidarity without respect to their political views and orientations; no matter, whether they were Red, White, democratic, monarchist, or communistic. They opposed the Ukrainian cause only in the name of their special and separate group interests; the Bolshevik followers opposed the Ukrainian independence in the name of their concept of an indivisible Soviet Russia, which was supposed to promote the Communist domination of the world; the Tsarist reactionary forces — in the name of the restoration of the traditional Russian Empire, of which Ukraine was once a territorial part. Both Russian political camps, the Red and the White, were organizing and were preparing, meanwhile, a military-revolutionary over-throw of the *Hetmanic* govern-

ment to promote their separate political ends. The Bolsheviks were actually too late in their preparations, and were fully surprised by the Ukrainian developments in December, 1918. The White-Russian forces meanwhile, on the one hand, reached some kind of an agreement with the *Hetman* government, getting ready for a *coup d'état* from above, and on the other hand, the Denikin agents readied an over-throw of the Hetmanic regime to subject Ukraine directly and completely to Denikin's rule, who worked toward the restoration of the Tsardom.

In fact, both centers of the idea of an indivisible Russia, that of Lenin and that of Denikin, instigated and waged a very aggressive psychological propaganda war in the Ukrainian cities and towns against the Ukrainian statehood by means of their agents, fellow-travellers and sympathizers, who could be easily hired among the Russian and Russianized population in Ukraine. Many untrue stories were manufactured by those two centers and then disseminated and circulated in order to confuse and disorient the people in general. Many false documents were forged, by means of which it was attempted to expose the activities of the Ukrainian political leaders, and in particular the members of the Directorate, in a negative way.

Denikin's psychological warfare affected and indoctrinated actually a rather limited sector of the Russianized ethnic elements and some backward and nationally unconscious strata. It did not affect at all even the most rightest circles of the educated upper crest of the Ukrainian society or the Ukrainian peasants and workers. The Bolshevik agitation and propaganda were much more successful. The Bolshevik center knew very well how to utilize and apply in its propaganda the slogans of a world-wide revolution, of Socialism and of the liberation of all mankind from "capitalist" oppression. Those slogans and ideas had, of course, a considerable impact upon the susceptible, liberally thinking, educated and intellectual groups and working class, who were rather sensitive and perceptive to the revolutionary and humanist ideas not only in Ukraine, but in other countries as well. By means of those "internationalist" slogans, Moscow succeeded in infecting and gaining influence not only upon some Ukrainian social elements, but also in Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Germany, Italy, France and even in other countries where there were no substantial revolutionary moods and movements at all, as in the United States.

Even in such cases, as the German Social-Democratic Party or the rightist German National Party, or other well disciplined and experienced Socialist parties in Western Europe, it was not possible to succeed fully in resisting the Russian Bolshevik subversion. The Bolsheviks, having exploited the post-war situation, succeeded in gaining their sympathizers and fellow-travellers amongst the ranks

of those Socialist parties and induced them to split away from their political organizations, and built their own, Moscow-oriented factions.

It cannot be marveled, therefore, that also in Ukraine at that time there were some political activists who were misled by the Soviet Russian propaganda, and accepted the doctrine of the "council government" as a solution for the post-war political confusion.

The "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine" (CPBU) was then a rather small one, counting only 3,364 members, of whom only some 3 per cent were Ukrainians, and smaller than other political factions of the country. Yet, it was much more disciplined and more efficiently run, than those major Ukrainian socialistic parties, which vacillated in their ideologies and actions.³⁵⁵)

The split within the UPSR

After having briefly analyzed the general situation, it is possible now to discuss the ideologies, the organizational structure, and the strength and weaknesses of individual Ukrainian parties in particular.

The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries experienced at that time an internal crisis. Since its national organization was accomplished at the dawn of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* (at the beginning of 1917, until the end of that year), the party was growing internally, and it was getting stronger organizationally; its political influence upon the masses was rapidly rising. The fact that its leaders were representing different political and "revolutionary" temperaments did not really hurt the party.

The UPSR was very much monolithic with respect to its ideology, program and operational tactics. Yet, at the end of 1917, an internal crisis began to develop, concerning the party's attitude toward the "council system" in general, and toward the Bolsheviks and the Bolshevik party in Russia and in Ukraine, in particular. It was the cause of the gradual differentiations within the party and the formation of separate factions of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. In January, 1918, the faction of the extreme leftists in the UPSR was getting ever so more clearly crystallized; they were led by Vasyl Ellansky, Lev Kovaliv, Hnat Mykhailychenko, Mykhaylo Poloz, Antin Prykhodko, and Olexander Shumsky. It was unbelievable that, at the very time of the war crisis caused by the war invasion of Ukraine which was carried out by Soviet Russia, the Bolshevik government of which attempted simply to overthrow the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, those leftist extremists from among the Socialists-Revolutionaries propagated an appeasement of Moscow at any price.

Of course, nobody from among the responsible leaders of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* promoted the idea of an aggressive Ukrainian war against Soviet Russia. Yet, these leftists certainly realized that the Ukrainian National Republic had to defend itself against the unprovoked Soviet Russian war invasion. Many saw the things in proper perspectives and clearly understood that the war was simply a case of the Red-Russian imperialism attempting to restore the Russian Empire in its new Communist version. The President of the Ukrainian National Republic, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, and all supporters and followers, favored a peace with Soviet Russia on the basis, however, of a complete withdrawal of the Soviet Russian troops from the Ukrainian territories and of Soviet non-interference with the internal affairs of the U.N.R. The leftist extremists suggested, however, a peace with Russia even at the price of a "federation" with Soviet Russia, and in conjunction with all sovereign non-Russian nations of the former Tsarist Empire.*)

The compact majority of the UPSR at that time was still led by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, Vsevolod Holubovych, Ivan Lyzaniivskyy, Yuliyani Okhrymovych, Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv, and Mykyta Shapoval. It still favored well planned and gradual social reforms in Ukraine, termed then as "strengthening the revolutionary achievements," and only a small minority adopted the slogans of an instant and immediate social revolution; in connection with it, the minority favored an alliance with the Russian socialist-revolutionary parties in Ukraine. In its practical version, it meant, first of all, a peace with the Russian Bolsheviks. The political controversy between the views of the majority and the minority of the UPSR became particularly acute after the proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on January 22, 1918. Then, however, the leftist extremists within the UPSR had not yet formed their separate political faction. There was at that time only the majority, following one political program, and the minority of the leftists — the other. The demarcation line between these two wings was then not very clear and rather fluctuating.³⁵⁶) Nevertheless, later, historians and memoirists, attempted to present a different picture of the political process of the party. They attempted to assert that, by the end of December, 1917, and January, 1918, there were three factions within the party which were well crystallized and formed: the right, the central and the left ones.

*) Vynnychenko, Head of the Secretariat General of the U.N.R. and later Prime Minister of the U.N.R., also had taken a strong position against the claims of Soviet Russia in his diplomatic notes (see his stand in Khrystyuk, III), in his speeches and articles published in the press organ of his party "Robitnycha Hazeta." After his ideological breakdown, Vynnychenko interpreted his activities in a different and unrealistic way.

In the camp of leftist extremists, the Socialists-Revolutionaries within the UPSR established itself first during the Russian Bolshevik occupation of the eastern parts of Ukraine in February-March, 1918. The relations between the two wings of the UPSR became very bad after the Germans disbanded the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and *Hetman* Skoropadskyy took over the government of Ukraine. A sharp conflict between the two factions then erupted during the Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, which was held illegally in Kyiv on May 13-16, 1918. Since the congress was secret and illegal, only 35 members of the party participated in the debates. Some most outstanding and leading members of the UPSR, such as Vsevolod Holubovych and Col. Olexander Zhukivskyy, could not attend, because they were at that time in German prison. Neither did Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy attend the congress, since he lived in hiding.

For three long days the delegates debated the issues of an evaluation of the Central *Rada* period and whether it would be worthwhile to restore this system of government in the future. It was debated as to whether to continue the traditional program and tactics of the party's majority or to adopt a sharp change in the party's ideology and to follow the extreme leftist program of the minority. On May 15, the majority program was again adopted as the party's platform. However, on the next day, when the ruling Central Committee was supposed to be formed for the next term of office, the vote was reversed. First of all, the place of the congressional debates was changed at the last minute and a few members of the majority faction did not arrive in time for the deciding vote and could not take part in the election of the Central Committee of the party. And, the left wing indulged in some maneuvering to reverse the vote. As a result of these developments, the extreme leftist faction succeeded in electing the majority to the Central Committee, which then decided the course of action. Hence, after the party congress, the leftist Central Committee, having openly ignored the political resolutions adopted by the Congress, directed the practical policies of the UPSR toward the immediate "social revolution" and propagated the idea of an immediate agreement with the Bolsheviks on the basis of an alliance with the "revolutionary Russia." Having been aware of the fact that the majority of the party membership was against that kind of an intra-party, pro-Bolshevik *coup d'etat*, the new Central Committee, acting underground, announced the termination and dissolution of the present party organization and ordered a new registration of the membership, hoping in that way to eliminate from its ranks those outstanding and leading members who opposed the Central Committee's extreme leftist orientation and pro-Bolshevik attitude.³⁵⁷)

That rather “revolutionary” and deceitful maneuver of the Central Committee of the party, directed against the will of its majority, produced sharp opposition and innumerable protests from the rank and file of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and caused the formation of a temporary “Organizational Committee of the UPSR.” The Committee began to organize the membership and the party anew along the ideological principles of the resolutions of the Fourth Party Congress. Then, the Committee established a “Central Bureau of the UPSR of the Central Trend.” That developed into a full split of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries. In order to underscore its disagreement with the extreme leftist elements which dominated the Central Committee, the party organization of the pro-national majority had to adopt a new official name, “Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries of the Center.” From now on, there were two socialist-revolutionary parties. A struggle soon developed between them to gain more followers and greater influence. The UPSR of the Center soon acquired the leading position within the peasant professional organization, the Peasant Union, which enjoyed quite a good will among the broad circles of the countryside and village population and had quite an influence upon those elements. N. Hryhoriyiv was the chairman of the Organizational Committee of the UPSR of the Center.³⁵⁸)

The extreme leftist Central Committee of the UPSR began soon to publish its press organ, “*Borotba*”*) (the Struggle), mostly as a weekly, where in it promoted its leftist philosophy. From the name of the paper, “*Borotba*,” later on the entire extreme left wing was called the *Borotbists*, to indicate those members of the UPSR who followed the extreme left views of the “*Borotba*” paper. Subsequently the term “*Borotbists*” was officially adopted by the faction and was added to the party’s name, being closed in parentheses: “the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (the *Borotbists*).” That completed the full split of the originally monolythic political organization.

Intrapartisan unification attempts

As mentioned before, in the previous chapters, the UPSR of the Center soon started to propagate and promote in word and practice the idea of a unified Ukrainian socialist-democratic front, which was adopted before long by Vynnychenko and the entire Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker’s Party. Along with these developments, the Ukrainian National-Statehood Union,**) originally

*) “Боротьба”.

***) “Український Національно-Державний Союз”.

organized in the middle of May, 1918, was reorganized by giving it a broader political base and was given a new name, the "Ukrainian National Union" (*Soyuz*).*) The Union was joined not only by all socialist parties but by many democratic organizations, some of them of neo-socialist character. The Socialists-Revolutionaries of the *Borotbist* wing, however, not only did not join the *Soyuz*, but most actively opposed the very idea of such a nation-wide organization.³⁵⁹)

Yet even while working to organize a unified social-democratic front, the Organizational Committee of the UPSR, the Center, did not give up the idea of reestablishing the unity of the party with the *Borotbists*. The platform for the reunification was supposed to include the declaration of the Central Committee of the *Borotbists*, stating that they stood for the idea of the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian national statehood and did not favor a federation with Soviet Russia. Other matters, especially the problems of various social reforms and of the approach to the solution (the ways and methods), were left to the free discretion within the eventually unified party. The negotiations to this point were continued between Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv, representing the Center, and Panas Lyubchenko, representing the *Borotbists*. The *Borotbist* representation declared, among other things, that their faction would not oppose Ukrainian independence, yet it insisted on a future convention of the unified party with the Bolsheviks. No mutual understanding between these two wings of the UPSR was ever reached.

On the eve of the announcement by the Directorate of its uprising against the *Hetman* regime, the Organizational Committee of the UPSR, the Center, attempted once more to reach an understanding with the *Borotbists* concerning their participation in the uprising and their cooperation with other socialistic groups. However, Panas Lyubchenko declared, in the name of his *Borotbist* faction, that the *Borotbists* would not participate in any unified Ukrainian national front and that they would conduct their revolutionary activities independently.³⁶⁰)

Hence, the anti-Hetman uprising, led by the Directorate, was carried out by the Ukrainian socialist and democratic forces without the *Borotbist* participation, and without the participation of the non-Ukrainian democratic, Russian and Jewish groups. The political success of the unified socialist-democratic front in the uprising astounded and confused the extreme leftist elements in Ukraine and abroad. When the Directorate was still in Khvastiv, at the beginning of December, 1918, Mykhaylo Poloz arrived there to nego-

*) "Український Національний Союз".

tiate with Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv in order to bring about some kind of an understanding between the Center and *Borotbist* wing of the original UPSR. In the new political situation, Hryhoriyiv rightly asserted that the *Borotbists* had to synchronize their actions not only with the Center of the party, but also with the action of the Directorate first of all. Poloz then had a conversation with Petlyura, concerning the political platform of the Directorate. After his interview with Petlyura, Poloz eventually stated that the *Borotbists* could not cooperate with the new government on that platform. Since, however, the UPSR of the Center very closely cooperated with the Directorate, having there even one of its five members, Prof. Fedir Shvets, the prospects of an understanding and merger of the two wings of the Socialists-Revolutionaries were equal to zero and finally, after this, the matter was dropped.³⁶¹⁾

Local activities of the *Borotbists* against the Directorate

In the process of the uprising of the Directorate against the Hetman, the *Borotbists* remained during the first weeks absolutely inactive and did not show any organized political action. In various districts and counties of Ukraine, the representatives of the new government of the Directorate had all power and functioned without much opposition. The political influence of the Ukrainian National Union, as the expression of the contemporary political philosophy of the only Ukrainian national front, was predominant all over the country through its local branches. Only in the Kharkiv and Poltava districts did the *Borotbists* exhibit some action. There one of their leaders, Shynkar, operated toward undermining the authority of the Directorate. However, the military government of the armed forces of the U.N.R., being in the hands of an able commander, Coln. Petro Bolbochan, was alert and soon neutralized the *Borotbist* subversion. Shynkar was arrested and sentenced to death for his attempt to start a rebellion in a military zone. Only by accident was he able to escape from prison and to hide in Kyiv.³⁶²⁾

The subversive attitude of the *Borotbists* toward the government of the Directorate, republican and socialistic in its essence, in the reestablished U.N.R., produced a decisive opposition within the leading circles of the UPSR of the Center to continue any further negotiations with the *Borotbists* on the unification matter; any further negotiation could have pertained to streamlining the inter-parties political cooperation and its support for the Directorate, but not any merger of the two opposite wings. This view was represented, for example, by Yanko, who at that time was not only a member of the Organizational Committee of the UPSR of the Center, but also the chairman of the influential Peasant Union.³⁶³⁾

On the other hand, the Directorate, and its representatives in various districts and counties of the land, continued still to regard the *Borotbists* as legitimate Ukrainian political party and did not apply any repression against it, as a whole. Only in some particular cases some of their leaders, like Shynkar, got in trouble with the law for propagating and promoting the cause of a violent overthrow of the government of the U.N.R. Even the Directorate and some of its representatives in Kyiv tried to gain some of the *Borotbist* leaders to the idea of creative and cooperative work for the welfare of the Ukrainian national statehood. On the recommendation of the Directorate, for instance, Coln. Konovalts of the *Sichovi Striltsi* guaranteed personal safety to Shynkar, who lived meanwhile in Kyiv illegally, and negotiated with him personally to induce him to give up his hostile and rebellious attitude toward the Directorate. All efforts proved, however, futile.³⁶⁴)

At first, the *Borotbists*, did not have much of an influence upon the broad masses of the Ukrainian peasants and workers. In the beginning, only small groups of students and intellectuals followed their slogans. In a few cases they succeeded in penetrating some ranks of the peasantry and labor. If only the Organizational Committee of the UPSR, the Center, would have developed a little stronger organizational structure throughout the country, the *Borotbist* wing would have certainly remained a small and unimportant political sect of intellectuals without much impact on history. Yet, the leaders and activists of the Socialists-Revolutionaries of the Center got largely involved in the government process, having been employed in various administrative, diplomatic or military posts of the U.N.R., and so an absolutely inadequate number was left to organize and conduct the party affairs.

The *Borotbists* took full advantage of that situation. They were not involved in the government apparatus at all, and could devote all their time to their party's cause. Hence, their political influence was continuously growing, although in December and early January still the influence of the Center upon the masses prevailed.

The Ukrainian Social-Democrats

Strong was also the influence of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker's Party upon the masses of the workers. This was evident during various conventions, held at various times and in various places, where the representatives of the UPSR of the Center, the *Borotbist* wing and the USDWP were active. At that time, the *Borotbists* could not score any decisive success. A grand convention of the peasants of the Kyiv district, held in the capital on December

21-24, attended by some 700 delegates, could serve here as an example of such gatherings. At that convention, Shvets, Yanko and Hrushevskyy spoke for the UPSR of the Center, and Shumskyy for the *Borotbist* wing. Also, in the name of the Directorate, speeches were delivered at the convention by Vynnychenko and Andriyevskyy. The Kyiv peasant convention adopted entirely and almost unanimously the political ideology of the central wing of the UPSR, and accepted proper resolutions in the democratic spirit with the demand to organize a strong and well disciplined army, which would oppose any foreign powers attempting an invasion of Ukraine. Similar positions were taken by other peasant conventions, such as the county convention in Rivne and other counties. Only in the Poltava regions, the *Borotbist* political influence was somewhat apparent.³⁶⁵⁾

The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party was also a very important political organization, though in its framework during the Directorate era, until the end of December, 1918, an internal opposition of an extreme "revolutionary" nature was growing. At the time of the *Hetman* regime, the USDWP was largely holding to the true principles of a parliamentary democracy, but by the end of the 1918 its ranks were also somewhat penetrated by the symptoms of the pro-Soviet ("council") "revolutionary" tendencies. Yet, at the very beginning those symptoms were rather weak and not clear-cut ideologically, being a mixture of true democracy, moderate socialism and revolutionarism. Even some leading members of the party's Central Committee were ideologically rather confused.³⁶⁶⁾

Nevertheless, all those pro-Soviet feelings within the USDWP did not crystallize and did not form any separate political faction until the middle of January, 1919. In general, so far the political and ideological views and thoughts were widely fluctuating and changing, and frequently one and the same person, even with leadership qualities, altered his political orientation from day to day in a quite opposite direction. A very aggressive psychological warfare by subversion and propaganda, waged by Soviet Russia, along with her military operations, produced some "pro-Soviet" feelings within other political groups and parties in Ukraine, too. Yet, these feelings toward the "system of the council government" accepted there did not take the form of a principle or doctrine, but were rather a tactical maneuver or measure to combat the Russian propaganda war-cries. Finally, by having formulated and adopted the so-called "labor principle" of democratic government, the Ukrainian leaders hoped to be successful in averting and defeating the deadly threat of Soviet propaganda, which by its slogans paved the way for a full abolition of the Ukrainian political sovereignty.³⁶⁷⁾

The nationalist parties

The Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Independentists was the third political force, which, during the first months of the Directorate rule, had very much a decisive voice, along with the two others as pointed out above, in forming the national life of the re-established and young Republic. In comparison with the above two parties, the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Social-Democratic ones, the Socialists-Independentists were numberwise the smaller in membership and the weaker in influence in the Directorate. Their influence did not reach the masses of the people at all. Yet, at that time it was the more forceful political power than any other remaining political party in Ukraine, to be discussed a little later. The Socialists-Independentists constituted the presidium or the executive board of the Ukrainian National Union before the anti-*Hetman* uprising; they participated in electing the Directorate and one of their leaders, attorney and judge Panas Andriyevskyy, became one of the five members of that new governing body.

The official name of the party was as follows: "The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists (the Ukrainian National Party)." In the party's publications, the name was shortened to the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists (UPSI), while popularly the group was called the Socialists-Independentists.*) It was the youngest of all the existing political organizations, since it was established at its first convention on December 17, 1917. It was originated by all kinds of younger revolutionary activists who failed to join or did not want to join the three other parties of the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries or Socialists-Federalists. It was also joined by those who had once belonged to the Ukrainian National Party which existed in the years 1902-1906, and had since waned.

Actually, the Ukrainian National Party developed as a result of a split within the original political organization, "the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party," the RUP, and its known leaders were Mykola Mikhnovskyy, Ivan Lutsenko and Valentyn Otamanovskyy. When the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was formed, Valentyn Otamanovskyy first joined it as the representative of his party, then was replaced by Mykyta Shapoval, while Mykola Mikhnovskyy and Ivan Lutsenko joined the *Rada* not as the representatives of their party but of some other organizations.** 365)

*) Українська Партія Самостійників-Соціалістів. (Українська Народна Партія).

***) Later Mykyta Shapoval joined the UPSR.

The first group of people who constituted the party of the Socialists-Independentists during the revolution were mainly the commissioned and non-commissioned army officers, while the second group were the former members of the Ukrainian National Party, with rather older and more experienced political and social activities. Yet, the first group was more numerous and its influence prevailed. The mostly young and dynamic people, although sometimes without proper political experience, overwhelmed the older and more experienced partisan politicians, who lacked dynamism. Hence, the following party leadership was elected at its convention in December, 1917: Olexander Makarenko, the chairman; Ivan Lutsenko, Panas Andriyevskyy and Pavlo Makarenko — the vice-chairmen or “chairman’s comrades”, all members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* representing there the All-Ukrainian Military Convention.

Obviously, because of its clearly nationalistic character, the Party of the Socialists-Independentists attracted numerous nationalist-thinking elements, who at first during the war, joined the armed forces and later on, during the *Hetman* era in Ukraine, staffed either various lower administrative offices or were employed as teachers in the growing educational system throughout the land. These people again joined various insurgent units during the uprising led by the Directorate against the *Hetman* regime, having filled the posts of the commanders of numerous small and large insurgent detachments, which were liberally receiving the names of regiments and divisions of the republican army. After the successful completion of the uprising even more military people joined the party, among others also Gen. Olexander Hrekiv.

The party platform of the Socialists-Independentists was adopted in December, 1917. It was a usual socialist program but modulated by a strong nationalistic spirit, hence even the own party’s publications frequently referred to it as a national-socialism.³⁶⁶) It is to be remembered, that the name “national-socialism” was then used in a quite different meaning than Hitler did to identify his “*Nazi*” and racist movement a few years later. The Socialist-Independent platform included briefly the following matters: In the agricultural sector, it demanded a full confiscation of non-labor *latifundia* lands and free and without charge distribution of those lands among the peasants; in the industrial sector, the minimum program of the Social-Democrats and Socialists-Revolutionaries concerning the nationalization of large industrial projects, was there repeated; in the military sector, the abolition of the regular army in the peace time and its replacement by a national militia was proposed; in the religious sector, the party platform suggested a separation of state and church, prohibited any state interference

in the church or religious matters, demanded an independent Ukrainian Church, electoral priesthood and full right of the individual communities to chose their own pastors.³⁶⁷) The Party of the Socialists-Independentists, as a rather novel party organization, did not develop a strong and efficient organizational set-up, and also its influence upon the peasant and labor masses was negligible. That influence was not firm either and frequently vacillated according to the over-all political developments.

Little power and influence had the fourth political party, having been poorly organized throughout the country, and not even represented in the Directorate, although it fully endorsed the uprising, sponsored and led by the Directorate. It was the Party of Socialists-Federalists, which developed actually out of "the Society of Ukrainian Progressives" in March, 1917. The party included the most experienced political and social activist groups, which proved themselves during the first revolution in the Russian Empire in 1905-1906. Its rank and file membership included the largest number of Ukrainian intellectuals. The party had changed its political name three times in the course of the first months of 1917, having indicated by this, that it did not have either any firm political ideology or partisan tradition. Of course, it was joined by the upper crust of the Ukrainian intellectuals, but it had no elaborate organizational structure throughout the country, and consequently its influence upon the peasant and labor masses was very negligible, too. The other, two or three parties had scarcely any organization or any membership.

In general, it must be underscored here, that at the beginning of the revolution of 1917, the political organization of the Ukrainian masses was very inadequate, almost equal to zero. This had, of course, its objective reason. The Tsarist regime did not allow and quelled any form of an attempt of a nationally Ukrainian, democratic, "separatist" or otherwise politically minded movement, as pointed out. Hence, at that time such organizations acquired mostly the scope of small group circles only; they were never large scale ones, and because of that, they were utterly weak. A few months of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* era could not produce any miracle in this respect. Neither could the *Hetman* era do it either. Hence, although the Directorate had considerable acceptance and popularity among the masses during the first weeks of its uprising, antagonized by some measures of the *Hetman* government, that popularity was not backed up by any firm political organizational structure of various parties, which constituted the body of the reestablished republican government of Ukraine.³⁶⁹)

In the politically well-organized societies of Western Europe those political or public men, who did not join any political party or were not backed up by any of them, were usually called "wild-cat politicians." Such "wild-cat" public men acted wilfully and normally in an anti-social manner. Unfortunately, there were many such politicians in Ukraine during the revolutionary era, mainly because the political life was there poorly organized. The instance produced the roots of some anarchistic mood among some revolutionary leaders, who had not much training, and not much tradition in their political activities. It had an adverse impact upon the political developments in revolutionary Ukraine, having caused many unfortunate or directly fatal historical incidences, including the defeat of the struggle for independence of the Ukrainian people of 1917-1923. The lack of a well-balanced political organization, of political training and experience of the leaders, and of the political mindedness of the masses were the main causes of the political vacillations in building the Ukrainian statehood and shaping-up its foreign policies during those revolutionary years.

In such a situation of the Ukrainian political and partisan process developments, being surrounded by utter uncertainty, the government of the Directorate had to act. Meanwhile grave news came from Western Europe to Vynnytsya and Kyiv about the revolutionary instabilities and intra-party splits in the labor movements and socialistic organizations. It happened in particular in Germany, France, Italy and England. Obviously, it only made the things so much more uncertain in Ukraine. For those reasons, therefore, the Directorate waited and hasitated for a long 10 days, until after extended discussions, before, finally, the text of the Declaration of December 26, 1918 was adopted. The Declaration constituted the foundation of the Temporary Constitution of the Ukrainian National Republic, the U.N.R.



CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION

The Declaration of the Directorate of the U.N.R. of December 1918

On December 26, 1918, the following Declaration of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic was announced throughout Ukraine:

“The destructive, landowning-monarchistic rule, the *Hetmanate*, was abolished on all Ukrainian territory by the heroic uprising of the armed Ukrainian working people.

Ukraine was freed from any punitive expeditions, *starostas* [district governors], constables and other criminal establishments of the ruling class. The national personal autonomy, guaranteeing each nationality the right to free life, was restored.

Census city councils and district offices, introduced by the *Hetman* regime, were abolished and the democratic, elected by all people, agencies of local self-government reestablished.

Until a full land reform will be introduced, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic announced, that all small peasant farms and all farms, cultivated by own labor [of the owners], remain in use of their previous owners without any change, while the remaining lands have been given in use to the landless and small farm peasantry, and above all, they have to be given to those, who rendered military services to the Republic in its struggle against the former *Hetman*. The supreme management of those lands is in the jurisdiction of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. The above regulation pertains equally also to the lands formerly owned by the religious orders, the Church and state. To carry out the land reform, the People’s Agrarian Administrations have been organized.

According to the “Order No. I of the Directorate,” directed to the peasants, the listings of the contributions, taken by the manorial landowners from the peasants, have been prepared in order to return the values to the harmed ones.

By its decision of December 9, the Directorate changed all the laws and regulations of the *Hetman* government in the area of labor policies. The eight-hour working day has been

restored. The collective labor agreements, the rights to organize and to strike and the fulness of rights of the industrial labor committees have been reinstated.

Also in all other sectors of life the Directorate altered all laws and regulations of the *Hetman* government, which were directed against the interests of the working classes and were harmful for the entire national community.

Empowered by the strength and will of the working classes of Ukraine, the supreme authority of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Directorate, achieved by those measures the first stage of a social and national-political liberation of the Ukrainian people.

The creation of a new, just, sound and proper system, for the realistic relationship of the social and political forces in the state, is the next stage in our revolution.

The Directorate is a provisional supreme authority in the revolutionary time. Having received from the primary source of the revolutionary law, the working people, the power and the right to govern the state at the time of struggle, the Directorate will transfer all its powers back to the same people.

Yet, the Directorate believes that the right to govern and direct the country ought to be only in the hands of those classes which are the foundation of the social life and are creating all material and spiritual values and which by blood and life of their members participated in the struggle against the destructive forces of the previous social order.

The authority in the Ukrainian National Republic ought to be in the hands of the working classes only, of the labor and peasantry; of those classes which by their blood and sweat acquired that authority.

The so-called "ruling classes" of the landed and industrial *bourgeoisie* proved in the course of their seven months-long, full and unlimited rule in Ukraine that they were completely incapable and harmful for the whole nation by the way they governed the state. Having had all material, physical and spiritual resources, having had full freedom to organize the economic and political life, these classes were bringing only disorganization and destruction to the country. Having only the narrow-class and egoistic class interests in mind, these classes conducted really predatory policies in the country. They pillaged, stole or delivered into foreign imperialistic hands a substantial part of the state-national wealth.

Having taken care only of accumulating capital in private hands, those people brought manufacturing to a full decay and the country's economy to a miserable plight. Speculations

reached unbelievable heights during the rule of that administration. Behaving like in a conquered land, large property-owners ruled by means of ruthless terror and coercion. Burrying alive in the earth, cutting out pieces of skin, burning the eyes with the so-called landowner's "*karatels*" [punitive], were the regular methods by which the land was ruled. Big capitalist, having been aliens in this country, brutally trampled national rights and achievements of our people, dishonored the authority of its statehood, traded with and betrayed the national state, built by many sacrifices and by hard effort.

It would be a crime against this country if the revolutionary government, formed by the people, which in anger and anguish arose against the oppressors, would allow those classes to participate in the country's governing process, inspite of what had happened.

The Directorate asserts, therefore, the following:

The non-working and exploiting classes, which live by and enjoy the fruits of the toil of the working classes, which destroyed the land, ruined its economy and marked their rule by cruelties and reaction, have no right to take part in the nation's government. The Directorate would transfer its rights and authorizations only to the working people of the independent Ukrainian National Republic.

The Directorate proposes the following:

1. The working peasantry, which was the first to respond to the appeal of the Directorate to rise with arms in hands to fight against the gentry, should arrange throughout Ukraine their conventions in various districts to elect their delegates to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine. Those delegates should represent there the will also of the armed peasantry, doing presently temporarily military duty; and of those peasants who by their peaceful work at home help to establish the national law and order in the state.

2. The urban workers should elect their representation to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine from each of the factories, industrial units, shops, workshops and other establishments, where work is performed. Though some non-Ukrainian national groups of the workers had rather a passive attitude toward, and other groups were rather neutral in the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the former Hetman, the Directorate still believes, that in the further progress of the struggle for the liberation of all working people, the non-

Ukrainian laborers will forget their national intolerance, and then sincerely and friendly join the entire working people of Ukraine.

3. The working intelligentsia, which works directly for the working people, the workers in national education, medical people, workers in the cooperative movement, managerial staff and staff people in other institutions, should also elect their representatives to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine.

The place and the time of convening the work of the Congress, as well as the electoral norms to the said Congress, will be announced by a special instruction of the Directorate.

The Congress of Working People, as the revolutionary representation of the organized working masses, will convene not according to the perfect electoral procedure which cannot be materialized under present conditions. Yet, later on, after peaceful conditions get established, the Congress should be replaced by a representation of the working masses, elected in accordance with the perfected voting methods, by the Constitutional Assembly.

The Congress of the Working People shall regulate the forms of government in the center, as well as in the provinces. Until the Directorate's decisions in this respect will be made, it would regard any attempt to grab power by any groups for the coercion of the liberty of the Ukrainian working people, and so it will resolutely stop any such wilfull excesses.

Until the Congress convenes, the Directorate, by its supreme authority, first of all will return to the peasantry all the contributions collected from it by the large manorial land-owners.

In order to save the country from the continuing economic and industrial decline and from robbing and exploiting the workingmen and the entire population, the Directorate will introduce in the factories and workshops, and other manufacturing establishments state labor control, and it will take utmost care in enabling manufacturing to regain its strength, so much needed for the national development.

The Directorate shall direct all its efforts toward that organization of the national economy, which will best correspond to the present temporary period in course of which the old capitalist order crumbles and on its ruins the new world-wide order, not knowing any oppression or exploitation, is rising. The Directorate considers its responsibility and duty to take under the control of the Ukrainian National Republic all major sectors of Ukrainian manufacturing and to direct their economic

process toward the interest of the working classes and all people, and not let them work in the interest of a small group of capitalists.

All forms of speculation will be mercilessly exterminated by the Directorate, through the use penalties appropriate for war time. The Commissions for Extermination of Speculations will be organized for that purpose throughout all Ukraine. The Directorate will also take immediate care to supply instantly the working masses with basic and urgent necessities, such as lather, textiles, iron appliances, and other goods, including food.

Having strongly and fully taken the path of social reforms, the Directorate considers it inevitable to underscore, that it shall use all measures to avoid any anarchistic, disorganized and unsystematic ways in the process of the reconstruction. The Directorate considers it its responsibility to coincide these great tasks with the social and historical developments and international conditions which contemporarily surround Ukraine, and with those better forms of social reforms which will be attained by the world, and in particular, by the Western-European labor democracies.

In the area of international relations, the Directorate stands on the platform of a full neutrality and of the desire for peaceful coexistence with the peoples of all nations. Having in mind great and complex responsibilities, the Directorate desires to use all efficient labor forces of its nation to build a new life in the country and to introduce law and order, so much needed by the working people, and not for bloody struggles against the neighbor nations.

Also on the domestic front of the Republic, the Directorate sets itself the goal of national tranquility and friendly understanding among the working democracies of all nationalities, populating the Ukrainian territories.

The Directorate sincerely believes, that with the united forces of all laborers, the working people of Ukraine will attain their goals without any cruel, bloody and unnecessary forms of struggle. Further, the non-working classes should have understood and should have honestly admitted the whole perniciousness injustice of their former rule, and they should once and for all accept the fact that the right to decide the fate of the majority of the people should be in the hands of the majority itself, it means, in the hands of the working classes.

The Directorate calls upon the working intelligentsia to take resolutely the side of the working classes and support the cause of forming the new, just and sound forms of life for

all people; to apply all its efforts, wisdom and learning for the best direction of the social construction process.

The Directorate calls upon all socialist parties and groups of all socialistic trends and of all nationalities to accept a full understanding of the most important momentum, and to direct all their efforts toward the right and dignified organization of the freedom of the working people and toward the organization of law and order on the entire territory of the Republic of the Working People.

Entrusting the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Council of National Ministeries, with the responsibility to carry out these great tasks, the Directorate believes that the whole working people of Ukraine will sincerely assist their government in those important and responsible works.

Signed: Head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, V. Vynnychenko; Members of the Directorate: Petlyura, Shvets, Andriyevskyy, Makarenko.³⁷⁰⁾

General characteristics of the Declaration

Before a detailed analysis of the provisional constitutional principles of the Declaration of December 26, first its fundamental political philosophy should be ascertained. The style and the political spirit of the Declaration indicate beyond any doubt that Vynnychenko was its author. Moreover, he himself admitted indirectly his authorship of the document.³⁷¹⁾

Of course, other members of the Directorate must have introduced in various parts of the document their own corrections and thoughts. The same must have been done also by other political leaders from outside of the Directorate, who desired to improve the Declaration along with their political thinking. Yet, all those additional thoughts and corrections were apparently edited in their final wording by Vynnychenko who gave them the imprint of his style of writing. After all, Vynnychenko had for a long time been a famous novelist and an acknowledged leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats. Therefore, the other members of the Directorate conceded to him the privilege of writing the draft and editing any document in the name of the Directorate. But Vynnychenko had to accept and to introduce into the document the principle of "labor democracy" which worked with the idea of three classes of the working people: the peasantry, the industrial proletariat, and the working intelligentsia. The idea was not fully acceptable to Vynnychenko, who, as a Social-Democrat, embraced the Marxist approach, according to which only the industrial proletariat was accounted

for, while other segments of the society were regarded by and large as “petty *bourgeois*.” Vynnychenko certainly tried to incorporate the whole Marxist philosophy with the “historic mission of the proletariat” into the Declaration, but he could not succeed fully, because the majority of the Directorate, as well as the vast majority of the Ukrainian society, the peasantry and the educated class, did not share his radically Marxist ideology, either in its political or social aspects.

Then, the very principle of the “labor democracy” was not properly developed in the Declaration, because of Vynnychenko’s reservations. The principle acknowledges in fact constitutional and political equality, in the moral and economic aspects as well, of all working people who do not take any advantage from the work of others to benefit themselves or to advance their own production processes for their exclusive private profits. Consequently, the Declaration should have considered three equal classes of the society: the peasantry, the industrial proletariat and the working intelligentsia. Yet, Vynnychenko, authoring the document, was referring largely only to two classes: to the peasantry and the industrial proletariat. He referred to the working intelligentsia only in by-passing, as to some kind of service group of the “working people,” and not as to a politically and socially equal class to the two other ones. It was by him not fully recognized as an independent and creative class component of the society, but rather as an incoherently hooked element to the Ukrainian social structure.

Although the Declaration clearly asserted that the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine would establish only a temporary constitution in the Ukrainian National Republic, and then, that the permanent constitutional structure of the country would be introduced by the Constitutional Assembly, yet it embraced first of all Socialism and appealed only to the socialist parties to give their cooperation in building the new state. Other democratic parties, which certainly recognized the need of fundamental social reforms, but were not socialistic, were simply ignored by Vynnychenko’s one-sided opinion. That one-sidedness and partiality of the Declaration, which was supposed to be a provisional constitution, before convening of the Congress, was its essential fault.

The Declaration not only stated the principles of a temporary constitution of the U.N.R. according to the principle of the “labor democracy” until the Congress adopted another one, but it also identified the political ends and outlined the program of action for the country for the near future. As far as the constitutional structure of the land was concerned, the following five leading points of the constitutional nature may be identified:

1. Until the Congress would enact otherwise, the “labor democracy” was the binding principle in the Ukrainian Republic; it meant, that the working classes only, no matter of what national descent, voiced their will and participated in the legislative and administrative government of the state;

2. Until the Congress convened and decided otherwise, the Directorate was the temporary supreme authority of the land;

3. The Council of National Ministers, appointed by and responsible to the Directorate, was the supreme executive body in the U.N.R.;

4. The introduction of fundamental social reforms, aiming at the abolition of the private capitalistic system, and patterned after the contemporary Western European socialist reformatory movements, became the leading responsibility of the supreme government bodies of the Republic, set-up by the provisional constitution;

5. The local administration was supposed to be established also on the basis of the “labor democracy,” as the provisional constitution deemed proper, yet meanwhile the local self-governing elections were carried out according to the principle of the general and equal electoral rights for everybody.³⁷²)

As far as the political ends the program of action for the government for the near future was concerned, the Declaration proclaimed the desire of maintaining an absolute neutrality in international relations and of promoting peace and cooperation among all nations of the world. That all-out pacifist concept of the provisional constitution and of its authors was certainly out of date in the war-torn and revolutionized Eastern Europe.

As a general remark, it must be emphasized that the form of this Declaration by the Directorate, for the contemporary reader, seems inadequate. This Declaration was supposed to be a provisional constitution but, in actuality, the Directorate had chosen the form of a manifesto in which all things were mixed together — political and social philosophy, program of social reforms for the future, appeals to various groups within the population, calls to some parties, etc., and in the same document a set of real constitutional principles. But, it must be emphasized that such a form of the constitutional Declaration was necessary in the given social and political conditions: it should be quite understood by the popular masses. Although the Declaration asserted that it was patterned on activities and positions in practice by Western European Socialists, in reality, this was not so. For example, the German and Austrian socialist governments proclaimed their declarations quite separate from pure constitutional or other laws. Also, these Western socialist leaders

had taken as their basic principle general democracy and not the narrower "labor democracy." The Directorate in its Declaration had chosen the compromise position between general democracy and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In addition the use of a manifesto form was, for the contemporary conditions, also a compromise.

Politically, the Declaration was obviously aimed against a violent Communist propaganda which was promoted to create sympathy for the Soviet system in Ukraine and for uprising and revolts against the Directorate. That is the reason why such Directorate members with a high nationalistic spirit, like Andriyevskyy and Petlyura, had agreed to proclaim a "labor democracy." No doubt that the Declaration had achieved some success in weakening the results of the Soviet propaganda against the Directorate. But on the other hand, "the labor democracy" of the Declaration was used in the propaganda of the White Russian circles against the Directorate. That propaganda pictured the Directorate as a non-democratic and even as a semi-Bolshevik government.

In analyzing the Declaration, one should also take into account the contemporary social and economic conditions of the Ukrainian people. At that time, over 90% of the Ukrainians were working people. Hence, in universal elections, they had an absolute majority as was shown in the elections to the Constituent Assembly in January, 1918. Therefore, it was not necessary to introduce the limited "labor democracy," in as much as the Directorate in its Declaration had pronounced that the universal voting right was the only "perfect."

The legislative activities of the Directorate

Until the Council of National Ministers was established, all of the legislative process was carried out by the Directorate and by it all major laws were enacted, such as bills, rules, regulations and decrees. The signatures of all five or the majority of the members of the Directorate were affixed to all those acts to make them legal. After the Council of the National Ministers was formed, the legislative procedures was substantially changed. From that time on, all legislative proposals were prepared by the respective ministry, discussed subsequently by the Council of Ministers as a whole, and then the adopted proposal by the Council was presented to the Directorate for its confirmation. After the legislative proposal was enacted and signed by the Directorate and the proper minister responsible for the action, the new law or act was officially announced in the "Herald of Laws and Executive Orders."

In that early period of the Directorate's government, it issued a considerable number of new acts, which either annulled some laws of the former Hetman regime and restored the validity and effectiveness of the old acts once adopted by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, or introduced some new and original legislative norms of its own.

Among those new laws adopted by the Directorate, the following were of a greater importance:

1. The Act Concerning the Restoration of the Law of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* Concerning the Formation of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Ukrainian National Republic;
2. The Act of Annulment of the Hetman Law of November 3, 1918, about the Formation of the Commission for Streamlining the Municipal Administration of the Capital of Kyiv;
3. The Act of Annulment of the Hetman Law of the "Statute of the Temporary Auditing Commission for Control of the Activities of the Local Self-Governing Bodies";
4. The Act concerning the Ukrainian Republican Orchestra;
5. The Act about the Transfer of the Properties of the General Cossack Council into the Disposition of the Chief of the Directorate's Office;
6. The Land Reform Act;
7. The Act about the Closing of Safes in the Private Banks and the Mutual Credit Institutions from 9 to 15 of January, 1919, to carry out the auditing of the valuables in those safes;
8. The Act and the Instruction about the Elections to the Congress of the Working People;
9. The Act about the Draft for Military Service;
10. The Act about the Temporary Rules of Closing the Establishments and Settling the Accounts with the Workers;
11. The Act about Changes in Staffing the Professional-Technical Schools of the Secondary Level and about Assigning 2,300,000 Karbovanets for Maintenance of Such Schools;
12. The Act about Increasing the State Aid for Payment of Teachers of the Lower Elementary Schools and about Changing the Staff Assignments of the Higher Elementary Schools;
13. The Act on the Improvement of Conditions of the Criminal Inmates;

14. The Act about the Ukrainian Language as the Official Language in the U.N.R.;
15. The Directorate's Manifesto of January, 1919, to the Peasants on the Occasion of Promulgation of the Land Reform Act;
16. The Act about the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (The Act on the All-Ukrainian Church Council and the Ukrainian Church Synodal Council).³⁷³)

Truly, the Directorate issued rather a considerable number of legislative acts during this rather short span of time. However, this legislative activity of the Directorate and of the Council of National Ministers had one serious shortcoming. These two supreme government bodies did not prepare or develop any legislative proposal, concerning any fundamental matters, to submit to the Congress of the Working People to act upon. Not even a constitutional proposal was prepared in order to proceed with building a more permanent basis for the growth of the new republic.

The formation of the supreme state bodies

The temporary December constitution retained the Directorate as a collegiate body, composed of five members, without any change, as the top government body. It functioned as the head of the state and represented the Ukrainian nation abroad. The only change introduced in the procedural matter since the success of the revolution was signing the acts and laws from now on by the appropriate ministers along with the signatures of the members of the Directorate, while previously it was done by the Directorate only.

It was clearly apparent from the direct interpretation of the provisional constitution, that the Directorate reserved for itself only the right of being the state "presidency," which implied in the sphere of legislation, the power to enact laws, previously adopted by the Council of National Ministers; in the sphere of judiciary — the authority to grant clemency; in the military sector — the supreme command over all armed forces.

The executive power was vested in the Council of National Ministers, responsible to the Directorate, either as a whole or individually, each minister being responsible for his individual sector of administration. At times, the Directorate acted as a collegiate body; other times individual members of the body individually issued various regulations, pertaining to various aspects of national life, along with the decrees and regulations of the Council of National Ministers and individual ministers as well. Hence, the Directorate

fulfilled not only the representational functions, but it attended indirectly the legislative, judiciary, and administrative processes of the state, though to a lesser extent, than in the previous period. As it was pointed out above, however, the legislative proposals were to be initiated by the appropriate ministries, then adopted by the Council of National Ministries as a whole, and eventually sanctioned and enacted by the Directorate, signed by its members and countersigned by the responsible minister of the state.

The Council of National Ministers consisted of a chairman and eighteen ministers for different sectors of the country's administration: foreign affairs; internal affairs; agrarian affairs; the arts; naval affairs; national health; post and telegraph; food and provisions; commerce and industry; defense affairs; education; justice; finances; labor; transportation and roads; religious affairs; press and information; Jewish affairs. The last one was always appointed from among the Jewish political representation. Furthermore, the state comptroller and the state secretary joined the cabinet of ministers.

In fact, the Council of National Ministers, as another collegiate body, was supposed to form the fundamental trend of the state policy and state administration, while individual ministers were supposed to manage their special administrative sectors. The chairman of the Council chaired its proceedings, deliberations and decision making.

The independent judiciary in the U.N.R. was headed by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Ukrainian National Republic, which was restored in its functions after the abolition of the State Senate which was formed during the Hetman era according to the Russian patterns.

The first cabinet of ministers

Long before the Declaration of December 26 was proclaimed, the Directorate was already involved in negotiations with the representatives of various political parties, concerning the composition of the future Council of National Ministers, planned-for by the above Declaration. As a result of those negotiations, a broad coalition cabinet of ministers was finally formed with the following make-up:

1. The Head of the Council and at the same time Minister of Foreign Affairs — Volodymyr Chekhivskyy (a graduate of a Theological Academy);
2. Minister of Internal Affairs — Prof. Olexander Mytsyuk;

3. Minister of Agrarian Affairs — social scientist Mykyta Shapoval;
4. Acting Minister of Defense — Gen. Olexander Osetskyy;
5. Minister of Naval Affairs — M. Bilynsky;
6. Minister of Commerce and Industry — Prof. Serhiy Ostapenko;
7. Acting Minister of Education — Petro Kholodny;
8. Acting Minister of Justice — Justice of the Supreme Court Serhiy Shelukhyn;
9. Acting Minister of Finances — Vasyl Mazurenko;
10. Acting Minister of Labor — Prof. Leonid Mykhayliv;
11. Manager of the Ministry of Transportation and Roads — Dipl. Eng. P. Pylypchuk;
12. Manager of Religious Affairs — Dr. I. Lypa;
13. Minister of Post and Telegraphs — I. Shtefan;
14. Minister of Arts — Prof. Dmytro Antonovych;
15. Minister of National Health — Dr. Borys Matyushenko;
16. Minister of Food and Provision Affairs — Borys Martos;
17. Manager of the Press and Information — Dr. Osyp Nazaruk;
18. Minister of Jewish Affairs — Abraham Revutsky;
19. State Controller — D. Symoniv; and
20. Acting State Secretary — I. Snizhko.³⁷⁴)

The political composition of the cabinet was the following: Chekhivskyy, Antonovych, Matyushenko, Martos, Mazurenko and Mykhayliv were Social-Democrats; Mytsyuk, Shapoval, Shtefan, Pylypchuk and Ostapenko were Socialists-Revolutionaries; Kholodnyy and Shelukhyn were Socialists-Federalists; while Gen. Osetskyy, Bilynsky and Symoniv were Independentists-Socialists. Lypa and Snizhko did not join any political party at the time of their nomination, but closely cooperated with the Independentists-Socialists.

In a short while, at the beginning of January, 1919, some personal changes took place in the cabinet. Prof. Ivan Ohiyenko was appointed Minister of Education, and meanwhile joined the faction of the Socialists-Federalists;*) Mykhaylo Korchynskyy, a Socialist-Federalist as well, was made State Secretary. Also the position of the Minister of Defense Affairs was taken away from Gen. Osetskyy, and he was replaced by Gen. Olexander Hrekyv, another Independentist-Socialist.

After those changes had taken place, the Social-Democrats had in the ministerial cabinet six of their people; the Socialists-Revolutionaries — five; the Independentists-Socialists — four; and

*) Prof. Ohiyenko was in 1940 chirotonized as Archbishop of Kholm. Later, 1948 he immigrated to Canada where he was chosen to head the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as the Metropolitan of Canada.

subsequently — five, after Lypa officially joined the party; and the Socialists-Federalists — four. Yet, Nazaruk, a member of the Ukrainian Radical Party of Western Ukraine, cooperated so closely with the Independentists-Socialists that they regarded him as one of their people in the cabinet. Hence, the Social-Democrats and the Socialists-Revolutionaries, two political groups who worked together very closely at that time, had an absolute majority in the Council of Ministers.

The Ukrainian public opinion popularly made the division of the political groups of that period into the “left” and “right,” having included the Social-Democrats and the Socialists-Revolutionaries to the “left,” and the Independentists-Socialists, the Socialists-Federalists and other small political parties, which developed at various points in the Ukrainian political evolution of 1917-1919, — to the “right.” That division was, however, relative, and its identification was dependent upon who attempted to make it. The Russian Bolsheviks, for example, qualified all Ukrainian parties as “bourgeois-nationalist,” “reactionary,” or “counterrevolutionary.” At times they made a slight “concession” by calling the Social-Democrats and the Socialists-Revolutionaries the “petty bourgeois” or “socialist-patriotic” parties, having no kind words for the other groups. The *Borotbists* and the Independent Social-Democrats included the majority of the Social-Democrats and the Socialists-Revolutionaries, their central wing, into the “right” or the “petty bourgeoisie.”

Nevertheless, evaluating those parties from the objective point of view, it must be admitted that all of them, as they participated in the ministerial cabinet, did not differ much with respect to their practical approach and suggested procedures in carrying out their social-economic programs which were in practice fairly identical. All these socialistic parties demanded radical agrarian reform and nationalization of all industries mature enough for this measure. Yet, practically no manufacturing segment was nationalized, except the sugar refineries; hence all these political groups should be rather called to-day the parties of the “social-economic reform movement” and not essentially “socialistic” strictly from the economic point of view. They were socialistic, however, as far as their political philosophy was concerned.

For the sake of a proper evaluation of the political program of the cabinet, it is important to assert that it was formed actually to carry out the ideological premises of the Declaration of December 26. In reality, however, nobody could seriously expect the cabinet to do that, since some of its members represented party lines which were against the idea of a “labor democracy,” and championed the

idea of a "full democracy." Not only the Socialists-Federalists, Independentists-Socialists and the members of some smaller political groups, but even some Social-Democrats and Socialists-Revolutionaries, in practice opposed the principle of a "labor democracy" for this or other reasons. The Directorate knew that very well even before the formation of the cabinet. During the State Consultation in Vynnytsya and then, during the negotiations carried on in Kyiv after the take-over, disclosed the true political nature of the problem of their quite diffused and opposing views. Politically, those different socialists were quite differentiated in their views, although in their practical socio-economic thinking they were closely identical.

The formation of the cabinet in its first version clearly indicated the Directorate's attempt to put the nation's political life on the basis of a wide and broad inter-parties national consolidation. There is no other explanation of the wide consolidation of the "left" and the "right" in attempting to form the cabinet under the conditions of that time. Consequently, one could easily surmise that the first Council of National Ministers would not have attempted any experimentations in the "social revolution" for the sake of experimentation out of dreamy doctrinarism, having ignored the real conditions and practical developments in Ukraine.

Prime Minister Chekhivskyy deserves a study in depth of his characteristics. After all, he was a first line leader in the government of the U.N.R. at this time. Therefore, we will review his political and philosophical characteristics at a proper place in a subsequent chapter.

To terminate the review of the political character of this first cabinet of the Directorate of the U.N.R., we should here underline that in spite of the radical phrases of the Declaration of December 26, neither the Directorate as a whole, its members personally, nor the Council of National Ministers acted, in practice, according to those radical principles. Especially they did not promote a real class struggle; on the contrary, they showed a great deal of inter-class tolerance and cooperation. In short, in the Directorate's circle, there dominated a strong spirit of national consolidation. For example, the Directorate, on the proposal of the government, appointed to high government positions members of the "bourgeoisie" and aristocracy. Count Mykhaylo Tyshkevych was appointed envoy to the Apostolic See in the Vatican; a conservative nobleman, Vyacheslav Lypynskyy, was appointed as ambassodar to Austria. In addition, there also operated a strong spirit of inter-faith cooperation; Minister Dr. Osyp Nazaruk was a Catholic of Eastern rite; envoy Lypynskyy and Secretary of State Korchynskyy were Roman Ca-

tholics; envoy to Denmark Dr. Dmytro Levytsky was a Catholic of Eastern rite. The others were Eastern Orthodox and one a believer of Judaism.

To achieve a truly objective view of the activities of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, one must take, first of all, into consideration the entire heritage of the former Russian Empire. It was very bad in many aspects. Here are the most important of them.

The deep economic crisis of the young capitalism in the Tsarist Empire created a large number of jobless who, without any relief from the state, communities and the society, turned into an entire class of "Lumpenproletariat" (in Russian "*bosyaki*" = i.e. barefooted vagabond). This *ochlos* or mob was incorrectly idealized in Russian literature (as in Maxim Gorky's early works). As once the President of the Russian Constituent Assembly, Victor Chernov, stated, this mob supplied the contingents for those sporadic mass outbreaks of *pogroms*, anti-Jewish and others for which Russia was famous.³⁷⁴) These all social elements constituted the main force of the Russian nationalistic reactionary and extreme anti-Jewish organization of "Black Hundreds" responsible during the Tsardom and later after its fall for spreading of *pogrom* climate and then organizing the anti-Jewish *pogroms* themselves.

The World War, 1914-1917, brought an additional mass of *declasées*. It created the scourge of wholesale evacuation carried out by the Russian military authorities in a wanton and reckless manner. Besides the Jews who were driven from the prefrontal area, on a general and unsupported suspicion of espionage and aid to the enemy, and the government officials and voluntary refugees, a larger group than this was expelled by the military in order to depopulate territories abandoned to the enemy. This evil grew to high dimensions in Ukraine because the World War fronts expanded across Ukrainian territories from the Black Sea to the Prypyat River. The uprooted people numbered about a million and they lived in miserable conditions. Later on they fell victim to the ruthless demagoguery of the Bolshevik propaganda quite naturally.

The most numerous group of the *declasées* were the deserters from the military service. According to official records quoted by Chernov, deserters from the front, even prior to the revolution, amounted to over 195,000 men and on August 1, 1917, to 365,000 men. Together with slackers hidden in the hollows, forests and various dives (the "*Greens*") they totaled about 1,500,000 men. The chairman of the Imperial Duma, Mikhail Rodzianko, gave in another official estimate of this group of *declasées*, the amount 2,000,000 men.³⁷⁵)


This mass of *declassées* was the source for the growing group of ordinary criminals, especially of robbers, which was a plague to the peaceful population in the last months of the war. It is obvious that this social group of *declassées*, and deserters, was, so to say, a cadre for the Bolshevik reserve force. We must pay attention to the fact that the mass of deserters from the Russian mobilized armies remained for a long time in the hinterland of Ukraine because there were the front lines of the war and not in Russia proper.

Finally, in a gesture of magnanimity more beautiful than practical, the Russian revolution opened almost everywhere the prison gates, even for criminals.³⁷⁶)

Such a heritage from the Tsardom and the Russian revolutionary government fell to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and later to the Hetman regime. The last was in a favorable position in comparison with the *Rada* in-as-much as the Hetman government was supported by the Austrian and German troops which pacified, to some extent, the above mentioned unruly elements by force.

The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic had to check those elements only by its own efforts and its own organized force. Evidently, this was not an easy task in revolutionary times.

In addition to those difficulties, there arose for the Directorate a new problem: mass evacuation of the occupational Austrian and German troop units to their home countries and the transport of hundreds of thousands of former prisoners of war from the countries of the Central Powers and from Russia proper and Siberia. Therefore it is no wonder that the administration of the Directorate in the provinces and districts was, in those turbulent times, not successful enough.



CHAPTER 3
**THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS
OF THE FIRST TEMPORARY CONSTITUTION**

**The initial difficulties in developing
the administrative set-up**

In order to understand properly the government process in Ukraine in those difficult revolutionary times, one must realize the enormous handicaps the new government had to work with setting-up its administrative machine. In a relatively short period, the government in Ukraine changed several times. The collapse of the Tsarist Empire handed the government into the hands of the Ukrainian National Central, *Rada*, which started to establish an administrative system in the new state, soon interrupted by the Soviet Russian invasion and then by the Hetman *coup d'etat* aided by German intervention. The Hetman scarcely had time to organize his own administration, when a few months later, very much because of his own faults and because the Socialists were unhappy with his "capitalistic" and Russophile ways, he was over-thrown by a new uprising, headed by the Directorate, which again, as a new government, had to struggle against the grave odds of setting-up anew an administrative scheme in the country. It is another question whether this uprising was necessary and positive from the point of view of the national interest. Col. Konovalts, who played a prominent role in it, years later admitted that it would have been possible to have avoided the uprising by the Directorate if the Hetman had made concessions to the concept of a "united national front" in order to save peace and law in Ukraine at that time. As it was mentioned before, Col. Konovalts made an effort to persuade the Hetman in the last minutes before the uprising began on November 15, 1918, in a surprise appearance at the Hetman's palace. But his efforts proved futile.³⁷⁷) However, one must remember that Col. Konovalts never before or after had any sympathy with socialism. He was a democratic nationalist and acted to help realize the idea of a strong Ukrainian State. In these circumstances even such conservatives as Prof. Victor Andriyevskyy considered the uprising inevitable.³⁷⁸)

The uprising was carried out; a new republican government had to tailor the administrative system according to its new

needs. Although Poland and Czecho-Slovakia constructed their statehoods after the collapse of Austria and Germany under much more favorable conditions, they also had considerable difficulties in setting-up their state administration. It is always hard to set-up a new system of government after an old one goes out of existence. Yet, aside from those normal difficulties of the state construction, Ukraine experienced during that short time already one Russian Bolshevik aggression and faced eminently a new one. It seems, therefore, to be utterly unjustified to go along with the harsh criticism of the state administration of the new republic, expressed often by those who substantially contributed or even largely caused those initial difficulties of the administrative process. Those critics, having ignored the developments, condemned some cases of anarchy ("*Otamaniya*") in the administration, while themselves being responsible for that to a great extent.³⁷⁰)

In fact, in most cases, the criticism of the alleged weaknesses of the initial administration of the U.N.R., during the period of the Directorate, was largely directed not so much against the real shortcomings, such as inadequate and inexperienced personnel, liberal attitude toward the abuses and others like that, but rather against the firm stand of the administration toward the allegedly "socialistic," in reality, however, anarchistic activities of all kinds of the "*Borotbists*," Russian Bolshevik agents and Soviet fellow-travelers; simply, against the subversive activities of the enemies of the U.N.R. A few examples of such criticism should illustrate the case amply.³⁸⁰)

For instance, the following order, issued by Symon Petlyura as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic, has been criticized as faulty and inappropriate:

It came to my knowledge that in the localities where martial law has been imposed, certain individuals carry out criminal and subversive activities against the Ukrainian National Republic and its constitutional government, the Directorate. Most of those people are not citizens of our Republic but came either from Russia proper or other lands of the former Russian Empire. Those people, instead of being thankful to our Ukraine for the bread that they eat here, arrange all kinds of disturbances, cause anarchy, rob the peaceful population, get involved in sabotage acts, provocations and speculations. The former Hetman followers turned into the Bolshevik-Communists, and they again attempt to put us into the Muscovite yoke, which we just succeeded in over-throwing, and to take away from us that land and freedom which we just succeeded in achieving.

I thereby proclaim that the Ukrainian republican armed forces did not shed their blood to allow either the Hetmanic

or Russian-Soviet rule to return, but to assure that our people will live peacefully and in tranquility their own free way in the sovereign Ukrainian National Republic.

For that very reason I thereby order all commanders of various front lines, provincial commanders, and railroad securities, independently upon the already ordered measures to suppress the counterrevolution and anarchy, to deport beyond the borders of Ukraine all enemies of the Ukrainian government, suspected in the criminal agitation against that government. I order to announce publicly, that not only the criminals-agitators will be subject to deportation, but along with them their wives and families as well. Because the saboteurs of the non-Ukrainian descent frequently forge the personal papers and passports of the Ukrainian Republic, I thereby order to check by telegraph such documents in each case, and all, suspected in forging the papers, consider for spies and treat them accordingly.

This order must be brought to the knowledge of all concerned authorities by telegraph, announced in all newspapers and posted on all railroad stations, and put in force immediately.

January 2, 1919.

Signed:
Commander-in-Chief, **Petlyura** ³⁵¹)

That order of the Commander-in-Chief, No. 18, communicated through the Minister of Defense, extremely infuriated the *Borotbists* and other political elements, subserviant to Soviet Russia. They particularly disliked the way by which Petlyura put on the same level the followers of the Hetman and the Soviet sympathizers as the enemies of the Republic. Yet, that order of the Commander-in-Chief was simply an exemplary measure to defend the Ukrainian statehood against the enormously large deluge of anti-Ukrainian propaganda, in general, and against the legitimate government of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Directorate, which represented the Ukrainian national aspirations for a sovereign statehood, in particular; all subversive propaganda being masterminded in Moscow, of course. Petlyura's order most correctly put on the same level the White and the Red Russian agents, as equally dangerous enemies of the Ukrainian nation. Furthermore, the order clearly emphasized the foreigners, Russian citizens, who came from the North to carry out subversive activities in Ukraine. Moreover, whoever in addition to that also forged his personal papers and passports, must have been considered as a spy at the front or sub-front regions. What other reason for forgery could one have than espionage, when hiding from the authorities his name and his nationality? The so-called

Ukrainian “*Borotbists*” and various left “social-revolutionaries” of an unrecognizable identity, sympathizers and followers of the ideology of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” were infuriated by the above order, because it could be used against them in many instances.³⁸²)

In December, 1918, and January, 1919, the enemies of the idea of an independent Ukrainian State, this time in the form of the U.N.R., continued in all possible ways an anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign, in general, and against any outstanding Ukrainian military leaders, who did not permit subversive activities toward organizing a *coup d'etat* either in the name of Denikin, Lenin or Piatakov in the front or sub-front regions, in particular. Col. Petro Bolbochan was naturally the favored target of the attacks of the left extremists. He was the commander of Eastern front, “the left-bank front,” which had to withstand the heaviest impact of the Soviet psychological warfare by means of subversion and actually the frontal attack of the Soviet military operations against the U.N.R. Bolbochan had to maintain, therefore, a very resolute attitude toward the Red Russian subversive, and otherwise anarchist, elements, which attempted by all kinds of means to hurt the Ukrainian national state interests and even to capture territorial rule in the name of the “Soviet” revolution or other indefinite slogans and ideas. Those hostile elements, ably aided by the “*Borotbists*” and other leftists on the home front, tried to expose the colonel by slandering him with all kinds of untrue blames, accusing him of “counterrevolution” and out-right “treason.”³⁸³) Bolbochan was too firm for them to handle, and they wanted the central government to replace him with somebody easier to handle. The following, fully reasonable, military order of Col. Bolbochan was singled out as a target of those critics of the civil and military administration of the U.N.R.:

I thereby announce, that I shall not allow any “Soviets of the labor deputies,” monarchistic organizations and otherwise other organizations, which attempt to grab power and to seize any authority. I declare that we fight for an independent and democratic Ukrainian Republic and not for one Russia; no matter what kind of Russia, a monarchistic or a Red one.³⁸⁴)

Yet, the most attacks, slanders and hatred of the White and Red enemies of an independent and democratic Ukrainian statehood and their fellow-travellers were mainly directed against the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, and their commanders. It was that way, because that military unit was ideologically firm, of high morale, and very well disciplined, which actually at the beginning of the Directorate’s government was the most reliable military formation of the repub-

lican army on which the new administration could count with certainty. Furthermore, the *Sichovi Striltsi* were fully resistant to any anti-Ukrainian propaganda or subversion, and served the country devoutly. All foreign or domestic agents, who worked against the Ukrainian national interests, were completely powerless and could not undermine or weaken the moral stand of this corps. The Directorate, appreciating the discipline, the loyalty, and firmness of the formation in its service to the Ukrainian nation, unanimously resolved to put into the hands of the *Sichovi Striltsi* the exclusive responsibility of protecting law and order in the capital of Kyiv. No other military unit was entrusted with the duty. Having undertaken measures to suppress the White-Russian subversion in the capital along with the subversion and sabotage actions of the Bolsheviks and their willing and unwilling collaborators in the city, as well as in the countryside, the corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi* provoked vicious attacks and smear slandering criticism from the alleged defenders of "democracy." Unfortunately, those elements, at the same time, were able to instigate also the *pogroms*, the massacres, among the lowest classes of the town's population. In their propaganda campaign against the Directorate and the U.N.R., the left extremists used the following order, issued by Col. Konovalets, the commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi* Corps, who was in charge of executing law and order in the capital:

By my order from 22 of December, No. 21, it was prohibited to engage in any propaganda campaign against the established state form of the Ukrainian National Republic, its political independence, the authority of the Directorate, the laws, rules and regulations, issued by the agencies of the Ukrainian government. In addition I announce thereby, that all provocative agitators, who would come to the army barracks, army camps or other military establishments, with the intention of spreading there hostile propaganda, will be shot on the spot without any hearings or court procedures and in the very places where they committed their crimes.³⁸⁵)

No doubt, the above order was a very rigorous one. Nevertheless, the severity of the order seemed to be justified. No other commander, responsible for law and order in certain areas near the front, would have acted differently under conditions of binding martial law, which was then in force in order to improve the chances of the government to combat the subversion during the eminent threat by the foreign, Red-Russian, aggression. Only harsh penalties, applied against the foreign-motivated hostile activities to undermine the authority at the time of war and revolution, could be successful,

at least in part, against any subversion and *pogrom* propaganda. In fact, as long as the *Sichovi Striltsi* Corps was in charge in Kyiv, there were no disorders, no riots to advance the communist cause or any attempts at a *pogrom*. No wonder, therefore, that the left extremists hated the Corps and its chief commander. Yet, no objective critics could really find any serious faults in the measures, adopted by the Directorate and carried out by its loyal followers, except, that they were anti-Red.³⁵⁶)

The election procedure to the Congress

As far as the orderly government process in the U.N.R. was concerned, the act about the elections to the Congress of Working People of Ukraine of January 5, 1919, was a very important piece of legislation. According to the fundamental principles of the temporary constitution of December 26, 1918, the election system to the Congress was supposed to be a *curial* one.*) The system is very expedient and convenient under truly democratic conditions, since it may grant different socio-economic groups, or in the case of the national or ethnical *curias*, a proper and constitutionally guaranteed proportional representation in the legislation. The election of the representation among the *curias* was basically fair and just, since it gave to the Ukrainian peasantry, which constituted at that time a solid majority of the population in the state, some 2/3 majority of representatives or deputies. Yet, on the other hand, the act certainly favored the industrial workers, to whom it gave a greater representation than they could have been entitled to according to the percentage of the population of the Republic they constituted. This certainly weakened the fairness of the measure. The most favored electoral group was, however, as the act provided, the working intelligentsia, the educated people. It received over 6 per cent of the representation, much more than it deserved in proportion to the total population of the land.

According to the act about the election to the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, the Congress had to consist of 593 deputies, apportioned according to the number of mandates of each separate electoral province ("*guberniya*") and working *curia* in accordance to the following pattern:

*) The *curial* electoral system means the division of the electorate into occupational groups. Such an occupational electoral group was called a "*curia*" (like the tribes in ancient Rome.) This *curial* electoral system was used in both the Austrian and Russian empires for the purpose of diminishing the electoral right of the peasants.

Number of Deputies:

District	Peasants	Workers	Intelligentsia
Kyyiv	50	12	5
Podillya	45	8	4
Kharkiv	50	11	4
Kherson	37	11	4
Volyn	46	10	4
Chernyhiv	42	9	3
Poltava	46	8	4
Katerynoslav	31	12	3
Tavriya	14	3	1
Kholm, Pidlyasha and Polisia	14	4	1
All-Ukrainian Union of Railroad Workers		20	
All-Ukrainian Union of Postal Workers		10	
Together	377	118	33

Later on, after the ratification of the Universal of the Unification of the Ukrainian National Republic with the Western Ukrainian National Republic, 65 deputies of the Western Area of the U.N.R. were added to the total number of the membership of the Congress, totaling, as pointed out, 593 deputies.³⁵⁷⁾

The active and passive electoral right, the right to elect and to be elected, was given by law to the citizens of the U.N.R. at their 21st year of age, with no discrimination against sex, religion, or national descent, as long as they belonged to the above mentioned groups of working people. Individuals sentenced by courts of justice for crimes were denied the electoral rights. Looking from the practical point of view, it was absolutely unnecessary to exclude the so-called non-working class from the elections. After having accepted the *curia* proportionate voting system as the base there was no risk involved in granting to the non-working classes the right to vote, since due to their small number of people, they would have gotten an appropriately small representation in the Congress. The class of the "large landowners," and the "bourgeoisie," as they were called by the temporary constitution of December 26, were a fast declining minority of the population and its percentage in the legislative state body would have had practically no influence on the outcome of the legislative activity of the Congress at all. Yet, if the provision about the exclusion of the "capitalist" class would not have been put in the act, purely out of the "ideological" reason, the Congress would have represented a legislative body reflecting, very much, the composition of the population of the Ukrainian nation. Under the free and democratic conditions, prevailing in the Ukrainian National Republic, there was absolutely no risk that the Russian or

Russianized or Polish "capitalists" or landowners would succeed in acquiring a majority or at least a substantial representation among the Ukrainian peasant or worker masses in the framework of their electoral *curias*.

Yet, there was one reason for justifying the Directorate's decision with respect to the principle of a "labor democracy." As was indicated before, at the time strong pro-labor feelings prevailed among the people, and by stressing the "labor democracy," the Ukrainian political leadership hoped to divert popular feelings from and to weaken in this way the sentiments toward the "council system" and the "dictatorship of proletariat" of the Russian style, aggressively sold by the Bolshevik propaganda by means of their agents and their followers. And in fact, the developments at that time did indicate that the electoral system for the Congress, as adopted by the Directorate, had some success in combating psychologically the Soviet-Russian propaganda against the U.N.R. and its democratic government. Of course, there were some practical problems involved in the *curia* proportionate system, which had to be solved, such as: who should be considered a peasant; how to treat apprentices in various trades; why not to treat free professions as a separate class? These problems were, however, solved, at least in part, to everyone's satisfaction.

The elections to the Congress were indirect. The village communities elected their delegates in accordance to their population, and then, those delegates gathered in the county conventions, and elected the deputies for the Congress. In a similar way, although with some slight differences, also the deputies of the workers were elected. The indirect system was adopted, however, only, because the Directorate thought the elections should be held as soon as possible, and because of the uncertainty of the political situation, it was practically inconceivable to prepare technically the direct voting by applying the proportionate electoral system. As far as the educated people were concerned, the electoral instruction allowed the government and self-government officials and clerks to vote. The Congress was called to convene on January 22, 1919, in the capital of the nation, Kyiv.

The internal administration of the country

No doubt, the internal administration of the land is a very important sector of the over-all national life process, in particular in time of war. A well organized and administered hinterland may very well support the front-line in its military operations.

Nevertheless, in this early period, the Council of National Ministers, or perhaps, the Minister of Internal Affairs, did not pre-

pare and did not submit for the Directorate's approval any act about the "labor councils" of peasants and workers to administer the land, as the Directorate's Declaration of December 26 promised to be done. Consequently, in the sector of the state administration and self-government, the old system remained in force. The state administration was done by way of county and regional commissioners of the U.N.R.; the self-governing process was carried out by way of the formerly elected communal and county councils. Only the act about the Ukrainian language as the official tongue of the land was a new and important change in the state administrative process of the recently reestablished democratic republican regime.

In the sector of soil administration, a new Land Act was promulgated on January 9, 1919, which included the principle of soil socialization and intended to form appropriate agencies of the "people's landed self-government." However, the Directorate was certainly too late with issuance of that Land Act, which was to have been enacted earlier, immediately after the first initial stages of the uprising in order to gain firmer support of the broad peasant masses. Instead, a bill to stop the land mobilization of December 15, 1918, was enacted, which prohibited selling, leasing and renting the soil, without having initiated any new land reform or restoring the validity of the Land Act of the Central *Rada* of January 31, 1918. That delay of the Directorate caused some unjustified rumors about the real intentions of the new government. The Bolshevik agents and fellow-travellers mendaciously spread rumors of a "pro-capitalist" tendencies of the Directorate, intending the restoration or retention of the large land holding. As a result, the Land Act of January 9 and the Directorate's Decree to the Ukrainian peasants, concerning the enactment of the Land Act had to be hastily transmitted by telegraph throughout the country in order to counterweight, at least to some extent, the unfavorable rumors, instigated by the enemy.³⁵⁸)

The Land Act of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was not reestablished in force for some reason, while this could be done right away without much trouble and with a great political advantage for the new government. The Directorate could have then later on introduced some changes to the old bill, if it would have wished to do so. Instead, the land problem was not taken care of for two whole months. The local administration agencies were left too long in the dark, and they did not know, how actually the case would be settled; what would be the new land order? As a matter of fact, even the political parties and groups within the Ukrainian National Union, which supported the Directorate, were not aware of the real intentions of the Directorate in the land sector and could not counteract the Bolshevik hostile propaganda campaign in this respect.³⁵⁹)

Yet, the problem of land reform was of extreme significance for the successful construction of the Ukrainian State; it was next most important after the problem of establishing proper Ukrainian armed forces for the defense of the country against the eminent foreign aggression. It was apparent from the number-wise and percentage-wise composition of the Ukrainian people at that time. The following was the division of the people according to their economic trade and professions: Farming and production of raw materials — 90 p.c.; Manufacturing, processing the raw materials and production of finished fabricate — 3.6 p.c.; Commerce — 0.9 p.c.; Free professions, armed forces, administ. and other — 5.5 p.c.

Ethnic minorities were largely populating the towns and cities, while the Ukrainians — the countryside, villages and farmsteads. Out of each 100 Russians some 54.9 lived in the towns and cities; out of each 100 Jews — 66.2; and out of each 100 Ukrainians only 8.8 were city dwellers. Hence, at that time, the Ukrainians were a *par excellence* peasant nation, and because of that the state construction had to care first of all for the peasant class and land reform, the latter being the indispensable condition for establishing a strong and economically well-to-do class — the most important social class of the nation. Otherwise a strong nation could not have been built.³⁹⁰)

The Land Act of the Directorate determined only the possession and use of land, while the supreme ownership title to soil was given to the state, which acquired the right to administer the land resources by means of the elected land offices. The Land Act, furthermore, confirmed the existing conditions in the peasant land during the regime of *Rada*, by reducing the maximum norm of possession down to 15 *desyatins* (40.5 acres) of land. The land norm could not be altered by sale, alienation, lease or otherwise, but was hereditary as a unit. (The Land Act of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* of January 31, 1918 had determint the norm of possession to 40 *desyatins* (108 acres).³⁹¹)

The lands, which previously belonged to large land owners and other non-working subjects, were gradually distributed among the small peasant farms and also given to the non-possessing peasants up to the maximum norm of 40.5 acres.³⁹²) It was done by the local agencies of the land self-government under the supreme supervision of the state. Also a minimum norm of land grant to the landless peasants at 5 *desyatins* (or 13.5 acres) of soil, was established by the law.

The land grants were made into the permanent use of the recipients in contradiction to the Bolshevik system, introduced in the occupied regions of Ukraine by the Soviet-Russian administration, by which land lots were subject to continuous redistribution.

The Directorate's Land Act also provided for voluntary peasant cooperatives to advance the peasants' material interests.³⁹³)

In the process of psychological warfare, carried out by the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian National Republic, and in order to weaken the demaging effect of the Land Act for their interests, they tried to convince the landless and small farm peasants by their propaganda, that the Act allegedly was intended to help only the wealthy farmers, the *kurkuls*, and not the poor peasants, who needed help most. Considering the fact that among the landless and small farm peasants some 80 per cent were illiterate, there was small wonder that, among those elements, the misleading statements of the Bolshevik propaganda found many followers, and it was relatively hard for the Ukrainian government to counteract for various reasons.

First of all, the Land Act was issued much too late. Meanwhile the false rumors and Bolshevik agitation succeeded in making considerable inroads among the landless and poor peasant masses in Ukraine. Second, the Ukrainian government had to counteract the Bolshevik propaganda already at a time when the Soviet war aggression against the U.N.R. was in progress.³⁹⁴) It made the task so much more difficult. Third, there was a considerable shortage of intelligent and educated people in Ukraine at that time with the help of whom the Ukrainian government could have initiated and continued the action in combating the Soviet propaganda campaign. These people could have explained to the Ukrainian peasant masses the strictly anti-peasant Bolshevik policies. In Russia and in the occupied eastern parts of Ukraine, the Bolshevik government had already passed some laws which put the peasants at a disadvantage. Moreover, because of that shortage of qualified personnel, the intelligence service in Ukraine was very inadequate, and consequently, the Ukrainian political leadership did not have even sufficient information about what was going on in Soviet Russia to use that information in its anti-Bolshevik psychological-political propaganda counterattack.

In the area of state and country financial affairs, no significant bills or regulations were enacted, otherwise the things were left as before. The taxation system did not work well during that revolutionary time; only a few felt that they should pay any taxes. Hence, the public revenues were at their lowest. Public expenditures were covered primarily by public debt, borrowing from the State Bank, while the Bank continuously issued more and more new money to create needed financial means. The money inflation was progressing.

In the area of Church affairs, the Directorate issued the Act about the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church ("the Act

on the All-Ukrainian Church Council and the Ukrainian Church Synodal Council"). Yet, the Act did not begin to work until the fall of 1919. At the beginning of that year, the All-Ukrainian Church Council could not convene and could not be held because no bishop of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine then wanted to participate in it. Without the participation in the Council of at least one bishop, it would have been canonically "illegal." The political leadership of Ukraine had first to alter in some way the absolutely negative attitude of the Orthodox bishops in Ukraine to the very idea of an Autocephalic Ukrainian Orthodox Church, a Church fully independent from the Muscovite Patriarchate. Still at the time of the Directorate, all Orthodox bishops in Ukraine were either Russian chauvinists or Russianized fellow-travellers, who hated the very thought of an Autocephalic Ukrainian Church. Until these things were changed, the normal operation of an Autocephalic Church could not be expected.

In the sector of public education, a few acts were adopted to improve the material situation of the teachers in the country.

It must be pointed out here that the general administration of the country was partially carried out by the military authorities. Especially, with respect to the internal security of the cities and the safety of the citizens, at first during the early days of the revolution, and then because of the war situation due to the Soviet-Russian invasion, the Directorate had to turn over a part of the administration process to the military authorities, especially in the regions in peril of invasion. At the time of taking over the capital of Kyiv by the forces of the Directorate on December 14, 1918, the Directorate entrusted the command of the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi* with the administrative authority in the city until its own arrival there. The command of the Corps did not want to take over the task, but the Directorate insisted on its order.³⁹⁵) And even later on, after the Directorate arrived in Kyiv, the administration had to remain still in the hands of the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, because not until December 26, was the new municipal government finally formed. Once that government was inaugurated, the Directorate appointed a special "capital's chief" to carry out there the police functions to protect life and property of the residents. Pavlo Bohatsky was entrusted with the responsibility.³⁹⁶)

Finally, it must be added, that in order to strengthen the internal administration, numerous administrative offices and commissions were created. Many such commissions were appointed by the Directorate itself and various ministries in their fields of administration as well. Many people were employed in those offices and commissions.

Those above mentioned difficulties were, of course, part of the birth pains of the formation of the new government, which needed time, experience, and above all, peace in order to establish itself. Nevertheless, in comparison with the new regime in neighboring Poland, the interior administration in the U.N.R. did not function any worse.³⁹⁷⁾

The press and information service

Along with the internal administration, the state supervision of the press and information service must be briefly discussed, the function of which was extremely important in the presence of the Soviet psychological war campaign against the U.N.R. and its government.³⁹⁸⁾

When arriving in Kyiv, the Directorate formed its information bureau, named the "Ukrainian Telegraph Agency," U.T.A. During the Hetman era, the identical agency was directed and managed by Dr. Dmytro Dontsov. Now Dr. Osyp Nazaruk was appointed the manager of the Agency. The Agency's responsibility was to supply promptly information to the press about the significant developments in Ukraine and the world, and in particular to give official information, coming from the top government agencies of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Agency was organized along the pattern of similar official agencies in Western Europe, the "Havas" in France, the "Reuter" in England, and in the other countries.

After the cabinet of the U.N.R., in the form of the Council of National Ministers, was formed on December 26, 1918, an initiative by Vynnychenko led to the establishment of Special Agency of Press and Information of the Ukrainian National Republic and Nazaruk was appointed its head by the Directorate. The head of the Agency had the position of a minister and was a member of the cabinet.

From the very first days of the reestablished Republic the real problem facing the new government was the question of how to manage the press in those turbulent years, during which the new administration was under construction. At first, the head of the Agency of Press and Information, with the approval of the Head of the Directorate, decided to introduce in Kyiv and the entire country the system of supervision of all papers and periodical publications and of preventive censoring of their first issues, including the first issuances of books, as well. Preventive censorship meant the right of the official censors to take off the press anything which was published against the law by any paper, publication or book,

while the editor and author was at the same time free from any court liability for writing the censored materials.³⁹⁹) That system of censorship was very much opposed by some Ukrainian ultra-liberals. Consequently, the head of the press agency prepared and proposed a new law, which introduced complete freedom of press together with a criminal responsibility in court of all editors, authors and printing shops for any transgressions of criminal code. Nevertheless, the enormous amount of work which was facing the Directorate and the Council of National Ministers, on the one hand, and the war time, unfavorable for a coordinated legislative process, on the other, the particular project was not enacted, and for all practical purposes the preventive censorship remained in force.⁴⁰⁰)

Yet, considering the war conditions, developed through the Soviet aggression, the Ukrainian system of press control at that time was very liberal; much more liberal than that applied by the Allied nations, the old Western democracies, during WW I. However, the system of censorship was also heavily criticized and attacked by those who actually were supposed to justify and defend it for the reason of the state political interest and the country's internal security.⁴⁰¹) It must be here admitted, too, that the Ukrainian newspapermen and journalists at that time frequently thought, that in the name of freedom of press they were not bound by any restrictions and were allowed everything, everywhere and under any conditions. They often viciously criticized various government acts and regulations, directed to preserve law and order and to promote the national democratic character of the Republic, repudiating on their part any responsibility in this respect. Too bad that this was frequently done by some outstanding journalists, who should have known better.

The inadequate armed forces

The organization of the armed forces, their completion and supplementation, was administered in the first months of the Directorate in the same way as during the Vynnytsya period. In theory, the general and compulsory draft system was in force, but practically only the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, the Corps of *Zaporizhtsi* and the division of *Siri* were organized quite regularly. Other military formations were organized differently, namely, the supreme command usually appointed first a unit commander, who then was completing his military staff and gathering the non-commissioned officers and privates. Of course, the system proved to be impractical.

The military administration and armed forces supplementation were attended by the Minister of Defense, while the supreme

command of the fronts was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief and his General Staff. Yet at times, the Commander-in-Chief advised the minister even in the area of military operation, like it was done, for example, in the order of the Supreme Command, No. 18, of January 2, 1919.

In this period of the Directorate's government all-of-a-sudden large "insurgent divisions" developed in all parts of the land, which lacked proper military experience. Their composition was largely incidental, as far as the command and the enlisted men were concerned as well. For these reasons, those haphazardly organized divisions were ideologically very weak and therefore were the fertile ground for all kinds of agitation and propaganda. From time to time, those formations became also the experimentation objects of their ambitious commanders-*otamans*. The soldiers of those "divisions" were largely courageous and full of desire to fight in defense of Ukraine, but being without responsible leadership, they often directed their fighting spirit not against the real enemies of their country, but toward supporting some indefinite and ambitious plans of their, frequently self-made, *otamans*. During these first months of the Directorate's rule, starting with the second half of January, 1919, the implorable revolt of *otaman* Danylo Zelenyy (Terpylo) took place, for the suppression of which, it was necessary to withdraw temporarily some regular troops from the anti-Soviet front and use them against the rebels.⁴⁰²) Furthermore, various military and civilian leaders developed numerous plans to be used in the reorganization of the armed forces of the U.N.R. and added at that time to the confusion. In most cases these plans were unrealistic.

Experienced commanders of the *Sichovi Striltsi* advised the Directorate to adopt first the organization of all armed forces of the Republic into a framework of a volunteer system. The reason for this advice was the fact that the Directorate lacked, at the time, the proper number of training cadres. However, the Directorate did not follow this advice and instead proclaimed a general draft of all 18-35 year old men. The sudden rally of hundreds of thousands of recruits could not be properly trained and, in consequence, this led to many difficulties.⁴⁰³)

The development of the rebellious "otamanhood" of some military commanders; sometimes their opposition to Symon Petlyura, as the Commander-in-Chief; their refusal to follow his orders properly, have been attributed by Petlyura's enemies solely to his weaknesses and mistakes. That assertion was completely groundless. First of all, the mobilization order was issued by the Directorate, as a whole, and cosigned by the Minister of Defense Gen. Osetskyy, an experienced and professional military man. Hence, any mistakes which might have been incorporated into the order and could be

the very cause of the shortcomings in the army organization and subsequent development of the "otamanhood," were not the mistakes of Petlyura alone, but of the Directorate and the cabinet of ministers collectively. Secondly, there were some external and objective factors, independent from the Ukrainian government, which were causing the initial lack of military discipline on the part of some commanders of those "insurgent divisions."⁴⁰⁴) The over-all revolutionary time produced rebellious moods and weakened military and civilian discipline throughout. The hostile propaganda and the conditions of war were there as a general phenomenon of time,⁴⁰⁵) and were also contributory factors. Similar riotous developments took place at that time in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and even in Soviet Russia, though the later one was ruled by a ruthless "dictatorship of proletariat." Blaming Petlyura alone did not make any sense at all, unless it was simply a propaganda trick, intended to undermine the authority of the most respected member of the Directorate. Third, the revolutionary atmosphere, together with the lack of intensive supervision from above due to the unfavorable consequences, soon weakened even some positive, though not strong enough, characters, which did not have any previous and good military training. Some of those rebellious "commanders" were formerly efficient and devoted officers of lower ranks. Once, however, their military units had grown large, out of proportion, and really became regiments, brigades or divisions, not only did those commanders lack the ability to handle the jobs beyond their heads, but some of them soon began to suffer a kind of mania of grandeur, which ultimately pushed them to become rebels.

Evaluating the situation, it must be stated, however, in the name of historical objectivity, that the very reason of the military weakness was caused by an inadequate number of patriotic and well trained Ukrainian military officers, in relation to the total population, and the number of recruits and soldiers it could supply. In this respect, the situation was worse in Eastern Ukraine than in the Western one. It is objectively impossible to organize a large and fit for fighting, regular, well disciplined and modern army without nationally minded and responsible officer ranks. The government of the Ukrainian National Republic was able, however, already in January, 1919, to organize its regular armed forces up to 50,000 men. It was really the most that could be physically done. With a great effort perhaps the number could have been increased in the next few months to a 100,000 man army in combat and approximately the same number in reserve and in training. But, it certainly was the most that could be done with the available commissioned and non-commissioned officers of Ukrainian descent who were loyal to the ideals of the Ukrainian national state.

At the very beginning of the anti-Hetman uprising, the armed forces of the U.N.R. reached some 100,000 men, including numerous peasant insurgent units. Those peasant insurgents at first followed loyally the orders of the regular armed forces of the Directorate, but once the uprising met with success, the peasants simply left and went home, taking the equipment and arms with them, convinced that their task was completed and finished. Some authors wrote later on that the armed forces of the U.N.R. at that time consisted about 400,000 men. Yet, according to reliable source materials one must objectively indicate, that the figure of 400,000 has been hopelessly inflated.⁴⁰⁶)

For the sake of completeness of this survey of the military affairs in the Ukrainian National Republic, until January 1919, it is necessary to mention, that according to the patterns of military administration of old Austria and Russia, in the U.N.R. the military judiciary also was separated from the civilian one. Considering the revolution and war conditions, it was necessary to do so. Regular military courts were established along with all higher military commands, while the Supreme Military Court functioned at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. All military persons and all civilians who committed grave crimes, such as espionage, rioting or massacre (*pogrom*), in the areas where martial law was proclaimed, came under the jurisdiction of the military court system.

Foreign affairs

The administration of foreign affairs of the U.N.R. was within the jurisdiction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All Ukrainian embassies, diplomatic missions and consulates in foreign countries were under his authority and directed by him. Actually, first after having settled in Kyiv and not until the end of January, 1919, the Directorate and the Council of National Ministers began to set-up those diplomatic agencies in other lands. Volodymyr Chekhivskyy, the Head of the Council of National Ministers, was at the same time the Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Volodymyr Vynnychenko was closely working with the problems of the Ukrainian international policies as his particular function in the framework of the Directorate. Later on, the U.N.R. government certainly overdid it and established too many and too numerous foreign missions and representations, having tied up in this way too many people in the foreign service at the very time when there was a shortage of qualified manpower to organize efficient internal administration and to form a successful anti-Soviet information and propaganda campaign. More will be said about this later on.

As it was pointed out before, Volodymyr Vynnychenko was involved in the process of the Ukrainian foreign policies in general, and in the personnel set-up of the foreign missions and representations, in particular. In fact, it would not be too far from the true state of affairs to say that, actually, Vynnychenko, and not Chekhivskyy, the minister appointed for the job, conducted the matters of foreign policies of Ukraine. Officially, Chekhivskyy gave the final instructions to the missions, ambassadors, envoys and consulates, but Vynnychenko always made the final decisions about the personal compositions of those Ukrainian representations.⁴⁰⁷) Of course, he was greatly interested in those matters and liked to get involved, but on the other hand, he did it also, because Chekhivskyy, as the head of the cabinet at the same time, was very busy with other problems and did not have time even to attend the details of personal composition of individual representation going abroad. Hence, at first Vynnychenko worked on certain details, and then presented them to the Directorate, as a whole, in Chekhivskyy's presence.

The Ukrainian delegation to attend the Peace Conference in Paris was formed very late, although it was the most important one of all. Yet, the late dispatching of the delegation was also caused by the fact that France refused the entrance visas for a while. Paris was at that time the very center of world political and diplomatic developments. There, at the Peace Conference, not only the ministers of foreign affairs but also the heads of governments of the victorious nations and innumerable diplomatic representations with broad authorizations from their lands, were present and active. Although, in December, 1918, Hryhoriy Sydorenko was sent to Paris to represent the Directorate, he reached his destination only at the end of January, 1919, while the rest of the delegation gathered in Paris in the middle of March. This was quite late to lay the groundwork for diplomatic negotiations, in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic in an unfavorable atmosphere for the Ukrainian cause.

The Directorate considered, at that time, the city of Odessa as the major contact point with the Western Powers, where in December the Allied military landing took place. The general trend of the foreign policy of the Directorate then vacillated between "neutrality," proclaimed by the Directorate prior to the uprising, and the attempts to contact the Allies and to acquire their support, after it became apparent, that the neutrality policy would not dissuade Soviet Russia from starting a war aggression against the Ukrainian state. Searching for Western help, the Directorate and the cabinet made a mistake by not concentrating on the direct contacts with the governments of the Powers of the Entente, but concentrating all their efforts, concerning the Allied assistance, on

the military mission of the Allied landing forces in Odessa. In December, 1918 — January, 1919, several delegations were sent to Odessa to contact the Allied command: one, headed by Gen. Olexander Hrekiv; another one by O. Nazaruk and S. Ostapenko; and still another one by Arnold Margolin. Paralelly, Vynnychenko appointed another mission to go there, headed by Gen. Matviyiv. However, so far all these efforts were fruitless because of the strictly pro-White Russian stand of the French command of the Allied landing expedition in Odessa, which represented there the Allied Powers. Perhaps, the direct contacts with the Western governments would have had a more favorable result.

The second most important problem of foreign policy, in that period handled by the Directorate, was the issue of the Soviet Russian war invasion in Ukraine. The Directorate and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister V. Chekhivskyy, at first negotiated directly with Moscow by means of radio and telegraph without much success. Then, Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy suggested forming and sending to Moscow a separate peace delegation to continue the negotiations, going along with a similar proposal of the Soviet-Russian government. Originally it was planned to send such a delegation under the chairmanship of Yuriy Mazurenko. After the political platform for negotiations of the proposed delegation did not receive the backing of the majority of the Ukrainian political parties, Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy formed another delegation, led by Semen Mazurenko. The later really left for Moscow and negotiated there for some time without having any apparent success either.

The Directorate attempted to establish some political relations with the newly formed Polish Republic. A separate representation was dispatched to Warsaw. Also this undertaking did not bring any visible, politically favorable for the U.N.R., results.



CHAPTER 4

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE DIRECTORATE

The general socio-political situation in Ukraine in January, 1919

The political moods and sentiments of the Ukrainian society and of the ethnic minorities in Ukraine were largely affected by the developments in international politics at that time. In the northern, north-eastern, south-eastern, western and south-western border regions of Ukraine there was actually a state of war with some neighbors of Ukraine.

From the north and north-east, the regular units of the Red Army of Soviet Russia invaded Ukraine. On December 1, 1918, the manifesto of the so-called "Provisional Workingsmen-Peasant Government of Ukraine" was announced in the official organ of the Moscow regime, *Izvestiya*, having asserted that allegedly that "government" led the uprising of the Ukrainian working people against the government of the Ukrainian State.⁴⁰⁹⁾ This was the political maneuver of the Moscow government to camouflage its flagrant aggression against Ukraine, actually the first from among many victims of Soviet Russian imperialism of the 1917's-1920's. By the end of December, the Russian armed forces had moved close to the city of Kharkiv. At the beginning of January, 1919, the Soviet-Russian armed forces had taken Kharkiv and moved ahead toward the city of Poltava. At the same time, they launched and continued to push their attack from the north against the city of Kyiv. As a result of that relatively successful Soviet offensive, all Bolshevik and pro-Bolshevik elements in Ukraine immediately became very bold and ready for an open revolt.

In the south-east Ukraine, the "Voluntary Army" of the White-Russian movement, commanded by Gen. Anthony Denikin, and allied with it the army of the Don-Cossacks, were stationed and ready for action. Those military forces were organized to fight for the restoration of the old, non-Bolshevik, Russian Empire. In the south-west, the Allied landing of the French and Greek military units, under the French command, had just been accomplished. They occupied Odessa, Mykolayiv and the surrounding regions, being a part of the anti-Bolshevik military project of the Western Powers. Since the French command of those units was definitely friendly toward the White-Russian cause, all the White-Russian and pro-White Russian elements there became very active under French sponsorship.⁴¹⁰⁾

In the west, Poland proceeded to occupy ever more of the Ukrainian territory, almost threatening an invasion beyond the eastern banks of the Buh River.⁴¹¹⁾

In Germany at that time, here and there sporadic and separate armed revolts of the German workers erupted, clearly indicating their indoctrination with Communist ideology. At the beginning of January, 1919, the "*Spartaks*," the extreme left movement of the German Socialists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, initiated, in Berlin, an uprising against the democratic government, headed by President Friedrich Ebert. Although the uprising was soon suppressed, throughout all of Germany, in various cities and towns, numerous sporadic *Spartak* revolts continued to flare up. Those developments strengthened the general belief of many, as was pointed out before, that the time of a world-wide proletarian revolution was near.⁴¹²⁾

The over-all international situation caused a feeling of uncertainty and unrest in public opinion in Ukraine as far as the future was concerned. This produced continuous vacillations in the political orientations and trends within the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian (ethnic minorities) social groupings. If the Ukrainian political parties would have been older, and better organized, the general ideological and political confusion and feeling of social uncertainty would have been more easily mastered. Yet this was not the case. Unstable elements, which were brainwashed by Soviet propaganda, and had lately left their original party adherence, would not have done so much damage to the over-all Ukrainian national interest by following foreign ideology and hostile direction, if political parties of democratic camp were stronger in Ukraine. This was the case in Germany, where the strong and disciplined social-democratic majority soon succeeded in suppressing and liquidating the communist subversion within the party and country and thereby restored relative internal balance for a while. But in Ukraine, due to objective historical developments, these political parties were too young and unexperienced to present a real bulwark against the damaging effects of foreign psychological campaigns. Political vacillations and internal party splits followed and there was no adequate force to counteract the negative developments.

The decline of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revelutionaries in January, 1919

No doubt, the changes and major shifts in the ideology, structure and composition of the Ukrainian political parties of that time strongly reflected the changes in the social and political moods

and sentiments of the Ukrainian society as a whole, being also the projection of the international and world-wide political processes as well.⁴¹³)

Neither the Organizational Committee of the U.P.S.R. (the *Center*) nor the Central Committee of the U.P.S.R. (the *Borotbists*) had given up the attempts to bring about the unification of the party anew after the completion of the victorious uprising against the Hetman regime, although the *Borotbists* did not participate in that major political undertakings. The latter continued to propagate an essentially separate "council system" to be materialized in the framework of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian Republic. The negotiations were conducted in the capital of Kyiv between the representatives of the party Organizational Center, Nykyfor Hryhoriyiv, Pavlo Khrystyuk and Col. Olexander Zhukivskyy, and the representatives of the Central Committee of the *Borotbists*, Hnat Mykhaylychenko, A. Prykhodko and M. Shynkar. At that time, the *Borotbists*, as a group, were acting openly and pretended still to be a legal political faction, while only some of their members were operating in hiding.⁴¹⁴)

The U.P.S.R., the *Center*, participated in the uprising and cooperated in the government work of the Ukrainian National Republic. Its members were in the Directorate and the Council of National Ministers: F. Shvets was one of the five members of the Directorate; Mykyta Shapoval was the Minister of Land Affairs; Prof. Olexander Mytsyuk — Minister of Internal Affairs; I. Shtefan — Minister of Post and Telegraphs; Prof. Serhiy Ostapenko — Minister of Commerce and Industry; Prof. Hryhoriyiv — Chairman of the Army Information Bureau. Yet, as a result of those attempts to unite the party with the *Borotbists*, who maintained a sharp opposition and an absolutely negative stand toward the Directorate, and represented the political ideology of a "council government" and "immediate peace" with the Societs, the party's *Center* was not able to develop a really strong resistance against the demoralizing, pro-Soviet and certainly anti-Ukrainian ideas of the extreme left *Borotbists*. Hence, soon even within the party *Center* faction the pro-"council" feelings began to grow, although it was still loyal to the political ideology of an independent Ukrainian statehood without submitting to Russia and opposed to the "one-party system" of the Bolshevik style. The party newspaper of the *Center* faction, "Trudova Ukrayina," (Working Ukraine), with the editors, Dmytro Isaievych, H. Tollmachiv and P. Khrystyuk, in fact, were against the "dictatorship of proletariat." Nevertheless, in that official party organ of the *Center* some articles were published, from time to time, which championed "a united worker-peasant revolutionary front," which practically meant undermining the authority of the

prevailing system of the "labor democracy" of the U.N.R. and its government. Those articles, written by the sympathizers of the *Borotbists*, were directly aiming against the Ukrainian state sovereignty and at time being subject to censorship by the Bureau of Press and Information.⁴¹⁵)

However, in order to do justice to the *Center* of the U.P.S.R., it must be asserted, that its compact majority definitely stood either for a "full democracy" of a parliamentary type or for a "labor democracy," as adopted by the Declaration of December. Everywhere, where the U.P.S.R. - *Center* acted by means of its experienced and disciplined people — at various conventions, large gatherings, and especially, peasant congresses — they usually presented unanimous resolutions to support the government of Ukraine and the organization of the disciplined armed forces of the Republic which were adopted. The peasant convention of the Kyiv province, held on 22-24 of December, 1918, in Kyiv, and its resolutions could serve as a proof of such a patriotic stand of the U.P.S.R. - *Center*. The convention was attended by over 700 peasant delegates, and among the speakers were F. Shvets, member of the Directorate, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, specially invited to attend the convention, Vynnychenko, and O. Yanko, head of the Organizational Committee of the U.P.S.R. - *Center*, and chairman of the Peasant Union. Among others, the following thoughts were expressed by the resolutions of the above convention:

"The convention expresses its deep appreciation to the revolutionary government — the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic — which led the revolutionary movement of the people, and promises it its continuous support in the struggle for the Ukrainian labor republic... The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic should decidedly declare, that the working people of Ukraine desire to live in peace with all working people of the entire world, yet it does not allow any foreigners to rule them... The Directorate should undertake immediately all possible means to organize national armed forces which, by being well-disciplined and well-managed, will secure land and freedom to the working people... The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic should demand that all foreign military troops should leave the borders of Ukraine in the nearest time..."⁴¹⁶)

In spite of all attempts to negotiate a party unification with the *Borotbists*, an agreement was not reached. As the Soviet-Russian invasion progressed in Ukraine, the *Borotbists* adopted, with every successive day, a more uncompromising opposition policy toward the Directorate, which soon turned even into a direct hostile campaign and fight against the very idea of a Ukrainian National Republic and its government. Consequently, during the elections to

the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, the U.P.S.R. - *Center* had to accept the inevitable necessity of an open fight against the subversive acts of the *Borotbists*. The election results showed the crashing majority of the U.P.S.R. - *Center*. It proved the fact of a general support of the Ukrainian peasantry given to the Directorate and its general opposition not only to the Bolsheviks, but their fellow-travellers as well. The followers of the "council system," in alliance with the Bolsheviks, received only 30 out of the total of 593 seats in the Congress.⁴¹⁷)

Eventually, at the end of the said period of development of the U.N.R., the final and full split of the once united Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries into two separate political parties was accomplished; the U.P.S.R. - *Center* and the U.P.S.R. - *Borotbists*. At a later time, there were no attempts undertaken anymore to merge the two groups, because the *Borotbists*, with every week and month, evolved ever more closely toward a full acceptance of Communism-Bolshevism.

The convention of the U.P.S.R. - *Center* held in Kyiv on January 28, 1919, developed a new political platform, and initiated the new political and organizational era of the party, to be discussed in the subsequent volume since it belongs to another phase of the history of the U.N.R.

The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party in January, 1919

The party intended from the very beginning of its existence to be a true worker party in accordance with Marxist democratic ideology. It organized only workers and educated people, who performed hired or dependent labor and who accepted the Marxian doctrine in its new interpretation, as given at that time by the most famous theoretician and the most fertile writer and publicist of the Marxian teachings, Karl Kautsky.⁴¹⁸) Because of its organizational principle, to draw the membership from among the workers and educated people (*intelligentsia*) only, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party could not be percentage-wise large in the national framework of the Ukrainian people, which were prevailingly agricultural-peasant. Yet, it enjoyed a great popularity and favorable acceptance among the peasant circles also.⁴¹⁹) It had also relatively many well prepared and experienced party leaders, all working according to the same ideological principles. It made the party in action well disciplined. Being, however, relatively small in number, it had to cooperate, by necessity, with the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries in order to gain a broader support of the population during the era of state construction.

Two leading members of the party were in the Directorate — Vynnychenko and Ptalyura, and six other prominent people from among its membership were given important functions in the Council of National Ministers: Chekhivskyy received the key positions as a Prime Minister and was at the same time also the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Dmytro Antonovych became Minister of Arts; Prof. Borys Matyushenko — Minister of National Health; Prof. Borys Martos — Minister of Food and Provision Affairs, and later on took over the position of the Minister of Finances; Vasyl Mazurenko — Minister of Finances; and Leonid Mykhayliv — Minister of Labor. Considering the instance, that the Head of the Directorate and the Prime Minister of the cabinet were both Social-Democrats, and that also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces was a Social-Democrat as well, it must be asserted, that the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party really filled the most responsible positions in the government of the U.N.R. Some ministerial positions were simply created not out of work expediency, but only to get a proper balance of political party power in the Council of Ministers, such as the Ministry of Arts, which could easily be embodied in the Ministry of Education.⁴²¹)

During the first Soviet-Russian aggression against Ukraine (Dec. 1917 — Apr. 1918) only a few of the members of the Social-Democratic Workers Party left their party affiliation and became Bolshevik collaborators during the invasion and occupation, such as Vasyl Shakhrai, Vasyl Mazlakh, Yevhen Neronovych and some others.⁴²²) First during the Hetman era, from April to November 1918, a left wing of the party began to evolve, which, however, did not fully crystallize as a definite political faction until the end of December of that year. Some individual party members continuously vacillated from the right to the left and vice-versa. The division in party thinking was deepening along the basic question of the constitutional structure of the U.N.R.: whether the independent Ukrainian State should be organized as a full parliamentary democracy or as a “dictatorship of the proletariat” or the “council” or the “soviet” system. That constitutional question then related itself immediately with the stand towards Soviet Russia. Those Social-Democrats who were in favor of the parliamentary system rejected any thought of cooperation with the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and in Russia and of a peace with them at any price; the left-wingers, on the other hand, favoring the “council” system and the “dictatorship of proletariat,” were eager to cooperate with the Red Russians on any conditions and demanded an immediate peace with the Bolsheviks on any terms; they were ready to sacrifice the ideal of a sovereign Ukraine, separated from Russia, for the price of confederating with the Russian proletariat. Such cooperation with the Bolsheviks

on any terms meant really and practically a direct submission of Ukraine to the Russian supremacy, being a surrender in the eyes of the patriotic Ukrainians. The reason for such a political position of the left Social-Democrats was this: In all of Europe and even throughout the entire world, a "world revolution" was believed to be eminent. This revolution aimed at Socialism which, of course, would be victorious. After this victory, automatically all national problems of all nationalities would be solved. Therefore, any attempt to resist this revolutionary movement was not only useless but even reactionary and, at the same time, detrimental to the interests of the Ukrainian people which had a majority of the "working people."

Because of the widening gulf in political positions, the split within the Social-Democratic Workers Party was growing with the problems presented in internal and international spheres, constitutional structure, foreign attitude toward the Bolshevik policy and policies of the U.N.R. at the given time of its sovereign development.

At the beginning of January, 1919, Andriy Pisotskyy-Richytskyy, Mykhaylo Avdiyenko, Mykhaylo Tkachenko, Z. Vysotskyy, Yuriy Mazurenko and a few other leaders were definitely in favor of the "council" system for the U.N.R. The majority of the party rejected the idea.⁴²²) Vynnychenko, Chekhivskyy and Mykola Porsh, who until that time were most respected leaders of the Social-Democrats, stood undecidedly between these two major concepts: the parliamentary system or "the council system;" a firm stand against the Soviet-Russian aggression or pleading for peace at any price with the Bolsheviks. Petlyura, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the U.N.R., had always maintained a strong pro-democratic stand and rejected any thought of a "soviet type of a dictatorship of proletariat" for Ukraine and any thought of a military or political capitulation before or surrender to Soviet Russia.

Before the Sixth Congress of the U.S.D.W.P. convened in Kyiv on January 10, 1919, Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy favored the "council" system. Isaak Mazepa, later Prime Minister of the U.N.R., who spent a great deal of time discussing political questions and problems with Vynnychenko in the days before the Congress, gave in one of his writings the following characteristics of the latter's political stand:

"Vynnychenko wanted a peace with the Soviets, but he frequently was in doubt and did not know, what to do."

As far as Chekhivskyy was concerned, Mazepa asserted, "he absolutely favored an understanding with Soviet Russia."⁴²³) Chekhivskyy's political philosophy was a curious mixture of ideas of democratic Marxism and Christianity; this certainly hurt the national interests of Ukraine at that time. He made the following statement in conversation with Mazepa:

“I have the conscience of a Christian. Do I have the right to send our soldiers to die on the front, while I am not sure myself, what kind of consequences to expect from that war? I may go myself to the front and fight there for what I believe. But to force others to do that, it is immoral, according to my belief.”⁴²⁴)

It seems that the Social-Democratic Workers Party made a grave mistake by appointing to the highly responsible position of a Prime Minister a man who, during time of war, was incapable to undertake any independent decision and action, when making quick decisions, followed by resolute action.⁴²⁵)

The Katerynoslav group of the Social-Democratic Workers Party, led by Mazepa, Panas Fedenko and Ivan Romanchenko, stood in sharp opposition to any “Sovietophile” orientation of any faction of their party. Already before the said party Congress, Mazepa succeeded in persuading Porsh to give up his original “council political platform” and to accept again the platform of the democratic parliamentarism. In the course of those pre-convention talks, it was possible also to persuade Vynnychenko to retreat from his recent “pro-council” views. Yet, the left wing leaders of the party, Pisotskyy, Avdiyenko and others, could not be persuaded; they strongly held to their radical convictions.⁴²⁶)

The delegates and resolutions of the Social-Democratic Workers Congress

In that atmosphere, the Sixth Congress of the U.S.D.W.P. was held in Kyiv between 10 and 12th of January, 1919. Dmytro Antonovych was elected chairman of the Congress, while the keynote was delivered by Andriy Pisotskyy-Richytskyy according to the decision of the Central Committee of the party. Pisotskyy concentrated in his speech on the international situation of that time, and out of that situation he attempted to develop logically the outlines of the future policies of Ukraine. He was for “pro-council” system from December of the previous year, and the instance of his being selected by the Central Committee of the party as the keynote speaker of the Congress might have indicated that the “pro-council” views were popular then in that committee of the party and that there was sympathy with Pisotskyy’s political platform.

In his keynote speech Pisotskyy outlined the following thesis for the party’s subsequent acceptance as a platform for future political action: To admit the necessity of organizing a “workers-peasants” government in Ukraine by accepting the Directorate and the Con-

gress of Working People as only temporary and quickly by-passing stages in the process of materializing the intended final goal, the "council system" with the dictatorship of proletariat. Pisotsky built up his thesis with the following argumentation: Already in the West a socialist revolution has begun, consequently the very time has come to establish the Ukrainian economy on the socialistic basis, while the rule of the "councils" seems to be the most powerful device to bring about the socialist reconstruction of the society. Pisotsky furthermore argued, that it was a mistake to think that the Ukrainians would lose power and authority in their republic once the system of "councils" would be introduced there. He stated, that the Bolsheviks were against the Ukrainian statehood only as long as in that republic no identical forces were at work.

Pisotsky's thesis was supported in the following discussion by Tkachenko, Avdiyenko, Mazurenko and a few other "Sovietophiles." They went even further in their speeches and demanded not only an immediate establishment of the "council" rule, which meant, according to the Bolshevik definition, the dictatorship of proletariat with the participation of the poor peasantry, in all of Ukraine, but they also argued, that Ukraine should immediately develop the closest contacts with "the revolutionary movements" in other lands: with the German revolution in the West and the Russian in the East. They proposed that the party adopt the policy of an immediate peace with Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and a Ukrainian-Soviet military alliance to go to war against the Don-Cossacks and the Western Allies, who developed an offensive against Soviet Russia by their landings in various territories, on the other hand. In order to prove the need of the "council" rule in Ukraine, the debaters pointed out, that in the town of Trypilya, near Kyiv, the "Dnipro division," commanded by the rebellious "otaman" Danylo Zelenyy, was stationed, and that all its soldiers allegedly claimed to be Bolsheviks.⁴²⁷)

The delegation of the region of Katerynoslav, led by Isaak Mazepa, argued most aggressively in favor of a full parliamentary democracy along with needed social reforms for the nation, and opposed definitely the Sovietophile tendencies. The delegation was then joined and supported by other opponents of the "council" system from the provinces of Poltava, Kyiv and other sections of the country. The "Sovietophiles" were unpleasantly surprised by Mykola Porsh's address, who in the first days of January still joined the "pro-council" orientation. Porsh, it should be noted, with his academic education, was known in the Ukrainian Social-Democratic circles as the best theoretician of "orthodox Marxism." His speech was a strong and well-argued repudiation of the idea of a "soviet" rule in Ukraine. He, among other things, said the following:

The socialist revolution did not yet reach full maturity in the world. Whatever is going on in Russia is not Socialism at all. In the process of the Ukrainian social construction, the dictatorship of proletariat of the Soviet style would mean the rule of the Muscovite minority in Ukraine over the overwhelming non-proletarian Ukrainian majority. The only solution in our case is a staunch democracy in Ukraine, and not a dictatorship of proletariat. Agricultural Ukraine is not supposed to start a socialist revolution; this was supposed to be done by the highly industrialized nations, like England and Germany and others.⁴²⁸)

Vynnychenko's political views

Vynnychenko arrived at the Congress very late and at a time when it was already apparent that the "council" orientation was losing the battle of gaining a majority, and that it would remain a small minority of the Congress. Some writers, relating the above developments, guessed that Vynnychenko's late coming was a premeditated move to arrive at the point when it would be already clear in what direction the debates and the whole Congress were going. However, Vynnychenko vacillated, at the time, without any premeditation in foreign, as well as, in internal policies. The extreme left was even more disillusioned by Vynnychenko's speech, which scorned any kind of pro-Soviet political orientation. The leftist members of the party considered Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy to be their men or, at least, their sympathizers. Vynnychenko's address was printed in excerpts in the official party paper. We quote here the most significant paragraphs:

Where 70 percent of the people is constituted by the peasantry, there the urban proletariat cannot rule. Here, in Ukraine, where individual peasant farming prevails, Socialism cannot be materialized by applying simply the Russian approach, from which the village certainly will alienate itself. Analyzing the problem of our state construction process, I, as in part an artist,⁴²⁹) do not view that process in only a one-sided way, like some of my fellows do. It cannot be locked into one, single precept. We, as Marxists, cannot adhere to only one and single form. Life is subject to changes, so are also the forms and precepts. And presently, life is not simply changing, it is just galloping ahead. One must also keep in mind the instance, that we are not only Socialists, but also the statehood-minded people. Everyone of us is a Nationalist to some extent, too. Don't we believe in the council system? Isn't the idea of the evolution

of the working masses our idea? Of course, yes. Yet, as a patient who has bad lungs must first take care of healing them to bring them to normal, so we must also first solve our national question.

We must first find the satisfactory forms of our national state development. For that very purpose, we must unite two elements: the class-proletarian and the national one. Presently, we have ahead of us the same situation as a year ago. The only difference is that we have meanwhile experienced the Hetman era, which has been the result of the Russian-Bolshevik criminal activities in Ukraine a year ago. Without that Bolshevik aggression, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* would have had properly developed and would have found proper solutions.

A year ago we worked with proper premises. The majority of working people in Ukraine are the peasants and it must be made a true labor class. It never has been capitalistic, and our legislative acts will never make out of it any village *bourgeoisie*. To-day the Land Act was adopted, according to which the "*bourgeois*" character of the peasantry would be identified by its right to use and not to own 5-15 *desyatins* of land. According to that act, the peasant would not have any right to alienate but only to transfer land in inheritance. Essentially the act represents a nationalization of land,⁴³¹⁾ and not in vain one of the Socialist-Revolutionary ministers pointed out in connection with the passage of the law: 'Here I had to turn myself into a Social-Democrat.' Of course, it is still far away from materializing the very ideal of Social-Democracy, because the utilization of land in the small peasant farm would be done according to the capitalistic methods.⁴³²⁾

We are Socialists first of all. One of the first prerequisites to the introduction of Socialism is acquiring the authority, taking into account the prevailing conditions. I do not think, that the social revolution can be carried out by the "Councils of Workers' Deputies." You should only recall in whose hands remained those "Councils of Deputies."⁴³³⁾ At first, the Mensheviks, then the Bolsheviks, and finally the demobilized and declassed soldiery, the Communists and simply Anarchists ran the 'councils.' Yet, remember, that the peasantry represents the only true and real power, then in whose hands should be the government? The peasantry as a petty *bourgeois* class must be liquidated and a working peasantry must be developed out of it.

The peasants, who have in their use 5-15 *desyatins* of land, do not contradict a social revolution. They do not contradict any socialist reforms. They simply help to reform. It is our job, when developing a new kind of peasantry, to employ it in the process of our social-national revolution.

We are state-minded Nationalists. As a national entity, we do not want to die or to be subject to some painful experimentation. Consequently, we must pay utmost attention to and to base our policies on the real power — the peasantry.

Why not organize the ‘soldiers soviets’? But what will come out of it? The following will come out of it: Suppose, in Kyiv the ‘Soviet or Council of Workers Deputies’ will convene. The proportion of the delegates must be in accordance with the ‘soviet’ principle: one vote of the metal worker as equal against 14 votes of the domestic servants, as equal against 50 or more votes of the peasants. Hence, when accepting the idea of dictatorship of proletariat, it had to be a dictatorship over the peasant masses.

Then, why did we fight against the Hetman? To enslave the peasantry, which shed its blood? We are the Ukrainian Social-Democrats — a party of proletariat. We would be ready in this case to surrender the government into the hands of that proletariat, which, perhaps, in ten years would have given back to us all our national rights. It is no secret that the war and the Russian policy introduced into our industries a great many non-Ukrainian workers. We would do it. Yet, will the others act that way?

Suppose, that the Congress of the Working People convenes and enacts to take away from the peasants the right to participate in the national government. Not only the peasants, but also the *Sichovi Striltsi* would not stand for it and would force the Congress to disband. A terrible intense war would follow. We could not count on the loose bands. We would not have any power...

And what is the solution? What kind of a solution do you suggest? I would not ally myself with Piatakov and Antonov and I would not under any condition oppose the Ukrainian *Sichovi Striltsi*. Here I put a period. If you wish, you may exclude me from the party.

This is the national element, suggested by logic. Some say, that the Congress of the Working People is a falsification. It is not true. We must maintain a strong stand at the very moment when the rights of the people, the defense of the state sovereignty and the question of the form of government must be decided by the organized will of the democratic majority of Ukraine.⁴³⁴)

After having mentioned the instance of the invasion of Ukraine by the Soviet Latvian-Chinese “international” detachments and the armed forces of Soviet Russia, and after having read the

text of the note, dispatched by the government of the Ukrainian National Republic to the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia, Vynnychenko continued:

“Here the question of the constitutinal structure of government is put before us and that question we must keep before us all the time. Briefly, the peasantry is our base of activities. Our task is to make the village a proletarian force, oriented on the Western and world highly industrial proletariat, and to prevent that it does not develop into a petty *bourgeois* element. In no case should we use the Russian underdeveloped proletariat as a pattern to follow, because if we once have linked us with it, the Russian Bolsheviks will split us and will take away from our own national forces the right to govern ourselves. Then, a dictatorship of Piatakov or Antonov will be established for us.

We have to count on our own forces, — the proletarian-democratic forces —, which must be available to us later one year of the revolutionary struggle. If we did not develop these forces of our own, then we would not be able to establish any democratic nation and so much less a socialistic one.⁴³⁵)

Vynnychenko's speech, printed in his party's newspaper, gave a full picture of his splendid rhetorics, although it was not free from some weaknesses. The strongest aspect of the speech was Vynnychenko's convincing argumentation against the shallow slogan of the “dictatorship of proletariat,” as suggested by the extreme leftists to be the new “Soviet” form of government for Ukraine. He asserted that to be a patriotic and state-minded Ukrainian was the prime duty of every Ukrainian Socialist. Consequently, he most definitely rejected any thought of a civil war in Ukraine to be provoked or instigated by simply blind holding to the Socialist-Marxist dectrines and overriding the country's national interests. In this way, Vynnychenko certainly helped to defeat the “council” orientation and to gain an absolute majority for the principle of full democracy at the party's Congress. There were, however, in the speech numerous contradictions, mainly based on Vynnychenko's Marxist thinking. Once he declared himself to be a Socialist above all, and then he said, he was first of all a state-minded Nationalist. Yet, he attempted to defend the case of Ukrainian statehood against the unfounded pseudo-internationalism of the Russian Bolsheviks and their fellow-trevellers.

Chekhivskyy's stand

In the debate on the political situation in general and the proposed future political program of action of the party in particular, participated also Prime-Minister V. Chekhivskyy, one of the leading

party men. It is important to mention here that Chekhivskyy had a theological education; that he was in his own way a very pious man; and that at the same time, aside from his religious convictions, he attempted to be an ardent Marxist.

Chekhivskyy spoke definitely against the theses as proposed by Vynnychenko. He did not agree with the later that the party was not supposed to take the stand against the "council" system of the Bolshevik model. Chekhivskyy tried to impress upon the minds of the listeners the weak assertion, that allegedly the "council" system is one thing and that, what the Bolsheviks attempt to do by force and ruthless methods, is quite another one. He thought that the violent Bolshevik approach may be rejected, and that, at the same time, the system of "councils" might be and should be successfully applied in Ukraine. He attempted to persuade the Congress that during those revolutionary times Ukraine had no use for a parliament, based on general and equal elections, because such elections would simply secure all political benefits to the *bourgeoisie* only. He argued that Ukraine actually needed the "councils" in their pure and not disgraced form, without terror and violence to accompany them. Moreover, he demanded, that the difference between the urban and rural proletariat should be eradicated, and then, supposedly, a unified working force, not differentiated by the Bolshevik system of preferring the industrial working class, would be created. Chekhivskyy finalized his speech with the note, that Ukraine should not associate itself either with the Western Allies or with the Soviet-Russian revolution, carried out by Chinese bayonets.⁴³⁶)

Chekhivskyy's speech proved in a very dramatic way that there was no unanimity among the top agencies of the present government, concerning the most essential problems of domestic policies. The Head of the Directorate said at the same convention one thing and the chairman of the Council of Ministers quite another and opposite one in reference to the leading issues. Furthermore, Chekhivskyy's speech disclosed lack of realism of his political views, concerning the problems of the social and state structure of Ukraine. He suggested eradicating the difference between the urban and rural proletariat, but he failed to propose how this goal could be accomplished. He failed also to show how the U.N.R. could survive politically in the conflict between the Allies and Soviet Russia without associating itself militarily with either.

Along with Chekhivskyy, Mykhaylo Tkachenko, former minister in the government during the *Rada* regime, spoke in favor of the "council" system. Yet, he did not talk of some "pure" and non-existing forms of peaceful "Soviets," but simply asserted that there was no reason to be afraid of introducing them in Ukraine even by

the same methods as applied by the Russian Bolsheviks, but in the independent Ukrainian Republic.

Of course, some of those advocates of the "soviet" system in independent Ukraine who participated in the convention of the U.S.D.W.P., were state-minded Ukrainian patriots, though their political concepts were lacking any rationality under the prevailing conditions. Only a few of them were pro-Russian fellow-travellers. The majority of them did not want any political dependence upon Soviet Russia and Russian Bolsheviks. If they argued in favor of the "soviet" or "council" system, they did it out of their honest patriotic conviction. They thought, that in this way, by introducing the "councils" throughout Ukraine, the purpose of the political sovereignty of the U.N.R. would be best served.

However, the followers of the principle of full parliamentary democracy, led by Isaak Mazepa, by well argumenting their position, succeeded in getting for their cause a compact majority of the delegates of the convention. Also the resolutions, adopted by the convention, followed the political philosophy of that democratic majority. Only ten delegates voted against the adoption of the above resolutions, who later on still declared that they were willing to remain members of the party, and that only within the party would they organize a separate faction of the "Independent Social-Democrats."⁴³⁷)

The third outstanding member of the party, Symon Petlyura, was compelled, as the Commande-in-Chief, to leave Kyiv and to attend some important military affair at that time, and could not participate in the Congress proceedings. Then, later on, after the convention, Petlyura visited the newly elected Central Committee of the party and there declared his complete unanimity with the party's newly adopted resolutions and policy principles, since he always stood for parliamentary democracy as the constitutional system for the Ukrainian National Republic and always definitely rejected the "council" approach.

Some excerpts from the resolutions of the U.S.D.W.P.

In order to understand the ideological aspects of the democratic majority of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker Party, some essential parts of the resolutions of the party, adopted at that convention, must be pointed out here and briefly commented upon. They were as follows:

1. The Sixth Congress of the U.S.D.W.P. asserts, that the capitalistic world has already entered the process of the socialist

revolution, which is inevitable throughout all lands, yet being a different and specific one in every individual country, as far as the progress and form of the reconstruction of modern society are concerned...

As a result of her revolutionary past and her immediate revolutionary state of affairs, as well as in consequence of the revolutionary developments in the West, Ukraine joined the powerful drive of the inevitable world-wide revolutionary process...

2. Yet, Ukraine has a very specific place in the capitalist world, because of her economic and national-political questions. Ukraine is a land of the small peasantry which has been the powerful foundation of the Ukrainian revolution during its entire era, and for which that revolution has been first of all and largely an agrarian one. The role of the industrial proletariat in the Ukrainian economy has been always limited and its political impact on the revolutionary movement has been and still is of little importance. The insignificant development of industrial capitalism and because of that also the small number of the proletarians, the prevalence of the extractive and agrarian-processing industries, the insignificant class awareness and inadequate organization of the proletariat, the national and ethnic contradictions between the city and countryside, and by the same token, between the urban proletariat and the peasantry in Ukraine, have been the main causes of that specific economic phenomenon.

The recent imperialist war, which economically exhausted even the most developed nations, brought the agrarian countries, and among them also Ukraine, to the verge of an economic catastrophe. The final ruin of the weak Ukrainian manufacturing, through the lack of raw materials and machinery, the ruin of farming, through the decline of cattle reserves and field-work equipment, billions of inflated paper money, terrible ruin of transportation, enormously high prices of goods, came as the harsh and disastrous results of the world war in Ukraine. Furthermore, in consequence of the above developments, the sharp, specific for the capitalistic world, contradiction between the city and village reached there the levels which turned to be most unfavorable for the [= socialist] revolution.

The Ukrainian nation, separated into many parts and thrown under the rule of different countries, — Galicia, Bukovina, Hungarian Ukraine, Bessarabia, Kuban and Don-region, — attempts today to survive under the most difficult economic-financial and political-international conditions, being surrounded by imperialistic and counter-revolutionary enemies, such as the

Polish, Rumanian, Don-Cossack, "Voluntary" White-Russian, Western Allied and Soviet-Russian assaults. Ukraine yet attempts to unite herself in the framework of the national and sovereign state.

3. Having taken into consideration all these domestic and foreign developments, the Ukrainian proletariat asserts that it cannot and has no right today to endanger the fate of the revolution by taking over the national economy to introduce in the country a decisive and ruthless nationalization throughout by the way of a proletarian dictatorship. It, furthermore, asserts that it considers its responsibility under the present conditions to participate in the state government and state construction process by supporting with all its powers the unification of all parts of the Ukrainian nation into one; to build the way for the rule of the labor democracy in the Ukrainian Republic; to enlarge labor organizations; to carry out a careful and gradual nationalization of the mature sectors of the national economy; and to employ the peasantry in the process of the economic nationalization of the land.

Having taken all the above matters into consideration, the Sixth Congress resolves:

A. On the state structure:

1. Considering the instance, that the socialist reconstruction is a long process, which can be materialized in real life by the class conscious and organized proletariat with the help of a revolutionary democracy in general, the Congress believes, that at the given initial stage of the socialist revolution the government in the center and in the provinces should be of that kind which could secure fully the development of the democratic forces. The present revolution in Ukraine is only an initial and preparatory phase to materialize, first of all, general democratic reforms; the phase of the truly democratic government, through which and on the basis of which only the transition to socialism may be possible.

Having accepted the above premises, the Congress thereby speaks out in favor of convocating, in the nearest possible time, the people's representation, the parliament, elected by the general, and so on, voting system. Considering, however, the difficult transitionary era which is experienced by Ukraine at this time, and also taking into account the immediate need of the government to base its activity on the organized representation of the revolutionary democracy, the Congress speaks in favor of an immediate convocation of the all-Ukrainian Congress of the Working People out of the delegates of labor and peasantry as a temporary legislative house. Until the Congress of Working

People convenes, all government powers should be in the hands of the Directorate, which should direct all its work toward strengthening the revolutionary achievements and toward carrying out a series of reforms to bring about the initial stage of the socialist reconstruction.

The Congress demands immediate elections to the provincial self-governing bodies. Until the local self-governing agencies can be reelected, the local government is in the hands of the commissars, who shall function in contact and under control of the local labor councils. The councils are the agencies of the revolutionary democracy, formed from the proportionate representation of workers and peasants. The commissars shall be elected by the local labor councils and confirmed by the national government. The government should be decentralized, while the military should be subject to the civil-political government agency.⁴³⁸)

The later parts of the resolutions covered various aspects of the internal policies, only the details of the general principles being quoted above. Hence, they will be omitted as having rather little value as an illustration of the political philosophy of the Congress of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party. Only the paragraphs talking about the armed forces were of great significance, considering the over-all anti-military attitude at the time.

“...To organize immediately strong and well-disciplined national armed forces to defend the United Ukrainian National Republic against the enemy assaults from outside.”

Then, the thoughts of the Congress of the party concerning foreign policies followed:

“B. On the program of foreign policies:

“Holding to the principle of the right of the Ukrainian nation to be sovereign, the Sixth Congress of the party stands for the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. Growing out of that premise, the Congress resolves to support the endeavors of the Ukrainian people to attain their full self-determination and to fight against any assaults upon the independence of Ukraine, either by the Russian Soviet Republic or any other country.

“The Sixth Congress asserts that the Allied Powers pursue in Ukraine only their imperialist ends, and that an occupation of Ukraine by the Allied Powers would mean there a restoration of monarchy and reaction.

“In reference to the Russian Soviet Republic and its policy toward Ukraine, the Sixth Congress must express its con-

demnation of the infamous imperialist plans of that proletarian party and socialist government, undertaken by the Soviet-Russian regime against the Ukrainian Republic. The Soviet government, being unable to close the gap between the workers and peasants of Russia, which gap that government produced by its own policies, in order to prolong the time of its rule, attempts by open plundering of the Ukrainian peasantry to cover the basic needs of the unemployed Russian workers. This being the only way to explain the assault of the Russian armed forces upon Ukraine.

“Protesting against the assault of the Russian armies, the Congress admits the possibility of peaceful relations and commercial trade with the Soviet-Russian Republic only under the condition that the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian armies be stopped and all foreign Soviet troops be withdrawn from Ukrainian territories.

“The Sixth Congress of the party declares that it is a desired goal of all nations, which entered the revolutionary process, to achieve the closest mutual unification in the struggle against the imperialism of the Western Allies. Yet, the policies of the government of the Soviet Russian Republic, aiming at the conquest of Ukraine, damages any possible agreement in this respect, annihilates any mutual understanding and undermines any hope that the international proletariat will achieve any success in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism.

“The Ukrainian workers have already experienced once the severe monarchistic reaction because of the conquest policy of the Soviet government. And today again, in the hour of a menacing danger for the development of the Ukrainian proletariat and the revolutionary democracy, the Ukrainian National Republic, the Sixth Congress of the party declares that the Ukrainian organized workers will with all their efforts fight against the hostile reactionary assaults, coming either from the Western Allies or from the Russian Soviet Republic.


“The Ukrainian workers will try with all their power to defend the foundation of their normal development, the Ukrainian National Republic, against any imperialists, no matter by what pretty slogans they would try to smokescreen their ferocious assaults against the independence of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian proletariat.”

The resolutions, quoted above, were adopted by the prevailing majority of the convention's delegates. Against the resolutions there were only ten out of all fifty delegates. Perhaps, some parts of the resolutions might have seemed poorly formulated or poorly argued by applying present standards. Yet, they were based on

a general premise that, at that time in Europe, an over-all socialist revolution was in progress. Although the view was a faulty one, it was shared by a majority of intellectuals in Europe and it served as a basis for the derivative conclusions of the above resolutions, making them rather weak at this point. In that projection however, even at the Paris Conference the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was so evaluated by the non-Socialists and the opponents of Socialists, as well.

However, the very strength of those resolutions was not in their details, but in their over-all mood, that ably counteracted the subversive Bolshevik propaganda and the work of the Bolshevik fellow travellers. No doubt, the resolutions were permeated by a strong national-minded ideology, which must have deeply impressed every reader at that time, who had some sense of objective criticism. The resolutions then became the foundation of the subsequent political activities of the party during 1919, and in order to evaluate properly the later developments in Ukraine, and in particular the role of the party in those developments, one must always refer to those resolutions as a pace-setting program of action. Doubtlessly, the basic political philosophies of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party best reflected the social-political movements which dominated the minds of the politically conscious and active people in those days in Ukraine.

The minor political groups, like the Independent Social-Democrats, the Socialists-Federalists, the Ukrainian Party of Independentists-Socialists, the National-Republicans, the Democratic Farmers and other, certainly added to the political mosaics of the Ukrainian society at the time of the Directorate of the U.N.R., without decisively forming, however, the trends of the political and national life of Ukraine.



CHAPTER 5

THE "LEFT-WING" SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE "RIGHT-WING" SOCIALISTS-FEDERALISTS

The proposal of the resolutions of the "Independent Social-Democrats"

In order to learn the various political ideas and movements permeating the Ukrainian society in the early 1919, it is also necessary to get acquainted with the proposed resolutions of the so-called "Independent Social-Democrats," which were recommended by the radical group of delegates for adoption by the Sixth Congress of the party, yet rejected by its overwhelming majority. The proposal enables us to understand the trend of the political thought of that group of people within the U.S.D.W.P., which abandoned the party's general political line, and adopted a radically negative attitude towards the government of the Ukrainian National Republic and its democratic methods of national state administration. The proposed resolutions were as follows:

1. The Sixth Congress of the U.S.D.W.P. states, that Europe experiences today the era of the socialist revolution, caused by the former development of capitalist economy and the imperialist war.

2. The present Ukrainian revolution represents one of the stages of the socialist revolution in its Ukrainian national forms, and as such, it points to the proletariat its subsequent responsibilities:

- a. To reconstruct the sovereign and independent Ukrainian National Republic into the sovereign and independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic;

- b. To organize the government in accordance with the principle of the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and poor working peasantry, all organized into the labor-peasant councils; to remove from any economic and political ruling power the *bourgeoisie*, large landowners and wealthy peasants; to organize the council government out from the center in accordance with a plan, in a constitutional way, and without any disorganized, anarchistic and willful attempts of the individual local councils to grab power in an unauthorized way in individual localities and places;

c. To organize the entire national economy of Ukraine on a socialistic basis for which an inevitable and planned nationalization of land, credit, all production means, and transportation must be carried out, and all subject to a general plan of the state economy.

3. Having accepted the premise that Ukraine has to be a socialistic republic in conformance with the progress of the world revolution and her own internal developments, where the government must be in the hands of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry, the Congress of the party asserts that the present government should be reorganized in accordance with the proper representation of the revolutionary parties which adopted the principles: a) of the independent, national Ukrainian Socialist Republic, and b) of the government by the labor-peasant councils; the present government must be considered only a temporary one, until the government of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Worker-Peasant Councils will be organized.

4. Having accepted the premise of the independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic and having acknowledged the reality of a world socialist revolution, the party, defending by all means the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, demands from the Ukrainian government the following:

a. To come to an agreement with the Soviet-Russian Republic on the basis of a mutual recognition of the sovereignty of both socialist republics; of a full and mutual non-interference into the internal matters of the neighbor republic; of an immediate withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from the territories of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic; and of the establishment of economic relations;

b. To demand from the Western Powers withdrawal of their armed forces from the territories of Ukraine, including Crimea; their non-interference into the internal matters of Ukraine; and in the case of their refusal to cooperate, of an active defense of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic against the imperialistic assault.⁴³⁹⁾

The evaluation of the platform of "Independent Social-Democrats"

The very essence of the program of action for the party, presented by the Independent Social-Democrats, developed around the idea of a dictatorship of proletariat. Having added to the "proletariat" also the so-called "poor peasantry," as standard bearers

of the dictatorship, they certainly did not mean an equality of various "working" classes, — workers, peasants and educated people along the line of the labor's social-revolutionary principle. They made that addition purely for propaganda reasons; their terminology was not consistent even in that respect, calling the peasant class to be recognized by the state building process at one time — "the poor peasants," and at other times — "the revolutionary peasantry." The so-called "wealthy peasants" were denied all constitutional rights along with other "owning or possessing classes," such as capitalists and land latifundia owners and even craftsmen. A reference to the "poor" peasants was simply made in the proposal to neutralize the peasants' general hostility toward the very idea of a dictatorship of proletariat.

The principle of dictatorship of proletariat did not interfere with the national interest in Russia proper, because there the industrial proletariat was, exclusively, ethnically Russian. Hence, no matter, whether monarchy, democracy or dictatorship of proletariat would be the system of government in Russia, Russia would have always remained a Russian national state, having only changed the form of government. The situation in Ukraine was quite different in this respect. In Ukraine, as already pointed out, the majority of the industrial proletariat consisted of the immigrant Muscovite (Russian) ethnic element and the thoroughly Russianized Poles, Jews, Greeks and partially Russianized Ukrainian peasants who had moved to town. In reality, therefore, the consequent materialization of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the political process of Ukraine in 1919 would have meant the dictatorship of the Russian foreign ethnic elements over a vast non-proletarian peasants and educated group of the Ukrainian majority. Essential was here the fact that, at that time in Ukraine, the peasants made up some 90 per cent; the industrial workers, 3.6; and other occupations and professions, 6.4 per cent of her entire population.⁴⁴⁰)

That kind of a predominately Russian dictatorship of the proletariat in Ukraine would not have had any chance to keep itself in power, but with the support of the Bolshevik bayonets of Soviet Russia. The power of the Russian ethnic minority, and in particular, the Russian proletarian minority, in Ukraine was absolutely inadequate to prevail there and to dominate the government by democratic Socialists. The entire number of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine, including the transportation workers, with no ethnic differentiation of its composition, constituted some 11 per cent of the entire population of the land. Even if a few per cent of the peasant or rural proletariat would be added to that tiny percentage of the city proletariat, the percentage-wise relationship in the composition of that segment of the population would not be changed

substantially. If, therefore, the system of the "worker-peasant councils," or in reality, the system of the "proletarian-peasant" dictatorship according to the Bolshevik patterns, would be introduced in Ukraine, inevitably the Russian minority would completely over-run and dominate the government agencies and the government process of that land.⁴⁴¹)

On the other hand, however, the "independent" authors of the above proposal always underscored the indispensability of the Ukrainian national character of the sovereign Ukrainian Socialist Republic, governed by the "worker-peasant councils." What solution could be suggested to solve that controversy, or national dilemma? How could the Ukrainian national character of Ukraine be preserved, when ruled by the dictatorship of the Russian proletarian "Soviets" or "councils"? It was certainly a kind of political naivety or doctrinary blindness on the part of some of those "Independent Social-Democrats" who championed that kind of a utopia.

Furthermore, those "independents" were supported by such leaders, as Tkachenko, Drohomiretsky and Avdiyenko, who were apparently Ukrainian patriots, although ideologically misled. For example, Avdiyenko was a devoted organizer and leader of Ukrainian labor. Those people were also supported by Chekhivskyy and others, in whose honesty was there no doubt. Chekhivskyy could serve as an example, by which the psychological-political atmosphere of that pro-Soviet group of politicians could be learned, and perhaps, explained. Chekhivskyy simply proclaimed certain naive and contradictory slogans of his political philosophy, a Christian-Marxian contradiction in itself, without having thought these slogans thoroughly through. No doubt, the same was true, as far the authors of the above resolution and all other followers of the "council" system of government were concerned. The proposed resolution of the Independent Social-Democrats suggested that a complete socialist revolution must be accomplished in the Ukrainian National Republic, concerning its social and political structure, yet in a peaceful and legal way, without any anarchy, violence and willful seizures of authority by anyone, and strictly on the basis of a new election law. That entire revolutionary, yet peaceful process, would have to be carried out by the present government of the Directorate and the Council of National Ministers of the U.N.R. with a consent of those who were open and declared opponents of such a system of the dictatorship of the worker-peasant councils after all. That kind of a political utopia could be constructed only by such unrealistic politicians as Pisotskyy-Richytskyy and others like him who sought harmony between Marxian materialism and Christian dogma and were out of touch with political reality.

“Independents” organize their own faction

The faction of the Independent Social-Democrats held during the last day of the congress of their party, on January 12, a special meeting of its own where a separate political platform, unanimous with the rejected proposal of their resolution, was adopted. Moreover, they also adopted a special declaration of the faction which was announced a little later. In addition, the faction of the “Independent Social-Democrats” elected an Organizational Committee of five members of their own, and without having officially left the party, began immediately, on January 13, to function as a separate political formation. It also began to publish its own newspaper, “*Chervonnyy Prapor*” (the “Red Banner”), the first copy of which appeared in Kyiv on January 22, 1919.⁴⁴²)

In that first copy of the “Red Banner” from January 22, the “Faction of the Independent Social-Democrats” published their political platform and the program of its political action. The more important paragraphs of the declaration were the following:

More than a year ago, the Fourth Congress of the party asserted that the World War caused a complete ruin of the capitalistic economy, brought about a collapse of the organizational abilities and endeavours of capitalism, and that as the result of those developments, capitalism and imperialism bankrupted, and the world imperialistic war changed into a world socialist revolution.

The disintegration of the old multi-national empires, built by means of violence, and formation of the new national republics represent the inevitable initial stage of the socialist revolution, which will succeed only in an international scope, and from now on only in the forms of the national state-economic organisms...

The instance of the beginning of the socialist revolution in Germany and the signs of its probability in other countries predetermined the continuous progress of the Ukrainian revolution as a social revolution... It became apparent today that also Ukraine, inspite of her agrarian character and economic underdevelopment, can overcome the plight of her economic ruin only by way of organizing her national economy on the socialistic foundations.

From now on, any attempt to reform [the social-economic life process] without having destroyed the foundations of the old economic system would inevitably bring about an economic collapse of Ukraine and the conquest of her by more powerful nations. Hence, life itself has demanded from the Ukrainian proletariat and from the party to give up at last their state of

passive waiting and to undertake an active and creative struggle in order to reconstruct all social, political and economic life process of Ukraine according to a certain plan...

Yet, the majority of the Sixth Congress stopped at the hopeless attempts of preserving largely the old *bourgeois* institutions by changing only some of their minor aspects... That kind of approach left the whole process at a dead end, which neither left the old system to regain strength, nor the new one to move decisively toward the goals which have been predetermined by fate.

We, the Faction of the Independent Membership of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker Party, have accepted resolutely and clearly the new approach and in that way, by those accepted tactics of action we differ from the rest of the party... As far as the principles are concerned, allegedly the Faction of the Independent Membership and the official membership of the party stand for the socialist revolution, because both wings of the party believe that the socialist revolution in Ukraine can be carried out only in the frameworks of the sovereign and independent Ukrainian National Republic. However, the dead end stand, which has been adopted by the Sixth Congress, hurts heavily above all the cause of the sovereign and independent Ukrainian Republic. It did not allow Ukraine to accept a firm attitude either toward her internal or external affairs at the very time when the World War developed into a series of particular wars...

Going out from the common concept of sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as an inevitable and necessary form for carrying out the socialist revolution, the Faction of the Independent Membership differs, however, sharply from the official party wing with respect to the form of government to be fit to accomplish the socialist revolution. While the Faction of the Independent Membership believes that, at the very time of the socialist revolution, and in particular, at its present stage, the dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry in the form of the worker-peasant councils, is the only possible form of government, then the official party accepts a complete confusion in this regard: a Congress of Working People and a parliament, and locally — agencies of self-government and commissioners and labor councils.

We believe, that if the U.S.D.W.P. cannot change the direction of its official policies, then it should at least recall its representation from active participation in the government and accept the way of struggle for the true people's government of the worker-peasant councils.

The official party wants to save the revolution, hiding itself behind the old democratic formulas, and being afraid to take a clear and open stand, which is an inevitable one for a party of proletariat at the present time. Democracy does not and will not secure a strong centralized government, which only one could accomplish the revolution. Democracy in Ukraine will inevitably change into the dictatorship of the middle classes of the society, which normally could not be the factors of a socialist revolution. Also the national masses would be pushed aside from the creative action at the parliamentary system. The socialist revolution requires a centralized national as well as local government, yet based on a broad and active participation of the main stock of the working masses by way of the government of councils. Consequently, whoever talks about "a socialist revolution," must talk of "a council government" as well. This is the essence of our difference from the official stand of the party.

The lack of clarity and ambiguity of the stand, taken by the Sixth Congress, was largely caused by the fear that the urban, non-Ukrainian, elements would prevail, if the council approach would be applied. However, the government by the councils does not mean a dictatorship of proletariat in its pure form and the proletariat in Ukraine is not all nationally foreign either. The organization of the councils may be accomplished without rendering to the workers the numerical prevalence in the government agencies, and in particular in Ukraine, where the working peasantry represents an overwhelming majority. The proletariat as a class, which has been predestinated to bring about socialism in its full content, must receive only a security of its strong influence on the government in accordance with its significance for the future socialist creative development. Right now, however, as long as the transitionary stage continues, as long as throughout the world a struggle between socialism and capitalism is in progress, the Ukrainian proletariat can take over the government only together with the revolutionary peasantry. It is true that a large segment of the proletariat in Ukraine has been blinded by the chauvinism and imperialism of the Russian Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, analysing the developments objectively, it must be accepted that those workers will gradually more and more enter various forms of the internal life process of Ukraine. We are sure that all non-Ukrainian workers will soon overcome the outdated prejudices of old Russia and will join the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian proletariat. Yet, for that we need a joint stand. The clear-cut and resolute proletarian stand is maintained by us, the Independent Ukrainian Social-Democrats.

During the revolution in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks showed full absurdity and worthlessness of their anti-Ukrainian tactics, which led the proletariat to a catastrophe. The non-Ukrainian workers must be forced by the mere progress of events to join the work of the social-political construction of the Ukrainian Republic. The repetition of the Bolshevik anti-Ukrainian experiments will be destroyed by the progress of the Ukrainian national movement very soon; yet, the proletariat should not take a new utter defeat into account. We believe that the opportune time has already arrived to induce the non-Ukrainian proletariat to join the work of the social-political construction of the independent Socialist Ukrainian Republic and that the construction can best and, on a broadest basis, be accomplished by the way of the council government, where the workers should be secured not less than one-third of all influence in the respective government agencies.

Various ways of understanding the socialist revolution and various ways of its realization in life, have compelled us to form the Faction of the Independent Membership within the framework of the USDWP, yet with separate ideology and tactics... The Faction of the Independent Membership of the party will work among the masses in accordance with its resolution under the banner of the struggle for the worker-peasant council government in the sovereign and independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic. However, the Faction does not separate itself definitely from the party, because it believes that, with the progress of the revolution, the whole party will be forced to accept the faction's political position.

Our relationship to the Ukrainian government is predetermined by our general position. The present government of Ukraine — the Directorate — we do support. By our open criticism we induce it to enter the path of liberating itself from the *bourgeois* chains, and at the same time we uncover before the masses all its mistakes and all its disloyalties toward the national interests...

Our understanding of socialist revolution differentiates us from the party of the Bolsheviks-Communists [= in Ukraine]. Their work is damaging for the proletariat of Ukraine, because it gravitates to Russia and thus, it looks for support outside, and not within Ukraine herself. Hence, the work of that party is imperialist and tends to submit Ukraine to Russia. We, the Independent Social-Democrats, cannot allow it, since first of all we are a political group which sees the guaranty of success of the revolution in the masses of Ukrainian workers and peasants

and only on those masses plans to base that success. Furthermore, we differ from the Bolsheviks also by the instance that we do not believe in the possibility of introducing a pure dictatorship of proletariat right now at the present time, and rather believe in the inevitability, at the present time, of connecting the dictatorship of proletariat with the working peasantry in the form of a government by the Worker-Peasant Councils.⁴⁴³)

The declaration then sums up that the Independent Social-Democrats would attend the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, but only to present and to explain there their political philosophy and political platform to the masses of the Ukrainian proletariat and peasantry. The complete political-doctrinary infatuation of the declaration has been most evident in its last section, where all leading slogans of the Marxists were given in an abbreviated form. Among those slogans, a prominent place was given to the following statement: "Long life to the friendship among all socialist republics." It was apparent at that very time, January 22, 1919, when already extensive territories of Left-Bank Ukraine were conquered and occupied by the Red Russian armed forces, that it was scarcely an opportune moment to talk about friendship with the "socialist" Russian Republic.

Under the circumstances, for every Ukrainian statesman there was only one decisive issue: the defense of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic. Any other issue had to be subordinated to this first. These secondary issues had to be solved at the time and in a manner which would be proper to the defense against the Soviet Russian military invasion of Ukraine. This military aggression by Soviet Russia had been progressing with overwhelming speed and force since December 1, 1918. At that time, i.e. in the first weeks of January when the proposed resolution by the "Independent" Social-Democrats was raised in the Sixth Congress of the party and in the "independents" newspaper "*Chervonnyy Prapor*" — the Soviet Russian regular divisions, after bloody battles with the Ukrainian Active Army, conquered a great deal of the Ukrainian territory with the industrial center, the city of Kharkiv, and were directing their offensive operations against the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv. As early as December 1, 1918, Moscow had created a puppet Soviet government in Kursk (Soviet Russia) and had sent it and its chairman, the Russian Georgiy Piatakov, into Ukraine on the heels of the Soviet Russian advancing armies. This was a guise for an alleged Ukrainian Soviet government. For every political leader, this activity only had one meaning — Lenin was attempting, through this means, to provide a smoke screen for his real aim which was the complete annihilation of any form of any real Ukrainian independence.

Hence, if the Ukrainian Independent Social Democrats were champions of Ukrainian independence, then they had first of all to advocate and find the means to defend the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic. The realization of socialism in a Marxist shape had to come step by step, through proper reforms which would not jeopardize the defensive war of the U.N.R. against the Soviet Russian aggression. Such a plan was chosen by the leadership of the socialist parties which had a majority in the Directorate (three members out of five) and the absolute majority in the Council of National Ministers. This government was realizing socialistic reforms in the fields of agriculture and industry. Of course, this was done slowly because of the existing war between Ukraine and Soviet Russia. Evidently, it was impossible to decree socialism in Ukraine by only one order of the government unless a dictatorial pattern like Soviet Russia were adopted whereby a small minority dominated by terror the vast majority of the people.

But, unfortunately, the reasoning of the Independent Social Democrats was another. They believed in the "socialist ethics" of the leadership of Soviet Russia, especially of Lenin. They considered the aggression of the Soviet Russian divisions as "an adventure by the Piatakov clique." They were convinced that it would soon be possible to reach a proper "understanding" with Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and other leaders of the Russian Communist Party in Moscow. They believed that these communist leaders would call to order the "Piatakov clique" and that an "agreement" would be reached based on the sovereignty of both republics, — Ukraine and Russia.

All this reasoning by the Independent Social Democrats was absolutely unrealistic; it was some kind of blind doctrinary lunacy. Nevertheless, they marched under the banner of this lunacy to the brink of the abyss.

The Independent Social-Democrats, in fact, declared to fight against the Ukrainian government of the Directorate for its alleged pro-capitalist stand by virtue of its weakness in uprooting the capitalist remnants, and only theoretically attested to the imperialist policy of the Bolsheviks. No practical suggestions were made as to how to resist the Soviet aggression or at least, how to deal with it. Yet, though the faction clearly proclaimed its opposition and resistance against the political stand and practical policies of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, it still did not develop any direct contacts with the Bolsheviks until the end of January. It was ideologically not yet ready to undertake that "bold" move. As yet, it only limited itself to propagating a peace between Ukraine and Soviet Russia, without having logically realized the futility of the thought.

The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists

After having altered its name several times, the party entered the historical period of Ukraine under the political identification as the "Socialists-Federalists." The adoption of the term "Socialists" was simply a reverence toward the general political mood of the time without really reflecting the political philosophy of the group. It was popular and fashionable to be "socialistic" in those unhappy days of Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, and without a tribute paid to the term, a political group might not have been admitted to function openly, on the other hand. The trend to adopt the term "socialistic" out of political expediency also developed overwhelmingly in Central Europe some two years later, including Western Ukraine. The *bourgeois*-democratic parties all-over adopted some of a socialistic flavor.⁴⁴⁴)

The majority of the Ukrainian educated people of middle and older ages were largely joining the U.P.S.F., and it had a considerable influence upon the *bourgeois* population segments. However, among the national masses of workers and peasants, its influence was very minute. Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko, Serhiy Yefremiv, later member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Science, Ludmyla Starytska-Chernyakhivska, I. Salikovskyy, Senator Serhiy Shelukhyn, Prof. Olexander Shulhyn, Prof. Maxym Slavinskyy, and Prof. Kost Matsiyevych were among the most outstanding members of the party.

The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists held its last convention in May, 1918, in Kyyiv, long before the Directorate was formed. Between May 10-12, the party formulated its last program. In the areas of social and political structure of independent Ukraine, the matters which were of the outmost concern, the Socialists-Federalists, after having listened to the program speeches of Matsiyevych and Shulhyn, adopted the following resolutions:

In the matters of federation and independence: In the course of formulating its program, the party considered a federative union of Ukraine and Russia to be the best and the most advantageous for Ukraine. Yet, the subsequent political developments, the centralist and selfish policy of the Russian (= democratic) government, society and political parties, their hostility to the fact of a real federalism, and finally, the Bolshevik ventures, advanced the idea of an independent Ukrainian State.

Having taken into consideration the real conditions of the life process, the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists has been acknowledging the statehood of Ukraine in its entire parliamentary action and foreign policy, supported the idea and favored the cause of the consolidation of the Ukrainian State.

However, along with the developments, the party believes that the federalist idea in the [Ukrainian] political life has the same significance as Socialism has in the social-economic life of Ukraine, and so it considers it necessary that those ideas remain the leading thoughts of the party. As Socialism unites all working masses of the entire world, so does federalism include in itself the idea of a world-wide unification of nations which can become the only guaranty against imperialism and war. Considering the nearest perspectives and taking into account the real developments in Russia, the party at this time excludes any possibility of any federative unification with Great Russia. At the same time, however, the party considers for possible and desirable in the interest of Ukraine any association attempts with other neighbor nations which form today their state organizations.

In the agrarian matters of Ukraine: 1. The supreme property rights on land belong to the State. In the cases of the State or public needs, the State has a right to take away the land from the private owners against a compensation. 2. Asserting its socialist ideal, that the private property rights on land should eventually be abolished to exclude land definitely out of the devices of exploitation of human labor, the convention believes, however, that under the present economic conditions in Ukraine a definite and consequent democratization of land utilization must be carried out on the basis of private ownership, in order to promote the growth of the production forces and to intensify the farm economy of the land, considering labor farming as its most productive economic unit. The above democratization of land should be carried out by a forced expropriation of all lands above the labor norm unit, against a certain compensation, and by transferring them to the small farm and landless peasantry.

To achieve that, the party intends to undertake immediately some specific measures: a). To create a temporary State Land Fund out of the government, private latifundia, monastery and other lands, out of which the land grants will be made to small farm and landless peasants; b). To leave temporarily in the hands of the present owners on the rent-lease terms all state purchased farm lands, related to the farm produce-processing industries and other high value industrial cultures, and then to develop proper production technology and to transfer ultimately those lands to the labor-based, farm economies; c). To create a state-cooperative mortgage institution, which will assume all former debts on the state-purchased lands as well as will manage the repayment process of all sums concerned, done by the indi-

vidual farmers; d). To allow a liberal cultivation of land, limited only by a labor-production norm and the control by the agencies of the local self-government; e). To transfer the land policy to the local agencies of self-government, before the land grants were made, as well as, after the land usage was regulated, while the supervision of the land matters be reserved to the local judiciary; f). To pass a rent-lease legislation in order to protect the tenant's rights to take advantage from farm improvements, done by him, to secure just rent payments and to provide the prolongation of the rent-lease terms; g). To secure the agricultural assistance to the peasantry on a broadest basis, with respect to developing farm cultures and enlarging the cooperative organization; h). To establish a state-civic assistance organization to help the emigrant-colonists outside Ukraine and to maintain its field agencies in those places of colonization.⁴⁴⁵⁾

It must be generally stated, with respect to the above resolutions representing the party's program of action, that considering the circumstance, they were rather logical and realistic. It seemed, however, that without making any reference to the land legislation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the Socialists-Federalists could not expect to advance their program under the rule of the pro-capitalist and pro-latifundia landowners Hetman government at all. Hence, they were not supposed to omit in their resolutions the already achieved progress in this respect during the first republican era of the newly reestablished independent Ukraine under Central *Rada*. The federative notion of the resolutions was also nothing new, but only the resonance of the past days. Consequently, in both respects, in the national-political and the social-economic, the resolutions of the Socialists-Federalists lacked any exciting novelty or ideological enthusiasm concerning the issue of the struggle for the Ukrainian statehood; they also lacked any depth in the formulation of their national-liberation and social-economic content. No wonder, therefore, that during the Hetman era, amidst the general upheavals, the Socialists-Federalists were not able to gain any further popularity and any larger following among the masses of the Ukrainian people.

The above program of action of the party was binding during the entire Hetman era, since no other convention of that political group was held at any other time. Truly, during the Hetman era, characterized as a rather "reactionary" mood, the program of the Socialists-Federalists might have made an impression of political radicalism, but later on, at the time of the Directorate, as against such radicalism as that of the extreme-left *Borotbist* and Independent Social-Democratic platforms, it must have been looked upon either as too moderate or even too conservative.⁴⁴⁶⁾

Ukrainian Party of Democrats-Farmers

From those in last time organized and hence less important Ukrainian political groups of that time, no doubt, the Ukrainian Party of the Democratic Farmers was more significant in the political process of the U.N.R. The party was almost like the previous one, the Socialists-Federalists, the movement of the educated crust of society, before the Hetman uprising, and later on. The socialist block of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats succeeded in eliminating the Democrats-Farmers from the socialistic government coalition, and attempted to ignore the group completely as ideologically impure. Of course, during Het. Skoropadskyy's era, because of its national-political ideas contrary to the federative tendencies of the Hetman government, the party of the Democrats-Farmers joined the opposition, along with all socialistic groups. However, later on, because of the radical-left trends during the Directorate era, the above socialistic block considered the Democrats-Farmers, at least, as a "petty-*bourgeois*," if not as an out-right „*bourgeois-capitalist*" group, and refused, therefore, to cooperate with it, simply following its extremism at the expense of national interest.

The Ukrainian Party of Democrats-Farmers continued to preserve its rather small political organization during the Directorate period. During the Hetman era, the party was joined by Mykola Mikhnovskyy, an attorney and early Ukrainian nationalist, Prof. Viktor Andriyevskyy, brothers Shemet and some others. During the early days of the Directorate, the above party supported the ideas adverse to Bolshevik extremism and dictatorial tendencies.

In January, 1919, the Kyivian segment of the party, led by V. Shemet and Mykola Mikhnovskyy, somewhat damaged the party's image by attempting, on its own, to help the Ukrainian defense against the Soviet invasion, without coordinating its plan with other political groups. No matter that the plan of organizing separate military units for defense, along with Col. Bolbochan's *Zaporizhskyy* Corps, had some merits, the approach to it was not very lucky, considering the declining popularity of Bolbochan himself among the socialistic political leadership and the anti-Democrats-Farmers feelings of that leadership in general. Furthermore, Mikhnovskyy, who contacted Bolbochan, fell ill meanwhile, leaving the plan unfulfilled, and the party's popularity was declining.⁴⁴⁷)

Ukrainian Party of Independentists-Socialists

This party may be characterized approximately like the Socialists-Federalists: It had its membership mainly among the circles of the intelligentsia, and especially it was joined by the younger

people, largely of some military past. "Socialism" was in their party name, but party policies held it to the same secondary meaning, as in the case of the Socialists-Federalists. Rather it was a reverence toward a popular slogan. The Independentists-Socialists seemed to differ in their program from the Socialists-Federalists by their greater ideological radicalism with respect to the national-political matters. The stress put by the party on the term "independentists" indicated a radically anti-Russian stand of the group, rejecting any thought or any possibility of a federation with Russia, no matter, Red or White one. The term meant that they were firmly fighting for independence of Ukraine.

As was pointed out before, from among the outstanding political leaders of the time, Panas Andriyevskyy, one of the members of the Directorate, Dipl. Eng. Olexander Makarenko, number one man in the group, Gen. Olexander Osetskyy, Col. Olexander Shapoval, Otaman Volodymyr Oskilko, Dr. Ivan Lypa, joined the party of the Independentists-Socialists. Especially Olexander Makarenko enjoyed an outstanding prestige among the people for his stunch character and political skill. Nevertheless, among the broad masses of the people, in particular among the peasants, the party never gained any noticeable influence.⁴⁴⁸)

The Ukrainian People's Republican Party, led at first by Dipl. Eng. Eugene Arkhypenko and then, by Olexander Kovalevskyy, was of minor significance. The Ukrainian Labor Party, somewhat active during the Hetman era, faded away and disappeared from the political scene during the Directorate period.

The non-Ukrainian political parties

A survey of the non-Ukrainian political groups of the ethnic minorities in the UNR should complete the social-political picture of the land during the Directorate era, from which the Russian and Jewish parties were most important.

From among the Russian political organizations in Ukraine, the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which at that time functioned under the name of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, must be mentioned first. The later, the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (the CPBU), operated as a branch or territorial unit of the first, the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (the RCPB). Neither the membership nor the leadership of the CPBU was Ukrainian in their majority at all. In spite of very clever and deceitful demagoguery and methods of propaganda, the Communists did not achieve, at that time (until the end of January,

1919) any majority or, at least, large following among the masses of the workers of the Russian nationality, organized in the trade or labor unions. So far, the leading influence upon the Russian proletariat had still the Russian Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks, and the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries of both wings, the left and the right ones.

Yet, in the struggle of the Ukrainian National Republic against the Soviet aggression, the above circumstance of the socialist and not communist majority among the Russian proletariat in Ukraine did not help the Ukrainian cause very much. Although the Russian Mensheviks and Socialists-Revolutionaries opposed the Bolsheviks, as a political party and ideology, yet they still preferred their domination of Ukraine over the Ukrainian national and sovereign statehood and government. Of course, out of practical and pragmatic considerations, those socialists of the Russian nationality did not want to break openly with the Ukrainian government in order not to forfeit the opportunity to operate legally within the framework of Ukraine. Hence they sought contacts with the government of Ukraine. They joined the elections for the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, elected their representatives and sent them to Kyiv to voice their views and thoughts during the congressional session.

A very important role in the revolutionary process of Ukraine in that historical period was played also by the Jewish political organizations. It was quite understandable under the Ukrainian conditions, since the Jewish ethnic minority lived largely in the Ukrainian cities and towns, frequently making there even a majority of population, and the cities and towns and the urban populace have always been a dominant factor in the revolutionary tides.

The Ukrainian Jewry represented a real mosaic of political orientations and organizations; a) the *bourgeois*, Zionist, neo-Zionist and socialist groups; b) then the Zionist and Socialist Paoley-Zion and the non-Zionist and Socialist "Bund" were the leading Jewish political parties. The *bourgeois* Jewish organizations indirectly favored the preservation of the old Russian Empire in some federative form, and by the same token, they opposed a political independence of Ukraine. The Jewish socialists of both groups supported the Ukrainian National Republic as long as it did not officially proclaim its political sovereignty; this meant, as long as it remained a political unit in federation with Russia. On January 22, 1918, when the matter of the Ukrainian independence was voted upon by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the deputies of the "Bund" voted against independence, and the Paoley-Zion deputies abstained. Nevertheless, the official leadership of the Jewish socialist parties did not favor the Bolsheviks and even opposed them. At the beginning of the

Directorate era, the Jewish official leadership cooperated with the Ukrainian government, participated in all important state meetings and consultation discussions, took part in the elections for the Congress and joined its convention procedures.⁴⁴⁹)

After the Directorate called to life the regular Council of National Ministers of the U.N.R., December, 1918, a special Minister of Jewish Affairs, with full rights of a cabinet member, was appointed to take care of Jewish matters in the Ukrainian Republic and to show the official favorable stand of the Ukrainian government toward the Jewish minority. Abraham Revutsky, the representative of the Jewish Social-Democrats of the Poaley-Zion, became the first Minister of Jewish Affairs in Ukraine, as a matter of fact, the first minister of that kind in Europe.

Nevertheless, with the development of the revolutionary fever of the extreme left orientation, which appeared in ever growing and progressive forms at the beginning of January, 1919, some segments of the Jewish minority in Ukraine, having perhaps instinctively felt the coming collapse of the Ukrainian political aspirations and the eminent victory of Bolshevism, began to turn their backs on the official Jewish leadership and gradually crossed over to the Bolshevik camp and became active there. The pro-Bolshevik fever among some Jewish circles affected not only those, which were so far politically neutral, but also those who, so far, were either members or sympathizers of the democratic and anti-Communist Jewish political groups. That process of the changing political climate (like in the left movement of Ukrainian Socialists) among the masses of the Jewish people at that time has been described as a fact by many Jewish political writers, and especially by Moses Rafes and Prof. Solomon Goldelman.⁴⁵⁰)

The Jewish anti-Zionist "Bund" very early, even at the very beginning of 1919, was dominated by pro-Bolshevik feelings, and so its leadership immediately took, at first, a neutral stand toward the government of the U.N.R.; then, not long thereafter, the majority of its leadership, headed by Rafes, adopted the "council" political platform. The Zionist oriented Jewish circles, including the Jewish proletariat of that wing, proved to be more resistant toward the Bolshevik demagoguery. Consequently, the Poaley-Zionists much longer cooperated with the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, having been loyal to its democratic system but it was joined mostly by the younger workers and professionals.

That pro-Bolshevik fever among the Jewish proletariat at the beginning of 1919 had a very unhappy side-effect. It produced strong anti-Jewish feelings among the low and politically primitive stratum in Ukraine, especially Russified circles, which were blindly ready to identify the Jews with the Bolsheviks. The instance was

also skillfully utilized by the White-Russian agents and fellow-travellers to promote criminal anti-Semitism in Ukraine and to incite the criminal "city vagabond" elements to initiate the anti-Jewish assaults, the pogroms.⁴⁵¹)

In order to stress the loyalty of the Poaley-Zionist circles toward the Ukrainian nation, the very instance must be here asserted, that the leaders of that, and some other Jewish groups as well, always warned, whenever conferring with Vynnychenko or other outstanding representatives of the Ukrainian government, of the dangers of any pro-Soviet feelings and sympathies, hidden behind the demagoguery of the struggle against the *bourgeoisie* and capitalist democracy.⁴⁵²)



CHAPTER 6

THE DIRECTORATE AND THE CABINET IN ACTION

The formation of the cabinet and the division of government's functions

It has been pointed out before that in December, 1918, the cabinet of ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic in this period was formed on the coalition principle. The coalition was constituted by four major socialist Ukrainian parties, which represented the backbone of the Ukrainian National Union, and one Jewish party: the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, the Ukrainian Socialists-Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Socialists-Federalists and the Ukrainian Independentists-Socialists, as well as the Jewish Social-Democrats of the Zionist ideology, the Paoley-Zion.⁴⁵³) It is of importance to point out that the Socialists-Federalists were really a moderate democratic party without a true socialistic character.⁴⁵⁴)

Yet, in that coalition government there were neither the representation of the Farmers-Democrats, who were not members of Ukrainian National Union, nor even the representations of these political groups which actively supported the uprising, namely, newly formed parties such as "Laborists" and the "National Republicans." But, these last groups were of small memberships and of insignificant influence.

The formation of the cabinet was not done according to the parliamentary tradition, either. Normally, the political leader who was asked to form the cabinet, negotiated with the individual parties, who declared their willingness to participate, and informed them of his political platform and program of action. Hence, normally, the cabinet was the product of the appointed prime-minister's own work and so a personal touch existed, at least to some extent, between him and his cabinet members. However, the Council of National Ministers from December, 1918, was formed in an different way. All negotiations about the composition of the cabinet, both, in the partisan and personal respect, and appointment of specific persons for specific cabinet seats, were done by two men, Vynnychenko, in the name of the Directorate, and Shapoval, in the name of the Ukrainian National Union, each being the head of the respective body, and the responsibilities of each by no means included in the above function. Then, Chekhivskyy, the appointed Prime Minister, was handed down the ready list of his cabinet members,

with whom he had first to get acquainted. Consequently Chekhivsky was right, when later on he sarcastically asserted, that essentially he had no cabinet of ministers of his own, but that the cabinet was only a Directorate's cabinet, for which he was nominated as a Prime Minister.⁴⁵⁵)

The above cabinet had, however, its political platform. It was given that platform in the form of the Directorate's Declaration of December 26, officially announced by the Directorate together with the list of the said cabinet, of which Chekhivsky was the chairman. During the first cabinet meeting, the Declaration was solemnly read and adopted as the basis of action.⁴⁵⁶)

Because of its coalition character, and because of a general aversion of the Directorate toward the former leadership of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its last Council of Ministers, no former experienced politicians, trained before in the democratic process of government, such as Mykhaylo Hrushevsky and Vsevolod Holubovych, were drafted to participate in the Council of Ministers and the political work of the new government. Chekhivsky's cabinet consisted largely of new people. Then, the manager of press and information, Dr. Osep Nazaruk, was appointed to the cabinet as its full-ranking member by Vynnychenko on a personal basis only, and not as a representative of the later's party, the Ukrainian Radical Party of Western Ukraine. Soon, also some personal changes were made in the composition of the Council of National Ministers, such as replacing Goldelman, a Jewish Social-Democrat, as the Minister of Labor by Leonid Mykhayliv, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat.

This kind of formation of the executive branch of government, the Council of National Ministers, in the above described way under the heavy influence of the representative body of the Directorate, surely produced some weakness of a completely inadequate division of official jurisdiction of the particular bodies as the government entities, as well as among the individual members of the Directorate and individual ministers of the cabinet. Numerous affairs were parallelly attended by the Directorate and the Council of Ministers, as well as numerous matters of the state administration inspite of their heterogeneous nature were taken care of in a confusing and conflicting way by various ministries.. Some described the situation as a government of two cabinets: one, the Directorate, consisting of five members, and another, the Council of Ministers, of 21 members; one — under the chairmanship of Vynnychenko, and another — under that of Chekhivsky. It obviously did not increase the efficiency of the governmented process.

The members of the Directorate, five of them, did at that period spend much time for discussion about the cours of their action. Two most outstanding members of the Directorate, Vynny-

chenko, its Head, and Petlyura, a member of the Directorate, with the function of Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces, represented two views in behalf of that. Vynnychenko often vacillated in his political views and was rather a follower of the idea of a "labor democracy," while Petlyura never waived and was a staunch representative of the principle of a parliamentary democracy all the time.⁴⁵⁷) Moreover, Vynnychenko attempted to blame Petlyura for the weaknesses of the armed forces of the U.N.R. and for possible military mishaps and mistakes. Objectively speaking, however, those weaknesses and mistakes were rather caused by the unfortunate internal and external developments and by the tactics and decisions of the entire Directorate during the first two months of its government, largely promoted by the essentially dominant political climate in entire Europe in this time. These personal differences among the leading men within the Directorate certainly made its functioning difficult.⁴⁵⁸)

Contact of the government with the people

The cooperation of the Directorate and the Council of National Ministers with the social-political circles of the Ukrainian society was not adequately developed. Above all, the Directorate and the cabinet were very cold and unfriendly toward the so-called "rightist" political and social circles, which were really not reactionary at all and rather believed in full democracy, while at the same time the Directorate attempted to force upon the society a strongly socialist - oriented course of the national policy.

Then, the socialist-oriented circles did not even succeed in forming a unified and monolithic socialist front of all these parties to support unconditionally the program of the government until the Congress of Working People convened. The parties of the socialist camp could not agree on one political platform. For that, there were several reasons. First of all, some socialist parties were Ukrainian, others — non-Ukrainian, either Russian or Jewish. Second, the Ukrainian socialist parties were internally substantially differentiated into factions and wings, some of which were either reluctant to support or outright were opposed to the existing Ukrainian government on tactical or ideological grounds. Third, also the non-Ukrainian parties were internally differentiated, and some of them were directly opposed to the Ukrainian government for national and political reasons. For instance, being the representation of the Russian minority, they preferred rather that the Russians, even the Bolsheviks, take over Ukraine and establish there perhaps the Soviet-Russian government. They liked it better than being

subject to Ukrainian socialist domination. The national, ideological, tactical and otherwise differences among the socialist groups and sub-groups made the formation of a monolithic socialist front impossible. Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy attempted to initiate the actions toward a unified socialist block in December, 1918, and January, 1919, but without success.

Then, in the first part of January, such a general conference of all socialistic groups was arranged in Kyiv. The representations of all parties, not only of the Ukrainian, but of the Russian and Jewish parties as well, including the out-right leftist groups, were invited. Vynnychenko and Chekhivskyy tried to persuade the representations of the minority (Russian, Jewish) parties to support the "labor democracy" political course of the Directorate of the U.N.R.

These attempts to unite all socialists in Ukraine, with no regard to their nationality, to defend the statehood of Ukraine, were, theoretically speaking, a very alluring political step. If it would have succeeded, it would have represented a turning point in recent Ukrainian history of the nation's struggle for political independence. It would have meant a victory over the centuries-long national prejudices and antagonisms on the Ukrainian soil. Such a proposal of a united socialist front in Ukraine, if realized, would also succeed in building a new socio-economic life of this country on the basis of a social-democratic principles. In the case of success the country would build with own forces an impassable "*cordon sanitaire*" against the Russian Bolshevism. From the practical point of view, the whole plan indicated an idealistic, and, therefore, some unrealistic approach. It was almost evident that the Russian socialists were traditionally obsessed by an imperialistic spirit. No matter, whether the Mensheviks, Socialists-Revolutionaries or Laborists, the Russians in that time considered an independent Ukraine as ill-disposed: an attempt to destroy "indivisible Russia." The attempt of the Directorate in behalf of the united socialist front in Ukraine including the national minorities succeeded in the Russian camp insofar that at that time a group of the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries decided to cooperate with the government of Ukraine. The majority of that Russian party, however, declared itself "neutral." The Mensheviks did take an entirely negative position. Also partly only the Directorate succeeded to bring Jewish socialists to the proposed united front. The Jewish Social-Democratic Party "Bund" at that time was already split: a minority of it declared its support for the Soviets, and the majority of that party under the leadership of Rafes pronounced its opposition to the government of Ukraine. So much less could their loyalty toward the Ukrainian National Republic be expected at the time of the so-far victorious Soviet-Russian invasion of the Ukrainian territories, promising a restora-

tion of the Russian Empire, only of another color and political structure. Only Poaley-Zion Party and the Jewish People's Party, at this time, decided to support the Directorate of the U.N.R.

Chekhivskyy's undertaking to induce the Jewish socialists to join the official delegation of the government of Ukraine, which was supposed to go to Moscow to negotiate peaceful relations with Soviet Russia, failed. He succeeded in persuading the Ukrainian Independent Social-Democrats to join the delegation, though they were in opposition to the official policies of the Directorate. Yet, the representatives of the Jewish "Bund" refused to cooperate, having declared openly that they did not approve the political course of the Ukrainian government and so could not represent and defend that course in Moscow. The said delegation left for Moscow a few days later having been composed of the Ukrainian delegates only.

The Directorate and the Sichovi Striltsi Corps

The feeling of uncertainty, which generally prevailed among the political circles and projected itself upon the entire society, must necessarily affected the armed forces of Ukraine as well. The big disciplined military formation, which was absolutely firm in its loyalty to the idea of the Ukrainian national independence, did not waiver along the changing political moods, being in particular fully resistant to any subversive attempt of the Bolshevik propaganda and provocations by all kind of foreign agencies, was the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. It was truly a "National Guard" watching over the security of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic.⁴⁵⁹) The power of the Directorate during the uprising against the Hetman government in November, 1918, as well as its safety and prestige after the victorious completion of the uprising, and its ability to maintain the eastern front which resisted the progressing Soviet-Russian invasion forces, fully rested on the Corps of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. After his departure from the Directorate, considerably later on, after he even changed fully his political philosophy and views, Vynnychenko still praised the *Sichovi Striltsi* for their loyalty to the U.N.R., discipline and readiness to sacrifice beyond the line of duty.⁴⁶⁰)

In the hands of the *Sichovi Striltsi* command the Directorate entrusted the safety of the national capital of Kyiv, having given the command the complete power on December 14, to maintain law and order in the city. This meant the Directorate itself decided to entrust in the hands of the military command the power to enforce law and safety in the city where the agencies of the supreme national government were housed. The commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi*,

Coln. Konovalets, suggested the Directorate entrust the security and police functions to a certain civilian agency, at least until government arrived in the capital city. Yet, Vynnychenko and other members of the Directorate insisted on their original order. After the *Sichovi Striltsi* had been definitely advised to comply with the order of the Directorate to assume the fullness of the security in Kyiv until the Directorate itself arrived in the city, Konovalets, the commander of the *Striltsi*, who in fact became the representative of the new national republican government there, demanded at least, that he be given strictly definite instructions as to the policies to be followed.

Moreover, later on, after the Directorate arrived in Kyiv and took there its permanent residence, and after even the Council of National Ministers was appointed and assumed the office, the commander of the *Striltsi* was expected to continue the full security and authority in the capital, although the Corps made continuously the request ever and ever again to be relieved of that rather unpleasant responsibility.⁴⁶¹⁾

The Council of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, constituted by their ideological leaders, was fully aware of its responsibility to protect the state capital at that time of political uncertainty. It was aware of the fact that all political circles of Ukraine, the Ukrainian and the non-Ukrainian, those of the national minorities, relied on the *Sichovi Striltsi*, composed prevailingly of the Western-Ukrainians, for the guaranty of law and order in those turbulent times. Yet, not always those circles looked upon the *Striltsi* with friendship because of the *Striltsi* being in sharp opposition to their leftist ideologies.

The leading circles of Ukraine had to count on the formation of the *Sichovi Striltsi* for two reasons. First of all, because the formation was the most disciplined and best organized military unit. And secondly, because it was the most numerous formation within the framework of the armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic. All regular armed forces of the UNR by January 20, 1919, reached some 50,000 men, of whom the *Sichovi Striltsi* made a little more than one-fifth, over 10,800 officers and soldiers.⁴⁶²⁾ On the other hand, the command of the *Striltsi* was fully aware of the factual power of the formation. Besides these regular armed forces, there were still about 100,000 irregular "partisans" who supported the Directorate.

The *Striltsi* Council had the full knowledge of the rather unhappy state of affairs, in particular, of the lack of unanimity between the cabinet as a whole and its individual ministries on the one hand, and the difficulty to bring a unanimity of views and actions in the state administrative procedures between the cabinet and the Directorate, on the other. This state of affairs was considered by the Council as a damaging development at the time, when one firm

action was indispensably necessary to streamline the domestic and foreign policies of the nation, born and fighting to exist under the most unfavorable conditions. Hence, the *Sichovi Striltsi* decided to make a suggestion to two leading members of the Directorate, by means of their Council, that one of them assume a fullness of government authority from the Directorate, concentrate in his hands all the decision making power, and in this way be able to coordinate and normalize the national policy, administration and defense.⁴⁶³) The *Striltsi* were then determined to support such a consolidated authority under only one condition, that it would serve and defend the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation.⁴⁶⁴)

The *Striltsi* Council planned first of all to suggest to Vynnychenko that he assume full authority in Ukraine. In case of his refusal, to make it to Petlyura, offering at the same time the loyal support of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. A special delegation was elected to present the proposal to both, one after another. Dr. Osyp Nazaruk was appointed the speaker of the delegation, first of all, because he was very close to Vynnychenko, a kind of confidence man, and because he also was on good terms with Petlyura, too. And second, Nazaruk was a member of the cabinet in charge of press and information, hence a highly placed person, having official contacts with the two men in question, whose word, no doubt, carried weight. Yet Vynnychenko and Petlyura refused to cooperate in such a manner; at first Vynnychenko, and then, Petlyura. Both men named approximately the same reasons of their refusal: that allegedly it would be very difficult for one man, without an inter-parties coalition, to direct the state affairs; that it was supposedly easier for the Directorate to do the job⁴⁶⁵) Nevertheless, having made that decision, neither Vynnychenko nor Petlyura, nor their political advisors from among the Social-Democrats considered the fact that at the same time in neighboring Poland not only the Polish Socialist Party but also all other political parties agreed to concentrate all state authority in the hands of one man, Józef Pilsudski, a Socialist, in order to streamline the government process until the parliament could be called to convene. They did not see any other rational solution to the problem during the grave formative time of the new Polish republic.⁴⁶⁶) Also, the *Sichovi Striltsi* suggested such a one-man approach to government only to the convocation of the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly or Parliament. The suggestion was a very practical one, yet neither Vynnychenko nor Petlyura dared to assume this great responsibility.

The refusal by Vynnychenko and Petlyura to assume provisionally the full government authority was caused by their political beliefs; bound by their social-democratic doctrine, they were afraid of any kind and any possibility of personal dictatorship, no matter,

that such a one-man rule was planned only for a short and transitional time and was designed actually to make a little later a full democracy possible and workable. The two men and their advisors believed that a collective body of the Directorate, no matter, that it had in fact fullness of government authority, hence, being a dictatorship of a five-man collective, was a much better solution than a one-man rule. At the time of war and political upheavals such a collective approach to government was the worst of all possible and available forms of rule; bound to be slow in decision making, often wavering in action, frequently handicapped by dissent and discord of its members. In a democratic republic, even in peacetime, there is only one chief executive, the president, and not a Directorate. Historical experience has proved the inadvisability of a collegiate chief executive office for a republic. For example, the pattern of the Directorate during the first French Republic, after the Great Revolution, could not effectively fulfill its objectives and obligations and was forced to adopt the supreme executive state office to only one man.*) A collective leadership, after a short period of time, always moves into the hands of one leader, be he the president of the republic or a "secretary general" of a dictatorial monopoly (as in Soviet Russia.)

Because of the suggestion made by the *Sichovi Striltsi*, to reorganize the collective Directorate into an one-man supreme state authority, as chief executive, some authors later on attempted to blame the *Striltsi* Council and the entire Corps in their alleged unwillingness to submit to civilian authority.⁶⁴⁷) Indeed, this was not true. The instance of the above suggestion, made by the *Sichovi Striltsi*, was evident to the contrary. The *Sichovi Striltsi*, as the very backbone of the armed forces of the U.N.R., wanted to see a strong civilian government and were ready to submit unconditionally to its authority in the name of the national interest.

All those developments took place actually at the beginning of January, 1919, when the *de facto* war of Soviet Russia against the Ukrainian National Republic was already in full progress and already substantial territorial portions of the Left-Bank Ukraine were invaded and occupied by the Soviet-Russian armies. It was fully uncertain as to the composition of the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, which was about to convene; would it be nationally Ukrainian and democratic or pro-Soviet. Moreover, the Directorate solemnly promised to surrender to the Congress the fullness of its government authority at the very time when the political character of the Congress to come was completely unknown and uncertain and the country was in a state of war.

*) The term in French was **Directoire**.

Nevertheless, the continuation of the *status quo* did not solve the basic problems at all: What political course to follow? How to eliminate the conflicts of jurisdiction of various top agencies of government? How to streamline the top state administration process? At the same time, the Soviet-Russian propaganda machine opened a most aggressive and vicious psychological warfare against the government of the Ukrainian National Republic in order to weaken the psychological resistance of the Ukrainian people, facing the most real fact of a military aggression by Soviet Russia, assulting the eastern and northern borders of Ukraine. Moreover, the hostile enemy propaganda had succeeded already in penetrating the ranks of some, relatively smaller units of the army of the U.N.R., such as some units of the "Dnipro Division" under the command of Otaman Danylo Zelenyy and of the "Kherson Division" under the command of Otaman Matviy Hryhoriyiv. A rebellion of those units against the authority of the U.N.R. was eminent in the second half of January, 1919.

The invasion forces of Soviet Russia were penetrtrng deeper and deeper. The general atmosphere of uncertainty with respect to the future political course was growing as a result of the Allied landing in Odessa and Mykolayiv. Then Vynnychenko called, in the name of the Directorate, a State Conference to discuss there once more the question of a reorganization of the top government authorities and to decide the main course of the Ukrainian foreign policies. The Conference was held on January 16. The representation of the *Sichovi Striltsi* formation was invited to participate in the discussions. The measures to reorganize the authority and plans to form the foreign policies, as they were discussed at the State Conference, will be analysed in the subsequent volume of the work.

The over-all characteristics of the period

The above volume covered some two months in the construction of the Ukrainian Republic under the authority of the Directorate, from November 15, 1918 to January 16, 1919, which could be rightly called the first period of the Directorate. The individual chapters of the work represented the attempt to describe, analyze and evaluate, in the light of an objective criticism, the operations of the individual government bodies, their acts and steps, political concepts and decisions, including also other social-political and defense-military factors, against the background of the over-all social and political developments in Ukraine and in all of Europe.

An improper comprehension of the critical survey and analysis of the individual developments, happenings and various aspects of

the over-all situation of Ukraine in the course of those two months, could give the student of the past a somewhat distorted picture of the state construction works. Surveying and analysing critically the individual components and parts of a construction, the spectator may easily fail to appreciate the grandeur, the beauty, and the artistic and architectural values of the construction as a whole. Hence, in order not to lose the proper perspective and not to become a victim of false impressions, the spectator, after having surveyed individual parts of the construction, must concentrate on surveying the building in its entirety from a proper distance. The same thing we must do in the analysis of the above two-months period of Ukrainian history. After having surveyed and critically analyzed the individual developments of the social and political process of Ukraine during that period, it is necessary to appraise the era as a whole to acquire a proper understanding of the historical evolution of the nation in the course of that relatively short, but pregnant with events, time. That will enable us to evaluate properly the people, the institutions and the state-building process of the U.N.R. under the government of the Directorate.

First of all, it must be asserted, that the leaders of that period were bold and ready to sacrifice themselves for their ideas. Starting the uprising against the Hetman government, they risked a great deal, since they entered the road of temporary illegality by opposing that government and, associated with it, strong and influential White-Russian circles and the regular units of the German army, still stationed in Ukraine. The insurgents could count on a relatively small number of armed supporters at the very beginning of the uprising; no more than some 10,000 soldiers.

Second, for better or worse, the leaders of the uprising were able to promote a great enthusiasm for the uprising among the masses of the people, not present since the grand days of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's national revolution and liberation war 1648-1649. They were able to convince those masses of the necessity of fighting for liberation of Ukraine from foreign domination. Even the Bolshevik writers, hostile to the idea of a national and sovereign Ukraine, admitted in their writings, memoirs and history books, that the Directorate was able virtually in a few days to abolish the unfriendly rule throughout the whole country, except in the city of Kyiv, by neutralizing the German army of a few hundred thousand men, which supported the previous regime.

The third aspect to be considered in this over-all evaluation of the period was the speedy success of the national revolution, accomplished, no doubt, through the undeniable abilities of the men, who constituted the Directorate, or were the leaders of various political groups or the commanders of different military units of the

republican armed forces. This, a relatively small group of men, was capable in a short time to organize a large insurgent army and transform it into a regular, combative and pugnacious force. Against the over-all background of war-torn and war-tired Eastern Europe, the leaders of the Ukrainian independence movement knew how to initiate and to incite a general patriotic enthusiasm in the country, and to raise and organize a proper armed force in order to make the uprising a success, and then to be able to resist a second Soviet-Russian war invasion.

The fourth aspect of the period was a general national consolidation of various political groups and various social segments of the society in defense of the Ukrainian political independence and sovereignty. In the very center, the growth-cone, of the uprising the people from all parts of Ukraine were represented, from the central Dnipro regions, Western Ukraine, Carpathian Ukraine and Bukovyna. The *Sichovi Striltsi*, the military formation from Western Ukraine, built the core of the U.N.R. army, as it was pointed out before. Although the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic called the *Striltsi* to come west to help to defend the Western Ukrainian capital, the city of Lviv, against the Polish assault, they refused and remained loyal to the Directorate, ready to defend the capital of the Ukrainian National Republic, the city of Kyiv, as the center of Ukrainian nation. Those Western Ukrainians were very much correct, when they believed, that the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine could be preserved only, if maintained on her central territories on the banks of the Dnipro River with her capital in Kyiv, and that otherwise all struggle would be in vain. Also the Ukrainians from the Bukovyna region actively participated in the preparatory works for the planned anti-Hetman uprising under the leadership of Artym Halip.

The consolidation of the national forces under the leadership of the Directorate was almost complete in the political-partisan aspect as well. From the very start, all political parties and groups joined the common work of state construction; they participated in the legislative, civil administrative, military administrative and judicial processes. The Socialists-Marxists, such as Vynnychenko, Petlyura, Porsh, Mazepa, Chekhivskyy and many others; the Socialists of the ethical wing, the Socialists-Revolutionaries, such as, Hrushevskyy, Shapoval, Hryhoriyiv, Mytsiuk, Holubovych and Kovalevskyy; the Socialists-Federalists who represented somewhat the equivalent of the National-Democrats in Western Ukraine, such as Serhiy Yefremiv, Olexander Shulhyn, Serhiy Shelukhyn, Mykhaylo Korchynskyy and other leading educated people of the older generation; the Independentists-Socialists who corresponded, as far as their political attitude was concerned, to the modern Nationalists,

such as Panas Andriyevskyy, Olexander Makarenko and Lutsenko; National Republicans, Laborists and Farmers-Democrats, who corresponded to modern conservative groups; the National-Democrats from Galicia and Bukovyna, such as Dr. Dmytro Levytskyy, Yevhen Konovalets, Wasyl Mudryy; the Western Ukrainian Radicals, such as Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, Mykhaylo Matchak, Yaroslav Chyzh, Dr. Roman Dashkevych, Fedir Chernyk and those people who favored either the National-Democrats or Radicals in part, such as Andriy Melnyk, Yuliyany Chaykivskyy and other members of the *Sichovi Striltsi* formation; all those groups, as enumerated, constituted the broad political rainbow of various and, at times, opposing political philosophies and ideologies who showed an amazing national solidarity in joining the state construction process under the leadership of the Directorate of the U.N.R. The exception to the consolidated national front of all parties and groups were the *Borotbists*, the extreme-left Socialists-Revolutionaries, who did not dare at that time to oppose the Directorate openly and officially. The religious element was at that time absolutely unimportant. In the Council of Ministers, the Orthodox ministers cooperated with the Catholics of the Eastern Rite, (as Nazaruk) including some Catholic ministers of the Latin Rite as well, (as Korchynskyy).

As a matter of fact, one consolidated national front on the democratic base was the very feature of the political life of Ukraine in this period. At the same time, in Russia a bloody civil war was going on, so far unsuccessfully attempted to infect the Ukrainians with the same germ of class hatred, leading to a merciless war of brothers against brothers. Also in Poland, at that time, there were two political camps, which were struggling against each other: the official government camp of the Socialists and Populists under the leadership of the chief of state Józef Pilsudski and the Prime Minister Andrzej Moraczewski, and the nationalist one, led by Paderewski and Dmowski. In Poland, at the beginning of January, a *coup d'état* took place to overthrow Moraczewski's cabinet and to oust Pilsudski as the head of the state. Almost all ministers were imprisoned. Only with great difficulty was the rebellion subdued.

Five, it is important to underscore the fact of relative law and order prevailing in the Ukrainian National Republic in spite of the revolutionary turmoil blazing all over Europe. The Hetman regime was abolished, because it was largely non-Ukrainian, according to the contemporary evaluation. Yet, after a few days, the state government machinery was reestablished, supported by the general subordination of the public, the indispensable ingredient of any well organized national society. The difficulties were, however, enormous, especially in the provinces, provincial towns and townships, because of the mass migration of the Russian war prisoners from Germany

and Austria eastward, across Ukraine to Russia, and the evacuation of the hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian military units, which at first occupied Ukraine, but soon, after November 11, began also to move this time westward, across the country to reach their homes in Germany and Austria. This was a perfect atmosphere for the hostile and criminal elements to start riots and assaults (*pogroms*); yet, because of a general national enthusiasm and the successful completion of the uprising, those elements did not dare, at first, to initiate any serious troubles. Not only the Ukrainian, but also the foreign, and in particular, the Jewish writers, witnesses of those developments, asserted, that at this very time of the first period of the Directorate rule there were no disorder and turmoil in Ukraine, leading to some assault or *pogrom* excesses.⁴⁶⁸) The things were quite different and much more unfavorable at that time in Poland, for instance, where frequent anti-Jewish *pogrom*-assaults were taking place along with some Bolshevik and pro-Bolshevik riotings. On January 3, 1919, a nationalistic *coup d'etat*, led by Prince Eustachy Sapieha was attempted there. It meant, therefore, that the authority of the Directorate was unquestionable then, having secured relative law and order on the whole territory of the Ukrainian National Republic, which after the conclusion of the agreement of unification with the Western Ukrainian Republic, extended from the Syan River in the west to the Don River in the east.

No doubt, the Ukrainian national government had to have at its disposition proper armed forces to defend the land against foreign aggression. The organization of such armed force was one of the achievements of the Directorate, although the difficulties were considerable, since the organizational process was going on during a revolutionary time along with the parallel struggle against the Hetman government, supported by the German military and the rather strong White-Russian circles. The people were quite tired of war which had harassed Ukraine already for over five years, since the summer 1914, and here again the Directorate called for another military effort. Moreover, since March, 1917, the Bolshevik subversion was very active in Ukraine, promoting anti-military feelings throughout. Considerable parts of the country were destroyed and ruined by the previous world war operations, which moved across the land several times. The Bolshevik war invasion in early 1918 aggravated the over-all political and social situation. Subsequently certain measures, undertaken by the Hetman government, such as the punitive expeditions against the village population as reprisal for the land reform of the former government of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, exhausted the people. Finally, two weeks after the anti-Hetman uprising was initiated, a new Soviet war aggression began, on December 1, 1918. Amid those most unfavorable circum-

stances, the worst conditions any other country ever faced at that time, the Directorate began to organize its regular armed forces from the rather inadequate units of the army of the previous regime and the numerous insurgent troops. It must be emphasized at this point, that the Directorate succeeded in a rather short time and under the most adverse conditions to organize a rather well disciplined armed force, the morale of which was high and combat fitness effective, as the foreign eye-witnesses testified.⁶⁴⁹)

Finally, as the sixth aspect of the Directorate accomplishments, its internal policies and foreign diplomatic activities must be mentioned. The top agencies of the government were there not firm and vacillated considerably. Yet, the political moves of the Western governments, including the United States, were also showing considerable vacillations and unsteadiness. The general political stand of the Directorate, however, such as the position toward the Bolshevism, the attitude toward the new national states and the approach to the social problems, was more firm and steadfast, than that of the Western leaders and governments. The Western leaders at that time just did not know what policies to adopt or changed them frequently, while in the most fundamental questions, there was no wavering among the Ukrainian leadership to that extreme extent. Doubtedlessly, the firmness of the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian political parties and political leaders in their majority, showed and exhibited in their struggle for the independence and sovereignty of their land, must be considered a great achievement of the nation in distress. There were mistakes made and blunders committed; there were differences of views and opinions and there were vacillations, which together hurt the cause, but rather the external developments, more than these internal inadequacies, worked toward the fatal outcome of the Ukrainian struggle for independence.



DOCUMENTS

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(University South Dakota)

The (First) Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada to the Ukrainian People in Ukraine and abroad

Ukrainian Nation! Nation of peasants, workers, and toiling people!

By your will you have placed us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* [Council], on guard of the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian Land.

Your best sons, the elected people from villages, factories, soldiers' barracks, from all Ukrainian communities and societies have chosen us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* [Council], and ordered us to stand and fight for these rights and liberties.

Your elected people, Fellow Ukrainians, had expressed this desire:

Let Ukraine be free! Without separating from the entire Russia, without breaking away from the Russian state, let the Ukrainian nation have the right to guide its life on its own territory. Let the All-National Ukrainian *Soym* [Assembly], elected by all by an equal, direct, and secret vote, provide Ukraine with law and order. All laws which are to establish this order here, in Ukraine, can be properly issued only by our Ukrainian Assembly (*Soym*).

Those laws which are to establish order throughout the entire Russian state should be issued by the All-Russian Parliament.

No one knows better than we what is needed for us and which laws are best for us.

No one knows better than our peasants how to manage their land. And for this reason we wish that, after the land of the gentry, state, tsar, monasteries and others is taken away throughout the entire Russia and [made] the property of the nations according to a law issued by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly regarding this matter, the right to manage our Ukrainian land, the right to use it should belong solely to us, to the Ukrainian *Soym* [Assembly].

The elected representatives of the entire Ukrainian Country have spoken thusly.

Having this spoken they have elected from their midst us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* [Council] and ordered us to be at the head of our nation, to stand for its rights and to create a new order of the free, autonomous Ukraine.

And we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* [Council], have fulfilled the will of our people; we have taken upon ourselves a great burden of building a new life and [we] have begun this great task.

We thought that the Central Russian Government would extend its hand in this task, that in harmony with it we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* [Council], would be able to provide order for our country.

But the Temporary Russian Government rejected all our demands, pushed away the extended hand of the Ukrainian nation.

We have sent to Petrograd our delegates so that they could present our demands to the Temporary Government of Russia.

And the most important demands were the following:

That the Russian government, in a separate act declare publicly that it does not oppose the national will of Ukraine, the right of our nation to an autonomy.

That the Central Russian Government in all matters which concern Ukraine should have our Commissioner for Ukrainian affairs.

That the local authority in Ukraine would be unified in one representative of the Central Russian Government, i.e. in a Commissar of Ukraine, selected by us.

That a certain sum of money which is collected for the Central Treasury from our nation, would be given to us, the representatives of this nation, for its national-cultural needs.

The Central Russian Government rejected all our demands.

It did not want to declare whether it recognizes the right of our nation to an autonomy, its right to direct its own life. It evaded the issue by sending us to the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

The Central Russian Government did not want to have our Commissioner in it and [it] did not want to form a new order together with us.

Also it refused to recognize a Commissar for Ukraine so that we could, with him, lead our country to harmony and order.

It refused to return the money which is being collected from our land for the needs of our schools, education and organizations.

And now, Ukrainian Nation, we were forced to build our own fate. We cannot allow our country [to fall into] disorder and decay. If the Temporary Russian Government cannot provide us with order, if it does not want to join us in the great task, then we should assume it ourselves. It is our duty before our country and before those nationalities which live on our soil.

And for this reason we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, issue this Universal to our entire nation and declare:

from this day on we shall form our own life.

Thus let every member of our nation, every citizen of village or town, as of this day, know that the time for great task has come.

From this time on every village, every borough, every administration of city or of *zemstvo*, which stands for the interests of the Ukrainian nation, should have the closest organizational relations with the Central *Rada*.

In places where for some reason the administrative authority remained in the hands of people hostile to the Ukrainians we direct our citizens to develop a broad and energetic organization for the education of the people and then to elect the new administration.

In towns and places where the Ukrainian population lives together with other nationalities we direct our citizens to reach immediately an agreement and an understanding with the democracies of these nationalities and together with them to approach the preparation of a new proper life.

The Central *Rada* hopes that the non-Ukrainian nationalities living on our territory will also care for harmony and order in our country and in this difficult period of governmental disorder, harmoniously with us, will join us in the task of organizing Ukraine's autonomy.

And when we complete the preparatory organizational work we will convoke the representatives of all nationalities of Ukrainian territory and formulate its laws. These laws, the entire system which we will prepare, are to be confirmed by a law of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

Ukrainian Nation! Before your elective organ, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, stands a huge and tall wall which has to be toppled in order to reach a free path.

For this [task] strength is needed. Strong and brave hands are needed. A great national work is needed. And for the success of this work, first of all, considerable sums are needed. Up to this time the Ukrainian nation made all payments into the All-Russian Central Treasury and did not receive nor does it have now the share it should have [in return].

And for this reason we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, direct all organized citizens of villages and towns, all Ukrainian communal administrations and establishments to place, as of July 1, on the population a special tax for national cause which is to be sent punctually, immediately and regularly to the treasury of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.

Ukrainian Nation! Your fate is in your hands. During this difficult time of universal disorder and decomposition of the state,

prove by your unanimity and state reason that you, a nation of workers, a nation of agriculturalists, can proudly and with dignity stand by the side with every organized sovereign nation as an equal with an equal.

Resolved: Kyiv, June 10th, 1917.*)`

Ukrainian Central Rada

The (Second) Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

Citizens of Ukrainian Land!

The representatives of the Temporary Government informed us of certain measures to be taken by the Temporary Government in regard to the government in Ukraine until the Constituent Assembly.

The Temporary Government, standing on guard of the freedom won by the revolutionary people, recognizing the right of every nation to self-determination, and postponing the final established form until [the meeting of] the Constituent Assembly, extends its hand to the representative of the Ukrainian democracy — the Central *Rada* and urges to build harmoniously with it a new life for Ukraine for the benefit of the entire revolutionary Russia.

We, the Central *Rada*, having always taken the position that Ukraine should not be separated from Russia, that together with all her nationalities [we should] strive for the development and well-being of the entire Russia and the unity of her democratic forces, accept with satisfaction the call of the Government to unity and inform all citizens of Ukraine:

The Ukrainian Central *Rada*, elected by the Ukrainian nation through its revolutionary organizations, soon will be supplemented on just basis by representatives of other nationalities living in Ukraine, by their revolutionary organizations and then it will become the only supreme organ of the revolutionary democracy of Ukraine which will represent the interests of the entire population of our land.

The supplemented Central *Rada* will select anew from its composition a special organ, the General Secretariat, which will be presented for confirmation to the Temporary Government as the highest regional representative of authority of the Provisional Government in Ukraine.

*) The date June 10 was according Julian calendar. According to the Gregorian calendar the date meant: June 23.

This agency will embody all rights and means so that, as a representative of democracy of the entire Ukraine as well as the highest regional body of administration, it would have the opportunity to execute the complicated task of organization and arrangement of life in the entire country in harmony with the entire revolutionary Russia.

In accord with other nationalities in Ukraine and acting in matters of state administration as an organ of the Temporary Government, the General Secretariat of the Central *Rada* will firmly take the path to strengthen the new order, created by the revolution.

Striving after the autonomous order in Ukraine the Central *Rada*, in harmony with national minorities in Ukraine, will prepare legislation concerning the autonomous system of Ukraine to be proposed for the approval by the Constituent Assembly.

Considering that the formation of a regional body of the Temporary Government in Ukraine secures the desired rapprochement of the country's administration with the needs of the local population within the possible boundaries until the [meeting of] Constituent Assembly and acknowledging that the fate of all nations in Russia is tightly connected with the general gains of the revolution, we decidedly stand against the arbitrary realization of Ukraine's autonomy prior to [the meeting of] the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

And concerning the completion of Ukrainian military formations, the Central *Rada* will have for this purpose representatives in the Cabinet of the Military Minister, at the General Staff, and the Supreme Command who will participate in the attainment of separate formations made up exclusively of Ukrainians as far as such fulfillment, according to the definition of the Minister of Military Affairs, will appear possible from a technical point, without violating the combat capability of the army.

While informing the citizens of Ukraine of this, we firmly believe that the Ukrainian democracy, which had transferred its will to us, together with the revolutionary democracy of the entire Russia and her revolutionary Government will make every effort to lead the entire state and especially Ukraine to the complete celebration of the revolution.

Kyyiv, July 3, 1917.*)

Ukrainian Central Rada

*) According to the Gregorian calendar: July 16, 1917.

Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine

On the basis of an agreement with the Temporary Government of July 3 (16), 1917 the organ of the revolutionary democracy of all nations in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* which is to prepare Ukraine for the final realization of an autonomous order and to lead her to the Ukrainian Constituent All-National Assembly and the Russian Constituent Assembly, is forming the General Secretariat which is to be the highest body of administration in Ukraine.

The authority of the General Secretariat is extending temporarily by the following main points:

§ 1. The highest regional body of administration in Ukraine is the General Secretariat, appointed by the Central *Rada* and responsible to it and confirmed by the Temporary Government.

§ 2. The formation of the General Secretariat by the Central *Rada* is accomplished through its [Executive] Committee.

§ 3. The Central *Rada* confirms the General Secretariat in its entirety, expressing confidence in it.

§ 4. The General Secretariat consists of 14 General Secretaries: Secretary of internal affairs, finance, military, food, land, justice, education, nationalities, trade and commerce, post and telegraph, labor, roads, comptroller general, secretary general.

Note: Three deputy secretaries, for the Great Russians, Jews, and Poles — are appointed to the Secretariat for nationalities. The deputy secretaries in matters concerning their nationalities have the right of presentation and decision in these matters in the General Secretariat. The deputy secretaries for the national affairs are confirmed by the [Executive] Committee of the *Rada*.

§ 5. The General Secretariat realizes its authority through all official agencies in Ukraine.

§ 6. All official agencies in Ukraine are subordinated to the authority of the General Secretariat.

Note: The General Secretariat determines which offices, in which limits, and in which cases they can have direct relations with the Temporary Government [of Russia].

§ 7. All officials in Ukraine, if they are not elective, are appointed by the General Secretariat or the agencies, subordinated to it.

§ 8. Attached to the Temporary Government [of Russia] will be a State Secretary for Ukrainian Affairs, appointed by the Temporary Government with approval of the Central *Rada*.

§ 9. The State Secretary is to care for the interests of Ukraine in all actions of the Temporary Government and, in a case of need, to send the proposed laws through the General Secretariat for the consideration of the Central *Rada*.

§ 10. The General Secretariat sends to the Temporary Government for its sanction those proposed laws which had been considered and approved by the Central *Rada*.

§ 11. The General Secretariat submits for confirmation by the Temporary Government the temporary financial accounts of expenses for the needs of Ukraine which had been considered and approved by the Central *Rada*.

§ 12. The funds which flow to the account of the Central *Rada* are at the disposal of the General Secretariat for a budget approved by the Central *Rada*.

§ 13. The affairs which the General Secretariat considers to be of paramount importance are submitted for consideration by the Central *Rada*.

§ 14. The activities of the General Secretariat, responsible to the Central *Rada*, are controlled by interpellations concerning all matters.

Note: The order of questions has to be indicated through a special rule.

§ 15. During the recess between the sessions of the Central *Rada*, the General Secretariat is responsible to the [Executive] Committee of the Central *Rada* which executes all of its functions except the one set forth in § 3.

§ 16. When the General Secretariat disagrees with a resolution of the [Executive] Committee on any matter, the latter is passed on for consideration by the Central *Rada* which convenes immediately.

§ 17. When the Central *Rada* expresses lack of confidence in the General Secretariat, the latter resigns.

§ 18. All acts of the Central *Rada* and the [Executive] Committee are countersigned by the General Secretariat.

§ 19. All laws of the Temporary Government [of Russia] are in force in Ukraine from the day of their publication in the Regional Official Newsletter in the Ukrainian language.

Note: In special cases the General Secretariat makes them public by other means.

§ 20. All laws, administrative rules and resolutions made public in Ukrainian language will be also published in Russian, Jewish, and Polish languages.

§ 21. In matters concerning the internal work plan, the General Secretariat formulates its own rules.

Temporary Instruction for the General Secretariat by the Temporary Government of Russia

1. Until the time that the question of local administration is settled by the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat is

a higher office of the Temporary Government [of Russia] in matters of local administration in Ukraine, appointed by the Temporary Government at the suggestion of the Central *Rada*.

2. Authority of the General Secretariat extends to the provinces of Kyiv, Volyn, Podilya, Poltava, and Chernyiv but excluding the districts of Mhlyn, Surazh, Starodub, and Novozybkiv. It can be extended to other provinces or their parts if the *zemstvo* institutions, formed in those provinces on the basis of a resolution of the Temporary Government [of Russia], will express a desire for such an extension.

3. The General Secretariat consists of General Secretaries in the spheres of: a) internal affairs, b) finances, c) agriculture, d) education, e) trade and commerce, f) labor, and also of a General Secretary for Nationalities, and a Secretary General.

In addition the General Secretariat, for control of its affairs, has the Comptroller General who participates in the meetings of the General Secretariat with a right of a deciding vote.

Among the Secretaries not less than four should be individuals who do not belong to the Ukrainian nationality.

Within the Secretariat for National Affairs three posts of Deputy Secretaries are established so that all, most numerous nationalities in Ukraine would have their own representatives in the person of the Secretary or one of his Deputies.

4. The General Secretariat considers, develops, and submits for confirmation by the Temporary Government [of Russia] the projects which relate to the life of the country and its administration. These projects, before they are submitted to the Temporary Government, may be introduced for discussion of the Central *Rada*.

5. The authority of the Temporary Government [of Russia] in matters of regional administration which come into the competency of the departments listed in § 3 is realized through the General Secretaries. A more exact definition of these matters will be provided in a special amendment.

6. In all matters, mentioned in the previous article, the local authorities of the country consult the General Secretariat which, having communicated with the Temporary Government, convey the directives and orders of the latter to the local authorities.

7. The General Secretariat submits a list of candidates to official posts, whose duties pertain to matters described in article 5, which are filled by appointment [on the part] of the Temporary Government.

8. The relations of higher state institutions and individual civil departments with the Secretariat and individual Secretaries of a given fields, as well as, [the relations] of the latter with higher state institutions and departments take place through a spe-

cial Commissar of Ukraine in Petrograd, appointed by the Temporary Government; in the same manner all designs and projects dealing with foreign affairs which pertain to the local matters of Ukraine are dealt with; as well as those designs of general-state significance which will arise in separate departments or which will be discussed in the interdepartmental and departmental commissions and which will demand, because of their special relation to Ukraine, the participation of the government's representative, the Commissioner, in the mentioned commissions.

9. In immediate and pressing cases the higher state institutions and the departments convey their orders to the local authorities directly, simultaneously informing the Secretariat of these orders.

Petrograd, August 4, 1917.*)

Signed:

Minister-President Kerensky
Minister of Justice Zarudny

The (Third) Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

Ukrainian Nation and all nationalities in Ukraine!

A hard and difficult hour has descended upon the land of the Russian Republic. In the north, in the capitals, a civil war and a bloody struggle is taking place. The central government does not exist and the lawlessness, disorder, and ruin spread throughout the state.

Our country is also in danger. Without a strong, unified, and national authority, Ukraine can also fall into the bottomless pit of strife, slaughter, and decay.

Ukrainian Nation! You, together with the brotherly nationalities of Ukraine, had placed us to protect the rights gained by the struggle, to create order and to build all aspects of life in our land. And we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, by your will, in the name of creation of order in our country, and in the name of saving entire Russia, declare:

As of today Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian National Republic.

Without separating from the Russian Republic and maintaining its unity, we firmly shall stand on our land in order to help entire Russia with our strength, in order that the entire Russian Republic may become a federation of equal and free nations.

*) The date according Gregorian calendar is August 17.

Until the [meeting of] Constituent Assembly of Ukraine, all authority to establish order on our territories, to pass laws and to govern belongs to us — the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and our government — The General Secretariat of Ukraine.

Possessing the strength and authority in our native land we will, with this strength and authority, stand on guard of the rights and of the revolution not only for our land but also for the entire Russia.

Thus we declare:

To the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic belong the lands settled by the Ukrainian majority: [provinces of] Kyiv, Podilya, Volyn, Chernyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, Tavria (without Crimea). The final determination of boundaries of the Ukrainian National Republic regarding the joining of parts of the provinces of Kursk, Kholm, Voronizh and the bordering provinces and districts where the majority of the population is Ukrainian, has to be established according to the organized will of the people.

Let it be known to all of the population of these territories:

From this day, on the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic the existing right of ownership regarding the land of the gentry and other lands of unproductive estates of agricultural significance as well as of the hereditary, monastic, cabinet, and church lands, is null and void.

Admitting that all lands are the property of the entire laboring population and are to become its property without compensations, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* instructs the General Secretary for Agrarian Affairs to formulate immediately a law having to do with the administration of that land by the land committees, elected by the people, up to the time of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

The labor of the working population within the Ukrainian National Republic has to be brought to order immediately.

As of this day at all places of business on the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic an eight hour work day is established.

The difficult and terrible time experienced by the entire Russia as well as Ukraine demands well organized means of production, equal division of consumer products, and a better organization of labor. Therefore we are directing the General Secretariat of Labor to establish as of this day, together with the representatives of labor, a state control over the production in Ukraine, caring for the interests of Ukraine as well as those of entire Russia.

For the fourth year blood flows at the fronts, the strength of nations of the entire world, dies uselessly. By the will and in the name of the Ukrainian Republic we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, will firmly take the stand to establish peace as soon as possible.

For this purpose we will use decisive measures, through the central government, to force the Allies and the enemy to undertake peace negotiations immediately.

We shall see to it that at the Peace Congress the rights of the Ukrainian nation in Russia and outside Russia will not be violated by the armistice. But until peace [comes], every citizen of the Republic of Ukraine together with citizens of all nations of the Russian Republic should firmly stand on their positions, on the front as well as in the rear.

Lately, the bright gains of the revolution have been darkened by the reintroduction of the death penalty. We declare:

As of today, the death penalty on the territory of the Ukrainian Republic is revoked.

All imprisoned and detained persons for political utterances made to this day, as well as those who had been sentenced and those who are yet to be [tried], as well as those who were not brought in to face their responsibility, are granted a complete amnesty. A law will be passed immediately concerning this matter.

The court in Ukraine should be just, corresponding to the spirit of the nation.

Toward this goal we direct the General Secretariat of Justice to make every effort to bring the judiciary to order and to bring it into harmony with the legal concepts of the nation.

The General Secretary for Internal Affairs is directed:

To make every effort to strengthen and to broaden the rights of the local self-administration which is the arm of the higher administrative authority in the area and to establish the closest contact and cooperation with the bodies of the revolutionary democracy which is to form the best foundation for a free, democratic life.

Also in the Ukrainian National Republic all liberties, which had been won by the Russian revolution, are to be secured: the freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, unions, strikes, inviolability of person and dwelling, and the right and the opportunity to use the local language in dealing with all institutions.

The Ukrainian nation, having fought for many years for its national freedom and having gained it today, will firmly defend the freedom of national development of all nationalities living in Ukraine; therefore we declare that for the Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other nationalities in Ukraine we recognize the national-personal autonomy for securing them their right and freedom of self-government in matters of national life and direct the General Secretary for National Affairs to provide us in the nearest future with a legislation concerning the national-personal autonomy.

The question of provision is the root of state's strength in this hard and responsible time. The Ukrainian National Republic

should make every effort to save itself as well as the front and those parts of the Russian Republic which need our help.

Citizens! In the name of the Ukrainian National Republic within the federated Russia we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, call upon all to a decisive fight with disorder and destruction of all kind and to a friendly and great building of new state forms which will provide the great and weary Republic of Russia with health, strength and a new future. Formulation of these forms is to be achieved at the Ukrainian and All-Russian Constituent Assemblies.

December 27, 1917*) has been selected as the day of elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and January 9, 1918 — as the day of its convocation.

A law concerning the order of convoking the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly will be issued immediately.

In Kyiv, November 7, 1917.

Ukrainian Central Rada

The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

People of Ukraine!

By your strength, will, and word a Free Ukrainian National Republic was established on the Ukrainian Land. The former old dream of your fathers, fighters for freedom and the rights of the working people has come true.

But the freedom of Ukraine was reborn in a difficult hour. Four years of vicious war have weakened our country and the population. Factories are not producing goods, [works at the] plants are coming to a stand still, the railroads are dislocated, the money is losing its value, the bread has grown scarcer — hunger is approaching. Bands of robbers and thieves sprang up throughout the country, especially when [Russian] troops pulled back from the front, causing carnage, disorder and ruin in our land.

For these various reasons the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly could not take place at the time designated by our previous Universal and the meeting designed for this day could not be held so that [the Assembly] could take over from us the temporary revolutionary authority in Ukraine, to establish order in our National Republic, and to organize a new government.

*) All dates are here according the old "Julian calendar" which is 13 days late.

In the meantime, the Petrograd Government of People's Commissars, in order to place the free Ukrainian Republic under its authority, has declared war against Ukraine and is dispatching troops into our land — the Red Guard, the Bolsheviki who rob bread from our peasants and carry it off to Russia without any compensation, not sparing even the grain prepared for planting; they kill innocent people and everywhere they spread disorder, thievery, and chaos.

We, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, made every effort to avoid the fratricidal war between the two neighboring nations but the Petrograd government did not do likewise and continues the bloody fight with our people and the Republic. Furthermore, the very same Petrograd Government of People's Commissars is delaying the peace efforts and calls for a new war, naming it "holy." Once more the blood will flow, again the unfortunate working people are to lay down their lives.

We, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, elected by the congresses of peasants, workers, and soldiers of Ukraine, cannot agree to this and will not support any war because the Ukrainian Nation desires peace and a democratic peace should come as soon as possible.

And so that neither the Russian government nor any other should place obstacles for Ukraine in establishing the desired peace and to lead our country to order, to a creative work, to strengthen the revolution and our freedom we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, inform all citizens of Ukraine of the following:

From this day on the Ukrainian National Republic becomes an independent, self-dependent, free, sovereign State of the Ukrainian Nation.

With all neighboring states such as Russia, Poland, Austria, Roumania, Turkey and others we want to live in peace and friendship but none of them can interfere with the life of an independent Ukrainian Republic. Its authority will belong only to the People of Ukraine and in its name, until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly convenes, we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the representatives of working peasants, workers, and soldiers, shall govern together with our executive organ which as of today shall have the name of Council of National Ministers.

[And this] first of all we direct the government of our Republic, the Council of National Ministers [to do], as of this day to conduct peace negotiations with the Central Powers, which already had began, completely independently and to bring them to a conclusion, disregarding any obstacles from any other part of the former Russian Empire and to establish peace so that our country can begin life in peace and harmony.

Regarding the so-called Bolsheviki and other aggressors who are destroying our country we direct the Government of the Ukrain-

ian National Republic to take firm and decisive measures against them and we call upon all citizens of our Republic to defend the welfare and the freedom without regard for their life. Our National Ukrainian State should be cleared of the attackers sent from Petrograd who trample the rights of the Ukrainian Republic.

Immeasurably hard war, started by the *bourgeois* government, exhausted our Nation, already destroyed our country, ruined the economy. Now all of this must come to an end.

At the time when the army will be demobilized, we direct that some soldiers are to be released to their homes and after the peace treaties had been ratified, to dissolve the army completely; then, instead of a permanent army to create a national militia so that our troops would serve in the defense of the working people rather than the desires of the ruling strata.

Localities ruined by the war and demobilization are to be reconstructed with the help of our state treasury.

When our soldiers reach home, the people's councils — borough and county — and the city *dumas* are to be reelected at a prescribed future time so that also our soldiers would have chance to vote. In order to establish a local authority which would enjoy the confidence and which would find support from all revolutionary democratic segments of the population, the Government should invite the cooperation (with the bodies of local self-government) of the councils of peasants, workers, and soldiers deputies, elected from among the local population.

In the matter of land, the commission elected at our last session, has already worked out a law concerning the transference of land to the working population without compensation, having accepted as the basis the abolishment of ownership and the socialization of land according to our resolution at the eighth session. This law will be examined in a few days by the plenary Central *Rada*. The Council of National Ministers will use all means [to see to it] that the transfer of land into the hands of working people through the land committees will definitely take place before the spring works.

The forests, waters, and all underground wealth, as a property of the Ukrainian working population, is placed at the disposal of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The war has also claimed for itself all the working forces of our country. The majority of plants, factories and shops have been producing only what was necessary for war and the population was left entirely without goods. Now the war is over. Therefore we direct the Council of National Ministers to take immediate measures to adjust all plants and factories to peacetime conditions, for the production of goods needed, first of all, by the toiling masses.

This very same war has given birth to hundreds of thousands of unemployed as well as invalids. In an Independent National Republic of Ukraine not one worker should suffer. The Government of the Republic is to upraise the industry of the State, has to initiate the constructive work in all branches in which all unemployed would be able to find work and to utilize their force, and to make every effort to provide security for the maimed and those who have suffered from the war.

In the time of the old regime traders and various middle men had amassed great capitals at the expense of the poor, suppressed classes. From this day on the Ukrainian National Republic is taking over the most important branches of trade and all profits will be returned for the benefit of the people. Our State will supervise the import and export of foods in order to prevent the high costs which are suffered by our poorest classes because of the speculators. For the execution of this [directive] we instruct the Government to prepare and submit for approval a law dealing with this as well as [a law] concerning the monopoly on iron, leather, tobacco, and other products and goods from which most profits were taken from the working classes for the benefit of non-working people.

Also we direct to establish state-national control over all banks which with credits and loans helped the non-working classes to exploit the working classes. From this day on help in the form of bank loans is to be given mainly for the support of labor and for the development of national economy of the Ukrainian National Republic rather than for speculation and various exploitation and gain on the part of the banks.

Founded on disorder, uneasy life and the lack of goods, dissatisfaction is growing in some part of the population. Various dark forces take advantage of this dissatisfaction and prod the ignorant people toward the old regime. These dark forces want once more to submit all free nations to a unified tsarist yoke of Russia. The Council of National Ministers should fight decisively against counter-revolutionary forces. And anyone who will urge an insurrection against the Independent Ukrainian National Republic, to return to the old regime, should be punished for state treason.

All democratic freedoms proclaimed by the Third Universal, the Ukrainian National Republic reaffirms and especially proclaims: in the Independent Ukrainian National Republic all nationalities enjoy the right of national-personal autonomy, recognized by us through a law of January 9th.

If we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, will not be able to accomplish in the following weeks the goals listed in this Universal, they will be completed and achieved ultimately by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.


We order our citizens to conduct the election to it very carefully; to take every measure to count the votes as quickly as possible, so that in a few weeks our Constituent Assembly — the supreme master and arranger of our Land — would strengthen liberty, order and welfare by a constitution of the Independent Ukrainian National Republic for the benefit of the entire working population, for the present and for the future.

This highest body is to decide [the matter of] federative union with the national republics of the former Russian state.

Up to that time we call upon all citizens of the Independent Ukrainian National Republic to stand firmly on guard of the gained freedom and the rights of our nation and to defend with every effort the liberty from all enemies of the Independent Ukrainian Republic of peasants and workers.

In Kiev, 9 (22) January, 1918.

Ukrainian Central Rada



NOTES

PART I

Chapter 1

1) Михайло Грушевський: Історія України-Руси. Томи VII-IX. Наукове Тов. ім. Шевченка. Львів — Київ, 1901 — 30. — Михайло Грушевський: Як творилася Українська Держава. "Вістник Визволення України". Відень, 1918. Стор. 433 і наст. — Іван Крип'якевич і Микола Голубець: Велика історія України. Вид. Івана Тиктора, друге вид. Вінніпер, 1948. Стор. 543 і наст. — Володимир Винниченко: Відродження нації. (Історія української революції, марець 1917 — грудень 1919). Вид. "Дзвін". Відень, 1919. Том I. — Павло Христюк: Замітки і матеріали до історії української революції 1917-1920. Том I. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Відень, 1921. — Дмитро Дорошенко: Історія України. 1917-1923. Том I. Доба Центральної Ради. Ужгород, 1932.

2) Great Britain was the first great power in the First World War which had formulated "the national principle" for the settlement of the permanent world peace. See: Lloyd George: *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*. Vol. I. New Heaven, 1937, p. 12. — Charles Seymour: *Intimate Papers of Col. Edward House*. Boston - New York, 1926, vol. IV, pp. 198-200. — Robert Lansing: *The Peace Negotiations. Personal Narrative*. Boston-New York, 1921. — Thomas A. Barley: *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*. New York, 1948.

3) The basic developments of the March Revolution in Russia: Христюк, I, 5-13. — Винниченко, I, 24-27. — Дорошенко, I, 40 і наст. — Грушевський: Як творилася Українська Держава, "Вістник" 1918, стор. 433 і наступні. — Володимир Короленко: Як упала царська влада, "Вістник", 1917, стор. 744 і наст. — Ген. А. Деникин: *Очерки русской смуты*, Берлін, 1925. — І. Мазепа: *Україна в огні і бурі революції*. Том I. "Прометей". Авґсбург, 1951. — І. Мазепа: *Підстави нашого відродження*. Томи I-II. "Прометей". Авґсбург, 1949. — П. Н. Миллюков: *История второй русской революции*. Том I. Париж, 1927. — Victor Chernov: *The Great Russian Revolution*. New Heaven, 1936. — Gen. A. Denikin: *The Russian Termoil. Memiors...* London. — Alexander Kerensky: *The Catastrophe*. New York, 1927. — I. N. Steinberg: *In the Workshop of the Revolution*. New York, 1954. — L. Trotsky: *The History of the Russian Revolution*. Vol. I-II. New York, 1936. — Alexander Kerensky - Robert Paul Broeder: *The Russian Provisional Government. Selected Documents*. Stanford University Press. 1965. — Trotsky's Papers, 1917-1922. Edited and Commented by Ian Mayer. The Hague, 1968.

4) Грушевський: Як утворилася Українська Держава, "Вістник", 1918, стор. 506-508. — Христюк I, 13-38. — Винниченко I, 78-84. — Дорошенко I, 40 і наст.

5) Дорошенко I, 57-59. — Христюк I, 48-51. — Винниченко I, 87-94. — "Вістник" 1917, стор. 304-311, 327-332, 344-345. (Here is the fullest record of the proceedings of the Ukrainian National Congress).

6) *Ibidem*.

7) Дорошенко I, 69-85.

8) Винниченко I, 41-48. — Христюк I, 41-65. — "Вістник" 1917, стор. 275, 277-278, 291-292, 306-309, 346-347, 356-357, 386-388, 402-404.

9) Дорошенко I, 84-85.

10) About the continuation of the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, especially by the Ukrainian military units see: *By-Laws of the Ukrainian Hetman Polubotok Military Club, organized by Mykola Mikhnovskyy, "Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 309-309.* — The proceedings and resolutions of the First Ukrainian Military Congress ("Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 386-88, 402-404); the story about the organization of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky

Regiment in "Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 372, 375; about the movement of organizing other Ukrainian military units in the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary: Винниченко, I, 125-145.

11) The full text of the memorandum of the Rada: Христюк, I, 72-74.

12) Христюк, 74 і наст.

13) The negotiations of the delegation of the Rada with the Provisional Government of Russia: Винниченко, I, 149-170. — Khrystyuk describes the negative answer of the Provisional Government verbatim, I, 60-64.

14) Дорошенко I, 4-39. — Христюк I, 5-13. — Винниченко I, 31-40.

15) The full text of the First Universal: Христюк, I, 72-74. — Дорошенко, I, 98-92. — Винниченко, I, 219-224.

16) Христюк I, 74-76. — Дорошенко I, 91-92. — Винниченко I, 322-325. — Грушевський: Повороту нема. ("Народна Воля", Київ, 12 квітня 1917).

17) Христюк I, 77-78. — Дорошенко I, 95-96.

18) Христюк I, 76-89. — Дорошенко I, 69-98. — Винниченко I, 225-250. — "Вістник" 1917, стор. 465 і наст. — Грушевський: Як утворилася Укр. Держава, "Вістник", 506-507.

19) Ibidem.

20) The text of the manifesto of the Russian Provisional Government: Христюк, I, 90.

21) Винниченко I, 265-268. — "Вістник" 1917, стор. 340-343, 377-378, 394-395, 401-402, 467-468, 482-487, 499.

22) "Вістник" 1917, стор. 498-499.

23) The Russian Provisional Government by Kerensky - Broeder. — Винниченко, I, 240-244. — "Вістник", стор. 501, 514, 520.

24) Many members of the Rada had absented themselves, hence the majority for the ratification was slim.

25) To emphasize full civil rights of the national minorities in Ukraine, the Second Universal of the Rada had been published officially not only in Ukrainian, but also in Russian, Jewish, and Polish. On the other hand the Russian Provisional Government had published all laws, executive orders and declarations only in Russian, although in the former Russian Empire, besides the Ukrainians, lived millions of Byelorussians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians etc.

26) The text of the Second Universal: Христюк, I, 92-93.

27) Грушевський: Як творилася..., "Вістник", 1918, стор. 506, 507.

28) Дорошенко I, 120-121.

29) The Statute in full text: Дорошенко, I, 124-125. — Христюк, I, 96-97.

30) Христюк I, 96-97. — Винниченко I, 293-297. — М. Шаповал: Велика Українська Революція і визвольна програма. "Вільна Спілка". Прага, 1928. — М. Стахів: Державно-правний розвиток УНР і різні етапи советської влади в Україні (Альманах Українського Народного Союзу на 1968, Джерзі Сити).

31) Ibidem.

32) Винниченко I, 302-303.

33) An evident proof of this attitude of all Ukrainian parties are the speeches at the All-Ukrainian National Congress ("Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 330 and following, and a special paragraph of the First Universal).

34) See: Nolde's article: Khrystyuk I, 97-98; other views see: "Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 407-409, 467-458, 482, 484-486, 499, 514, 518-520.

35) Винниченко I, 307-315.

36) The text of the Provisional Instruction: Khrystyuk I, 114-115.

37) For the detailed evaluation of the Provisional Instruction see: Stachiw, Ibidem.

38) Ibidem.

39) The text of the resolution: Khrystyuk I, 118-119.

40) Khrystyuk I, 119-120.

41) Ibidem.

42) I. Mazepa, I. — Doroshenko, I, 139 and fol. A noted Ukrainian patriot and publisher, Yevhen Chykalenko, lived at that time on his estate in the province of Kherson which had been separated from autonomous Ukraine by the Russian Government and attached to the Russian administra-

tion. He mentioned in his memoirs that because under the Russian administration had developed very soon many Russian nationalist anarchic conditions, but wealthy people, were active to separate Kherson province from the Russian administration and to attach it to autonomous Ukraine. One of them, a relative of the President of the last Russian Duma, M. Rodzianko, told Chykalenko that he would now prefer to see Ukraine as an independent republic (See memoirs of Chykalenko: Євген Чикаленко: Уривок з моїх споминів за 1917 р. Прага, 1932. Вид. "Українського Акад. Комітету". Стор. 19-20.

⁴³⁾ Stachiw, *ibidem*. — Kerensky: *The Catastrophe*.

⁴⁴⁾ Doroshenko I, 157-158. — Steinberg, *ibidem*.

⁴⁵⁾ For the details see: Kerensky: *The Provisional Government*. Milyukov, *ibidem*. — Rafael Abramovich: *The Soviet Revolution 1917-1919*. London, 1962.

Chapter 2

⁴⁶⁾ Khrystyuk II, 36-46. — Doroshenko I, 160-163.

⁴⁷⁾ Doroshenko I, 166-173. — Khrystyuk II, 47-50. — "Vistnyk", 1917, pp. 770, 773-774, 813-816.

⁴⁸⁾ Khrystyuk II, 49-51. — Doroshenko I, 176-179.

⁴⁹⁾ Hrushevskyy, *ibidem*. — Khrystyuk II, 53.

⁵⁰⁾ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹⁾ Doroshenko I, 181-182.

⁵²⁾ The text of the Third Universal: Khrystyuk II, 51-53.

⁵³⁾ М. Стахів: Коли і як реально відновилася Українська Держава ("Народна Воля", Скрантон, 1968, чч. 44-45). — Стахів: Державна і міжнародно-правна якість Третього Універсалу (Науковий Збірник УТГІ, Мюнхен, 1968). — Стахів: Чи проголошення УНР було спізнене ("Народна Воля", Скрантон, 1968, чч. 42-48).

⁵⁴⁾ *Ibidem*. Also; — Doroshenko I, 212-213.

⁵⁵⁾ Khrystyuk II, 44.

⁵⁶⁾ "Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 738, 799, 815. — "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 253, 279. — Stachiw, *Derzhavna...*

⁵⁷⁾ N. N. Sukhanov: *The Russian Revolution. A Personal Record*. — George Vermadsky: *Lenin. The Red Dictator*. New Heaven, pp. 100 and fol.

⁵⁸⁾ Victor Chernov: *The Great Russian Revolution*. New Heaven, 1936.

— Michael Florinsky: *Russia. A History and an Interpretation*. New York, 1965. — R. Pipes: *The Formation of the Soviet Union 1917 - 1921*. New York, 1931.

⁵⁹⁾ Stachiw, *ibidem*. — The results of those elections had been published later in "Arkhyv Radyanskoyi Ukrayiny" Nr. I, Kharkiv, and in non-Communist sources: "Vistnyk" 1917, pp. 783 and fol. — On the territory of all gubernias of the former Russian Empire (except those under the German military occupation) the list of the Russian Bolshevik Party received only 23% of the votes. In Russia proper the Bolshevik candidates received some what more, but still a minority. Anyway, the results of those elections in Ukraine had been for the Bolsheviks catastrophic: they brought for the Bolsheviks less than 10% of all votes.

⁶⁰⁾ Doroshenko I, 254-255.

^{60a)} The results of the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly are here for the first time put together from Ukrainian gubernias on the basis of the contemporary news papers in Ukraine, repeated in "Vistnyk" 1918 and analyzed by Stachiw, *ibidem*.

⁶¹⁾ Doroshenko I, 250-254.

⁶²⁾ *Ibidem*.

⁶³⁾ For the first proclamation of the Soviet Government: — Stachiw: *Ukraine and Russia. An Outline of History of Political and Military Relations* (December 1917 — April 1919), Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1967, pp. 9-12, where an evaluation of the coat of weapons of the Soviet

Union is given: the entire earth globe. Also see: Д. А. Чугаєва: Хрестоматія по історії СРСР, 1917-1925. Акад. Н. СРСР, Москва, 1963.

64) І. М. Кулинич і М. М. Кошик: Революційна діяльність комуністичної групи "Спартак" на Україні (1918-1919). Академія Наук УРСР. Київ 1959. — П. М. Калиниченко, гол. редактор: Зарубіжні інтернаціоналісти в рядах борців за владу рад на Україні 1917-1920. Академія Наук УРСР. Київ, 1967. — В. Антонов-Овсенко: Записки о гражданской войне. Том I-IV. Гос.-Воен. Издат. Москва, 1933.

65) L. Trotsky: Stalin. Publ. by Harpers, New York, p. 264 and fol. — Khrystyuk II, 37 and fol. — Doroshenko I, 201 and fol. — М. Скрипник: Начерк історії пролетарської революції на Україні. "Червоний Шлях", I-IV, Харків, 1923. — М. Стахів: Звідки взялася советська влада в Україні і хто її будував. Наукова Бібліотека Укр. Вільної Громади, Скрантон, 1955. — М. Равич-Черкаський: История Коммунистической Партии на Украине. Госиздат. Харьков, 1923.

66) Ibidem.

67) Khrystyuk II, 66 and fol. — Doroshenko I, 219 and fol. — М. Стахів: Перша Советська республіка в Україні. Наукова Бібліотека Вільної Громади. Нью Йорк, 1957, стор. 16 і наст.

68) Khrystyuk II, 91 and fol. — Doroshenko I, 226 and fol.

69) Khrystyuk II, 93. — Doroshenko, ibidem. — Stachiw, ibidem, 46.

70) Ген. Олександр Удовиченко: Українська Армія у війні за державність. Вид. Д. Микитюка. Вінніпег, 1954, стор. 17 і наст. — "Вістник" 1918, стор. 73 і наст. — В. Антонов-Овсенко: Записки, том I. — Стахів: Перша сов. республіка в Україні, стор. 91 і наст.

71) Skrypnyk, ibidem. — Antonov-Ovsyeyenko, ibidem. — Stachiw, ibidem.

72) Грушевський: Як творилася..., Україна самостійна. "Вістник" 1918, стор. 516 і наст. — Грушевський: Українська самостійність і її історична необхідність. "Вістник" 1918, стор. 170 і наст.

73) Hrushevskyy, ibidem. — Doroshenko I, 266 and fol. — Khrystyuk II, 102 and fol. — "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 56 and fol.

74) "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 50 and fol. — Doroshenko I, 263 and fol.

75) The full text of the Fourth Universal: Khrystyuk II, 103-106.

76) The text of this law: Doroshenko I, 274-276. For material of the Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the years 1917-1920 see: С. Гольдельман: Жидівська автономія на Україні. Інститут Дослідів СРСР. Мюнхен, 1956.

77) Doroshenko, ibidem.

78) Stachiw: Why the Jewish problem has been connected with Ukraine. Symposium: Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. New York, 1962.

79) Ibidem.

80) Дмитро Дорошенко: Мої спомини про недавнє минуле. Том I. "Червона Калина", Львів, 1924.

81) М. Шаповал: Революційний соціалізм на Україні. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Відень, 1921. — Шаповал: Велика Укр. Революція... — Христюк, IV, 4.

82) The text of the Land Act: Khrystyuk II, 128-133.

83) The text of this law: "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 173-174.

84) Doroshenko I, 330 and fol.

85) Ibidem. — The text: Khrystyuk II, 178-181.

86) Hrushevskyy in "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 268-269. — Khrystyuk II, 156 and fol.

87) Khrystyuk, ibidem. — Д. Дорошенко: Історія України 1917-1923. Укр. Гетьманська Держава. Том II. Ужгород, 1930.

Chapter 3

88) The characteristics of the Ukrainian parties: — Khrystyuk I-II in proper chapters. — М. Стахів: Українські політичні партії з соціологічного погляду. Наукова Бібліотека Вільної Громади. Скрантон, 1954.

⁹⁰⁾ In the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly the Ukrainian conservative groups had won only insignificant percentage of the mandates (1.36%) and the Russian conservatives and extreme rightists near zero (0.96%); the German candidates — 0.48%, the Jewish Zionist groups — 4.36%. There must be kept in mind that the electoral law had a proportional division of all mandates and the majority votes could not capture all mandates. (See: Стахів: Державна..., стор. 70-72).

⁹¹⁾ Khrystyuk, *ibidem*. — Doroshenko II, pp. 5 and fol. — Theophil Hornykewicz: Ereignisse in der Ukraine... Vol. I-III. Lypynsky's Historical Institute. Philadelphia, 1966-1968. — The debate over the German interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine see: proceedings of the Rada reprinted in "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 298-302.

⁹²⁾ Doroshenko, *ibidem*.

⁹³⁾ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁴⁾ Hornykiewicz II, contains a series of the secret reports of the German and Austrian diplomatic and military representatives to their authorities in Berlin and Vienna about the resolute view of the Rada and the government of the U.N.R. and the proposal that the Rada and the government of the U.N.R. should be forcibly replaced by another government. The new government had to be obliged to accept the dictated conditions of the German Staff.

⁹⁵⁾ The reports about the proceedings of the open session of the Rada and the protests against Eichhorn's interference: "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 298-302.

⁹⁶⁾ Hornykiewicz, *ibidem*. — Doroshenko II, 18 and fol., 30 and fol.

⁹⁷⁾ Hornykiewicz, *ibidem*.

⁹⁸⁾ Doroshenko, *ibidem*.

⁹⁹⁾ Doroshenko II, pp. 31-32.

¹⁰⁰⁾ Khrystyuk II, 164 and fol.

¹⁰¹⁾ Khrystyuk II, 166 and fol.

¹⁰²⁾ *Ibidem*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁰³⁾ Khrystyuk II, 174. — Doroshenko II, 35-41.

¹⁰⁴⁾ The text of the Hramota: Doroshenko II, 49-50.

¹⁰⁵⁾ The constitutional analysis of the Hramota: Стахів: Гетьманський режим в 1918 і його державно-правна якість. Скретон, 1950.

¹⁰⁶⁾ Doroshenko II, 50-53.

¹⁰⁷⁾ The text: Doroshenko II, 372 and fol.

¹⁰⁸⁾ *Ibidem*, 158-160.

¹⁰⁹⁾ *Ibidem*, 252-253.

¹¹⁰⁾ *Ibidem*, 215 and fol.

¹¹¹⁾ Doroshenko, I.

¹¹²⁾ Doroshenko II, 403 and fol. Дорошенко: Мої спомини про недавнє минуле. — М. Шаповал: Гетьманщина і Директорія. Нью Йорк, 1959. — Виниченко, III, 91, 116.

¹¹³⁾ The text of the peace treaty in Berestya with Soviet Russia: Stachiw: Ukraine and Russia, pp. 195-196.

¹¹⁴⁾ Стахів: Перша сов. республіка, 187 і наст.

¹¹⁵⁾ Khrystyuk II, 182-184.

¹¹⁶⁾ Doroshenko II, 162-164.

¹¹⁷⁾ The text: Doroshenko II, 162-164.

¹¹⁸⁾ Doroshenko, *ibidem*.

¹¹⁹⁾ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁰⁾ *Ibidem*.

¹²¹⁾ Doroshenko II, 166-167.

¹²²⁾ Doroshenko II, 269 and fol.

Chapter 4

¹²³⁾ Khrystyuk II, *ibidem*.

¹²⁴⁾ Excerpts of Hetman's memoirs in "Khliborobska Ukraina", Vol. IV, Vienna. 1923. — Doroshenko II, 26 and fol.

- 125) Khrystyuk III, 32 and fol. — Doroshenko II, 60 and fol. — Mytsyuk, ibidem. — Khrystyuk III, 60 and fol. — Doroshenko II, 103 and fol.
- 126) Ibidem.
- 127) Khrystyuk III, 63-66. — Doroshenko II, 103-104.
- 128) Khrystyuk III, 87-90. — Doroshenko II, 386 and fol.
- 129) Ibidem.
- 130) Doroshenko II, 389.
- 131) See the documents: Hornykiewicz, ibidem.
- 132) Doroshenko I, 389.
- 133) Ibidem.
- 134) Ibidem.
- 135) Khrystyuk III, 70 and fol. — Doroshenko II, 419 and fol. — Andriyevskyy, ibidem. — Mytsyuk, ibidem.
- 136) Ibidem.
- 137) Краткая записка истории взаимоотношений Добровольческой Армии съ Украиной. 1918 г. Ростовъ н. Д. Стор. 4-15.
- 137) Dmytro Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 394.
- 138) Doroshenko II, 390-391.
- 140) The political and the socio-economic program of all Russian parties concerning especially Ukraine: "Vistnyk" 1918, pp. 319-322.
- 141) "Dobrovolcheskaya Armiya". — Hornykiewicz, ibidem. From the secret documents of the German and Austrian High Command is evident that they already in the last days of September 1918 anticipated the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Hence they decided to press on Hetman that he should organize a major Ukrainian army to defend his country against Bolshevism. Unfortunately Hetman did organize only numerous cadres but not ready mobilized fighting divisions. To make effective mobilization of a big national army required a Government of National Unity, but to such a policy in that time Hetman was not inclined.
- 142) See the typed manuscript page 10.
- 143) The list of the new cabinet ministers: Prime Ministers S. N. Gerbel; members of the cabinet — were all members of the Russian Constitutional Party (also under the name: Russian Party of the National Freedom) and only one of them declared himself to be Ukrainian; one of them was a Jew.
- 144) Шаповал: Гетьманщина і Директорія. — Віктор Андрієвський: З минулого. Том I (last chapter) and Volume II the first chapter. "Українське Слово", Berlin, 1923.
- 145) Ibidem.
- 146) Ibidem.
- 147) Ibidem.
- 148) Vynnychenko III, 92-97.
- 149) Shapoval, ibidem.
- 150) Ibidem.
- 151) Ibidem.

PART II

Chapter 1

- 152) D. Doroshenko: *Pyustrovana Istoriya Ukrayiny, 1917-1923*, Vol. II, p. 380.
- 153) П. Н. Милюков: *Дневник. Переговоры с немцами в 1918 г.* Новый Журнал, кн. 66, Нью Йорк.
- 154) Ibid.
- 155) For details see: Milyukov, *Op. Cit.*
- 156) The United States Ambassador David Francis reported in his telegram to Washington about the escape of Alexander Kerensky in the automobile of the American Embassy in Petrograd. See: *Papers Relating the Foreign Relations of the USA. Russia, 1918*, Vol. I, p. 292.
- 157) The previously appointed Russian diplomatic envoys remained in the service until December 7, 1917, when Leon Trotsky in his capacity as the

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs telegraphically demanded from each and every diplomatic envoy abroad to declare his pledge of loyalty to the Sovnarkom. In case of the rejection, Trotsky threatened to remove the envoy from the office and deprive him of the diplomatic capacity. See: F.R., **Russia**, 1918, Vol. I, p. 291.

158) **Intimate Papers of Col. House**, Vol. III, 265.

159) **Ibid.**, Vol. III, 387.

160) **F.R. Russia**, 1918, Vol. I, 255.

161) **Intimate Papers of Col. House**, Vol. III, 387.

Chapter 2

162) **F.R. Russia**, 1919, Vol. I, 257. The views and actions of the Ambassador of the USA in Petrograd, David R. Francis, are in details described in his memoirs: *Russia from the American Embassy*, April, 1916 — November, 1918, by David R. Francis, US Ambassador to Russia. New York, 1921 (pp. 173 and fol.).

163) **Ibid.**, I, 289.

164) **Ibid.**, I, 299.

165) **Ibid.**, I, 312ff.

166) For the reports of the United States diplomats about conditions in Ukraine at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, see Dr. Matviy Stachiw, *Zakhidna Ukrayina ta polityka Polshchi, Rosiyi i Zakhodu*, Vol. II, 46ff. Here some quotations from the report of Ambassador Francis in his telegram to the Department of State in Washington. This telegram was a result of the Lansing's inquiry on December 24, 1917: "...How are troops in your district as a whole disposed toward movements in Ukraine, [general] Kaledin and Cossacks to continue war? Are they supporting them or opposing them?" (*Ibidem*, 318 and fol.).

Only on January 16, 1918, Ambassador Francis dispatched to Washington some detailed information from the US Consul General in Moscow:

"...In Russia feelings outweigh facts and the present fluidity of feelings makes institutional stability improbable..."

He characterized that situation in Russia proper in such an aphorism: "I came, I looked, I went away." This was ironical paraphrase of the Caesars dispatch about his victory over the Gauls: "I came, I looked, I won."

Chapter 3

167) For detailed treatment, see: M. Stachiw, *Persha Sovyetska Respublika v Ukrayini* and: M. Stachiw, *Ukraine and Russia*. Outline of history of political and military relations (Dec. 1917 — April 1918). Shevchenko Scientific Soc., New York, 1967.

168) **F.R. Russia**, 1918, Vol. I, pp. 370-371.

169) **Ibid.**, I, 390.

170) **Ibid.**, I, 393.

171) **Ibid.**, I, 396.

172) **Francis, Op. Cit.**, pp. 230-231.

173) **F.R. Russia**, 1918, Vol. I, pp. 396-397.

174) **F.R. Russia**, 1918, Vol. I, 337.

175) **V. M. Chernov, Pered burey. Vospominaniya**. New York, 1953, p. 357.

176) **Arkhiv Radyanskoyi Ukrayiny, istorychno-arkhivnyy zhurnal**, 1932,

No. 1-2. Kharkiv.

177) The text published in *Izvestiya*, No. 239 of November 29/December 12, 1917.

178) Reported in *Nash Vek* (Petrograd), No. 21 of December 23, 1917/January 5, 1918.

179) **Chernov, Op. Cit.**, pp. 368ff.

¹⁸⁰⁾ Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, p. 369 claims that the plan to move the Constituent Assembly was abandoned because Ukraine was on the eve of the German occupation. This is an error because at that time it was not known that the Germans might be invited to fight the Russian Bolshevik aggressors against Ukraine.

¹⁸¹⁾ For the details on the negotiations at Berestya, see M. Stachiw, *Persha sovyetska respublika v Ukrayini*, and concerning the Russian war plans, see M. Stachiw, *Zakhidnya Ukrayina*, Vol. II.

Chapter 4

¹⁸²⁾ Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, 369ff.

¹⁸³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

¹⁸⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

¹⁸⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

¹⁸⁶⁾ The policy of the Mensheviks shall be treated later in another study.

¹⁸⁷⁾ Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, p. 371.

¹⁸⁸⁾ *F.R. Russia*, 1918, Vol. I, pp. 535ff.

¹⁸⁹⁾ Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov, *Dnevnik Peregovorov s nemtsami v 1918 godu*, in *Novyy Zhurnal*, Book 66. New York, N. Y.

¹⁹⁰⁾ For the text of this resolution, see *F.R. Russia*, Vol. I, p. 535.

¹⁹¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

¹⁹²⁾ Gen. Anton Denikin: *The White Army*, London, 1936, p. 123.

¹⁹³⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-31.

¹⁹⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁹⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁹⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁹⁸⁾ In 1961, the United States Post Office issued a stamp in the series of the "Freedom Fighters" with the picture of Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. His invitation of the German help in struggle for freedom of Finland constituted no objections. For the time being, there is little hope that the United States would similarly honor the President of the Ukrainian National Republic, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, because it could be expected that the anti-Ukrainian forces would immediately accuse him of pro-German attitude. In reality, however, Hrushevskyy, has done nothing different from what Mannerheim has done. Like Mannerheim for defense of Finland, Hrushevskyy in his attempt to defend freedom of Ukraine against the Soviet Russian aggression turned to Germany for help. One wonders, why double standards are applied?

¹⁹⁹⁾ Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 132ff.

²⁰⁰⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁰¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²⁰²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Chapter 5

^{202a)} *Ibid.* p. 158. For the treatment of the change of German attitude, see P. N. Milyukov, *Dnevnik Peregovorov s nemtsami v 1918 ., Novyy Zhurnal*, Book 66.

^{202b)} D. Doroshenko, *Pyustrovana istoriya Ukrayiny*, Vol. II, treats the difficulties of the Hetman regime in its relations with the Germans as far as this particular problem was concerned.

²⁰³⁾ For details see: Журналъ и протоколъ засѣданій и приложенія к ним. Второе чрезвычайное Областное Приморское Собрание 7-го марта 1918. Владивостокъ, 1918.

²⁰⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁰⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 25ff. Also see: "Вістник", червень 16, 1918, Відень ("Справа з Зеленим Клином").

²⁰⁶⁾ See the report of Ambassador D. Francis to the State Department in Washington, dated May 2, 1918, quoted by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy against Russia* (New York), 1946, pp. 10ff.

207) *Ibid.*, p. 12ff.

208) The Soviet historiography maintains silence about the uprising of the Left Wing Socialists-Revolutionaries in Moscow. Details are available only in the Left Wing SR's publications in exile. Some mention is found in Sayers and Kahn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 14, and in Denikin's *Memoirs, Op. Cit.*, pp. 132ff.

Chapter 6

209) Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 372ff. and Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 141ff.

209a) Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis. 1918-1923. The Aftermath.* Charles Scribners Sons, Nougards, 1929, pp. 85ff.

210) Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 14ff.

211) Denikin treats the failure of mobilization, *Op. Cit.*, p. 142.

212) Denikin, pp. 142ff.

213) Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, p. 374.

214) For a more detailed treatment see: Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923.*

215) Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, p. 377.

216) Chernov, p. 375.

217) The membership in the Central Committee of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party at that time consisted of the following persons: Victor Chernov, Rokitnikov, Zenzinov, Fedorovich, Chaikin, Gendelman, Velenyapin, Rakov, Burevoy, N. Ivanov, and Gershelshtain.

218) Churchill, *ibidem*, pp. 87ff.

Chapter 7

218a) Chernov, pp. 375-377.

218b) Chernov, p. 373.

218c) For the composition of the Central Committee of the SR's see above, footnote.

218d) Carr, *Op. Cit.*

218e) Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 146ff.

219) *Ibidem*.

220) *FR, Russia*, I. 560. — Also see: Churchill, *ibidem*, pp. 85 and fol. About details of the Entente's diplomacy in 1918 see: *Russia from the American Embassy, April 1916 — Nov. 1918.* by David R. Francis, New York, 1921.

221) *FR, Russia*, p. 562.

222) Sayers & Kahn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 19. Also Churchill, *ibidem*.

223) Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 137.

224) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

225) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

226) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

227) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

228) Ukrainian publications of that time covered the existing situation of the Eastern front in some details on the basis of the Entente and German source material. For instance, see *Vistnyk (Vienna)*, July 28, 1918, and August 4, 1918.

229) The Germans renewed their plans for the restoration of Russia in June of 1918. On June 17th, German generals and diplomats turned to Milyukov, who at that time was in Kyiv, and proposed to reach an understanding with him and his followers on this problem, and especially concerning the status of Ukraine in the restored empire. See Paul Milyukov's *Memoirs* in "Novyy Zhudnal", Book 66, New York.

230) *FR, Russia*, I, 575.

231) *Ibid.*, I. 575.

232) See *Vistnyk (Vienna)*, July 28 and August 4, 1918.

233) Sayers and Kahn, p. 20.

234) According to data of Lloyd George and W. C. Churchill.

225) Sayers and Kahn, *Op. Cit.*, on pp. 19ff do cite writings of the American commanding officer in Siberia, William Graves, *American Siberian Adventure*.

236) Winston C. Churchill, *World Crisis, 1819-1928. Aftermath*. New York, 1929, p. 181. In his book, Churchill praised Kolchak as an individual as well as politician. He praised him especially for, the *coup d'etat* against the All-Russian Directorate and elimination of socialist influence on its cabinet. On this basis, one might conclude with a great degree of probability that General Knox helped Kolchak to overthrow the Directorate with consent of Winston Churchill behind the backs of Lloyd George who supported the Russian moderate socialistic and democratic elements.

237) See Sayers and Kahn, p. 19.

238) Chernov, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 390ff.

239) Kolchak later persistently used the title as the "All-Russian Supreme Ruler" — *Vserossiiskiy Verhovnyy Pravitel'* — rather than "the Supreme Ruler of Russia."

240) *Intimate Papers of Col. House, 1917-1918*, III, 415.

241) For a Soviet official historiographer's evaluation of Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward an attempt to establish truly democratic government in Russia as well as toward the liberation movements of the non-Russian nations, see R. H. Symonenko, *Imperiyalistychna polityka antanty i SShA shchodo Ukrainy u 1919 r.*, Kyiv, 1962.

242) *Intimate Papers of Col. House, 1917-1918*, III, pp. 416-417.

243) *Ibid.*, III, 416-417.

244) *Ibid.*, III, pp. 417ff.

245) *Ibid.*, III, p. 421.

246) *FR, Russia*, I, p. 578, indicated that Aleksander Kerensky was guest of the British government in London. British official circles tried to induce the government of the United States to invite Kerensky to Washington for presentation of his policy.

247) Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations. Personal Narrative*, Boston — New York, 1921.

248) Denikin, *The White Army*, pp. 229ff.

249) Churchill, *Op. Cit.*, p. 167.

250) *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

PART III

Chapter 1

251) Denikin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 229ff.

252) The armistice agreement between Germany and the Entente signed on November 11, 1918, contained a provision concerning stationing of German troops in Ukraine on temporary basis at the pleasure of the victors.

253) D. Doroshenko, *Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrainy, 1917-1923*, p. 407.

254) *Ibid.*, p. 409.

254) *Ibid.*, p. 410.

255) Ukrainian National Council in Lviv declared independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic on October 19, 1918; in Hungary, on October 31, 1918, a national government headed by Count Mihaly Karolyi was established, and on November 16, 1918, Hungary was proclaimed a republic. The activities of the Czech liberation movement, led by Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, resulted in a firm support of the Entente for the independence of the Czech people; similar situation was with the Poles.

256) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 409.

257) *Ibid.*, p. 409. — Count Forgach was ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Kyiv; he was a Hungarian. — Count Sheptytskyy was the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan in Lviv.

258) The ambassador of France was informed about a meeting of the Don Cossack Ataman Peter N. Krasnov and the Hetman of Ukraine General Pavlo Skoropadskyy, which has taken place on November 3, 1918, at Skoro-

khodove in Ukraine, and the statement made by Ataman Krasnov in the presence of General Skoropadsky, claiming that their common policy objective is to restore the Russian Empire. British and French ambassadors also were informed about absence of any denial by Skoropadsky.

- 259) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 410.
260) *Ibid.*, p. 410.
261) *Ibid.*, p. 410.
262) Unpublished notes of I. Korostovets cited in Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 410.
263) Doroshenko, p. 412.
264) Mykyta Shapoval, *Hetmanshchyna i Dyrektoriya*, (New York, 1959), p. 19.
265) *Ibid.*, p. 19.
266) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 248.
267) A. Denikin, *The White Army*, p. 242.
268) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 410.
269) *Ibid.*, p. 410.
270) For details, see Iv. Za-vych, "Chuzhozemni viyskovi formuvannya v Ukrayinskyi Derzhavi," in "Kalendar-Almanakh Chervonoyi Kalyny" na 1939 rik (Lviv, 1939), pp. 98ff.
271) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 406.
272) A. Denikin, *Istoriya russkoy smuty*, Vol. IV, pp. 184-190.

Chapter 2

- 273) Mykyta Shapoval, *Hetmanshchyna i Dyrektoriya*, pp. 43-44.
274) *Ibid.*, p. 28.
275) D. Doroshenko, *Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrainy, 1917-1923*, p. 406.
276) Shapoval, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 15ff.
278) *Ibid.*, pp. 41ff.
279) *Ibid.*, pp. 41ff.
280) *Ibid.*, pp. 41ff.
281) *Ibid.*, p. 42.
282) *Ibid.*, p. 42.
283) *Ibid.*, p. 42.
284) *Ibid.*, p. 43.
285) *Ibid.*, p. 43.
286) Osyp Nazaruk, *ibidem*.
287) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 411. Among the most active Russian central organizations in Kyiv at that time were, "Soviet gosudarstvennogo obyedneniya," "Natsionalnyi Tsentri" and "Soyuz Vozrozhdeniia Rossii."
288) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 411.
289) *Ibid.*, p. 411.
290) *Ibid.*, p. 411.
291) Ryabkin, *Yassy i soyuznaia okupatsia Ukrainy. Chornaia Kniga*, 1925, p. 35.
292) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 411.
292) Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 411. — A. Denikin, *Istoriya russkoy smuty*, Vol. IV, pp. 38ff. — A. Denikin, *The White Army*, pp. 232ff.

Chapter 3

- 293a) Д-р Матвій Стахів: Західна Україна та політика Польщі, Росії і Заходу. Том II. Скрентон, 1963, стор. 165-203.

PART IV

Chapter 1

- 293) Yevhen Konovalts, *Prychynky do istoriyi Ukrayinskoyi Revolyutsiyi*, p. 17. Such a swift success of the Directorate admitted even Soviet historian M. Yavorsky: "Ukrayinska revolyutsiya v yiyi holovnykh etapakh". Derzhvydav Ukrayiny, Kharkiv, 1923, p. 63.

²⁹⁴⁾ Dmytro Doroshenko, *Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrainy, 1918-1923 rr.*, Vol. II, p. 424.

²⁹⁵⁾ Svyatoslav Dolenga, *Skoropadshchyna*, pp. 140ff.

²⁹⁶⁾ Dr. Osyp Nazaruk tried to influence the Directorate against passing a resolution declaring Pavlo Skoropadskyy an outlaw. He correctly pointed out that in a system of government by law, such a decision was out of place. However, on advice of attorney Panas Andriyevskyy, himself a member of the Directorate, the advice of Dr. Nazaruk was overruled.

^{296a)} For details, see: Osyp Nazaruk, *Rik na Velykyy Ukraini*, pp. 77ff. Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, who was appointed by the Directorate to the position of the Minister of the Press and Information in the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, objected to "Balkan-type" punishment of the leaders of defeated regime. — Most probably, not only Col. Yevhen Konovalets was instrumental in the safe "escape" of former Hetman Skoropadskyy. He acted with consent of Symon Petlyura, member of the Directorate and the Commander-in-Chief of military forces himself. Efforts to save the life of Skoropadskyy were made by his former secretary, S. Morkotun, through the Mason lodge to which he and Petlyura belonged.

²⁹⁷⁾ For the full list of the cabinet members, see D. Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 60; and for their party affiliations, see V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, Vol. III, p. 39. Resolutions of the Russian parties see: "Vistnyk", Vienna, for 1918. The text of memorandum: Doroshenko, *ibidem*, p. 103 and fol.

²⁹⁸⁾ For the text of the memorandum, see D. Doroshenko, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 103-107.

²⁹⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

³⁰⁰⁾ D. Doroshenko, a historian, closely related to the Hetman movement, has not noted in his writings any effort on the part of Hetman Skoropadskyy to correct the statement of Ataman Krasnov.

³⁰¹⁾ Mykyta Shapoval, *Hetmanshchyna i Dyrektoriya*, p. 19.

³⁰²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 47. Petro Didushok was a Ukrainian journalist from Western Ukraine.

³⁰³⁾ Complete list of the participants, see in Shapoval, *Op. Cit.*, p. 48, who wrote his memoirs almost currently with the events. V. Vynnychenko has omitted in his writings names of some participants.

^{303a)} Shapoval, p. 48; Vynnychenko, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 95-96.

³⁰⁴⁾ Cited by Shapoval, *Op. Cit.*, p. 48.

³⁰⁵⁾ Shapoval, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 48-49.

³⁰⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

³⁰⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 58. Also, M. Shapoval, "22-ho Sichnya", *Trudova Ukrayina* (Prague, 1932), Nos. 7 & 8.

³⁰⁸⁾ M. Shapoval, *Hetmanshchyna i Dyrektoriya*, p. 32. For a detailed treatment, see: Matviy Stakhiv, *Druha Sovyetska Respublika v Ukraini*, pp. 25ff.

³⁰⁹⁾ Mykyta Shapoval, *Velyka revolyutsiya. Z nahody 10-litya revolyutsiyi na Ukraini. Z tsykladu lektсий v Amerytsi*. Prague, 1923, pp. 122ff.

Chapter 2

³¹⁰⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 119ff.

³¹¹⁾ Pavlo Khrystyuk, *Zamitky i materiyaly*, Vol. III, pp. 127 and 158-159.

³¹²⁾ See Shapoval and Khrystyuk, as above. Also see: A. Krezub, "Povstannya proty Hetmana Skoropadskoho i Sichovi Striltsi," *Literaturno-Naukovyy Vistnyk* (Lviv), kn. XI za 1928 r.

³¹³⁾ There has been some confusion created by some of the memoirs writers concerning the date of the Directorate election. Volodymyr Vynnychenko stated in his *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, November 13, 1918, as the date of the Directorate formation. Pavlo Khrystyuk followed Vynnychenko in his *Zapysky i materiyaly* as well as an unsigned article in *Ukrayina* of November 17, 1919. Mykyta Shapoval in his *Velyka revolyutsiya* gives November 15, 1918, as the effective date, while Colonel Yevhen Konovalets in his *Prychynky do istoriyi Ukrayinskoyi revolyutsiyi* stated that on November 15, 1918, in

the afternoon, he left Kyiv together with Vynnychenko for Bila Tserkva already after the election of the Directorate. Thus, for the proof about November 14, 1918, as the effective date see *Matviy Stakhiv, Ukrayina v dobi Dyrektoriyi UNR*, Vol. I, pp. 74-76.

³¹⁴) Mykyta Shapoval, "22-ho Sichnya", *Trudova Ukrayina* (Prague, 1932), Nos. 7 & 8.

³¹⁵) *Ibid.*, as above.

³¹⁶) Professor Mykhalo Hrushevskyy did not formally belong to any political party until December of 1918, when he joined the Central Wing of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries.

³¹⁷) Vynnychenko expressed his disliking of Professor Hrushevskyy in his *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*. Mykyta Shapoval expressed his unfriendliness toward Hrushevskyy on several occasions in Kyiv after the victorious uprising of the Directorate. Also see his memoirs written in the spring of 1919, titled *Dyrektoriya i Hetmanshchyna* and especially in his *Schema zhytyepysu*, pp. 30-33.

³¹⁸) In his writings, M. Shapoval justified the relatively weak personal composition of the Directorate by the lack of better qualified individuals. The reality was to the contrary. After Shapoval's nomination from the Ukrainian Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, Yanko, has declined the nomination because he was totally surprised by the unexpected move of his nominator. Shapoval nominated even a weaker candidate in person of Shvets, who was elected. Most probably, Shapoval purposely did not attempt to agree with other leaders on the list of candidates before the actual meeting in which they were elected members of the Directorate. There is no doubt that the initiators could have found well qualified individuals besides Petlyura and Vynnychenko. Most probably, Shapoval did not want to do it.

³¹⁹) Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya natsiyi*, Vol. III, p. 109.

³²⁰) Mykyta Shapoval, who disliked Petlyura, behaved differently. Although he was a trained officer in the Russian Tsarist army with a rank of captain, he did not join the Ukrainian Army and did not participate in the defense of the country against the Russian Bolshevik invasion. When the Russian Bolshevik forces occupied Kyiv, Shapoval remained there passively and then moved to a village.

Symon Petlyura was somewhat older than Shapoval. Although he never served in the Russian Tsarist army and lacked formal military training, Petlyura joined the Ukrainian Army and actively participated in the organization of the defense of the country against the foreign invaders. Actually, he fought in the front firing lines with other patriotic soldiers of the Ukrainian National Republic.

³²¹) Petlyura was released from the prison on November 10 or 11, 1918, and he immediately established contacts with the Ukrainian military units.

³²²) Petlyura was elected the *Holovnyy Otaman Viysk* of the Ukrainian National Republic by explicit consent of Vynnychenko, and in agreement with him, Petlyura went on November 14, 1918, to Bila Tserkva in order to join the *Sichovi Striltsi* before commencement of their uprising operations. See M. Shapoval, "22-ho sichnya" in *Trudova Ukrayina* (Prague, 1932), Nos. 5 & 6.

³²³) Vynnychenko, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. III, p. 108.

³²⁴) M. Shapoval, *Velyka revolyutsiya*, p. 122.

³²⁵) Vynnychenko and Petlyura belonged to the same political party, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party. Thus, he had no choice but to support Petlyura's candidacy presented by the *Sichovi Striltsi*. Vynnychenko has developed strongly unfriendly attitude toward Petlyura in his exile writings, especially in *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*.

M. Shapoval could not forgive Petlyura his opposition to his candidacy to the post of the Chairman of the Third Military Congress held in 1917. Shapoval regarded this as a personal insult. See M. Shapoval, *Velyka revolyutsiya*, pp. 61-62. Also see V. Vynnychenko, *Pered novym etapom* (Toronto, 1938).

³²⁶) V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, Vol. III, pp. 110-114.

327) After the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Czech national leadership has applied this sort of method of popular representation after proclamation of the independence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic on October 28, 1918. The Czechs have used the Czech National Council as a representative organ of the sentiments of the people under the name of the Revolutionary National Assembly.

328) Ivan Yuriyiv, "Spohad pro 22 sichnya," *Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny* (Lviv, 1928), Vol. X, No. 1, Also M. Shapoval, "22-ho sichnya" in *Trudova Ukrayina* (Prague, 1932), Nos. 5 & 6.

329) P. Khrystyuk, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 9.

330) V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, Vol. III, pp. 168-176; also P. Khrystyuk, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 15-18.

331) V. Vynnychenko, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. III, p. 107.

332) V. Vynnychenko, *Pered novym etapom*, p. 29. This particular praise should be especially stressed because Volodymyr Vynnychenko in 1938 was diametrically opposed to everything that the still living leaders of the Sichovi Striltsi, especially Colonels Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk, and Roman Sushko and Dr. Roman Dashkevych and Captains Mykhaylo Matchak and Vasyl Kuchabskyy in Ukrainian politics stood for. At the time of Vynnychenko's writing these lines, they were the most prominent leaders of the Ukrainian national camp. By the way, Konovalets was murdered at Rotterdam in May of 1938 by a special Soviet agent.

333) Yevhen Konovalets, *Prychynky do istoriyi Ukrayinskoyi Revolyutsiyi*.

334) See Yevhen Konovalets, *Op. Cit.* Also see V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, Vol. III, p. 245. In this source, Vynnychenko presents no correct data on the small size of the regular military units of the Ukrainian National Republic. He cited information of Gen. Hrekiv. However, then Vynnychenko tended to distort these data along with the change of his political orientation.

335) Solomon Goldelman, *Lysty Zhydivskoho sotsiyal-demokrata pro Ukrayinu. Materialy dlya istoriyi ukrayinsko-zhydivskykh vidnosyn v chas revolyutsiyi*. Vienna, 1921, pp. 11-12.

336) M. Rafes, *Dva goda revolutsii na Ukrainye*. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1920.

337) Matviy Yavorskyy, *Revolutsiya na Ukrayini v yiyi holovnykh etapakh*. Kharkiv, 1923, pp. 61-62.

338) Mykyta Shapoval, as the closest collaborator with Vynnychenko during the pre-uprising period of time, stated on the basis of confidential conversations with Vynnychenko that Vynnychenko informed him that he has not seen Rakovsky or Manuilskyy during their stay in Kyiv for the purpose of the peace negotiations with the Hetman Government of Ukraine. For the detailed treatment of this problem, see Matviy Stakhiv, *Druha Sovyetska Respublika v Ukrayini*, pp. 41ff.

339) It is believed that V. Vynnychenko was misinformed by Avdiyenko or Mazurenko who have joined later the Bolshevik forces. In order to press Vynnychenko in his preparatory work in opposition to the Hetman regime, apparently Avdiyenko has invented stories about his contacts with the Bolshevik representatives and passed them to Vynnychenko through his wife, Rozaliya. For reasons of his own, Vynnychenko himself spread such stories later.

340) V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi*, Vol. III, p. 158. — See Matviy Stakhiv, *Druha Sovyetska Respublika v Ukrayini*, pp. 41ff.

After the arrival of the Directorate in Kyiv, those members of the Council of Ministers headed by S. M. Gerbel, who were found in Kyiv, were arrested for the treason against the Ukrainian State. Also the Orthodox Metropolitan Antony was arrested in Kyiv on the basis of an open activity against the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State. Also, he was held responsible for the leadership of the Russian Black Hundreds who have carried out open pogroms against the Ukrainians and the Jews. The investigation was carried on for very long period of time, and it was not completed. Therefore, none of the arrested was sentenced and no punishment carried out.

In 1920, Vynnychenko tried to present different reasons for the establishment of the Directorate and the success of the uprising. In his *Vidrodzhennya Natsiyl*, Vol. III, he tried to put emphasis upon the socio-economic issues because he himself switched toward the Soviet ideology. Even worse distorted he the historical facts in his pamphlet *Pered novym etapom*, published in 1938. In this pamphlet, he claims that he and his supporters were from the very beginning in favor of the Soviet type of revolution, but its realization was prevented by Symon Petlyura and his followers. See pp. 28ff.

PART V

Chapter 1

³⁴¹⁾ More about revolutionary trends and movements in Eastern and Central Europe may be found: *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History* by Matthew Stachiw, L.L.D. and Jaroslaw Sztendera, M.A. Foreword by Prof. R. Smal-Stockyy, edited by Joan L. Stachiw, D.Ed. Shevchenko Scientific Society. New York. Vol. I and vol. II (especially vol. II, pp. 119 and foll.). — Bibliography cited in the above work. Vol. II, pp. 283 and foll.

³⁴²⁾ Lutzov, Ralph: *The German Revolution 1918-1919*. Stanford University Press, 1922. — Laufenberger, Heinrich: *Zwischen der ersten und zweiten Revolution*. Hamburg, 1919. — Marshall, Dill: *Germany. A Concized History*. University of Michigan Press, 1961. — Naumann, M.: *Die Berliner Spartakusunruhen*. Im Maerz 1919. Berlin, 1919. — Boehm, Vilmos: *Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen*. Muenchen, 1924.

³⁴³⁾ *Ibidem*. Also: Noske, Gustav: *Von Kiel bis Kapp. Zur Geschichte der deutschen Revolution*. Berlin, 1920. — Rauch, V. Georg: *A History of Soviet Russia*. Revised edition. New York, 1958.

³⁴⁴⁾ Назарук, д-р Осип: *Рік на Великій Україні. Конспект споминів*. Вид. "Український Прапор", Відень, 1920.

³⁴⁵⁾ Rauch, *ibidem*. — Bobrzynski, Michal: *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*. Vol. III. *Poznan - Wilno - Warszawa*. 1931. — Pobog-Malinowski, Wladyslaw: *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864-1945*. Paris, 1953, Vol. I.

³⁴⁶⁾ Винниченко, Володимир: *Відродження нації. Історія української революції 1917-1920*. Частина III. Вид. Дзвін. Відень, 1920, стор. 131 і наст. — Христюк, Павло: *Замітки і матеріали до історії української революції, 1917-1920*. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Том IV. Відень, 1922, стор. 5 і наст.

³⁴⁷⁾ *Ibidem*.

³⁴⁸⁾ Vynnychenko, vol. III, 138 and foll.

³⁴⁹⁾ Vynnychenko, vol. III, p. 142 and foll. — One must always keep in mind that Vynnychenko one year later, after his full mutation of mind in political philosophy, had exegerated his differences of view with the other members of the Directorate and especially with Petlyura. As a matter of fact, he in November-December, 1918, as a rule, shared the views of the democratic colleagues of his party.

³⁵⁰⁾ About the first military invasion of Soviet Russia in Ukraine see: *Ukraine and Russia. An Outline of History of Political and Military Relations* (December, 1917 - April, 1918). Preface by Prof. Clarence Manning. By Matthew Stachiw, L.L.D. Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1967.

³⁵¹⁾ See: *Proclamation of Vynnychenko* (dated December 13, 1917) against the subversive activities of the Russian Communist Government (text: Khrystyuk, vol. II, p. 79 and foll.) — The note of the Secretariat General of the Ukrainian National Republic with the signature of Vynnychenko against the ultimatum of the Russian Soviet Government (Khrystyuk, vol. II, p. 86-87).

³⁵²⁾ Кучабський, Василь — Безручко, Марко: *Січові Стрільці. Воєнно-історичний нарис ("Золоті Ворота")*. Вид. Червона Калина, Львів. — Антін Крезуб: *Повстання проти Гетьмана Скоропадського і Січові Стрільці*. ("Літературно-Науковий Вістник", книжка III, рік 1928). — Антін Крезуб: *Облога Києва*. Літературно-Науковий Вістник, кн. IV, 1928, Львів.

³⁵³) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, p. 13 and foll. These negative results of the delayed publication of the Directorate's political and social program had stressed all political observers and witnesses of these events in Ukraine in their memoirs: Nazaruk, Khrystyuk, Viktor Andriyevskyy, Konovalets, Kuchabskyy, and others.

³⁵⁴) Д-р Матвій Стахів: Українські політичні партії в соціологічному світленні. Вид. "Українська Вільна Громада", Скрантон, 1954, стор. 39 і наст. — М. Яворський: Революція на Україні в її головних етапах. Держвидав, Харків, 1923. — А. В. Лихолат: Разгром националистической контрреволюции на Украине. Госиздат Политической Литературы. Москва, 1954. — Т. Д. Бондар: Комуністична Партія України в період іноземної інтервенції та громадянської війни. Вид. Київського Університету. Київ, 1968.

³⁵⁵) М. Шаповал: Українське народництво в визвольному рухові. "Вільна Спілка", ч. 3. Прага.

³⁵⁶) Shapoval, *ibidem*, p. 108.

³⁵⁷) *Ibidem*, p. 108 and foll.

³⁵⁸) Shapoval, *ibidem*. — Khrystyuk, vol. p. 7-8.

³⁵⁹) Shapoval, *ibidem*.

³⁶⁰) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, p. 8 and foll.

³⁶¹) Konovalets, *ibidem*, p. 32.

³⁶²) *Ibidem*.

³⁶³) Konovalets, *ibidem*, p. 32 and foll.

³⁶⁴) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, p. 43-46.

³⁶⁵) *Ibidem*.

³⁶⁶) І. Мазепа: Україна в огні і бурі революції. Том І. Стор. 74 і наст. — Христюк, IV, 9-21.

³⁶⁷) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, p. 9.

³⁶⁸) D. Doroshenko, vol. I, p. 57-71.

³⁶⁹) Інж. В. Василювський: Українська Партія Самостійників-Соціалістів (У.Н.П.). Відень, 1920, стор. 69-71.

Chapter 2

³⁷⁰) *Ibidem*, p. 57.

³⁷¹) *Ibidem*, p. 65 and foll.

³⁷²) Full text of the Declaration was reprinted by Vynnychenko in his "Vidrodzhenya Natsiyi" (Vol. III, pp. 167-176) and by Khrystyuk in his "Zamitky i materiyaly" (Vol. IV, pp. 15-18). In the text of Vynnychenko are several errors which shall be here mentioned: The paragraph of the Declaration was in Vynnychenko's work omitted.

³⁷³) This paragraph in Vynnychenko's work was omitted.

³⁷⁴) Full text see: — В. Винниченко: Відродження нації (Історія української революції, марець 1917 — грудень 1919). Частина III. Відень, 1920. Вид. "Дзвін". Стор. 167-176. — Павло Христюк: Замітки і матеріяли до історії української революції 1917-1920. Том IV. Відень, 1922. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Стор. 15-18.

³⁷⁵) Vynnychenko himself admitted in his above mentioned work (vol. III, p. 141 and 196) that it was he who had drafted the basic text of Declaration. Especially he underlined that he had persuaded the other members of the Directorate and the leaders of the parties of the Ukrainian National Union to the idea of the "labor democracy", as a substitute for "council system". We call the attention of the readers to the fact that the above mentioned work Vynnychenko had written in the last months of 1919 and first months of 1920. It was the time when Vynnychenko, after a nervous break-down, because of his leaving the membership of the Directorate and the country altogether, suffered a full mutation of his previous political ideology and declared himself to be "revolutionary Communist". Therefore he had considered all activities of the Directorate under his chairmanship not only erroneous but also harmful and even criminal (especially the activities of his party fellow and member of the Directorate Symon Petlyura). He condemned his previous anti-Soviet stand, if there were notorious his

own public enunciations concerned or he passed them over in silence. Even more, he then repented in his writings his allged political "sinns" against the Ukrainian people although he had never made some decisions of this kind. Hence, one must use the above mentioned work of Vynnychenko with a great cautionness and with a lot of reservations and doubts.

³⁷⁶⁾ In this point the Declaration was contradicted to its basic principle of the "labor democracy".

Chapter 3

³⁷⁷⁾ Христюк, том IV, стор. 69.

³⁷⁸⁾ Христюк, том IV, стор. 4.

³⁷⁹⁾ Ibidem.

³⁸⁰⁾ Христюк, том IV, стор. 78-79.

³⁸¹⁾ Ibidem.

³⁸²⁾ In France in that time acted two parties, which were influential, with the name of "radical" or "socialist-radical". But they were as a matter of fact — petty "bourgeois". — In Western Ukraine, in March 1919, the "petty bourgeois" — "Ukrainian National-Democratic Party" had changed its name for "Ukrainian Labor Party".

³⁸³⁾ Христюк, том III, стор. 145-146.

³⁸⁴⁾ Христюк, том IV, стор. 98. — Проф. О. Мицюк: Доба Директорії. Спогади і роздуми. Львів, 1931, стор. 54.

³⁸⁵⁾ М. Рафес: Два года революции на Украине. Госиздат, Москва, 1920. — Соломон Гольдельман: Листи жидівського соціал-демократа про Україну... Відень, 1921.

³⁸⁶⁾ Христюк, том IV, стор. 21.

³⁸⁷⁾ Дело членов УПСР..., стор. 314.

³⁸⁸⁾ More about these conditions in the hinterland during the war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine:

— Антін Крезуб: Повстання отамана Зеленого проти Директорії в січні 1919. Літературно-Науковий Вістник, кн. V, Львів, 1927.

— Віктор Андрієвський: З минулого. Том II, Директорія. Ст. 76 і наст.

³⁸⁹⁾ Христюк, том IV, ст. 59.

³⁹⁰⁾ In that time emerged some new projects of land reform tied with the organization of the armed forces of the UNR. For instance, such a special project for the Council of National Ministers made the Minister of the Defense, Gen. Osetskyy. Even the leader of the "Independent Faction of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats," Mykhaylo Avdiyenko, supported such project aiding more sufficient draft procedure: See: Nazaruk, pp. 81-82.

³⁹¹⁾ Khrystyuk later, after changing his socio-political platform, treated all legislative measures of the Directorate with contempt. Although he was member of the cabinet during the rule of the Directorate he did not reprint the contents or the text of the Land Act.

³⁹²⁾ The statistical data see:

— Д-р Матвій Стахів: Друга советська республіка в Україні. Вид. Українська Вільна Громада в Америці. Нью Йорк, 1957. Ст. 266-268.

— М. Яворський: Революція на Україні в її головних етапах. Держвидав України. Харків, 1923, ст. 68.

³⁹³⁾ More about the Land Act see in the work of the autor of that Act: — М(икита) Шаповал: Революційний соціалізм на Україні. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Відень, 1921. Ст. 138.

About the policy of the Bolsheviks on the parts of the occupied territory of Ukraine by them see the details:

— Д-р М. Стахів: Друга советська республіка в Україні, ст. 266-268.

³⁹⁴⁾ The history of the second war aggression against Ukraine shall be represented in vol. II of this work.

³⁹⁵⁾ More about the Soviet Russian propaganda in Ukraine see: Stakhiw, ibidem, pp. 274-278.

³⁹⁶⁾ Konovalets, *ibidem*, p. 20. Bohatskyy described his functions in his above quoted memoirs:

— Павло Богацький: Спогади. "Вільна Думка", Сідней, Австралія, чч. 27, 28, 29.

³⁹⁷⁾ About the Polish administration and its difficulties in the first months of the new Polish Republic (November, 1918 — January, 1919) see details: M. Stakhiw and J. Sztendera: *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History*. Vol. I. Pp. 187 and following.

³⁹⁸⁾ Nazaruk, *ibidem*, pp. 83-86 and fol.

³⁹⁹⁾ Such a system was introduced in the new Polish Republic and Czecho-Slovakia.

⁴⁰⁰⁾ Nazaruk, *ibidem*, p. 100.

⁴⁰¹⁾ Later, during the emigration years, Vynnychenko and Khrystyuk assailed in their articles the practice of the press supervision conducted by Nazaruk. The kind of this criticism was highly unfair because they themselves fully approved this practice in the time when they were in the government of the UNR, — Vynnychenko as the Head of the Directorate and Khrystyuk as the Vice Minister of Interior Affairs. In that time Nazaruk was the most intimate adviser of Vynnychenko who had given him the most responsible and confidential missions (for instance, Vynnychenko appointed him as the head of the delegation of the Directorate to negotiate a treaty with the Entente landing forces in Odessa in January 1919).

⁴⁰²⁾ Details may be found: Nazaruk, *ibidem*, pp. 98 and fol.

⁴⁰³⁾ Konovalets, *ibidem*, pp. 18 and fol.

— Mazepa, *ibidem*, vol. I, pp. 75-76.

⁴⁰⁴⁾ Konovalets, *ibidem*.

— Василь Мудрий: Проскурівський погром. Календар Т-ва "Просвіти", 1926.

⁴⁰⁵⁾ About similar disturbances in the military and civil administration in Poland see: Stachiw and Sztendera, vol. I, *ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁶⁾ Konovalets, *ibidem*, p. 22.

⁴⁰⁶⁾ The number of 400,000 bayonets asserted first M. Shapoval in his "Welyka revolyutsiya..." (p. 135). Later on repeated essentially the same B. Martos in his "Oskilko i Bolbochan". Vynnychenko in his "history" did not accept such an exaggerated number.

⁴⁰⁷⁾ About the influence of Vynnychenko in the field of foreign affairs see:

— Ген. Олександр Греків: Переговори з антантою в Одесі. "Шлях Перемоги", ч. 44 і наст., Мюнхен, 1957.

— Назарук, ст. 119-120.

— Мазепа, т. I, ст. 105-106.

⁴⁸⁰⁾ Арнольдъ Марголинъ: Украина и политика антанты. (Записки еврея и гражданина). Берлин, 1921.

Details of landing of the Entente forces in Odessa and the negotiations therein with various delegations of the Directorate will be represented in one of the following volumes of this monography.

⁴⁰⁹⁾ As a matter of fact, the Piatakev government was organized, according to the directives of Lenin, on November 28, 1918. Then was written the manifesto but it was published only on December 1, 1918 after the approval of this by the Sovnarkom of Russia. The respective minutes and other documents see:

— Проф. И. К. Рыбалка: Гражданская война на Украине. Том первый, книга первая. 1918-1920. Сборник документов и материалов, в трех томах, четырех книгах. Институт Истории АН УССР. Київ, 1967, ст. 456 і т. д.

⁴¹⁰⁾ More about landing of the Entente forces in Odessa in cooperation of the "Volunteer Army" of Gen. Anton Denikin and one Polish division in:

— Д-р М. Стахів: Україна в добу Директорії УНР. Том IV. Директорія і антанта. Наукове Товариство ім. Шевченка в Нью Йорку, 1969.

— Очеркъ взаимоотношений Вооруженных Сил Юга России и представителей французского командования. Издано Управленієм Генерал-Квартир-майстера Штаба Главнокомандующего Вооруженными Силами на Югѣ Россіи. Май 1919 г. Екатеринбургъ 1919 г. Совершенно секретно. Нр. 21.

— Henryk Baginski: *Wojsko Polskie na Wschodzie 1914-1920*. Warszawa, 1921.

411) Matthew Stachiw and Jaroslaw Sztendera: *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History*. Edited by Joan L. Stachiw. Publ. by Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, NY. Vol. I. 1967.

412) *Ibidem*, vol. II, pp. 110 and fol. and the sources quoted therein.

413) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, pp. 12 and fol.

414) *Ibidem*.

415) Khrystyuk, *ibidem*, p. 11.

416) Khrystyuk, *ibidem*. Nazaruk, *ibidem*, pp. 110 and fol.

417) Khrystyuk, *ibidem*, 39-40.

418) Karl Kautsky was born as a Czech. As a teenager he fell under German influence and became German.

Former Minister of the UNR and in the time of April — August 1919 even the Prime Minister Prof. Borys Martos in an article (*Narodna Volya*, No. 6, 1959, Scranton, Pa., USA) asserted that the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker Party as a whole was not a Marxist one. Alleged only some individual party members were Marxists. This allegation is not true. All publications and resolutions of this party were orthodox Marxist.

419) It is important to state here that the UPSR was able to win in general elections to the Constituent Assembly in January 1918 a two thirds majority of all the votes. The Ukrainian Social-Democrats won in these elections only a few percent of the votes cast. The characteristics of Ukrainian political parties of that time see:

Д-р Матвій Стахів: Українські політичні партії в соціологічним наświetленні. Українська Вільна Громада в ЗДА. Нью Йорк, 1954.

420) A review of the elections to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine in January 1919 in Poltava region see: V. Andriyevskyy, *ibidem*, p. 110 and Mazepa, vol. I, p. 91.

421) Such a useless ministry employed numerous high educated people who were necessary in military service or in the local administration.

422) In 1918 during the first war invasion of Soviet Russia in Ukraine were only 225 members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Worker Party who actually cooperated with Russian Bolsheviks:

Спогади про Перший З'їзд КПБУ. Держвидав Політичної Літератури, Київ, 1968, ст. 37.

423) Mazepa, *ibidem*, p. 74.

423) Mazepa, *ibidem*.

424) Fedenko, *ibidem*, p. 60.

This author who was present at Mazepa's conversation with Chekhivskyy, states the following remark of Mazepa after leaving the office of Chekhivskyy:

"Alyosha Karamazov in the role of a prime-minister!"

425) Mazepa, *ibidem*.

426) Fedenko, *ibidem*, 55.

427) *Ibidem*.

428) Khrystyuk, vol. IV, p. 50. — Mazepa, *ibidem*, pp. 78-79.

429) Vynnychenko was then already famous as a novelist and as a dramatist.

430) "Marxist" at that time had not the meaning which is at present time. It meant an orthodox Social-Democrat, but not a Bolshevik.

431) The term "nationalization" means to proclaim by law state ownership of some means of production or trade. In that period of Europe's and Ukraine's history the nationalization was propagated as a matter of principle by all Social-Democrats. The Socialists-Revolutionaries were not supporters of "historical materialism" of Marx and Engels and they rejected the Marxian philosophy of the historical exclusive mission of the proletariat and its dictatorship. Against the nationalization they proclaimed the program of "socialization" i.e. ownership of the communities and cooperatives.

432) Here is common Marxian mistake: a husbandry of some 5 desyatynas land is not to be considered as a capitalistic enterprise.

433) Vynnychenko speaks here about the Soviets in the former Russian Empire during the regime of the cabinet of Prince Lvov and later of Alexander Kerensky.

⁴³⁴) The text of Vynnychenko's speech was published in the newspaper of the USDWP "Robitnycha Hazeta" (Worker's Gazette) from January 16, 1919, Kyiv, reprinted by Khrystyuk, vol. IV, pp. 50-52.

⁴³⁵) Ibidem.

⁴³⁶) Mazepa, *ibidem*, p. 80. The mention by Chekhivskyy of the Chinese indicates the fact that at that time large numbers of Chinese soldiers were in the "international" brigades of the Soviet-Russian Army operating against Ukraine.

⁴³⁷) Mazepa, *ibidem*, pp. 80-82.

Vynnychenko in his "Vidrodzhennya natsiyi" (written in the last months of 1919) and still in his later publications asserted that he always held the same political philosophy like his later declarations defined. That assertion is contradicted by his own speech at the Sixth Congress of his party.

⁴³⁸) Text was reprinted by Khrystyuk, *ibidem*, pp. 52-54.

⁴³⁹) Павло Христюк: Замітки і матеріали до історії української революції 1917-1920. Український Соціологічний Інститут. Відень, 1922, т. IV ст. 20.

⁴⁴⁰) Дело членов Центрального Комитета Украинской Партии Социалистов революционеров Голубовича, Петренка, Лызановского, Часника, Ярославла и др. (Стенографический отчет). Под редакцией Д. З. Мануильского и С. С. Дукельского. Харьков, 1921, ст. 314.

⁴⁴¹) Соломон Гольдельман: Листи жидівського соціал-демократа про Україну. Матеріали до історії українсько-жидівських відносин за час революції. Українсько-жидівські відносини. Повстання проти гетьманщини. Українсько-жидівські відносини в Галичині. Психологія погромного антисемітизму. Хто винен? На шляху до порозуміння. Провокація чи щось інше? Між большевиками і Денікіним. Під польською окупацією. Українсько-польська згода. Становище жидівства під большевиками. Відень, 1921. Жидівське видавництво "Гамаен" на Україні. Ст. 21.

⁴⁴²) Mazepa, I, ст. 80.

⁴⁴³) Very high estimated the Corps of **Sichovi Striltsi** not only Victor Andriyevskyy, Mazepa and others, but also Vynnychenko. The term "National Guard" used Solomon Goldelman (*ibidem*, p. 19).

⁴⁴⁴) In his "Vidrodzhennya natsiyi", written after Vynnychenko's resignation from the membership of the Directorate, he criticized all activities of the Directorate and especially of the military. Nevertheless he praised the **Sichovi Striltsi** in the highest terms for their sacrifice to the Ukrainian nation. See: vol. III, pp. 182-183.

⁴⁴⁵) Полковник Євген Коновалець: Причинки до історії української революції. Видання друге. 1948. Видання Проводу Українських Націоналістів. Ст. 23.

⁴⁴⁶) Винниченко, III, ст. 245.

⁴⁴⁷) Д-р Осип Назарук: Рік на Великій Україні. Конспект споминів. Вид. "Українського Прапора". Відень, 1920. Ст. 108-109. — Коновалець, *ібідем*, ст. 25 і наст.

⁴⁴⁸) Nazaruk, *ibidem*.

⁴⁴⁹) Nazaruk, *ibidem*.


⁴⁵⁰) Д-р Матвій Стахів: Західня Україна та політика Польщі, Росії і Заходу (1917-1918). Том II. Скрентон, 1968. Ст. 178-180.

⁴⁵¹) Vynnychenko in his "Vidrodzhennya natsiyi" (vol. III, p. 233), from his new communophile point of view, blames the advice of the leadership of the Corps of the **Sichovi Striltsi** as "a blackmail of the otamanship". This opinion is obviously untrue. The leadership of the **Sichovi Striltsi** made its advice to reform the Directorate in friendly and loyal way and only in order to make the function of the highest state authority in the transitional time before the opening of the Parliament more efficient.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

SENATOR PROF. PAUL YUZYK

SHORT CURRICULUM VITAE



Born in Pinto, Saskatchewan, June 24, 1913, of pioneer Ukrainian parents, Martin and Katherine (Chaban) Yuzyk. Public and High School education in Saskatoon, 1924-32. Teacher training in Saskatoon Normal School, 1932-33. Taught Public and High School at Hafford, Sask., 1933-42. Volunteer in Canadian Army, N.C.O., 1942-43. Appointed to the Senate of Canada for life by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, February 4, 1963.

Academic career. University of Saskatchewan, 1941-48: B.A. in Mathematics and Physics, 1945; B.A. Honours in History, 1947; M.A. in History, minor in Slavic Literature, 1948; M.A. thesis, "The Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church of Canada".

Fellowship, Manitoba Historical Society, to write history of Ukrainians in Manitoba, 1948-49. — University of Minnesota, 1949-51: Ph.D. in History, minor in Russian Literature, 1958; Ph.D. thesis "The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada." — University of Manitoba, 1951-63: Assistant Professor, Slavic Studies and History, 1951-58; Associate Professor, History and Slavic Studies, 1958-63. — University of Ottawa, 1966 — : Full Professor, Russian and Soviet History and Canadian-Soviet Relations. — Manitoba Historical Society, Treasurer, Secretary, Vice-President and President, 1952-63: Editor of annual transactions, 1953-58; Member, Editorial Board of **Manitoba Pageant**, quarterly historical magazine for Public and High Schools, 1956-63; Chairman, Ethnic Group Studies, granting fellowships and grants subsidized by the Manitoba government. Books have been published on the Mennonites, Poles, Ukrainians, Icelanders, Jews and Hutterites of Manitoba.

Books published:

The Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1953.

Ukrainian Reader (with Honore Ewach). Winnipeg, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1960. Several editions. Text for Public and High Schools in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life. Toronto, Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen's Federation, 1967.

Canadiens Ukrainiens: Leur place et leur role dans la vie Canadienne. Winnipeg, Prosvita, 1967.

Ukrayintsi v Kanadi: Yikh Rozvytok i Dosyahnennya (i Ivan Teslya) (Revised). Munich, Ukrainian Technical-Economic Institute, 1968.

Editor, **Concern for Canadian Cultural Rights: A Conference to Study Canada's Multicultural Patterns in the Sixties**; Proceedings of and response to Thinkers' National Conference on Canadian Cultural Rights held on December 13, 14 and 15, 1968 in Toronto, Ontario. Ottawa, Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, 1968.

Aird, Hon. John B., et al (including Paul Yuzyk), **Canada — Caribbean Relations: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of The Senate of Canada.** Ottawa, Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970. English and French.

Davey, Hon. Keith, et al (including Paul Yuzyk), **Mass Media: Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media.** Vol. I *The Uncertain Mirror*; Vol. II *Words, Music and Dollars*. Vol. III *Good, Bad, or Simply Inevitable: Research Studies.* Ottawa, Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970. English and French.

Lamontagne, Hon. Maurice, et al (including Paul Yuzyk), **A Science Policy for Canada: Report of the Senate Special Committee on Science Policy.** Vol. I *A Critical Review: Past and Present.* Vol. II *Targets and Strategies for the Seventies.* Ottawa, Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970 and 1972. English and French.

Articles (partial list):

"The First Ukrainians in Manitoba" in **Papers read before the Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba**, Series III, No. 8, 1953.

"Orthodox Churches" and "Ukrainian Catholic Church" in **Encyclopedia Canadiana.** Ottawa, Canadiana Co. Ltd., 1958.

"Canada: A Multicultural Nation," Maiden Speech, **Debates of the Senate**, March 3, 1964, subsequently published as a pamphlet separately by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Winnipeg; the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, Toronto; **Ukrainian Voice**, English Series, Pamphlet No. 5, Winnipeg, April, 1964.

"Canada — A Multicultural Nation" in **Canadian Slavonic Papers**, VII. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965.

"The 'Third' Nation — and Tomorrow's Canada" in **Canada Month**, January, 1967.

"Un statut officiel pour 'la troisieme force'?" in **La Presse**, April 22, 1967.

Foreword to Peters, Victor, **Nestor Makhno: The Life of an Anarchist.** Winnipeg, Echo Books, 1970.

"The Constitution of Canada" in **Debates of the Senate of Canada**, Second Session, Twentieth-eighth Parliament, 18-19 Elizabeth II, February 17, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 557-570.

"Freedom: Mankind's Common Heritage" in **Sudbury Star**, February 3, 1970; reprinted in **The Ukrainian Weekly**, March 26, 28 and April 4, 1970; Jersey City, N. J., U.S.A.

"The True Canadian Identity — Multiculturalism and the Emerging New Factor in the Emerging New Canada," pp. 1-17, in **Report of the Conference MULTICULTURALISM FOR CANADA**, sponsored by the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State, the Students' Union of the University of Alberta and the Ukrainian Students' Club of the University of Alberta. Held at the UUniversity of Alberta, Edmonton, August 28-29, 1970.

"Biculturalism or Multiculturalism?" pp. 23-27, in **Report of the Multi-Ethnic Conference**, sponsored by the Ukrainian Students' Club of Ottawa in conjunction with The Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State, at the National Arts Centre, Ottawa, November 1, 1970.

"Technological Progress, the Environment and the Quality of Life," delivered to The Manitoba Teachers' Society at the 51st Annual Dinner, Winnipeg, March 30, 1970. Published in **The Ukrainian Weekly**, June 6, 13, 20, 27, July 3 and 10, 1970. Jersey City, N. J., U.S.A.

"The Soviet Union and the United Nations," delivered to the Annual Meeting of the Lincoln County Women Teachers' Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, May 12, 1970, basically the speech delivered in the Senate — see **Debates of the Senate of Canada**, 28th Parliament, Second Session, November 18, 1969.

"Le multiculturalisme Canadien tel que le voient les elements de la 'troisieme force' au pays" **Le Soleil**, Quebec City, November 17, 1971.

Major Research Project:

Director of three-year research project "**Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1971**," subsidized by annual grants amounting to \$45,000 from The Canada Council. This project which involves 8 authoritative researchers and 3 stenographers will be completed in 1973, after publication of the 1971 census. Facilities are provided by the History Department of the University of Ottawa.

Public Service

Senator Yuzyk is a member of the Steering Executive of the all-party Joint Parliamentary Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, which held public meetings in the important centres of all the provinces and territories of Canada from September, 1969 to June, 1970. The report of this Committee, recommending a new Canadian constitution, was tabled in both Houses in April, 1972.

Canadian Delegation to the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, Lake Success, N. Y., September — December, 1963.

Canadian Parliamentary Delegation to Poland on the occasion of the Millennium of Poland, July, 1966.

Senate Special Committee on Science Policy to Congress of the U.S.A., Washigton, May 7-9, 1969 and to Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Switzyerand, September, 1969.

Joint Parliamentary Committee on Centennial Youth Parliament (ad hoc), 1965-67.

Jiont Parliamentary Committee on Canadian National Anthem (ad hoc), 1966-67.

Senate Special Committee on Science Policy, 1968-72.

Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, 1969-70.

Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution of Canada, 1970-72.

Joint Parliamentary Library Committee.

Foreign Affairs, Senate Standing Committee.

Health, Welfare and Science, Senate Standing Committee.

Founder and first President, Ukrainian National Youth Federation of Canada, Saskatoon, 1934-36.

Editor, **Holos Molodi** (Youth Speaks), monthly, Winnipeg, 1948-49.

Associate Editor, **Opinion**, magazine, Winnipeg, 1948-49.

National Treasurer, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Winnipeg, 1952-55.

Editorial Associate, **Ukrainian Directory and Year Book**, Winnipeg, 1952-56.

Founder, Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union (SUSK), Winipeg, 1953.

Vice-President, Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) of Canada, Winnipeg, 1953-68.

Founder, first Secretary-Treasurer (1954-56) and President (1963-64), Canadian Association of Slavists.

President, Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, Winnipeg, 1955-71.
Member, General Curriculum Committee, Department of Education of Manitoba, 1958-59.

Member, Y.W.C.A. Advisory Committee on Adult Education, Winnipeg, 1958-63.

Vice-President, Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko, Winnipeg, since 1964.

Member, Board of Directors, Canadian Centenary Council, Ottawa, 1965-67.

Director, Winnipeg Symphony Orchestra, 1962-68.

Director, Canadian Council of Christianis and Jews, Winnipeg — Toronto, since 1963.

President, Higher Education Scholarship Foundation, Toronto, 1966-71.

Director, Canadian Scholarship Trust Foundation, Toronto, since 1971.

Vice-President, Ukrainian National (Fraternal) Association, Inc., Jersey City, N. J., since 1970.

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, **The Ukrainian Quarterly: A Journal of East European and Asian Affairs**, New York, since 1970.

Chairman, Human Rights Commission, World Federation of the Free Ukrainians, New York, since 1967.

References in Directories: **Canadian Parliamentary Guide**, Ottawa, since 1963. — **Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967**, Ottawa, 1967. — **Canadian Who's Who**, Toronto, since 1965. — **The Blue Book**, London, England, since 1968. — **Directory of Educational Specialists, U.S.A.**, 1970.

Medals: Canadian Centennial Medal, Ottawa, 1967. — Taras Shevchenko Gold Medal, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Winnipeg, 1968. — Manitoba Centennial Medal, Winnipeg, 1970.

Personal: Married July 12, 1941, to Mary, daughter of John and Irene Bahniuk, Hafford, Sask. — Children: Evangeline, Paulette (Mrs. George) Duravetz, B.A., Toronto. Victoria Irene (Mrs. Robert) Karpiak, B.A., Vera, Catherine, Ottawa. Theodore Ronald, Ottawa. — Religion: Ukrainian Catholic. — Party: Progressive Conservative.

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. DR. MATTHEW STACHIW

Academic carrier: **Matthew Stachiw** (Ukrainian form of the first name is **Matvly**) born on November 30, 1895. — LL.D. (law and social-economic sciences) of Charles University in Prague, Czecho-Slovakia (January 20, 1923). — Scholarship Winner of the Masaryk Foundation for Social-Historical Studies (1923-1924). — Lawyer and editor in Lviv (1925-1939). — Director of the National University **Samoosvita** (Self-Enlightenment) in Lviv (1930-1939). — Full-fledged member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1942). — Associate Professor and then Ordinary Professor of Political Sciences and Government Law at the Ukrainian Free University (1945-1973). — Full-fledged member of the International Free Academy of Sciences in Paris (1965). — Member of the Editorial Board of the Ukrainian Encyclopedia of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1948-1973). — Member of the Editorial Board of "The Ukrainian Quarterly" (1951-1973). — President of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, USA (1969-1973).

PUBLICATIONS

Books and pamphlets

1. **Історія світової війни в рр. 1914-1918.** Частина перша: Причини світової війни. Народний Університет Самоосвіти у Львові, ч. 17. Частина друга: Як провадилася світова війна. Ч. 19, Львів, 1931.
2. **Нарис історії революційного руху в Росії.** Частина перша: Царі і люди. Видання Народного Університету Самоосвіти ч. 24. Частина друга: Як дійшли більшовики до влади. Ч. 29. Львів, 1932.
3. **Народини нового людства.** Доба абсолютизму і перші революції. Видання Народного Університету Самоосвіти. Чч. 44-45. Львів, 1933.
4. **Про державу.** Видання Народного Університету Самоосвіти. Чч. 69-70. Львів, 1935.
5. **Влада народу.** Розвиток демократії в новіших часах. Видання Народного Університету Самоосвіти, ч. 65. Львів, 1935.
6. **Історія українського політичного руху.** Частина перша: Над берегом пропасти (до смерті Т. Шевченка). Видання Народного Університету Самоосвіти. Чч. 99-100. Львів, 1938. Частина друга: На хвилях революції (Революція в Австрії та її вплив на політичне відродження українського народу). Чч. 102-103. Львів, 1938. Частина третя: На переломі (1860-1870 рр.). Ч. 105. Львів, 1938. Частина четверта: Пробудження народних мас. Чч. 110-111. Львів, 1939. Частина п'ята: Народні маси в русі. Чч. 116-117. Львів, 1939.
7. **Проти хвилі.** Нарис історії українського саціалістичного руху на західних землях. Видання Української Соціалістично-Радикальної Парляментарної Репрезентації. Львів, 1932.
8. **Вплив Хмельниччини на формацію української нації.** Записки Наукового Товариства ім. Шевченка, том 156.
9. **Зміна назви держави, як вислід розвитку держави.** Науковий Збірник Українського Вільного Університету. Мюнхен, 1948.
10. **Гетьманський режим в 1918 р. та його державно-правна якість.** Українська Науково-Історична Бібліотека, Скрентон, 1951.
11. **Українські політичні партії у соціологічній наслідності.** Українська Науково-Історична Бібліотека. Скрентон, 1954.
12. **Нарис історії воєнної агресії Советської Росії та конституційного розвитку советської влади над Україною.** Частина перша: Звідки взялася советська влада в Україні і хто її будував. Скрентон, 1955. Частина друга: Перша советська республіка в Україні. Скрентон, 1956. Частина третя: Друга советська республіка в Україні. Скрентон, 1957. Частина четверта: Третя советська республіка в Україні. Нью Йорк, 1969. Наукове Т-во ім. Шевченка.

13. **Нова Україна в Америці.** Нарис історії суспільно-політичного руху в ЗДА. Видання "Ювілейна книга Українського Робітничого Союзу", Скрентон, 1960.
14. **Західна Україна.** Томи I і II.: Політика Польщі, Росії і Заходу в 1772-1918. Видання: Національно-Освітня Бібліотека УРСР Союзу. Скрентон, 1958. Томи III.-VI.: Нарис історії державного будівництва та збройної і дипломатичної оборони в 1918-1923. Скрентон, 1959-1961.
15. **Нарис історії національно-суспільного руху в Галичині (1772-1890).** "Збаражчина". Торонто, 1964.
16. **Відновлена Українська Держава і Советська Росія.** Збірник НТШ у Канаді з наукової конференції в обороні українського народу і його культури. Торонто, 1966.
17. **Україна в добі Директорії Української Народної Республіки.** Томи I-VII. Наукове Товариство ім. Шевченка. Нью Йорк, 1962-1965.
18. **Державно-правна і міжнародно-правна якість Третього Універсалу.** Науковий Збірник УТГГ. Мюнхен, 1968.
19. **Державно-правний розвиток УНР і різні етапи советської влади в Україні.** Альманах Українського Народного Союзу, Джерзі Сити. 1968.
20. **Назва держави в англійській мові.** Записки Наукового Товариства ім. Шевченка, Нью Йорк, том 177.
21. **Права і обов'язки громад і громадських урядів.** Систематичне пояснення закону про громадське самоурядування і додатків до нього. В-во "Громада", Львів, 1926.
22. **Виборча ординація до громад.** В-во "Громада", Львів, 1926.
23. **Нова виборча ординація до громад.** В-во "Громада", Львів, 1933.
24. **Про полелі і лісові шкоди.** Систематичне пояснення цивільних і адміністративних правних приписів. В-во Краєвого Товариства "Сільський Господар", Львів, 1930.
25. **Загальний курс науки адміністрації і адміністративного права.** Скрипт для студентів УТГГ, Регенсбург, 1948.
26. **Слова і діла большевиків.** Історичний реферат про большевицьку політику. В-во "Громада", Львів, 1934.
27. **Хто винен.** З історії комуністичного руху. В-во "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
28. **Москвофільство. Його батьки і діти.** Історичний нарис. Видавництво "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
29. **До джерел нашої сили.** Замітки до основних думок програми УСРП. Видавництво "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
30. **Демократія, соціалізм і національна справа.** Видавництво "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
31. **Наша тактика.** Відповідь на найважливіше питання. Видавництво "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
32. **Як боронити селянську працю перед визиском?** Видавництво "Громадського Голосу", Львів, 1936.
33. **Чого хоче Українська Соціалістично-Радикальна Partія?** Видавництво "Громада". Львів, 1926. Систематичне пояснення тексту нової програми УСРП з того ж року. Співавторами пояснення: М. Стахів, К. Коберський, М. Матчак, М. Курах.
34. **Право народу.** Приступний виклад програми Української Соціалістично-Радикальної Partії (УСРП). Чотири видання від 1927 року по 1938 рік. Видавництво "Громада", Львів.
35. **Домашній ворог.** Як боротися проти ворожої підривної акції. Скрентон, 1952. Видано під псевдонімом.
36. **Перед світовою бурею.** Що діялося в 19 столітті. Народний Університет Самоосвіти у Львові. Світова історія. X-та частина. Львів, 1934 рік.
37. **Sociologie (University lectures for 2 semesters in Germany).** Munich, 1948.
38. **Soviet statenhood in Ukraine from Sociological aspect.** Publ.: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. New York, 1961.
39. **Ukraine and Russia. An Outline of History of political and military**

relations (December, 1917 — April, 1918). Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1966. Publ.: UCCA.

40. **Why the Jewish Problem is Connected with Ukraine?** A Symposium: Ukrainians and Jews. Publ.: UCCA, New York, 1962.

41. **Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History 1918-1923.** Vol. I-II. Shevchenko Scientific Society. New York, 1969-1971. (together with Prof. J. Sztendera).

Articles (partial list)

1. **Чому Грушевський вернувся в 1924 році до Києва?** Жмут спогадів і документи. "Народна Воля", Скрентон, чч. 1-19, 1965.

2. **Україна і протибольшевицька Росія.** "Народна Воля", чч. 37-46, Скрентон, 1966.

3. **Михайло Драгоманів і його національна програма.** "Народна Воля", чч. 8-22, Скрентон, 1966.

4. **Відновлення Української Держави в 1917-1918 рр. — реальне чудо в історії.** "Народна Воля", чч. 3-4, Скрентон, 1966.

5. **Яку інформацію мала Америка про Україну в 1919 р.** "Народна Воля", чч. 9-16, Скрентон, 1966.

6. **Політична ситуація за Шевченка і сьогодні.** "Народна Воля", чч. 10-16, Скрентон, 1966.

7. **До життєпису М. Грушевського.** "Народна Воля", чч. 15-35, Скрентон, 1966.

8. **Як перекладати УНР на чужі мови.** "Народна Воля", чч. 18-25, Скрентон, 1966.

9. **Михайло Грушевський як державник.** "Народна Воля", чч. 18-25, Скрентон, 1966.

10. **До історії прилучення Карпатської України до ЧСР.** "Народна Воля", чч. 24-26, Скрентон, 1967.

11. **Коли і як відновлено реально Українську Державу.** "Народна Воля", чч. 44-45, Скрентон, 1967.

12. **Четвертий Універсал і його значення.** "Народна Воля", чч. 3-15, Скрентон, 1968.

13. **Соборність в національних і церковних аспектах.** "Народна Воля", чч. 15-35, Скрентон, 1968.

14. **В. Винниченко і Четвертий Універсал.** "Народна Воля", чч. 19-21, Скрентон, 1968.

15. **Проблеми суспільно-політичного світогляду Івана Франка.** "Народна Воля", чч. 20-27, Скрентон, 1966.

16. **Михайло Грушевський, як президент УНР.** "Народна Воля", чч. 28-41, Скрентон, 1966.

17. **Історія "нормалізації" в 1935-1939.** "Народна Воля", чч. 38-46, Скрентон, 1966.

18. **Чи була Українська Національна Революція в 1917 р.** "Народна Воля", чч. 41-42, Скрентон, 1966.

19. **Чи проголошення УНР було спізнене.** "Народна Воля", чч. 42-48, Скрентон, 1966.

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21. **President Andriy Livytskyu.** "Ukrainian Quarterly," Vol. X, New York.

22. **A scientist and social leader as president of a state, — M. Hrushevskyu.** "Ukrainian Quarterly," Vol. XIII, New York.

23. **Social and economic ideals of Ivan Franko.** "Ukrainian Quarterly," Vol. II, New York.

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25. **35 years of war for independence.** "Ukrainian Quarterly," Vol. IX, New York.

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BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. DR. PETER G. STERCHO

Peter George Stercho, born April 14, 1919, in Kuzmyno, Carpatho-Ukraine, came to the United States in 1950 and was naturalized in 1955. Elementary and secondary education completed in Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia; the higher education — in Germany and the United States. He received the Ph.D. degree in Economics from The Ukrainian Graduate School of Economics at Munich, Germany, in 1949; and the Ph.D. degree in Political Science from The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., in 1959.

His teaching career, Peter Stercho began in secondary schools at Berezhany, Drohovych, and Augsburg. After serving at the University of Notre Dame as a Research Fellow in International Relations, 1953-1955, in September of 1955 he was appointed as an Assistant Professor of Economics and Political Science, St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pa., where he was promoted to Associate Professorship in 1960 in which capacity he worked there until 1963, when he accepted position as an Associate Professor of Economics at Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia, Pa. In 1969, he was promoted, and until now he serves as Professor of Economics at Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pa. Professor Stercho served also as a visiting professor at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, and Seton Hall College, Greensburg, Pa.

Dr. Stercho serves as Assistant Secretary General, the World Supreme Board of Shevchenko Scientific Society, and Vice President, Shevchenko Scientific Society in the United States; President (1967-1971), Vice President (1961-1962), and Secretary-Treasurer (1962-1967) of the Ukrainian American Association of University Professors, of which he also was a cofounder; since 1969, he is President of the Bishop Ortynskyy Foundation, Philadelphia, Pa., in which as a co-founder, he served as its first Secretary, 1967-1969. He is a member of the Advisory Editorial Board, **The Ukrainian Quarterly**, organ of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, on whose Board of Directors Dr. Stercho serves since 1965. He is member of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, American Economic Association, American Political Science Association, American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies, American Association of University Professors, etc. Professor Stercho has been awarded membership in Pi Sigma Alpha and Beta Gamma Sigma honorary societies.

He is listed in: **Who's Who in the East**, **Who's Who in American Education**, **American Men of Science**, and **Directory of International Biography**.

PROF. STERCHO'S MAJOR PUBLICATIONS

a) Books:

Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919-1939. New York: Carpathian Research Center, 1971.

Карпато-Українська Держава. До історії визвольної боротьби карпатських українців у 1919-1939 роках. Торонто: Наукове Товариство ім. Шевченка, 1965.

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b. Monographs:

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c. Articles in collective works:

"Національне відродження Карпатської України", **Організація Українських Націоналістів, 1929-1954**. Париж: Перша Українська Друкарня, 1955, ст. 187-212.

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"Масарик і Карпатська Україна", **Самостійна Україна (Чикаго, 1961)**, XIV, чч. 3 і 4, ст. 14-17 та 17-21.

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"Марксистська теорія революції", **Розбудова Держави (Клівеланд)**, VI, 4.

Numerous other articles on current socio-economic and political issues.

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. NICHOLAS L. FR. CHIROVSKYY

Academic career:

Nicholas L. Fr. Chirovskyy, born in Ukraine, in 1919, came to the U.S.A. in 1949, naturalized in 1955. Elementary and high-school education completed in Poland; the university education also started in Poland, Catholic University of Lublin. The J.S.D., Dipl. Economist and Dr. of Pol. Ec., received from the Karls-Franzes University, Graz, Austria, and the Ukrainian Free University, Munich, Germany. Teaching career: Instructor of economics — Ukrainian College of Economics (U.V.E.S.), Munich, Germany; then, instructor, assistant and associate and finally, full professor of economics, chairman of the econom. department, and the director of the M.B.A. program, Seton Hall University, South Orange, N. J. Vice-president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, member of the American Eco. Association; active in the social and political affairs.

PUBLICATIONS:

Books:

The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia, Philosophical Library, New York, 1957;

Old Ukraine, Its Socio-Economic History prior to 1781, Flozham Park Press, Madison, N. J., 1963;

The Ukrainian Economy, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1965;

An Introduction to Russian History, Philosophical Library, New York, 1967;

A History of the Russian Empire, Philosophical Library, New York, 1973, Vol. I;

Essays (pamphlets):

American Trade and the Russian Domination Countries? A.F. of A.B.N., New York, 1953;

Why a Shortage of Consumer Goods in the U.S.S.R.? A.F. of A.B.N., Newark, N. J., 1954; and its Spanish addition: "Por Que Hay Escasez De Articulos De Consumo en La Union Sovietica?", **Revista De La Secretaria De Estado De Industria y Comercio**, Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, 1955;

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"Господарське положення України під російською окупацією", **Визвольний Шлях**, London, July-August, 1968;

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and over 150 additional articles, dealing with historical, political, legal and economic issues of the past and the present, scattered throughout many, largely Ukrainian speaking, papers and journals between 1948 and 1972.

"Philosophy in Economic Thought". **Florman Park Press**, Madison, New Jersey, 1972 (in cooperation with Dr. Vincent Mutt).

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Mr. Ivan Romanyuk granted from his foundation in the framework of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York, N.Y., the grown interests for the publication of this work.

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