
Murder To Order

Karl Anders

AN AMPERSAND BOOK



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MURDER TO ORDER

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THE PERFECT CRIME

SOON after nine o'clock on the morning of October 12, 1957, Bogdan Stashinsky, a 26-year-old Ukrainian, left the Munich hotel where he had been staying for the past two days. He had taken two pills, one a tranquilliser to steady his nerves for the task that lay ahead, the other a poison antidote.

A few minutes later he was in the Karlsplatz, a central square of the city. Near No. 8, which housed the offices of the Ukrainian emigré newspaper, *Sucasna Ukraina*, he stopped, waited and watched, as unobtrusively as possible. Before long he saw what he was waiting for. A streetcar stopped nearby and from it alighted a man Stashinsky knew by sight—Dr. Lev Rebet, a leading member of the Ukrainian emigré organisation in West Germany.

Stashinsky walked quickly to No. 8 and went up the stairs to the first floor. In a few moments he heard the front door open. Footsteps started up the stairs. Stashinsky took from his pocket a newspaper rolled into a narrow cylinder about eight inches long and less than an inch in diameter. Inside this innocent wrapping was a thin tube with a safety catch and a trigger. Inside the tube was an ampoule, or capsule, which on the pressure of the trigger would be shattered by a tiny explosive charge and the instrument would shoot out a spray of poisonous gas.

Stashinsky started down the stairs. As he went he released the safety catch. When he was within two feet of Dr. Rebet he raised the newspaper, pointed it at him and pressed the trigger. There was no more noise than would be made by two gloved hands being clapped together. The spray hit

Rebet in the face and he reeled against the wall of the staircase. Stashinsky hurried on down the stairs. He stuffed the newspaper into a pocket and took from another a gauze-wrapped ampoule, smashed it against the wall and inhaled the fumes. This was another antidote to the poison gas.

The effect of the poison gas on Rebet was that as he inhaled it his blood-vessels contracted, he lost consciousness, and soon afterwards died. The blood-vessels then expanded again to normal.

Stashinsky walked to the Hofgarden and from a bridge threw the weapon into a small stream.

Tenants of the second floor of No. 8 Karlsplatz, hearing moaning, ran downstairs and found Dr. Rebet. They telephoned the police, reporting that a man had collapsed on the staircase. The message went out to a police radio patrol car but a few minutes later another message was received that the man was already dead.

Stashinsky took a zigzag course, on foot and by tramcar, and returned to the Karlsplatz about an hour later. A small crowd of people and a police car were outside No. 8. He then went straight to his hotel, destroyed his travel permit (in a false name) by burning it in an ash-tray and throwing the ashes down the lavatory. At noon he took a train to Frankfurt where, as there was no available flight to Berlin that day, he spent the night at an hotel and flew on to Berlin on a Pan American plane the next day, Sunday.

On the Monday Stashinsky made a verbal report to an official of the KGB—the Russian Secret Service—known as ‘Sergey’, from whom he had received his instructions. He then made a written report, describing his journey from Berlin to Munich and back, which he signed with his cover name ‘Taras’. In this report he wrote:

'On Saturday I met the person in question in a town which I know well. I greeted him and I am sure the greeting was satisfactory.'

★ ★ ★

A post-mortem was carried out on Rebet. The finding was a high degree of inflammation and softening of the coronary arteries. The coroner's verdict was that Rebet had most probably died of heart failure resulting from coronary insufficiency—commonly known as a heart attack.

Stashinsky had committed the perfect murder. The victim was dead and there was nothing to suggest that he had died violently or unnaturally.

STASHINSKY

BOGDAN STASHINSKY was born in the village of Borshchevitse in the western Ukraine on November 4, 1931. Borshchevitse is ten miles from the nearest big town, Lemberg, and it consists of some four hundred houses. Half the 1,000 inhabitants of the village are Poles, the other half Ukrainians. The Stashinsky family is of Ukrainian extraction and Greek Orthodox by religion. Stashinsky's father was a small farmer but later he was employed as a joiner. There are two daughters, both some years older than Bogdan; one is married to a wood-turner and lives in Lemberg and the other is unmarried and works on a collective farm in Borshchevitse.

Stashinsky attended the local elementary school from the age of eight until he was 15. As a boy he heard passionate discussions on nationality between Ukrainians and Poles. His native village had formerly belonged to the Austrian monarchy, but became Polish territory after the First World War. In 1939, as a result of the secret supplementary clause to the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Poland was parcelled out between the Soviet Union and Germany. Lemberg and Borshchevitse came under Soviet rule. After Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 the Ukraine came under German administration. Since the end of the Second World War Borshchevitse has belonged to the Ukrainian Republic and thus to the USSR. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic has nearly 42 million inhabitants and covers 234,000 square miles—bigger than Spain and Portugal together.

For centuries the real aim of the Ukrainians has been to establish an autonomous, independent and free state. They

achieved this, however, for only a very short time. The 'Ukrainian National Republic' was recognised by Lenin in 1917 as an autonomous sovereign state, but in 1920 it was proclaimed, by Moscow, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which, apart from the interruption of the German occupation, it has remained ever since.

In 1943-44 the Germans retreated and Soviet troops once more occupied the Ukraine. This was the beginning of a long struggle, partly in the open, partly in partisan actions, against the Soviet regime. Most of the Stashinsky family were supporters of the resistance.

These constant political changes naturally influenced the curriculum of the elementary school in Borshchevitse. Stashinsky learned the language of whichever nation was in power—first Polish, then Russian, then German and then Russian again. He was considered a good pupil.

In 1945 Stashinsky went to the secondary school at Lemberg and there in 1948 he passed the school-leaving examination and, as he wanted to be a teacher, he began studies at the Teachers' Training College. Once or twice a week he visited his parents in Borshchevitse and collected food. During one of these trips, in the late summer of 1950, the transport police carried out a check. Stashinsky had no ticket. Among the students of Lemberg it was looked upon as a test of pluck to travel without a ticket. Stashinsky's name was noted by the transport police. This small incident was the beginning of a chain of events in the life of the 19-year-old student.

Soon after Stashinsky came to the notice of the police through his illicit journey, he was sent for by the transport police. He was seen by an officer of the MGB (Ministry of State Security), Captain Konstantine Sitnikovsky. The captain was surprisingly friendly. He talked to Stashinsky

about personal affairs and asked him about conditions in Borshevitse. The illicit journey was not even mentioned.

However, the matter did not end with this one conversation. Shortly afterwards Stashinsky was again sent for by Sitnikovsky, who now began by discussing in great detail the Ukrainian resistance movement. The captain explained to him the 'senselessness' of the struggle of the anti-Soviet Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and repeatedly pointed out the deeds of violence perpetrated by the resistance, the victims of which were sometimes people who had nothing whatever to do with either side in the resistance struggle.

Stashinsky himself was not at that time at all pro-OUN. He had experience of the merciless and bloody exchanges between Ukrainians, Poles and Soviets and they had shocked and confused him. Moreover, the political instruction at the secondary school had not been without its effect on Stashinsky's political views. He saw—as he had been taught to see—the adherents of the OUN as 'traitors' and their leaders as 'agents in the pay of the Americans'.

During further meetings with Sitnikovsky, Stashinsky's family came under discussion. Sitnikovsky told the young man that his own relatives supported the resistance movement. Stashinsky was astonished to discover that the captain was completely *au fait* with the family's relations with the OUN and in particular with those of his sister Maria. In the course of one of these talks Sitnikovsky asked Stashinsky to work for the Soviet State Security Service. Stashinsky realised that he was being put under pressure, and he finally agreed. He believed that his consent would protect his parents and sisters, whose anti-Soviet attitude was known to the MGB, from reprisals. Captain Sitnikovsky promised him explicitly that his family would be safe if he were

to work for the MGB. This promise was indeed kept.

Stashinsky pledged himself in writing to work for the MGB and to unconditional secrecy about his work. He was given the cover name 'Oleg'. He had become a secret employee of the Soviet State Security Service. During the first few months his work consisted solely of reporting to Sitnikovsky on all that occurred in Borshchevitse.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT

IN January 1951 Captain Sitnikovsky told Stashinsky that he must join one of the OUN resistance groups. His assignment was to probe into the circumstances in which a Ukrainian writer, Yaroslav Galan, had been murdered in 1949. Galan's pro-Russian views had incurred the hostility of the Ukrainian resistance and he was liquidated by them.

Stashinsky went about his first important assignment by means of a deception. He told the OUN that he was in imminent danger of being arrested. He was accepted as a member of the resistance organisation and before long succeeded in discovering Galan's assassin. His name was Stefan Stakhur. Stashinsky reported this to his MGB superior. Stakhur was, however, also betrayed to the MGB by a third party. He was arrested and condemned to be executed.

But Stashinsky's activities for the MGB had become known. There was now no way back for him. He could no longer visit his parents. On MGB orders he broke off his studies and worked full-time as an agent, for the next year mainly against OUN resistance groups in the Lemberg area. Then he was transferred to Kiev.

In Kiev Stashinsky was given a two-year training, which included instruction in the methods employed by the Soviet intelligence service. His main instruction in Kiev was in ideology and the conspiratorial methods used in collecting and passing intelligence. He also received technical training in the use of arms.

At the beginning of 1954 Stashinsky was told to go home to Borshchevitse and reconcile himself with his parents,

which he succeeded in doing. He told them that he was living in Kiev and that he had a job there. No mention was made of his real activities. Later that year Stashinsky was sent to Poland on a false passport in the name of Bronislaw Katshor. He was accompanied by Soviet and Polish secret service officers. He also received verbal instructions from the KGB (the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which had by now taken over from the MGB) that he should in future use the pseudonym 'Taras' for his reports. This was in fact the beginning of his work in the West.

* * *

Stashinsky was now being prepared to work in Germany. He was to have a new name and a new life-story. For this purpose a special 'legend' was worked out. Stashinsky has given the following details of this:

'I was to be the son of parents named Lehmann of German origin, who had moved to Poland in 1930, shortly before my birth. My christian name was Josef. The family lived in Lukowek until some time in 1939-40 and then moved to Rejowec because of the war. Both places are in the Lublin area. I attended the elementary school in Rejowec until 1944. That year my father met with a fatal accident at work. The same year my mother was killed in an air-raid while we were fleeing to Germany. I sustained a slight foot injury and returned to Rejowec, where I found work in a local sugar factory.

'In 1949 I moved to Siennice-Nadolne where I worked as a farm-hand until 1951. Then I moved to Lublin and became a taxi driver. One of my mother's sisters lived in Dresden and I now tried to get in touch with her through the East German embassy in Warsaw. As I had not heard anything up to 1953, I moved to Warsaw so that I could

intensify my efforts at the embassy. I discovered it would be difficult for me to get an exit permit for Dresden, as I did not possess the necessary papers, which had been lost during the air-raid when we were fleeing to Germany. I therefore went to Stettin in 1954, so that I could try to cross the German border there illegally. I was arrested in East German territory and taken to the camp at Bautzen. My aunt stood bail for me and I was discharged and given a residence permit for the Soviet Zone.

‘I was sent to Dresden, where I was given an identity card for a stateless person. I lived with my aunt and worked in a garage. Later I worked with Wismuth-AG in Zwickau as a lorry driver and through my work I came to know a Russian who helped me to get a job as interpreter in the garage of the Soviet embassy, which was first in Berlin-Weissensee and later in Karlhorst.’

* * *

In order to become acquainted with all the details of his new life as Josef Lehmann, Stashinsky had to undertake a ‘journey into his past’. One night in July 1954 he was taken secretly across the Russian-Polish frontier, which was opened for a few hours for him to cross. After Stashinsky had engraved on his mind at first hand in Poland all the details which were of importance for the Lehmann legend, he crossed the frontier into the Soviet Zone at Frankfurt-on-Oder. The frontier crossing was carried out in the same discreet manner as had been the crossing of the Russian-Polish frontier. He had to give back the false Polish passport in the name of Bronislav Katshor which he had received from the KGB. In Frankfurt-on-Oder he was taken over by his future Soviet case-officer, Sergey Alexandrovich (Sergey) and conducted to the Soviet security compound at Karlshorst in East Berlin.

Stashinsky's next task was to become really familiar with German manners and habits and to master the language. Accompanied by Sergey he visited Dresden and Bautzen, both towns of significance for the Lehmann legend. In Dresden Stashinsky received a Soviet Zone identity card for a stateless person in the name of Josef Lehmann and a lorry driver's licence. A visit to the former concentration camp at Maidanek left Stashinsky deeply impressed with the inhumanity of the Nazi regime.

During this period Stashinsky avoided as far as possible any contact with Germans. He still had considerable difficulty with the language. But apart from that, his ideological training had fostered in him a basic aversion to all Germans, whom he considered 'wicked people' and 'former Nazis', who rejected everything Russian.

At the beginning of 1955 Stashinsky was taken ill. He suffered from severe headaches and insomnia. He traced the malady, from which he suffered periodically, back to a fall he had had as a child. He was taken to the Soviet military hospital and registered under a false (Russian) name—Krylov. When he left hospital he was given a short leave which he spent in Kiev, travelling on a Soviet passport in the name of Krylov.

After his return from the Ukraine, Stashinsky started work in April 1955 as 'Josef Lehmann'. His job was as a metal stamper at the Soviet-controlled Wismuth-AG in Zwickau. He had to obtain genuine employment papers to back up the Lehmann legend. During this period he lived in a hotel. Four months later, having established that part of the legend and background, he gave up his job and, travelling once more under the name of Krylov, he went on leave again to Kiev, and had a holiday on the Black Sea coast at Sochi and Odessa.

At the end of September 1955 Stashinsky returned to East Berlin. As Josef Lehmann he moved into a furnished room in the house of Hertha Stranek, a widow, who lived at No. 9 Marienstrasse, Berlin N.4. From now he passed himself off as an interpreter at the Soviet Zone Office for German Internal and Foreign Trade (DIA).

In January 1956 he began his real intelligence activities. He was sent on his first job for the KGB.

* * *

Stashinsky travelled, as Josef Lehmann, with a Soviet Zone travel permit, to Munich where he had a rendezvous with a Ukrainian exile, Ivan Bissaga.

At this point it might be wondered why Stashinsky, a Ukrainian, was used especially against Ukrainian emigré organisations in the German Federal Republic. An expert's view on this is as follows:

'The Ukrainian emigrés evidently appeared to the Soviets to be particularly dangerous on account of their outlook and aims, which were directed towards freeing their homeland from Soviet domination. The Soviets were still afraid that emigré circles could exercise a disturbing influence on the population of the Soviet Union and in particular that of the Ukraine.'

Bissaga had ostensibly come to Germany as a refugee and he had been given permission to live in the Munich area. He had been able to win the sympathy of his fellow-Ukrainians in exile and had been given a subordinate position on the anti-Soviet paper *Ukrainski Samostinik*, published by one of the exile organisations. In fact Bissaga was a Soviet informant and worked under the cover name 'Nadiychyn'.

Stashinsky's job was to work as a courier. His assignment was to take to 'Nadiychyn' sums of money—some £25-£35 in marks each time—and to receive intelligence messages in return. Over and above this, he was to give Bissaga 'moral and ideological' support, since the Ukrainian was agitating for return to his homeland.

Stashinsky had at least five rendezvous with 'Nadiychyn' in Munich. He received intelligence material from him and took it to East Berlin in a suitcase with a false bottom. During one of these meetings Stashinsky put the question, as he had been instructed to do, as to whether 'Nadiychyn' would be prepared to co-operate in the projected abduction of Dr. Lev Rebet, the editor-in-chief of *Ukrainski Samostinik*. At this period Stashinsky still saw every leading Ukrainian emigré as a 'traitor to the people'.

Bissaga-Nadiychyn flatly refused to have anything to do with the proposal. He said, moreover, that he felt insecure and believed he was being watched. He was, in fact, placed under temporary arrest and interrogated by the German authorities in October 1956 on suspicion of intelligence activities. Shortly afterwards Stashinsky brought him an Interzonal Pass, which enabled him to leave the Federal Republic. Bissaga's return to East Berlin was exploited by the Communists for propaganda purposes. They arranged for him to broadcast an appeal to the Ukrainians in exile to follow his example of 'voluntary repatriation'.

* * *

As well as the rendezvous with Bissaga, Stashinsky carried out other assignments for the KGB in the Federal Republic. In April 1956 he stayed at the Hotel Helvetia in Munich and had a meeting with a Ukrainian exile whom the KGB

wanted to recruit. All their attempts to get him to co-operate had been unsuccessful. The KGB knew that his wife was still living in the Soviet Union and in return for his co-operation they offered to arrange a meeting between husband and wife in East Berlin.

Stashinsky took money for this man (whose name he never knew although they had three meetings) and also a prepared sheet for secret writing. The Ukrainian would evidently have nothing to do with the KGB offer.

On his repeated journeys from East Berlin to the Federal Republic Stashinsky usually took with him in the false bottom of his suitcase forty to fifty letters. His case-officer Sergey handed them over to him with instructions to post them in the towns where he stayed. The letters were addressed to emigrés and the contents were political.

Also, in the summer of 1956, Stashinsky travelled as a courier to Frankfurt-on-Main, taking with him a small package which he had been given by Sergey. He deposited it in a prearranged hiding place on the centre strip of the motorway from Kassel to Karlsruhe. The position of the hiding place had previously been described to him exactly with the help of a map. Stashinsky said later that the carrying out of this assignment was very dangerous, but that it must have been important as it concerned a commission which the KGB had to carry out for 'a friendly intelligence service'.

On his journeys through Western Germany Stashinsky also had orders to note all numbers of military vehicles which he saw. On one occasion he had to report on troop concentrations in a south German town; on another, he had to take to Munich three copies of seals which were used on correspondence by the Ukrainian emigré organisation and their newspaper *Ukrainski Samostinik*. His instructions were to leave the seals in a small café much frequented

by emigrés. The aim of this KGB manoeuvre was to sow seeds of mistrust among the Ukrainian emigrés by making them suspicious of one another.

* * *

In the spring of 1957 Stashinsky received a fresh assignment. His Soviet case-officer Sergey ordered him first to observe the political exile Dr. Lev Rebet very closely in Munich and then to 'clear him out of the way'.

Sergey described Dr. Rebet as an influential leader of the Ukrainian emigré organisation OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) who, by means of threats and deeds of violence, was preventing the emigrés in Germany from returning to the Ukraine and who was working as an agent for the American intelligence service.

Of this briefing Stashinsky said later, 'Sergey gave me detailed information on the nature and aims of the Ukrainian emigré organisation. For KGB, and thus also for me, the emigrés in the OUN were "people of the lowest sort" since they prevented the Ukrainians who were living in Western Germany from returning to their fatherland. The KGB asserted that 90 per cent of all Ukrainians would go back if they were not prevented by the OUN. Sergey told me that the "Committee for Return to the Fatherland" in East Berlin were not achieving any success because the opposition of the OUN, which was supported by the Americans, was too strong. Also, the prestige of the Soviet Union was constantly being lowered by the emigré press, which was thus alienating the emigrés from their fatherland. Moreover, Ukrainians were often used to spy against the East. Taking all this into consideration, Sergey said, it was necessary to eliminate the leaders of the OUN, since they were not receptive to reasonable arguments.

'I heard the word "eliminate" so frequently during my work for the KGB that in the end I was completely indifferent to it. It was the order of the day in the KGB that one should wish to "eliminate" all those who were not prepared to conform to Soviet views and aims. The "elimination" of, for example, Adenauer, Strauss and other "militarists" was always being called for. When I say that one gradually became insensitive to such expressions, so appalling in themselves, I mean that one heard them too often to dwell on their real meaning.'

Stashinsky made three more journeys to Munich in preparation for the attempt on Dr. Rebet—in April, May and July 1957. Each trip lasted about ten days.

For the carrying out of this assignment Stashinsky was to assume a new false identity; he was now to pose as Siegfried Drager, of Essen-Haarzopf, born August 1930 at Rehbrucke, near Potsdam. For this reason Stashinsky was sent to Essen, where the real Drager lived, in order to acquaint himself thoroughly with the locality.

In April 1957 Stashinsky received from Sergey a forged West German identity paper in the name of Siegfried Drager and he travelled to Munich using this document.

Stashinsky had seen a photograph of Rebet, which had been taken by 'Nadiychyn', and he had received an exact description of Rebet from Sergey. Thus when he watched No. 8 Karlsplatz, where the Ukrainian emigré organisation had its offices, he had no difficulty in recognising Rebet when he left the building. Stashinsky followed him and boarded the same tramcar. A small detail indicative of Stashinsky's inexperience in this kind of work was that he had put on sunglasses to disguise himself, but when on the tramcar he saw that he was the only person wearing such glasses, he took them off again. He felt very unsure of

himself, he says, and was afraid of being conspicuous, especially as he did not know the tram route or the price of a ticket.

Having established Rebet's appearance and his travelling routine, Stashinsky returned to East Berlin and reported his observations to Sergey.

In May and July 1957 Stashinsky again travelled to Munich. He took a room in the Hotel Grunwald, overlooking the Dachauer Strasse. At No. 9 Dachauer Strasse were the offices of the paper *Ukrainski Samostinik*, of which Dr. Rebet was the editor-in-chief. The position of his hotel room afforded Stashinsky a good view of the building and he could observe without being observed. He was able to establish the fact that Dr. Rebet usually arrived at the newspaper office about 9 a.m. and left it again after some time to go to No. 8 Karlspatz, which housed not only the office of his exile group but also the editorial office of the paper *Sucasna Ukraina*.

On one occasion Stashinsky followed Dr. Rebet in the street again but at the entrance to a cinema in the Occamstrasse the two men nearly bumped into each other. After this Stashinsky gave up trailing Dr. Rebet. He was afraid that he would be recognised, or that he had already been recognised. Before he left Munich, however, he went once more to the Occamstrasse. He chose a time when Dr. Rebet would normally be at work and he located Rebet's house at No. 21 Occamstrasse. He took a photograph of the doorplate with Rebet's name. He showed the photograph to the KGB.

THE WEAPON

WHEN Stashinsky returned to East Berlin from his 1957 summer leave, which he had spent with his parents, Sergey took him to the Karlshorst security compound. In what is known as a 'safe house'—a place where agents can meet in safety—he had a meeting with a man, evidently a KGB officer from Moscow, who was not introduced to him by name. This man gave him and Sergey a lecture on a weapon which, he assured them, had already often been successfully used. This was the weapon described earlier—a tubular object just under eight inches long and three-quarters of an inch in diameter. The man from Moscow explained about the poison ampoule and the striker which, when set off by a gunpowder charge, shattered the ampoule inside the tube and so allowed the poison to be sprayed out from the front end of the tube in the form of gas. He explained too the effect of the gas and how, soon after death, the contracted blood-vessels would expand again and no post-mortem examination could establish the cause of death.

The man from Moscow had three specimens of this weapon with him. He loaded one of these spray pistols with an ampoule full of water and presented it for inspection. When the firing pin had been released, the gunpowder charge expelled the water contained in the shattered ampoule and Stashinsky observed that the jet of water spurted just over a yard. The man from Moscow said that poison gas would reach further, as it was not as heavy as water. He also explained that an operator using this weapon must inhale immediately the contents of another

ampoule containing an antidote. Also the operator should take an antidote pill and another pill to calm the nerves, if possible half an hour before the deed. The man from Moscow emphasised again that this weapon had always worked one hundred per cent successfully.

Stashinsky said of this meeting that the lecture 'completely took me aback, for it now became clear to me that this instrument was the weapon which had been selected for the attempt on Rebet's life. It further became clear to me that I had been chosen to make the attempt, for otherwise I should certainly not have had the workings of the weapon explained to me. Up to this time I had not known what I was ultimately to be used for.

'True, Sergey had said to me during the discussions which always followed my reconnaissance trips that, given a situation such as that when I was in the tram with Rebet, one could stab him from behind with a needle and everything would be settled. He did not actually say that the needle must be a poisoned one, but I assumed that.

'All the same, I had not taken these remarks of Sergey's seriously. They appeared to me to be too ridiculous even to discuss. But when I had been so secretly initiated into the workings of the spray pistol at Karlshorst, it suddenly became clear to me what it was intended I should do.'

The day after this meeting Stashinsky, Sergey and the man from Moscow drove to a wood by the Muggelsee, outside East Berlin. Also in the car was a dog—a small mongrel. When they were in the wood, the dog was tied to a tree and Stashinsky was handed the weapon. The man from Moscow had previously given him a tablet, which he had described as an anti-poison tablet.

At a distance of about a foot and a half Stashinsky pointed the weapon towards the dog's muzzle and fired. The spray

of fluid ejected from the weapon hit the dog which immediately fell to the ground. Stashinsky stepped back and watched. The dog's legs were moving jerkily. After two or three minutes it was dead. From the moment the weapon was fired the dog made no sound at all.

Stashinsky said later of the incident, 'I was sorry about the dog. I could hardly even bear to look at him. When I approached him, carrying the weapon, he tried to lick my hand. I turned my head away and fired. My first victim, I thought to myself. True it was only a dog, but suddenly it was not a dog any more. Later on it will be just the same, I thought. I know it all as though in a dream. From then on the dog was ever-present in my mind. I had killed him'.

On Monday October 7, 1957 Stashinsky had another meeting with Sergey. Again they drove to a wood by the Muggelsee. When they were in a lonely spot Sergey gave Stashinsky detailed instructions on how to act before, during and after the attack on Dr. Rebet. He went into details on the following points:

1. On the journey and in his hotel in Munich Stashinsky was to use the name Siegfried Drager and in case of necessity to show the West German identity paper made out in this name.

2. If he were to be arrested at the airport at Berlin, Munich or Frankfurt, or in his hotel, he should tell the following story:

In the Casino in Friedrichstadt he had made the acquaintance of a foreigner, who had handed over to him a tin of Frankfurter sausages and asked him to give it to a woman in Munich—at Maxim's Bar. He did not know there was anything special about the tin. For doing the man this favour he had received from him the cost of the air trip,

a certain sum of money as remuneration, and a West German identity paper in the name of Siegfried Drager.

3. In the case of his being arrested directly before or after the attack—other than in the hotel—and the weapon was found on him he was to say that he had found it.

4. When not in the hotel he was to carry with him only the travel permit in the name of Josef Lehmann. The West German identity paper in the name of Drager was to be left in the hotel. By this means he could say, were he to be arrested, that he was a tourist from the Soviet Zone and he was making a trip through West Germany. If he were to be arrested at No. 8 Karlsplatz, he would make the excuse that he was going to visit a dentist who had his surgery in the building.

5. If a third person were to appear immediately after the carrying out of the attack, he was to appear to be caring for the victim and was on no account to take to his heels. In view of the special effect of the weapon and the sprayed poison he need have no fears that anyone would recognise it as a case of violent death. After having pretended to help, he was to disappear from the scene as unobtrusively as possible.

6. After carrying out the attack, he was to get rid of the weapon as soon as possible. He was to take it to pieces and throw the parts away separately.

7. Thereafter he was to go to his hotel, destroy the travel permit in the name of Josef Lehmann and leave Munich as quickly as possible, using the West German identity paper in the name of Drager.

8. Should difficulties arise of such a kind as to endanger his safety, he was to postpone the attempt on Rebet.

Sergey then handed over to Stashinsky the identity paper in the name of Drager and a sum amounting to DM-W 2000 (about £170) and instructed him to book himself on a flight to Munich or Frankfurt within the next few days.

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Next day Stashinsky booked a seat on an Air France flight to Munich on the afternoon of the following day, October 9. On the eve of his departure Sergey met him again and handed over the travel permit in the name of Josef Lehmann and a sum of money amounting to DM-W 800. Both the travel permit and the money were hidden in the leather cover of a large notebook. Sergey also gave him two tins of 'Frankfurter sausages', one of which bore a distinguishing mark. This one contained the loaded weapon, packed in cotton wool, in a central cylinder. The space between the cylinder and the sides of the tin was filled with water and soldered at the top, so that if the tin were shaken there would be no reason to doubt that it did in fact contain Frankfurter sausages in liquid. In place of the normal riveted tin top, this tin had a removable lid, so that the weapon could be extracted from the centre cylinder without difficulty.

There had previously been discussion as to whether the weapon should be handed over to Stashinsky only when he reached Munich. In that case the plan was that he should receive it from a member of a Communist bloc diplomatic mission in the Federal Republic. But this plan was discarded because it was feared that the rendezvous between Stashinsky and the diplomat might possibly be observed.

THE REBET CASE

WHEN he arrived in Munich next day Stashinsky went to the Hotel Stachus and filled in the police registration form with the particulars of Siegfried Drager. In the privacy of his room he opened the tin of 'sausages', removed the weapon, and wrapped it in a newspaper. (He later threw away the empty tin in the English Garden.) He tore a hole in the rolled newspaper so that he could reach the safety catch easily. From now on he always had the weapon in his coat pocket so that he could use it at any moment.

For the next two days Stashinsky kept watch on No. 8 Karlsplatz. He had decided to carry out the attack in the hall of the building. But on neither day did he see Dr. Rebet. Describing his frame of mind on those days, Stashinsky said that when the afternoon came and the possibility of carrying out the attempt on Dr. Rebet was over for the day, he felt as though 'freed from a great burden'. He went for walks about the town, trying to relax the strain he was under. But when he woke in the morning the 'burden' descended on him again and he felt 'utterly miserable'.

On the third day, Saturday 12 October, Stashinsky took the anti-poison pill as he had done on the two previous days, then the sedative pill, and soon after 9 o'clock he left the hotel. As before, he went to the Karlsplatz and took up his watching post. This time he saw Dr. Rebet arrive by tramcar, and there began that fatal sequence of events which has already been described. With the deed done, Stashinsky returned to Berlin and made his report to Sergey.

* * *

Looking back on that day later Stashinsky had this to say of his feelings:

'Ever since I had known that I had to kill Rebet I could not imagine that I should ever be able to go through with it. Never in my life—not even as a child—have I come to blows with people. I am not the kind of person who uses force against another human being. I think the KGB must have been well aware of this aspect of my character and made allowances for it. The weapon I was given was constructed in such a way that it required no exertion nor the use of force to bring about someone's death. That is to say the weapon was so subtly conceived that it was hard for the person using it to realise its murder potential.

'When using an ordinary gun one must either lie in ambush or reckon on being discovered immediately; one must determine the line of fire and aim at the victim. None of that was necessary with the pistol I had. I only needed to pass Rebet on the stairs, slightly raise the rolled-up newspaper and release the striker. I did not think of the act of killing, only of the act of pressing the trigger. The insidious thing was that the execution of the deed seemed not so much to rest on me but rather on the weapon. The only action I had to take required only ordinary, everyday behaviour, so that I had the feeling that I had only carried out the deed "in theory".

'Before and at the time I felt as though I were only half awake. My surroundings, people, traffic in the street, did not seem to penetrate to my conscious mind. It was all in shadow, as if only reaching my sub-conscious mind. It was not until I was on the way to the bridge in the Hofgarten—roughly ten to fifteen minutes after the event—that I began gradually to awaken: my surroundings made an impression upon me again and penetrated my conscious mind. . . .'

* * *

About a week after the assassination of Dr. Lev Rebet, Sergey told Stashinsky that it was now known in East

Berlin that he had carried out his assignment successfully. Otherwise Sergey, according to Stashinsky, would not have referred to the Rebet affair again.

Stashinsky remained in East Berlin. He was in a highly agitated state. He was tormented by feelings of guilt, and yet there was a conflict with his conscience. On the one hand he continued to try to justify to himself what he had done by repeating what Sergey had said to him—that Rebet was a ‘traitor’ and an ‘enemy of the Soviet people’; on the other hand the dead man was ever before him and the thought that he had taken from the Rebet family their husband and father was perpetually with him. He went over the arguments again and again in a vain attempt to silence his conscience and achieve peace of mind.

In the midst of this inner struggle between doubt, reproach, self-accusation and the silencing of conscience Stashinsky believed that he had found support in someone whom he had come to know some six months earlier, in April 1957. This was a 20-year-old German girl, Inge Pohl. She lived in Dallgow, a municipality to the west of Berlin, in the Soviet Zone. She was a hairdresser and worked in West Berlin. This indeed was the girl he was to marry and of her relations with Stashinsky at that time Inge Pohl has said, ‘I got to know my husband some time in April 1957 in the Friedrichstadt dance casino. He introduced himself to me as Josef Lehmann and told me in the course of our acquaintance that he was working as an interpreter in the East German Ministry of Trade (DIA). He had a furnished room in the house of the widow Frau Stranek at Marienstrasse, Berlin.

‘Even during the early days of our friendship I could tell that he was a convinced Communist. He said that government circles in the Soviet Zone did not answer to his

conception of what they should be—he found them too militarist—but he praised everything connected with Russia and the Communist ideology. We frequently had arguments on the subject as I did not share his convictions and his enthusiasm for Russia. I would bring up points of argument but he always had a counter-argument ready. He did not talk about his work at all except to explain that when he was temporarily away from Berlin he was travelling officially for the Ministry of Trade.’

Stashinsky and Inge Pohl became engaged in April 1959.

THE BANDERA CASE

BETWEEN the murder of Dr. Rebet and Stashinsky's second murder assignment he carried out a number of jobs for Sergey. He was kept in the dark for a long time about what was in fact planned as his next major assignment—the 'elimination' of the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Munich, Stefan Bandera. Several of the intermediate assignments Stashinsky carried out were in fact connected with the Bandera plan, but he did not know this at the time.

Thus in May 1958 Stashinsky was ordered by Sergey to go to Rotterdam for the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the death (by assassination) of the founder of the OUN, Colonel Eugen Konovalc. The commemoration was to take place in a Rotterdam cemetery and Stashinsky's instructions were to take as many photographs as possible of those present.

Stashinsky duly attended the service and in addition to bringing back pictures of the Ukrainians taking part he also photographed a number of cars with foreign registration numbers which were parked by the church and at the cemetery. One of the cars was a dark blue Opel Kapitän with a Munich registration number. Stashinsky remembered having seen this car before—outside a church in Munich which was attended by Ukrainians. He also noted that the man who made the longest speech at the commemoration service later left the cemetery in this car. When Stashinsky read reports of the speeches in the emigré newspaper he was able to identify the chief speaker and the man in the dark blue Opel Kapitän as Stefan Bandera.

But Stashinsky still did not suspect the role that this name was to play in his life.

On his return to East Berlin he gave Sergey a detailed report of what he had heard and seen in Rotterdam. On Sergey's instructions, he made a sketch of Konovalec's grave. Sergey studied the sketch and then asked Stashinsky whether it would not be possible to carry out a successful bomb attack there at a commemoration. Stashinsky was both startled and repelled by the idea. He said that such an attack would cause the death of innocent women and children. 'They don't take our women and children into consideration', Sergey replied.

In the autumn of 1958 Sergey asked Stashinsky to check on the collected works of a writer, Stefan Popel, in a West Berlin bookshop. Stashinsky saw nothing unusual in this request; he had several times carried out commissions for Sergey in West Berlin. He did not know the significance of the assignment—or indeed anything about Popel—at this stage, and he even told his girl friend, Inge Pohl, what he had to do in West Berlin. He went to a bookshop and looked through the bookseller's catalogue, but he could not find the name Popel. He reported this negative result to Sergey.

It was not until the beginning of 1959 that Stashinsky discovered the connection between his assignments in Rotterdam and West Berlin and the Bandera plan. Then came the blunt announcement from Sergey: Stashinsky, he said, had been selected by Moscow to carry out the assassination of the OUN leader, Stefan Bandera.

For this assignment, Sergey told him, he would receive a new West German identity document in the name of Hans Budeit. Budeit had relatives in the Soviet Zone, owned a car and lived in Dortmund. In order to acquaint

himself with the locality, Stashinsky flew to Dusseldorf and travelled from there to Dortmund. He sought out Hans Budeit's house and imprinted the surroundings and the details on his memory so that he would be able to answer questions if necessary.

Next Sergey ordered Stashinsky to fly to Munich, locate Stefan Bandera's flat, and gather information about his daily routine. Sergey explained that Bandera might be living in Munich under the alias Stefan Popel. He gave Stashinsky an address in Munich—near the Isar—where Bandera was believed to reside. The address turned out to be a false one. But while Stashinsky was vainly waiting about for Bandera in the area he had been told to watch it occurred to him to look in a directory in a telephone box to see whether the name Bandera or Popel was given. Sergey had told him that neither name was in the directory. To his surprise Stashinsky found the entry: Popel, Stefan, Kreittmayrstrasse 7.

He located the Kreittmayrstrasse and found the name Popel on the bell board. The apartment was No. 7, third floor, right. Stashinsky noted that the street door was kept locked and had an ordinary—that is not a safety—lock.

Stashinsky kept watch for the next day or two and was at last rewarded by the sight of Bandera in the garage in the courtyard of No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse. Bandera, who had another man with him, was busy doing something to a dark blue Opel Kapitän with the registration number M-Da 105. This was the car Stashinsky had seen in Rotterdam. He concluded that he had found his man and that Bandera and Popel were one and the same person.

After some further days of watching Bandera's movements Stashinsky flew back to Berlin and gave Sergey a

detailed report. He added that Bandera was apparently always accompanied by a bodyguard. Sergey was delighted with his success.

At the end of April 1959 Sergey told Stashinsky that he must go to Moscow and handed him a Soviet passport in the name Alexander Krylov. In Moscow Stashinsky was met by an official from KGB headquarters, who took him to the Hotel Ukraine. The official told him that he would be visited in the hotel the next day or the day after by a senior KGB official called Georgiy Aksentyevich. The visitor duly arrived and Stashinsky gave him a report on his recent enquiries in Munich.

Aksentyevich repeated what Sergey had already said: that it had been decided to liquidate Bandera and that he, Stashinsky, was to carry out the liquidation. This could best be done in the garage or in the hall at No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse. He would be given the key needed to open the street door. Stashinsky protested that Bandera was always accompanied by a bodyguard but Aksentyevich replied that if this were so then the guard would also have to be liquidated.

The weapon which Stashinsky had previously used had been improved upon. Aksentyevich said that it was now double-barrelled, and a net had been fixed over the mouth of each barrel to prevent splinters of glass from the ampoule escaping. It was also possible to fire both barrels at once.

This conversation lasted about twenty minutes or half an hour and then Aksentyevich had champagne sent up. 'We drank to the successful execution of the plan', Stashinsky said later. 'It made me think of a Russian film I had once seen. It was about the "heroic deed" of a spy and the officer who sent the spy on a mission behind the enemy lines took leave of him with champagne. Aksentyevich then handed

over to me a ticket for the grandstand for the May Day parade in Red Square.'

Stashinsky attended the parade and then was told to return to Berlin. Before he left he was given the double-barrelled weapon, packed in a cylindrical container. He was told that if he should have any trouble at the frontier he was at all costs to prevent the Customs officers from looking inside the container. He was to ask a member of the KGB stationed at the frontier to ring a certain telephone number in Moscow. Stashinsky explained this by saying, 'People like us usually escape much attention from the Customs since our travel documents contain special numbers which are known to be used only by members of the KGB.'

* * *

About a week after his return from Moscow Stashinsky flew from Berlin to Munich to carry out his assignment to assassinate Bandera. He still had false West German identity papers in the name of Hans Budeit.

As well as the new double-barrelled poison pistol, ten anti-poison tablets and anti-poison ampoules, he had received also from Sergey a skeleton key with four different and interchangeable parts. He was to try these out on the street door of No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse so that it might be possible for him to make the attack in the hall or on the staircase, as he had done in the case of Rebet. The weapon was not hidden in a tin of 'Frankfurter sausages' this time, but was carried loose in Stashinsky's coat pocket.

Stashinsky took a room in the Hotel Schottenhamel in Munich in the name of Hans Budeit. For the next few days he kept No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse under observation.

Before he left the hotel each day he took one of the anti-poison tablets, so that he was ready at any time to carry out the attempt on Bandera's life. On the second or third day of his stay in Munich—he could not remember exactly—Stashinsky had what seemed a favourable opportunity. About 4.30 p.m. he was at his observation post in the Sandstrasse, from which he could observe the entrance to the courtyard of Bandera's apartment building in the Kreittmayrstrasse. Suddenly he saw Bandera's dark blue Opel Kapitän turning into the Kreittmayrstrasse from the Massmannplatz. Bandera was alone in the car, which swung into the courtyard entrance of No. 7.

Stashinsky left his observation post and walked towards the courtyard entrance. On the way he released the safety catch of the murder weapon. When he reached the entrance he could see that Bandera had put the car in the extreme right garage and was standing beside it. Stashinsky decided this was the moment. There was no one in sight except Bandera. He went through the courtyard entrance in the direction of the garage, holding the weapon in his right hand. Only a few steps separated him from his unsuspecting victim. Then suddenly Stashinsky stopped, turned round and walked quickly out of the courtyard. He kept walking until he reached the Hofgarten and there, at a quiet spot on a stone bridge over the Kogelmühlbach, he fired both barrels, then threw the weapon into the stream.

Why? Why had he drawn back at the last moment from killing Bandera in such favourable circumstances? Stashinsky replied to this question later by saying, 'When I ask myself now why I acted as I did I can only explain it in this way—that the half of my split personality which rejected such an action on humane grounds had the upper hand. The fact that I almost ran from the courtyard and the haste with

which I got rid of the weapon show that I did not want to be able to change my mind again about killing Bandera. When I saw him standing in the garage I became conscious of the fact that in a few minutes he would no longer be alive, that I was bringing death to him, and that he had done nothing against me personally. My assignment—and the possible consequences of not obeying my orders—were obscured by purely humane considerations. These feelings were uppermost in my mind until I had destroyed the weapon.’

After this first failure Stashinsky began to wonder what would be said in Berlin when he returned without having accomplished anything. He therefore decided to try out the skeleton key with variable parts which Sergey had given him for the street door of No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse. He tried the various parts in the lock one after the other but could not open the door with any of them, though one showed signs of moving the lock. One of the parts snapped off and remained in the lock.

In an effort to be able to justify his behaviour to his superiors, Stashinsky tried to produce a fifth key. At Woolworth’s in the Kaufinger Strasse he bought a small case with three files and in his hotel room he filed down the key of his Berlin house, trying to reproduce the shape of the skeleton key part which had broken—the one which had shown some sign of working. But when he tried out this makeshift key at No. 7 it too broke and part remained in the lock. (Both broken-off bits were found in the lock of No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse in 1961.)

* * *

Stashinsky stayed on in Munich for another week. As he had thrown away the murder weapon there was no like-

likelihood of his carrying out his assignment, but he was not unnaturally reluctant to return to Berlin and report his failure. He saw Bandera once or twice more but always in company.

At last Stashinsky returned to Berlin and told Sergey what had happened—or at least a somewhat altered version of it. To justify himself he told Sergey that he had been observed by a third person in the courtyard and had therefore been unable to carry out the deed. He did not say that he had got rid of the weapon directly after his retreat, but told Sergey that he had disposed of it shortly before his return. As proof of the fact that he had been working on his assignment Stashinsky showed Sergey his broken Berlin key. Sergey told him to prepare an exact drawing of the key part which would in his opinion fit the lock.

A few days later Sergey handed over to Stashinsky four keys, which had been made according to the sketch, and told him he must fly to Munich straight away to try the keys out.

Once more in the name of Hans Budeit, Stashinsky flew to Munich and booked in at the Hotel Schottenhamel. The next day he went to the Kreittmayrstrasse and tried the first of the keys. It unlocked the street door of No. 7 without difficulty. Stashinsky then flew back to Berlin and reported to Sergey. Now, with a key which would let him into No. 7, there was nothing to prevent Stashinsky going ahead with his task. But, as if murder were not enough, Sergey gave Stashinsky another assignment to be carried out in Munich. He was told to locate the house of the OUN leader, Yaroslav Stetsko, who lived in Munich under the alias 'Dankiv'. 'Sergey gave me an address in the Ohmstrasse', Stashinsky said. 'He warned me to be very careful as Stetsko had a bodyguard. This time the

address was correct. The name "Dankiv" appeared on the bell-board. I also ascertained that the street door did not have an ordinary lock—as in the Kreittmayrstrasse—but a safety lock.'

It was not until later that Stashinsky learned the purpose of this assignment.

* * *

Once again, however, Stashinsky was given leave at home in Borshchevitse and it was not until the beginning of October 1959 that he received orders to report back to Sergey in Berlin. Of this meeting Stashinsky said, 'Sergey told me that the time was ripe for action. He had received instructions from Moscow that I was now to carry out the attempt at assassination in Munich. Later on a general to whom I was introduced in Karlshorst described the work I had done as "government orders" or "government assignments". There must therefore have been a supreme state department in Moscow which decided upon the deaths of Rebet and Bandera.'

On Monday October 12, 1959, Stashinsky received from Sergey another travel permit in the name of Hans Budeit and a sum of money to buy an air ticket for the journey to Munich. Next day Sergey handed him a double-barrelled weapon of the same type as he had been given in May. On Wednesday Stashinsky flew to Munich and booked into the Hotel Salzburg in the Senefelderstrasse in the name of Hans Budeit. His account of the events of the day after his arrival in Munich is as follows:

'On October 15, a Thursday, I had breakfast at about 9 a.m. in the Hotel Salzberg and immediately afterwards took one of the anti-poison tablets which Sergey had given

me. I did not really expect that I should come face to face with Bandera that day. I wandered in a leisurely way from the hotel to the Ludwigsbrücke, so that I could observe the OUN office at No. 67 Zeppelinstrasse where Bandera worked.

'I arrived at my observation point after 11 a.m. I distinctly remember hearing the carillon of the town hall at 11 a.m. when I was in the Marienplatz. I then went into the Zeppelinstrasse and saw Bandera's blue Opel Kapitän parked in front of No. 67. I returned to the Ludwigsbrücke as I had a good view of the car from there.

'About 12 o'clock I saw a man and a woman get into the car and drive away along the Zeppelinstrasse in the direction of the Ohlmüllerstrasse. I was certain that the man in the driver's seat was Bandera.

'After I had seen the car drive away I decided to go to the Kreittmayrstrasse to see if Bandera would turn up there—I did not immediately think of carrying out the deed. I took a tram as far as the Massmannplatz, where I stayed for a while, and then went into the Kreittmayrstrasse at about 12.45, going on some five houses further than No. 7. I decided to stay there until 1 p.m. I can still remember the time so clearly because I kept looking at my watch and thinking how pleased I should be if one o'clock came and went without my having seen Bandera. I planned to give up for the day at 1 p.m. and take no further action.'

But shortly before this time limit expired Bandera's blue Opel Kapitän turned into the Kreittmayrstrasse.

'When he had turned into the courtyard entrance', Stashinsky reports, 'I released the safety catch of the pistol and went towards No. 7. From the courtyard entrance I thought I could see Bandera's car already in the garage, but I dared not look any closer. At the street door I took

the weapon in my left hand and with my right hand took the counterfeit key out of my coat pocket. I unlocked the door and went up the five or six steps to the ground floor.

‘I had started up the stairs towards the first floor when I suddenly heard women’s voices upstairs. I clearly heard the word “Wiedersehen” (“Goodbye”). Then I heard steps coming downstairs. The sound was obviously made by a woman’s heels. This was an entirely unexpected situation and I wondered what I should do. If I went on upstairs I was bound to meet the woman. If I turned back I was almost certain to walk into Bandera. What should I do? I went to the lift door, which was between the front doors of the two ground floor flats. I stood with my face towards the lift and pressed the button. I can still clearly remember that I heard the lift coming down. But I do not remember whether I got into it. I cannot remember whether I remained standing with my face to the wall on the ground floor or whether I went up in the lift to the first floor. But I remember my brain registering the fact that the woman had left the building.

‘Shortly after that the street door was opened. I don’t know where I was when I heard that, but I know I was on the ground floor when I saw Bandera. He had several packages in his right hand, one of which I remember was an open bag of tomatoes. He was trying to get the key out of the lock with his left hand. He struggled with it but didn’t seem to be able to manage it. To tide over this delay I bent down and pretended to be adjusting a shoe lace. In fact I was wearing shoes without laces. While I was bending down I could only see Bandera’s feet and I noticed that he had one foot pressed against the door so as to exert pressure to get the key out.

‘After a moment I stood up and went down the few

steps from the ground floor to the front door of the building. I suddenly heard myself saying (in German): "Isn't it working?" to which Bandera replied: "Yes, it's all right". He said something further, but I don't remember exactly what—something about the key getting stuck.

'The fact that I spoke at all shows that I was acting in a sort of daze. If I had been thinking sensibly I would have realised the danger of my accent betraying me.

'While we were exchanging those few words I had come quite close to Bandera. He was still busy with the front door and I did not see him full face. I stepped past him, turned about, and took hold of the outside door knob with my left hand while with my right hand I fired both barrels of the gun in the direction of the entrance hall. I did not see his face when I fired but I believe that the left side of his face was towards me. The door was still open. I must have put the weapon back in my coat pocket, but I don't remember exactly. At any rate I crushed the ampoule containing the anti-poison inhalant and breathed it in. After firing the shots I closed the door, turned round and walked past the courtyard entrance down the Kreittmayrstrasse in the direction of the Erzgiesserstrasse.

'I don't know what happened to Bandera after I had closed the front door. I neither heard a cry nor did I see him fall.'

Stashinsky then went to the Hofgarten and threw the weapon into the Kogelmuhlbach from the bridge over the stream, just as he had done after the assassination of Rebet. He then went to his hotel, paid his bill, and took an express train to Frankfurt-on-Main at about 3 p.m. He spent the night there at the Wiesbaden Hotel and next day booked on a BEA flight to Berlin for the day after. He used the name 'Kovalsky' when making his reservation. This

was not on instructions but was a sudden idea for which Stashinsky was later reprimanded by Sergey, because 'Kovalsky' was an invention which did not fit into the legend which was backed up by his false travel papers.

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Neighbours found Stefan Bandera dying at 1.05 p.m. Tenants of the first floor flats heard moans coming from the hall and when they found Bandera they rushed upstairs to tell his wife. She was waiting for her husband, having heard him shut the door of the car in the courtyard. She called the first-aid service, but Bandera died on the way to the hospital.

A gun was found on Bandera, carried in a gun-belt under his coat on his right-hand side. As violent death was suspected, a post-mortem examination was carried out next day. Bandera had facial injuries caused by small splinters of glass, but the post-mortem also showed that the stomach contained a large quantity of cyanide. The conclusion was 'suspected cyanide poisoning' but the suspected cause of death was not mentioned publicly. The newspaper report spoke of a 'mysterious murder in Munich'.

SPIRITUAL CHANGE

BACK in East Berlin Stashinsky gave his case-officer a detailed report of the assassination of Bandera. In his written report he stated—as in the Rebet case—that he had met the ‘person in question’ and that he was sure that ‘the greeting had been satisfactory’. Sergey congratulated him and said he was ‘a hero’. But Stashinsky did not feel at all heroic. For him it was the beginning of the end.

Of what he heard and read about Bandera’s murder Stashinsky said the following:

‘The first mention of the assassination of Bandera which I read in the newspaper was on the following day when I was at Frankfurt airport. It was stated that Bandera had been found dead at his home and that it was still a mystery as to how he had met his death. I later read in the Soviet Zone press that Bandera had been murdered at the instigation of the then Federal Minister for Refugee Affairs, Dr. Oberlander, because Oberlander was afraid that Bandera would come forward as a witness for the prosecution in a case which was pending against him. The newspaper maintained that Oberlander was one of the political leaders of the “Nightingale” battalion, which was in fact composed of Ukrainians, and that Bandera had participated in an illegal execution carried out by this battalion.

‘Then one day in East Berlin I saw a newsreel which showed Bandera’s funeral in Munich. He was shown lying in his coffin. His family and friends stood in mourning around him. The film shots made me feel as though I were being hit on the head with a hammer.’

Stashinsky added that when he heard the newsreel commentator saying that Bandera had been basely murdered

by paid assassins of the American Secret Service that was the first time he had heard—perhaps he meant the first time he had properly taken in—the word ‘murder’ in connection with his act and he realised that he was a murderer.

‘For the first time I saw clearly what I had done’, he said. ‘I have already described in the account of the Rebet assignment how killing was made easy for me by the construction of the lethal weapon. I only needed to walk past my victim and, without even taking exact aim, press the trigger. Neither in the case of Rebet nor Bandera did I see what happened to the victim afterwards. This film shot, however, gave me such a shock that something happened to me. This shock was really the root of a personal and political change in me. I became conscious of the inhuman results of my deeds and of what I had on my conscience. I sat back in my seat and covered my face with my hands so that I could see no more. When I left the cinema I had come to a decision.’

Stashinsky felt he *must* talk to someone and discuss his experience in the cinema. He went to Sergey, though he had little hope that Sergey would understand him. He said to Sergey, ‘Bandera has a wife and children. I’ve done it. I’m a murderer’. Sergey only smiled and said, ‘You don’t need to worry yourself about that. Bandera’s children will later be grateful to you for having done it, when they are able to see things in perspective’.

Stashinsky was deeply affected. He did not know what he ought to do. He only knew that he had definitely decided never again to carry out such an assignment. He later claimed that at this moment he lost his faith in Communism.

* * *

Shortly afterwards, in November, Sergey took Stashinsky one day to the Karlshorst compound. In a ‘safe house’ he

was introduced to a Russian general, whom he assumed to be the KGB director in East Berlin. Stashinsky said of this meeting:

'A meal had been prepared and a table laid for three. We began with cognac. The general told me that it gave him particular pleasure to be able to inform me that I had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the carrying out of a government assignment. I was to travel to Moscow in the next few days where this high decoration would be conferred on me. We then started the meal proper, in the course of which general conversation was carried on, such as about my impressions of Munich, etc.

'Later, when we had gone into another room for coffee, the general told me that after the investiture I should be staying in Moscow for a while until the Bandera affair had been forgotten. During this time I would receive extra training for future assignments which would be even more demanding. He did not go into details about these plans but spoke of a very promising future and a decisive turning point in my life. Sergey made a remark to the effect that in a few years' time I might be occupying his position.'

After this Stashinsky had several meetings with Sergey. Stashinsky asked him what was to become of his fiancée if he had to go to Moscow for a long period. Sergey was not sympathetic. He took the view that marriage to Inge Pohl would be bad for Stashinsky's future, that he should 'finish' with her and arrange a suitable cash settlement. Stashinsky refused to entertain this idea and Sergey then advised him to settle the matter in Moscow. He must above all adhere to his present 'legend' *vis-à-vis* Inge Pohl and her family.

The date of the investiture was fixed for November 25, and a few days before that Stashinsky travelled from East Berlin to Moscow. He was met at the station by an official

from KGB headquarters who called himself Arkadiy Andreyevich. Stashinsky was given a room at the Hotel Leningrad. The next day a senior officer of the KGB, Nikolay Nikolayevich, came to the hotel and told Stashinsky that the investiture had been postponed for a little while.

In the last days of November Nikolayevich took Stashinsky to a private room in the Hotel Moscow where he was introduced to the KGB departmental head, Alexey Alexeyevich. After some introductory conversation Alexeyevich got on to the subject of Stashinsky's future. He told him that until the time was ripe for his next operation, or at least until interest in Bandera's death had died down, he would receive supplementary training. In the first place he must perfect his knowledge of the German language. His second foreign language was to be English. He would then be sent to Western Europe for three to five years, where he would carry out assignments. These assignments, it was made clear, would be of the type he had already carried out (i.e. the Rebet and Bandera murders) and these would be his principal tasks for the future. He must concentrate upon them. In the meantime he would also receive other assignments, such as the direction of a group of agents. Alexeyevich stressed that Stashinsky was not a common or garden agent, but a representative of the KGB in a leading position.

Then he went on to talk about Stashinsky's fiancée. Alexeyevich said that this marriage to Inge Pohl which he had planned was unsuitable. His 'legend' made it difficult for him to enter into marriage. His 'Lehmann' time was over. Moreover, it was not usual for KGB members to marry foreigners. Stashinsky's counter-arguments—that he was in love with Inge Pohl and that being married to her would make it easier to 'legalise' himself abroad—were not

considered valid by Alexeyevich. He advised Stashinsky to give earnest consideration to what he had said.

On December 4 or 5 (again Stashinsky is not sure) the investiture took place. Stashinsky was ordered to go to Nikolayevich's office. There he was collected by Georgiy Aksentyevich, who had given him the order for the liquidation of Bandera. They went together to KGB headquarters and were shown into the office of Alexander Shelepin.

(Alexander Nikolayevich Shelepin, since 1952 a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Supreme Soviet, had a year earlier become chairman of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR—the KGB—as successor to the notorious General Ivan Serov.)

Alexeyevich was already with Shelepin. 'Shelepin came towards me and greeted me', Stashinsky said of this occasion. 'On his desk I could see a file on which there was an enlarged photo of myself. Shelepin took from the file the citation accompanying the decoration and read aloud to us the beginning and the end. It stated that "for carrying out an extremely important government assignment" I had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner by decree of the Supreme Soviet. The citation bore the signature of Voroshilov and of Georgadse, to which Shelepin particularly drew my attention.'

(Marshal Voroshilov was at that time Head of State of the Soviet Union, that is President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Georgadse was Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.)

'Shelepin then handed the decoration over to me in a case and congratulated me. The citation, which should also have been handed over to me, remained in my file because

of its secret contents. This ceremony was carried out standing. We then sat down at the conference table and Shelepin asked me to describe the course of events in the attack on Bandera. I began with my activities in Rotterdam and told him in chronological order everything which had a bearing on the case. Shelepin then asked me to describe again very exactly the position from which I had fired the weapon and to make a sketch of the situation.

‘After that Shelepin spoke of the further plans they had for me. Using a good deal of political and propaganda padding, he said that what was expected of me was difficult but honourable. When he eventually started to talk about my personal affairs I was able to bring up the subject of my fiancée. I described her as a decent, hard-working girl with whom I got on well and who was by no means wholly unreceptive to the political ideas of Moscow. It was quite the opposite of the truth but I described her as being sympathetic to Soviet ideas. I had to lie. My soul was at stake. I already abominated what I had done. Had I not married Inge Pohl I should probably have become again a faithful party-line Communist and KGB man. I lied to Shelepin to attain my goal.

‘Shelepin said that there were also pretty girls in Moscow and in the KGB who could help me in my work. Finally he said, however, that they could not take exception to my desire to marry Inge Pohl if she really conformed to the requirements of Soviet behaviour. There could be no other decision with regard to friends from the People’s Democracies. He stipulated that my fiancée would have to support me in my future work and must also satisfy the requirements of the KGB from the political point of view.

‘When the question of the marriage was settled, I suggested that I should go to East Berlin at Christmas and make

arrangements. Alexeyevich had May or June 1960 in mind but Shelepin finally agreed to Christmas. He said I should bring my fiancée to Moscow and spend a few weeks with her there, so that she could see what life in the Soviet Union was really like. Not until then was I to tell her that I was not German and that I worked for the KGB. I was then to ask her if she still wanted to marry me after this disclosure.

‘In the evening of the day of the investiture I celebrated with Arkadiy and Nikolay and a few days later I travelled to Borshchevitse and told my parents about the honour which had been conferred upon me. I was back in Moscow on December 20.’

In Moscow Stashinsky received instructions from Nikolayevich as to how he was to behave in Berlin, and particularly in relation to his fiancée. He was first to give her a political talk and hint that he was working for the KGB. He was then to ask her if she would help him in this work. Their marriage would depend upon her answer. If she agreed, they could travel back to Moscow together at the beginning of January 1960. If she refused, he would return to Moscow alone.

* * *

Stashinsky celebrated Christmas with Inge and her parents at their home. The moment came when he decided to tell her who he really was.

‘I told her I was a Russian’, Stashinsky said later, ‘that I worked for the KGB, and that up to now I had deceived her about my identity. She was deeply shocked. I tried to soften the blow by saying that I wasn’t actually Russian, but Ukrainian. I told her that I had a very responsible job,

but I didn't go into details. I did not mention the assassination of Rebet and Bandera. My fiancée was absolutely opposed to the Soviet system and it was obvious to me that she would never agree to work with me for the KGB. Nor did I want her to do so. But I had at least to get her to appear to take an interest in my work when she was in Moscow.

'We discussed whether we should put everything behind us and go over to the West then and there. This idea came first from Inge. I was not yet ready for such a step. I proposed that we should first see how things went in Moscow. I particularly wanted to take advantage of the extra year and a half's training. I told myself that it could only be to my advantage for my future in the West. After all, the way to the West remained open to us, even if at that time it did not appear to me personally to be wholly desirable.

'So we came to an agreement and I warned her that everything we had discussed must be between ourselves. I told her she must not only say nothing in Moscow about what we had discussed but that for the present she mustn't say anything to her parents—we must keep to the old "legend". She agreed to this.'

MARRIAGE

ON January 9, 1960 Stashinsky and Inge travelled on a tourist train from East Berlin to Moscow. Inge received from Sergey a Soviet passport in the name of Inge Fyodorovna Krylova. They spent two months in Moscow, with a ten-day visit to Leningrad. Stashinsky apparently succeeded in persuading his fiancée to feign a pro-Soviet attitude with his superiors and he was granted permission to marry.

The two months in Moscow contributed to the development of what he called the 'spiritual change' in Stashinsky. He felt he was being spied upon by the KGB. Inge drew his attention to the differences between Soviet propaganda and Moscow realities. Stashinsky gradually became accustomed to seeing life under Communism through her eyes. He began to analyse the conditions and to develop his own opinion.

On March 9 they returned to Berlin. Sergey had by now been transferred to Kiev and his successor was called Alexander Afanasyevich. He saw to all the papers which Stashinsky required for his marriage and on April 23 they were married at the East Berlin central register office, with a church ceremony immediately afterwards at the Golgotha evangelical church in the Borsigstrasse. Stashinsky says, 'In Moscow I had been told that I was only to go through with the church ceremony if my refusal were going to lead to a breach with my wife's parents and family. However, I didn't even raise the question and made no difficulty about the church ceremony, as I wanted everything to be as it should be. I knew too that it would make my very religious-minded parents happy. I said nothing about it to my KGB

superiors, but my wife later betrayed herself by innocently showing our case-officer a photograph taken outside the church after the ceremony. We returned to Moscow as a married couple, using the name "Krylov".

They were met at the station in Moscow by Arkadiy Andreyevich, who introduced them to their future case-officer, Sergey Bogdanovich Sarkisov (Sergey II) who took them to the flat which had been arranged for them. It apparently belonged to a member of the KGB who was temporarily absent from Moscow.

Sergey II told Stashinsky about his future work. His training would be principally directed towards increasing his knowledge of the German language and later learning English. At the same time he would receive political instruction. Sergey II added that the specialist training which had been mentioned would cover photography and radio. Finally Stashinsky would have to learn a trade with a view to his later being able to legalise his position in the West. It was first planned that he should train as a radio technician, but later it was decided that it would be preferable for him to go into the hairdressing trade, since his wife was a hairdresser and there would thus be a possibility of their running a business together.

The principal aim for Stashinsky from the political point of view while they were in Moscow, according to Sergey II, was to 'find his way back into "Soviet reality"', which required practice by everyone who had spent any length of time abroad. Stashinsky's wife would have to be 'formed into a "Soviet being"'. For this purpose they received copies of Russian newspapers and periodicals, were taken round factories, encouraged to go to the theatre, had to visit museums and inspect a collective farm. They were urged not to make friends with foreigners and to avoid

the area around the Intourist hotel, the Metropol. They were to be reserved towards the local people. They could correspond with Inge's parents via an accommodation address in Warsaw. Their real address was to be kept secret also from Stashinsky's parents. Correspondence went via P.O. Box 790 of the General Post Office in Moscow, a KGB postal box.

* * *

Up to the end of July 1960 the Stashinsky's life ran according to the KGB plan without any particular incidents. Twice a week a teacher, Elvira Michailovna, came to their flat and gave Stashinsky lessons in German, geography, history, religion and etiquette—with a view to future operations.

The 'spiritual change' in Stashinsky was steadily proceeding. His wife had prophesied, 'One day you will wake up and find yourself cured'. Instead of his turning her into a convinced Communist—as Shelepin had said he must—she continued to influence him against Communism. His doubts and distrust of the system grew. One day Inge said to him, 'You're not a stupid person. How can you be so ridiculous about all this?' His reply was, 'Yes, you're right'.

During this period something happened which had an important bearing on Stashinsky's increasing rejection of the Soviet system. He said of this:

'At the end of July 1960 we confirmed that there were bugs in our flat. I was trying to track them down when I ripped off a piece of skirting board in the living room and discovered a cable, insulated with rubber, running behind the skirting. At first I had no inkling as to what the cable could be for. I then discovered that at a certain point the cable, together with a second cable coming from the opposite direction, led through a hole into the next-door flat. Every

now and then the cables were led into the walls of our living room. It was clear that the flat had been miked.

'To check on this I undid the insulating tape at one of the connection points and connected the cable coming from the wall with a tape recorder by leading the ends of the cable into a micro-box. I switched the machine on and spoke loudly against the wall where I suspected there was a microphone. Then I re-wound the tape and set the machine to reproduction. I could actually hear—though only faintly—the words which had been recorded on the tape reproduced through the loudspeaker. The weakness in reproduction must have been due to the makeshift way I had led the cables back into the microphone box. At any rate I was now certain that we were being spied upon.

'This incident was, for me, in a way the last straw so far as my activities for the KGB were concerned. I was now convinced that our ways must part.'

Mrs. Stashinsky added that after this incident they no longer dared to talk in the flat about anything which could possibly bring suspicion on them. 'Then one day we found our post had been opened', she said. 'The letters had not even been re-sealed after censorship. When we mentioned this to Sergey, he said straight away that all letters were censored. His explanation of the cable behind the skirting was that the previous occupant had probably been carrying out experiments!'

★ ★ ★

During that summer of 1960 Inge found she was going to have a baby. They mentioned this to no one, but Sergey raised the subject—'Proof that we were being spied upon', Inge said later, 'because it was impossible to tell by looking at me at that stage'. She asked Sergey how he knew and

he replied, 'There are no secrets from the KGB'. He told her she must have an abortion and when Inge reacted strongly against this he assured her it was quite customary in Moscow. However the Stashinskys both resisted this idea emphatically and no more was heard of it.

Later in the summer they were given leave to visit the Stashinsky parents in Borshchevitse. When they returned to Moscow in September the visits from the teacher ceased and Stashinsky had virtually nothing to do beyond a few translations from German into Russian. He became more and more mistrustful of his employers. It seemed, for one thing, that the expected child was worrying them. Sergey suggested to Inge that she should put the child in a home and let it grow up there. When she protested he said it was a wonderful thing to be able to give a child to the community.

Things began to move towards a climax about the end of the year when General Vladimir Yakovlevich of the KGB called on the Stashinskys, accompanied by Sergey, and told them their planned return to East Berlin was not possible. The political situation, he said, had 'fundamentally altered' and Stashinsky's safety in Berlin was endangered to such an extent that it would not be possible for him to go back there for five years or more. Inge very much wanted to return to her native city to see her parents and there was no objection to this. The underlying intention of the KGB, Stashinsky therefore decided, was that they were not to be allowed to go back to Berlin *together*; one was to be held in Moscow as a hostage.

Stashinsky told his wife this, and took this opportunity also to confess to her about the assassination of Rebet and Bandera, so that she would be fully informed about his past life and his guilt. Mrs. Stashinsky was deeply shocked

but Stashinsky felt himself delivered from the continual pangs of conscience he had suffered. Now at least his wife knew the whole truth.

Stashinsky said later, 'My situation by this time was that I must either continue to work for the KGB or I must flee to the West. As the first alternative was morally impossible for me, but on the other hand the KGB travel restrictions prevented my reaching the West via East Berlin, my wife and I agreed on a plan. First of all my wife should write a letter to Shelepin from East Berlin, via the Russian embassy there, in which she would ask that I should at least be allowed to travel to East Berlin for her confinement. If this had no result, she would then try to make contact with the Americans via Frau Schade, a friend of her father. She was to tell them that I was an under-cover KGB worker who had morally dissociated himself from his employers and wanted to go to the West. She was to ask the Americans to help me in this. She would say that when I had succeeded in reaching the West I would give them details of my work for the KGB.

'I had to reckon on the possibility that something might happen to us both. After the talk with General Yakovlevich I felt I must warn my wife that she might one day meet with a fatal accident. The same might also happen to me. My anxiety was that the true background of the two assassinations would be made known to the world.

'If my wife were unable to carry out any of this—I did not pin much faith in Shelepin and making contact with the Americans seemed to me a very delicate affair—she was to return to Moscow. In that case I had decided that on the next occasion when I was given a KGB assignment to carry out in the West I should myself make contact with the Americans or with German intelligence.'

Having agreed on their course of action, the Stashinskys informed Sergey II that Mrs. Stashinsky was now willing to travel alone. Sergey seemed pleased and said he would make the necessary arrangements.

Before Mrs. Stashinsky left Moscow on January 31, 1961, she and her husband devised some twenty phrases which they could use as a sort of code. They also agreed a time and a place for use in case the Americans wanted to contact Stashinsky in Moscow via a middleman. Only the date was left open. That would have to be agreed between Mrs. Stashinsky and the Americans and communicated to Stashinsky by letter.

They packed up all the things which were not absolutely necessary for daily use and Mrs. Stashinsky took their belongings back with her to East Berlin in two suitcases. So as to delay her return journey to Moscow, which was planned to take place two weeks later, Stashinsky had advised his wife to go at once to a Berlin doctor, who would certify that on medical grounds she should not undertake any further journeys.

A few days after her departure from Moscow a letter arrived from her in East Berlin to say that the doctor would not let her travel back at the end of the fortnight. Stashinsky reported this to Sergey II, saying that Inge had been unwell before leaving and that this was probably the reason why she was not allowed to travel before her confinement.

In the meantime Stashinsky was instructed to resume his studies. For this purpose he was given papers in his real name of Bogdan Stashinsky—identity card, employment papers, trade union papers, and military pass. As there had been a decision about his case at ministerial level, he was admitted without examination into the fourth term at the

'First Moscow State Pedagogic Institute of Foreign Languages'. The Institute authorities knew that he was a KGB member.

Stashinsky received from the 'Director of the Scientific Research Institute' (a cover office of the KGB) a 'Service Testimonial' certifying that he had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1959 for his 'successful contribution to the solution of an important problem'.

At the end of February Stashinsky received from his wife a letter containing the phrase 'I have cut my finger'. This meant that she had sent the agreed letter to Shelepin via the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Soon afterwards Sergey II told Stashinsky that his wife had written to Shelepin about his being allowed to join her in Berlin but that the answer was in the negative. Sergey II sternly criticised Inge's having 'bothered' the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin with this and told Stashinsky to use his influence with his wife to see that nothing like this happened again.

Stashinsky thereupon wrote to his wife, saying that she should 'go to the dressmaker'. In code this meant that she should try to get into contact with the Americans. He later had misgivings about this. He telephoned his wife and asked her 'not to go to the dressmaker' for the time being.

Mrs. Stashinsky had to go into the maternity home a month earlier than was expected, and there, on March 31, their son Peter was born. Mrs. Stashinsky telegraphed the news to her husband in Moscow. Stashinsky asked the successor of Sergey II, Yuriy Nikolayevich Alexandrov, to arrange for him to get permission to visit his wife in East Berlin, as there were complications after the birth. The request was refused.

Mrs. Stashinsky said of the situation, 'After this had

failed and my husband's letters were becoming more and more despondent, I came to the conclusion I had better return to Moscow with the baby. My contacts at Karlshorst, with whom I had to be constantly in touch, were very pleased at my decision and communicated it to Moscow the same day. The journey was planned for the beginning of August. But while I was still arranging the exact date of the journey my son was taken ill with pneumonia and died two days later on August 8, in the maternity home. This was a terrible blow. It was too much for me and I asked Karlshorst if my husband could come at once to Berlin.'



Bogdan Stashinsky, born at Borshchevitse in the Ukraine, November 4, 1931; recruited by the MGB (Soviet State Security Service) in 1950 as secret collaborator. On the orders of the KGB (successor to MGB) he murdered two Ukrainian emigré politicians in Munich—Dr. Lev Rebet in 1957 and Stefan Bandera in 1959.



Gültig
für 10 Jahre
Tage der Ausstellung geschätzt

Unterschrift
des Inhabers Josef Lehmann

Größe: 170 cm Augen-
farbe: grün

Bes.
Kennz.: keine

Gültig bis 13 April 41

Geburts-
name: Lehmann

verheh.

Vornamen: Josef

Geburts-
tag: 14. November 1930

Geburts-
ort: Lubowek

Geburts-
kreis: Lubliner

Nationalität: Deutsch

Erlernter Beruf: Kraftfahrer

Familienstand: ledig 514

Dieser Personalausweis wurde in
Berlin am 14. 11. 1961 ausgestellt



P. Lehmann
Unterschrift

XV 1431159

A false identity card and (below) driving licence issued to Stashinsky by the KGB when he was sent to Berlin as a secret agent.



Im Besitz der Fahrerlaubnis seit
1954

Listen-Nr. 3315/54

Dresden, den 9.8 1954

Der Vorsitzende
der Prüfungskommission
bei der Kfz.-Insp.
der Polizeibehörde
Lehmann
(Unterschrift)

Stempel

Eigenhändige Unterschrift des Inhabers
Lehmann Josef

FAHRERLAUBNIS

Herr Lehmann Josef

geb. 14.11.30 in Polen


wohnhaft in Dresden A2,
Kaitzer Straße Nr. 23

erhält die Erlaubnis, ein Kraftfahrzeug
mit Antrieb durch
Verbrennungsmaschine
Elektromotor Dampfmaschine
der Klasse -3- zu führen.

C431585



Stephan Bandera. I leader OUN
~~Dr. Lev Rabet~~, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian emigré papers
Ukrainski Samostinik and *Suzanna Ukraina* in Munich, was murdered
by ~~Stashinsky~~ on KGB orders on October 12, 1957.



Reconstruction sketch of the poison-spray weapon issued by the KGB to Stashinsky and used by him to kill Dr. Rebet. It was 8 ins. long and less than an inch in diameter.



Степ Бандера


~~Stepan Bandera~~, leader of the Ukrainian emigré organisation OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) was murdered by Stashinsky on the orders of the KGB in Munich on October 15, 1959.



Bandera and his family lived in this block of flats at No. 7 Kreittmayrstrasse, Munich. Stashinsky described how he kept watch on the building and the courtyard entrance leading to the garages. When he had seen Bandera drive into the courtyard he went into the building and made his fatal poison-gun attack as Bandera was opening the street door (*left*).



Stefan Bandera with his son Andrey and his youngest daughter, Cesia. *Jesia*




Reconstruction of the double-barrelled poison-spray pistol with which Stashinsky killed Bandera. Its operation is similar to that of the single-barrelled pistol shown on p. 68.



Bandera lying in state. As Stashinsky had not seen either of his victims dying or dead it was the sight of Bandera, surrounded by his mourning family and friends, on a newsreel in a Berlin cinema which, Stashinsky claimed, shocked him into the feelings of remorse which eventually led to his flight to the West and his confession.

Alexander Shelepin, chairman of the Committee for State Security of the USSR (KGB) who issued the orders for Stashinsky's murders and who personally bestowed on him the Order of the Red Banner for the successful 'liquidation' of Bandera. Shelepin was later promoted to be Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Party State Control Committee and in November 1964 was again promoted—to full membership of the Soviet Presidium.





On April 23, 1960 Stashinsky married a 23-year-old German girl, Inge Pohl, at the Central Register Office of East Berlin.


СЛУЖЕБНАЯ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА

на т. СТАШИНСКОГО Б.Н.

Тов. СТАШИНСКИЙ Богдан Николаевич, 1931 года рождения, работал в НИИ п/я 946 с марта 1951 по декабрь 1960 года. За время работы т. СТАШИНСКИЙ проявил себя как честный и добросовестный работник. С порученной работой справлялся в срок и успешно. За хорошую работу, а также за проявленную при этом инициативу и настойчивость имел от руководства института поощрения.

Одновременно с успешной работой т. СТАШИНСКИЙ самостоятельно работал над повышением своей служебной квалификации, в результате чего добился хороших навыков в переводческой работе и был повышен в должности до старшего переводчика.

За успешную работу в разработке важной проблемы Указом Президиума Верховного Совета СССР от 6 ноября 1959 года награжден орденом Красного Знамени.

28 декабря 1960 года
 НИИ п/я 946
Макаров
/МАКАРОВ/

This 'Service Testimonial' was given to Stashinsky by the Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Moscow (which is, in fact, a 'cover' office for the KGB). It states that Stashinsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner on November 6, 1959 by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (See English translation opposite.)

OFFICIAL TESTIMONIAL

concerning Comrade B.N. Stashinsky.

Comrade Bogdan Nikolayevich STASHINSKY, born in 1931, worked in the Scientific Research Institute, P.O. Box 946, from March 1951 to December 1960. During his service Comrade STASHINSKY proved to be an honest and conscientious employee. He performed the work assigned to him promptly and successfully. He received awards from the Institute management both for his good work and for the initiative and perseverance he showed in carrying it out.

In addition to doing his work well, Comrade STASHINSKY worked independently to improve his professional qualifications, as a result of which he acquired substantial skill as a translator and was promoted to be senior translator.

For his successful contribution to the solution of an important problem he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, in accordance with an Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, November 6, 1959.

Director of the SRI, P.O. Box 946

MAKAROV

(Official seal of the
Scientific Research
Institute, P.O. Box 946.)

December 28, 1960

English translation of the 'Service Testimonial'. (See opposite page.) Stashinsky's 'successful contribution to the solution of an important problem' was, in fact, his assassination of Stefan Bandera.



Stefan Lippolz.

At an East Berlin press conference after Stashinsky's flight to the West in 1961 Stefan Lippolz, a Ukrainian emigré, stated that he had been ordered by the West German Intelligence Service to poison Bandera. He avoided the assignment, he claimed, and recommended another Ukrainian, Dmytro Myskiw.

Myskiw—according to Lippolz—was killed by 'Bonn Intelligence' after he had carried out the assignment to murder Bandera. Lippolz's story was easily proved false as Myskiw was in Rome when Bandera died and Myskiw himself died of natural causes.



Dmytro Myskiw.

FLIGHT

INGE telephoned her sad news to her husband on the day the baby died and her father sent a telegram urging him to come to Berlin. Next day Stashinsky got in touch with Alexandrov, who said he had already heard the news of Peter's death but he had wanted Stashinsky to hear about it from his wife. Stashinsky said he wanted to go to Berlin, as he must look after his wife. 'I emphasised', he said, 'that in her present state of mind she might in despair do something which would be harmful to the KGB. He agreed with me and asked me to telephone him later in the day. I did so and he told me that permission had been granted in principle, but that there were still difficulties concerning travel documents. My wife telephoned again and I told her I would be coming to Berlin next day or the day after. At 7 o'clock that evening I rang Yuriy (Alexandrov) again and he asked me to be waiting outside the house at 5 a.m., as I was to fly to Germany in a military plane. He instructed me to get all my passes etc. ready to hand over.'

Distressed as he was about the baby's death Stashinsky nevertheless saw that here was a new and unexpected opportunity for escape. He put everything in order in the flat, being especially careful to destroy the paper concerned with the code phrases. Those papers he did not consider necessary for his future he put in an envelope to give to Alexandrov. The remaining passes and permits etc. he put loose in his coat pocket. He hoped that he would later be able to take them with him to the West.

At 5 a.m. he was waiting outside the house. Alexandrov arrived. He was dressed in his Sunday best and looked as

though he were ready to go on a journey. He announced that he was going to accompany Stashinsky to East Berlin. Stashinsky saw his chances of escape receding. At the airport they had to wait several hours for the plane. During this time Alexandrov expressed his suspicions about the baby's death. There were two possibilities: either the Americans or the Germans had killed the baby, so as to lay a trap for Stashinsky, or his wife had done it herself, so as to get him to come to Berlin.

Stashinsky flared up at this and retorted that it was really too much to imagine that his wife could have killed the baby. Alexandrov told him to compose himself. They were, he said, intelligence service men, and they would shortly learn from the German authorities something more about the cause of death. Up to now they did not know anything conclusive.

'After all that I had experienced with KGB men', Stashinsky said, 'this conversation was the last straw. Those people really thought that a mother was capable of murdering her own child in order to gratify her wishes.'

They landed at Spremberg airfield in the afternoon and were met by one of the Berlin KGB staff who was also one of the contacts for Mrs. Stashinsky. Stashinsky did not know this man's name and always referred to him as 'Graukopf' (grey head) when talking to his wife. 'Graukopf' asked him if he had given his wife any idea that he was coming. When Stashinsky said he had told his wife that she could expect him 'Graukopf' criticised this as 'premature'. He said that Stashinsky would have to stay in the Karlshorst security compound until the situation was straightened out. Berlin, he continued, had lately become 'a seething den of vice'. The scum of humanity had collected there and 'created an unhealthy atmosphere'. Strange people

had been asking about him (Stashinsky). Also the cause of the baby's death must be established conclusively.

Stashinsky insisted on telephoning his wife immediately to inform her of his arrival. At about 7 p.m. they drove from the Karlshorst security compound to Dallgow, to the house of Stashinsky's father-in-law. Stashinsky told his wife that they would have to spend the night in Karlshorst. Shortly after 11 o'clock they were back at Karlshorst, where they were accommodated in a 'safe house'.

Of the events of the next two days—August 11 and 21, 1961—Stashinsky said: 'It was agreed that we should meet the others at about 9 o'clock next morning outside the "safe house". When I looked out of the window before leaving the house, I saw a car with a CD (Corps Diplomatique) number plate parked nearby. Then a Volga arrived and the other car drove away. They had thus obviously been keeping an eye on us during the night. Shortly afterwards "Graukopf" and Yuriy arrived in a Volkswagen. Yuriy took me aside and told me that up to then they had received no report as to the cause of the baby's death. I was to go and make enquiries myself at the hospital. The utmost caution was necessary, he said, and it had therefore been arranged for a surveillance team to guard our safety. The Volga was at my disposal. He would like to meet us at the Budapest Café in East Berlin at 4 p.m. to exchange information.

'I drove with my wife to Dallgow and noticed that there was a car parked in such a position that the house and the street could be kept under observation. In my father-in-law's house we were at last able to talk freely. We both realised that we should now have to take the great decision. We agreed that we would flee to the West after our son's funeral.'

That afternoon Stashinsky drove to the maternity hospital and there was told that the baby had died of pneumonia.

After Stashinsky and his wife had visited the cemetery chapel, where the baby had been laid out, they went on to their meeting with Alexandrov in the Café Budapest as arranged. Alexandrov told them straightaway that he had learned that the baby had died of pneumonia—death from natural causes. Stashinsky reported that his enquiries at the hospital had produced the same answer. He told Alexandrov that they wished to spend the rest of the day in East Berlin. It was agreed that the car would pick them up at 11 p.m. outside the Café Budapest.

Stashinsky continued: 'In the café and later in the streets we knew we were still under observation, despite the fact that the cause of Peter's death had now been established. We wandered about in the town and talked about the events of the last six months. At 11 p.m. we were driven back to the security compound.'

At about 9 o'clock next morning the Stashinskys were collected by Alexandrov in the Volkswagen. He was driving himself. He told them that he would take them to Dallgow and arrange for them to be collected there at 10 p.m. He behaved as though the measures which had been taken to 'ensure their safety' had now been given up.

The Stashinskys planned that afternoon to visit the furnished room Inge had rented, near her parents' house, and pick up some of her belongings. But when they were ready to set out they noticed a Volkswagen parked nearby. In it were the Soviet surveillance men who had been shadowing them now for two days. There had been no let-up in the watch on them as Alexandrov had seemed to indicate and they were now afraid that they would be watched as

closely as ever, or even more so, after the funeral, and that they would have no chance of escape.

Stashinsky then told his wife they must flee before the funeral. 'I was very much afraid she would not be able to bring herself to do this', he said, 'but she realised that it was vital to do so and that we could be of no further use to our son even if we did attend the funeral.' They decided to make their attempt without delay. Accompanied by Inge's 15-year-old brother Fritz, they left the house but instead of going into the street they crept along under cover of the hedges and were able to reach Inge's rented room without being observed.

'She changed and packed a few things quickly', Stashinsky said, 'We could not take much as we had to be inconspicuous and allow for being challenged in the course of our flight.'

When they left the house they did not return to Inge's parents but walked on through Dallgow to Falkensee. Stashinsky said, 'I noticed that we no longer had anyone following us. In Falkensee we went past the station to a taxi-rank, but we were unable to hire a taxi there. At a nearby car-hire garage we finally found a taxi-driver who was prepared to drive us to Berlin. On the Berliner Ring we had to show our papers at a check point and say where we were going. I showed my East Zone pass in the name of Lehmann and told the officials I lived in Berlin and was returning home. They allowed us to drive on. We drove through Pankow to the crossroads at Friedrich-Reinhardt-Strasse. There we paid the taxi off and walked to the Friedrichstrasse station. Here we parted from my wife's brother and he returned home by S-Bahn (Underground). We took another taxi and were driven to the Schonhauser-Allee station which is still the Eastern Sector. We got into the S-Bahn and went one stop beyond the sector boundary

to Gesundbrunnen station. I had chosen this route so as to be able to say, if we were checked, that we intended to go to my house near the Friedrichstrasse station. This time, however, there was no check.

‘When we were in the Western Sector we went straight to the nearby Osloer Strasse, where one of my wife’s relatives, Frau Villwoks, lived, but she was not at home, so we took a taxi to Berlin-Lubars where another of my wife’s aunts, Frau Kugow, lived. There we met the Villwoks as well and we discussed our position with them all. I urged that we should get in touch with the Americans, if possible that very day. Finally my wife’s cousin, Gunter Kugow, drove us in his car to the police station at Berlin-Tempelhof on the Tempelhofer Damm. The police officers there arranged for me to be collected by a contact of the Americans.’

Mrs. Stashinsky confirmed this story of her husband’s and added, ‘Our flight to West Berlin really was a flight. There was no other way out for us, though with all the strain and stress and emotional burden of the last few days we were not really fully aware of the consequences of our step.’

Inge’s 15-year-old brother Fritz played an important role in the escape, although he knew nothing about it in advance. He also, and quite separately (and contrary to Stashinsky’s belief that he ‘returned home’) took the opportunity to make his own escape from the Soviet Zone. He later told how, on that Saturday afternoon, he had fetched from the florist’s the two wreaths which Joschi (‘Joschi’ was Stashinsky’s pet name, derived from his alias, Josef Lehmann) and Inge had ordered for Peter. ‘I put them in the hall of our house’, he said. ‘Inge came and looked at them. One wreath was of fir leaves with roses and on the ribbon were the

words "Ruhe Sanft" (Rest gently). This one was from Joschi and Inge. The ribbon on the other wreath bore the words "Von Opa und Fritzchen" (From Grandpa and little Fritz). Inge said to me, "You will have to take our wreath with you". From this I understood that she and Joschi would not be present at Peter's funeral, that they would try to flee beforehand. Neither Inge nor Joschi had said anything to me about it. But I thought that was what they would have to do, as it would be impossible to flee after the funeral.

'I had already noticed the cars which had been parked suspiciously near the house. They usually had two or three men in them who looked foreign. When I spoke about this Joschi said that he was being protected by these people, but the tone in which he said it indicated that he was really being watched by them.'

When Fritz was on his way to the florist's a friend had told him that at Staaken station many travellers who wished to go to Berlin were being turned back at the check point. Fritz told his sister and brother-in-law about this. 'Inge asked me to go for a walk with them,' he went on. 'Before we left Joschi asked me if I had seen a car outside. I told him what I had seen. Joschi told us to turn right when we left the house and keep alongside the fence. We were not to look round. Between us and the street there was a ditch and a row of trees. From the corners of the Ernest-Thalman-Strasse, and in particular from the corner where I had repeatedly observed a car, we could not be seen. When we had reached the street leading to Dallgow station, Joschi asked me to go ahead and see whether there was a car there. When I had confirmed that there was no car, we crossed the road and went on in the direction of the Geibelstrasse.

‘Shortly after that we reached Frau Niebuhr’s house and went to Inge’s room. Joschi changed his shirt there and put on a coat. Inge asked Joschi if they should take Peter’s blanket with them so as to have at least some keepsake and Joschi agreed. Up to that moment neither of them had said a word to me about an intended escape.’

When they left the house and continued to walk in the direction of Falkensee, Stashinsky advised them to say, should they be halted, that they were going to ‘have an ice’. When they were near Falkensee station he said that he thought it was dangerous to stay in the vicinity of the station. It would be certain to be under observation. ‘Inge asked me to go round to the station and fetch a taxi’, Fritz said. ‘I said that would be rather obvious, and then I remembered a taxi-rank nearby. We went there and I asked a driver if he would take us to Berlin. He agreed. On the way to Berlin I remembered that I still had a pair of shoes in Joschi’s room in the Marienstrasse. I told Inge this. She thought that was splendid, as we could say, if asked, that that was what we were going for. However we were not stopped.’

After paying off the taxi at the crossroads Inge said to Fritz that they would probably not see one another again for a long time. She gave him 300 East Marks (about £40) and told him he was to return home. Fritz added, ‘Although neither Inge nor Joschi had said so, I knew for certain that they would take the S-Bahn from there to the Western Sector of Berlin’.

Fritz Pohl then went to the S-Bahn ticket office and took a ticket to Staaken station. He was going to return home via Dallgow. He went as far as Spandau station.

‘There I wondered whether to go home or to relatives in the Western Sector. I thought of Inge’s last request. She

had asked me to say, should I be questioned at home, that she and Joschi had gone to visit some relations. It occurred to me that I might also visit some relatives who lived near Gesundbrunnen station. I therefore got into the Nordring train and went as far as Gesundbrunnen. As I did not find aunt Grete Villwok at home, I took a bus to aunt Lotte Kugow's. There I also met Uncle and Aunt Villwok. At my request, with the permission of my uncle, Rudolf Pohl, I was allowed to go the next day to the emergency camp at Berlin-Marienfelde to register as a refugee.'

* * *

Stashinsky was in due course handed over by the Americans to the West German authorities. On September 1, 1961, he was imprisoned pending investigations. The warrant for his arrest gave the reason as 'treasonable relations'. The two murders to which Stashinsky had confessed were not mentioned. Not until December 21 did the judge responsible for the preliminary proceedings at the Federal Court in Karlsruhe decide to extend the warrant to include the murders of Rebet and Bandera.

THE TRIAL

IT would not be unreasonable if the reader, knowing nothing of the Stashinsky case except this account of the facts, were to have a faint scepticism about the absolute truth of all the details. For this is one of the most remarkable, at times almost incredible, cases in the history of political murder, and although everything written here is based upon Stashinsky's confession, upon his trial and the abundance of evidence adduced there in corroboration, upon statements by those who played some part in the events and others who have met and talked with Stashinsky and were present at his trial, the narrative of events and their motivation may give rise to some reservations.

Indeed such reservations were present at first in the minds of practically everybody connected with the case as it unfolded after Stashinsky's flight to the West. The American authorities expressed doubts; the West German criminal investigation officials at first believed the whole story to be fictitious. Even the first hearings by the judge responsible for the preliminary proceedings of the Federal High Court were not without question marks. And the seven-day trial itself, before the Third Criminal Senate of the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe, was marked by the cool reserve of the court, which seemed to many of the spectators to be exaggerated. No accused man was ever surely treated with so much impartiality and reserve by a court and prosecuting authorities as was Bogdan Stashinsky. One of the constantly recurring phrases used by the presiding judge, Dr. Jagusch, to the accused was, 'If what you say is correct, Herr Stashinsky. . . .'

The absolute objectivity which had been laid down by

the highest German criminal court as the basis for the trial was specially stressed by the presiding judge at the start by his reading out a statement which was intended for the representatives of the German and foreign press and radio. In this statement it was said that shortly after the charge had been brought the accused had already been described as a 'murderer' or 'political assassin' in certain press publications, as though the court proceedings had already taken place and the accused been convicted. As chairman of these proceedings, Dr. Jagusch said, it was his duty to protect the accused against this sort of 'premature conviction'.

'An accused person', he went on, 'no matter how suspect he has rendered himself, is not merely the object of the proceedings. He remains a morally responsible human being also when he is before the court . . . no one is entitled to use the accused as a plaything or as a weapon in political altercations. The accused has a right to the court's protection in this matter.'

Scepticism and doubt prevailed among Germans and foreigners alike on the first day of the main proceedings. There was no doubt as to whether the accused was the person he said he was or whether he would repeat the statements he had made during the preliminary enquiries and proceedings. But there was no doubt either as to the judicial impartiality and open-mindedness with which the trial was conducted. Bogdan Stashinsky had that prerequisite of lawful criminal procedure, 'a fair and unbiased trial'.

The objectivity with which this trial was conducted has been specially stressed by the legal representatives of the widows of the murdered men, Frau Daria Rebet and Frau Jaroslava Bandera. Dr. Miehr, counsel for Frau Rebet, said, 'It is certainly a comfort to be able to confirm at the end of this trial that it has not turned into a "show trial"'. Thank

God that we cannot be reproached with that, and that the reasonable and pertinent investigation of the facts of the case conformed to the reasonable and pertinent confession of the accused, which provided a reliable and convincing basis for judgment. On the other hand this trial has allowed us to take a look behind the scenes at the practices of the Soviet Secret Service, a secret service which we know in all its world-embracing activity and which we know to have an army of agents ready to infiltrate and to undermine all over the world.'

Frau Bandera's attorney, Charles J. Kersten, a former United States Congressman, said in his speech, 'The High Court has conducted a trial which is of great significance for the whole world. All the essential facts were presented in the most objective manner, in keeping with the democratic traditions of western civilisation.'

During the seven days of the trial the court and the spectators became convinced that Stashinsky was willing and able to make correct, clear and complete statements. The confession, which he repeated, corresponded in all details with the earlier confessions which he had made to the police and to the judge at the preliminary proceedings. He evidently had an excellent memory. He appeared to be incapable of inventing or embellishing anything.

The psychiatric expert had also particularly stressed this point. Stashinsky's statements and his behaviour when making them, he said, were natural, genuine and spontaneous. Although he was a foreigner, he reacted swiftly and logically to unexpected interpolated questions. His statements were sensible, exact to the smallest detail, and struck no false notes. The complete and consistent presentation of the external events and inner feelings of the whole affair made the confession and the mass of objective proof power-

fully persuasive. The events could only have been described in such detail by someone who had taken part in them. This chain of events, most of which could be checked, could only be known to the person involved. The inner, spiritual conditions which Stashinsky had described during the trial could also only have been experienced by the person involved.

Stashinsky's confession was corroborated by an abundance of evidence—identity cards, driving licences, telegrams, travel tickets, hotel bills and many other details which could be independently checked. He identified and named Shelepin and the agent Bissaga ('Nadichyn') from photographs. All his topographical detail about Munich was correct; he identified, again from photographs, houses he had mentioned in his statements, and his description of the Soviet security compound at Karlshorst—*forbidden territory to unauthorised persons*—was confirmed as correct.

When he said there was a crowd and a police car outside No. 8 Karlsplatz in Munich after he had murdered Rebet this was confirmed by the police. The woman he said he heard on the stairs of the building where he killed Bandera was traced to be a cleaner, Kressengia Huber, and her story tallied. The broken-off bits of keys were found in the lock as he had described. His statement that Bandera was trying to get the key out of the lock with his left hand was confirmed; Bandera *was* left-handed.

His descriptions of the murder weapons and how they worked were confirmed by scientific experiments and tests by experts. The antidotes to the poison spray, which he described, were recognised by experts as sodium thio-sulphate and amyl-nitrite, which are used in accidents with cyanide.

In his speech giving the reasons for the verdict, the

presiding judge, Dr. Jagusch, said, among other things, 'The accused has shown during the trial that, in spite of his troubled youth, he had learned to think and to feel in a morally sound way. When he was only 19 years of age and a student at the Teachers' Training College in Lemberg, the Soviet State got him into its grip and turned this young, inexperienced, tractable human being into a political tool. The action which brought him into contact with the police was an unimportant student's prank.

'The Soviet Secret Police, the MGB, win this easily influenced young person, not yet sufficiently discerning to weigh matters up, as an MGB spy against Ukrainian underground groups. They threaten him with reprisals against his family, turn him into a renegade and alienate him from his family and his own people. As a naïve young man he is unsuspecting of the crafty methods of the Secret Police.

'In return for his services as an agent he receives the promise that his family will be spared. What a demand on a young person! He "proves himself" in an enquiry into a political assassination and becomes an MGB man to be used against Ukrainian underground groups. From now onwards he lives exclusively in the sphere of influence of the Soviet MGB. He receives training in Communism and as an agent.

'From now onwards he is encumbered with the political system which has been characterised as the absolute negation of the value of the human being, the denial of man as a being created by God and the substitution of the synthetic Soviet religion of a debased and inhuman humanism—man as the mere product of protein and water, who can be drilled into producing automatic reflex actions, man as the tool of a social Utopia, replaceable at will and worth only as much as the sum of the reflexes useful to society.

'The scars and injuries produced by such drilling of the human soul should be particularly well appreciated by us—the nation of Goethe and Lessing—who, in the centre of Europe, were for twelve years the scourge of humanity under the criminal influence of Hitler, Goebbels and their associates; us, the nation with still some eighteen millions of its people living in the Soviet sphere of influence. For eleven years, nearly as long a time, the accused was the tool of the MGB-KGB.

'The Moscow order for the murder of Rebet places the accused in an entirely new position. There can be no one who has been present at this long trial who really thinks that Stashinsky was cut out to be the murderer of political opponents of the Soviet Union. He is an intelligent and gifted person, gentle and peace-loving by nature. Had it not been for the Soviet system, which, just as did the National-Socialist (Nazi) system, regards political murder on behalf of the state as a necessity, he would today probably be a school-teacher somewhere in the Ukraine. No, he belongs to the—alas—large group of people who on the orders of their own state, to which they are subservient, commit crimes.

'In him we see a man who has first been indoctrinated with the propaganda of hate and is then degraded to having to commit murder. That does not absolve him from criminal guilt. He knew the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill". Indeed, the order to commit murder was contrary to his whole character. He was distressed about the victim and the victim's family, whom he had never seen. On the other hand the method of murder chosen did not call for exceptional energy or skill. Also at that time he was still accustomed to absolute obedience. He has clearly described the arguments he used to himself. His political

training had taught him to see Rebet as a traitor and an enemy of the Soviet Union. He was thus able to pacify his conscience for the time being.

'He takes on the assignment, travels to Munich with the hidden weapon and on October 12, 1957, has the opportunity he has been ordered to wait for, though his conscience tells him he should avoid it. He keeps strictly to the terms of his assignment to lie in wait for Rebet at his office at No. 8 Karlsplatz. He knows that there is probably a better opportunity for carrying out the deed somewhere else, but he says to himself, "An order is an order and if he comes I must do it; if he doesn't come then my work for today is finished."

'But Rebet comes to the office about 10 a.m. Acting almost automatically, the accused goes towards him on the staircase and fires the poison pistol in the unsuspecting victim's face. He has the weapon, a short, finger-like tube, rolled up in a newspaper. It all goes very easily. He does not have to aim exactly. No struggle. No shrieks. No blood. Only the pressure of a finger; a weak, smacking sound. Rebet immediately falls forward and is shortly afterwards found a few steps higher. Stashinsky leaves the house, goes to the Hofgarten, throws the weapon into the water, travels back to East Berlin and there reports on his activities.

'In the prescribed KGB language he has "successfully greeted an acquaintance"—by which murder is meant.

'Unpalatable facts have come to light in this trial. The political leadership of the Soviet Union—a world power which used to be proud of its history and of its culture, which gave the world a Pushkin, a Gogol, a Chekhov, a Tolstoy and a Dostoevsky, and more recently a Mayakovsky, a Sholokhov and Pasternak—the political leadership of this country, a member of the United Nations, having correct

diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic, considers it advisable to have carried out on the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic a state assignment for a murder by poisoning, decided upon at government level at least.

'In the confident expectation that the deed would not become known, they were ready to flout international morality and German penal laws in order to remove a political opponent. Yet in the end every political murder is turned against its instigator, just as are all political lies. From a previous case which came before the Federal High Court we learned that the Soviet Union had misused a member of its embassy in Bonn to spy against the Federal Republic. It can now regretfully be confirmed that the Soviet Union has also officially ordered and had carried out attempts on people's lives on German territory.'

The written judgment stated that the trial 'conclusively proved' that Stashinsky carried out the murders on the orders of 'a very high Soviet authority'. It went on:

'Before Stalin's death, orders for the liquidation of Soviet citizens and others were frequently given by the head of the KGB (or, previously, MGB, NKVD, GPU). Since about 1956 these decisions have no longer been taken by the KGB, but by a committee consisting of several members of the government. This is emphasised by the fact that Stashinsky received the Order of the Red Banner for carrying out an important government assignment.

'In the instructions for the attacks on Rebet and Bandera, Stashinsky's employers determined beforehand all the essential features of the attempts—victim, weapon, antidotes, method of use, time and place of attempt, travel arrangements. Everything was premeditated. The poison pistol, made to their orders and "already used on several

occasions and always with success”, the detailed directions for carrying out the deed, all prove that they planned to kill, taking deliberate advantage of the victim’s defencelessness, and that they ordered these murders.’

Elsewhere the written judgment says: ‘As organisers of the deed—the actual wire-pullers—they (the Soviet government) had the will to commit the deed . . . therefore (they are) the indirect perpetrators. There have always been political murders committed in the world. More recently, however, certain modern states have, under the influence of radical political conceptions (for example, Germany under National-Socialism) gone over to actually planning political murders or mass murders and ordering the execution of these bloody deeds.

‘Those who merely receive official orders to commit a crime are not subject to the usual criminal, or at any rate personal, impulses to commit the deed. Rather do they find themselves in the morally confusing, at times hopeless, position of being ordered by their own state—which many people who have been subjected to clever mass propaganda seem to regard as having unquestioned authority—to commit reprehensible crimes. They carry out these directions under the authority of their own state, from which on the contrary they are justified in expecting the maintenance of justice and order. These dangerous stimuli to committing crime originate not from those who receive the orders but from those in positions of power in the state, who thereby flagrantly misuse their power. Such criminal orders are not even confined to their own national territory. This trial has demonstrated that they are international in range.’

The judgment then treats the essence of the problem of the criminal responsibility:

‘ . . . the mental and spiritual attitude of the accused

towards both the murders shows . . . that he did not commit these deeds of his own volition, that he had no personal interest in them and no will to commit them, that he finally submitted himself to the authority of his political superiors against the dictates of his conscience and that he did not himself determine any of the essential points for their execution. No material or political interest of his own was present to provide the will for the deed. He was promised no payment for carrying out the deed, as in the case of a hired underling, and he received none. He was surprised by the award of the decoration. It was repellent to him, but he could not avoid accepting it.

“To regard Rebet and Bandera as “enemies of the Soviet Union who must be liquidated” did not arise from his own political ideas. Such ideas have been pumped into him from his youth onwards without real results. . . . The guilt of the deeds only fanned his conscience into more life. The political circumstances, moreover, would not force him to atone for his deeds. On the contrary, he deliberately endangered his life to be able to make atonement, morally inescapable as it was, when he realised that he was being misused as a “professional murderer” . . .

‘Stashinsky’s superiors controlled the “if” and “how” of the deed in both cases. They took the decision, determined the victim, chose and tested the weapon and the poison. They dictated the carefully planned “legends”, organised the journeys to Munich and gave minute details as to where and when the deeds should be committed.’

At the conclusion of the judgment the following was said about the deciding of the punishment:

‘The accused has, on behalf of a foreign power, killed two people in the German Federal Republic who were entitled to the Federal Republic’s protection. That weighs

extremely heavily. He was, however, only an unwilling tool of the ruthless political instigator. He became aware that he had acted criminally and reprehensibly while he was still in the Soviet sphere of influence, and after a successful flight he at once made a frank confession.

‘He obviously repents his actions, even though he may not show his feelings. He has confessed fully and freely and spared nothing. He knew that the murder of Rebet had aroused no suspicion whatever. In spite of this he revealed it on his own initiative to the entirely unsuspecting examining authorities, so as to make a clean breast of everything. He gave himself up knowing that he was almost certain to be charged with having committed two murders, and knowing all the consequences of such a charge. He broke with his past under the most difficult circumstances and in a very dangerous manner both for him and for his wife. That applies not only to their flight but also to their future.

‘His guilt is also mitigated by the fact that in his early youth, in spite of a Christian home and background, he was repeatedly the witness of bloody deeds of political violence. It must also be borne in mind how craftily the MGB got him into its grip when he was only 19 and the political and ideological drilling he received from them. He has already atoned for part of his great guilt. He is, however, prepared to make whatever further atonement is necessary.

‘The guilt of his superiors has been proved to be much greater. Without their system of individual political terror neither murder would have taken place. The Soviet Russian principals unscrupulously ordered and had carried out on the territory of the German Federal Republic two political murders, thereby grossly disregarding all international morality and the obligations of international law as between

two states. The guilt of the highly-placed instigator of the deeds cannot be laid to the charge of the accused. On the other hand, Stashinsky's frank confession has helped to uncover and lay bare the criminal methods of the political struggle. The punishment he receives will not destroy the accused's civic existence. It will as far as possible help him to atone.'

The Federal High Court considered that the appropriate sentence for the two cases of being an accessory to murder was six years' hard labour for each. The sentence for treasonable relations was eighteen months' imprisonment, which was changed to one year's hard labour. This amounted altogether to thirteen years' hard labour, which was compounded into eight years' hard labour on the combined charges.

In the course of the trial Stashinsky made the following statement about his state of mind and conflict of conscience:

'From my childhood onwards I had known that one must never kill another human being. I knew too that this moral law might only be broken in case of self-defence or war. I acted to a certain extent in self-defence—at least I believed myself to do so—since refusal to carry out the order would have put my life in danger. If this point of view cannot be accepted as valid, one must consider the fact that from my earliest youth there was implanted in me, in addition to the moral law, the belief that an enemy of our people, if he could not be brought to reason by any other method, must be eliminated, so that he would be unable to do any further harm. I had been taught that every means was justified in putting this thesis into practice.

'Rebet and Bandera had been depicted to me as enemies of our people whose elimination was a necessity. At the time I was convinced of this, especially since I had had

experience in boyhood of the way in which the OUN had behaved in the struggles in the West Ukraine.

‘While in the Rebet case I still justified the deed on the grounds of political necessity, as I had been taught to do, in the Bandera case I had already begun to have doubts on the grounds of the moral law. For that reason I drew back in May 1959 from the deed I had been ordered to carry out. In October 1959, however, I carried it out as I did not believe it possible to evade doing so without danger to myself. I was in a hopeless position in relation to the KGB. If I had refused to carry out the order I should immediately have been eliminated as being in the know about, and having carried out, the murder of Rebet.’

Asked what other consequences he would have expected if he had refused to obey the order to murder, Stashinsky said that the imprisonment of relations was usual and was an open secret. He said, ‘Those who would have been affected in the first place were my parents and relatives. I had never been explicitly threatened on this point, as there had never been any difficulties with me before the attempts on Rebet and Bandera. But I know that their fate would have been a move to Siberia, or at least that they would have been driven out of Borshevitse. It had not been for nothing that I was told to reconcile myself with my parents in 1954, so that I should once more be bound to my parental home and become responsible for their fate.

‘It was obvious that there would be no reluctance to use coercive measures against my parents. My father was known to be a Ukrainian nationalist and to have been in contact with the resistance, for which he was imprisoned for ten months. My parents’ nationalistic outlook and their connections with the resistance were sufficient reasons for proceedings to be taken against them at any time. Such

things can be brought up again even after a decade; the laws concerning these offences know no limitation.

'Then there was my sister Maria, who was the most vulnerable because of the close relations she had had with a man in the resistance, who later died in the struggle.

'My brother-in-law Kruk, as a boy of fifteen, had been found in possession of arms and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for participation in the resistance. He served seven of the fifteen years. My sister Irene had earlier been dismissed from her post as a teacher on the grounds of political unreliability. I knew the KGB would take action against this "politically unreliable" family if I dared to refuse to carry out the orders of the Russian Secret Service. The fate of my parents and my relatives is a heavy spiritual burden for me today, even though I have freed myself by my confession.

'If I had refused to carry out the order concerning Bandera it would have been very serious for my fiancée and her family. The Pohl family were by no means Rus-sophiles but rather viewed the Russian occupation as hostile. True, my father-in-law had suffered no appreciable losses since 1945 and had been able to keep on his workshop with three employees, as he did work that was needed. He made no secret, however, of his anti-Soviet and anti-Communist attitude, especially when he was drunk. He had once been denounced by name in a Soviet newspaper for thus expressing his views. He always carried the newspaper cutting about with him and showed it with great pride when conversation was on that subject.

'Finally, I should have exposed myself to the greatest danger if I had not carried out the murder assignments. It must be realised in this connection that these assignments were of a fundamentally different nature from the usual

intelligence assignments. Had I, for example, refused to go to see Nadiychyn, then the consequences would at most have been a reprimand or dismissal. In the case of the murder assignments, however, I should have had to be eliminated as a witness or as someone who had taken a look behind the scenes. I should even have had to be liquidated if I had reported the Rebet assignment to the American or West German authorities before the attempt, because the disclosure of the assignment would have been so harmful to the Soviet Union. That it is possible to accomplish such liquidation even in another country without causing a great sensation had been shown clearly enough.

‘I once had a talk on this subject with Sergey in Berlin. I had read in some Western newspaper about the case of the KGB captain, Nikolay Khoklov, and had asked Sergey what type of man he was and what posts he had occupied. Sergey described him as an adventurer, who was “morally fallen”. He added something which was very significant for me: “We shall get him sooner or later”.

‘It is quite clear that anyone who betrays the KGB will be liquidated. I am today still afraid of this happening to me and to my wife. I was already convinced of this before I came to the West. My wife and I know that we must be prepared for the revenge of my late employers for the rest of our lives.’

In reply to the question as to what his present attitude was to his past deeds, Stashinsky replied:

‘My present attitude to both deeds is fundamentally different. This is explained by the change which I have undergone since November 1959. The reason for my flight to the West is to be found in this change. I wanted to unburden my conscience and I wanted to give world-wide publicity to the way in which “peaceful co-existence”

really works in practice. I did not want to go on being used on murder assignments. I wanted to warn all those who live in danger of being liquidated, as were Rebet and Bandera, to take precautions. I hope that my flight to the West will be seen as lessening my guilt, for I have brought a great deal upon myself through my flight. The fate of my parents and relatives will come to pass, or may already have come to pass, as I have described it. This will always remain a heavy spiritual burden for me. My flight has already resulted in my father-in-law, who still lives in the Soviet Zone, being kept in custody for seven weeks by the Soviet authorities. It is by no means certain that he will not be subject to more serious measures when my case becomes known in its entirety.

‘My wife and I will always live in the fear that we shall one day be overtaken by retribution from the East. Quite apart from that, we are entirely without means here in the West. Nevertheless I have decided in favour of the West, because I believe that this step was absolutely necessary for the world at large.’

AFTERMATH

WHEN Stashinsky's Moscow employers were certain that his attempt on Bandera's life had been successful, but unlike the Rebet case, was known to have been murder, they did what is virtually Communist routine in such cases: they accused the West of having committed the crime.

They had ready-made 'murderers' to hand, and they evidently counted on human forgetfulness, judging by the way they presented a 'new' murderer before they had withdrawn the accusation against the 'old' one. According to the Communist propaganda version, Bandera's first 'murderer' was the former Federal Minister for Refugee Affairs, Dr. Theodor Oberlander.

Three days after Bandera's death the Soviet bloc press started reporting and commenting on it. The theme was that the 'traitor' Bandera had now come to the end he deserved, and that Dr. Oberlander had killed Bandera, or had him killed, because he was an embarrassing and disturbing witness from Oberlander's past.

The periodical of the Communist youth organisation of the Soviet Union, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, wrote on October 18, 1959: 'Just when Bandera had learned the bloody truth about Oberlander, he was found dead. . . . West German newspapers are beating about the bush and talking about a mysterious third person. Who this third person is is clear to every logically-minded being. The clues point to Oberlander.'

The Bulgarian paper *Rabotnichesko Delo* wrote on October 19, 1959: "The "accidental" death of Bandera . . . "accidentally" coincides with the unmasking of Ober-

lander. . . . One of the weightiest witnesses against the Bonn Minister has been destroyed. The man (Bandera) who knew too much can say no more. . . . Did the Good Fairy help Herr Oberlander or was it he himself?’

On October 20, 1959 *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*) of Moscow wrote: ‘Bandera . . . knew too much about Oberlander’s activities. As public opinion is becoming increasingly insistent that Oberlander should be brought to judgment, Bandera could have become one of the most important witnesses. This made the Bonn Minister and his patrons apprehensive. They decided to liquidate Bandera and obliterate all traces. Thus has one rogue got his own back on another.’

The death of Bandera and the attempts to push the guilt on to the West had a varied reception in the press of the Soviet bloc countries. While it was given a prominent place in the Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovakian press, it was accorded only scant notice in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This means that, at first, Communist propaganda was mainly concerned with conveying to the population of the countries which knew Bandera and had belonged to his field of activity the news that the ‘dreaded Bandera’ was dead. Who had killed him was of secondary importance. It was the special task of the Soviet Zone press to publicise the latter problem, duly inflated for propaganda purposes.

It was two years before the Soviets and their satellites—principally the Communist propagandists in the Soviet Zone of Germany—began their second action in the Bandera case. They were forced to begin it because Bogdan Stashinsky had now fled to the West.

This fact could not be hidden for long from the KGB. The question was whether or not he would confess to the murders. If he did, Communist propaganda must react

accordingly. But the reaction proved revealing, as was said correctly in the judgment against Stashinsky: 'The reactions of the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Union after Stashinsky's flight emphasise the authenticity of his statements. It should be borne in mind that the German authorities did not make his arrest and confession known until the middle of November 1961.'

But already by the end of September 1961 the Ukrainian whom Stashinsky had in vain tried to recruit for the KGB during his first assignments in Munich (and whose name he did not know) had received a secret letter from the KGB, warning him about statements from 'the man with whom he had been in contact in 1956-57'—i.e. Stashinsky—and asking him to destroy all the papers received at that time and to report on certain dates at a certain place, using certain passwords, to receive further instructions.

It can be assumed that it was known to the KGB by September that Stashinsky had confessed. It was decided to take action and the Soviet Zone was charged with this. The press office of the Prime Minister called a press conference in East Berlin on October 13, the eve of the second anniversary of Bandera's murder, and introduced to the world a new version of the murder of Bandera. The star of this conference was Stefan Lippolz, a 54-year-old Ukrainian who had fled from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic in 1955 and had opened a public house, the 'Stephansklaus', on the Stephansplatz in Munich, which was much frequented by Ukrainians.

Lippolz's story was that in Munich he had been recruited as an agent by Yaroslav Sulima, a secret collaborator of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and Sulima had introduced him to a German who called himself 'Dr. Weber' and who also belonged to the BND.

At the East Berlin press conference (according to *Neues Deutschland* of November 14, 1961) Lippolz said he was ordered to murder Bandera by the Bonn Secret Service. 'In January 1957', he said, '“Dr. Weber” suggested to me that he knew of a way of eliminating Bandera by violent means. He then gave me a white powder, with which Bandera was to be poisoned. I was not, however, in a position to carry out the assignment and I explained this to “Dr. Weber”, advising him to look for someone who was permanently at No. 67 Zeppelinstrasse (in Munich), the canteen of the Bandera organisation. At the same time I gave him the name of a Ukrainian émigré, Dmytro Myskiw, who was economic adviser to the Bandera organisation.'

Lippolz said he fled from the Federal Republic to Austria because he believed the BND to be on his track as knowing about the plan to murder Bandera.

'When I learned in Austria of the murder of Bandera I thought the BND would now have lost interest in me, so I travelled back to the Federal Republic and went straight away to see Dmytro Myskiw in Munich. He made a pitiful impression on me. In reply to my question as to why he was so depressed, he said that he had murdered Stefan Bandera on the order of the Federal Intelligence Service. When he told me that on the day of Bandera's death he had brought him his lunch I knew at once that he had done what I was to have done in carrying out “Dr. Weber's” assignment.'

Lippolz then left Germany again and went to Norway as he felt he was in danger from the BND because of his knowledge of Bandera's murder. 'I only realised how serious things were', he said, 'when I received the news of Dmytro Myskiw's sudden death.'

Lippolz maintained that Myskiw had been murdered by BND agents and added, 'It was obvious that the BND people intended to do to me what they had done to Myskiw.' For this reason, he said, he returned to Germany, but to the Soviet Zone this time, and gave himself up to the authorities.

The Lippolz story, intended to lay the murder of Bandera at the door of the 'Bonn Secret Service', did not stand up well to examination. Investigation proved that Dmytro Myskiw was absent on an official journey to Italy at the time of the murder of Bandera. On the day of Bandera's death he was in Rome, not Munich. Entries in his travel documents showed that he returned to Munich on the following day, having received news of Bandera's death by telegram.

Lippolz' statement that Bandera had been poisoned by Myskiw with a white powder put into his lunch proved untrue because Bandera did not eat at the OUN canteen on the day of his death; no one 'brought him a midday meal'. On that day Bandera left his office about noon, bought some provisions in the town (including the tomatoes Stashinsky saw) which were later found near him, and drove home to have lunch with his family. It was then and there he met Stashinsky—and death.

It was further established, moreover, that Myskiw was not murdered, as Lippolz maintained, but died on March 27, 1960 in his room at 100 Moosacher Strasse, Munich, of natural causes. According to the post-mortem findings, the cause of death was cerebral haemorrhage. There was no trace of violence nor of poison.

CONCLUSION

IN the course of his judgment in the Stashinsky trial the presiding judge, Dr. Jagusch, remarked that 'the Soviet Secret Service no longer commits murder at its own discretion. Murder is now carried out on express government orders. Political murder has, so to speak, now become institutionalised.'

There can be no doubt where Stashinsky's orders emanated from. Stashinsky said in his original statement that, during a conversation he had in Moscow at the time of his investiture with the Order of the Red Banner, his case-officer, Arkadiy Andreyevich, told him that while the Soviet government does not officially sanction murder certain 'enemies of the state' must be liquidated and in these cases special exceptions are made. He added that the murders of Rebet and Bandera belonged to these exceptions, and that Shelepin himself gave approval for Bandera's murder.

Yet when the news of Stashinsky's flight to the West was reverberating through the KGB and other official circles in Moscow the man who escaped blame or censure was Shelepin.

The importance of Stashinsky's defection was that he had been initiated into the secrets of the Soviet Secret Service, he had known of the existence of the murder orders and he had carried them out. A former KGB major, Anatol Golizin, has stated that the Stashinsky case caused a sensation in the KGB. In the search for scapegoats, seventeen KGB officers who had been involved in one way or another with the direction of Stashinsky were either dismissed or demoted. Shelepin, on the other hand, was promoted. In

November 1962 he became a Deputy Prime Minister and took over the newly-created Party State Control Committee, giving him a key position in the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state.*

* * *

Finally, there is on the record of the Stashinsky trial a speech extracts from which summarise the significance of the whole case as simply and penetratingly as possible—the speech made by counsel appearing for Frau Bandera, widow of one of the murdered men. The speaker was Mr. Charles J. Kirsten:

‘This trial has clearly demonstrated that practically any nation of the free world can be the hunting ground of the KGB. The secret of the cyanide pistol, which allows the murdered person to look like the victim of a heart attack, has now been disclosed. The machinations of the Russian Communist police in foreign countries will not be able to be repeated so successfully elsewhere.

‘It may be taken as proved that the field of activity of the accused would have been further extended after the murder of Herr Bandera and Dr. Rebet. He had been given a training which would enable him to be used as a highly qualified professional murderer against “enemies of the Soviet Union” for the rest of his life. He is an outstanding product of Russian Communist education. He was to have learned English. It is to be assumed that his field of activity would probably have become England and the USA.

*In November 1964 Shelepin was promoted again—to full membership of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party. As he was already a secretary of the Central Committee, the significance of his new appointment, the *London Times* wrote, was the considerable accumulation of power in his hands at the relatively early age of 46.

'The murder of Frau Bandera's husband was no ordinary murder, carried out by just anybody. It was not simply a gangster's action. It has been proved that Bandera's murder was decided upon by the government of the Soviet Union. Soviet science was used to produce a weapon against which the West knew no antidote. The Soviet government had given the murderer-to-be a long training. During his careful preparations for the murder he was supported by the KGB authorities.

'The reason why the Soviet government had decided upon the murder of Stefan Bandera was because he was a leader of a world-embracing resistance movement against the Russian Communist occupation of the Ukraine. Bandera was the symbol of the struggle for a free and independent Ukraine, a non-Russian nation of 42 million people, with their own traditions, culture, language and civilisation.

'Russian Communist methods in crushing the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom are so merciless that they are without parallel in the history of tyranny. In the year 1932-3 the Russian communists removed all stocks of food and seed corn from the Ukraine, thereby organising a famine which cost five million people their lives. Near the town of Winnitza some 10,000 Ukrainian political prisoners were murdered by the NKVD in the years 1938-40 when Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Ukraine.

'At about the time Khrushchev was meeting President Eisenhower in Geneva in 1956 his tanks were mowing down 500 Ukrainian women—political prisoners—at the Kingiri concentration camp, because they had formed a protecting ring round their fellow-prisoners, Ukrainian men.

'It was the Soviet Russian Secret Service which carried out the murder of Bandera in 1959 and of Rebet in 1957.

The same Russian Secret Service had also carried out the murder of Symon Petlura in Paris in 1926 and Eugen Konovalec in Rotterdam in 1938. Thereafter it was planned to murder Herr Stetsko, president of the Anti-Boshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) and former prime minister of the independent Ukrainian government.

‘As a member of the KGB Stashinsky consciously carried out the order of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Frau Bandera does not seek revenge, but justice for Stashinsky. She points to Voroshilov’s signature on the citation with the Order of the Red Banner, which the murderer received as formal and official recognition of first degree murder on the part of the Soviet government itself.

‘It is the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union which has been found guilty of murder in this case. It is true that this court cannot impose the sentence which the real criminal should receive, but it can pronounce an historical judgment in declaring the Soviet government guilty of the murder.’

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