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UKRAINE'S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY,

1917—1918



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UKRAINE'S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, 1917-1918

by

MICHAEL S. PAP

Among the many factors contributing to the anti-Tsarist revolution in 1917 was the neglected problem of the non-Russian nations within the Russian Empire.¹ The Tsarist Government denied the right of these nations to an independent existence in spite of the fact that some of them entered into voluntary alliance with Moscovite Tsars as sovereign states such as Ukraine did in 1654.² Following the collapse of Tsarism only the insignificant Bolshevik Party under Lenin's leadership included in its program such appealing slogans as the "right of all nations in Russia to freedom and self-determination," "equality of all nations," and so on. These slogans misled many into believing that the Bolshevik Party was the only Russian party which would not interfere in the internal affairs of these nations. It was inconceivable, at that time, to suspect that the position of the Bolshevik Party was but a screen behind which the Bolsheviks sought to conceal their device for Russian oppression and expansion.

After the Revolution of March, 1917 which forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate and which led to the formation of the Provisional Government in Russia, the oppressed nations availed themselves of the opportunity to regain and secure their freedom. The largest among them was Ukraine (present population, 45,000,000) which had been for centuries dominated by Russian Imperialism. The western world was rather surprised by the spontaneous emergence of liberation movements among the non-Russian nations, for prior to the revolution the official Russian representatives abroad had repeatedly asserted that a nationality problem did not exist in the Empire. In fact, on June 21, 1863, the Russian Minister of the Interior, Count Waluev, issued a special decree prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature and stated that there never was, there is not, and there never can be a Little Russian (Ukrainian) language and

nationality. Yet, according to the official Tsarist census of 1897 (the last before the collapse of the Empire) on national composition, the Ukrainians were listed as numbering 22,415,000 or 17.41% of the total population of the Tsarist Empire while the Russians constituted only 55,673,000 or 43.30%.³ The ban on the Ukrainian language and literature was relaxed in 1905 under the impact of the revolution only to be reimposed with great severity in 1914.

In April, 1917, The Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) was elected by the Ukrainian National Congress and it became the *de facto* Provisional Government of Ukraine. The distinguished historian Mychajlo Hrushevsky, who had returned to Kiev from exile, became its first president. The Central Rada was endorsed as the representative body of Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev on May 19, 1917, by the Peasants' Congress of Ukraine on July 12, 1917, and by the Workers' Congress in July, 1917. Subsequently, the Rada included all political parties of Ukraine with representation relative to their strength.

In order to vouchsafe free development for the Ukrainian nation, the Rada was willing to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government. Such an agreement was to be based on the recognition of territorial, cultural and political autonomy for Ukraine in federation with Russia. The Rada demanded only that the Russian Government would not interfere in Ukrainian internal affairs. This proposal which would have provided a liberal solution to the Ukrainian-Russian problems was rejected by the Russian Provisional Government. This reaction was unexpected, since the Provisional Government, upon assumption of power, had promised certain rights in the declaration to the non-Russian people. The rejection aggravated even those elements in Ukraine which sincerely believed in the possibility of a peaceful and friendly relation and cooperation with the anti-Tsarist Russians.⁴ Reflecting the genuine desires of the nation, the Rada proclaimed on June 23, 1917, its First Universal (Manifesto) inviting the people to fortify their own independence by becoming masters on their own soil. The Rada further informed its people of the unsuccessful negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government and stated that "from this day, you will have to create your own destiny."⁵ Simultaneously, it established a General Secretariat with Wolodymyr Wynnnychenko as its head which assumed the form of a National Government. Only when the Russian Provisional Government began to lose ground in Russia proper did its representatives, Irakli Tsereteli, Michael Tereschchenko and Alexander Kerensky, resume negotiations in Kiev and con-

cluded on July 11, 1917, a compromise agreement with the Ukrainian Central Rada recognizing "without delay" the autonomy of Ukraine and the General Secretariat as "the governing body of Ukrainian affairs." The results of these negotiations were disclosed to the Ukrainian people in the Second Universal (Manifesto), issued on July 16, 1917. However, many representatives of the new Russia were still reluctant to accept the existing reality. Prime Minister Prince G. E. Lvoff and his Cadet Ministers (Constitutional-Democrats) resigned from the Provisional Government on July 16 in protest against the "concessions" granted the Ukrainians.⁶

In spite of the Russian opposition, national revolutions spread to other non-Russian territories. In order to confuse these peoples and at the same time weaken the existing regime in Russia, the Bolshevik leaders made a great issue of the question of self-determination of nations. They speculated that after the eventual overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a Soviet regime in Russia, it would be relatively easy to force their rule upon the non-Russian nations which at that time were preoccupied with building their autonomous life and did not possess adequate military strength. Bolshevik attention was centered primarily on the Ukrainian-Russian controversy which was being heatedly debated. Referring to the ignorant policy of the Provisional Government toward Ukraine, Stalin stated:

The "grand words" about self-determination and the solemn promises "not to create obstacles" are being consigned to oblivion. Obstacles of the most incredible kind are being created, even to the extent of direct interference in the internal affairs of the peoples. The Finnish Diet has been dissolved, with the threat of "declaring martial law in Finland, should the need arise." (Vecherneye Vremya, August 9) A campaign is being launched against the Ukrainian Rada and Secretariat, with the manifest intention of beheading the autonomy of Ukraine.⁷

Stalin further stated that the accusation of treason made by the Provisional Government against the Ukrainian leaders was nothing more than a screen behind which it sought to destroy the aims of national liberation. The Soviet leaders reiterated that only the Bolshevik party was in a position to secure the right of self rule for the non-Russian nations:

Nobody has the right forcibly to interfere in the internal life of nations and to "correct" their errors by force. Nations are sovereign in their internal affairs and have the right to arrange their lives as they wish.⁸

While the Provisional Government struggled against Ukraine, the Bolshevik party recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada and the General Secretariat as the only legal representation of the Ukrainian

people. During the conflict between the Rada and the Provisional Government, the Soviet leaders made numerous assertions of their desire to promote Ukraine's independence. This was, however, only a maneuver and part of the over-all Russian Bolshevik strategy of preventing military preparations by the non-Russians for the defense against future Soviet aggression. The mistakes and incompetence of the Provisional Government in solving the problems engendered by the revolution against Tsarism resulted in a Bolshevik seizure of power and gave Lenin control of events on November 7, 1917. On this development, Professor Masaryk, the well-known authority on Russia, makes the following comment:

The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men... Lenin was a logical consequent of Russian illogicality.⁹

Lenin endeavored to avoid the mistakes made by the Provisional Government in regard to the non-Russian nations. To impress these peoples, he appointed Djughashvili-Stalin, the Russified Georgian, as Commisar for Nationalities. Stalin was an expert in the field of propaganda and proved himself to be an extremely loyal servant of Moscow. The appointment of a non-Russian agent, Lenin believed, would win the confidence of the non-Russian nations so far as the "sincerity" of the Bolshevik slogans was concerned. As soon as the Soviet regime in Russia was firmly established and the Russian anti-Bolshevik elements were engrossed in a struggle among themselves, Stalin unveiled the Bolshevik's true position on the concept of self-determination. He rejected the right of the Ukrainian people to decide their destiny without Bolshevik interference and "advice." He stressed rather the need for solidarity and unity among the working men under the banner of the Bolshevik Party. Paradoxically, this rejection was followed by the issuance on November 15, 1917 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia as part of the Bolshevik program, in which the nation's right to self-determination, including secession from Russia and the formation of independent states, was officially legalized.¹⁰ This fraudulent document, accepted by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, edited and signed by Lenin and Stalin, was designed to impress the non-Russian peoples and the free world that the Soviet Government was earnestly attempting to solve the difficult nationality problem on the basis of human and just principles. The main purpose, however, was to undermine the national revolutionaries and, at the same time, to create conditions for the conquest of former territories of the Russian Empire

in accordance with the slogan of "voluntary" decision of the people involved.

The Bolshevik leaders were confident that the non-Russian nations would welcome so liberal a program and would seek admission into the new Soviet Russian federation, or at least accept the Communist slogans which would pave the way for future centralization. Lenin and Stalin were also confident that their guarantee of the right of self-determination would strengthen Soviet authority abroad. However, the ensuing developments had taken an unexpected course. Much to Stalin's disappointment, the Central Rada proclaimed the Independence of the Ukrainian National Republic on November 20, 1917, in the Third Universal (Manifesto).¹¹ The Ukrainian Government included the following members: President, W. Wynnychenko (Social Democrat); War, S. Petliura (Social Democrat); Labor, W. Porsh (Social Democrat); Finance, M. Tuhan-Baranovsky (Socialist Federalist); Foreign Affairs, O. Shulhin (Socialist Federalist); Post and Telegraph, A. Zarubin (Socialist Revolutionary); State Comptroller, Zolotariv (Bund); V. Mickiewicz (Polish Democrat), and Odinets (Socialist Populist). This body was immediately branded by Russian Bolsheviks as anti-Soviet.

On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Alexander Shulhin, dispatched notes to the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Belgium, the United States, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia describing the situation in Ukraine and asking them to inform their respective governments about the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic. Shulhin called attention to the fact that the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of Russia represents only Russia, (the Muscovite State) and not the other countries of the former Russian Empire. He argued, that the possibility of a federation existed only if all national republics would willingly agree to create a federal government. "We will receive," Shulhin stated, "with great satisfaction all the suggestions and advice which our allies will give us for the defense of the common interest."¹²

As evidenced from the Third Universal as well as from the dispatch to the Allied Ambassadors, the Ukrainian Government still believed in the feasibility of a federative union with a free Russia which would recognize the Ukrainian State as well as other non-Russian nations and which would refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. The strong emphasis placed on the principle of independence and statehood in the proclamation angered both Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik Russians. The Bolsheviks who were already masters in Russia proper were even more disturbed since the Ukrainian

action hindered their plan of reuniting all territories of the former Russian empire in one Red Empire on a "voluntary basis." Having studied the events in Ukraine under the leadership of the Rada and recognizing the ineffectiveness of Soviet propaganda, the Bolsheviks started a new intensive campaign against the Ukrainian Government. They now reversed their previous denunciations and their bitter attacks upon the methods employed by their predecessors and began to infringe more and more upon the sovereignty of Ukraine. They violated all promises and agreements and made every attempt to thwart the continued progress achieved by the peaceful efforts of the Ukrainian people. Every activity of the Central Rada and of the Government was labeled as bourgeois, counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet. The Ukrainian people concluded that between Red and White Russia there was little or no difference, for, as Masaryk once observed:

The Russians, even the Bolsheviks, are children of the Tsarism in which they were brought up and fashioned for centuries. They managed to get rid of the Tsar, but not Tsarism. They still wear the Tsarist uniform, albeit inside out; a Russian, as is known, can even wear his boots with the soles inside.¹³

Because of increased Soviet activity, the Ukrainian Government proceeded to organize military units by recalling its soldiers from the Russian territories, thus taking an independent attitude in foreign relations. It also provided for internal order and peace and sustained its neutrality by refusing to allow Soviet units to pass through Ukrainian territory to attack the Don Cossacks. This policy of accelerating its position as an independent state was in direct opposition to the plans of the Bolshevik strategists who saw in an anti-Soviet Ukraine a stumbling block to their expansionist aims. It is, therefore, understandable that after carefully considering this obstacle, the Soviet Russian Government did not hesitate to use every conceivable scheme to destroy the roots of this independence.

Because the method of direct and indirect intervention in Ukrainian affairs proved unsuccessful, the Soviet Government switched to open aggression. On December 17, 1917, an ultimatum was dispatched to the Ukrainian Government in which the Bolsheviks demanded the acceptance of all Soviet mandates within forty-eight hours or face the consequences of a war with Russia. Since the Soviet ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada and the Rada's reply provide instructive clarification as to the Ukrainian-Russian relationship at this early stage of the Bolshevik revolution, it seems worthwhile to record the exchange in full:

SOVIET ULTIMATUM TO THE UKRAINIAN RADA

(Decree of the Sovnarkom, December 17, 1917)

Taking our stand on the principle of the solidarity of the exploited masses and of the brotherly union of all workers in their struggle for socialism . . . we, the Soviet of People's Commissars, have recognized the complete independence of the Ukrainian Republic . . . All that concerns national rights and national independence of the Ukrainian people, we are ready to acknowledge unconditionally and without hesitation . . . We accuse the Rada of playing, under the guise of nationalism, a double game, a game which for some time expressed itself in the Rada's refusal to recognize the Soviets and the Soviet power in the Ukraine (among other things, the Rada refused to call . . . a regional congress of Soviets). This double game, which is the chief reason why we cannot recognize the Rada as the plenipotentiary representative of the toiling and exploited masses of the Ukrainian Republic, has of late led the Rada to undertake a number of steps which preclude the possibility of any agreement.

In the first place, the Rada is disorganizing the front . . . by moving about and recalling the Ukrainian units . . . In the second place, the Rada is disarming the Soviet troops stationed in the Ukraine. In the third place, the Rada is supporting the Cadet Kaledin plot . . . Having embarked upon this policy of unheard-of treachery to the revolution, a policy of helping the bitterest enemies of . . . the Soviets and of the toiling and exploited masses, the Rada fully deserves that we at once declare war upon her . . . (Instead) the Soviet of People's Commissars asks the Rada . . . the following questions:

1. Will the Rada stop disorganizing the front?
2. Will the Rada prevent the movement of troops to the Don, the Urals, or any other place unless such movements are authorized by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief?
3. Will the Rada assist the revolutionary troops in their fight against the counter-revolutionary plots of the Cadets and Kaledin?
4. Will the Rada stop disarming the Soviet regiments and the Workers' Red Guards in the Ukraine? . . .

In case no satisfactory reply to the above questions is received within forty-eight hours, the Soviet of People's Commissars will consider the Rada in a state of open warfare against the Soviet Government in Russia and in the Ukraine.

Signed: V. Lenin, Chairman
For the Soviet of People's Commissars

L. Trotzky,
Commissar for Foreign Affairs

THE RADA'S REPLY
(December 19, 1917)

The declaration of the Sovnarkom, in which the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic is recognized, lacks either sincerity or logic. It is not possible simultaneously to recognize the right of a people to self-determination including separation and at the same time to infringe roughly on that right by imposing on the people in question a certain type of government. . . . The General Secretariat categorically repudiates all attempts on the part of the People's Commissars to interfere in the political life of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The pretensions of the People's Commissars to guide the Ukrainian democracy are the less justifiable since the political organization which they wish to impose on the Ukraine has led to unenviable results in the territory which is under their own control. Great Russia is more and more becoming the prey of anarchy and economic and political disruption, while the most arbitrary rule and the abuse of all liberties gained by the revolution . . . reign supreme in your land. The General Secretariat does not wish to repeat that sad experiment in the Ukraine. . . . The Ukrainian democracy . . . is quite satisfied with its government. The only elements which are not satisfied with the composition of the Rada are those of Great Russian extraction, viz., the Black Hundred, the Cadets, and the Bolsheviks. . . . The General Secretariat will facilitate in every way their return to Great Russia where their sentiments will receive the desired satisfaction. It is with this in mind that the anarchistically inclined soldiers of Great Russian extraction were disarmed . . . and given a chance to return to their homeland. . . . The General Secretariat is doing its best to avoid bloody methods of settling political questions. But if the People's Commissars of Great Russia . . . will force it to accept the challenge, the General Secretariat has no doubt that the Ukrainian soldiers, workers, and peasants will give an adequate reply to the People's Commissars.

W. Wynnichenko (President)

S. Petliura (Secretary of War)¹⁴

Rejecting the Soviet ultimatum, the Ukrainian Government urged its people to intensify their preparedness in the defense of their freedom. However, the Bolsheviks postponed their invasion since they were dubious of victory in a conflict with such determined people. Once again, the Soviets considered it prudent to change their methods; this time, they initiated the use of lies and terror as their weapon.

Following the Bolshevik bidding, a Congress of Workers and Peasants was summoned at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of about 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small helpless minority proceeded to Kharkiv where, at the same time, the Congress of Proletarians, (a conglomeration of various radical elements from the Donetz Basin consisting

mostly of non-Ukrainians) was in progress. On December 27, 1917, this group hailed itself to be the "only representative body" of Ukraine and appealed for help to the Soviet Government in Russia. Two days later, the Soviet of People's Commissars welcomed in a special resolution this "new Ukrainian revolutionary Government" and promised it unlimited aid.¹⁵ This aid was then rendered in the form of Bolshevik aggression on December 29, 1917. Red army units invaded the frontiers of Ukraine under the command of V. Antonov, chief of all invasion forces of Soviet Russia, and Colonel Muraviev, commander of the armies marching on Kiev.

Open war between Russia and Ukraine was once again a reality. The military battle between the two countries lasted four years. Ukraine's repudiation of Bolshevism at the every beginning and her fierce defense of freedom is the best demonstration of Ukraine's merited claim to sovereignty. Lenin himself remarked: "One cannot refuse to recognize that which exists; it will force itself to be recognized."¹⁶

As Soviet power grew, so also did the Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik opposition. Having instigated an open attack upon Ukraine, the Soviet Russian leaders were forced to explain the difference between their theory and practice. Even many Bolsheviks saw in the war against Ukraine nothing but a return to Russian imperialism. This confusion was heightened even more, because almost everyone recalled Stalin's statement issued on December 21, 1917, when he repeated the familiar phrase that, "The Council of People's Commissars . . . would not even object if the Ukrainian people were to secede and form an independent state."¹⁷ The situation drew protests from revolutionary sympathizers who sincerely believed the Bolshevik slogans. Irritated by the increasing criticism of Soviet imperialistic policy toward the non-Russian nations, Stalin retorted:

It is said that the conflict arose over the question of the Ukrainian Republic, that the Council of People's Commissars does not recognize the Ukrainian Republic. Is it true? No, it is not. The Council of People's Commissars officially recognized the Ukrainian Republic in the "Ultimatum" and in the "Reply" to the Petrograd Ukrainian Staff.¹⁸

Stalin referred to a second Ultimatum of the Soviet Government or the "Manifesto to the Ukrainian people," as it was called, which had been drafted by Lenin and which said that:

. . . We, the Council of People's Commissars, recognize the national Ukrainian Republic, its right to separate completely from Russia or to enter into an agreement with the Russian Republic on federation and other similar relationships between them. Everything which concerns the national rights and national independence of the Ukrainian people is recognized by

us, the Council of People's Commissars, immediately, without limitations, and unconditionally.¹⁹

Being cognizant of the Bolshevik danger, the Ukrainian Government came to the conclusion that only the capacity for self-defense would safeguard democracy and that without the will to defend sovereignty, there could be no real liberty. The Ukrainian leaders persistently argued that only democratic principles could secure free development for the Ukrainians and therefore, the Bolshevik Soviet system was strongly reputed as a regime dangerous and foreign to the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian Government applied the theory that all groups and classes in a country must be represented in a democratic government. Stalin ridiculed this principle and in describing his own version of the facts which contributed to the conflict between Soviet Russia and Ukraine, he said:

The Rada starts out from the principle of a division of power between the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the proletariat and peasantry, on the other. The Soviets reject such a division, and want the whole power to belong to the people, without the bourgeoisie.²⁰

Despite the Soviet's treacherous policy toward Ukraine, they were unable to gain influence among the Ukrainian people, the majority of whom supported their legal government in its drive to improve living conditions and sustain peace and freedom in the independent state. The Bolsheviks were forced once again to alter their methods. Now they began to attack the Ukrainian Rada as the tool of foreign powers. Stalin, in his article on the Ukrainian Rada stated in *Pravda*, on December 29, 1917:

... There exists, it appears, an alliance of the Rada, Kaledin and the French Military Mission with the purpose of torpedoing peace, of "delaying" it "until the spring." Furthermore, the French Military Mission is not acting independently, but on "the urgent instructions of the French Government."²¹

Stalin elaborated further by denouncing the Rada and the General Secretariat as a bourgeois government, one "which, in alliance with the British and French capitalists, is fighting to prevent peace."²² Similar statements defending "peace" were issued by Stalin at the time when the Bolshevik army was engaged in military operations against Ukraine. These events, as so often has been the case, demonstrate that the Bolsheviks are always ready to use any argument, however illogical, as long as there is a chance that it will confuse or convince someone. While the Bolshevik forces murdered and looted the innocent people of Ukraine, their propaganda organ *Pravda* on December 31, 1917, defended the action thus:

Let the peoples of Russia know that the striving for conquest is alien to the Russian revolution and its government. Let everyone know that the

Council of People's Commissars counters the imperialist policy of national oppression by the policy of complete liberation of the oppressed peoples.²³

The Ukrainian Government's only crime was its repudiation of Bolshevik encroachment. The representatives of the newly organized state staunchly maintained that the Ukrainians knew best what was good and most advantageous for them. They argued that in the event Ukraine remained free and independent, Moscow would be in a position to demobilize its large police force, which in the past had been necessary to secure the "loyalty" of the Ukrainian population toward Moscow. This reasoning was to no avail. Not only Red Moscow, but the Russian anti-Bolshevik military units whose commanders refused to recognize Ukraine's right to independence were engaged in active combat with Ukraine.

At a later date, Stalin himself admitted that the hostile policy toward the non-Russian nations which gained the support of the Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders and subsequently of the former Tsarist Generals, A. Denikin, N. Wrangel and Admiral A. Kolchak, secured the Bolshevik victory in Russia.²⁴ However, despite the insurmountable internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government proved to the world that it was capable of governing its people and defending its interests. Its daring opposition and fierce struggle against Bolshevism won the sympathy of many free nations.

On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to recognize, in its name, the independent Ukrainian state. Presenting his credentials to the President of Ukraine (Wynnychenko), Tabouis assured the latter that France would support the Ukrainian Republic with all its moral and material forces. The French Government informed Washington earlier on January 7, 1918, about its decision to recognize the Rada as an independent government. In his dispatch to the American Secretary of State, the French Ambassador in Washington (M. Jusserand) stated that, "General Tabouis is, therefore, to be instructed to notify the Ukrainian Government that the French Government is glad actually to recognize it as an independent Government" and he also inquired whether "The United States Government would be inclined to take a similar step with the Ukrainian Government."²⁵ In his reply, the Acting Secretary of State (Polk) informed the French Ambassador on January 11, 1918, that the American Government "is giving careful consideration to the whole situation, but as yet has reached no determination as acknowledging separate governments in Russia."²⁶

On January 12, 1918, the British Government appointed Mr. Bagge as its High Commissioner in Kiev. He waited only for an appropriate occasion to recognize formally, together with other allied countries, the independence of Ukraine. The United States was represented in Kiev by Consul Douglas Jenkins. The American Consul General at Moscow, Mr. Summers, informed the Secretary of State on January 16, 1918 about the situation in Ukraine. His message was based on the reports Consul Jenkins had made to his office from Kiev. Concerning the Ukrainian leaders' ability to govern Ukraine, the American Consul General stated:

The Ukrainian Government, whose beginnings date back to the March revolution, has steadily gained strength. There is now a completely organized ministry. A small army has been formed by drawing soldiers of Ukrainian nationality from the Russian forces.... Kiev is an active political center. French, British, Belgian, and other Allied officers are there observing the situation.²⁷

In another dispatch to the United States Government on January 18, 1918, the Consul General at Moscow (Summers) described the quality of military units in Central Russia and Ukraine in the following manner:

In Central Russia, the garrison soldiery is dirty, unkempt, slouchy, unsoldierly in every respect. They are well enough fed and clothed, but need washing and brushing. They do not salute officers, but are not often insolent except the small minority that engage in highway robbery. They have minimum military value.... The soldiers of Ukraine originally probably have more discipline and better fighting qualities than the average of the Russian armies taken as a whole. The Ukrainian volunteers cheerfully salute officers, conduct themselves in an orderly fashion, and are ardent patriots, but have still to prove their military value.²⁸

In view of the successful beginnings in establishing friendly relations between Ukraine and other foreign countries, the Bolsheviks considered it prudent to once again revise their immediate strategy. To facilitate annihilation of the anti-Soviet forces especially in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks had to conclude a peace treaty with their external enemies, the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey), and so the Soviet government turned its attention to this problem. Their ensuing negotiations with the German-Austrian General Staff eventually led to the Armistice Agreement on December 15, 1917. Negotiations concerning a peace treaty followed on December 22, 1917 at Brest-Litovsk.

Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks officially recognized and demanded the right of all nations to self-determination and independence, the Soviet Delegation under L. Trotzky's and his deputy Joffe's leadership completely ignored the existence of the Ukrainian state

and acted as though the Bolsheviks had the legal right to represent the Ukrainian people. The news of the deliberate disregard of Ukrainian statehood reached Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, at the time when the invading Bolshevik forces were opening a new attack on Ukrainian territories and trying to occupy Kiev at all cost. In spite of this serious situation, the Rada sent a delegation to Brest-Litovsk to represent its interests at the peace conference. The delegation, consisting of Mykola M. Lewitzkyj, Alexander Sevriuk and Mykola Liubinskyj, arrived in Brest-Litovsk on January 4, 1918, and demanded a place at the conference table. A few days later this delegation was joined by Wsevolod Holubovich, who later on January 26, 1918, became the Prime-Minister of Ukraine. The representatives of the Central Powers concluded that the Ukrainian delegation, as anti-Soviet force, might be utilized against the Soviet Russian delegation on the basis of the principle of self-determination of non-Russian nations in former European part of the Russian Empire. Graf Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, provides the following characterization of the Bolsheviks shortly before the negotiations with Ukraine:

Those Bolsheviks are very strange. They talk of freedom and reconciliation among the nations, of peace and agreement, and at the same time they are the most cruel tyrants our history has known; they exterminate the middle class without scruple and their arguments are the machine guns and the gallows. My conversation with Joffe today has shown me that these people are not honest surpassing in duplicity all that which is charged against the corporate diplomacy, because, to suppress the middle class in such a way, and to talk simultaneously of blessed freedom, is a lie.²⁹

On the other hand, the Ukrainian delegates were successful in upholding their national interest. To quote Graf Czernin's opinion about Ukrainian delegates:

The Ukrainians differ entirely from the Russian delegates. They are considerably less revolutionary and are much more interested in their country than in general socialism. They are not interested in Russia, but exclusively in Ukraine and their attempts are focused on one goal: emancipation of Ukraine.³⁰

On January 12, 1918, the Ukrainian delegation was permitted to participate in the conference. Mr. Holubovich, the head of the delegation, took the floor and stated that Ukraine should be represented at the conference by the legal representatives of the Ukrainian Government. He denounced the Bolshevik presumption to speak in the name of his people for this was direct interference in the Ukrainian internal affairs. He called upon all nations to conclude an honest peace which would secure also for the Ukrainian nation the right to live in freedom and enjoy the sovereignty of statehood. Holubovich

emphasized the democratic position of the Ukrainian people and demanded from the Central Powers as well as from the Soviet delegation recognition of these facts. The way was cleared for Ukrainian participation as an independent power and Trotzky was unmistakably disappointed. He knew that the Ukrainian participation might lead to signing a separate peace treaty with Ukraine — a move which could thwart the Bolshevik policy of planned conquest of this rich territory by Soviet Russia. Trotzky's only hope now was that a proletarian revolution would sweep over Europe before the peace treaty was signed.

A discussion between Kuehlmann, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Trotzky followed Holubovich's discourse. Kuehlmann wanted to know if Trotzky still considered his delegation as the only diplomatic representation of the entire former Russia since Trotzky previously regarded the Ukrainian delegation as part of the Russian entourage. The speaker of the Ukrainian delegation again protested this misrepresentation and demanded recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian delegation. He further asked that it be noted in the protocol of the conference that the Ukrainian and Russian delegation were two entirely different delegations from the territories of the former Russian Empire.

The Ukrainian Government's right to negotiate peace with the Central Powers, and its independence of the Soviet regime in Petrograd was finally recognized on January 12, 1918, both by Kuehlmann in behalf of the Quadruple Alliance and by Trotzky, on behalf of Soviet Russia although the formal recognition by the Four Powers of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent state was reserved for the peace treaty. This was, however, *de facto* recognition of the Ukrainian national sovereignty. Trotzky realized that the Ukrainians were not easily silenced by Bolshevik propaganda and communicated with Lenin asking that the struggle against Ukraine be intensified by all means and methods in order to destroy her government and independence. In the meantime, Trotzky advanced a proposal to postpone negotiations with an agreement that the delegations return to Brest-Litovsk after having consulted with their respective governments and with new instructions for the final draft of a peace treaty at the end of January, 1918. The Bolsheviks needed time desperately; compared to the armies of the Central Powers they were so weak that effectively organized military action might easily have brought about the collapse of the Soviet regime.

Ukraine was forced to enter into peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk for two important reasons. First,

the Soviet Government of Russia was already negotiating a peace treaty alone, completely ignoring the existence of the Ukrainian Government. If the Ukrainian Government had failed to send its delegates to Brest-Litovsk to participate in the peace negotiations, the Sovnarcom of Russia would have been in a position to contrive a peace treaty in the name of all nations of the former Russian Empire, including, of course, Ukraine. Secondly, Ukraine had no other recourse since she was unable to continue war on two fronts — against the Central Powers and against Soviet Russia.

Concurrently with the negotiations undertaken with the Central Powers, the Ukrainian Government made a vain attempt to obtain Allied recognition of its independence in order to gain this essential support in the struggle with Bolshevism. On January 21, 1918, only one day before the proclamation of the complete independence of Ukraine, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, (Halip) informed the Ministers of the United States, Italy, England, and France about the Ukrainian difficulties and formulated the following requests:

1. Recognition of the independence of Ukraine by the great powers of the Entente and nomination of the Allied diplomatic representatives at Kiev;
2. Financial support to the Ukrainian government;
3. Facilities on the part of the Entente for supplying Ukraine with manufacturing products.³¹

To facilitate the potential recognition, the Allies demanded that the Ukrainian government abandon its proposed peace treaty with the Central Powers. This demand would have been met if the Allies had offered to assist the young Republic with more tangible action than mere declaration of good will. It can be argued that the Western Powers were in a difficult position to give Ukraine real military aid. The northern part of Russia was under Bolshevik control while the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were blocked by Turkey. For this reason the Western Allies did not take advantage of the declaration of the Ukrainian Government of December 12, 1917, in which the latter petitioned suggestions as to the defense of their common interest, but they failed to offer the young Republic even moral help.

Concerning the situation in Ukraine, the American Consul General in Moscow reported to the Secretary of State on January 16, 1918:

The opinion is expressed that the Ukrainians may be expected to furnish a point of rallying the forces of reorganization of Russia on a federal basis, while offering relative resistance to German and Austrian influence

and trade. Like all Russians, the Ukrainians are ready to welcome foreign interference, and non-interference on the part of the Entente Powers would simply leave them at the mercy of the Central Powers.³²

Realizing that there was no hope in getting any assistance from the Western Allies, the Ukrainian Government turned its energies to the problem of concluding a peace treaty with the Central Powers. In the meantime, the fierce battle between Ukraine and Soviet Russia continued. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the armistice agreement with the Central Powers and employed all available forces against Ukraine. For a while, the Ukrainian people succeeded in pinning down the Russian Bolshevik forces which might otherwise have been used elsewhere in Europe. These people were determined to live freely and independently of Moscow. They gave their government moral and physical support in denouncing Moscow's right to domination. Following the aggressive acts, first at the hands of the White Russian and then at the hands of the new Red regime, the Ukrainian Central Rada, in behalf of its people, proclaimed total independence of the Ukrainian Republic in its Fourth Universal (Manifesto) issued on January 22, 1918.³³

This act testified that Moscow and Kiev represented two different nations. Kiev represented the anti-Bolshevik world, whereas Moscow and Petersburg were the sources of the anarchistic, godless forces of destruction. The Bolshevik aggression which brought suffering to millions of innocent people and the Allied "wait-and-see" policy placed the Ukrainian Government in desperate straits. On January 23, 1918, the Ukrainian Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Halip) again dispatched to the Ministers of the United States, England, France, and Italy the following information:

The Ukrainian delegates at Brest-Litovsk have received full powers to negotiate peace with the Central powers. The latter are insisting especially on the resumption of economic relations. They ask to exchange their manufactured products against provisions from Ukraine. The Government of Kiev not disposing (sic) of an army and being obliged to employ its feeble police forces against the Maximalists, cannot resist the pressure of the Germanic powers.³⁴

Though the Soviet plan of capturing Kiev before the scheduled session of the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk did not materialize, Trotzky appeared jubilant over the Bolshevik successes on the fronts. He was certain that the Ukrainian delegation could not possibly reach Brest-Litovsk since he had commanded the Bolshevik terrorists to intercept and liquidate them en route. The new negotiations were resumed on January 30, 1918, and Trotzky introduced the new "representatives" of Ukraine whom he brought to the conference. He ex-

plained that the presence of the delegates Medvedev and Shakhraj was of great importance since the Soviets were in a state of war with the Central Rada, and he assured the members of the conference that the two delegates were the duly elected representatives of the occupied territories of Ukraine. The German Secretary of State, von Kuehlmann, replied that the Quadruple Powers, together with Trotzky representing the Soviet Government, had recognized on January 12, 1918, the Rada as the only legal government of Ukraine; therefore, the discussion concerning Ukraine should be postponed until the arrival of the Rada's delegates. Trotzky agreed without hesitation. However, much to his astonishment, the Ukrainian delegation did reach Brest-Litovsk. In accordance with Trotzky's arrangement, this delegation had been seized en route by Bolshevik partisans, but had successfully escaped the trap. Upon arriving in Brest, they learned from the Ukrainian Foreign Minister (Shulhin) of the Bolshevik advance toward Kiev. Disheartened by this news, the delegates were in a hopeless situation. They were afraid that the Central Powers would be reluctant to recognize them as the legal representatives of Ukraine since a large area of Ukrainian territory had been lost to the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Four Powers declined to discuss the problem of Ukraine with the "representatives" produced by Trotzky.

Once accepted, the Ukrainian delegates did not allow the grave situation at home to disturb their spirits or confidence. On the contrary, they sought additional concessions from the victorious Central Powers by demanding from the Austro-Hungarian delegation that Galicia be divided into two parts — the Ukrainian part of which would be united with Bukovina. This act may be regarded as an interference in the internal affairs of Austro-Hungary. However, it was prompted by the information received from the Ukrainian parliamentary representative in Vienna about the serious food shortage in Austria. The delegation also felt a moral obligation to protect the rights of those Ukrainians who were not in the Ukrainian State. Graf Czernin considered the course against the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers as a bold reality and not merely a maneuver. In his diary, he wrote, "Ukrainians are not negotiating, they are dictating."

The next negotiations with the Rada delegates were held on February 1, 1918. Trotzky angrily opposed their participation. In the name of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic, the leader of the delegation (Sevriuk) re-emphasized the complete independence of his state from any ties — physical, spiritual, or polit-

ical — with the Soviet regime. Sevriuk further added that if Trotzky refused the right of Ukrainian delegates to represent Ukrainian people merely because his “Ukrainian Delegates” did not want to recognize the legal government, Trotzky could be told with similar logic that the entire Soviet delegation must be considered illegal on the grounds that the representatives of the Crimea-Tartars, Cossacks, and other nations as well as the whole of Siberia did not recognize the Soviet regime. Trotzky made a vain attempt to ignore these remarks. Again he reiterated that the Central Powers should not negotiate with the Rada’s delegation because the Bolsheviks were the only legal representatives of Ukraine. After Trotzky’s speech, Liubinskyj, the second Rada spokesman, stated:

The noisy declarations of the Bolsheviks regarding the complete freedom of the people of Russia is but the vulgar stuff of demagogy. The Government of the Bolsheviks, which has broken up the Constituent Assembly and which rests on the bayonets of hired Red Guards, will never elect to apply in Russia the very just principle of self-determination, for they know only too well that not only the Republic of Ukraine but also the Don, the Caucasus, Siberia and other regions do not regard them as their government, and that even the Russian people themselves will ultimately deny their right; only because they are afraid of the development of a National Revolution do they declare here at the peace conference and within Russia, with a spirit of demagogy peculiar to themselves, the right of self-determination of the peoples. They themselves are struggling against the realization of this principle and are resorting not only to hired bands of Red Guards but also to meaner and even less legal methods.³⁵

At the conclusion of the session Czernin, despite Trotzky’s opposition, declared on behalf of the Central Powers that it recognized immediately the Ukrainian People’s Republic, as an independent, free, and sovereign state, one able to enter into international agreements independently. The Ukrainian delegation was further recognized as the legitimate delegation and the plenipotentiaries of the Independent Republic.

During the night of February 8, 1918, the Ukrainian Government was forced to evacuate the capital, Kiev, after eleven days of fierce fighting. Upon entering Kiev on February 9, the Bolsheviks pillaged and massacred innocent people without trial or mercy. The American Consul informed his Secretary of State about the events as follows:

It is estimated that there were 6,000 casualties . . . For the first two days of Bolshevik occupation there were hundreds of executions or more properly speaking, murders. It is estimated that 300 or 400 officers were shot down on the streets or taken to a park near former residence of the governor where they were killed . . . whenever officers who carried Ukrainian papers were found, they were shot.³⁶

On February 9, 1918, the Ukrainian representatives and the representatives of the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) signed a separate peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers. The independence of Ukraine was recognized and the mutual state of war was at an end. Significant in this peace treaty was the fact that there was no provision for the Ukrainian Government's support of the war aims against the Allies. Article 4 of the treaty provided that: "Diplomatic and consular relations between the Contracting parties shall commence immediately after the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace."³⁷ The Bolshevik delegations refused to sign the treaty because the Central Powers demanded their signature in the projected peace treaty of the recognition of the right to self-determination for Poland and the Baltic States as well as recognition of the sovereignty of Ukrainian National Republic. Instead they issued on behalf of the Soviet Russian Government a declaration which later became known as the policy of "no peace-no war." Trotzky stated that the state of war between nations of the Central Powers and Russia was over. Despite Trotzky's announcement that "the Russian troops are simultaneously given orders to demobilize completely on all fronts," the Bolsheviks strengthened their effort to occupy as much Ukrainian territory as possible.

Realizing that the Bolsheviks would throw all available forces against Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government formally requested the Central Powers to intervene. The German and Austrian forces responded by entering Ukrainian territory. On March 1, 1918, the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had been engaged in counter offensive against Soviet Russian invasion since the middle of February, succeeded in liberating Kiev. They were followed by the Austrian and German armies.

The most important problem which was to be solved immediately was the land reform. The majority of ministers in the government were Socialists and they pressed for agrarian reforms, taking into consideration the fact that large land tracts belonged originally to non-Ukrainian landlords. The prolonged deliberation over this matter and the Bolshevik propaganda contributed to unrest among the peasants who demanded the immediate division of the land. Earlier, in January, 1918 the Rada promulgated a law on socialization of land over 30 hectares. The German generals who came to Ukraine supported the landowners. They further prohibited this contemplated action. This German interference was inspired by non-Ukrainians, mostly Russian landlords, who promised the Germans large

quantities of food products. On the other hand, Bolshevik propaganda presented the Ukrainian government as a tool of the occupation forces. German interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine was an open violation of the peace treaty since there was no provision in the terms giving the Central Powers the right to police the country.

The controversy between the occupation forces and the government assumed serious proportions. Differences also arose between the Austrians and the Germans concerning the policy to be followed in Russia. The Austrians stood firmly by the policy of national independence for Ukraine as was provided in the peace treaty, while the Germans recommended a federal Russia under their protection. The Ukraine was gradually being isolated from her neighboring countries; native officials were replaced by Austro-German officials while German and Austrian currency came into circulation. The relationship between these forces and the Rada reached such an abyss that the American Ambassador in France said:

...there is a rumor that the Austro-Germans intend to dissolve the Rada at Kiev and install a German Government... Ukraine is in process of transformation into a German colony...³⁸

The most serious conflict between the Ukrainian Government and the German occupation forces was caused by the decree on land appropriation proclaimed in April, 1918, by the German Commander-in-Chief, Eichorn. This decree was issued without any consultation with the national government. The Ukrainian government regarded the decree as an intolerable interference in its internal affairs; the Agricultural Minister resigned in protest. The Rada unanimously adopted the following resolution:

The Rada having heard the declaration of the Agricultural Minister and noted his resignation emphasized that German troops were called by Ukrainian troops for the purpose of helping them in restoring order within such limits and in such direction only as decided by the Ukrainian People's Republic, that no arbitrary interference on the part of German and Austro-Hungarian military commanders (in) social-political life of Ukraine will be tolerated, that such interference as that of General Eichorn will disorganize our economic life, aggravate social-political conditions, and render impossible fulfilment of obligations concluded and signed between Ukrainian People's Republic and Central Powers. At the same time the Rada in refusing to grant demission of Minister of Agriculture requests him to announce to the population that Eichorn's order shall not be obeyed. The Foreign Minister will send presidents of the Berlin and Vienna Ministries notes in accordance with this military authorities in social-political life of Ukraine.³⁹

This independent attitude of the Rada aggravated still more the Command of the German occupation forces. They were dissatisfied

with an independent government which refused to tolerate the German interpretation of independence, and the Germans openly started a campaign against the Rada by accusing it of relying upon the Allied Powers and even upon the Bolsheviks. This campaign resulted in the dissolution of the Ukrainian Government by the German military force on April 26, 1918. An official Ukrainian report on the events, read by Social-Democrat Rep. Scheideman in the Reichstag Committee in Berlin, gives the following explanation for the German action:

Yesterday at 4 o'clock afternoon the building in which Central Rada sits was surrounded by men in uniform of German officers and soldiers, and members of Central Rada as well as members of government who were assembled for session of Rada were searched and arrested. Those present were ordered to hold up their hands. Treatment was rough and discourteous. Protest of president of Central Rada, Professor Hrushevski, against arrest of members of parliament in parliament building was disregarded. More than this brachial force was used against Professor Hrushevski during search. All private papers and documents of Central Rada were taken away from Professor Hrushevski. Search lasted three and half hours. Without any warrants of any sort being shown, following ministers were arrested: Minister of Interior, Tkachenko; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liubinskyj; Minister of War, Zhukovski; and Director of Political Administration, Kayevski . . . Other members of Central Rada and government protested similarly against this interference in internal affairs of the republic, against violation of constitution of international law and usages of nations. Report spread like lightning throughout Ukraine. Disorders are reported from various localities, so that country is threatened with anarchy.⁴⁰

Because of this violation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, including the arrest of the members who signed the treaty, the Ukrainian leaders declared themselves in opposition to the German policy in Ukraine. The peasants refused to deliver food products for export to Germany because they received paper money instead of the products they needed. With the intensified persecutions of peasants, the anti-German resistance increased. Only the existence of the Bolshevik regime in Russia with a hostile attitude toward Ukraine prevented the outbreak of an open war against the Germans.

Instead of recognizing the danger, the Germans provoked further incidents. At their suggestion, a Congress of Landlords of Ukraine convened and proclaimed on April 29, 1918, General Pavlo Skoropadsky as Hetman of Ukraine. (Hetman is the historic title of the chief executive in Ukraine). Skoropadsky had many excellent ideas for strengthening the Ukrainian State, for promoting internal order and for augmenting security. In his first proclamation to the people, he submitted a plan which promised a bright future for every citizen; however, the large majority of the Ukrainians did not trust

the Hetman Government since it had been created with the help of the Russian reactionaries among the landlords, and was subservient to German dictation. Skoropadsky also announced the liquidation of the Rada, which had already been silenced by the German occupation forces. This act undermined his regime even more. Furthermore, he was looked upon as the representative of the old type conservatism which supported the ruling social classes against the peasants and workers. Nationally conscientious Ukrainian factions supported the interest of the masses and, therefore, defended Ukrainian independence by rejecting the Hetman's maneuvering. Nonetheless, during his regime, Ukraine won more and more recognition abroad as an independent power. In addition, the Hetman secured peace and the relationship between the government and occupation forces became more tolerable. Negotiations with the Soviet Russian Government also were resumed, first in Kursk and then in Kiev; this led to a truce between Ukraine and Bolshevik Russia which was signed on June 12, 1918. It is interesting to note that Stalin, the head of the Soviet delegation, expressed the opinion that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be based upon mutual respect for the independence of both countries.⁴¹

The restoration of the former Russian Empire under a Central Russian Government in Moscow had been a dream not only of Russian reactionaries but also of those German officials who formulated and directed the policy toward Eastern Europe. They refused to recognize the newly re-established Ukrainian state and for them even a Hetman was not desirable. Ukrainian political leadership was always ready to cooperate peacefully with any Russian Government which would have respected Ukraine's sovereignty and would have abstained from interfering into her domestic affairs. With the surrender of Germany on November 1, 1918, Western diplomatic representatives supporting the Russian imperialists were pressuring the Hetman to recognize the principle of an indivisible Russian empire. The Hetman yielded to this pressure but then went on to sign a Manifesto which disclosed his new plan: to reorganize the future Russian state into a federation of national states. By this act, however, he could not satisfy the national political factions which did not want to deviate from the goal of re-establishing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation, a goal which had already been achieved. In addition, he also provoked the Russian chauvinists who now had decided to get rid of the Hetman. Only the existence of the Ukrainian liberation movement, which was ready to act, prevented them from immediately moving against Skoropadsky. The great dissatisfaction among

the Ukrainians with the Hetman's policy aiming at a federation with Russia led to an all-out revolt against him. This revolt was carried out under the leadership of the Ukrainian National Union which included and united the country's democratic forces. This Union elected a *Directorium* (Board of Directors) composed of five outstanding Ukrainian leaders with W. Wynyuchenko as its head and S. Petliura as the Chief of Staff of all military forces. The insurrection was directed also against the German occupation forces. On November 15, 1918, the Directorium proclaimed the restoration of a democratic system in the Ukrainian National Republic. However, the Soviet Government took immediate advantage of the collapse of the Central Powers and annulled the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. To avoid a new war with Bolshevik Russia, the Ukrainian Government communicated with the Allied Powers on November 27, 1918, asking them to adopt, in regard to Ukraine, the Wilsonian Fourteen Point Program. The Directorium further requested the Allied Powers to issue a joint declaration against Bolshevism. Instead of recognizing the new democratic government under Wynyuchenko and Petliura however, the Allies instructed the French Consul in Kiev to issue a statement declaring that "...the Entente powers intend to support, with all their force, the existing authority at Kiev represented by the Hetman and his government."⁴²

The forces which took up arms against the German occupation and Skoropadsky in Ukraine were anti-Bolsheviks, the leaders of which pledged to defend the country against Moscow's invasion. Despite these facts, the American Minister in Rumania, Vopicka, informed the American Secretary of State that according to the information he had from reliable sources, Petliura was the "head of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine."⁴³

When the spontaneous insurrection of the Directorium spread into all corners of Ukraine and sealed off Kiev, the seat of the Hetman's Government, the German armies under a new command declared their neutrality. The forces of Russian reactionaries were too weak and too disappointed to defend the Hetman. There was no alternative for the Hetman but to resign. On December 14, in a special declaration he transferred all political power into the hands of the Directorium. Thus, all Ukraine was now under the regime of the Directorium.

Following the collapse of the Central Powers, Soviet Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time. The Ukrainian people fought with united strength because now the Hetman's supporters were also in the ranks of the Army of the Directorium of the National Republic.

lic. It took the Bolsheviks two more years to finally suppress the will of the sovereign Ukrainian Republic. When the Russians finally succeeded in imposing in 1920 their own Soviet regime on Ukraine, they did not dare to eliminate the formal statehood. Instead, since 1920 Moscow has been trying to prove to the world that Ukraine is enjoying an "independent status." The Ukrainians, on the other hand, know that it was through their great sacrificing efforts that they regained their sovereignty and statehood. Now they are engaged in the struggle to eliminate the Russian Communist dictatorship which was imposed upon them by force.

NOTES

¹ This article deals only with the Ukrainian territories which had until 1917 been a possession of the Russian Empire. The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine which were under the Austro-Hungarian rule proclaimed an Independent Western Ukrainian Republic on their territory in November, 1918. Western Ukraine's efforts to strengthen the statehood and effect a union with the Central Ukraine was interrupted by the invasion of the Polish armies under the command of General Haller. This army had been well equipped by the Western Allies for the purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks. It occupied, instead, the Ukrainian territories over the strong protests of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference. For information on this problem, see: David Lloyd-George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1931, 200-208.

² The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian Empire — Finns, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Kazaks, Turks, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghizs, Tartars have long histories of struggles against Russian domination and oppression. Former Russian historians referred to them all as Russians, disregarding their differences in cultural life as well as in language. This falsification caused much confusion among the people outside the Russian Empire in the past. Even today, many students of Eastern European problems refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

³ H. Bochkovsky; *Ponevoleni Narody Tsarskoi Imperii*, Politichna Bibliotika, Vienna, 1916. pp. 14-15.

⁴ Alexander F. Kerensky, *The Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution*, New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1927, p. 231.

It is unfortunate that the former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government in Russia (Alexander Kerensky) did not include in his book a chapter on the Ukrainian-Russian relations during the period of March-November, 1917. He explained the omission as follows: "Because of lack of space I have excluded from this book the story of the separatist movement in the Ukraine and the struggle of the Provisional Government against it, as well as the general question of national minorities and other basic problems of the Revolution, as they appeared in 1917."

⁵ Michael Hrushevsky; *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, p. 526.

⁶ The U.S. Ambassador to Russia referred to this event when he stated on July 16, 1917, that "The cause (for the resignation of the Cadet Ministers) attributed is that Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had

granted that province concessions with which Cadet party unable to agree..." "The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State," Petrograd, July 16, 1917, Department of State, **Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States; 1918; Russia** (three volumes), Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1932, II, 648.

⁷ Joseph V. Stalin; "Counter-Revolution and the Peoples of Russia," **Works**, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, III, 222.

⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 224.

⁹ Thomas Garrigue Masaryk; **The Making of a State: Memoirs and Observations, 1914-1918**, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1927, 176.

¹⁰ "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia," November 15, 1917, James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera (eds.) **Materials for the Study of the Soviet System; State and Party Constitutions, Laws, Decrees, Decisions and Official Statements of the Leaders in Translation**, Second edition, Ann Arbor, Michigan, The George Wahr Publishing Co., 1953, 25f.

¹¹ "Proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic — The Third Universal of Ukrainian Rada," November 20, 1917" in: James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, **The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918; Documents and Materials**, Stanford University, California, Stanford University Press, 1934, 435-437.

¹² "The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State," Petrograd, December 12, 1917, Department of State, **Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States; 1918; Russia** (three volumes), Washington, D.C. United States Government Printing Office, 1932, II, 651.

¹³ Masaryk, *op. cit.*, 175.

¹⁴ Vladimir I. Lenin, "Manifest k ukrainskomu narodu s ul'timativnymi trebovanniami k ukrainskoi Rade" (Manifesto to the Ukrainian People with the Ultimate Demands to the Central Rada), **Sochinenia (Works)** Fourth Edition, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949, XXVI, 323-325; cf. James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *op. cit.*, 439-441.

¹⁵ A. V. Likholat, **Razgrom Nazionalisticheskoi Kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraini (1917-1922)** Moscow, 1954 p. 68.

¹⁶ Lenin used this phrase when he referred to the Provisional Government's attempt to ignore the existence of the Finnish nation and her right to self-determination. cf. Julian Towster, **Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947; The Theory and Structure of Government in the Soviet State**, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, 61.

¹⁷ Joseph V. Stalin, "Reply to Ukrainian Comrades in the Rear and at the Front," **Works**, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, IV, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, IV 8f.

¹⁹ Ukrainian army units stationed in Petersburg organized in April, 1917 a Military Committee which was authorized to represent the Rada in Petersburg, and which recognized the Rada as the legal government of Ukraine. These units remained neutral during the Bolshevik revolution.

V. I. Lenin, "Manifest k ukrainskomu narodu s ul'timativnymi trebovaniiami k ukrainskoi Rade," **Sochineniia**, Fourth edition, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949, XXVI, 323-325.

²⁰ Joseph V. Stalin, "The Ukrainian Rada; Speech Delivered in the All Russian Central Executive Committee," December 14, 1917, **Works**, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, IV, 16.

²¹ J. V. Stalin, "What is the Ukrainian Rada," **Works**, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, IV, 20.

²² *Ibid.*, IV, 22.

²³ J. V. Stalin, "Turkish Armenia," **Works**, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, IV, 27.

²⁴ In his declaration of the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist-Bolshevik Party (Moscow — April 17-27, 1923) Stalin stated:

"Do not forget, comrades, that if we were able to march against Kerensky with flying colors and overthrow the Provisional Government it was because, among other things, we were backed by the confidence of the oppressed peoples that were expecting liberation at the hands of the Russian proletarians. Do not forget such reserves as the oppressed peoples, who are silent, but who by their silence exert pressure and decide a great deal. This is often not felt, but these peoples are living, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Do not forget that if we had not had in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich the so-called 'aliens', if we had not had the formerly oppressed peoples, who disorganized the rear of those generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians — comrades, this is a special factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything — if it had not been for this sympathy, we would not have knocked out a single one of these generals. While we were marching against them, disintegration began in their rear. Why? Because those generals depended on the Cossack colonizing elements, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed peoples were therefore pushed into our arms, while we unfurled the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of those generals; such is the sum-total of the factors which, although overshadowed by our armies' victories, in the long run decided everything. That must not be forgotten."

Works, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, V, 251.

²⁵ "The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State," Washington, January 7, 1918, Department of State, **Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States; 1918**; Russia, Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1932, II, 655.

²⁶ "The Acting Secretary of State (Polk) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)," Washington, D.C., January 11, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 655.

²⁷ "The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State," Moscow, January 16, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 658.

- ²⁸ Department of State, *op. cit.*, I pp. 345 and 347.
- ²⁹ Theodor Kroeger, **Brest-Litovsk; Beginn und Folgen des Bolshevistischen Weltbetrugs**, Berlin, Im Verlag Ullstein, 1937, 143.
- ³⁰ Ottokar Czernin, **Im Weltkrieg**, Second edition, Berlin and Vienna, Verlegt bei Ullstein and Co., 1919, 315F.
- ³¹ „The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State,” Paris, January 22, 1918, Department of State, *op. cit.*, II, 661.
- ³² “The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State,” Moscow, January 16, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 658ff.
- ³³ The text of the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Rada is cited in: James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *op. cit.*, 444-448.
- ³⁴ “The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State,” Paris, January 26, 1918, Department of State, *op. cit.*, II 663f.
- ³⁵ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, **The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk; March 1918**, New York, William Morrow and Co., 1939, 210.
- ³⁶ “The Consul at Kiev (Jenkins) to the Secretary of State,” Moscow, March, 1918, Department of State, *op. cit.*, II, 675.
- ³⁷ “Treaty of Peace Between Ukraine and the Central Powers” in “The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State,” Moscow, April 27, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 666 cf., John W. Wheeler-Bennet, *op. cit.*, 394.
- ³⁸ “The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State,” Paris, April 16, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 679.
- ³⁹ “The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State,” Stockholm, May 2, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 680.
- ⁴⁰ “The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State,” The Hague, May 9, 1918, Department of State, *ibid.*, II, 684.
- ⁴¹ Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Moscow, 1947, IV, 82-84.
- ⁴² “The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State,” Paris, December 10, 1918, Dept. of State, *ibid.*, II, 701.
- ⁴³ “The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State,” December 19, 1918, Dept. of State, *ibid.*, II, 704.

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