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EDITORIAL .................................................................................................................. 1

Genesis and Development of East Slavic Nations
By N. Andrusiak ........................................................................................................ 5

Ukrainians and the Polish Revolt of 1863
By W. Lucie ................................................................................................................ 22

Polish-Ukrainian Relations, November 1916—November 1918
By C. Warwariv ..................................................................................................... 35

Why Western Ukrainian Territories Were Annexed to Poland
By S. Horak ............................................................................................................. 51

A Picture of Polish Imperialism
By D. Kulikowsky .................................................................................................. 69

Book Review ............................................................................................................. 78

Activities of the Research Center of Polish Relations ........................................... 83
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EDITORIAL

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the European East came to exert great influence on world affairs. The breaking up of multi-national empires—Turkish, Russian and Austro-Hungarian—was the result of the striving of oppressed peoples for independence. In the period of these strivings for independence, the East-European peoples created a new conception—one that differed from the traditional identification of nation with state. Thus, the Serbs, the Greeks and the Bulgarians in the Turkish Empire did not consider themselves to be Turks, but rather Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. In the same way, Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Slovaks and Romanians living within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire felt themselves to be neither Austrians nor Hungarians. Nor did the peoples living in the Russian Empire—the Finns, Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians and others—consider that they were the Russian nation.

In the West, these currents did not always meet with proper understanding, and the Western powers approached these aspirations from the point of view of their own immediate interests. For this reason, going counter to the trends in Eastern Europe, they tried to negate the national principle as was done during the Berlin Congress of 1878. As a result of this, the wronged Serbs struck the spark which resulted in World War I. The Wilsonian policy of self-determination of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire satisfied only those nations whose statesmen had previously found sympathizers for their causes among the leaders of
the Western states. The Poles were in this fortunate position, for they had the sympathy of the French from Napoleonic times (they had been permitted to form Polish legions in Napoleon's army). The Polish were even successful in getting President Wilson's ear, and because of this, diplomats of other Allied nations after the first world war agreed, perhaps only partly and perhaps not in complete awareness of what they were doing, to the expansion of the new Polish state to the East to the territories of Byelorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania. In spite of a stubborn defense by the Ukrainian Army of Galicia, Galicia was occupied by Haller's army raised with the help of France and the U.S.A., and this made impossible further Ukrainian resistance to the Russian Bolsheviks and the White forces led by Denikin. This led, in turn, to the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic, which, at the time, was the only power capable of leading the struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. At that time, the West did not properly evaluate either Ukrainian independence or the struggle for their national liberation of the peoples oppressed by Moscow. It wanted to see east of Poland one Russia as a future ally against German imperialism. It was through this blind faith in the possibility of the existence of an integral Russian empire that the West made possible the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime in Russia and a new enslavement of peoples—this time in the USSR. When Germany renewed and enlarged her military strength during her Nazi period under Hitler, her pact of friendship with the Soviet Union, so unexpected for the West, made possible the German advance against Poland. World war was the result, and soon Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and France in the west, and Yugoslavia and Greece in the south were occupied by the Nazis.

German might seemed invincible, and Hitler, to complete the conquest of Europe, resolved to destroy his ally of yesterday, the USSR—the prison of East-European nations. Soldiers of the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism surrendered to the Germans without fighting, hoping for the liberation of their countries from the Bolshevik yoke. The blind policies of Hitler, who wanted to replace the Bolshevik yoke by
a German one, saved the Soviet Union from disaster and brought about the German defeat in the East. This made possible the American landings in Normandy.

The West, in alliance with the USSR, defeated Germany. Yet, by its toleration of the USSR as "the most democratic state" in the world, it only strengthened the Bolshevik prison of nations, ceding to it all the East-European states including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Poland, too, whose eastern borders had been set by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin to coincide with the Curzon Line, was given under Bolshevik "protection." The Curzon Line cut Western Ukraine—the main base of the anti-Nazi and anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian Insurgent Army—into two, forcing it to fight not only against the Moscow Bolsheviks but also against the Soviet satellite, Bierut Poland, which, in accordance with a treaty signed with the Soviet Union, deported the Ukrainian population of the Lemko, Peremyshl, Kholm and Pidliashia regions.

Accounts of the indomitability of the Ukrainian people in their fight against the Bolsheviks have filtered through the Iron Curtain, brought out by refugees and returning German prisoners of war. In recent days, voices have appeared among the Germans seeking to inform the West about the ostensible success of the Bolsheviks in alloying the enslaved peoples into a "supranational monolith."

Among all this information about East-European problems in general, and about Polish-Ukrainian-Russian relations in particular, there often appear deliberate and calculated false data aimed to spread confusion in Western Europe and America.

In order to give the free world a correct and true picture of the past and present relations in Eastern Europe, the Research Center on Polish Relations is beginning to publish a periodical journal—EAST-EUROPEAN PROBLEMS. Scholars from the RCPR (themselves from Eastern Europe) who have academic experience in this field will attempt to illuminate objectively and accurately the complex problems of the East-European region, basing their reports on detailed
studies of current events and documents from the past. In this way, they hope to contribute to the understanding of the potentialities and strength of the East-European peoples in the struggle against Communism.

All who come from Eastern Europe, regardless of their national origin or political affiliation (so long as they are not members of the Communist Party or any body associated with it, are hereby invited by the Research Center to cooperate in the publication of EAST-EUROPEAN PROBLEMS.

THIS ISSUE IS DEVOTED TO POLISH-UKRAINIAN AFFAIRS
GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EAST SLAVIC STATES

by Nicholas Andrusiak

In the article "Ukrainian and Russian Conceptions of the History of Eastern Europe," Mykola Chubaty cites the Usual Scheme of Russian History and the Matter of Rational Arrangement of the History of Eastern Slavs by Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, who, taking as his point of departure, the contemporary ethnic and national division of Eastern Slavs into three nationalities—Ukrainian, Russian, and Byelorussian—affirms that this division existed at the dawn of history. Three East-European Slavic groups had formed before the Slavic tribes of Eastern Europe united into three East Slavic nations. Despite the political changes in Eastern Europe and the existence of the Kievan-Rus’ State, the Lithuanian-Rus’ State, the Tatar State, the Great Principality of Moscow, and the Russian Empire, these three nations preserved their individualities with their particular ethnic and spiritual characteristics. From this, stems the necessity to examine their histories separately. The existence of the Russian Empire is no reason to examine the history of these three nations in the one current of Russian history. The history of each of these three nations has its own course. Ukrainian history developed on the present territory of the Ukrainian nation which, under pressure of the hordes from the East, first lost land and then expanded, but ultimately was left unchanged in its basic territory, which borders on the Russian, Polish, and Byelorussian nations.

When we review the prehistoric, so-called Trypillian culture in Ukraine, we see that its population introduced farming in Ukraine. Because this Trypillian population, like its neighbors, left no written records, we cannot determine its ethnic origin. There are later Greek reports, dating from the ninth century before Christ, concerning the population in Ukraine, but these also do not accurately depict the boundaries of the land of the original historical residents of Ukraine: Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alans. Inasmuch as the Greek geographer Ptolemy, writing in the second century after Christ, placed the "great nation" Slavs (Veneds) in Eastern Europe, to the east of Vistula and north of the Carpathians, while he stated that the Iranian Alans lived on the Black Sea, we can presume that the Slavic population in the northwest forest zone of Ukraine fused with the Iranian population of the steppe zone in the southeast: Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans. Michael Miller\(^3\) considers that the Alans were the "Antes" who, from the fourth to the seventh centuries, appeared as state organizers of the Eastern Slavic peoples, in the area from the Don to the Danube. As to the population to the north of the contemporary Ukrainian national territory, the Ukrainian paleo-ethnologist Vadym Shcherbakivsky\(^4\) considers the Lithuanians to be the ancient Budins whose settlements extended as far as the Ukrainian Severian region. On the basis of the name of one of the Slavic peoples—"Krivichians"—forefathers of the present-day Byelorussians, one can surmise that these also were the Slavified descendants of some Lithuanian race; Lithuanian "mages" were called "krive," and the chief "mage" was the "Krive-Kriveito." From the above, it appears, consequently, that the population of Ukraine originated from a mixture of Slavs and Iranians, and the population of Byelorussia from a mixture of Slavs and Baltic Lithuanians. Shcherbakivsky, who, at times, is inclined to Marr's linguistic theory concerning the hybridity of languages, even

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\(^4\) Hrushevsky: Conception of the Origin of the Ukrainian Nation in the Light of Paleonthology, Prague, 1940.
accepts that the steppe pre-Aryan population of Ukraine fused with the Baltic (Lithuanian) peoples during the influx from the wooded districts of the Dnieper. As a result, this mixture, in the course of a prolonged process, produced the pre-Slavic language, which pushed the Lithuanian tongue to the shores of the Baltic Sea in the region of lower Neman and the West Dvina. In fact, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, the Yatviagians and the Lithuanians, under the influence of the higher Ruthenian culture, denationalized to the benefit of the Byelorussians.

Hrushevsky's above-mentioned concept that the state organization has some influence on the formation of a nation and on the designation of its borders must be corrected. This can be seen by examining the history of the Severians, Drehovichians, and Krivichians. Not all the territory of the former Ukrainian Severians was incorporated into the contemporary Ukrainian national territory; its districts on the upper Seym River became Muscoified (Kur'sk) as a result of Moscow's conquest at the end of the fifteenth century. The present Ukraino-Byelorussian ethnic divisions do not correspond to the regions of the former Drehovichians in Polissia. Finally, only the western Krivichians (Polotsk on the West Dvina) became the nucleus of the Byelorussian nation, whose people now show some desire to change its national designation, "Byelorussy," to "Krivichi." The eastern Krivichians in the region of the upper Volga (Tver), subdued by Moscow, have been Muscoified. On the way to Muscoification are the remnants of the Krivichians—the Byelorussians on the upper Dnieper (Smolensk) who do not enter into the present Byelorussian SSR, just as the territory of the former Ukrainian Severians in the region of central Desna (in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Starodub Kozak Regiment) is excluded from the Ukrainian SSR. This gives a basis to affirm the fact that political changes in Eastern Europe did influence the formation of the Eastern Slavic nations.

The first state to influence the formation of the Eastern Slavic tribes was Rus', from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries. The oldest Rus' chronicle is based on Byzantine chronicles, local reports and writings conducted initially at
the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev; these writings were begun in 1039 and finally collated at the beginning of the twelfth century by the Monk Nestor of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves. This so-called Tale of Bygone Years considers that the “Rus’” were the Scandinavian Varangians who came to Eastern Europe. He counterposes them to the native Slavic tribes in the early chapters of his account. Then the term “Rus’” was used to denote princes of the Rurik line and their retinues, in which there were also local Slavs, and the territories conquered by them were called the “Land of Rus’.” The establishment of Christianity by King Volodymyr (Vladimir) the Great in 988, rooted out the Slavic tribal names together with the Slavic pagan religions connected with the cults of individual tribal gods. In this manner, tribal separateness was lost and the nation of “Rusyny” or “Rusychi” was created. The first to disappear were the tribal names of the Polrians, Severians, Derevlans, Dulibians, Tyvertsians, Ulichians, Khorvatians (Croats), Slovenes and, in time, the Drehovichians and Krivichians. Last to disappear were the tribal names of the Vyattachians, among whom, even in the beginning of the twelfth century, missionaries of the Christian faith were martyred.

In the continuation of the Tale of Bygone Years, in the so-called Kievan Chronicles of 1200, the Kievan territory is called the “Land of Rus’” in contrast to other foreign lands over which princes of the Rurik dynasty ruled. Chubaty, following M. F. Vladymirsky-Budanov, accepts the idea that the name “Rus’” had a narrower ethnic meaning and signified the original land of the Kievan Polians. This is contradicted by the implication in the Kievan Chronicle of the middle of the twelfth century in regard to the complaint of the first Prince of Suzdal, Yury Dolgoruky, who thrice ruled in Kiev (1149-50, 1151, and 1155-57) about the fact that for him and his children there was no appanage in the “Land of Rus’,” although he and his children kept for themselves Pereyaslav and Ostersky Horodok not far from Kiev. Therefore, “Rus’

5) Proceedings, 1., op. cit., p. 16-18.
Land” in the *Kievan Chronicle* was used narrowly to apply to the territories belonging to the throne of the great Prince of Kiev; in contrast, “Rus’ Land” in the *Tale of Bygone Years, Tale of Ihor's Campaign* and *Tale of the Doom of the Rus’ Land*, meant lands of the Rurik dynasty. The Halych-Volynian chronicler of the thirteenth century names the Halych-Volynian king Roman Mstyslavich as “the autocrat and tsar of the entire Rus’.” In this Chronicle, the words “all of the Rus’ territories” are used to refer to the territories of the Halych-Volynian State to which Kiev twice belonged (1200-2, 1240). The *Chronicle of Suzdal*, compiled from the two above Kievian annals by the Monk Lavrenty in the fourteenth century, with a supplement of local chronicles, considers as “Rus’ territories” all lands belonging to the Rurik dynasty apart from Suzdal. Analogically, in the first Novgorod chronicle, the “Rus’ country” includes Kiev, Chernihiv, Pereyaslav and Volodymyr-Volynsky, but not Great Novgorod. Authoritative evidence that the Moscow-Suzdal population did not consider itself a Rus’ people in the twelfth century is the mention in the chronicle that the Suzdalians of Rostov complained against their princes that they had filled state positions with “Rus’ squires,” that is, members of the military retinue who came to Suzdal from Rus-Ukraine with the princes. These Rus’ squires were of a junior branch of the Monomakhovichi who were first princes of Pereyaslav in Ukraine. Therefore, Russian historians have no right to apply the concept “people of Rus’” to the population of Muscovy before the twelfth century. Exactly when this population, which initially was dissatisfied with the Rus’ princes and their retinues, adapted itself to a subordination to these princes, and thus began calling itself “russkiye” is a question which should be answered by Ukrainian and Byelorussian historians who should base their answer on Muscovite sources in order to show the falseness of the affirmation made by those Russian historians who wrongly place the origin of the Muscovite nation, in its present “russky” form, several centuries before the twelfth century.

As if supporting the conception of A. Y. Presniakov and M. N. Pokrowsky, who, accepting Hrushevsky’s scheme, limited the beginning of Russian history to the Suzdal country,
P. Smirnov\(^7\) averred that the first Russian State already existed in the eighth century but on the upper Volga and Oka Rivers. He based his affirmation upon the names of Volga—“Rhâ” or “Rhos”—in Greek and Roman literature. But earlier, the Polish Slavist Alexander Brueckner\(^5\) pointed out that Arab data concerning Slavs, Rus’, and Amazons were, upon basic research, found to be misleading. They created much difficulty through their use of topographical and tribal names, from which it is difficult to comprehend to which known places and peoples they should be applied. In many instances, the Slavs were identified with other peoples and “el Rus” generally referred to a northern longlegged people.

Soviet historians affirm the existence of the Russian nation as early as the ninth century. On the pages of the prominent journal of Soviet historians, *Problems of History*, for April, 1950, V. V. Mavrodin writes:

It can hardly be doubted that from the ninth to the eleventh centuries, the Eastern Slavs blended into one Russian nation... And so, on the basis of ancient ties and traditions, on the basis of ethnic community of the Eastern Slavs under conditions of the establishment of the old Russian (“russky”) state, on the basis of common language, customs “of their forefathers,” statutes, ideology, on the basis of unity of material culture and contemporary struggle for Russian land and faith, the awareness of the unity of the Russian nation began to arise... In this manner, on the basis of a blending of the Eastern Slavic peoples into one ethnic mass from the ninth to the eleventh centuries, the Russian nation was formed—a distant ancestor of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations... The Russian nationality came directly from Kievan Rus, while the beginning of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities came later in the thirteenth century. The problem of the formation of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities needs separate research.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) *Volhsky shliach w starodavni Rusy*, Vseukrainska Akademia Nauk, Klev, 1928.

\(^5\) *Poczàtki kultury slowianskiej*, Polska Akademia Nauk, Crakow, 1912.

Examining the thoughts of Mavrodin, Chubaty\textsuperscript{10} writes: “Only recently, we have come to accept as the official scientific view, the statement that only one ‘Russian nation,’ in the ethnic understanding, existed in the ninth century.” But this affirmation by Chubaty is not suitable for an evaluation of Mavrodin, who accepts the formation of the “Russian nation” between the ninth and the eleventh centuries. Another Soviet historian, B. D. Grekov, at a session of the Historical and Philological Section of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR announced that even “prior to the eleventh century the Russian nation was able to make major strides in its administrative, social and political life.”\textsuperscript{11}

In the edition of \textit{Tale of Bygone Years} published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1950, and based on the Laurentian, Hypatian and Radziwill versions, ancient Ukrainian ethnic names “Rus’” and “Rusyn” are translated by the present Russian words “Russkyy” and “Russkyye” in the Russian translation. This is similar to the case when in the middle of the last century the Polish translator of \textit{Tale of Bygone Years}, August Bielowski, in his \textit{Monumenta Poloniae Historia}, in translating the account of the domination of the Ukrainian “Polianian land” by the Varangians, translated this as “Polska” (Polish) land, and after him, in some Polish publications nonsense appeared claiming that the Varangians had Russified Polish tribes which extended up to the Dnieper. Serious Polish historians never based their conceptions on such inaccurate translations as Bielowski’s; however, the present Soviet translators of the \textit{Tale of Bygone Years}, with their substitution of the Russian names, “russkiye” and “rus-skyy” for the names “Rus’” and “Rusyn” follow him without reservation.

George Vernadsky\textsuperscript{12} places the “embryonic period of the formation of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities”


at the middle of the twelfth century. He observes that in 1154 there occurred one of the first signs of Ukraino-Moscow differences, when Yury Dolgoruky, in opposition to the Kiev population, imported Suzdal "boyars." But why does Vernadsky consider the Suzdalian, who in that century opposed "Rus' squires" in their midst, the contemporary champions of the ideal of a Rus' state, while the residents of the "mother Rus' cities," by their opposition to the Suzdalian, were but initiating the Ukrainian nationality? Both facts—the opposition of the Kievan to the Suzdal "boyars," and the opposition of the Suzdal and Rostov population to the "Rus' squires"—show that during the struggle between the old Ukrainian senior branch of the Monomakhovich and the Moscow junior branch for the throne of the Kiev King, the Kiev Rus' did not consider the Suzdalian to be their people and the Suzdals did not consider the "Rus' squires" to be of their stock. Therefore, not only up to the eleventh century, as Mavrodin states, but even in the middle of the twelfth century, the Suzdalian had not merged into one Rus' nation. This could never be accomplished after the Suzdal principality had separated from the Rus' state. Upon an ethnic Ugro-Finnish-Turkic (Volga Bulgarian) foundation, with a small admixture of the Slavic Vyatichians and Krivichians, the linguistically Slavic Suzdalian nation began to form in the twelfth century (during the fourteenth century, it became the Muscovite nation). Their princes, although descendants of the Kiev King Volodymyr II Monomakh, from the very beginning followed a policy hostile to the Kiev King of Rus'. The destruction of Kiev, March 8, 1169, by the Suzdal-Vladimir Prince Andrey Bogolubsky was a prophetic expression of this policy, and the call of the author of the Tale of Ihor's Campaign to his brother, Vsevolod Yuryevich, did not influence the Suzdal princes to subordinate themselves to the Kings of Kiev and to assist them in the struggle with the nomadic Cumans and Tatars. On the contrary, the Suzdal princes followed the line of atavism of the Suzdal population, seeking from the Eurasian nomads support against Kiev. Yury Dolgoruky held the throne in Kiev, thanks to the assistance of the Cumans against whom Izyaslav II also found allies among the Asiatic nomads, who at that time
wandered over the Ukrainian steppes: the Black Klobuks, of Turkic origin. Following the Tatar attack upon the Rus' state in 1239-41, the Suzdal prince Yaroslav Vsevolodowych was first to swear fealty and homage to the Tatar Khan Batu, and, up to the time of complete weakening of the Tatars, the Suzdal-Moscow princes pursued a policy loyal to their Mongolian masters. Mongolian influences left their effect upon the formation of the Moscow state ideology: the Moscow princes, imitating Tatar tactics of taking prisoners into bondage, mixed the population of conquered lands and in this manner Muscovized it. This is the way Moscow acted with the leaders of Great Novgorod (1478), Pskov (1509), and princes Olhovychs in the borderlands of the old principality of Chernihiv on the Upper Oka, Desna and Seym rivers.

In the Slav world, the Muscovites are a creation analogous to the Prussians in the German world. The Germans assimilated Lithuanian Prussians and Slavs over the Elbe, Oder and the Baltic Sea, and the Prussians have now become a symbol of German brutality. The Muscovites are an admixture of the dour Ugro-Finnish residents of the marshy forests of northeastern Europe and the Asiatic steppe nomads—Eurasian Slavs. G. Vernadsky endeavors erroneously to attach to all Eastern Slavic nations, that is, to the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, too, the Eurasian character of the Muscovites. The Rus' nation during the middle ages did meet with the Eurasian nomads in the Black Sea steppes, but only minor hordes displayed an inclination to permanent settlement and assimilation in Ukraine, to which they completely succumbed similarly to the Bulgarians among the Trans-Danube and Balkan Slavs. During the Tatar invasions in the thirteenth century, the formerly assimilated hordes

13) Prof. K. Menges of Columbia University mentioned them in his lecture at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Science, New York.
quickly returned to their own people as the "Tatars' people." Thanks to their custom of taking prisoners in bondage from Ukraine, they were also being racially changed to a certain degree. But in Ukraine, the superior Slavic culture triumphed. Remnants of geographic names of Turkic origin in the Ukraine steppe\(^{16}\) are not unusual phenomena, for from the middle of the fourteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, various nomads, either of Turkic origin, or united politically or culturally with the Turks, lived in the Black Sea steppes.

Only the Tatar incursions, terrible in their beginnings, permitted the Suzdalian princes to rule over Kiev, from which city, at the end of the thirteenth century (not without coaxing on the part of the Suzdalian princes), Metropolitans of the "whole of Rus'" went to their capital, Vladimir-on-Klyazma. By bribing the Patriarchs of Constantinople, they managed to secure the abolition of the separate Halych metropolitanate for "little Rus'." They even lured the Halych Metropolitan Petro to Moscow by promising him the title of "Metropolitan of all Rus'." But, thanks to internal strife among the Tatar Khans in the middle of the fourteenth century, the old "Mother of Rus' cities" breathed a little more freely, and launched a protest against the Muscovite usurpation of her metropolitan rights. With the help of a fraternal Bulgarian Metropolitan, the local Prince provided for the consecration of the Kiev Metropolitan, Teodoryt (1353), whose supremacy was recognized by St. Moses (†1360), as Archbishop of Great Novgorod. This united and simultaneous advance of the hierarchy of both capitals of the old Rus' state against Moscow is an indication of an awareness in the fourteenth century of a difference in nationality between the old Rus' nation and the newly established Suzdalian-Muscovite one.

On the five hundredth anniversary of the death of the renowned Lithuanian-Rus' prince, Vytautas, son of Keistut, the Ukrainian historian Myron Korduba published an article in the Lwiw Literary-Scientific Herald, in 1930, entitled "The Most Important Moment in the History of Ukraine." He showed

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\(^{16}\) Lecture by Prof. K. Menges, Prof. L. Czykalenko, (Svoboda, 5. 24. 1952, No. 133).
that, thanks to the annexation of Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands by the Lithuanian princes of the Gedimin dynasty, the Ukrainian nation had the opportunity, within the borders of the Lithuanian-Rus’ state, to resurrect and develop apart from the Muscovites. I consider that the Rus’ nation went under foreign Lithuanian and Polish rule conscious of its national separateness, of which the Trans-Carpathian Rus’ within the Hungarian Kingdom was also aware from the time of its short stay in the State of Volodymyr the Great.

We must agree with Dr. Myron Korduba in that the annexation by Lithuania of Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands saved these territories from later annexation by Moscow, and their population from Muscofication. The Lithuanian prince Olgerd did not liberate Kiev from the Tatar yoke: he only replaced the local Kievian princes by his son, Volodymyr V. The Kievian princes frequently emancipated themselves from Tatar dominion, exploiting the khans’ internal strife in the middle of the fourteenth century. But if the annexation of Kiev, Chernihiv and Smolensk had not been accomplished by the Lithuanian princes, their fate would have been like that of Great Novgorod (1478), the “states” of the princes from the Chernihiv branch of the Rurykides, on the Upper Oka and Desna at the end of the fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth century, and like that of Pskov (1509), which Moscow conquered by force. It is a glaring fact that the Chernihiv Rurykides preferred the domination of Gedimin’s descendants, the Jagellons, to the Muscovite successors of Yury Dolgoruky. Although the Jagellons deprived the princes Rurykides of their power, leaving them with only their princely titles and estates, they did not oust them from their homeland as Moscow’s Tsar Ivan did to the leaders of Great Novgorod. It was this fear of exile into the depths of Muscovy which drove the Chernihiv Rurykides to stubborn resistance. Following the exile of the leaders from the occupied lands of Rus’, came the forcible Muscofication of the Rus’ population by means of mixing them with Muscovites, Finns and Tatars—methods which the Muscovites have used against nations enslaved by them during the entire span of their history.
Although philologists may find differences between the languages of the ancestors of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians as early as the tenth century, the Byelorussians had no consciousness of their national distinctiveness up to the second half of the nineteenth century. The facts that they were part of the Kiev Rus’ state from the tenth century, and after the latter’s partition, owed allegiance to separate Rurikides, descendents of Izyaslav Volodymyrovich († 1001) (Polotsk branch) and Rostyslav I Mstyslavich († 1167) King of Kiev (Smolensk branch) up to the fourteenth century, created among the Byelorussians a feeling of belonging to the Rus’ people. When, during the fourteenth century, the Lithuanian princes gained dominion over Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands, the Byelorussians and Ukrainians called themselves generally “Rusyns.” Dr. Franz Skoryna, a Byelorussian by birth, remarked in his Psalter which appeared in 1517 that he had published this book for the Rus’ people in the Rus’ language. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the Suprasl Monastery on the Ukraino-Byelorussian lingual border, praise was penned for the Rus’ Prince Konstantyn of Ostroh for having successfully “beaten the mighty force of Moscow.” In Byelorussia, which entered into the Metropolitanate of Kiev, there were bishops from Ukraine, like the archbishops of Polotsk, Josaphat Kuntsevich and Melety Smotrytsky, and the bishops of Mohyliv, Silvester Kosiv, Joseph Neliubovich Tukalsky (both later metropolitans of Kiev), Yury Konisky and many others. Although natives of Ukraine, they did not feel that they were working among foreigners—among people alien to them. The ancestors of the Byelorussians joined the Ukrainian Kozaks. When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky spoke of liberation of the whole Rus’ to the Vistula, he had in mind Ukraine and Byelorussia together; his colonels organized Kozak regiments in the Byelorussian counties of Mohyliv, Slutsk, Novgorod, and Smolensk. Hetman Philip Orlyk came from Byelorussian territory and before his service with the Kozaks, he had dedicated his book, The Russian Alcides, which was published in the Polish language in Vilna, in 1695, to Hetman Ivan Mazeppa. In the seventeenth century, the Greek name for Rus’, “Rossiya,” and from it the adjective “Rossiysky” were
used by Ukrainian literates for differentiating Rus’-Ukraine from Moscow. “Hetman of Rossiya” is inscribed on Mazeppa’s gifts to the Orthodoxes in Palestine and Syria; these words appear on the silver depiction of Christ in the tomb donated by him to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and on the Gospels in Arabic printed at his cost for the liturgical of the Syrian Orthodox Christians in Allepo. In “The Humble Memorial of the Zaporogovian Army to the King’s Sacred Majesty of Sweden” in Bendery, on October 20, 1709, the leading Mazeppists, Quartermaster-General Ivan Lomykowsky, Zaporogovian Kozak Chief Kost Hordiyenko, Colonel Dmytro Horlenko of Pryluky, Secretary-General Philip Orlyk and General Keeper of the Regalia Fedir Myrovich among others, wrote: “We well know that the desire to accept the protection of His Holy Majesty, The King, was aroused in His Excellency Hetman Mazeppa by the wish that the Rus’ nation cast off the Muscovite yoke and be free…” In his Deduction of the Rights of Ukraine, Orlyk referred to Mazeppa’s treaty with Charles XII in which it was agreed that “all that is won from the former territory of Muscovy… which—as it will appear—belonged formerly to the Rus’ people, is to be transferred to and kept by the Ukrainian principality.”

Language differences did not influence the separation of Byelorussians from Ukrainians because to the end of the eighteenth century there was one mutual, so-called Rus’ book language for Ukrainians and Byelorussians, based on the Church Slavonic, and cluttered up during its administrative use in the Polish Republic between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries with Polonisms. This “Rus’ book language” was augmented in literary works by words and idioms which entered from popular Ukrainian and Byelorussian speech—depending upon the place of origin of the authors of the literary monuments. In the Orthodox polemical work written in the Polish language in the second half of the seventeenth century, which Wasyl Shchurat (1929) found and reprinted in Ukrainian, under the title, In Defense of the Potijs’ Union, there is mention that the Uniate priests in Byelorussia used a language in their sermons which was neither the Rus’ language nor the Polish one. From words
given as examples of this language, we see that it was Byelorussian.

On the basis of traditional citizenship of the ancestors of the Byelorussians to the Rus' state and their belonging to the Metropolitannate of Kiev, there was during the nineteenth century a widespread viewpoint in Galicia that the Byelorussians (Bilorusyny) were a segment of the Ukrainian nation (Rusyny). At that time, even such linguists in Galicia as Ivan Mohylnytsky in the first half of the past century and Omelian Ohonovsky in the second half, considered the Byelorussian tongue a dialect of the Ukrainian. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the language of the Carpatho-Ukrainian settlers in Bachka (Yugoslavia) in the eighteenth century is further from the Ukrainian literary language than the Byelorussian and yet the Bachka-Ukrainians, although their speech has taken on many an admixture from their Serb-Croatian surroundings, consider themselves to be Ukrainians on the basis of their historical tradition.

The echoes of traditional belonging of the population of Great Novgorod to the Rus', and not to the muscovite nation, are found in Galicia in popular stories about Martha Boretska concerning the Great Novgorod heroism during its struggle with Moscow for independence. Published by the "Rus' Pedagogic Society," later the "Native School" in Lviv, that story tells of Martha's heroism as well as about Queen Olha as a native of the region of Great Novgorod. (The story about Olha is contained in the "Library for Rus' Youth," edited by Julian Nasalsky in Kolomiya.) In the newspaper Missionar published by the Basilian Fathers in Zhovkva, there were mentions of "our brothers Rusyny in Byelorussia" even at the beginning of our century.

National rebirth of Ukrainians within the borders of the former Russian empire did not develop on the tradition of the old Kievan Rus' State, but was more closely related to the Kozak campaigns told of in native "dumas" (epic ballads) and songs. But the Kozak tradition was not preserved among the people in the broad sense of statehood that Bohdan Khmelnytsky entertained, but only as a struggle for the liberty of the people without special delineation of territory.
Then, too, the last period of the existence of the Kozak hetmanate left only a tradition to preserve the remnants of the Kozak self-administration (autonomy) in that narrow area of Ukraine—on the left bank of the Dnieper; the Sitch, too, left tradition territorially-limited to Zaporogovia. The confined terrain of this tradition broadened during the era of rebirth due only to the native tongue. The creativity of Taras Shevchenko, particularly, reminded the people, in their native tongue, of their past and informed the world of the life of the Ukrainian nation, whose territory should be considered that land where the population spoke one Ukrainian tongue.

And, based on language, the Ukrainian Cyrillo-Methodian brothers in Kiev, at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, contrary to historical tradition, considered Byelorussia closer to Moscow than to Ukraine. The Byelorussian people drowsed, forgotten by their closest brothers—Ukrainians. They were awakened by the Poles, who, through articles and songs in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages, recruited warriors from among the Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations for their anti-Moscow insurrection. And the first pioneers of national Byelorussian rebirth in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century, were those Byelorussians who answered the Polish summons, and later found that neither Polish ideals nor Russian ideals were native to them. They became convinced that their people must be enlightened so that they would not become tools for foreigners. Thus commenced the Byelorussian national rebirth, independent of the Ukrainian, notwithstanding that the history and spirit of the Byelorussian people were bound up with the Ukrainian. The Byelorussian folk songs are adapted from Ukrainian songs; even during the twenty years of Polish occupation of West Byelorussia (1919-1939), the Ukrainian soldiers' songs from the time of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine spread there spontaneously. When one hears the Byelorussian populace speak of the "holy city"—that city is not Minsk, nor Vilna, nor Moscow, nor Warsaw—but Kiev, notwithstanding that Ukraine during the period of its state liberation struggle in 1917-20 made no effort to take under its care the Byelorussian national-state struggle. The separation of the Byelorussians from the Ukrainians came
about as a result of Ukrainian and Byelorussian national enlightenment on the basis of language in the past century.

Nevertheless, both nations cannot be denied historicity, for earlier they appeared under the common names of "Rusyny" and "the Rus' people" as distinguished from Moscow, which appropriated the name "Russian" only in the beginning of the eighteenth century. There are no non-historical nations; there are only historical nations, for every nation has its own history even though in the past, it appeared together with neighboring nations under another name. Also, for national separation, it is unimportant when the separation ensued. American Yankees are not ashamed of their English origin, and the English cannot deny them the right of national difference because national-state separation of the U.S.A. from England occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. United by a Catholic religion, the Walloons (related to the French) and the Flemings (related to the Dutch), arose against Protestant Holland in 1830 and created independent Belgium. Nevertheless, the Belgium nation today is divided into two nations on a language basis. The Italian nation originated from various ethnic components in northern, central and southern Italy; there are great anthropologic and language differences between southern and northern Italians. This example, from Italian soil, is analogous to the Rus' nation, when in the past it was composed of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who anthropologically and linguistically differed amongst themselves.

Therefore, when we look at the historical process of the formation of the Ukrainian nation, we see that this formation commenced at the end of the tenth century, when Christianity spread through Ukraine, and wiped out the idols, together with the pagan cults, and the separate tribes. There were prospects of assimilation of almost all Eastern Slavs by the Rus' nation, which appropriated the name "Rus'" "ruskv." "Rusychi," "Rusvny." The downfall of the state "Rus," with its capital in Kiev, prevented the accomplishment of that assimilation. The Halych-Volynian state was limited exclusively to Ukrainian territory. Northwest Byelorussia fell under its influence in the second half of the thirteenth century for only a short time. During the Lithuanian-Rus' state and the
struggle of the Kozaks for statehood, this process was manifested in the form of one Rus’ nation composed of ancestors of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Only during the era of its rebirth did the Ukrainian nation begin to assume the appearance which it has today. This one-thousand year process provides an answer to the question why the Ukrainian people did not win state independence in previous centuries. The struggle of the Ukrainian nation in the past was not expressed in the way in which it is formulated today.\footnote{M. Andrusiak: \textit{Istoria Ukrainy}, Prague, 1941, p. 132.}

\textbf{MINORITIES AS A SOURCE OF POLISH WEAKNESS}

Samuel L. Sharp, Associate Professor of International Relations at the American University (see page 68 of this issue for biographical data) outlines Poland’s handling of its minority problem succinctly. He states on page 89 of his book \textit{Poland—White Eagle on a Red Field}:

"The acquisition of such a large number of people of foreign nationalities would have been a source of weakness and trouble for any state. It was particularly so for Poland, surrounded by hostile and potentially strong neighbors.

Interwar Poland was unable to work out an intelligent solution or even to maintain a consistent approach to the problem of minorities. The way chosen by most interwar cabinets was to buy the support of a certain segment of the minorities and to suppress the activities of more radical groups by force. With respect to the Ukrainians, for instance, after a series of terrorist attacks organized by a militant nationalist group against Polish officials, "some brutal reprisals were inflicted pretty indiscriminately on the Ukrainian population by Polish troops and police, especially in the autumn of 1930. Libraries and cooperatives were destroyed, Boy Scout organizations with Ukrainian membership were dissolved, and Ukrainian high schools were closed."
UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH REVOLT OF 1863
(A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN-POLISH RELATIONS)

by Basil Luciv

I. INTRODUCTION

Much has been written and discussed among the Ukrainians and Poles concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations. One of the reasons for this has been that historical circumstances united the fate of Ukraine and Poland for long years. This unfortunate union brought the Ukrainian nation much misfortune. As a result of it, the Ukrainians lost almost all their leading class, and some of the Ukrainian territories were threatened with complete and irretrievable annexation.

True, Ukrainians fortunately survived this period of their history; only the Ukrainian lands west of the Curzon line lost their national character, while on the other hand, historical Poland fell—declined to a second-class role, and today finds itself in the same circumstances as Ukraine.

Considering the importance of the Ukrainian-Polish problems, it is worthwhile to review some of the dust-covered, forgotten pages of history and throw an objective light on matters about which the public should know.

Among the forgotten historical events lies the Polish revolt of 1863, or more specifically, the Polish-Ukrainian relations of that time. It is surprising that work on this subject has been limited to small newspaper items or articles and some small mention in literature; up to this time, we have no broad work on the subject. The author of this paper has attempted to fill this gap on the basis of collected material. This work attempts to provide material for a history, and therefore, does not pretend to be a full and exhaustive work. Lack of archival material may possible have been the cause of certain deviation and inaccuracy; if so, I ask the reader's pardon. One purpose of this work is to uncover that which
has overgrown with moss, and depict it in the aspect of historical events and situations. Another purpose of this work is—instead of creating barricades and entanglements of barbed wire—to endeavor to carry the attack to the conscience and spirit of our neighbors who are experiencing the same fate as ours.

II. POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE REVOLT

In this chapter we will consider Ukrainian-Polish relations in the years 1860-1863, the period directly prior to the revolt. First, it is our belief that Moscow’s failure in the Crimean War (1853-56) revealed all the ills of the state system, thus forcing the administration to carry out a number of reforms. Most important of these were the abolition of slavery in 1861, and the reformation of the judiciary. In addition, municipal self-administration was reformed, length of military service was reduced from twenty-five years to three or four years, and there were even expectations of a constitution. Tsar Alexander II gave permission for the return from exile of members of the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius, and social life was reborn following the decade of Nicholas’s despotism. Initially, Ukrainian life was centered in St. Petersburg; later, it was transferred to Ukraine. In the cities, Hromady (communities) were organized which published and propagated Ukrainian books, established “Sunday Schools” for children and adults, and organized exhibits and concerts, through such activities strengthening the Ukrainian ideal.

Kiev became the center of the social-cultural movement. It is proper to note that the Tsarist government spared no efforts to demoralize the youth of the University of Kiev, established in 1834. Bibikov, governor of Kiev, could boast before the Tsar that “the youth of Kiev dances but does not think.” 1 A year after the Crimean war, the youth began to organize. Clandestine, humorous newspapers such as the Bigus Hultajski appeared in Polish denouncing the errors of youth. The Polish student youth of Kiev established Gminy

1) Review of the Teofil Szumski’s story Na gruzach in “Siolo” (Village), ed. by Paulin Świencicki, Lviv 1886, No. 2, p. 150.
(Polish for "communities") based on the Ukrainian "communities." The more affluent taxed themselves for the benefit of the poor, established libraries, and completed collections of banned works. The Gmina in Kamenets-Podilsky established a store where goods could be purchased at a minimum price and instituted a six-month period of credit for the poor.²

Democratic youth of noble extraction met with the people and came to the conclusion that the populace should not be identified with the Polish gentry—that their paths diverged because the populace had enough power for an independent life. The fiery works of Shevchenko awakened ardor in the youth, and the Ukrainian people found among the Polish university students devoted friends who desired to work for the Ukrainian good and to demand for Ukrainians the land appropriations and education which, as a minority, they lacked. The nobility attacked the youth for their acts, calling them "demagogues;" ideas about citizenship for the peasantry were called "mania," and all friends of the common people were called khlopomany (common-man maniacs). True, these endeavors were not without results. The aforementioned democratic youth (gentry and Catholics), now called khlopomany, separated and created an independent group—Hromada (Community). They rejected the slogan of nobility—"to elevate the populace," and did not act superior in any way. Rather, they became one with the common people; they accepted the Ukrainian tongue, Ukrainian customs, manners, and dress. In brief, in their struggle for the welfare of the common people they became khlopy (common-men), from which term the contemptuous name khlopomany was derived.

In 1860, the youth who had not become a component of the Hromady united the gymnasium Gminy into provincial ones. Five Gminy were established: the Podolian, Volynian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and that of Congress Poland. These Gminy united into the Ogól in opposition to the Ukrainian Hromada. Only later did the more poorly organized Muscovites and Jews follow.³

²) Szumski, op. cit., p. 159.
³) Ibid., p. 100.
The Ukrainian *Hromada* in Kiev was headed by Volodymyr Antonovych, who left the camp of the nobility for the *khlopomany*, explaining this step as follows:

Fate willed me to be born in Ukraine a nobleman; since childhood my customs were those of the gentry and for long I have shared all the principles and national prejudices of the people among whom I was reared. Then when the time came for self-appraisal, I serenely weighed my position in the country, weighed all the errors, all the aspirations of the society in which fate placed me—and I observed that its moral position was hopeless if it did not diverge from its viewpoint of exclusiveness, from its pretenses to the country and its populace. I saw that the Polish gentry who reside in Ukraine had before the tribunal of their own conscience only two ways out: either, to love the people among whom they resided, to concern themselves with the people’s interests, to return to the nationality abandoned at one time by their predecessors, and, in the measure of their power, with untiring labor and love, to do penance for all the evil which they caused the populace that had reared many generations of aristocratic colonists, said populace having been repaid by the Polish gentry only by jealousy, quarrels, degration of its religion, customs, morals, and dignity; or, in the event that there was not enough moral strength, to settle on Polish soil, populated by Polish people, so that each man might finally acquit himself in his own heart of the following sad accusation: “I, too, am a colonist. I directly or indirectly feed on foreign labor, block the road to the development of the people into whose homeland I came without invitation, with ambitions alien to it. I, too, belong to the camp which desires to block the development of the natives, and although without guilt, I share responsibility for its deeds.”

The above declaration by Volodymyr Antonovych was not only his creed but it was also the creed of other Polish or polonized gentry who went over to the Ukrainian camp. The name of Antonovych, as well as that of the renowned researcher on Slavic culture, Konstantyn Mychalchuk, the economist Tadey Ryisky, the ethnographer Borys Poznansky, and other outstanding scientists who dedicated their works

to the Ukrainian people, became famous in the European scientific world.

The above members of the Hromady, especially Professor Antonovych, were, at that time, a threat to the Moskrodziyi (as the nobility was called) who could not ignore the declaration of Antonovych because it had touched the depth of their conscience.

Of the Gminy, it should be said that each of them was comprised of several hundred members. Every member considered it an honor to belong to the Ogól. Leaving a Gmina was considered a "disgrace," and those who had done so were not even accepted in the homes of the gentry. 5

The Gminy held sessions twice a year. In cases of necessity, special sessions were held. At meetings they elected representatives. Five representatives of the Gminy constituted the representative committee, which resolved minor general matters of the Ogól, and the complete Gminy considered and resolved local matters of greater importance. In cases of differences, each Gmina elected representatives to the General Meeting, which, under the guidance of a president elected by the representatives, resolved the matter. Meetings were held in private homes, and an attendance of several hundred people was not uncommon. The police pretended they were unaware of this and created no obstacles, although the speakers were very outspoken. In addition to the representative committee, there were others: administrative, library and educational. Later, premises called Hospoda (inn) were hired for meetings. The Hospoda contained a collection of books and a reading room where they also filed copies of newspapers, the majority of which were illegal. The Tsarist government de jure did not recognize the Ogól, but de facto was forced to contend with it and, out of necessity, to negotiate with it. Not only that, but individual citizens considered it an honor to be a member of any type of Gmina and even placed their personal problems before the Ogól for decision.

And now, a few words concerning the principles and character of the Gminy. Members of the Podolian, Volynian and Ukrainian Gminy considered themselves citizens of the

5) "Siolo," op. cit., p. 100.
country; they did not renounce leadership of the given areas, but they endeavored conscientiously to fulfill all their obligations toward the country. They did not segregate themselves from the Ukrainian populace; they called themselves Rusyny (meaning Ukrainians) and they tried to represent the Ukrainian interests. Because, during the course of centuries, great changes had taken place and the people, as was averred, had appropriated the Polish culture from the gentry and entered into the composition of the Polish state, the citizens of three Ukrainian provinces (Podilia, Volinia, and Ukraine), in addition to their own designation of Rusyny, preserved the name of the Poles, and called themselves Poliako-Rusyny (Poles-Ukrainians). This youth, although Polish, was active in educating the populace. It established schools in which the Polish language was not even taught—only the Ukrainian. For instance, in Kiev a model three-class school was established in which the Ukrainian language was used in lectures. This School Committee published a Ukrainian dictionary, and the Pedagogic Council published several popular books for the populace. The “Society of Friends of the Populace” was organized, the members speaking Ukrainian among themselves.

The activities of the Ogól and the Gminy interested the “Catholic Gentry Society,” and they demanded from the Ogól recognition of their political credo. The youth of three provinces called a conference of their Gminy, and later, at a general meeting, issued a written proclamation that, although they did not intend to break with the Polish element, they considered themselves to be Ukrainian (Ruski) citizens; therefore, the defense of the rights of Ukraine, with which they were federatively connected, was their first concern and Poland their second, inasmuch as they united with Poland as an equal with an equal and the free with the free. The Ogól decided to print this proclamation in the foreign press.

To all the announcements and activities of the Poliako-Rusyny, Congress Poland and the Lithuanian Gminy took a passive attitude, participating only in matters which con-

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7) Ibid., p. 162.
8) Ibid., p. 164.
cerned the Ogół, because they always considered themselves aliens in Ukraine.

The main difference between the Gminy of the Poliako-Rusyny and members of the Hromady was that the principal purpose of the members of the Hromady was to broaden education among the populace, and in the political aspect to lean or to depend on the strength of the Ukrainian nation whereas, at that time, the Gminy had a distinct purpose: to liberate themselves from Muscovite domination and to unite with Lithuania and Congress Poland as one federative state. In political affairs, the Hromady depended upon Providence and the destiny of the Ukrainian nation; they frequently broke with certain moments of the past, yet they had no plans for the future, and they acted according to the needs of the day. On the other hand, the Ogół had a definite political purpose; they distinctly noted positive moments of Polish-Ukrainian mutual relations in the past, and dreamed of the greatness of the “Polish Republic” in the future.  

Members of the Hromady were called rizuny (butchers) by the gentry, while the Poliako-Rusyny were more often called khlopomany, although there were other less popular names for both. In the Gminy there was a certain faction of the youth at the helm. This faction of the youth was impressed by their position since, after all, it was a certain honor to administer the affairs of the country. In order not to lose that power, this faction of the youth permitted no parliamentarianism which might have taken that power away from them. The youth, in general, opposed them, nicknaming them coryphaei (l. corypheus) and pointing out all their errors. A fierce struggle began between the coryphaei, the students, and the other members of the Gminy. First, Lithuania got rid of the coryphaei; them a movement against them started in Ukraine. This led to serious changes, especially in the Podolian Gmina where an internal reorganization was carried out. After the reform, the Podolian Gmina differed very distinctly from the two other Gminy in Ukraine. True, in general matters the students continued to discuss affairs together, while the Ogół decided everything. For instance, in 1862, in the uni-  

versity auditorium in Kiev, conferences and heated discussion lasted three weeks because the Tsarist government intended to promulgate certain laws which would limit the freedom of the students. Indignation rose to such a point that all government papers were destroyed, and the majority of the students declared that the university must cultivate not only scientists but also good citizens of the country.\footnote{10}

This was the period before the Polish revolt. The agitated youth began demonstrations. The \textit{Ogól} consented to this and did not order the arrested to deny their guilt. Polish student leaders were arrested and imprisoned. The Polish youth in Ukraine began to see matters more soberly. Despite the resolutions of the \textit{Gminy} of Lithuania and Congress Poland, the Ukrainian \textit{Gminy} resolved that the prisoners should plead not guilty of singing national songs and anthems, because the government released such cases. To this, one of the members of the Congress Poland \textit{Gmina} became empassioned and shouted that it was for Congress Poland to give orders and for Lithuania and Ukraine to obey. Then Stephan Bobrowski rose and announced that it was nonsense to advance such pretenses, and that if other members of the Congress Poland \textit{Gmina} were in accord with such ideas, then \textit{Rus'} (Ukraine) did not want to have anything to do with them and would break off reciprocal relations.\footnote{11} This had a positive influence, and thenceforth the members of the Lithuanian and Congress Poland \textit{Gminy} never again expressed themselves in matters strictly Ukrainian. True, in a very short time, members of the aforementioned \textit{Gminy} left Ukraine for the eventual organization of the revolt.

The members of the \textit{Gminy} in Ukraine were also active in this direction. Thus, the memorable "January Revolt" (Polish Revolt of 1863) approached for the Poles, together with events tragic in their culmination for Poland.

**III. UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH REVOLT OF 1863**

Since our purpose is to investigate the Polish revolt of 1863 from the aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian relations, we

\footnote{10) "Siolo," No. 2, Lwiv, 1866, pp. 163-4.}
\footnote{11) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 164.}
shall not go into a lengthy review of the revolt itself because for this there is ample Polish literature. We give here only a general outline of the insurrection itself and the preparations for it, placing special emphasis on the activity of the insurgents among the Ukrainians.

On closer examination, we see to our astonishment that this outstanding but saddest page in the history of the Polish nation, the “January Revolt,” enveloped the major portion of the Ukrainian national territory. The majority of the battles and skirmishes took place on Ukrainian soil. Ukrainians, not only by origin or blood, but also those who possessed a definite Ukrainian national identity played a dominant role in its preparation and in the revolt itself. At the same time, the Ukrainian populace decided it was a lost cause, although, under other circumstances, it could have supported the Revolt and brought about victory.\(^{12}\)

Among the Polish citizenry, two political parties were in the lead—“Whites” and “Reds.” Their policies and methods of struggle were varied. The “Whites” were the gentry and wealthy burghers who gathered for conferences at the home of Count Andrew Zamojski. The “Reds” endeavored at all costs to bring about war with Moscow and maintained a more democratic character. A third party, headed by Marquis Alexander Wielopolski, asked for peace with the Tsarist government.

At that time, the Tsarist governor in Warsaw was M. Gorchakov. He saw that Moscow must resort to concessions and give Poland some relief. For that reason, he received permission from the Tsar to organize an administrative commission for education and religion, headed by a Polish minister. The Russophile, Marquis Wielopolski, was appointed. He distinguished himself by severe treatment of the democratic youth and by disbanding the “Agricultural Society,” which act brought about one of the most bloody manifestations in Warsaw. In the demonstration over 200 people were killed and as many wounded. Nevertheless, this was only a spark to the explosion; these victims did not

\(^{12}\) O. Nazarlyv: *Povstannia 1863 r. i Ukraina* in “Ilustrovana Ukraina” Lviv, Dec. 1, 1913, p. 4.
quench the resistance but brought about a whole series of manifestations in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. The “Reds” were especially active. Fear overcame the Tsar. He dispatched Prince Konstantyn to Poland as governor, and he appointed Wielopolski as chief of the civil government. On June, 8, 1962, Congress Poland received full autonomy. Despite this, the “Reds” did not interrupt their revolutionary activities and they committed several outrages. The populace was rebellious and restless; the number of arrests and exiles to Siberia increased. Wielopolski saw that matters were nearing an explosion and for that reason ordered compulsory military service in the Russian army. This decree hastened the revolt. Conscription into military service was to take place on January 17, 1863, and on January 22nd insurrection broke out simultaneously in several places.\textsuperscript{13}

Polish sources report that initially there were only 10,000 insurgents, poorly clothed and lacking in weapons. For the most part, these were youths unaccustomed to hardships and untempered in battle. The Russians appeared with a much larger army—almost 83,000 men armed and equipped with 120 cannons—while the insurgents had none.\textsuperscript{14}

Polish revolutionary committees were formed in Warsaw and Vilna. The administration of the Committees was recognized by the lesser gentry and priests, while the more important gentry and magnates offered no resistance to them. The Committee members conducted broad scale propaganda among the peasantry, especially among the Ukrainians, and some of the villages, or sections of the peasantry as a whole, swore allegiance to them. The insignificant participation of the peasantry in this revolt might be explained by the revolt’s intelligentsia-aristocratic character. The organizers of the revolt did not properly recruit the peasantry. True, special circulars, a few articles and two types of the so-called “Golden Writs”\textsuperscript{15} were issued for the Ukrainian population. The populace did not rally to the obscure promises and did not support the insurrection. The organizers of the revolt on

\textsuperscript{13} Watra-Przewłocki: History of Poland, publ. In Stevens Points, U.S.A.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 526.
\textsuperscript{15} O. Nazariyiv, op. cit., pp. 4-7; D. Doroshenko: Istoria Ukrainy, Crakow, 1942, p. 209.
the right bank acted very unwisely and frivolously. Let us cite an example. A group of armed Kievan youth marched on the villages for the purpose of inciting the populace to revolt. The “Golden Writ” was to serve as a means of propaganda and verbal agitation. Some villages received them sympathetically, even with favor. By accident, they came to the village of Soloviyiwka in Radomyshl county, a village unfamiliar to them. The local population adopted a hostile attitude toward them because the villagers were unsuccessful in reaching an understanding with the Kievan youth. Motivated by the lack of tact on the part of the Kievan youth, the peasants surrounded the insurgents, murdered a majority of them by brutal methods, and captured the remainder by using units of the Russian army.\textsuperscript{16} Polish historians attribute this incident to anti-Polish propaganda by Moscow. In our opinion, this is not so. Undeniably, Moscow waged its propaganda, but in this instance the outcome was decided by the indifference and even hostility of the Ukrainian peasantry toward the insurgents, which attitude was caused by the everlasting serfdom of Ukraine under Poland, the exploitation of Ukrainian peasants by the Polish nobility, and an improperly prepared political program for the Ukrainians.

The later course of this revolt is known. Unnecessarily, two administrations were formed. One, the so-called “Central Committee,” elected Mieroslawski dictator, and declared itself the “Popular Government.” The “Whites,” fearing that the “Reds” would incite a social revolution, proclaimed Marian Langiewicz dictator. Langiewicz succeeded in gathering together a more significant rebel force, and he waged successful battles in Sandomierz province in the Swietokrzyski Hills. The Muscovites finally defeated the forces of Langiewicz who then fled to Galicia where the Austrians interned him. Mieroslawski was not so fortunate in battle; the Muscovites defeated him earlier and he saved himself by fleeing abroad. Taczanowski was active in Poznań province, but the stronger foe defeated his divisions. The “Popular Government” issued an order that the populace lay down their arms and depart to their homes. The peasants became in-

\textsuperscript{16} Nazariyiv, op. cit., p. 5.
dignant and complained, "You gentry are always the same! The time will come when we, the peasants, will incite a revolt without you."^17 Fighting continued in various parts of the country, as well as in Lithuania, Byelorussia and in Ukraine. The insurgents fought heroically, attacking the many times stronger enemy, and frequently achieving miracles. The leaders constantly buoyed the spirits of the insurgents, believing that help would shortly come from France and Austria. The principal representative of Polish affairs abroad was Prince Władysław Czartoryski. It was he who influenced Romuald Traugut to accept secret dictatorship in the middle of November, 1863. Traugut was an unusually capable officer of the Tsarist army. He joined the revolt, advanced on Byelorussia, and defeated the Muscovites several times. He selected the most capable people for his administration but by April of the following year the Muscovites had arrested them all, and in August 1865, they were hanged in Warsaw. The revolt commenced to wane and end.

In Galicia, on the Austrian side, remnants of the insurgents met at the estate of the landowner Rozwadowski, an insurgent general, in the village of Iliadky. Here he reclothed them, issued money to them from the insurgent funds, and dispatched them with letters to other landowners, where they entered into service as lackeys, valets, managers, or secretaries, because many of them were educated.

The revolt lasted longest in Pidliashia (Northwest Ukraine). A priest, Father Brzóśka, fought against the Muscovites until April 26, 1865. After the failure of this heroic revolt, the Tsarist government commenced brutal repressions against the insurgents. The Tsar dispatched his executioner, Alexander Berg, to Warsaw. In Lithuania, Muravyev was nicknamed "the hangman." The notorious Muscovite brutalities commenced, ignoring the fact that thousands had already perished in lesser and greater skirmishes and battles. According to Polish historians, 30,000 insurgents were killed in battle, over 1,500 were shot by the Muscovites, and 150,000 men and women were exiled into Siberia.^18

^18) Ibid., p. 534.
In Ukraine, on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Tsarist government closed all Polish schools and Catholic monasteries and confiscated many Polish estates. In this manner, Moscow rid itself of Polish influences and commenced to russify Ukraine. All of Poland’s heroic efforts came to nothing. Moscow brutally punished the insurgents and the more nationally-conscious citizens, and also advanced against the Ukrainian movement. Had the Poles adopted the principle of real freedom, equality, and brotherhood instead of endeavoring to reconstruct the historical Poland of 1772, the Ukrainian people would have supported them because they would have felt that they were fighting for their own rights—for their own statehood. The Ukrainian peasants were reluctant to fight for a renewed Polish serfdom, and in retribution, they even captured insurgents and handed them over to the Tsarist government, or themselves defeated the insurgent bands, although there were exceptions to this.

The peasants in the village of Horodyshche in Podilia, relate the following incident:

In the unit led by the landowner Cinski there was among the rebels a Ukrainian. When the landowner was severely wounded by a Cossack spear and fell unconscious at the edge of the forest near the border, this Ukrainian picked him up and carried him half alive through the forest to the Austrian side. There the rest of the insurgents helped bring their officer to his manor. In appreciation the landowner presented the Ukrainian with twenty morgues of land, and built him a house.

Although this Ukrainian fought for Polish interests, he was, nevertheless, a sincere Ukrainian and remained so until his death.¹⁹

The January revolt was one more practical lesson for the Polish nation, or better, for the Polish leading circles. It is well to remember that in addition to heroism and self-sacrifice, concrete political plans and proper understanding of others are necessary.

POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS
NOVEMBER 1916—NOVEMBER 1918

by Constantine Warvariv

I. POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS UNDER TSARIST RUSSIA

SECTION 1.

During the 120 years between the eclipse of the Polish state and the rise of the Polish and Ukrainian nations in World War I, one might expect that a community of purpose—that of national liberation—would have drawn the both peoples together. This was prevented, however, by the social structure in the territories where the Ukrainian and Polish population was mixed, and by certain external factors. During this period it was the policy of the Russian state to strengthen the old Polish-Ukrainian antagonism by emphasizing the bitter memory of historical events. The whole Ukrainian political movement in the eyes of the average man in Russia was presented as a means for the attaining of foreign goals—as the product once of “Polish intrigue” and once of “German intrigue." The press—Russian and Polish—alike, inflamed the contemporary sore spots on the terrain of strained Galician relations. All this greatly complicated the problem of Ukrainian-Polish relations and hindered elementary comprehension of the fact that only by the united efforts of both was it possible to become free of the yoke of the third.

In general, the relations between the Ukrainian and Polish populations in Central Ukraine were conducted in a different mood than in neighboring Galicia. In Central Ukraine, the struggle between the Ukrainian and Polish populations was conducted, and often it reached its most bitter point, over the interests of daily life, while in the Russian Ukraine this embitterment originated in and was limited to higher social circles, and it did not extend to the daily relations of the two intermingled peoples.

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Where a national-political consciousness penetrated into common relations, a communal sympathy was forged by the repression of the ruling regime; in such cases, mutual respect between Poles and Ukrainians was aided by a national awareness on the part of each.

The general tone of the Polish frame of mind was set by the Polish landowners, as the most influential factor—economic and intellectual. Among this class there were two wings, different as to their relation to the Ukrainian movement. One group was that part of the Polish gentry whose relation to their landed estates—often latifundia—was only for the economic base of their existence. These landowners entrusted their estates to bailiffs for exploitation. They then lived abroad, chiefly in Austrian Poland, and came home only periodically on visits. This element of Polish society, strengthened by the nationalistic diatribes of Sienkiewicz’s Trilogy, reared on the terrain of old historical quarrels, and influenced by the course of the strained Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia, was very often unsympathetic towards the Ukrainian cause. Here, there predominated the moods of the old historical tendencies, which by their character colored the contemporary views also.

However, besides these nobles, there existed a Polish element which had grown deeper into the ground of Ukrainian life. This element perceived the strength of the Ukrainian spirit, evaluated much more realistically the situation in the Ukraine, and arranged its opinions on the Ukrainian question accordingly. The reminiscences of the historical bloody struggles made clearer the realization that the existing conditions of the common oppression were due to the former quarrels.

This group of Poles published in Mohyliv, in Podilia, the Ukrainian weekly “Svitova Zirnytsia.” In the schools in Ukraine there existed circles of Polish youth, organized on

1) Henryk Sienkiewicz is the famous Polish writer of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The three parts of his Trilogy bear the titles With Fire and Sword, The Deluge and Pan Wołodyjowski. The first is a real masterpiece of national hatred, describing in a most insulting manner the Ukrainian Cossack uprisings, led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in 17th century against Polish szlachta.
the initiative of the Polish Socialist Party (P. P. S.). Here also pamphlets were circulated, e. g. Wspólnym jarzmie (In Common Yoke), by Leon Wasilewski, which called the non-Russian people enslaved by the Tsarist Government to common action.

The most important center of Polish Ukrainophil expression was Kiev, where the connection of the Polish element with the Ukrainian was direct and constant. From thence came forth the ideas of Polish-Ukrainian understanding which occasionally obtained a real meaning in Galicia. There, in Kiev, at the beginning of the 1890s that stream in Polish-Ukrainian relations which was known under the name of the "new era" was initiated.

SECTION 2.

The Polish organized movement in the early twentieth century which found its double incarnation—illegal in P.P.S. and legal in elements which constituted the Polish Club (Kolo) in the Russian State Duma (National Democrats), did not keep direct organized contact with the Ukrainians. The political chances of Polish actions were considerably greater because the progressive Russian parties included in their political programs the possibility of Polish autonomy, while the Ukrainians, in the meantime, were striving for such elemental political rights as the right for the Ukrainian language in administration, schools and courts. Therefore the Polish Club acted with great reservation as to its participation in the "Union of Autonomists," (a bloc organized by

2) "The Union of Autonomists," created in November 1905, in Petersburg, was composed of more than one hundred deputies representing the national minorities in the Empire. The "Union," of which A. Lednicki (Polish) was the president and E. Shrah (Ukrainian) the vice-president, advocated equal rights for all nationalities, the decentralization of administration on a purely territorial or national-territorial basis, and the use of local languages in courts, schools, and political institutions. Yet it did not hesitate to reaffirm the indivisibility of the Russian state as a united whole. On its activity see: All M. B. Topchibashi's article in Spohady, Warsaw, 1932, pp. 133 ff. (vol. VIII in the publication series of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute); also: V. Chere, Pervaya Russkaya Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Moscow, 1906, and D. Doroshenko, "Ukraina v 1906 roci," Ukraina, V. I, part two, January, 1907, Kiev.
non-Russian deputies in the First Duma) so as not to weaken its political actions, which already had on the political market a certain price which was willingly paid by those elements which still had nothing, for the privilege of partnership with the more powerful body.

Besides, it was the Polish Kolo, dominated by the national-democrats under the leadership of Roman Dmowski, which brought to Polish-Ukrainian relations in Russia the same aspect as this relationship had in the political struggle in Galicia. This, in turn, worsened these relations.

The Ukrainian-Polish crisis in the countryside in Russian-held territories reached its peak when the Polish deputies to the Second and Third Dumas, instead of working jointly with the other nationalities to attain the decentralization of the state apparatus and autonomous rights for the non-Russian peoples, cooperated wholeheartedly with the Russian nationalists. This change was elaborated by the chairman of the Polish Kolo, Roman Dmowski, in his speech to the Duma on May 15, 1908, in the name of the whole Polish Club. This pronouncement stated that the Poles did not put forth claims for autonomy, that they would accept any "good" reform, and that Polish policy "is now built on a realistic basis."

Two weeks later, R. Dmowski, with the majority of the members of the Polish Club, decided to join hands with the new Russophilism, under the official name of the Neo-Slav movement; and, as one noted Polish historian remarks, "contrary to the age-old tradition and wishes of the Polish nation" pledged at the Pan-Slav Congress at Prague (1908) the full support of the Polish Club "to the cause of Slavic solidarity." The new movement was particularly welcome.

5) Ibid., p. 559. A well known Russian statesman, P. Millukow, has noted that "though Dmowski attended the Congress in Prague, it was not at all with the object of promoting a Neo-Slav policy. As he himself acknowledged to Benes in 1916, it was 'not on account of any chimerical Slavonic policy, but simply to extract something or other for Poland from all this.'" Cf. P. Millukov, "The World War and Slavonic Policy," The Slavonic Review, vol. VI, pp. 268-290.
as a means of combating Ukrainian aspirations at this time, for the domination of the Poles in Galicia was to some extent threatened by the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria. Accordingly, an arrangement was made between Roman Dmowski and Count V. Bobrinski, a leading Russian Pan-Slavist, to the effect that in return for a free hand to Russophils in Eastern Galicia, Bobrinski would use his influence at St. Petersburg to secure certain concessions to the Poles in Russian Poland. This Dmowski-Bobrinski *pacta conventa* lasted until World War I.  

Examining Polish diplomacy and tactics in the State Dumas, the aforementioned Polish historian, E. H. Lewinski-Corwin, came to the conclusion that no influence in the whole course of modern Polish history has been more harmful to Poland than that of the national-democrats. He states:

> They have demoralized Polish political life, dragged politics into the mire of personal ambitions and petty racial animosity . . .

By siding with the Russian Government in its persecution of the national aspirations of the Ukrainians, they have contributed much toward the deepening of ill-feeling between the Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia.  

The worsening of Polish-Ukrainian relations which came after the Prague Congress was increased later by the opposing positions taken by Poles and Ukrainians on the Kholm question, about which there were great debates in the Russian Duma in 1912. The Ukrainians supported a governmental bill for the detachment of Kholm Province from the administrative body of the Polish Kingdom so as to bring it from under the influences of Polonization. The bitter irony

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8) On Kholm question see Leon Wasilewski, *Der Kampf um das Chelmierland*, Wien, 1919 (series: *Polens Grenzprobleme No. 2*). For statistical information on Kholm and Pidliashia districts see Appendix A at the end of this essay.
of fate was that the Ukrainian tactical position coincided with the position which was taken in the Duma by the most reactionary group at the head of which was the Bishop of Kholm, Yevlohi, and which aimed at the Russification of Kholm, while the Polish project was supported by the Russian Cadet Party (Constitutional-Democrats). This was the basis of this party's alliance with the Polish Kolo. The Poles, on the other hand, considered Kholm as Polish territory and declared that such a secession would be considered by all Poles as "the fourth partition" of Poland.

After long discussion, the governmental project was accepted in 1912 by the Duma and the tsar, and it became a law. The southern and eastern parts of the province of Lublin and the southern part of the province of Siedlets were combined into one administrative unit, which was taken from the kingdom of Poland to form henceforth a province, with Kholm as its capital.

It was under these conditions that both the Ukrainian and Polish peoples living in Russia, while oppressed by the same common enemy, divided into two hostile camps and entered World War I hoping that war would open to them the possibility of a recovery of political independence.

SECTION 3.

With the outbreak of World War I there arose before the Ukrainians a great problem: with whom to ally themselves? Their wishes could not be on the side of the Entente because the victory of the Entente meant the victory of Russia. There was no hope that victorious Russia would change her policy toward the Ukraine. There also was no hope that the Western powers (if victorious), would and could influence Russia in this respect.

As we shall see further, at the very beginning of the war Russia had disclosed clearly her hostile attitude toward the Ukrainian people. Notwithstanding the fact that the whole Ukrainian press in Russia at once declared that Ukrainians would loyally fulfill their obligations toward the Russian state, the administration closed all Ukrainian papers and periodicals on the day following the outbreak of war.
and exiled some of their editors to Siberia. All Ukrainian cultural and political organizations and societies were closed. The decree of 1876 entirely prohibiting the printing of books in Ukrainian was again put into force, and the reversion to the status quo ante 1905 in regard to the Ukrainian movement was complete.  

An even worse fate awaited the Ukrainians in Galicia after the Russian armies entered there. This official Russian policy was later confirmed by the Russian foreign minister Sazonov to a Ukrainian delegation sent to him in order to attract his attention to violence and breaches of the law being perpetrated by the Russian authorities in occupied Galicia. He answered that “the present was a favorable moment to exterminate the Ukrainian national movement once and forever.”

Sazonov's declaration and the policy of the Russian government persuaded the Ukrainians that they could not expect any good from a Russian victory and that only the military defeat of Russia could bring the Ukrainians their national emancipation. Such a stand was strongly supported in particular by the Ukrainian parties in Austria. Even late in 1912, when war threatened between Russia and Austria-Hungary, all Ukrainian parties in Galicia and Bukovina, in their declaration of December 7, 1912 stated that in case of military conflict the aims of the Ukrainians were in accord with those of Austria-Hungary.

The idea of having, under the sceptre of the Austrian emperor, a strong Ukrainian territory which could serve all Ukrainian people as a rallying center, as Piedmont served to unite and liberate Italy, gradually found support among the Ukrainians under Russia. In 1914, soon after the outbreak of the war, a group of Ukrainian political refugees from the Russian Ukraine founded in Vienna the “Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine” (Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukrainy), whose object was to build up, with the help of Germany and

10) D. Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 613; M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 507 ff.
Austria, an independent Ukrainian state out of the territories decontrolled from Russia. The "Union" also conducted in the neutral non-belligerent countries extensive propaganda for the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, putting this question in the forefront of the problems raised by the war.

But the victory of the Central Powers over Russia did not at all signify the realization of the Ukrainian endeavors. The Poles, with the aim of the restoration of "historical" Poland, raised claims not only to Eastern Galicia, but also to the whole area along the right bank of the Dnieper, should the Central Powers take it over from Russia. The fact that the Austrian policy toward the Ukrainian people up to that time had been along the line of Polish aspirations indicated that Austria might take the same position in the event of her victory over Russia.

The Poles were, however, in a much more advantageous position; both belligerent sides had promised them their national liberation. Under Austria, all Polish parties had united themselves in the "Supreme National Committee" which declared that the war of the Central Powers against Russia was a war for the restoration of Poland. The Supreme National Committee called to life the Polish legions, which, under the leadership of Pilsudski, were to help the Central Powers liberate Poland from Russia.

Already, in the first stages of the war, Russia, in the Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, declared as one of its war aims the liberation of Polish lands from Austria and Germany, and the creation of a united Poland, in union with Russia. This manifesto was supported by the other Entente powers, and in Paris, the Polish National Committee which worked for the realization of such a program began to function. Thus, the international situation gave the Poles an opportunity to identify their future with the war fortunes of both belligerent sides. Both Polish camps, "Austrophiles" and "Russophiles", although outwardly fighting each other,

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in reality worked toward one and the same goal, seeking—one, from the Central Powers, the other from the Entente—an assurance of the restoration of Poland. Either solution was to involve the inclusion of some Ukrainian territories in the new Poland. This fact was not conducive to a united Polish-Ukrainian front in the struggle for national liberation.

SECTION 4.

Due to the rivalry between the belligerent camps to win the Poles to their side, and aggravated by the German endeavors to recruit Poles into their armed forces, the Polish question had become an international problem by the end of 1916. On November 5, 1916, an independent Polish Kingdom was created by the "Two Emperors' Proclamation." This Act provided that, while Germany would give only the former Russian-Polish provinces to this Kingdom, Austrian Poland would continue to remain in the hands of Austria. Galicia would not be divided, as the Ukrainians had hoped, into separate Ukrainian (Eastern) and Polish (Western) parts, but would be governed as a unit. In practice, this meant that it would be ruled by the Poles, and that the Ukrainian inhabitants would have no direct recourse to the Austrian government.¹³

Once the right of Poland to independence had been admitted, there arose the question of which territories were to be included in the new Kingdom of Poland, and what should be the relations of this future Poland towards her neighbors. At this point it must be remembered that the question of the frontiers of the future independent Poland was not only a territorial one, but even more, a national and ethnic one. If the matter could have been decided merely on the basis of geographical and commercial boundaries, the problem would have been a trifling one. Rivers, forests, mountains, and valleys do not protest against any of their possessors, and readily accept any political arrangements and limitations man makes on their account. It is the people who dwell there who give rise to trouble.

¹³) Lozynski, op. cit., pp. 20 ff.
The reaction of the Ukrainians in Russia to the Proclamation establishing an independent Polish state can be seen from the declaration of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (T.U.P.) published secretly in December, 1916, under the title *Nashi Pozytsii (Our Position).* For our purpose it is important to note that this declaration characterized the contemporary opinion of organized Ukrainian circles, which a few months later, in March 1917, organized the Ukrainian government in Kiev. In reference to the aforementioned Proclamation, the Ukrainian declaration says that:

As federatists-autonomists and as supporters of the principle of the widest national self-determination, we cannot but sympathize with the sacred right and just striving of the Polish people toward their national independence within their ethnographic boundaries...

However, while we extend our sympathy and understanding to the Polish people on the eve of the correction of that historic injustice which has rent the living body of Poland, at the same time we cannot but protest in a most determined manner against the coveting of lands inhabited by Ukrainian people, which unfortunately has already appeared among Polish chauvinists...

We give brotherly warning to the Poles that they should not begin their liberation with old mistakes, resurrecting the ghost of the "historical Poland," and with new violence over the neighboring peoples: Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian.

As to the question of Galicia, the declaration further says:

...We also support in full the demand of Galician Ukrainians that Galicia be divided into autonomous national parts, Ukrainian and Polish, and we protest against the form of national oppression of the Ukrainian people, which was announced in the Austrian Act for the Autonomy of Galicia on November 6, 1916.

Thus, the strain in Polish-Ukrainian relations discernible from the outset of World War I developed into a conflict over the question of what territories were to be included in

the postwar Polish state. This conflict in the Russian Ukraine did not deteriorate Polish-Ukrainian relations to the same degree as in Galicia. This was especially true after the Tsarist regime's collapse in March 1917, when the Polish and Ukrainian populations in Russia were drawn closer together by a renewed hope for early national liberation. This motivation produced a common spirit of cooperation under the slogan "for your and our freedom."

To these relationships we now want to turn in the following section.

SECTION 5.

The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, which brought the collapse of the Tsarist Government and the rise of the Ukrainian state on the territory belonging to the former Russian Empire, marked the beginning of the new period in Polish-Ukrainian relations. On March 17, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) was organized by Ukrainian patriots as the Provisional government of the new autonomous state. The Rada, in order to make itself more representative, convened an All-Ukrainian National Congress which met in Kiev from April 17 to 21. The Congress demanded of the Russian Provisional government recognition of Ukrainian autonomy, immediate and complete local control, and the formation of a separate Ukrainian army. The Congress also demanded that frontiers between states be determined in accordance with the will of the border population and asked that Ukraine be granted a seat at the coming peace conference for the purpose of claiming the ethnically Ukrainian region of Eastern Galicia. The principle of "national-personal autonomy" was also proclaimed for all national minorities living in the Ukraine. This raised the problem of the participation in Central Rada of national minorities living in the Ukraine. These minority groups had begun to organize themselves simultaneously after the collapse of the Tsarist government.

On March 20, 1917 (three days after the establishment of the Ukrainian Central Rada), the Congress of all Polish organizations in the Ukraine took place in Kiev, and the so-called Polish Executive Committee of the Union of Polish Organizations was created by this Congress. The Committee organized four departments: foreign affairs, domestic affairs, culture and finance. It also organized the so-called Commissariats, to serve as local organs representing the Polish Committee among the Polish population.

Next, the newly established Polish authority had to adjust itself with relation to the Ukrainian Provisional government. At its meeting on March 21, 1917, the Committee decided to support the “efforts of the Ukrainian people toward their national and political development;” and on March 30, 1917, the Polish Committee sent to the Central Rada a letter (in Ukrainian), signed by its President, M. Joachim Bertoszewicz. The letter welcomed the Ukrainian Rada and further stated:

On this day, joyful for us, when the now free Russian people have recognized our right to independent political life, we extend our hand to you, brother Ukrainians, as to the nearest neighbors of our native land. For the first time, we can truly come to an understanding, as two peoples, each of whom—with God’s help—will have in his home his own strength and freedom. Before us, as well as before you, there is still a great deal of work to be done... Let us begin to live as neighbors; let us begin to work together for our common and universal welfare... With the means available, we will help you in your national development for the welfare of Ukraine, which we all want to see happy....

The Ukrainian Central Rada answered in the same friendly spirit. The letter declared that the Rada recognized all rights, civil and political, for all national minorities, which inhabited

17) Ibid., p. 29.
18) Ibid., p. 30.
the Ukraine, and which wished to work together with Ukrainians, "as free with free and equal with equal..." The Ukrainian Rada expressed its hope that the free Polish people would also recognize the same rights for Ukrainians living on the Polish ethnic territory.

In such a manner the Polish-Ukrainian relations under the Ukrainian policy, in the process of establishing independence, were taking the form of agreed and friendly cooperation. A similar spirit prevailed at the All-Ukrainian Congress, convoked by the Rada in April, 1917, and to which the Polish Committee sent its delegation. The chief Polish delegate, M. Jezierski, concluded his welcoming speech with the words "long live the free Ukraine." The same friendly atmosphere prevailed at all official and unofficial Polish-Ukrainian gatherings. It was surprising that such an intercourse was possible between the Ukrainian Socialists on one side, and representatives of Polish gentry and upper classes on the other. A similar spirit of friendly relations predominated also in the Polish press with the Dziennik Kijowski and the Kosy Ukrajinskie at the head.20

The Polish Executive Committee profited greatly from this atmosphere and expanded its activity more and more, particularly in the field of education. For example, taking advantage of the great numbers of the Polish intelligentsia in Kiev as well as the favorable disposition of the Ukrainian authorities, it established in March, 1917 the Polish Academic Higher Courses, somewhat like a "Polish University." In a word, the Polish minority secured an ever more suitable cultural position.

However, this "golden period" in Polish-Ukrainian relations should not be overrated. Until this time, both the Central Rada and the Polish Executive Committee were similarly situated organizations: they lacked specified rights, but both were reaching for power; they feared a struggle on two fronts, (Russia being potentially the First Front) and were looking for an ally rather than for enemies. Soon, however, the situation was changed. Popular moods and the

march of political events changed both organizations, giving them distinct colors.

The role of the Central Rada grew from day to day and came to be recognized as the authority of the whole Ukraine. In June, 1917, the Central Rada organized a "General Secretariat," a kind of cabinet, which was to be the national administration for all the Ukraine. In order to become a representative body of all inhabitants of the Ukraine, the Rada took the initiative of calling upon the national minorities to send their representatives to itself.

A Polish National Convention was convoked by the Polish Committee early in July, 1917. Its purpose was the creation in the Ukraine of a stable Union of Polish Organizations, whose Executive Committee was to take the place of the P.K.W., since the latter had been organized only on a temporary basis. The Convention resolved that

Poles, who feel themselves as age-old citizens of this land, are willing to cooperate in the creation of a basis for the independent life of the Ukrainian people...[21]

Another evidence of cooperative spirit at this time was the fact that the Ukrainian Central Rada actually admitted to its membership representatives of Polish minority, as well as of other non-Ukrainian nationalities.[22]

While not interfering with the inner affairs, the leading Ukrainian press enthusiastically welcomed the Polish Convention. The Nova Rada (an official Kievian daily) of July 6th expressed the conviction that the Polish-Ukrainian under-

[21] Jan Ursyn-Zamarajew, op. cit., p. 19-20. At this Convention, there occurred a split in the Polish ranks. The National-Democrats remained in the Polish Executive Committee (P.K.W.) and considered themselves as the only rightful representatives of the Polish minority in the Ukraine. On the other hand, the Left, Democrats and Socialists, quit the Congress and created, in July 1917, the so-called Polish Democratic Center (Centrala). More detailed information about the new-born Polish organization is given by its honorary chairman and its spiritual leader, Eugeniusz Starczewski, in his two volumes: Nasze Sprawy (Kiev, 1918), and Ku Odbudowie (Kiev, 1917).

[22] Out of the total 822 members of the Ukrainian Central Rada, there were fifteen delegates from the Polish Socialist parties. Cf. P. Khristiuk, Zamitki i Materjaly, 1917-1920, (Vienna, 1924), vol. I, p. 137.
standing on the most difficult terrain, i. e., in Galicia, must be preceded by an understanding in Central Ukraine:

The road to good understanding, which must reach Lemberg, leads only via Kiev...23

This Ukrainian paper believed that the organized Polish minority would play a considerable role in the life of Ukraine and that "political wisdom and tact on the part of both people, Ukrainian and Polish, will find such forms of new mutual relationship as will be advantageous to both peoples and the whole country." The paper affirmed that these forms, owing to common and peaceful work, would by themselves become a seed for the restoration of good Ukrainian-Polish relations in general.

This reconciliation of some Polish and Ukrainian groups in the Ukraine was followed by similar manifestations in Russia. On the initiative of the Polish Colony in Moscow, a Polish-Ukrainian meeting took place there in mid-July, 1917, which had for its purpose the "closer acquaintance of the two brotherly nations and the tightening of friendship."24 Also, the Polish paper Echo Polskie in Moscow came forth for Polish-Ukrainian friendship stating that "Polish interests do not oppose in any way, but intertwine with the aims of the young Ukrainian movement." The paper felt that the question of boundaries should not divide the two states. He remarked, however, that the

political and governmental boundaries of Poland are not identical with the boundaries of Polish cultural influence, having only a historical basis under them...25

For this reason the Echo Polskie demanded a guarantee of free cultural development for the Poles in the Ukraine.

A similar stand in respect to the Ukrainian question was taken by the Second Polish Democratic Congress, held in Petrograd in October, 1917 under the chairmanship of one of the most widely respected of the Polish leaders in Russia,

24) Ibid., p. 44.
Alexander Lednicki. The Ukrainian Rada sent its greetings to the Congress on behalf of the Ukrainian people. While resolving that, in its opinion, the only just solution of the Polish question was the creation of a united and independent Poland with access to the sea, the Congress greeted the rising Ukrainian State, and expressed its firm conviction that the Ukraine as well as the Polish nation possessed the necessary qualifications for independent existence. Regarding Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, the resolution further stated that

the two nations will base their future relations on justice and mutual confidence, and will combat chauvinistic currents which tend to interrupt the mutual relations of the two neighbors.\footnote{Chairman of the "Union of Autonomists," organized in the First Duma, in 1905. \footnote{Hrushevski, op. cit., p. 525.}}
WHY WESTERN UKRAINIAN TERRITORIES WERE ANNEXED TO POLAND (1918-1923)

by Stefan Horak

Based on studies of events from 1918 to 1923 concerning reasons why the Western Ukrainian territories were annexed to Poland, it can be confirmed today that three factors were fundamental in this problem. These were: (1) the successful foreign activity of the Polish National Committee led by Dmowski and Paderewski; (2) generally speaking, the profound passiveness of Ukrainian foreign policy, in addition to the disorientation of the Allied countries in East-European problems, which proved advantageous to Poland and harmful to Ukraine; and (3) the inability of the Ukrainians to prolong the Ukraino-Polish war. The Ukrainian Army of Galicia should not have crossed the Zbruch in July 1919, but rather, it should have followed the plan of some officers of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen—to retreat at the critical moment to the Carpathians where there was a better possibility of awaiting new opportunities for an offensive against the Poles than in 1919 on the territories of the Ukrainian National Republic.

1. WEST-UKRAINIAN TERRITORIES AS THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

We pause here to consider events referred to in points (1) and (2) above.¹

West Ukrainian statesmen were the only ones who, up to the fall of Austro-Hungary, had made no contacts with

¹) For wide acquaintance with the subject matter, we list here some of the more important literature:

51
Western State. When the Czech Masaryk and the Pole Dmowski, in 1916, began to develop intensive activity in the West, the Ukrainian parliamentary as well as political workers in general knew no other political centers beyond Vienna and Lviv.

The designation “Eastern Tyroleans” and the naive belief that the national problem would solve itself was not accidental. The manifesto of Charles I, October 16, 1918, was accepted by the Ukrainians as the maximum in achievement, without awareness as to the nearness of the end of the Hapsburg monarchy. Proof of this is that the Ukrainian parliamentarianists made no demands that the Ukrainian divisions be transferred from the distant Italian front to Galicia, if only under the pretext of eventual defense against Russia.

The day the Ukraino-Polish war broke out, the fact of the absence of the finest military divisions quickly told against the Ukrainians.

After the fall of the Monarchy, the Ukrainian politicians placed complete trust in the famous “Fourteen Points” of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, proclaimed on January 8, 1918, in which the self-determination of nations became the program of the Allies. However, the mere fact that the policy of self-determination had been stated did not necessarily mean that this objective would be realized everywhere.

The Western diplomatic world continued to be guided by past thinking, and it is a known fact in politics, acceptance of anything new requires a long time. The Ukrainians did

Lozynskyj, M., *Ukrainska Revolucja, Rozwidy i materjały*, Halyccyna w r. 1918-1920, Widen, 1922.
not win for themselves this time element, neither before the proclamation of the West Ukraine Republic on November 1st, nor during the war, because by the time that the efforts of the Ukrainian diplomats had resulted in an understanding of the Ukrainian problem by the Western powers in Paris, the Poles had already succeeded in placing before them an accomplished fact, forcing the Ukrainian Army of Galicia to move east.

To relieve the Ukrainians of part of the blame for this unfortunate circumstance, some blame should be placed upon the French government for its unfair attitude to the Ukrainian problem in general. The French government, under the leadership of Clemenceau, was under the complete influence at first, of the Russian diplomats, and later, of the Poles. It is a fact that, under the influence of the Poles, the Ukrainian delegation was, itself, barred from France for eight weeks. Only on February 27, 1919 did Dr. Vasyl Paneyko receive an entry visa, and only on March 4th did the full West-Ukrainian diplomatic representation arrive in Paris. Up to that time, all contact with the Entente was conducted through its mission which, while delayed in Warsaw, was subjected to disgraceful Polish propaganda. A typical example of a one-sided mission is this so-called "Berthelemy Mission," which, during the month of February, was the only source of information concerning the Ukraino-Polish war for the Allied Supreme Council.

The demands of the "Berthelemy Mission," of February 5th and 25th, were nothing more than the extreme demands of the Polish side which, at that time, did not, itself, believe in the possibility of conquering Galicia.

The effect of Polish propaganda was recognized by the American general F. J. Kernan, who, in March, toured Poland and West Galicia. His letter\(^2\) of April 11, 1919 to President Woodrow Wilson shows a clear awareness of what hostile propaganda can accomplish. He states:

The definite impression which I carried out of Galicia is that the Ukrainian leaders are intelligent people, and in no case are Bolsheviks. In addition to my observations, I spoke with many disinterested observers who also toured Ukraine, with the result that I am convinced that the now-acting Ukrainian Government and the great mass of Ukrainians are not Bolsheviks... The Ukrainians are completely isolated from Europe, and my belief is that, in a large measure, they are not justly represented in the West, which fact remains in the interests of their enemies who represent them as Bolsheviks and plunderers. Naturally, such non-basic slander, repeated constantly, can have certain success.

The notorious Polish falsifier of reality (we use the word "falsifier" in this instance with full responsibility), Dmowski, even in his letter of October 8, 1918 to the President of a democratic nation, Woodrow Wilson, did not hesitate to depreciate the value of the entire Ukrainian nation. He wrote:

When, in Galicia, under the Austrian regime, the administration lay in Polish hands, it did not mean that Austria supported the Poles, but merely that in that country there is no other element which would be capable of taking over this administration. Therefore, at least in the nearest future, Polish rule is essential here to assure development and progress of this country. The Ruthenian (Ukrainian) national aspiration must be satisfied in the system which gives full liberty to its national development through official recognition of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) language as a language of instruction in educational institutions... Up to the time of complete Ruthenian (Ukrainian) development, Eastern Galicia must form a part of the Polish state...

This document was then presented by the Polish delegation in Paris, on February 25, 1919, to the Commission of Polish Affairs, at the Peace Conference, as the Polish argument for Polish claims to non-Polish lands in general—German, Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian.

With such amoral Polish argumentation, the remark by

Dmowski to the Polish geographer, Romer, who called his attention to the false statistical data, will be understood. Dmowski is said to have replied, "The fools in Paris do not understand anything anyway."

This Polish "protection" over development of the "Ruthenian national movement" will be taken up in another chapter, and we shall pause here upon Dmowski's conception of dividing Ukraine between Poland and Russia. Kutschabsky, taking issue in his excellent work with the political conceptions of Dmowski, notes that the combination of a Russian-Polish front against the Ukrainians could easily turn into a Russian-Ukrainian understanding against Poland, which would mean complete liquidation of the Polish state. In this way, the Polish sword fashioned upon Dmowski's pattern has a double edge and, perhaps, it is not less dangerous for the Polish than it is for the Ukrainians.

The possibility of a Ukrainian state existing in the presence of the small ethnographic Poland, or even under the circumstances of the non-existence of Poland as a sovereign state, is not at all excluded, and, perhaps, it would be better for the Poles if the flexible political theoretician Dmowski had considered this possible historical development while formulating his plans.

Returning to the "Berthelemy Mission" which was influenced by Dmowski's propaganda, it is necessary also to stress its decision, so tragic for the Ukrainians, or more specifically, the decision of the Entente, of February 28, 1919, concerning the suspension of the Ukrainian offensive on Lviv, the purpose of which offensive was the complete encirclement of the city and with this, its seizure. Within a few days, the Commander of the Ukrainian Army of Galicia discovered the error of the government which had accepted this suggested cease-fire, and almost immediately it renounced the cease-fire agreement on March 1st, because the Poles, under pretext of delivering food, were actually bringing in reinforcements and preparing a new offensive. This intervention of the Berthelemy Mission had a crucial significance in the progress of the Ukraine-Polish war, since the new

Polish army, under command of Iwaszkiewicz, succeeded in reaching Lviw.

The second decisive factor in this phase of the Ukraino-Polish war was Haller's army, which the Poles, again by outwitting the Entente and by direct disregard of their responsibility to use this army exclusively against the Bolsheviks, had already directed against the Ukrainians in April. Immediately upon arrival in Paris, the Ukrainian delegation commenced lively activities, and one of its first steps was Dr. Paneyko's telegram to President Wilson who, in his reply of March 17th, assured the Ukrainian delegation of the Entente's best intentions in their attitude to Ukraine. It is a fact, however, that in principle President Wilson had no great influence on the progress of the Peace Conference, and that the initiative was exclusively in the hands of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, especially Clemenceau, who treated the East-European problem in the spirit of the nineteenth century, as emphasized by Kutschabsky. An additional misfortune for Ukrainians was the fact that the American delegate, Professor Lord, notwithstanding his pretense of being a specialist on Eastern affairs, basically proved himself to be a complete layman in these matters. Inexperienced as he was, he was charmed by Polish chauvinism, which he dispatched to "free" East Galicia. The personal policy of Professor Lord in Paris, in relation to the Ukraino-Polish problem, was neither the expression of President Wilson's attitude, nor was it that of the American government. It is a fact that Point 13 of the famous "Fourteen Points" established that an "independent Polish state must be formed of those lands which, without doubt, are populated by a majority of Poles;


that the state must have free access to the sea; its policy and administrative independence must be protected by international treaties."

Under pressure of the French who, at that time, were already preparing an anti-Bolshevik bloc, and who, for that reason, desired to settle the Ukrainian-Polish controversy, the Peace Conference, on March 19th, placed the "East Galicia problem first on the conference agenda of the Supreme Council."

The Council decided upon an immediate cessation of military activities and called on both sides to interrupt the battle near Lwiw and dispatch their delegations to Paris. ⁶ This decision was not accepted by the Poles, who hoped for a speedy transfer of Haller's army to Poland through the assistance of their guardian, Foch, who had already commenced negotiations with Germany in Spa on March 21st concerning the transfer of the Polish army through Germany.

On the other hand, at that time this decision was even advantageous to the Ukrainian side, which fact Lozynsky discusses frankly. Poland, meanwhile, continued to strengthen its military might, and new enforcements began to flow from the Western freed lands. Meanwhile, the West Ukrainian National Republic found itself in a critical situation. They were deprived of a trained military force of 100,000 men who, at that time, were imprisoned in Italy. Also, in Ukraine, following the overthrow of the Hetmanic state, there was an outburst of complete chaos coupled with a simultaneous attack by the Russian Bolsheviks. Crack divisions of the Sichovi Striltsi (Sitch Riflemen) were drawn into the domestic war, and the real assistance of the Directorate for the West Ukrainian National Republic, beyond the dispatch of staff officers, remained theoretic.

Following the unsuccessful conferences in Chyriw, it

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⁶ Kutschabsky, op. cit., p. 271.
Lozynskyj, op. cit., p. 85.
Lang, op. cit., p. 158.
became evident that the Poles were preparing for the complete conquest of Eastern Galicia.

On April 17th, the state Secretariat dispatched a delegation to Paris with authorization to seek the cessation of military activities.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Council, on April 2nd, summoned a separate commission composed of representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy (Commission Inter-alliée pour la conclusion d'un armistice entre la Pologne et l'Ukraine). This Commission, under the leadership of the Boer general Louis Botha authorized the American general Kernan to achieve an armistice, but the Polish general Iwazkiewicz declined to negotiate and Kernan, unsuccessful in his attempts, returned to Paris.

On April 30th, Haller personally arrived in Lviw and prepared "to determine the borders of Poland in the East as rapidly as a bird flies."

In truth, through the personal intervention of Lloyd George, the Poles had obligated themselves to utilize Haller's army exclusively against the Bolsheviks, but this obligation of the Poles, like so many before and after, was only on paper, and on April 11th the Polish Sejm (Parliament) authorized Haller to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia.\(^9\)

Meanwhile, in Paris, the arrival of the Polish Mission, which was in no hurry, was expected, and only on April 12th did the "Botha Commission" draft a new decision in the matter of the Ukrainian-Polish border. For the Ukrainians, this decision was much more favorable than the so-called "Berthelemy Line."\(^10\)

"Botha's Line" ran south from Belz cutting to the west of Kaminka-Strumilowa, leaving Lviw on the Polish side, and then cutting southwest of Mykolaiv, Drohobycz and Boryslaw to the Czech border.

And this time, the Ukrainian delegation, under pressure on the one hand of increasingly more unfortunate conditions

\(^9\) Lozynskyj, op. cit., p. 104.
\(^10\) Hupert, op. cit., pp. 31-36.
in the Ukrainian Army of Galicia and, on the other, motivated by their continued belief in the honest intentions of the Entente, accepted this decision. The head of the Polish delegation, Dmowski, rejected even this decision and Pilsudsky, in order to relieve Paderewski of his obligation not to use Haller’s army against West Ukraine, took full responsibility upon himself, and following the successful seizure of Vilna on April 19th, he launched all the free Polish forces against the Ukrainian front. During the Polish eastern offensive in April and May, the Polish army occupied the territories of south Lithuania, western Byelorussia, the Ukrainian regions of western Polissya and western Volyn, and the western section of the West Ukrainian National Republic.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks reached the line of the River Zbruch where they camped, awaiting further developments. Haller’s army, from the Volyn sector, commenced an offensive against the Ukrainian Army of Galicia on the southwestern sector. In this manner, that army found itself between two fronts—the western and the southern.

The precarious position of the Ukrainian Army of Galicia became tragic after the attack by the Romanian army, under General Zadiks, upon the southeastern section of Galicia. On May 24th, the Romanians commenced an attack on Stanislaviv—the temporary capital of the West Ukrainian National Republic. From a military viewpoint, this meant a near catastrophe for the Ukrainian army, because under those circumstances, there was no hope of assistance from the outside—except perhaps from the Bolsheviks—who, in their note of May 7th (Appeal to “Galician peasants and workers”), in behalf of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, had proposed to the West Ukraine National Republic the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a unified front with Soviet Ukraine. Also, Petrushevych’s administration categorically declined later efforts of the Soviet Ukrainian government to come to an understanding with the West

Ukrainian National Republic, and it remained a faithful partner of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic.\textsuperscript{13}

Perhaps in the history of nations the adage that "misfortune walks in pairs" has its fatal meaning, or, perhaps, only in the history of West Ukraine in 1919. The affairs of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris appeared no brighter than the critical position in which the Ukrainian Army of Galicia found itself. By a decision of both governments of Ukraine on March 30th, the two Ukrainian delegations in Paris were united as the result of a proclamation of unity on January 22, 1919.

From this moment on, a new situation arose for the reason that the Entente declined recognition of independent Ukraine, declaring themselves in favor of the non-existent federal Russia, which, in their profound and possibly serious desire, was to be established. However, preparing for that time, the Bolsheviks were consistently strengthening their government and intelligently utilizing the illusive plans of the Entente which, directly supporting the remnants of the Tsarist regime in the persons of Denikin, Kolchak and then Wrangel, indirectly strengthened the Bolsheviks by their slogans of national liberation and self-determination.

Then, when the West Ukrainian National Republic became the western province of the Ukrainian National Republic, this non-recognition of Ukraine as an independent state automatically spread to the West Ukraine province. When, up to that period, the West Ukrainian National Republic had certain prospects of receiving separate status and, perhaps, full recognition, through the support of Great Britain, these chances immediately lessened. Simultaneously, an internal misunderstanding within the Ukrainian delegation erupted, which eventually ended with the departure of the West Ukrainian National Republic's delegation from the

\textsuperscript{13) Re these events see: Lozynsky\textsuperscript{1}, op. cit., p. 100; Nazaruk, O., Rik na Welykij Ukraini, pp. 178-81, V zaschitu Sovetskoi Ukrainy. Sbornik diplomaticsckich dokumentov i istoriceskich materjalov, Krasnye knigi I., Charkov, 1921, p. 33.
general Ukrainian delegation on August 28th. Naturally, in the face of such negotiations, vital to Ukraine, all misunderstandings of an internal character had a two-fold negative influence and here, too, we do not wish to state that the Ukrainian failures in Paris were the result of these misunderstandings, but they unnecessarily burdened individual delegates and took up time needed for more important matters.

During the time when the Ukrainian delegation awaited summons for the signing of the truce founded on the conditions decided by the "Botha Commission" and accepted by the Supreme Council (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Sonnino), and by Clemenceau himself, on May 21st and 22nd, the Poles commenced an intensive campaign against the decision of the "Botha Commission." Their campaign was successful.

The "Botha Commission," which was responsible for the Ukraino-Polish truce, was dissolved, and the Supreme Council then had to make a final decision in the matter of Eastern Galicia. Again, under Polish pressure and the support of the French, the matter of recognition of the West Ukrainian National Republic appeared to be hopeless, and only the complete success of General Hrekiw's offensive would have altered the increased misfortunes of the Ukrainians in Paris. Unfortunately, this time, the simple lack of arms and military resources interrupted the heroic advance of the Ukrainian forces. The Poles fled in panic, and it appeared as though the outcome of the war would be sealed, but on the Ukrainian side, the soldiers in the trenches lacked ammunition—and war cannot be decided with bayonets alone. On June 27th, Pilsudski personally took command, and with new Polish reserves, began a counter-offensive which, this


time, proved to be tragic for the Ukrainian Army of Galicia. On June 25th, the Supreme Council of the Entente announced its unrighteous and disgraceful decision:

To protect people and property of the population of Eastern Galicia against the peril threatened by Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Entente has decided to permit the forces of the Polish Republic to carry out their operations up to the River Zbruch. This authorization will, in no way, influence the decisions which the Supreme Council may later reach in order to formulate a political constitution for Galicia.¹⁶

This decision was not final but introductory to the later complete enslavement of Eastern Galicia by Poland. The Ukrainian protests of July 2nd to the President of the Peace Conference, as well as to the American delegate Lansing remained without effect.¹⁷

Following a heroic but unequal battle, the Ukrainian Army of Galicia, on July 16, 1919, left its native terrain and crossed the tragic Zbruch—to meet new events, with the goal “through Kiev to Lviv.” Not only Galicia, but Kholm, Pidlasya, and Volyn came under Polish occupation.

The character of the Polish occupation of the West Ukraine territories and the true situation of East Galicia were determined in the Peace Treaty with Austria in St. Germain, on September 10, 1919.¹⁸

In Statute 91 of this treaty, Austria renounced all rights to its former territories, including Galicia. This action was not beneficial to Poland, only to the Entente. Poland receives only the right of occupation of Eastern Galicia, not the juridical right of ownership.

To clarify the eastern boundaries of Poland, it is essential


¹⁷) Lozynskyj, op. cit., p. 143.


to return to the work of the sub-commission, summoned on March 20th, which, on June 17th, presented "Report Number 3" to the Commission, with a proposition for designating the boundaries of Poland in the East with set lines "A" and "B." These boundary lines were important because they appeared as the initial test of the Entente's power to designate ethnographic demarcation between the Poles and Ukrainians. The next test in the designation of Polish eastern boundaries by the Allies was the so-called "Curzon Line," of December 8, 1919. It is understood that at the Yalta Conference all these lines were investigated.

Line "A" cut southwest from Belz running a little to the west of Rawa Ruska, then further south passing just to the east of Peremyshl and thence south to the source of the Syan River. It was the opinion of the American, French and Italian representatives that the Commission was to have been further implemented at that time when Galicia became an autonomous portion of Poland. In the event that West Ukraine became an independent state, Line "B" was to go into effect. Line "B" began in Sokal, proceeded south through Bibrka, and then further south passing to the west of Stryj. The British delegation did not agree with this project, but defended "Line A." Thus, Lviv and Drohobych were to remain on the West Ukrainian National Republic side of the Line. Nevertheless, at session of the Supreme Council, the majority were for the pro-Polish resolution, and in this manner, the decision of June 25, 1919 fell through.

19) And the subcommission composed of: French General DeRond as President, and member: H. J. Paton, Englishman; Prof. Lord, American, and Marquis della Torreta, Italian; was created by the Commission for Polish Affairs, which again acted upon authorization of February 12, 1919, of the Supreme Council. In this Commission, the most important roles were played by Jules Cambon and Prof. Lord, both Polish sympathizers.


Following this decision, the Commission, at the request of the Council, proceeded to work out an autonomous constitution for East Galicia.

The Polish delegation, invited for this purpose, at first commenced to protest against granting autonomy and again utilized the usual Polish arguments. After they were informed categorically that the matter had already been decided by the Supreme Council, they put forth every effort to assure that this future constitution should be most advantageous to Poland.22

The typical Polish tactics of making insolent demands (where possible) and of cheating when the "heat" was on, were repeatedly indulged in after this.

The Ukrainian diplomatic mission was also included in the work of the Commission.

Proof of the unjust attitude of the sub-committee toward the Ukrainian delegation rests in the fact that the delegation of the Ukrainian National Republic—the representative body of all Ukrainians—was denied participation in the conferences of the sub-committee on the pretext that the problem was a problem of the population of East Galicia only. At this time, East Galicia was juridically a part of the Ukrainian National Republic and, as such, should have been represented by its delegation. Going counter to all legal and international usage, the Polish delegation, which had no relation with or to the Ukrainian ethnographic territories and the Jewish and Moscophile representatives were, however, invited to participate. In this manner, the fate of the Ukrainian territories was decided by alien elements—strangers to Ukrainian territories. For this reason, the Ukrainians are in no way obligated to abide by these decisions. Also, the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, of 1923, was rendered without the participation of representatives of the population of West Ukraine, and because of this, all those oppressive decisions were not binding upon Ukrainians in the past—nor will they be considered binding upon Ukrainians in the future.

True, the Galician representatives, Paneyko and Toma-

shiwsky, received a letter on June 2, 1919 from the Secre-
tariat General of the Peace Conference, extending an invita-
tion to a hearing before the sub-commission, but an ex-
tension of the hearing was requested because of internal
difficulties. When the representatives of the Ukrainian popu-
lation appeared before the sub-commission on August 21st,
they heard only that it was too late because the constitution
was ready. Protests of the Ukrainian delegates were in-
effective, and on November 21st, the Supreme Council, upon
proposition by the sub-commission, accepted the project of
the constitution for East Galicia. The project established
the return of East Galicia to Poland for a twenty-five year
period of occupation, with rights of organizational admin-
istration. The boundaries of East Galicia were determined as
follows: from Belz to a point northwest of Rawa Ruska, con-
tinuing south along the administrative boundaries with Yaros-
law and Peremyshl on the west and Yavoriv, Sambir, and
Stary Sambir on the east; passing through Radych, then going
15 kilometers southwest of Chyriw; then further south to the
Czechoslovakian border at a point approximately two kilo-
meters from Halych. Therefore, the boundaries were de-
signated in accordance with Dmowski’s conception—further
to the east!

The constitution established the competency of the East
Galician Sejm (parliament); it called for representation of
East Galicia in the Polish parliament and in the Polish gov-
ernment; it determined the administration of East Galicia,
its judicial organization, its financial (economic) order, its
military organization, and its transportation regulations. This
constitution was to go into force simultaneously with the

ments choisis.
Lozynskyj, op. cit., p. 152.
24) Text: Akty, III, op. cit., 6, p. 62;
Kutschabsky, op. cit., p. 413;
Lozynskyj, op. cit., p. 155;
Kozicki, op. cit., p. 86;
House, E. M., and Seymour, Ch., What really Happened at Paris: The
Story of the Peace Conference 1918-1919 (by American Delegates),
New York, 1921, p. 83 and further.
Peace Treaty with Austria. The place of ratification was to be Paris.

The Supreme Council sensed its two-facedness and dishonesty toward the Ukrainian nation, but it did not even have the conscience to inform the West Ukrainian National Republic’s delegation of this draft. The Ukrainian delegation protested against it only on the basis of information printed in the press.

Proceeding to an evaluation of this constitution, we shall repeat the words of Lozynsky:

Considering the independence of East Galicia as the West Ukrainian National Republic, and its unity with Great Ukraine, the draft of the constitution—notwithstanding its contents—has to be judged as violence against the will of the Ukrainian people and it must be rejected, without evaluating its separate resolutions.25

Under this constitution, the Supreme Council simultaneously broke its own promises of June 25th, in which it assured the Ukrainian nation of “autonomy of territory” and “political, religious, personal liberty for the residents” under Poland, and later “realization of the right of self-determination.” In reality, the constitution made no mention of the “realization of the right of self-determination,” and it reduced all “liberties” to fiction.

Again, it must be emphasized that Great Britain, through its representative, Sir Eyre Crowe, on November 7th, demanded the placing of East Galicia under Poland for only a limited, short time and it asked for a change in some of the resolutions in favor of the Ukrainians. The well-known Ukrainian enemies, Grabski and Patek, with the help of France, achieved the rejection of the English protests.26

The Poles, dizzied with their chance success27 and posturing before Clemenceau as defender of Europe against the

27) Taking advantage of defeated Germany, the Poles, without more stress, seized, in the West, all of Poznań and Śląsk, and in the north the coast region; the southern section of East Prussia, as well as Vilna and surrounding territory from the little Lithuanian nation. In the East,
Bolsheviks (18 million Poles against Russia?!), began a broad campaign against this constitution in spite of the fact that it was so favorable for them. They had hopes of further French support and discord among the Entente. Manifestations, phrases and protests once again were to assure Polish success.

To the echo of Warsaw’s noise and din, on December 10th, the Polish delegate, Stanislaw Patek, handed a note of protest to Clemenceau, who, on that same day, left for London. In this note, as argument for justification of the protest, it was stated that when the provisions of the constitution became known in Poland, military preparations against the Bolsheviks weakened visibly. Clemenceau, unoriented in East European problems, and frightened by Bolshevism, thought that Poland, being large in territory although artificially put together, would be able to stop the Bolsheviks. He, therefore, promised the Poles support, and while in London, persuaded Lloyd George to delay temporarily the introduction of the constitution. Inasmuch as the other delegates were but little interested in this problem, it was resolved on December 22nd, following an insignificant discussion, to put off the matter of East Galicia to a later date, which, as Rhode correctly noted, meant practically nothing other than that the idea of the constitution was to be dropped entirely.

Kozicki, a Polish delegate in Paris, in his work previously cited here, sensed already in 1921 the uncertainty of this Polish success when he wrote:

> taking advantage of the Ukrainian-Russian war, without declaring war upon Ukraine, they attacked the provinces of Cholm, Pidlassya and Wolyn; also seized the west Byelorussian territories without any skirmishes.

29) Kozicki, op. cit., p. 95 and further.
30) Rhode, Gotthold, Die Entstehung der Curzon-Linie. W: “Osteuropa” 5. Jahrgang, Heft 2, April 1935, Stuttgart. In his article, Rhode, like other German historians, considers that Clemenceau, supporting Polish imperialistic tendencies, had in mind utilizing Poland against Germany, which appeared as a threat to France. This naive plan of France to utilize little Poland against two large states is a pitiful example of the illusive outlooks of France at that time upon the entire East European problem and material for the topic “France—the Reason for the Growth of Bolshevism and Hitlerism” is prepared.
Measures proposed by the Government ended in success. Whether this success will be advantageous for the cause—only the future will show.31

We do not know whether Kozicki is still alive, but we know that the whole anti-Ukrainian Polish policy ended tragically for the Poles, perhaps more tragically than for the Ukrainians—but this the future must also confirm.

THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN POLAND.

Samuel L. Sharp, born in Poland and educated at the University of Warsaw, is a scholar with broad professional background. He has been a parliamentary correspondent, an editor with the information services of the Polish government-in-exile, and a political analyst for the United States Office of Strategic Services. Currently, he is an Associate Professor of International Relations at The American University. Professor Sharp, in his book, *Poland, White Eagle on a Red Field*, published by The Harvard University Press in 1953, clearly outlines the ethnic problems confronting Poland in 1939. On page 88, he states:

"The peace treaty with the Soviet Union actually amounted to a partition of the Ukraine and Byelorussia between Poland and Russia, without consulting the native population that was neither Polish nor Russian and, on the whole, was hostile to both the Poles and the Russians.

As a result of these developments, Poland found herself with about a third of her total population of non-Polish stock. There were some 14 per cent Ukrainians (which official Polish statistics broke down into two groups: Ukrainians and Ruthenians); more than 3 per cent Byelorussians; about 10 per cent Jews (according to statistics of religious distribution; some 400,000 Jews gave their mother tongue as Polish rather than Yiddish or Hebrew and were therefore classed as Poles); 2.3 per cent Germans, and roughly 3 per cent various other nationalities, including Lithuanians, Russians, and Czechs. The quoted figures naturally do not tell the full story; official Polish sources tended to play down the number of people who did not consider themselves Poles, while on the other hand various committees representing the minorities both in Poland and abroad claimed that the actual figures were much higher".

31) Kozicki, op. cit., p. 97.
A PICTURE OF POLISH IMPERIALISM
AN ATTEMPT AT A CHARACTERIZATION

by D. Kulykowsky

Historical circumstances in the eastern part of Europe for centuries took the form of endless invasions by Asiatic nomads against the Ukrainian people. This long, self-sacrificing and desperate struggle against these nomads, in the final analysis, resulted not only in the ruination of the Kievan state and the devastation of a good half of this state, turning it into a wilderness, but also, and what is worse, it brought about the dangerous undermining of the biological basis of the Ukrainian nation. It is from this blow that Ukraine, after successfully defending Europe against Asia, has been trying to recover for six hundred years.

Other historical circumstances seemed fated to disturb life in the western part of Europe. These were the circumstances which, having toppled the Frankish state of Charlemagne, then embodied themselves in feudalism, and, finally, became contributive causes of the Reformation. The denial of an opportunity for the "Holy Roman Empire of the Germans" to consolidate caused another great nation in Europe, the German nation, like the Ukrainian, to find itself in circumstances of political despair, from which it, too, has not completely recovered even now.

The incidental interplay of the above historical circumstances occurring simultaneously in both halves of the European continent, determined for long centuries the fate of the Ukrainian nation, on the one hand, and the German, on the other, (in the sense of an immeasurable weakening of these two principal factors in continental European life). There appeared between these two provinces of Europe a sheltered area that enabled the Polish people, in those early historical times, to establish their independent
state. This state, further utilizing the continuation of the crises in the eastern and western halves of Europe, began a policy of imperialism, unnatural for it, creating the monstrous phenomenon of empire known today as "Historical Poland," which will long remain an example of political unnaturalness and biological-national infirmity.

Such phenomena as states are accepted by the world only after they have actually existed over a period of time. In international-legal relations there are innumerable other tests which, in their total, fall into two groups: *ius gentium absolutum* and *ius gentium particulare* or *voluntarium*. It is international custom that states do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This possibly explains the fact that in every nation the literature concerning other nations is the poorest. Usually it is comprised of some official textbooks of geography, or some rare and special works which are compiled only in special scientific, political, or military chambers.

At the present time, the states of the Ukrainian and Polish nations find themselves together in the bondage of their Muscovite neighbor. This situation is the result, at least in part, of several centuries of Polish (historical as well as post-Versailles Poland) policy. It would be purposeless to gloss over in silence the political complex which the "spirit" of the monstrous, imperialistic Polish state has created. Finally, we must consider the fact that the Polish side, at present, although finding itself at the very bottom of the abyss created by its wretched policies, does not intend to take a critical attitude toward them but, instead, continues to renew and nourish the conception of a "great imperial Poland."

In this work, we desire to present the picture and concept of Polish imperialism in its historical continuity and to analyze it on the basis of the latest works of contemporary Polish political authors.

The work of the Pole, M. Wasilutyński, entitled *A Thousand Years of Polish Policy*, is a review of the historical development of the statehood of the Polish people and an
effort by the author to connect all the stages of this development into one pragmatic whole, which, regardless of the long thousand-year course, in his concept, never loses its elemental unity and purpose—the building and preservation of a Polish imperialistic state.

From the above-mentioned book by Wojciech Wasiutyński, we quote a series of the author’s concluding thoughts which accurately reflect the contents of the book:

The role of Poland—preservation of European civilization...

Without Poland western civilization can exist, but as a political and cultural whole cannot be European...

Fundamentally, there are not several conceptions of Polish policy; there is only one, but political methods differ, depending upon time and conditions...

The principles of Polish policy during the course of one thousand years are the same, but the methods sometimes are very changeable...

The few thoughts of Wasiutyński designating Poland’s role, unequivocally give Poland almost global significance and point to the peril which would befall at least Europe if not the entire world, if the interests of Poland were ignored or her role lessened. Having laid such a foundation and consolidated it, Wasiutyński erects upon it the conception of a Polish state and other imperialistic dogma. Correctly stated, he does not build it; he only concretizes it, for, having added the thousand-year evolutionary process of Poland, he sees in everything during this span of time the existence of only an imperial Polish state.

Another Pole, Jan Szuldryński, states:

A Pole must comprehend what a state is in contrast to a nation. It is essential to know how to think, not exclusively in nationalistic, social, administrative, or ideological categories, but first of all in the category of a state organization, as an emanation of the whole national life and of its highest creative effort in the creation of

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1 Wojciech Wasiutyński, Tysiéc lat polityki polskiej, Monachium, 1946.
2 Ibid., p. 162.
an international political power. There is a primacy of foreign policy over the internal state tasks.3

In these words, there is a lesson regarding each expression of the state, as the instrument with which a state people achieves dominance. Transferring this significance of the state into the field of the ordering of international political power and emphasizing the primacy of foreign policy over the internal state tasks, Jan Szuldryński makes more particular his lesson regarding the state as an imperialistic state.

What this is—actually so, Jan Szuldryński does not permit us to doubt for even a second, when a few sentences later he states:

Our need (that is, of Poles—D. K.) in the first place, is to unite in central east Europe all nations who follow the same political state rationale as Poland into one state union: "Neither the Germans nor Moscow!" The extent of such a union demands plain boundaries from the Germans and Moscow. The western boundaries run along Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia: from the Baltic to the Adriatic. The eastern boundary—the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania.4

We shall leave aside discussion as to whether the Polish nation has possessed in the past, and whether it now possesses in sufficient measure, the psychological and special biological funds necessary for the creation of an imperialistic Polish system so mighty that it could fill the role which the aforementioned Poles give it. Everyone knows that the thoughts of these political writers who endow the Polish nation with an immeasurably high messianic role impresses no one. Their picture of the Polish nation is their own creation, with a basis in unknown psychological laws. Some picture Poland as a mixture of Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians; others picture it as the amalgamation of these three with the addition of Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, Hungarians, and Romanians. This can be accepted with any desired feelings, but it would, suffice it to say, be impossible to refuse or to deny at least the feasibility of this

3 Jan Szuldryński, Dziejowa idea Państwa Polskiego, Jeruzolima, 1946, p. 83. also Antoni Chołoniewski, Duch dziejów Polski, Rzym, 1946.

4 Ibid., p. 83.
if the Polish authors, endowing their Polish nation with this messianic role, would conceive it in its own ethnographic form. However, not only are we not impressed, but also, it repels and offends us when Polish political writers, as we shall see below, without the least scruple, not only do not recognize the ability of a purely ethnographic Polish nation to play a part in preserving European civilization in central eastern Europe, but even deny it the ability to preserve any kind of Polish national state.

If we should agree with J. Szuldryński that the nations enumerated by him acknowledge as right the principle “Neither the Germans nor Moscow!”—it, nevertheless, remains unexplained that these nations should take upon themselves the yoke of Poland any more willingly than that of Germany or Moscow. Besides, Rus-Ukraine is not even mentioned separately here—because for J. Szuldryński it simply enters into the composition of Poland. He states, “Our need is... to unite all nations into a state union...” He indicates that he considers a whole number of national states as ordinary objects who have nothing to say when gentlemen like Szuldrynski proceed to “unite” them. He believes that 7 million Balts, 10 million Byelorussians, 18 million Romanians, 45 million Ukrainians, 8 million Czechs, 4 million Slovaks, 18 million Yugoslavs, 10 million Hungarians—altogether 120 million—should permit themselves to be “tied” by 20 million Poles to a Polish union just because none of them desires to have either German or Muscovite overlords. True, Mr. Szuldrynski kindly permits the Romanians and Hungarians to sit closer to the gentlemen Poles because they “create the geographical spine of the Union,” and he is willing to grant them the “right,” sitting in the bag of the Polish union, to help the Poles bind the rest of the peoples and... themselves. In other words, all these nations, in the nomenclature of the Polish authors, are only ludy (people), that is, an ethnographic mass without rights.

In another place, J. Szuldryński elucidates:

The defeat in 1444 of Władysław Warneńczyk who was from 1434 the Polish king (in 1440 he became king of the Hungarians—D.K.), and later the defeat of King Jan Olbracht (1497—D.K.) cancelled that great program
for the creation of the Republic of Poland out of Lithuania, Rus’, Czech, Hungary, and the territories of Moldavia-Walachia. The consequences of Jan Olbracht’s defeat were that Poland never annexed to itself the territories of Ukraine, the Dnieper Kozak state or the territories along the Black Sea.\(^5\)

This point one must accept as cynically as the author himself understands it. It appears that Poland, even with Lithuania, was too weak to subdue entirely and permanently the Ukrainian territories to which, needlessly, Mr. Szuldryński gives three names—Ukrainian territories, Dnieper Kozak state, and the Black Sea territories. However, the “great plan” would have been successful for the Poles, and the Polish Republic would have been established had the Poles, at the time, also harnessed for themselves the Czechs, Hungarians and Romanians. But this did not happen, and the cause of its non-realization was the defeat of the Polish kings—Władysław Warnenczyk and Jan Olbracht.

Nevertheless, despite all this, the diligence and detail (an attitude they display to all, even the slightest, phenomenon in Polish history) with which the Polish scholars treat these matters impresses. They never forget a similar phenomenon in their neighbor’s history when they see in it an advantage for Poland, even though an imaginary one only. We comprehend this very well; they are forced into this by the lack of good, positive, original argumentation. For instance, Mr. Szuldrynshi states:

At the Synod in Florence, the Kievan Metropolitan Isidor (Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 1438—D. K.) showed constructive activity in behalf of the Polish state.\(^6\)

He also avers:

Whether Poland is a small or a great nation—this problem has already been resolved by history... when Poland becomes small, she disappears entirely from the map of Europe. There is place only for a great Poland.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) Jan Szuldryński, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 72.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 88.
Among other things, as a point of curiosity and to foster greater understanding of the position of this Polish political author, we give here a thought expressed by him in another place in this work. According to his statement, the Polish state, during the period from 1918 to 1939 was only a small Poland.\(^8\)

And yet, but for those 120 million people already enumerated by us previously, there is no way out other than to climb into the Polish-union bag.

Nevertheless, we ask: what would these 20 million Poles prefer to do, even with the understanding that they dominate over these 120 million “allies,” in the event that 90 million Germans united, for instance, with some 90 million unionized or allied Muscovites? According to our humble opinion, in this hypothetical but entirely possible situation, there would ensue so much catastrophe for the Polish Empire that not even two Konashevych-Sahaydachny’s could save it, even if both permitted themselves to be slain on the spot.\(^9\) This example clearly indicates all the futility of Polish imperialistic perfection and the dubiousness of their state constructive ability.

We are certain that the objective reader, learning of the ideas of the Polish authors presented here, may get the impression of insincerity toward the problem. We must admit that the author of these lines, during his perusal of this material had the impression of grotesqueness. But it is not really so. The quotations from the Polish works are only small indicators of the quintessence of contemporary Polish political thought as applied to the thousand-year evolution of Polish statehood. Everyone is free to adopt any attitude that is convenient—either one of mirth or one of respect. This is the actual state of affairs and no other. The thoughts of the Polish authors cited here, without doubt, reflect the true Polish mentality which, in the course of centuries, has not changed.

We believe that the thesis can be proven that historical Poland fell as the result of the impracticability of Polish

\(^8\) Jan Szuldryński, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 100.
imperialism itself which, at the same time, was caused by the ineptitude of the missionaries of this imperialism. Therefore, the fall of Poland is due to the Poles, themselves. However, with all this, the thing that offends mostly is the profound tenacity, the blind faith and uniformity of the Poles (especially those contemporaries who have the opportunity to observe and examine in perspective the course traveled by the Polish nation over almost a thousand years) with which they view their Polish messianism and see its accomplishment in the imperialism which, actually, caused the downfall of Poland.

Let us take the incident of historical Poland which, as is known, concluded its existence by the divisions perpetrated by three neighboring empires—German, Austrian and Muscovite. Observing these times more closely, and diligently seeking the causes for such an infamous end of the Polish state, in general, and the empire, the Republic of Poland, in particular, we see three main causes: (1) the anarchy of the Polish psychological make-up; (2) the weak and inadequate biological fund of the Polish nation; and (3) the ineptitude of Polish imperialism.

We explain it thus:

The first cause: Polish anarchy appeared in two forms: (a) the sorry formula of *liberum veto*, based upon which the fate of the entire state depended upon the will of one inadequate individual and; (b) the grotesque union of two controversial elements—monarchy and republicanism—which resulted in the curious phenomenon of a republic with a king at its head.

The second cause: In addition to all other media for the preservation of an empire, it is also essential to have human material in a suitable quantity. The Polish nation, biologically, was entirely adequate for the preservation of its state within its ethnographic borders, but there was too little of it for the keeping in servitude and brutal exploitation of several nations who had previously enjoyed statehood.

The third cause: The appearance of the first two causes and conditions indicated the incompatibility of an imperialistic policy in the Polish state. However, contrary to this, the Poles adopted this imperialistic policy in its most brutal
and oppressive forms. This course gave birth, in the final analysis, to the aforementioned monstrous ineptitude.

It was evident even in the sixteenth century (and future eras confirmed it) that the era of isolated, parasitic Polish at the cost of other nations was coming to an end. On the one hand, the German nation was consolidated and, on the other, the Muscovite nation in the east had grown. Those two powers would, by the nature of the situation, threaten Poland, the Baltics and Ukraine. This meant that all those nations would have had to unite for defense—but not on any imperialistic basis, no less one of Polish imperialism. Unity could have been achieved only on the basis of a voluntary union of independent states with equal rights. Such was the demand of those times.

When we observe the present political constellation of central and eastern Europe, we see that the demands of the past remain in force even today, with a suitable widening of the circles of participating nations. But the Poles do not see this! "Whom the Gods would destroy, them they make mad!"

We did not intend to make this an exhaustive study on the subject. For that reason, we have stressed, in our subtitle, that this is merely our characterization.

We shall conclude our remarks by paraphrasing the words of J. Szuldryński: Is Poland a small or great nation—this problem has already been resolved by history. When Poland tries to become great, she disappears completely from the map of Europe. There is place only for an ethnographic ("small") Poland.

December 11, 1955.
JÓZEF KOSTRZEWSKI, KULTURA PRAPOLSKA
POZNAN 1947

In this book the author deals with the prehistory of territories which are now part of Poland, although at times he mentions other territories as well—Volyn, for example. (Incidentally, it is his opinion that the name “Volyn” is derived from the city of that name.) He, together with other authors whom he does not name, considers the region north of the Carpathians and between the Oder and the Dnieper, to have been the cradle of the Slavs. It was from there that they migrated in the fourth and fifth centuries to their present places of settlement.

Kostrzewski contends that the hoe-plow found in Biskupino dates back to the seventh—possibly to the fourth—century B. C. The plow came from the Celts through the intermediacy of the Romans and the Germans. He considers rye to be among the newest of grains. Legumes were already found in the period of the “Lusatian” culture which the author mentions very frequently, always adding the modifier “proto-Slavic.” It may be deduced that he does not have the necessary proofs for this and that he is conscious of this fact.

In speaking of fruit trees, he remarks when mentioning the bird cherry and the sweet cherry that these now “unnecessarily” have names “z ruska,” (from the Rus’ language), that is, czeresznia and czeremcha. Further on, he remarks similarly that the ozoha (oven-rake) is called “kotsiuba z ruska,” and so forth. While discussing wooden buildings, he mentions that defensive towers were called sambory and that a city in Ukraine, in the Tarashcha county near the present village of Lesovychi, was called by this name.

Dug-outs made in the loess were known in Volyn in historic times, in Horodok, for instance. They were also found in the Roman period. In Poland, such dug-outs are very rare.

The author everywhere sees “Slavic-ness,” even where borrowings have been established long ago. Thus, he un-
critically considers such Celtic words as *skobel* (staple, hasp) and *korowa* (cow) to be of Slavic origin. However, he is forced to accept Celtic influences in such words as *brzeczka*, *braha* and in the borrowing of the sword, mail, spurs.

Such findings as those of distaffs of red Ovruch schist which may be encountered throughout Poland (in Gniezno, for example) testify that even before the tenth century A. D., there was an active contact between Poland and Volyn, and that many articles used in Poland came from Volyn. In the tenth century, helmets, painted eggs (enameled), silver ornaments, etc., were imported from Rus’. From here, too, came the colored enamels for pots. From the east, through Rus’, came the axe.

In discussing religious beliefs, he indicates vestiges of the ancient cult of lightning in the observances of “*Palikopa*.”

In conclusion, he admits that “Kievan Rus’,” thanks to its close relations with Constantinople in the tenth and eleventh centuries, was culturally superior to Poland. He also speaks of the influence of Rus’ on Poland, but does not mention Poland’s influence on Rus’ (pp. 502-506).

A BOOK WHICH APPEARED FAR TOO LATE...

BORDER OF EUROPE. A STUDY OF THE POLISH EASTERN PROVINCES. ADAM ZOLTOWSKI, ONE-TIME PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF POZNAN; DIRECTOR OF THE POLISH RESEARCH CENTER IN LONDON, LONDON, HOLLIS AND CARTER, 1950. XVI, PP. 348, 1 MAP.

An English professor at Cambridge, Ernest Barker, in the preface to the work by Zoltowski, presents his friend to the world of learning as follows:

Professor Zoltowski was born in Lyiw, in Galicia, and he was brought up on the west side of Poland... He was educated in a German university and afterwards

in France; he has lived for the last ten years in England, and his culture and outlook are thus European in their range and breadth... He is a Pole through and through, but he is not a Pole of one part of Poland... I have never been further east myself than the region of Warsaw and Cracow, and I do not know the border. I only know, from very old friendship with him, that Professor Zoltowski is the sort of guide I am willing to follow when I seek for knowledge; and I ask permission to commend him as a guide to all who may read this book.

The recommendation, as we see it, is of the best; it is that of an old friend—but permit us to ask a question: can a friend write otherwise? In any event, Professor Zoltowski knew how to utilize his English friend, turning to him with the request that he write the preface. However, we do not know whether Professor Barker wrote this preface as a gentleman or as an objective historian-scientist. He did excellently in the first instance; so far as the second is concerned, we leave the decision open to discussion.

*Border of Europe* is the principal title of Zoltowski’s work. As we know, he changed from a philosopher to a historian, and in the work itself, which has the character of historical philosophy in places, this is sometimes evident. But, returning to the title, he sets the borders of Europe as being the changeable, relative and conjectural borders of Poland in the East, and he makes them the cultural borders of Europe. What lies beyond Poland to the East is not Europe. The study of geography, naturally, designates the borders of Europe entirely differently from those of Professor Zoltowski. Historians are divided on this viewpoint. For a long time, the West Europeans considered that Europe was only its Romano-German portions. This viewpoint was upheld particularly by the German historian, Ranke. Contemporary German historians at the conference of the “Society for Research on Eastern Europe” in 1954, in Stuttgart, agreed that, historically speaking, Russia also belonged to Europe. This viewpoint is also recognized in American historian textbooks, in relation not only to recent times but also to past centuries. The history of Kiev and also of Novgorod, which, in their time, were very frequently more European than
Europe itself, is known to an expert on history, or, better still, on philosophy and the history of culture.

Returning to the book in question, it should be noted that Professor Zoltowski endeavors in his work to establish new borders of Europe in the East, making them those borders that Poland, during auspicious periods, and for a very limited time, could seize. So, to the author, Europe in the East begins only with Poland's conquest of the territories of Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine.

In this work, the sub-title, "A Study of the Polish Eastern Provinces," has the character of political propaganda. To serve this end, a whole series of abstracted favorable events is given and, naturally, an interpretation in this spirit.

To make concrete the author's intentions, it must be stated that he wrote his book in a spirit of reaction to the events of World War II and the post-war years. Events of these years resulted in the loss by Poland of the western territories of Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine. The author's purpose is to prove that these territories are "historically" Polish. His supporting argument is an effort to prove that only Poland brought to these lands something in the nature of "culture." The author leaves aside the principle of national self-determination, as well as the ethnography of these territories, having in his reservoir of arguments no "proof" in these spheres of Polish claims to these areas.

Already in these fundamental affirmations, reality breaks through—that this book has appeared much too late—because the whole twentieth century stands under the sign of the self-determination of nations, ethnographic principles, and anti-colonialism.

Professor Barker endeavors, to no avail, to present his friend as a European with a broad viewpoint, while the author, himself, on the pages of his work, written with a purely subjective Polish point of view, proves that he has selected from this Europe only that which is beneficial to the Poles. All else he has left to Europe for its own use. He considers the matter thusly: let European nations renounce colonialism but we Poles shall never do so because in the East we, somewhere, sometime, erected a church, and not
too distant from it, a prison, and we organized penal expedi-
tions—once in “defense of the Catholic faith,” and later
“in defense of Polish culture” or of colonial status quo in
the East!

With this attitude and with such a specific purpose,
Professor Zoltowski, in sixteen chapters of his book, reviews
the events of the era from the middle of the sixteenth
century to 1939. We shall not here consider all the questions
discussed about Polish expansion to the East and the Lithuan-
ian-Polish or Russo-Polish problems, but we are from the
start limiting ourselves to the Ukraino-Polish topic. In the
book, this topic occupies much space and, therefore, it
requires objective criticism not only in the purely historical
but also in the problematically argumentative sense.

In Chapter I, “The Origin and Growth of Poland’s East-
ward Extension,” Professor Zoltowski suggests the idea that
the western territories of Ukraine were, even in early times,
under Polish rule. The book states: “This is confirmed by
the oldest Kievan chronicler, Nestor, who records that in
981 Vladimir, the Norse Grand prince of Kiev, conquered
Przemysl, Cherven and other cities belonging to the Liakhs
or Poles.” The author forgot, or, perhaps, deliberately omitted,
further data from the chronicles of Nestor who continues
that the “Radymychi” lived on the left bank of the Dnieper,
and the “Vyatychi” on the Oka and on the Volga. It is
evident, therefore, that Nestor speaks of the efforts of Vol-
dymyr to unite again Kievan Rus-Ukraine under his domain,
and these races, according to Nestor, are not identical with
races which lived in Galicia. It is true, Volodymyr campaigned
in the west only to bind more closely these Rus’ tribes with
Kiev, for it is a fact that after the death of Sviatoslav and
until Volodymyr the Great sat firmly on the Kievian throne,
some of the Rus’ tribes endeavored to be independent.
Therefore, to refer to Nestor in the way the author does is
historically without basis to say the least.

Further, Professor Zoltowski touches upon the two and
one-half century history of the Halych-Volynian state only
marginally—and that, literally, only in a few sentences. In
such a book, this topic should have been paid considerably
more attention.
The history of the West Ukrainian princedoms begins in 1084, when we have the first chronicle reports concerning the Rostyslavychi princes, the Rurik Princes of Peremyshl, Volodar of Zvenyhorod and Vasycho of Terebovlia.

Supplementing the course of historical events, it is well to note here that Prince Roman, the father of Danylo, attacked the Polish territory of Sandomir, where representatives of Leszko the White requested him not to destroy the Liakh (Polish) lands (therefore, the Liakh [Polish] lands begin only with the Sandomir province). As ransom, the Poles gave him the sparsely populated lands of the Lublin province there the Halych-Volynian princes began to settle peasants.

It is important at least to note, that King Danylo founded the City of Lviv (naming it after his son, Lev) and Lviv, according to Professor Zoltowski, eventually became the center of Polish culture.

Further reviewing the first chapter, it is well to note that this chapter and others are written in an idealistic-romantic spirit. For instance, on page 15, the author avers that the Lublin Union of 1596 in Lithuania was “very popular.” Perusing the works of Lithuanian historians, the reader will learn that for the Lithuanians this was an act forced upon them. Later, in Lithuania, the act resulted in harsh opposition to this Union. Here it must be stressed that in the bibliographic section not one work of a Lithuanian historian is given. Ordinarily, in research on Lithuanian-Polish relations, it would appear to be inevitable to include some Lithuanian historians.

The author continues in this spirit in Chapter II, “The Two Nations,” describing, in general, the activity of the Jesuits and Polish Catholicism in the territories of Ukraine. He states:

The Jesuits, who were foremost among the organizers of the counter-Reformation, founded in rapid suc-

1. Ignacy Chodyniecki: Historia stołecznego Królestwa Galicji i Lodomerii Miasta Lwowa od założenia jego aż do czasów terazniejszych. Lwów 1865, X, 466 p. (The author completed this work in 1829. Citation here from p. 23.)
cession a number of important houses in the eastern provinces of Poland and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania... In 1582, the Jesuits settled in Riga; in 1585 in Nieszwież; in 1590 in Lviv; and in the following decades they created colleges in almost every important center in the Polish east, such as Kowno, Grodno, Nowogrodek, Pinsk, Minsk, Witebsk, Orsza, Brześć-Litewski, Luck, Ostrog, Przemyśl, Kamieniec-Podolski and numerous 'missions' besides.

Beyond the "hyperbolization" of the Catholic and cultural activities of this order in particular, there is no mention regarding their role as denationalizers of the Ukrainian population in behalf of Poland and their co-responsibility for the political-social pressure upon the populations of Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania. As an illustration of historical reality from this same sphere, we quote here from the eminent work of the Greek-Catholic priest, Titus von Woynarowsky.²

In the chapter "Religious Tolerance in Poland," Woynarowsky writes:

The most educated and most influential class was the body of priests. They, too, had to fall victims to the Polish state idea and the Polish interests of the nobility. For a long time, the right of appointing archbishops and bishops, to the archimandrite throne, as well as clergy, belonged exclusively to the Ukrainian people. This applied to monks as well as clergy. After the union of Ukraine with Poland, the Polish kings appropriated for themselves the right to nominate clerical persons. This policy soon showed itself to be deplorable. Religious institutions in Ukraine were peopled with complete bankrupts, morally corrupt gentry or other creatures of the court, and these, in the majority, were without the slightest theological education. There were instances where people who had no idea of the meaning of the ward "bishop" were appointed bishops—such instances were reported by the papal Nuncio, Honorat Visconti. Rich estates, granted to the bishoprics and monasteries of St. Basil by the Ukrainian boyars were plundered for the benefit of royal estates and for the Polish gentry privately, or they were granted to the Latin bishops and

Jesuits. And so, for the establishment of one Jesuit college in Polotsk, 72 villages with over 142,000 morgues of land and 432 homes were donated. These, naturally, were mostly taken from the Basilian Fathers, and they were plundered.

(The author refers to his source of information: Ign. Stelbelski: Jesuits in Poland, 2. vol., Vilna, 1782, p. 156; Vol. 4, I section, p. 188). He continues:

The most capable monks were forced to leave the monasteries and their scholarly work, and work as farm laborers for their bread. According to law, not only the private property of the Ukrainian population, but also the monasteries with all their assets were seized. In the Warsaw parliament, in 1620, a representative from Volyn, Lawrenty Drewinsky, complained in the presence of the king and a large number of senators concerning the destruction of Church and people in Ukraine. Among other things, he related: "In Mohyliv and Orsha, the churches are closed, the clergy ousted. The same was done in Pinsk. The Leshchyno Monastery was turned into a public house. As a result, children die without baptism, and their bodies are buried without benefit of clergy. People live without benefit of clergy, in moral turpitude, and they die without the Blessed Sacraments. Is not this mockery against God? Will not God punish for this? ... Whoever is of Greek rite or a Uniate, dares not live or sell his wares in the city. When a Uniate dies in the city, he dares not be buried in accordance with church ritual ... Briefly stated—for too long our Ukrainian people suffer unheard of injustices, both in the Kingdom as well as in Lithuania."

(Source given: Act of Parliament of 1620; Professor Petrov, No. 74.). Continuing, he states:

These miserable complaints were confirmed by Prince Lev Sapfa, Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, in his letter to Archbishop J. Kuncwych, on March 12, 1622.

In the cemeteries, too, the buried found no peace. Count Adalbert Dziedusynski, former Vice President of the Polish Club at the Austrian Parliament, wrote in his work Fara Lacinska i cerkiew sw. Jura w Drohobyeczcu, on page 44, the following: "The corpses of former Orthodox Ukrainians were taken from the cemeteries in order not to debase ground sanctified by the Latin Church..."
This is how the Ukrainian clergy were suppressed and destroyed socially. On the other hand, you will hear how the Poles praised their own tolerance and in West Europe, even today, there are many who are willing to believe in the praiseworthiness of Polish knighthood, notwithstanding the fact that such a fallacy can not only be disproved very easily by historical facts, but also, that the opposite can be proved.

So much for Woynarowsky’s work which is rich in reliable references, which basically we do not encounter in Professor Zoltowski’s work. This deficiency is a pity because any “European” should be guided by fundamental necessities—in the first place, to utilize the sources of interested parties and, secondly, not to run to those French works which were incidentally written exclusively from Polish data. Naturally, this is no place to give hundreds of concrete historical examples of the sorry Polish colonization of the foreign lands which Professor Zoltowski so stubbornly and entirely without foundation calls “eastern provinces of Poland.” Already our limited citations from reliable works prove that the work of Professor Zoltowski has a propaganda character and should be accepted as such by those objective readers acquainted with the material. Later, on, we shall consider his conception of development during recent times, the so-called “Rebirth of Poland,” in order to ascertain whether the author, at least in this not so distant past, took pains to be objective.

Let us consider Chapter XI, “The Reconstruction of the Polish State, the Campaigns in the East, and the Peace of Riga,” p. 182. Here the author states:

In 1918, the belated appeal sounded hollow and fell flat. (October Manifesto—S. H.) There was nowhere an attempt to carry it out, except in eastern Galicia, where measures were taken with feverish haste to put a Ukrainian administration in control over the heads of the Polish inhabitants. On October 19th, a Ukrainian National Council was formed, which appealed to the Austrian government, demanding for itself full powers in eastern Galicia and military preparations necessary to enforce the scheme. These preparations were thought out in detail and were to include the concentration in Eastern Galicia of a large number of units of the Au-
stronian army consisting of Ukrainians, the withdrawal of units composed of Poles and Czechs, and the elimination from the ranks of men belonging to these nationalities...

As we see the situation, the four hundred year occupation of West Ukrainian territories by Poland became, for Professor Zoltowski, the pretext to speak at this time about the "Ukrainian government" over the heads of the Polish inhabitants."

We shall now permit ourselves to recall some statistical data which, for some reason, are entirely omitted in this work, leading one to think that for Professor Zoltowski, they had no meaning, most likely because with this type of material, it would be impossible to maintain the uncertain and false thesis concerning the "Polishness of these provinces."

In order to avoid the least suspicion of bias, we give here, as a matter of principle, data from Polish sources including the work of the Polish Committee in Lausanne. This Committee was composed of national-democrats under the leadership of the renowned politician, R. Dmowski.

On page 88, table 1, we give the table from page 79 of the work: Polen Entwicklung und gegenwärtiger Zustand.

Reproduced on page 88, table 2, is the table from page 88 of the same work.

From the first table, it is sufficiently clear that the number of the Polish population in East Galicia is discussed. It is well to note that in the number included among those using the Polish language, there are more than 500,000 Ukrainians included who, at that time, used the Polish language although they were not Polish; therefore, the statistics on the Roman Catholic faith are more accurate regarding the real situation—and according to these statistics, there were in all 25% Poles in East Galicia.

The second table shows reality distorted by the Poles. They, themselves, under Austria, continued their Poloniza-

3. From the occupation by Casimir in 1349 to 1772 when these territories were annexed to the Austrian monarchy, is a period of 423 years.
4. Polen, Entwicklung und gegenwärtiger Zustand, Bern; Hallers Buchdruckerei, 1918, pp. 1069. 4 maps.
**Table No. 1.**

Composition of Population in Galicia from Data of 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1910</th>
<th>Using Polish Language</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Using Ukrainian Language</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Roman-Catholic Faith</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Jewish Faith</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>4,675,612</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>3,207,784</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>3,735,145</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>873,075</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Galicia</td>
<td>2,560,820</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>75,551</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2,384,280</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>213,369</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Galicia</td>
<td>2,114,792</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>3,132,233</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>1,350,856</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>659,706</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table No. 2.**

Increase in Polish Population in Eastern Galicia in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polish Language</th>
<th>Roman-Catholics</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polish Language</th>
<th>Roman-Catholics</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tion policy, and their complaints about the Austrian government are, to say the least, dishonorable, because what the Polish administration did in East Galicia would be unheard of in another state. Let Professor Zoltowski explain before the scientific world the data in this table.

From the table it appears that the Ukrainians are "dying out" and that more children are being born to the Poles, which, in the sphere of increase in population, is generally possible. Polish increase and the decrease in the Ukrainian status quo, on Ukrainian ethnographic territories, unmask the falsity of Polish history which so stubbornly by-passes bitter reality and which, with phrases concerning "Polish culture," desires to hide their past colonial crimes from the world lest such knowledge result in condemnation.

In the course of 30 years, the Polish status quo increased 11.7%, and, for some reason, the Ukrainian, perhaps "voluntarily," decreased 5.6%. Behind these statistics is hidden the whole national tragedy of the Ukrainian nation, but the Polish crime should be revealed. The reader will seek in vain for historical truth in the work of Professor Zoltowski. Instead, he will find accusations against the Ukrainians in cooperation with Austro-Hungary and Germany.

Here, we must emphasize that the Poles themselves first received permission to form Polish units under Austria and Germany. In repayment for this, they committed treason and went over to the Russian side! We shall not here argue the Ukrainian policy which, because of natural reasons, considered that Austro-Hungary and Germany were its allies against Russia, which had enslaved two-thirds of the Ukrainian territory. If it was permissible for Poles to divide Ukrainian territories with the aid of Russian imperialism, then the Ukrainians could certainly seek an ally against their and Europe's greatest enemy—Russia. The Poles were the first in history to make an agreement with the Bolsheviks in Riga—again at the cost of Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian territories. Professor Zoltowski is silent about that because it is clear to him that this was a renunciation of the ideal of freedom, a trampling upon the principle of self-determination of nations, and official legalization of Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. When, 20 years later, these Polish
allies from Riga did the same thing to the Poles, the Poles thought that a great injury had been committed and profound expressions of Polish grief poured forth to the West with a plea to defend "Polish justice." In 1919, the West Ukrainian government declined the proposed Bolshevik assistance and refused union against Poland, but the Poles, with "knightly spirit," quickly hurried with these same Bolsheviks to divide Ukrainian territories.

In conclusion, we must offer just one more relevant correction to Zoltowski's citation. It is untrue that the Austro-Hungary government brought into East Galicia soldiers of Ukrainian nationality. The truth is that more than 100,000 Ukrainians were left on the Italian front up to the last day of war. They eventually became Italian prisoners of war. When the 55,000-strong Ukrainian Army of Galicia had to fight against all of Poland, which, almost without a battle, had seized the German territories of Silesia and the coastal region, thereby making it possible to attack on the Ukrainian front with divisions from Posnan, these prisoners, thanks to Polish intervention, were forced to witness idly from distant Italy the fall of their homeland under alien Polish occupation.

Concerning Chapter XIII, "The Eastern Provinces in the Restored Polish State, Geographical and Economic Aspects," in refutation of all the praises which Professor Zoltowski lavishes, we will state the reality: that during twenty years of Polish administration in East Galicia not one road was built, not even one of an average type such as they have in Germany or other west European states. Up to 1939 there was not electricity in every town, but in contrast, in 1937, the Ukrainian farmers, ruined economically, had to paint their fences white because "Polish culture" so willed it—at a time when the population was forced to divide matches into two and eat meals without salt!

The average wage of a farm worker was one zloty per day. In dollars, this equals the sum of 14.3¢ per day! A city worker earned approximately 85¢ per day!

In Chapter XV, "Language and Religion, Education, Fine Arts and Intellectual Culture," the author utilizes Polish statistics from the population census of 1931. Today, for international researchers on the Polish reality, there is no
doubt that the facts of 1931 are inaccurate and, not without reason, this census is considered falsified. It is sufficient to compare the statistics given by Professor Zoltowski with the census of 1921 or the statistics of Professor Volodymyr Kubijovych, to see the artificiality of these statistical data in all fields.

The efforts of Professor Zoltowski to differentiate Rusyny from Ukrainians, and to use these arguments in support of anti-Ukrainian argumentation appear undignified. This method, perhaps, can be compared with Hitler's during the time of the occupation of Poland from 1939 to 1944, when, besides Poles, the Germans, included as separate peoples those from Silesia, the Mazurs, the Gorals, etc. Among Ukrainian scholars such "scientific methods" have not been adopted, but we find them in the work of a Polish historian who, in spite of his Polish nationalism, has chosen to reside in democratic England for the past sixteen years.

In the above chapter, on page 290, for instance, Professor Zoltowski gives the proportion of the Polish elements in the following counties: Peremyshl 82.3%; Mostyska 56%; Rudky 48.8%; Sambir 44.5%; Drohobych 47.2%; Peremyshlany 58%; Kaminka Strumilowa 52%; Zolochiw and Zboriw 47%, etc.

We shall now compare this with data, also abstracted from the Polish sources already mentioned here—the work of the Polish National Committee of 1918, treating especially the year 1897. So: Peremyshl 52.4% (35.4% Latin rite); Mostyska 43.8% (31.3% Latin rite); Rudky 39.1%; Sambir 41.7%; Drohobych 41.4%; Peremyshlany 39.5%; Kaminka Strumilowa 40.3%; Zolochiw 40.3%; Zboriw 32.0%, etc.

And again, the question of how to explain this Polish increase arises. If, in the first place, Professor Zoltowski, as a Polish patriot, cannot do this, then we consider it our duty to recall the Polish colonization after the seizure of West Ukrainian territories in 1919-20. In order to avoid unnecessary discussion, we call attention here to the fact that all "colonization laws" are to be found in the yearbooks of the "Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej." Causes of the increase were: Polish colonial policy under which Polish officials were brought into East Galicia, and the local Ukrainian population was barred from official and administrative po-
sitions—unless a particular job candidate accepted the Latin rite or proclaimed himself a Pole. However, the so-called Rusiny, few in number, who remained from Austrian times, were tolerated by them. Finally, there was the gendarme terror, which ended in the horrible pacification of the Ukrainian population in 1930, and again in 1938.

Naturally, Professor Zoltowski makes no mention of these phenomena and, by this omission, he condemns his own work of 348 pages as being biased. There is not even mention concerning the law on East Galicia autonomy, which, actually, (under pressure from the western states) was ratified, but which was never realized. Nor is there a mention of the establishment of the Ukrainian University in Lwiw, on September 26, 1922. (Text in “Dziennik Ustaw, etc”. 1922, No. 90, p. 829.)

The author mentions the Prosvita (Enlightenment) and the Ukrainian cooperatives in such a manner as to proclaim that it was thanks to Poland that the Ukrainians achieved success in these fields. We refrain here from the merited reply, but hundreds of documents and sources can be given on the subject of Polish brutal destruction of Ukrainian institutions in 1930.

On the international forum, the researcher will find in the acts of the League of Nations hundred of petitions, complaints, and accurate reports concerning this Polish terror.

A great portion of this material is contained in the reports of the English Parliament and, assuredly, they are available to Professor Zoltowski.

Concluding our remarks on this typically subjective Polish work, we wish to note that it, too, has its worth—as additional proof of the scientific-objective unreliability of the majority of Polish works in the field of history. The collection of West European literature for this work was wasted effort because even this collection could not possibly alter Polish tendentiousness.

S. H.
ACTIVITIES OF THE RESEARCH CENTER OF POLISH RELATIONS INC. IN NEW YORK

Within the framework of its informational activity regarding the true state of Ukraino-Polish relations in the past and at present, the Research Center of Polish Relations sent a letter to the Free Europe Committee, the text of which is given below. Appended were a map and an article also printed here.

RESEARCH CENTER OF POLISH RELATIONS
320 EAST 14TH STREET
NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

October 19, 1955

FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE
110 WEST 57TH STREET
NEW YORK 19, N. Y.


Gentlemen:

The Research Center of Polish Relations, at the Ukrainian Technical Institute in New York, is doing research on past and present Ukraino-Polish affairs and relative East European problems. One of the future tasks of this Research Center is the correction of misinformed reports concerning the aforementioned subjects, which very frequently appear in the English literature and other West European publications. For a systematic revelation of its scientific research activity, the Administration of the RCPR proposes to publish, in the very near future, a periodic journal, entitled "East European Problems."

In your monthly publication—"News From Behind the Iron Curtain," May, 1955, Vol. 4, No. 5—the author of the
Ukrainian (Lesky, Peremyshl, Chelm, Pidlacha) and White Ruthenians (Bielostok) Territories remained under present Polish regime.

Boundaries of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian counties in present Poland.

Source: Archive of Research Center of Polish Relations in New York, N.Y.
article “Satellite Demography—Poland,” misconstrued Ukrainian and Byelorussian problems, by alleging that present Poland is a unilingual state and has no Ukrainian and Byelorussian population within its ethnographic territory. The author of the aforementioned article utilized only the official material of contemporary Polish statistics, without recognition of non-Polish sources. Such biased treatment in the future of East European problems will be disadvantageous to the Polish nation and will harm the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples.

Supporting your position as printed on the title page of your journal, that “accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strength and weaknesses of communism, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system”—we consider it our duty to forward to you a supplement to your article, entitled “The Ethnic Problems of Present Poland,” written by our member, Mr. Nicholas Andrusiak.

For the Administration of the Research Center of Polish Relations

ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN PRESENT-DAY POLAND

(This article has been revised and expanded on the basis of material not available at the time it was written and sent to Free Europe Committee.)

Three statements contained in the article “Satellite Demography—Poland” (News From Behind the Iron Curtain, May, 1955, Vol. IV, No. 5, pp 25-30) call attention to themselves. The first is the statement that “the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians were almost all in the area ceded to the USSR.” From Table II, (“Balance Sheet of Population Changes, 1939-1949”) included in the article, we learn that only 520,000 persons were transferred to Soviet territory. Table X (on “Ethnic Composition”) tells us that there was an influx of some 2,000,000 individuals from the former Polish eastern provinces into areas lying west of the Curzon Line.

95
From the official Polish statistics on which the above data are based, it would appear that at the present time Poland is a uninational state without ethnic minorities. Close observation, however, of Poland's internal policies tells a different story.

From the outline history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army by Peter Mirchuk (Ukraїnska Povstancha Armiya—1942-52, Munich, 1953, pp. 25, 160-193) we learn that not all the Ukrainian population living west of the Curzon Line left for the east as demanded by the Soviets. In fact, only an insignificant number migrated to Soviet territory from villages which had been destroyed during the war or else from those which were situated among villages peopled by Poles. The majority, attached to their native soil and harkening to the call of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, remained to protect their land. Until the summer of 1947, the Army actively opposed the evacuation of Ukrainians from contemporary Poland and for this reason a tri-partite treaty was signed in Warsaw on May 28, 1947 by Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the USSR regarding joint military activities against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Because the Insurgent Army's forces were chiefly to be found in Lemko territory and the region along the upper San River, armed forces belonging to the three powers poured into the area. Later the Polish army and police undertook the evacuation of all Ukrainians into areas lately seized from Germany (ziemie odzyskane) where the provinces of Opole, Wroclaw, Zielona Gora, Szczecin, Koszalin and Olsztyn were created. Before that, those coming into Poland from Byelorussia and Ukraine as "Poles" in accordance with the Soviet-Polish treaty of 1945 had also been directed to this region. Among these "Poles" there were many Ukrainians and Byelorussian who had registered as Poles and accepted the Roman Catholic faith, hoping that in Poland there would be no Communist system.

Recent information, however, indicates that during the forced displacing of Ukrainians west of the Curzon Line in 1945-46 there were cases when some individuals, terrorized by the Poles, changed the Greek-Catholic faith for the Roman Catholic and thus came to be regarded as "Poles." On the
whole, they maintained their original religion and nationality despite Polish pressure.

Two instances may be cited: a Ukrainian wife, leaving her husband in Ukraine, migrated to Poland as a "Pole" so that she would not have to "work for the Bolsheviks." Another case is that of an aged widow whose daughter was a Displaced Person in Germany. In order to remain in her house in Liubachiv (in the Polish language, Lubaczow, west of the Curzon Line), she went to the local Roman Catholic priest asking to be converted to the Roman faith from the Greek Catholic, thus to become a "Pole" and so to be permitted to remain.

Many Roman Catholics in Western Ukraine regarded themselves as Ukrainians and used the Ukrainian tongue. Some had even participated in the Polish-Ukrainian war (1918-19) on the Ukrainian side. But even they were regarded as "Poles" by the Soviet government and forced to emigrate to Poland. One Roman Catholic Ukrainian in Ternopil province who was head of the village council was permitted to remain only long enough to bury his mother and then was transported to Poland. In cases where Greek Catholics were married to Roman Catholics, both were forced to go to Poland if they wished to remain together.

All this, of course, was advantageous to Poland. Ukrainians were voluntarily changing their religion and nationality, were becoming "Poles," so naturally there were neither religious nor national minorities in Poland.

But although Moscow had sacrificed the Ukrainian lands and population west of the Curzon Line, granting them to Poland and permitting those who did not migrate to the USSR to be resettled on territories recently acquired from Germany, it none the less decided to "protect" them spiritually. Accordingly, the Patriarch of Moscow placed his appointees in the Orthodox Diocese of Warsaw. From 1919-39, this diocese was administered by Orthodox Byelorussians and Ukrainians living west of the Riga Treaty line. During the German occupation it was administered by Orthodox Ukrainians in the so-called General province created out of the Kholm-Cracow-Lemko bishoprics. The present Metropolitan of Warsaw has, in turn, consecrated Orthodox bishops for
the Szczecin and Wroclaw provinces, particularly for Ukrainians from the Lemko and upper San regions.

The Ukrainians did not forget their countrymen west of the Curzon Line, however. In the winter of 1947-48, two units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army entered Olsztyn province (near East Prussia) to help keep up the morale of the local Ukrainian population. Evidence of the U. I. Army’s continued activities in present-day Poland was provided by the sentence pronounced against seven of its commanders by the Military Tribunal of the Warsaw Garrison from June 21 to 27, 1955. These came from the Yaroslav, Sianyk, Liubachiv districts of Piashiv province and the Ìrubeshev district of Lublin province. The free world learned of this from Radio Warsaw broadcasts and the newspaper Zycie Warszawy, No. 179 for June 29, 1955.

In 1954, Lemko immigrants living in the USA asked the Polish government to permit their countrymen to publish a newspaper in the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. The Polish government, replying through its representative in Washington, stated that since there were no Lemkos in Poland (all having emigrated to the Ukrainian SSR), there was nobody for whom to publish such a paper.

The editor of the Lemko newspaper, Karpatskaya Rus, Yonkers, N. Y., Nestor Volchak, however, has visited Lemkos in the Priashiv diocese of Eastern Czecho-Slovakia and in the Polish province of Wroclaw, in which forcibly resettled Lemkos are living. His mother and brothers among them. He reports that there are many Lemkos at present living in the city of Wroclaw and Wroclaw province and that they all need aid, particularly spiritual aid. They are all homesick for their Carpathian homes and would like to return. At the Wroclaw university, there are many Lemko students from such places as Ustia-Ruske, Los, Snitnytsia, Florynka, Zlotske and other Lemko villages.

They proposed that a “Ukrainian Society” be founded and, for this purpose, they held a meeting on October 19, 1955. Fifty-three students, among them seven girls, participated. At that meeting, the deputy head of the provincial People’s Council, and a representative from the office of the Minister for Internal Affairs were present. The Lemko youth
were quite outspoken at the meeting and criticized the harsh treatment that the Ukrainians had experienced at the hands of the Poles. Speakers demanded that the government permit the organization of Ukrainian choirs, drama groups, committees, etc., throughout the province. The government representatives heard them out and agreed that the proceedings be considered as instituting the activity of the "Ukrainian Society" and as being representative of the Ukrainian people. The same meeting also demanded that a newspaper for Ukrainians in Western Poland be established.

A committee of ten (among them two girls) was elected with the consent of the government representatives and it met on October 25. On November 6, two hundred Ukrainians met at the old town-hall building. About half of these were from the Lemko country and half from the Peremyshl (Przemysl) region. They were first subjected to a discourse on "the importance of the Socialist revolution in Russia." There followed performances by artists from the Wroclaw radio station and finally those who had gathered were able to sing their own Lemko and other Ukrainian folk songs and discuss their organizational matters. (N. V., "Lemkos in Wroclaw," Svoboda, Jersey City, No. 219, Nov. 12, 1955; Zhepetsky, S. "Lemkos in Poland Organize," Svoboda, No. 243, Dec. 17, 1955; and by the same author "More About Lemkos in Poland," Svoboda, No. 9, Jan. 17, 1956).

As a letter in Karpatskaya Rus for Jan. 6, 1956 informs us, this meeting was a result of the one held October 19, 1955 at which, besides the 53 students, there were also present representatives of older Lemkos making the total attendance almost 100. An organization was then formed under the leadership of Vasyl Shost, a student born in the Carpathian village of Zlotske. It was called "The Ukrainian Educational Society" and opened its own "Home of Cultural Life" in Wroclaw in which a reading-room, dramatic and choral groups were to be organized. After November 22, 1955 meetings of Lemko representatives were held in all counties in which Lemkos lived, and they demanded school instruction in their mother tongue. In each county, commissions of ten to fourteen persons were elected to assure that their demands were met by the Polish government and to see that their
complaints were satisfied. At the meeting which took place in Lignica on November 25, 1955, apart from the representatives, other Lemkos interested in educational matters and the preservation of their rights, attended, among them 75 to 80 aged women. Total attendance was 237. In many villages, choral and dramatic groups working in the Lemko dialect and in literary Ukrainian already exist. Outstanding among these is the group from Lisiec, Lubin-Lenicki county where Lemkos from Bortne, Horlytsia (Polish—Gorlice) county, Galicia, live. This group has also performed in the Polish town of Rudno with great success. (Zhepetsky, S. "The 'Ukrainian Educational Society' in Poland," Ameryka, Philadelphia, March 2, 1956, No. 41).

The above information would then contradict the claim made in the article "Satellite Demography—Poland" that there are, in effect, no Ukrainians in Poland. There are Ukrainians in Poland—in the Lemko and upper San regions with their cities of Sianyk and Peremyshl; in the present Riashiv province; in the Kholm and Pidliashia provinces with the cities of Kholm and Drohichin; in Lublin province and northern Pidliashia; in Bilostok province which is Ukrainian to the River Narva and Byelorussian north of the Narva, including the town of Bilostok (see map).

FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE, INC.
110 West 57th Street       New York 19, N.Y.       Tel.: PLaza 7-7600
Cable Address: NATFECOMM

November 3, 1955

Research Center of Polish Relations
320 East 14th Street
New York 3, New York

Dear Sirs:

Thank you for letter of October 22, 1955 and the interest you have shown. We welcome such constructive criticism.

Unfortunately, at the time of the publication of the article, there was no official information on remaining White
Ruthenian or Ukrainian elements in contemporary Poland. We therefore had to rely on the best available sources: the US Bureau of the Census, United Nations publications and regime releases. The estimated 1949 ethnic breakdown (p. 30) was taken from the US Bureau of the Census publication, *The Population of Poland*.

Subsequently, on September 7th and 9th, *Trybuna Ludu* disclosed that there were about 100,000 White Ruthenians in the eastern border areas, although it expressed uncertainty as to the accuracy of this figure. If it is accurate, White Ruthenians comprise about .37 percent of the Polish population.

There are no official figures on the number of Ukrainians in Poland. Estimates from refugees and other sources indicate that there are about 150,000 to 200,000. Almost all of these have been removed from the eastern border territories and resettled in the western territories.

We are painfully aware of the fact that determining ethnic categories of peoples under Communist subjugation is bound to be difficult in so far as the figures available reflect to a large extent the regime’s will and policies rather than the free choice of the people they enslave. The article did not intend to imply that present boundaries and classifications are final, or that they reflect the will of the people involved, or that we approve of them. On the other hand, if it is true, as indeed you stated it, that “many Ukrainians and Byelorussians ... registered as ‘Poles,’ accepting the Roman Catholic faith,” demographic practice suggests that these people be presently included in the Polish ethnic element—until their free choice can be voiced.

Sincerely yours,

*George J. Lieber*
MANAGING EDITOR
NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

101
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED


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