


The UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



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March, 1959

**CURRENT TRENDS IN MOSCOW'S
NATIONALITY POLICY**

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

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POST-MORTEM ON OPERATION MIKOYAN

Editorial

This examination of the causes, nature, and effects of the visit of Moscow's Deputy Premier to the United States will surely not be the last. Anastas I. Mikoyan has undoubtedly left his imprints here. Operation Mikoyan is closed, but the campaign continues. The operation in which the traitor to the Armenian people featured, was only the first phase of a direct cold war campaign against the United States on its own terrain. Despite the deceitful pleas of Mikoyan and also Khrushchev for ending the cold war, Operation Mikoyan was an integral part of Moscow's cold war activity. This activity is a necessarily continuous one. Significantly, the prodigious paradox of the visit is that too many Americans failed to see it in this light.

When Mikoyan just arrived here, the alert Committee on Un-American Activities greeted him with its sobering report on *Patterns of Communist Espionage*. The report at least alludes to the cold war nature of this typical Russian Bear maneuver. At the very outset it soundly states that Moscow's "protestations of peaceful intent and a desire for true friendship with the United States are an utter sham."¹ The rich material in the report should have been used consistently in the course of the press interviews and other appearances of this visitor on a tourist visa. But the reason why this did not eventuate can be found in the prime lessons to be drawn from the entire affair.

For one, the spectacle brought into the open the naïvete of countless Americans in regard to tried Russian techniques of undermining the targeted enemy. Second, it disclosed the short memories and the shoddy character of thinking in many sections of our populace as concerns not only present international circumstances but also those of the immediate past. And third, the minor errors of the Administration scarcely contributed to an enlightened atmosphere in connection with the real aims, intent, and purposes of this celebrated "tourist" who was allowed to enjoy free advantages

¹ House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan., 1959, p. 1.

which no foreign tourist of comparable rank could possibly realize in the Soviet Union. Instead, the atmosphere was one of confusion, bewilderment, and foolishness until, toward the close of the visit, Mikoyan showed some of his real character.

An evaluation of this cold war operation must deal with its aims, actual behavior, and noted effects. The field for the operation was, of course, the traditional warmth and good fellowship of Americans generally. Menshikov was sent here long ago to exploit and cultivate this field. In this respect, Mikoyan had a nicely set stage for his own operation and took full advantage of it. Moreover, the operation was being executed in an international context. It would be the height of political immaturity to think that the visit was a good will tour in an isolated American setting. Actually, it was just one facet of an unfolding pattern. The *Lunik*, West Berlin, the forthcoming 21st Communist Party Congress, the Seven Year Plan, and a resultant impact upon not only the captive nations and the underdeveloped countries but upon our Free World allies as well—all of this was tied to Operation Mikoyan. This integralist viewpoint is no rationalist imputation; that is, viewing it in a way the Kremlin did not. What Mikoyan himself had to say and what the propaganda machine in Moscow was disgorging at the same time, easily substantiate this viewpoint.

THE PRIMARY AIM OF MIK-OPERATION

While Mikoyan was here, there was a great deal of speculation as to the aims of his mission. Editorials, radio and TV commentaries, and a number of public and private utterances produced a mass of possible explanations. Some were plainly superficial and even ridiculous, others were well grounded and incisive. Taking the more sensible ones, it is not difficult to boil them down in an order of relative importance. The order itself is based on certain criteria of knowledge and understanding concerning the chief drives and problems of the present Kremlin leadership. In short, one couldn't begin to make an assessment of this kind without constant reference to developments in the Soviet Union itself.

In immediate terms, the first aim was to drive a wedge between American public opinion and the Government. When this was emphasized by certain groups and individuals in this country—weeks before Mikoyan himself distemperately admitted it—a cold shoulder of skepticism and impatience was the response. Yet the fact is that this warning was no idle inference or speculation. It was generally based on known techniques of the Russian ma-

nipulators and it was specifically related to the wild impressions created by Cyrus Eaton during his stay in Moscow. Most Americans don't bother to read USSR publications. Thus they couldn't know the irresponsible encouragement given by Eaton for Moscow's use of traditional techniques of *divide et impera* in the United States. Instead of employing their ever-active subversive channels, Moscow was fully encouraged to realize this aim openly and directly. It correctly reasoned that if an opulent industrialist like Eaton can be duped, there must be quite a reservoir of gullibility in the higher and leading circles of American society.

It is very strange, indeed, that our press failed to seize upon the following statements made by Eaton in Moscow last year. They were virtually repeated verbatim by Mikoyan at the close of his trip. In one interview Eaton said: "But it should be borne in mind that in the United States the Government is the Government and the people are the people."² He elaborated on this as follows: "In the Soviet Union the Government speaks in the name of all the people. In the United States this is not the case. It does not speak in the name of the people."³ Fantastic, isn't it? What would you do if you were in Khrushchev's or Mikoyan's shoes? The answer should be obvious.

But this is not all. In another interview we note these additional political gems scattered about by one of our captains of industry. "I have convinced myself," says our expert in money-making, "that the Soviet Union desires to improve relations with the United States. In our country, too, there is an influential group that feels the same way."⁴ Of course, Eaton doesn't say how he arrived at this conviction or on the basis of what solid evidence is Moscow's alleged desire founded. Further, he observes that "Nothing in the world can justify a nation trying to impose its convictions on other countries... There are some in the United States who want to impose our system on other countries."⁵ From this one would think the United States is the imperialist and colonial power, not the Russians. And finally, Eaton told his Russian audience in Moscow, "The U.S.A. has not been built up by statesmen and soldiers but mainly by the genius of its industrialists and leaders in commerce. There is a large group in my country, representing every phase of business, that wishes to promote trade and commerce

² *International Affairs*, Moscow, October 1958, p. 76.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴ *New Times*, Moscow, September 1958, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

between our two great nations." ⁶ These are the words of a supposedly enlightened business leader in our society. The USSR is not a nation, but Eaton's statement is indicative of his understanding of that state.

No great amount of analytic effort is required to directly connect Eaton's inspirations with Mik-operation. Could the Kremlin possibly have a more voluntarily tutored spokesman here? If you carefully followed the Mikoyan operation, you doubtlessly were impressed by the reiteration of most of the points quoted above. By the time he was heading for home, Mikoyan openly accused the Government of deliberately continuing the cold war in a manner contrary to the interests and desires of the American people. "The cold war in the State Department is continuing," he charged. This and other charges, poised on the fundamental driving wedge tactic, were afforded ample psychological cushion here by leaders who should know better. For instance, with little discretion or judgment, an American public figure thought it was a stroke of humor to blurt out in Chicago: "I feel about the Republicans about the same way Mr. Mikoyan feels about Molotov. I would trust them with any post except public office." This public remark couldn't have served the primary immediate aim of Operation Mikoyan better.

Regardless of party affiliation, an intelligent citizen respects the fact that a Republican named Eisenhower is also, and more importantly, the President of this nation. He is respectfully cognizant also of the fact that as Chief Executive of the Government, our Republican President is vested with powers and responsibilities to conduct the foreign affairs of this country. Not the Eatons, the Stevensons and other misguided private citizens, but the President is held accountable for this serious undertaking. The intelligent citizen cannot compliment Mr. Truman enough for his excellent article which appeared in this period. Our former President not only reduced Mikoyan to proper size but he also depicted these amateur diplomats in their true light.

SEVERAL CONTINGENT AIMS OF MIKOYAN

It is evident that a marked degree of success with the primary aim would open the way for the realization of several contingent and even higher aims. These bear on a summit meeting, trade, West Berlin, and peace propaganda in Asia and Africa. With soft spots adequately tapped in this country, Moscow reasons that it could

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

gain valuable support here for the fulfillment of its other objectives. After all, weren't there many voices raised to ditch Matsu and Quemoy? The push to realize these contingent aims, each in greater or lesser degree, actually constitutes the second phase of Moscow's cold war campaign on the American terrain. This is the phase we're in now. Mikoyan was supposed to have driven the wedge sufficiently for pressure to be exerted on our Government to relent somewhat on its present policies. He was supposed to have influenced enough influential Americans in business and industry to undertake this campaign, ultimately in behalf of Moscow. If there is one Eaton, there must be thousands of them.

Basically, there is nothing that Moscow wants more at this time than a summit meeting. It has angled for this since the Bulganin missives were launched at the end of 1957. Throughout 1958 and into the 21st Communist Congress at the beginning of this year, Moscow has pressed hard for such a meeting. As Khrushchev has so often let the world know, a summit agenda must exclude any talk about the captive nations. If this were to come to pass, the Russians would achieve their greatest victory since the establishment of their new empire, the USSR. Within their expanded empire today, they would convincingly make known to every captive that the West is really hypocritical in the espousal of its principles. They would effectively convey the idea that the West is resigned to the permanent captivity of the enslaved nations. Khrushchev's personal power would be fortified and entrenched beyond question. Briefly, such a summit meeting would seal Moscow's desperate consolidation of its empire. Russian operations in the basically secondary areas of Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia would become that much easier.

A corollary aim for the attainment of this grand objective is to consummate bilateral treaties between the USSR and the U.S. This aim has the further advantage of splitting the Free World allies. This trap would be prepared by preliminary visits and exchanges of the heads of state, perhaps a treaty on banning nuclear weapons and similar subsidiary negotiations. Mikoyan and some of his benighted American friends have urged this. It is enough to quote here the excellent statement made by Dr. Emilio Nunez-Portuondo of Cuba in the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly of the U.N.:

The Moscow Government bound itself by solemn treaties to respect the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania and martyred Hungary. Yet all these States have been subjected to a pitiless colonialism, which is maintained by vast Russian

armies. We could say the same of China which has signed a solemn treaty of friendship—later violated—with the Soviet Union. We could say the same about Outer Mongolia, Ukraine, East Germany, North Korea and North Viet-Nam. Thousands of square miles have been conquered and colonized by the Soviet Union in recent years and the number of human beings now beneath its pitiless yoke runs into hundreds of millions.⁷

Needless to say, sudden smiles are no substitute for hard experience.

Moscow's operations of methodical infiltration, subversion, and gradual domination—so typical of centuries of Russian diplomatic and political history—would also be immensely facilitated by unrestricted trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moscow is seeking this and Mikoyan has laid down the precondition of long-term credits. Amity through trade is a fatuous slogan in this instance. Britain and Germany were mutually best customers for decades but two wars in this century were fought between them. A close analysis of the Seven Year Plan shows that Moscow will be exceedingly under pressure for capital accretions—this aside from its already overdrawn commitments in the underdeveloped areas. Very simply, unrestricted trade on a long-term credit basis—and even without this—would to some extent relieve Moscow of this pressure, abet the fulfilment of some of its industrial goals, and indirectly sponsor its operations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The propaganda value attached to the success of any of these aims need hardly be stated. Mikoyan was able, for example, to exact from the lips of many American businessmen tributes to the "rapid strides of the Soviet economy." These tributes will be read and heard of in Asia and Africa, but to Moscow's advantage. Mikoyan searched for the soft spots in the political, and even moral, fibres of our Nation and found them. The Cleveland conference of Protestant clergy, sponsored by the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. last November, is a recent example of political weakness. Its unanimous vote for the recognition of Red China surely attracted the attention of those planning Operation Mikoyan. The tapping of such weak spots, coupled with Khrushchev's boasts at the 21st Congress about the "serial" production of ICBM's, was obviously calculated also to further Moscow's aim on West Berlin. Why fight over this small bit of territory which we want to be "free" anyway? Operation Mikoyan voiced this.

⁷ Delivered on August 20, 1958.

SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION

In carrying out the operation Mikoyan dwelled on each of these major aims. He hammered away at peace, the summit, and treaty agreements to further the aim of the wedge. Upon his return to Moscow, he had the temerity to say, "An increasing number of Americans are beginning to understand that war and the threat of war... are an altogether unsuitable means of settling international issues." With regard to the implication of this remark, *The New York Times* quite properly stressed, "What vicious nonsense this is!"⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Berding provided the best succinct reply to the spurious peace plea in the operation: "...we are not just interested in peace, but in peace with justice. If all we wanted was peace, we could have that tomorrow, with a maintenance of the *status quo*."

The equally spurious plea for trade was effectively answered by Undersecretary of State Dillon. Although he didn't present some of the points raised in this editorial, the Undersecretary nevertheless made clear the fact that we are ready to trade without credits and predominantly in the category of consumer good items.⁹ Undoubtedly, the low standard of living in the USSR justifies this. As for the West Berlin aim, Mikoyan showed his hand at the National Press Club luncheon. He warned his audience that Moscow would meet force with force if the U.S. should use military power to maintain its access to West Berlin. This characteristic Russian bluster can be wholly discounted. No one trusts the armed forces of the Soviet Union less than the Kremlin itself.¹⁰ Behind the ICBM's, the tanks etc. are armed forces made up of over 40 per cent captives. This is scarcely a guarantee for victory.

One cannot compliment too highly those who questioned Mikoyan on the *Meet the Press* program. Lawrence Spivak and Harry Schwartz brought out the worst in Mikoyan. His parallel between Moscow's brutal domination over Hungary and U.S. intervention in Lebanon was indicative of the lying casuistry in which he and his kind revel. This program capped the growing irritability of the so-called fact-finding tourist. The demonstrations certainly contributed to this as, also, had the public condemnation of the political criminal by some of our leading citizens.

⁸ Editorial, January 26, 1959.

⁹ AP, New Orleans, January 27, 1959.

¹⁰ See, "Basic Misconceptions in U.S. Military Thought on the USSR," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, December 1958.

The Presidential message on a show of courtesy toward the man was ineptly worded. It conveyed the impression that demonstrations *per se* were acts of discourtesy. This unfortunately played into the hands of those who sought to paint the demonstrators as merely "Hungarian refugees." Mikoyan, in turn, lost no time in seizing upon this opportunity. "I do not think" he said, "that picketing is a great achievement of the American way of life . . . The more quickly the Americans get rid of these freedoms, freedoms for hooligans, the better for yourselves." He expressed the opinion that "99 per cent of the American people" had nothing to do with this. That might have been, but a good percentage sympathized with the demonstrators. The public condemnation of the man for his political crimes in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Hungary by such leaders as Congressman Judd, George Meany, Cardinal Cushing and others indicated the temper of broad sections of our population. Basic principles were maintained in the midst of a seeming loss of them.

EFFECTS AND THE SECOND PHASE

It would be foolish to deny that Operation Mikoyan made definite inroads here. The soft spots were expertly tapped and will show themselves again in drives for the recognition of Red China, a compromised summit meeting, more cultural and political exchanges, a retreat on West Berlin, and more trade with the USSR. Moreover, it provided propaganda fodder for Moscow's use in Asia and Africa, hoodwinking the neutralists and undermining the faith of some of our staunchest allies. It bred confusion in the minds of innumerable Americans and succeeded in exacting an audience for the tourist with the President. Also, the operation revealed the low state of principled behavior on the part of many of our groups who lavishly feted the political criminal. About twenty years ago Dr. Hjalmar Schacht was placed in a deep political and social freeze for the government he represented: today, a man is honored for the crimes he committed, one just over two years ago.

The second phase, from Moscow's viewpoint, is to capitalize on these inroads. We are now in this phase. Internal pressures here will mount for expanded trade with the USSR and some retreat in West Berlin. As in the past, an alert and vigilant opposition to complacency and softness can thwart Moscow's cold war plan to exploit misguided Americans for its own end. The consummate end is nothing less than our defeat.

CURRENT TRENDS IN MOSCOW'S NATIONALITY POLICY

By MYROSLAV PROKOP

The present-day nationality policy of Communist Moscow with respect to the non-Russian nations of the Soviet empire is characterized by a certain nervousness and disquietude.

This is so for a series of reasons.

In the first place, Moscow is perturbed by the fact that the non-Russian nations are claiming their right to independence with a steadily-growing voice. The Russian Communists are endeavoring by any and all means to preserve the unity of the Soviet empire. All attempts of the non-Russian peoples to liberate themselves from the Russian control are branded as "revisionism," "bourgeois nationalism" or "national communism."

Secondly, the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples toward independence hamper the policies of Moscow with respect to the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. The Kremlin strives to appear to these peoples as the champion of national and social liberation and equality. The communist propaganda presents the USSR as a unique state in the world where the nationality problem has been justly solved, where there is no national oppression and where the metropolis does not exploit the colonies. But in reality the true relationship between Russia and the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and her satellites is in full negation of this propaganda, a fact which is partially also known in Asia and Africa. This, naturally, perturbs Moscow more than it cares to admit.

Thirdly, knowledge and information about the colonial character of the Soviet empire is penetrating into the free world more and more deeply. Appearing in the West with increasing frequency are substantial studies which reveal the extent of the national enslavement and the economic exploitation of the non-Russian nations by Russia. This, too, makes Moscow nervous and jittery. Here are some examples:

(1) In the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union appeared an article¹ in which its author, B. Gafurov, writes with indignation about the pamphlet which was published by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee under the direction of Senator James O. Eastland.² Gafurov states that in the pamphlet the depicted nationality policy with respect to the non-Russian peoples in the USSR, especially the Islam peoples, is based on lies. In his opinion national oppression of colonial peoples exists only in the West; in the USSR, all the people are equal and nobody oppresses anybody.

But at the same time Gafurov does not deny that in the Soviet Union there "are some nationalist prejudices and manifestations of national narrowness and limitation." He even takes pains to provide some vivid examples of these "nationalist prejudices."

The non-Russian nations are primarily opposed to the continual colonization of their countries by the Russians, also to the Russians being granted privileges in the non-Russian territories where they push the native masters to inferior positions. Gafurov writes about this in an extremely guarded manner:

In certain places there has appeared a tendency to oppose the cadres of the local nationalities.

In plain language, this is self-defense on the part of the non-Russian peoples against the infiltration of their economy, culture, the party and the state apparatus by the Russians. Adlai E. Stevenson, upon his return from the Soviet Union, pointed out one result of this policy of Moscow in Soviet Asia:

The recent immigration from Russia has already reduced the native Kazakhs to a minority.³

We must not fail to underscore another trait which characterizes the methods and objectives of the Russian colonial policy with respect to the territories of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Asia is colonized not only by the Russians, but also by Ukrainians,

¹ A. Gafurov: *Uspekhi natsyionalnoy politiki KPSS i nekotorye voprosy internatsionalnogo vospitaniya*, *Kommunist*, No. 11, August 1958, pp. 10-24 (*Successes of the Nationality Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Certain Questions of International Education*).

² *The Soviet Empire: Prison of Nations and Races*. A Study in Genocide, Discrimination and Abuse of Power. Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress at the Request of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, 1958, X, 72 p.

³ *The New York Times*, November 17, 1958.

Byelorussians and others. For instance, from the *oblast* of Lviv alone about five thousand Ukrainian youth recently were sent to Kazakhstan,⁴ and in the early months of 1958 450 Ukrainian families from the *oblast* of Vynnytsia were compelled to go to Kazakhstan.⁵ At the same time Russian settlers are steadily colonizing Ukraine, so that today the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR constitute only 75 per cent of the population, the rest being national minorities among whom the Russians occupy first place. A great number of Russians have come to the Western Ukrainian provinces, where before 1939 hardly a Russian was to be found.

Secondly, the non-Russian peoples are defending themselves by various methods against the economic exploitation of their countries by Russia. Gafurov calls it a "national limitation." He writes:

One of the manifestations of national limitation in certain *oblasts* are the local tendencies which are seen in the non-fulfillment of plans of collective decisions, in the attempts of certain workers to 'snatch' more for their own locality at the expense of the state as a whole.

The term "state" is used here as a synonym of the empire, against which the non-Russian republics are constantly defending themselves.

The extent of the exploitation of these republics can be assessed from the following data:

In 1956 in railroad freight alone 25.4 million tons more of products were exported from Ukraine than were brought in. A similar situation exists in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Estonia. In contrast, the Russian SFSR brought in 12.7 million tons more of products by railroad transport than it exported in 1956.⁶

Or another example: up to 1957 the industrial production of the Russian SFSR, as compared with 1913, increased by 31 times. But in the same period of time the industrial production of the Ukrainian SSR increased only by 18 times.⁷ The investment of capital

⁴ M. K. Lazurenko, "Revolutsiyni tradytsii mnozhyty yunym," ("The Revolutionary Traditions to Multiply by the Young"), *Molod Ukraina*, July 16, 1958, p. 1.

⁵ A. Khakhekov: "Na zemliakh Kazakhstanu," ("On the Lands of Kazakhstan"), *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 26, 1958, p. 4.

⁶ *Transport i svyaz SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik. (Transport and Communication of the USSR. A Statistical Collection)*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 68-69.

⁷ M. A. Yasnov: *O dalneyshem sovershenstvovanii organizatsii upravleniya promyshlennosti i stroitel'stvom v RSFSR* ("About the Further Perfecting of the Organization of the Administration of Industry and Construction of the RSFSR"). The Session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, *Pravda*, May 29, 1957, p. 2; N. T. Kalchenko: *Pro dalshe udoskonalennia organizatsii upravlinnia promyslovosti i budivnytstvom Ukrainskoyi SSR*, *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 31, 1957,

in Russian industry planned now for the years 1959-1965 is much larger percentage-wise than that earmarked for Ukraine.

Thirdly, Gafurov says:

Local attachment goes parallel with the exaggeration of the national differences of this or another republic, which generates strange demands for special alleviations and heavier contributions of the all-Union budget to the republic's economy.

These "strange demands" of the non-Russian peoples derive from the fact that Russia discriminates against the non-Russian republics of the USSR in the matter of capital investment in their economies.

The fourth type of "nationalist superstitions" are to be found in ideology. Gafurov says:

In the field of ideology the nationalist survivals find their expression in an idealization of the historical past, in an uncritical attitude toward various national movements, a disregard of party principles in explaining the problems of culture, literature and the arts. Some scientific workers are endeavoring to justify the activity of the reactionary bourgeois-nationalist organizations of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, reasoning that after the XXth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the errors in regard to the appraisal of the role of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of Asia and Africa were to be corrected.

These charges of Gafurov require explanation. It should be kept in mind that while both the Russians and non-Russians in the USSR suffer under the social oppression of the Communist dictatorship, the non-Russian nations are under the additional handicap of national enslavement. Among the most drastic manifestations of this enslavement are the falsification of their national history, prohibition of their national traditions and limitation of the development of the national culture. This course of Great Russian imperialistic chauvinism was officially accepted in the USSR in January, 1934, and in reality it has continued to persist to this day, despite the fact that at the XXth congress of the Communist Party of the USSR attempts were made to condemn it as the heritage of Stalinism.

The non-Russian peoples sought to take advantage of the post-Stalinist "thaw" in order to rehabilitate their national and political traditions and their proscribed or destroyed national leaders of the past. This provoked resistance on the part of Moscow. But where the historical past of the Russian people has been concerned, the official communist historiography has introduced into the Pantheon of Russian national heroes also the leaders of the Czarist

("About the Further Perfecting of the Organization of the Administration of Industry and Construction of the Ukrainian SSR").

period, including numerous representatives of aggressive great Russian chauvinism. Other criteria, however, are applied to the non-Russians.

This double standard is also evident in Gafurov's writing in his appraisal of the same phenomena. While opposing the national liberation movements of the non-Russian nations of Soviet Asia, at the same time he supports and even calls patriotic the very same movements of the Asian peoples outside the USSR, if these movements are directed against the West. Gafurov simply says:

But the activities of patriot-nationalists in the countries of the East are progressive, inasmuch as they conduct a struggle against imperialism and for assurance of the political and economic independence of their countries...

(2) Further disquietude in the Kremlin is provoked by the attempts of the cultural elite of the non-Russian peoples to address themselves to the sources of Western culture. On the other hand, Moscow wants to compel them to lean only on the Russian culture. The official organ of the Soviet government, *Izvestia*, recently printed an article by E. Vuchetich, a full-fledged member of the Academy of Arts,⁸ in which he writes with indignation:

Echoes of revisionist tendencies were to be heard at the conference of young artists of the Transcaucasus which recently convened there. Byelorussian artist Stelmashanok, who participated in the conference as a guest, "announced" that we had been singing too long in one voice only and that he does not want to be a Suzykov, but instead wants to be a Van Gogh [Suzykov is one of the leaders of the Union of Soviet Writers—M. P.]... Similar "philosophies" were uttered in other speeches. For instance, M. Talakvadze said that he does not want to learn only from the Russians, but from the French as well.

(3) Accentuated in the resistance of the non-Russians against Russian centralism is their struggle against forcible Russification. About the extent of this Russification Adlai Stevenson writes that in Central Asia, where five non-Russian republics officially exist, "the Russians try hard to preserve the fiction of national independence, while rapidly Russianizing the languages and everything." Russia is conducting the same policy with respect to the non-Russian peoples in the European part of the USSR. Understandably, this provokes resistance, which in turn evokes repercussions abroad.

The review *Kommunist* for September, 1958 printed an article by I. Razzakov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,⁹ in which we read:

⁸ *O khudozhestvennoy krytyke. Zametki skulptora*. ("On Artistic Criticism. Remarks of a Sculptor"), *Izvestia*, October 22, 1958, p. 3-4.

⁹ I. Razzakov: *Leninskaya natsionalnaya politika i druzhba narodov* ("Lenin-

In this book pertaining to security questions of the United States of America, to which we referred before [the reference is made here to the survey published by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee under Senator James O. Eastland—M. P.], a savage statement is made that the Soviet government is endeavoring to liquidate the various national cultures, that it allegedly impedes the development of the Turkic literature and that it assures a privileged status for the Russian language.

Thus, the knowledge of the Western world about the Russification of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR also makes Moscow apprehensive and uncertain.

II

How does the Kremlin counteract the liberation struggle of the enslaved nations and the repercussions which this struggle has in the free world?

As far as the West is concerned, especially the United States, Great Britain and France, Moscow systematically is accusing them of colonialism and the enslavement of the peoples of Asia and Africa, and, in addition, ascribes to them hostile and aggressive designs with respect to the peoples of the USSR. As far as the non-Russian nations themselves and their liberation struggle are concerned, the Kremlin seeks to suppress them by terror on the one hand, and counteracts it on the other hand by sporadic concessions and through psychological warfare. The purpose of this psychological warfare is quite simple: to convince the non-Russian peoples that they allegedly enjoy in the USSR all the prerogatives of free development, that they have their "sovereign" states, and that, in comparison with these attainments, the West generally does not even recognize their national aspirations. In such circumstances, the Moscow propaganda asserts, the liberation struggle of the non-Russian peoples has no perspective at all, and therefore it would be far better to come to an understanding with the Kremlin.

These tendencies of the Russian nationality policy are especially evident in the case of Ukraine.

Ukraine has always been the nation in which the leaders of the Soviet empire met the greatest difficulties. In 1917-20 the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) waged a gallant and determined war against the aggression of Communist Moscow. In the 1920's, after the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic, the resistance in Ukraine continued in the political, economic and cultural domains.

ist Nationality Policy and Friendship of the Peoples"), *Kommunist*, Sept. 1958, pp. 37-48.

It is a signal fact that the independence of Ukraine was demanded not only by the national democratic forces, but by the local Communists as well. The Ukrainian peasantry put up a tremendous resistance to forced collectivization; in retaliation Moscow organized an artificial famine in 1932-33 which resulted in at least five million deaths from hunger and starvation. At that time thousands of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and cultural leaders were also destroyed. At the beginning of the German-Soviet war in 1941, Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army constituted the largest percentage of those deserting to the German lines, inasmuch as they refused to defend the Soviet empire. Simultaneously the Ukrainian nationalist forces organized a nation-wide underground resistance movement against the German occupants. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was created at that time, continued the liberation struggle against the Bolsheviks until the first half of the 1950's.

In these circumstances it was not accidental that Khrushchev should confirm at the XXth congress of the Communist Party of the USSR that Stalin had planned to deport all the Ukrainians from Ukraine in order to break their resistance, but failed in achieving this goal simply because there were too many Ukrainians. With this statement, both Stalin and Khrushchev confirmed that the objective strength of the Ukrainian nation comprises the principal difficulty in the Ukrainian policy of Moscow. These objective elements of the strength of Ukraine are its territory, the size of its population, its economy, the present social structure and its spiritual and political resistance.

Ukraine now embraces a total of 601,000 square kilometers of territory; thus after Russia it is the largest state in Europe. In Ukraine live about 42 million people.¹⁰ True, these figures are not absolute indicators of the strength of the Ukrainian nation. According to *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia* (edition of 1956, Vol. 44, p. 74) in the Ukrainian SSR the Ukrainians constitute only 75 per cent of the population. But in the USSR and outside the Ukrainian SSR live about 10 million Ukrainians. Inasmuch as they are dispersed throughout the entire territory of the USSR, however, they do not possess the rights of a minority.

Ukraine is above all a leading economic force in the Soviet Union. It produces half of all the pig iron of the USSR, 38.5 per

¹⁰ The population of Ukraine, according to the *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainiskoi RSR (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR)*, Kiev, 1957, p. 7 and 11, was 40.6 million people in 1956. But in May, 1954, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, A. I. Kirichenko, declared that Ukraine had over 42 million people, cf. *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 23, 1954, p. 3.

cent of the steel, 40 per cent of the rolling mill steel, more than half of the iron ore and a third of the entire coal output of the USSR. It produces over one-fifth of the entire wheat output, two-thirds of the sugar beets and one-fourth of the milk and meat. Ukraine produces as much pig iron as France and Belgium combined; its steel production is bigger than that of Belgium, Austria, Italy and Sweden combined.¹¹

Ukraine today is a nation of modern social structure. In 1956 in Ukraine 24.6 million or 60.7 per cent of the population was rural, with 15.9 million or 39.3 per cent urban. This is a great advance in comparison with 1913, when 80.7 per cent of the inhabitants of Ukraine lived in villages. Furthermore, in 1955 there were 8.7 million workers and officials, 414,000 specialists with university or middle school education (not including armed forces personnel), 96,800 engineers and 58,700 doctors. In 1955-56 in the higher schools of Ukraine were registered 225,000 students; adding these to the number taking correspondence courses gave a total of 325,000 high school students.¹²

But the most important element of the strength of the Ukrainian people is the desire for their independence. As mentioned before, the underground struggle was waged until the first half of the 50's by resistance means which often had repercussions in the Soviet press and which elicited official appeals of the government to the insurgents to surrender their arms. In 1956 petitions reached the United Nations which were written a year previously by Ukrainian political prisoners in Soviet concentration camps. The petitions demanded full statehood and independence for Ukraine.

Under present-day conditions the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people is conducted by lawful means in the various fields of social life, culture and economics, in the state and the party apparatuses, in the area of religion, and the like. The immediate objective of this struggle is to secure more rights for Ukraine within the framework of the existing reality and to combat the systematic Russification. But the ultimate aim is liberation from the communist dictatorship and national independence of Ukraine.

Here are some phases of this struggle:

¹¹ *Nazustrich XXI-omu z'yizdovi KPSS* ("Towards the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"), *Komunist Ukrainy*, No. 10, October 1958, pp. 98-99.

¹² *Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukrainskoyi RSR* (*National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*), Kiev, 1957, pp. 7, 385, 388.

(1) In the first place a constant fight is being waged for the de-Russification and Ukrainization of the Ukrainian schools. It is a defense against the Russification course directed from Moscow, which in fact has not stopped since the early 30's. As a result of this policy of Moscow we have an unbelievable phenomenon: the official language in the allegedly "sovereign" Ukrainian SSR is in reality the Russian language, which prevails in the cities, factories, universities, party and state administrations. Almost all the newspapers in Ukraine appear not only in the Ukrainian, but also in the Russian language. The matter is not one of the Russian newspapers of the Russian minority in Ukraine, which would be quite normal; but one in which the official organs of the government and of the party in Ukraine are also printed in the Russian language. Russian literature inundates Ukraine. In 1956 in Ukraine a total of 2,670 books in the Ukrainian language was published. At the same time the titles in Russian reached the figure 3,200.¹³ True, the circulation of the Ukrainian works was much greater than that of the Russian. However, in Ukrainian appear not only the works of Ukrainian writers and scientists, but also the official propaganda. The front of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people must be quite wide, judging from the fact that the Soviet regime allows the press to publish frequently articles and letters from readers which defend the rights of the Ukrainian language in everyday life, especially in government offices, schools and theaters; which demand an increase in the circulation of Ukrainian newspapers and books, Ukrainian textbooks for all the subjects of university studies and Ukrainian music records. Protests are also made against the abuses of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and against the fact that the Russians who live in Ukraine are unwilling to learn the Ukrainian language.

(2) The Ukrainian historians are fighting for the right to conduct researches on the sources of Ukrainian history. As is known, the most characteristic trait of all the communist regimes is the so-called "re-writing of history," that is, the readjustment of historical events to suit the present exigencies of the regime. With respect to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR this course leads above all to the negation of the national elements and traditions of the non-Russian peoples and to the identification of their histories with the history of Russia, both Czarist and Communist. All these processes are being implemented towards the creation of the so-

¹³ *Elzhegodnik Bolshoy Sovetskoy Encyklopedii* (Year Book of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 1957, p. 218.

called "Soviet" people, which in reality means the Russian people. This new "Soviet" people would solely use the Russian language, follow Russian culture and the Russian traditions; all the non-Russian peoples would meanwhile lose thereby their national and political identity and, in fact, would become Russians.

In accordance with these plans, Moscow is compelling Ukrainian historians to omit in their writings all the manifestations of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence and to castigate the heroes of this struggle as traitors. At the same time it forces them to glorify Russia and all its imperialistic traditions. Against such falsifications the non-Russian peoples are waging a constant and unfaltering battle. For instance, Ukrainian historians are demanding the right to study non-falsified historical sources on the past of Ukraine, its struggle for independence, its culture, etc. This pressure from the grass roots is so strong that recently Moscow was compelled to grant some mild concessions and to allow the preparation for publication of a new 12-14 volume history of Ukraine.¹⁴

(3) Ukrainian writers and cultural leaders are endeavoring to lead Ukrainian culture out from the provincialism imposed upon it by Czarism and present-day Communist Moscow. In this respect Ukrainian writers can register some successes. For instance, the novels of Mykhailo Stelmakh, *Krov ludska ne vodytsia* (*Human Blood is Not Water*) and *Perekop* (*The Cross-Ditch*) of Oles Honchar were singled out in Moscow for literary awards as among the best literary creations in the USSR in recent times. Moreover, the Ukrainian writers and literary critics often point to the great cultural traditions of the Ukrainian people and to the influence of the Ukrainian culture upon the Russian. Up to recent times one was allowed to talk only about the influence of the Russian culture upon the cultures of the non-Russian peoples, because, according to the official thesis, the Russian nation is the "most prominent." Recently the review *Dnipro* (*The Dnieper*) noted that the Ukrainian language has great historical traditions and that Kievan Rus was connected primarily with Ukraine and Byelorussia at the time when the world knew what later became the Russian state as Muscovy.¹⁵ Another review, *Vitchyzna* (*The Fatherland*)

¹⁴ I. M. Shekera: *Obhovorennia perspektynoho planu rozvytku istorychnoi nauky na Ukraini*, *Ukrainsky Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 4, July-August, 1958, pp. 162-164 ("Discussion of a Perspective Plan of Development of the Historical Science in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Historical Journal*).

¹⁵ *Slovianski movy ta yikh vzayemoviazky*. Petro Tymoshenko. (*The Slavic Languages and Their Inter-relations*), *Dnipro*, No. 9, September, 1958, p. 128-129.

underscored the great contribution of Ukrainian literature to the Russian and recalled that Mykola Hohol (Gogol) was a Ukrainian.¹⁶ Still another review, *Pravda Ukrainy*, published an article which described the great achievements of Ukrainian film artistry. The author especially underscores the attainments of Alexander Dovzhenko, a Ukrainian, who became one of the most outstanding film directors of the USSR.¹⁷ We have to emphasize that all these pronouncements in the Ukrainian Soviet press are nonetheless very timid and cautious, and they mirror only a very small portion of the truth about the enslaved existence of Ukrainian culture under Soviet conditions.

(4) An important place in this struggle for the rebirth of Ukrainian national traditions and national pride is occupied by the Ukrainian youth. The youth is much bolder than the older generation, which knew the terror of Yezhov and the post-war purges in Ukraine. The Ukrainian youth possesses a clean political card; it is enlightened and it is shocked by the colonial subjugation of Ukraine to Moscow. It has more daring in standing up in defense of the rights of the Ukrainian language. It shows its pride freely at the attainments of the Ukrainian people in economics and in culture, and behaves in an uninhibited manner when meeting foreigners. Among the Ukrainian writers and poets a great percentage consists of young people.

(5) In Ukraine the desire for free connections with countries abroad steadily increases. Although the Ukrainian SSR is a charter member of the United Nations, up to now Ukraine has had no diplomatic relations with any other nation, and there is not a single foreign diplomat in Kiev. This circumstance offers such a loud contradiction to the official propaganda about the "sovereignty" of Ukraine, and such is the strong pressure of the Ukrainian people for free connections with the world, that on this sector, too, the rulers of the Kremlin have been forced to grant partial concessions. In 1958 a permanent representation of the Ukrainian SSR was established at the United Nations; heretofore the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR only attended the actual sessions of the United Nations. Furthermore, in Kiev, General Consulates of Poland and Czechoslovakia have been opened, and Ukrainian branches of "Association of Friendship" of the USSR with Poland, Red China, Czechoslovakia

¹⁶ Hryhory Verves: *Ukrainska literatura i slovianstvo* ("Ukrainian Literature and Slavdom"), *Vitchyzna*, No. 9, September, 1958, p. 179.

¹⁷ V. Kudyn: "*Kino i sovremennost*" ("Motion Pictures and the Present Time"), *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 16, 1958, p. 3.

and Rumania have been established as well. Recently, an exchange of delegations of the Ukrainian SSR with the free peoples, and above all, with the Soviet satellites, has also increased. This has been followed up by an exchange of newspapers, reviews and books. Several Ukrainian writers are being translated into foreign languages, while in Ukraine there is also a steady increase of the works of foreign writers, including the Western.

(6) There is indisputable evidence that the Bolsheviks have completely failed to eradicate religious feeling among the Ukrainian people; one can even talk about a partial religious rebirth in Ukraine, even among the Comsomol youth. As recently as the latter half of October, 1958, the Soviet press and radio reported the existence of "religious superstitions" in the Transcarpathian, Odessa, Khmelnytsky and Zhytomyr *oblasts*. The regime is consequently strengthening its anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine.

(7) In Ukraine there is an evident trend to wrest autonomy in the field of economics away from Moscow. These tendencies are connected with the decentralization of the economy of the USSR, which began three years ago, but they are also organically connected with the general Ukrainian aspiration toward independence.

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The Kremlin is trying to break all these liberation processes of the Ukrainian people by various methods and devices. In granting their concessions the Russian Communists at the same time are continuing the Russification course in Ukraine: they deport the Ukrainian youth outside the borders of Ukraine and colonize Ukraine with Russians or other elements.

Simultaneously, Moscow wages a large-scale psychological warfare in Ukraine, whose objectives and purposes are manifold.

In the first place, the Kremlin is endeavoring to persuade the Ukrainian people that in the Soviet Union they have achieved full national and social freedom.

Secondly, the Kremlin propagandists assert that the Ukrainian people "voluntarily" united with Russia three-hundred years ago on the basis of the Treaty of Pereyaslav between the Muscovite Czar and Ukrainian *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and that Ukraine also voluntarily united with Russia within the framework of the USSR. The fact that under the terms of the Pereyaslav Treaty Ukraine remained an independent state, although it had a vassal character, and that the Czarist government gradually liquidated the *Hetmanite* Ukrainian state and transformed it into an ordinary colony of the Russian empire—all this is ignored by the official communist prop-

aganda. The official propaganda also falsifies the liberation struggle of 1917-20, when the Ukrainian people established the Ukrainian National Republic, which fell only as a result of the armed aggression of Communist Moscow.

Thirdly, the Kremlin says that the Ukrainian people have a responsible share in the government of the Soviet empire. By way of proof, such Ukrainians as Alexander I. Kirichenko, V. E. Matskevych and others are in key positions of the USSR. But the fact is that even if these communist leaders could be considered Ukrainians, they are implementing the Russian imperialist policy, not a Ukrainian one.

Fourthly, the official Soviet propaganda says that the Ukrainian people should reconcile themselves to the relations between Ukraine and Russia as they exist in the USSR, since they cannot expect any assistance from the free world in the struggle for their independence. This is one of the most frequently used arguments of Moscow in its struggle against the Ukrainian liberation movement. Moreover, the Russian Communists and their puppets in Kiev systematically pound into the minds of the Ukrainian people that the West in general is against the independence of Ukraine.

In his address on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Ukrainian SSR in December, 1957, in Kiev, Nikita S. Khrushchev stated:

Had the workers not driven out the accursed enemies—the capitalists and landowners and their servants—the Skoropadskys and the Petluras—if they had not expelled the foreign interventionists—Ukraine would inevitably have been parcelled and enslaved by the West European imperialists. It would not have had national independence and could not have existed as a sovereign and free state of the working people...¹⁸

The review *Zhovten* (October) for January, 1958, published an article which in effect is an attack on the United States:

The nationalist bosses themselves admit that in the so-called American Committee, the unofficial agency of the Department of State of the United States, the first fiddle is being played by the Russian White Guard "non-predeterminists," who do not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian state. In their opinion this matter will have to be "decided" naturally, once they have come to power. How such a question would be "decided" is not hard to imagine. It would be sufficient to say that they consider Ukraine a part of Russia, and the Ukrainian language as a corrupted Russian language. On the other hand, the American bourgeois press wages a libelous propaganda that the Soviet Union "grabbed a half of Eastern Poland." Under "Eastern Poland" they understand the Western Ukrainian and Western Byelorussian lands, united with

¹⁸ "The Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. The Address of N. S. Khrushchev." *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 25, 1957, p. 5.

Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia. It seems that it is needless to prove that this press reflects the attitude of the Department of State, which considers even now that Poland was "wronged" and that this "wrong" will be righted only when the Western Ukrainian and Western Byelorussian lands will have been returned to Poland, and the historical Polish lands in the West to Germany. The Horthyites were not yet in power, but they already clamored for the restoration of a "Great Hungary," usually with the inclusion of the Transcarpathian area. The Rumanian *boyar* remnants cannot forget Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Izmail *rayon*. It is evident that in the plans of the present-day nationalist "allies" and "liberators" no Ukrainian state, not even a bourgeois one, is foreseen.¹⁹

While attacking the West, Moscow at the same time ruthlessly combats the Ukrainian liberation movement as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," "national communism," "revisionism," "intrigues of the Ukrainian emigration" and foreign "espionage" agencies, and the like. This is the fifth method of the communist propaganda in Ukraine. When the Ukrainians demand full rights for the Ukrainian language and protests against Russification, when they demand the freedom of historical research, when they prove that Ukraine has its own culture, separate and distinct from the Russian, when they recall that the Czarist government destroyed the independence of Ukraine—all this Moscow defines as Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism." When Ukrainian writers, albeit timidly, critically eyed the intervention of Moscow in Hungary—this was "revisionism." When Ukrainian researchers are proving that in the 20's even some Ukrainian Communists demanded Ukrainian independence of Russia—they are accused of "national communism."

Moscow is now mounting an attack in the Soviet press against the Ukrainian liberation movement, against the activities of the Ukrainian emigration and against the manifestations, though rare, of the friendship of the free peoples for the Ukrainian people. Here are a few examples:

(1) In the review *Dnipro* (*The Dnieper*) for February, 1958, appeared a stage play by V. Mynko. Its hero—a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist" and member of the Ukrainian underground—is endeavoring to enlist Soviet citizens in the struggle against Moscow and for the independence of Ukraine. The hero declares: "My ideal is a free, flourishing and happy Ukraine." The dramatist remarks that "the action takes place in our time in Ukraine."²⁰

¹⁹ Yaroslav Zynych: *Zaprodanci v maskakh i bez masok* ("Traitors Masked and Unmasked"), *Zhovten*, No. 1, January, 1958, pp. 92-106.

²⁰ Vasyi Mynko: *Chorny zmiy* (*The Black Snake*), *Dnipro*, No. 2, February, 1958, pp. 5-41.

(2) In March, 1958, Alexander I. Kirichenko, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, arrived in Kiev to attend a "pre-election meeting" of the party workers, to whom he declared:

The remnants of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, fulfilling the tasks of their imperialistic bosses, are arming against the centuries-long friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, are sowing all sorts of provocations around the fact that the Ukrainian people ardently and sincerely love the culture of the Russian people and learn the rich Russian language...²¹

(3) A special appeal was issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to the congress of the "Ukrainian Society for the Expansion of Political and Scientific Knowledge of the Ukrainian SSR," in October, 1958. The appeal said in part:

We must continue to wage a decisive struggle against revisionism as a principal danger in the international communist movement at the present moment, also against dogmatism, against any and all manifestations of reactionary ideology, and in the first place, against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.²²

(4) Extremely acerb attacks against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," against the Ukrainian emigration, and also against American and Canadian statesmen have appeared in practically the whole Soviet press, including the leading organs, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, in February, 1958. The occasion for these attacks was the 40th anniversary of the Ukrainian National Republic, which fell under the savage attack of the armed aggression of Communist Moscow.

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In summing up our presentation, it is evident that the nationality problem, that is, the liberation struggle of the enslaved nations, represents a real Gordian knot for the Soviet empire. There is no doubt that this struggle of the enslaved peoples constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of the USSR. Especially compromising for Moscow is the liberation process of the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa set against the backdrop of the enslaved nations of the USSR. With the progressive emancipation of these peoples the USSR remains in the eyes of the world the sole colonial empire, perennially unable to settle relationships among the peoples of the USSR on the basis of true state independence, equality, friendship and collaboration. This fact, plus the fact that Western colonialism

²¹ *Vstrechi izbirateley s kandidatami v deputaty Verkhovnogo Sovieta SSSR. Rech tovarishcha A. I. Kirichenka* ("Meetings of Voters with Candidates for Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Address by A. I. Kirichenko"), *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 13, 1958, p. 2.

²² *Radyanska Ukraina*, October 9, 1958, p. 1.

is gradually being liquidated in Asia and Africa, in great measure strengthens the position of the enslaved nations of the USSR.

On the other hand, the everyday reality for these peoples is bleak and miserable. First of all, posed against them is the all-powerful apparatus of the totalitarian communist system which by every means continuously impedes their liberation processes. Secondly, although the liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples of the USSR takes great latitudes and has cost much in human sacrifices and although Moscow itself can scarcely deny the existence of this struggle—it regrettably evokes but a small repercussion among the free peoples of the world and has yet to win the moral and political support of these free nations. This necessarily narrows the possibilities of the enslaved peoples of the USSR. We must not forget that the Kremlin capitalizes upon all this. Therefore, the present incapability and indifference of the nations of the free world, including Asia and Africa, to support the ideals underlying the liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples of the USSR—constitutes one of the greatest sources of strength of the nationality policy of Communist Moscow.

THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM: FROM IVAN THE TERRIBLE TO NIKITA THE SANGUINE

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In the light of Russian political and diplomatic history the recent Mikoyan exhibition in the United States confirmed many established techniques of Russian empire-building. Many Americans are unaware of these traditional techniques and jump to the conclusion that Mikoyan's behavior was only a deceptive product of communist tactics. A few even believed that the man was sincere and that the present rulers in Moscow are desirous of ending the cold war. In both cases an historical myopia prevails, along with an inordinate disdain for an institutional analysis which alone can insure some realism and maturity in our outlook toward the operations of a dedicated enemy.

Regardless of transient and momentary fluctuations in the behavior of the Kremlin, it can be reasonably argued that from the viewpoint of history alone the cold war is here to stay so long as the Russian colossus continues to breathe and unless a hot war, for one reason or another, should break out. Paradoxical as it may appear to some, the Mikoyan venture was a cold war instrument in application and its emphasis on Russian longing for peace was by no means the first of its kind in the long history of Russian empire-building. It cannot be too strongly stated that in order to understand the current tactics of Khrushchev and company—the scientific feats, the economic challenge, the fictitious superiority of USSR's armed forces etc.—the lessons of Russia's successful empire-building in the past must be securely grasped. Pragmatic, day-to-day analysis and evaluation may make for sensational newsprint but they are no substitute for cumulative experience and secular judgment.

DOMINANT VIEWS TOWARD THE PROBLEM

Most of us realize that the world today is seriously challenged by what many regard as the "challenge of Communism." Some of us who are guided by the clear-cut evidences of history prefer to des-

ignite objects by their proper names, to call a thing for what it is, without fear or sentiment. Penetrating through the ideologic veneer, cold analysis will show that the challenge is one of the Russian problem. As in the past, this problem is being felt all over the world: in the Far East, in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, and even here in the United States. But it is also being tragically encountered within the far-flung borders of the present Russian Communist Empire.

The Russian problem is one that was born, cultivated, and shaped in a definite historical and cultural environment. It is assuredly not a problem that suddenly emerged, as many in this country suppose, in 1947, with the spurious origination of the cold war. Indeed, the problem and the cold war activity which it intrinsically engenders did not first come into existence in 1917, with the ascent of the Russian Bolsheviks. They are only creatures of the problem. If perspective and the secular institutional viewpoint are to be valued, the problem can be traced back to the very origins of the history of Russia which, more accurately, means the history of Muscovy.

How does one view the nature of the global Russian problem today? How has it come to be what it is? How does the West, and the United States in particular, understand it, its features, character, and portent? These are fundamental questions which are very infrequently raised and discussed. It is a truism that times change, but it is an attainment of truth to perceive the persistent being of things. By virtue of its technology and other assets the United States has changed radically and enormously since the beginnings of the Republic. Nevertheless, despite the manifold change, there is an institutional being in the Republic which has persistently attested to the preservation of individual liberty, relatively free economic enterprise, trial by jury, government by checks and balances and a host of other traditional treasures of social existence. With rational and spiritual grounds of justification, it is an institutional habituation that has made it possible for us to maintain our unique cultural fabric. The same applies to other states and nations. The predominant force of tradition, especially abetted by unprecedented successes, applies also to the Russian and Muscovite segment of the Soviet Union. It is in this institutional context of being and becoming that the Russian problem is viewed here.

Before defining and analyzing this problem it would be well to consider some general views held in government and private circles with regard to the challenge facing us. One view may be called the sentimentalist view. It is based on the identity of human nature.

After all, it will be argued, the Russians are a part of humanity; they are people like ourselves: consequently, they are subject to very substantial changes in habit and disposition. Those whose thinking is dominated by this view will quickly point to Russians who are highly cultured and of fine breed. The defendant of this superficial view will say, "You can't look upon these Russians as being barbaric and predatory. We should expand our cultural exchange programs in order to understand the Russians better and thus avoid a terrible world holocaust."

Doubtlessly, the elements of this sentimentalist view are true, but they are misplaced. It is astounding how many of us live by short memories and, as a result, become susceptible to all sorts of passing fancies. Have we forgotten so soon that back in the twenties and thirties there were also cultured and warmly human Germans and Japanese? In fact, in the context of Western society, Germans by and large were quantitatively more cultured than can be said of the Russians. Moreover, it would be nonsensical to deny the civilization and culture of the Japanese people. Despite all of this, including the often overlooked fact that our accessibility to Germany and Japan was far greater than it is in relation to the Soviet Union, we did find ourselves in war. We traded with them, we talked, we exchanged; yet we ended in war. With a more conspiratorial and deceitful enemy, will these means perhaps work toward our own destruction, aside from having little to do with the avoidance of conflict? Be nice, understand, exchange are rather extraneous to the problem at hand.

Another prevalent and popular view concerns the conflict in ideology. This view may be properly designated as the misplaced ideologic view. According to it, we are fighting Communism. This is the real enemy and threat to the United States and the entire Free World. Proponents sometimes call this enemy "international communism" or "Soviet communism" or "world communism," each being a vague abstraction that only befogs the issue. In comparison with other free nations, including England, the United States seems to unduly restrict the current struggle within the narrow limits of this ideologic doctrine. When we adopt this view, our approach becomes excessively rationalist and quite misleading. It is one which tends to shut off centuries of history and national experience. No room is afforded by this view for any cultural and institutional analyses which can scarcely tolerate conceptions that would have the Soviet Union emerging from some historical hiatus, without roots in history, peoples and so forth. But such is the case in our present thinking, and ultimately it will demand its price.

A fact worth considering is that countries and nations who have had long experiences with Russian diplomacy and expansionism actually scotch this superficial ideologic view of the struggle. If they were in more formidable material circumstances, they would certainly be more outspoken on this. They fully recognize the fact that this misleading ideologic viewpoint on simply fighting Communism has to the largest extent worked to preclude our understanding of the real adversary. Above all, it has precluded a realistic assessment of the enemy's power and its military and economic potentials. If this is only partly correct, then it follows that we have been wastefully dispersing our forces and assets by virtue of not recognizing the ramifications of our misunderstanding or, more properly, our lack of understanding the real problem. This lack is basically at the source of our being continually on the defensive. It explains the ever present contradictions between our espousals of principles and our passive deeds, viz. between our expressed liberation policy and our containing behavior. It fundamentally accounts for our inability to cope with the Russian drive for extreme nationalism in the Middle East,¹ to realize the potentials for freedom resident among the captive non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union itself, and to successfully combat Russian propaganda in all spheres, be it scientific, economic, military,² political or cultural.

THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM DEFINED

What, then, is the nature of the Russian problem? As is necessary for the solution of all problems, the first step is to define the problem. And this foremost of problems today may be satisfactorily defined as follows: rooted in four centuries of development, the Russian problem is an institutional nexus between external imperialist, colonial predation and internal totalitarian coercion. It is important to view the history of any phenomenon in terms of its totality, its central directions and chief features. History does divulge its own patterns. The overall and prime feature of Russian history is external predation. If one cannot see this, then he has yet much to learn about this history down to present times. Moreover, this feature of predation supports and is supported by the equally important feature of internal totalitarian coercion.

¹ See article on "Guiding Impressions of the Middle East," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, September 1958, pp. 226-235.

² See "Basic Misconceptions in U.S. Military Thought on the USSR," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, December 1958, pp. 299-310.

The striking aspect of this institutional nexus is the interplay between these two phenomena. The success of the one is dependent on that of the other. Thus the problem encompasses within its own nature a vicious circle that for its existence and the glory of the Russian mission in the world must continually widen. Regardless of the ideologic guise under which it has operated—today, Communism; yesterday, Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism—this concentric growth has brought about the subjugation of good parts of Europe and Asia. Modern technology has facilitated this growth so that now it threatens the security of our own nation.

Another essential aspect of the nexus is the demographic one. The statistics quoted here will doubtlessly be contradicted by the results of the recent population census taken in the Soviet Union; but Western students have learned some time ago to discount Moscow's official figures in whatever vital area. There are about ninety million Russians. Against this amount stand some one hundred and ten million non-Russians in the USSR itself and another one hundred million in the external satellite area in Central Europe. Excluding the captive non-Russian populations in the Far East and in south Asia, it is evident that similar to the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, the Russians are clearly in the minority. As in the other case, the Russian Empire, today under the legalistic veil of the USSR, possesses in captivity a majority of non-Russians to do its work.

Now, once one recognizes this Russian problem, he is faced by another. The question that arises in one's mind is not a new one. In fact, going back to the beginning of the sixteenth century, the ambassador of Emperor Maximilian to Muscovy defined it well when he said, "I do not know whether it is the character of the Russian nation which has formed such autocrats or whether the autocrats themselves have given this character to the nation." Baron von Herberstein was obviously in doubt about the source of the problem, but he at least recognized the major problem itself. In terms of tyranny, state controls, censorship, pretentious military prowess, and other familiar institutional facets, the Muscovy he knew was substantially no different from the Russian-based Soviet Union we know in our day. Fluctuations in the exercise of these institutional facets, by way of relaxations, glowing promises of improvement, and changes in characters, have marked the history of the Muscovite and later Russian state from his day down to our own. Nevertheless, the nexus was maintained and the empire grew. This notable fact is particularly important for those in our day who are easily deluded by transient and incidental changes in the Soviet Union.

This institutional mirror of the political body of Russia has been shown time and time again by objective foreign observers. In the nineteenth century, people like de Tocqueville and de Custine vividly painted the picture of Russian society as it was and, one could say, as it is in substantial form today. It is most heartening to note that some of our leaders are beginning to realize the importance of the perspective stressed in our definition of the Russian problem. Recently, with reference to Marquis de Custine's classic, *Journey For Our Time*, Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told a witness: "I know you would be interested in it, because in its description of how the Russian people think it sounds in many cases as if it was written yesterday." ³

In point of fact, this psychocultural analysis by de Custine is indispensable to the competent knowledge of anyone dealing with Russia. It should be donated as a charitable present to our Cyrus Eatons, Stevensons, and Ellenders who, if they would pause to think, could benefit from this classic. Few proper names need be changed in this work for it to describe the basic institutions of present-day Russia. As de Custine puts it in cultural terms, "Russian civilization is still so close to its source that it resembles barbarism . . . Russia is no more than a conquering society. Its strength is not in ideas, it is in war; that is to say, in ruse and in ferocity . . ." ⁴ The existence of space satellites, rockets, missiles and other technologic novelties of our day do not diminish the pertinence of this truth to contemporary Russia in the least. Indeed, they only magnify it as they aggravate the problem itself.

The phrase about war "in ruse and in ferocity" is most significant. The techniques of deception and chicanery have long been employed in Russia's foreign affairs. What we call the "cold war" today is in essence an old Russian institution, well antedating the "indirect aggression" Mr. Dulles perceives in the Middle East or, for that matter, operational Leninism itself. What we are witnessing today, from Mikoyan's pleas for peace without justice to tune-saving babble in the United Nations and elsewhere, has numerous traditional precedents in the empire-building history of Russia. These tactics and techniques were formed and fashioned for well-nigh four hundred years.

Dealing with working and fact-based concepts, it is not the aim of this article to recite all the outstanding evidence supporting our definition of the Russian problem. The sole general fact that

³ *Review of Foreign Policy*, 1958, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., p. 191.

⁴ Marquis de Custine, *Journey For Our Time*, New York, 1951, p. 331.

in the span of a few centuries an unprecedented empire was created by the Russians would seem to suffice. However, it is necessary to demonstrate the striking relevance of de Custine's observations to the present by citing several prominent examples of how this was accomplished. Contrary to false popular impressions, direct Russian military aggression has always been secondary and subsidiary. It has been in the field of what is known today as "cold war activity" that Russia has always relied for its primary weapons to achieve predatory conquest. And such activity embraces subversion, infiltration, divide and conquer maneuvers, friendship societies, ideologic diversion, pretenses at peace promotion, diplomatic blackmail and several other deceptive devices.

In this dimension the distance between Mikoyan in the present, or a Khrushchev, to an Ivan the Terrible in the past is short, indeed. Few appreciate the fact that the first "Czar of Muscovy" laid the formal groundwork of the many exhibitions we are witnessing today. His crucial conquest of the Khanate of Kazan in 1552, which actually started Muscovy on a unique empire-building enterprise, was preceded by thirty-three years of cold war operation. He was the first to put into successful practice what Lenin, almost four hundred years later, codified as "neither peace nor war" or what Secretary Dulles today calls "indirect aggression." Ivan sponsored a competing native candidate for the throne of Kazan as early as 1519 and, through him, succeeded in weakening the Khanate to such an extent that by 1552 Muscovite troops had only to move in. The policy of Khrushchev toward Nasser and his pan-Arab plans is not much different.

Building on this and other similarly successful feats under Ivan, as, for instance, the subsequent subversion of Astrakhan, Muscovy provides many such essential cases for the following centuries. The conquest of Ukraine was begun in the seventeenth century with the breach of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, a military pact which Muscovy distorted into an integral political union of Muscovy and Ukraine. Significantly, this untruth was sounded again in the USSR in 1954 during the so-called Pereyaslav celebrations. The full conquest of Ukraine was not achieved until Catherine's time, but the period is replete with Muscovite political preparations, subversion, and monistic Orthodox ideology. Moreover, this period discloses a powerful truth which has been repeated as a cyclical pattern in our times. And that is, so long as Ukraine was free, Poland, the Caucasus, and other neighboring areas were free of Muscovite or Russian domination: once it was submerged, the others

followed. This happened in the eighteenth century; it was repeated in this century.

Thus it was not long that the partition of Poland ensued under Catherine the Great. Here, too, the Russian ambassadors Repnin and Stackelberg played the role which we in our time saw Vishinsky execute in Latvia—"accept this, or else." Before the second partition in 1793, renegade Poles were organized to call for the "liberation" of the people from Polish *boyars* and the Church. With Poland and Ukraine submerged, the Caucasus soon followed. This event was prepared decades in advance.⁵ The process of weakening the area was seen even during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. Although in a pact with Georgia, Catherine had her troops withdrawn on the eve of battle, leaving Georgia to the devastating blows of the Turks. It is evident that the Russian infamy in the Warsaw uprising of the last war is not without able precedent. The stage and characters are different, but the form and act continue to repeat themselves. If space permitted, the operations of Russian diplomacy in Persia and elsewhere during the nineteenth century would tell the same story.

THE INTERNAL COMPONENT OF THE PROBLEM

Our problem, then, is not the challenge of Communism; it is the despotic challenge of traditional Russian institutions. In the period covered above, other ideologies prevailed as both instruments and smoke screens for totalitarian Russian expansion. Fatuous Communist doctrine does not differ in this respect from the Petrine doctrine and Pan-Slavism of the past. What is fundamentally important for the West to understand is that the imperialist and colonial objectives of Russia and its tactics and techniques have been substantially the same these past four hundred years. We are deluding ourselves if we continue to believe that any enhanced output of technologic gadgets will alter the structure of the Russian institutional nexus.

Those who would seek to impute any anti-Russian bias to this realistic interpretation either do not understand the reasoning involved or are quick to shield their own biases. It is often intellectually sickening to hear that we cannot face up to the bold and stubborn facts because it would be construed as anti-Russian, i.e., against the Russian people. The forceful truth is that along with other peoples

⁵ For a keen analysis of this, see *The Strength and Weakness of USSR*, by Vano Jan Nanwashvili, Boston, 1956.

and nations, the Russian people have long been oppressed by the internal component of the institutional nexus in this Russian problem. Here, too, it is not difficult to trace the facets of this component from the time of Ivan's *Oprichniks* to Khrushchev's security forces, from Peter's crash economic programs to the present Seven Year Plan, from the Czarist *mir* to the present collectives. It will be readily admitted that many liberal forces were at work in the old empire and, no doubt, that such forces are latent in the present empire. But one must also be intellectually honest to admit that these forces really had little effect upon official Russian policies.

A clear analytical grasp of the Russian problem as defined here enables one to see the dual direction that a successful policy must logically take in order to solve this historic problem for all time. Present U.S. policy rests on a basic misunderstanding of the problem. In turn, this misunderstanding stymies the full use of our own traditional forces which, if unleashed, would overwhelm the enemy in the current struggle. The antidote to the external part of the Russian institutional nexus, namely predatory conquest, is our manifold support of the patriotic nationalisms of every captive non-Russian nation in the present Russian Communist empire. For obvious reasons, the emphasis of this direction should be placed on those within the Soviet Union itself. The antidote to the internal part of the nexus is our appeal to the Russian people in terms of individual liberty, improved living conditions, and democratic freedoms. By nature of the nexus that exists, the antidotes cannot but reinforce each other. We still have time to pursue these logical directions. What is necessary first is an intelligent awareness of the Russian problem.

SOVIET STATEHOOD OF UKRAINE FROM THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT

*A Sociological Appraisal
of Three Soviet Republics of Ukraine*

By MATTHEW STACHIW

I

The *state* is a socio-political phenomenon. It represents an entirely new and distinct type of social system which differs from the system of the *primitive horde* (which is the first form of social system) and from the *clan-tribal system* (a second stage of social system). The stage grew up on the ruins of the clan-tribal system. Some sociologists call this stage of the social development of humanity, and rightly so, "a *political system of social life*" (Franz Oppenheimer).

Because the state is a social phenomenon, it should in the first place be analyzed from the sociological viewpoint. Only after that can we proceed to analyze it from the viewpoint of the law. The principal question which must be taken into account in any sociological appraisal of the state is the question as to what social group created a concrete state, the object of this analysis. As a rule, only a certain social group of interests provides the beginning of the existence of a specific state. In earlier times it was above all a certain tribal group; in modern times it is usually the *nation*, represented in this creative group by one or more political *parties*, which constitutes this creative group aiming at the creation of a state.

The author's researches on the first and second Soviet "Ukrainian Republic" (1917-1918 and 1918-1919) have disclosed a series of incontestable proofs to the effect that both these republics were the creation of an *alien*, and not a Ukrainian political party.¹ The

¹ Dr. Matthew Stachiw: *Persha sovietska respublika v Ukraini* (The First Soviet Republic in Ukraine), New York-Scranton, 1956.

Dr. Matthew Stachiw: *Druha sovietska respublika v Ukraini* (The Second Soviet Republic in Ukraine), New York-Scranton, 1957.

first Soviet authority on the partially-occupied Ukrainian territory was created by the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, known at that time as the "Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks." This party was completely alien to the Ukrainian people for two important reasons:

(a) It had its center and basis in the ethnographic Russia proper (Muscovy), and as a result the directing center belonged to *another nation-country*;

(b) In Ukraine, this party's membership was *non-Ukrainian*, consisting exclusively of the members of the Russian minority in Ukraine. Among them were not only the Russians proper, but numerous Russified elements from among the Jews, Poles and others, and a small percentage of Russified Ukrainians. Members in this party who openly acknowledged their Ukrainian nationality barely constituted 3 per cent, an insignificant quantity, which was not taken into consideration as a Ukrainian group. Thus this party was totally alien to the Ukrainian nation, inasmuch as its membership was nationally Russian and its nerve center was outside Ukraine, in Muscovy.

There is still another characteristic of this alien party which operated in Ukraine, namely, that up to the summer of 1918 it had no center in Ukraine for its provincial organizations. The directing center of the Russian Communist Party directed its provincial organizations in Ukraine, first from Petrograd and later from Moscow, *directly* without any unifying center in Ukraine. This only indicated that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party regarded Ukraine as a province of Russia, divided, as was all Russia, into separate provinces (*gubernias*). It could not think of any separate national peculiarity of Ukraine in its economic-social, political and national-cultural aspects.

This purely Russian political organization, that is, the Russian Communist Party (then still known as the "Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks"), in December of 1917 established the Soviet authority on Ukrainian territory that was partially occupied by Russian troops, so as to provide a formal pretext of war against the Ukrainian National Republic and its Central *Rada*. The leading center of the Russian Communist Party, as a matter of fact, created *five* different Soviet republics in Ukraine.² Under these circumstances one can hardly say that these five

² Stachiw, *op. cit.*, *Druha sovetska respublika v Ukraini* (*The Second Soviet Republic in Ukraine*), p. 31-41.

republics *really* constituted a form of *statehood* of the Ukrainian people.

All these Soviet republics in Ukraine, which were formed between the end of December of 1917 and February of 1918, lasted only until April of 1918. At that time, under the counter-offensive of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic which acted in alliance with the armies of the Central Powers, these republics fell and *formally liquidated* themselves. The leaders of these Moscow-inspired republics, as private citizens, emigrated from Ukraine to Soviet Russia.

II

It was not until July 5, 1918, that these exiled Russian leaders, upon instruction of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, created a separate association of all provincial organizations of this party in Ukraine, which assumed the name of the "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPbU). The name of the "party" was adopted specifically for the purpose of agitating the ill-informed peasantry and workers, who could be led to believe that it was not the "Russian Communist Party" which conducted an aggressive war against the Ukrainian State, but that in reality it was a civil war being waged by a *Ukrainian* party of the Bolsheviks.

This provincial form of the party administration of a totally alien Russian party under the name of the "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine" was purely a smoke screen for the *second military aggression* of Russia against the Ukrainian National Republic in December of 1918. The Russian Communist Party, under the name of the "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine," created on the partially-occupied territory of Ukraine a separate administration in the form of an "independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic." In the war against the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic and later on, in the summer of 1919, against the "Volunteer Army" of General Denikin, the Soviet Russian occupation army was defeated and was compelled to abandon the territory of Ukraine. After the Soviet Russian army left Ukraine the entire Soviet Russian party apparatus of the Soviet state in Ukraine also went back to Soviet Russia. Thus came again the formal *dissolution* and *liquidation* of all the principal organs of this state and the dissolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine. This event took place on October 2, 1919, in Moscow.

After this date, October 2, 1919, the struggle for power in Ukraine was again conducted *directly* by the Central Committee

of the Russian Communist Party itself. Only in December of 1919 did Moscow begin renewing the Soviet forms of authority in the occupied part of Ukraine, but this time in the form of a strictly *party-power system—revolutionary committees (revcoms)* and revolutionary military committees (*revvoencoms*), and not in the form of *soviets* of deputies. The national organization of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine itself was restored only in the spring of 1920. This "party" was wholly ruled and directed by the Politburo from Moscow, which appointed and dismissed the members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine according to its own whims and volition.

All these facts clearly indicate that the political organization, that is, the Russian Communist Party and its provincial organization—the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine—continued to be an *alien* element with respect to the Soviet republics in Ukraine. This fact is substantiated by incontrovertible documents of the Russian Communist Party.

The new program of the Russian Communist Party in March of 1919 spoke about the fact of the formal existence of the separate Soviet republics of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Byelorussia. It said:

Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Byelorussia exist at the present time as separate Soviet republics. Thus the state structure is so resolved.

But this does not in any measure mean that the Russian Communist Party in its turn should be reorganized into a federation of independent Communist Parties.

The VIIIth congress of the Russian Communist Party decrees: There must exist only one centralized Communist Party, with one Central Committee, conducting the party work in all branches of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. All decisions of the Russian Communist Party and its leading organs unconditionally bind all branches of the party, regardless of their nationality membership. The Central Committees of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian Communists have rights only of provincial committees of the party and they are *completely subordinate* to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.³ (*Italics added—Author*).

The subordination of these allegedly "national" branches to the Russian Communist Party and its Central Committee was strictly *military* and on a military basis. In the program decisions of 1919 the military principle with respect to party discipline was defined as follows:

The party finds itself in a situation in which the most exact centralization and severest discipline are an absolute necessity. The decisions of higher levels

³ *Kommunisticheskaja Rossijskaja Partia Bolshevikov v rezolutsiakh ee zjazdov i konferentsij* (*The Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Resolutions of its Congresses and Conferences*), Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, p. 255.

are absolutely mandatory for lower organs. All [members of the party] must execute every decision and only later may they appeal to the competent organ. In this sense the party must have at the present time a really military discipline.⁴ (All italics added).

With such a politically-centralized party which possessed an unlimited dictatorial power on all the territories of all the formal Soviet republics, it was hardly possible that any national sovereign state could exist; there was no possibility for a local autonomy of a council to emerge.

American writer Richard Pipes draws quite a correct conclusion from such a state of affairs, saying that "the sovereignty over all Soviet areas belongs to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Soviet federalism did not bring the division between the center and the provinces; only decentralization could make the building of truly federalist relations possible."⁵

III

Inasmuch as the national composition of this Russian Communist Party on the territory of Ukraine is concerned, its character changed in the Party's favor through the fact of conquest and the military successes of Soviet Russia, as far as increase of membership of elements of Ukrainian national origin is concerned. But even this increase was slight and was effectuated very slowly, which is borne out by the following data:

In 1918 the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine had barely 4,364 members. In relation to the almost 30-million population of the eastern and central Ukrainian lands, this represented an infinitesimal figure. This handful of Communists could never establish the authority of revolutionary committees or *soviets*.

In the same year only 3 per cent of the personnel of the organization of the Russian Communist Party acknowledged their Ukrainian origin—130 persons, members of the Russian Communist Party who were of Ukrainian nationality. Naturally, such a small number of Bolsheviks of Ukrainian origin could not possibly exert a decisive influence on general Ukrainian social life.

In the elections to the All-Russian Constitutional Assembly which took place at the end of November of 1917, the slate of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine received barely 10 per cent of all the votes in Ukraine. This again demonstrated that the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁵ Richard Pipes: *Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism. 1917-1923*. Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 244-245.

political influence of the Bolsheviks, despite all the communist demagoguery, was minimal in comparison with the Ukrainian parties, which overwhelmingly supported the Ukrainian National Republic.⁶

This insignificant number of Bolsheviks in Ukraine in general, and of Ukrainian origin in particular, could only seize control of the power in Ukraine through conquest by the regular army of Soviet Russia.

It is significant that the present-day Soviet official literature is shying away from publicizing the national composition of the party organizations of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine. It does so in order not to reveal that Ukraine was conquered by Communist Russia. This matter, therefore, especially merits greater emphasis.

After the first military victories of the Soviet Russian troops over the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic in the beginning of 1919, the Russian Communist Party increased considerably the number of its members in Ukraine, but not with the Ukrainian national element. In March of 1919 the membership of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine rose to 16,368; these new members came either directly from Russia proper or from the Russian minority in Ukraine. At the beginning of 1920, when Ukrainian Communist-Borotbists became members of the Russian Communist Party, the Ukrainian element in the party increased percentage-wise. The absolute figure of members of the party in March of 1920 was 25,247; but after the purges of the party in the spring and summer of the same year the membership fell to approximately 15,000 persons.⁷

In the summer of 1920 it seemed to many people that the Soviet Russian system had finally triumphed. Hence a significant number of people tried to "adapt" themselves to the new government by enrolling in the governmental party. This more than anything else explains the increase in the membership of the party as compared with the year 1918. That year, 1920, was characterized by the prevalence in the rank and file of the Russian Communist Party of the Russified Jewish element and various other minorities. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who in the summer of 1920 remained under the Soviet occupation, had ample opportunity to study not only the actual conditions, but also official documents relating to the

⁶ cf. bibliography of the author's *The First Soviet Republic in Ukraine* and *The Second Soviet Republic in Ukraine*.

⁷ The first figure is taken from *Eshegodnik Kominternu* for 1923, Moscow, 1923, p. 477; the other figures are quoted after Volodymyr Vynnychenko's *Ukrainska Komunistychna Partiya ta KPbU (The Ukrainian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine)*, Vienna, 1921, p. 9.

party life of the dictatorship. In his book, entitled, *The Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP) and the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPbU)*, he provides some data on the national composition of the CPbU, the official government party organization of that time:

It is a party of the military and bureaucratic petit-bourgeois intelligentsia, with an insignificant mixture of Russian or Russified workers, who live on the territory of Ukraine... The whole party numbers 15,000 members. As is known, all official and responsible government posts are occupied only by Communists from the official party. In all the institutions of Ukraine there are more than 15,000 posts. It is clear, though, that the entire party must be a party of officials, bureaucrats... The national composition of the party is streaky, with the Jewish element in a prevailing majority. One can state unerringly that 60 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine are Jews, 20-26 per cent are Russians, and 10 per cent are Ukrainians (the remnants of those *Borotbists* who had joined the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine).³

Vynnychenko was able not only to give an exact picture with respect to the national composition of the party, but also managed to provide important data on the social composition of the membership of the party which ruled occupied Ukraine. This party, which was propagandized as being a "purely proletarian and workers' party," was in fact a party of bureaucrats—namely the civil and military administration. Even the insignificant percentage of industrial workers who belonged to the official party, at the beginning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, had been transformed into a bureaucratic apparatus by being placed in official administrative posts.

The percentage ratios of the various nationalities among the members of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine, or rather its branch, the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, later underwent a substantial change inasmuch as with the victory of the Soviet troops in Ukraine by the end of 1920 the Russian element obtained an overwhelming preponderance in all the party organizations of Ukraine. This came about mainly through the influx of new elements from Russia proper. In addition, the Russian minority in Ukraine, after the defeat of the White Russian movement, flocked into the ranks of the Communist Party, inasmuch as membership conferred great personal advantages. There was also an increase in the number of members of Ukrainian national origin. But even then the participation of Ukrainian Communists in the official party remained insignificant.

Although later on the Ukrainians, whether for personal or "political" reasons, joined the ranks of the Communist Party of

³ Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

Bolsheviks of Ukraine, the Russian center saw to it that the Ukrainians were admitted only in limited numbers and that the Ukrainians were never permitted to become decisive factors in the party organizations. This selective system admitted to the party only those Ukrainians who, soul and body were at the disposal of Moscow. Whoever from among these subsequently proved to be disloyal was mercilessly "liquidated," one way or another.

Some statistical data on the national composition of the party are more than eloquent:

In 1922, two years after the victory of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, the percentage of Russians in the whole Russian Communist Party was 72. An additional 10 per cent comprised those Communist members, who, although of different national origin, were completely Russified and spoke only the Russian language. Thus the Russians constituted 82 per cent of all the members of the Russian Communist Party.

The percentage of members of Ukrainian origin in 1922 was 5.88. But actually this figure should be lowered to 3, if we take into consideration only those members, who not only were of Ukrainian origin, but could speak Ukrainian, that is, who were not Russified.

When we take into consideration the number of Communists according to the national origin and not according to their real nationality (if we count as non-Russian nationalities also those who could not talk their mother tongue), we receive a very interesting picture of communization of a given people and the confidence Moscow had in such. Thus, on the basis of the data of 1922 the Communists of a given people, were percentage-wise as follows:

Russians	3.80
Ukrainians	0.94
Jews	7.20
Byelorussians	1.67
Armenians	2.91
Germans	2.91 *

These figures provide us with two distinct phenomena. First, in 1922 the Russians, by origin, culture and language, constituted 82 per cent of the entire membership of the Russian Communist Party on the territory of the Soviet authority, while they constituted at the same time only 49 per cent of the entire population of the USSR. The second phenomenon is the percentage of Communists in every nationality which was part of the Soviet empire in 1922.

* These figures are taken from *SSSR i natsionalnaia problema* (*The USSR and the Nationality Problem*), Moscow, 1924, p. 26, quoted from Pipes, p. 269.

These figures are given not in the relation 1:100, but that of 1:1000. These official figures reveal that of all the many nationalities in the Soviet empire the numerous Ukrainians had the smallest *per millum* of Communists as compared with other nationalities. With regard to the Russians, there were 4 times less Communists among the Ukrainians, and almost 8 times less than among the Jews.

But the Russians prevailed in the entire party organization of the Russian Communist Party, inasmuch as they constituted 82 per cent of the entire membership. They were leading and decisive factors of the party not only technically, but nationally as well. The entire Russian Communist Party in its activities and by its character was a Russian party. Richard Pipes justly points out that at the beginning of March, and even more so during the October revolution in all the non-Russian countries of the former Russian empire the term "Communist-Bolshevik" was identical with that of the Russian.¹⁰

IV

From the social-political viewpoint the Soviet republic in Ukraine (the third, which has lasted to this day since the establishment of the USSR) remains unchanged. The Russian center directs not only a gigantic machine of coercion (army and police), but it remains a nerve center from the viewpoint of political and party policies, exercising the actual social sovereignty over the whole territory of the Soviet Union.

This is also substantiated by the now compulsory "Statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," which was adopted at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party in February, 1956. We should not forget that despite the existence of the various "parties" of the Soviet Republics, every Communist on the territory of the USSR must be a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and is bound by its "Statute." In the first paragraph of this document on the duties of members, we read the following directive:

A member of the party is obligated:

(a) To safeguard in all ways the unity of the party as a principal requisite of the strength and might of the party;

(b) To obey party and state discipline, which are equally obligatory for all members of the party (pp. 4-5).

When there is only one party and where there exists a discipline over all members of the party by a sole party center in Moscow, politically there are no other state creations except that of the "USSR."

¹⁰ Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

All the decisions of the local party organizations are only the execution of the general and special decisions of the Central Committee of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the separate "republic parties" (for instance, the "Communist Party of Ukraine") are by statute on the level of all local, *rayon* or *oblast* party organizations. Their members are bound not only by the party discipline, but by the state discipline of the USSR as well.

In such a system there is no room not only for any other form of statehood, but even for local community autonomy.

Alongside this actual social system of the USSR there exists a sphere of theoretical law, which is something entirely different. This system of legal relationship must exist, even despite and against the will of Moscow, inasmuch as it opposes the nationalism of the non-Russian nations, that is their liberation movements. The basis of this legal system and its significance warrant a special discussion which will be provided in another article.

NEW TRICKS TO RELIEVE WORLD TENSION

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

By now the American people should have become fully aware of the guilelessness with which they and their leaders have approached the subject of international affairs. In the course of the last fifty years, the United States has accomplished miracles in international relief and in erecting for men everywhere a new faith in liberty and in the possibilities of human nature. They have fought in two World Wars and directly or indirectly have inspired the setting up of two international organizations for the introduction of a reign of law under freedom. Yet at the same time they have failed to obtain a just reward for their efforts through an almost childish readiness to accept promises for facts and to close their eyes at crucial moments to the situation around them. They have misread Lincoln's statement that the important thing was to be on God's side, misinterpreting it to mean that the foes of liberty must be treated as if they were at least ninety percent right in their claims against the United States.

Since the close of World War II, they have seen the states which they had liberated in World War I swallowed up behind the Iron Curtain of Russian Communist centered in the Kremlin. They have seen the abandonment of the mainland of China to the Communists. They have witnessed the unprovoked Communist attack on South Korea, and then when that was driven back at a huge cost in American and allied blood, they declined to finish the job of driving the Communists out of Korea lest it imperil the tottering truce with the USSR and precipitate World War III. Space precludes listing here all the missed opportunities for advancing American ideals and the ideals of the free world which at least in word were subscribed to even by Stalin in the days when he was attacked by Hitler in 1941.

Now in the latter part of 1958 and the beginning of 1959 the United States and the American people have once again seen fit to throw logic and common sense to the winds and follow again their confidence in that will-o'-the-wisp of human brotherhood im-

personated by the Communist leaders. The position adopted by the American leaders in government and society makes sense only if there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union and the Communist world have hopelessly outdistanced the West in the application of the new technology to war and that therefore the West is facing certain defeat if it crosses the desires of the East. Since that is patently untrue, the United States and its allies are playing the part of guileless innocents in the great game involving the future of freedom and humanity.

Since the beginning of the Red Chinese bombardment of Quemoy, the West has more than ever talked of its defense of freedom and taken equal pains that this be not expressed in deeds. This behavior has not been lost on Khrushchev and his aides, who have succeeded in rendering futile the congresses at Geneva for the arrangement of a suitable system of inspection and of prevention of unprovoked attacks. Khrushchev has gone further and threatened the West with a *fait accompli* in Berlin and demanded the setting up of a free city in West Berlin and the withdrawal of Western support with war the alternative. He has denounced the agreements Stalin made in World War II. Then, having secured the desired effect, he has again waved a much-soiled olive branch of negotiations. And he has received the reply from Secretary Dulles that, in regard to the reunification of Germany, "I do not think that it is reasonable to expect that the Soviet Union will give up positions which it has, if it thinks that by doing so it may be giving a strategic military advantage to those whom it regards—I think wrongly, but nevertheless which it regards—as potential enemies. We just can't expect that to happen. Therefore, if there is going to be any reunification of Germany, it has got to be under conditions which take into account realistically some of these very elemental, primitive facts of life. It was in order to meet that point of view that we tried to give reassurance to the Soviet Union along these lines, and it is still my view that we should be prepared to do that" (*The New York Times*, January 14, 1959).

As the reporters present at the conference indicated, it is hard to see how it will be possible to unite a Germany allied with the free world, or in contact with it, and still guarantee that Western ideas and ideals cannot penetrate into the eastern section of the country now under Soviet dictatorship and thus threaten Soviet power. It is hard to see how the brave American words of liberation and even of containment can be made to mean anything, provided it is understood that both containment and liberation must not put a stop to Soviet intrigue. As so many European statesmen fear,

American policy, often practical in essence and in development, is still wandering in the clouds in theory and bringing nearer by its unreal thinking the very choice it is trying to avoid—appeasement or World War III.

It is of course in Khrushchev's interest to foster this confusion in every possible way, and so he has acted cleverly in forcing Mikoyan upon the United States to make confusion further confounded. Yet there are some distinguished Americans who have not fallen into the trap. Such men as Congressman Judd, who has long closely followed the Communist movement in China, and George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, have realized the tactics of Khrushchev and Mikoyan and separated themselves from the welcoming throng of capitalists and scholars who are overjoyed like the ancient Athenians in the words of the *Book of Arts*, "who spent the time in nothing else but either to hear, or tell some new thing." Mikoyan has pulled out all the old stops on the Soviet organ, including the statement that the United Nations should merely talk and not vote even a nominal condemnation of the outrages of the Communist world lest it heighten tension and dissipate good will. Moscow is laughing up its sleeve at the bottomless gullibility of the Americans, who talk as if they were willing to trade liberty for some fine, resounding phrase of brotherhood, even if they are not.

Yet Khrushchev has another and deeper purpose in stirring up confusion at this time, and perhaps he does have some anxious thoughts about the future. But if he has, he has cloaked them in a form that that vague group of Russia-firsters here has long been able to use for its own purposes and for rescuing the Soviet Union, whenever it comes into real difficulty. Let us consider this for a moment.

There has never been a clear answer as to what would have happened if Lenin's expectation of a world revolution had taken place in 1918 and such states as Germany had adopted Communism. At that moment he was in control of the ruined machinery of part of the old Russian Empire and it looked as if the non-Russian peoples would escape his grasp. His Soviet realm had little food and fewer manufactures but it had its claims and its brutality. The West preferred to waste its resources on the White Russian movement, which was rarely conducted in accordance with military requirements, and it refused support to the struggling non-Russian peoples, who were fighting in behalf of the same ideals as those held by the victorious powers. Lenin profited by their fuzzy thinking as he saw his hopes of a Communist revolution in Germany and Hungary go glimmering and democratic governments beginning to

emerge. He became himself the center of organized Communism who could turn the Communist International into a series of parties entirely dominated by Moscow. Then, with the help of Russia's friends abroad, he reorganized the old Empire as the Soviet Union and introduced a more severe and brutal Russian control than the Czars had ever practiced. While he was doing so, the West protested in words but had to respect the unity of Russia.

Stalin took the next step. The West acquiesced in his seizure of the so-called satellite states after World War II because they did not want to get on bad terms with "Russia," so recently one of their noble allies. Today, with Khrushchev's denunciation of the agreements then made, they have the chance to speak out against Communist rule in the satellites but they do not want to imply that Moscow is an enemy.

Meanwhile they abandoned the Chinese to Stalin on the plausible ground that the Communist Chinese were merely agrarian reformers. Despite the urgings of Chiang Kai-shek and the advice of men who had known the Chinese Communists practically, the United States allowed the Chinese Communists to take over the country, only at the last moment saving Chiang and the representatives of free China in Taiwan.

The Chinese Communists, following in the steps of the Russians, have introduced iron discipline and upset the traditional Chinese mode of life regardless of the number of human lives that they have needlessly taken in carrying out their theories. More than that they have followed in the path of the Manchu conquerors and reasserted their control over Tibet and started elsewhere in the south-east of Asia on a war of conquest. They are interested in settling and communizing northwest China, which is not inhabited by Chinese, just as they have also impinged upon formerly semi-independent Mongolia, which had secured a nominal independence under Russian imperial and Communist control.

This brings the power of the Chinese population into eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang), while Khrushchev is busy moving Ukrainians and other non-Russian peoples into Kazakhstan and the other territories which once formed part of Russian Turkestan or Russian Central Asia, as it was termed by the imperial government. Of course he is doing it under the guise of settling the virgin lands. Actually, it is another part of his campaign to cement his power, of breaking down the national sense of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian peoples and populating the remote stretches of the Soviet Union with displaced persons who will be utterly dependent upon his will.

RIVALRY IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD

This carries us to the most disputed subject in connection with the Communist world. What regard does Khrushchev have for his Chinese co-religionists? Which nation is assuming the leadership of the Communist world? Now that Red China is taking its great leap forward, do its leaders entertain the ambition of asserting control over Moscow? On the same principles that Moscow has used to assert its control of Ukraine, Peiping can appeal to the example of the great Mongol dynasty of Genghis Khan and declare itself the legitimate ruler of Moscow.

There are hints to this effect. Last year when it looked as if plans were being made for a top level conference with the West, Khrushchev flew off to China. On his return, there was no talk of a conference but the bombardment of Quemoy. Mao Tse-tung has played at best a dubious role in relations with both Poland and Yugoslavia, now supporting the policy of Khrushchev, now the movements toward a relaxation of Muscovite control, and now the movements toward a still stricter form of Communist organization in the satellite states.

There is one thing certain. The leaders of the Chinese Communists do not seem to be the passive satellites of Moscow that Moscow would desire. China is developing along the path that its own leaders want. It is taking from Moscow what it wants but it is nourishing also that hostility to the outside world, including Moscow, that the Chinese Empire showed throughout its long history. It is ordering its people into communes and regimenting every step of their life in an even more extreme manner than Moscow.

No one knows how far this internal rivalry is going to go, for it must be interpreted by those doctrines of Eurasianism that have long cast their shadow over Moscow. Moscow learned its lesson when the forces of Batu Khan swept westward and the princes of Kiev and later of the Galician-Volhynian state tried in vain to secure Western help to carry on the struggle for freedom and independence in the east. Ukraine paid dearly for that effort but Moscow used its place of subordination to the Grand Khan to build up its resources for the future. When the Russians crossed the Urals they tried to sweep due east, and in the seventeenth century it was the Manchus who forced them to the north, so that it was only in the nineteenth century that they were able, in China's decline, to reach the open harbor of Vladivostok. All this does not deny the Eurasian principle that the Russian-Eurasian state should include all the territory of the great Mongol Empire, the land between

the Adriatic and the Pacific, including at least north China around Peiping, even though the Eurasians were willing to concede that Arabia, India, southeast Asia and south China were not natural components of the land. Over that great stretch of territory Russian was to be the national language when the center of gravity was Moscow.¹

If we interpret this in the terms of the modern Soviet and Communist Empires we can see that from one point of view it is unimportant whether Peiping controls Moscow or Moscow dominates over Peiping. Yet history also shows that there has been a consistent swinging of the pendulum between the eastern and western ends of the axis. No one knows whether or not we are approaching such a swing at the present time but it might conceivably make a difference in the plans of Khrushchev.

If there is to be such a swing, the center of the struggle will be the relatively empty areas of Eastern and Western Turkestan where the Russians and the Chinese are now approaching each other with scant regard for the feelings and traditions of the various tribes and nations who are treated merely as pawns and cannon fodder for the clash of the two giants.

Alexander Blok, in the early days of Bolshevik rule in Moscow, wrote in his poem *The Scythians* a new version of the role of the Communists. Under this, Europe was to accept Bolshevik friendship and terms as the price for continued help from Russia. Otherwise Russia, the Scythians, would stand aside and let Europe and Asia clash and then be in a position to pick up the pieces and resume its drive for supremacy. The poem attracted some attention but its message was lost in the later interest over such subjects as collectivization and the new ideals of the Russian peace-loving democracy.

ANOTHER EXCUSE FOR INACTION

Yet it is significant that today we are beginning to hear in the West quiet arguments that even the Union of the Soviet Republics can serve a good cause if its unity is maintained by checking any western advance of Red China. It is a new and tempting excuse for a means of emphasizing the humane and civilizing mission of Russia in unknown lands. We are told that we must not be surprised if the time will come when we will be glad to seek an alliance with the Soviet Union against Chinese Communism just as in the far west we are urged to support a Communist government in Yugo-

¹ Cf. G. Vernadsky, *Sketch of Russian History*, Part I, Eurasian Publishing House, 1927.

slavia because the Communist Tito, basing his foreign policy on that of Moscow, can protect or at least give aid and comfort to the West to save his own skin, if Moscow moves westward.

These and similar ideas have long nestled in certain sections of the State Department, where they took root during the period when a popular American pastime was "twisting the lion's tail" and seeking European support against the British Empire. Whatever validity they had then has long since been lost with the growing relations between the United States and Great Britain and the newly established independent states of the British Commonwealth, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But like many other antiquated notions, they have been fed by sources which were friendly with holy Russia for its own sake and are unwilling to see that the new demands for freedom and independence which are stirring in Asia and Africa are being raised by the peoples and nations in that great prison house of nations, Russia-USSR.

Even Mikoyan as Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union is adding his bit to the campaign, for he too is personally willing to stress that while there is but one road to Communism, there are differences between Moscow and Peiping which have gone further in the organization of slave communes than Moscow found applicable in its own case. His guarded words imply very definitely the doubts that are in the mind of Khrushchev as to whether Moscow is to accept a definite shift in the axis or whether it is to seek by some form of blackmail to use the resources of the West to maintain the Communist axis at its Western center.

Thus whether it is open or secret, there are doubts in the mind of Khrushchev. A victory for him in Germany would increase his prestige and perhaps swing some doubters to his side. So he can threaten and cajole, insult and flatter, secure in the knowledge that the United States is placing above everything the need for maintaining peace with the USSR and of not reacting so strongly to Red Chinese threats and attacks that Moscow will be called to intervene and perhaps grant leadership to the east. It worked in Korea. It has worked with Quemoy, and the United States is still hoping that there will be no revolt in China that will justify Chiang Kai-shek in raising again on the China mainland the call for the reestablishment of that Chinese democracy which was saved with difficulty from the Communists in the twenties.

A WISE POLICY TO FOLLOW

What is the wise policy for the United States at the present time? It is not leaving the situation in the hands of Khrushchev

but striking out boldly with a renewed demand that true democracy be established throughout the satellite states, that the Baltic states ruthlessly and treacherously seized by Stalin in 1939 and 1940 be restored and that the campaign of liberation be pushed to the walls of Moscow and the Great Russian domain.

That will not leave the West defenseless or deprived of its strongest potential ally, an enemy which is only too ready as in World War II to nullify its promises and assurances for the good of world Communism and the supremacy of the Eurasian state. Rather, with the newer trend toward the unification and cooperation of Europe, the way will be open to take that action which the West failed to take when Batu Khan made his great assault upon Kiev and followed up with overrunning so much of Europe.

Once the blight of Russian Communist misrule is lifted from the satellite states and the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, the way will be open for the creation of a newer and broader concept of Europe which over its whole domain will be able to unite as the nations of the West have done in NATO and then can stand as a single whole against any aggression from the organized Communist imperialism of the East. Just as the nations of the West and the United States prevailed against the forces of Hitler, so can they stand with the aid of the liberated peoples against an outside menace.

If the West will do this, the dreams of the great Eurasian empire pivoted on Moscow and Peiping will be irretrievably shattered. The free nations of southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands will find themselves in the new democratic union of the world and Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung will be left to carry on their own personal autocracies over their own immediate followers. It will make little difference to the world whether they kill each other or starve each other. Mankind can live without them and their autocrats.

Yet to bring that about the nations of the free world, and especially the United States, must give up foolish dreams that the future of humanity depends upon willingness of Khrushchev and Company to give up their basic code of conquest and aggression, infiltration and demoralization so that there can be peaceful co-existence on Moscow's terms. In place of that there will be the more inspiring picture of the liberated nations enjoying the four freedoms and uniting for the removal of ignorance and need and for the harmonious building up of the human family, secure in the knowledge that freedom is indivisible and that the world cannot endure in peace half-slave and half-free.

UKRAINE IS LARGELY STILL A "TERRA INCOGNITA"

Results of a Survey Among West Europeans

By VASYL MARKUS

The author of this report spent a month attending the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, 53rd session, January 1958, which was attended by students and young graduates hailing from various countries of Western Europe. This was an exceptional opportunity to discover what this category of person thinks and knows about Eastern Europe and especially about Ukraine. The people concerned were not mere students but predominantly individuals with higher education who specialized in political and diplomatic activities. The group and discussions led the author to an expected conclusion—the countries of Eastern Europe, known as the "people's democracies," evoke only a slight interest among West Europeans, and that Ukraine, although sometimes an object of interest, to a large degree still remains a *terra incognita*. We deem it important to disclose more precisely the amount of knowledge and opinions of our Western European colleagues on Ukraine and on Eastern Europe in general.

With this in mind, a fairly extensive survey was conducted among the participants of the Seminar.

The Seminar, whose main object was to study the foreign policy of the United States, was attended by young people, most of whom had already obtained a degree in the social sciences and were already working in their respective professional fields. About 80 per cent of them were between the ages of 25 and 35. On the basis of professions and scholastic levels of the 47 participants in the survey 11 were engaged in the diplomatic and foreign service, 10 were economists and lawyers who worked in state and private enterprises, 6 were employees of radio stations (4 from the BBC) and there were 4 journalists, 2 pedagogues and 14 alumni of higher institutions of learning preparing their dissertations in the political, historical and economic sciences.

From the national point of view there were: 8 Englishmen (one of whom was a naturalized Hungarian), 6 Italians, 5 Germans, 5 Dutchmen, 4 Frenchmen, 3 Austrians, 3 Swedes, 2 Irishmen, 2 Danes, 2 Norwegians, 2 Yugoslavs (not immigrants) and one Swiss (naturalized Lithuanian), 1 Finn, 1 Belgian, 1 Czech (immigrant) and 1 American (who works for the U.S. Information Service in Germany). Of the 47 persons 7 were women.

The author of this survey did not believe the nationality of the participants was significant in this case. Besides, the anonymity would have been lost. That is also the reason for the unasked question of party membership. For the sake of thoroughness, we might add that among the participants one was a Communist, 8-10 were leftists and Socialists, 10-12 Christian Democrats; but the majority were not members of any party, as is usually the case with government employees.

We will now describe the manner in which this survey was conducted. All the participants were given a questionnaire, to be filled out within 3 days and placed in a special box. Strict anonymity was preserved. No special pressure was brought to bear on the participants to fill out the questionnaire: participation was voluntary. The questionnaire itself was divided into three sections: (a) opinion about Eastern Europe in the light of the East-West conflict; (b) opinion about the political question of Ukraine and (c) knowledge of Ukraine. All those wishing to participate in the survey were asked to answer individually and not consult any literature or seek information from other participants. Most of the answers were in the form: yes or no, without opinion. In places it was possible to add comment. Only in the test concerning the knowledge of Ukraine was a definite answer required.

The questionnaire was filled out and returned by 28 persons, constituting 60 per cent of the group. We will permit ourselves to make one more comment concerning the response. Our opinion is that it was satisfactory. Of the 19 abstentions some undoubtedly knew either very little or nothing about Ukrainian affairs, and so did not bother to reply. For some the questionnaire was too long (21 questions and additional comments). The anonymity of the survey being guaranteed, many did not feel obliged to take part; they saved thus 10 to 15 minutes of time for recreation or other activity. We believe that only an insignificant part (10-15 per cent) ignored the survey intentionally.

AGAINST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The first series of questions concerned East European affairs in general. It is necessary to note that the questions were connected to a previously conducted discussion among the participants on the state of affairs and perspectives in Eastern Europe. That discussion gave the participants a chance to specify their views and state them more cogently at the conclusion.

The questions, along with the answers, are given in the order they appeared in the questionnaire:

(1) *Are you for retaining the status quo in Eastern Europe?* Two persons gave a distinct "yes." Three also answered "yes," but to subsequent questions they answered positively for a policy of liberation of Eastern Europe; therefore it would follow they are also against the *status quo*. Either they did not understand the question or thought that a change in the *status quo* would necessarily be a cause of war, and so they declared themselves against any change. 26 of 28 answers do not favor the actual situation in Eastern Europe. One of the respondents who approved the current situation argued, "it is the only way to any reasonable coexistence."

(2) *Do you favor a policy of liberation regarding Eastern Europe?* 22 persons answered "yes," 5 "no" and another also "no," but later the latter selected one of the modes of liberation. Some of the partisans of liberation underscored that they favor a "peaceful" liberation or liberation at long range, or the condition that such a liberation would not cause war. How these persons imagine this policy is illustrated by the following question:

(3) *If you are in favor of a policy of liberation, what methods do you prefer?* The respondents were given a choice of one or several of the indicated ways: (a) internal evolution without Western intervention; (b) diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure; (c) military intervention. In reply to this question 24 persons declared themselves for liberation; this means that 2 persons who were against a definite policy of liberation favor a change (one by way of evolution; the other, by psychological pressure). 2 persons favored the employment of all three methods at once or as supplements; 8, internal evolution accompanied by external pressure; 14 preferred one of the two previous methods, of whom 4 underlined that they preferred a process of liberation by way of progressive internal evolution without intervention. Therefore 86 per cent were for a change in Eastern Europe, of whom 14 per cent preferred internal evolution, 78 per cent external pressure (not military), and not

quite 8 per cent desired military intervention with other means of pressure.

The next question was designed to establish the opinion of the participants in regard to actual affairs, such as the recent Hungarian revolution. The question was:

(4) *In case of new insurrections in Eastern Europe should the West react more actively than it did during the Hungarian revolution?* Eighteen persons answered affirmatively, 7 negatively and 3 had no opinion. The comments on these answers are especially interesting: the majority of those who proposed a more active reaction did not wish a military action, but favored all means that would not cause war. Also those who were against a more violent reaction than was evoked by the Hungarian revolution explained that a violent reaction might lead to World War III. Only one person wanted to see volunteers sent. In any case, 64 per cent declared themselves for the principle of active reaction.

The author wished to find out the position of the respondents in regard to the question of liberating the nations of the USSR. The following question was posed:

(5) *Do you also include in the policy of liberation the nations of the USSR? If so, name which.* Fourteen answers were affirmative (50 per cent), 10 negative (36 per cent), the remainder without opinion. As for naming of the nations, 6 included Ukraine, 5 the Baltic States, 4 Byelorussia, 2 Kazakhstan, 2 Georgia, 1 Russia, 1 Uzbekistan, 1 the Chechens, 1 every nation, while one made the general remark: "Every nation that wants to be independent." Let us note that each affirmative answer contained several nations.

THE IDEA OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE ALREADY HAS ITS ROOTS IN PUBLIC OPINION

The next group of questions concerned the Ukrainian political question. Questions which very often arise in discussions between Ukrainians and West Europeans were posed. They were formulated in an objective manner, so as not to influence the answers. Here, naturally, there were more "without opinion" than in the preceding section, owing to lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian problem. The questions and their answers with some comments follow:

(1) *Are you friendly to the idea of independence of Ukraine from Russia?* There were 14 (50 per cent) affirmative answers, 5 (18 per cent) negative, 9 without opinion.

The second question was posed not as an alternative to the first but as a possible solution propagated by Russians and some persons in the West. The question:

(2) *Do you favor a future solution of the Ukrainian problem in the framework of a Russian democratic federation?* Thirteen said "yes," 1 "no," 14 were "without opinion." We noted that 7 of those who answered this question affirmatively did likewise for Ukrainian independence in the previous question. One can perhaps understand them through these two comments: "Better than the present status"; "If not independence, then it's a better solution." Two persons in their comments excluded the possibility of a "democratic Russia" and one, who declared having no opinion on this subject, added that "It is a matter to be decided among the Ukrainians and Russians themselves."

The next two questions concerned the eventual enclosure of Ukraine in a supra-national community besides that of Russia. And here, many of those who were favorable to independence, answered in the affirmative as well. Therefore, the questions were not alternatives. One question was:

(3) *Would you include a free Ukraine in a future Central European federation?* Eleven persons answered "yes," 8 "no," and 9 were "without opinion." Hence 40 per cent favored the presence of Ukraine in a federation of Central-Eastern Europe, now discussed not only by emigres but by certain circles in the West as well.

(4) *Would you include a free Ukraine in a United Europe?* This question was answered affirmatively by 12, negatively by 9, without opinion 7. The answers in general are similar to those elicited by the previous question. We think that the participants answered this question more definitely than the preceding one because in the case of a United Europe they knew exactly the subject involved. Concluding, it seems that 43 per cent favored the membership of Ukraine in a United States of Europe.

Next we put a question to find out how much Western opinion expects to gain from an independent Ukraine: The question:

(5) *Would you consider a separation of Ukraine from Russia would bring any profit to your country? If so, state how (economic, political, military).* Five persons answered "yes," 13 "no," 10 "without opinion." When it came to the gains, 3 expected them in the political and military field and only 2 in the military (weakening of Russia). None mentioned economic gains. We think that for many Ukrainians this response will come as a surprise, since many of them think that the West is interested in Ukraine mainly from an economic point of view. On the other hand, we can attribute it to a minimal knowledge of the economic potentialities of Ukraine. We shall return to this point later.

Two more pointed questions concerning the Ukrainian political problem were posed. One of them dealt with the actual international status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the other with the character of the Ukrainian national liberation movement which sometimes is said to be the result of "foreign intrigue." The first question was:

(6) *Are you for retaining Soviet Ukraine in the United Nations?* Twelve (43 per cent) answered "yes," 5 (17 per cent) "no," 11 "without opinion." Such an answer will surprise many people and first of all Ukrainians. But it looks as though this is the personal conviction of the respondents who, for the most part gave their reasons. Here are some:

"Even though today it is unimportant, it will be an important precedent for a free Ukraine"; "Because Ukraine is a charter member, recognized by the Western powers"; "It is unnecessary to anger the Soviets," etc. Those who were for excluding Soviet Ukraine from the U.N., said:

"Colonies are not members of the U.N."; "She is not an independent state, but a Soviet province"; "Because South Dakota also is not a member of the U.N."; "She is not independent," etc. It is interesting to compare these answers with those about Ukrainian independence: 5 of those who were partisans of independence declared themselves for retaining Soviet Ukraine in the U.N.; also for its membership were two who were against independence. Four of those who were for independence declared themselves for the expulsion of Soviet Ukraine from the U.N.; so did one who was against independence. The rest of the "for" and "against" were given by those who were without opinion on the subject of Ukrainian independence. Also, some who declared themselves without opinion on the question of Soviet Ukraine's membership in the U.N. were "for" or "against" independence. This division of thought would be, we suppose, typical among Ukrainians themselves.

Another question was:

(7) *Do you think that Ukrainian nationalism is a result of the German policy "Drang nach Osten"?* Two answered "yes," 15 "no," 13 were without opinion. We find such comments on this question as the following:

"It is probable that German policy stimulated it" (in both answers of "yes"); "It has nothing in common with German policy"; "No, Ukrainian nationalism is much older"; "The Ukrainian state already existed several centuries before"; "It is much older than the German East European policy"; "Nationalism is in human nature," etc. It is important to note here that the respondents had not

accepted the often propagated Russian theory about German "intrigue."

PITIFUL STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT UKRAINE

The third section was devoted to knowledge about Ukraine. It was supposed to be a sort of examination for the participants. The author on purpose posed a few questions to which he did not expect any answer or a weak one at best because he wished to ascertain the actual state of things, leaving commentary for later.

(1) *State the approximate territorial size and population of Ukraine.* Four stated "territory like France"; 2 like Rumania, 2 like France and West Germany; 1 like France and Belgium; 1 like Germany; 1 two million sq. miles; 1—600,000 sq. km; 1—150,000 sq. km; 16 gave no answer because they did not know.

About 7 answers can be considered as correct—25 per cent of the total who took part in the survey and 54 per cent of those who replied. As far as the population is concerned, 16 could say nothing; the rest stated the following: 3—30 million; 2—40 million; one each for 50, 45, 20, 10, 7 and 6 million. If one takes into consideration the wide range of figures from 30-50 million (these figures usually appear in various books to indicate either the population of the ethnographic territory or the Ukrainians, in a limited sense, the population or territory of the Ukrainian republic), then the correct number of answers is 7, and the wholly incorrect 4.

(2) *What are the natural resources of Ukraine?* 20 persons answered this question, naming at least one section of the national economy or one type of resource; the majority listed several sections and types. In 12 answers agriculture appears; in 7, cultivation of wheat; in 2, industry; in 2, cattle raising; in 2, the mining industry; 7 persons named coal; 1, electric energy; 1, petrol. In general, judging from the 11 answers, Ukraine appears to be an agricultural-industrial country (55 per cent of those who answered this question).

(3) *Name 5 Ukrainian cities (if possible, in the order of their importance).* 17 persons out of 28 replied to this question. 14 mentioned Kiev; 7, Odessa; 4, Kharkiv; 4, Dnipropetrovsk; 2, Lviv; while Zaporizhia, Poltava, Stalino, Sevastopol, Taganrog (the latter not in Soviet Ukraine) were each mentioned once. Also mentioned were several non-Ukrainian cities, among them Rostov (in 7 answers; most probably because of its close connection with the war operations in Ukraine), Voronezh, Kursk, Orel and Minsk. In one answer 5 cities were placed in the correct order of their importance; in another—almost correctly. The majority named less than 5 cities.

In general, we think that the answers to this particular question were satisfactory.

Next we posed a somewhat naïve question:

(4) *What language does the population of Ukraine speak?* The author was conscious of the absurdity of this question but he thought it worthwhile to ask, since very often the West confounds the Ukrainian language with the Russian. Out of 28 persons, 9 left this question unanswered (32 per cent); 19 named the Ukrainian language. It is significant that no one named the Russian language. Hence perhaps the majority of people in the West are aware of the existence of the Ukrainian language.

The most unsatisfactory answers of all were given to the next three questions, which consisted of naming several leading Ukrainian personalities in the cultural and political fields. The first question was:

(5) *Name several important Ukrainians known for their works in literature, art or music or active in the theatre or cinema.* 20 persons left this question unanswered and out of the rest, one mentioned Shevchenko; 3, Hohol; 1, Wanda Wasilewska. Also mentioned were 6 Russian names who have nothing in common with Ukrainian culture.

The second question of this type was:

(6) *Name several Ukrainian nationalist political leaders after 1917.* No one answered this question. One did mention two names (Petlura and Skoropadsky) but he placed them under communists (see next question).

(7) *Name several Ukrainian communist personalities after 1917.* This was rather a general question. It was answered by 11 persons; here 8 named Khrushchev; 1, Timoshenko; 1, Kirichenko and 1, Budenny. Also given were names of persons who have no relation to Ukraine: Stalin (2), Trotsky (1), Zhdanov (1). The names of Petlura and Skoropadsky also appeared here (incorrectly). Only one of the respondents named 4 persons of more or less Ukrainian origin. On the basis of this survey we may conclude that Western public opinion has accepted the much publicized revelation of Khrushchev's Ukrainian origin (28 per cent of those who participated in the survey and 72 per cent of those who answered the given question).

VERITABLE OR PREPARED OPINION?

On the basis of observing the replies to the questionnaire and of listening to discussions connected with it, the author of this survey had an opportunity to verify the genuineness of the opinion

and knowledge of Ukraine. Conversations on the subjects mentioned in the survey took place after its completion; likewise, only after filling out the questionnaire did a few persons look up the latest edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and its fairly good section on Ukraine. We may suppose that for some 90-95 per cent the survey reflected the actual state of knowledge of the given people.

With regard to the opinion, it was partly oriented by the Seminar (the survey was conducted after three weeks of living in the students' center). One of the last questions was related to this fact:

Did your participation in this Seminar influence your answers? If so, which ones? This question was answered negatively or not at all by 21 persons. Only 7 said "yes"; two of these stated that their presence in the center influenced all of their answers: 1, only with respect to the questions about Eastern Europe; 3 on questions on Ukrainian affairs, and one declared that his presence in the center directed his attention to the existence of a Ukrainian problem. It is important to note that 5 of these 7 persons answered positively the question about Ukrainian independence; 1 left it unanswered, while 1 reserved his position, although he was very well acquainted with Ukrainian affairs. The author finds it also necessary to note that his influence on opinion occurred only by chance in conversations or discussions mostly on other problems, without any specific intention of "propagating the Ukrainian cause," and that because from the very beginning he was planning to have a survey which he wished to be representative of the actual state of things.

Another question, important from the methodical point of view, was posed in the following form:

What are the sources of your knowledge of Eastern Europe, and especially of the Ukrainian question? The participants had a choice from among: lectures, personal contacts (conversations) and specialized studies. Only 13 answered this question. None of those who answered studies East European or Ukrainian questions; 8 named the reading of newspapers and magazines; a few, the radio; 7, personal contact (one mentioned meetings and conversations with Ukrainians in DP camps in Germany), and 2 stated as their source of knowledge conversations held with the author of this survey.

Aside from the fact that part of the opinion (about 15-20 per cent) may have been influenced by conversations with the author prior to the survey, we may presume that it was not a prepared opinion *ad hoc*, but a valid one, reflecting the true state of things.

SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS

If it is possible to reach a conclusion from this survey, conducted among a limited number of people, then it would be such:

The present West European young intellectual elite and especially the people who hold socio-political jobs or work in administration, pay but little attention to the problems of Eastern Europe. Although morally they reject the *status quo*, in practice they are ready to go along with it. They would hardly place the solution of this problem among the aims of Western foreign policies. They conceive protection against communism and Russian imperialism as a defensive affair. They think that any active East European policy would necessarily be connected with a world war.

Although for many in the West the Ukrainian question is an unpleasant one, even an unwanted one, nevertheless it imposes itself by virtue of its objective weight. Doubtlessly such a survey ten years ago would have been worse for the Ukrainians than it is today. Roughly half of the people who would like to have any active relations with Eastern Europe favor Ukraine's independence. This, however, does not mean that these people would be ready to engage themselves or their government in the policy of liberating Ukraine. It is only an opinion and a desire, without real political force behind it. About an equal part of opinion favors closer ties of Ukraine with her Western neighbors and eventually with a United Europe. It is a fact that the state of knowledge of the Ukrainian question, and especially of its political aspect, is pitiful. If it is true of this center, then without a doubt the state of knowledge is still lower for the average Western opinion.

Analysis of the questionnaire shows that persons better acquainted with the Ukrainian question are in 75 per cent of the cases more favorable to it. Therefore the problem arises for Ukrainians of adequately informing Western opinion.

As for the ignorance of Ukrainian affairs, one can eliminate it only gradually and most certainly it will never be entirely accomplished by emigres alone. Certainly Western institutions and press organs could help, but it is doubtful whether they would be sufficiently interested in these affairs and could break Moscow's conspiracy of silence about Ukraine in the world. Therefore, the essential part of the work in this field in the meantime of necessity falls upon the Ukrainians in the free world.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN SPANISH AMERICA

By JOSE JULIO SANTA PINTER

I. SOVIET DIPLOMACY

Red penetration in South and Central American countries must, of necessity, be considered in connection with Soviet diplomacy¹ for three main reasons:

First—E. S. Varga, the great Soviet theoretician, lists, among others, the following tactical points of the world's communist movement: the defense of the USSR as the "citadel of socialism" in the international field, by means of "fifth columns;" the defense of the countries' independence and sovereignty against "American imperialism;" the struggle for peace, weakening the peoples' will to resist, encouragement to the nationalist independence movements of the peoples under colonial powers, simultaneously with the fight against the warmongers, whose maximum exponent is "American imperialism," or the "stronghold of capitalism," utilizing every tactical means needed.²

Second—As we see it, Soviet diplomatic strategy operates on two fronts: on short term (tactically) and on long term (or strategically). With the first they obviously try to spark quick action by all means at their disposal; we shall see that these means vary from acts of sabotage to the infiltration of the clergy; the second policy, on a longer term basis, is twisting and sneaky, but no less *direct* on the whole. Peace agitation, the ideological indoctrination of teachers, and so on, are some of its numerous props.

We must emphasize, as a matter of our sincere purpose of objectivity, that Russians are recognizedly capable diplomats and shrewd politicians, and that in their classical play even withdrawals

¹ See the author's *La Diplomacia Sovietica*, Santiago de Chile, No. 19, pp. 30 ff and also *Teoria y practica de la diplomacia*, Roque de Palma, publisher, Buenos Aires 1958, pp. 55 ff.

² Varga, *The Basic Problems of Economics and Politics of Imperialism*, Moscow, 1953, quoted by K. Kononenko in "Strategy of Soviet Expansion into Asia and Africa," *Prologue*, New York 1957, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 34, footnote 9.

—certainly not too numerous and certainly only apparent—have a strategical value.

Add to the above fact that Soviet Russian propaganda—another very important factor—leads the masses on both sides of the Iron Curtain to believe its “desire for peace” and you shall see why anybody who is not on their side is necessarily an enemy of peace and, consequently, a “reactionary” or a “fascist.”

All this is based on the Soviet belief—for the Reds are true champions of *Realpolitik*—that the *great majority* of mankind is neither for or against communism, but only stupid or indifferent. They do not try to sell the *minority*, who are anti-communist because they know what communism is; they direct their efforts towards winning the huge majority of stupid or indifferent people, or at least make them receptive to Soviet ideas.

Third—Soviet diplomacy—which, in our judgment is the only one (apart from the Vatican³) knowing where it wants to reach—is *loco temporeque conveniens*;⁴ both pacifist (peace movements) and militaristic (military interventions); both imperialistic⁵ and nationalistic;⁶ both Stalinist and anti-Stalinist; both democratic and totalitarian; both industrialist and agricultural;⁷ according to the circumstances of place and time.⁸

II. PENETRATION

After establishing these premises we may go into details, that is, size up, briefly and for information purposes,⁹ Red penetration and its methods in Spanish America and Brazil. To help us in this task, we are fortunate in having available a valuable collection of *Estudios sobre el Comunismo*, a review published in Santiago, Chile, and edited by R. P. Miguel Poradowski, whose latest articles and writings have been extremely useful to us, as they are the foundations on which we built the present survey.

³ For this reason, the only *serious* enemy of communism is the Vatican, for its spiritualism.

⁴ S. Kertesz, “Church and State in Hungary,” in *The Review of Politics*, Notre Dame University Press, Ind., Vol. II, No. 2, 1949, p. 210.

⁵ That is, a *contemporary* kind of the old satellite system.

⁶ Mainly in South America, Asia, and Africa.

⁷ Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁸ A. Schoenfeld, “Soviet Imperialism in Hungary,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 26, pp. 554 through 566 and Rodrigo Cifuentes, “Declaracion de Unidad del Comunismo Internacional,” in *Informaciones Exclusivas*, Mexico City, January 30, 1958, Vol. 6, No. 333, p. 2.

⁹ We say “size up” because the subject lends itself to a deep and analytical study comprising many volumes.

Our point of departure is the importance attributed Latin America by the Soviet Union, as stated also by Pedro V. Domingo when he deals with communist tactics:¹⁰ the Soviet Union considers Latin America its natural economic source, open to exploitation; to better use those countries, the Soviet Union must leave room for a fallacious pseudo-sovereignty and pseudo-independence (government, armed forces, etc.) and finally, Latin American Governments, or the domestic political opposition to them, greedy military chiefs, etc., may be utilized with greater success against the United States¹¹ than the weak, undisciplined and clumsy local Communist Parties.

A. ANTECEDENTS

1. Socialism

Among the forerunners of Red penetration one should mention in the first place socialism, the postulates of which indicate without a shadow of a doubt its Bolshevik essence. According to the official Soviet doctrine, States are divided in three categories: capitalist States, forming the lowest stratum; People's Democracies, that is, the satellite countries, rated as superior because they passed from capitalism to socialism, and finally, at the very top, the Soviet Union, as having passed from socialism to communism, the ultimate goal.¹²

In Ecuador, for instance, the Statement of Principles and the Constitution of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party includes statements like the following:

The recognition of a Universal Motherland, as a basis of human equality and brotherhood; the inescapable duty to extol the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitional stage, until the capitalist class is extinguished,¹³ etc.

At the Twenty-fourth Congress of that same Socialist Party, held in 1957, its Secretary General, Juan Isaac Lovato, exclaimed that "the Ecuadorian Socialist Party must confirm, today as it did yesterday, that it is a Marxist party..."¹⁴ thus serving as a sort of Trojan horse of communism.

¹⁰ "Nuevas táticas de Moscú en América Latina," in *Estudios*, No. 18, pp. 104 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹² See the author's, "*Sistema del Derecho Soviético*," *Análisis Sistemático*, Roque de Palma, publisher, Buenos Aires 1957, p. 13.

¹³ Gonzalo Bonilla Cortes, "*Procomunismo del Partido Socialista del Ecuador*," in *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

2. Other "Isms"

Laissez-faire liberalism and its principle of free competition, which sometimes amounted to "let steal," created in many countries—like in Guatemala,¹⁵ for instance—a climate of poverty highly favorable to the spreading of communistic ideas which promise solutions; only the poor people don't know that the promise, if ever fulfilled, will make things much worse than they are right now.

Similar is the behavior of the old style conservatism, which closes its eyes to vital problems of social coexistence, and thus unwittingly helps in the preparation, perhaps, of social upheavals.

3. The "Intelligentsia"

The intelligentsia plays a prominent role in the propagation of the communist ideology.

It is important to note that, contrary to some divergent opinions, we believe that the subversive work of the several communist parties—however necessarily uniform at heart—in the Ibero-American countries is not to be disregarded. Nevertheless, for reasons of political and social convenience, it is the bodies of overt or clandestine communist affiliations and the associations of fellow traveling intellectuals that cooperate more effectively with international communism. We must give first place among these to the movements of the so-called *intelligentsia* which, for different reasons, lend the Reds valuable aid. We can thus mention—and only mention, without pretending by a long shot to present an exhaustive list—the activity of communist intellectuals in Argentina,¹⁶ whose "smoke screen maneuvers permitted... the Communist Party to assign its leading elements different jobs planned by the Central Committee, around orders from Moscow." ¹⁷

The thesis of Hector P. Agosti includes "the theoretical directives, the strategic groundwork and the doctrinal foundations to attract the great mass of Marxist Argentine intellectuals, those with leftist leanings or the inclination to be 'useful fools,' clay easily molded by the smiling communism which affirms, devilishly, to have broken with Stalinist sectarianism." ¹⁸

¹⁵ Monsignor Mariano Rossell y Arellano, "*Tácticas y Obras del Comunismo en Guatemala*," in *Estudios*, No. 15, pp. 83 ff, specially p. 84. *Atheism* is not an innocent forerunner (see Mario Fiorini "*El Comunismo en Mexico*," in *Estudios*, No. 15, p. 71).

¹⁶ Damaso MacLaurin, "*Los Intelectuales en el Comunismo de la Argentina*," in *Estudios*, No. 20, pp. 71 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

Enlarging on the first item (theoretical directives), Agosti outlines the bases of the whole political action that had as objectives to support the candidacy—and later the Government policy—of the presidential formula which won the latest Argentine elections. Of all of them, those revealing the most direct influence are some clearly communistic principles of the agrarian plan. Of that, more later.

As to the "strategic groundwork," Agosti says that "the function of the Argentine intellectuals shall consist of showing, with the help of objective analyses, the social roots of such abnormal growth, without being themselves attracted by the sentimentalism of the quarrels between '*portenos*' and '*provincials*'¹⁹ formula embodying a remainder of bourgeois ideology which obfuscates the true dimensions of the historic and present problems."²⁰

Regarding the "doctrinal foundations," he writes that "the leading function of the party in the cultural work" consists of "the establishment of this unity of tendencies, which all of us have helped to forge, and the absence of which has determined, in so many cases, the splintering of the efforts of the avant-garde intellectuals."²¹

Last but not least, the collaboration with the intellectuals who do agree with the Reds does not mean, according to Agosti, a renunciation of their ideology, for "controversy with the allies must lead to the strengthening of the possibilities of common action."²²

In the second and third parts of his work²³ Damaso MacLaurin lists many intellectuals and fellow travelers who cooperate with communism. He transcribes likewise the "Manifesto for a National Popular Program," issued on the eve of the above mentioned presidential elections in Argentina; many of its co-signers, "almost every one with a leftist past, Marxist and communist connections . . . hold very important jobs in the present Government of Argentina."²⁴

We shall now deal with the Reds' press organs and other cultural activities.

B. METHODS AND MEANS OF ACTION

Under this heading we will study the inter-relationship between publications and cultural associations and institutions.

¹⁹ *Portenos*, popular denomination of the citizens of Buenos Aires, the federal capital of the Argentine Republic.

²⁰ MacLaurin, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²³ In *Estudios*, No. 22, pp. 111 ff and No. 23, pp. 72 ff, respectively.

²⁴ *Estudios*, No. 22, p. 114.

1. Publications

Material is extremely abundant.

Firstly, we may mention the publications of the different Spanish Communist Parties in the American countries. Pierre Faure lists them²⁵ as follows: in Argentina, *Por la Republica*, *Pueblo Espanol*, *Espana Independiente*, *Noticias de Espana*, *Cronica Espanola* and *Espana Democratica*; in Cuba, *Nosotros*; in Chile, *La Voz de Espana*; in Mexico, *Nuestro Tiempo*, *Espana Popular* and *Alkartu*; in Uruguay, *Espana Democratica*.

Apart from the above publications there circulate in Argentina *Cuadernos de la Cultura*,²⁶ *Hoy*, *Nueva Revista*, 1936, *La Internacional*²⁷, *Nuestras Mujeres*,²⁸ *Derechos del Hombre*²⁹ and *Propositos*.

In Mexico:³⁰ *La Voz de Mexico*, *Liberacion*, *Noviembre*, *Problemas de America Latina*, *Intercambio cultural*. Disguised publications: *Siempre*, *Paralelo 20*, *Futuro*, *Mexico en la Cultura*, *Diorama de la Cultura*, *Cauce*. The famous *Fondo de Cultura Economica* has printed many volumes by communist or communizing authors³¹ but never a book against communism. The *America Nueva* and *Grijalbo* are also Red publishing firms in disguise.

It may be enlightening to quote here a passage from an article by Jorge Crespo, "Toral on Communism in Ecuador":³² "The big favorable headlines on the activities of the Socialist and Communist Parties; the no less helping editorials; praise for the Marxist leaders in the fields of politics, culture and letters; the trend to hide and cover for and disregard all the mistakes, damage and insults of Bolshevism in Ecuador, since the party was established, etc., etc., have in such a manner encouraged the Left that it is not possible to estimate the effectiveness of such an unceasing and faithful collaboration."

A few lines before, he writes: "Were it possible to evaluate in cash the huge help given by the press to the development of communist ideas and action in our country, during the last thirty years, and at the usual space rates, it is certain that the total would rise to hundreds of millions of sucres."³³

²⁵ "El Partido Comunista Espanol," in *Estudios*, No. 15, p. 78.

²⁶ *Estudios*, No. 20, p. 72.

²⁷ *Estudios*, No. 22, p. 125.

²⁸ *Estudios*, No. 19, p. 98.

²⁹ *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 97.

³⁰ Beipi, "La Penetracion Comunista en Mexico," *Estudios*, No. 20, p. 84.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³² *Estudios*, No. 22, pp. 87 ff.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

2. Associations and Other Organizations

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (The People's Revolutionary Alliance of the Americas), founded in 1924 by Haya de la Torre in Mexico, must have played its role in pushing Marxist and communist ideals.³⁴

In Argentina: *Socorro Rojo Internacional* (International Red Aid), *Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre* (Argentine League for Human Rights),³⁵ *Comision Central por Defensa de la Libertad y de los Presos Politicos* (Central Committee for the Defense of Freedom and of Political Prisoners), *Comision por Abolicion de las Torturas* (Committee for the Abolition of Tortures),³⁶ *Union de las Mujeres de la Argentina* (Union of Argentine Women), *Movimiento pro-Democratizacion e Independencia Sindical* (Movement for the Labor Unions' Democratization and Independence),³⁷ *Union de Mujeres Espanolas* (Union of Spanish Women),³⁸ *Casa Argentina de la Cultura* (Argentina's House of Culture), *Movimiento de los Partidarios de la Paz* (Movement of the Peace Partisans),³⁹ and many others.

In Mexico, particularly the universities—which is the case also in Argentina, at present—are the main nests of communism: *Universidad Autonoma de Mexico* is undergoing extensive Red infiltration; the University of Guadalajara is in communist hands and likewise the monthly publication, *Vida Universitaria* of Monterey University begins to show signs of Red influence.⁴⁰

Among the book stores serving communism one can mention *Fondo de Cultura Popular*, *Libreria Nacional*, and *Libreria Navarro*.⁴¹

3. Teaching and Faculties

Sadly illustrative is the method followed to achieve the communization of teaching in a country like Mexico. Let us quote from Mario Fiorini's *El Comunismo en Mexico*:⁴²

Just as the big shots of the Comintern wanted the Mexican Government to act, it did act. The key to the Marxistization of the people was teaching,

³⁴ Mario Fiorini, "El Comunismo en el Peru," in *Estudios*, No. 16, pp. 67 ff.

³⁵ Damaso McLaurin, in *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 95.

³⁶ Damaso MacLaurin, in *Estudios*, No. 19, p. 91.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 97.

³⁹ *Estudios*, No. 23, p. 75.

⁴⁰ Belpi, *op. cit.*, in *Estudios*, No. 23, p. 88.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴² *Estudios*, No. 15, p. 71 ff.

which was given an atheistic and socialistic philosophical basis. Article 3 of the Constitution, as revised in 1935, read, textually: "Instruction provided by the State shall be socialistic and besides excluding every religious doctrine it shall combat fanaticism and prejudices, for which purpose the school shall organize teaching and other activities in a manner as to permit giving youth an exact and rational concept of the Universe and social life."

To achieve such "socialistic instruction" a "Plan of Action for the Socialistic Grade School" was drawn. As a sample, I quote:

III. By means of research and lectures, visits to museums, fixation of clear concepts of man's evolution. (a) The first religious ideas as products of fear of the unknown and of ignorance... (d) Birth of Christianity: its swift development; its influence on the struggle of the oppressed peoples. Its triumph and *transformation into an organ of exploitation*. The Middle Ages; the great kingdoms, the feudal economy, the classes and struggles, labor organization, religious fanaticism and the Crusades. (h) The immoralities and the exploitation of the Catholic clergy; the heretic movements and Reformation, as a reaction; its bourgeois character. The counter-Reformation. The great States. (j) The great social struggles; monopolization of wealth by the minorities; the proletariat acquires class consciousness; Karl Marx and the class struggle; the Paris Commune; the First International; imperialism and its economic causes, the Chicago martyrs; the Second International. (1) The Russian Revolution; establishment of Soviet power; end of World War I; economic, political and social organization of the Soviet Union; the Third International.

IV. (a) Explain the origin and the evolution of religions, emphasizing how all of them are based on fear before the unknown and how they have been dispelled with the advancement of science. Religion's exploiting, fanaticizing and obscurantist function. (b) Teach the pupils that churches are the property of the Nation and for this reason the government and the community are entitled to and have the duty of using them for more profitable communal purposes (schools, libraries, gyms, etc.).⁴³

About faculty contamination by means of Red infiltration of its ranks, we have data on Ecuador giving us an idea of how the heinous mission was accomplished. Jorge Crespo Toral writes:

After the young teacher is submitted to the materialization process in the State *Ecoles Normales*, it is easy to understand he should be a ready quarry for Bolshevism. So, since 1925, when an active communist drive started, the winning of new teachers took place in really alarming proportions.⁴⁴

Corruption of teaching went on:

The teaching of all subjects was handled in a materialistic spirit, with an effort to obliterate any innate spiritualism the children had brought from home. Anti-Leftist students were persecuted, and their marks lowered while those who embraced the communist ideology of their teachers were rewarded with better grades and scholarships. The position deteriorated to the point of sometimes removing a student from his class for his opposition to communism, thus making him waste a whole year.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 73 and 74.

⁴⁴ *Estudios*, No. 22, pp. 100 ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

In Argentina, the situation is hardly better. All the struggle artificially incited around the famous Article 28 of the University law on private universities, that is, those not inspected by the Government, was at the initiative of Leftist, socialist, philo-communist and communist elements and their fellow travellers, led by the present Dean of Buenos Aires University, no lesser a light than the brother of the President... *Sapienti sat*...

4. *The Student Body and Youth*

One of the main themes of any communist activity is to attract youth and use it for its own ends. We see thus that among the leading efforts of the "Ibero-American Section" is to establish normal (underground) contacts with the Latin American youth organizations.⁴⁶

Consequently, in Ecuador, for instance, one of the principal goals of Marxism "has always been the conquest of youth in general and especially of the young students, who will be the future leaders of society."⁴⁷ "The opportunistic university student who wants good grades without working hard joins the Ecuadorian FEUE."⁴⁸

It is notorious that in Argentina the FUBA completely controls the situation in all official teaching institutions of the Capital and, through its branches,⁴⁹ throughout the country. Its communistic leaning is obvious, as witness its ideological stand and even more its activity.

In Peru the same agitation for strikes has been noted among high school and university students.⁵⁰

5. *Schools for Agitators*

As it is traditionally important⁵¹—for, according to Lenin there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory—communism is indoctrinating its future "activists." The latest and sensational finding of the Argentine federal police (September 1958) of a "Latin American School for Communist Cadres" in the

⁴⁶ Pedro V. Domingo, "Penetración Soviética en América Latina," in *Estudios*, No. 16, p. 65.

⁴⁷ *Estudios*, No. 22, p. 108.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ e.g., *Federación de Estudiantes Secundarios y Especiales* (Federation of the Secondary and Special Students).

⁵⁰ Mario Florini, "El Comunismo en el Perú," in *Estudios*, No. 16, p. 70.

⁵¹ Pierre Faure, in *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 102.

neighborhood of Buenos Aires,⁵² makes one wonder: how many of such training courses function on the American continent?

6. Nationalism

As told by Pedro V. Domingo in his article "New Tactics of Moscow in Latin America,"⁵³ "in a strictly secret meeting, held in August, 1957, near Leningrad, and sponsored by the Economic Affairs Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a decision has been taken to step up the use of the local Nationalists rather than the Communists or the so-called 'progressives.'" ⁵⁴

According to Moscow, the reason for this was the insufficient number of trained "activists" available for Latin America,⁵⁵ and thus the continued need to apply the previous plan ("Grechev Brigade"): strong yet prudent support of all local nationalist groups and wide *national* cooperation with the Catholic clergy.⁵⁶

7. Anti-Americanism

Nationalism and anti-Americanism go hand in hand.

Among the new methods, two deserve particular mention: the exploitation of the Catholic and Nationalist labor unions opposing U.S. influence and the establishment or continued use of existing Nationalist and anti-American organizations, clubs and bodies.⁵⁷

The same applies to the conquest of the middle class and the native capitalists, to offer a wide united front to the "oppressive and criminal" U.S. imperialism, as is the case in Bolivia, for instance.⁵⁸

In Brazil, the Communists' stand is similar: they want to form an all-embracing National Popular Front to expel the *entreguistas* from the Government and to stop any attempt at "retrocession." (*Entreguistas* are people who accept foreign participation for the development of natural resources, especially oil, an explosive issue in the country.) They are out to exploit the deep nationalist feeling

⁵² Carlos Gomez Mena, "Algunas de las Actividades Mas Sobresalientes del Partido Comunista Argentino en 1958," in *Estudios*, No. 23, pp. 81 ff.

⁵³ *Estudios*, No. 18, pp. 104 ff.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106. See, Alberto D. Faleroni, "El Nacionalismo Marxista en Hispano America como Base Comunista de los Movimientos de Masas," in *Estudios*, No. 23, p. 49.

⁵⁷ *Estudios*, No. 16, p. 65.

⁵⁸ Sergio Fernandez Larrain, "El Comunismo en el Agro Latinoamericano (II)," *Estudios*, No. 18, p. 83.

of the Brazilian people by means of the labor unions, which have partisan coloring, so that they can eliminate the exploiting influence of the American trusts. They are against any concessions and negotiations between the Brazilian Government and American corporations for the establishment of oil refineries and other undertakings.⁵⁹

Moscow considers the Latin American countries as actual or potential "U.S. bases." There are, however, certain differences in category: in order of importance to Moscow, the four first places are held by Panama and its Caribbean *annexes*; Venezuela; Brazil; and Argentina.⁶⁰

Closely connected with this are the plans to create in each country such a situation that might make difficult the production of oil and prepare crews capable of taking over and managing the oil industry or, alternatively, to sabotage it by means of large scale movements.⁶¹

8. Colonialism

As a correlated problem, Stalin devoted special attention to the economic and political aspects of subversion in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, having indicated the following immediate tasks: to win over to communism the best elements of the working class and to create "independent" communist parties; to create a national revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants and the revolutionary intellectuals, against the national appeasing bourgeoisie bloc and imperialism; to ensure the dominating influence of the proletariat in such a bloc; to fight for the liberation of the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie from the sway of nationalist appeasement and, finally, to assure the dovetailing of the emancipation movement with the workers' movements of the more advanced countries.⁶²

Stalin split the world in two: on the one hand a handful of civilized nations having financial capital and exploiting the great majority of the world's population, and on the other the oppressed and exploited peoples of the colonies and of the underdeveloped countries, which are in the majority.⁶³

⁵⁹ Mario Fiorini, "La Crisis en el Comunismo Brasileiro," in *Estudios*, No. 19, p. 108.

⁶⁰ Pedro V. Domingo, "Los Dictadores Ayudan a los Comunistas," in *Estudios*, No. 23, p. 77.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁶² Alberto Daniel Faleroni, "Estrategia y Tactica Comunista en los Paises Coloniales y Semicoloniales," in *Estudios*, No. 16, p. 15.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

At the moment, the main communist watchword is to *dis-organize* production and transportation in the "colonial and dependent countries" in order to deprive the democratic powers of their principal essential raw materials, equally useful in peacetime and wartime. To this goal, the Reds use their old trick of fomenting constantly the class struggle which, at a given moment, can develop into a civil war.⁶⁴

Concomitantly, the strategic problem must be considered, mainly from the Caribbean (Panama Canal), where the Central American and Caribbean Revolutionary *Junta* sits.⁶⁵

9. *The Farm Question and the Peasants*

This is, without a doubt, one of the preferential and most disturbing matters in the national sphere, side by side with the industrial workers' problem.

The Guatemalan communist agrarian bill denied the citizens the property of the soil, allowing its use only on a temporary basis, so that the peasants would be at the mercy of the Reds and could be dispossessed of their allotted farms of and when they disobeyed the directives of the Communist Party.⁶⁶

The "Statement of Principles and Program" issued at the Eleventh Congress of the Mexican Communist Party in 1950⁶⁷ reads:

The agrarian and anti-imperialistic character of the Mexican Revolution makes the upward march of the agrarian revolution and the destruction of the large landed-estates one of its essential problems; the large-landed estates still are the main reactionary force, together with the imperialistic interests which dominate the country.⁶⁸

In El Salvador, the agrarian problem caused a disaster, as a result of the Second International intervention; in 1932 there was a bloody civil war in which 17,000 peasants were killed.⁶⁹

In Bolivia, the agrarian question is not much better.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁶⁵ Pedro V. Domingo, "Penetración Soviética en América Latina," in *Estudios*, No. 16, p. 66.

⁶⁶ Rossell y Arellano, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁶⁷ Fernández Larrain, *op. cit.*, in *Estudios*, No. 18, pp. 66 through 94.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 82 to 90.

On the agrarian plane, the tendency of communism is land collectivization⁷¹ and the consequent proletarianization of the peasants.⁷²

10. *Industrial Workers*

In Argentina, the communist workers' movement comprises two groups: one following the Moscow line, through the Communist Party, and another calling itself "independent," with Trotskyite features and directed by the Workers' Party, the Revolutionary Workers' Party and the Revolutionary Workers' Union, which act clandestinely and show their hand by means of acts of sabotage, work stoppages and other terror manifestations.⁷³

In Ecuador the Reds are trying to create the United Workers' Front with a double aim: to cause unrest in the street, for under the guise of claiming reform they disturb the peace with street meetings, and to unite all workers under communist leadership.⁷⁴

Strikes, organized for the smallest reasons, or without any reason, are sadly remembered events, well known in the life of the Latin American nations. In Argentina, the latest tactic is to bring to the streets *both workers and students together*.⁷⁵

11. *Infiltration in Religion*

The Reds take advantage of the Christian tradition of the peasants, as for instance in Guatemala, to penetrate their minds, printing pictures of their congressmen or candidates on Sacred Heart cards. They used to offer to repair churches, made gifts of religious and worship ornaments, etc.⁷⁶ Then they turned around and demoralized parish priests, protected the schismatic clergy.⁷⁷ With Arbenz's blessing they forbade or hampered religious manifestations and when the clergy protested President Arbenz replied: "He who attacks communism, attacks the Government itself."⁷⁸ What more evidence is needed?

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 and 91. See, Damaso MacLaurin, "Los Intelectuales en el Comunismo de la Argentina," in *Estudios*, No. 20, p. 76, "agrarian plan."

⁷² The second as a consequence of the first.

⁷³ Damaso MacLaurin, "El Comunismo en el Movimiento Obrero Argentino," in *Estudios*, No. 15, p. 91.

⁷⁴ Jorge Crespo Toral, "El Comunismo en el Ecuador," in *Estudios*, No. 22, p. 100.

⁷⁵ On the occasion of the disturbances because of "Article 28."

⁷⁶ Rossell y Arellano, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

12. Social Aspects

Sowing hate among the classes and even within the classes themselves;⁷⁹ encouragement of immorality and prostitution⁸⁰ as well as of the subversive and immoral press;⁸¹ worship of race;⁸² demoralization of the army⁸³ or infiltration of its ranks;⁸⁴ organization of espionage;⁸⁵ penetration in the administering of justice,⁸⁶ etc. No activity or social plane is immune from Red influence, either directly or indirectly, as the circumstances may allow.

13. Spanish Communist Parties

We consider extremely serious the presence of the several Spanish communist parties in Latin American countries. Their existence and methods of work cannot be left out of a study of communist penetration of Spanish America. However, we deem it sufficient to indicate a few direct sources on the subject, so that the reader and the researcher may find enough material to satisfy their curiosity. See, Pierre Faure *Estudios sobre el Comunismo*, No. 15, page 78; No. 16, p. 71 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela); No. 18, p. 99; No. 20, p. 57; No. 22, p. 92; No. 23, p. 68, etc.

III. CONCLUSION

These are only a few of the many methods used by communism in its penetration of Latin America.

If it is true—more in the case of communism than in any other—that the best defense is an offensive, one must hope (and what will be left if there is not even hope?) that the Latin American peoples shall at least defend themselves in the face of the obvious Soviet initiative.⁸⁷ If not, we don't see how and to what extent our nations can resist.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸³ Mario Florini, "El Comunismo en Mexico," in *Estudios*, No. 15, p. 77, and also in Argentina.

⁸⁴ Belpi, *op. cit.*, *Estudios*, No. 20, p. 90.

⁸⁵ Mario Florini, "El Comunismo en Mexico," in *Estudios*, No. 15, pp. 75-76. See, Alberto D. Faleroni, "Denuncia sobre Agentes Secretos Comunistas que Operan en America al Amparo de las Embajadas Sovieticas," in *Estudios*, No. 23, p. 60.

⁸⁶ Rossell y Arellano, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁸⁷ Since, in face of facts, as we have seen in broad lines, it is not possible to talk any more of the "initiative" of the Americas.

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia (1654-1917). By Konstantyn Kononenko. The Marquette University Press. Milwaukee, 1958.

In this volume, Professor Kononenko has covered the first phase of his two-volume study of Russia's economic relations with Ukraine, bringing his account up to the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The present study is a well-documented analysis in depth of the record of Russia's imperialist dominion over its smaller neighbor to the southwest. As such, its findings are of historical as well as contemporary significance. The evidence so painstakingly adduced here underscores the fact that Russia has been for centuries and is today a colonial power with a difference. The difference, as Professor Kononenko demonstrates with an abundance of data, is in form rather than in substance. In form, Russia differs from the classic type of imperialist power in the sense that she did not acquire her independent territories, including its non-Russian population, by way of overseas exploration and enterprise but rather as a result of a pedestrian expansion overland achieved through the prowess of the foot-soldier. This unique history of territorial expansion has made it possible for Russia to represent its empire, to those who would accept it, as an extension of the original national territory.

As an analyst concerned chiefly with the economic terms in Russia's relationship with Ukraine, Professor Kononenko calls attention to still another departure from the usual colonial pattern. With the aid of a wealth of documentary evidence he shows that, in contrast with the usual pattern, the level of economic modernity has always been higher in this particular "colony" than in the imperial nation. As shown by measurable economic results, Ukraine has always displayed more kinship with the nations of Western Europe than with Russia with respect to the efficiency of its agriculture, trade, and handicrafts. Individual enterprise in the economic sphere has traditionally shown greater vigor in Ukraine, and, as the author's data demonstrate, farm yields ran consistently higher in Ukraine even during the decade of 1907-17, after centuries of Russian occupation.

Indeed, this historical experience of the Russian state in dominating a more advanced nation has not been wasted on the present government of the USSR. Since the end of World War II, the latter has utilized this experience on a broader arena by extending its imperial rule over several more neighbors to the west. In the case of at least two of these nations, namely East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government has thus again, in recent decades, acquired "colonies" that specialize in the production, and export to the metropolitan power, of modern industrial equipment rather than raw materials.

Because of the nature of the available data, Professor Kononenko's study concentrates on the period following the historic land reform of 1861. He finds that the execution of this reform on the territory of Ukraine was highly

discriminatory in character. Legally, to be sure, the peasants were granted their personal freedom. However, the partiality of the Russian government to the owners of the large estates was so strong that the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants were released from their former state of bondage with a minimum of land. After the Reform, the peasants of Ukraine had 30.8 per cent less land at their disposal than they did as serfs. By comparison, the average loss throughout the empire amounted to 9.9 per cent of their former peasant holdings. Thus, the imperial interests were protected. For Ukraine, as the author reminds us, contributed 80 per cent of Russia's total grain exports during that period.

The author also demonstrates, with the aid of official Russian figures, that the imperial government which appreciated the superiority of Ukraine in farming, followed a deliberate policy of excluding large scale industry from this region in order to limit the "borderland" to the role of a producer of raw materials (wool, tobacco, hides, lard, etc.). Even the cotton arriving in the ports of Ukraine was carried all across its territory to the central provinces of Russia and then returned to Ukraine in the form of expensive finished products.

The situation changed drastically, however, when the center of gravity in industry shifted from textiles to coal and steel towards the end of the 19th century. This crucial change proved to be a setback to Russia's ambition to become the industrial workshop for the entire empire. History ruled otherwise. The first large scale, workable deposits of coal, manganese, and iron ore were found on the territory of Ukraine. These raw materials required a large outlay of capital for their development. For reasons of capital and technology, Russia's entrepreneurs found it beyond their power to undertake the establishment of a modern metallurgical industry without the aid of foreign investors. As far as Ukraine was concerned, according to Professor Kononenko, the result was doubly unfortunate. Its rich natural resources passed into the hands of two outside masters instead of one, leaving precious little economic substance for raising the domestic standard of living in measure with the increased productivity of domestic industry. In due time, the combination of Russian and Western capital inevitably penetrated into other branches of local industry, into transportation and, municipal services, thereby completing the subjugation of economic life in Ukraine. Even where the capital was basically Franco-Belgian, the author demonstrates, it was dispensed through Russian banks and in this manner delivered a further tribute to the imperial state. Above all, the political influence which came with economic domination accrued to Russia alone. The taxation and import tariff policy was controlled by the Russian government; industrial and grain prices were likewise determined by the monopoly groups located at the center of the empire. And the center was quite adroit, in the words of the author, at using "foreign capital as another means of increasing the opportunities for exploitation." As for repayment, the foreign capital invested in industry was paid off by Ukrainian metal, while the foreign currency loans of the government were repaid with the aid of Ukrainian grain.

As a result, the bulk of the domestic metal was earmarked for export. Heavy quantities of metal went to the rest of the empire, especially in the form of rails for Russia's government-owned railways. At the same time, the population of Ukraine remained starved for metal products. Utensils were generally made of clay, axles for carts were made of wood, gates and doors were hung

on wooden hinges, and peasant homes were universally covered with straw-thatched roofs.

The whole complex of relations between Ukraine and Russia during the period covered by his study, Professor Kononenko concludes, is in full accordance with the classic definition of colonialism in the generally accepted sense that the surplus production of one national economy was systematically appropriated by another national economy with the aid of political and military force. To that extent, the industrial and economic growth of Russia during these several centuries was based to a large extent upon the exploitation of the economic resources and skills of the Ukrainian population.

The grateful reader of the present volume, part of whose gratitude duly belongs to Mr. Roman Olesnicki for making the study accessible in highly readable English, will be looking forward to the second volume of this work in the hope it may shed the necessary light on how the Soviet successors to the Russian imperial rulers have adapted the process of exploitation to a wholly new set of political and economic conditions.

Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

LEON M. HERMAN

THE PRIVILEGE WAS MINE: An Eyewitness Account of Russia Today by the Wife of a Western European Diplomat, Princess Zinaida Schakovskoy. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959, pp. 318. \$4.00.

The relatively numerous books written by Western visitors to the Soviet Union, dealing with their impressions and reflections, acquire an especial enrichment in the eyewitness account of Russian Princess Zinaida Schakovskoy. This is so not because this account contains any new revelations regarding the Soviet reality; but because it in itself serves as a classic example of how deeply Russian chauvinism is embedded in the mentality of some Russian emigres, who are incapable of talking about Russia in terms other than an empire and who defend the imperial interest, even the Soviet, despite the elementary principles of morality and political tenets which they openly espouse.

A daughter of the old princely family of Schakovskoy who claims direct lineage from the Rurik dynasty and who considers St. Volodymyr the Great to be her direct forebear, the author left Russia as a young girl during the revolution. After thirty-seven years of emigre life, she returned for a one-year stay in her native Moscow as the wife of a Belgian diplomat. Taking advantage of her privileged diplomatic status and the "thaw" then existing in the USSR, the author was able to hold a series of conversations with the Kremlin chieftains of the "collective leadership." She chatted in provocative fashion with MVD Chief Gen. Ivan Serov, who was her table companion at a Kremlin banquet. She met and talked "openly" with a surviving member of the Russian aristocracy and called upon a newly-wed scientist couple. Innumerable talks and chance meetings with people of all professions and social gradation round up the gallery of her study and observations which she utilizes for the elucidation of various problems in the thirty chapters of the book. Written in a concise and lucid style, her report is imbued with Russian patriotism, which holds the unity of the Russian empire as a "must" and unconditional law. Although the author declares that "this was no longer my country and I no longer shared the destiny of the Russian people" (p. 37), she nonetheless cannot liberate herself from this pathological sentiment toward her own people and is incapable of appraising objectively the present Soviet brutal imperialist policy.

As a loyal relic of the Czarist regime, the author sees in the present USSR only one legitimate Russian people, with Kiev "the mother of the Russian towns, and Leningrad, the prettiest city in the Soviet Union" (p. 307), and Ukrainian songs and dances as mere folklore variations of an ethnic branch of one great Russian people. This, of course, does not mean that the author is unaware of the existence of other peoples in the USSR. On the contrary, she misses no opportunity to pelt them with negative and deriding remarks. Thus in her "historical" account appears such an illiterate expression as "*Hetman* of the Ukraine, the anarchist Machno" (p. 24); there are her patriotic reflections upon her visit in the Kremlin halls, where she notices a column commemorating "the merging of Russia and Ukraine" (p. 98). The Russian princess allows the present-day Ukraine to be represented by a servant girl, Tania, a thoroughly unprepossessing person who was assigned by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist the author. The other non-Russian peoples are mentioned only incidentally, but even these casual remarks are replete with contempt. The Georgians are characterized in the author's account by a Russian as follows:

"Stalin and Beria spoiled them (the Georgians—L.O.) for years. Of course, you have to admit they make a better job of their lives than the Russians" (p. 157).

But the principal objective of Princess Schakovskoy's book seems to be a whitewashing of the Russian people. They are presented to the Western reader in the most ideal coloring and they are absolved of any responsibility for the present aggressive policy of the Kremlin. In order to get across her point, namely, that everyone is guilty except the Russian people, the author allows herself to juggle and manipulate facts and interpretations at will. She remains totally oblivious to the fate of the enslaved peoples and the suppression and violation by the Soviet Russian aggressor of their fundamental rights. What is uppermost in her mind are the imperial interests of the Russian people, who are now being guarded by the Soviet government. Although the author is not a sympathizer of the regime in Moscow, nonetheless she is prone to overlook her personal grievances as well as those of her aristocratic class. She appears quite ready to sacrifice the sense of the political ideology of the West and to forsake the principles of democracy and respect of rights of both individuals and nations, if this should be required for the safeguarding of the present Soviet Russian empire. This characteristic is so marked and so typical of the mentality of Russian imperialists, both White and Red, that it is worthwhile to acquaint the reader with it.

In accusing the West of an atavistic attitude toward Russia, the author writes:

"Since Russia abandoned Kiev for Moscow, the West has shown her nothing but hatred. Olearius paints a black picture of his travels in Muscovy in the sixteenth century, probably for religious reasons, for Paul d'Alep, a member of the Orthodox Church, finds good things to say about the country in the same area..." (p. 281).

"...If the ordinary people are conscious only of the hatred with which they are regarded in the West, the intellectuals are on their guard against certain foreign plans to partition Russia. These semi-secret plans are reminiscent of Hitler's idea of reducing Russia to the scale of a kind of Muscovite principality. The more intelligent Russians feel that this is what they would really have to fear from a national defeat... Russia's weakness is not military; it is

political and ideological. But faced with this threat, even men who have no time for the regime feel the stirrings of the urge to defend their country" (p. 284).

Having issued a threat to the West that any attempted change in the *status quo* of the present Soviet empire or show of encouragement for the aspirations of the enslaved nations to freedom and independence will mobilize the Russians, even those hostile to the Soviet regime, including the author herself, in defense of the communist empire, Princess Schakovskoy condemns the West for the Hungarian uprisings! (sic!). In fact, her arguments in defense of the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution coincide identically with the Soviet propaganda, thereby attesting to the fact that Red and White Russians are alike inasmuch as the preservation of the Russian territorial empire is concerned. Princess Schakovskoy's apologia for the Muscovite crimes in Hungary goes as follows:

"Politically the Hungarian revolution was a great mistake... Even if the West did not openly incite Hungary to rebellion, it encouraged her, in principle, by firing her with hope and enthusiasm. Its radio stations should have warned the rebels against premature action... The wave of indignation it provoked gave free rein to clumsy anti-Russian propaganda, and against the Russian people, who were on the Hungarian side... The Russians could have crushed the disturbances in Hungary right at the beginning... They were passionately keen to find in Hungary someone with whom they could talk terms and who would save them from having to resort to force. But Nagy was not Gomulka... What else could the Soviet leaders do?... It was we who slammed the door shut and provoked a new stiffening on the part of the Russian government... The rupture came not from the Soviets but from the Western powers. The Soviets tried to make the best of things... We turned our backs on them... Like matadors, the Western powers thrust banderillas into the pride of the Russian bull. But they were waving a hatpin in place of a sword" (pp. 142, 153 and 154).

One need not be a profound political analyst to find on whose side Author Schakovskoy stands. It is valueless, therefore, to discuss a series of details scattered throughout her book, even if they do reflect valid analysis and observation. They are of third-rate significance and Princess Schakovskoy is not the first to note them. Moreover, her unwavering tendency to whitewash the Russian people at all costs casts much doubt on the veracity of her statements and renders suspect her otherwise interesting accounts. This is especially true of her long descriptions about religious matters in the USSR which largely appear to be wishful thinking rather than fact.

Ironically, the author selected as the motto for her book a paragraph from *The Treasure of Popular Education* by Prince Alexis N. Schakovskoy, her forebear, which reads:

"A country can only be great and deserving of respect if its actions are honorable and possess moral value. If Russia were to act in a manner which was unjust, if she were to employ her might to harm other countries, without provocation on their part, then however powerful and prosperous she might become, we should have no cause to praise her."

It is difficult to imagine a greater gap than that existing between the author and her forebear. They stand, as we clearly see, at diametrically-opposed poles in such matters as human rights, morality, the principles of self-determination and the right of every man to freedom. Princess Schakovskoy has failed

completely to heed the moral teachings of her forebear, inasmuch as she idolizes the slave empire of the USSR, whereas he admonished that "however powerful and prosperous she (Russia—L.O.) might become, we should have no cause to praise her."

Unless he, too, used political doubletalk.

LUBOMYR O. ORTYNSKY

RUSSIAN LIBERALISM, From Gentry to Intelligentsia. By George Fischer. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1958, pp. 240.

It is not an easy task to write about Russian liberalism. In the Russian Empire there was no tradition of liberal thought as we understand it in the West. Moreover, the very term, liberalism, demands an adequate definition to make a treatise of this sort intelligible and instructive. As the author correctly points out, "Throughout the nineteenth century, Russian liberalism was not a movement. It was a state of mind, a hazy cluster of political ideals and programs..." (p. 119). The situation changed somewhat at the beginning of this century as liberal thought in the empire assumed more organized forms. However, the term, as used in this study, is loose and vaguely comprehensive, covering many intellectual streams which bear little affinity to the fundamental ideas of Western liberal thought.

Despite the difficulties, Fischer has produced a study that commends itself to the must reading of every student of the Russian empire, whether before 1917 or after. The book concentrates on the period from the 1860's to the 1905 revolution. It is in this period that what he characterizes as liberalism—essentially a growing penchant for institutional change—is transformed from a gentry type, from rural self-government, to an intelligentsia one, to a mass party movement led by the Kadets. Regardless of the many variations and differences of thought developed in this period, the study succeeds in patternizing the overall development and in providing the reader a composite picture of a cumulative intellectual trend. The representatives and exponents of the many rivulets of thought are interestingly depicted.

The description of the *zemstvo* and its effectiveness is accurately portrayed. Initiated in 1864, this institution of local self-government was actually a "non-political" means for the furtherance of liberal aims. Some hoped it would eventually form the foundation for a "national assembly." Fischer is uncritical in accepting the notion of a "national assembly" where the empire consisted then, as it does today under a new guise, of many different nations. He is correct, however, in showing the ambivalent status of the *zemstvo* and the hand of government control over it throughout the entire period. The period was largely dominated by "small deeds" liberalism, seeking support both from above and below through the media of the *zemstvo* and also education and loyalty to the Czar.

The supposed variants of Russian liberalism are dealt with in methodical order. Populism, which rested in the belief that the Empire's future depended on the people, sought to ameliorate the material and cultural condition of the masses through the efforts of an enlightened educated minority. The author places this expression of thought in more proper focus when he states that to "the lower intelligentsia, populism usually means socialism, an agrarian socialism centered on Russia's peasant commune. In part influenced by the Slavophiles, the populist intelligentsia for half a century idealized the commune as a unique path to a total social transformation..." (p. 89). This is a

very essential point for one's accurate understanding of the so-called liberalist trends in Russian thought. Most of them were collectivist in character and helped to shape the totalitarian pattern of what was later to become Russian Communism. Read critically and intensively, the study furnishes many fine insights into the institutional and even ideational continuity between the Czarist empire and the Russian Communist one. It is also a study in intellectual disillusionment, idealism betrayed by the realities of experience.

Slavophilism, which was supposed to be another liberalist manifestation, contained its own messianic elements, viewing Russia as a unique society. It advanced an idealized version of absolute monarchy. The society envisioned by its exponents would be an agrarian and deeply religious one, founded on a "mutual trust" with a paternalistic and enlightened despot. Autocracy, then, was to be combined with local self-governments. The widespread influence of this thought is vividly brought out by the author. Along with populism, this current bucked for a time the growing influence of Marxist thinking.

Fischer describes the leaders of these many intellectual expressions in a very interesting and absorbing way. Boris Chicherin is shown favoring a limited monarchy. In addition to this major liberal leader, there was Ivan Petrunkevich, an ardent liberal constitutionalist of the gentry class. He advanced the goals of constitution and democracy in this period. The president of the first *Duma*, Sergei Muromtsev is accurately depicted as a leading representative of moderate liberalism in the upper intelligentsia. Pavel Miliukov, who succeeded Petrunkevich as the leader of Russian liberalism after 1905, was about the closest representative to European liberalism. On the whole, Fischer does a good job in carefully delineating the intellectual distinctions among the Russian liberals. Rodichev, Prince Dmitri Shakhovskoy and other outstanding liberals are well accounted for, too.

An important point stressed by the author concerns the attitude of business entrepreneurs during this period. As he puts it, "Thus in Russia, despite the vast industrial advances of the late 19th century, the younger scions of big business did not develop political appetites until a decade or two later, on the eve of World War I. Only then—too late—did they seem prepared to risk the state's ever paternalistic bounties by occasional opposition to governmental policies" (p. 47). In terms of economic history there is no doubt that several decades more of the developments and projects initiated under Stolypin would have brought about many significant liberal changes in the empire. The reviewer firmly believes that the empire would have vanished. But the importance of Fischer's account lies in the fact that prior to 1917 all these tendencies of liberal thought were essentially weak and relatively embryonic. They scarcely affected, in any real and substantial terms, the autocracy that prevailed. Without the ruptures and dislocations of World War I, the likelihood is that it would have continued with minor interruptions for some time. Projected into the present, it should be evident that a long period of training and education in democratic methods and techniques would be necessary in Russia proper in the event of "communism's" collapse.

The discussion on economism and its variants and also on Marxism and "legal Marxism" is well worth reading with care. Georgi Plekhanov, ostensibly the founder of "Russian Marxism," is cast properly alongside the "legal Marxists" like Nicholas Berdyaev and Peter Struve. Contrary to popular impression, it was the legal Marxist camp, which published its writings legally in the Russian empire, that fought the polemical battles against the populists and

others. Revolutionaries like Lenin, Plekhanov and others were in exile or in conspiratorial activities. The debates in St. Petersburg were led by the legal Marxists who resembled the many revisionists of orthodox Marxism in Germany and elsewhere. Struve, for example, became one of the leading figures of Russian liberalism, and Berdyaev, who later became an idealist philosopher made a profound impact on Western thinking, particularly in connection with his analytical critiques of the foundation of Russian Communism.

On several important philosophical issues the author is insufficiently critical and even somewhat superficial. In the area of political philosophy the whole question of national self-determination seems to elude him, as concerns its subtleties and niceties. Fischer fails to recognize the outstanding fact that the Russian liberals were dedicated to the maintenance of the empire and, with considerable casuistry, qualified sharply the principle of national self-determination. For example, citing the first program adopted by the Union of Liberation in 1904, he points to the provision on the so-called national question: "In the sphere of national questions, the Union recognizes the right of self-determination of different nationalities entering into the composition of the Russian state" (p. 147). On the following page, Fischer says "And the unqualified endorsement of the right of self-determination for all of Russia's nationalities had no precedent either." Obviously the statement is not unqualified endorsement since it openly suggests the retention of the non-Russian nations in what is called the Russian state. The author is also incorrect in understanding the role of the non-Russian drive for self-determination in the revolution of 1905 (p. 159).

To gain the fullest benefit from this study, the reader must approach it with a vivid knowledge of the history of the Russian empire in the 19th century and this. The study can be misleading without this context of thought.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

DE PROTOARCHIMANDRITA BASILIANORUM, (1617-1804). By Meletius M. Wojnar, OSBM. Series II—*Analecta OSBM*—Section I, Romae, 1958.

The Rev. Dr. Meletius M. Wojnar, Professor of Eastern Canonical Law at the Catholic University of America in Washington, has published the third volume of his monumental work on the Basilian Order.

The author has made a detailed study of the juridical structure of the Basilian Order in Byelorussia and Ukraine, that is, in the Kiev Metropolitanate of the XVIIth and XVIII centuries, which covered the period 1617-1804.

In the first volume, *De regimine Basilianorum Ruthenorum a Metropolita Josepho Rutzkyj instauratorum* (Vol. I, Romae, 1949), the author provided the general characteristics of the Order in this period by underscoring its four main trends: (a) its steady development [including its history]; (b) its inclusion of Eastern and Western elements; (c) its centralization, symbolized by the office of the Protoarchimandrite; (d) its relations to hierarchs [exemption from the authority of Bishops and later on, of the Metropolitan].

In the second volume, *De Capitulis Basilianorum* (Vol. II, Romae, 1954), Father Wojnar discussed the various institutions of the supreme administration of the Basilian Order, the so-called capitularies (from the Latin *capitula*), which represented the democratic element of the administration of the Order. These capitularies were subdivided into three categories: (a) general capitularies

[for the election of the Protoarchimandrite and for the removal of the same]; (b) provincial capitularies, and (c) domestic capitularies.

The third volume, which is the subject of this review, discusses the supreme authority of the Order, namely, the Protoarchimandrite, who symbolizes the monarchic element of the administration, and also his auxiliary body, his *curia*, general counselors, secretaries and a procurator in Rome (*in urbe*).

The author begins by giving general material on the monastic superiors in the Latin order in the post-Trent law, on the superiors in general, and on the office of the Protoarchimandrite in the Basilian Order, especially.

The first part of the third volume of Father Wojnar's work deals with the office of the Protoarchimandrite itself, which is analyzed from the viewpoint of the general capitularies and decrees of the Holy See. In this part the author discusses the following problems:

(a) His authority in the Basilian Order; (b) his right in the Order and outside the Order [a detailed history of his rights in the election of Metropolitans]; (c) his duties with respect to the Pope, the Metropolitan and within the Order; (d) the term of duration of his office and succession in his office [*sede vacante*].

The second part is devoted to his *curia* and embraces the following subjects:

(a) General counselors [who in the first period, that is, up to 1743, were appointed for life and constituted the oligarchical element in the administration, and in the second period, that is, after 1743, followed the same rule as applied to the Protoarchimandrite, and up to 1751 were elected for four years and subsequently for eight years]; special rights of the Pro-Consultor and General Vicar under the Protoarchimandrites-Metropolitans;

(b) General secretaries: in the first period there was only one; in the second there were two secretaries from the two provinces. After 1780 their office was filled by general counselors;

(c) The Procurator *in urbe*, who resided in Rome, represented the affairs of the whole Church, that is, of the entire Kievan Metropolitanate [the history of the Procurator in Rome is discussed on pages 211-224 of the book].

In the appendix there are biographical notes on all the Protoarchimandrites of that period, who at the beginning were almost exclusively Metropolitans: J. V. Rutsky, Raphael Korsak, Anthony Sielava, Havryil Kolenda and Cyprian Zhokhovsky.

The work of Father Wojnar is valuable above all because it is based on archival material heretofore unused and as such gives an authoritative account of the organization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church based on documents of primary importance. Also valuable are the biographical sketches of many Protoarchimandrites which the author has appended to his work.

The only shortcoming of the work, if one can call it so, is the fact that the book is written in the Latin; therefore, it is inaccessible to all readers unfamiliar with the Latin language. It is true that this work is intended primarily for specialists of church history. But it would be highly desirable to have at least some parts of the book in the Ukrainian or the English language.

In conclusion, the work of Father Wojnar is a valuable contribution to the canonical and historical literature of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Every scholar and researcher of the juridical relations in the Kievan Metropolitanate will welcome its appearance with gratitude.

VASYL LENCYK

UCRAINICA IN THE SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW. Published by the University of London, Vols. XXXV and XXXVI, 1957-1958.

The Slavonic and East European Review is published by the University of London for the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. In the last three volumes of this scholarly publication (two for June and December of 1957 and the third for June, 1958) appeared a series of articles and reviews written by Ukrainian writers and others which discuss Ukrainian scientific works.

In the June, 1957 issue of the review the article of Prof. Yuriy Shevelov, "The Trist-Type Groups and the Problem of Moravian Components in Old Church Slavonic," analyzes the Moravian components of the Old Church Slavonic language. Relying on rich literature on the subject the author thoroughly examines certain questions from the field of phonology and morphology of the Church Slavonic and finds therein the Moravian components.

In his article, "The Dependence of Halych-Volhyn Rus' on the Golden Horde,"¹ Author Michael Zhdan deals with the question of dependence of the Western Ukrainian lands (Galicia and Volhynia) on the Golden Horde. Contrary to the opinions of some researchers (Pashuto, Vernadsky) who maintained that these lands depended on the Golden Horde in the same measure as was true of the rest of the Ukrainian lands and that tribute collectors were stationed in Halych, Lviv and Sianok, the author demonstrates that this dependence was much smaller in degree. There were no tribute collectors (*baskaks*), nor was there any fiscal zoning of the country. The author, who is thoroughly conversant with the subject, makes his points eloquently.

The December, 1957 issue of *The Review* contains a very favorable review of Paul Zaitsev's *The Life of Taras Shevchenko*,² written by Duklid White. The reviewer stated that although there were many English translations of Shevchenko's poetry, the rich and prolific literary output of the poet is known only to a limited number of Slavists in the West. The reviewer values very highly the poetic creativeness of Shevchenko and underscores the ethical value of his poetry to be found in his defense of human dignity. He also praises Author Zaitsev, characterizing his work as something "from under the chisel of a master sculptor."

The same volume contains also a review by Panas Fedenko of Rev. Dr. Anastasius Velykyl's work, *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia*.³ Fedenko is of the opinion that the Union of Brest (1596) did not enjoy considerable popularity in Ukraine, a development which he ascribes to the "fanatical attitude" of Rome. After a brief discussion of the circumstances under which the Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches found themselves in Czarist Russia and Austria, the reviewer concludes that the publication of the Vatican documents is not a matter of historical science but rather one of "clerical propaganda." It is regrettable that the reviewer should air such a conclusion, inasmuch as the publication of the Vatican documents connected with the history of religious life in Ukraine constitutes an incontestably great scientific value.

Other items in the same volume include an obituary of Prof. V. Shcherbakivsky which is written by Prof. I. Mirchuk;⁴ a notice by V. Milkula about the translation of the *Book of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* of M. Kostomarov

¹ *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 85, pp. 505-522.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 86, p. 259

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 86, pp. 229-232

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-210

(translated into French by Prof. G. Luciani⁵) and another notice about the book of Bohdan Kentzhynsky, *Karl X Gustav infor krizen i eoster 1654-1655*.⁶

The June, 1958 issue of *The Slavonic and East European Review* contains a very interesting article by Arthur E. Adams, "The Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Front in 1918-1919," in which he describes the establishment of the Bolshevik authority on the basis of a very extensive literature of a historical and political character.⁷

In the same issue appears Dennis Ward's, "On Translating *Slovo o polku Igoreve*" (sic!).⁸ The author deals with the difficulties arising from translating epic poetry in general and the *Slovo* especially. The translation of *Slovo* creates exceptional difficulties, according to the author, because it contains "dark" spots, which various interpreters have endeavored to interpret, and because it contains a great many archaisms, rhythmic, assonances and alliterations. It is deplorable that the author is so little acquainted with the Slavonic studies that he considers the *Slovo* to be a literary monument of the Russian literature.

The same volume contains also a review of Prof. D. Chyzhevsky's *On Romanticism in Slavic Literatures*, written by Georgette Donchin,⁹ and a review by V. Mikula of Thor Kamenetsky's book, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine 1941-1944*.¹⁰

VOLODYMYR RADZYKEYCH

MOYI PIONIRSKI PRYHODY V KANADI (My Pioneer Adventures in Canada).

By: Augustine Romaniuk. Autobiography. Published by the Author. Winnipeg, 1958, p. 228.

The memoirs of Augustine Romaniuk, written ably and in a lucid style, will contribute richly to the literature of Ukrainian pioneers in Canada. The author, who is a good narrator, came to Canada some forty-six years ago as a young boy. Before his departure from Western Ukraine he had only attended a grade school in the village of Myshkiv of the Zalizhchyky rayon. Thus when he arrived in Canada he had had neither high school nor professional schooling.

In Canada the author worked at a variety of jobs. First, he was a farm-hand on a farm owned by his parents; subsequently, he was a seasonal farm worker, a railroad construction worker, a lumberjack, a dishwasher in restaurants and a fisherman on Lake Winnipeg.

But what really beckoned to him was trade. Thus he engaged in horse trading; he saved every penny he earned so that he could purchase horses to resell to farmers. Upon his marriage Augustine Romaniuk settled in the town of Riverton, eighty-five miles north of Winnipeg, where he founded a "universal" store which stocked all merchandise that conceivably could be used by farmers. Moreover, he learned barbering and soon established a barber-shop within his store. But he did not neglect his trade inclinations: he bought furs for which he travelled far to the north; he traded in lumber, cattle and horses. He supplied the far-flung gold miners in the north with meat products.

It was his inexhaustible endurance and determination which enabled the author to survive the severe economic crisis which hit Canada. While others were overcome, the author emerged almost unscratched. He built a modern house

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-243

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 248-250

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 87, pp. 396-417

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 502-512

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 550-551

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 562-564

for himself and bought two large farms for his sons. Subsequently, he built a modern commercial hotel in Riverton which became a source of substantial revenue.

In his memoirs the author refers to many Ukrainian farm pioneers who settled in the various parts of Canada. In addition to Ukrainians there were many Islanders in the area of Riverton. One of them, Dr. Thompson, who as a representative in Parliament succeeded in obtaining subsidies for the drying up of the marshes, gets a great deal of attention in the book.

Substantial portions of the autobiography are devoted to fishing and to hunting trophies of the Indians, with whom the author traded in animal pelts.

All the stages of his life are described in such a natural and vivid style that they leave unforgettable impressions in the reader's mind. The same holds true of his descriptions of nature, especially the Canadian virgin forests.

Through his work the author contributed immensely to the raising of economic standards and the welfare of the community in which he spent some forty-odd years.

The author has achieved an even greater goal by setting down a comprehensive record of his untiring efforts as well as those of his Ukrainian compatriots, pioneers who with others made Canada what it is today, a great and progressive country. The book then is a stirring saga of man's conquest of his environment.

VASYL MUDRY

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"REVIEW OF UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY OPERATIONS,"
hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1959.

At the beginning of February the Committee on Foreign Affairs released its review of United States Information Agency operations. The bulk of this review is in the nature of testimonies delivered before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations. The hearings were conducted last Fall under the chairmanship of Congressman Wayne L. Hays of Ohio.

The charge of Communist influences in the U.S.I.A. and the reduction of the Baltic and Ukrainian broadcasts to the Soviet Union were the reasons necessitating these hearings. Actually, as the review shows, the charges on Communist influences were unsubstantiated. The scant few who attempted to support these charges revealed their own immaturity and publicity craze. However, in connection with the problem of broadcast curtailment to the several important non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, it turned out that the hearings were largely devoted to this subject. Officials of the U.S.I.A. presented their case on the basis of transmitter shortages, whereas various spokesmen of national organizations with an intimate knowledge of these non-Russian nations advanced their criticisms of the recent action taken by the Agency.

The U.S.I.A. has shifted its position somewhat from one of firmness concerning these cutbacks to one of experiment. The committee for its part intends to investigate this matter further. An examination of the transmitter shortage problem appears to be in the offing. In the meantime the U.S.I.A. has indicated that it would seek an additional eleven (11) million dollars from Congress to resolve the problem. Even if it should succeed in this, considerable time will lapse in establishing the transmitter stations and much damage could be done in our psychological efforts toward these particular nations.

"COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH," hearings,
Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1958.

The recent attacks upon the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee seem to indicate that some circles in this country are fearful of its investigations, consultative analyses and, above all, its vigilance toward communist activity in many spheres of our society. The committee has produced many salutary results, and the Congress once again has shown its good sense in supporting its own creation. The investigations of the committee usually come up with some interesting data, and this set of hearings is one of them.

Among the several testimonies contained in this brochure is one given by a Hungarian refugee who now lives in the Southland. He was born in Hungary. In 1945 he was captured by the NKVD and, at the time, had no knowledge of the Russian language. Rather confusing and inaccurate is his narration of deportation proceedings to a Russian slave labor camp. When asked by the committee counsel about the percentage of Hungarians in the railroad car which he rode, the witness replied that about 10 per cent were Hungarians, "the others were Russians, Russian soldiers" (p. 2732). Not knowing the Russian language, it is most doubtful that the witness knew the difference between a Russian or a White Ruthenian or a Georgian. Overwhelming evidence shows that relatively few Russians wind up in slave labor camps. Then on the next page, when asked whether the guards were Russian soldiers, the witness replied "Not Russian—Soviet."

This confusion was not dissipated by any factually pointed questions on the part of the counsel. Later in the testimony the witness admitted picking up the Russian language, and apparently this enabled him to distinguish between the peoples who make up the Soviet Union. Bearing on his eleven month experience in a slave farm camp in Ukraine, Mr. Arens asked: "Were most of the people in this camp likewise prisoners, likewise Russians?" To which the witness answered: "Yes (?); mostly Ukrainians. They were mostly Ukrainian people." He went on to say, "These Ukrainian people were all the same people as we were. They were captured from home" (p. 2737). A little later on he lapses again into his inaccurate indistinctions when he speaks of sympathetic Russian garrisons in Hungary during the '56 revolution. Testimonies by revolutionaries before the Senate Internal Security Committee in November of that year disclose that these garrisons were mainly Ukrainian. In this case, it is unfortunate that the interrogation was not sufficiently grounded in known facts. Penetrating questions are often more valuable than answers.

"AN ADDRESS BY VICE PRESIDENT NIXON," introduced by the Honorable John Sherman Cooper. *Congressional Record*, Washington, Jan. 27, 1959.

As Senator Cooper rightly expresses in his introduction, this "address furnishes further example of the rare understanding, ability, and leadership of the Vice President." Dealing with current international developments, the address was delivered before the alumni association of Fordham College. The focal point of the address is Mikoyan's recent visit to the United States. In systematic fashion the Vice President analyzes the positive and negative aspects of the visit.

The analysis embraces a well balanced evaluation of these aspects. But of particular importance is the Vice President's observations concerning the possible effect of the visit "on the millions of enslaved people in Poland, Hungary, and other satellite countries." He readily admits that the Communist propaganda machine is seizing upon Mikoyan's meeting with American officials as supposed evidence of America's resignation to the permanent captivity of the enslaved nations. However, as he puts it, "I can state categorically that nothing could be further from the truth and that we continue to support the cause of freedom and independence for people everywhere." Everywhere means also the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. It is time that we formed a concrete policy in this direction.

"THE RUSSIAN RACE FOR KNOWLEDGE," an address by Lawrence G. Derthick, *Education Fact Sheet*, Office of Education, Washington, D.C., August 1958.

The fact sheet issued regularly by the Office of Education contains many worthwhile items. This one, however, presents many fine examples of mis-education. When it comes to the subject of the USSR, the sheet defies both fact and education. In this number, excerpts from an address given by the U.S. Commissioner of Education support this observation. Mr. Derthick toured the Soviet Union with an education team and in this address reports his findings.

It is immediately clear to the critical reader that the Commissioner is unaware of some political fundamentals. For him the USSR is Russia. Referring to this misentity, he says, "We are today in competition with a nation of vast resources, a people of seemingly unbounded enthusiasm..." Even Moscow would hesitate to call the USSR a nation because it is so blatantly contrary to fact. Further on the Commissioner asserts, "Everywhere in Russia there were evidences not only of passionate love of country but a burning desire to surpass the United States in education..." How Mr. Derthick gauged the "passionate love" of Ukrainians, Lithuanians and other non-Russians for what he calls "Russia" remains a profound mystery.

These comments by our Commissioner of Education make it obvious that the first step in our education about the USSR is one of learning about the nations in this empire. It is somewhat of a sad commentary that we get these from a top official on education in this country.

"THE WEEK," a commentary, *National Review*, New York, N.Y., Jan. 3, 1959.

Ivan Bahriany, an "outstanding novelist and hero of the Ukrainian Resistance," receives several complimentary remarks in this nationally read periodical. The comments are based on a press conference interview held in New York last December. The Ukrainian novelist is quoted as saying that "being a writer is the most perilous occupation in the Soviet Union." He is on a visit to this country and is presently lecturing in various cities.

For his opposition to both Marxism and Russian domination of his homeland, the writer spent some time in a concentration camp. Bearing on his own experiences and those of his associates, his views regarding the Pasternak affair are especially interesting. This leading Ukrainian novelist predicts that the famous author of *Doctor Zhivago* will take one of two ways out for a deviating writer in the Soviet Union—silence or suicide. So far it seems to be silence.

"THE KREMLIN'S DANGEROUS KURDISH WEDGE," by C. L. Sulzberger. *The New York Times*, New York, N.Y., January 7, 1959.

An excellent column is devoted here to Russia's traditional and primary borderlands policy. Although Mr. Sulzberger does not describe the policy as such, it is nevertheless the same policy which over four centuries led to the submergence of the Caucasian nations, Ukraine, Turkestan and many other territorially contiguous peoples. The West is not ordinarily given to traditional concepts of thought and thus believes that this move by Moscow is some new "Soviet" or "Communist" technique or strategem. Nothing could be further from the truth.

There are about some four million Kurds in the Caucasian and Middle East areas. This proud Moslem people, with its tribal aristocracies, dwell specifically in the USSR, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, an area which they have inhabited for the past four thousand years. In the Wilsonian period, Washington took an interest in the Kurds and some hope for an independent Kurdistan was seen in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. This, of course, did not come to pass. And since World War I there have been about a dozen bloody Kurdish revolts in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.

In the past three decades Moscow has been persistently encouraging Kurdish nationalism. The threat to Turkey, Iraq, and Iran is obvious. In 1945, during its occupation of northern Iran, Moscow created an autonomous Kurdish Republic at Mehabad. When the Russians were compelled to withdraw from the area, the Kurd leader, Mullah Mustapha Barzani, fled to the USSR. It is most interesting that after the coup in Iraq last year Barzani returned and now dwells in the Baghdad house of the murdered Nuri. At the same time Nasser made the mistake of permitting the Communist Kurd, Khalid Bakdash, to return to Syria.

The ground for further explosions in the Middle East is being carefully prepared by Moscow. Today, all eyes are centered on West Berlin: tomorrow, they will shift again to the Middle East. These are only different settings in the same cold war. There is no doubt that Moscow is striving for a "Kurdish Soviet Socialist Republic." It has created an empire through this means. The West has not understood the process and thus has no plan to combat it. Sulzberger perhaps isn't aware of the far broader significance of his judgment that "It is a tragedy that the free world, which for so long ignored the aspirations of the Kurds, must now pay for this moral lapse."

"REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST TACTICS, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES," American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill., 1958

Wide circulation is being given to this comprehensive report on Communist techniques and objectives. The American Bar Association is to be highly complimented for this constructive public service. The report is packed with authoritative data and incisive interpretations. As it emphasizes, "Communist Russia has been called 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'—this is only true for those ignorant of Communist writings."

Much essential material is contained in the report. In view of Mikoyan's visit here, it is appropriate to cite the impressive fact that "During the last 25 years, the United States has had 3,400 meetings with the Communists... All this talk led to fifty-two (52) major agreements, and Soviet Russia has broken fifty (50) of them." It is a wonder that many Americans who lavishly feted Mikoyan failed to recall Lenin's dictum: "Promises are like pie crusts—made to be broken" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 290-291). Also worthy of mention is the report's reference to Ivan Pushkar's testimony before the famous Kersten Committee on Communist Aggression. Mr. Pushkar is a Ukrainian who was imprisoned in Russian slave labor camps in Siberia. For those Americans who presently tour the Soviet Union, this testimony would be the best guide. It shows how Russians "stage these conducted tours for foreigners" with "ruse and fakery and fraud." Moreover, the report stresses the fact that Moscow "forced millions of Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Czech, Hungarian, and Ukrainian citizens to work as slave laborers in Siberia."

A basic criticism of the report is that it is founded on certain misconceptions of the Soviet Union and East European history. This is a serious

defect in the undertaking. For example, one couldn't agree more with the conclusion on "peaceful coexistence" that the "only alternative is not World War III. Another alternative is a declaration of independence for the satellites and oppressed peoples of Russia. The Kremlin would not embark upon a foreign war if it had or was threatened with a strong independence movement behind the Iron Curtain." The concept of "peoples of Russia" is grossly misleading in this context. Its only validity rests on its identity with the RSFSR, which is only one republic in the Soviet Union.

"THE KREMLIN'S GREATEST WORRY," by Eugene Lyons. *National Review*, New York, N.Y., August 16, 1958.

This is a very good article on attacks within the USSR, against "revisionism." The author's analysis applies poignantly to present circumstances. It shows quite convincingly that behind the nuclear bluster and bluff of Moscow there are serious weaknesses in the Soviet Union. In toto, these weaknesses constitute the Kremlin's greatest worry.

Particularly instructive is the author's observation on the non-Russian problem in the USSR. He writes: "When the disease of 'bourgeois nationalism' is diagnosed and denounced inside the USSR, it has a special meaning. It then refers to the resentment against Russian domination among the non-Russian populations—the Ukrainians, Georgians, the Moslem peoples of Central Asia—making up almost half the Soviet population." Referring to Kiev's organ, *Radyanska Ukraina*, which in one of its issues equated revisionism with "bourgeois nationalism," Mr. Lyons states that "It was taking cognizance of actual anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine."

When one compares these facts of Russian domination with the spurious resolution of the recent Afro-Asian Writer's Conference in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, the height of irony is reached. As reported by Reuters on October 13, the resolution appealed to writers of the world to protest against "colonialism" and "exploitation." The framers of the resolution failed to discern these diseases right under their nostrils in the Soviet Union.

"STUDENTS EMBRACE COMMUNISM IN OUR UNIVERSITIES," by Fred C. Schwarz, *News Letter*, Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, Long Beach, California, November 1958.

Dr. Schwarz is one of the most persuasive speakers in this country on Communist techniques and strategy. A physician by profession, he felt so dedicated to the anti-Communist cause that he left his practice in Australia.

In a previous issue Schwarz dwelled on Stalin's deportation of Ukrainians. He said: "On the evidence of Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin would have liked to do the same with the Ukrainians, but he was unable to do so because he lacked adequate transportation facilities... He simply did not have enough box cars to transport 30 or 40 million Ukrainians." Another reason given by the editor is Ukraine's proximity to the West. "There was a possibility that an act of such obvious, limitless brutality might provoke the West to some counter-action."

The editorial in this issue points out the degrading uses of science in the USSR. As Schwarz says, "to others it may have been scientific when in 1931-32 Stalin took the wheat from the Ukraine, dumped it in western Europe, and caused an artificial Ukrainian famine in which 7 million perished..."

L. E. D.

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