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Occasional Paper No. 6

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PREFACE

The information upon which this work is based is in spots uncomfortably fragmentary. We have gone ahead, nevertheless, because we think that a preliminary assessment of the Ukrainian aspect of the Czechoslovak crisis -- which is all this can be -- has its value. New evidence that comes to light will undoubtedly make it necessary to alter various judgements we have passed; hopefully, not too drastically. We would appreciate suggestions as to how our analysis should be revised or amended.

It is a pleasure for us to be able to express our thanks to colleagues and friends who have generously put their knowledge and time at our disposal. In particular, we would like to thank Dr. R. Szporluk of the University of Michigan; Professor V. Holubnychy of Hunter College of the City University of New York; Dr. O. Danko of Yale University; Dr. A. Rosa of McMaster University; Professor Gordon Skilling of the University of Toronto; Mr. J. Kolasky of Toronto; Dr. T. H. Rigby and Mr. G. Jukes of the Australian National University; and Dr. J. Wilczynski of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. For obvious reasons we are unable to acknowledge properly our indebtedness to a number of Ukrainians, Slovaks and Czechs with whom we have had informative conversations. We also wish to thank Mr. V. D. Ogareff for his assistance with economic data, and Carolyn Hodnett for her editorial efforts. Potichnyj thanks McMaster University for a summer stipend that made it possible to collect material for the study. And Hodnett expresses his appreciation to the political science departments of York University and the Research School of Social Sciences of the A.N.U. for making it possible for him to work on this and other subjects.

I

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of Ukrainian involvement in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968-69. Our interest in the topic was aroused by widespread speculation in the West that fear of the contagious effects on the Ukraine of the reforms in Czechoslovakia was an important reason for the Soviet intervention. The "Ukrainian" hypothesis was largely based upon the prominent role in the crisis played by the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, P.Iu.Shelest, and upon speeches he delivered in 1968. We should state at the outset that we are not inclined to accept any single-factor interpretation of the Soviet invasion. The argument seems plausible to us that the invasion resulted from the dynamic interaction of developments both in Czechoslovakia and in the U.S.S.R., and that one crucial element in this process was irresolution or political struggle within the Soviet leadership.[1] However, our aim is <u>not</u> to attempt to explain the momentous choice made by Soviet policy makers in the summer of 1968, nor to estimate the weight of the Ukrainian factor. We assume only that Ukrainian considerations were of some relevance to the Soviet leadership -- an assumption fully justified by known facts. Our objectives are limited to describing the background of Ukrainian involvement in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and analyzing the various ways in which the Ukraine and Ukrainians had a bearing upon the events of 1968 and 1969. This is not a tidy subject. Its investigation leads one in many different directions. At the risk of trying the reader's patience, we have therefore presented as much information as possible. A number of the sources are not readily available; and, more importantly, we wish to make it possible for the reader to reach conclusions which may differ from our own.

Aside from one well-known monograph,[2] English-speaking scholars have tended to ignore the role of the national republics in Soviet foreign policy. The division of diplomatic labour among the republics, the kinds of tasks assigned to them, and the means utilized to accomplish these

tasks are matters which await further exploration. Our analysis is, by its nature, a case study of participation by one republic in relations between the Soviet Union and East Europe. It is also an examination of problems which fall under the rubric of "linkage politics" -- a term used by some international relations theorists to refer to the interplay of external and domestic forces in policy making.[3] The objective of these theorists is to discover regularities in the ways in which various features of the external world impinge upon particular elements of political systems, and vice versa. Although we cannot generalize on the basis of a single case study, our material does invite the sort of questions which the theory poses. Consequently we shall employ categories developed by one scholar, James Rosenau,[4] in a preliminary sketch of the various facets of Ukrainian involvement in the Czechoslovak crisis.

Rosenau's "proposed linkage framework" distinguishes six external "environments" which may affect or be affected by features of a polity. These are labelled the "contiguous," "regional," "cold war," "racial," "resource," and "organizational" environments. The "contiguous" environment in the present case is Czechoslovakia; which in turn may be divided into three important sub-environments: (1) the Presov region in East Slovakia, partly inhabited by Ukrainians (Ruthenians), which lies immediately across the border from the Western Ukraine; (2) Slovakia (the eastern half of Czechoslovakia), in which Slovaks are the dominant national group, but in which there is also a large (450,000) and not altogether contented Hungarian minority -- in addition to the Ukrainians already mentioned; and further to the west (3) the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia. The "regional" environment is Eastern Europe, which before the invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed to be gradually slipping from the Soviet grasp. The "Cold War" environment is represented by the United States and West Germany, which offer bases for anti-Soviet Ukrainian emigré organizations. The "racial" (ethnic) environment is provided by the large Ukrainian diaspora in Eastern and Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere.[5] Both pro- and anti-Soviet elements in it maintain a keen interest in the affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and their activities, in turn, are closely followed by the Soviet authorities and by some informed members of the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia. The "resource" environment in the case of Czechoslovak-Soviet relationships is determined by the Soviet Union's desire (for political and economic reasons) to maintain its hegemonistic position in the international

economic relations of Eastern Europe, and more specifically, by the dependence of Czechoslovakia on a number of key deficit raw materials produced in the Soviet Union (largely in the Ukraine). The "organizational" environment, in the sense in which this term is used by Rosenau, is not relevant to the present study because no genuinely international organizations were involved in the Ukrainian dimension of the crisis.

Rosenau's linkage framework envisions possible interaction between these six external environments and four aspects of the political system: "institutions," "actors," "processes" and "attitudes." The central institutional fact characterizing the linkage field of our study is the complex division of labour between Moscow and Kiev and Kiev and the Western Ukrainian oblasts in the Soviet Union; and a somewhat analogous set of relationships in Czechoslovakia between Prague and Bratislava and Bratislava and Presov. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union this division of labour is a product of quasi-federal governmental institutions, the distribution of power within the Communist Party and particular features of the western oblasts (their proximity to Czechoslovakia, the demographic fact that significant numbers of Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, and Poles as well as Ukrainians and Russians live in them, and the historical fact that Ukrainian nationalism and Catholicism have been strong in the area).[6] It is also a product of the Soviet policy of drawing lower administrative echelons into quasi-diplomatic activities. The cast of actors involved in the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis (viewed only from the Ukrainian perspective) was determined, to begin with, by the Soviet institutional structure. At the highest level, the Politbiuro of the C.C. C.P.S.U., a number of Ukrainians participated in policy making -- either by virtue of the prominence of their political status in the Ukraine (Shelest and Shcherbitskii), or because the "logic of faction" brought one of them (Podgornyi) into the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. Thanks to the practice of quasi-diplomacy, many political, ideological and security officials in Kiev and the western oblasts participated in relations with Czechoslovakia. So did numerous members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, either as cultural officials or as private citizens. The buildup to the invasion, the invasion itself, and then its aftermath temporarily drew the Ukrainian public at large, youth, and servicemen into involvement in Soviet-Czechoslovak affairs. The main political process in the Ukraine affected by the Czechoslovak events was that of communications, although the

crisis had some impact upon socialization, interest articulation, policy making, and -- perhaps -- leadership recruitment. As we shall show, attitudes within the political elite, the intelligentsia, and the public at large affected and were affected by relations between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine.

II

THE UKRAINIAN SCENE BEFORE 1968

Developments in the Ukraine in the 1960's confronted Soviet policy-makers with a potentially serious long-range threat to existing political arrangements there and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.[1] It is wrong, of course, to conceive of all the problems of the Ukraine as exclusively "ethnic" in nature. The various dilemmas with which the regime must deal in the Russian Republic -- economic, social, cultural and political -- exist in equal measure in the Ukrainian republic. However, the presence of the nationality issue does distinguish the Ukrainian situation in a fundamental way from that which exists in the R.S.F.S.R. It colours, intensifies, and makes far more volatile all other conflicts. Most importantly, it provides a potential bridge between the disaffected intelligentsia and large segments of the population -- something that has no parallel in Russia proper.

Nationality disputes usually have several facets. But the core issue is the problem of <u>meaning</u>; the meaning of self (sense of identity), the meaning of group ties, the meaning of deprivations, and above all the meaning of the past and future of the subordinate ethnic group. Controversy over these meanings is central to the French-Canadian problem ("deux nations"), central to the Negro Revolt in the United States,[2] and central to the nationality problem in the U.S.S.R. It is a weakness of prevailing sociological orthodoxy that it fails to recognize the latent instability and fluidity of sets of meanings under certain conditions. Failure to emphasize the autonomous, meaning-giving role which symbols play in mediating between social structure and personality is, we believe, a fundamental error in conventional approaches to the analysis of social beliefs.[3] Neglect of the problem of meaning is one of the important reasons why the world-wide explosion of ethnic passions in the 1960's seems to have caught social scientists off guard. Established systems of meanings evolve or disintegrate for various reasons. Grossly over-simplifying, we may identify three major sources of change:

(1) changes in the channels and content of communications
(2) changes in social processes
(3) changes in the legitimacy and/or power of meaning-giving authorities

Soviet leaders are concerned about the situation in the Ukraine and in other non-Russian republics because all three types of change are seriously endangering what might be called Official Soviet Meaning.

Communications

In the decade 1957-67, no single change in the Ukraine was more dramatic, more significant, or more resented by the guardians of orthodoxy than the emergence of non-official, uncontrolled channels of communication. This development took place on two planes -- the overt and covert. Covert channels of communication included the spread of zakhaliavna literatura -- uncensored poetry and prose expressing socio-political and nationalist demands;[4] the dissemination of anonymous manifestos and platforms; the circulation of informational documents;[5] and even the appearance recently in some cities of "radio hooliganism" on a surprisingly large scale.[6] The messages sent through these covert channels were frequently amplified by being transcribed in the West and then "played back" to the Ukraine through publications and radio broadcasting. The most important overt channels of uncontrolled communication were "aesopian" or openly heterodox writings published in approved press organs; speeches (e.g. Dzyuba's Babyi Yar address of September 29, 1966); symbolic public acts (e.g. demonstrations or manifestations of solidarity with convicted writers in literary trials); the submission of unsolicited or unexpected memoranda to political authorities (most importantly, Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification?); and lastly, but not least, the increasing resort to signed petitions directed to prominent figures and authoritative bodies outside as well as inside the U.S.S.R., with simultaneous dissemination of these petitions among the interested public.[7]

It is our strong impression that the volume of non-controlled communications, covert and overt alike, increased progressively throughout the pre-1968 period. Also, it appears that the number of non-controlled communications channels multiplied over time, that separate networks (in

different cities, or institutional milieux) began to coalesce, and that the anonymity of the whole process decreased (that is to say, the degree of mutual perception in communication and collective experiencing of communication increased). It is highly significant that these changes in communication patterns could not be stopped, even by the K.G.B.

Through the new channels of communication a counter-definition of reality, an alternative set of meanings, was made increasingly available to the urban Ukrainian population. This is a point of central importance. The Ukrainian literature of protest expresses the same critical definitions of the established order that one finds at the "all-union" level. (Ukrainian dissidents would find no fault with the Russian scientist Sakharov's Thoughts about Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, except what they would regard as his failure -- and the failure of other Russian liberals -- to speak out strongly enough in favour of the rights of the non-Russian nationalities.) In addition, it reflects in great detail the many demands which together make up a counter-definition of Ukrainian national interests. The exponents of the new meanings are third- or even fourth-generation Soviet men; products of Soviet education and Soviet life. Perhaps the most articulate spokesman of this group is Ivan Dzyuba. His book Internationalism or Russification? is a polemical but sensitive analysis of what he believes to be the critical situation in which the Ukrainian nation finds itself today. Dzyuba produced this work after Skaba, the former ideological secretary of the C.P.Uk., had told him as a provocation that if he wished to present his views to the Party leadership he should do so in writing. It is said that the manuscript of Internationalism or Russification? was reproduced and circulated by the leadership among the obkom secretaries. In 1968 the book was published abroad in Ukrainian (Internatsionalizm chy rusifikatsiia? [Munich: Suchasnist', 1968]). Dzyuba, it must be said, has received some support from the liberal Russian intelligentsia (e.g., a book review he wrote was published by Novyi Mir in March, 1968). During 1968 and 1969 he and his book were viciously attacked in the Soviet Ukrainian press and over the radio.[8]

In Internationalism or Russification? Dzyuba does not take a millenary view of the future; a leit-motiv of the book is its recognition of the spirit of resignation and indifference to Russification characteristic of many Ukrainians. The

greatest contribution of Dzyuba to the shaping of new meanings is not his many sociological insights, but his critique of operative Soviet nationality doctrines, and his harmonizing in Marxist-Leninist categories of the national idea with socialism. Dzyuba is at one with Eastern and Western European Communists who support "Marxist-humanism" in opposition to Stalinist-Marxism; but he also has succeeded in formulating and defending the idea of "national humanism" as a counterweight to the chauvinistic concept of the "fusion of nations" popular among Russifying elements in the U.S.S.R. A recognition of both the personal and the national dignity of the individual as the basis on which socio-political, economic and cultural relationships between the state and the individual ought to be built is the common element present in the writings of Dzyuba and East European neo-Marxists. The idea of "national humanism" is by no means his monopoly; it is reflected in almost all of the documents which have found their way to the West. The petitions of Kandyba, Lukianenko, Moroz, Chornovil and Karavans'ky all pay homage, in one form or another, to such goals as the "national dignity of the individual," "relationships among nations based on equality," the right of nations and individuals to free cultural development," and so forth. (Karavans'ky's petition is especially noteworthy because in it he, an inmate of a concentration camp, pleads not for his own life and the Ukrainian cause, but rises in defense of the other non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R.) Dzyuba's tract treats all the basic problems involved in nationality policy (social-structural, linguistic, psychological, cultural, legal and political), sets these problems within the framework of a defensible interpretation of Leninism, defines what a truly "Leninist" solution to them ought to be, and thus offers Soviet Ukrainians an alternative to the official set of meanings that is both legitimate and enormously appealing. In this respect Ukrainian dissidence has changed significantly within a relatively short period. There has been a progression from historiographical disputes and literary struggles to the initial formulation of a doctrine of liberal national communism.

Social Processes

The long-range Soviet policy of ethnic integration is predicated on the assumption that time is on the side of "amalgamation" (Russification). While nationalistically-minded dissidents are kept in their place (by "administrative" means if necessary), broad social changes will gradually

eliminate national differences and focus all ethnic identifications upon a common reference group -- the "Soviet People". Recent events in other countries (Canada, the U.S., Northern Ireland, Wales, Belgium, France, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, Malaysia, etc.) suggest the need for caution in predictions of ethnic, racial or religious harmony anywhere. Nevertheless, ongoing social processes in the Ukraine are rightly a source of serious concern to those who wish to preserve a Ukrainian national identity. The trends involved here are discussed at length in the materials indicated in fn.1. We shall merely note them, without any attempt at quantification.

(1) Cumulatively large-scale population movements have occurred of Ukrainians out of the Ukraine to the R.S.F.S.R. and Kazakhstan, and of Russians into the Ukraine.

(2) For whatever reasons, the educational system has in fact encouraged "language disloyalty" at all levels, particularly among those hoping to rise to higher levels. Career interests are reinforced by social pressures to appear "cultured" and "politically-enlightened" to linguistic Ukrainophobes -- of whom there are many (Dzyuba's urban Russian "petty-bourgeoisie").

(3) The educational system has been carefully screened to minimize the Ukrainian patriotic content of political socialization.

(4) Urbanization has made inroads upon the most thoroughly "Ukrainian" part of the population, the peasantry, and has brought more Ukrainians into the Russified educational, occupational and cultural environment of the cities.

(5) An official policy has been pursued of transferring skilled Ukrainian personnel to jobs outside the Ukraine, and of replacing them with Russians imported from elsewhere.

There are, of course, counter trends produced by social change. In one of the more optimistic passages in his book, Dzyuba declared:

> Everywhere the socialist national consciousness of Ukrainians keeps growing and growing. It is inseparable from human self-knowledge. And it will keep on awakening and growing under the impact of powerful

forces. Economic and social development and progress bring on a democratization of social life, which promotes human dignity and self-awareness. Civic concepts and sentiments are crystallizing, everywhere people begin to raise their heads again. The educational and cultural level of the Ukrainian population is rising, inevitably bringing in its wake a more or less conscious desire to achieve distinction in the world. There is an improvement in the material position of the Ukrainian village, which sends forth more and more young people who are no longer downtrodden and crushed by poverty, but fresh, strong and proud, ready to stand up for their national identity. (Take a look, for instance, at our present village school-leavers who enter establishments of higher education, and compare them with those of ten years ago.) Growing numbers of city youth (in establishments of higher education, schools and factories) embark on a moral and spiritual search, feeling that they have been deceived in some way, that something sacred has been concealed from them...

This socialist national consciousness, this certainty of their right and duty to give a good account of their socialist nation to humanity, this desire to see the socialist Ukraine as truly existing and a genuinely equal country among other socialist countries, to see it as a national reality and not simply as an administrative-geographical term and a bureaucratic stumbling-block -- all this is also intensified by a number of universal factors, in world history and in the world communist movement. Witness the historic reality of the socialist nations of Europe, which are experiencing an upsurge and a revitalization of their national awareness, and make the elementary comparison -- which suggests itself -- between their position and that of the Ukraine. Witness the fiasco of the miserable notion of nationlessness, of the nationless uniformity of communist society, under the pressure of actual historic reality, of the real historic-national multiformity of communism. Witness the growing interest and acquaintance of the Soviet reader with living world communist theory, with the theoretical works and ideas of Marxist-Leninists from all over the world, works and ideas which turn out to be much more profound, humane and attractive than the stuff that our present newspapers keep chewing over. Finally, witness the uprising of national movements and national values all over the world, Europe included.[9]

According to the theoretical premises of official Soviet doctrine, Dzyuba's argument is wrong. One might have expected, therefore, that ongoing and anticipated social changes in the Ukraine would have lessened the Soviet leaders' concern over Ukrainian nationalism. The reason fhis has not happened is that orthodox officials sense that the premises might be incorrect. In fact, officialdom is very much aware that the future of Ukrainian national identity still hangs in the balance.

Official Soviet theory, naturally, makes no allowance for the frustrations and resentments produced by unacknowledged assimilationist pressures. This is no minor oversight; a good case could be made that much of the original impetus behind Ukrainian dissidence in the 1960's was provided by the Party's reversal after 1958 of the hopeful nationality policy proclaimed at the XX Congress of the C.P.S.U. At a deeper level, Soviet theory ignores important intervening variables separating macro-social change and ethnic identification. We would argue that the dynamics of ethnic tensions can best be understood in terms of the concepts of "relative deprivation" and "status incongruence."[10] The central insight of the concept of relative deprivation is that it is not absolute levels of reward that generate satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's condition. Happiness with one's lot depends upon how it "measures" against some other real or imagined condition. Thus an objective improvement in one's condition may simply produce discontent if it is accompanied by a shift in one's base line of comparison. A particular case in point is that of "status incongruence," in which an individual who has come to rank higher on one scale of social stratification (e.g., education) than on other scales (e.g., ethnicity or political reliability) feels deprived because the standard against which he measures his lower rankings is that of his newly-achieved higher rank. In our context, these concepts suggest that the level of ethnic tensions and militant ethnic identification in the Ukraine depends ultimately not upon "objective" social changes of the sort specified by Soviet theory (although these <u>affect</u> the level), but upon the breadth of the gap between the Ukrainian's status as he perceives it and his status as he thinks it ought to be. It is plausible to suppose that social change frequently <u>increases</u> the gap; this seems to have been the case in Quebec, and the passage from Dzyuba quoted above indicates he believes that it is true in the Ukraine. There are other signs too that particular social groups have not fallen neatly into the roles cast for them by Soviet doctrine.

The intelligentsia. The intelligentsia is the driving force in the Ukrainization movement. However, the ranks of intellectual rebels do not yet include many people not directly involved in art and literature. There are relatively few journalists, lawyers, philosophers or ideologists actively enrolled. The movement is still weak because its participants are drawn mainly from young academics and literary circles. Broader and potentially more influential groups -- governmental, Party, professional, and managerial -- have stayed in the background or undercover. However, under opportune conditions the older generation has been mobilized (as happened at the Conference on Questions of Linguistic Culture in February, 1963 in Kiev). Also, the lists of those who have signed various recent petitions suggest a rapid expansion of the social base of the rebels. It should be added that numbers are not of central importance to the function of the dissident intelligentsia -- the elaboration and dissemination of heterodox political meanings.

Youth. Of no less importance in the equation of dissidence is the problem of Ukrainian youth. A basic demographic fact should be borne in mind: approximately half the population of the Ukraine is under thirty years of age. Thus, there are large numbers of Ukrainians in institutions of higher learning (over 600,000 in 1967). It was mainly of this group that Dzyuba spoke in his appeal to Shelest:

> Particularly bitter and often contradictory thoughts arise amongst a large section of our youth. This is borne out by a number of facts. Numerous individual and collective letters are being sent to various authorities, editorial boards, etc. An enormous amount of unpublished, mostly anonymous, poetry and publicistic writing is circulating from hand to hand. (This writing is often naive and unskilled but it expresses a cry from the heart.) Various literary evenings and discussions are being organized and only too often prohibited. (How many resolutions have already been adopted by Party authorities against these evenings, and how many people have been punished for them!) A smouldering, vague movement is felt among Ukrainian youth all over the Ukraine. A more indirect pointer to the unsatisfactory situation can be seen in the conspicuous expansion of the staff and a feverish increase in the activities of the K.G.B., which for some reason has been entrusted with nationalities policy in the Ukraine.[11]

The "awakening" Dzyuba speaks about began to express itself in nonviolent protest during the 1960's. A great deal of information is available which shows that Ukrainian youth did not limit itself to writing forbidden poetry, articles, or petitions to the authorities. In the several years before 1968 Ukrainian students came to realize that even within the limits of the existing laws there was room for various forms of protest. Let us look, for example, at the annual Shevchenko demonstrations in Kiev since 1964.[12] The ostensible aim of the student demonstration beside the Shevchenko monument in 1964 was to commemorate the anniversary of the return of Shevchenko's body from Russia to the Ukraine, some 100 years ago. However, if one realises that this was not an officially organized attempt to honour Shevchenko, that the initiative came from the students, and that the demonstration was set for a day different from the officially-designated one, then it becomes clear that the real aim of the demonstration was for the students to set themselves apart from the official festivities, to choose their own speakers, and to express their ideas freely as an exercise of their presumed constitutional rights. The information available suggests that the regime was totally unprepared for the demonstration. At first an attempt was made to dissuade students from this undertaking. When this failed, the demonstration was permitted, probably with the anticipation of a rather small gathering. But the demonstration was large, and it appears to have had a significant impact on the population of Kiev and the Ukraine. For the participants this was a baptism of sorts; they were aroused by the success of the demonstration.

After this event, the political leadership evidently resolved to prevent similar occurrences in the future. When a year later the anniversary was approaching, a flood of rumours, warnings and threats began to circulate in Kiev. These only added to the enthusiasm of the students, because now a new element was added -- namely an enemy who was trying to frustrate their plans. In 1965 the demonstration itself did not come off; but wreaths were laid on the statue and the beginnings of a confrontation between students and the regime did occur. A year later several hundred people -- mainly students -- gathered peacefully by the Shevchenko statue. There were no arrests at the demonstration itself. But in 1967 the regime, unable to frighten the students and prevent them from demonstrating, did fall back on the well-tested tactic of arresting would-be organizers and speakers. The result was that the students -- led by a group which included a woman Party member of long <u>stazh</u>, and Ivan Svitlychnyi's

sister -- marched to the Central Committee headquarters and demanded that the arrested students be released immediately. The ceremony itself of honouring Shevchenko did not take place, but the students won. The Central Committee accused the city militia of excesses and released the students. In 1968 and 1969 the regime organised official Shevchenko celebrations as a preemptive measure. The 1969 one, however, was followed by an informal singing of Ukrainian songs. Student participants in this demonstration were photographed and recorded, and later expelled from the University. The net result of the demonstrations was that the students' sense of power and purpose increased while the "communications" chasm between youth and the "establishment" was further widened. It is not important whether the majority of the participants in these demonstrations were consciously pursuing a strategy of "non-violent protest." What is important is that the protests took place, and undoubtedly had much the same sort of impact upon participants and audience -- the student body, sympathetic staff, the Kiev Ukrainian populace, and observers outside the capital -- that similar nationalist demonstrations have had in Eastern Europe.

The locus of the youth problem, it must be emphasized, is by no means restricted to the campus. While the stake there is great -- namely, the character of future elites -- it is not as immediate as that involved in two other arenas: the factory and the army. We have much less direct knowledge of these aspects of the youth problem. Judging by official sources, nationalism among labouring youth is blended with generational alienation, dissatisfaction with poor living conditions, and the discontents of the working class as a whole. As events in Eastern Europe have shown, the younger workers are a potentially dangerous group; and much official concern was displayed about the level of their "moral-political training" in the years prior to 1968.[13] We know still less about the ideological health of young Ukrainians in the army before the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- except that instilling proper attitudes among them on the national question was considered a central task of military indoctrination.[14]

Workers and peasants. Only fragmentary evidence is available about attitudes among the Ukrainian working class and peasantry before 1968. For most of the prior decade, Khrushchev's economic policies had probably hurt both groups. Industrial growth in the Ukraine was retarded to speed development in

Siberia and Kazakhstan. John Kolasky states that the disturbances in Rostov Oblast in the spring of 1962 connected with increases in state food prices had their counterparts in the Ukraine. In 1962-63, high food prices, shortages, and the spectacle of food being shipped to Cuba generated visible working class discontent. Kolasky cites a protest by dock workers in Odessa, an interruption in the work schedule of a Kiev motorcycle factory, and a one-day strike by bus drivers in June, 1963. He also recalls: "A worker from the railway shops related to me late in 1964 that a delegation had been sent by the workers to the Central Committee in Moscow requesting improvement in wages and working conditions."[15] We also have Shelest's word for it at the March 1965 agricultural plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. that the food situation in Ukrainian cities had been tense in the last years of Khrushchev's rule.[16]

As in other regions, Khrushchev's agricultural policies during the Seven-Year Plan -- with their unrealistic demands, reduced inputs, and discrimination against private plots -- had not won him many friends among the peasantry. In the Western Ukraine concealed unemployment magnified the strains. One of the best indicators of "relative deprivation" among the kolkhozniki was the eagerness with which younger people sought to flee to the cities from collective farms in this period. The most consistent complaint in the Ukrainian protest literature with respect to the rural population deals with the internal passport system, which is held to be a device designed to keep the peasantry forever in bondage to the collective farm.

The religious revival during the 1960's in the Ukraine, as elsewhere in the U.S.S.R., can be interpreted partly as a manifestation of working class alienation. Baptists and other evangelical groups have been particularly active in the Ukraine, evoking special attention from the Soviet authorities.[17] The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, despite its legal non-existence in the Ukraine, continues to be an extremely important problem confronting the regime -- especially in the Western Ukraine. It has recently been admitted in the Soviet press that an underground Uniate Church does in fact exist in the Ukraine.[18] The Church and its hierarchy fall within the jurisdiction of Cardinal Josyf Slipyi, Archbishop Major and to all intents and purposes the Primate of the worldwide Greek Catholic Church. Cardinal Slipyi, who spent some seventeen years in Soviet

concentration camps before being released by Khrushchev, resides in Rome. He has established the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, and is active in Vatican politics -- especially among the Eastern Churches under Rome's jurisdiction. He has a programme on the Vatican Radio and also one beamed at the U.S.S.R. on the Italian national network. The official revival of the Uniate Church in Czechoslovakia during the 1968 reforms (described below) apparently gave a further stimulus to Ukrainian Catholicism across the border. In 1968 and 1969 a number of elaborate anti-religious seminars were held in the Ukraine, with the Uniates receiving great attention -- particularly in the Transcarpathian Oblast. The head of the Church in the Western Ukraine, Archbishop Vasyl Velychkivs'ky (no stranger to Soviet concentration camps himself), received a sentence of three year's hard labour in the summer of 1969 for "anti-Soviet activities" in which he and other priests (some of whom were arrested) were said to have been engaged.[19] Rome is also the seat of the Archimandrite of the Ukrainian order of Basilians (Ukrainian "Jesuits"). This order used to be very strong in Transcarpathia and in the Presov region of Czechoslovakia, and its activities remain extensive. It is attacked from time to time in the Soviet Ukrainian press.

Legitimacy and Power of the Regime

Repression. It is some measure of the distance the Soviet Union has come since Stalin's time that the petitions, demonstrations, confrontations, etc. we have described above could even have occurred. In the 1960's the Soviet leadership seems to have been unable to pursue a consistent nationality line in the Ukraine. Each of a number of options -- conciliation, diversion, repression -- was tried at different times, without complete success. (There was never any serious consideration of the proposals of the dissidents.) The main tactic was heavy-handed repression. The pace of arrests, which had already begun in the late 1950's, quickened in the early 1960's.[20] According to what purports to be an inside account by a group of dissident Ukrainian Communists, a secret circular was dispatched to the national republics in April, 1963 by the C.C. C.P.S.U., which asserted that nationalism was growing in the Ukraine, the Baltic states and the Caucasus, and that while mass repressions would not immediately be resorted to, a "struggle" had to be conducted.[21] In 1965 the arrests described by Chornovil began.[22] The timing of the 1965 arrests and of the closed trials in the spring of 1966,

coinciding with the arrest and trial of Siniavsky and Daniel in Moscow, unmistakably revealed the Centre's hand in the Ukrainian events. It also indicated -- as did the timing of the secret circular of April, 1963, and the parallel repressive measures in Moscow and the Ukraine during 1968-9 -- that anti-Ukrainian policies were not only a response pure and simple to nationalistic tendencies in the Ukraine, but were also a function of fluctuations in the regime's overall campaign against all forms of dissent. In the Ukraine, as elsewhere, the K.G.B. set to work with its informers, listening devices, agents provocateurs, "talks" with dissidents, raids and so forth.[23] The stained-glass window at Kiev University was smashed, and the Ukrainian section of the library at the Academy of Sciences burned.[24] Many people lost their jobs, or were expelled from universities. Writers were denied access to publication. In brief, many familiar techniques were tried and found wanting. Alternating with repression were fits and starts of relaxation -- the high point, perhaps being the Writers' Congress in November, 1966. Diversion was regularly attempted. We place in this category the notorious Kychko anti-semitic tract, Judaism without Embellishment, published under the imprimatur of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1963,[25] and even more overtly official attempts to release tensions in this manner.[26] Another example of diversion was a steadily increasing stress on military patriotic themes in propaganda during this period, as indicated by Figure I. Still another device was the manipulation of rumours of nationalist organizations, conspiracies, Western intelligence plots, etc.[27]

What stands out, however, is the gap between plan and performance, aim and accomplishment in the campaign against the reformers. Stupid measures such as the window-smashing or library episodes -- said to have been locally-inspired -- must have needlessly antagonized many Ukrainians. The price paid for sending some people to Mordovia and ruining the careers of others may have been higher than the regime bargained for. A new generation of Ukrainian martyrs was created. The repressions received world-wide adverse publicity. But far more importantly, the surgery attempted by the authorities seems to have spread the disease. Repression accelerated the dissemination of the reformist message, forced some members of the intelligentsia to commit themselves who might otherwise have not, and surely was a fundamental factor in politicizing large numbers of young

Figure I

Number of Items Published in Selected Ukrainian Newspapers on the Fighting Traditions of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. : 1961-1967

Newspaper	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1967 as % of 1961
Pravda Ukrainy	29	42	68	89	96	87	91	314
Komsomol'skoe znamia	23	39	71	93	102	98	111	482
Kryms'ka pravda	27	34	52	68	97	120	147	544
Pivdenna pravda	25	38	49	63	81	79	91	364
Sotsialisticheskii Donbass	41	40	61	83	92	83	107	261
Chornomors'ka Komuna	30	33	57	60	77	93	84	280
L'vovskaia pravda	51	59	67	71	101	93	113	222
Kadievs'kii robitnik	7	9	19	27	42	36	44	628
Pivdenna zoria	11	13	23	30	44	39	52	472
Bloknot agitatora	6	6	10	17	23	19	21	350
Radians'ka shkola	4	5	7	11	19	13	12	300
Total:	254	318	484	612	774	760	873	344

Source: A.S.Zolotukhin, "Presa Ukrainy ta zmitsnennia iednosti narodu i armii (1961-1967 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1968, No. 6, p.88.

people. One of the striking effects of the confrontation between the regime and reformers was to reduce to life size and de-mystify the "administrative organs." The K.G.B., procuracy and courts were brought into the light in awkward poses, and suffered from it. References in the reformist writings to these bodies convey many feelings -- dislike, irony, contempt, outrage; but not the old sense of paralyzing dread. Police methods were less than successful for two reasons. The first is that not all the old third-degree techniques were applied. The second is that in an environment of selective rather than general repressiveness, the punitive organs were simply unable to block off bold questions and flows of embarrassing information about their own activities. The new communications environment forced politicians to set limits on police activities. This situation was largely a reflection of the changes in the overall Soviet political system since Stalin's time. Certain restraints on repression, however, had more specific causes. An example of external restraint is the interest of the Canadian Communist Party (C.C.P.) in Soviet Ukrainian affairs.

External inhibitions. Because of the importance of the Ukrainian group in the C.C.P. and the C.C.P.'s stake in cultivating its ethnic constituencies, the Soviet arrests in 1965, Kolasky's revelations on his return from the Ukraine at the end of 1965, and disquieting information from other sources made the C.C.P. the one party in the world potentially motivated to make trouble in the international Communist movement over the strategically most sensitive nationality group in the U.S.S.R. -- and at a highly undesirable moment from the standpoint of Soviet relations with China and Eastern Europe. Although the electoral strength of the C.C.P. is almost nil, it retains some influence over pressure points in the Canadian labour movement (in which Eastern European groups are well-represented). A break by the Party with the Soviet Union over the Ukrainian issue could have stimulated anti-Soviet sentiment there and among broader segments of the Canadian electorate, at a time in which it was in the Soviet Union's interest to encourage greater independence from Washington in Ottawa's foreign policy (e.g. with regard to N.A.T.O.). The Soviet leadership also had a stake in minimizing the moral support which the C.C.P. might render directly to the Soviet Ukrainian dissidents. Finally, the C.C.P. had a vote in the long-delayed International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (it endorsed the resolution in June, 1969), and a "vote" -- as it happened -- in

the evaluation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia (it initially condemned the invasion, but reversed its position two days later -- a decision well-publicized in the Soviet press). It would be most unwise to exaggerate the inhibiting effect of the C.C.P. on actual Soviet policy, particularly when it appears that the C.C.P. leadership was less than eager itself to wash dirty Soviet laundry in public.[28] However, it is a fact that in 1967 and 1968 Canadian Communist leaders repeatedly visited Moscow and Kiev, were seen by Suslov and officials of the C.C. C.P.S.U. apparatus, and received the highest-level treatment in Kiev.[29]

Legitimacy. A significant factor conditioning effective response by the regime to the challenge of its definitions of Ukrainian reality was probably the orthodox Establishment's perception of the shaky nature of its own legitimacy. This group found itself in the unfamiliar position of having to defend unacknowledgable informal practices of an illiberal or Russifying nature against attacks mounted from its own "political formulae." Constitutional provisions, legal rights, and quotations from Marx and Lenin which had hitherto served a useful decorative function were now being turned against their official guardians. What was the meaning of these signs, after all? Did they point to implicit and esoteric Stalinist meanings, or to the "naive" face-value meanings assigned to them by the reformers? The guardians could not openly repudiate their own legitimizing symbols, and while they struggled with this insoluble problem some of them were individually subjected to a type of moral and political criticism uncommon in the Soviet Union.[30] Many pieces of evidence from the Ukrainian protest movement indicate an irritated awareness by officials of a lack of public support for regime actions, and at the same time a measure of fear of provoking public opinion (or the opinion of certain publics, such as that of student youth). Nothing demonstrates this concern better than the confused handling of information about the arrests and trials.

Elite Conflict. Certain inhibitions in the use of repression, vacillation in its application, and contradictory tactical decisions were also produced by divisions within the political elite at both the all-union and republic levels. The existence of conflict in Moscow during this period has been persuasively demonstrated by Michel Tatu.[31] It made itself felt in the Ukraine through support for mutually antagonistic Ukrainian politicians, shifts in cultural policy, and -- it would seem --

on-again-off-again authorization for K.G.B. intimidation.[32]

At the republic level, first secretaries do not wield absolute power. Power is shared by the first secretary with others in policy formulation and -- naturally -- policy implementation (which is often crucial in nationality matters). Some degree of "collective leadership" is institutionalized by the establishment of separate and overlapping jurisdictions among groups and individuals represented in the top leadership. Within the Party Secretariat at the beginning of 1968 day-to-day supervision of the three areas of central concern to our study -- personnel, propaganda, and the K.G.B. -- was assigned to three different secretaries (A.P.Liashko, A.D.Skaba, and V.I. Drozdenko respectively). The Chairman of the Party Control Commission (I.S.Grushetskii) also played a role in personnel and "administrative" matters. Shelest's control over these four individuals was limited by their own membership (two full, two candidate) in the highest collective decision-making body, the Party Politbiuro, and by their power of informal appeal to their functional superiors and friends in Moscow. The existence of the Politbiuro, which provided representation for the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the military, and three key oblasts of the republic (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk and Khar'kov), offered a partial check on the Secretariat. And the functioning of mixed party-state "teams" in all basic policy areas institutionalized jurisdictional overlap.[33] Moreover, there is no evidence that these structural "checks and balances" were frustrated by the presence of a Shelest "machine."

What is striking about the Secretariat and Politbiuro in 1968 is the absence of close past dependency relationships between any of the other members of these bodies and Shelest. Those informal bonds of loyalty which may have existed between Shelest and some of his colleagues could only have been based on a temporary convergence of personal or policy interests. This situation was not accidental; it reflected the system of bureaucratic appointment from above of each of these top republic officials, and the balance of power and policy orientation in the C.P.S.U. Politbiuro when each was promoted. One effect on a first secretary of operating in such a political environment, we may hypothesize, is to motivate him to carry out the Centre's wishes zealously when these are clearly and forcefully articulated. The situation in which he finds himself bespeaks the fact that no first secretary is irreplaceable.

When circumstances permit local discretion in the handling of highly-charged political issues, even formal adherence to "collectivity" demands that the issues be at least discussed among the top leaders; and discussion implies that any leader -- including the first secretary -- must argue for some particular "definition of the situation." We have a bit of direct proof that "the situation" still lacked clear definition in the mid-1960's. In his letter to Shelest (see footnote 20) I. Kandyba states that Marusenko, a L'vov K.G.B. official, told him in 1966 that the many appeals sent to various authorities by those jailed in the "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union" case had led the "C.C." C.P.Uk. to demand that the L'vov K.G.B. report to it in order that it could make up its mind whether the matter had been handled properly. The "C.C.'s" decision hung in the balance until Marusenko played back tape recordings made by a police informer (which were inadmissable as legal evidence), There is other evidence as well of irresolution and argument among the Ukrainian leaders.

The most important split in the Ukrainian leadership, although not necessarily the most pronounced, was probably that which seems to have separated the Party first secretary, Shelest, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, V.V. Shcherbitskii. The a priori evidence of conflict here may be quickly summarized: (1) as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and thus the leading prospective candidate for the succession to the first secretaryship, Shcherbitskii represented a standing threat to Shelest's tenure of office; (2) as a candidate member of the Politbiuro of the C.C. C.P.S.U., Shcherbitskii was in a position to undermine Shelest's authority among the Soviet leaders, or at least to make it difficult for Shelest to act as the spokesman for the Ukraine; (3) as a former official in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Shcherbitskii shared a common regional base with the Party's General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev -- under whom he had served in the late 1940's. The basic piece of empirical evidence of incompatibility between Shcherbitskii and Shelest was the sudden demotion from Chairman of the Council of Ministers to first secretary of Dnepropetrovsk obkom that Shcherbitskii suffered in 1963, when Shelest became first secretary of the C.P.Uk. and Podgornyi (the former first secretary) rose to the Secretariat in Moscow. There were rumours that Shcherbitskii had opposed Khrushchev's ruinous agricultural delivery quotas for the Ukraine. But whatever he had done to antagonize Khrushchev was retrospectively judged "correct" in 1965, when he was returned to the chairmanship of

the Council of Ministers. This decision re-emphasized the likelihood that he and Shelest had taken different policy stands in 1963. As we shall suggest below, the two probably did not see eye to eye on basic questions in 1968 either.

It appears certain that relationships between Shelest and the man most involved in "managing" the intelligentsia, the propaganda secretary Skaba, were quarrelsome. Skaba had been appointed propaganda secretary in 1960, three years before Shelest became first secretary. He rose to power as a protegé of Podgornyi, having served under the latter in Khar'kov and then having been promoted directly from Khar'kov to the important post of Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education of the Ukraine after Podgornyi's elevation to the post of first secretary. Skaba had a reputation in the Ukraine as an implacable foe of the dissidents and as a leading Russifier.[34]

According to John Kolasky, Skaba had quarrelled with Shelest over the latter's failure to take action against Dzyuba and Honchar, and had denounced Shelest to Moscow for "supporting Ukrainian nationalists in the Writers' Union."[35] The report of the Canadian Communist delegation to the Ukraine of April 1967 makes it perfectly clear that they thought the Ukrainian leadership was divided over the policy of repression. They portray Skaba as a man profoundly indifferent to Ukrainian national aspirations.[36] Skaba's outlook led him to approve the Great Purges in the Ukraine in a way pointedly avoided by Shelest.[37] His neo-Stalinist convictions carried his political activity beyond the strictly Ukrainian arena. At the June, 1963 ideological plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. he lashed out against Novyi Mir,[38] while in a 1967 article published by the Party's leading organizational journal he had the temerity to accuse Voprosy ekonomiki, Voprosy filosofii and the Party's leading theoretical journal -- Kommunist -- of failing to unmask liberal heresies propounded in discussions of the economic reform.[39] Under these circumstances, such accusations constituted an implicit challenge to the high-level political overseers of these journals, and would only have been possible if Skaba himself had strong personal support at an equally high level in Moscow. Retrospectively it seems that Skaba's star began to wane in the fall of 1967.[40] Perhaps his fate was decided during Brezhnev's talk with the Ukrainian leaders on Christmas Day, 1967. On March 29, 1968, he was replaced as propaganda secretary by F.D. Ovcharenko. The

occasion was a Central Committee plenum which critically reviewed the state of "political information" work in the Ukraine.[41]

The report at the Plenum was delivered by A.P.Liashko, and the speakers included the first secretaries of the Transcarpathian and L'vov obkoms of the Western Ukraine. The subjects under discussion at the Plenum are suggested by the following:

> Frequently agitation and propaganda work does not make allowances for the complexity of the international situation. The perfidious acts of imperialist ideologues, which are directed against our country and the entire socialist camp, are inadequately exposed. Cases occur in which Party organizations are slow to rebuff unequivocally all manifestations of bourgeois ideology. They have an imperfect knowledge of the moods of individual groups of our populace and fail to react sharply to various unhealthy conversations and rumours.[42]

One might infer that both the Czechoslovak crisis and nationalism in the Ukraine were among the matters analyzed at the Plenum. The Plenum took place at about the same time that a remarkable appeal signed by 139 Ukrainians from many professions (including a number of eminent scientists), protesting against lawlessness in the Ukraine, was sent to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi.[43] If the appeal was sent before the Plenum, it undoubtedly would have influenced what transpired there. But in any event, the appeal -- on top of all else that had happened in the Ukraine -- could not have failed to bring home to the highest Soviet leaders both the depth of emotions among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the disquieting capacity of this group to organize itself (and even a number of workers too). Surely, some image of the Ukrainian situation -- more or less threatening -- must thereafter have been present in the minds of these leaders as they attempted to size up the meaning of Czechoslovakia for Soviet interests.

The new line. Ovcharenko's appointment must have evoked uncertain reactions in the Ukraine, for his background was quite untypical of the ordinary occupant of this post, and there were elements in his past which could be given a "liberal" interpretation. By profession he was a chemist, with a thoroughly respectable list of scientific publications to his name. He had worked his way up to membership in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and was

head of one of its institutes. Simultaneously, however, he had made his "political" contribution: in the relatively liberal period, 1956-58, he had been head of the Science and Culture Department of the C.C. C.P.Uk.; he was later secretary of the Party committee of the Academy of Sciences; and at the time of his appointment as C.C. secretary he was serving as head of the Ukrainian branch of the "Knowledge" Society.[44] Ovcharenko's appointment was an admission that Skaba had thoroughly discredited himself. It was also a step in the direction of entrusting the leadership of the intelligentsia to someone who could claim some familiarity with science and culture. In the final analysis, however, it did not signal a relaxation of repression in the Ukraine. Quite the contrary, it was tied to the hardening of Soviet ideological policy proclaimed at the April (1968) Plenum of the C.P.S.U.

Basically, the new line in the Ukraine was part of a broader design to secure a more profound, if less obtrusive control over restless elements among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and youth. The policy which Ovcharenko was called upon to implement in the Ukraine seems to have entailed at least three interrelated courses of action: (1) avoidance of personal publicity for dissidents (no more martyrs); (2) a shift in the field of battle from reactive skirmishes with individual dissenters to active measures in the organizational and "group" arena; (3) systematic support for regime supporters as a complement to the counter-attack against dissidents. This line, apparent at the time of Skaba's replacement by Ovcharenko in the spring of 1968,[45] became fully manifest after the invasion. Shelest, who by 1968 had had five years' exposure to the annoyance and political risks of dealing with obstreperous intellectuals, rebellious students, crusading associates, and demanding central authorities, gave every sign of accepting the new line as his own.

From the standpoint of the "Ukrainian factor" in the Czechoslovak crisis, perhaps the most important feature of developments in the Ukraine in the 1960's was that they were open to conflicting evaluation. Some were undoubtedly encouraging from the Soviet leadership's point of view. On the other hand, it would not be an exaggeration to say that phenomena identified by theorists as preconditions of revolution

were also in evidence.[46] One should add, of course, that preconditions are one thing and revolution another. As the Procurator Denisov put it to L.H.Lukianenko before the latter was sentenced to death in 1961 (the sentence was later commuted to fifteen years' imprisonment), had Lukianenko been able to organize in large Ukrainian cities mass demonstrations demanding secession, they still would have been crushed by government troops. "Why," Denisov asked rhetorically, "do you think they're garrisoned in the cities?" [47]

III

THE CZECHOSLOVAK SCENE BEFORE THE INVASION

The Slovak Question

Background. Before the overthrow of Novotny in January, 1968, the most important political feature of the Czechoslovak scene relevant to the "Ukrainian" dimension of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations was the Slovak question. This circumstance was the result of geography, the incorporation of the Carpatho-Ukraine (the eastern end of Czechoslovakia) into the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1945, and the presence of Ukrainians on both sides of the border. Soviet policy toward this area of Eastern Europe has a long and complex history connected with twists and turns in the Comintern line in the 1920's and 1930's, the evolution of Soviet aims in the wartime and early postwar periods, and relations between the Czechoslovak Communist regime and the Soviet Union since 1948.[1] Where it has had the choice, the Soviet Union has supported centralizing forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (C.P.C.) whatever its current line has been on Slovak autonomy. Thus, in the 1920's and early 1930's when Comintern directives stressed "self-determination" and the right of Slovak separatism, power in the C.P.C. was nevertheless being consolidated in the hands of the "Prague centralizers." With the establishment of a Communist system in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Soviet Union placed the weight of its authority behind those leaders who opposed concessions to Slovak autonomist aims. The present first secretary of the C.P.C., Dr.Husak, was one of the prominent Slovak Communist leaders purged in 1950 for "bourgeois nationalism" -- presumably with Soviet approval. From then until Brezhnev abandoned Novotny to his fate in December, 1967, the Soviet-backed leadership in Prague stubbornly resisted devolution of powers to Slovakia along either Party or state lines. When Brezhnev visited Bratislava in June, 1966 (accompanied by the then Slovak first secretary, Alexander Dubcek), he seemed to place Soviet support entirely behind Prague. In his main speech in the Slovak capital, after hinting at Soviet interest in the emerging controversy over Slovak rights, he praised Novotny, emphasized the economic gains actually achieved by Slovakia since 1948, and observed that both the C.P.S.U. and C.P.C. were

"conducting a Leninist nationality policy aimed at the all-round, harmonious development of the economy and culture of all regions and all nationalities of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia." He pointed out, not too tactfully, that Slovakia had been liberated at the cost of many Soviet lives and was currently benefiting from Soviet economic aid, including construction of the East-Slovak Metallurgical Combine ("one of the biggest in the world"). The international relations section of his speech included a condemnation of "separatism, nationalism and other currents alien to Marxism-Leninism." In no way, publicly at least, did he suggest any Soviet sympathy for Slovak nationalist demands.[2]

This picture of Soviet attitudes toward Slovakia must be balanced, however, by a recognition that the Soviet Union was willing -- under unusual circumstances -- to accept an independent Slovakia. Thus the so-called Slovak Soviet Republic (Slovenska Republika Rad), created on June 16, 1919 as a by-product of Bela Kun's war with Czechoslovakia over former Hungarian territories, established an historical precedent of sorts for an independent Communist Slovakia closely allied with the Soviet Union.[3] In 1939 the Soviet Union formally recognised the independence of the Nazi-created puppet regime in Slovakia. Simultaneously, a Slovak section of the Comintern was created, although it was still formally controlled by the C.P.C. During the war the underground Slovak Communist Party (C.P.S.) led by Siroky, pursued a national-liberation anti-fascist coalition line. Cooperation between democratic and Communist forces culminated in the Slovak Uprising of August 1944, in which Husak and Novomesky were the outstanding Communist figures. Early in the war some Slovak Communists had proposed the reestablishment of the Slovak Soviet Republic. (The most prominent member of this group, Jan Osoha, died in February, 1945 in Austria on his way to a German concentration camp.) It now appears that even in mid-1944 Husak and the Slovak C.C. were ready to accept an independent Slovak state. However, this possibility soon gave way to a choice between federal status within the existing Czechoslovak state or joining the Soviet Union. Because Slovaks in fact dominated the ruling Slovak National Council set up in Slovakia following the expulsion of the Germans, and because the Soviets did not want to annex Slovakia, the C.P.S. found it convenient to opt for autonomy under the terms of the Kosice Programme of April 5, 1945.[4]

While the Soviet-supported C.P.C. leadership, headed by Gottwald, accepted temporarily some of the Slovak institutional gains brought about as a consequence of the role of the C.P.S. and the Democratic Party during and after the Uprising, (e.g., the Slovak National Council and its Board of Commissioners) and paid lip service to the Kosice Programme, it never approved of federation even in principle. After the liberation the C.P.C. leadership gradually reestablished its control over the Slovak Communists.[5] When the elections of May, 1946 demonstrated that the tactical appeal to Slovak nationalism was not winning Slovakia (largely Catholic) to the Communist cause, it was abruptly abandoned.

The recent period. The vital role played by the Slovak Communists from 1962 to 1968 in weakening and then deposing Novotny is well known.[6] In this period, destalinization within the C.P.C. created an opportunity for the rehabilitation of Slovak communism from the charge of "bourgeois nationalism," which had cost it so dearly in the early 1950's. At the same time, Slovak intellectuals pushed insistently for revision of the centralist Constitution of 1960. From January 1968 to the Soviet invasion the most profound political emotions in Slovakia centered upon the redress of national grievances and the establishment of federal equality between Czechs and Slovaks, not upon the issues of democratization and economic reform. We by no means wish to imply, of course, that Slovaks were uninterested in democratization. The conflict between liberal and conservative national communists within the Slovak Writers' Union in 1968 suggests the need to avoid oversimplification of Slovak attitudes. Our point is simply that there was a strong tendency in Slovakia to consider equalization of Slovak rights the aspect of "democratization" that had to come first. Moreover, it should be mentioned that a not insignificant minority of the population, particularly in the western areas of Slovakia, did appear to have been willing to entertain seriously the notion that secession from the Czechoslovak Republic (but not annexation by the U.S.S.R.!) might offer the best solution to Slovakia's difficulties. Attitudes toward the economic reform were also more reserved in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. As Riveles points out, the "new economic model," with its reliance on market forces, worked against the interests of balanced industrial development and full employment in Slovakia, and was acceptable to Slovak economists and politicians only after significant investment concessions.[7]

After Dubcek replaced Novotny as first secretary of the C.P.C. in January, 1968, his former post of first secretary of the C.P.S. was filled by Vasil Bilak. Bilak, who earned the reputation of a quisling during the invasion, became secretary of the C.P.C. responsible for international affairs in December, 1968 during the post-invasion "normalization" and in 1969 was one of the more powerful figures in the Party. He had been officially replaced by Husak as first secretary of the C.P.S. on August 28, 1968. When Husak replaced Dubcek in April, 1969, Stefan Sadovsky became first secretary of the C.P.S. The behaviour of each of these leaders with respect to Slovakia was inspired by rather different combinations of policy aims, personal interests, and situational imperatives -- all of which found support among various sections of the political elite and the general population in Slovakia.

Although Dubcek led the fight for Slovak rights against Novotny, he emerged in 1968 as an individual concerned most with Czechoslovak-wide reform. In contrast, it is clear enough that Husak's one distinguishing policy ambition throughout his career (at least until he became first secretary of the C.P.C.) was to achieve equality of rights for Slovakia. Just as he was more radical on this question than Dubcek, so he was far more conservative on cultural liberalization, economic reform, and the Party's internal discipline and external monopoly of power. In 1968, before he became first secretary of the C.P.S., Husak played a key role in pushing through the new federal system which was approved by the National Assembly in October. When, as spokesman for the C.P.S. after the invasion, he refused to validate the secret XIV Congress of the C.P.C., he may be assumed to have been acting in a way consistent with his past advocacy of Slovak interests.

Bilak, who was actually in power in Bratislava during the months before August, is a politician of a different stripe. He is of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) ethnic origin. He spent virtually his entire career in the Slovak Party apparatus, rising steadily upward at the time Husak and others were in prison for "bourgeois nationalism." From 1954 to 1958 he was secretary and then first secretary of the Presov Krai Committee of the C.P.S., following which he served in other posts that involved contact with the Ukrainian question (Minister of Education 1960-62, and ideological secretary of the C.P.S. 1962-68). In 1954 he produced a book ominously titled <u>On Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism in Czechoslovakia</u> --

not the type of study that would endear him to Ukrainians. He displayed particular hostility toward the religious interests of the Ukrainian population, and -- as we shall see -- was unaccommodating toward Ukrainian political aspirations in 1968. However, there is some evidence that he made efforts to secure special economic benefits for Ukrainian-inhabited areas (e.g., in the Ulic-ubla Valley). Also, there appears to be some truth to the assertion (by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung January 26, 1968) that he "supported the cultural stirrings of the Ukrainian minority in Eastern Slovakia."[8] This seems to be why he was typed as a "Rusnak" ("Uke") by the Slovaks, and why his appointment as first secretary of the C.P.S. was welcomed by at least some Ukrainians.

There seems to have been a discrepancy, however, between Bilak's public image among Slovaks as a person of doubtful loyalty to the Slovak cause, and his actual political behaviour. In December, 1967 at the Central Committee meeting which preceded the January showdown, Bilak turned on Novotny and raised the highly sensitive issue of the Stalinist purges in Slovakia.[9] Politically he may tentatively be categorised as a rather pro-Slovak, opportunist neo-Stalinist. During his tenure of office as first secretary of the C.P.S., he and his group appear to have cynically exploited the groundswell of Slovak nationalism among intellectuals and the public in order to solidify their own position vis-a-vis Prague, while at the same time deflecting the democratization process.[10] As a result, conservative cadres were not removed from the Slovak political apparatus as they were in the Czech lands, and hence there existed a natural base of support for Soviet efforts to re-establish orthodox control. Of course, other tendencies -- liberal and "Husakite" -- were also represented in the Slovak leadership before the invasion. Basically, however, the political situation in Slovakia was more to Soviet liking than that elsewhere in the country.[11]

The Ukrainians in Slovakia

Background. As we have already mentioned, the Ukrainian community is concentrated in the Presov region of Eastern Slovakia, especially in the districts of Humenné, Bardejov, Poprad, and Presov itself. The size of the group is to this day a very controversial matter. Estimates run from a low of 58,000 to a quite unrealistic high of 1,400,000.[12] Our guess would be between 75,000 and 125,000. (The discrepancies in the estimates

of the Ukrainian population partly reflect the different possible ways of defining "Ukrainian": religious affiliation, language, ethnic origin, or sense of ethnic identification. Religious affiliation produces the highest estimates, and is therefore preferred by Ukrainians.) As Figure 2 indicates, the Presov Ukrainians are a predominantly "lower class" group with disproportionately high representation among private farmers and low representation in the white-collar category.

Figure 2

Social Composition of Ukrainians, Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia: 1968

Social Class	Ukrainians %	Slovaks %	Hungarians %
Workers	44	52	51
Collective farmers	14	15	34
Employees	12	25	12
Private farmers	25	6	2
Private artisans	--	1	1
Other	5	1	1
Totals	100	100	100

Source: Druzhno Vpered (Presov) July 1968 (rounded figures)

They tend to live in the mountainous regions, which are extremely poor and difficult to collectivise -- as the figures show. In fact, Ukrainians are the least collectivised nationality in Czechoslovakia.[13] If they had been incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1968, their "political reliability" would have been lower even than that of the Western Ukrainians.

The Presov region joined Czechoslovakia in January, 1919 by decision of the Presov Ruthenian Peoples' Council, whose most prominent leader was Dr. A.H.Beskyd. In the period between the two wars the region was very much under the influence of Russian culture. There was a "Russian Gymnazium" in Presov, and university students were united in an Obshchestvo Vozrozhdenie

which had branches in Bratislava and Prague. The main newspaper was Russkoe Slovo, and for a short time there was a newspaper, Molodaia Rus' (1930-31). The foundation upon which the whole Ruthenian social structure rested in Presov and elsewhere was the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, which at this level contained strong Magyarophile, Russophile and, later, Slovakophile elements, who opposed the Ukrainophile tendencies that predominated at the top of the church hierarchy. This struggle over ethnic identity within the church continued to exist after World War II. The "church" then became the Orthodox Church, however, and while of necessity it was closely allied with the Moscow Patriarchate, its organization and ideology became basically Ukrainian.

Before the war, most Presov Ukrainians considered themselves "Ruthenian," and some even thought they were Russian. Until 1950 the population was indeed officially told that it was "Russian," perhaps in the hope that this would score points with the Soviet leadership. The present intelligentsia grew up in a generally anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian environment. It is surprising, therefore, how quickly this group reversed its own ethnic orientation in the postwar period. To a considerable extent it has succeeded in changing the self-identification of the masses as well. Nevertheless, a residual ambivalence still exists in the sense of ethnic identity of many Presov Ukrainians. Their particular ethnic ambivalence distinguishes them from persons of both Eastern and Western Ukrainian origin and provides an opening for attempts to reverse the Ukrainization process (either through "Ruthenization" or Slovakization). Many Presov intellectuals became consciously "Ukrainian" only after attending universities in the Ukraine. Thus one prominent Presov intellectual who has visited the West presented his own case as a typical example. Until living in the U.S.S.R. he considered himself a Russian and spoke Russian. His stay in Kiev completely changed his outlook. "There are many like myself back home," he added. Paradoxically, the upheavals of World War II, the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church, and ties with the Soviet Ukraine all contributed to the national reawakening in Presov.

Political organization of the Ukrainians. In December, 1944 as the Germans retreated from the Presov area, Ukrainian National Committees were established in a majority of villages and smaller towns. These committees demanded equality for the Ukrainian population living within Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian demands

were discussed by the Communist Party at the Kosice conference of February-March, 1945. In his report at the conference Husak pointed out that until the Transcarpathian Ukrainians had decided to join the U.S.S.R., the C.P.S. had upheld the principle that Czechoslovakia would be a state composed of the "three fraternal Slavic nations of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ukrainians." Under the new conditions the Czechoslovak republic would be a peoples' democracy of the two equal nations of Czechs and Slovaks, and Ukrainians living in Slovakia would be granted equal political and cultural rights. But Husak demanded in return that the Ukrainians respect the indivisibility of the Slovak polity.[14] At this same moment (March 1, 1945) the newly-created Ukrainian Peoples' Council of the Presov Region (U.P.C.P.) sent a telegram to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. requesting that Presov become part of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When the Soviet government failed to respond to this invitation -- to the consternation of the Presov leaders -- the U.P.C.P. sent a memorandum to the Slovak National Council on May 5, 1945 which declared the U.P.C.P.'s acceptance of the Kosice Programme and willingness to co-operate with the new Czechoslovak government and the Slovak National Council if certain conditions were met.[15] The S.N.C. replied positively, and for several years the U.P.C.P. functioned effectively in lobbying for the Ukrainian cause, even though it was not legally recognized. Its newspaper, Priashevshchina, was published in Russian, but approached problems from a Ukrainian -- or at least local -- point of view. Members of the intelligentsia, which was still under strong Russian cultural influence, acquired literary Ukrainian only later as students or visitors in the Soviet Ukraine. (Thus initially, as we have already noted, it was the Soviet Ukraine that spread national consciousness and even Ukrainian nationalism to the Presov Ukrainians, not the other way around.)

From 1948 on the role of the U.P.C.P., which had not been legalized in the 1948 Constitution, became increasingly circumscribed. In this period approximately 10,000 "optanty," predominantly members of the intelligentsia and conscious Ukrainians, left the country for the Soviet Ukraine -- which weakened the Ukrainian movement.[16] By decision of its Presidium the U.P.C.P. liquidated itself in December, 1952, under pressure from Bratislava.[17] It was replaced by the Cultural Association of Ukrainian Toilers (C.A.U.T.), which was formally created in 1951 and exists to this day.[18] Unlike the U.P.C.P. the C.A.U.T.'s jurisdiction extended only to Ukrainians in Slovakia.

The C.A.U.T. from the very beginning made use of the same personnel and buildings as the U.P.C.P. Because of the "cult of personality" and collectivization drive it did not really get under way until the constituent conference of May 29-30, 1954. Its statute charged it with: (1) co-ordinating the work of Ukrainian cultural institutions; (2) helping to guide cultural and educational activities among Ukrainians; (3) disseminating socialist ideology among Ukrainians; (4) conducting research in the field of Ukrainian culture, jointly with the Slovak Academy of Sciences; (5) informing the public of economic and cultural achievements in the Ukrainian S.S.R., in co-operation with the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society; (6) establishing and maintaining through state channels relations with progressive Ukrainian organizations abroad, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; (7) preserving Ukrainian material and spiritual cultural treasures.[19] By 1967 the C.A.U.T.'s organizational roots encompassed four district committees and over 230 local chapters with 8,000 members.[20]

As the example of Bilak indicates, the Presov Ukrainians were also "represented" through the participation of individual Ukrainians in the normal Party and state organs of Eastern Slovakia. Figure 3 shows the number of Ukrainians elected as delegates to Presov Krai Party conferences while the Krai existed.

Figure 3

Ukrainian Delegates to Presov Krai Party Conferences (% of all delegates)

1949	1951	1953	1954	1955	1957	1958
35	32.6	31.5	27.1	25.9	27	27

Source: Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, p.106

Percentages in Figure 3 substantially exceed the share of the Ukrainian population in the entire population of the region. The same applies to the figures for membership in the Krai Committee given in Figure 4.

Figure 4

Ukrainian Membership in the Presov Krai Party Committee (% of elected members)

1949	1951	1953	1955	1957	1958
27.2	37.5	31.5	34.4	29.6	37

Source: Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, p.106

At the district level Ukrainians completely dominated some Party committees. Thus, for example, in 1953 all 28 members of the Medzilaborce district committee were Ukrainians.[21] Large numbers of Ukrainians were also members of local government councils. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the Ukrainians, participation by Ukrainians as individuals did not add up to representation of Ukrainians as a group; they did not even have the "autonomous oblast" status enjoyed by smaller ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R.

The limitations which had been placed on the activities of the C.A.U.T. by the Slovak authorities were always disliked by the Presov Ukrainians. When it began to appear in 1968 that Slovak demands for federal constitutional arrangements were likely to be met, the Ukrainians (and Hungarians) feared that they might suffer from this. The fear of the Ukrainians had a regional as well as ethnic basis to it, for Eastern Slovakia as a whole -- in comparison with western Slovakia -- had been favoured economically during the Novotny era. In 1968, taking advantage of the changed environment, the Presov Ukrainians began to demand group political representation. In February-March moves were made by communist Ukrainians to recreate the U.P.C.P., at a projected Congress to be held in May 1968. The Congress was proscribed by Bilak, then the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia. The Ukrainians set a new date: August 23. The Soviet invasion made a further postponement necessary. On September 26, 1968 an expanded Plenum of the C.A.U.T. was held, attended by 110 people.[22] In his report Mykhailo Myndosh, the head of the C.A.U.T., quoted early postwar statements by Husak on the need to improve the lot of the Ukrainians. (Husak, it may be recalled, had become first secretary of the C.P.S. after the invasion.) The Plenum resolved to convene the People's Congress and resurrect the

U.P.C.P. -- but set no date. It became clear at the Plenum of the C.A.U.T. held on May 14, 1969 that this idea had been shelved indefinitely. The new head of the C.A.U.T., Ivan Matsynskyi (a writer and member of the C.C. C.P.S.), presented a series of proposals aimed at expanding the organization's publications (and thus its influence over various strata of Ukrainians), reviving the local dialect (Ruthenian) as a counter to conscious Ukrainianism, and subordinating the important journal Duklia to the Association of Slovak Writers.[23] At the same time steps were taken to scale down polemics in the press between Hungarians and Ukrainians, on the one hand, and Slovaks on the other.[24] Somewhat the same pattern of developments took place with respect to the new youth, women's, journalists', and teachers' organizations which the C.A.U.T. was instrumental in creating in 1968-69. While there were reverses, by no means was all lost after the Soviet invasion.[25]

Ukrainian-Slovak relations. It should be clear already that the organizing efforts of the Presov Ukrainians were closely related to serious tensions in Slovak-Ukrainian relations which were rooted in memories of the campaign against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," religious and cultural differences, conflicting economic interests, and fears of the future. Just as some Czechs were apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the Slovaks, so some Slovaks were unsure of the loyalty of the Ukrainians.[26] The Slovak-Ukrainian tensions, in turn, were conditioned by conflicts between the Slovaks and the large and -- to the Slovaks -- threatening Hungarian minority in their midst.[27] (The Hungarians and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia collaborate in advancing the interests of the national minorities, and Slovak concessions to the Ukrainians would immediately provide the Hungarians with a lever for pressing their own claims against Bratislava.) The reason that the U.P.C.P. was not recreated was undoubtedly that it was unpalatable to the Slovaks, not to mention the Soviets. The formation of the Section of Ukrainian Journalists (see fn.25) was stimulated by the desire to combat what were felt to be chauvinistic attacks against the Ukrainian community in the Slovak press. And the underlying situation was most clearly revealed in the case of the teachers.[28]

Until recently the Ukrainians living in the Czech lands had no organization of their own. The functions of the C.A.U.T. were limited to the Presov region, or at best to Slovakia. In July, 1968, however, an organization for these Ukrainians was finally established: the Ukrainian Cultural-Enlightenment

Union (U.C.E.U.). It primarily serves the 4,000 Ukrainians who live in Prague and are mainly members of the intelligentsia (including a sizeable, well-organized and nationally-conscious group of students in the Charles University). An indication of what can be expected from Ukrainians in Prague was provided by a Shevchenko Concert on March 22, 1969. After listening to a quite political oration on the topic of "Shevchenko and the Present," and to Czech and Ukrainian choral groups sing Ukrainian songs, the audience burst into "tumultuous applause" at the recitation by students of Shevchenko's violently anti-Russian poem, Son.[29] For the present, at least, Ukrainian activities in the Czech lands will be less restricted than in the Presov region. Czech-Ukrainian relations are better than Slovak-Ukrainian ones, and their importance will tend to grow in the future. We shall now describe the cultural scene in Presov in more detail.

The church. As we have mentioned above, the Uniate Church was one of the main arenas in which the struggle over the ethnic identity of the "Ruthenians" was waged. In April, 1950 the Church was liquidated and bishops Goidych and Hopko were arrested and tried on charges of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and engaging in illegal activities on behalf of the Vatican. Many priests were arrested, while others left the profession. Some, however, recognized their new spiritual leader -- the Moscow Patriarch. Thus it came to pass that the (Russian) Orthodox Church suddenly blossomed forth in this predominantly Catholic land. (At present the Church has autocephalous status.) As time passed, however, despite the Orthodox Church's subordination to Moscow, and despite its avowed purpose of containing Ukrainian feeling and guiding it in the direction of the "Russian See," the Church itself became Ukrainianized -- as had the Catholic Church before it -- because its social base was Ukrainian.

The overthrow of Novotny led to the restoration of the Uniate Church in Czechoslovakia (by a government decree of June 13, 1968). This important event was soon clouded by wrangling between Ukrainians and Slovaks over the seat of the bishopric (Presov or Kosice?), whether a joint theological seminary should be set up with the (Slovak) Roman Catholics in Spis, and whether the eparchy should be divided into Ukrainian and Slovak vicariates. As passions mounted, some Presov intellectuals, though Marxists and atheists, began to defend the Ukrainian tradition of the Church. One of them, Jurij Baca, cut to the core of the matter when he declaimed, "Religion and church are not only belief in God [but]... ideology and politics."[30] Thus, relations

between Slovaks and Ukrainians are not altogether fraternal in the religious field. The process of Slovakization is strong and has a weakening and divisive influence on the Ukrainian population. (The Church is now administered by a Slovak, Jan Hirka.) This is probably acceptable to the Slovaks, and to the Russians as well. The Ukrainians' main allies have been the Czech bishops, headed by Tomasek. The Vatican stands with Moscow on the side of the Slovaks.

Schools. Something has already been said above of school affairs. The C.A.U.T. faces difficult problems here not only because of the general backwardness of the population, but also because of what Ukrainians take to be deliberate Slovak obstruction of Ukrainian education and Slovakization of the school system. From the Slovak point of view, the arguments used by any dominant nationality with respect to the education of ethnic minorities are apposite. That is to say, excessive emphasis on minority-language education is not only expensive for the majority, but disfunctional in terms of the lower-quality primary and secondary education likely to be provided in the minority-language schools and the reduced opportunities afforded to the minority for effective higher technical training. As in the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainian community in the Presov region feels threatened by the leakage of Ukrainian children into the dominant-language school system in search of broader educational and occupational opportunity. This process is reflected in the data available on the number of Ukrainian-language schools. In the 1955-56 school year there were 245 nine-year schools, five regular high schools and four secondary specialized high schools.[31] Before the 1968-69 school year there were sixty-eight nine-year Ukrainian schools and three high schools. By September 1, 1968 the number of nine-year schools had declined to forty-eight. Revealingly, this measure was said to have been taken partly in response to popular fears that insistence on things Ukrainian might result in the area's inclusion in the Ukrainian S.S.R.[32] According to an article published in November, 1969 the Ukrainian school system in Slovakia in the present, post-invasion period is threatened with total collapse. The author of the article, Andrii Dutsar, attributes this situation partly to requests by Ukrainian parents to turn Ukrainian- into Slovak-language schools, and partly to an "incredible anti-Ukrainian campaign in the mass media." This campaign, he claims, has emboldened "arch-reactionary elements" to agitate against the Ukrainian schools, demagogically misinforming the Slovak population about

alleged discrimination against Slovak children. Some individuals, he adds, have "with impunity" gathered signatures on petitions to change the language of instruction in Ukrainian schools from Ukrainian to Slovak. "Those who do not wish to sign the petitions are labelled Bilakists and traitors."[33] Whether Dutsar's charges are correct or not we do not know but his evidence makes it plain that Ukrainian schools in Slovakia will have to struggle hard to survive. This school crisis, which has been exacerbated by emotions generated by the Soviet invasion, will heighten the anxiety of Presov Ukrainian intellectuals and probably lead them to articulate Ukrainian interests even more vociferously than they have in the past -- if they are permitted to do so.

Folk culture. One of the most successful activities of the C.A.U.T. has been the promotion of various amateur groups in Ukrainian villages and towns. The annual Festival of Song and Dance in Svydnyk attracts from 35,000 to 40,000 people. It has been the sole meeting place for Ukrainians from Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Western Europe, North and South America, and -- in recent years -- even the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is also an annual Festival of Culture and Sports in Medzilaborce, attended by Ukrainians from Poland and the border regions of the Ukraine, and an annual Snina and Stakcin Festival of Drama (of strictly local significance).

Theatre and music. The Ukrainian People's Theatre has existed since November, 1945. Its repertoire is composed almost entirely of classical and contemporary Ukrainian plays, which to date have been viewed by over one million persons. It has a full-time staff of thirty-six people. The Theatre has played an important role in awakening Ukrainian national consciousness in East Slovakia, and has also established contacts in Poland and the Ukraine.[34]

The Duklia Ukrainian People's Ensemble was established by a resolution of the C.C. C.P.S. of December 3, 1955 in order to popularize Ukrainian song and dance, and to "acquaint Ukrainians with Slovak and Czech folklore."[35] The Ensemble has been acclaimed by French, Belgian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Polish critics. At home, it is periodically criticized by Ukrainians for not being Ukrainian enough, and by Slovaks for sins of a different order. The Ensemble serves as a useful means of

communication for Ukrainians throughout the world. It travels frequently and has good relations with amateur groups in other Eastern European countries and in Galicia and Transcarpathia. It was a keen disappointment to Presov Ukrainians that, after the successful "Days of Ukrainian Culture" in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 (of which more later), a Slovak group rather than the Ensemble was invited to appear in the Ukraine in 1969 -- despite a triumphal earlier tour by the Ensemble in the Soviet Union. Complaints on this score were raised by Ukrainians on both sides of the border in numerous letters published in Nove Zhyttia.

Higher education.[36] University-level study of the Ukrainian language and literature in Presov was introduced in 1952-53 in the Department of Russian and Ukrainian Languages of the Presov Pedagogical Faculty of Bratislava University A separate department of Ukrainian studies was set up in September, 1953 in the same Faculty. In 1968 the Department (affiliated since 1959-60 with the Safarik University in Kosice) had ten members, six of whom received their degree in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Beginning in 1955-56 the Department was made responsible for the study of Ukrainian by non-specialists, and for implementation of the requirement that all students of Ukrainian origin pass examinations in the Ukrainian language during their first two semesters at the University. The Department was also influential in convincing teachers in other disciplines who were Ukrainians to teach in Ukrainian and helped spread the use of Ukrainian in several institutions of higher learning in Presov. From the very beginning the Department has been extremely active, having graduated already almost eighty specialists in Ukrainian literature, language and culture. It has organized several important seminars and conferences devoted to Ukrainian problems. The publications of some members of the Department -- especially Iu. Baca, M. Mushynka, I. Shelepets, and O. Rudlovchak -- are known everywhere in Slavistic circles.[37] These publications are designed to rehabilitate everything worth rehabilitating in Ukrainian science, culture and literature. The Department is an important centre for Ukrainian scholars around the world. It has excellent informal contacts with both the older generation of scholars and the younger rebels, and plays a significant role in maintaining communications between the Ukraine and the West.

Two other bodies deserve mention. One is the Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature of the Presov Pedagogical Institute. Its establishment as a separate department in 1965

was motivated by the need to expand the training of Ukrainian language teachers for grades 1-9. (It was only at this late date that Russian was classified as the "foreign" language and Ukrainian the "native".) In 1967 the Department had four members, whose scholarly work was concentrated on problems of teaching Ukrainian and the preparation of textbooks. The department was suddenly liquidated in 1969.[38] There is also a Ukrainian Section of the Research Pedagogic Institute. It is responsible for upgrading instruction in Ukrainian schools, raising the qualifications of teachers, and improving textbooks. The section, which is extremely active, maintains contacts with the Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Its textbooks (rather than the Soviet ones) are used as model Ukrainian textbooks in all the bloc countries. Members of the Department work closely with Radio Presov and the press in strengthening Ukrainian national consciousness among parents.

The Museum of Ukrainian Culture. This museum, located in Svydnyk, is one of the more important Ukrainian institutions in the Presov region.[39] The Museum employs eighteen qualified specialists working in the four areas of History, Ethnography and Folklore, Documentation and Economics. The library of the Museum has an imposing collection of rare books, some unavailable anywhere else (especially since the liquidation of the Ukrainian library in Prague by the Soviets in 1945). The Ethnography and Folklore section attempts through its collections and exhibitions to retain for Ukrainian culture those artifacts, songs, etc., which Slovaks sometimes try to claim for themselves.[40] Publications by the Museum are of high quality. Between 1965 and 1969 five volumes were produced, in which, for example, the "lost" writings by the world-famous Ukrainian ethnographer and folklorist V. Hnatiuk were recovered for posterity. The Museum has also published Shliakh Do Voli, which shows in great detail the contribution made by Transcarpathian Ukrainians in fighting the Germans as members of General Svoboda's Brigade. (The brigade was at one time 75% Ukrainian in its composition, and General Svoboda has acknowledged this on visits to several of his comrades-in-arms in the Presov region.) In short, the Museum is more than a museum. It is an important institution which preserves and strengthens Ukrainian culture not only in Czechoslovakia but -- through its contacts and publications -- in other Eastern European countries and the Ukraine itself.

The press. The C.A.U.T. publishes two main newspapers (Nove Zhyttia and Druzhno Vpered), a children 's newspaper (Pioners'ka Hazeta), and a literary-political journal (Duklia). Ton and Dysonansy are youth supplements to Nove Zhyttia which in recent years have raised many controversial questions and are marked by intense Ukrainian patriotism. There is also a supplement to Druzhno Vpered called Shkola i Zhyttia. In addition, the C.A.U.T. sponsors a variety of non-periodical publications.[41] It has published some eighty important studies on various aspects of Ukrainian life already, while Presov writers as a group have produced to date about 180 titles in belles-lettres alone. We shall discuss the contents of the press in some detail below.

Presov Ukrainian broadcasting. Until 1951 programmes beamed to the local Ukrainian population by the Ukrainian section of Radio Presov were in either Russian or the local dialect. After 1951 the Ukrainian literary language was used. In 1965 Ukrainian-language broadcasts received 19,455 minutes of air time, distributed as follows: News -- 4,516; socio-political programmes -- 4,980; literary-dramatic programmes -- 2,822; musical programmes -- 4,711; and youth programmes -- 2,426.[42] In the 1950's a number of programmes were introduced designed to "educate Ukrainian workers to be nationally conscious as well as loyal to Czechoslovakia."[43] These programmes included "Let's learn about our native land," "Our giants" (about Ukrainian national heroes), "Our history in legends and oral traditions," "From the national treasure-house," etc. In many ways the Presov Ukrainian programmes have been different from those originating in the Ukraine itself. By criticizing political and social inadequacies in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the sphere of nationality problems, these programmes raised issues that were of interest in the U.S.S.R., but could not be discussed so overtly. To be sure, the criticism was restrained until late 1967. But even during the Novotny period the Presov radio was less inhibited than the Soviet. As elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, the radio in Presov played an important communications role in the democratization process of 1968.[44]

The radio in the past has received much of its news directly from Prague, Bratislava, Moscow and Kiev, and thus has not had to rely completely on material filtered through the C.T.A. wire service. News from the Ukraine has a prominent place in foreign news coverage. Perhaps there is no other station in the world outside of the Ukraine that devotes so

much time to the affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Nor does it present all the news "straight"; it comments, analyzes and criticizes. Because most of the journalists and writers in the Presov region work closely with the studio, and because many of them have written openly critical articles about events in the Soviet Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine that "incorrect" thoughts about Soviet Ukrainian affairs were not regularly being voiced over the airwaves -- before and after Novotny's fall.

From the early postwar days the Ukrainian section of Radio Presov has had close contact with the Soviet Union. The head of the section at that time, Andrii Rudlovchak, established direct ties with the radio committees of Moscow, Kiev, Minsk and L'vov, from whom the Radio received Russian and Ukrainian materials and programmes.[45] These relations have existed ever since. Between 1961-65 five employees of the Radio (who were also active in other Ukrainian affairs in Presov) visited radio studios in Moscow, Kiev, Uzhgorod and L'vov. The Radio's collection of Ukrainian music was built up from records sent from the Ukraine on the basis of an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Soviet governments. The Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries has sent newspapers, periodicals, books, etc. to the Radio free of charge.[46] Soviet Ukrainian visitors to Presov have been featured on the radio, as well as Soviet Ukrainian theatrical and music groups (e.g., the Ukrainian State Theatre and Ukrainian State People's Choir, both of Uzhgorod). The Radio, in turn, was listened to before the invasion by a large audience in the Ukraine (especially in the L'vov and Transcarpathian oblasts) and in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania.[47]

IV

UKRAINIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS BEFORE 1968

General Relationships

Cultural-scientific. Among all the East European countries, Czechoslovakia is the one with which the Soviet Ukraine has maintained the closest cultural contacts both before and after the II World War.[1] Cultural communication between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia takes place at the Academy of Sciences level, through university exchange agreements, by means of the publication in translation of each other's writings, and through special research and teaching programmes.[2] The present state of Ukrainian studies in Czechoslovakia has been conveniently summarized by the Czech Ukrainist, Vaclav Zidlicky, in an article published in Literaturna Ukraina April 19, 1968.[3] After the II World War Ukrainian studies were revived at Charles University under the supervision of Professor I. Pankevych (literature) and I. Zilins'kyj (linguistics). "From this centre," Zidlicky comments, "came a large number of young Ukrainists who, together with their older colleagues and graduates of other universities, including Soviet schools, today form the nucleus of Ukrainian studies in Czechoslovakia. Among them are scholars, translators, editors and educators." Michal Molnar, a graduate of the centre and learned secretary of the Institute of World Literatures and Languages of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, introduced Ukrainian studies as a discipline in Slovakia. Research on Ukrainian topics is also conducted not only in Presov, but in Brno, Plzen, and other cities. Where earlier research concentrated on Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations, Czechoslovak scholars have now begun to work on purely Ukrainian topics (e.g., an 800-page history of Ukrainian literature, a dictionary of Ukrainian authors, a book on Soviet Ukrainian poetry of the 1920's, studies in Ukrainian history and folklore, etc.). "On the whole," says Zidlicky, "we may say that Ukrainian studies in Czechoslovakia are extensive and high in quality. Please do not treat this opinion of mine as a breach of modesty. To date, probably every important work of Ukrainian literature has been translated into the Czech and Slovak languages. We also follow new Ukrainian publications with utmost care. Our newspapers and journals systematically publish articles and reviews dealing with Ukrainian problems. We pay most careful attention to debates, discussions and events not only in the realm of

Ukrainian culture, but also in all of Ukraine's social life." Zidlicky concluded his article with a plea to the Soviet Ukrainians for closer and more regular contacts. He also announced plans to publish a journal of Ukrainian studies, and noted the desire of Czechoslovak scholars to establish an International Association of Ukrainists "similar to the existing International Association of Russianists."

As Zidlicky's article reveals, Soviet Ukrainian authorities have not responded with open arms to the efforts of Czechoslovak Ukrainists to expand existing relations, nor have they always approved of Czechoslovak research. Recently, for example, an important book edited by Dr. Orest Zilinskyj was published which describes Czech-Ukrainian literary relations for the last 150 years (Stopadesat Let Cesko-Ukrajinskych Literarnich Styku, 1814-1964; Vedesko-Bibliografisky Sbornik [Prague: "Svet Sovetu", 1968], 480 pp.). It shows beyond any doubt the tremendous contribution of Czech scholars to Slavic studies in general and Ukrainian studies in particular. The book was attacked in the Soviet press for playing up the generational problem in the Ukraine and falsifying the history of Ukrainian literature in the Stalin period, and it cannot be obtained in the Ukraine.[4] A questionnaire administered by Dr. Zilinskyj to eight Czech scholars concerned with contemporary Ukrainian literature also helps to explain official Soviet coolness. When asked what qualities of Ukrainian literature and culture were of most interest to them, they responded by praising the freshness and vitality of the writing of the "group of the 1960's" -- Lina Kostenko, Vinhranovs'kyi, Drach, Symonenko, Korotych, Hutsalo, etc. -- that is, largely the rebels.[5] Zilinskyj has published some information from the archives of the Czech Writers' Association on the number of Ukrainian writers who were guests of the Association from 1962 to 1968, which is given in Figure 5. The numbers in Figure 5 do not entirely "speak for themselves," as only three of the Ukrainians (Kostenko, Levada and Novychenko) made extended (2-3 week) visits to Prague.

Figure 5

Soviet Guests of the Czech Writers' Association: 1962-68

Year	No. from U.S.S.R.	No. from Ukraine	Visitor's Names
1962	57	3	L. Kostenko, S.Pan'ko, O.Levada
1963	46	3	V.Motornyi, O.Mykytenko, L.Novychenko
1964	63	4	V.Kompaniets, M.Bazhan, S.Pan'ko, P.Voron'ko
1965	56	2	V.Korotych, D.Zatons'kyi
1966	49	2	Iu.Petrenko, F.Zalata (Russian)
1967	74	6	M.Zarudnyi, Krugliarov, D.Pavlychko, O.Levada, I.Haidaenko, I.Tel'man (Jewish)
1968 (to June 17)	43	3	L.Novychenko, Iu.Zbanatskyi, B.Tenkhomychevs'kyi
Total	388	23 (6%)	

Source: Duklia 1968, No. 4, p.358

"Friendship" societies. In both the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia official Friendship societies provide the organizational framework for controlled interaction across the border on a broader scale. The Ukrainian branch of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society, formed in 1958, had 20 oblast, city and raion sections in 1968 with over 500 collective members (i.e. institutions and enterprises).[6] The Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society has a similar structure, with a branch for Slovakia. The local chapters may concentrate their attention on particular chapters in the other country, or may be mobilized in support of special campaigns (e.g., celebration of the Slovak National Uprising, or the Days of Ukrainian Culture in Czechoslovakia, discussed below).

Political relationships. Czechoslovakia, -- like Poland, East Germany, and now Hungary -- maintains an active Consulate General in Kiev. In the years before 1968 delegations of Czechoslovak and Ukrainian politicians also occasionally visited the other's country. Thus in July, 1958 and July, 1967 Novotny came to Kiev, where he was well received. Ukrainian politicians have gone to Prague and Bratislava in return. In June, 1966, for example, Shelest was a member of the Soviet delegation to the XIII Congress of the C.P.C. He gave a speech in a factory near Prague during the course of which he discussed economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Local Party committees in the Western Ukraine have established ties with their counterparts in Slovakia. On the basis of press accounts, we would imagine that the highest Party and state officials of the Ukraine and also of the city of Kiev were fairly familiar with their counterparts in Prague and Bratislava before the ousting of Novotny.

Economic ties. Economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine have been extremely important for Czechoslovakia, though relatively less so for the Ukraine. In 1966 Czechoslovakia held second place among countries receiving Ukrainian exports.[8] Total trade turnover between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine "exceeded 550 million rubles" in 1967.[9] The question of mutual "profitability" is a thorny one, not the least because Ukrainian exports to Czechoslovakia are included in total Soviet exports and "payments" to the Ukraine may -- or may not -- take the form of investment in the Ukraine or transfers from the all-union to the Ukrainian budget. It was evident from the Czechoslovak press in 1968 and 1969 that many people in Czechoslovakia thought that their country was paying exploitative prices for raw material imports from the U.S.S.R. But it is doubtful whether this resentment was focused specifically upon the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is some indirect evidence suggesting that Czechoslovak/Ukrainian trade might also have been considered financially unprofitable from the Ukrainian point of view.[10] However, financial considerations are only one factor, and not necessarily the most important one, in economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine.

Czechoslovak industry is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for a number of inputs, and the Ukrainian contribution to overall Soviet exports to Czechoslovakia of a number of key goods has been great. The Ukraine supplies most of the iron and manganese ore, coal, minerals, gas, sulphuric acid, and pig iron sent to Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union, and a significant percentage

of machinery. Trade related to the metallurgical industry is of cardinal importance to Czechoslovakia, because of the demands of its engineering and manufacturing industries and the country's lack of mineral resources. Figure 6 reveals the dominant position of the Ukraine in supplying Czechoslovakia with iron ore. The

Figure 6

Distribution of Czechoslovak Iron Ore Imports by Exporting Countries: 1958-64

	1958		1962		1964	
	Thousand Tons	%	Thousand Tons	%	Thousand Tons	%
Total	5164	100	8319	100	9309	100
USSR	3701	72	5947	71	7657	82
Uk.SSR	3657	71.9	5947	71	6953	74.9
India	494	10	783	9	810	9
Brazil	359	7	576	7	482	5
China	156	3	--	--	--	--
Sweden	113	2	233	3	144	2

Source: B.G. Bondarenko, "Vplyv radians'ko-chekhoslovats'kogo spivrobitnytstva na rozvytok chornoi metalurgii Ch.S.S.R." in L.I. Kukharenko (ed.), Pytannia politychnoi ekonomii, vypusk 32 (Kiev, 1967), p.123.

share of the Ukraine in Soviet exports of this and other metallurgical materials to Czechoslovakia in recent years is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7

Share of the Ukraine in Soviet Exports of Metallurgical Raw Materials and Ferrous Metals to Czechoslovakia (percentages)

	1958	1960	1962	1964
Iron ore	98.8	100.0	100.0	91.4
Manganese ore	75.0	72.5	61.7	84.0
Pig iron	94.0	100.0	100.0	72.5
Rolled steel	66.7	100.0	100.0	74.9

Source: ibid, p.124

The growth rates of these same exports is indicated in Figure 8.

Figure 8

Ukrainian Exports of Metallurgical Raw Materials and Ferrous Metals to Czechoslovakia (1958 = 100)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Iron ore	138.6	141.3	164.6	180.3	206.4
Manganese ore	92.1	112.7	104.3	131.9	173.3
Pig iron	145.6	116.1	199.0	131.1	40.0
Rolled steel	217.0	516.0	966.0	1113.0	1399.4

Source: ibid, p.125

It is apparent that during the period of the Soviet Seven Year Plan, a radical increase in rolled steel exports occurred. Presumably the cost to the Czechoslovaks of this increase was high, although it may have been offset in ways of which we are unaware.

The Ukraine also provides most of such Soviet food exports to Czechoslovakia as grain, meat, butter, and salt.[11] The "Friendship" oil pipeline which links the Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries was built with Ukrainian help. The "Brotherhood" gas pipeline, opened in the summer of 1967, supplies natural gas from the Dashava fields

in the Western Ukraine to Ostrava, Bratislava, Brno and Prague. It will presumably ease the fuel shortage in Czechoslovakia and contribute to development of the chemical and petrochemical industries. (A large new chemical combine has already been built in the Slovak city of Strazke, designed to run on the Ukrainian gas.)[12] Also important is the "peace" electric power grid which connects Ukrainian and Eastern European (including Slovak) power stations. A Soviet author quotes the March, 1965 number of Czechoslovak Heavy Industry as saying, "The Ukraine is becoming the 'storehouse' of electrical energy for the European socialist countries."[13]

The Ukraine has in addition participated in the construction of factories in Czechoslovakia, including the East-Slovak Metallurgical Combine in Kosice -- said by the Soviets to be the largest such enterprise in continental Europe. The construction of this combine was a bone of contention between Bratislava and Prague for many years. Slovaks strongly support the project, because they think it will contribute substantially to the industrialization and diversification of the Slovak economy. Electrical equipment for the combine was manufactured in Khar'kov, rolling-mill machinery in Kramatorsk and Dnepropetrovsk, and hundreds of personnel were trained at the Zaporozhe and Donetsk metallurgical factories. Built to Soviet specifications, the combine runs on Ukrainian iron and manganese ore from Krivoi Rog and Nikopol, and coal from Donetsk. In order to meet these demands for exports to Slovakia, the capacity of existing mining facilities in the Ukraine has had to be expanded. Czechoslovakia has been induced to invest in this expansion and to supply mining equipment. To facilitate transportation of the ore and coal, broad-gauge tracks have been laid from Kosice to the Soviet border. (Creation of the "Peace" system has also permitted electrification of the Donbass-Kiev-L'vov-Prague railway line, to speed up coal and ore exports from the Ukraine.[14]) In agriculture a certain amount of cooperation is said to take place between cooperatives in Slovakia and kolkhozes in the Western Ukraine. In the border region there is also a joint project for irrigating 130,000 hectares.[15]

It is quite difficult to estimate the opportunity cost to the Ukraine of its aid and exports to Czechoslovakia. While deliveries to Czechoslovakia constitute only a small fraction of the total Ukrainian output of most of the items traded, this fraction might loom large from the standpoint of particular bottlenecks in the Ukrainian economy (such as electric power), or

of the needs of particular regions (such as the Western Ukraine), or of capital investment forgone in certain branches (such as light industry).

The Ukraine imports many items from Czechoslovakia. These include precision machine-tools and many other types of machinery, buses, trolleys, trams, trucks, automobiles, motorcycles, diesel engines, refrigerators, pipes, cables, chemicals, household appliances, furniture, medicines, specialty foods and beer. Undoubtedly the Ukraine desires these imports, especially machine-tools and consumer goods. Nevertheless, the importance of the two trading partners to each other would seem to be asymmetric; Ukrainian planners do not have to be nearly as concerned with Czechoslovak imports as Czechoslovak planners must be with Ukrainian metallurgical, coal, gas and grain imports -- given the profile of Czechoslovak industry and the absence of realistic alternative sources of supply for a number of key goods. But this, perhaps, is a short-range and narrow view of the problem. In a provocative article, the economist Vsevolod Holubnychy has argued that contrary to what most people automatically assume, the Ukrainian economy is even now more closely integrated with the Eastern (and to some extent Western) European economy than it is with the economy of the rest of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he asserts, this nexus will in all likelihood become stronger in the future.[16] One implication of this argument is that Ukrainian officials probably perceive Ukrainian/Czechoslovak economic relations not in isolation, but as an integral -- indeed strategic -- element in the expanding overall network of trade ties linking the Ukraine with countries to her west. The biggest investment-devouring and attention-absorbing projects undertaken in recent years to bind the economies of the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia together (pipelines, the electric power grid, railway electrification, etc.) simply do not lend themselves to compartmentalized consideration. Rather, they compel planners and politicians to think about the Ukrainian economy in an Eastern European-wide context.

Presov-Soviet Ukraine Relationships

Tourism. In the late 1950's and early 1960's it became easier for Ukrainians in Presov and the Ukraine to visit one another. Thus in 1960 a large delegation from Presov visited Transcarpathia, L'vov, Volyn and other oblasts of the Ukraine as part of a reciprocal exchange of delegations from the border region. The same year a number of representatives of the Presov Ukrainians

were included in a delegation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society which toured the Ukraine. The Presov branch of the Society and the C.A.U.T. in 1958 had already organized a lottery which sent twenty-four members of the Society on a tourist trip to the Ukraine.[17] Some idea of the tourist flow in the other direction is provided by data for L'vov Oblast, according to which 400 tourists visited Czechoslovakia in 1963 (although 4,500 Czechoslovak tourists visited L'vov the same year).[18] It should be stressed, however, that this was largely organized, group tourism.

An important innovation in Soviet tourist policy occurred in the mid-1960's when restrictions on individual tourism between the Soviet Union and her East European neighbours were relaxed. According to the head of the foreign travel department of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, V.M.Ankudinov, the Soviet Union reached an agreement with Bulgaria, Hungary, the G.D.R., Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia by which Soviet citizens could visit the other countries without a visa (but with their personal passport and a Soviet "tourist certificate"), while citizens of the other countries had the same opportunity to visit the Soviet Union. He implied that this decision was part of a broader attempt to streamline foreign tourism in the U.S.S.R.[19] Hence it became possible for Ukrainians living in Poland and Czechoslovakia to visit friends and relatives in the Ukraine and vice-versa. This decision was not viewed in purely economic or "cultural" terms. As Kommunist Ukrainy put it, "Among the varied forms of fraternal political collaboration of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with foreign socialist countries, there have recently developed such new important forms as direct contacts and close collaboration of the western border oblasts of the Uk.S.S.R. with border oblasts of neighbouring socialist countries, for example, of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Uk.S.S.R. with the East-Slovak Region of the C.S.S.R..."[20] That is to say, the opening-up of the border was viewed as a means of achieving Soviet policy objectives on the other side of the border.

Cultural-scientific relations. The various Ukrainian cultural organizations of Presov which we have already described have maintained contacts with the Ukraine too. In the area of education, textbooks printed in the Ukraine have been used in the Presov Ukrainian-language schools, and there has been some cooperation in teacher-training and methods of foreign language instruction.[21] A literary conference in Presov sponsored by

the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers' Union in 1958 was attended by three writers from the Transcarpathian Oblast (M.I.Tomchaniia, I.M.Chandei, and V.P.Polishchuk). Other Soviet writers who have visited Presov include O.Iushchenko, Iu.Petrov, L.Pervomais'k, Ivan Le, P.Voron'ko, and O.Honchar. In 1964 a conference on literary ties between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was held in Presov at which 16 papers were read. It was attended from the Soviet side by Voron'ko. Historians of Presov are collaborating with Soviet Ukrainian colleagues in writing the history of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Slovakia. Actors and directors from the Ukrainian theatre in Presov have travelled in the Soviet Union, while Soviet Ukrainian films have been shown in Presov.[22] The most important channel of cultural communication, however, has been the press (which provides additional information about all sorts of cultural-scientific and other contacts among Ukrainians).

The press. The best ways of conveying a sense of the Presov Ukrainian press, we think, is simply to present in abstracted form some typical material printed by Nove Zhyttia and Duklia over the course of several years. The length of the following is justified, perhaps, by the revealing nature of the material and the value of having some record of it in English. This section has been placed here rather than in an appendix in the hope that it might be read.

N.Zh.14/1/1967

[1] An interview by correspondence with I.Dzyuba (Kiev, 2/XII/1966), in which he places himself in the mainstream of "critical Europeans."

N.Zh. 11/II/1967

[1] Report that the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Association of Writers numbers 18 poets, 15 prose writers, and 12 literary critics and literary historians. Measures are being taken to bring about closer ties with Soviet Ukrainian writers.

N.Zh. 4/III/1967

[1] Report that "Radians'ka Knyha," a bookstore in Presov, has reached an agreement with "Karpatiia" in Uzhgorod according to which all publications of that publishing house will be received in Presov. Expresses hope that limits on imports of Ukrainian books will not exist for long.

N.Zh. 11/III/1967

[1] M.Kovach's report of his trip with a group of tourists to the Ukraine, and their difficulties upon attempting to visit the grave of Shevchenko. Accompanying him were I.Shelepets', Iu.Baca, and others.

N.Zh. 11/III/1967

[1] A letter from B. Malanchuk, who works as a "kolkhoz mailman" in Skorodyno in the Ukraine. He visited his cousin in Moravia in 1966, and she subscribes to N.Zh. for him.

N.Zh. 25/III/1967
[1] A series of letters from the Ukraine:

M. Kutyns'kyi who lives in Moscow writes, "We are jealous of you," and hopes that N.Zh. will continue to further Ukrainian culture. "Measures should be taken to have N.Zh. available in the USSR on a subscription basis, and if not in the USSR then at least in the Ukraine."

I.Khudio, from Telmann Raion, Donetsk Oblast, wants a separate page of criticism. Writes that he reads N.Zh. regularly.

A. Hoshovs'kyi, editor of Nashe Slovo (Warsaw), sends greetings in his letter.

Prof. I.Nepohoda, Bucharest, sends greetings and says that it is easy to subscribe N.Zh. in Rumania.

Letter from M.Chekovs'kyi, Brussels, praises N.Zh. for its ability to defend Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia.

Letter from V. Krechanyn, Chairman of the Transcarpathian Oblast Cultural Association. He points "with pride" to the fact that the "Transcarpathian Oblast and the Eastern Slovak Region have established a firm friendship, like that of the Soviet and Czechoslovak people. The press of the Transcarpathian Oblast and of Eastern Slovakia has contributed to this greatly. We hope that N.Zh. will continue to foster such friendship in the future."

Professor Vsevlad Karmazyn-Kakovs'kyi writes from Rumania that "the lack of dogmatism" in N.Zh. makes the newspaper that much more interesting. Wants a regular section devoted to "Ukrainian-Czechoslovakia relations" and "Ukrainians beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia."

Iurii Parashchak, Susidovychi, the Ukraine, writes that he became acquainted with N.Zh. while studying at Uzhgorod University. He receives it regularly and "does everything possible to

popularize it." "The newspaper is awaited here with anticipation and is liked by everyone."

V. Hryn'ko, editor, Chervonyi Prapor, the Ukraine. "I am very interested in your newspaper. We could help each other by exchanging information. After all, we work for a common cause."

[It might be noted that Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia are not as enthusiastic about N.Zh., considering it backward in comparison with Czech and Slovak newspapers.]

Iu.Baleha, Uzhgorod, writes: "Two years ago I was in Presov and thanks to friends there I regularly read N.Zh." He particularly praises "Rezonansy" [a controversial youth page of N.Zh. which is extremely patriotic].

E. Kyryliuk, corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: "I have read N.Zh. since 1956." Wants more thorough coverage of new developments in the Ukraine.

I. Kolesnyk, editor of Novyi Vik, a Ukrainian biweekly in Rumania, praises N.Zh.

O. Bilash, composer, Kiev. Writes that when he reads N.Zh. he sees "the faces of his friends, F.Hula, V.Kapishovs'kyi, F.Kovach, Iu.Datsko and others." [All of them are prominent people in the Presov region.] Praises "Rezonansy". "Let every line in N.Zh. echo beautiful Ukrainian melodies."

V.Korotych, editor of Ranok, Kiev. Praises N.Zh. for building bridges among Ukrainians everywhere. [Korotych is a physician by profession, and a poet too.]

[2] An interview with Iu.Datsko, the editor, in which he states that if he "had unlimited power he would bring about closer ties with the Ukraine."

N.Zh. 13/V/67

[1] A report written especially for N.Zh. by M. Sachenko, Kiev, about the young poet Ihor Kalynets, with samples from his poetry. [His versification resembles contemporary modernists in the West, with a healthy dose of Ukrainian patriotism.]

[2] An article on the historian M.I. Kostomarov, stressing his contributions to the study of Ukrainian history, written by M. Hamrets'kyi, Kiev.

[3] Report (in a very patriotic tone) of the burial of O.L. Kulchytska in Lvov, written by M. Petrenko.

N.Zh. 20/V/1967

[1] An interview with Petro Hula, a noted Presov poet and author. To the question "What have you to say about your Kievan period?" he replied: "It was the happiest, but also the most tragic period of my life. As a result of the work of informers, some of them our own people, I was forcibly separated from the girl I loved." [Hula was tricked into returning home from the Kiev Pedagogical Institute and then not permitted back into the Ukraine in 1957.]

[2] Report of the Days of Russian Culture in Czechoslovakia and a reminder that Days of Ukrainian Culture would be held 12-25 April, 1968. The Czechoslovak Days in the Ukraine would be held in September, 1968.

N.Zh. 1/VII/1967

[1] Iu. Parashchak writes a special article for N.Zh. about Kaniv, the place where T. Shevchenko is buried. [A very patriotic piece.]

[2] Report about the Ukrainian Chair at the Sorbonne, and its occupant Marie Sherer.

[3] Report of a tour of the Presov region by the Transcarpathian Choir.

[4] Report that a soccer team from Perechyn in the Transcarpathian Oblast will come to Humenne.

N.Zh. 22/VII/1967

[1] Report from the 13th Festival of Song and Dance in Svydnyk. The Transcarpathian People's Choir from Uzhgorod participated. Also present were a correspondent of Literaturna Ukraina (Kiev), M. Petrenko, ensembles and individuals from Poland and Yugoslavia, and consular officials from Hungary and the USSR.

[2] A letter written by I.Iu.Kovalenko, Kiev, about the activities of M.Kutynskyi, whose goal in life is to find, record and rebuild the graves of all famous Ukrainians.

N.Zh. 5/VIII/1967

[1] Report of the Ukrainian Festival in Sanok, Poland. Presov Ukrainians sent the "Karpatianyn" ensemble and a soloist from the Duklia Ensemble to the Festival. Criticizes the fact that Soviet Ukrainians were absent.

N.Zh. 2/IX/1967

[1] Visit to Presov of I.Baliuta, a former partisan commander during World War II. He lives in the Ukraine.

[2] Report of a visit to the Transcarpathian Oblast of the "Verkhovyna" ensemble from Medzilaborce. Representatives of Humenne as well as of the C.A.U.T. travelled with it to Perechyn Raion. Such raion to raion ties are being developed. The Perechyn raikom secretary said: "The border is symbolic only, but at the present time still necessary" [sic!]. Evidently the "Karpatianyn" ensemble from Presov was also visiting there.

[3] Report of a visit by students from Kiev University to the Presov Philosophical Faculty for a three-day stay. Kosice University has an official exchange with Kiev University according to this report. The students were welcomed by F.Kovach, a secretary of the C.A.U.T. They complimented the editor of Duklia, F.Ivancho. They wondered why they could not buy Presov publications in the Ukraine, and also requested Antonych's works. [Antonych was a Western Ukrainian poet who died in L'vov in 1937. His works have been recently republished in Kiev, following their earlier publication in Presov.]

N.Zh. 9/IX/1967

[1] Visit of P.Pavlychko, Secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, to Presov. In his conversation with F.Kovach, M.Molnar and M. Drobniak he stated that "A way must be found to allow subscriptions to your publications in the Ukraine!" The intelligentsia in the Ukraine knows you very well, but not the people in general. He added that the "cult of personality" was still responsible for difficulties in establishing contacts with Presov.

[2] Report of Iu.Datsko's trip to Yugoslavia.

[3] Report of a C.A.U.T. delegation's trip to Canada to establish contacts with the Association of Carpathian Ruthenians.

N.Zh. 16/IX/1967

[1] I.Iu.Kovalenko from Kiev describes for N.Zh. the museum of I.Honchar. He hopes that this private collection will become the foundation of a national museum, and requests the Museum in Svydnyk to establish contact with Honchar.

N.Zh. 23/IX/1967

[1] The Ukrainian poetess Inna Khrystenko from Khar'kov visited Presov. She has published several poems in N.Zh., met a number of people, and expresses the hope that "relations between Presov and the Ukraine will continue to grow."

[2] From 11 to 13 September in Smolenice near Bratislava a conference was held devoted to the study of Popular Culture in the Carpathians. Present were 87 scholars, of whom 30 came from the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Those from the Ukraine were Iu.Hoshko, Director of the L'vov Museum of Ethnography, and Ia.P.Prylypko of the Institute of Art, Folklore and Ethnography of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. "P.Lintur from Uzhgorod did not come, although he was expected."

N.Zh. 30/IX/1967

[1] Carries a remarkable letter from Kiev written by M.Pidmohylnyi, as a followup to an article by P.Kovtan in Druzhno Vpered entitled "Heroika ii zavziattia," in which the history of Ukrainian literature was treated in "a controversial manner." This article and its author were attacked by K.Kyryliuk in Literaturna Ukraina, August 11, 1967. Pidmohylnyi replies to Kyryliuk. His main ideas are as follows: (a) Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia are today the best representatives of the national ideals of the Ukrainian people; (b) The relations of Presov with the Ukraine are artificially hampered. The Ukraine has a responsibility to help Presov Ukrainians; (c) Today in the Ukraine one can subscribe to all Czech and Slovak publications, but not to Ukrainian publications from Czechoslovakia. Ukrainian publications from Czechoslovakia are treated as "bourgeois"; (d) Then he reminds Kyryliuk that Ukrainian literature lost almost 100 writers, while almost 200 were put in concentration camps during the 1930's and early 1940's. "No other literature in the world can boast of such accomplishments." Also, almost 10 million Ukrainians died of hunger during 1932-33 as a result of collectivization. Finally, "Ukrainian writers who returned to the Ukraine found certain death there, while Russian writers who returned were being published." [This, indeed, is a devastating letter and the fact that it appeared in N.Zh. speaks for itself.]

N.Zh. 7/X/1967

[1] A report of the Second Youth Festival of the Ukraine notes the presence there of Czech, Polish and Hungarian delegations. It concludes sadly that Presov Ukrainians were not invited to participate.

[2] S.Niroda, a medical student in Kosice who visited the Ukraine, writes about his impressions of Kiev. He was approached by I. Honchar, a sculptor, who has established a private museum of Ukrainian culture in Kiev. "He speaks only Ukrainian and complains that many Kievans have forgotten who their ancestors were." He reads Presov publications which are being subscribed to for him by "a student at Presov."

N.Zh. 21/X/1967

[1] Report of a visit by M.Zarudnyi, Soviet Ukrainian playwright and a secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union.

N.Zh. 4/XI/1967

[1] Report of a track and field competition in Presov between the Presov Pedagogical Faculty and the University of Uzhgorod.

N.Zh. 11/XI/1967

[1] Report that on November 7, 1967 at the Presov Pedagogical Faculty a meeting of the teaching and administrative personnel took place. The meeting decided to send greetings to the Soviet Embassy at Prague, the Consulate General in Bratislava, and the University of Uzhgorod. [The Faculty has exchange arrangements with Uzhgorod.]

N.Zh. 18/XI/1967

[1] Report of a Plenum of the C.C. C.A.U.T. on November 2, at which contacts with the Ukraine were discussed in some detail. The C.A.U.T. was planning to organize conferences together with the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Ukrainian institutions on various topics. The Plenum noted with pleasure the growth of interest among "people in the Ukraine" in the life of Presov Ukrainians. It also criticized N.Zh. for publishing an article by V.Pidmohylnyi (N.Zh. No. 39, 1967), and warned that better selectivity should be the rule in publishing materials about the Soviet Ukraine.

N.Zh. 2/XII/1967

[1] Report that the Central Committee of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society had organized a reception for a Ukrainian delegation on November 24, 1967. On the same day an agreement was signed for "Days of Ukrainian Culture" to take place in Czechoslovakia in May-June 1968, and for "Days of Czechoslovak Culture" in the Ukraine in September.

N.Zh. 9/XII/1967

[1] Report about the visit of the Presov "Vesna" choir to Poland.

[2] Report that a volume "Ukrainians in the C.S.S.R." is being prepared under the editorship of M.Mushynka. It will be about 800 pages long. Scholars outside Czechoslovakia are being approached for contributions. [This must mean the Transcarpathian Oblast, and perhaps some Western scholars.]

[3] Report that M. Shkurlo ("Svydnyts'ka Zolota Valka," Sotsialistychna Kul'tura No. 11, 1967) describes life in the Presov region for Soviet Ukrainians. "This is the first time that a Soviet Ukrainian journal has written so extensively about us," reports N.Zh.

[4] Iu. Baca writes about the Presov Symposium "October and Ukrainian Culture." States again that Presov Ukrainians demand regular contacts with the Ukraine. Points out that at the symposium Presov intellectuals had raised "up to now unexplored, but complex questions" of the development of Ukrainian culture.

N.Zh. 16/XII/1967

[1] Report about the International Symposium "October and Ukrainian Culture" organized in Presov. Present were 100 scholars. Eight scholars came from the Ukraine and one from Hungary. Presov intellectuals (Baca in particular) complained of "minimal contacts and minimal aid from the Ukraine." Some of the Soviet Ukrainian scholars agreed. Present from the Ukraine were: E. Kyryliuk (Academy of Sciences), I. Dzendzelivs'kyi (University of Uzhgorod), and A. Bodnar (Kiev University).

[2] Report of a visit by the Ukrainian People's Theatre from Presov to the Transcarpathian Oblast, written by I. Chendei, a Soviet Ukrainian writer. He complains that soccer teams have a better chance of meeting each other than do groups of an intellectual or cultural character.

N.Zh. 23/XII/1967

[1] Iu. Iuras' reviews letters to the editor from the Soviet Union. According to him N.Zh. has received "hundreds of letters from readers in the Soviet Union," who write from "Kiev, Zaporozhe, Uzhgorod, L'vov, Khar'kov, Moscow and other places." The letters are "warm and friendly"; some of them "written in Russian," but from people with "distinctly Ukrainian names": B.D., a historian from Vinnitsa, asks how he could receive Presov publications. He is"interested in Ukrainian national problems." He reports that he can subscribe to Ukrainian papers in Poland and Rumania;

I.P., from Kiev, says that he receives N.Zh. because it was subscribed to for him by a Czech. He wants the editor to "line up" subscriptions for him to other Presov publications; Zh.I., Komi A.S.S.R. Vorkuta, asks for newspapers, journals and the Calendar. [Probably one of the exiled literati]; M.B., from Ternopil, asks for N.Zh. and other publications; H. Hrebeniuk, Kramatorsk, writes in Russian. Wants publications; O.Kompaniets, Moscow, wants publications; Iu.B.Volynsk Oblast, wants publications; Iu.Voronych, Ternopil, wants publications. Other letters, writes the author, "express surprise that Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia develop with such speed." "You teach us how to defend our spiritual and cultural treasures," write others. "Do not loose hope. Your contributions are great." "Please send me other publications -- maybe a Ukrainian newspaper from Yugoslavia," writes another. [Subscription rates for all Ukrainian publications in Czechoslovakia are conveniently published on the same page with an appeal to "friends everywhere" to subscribe to help "your friends in the U.S.S.R."]

1968

N.Zh. 10/II/1968

[1] A letter from Bratislava complaining that Radio Kiev transmits "too much in the Russian language."

[2] Iu.Baca complains that Soviet Ukrainian books are not available in Presov. He warns that if the situation continues "We shall have to turn to Hrushevskyi, Doroshenko, and Arkas." [All of them "bourgeois-nationalist" historians.]

N.Zh. 2/III/1968

[1] Report of the visit to Presov of Roman Ivanychuk, the editor of Zhovten (L'vov). He stated that Ukrainian publications from Presov are "well-known in the Ukraine," but that "old barriers" should be removed as quickly as possible. He reported that plans were being made to have "all Ukrainian writers from Presov meet in Kiev in 1968." He was invited to Presov by Iu.Datsko, the editor of N.Zh. [Because of the invasion no such meeting ever took place.]

[2] Report of a visit by the "Kyianka" girls' choir from School #101 in Kiev, accompanied by Director Shapoval and "Archangel" Ermolenko.

N.Zh. 2/III/1968

[1] The last page carries the following announcement: "Bring happiness to your friends in the U.S.S.R. and subscribe for them to N.Zh. A subscription is 36.40 Crowns per year. The newspaper is available in Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia."

N.Zh. 9/III/1968

[1] S. Hostyniak complains that almost all scientific journals in the Ukraine appear in Russian.

N.Zh. 16/III/1968

[1] M. Myndosh in a long article discusses the lack of support from the Ukraine for Presov Ukrainians, while other national minorities like the Hungarians and Poles receive much support from the governments of both countries. He also has some unpleasant things to say about the "elder brother" and its care for the "younger [Ukrainian] brother."

N.Zh. 16/III/1968

[1] I. Shelepets' warns that Slovak chauvinists are spreading rumours that the desire of Presov Ukrainians for closer contacts with the Ukraine represents an attempt to separate themselves from Czechoslovakia and "unite" with the Ukraine.

N.Zh. 23/III/1968

[1] Report that on March 13, the Ukrainian People's Ensemble came to Svydnyk with Ukrainian songs and dances. The reporter objected to the fact that the M.C. used Russian, and even more to the latter's farewell -- "Bolshoe vam russkoe spasibo" [Our heartiest Russian thanks to you!"].

N.Zh. 30/III/1968

[1] Interview by correspondence with O. Honchar, the Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, who had been attacked for his novel "Sobor" (The Cathedral). Among other things Honchar said: "We follow your cultural life with great interest. You help to spread Ukrainian culture in the world." "Sobor" he stated, was a "search for humanism in Ukrainian literature."

N.Zh. 20/IV/1968

[1] An article by V.Kapishovs'kyi describes how "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" had to be found and dealt with in Czechoslovakia because "The U.S.S.R. had Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, and since the U.S.S.R. was a model for all to follow, the C.S.S.R. had to have them as well."

N.Zh. 25/IV/1968

[1] Report about the forthcoming Days of Ukrainian Culture in C.S.S.R. At the end the hope is expressed that at least closer ties will exist in the future between Eastern Slovakia (i.e. Presov) and the Transcarpathian Oblast.

N.Zh. 8/V/1968

[1] Report about a drama group from Yugoslavia at Presov.

[2] Report about a "Seminar on Political-Cultural Aspects of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian Relations," which was organized by the C.C. of the Slovak Communist Party. Some interesting views were expressed at the Seminar. Thus Iu.Baca stated that "The development of Ukrainian culture was hampered by the Tzarist government in the past," by "the Soviet government in the recent past," and that the "Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society propagates only Russian culture" and "represents everything Soviet as Russian." He also spoke of the "so-called Ukrainian nationalists and their repressions." I.Kolesar (Docent at Bratislava) suggested that greater contacts among Ukrainians in both countries should be cultivated and that this should be an ongoing affair -- not just a temporary phenomenon connected with the Ukrainian Days in the C.S.S.R.

[3] Report that the Soviet Ukrainian Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture has over three million members and that it performs "very important patriotic work" because "people who do not know their past are not worthy of their future." Reporter calls for closer ties with this organization.

N.Zh. 18/V/1968

[1] Report that the "Iatran" group from Kirovograd Oblast will perform in Svydnyk.

N.Zh. 1/VI/1968

[1] Letter from poetess Inna Khrystenko asking readers to see the Virs'kyi dance group when it comes to Czechoslovakia, because it is "the only ensemble that permits one to look into the soul of the Ukrainian people."

[2] Report that about 10,000 Ukrainians ("optanty") have recently returned to Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union.

[3] M.Drobniak complains that "The Ukraine, perhaps the first among the nations of the world, rejects its own children." The reason for this was the refusal to permit P.U.N.A. during Czechoslovak Days in the Ukraine. Instead, a request was made for "Lucnica", a Slovak ensemble.

[4] Iu.Baca attacks the Soviets for criticising Honchar's novel, "Sobor".

N.Zh. 8/VI/1968

[1] Report on the arrival in Presov of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation for the "Ukrainian Days of Culture in the C.S.S.R." Present were: P.T.Tron'ko, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers; D.H.Tsmokalenko, functionary of the C.C. C.P.S.U.; Iu.Zbanats'kyi, writer and Hero of the Soviet Union; V.P.Rusyn, Chairman, Transcarpathian oblispolkom; V.M.Bulat, Tron'ko's secretary; V.Eremenko, international affairs reporter with R.A.T.A.U.; V.I.Klokov, Chairman, International Affairs Commission of the S.P.U.; V.M.Dymytruk, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine; Comrade Cherkasov, Soviet Embassy; E.Malishevskyi, R.A.T.A.U. correspondent. During the evening the "Mriia" ensemble performed "Ukrainian pop-music" [sic]. "During the discussions with the delegation, the question of closer ties with the Ukraine was raised."

[2] Interview with M.Mushynka who has just returned from France. He speaks in glowing terms about his contacts with Ukrainians in France.

N.Zh. 17/VI/1968

[1] The opening of an Art Exhibition in Kosice was attended by: V.M.Kerechanyn (Chairman, Cultural Administration of the Transcarpathian Oblast), A.M.Kashshai (artist), Erdeli (artist), Shutiev (artist). M.Chychvak, head of the Schools and Culture Administration of Eastern Slovakia (and a Ukrainian) welcomed the delegation and pointed out that since 1931 nothing of the sort had happened in Kosice. [In 1931 an Exhibition of Ukrainian Arts took place there.] He expressed the hope that mutual visits would be beneficial to both sides.

N.Zh. 22/VI/1968

[1] A letter from the village of Solukiv, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, from Young Pioneers who would like to have pen pals in the Presov region.

[2] Report about an international seminar on "The development of Ukrainian Studies in Socialist Countries." [This was a very important event, with implications for the future.] The Presov Philosophical Faculty hosted the seminar, which took place in Presov June 21-22, 1968. About 35 people participated from various countries, but not all were present physically. These were the conclusions: (1) An International Association of

Ukrainists should be set up; (2) A Bibliography of Ukrainian Studies should be published and conferences organized; (3) A Bulletin should be published; (4) At present the Association should unite Ukrainists from socialist countries, and institutions in the Ukraine should take the initiative in organizing the Association; (5) In case the "Ukrainian comrades" did nothing, the initiative to continue with the Association should remain with Presov; (6) The Organizing Committee would include: Iu.Baca, (Chairman), M.Mushynka, O.Zilynskyi, and M.Molnar. The Yugoslav delegation proposed Iu.Papharhai; (7) The Committee was to organize a seminar in June 1969 on "Ukrainian National Consciousness."

[3] Report of several visits to Presov by Ukrainian students from Canada, U.S.A., West Germany, and France.

N.Zh. 6/VII/1968

[1] An article by Iu.Baca about difficulties in contacts with the Ukraine and problems of organizing the proposed International Association of Ukrainists.

[2] Dr. Molnar informs readers of the contribution which is being made to Ukrainian studies by the Ukrainian Catholic University founded recently by Cardinal Slipyi. [The publication of this information was hardly accidental, considering that many Soviet Ukrainians happened to be present in Presov at that time.]

[3] M.M.Krechko, Director of the Transcarpathian People's Choir, writes enthusiastically about the Festival in Svydnyk. Promises to come in 1969.

N.Zh. 13/VII/1968

[1] Interview with Diura Latak, Editor of Ruske Slovo in Yugoslavia.

N.Zh. 20/VII/1968

[1] Declaration of the Participants of the First International Seminar of Ukrainian University Students, calling for future meetings and complaining that Soviet Ukrainian students did not participate. The seminar was organized by the Ukrainian Students' Club in Bratislava.

N.Zh. 27/VII/1968

[1] A long article about the visit to Presov of M.Tsarynnyk, a Ukrainian poet from Philadelphia.

[2] A long letter from C.A.U.T. over the signature of M.Myndosh, Chairman, and F.Kovach, secretary, addressed to the Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad and to the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In it the C.A.U.T. informs these societies about "the democratization processes that are taking place in our country," and "corrections in nationality policy with regard to Ukrainians." "Do not look at us as material for speculation in the manner of the 20's and 30's when Russophilism was rampant." "We want to be friends with the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R." "There are no anti-Soviet tendencies among us," "We hope for greater contacts," etc.

N.Zh. 3/VIII/1968

[1] Report about the concert in Kosice of the Veriovka Ensemble from Kiev. In an interview afterwards, the Choir director, A. Avdievs'kyi, complained that he "was not permitted to give concerts in the areas inhabited by Ukrainians." "Other members made very active inquiries about Ukrainian life in Czechoslovakia, while one of the Choir members brought his paintings which he gave as a gift to Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia." The reporter asked why it was that Ukrainian ensembles were not permitted to appear in the area inhabited by Ukrainians. [evidently "Iatran's" tour was changed at the last moment too.] His reply to his own rhetorical question was that "somebody is afraid of stirring up the consciousness of our Ruthenians."

[2] An article reprinted from Holos Lemkivshchyny, a nationalist newspaper which appears in Yonkers, New York.

N.Zh. 10/VIII/1968

[1] Strong emphasis on public support for the Czechoslovak delegation to the Cierna-nad-Tisou negotiations with the Soviet leadership.

[2] Nationality question discussed. In this article many things are discussed concerning relations with the U.S.S.R. but "educational work" by means of books, newspapers and other publications in the Ukrainian language is particularly stressed.

N.Zh. 17/VIII/1968

[1] An article about the "state language."

[2] A letter from M.Myndosh to Alexander Dubcek in which the Stalinist policy of denationalization is bitterly attacked.

[3] Memorandum of the U.N.R.P. and reply by the Slovak National Council signed by Husak (1945) are published. The first asks for and the second "guarantees" all kinds of "rights" to the Ukrainian minority.

N.Zh. 24/VIII/1968

[1] An interview with Dr. Mushynka and Iu.Baca at the Sixth Congress of Slavicists in Prague. Baca castigates D.Cyzevskyi from Heidelberg for not coming to the Congress. He considers individual contacts the most interesting aspect of the Congress. Ukrainian literature, he said, was still not properly represented at the Congress. There followed a description of the meeting of Ukrainists at the Congress. Ukrainists from the following countries were present: The Soviet Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East and West Germany, U.S.A., Canada and Czechoslovakia. "All of those present spoke in favour of deeper international contacts, but on the question of the Association views differed." The Soviet Ukrainians [Professor H.Verves and Professor V. Rusanivs'kyi] said that international contacts could be developed on the basis of existing institutions. The Czechoslovak Ukrainists continued to press for the Association. The result was indecisive. [But the pressure was not without influence on the Soviets. In order to justify their refusal to support the Association they had to promise that from 1969 summer courses for Ukrainists from abroad would be organized in the Ukraine.]

[2] Report about a visit to Backa, Yugoslavia, by a delegation from Presov and P.U.N.A.

[3] Report of a visit with the editor by Professor R.V.Kuchar of Kansas State College.

[4] Report from Yugoslavia in which Ukrainians there complain that not a single Ukrainian student from that country is studying in Kiev, and that the reason for this is not because Yugoslavia creates difficulties, but because the Soviet Government will not accept Ukrainians from Yugoslavia.

N.Zh. 27/VIII/1968

[1] A big outcry against the occupation and declarations of loyalty to the Republic and the government.

[2] A warning to the people that in Kosice six well-dressed men who emerged from two Soviet helicopters that landed there were allegedly "N.K.V.D. workers who came to arrest some functionaries." The newspaper calls for total silence: no information is to be given to "unknown individuals."

N.Zh. 19/X/1968

[1] Report of the Presov Theatre's visit to Yugoslavia.

While Nove Zhyttia tended to confine itself to recording such contacts as there were, the journal Duklia looked at events and analyzed them more thoroughly. What follows are abstracts of material in Duklia of relevance to contacts of all sorts among Ukrainians.

I.Dzyuba, "Ochystytel'nyi i zhyvotvoriashchyi vohon," Duklia, No. 1, 1965, pp.103-107.

A very patriotic article about Shevchenko by the author of Internationalism or Russification?

Iu.Baca, "Dal'shyi krok upered," Duklia, No. 1, 1965, pp.95-98.

Review of the History of Ukrainian Literature (Kiev, 1964) [for which Baca was attacked in the Soviet Press.]

I.Shelepets', "Stan, mozhlyvosti ta perspektyvy nashoi literatury," Duklia, No. 2, 1965, pp.76-83.

A self-critical review of Presov literature. He discusses its influence on Soviet Ukrainian literature.

P.Murashko, "Rozmova z H.Kochurom," Duklia, No. 4, 1965, pp.63-66.

Kochur, a Soviet Ukrainian, translates Czech and Slovak literature into Ukrainian. For him Czechoslovak literature is valuable not only because it is good literature, but because it can transmit to the Ukraine its heroic traditions, e.g., the "struggle against denationalization and victory over it." What is the influence of Presov writers in the Ukraine? Answer: It exists and it is good that it does exist. A secondary role of the Presov writers is to serve as a bridge between Slovak and Czech literature and the Ukraine. I am sorry that Duklia cannot be subscribed to in the Ukraine, but I read it, nevertheless, with great interest.

Iu.Baca, "Do pytannia pro periodyzatsiiu Ukr.Rad.Lit.," Duklia, No. 1, 1966, pp.56-59.
[see also Iu.Baca, review of Istoriia Ukr.Rad.Lit., Duklia, No. 3, 1965.]

Baca wants the following periodization of Soviet Ukrainian literature: 1917-1932; 1932-1945; 1945-present. [This is obviously an explosive issue. The middle period, if set out by itself, would be the period of destruction of Ukrainian literature and culture in general. Baca was violently attacked for this suggestion. See S.Kryzhanivs'kyi, Literatura Ukraina, No. 104, 1965, and another article in 1966 to which he replied again.]

M.Nevrli, "M.Drai-khmara ta novyi pidkid do neoklasykiv," Duklia, No. 1, 1966, pp.16-19.

Mentions a poet still not rehabilitated who died in 1939 in a concentration camp.

M.Molnar, "Nevykorystani mozhlyvosti," Duklia, No. 1, 1966, pp.66-73.

Among other things attacks the Soviet Ukrainian government for not inviting to the Ukraine translators interested in Ukrainian literature as, for example, is done periodically by Poland. Also suggests that summer courses for foreigners desiring to study Ukrainian be organized.

V.Pezhans'kyi, "Zvidkilia pokhodiat," Duklia, No. 1, 1966, pp.76-79.

Discusses the origins of some 20,000 Ukrainians who live in Czechoslovakia outside of Presov. Praises the prewar Czechoslovak government for taking a positive attitude toward Ukrainian immigrants.

M.Nevrli, "Reabilitatsiia avanhardu," Duklia, No. 2, 1966, pp.47-50.

A short note about a literary conference at the Slovak Academy of Sciences. M. Nevrli presented a paper on Ukrainian avantgardist literature, and here he reproduces a large part of it. [He treats many Soviet Ukrainian writers who have not yet been rehabilitated in the U.S.S.R.]

I.Shelepets', "Shche pro etapy rozvytku Ukr.rad.literatury," Duklia, No. 3, 1966, pp.58-60.

Continues to push a controversial periodization of Ukrainian literature which was started by Iu.Baca in Duklia, No. 3, 1965 and No. 1, 1966, and which was attacked in the Ukraine.

Iu.Baca, "Zasluhy i prohalyny slovats'koi Ukrainistyky," Duklia, No. 3, 1966, pp.72-75.

This is an extensive review of Dr. M.Nevrli's bibliography of Ukrainian studies in the Slovak language. The review points out, among other things, that the Slovak press in the period 1945-64 wrote "144 articles about contacts and friendship with the Soviet Ukraine." There were over 1000 articles in the Slovak press about the Ukraine in 20 years, or approximately one per week. The bibliography also indicates the number of articles about Ukrainian cultural and political problems in Slovakia: 1945-- nine; 1946 -- four; 1950-55 -- one; 1955-60 -- two; 1960-64 -- four. Some were on the topic of "Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism in the

Czechoslovak Republic." [A bibliography for the years 1965-69 would contain numerous articles about Ukrainians in Slovakia -- but many would not be favourable either.]

O. Zilyns'kyi, "Dosiahnennia i perspektyvy nashoi literaturnoi krytyky," Duklia, No. 4, 1966, pp.4-19.

This is a summary of a clash of opinions among Presov writers concerning the role of literature. [The Presov debate is important because it had a direct influence on and acted as a stimulant for a similar discussion in the Soviet Ukraine.]

Iu.Baca and I.Shelepets', "Nevzhe zabudet'sia?" Duklia, No. 4, 1966, pp 56-57.

An article commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of M.Hrushevs'kyi, the famous Ukrainian historian who is still unacceptable in the U S.S.R.

O.Zilyns'kyi, "Dim za zoreiu," Duklia, No 6, 1966, pp 36-44.

A discussion of Antonych's poetry, with some barbs aimed at the Soviet censorship, the cult of personality, and Soviet lack of humour.

O. Zilyns'kyi, "Pro poeziiu E. Pluzhnyka," Duklia, No. 6, 1966, pp.18-24.

[The poet died in 1936 in a concentration camp. He was "rehabilitated" after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. but his works have not been republished in the Soviet Ukraine. Presov has published his works.]

I.Matsyns'kyi, "Rosiis'ki umovy i vsesvitne znachennia velykoi zhovtnevoi revoliutsii," Duklia, No. 1, 1967, pp.3-9.

Discusses the backwardness of Russia and consequences for the development of socialism. A direct relationship to the cult of personality is shown. The repression of national cultures was another consequence. [This article was criticized in the Soviet Ukrainian press.]

Iu.Baca, "Bezmirna Vidpovidalinist," Duklia, No. 1, 1967, pp.37-39.

Speaks about discontent displayed at the V Congress of Soviet Ukrainian Writers. Points out that even Shelest had to raise the question of "national culture" in his speech. Decries the fact that Presov writers had no representatives at the Congress. He is happy "that the discussion which took place at the Congress was initiated

by the Ukrainian writers in Presov." Presov's accomplishments were cited by Honchar and Korotych, especially with respect to publishing the works of Antonych and Pluzhnyk [both previously condemned for "bourgeois nationalism"].

Iu.Baca, "Dva Pershi Korky: Rozvytok Ukrainy 20 kh Rokiv," Duklia, No. 2, 1967, pp.1-6.

Discusses Lenin's attitudes towards the Ukraine, quoting all of the appropriate passages [i.e., in the fashion of Dzyuba]. Then points out the repression of Ukrainian culture by Stalin.

I.Shelepets', "Zizd Ukr.Rad.Pysmennykiv v Chasovii Perspektyvi," Duklia, No. 2, 1967, pp.42-43.

Discusses the V Congress of Soviet Ukrainian Writers. Refers to mention of contacts with Presov by speakers at the Congress.

Ivan Matsyns'kyi, "Ukr.filiia SSP mizh III ta IV zizdamy Cz. pys'mennykiv," Duklia, No. 5, 1967, pp.1-14.

Discusses the question of relations with the Ukraine of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers' Association: (1) There is a need for contacts. Older writers have never been to the Ukraine; (2) The Slovak Literary Fund should be used more frequently for such visits. [Baca, Nemet, Bobak, Kotsur, and Kostyniak were supported by the fund on their visits to the Ukraine]; (3) Only now has O.Honchar, Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union begun to speak about us; yet contacts are still non-existent; (4) There have been four trips to the Ukraine [I.Matsyns'kyi -- two times; F.Mraz and M.Dubai -- once] with a view to regularizing contacts. Agreements were made and signed . . . but nothing has happened; (5) We will be glad to accept any writer from the Ukraine in our midst. But if this is impossible "We shall send all our materials to the U.W.U. so that our Soviet Ukrainian comrades may have an opportunity to study and understand our problems." [This was the policy of the section.] (6) We suggested to the U.W.U. to send two members for discussions about contacts or let us send two of our people to the U.W.U. No answer was received; (7) The problem was then discussed with members of the C.C. of the Slovak C.P., and they suggested that the problem of contacts with the U.W.U. be included in the agreement between the Czechoslovak Writers' Association and the Soviet Writers' Union [the U.W.U. is only part of the Soviet Writers' Union]; (8) Nothing happened so I. Matsyns'kyi addressed the Congress of Czechoslovak Writers about this problem. The Congress

was sympathetic and in the fall of 1967 the Secretary of the Ukrainian Section is to travel to the Ukraine on this matter. [Note that the Czechs wanted contacts and Ukrainians on both sides wanted contacts -- but nothing happened.]

"Rezolutsiia IV Zizdu Cz.Pysmennykiv," Duklia, No. 5, 1967, pp.47-54.

Includes in point six of the Resolution a demand that the Czechoslovak Writers' Association investigate the question of contacts between the two Ukrainian writers' organizations.

Iu.Baca, "Nova Literaturna Khvylia na Ukraini," Duklia, No. 1, 1968, pp.74-75.

A review of an anthology of Ukrainian poetry in French published in 1967. In the review Baca calls for the rehabilitation of Ukrainian literary treasures in Galicia and abroad which are still referred to simply as "nationalist, separatist, or traitorous."

M.Jakubiec, "Slovo pro B.Antonycha," Duklia, No. 1, 1968, pp.72-73.

This is in fact an interview with Jakubiec by O.Zilyns'kyi. Jakubiec is a professor at the University of Wroclaw, and his field of specialization is Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian ties. A criticism is offered of Soviet censorship of Antonych's works.

I. Matsyns'kyi,"Skhidna Slovachchyna v Zakarpatoukrains'komu kul'turnomu zhyti," Duklia, Nos. 1-3, 1968, pp.1-7; 129-139; 195-204.

This is an historical treatment of the influence that Presov Ukrainians have had on the development of Transcarpathia. The author discusses in great detail the influence of Russia and of Russophilism in that region.

O.Zilyns'kyi, "Poet Buri i Natysku," Duklia, No. 2, 1968, pp.108-114.

Shot in 1934, the poet Vlyz'ko -- whom the author discusses here -- has not yet been "rehabilitated" in the Soviet Ukraine.

O.Zilyns'kyi, " 'Sobor' O.Honchara," Duklia, No. 3, 1968, pp.221-225.

An excellent criticism of Honchar's "Sobor" but even more importantly of Soviet Ukrainian literary criticism which, according to the author, "did not guide the talented writer in the proper direction," but stultified his creativeness. It was only now, when he turned to the "national traditions" of the Ukrainian people, that his talent truly sparkled. Zilyns'kyi deems "Sobor" a "political novel."

I.Marusyn, "Dialektyka superechnostei -- korin' zla," Duklia, No. 3, 1968, pp.219-220.

A devastating article describing the liquidation of Ukrainian members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party who escaped to the U.S.S.R. in 1939.

M.Nevrli, "Khudozhni napriamky i literaturni uhrupuvannia v rannii Ukrains'kii porevoliutsiinii literaturi," Duklia, No. 3, 1968, pp.205-210 (First Part).

The author discusses literary politics in the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920's and 30's. [His approach is similar to G.S.Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, New York, Columbia U.Press.]

An editorial. Duklia, No. 4, 1968, p.241.

This number of the journal is devoted to Czech literature, with selections from the best Czech writers -- many of them unknown or censored in the U.S.S.R. The editorial stresses all this, but goes beyond in drawing parallels between the "revolutionizing effect of literature" in Czechoslovakia and the "struggle of Ukrainian literature" in the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R.

* * * * *

A number of themes recur in this material. There is, of course, the Ukrainian patriotic motif. Another theme is the craving of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. for information from the outside world. Still another is the frustration of Presov intellectuals in their attempts to establish closer relations with the Ukrainian S.S.R., and the systematic discrimination against them practiced by the Soviet authorities. The material also reveals how Presov has served as a "window to the West" for the Soviet Ukraine, and a communications link between Soviet Ukrainians and Ukrainians in other Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland) and elsewhere. Some aspects of the Presov message to the Soviet Union, however, which probably played a significant role in influencing Soviet Ukrainians, are not illuminated in the material we have summarized above. These include the discussion in Presov publications of:

(1) The nationality problem within Czechoslovakia itself. Political, economic, social, cultural and religious questions were raised -- and they are similar to the questions now rising to the surface in the Ukraine.

(2) Ideology and society (e.g., "socialism with a human face"). The generally progressive nature of Czechoslovak thinking as compared with Soviet must have come across sharply.

(3) Literature and art. Many Ukrainians must have found the undogmatic treatment most refreshing.[23]

(4) The "cult of personality," with a detailed enumeration of crimes perpetrated during this period, especially against the Ukrainian people. This is something that has never been done in the Soviet Union.

V

THE UKRAINE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968

Ukrainian developments in the 1960's, the Slovak question and the position of Presov Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, and relationships between Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian S.S.R. provided the background for Ukrainian involvement in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in 1968. In this section we shall examine the Czechoslovak impact on the Ukraine, and Ukrainian involvement in Soviet responses to Czechoslovakia before the invasion on August 21st.

The Czechoslovak Impact on the Ukraine

General ferment. It is extremely difficult to gauge the extent to which the political forces unleashed in Czechoslovakia after January, 1968 in fact were understood by large numbers of Ukrainians before August, much less approved by them. The Czechoslovak reforms were presented no differently in the Ukrainian press than they were in the Moscow press. However, interested Ukrainians could have easily learned what was going on from foreign radio broadcasts, including those emanating from Presov. A Radio Free Europe analyst writing in the summer of 1968 concluded that "A study of the Soviet Ukrainian press for the past two months shows that the public -- above all, the intelligentsia -- is in sympathy with the bloodless revolution in Czechoslovakia and is closely following the various events which have occurred as a result."[1] This is probably too sweeping a judgement, although he rightly stresses the interest in Czechoslovak developments among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

What is most important, perhaps, is the apparent belief by Ukrainian authorities that Czechoslovak events were being sympathetically viewed by a large Ukrainian audience. Throughout the spring and summer of 1968 a campaign of mounting intensity in the Ukrainian press was directed against the doctrines and practice of the Czechoslovak reformers. The Czechoslovaks, emigré Ukrainian nationalist organizations, foreign radio broadcasting stations, and dissidents in the Ukraine were lumped together in the official propaganda offensive; they all "copied from the same brown gospel."[2] Many articles stated or implied that Czechoslovak "revisionist" ideas had penetrated across the border.

In early July mass meetings were held throughout the Ukraine to explain the official position on Czechoslovakia, recall the loss of Soviet lives in the liberation of that country from the Germans, and cultivate fears of "West German revanchism."[3] Two important republic meetings for propagandists were held right before the invasion on August 16th and 20th, indicating that the leadership did not take "public opinion" lightly.

Personal contacts. As we shall show in more detail below, the holding of Days of Ukrainian Culture in Czechoslovakia and other events involved contact between fairly large numbers of Czechoslovak citizens and Ukrainians during the spring and summer of 1968. These and other contacts occurred not only in Czechoslovakia, but in the Ukraine as well. Those in the Ukraine typically took the form of the presence of Czechoslovak delegations at ceremonies designed either to promote Soviet-Czechoslovak "friendship," or to commemorate joint wartime sacrifices. What impact these contacts may have had on individual Ukrainian participants is moot. Under the conditions in which many meetings took place it must have been difficult if not impossible for the Czechs and Slovaks to speak frankly to the Ukrainians. At the same time, the stress by the mass media on the "solidarity" displayed at these ceremonies undoubtedly made it easier to convince the public at large that only a minority in Czechoslovakia supported reform.

The border regions. The impact of the "Prague spring" was probably greatest in the western oblasts of the Ukraine, nearest Czechoslovakia.[4] (It should be noted that the region is not only one of the strongholds of Ukrainian national consciousness, but also the home of the Transcarpathian Military District. This rather unpublicized command plays a strategic role in assuring Soviet military domination in Eastern Europe. Some Western military observers think that about half of the Soviet divisions which invaded Czechoslovakia were based in Transcarpathia. Large-scale manoeuvers by support and supply troops were said to be held in the region during the month preceding the invasion. [Izvestiia, July 23, 1968].) Naturally, the flow of tourists and delegations was greatest in the border oblasts, posing a problem of controlling ideological contraband.[5] It was in this area that channels of communication from Czechoslovakia were most accessible to the Ukrainian audience. Among these channels radio broadcasts were surely the most important, although telecasts also evoked Soviet ire.[6]

A number of Western authors have stressed the role of Radio Presov in spreading the Czechoslovak message to the Ukraine, and noted hostile Soviet reactions to it.[7] Public Soviet complaints about the radio station were oblique; needless to say, they did not tell Ukrainians where to set their dials. Thus, we find references to "people one still encounters who take the bait of radio liars from the other side of the barricades,"[8] or the more pointed comment a week after the invasion that "clean and clear voices of honest patriots will resound once again through the ether."[9] Whether Czechoslovak leaders deliberately used Radio Presov in an attempt to place their side of the story before the Soviet public -- or even to appeal to fraternal feelings of the Ukrainians -- is something we do not know. A rumour circulated after the invasion that Frantisek Kriegel, whom Dubcek had placed in charge of radio and television, had taken an active part in planning controversial broadcasts in Ukrainian from Presov.[10] If this report is true, it helps to explain why Kriegel (who was born in Stanyslaviv in Eastern Galicia -- now Ivano-Frankovsk in the Ukrainian S.S.R. -- of Orthodox Jewish parents) was subjected to anti-semitic insults at Cierna-nad-Tisou by members of the Soviet delegation, notably Shelest.[11] What can be said in any event is that the political climate in Czechoslovakia in 1968 would not have favoured attempts to censor Radio Presov, while the Soviets would have found offensive even regular broadcasts in Ukrainian. We have been told by several knowledgeable Czechoslovak citizens (one with first-hand exposure to the problem) that the transmission of news and other programmes by Radio Presov was greatly resented by Soviet authorities.[12]

Ukrainian Involvement in Soviet Responses to Czechoslovakia

Policy-Making. Ukrainians clearly played a significant role both in policy making and policy implementation in the crisis of 1968. At the top level the most important Ukrainian figures involved in policy making were Podgornyi and Shelest (full members of the C.P.S.U. Politbiuro), Shcherbitskii (a candidate member of the C.P.S.U. Politbiuro), Marshal Grechko (the Minister of Defence) and S.V.Chervonenko (the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia).[13] Together, they constituted a respectable fraction of those able to influence the final policy choice. It is likely that "Ukrainian" considerations weighed most heavily in the views of the first three. Let us examine, insofar as we can, their positions before the invasion.

As Figure 9 indicates, Podgornyi, as Chairman of the Presidiu of the Supreme Soviet and one of the top Politbiuro members, participated actively in the decisive concluding stages of the

Figure 9

Soviet Participants in the Diplomacy of the Czechoslovak Crisis

Delegation to Prague 21/II/68	Dresden Meeting 23/III/68
L.I.Brezhnev (General Secretary)	L.I.Brezhnev
P.E.Shelest (First Secretary, CPUkr)	P.E.Shelest
K.F.Katushev (First Secretary, Gorki Obkom)	A.N.Kosygin (Chairman, Council of Ministers)
L.S.Kulichenko (First Secretary, Volgograd Obkom)	A.P.Kirilenko (Secretary, CC CPSU)
S.V.Chervonenko (Amb.to Czechoslovakia)	N.K.Baibakov (Chairman, Gosplan)
	K.V.Rusakov (Head, Dept. CC CPSU)
Warsaw Letter 15/VII/68	**Cierna-nad-Tisou 29/VII - 1/VIII/68**
L.I.Brezhnev	L.I.Brezhnev
P.E.Shelest	P.E.Shelest
A.N.Kosygin	A.N.Kosygin
K.F.Katushev (Secretary, CC CPSU)	K.F.Katushev
N.V.Podgornyi (Chairman, Presidium Supreme Soviet)	N.V.Podgornyi
	G.I.Voronov (Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers)
Bratislava Meeting 3/VIII/68	A.Ia.Pel'she (Chairman Party Central Commission)
L.I.Brezhnev	M.A.Suslov (Secretary, CC CPSU
P.E.Shelest	A.N.Shelepin (Chairman Trade Unions)
A.N.Kosygin	P.N.Demichev (Secretary, CC CPSU)
K.F.Katushev	P.M.Masherov (First Secretary, CC Bel.)
N.V.Podgornyi	B.N.Ponomarev (Secretary, CC CPSU)
M.A.Suslov	
B.N.Ponomarev	

diplomacy of the Czechoslovak crisis. On July 20, 1968, soon after the delivery to the Czechoslovaks of the ominous Warsaw Letter and shortly before the decisive Cierna talks, Podgornyi delivered a major speech on the occasion of the awarding to the

R.S.F.S.R. the new Order of the October Revolution. The first part of the speech was devoted to praise of the Russian nation so extravagant that it recalled Stalin's Toast to the Great Russians. There followed a long passage on Czechoslovakia that included the following:

> With the active support of imperialism, rightist, anti-socialist forces -- remnants of defeated exploiting classes, revisionist and nationalist elements -- are subjecting the foundations of the socialist system to fierce attacks.
>
> Having taken advantage of measures conducted to improve the activity of the Party and state, and to correct existing mistakes and shortcomings, demagogically covering themselves with the slogan of "democratization," they are striving to discredit the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and to deprive it of its leading role, to discredit Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Hostile internal and external forces are striving to push Czechoslovakia off the path of socialism, to tear her from the socialist commonwealth.
>
> The representatives of Communist and workers' parties of socialist countries who met recently in Warsaw expressed a decisive intention of strengthening the socialist system, its unity and solidarity. They firmly declared that they would never consent to the historical victories of socialism being threatened, to imperialism making a breach in the socialist system by peaceful or non-peaceful means, from within or without....
>
> Our Czechoslovak friends...need not doubt that the Communists and all Soviet people, fulfilling their international duty, will render them all possible aid and support in this.[14]

In comparison with the speech delivered on the same occasion by his fellow Politbiuro member G.I.Voronov, the Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers, Podgornyi's was clearly more "hawkish" and suggested a greater personal commitment to the hard line on Czechoslovakia. We are scarcely convinced, therefore, that Podgornyi was among the minority in the Politbiuro said to have opposed the invasion.

If Shelest's role in the Czechoslovak crisis is at all faithfully reflected by his presence at the major meetings of the Soviet Union and her allies devoted to Czechoslovak affairs, it was prominent indeed. Shelest was the only Politbiuro member

besides Brezhnev who attended all the key meetings. (See Figure 9.) Throughout 1968 the nationality problem in the Ukraine and the dangerous international situation were interwoven themes in his speeches. On both questions he took an extremely inflexible stand. In his speech at the Kiev Oblast Party Conference in February he spoke at length about "treacherous Ukrainian counter-revolutionary elements" in the emigration who were trying to administer the poison of nationalism to "some of our own politically immature, ideologically wavering people," and he declared:

> This counter-revolutionary essence of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism must always be remembered by all our people. Chattering about so-called "independence," about some sort of decline of culture, of language is rotten bait that could be swallowed only by a political blindman, a limited or prejudiced person, various demagogues and degenerates, and also some people who love to display their own "superiority," for whom everything that is done by our people is not to their liking.[15]

A week before he left for the Warsaw meeting, Shelest wrote an article in Pravda in which it was difficult to distinguish the references to "correct" nationality policy in the Ukraine from those dealing with the Czechoslovak crisis.[16] Lenin had said, he declared, that "the conduct of nationality policy must be subordinated to the interests of the building of socialism and communism," and that it was precisely in this spirit that the Communist Party of the Ukraine had "selflessly struggled to strengthen the political, military, economic and cultural co-operation of the Ukrainians with the Russian, Belorussian and other fraternal peoples." Drawing the moral for Czechoslovakia, he pointed out that if one interpreted proletarian internationalism to mean only recognition of the independence and equality of nations, while ignoring mutual aid, this could "lead to separation and self-isolation."

Shelest's major policy speech in the summer of 1968 was his address on July 5 to a large gathering celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Three versions of the speech were printed on July 6; the shortest and blandest in Pravda, a longer and tougher one in Izvestiia, and the longest and most belligerent in Pravda Ukrainy. In the speech Shelest continued to discuss internal and external affairs in a parallel manner. Thus, referring to the Soviet Union, Shelest seemed to

turn the clock back doctrinally as he proclaimed: "At all [N.B.] stages of the development of our country the Party has devoted great attention to strengthening the Soviet state as the organ of dictatorship of the proletariat." Similarly, referring to Czechoslovakia he declared:

> Not a single Communist can or will agree with those pseudo-theorists who, forgetting about the class nature of the Communist movement and the socialist system, propagandize contrived lifeless "models of socialism," abstract humanism, ideas of so-called "democratization" and "liberalization" of socialism. It is not difficult to see through to the social-democratic, reformist core in all these theories. For us communists of the Ukraine who have passed through a stern school of class struggle with internal and external counter-revolution, it is very painful when we see that in individual fraternal parties some people are taking the bait of opportunists of various stripe.
>
> (omitted by Pravda)

A characteristic feature of Shelest's speeches in 1968, including this one, was his wholehearted endorsement of the characterization of the current world scene promulgated at the April (1968) Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. The basic proposition approved at this time was the neo-Zhdanov thesis that a phase of intensified international class war existed, pitting a weakened but therefore more aggressive and cunning imperialism against the workers' and national-liberation movements.[17] Shelest had no difficulty in finding evidence to support this view: Vietnam, the "Israeli aggressors," neo-fascism in West Germany, revanche. In his passages excised by Pravda he recalled the horrors of the German devastation of the Ukraine, spoke of the subversive intent of American cold-war gangsters, and boasted of the Soviet military capacity to deal ignoble death to anyone "thinking to test our strength again." The implications of this line of argument for Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia were expressed in the following words: "...The Ukrainian Communists actively defend the unity of Party ranks, the solidarity of the world Communist movement on a principled basis of Marxism-Leninism. They have always conducted and will always conduct an uncompromising struggle against any manifestations whatever of right or 'left' opportunism, reformism and revisionism, whenever and in whatever form they may appear."

And he specified where in fact "reformism and revisionism" were appearing -- namely, Czechoslovakia.

That Shelest spoke for a united Communist Party of the Ukraine on the Czechoslovak issue is doubtful. Various argumentative remarks in his own speech of July 5 suggested the contrary, though they may well have been aimed also at cautious colleagues within the Politbiuro of the C.P.S.U.[18] If we compare Shcherbitskii's public statements with Shelest's, we have even more reason to suspect the lack of a consensus of opinion in the Ukrainian leadership. Although Shcherbitskii was not involved in the top-level negotiations with the Czechoslovak leaders, he was not unfamiliar with developments there, having led a Ukrainian delegation to Bratislava at the end of May, 1968. At a joint Ukrainian-Slovak ceremony in Uzhgorod during this trip Shcherbitskii delivered a speech whose overall tone was quite moderate: "We sincerely wish our Czechoslovak friends...new successes and victories in fulfilling the decisions of the XIII Congress of the C.P.C., in implementing the Party line in the construction of a developed socialist society, in the struggle against all enemies of peace, progress and socialism."[19] Shcherbitskii graciously thanked the Czechs and Slovaks for fighting in partisan units to help free Belorussia and the Ukraine (rather than picturing them as supernumaries of the Soviet army in liberating Czechoslovakia). He also failed to comment on any threat to Communist Party dmination in Czechoslovakia or on the danger of capitalist restoration.

An even better occasion for comparing the two Ukrainian leaders' views was offered by the publication of an article by Shcherbitskii in Izvestiia on July 5th. Like Shelest's article and speech on the same day, it was also in honour of the 50th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Where Shelest emphasized the secondary importance of nationality distinctions, Shcherbitskii spoke of "a really popular sovereign state -- the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." Where Shelest dwelt on the "selfless struggle" of the Ukraine to enhance the power of the Soviet Union, Shcherbitskii described Ukrainian efforts as the "labour contribution of the Ukrainian people." Where Shelest atressed the inviolability of the central planning principle, Shcherbitskii referred favourably to the economic reform. Where Shelest spoke with personal feeling about ideological subversion and emigré machinations in his treatment of the intelligentsia, Shcherbitskii merely lapsed into impersonal

bureaucratese. In Shcherbitskii's section on foreign policy there was no mention of Vietnam, no specific reference to Czechoslovakia, and only a pro-forma statement that "The Communists and all the toilers of this republic warmly approve the domestic and foreign policy of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and of the Soviet government, unanimously support measures taken by the C.C. C.P.S.U. for the sake of the solidarity of the international communist movement, to strengthen the unity of all the forces of socialism and democracy in the struggle against imperialism, for peace and progress." Instead of presenting the official characterization of the current international scene ("ever increasing efforts aimed at subversive political and ideological struggle against the socialist countries," etc.) as his own, which is what Shelest did, he specifically assigned authorship of the doctrine to "the resolution of the April (1968) Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U." In short, Shcherbitskii's approach in the article -- as in other statements by him -- was marked by great interest in industrial and agricultural performance, a defense of Ukrainian economic interests, some concern with welfare matters, lack of anxiety about the "ideological front," and an optimistic matter-of-factness with respect to foreign affairs. Surely he revealed no enthusiasm for military adventures in Czechoslovakia.[20]

One can think of possible reasons why Shcherbitskii may have been opposed to the invasion. Assuming that he favoured economic reform (if only out of "localistic" considerations), he might have thought that success in Czechoslovakia would have strengthened prospects for reform in the Soviet Union. Probably more to the point, the change in profile of Czechoslovak industry implied by the reform (toward "growth" sectors, away from irrational investment in heavy industry) might have seemed desirable in terms of Ukrainian interests. Whether Shcherbitskii was pleased or not with the existing terms of Ukrainian-Czechoslovak trade, it is unlikely that he thought they would be better after an invasion. And on more general grounds, we wonder whether he thought that a further militarization of the Soviet economy in the wake of an invasion would be in the overall interests of the Ukraine. In brief, if "political" considerations probably encouraged Shelest to support the invasion, "economic" considerations -- among others -- might well have led Shcherbitskii to urge restraint.

Western observers were led to speculate about the "Ukrainian factor" in the invasion not only because of Shelest's role, but also because of the curious fact that on the remarkable

list of speakers at the crucial July 17 Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. (which approved the Warsaw Letter before its publication the same day) was included the name of Iu.V. Il'nitskii, first secretary of the Transcarpathian obkom in the Ukraine.[21] He was not a member of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, and in truth might ordinarily have felt fortunate to be invited to speak at a plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee.[22] We do not know what he said at the Plenum, but we can take a good guess. On the basis of (a) what he said later,[23] (b) our knowledge of the state of "friendship of peoples" in the Western Ukraine, and (c) the unlikelihood that a person of his low political status would be called upon to oppose a decision of the C.P.S.U. Politbiuro or argue against the first secretary of the Ukraine, we can say that it is most unlikely that he was invited to Moscow in order to urge caution. The obvious conclusion is that he must have been invited to dramatize the danger of Czechoslovak influences upon the Ukraine. This is an extremely important point, for it reveals better than almost anything else possibly could that the majority in the Politbiuro wanted or needed to convince the Central Committee of the seriousness of the Czechoslovak threat to the Soviet Union's south-western flank. Apparently Shelest's word on the matter did not carry conviction with everyone.[24]

Policy implementation. As we have already shown, the many economic, cultural, and political channels which connected the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia necessarily meant that over the years fairly large numbers of Ukrainian officials had had some contact with their Czechoslovak counterparts. In this section we discuss two examples of quasi-diplomatic activity which were important in the summer of 1968: the Days of Ukrainian Culture in Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak dimension of Soviet policy.

On January 23, 1968 the Ukrainian Society of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Ukrainian branch of the Society for Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society (of Czechoslovakia) signed an agreement in Kiev concerning the holding of "Days of Culture of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Czechoslovakia" and reciprocal "Days of Czechoslovak Culture in the Ukraine." The agreement provided for tours in Czechoslovakia by the Ukrainian State Dance Ensemble, the State People's Choir and a number of lesser musical groups, as well as for a Shevchenko Exhibition and the showing of Ukrainian-produced films.[25] At a press conference on April 22 it was announced that the main events in Czechoslovakia

would take place from May 28 to June 10. The list of officials present on this occasion offers some idea of the depth of administrative "backstopping" on the Soviet side.[26] At the appointed time the official Ukrainian delegation (composed entirely of cultural bureaucrats, with the exception of the Chairman of the Transcarpathian Oblast Executive Committee) made its circuit of Czechoslovakia, probably receiving a less spontaneous welcome than the performers themselves.

What is interesting about the Ukrainian Days of Culture (the Czechoslovak Days, foresightedly scheduled for the fall, were postponed) is simply the fact that they were held at all when presumably they could have been cancelled even at the last moment. Apparently the prospect of exposing hundreds of Ukrainians to the ideological and other fleshpots of Czechoslovakia described with such abhorrence in the Ukrainian press[27] did not deter the Soviet authorities. It is said that the Ukrainian performances were enthusiastically received in Czechoslovakia; so it is not inconceivable that those who planned the affair may even have believed that the Days would make the Czechs and Slovaks love their Slav brothers with renewed fervour. Of course, one may also wonder how closely shepherded the Ukrainian groups were; how much intellectual contact did they actually have with Czechoslovakia? On the more positive side, from the Soviet standpoint, were the possibilities provided by the Days for Soviet officials to make contact with leaders in many of the larger towns and cities of Czechoslovakia -- especially Slovakia. (The actual duration of the Days was longer than the official two-week period.) Without wishing to overemphasize the role of the K.G.B., we simply note that the Soviets must have been collecting as much political intelligence as they possibly could; and that because their inside sources of information were drying up at this time, it is not improbable that they were using the Ukrainian Days as one device to size up as many local politicians as possible.

Annexation? During and after the invasion fears were expressed in the Western press that the Soviet Union might take the opportunity of annexing some or all of Slovakia. A Slovak living in Eastern Slovakia at the time has informed us that rumours of Soviet annexationist designs were widespread during the invasion. Radio Free Slovakia warned its listeners on August 25th that collaborators were spreading leaflets advocating Slovakia's secession from Czechoslovakia and admission to the U.S.S.R. as a union republic.[29] In what purports to be a blow-by-blow account of

the talks in Moscow after the invasion between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders, Colin Chapman, the foreign news editor of The Sunday Times states:

> Brezhnev [sic] told the four leaders that it was only with these safeguards that the Soviet Union could allow a measure of self-government in a dependent East European country. If they refused to accept and enforce the safeguards, the alternatives were drastic. The country would be split and part of it absorbed into the Soviet Union -- an idea first mooted by Stalin in 1946. He told them the Soviet Union would do anything to defend herself and her system, even if it meant destroying the 14 million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, that in the past fifty years the Soviet Union had killed many more than 14 million in its own defence, and was ready if necessary, to do the same again. Czech and Slovak lands would be completely repopulated with Soviet citizens.[30]

Assuming for the sake of argument that Brezhnev did make this threat (Chapman gives no source for his report), we still have no way of knowing (a) whether he was bluffing, and (b) whether this was a sudden improvization or a long-contemplated possibility. It may be recalled that the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine in 1945 gave the U.S.S.R. immediate access to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which it lacked before World War II. Also, the presence of large numbers of Ukrainians in the region made the accession somewhat digestible. Neither the geopolitical nor the ethnographic temptations were as great in 1968 and the political disincentives were enormous. While the Soviet leaders were no doubt thinking about all the possibilities in Slovakia during the spring and summer of 1968, we have found no convincing evidence that they were seriously considering immediate annexation of part or all of Slovakia. Certainly, there was no propaganda buildup of the sort one might have anticipated,[31] although the absence of it might have been misleading. Nor can a prior decision to annex territory easily be extrapolated from particular Soviet interests in Slovakia. The notion that the Soviet leaders may have considered the Presov Ukrainians to be Sudeten Germans of the East is nonsensical in terms of the outlook of this group, its size, and its complete loyalty to Czechoslovakia during the crisis.[32] If, on the contrary, it is assumed -- rightly -- that the Soviets wished to "turn off" the Presov Ukrainians, it is difficult to believe that they would not have realized that this

objective could be achieved at far less political cost through jamming, intensified border controls, etc. It is possible that the Soviet leaders may have been tempted by historical analogy to believe that the Slovaks would seize upon a Soviet-created opportunity to enjoy "autonomy" under Soviet suzerainty. There is no published evidence, naturally, to indicate that the Soviets were misinterpreting Slovak nationalism so grossly in 1968. Hence, we are inclined to believe that the Soviet interest in Slovakia before the invasion was "political" -- as it has traditionally been. Soviet behaviour after the invasion can be interpreted in the same light, although there were some interesting new developments.

VI

THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION

Relations with Czechoslovakia

Prague. It appears likely that the top Ukrainian leadership continued to be closely involved in the elaboration of Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia after the invasion. An important meeting between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders was held in Kiev on December 7 and 8, 1968, attended by Dubcek, Svoboda, Chernik, Husak (then first secretary of the C.P.S.) and Strougal on the Czechoslovak side and by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyi, Shelest, Shcherbitskii, Katushev and Kuznetsov for the Soviets. The negotiations dealt with relations between the two countries at both the Party and state levels,[1] and with economic planning, trade, and Soviet aid. According to Rude Pravo, a central question discussed was the "deepening of cooperation within the framework of COMECON."[2] While Kiev was a diplomatically convenient site for the talks, almost half of the Soviet representatives were Ukrainians and the location did point to the key role of the Ukraine in economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. The participation of leaders of the Uk.S.S.R. in dealings with the Czechoslovaks at this level hinged upon the fact that Shelest and Shcherbitskii were members (full and candidate) of the C.P.S.U. Politbiuro. From the point of view of the entire Politbiuro membership there were thus political as well as functional reasons for giving the Ukrainian leaders front-row seats at the bargaining table.

In October, 1969 the Czechoslovak leadership visited the Soviet Union to conduct critical negotiations over the entire range of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations -- economic, military, and political. Between the initial negotiating sessions (October 21-22) and the final negotiating sessions and signing of the Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Declaration in Moscow (October 26-27) the Czechoslovak delegation of Husak, Svoboda, Chernik, Strougal, Bilak, Sadovsky, Gamouz, Marko, Dzur and Koucky spent two days in Kiev (October 24-26). From press accounts of the Kiev interlude it was clear (a) that the disagreements between the two sides had been brought along to Kiev, where they were being ventilated behind the scenes; (b) that the Czechoslovaks felt it desirable to offer assurances (e.g., that purges would be carried out) and to argue their case

with the Ukrainian leaders; and (c) that the latter (especially Shelest) considered it appropriate to comment both upon internal Czechoslovak developments and upon the negotiations.[3] Ordinary consular relations between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia were, of course, hardly interrupted by the invasion. The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Kiev returned to business-as-usual after "normalization" of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and in 1969 the Ukraine was once again participating in the quasi-diplomacy of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. Thus, for example, Shcherbitskii received a Czechoslovak Embassy adviser in late March, while he and Shelest received the Czechoslovak Ambassador in early July. As before the invasion, the main "Ukrainian" diplomatic effort was directed toward Slovakia.

Slovakia. In 1969 Ukrainian relations with Slovakia developed with increasing intensity, reflecting at a lower level the growing attention paid to Slovakia by Moscow. Soviet interest in Slovakia was not altogether benevolent. In March a Party Control Committee delegation led by the Committee's rather sinister Chairman, the Latvian Arvid Pel'she, visited Bratislava to compare notes with "leaders and workers" of the Control and Auditing Commission of the C.C. C.P.S. "During the meeting, which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere, the Chairman of the Control and Auditing Commission of the C.P.S. Jan Koscelansky and members of the Commission told the Soviet guests about their work aimed at strengthening the ranks of the Communist Party and shared their thoughts on the current situation in Slovakia..."[4]

The next public display of Soviet interest in Slovakia took place at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June, where the new Slovak first secretary, Stefan Sadovsky, was prominently featured in pictures of Brezhnev talking with Husak.[5] On June 16 a special celebration in honour of the 50th Anniversary of the Slovak Soviet Republic was held in Kiev, attended by Sadovsky. Two articles written for this occasion not only stressed ties between Slovakia on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Ukraine on the other, but also included several rather ambiguous phrases.[6] On July 25 Brezhnev received Sadovsky and the head of the Slovak government, P.Colotka, with whom he had a talk about "problems of further developing friendly Soviet-Czechoslovak relations."[7] One observer commented at the time that "The visit is conspicuous because this is the first trip made by unaccompanied Slovak top Party and state representatives, and because it took place merely two days after Husak's and Svoboda's discussions with the Soviet leaders in Warsaw."[8]

It might also be noted that this get-together preceded by a week the conversations in the Crimea between Husak, Svoboda, Brezhnev and Podgornyi (August 2), at which the crackdown at the September 25-26 Plenum of the C.P.C. was in all likelihood discussed. Less than a week after the July 25 meeting an agreement was signed on cooperation between Slovak and Soviet writers during the rest of 1969.[9] And, finally, the C.P.S.U. made a politically-important gesture of atonement toward the Slovak Communist Party at a celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising on August 29th in Banska-Bystrica, when the head of the Soviet delegation, K.I.Mazurov, awarded Orders of Lenin to Husak and Laco Novomesky for their role in the Uprising.

Moscow's interest in Slovakia was paralleled by regular official contacts between the Ukraine and Slovakia in 1969. Late in March a delegation to Bratislava, led by the first secretary of the Kiev gorkom, A.P.Botvin (a Russian who had frequently been involved in low-level "party" diplomacy toward Czechoslovakia), signed an agreement establishing friendly ties -- so it was said -- between the cities of Kiev and Bratislava.[10] A Bratislava delegation, in return, spent nine days in Kiev in mid-June.[11] On June 20 a different delegation, led by Miroslav Valek, the Minister of Culture of Slovakia, signed an agreement in Kiev setting the Days of Czechoslovak Culture in the Ukraine for September 23-October 6.[12] In early July a large group of teachers and students in Czechoslovak Party schools, led by the director of the Slovak Higher Party School, J.Herzkova, made a two-day visit to Kiev where they were met by the Ukrainian propaganda secretary, Ovcharenko.[13] At the end of the month a delegation of Czechoslovak journalists, headed by the deputy chief of the ideological department of the C.C. C.P.S., V.Kriz, also visited Kiev.[14] Several days later the Kiev <u>aktiv</u> of the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society received 300 Slovak teachers, higher education workers and journalists.[15] At the end of August the Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, A.P.Liashko, played a prominent role in the Moscow celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Slovak Uprising, while simultaneous festivities were held in the Ukraine.[16] On October 6th Shelest, Shcherbitskii and other members of the top Ukrainian leadership met in Kiev with Sadovsky and Kempny (Chairman of the government of the Czech Socialist Republic) on the occasion of the Days of Czechoslovak Culture in the Ukraine. Later that month, as we have already mentioned, the high command of the C.P.C. visited Kiev during the Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations. The main public speakers in Kiev for the Czechoslovak delegation were Chernik, Bilak, (who quoted Shevchenko in Ukrainian) and Sadovsky. In his speech to

the Czechoslovaks Shelest effusively praised Husak, including his role in the Slovak National Uprising, but had nothing particular to say about Slovakia. There were further contacts between Slovakia and the Ukraine in early 1970. Thus, for example, on January 13 a Party delegation led by the first secretary of the Bratislava city committee, Jan Janik, met with V.I.Drozdenko (secretary of the C.C. C.P.Uk.) and A.P.Botvin (first secretary of the Kiev city committee) for the purpose of "strengthening and broadening friendly ties between the fraternal cities of Kiev and Bratislava and studying the working experience of Party and Soviet organs."

This manifest Soviet interest in Slovakia requires explanation. It should be pointed out, first, that Ukrainian-Slovak ties were part of a general division of quasi-diplomatic labour which paired other (R.S.F.S.R.) territorial Party organizations in the U.S.S.R. with "fraternal" (Czech) organizations in Czechoslovakia. There was thus an element of purely bureaucratic routine in Slovak-Ukraine relations. On the political level it is possible that the Soviet leadership <u>was</u> considering annexing part or all of Slovakia, creating a "protectorate," or at least keeping these options open. More immediately, the <u>threat</u> of such eventualities may have been used -- as Chapman says it was in August, 1968 -- to put pressure on the Czechoslovak leaders. The treatment of Slovakia in the Soviet press was not inconsistent with this objective. But the basic aim of Soviet policy makers, we think, remained that of giving sufficient symbolic recognition to Slovak autonomist aspirations and political support to individual Slovak politicians to weaken and further divide the leadership of the C.P.C. The failure of the invading forces systematically to disarm the Czechoslovak troops was an initial sign that partition or annexation was not anticipated by the Soviet leaders. In the following months it became clear that slow suffocation of the post-January reforms was the basic Soviet strategy for Czechoslovakia. The tactical corollary -- at both social and elite levels -- was to "divide and rule." The two most potentially exploitable cleavages in Czechoslovak society, each with its own potential leaders, were those which pitted the less-skilled workers (who stood to suffer most from market socialism) against the intelligentsia, and the Czechs against the Slovaks. The latter cleavage assumed increasing importance as it became clear that industrial workers could not be rallied to the side of orthodoxy as easily as the Soviet leaders may have imagined. While exploiting Czech/Slovak tensions in the short-run, the Soviets were seeking -- through purges and the reestablishment of "democratic centralism" -- to

make the Czechoslovak political system responsive to Soviet demands imposed by orthodox, pro-Soviet cadres in the C.P.C. This objective could not be achieved immediately, however, without jeopardizing political decompression and provoking economic turbulence that could have proved costly to the U.S.S.R. Time was needed to "normalize" public opinion and allow the yeast of career ambitions to rise.

The more conservative overall cast of the C.P.S. in the post-August period, and the political profile of Husak, created an obvious Soviet interest in cultivating ties with Bratislava as one means of undermining the Dubcek leadership. Orthodox Slovak Communists provided a pool from which replacements were drawn as a number of important posts were vacated, including the first secretaryship itself in April, 1969. Husak's incumbency of the top position did not encourage Czech/Slovak solidarity -- given his lack of personal popularity among the Czechs and, more importantly, the programmes to which he was committed. Once Husak became first secretary of the C.P.C., his considerable public support in Slovakia also began to evaporate. Meanwhile, his authority increasingly came to be challenged by reactionary forces in the Czech Party branches, led by Lubomir Strougal, the Chairman of the Bureau for Party Affairs in the Czech Lands.[17] In Slovakia, paradoxically, the retention of office by conservatives in the pre-August period forestalled the backlash observed in the Czech lands in 1969, and set the stage for a lower-keyed struggle within the Party itself between Husak "moderates" (with whom the first secretary of the C.P.S., Sadovsky, could be bracketed) and the outright dogmatists (who looked to Bilak). The Husak forces lost ground throughout 1969.[18] On January 28, 1970, the promotion of Strougal to head of the Czechoslovak government (in place of Chernik) and other important changes in the Prague leadership were accompanied in Slovakia by the replacement of Sadovsky by Novotny's former premier, Josef Lenart. Sadovsky also lost his membership in the Presidium of the C.P.C. and the Secretariat of the C.P.C. -- posts which had given him influence in central decision making somewhat akin to that enjoyed by Shelest in the U.S.S.R. The significance for Slovakia of these personnel changes was soon explained by Lenart to a plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.:

> the argument was <u>not</u> tenable that "rightist and anti-socialist forces" had been less dangerous in Slovakia than in other regions of the country; therefore, a thoroughgoing purge of the C.P.S. could no longer be avoided.[19]

The change of leadership also heralded a recentralization of state power in the new federation and the retraction of foreign trade negotiating rights reported

to have been exercised by Bratislava. Commenting on these developments, the New York Times correspondent in Prague observed: "Moves to curtail the present form of regionalism presumably will not make the occupying Russians unhappy. Moscow is said to have opposed greater regional autonomy all along for fear that word of it could reach independent-minded Soviet national regions such as the Ukraine."[20]

Ukrainian involvement in relations with Czechoslovakia served those Soviet aims centred upon Slovakia. In the initial post-invasion period these included building up a counterforce to the liberal leadership of the C.P.C. Once Husak became first secretary, contacts with other Slovakian leaders afforded access to Husak's own political power base and provided one channel for attempting to influence the decisions of the C.P.C. Presidium. At the same time, manifestations of Soviet concern for Slovakia weakened the common front of Czechs and Slovaks against the U.S.S.R. by playing upon Czech fears of Slovak loyalty, and upon the interest of Slovakia in a pattern of trade relations with the Ukraine not altogether congruent with that desired by the Czechs. Relationships with Slovakia also offered a means of overseeing the consolidation of political orthodoxy in this half of the country and -- as a side effect -- repressing the Presov Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Presov. In late December, 1968, the first Secretary of the Transcarpathian obkom, Iu.V.Il'nitskii, was a member of a party delegation to Prague led by K.F.Katushev, the secretary for bloc affairs of the C.C. C.P.S.U. who played a prominent role in the pre-invasion diplomacy.[21] Presumably Il'nitskii went to Prague to lodge complaints directly with the Czechoslovak Party leadership about the conduct of liberals in Czechoslovakia and the Presov Ukrainians. Almost simultaneously an article he had written observed that the Transcarpathian Oblast was "vulnerable to foreign radio and television stations which so often are permeated with hostile propaganda that strives to sow suspicion among the representatives of our various nationalities." And he then declared:

> We must not lose sight of the fact that for many years bourgeois parties spread their ideas in this area, their dirty nationalistic poison. We must remember how they praised and promoted everywhere the bourgeois democracy of Benes and Masaryk. History itself disproved and destroyed such ideas.

> Yet bourgeois propagandists attempt to revive and serve them up in what they consider more attractive packaging. This, plus overemphasis on the peculiarities of historical paths of building socialism, with a simultaneously "delicate" silence about everything in common which unites socialist countries; this, plus discussion of democracy in general, freedom in general, sovereignty in general, "liberalization," etc...

he also commented on the dangers of tourism:

> Transcarpathia -- once an isolated corner of Europe -- has become a lively international crossroads and one of the main tourist highways in the country. But we realize that not all of our visitors come with good intentions. The fact that we have confiscated anti-Soviet literature from various so-called tourists proves this. Some of them came to us with outright espionage tasks. All of this makes necessary constant vigilance on the part of the oblast Party organization, of all Communists and toilers; the ability to distinguish between friend and foe.[22]

A similar note was struck by Ovcharenko in his remarks on tourism and cultural exchange in an article in the same issue of Kommunist Ukrainy.[23] The conclusions on tourism seem to have been drawn in early March at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which reviewed the question of cultural and scientific ties of the Transcarpathian and Odessa oblasts with regions and cities of foreign countries. The impression conveyed by the newspaper report of this meeting was that "The exchange of delegations, friendship visits, articles and athletic groups, the celebration of the anniversaries of cities, film festivals and exhibitions, and the signing of agreements on scientific co-operation between institutions of learning" were still approved. Little was said, however, of private tourism in general, and nothing of private travel across the border by lone Soviet citizens.[24] Contacts described in 1969 were of the traditional official, organized sort.[25] Later in the year Shelest himself played up the border vigilance theme as he inveighed against "spies" and "ideological diversion" while awarding an Order of the Red Banner to the Border Guards of the Western Border District, on behalf of the C.C. C.P.S.U.[26]

Internal Political Developments in the Ukraine

Continuing signs of conflict. In the last quarter of 1968 and during 1969 a number of signs pointed to continuing personal and policy conflict in the Ukraine. The most debatable of these signs dealt with the "historical" theme of the establishment of the "military-political unity" of the Soviet republics during the Civil War. The central issue at the time had been relations between the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R. with regard to the disposition of troops and control over defense industry and supplies. In a surprising number of theoretical articles in 1969 the history of Lenin's conflict with Ukrainian leaders over "localistic" resistance to centralized control at "the most critical moment of the socialist revolution" was recalled.[27] The most plausible interpretation of these articles is that they were intended to alert sophisticated readers to the further integration of forces in the Warsaw Pact.[28] However, it is conceivable that they may also have referred to relations between Kiev and Moscow.

Several equally interesting theoretical articles on civilian matters appeared in 1969. One, written by a member of the editorial board of the Ukrainian Historical Journal, discussed the contemporary relevance of the history of the Ukrainian Communist Party, a small non-Bolshevik Communist faction which had been permitted to exist in the early 1920's and which advocated a brand of left-wing national communism in a more independent Soviet Ukrainian republic. The author of the article, V.A. Chirko, criticized the Ukapists for the following sins: advocating the separation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from the R.S.F.S.R.; juxtaposing the toilers of the Ukraine to those of Russia; defining the Revolution in terms of "national liberation"; interpreting Soviet federalism as "Soviet colonialism"; asserting that the K.P.(b)U. was not connected with the Ukrainian workers and peasants and that Bolsheviks were "outside elements"; proposing that the U.K.P. become an independent Ukrainian section of the Comintern; resisting military-political union with Soviet Russia; opposing unification of the people's commissariats; advocating the creation of the Red Army on a national basis and the withdrawal of Russian military units from the Ukraine and the recall of Ukrainian units from Russia; establishing a separate Ukrainian economy; "demagogically" declaring that the N.E.P. led to the restoration of capitalism and the separation of proletariat and peasantry; falsely claiming that the shipment of Ukrainian grain to the R.S.F.S.R. was a form

of exploitation; establishing ties with foreign Communist groups and trying to drum up support in foreign Communist parties by circulating "numerous memoranda" to these parties criticizing "Leninist nationality policy"; circulating leaflets and sloganeering at "demonstrations of toilers"; striving "in a number of places in the Ukraine" to appeal to the Red Army; advocating forcible Ukrainization of Russian workers "under the pretext of developing national culture"; and creating an intolerable atmosphere for "Party-Soviet workers who came to the Ukraine from other republics."[29] Chirko's article described -- in a distorted fashion -- the main planks in a platform of Ukrainian national communism. It also hinted, by analogy, at an extension of dissident agitation to the army. The reason for interpreting the article "esoterically" is not only the author's own claim that it had "contemporary" relevance, but also the fact that dissidents have expressed the ideas he mentions (although not as sharply, at least in public) and <u>have</u> engaged in at least some of the activities he mentions.[30]

Whether Chirko's article was written as a form of veiled criticism of elements with deeper roots in the C.P.Uk. is unclear. Other articles, however, almost certainly were. The most interesting of these by far was another "historical" study, "The Struggle of the C.P. of the Ukraine against Anti-Leninist Currents and Groupings," written by V. Iurchuk, head of the Party History department of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy and an editor of the C.P.Uk's theoretical organ, <u>Kommunist Ukrainy</u>.[31] The article presents itself as a critique of deviationists in the 1920's, although its final paragraphs observe that analogous deviations can occur "even in countries which have taken the path of socialism" -- such as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. (The Ukrainian emigré journal <u>Suchasnist'</u> is also attacked in the article, perhaps -- among other reasons -- for the publication in Ukrainian by its related New York organ of a small pocket-size edition of a hitherto suppressed early Ukrainian national communist tract, <u>Do Khvyli</u>.[32]) Iurchuk directed his heaviest fire, not unnaturally, at "anti-Party tendencies," "left and right opportunists," "national deviationists," "demagogic demands for freedom of factions and groupings in the Party," "anarcho-syndicalists," and the like. However, the context of some of his discussion was clearly intra-Establishment. Thus he did not ignore the dangers of "great-power chauvinism" -- displayed, he said, in "the striving to belittle the significance of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as an integral and equal part of the U.S.S.R., in revision of the Party's Leninist policy with regard to the

development of national statehood, in a condescending attitude toward national peculiarities of culture and way of life." His treatment of several episodes of Party history suggested that he thought their correct elucidation had contemporary relevance. These included the "Left Communists' " inflexibility toward Germany in 1918; the"right opportunists'" support of capitalist solutions to agricultural problems in the 1920's and their rejection of the priority of heavy industry; attempts by oppositionists to infiltrate the largest Party organizations of the Ukraine (Khar'kov, Donetsk, Kiev, Odessa,etc.); designs by "separatists" who wished to "divorce the K.P.(b)U. from the R.K.P.(b) and strove to undo the military and economic unity of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia"; and the desire by various groups to undermine the sacred principle of "democratic centralism."

Among articles dealing overtly with contemporary affairs which pointed by implication to heterodox ideological currents within the C.P.Uk., the most significant in 1969 were probably three written by a Kiev economist, V.N.Mazur. A key passage in a four column "theoretical" article by Mazur in Pravda Ukrainy declared:

> In order for a socialist society to develop along the path to communism it is necessary in all cases to provide for the priority of general [obshchenarodnye] interests, and not to permit nationalism, localism, departmentalism, and the juxtaposing of the interests of separate regions, nations or groups to the general interests. Only a Marxist-Leninist Party can do this which assumes and carries full responsibility for the development of society as a whole, a party most fully expressing the interests of the toilers of all nations, of all regions of a country, a party constructed on the basis of democratic centralism and firmly holding in its hands all the levers of leadership and social development. Therefore, the slightest attempt to weaken a Marxist-Leninist party, any belittling of its leading role in society, in the last analysis leads to betrayal of the goals of the working class, betrayal of communism.[33]

From the context it was quite clear that Mazur was not talking about Czechoslovak "nationalism," but about nationalism within a country -- that is, within the U.S.S.R. This is not to say

that Mazur's polemics against "revisionists" at home were unrelated to his view of developments in Czechoslovakia. In a later article specifically written to refute theories which had been disseminated in Czechoslovakia, he took to task all those who supported multi-party pluralism, "pure democracy," market socialism, and national communism.[34] It should be noted, of course, that Mazur's articles, while written by a Ukrainian for a Ukrainian audience with Ukrainian problems in mind, were at the same time part of a general propaganda campaign against deviant political ideas that had been organized at the all-union level.

Turning to more overt signs of disagreement at higher levels, we note the restrained publicity that continued to be accorded the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, Shcherbitskii. In May, 1969, (when Shelest happened to be leading a delegation to Bulgaria) Shcherbitskii did break into the news twice. At a Jubilee Session of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Shcherbitskii delivered a report that concentrated on the economic benefits of natural science and made only a passing reference to social science. It also paid homage to those scientists who "had not managed to live to see today's celebration."[35] In an article on May 28 devoted to the Week of Ukrainian literature and Art in the R.S.F.S.R. Shcherbitskii inappropriately remarked, in a defensive tone, that "The concern of our Fatherland to strengthen the economic might, the defensive capability of the country -- is our common concern. The striving of our Leninist Party to strengthen the unity of ranks of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and of the entire Communist and workers' movement is our common aim." However, he also stressed the "flourishing" of Ukrainian literature and art, had nothing to say about "bourgeois nationalism," and ignored the "intensification" of the world ideological struggle.[36]

Perhaps the most striking difference in emphasis in public statements by Shcherbitskii and Shelest occurred in the speeches they delivered when the delegation of top Czechoslovak leaders visited Kiev in October, 1969. Shelest's was a tough lecture to the Czechoslovaks which depicted the events of 1968 ("those serious, complex, and alarming days") in the severest possible manner. Shcherbitskii's, on the contrary, merely alluded to "temporary difficulties and individual setbacks" while stressing economic, cultural and scientific ties between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In a passage sandwiched in between praise of the Czechoslovak Days of Culture in the Ukraine and a vague hint that "difficulties which sometimes arise" in relations between Communist

states could be solved through compromise, Shcherbitskii declared: "There can be no doubt of the fact that the visit of the Party-state delegation of the C.S.S.R. to our country, and in particular to the Ukraine [N.B.], will promote the all-round development of friendly ties and cooperation between our Communist parties and our peoples."[37]

The most overt sign of elite conflict occurred in the area of high-level "organizational questions." On April 7, 1969 the Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, D.S. Korotchenko, suddenly died of a heart attack. This event threw open the question of who would occupy the top positions in the Ukrainian leadership, because it provided a convenient opportunity for easing any leader (including Shelest or Shcherbitskii) out of the job he then held, and in any case made necessary the filling of a chain of lesser jobs. It took almost ten weeks to resolve the succession problem. On June 19th the former second secretary of the C.P.Uk., A.P.Liashko, was elected as the new Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and he in turn was replaced as second secretary by the agricultural secretary, I.R.Lutak.[38] These appointments, of course, were not merely a domestic Ukrainian matter; they were ultimately decided by the Politbiuro in Moscow. However, Shelest, Podgornyi and presumably Shcherbitskii had a voice in that body -- and thus could shift Ukrainian disputes to the all-union arena. Perhaps it is in this light that we should view the demonstrative appearance of Brezhnev with Shelest and Shcherbitskii at his side in late June at an aktiv in Dnepropetrovsk that discussed the results of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.[39]

Several conclusions follow from the signs of dissension noted above. As the Czechoslovak crisis unfolded, dogmatic forces in the Ukraine found it necessary and/or tactically desirable to expose to public view more directly than they had in the past the political meanings which were at stake in their struggle with the Ukrainian dissidents, and to hint that elements within the Party might have been finding these meanings congenial to their own way of thinking. They were encouraged to do so, of course, by the conservative winds blowing from Moscow. In this process of orthodox self-assertion, the Czechoslovak events were depicted both as a threat to the political health of the Ukraine, and as an object lesson revealing the practical implications of "revisionist" ideas already circulating in the Ukraine. At the elite level, the Czechoslovak crisis certainly did not evoke greater public displays of consensus among the highest Ukrainian leaders.

If our reading of Shcherbitskii's position is correct, it would appear that the divisions within the Ukrainian leadership after the invasion remained basically the same as those which existed before. That is to say, the main differences of opinion centered upon the approach that should be taken in handling nationality tensions in the Ukraine, the relative effort that ought to be invested in Ukrainian economic and cultural development as against merely negative defense of the existing political system, and the evaluation of the significance for the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. of trends in the communist camp and in the West. However, it also appears that there were differences of opinion over Czechoslovak issues. These disagreements may have arisen from conflicting perspectives on the pre-existent issues just mentioned; but they probably "fed back" to increase the political charge attacked to indigenous conflicts. It is likely that the effect of this was to circumscribe still further the opportunities within the political elite for arguing in favour of liberal or moderate policies of any sort.

Other personnel changes. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was followed by a number of significant personnel changes. In the central Party apparatus, the most radical changes affected the Science and Culture Department. Its head, Iu.Iu.Kondufor, was ousted. The Department was then divided into a Culture Department (headed by P.M.Fedchenko) and a Department for Science and Institutions of Learning (headed by a Russian, V.V.Tsvetkov). In the spring of 1969 the editor of Kommunist Ukrainy, Ia.E.Pashko, was replaced by V.M.Terletskii, and alterations were also made in the journal's editorial board. These personnel changes probably reflected both a desire to eliminate Skaba's associates, and further implementation of the "Ovcharenko line" in Ukrainian cultural politics. The other major change in the C.C. C.P.Uk. apparatus involved the replacement of the head of the Organizational Party Work Department, I.I.Vivdychenko, by V.M.Tsybul'ko (formerly first secretary of the Zhdanov gorkom in Donetsk Oblast, and perhaps a protegé of A.P.Liashko). Changes of prominent personnel in the regional Party apparatus included the replacement of the first secretary of the Ivano-Frankovsk obkom, Ia.P.Pogrebniak, by V.P. Dobrik (formerly first secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk gorkom in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast);[40] the replacement in May of a secretary of the Chernovtsy obkom, V.M.Kurilo;[41] and the replacement in August of the first secretary of the Volyn obkom, F.I.Kalita, by S.Ia.Zaichenko.[42]

Party discipline. The need to tighten discipline within the C.P.Uk. was emphasized on June 30, 1969 at a large meeting of Party

commission officials in Kiev addressed by the Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the C.C. C.P.S.U., Pel'she, and the Chairman of the Party Commission of the C.C. C.P.Uk., I.S.Grushetskii. The meeting evoked memories of the purges of the 1920's: "In the struggle with all kinds of deviations from the demands of the Programme and Rules of the C.P.S.U. it is necessary to preserve the Leninist traditions of the C.C.C. [the Central Control Commission], its lofty demandingness, its principled struggle for the purity of the Party's ranks."[43] Accompanied by Grushetskii, Pel'she went on from Kiev to the Western Ukrainian city of L'vov where he delivered a report on the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, listened to an appeal for "struggle with hostile bourgeois ideology" by M.M.Oleksiuk, the Director of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and probably spelled out to the L'vov comrades how the Party should be "purified."[44]

Public opinion. The Ukrainian press made strenuous efforts in the post-invasion period to justify Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia and to combat "false" impressions. Soon after the invasion the C.C. C.P.Uk. held a meeting on the mass media, at which Ovcharenko gave a report on "improvement" of the press, radio and T.V. At this meeting and a plenum of the C.C. in November, Shelest more strongly than ever emphasized the need to "strengthen the rearing of the toilers in the spirit of unlimited devotion to Communist ideals, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism."[45] The very forcefulness of his assertion in November that "The Communists and all the toilers of the Ukraine unanimously approved and wholly and fully supported all the foreign-policy activity of the Politbiuro of the Leninist Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and of the Soviet government" casts doubt on its sincerity -- or at least veracity.[46] It seems apparent from the press that many Ukrainians -- particularly among the intelligentsia -- did not accept the official explanation of the invasion. Nor were they probably inclined to take literally the anti-Ukrainian nationalist propaganda that went with these explanations, such as the lecture by B.S.Shulzhenko, First Deputy Chairman of the K.G.B., on "Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism in the Service of Imperialist Reaction."[47]

The intelligentsia. In examining the Soviet Ukrainian press after the invasion a reader is struck by how very few prominent individuals could be enticed to endorse it publicly. On August 22, 1968, the day of the TASS announcement of the invasion, the two most well-known approving names were those of Vasilii Vovchok, secretary of

the Party organization of the Transcarpathian Section of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, and V.M.Glushkov, a vice-president of the Academy of Sciences and Director of its Institute of Cybernetics. August 24th's issue of Pravda Ukrainy added the name of the artist and cultural official, V.Kasiian. (A speech delivered on August 23 at a celebration of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Khar'kov, by the first secretary of the Khar'kov obkom and candidate member of the Ukrainian Politbiuro, G.Vashchenko, printed in the same issue of Pravda Ukrainy, had nothing whatever to say about Czechoslovakia -- although an editorial comment noted that "The orators expressed full approval and unanimous support for the decisive measures taken by our country.") Meetings of Kiev writers and of the Journalists' Union reported on the 28th turned up a most undistinguished list of names.[48] The tone of the meetings may be judged from the speech by Kozachenko, the secretary of the Party committee of the Writers' Union, who took aim at Goldstuecker, Prochazka and Vaculik for aiding "world imperialism and militant zionism."[49] The anti-intellectual backlash of the invasion was soon expressed in doctrinal form by a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, E. Sitkovskii, who explained that it was a foolish conceit of intellectuals to think that they played the leading role in the contemporary revolutionary movement; hegemony belonged to "the proletariat." There was no future for "democratic socialism," "liberalization," or "old Trotskyist notions of freedom of factions in the Party."[50] Attempts to bring this message home to Ukrainian intellectuals were undertaken -- to cite a few occasions -- at a gorkom plenum in Khar'kov devoted to "ideological work";[51] by an attack in December on the editorial board of the L'vov literary journal Zhovten' and a number of contributors to the journal (e.g., B.Necherda, I.Drach, V.Didpalii, I.Nizhnik, M.Pilatuk, and P.Movchan);[52] and at a plenum of the Board of the Writers Union in February.[53] The Writers' Union discussion came after publication of an article by the C.C. propaganda secretary, Ovcharenko, in which he declared: "It is to be hoped that the Union of Writers of the Ukraine will devote proper attention to problems of the contemporary literary process and the state of criticism in the republic. A profound, principled discussion [razgovor] of the most important creative problems is required, a discussion that will leave unnoticed neither our best achievements, nor our shortcomings."[54]

The voices raised at the Board meeting of the Writers' Union, however, were not all in tune. While the Secretary of the board, L.N.Novychenko, repeated all the orthodox cliches, Honchar -- who miraculously remained first secretary of the

Board -- managed to attack the "theory of non-conflict" and praise "serious creative endeavours" and "qualified, objective and thoughtful" literary criticism in his impressively lukewarm endorsement of orthodox literary policy. Novychenko used Czechoslovakia as a negative example to illustrate what happens when critics and writers discredit the "ideological educational obligation of literature in socialist society." He also venomously attacked "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" who were "interweaving their slander of all literature with false flattery of those whom they wish to unsettle spiritually." Honchar, on the contrary, cited Lenin's views to advance the cause of moderation:

> As contemporaries will testify, Lenin was constantly concerned with building a socialist culture within the Ukrainian nation.... Diduk, an old Bolshevik who was a member of the delegation of Ukrainian peasants which, in 1921, was received by Lenin in Moscow writes in his memoirs: "We conversed with Lenin in Ukrainian. One of our comrades apologised for speaking in Ukrainian, and asked if Comrade Lenin understood. Vladimir Il'ich replied that he understood and was very fond of Ukrainian.... He asked if works by Shevchenko, Franko and Kotsibynskyi were available to us in the villages." ... Let these moving examples of Lenin's concern for our culture remain in our thoughts today, at this plenum, which is meeting at the very time preparations are being made...for observing the memorable date of his birth.[55]

However, the resistance of individuals like Honchar, significant as it was as a sign that support for the moderates continued to exist within the Ukrainian leadership, could not stop the dogmatist offensive.

Thus, changes were introduced in the personnel and structure of several "creative unions." In early December, 1968, the new head of the C.C. Culture Department, P.M.Fedchenko, supervised the installation of A.Ia.Shtogarenko as Chairman of the Board of the Composers' Union, in place of G.I.Maiboroda. It was indicated then that a concerted effort would be made to revise the system of political indoctrination in musical conservatories.[56] At the plenum of the Board of the Writers' Union already mentioned, Honchar's authority was reduced by a

reorganization which substituted a more collegial structure for the relatively hierarchical "secretariat" setup.[57] More importantly, it was announced that a Kiev branch of the Writers' Union would be established, facilitating closer control over a large fraction (437) of Ukrainian writers. At the constituent assembly of the branch in late February, the conservative Vasilii Kozachenko (noted above) was "elected" Chairman of the Board.[58]

In April, 1969 an important resolution of the C.C. C.P.Uk. entitled "On the Further Development of Scientific Research in the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian S.S.R." was publicized.[59] While holding out the promise of an expansion of branch scientific research establishments of the Academy of Sciences in the Western Ukraine, the resolution complained of a lack of "direction and coordination" in the work of existing institutions, and ordered that this situation be corrected by bringing a number of them under the control of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.[60] Other "coordinating" measures were not disclosed. The emphasis of the resolution was clearly upon social science. This resolution was soon followed by another: "On Measures for the Further Development of Scientific Research in the Area of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Improving its Teaching in Institutions of Higher Learning in the Republic."[61] The announcement of the resolution was followed by a republic meeting of "philosophical science workers," at which Ovcharenko delivered the main report. The resolution demanded that a whole series of measures be taken to revamp research and teaching in Marxist-Leninist philosophy and "improve" publications so as to bring philosophy and sociology more directly to bear upon "criticism of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and sociology, of every sort of pseudo-theory of social-democratism; the unmasking of falsifiers of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, of right and left opportunism, of contemporary revisionism, of the ideology of bourgeois nationalism." It was also revealed that the C.C. C.P.S.U. had decided that a new journal, Filosofs'ka dumka, was to be published in the Ukraine starting July 1st. (A less specialized political journal published in both Ukrainian and Russian was also introduced on the same date, entitled Pid Praporom Leninizmu.) An article in the same issue of Pravda Ukrainy by I. Bilodid, a conservative-minded vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, filled in further details on the restructuring of social science in the Ukraine.[62] If nothing else, these counter-attacks on the social science "front" must surely have given aid and comfort to many of the less popular figures in the Ukrainian intellectual community.

While the Ukrainian leadership was clamping down upon the intelligentsia in 1968 and 1969,[63] it was also attempting to reassure Russian "opinion leaders" that effective measures were indeed being taken to guarantee political stability in the Ukraine. This was the message, for example, of an article on the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia by Ovcharenko printed in the October 3, 1969 issue of Pravda. And we take this to be the political import of the "Leninist Days of Science of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Moscow", held in January, 1970. In his speech at the opening ceremonies, Ovcharenko declared: "We have come to you not only to share our achievments in the development of science and technology, nor to exchange experience, but also to say once again and yet again [eshche i eshche raz] to you, our Russian brothers, and to all the toilers of the Soviet Union, that the Ukrainian people has been, is, and always will be loyal to the great invincible banner of Lenin, to his eternal ideas, and will devote all its efforts to the construction of communism in our country."[64] The same message was communicated by members of the large Ukrainian delegation which numbered among its members most of the top Ukrainian cultural-scientific bureaucrats (including Skaba), at meetings with Moscow City Party officials, representatives of the mass media, soldiers of the Moscow Military District, historians, and leading officials of the C.C. C.P.S.U. apparatus.

Youth problems. The workings of the new approach toward "dissidence management" were most clearly revealed in the leadership's handling of youth. For at least several years before the invasion of Czechoslovakia a nagging concern over the conflict between generations constantly obtruded in Shelest's speeches -- whatever the topic of the moment happened to be. On May 14, 1968 at a plenum of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee, the first secretary, Iu.N.El'chenko, was released from this post "in connection with his transfer to Party work." His replacement was A.S.Kapto, one of the other secretaries of the Ukrainian Komsomol.[65] This change of leadership was not exclusively a domestic Ukrainian affair; it preceded by a month a purge of the all-union Komsomol high-command administered on June 12 by Suslov and Kapitonov.[66] The Ukrainian Komsomol plenum at which El'chenko was removed was devoted to "organizational and ideological training work of Komsomol primary organizations." Presumably El'chenko's leadership had been judged inadequate in these fundamental areas. An article written by V.I.Drozdenko, one of the secretaries of the C.C. C.P.Uk., that appeared several months later implied indirectly that the decision to remove El'chenko was connected with "intensification of the ideological struggle under contemporary

conditions" -- that is, with the new line laid down at the April (1968) Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. "The Comparty of the Ukraine," declared Drozdenko, "has always attributed important significance to perfecting the forms and methods, the style of its leadership of the Komsomol, and has taken pains to see to it that its leadership corresponds to the demands of the time..."[67]

Soon after the invasion the Ukrainian Party leadership began to pay even greater attention to Komsomol affairs. Shelest's defense of the invasion to a youth meeting in early September set the tone of this new campaign -- Soviet patriotism, "class consciousness," and political "vigilance."[68] An article in Pravda by the new Ukrainian Komsomol chief, Kapto, reassured the all-union audience that measures were being taken in the Ukraine to foil imperialist attempts to discredit the Komsomol, set it off against the Party and "shake the faith in the older generation."[69] Soon after this a plenum of the C.C. C.P.Uk. was held, devoted to Party leadership of the Komsomol. The report delivered by the C.C. secretary A.P.Liashko dwelt on the struggle against "revisionist and nationalist elements." In it, Liashko commented that "A considerable place in the ideological designs of imperialism against our youth -- as indeed against the entire Soviet people -- is occupied by attempts to enliven nationalist views, to shake the internationalist world-view of Soviet boys and girls. The American, West German and other imperialists are faithfully served in this objective by their pitiful lackeys -- the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists."[70] In its editorial on the plenum Pravda Ukrainy also observed:

> Boys and girls who have not been enriched with the experience of the class struggle, who have not been armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, are easily wounded by the poisoned arrows of bourgeois propaganda. The events in Czechoslovakia have only confirmed this. Our task is not only to instill in youth an immunity to Western radio lying, but also to make them active fighters against every sort of display of bourgeois ideology, patriots endlessly devoted to the Fatherland, internationalists fully committed to Lenin's goals.[71]

At the plenum the Komsomol was enjoined to employ a range of techniques to expand its influence over youth. Measures were to be taken to overcome the existing situation in which "insufficient information is provided to Komsomoltsy and youth

on the most important problems of the domestic and foreign policy of our Party and government." For the longer haul the Komsomol was told to stress military-patriotic themes in its propaganda activities; to arrange frequent meetings of war veterans with young people; to intensify para-military training; to involve youth consistently in the affairs of trade unions and local soviets; to strengthen contacts between Komsomol organizations in vuzy, on the one hand, and in factories and farms on the other; to expand physical education while at the same time improving "moral" training; and, finally, to increase the percentage of Party members among the secretaries of Komsomol organizations.

In 1969 a number of organizational steps were taken to implement the Party plenum's directives. In March, it seems, lower echelons of the central Ukrainian Komsomol leadership were purged.[72] Komsomol influence in secondary schools was enhanced by a C.C. C.P. Uk. resolution on school primary Party organizations.[73] Finally, at a plenum of the Ukrainian Komsomol C.C. devoted to "cadres" work (which was held shortly before the "election" of 62,000 secretaries of primary Komsomol organizations, 245,000 lower Komsomol organizers, and "tens of thousands of members of V.L.K.S.M. committees and bureaus"), a "businesslike discussion" (delovoi razgovor) took place on the selection of Komsomol leaders.[74]

An attempt to re-root political controls was equally apparent in the regime's approach to university youth -- a group of 800,000 persons in the Ukraine.[75] A change of style had become apparent here in the spring of 1968, when Komsomol'skaia Pravda presented as a "positive" model a description of the behaviour of the Rector of the Ukrainian Polygraphical Institute in L'vov, V.G.Shpits.[76] The techniques recommended by Komsomol'skaia Pravda were elaborated and expanded in the Ukraine in the post-invasion period. At Kiev University on September 2, 1968 Shelest attacked loafing, political passivity, nationalist moods and other vices in a speech intended to eliminate any misunderstanding among the students about "the current international situation, about the measures undertaken by the C.C. C.P.S.U. and Soviet government to normalize the situation in Czechoslovakia."[77] At the same time Shelest dwelt on the need to improve student living conditions and medical services. A full-fledged University student policy, however, was articulated only in the first months of 1969. In early January a mass meeting of Party, Komsomol, university and propaganda officials was convened by the C.C. C.P.Uk.

to discuss the indoctrination of university youth.[78] A series of measures were approved to reinforce the 322 social science departments in Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. It was laid down that vuzy Party and Komsomol organizations were to draw up long-range indoctrination plans. Vuzy were also told to step up para-military training. Children of workers and kolkhozniki were to be given priority in admissions. Also, investment in student housing was to be increased by 150% in 1969. The most interesting aspect of the student dimension of youth policy, though, was only revealed several weeks later.

It had evidently been decided before the vuzy meeting to hold a republic assembly (slet) of student activists in February. The "activists," who were nominated at student aktivs throughout the Ukraine in late January and early February, met in Kiev at the end of February. Here they not only listened to speeches by Shelest and Ovcharenko, but participated in discussion sections organized around the major areas of university life. More significantly, perhaps, they were given a tour of Kiev in which they "visited research institutes and creative unions, talked with scientists, writers, composers, artists and film producers," and were then entertained at an evening session with "leading scientists of the Soviet Ukraine, academicians, Lenin and State prize-winners, and figures from art and culture."[79] The next day Ovcharenko explained: "The student gathering has convincingly demonstrated the profound understanding by youth of the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government, its readiness to struggle persistently for the implementation of the great ideals of communism."[80] The student activist gathering was something the likes of which had not been seen in Kiev for many years. It was not an outright concession to pressures from below, but an active attempt to build a base of regime support among students broader than that created by the Komsomol.[81] How successful this politicizing move will be remains to be seen.

The general measures undertaken to improve Komsomol performance were aimed at working youth too as well as at other groups. Among other materials on this particular group, we have found especially revealing a series of articles on the role of factory Komsomol organizations in the city of Zhdanov -- a sea port and important centre of heavy industry in Donetsk Oblast.[82] Zhdanov, like other cities, has had its working youth problems: labour flitting, dissatisfaction with low wages, indifference to further education, delinquency, attraction to

"bourgeois" ideas, etc.[83] However, remarkable progress was made in eradicating these evils, so it is reported, among young workers in a number of factories. The key to success lay in giving the factory Komsomol organization real power in all matters which vitally affected young workers. This was done by command of the directors at several large enterprises in Zhdanov. The manager of the Zhdanov Metallurgical Construction organization, for example, issued an order which stated that workers of Komsomol age could be hired, fired, promoted, demoted or transferred only with the permission of the Komsomol committee. The Komsomol was also given a voice in the distribution of housing, the allocation of spaces in creches, and the determination of vacation schedules, as well as other rights. Sensational results were claimed for the city's plants: a gorkom secretary stated that the number of juvenile machine-operators not fulfilling output norms had declined by a factor of eight while their wages had risen by 150%. They were now winning socialist competitions, attending night schools, and in general being good Soviet citizens. But upon this happy scene stumbled a prosecutor who took the letter of the law too seriously, and forbade the alienation of managerial rights to the Komsomol. Fortunately, the Komsomol cause was successfully defended by the gorkom first secretary, V.M.Tsybul'ko. Here, again, we see the Communist Party attempting to handle its problems through some rather unusual politicization and institutional innovation. The seriousness with which the working youth problem is viewed is suggested, perhaps, by the fact that Tsybul'ko was later promoted to the post of head of the C.C. Organizational-Party Work Department.

Working youth provides one of the potentially strategic links between the nationalist intelligentsia and the working class. It can serve as a channel for the dissemination of interpretations of reality elaborated by intellectuals, and also as a catalyst of "anomic" behaviour. The possibility of this sort of occurrence is illustrated by the "Nazarenko Affair."[84] Nazarenko and several fellow evening students at Kiev University, all of whom worked in the daytime on the Kiev Hydroelectric Station construction project, were arrested and given stiff prison sentences in January, 1969 for having spread leaflets in the University which related the poor living conditions of the Ukrainian working class to Russification. "Many other students," writes Olynyk, "allegedly implicated in this affair, were dismissed from the University. Subsequently, entry into Kiev University has become barred to everyone except holders of special passes." The interesting aspect of the Nazarenko Affair is its

apparent connection with later developments at the construction site. The housing situation of workers on the project, it is said, had become intolerable. An unofficial "workers' council" was organized in May, 1969 at which six hundred signatures were collected on a petition to the C.C. C.P.S.U. and a former army major, I.A.Hryshchuk, was dispatched to Moscow by the workers to lodge their complaints in person. Subsequently the management (or the K.G.B.) tried to denounce Hryshchuk to the workers -- an act which inflamed emotions even further. When Hryshchuk was arrested shortly afterwards in Moscow (for drunkenness, non-payment of alimony, and obtaining money under false pretenses), there were -- to quote Olynyk again -- "mass demonstrations by the workers of the Kiev GES and sympathy demonstrations at other GES construction sites on the Dnieper river." These events no doubt were borne in mind by the Party leadership as it attempted in 1969 to intensify political control over the workers through the Komsomol and the trade unions.

Enlisted men in the armed services are the last youth group in which we are interested. A number of general signs pointed to concern over their attitudes in the post-invasion period. Interestingly, the legal penalties for deliberate avoidance of service by reservists were increased in January, 1969.[85] In his speech at the 50th anniversary celebration of the Ukrainian Komsomol in July, 1969 Kapto firmly declared: "We regard it as our very first duty to strengthen the unity of the army and the people.... Komsomol organizations of the republic maintain firm ties with ships and units of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, with army units, and with the border troops... "[86] Many of the Soviet units which invaded Czechoslovakia had been based in the Ukraine and returned there later. From what we know of their reception in Czechoslovakia, it would be reasonable to suppose that they were one of the groups most profoundly affected by the entire experience. In fact, there <u>is</u> a good deal of information in the Soviet press to support this assumption.[87]

The Problem of Interpretation

The crux of the problem of interpreting the post-invasion developments in the Ukraine is to decide (a) how much they were simply part of a broader campaign across the Soviet Union to tighten political controls; (b) how much they represented a response to real as opposed to selectively perceived dangers in the Ukraine; and (c) how much the dangers

were a product of the impact of Czechoslovak events. We are inclined to think that the political situation in the Ukraine was not the same as that in Russia, and that the clear-cut ascendance gained by neo-Stalinist forces in Russia after Czechoslovakia was not paralleled in all respects in the Ukraine. The situation in the Ukraine, as we have shown, had a different background -- the liberal national-communist agitation of the 1960's. Ukrainians had been more exposed to the reformist and nationalist ideas expressed in Czechoslovakia. And the youth problem in the Ukraine, because of the nationality issue, had become far more of a potential threat than it was in the Russian Republic. While the steps taken in the Ukraine after the invasion followed logically from the new approach associated with the appointment of Ovcharenko in the spring of 1968, they seem to have been implemented with a certain sense of urgency. It would be premature, at the least, to interpret the escalation of counter-measures against dissidence as the triumph of Russification in the Ukraine. These measures, which were bureaucratic and manipulative in inspiration, did not come to grips at all with the dissident challenge on the level of political discourse. As the experience of the early 1960's suggests, repression can have effects quite different from those intended.

VII

CONCLUSIONS

The "Ukrainian" factor in the Czechoslovak crisis has been reduced by some observers to speculation that Soviet leaders feared that Czechoslovak defiance of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovak liberalism, the example provided by successful Slovak demands for federal autonomy, and nationalist incitement by the Presov Ukrainians would prove contagious and could set off an explosion in the Ukraine. To pose the question in this way, however, is to oversimplify a complex set of relationships. In fact, Ukrainian involvement in the crisis was conditioned by the convergence of political developments in the Soviet Union, the foreign policy objectives of the U.S S.R., and -- naturally -- the evolution of events in Czechoslovakia. The main domestic factors that made the Ukraine relevant to Soviet policy makers were the increasing threat of liberal national communism in the Ukraine, the voice exercised by Ukrainians in the Politbiuro of the C.P.S.U. and other high-level decision-making or advisory organs, and the existence of factional leadership politics at both the republic and all-union levels. In Czechoslovakia the relevant factors were the rapid evolution of the political system away from orthodox communism, the persistent and successful articulation of nationalist demands by various Slovak leadership groups, and the simultaneous expression of national demands by the Presov Ukrainians -- demands which could only be satisfied by Slovak and Soviet concessions. The economic requirements of Czechoslovakia as a whole and Slovakia by itself necessarily increased Ukrainian involvement. In its attempt to promote desired objectives in Czechoslovakia (and especially in Slovakia) the Soviet leadership -- which included a number of prominent Ukrainians -- utilized the Ukraine as a main base of quasi-diplomacy.

Attitudes

Political attitudes were probably the aspect of the Soviet system most significantly affected by the situation in Czechoslovakia and by the Soviet military response to it, although the effects did not simply involve the reception in the Ukraine of doctrines formulated in Czechoslovakia. The context here was the struggle between orthodox and liberal national-communist definitions of Ukrainian political realities; a struggle which

had been going on for some years before the events of 1968-69. The importance of the battle of meanings was accentuated by the "ideological" character of Soviet politics and political culture, and by the assumption that "correct" doctrine has international validity. Although members of the liberal Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia were undoubtedly the most avid consumers in the Ukraine of cultural and political wares produced in Czechoslovakia and Presov, it is unclear whether this group drew upon Czechoslovakia for theoretical concepts so much as for factual information and moral support. We recall in this connection the likelihood that many Presov "Ruthenians" became Ukrainian patriots only after living in the Soviet Ukraine. It is also difficult to distinguish the Czechoslovak influence from the more inclusive influence of liberal Marxist thought in Eastern Europe as a whole. The character of Czechoslovak influence upon attitudes among the Ukrainian mass public -- especially that section of it most within range of Czechoslovak and Presov communications -- was probably somewhat different. While messages from Czechoslovakia undoubtedly did reinforce existing nationalist feelings and supply information unavailable in the Soviet mass media, they also disseminated "revisionist" ideas which were less familiar to the public than to the intelligentsia.

As we have noted above, it has been argued that successful Slovak agitation for genuine federalism was frightening to Soviet leaders, who -- it is said -- feared that the "infection" would spread to the Ukraine.[1] This may well be true. In the years before the invasion there was certainly an academic Ukrainian interest in federalism in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries.[2] Presov publications did inform Soviet Ukrainians about the problem. On the other hand, federalism in Czechoslovakia was not discussed much in the Soviet Ukrainian press in 1968-69 and did not figure at all in public anti-Czechoslovak polemics. It is not clear whether this silence meant that the subject was too sensitive to raise publicly, or simply that there was no broad interest in it.

The impact of Czechoslovakia upon attitudes within the Party is difficult to weigh. One can safely say at the very least that there was great interest in Czechoslovak developments on the part of some Communists in the Ukraine -- not only in the intrinsic features of the reforms, but in seeing how far the reformers would be allowed to go. It would be quite difficult, however, to separate out the Czechoslovak contribution

to ideological currents within the Party from that of meanings derived from Ukrainian Party history and from conflicting political tendencies within the C.P.S.U. As we have attempted to show, foreign and domestic, as well as ethnic and union-wide meanings flowed together for both progressives and conservatives. The evidence clearly indicates that neither side needed to be told by the Czechoslovaks how "socialism" ought to be defined. For nationally-minded Ukrainian Communists, Czechoslovakia offered hope that their own aspirations might someday be fulfilled; and -- for a short while -- provided arguments with which they might advance their cause. Among orthodox Party members and officials, the ideas of the Czechoslovak reformers and Presov nationalists were probably equated with the "real" views which Soviet Ukrainian dissidents had long "masked" in public expressions of opinion. Given the "internationalist" (or imperial) outlook of this group, it is not difficult to imagine that it quickly projected onto the Czechoslovak scene fears and resentments which owed their origin to domestic ideological struggles in the Ukraine itself. We do not mean to imply, of course, that orthodox Soviet officials were indifferent to the presentation to Ukrainian audiences of ideas which constituted a challenge to the power and authority of the established order. The more this occurred, the more problems it created in maintaining the confidence of Moscow that political stability was assured in the Ukraine.

Communications

Communication processes in the Soviet Union were also affected by the events across the border. Czechoslovak "inputs," especially those originating in Presov, added a valuable component to the already-existing non-official communications network in the Ukraine. Presov played a substantial role in amplifying the dissemination of heterodox interpretations of political reality among the Ukrainian public. The accessibility of Presov publications and broadcasts to Soviet Ukrainians introduced communicators into the network who were not obstructed by ordinary Soviet controls. These included Czechoslovak reformers, Presov Ukrainians and representatives of the world-wide Ukrainian diaspora. Soviet Ukrainians themselves made use of the Presov media to voice ideas which Soviet editors did not wish or dare to approve, but which nevertheless could not expediently be labelled "counter-revolutionary" when expressed through officially-approved media in a fraternal "socialist" country. As the materials from Nove Zhyttia and Duklia indicate, the audience in the Ukraine reached by these publications (not to mention the far broader audience reached by Radio Presov) may have included

more of a cross-section of the population of the Ukraine than one might have supposed. The incorporation of Presov into the unofficial Soviet Ukrainian communications network, as well as contacts between Presov and official representatives of Soviet organizations, also brought about linkages in the area of "interest articulation." Because of the analogous nature of ethnic issues in Presov and the Ukraine and the sharing of a common language of justification of interests on both sides of the border, the public expression of demands in Presov pointed by implication to the same issues and same demands in the Ukraine. Likewise, demands expressed by Presov Ukrainians directly to Soviet authorities (e.g., for more contact with Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals) gave voice to the interests of their Soviet colleagues.

Institutions

The most important institutional mechanisms linking external and domestic forces in the context of Ukrainian involvement in the Czechoslovak crisis were Soviet federalism, "collective leadership," and quasi-diplomacy. The constitutionally "federal" division of administrative responsibility between Kiev and Moscow permitted a degree of Ukrainian participation in the events of 1968-69 which might not otherwise have occurred. Collective leadership probably contributed to the adoption of repressive measures in the confrontation with the Czechoslovaks. Collective leadership is a condition in which mutual insecurity and competition within the leadership group are, to a greater or lesser degree, inevitable. Under certain circumstances this condition of collective leadership is likely to evoke attempts by individual members of the collective to "reinsure" themselves by advocating the safer line. Broader considerations aside, the threat to Ukrainian political stability that could so easily be read into Czechoslovak influences, combined with the existence of collective leadership at both the republic and all-union levels, tended to enhance the attractiveness of the "safe" policy of repression in both Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine. Probably Shelest's behaviour can be partly explained in these terms.

Quasi-diplomacy had its advantages from the point of view of the Soviet leadership, and these must be borne in mind if the "Ukrainian factor" is to be placed in proper perspective. By allotting a role to the Ukraine in the conduct of affairs with Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders facilitated the establishment of a fairly dense network of contacts with lower-level officials

in Czechoslovakia, with whom it otherwise would have been extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to communicate under the conditions prevailing in 1968. Officials in the Ukrainian S.S.R. were well-situated to perform such a function because of their nearness to Czechoslovakia and their possession of a certain amount of knowledge about the country gained through past experience. Quasi-diplomacy usefully supplemented direct Moscow-Prague communications by making possible contacts in which the limits of propriety were more flexible than those operative in normal diplomacy. To put it crudely, the Soviet Union stood to learn more about Czechoslovak politics with quasi-diplomacy of the "Days of Ukrainian Culture in Czechoslovakia" variety than without it. Naturally, when Ukrainians are sent to Czechoslovakia, Czechs and Slovaks must be invited to the Ukraine. If Soviet policy makers assume that a visit to Kiev or Donetsk will inspire greater love for the Soviet Union among Czechoslovak citizens (and there surely must be a substantial element of this in Soviet thinking), then the presence of these foreigners in the Ukraine is eminently desirable. Furthermore, adroitly managed quasi-diplomacy gave substance to official assertions of Ukrainian statehood and "sovereignty," while probably helping to pre-condition mass attitudes toward acceptance of invasion if this proved necessary. The "Ukrainian" diplomatic effort, as we have shown, was directed primarily at Slovakia. Thus the specific advantages to be gained from it were connected with the objectives sought by Soviet policy makers in Slovakia before and after the invasion. These included weakening the solidarity of the Czechoslovak leadership, strengthening orthodoxy by means of supporting conservative Slovak politicians, inhibiting reform by inspiring fear of a future annexation of Slovak territory, and having a "solution" to the Presov Ukrainian problem imposed by the Slovaks themselves.

Actors

The utilization of the Ukraine as a base for quasi-diplomacy conditioned the type of official actors chosen to "represent" the Ukraine. Quasi-diplomacy is predominantly "cultural" in form. Thus, a majority of the leading figures involved in it were themselves responsible for the ideological-political stability of the Ukraine as occupants of such positions as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers for culture, propaganda secretary of the C.C. C.P.Uk., head of the C.C. agitprop department, secretary of the Writers' Union, chairman of the Friendship Society, etc. Most of these individuals were chosen for such jobs precisely because of their complete reliability on the nationality question.

The same applies to the "generalist" politicians who happened to be most involved in quasi-diplomacy toward Czechoslovakia: those of the capital city, Kiev, and those of the politically less-reliable western oblasts of the Ukraine. Thus the form and loci of quasi-diplomatic interaction to some extent influenced the composition of the Soviet Ukrainian "linkage elite."

Costs and Benefits

The costs of Ukrainian involvement in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations are easier to identify than to weigh. An active Ukrainian role inevitably increased the exposure of many Ukrainians to "live" information about Czechoslovakia which otherwise they might not have obtained. While the Soviet leadership stood to lose from the exposure of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, youth and public at large to greater knowledge of the Czechoslovak reforms, it probably stood to gain from the exposure of many Ukrainian officials to these threatening phenomena. Thus "public opinion" losses were to some extent offset by a gain in support for repressive action from within the political machine.

It is characteristic of Soviet policy in this and other instances of external challenge to internal ethnic relationships that the Party leadership has not simply slammed the door on quasi-diplomacy. The maintenance of some forms of tourism, the exchange of various delegations, and the continuation of political contacts between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia after the invasion illustrate the active, manipulative approach of the Soviet leadership to relationships between the non-Russian republics and foreign countries. To a certain degree the Soviet leadership has been willing to risk weakening the ethnic cohesion of the U.S.S.R. in order to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s hegemony in Eastern Europe. This paradox can be observed not only in the sphere of quasi-diplomacy, but also in that of economics. Obviously, the leadership does not consider the risk to be great, nor the immediate price of contacts to be exhorbitant. Such optimism must be based upon confidence in the K.G.B.'s capacity to minimize costs to the regime by dominating reciprocal influence in intra-bloc contacts. The repeated complaints in the Presov materials of Soviet obstruction of fruitful relations show how dilligently the Soviet authorities work to create settings in which only the right sort of communications take place between its citizens and foreigners. In the case of the Ukrainian role in the Czechoslovak crisis we see the careful selection of personnel chosen to represent the Ukraine (including many Russians), the

preference for sponsored over unsponsored and collective over individual forms of contact, the attempts to influence the composition of Czechoslovak delegations to the Ukraine, the creation of interaction settings in the Ukraine in which frank talk would be in bad taste, and so forth. These attempts at building "correct" effects into quasi-diplomatic relationships were partially frustrated by the reduced effectiveness of police controls in the Soviet Union and (even more) in Czechoslovakia, by the desire to achieve other incompatible objectives, and by lack of Soviet control over events in Czechoslovakia.

In evaluating the net effects upon the Ukraine of the Czechoslovak crisis, we would emphasize that Czechoslovak influences were superimposed upon processes indigenous to the Ukraine, the origins of which can be traced back at least to the early 1960's. The breakdown in the official monopoly of the means of public communication, the challenge to official political socialization presented by the public formulation of new definitions of political realities, and the articulation of demands upon authorities by unauthorized persons were developments which antedated the Czechoslovak crisis. What the "Prague Spring" and Presov Ukrainians did was to accentuate each of these processes. Similarly, the strategy of response by the Soviet leadership to the Ukrainian problem had been largely worked out before the height of the crisis. As we have shown, most of the steps undertaken in the Ukraine after the invasion represented a continuation of measures initiated in 1967 or early 1968. The Czechoslovak crisis at the very least, however, heightened anxiety over the situation in the Ukraine and thereby intensified the official counterattack.

The Decision to Intervene

It is not our intention to estimate the overall influence of the "Ukrainian factor" in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia. However, we can say something about the nature of this influence. Our comments begin with what is relatively certain and proceed to what is quite speculative.

(1) The prominent role of Ukrainians in the events leading up to the invasion, and then the continued presence of Ukrainian leaders at negotiations with the Czechoslovaks after the invasion (e.g., in December, 1968 and October, 1969) strongly indicate that the Ukrainians were being consulted in earnest about policy toward Czechoslovakia and that Ukrainian considerations were relevant to

the Soviet leadership.

(2) "Objectively" Czechoslovakia was exerting a perceptible but by no means extraordinary influence before the invasion upon a delicate but not immediately dangerous situation in the Ukraine. Although there was unrest among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and warning signs of possible turbulence among youth and industrial labourers, the regime had not begun to exhaust the repressive weapons available to it. The K.G.B. undoubtedly would have been willing to assume even greater responsibilities in handling nationality affairs in the Ukraine, if the Soviet leadership had wished to give it still broader operating scope. Thus, there was little "realistic" danger that the regime would have been unable to keep the "lid" on the Ukraine for the foreseeable future whatever the outcome of developments in Czechoslovakia might have been. Moreover, the invasion itself had certain predictable unsettling effects on the Ukraine which -- even if not as lasting as the stabilising effects produced by the act -- nevertheless had to be pondered. But this, of course, is only our view of the problem that confronted the Soviet leadership. Students of policy making agree that a process of interpreting "reality," of "defining the situation" separates "facts" and policy responses to them. What one makes of the situation is what ultimately counts. Hence, it cannot automatically be assumed that the Soviet leaders read their own vulnerability correctly. And it is perfectly true that controlling dissidence in the Ukraine would have become more difficult had Czechoslovakia been allowed to go her own way. Those responsible for the job would have been especially conscious of the difficulties.

(3) Most observers of the Czechoslovak crisis would probably agree that the situation which confronted the Soviet leaders did not define itself; that different pictures of it existed in the minds of individual leaders; and that the final decision to invade Czechoslovakia did not come easily. Under such conditions, "The play of power is not a substitute for policy analysis, simply resolving those issues left unsettled by analysis. Instead, policy analysis is incorporated as an instrument or weapon into the play of power, changing the character of analysis as a result."[3] For Soviet leaders of "hawkish" inclination, the Czechoslovak "threat" to the Ukraine might well have provided one extremely convenient peg on which to hang their case. It vividly dramatized the danger of reforms in Czechoslovakia by bracketing them with the "Ukrainian question"--

a matter about which many members of the Central Committee were more likely to have been anxious than well-informed. (Ovcharenko's remarkably explicit pledge of Ukrainian loyalty to the regime in January, 1970 spoke volumes about attitudes toward the Ukraine in some quarters.) The invitation to the Transcarpathian obkom first secretary, Il'nitskii, to address the July, 1968 Plenum of the C C provides good evidence that efforts were made to use evaluations of the danger to the Ukraine as a weapon in the play of power The issue offered interventionists a clear tactical advantage; although moderates like Shcherbitskii may not have agreed with the alarmist evaluation of political stability in the Ukraine, they must have found it tricky to formulate their misgivings without opening up a dangerous discussion of the "true" sources of Ukrainian instability.

(4) In addition to the participatory, practical and power-political aspects of the influence of the "Ukrainian factor" on the Soviet decision to intervene, there is what might be called -- for want of a better label -- the "cognitive" aspect. We start with the proposition that behaviour toward an object flows from an "image" of the object in peoples' minds.[4] The image is a product of past experience. Its object can be undifferentiated, or it may have several distinguishable parts which are perceived as "going together." In the latter case, the image incorporates clusters of meanings that are assigned to these component parts of the object. The point we would like to stress is that the clusters can affect each other, and in ways which are ultimately explicable in psychological or social-psychological terms rather than in terms of the "real" dynamics of the object. Conditioning influences among the clusters might flow in directions not necessarily congruent with the objective situation, or there might be reciprocal conditioning.[5]

Returning to the subject at hand, we think it plausible to assume that the image of the Czechoslovak problem that existed in the minds of the Soviet leaders was one which included both Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine (not to mention other relevant domestic considerations). In other words, the cluster of meanings assigned to Czechoslovak events was closely conjoined with that assigned to Ukrainian ones; the two were not rigidly compartmentalized -- no mental frontier separated them. The reasons for making this assumption may be briefly summarized. Neither Communist doctrine nor Soviet political culture makes a fetish of the distinction between that which is "foreign" and that which is "domestic." Doctrinal discussions of relations among

nations do not distinguish sharply between inter-ethnic and inter-country relations. The fact that Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine were linked together "objectively" by communication, economic and other ties also encouraged locating both within the same cognitive field. Both posed analogous problems of political control - or so it must have seemed to those of the Soviet leaders (Brezhnev, Podgornyi, Pel'she, Mazurov, and Shelest) who brought to the confrontation with Czechoslovak "nationalism" thorough preconditioning gained in encounters with the "same" phenomenon in various republics of the U.S.S.R., including the Ukraine. Moreover, the Soviet leadership was dealing with important phases of the two problems concurrently.[6] Finally, clear evidence was provided by the speeches of at least one leader (Shelest) that Soviet leaders did perceive Czechoslovak reform and national self-assertion in the U.S.S.R. as parts of a single "reality" with which they had to deal. If the hypothesis of a single "image" is at least defensible, two further lines of speculation can be built upon it.

We might argue, first, that the threat to the Soviet political model (the Party, "democratic centralism," censorship, secret police control, centralized planning, Russian preeminence, etc.) -- so very real in Czechoslovakia -- was cognitively "translated" into a similar threat to the Ukraine. That is to say, meanings attached to unpalatable developments in Czechoslovakia infused and coloured meanings attached to incipiently analogous trends in the Ukraine -- which in turn "fed back" to darken the overall definition of the situation. The argument parallels what might be called the "infection" interpretation of the Ukrainian factor in the Czechoslovak crisis. It assumes that Czechoslovakia was the active element in the mental connection, the Ukraine the passive element, and that the causal flow -- so to speak -- went from West to East, from "outside" to "inside." This variant of the stimulus/response interpretation of Soviet foreign policy decision making accords with commonsense and with much of the evidence we have gathered above in the main body of the study.

The second possibility is that the relationship between "external" and "internal" was precisely the reverse. Let us assume that the dynamic roles of the clusters of meanings attached to Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine were turned around. Those assigned to threatening developments in the Ukraine (and indeed in all the national republics) would then have actively shaped the perception of Czechoslovakia. The impetus to action, cognitively speaking, would have been from East to West, from the "inside" to the "outside." Czechoslovakia would have appeared in the mind's

eye of the Soviet leadership as a union republic in which the "bourgeois nationalists" were actually getting away with what "they" were trying to do in the Ukraine. The Dubceks, Smrkovskys, Kriegels, et.al. were simply Dzyubas, Karavanskys, and Chornovils in disguise, and merited the same treatment. The definition of and response to the Czechoslovak situation, in other words, would be considered from this perspective as a projection outward of the campaign underway already in the Ukraine and other national republics to combat local nationalism and anti-Russianism. The critical factor here would be the cognitive impact that Ukrainian dissent had presumably already made upon the Soviet leadership.

This hypothesis is not entirely implausible as an explanation of the Ukrainian component -- whatever its magnitude -- in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. As we have shown, things had been taking place in the Ukraine for some years before the Czechoslovak crisis which must have constantly preoccupied, irritated and politically threatened security-minded Soviet leaders. Shelest, of course, was deeply engaged in the Ukrainian problem; but so must have been his predecessor Podgornyi, and Brezhnev too. Fortunately, there is no need to choose between the two interpretations because they are not mutually exclusive. Both processes could have been at work simultaneously -- reinforcing each other, or operating on different planes of consciousness. Such a scheme for conceptualizing the cognitive dimension of external/internal impulses to action in Soviet foreign policy, we should add in conclusion, might equally well be applied to cultural-political dissent among the Russian intelligentsia as a factor in the Czechoslovak crisis.

FOOTNOTES

I INTRODUCTION

1 See Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), pp.13-14, 62-79.

2 Vernon V.Aspaturian, The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy (Geneva: Droz, 1960).

3 For a general discussion of linkages in the Soviet context see Vernon V.Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," inR.Barry Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp.212-287. For a theoretical consideration of the problem see James N.Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in ibid. pp.27-92, and "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," in James N.Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.44-63.

4 See ibid. p.52.

5 The largest concentrations of persons of Ukrainian origin outside the U.S.S.R. are found in the following countries: U.S.A. -- 1,100,000; Canada -- 700,000; Poland -- 450,000; Argentina - 130,000; Czechoslovakia -- 120,000; Brazil -- 120,000; Rumania -- 100,000; Yugoslavia -- 49,000; France -- 35,000; Australia -- 22,000; West Germany -- 20,000; and Great Britain -- 15,000.

6 See John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 2nd ed., and Yaroslav Bilinsky The Second Soviet Republic (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

II THE UKRAINIAN SCENE BEFORE 1968

1 For descriptions of recent events see Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Recent Ukrainian Writing," Survey No. 59 (April, 1966), pp.102-112; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union," in Erich Goldhagen (ed.), Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp.147-184; John Kolasky, Education in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto:

Peter Martin, 1968) and Two Years in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin, 1970); George Luckyj, "Turmoil in the Ukraine," Problems of Communism Vol. XVII, No. 4 (July-August, 1968); Vyacheslav Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).

2 See Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York: Apollo editions, 1968).

3 See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter (ed), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp.47-76.

4 The outstanding known example of this genre is the writing of the Communist Vasyl Symonenko. Symonenko, a promising young poet and Komsomol activist who died from cancer in 1963 at the age of 28, was posthumously nominated for a Shevchenko Prize in January, 1965 on the basis of several published collections of verse. But that same month a Ukrainian emigré journal (Suchasnist' No. 1, 1965) embarrassed the Ukrainian Establishment by printing passionately patriotic, anti-Russian poems and extracts from Symonenko's diary -- material which was already circulating in manuscript form within the Ukrainian intellectual community. For a translation of some of Symonenko's poetry see the Yale Review No. 4, 1969.

5 Thus the fire in the library of the Academy of Sciences in 1964 led to the dissemination of a document entitled The Trial of Pohruzhal'sky, which accused local Party and K.G.B. officials of complicity in the arsonist Pohruzhal'sky's deed.

6 An article in the October 3, 1968 issue of Pravda Ukrainy revealed that there were over 600 illegal radio transmitters operating in Krivoi Rog alone, not including the 143 transmitters shut down in 1967. The source fails to tell us whether more than "pop" culture was contaminating the airwaves.

7 The Chornovil Papers alone contains petitions or references to petitions addressed to the Procurator-General of the Ukraine, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Ukrainian K.G.B., the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the C.C. C.P.S.U., the L'vov Oblast Court, the first secretary of the C.P.Uk., the Presidium of the XXIII Congress of the C.P.S.U., the deputy to the Supreme Soviet of

the U.S.S.R. and writer M.Stel'makh, the first secretary of the P.U.W.P. (Gomulka), the Odessa Oblast Lawyers' Collegium, the People's Court of an Odessa raion, the Chairman of the Board of the U.S.S.R. Writers' Union, the Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Chairman of the Ukrainian Journalists' Union, the Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., L.I. Brezhnev, and the editors of L'Humanité. A recent example is the "Open Letter" to deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet said to have been written by a Ukrainian citizen, Anton Koval, in April, 1969. Numerous economic and political reforms are demanded by Koval, including a shift of real budgetary powers to the republic, the introduction of a multi-party system, secret voting in the Soviets, the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian army, abolition of the censorship, liquidation of the K.G.B., etc. (This document, together with a covering news release, was published in translation on August 22, 1969 by the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council in New York.)

8 For the details see Stephen D.Olynyk, "Ivan Dzyuba Under Renewed Criticism," Radio Liberty Dispatch, November 12, 1969.

9 Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification?, pp.205-206.

10 For the concept of relative deprivation see W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). For the original formulation of the notion of status incongruence see Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review Vol. 19 (1954), pp.405-13.

11 Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification?, p.202.

12 Our description is based on the following sources: The Chornovil Papers, Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification?, and Kolasky's Two Years in Soviet Ukraine; the A.P. release of May 22, 1966; Prolog Archives; Khronika tekushchikh sobytii as reported in RFE Research November 13, 1969; and private conversations with Soviet citizens abroad.

13 It is a noteworthy fact that the First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and former all-union Komsomol chief and Chairman of the K.G.B., V.E.Semichastnyi, appears to have been the chairman of a special Commission on Juvenile Affairs attached to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. See PU March 3, 1968.

14 See, for example, the article on promoting friendship among Ukrainian and Russian soldiers in a tank unit in East Germany originally printed in Sovetskaia Armiia (published in East Germany) and reprinted in PU November 26, 1967. Bilinsky also notes: "Der Spiegel (Hamburg) March 31, 1965, pp.112ff. reported the contents of a Peking broadcast to the Soviet Ukrainian soldiers stationed in Siberia. That broadcast accused the Soviet regime of dangerous Russification, pointing out that Ukrainian troops were sent to the Far East, while Russian troops were stationed in the Ukraine." (Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness...," p.183.) China's interest in Ukrainian military morale cropped up again in a not altogether historically objective 1968 article that stated: "In the summer of 1963, the Ukrainian people organized large-scale demonstrations against the Soviet revisionist new Tsar's policy of national oppression, and for national equality. Soldiers of the Ukrainian military district refused to carry out the Soviet revisionist authorities' orders to slaughter their class brothers. These authorities then brought in troops from two other military districts to carry out a ruthless suppression." (Hung Chuan-yu, "The new Tsars -- Common Enemy of the People of All Nationalities in the Soviet Union," Peking Review July 4, 1969, p.26.)

15 For all these reports see Kolasky, Two Years..., pp.186-187.

16 Plenum tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza, 24-26 marta 1965 g., stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965), p.37.

17 For the October, 1966 trial of Baptists in Zhytomyr see News from Prolog, January 10, 1967.

18 See the article by I.Mayhal in Kultura i zhyttia January 3, 1969, pp.2-3. Mayhal attacks the Church abroad and its proposal to establish a Ukrainian Patriarchate.

19 Stephen D.Olynyk, "The Quest for Civil Rights and National Autonomy," Estonian Events February, 1970, p.4.

20 Between 1957 and 1963 a series of political trials were held in L'vov and other Ukrainian cities. (See M.M.Masyutko's letter of February, 1967 to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.S.S.R. in U pivstolittia radians'koi vlady, Dokumenty II [Paris: PIUF, 1968].) The death penalty was demanded in a number of cases. In the trial in March, 1959 of a group of workers and students who had formed a "United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine," the court imposed long prison sentences rather than execution.

However, L.H. Lukianenko, a leader of a group that called itself the "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union" (and which enlisted a number of Party members), was sentenced to death by shooting in May, 1961. (The penality was later reduced to long imprisonment by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.) A trial in December, 1961 in L'vov of twenty persons (mainly workers) accused of forming a "Ukrainian National Committee" resulted in the execution of two young labourers. (For these cases see I.O. Kandyba's 1966 letter to Shelest in Ukrains'ki iurysty pid sudom KGB [Munich: "Suchasnist'," 1968].) Trials in 1962 in L'vov and Ternopol' also produced death sentences. (See L.H. Lukianenko's letter of May, 1967 to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.S.S.R. in U pivstolittia radians'koi vlady, Dokumenty II.)

21 "Komunisty Ukrainy," "Do vsikh komunistiv narodno-demokratychnykh i kapitalistychnykh krain, do kerivnykh organiv komunistychnykh i robitnychykh partii svitu," Suchasnist' December, 1969 p.96.

22 See The Chornovil Papers.

23 See the specific references scattered throughout Kolasky, Two Years..., Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification?, and The Chornovil Papers.

24 More recently, on the night of November 26, 1968, some of the Ukrainian historical materials which had not been destroyed by the 1964 fire in the Academy of Sciences library were burned -- along with other Ukrainian and Jewish manuscripts -- in a fire which razed the Church of St. George in the Vydubetsky Monastery in Kiev. The same evening a collection of historic Jewish documents went up in flames when a fire destroyed the Great Synagogue in Odessa. (See the article by Peter Grose in the New York Times, February 20, 1969.)

25 Kolasky learned from publishing officials that the book had been commissioned and the date for its publication set in Moscow. While the author's name was Ukrainian, little else involved in its production was. Kolasky argues persuasively that the aim of the book was to stir up hatred between Ukrainians and Jews, win friends among the Arab countries, and cast a shadow upon the forthcoming Shevchenko celebration (which, says Kolasky, was not attended by a single Jewish writer from the Ukraine, the R.S.F.S.R., or abroad). See Kolasky, Two Years..., pp.94-5.

26 See for example, the series of articles attacking "Zionism" in Pravda Ukrainy of August 5, 12, 16 and September 6, 1967. There is obviously an audience ready to "get the message." Examples

were cited to one of the authors by a Ukrainian visitor to the West, who stated -- and this is his own opinion -- that immigration of Jews from other parts of the Soviet Union to Ukrainian cities had intensified competition between Jews and Ukrainians for university admission (the quota for Russians appeared to be fixed), caused some Ukrainian intellectuals to feel threatened in competition for jobs, and stimulated popular anti-semitism -- since the newcomers frequently were wealthier than Ukrainians and thus better able to obtain scarce housing, services, etc.

27 See Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? pp.2-5.

28 This judgment is supported by a reading of the Report of the C.C.P. investigating delegation sent to the Ukraine in April, 1967. See Viewpoint (Toronto) Vol.5, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp.1-13.

29 For material on relations between the C.C.P. and C.P.S.U. see ibid. and the following issues of Pravda Ukrainy: April 1, 1967; April 6, 1967; April 22, 1967; April 23, 1967; August 29,1967; November 7,1967; December 24, 1967; December 29, 1967; October 16, 1968; June 14, 1969; June 22, 1969; July 3, 1969. Also see Zhyttia i slovo (Toronto), September 22, 1969, for a semi-official letter from the Ukraine attacking the report published in Viewpoint (Vol.5, No. 1).

30 For example, see Dzyuba's scathing personal attack on the secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, L.M.Novychenko, in his speech of January 16, 1965 at the Symonenko anniversary meeting. (Appendix IX in Kolasky, Two Years..., pp.249-254.)

31 Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (London: Collins, 1968).

32 The opening provided to local orthodox activists by this uncertainty of policy is illustrated by the campaign in 1968 against alleged "bourgeois nationalism" in Dnepropetrovsk, the actual Ukrainian industrial city described by Oles' Honchar in his controversial novel, Sobor ("The Cathedral"). Hinging their attack against the Ukrainian-minded intelligentsia upon its support of Sobor, the orthodox forces in the Party, Komsomol, universities and K.G.B. (led by the obkom first secretary, Vatchenko, who had served as an official in Dnepropetrovsk when Brezhnev was first secretary of the obkom, and who in 1968 was a member of the Ukrainian Politbiuro) conducted a witch-hunt in which more than a dozen journalists, theatre directors, teachers and writers were removed from their jobs and expelled from the Party. Information about these events is contained

in a petition addressed to Shcherbitskii, Ovcharenko and Pavlychko (a secretary of the Writers' Union) by young intellectuals in Dnepropetrovsk. (See "Lyst' tvorchoi molodi Dnipropetrovs'kogo," Suchasnist' 1969, No. 2, pp.78-85. A resumé in English can be found in R.F.E. Research March 10, 1969.)

33 Thus, general leadership was shared by the Party first secretary (Shelest) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Shcherbitskii); personnel matters fell within the joint oversight of the Party second secretary (A.P. Liashko) and a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (N.A. Sobol'), with the Chairman of the Party Control Commission (I.S. Grushetskii) having an important say in Party disciplinary proceedings; cultural affairs were supervised not only by the Party propaganda secretary (A.D. Skaba) but also by a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (P.T. Tron'ko); while the K.G.B. was looked after by a Party secretary (V.F. Drozdenko), a deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (S.N. Andrianov), and -- of course -- the Chairman of the K.G.B. himself (V.F. Nikitchenko). The same pattern existed at lower administrative levels.

34 See The Chornovil Papers, p.75.

35 Kolasky, Two Years..., p.202. (According to Kolasky, Shelest met Skaba's demands with the reply that "he was not Kaganovich and these were not the times of Stalin.") Indeed it is difficult to imagine how the popular writer Honchar could have possibly remained head of the Writers' Union up to the present (February, 1970) had he not been tolerated by Shelest.

36 "There was the opinion, expressed by the Minister of Education, to the effect that the question of national aspirations doesn't depend on language. A similar position was advanced by A.D. Skaba, secretary for ideology in the Central Committee who declared that what is important is the technique developed, not the language in which the text books [sic] are published. It didn't bother him, he stated, whether in the hydro station at Burshtyn, there were more signs in Russian or in Ukrainian... This concept was, however, contradicted by the statements of P.Y. Shelest, member of the Polit-bureau, C.P.S.U. and first secretary, Central Committee, C.P. Ukraine, who declared emphatically that the development of Communist society must permit the fullest and freest economic and cultural development of every nation. 'Patriotism' he went on to say 'is developed in the family and its roots are in the family.' During our discussion with M.A. Suslov, member of Polit-bureau and Secretary of C.P.S.U. in Moscow later, he also spoke very

positively about the close relationship between language and culture. This was in line with Shelest's remarks at the Ukrainian Writers Congress to the effect that 'It is necessary that we cherish and respect our beautiful Ukrainian language...'." Viewpoint Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 1968) pp.10-11.)

37 The key "indicator" was Skaba's inclusion of the name of the decimator of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, Pavel Postyshev, in the pantheon of great Bolsheviks of the Ukraine. In his speeches Shelest always carefully omitted Postyshev's name from the list of Communist heroes.

38 Plenum tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza 18-21 iiunia 1963 g., stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1964), p.89.

39 A. Skaba, "Nekotorye voprosy vospitatel'noi raboty v sovremennykh usloviiakh," Partiinaia zhizn' 1967, No. 4, pp.58-59.

40 At the November, 1967 Plenum of the C.C. C.P.Uk. Skaba's future replacement F.D.Ovcharenko was promoted from candidate status to full membership in the C.C. Several weeks later, on December 20th, the unlikely occurred as Skaba was elected a new member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

41 See PU March 30, 1968.

42 RU April 2, 1968.

43 The appeal was printed in New York by Novoe Russkoe Slovo in 1968, and later by several Ukrainian emigré publications.

44 The "Knowledge" (Znanie) Society is an all-union propaganda organization designed to secure the participation of professionally-trained people in popularizing technical and political material through lecturing and pamphleteering. Its head in a republic is ordinarily a ranking official in the Academy of Sciences, who in this connection works closely with the Party and state propaganda departments.

45 The new campaign was reflected, for example, in the RH editorial of February 21, 1968; the article by M.Ostryk in the March 12 issue of Literaturna Ukraina; the attack by Iurchuk and Lebedenko on Honchar's Sobor in RU, April 26; the proceedings of the Writers' Union meeting of April 29 (see Literaturna Ukraina May 1 and 7); the self-criticism by Khar'kov writers (Literaturna Ukraina May 24); the conference for Party obkom ideological secretaries (RU, May 24); and the meeting of writers with Shelest and Ovcharenko in early June (Literaturna Ukraina, June 4 and 7).

46 See especially David Willer and George K.Zollschan, "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Revolutions," in George K.Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (eds.), Explorations in Social Change (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp.125-51.

47 Statement by L.H.Lukianenko to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uk.S.S.R., D.S.Korotchenko, in U pivstolittia radians'koi vlady, Dokumenty II (Paris: PIUF,1968).

III THE CZECHOSLOVAK SCENE BEFORE THE INVASION

1 See Zdenek Elias and Jaromir Netik, "Czechoslovakia," in W.E.Griffith (ed.) Communism in Europe (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), Vol. II, pp.157-276; and Paul E.Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York: Praeger, 1963).

2 Pravda June 3, 1966.

3 See P.A.Toma, "The Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919," The American Slavic and East European Review, April, 1958.

4 The information about the C.P.S.'s policy in 1944 and 1945 concerning independence, autonomy, and annexation was published in the August 14 and 21, 1969 issues of Nove Slovo and the September 5, 1969 issue of Pravda (Bratislava). It is cited by Hajek and Niznansky in "Policies and Problems in Slovakia," R.F.E. Research November 28, 1969, pp.2-3.

5 Zinner, ibid., p.75.

6 See Stanley Riveles, "Slovakia: Catalyst of Crisis," Problems of Communism Vol. XVII, No. 3 (May-June, 1968), pp.1-9.

7 Ibid., pp.7-9.

8 In its letter of congratulations to Bilak on his fiftieth birthday the Cultural Association of Ukrainian Toilers (see below) stated: "The Central Committee of the C.A.U.T. remembers your jubilee with great warmth and recognition of your efforts in creating, for many years, proper conditions for the development and flourishing of the culture of the Ukrainian population of the C.S.R. Working in important positions in the central Party and state organs of Slovakia,you of ten stood at the cradle of good beginnings in the socio-political and national-cultural movement of the Ukrainian population.... You supported those tendencies that helped to strengthen

friendship and mutual understanding between Slovaks and Ukrainians." (Nove Zhyttia August 19, 1967.)

9 See Pavel Tigrid, "Czechoslovakia: A Post-Mortem," Survey No. 73 (Autumn, 1969), p.140.

10 For a revealing account of the period by the former head of the ideological department of the Slovak C.C., Miroslav Kusy, see Czechoslovak Press Survey April 10, 1969).

11 For a review of Slovak politics in this period see Hajek and Niznansky, "Policies and Problems in Slovakia," R.F.E. Research, November 28, 1969, pp.3-10.

12 A recent Czechoslovak source (Demografie 1968, No. 2) sets a figure of 58,000. The Soviet Ukrainian volume Ukrainskaia SSR i zarubezhnye sotsialisticheskie strany (Kiev, 1965, p.69) claims 70,000. A more recent Soviet source, however, says 100,000 (Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1968, No. 7, p.73), a figure accepted by some emigré publications in Canada and the United States. Dr. Ivan Shlepetskyi, who claims to have prepared a statistical study for the Orthodox Church in 1951, counted 277,476 orthodox "Ruthenians" in Czechoslovakia (Prav.Tserk, kalendar: 1951, Prague, 1951, pp.92-95). Rude Pravo 1968 No. 102, however, states that in 1948 the Uniate Church in Czechoslovakia had 305,000 "Ruthenian" believers. The figure of 1,400,000 is given by Mr. Sava Zerkal in Holos Lemkivshchyny 1968, No. 12 (Yonkers, N.Y.). And according to the document, "Report on the Current Political Situation in the C.S.S.R. and on the Conditions under which the C.P.C.S. Pursues its Activity" of August 12, 1968, prepared by a section of the C.C. apparatus of the C.P.C., there were no less than 318,000 "Ukrainian citizens" of Slovakia. (see R.F.E. Czechoslovak Press Survey July 30, 1969, p.44.)

13 See R.F.E. Research April 28, 1967.

14 See I. Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR (Kosice: Vychodoslovenske Vydavatel'stvo, 1967), pp.71-75.

15 The conditions were: (a) proportional representation of Ukrainians in the S.N.C.; (b) proportional representation of Ukrainians in the central administrative organs, and especially in administrative organs in regions inhabited by Ukrainians; (c) the establishment of Ukrainian and Russian schools in predominantly Ukrainian regions and their subordination to local councils; (d) that no obstacles be placed in the way of closer cooperation between Presov and the Soviet Ukraine,

especially the Transcarpathian region, and that Ukrainians have the right to attend universities in the Soviet Ukraine. See Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, pp.72-76.

16 Their departure may have been deliberately engineered to keep the Ukrainian element in place. During the "Prague Spring" there were hints in Nove Zhyttia (Presov) to this effect. Those optanty who later returned did not hesitate to say that they had been deceived and treated unjustly in the U.S.S.R. Their return to Czechoslovakia was strongly resisted by the Slovaks, who probably feared stronger Ukrainization pressures. Because the optanty returned as super-loyal subjects of Czechoslovakia, they could not be checked as they had been before with inspired rumours that they wanted Presov annexed to the Ukraine.

17 As a discussion in Nove Zhyttia from January to August, 1968 revealed, many Presov Ukrainians consider this decision to have been illegitimate because it was never confirmed by the Plenum of the U.P.C.P.

18 On the C.A.U.T. see Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, pp.123 ff.

19 V.Kapishovskyi, "KSUT," Naukovyi Zbirnyk Muzeiu Ukr. Kultury v Svydnyku 1967, No. 3, p.404.

20 Ibid. p.407.

21 Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, p.107.

22 The outsiders included members of the C.C. C.P.C., the C.C. C.P.S., the Preparatory Committee of the proposed People's Congress of Ukrainians, the Slovak National Council, the Preparatory Committee of the Association of Carpathian Youth, and representatives of the formerly elected village delegates to the Congress. (Nove Zhyttia 1968, No. 46.)

23 Nove Zhyttia May 23, 1969.

24 Ibid. May 9, 1969.

25 A Council of Ukrainian-Ruthenian Youth was established in Presov on January 24, 1969. (Homin Ukrainy March 29, 1969.) The Chairman of the Council, Dr. Jurij Baca, soon agitated for separate Ukrainian youth representation in the Association of Children and Youth Organizations of Slovakia (Ton 1969, No. 4 and Ukrainskyi Holos May 7, 1969), an objective later sought unsuccessfully with respect to the Federal Council of Youth Organizations (Ton March 28, 1969). A Council of

Ruthenian-Ukrainian Women was set up on May 23, 1969. Its Chairman was Dr. Suzanna Hanudel of the Presov University Philosophy Faculty, and many of its members were drawn from the local teaching community. (Nove Zhyttia May 30, 1969.) A meeting of Ukrainian journalists on March 9, 1968 in Presov led to the creation of the Section of Ukrainian Journalists in May, 1969. (Nove Zhyttia June 1, 1969.) The Section, headed by S. Kochuta, is important in terms of relations with the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. Most of its members were trained in the Ukraine and have personal contacts there as well. The attempt to organize teachers is still underway. A Preparatory Committee met on May 7, 1969 to discuss the formation of a teachers' organization. In the meantime, a Teachers' Club has been established as a section of the C.A.U.T.

26 A Slovak from Kosice who left Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion recalled to one of the authors a rumour that had circulated widely after 1956 to the effect that certain Presov Ukrainian leaders had sent a resolution to Prague asking that the district be allowed to join the Soviet Union.

27 For the Hungarian question see R.F.E. Research of May 16, 1968; June 21, 1968; August 14, 1968; October 24, 1968 and October 28, 1968.

28 In late 1968 Ukrainian teachers went on strike in protest against attempts to compel them to meet the qualifications set for Slovak teachers. They complained that Jan Chicha, head of the Presov Department of Education, was discriminating against them, and refused to obey his orders. A teachers' meeting was convened in Svydnyk on January 24, 1969, attended by the propaganda secretary of the C.C. C.P.S., Chomca, the head of the C.C. Cultural Department, Vanchyshyn, and Chicha himself. But the meeting only further exacerbated the conflict. What the outcome was we do not know. (See Nove Zhyttia January 21, 1969 and Homin Ukrainy March 29, 1969.)

29 Novyi Shliakh April 19, 1969.

30 Nove Zhyttia 1968, No. 36.

31 Bajcura, Ukrajinska Otazka v CSSR, pp.123 ff.

32 Interview given by Iurii Datsko, editor of Nove Zhyttia.

33 Andrii Dutsar, "Za povernennia ridnoi shkoly," Pedagogichnyi chasopys dodatok do zhurnalu "Druzhno Vpered", 1969-70, No. 3 (63) (November), p.2.

34 See I.Fel'baba, "Priashivs'kyi Ukr. Narodnyi Teatr," Naukovyi Zbirnyk..., 1967, No. 3, pp.428-33; I.Masyns'kyi, 10 Rokiv UNT (Presov, 1956); V. Fedor, Pochatky UNT (Presov, 1957); H. Krainiak, Ukrains'ka Klasychna Drama v UNT (Presov, 1956) and P.Terniuk, "Priashivs'ki Pobratymy," Mystetsvo (Kiev), 1966, No. 6.

35 Ia. Tsymbora, "PUNA," Naukovyi Zbirnyk..., 1967, No. 3, pp.434-36.

36 The following section is based largely on Naukovyi Zbirnyk..., 1967, No. 3, pp.409-419.

37 Conservative Soviet Ukrainians have labelled them "bouregois-nationalist." See V. Petliuvanyi, "Ne vyishlo: ne vyide," Literaturna Ukraina August 27, 1968.

38 Pedogogichnyi chasopys dodatok do zhurnalu "Druzhno Vpered", 1969-70, No. 3 (63) (November), p.3.

39 On the Museum see Naukovyi Zbirnyk..., 1965, No. 1, pp.25-30 and 1967, No. 3, p.378, and Nove Zhyttia July 6, 1968.

40 See Nove Zhyttia May 15 and June 19, 1968.

41 An exhibition of them in Winnipeg in May, 1969 evoked an extraordinarily warm response in the Canadian and American Ukrainian press. See Novyi Shliakh June 7, 1969.

42 V.Verkhola, "Ukrains'ka Radiomovlennia v Chekhoslovachchyni," Naukovyi Zbirnyk..., 1967, No. 3, p.421.

43 Ibid.

44 For a discussion of democratization and the radio see F.Kovach, "Tverdo Otsiniuvaty," Nove Zhyttia March 16, 1968. For the "Ukrainian window" on Czechoslovak T.V. before 1968 see ibid. April 22, 1967. Other information about the radio may be found in ibid. February 4, 1967 and April 15, 1967.

45 V.A.Pavlenko, "Rozvitok kul'turi ukrains'kogo naselennia chekoslovats'koi sotsialistichnoi respubliki (1945-1965 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1965, No. 12, p.62.

46 Naukovyi zbirnyk..., 1967, No. 3, p.422.

47 Ibid.

IV UKRAINIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS BEFORE 1968

1 For the prewar period see V.A.Pavlenko,"Z istorii kul'turnykh zv'iazkiv radians'koi Ukrainy Chekhoslovachchyny (1918-1939rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1966, No. 7, pp.73-82. For the postwar period see Ukrainskaia SSR i zarubezhnye sotsialisticheskie strany.

2 Extensive ties maintained among institutes of the Ukrainian, Czechoslovak and Slovak academies of science are regularly described in the Soviet Ukrainian press. (For example, see Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1962, No. 2, pp.153-55; 1963, No. 3, pp.153-54; 1967, No. 4, pp.149-51; and 1969 No. 3, pp.34-39. Also see Ukrainskaia SSR i zarubezhnye sotsialisticheskie strany, pp.206ff. and 302-3.) In 1967 180 Czechoslovak scientists visited the Ukraine and 83 scientists from the Ukraine went to Czechoslovakia. (PU May 26, 1968.) University connections are illustrated by the collaboration of Kiev University with the universities of Bratislava (Slovakia) and Brno (Moravia), and of Uzhgorod University with Kosice University (East Slovakia). (Kommunist Ukrainy 1965, No. 9, p.49.) Reciprocal publication takes place at the local level as well as in Kiev, Bratislava and Prague. For example, newspapers in L'vov and Uzhgorod from time to time have printed articles written by Czechoslovak authors (V.K. Sul'zhenko, "Braters'ka druzhba i spivrobitnitstvo trudiashchikh zakhidnikh oblastei Ukrainy ta narodno-demokratychnikh krain," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1965, No. 3, p.83), while the Carpathian Publishing House in Uzhgorod has occasionally published works by Czech and Slovak authors. (See Kommunist Ukrainy 1968, No. 8, p.94. The multinational population of the Transcarpathian Oblast provides an opportunity for this publishing house to put out works in the languages of the neighbouring countries, to which these works can then be exported.)

3 The account in the text is based on the translation of this article in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press Vol. XII, No. 6 (June, 1968), pp.23-27.

4 See Literaturna Ukraina December 17, 1968.

5 O. Zilynskyi, "Anketa pro ches'ko-ukrainski kul'turni vzaiemyny," Duklia 1968, No. 4, pp.352-56.

6 PU April 23, 1968.

7 For sources on economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine other than those cited below see: I.M.Kulinych and I.A. Peters, Ekonomichne spivrobitnytstvo Ukrains'koi RSR z kraiinami sotsializmu (Kiev, 1962); V.Budkin, Druzhba naviky (Kiev, 1967); and N.G.Klimko (ed.), Problemy razvitiia ekonomiki sotsialisticheskikh stran Evropy (Kiev, 1968).

8 D.Vovko, Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh ekonomichnykh zv'iazkakh SRSR (Kiev, 1966), p.56.

9 PU May 26, 1968.

10 Vsevolod Holubnychy states on the basis of Soviet sources that "In terms of domestic f.o.b. prices, Ukraine's exports to the CEMA countries exceeded imports from them by as much as 42.5% in 1965." ("Some Realities in the Economic Integration of East-Central Europe," mimeo, 1969, p.12.)

11 V.Bondarenko, "Bratni zviazki Ukrainy z Chekhoslovachchinoiu," Ekonomika radians'koi Ukrainy 1965, No. 6, pp.89-90.

12 Ibid. p.91.

13 Kommunist Ukrainy 1965, No. 9, p.47. It appears, however, that the Ukraine became a different sort of "storehouse" soon afterwards. Soviet-supplied power to Czechoslovakia dropped from 189.4 million kilowatt hours in 1965 to 11.4 in 1966. See Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1966 god., statisticheskii obzor (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia", 1967), p.215.

14 Kommunist Ukrainy 1965, No. 9, p.47, and Bondarenko, "Bratni zviazki...," p.90.

15 Ibid. p.91.

16 Holubnychy, "Some Realities in the Economic Integration of East-Central Europe."

17 Pavlenko, "Rozvytok kul'tury...," p.64.

18 Sul'zhenko, "Braters'ka druzhba...," p.84.

19 Quoted in Molod'Ukrainy March 7, 1967, p.2. (Translated in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press 1967, No. 4, pp.16-17.)

20 Kommunist Ukrainy 1966, No. 5, p.92.

21 V.U. Pavlenko, "Zv'iazki radians'koi Ukrainy i Chekhoslovachchyny v galuzy seredn'oi i vyshchoi osvity (1948-1965 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1969, No. 11, pp.75ff.

22 See Pavlenko, "Rozvytok kul'tury...," pp.62-64.

23 Soviet authorities, however, did not take kindly to Presov criticism of literary life in the Ukraine. Thus, at the May, 1968 meeting of the Writers' Union in Kiev it was declared: "We must throw back these dark forces by means of a united ideological offensive, and by constant readiness to repel enemy attacks. ... All of the bourgeois press, and occasionally even certain organs published in socialist countries resort to this kind of distortion. For example, the Presov Duklia printed a flimsy article on P.Tychyna. ... And this is not an isolated case of the editors of this journal coming into conflict with objectivity and truth as they expound on questions concerning the development of Soviet Ukrainian literature. It is quite astonishing that Duklia would publish inferior, and occasionally incidental work, signed by unknowns and in no way representative of our contemporary literary process." (Literaturna Ukraina May 7, 1968.)

V THE UKRAINE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968

1 "Pro-Czechoslovakian Mood in the Ukrainian SSR," R.F.E. Research n.d. (1968).

2 For example, see V. Trypils'kyi, "Anti-Communism and its Historical Destiny," RU June 6, 1968; O.Poltoratskyi, "Whom are Certain Humanists Defending?" Literaturna Ukraina July 16, 1968; V. Vilnyi, "Before the Judgement of History," ibid. July 26, 1968; and especially P. Hryniuk, "Old Intentions in Up-dated Packaging," RH July 31, 1968.

3 PU July 9, 1968.

4 Some evidence of concern with the political "health" of inhabitants of the region -- particularly youth -- is provided by the following chronology. In May, 1967 a republic-wide seminar on the "internationalist indoctrination of toilers" was held in L'vov. The seminar, which was sponsored by the Ukrainian "Knowledge" Society and the Academy of Sciences, was attended by 1,200 people. The opening speech was given by F.D.Ovcharenko. (PU May 19, 1967.) In April, 1968, a L'vov Oblast Conference of Public Education Workers was held, devoted to "ideological-political, military-patriotic, and internationalist training in the schools." (PU April 3, 1968.) In late May, 1968, a plenum of the L'vov obkom was held which discussed "shortcomings in ideological-indoctrination work with youth." (PU June 1, 1968.) From an article published in 1969 we also

learn that the L'vov gorkom bureau spent three separate meetings in 1968 discussing the affairs of various institute Party committees, while in April 1969 it heard a report by the city Komsomol Committee on ideological indoctrination in institutions of higher learning. (PU July 4, 1969.)

5 Thus, for example, the head of the Political Department of the Western Frontier District of the Border Guards described the apprehension of two Americans said to have been trying to smuggle 8,000 anti-Soviet leaflets and over 1,000 religious publications into the Ukraine. (RU May 28, 1968.) Contrariwise, M. Mushynka was caught at the border railway station of Chop attempting to smuggle writings by Dzyuba out of the Ukraine.

6 See Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 1, p.86.

7 See Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage," Problems of Communism Vol. XVII, No. 6 (November-December, 1968), pp.10-14, and R.V.Burks, "The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1969), p.45.

8 PU April 27, 1968.

9 PU August 28, 1968.

10 See Peter Last in the Montreal Gazette September 21, 1968.

11 Tigrid, "Czechoslovakia: A Post-Mortem," p.160.

12 Burks states that "One of the first acts of the invading Russians was to close down this station." (The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," p.45.) Ukrainian emigré sources say that upon entering Presov Soviet troops immediately destroyed the transmitting tower. A scholar from Czechoslovakia has also told us that all publications of the Presov Ukrainians have been banned in the Soviet Ukraine since the invasion.

13 Chervonenko, a graduate of Kiev University in 1936, served in the apparatus of the C.C. C.P.S.U. from 1949 to 1956, and was secretary for propaganda of the C.P.Uk. from 1956 to 1959. (He was thus Ovcharenko's immediate superior from 1956 to 1958.) From 1959 to 1965 he was Ambassador to China and from May, 1965 Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He was elected to full membership in the C.C. C.P.S.U. at the XXIII Congress.

14 Pravda July 20, 1968.

15 PU February 17, 1968.

16 Pravda July 5, 1968.

17 Pravda Ukrainy July 6, 1968.

18 For example: "...Not a single member of the Party, not a single person of progressive views can stand aside from direct participation in this struggle. For a Communist to shun it means to deviate from Marxism-Leninism, to betray the aims of the working class and social progress." (Omitted by Pravda.)

19 PU May 26, 1968.

20 A sign of this coolness, perhaps, was his and a number of other Ukrainian Politbiuro members' absence from a Kiev Oblast aktiv called to hear Shelest report on the July Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. (See PU July 20, 1968.)

21 The speakers at the July Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U. included the following: P.E. Shelest, V.V. Grishin (first secretary, Moscow gorkom), D.A. Kunaev (first secretary, C.C. C.P.Kaz.), L.S. Kulichenko (first secretary, Volgograd obkom), Iu.V. Il'nitskii (first secretary, Transcarpathian obkom), N.M.Gribachev (secretary of the Board of the Writers' Union), V.S.Tolstikov (first secretary, Leningrad obkom), A.I. Shibaev (first secretary, Saratov obkom), A.E. Voss (first secretary, C.C. C.P.Lat.), V.I. Konotop (first secretary, Moscow obkom), V.I.Degtiarev (first secretary, Donetsk obkom), M.V.Keldysh (President, Academy of Sciences), A.Iu.Snechkus (first secretary, C.C. C.P. Lith.), S.G. Lapin (General Director, TASS). As Richard Lowenthal has pointed out, it is surprising that neither Suslov nor Ponomarev spoke at the Plenum, and that two intellectual bureaucrats (Keldysh and Gribachev) did. (Problems of Communism Vol. XVII, No. 6 [November-December, 1968] p.17.) It is also striking that over half of the party officials who spoke at the Plenum represented non-Russian constituencies. Three of the speakers (Shelest, Il'nitskii and Konotop) were Ukrainians by ethnic origin, and another (Degtiarev) was in charge of a Ukrainian oblast.

22 Il'nitskii is a Ukrainian of peasant origin, born in 1924. He has only higher Party education (VPSh, 1954.) His entire career has been spent as a Party official in the Transcarpathian Oblast.

23 An "historical" article published by Il'nitskii in PU July 29, 1968 emphasized the deep impression that life under the " 'democracy' and 'freedom' of Massaryk and Benes" had made upon inhabitants of his region. It also included some rather strained abuse of the U.S.: "Everyone knows that the bourgeois Czechoslovak republic was created in its own image by capitalist America, which the peoples of the world today call the "United

States of murderers." Another article by Il'nitskii published after the invasion dwelt on nationality tensions in the Transcarpathian Oblast and the harmful influence of "foreign radio stations and television studios." It also repeated the attack on traces of Massaryk and Benes in the minds of the oblast's population. The tone of the article was harsh. (See Iu.V.Il'nitskii, "Nashe Znamia -- internatsionalizm," Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 1, pp.85-93.)

24 Another sign of reserve toward Shelest was the slight implied by the publication of his article on the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in the less prestigious journal Voprosy istorii KPSS (1968, No. 7, June 28), while the article by the Ukrainian propaganda secretary Ovcharenko on the same subject was published almost simultaneously by Kommunist (1968, No. 10, July 10).

25 PU January 24, 1968.

26 Those named were: a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; the Minister of Culture; the chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Society of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; a secretary of the Trade Union Council; a deputy chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Branch of the Society for Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship; a deputy chairman of Gosplan; the Director of the Ukrainian Telegraph Agency; the first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol; the chairman of the State Committee on Cinematography; a deputy chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television; the head of the Administration for Foreign Tourism; and a deputy minister of Agriculture. (PU April 23, 1968.)

27 See Ol.Kurin, "Radi obshchei tseli," PU May 28, 1968.

28 For a typical undocumented reference see Francois Fejto, "Moscow and Its Allies," Problems of Communism Vol. XVII, No. 6 (November-December, 1968), p.37.

29 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), The Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p.147.

30 Colin Chapman, August 21st, The Rape of Czechoslovakia (London: Cassel, 1968), p.68.

31 A check of the B.B.C. monitoring reports has not turned up any suspicious Soviet broadcasts in Slovak during the summer of 1968, although the B.B.C. reports are far from complete. There was also no obvious attempt in either the Ukrainian or the central press in 1968 to stress the separateness of Slovakia, although the speeches of Slovak leaders at Slovak Party Plenums were

given good coverage.

32 We have been assured of the loyalty of the Presov Ukrainians by several informed Czechoslovak sources. For confirmation see Burks, "The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," p.45.

VI THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION

1 Pravda December 9, 1968.

2 Rude Pravo December 10, 1968 as quoted by James (ed.), The Czechoslovak Crisis 1968, p.159.

3 See PU October 26 and 28, 1969.

4 PU March 9, 1969. Koscelansky, reputed to be a political moderate, had for several years been Party leader of the East Slovak Krai. As Husak's "consolidator" in the key purging post of chairman of the Slovak Party Control and Auditing Commission, Koscelansky brought with him first-hand experience in dealing with the Presov Ukrainians. He himself, along with other members of the East Slovak Krai Party Committee, was purged on November 28, 1969 following reports of disturbances at the East Slovak Metallurgical Combine. (See R.F.E. Research December 1, 1969, pp.2-3.)

5 There were some interesting pictorial differences, however, among Soviet newspapers. Izvestiia (June 15) featured a picture of Brezhnev alone with Husak. Pravda (June 10) published a group photograph of Brezhnev talking with Strougal, Sadovsky, Husak, and Bilak. And Pravda Ukrainy (June 14) especially emphasized Slovak distinctiveness with a picture of Brezhnev seated between Husak and Sadovsky.

6 See PU June 15 and 18, 1969.

7 PU July 26, 1969.

8 R.F.E. Research July 29, 1969.

9 Literaturnaia gazeta August 6, 1969.

10 PU April 1, 1969.

11 PU June 17, 1969.

12 PU June 22, 1969.

13 PU July 6, 1969.

14 PU July 29, 1969.

15 PU August 2, 1969.

16 See PU August 28, 29 and 30, 1969.

17 See "Husak and Strougal: Their Positions and Prospects in Czechoslovak Politics," in R.F.E. Research August 20, 1969.

18 For a detailed survey of political developments in Slovakia in 1969 see Hajek and Niznansky, "Policies and Problems in Slovakia," R.F.E. Research November 28, 1969, pp.4-13.

19 Pravda February 8, 1970.

20 Alvin Shuster, "Prague to Pull in Reins on Slovakia's Autonomy," New York Times February 16, 1970. Czechoslovakia became a federal state on January 1, 1969. The law amending the 1960 Constitution to this effect was approved by the National Assembly on October 27, 1968. (See Henry Frank, "Czechoslovakia Becomes a Federation," R.F.E. Research January 1, 1969.) The restoration of Soviet-style "democratic centralism" in the Party should not, in our view, be allowed to obscure entirely the importance of the rearrangement of administrative powers.

21 PU December 28, 1968.

22 Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 1, p.93.

23 Ibid., p.22.

24 PU March 13, 1969.

25 Thus, for example, Party officials from Kiev, the Transcarpathian Oblast, the East-Slovak Krai, and Bratislava met in Uzhgorod in early May to celebrate the 24th Anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia. (See PU May 11, 1969.)

26 PU November 5, 1969.

27 See S.Lipitskii, "Deiatel'nost' TsK RKP(b) i V.I.Lenina po ukrepleniiu voeno-politicheskogo edinstva Sovetskikh respublik (1917-1920 gg)," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 1969, No. 1, pp.3-14; A. Blokhin, "Uroki vozhdia," Pravda March 16, 1969; I.Min'kovich, "Edinstvo -- zalog pobedy," PU May 24, 1969; N. Azovtsev and V.Petrov, "Boevaia programma oborony respubliki," Krasnaia Zvezda July 9, 1969; and "Vse na bor'bu s Denikinym! " PU July 9, 1969.

28 See Victor Zorza, "Russia Takes over New Warsaw Defence Force," The Guardian Weekly, Vol. 102, No. 6 (February 7, 1970), p.3.

29 V.A.Chirko, "Krakh ideologii ta politiki natsionalistychnoi partii ukapistiv," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 1968, No. 12 pp.25-33.

30 We know from The Chornovil Papers that Ukrainian dissidents were making appeals to foreign Communist parties. It is also apparent from the same source and from Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification? that dissidents entertained the notion of a community of "socialist" countries which would include the Ukraine as a separate entity. A romanticized image of the Comintern as an international court of appeal open to Ukrainian Communists also appears in the dissident literature. The contents of the "Open Letter" to members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet mentioned above provide further evidence of the range of currently-held ideas to which Chirko was addressing himself. Finally, we note the letter sent by an anonymous "committee" of Party members to foreign Communist parties in December, 1964. (See "Kommunisty Ukrainy," "Do svikh komunistiv... ".) Among other points, the letter criticized the denationalization of the Ukrainian Party apparatus, the formation of a new privileged class in the Soviet Union, and the exploitation of Ukrainian workers.

31 V.Iurchuk, "Bor'ba KP Ukrainy protiv antileninskikh techenii i gruppirovok," Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 9, pp.62-73.

32 Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakh-Rai, Do Khvyli: Shcho Diet'sia na Ukraini i z Ukrainuiu (Saratov: December, 1918-January, 1919). The Ukrainian republication was by Prolog (New York, 1967). There is also an English translation edited by Peter J. Potichnyj. (Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine [Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970].)

33 V.Mazur, "Revizionizm meniaet masku," PU May 28, 1969. Also see his earlier article, "O korniakh sovremennogo revizionizma," Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 4, pp.67-76. The importance attached to Mazur's polemics is indicated by their repetition in Pravda Ukrainy.

34 See V. Mazur, "O nesostoiatel'nosti kontseptsii 'modelei sotsializma'." Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 10, pp.75-85.

35 PU May 23, 1969.

36 PU May 28, 1969.

37 PU October 28, 1969.

38 See PU June 20, 1969.

39 PU July 1, 1969.

40 PU March 7, 1969.

41 PU May 21, 1969.

42 PU August 9, 1969.

43 PU July 2, 1969.

44 PU July 4, 1969. On July 2 Shelest delivered a speech to students at the Ukrainian Higher Party School on "Problems of Further Perfecting the Style and Methods of Party Work," the contents of which might well have been connected with Pel'she's visit to the Ukraine. Unfortunately, the speech was not published.

45 PU September 6, 1968.

46 PU November 23, 1968.

47 RH April 18, 1969.

48 The writers who endorsed the invasion were: V.Kozachenko (secretary of the Party committee of the Writers' Union), V. Petliuvannyi, P.Panch, N.Rybak, A. Il'chenko, V.Tkachenko, N.Nahnybida and I.Honcharenko. The journalists who added their voices were: P.N.Biba (editor of Kul'tura i zhyttia), M.L.Vinokurov (correspondent of Radians'ka Ukraina), D.A.Aleksandrov (deputy editor of Bloknot agitatora), V.S. Kolomyets (senior editor of RATAU), and V.Ia.Sarnatskii and O.S.Kurin (department heads of Pravda Ukrainy).

49 A blend of anti-semitic, anti-nationalist and anti-Western themes was standard fare in orthodox propaganda throughout 1968 and 1969. For example, see the article by Nikol'nikov in RU September 3, 1968; the article "Behind David's Shield" by Podchekaev in Kultura i Zhyttia February 6, 1969; and the review by Levinson of Kichko's latest contribution, Judaism and Zionism, (Kiev:"Znanié," 1969) in Liudyna i Svit, 1969, No.1, pp.55-56. (It would be a reasonable assumption that Kichko's book was planned for publication while Ovcharenko was still chairman of the "Znanie" Society.)

50 E.Sitkovskii, "Falsifikatory Leninizma," PU September 8, 1968.

51 PU September 19, 1968. Also see the attack on Khar'kov writers by B.Sylaev in Literaturna Ukraina November 26, 1968.

52 PU December 26, 1968.

53 PU February 15, 1969.

54 F.D.Ovcharenko, "Leninizm -- nashe nepobedimoe ideinoe oruzhie," Kommunist Ukrainy 1969, No. 1, p.20.

55 Literaturna Ukraina February 14, 1969.

56 See PU December 5, and 10, 1968.

57 Thus, instead of "first secretary," Honchar became "chairman" of the Board, and his former secretarial assistants became "first deputy chairman" (Ia. Zbanatskii) and "deputy chairmen" (V.Kozachenko and L.Novychenko).

58 See PU February 26, 1969 and Literaturna Ukraina February 28, 1969. The other members were: P.Voron'ko (first deputy chairman); V.Petliuvannyi and B.Oleinik (deputy chairmen); and A.D'iachenko (responsible secretary).

59 PU April 3, 1969.

60 These included the Institute of Social Sciences of L'vov State University, the State Natural Science Museum, the L'vov Museum of Ethnography and Artistic Crafts, and the L'vov State Scientific Library.

61 PU May 22, 1969.

62 Divisions of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences had been created in Donetsk, L'vov and Khar'kov, while "academic sub-divisions" had been created in Ivano-Frankovsk, Chernovtsy, Uzhgorod, and Lugansk. Social science, Bilodid proclaimed, was to concentrate its attack on refuting "bourgeois, nationalistic, reformist and revisionist conceptions of social development." (PU May 22, 1969.)

63 There were further arrests of intellectuals in 1969. These included the arrest in Dnepropetrovsk of the poet and journalist Ivan Sokul'skyi and the poet Mykola Kul'chinskyi; the arrest in Kiev of a student at the University, Oleg Bakhtiiarov, and an economist, Stepan Bedrilo, as well as the sentencing of the schoolteacher Mykola Breslavskyi to two and a half years' detention for attempted self-incineration in front of the University on February 10, 1969 (following the example of V.Makukha, who -- in protest against Russification -- did burn himself to death on November 5, 1968); the arrest in L'vov of two students at the Agricultural Institute, and a journalist, Vasil Rivak; and the trial in Ternopol' of ten persons accused

of disseminating underground documents about the nationality question in the Ukraine and Czechoslovak events. (Press releases of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, New York, December 16 and 23, 1969.) There were also said to be arrests in Khar'kov, Odessa, and Chernovtsy. (Olynyk, "The Quest for Civil Rights and National Autonomy," p.5.)

64 PU January 13, 1970.

65 PU May 15, 1968.

66 See Komsomol'skaia Pravda June 13, 1968. The former Komsomol first secretary, Sergei Pavlov, considered in the West to have been a protegé of Shelepin, suffered the humiliation of being demoted to Chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the U.S.S.R.

67 Komsomol'skaia Pravda July 5, 1968.

68 PU September 10. 1968.

69 Pravda September 14, 1968.

70 PU September 25, 1968.

71 PU September 27; 1968.

72 See PU March 28, 1969.

73 "On the Experience of Work of the Party Organizations of Secondary School No. 8 in the City of Torez, Donetsk Oblast, and of the Bogdanov Secondary School named for Lenin of the Znamensk Raion, Kirovograd Oblast." The resolution dealt with Party leadership of Komsomol and Pioneer organizations in the schools and the extension of Party influence among teachers. It recommended the utilization of little Lenin museums, school work brigades, the graduation of larger numbers of children from worker and peasant families (presumably by lowering standards), greater parent-teacher contacts, a stress on Soviet patriotic themes in the learning process, greater efforts in the area of para-military and sports activities, and the "organizational strengthening" of School Party organizations. (See PU June 11, 1969.)

74 PU August 28, 1969.

75 PU September 25, 1968.

76 Komsomol'skaia Pravda April 25, 1968. Shpits' door, it was said, was always open to students. He knew how to deal with students, how to find the "Archemides lever" with which to influence them. He was never condescending toward them, understanding that his tastes were not always their tastes. He realized that one couldn't change students' ways merely by imposing disciplinary penalties. Most importantly, he did not evade discussion of the issue of Ukrainian nationalism, but patiently, through conversation, convinced students of the mistakenness of their ideas. In running the Institute he allowed the Komsomol organization a significant voice in admissions decisions, and shifted responsibility for domitory matters onto the student committee. Students were thus drawn into the administration of discipline in the Institute.

77 PU September 4, 1968.

78 PU January 9, 1969.

79 PU February 20, 1969.

80 PU February 21, 1969.

81 In early 1970 a campaign was publicized to activate student academic groups as the "primary cell" in institutions of higher learning, through which students could receive proper orientation in matters academic, social and political. (See the editorial "Cell of the Vuz Collective" in PU February 10, 1970.)

82 Komsomol'skaia Pravda March 22 and November 13, 1968 and Pravda January 3, 1969.

83 Pravda January 3, 1969.

84 The "Nazarenko Affair" is described in Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, No. 8, 1969. Our account is based on the paraphrase of this document by Olynyk, "The Quest for Civil Rights and National Autonomy," pp.4-5, and R.F.E. Research November 13, 1969.

85 See PU January 13, 1969.

86 PU July 2, 1969.

87 Lieutenant-General Bedniagin, Chief of the Political Administration of the Odessa Military District, lamented publicly that while today's soldiers were better-educated, they did not grasp political knowledge that much faster than had their predecessors. From Bedniagin's account it is quite apparent that political workers under his command were having an

extremely difficult time of it in attempting to sell the official story on Czechoslovakia to the troops in the military district, who happened to have seen the events there with their own eyes. (A.Bedniagin, "Avtoritet propagandista," Krasnaia Zvezda January 8, 1969.) This impression is confirmed by criticism of discipline among young soldiers in the Odessa Military District by the Commander, A.G.Shurupov (ibid., February 28, 1969), and by a discussion of the ineffectiveness of oral propaganda by Bedniagin's own agitprop chief (ibid., April 11, 1969). There also seem to have been propaganda failures in the Black Sea Fleet (ibid., August 22, 1969). In his speech to the XII Party Congress of the Carpathian Military District in L'vov, Shelest is reported to have "set a number of large and responsible tasks in further perfecting military and political preparation, in indoctrinating soldiers in the spirit of ardent Soviet patriotism, of proletarian internationalism, of endless devotion to the Party and the people." (PU January 28, 1970.)

VII CONCLUSIONS

1 See Der Spiegel May 19, 1969, pp.119-122.

2 See S.O.Makohon, Pryntsyp natsional'noi rivnopravnosti v sotsialistychnii Chekhoslovachchyni (Kiev: "Naukova Dumka", 1961); I.S.Dziubko, Torzhestvo leninskoi natsional'noi politiki v Chekhoslovakii (Kiev: Kiev State University, 1963); I.S.Dziubko, Rozviazannia natsional'noho pytannia v Chekhoslovachchyni -- zakonomirnist' budivnytstva sotsializmu (Kiev: "Nankova Dumka", 1966); and Ie. A.Tykhonova, Rozviazannia natsional'noho pytannia u derzhavnomu budivnytstvi ievropeis'kykh sotsialistychnykh krain (Ch.S.S.R.; S.R.R.; S.F.R.Iu.) (Kiev: "Naukova Dumka", 1966).

3 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p.30.

4 Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor Paperback, 1961), p.6

5 The precise manner in which the clusters condition each other is a question well beyond the scope of this study. Although an answer to it could be framed in terms of the theory of cognitive dissonance, perhaps a more satisfactory model could

be worked out on the basis of concepts developed by the symbolic interactionist school of social psychology.

For example, Novotny resigned as President on March 22nd, while the Plenum which removed Skaba was held on March 29th. The Action Programme was approved on April 5th, and the appeal by 139 Ukrainians was probably received by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi within a week or so one way or the other of this.

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The Department is working in selected areas of four fields: Australian politics, bureaucracy and public policy, comparative politics, and world politics.

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