

RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE

BY

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Jersey City, N. J.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

1915

ERRATA.

- P. 5, l. 23. *For couse, read course.*
- „ 8, „ 11. *For ergarding, read regarding.*
- „ 11, „ 1. *Omit been.*
- „ 12, „ 13. *For Rusia, read Russia.*
- „ 13, „ 13. *Omit comma.*
- „ 13, „ 41. *For Dume, read Duma.*
- „ 15, „ 10. *After attitude, insert assumed.*
- „ 16, „ 5. *For fromm, read from.*
- „ 18, Table. *For Finss, read Finns.*
- „ 19, l. 23. *For bceome, read become.*
- „ 20, „ 25. *After nation, insert ”.*
- „ 21, „ 22. *After imperialism, insert comma.*
- „ 21, note, l. 1. *For G. Sands, read B. Sands;
for Leuhner, read Leuthner.*
- „ 21, note, l. 3. *For Brieg, read Krieg.*
- „ 22, l. 24. *For became, read become.*
- „ 25, „ 41. *Before This, insert ‘.*
- „ 26, „ 13. *For Colmar, read Calmar.*
- „ 27, „ 17. *For Austrian, read Russian.*
- „ 28, „ 20. *For or, read of.*
- „ 29, „ 24. *For Russian, read Russia.*
- „ 31, „ 35. *After reconciliation, insert period.*
- „ 33, „ 2. *After Empire, insert period.*
- Bibliography, P. I, French. *For Problème, read
Problème; for Ruthénes, read Ruthènes.*
- P. II. German. *For Zivilization, read Zivilisation.*
- P. III. Swedish. *For nationalskad, read national-
skald.*

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.


These pages were written by Professor Steffen as part of a large work called "Krig och Kultur," of which the first volume appeared in Stockholm in November 1914, and the second volume a few months later. The present excerpt consists of pages 195—236 (Chapters 9 and 10) of the Swedish original, that portion of volume I which deals with the plight of the Ukrainian population of southern Russia. Those wishing to read Professor Steffen's entire presentation of the cultural values involved in the present war may, if unable to read the Swedish original, make use of the German translation of the volumes that has been brought out by Eugen Diederichs of Jena (1915); in that edition these chapters fill pages 138—165 of the first volume. Considerations of space prevent the reprinting of Prince Kropotkin's letter, referred to on page 8 of this reprint, but as Professor Steffen and his correspondent quote the essential parts of that missive in the chapters here translated, that omission will hardly be felt as serious.

It should further be borne in mind, that of the three Stockholm dailies quoted in these chapters, *Stockholms Dagbladet* is a champion of the Conservative Party, while *Dagens Nyheter* gives the Liberal point of view, and *Social-Demokraten* is of course socialistic. *Tiden* is a weekly, also appearing in Stockholm. *Smalands Folkbladet* is a provincial paper. Rudnitsky's German pamphlet, referred to by Steffen on page 18, has been translated into English, and may be obtained from the Ukrainian National Council, in this city.

J. W. H.

Jersey City, July, 1915.

N. B.—Such references in the text as "this year", or other allusions to the immediate past, apply, of course, to the year 1914.



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KROPOTKIN'S POSITION ATTACKED BY A UKRAINIAN.

In connection with Prince Kropotkin's letter, printed above, I am the recipient of the following communication from a young Austrian university student who is in reality a member of the great Ukrainian or "Little Russian" race — Mr. Emil Revjuk, of Czernowitz, in Bukovina. He has spent two years in Sweden, engaged in a study of our public schools and public higher education. I can certify to his unusually wide range of information, particularly as regards Sweden, and, more specifically, the relations of the Swedish nation to the Ukraine, beginning in the old Viking days, when Swedish warriors founded the Ukrainian state; his extensive information has been a source of pleasure and profit to me in the course of a number of interesting conversations.

It seems Mr. Revjuk represents the old, widespread national movement, the object of which is the liberation of the Ukrainian people from the tyranny of the Great Russians, which began as soon as the union of these two independent states under one sovereign had been realized (the Ukraine and the Muscovite realm) — a tyranny that has been directed not only against the economic and political liberties of the Ukrainian people, but also, and most energetically, against their language, their literature, their newspapers, their schools, and their church — in a word, against all their national culture.

Mr. Revjuk emphasizes strongly that after 1905 Russian liberalism assumed an increasingly imperialistic tone, simultaneously expressing, towards the Ukraine, the Great Russian ambition for power that is also evident in the attitude of the Great Russians toward the Poles and all the other races that languish under the

sceptre of the Muscovite Czar. This feeling is particularly strong against the Ukrainians, for the reason that they constitute at once the most numerous, culturally the most developed, and racially the most closely related people (to the Great Russians) within the Russian Empire. The state and culture ideal of the Neo-Liberal Great Russians seems not to consider the question of Ukrainian freedom at all.

Mr. Revjuk's contribution to the subject is as follows:

"Prince Kropotkin, in his letter to Professor Steffen, says: 'Russia's stand regarding Austria's ultimatum is not the cause of this war. It is clear that that is not the only reason, but it is one of the reasons. Possibly Russia did not desire war just this year, but Prince Kropotkin should at least have hinted in his letter that the Russian government and the Panslavic sections of both the Right and Left in Russian politics wanted this conquest, for that is a fact that had practically as great an influence in determining that the Russian-Austrian hostility should be decided, and at just this epoch, by a war, as did the conflicts of these two nations in the domain of Balkan politics. And the Russian ambitions for conquest must not be overlooked when the similar desires of Germany are under discussion. It certainly is not unreasonable to require that a Russian socialist shall not be silent on Russian territorial greed when he is condemning the territorial greed of Germany.

"Why did Russia need to expand in the direction of Eastern Galicia?

"In the January number of *Der Kampf*, the Austrian social-democratic periodical, Otto Bauer has the following to say on this point:*

'In Eastern Galicia the peasant is a Ukrainian, but the landed proprietor, the official and the burgher, are Poles. As long as the peasant remained uneducated, poor, and weak, a small Polish minority ruled over the Ukrainian body. But when the peasant's self-consciousness awakened and his economic position improved, he began to assert his national affiliation. The educated classes among the Ukrainians, who are themselves of peasant origin, are the leaders of this peasant move-

* See *Tiden*, No. 2, 1914, "Polen och Ukrajna", p. 4.

ment. Thus they state their national program: a Ukrainian university, Ukrainians in administrative public office, greater influence for their people in the province as well as in the (Austrian) empire. By filibustering tactics, they gain a hearing in the Diet. The government and the Polish politicians are obliged to make concessions. They are not without influence even on the general policies of the whole empire. This policy may inconvenience us, for obstruction in the Diet hinders our activities. And it may mislead the energies of the peasant movement in the interests of the intellectual classes. Yet it is a striking spectacle to behold a people a people, three and a half millions in number, awakening from a century of slumber and developing a will of their own.

‘The consequences of this awakening pass beyond the boundaries of Austria; they rouse an echo in the great Russian Empire and influence the relations between Russia and Austria. This becomes one of the determining factors in the European situation. The stronger the Ukrainian people become in Austria, the more difficult it is for Russia to fight the Ukrainian movement within its own boundaries.

‘The Russo-Austrian enmity produced in the Balkan Peninsula, becomes more acute and more dangerous, owing to this battle carried on by the Ukrainians for the continuation of peace, and for Austria’s existence as a nation. Possibly bloody battle-fields may decide whether the Russian gendarmes are to force the Russian language on Eastern Galicia also, or whether Russia is to lose control of the Ukraine, which would result in a division of the Russian people (as at present defined by Russia) into two nations.

‘It is perhaps not incorrect to say that the awakening of the Galician peasant makes up the most significant chapter in the history of Democracy in Austria.

‘The question is discussed from a Russian viewpoint in an article written for the *Deutsches Volksblatt* (an Austrian journal) early in 1914, by L. Varonin, the Vienna correspondent of a number of Russian newspapers. “Is Russia to become a national state, or a state of nationalities? This has become a question of the utmost importance since the Revolution of 1905. If Russia should follow the example set in Western Europe, we may expect to behold a new

edition of Austria. But that is not what we want. The Russian nationalism born after the Revolution of 1905 asks that Russia remain a national state and that it be not altered into a state of nationalities. To what extent is this desire likely to be realized? Humanitarians and liberals declare that the values that determine who is to succeed in international contentions are moral and spiritual values. This we deny. Of what use is it to the Austrian Germans that they possess a higher culture than all the other Austrians? If, instead of amounting to 35% of the population, the German element in Austria were 65%, it would be the ruling power of the nation. Austria would then be a homogeneous national state, and the other races making up the remaining 35%, would then be forced to remain silent, as is the case with the Alsacians and Poles in the German Empire.

“An estimate of the Russian population that seems very reasonable puts it at 175 million inhabitants. Of these, 70%, or 120 million, are Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians (Little Russians). As long as we remain as numerous as we are, Russia remains Russian. But suppose that, as a consequence of revolution or of a disastrous war—and such things may happen to any state—the White Russians and the Ukrainians (the writer always says Little Russians) cast off their quality of being Russians and declare themselves to be a White Russian and a Ukrainian nation? For us that would mean a loss of 35 million inhabitants; and then the Russian element would constitute a minority in the Russian state. To prevent this we must take steps in advance to prevent the Ukrainians from deserting the Russian cause. Russian diplomacy was guilty of a fatal error in the 1772 Partition of Poland. We should have ceded to Austria, instead of Eastern Galicia, what is now Russian Poland. Austria and Russia might then have been friends and both profited by conditions in the Balkan Peninsula. But as that was not the thing that happened, we are now enemies. The four million Ruthenians in Galicia and Bukowina are now often called the Piedmont of the Little Russian national renaissance. A new nation is being born—the Ukrainian. It would be a veritable ostrich policy to deny the danger that is thus made to threaten the unity of Russia. Evi-

dently Austria has been no reason to be afraid, for we know that a revolution would break out in Galicia, if Austria should favor the russophile agitation being carried on there.”’

Mr. Revjuk continues: "There is a little band of Galician Ukrainians whose object it is to achieve a cultural, and, if possible, a political union with the Russian people. They are a Panslavic party and a rather curious one. They insist that the Ukrainian language is simply a Russian dialect and is fit only to be spoken by the lower classes. They call themselves Russians, not Ukrainians. At present they are very insignificant, drawing their sustenance from semi-official Russian sources. And this is the party the Polish aristocratic section has been using as a tool against the Ukrainian parties.

‘But the Russian conception of conditions in Austria is exactly paralleled by the Austrian notion of conditions in Russia,’ the Russian publicist continues. ‘We cannot stand by idly when we behold our 28 million Little Russians slowly but surely imbibing, from Galicia, the doctrine that they are not Russians. That is the kernel of the Russo-Austrian difficulty. And as there is absolutely no hope that either Russia or Austria will alter its position, the state of affairs is truly tragical. Under these circumstances even the love of peace evinced by the two nations is likely to have but little weight.’

“At least this is rather frank statement”, Mr. Revjuk comments on the above.

“But the Russian desire to hold Eastern Galicia was even more clearly expressed in the Russian newspapers in the years 1908—1914. *Sviet*, *Kiyevlanin*, and, particularly, *Novoye Vremya*, have been calling for a conquest of Galicia for the last six years. These periodicals have been openly maintaining, particularly after the outbreak of the Balkan Crisis in 1912, that the Eastern Galician Ruthenian territory is a Russian country, which must be liberated from the Austrian tyranny. “We forgot,” says a number of *Novoye Vremya* in the Fall of 1912, “when we began the fight for an ‘All-Russian Empire,’ that four millions of Russians are languishing under a heavy foreign yoke.” All that this means

is that the four million Austrian Ruthenians (Little Russians or Ukrainians) should, in the interests of the Russian Panslavic movement, be deprived of the possibilities of working forward towards a national Ukrainian culture which have been granted them under the Austrian constitution. They must be brought under the Great Russian scepter, must be forbidden to be anything else than Great Russians, and, like the Russian Ukrainians, must be deprived of all their schools, when they teach the mother-tongue, lose their free press and their right of association, together with all the other national liberties they have obtained in Austria.

“If it were only the party of the Right in Russia that was filled with the ambition that all Slavic streams might join in one great Russian river, as the Russian poet Pushkin once expressed it so prettily, Prince Kropotkin would be perfectly right in reassuring us on the subject of Russian desire for territorial expansion, and in warning us only against that of the Germans. For we all like to believe that the future (how remote, we cannot as yet say) will make of the Russian people also, a nation governed in accordance with democratic principles, and that Russian conservatism will lose its power—in that we are all agreed. But it is unfortunately not true that the Russian liberal parties are less Panslavic and less imperialistic than the Russian reaction, with the possible exception of the Kropotkin type of liberals, which is not likely to get much encouragement from the Russian foreign policy of the next half-century. A non-Russian who has watched the training of the Russian Left since the 1905 Revolution, into an imperialistic party, cannot but be surprised at the rapid development of this change. The most typical case of this shift is shown by the way in which the political writer Peter Struve, after having devoted himself to an international radicalism during his life as an *émigré* in Paris, turned his back on those principles and was converted to a sort of liberalism of the Right wing after his return to Russia.

“Of course there is a reason for everything. The Russian Revolution of 1905—1907 awakened the many different races of the Russian Empire to an independent life. Previously, the Poles and the Finns had been the only ones to demand self-government from Russia, with no manner

of guardianship either on the part of the Great Russian official class or of the Great Russian revolutionary party. But in 1905, the Jews, Tartars, Letts, Lithuanians, White Russians and Ukrainians became articulate and asked for self-government: for their own schools, legislative representatives and officials. The ideas of the Ukrainian historian and socialistic statesman M. Dragomanov now made many converts among the various nations of the Russian Empire. 'The Russian Empire,' says Dragomanov, 'must become a sort of United States of free and equal races.'

"Now what was the attitude of the Great Russians to this request? When Prince Kropotkin says, that 'full autonomy for all the lands constituting the Russian Empire was one of the main planks of the liberal platform' of 1905, I must beg permission to point out that such was not the case. The liberalism of the Great Russians did not extend so far. And how could it, or can it, go to the length of relinquishing the Great Russian nationalistic ideal—unless we are ready to believe that morally speaking the Great Russian people are on a higher plane than all other peoples. No great nation has hitherto assumed an attitude of real justice toward its neighbors, merely because it has obtained a legislative body.

"Great Russian liberalism soon awoke to the fact that one is first a Russian and then a Liberal. The Great Russian social-democratic party does not propose as part of its platform to grant autonomy to the Ukraine. And yet the Ukraine is a country that was never conquered by Russia, but which, in 1654, entered into a union with Russia, a union which even the Russian authority on jurisprudence, Sergejevich, has distinctly declared to have been a "personal" union. This Ukrainian country has, during the past two centuries, been systematically deprived of every liberty, down to the very privilege of making use of their own language. And the result is that in certain districts in the Ukraine there are now fewer elementary schools than there were two hundred years ago.

"The right wing of the constitutional democratic party in Russia is hostile to Ukrainian autonomy. In fact, some of the liberal members of the Dume have gone so far as to take repeated trips to Eastern Galicia for the purpose of carrying on propaganda there for the annexation of the country to Russia. On the occasion of such a visit to Bukovina, Count Bobrinski, member of the Rus-

sian national party of the Right, representative in the Duma, and correspondent of the Times, was ordered to leave the country; he had nevertheless succeeded in establishing relations with several persons who later (in 1913) were in the prisoners' pen at Lemberg, accused of espionage. Stakhevich, a liberal member of the Russian Duma, while on such a mission in Eastern Galicia, managed to get a sound thrashing at the hands of the peasants. At the last espionage trial at Lemberg, which took place in the Spring of 1914, a number of Duma members and newspaper men attended among the audience, paying close attention to the proceedings; after they had returned home, they contributed to the Russian Liberal sheets of the Right, asserting that if the Polish judges at Lemberg should find the accused guilty, the Polish nation might expect to pay for it at Warsaw.

“All these incidents, including the ceaseless accusations of spying for the Russians, which were made against so many persons in Cracow, Przemyśl, Lemberg, and Czernowitz during the years 1908—1914, as well as the trial for High Treason in Northern Hungary, from which a very distinct trail led to Russia, sufficiently prove that the official organ of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the *Fremdenblatt*, was not far wrong in writing, as it did a few years ago, with its eye very evidently on Russia: the hand that tries the lock on the door of the Austrian State, must expect to meet with preventive blows.”

So much for Mr. Revjuk's, the Ukrainian's, remarks on Kropotkin's letter to me.

Just before I wrote these lines, there appeared in the journal *Social-Demokraten* (October 29) another letter from Kropotkin, this time “To a Swedish Lady, with the writer's permission to print”. I shall quote here those parts of this letter that deal with the Russian danger for Sweden, and with those forces in the Russian community that, in Kropotkin's opinion, neutralize this danger. The extreme vagueness and weakness of the whole course of its reasoning, as well as the striking lack of any information on the subject, appears, to my mind, to render an exhaustive comment unnecessary.

“I am well aware,” says Kropotkin, “that in Sweden people are wondering whether a defeated Germany would not strengthen Russia's power overwhelmingly, and thus encourage the latter country to give free rein to its

desires of conquest in the north of Sweden and Norway, in order to obtain a seaport on the Atlantic Ocean.

“Of course I have now been long absent from Russia, and it is therefore impossible for me to assert that no such plans have ever been under consideration in government circles. But this much I am sure of: that I have never known the thing to be spoken of as a future possibility, either in the press or in private conversation.

“Yet I must admit that such fears in Sweden are a very natural outcome of the attitude during the last quarter of a century by Russia towards Finland. This attitude must have seemed so incomprehensible in Sweden, as far as its reasons were concerned, and so ridiculous in its consequences—and quite opposed, among other things, to Russia’s best interests also—that the only explanation people were able to offer was, that Russia’s object was to make of Finland a basis of operations for an attack on Sweden.

“But for us, who know very well that at the same time an entirely similar procedure, every bit as stupid and just as harmful for Russia’s real interests, was being adopted toward Poland, toward the Georgians and Caucasia in general, toward the Little Russians and the Jews, and for those among us who know that Pobiedonostsheff, the adviser of Alexander III and Nicholas II, practically uttered threats against Protestant Finland (for in his eyes Protestantism was equivalent to heresy, as he recognized only such ecclesiastic authority as was vested in a church with a personal head)—for us who are, alas! too well aware of this, the government’s attitude toward Finland has been one ineluctable detail in its general reactionary policy.

“But we also know that this policy is in such violent opposition to the views of the people as well as to those of the cultured classes, not to mention the true interests of Russia herself, that it can endure only as long as the bureaucratic government and its head continue to dictate the laws of the country. As soon as the government is actually handed over to the control of a national legislature, the persecutions of the non-Russian nationalities will of course cease immediately.

“Russia must either achieve a federal state organization, like that of Canada, or resembling the relation between England and her independent colonies, or the same dissolution awaits it that awaits Turkey.

“I am not alone in this belief. I believe I may safely say that it is a pretty general one among all those who are well acquainted with Russia and who do not permit themselves to be deceived by the ideas of imperialistic unity, which have been emanating from Germany since 1871. As an indication that this really is a characteristic Russian view, I may mention that when the calling of a national assembly began to be discussed in 1881, Grand Duke Constantine proposed a plan for a federal government with seven parliaments, one for each section of the country (Poland, Finland, Caucasia, North Russia, Central Russia, Southern Russia, Siberia).

I am not a parliamentarian, but it is nevertheless my belief that in the near future Russia will move in the direction of some such political system. In view of the gigantic problems of internal administration that will remain to be solved, such a system will doubtless afford very little opportunity for the development of any lust for conquest.”

We Swedes are here expected to console ourselves with the empty phrase, that “the government’s attitude toward Finland has been one ineluctable detail in its general reactionary policy”, and with the equally empty phrase that “as soon as the government is actually handed over to the control of a national legislature, the persecutions of the non-Russian nationalities will of course cease immediately.” It is very difficult to understand how the implacable opponent of all parliamentarism, the anarchist Kropotkin, can, in the face of all our experience, be so certain that a Russian “national assembly” will not enforce a reactionary policy, and will not „persecute” the non-Russian nationalities.” This may very well depend on what “nationality” has a majority in the “national assembly”, and what views this majority nationality holds with regard to its own welfare, its own power, its own culture, etc., as compared with the welfare and the continuance of the entire empire.

No—Kropotkin is quite right; he is not a “parliamentarian”.

*

In connection with Professor Vinogradoff’s remarks on “the independence of the Press” in Russia, Mr. Revjuk begs leave to communicate the following statistics, copied

from the trade journal of Russian newspaper men, the "Journalist" of St. Petersburg. They give the number of fines imposed each year, and the aggregate sums thus collected each year, in Russia, for censorship offenses, in the years following the introduction of "freedom of the press" in 1905.

Year	Number of Fines	Sum of fines in roubles.
1906	16	15,525
1907	148	65,000
1908	120	82,000
1909	182	87,000
1910	243	60,000
1911	268	73,000
1912	317	96,000
1913	362	139,000
Grand Total:		1,656 fines, amounting to 617,525 roubles.

While the Russia of the old régime made use of measures of suppression against the uncomfortable newspaper press, "constitutional" Russia resorts to the modern capitalistic plan of destroying the undesirables by sufficiently severe fines—presenting a practically uninterrupted increase from 1906 to 1913. In this same period of years, 218 publications were confiscated, 63 editors were arrested, and 20 newspaper offices were closed by order of the government (information furnished by Mr. Revjuk).

THE UKRAINE, POLAND, AND THE GREAT RUSSIANS.

The vast aggregation of human beings living in the Russian Empire was estimated, at the beginning of the year 1913, at 172 millions, increasing at the rate of about 2 millions annually*. Ethnographically, this huge mass is distributed among some fifty races and tribes** Taking into account only eight of the more numerous and, culturally as well as socially speaking, the more important of these tribes of the Russian Empire, the numerical representation of each, as obtained from various sources, appears to be (for the beginning of 1913):

Nationalities	Absolute number (in millions)	Percentage of total population
Great Russians	72	41.8%
White Russians	8	5.0
Ukrainians	32	18.5
Poles	12.5	7.1
Jews	6	3.4
Lithuanians	4	2.2
Finns	8	5.0
Germans	2	1.2
Turks and Tartars	18	10.4
Other tribes	9.5	5.4
Grand Total	172.0 millions or	100.0%

Among the "other tribes" in the table are the Armenians, Mongolians, and the various races of the Caucasus, as well as communities belonging to smaller ethnic groups.

* According to Otto Hoetzsch, *Russland, Eine Einfuehrung auf Grund seiner Geschichte von 1904 bis 1912*, Berlin 1913, p. 15.

** *Op. cit.*, p. 18. Besides Hoetzsch and *The Statesman's Year-Book*, see particularly Rudnitsky, *Ukraine und die Ukrainer*, Vienna 1914.

The Great Russians therefore do not constitute a numerical majority of the population of the empire which, chiefly on the basis of conquests, has been built up by them. They make up hardly more than two-fifths. But together with the Ukrainians ("Little Russians") and the White Russians they amount to a majority of nearly two-thirds (really 65%) of the entire population.

The country of the Ukrainians is the great district in southern Russia that lies east of Poland, Austria, and Bessarabia, extending, in that direction, to the River Don and then including a large section east of the Sea of Azoff, while its northern boundary reaches as far up as to the latitude of Warsaw. The White Russians live to the northwest of the Ukrainian domain, between it and the lands of the Letts and Lithuanians. It is only after we have emerged to the eastward of these territories, that we enter the real country of the Great Russians, extending into the very heart of Asia, straddling the Ural Mountains, as it were.

Now, whether Russia is to remain what it is, namely, a Great Russian state, governed solely by the Great Russians, with all the other races under a more or less irksome yoke; or whether Russia is to become a state of practically equal nationalities, with a control over the central political power distributed among them in proportion to their population; the question of the relative position of the Great Russians and the Ukrainians cannot fail to have a decisive influence on the stability and integrity of the Russian state, both as regards internal and external affairs. A glance at the table of nationalities will show that it is not by a union with the Poles, but by a union with the Ukrainians, and no others, that the Great Russians must seek to obtain control of a majority, a thing which is of the utmost importance in despotic as well as in parliamentary governments, but which has a final and unlimited power in a parliamentary system.

Hitherto the question as to the internal relations of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians has been solved in a very simple manner—namely, by a systematic attempt, on the part of the Great Russians, to wipe out the Ukrainian nationality, by force, and to absorb it in the great mass of the Great Russians. The very existence of a Ukrainian people side by side with the Great Russians, has been officially denied by the latter—in spite of the

testimony of political history, *kulturgeschichte*, and anthropology. Yet, in the course of this war the Ukrainians have themselves taken steps to bring the matter of their political relations with the Great Russians into general view. It is evident that the Ukraine neither wishes, nor can it afford, to content itself, in the future, with its present oppressed condition within the Russian state, or with the prevailing Great Russian attitude of intolerant exclusion of all the national Ukrainian culture.

As it is being asserted in English circles, that "Russia is not so black as she is painted," and that "Russia is going to turn a new leaf," and as Russian Liberals and even a large number of Russian revolutionists are joining loudly in this chorus of praises of the Russian "conversion", it is the duty of such Europeans as wish, in this question, to form their judgment in accordance with the state of "things", not of "sounds",* to examine with the utmost caution what has been the attitude of the Russian Liberals, and of the other "coming men" in Russia, with regard to this Ukrainian question, and how the latter has been progressing.

May we expect "democracy and freedom" for the Ukraine? At the present moment this question is a far more important one to put to the conscience of the "converted Russian nation than that of the "democracy and freedom" of Poland and Finland, however important these questions may also be. For it is going to cost a great deal more of moral conviction on the part of the Great Russians to do justice to the Ukraine, than to do justice to Poland and Finland.

As very little study has hitherto been devoted to the Ukrainian question outside of Russia and Austria, I shall here reproduce a number of papers having a direct bearing on the World War, which, together with the bibliography given in the footnote** below, which Mr. Revjuk

* Professor Steffen uses these two English words, as well as the two English sentences quoted in the same paragraph — Translator.

** 1) Bibliography. — E. Reclus, *Géographie universelle*, vol. V, pp. 442-558; M. Hrushevsky, *Lillryssarna*, in the large work *Ryssland skildrat av ryssar* (in Swedish); Helholt, *Weltgeschichte*, vol. V.; H. Hjaerne, *Den lillryska nationalitetsroerelsen* in his large Swedish work *Oestani-fran*; O. Hoetzsch, *Die Ukrainische Frage* in his *Russland*; R. Sembratowycz, *Le Tsarisme et l' Ukraine*; W. Kuschnir, *Der Neopanslavismus*; L. Kulczycki, *Geschichte der russischen Revolution*; *Les Annales des nationalités*, 1913,

has been so kind as to place at my disposal, will enable the reader to acquire sufficient information on this subject to form a judgment of his own.

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In Vienna there has been appearing, since the middle of September, a periodical called "Ukrainische Nachrichten", which seems to be the organ of a political organization for the object of utilizing the opportunities that may be afforded by the present war, for gaining political independence for the Ukrainian people, possibly in a sort of "personal union with Austria, and on the basis of a democratic construction of society. The larger note in the general political situation would be the fact that a free Ukraine, united and powerful, would best conserve the interests of Austria and Germany, as well as of all southern and western Europe, by acting as a buffer-state against the purely Great Russian power, which would continue no matter what might be the outcome of the war.

In an appeal "to the public opinion of Europe", the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" declares that there is no such thing as panslavism, but that the existence of panmuscovitism, i. e., a Great Russian imperialism is beyond a shadow of doubt. It sails under the false flag of "Panslavism", but in reality aims at a systematic and entirely unscrupulous subordination of all the other Slavic nations under the Great Russian people. One of the cleverest moves in this Great Russian imperialistic program, will be to cut off the Ukrainians who live within the boundaries of the Austrian Empire (the Ruthenians) from any organic political connection with Austria, and then to unite them with the Russian

no. 3 and 4; G. Sands, Ukraine; K. Leuhner, Das Ende der polnischen Staatsidee, in Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1908, Heft 10; Ed. Hartmann, Bismarck ueber den Brieg mit Russland und die Selbstaeendigkeit der Ukraine, in Die Gegenwart (1883 or 1884); M. Dragomanov, La Littérature ukrainienne; Brockhaus' Lexikon, Die kleinrussische Literatur, Taras Schevtschenko, der groesste Dichter der Ukraine; A. Jensen, Ukrajna's nationalskald, Finsk Tidskrift, H. V. T. LXII; Bodenstedt, Die poetische Ukraine: Javorskyj, Das Urteil der zivilisierten Welt ueber den Ukas 1876 (by which ukase Ukrainian literature was absolutely prohibited in the Russian Empire from 1876 to 1905); N. Bilachevsky, The Peasant Art of the Ukraine, Special Autumn Number of the "Studio", 1912.

Ukrainians—rather, to draw them away from their present comparative state of freedom, in order to bestow upon them exactly the same degree of oppression as is now the all too generous portion of the Russian Ukrainians.

The appeal points out that a directly opposite development must take place, if the liberty of the Ukrainian nation, and therefore, in the long run, the best interests of Europe, are to profit. “Unless the Ukrainian provinces are separated from Russia, even the most crushing defeat for that country will be but a feeble blow, from which Czarism would recover in a few years, to take up again its ancient role of a disturber of the peace of Europe. Only a free Ukraine, which should be supported by the Triple Alliance, could form, with its extensive domain, reaching from the Carpathians to the Don and to the Black Sea, the necessary protective wall between Europe and Russia, a bulwark that would defeat for ever the greed for expansion on the part of Czarism, and free the Slavic world from the baleful influence of panmuscovitism.”

The proclamation in which the “League for the Liberation of the Ukraine” introduces itself to Europe runs as follows:

“The domain on both sides of the Austro-Russian boundary that is inhabited by Ukrainians has become a theater of war in which decisive battles are being fought, and, what is more important, it is this land that is the bone of contention between these two belligerents.

“The Ukrainians may rightly maintain that this war is really being fought to determine their fate, i. e., to determine, whether the Ukrainian Piedmont, the place of refuge for our national life under the sceptre of Austria, is to be destroyed, or whether our national life is to flourish on the other side of the Zbrucz also, far beyond the banks of the Dnieper, and along the shores of the Black Sea. The Ukrainians who are enslaved in Russia cannot and should not be mere passive spectators of this conflict. They are raising their voices loudly and distinctly in demanding the right of national independence that is theirs.

“Historical necessity implacably demands that an independent Ukrainian state should arise between Europe and Russia. Only by this means can the peace of Europe be assured and long maintained. The erection of this Ukrainian nation is a necessary condition for the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for enabling the German people, in the nation on the Danube as well

as in the German Empire itself, to pursue their normal development. And for the Ukrainian people it means the fulfilment of their dreams and longings for many centuries.

“When the Russian Ukrainians had become thoroughly aware of this, they formed a general national organization, “The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine” which aims to achieve the national-political and social-economic ambitions that are common to all the Ukrainian people in Russia.

“Within this League are represented all the political currents, united in demanding the political independence of the Ukrainian people. The League hopes to see its desires materialized through a victory of the Central Powers over the Empire of the Czar.

“The independent realm of the Ukraine must be a constitutional, consistently democratic monarchy with a single legislative assembly, with all civil, national, and other rights, and with their own national church.

“If only a portion of the country occupied by the Ukrainian people is freed from Russian despotism, the League shall attempt to weld together the entire national Ukrainian territory that will then be under Austria’s control, into a single self-governing state.

“Simultaneously with the erection of the independent Ukrainian state, will proceed the introduction of far-reaching agrarian reforms in the interest of the peasants.

“The practical problems the Ukrainian League has to solve, are so manifold, that nothing more than a general indication is here possible. In order to secure active support for their demands, the League has undertaken the formation of national-political organizations in the Russian Ukraine. As soon as Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Austro-Hungarian army, the League shall introduce its national-political organization in the conquered dominion. Preparations must therefore be made for the summoning of a national congress, to decide on the political institutions of the state, to replace the institutions formerly administered by Russia, as well as on agrarian reforms, etc. The League shall look after the interests of the Ukrainian people, and represent their interests (national-political) before foreign governments and international conferences, and by their publications, communications, etc., shall secure due publicity for the Ukrainian Freedom Movement among the European peoples.

“The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine” is in constant communication with the Austrian Ukrainians.

“While the Ukrainians hope for a victory of the Austro-Hungarian and German arms over Russia, they also hope for a time when a free and independent Ukraine shall grow out of the ruins of the Russian Empire, that burial-ground of many nations.”

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Mr. Emil Revjuk has published a number of interesting articles on the Ukrainian question in various Swedish newspapers and periodicals. I here quote the following extract from a contribution to *Dagens Nyheter*:

“The Ukrainian people, called Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia, and “Little Russians” in the Russian Empire, is the purest branch of the Eastern Slavic Race, and is therefore more closely related to the Teutons than are the Great Russians, who are blended with the Tartars. The “Little Russian” territory extends from the Carpathians, from a point almost exactly opposite the fortress of Pzremysl, and from the River Prut, to the Western tip of the Caucasus and to the River Donetz, thus including, between the Black Sea on the South and the River Pripet and the River Desna on the North, all of Russia’s most fruitful soil, its greatest coal-mines and richest deposits of iron-ore, together with a Ukrainian population of more than 30 million. The most important occupation in this country is agriculture, supplying a number of Europe’s manufacturing nations with their wheat, by way of Odessa. Factory industry can here flourish only in certain isolated places, and has therefore not yet attained the full measure of its development. This is due in part to the railroad tariffs of the Russian Empire, which favor the Great Russian industrial centres at the expense of those of the Ukraine. At the present writing the Ukraine nevertheless furnishes more than half of Russia’s coal and iron. Its industrial laboring classes, now constituting about 4 per cent. of the population, have been partially russified, partly because of an immigration of proletarian elements from Great Russia, and partly because of municipal life, which is of course Great Russian in character, with the result that Kieff, Odessa, Katerynoslav, and Charkov seem stamped with Great Russian characteristics.

“Even the great landed proprietors in the Ukraine have been considerably denationalized: russified on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, and polonized on the western. It has always been the rule for a subject people in Europe to lose its aristocracy. But the peasant class, or about eighty per cent. of the population, is Ukrainian, as it was in the eighteenth century, when the Ukrainian Hetmanship (Hauptmannschaft) constituted a self-governing country, united in alliance with Russia, but not a Russian province. The Ukrainian peasant and small burgher differ considerably in appearance, language, mode of life, and ethnical character, from the corresponding classes in Russia.

“Agriculture, as practiced in the Ukraine, is, in the judgement of specialists, in general on a higher plane than in any other part of Russia. Domestic industries have also attained a very characteristic and enviable position. In a work on the colonization of Canada, Professor Philipovich, a German of liberal views, without any particularly Slavic sympathies, designates the Galician Ruthenians as bearers of culture, a view that has found corroboration in the Canadian press. It should be noted here that the Galician farm laborers who come to Sweden are not Ruthenians, but Poles, of a class that is by no means representative of the peasant culture of the Poles.

“The right of the Ukrainian language to a separate existence, which has often been questioned in the past for political reasons, has now been acknowledged even by an official Russian source. In answer to a request made by the Russian government, for information as to whether the Ukrainian language, which had been forbidden in Russia since 1867, and therefore was printed only in the “Austrian Ukraine,” should be again freed from restrictions, the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences declared, among other things, that “their historical conditions had not created, for the Great and Little Russians, any common language,” and that the Little Russian people should therefore have as much right as the Great Russian to use their mother-tongue in print and in public affairs.

“The first Ukrainian-Little-Russian state was founded by Swedish Vikings in Kieff about the year 900. This city became for the Poles what Rome had been for the Germans’, says the Polish historian Zakrzewski, and for Scandinavia it was the most important connecting link with the old Byzantine civilization. Here there arose a

Russian literature, in which the Old Russian character found its first and definitive expression. And it is not the least of the merits of the later North Russian literature, to have preserved to posterity the culture of the more varied and gifted Kieff epoch.

“Kieff, ‘mother of Russian cities’, was swallowed up about 1240 by the incessant beating of the Mongol tide as it swept on from inner Asia. The state collapsed before the Tartar invasion, and in the middle of the fourteenth century the last of the Little Russian principalities (Halicz, Eastern Galicia), was conquered by Poland. At the same epoch that saw the union of the Scandinavian nations realized in the Treaty of Colmar, there was formed a Polish-Lithuanian-Little-Russian union in Eastern Europe. But this state federation was destroyed by religious dissension: the Poles were Catholics, the Ukrainians were Orthodox, and *de facto*, if not legally, only the former had any political rights. The consequence of this was that the Little Russian aristocracy was gradually catholicized and polonized. The Little Russian peasant class became serfs to the Polish proprietors. After many unsuccessful uprisings, they finally succeeded, under the leadership of the hetman Chmelnytsky, famous for the part he plays in the history of Charles X Gustavus, and with the aid of the Ukrainian cossacks, in obtaining their freedom (1648). The Ukraine became an independent republic, and only Eastern Galicia remained Polish. In 1654 Chmelnytsky laid the foundations of Russia as a great power by uniting his country with the Muscovites. Again, owing to the influence of Kieff, a wave of Western Civilization swept over northern Russia. The so-called Mohylev Academy was an outpost of Western Civilization that was strongly influenced by Polish culture. The foundations of Russian learning were practically laid here, at a time when Moscow was still in the semi-Tartar stage. Peter the Great formed a sort of scientific general staff of the teachers in this Academy which was to be of great importance in his labor of reform.

“Chmelnytsky also maintained relations with other European states besides Sweden. Cromwell, for instance, was made interested in the new Ukrainian republic, and English newspapers of that period warned against a union with the Czar, who surely would never keep his word with regard to self-government for Little Russia. Chmelnytsky sought in vain to save his country by alliances with Po-

land and Sweden, and under his successors, the Ukraine, notwithstanding a number of rebellions, soon lost all its independence. Mazeppa's unsuccessful attempt to re-establish the Ukraine by entering into a treaty with Charles XII and gaining the support of Poland, finally sealed the country's fate. At Poltava and Perevolotsna, the Muscovites gained access not only to the Baltic, but to the Black Sea also.

"In the general renaissance of national ambitions after the fall of Napoleon, political and social aspirations in the Ukraine also received a new lease of life. The re-awakened Ukrainian literature produced its first masterpiece in Kotlarevsky's travesty on the Aeneid (1789), to which Alfred Jensen has devoted an interesting study; but its master is the poet Taras Shevchenko (whose work was written in the forties), who labored, among other things, for the abolition of serfdom: The Austrian government rewarded his literary efforts in Little Russian by ten years of hard labor in the Siberian penal colonies. In 1864 Ukrainian literature was partially prohibited, and this prohibition was made still more severe in 1876. After the unsuccessful Japanese War these restrictions were abolished and even Little Russian newspapers are now occasionally met with, although the authorities make life as difficult for them as they can.

"There is no political life to speak of in the Ukraine until after the Russo-Japanese War: before that, the reaction had made any kind of political agitation impossible. In fact, in considering the compass of the political movement, we must constantly remember that conditions here are entirely different from those of Western Europe. In a country like Russia, where only 30 per cent. of the people can read and write, and 86 per cent. are peasants that have had only fifty years of liberty from serfdom, in which arbitrary officials are omnipotent and political offenders may be put to the torture—in such a country political agitation is no easy matter. It has been hard enough for Finland and Poland to save their cultures from the centralizing ambitions of Russia. How much more difficult has it been for the Ukrainians to reinvigorate their political life after it has been killed by the russification of their upper classes! And we must not overlook the difference in the length of the period that the three countries have been subject to Russian rule: Finland since 1809, Poland since 1772, the Ukraine since 1654.

“In the eyes of the Russian Right the Ukrainian movement is socialism pure and simple; the Left regards it as a purely brain-born movement without any roots in the broader classes of the common people. „Mazeppism”, for so the Ukrainian renaissance is called in Russian political slang, has been under discussion since the convocation of the First Duma. At that time, some forty members from the Ukraine formed a separate group, one of whose demands was autonomy for the Ukraine. So, in the 1912 elections, the Ukrainian parties entered the fray under the watchword of national autonomy, weakened as they had been by the general reaction in 1907. Stolypin’s well-known ‘election reforms’ not only decimated the number of Polish representatives, but made it absolutely impossible for the Little Russian rural communities to elect any representatives on a national platform in the Third and Fourth Dumas, in which, however, by the activity of the Left and Right representatives from the Ukraine, the Ukrainian question was not permitted to die. Particularly in the last two years, it has been a subject of frequent heated and ineffective discussion.—”

From an unusually stimulating article by Mr. Revjuk on the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko (in *Smalands Folkblad*, May 11, 1914), I quote the following lines:

“The independence of the Ukraine! That would mean nothing less than a cutting in half of the Russian Empire, but now the Empire uses one half of all the taxes derived from the Ukrainian governments to the advantage of the Russian governments. It would mean the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the schools, in the administration, but now even the children in the elementary schools of the Ukraine receive only Russian instruction. Only eight years have passed since permission was given by St. Petersburg to issue political newspapers in the Ukrainian language. It was the Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905 that gave us a Ukrainian press. Indeed, the independence of the Ukraine means the greatest possible defeat for the Russian bureaucracy, which has been governing the country for 200 years without any supervision or responsibility.

“It would also put a very ignominious end to the career of the Ukrainian aristocracy, which, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has succeeded in acquiring more Russian chauvinism than the Great Russians

themselves. They have accepted the Russian language, banished their old mother-tongue, even gradually driving it out of schools, and then they have taken pay for this work of civilization. The family of the Czar, and the aristocrats that once had been Ukrainian but now had become thorough Russians, divided up among them the finest and largest estates in the Ukraine. As a climax to this task, the once free country accepted the institution of bondage in 1764 from the hands of the Empress Catharine II. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this period seemed so remote that only the poets could see the evil of it. Shevchenko was one of the first to describe it as a burning national and social injustice, and to treat it from the standpoint of one who had himself suffered under it. He called shame by its name and stamped treachery as such. The national death which the Russian culture has always desired and continues to desire for the 28 million Ukrainians, he designated as a crime against the majesty of nature and of history, for the two peoples neither wish, nor are they able to, speak the same language or have the same views of life and institutions.

“The Ukrainian national character differs as much from the Russian as does its southern climate and nature from that of northern Russian. The Ukrainians are considerably fonder of liberty, artistically more gifted, and possess an older and more independent peasant culture than do the Russians. But the latter are stronger in the economic and executive fields. They can colonize and control any kind of foreign territory. Witness the conquest of Siberia. In reality the Russians got half of their culture from us. It came to us from Greece (Byzantium) a thousand years ago; it was we who passed it on, together with Greek Christianity, to the Russian lands that lay to the north. The Russian race at that time received large accessions of Ukrainian blood, at the moment when the Swedes were journeying in the Eastways and granting assistance both to the Russian North (Novgorod) and the Ukrainian South, organizing, in the latter, its first state (Kieff). The influences from Sweden and Greece, these the Ukrainians have had together with the Russians. But then the culture of the two nations developed along very different lines. The lot of the Russians was cast with the Tartars, that of the Ukrainians with the Poles; the western and eastern influences have not been obliterated among us, in spite of the fact that now the same Rus-

sian officials rule over the people of both Poland and the Ukraine.

“It was Shevchenko who best showed the Ukrainians that they were a nation, and not a province among many others, that the Ukrainian language was a distinct and independent one, and not a mere dialect of the Russian, that the Ukraine can become a free and self-governing state, for it once was that for many centuries. Those who read his poems get the impression that the Ukraine was a Paradise before the Russians conquered the country, and that it would be splendid for the Ukraine to regain its independence, and quite feasible too. Therefore he had to be considered as a very ‘dangerous criminal’, and so he was declared to be by Russian justice in 1847, when the thirty-three year old poet and painter was sentenced to deportation for life as a soldier in the penal regiments of the Siberian army. ‘To be closely watched. Not to write or paint’, Czar Nicholas I wrote in his own hand on the decision of the court.

“But this could not have any permanent effect, for Shevchenko was not only a great recreator of his country, and a great artist, but in his poems there burns the same love for those that are oppressed as in all the great poets of the Russian Empire. He is as deeply interested in the past and future greatness of the Ukraine as in the wretched fate of those now living. He loves not only the Ukrainian; he loves also the old woman who drags herself to church with difficulty to offer prayer for her son in the army of the Czar. He loves his people, and as his people consists almost entirely of peasants, tenant farmers and laborers, he is a democrat. He is not blind to the servility of the lower classes, their lack of solidarity, their envious character. He does not flatter the lower classes, but he loves them, for he sees their sufferings with the eye of a brother, and he understands,—what greater artists with a fainter sense of justice are so seldom prepared to understand—that while the ‘people’ may not be so ‘clever’ or so handsome as their ‘masters’, they yet are—b e t t e r. If Shevchenko had not been the thoroughly good man he was, one might say that he hated the Ukrainian upper classes for their cowardly treachery and the ease with which they forgot their own and accepted Russian conditions in order that they might retain their ancient class privileges and obtain new ones in addition. He calls them the ‘thrales and offal of the Muscovite’, ‘Warsaw’s refuse.’ He cannot for-

get that they were instrumental in introducing serfdom in the Ukraine, when Catherine II undertook to do so. His own father felt the yoke of being a peasant serf, his brother and himself were ransomed from bondage with the aid of the St. Petersburg Art Academy, which recognized his artistic talent. And yet no personal grievance is felt in his verses. He understood better than many others that serfdom existed at the cost of the country's future, and this it was that pained him more than others."

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I have dwelt rather long on the Ukrainian question, because it illustrates the fact that the Russia that is now fighting 'for democracy and liberty,' 'for freedom', against 'barbarous' Germany, presents within its own boundaries other unsolved questions of democracy and liberty than the Finnish question, the Polish question, the Lettish question, the Jewish question, as well as the matters of the reform of the Russian bureaucracy and the uplifting of the entire Russian lower class to a normal European plane of liberty, wellbeing, civilization and culture.

As to the present state of the Polish question, it should suffice to reproduce here two documents. One is the Proclamation to the Poles issued by the Russian General-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich in the middle of August. The other is an interesting Polish answer to this astonishing proclamation.

The proclamation, in the German translation accessible to me, is as follows:

"The hour has struck for the fulfilment of the sacred dreams of your fathers and grandfathers! For one hundred and fifty years the Polish land has been dismembered, but its soul is not dead. It lived with the hope that one day the hour for the rebirth of the Polish people would strike, and that they might be united in fraternal friendship with mighty Russia. Russia's soldiers are bringing you a solemn assurance of this reconciliation. Perish the barriers that part the races of Poland! Unite, all of you, under the mighty scepter of the Czar! Under his scepter shall the rebirth of Poland's independence, of its religion and its language, take place. Russia awaits you with an open heart and extends a fraternal hand to greet you. Russia believes that the Polish sword, which smote the German

foe at Grunwald, has not yet grown rusty. From the Black Sea's strand to the northern seas of ice the Russian troops are approaching. A new dawn is breaking in your existence. And may the sign of the cross glow in this dawn, a symbol for the people's sufferings and for their final rebirth."

Stockholms Dagblad for October 27, under the heading "Polish Views", printed the following:

"Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich's three proclamations (to the Poles, to the Ruthenians, and to the nations of Austria-Hungary) have called forth an interesting answer from Polish quarters in the form of an open letter to the Grand Duke concerning the Slavic world and the position of the Russian Empire within it. The letter is too lengthy to be quoted in its entirety, but we shall give here a few extracts.

"We Poles—writes the author—have had the misfortune to feel the full significance of Russian domination, and in the course of our sufferings, filling more than a century, we have acquired a greater right than any others, to judge the proclamations recently issued in the name of the Czar.

"They are very tempting;—the Pole continues—they seem to imply a complete break with Russia's past and with her traditional policy. But can we put any faith in mere words without deeds, in a miracle presented without any evidence of this sudden benevolence? You proclaim for the Slavic peoples liberty and independence under the sceptre of the Czar, but are these notions in any way compatible with each other; are they not rather mutually exclusive? In the Proclamations we are assured that there is no such thing 'as prosperity and happiness for the Slavs outside of mighty Russia's open arms and motherly bosom,' but hitherto these arms have done nothing but crush the other Slavic nations in their embrace. The Czar is designated in the proclamations as a beneficent protector of the entire Slavic world, a defender of their liberty, he foists himself upon us without consulting those whom he wishes to protect; he is hardly the protector we have longed for, but rather a conqueror to be feared, all the more so since he has very recently evinced tendencies that are diametrically opposed to the upright benevolence that he now expresses.

"The Polish writer proceeds to prove that the testimony of history can hardly be appealed to, in order to substanti-

ate the statement that the Slavic idea has been the dominant motive in the policy of the Russian Empire. The ties of blood and of a community of interests between the Slavs of the west formed the basis of the Polish republic, which, as early as the fifteenth century constituted a free union between the Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian people, at a time when the Slavic idea was as yet undreamt of in the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Even after 1600, when the Servian Krysianicz, one of the pioneers of the Slavic idea, arrived at the Russian court, he was simply packed off to Siberia. For the Czars who governed all Russia, the guiding thought was one of absolute dominance over conquered peoples, Slavs or not Slavs, and this notion was pursued with great stubbornness and realized with much success. The Polish state was the first obstruction, and the Russian policy made common cause with those of Prussia and Austria to secure its destruction. Poland's internal affairs were interfered with in order to break up the Slavic unity by sowing seeds of national and religious discord. It was by no means a Slavic idea that produced the partition of Poland.

“Not until the nineteenth century—continues the historical exposition of this Polish writer—does the Slavic idea turn up as part of the equipment of the Russian policy. It became a battle-cry against all that was Western, and in its name a revolutionary propaganda was started in the neighboring states, Turkey and Austria. In the internal policy of Russia, however, the traditional theory of an absolute Great Russian control continued to prevail. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877—78, the Slavic colors were permitted gradually to fade, and the Great Russian ideal shone forth, with the taking of Constantinople as its goal. After Bulgaria had been liberated, and had had an opportunity to feel the administrative methods of the Russian representatives, Cherkaski and Kaulbars, that country had no further desire to become a Russian province or a devoted ally of the Russian Empire.

“After the partition of Poland, the assimilation of the races thus coming under Great Russian control, was pursued with much energy, chiefly with the idea of destroying their racial individuality. For the Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians there were no national rights, their languages were barely tolerated, being excluded from the schools and courts, their Catholic or Greek-United faith was discredited

or prohibited, and they were compelled to become Great Russians and Orthodox, often under threats of moral, intellectual, and economic disgrace.

“The author therefore points out that the guiding Russian principle has been that only the Orthodox Great Russians are really Slavs, that a Slavic union cannot be anything else than a Great Russian unit. The empire of the Czar must, by reason of all its history, its traditions, its entire social and political structure, be an opponent of the true Slavic idea, which implies a federation satisfying the individual ambitions of the various Slavic nations. It is in this very fact that the Polish correspondent finds the true reason for the hatred of the Great Russians toward Austria, which has granted to its Slavs (Poles, Ruthenians, Chechs, Croatians and others) what Russia has withheld from its own: respect for their national rights, language, and religion, as well as an autonomy that guarantees their national development. In the opinion of this Polish writer, it is Austria therefore, that has begun to realize the conception of a Slavic federation, and now the Great Russians are anxious to crush this confederation as they once did the similar Slavic union in the Polish state.

“Grand Duke Nicholas’ fine promises recall to the Polish writer all that Catherine II and Alexander I, in their day promised the Poles; promises that remained unfulfilled; and these promises were not given to pacify Polish rebellions: it was rather the rebellions that resulted from a failure to keep the promises. The Ruthenians (and this distinguishes them sharply from the Poles) of the United faith have never attempted any uprising, and yet until very recently they were subjected to the most galling religious persecutions, particularly in the government of Cholm. ‘A Poland living happily under the sceptre of the Czar would have smoothed the path of the Russians in approaching the Slavic world; now it lies like a corpse to obstruct them.’

“The Polish correspondent further reminds the Grand Duke of the promise, in his proclamation, that the ‘sacred dreams’ of the Poles, for the reestablishment of their country, were now to be realized. Yet he and his compatriots cannot forget—he says—that even very recently these dreams were being punished as high treason. Even the name ‘Kingdom of Poland’, guaranteed by treaties, was changed to ‘Province of Warsaw’. And as for the sug-

gested autonomy of Poland, our correspondent recalls the imperial decree reducing the number of Polish members of the Duma to one-third their former strength, after the representation had been proportioned, for two years, to the population. And this year the long-discussed modest request for a limited local self-government was refused, because it presented dangers to the unity of the empire, in that it partly granted the use of the Polish language in the debates on the floor, which language otherwise is prohibited in official life.

“The writer declares that the promises in the proclamation met with ‘a reserved, if not a cold, reception,’ in Poland, and he warns the Grand Duke to give evidence of this new policy of conciliation, by actual deeds. ‘We Poles are already too far disillusioned to fall for words without deeds. We have paid too heavily for our illusions in the past, and the hard lessons of history have taught us to resist the temptations contained in fair promises. To show gratitude for words that we have already heard often before, this would be servility. We have not yet descended to that level, in spite of the persecutions of centuries, and, by God’s help, we shall never descend so low.’

“Considerations of space forbid us to reproduce the Polish writer’s reflections on the fraternal offer made to the Ruthenians, which, he says, was issued shortly after the celebration of the national poet Shevchenko’s birthday had been prohibited, and at the very moment that ‘the Great Russian military machine was laying waste the Piedmont of the Ruthenians, in Galicia.’ Similarly the author dwells, finally, on the promises of liberty to the various nations of Austria-Hungary, promises that their ‘fairest dreams’ should be realized. He reminds us that after all, these nations of the Double Monarchy are already living under a constitutional régime, such as is entirely absent under the Russian absolutism. ‘Can you give away what you yourself have never had or known of?’ It is a lovely thing to liberate subject peoples, but the notion of a liberation accomplished in Austria by Russian arms the Polish correspondent declares to be far from lovely.

“The letter closes with a direct address to the signer of the three proclamations, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich.

“Your Highness! You have affixed your name to three historical documents. In them you have declared yourself

to be a zealous defender of justice and of the rights of oppressed nations. You have promised these nations, under the benevolent sceptre of the Czars, the liberty they have so long desired, which cannot mean less than a complete reconstruction of the foundations of the Russian Empire in the interests of the Slavs and of the entire world. If these intentions are honorable, your will firm, and these promises can be realized, posterity will bless your name, will venerate you as the arm of Providence, as one of the rare men who are the true honor and credit of humanity. But if, on the other hand, the documents you have signed are merely products of Greek-Byzantine art, which was the way the great French Emperor Napoleon had of putting it, to carry out the policy of Alexander I; if this is simply a move to make the war popular by a pretence of a historic mission, and to acquire allies with honeyed words, then, indeed, History shall place your name with those all too numerous names of traitors to the human race, of crafty statesmen who sowed falsehoods, who profited by falsehoods and, after the fashion of the Roman augurers, said to themselves: *Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur*. Your Highness! You have propounded an enigma to the world; the future shall solve it!"

It is words of this kind, if not a little stronger, that I expected to hear delivered from the lips of a Kropotkin. Instead of which Kropotkin, the great "revolutionist," strikes me as speaking very much as a Great Russian Nationalist of these days would speak. For Kropotkin, like the rest of them, describes the glories of Russian liberty as that nation promises them for the future. It is unfortunate that the anarchist, Prince Kropotkin, cannot promise them with the full measure of authority that is possessed by General-in-Chief Grand Duke Nicholas! And Kropotkin even grants the possibility that a victorious Russia might not make a reality of "democracy and freedom", but might have to be forced to take such steps. Now I really must ask: by whom? And with what likelihood of success? Is there the slightest probability that the 72 millions of Great Russians, after a Russian victory over Germany and Austria, would voluntarily relinquish the authority which they have so long wielded over all the other races of the Russian Empire,—including the other Slav ic peoples—?

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ERRATA.

- P. 5, l. 23. *For couse, read course.*
- „ 8, „ 11. *For ergarding, read regarding.*
- „ 11, „ 1. *Omit been.*
- „ 12, „ 13. *For Rusia, read Russia.*
- „ 13, „ 13. *Omit comma.*
- „ 13, „ 41. *For Dume, read Duma.*
- „ 15, „ 10. *After attitude, insert assumed.*
- „ 16, „ 5. *For fromm, read from.*
- „ 18, Table. *For Finss, read Finns.*
- „ 19, l. 23. *For bceome, read become.*
- „ 20, „ 25. *After nation, insert ”.*
- „ 21, „ 22. *After imperialism, insert comma.*
- „ 21, note, l. 1. *For G. Sands, read B. Sands;
for Leuhner, read Leuthner.*
- „ 21, note, l. 3. *For Brieg, read Krieg.*
- „ 22, l. 24. *For became, read become.*
- „ 25, „ 41. *Before This, insert ‘.*
- „ 26, „ 13. *For Colmar, read Calmar.*
- „ 27, „ 17. *For Austrian, read Russian.*
- „ 28, „ 20. *For or, read of.*
- „ 29, „ 24. *For Russian, read Russia.*
- „ 31, „ 35. *After reconciliation, insert period.*
- „ 33, „ 2. *After Empire, insert period.*
- Bibliography, P. I, French. *For Problème, read
Problème; for Ruthénes, read Ruthènes.*
- P. II. German. *For Zivilization, read Zivilisation.*
- P. III. Swedish. *For nationalskad, read national-
skald.*

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N. B. Arrangements have been made for publishing a
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**BOOKS ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION
TO BE OBTAINED FROM:**

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL,

83 Grand St., Jersey City, N. J.

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THE UKRAINE, reprint of a Lecture Delivered on Ukrainian History and Present-Day Political Problems by Bedwin Sands. London, 1914. (Illustrated).—Net \$0.50.

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THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS. By Stefan Rudnitsky, Ph. D. (With three maps). Jersey City, N. J.—Net \$0.25.

THE RUSSIAN PLOT TO SEIZE GALICIA (Austrian Ruthenia) by Vladimir Stepankovsky. Second edition enlarged. (With portraits and maps).—Net \$0.25.

The following publications on the Ukrainian question are being prepared:

RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE by Prof. Gustaf Steffen (translated from the Swedish).

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION by Edwin Björkman, Michael Hrushevsky, Prof. Otto Hoetzsch and others.

N. B. Besides those books, there have appeared during the present European war various publications on the Ukrainian question: in Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and many capitals of neutral states, in the following languages: English, German, Russian, French, Ukrainian, Italian, Hungarian, Bohemian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, Swedish and Turkish.
