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World Congress of Free Ukrainians: A Symbol of Unity and Freedom

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

AN AMERICAN ANSWER TO THE "50TH"— THE FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

By '

Lev E. Dobriansky

Georgetown University

DEDICATED TO ALL FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND HEROES
OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)

With an Introduction by

The Hon. Edward J. Derwinski,

Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress

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WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS: A SYMBOL OF UNITY AND FREEDOM

(EDITORIAL)

"...The President is well aware of the unique and positive contributions made by Americans of Ukrainian descent to the philosophic and economic well-being of our country. He asked me to extend his warmest wishes to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. This organization and the members which comprise it have greatly served the cause of human freedom..."

(Dr. William H. Crook, President Johnson's Special Representative at the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, November 18, 1967).

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, held on November 16-19, 1967, in New York City, was by all measures and definitions, an outstanding success not only for the Ukrainians living in the free world, but also for those held captive behind the Iron Curtain. In general, it was a triumph for freedom everywhere.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians was a timely and effective riposte to the prevailing confusion and hypocrisy that has accompanied the noisy 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution.

Regrettably, in many quarters of the free world many statesmen and writers glossed over the crimes of Russian Bolshevism in their enthusiastic messages of congratulation to the Moscow leaders. The Ukrainian conclave, however, went on record in exposing the blatant perfidy and oppression perpetrated by Communist Russia upon Ukraine and other captive non-Russian nations.

While many in the United Nations, tacitly if not explicitly, contend that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the right of self-determination have no application to the peoples ruled by Soviet Russian imperialism, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians voiced its strong opposition to this flagrant discrimination

against the people of Ukraine and others held in Soviet Russian enslavement.

Where many journalists in the free world treat the Soviet empire as a national entity whose integral unity must not be challenged or disturbed, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians reminded the world at large that the USSR is not a nation, but a prison of conquered nations, kept in abject subjugation by the most ruthless kind of imperialism and colonialism history has known.

UKRAINIAN UNITY: PREREQUISITE OF EFFECTIVE LIBERATION POLICY

From the internal Ukrainian viewpoint, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians attained a notable success in bringing together all Ukrainian political parties, groups and segments.

Ever since the fall of the Ukrainian independent state in 1920, the Ukrainian political forces, both in the homeland and abroad, have been waging a systematic albeit unequal struggle to restore the political and national independence of Ukraine. Between World War I and II and, especially, during World War II, the Ukrainians exerted great efforts to make their cause known in the outside world and to bring about the liberation of their country. This task was extremely difficult not only because of the power of the enemy, or combination of enemies, but also because of the essential lack of unity among Ukrainians, especially with regard to tactics and political implementation.

Consequently, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians is to be viewed as an outstanding Ukrainian political triumph. It established a permanent body, the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, which will become a coordinating center for all Ukrainian political and other activities, a cementing medium that heretofore was lacking in the Ukrainian political mosaic.

Another important aspect of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians was the overwhelming support it received from the Ukrainian community in the diaspora. Some 1,003 delegates from Ukrainian central organizations in 17 countries, including the United States, Canada, South America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, took part in the historic conclave and gave it their unequivocal endorsement and approval.

The unity of Ukrainian political forces in the diaspora is an unwelcome development for Moscow. Indeed, Moscow has been exerting great efforts in the past decade or so to set one Ukrainian

group or party against another. Realizing the power and political significance of Ukrainians in the United States and Canada the Soviet government concentrated on Ukrainians in these two countries by sending over "cultural delegations" and other agitators who, under the guise of "cultural exchange" tried to break up the anti-Communist spirit and resistance of Ukrainians and strove to convince them that the so-called "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" is a sovereign and independent state of the Ukrainian people.

But the Ukrainians, guided by their intrinsic knowledge of the nature of Russian communism and their own bitter experience under the rule of Moscow, overwhelmingly and decidedly have rejected this spurious interpretation of freedom and independence advanced by Moscow.

This stand was unanimously endorsed by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in a series of resolutions, memoranda, appeals and manifestoes which were issued on the occasion of the world conclave of free Ukrainians.

SOVIET MYTH CHALLENGED AND UNMASKED

Still another positive result of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians was its challenging of another Soviet propaganda myth which Moscow has been effectively spreading throughout the free world. This one concerns its "benevolent nationality policy."

For instance, The Times of London, in its issue of November 6, 1967 (a number of articles were written also in Russian), carried several articles stressing the "equality" of the non-Russian republics.

Dr. Edward Bagromov, a member of the Institute of Law, USSR Academy of Sciences, in his article, "Unity in Variety is the Object," wrote eloquently:

The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia was one of Soviet Russia's first legislative acts. It proclaimed the equality of nations to self-determination, including secession, the right to set themselves up as independent states. It was because of this principle that national independence was granted to the Finnish and Polish peoples... At the same time other independent republics were founded — the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia...1

The Soviet Russian scholar wrote also on the importance of the Russian language in the USSR:

¹ The Times of London, November 6, 1967, London.

A knowledge of Russian is obviously of decided help to other peoples. Yet there is no compulsion, official or otherwise, to study Russian or any other language. Nevertheless, according to the data of the 1959 census, 10,000,000 people of non-Russian origin named Russian as their native language. The spread of Russian in our country runs parallel to, and does not take away from, the free development and spread of other national languages. The 1959 census data indicate that 94 percent of Ukrainians consider Ukrainian their native language and 93 percent of Byelorussians consider Byelorussian their mother tongue...²

Another Soviet scholar, Victor Chkhikvadze, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Institute of State and Law, treats of the Union Republic in the article "Equal Rights of States:

The sovereignty of each is legally fixed in the central constitution and individual constitutions... A republic has a right to secede freely. This inherent right arose in the period of forming the Soviet federation and may be neither repealed nor restricted by all-Union power. However, not a single republic is interested in seceding since this would weaken economic and historic ties with the USSR, would inflict irreparable damage on the development of its economy linked with the entire national economy, would lower the standard of living, and would adversely affect development of culture in the republic. Finally, secession would weaken the military potential of all. Therefore, on the contrary, Soviet republics strive for state unity within the framework...3

This Soviet Russian double-talk can no longer fool knowledgeable Western statesmen who have become adequately versed in Soviet semantic acrobatics.

The Rt. Honorable John G. Diefenbaker, former Prime Minister of Canada, who was the principal speaker at the banquet held during the World Congress of Free Ukrainians on November 19, 1967, pointed out that the Soviet government boasts of tremendous technological achievements but "avoids discussion of the tens of millions of freedom-loving peoples who have fallen under Communist dictatorship." The distinguished Canadian statesman recalled a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 17, 1917, concerning the political freedom of the non-Russian nations. He cited 4 points of the decree whereby the Soviet government promised: a) equality and sovereignty to all peoples of Russia; b) the right of self-determination, including secession and establishment of independent states; c) abolition of all national and religious privileges, and d) freedom of development for the national minorities in Russian territory. He then went on:

² Ibid.

a Ibid.

Freedom was promised to the peoples of Russia by an undated check, the date of which has never been filled in. Relying on this decree, beginning with Finland on December 6, 1917, and Ukraine on January 22, 1918, eleven nations seceded from Russian within a period of one year and not only proclaimed their independence, but elected national assemblies. Of these, only two are free today - Finland and Poland . . . 4

The late U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai E. Stevenson, in his Memorandum on Soviet Russian Colonialism sent to U.N. members on November 25, 1961, derided the Soviet concept of selfdetermination:

We are told that the peoples of the Soviet Union enjoy the right of selfdetermination. Indeed, the Soviet regime at its inception issued a "Declaration of Rights" which proclaimed "the right of the nations of Russia to free selfdetermination, including the right to secede and form independent states."

How did this "right" work in practice? An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917, but in 1917 they established a rival Republic in Kharkiv. In July, 1923, with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the USSR...5

The New York Times, in its editorial on the 50th anniversary of Finland's independence, rightly points out that "the political miracle represented by this event is best understood if it is remembered that of all Russia's subject peoples who sought national sovereignty after the 1917 breakup of the Czarist empire-Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians and others - only the Finns today still remain independent and free..."6

Regrettably, these are but individual voices. As a whole, the western world is sadly delinquent with respect to the captive nations, such as Ukraine, which along with other captive countries should be a prime concern of freedom-loving people everywhere.

How dismaying it must be to those held captive behind the Iron Curtain when they are told that practically every government of the free world, including our own, felt bound to extend felicitations to the Soviet government on the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. This despite the fact that the USSR at this very moment is fighting a proxy war against the United States in

⁴ Address of the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, Q. C., M. P., at the Banquet, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, New York City, November 19, 1967.

⁵ Captive Ukraine: Challenge to the World's Conscience. World Congress of Free Ukrainians, November 16-19, 1967, p. 6, New York, N.Y..

⁶ Editorial, "Half-Century for Finland," The New York Times, December 6, 1967, New York, N.Y.

Vietnam, a war which already has cost the lives of some 14,000 American fighting men.

CRIMES OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM EXPOSED

In a series of publications, including a number in the French and Spanish languages, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians charged Moscow with political subjugation, economic exploitation, religious persecution, cultural and linguistic Russification, the genocide of the Ukrainian people and the assassination of Ukrainian political leaders abroad.

In a special Memorandum to the U.N. Secretary General the World Congress of Free Ukrainians appealed to the world body to provide for a special investigation of Russian colonial oppression of Ukraine, and also called on the governments of the free countries to support the cause of the Ukrainian people in their search for freedom and national independence.

In a *Manifesto* directed to the Ukrainian people behind the Iron Curtain the World Congress of Free Ukrainians exhorted them to stand steadfast in the face of the Communist threat:

You have survived many calamities in your heroic victory. You never capitulated, always emerging from disasters unbowed. Your heroic stance evokes the admiration of all freedom-loving mankind. It was and continues to be the source of spiritual uplift to us all dispersed all over the world. Assured is your destiny: to be master of your own land.

The World Congress pledged "with all our power and means, and within the laws of the countries of our domicile, to aid the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom and towards the reestablishment of an independent, united, democratic Ukrainian State."

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians was thus a great historic event in the history of Ukrainians outside their native land. It has mobilized and strengthened Ukrainian efforts and hopes everywhere, and paved the way for a more consolidated and coordinated endeavor towards achieving the ultimate objective — freedom and independence of Ukraine. More, it has helped make freedom once more a rallying cry for embattled mankind.

⁷ First Manifesto: To the Ukrainian People in Ukraine and beyond Its Borders, in the USSR and in the Lands of the Russian Communist Bloc. World Congress of Free Ukrainians, November 16-19, 1967, New York, N.Y.

FIRST STAGE OF THE NEW SOVIET PLAN, 1966-1970

NICHOLAS L. Fr.-CHIROVSKY

I. THE PLAN: GOALS, HOPES, DRAWBACKS

Announced in February, 1966, at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, were the Directives of the new Five-Year Plan, 1966-1970, for the development of the Soviet national economy. Two months later the Directives were approved by the 23rd Congress of the Party, and thus another chapter, although not a new era, was begun in the story of the Soviet economy.

Overall, the new plan resembled previous planning documents, although it did contain some new features which may well have a significant impact on the future of the Soviet economy.

The Directives were invoked in traditional fashion, with past communist achievements receiving their customary fulsome praise:

In the course of the fulfillment of the seven-year plan the Soviet people achieved great successes in economic and cultural construction and in the development of science and technology. A new contribution has been made to the creation of the material and technical base of communism; the economic might and the defense capacity of our homeland have grown; the standard of living of the Soviet people has risen... Our successes demonstrate the enormous possibilities of the socialist system and its fundamental advantages over capitalism; they promote the consolidation of the world socialist commonwealth, the development of the international workers' and communist movement and of proletarian internationalism...1

A more detailed account of the achievements follows, calling out the increases in fixed assets, national income, volume of industrial output (electricity, machinery, chemical industry, steel, petroleum, etc.). Also claimed is progress on the part of the individual Union Republics.

The shortcomings of the Seven-Year Plan, however, were undeniably weighty. The document admits:

¹ The Directives for the 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 7-8, p. 3.

The successes of the country's national economy could have been more substantial had the objective possibilities inherent in our system been used more fully. In the course of the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan serious shortcomings in the development of certain branches of the economy came to light.²

The account of failures is a gloomy one: breakdowns in various branches of the economy; the agricultural plan was not fulfilled, adversely affecting the overall economic process; planned goals were not fulfilled in numerous industrial areas; new economic potentials were but slowly developed; available technological capacity was lethargically and inadequately utilized; interruptions and failures in the organization of labor increased material losses; labor productivity was low; the quality of the industrial product was inferior and could not sell; new achievements of science and technology were introduced at too slow a pace. "The shortcomings... resulted in large measure," stated the Directives, "from... a disparity between the sharply rising scale of production and methods of planning and economic management and the system of material incentives that were in effect until recently. The initiative of enterprises was restrained, their rights circumscribed and their responsibility reduced." 3

An analysis of the Directives discloses some habitual drawbacks which have tormented all previous Soviet economic plans. First of all, the new Five-Year Plan keeps to the principle of industrial preference, with discrimination against agriculture. The Plan aims "to increase industrial output by 47% to 50% in the five years, including 49% to 52% for the output of branches producing means of production (Group A) and 43% to 46% for the output of branches producing consumer goods (Group B)... to perfect the structure of industrial production on the basis of the development of heavy industry... to increase the average annual output of agricultural products in the years 1966-1970 by 25% in comparison with the average annual output of these products in the preceding five-year period." The industrial preference is explicit, with emphasis put on the growth of heavy industry.

In their study of the Soviet economy, Kaplan and Moorsteen pointed out that during the era from 1928 to 1960 production of machinery increased by 27.2 times, industrial output by 7.5, other outputs by 9.7, and the production of consumer goods by only 3.8

² Ibid., p. 4.

³ Loc. cit.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 6 and 9.

times.⁵ The study clearly indicates the Soviet obsession with heavy and machine industry, an obsession which in the long run has resulted in a lack of internal balance in the Soviet economic processes and which is largely responsible for the decline of the annual rate of economic growth since 1959.

Second, the Plan continues the unequal treatment accorded all Union Republics as regards territories, population, resources and wealth. The Russian SFSR finds its Siberian regions have been given preferential treatment, whereas other Union Republics have been assigned more or less subsidiary tasks in the giant Eurasian market of the USSR.

For example, for the Russian SFSR the plan emphasizes industrial growth, calling for encreases of 70 to 80 per cent in machine building and metal working, along with substantial production of electric power, steel, pig iron, gas, oil and coal. In other Union Republics — such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan stressed are increases either in consumer industries or farming and the related field of extractive industries, all with an eye to fitting each republic into the framework of a large-scale territorial specialization for the Eurasian market, where the advantages of interregional exchange, according to the law of comparative costs, could be fully exploited. At one time, it is to be recalled, the Russians attempted a similar large-scale intra-bloc territorial specialization with the countries of the COMECON. Every nation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance-Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, East Germany and the others—was assigned a specific task to perform. The Kremlin pushed for joint economics.6 But this was not to the liking of the satellites. They managed to extricate themselves to some extent from the Soviet grip forced upon them when the deepening split between Moscow and Peking presented the opportunity.

From the point of view of Soviet economic expediency, the assigning to each Union Republic of a specific role in the Soviet national economy makes some sense. Since it is not to the liking of these republics, however, friction develops, great enough to have a detrimental effect on the performance of the plan. Moreover, cer-

⁵ N. Kaplan and R. Moorsteen, "An Index of Soviet Industrial Output," *American Economic Review*, June 1960, p. 296.

⁶ A. Rosenthal, "Red Bloc Pushes Joint Economics," The New York Times, Nov. 11, 1958.

tain interests of individual republics (nationalities) come into conflict, and are complained about by the party leadership.

Third, the Directives profess the political ideal of world communism. The document asserts that the new plan 1966-1970 "... will constitute an important new stage..." in the creation of the material and technical base of communism... and this will exert a great influence on the strengthening of the world revolutionary processes." It promises Soviet support for the struggle for national and social liberation of the young developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, for the international proletariat and the world liberation movement, and for the "curbing of the forces of American imperialism."

In living up to the international communist commitments of the Directives the Plan from the very beginning has imposed a heavy strain on the Soviet economy. It has made impossible of fulfillment domestic or internal promises made to the Soviet farmer and Soviet consumer. Corners have had to be cut. A few years before (in 1962), the Kremlin, confronted with a sluggish economy, was forced to warn needy nations not to rely solely on Soviet help. Since then, matters in this regard have not improved.

II. THE BASE: NOVELTIES, LIMITATIONS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

The new Five-Year Plan of 1966-1970 differs from the six previous ones and the Seven-Year Plan of Khrushchev's era on three major counts. First of all, the planning techniques underlying the new document were improved. Not only did planning experience in past decades help. Of undoubted value, too, was the use of electronic computers, linear programming and an input-output tables approach. To be sure, Malyshev, the vice-chairman of the Soviet Central Statistical Board, expressed his doubts as to the infallibility of these new techniques:

We have eight million different prices. Taking into account the various links between them... a machine could with high speed possibly build responses of a billion by a billion. But the question is, what good would it do us? Do you mathematicians expect to be able to see from the main computing

⁷ M. Volobuyev, "Do Problemy Ukrainskoi Ekonomiky," Bilshovyk Ukrainy No. 2-3, 1928. Then, voices in the defense of the economic interests of individual union republics were largely silenced. Recently, they have reappeared.

⁸ The Directives, p. 3.

⁹ N. Chirovsky, "The Council For Mutual Economic Assistance: An Evaluation," The Journal of Business, South Orange, N. J., December, 1962, p. 30; Also, "Russian 'Foreign Aid:' Big Headache For Khrushchev," U.S. News and World Report, May 27, 1963, pp. 50-53.

center all of our vast territory... all the innumerable technological processes—how people sow and reap, how every chemical installation functions, how every machine operates? 10

Other critical voices in the Soviet Union have been heard on this point. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that these new techniques, however imperfect, have enhanced the reliability of the new Five-Year Plan of the Kosygin-Brezhnev era.

Second, the new Directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU are more realistic than their predecessors. Bush has delineated the Soviet lack of realism under Stalin and Khrushchev. The Stalinist principle of maximums in planning made the fulfillment of desired ends almost impossible, putting plant and business managers under intolerable pressure to meet assigned quotas. Almost without exception, they resorted to rigging of production statistics, deliberately turning out inferior products and cheating the authorities. These practices certainly did not help the goals to materialize.¹¹

Khrushchev not only insisted on maximum goals in his Seven-Year Plan, he was absurdly confident about them. His bombastic bent was echoed in his economic measures. As a result, his planning goals were almost ludicrous in view of the technical capacity of the Soviet economy of the time. Let us compare only a few planning targets as envisioned by Khrushchev in 1961 for the year 1970, and the targets for the same year as planned by the Directives of 1966:

PLANNING TARGETS FOR 1970,12

ITEM	Khrushchev's	Kosygin-Brezhnev's
Electricity (billions of kilowatt hours)	900-1,000	830-850
Steel (million metric tons)	145	124-129
Oil (million tons)	39 0	345-355
Gas (billion cubic meters)	310-325	225-240
Cement (million tons)	122	100-105
Leather footwear (million pairs)	82 5	610-630
Meat (million tons)	25	5.9 - 6.2

The moderation and realism of the new plan are striking as compared to Khrushchev's inflated figures. Needless to say, the

¹⁰ H. Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, Philadelphia and N.Y., 1965, p. 145.

^{11 &}quot;If you worked in Soviet Russia," Bulletin, The Research Institute of America, New York, 1950; L. Smolinsky, "The Soviet Economy; In Search of a Pattern," Survey of Soviet Economy, No. 59, April 1966, pp. 88, 94-95, 97-98: "He (the Soviet manager) is the tragic hero of the comedy of planners' errors. ... he knows the price of everything and the value of nothing."

¹² The Directives, p. 6; The New York Times, October, 20, 1961, p. 2.

chances of fulfillment of a plan have never been greater. Bush notes this sober realism of the new leaders in various business areas, such as budgeting, production of consumer and producer goods, chemical industry, prediction of crops, and increasing investment expenditures for 1966 in preparation for the new, moderate economic plan for the USSR.¹³

Third, the new plan is flavored by a Libermanist "revisionism" of the orthodox Soviet style of Marxism-Leninism. Libermanist ideas of liberalizing Soviet planning and centralized state control of the economy originated in 1962 with Yevsey Liberman of the Kharkiv-Institute of Engineering and Economics, in reaction to the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions of the Soviet Union since 1959, a decline detailed by a CIA report in 1964 and by a joint House-Senate Economic Committee report in 1966.

The Five-Year Plan for 1966-1970 has loosened the grip of central planning. It demands more freedom of initiative on the part of individual enterprise, recommends material incentives towards raising efficiency, stresses the concept of profit as a device to improve productivity and envisions a more realistic market-distribution system, based on initiative, responsibility and accountability of individual enterprise. Previous planning is criticized for lacking these features. Several times during 1965 Kosygin and Brezhnev prepared the Soviet society for this new approach by way of speeches on the need for liberalization.

Thus, improved planning techniques, the setting of realistic targets and a fresh wind of liberalization blowing through the economic processes—all combine to augur a high degree of success in fulfillment of the new plan. On the other hand, there remain certain inherent structural deficiencies in the Soviet economic and business system which might have not been properly evaluated by the Soviet authorities in the planning process, and hence could substantially thwart target fulfillment.

The essential weakness of the Soviet industrial plant structure is its still existing dual character—advanced technology alongside primitive methods—which was analyzed so properly by Smolinsky in his article, "In Search of a Pattern." ¹⁵ He quoted several interesting instances. For example, of 80 small steel mills in the Russian

¹³ K. Bush, "The Budget and Plan for 1966," Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Vol. 13, April 1966, pp. 32-43.

¹⁴ The Directives, p. 4.

¹⁵ Smolinsky, pp. 89-90.

SFSR, 77 operate with the most primitive technology, dating back to the 19th and 18th centuries, their efficiency but 1/20 or 1/30 of that of a dozen giant, modern, steel establishments. This despite 50 years of the Soviet obsession with industrialization and sheer size and 40 years of heavy industrial investments. The same situation prevails in electric-power production and in other fields.

Even the very first Five-Year Plan sought a "liquidation of small establishments as deficient and backward." But to achieve it was not a simple matter. First of all, the construction and putting into operation of new, modern and large-scale establishments was a prolonged process, taking many years. Meanwhile, the principle of maximalism ruling the economic planning of the USSR, forced the industrial trusts, and then directors and managers of individual establishments to resort to every and any means to meet the targets. Hence, the old and primitive small operations were retained, and in addition scores of small workshops were thrown up, using more often than not backward and inefficient methods, all because short-run gaps had to be closed. That is why, points out Smolinsky, 18th-century steel mills and mines exist side by side with modern technical wonders.

There is yet another facet to this problem. The dual character of old and modern plagues not only individual industries, but also is to be found under the roof of a single establishment. Thus, not unusual is the case of a modern establishment using up-to-date production processes but whose shipping, repair, accounting, and office work is done in the most backward way — almost without any mechanization at all. Hence productivity of the various departments varies widely, ranging from a high to an incredible low one.

This may well be the main reason why there has been such a widespread difference in efficiency between American and Soviet industrial establishments. In some instances, Soviet plants show efficiencies as high as 90% in comparison with the American, in others as low as 10%.16

Perhaps the contemplated abandonment of the principle of maximalism in planning will tend to abolish the dual character of the Soviet industrial structure. Without doubt, however, this will take time, and the inherited imbalance can be counted on to sap efficiency steadily.

Many other old faults of the highly centralized planning, such as poor allocation of resources, poor coordination and synchroniza-

¹⁶ R. Campbell, Soviet Economic Power, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 59-67.

tion of various related production and auxiliary processes (deliveries, repairs, quality of services and materials), and deficient marketing, may be corrected and avoided during 1966-1970. Again, however, the likelihood is that the process will take a long time.

Meanwhile, the fulfillment of the seventh Five-Year plan has been hindered both in 1966 and 1967 by some new and at least partially unexpected developments: the growing Sino-Soviet split, the war in Vietnam, and an internal resistance to the Libermanist spirit.

The Sino-Soviet split, which goes back to Khrushchev's era, contributed in good part to his ouster as top Soviet leader. The new leaders, however, have been unable to patch the differences between Moscow and Peking. The Chinese "cultural revolution" and Soviet Russia's indirect involvement in it, admitted by Kosygin during his recent visit to London, aggravated the situation, making for increased defense expenditures, massive movements and transfers of troops and increases in production of armament. Affected, too, was any intended abatement of the traditional Soviet obsession with heavy industry and war production.

Also, the escalation of the war in Vietnam came about, increasing the demands of the Vietnamese Reds upon the Soviet economy, especially industrial production. Moreover, the Chinese "cultural revolution" reduced the Chinese capacity to help Ho-Chi Minh and the Viet Cong, thereby shifting most of the burden of international communist assistance to Moscow. When Russian military and economic supplies for Vietnam began rolling across the Chinese territory, the Peking authorities found themselves loath to see them go. Moscow's diplomatic protests followed, thereby intensifying the Sino-Soviet split. Thus it would seem that fulfillment of Soviet production targets for 1966 and 1967 has been thrust beyond the Kremlin's control.¹⁷

Domestically, the resistance of conservative communist circles among the managerial ranks to the new liberal administration techniques in the Libermanist sense have persisted and have hampered progress. Either directors of the establishments or local authorities were to exercise a greater initiative in improving the flow and quality of production. Centralization of decision-making was to be relaxed. But things are not working out that way.

Some time in September or October 1965, according to the Soviet press, in the oil-extraction fields and gasoline establishments

¹⁷ Armaments disturbed the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan as well: *Planovoic Khozyaistvo*, No. 9, 1966, p. 3-4.

in Boryslav in the Ukrainian SSR, large quantities of natural gas appeared on the surface and have caught on fire. The gas was not being processed because of lack of facilities and equipment. Until June, 1966, nothing was done about it. Neither the local management, nor the local authorities, nor the Republican Ministry of Oil and Gas industry in Kiev, could or were allowed to cope with the problem. Oil and gas affairs, it seems, were under the jurisdiction of the central society agencies in Moscow. Hence only they were empowered to act to stop the dangerous waste and to improve the industrial efficiency of oil and gas establishments in Boryslav.¹⁸

In January, 1967, Shelest, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, reflected the overall mood at the convention of industrial directors and managers in Kiev. He said:

... Successful realization of new principles in the economy depends greatly upon improvement of industrial leadership on the part of ministries and their respective departments. It is too bad, however, that some of them still follow the old, outmoded and outdated methods of direction by exercising minute control over the individual establishments, in this way reducing individual initiative and market freedom. Nor has practical assistance always been extended to individual establishments in their attempts to measure up to the tasks related to technical progress... In many cases proper measures have not been undertaken to relate manufacturing and selling... The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine will make every effort to ensure a successful completion of these economic reforms, which represent an important step in furthering the productive forces of our Republic.¹⁹

The disappointing progress to date was also disclosed by the debates at the convention at which Shelest spoke. It was said, for example, that the Ministery of Food has constantly restricted the initiative of individual food processing establishments by not allowing them to sell their products by making direct contracts with the market channels and, at the same time, by not helping them to unload their over-loaded stocks at all. Too, when the Kiev Meat Combine, in order to clear its stock, sold 36 thousand cans of meat to a willing market, the Ministry declared it was determined to punish the "wrong-doers." 20

¹⁸ Robitnycha Hazeta, No. 117, May 21, 1966, p. 2.

¹⁹ P. Shelest, "Important Step in the Reforms," Robitnycha Hazeta, No. 6, Jan. 7, 1967, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 2; J. Montias, "Economic Reform in Perspective," Survey of Soviet Economy, No. 59, April 1966, pp. 54-55: He expects that similar new principles of planning in Czechoslovakia will assume a practical shape not earlier than 1968.

Such is the overall background of the feverish Soviet efforts to fulfill the new plan which has its strengths but also some serious drawbacks. The experience of the first year of the new plan is reminiscent of the situation of the Soviet economy in 1958-1959, when the resistance of conservative communist circles toward Khrushchev's Decentralization Act of 1957, which sought to improve the deplorable plight of Soviet farming and manufacturing, crippled implementation of the measure from the very beginning.

III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

The new Five-Year Plan decidedly has pushed ahead Soviet industrial development. The journal *Kultura i Zhyttia* (Ukrainian) summed up in the following way the results of the plan for the Ukrainian SSR in its first year of operation, a year which, in general, reflected the overall Soviet economic picture:

... The working people of our Republic have achieved new successes in the development of the economy and in raising the standard of living of the people... (Industrial) establishments have overfulfilled their norms and increased profits and efficiency.... New successes have been achieved by the agriculture of our Republic.... The state plans for purchasing grain, sunflowers, potatoes, and fruits either were fulfilled or overfulfilled....²¹

Starting industrial development literally from scratch in 1931, at the end of 1966 the Kharkiv Tractor Plant delivered its one millionth tractor. At the beginning of 1967, the Kharkiv Machine Combine was manufacturing a new type of locomotive, lighter, more powerful and much more economical than any produced before. In Kiev, subway trackage was substantially extended. The automobile plant in Zaporizha raised its labor productivity 103.7% in 10 months. The Ministry of Industrial Constructions of the Ukrainian SSR announced substantial increases in the cement industry, owing to the installation of new furnaces, more modern equipment and the utilization of more efficient production methods. Similar advances were made in the brick and tile manufacturing, outdated equipment being replaced by modern. In the city of Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog) construction of the biggest blast furnace in the world will be soon completed; it is expected to increase the output of iron there by three and a half million tons. New modern mines have been under construction

²¹ Kultura i Zhyttia, No. 10, February 2, 1967, p. 1.

to go down as deep as 800 meters. It is hoped that the new mines will increase iron ore extraction by some three million tons annually.²²

The Ministry of Light Industry of the USSR developed a program to increase pay bonuses 40 to 60% for the industrial workers as a reward for greater labor productivity. Officials of the Ministry see this incentive program as substantially raising the quality and quantity of consumer goods production and processing. Already, in some instances, overfulfillment of short-run (annual) production targets has been reported. For example, the Vynnytsia Sugar Refinery had produced 1.2 million pounds of sugar over the assigned quota at the beginning of the 1966 season. Production of basalt was substantially increased in Ukraine. Manufacturing of a new kind of high-quality steel was initiated.²³

Irrigation and regulation of rivers — for improving water transportation, increasing power production and enlarging the soil acreage for farming — are progressing satisfactorily, according to press reports. Some 63,000 hectares of new soil have been added to the land under cultivation. Construction of the North Crimean Canal forged ahead of schedule.²⁴

Even in the field of farming, notorious soft spot of the Soviet national economy for decades, gains have been made. In the Crimean Peninsula and other parts of the USSR new, large-scale vineyards have been successfully esablished. In several regions of the Soviet Union, harvests of grain and corn exceeded all expectations; winter crops have been planted on larger areas and on time. The productivity of agricultural workers improved considerably in some instances. Many collective farms and farm regions reportedly fulfilled their food and raw-material deliveries for the socialist state ahead of schedule. Resolutions adopted at the convention of the Agricultural Workers of Ukraine in February, 1967, declared the following:

... The achievements of the collective and state farms of our Republic are undeniable. However, we are fully aware that only the first measures have been undertaken toward realization of the great program of our agricultural development, outlined by the 23rd Congress of the CPSS. We are bound to concentrate all our effort and all our energy, and to mobilize the reserves

²² Radyanska Ukraina, No. 17, January 20, 1967, p. 1; No. 37, February 12, 1967, pp. 1 and 4; No. 277, December 2, 1966, p. 1; No. 289, December 17, 1966, p. 1; Robitnycha Hazeta, No. 236, October 7, 1966, p. 1.

²³ Radyanska Ukraina, No. 242, October 20, 1966, p. 1; Robitnycha Hazeta, No. 253, October 27, 1966.

²⁴ Radyanska Ukraina, No. 235, October 12, 1966, p. 1; Molod Ukrainy, No. 108, May 29, 1966, p. 1; Robitnycha Hazeta, No. 253, October 27, 1966, p. 1.

of every farm unit... Raising grain crops continues to be the most important task of the collective and state farms and of all farm workers...²⁵

Nevertheless, the continual official exhortations for increasing effort and efficiency suggest that not everything is in order with the Soviet collective-farm economy, as Western observers and students of Soviet affairs imply.

Along with favorable reports on fulfillment of planning targets, the Soviet press in 1966 and 1967 also provided disturbing news on shortcomings. Pravda (March 1, 1967) complained about the quality of agricultural production, the deplorable state of affairs in the raising of livestock, and the inadequate mobilization of labor and technology in farming. Radyanska Ukraina (September 9, 1966) reported serious breakdowns in crop processing in various regions, where the harvest of sugar-beet was progressing nicely but where its completion was threatened by a shortage of combines and trucks. The newspaper added a dramatic note about inadequate technical equipment being both traditional and chronic. Another paper, Molod Ukrainy, on July 16, 1966 described chaos in the processing and shipping of grain crops. At grain delivery stations there were not enough weighbridges to accept and register the grain brought in by trucks from the fields. Trucks and drivers waited hours to unload, making for irritation and some fighting. The newspaper states that such faults are neither sporadic nor confined to certain localities. The same paper reported also lamentable waste in the forest economy, many forests having been recklessly exploited and not reclaimed by any worthwhile reforestration program.26 Utilization of soil in agriculture has been deplorably wasteful in various Union Republics — the Russian SFSR around Moscow itself, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbek, etc.27

Inferior consumer goods and inadequate marketing also have marred the current Five-Year plan. Freight cars are poorly built; passengers wait hours for local transportation buses, even taking bets whether buses are going to come at all (by no means a long shot).

Clothing and equipment for new-born babies, including baby carriages and pacifiers, could not be bought: they were simply un-

²⁵ Radyanska Ukraina, No. 45, February 22, 1967, p. 1.

²⁸ Molod Ukrainy, No. 137, July 10, 1966, p. 2.

²⁷ L. Brezhnev, "Land Irrigation; An Essential Question in Creating A Stable Farm Production in the Country," May 27, 1966, *Molod Ukrainy*, May 28, 1966, p. 2; also, *Radyanska Ukraina*, No. 123, May 29, 1966, p. 3.

available. Inferior fur coats could be purchased in summer, but not in winter. Hats and caps were not available in the stores. Children's footwear has been in short supply and needlessly has been getting heavier. Glues did not adhere. Refrigerators, sewing machines and other appliances have not been working; replacements and repairs mean a waiting period of months. Television and radio parts simply could not be bought. Food for livestock was scarce.

Robitnycha Hazeta on January 7, 1967 published an article, "Food Industry And The Need Of Reform," detailing bad organizational breakdowns. Charged therein is that the population is suffering shortages because the food processing establishments either do not receive raw materials at all or receive them in such meager quantities that they are technically not able to process them. "Perishable produce is constantly being delivered and delivered; tomatoes, beets, grapes and milk accumulate in the plant yards by the hundreds of tons, while in the workshops only a fraction of the deliveries are processed owing to inadequate technology. . . . Sometimes, however, things are deplorable in another way: there are adequate materials and there are adequate technical means to work with, but there are no skilled workers to use the superior equipment. . ."

Two other significant developments have been aggravating the overall economic situation of the USSR. First, income levels of broad circles of the Soviet population have been low. The average annual income of the Soviet workers has varied for the 1965-1966 period from some 1,150 to 1,190 rubles. While officially the ruble is supposed to have a slightly higher value than the U.S. dollar, in fact the purchasing power of the dollar is considerably greater than that of the ruble in the two respective countries. Hence when real incomes in the USSR are compared for past and present with those in the U.S., it must be conceded that about 95% of the hardworking Soviet population lived in poverty during the first year of the new plan. No noticeable improvement over the previous decade has been made.²⁸

• Second, the low family income in the Soviet Union is being threatened by the inflationary tendency of the ruble. Prices have risen and the ruble purchasing power has declined to make things worse.²⁹ The new Five-Year plan, then, despite the Libermanist spirit,

²⁸ Pravda, No. 29, January 29, 1967, pp. 1-4; also Radyanska Ukraina, No. 25, January 29, 1967, p. 2.

²⁹ Pravda, October 21, 1966; "Rastiet li ugroza inflatsii v SSSR?", Yezheniedielnii Obzor, Radio Liberty, December 2, 1966.

may be losing much of its hoped-for effectiveness because of low earnings coupled with inflation.

IV. THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT: EVALUATION

On January 29, 1967, Pravda published the offical figures on progress in fulfillment of the planning targets for the first year of the new plan. The results are mixed, ranging from considerable underfulfillment and production below the 1965 level in some fields to generously fulfilling the annual quota in others. More, they also clearly uncovered traditional Soviet unevenness in meeting the quota targets by virtue of preferential treatment extended the heavy industries, despite the new Directives.

Production for 1966 in the electric energy, oil, gas, steel, plastics, automation and technological equipment, motor vehicle, and cement industries has, on an annual basis, been rather slow (some 7% to 14% increase of output over the 1965 level). Nevertheless, achievement of 1970 targets still seems quite feasible, if during the next four years redoubled efforts are made and if no major adverse events come to pass.

Otherwise, Pravda related a rather modest increase (4% over the 1965 level) in the food industries, which in view of the natural rate of population growth hardly seems adequate. Construction of dwelling units was even more glaringly insufficient: only a 1% increase over 1965. Production of generators, textile machinery, sugar beets, sugar, vegetable fats, canned food, and soap actually was below the level of the last year of the Seven-Year Plan (1965). The output of coal, iron ore, some chemicals, turbines, machine tools, locomotives, farm machinery, textile materials, glass, butter and motorcycles increased over 1965, between 1% and 4% mostly, but was below the planning schedule. Altogether, some 11 major industries did not meet their quotas for 1966.

Although two years ago the Soviet leadership decided to invest some 73 billion rubles over a five-year period in agriculture to raise its productivity, the results have not been spectacular. *Pravda* reported that gross output of Soviet farming had increased by 15%, but added: "... productivity of farm crops has remained low in numerous instances... in a number of collective and state farms... the production process has been carried out unprofitably... many state farms have not fulfilled their income targets, registering, instead, considerable losses.³⁰

³⁰ Pravda, No. 29, January 29, 1967, pp. 1-4.

Transport industry, according to the report, did not fulfill the plan with respect to the shipping of soft coal, lumber and other products. Organization of transportation was poor. The capital investment plan for 1966 was only up to 95%. Manufacturing left much to be desired from the point of view of organization and technology.

A few ministries — the Ministry of Coal, Forestry, Fishery, Food and Microbiological Manufacturing — succeeded in meeting their plan fulfillments, but this represented only a minimal percentage.

In view of this mixed picture for 1966, the preface to the *Pravda* report may sound somewhat hollow:

The workers of the Soviet Union, carrying out the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSS, achieved in 1966 — the first Five-Year Plan — a successful development of all sectors of their national economy and a further improvement of material welfare.³¹

Nevertheless, the year has been an unremitting effort on the part of the Soviet leadership to push their economy ahead despite built-in obstacles and unforeseen eventualities. Although achievements in 1966 fell short of expectations, they represented an advance. The Soviet economy is improving, however slowly. The current, seventh Five-Year Plan can be expected to muddle through to a conclusion in 1970 which will be at least more successful than its predecessors.

³¹ Ibid., p. 1.

THE TRAINING OF FOREIGN STUDENTS BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

By Joseph S. Roucek

In the multi-faceted arsenal of the enormous propaganda carried on by the Communist governments, an important weapon are the programs promoting exchanges of persons, students, professors and intellectuals and involving other aspects of "cultural diplomacy." The Soviet cultural program has been speeded up in recent years, in contrast to the pre-World War II period. It remains little more than an experiment with the principles laid down in Lenin's What is to be Done (1902), wherein Lenin emphasized the crucial significance of propaganda and urged his followers to go "among all classes of the population," as "theoreticians, propagandists, agitators and organizers." ¹

SOVIET CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

Coombs claims that "Soviet cultural relations are in a class by themselves because they express Russia's unique political system, traditions, nationalism, and international aims. No nation, not even France, has made cultural affairs a more vital and integral part of its foreign policy or invested more generously in them. In so doing, the Soviet Union is perhaps taking a great political risk. In the decade since Stalin's death the Soviet cultural program has grown rapidly in scale, sophistication, and liberality. These recent trends, if continued, are likely to produce important changes not only in the USSR's external relations but within the Soviet society itself." ²

Historically, Soviet cultural propaganda has had its marked ups and downs.3

¹ Lenin, Chto Delat'? (What Is to Be Done?), International Publishers, New York, 1929.

² Coombs, Philip H., The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs, Harper and Row, New York, 1964, p. 87.

³ For details, see: Barghoorn, Frederick C., "Propaganda," 456-459, in Florinsky, Michael T., Ed., McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961; Inkeles, Alex, Public Opinion in Soviet

During Lenin's rule the USSR was culturally isolated from the outside world, especially since this era coincided with civil war. But in 1925, by which time the new regime was fairly well consolidated, a start at a systematic attempt was made to tell the story of the "new society" abroad, to win foreign friends and to advance communism's international aims. The All-Union Soviet for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) was founded to promote Soviet "Friendship Societies" abroad and interchanges of various professional, artistic, and labor groups. Since the Soviet government had only limited diplomatic relations at that time, cultural channels offered an effective means of by-passing governments and appealing directly to their peoples. One aim was to promote popular opposition to the antagonistic policies of such governments against the USSR. Another was to give support to the "progressive elements," especially the budding Communist organizations within these states. 4

By 1930 VOKS had succeeded in establishing cultural relations with private organizations in 72 countries, only 46 of which had formal diplomatic relations with the Kremlin.⁵

These early attempts included cultural interchanges, blending them with politics and simple propaganda; but many Western critics found in them much too much Marxist ideology, often belying the avowed purposes of the program. While promoting "cultural cooperation" on the one hand, on the other the Soviet line also featured the Marxist-Leninist view that "socialist culture" and the "imperialist culture" stood irreconcilably in conflict. The world-wide socialist revolution, it argued, must include a cultural revolution leading to a "truly unified and universal human culture."

Then, as now, in the official Soviet viewpoint, scholarship, science, and the arts were integral parts of politics. Artists and scientists were assigned roles in the movements for peace and for the popular

Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951; Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1950, stresses that Soviet propaganda against the U.S. is one of the main instruments in the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy: Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, N. J., 1960; Garver, Richard A., "Polite Propaganda: USSR" and "America Illustrated," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVIII, Autumn, 1961, 480-484; Evans, F. Bowen, Ed., Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities, MacMillan, New York, 1955.

⁴ Draper, Theodore, American Communism and Soviet Russia, The Formative Period, Viking Press, New York, 1960; Glazer, Nathan, The Social Basis of American Communism, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1961.

⁵ Coombs, op. cit., 87-88.

front. Cultural societies abroad, as the Vice-President of VOKS informed a group of visiting Czech students in 1931, were to organize their work so as to convince the representatives of the working intelligentsia to stand in defense of the USSR in times of great trial. "These societies must create a ring of trust, sympathy and friend-ship around the USSR, through which all plans of intervention will be able to penetrate."

After 1930, the growing threat of fascism and the political purges in the USSR weakened the interest in external cultural contact. The outbreak of World War II resulted in a near stoppage of this program. Yet, before the Great Purges, Stalin had been personally quite interested in cultural diplomacy. He often played host to foreign delegations and to visiting artistic and literary figures. The basic motive for his policy was presented to the 14th Congress of the Russian Communist Party: he reported that visits of groups from India, Egypt, and China constituted "the best, most forceful and active propaganda for the Soviet system against the capitalist system." (A similar opinion was aired by Khrushchev during his visit to the United States in September, 1959; he favored "the broadest cultural and scientific exchange" for the USSR and the United States, and linked such exchange to peaceful competition between rival social systems.)

REVIVAL OF THE CULTURAL OFFENSIVE AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II

To gain support for the Soviet Union's postwar aims, the cultural offensive was revived near the end of World War II and immediately thereafter. It was especially concentrated on Latin America. In 1944 a new Russo-Mexican Cultural Institute was founded to promote Soviet cultural activities throughout the whole area. At the same time the Kremlin launched a campaign in the neighboring small countries of Europe and in the Near East. Over 500 scholarships for study in the Soviet Union were granted in 1946 to students from Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and other Central-Eastern-Balkan countries. In every "People's Democracy," a society for the propaga-

⁶ McMurry, Ruth and Lee, Muna, The Cultural Approach—Another Way to International Relations, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1947, 117. See also: Thompson, Charles A. and Laves, Walter H. C., Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1963; Barghoorn, "Cultural Exchange," 124-126, in Florinsky, op. cit.

⁷ Barghoorn, "Cultural Exchange," op. cit., 124.

tion of friendship with the Soviet Union was formed, on both an elite and a mass basis. Leading intellectuals, enjoined to enroll as members, often were given free trips to the Soviet Union; recruitment drives were held throughout the countries. The societies, with branch offices in almost every town, sponsored Soviet exhibits, featured Soviet movies, held appropriate celebrations on Soviet anniversaries, published their own papers and magazines, arranged for translations of Soviet books and organized Russian-language classes for adults (compulsory for school children). Their task, in brief, "was to eliminate negative conceptions of Soviet life, and instill a positive emotional commitment to the USSR." 8 Through VOKS (retitled in February, 1958, as the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), they arranged the details of cultural exchanges with the USSR, of visits of Soviet citizens to the satellites, and of visits of satellite citizens to the Soviet Union. They set up many delegations to make pilgrimages to the Communist countries. Upon their return these delegations provided glowing accounts, "eye-witness accounts," of the wonders of the Soviet Union, the East European satellites and (at that time) Communist China.º

The strength, membership and influence of these friendship societies reached a high point in 1945 and 1946. After 1946, as tensions developed between the USSR and the Free World, these organizations started to run into difficulties. The difficulties mounted with the Tito-Stalin rupture, the rise of polycentrism, the Sino-Soviet split ¹⁰ and the growing realization of the non-Communist elements that these tactics and claims on loyalty redounded to the benefit of the USSR rather than World communism.¹¹

s Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Praeger, N. Y. 1961, 114-115.

⁹ For details see: Evans, op. cit., Chapter II, "The Objectives, Theory, and Organization of International Communist Propaganda," 3-34, and ff.

Penguin Special, Baltimore, 1965. Griffith, William E., Ed., Communism in Europe, Vol. I, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964; and The Sino-Soviet Rift, Allen and Unwin, London, 1964; Pethybridge, Roger, Ed., The Development of the Communist Bloc, D. C. Heath, Boston, 1965.

¹¹ The current form of international communism is described as polycentrism; the term suggests many areas or centers of communism replacing the simpler early phases of single and dual leadership, see: Laqueur, Walter and Labedz, Leopold, Ed., Polycentrism: The New Factor In International Communism, Praeger, New York, 1962.

THE EXPANDED CULTURAL DIALOGUE

Immediately after World War II there was a very short period of an expanded cultural dialogue between East and West. The swiftly intensifying "Cold War" after 1948 drew the Soviet cultural curtain tight again. It began to lift anew only after Stalin's death (1953) and the adoption of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" line, and it continued to expand despite periodical political-military crises. Between 1953 and the present, formal cultural exchange agreements were signed with various Western powers, including the United States, and the Kremlin has made special efforts to develop cultural activities in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Union of Friendship Societies played the leading role in Khrushchev's expansion of cultural diplomacy under George A. Zhukov (former Pravda foreign editor). To this day it invites scientific and lit-. erary delegations to visit the USSR, arranges formal meetings between such groups and Soviet colleagues, and is active in disseminating Soviet publications to foreign scholars and intellectuals.

FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE USSR

In the fall of 1963 some 25,000 foreign students were enrolled in Soviet higher institutions of learning, many from neighboring Communist states but also including "a sharply growing proportion from Africa, Asia, and Latin America." 12

Obviously, much faith and quite a lot of money has been invested in importing foreign students to the communist countries and exporting USSR students and educated personnel abroad. Yet the hope that "international education" would solve many international and national problems has been turning sour (witness the more recent record of the plan of the Kremlin to "recondition" imported students, especially from the developing countries. The same holds true for the satellite nations and Communist China.

THE IMPORTATION OF STUDENTS FROM AFRICA

In 1960 the USSR launched a serious drive to recruit students from Africa to go to the Soviet Union to obtain their university education. Soviet diplomats offered hundreds of all-expense-paid scholarships and, wooed by Soviet claims of racial democracy, students from all over that continent started to head for the USSR.

¹² Coombs, op. cit., 90.

Actually, the Soviet educational policy for Africa is very much of East German origin.¹³

The idea was raised at a meeting of satellite leaders in Moscow in 1954. The East German delegates pointed out that of all the countries within the Soviet bloc, Germany had the soundest knowledge of Africa and the Africans—thanks to the historical experiences of Germany with Africa during the colonial days. Asked to study this problem and to make specific recommendations, the East German government readily complied. The experiment began with 500 selected young Africans from Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia (then still two separate territories), Togo, the then French Cameroons, Zanzibar, the Ivory Coast, Angola, Morocco and Algeria. A special department was opened in the East German Ministry for Higher Education and a corps of German students was recruited to supervise their day-to-day activities.

The enthusiastic reports of East Berlin on the experiment encouraged Moscow to ask for a special study (in 1958) of the role such education could play in the "national liberation struggle." The subject was discussed at a special conference held at Humboldt University in East Berlin in November of that year. Subsequently, three new training centers for young Africans were founded: the "Solidarity School" at the Wilhelm Pieck Youth College at Bautzen; the "Ideological College" at Bogensee, and the "School for International Friendship" at Bernau. In addition, an American institute was set up at Karl Marx University in Leipzig which featured study groups, with Africans participating, discussing "the menace of neocolonialism."

Soviet Russia, for once, used the suggestions of a satellite. One recommendation which was adopted was to create a separate institution for young Africans. Known initially as the People's Friendship University outside Moscow, it has since been renamed the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University.¹⁴

The Friendship University was opened on October 1, 1960. Because of lack of facilities, only about 500 students were enrolled the first year. But by 1963 the Soviet organs could—and did—boast that there were 18,000 foreign students in the USSR, over 2,000 of them in Moscow, hailing from more than 80 countries of Asia, Asia,

¹³ Lessing, Pieter, Africa's Red Harvest: An Account of Communism in Africa, John Day, New York, 1962, 109.

¹⁴ Rosen, Seymour M., Soviet Training Programs for Africa, U.S. Office of Education, OE 14079, Bulletin 1963, No. 9, Washington, D. C.

and Latin America. During its third anniversary celebration (February, 1963), pro-Rector Rafail Romano claimed that the Friendship University had proved to be an unquestionable success in training engineers, agronomists, doctors and economists for the developing countries, inasmuch as most of the students were receiving high marks in examinations.

Before becoming a student at any institution (colleges are called "institutions" in the USSR), most foreign students coming to study in the Soviet Union spend a year attending the so-called preparatory faculty. Here they study chiefly Russian to enable them to attend lectures with Soviet students (selected to supervise the activities of the "foreigners"—a feature of the East German experiment). But not all graduates of the preparatory faculty remain in Moscow, since they are allowed to go to other Soviet cities to continue studying in institutions chosen by them beforehand.

Applicants, when accepted, have their expenses paid, including travel from their homes, and receive a monthly allowance of 90 rubles (about \$100) to cover food, travelling expenses, entertainment, etc. No tuition is charged, the textbooks and laboratory fees are free. The charge for hotel accommodations is very low—only 2 rubles and 50 kopecks a month. Upon arrival in the USSR, the student receives a lump sum of 300 rubles to buy clothes more suitable to the Russian climate, and other necessities. The age limit is 35.

In 1965 Moscow's Friendship University graduated its first foreign students—230 of them—upon their completion of the 5-year course. At this time there were some 2,700 students. Mongolians were most numerous (more than 500), while the largest African contingent, about 250, came from Kenya, with smaller numbers coming from Ghana and Egypt. There were also many Cubans, Indonesians and Indians. More than half were training to be engineers; other popular pursuits were medicine, agriculture, physics, chemistry, law and economics.¹⁵

During its four years of existence, however, the University admittedly lost some 200 foreign students. About 50 had failed their examinations or were expelled for "bad behavior"; 140 had left for "other reasons."

Although Soviet officials cited family reasons for a number

¹⁵ "Soviets to Graduate 230 Foreign Pupils," Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1965.

of the "departed ones," the figure undoubtedly included many who had left because of discontent with conditions in the USSR.

PROPAGANDA BACKLASH

In fact, by this time the Soviet authorities had discovered to their chagrin that importation of students from the new nations did not provide the propaganda windfall so fondly envisaged.

The wave of student discontent which received the most publicity welled up in 1964.

In that year Edmund Asare-Adde, a 29-year-old Ghanian studying in the Soviet Union, boarded a train at Moscow's Leningrad Station to return to medical school at Kalinin, 100 miles away. The next day his body was found in a snowbank in a Moscow suburb. Normally, such an event in Soviet Russia would not have become public knowledge. But, unfortunately for the Moscow authorities, it was common knowledge that Asare-Adde was soon to marry a Soviet girl. His fellow Africans, by now highly sensitized, suspected that resentful Russians had murdered him to prevent the marriage.

The authorities claimed that Asare-Adde had been drunk, had wandered from his train as drunks do, and had simply died from exposure. But two Ghanian medical students who attended the autopsy claimed that Asare-Adde's body bore bruises and other signs of violence, and accused the Soviet authorities of trying to suppress the truth.

The result was a demonstration in which 500 Africans marched through Red Square in Moscow carrying signs protesting Russian racism.¹⁶

A Kenyan group of students returned home in the spring of 1965 with an even worse tale. They had enrolled in the University of Baku for 6 years. After just six months they had staged a one-week sit-down strike forcing the Soviets to airlift them back to Nairobi. There they described the misery, hostility and beatings they had suffered. "It was more of an indoctrination camp than a University," they reported. Most of our studies were taken up with brainwash-

¹⁶ Dubar, Ernest, "The African Revolt in Russia," Readers' Digest, LXXXV, 508, August, 1964, 71-74; "Red and Black," Newsweek, LXII, 27, December 30, 1964, 23-24; Kassof, Alleb, "Bringing up the Communist Man," Problems of Communism, XIII, July-August, 1964, 44-45; Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow; An Outsider's Report," Ibid., 11-18.

ing and communist doctrine. All the people hated us. They just did not like black people. It was hell. May God let us forget that place." 17

IMPACT OF SINO-RUSSIAN CONFLICT ON STUDENT EXCHANGES

Furthermore, some foreign students in the USSR became cat's-paws in the Sino-Russian competition for world conquest. Thus, on March 4, 1965, mob violence against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—inspired by the Soviet government—got out of hand. It turned into a bloody battle between the anti-American rioters—some 2,000 screaming Communist students, mostly Red Chinese and North Vietnamese—and police reinforced by the Red Army. Mounted militiamen on foot followed, swinging clubs and fists. The demonstrators fought back savagely, and "at this stage, the riot looked more anti-Soviet than anti-American." 18

Racism has become, in fact, the foremost aspect of the foreign-students' exchange between Moscow and Peking. On October 7, 1966, the Soviet Union ordered all Chinese students out of the country by the end of the month and ordered the immediate return of all Soviet students from China. Just how many students were affected was not announced, but the Chinese reported only 65 Chinese students were left in Soviet Russia, once numbered in the thousands. (In September Red China had ordered all foreign students—including the Russian—out of China after its schools had been shut down as part of the "great cultural revolution." The Sino-Russian exchange program had been in effect since 1956, a time when Soviet Russia and mainland China were on the best of terms.)

RACIAL IMPLICATIONS

Such incidents, rooted in color prejudice, obviously are bound to influence Soviet relations with African and Asian nations.

Until a few years ago, Soviet citizens had rarely seen a black man. While Soviet Russian propaganda had been expressing pious sympathy for oppressed Negroes in America, or for Africans suffering under colonialism, the average citizen's attitude to color had never been put to the test.

¹⁷ "How Russia Mistreats Students from Africa," U.S. News and World Report, LVIII, 16, April 19, 1965, 14.

^{18 &}quot;New Twist to anti-U.S. Riots: Reds Vs. Reds," U.S. News and World Report, LVIII, 11, 1965, 11.

The meeting of Africans and Russians had rude jolts for both. Russians stared at the black visitors wherever they went. The irritating effect of such scrutiny was heightened by the fact that, *Sputnik* nothwithstanding, Soviet Russia is an underdeveloped nation that cannot offer some of the services and facilities found in modern African cities. Many Russians themselves noted that, though the students were just out from under "colonial exploiters," they wore clothing superior in style and quality to that owned by the average Soviet citizen.¹⁹

Understandably, too, living in the USSR called for a drastic adjustment on the part of the Africans. The unfamiliar food, the depressingly gloomy Russian winter, the ubiquitous lines in which students had to stand for their meals—all contributed to their disenchantment.²⁰

But the biggest adjustment the Africans have had to make is to the Soviet system itself, wherein every area of the citizen's life is subject to government supervision.

¹⁹ Dunbar, op. cit., p. 71-74.

²⁰ It would be unfair to prepound that the African students in the USSR and Communist China have been the only ones encountering difficulties. The fact remains that, in spite of all the enthusiasm for international education and foreign exchanges, foreign students going abroad have been confronted with "cultural conflicts" everywhere, including the United States. See, for instance, such studies or recorded impressions as: Wedge, Bryant M., Visitors to the United States and How They See Us, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, N. J., 1965; Tajfel, Henri and Dawson, John L., Eds., Disappointed Guests: Essays by African, Asian, and West Indian Students, Oxford, New York, 1965; Feighan, Michael A., "Short Change in Cultural Exchange," Washington Report, March 9, 1964; Allen, George V., "The Overseas Image of American Democracy," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXVI, July, 1966, 60-67; Foreign Policy Association, Travel: A Two-Way Street, Americans Going Abroad, Visitors Coming To The U.S., Intercom, New York VIII, 1, 1966; Rupp, Theodore H., "The Junior-Year-Abroad-Some Second Thoughts," Bulletin of the Pennsylvania State Modern Language Association, XLIV, December, 1965, 5-9; Mann, Charles K., "Developing 'Americans at Home' for International Visitors," Journal of Human Relations, XIV, 2, Second Quarter, 1966, 217-229; Roucek, Joseph S., "The Psychological Impulses Behind Study Abroad and its Effects on Personality," International Association, XII, July, 1960, 412-422; Roucek, Joseph S., "Some Educational Problems of Children from Immigrant, Refugee, and Migrant Families in U.S.A., International Review of Education, VIII, 2, 1962, 225-235; Roucek, Joseph S., "The Educational Aspects of Language Problems of American Minorities," V.O.C. Journal of Education. IV, 1, April, 1964, 18-32; Roucek, Joseph S. "The Impact of Africa on the American Negro," New Africa, VI, 12, December, 1964, 9-10; Roucek, Joseph S., "The Marginal Man as a Sociological Phenomenon," Indian Sociological Bulletin, I, 1, January, 1964, 6-11; etc.

This is well described in Jan Carew's novel;21 he was the first British Guianese to arrive. He soon learned that each foreign student shares a room with a Russian informer. His mail went through so many censors that "the letters got worn out." He found the level of instruction disappointing; the lessons were ruled by dogma. Bureaucracy was so dismayingly dominant in Soviet life that Kafka seemed to have replaced Marx and Lenin as the prophet of communism. But for Carew and his fellow Negroes, who "must judge all systems from the limbo of our skin," the greatest shock of all was the strident racial prejudice of a nation whose leaders deny that prejudice exists. The Negroes' white girl companions were suddenly shipped away from Moscow—"To Keep Russia Red." On the streets, the Negroes were always stared at, occasionally attacked and often taunted with the Russian equivalent of "Nigger"— "Black Monkey." At Comsomol meetings, girls were warned against consorting with Africans. Pressures were brought to bear on female workers when the secret police reported their friendship with Africans to shop foremen.

All in all, the African student has become quite a painfully embarrassing dilemma to the Russians, who are presently the targets of a Chinese communist campaign to portray them to Africans and Asians as just another variety of white racists.

The disenchantment, then, is shared by the Kremlin as well.

FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE SOVIET BLOC

We have noted that the idea of importing Africans for communist training had originated with East Berlin in 1954.

In 1961, one year after the doors of Friendship University had opened in Soviet Russia, the Czechoslovak government opened a similar institution in Prague. It was called the University of November 17th in commoration of the day in 1939 when Hitler had closed the Czech educational institutions and executed a number of Czech students. The institution offers courses for students from underdeveloped countries, preferably African students.²² Like Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia accepts young Africans who are not even ready for higher education; for these a special school has been established

²¹ Carew, Jan, Green Winter, Stein and Day, New York, 1965.

²² Lessing, Pieter, Africa's Red Harvest, John Day, New York, 1962, 113; Bass, Robert and Elizabeth, "Eastern Europe," Chapter 3, 87-115, in Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Ed., Africa and the Communist World, Stanford University Press, 1963, 101 ff.

at Teplice, where 250 semi-illiterates are accommodated. According to Radio Prague, in 1961 there were over 3,000 Africans at Czech secondary and higher institutions of learning.

The drive to enlist young Africans for study in the Captive Nations has been made, in fact, by all bloc countries, including Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, with the greatest number having gone to Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. In 1961, the Warsaw weekly, Polityka, established a "Patrice Lumumba Scholarship Fund" to enable more Africans to study at Polish institutions, and a sum of more than one million zlotys was contributed within a fortnight. The Polish Academy of Sciences has granted two annual scholarships to enable African students to study "atomic science" under the auspices of the Polish State Council for the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy. Counting industrial trainees and others in non-University programs, African students in the People's Democracies represent 21 African countries and number in the thousands.23 "This is impressive, especially since educational institutions in Eastern Europe are far smaller and less numerous than in the West, or even in the USSR." 24

The Communist bloc has also begun training administrative personnel. The USSR, for instance, has inaugurated courses in banking for what are called "finance workers" from Ghana, and both the Moscow Cooperative Institute and the Soviet Industrial Technical Cooperative School accept officials of African cooperatives' for training. Recently, special courses in national economic planning have been added at the Friendship University (Czechoslovakia), in addition to special ten-week courses for Africans at the Central Cooperative School near Prague. East Germany has asked African cooperative societies to send students for training by the East German Association of Cooperative Societies.

The problems encountred by the Africans in the Communist satellites have been quite as serious as those cropping up in the Soviet Union. In August, 1962, for example, a small riot took place in Sofia, after Bulgarian youths assaulted African students for seeking white dancing partners in a public restaurant. And early in 1963

²³ Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, "Red Rivalry in the Black Continent," The Reporter, January 18, 1962, 23-25. See also: American Afro-Asian Educational Exchange, The Shattered Illusion: African Students in Communist Countries, N. Y., 1963; "Communist Failures with Foreign Students," Problems of the Peoples of the USSR, XVI, December 1962, 35-41; "Students in Bulgaria: New Friends and Old Opponents," Africa Today, X, March, 1963, 6-7, 15-16.

²⁴ Bass, op. cit., 101.

an Ethiopian student left Brno, Czechoslovakia, outraged at having been used as an instrument of propaganda at recurrent political demonstrations and rallies. Also early that year massive disorders jolted Bulgaria following official attempts to suppress an All-African Student Union, organized without government sanction in December, 1962; some 200 African students had to be dispersed by riot police and numerous arrests were made. Subsequently, more than 100 African students left the country or were expelled, some at the request of their own governments. In May, 1963, African students were beaten in broad daylight on one of Prague's principal thoroughfares, with the police standing by.

As far as activities in Africa are concerned, most successes by the Communist agents have been achieved in Guinea, Mali and Somalia, while Ghana's educational system also has been infiltrated. The Kremlin has presented Guinea with a complete Polytechnical Institute, claiming to be the largest establishment for teaching technology in Africa, with a library of 170,000 books, a stadium seating 25, 000, and a conference hall holding 700. In Ghana, Nkrumah's announcement to recruit lecturers in Soviet Russia and Poland led to angry demonstrations by African students (Dr. Jan Drownowski of the Polish Central School of Planning and Statistics was appointed, nevertheless, as Professor of Economics at Accra University in September, 1961). Later the government announced that the Soviet Academy of Sciences was to train Ghanian science teachers. In September, 1961, Prague announced that its Ministry of Education had been asked by the Mali Ministry of Education to reorganize completely the Mali educational system. Czechoslovakia is also building a technical college in Somalia. In April, 1961, a cultural agreement between Soviet Russia and Ethiopia provided for Soviet teachers to staff the science faculty at Addis Ababa University College. Moscow also promised to build and staff, as a gift, a technical school for 1.000 pupils.

PEKING INTEREST IN AFRICAN STUDENTS

In December, 1963, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai began an unprecedented "good-will" tour of ten African countries. On the way, he signed a "peace and friendship" declaration in Algeria, talked about economic development in Egypt and Ethiopia, and won diplomatic recognition for Communist China in Tunisia. At the end of the tour in February, 1964, Chou announed, "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa."

Most of the African heads of government to whom Chou talked came to power through revolution. Most consider themselves revolutionists still, most are eager to promote revolutions against remaining white-ruled African areas—and often against one another. They do not trust either Soviet Russia or mainland China, and in the few African countries where there is a Communist Party—about 8 in all—its leaders are usually in jail.²⁵ But the African nations unabashedly take Chinese and Soviet money and help, using such aid as leverage against Britain and the United States.²⁶

In their cultural propaganda, Soviet and Chinese activities often overlap in Africa, but are independent of each other. In recent years ever since the Sino-Russian rift they even conflict. But the Chinese drive is more reckless than that of the Kremlin, and enjoys many advantages over the Russians. Classified as "non-white," if not

²⁵ For details, see: Cooley, John K., East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive, Walker, New York, 1965; Zartman, I. William, "Communism in Africa," 165-194, in Kirkpatrick, Joane J., Ed., The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics, The Noonday Press of Farrar, Straus and Co., New York, 1963; Lessing, Pieter, Africa's Red Harvest, John Day, New York, 1962, Chapter 7, "Indoctrinating the Youth," 108-118; Botzaris, Alejandre, Communist Penetration in Africa, Lisbon, 1961; Union of South Africa, Report of the Select Committee on Suppression of Communism Act Enquiry, Printed by Order the House of Assembly, Parew, Cape, Cape Times, 1952; Asian People's Anti-Communist League, China, Communist China in Africa, Talpei, 1961; Bartlett, Robert E., Jr., Communist Penetration and Subversion of the Belgian Congo (1946-60), Acarn Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1962; Beck, Curt F., "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955-63," World Politics, XV, April, 1963, 403-416; Beynton, John, "The Communist Campaigns in Africa," New Commonwealth, August, 1962, 494-6; Evans, J. E., "Africa's Cuba," Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1961, 1-9; Grundy, Kenneth W., "Marxism-Leninism and African Underdevelopment; the Mali Approach," International Journal, XVII, Summer,1962, 300-304; Irvine, Keith, "Ghana: the Black Start State," Current History, XXXX, February, 1961, 88-92; Kolarz, Walter, "Communism in Africa: the West African Scene," Problems of Communism, X, November-December, 1961, 15-23: Kolarz, "The Impact of Communism on West Africa," International Affairs, XXXVIII, April, 1962, 156-169; Laqueur, Walter Z., "African Communism," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XII, March, 1963, 15-16; Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, July, 1961, 610-621; London, Jurt, "Communism in Africa: The Role of China," Problems of Communism, XI, July-August, 1962, 22-27; Schatten, Fritz, "Peking's Influence in Africa, Military Review, XXXXI, August, 1961, 51-55; Udochi, Julius Momo, "The Conflict Involving Communism in Mid-Africa," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXXXXII, July, 1962, 9-20; Lasky, Victor, The Ugly Russian, Trident Press, N.Y. 1965.

²⁶ Lasky, Victor, *The Ugly Russian*, Trident Press, N.Y., 1965, especially chapter 2, "Russian Gifts," 18-39 and 9, "Peking Safari," 173-199.

"colored," the Chinese are not as suspect as the Russians. As a non-European country, mainland China became a full participant in the Bandung Conference of 1955 (Soviet Russia was not allowed to join), and from 1955 onwards China has been accepted as a genuine member of the Afro-Asian bloc. Furthermore, China had suffered as a "colonial" power, and was able to throw off that oppression by her own efforts; this has earned for her a legitimate voice in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist councils. In addition, in African eyes, China is an underdeveloped country that is making rapid economic and industrial progress. In contrast, in African eyes, the USSR is a highly developed country after the European pattern. Chinese propaganda machinery is not at all reticent in reminding the African leaders that China's methods of development are applicable to African conditions. Day after day, the Chinese message pounds home three points: 1) We have a common background of backwardness and colonial oppression; 2) We have a common enemy (imperialism and colonialism); and 3) We have common ambitions (national independence and social progress).27

Interestingly enough, up to 1955, Communist China had negligible influence on even the African operations of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) or on any other worldwide front organization—with the exception of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students.²⁸

Then the Chinese broke through in Africa, first in the diplomatic area and later in organized political influence. Diplomatically, the first successful step was the Bandung Conference of Asian-African states in April, 1955. This conclave saw the meeting of Premier Chou En-lai with President Nasser, which led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and China in 1956. Organizationally, the bridgehead for political activities in Africa was established when the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference met in Cairo in December, 1957, and founded a permanent secretariat there.

Since then, Peking's propaganda in Africa has had two main objectives. The first is to induce Africans to embrace Chinese Communist theory, especially the doctrine of violent revolution against Western influence in all its forms "as part of a world-wide struggle

²⁷ Lessing, op. cit., 42.

²⁸ Lowenthal, Richard, Chapter 5, "China," 142-203, in Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Ed., Africa and the Communist World, Stanford University Press, California, 1963, 150.

against U.S. imperialism and racism." The second objective is to force the Russians and other communist satellites out of their positions of control in international communist fronts and organizations for African students, workers, youth, journalists, women, lawyers, doctors and "peace workers" and to replace them with Chinese-dominated organizations (as one aspect of the larger Chinese design to control the entire world Communist movement).²⁹

Most of the control organs were founded in 1960 and 1961. One of the least publicized is the Committee for the Support of Afro-Asian Liberation Movement (which distributes military aid to armed forces of the liberation movements). The Chinese Institute of African Affairs trains African Communist Party cadres. Well publicized, in contrast, is the Chinese-African Peoples' Friendship Society, which arranges cultural and economic exchanges; it organizes each year an "African Freedom Day" on April 15, at which routine speeches are made by Chinese and Africans in Peking. The Committee for Cultural Relations with African Peoples controls all Chinese communist agents in various fields sent to Africa.³⁰

As far as African students are concerned, "few Chinese activities in Africa are as important in their possible future impact as the training of African students in China," reports Cooley. "All over Africa, from Casablanca to Capetown... Peking is engaged in a propaganda effort on the African continent that is probably unprecedented anywhere, unless perhaps by the Soviet propaganda in Eastern Europe after the Second World War." ³¹

Following Soviet practices, Communist China has been importing foreign students. But, as in Soviet Russia, this grand scheme has not been too successful. Apparently, the African students started to resent racial discrimination very soon. The African visitors were reported to have complained about prohibitions against their shopping at stores open to other foreigners. In 1961, four Sudanese students refused to remain in China for the full 7-year course at the end of the first year, complaining about discrimination, the limiting of their travel outside Peking to 19 miles, and of not being allowed to mix with Chinese students or to attend regular students' meetings. March of 1962 saw a riot that started with an argument between a Zanzibar student and a Chinese outside a Peking hotel.

²⁹ Cooley, John K., East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive, Walker, N. Y. 1965, 194.

³⁰ Ibid., 194-5.

³¹ Ibid., 193.

TERMINATION OF SINO-RUSSIAN STUDENT EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Of interest is that another fraternal link between Moscow and Peking was broken in October, 1966, when a chilly Soviet government protest set the new tone of official animosity between the neighboring communist powers. The last of the Chinese students assigned for study in the Soviet Union left Moscow under a Soviet expulsion order, waving their little red handbooks containing the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung from the windows of their departing train. The Chinese charge d'affaires, Chang Teh-Tsuem, drove to Moscow's Yaroslavsky Station to wish them well with final embraces and handshakes.³²

The departure of the 55 Chinese students marked a particularly significant rupture in party relations, for the exchange of students among fraternal communist countries holds high priority in ideological indoctrination programs and plans of the communist world.

The expulsion order was announced in retaliation for the Chinese expulsion of Soviet students and other foreign students in September, 1966. It promptly led to demonstrations. The students sang the Communist anthem, "The Internationale," in Chinese on Moscow's station platform. Then one of the group led them in signing "the East is Red," the new battle hymn of the Chinese Red Guards. "No Soviet officials were in evidence to see them off, though lines of policemen hovered discreetely in the background to intervene in case of trouble..." 33

It is true that Red China's attempts to penetrate Africa have recently received a severe setback... except in Tanzania, Zanzibar, Congo (Brazzaville) and Somalia. But the danger point has by no means been passed. In 1958, Peking had only one diplomatic mission in Africa—in the United Arab Republic; but early in 1966 Peking had 14 African Embassies, despite its expulsion from Burundi, Central African Republic, and Dahomey. Radio broadcasts to Africa have now risen to 112 hours a week, and the continent has been flooded with excellently produced magazines, such as China Reconstructs, very often selling at less than the cost of postage. A channel of Communism into Nigeria remains; the Niger Youth Union is a member of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in Budapest and the International Union of

³² Grose, Peter, "Soviet and China End Another Link," New York Times, October 28, 1966.

³³ Ibid.,

Students (IUS) in Prague. And Peking has been persistent in sighting new targets for future Communist subversion. This comes despite political upheavals at home and recent dismal defeats of its revolutionary thrusts abroad. Eritrea, for instance, a territory lying along the Red Sea's west coast, and Rwanda, bordering Lake Tanganyika, can both expect Communist agitation to accelerate. By United Nations action in 1952, Eritrea was federated with Haile Selassie's empire; now an anti-Ethiopian separatist movement in Eritrea is getting Peking's backing. And Chinese propaganda blasts against President Gregoire Kayibanda of Rwanda are suddenly charging that he is "a puppet of the Belgian and United States neo-colonialists" and is supported by the reactionary regime of Israel and the Chiang Kai-shek group."

These accusations could have been predicted; they were identical to labels hung on him by a group of far-left Afro-Asian writers who met in the summer of 1966 in Peking. At that time the writers forecast these new Chinese Communist targets in Africa. Now the trouble is beginning to surface.³⁴

³⁴ Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1966.

FROM MOSCOW'S IZVESTIA TO WASHINGTON'S POST

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, which was celebrated for a week up to November 7, 1967, disclosed a number of instructive items. There was the disclosure of Moscow's orbital missile, the firmness of its anti-American policy, particularly in Vietnam, the single-man ascent of Brezhnev, the continued concentration on capital and war goods as against consumer goods production, and the persistent attempt on the part of the Soviet Russian totalitarians to exercise their superior leadership over the world Communist Party movement. As concerns the last, this would only be a political and ceremonial reaffirmation of the primary power position of the Russian center in the Soviet Union in relation to all other states in the Red Empire, including mainland China, and also in relation to the Communist Parties in the Free World.

But significant, too, were the comments and observations made of this "50th" by American commentators, journalists, and periodical writers. In fact, this aspect constituted the prime disclosure of the event. Without itemizing the popular magazines, such as Life and Look, and detailing their specific comments, it is sufficient here to point out that their uncritical handling and assessment of the facts provided Moscow with a billion dollar propaganda windfall. Their comments on "Russia's economic progress" these past fifty years, its mighty armed forces and space exploits, its slow evolution toward "capitalist" ways of thinking and doing and similar matters can all be taken as superficial and devoid of perspective and meaning. Reading some of these accounts, one would think that these accomplishments were effected without incalculable and irrational costs in lives and economic value, as though fifty years of Soviet Russian totalitarianism and imperio-colonialism were unblemished by genocide, concentration camps, man-made famine, the cruelest forms of oppression and continuous aggression.

Most important in this interesting episode was the almost complete neglect shown by our commentators and writers toward the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. The average American reader of these popular magazines wouldn't think they even existed. On the basis of what was presented to him in these magazines and several newspapers, he couldn't possibly entertain the thought that there exists any such thing as Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism within the Soviet Union itself. Some of our writers haven't even a working awareness of the multi-national nature of the USSR, no less its empire-state character. To cite one example, a columnist refers to Red China and the USSR as "two very large nations," evidently completely ignorant of the fact that since 1963 the Red Chinese, who can boast of a national entity, have been attacking Moscow on the Russian/captive non-Russian scale in the USSR.¹ In the same organ, another summarizes the event in this vein: "But the whole thrust of the celebrations was aimed at boosting Brezhnev's image as if it was felt that the nation needs a stronger voice than merely a collective one." ²

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

As this writer has constantly stressed, one of the most formidable weapons at the disposal of Moscow in the Cold War is the protracted ignorance of numerous opinion-makers in this country concerning the make-up, policies, and strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union, which is dominated by the Soviet Russian totalitarians. If fundamental concepts of state and nation, Russian and non-Russian, elude them, what worth can we impute to their interpretations and higher formulations? As I show in my current work, the ultimate responsibility for this general state of confusion and misinformation rests with our Government where similar misleading conceptions abound. Time is short in getting to know your enemy — Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism — and it is our Government, not the universities and their time-lengths, that can achieve this in the shortest possible period.

In offsetting the untruths and fantasies built about the Russian Bolshevik "50th," Americans of Ukrainian ancestry can well take pride in their World Congress in New York during the week of November 12-19. The full-page ads in *The New York Times* related the

¹ Richard Wilson, "Soviet Union Playing Long-Haul Power Game," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., November 8, 1967.

² Bernard Gwertzman, "Curtain Falls Quietly on Soviet Jubilee," *The Evening Star*, November 8, 1967.

³ Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*, Pageant Press, New York, 1967, pp. 454.

essential story of Soviet Russian conquest and domination of Ukraine. The demonstration in front of the United Nations building was most impressive and received TV, radio, and news coverage. And the rally in Madison Square Garden, attended by some 13,000, was a tremendous highlight which preceded the march to the Soviet U.N. Mission. The demonstration at the mission produced another highlight of the Congress. On record, no other American group in this country equalled this massive protest against the fraudulence and pretensions of the Russian Bolshevik revolution.

Judging by reports from other sections of the country, the AP and UPI release on this mammoth demonstration were carried in local newspapers and over TV and radio media. In performing this feat, Americans of Ukrainian ancestry have, in effect, done their share at this time in pointing to the real enemy whose tentacles reach into places like Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Egypt. This powerful, yet from another viewpoint, fragile enemy is Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, which was given birth to by the Russian Bolshevik revolution.

However, the Congress and the demonstrations were far more positive than negative. The negation of the Russian Bolshevik "50th" was only one major aspect of this memorable event. More important and consequential was the positive affirmation of the continuous Ukrainian National Revolution and the launching of the patriotic, national "50ths," commencing with the 50th Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence on January 22, 1968. This will be followed by the Lithuanian "50th" in February and numerous others through the Latvian "50th" in November, all pointing to the present captivity of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. In short, all of this is interwoven with the whole captive nations thesis as set forth in the Congressional Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) and as expounded by participating groups annually in the Captive Nations Week Observance.

THE IZVESTIA ATTACK

What has been described in the preceding sections is only a further projection of the fundamental problem of U.S. policy toward

^{4 &}quot;Ukrainian National Revolution vs. Russian Bolshevik Revolution!," The New York Times, November 16, 19, 1967.

^{5 &}quot;Ukrainians Protest Slavery," Daily News, New York, November 18, 1967.

^{6 &}quot;Stepping Out for Freedom," Sunday News, New York, November 19, 1967.

⁷ "Police Repulse 2,000 Marchers at Soviet U.N. Mission," *The New York Times*, November 19, p. 1, 4; "Cops Break Up Charge on UN Soviet Mission," *Sunday News*, p. 21.

the USSR. Controversy and debate over this problem have centered on the Captive Nations Week since its inception in July, 1959, and its chief premise that the captive nations in toto are of paramount value to U.S. strategy and tactics in the Cold War. In the summer of 1967 a new episode developed in this continuing battle envolving, as so often in the past, colonialist Moscow and a prominent American newspaper organ. The details of this outstanding episode begin with an attack against the Week and also this writer in Moscow's government newspaper Izvestia and extend to this day with an open challenge to the editors of The Washington Post. A familiarity with these details can enable one to see and appreciate the urgent need for a thorough U.S. review of its present policy toward the USSR.

It is highly significant that as in every preceding year since 1959, Moscow again decided to inveigh against Captive Nations Week. Sarcasm, vituperative bitterness, and sheer vehemence have consistently punctuated its attacks. Here are several samples of 1967 vintage under the caption "A Champion Cynic." Manifesting some sardonic humor, the attack begins in this fashion: "In the United States of America, at Georgetown University, a world record has been established. It was established not by a runner or swimmer, not even by a spaghetti eater, but by Professor Lev Dobriansky, a big wheel in the American propaganda machinery and Chairman of the so-called National Committee on Captive Nations."

The attack assumes a more serious tone in the next paragraph. "The point is that the Washington rulers celebrate each year in July a propaganda spectacle called 'Captive Nations Week,' which sets people's 'teeth on edge.'" After talking about "the emigre scum," "capitalism" and the like, the frustrated writer interjects, "Usually, prominent government leaders of the U.S.A. shed a few tears, too." The commentary continues: "This time, the approach of the notorious 'Week' is being widely commented on by the American reactionary press. During the past years the 'Week' has been in crisis and passing without effect, the anti-Communists complain; it is necessary, from nice words on liberty to change to deeds. They even blame Washington for not showing a firm determination to support 'the peoples of the captive nations.' Something new is needed, they say." Although it cannot be denied that the Administrations since 1959 have feared a courageous implementation of the Resolution and thus have toned down the presidential proclamations, there is obviously much wishful thinking here about the Week being in crisis and the cry for some-

⁸ Izvestia, July 7, 1967.

thing new. By all evidence, the Week has expanded in scope, both nationally and internationally, and constantly represents the new alternative to the threadbare policy pursued toward the USSR and the entire Red Empire.

Among other things mentioned in this attack is Vietnam, evidently a source of irritation to Moscow when properly brought into the captive nations context. "It is here," the attack continues, "that Professor Dobriansky established his record. It would be a record in stupidity if it was not a record in cynicism." Why? Because in "the center of attention of the 'Week,' Dobriansky has declared, referring to the wishes of the Washington leadership, there will be this year 'the disastrous condition of the 17 millions of enslaved North Vietnamese." 9 In truth, this was highlighted during the 1967 Week, and it is encouraging to witness its effects in terms of wider discussion about invading North Vietnam, not by American troops but rather by South Vietnamese guerrillas and some regulars. North Vietnam is a captive nation, and its enslaved millions are the ultimate key to victory over the totalitarian Hanoi regime. They are also the key to a unified and independent Vietnam. Should all this come to pass, the 1967 Week would have accomplished its purpose, indeed.

THE POST ATTACK

Three days later, on July 10, the editors of *The Washington Post* also came forward with a blistering editorial attack against the Week and this writer. The striking parallel here causes one to lean toward the apt characterization of yesteryear "The Washington Pravda," which would have made for an even more attractive title. However, regardless of the vicious editorial against my person, I deem such a characterization unfair. The *Post* is more than its editors and owner, and although Senator McCarthy often relished using this characterization, he certainly didn't grasp the issue at hand in his time. Moreover, many reporters and others at the *Post* are at variance with the paper's editorial opinions, and surely the type of editorial produced here scarcely reflects well on those responsible for it. The *Post's* July 10, 1967 editorial is a classic in irresponsible and unenlightened journalism and deserves to be read in full. Here it is: 10

⁹ Complete text of *Izvestia* article is quoted in *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, October 1-15, 1967, p. 85.

^{10 &}quot;Captive Congressmen," editorial, The Washington Post, July 10, 1967.

CAPTIVE CONGRESSMEN

Captive Nations Week is almost upon us, and so it's time to pine again for Idel-Ural, Turkestan, White Ruthenia and — don't forget — good old Cossackia. These pseudo-states and others of better historical repute are listed in Congress' Captive Nations Resolution as having lost their "national independence" to the wicked Communists. "The people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence," in case you didn't know.

This fanciful cold-war rhetoric was issued by Congress in 1959 in a surge of hysterical anti-communism. Or rather, it was issued by ethnic manipulator Lev Dobriansky, father of the Captive Nations idea, and foisted by him upon a Congress sensitive to the presumed sentiments of Americans from now-Communist lands. Actually, many of these Americans, if not most of them, are insulted by being treated as hyphenated citizens. The annual Captive Nations charade might better be called Captive Congressmen Week.

Its aspect of ethnic discrimination is particularly offensive. For, it turns out, Russia is not among the Captive Nations. The reason for this strange omission is that Mr. Dobriansky's heart belongs to his ancestors' native Ukraine, and Ukrainian nationalism is nothing if not anti-Russian. This is, in our view, precisely the kind of old-country ethnic backbiting that has no place in a gambit designed to influence American policy.

To those who do not share faith that Captive Nations Week will crack the Kremlin, Mr. Dobriansky has prepared an insidious rebuttal. "High on the priority list in Red psycho-political warfare," he has written, "is the downgranding and eventual elimination of Captive Nations Week." The technique of attributing criticism to foreign manipulation is, unfortunately, typical.

To his credit, President Johnson has shown some embarrassment over the Resolution, which "authorizes and requests" him to proclaim Captive Nations Week annually. He has avoided specifying which countries are Captive Nations and has stressed instead American support for the "just aspirations" of peoples everywhere. Clearly, Mr. Johnson rejects the Resolution's tenet that "Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence." He believes, as most Americans do, that all available openings to East-West peace and stability should be explored.

Having had long experience with the Post's treatment of letters-to-the-editor, I had but one choice in the immediate situation. That was to send the editors'a short letter establishing formally our exchange and at the same time offering a concrete challenge. Again on the basis of past experience with the ostensibly liberal minds in command of the paper, I anticipated correctly that neither my brief letter nor critical letters from others would be published in the pages of the Post. This turned out to be the case, but other avenues of publication were managed for the most essential letters of criticism. Reproduced here is my immediate letter, which is self-explanatory,

and then we can proceed from it to a systematic evaluation of the *Post's* substantive opinions and the challenge it raises:¹¹

Aside from its malicious overtones, your July 10 editorial on "Captive Congressmen" is so absurb, both logically and empirically, that I am fully convinced my forthcoming book on *The Vulnerable Russians* will be of enormous value to you. Scheduled for publication release this October as "An American Answer to the '50th' — The Fraudulent Russian Bolshevik Revolution," the work will not only place imperio-colonialist Moscow on notice that not all Americans, by a long shot, are fools as concerns its empire in the USSR itself, but it will also, I am sure, be a permanent answer to you and other segments of Moscow's-induced breed of Pavlovian dogs in our country.

Having had long experience with your letter-cutting and omitting techniques because of "want of space" and other convenient rationalizations — in itself scarcely a symbol of journalistic honesty — I offer here a simple, formal challenge which I raised publicly on July 15 at the Captive Nations Conference in the Mayflower Hotel. It is a challenge for you to receive some elementary education on Soviet-Russian imperio-colonialism. Simply, I challenge you to arrange a discussion meeting in the *Post's* auditorium, which would bring you face-to-face with living victims of Soviet-Russian imperio-colonialism from Idel-Ural, Turke-stan, White Ruthenia, and Cossackia.

It doesn't require much courage to shield one's ignorance behind an editorial pen and continue to misinform your readers about the true nature of the USSR. Let us see how courageous you are in meeting these people — whom you think are ghosts without a national background of independence struggle — before the audience of the *Post's* personnel who, in this setting, would have the opportunity to gauge the level of their editors' understanding of this vital problem. Here, too, I am confident that quite a number of our citizens will be interested in your response to this challenge.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY,
Professor, Georgetown University,
Chairman, National Captive Nations Committee

AN EDITORIAL OF IGNORANCE

Comparing the *Izvestia* article and the *Post* editorial, the reader by now is doubtless impressed by their similarities in tone, character, and content. The *Post* editorial might well have been written in Moscow except that the motivation of the Russian totalitarians would be one of circumspect distortion rather than blind ignorance. The editorial is, indeed, one of ignorance. A highly reputable organ run by Americans of Armenian ancestry, which was not given a hearing by the *Post's* editors, goes a bit further by saying, "The offending editorial is really not an editorial; it is a cartoon in the worst pos-

¹¹ Lev E. Dobriansky, "Letter to the Editor of The Washington Post," Congressional Record, September 14, 1967, p. H11920.

sible taste calculated to destroy an issue by the application of the great American belly-laugh." ¹² It is also an insult to our legislators for, as *Hairenik* states further, the editorial "has caricatured not only their motivation in expressing their warm support of the common cause of the Captive Nations of the Soviet, but has in effect cavalierly scorned the sacred aspirations to be free (as *The Washington Post* is free) of 119,000,000 non-Russians who, today, in a classic syndrome of colonialism, are dominated by a minority of 96,000,000, the Russians of the Soviet Union."

Now, point by point, let's examine this editorial cartoon. First, brushing aside its silly sarcasms and belly-laughs, we meet at the outset a defnitive statement that Idel-Ural, Turkestan, White Ruthenia, and "good old Cossackia" are pseudo-states which really shouldn't be listed in the Captive Nations Week Resolution. Mind you, this is the last word of precise knowledge from literary artisans who know there are no such animals in the human kingdom as "the wicked Communists." This first argument alone reveals how pathetically ignorant the editors are. Historically, each of these national entities staked out an independent state in the 1917-23 period. This isn't the place to teach them history, but if they would move their lazy minds, a quick reading of Idel-Ural and its revolution in 1917 would show the writers how foolish they really are.¹³ Analytically, they also don't make sense. White Ruthenia is Byelorussia, a Republicstate in the USSR. Then, even if all four had never attained to statehood, they possess more national substance than can be found in most states of Africa; and the Resolution talks about captive nations, not states. The vital distinction between nation and state is obviously too heavy for our omniscient editors.

Regarding these national entities, the views expressed by the many who sent their letters to the *Post's* editors, only to have them liberally suppressed from publication, make for some choice reading. One, for example, after having cited the population of each of these entities, states, "In 1918, they were all proclaimed independent National Republics and were on the road to rebuilding their countries before being brutally destroyed by Russia in the name of "world Communism." A young scholar at Columbia University, who has

¹² "The Washington Post: A Captive Organ," The Hairenik Weekly, Congressional Record, September 14, 1967, p. H11921.

¹³ "Anniversary of First Revolution, By Captive Nations," Congressional Record, November 13, 1967, pp. H15120-22.

¹⁴ Walter Tutka, Letter-to-the-Editor, Congressional Record, September 14, 1967, p. H11921.

written Marxism and Existentialism, published by Doubleday, strikes a point in his suppressed letter: "Before becoming comic about Idel-Ural and Turkestan, it would be wise to remember that no more than two hundred years ago America was a tiny, backward nation whose struggle for national independence evoked a sarcastic smile on the faces of the 'sophisticates' of Britain and Europe. 15 Need more be said about the Post's "sophisticates?"

Aside from the childish, personal slur, the second point made in the editorial is that the Resolution is "fanciful cold-war rhetoric" issued in "a surge of hysterical anti-communism." This interpretation is far removed from the facts. Anyone who knows the facts of the quiet and deliberative passage of the resolution in Congress, the explosion in Moscow, and Khrushchev's apoplectic harangues over this event, cannot but wonder where our editors hibernated at the time, and even since then. Theirs is a sad case of misplaced hysteria. As Hairenik accurately points out, "the Post apparently is unaware that since 1959 the Soviet Government has directed an intensive worldwide propaganda effort against the Captive Nations cause, for there is no doubt in the least that the Achilles heel of the Soviet is its captive world—and the Kremlin knows this." 16 Offering a concise historical background on Russian imperialism from the days of Muscovy, another suppressed letter stresses that "the idea of the Week has transcended our own leaders and promises to awaken countless other individuals and nations to the historical character of Russian imperio-colonialism." 17

The Post's third point is clearly an argument of desperation, which it attempted to use during "the Shevchenko affair" in 1963-64. Because of the resolution, it holds that most Americans who come from now-Communist lands "are insulted by being treated as hyphenated citizens." This supposedly brilliant argument ignores completely the experiences these citizens have to offer for our benefit and security, the heavy participation of native Americans in the annual Week, and the mythical nature of the argument itself. As one letter pointedly states, "Yearly observances indicate that Americans from all walks of life participate in observances and express their support

¹⁵ Walter Odajnyk, Letter-to-the-Editor, The Ukrainian Bulletin, October 1-15, 1967, p. 88.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. H11921.

¹⁷ Walter Pretka, Letter-to-the-Editor, Congressional Record, August 1, 1967, p. A3898.

of the traditional American principles for freedom and independence of nations." ¹⁸ It then drives home the additional observation, "During the last Israel-Arab conflict, American Jews supported Israel 100%. I have not seen anything that stated or even implied that they were 'hyphenated' citizens. American Irish actively supported Ireland's struggle for independence, without being accused of 'hyphenated' citizenship or 'old-country ethnic backbiting.'" Evidently, the *Post* reserves its argument only for those who oppose the Russian colonialists

Another suppressed letter dwells on this same point in this vein: "Only the *Post* could conjure up a 'hyphenated citizen.' Benjamin Franklin, one of this country's founding fathers, is credited with the view that anyone ashamed of his forebears could add little to our country. This would certainly discredit hyphenated citizenship, not to mention the editor's mythical non-ethnic origins." The classic Coolidge statement on immigrants and Americanism could be thrown in for added measure.

Going from the absurd to the ridiculous, the Post now charges "ethnic discrimination" in the resolution because Russia is not mentioned and, with baseless reference to the writer, "Ukrainian nationalism is nothing if not anti-Russian." The conqueror of other nations is scarcely qualified for such listing, no more than a circle is a square. Also, to be anti-Russian imperio-colonialist does not mean being anti-Russian as concerns the Russian people at large, who have been captive in another sense for literally 500 years, namely to barbaric Russian institutions of tyranny, genocide, and imperialism. As another suppressed statement puts it, "The Post, consciously or not, upholds the foundation of the Russian empire, with all its ugly and inhuman features, including anti-Semitism. No wonder that in past years The Post's policy on the captive nations was praised by the Communist press within the Soviet Union." 20 Hairenik again sums it up in good humor, "Let us here draw a smile. To list Russia as a Captive Nation would be to have listed England with India, Uganda, Kenya etc., etc., among the territories of the British Empire which were candidates for decolonialization!" 21

¹⁸ O. Szczudluk, Letter-to-the-Editor, Congressional Record, September 14, 1987, p. H11920.

¹⁹ Vera A. Dowhan, Letter-to-the-Editor, Congressional Record, July 25, 1967, p. H9326.

²⁰ Peregrinus, "The Washington Post and Captive Nations," Congressional Record, September 14, 1967, p. 11920.

²¹ Ibid. p. H11921.

In essence, Ukrainian nationalism is no different from American nationalism and scores of others that brought independence from a foreign, imperialist power and for the self-determination of people. One of the suppressed letters puts this cogently, "In the days when more African peoples have won their independence, to deny the right to freedom for Ukraine, Armenia... is a contradiction to the concept of universal freedom and justice which is talked about so much in the free world nowadays."²² What the writer is unaware of is the fact that the *Post* operates on a double politico-moral standard.

The Post's further contention that this writer "has prepared an insidious rebuttal" on the downgrading of the Week and "attributing criticism to foreign manipulation" can be disposed of briefly. It is a figment of their own imagination. However, as the record well shows, it is interesting to observe how the Red totalitarians, the Kennans, The Post, and a few others have shared the same objective. And, finally, its adulation of the President's omission of the countries specified in the resolution and his ostensible rejection of the resolution's tenet that "Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence" is also largely inflated. From Eisenhower to the present, identical omissions have been made chiefly because of a fear of irritating the Bear and not knowing how to implement the resolution. As for the second item, it would be absorbing, to say the least, to see the President openly support The Post's statement at face value.

It may astound the editors to learn that we, too, are for a genuine "peaceful coexistence," not the present Russian ersatz type, and for openings to East-West peace and stability, but based on principle, truth, and expanded freedom, not blind and obscurantist impulses. As a suppressed letter states it, "We do not believe, however, that such an exploration should be on the account of the captive nations in tightening their captivity, but rather in supporting their right to freedom and self-determination." As another suppressed one views it, "Peaceful coexistence may be a tempting policy—but if it means peace at any price, then it is certainly a prelude to war..." And as a last suppressed one puts it, "The National Captive Nations Committee is in the forefront of a people-to-people program for peace and stability—much more so than the Post—for NCNC dares to mention the forgotten peoples—those in the USSR!"

²² Walter Tutka, op. cit., p. H11920.

²³ O. Szczudluk, op. cit., p. H11920.

²⁴ Walter Odajnyk, op. cit., p. 88.

²⁵ Vera A. Dowhan, op. cit., p. H9326.

The reader has noticed my challenge to the editors of the Post, contained in my suppressed letter of July 17, 1967. "I challenge you," it read, "to arrange a discussion meeting in the Post's auditorium, which would bring you face-to-face with living victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism from Idel-Ural, Turkestan, White Ruthenia, and Cossackia... Let us see how courageous you are in meeting these people — whom you think are ghosts without a national background of independence struggle—before the audience of the Post's personnel who, in this setting, would have the opportunity to gauge the level of their editors' understanding of this vital problem." ²⁶

THE OUTSTANDING CHALLENGE

In view of the *Post's* editorial, this, you will agree, is a most reasonable challenge. To this day, there hasn't been a whimper from the editors concerning it. Just stony silence. Meanwhile, able representatives of these national entities have stood ready to engage in such a constructive discussion. Their counterparts in the Soviet Union may be muted by Russian tyranny, but here no one will mute them, least of all the *Post's* editors. The challenge is outstanding.

The double standard of the *Post* should be recognized by all. When, for example, its editors sharply criticize the Greek Junta for curbing free speech and assert "That is hardly the behavior of a government prepared to let its opposition speak," the integrity of its words can be properly weighed on the scale of its own policy and behavior.²⁷ So, too, captive non-Russians in the USSR speak out at times and are arrested and confined to forced labor, and Americans who keep abreast of all this, also speak out in criticism of our Government's inept policy toward the USSR. By all means, let the opposition speak, but everywhere and not just those areas determined by double-standard judgments. In behalf of opposition speech, I repeat, the challenge still remains outstanding.

²⁶ Ibid. p. H11920.

^{27 &}quot;The Right Direction," Editorial, The Washington Post, October 9, 1967.

RELIGION IN THE USSR AND EAST EUROPE: A FOOTNOTE TO THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The usually careful and correct Catholic Encyclopedia, in its new edition, has run somewhat wild in the treatment of religion in Eastern Europe and the Slavic lands over the past millenium. Two articles especially invite attention. The first begins with the introduction of Christianity in what is called "Russia" and in East Europe generally. The second concentrates on the recent scene and focuses on religion in the Soviet Union since 1917 and the Bolshevik takeover.

This is a region of complex religious tradition and of conflicting historical accounts. There is special need to utilize the findings of the best modern scholarship in interpreting what has transpired over the centuries in matters religious between Orthodox and Catholic, between Christian and unbeliever. Careful interpretation and reporting become the more important since recently Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras I have met on friendly terms after their predecessors kept their distance mutually for nine centuries following the tragic events of 1054. Both Pope and Patriarch recognize that the intervening years have left differences that will take time to iron out. What follows is offered as a footnote to the articles in the New Catholic Encyclopedia in the hope that mutual understanding will thereby be furthered at this time.

There is still no agreement as to when Christianity first appeared in the Black Sea area and the Dnieper valley. We know that it did so before the division of the Roman Empire, into Eastern and Western in the fourth century. Old records tell us of the presence of bishops from the Kingdom of Bosporus (the Crimea) at some of the early Church Councils. Furthermore, the idea that there was

¹ New Catholic Encyclopedia. Prepared by an editorial staff at The Catholic University of America. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.

² Article, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," by J. Krajcar, op. cit., Vol. XIV, pp. 399-407.

³ Article, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Since 1917," by J. Chrysostomus Blaschkewitz, op. cit., Vol. XIV, pp. 408-412.

little or no intellectual or cultural relationship between the Greek and other settlements and the natives has now been abandoned as impossible. It seems certain that the warfare between the Rus of Tmutorokan Rus (the peninsula of Taman) and Byzantium began before the destruction of the Byzantine colonies on the Black Sea. Neither can we be sure that the tradition that St. Andrew the Apostle preached the Gospel in Scythia is entirely lacking in basis even if we do not accept all the details which the old chroniclers narrate.

Patriarch Photios (c. 820 - 891) tells us that the Rhos had already received a bishop and a priest about the time of the first attack of the Rus on Constantinople in the ninth century. Yet we have little definite information on that period, although we know that St. Methodius and his brother, Constantine the Philosopher, made several diplomatic missions to the area north of the Black Sea. Later the brothers went from Moravia to Rome for papal approval of their work which had come into conflict with the German missions. Constantine died in Rome (869) after receiving tonsure as Cyril, later to be known as a saint by that name. Since this was almost two centuries before the Great Schism (1054), we might expect to find traces of their work among the various Eastern Slavs.

We are on firmer ground when we come to the Rus-Varangian period. It is usually assumed that Rurik, a Scandinavian Viking leader, settled in Novgorod about 862 and there established control. Later in the century other members of his family moved down the Dnieper and came to play a predominant role in the organization of Kiev which already was an ancient settlement on the crossroads of trade routes from north to south and from Asia to Europe. The princes Askold and Dyr who preceded Prince Oleh perhaps were Christian Varangians. In any case, a church was built over their graves though they themselves still remain little more than names. However, in the Treaty of Oleh's son Ihor with the Greeks in 904, we can see that there were Christian Varangians who had taken the Christian oath, while the bulk of the Rus leaders were still pagan. The widow of Ihor, Queen Olha, definitely visited Constantinople in 957. She probably was baptized there although at the same time she attempted to maintain close relations with the Church of the West.

Because of the situation of the day she found this very difficult to accomplish. Christianity was still not the official religion of the state, although it seems obvious that the number of Christians was increasing significantly.

Olha's son and heir, Sviatoslav, was still a pagan. However, after his death at the hands of the Pechenegs, perhaps with By-

zantine connivance, her two grandsons, who were Christian, took over the throne. The third son Vladimir (Volodymyr) had been reared under pagan auspices and maintained his original faith. As intra-family feuds increased, Volodymyr retired to Scandinavia. He later returned with a new Varangian force, and established himself in Kiev in 980. Within ten years he felt the growing power of the Christian element and was himself baptized. He made Christianity the new state religion almost without opposition, although there were pagan revolts in Novgorod and the North. Volodymyr married the sister of Basil IV (the Bulgar-Slaver) and commenced the transformation of the state largely with the aid of Slavic-speaking Bulgarian monks. The first bishop was perhaps Nastas, a Slav from Korsun, but we hear later of a Metropolitan Ivan in the year 1000. The previous holding of this post by Mikhail and Leon is recorded so vaguely that it may be doubted. However, there were at least five bishops in the new state with sees in the larger cities. Volodymyr drew up at least the origin of an ecclasiastical statute, which perhaps consequent to Western influences or because of the general situation did not give the state supreme control over the Church as had been the case in Byzantium. Nor did it, on the other hand, provide for the subservience of the state to the Church.

When Volodymyr died (1015), there was again a period of intra-family troubles marked by the murder of two of his sons, Borys and Hlib, who were later canonized. Finally the throne was taken and held firmly by Yaroslav the Wise (978-1054), the most enlightened and powerful of the Kievan rulers. He established a school in the Cathedral of the Divine Wisdom, St. Sophia, on the pattern of Constantinople. He fostered in his people those cultural tendencies that were dominant in Byzantium but he also maintained close relations with the West and married his daughters to Western leaders, including the Kings of France, Norway, and Hungary. His sons made equally prominent marriages with daughters of Western rulers. Only one, Vsevolod, married a daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX. It was likewise in accord with Yaroslav's policy that after the death of the Metropolitan Theopempt, who had been appointed by the Patriarch, he encouraged the bishops to appoint Ilarion, a native-born citizen of Rus, and an outstanding scholar. He failed, however, to establish a definite system of succession for the kingdom and when he died in 1054, his realm began to fall apart.

Since this was the same year as the beginning of the Schism, it is hard to determine the role which that played in the quarrels

between the princes. Iziaslav, who succeeded to Kiev, soon found himself in trouble. To recover his throne, he secured the aid of the King of Poland and later of the Holy Roman Emperor and also of the Pope. However, his appeal to Rome seems to have been based upon plans for papal support rather than any question of the rite to be used in liturgical services, though both the Holy Roman Empire and Poland were naturally devoted to the Latin Rite. Later, toward the end of the eleventh century, Volodymyr Vsevolodovych, the ablest of the grandchildren of Yaroslav, married the daughter of the last Saxon King of England, Harold II. Yet Volodymyr's reforms could not stop the splitting of the realm. When Iziaslav II placed on the metropolitan throne Klement Smolyatych (in 1147) another citizen of Rus, the northern princes insisted that the metropolitan be named by the Patriarch.

Those Monomakhovyches who were ruling in Suzdal took advantage of the growing weakness and disunity and in 1169 Andrew Bogolubsky attacked and ravaged Kiev. But instead of trying to retain control of the city, he plundered it and returned with the booty to his northern capital. For all practical purposes, he separated the Suzdal-Moscow area from the fate of Kiev which continued to decline. It was then only natural that the Metropolitan in the course of the next century yielded to pressure and moved temporarily, and then permanently, to Moscow. Meanwhile, the more Western and Southern dioceses tried to secure the appointment of a specific Metropolitan as they began to move into the rising shadow of Lithuania, which was being formed over a wide area of the West, and of Poland which was extending its influence in Galicia-Halych.

The ruin was completed by the Mongol invasion when the Rus princes were defeated at the River Kalka in 1224, and more decisively by the Tatars on their great invasion of 1240, when they established at Serai on the middle Volga their capital of the Golden Horde and compelled all the Rus lands but Novgorod to pay tribute and to acknowledge their supremacy. Of these lands, Moscow was the most submissive, Halych the most rebellious.

The rulers of Halych definitely worked for the support of the Pope, and Daniel (Danylo) even secured papal coronation for himself. It was also in this period which followed the capture of Constantinople (1204) by the Fourth Crusade that the antagonism between the Eastern and Western Church became more bitter and the views of both sides more uncompromising.

When the Byzantines recovered their capital after the Crusade, their Empire, menaced by the Turks, was no longer what it had been. In the face of the rising West, and the Islamic advance, the Emperors and Patriarchs saw their final doom unless they could reweld the unity of Christendom. This was nominally secured at the Council of Florence. Yet the Eastern authorities could not carry their citizens along with them, so that the Union envisioned at Florence was not effective. In this turmoil Isidore, an educated Greek, was named Metropolitan of Moscow. However, he was summarily expelled by the Muscovite authorities, although he was able to occupy a new Metropolitan throne in the West in the Grand Principality of Lithuania. This event, as well as the capture of Constantinople, finally broke the close relations between Moscow and the Patriarch. Meanwhile, the marriage of Yagailo (Jagiello) of Lithuania and Queen Jadwiga of Poland strengthened the Catholic element in both states and aided in the decline of the Ukrainian Orthodox culture which was indeed running on its inherited capital.

All this fostered a new spirit in Moscow where a dangerous theory of cultural superiority began to grow, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This, in turn, gave rise to a new doctrine that Moscow was indeed the "Third Rome" and was destined to replace both old Rome and the "New Rome" (Constantinople), which had fallen prey to the infidels in 1453. Ivan IV was said to have rescued Moscow from the Moslem yoke, and had married Sophia Paleolog, who was hailed as heiress of the throne of Constantinople.

At the end of the fifteenth century the self-imposed isolation of Moscow was to a slight degree breached by the heresy of the Judaizers. This weird movement was preached apparently by a non-Talmudic Jew who had appeared from the south in Ukraine and had rapidly gone on to Lithuania and Moscow with his mixture of rationalism, a denial of the essential doctrines of Christianity, and a strange assortment of literature. Its influence in Ukraine was slight unlike that to the north. It was finally suppressed by Joseph Volokolamsky, a strong advocate of the state control of the church. He seemed to have been influenced by the Dominican clergy from Spain whom he had met in the Hanseatic settlements in Novgorod and the north, and his understanding of their stories of the Spanish Inquisition which he encouraged the Grand Prince of Moscow to introduce.

By the middle of the sixteenth century all Ukrainian religion was in a desperate situation and confronted by various ominous tendencies which threatened the traditional struggles of the Ukrainian people to maintain their independent position. The greatest and most pressing threat was the feeling of the Moscow rulers that they were the divinely ordained collectors of the "Russian lands," including all the areas that had been in the empire of Volodymyr and Yaroslav. They conquered and destroyed the independence and pretensions of Novgorod. Ivan the Terrible fought long and bitter wars to assert his control over the Byelorussian lands, and to impose his soulless system.

There was also growing pressure from Poland. That kingdom was indeed sharing in the Renaissance and the new learning. Moreover, it had welcomed the newly established Order of the Jesuits who on both Polish and Ukrainian territories established schools and colleges and emphasized the importance of using the Latin Rite and language in the Catholic Church. This position was favored by the King of Poland who had also been bothered by the appearance of various Protestant preachers and ideas. The Poles made themselves even more unpopular by restricting the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy in their traditional processions and the Ukrainian merchants by new commercial barriers.

At this crisis some of the more enlightened Ukrainian magnates like Constantine of Ostroh tried to establish an Academy in the newer style and to secure teachers directly from the ruined Byzantium. He was able to publish the Ostroh Bible (1581), the first printed Slavic Bible, but he realized the immensity of the larger task was beyond his strength. The Orthodox societies in the different cities also attempted to work along the same lines for the good of the people.

At this moment some of the Ukrainian bishops, perhaps with the approval of Constantine, revived the idea of creating a Slavic rite Ukrainian Catholic Church that would have the approval and protection of the Pope. An agreement to this effect was finally signed in Rome and it was proclaimed by the King at the Synod of Brest in 1596. However, this did not bring an end to the difficulties. The opponents of the Union who had secured the help of a rising Greek ecclesiastic, Cyril Lukaris, also obtained the help of the fiercely Orthodox Kozaks, bold raiders and fearless fighters whom the Polish Kings could neither placate, pay promised subsidies to, nor suppress. The Kozaks now claimed that the Union was merely an excuse to wipe out all traces of Ukrainian traditions. At one time the Union was in control of almost all the dioceses in Ukraine. But there was much unrest and fighting and finally after many unfortunate episodes, the Kozaks succeeded in forcing Orthodox bishops

into most of the sees in Ukraine, despite the efforts of the authorities. The Orthodox Academy in Kiev especially, under the direction of Metropolitan Peter Mohyla, a Moldavian by origin, developed into the most important school in the East Slavic world. It enjoyed prestige even in the ruined Empire where the writings of Mohyla, including his more balanced views on Orthodox theology largely expressed in Catholic terminology, were treated with respect.

In the meanwhile, after a series of troubles in the Muscovite state, Czar Alexei Mikhailovich (1629-1676) succeeded in restoring and improving the order left by his father Mikhail, the first ruler of the Romanov dynasty, who had died in 1645. Alexei reversed the contempt previously held for the Greeks. For a while he backed Patriarch Nikon of Moscow in his efforts to remodel the Russian Church on the Greek pattern but not before the fanatic admirers of the old order, especially Avvakum, had kindled a movement of the Old Believers and the Old Ritualists, who opposed any variations from what was supposed to be the faith of Moscow. Both Nikon (1605-1681) and Avvakum (1620/21-1682) became the victims of this struggle but many of the Kievan scholars began to be invited to Moscow.

The Kozaks under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (c. 1595-1657) now rose in revolt against the Poles. For a few years the Ukrainian state of the Hetmanate was an independent country. Yet Khmelnytsky saw himself compelled to seek Muscovite help against the Poles, so that step by step the new state fell completely under the control of Moscow. Its treaty privileges were more and more annulled until at the second half of the eighteenth century, Catherine II was able to wipe out all traces of Ukrainian independence. In the meanwhile the Czars had been able to secure the incorporation of the Ukrainian metropolitanate in the Patriarchate of Moscow without the permission of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This soon led to a sharp separation of the Church in Galicia and under Poland from that under Russia. As a result all the sees which had remained in Poland voluntarily joined the Union and this became the native church of the Western Ukrainians as had been planned at the time by the promoters of the Union. Henceforth, the fate of the Western Ukrainians was closely connected with the Ukrainian Catholic Church and it has so remained since that time.

With the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, the Byelorussian districts and most of Ukraine, except Galicia, fell to the share of Russia. The latter spared no device known to an

absolute monarchy to prove that the population was purely Russian Orthodox by origin, race and religion, and therefore could not be Catholic of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite.

The Russian monarchy imposed successively harder restrictions on the Catholic Church. While for the sake of its international reputation, it tolerated Roman Catholic Poles of the Latin Rite, in one district after another it wiped out by force the Union, seized the church buildings and cemeteries, and installed Russian Orthodox priests. In some parts of Kholm, for example, many of the faithful forthwith declared themselves Poles, though the great majority of the peasants submitted quietly to wait for newer and better times. In Galicia, which had fallen to Austria-Hungary, the Church found some defense. Particularly under Emperor Joseph II, the government took considerable pains to improve the education of the Ukrainian Catholic priests through various new educational institutions.

The difference in the conditions in the two parts of Ukraine can be seen by the difference in their Ukrainian revivals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In Eastern Ukraine the revival was carried on by various intellectual lay leaders like Ivan Kotliarevsky with his mock-heroic epic of the *Eneida* (Aeneid), a description of the wanderings of the Trojans depicted as exiled Kozaks. In Galicia the revival was led by the better educated priests, like Rev. Markian Shashkevych, who had discovered their own national and religious past. The ranks of the ardent Ukrainian leaders came to include the Ukrainian Catholic bishops like the great Metropolitan Count Andrew Sheptytsky who as Metropolitan of Halych was in the forefront of all movements to improve the conditions of his people spiritually, economically, and culturally in the first half of the twentieth century.

With the outbreak of World War I and the invasion of Galicia by a Russian army, the same processes were again called into play. All the Ukrainian Catholics were treated as members of the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was seized and carried away into Russia proper. Every effort was made to undo all Ukrainian work. Yet the period of the Russian occupation was too short to overturn everything and the Russians were forced to withdraw until the German and Austrian frontline ran across Eastern Ukraine. When the Russian Revolution commenced, it was the turn of the Russian Orthodox Church to suffer from the collapse of the Czarist regime. The Holy Synod, established in 1721 by Czar Peter, to provide for lay control of the Church, was abolished. The clergy

held a Synod and restored the old Patriarchal government with Archbishop Tikhon as Patriarch. With the advent of the Communists the Church was placed under heavy persecution. Tikhon was arrested and imprisoned. Hundreds of bishops and thousands of priests were executed or deported. The Russian churches abroad were divided into three main sections. A small number remained loyal to the central administration in the form allowed by atheistic Communism. The extreme Czarists left the country with the White Armies and became the Karlovytsky Synod, named after Karlovytsi, Yugoslavia, where King Alexander allowed them to settle as a Russian army. With World War II they moved to Germany. Many of them are now in the United States, as members of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. The rest of the Russian Orthodox in America declared themselves independent of the Communist regime. First under Metropolitan Plato, then Metropolitan Theophilus, and later under Metropolitan Leonty, they formed the Russian Orthodox Church of North America with its own institutions.

The Ukrainian Catholics of Galicia found their life under an independent Poland more difficult but they could still continue to keep their Catholic church until the destruction of Poland in World War II. With the Communist occupation of Western Ukraine a new period of trouble began. However, in 1941 the Communists were forced to evacuate and under Nazi Germany, equally hostile to religion, Ukraine suffered on until the return of the Communists in 1945. Immediately the new regime set itself to crush the last centers of Ukrainian Catholicism. The aged Metropolitan Sheptytsky died suddenly, and his successor, Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, was arrested with all other Ukrainian Catholic bishops, all of whom were tried and sentenced to hard labor. Metropolitan Slipy was released in 1963 and allowed to come to Rome, where he was made Archbishop-Major and a cardinal. The other Ukrainian bishops had died martyrs' deaths in one way or another. Today the Ukrainian Catholic Church can only exist officially and openly in the free world. Nevertheless, there is small doubt that there are many secretly faithful in Ukraine who hope and pray for better times.

We can only hope that the mutual withdrawal of the excommunications of 1054 will indeed be the beginning of a new and brighter future and of free religious worship in all the Slavic lands of Eastern Europe. Yet to understand the religious problems of the Ukrainians and the other Eastern Slavs, we must remember that the antagonism was largely fanned into extreme bitterness by the increasingly ar-

rogant demands of Moscow for supremacy. The antagonism was aggravated by the insistence of the Poles that acknowledgment of the power of the Pope involved almost automatically the abandonment of the long-standing efforts of the Ukrainian Metropolitans of Kiev to maintain their Byzantine Slavonic Rite and language. This was an important point which aroused as bitter opposition as the theological opposition between the Popes and the Patriarchs. This point is passed over by these two articles in the New Catholic Encyclopedia in its interpretation of the nine hundred years of struggle.

Neither article is free of the confusion that so often is found in discussions of the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe. This is especially true when it comes to references to Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

Whereas at the beginning, Ukraine is identified as Kievan Rus, or simply as Rus or Kiev, the author of the first article soon loses his poise by falling into linguistic traps. Thus, the noun and adjective "Russian" tends to be synonymous with "Ukrainian" or "Ruthenian." He writes, for example, of "Russian neophytes," "Russian Church organization," "Russian law" (Russkaia Pravda, the first code of laws promulgated by Prince Yaroslav the Wise), "Russian marriages," "Polish Halicz," "Southern and Western territories of Russia," "Western Russia," "Little Russia," and the like — all in reference to Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

Missing in both articles is a single Ukrainian source or reference. All references seemingly are from Russian, German, French or English sources. For instance, *Ukraine*: A Concise Encyclopaedia (University of Toronto Press, 1963) in its introductory article (pp.4-12) provides an exhaustive explanation of the origin of such names as Rus, Ruthenia and Ukraine. Consultation of this reference work would have assisted the authors through what can become a linguistic jungle to the less wary and informed.

It will remain a matter of regret that so important a subject as religion in Eastern Europe, that is, in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Lithuania and Russia, both before and after the revolution of 1917, and indeed from the beginning of the Christian era, has not been more adequately treated in a major Catholic reference work.

DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS

EDITOR'S NOTE: On November 16-19, 1967 the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, an important event in the modern history of Ukrainians, was held in New York City. Following are four basic documents, of six, issued by the World Congress: a) Resolutions; b) Memorandum to the U.N.; c) Appeal to Ukrainians outside Ukraine; d) Manifesto to the Ukrainian People. Two other publications are Captive Ukraine, and Ukrainians in the Free World. Some of the above publications have also been published in French and Spanish.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS

We, the accredited delegates of Ukrainian institutions and organizations in the free world, convened at the first World Congress of Free Ukrainians in the City of New York, seat of the United Nations, on the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th days of November 1967, on the 50th anniversary of our modern struggle for liberation and statehood, jointly and unanimously declare and resolve:

- I. WHEREAS, as a result of the subjugation of Ukraine and the national, religious, political, cultural, economic, and social oppression of the great and freedom-loving Ukrainian people by its invading neighbors, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who fled the homeland and settled abroad, have set as their goal aiding their people in the struggle for freedom and independence;
- II. WHEREAS, the Ukrainian settlers in the free countries have, from the very beginning of their resettlement, organized Ukrainian communities, and, enjoying freedom and unlimited opportunities, established numerous national, religious, cultural, scientific, educational, women's students,' economic and other establishments and organizations, which nurture and develop our own language and culture, our own national and religious traditions, thus enriching the treasure of the Ukrainian people, as well as the treasures of their countries of domicile.

III. WHEREAS, residing in the countries of the free world, and enriching them with their spiritual creativity and material acquisitions, the Ukrainian settlers have never lost a profound sense of an unbreakable historical, spiritual and cultural bond between themselves and the Ukrainian people in the homeland; they have shared their people's joys and tribulations, and their main purpose remains: to give undiminished aid to their own people, so as to restore unto them the lost freedom and independence, for which they are struggling without surcease. The Ukrainians in the free world protest in highest indignation against the spiritual and physical genocide being perpetrated upon the Ukrainian people by communist Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine and introduction of its system of total enslavement and terror.

- IV. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings and irrefutable facts, we, the accredited representatives of Ukrainian communities in the free world, assembled in this World Congress of Free Ukrainians, solemnly and unanimously resolve:
- 1. With all our power and means, and within the laws of the countries of our domicile, to aid the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom and independence toward the reestablishment of an independent, united, democratic Ukrainian State.
- 2. To use all necessary means to win the favor and help of the nations and governments of the countries of our domicile for the cause of these just aspirations of the Ukrainian people.
- 3. To keep, maintain, develop and tighten the spiritual and cultural bonds with the freedom-loving Ukrainian people.
- 4. Within the Ukrainian communities of the free world, to keep, maintain and develop our national, historical and religious traditions, our language and culture, and thereby enrich the cultures of the countries of our domicile.
- 5. To expose and condemn subversive communist activities and the communist threat to the countries of our domicile, because this will indirectly help strengthen the front of the freedom-loving nations against Moscow tyranny. To expose and oppose the designs of Moscow in its attempts to infiltrate and disintegrate Ukrainian communities in the countries of our domicile by devious means, and particularly under various pretexts of sending delegations from the USSR.
- 6. With all our power and means, to aid the growth of our Churches, civic, scientific, economic, educational, labor, women's, young people's, students', professional, publishing, charitable and other institutions and organizations, which provide us with a spiritual and material base, without which we would be unable to undertake independent political and civic activities.
- 7. To engage in active support of consolidation attempts for the purpose of mounting a cooperative effort of all our civic, cultural, educational, economic, and political forces in our central and national delegations, considering this to be one of the main prerequisites of our continued development in the countries of our domicile and of our aid to the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.
- V. For a successful implementation of these purposes and realization of the set goals, we unanimously further resolve;
- 1. To establish the institution WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAIN-IANS with its permanent SECRETARIAT to maintain better contacts and understanding among the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian communities in the free world, and for the purpose of coordinating their work and efforts in the cause of realizing the purposes set forth above.
- 2. To marshall the necessary funds which would facilitate the realization of the foregoing resolutions. $_\blacktriangle$

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY

VI. On the 25th anniversary of the establishment and activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians states that the struggle of this most recent armed formation is the domain of the entire Ukrainian people.

Its struggle against German Nazis, Russian Bolsheviks and other occupiers during the years of World War II has again demonstrated the desires of the Ukrainian people to freedom and national statehood.

IDEAL OF A UKRAINIAN IN THE DIASPORA

VII. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians defines the ideal of a Ukrainian in the diaspora as follows:

"A Ukrainian in the diaspora — is a full-fledged citizen of his country, bound to the Ukrainian people by the bonds of the Ukrainian language and culture, and his personality is characterized by Christian-ethical values and by his creative action for Ukraine."

CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS MATTERS

VIII. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians states:

- 1. Religion and the Church are inseparable parts of the life and development of Christian Ukraine and they played a decisive role in this life and development, having become the foundation of the 1000-year-old Ukrainian history.
- 2. Communist Russia, having conquered Ukraine by force and violence, and having transformed it into its colony, has tried and is trying now, by using the most Draconic means and methods, including physical genocide, to destroy in the Ukrainian people their faith in God by liquidating the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Protestant communities and associations. In this march of destruction the most cruel persecutions have been applied, including physical liquidation of hierarchs of the Ukrainian Churches and thousands of the faithful; Ukrainian churches, some of the most beautiful examples of Ukrainian culture, were either razed or transformed into atheistic clubs, warehouses, museums and the like.
- 3. The Ukrainian people not only refused to accept this destructive course of the atheistic Russian Communist occupier against religion and the Church in Ukraine, but fought actively and are fighting now against it, preserving deeply in their hearts and souls their faith in God and a desire to pray to Him in freedom.
- 4. As for Ukrainians in the homeland, so for the Ukrainians in the diaspora. religion and the Church constitute the greatest spiritual treasure and the greatest mainstay of their existence and growth.

Taking into consideration the above, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians decides unanimously:

- a) To denounce and condemn before the whole civilized world the criminal assault of atheistic Communist Moscow against the greatest spiritual treasure of the Ukrainian people their Christian religion and the Church. Especially condemned and denounced should be the continued persecution of all Churches and religions in occupied Ukraine at the present day.
- b) To request from the United Nations and its agencies the immediate establishment of a special committee which would investigate these Draconic practices of the government and regime of the USSR, directed against the religion and Church in general, and against the Christian religion and the Churches in Ukraine especially.

c) By all our means and resources to support our Churches and church life in the free world, especially all their efforts and attempts for the preservation and further development of our illustrious church and religious traditions.

AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND RUSSIFICATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN UKRAINE

IX. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians condemns most resolutely all forms of discrimination and Russification of the religious and national minorities in Ukraine. Above all, the Congress protests against the religious and national-cultural persecution by the Russian Bolshevik regime of the Jewish minority in Ukraine.

MEMORANDUM

to

THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Honorable U Thant Secretary General United Nations United Nations, N.Y.

Your Excellency:

It is our distinct honor to present to you this Appeal on behalf of the first World Congress of Free Ukrainians which is meeting in New York City, the seat of the United Nations, to plead the cause of freedom for the Ukrainian people, who are now in the political bondage of Communist Russia.

The first World Congress of Free Ukrainians represents over three million Ukrainians and their descendants in the free world who have their own social, political, cultural, economic and religious organizations as well as their national representations in a number of countries outside Ukraine, namely: the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Venezuela, France, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden. However, their native country, Ukraine, is a Union Republic of the USSR and a charter member of the United Nations since 1945.

The great majority of Ukrainian immigrants left their home country after World War I and World War II because they could not live under the regimes which were imposed by force upon the Ukrainian people by the occupiers of the Ukrainian lands. Some Ukrainians left their homeland under the stress of economic conditions, some were deported as slave-laborers during the second World War and did not wish to return thereafter to Ukraine, occupied by Soviet Russia. Therefore, the Ukrainian emigration in the free world is predominantly a political emigration; it is vitally interested in the political and social life of Ukrainians in their home country and is endeavoring to help

them by all means at its disposal in achieving these ideals of freedom and independence for which they have been fighting with great sacrifices during the past fifty years.

In the overwhelming majority, the free Ukrainians in the diaspora subscribe to the political ideal of a *free, sovereign and independent Ukrainian state*, which was proclaimed by a series of historical acts at the time of the revolution fifty years ago and later — between the two World Wars and during the second World War, — and which fell a victim of aggression on the part of Soviet Russia. These acts were:

- a) On November 20, 1917 the Ukrainian Central Rada, (Council), by its Third Universal, established the Ukrainian National Republic which was recognized officially by Soviet Russia in a special note of December 17, 1917. Despite the recognition of Ukraine as an independent republic, Soviet Russia launched a military aggression against Ukraine and endeavored to convince the world that it was a "civil war" between the "bourgeois factions" and the partisans of the Soviet system in Ukraine;
- b) On January 22, 1918 the Ukrainian Central Rada by its Fourth Universal proclaimed the full and unqualified independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. It maintained diplomatic relations with many countries, and was recognized de facto by France and Great Britain.

In the election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly which took place in 1917, the political parties which supported the Ukrainian Central Radu, received 72 per cent of all votes in Ukraine, while the Bolsheviks gained a bare 10 percent. Thus, almost three-fourths of the total population of Ukraine supported the policies of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which was the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine.

On November 1, 1918 Western Ukraine, which was a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, was proclaimed as the Western Ukrainian National Republic, with its own National Rada, whose members were elected by secret ballot in general, direct and democratic elections. This Parliament of Western Ukraine, by its unanimous decision of January 4, 1919 voted to unite with the Ukrainian National Republic. The Western Ukrainian National Republic was forced to wage a defensive war against the newly-born Poland which coveted this Ukrainian ethnic territory as its "own." By the Act of Union on January 22, 1919 both republics of the Ukrainian people were united into one, sovereign and independent state of the Ukrainian people. The united Ukrainian National Republic encompassed all the Ukrainian ethnic lands which were part of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires prior to 1914.

The traditions of Ukrainian statehood have their roots in Kievan Rus-Ukraine, the Kingdom of Halych and Volhynia and the *Hetman State*. Ukrainian statehood in 1918-1920 had three distinct forms of government; the Ukrainian National Republic with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as its parliamentary government, the Ukrainian State under the *Hetman*, and the Ukrainian National Republic under a Directorate.

To defend Ukraine against foreign aggressions, the Ukrainians organized in 1917 a regular Ukrainian army, which by 1919 numbered over 150,000 men.

In a long and drawn-out war against the foreign aggressors, the Ukrainian Army had some brilliant military successes, but despite the heroic efforts and self-sacrifices of its fighting men, unaided and unsupported by any foreign state, it could not overcome the numerically superior forces of Soviet Russia, the

White Russian Armies of Gen. A. Denikin, as well as those of Poland. Suffering from lack of medical supplies and equipment, this army was also exposed to a series of epidemics which heavily undermined its effectiveness and power.

In launching an unprovoked military aggression against the Ukrainian National Republic, the Russian Communists created a political fiction in the form of the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," which they used as a counter-government against the legitimate Ukrainian government. In 1923 this Moscow-created Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, along with other non-Russian republics, entered into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although many of the prerogatives of the Union Republics were taken over by the Soviet Union, nevertheless, the fiction that these republics are sovereign states is steadily maintained and supported by Moscow. In 1945, when Moscow believed it useful to expand these prerogatives so as to make it appear that the Union Republics were truly independent, Ukraine and Byelorussia were introduced into the United Nations as charter members. Moreover, each of the Union Republics was accorded also a number of outward attributes of a sovereign state: a national coat-of-arms, flag and national anthem.

Yet, behind this facade, the reality is quite different. From the very beginning of its enslavement by Soviet Russia, Ukraine was not and is not an independent republic in the USSR, but a colony of Soviet Russia. In the present Soviet Russian colonial empire the Ukrainian people are suffering from an unrelenting social and national oppression.

The Soviet Russian colonial empire, known as the USSR, is a totalitarian state-empire in which unlimited power rests in the hands of the centralist Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This totalitarian monoparty, which directs all the Union Republics from one center in Moscow, is in essence a ruling class of the empire, exercising unlimited power which is shared with no other social class or political group. It is a totalitarian and anti-democratic system of government.

In the Ukrainian SSR, which claims to be a sovereign state, out of the 30 ministries 26 are subordinated to and directed by Moscow. Even the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, formerly independent, became merely a branch of the "All-Union" Academy of Sciences.

In the economic field Ukraine is rigidly subordinated to the central planning in Moscow. All taxation taken from the Ukrainian people is directed toward imperialistic expansion of Soviet Russian foreign policy and territorial aggrandizement. All industrial and agricultural products of Ukraine are destined either for other parts of the USSR or for foreign imports, primarily for competition with the United States, while Ukraine receives little in return. Special economic policies of the Kremlin compel the Ukrainian population to seek employment outside its homeland; hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian specialists and technicians are taken away from Ukraine, while their place is taken by the alien Russian manpower. By special discriminatory measures the Soviet government is trying to keep the Ukrainian rural population from settling in urban areas, thus providing for the alarming growth of the Russian element in Ukrainian cities.

The enslavement of the Ukrainian people in the Russian colonial empire has assumed some of the most terrible and intolerable forms. The Soviet regime is engaged systematically in the destruction of the Ukrainian national substance.

through perennial genocide, deportations and man-made famines, thus trying to reduce the Ukrainian people, once a powerful dynamic people, to a static ethnographic entity.

Thus, in 1914 the population of Ukraine amounted to 38.1 million people. The last Soviet population census of 1959 revealed that Ukraine had only 41.9 million people. Ukrainian demographers estimate that in the normal process of development the population of Ukraine should have increased by 1 million people a year. Consequently, the population of Ukraine should have increased by 45 million in the last 45 years, and in 1959 it should have been at least 83.1 million. Inasmuch as the population census of 1959 had shown only 41.9 million people, it means that Ukraine had lost almost the same amount of people which it had at the time of the census-taking. Of course, the decrease of the population of Ukraine was due also to two World Wars; but this decrease was a result mainly of special Russian genocidal policies in Ukraine, policies which are outlawed by the U.N. Charter and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The most outstanding phases of Russian genocide against the Ukrainian people are a matter of historical record:

1. Moscow has completely eradicated the two Churches in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In the 1930's the Kremlin liquidated the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church by imprisoning its metropolitan and 36 archbishops and bishops, and hundreds of thousands of the faithful. This church was revived somewhat during World War II, but was again destroyed completely after 1945. There is only the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine today. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church exists only among Ukrainians in the free world, but not in Ukraine.

In 1946 Moscow destroyed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine by arresting and exiling its metropolitan, bishops and over 2,500 Catholic priests, monks, nuns and thousands of Catholic laymen (of 12 Ukrainian Catholic bishops only one returned alive from the Soviet concentration camps: Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, who was released in 1963, after 18 years of imprisonment, upon intervention of the late Pope, John XXIII; he was made a cardinal in 1965 and now resides in Rome). The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine exists in underground catacombs just as in the early era of Christianity. The Ukrainian Catholic Church has developed in the free world and at present there are 14 Ukrainian Catholic Sees in the diaspora.

The same fate befell the Ukrainian Evangelical-Reformed and Lutheran Church, while the still existing Baptist and Seventh-Day Adventists Churches are rigidly controlled by the Soviet government.

- 2. In 1932-33 the Kremlin willfully starved to death about 5 million Ukrainian peasants who resisted the forced collectivization introduced by Stalin against the will and welfare of the Ukrainian people. This man-made famine ensued when the Soviet authorities withdrew all supplies of foodstocks in order to force the farmers to become collective slaves. Prior to the famine all wealthy Ukrainian farmers were also liquidated as "enemies of the state," their property confiscated and they themselves sent to slave labor camps.
- 3. One of the most concentrated drives by Moscow in Ukraine was and is against independent Ukrainian culture; thousands of Ukrainian scientists, writers, poets, literary critics, academicians and professors had perished during the many "purges" conducted by the Kremlin in Ukraine. After the death of

Stalin a number of the so-called "rehabilitation trials" were held in Ukraine revealing how many hundreds of Ukrainian men of science and literature had perished without trials or any judicial proceedings. These "purges" encompassed not only the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," but Ukrainian Communists as well. Among the intelligentsia were some of the greatest intellects of Ukraine.

- 4. Moscow has been relentless in persecuting all those Ukrainian patriots who are striving for Ukrainian independence, in particular members of the OUN and UPA, although the Soviet constitution itself guarantees the "full sovereignty and equality" of Ukraine. In fact, that constitution assures the right of Ukraine and other Union Republics "to freely secede" from the USSR and remain outside the Soviet Union. But in reality any manifestations toward true independence, even the application of the Soviet constitution, are considered high treason and are severely punishable. Ukrainian patriots and true lovers of their lands Moscow labels scornfully "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and "enemies of the Soviet state." Significantly, the Kremlin does not persecute "Russian bourgeois nationalists"; on the contrary, Russian chauvinism is regarded as Soviet patriotism.
- 5. The Soviet government is systematically pressing Russification policies whereby it endeavors to Russify the Ukrainian people and thus weaken their national resistance. This Russification is pressed relentlessly in Ukrainian schools, especially Ukrainian universities, in administration and the armed forces. Moreover, the Soviet government is conducting population policies detrimental to the Ukrainians, who are either deported or sent to various administrative posts outside Ukraine, while ethnic Russians are being brought to Ukraine. For this Russian minority in Ukraine Moscow maintains Russian schools and a press, while millions of Ukrainians outside Ukraine in the Russian SFSR above all are deprived of Ukrainian schools, the Ukrainian press and books, and in general, of Ukrainian culture. By so doing, Moscow is implementing deliberate Russification policies for the purpose of increasing the Russian ethnic element in Ukraine and weakening at the same time the Ukrainian national entity.
- '6. During the whole period of occupation of Ukraine the Ukrainian people waged and are waging now an incessant struggle for their liberation, as demonstrated by the proclamation of independence of Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939; the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence on June 30, 1941 in Lviv; and the activities of a series of Ukrainian underground organizations: the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), the Association of Ukrainian Youth (SUM), the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The latter, under the command of General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka) and the political leadership of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), waged a full-scale war against both the Nazis and Russian Communists in Ukraine during and after World War II.

The Kremlin's fear of the Ukrainian liberation movement is demonstrated by the wanton murders of Ukrainian leaders by the Soviet secret police operating in the free countries:

a) Simon Petlura, head of the Ukrainian government-in-exile, killed in Paris on May 25, 1926;

- b) Col. Eugene Konovalets, head of the OUN, assassinated on May 23, 1938 in Rotterdam, Holland;
- c) Dr. Lev R. Rebet, a Ukrainian nationalist writer, assassinated on October 12, 1957 in Munich, Germany;
- d) Stepan Bandera, head of the OUN, assassinated on October 15, 1959 in Munich, Germany.

In 1965 and 1966 a number of Ukrainian writers, poets, literary critics and journalists were jailed and tried by Communist courts in Ukraine in the relentless drive of Moscow to suppress Ukrainian culture and make it an adjunct of the "superior" Soviet Russian culture.

Taking all this into consideration, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians states that the USSR, being a Russian colonial empire, practices genocide on a grandiose scale and destroys churches and the national cultures of the captive non-Russian nations. It constantly violates the Charter of the United Nations and fails to live up to the overall objectives of the United Nations.

The representation of the Ukrainian SSR in the United Nations is not a representation of the Ukrainian people but a representation of the alien occupying administration which enslaves the Ukrainian people. Its voice in the United Nations is but a servile replica of the Kremlin in the international forum of the United Nations.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, which fully supports the aspirations of the Ukrainian peoples as well as those of other captive peoples to freedom and national independence, is of the belief that the enslavement by Soviet Russian imperialism of a number of nations in Eastern Europe and in Asia is a warning for the whole world as to the true political nature of the USSR, a member of the United Nations. The democratic nations of the world should unite and prevent the Soviet Union from continuing its political practices with respect to the captive nations, practices which are inconsistent with and contrary to the U.N. Charter.

Taking into consideration the present plight of the Ukrainian people under the domination of Soviet Russia, and desiring to bring effective moral and political assistance to the Ukrainian people in their aspirations to freedom and national statehood, the elected representatives of all Ukrainian national organizations in the free world, namely those in North America, South America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, assembled on November 16-19, 1967 in the City of New York, the seat of the United Nations, for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, have accepted a series of resolutions on ways and means to assist Ukraine, and have also decided to submit this Appeal to the United Nations.

Therefore, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians appeals to you, Your Excellency, for three considerations:

- 1. To establish a special Committee under the auspices of the United Nations which would investigate the situation of the captive nations in the USSR, and in the first place the colonial enslavement of Ukraine, with all its features of national and cultural genocide, destruction of human rights and religion, and violation of all basic human liberties.
- 2. To appeal to U.N. members to support the aspirations to freedom of all peoples, not only the colonial peoples of Africa and Asia. The captive non-Russian peoples in the USSR are entitled to freedom and national independence in the same degree and measure as are the peoples of Africa and Asia.

3. To allow the representatives of the Free Ukrainians in the world to participate in the various U.N. Committees on the basis of non-governmental organizations, where they could represent the interests of the captive Ukrainian people.

We take the liberty of enclosing with this Memorandum a documentary brief on the present situation of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and the USSR.

APPEAL TO UKRAINIANS LIVING BEYOND THE BORDERS OF UKRAINE

DEAR COUNTRYMEN:

We, the duly elected delegates of the representations of many countries with a Ukrainian population, announce to all Ukrainians living beyond the borders of their ancestral Homeland, that on the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th days of November, 1967, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians was held in the City of New York, N.Y., U.S.A., which established the Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and adopted a number of important resolutions.

This great task has been realized thanks to the efforts and inspiring concordance of all Ukrainian patriotic organizations, groups and institutions which took part in the Congress. This fact merits consideration as a great achievement of all Ukrainians living beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Our achievements in the lands of our settlement were possible because of two factors: 1) the existence of our statehood and the continued struggle for its renewal, which activated the Ukrainian forces at home and abroad; 2) the endeavors of all those Ukrainians from various phases of emigration, who, often under dire circumstances, spared no effort nor means to preserve their separate national entity, and to establish institutions and organizations which became a firm foundation for our further development.

There are nearly 3 million of us living in various countries of the free world. We have succeeded in establishing institutions in the United States and Canada, we have raised new generations of highly educated people, and we are becoming an ever-growing force in all sectors of life. In Europe, Latin America and Australia the Ukrainians have gained respect among their fellow-citizens and political leaders in those lands, by their organizational abilities, persistence of effort, moral standards, and uncompromising defense of the rights of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainians have brought great spiritual values, an age-old heroic tradition, and a love of freedom and unfettered creative genius from their Homeland. We have learned from our people and their tradition to respect the dignity of man; we have experienced freedom, and we also keep in mind all the horrors of national enslavement, of the domination of one nation by another. In Ukraine, our enemy and the enemy of all mankind — imperialist Russia — is destroying all our national and independent assets. Human dignity is trampled upon by the brutal enactments of the Communist Party, outlawing expression of free thought and independent creativeness. By its policy of Russification, Moscow is endeavoring to erase all traces of the great past of the Ukrainian people, and purports to appear as the representative of a single nation.

Moscow is striving to distort Ukraine's history, turn its heroes into enemies of the people, and replace our heroes with her own. The same applies to the world of ideas, with an all-out attempt of Moscow to replace the Ukrainian people's spirited heritage with an alien, essentially, Russian tradition.

No nation can survive without its own national ideals. They are conspicuously lacking in the Moscow-created Ukrainian S.S.R. It is small wonder then that this Kremlin-imposed facade finds no support among the Ukrainian people.

Ukraine, so rich in historical and cultural traditions with the fertility of its soil and industry of the people, deserves a better fate. It should be one of the leading nations of Europe not only in the production of steel and grain, but also in thought, ideas, science and art. How can it be a leader, particularly in science, if nearly all of its scientific publications are printed in the alien language of the occupier?

We, in the free world, are duty-bound to maintain and develop the ideas and cultural heritage that we have brought out of Ukraine, and to bequeath them to our children and all those who cherish the ideals of liberty. Our work must encompass all sectors of our life: religious and political affairs, education of our youth, all areas of cultural creativity, economics and social welfare — all necessary ingredients of a free society. Having assumed the proper stand, we shall be in a position to help our own people in their liberation struggle, organizing under the ideal of freedom for Ukraine and all nations enslaved by Moscow, a united front of free nations for the abolition of the totalitarian Communist regime centered in Moscow.

The democratic world, which stands on the principles of individual and national liberty, respect for the rights of man and nations, allots unto each group its due place, commensurate with its power and inherent worth. This free world gives us an opportunity to demonstrate our culture and our spiritual creative genius. It is only within the prison of nations — the USSR — that people are compelled to think and act contrary to their beliefs, and according to imposed directives.

By maintaining and developing our age-old national and cultural tradisions, we are disproving Moscow's theory of the "fusion of nations" by our work, organization and our very lives. In place of the "fusion of nations" in Moscow's interpretation, we are struggling for a world of diversity, a community of large and small, but equally free and equal, nations, which march along the road of progress in free competition. Instead of a "fusion of cultures," i. e., imposing the culture of Russia on other peoples, instead of a "single language," i. e., the Russian, we hope for a flourishing development of the languages and cultures of all peoples, which will elevate them and their members to ever loftier spiritual heights. Instead of a drab life under the dictates of tyranny, we are fighting for an unfettered development of the human spirit.

In spite of shackles that bind them, the Ukrainian people are seeking new ways of expressing their creativeness and their political aspirations. Step by step they rise even under the most oppressive conditions and under the constant blows of Moscow's imperialism, continuing the struggle for an equal place in the family of free nations.

Here in the free world we enjoy unlimited opportunities to create for our own sake, for the sake of the Ukrainian people, and for the sake of mankind. We must avail ourselves of these opportunities; we must do our share in contributing to the overall struggle of our people. It is precisely for this reason

that the World Congress of Free Ukrainians is offering a reassessment of our accomplishments and our principles, and our readiness to do our utmost in helping our people in their struggle to regain freedom and independence.

Our Congress has unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

- 1. To strengthen and develop the resources and activities of Ukrainians living abroad in rendering our help to the Ukrainian people in their struggle for liberation.
- 2. To aid all unifying efforts of Ukrainian civic and political forces based on the concept of liberation and independence.
- 3. To call upon all Ukrainians to join organized activities, support all centers and organizations in their respective countries, and concentrate all forces on the realization of our ultimate goals.
- 4. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians calls upon all Ukrainian organizations outside Ukraine to intensify their activity, produce new ranks of workers and enlist all the forces and groups which are outside of organized life. No religious, territorial or political differences shall stand in the way of our people in fulfilling their duty toward their Homeland.
- 5. To apply all of their power and resources in educating young generations in the Ukrainian spirit. This refers not only to schools and other educational establishments, but primarily to parents.
- 6. To stress spiritual values as those determining the course of our development in the free world and of our people in the native land.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians calls upon you to carry out this appeal and these resolutions on the 50th Anniversary of the national rebirth and independence of the Ukrainian people. Let us be inspired in our endeavors and let us strive — WITH OUR TRUST IN GOD — TO LIVE, TO CREATE, TO FIGHT ON!

FIRST MANIFESTO

TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND ITS BORDERS, IN THE USSR AND IN THE LANDS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST BLOC

UKRAINIANS!

A time of trouble is upon Ukraine. The long and persevering armed conflict of the 1917-1920 period ended with the fall of the young Ukrainian state, and Ukraine was occupied by Soviet Russian troops and incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — actually, Moscow's colonial empire. Today it is designated as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic — a transparent cover for Russia's colonial order ruling in Ukraine. Our nation has been deprived of political, cultural and economic rights. All the important ministries are located in Moscow. The wealth of our land and the toil of our brethren is channeled primarily towards a strengthening of the imperial center in Moscow and its totalitarian political purposes. The Ukrainian SSR was allowed to become a member of the United Nations solely because its delegates in the UN

would be puppets of Moscow, without any policy or voice. There is an intensifying assault upon the Ukrainian spirit, aimed at eradicating in our people all awareness of equality with other nations and at smothering all desire to regain their lost, united and sovereign statehood, whose traditions reach back to the Grand Ducal Kievan Ukraine-Rus', the Galician Volhynian Kingdom and the Hetman-Kozak State.

This year Moscow has redoubled its propaganda effort on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the seizure of power by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Russia on November 7, 1917. In Ukraine the aim of the propaganda assault is complete eradication from the people's minds of the fact that the Great Ukrainian Nationl Revolution began as early as March 17, 1917, and that then, by virtue of several stages of struggle against imperialist Moscow, it wrested the opportunity to renew Ukrainian statehood. That through its freely elected representatives and by its own will and power alone, the Ukrainian people proclaimed their own state on November 20, 1917 - the Ukrainian National Republic, and, exercising the same will and power, proclaimed its complete sovereignty and independence on January 22, 1918. With changing times this statehood assumed various forms; the Ukrainian National Republic headed by the Central Rada and a parliamentary form of government; the Ukrainian State headed by a Hetman; and the Ukrainian National Republic under a Directorate. Achieved during this period was a complete unification of all Ukrainian lands within an all-embracing independent Ukrainian nation, by the Act of January 22, 1919.

In disregard of its official recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic, Soviet Russia, by its declaration of December 17, 1917, went to war against Ukraine. Over a period of three years — until November of 1920 — the Ukrainian armed forces managed to defend the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state against the overwhelmingly stronger Russian forces. Yet the Ukrainian armed forces succumbed not merely because of the superior physical forces of Bolshevik Russia. They were doomed also because the powers on the international scene, blind to the imperialist nature of the Russian communist movement, denied Ukraine any moral, political or economic support. The regular front disintegrated in November, 1920, but the Ukrainian people continued their liberation struggle with insurgent units and revolutionary acts. Forced into exile, however, were the Chairman of the Directorate, Simon Petlura, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic and the political and military elite who had sprung up from the various periods of state-building. As emigres they have continued the struggle by appealing to the conscience of the world.

The occupation regime in Ukraine, acting in strict accordance with the directives of its Moscow center, always has attempted to falsify the history of the Great Ukrainian National Revolution. This period in Ukraine, they mendaciously say, was the time of "Civil War" or of class struggle, never any Ukrainian struggle for national liberation for the achievement of statehood independent of any alien power. This falsification is reaching peaks of distortion right now, during the observances of 50 years of Soviet power.

Falsification and fabrication of history by Moscow developed into permanent policy as the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation struggle continued, both in the political - revolutionary and armed spheres. Having invaded and occupied Ukraine, the Bolshevik regime of Moscow now found itself up against the intangible but indestructible forces awakened by the Ukrainian National

Revolution during the period of statehood. Under pressure of the Ukrainian populace, the Moscow government of Ukraine was compelled to acquiesce to a partial Ukrainization of the governmental apparatus, hoping nonetheless that the spreading of the ideas of communism among the Ukrainian people would be made easier with the use of their own language. Toward the end of the 1920's, Moscow decided to launch a massive genocidal assault upon Ukraine in the form of collectivization, the purpose of which was to expropriate and enslave the kernel of the Ukrainian nation - its peasant class. Along with this, Moscow ruthlessly destroyed the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, staged mass trials of members of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and the Association of Ukrainian Youth, which had been the bannerbearers of independence ideas, and, during the forcible collectivization, organized a man-made famine in the countryside, claiming victims in the millions. By the 1930's, Ukraine had wholly become a place of terror and death. Not only were the educated classes destroyed, but also untold numbers of the workers and peasants. The number of "liquidated" Ukrainian writers alone is in excess of two hundred. Mass graves in Vynnytsia and other cities entombed tens of thousands of victims coming from every walk of life.

The effect of this genocide, both in numbers and in systematization, was appalling. Even with war losses taken into account, the number of Ukrainians should have doubled in the last fifty years. It has actually remained the same. It suffices to compare two Soviet censuses: the 1926 and the 1959. During this interval the number of Ukrainians in Ukraine increased 1.4 per cent, while the number of Russians increased 132 per cent — a hundred times as much. This is the heinous result of organized famine, executions, deportations and denationalization.

In 1939 Carpatho-Ukraine asserted its will to self-determination, declaring its independence in March, 1939, an independence which was heroically defended by its armed force, the Carpathian Sich. Later the same year, however, following an agreement between Stalin and Hitler, Western Ukraine was occupied by Soviet troops. As during the Czarist occupation of 1914, all Ukrainian institutions, press and publications were summarily liquidated and Ukrainian leaders were deported. *Communist institutions were set up in place of the Ukrainian.

Retreating from Ukraine in the face of the German drive in 1941, the Bolsheviks not only destroyed Ukrainian cultural riches and monuments but also mass-slaughtered Ukrainian prisoners. Hopes that the German-Soviet war would bring about changes beneficial to the Ukrainians were soon cruelly dashed. From the very first days of occupation, the Hitler forces began to arrest Ukrainians; they liquidated the Provisional Government established in Lviv by the Act of June 30, 1941, and executed Ukrainian leaders in Lviv, Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. The Ukrainian National Rada fell victim to the Nazi terror, equally born of totalitarianism.

The response of the Ukrainian people was, first, a broad political-revolutionary struggle waged by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was active in Ukrainian territories between the two World Wars and which continued the struggle of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). Then, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) rose in defense of the Ukrainian people against Hitler's brutal oppression and against the Soviet raiding groups. Armed resistance was sustained by the UPA long after the end of World War II under the command of Major-General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka)

and under the political leadership of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR). The latter was the executive arm of the revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people in their valiant resistance against the united forces of communist Moscow, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In their struggle against the UPA, the Communists mercilessly punished the Ukrainian population for its support of the Ukrainian liberation movement, resorting to general terror, executions, deportations and burning of forests and villages, thus blockading the UPA in the Western parts of Ukraine.

At the same time, Moscow systematically liquidated the Ukrainian Catholic Church, arresting its Metropolitan, Joseph Slipy, bishops and clergy, as well as leaders of other religious denominations, all of whom were placed in concentration camps or killed outright. Thus the Ukrainian Catholic Church was forcibly converted to Russian Orthodoxy.

Preparing for the next assault upon the free world, Moscow tightened its hold on the people in the occupied territories, particularly Ukraine, in order to achieve internal consolidation. Towards this end, it relinquished the idea of internationalism, substituting in its place the notion of the "leading" Russian nation, "first among equals," or chauvinistic theories of Russian superiority, the "fusion of nations" and the "Soviet Fatherland" with Moscow as its capital. In Ukraine, this had the direct result of intensified Russification of the government apparatus, the higher educational establishments, the press and radio. Today, twenty of the most important journals of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR, on physics, chemistry, medicine, mathematics, cybernetics, genetics, metallurgy, architecture, and coal, are published in Russian. At Expo 67 in Montreal the Ukrainian SSR was not represented as a Union Republic, but merely as an exhibit of collective farm panoramas, all under Russian titles. Even the celebrated Ukrainian choirs and soloists have not been able to withstand this onslaught on national identity.

We read that in per capita production of iron ore, cast iron, steel, rolling mill products, sugar and coal, Ukraine is in first place in the world. We read, too, that the 1966 Budget of the USSR was in the amount of 105 billion rubles. Hence rich Ukraine, with 1/5 of the population of the USSR, should have participated in the budget to an extent of 21 billion rubles. But Ukraine was allotted only 9.7 billion. Evidently, more than 11 billion had been appropriated by Moscow, using this wealth supplied by Ukraine for Soviet armanents and the blackmailing of the free world. This is just for one year. Of how much has Ukraine been looted during 47 years of Soviet rule?

All this time, Moscow has feverishly sought to discredit the Ukrainian people themselves. Constant vituperations against "Ukrainian nationalists," trials of OUN and UPA fighters and of cultural leaders who demand equal rights for the Ukrainian language and culture — all serve to point up two facts: one, that Ukrainian consciousness is very much alive, and, two, that the target is the Ukrainian youth. Yet almost four decades after the Bolshevik takeover, strikes and riots erupted in the great concentration camps of Vorkuta, Norilsk, Karaganda and Kolyma following the death of Stalin. And at the present time the youth is widely engaged in a struggle for the survival and development of Ukrainian culture, language and religion. Russia assiduously follows all manifestations of Ukrainian life in the free world. When it senses danger, it strikes. Its secret agents have on their hands the blood of Simon Petlura, Eugene Konovalets, Stepan Bandera and Lev Rebet.

Realizing the present hard fate of Ukraine, and in complete solidarity with its resistance to the enemy, we, the delegates of all Ukrainian national organizations in North and South America, Western Europe, and Australia with New Zealand, and with the blessings of the Hierarchy of the Ukrainian Churches in the free world, have convened in the seat of the United Nations, New York, to attend the World Congress of Free Ukrainians on November 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1967.

The primary task of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians is to view Ukraine's present situation and beyond, and to consider ways and means for rendering the most effective aid to the cause of the liberation of Ukraine.

The second task of the Congress is to unify the activities of the Ukrainian communities in every country on these continents, for the purpose of not only preserving the national substance of the Ukrainian nation, but also to help elevate each community in these lands to the highest possible level in all sectors of life. The entire Ukrainian community in all these lands, strengthened and acting in concert, cannot but prove to be an effective instrumentality in the provision of aid of every kind to Ukraine.

We, the duly accredited delegates to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, have in our deliberations considered both tasks, and have adopted appropriate resolutions thereon. The Secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians will implement these resolutions until the time of the next session of the Congress.

As one result of its deliberations, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians has unanimously resolved to address the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and outside Ukraine, in the USSR and the countries of the communist bloc, through this First Manifesto.

We, participants in the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, delegated to this First Congress by the central and national organizations of our respective countries, declare before the world that the Ukrainian national community in the free world will aid and abet our nation in its struggle until finally it once again becomes free and establishes its own independent, sovereign and united state.

In our aid to Ukraine we shall scrupulously utilize all means and opportunities available to us in the free world of democracy. First of all, we shall disseminate the truth about Ukraine — its history, liberation struggle, and culture. We have already accomplished much in this sector by our multilingual publications, radio broadcasts, papers at scientific conventions, work at universities, etc. In order to effectively refute Russian propaganda, we must present the whole context of our struggle, a context in which the nature of the Russian oppressor must be made explicit.

We consider it one of our most important purposes to preserve our national Ukrainian substance in the lands of our domicile. With this purpose in mind our emigre groups have undertaken extensive organizational work. In all countries of our domicile we have active Ukrainian Churches — Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, with millions of parishioners and countless magnificent edifices of worship. The Ukrainian Churches constitute a most important rampart in the struggle for the preservation of the Ukrainian heritage throughout the world; they also maintain social organizations, as well as schools of higher and lower grades.

In some countries of their domiciles, the Ukrainians have inevitably won considerable prestige and influence. United in central institutions, they possess rewarding social-political organizations. Ukrainian scientists annually publish dozens of original papers in Ukrainian and other languages. We are completing the printing of the fourth encyclopedia — this time in the English language — the goal of which is to offer complete and impartial facts about Ukraine. Ukrainian establishments of higher education are paying special attention to disciplines concerned with Ukraine.

In the countries of Ukrainian settlement, particularly in the United States and Canada where we have fraternal benefit associations with memberships exceeding 100,000, as well as cooperative associations and banks, Ukrainian economic life has been developing successfully. There are numerous local societies and institutions and educational organizations with thousands of young members with their own summer camps. Ukrainian women are organized in their own organizations, which constitute the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations (WFUWO). We have active labor unions, professional associations of physicians, engineers, professors and librarians, as well as associations of artists, writers and musicians, and charitable relief institutions. A free Ukrainian press comes out regularly: dailies, weeklies, monthlies; scientific, literary, art and popular journals. Independent Ukrainian science flourishes, organized in the original historical-academic institution, which continues the nearly 100-year-old tradition of Lviv: the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which perpetuate the tradition of the Kiev academic institution, prior to its take-over by the Russian Bolshevik government.

Higher educational establishments have been active as far back as 1921—the Ukrainian Free University and the Ukrainian Technical-Husbandry Institute, as well as the recently established Ukrainian Catholic University of Rome, all of the which annually graduate many students with academic degrees. Hundreds of Ukrainian professors teach in American, Canadian, Argentine, German, Australian and other universities. There are also special Ukrainian schools of higher education, theological seminaries and numerous lower schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

Thousands of Ukrainians fought in both world wars in the armed forces of their adopted countries. Many thousands of them gave their lives in the defense of freedom, which to them was the ideal of Ukraine. Those who survived founded veterans' organizations, which are united in comradeship of arms with veterans' organizations of other countries of Ukrainian settlement and with organizations of Ukrainian combatants who fought at different times on their own soil for the liberation of Ukraine. In the belief that a nation's armed force is the best guarantee of its independence, the veterans of Ukrainian, American, Canadian and other armies, jointly nurture Ukrainian military traditions.

Active abroad is the state center of the Ukrainian National Republic and a number of political organizations. All these groups are represented here at the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and are harmoniously working within its framework, as well as within their own central organizations, giving aid to the Ukrainian people in their struggle for liberation by exerting influence in official circles and societies of their countries and by gaining adherents and friends for the cause of the liberation of Ukraine and of other captive

nations. Ukrainians, as citizens of their respective countries of domicile, take an active part in the political life of these countries, in some holding high offices in legislatures and the state administration.

The extraordinary spiritual, cultural and material achievements of Ukrainians in the free world remain the best proof of the vitality and creative powers of the Ukrainian people, ample proof that they could immensely enrich the cultural treasury of mankind, given freedom and independence on their own soil.

The external manifestations of Ukrainian unity in the free world are impressive: the erection of the Taras Shevchenko monument in Winnipeg, Manitoba, in 1961; the erection of the Shevchenko monument in a public square of the capital of the United States — Washington, in 1964; the erection of a Shevchenko monument in the Brazilian capital of the State of Parana, Curitiba, in 1967; the official authorization of the President of Argentina, General Ongania, in 1967, to build a Shevchenko monument in Buenos Aires, the unanimous resolutions of both legislative chambers of the United States Congress for the annual observance of Captive Nations Week, thus giving the American people an opportunity to demonstrate their sympathy for the liberation movements of all nations enslaved by communism, this resolution making specific mention of Ukraine.

With all these burgeoning activities, we are attempting to uphold the Ukrainian community outside Ukraine and to augment such spiritual and material values which will prove to be of lasting benefit to Ukraine. We believe that by exposing and branding the crimes of the Russian communist dictatorship, we are rendering good service to other freedom-loving nations and are joining hands with them. Peace and liberty under law and justice, equal for all, will be assured in the world only when, under the blows of the revolution of national liberation, Russian communist despotism disintegrates. This revolution, just as the one against Russian Czarist autocracy, will be won in due time by the enslaved nations. Our duty is to gain and confirm the friendship and support of the free nations for this inevitable national revolution.

UKRAINIANS! .

We, your brothers and sisters in the countries of the free world, clearly differentiate between the spiritual and material values of the Ukrainian nation and the Russian communist regime which dominates Ukraine, which you are opposing without surcease. Your achievements in science, art, the economy and in all sectors of life we value most highly. We admire most of all your perseverance and devotion in the struggle not only to save but to develop actively the spiritual and material treasures of Ukraine which have brought to naught the plans of the enemy to destroy and assimilate the Ukrainian nation.

You have survived many calamities in your heroic history. You have never capitulated, always emerging from disasters unbowed. Your heroic stance evokes the admiration of all freedom-loving mankind. It was and continues to be the source of spiritual uplift to us all, dispersed all over the world. Assured is your destiny: to be master of your own land.

Ukrainians, accept from us all, your brothers and sisters in the free world, our respect and our assurance that we believe reverently in the success of your indomitable resistance and in the success of our diligent labors, which will accelerate the day of your liberation.

The First World Congress of Free Ukrainians sends you our sincerest greetings in your own native land and in the lands of exile. Rest we never shall until you, with God's help, regain the lost freedom and independence. We believe the day will come when you will take your place among the free, among just and peace-loving mankind.

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. An Outline of History of Political and Military Relations (December 1917 - April 1918), by Prof. Matthew Stachiw, LL.D., Ukrainian Free University. Translated from the Ukrainian by Walter Dushnyck, Ph.D.; Preface by Prof. Clarence A. Manning, Schevchenko Scientific Society, Ukrainian Studies Series, No. 20, New York, 1967, pp. 215.

In November, 1967, the ruling party in the Soviet Union, the Russian Communist Party-Bolsheviks (which after several changes finally calls itself "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union") noisily celebrated the 50th anniversary of its dictatorship. Although this party and its dictatorial government continually cite their "program of peaceful coexistence with the non-communist countries," the anniversary in Moscow was highlighted by demonstrating the newest Soviet weapons for mass killings — gigantic inter-continental missiles.

In the many publications dedicated to this anniversary the Soviet historians once again rewrote the history of the emergence of Soviet power. These slavish hacks vied with one another in fabrications, distortions and up-side-down misrepresentations of the facts, all in order to convince the subjects of the Soviet Union and world public opinion that the present Russian Soviet empire was created by the "free will" of the submerged and oppressed non-Russian captive nations in the form of the so-called "Soviet Union Republics" of those peoples. These Soviet pseudo-scientific publications celebrating the 7th of November, 1917, suppress by a conspiracy of silence the fact that this empire emerged in the form of the Soviet Union solely as a consequence of the conquest of the non-Russian countries by Soviet Russia in the years 1917-1921 (with the exception of the Baltic States, which were finally conquered during World War II).

The first victims of the military aggression of Soviet Russia in 1917 were Ukraine and Finland. And here the work of Prof. M. Stachiw gives us a factual and accurate outline-history of the first invasion and war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine. The history of this war is of fundamental importance. It is this war which established the pattern for all subsequent aggressive wars that Soviet Russia waged in Eastern Europe and Asia for the rebuilding of the old Russian Empire with the ultimate aim of encompassing the whole globe in a World Soviet Union.

At the outset the author recounts the renewal of the Ukrainian sovereign statehood, constitutionally established as the Ukrainian National Republic (U.N.R.). Then the author presents a picture of the activities of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks for the establishment in Ukraine of a dictatorship with the same methods employed in Russia proper in the coup d'etat

on the 7th of November 1917 in the then capital, Petrograd (presently Leningrad), spreading in the next three days to the whole of European Russia proper (with the exception of the western territories under German and Austro-Hungarian occupation during World War I).

The plan of Lenin, Trotsky and their cohorts envisaged a military putsch in Kiev against the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Ukrainian National Republic, in emulation of the successful thrust executed against the Democratic Provisional Government of Russia under Alexander Kerensky. The military coup was set to take place in Kiev after the final victory of the Bolsheviks in European Russia proper — on the 10th of November, 1917. But the Ukrainian Central Rada and its government, by both clever tactical political moves and military force, put down the communist rebellion. The whole Bolshevik military formation was crushed and disarmed.

Thereupon the Bolshevik government of Russia, the Soviet of People's Commissars, elaborated another plan for the conquest of Ukraine, this one combining subversion with overt military aggression. Red regiments brought from the German front were slated to accomplish a subversive overthrow of the legal Ukrainian government on December 13 and 14, 1917. The Ukrainian government learned about the planned Bolshevik action just in time; once again by military force it liquidated the preparations.

At the same time large armies of Soviet Russia had massed on the frontiers of Ukraine; this show of force directed at Kiev had the psychological aim of breaking the resistance of the Ukrainian government and forcing it to capitulate at once. With this end in view a war ultimatum of the Soviets was presented to the Government of the U.N.R. on the 17th of December. With a deadline of 48 hours, the ultimatum called for surrendering to the Soviet dictatorship or facing the offensive of the Soviet armies into Ukraine. Unexpectedly for the Soviets, the Ukrainian government rejected this ultimatum. With its own forces the Government of the U.N.R. conducted the defense of Ukraine against the invading armies of Soviet Russia up to February 19, 1918, a period of over two months, in spite of the fact that the Ukrainian Army had not completed its organization and in spite of the fact it was not numerically large.

In the course of Russia's military aggression the Soviet of People's Commissars made use for the first time — although tardily — of diplomatic camouflage for their aggression. It was in Kharkiv, conquered by the Soviet Russian armies, on the 26th of December, 1917, that by order of the Soviet government of Russia, a Soviet Ukrainian puppet government was proclaimed. This tiny group, pretending to conduct class and civil war against the U.N.R., allegedly asked the Soviet Government of Russia for help. These Soviet stooges proved to be of no help at all to the Soviet invasion; there were so few Soviet sympathizers that the "government" in Kharkiv could not organize even a single military formation.

In the meantime, on Soviet Russian initiative, peace negotiations were being conducted in Brest Litovsk, where necessity forced the appearance of delegates from the U.N.R. as well. On the 9th of February, 1918, the Ukrainian diplomats managed to win from the Central Powers an honorable peace for Ukraine. Subsequent to this peace treaty, the Ukrainian government negotiated the support of the Central Powers beginning the 19th of February against the invasion of Soviet Russia. Thus with joint forces the Soviet invasion armies were thrown all the way back into Russia proper, with the Ukrainian puppet

Soviet government fleeing after them. In accordance with the stipulations of the Peace Treaty of Brest Litovsk this puppet government, by a decision of its own ruling organs, officially liquidated itself and ceased to exist on the 19th of April, 1918. Therefore, the present Ukrainian Soviet Socialist government cannot connect its anniversary with the date of December 26, 1917; the then puppet Soviet Government of Ukraine decreed itself out of existence.

The foregoing outlines the historical events carefully presented and discussed by the author. He carries out analysis and interpretation of the historical facts with the precision of a lawyer and with a deep knowledge of this period — of the history of the Russian Communist Party-Bolsheviks, its ideology, its program, and of the whole development of the struggle of Ukraine for renewal of her statehood.

What gives the book extraordinary value and importance is Prof. Stachiw's profound knowledge and analysis of those Soviet primary sources, pertaining to this period, which are presently nearly inaccessible to historians in the free world, and which are proscribed inside the Soviet Union itself. The reason given why they are "out of use" in the Soviet Union is that these documents and their authors, eyewitnesses or participants in the events, falsified the truth by telling only half-truths. Therefore, these books are kept in Soviet libraries in so-called "special funds" which are accessible to Soviet scholars, including the academicians, only with special written permission from the KGB.

The work of Prof. Stachiw is the first scholarly publication in English about this first aggression of Russia against Ukraine. This aggression was the beginning of further aggressive wars on the part of Soviet Russia against the non-Russian countries, including the two next invasions and wars directed against Ukraine (the second on December 1, 1918, the third started in February 1920, coming to an end on the 20th of November, 1920).

Very valuable for all students of Soviet history is the method of presentation of the events and their clarification by the author. Prof. Stachiw quotes documents or other sources (often extensively) in excellent translations, giving thus to every reader and scholar an opportunity to make his own evaluation of the events of this period.

For American historical research the selected bibliography at the end of the book is also of great value.

To be underscored is that the work gives for the first time in English historiography a full, objective and documented presentation of the period in question, starting with November 1917, and thus in itself refutes all the present falsifications of Soviet historiography in the publications hailing the "October" in Soviet Russia.

The book has a preface by Prof. Clarence A. Manning, Columbia University, and was translated by Walter Dushnyck, Ph.D., Fordham University.

The Catholic University of America

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

SVITLYCHNY AND DZYUBA: Ukrainian Writers under Fire. By Osyp Zinkewych. Smoloskyp: Baltimore-Toronto, 1966, pp. 52.

The Western press and the intellectual world in general is still reeling under the impact of the trial and sentence of two Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who were punished by the Soviet government for their

nonconformism in advocating freedom in literature and in other creative endeavors.

A few weeks after the conviction of these two writers, reports filtered out of Ukraine about a veritable assault on Ukrainian culture and its representatives by the Soviet government. Reuters and the Associated Press, as well as The New York Times, Le Monde, Neu Zuericher Zeitung, Muenchener Merkur, the Toronto Star, L'Osservatore Romano, New Statesman, Sunday Telegraph and others, reported the arrest of two Ukrainian writers, Ivan Svitlychny, 37, and Ivan Dzyuba, 35. Subsequently received information revealed that since the middle of 1965 a wave of political arrests has swept throughout Ukraine, resulting in the imprisonment of hundreds of persons. Some were released immediately, but many were brought to trial in early 1966. At least 75 writers, literary critics, journalists and other intellectuals were involved. In the forefront were Svitlychny and Dzyuba. Short biographies of these two men and a treatment of their literary creativeness are given in this booklet by Osyp Zinkewych.

Svitlychny was accused of smuggling to the West some unpublished patriotic poetry of another Ukrainian poet, Vasyl Symonenko, who died in 1963 of cancer at the age of 29. Dzyuba was charged with conniving with Svitlychny. The author reports that Svitlychny was tortured by the Soviet Russian police, while Dzyuba, because of his ill health, was merely placed under police surveillance. On May 28, 1966, The New York Times transmitted an unconfirmed report from Kiev to the effect that Svitlychny had been released. If true, the release was probably the result of the wave of protests of Ukrainians in the free world; the Kremlin, anxious to present a good image for propaganda purposes, is sensitive to exile protests and demonstrations.

It is doubtful, the writer contends, whether it was Svitlychny who smuggled Symonenko's writings to the West. There are veritably hundreds of manuscripts circulating in clandestine fashion in Ukraine; one of these might have found its way to the West. Because in 1963 Svitlychny attended the funeral of Symonenko, the Soviet authorities charged that he took a number of Symonenko's manuscripts, which were highly critical of the USSR. Svitlychny was born in Eastern Ukraine in 1929; after his graduation from Kharkiv University in 1952 he was associated with the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature. Later on he began writing critical essays in the Ukrainian review Dnipro (The Dnieper) in Kiev. In the 1960's he emerged as one of a group of Ukrainian modernist poets seeking greater freedom of expression. Among them were Lina Kostenko, Ivan Drach, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Vitaliy Korotych, Volodymyr Luchuk, Eugene Hutsalo, and others. Svitlychny, impressed with this development, wrote that it occurred as the result of a "national elevation of the spirit of freedom, of unfettered thought, of a spirit of audacity and creativity." He also castigated "socialist realism" and demanded full freedom of subject matter, so that new writers could emerge, with new ideas and different styles. He maintained that truth can be realized from a free exchange of thoughts and ideas among creative people.

This was more than the Soviet totalitarian system could digest. In 1962 and 1963 at a meeting of party leaders with writers and artists, Khrushchev and Illichev strongly condemned modern literature, abstract art and freedom of expression. Svitlychny would not recant, and in his writings he attacked the strictures placed upon literature, whereupon he was forbidden to publish.

Ivan Dzyuba, two years younger than Svitlychny, was born in the Donets region of Ukraine; he, too, was graduated from the Institute of Literature, worked in a number of editorial offices, notably that of Vitchyzna (Fatherland), where he aired his liberal ideas to a considerable degree. In his articles, Dzyuba strongly defended freedom of creativeness, condemned "socialist realism," and assailed the writers of the older generation who idolized Stalin and the Communist Party. He especially espoused the national elements in literature and developed into a brilliant spokesman for the modern Ukrainian poets.

On June 23, 1963, the "case" of Dzyuba was discussed at a meeting of the presidium of the Union of Writers of Ukraine. The upshot was a warning that he faced possible expulsion from the Union for his "politically false concepts." Undaunted, he continued to defend Ukrainian culture against persecution by the Soviet regime. For some time he was not allowed to publish his work anywhere, but in January, 1965, appeared his essay, "The Honesty of Creative Research," in which he expounded his rebellious ideas and spiritual credo. He discussed at length the relation of the individual to society. In consequence he was accused of being oriented toward Western "existentialism," which the Kremlin views as diametrically opposite to the basic precepts of Communism.

The facts of the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals has been compiled by a 29-year-old journalist and member of the Comsomol, Viacheslav Chornovil. He discovered, after investigating several cases of arrested Ukrainian intellectuals, that the courts and the criminal code are strictly for "show," while the secret police, the KGB, actually sit in judgment.

(At this writing, according to reports of the Ukrainian press in the United States, Chornovil was tried in Lviv on November 15, 1967, and sentenced to three years imprisonment.)

There is no further information as to the fate of Svitlychny and Dzyuba. The Ukrainian newspaper in Paris, *Ukrainske Slovo* (The Ukrainian Word), on October 8, 1967 ran the text of Dzyuba's address, delivered on September 29, 1966, before a group of Jewish intellectuals who had gathered to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Nazi massacre of the Jews at Babyn Yar in Kiev. He said in part:

"Babyn Yar is a tragedy of all mankind, but it occurred on Ukrainian land. And that is why a Ukrainian, just as a Jew, has no right to forget it. Babyn Yar is a tragedy we mourn in common — above all, it is a tragedy of the Ukrainian and Jewish nations... Jews have a right to be Jews; Ukrainians have a right to be Ukrainians, in the totality, not merely in the formal meaning of the words. May the Jews know and be proud of Jewish history, culture and language. May Ukrainians know and be proud of Ukrainian history, culture and language. May they know each other's history and culture, and the history and culture of other nations...; may they be able to prize themselves and to prize others as their brothers..."

The persecution of Svitlychny and Dzyuba, and of many others in Ukraine, is but additional proof that the Soviet regime, despite its claims to "evolution," remains a dictatorial system.

This past fall the Kremlin observed the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. It seems to us that some Western leaders, unthinkingly, without bothering to heed their consciences, were all too hasty in toasting these unabashed totalitarians who so shamelessly and cynically oppress the Ukrainian and other peoples in Soviet Russian communist slavery. Although the booklet

is short it performs a useful service in bringing to the fore the latest developments in Moscow's persecution of Ukrainian culture.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, RUSSIA 1917-1967. By Isaac Deutscher, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 115.

In many respects this work is unusual and absorbing for its scholarship, perspectives, and motivation. It is also perplexing to any careful student of Marxism and the Soviet Union. The author, who unexpectedly died in the year of this work, was a long-time Marxist and an avid observer of Soviet affairs and socialist developments. His numerous travels included trips to Soviet Russia and later the Soviet Union. Evidently, he also spent some time in the Orient and kept abreast of the Chinese Communist movement. Clearly, his background and experience were extensive, and several of the insights he conveys in this work well reflect them.

Yet, allowing for all this, it is nothing short of amazing to see how completely the author misunderstood the nature and composition of the Soviet Union, its many nations and its basic intra-state and multi-national problems and strifes. The lectures that make up this work, obviously in preparation for the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, give every evidence of the writer's maximum endeavor to be objective, circumspect, and just. One has to read every line and paragraph, with their simple and compounded qualifications, to appreciate these traits. Throughout the lectures one is exposed to the pros and cons of the USSR's development, and the author well displays his familiarity with the sordid and heinous aspects of this history. Notwithstanding all this, he also displays his incapacity to grasp the very essence of the Soviet Union as an empire-state and a complete naivete as to the political warfare techniques of Lenin and all of his successors to present date.

From cover to cover the reader is led to believe that "Russia," meaning the Czarist Russian Empire before, then the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic from 1917 to 1922, and lastly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is solely the Russian nation, the Russian people, and at times the "Soviet people." Nothing could be farther from the truth, and yet during all his years Deutscher operated intellectually with this basic misconception and false premise. For example, relating the condition of the serfs in the Czarist Empire, he says the "nation's way of life remained anachronistic." Deutscher also labored under the illusion that the Soviet Union was established in 1917. He writes, "the whole history of the Soviet Union in these fifty years has been a struggle, partly successful and partly not, to resolve this incongruity and to overcome want and scarcity" (p. 37). In passing, it is evident that Deutscher's economic understanding is rather faulty, too. There is a fundamental difference between scarcity and shortages; neither the American economy nor the USSR's will ever eliminate the former as an integral condition of finite existence.

Thus, despite the everwhelming evidence to the contrary, the author fashions a historical perspective, which he calls *The Historical Perspective*, on grounds that are partially unrealistic and even relatively meaningless. By this he ignores completely the non-Russian wars, for national independence in the 1917-23 period, the nationalist assertiveness of all the non-Russian nations in

the USSR during the 20's, the man-made famine and purges and deportations against nationalist patriots in the 30's, the whole war period of massive, nationalist defections, and the Russian/non-Russian political struggle in the USSR to present date. At best, his historical perspective is an askewed and distorted one. In addition to not knowing this vital history, the writer appears to be overly indulgent in constructing his own scheme to validate the promise of philosophical and economic Marxism for the future, with the Soviet Union as the redemptive force and base.

Marxism has had as much to do with the Russian Empire, both white and red, as physiocracy has with the American economy. Deutscher realizes the material conditions weren't ripe for a proletarian revolution in the Czarist Russian Empire, but he vainly tries to explain the promise of the Russian Bolshevik revolution on subjective grounds of Marxist intention and aspiration and also futural grounds of industrialization and proletarianization, thus justifying the very title of his work and, no doubt, his wishful, long-life dreams. As a consequence, his tortuous endeavor is studded with fanciful interpretations and highly debatable contentions.

The reader should find many of his artificial reconstructions of facts quite interesting. As one example, he observes, "The great Empire was, in the reign of the last Romanovs, half empire and half colony," this because "Western shareholders owned 90 per cent of Russia's mines, 50 per cent of her chemical industry, over 40 per cent of her engineering plants, and 42 per cent of her banking stock" (p. 12). Aside from the doubious worth of these percentages, for which the author furnishes no source, in Deutscher's characteristic thinking anything that smacks of ownership on the private plane also means power, domination, and colonialism. It doesn't occur to him that it can also mean, and exclusively at that, pure returns for capital and technology extended to a relatively backward imperial state. His rejection of the thesis that economic growth in the empire called also for institutional modernization, both political and cultural, and would have meant the wholesome dissolution of the empire itself rests on no foundation of thought and fact. It is just necessary for his pet scheme.

Statements such as the following measure the worth of what the author calls "The Historical Perspective." "It seems inconceivable," he writes, "that any regime not inherently revolutionary should have been able to raise a semiilliterate peasant nation to anything approaching the present level of Soviet economic development and education" (p. 13). The revolutionizing dynamics of capitalism, without any "inherently revolutionary" regime, could have done this and more. "The great mass of the people," he continues, "were seized by the most intense and urgent awareness of decay and rot in the established order. The seizure was sudden" (p. 13). For "a semi-illiterate peasant nation" and basically servile population this must have been quite a feat; the facts of history contradict Deutscher's contention sharply. How Marxism is distorted in the author's hands is best shown by the following: "The Bolsheviks inherited from the Populists their sensitivity towards the peasantry, and from the Narodnovoltsy their concentrated aggressiveness and their conspiratorial determination. Without these elements Marxism in Russia would have remained an exotic plant..." (p. 17). After reading reflections of this type one doubts that the self-proclaimed Marxist author understood the Marxist system itself,

So much for the author's essentials of "The Historical Perspective." Plainly, if the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists had failed to re-create the Russian

empire, now in the form of the Soviet Union, their perversion of Marxism would not have even been an echo in human history. As pointed out above, the overall schema of this work is sadly off beam as regards the break-up of the Russian Empire and the many wars of national independence that were waged in that critical period. This fundamental omission accounts for the numerous interpretative absurdities found in the work. However, even in the worst of them, certain insights by the writer deserve commendable report. In fact, they can be used against his schematic thesis. "Stalin, we should remember, was also the descendants of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Nicholas I, and Alexander III. Indeed, Stalinism may be described as the amalgam of Marxism with Russia's primordial and savage backwardness" (p. 34). The same in this imperialist tradition can be applied to Lenin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin and others to come.

Except for their ill-founded nation-state assumption, the observations that "Decades of totalitarian rule and monolithic discipline have robbed the people of their capacity for self-expression, spontaneous action, and self-organization" and that "The ruling groups tinker with economic reforms, loosen their grip on the nation's mind, and yet do what they can to keep the people inarticulate and passive" (p. 38) are fully in accord with the histories of Soviet Russia and the USSR. Although the writer manifests no appreciation whatsoever of Soviet Russian psycho-political warfare and its basic importance in the expansion of Moscow's empire from 1917 to the present, an additional insight is reflected in the statement that "revolutionaries may take the view, traditionally held by British soldiers, that they may lose all the battles except the last one, and that in the meantime they have to fight the battles that they have to lose" (p. 66).

The best chapter is the one on "The Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution." The reader will begin to value the deep Russian involvement in Asia and why, today, Moscow is the greater menace in Asia than Peiping. Deutscher provides a superb, working background for such appreciation, which is necessary in our dealings with the Hanoi totalitarians.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

UKRAINIANS AND JEWS. A Symposium. New York: The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966. Pp. 199.

Although this enlightening symposium appeared in 1966, up to the time this review is being written, it received hardly any attention in the academic world. Yet it is one of the most important documents providing important source material for those interested in the plight of Jews in the Soviet communist countries (as well as for those studying the history of the Ukrainian people and their aspiration to freedom and independence).

The theme of the work is brilliantly described in the "Introduction" (pp. 7-9) which is signed by "The Editors" and which is one of the best parts of this collection. It points out that a substantial part of Europe's Jewish population lived in Ukraine for several centuries and that, as one of the largest and most active minorities there, they often found themselves between hammer and anvil. Either they tried to maintain an unlikely neutrality or they found themselves associated with forces that the Ukrainians came to oppose as they reached for independence. The ensuing tensions resulted in charges being leveled

by the Jews that Ukrainians were anti-Semitic, while Ukrainians for their part maintained that the Jews en masse were supporting Russian policies and providing personnel for the Russian communist police apparatus in Ukraine. While anti-Semitic excesses occurred in Ukraine during the revolution, and especially during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine in 1941-44, "these cannot be charged to the Ukrainian people as such. All the historical evidence proves the opposite." In fact, during the short-lived Ukrainian independent state (1918-1920), the Jews were granted national-personal autonomy in Ukraine; Jewish ministers were appointed to the government; and the Hebrew language was on the currency of the Ukrainian government. At the some time, some Jews occupied prominent positions in the NKVD and MVD and served in Ukraine in the generally oppressive apparatus of Communist Russia. But "the rank and file of Jews in Ukraine suffered just as much from Moscow's total-itarian rule as did the Ukrainians."

Today, quite a number of Jews from Ukraine have found a new life in the state of Israel; but between 900,000 and 1,000,000 Jews remain in Ukraine suffering along with the Ukrainians "the ruthless oppression and persecution directed by the Kremlin." A notable example of the use of anti-Semitism was the publication in 1963 in Kiev of Judaism Without Embellishment, by Professor Trofim K. Kichko, under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Much damage was inflicted upon the Ukrainian name by this publication, with some Jewish leaders ascribing the publication to "Ukrainian anti-Semitism, without realizing that the true culprit was the Soviet government itself." (Today, Kichko's tract has been withdrawn from circulation.)

It is divided into six chapters. Chapter I, "Feature Articles," includes: "Why the Jewish Problem Has Been Connected with Ukraine," by Matthew Stachiw; "Ukrainians and Jews," by Leo Heiman; "Russia, the Jews and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement," by Lew Shankowsky; "The Puppets of Soviet Russian Colonialism," by Michael Broida (as told to Leo Heiman); "The Revived Myth of Ukrainian anti-Semitism," by Lev E. Dobriansky; and "Shevchenko and the Jews," by Roman Smal-Stocki.

Chapter II is devoted to eight testimonies; Chapter III includes Ukrainian State Documents; Chapter IV reprints 3 letters sent to *The New York Times*; Chapter V features 3 statements rejecting the Moscow-sponsored anti-Semitism; and Chapter VI comprises five editorials and comments reprinted from *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and *The Ukrainian Bulletin*.

Most of the space has been devoted properly to the feature articles. These are all very good, displaying a wide erudition and intimate acquaintance on the part of each author with his topic. Dr. Stachiw's introductory article, in its opening sections, depends too much on S. M. Dubnow's History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Philadelphia, 1946.

Another minor weakness of this otherwise valuable work is the unorthodox formula used in bringing out the volume. As a paperback, it gives the initial impression that it is just another issue of a periodical; and no price is given. There is no editor mentioned on the cover or in the introductory pages, except that the "Introduction" is signed by "The Editors" (p. 9). Yet Dr. Walter Dushnyck is listed as the editor on the last page of the book.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION VS. RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVO-LUTION," a political advertisement. The New York Times, New York, N.Y., Thursday, November 16, and Sunday, November 19, 1967.

On the unprecedented occasion of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, held in New York City in the period of November 16-19, 1967, this political ad was published twice in *The New York Times*. It contains a full page of essential data on the continuous struggle of Ukraine for national independence and the barbarous realities of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. The ad received nation-wide and international attention, and the reaction to it, as judged by voluminous letters and popular comment, was largely favorable and encouraging.

The work on this remarkable presentation was largely undertaken by Dr. Walter Dushnyck, the editor of this journal and Ukrainian publications. The ad, in addition to reaffirming the 50th Anniversary of the Ukrainian National Revolution, was an appropriate answer to the myths propagated the weeks before by the celebrants of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution. "50 Years of Oppression, Fraud and Genocide—50th Anniversary of Russian Bolshevik Revolution!" was one sub-caption directing the reader's attention to the Soviet Russian record. Another stated clearly "Black Deeds of Soviet Russian Oppression in Ukraine!", and what followed spells out in concrete detail the political subjugation, economic exploitation, religious persecution, cultural Russification, and genocide of Ukraine.

Positively, the statement emphasizes "Struggle For Freedom and Independence Goes On!" and recounts the proclamation of independence of Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939, a similar proclamation in Lviv in 1941, the heroic underground fight of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during and after World War II, the murders of Rebet and Bandera in the 50's, and the present fight against colonialist Moscow. Because of these and additional data contained in the statement, uncounted Americans and many in the diplomatic colony have already expressed their appreciation for this concise review of the unending Russian-Ukrainian war.

"HALF-MILLION ARE CLEARED BY SOVIET OF PRO-NAZI CHARGE," a report by Raymond H. Anderson. The New York Times, New York, September 12, 1967.

It is now 23 years when the Tatars, the descendants of the Mongol Tatars who overran Eastern Europe in the 13th century, were banished by the Russians from the Crimea because of their alleged cooperation with the Nazi invaders. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet exonerates them from the earlier crime of collaboration, but does not encourage them to return to their Crimean homeland, which now is a part of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

This seeming stroke of humanity on the part of Moscow is an additional phase in a series of rehabilitations. In 1956, North Caucasians, made up of Balkars, Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechen and the Ingush, were absolved of the same crime. In 1965 the Volga Germans had their legal rights restored, but in contrast to the North Caucasians, failed to have their former autonomous republic re-established. Actually, Moscow has had nothing to lose by these rehabilitations and everything to gain. The Tatars are well settled in Turkestan and are scarcely prone to return to the Crimean Peninsula.

Some of the account given in this report is subject to sharp criticism based on fact. To say "former landowners and chieftains of the semi-feudal peoples particularly welcomed the German Army, expecting a redistribution of collectivized land" is only an eighth truth. The other seven-eighths is the population's complete desire to be liberated from Russian imperio-colonialist domination.

"THE REAL SVETLANA STALIN STORY," an article by John Kobler and Peter Wyden. Ladies' Home Journal, New York, N.Y., August 1967.

If the whole story about Svetlana Stalin's escape from the USSR paradise and the publication of her book is to serve as an offset to the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, the attempt is a rather puny one. This article is just one of several to prove the point. Much of it is devoted to Svetlana's escape from India to Switzerland and then to the United States, and the trust she placed in an Emmanuel d'Astier whose love for the United States is well below zero.

Brushing aside the transient minutae of this piece, one finds such nonsense as this: "By now the U.S. Government as well as the *Soviets* had decided how to handle Svetlana without increasing tensions between the *two nations* too severely." The *Soviets* are a non-national entity, and the USSR, if that is what is being carelessly referred to, is no nation. Similar nonsense runs through the article. The Kremlin should take great comfort in the excellent measure of ignorance provided by such popular pieces.

"UKRAINIANS LIKE DIEFENBAKER," an article. The Windsor Star, Windsor, Canada, November 18, 1967.

American periodicals, foolishly lauding the progress of the USSR and callously ignoring the subjugation of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, might well take a leaf from the experiences of the former Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. According to this informative account, Mr. Diefenbaker lashed out against Russian colonialism in the USSR. He did this often while being Prime Minister of Canada, and for his works was honored at the World Congress of Free Ukrainians with the coveted Shevchenko Freedom Award.

Those who participated in this Congress have every reason to be proud of achieving the most notable demonstration in the Free World against the 50th anniversary of the fraudulent Russian Bolshevik revolution. By honoring Mr. Diefenbaker, they honored his courageous stand against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. As pointed out here, "The award, established by the

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America in 1962, is given annually to a leader who has given outstanding service to what the congress calls the cause of freedom of Ukraine and other captive nations." A photo appeared with the president of UCCA presenting the award to the Right Honorable.

"POLISH CHARGES AGAINST PIUS REBUTTED," a report. The New York Times, New York, N. Y., June 1, 1967.

This report deals with the third volume of Vatican war documents. The documents show the reason why Pope Pius XII was tactfully silent in the 1941-43 years about German atrocities in Poland. They also rebut some Polish charges that the Pope turned his back on persecuted Polish Catholics. Very simply, open condemnation of the Germans would have increased the persecution.

One of the letters contained in the volume was from Metropolitan Andrei Shyptytsky of Lviv. Sent to the Pope, this letter by the Ukrainian bishop described German terrors and stated that "the Jews are the first victims." The concern shown by the brilliant Metropolitan for Jews and others was demonstrated by deed as well as word.

"HISTORICAL MONUMENTS", a comment. Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, National Council of Churches, New York, N.Y., April 15, 1967.

This issue of the council's organ reproduces a cartoon and comments from *Perets*, the chief humor magazine in the Ukrainian S.S.R. The cartoon displays an "historical monument," a church, that carries the inscriptions "stable" and "storage." Along with this is the magazine's comment, "As you can see, we constantly remodel this unique landmark."

Dwelling on this compounded sacrilege, the council's commentary recalls that thousands of churches in the USSR have been demolished or have been converted for certain cultural purposes. It goes on to stress, "even some churches which were declared historical monuments do not escape such anticultural treatment by local authorities." Needless to say, the distance between outright blasphemy and cultural deterioration is a very short one.

"UKRAINIAN RALLY CONDEMNS SOVIET," a report. Long Island Press, New York, N.Y., November 19, 1967.

Covering one of the several events of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, this report dwells on the Madison Square Garden rally. It starts by saying "Some 10,000 persons of Ukrainian descent gathered in Manhattan yesterday for a giant rally during which they heard a condemnation of the Soviet Union by the acting minority leader of the Canadian Parliament." It quotes the Honorable Michael Starr who also criticized the news media for having "gone overboard in presenting a highly flattering and thoroughly expurgated version of the story of the rise of the Soviet Union."

The day before this organ published a photo of Mr. George W. Drance of West Hempstead. He was Nassau's delegate to the Congress and participated in its activities.

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