

ECHOES of GLASNOST in Soviet Ukraine

Edited by Romana M. Bahry

CAPTUS UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS

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Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine

Edited by

Romana M. Bahry

Captus University Publications

Cover: Official demonstration "Ecology and Us" attended by 10,000 people in the center of Kiev, 13 November 1988. Scene from documentary film *Mikrofon* (*Microphone*), director Georgii Shkliarevsky, Ukrainian News and Documentary Film Studio in Kiev.

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To the memory of my grandfather

Dr. Wolodymyr Sylvester Kindraczuk

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Preface

This volume consists of a collection of viewpoints by twenty-five people, in the form of commentaries and essays, on the subject of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in Soviet Ukraine. It is unique not only because it is the first book on the subject but also because the views expressed are not only those of academics and researchers but also diplomats, dissidents, former political prisoners, journalists, artists, musicians. As the first book on the subject its purpose is to capture the first views and overviews of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in Soviet Ukraine as they were expressed up to and including 1989.

This book emerged from a symposium on "Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine" held at York University in Toronto, Canada, 28 January–1 February 1989. It was the first international and interdisciplinary conference on this subject, bringing together an unprecedented number of representatives from the Soviet Union (Y. Bohayevsky, F. Humeniuk, O. Krysa, V. Romaniuk, P. Ruban, D. Shumuk, M. Zhulynsky) as well as the West. In this respect it was ground-breaking.

Two-thirds of the essays in this volume were originally presented at the York University symposium. The majority of the comments expressed at the symposium have been included and I believe that the essays in this collection accurately reflect the essence of the spirit and the range of views presented at that time.

However, changes have been occurring at a breath-taking pace. It is due to the dynamic nature of the subject and the rapid development of events that a number of additional papers have been included in order to bring the volume up to date right up to and including the inaugural congress of *RUKH* (the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring) which was held between 8–10 September, 1989 in Kiev as the book was being type-set. At the same time it was impossible to constantly be making modifications and additions to the individual papers and so all the authors, as well as the editor, had to stop at some point if the book was going to be published.

The views presented in this collection are of course those of the individual authors of the essays. Editorial changes were deliberately kept to a minimum in

order to preserve the individual styles and thrust of the presenters' points of view. These styles run the gamut from highly personal and subjective to dispassionate analysis. No attempt was made to alter this. Some writers insisted on not including footnotes and their decision has been respected.

In most matters of style the system adhered to is that outlined in *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed., revised and expanded (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982) and Websters Dictionary for spelling. The system of translation is the Modified Library of Congress without diacritical marks and without the apostrophe for the soft sign. The soft sign has been maintained only for citations of poetry and for Rus'. I have chosen to use Kiev, Dneiper and Chornobyl. In the case of the terms *glasnost-hlasnist*, *perestroika-perebudova*, *demokratizatsiia-demokratyzatsiia*, *samizdat-samvydav*, they are used as the individual writers used them.

The preparation of this volume was made possible by the co-operation of the contributors. Thanks are due also to the numerous individuals, in addition to the contributors, who helped with the organization of the symposium or who participated in the symposium as chairs of sessions or commentators: Professor Sterling Beckwith (York, Music), Professor Jurij Darewych (York, Physics), Kathryn Elder (York, Film library), Professor John McErlean (York, History) Myron Maksymiw (Associate of Stong College and Director of Musicus Bortnianskii), Laura Martin (Director, Samuel J. Zacks Art Gallery of Stong College), Lydia Palij (poet and artist), Lydia Pawlenko (York, *Gazette* editor), Professor Christina Petrowska (York, Music), Professor Richard Pope (York, Languages, Literatures, Linguistics), Professor Peter Potichnyj (McMaster, Political Science), Professor Orest Subtelny (York, History and Political Science), Valerie Vanstone (York, Media Relations Officer), Dr. Roman Yereniuk (Director, St. Andrew's College, University of Manitoba), Joyce Zemans (Director, Canada Council). Above all I extend thanks to Professor Allen C. Koretsky, the Master of Stong College and Mrs. Olga Cirak, Assistant to the Master, without whose support the symposium, art exhibit, film screenings and concert would not have taken place.

Gratefully acknowledged are the sponsors of the symposium: the Wolodymyr and Olga Proc Endowment Fund, the Stong College Master's Office, the Stong College Student Government, the Co-curricular Fund of the Council of College Masters of York University, the Office of the Provost of York University, the Faculty of Arts (Dean's Office), the Faculty of Fine Arts, the Slavic and East European Studies Group of York University, the Department of Political Science, the Ukrainian Studies Endowment Fund, the Ukrainian Studies Lecture Endowment Fund, the York University Ukrainian Students' Association. Gratitude is expressed also to Stefan Genyk-Berezowsky and the crew of MTV (Ukrainian Magazine), who interviewed and taped many of the symposium participants, and Elizabeth Wells of CJRT-FM and Roma Hadzewycz, editor of *Ukrainian Weekly*, for their coverage of the events. Some of the articles on the symposium that appeared in the media are: Maureen Murray, "West Must Support 'Fragile' Glasnost Dissident Urges," *Toronto Star*, 29 January 1989; Natalie Pawlenko, "York Offers Rare Look at

Ukrainian Movies," *Toronto Star*, 31 January 1989; Ronald Hambleton, "Everything Coming Up Rosy for Duo," *Toronto Star*, 12 February, 1989.

Thanks are due to Taras Kuzio and the Ukrainian Information Service in London, England, Reverend Myroslav Tataryn, Iosyp Terelia and Ievhen Shabotenko, the director of the Ukrainian News and Documentary Studio in Kiev for the photographs and to John Dawson of DIAR. at York University and John Gereczka for their photographic assistance.

Special thanks are due to Andriy Wynnyckyj for his translations and transcriptions. Finally I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Pauline Lai, Randy Hoffman, and the staff of Captus Press.

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

THOMAS A. MEININGER

Introduction*

The world is witnessing today what is potentially a revolution in the Soviet Union. The forces now unleashed—forces which Mikhail Gorbachev both represents and drives—have profound implications for the very principles on which the Soviet system rests. In some spheres of life, furthermore, it is not only a question of the potential for change, it is a question of actuality. Dramatic, almost unbelievable change has occurred in matters ranging from freer expression to aspects of Soviet strategic thinking.

To be sure, in following the course of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the USSR today, one can recall the line in Hamlet's famous speech: "tis a consummation devoutly to be wished." Without question, real change has taken place; the promise of continuing transformation is, as noted, revolutionary in its implication, but both the realist and the historian of the region know that both the tsarist and the Soviet eras have seen previous periods of reform and promise quickly give way to repression and reaction. In the current case, caution and even scepticism are fed by the realization that what has happened to date does not as yet constitute *perestroika*, or transformation. A new take-off in productivity has yet to occur, a better standard of living for the people is in any event years away, and the regime still controls the commanding heights of political, economic, social and cultural life. The most recent speculation, as we know, deals with the possibility of Gorbachev's weakening hold on power, due to his inability to achieve appreciable progress in *perestroika*, as opposed to *glasnost*.

Strong winds of change nevertheless continue to sweep across the whole Soviet landscape, very much including its multinational character. The ferment

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*Originally delivered as the Opening Remarks to the York University Symposium on Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine, 28 January 1989.

in recent months and years in the non-Russian areas calls to mind the ferment and excitement in the same regions from the turn of the century through the immediate post World War I period. Intense volatility accompanies the protests of Armenians, the dramatic political gestures of Estonians, and the engagement of Ukrainian intellectuals in debates about the proper implications of the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Vladimir and the Christianization of Kiev Rus'. These and other developments remind us once again that nationalism remains the greatest single driving force in the contemporary world, since the French Revolution.

And in this aspect too of the current Soviet scene, historical-mindedness creates a high sense of caution about how to assess *glasnost*, *perestroika* and *demokratizatsiia*. The student of tsarist and Soviet history has seen it before—for example, in the reign of Alexander II or in the early 1920s. A compelling conclusion of history is that the Russian Empire and the Russian controlled Soviet state which followed it have seen the regime unable to resolve its most perplexing problem in modern times—how to deal with the aspirations of the non-Russian half of the population to achieve their place in the family of nations, their place in the sun. The history is very clear in its tale of alternating periods of liberalism, reform and promises of autonomous rights, followed by repression and Russification, a pattern that stands as both cause and effect of the failure of successive regimes to resolve the dilemma.

All of which brings us to the subject of this volume. For the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR, the nationality which dominates in the economically most important area of the USSR, and, arguably, the nationality whose historical interaction with the Russian one is the longest, is the Ukrainian nationality. It is a fascinating juxtaposition, is it not? Discussion of events as fresh as today's newspaper, but a discourse inextricably linked to the continuum of 1000 years of history. Put another way, the subject matter of this volume could not be more timely, and it could not be more enduring—in much the same way as Ukraine is enduring.



Politics



BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO

Glasnost and Perestroika in the USSR*

Glasnost has confronted us with information overload, a problem second only to that of perspective. As Harley Balzer of Georgetown University recently noted, "Things are moving too fast, no one knows where they are going, and we are drowning in details." Clearly, there is a desperate need to understand, if possible, the "laws of motion" of the large drama unfolding in the Soviet Union.

Only major crises give rise to major reforms. The Gorbachev leadership took the reins of power in 1985 cognizant of the fact that they inherited a country and a system in a state of material and spiritual crisis. The symptoms of decay were everywhere: in foreign policy (the Afghan disaster); in culture (epitomized when Brezhnev was awarded the Lenin prize for literature); in nationalities relations (a centralization of power so mad that the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine had to phone Moscow for permission to construct a pedestrian overpass in Kiev); and even in the health of the Soviet population (in contrast to the trends in all Western countries, life expectancy actually declined: from 71 to 64 years of age since the 1960s in the case of men). But the most pressing crisis was economic.

Everybody knew that official Soviet statistics lied, but the size of the lie is only now becoming clear. Gorbachev told his top officials last year that once the official figures are purged of the influence of expanded vodka sales and higher prices for Soviet oil exports during the Brezhnev years, it then turns out that the USSR has been a no-growth economy for as long as twenty years. In fact, things were even worse because of the operation of the "law of increasing inefficiency and waste." In Ukraine, two years ago, every fourth product of the machine-building industry was obsolete (by Soviet standards) the moment it left the factory. In 1983 the Soviet economy had to spend 3.7 times as much cast

*Keynote Address of York University Symposium on Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine 28 January 1989.

iron, 3 times as much steel and cement and 2.3 times as much oil as the American economy to produce a comparable unit of national income. The Soviet economy had not yet entered the third technological revolution—plastics, electronics and computers. Soviet labor productivity in agriculture is one-tenth that of the USA although the USSR has more farmers than the industrialized West and Japan combined. Up to one-third of all vegetables harvested rot in the fields and the equivalent of Canadian annual production of grain is lost during harvests in the USSR. Given the size of the Soviet economy, the scale of waste is mind-boggling. As Gorbachev noted, "We have already arrived at a point where such a waste is not only intolerable, but simply unsustainable." It was this "law of increasing waste and inefficiency," or abysmal capital-output ratios, that ultimately led to the crisis of the early 1980s that first brought Andropov, and then Gorbachev to power.

Gorbachev made it clear when he was elected to head the Communist party on 11 March 1985 that his most urgent task was the economy. Andropovian methods were to be used to achieve this end. A campaign was launched for tighter discipline and order, and above all, the power and authority of the Communist party leadership was to be restored. Structural reforms were not proposed, and although *glasnost* was affirmed by Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, it remained an ineffectual slogan. But by the summer of 1986 *perestroika* had entered a new phase, what Boris Kagarlitski calls its "golden age." The Chornobyl disaster and the political imperatives of economic reform changed the picture.

The Chornobyl accident revealed the numerous weaknesses of the traditional management system and its potentially cataclysmic consequences. The truth, more or less, about Chornobyl, opened the way to a more honest examination of a range of other contemporary problems, and in its wake soon followed a re-examination of the Stalinist past.

Gorbachev's early economic policy, that of increasing pressure on direct producers, yielded some immediate results. A 4 per cent growth rate was achieved in 1986 as enterprise directors called into circulation hidden reserves of raw materials. But almost all of this growth, as Nikolai Shmelev has noted, was attributed to the excess production of shoddy surplus goods. Success even of this sort was short lived; by 1987 industry grew by a mere 1.5 per cent, and the machine-building sector, considered as critical for *perestroika*, was stagnant. Reform through moral exhortation and direct pressure was getting nowhere. It was in a speech in Krasnodar in September 1986 that Gorbachev first spoke of the need to democratize Soviet society. Democratization was to become an instrument of reform, the "driving force of *perestroika*" as Gorbachev put it at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum.

The role of democracy in the process of economic reform was initially conceived of narrowly. Democracy was reduced to greater criticism of shortcomings and the chastisement of bureaucrats resisting change. But this cheerleader version of democracy was soon recognized as a poor antidote to the system's ills, for it failed to deal with the essential point, namely, that there are certain social and political prerequisites for a flourishing economy, such as: a

flexible and innovative administration, curtailment of police and bureaucratic arbitrariness, a free movement of ideas and information, free association, etc. As Abel Aganbegyan put it, all previous attempts at reforming the economy failed "because the reforms were not synchronized with a restructuring of other spheres of social life." Expressed differently, you cannot have a stagnant, controlled society, a domineering political system, and, at the same time expect economic dynamism. If this were possible to achieve, the dictators of this world would have long ago produced their version of Japan. But they have not and cannot. This is the political imperative of *glasnost*, and the only guarantee of its continuation. To backtrack on *glasnost* would mean to plunge the economy deeper into the mire of economic and social stagnation.

As Seweryn Bialer has noted, Soviet society seems to be governed by a peculiar social law which dictates that economic reform begins not with the "economic base," but with the superstructure. Gorbachev made this point succinctly at the 19th Party Conference, June 1988, when he said, "Today we are facing many complicated problems. Which of these problems is the key one? The Central Committee of the Communist party considers that it is the reform of our political system."

But political reform is the thorniest of issues since it concerns the essential feature of the Soviet Union—the monopoly of political power enjoyed by the Communist party and the panoply of privileges that this entails. Reforms adopted at the 19th Party Conference are aimed at invigorating the institutions of the state beginning with the Supreme Soviet, allowing for more than one candidate to stand for state and Communist party elections, abolishing many departments of the Communist party which oversee and dictate to government institutions, reducing the size of the Communist party apparatus, etc. The monopoly of power enjoyed by the Communist party was certainly not challenged. Indeed, Gorbachev denounced the idea of a multi-party system as an "abuse of democratization." The fundamental aim of the reforms was really to reestablish Communist party control over society. The 20 million strong Communist party, it should be noted, never existed as a party in the usual sense of a political organization. A single-party system is after all a non-party system. Rather, the Communist party leadership is the organizer of society and within it are reproduced all the possible factions and interests that one expects to find in an elite. The existence of patronage networks and of factional and institutional interests is a natural tendency of Soviet politics. Under Brezhnev, the Communist party leadership was weak and accommodating, and for that reason Brezhnev survived as long as he did. Powerful interest groups and factions were allowed to pursue their own self-interest unhindered, even when these conflicted with the overall good of society. The Bacchanalia of corruption and inefficiency that this produced was dysfunctional, to say the least. Under the old arrangement, where the Communist party dominated and interfered in everything, it in effect controlled and directed very little. The bureaucracy's corporatist nature was leading to political disintegration. Thus by withdrawing from everyday and petty intervention in society, Gorbachev hopes that the Communist party will be given the wherewithal to concentrate on the

supervision and the solution of major problems. Gorbachev was not engaging in double-speak when he said that the political reforms aimed at decentralization would strengthen the Communist party. But the success of this political streamlining will depend on whether the economy can be made to function more autonomously, and whether the apparatus can be made to unlearn its meddling habits. Political reform is a decisive battle for *perestroika*; it is necessary in order to make the process of *glasnost* and *perestroika* irreversible, argued Gorbachev. But past experience with the apparatus would suggest that the process is still very much reversible.

If one were to look for guarantees of *glasnost's* permanence in the legal sphere, such a decisive aspect of the superstructure, then one could be disappointed. The reform of the criminal code is slow in coming. Although there is much discussion about *zakonnost* (legality), it is ironic that the initials KGB are never mentioned (except by unofficial groups who have called for the KGB's abolition). Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the mechanisms of social control have been greatly relaxed and that violations of human rights are less frequent.

Neither has there been much progress in reforming the administration, a monster comprised of some 18 million people. True, some of the rules of petty bureaucratism have been abolished. There is less red tape, the size of the apparatus has been marginally reduced, travel is easier and there has been an expansion of local and republican autonomy. But the behemoth remains intact. To appreciate what a formidable foe that apparatus really is, it has to be experienced. As the Ukrainian writer Volodymyr Drozd wrote, "We have proved beyond a shadow of doubt that everything can be bureaucratized. And we continue to prove this over and over again in the years of *glasnost*, when we proclaim loudly a merciless struggle against bureaucratism. It may appear paradoxical, but the bureaucratization of the very process of the democratization of our society is a very real danger. The power of inertia is terrible... The bureaucrats live today as they lived yesterday and will live tomorrow thus." Tatiana Zaslavskaia has argued that nothing short of a "social revolution" will break the deadening hold of this administration on society.

The greatest achievements of *glasnost* and *perestroika* have been in that seemingly most ethereal of realms—consciousness. The leading role here is played by newspapers, journals and the mass media. Indicative of renewed interest in public affairs is the fact that newspaper circulation increased by some 5 million. (As one Moscow wit noted, "To read, is after all, more joyful than to live.") For the Gorbachev leadership, a freer press was essential if the reform process was not to stagnate, and it was also a precondition for winning the intelligentsia to the Gorbachev camp. If a precondition of change is an awareness that the old system is not viable, then *glasnost* has accomplished this task, but it has had some unintended consequences as well.

The first is that it has allowed reform alternatives to be posed which were not necessarily favored by the Communist party leadership. As one delegate to the June 1988 Conference complained, "the freewheeling referendum on the future of the country is producing a "cornucopia of heresies" (such as the idea of a multi-party system, the abolition of *nomenklatura* (privileged elite),

genuine self-management, the sovereignty of the republics or the Ukrainization of public life in Ukraine). The debate has politicized the population and encouraged individuals and groups to become involved in the political process.

Secondly, the honest accounts of the colossal injustices and crimes of Soviet history—the famine, the purges—and of the unforgivable inefficiency with which Soviet affairs have been conducted, has had the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the system. Unable to base its legitimacy upon its continuity with the past, the Communist party has had to assert its right to rule on the basis of its ability to become the engine of reform. This is an important shift in Soviet politics.

The rise of civil society is yet another major, yet unintended consequence of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. This refers above all to the establishment of independent political, social and cultural associations commonly called "informal groups" or "the informals." Today, there are probably 40,000 such groups in the USSR and some 70 million people are involved in them. Ludmilla Alexeyeva thinks that over 3 million people are members of groups with a distinctly political profile. Informal groups publish their own *samizdat* (self-publishing) bulletins, organize conferences, hold discussions and concerts, and they have held large demonstrations and have articulated alternative political programs. These groups are the harbingers of genuine political pluralism. Whereas in the past there were no intermediary groups to aggregate and articulate demands between the state and society, today an infrastructure of sorts is beginning to develop. If the atomization of society was the key mechanism in maintaining social control in the past, the development of informal groups represents the first real break in this method of maintaining domination.

The Communist party is particularly jittery about the rise of these groups, and police harassment of the informals is an almost daily occurrence. The fear of the informals was clearly expressed by I. I. Antonovich, the Central Committee representative in a round-table discussion on political and social pluralism published in a recent issue of *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (*Sociological Research*). He said, "I do not see informal groups as carriers of pluralism. The informals represent an alternative political power. Today they say that their movement represents the peaceful working out of alternatives—but in reality, this is a battle for power. And I know of only one dynamic of power: no institution surrenders it voluntarily."

But as events in the Baltics have shown, civil society may exert such pressure that the Communist party will have to accommodate a new political force. I am, of course, referring to the rise of the People's Fronts. In Estonia, for instance, the People's Front claims the allegiance of 90 per cent of Estonians and 10 per cent of Russians in the republic. Fronts are now being organized in Belorussia and in Ukraine. Significantly, in recent months, there have been calls for the democratization of the Communist party. Certainly, the Communist party is not about to surrender power, but it may have to learn to share it.

Surveying developments in the Soviet Union, we can see a new "scissors crisis" looming ahead. *Glasnost* has increased the population's expectations and their effectiveness in expressing discontent. But, on the other hand, there

has been no improvement in economic conditions, and there is much to complain about. If there is no improvement in the economic situation within the next few years, there may occur a rise in mass discontent, and the leadership will feel pressured to use the apparatus of coercion to effect a crackdown on society, a crackdown which would resolve nothing, and lead to the further disintegration of society.

What *perestroika* lacks is a clear, and of necessity, radical project that could arouse the enthusiasm of the masses. A new social bloc has to be formed involving the real collaboration of the intermediate and lower strata, for only such a new alliance is capable of opposing the bureaucracy. The present social basis of the reformist project is much too confined to sectors of the leadership and the intelligentsia. New social groups have to be invited to participate in the reform movement and this entails listening to their needs and aspirations.

Certainly, as many polls have made clear, very few in the USSR believe that there has been much success in restructuring the economy. A June 1988 public opinion poll of 11,000 workers showed that only 2 per cent answered "yes" to the question, "Has there been any success in restructuring the economy?" Asked whether they thought change was essential, 81 per cent answered "yes." The economic indicators released this month show that the news is not good. Agricultural production, for example, grew by a minuscule 0.8 per cent in 1988. Enterprise reform is getting nowhere as the potential benefits of *khozraschet* (self-accounting) have been nullified by *goszakaz* (compulsory state procurement). The effects of Chornobyl and the Armenian earthquake have added to a deficit which is now around 100 billion rubles. In short, as Gorbachev told the Moscow Communist party committee, "The new processes are moving very slowly."

Leonid Abalkin, director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, told delegates at the 19th Party Conference that "a basic understanding of political economy is a requirement for the leadership of a state. And one can confidently say that any government which fails to understand the laws of that science... will go broke." Gorbachev, as Ed A. Hewett observed so aptly, is like a man trying to cross a chasm, reaching for the far side, but holding on to this side for fear that when he jumps, he may fall. Prevarication is understandable for politicians, but terribly destructive of economic reform. The result is a society where support for a new system is widespread, with a *de facto* continuation of the past. This leads to confusion and a rise in mass discontent. Sooner or later the system will have to jump, because the price of standing still will be too high.

I did not want to say much about Ukraine in my address for fear of repeating the discussion which will take place in the next few days. But the temptation is too great and so I will end with a few thoughts. It is common knowledge that because there has been no significant political change in Ukraine (after all Shcherbytsky is still in power**), *glasnost* in Ukraine is different from the

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**The 71 year-old Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was ousted from the USSR Politburo and Volodymyr Antonovych Ivashko, 57, was named first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 28 September 1989.—ED.

process unfolding in Moscow or the Baltic republics. As Ivan Drach noted, "If they clip your nails in Moscow, they cut your fingers off in Ukraine." The legacy of decades of servility weighs heavily on Ukrainian society. But nonetheless, much has been achieved in Ukraine in the last two years, especially and in the first instance, in the realm of consciousness. What we have today is the first large-scale discussion of national life since the 1920s and a stark account of how that culture has been ravaged. Imagine, Ukraine with 50 million people produces 3 records a year in Ukrainian; one cannot write a doctoral dissertation in Ukrainian in Ukraine. The discussion has led to concrete demands, and we are seeing improvements slowly. Over 130 new Ukrainian language schools have been opened. A pedagogical school in the Dnipropetrovsk area has been transferred to the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian is now a compulsory subject for university entrance in Kiev and Chernivtsi and more and more subjects are being taught in Ukrainian there. Ukrainian will probably be declared a state language. Many works hitherto banned are appearing. There has occurred a significant rejuvenation of cultural and intellectual life.

At a deeper level what is happening is what Borys Tymoshenko calls, "the healing of the national body politic, the national soul, the historical roots of our nation"—a healing process after fifty years of savage attack. There is a real mobilization of public opinion which has affected the development of national consciousness. That consciousness is gaining strength every day. National consciousness, it must be remembered, is not a natural condition of humanity, but is the result of a process of social learning, and for this to occur there must be agencies communicating the national message—the press, radio, television. For the first time since the 1920s the national message is being communicated to the population. The secret of the process which is unfolding is the fact that for the first time since the 1920s the Ukrainian intelligentsia has a relatively unfettered access to the population. When Ukrainian writers speak to a mass audience of workers in Zaporizhzhia and discuss with them problems of Ukrainian culture, something profound and very significant is happening; a new national awareness is being formed. This also places the apparatus in a difficult position because it no longer has the monopoly on the message and it can be and has been outflanked by independent initiatives. Certainly, there would have been no Central Committee resolution on the national question had it not been for this independent pressure. The time is quickly approaching when Shcherbytsky too will have to jump, though where he will land is another story.

For the Ukrainian community in Canada and the academic milieu in particular, events in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine bolster our identity and are a source of inspiration for further work, but we do not yet have the ability, the structures, the policies, to deal intelligently, effectively and realistically with the great opportunities presented to us in Ukraine. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* will undoubtedly be a long process as society in Ukraine learns to speak to itself. We too have to learn how to address that society. Before we can act appropriately, we must first become aware of the processes in the USSR.



YURI BOHAYEVSKY

Some Aspects of Perebudova and Hlasnist in the USSR and in Soviet Ukraine

The topic under discussion has facilitated a new meeting of people with different backgrounds and outlooks, beliefs and political convictions. Isn't this a vivid example of the results of *perebudova* and *hlasnist* in the Soviet Union as a whole, and in Soviet Ukraine, in particular? I strongly believe it is. No matter how contradictory and diverse our views and positions may be, we all have reasons to acknowledge that the new developments in the Soviet Union give us all a good chance to abandon outdated concepts, approaches, thinking, and behavior in favor of a fruitful, constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue. Clashes of opinion, the prevalence of emotion over reason, as many of us know from past experience, have often been a cause of unnecessary confrontation, mutual rejection and distrust. *Hlasnist*, or openness, is a product, and one of the most important, of the *perebudova* process. These two categories are very close, interrelated, and interdependent. But at the same time, the efficiency of this process will not produce any desirable results without the comprehensive democratization of the society, and without a new thinking. These are the four challenges facing our domestic and foreign policy.

Unfortunately, in commenting upon or assessing the current developments and political situation in the Soviet Union, and specifically in one of its major Soviet republics, Ukraine, many people in the West, scholars included, prefer to talk about *hlasnist* as an excuse for demanding freedom for the individual. We do not state that freedom is something alien to us. That would be wrong, especially now. But, as it often happens, people's responsibilities are being drawn into the background. Our understanding is that freedom always goes hand in hand with increasing responsibility.

What many of us really lack today is the willingness or ability to listen to the views of another person. There is also a tendency to ignore other people's opinions or to impose one's own views on others, which is totally unacceptable today. This approach continues to prevail in the minds of many people in

Western countries at a time when we, in the Soviet Union, say now that we do not consider any more that we have a monopoly on the last word.

There are different interpretations of the current processes in the Soviet Union. A great number of people outside the boundaries of our country have met them with enthusiasm and relief, and sincerely hail and welcome the ongoing changes. For us, this response is very important and encouraging. Others, however, still consider these processes as a "threat" and a "puzzle" or a "smokescreen to lull the West," and on this presumption they continue to allege with irony and sarcasm that nothing has changed. This is a simplistic approach of assessing this new social and political situation in our country. The changes in the USSR concern above all the Soviet society itself, the country's economy, its cultural and scientific spheres. *Perebudova* is aimed at bringing the life of the Soviet people to a new qualitative dimension.

Revolutionary transformations have just started to take shape in Ukraine, as well as in other Soviet republics. Discussions carried on in the mass media and workers' collectives reflect a good deal of public concern. Sometimes such debates are quite uncompromising, with conservatism, extremism and realism clashing at the same time. For the most part, people realize that the breaking of the old mechanism is a hard, time-consuming process challenged by those who used to benefit from the "stable stagnation." Nevertheless the majority of the people welcome drastic changes in the society. When one Ukrainian-Canadian, while visiting Kiev recently, was asked about what he thought were the most striking points in the course of *perebudova* and *hlasnist* in the Soviet Union, he emphasized the psychological change of the people, who speak openly now as if they have nothing to hide. This is true. It is also true that the atmosphere of *hlasnist* is helping to break down many old barriers.

We made an impartial and critical political and socio-economic analysis of the society in which we live. It led us to the conclusion that there was a need to reorganize society fundamentally, and to do so in all its spheres. During the last almost four years, much has been done and achieved, but a lot has been missed and not all of the people's expectations have been met. There have been slips, blunders and mistakes on our socialist path. We continue to find solutions to the problems that accumulated during the decades, and we are optimistic. We still have many difficulties and we do not, as Mr. Gorbachev once said, know all the answers. But we do know the main thing; namely, that we have made the right choice.

In early July 1988 a special resolution on *hlasnist* was adopted at the 19th all-Union Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Among other things, this resolution emphasized that the consistent expansion of *hlasnist* was "an imperative condition for expressing the domestic essence of the socialist involvement in all public affairs, the affairs of the state and the collectives; an effective guarantee against any deformation of socialism, whose base is the control by the entire people over the activity of all social institutions, and of bodies of the state and government." *Hlasnist*, the Congress further stated, was a "necessary condition for the socialist self-administration of the people; for the exercise of the constitutional rights, freedoms and duties of citizens; for

collecting and accumulating the entire diversity of interests and the socialist plurality of opinions that exist in Soviet society; for an effective way of strengthening internationalism and cultivating socialist patriotism; for consolidating the humanistic image of socialism." I would not wish to continue to cite this very important resolution, but I only wish to stress that this document gives our society many opportunities.

Also, a new law to promote and consolidate the process of *hlasnist* in Ukraine was adopted, and that is the law "On Nationwide Discussions of Important Questions of State Life in the Ukrainian SSR." Why did we need such a law? The basic opportunity of holding nationwide discussions is envisaged by the constitutions of the USSR and of the Union republics adopted in 1977–1978. All kinds of important issues, mostly legislation, were discussed in our country before, as well. But they were irregular and the attitude to public opinion was often a token one. Over decades people enthusiastically applauded, unanimously approving speeches of our leaders of all ranks. We approved the adoption of the most democratic constitution and mass repressions against innocent people, which were the violation of the same constitution. We approved the rehabilitation of the councils of national economy and their elimination shortly after. We approved the growing of corn up to the Artic Circle and then explained its subsequent failure as one of the main causes of our serious failures in agriculture. And there are many other examples of the situation when the official viewpoint alone had the right to exist. But this, we believe, is now history, made by people and concrete individuals whose decisions and administering power have left us a very complex legacy, with a lot of problems, which we have to solve. The growing processes of democratization and *hlasnist* are, naturally, meant to change such a situation, for broad use of public opinion permits us to work out effective programs for solving the most complex problems. And we have had quite a few of them over the recent years.

To make these discussions systematic and fruitful one had to establish a clear-cut order of holding them, specifying citizens' constitutional rights in this question, and precisely defining their opportunities. Under the law I just mentioned, all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have an opportunity to participate in the discussion of all kinds of problems, and first and foremost, those dealing with the major directions of economic, political, social and cultural development of Ukraine; for example, large-scale research, technical and ecological projects. Besides, the public will discuss other important questions of state activity falling within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR. In a word, if a problem applies to the whole of Ukraine and its people's interests, the draft of its solution may be submitted for a nationwide discussion. Such an approach to the working out of decisions, envisaged by this new law of the Ukrainian SSR, will permit a more accurate reflection of the will and interests of broader sections of the population, and will make the decisions the result of a truly mass activity.

Now, a few words about history, which must be true and complete, and, of course, objective. Never before in the seventy year history of Soviet society has there been such a deep and truly vital interest in an objective presentation of

national history in general, and that of each national group of the multinational land of the USSR in particular. Never before have such lively, sharp and fruitful discussions of historical problems, periods and personalities, taken place. For the first time since Lenin's era the situation of a true civic respect to history has been formed, along with the necessary conditions for scientific activity: educational, ideological and moral. Naturally the responsibilities of historians and their new social function has grown in the conditions of restructuring. Recently society has become increasingly interested in questions connected with the period of maturity of Soviet power. People want to learn about the deep layers of that complex period of our history, and understand its lessons. This is not accidental, for this is where the roots of our socialist origin are, as well as the sources of all our accomplishments and the origin of a number of developments which later resulted in the problems that we are trying to solve today.

Historians owe much to history, and to the people. Many questions, commonly known as "blank" and "black" spots in our history, still await their answers. Among them, the period of 1932–1933, which produced so many contradictory opinions and various speculations. I mention this subject for the reason that for many of you, if not all, it has been one of the major concerns. Today we are searching for answers to very complex questions of our history, including the famine of 1933, a really tragic page of not only Ukrainian history, for the famine swept then also a number of areas in the Russian federation, in particular Kuban, the Volga River and the Saratov area, and even Siberia and reached Kazakhstan. For a long period of time, this topic was a taboo for outspoken analysis. Recently a lot of publications by experts—both economists and historians—have appeared, so there is no doubt that this dramatic page of our not-so-recent past will be presented in full.

Social problems that manifested themselves in Soviet society in the late seventies and early eighties, which we now tend to link with the stagnation phenomena, affected young people most of all. Conservative authorities considered it much easier, for instance, to say "No" to a proposal to turn a derelict basement into a rock club rather than support the desire of young musicians to express themselves the way they wished. Anything new or original that failed to fit the traditional yard-stick of notions about leisure, interests, and behavior was often prohibited or labelled as a manifestation of an inadequate cultural level. What is the situation today? The policy of *hlasnist* and democratization has actually given freedom to ideas and initiatives of the young. The most popular way to realize them is to form an amateur group or association: musical, ecological, literary, artistic, technological. The main objective of these associations is to meet the diverse interests of young people, bring individuals of one accord together.

As to the question of religion, I doubt very much that the ongoing changes in the relationship between the government and the church in the Soviet Union are being undertaken, as some have suggested, to win the believer's support for the government's (Gorbachev's) policy of *perestroika*. This is an incorrect observation. The new situation in our country has prompted the necessity to

reassess also the attitude towards believers. We are citizens of one country, and the artificial division of the population into non-believers and believers that existed for decades was unfair and brought no benefits to our society. This situation, as I already said, is gradually changing today. We will probably see many answers to this very sensitive and delicate question in a new law on the freedom of conscience, which is being drafted now. It would be premature to make any forecast or speculations at this moment, but the new legislation should reflect also the interests of the believers. Further developments in this area depend also on the position of the church circles. There are certain moves to establish a dialogue, and the outcome of it is in the hands of the church alone.

The present developments in Soviet Ukraine, I hope, are very well known to many of you. The unprecedented discussion of acute problems in various areas of the mass media of the republic, the upsurge of people's social activity, of their national self-consciousness bring positive results and make life in Ukraine more viable. Although the winds of the new times are not blowing too fast, and more time is needed so that the people will be able to see more visible results of *perebudova*, we are strongly convinced that there is no other alternative for us than to go along the chosen track. If we continue on this road, many of the problems which we inherited from the past, distant and not very distant, will simply disappear. What is happening today in Soviet Ukraine, is not, as some scholars and non-scholars in the West assert, a manifestation of the people's "unrest" or "re-emergence of Ukrainian nationalism." Unfortunately, the inability to make a proper distinction between national and international, between national consciousness and nationalism is a mistake being made even among the top Soviet scientists. And I might suggest that a number of Western scholars also make this serious mistake. I can express only my regret to those who fail or do not wish to see the changes in Ukraine today. These changes are very encouraging, and they open wide opportunities for the broadening of co-operation between Ukrainians, both in the whole Soviet Union, and those living in many other countries, Canada, the United States and Great Britain included.

It is time for all, not only us in the Soviet Union, to change our, in many cases, old-fashioned and outdated concepts and approaches according to the challenges of this crucial time. The Soviet Union is proving this in its domestic and foreign policy, and only during the last two years we have seen a number of deep-rooted positive changes in the world situation. No change comes quickly. But we, as I already said, are very optimistic, because without this optimism we will never accomplish the set goals. We welcome positive and constructive criticism of our domestic and foreign policy. We now study more carefully the experiences of other nations. But what we do not like, and will never agree with, is that others treat us and our social system with contempt. We will never accept lecturing, sermonizing, preaching, and this is what many in the West unfortunately continue to do.

The world is changing for the better. People are learning to co-operate peacefully. Humankind is less disposed to divide itself into isolated cages:

East-West, capitalism-socialism, white-black. We are beginning to feel ever more strongly that we are one single organism with common troubles and similar needs. According to the oriental calendar, this year is a year of the snake, a symbol of wisdom, prudence and restraint. So, let us show, regardless of our differences, the most of our wisdom, patience and restraint, to our mutual benefit. Let us prove that the world is really changing. Let us utilize in the most effective way the opportunities that *perebudova* and *hlasnist* offer us today.



DAVID R. MARPLES

Nuclear Power, Ecology and the Patriotic Opposition in the Ukrainian SSR:

An Analysis of a Post-Chornobyl Trend

In November 1988, when I visited the city of Kiev, I was particularly interested in speaking with Ukrainian publicists, writers and politicians about developments in Ukraine in the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's general secretaryship. It is hard for many Ukrainians in the West not only to accept that in Gorbachev the Soviets possess a leader who is genuinely interested in reform, who has rejected and then savaged the misdeeds and crimes of Joseph Stalin, and who appears (and I use that word carefully) to have renounced claims that the communist system will eventually triumph over the world. Perhaps even harder, given decades of determined dissidence in Ukraine, has been the recognition that if reform is to take place in Ukraine, the impetus may well come not from Kiev, but from Moscow.

My paper will concentrate on the issue of nuclear power. It is no longer examined in isolation, but represents part of a serious concern for the ecology in the Soviet Union today. As a sign of the Ukrainians' anxiety about the pollution of their cities and rivers, the salinization of good farmland by badly thought-out irrigation schemes, the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* (*Truth of Ukraine*) in its issue of 16 December 1988, came out in tabloid form with an issue devoted entirely to the ecology. But the chief concern is nuclear power. This has been the case for about eighteen months. But before discussing this question in detail, I wish to comment briefly on the Western understanding of Chornobyl, which forms the background to the events described herein.

Generally speaking, Western scientists, writers and journalists have adhered to what I have described as a "myth of Chornobyl." The myth is that the events in the immediate aftermath of the disaster constitute a veritable success story: an orderly and efficient evacuation process; a thorough cleanup operation; minimal casualties and negligible future deaths from cancer; a permanent burial of the burnt out reactor; an improved and safer nuclear power program. In the current atmosphere of warmer relations between the Soviet Union and the West—which is to be welcomed—one wins few friends by pointing out that

none of the above represent a truthful analysis of the results of Chornobyl. Suffice it to point to the woeful lack of instructions to the nearby population after the accident, so much so that a wedding was held in the nearby city of Prypiat on the day of the accident, hours after the explosion. The evacuation dragged on for a month and dangerous parts of Belorussia were never evacuated. There were more deaths than officially reported. The reactor has not been buried permanently, according to the Soviets. The burial will last only as long as a normal reactor's lifespan, after which a decision must be made what to do with it. And the current Ukrainian nuclear power program is unsafe, as both experts and nonexperts have demonstrated.

It is not my purpose here to illustrate the misconceptions about Chornobyl (I wrote my second book to more or less show this). But it should be emphasized that many Western spokespersons, having accepted the official Soviet view of Chornobyl, have subsequently either underestimated or completely ignored the tremendous wave of anti-nuclear power protests across the Soviet Union over the past year. These protests dwarf in scale any recent anti-nuclear protests in the West. And unlike the officially organized protests in the Soviet Union against nuclear war, these new protests have arisen spontaneously, from the grassroots level. Only belatedly have prominent Soviet officials responded to them and attempted to direct them, with little success to date.

A Ukrainian audience may be aware of another aspect of Chornobyl, with which I have been acquainted more than once over the past thirty-three months since the accident. This is a view or feeling that Ukrainians in the West are acting emotionally and unfairly by refusing to accept the view that the Soviets performed admirably in the Chornobyl aftermath. This view is not adhered to universally, but it cannot be denied. It is endemic in the book by the Canadian L. Ray Silver, entitled *Fallout from Chernobyl* which accuses "hyphenated Canadians" of wishing to extend the Russian Civil War on the Canadian prairies over the issue of Chornobyl.[1] I was asked in late 1986 during a visit to External Affairs in Ottawa, whether I was a representative of Ukrainian nationalist groups in Canada, even though I have never had such an affiliation, and am not even Ukrainian. And author Frederik Pohl, who has written a novel about Chornobyl, thinks that I have been too critical of the Soviet handling of Chornobyl because, having spent too long in association with Ukrainians, I have adopted something he calls the "Ukrainian émigré mind-set" which he believes is "virulently anti-Soviet."[2]

These are unfortunate preconceptions, not particularly about my own work—in which case they have been relatively few—but rather about Ukrainians in the West. They presuppose that Ukrainian émigrés, (which itself is a meaningless term since Ukrainians in the West are Canadians and Americans by any normal standard, not émigrés, most of them having been born over here) all think along the same lines. Those who have examined this so-called "mind-set," such as Harold Troper, the co-author of the book *Old Wounds*, about Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Canada, with whom I recently spoke in Edmonton, have recognized the great diversity of views among Ukrainians. Moreover, the question arises that if writers such as Pohl and Silver are

incapable of understanding the different viewpoints in the community on this side of the Atlantic, how much less do they understand about the quantum leaps, half-truths and panic that has occurred in the Soviet Union with regard to Chornobyl?

The actions of the Soviet citizens themselves, however, have delivered a definitive blow to the "Chornobyl is a success story" theory. Perhaps the most unpopular personality in Kiev today is not, as some would believe, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the Ukrainian party secretary, but Anatolii Romanenko, the Ukrainian minister of health. He is unpopular because it is widely believed that he withheld information from Ukrainian citizens about the extent of the fallout from Chornobyl. He is despised for stating that there will be no discernible health consequences from the nuclear disaster—an astonishing statement from a medical expert and the director of the Center for Radiation Medicine in Kiev which is examining the victims of Chornobyl. And this hatred is not manifested in grumbling at street corners, but in the press, on television and on the radio. In a recent issue of *News From Ukraine*, which is distributed in the West, prominent writer Dr. Iurii Shcherbak fiercely criticizes the health minister.[3] It is surprising that given the extent of this anger, that the West has not taken more notice of the movement to stop nuclear power plant building in Ukraine.

The past months have seen the culmination of a notable development in the history of nuclear power in the Ukrainian SSR; namely the emergence of a significant and eloquent opposition movement. It can be attributed both to the greater freedom to discuss the question under the atmosphere of *glasnost* and to the aftermath of the April 1986 Chornobyl disaster, which is regarded in many intellectual circles in the republic as something akin to a professional "cover-up" operation by Moscow-based scientists, and particularly by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy of the USSR, headed by Nikolai Lukonin, founded in July 1986.

In addition, the post-Chornobyl developments in the Ukrainian nuclear sphere cannot be divorced from a general concern for the ecology. While the latter is part of a campaign quite clearly initiated in Moscow in late 1987, there have been specific Ukrainian problems that arguably are particularly severe and which have been neglected for long periods; namely, the degree of pollution in major industrial cities, of which Zaporizhzhia is said to be the worst example, and plans to construct a grandiose canal à la Ceausescu, linking the Dnieper River, the principal water supply of Ukraine, with the Danube, thereby cutting the former off from the Black Sea.

The matter was compounded in the fall of 1988 by a mysterious illness in the city of Chernivtsi in the Bukovynian region of Western Ukraine. Here, over 130 children were hospitalized in Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow as a result of a debilitating nervous disease that caused hair loss. It has affected mainly lighter-haired children. Following the onset of symptoms (the children were said to have experienced nightmares, for example) the local authorities waited approximately six weeks before any major action was taken. The result was at least two major demonstrations in the city in November and December 1988, with so-called "hooliganism" in evidence at both (two Soviet policemen were

hospitalized after attacks by demonstrators). The citizens are anxious because aside from exposure to a rare metallic element called thallium, no cause has been found for the hair loss. Improperly stored chemicals, military factories violating ecological laws or depositions in the city dump are believed to be likely causes.

The affair of the Chernivtsi children has elicited numerous articles in both the all-Union and Ukrainian press. [4] Indeed, nothing can be so calculated to arouse the wrath of citizens as the sight of unfortunate children, bald and helpless, being treated in distant hospitals. It brought to mind at once Moscow's Hospital no. 6 in the late spring and summer of 1986, when Soviet firemen and first-aid workers were being treated for severe radiation burns after the Chornobyl tragedy. For a second time, there appeared to be an almost inexplicable delay in taking action. Ukrainian health minister Anatolii Romanenko was once again on the scene. A Chernivtsi scientist, whom I was able to interview on a recent visit to Ukraine, commented that Romanenko would doubtless insist that in Chernivtsi the children's hair would now grow even better than before (a reference to his 1987 statement that the health of children from the evacuated zone of Chornobyl today is even better than before the accident.)

However, it has been on the topic of nuclear power specifically that what can be termed a "patriotic opposition movement" has emerged in the republic. What are the roots of this development? First, there is the stark fact that the Chornobyl station itself has remained in service, following its start-up once again only five months after the major accident. The extent of local feeling against the continuing operation of the station was evident at two 1988 demonstrations in Kiev, the first on 26 April 1988, on the second anniversary of the disaster, and the second on 13 November (about which more below). In the spring of 1987, at what was described as the first public meeting in Ukraine on the question of nuclear power development (in fact, it consisted exclusively of scientists), a massive majority of those present, led by the late academician A.M. Grodzinsky, voted against the completion of the third stage of the Chornobyl plant's development: units 5 and 6, RBMK-1000 reactors.[5].

The main arguments advanced at the meeting against the extension of the plant were the lack of basic requirements, such as a shortage of water and land, and the fact that those required to build and operate such structures had already endured enough trials after the accident. However, only eight months after this meeting, Chornobyl's unit 3, which had remained shut down since the accident, was restarted without any such discussion or analysis. It should be borne in mind, of course, that the Ukrainian meeting of scientists had no legal powers over Chornobyl 5 and 6. Nevertheless, work on those two reactors was immediately suspended after the meeting, giving an impression that the Moscow ministry was paying attention to their concerns. But by December, the situation appeared to have been reversed. Radiation levels at unit 3 were still significantly higher than the natural background and higher also than around the uncompleted building of unit 5.

Second, the Soviet nuclear power program appeared to many Ukrainians to be unbalanced in that a significantly larger than warranted proportion of nuclear plant capacity was to be located in the Ukrainian SSR. Thus although the republic possesses less than 3 per cent of Soviet territory, and 18 per cent of Soviet population, nuclear plants already represented 34 per cent of all-Union nuclear plant capacity. By the year 2000, whereas the proportion of electricity generated at nuclear plants was scheduled to rise to 30 per cent in the Soviet Union as a whole, in Ukraine, the figure was 60 per cent. In addition, there were disturbing new developments; a plant was almost ready for service in what appeared to be a dangerous seismic zone in the Kerch peninsula of the Crimea and a station was being built, again on the Dnieper, in a beautiful and famous historical area, the seat of the former Ukrainian hetman state, in the Chyhyryn area of Cherkassy *oblast* (region). The groundwork for the latter was reportedly being prepared even before the station had been researched by the USSR Academy of Sciences and approved by the Ministry of Power and Electrification of the USSR.

Third, despite the atmosphere of *glasnost*, and the manifested protests of the public, not only did plans for Ukrainian nuclear power plants appear to be going ahead ever more irrationally but the Ukrainian party leaders appeared to be endorsing whatever the Moscow-based ministry decreed. The Ukrainian party hierarchy under Volodymyr Shcherbytsky has proved one of the more impervious to what has been described as the "Gorbachev revolution." Although Aleksander Tytarenko, second party secretary, was removed from office 12 December 1988, a sign that things may at last be changing. But, aside from Gorbachev himself, Shcherbytsky remains the last Brezhnev appointee in the Central Committee CPSU Politburo. in Kiev, even in official circles, he can hardly be described as popular, and on the subject of nuclear power, he has appeared to all but ignore the growing concerns of Ukrainian citizens.

As a result of the lack of action at the higher Communist party level, in 1987, the Ukrainian Union of Writers began to take up the mantle of opposition to nuclear power. Its organ, the weekly newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina* (*Literary Ukraine*), has a long tradition of uncovering defects in the building work at nuclear power plants, including the now famous article about the Chornobyl plant, published one month before the disaster by the Prypiat newspaper editor and poetess, Liubov Kovalevska.[6] The main spokespersons were all writers: Oles Honchar, Borys Oliinyk, Iurii Shcherbak. They drew attention first of all to the ostensible expansion of nuclear power in the republic without due regard for the environment. They sent a delegation to the Chyhyryn plant at the behest of local residents who were said to be worried about the project. They clashed swords repeatedly with what they saw as a stubborn and ignorant Ministry of Nuclear Energy in Moscow that callously put into operation its plans without consulting the local public.

By early 1988, Ukrainian writers, assisted by several academicians, penned a furious attack on a proposed expansion of three Ukrainian nuclear plants—South Ukraine, Khmelnytsky and Rivne—above their officially designated maximum size. The critique, which declared that the Ministry of Nuclear

Power was in need of *perestroika*, was published in a January issue of *Literaturna Ukraina*.[7] Thenceforth, matters rose quickly to a crescendo that peaked with writer Oliinyk's impassioned speech at the 19th Party Congress in Moscow, at which he demanded that a thoroughgoing review be held of the entire Ukrainian nuclear energy program, pending which the program should be completely halted.

A fourth reason for the development of opposition to nuclear power in the republic has been the posthumously published memoirs of Valerii Legasov, formerly first deputy chairman of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, until his suicide on 27 April 1988, just after the second Chornobyl anniversary. Legasov had been the main Soviet spokesperson and chairman on the Soviet delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in August 1986, at which the causes of the accident were revealed by the Soviet side. Between that time and early 1988, he had been one of the most outspoken proponents of nuclear power development in the Soviet Union, especially in terms of its assured safety. However, for three weeks, little was known outside Moscow about his suicide. On 20 May 1988 when *Pravda* (*Truth*) published his memoirs, the impact on all the USSR, and perhaps in the Ukrainian SSR in particular, was profound. For Legasov refuted virtually every statement he had made for the past two years. Not only was the Soviet graphite-moderated reactor still unsafe in its design, he wrote, but it could never be made safe. He alluded to improperly trained operators still in charge at Soviet nuclear plants, to the basic failure of the industry to learn the lessons of Chornobyl. To the Ukrainian opposition, here was confirmation of its deepest fears from an unimpeachable source. Pro-nuclear power scientists were becoming increasingly isolated.

Over the past six months, there have been more important developments at individual Ukrainian nuclear plants. We will examine them briefly in turn, but to put them in perspective, first a list of all Ukrainian plants, both in operation and planned, with their planned capacity, as far as is known, in parentheses:

1. Chornobyl (Kiev oblast), 3,000 megawatts (3,000).
2. Rivne (Rivne oblast), 1,800 mw (2,800).
3. South Ukraine (Mykolaiv oblast), 2,000 mw (6-8,000).
4. Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast), 5,000 mw (6,000).
5. Khmelnytsky (Khmelnytsky oblast), 1,000 mw (4,000).
6. Crimea (Kerch oblast) (under review).
7. Chyhyryn (Chyhyryn oblast) (under review).
8. Odessa (Odessa city), abandoned.
9. Kharkiv (Kharkiv city), abandoned.
10. Kiev (Kiev city), abandoned.
11. Desna (Chernihiv oblast), not known.

It is important to note that Odessa, Kharkiv and Kiev were to have been cogenerational nuclear power and heating stations. With the exception of the RBMK-1000 reactors at Chornobyl, all reactors, operational or being built in

Ukraine are VVER (water-pressurized) reactors. The start-up of unit 5 at Zaporizhzhia was said to be imminent at the time of writing.

In September 1988, following widespread petitions by local residents with almost one quarter of a million signatures, a commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by Vice-President Evgenii Velikhov, was sent to investigate the safety of the Crimean nuclear plant, the first reactor of which was close to completion. Velikhov's initial report was that the zone was so dangerous that it wold have been a crime to have brought the reactor into service. The commission discovered that the seismicity in the region was much higher than anticipated. By November, it was revealed that whereas the initial investigators planning the station in the 1970s had declared the probablilty of an earthquake to be once in 10,000 years, a historical study conducted by the commission had uncovered numerous examples of such earthquakes throughout history, including a major one as recently as 1927. During the period of Turkish rule over the region, for example, the Turks had built earthquake-resistant fortifications to their castles, indicating that they were aware of the danger that the builders of the nuclear power plant were proposing to ignore. The vast majority of those on the commission are said to strongly oppose going ahead with the Crimean plant.[8]

At two other stations there have been strong recent protests. Personnel involved in the actual construction of reactors at Zaporizhzhia have expressed doubt about the wisdom of this grandiose project. Almost quietly, in the aftermath of Chornobyl, this water-pressurized-reactor based plant is approaching completion, even though the first reactor there was brought on-stream only in 1984. A flowline production method has been introduced with standardized units that evidently has enabled the simultaneous construction of reactors. Resources and manpower have been poured into the plant's city, Energodar, in an effort to complete the 6,000-megawatt project by December 1989. There are widespread fears about the safety of such a huge plant in a heavily industrialized region.

At South Ukraine, a major debate is in place. The nuclear power plant, based on the south Buh River in Mykolaiv oblast, is being built in conjunction with three hydroelectric stations, all in one unit. As if this were not grandiose enough, plans are afoot to raise the projected ultimate capacity of the plant from a scheduled 4,000 to 8,000 megawatts. A senior engineer at the plant, V.Bilodid, wrote an impassioned letter to the Kiev newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta* (*Workers' Newspaper*) in mid-October 1988, in which he described the environmental damage that the proposed scheme would cause. He maintained that the flowoff reservoirs from the nuclear plant, at Konstantynivka and Tashlitske are already becoming overheated, with an adverse impact on animal life therein. He felt that the completion of the entire "energy complex" would cause irreversible damage to the south Buh, which is also being used for the cooling pond of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant further north.

Bilodid's letter was supported by both the Mykolaiv oblast party organization and government. Both of the latter have, it is reported, sent regular petitions to the USSR Council of Ministers, the all-Union and Ukrainian

Academies of Sciences and the Ukrainian Nature Protection Committee. They requested the cessation of all work on the south Buh, pending an investigation of experts. They strongly oppose putting into action the "stage three" of the South Ukraine nuclear plant (units 5 and 6) and question the viability of stage two (units 3 and 4). In response, the planners of the complex from the Hydro Planning Institute in Kharkiv, subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, sent *Robitnycha hazeta* a 22-page response, in which they denied that damage would be caused to the south Buh River, and that they had violated any ecological laws.[9] However, the editorial board of *Robitnycha hazeta* was so contemptuous of the response that they refuted it point by point after publishing its main points. Even Communist party officials of one of the reactor units, it pointed out, had expressed their concern. Moreover, it was now outdated, the editors felt, to use arguments in favor of such schemes like shortage of water and electricity in a region. The planners should be more concerned with energy saving and economizing on water usage. In fact, they continued, if the planners have nothing more original to say, then the debate might as well end there. The response was a sign that the newspaper regarded opposition to the project as overwhelmingly strong. A comparison was made between the planners of the South Ukraine complex and planners of the now defunct Danube-Dnieper Canal, which was abandoned after a series of attacks in this same newspaper, and following an investigation by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

On 13 November 1988, in Kiev, an official demonstration called "Ecology and Us" was held in the center of Kiev. Among its organizers were the ecological groups *Zelenyi svit* (Green World), *Noosfera* (Neosphere), and the *Hromada* (Society) student organization from the University of Kiev. Speakers included writers such as Shcherbak and Dmytro Pavlychko, the Moscow academician F.Ia. Shipunov and members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, such as O. Shevchenko and I. Makar. The speakers focused heavily on the development of nuclear power in the republic, the failure of the Shcherbytsky leadership to attend to public demands, and the need to establish a Popular Front to Promote Perestroika in the Ukrainian SSR (the Front was officially founded two weeks later). It thus combined ecological and political demands.[10]

Indeed, the attack on nuclear power has assumed patriotic overtones. Shipunov made reference to the dangerous reduction in the ozone layers around Kiev. Other speakers focused on the desire to save Ukrainian land from destruction stating that "Ukraine is living inside a nuclear reactor." The need to abandon construction at the Crimean and Chyhyryn stations was stressed by several speakers, as was the desire to shut down the Chornobyl plant permanently. There were about 10,000 in attendance at the demonstration, including Communist party officials and government members—although there was no one from the Kiev party hierarchy in attendance. Nevertheless, a significant representation of Ukrainian society was making known its feelings about the ecological situation in the republic and about nuclear power in particular.

One concern is that there is no decision-making authority on this question at the republican level. Yet not all are in agreement that a decentralization of

authority in this area to the republics would be beneficial. One official commented to me that this would be a retrogressive step because it would not make a significant difference. He implied that in the Ukrainian case at least, Kiev would simply comply with Moscow's wishes. Yet, he believed, there were already the makings of a democratic process on the question of nuclear power development in the public protests that were taking place across the country. Such protests are healthy, he stated, because they show that those living in the vicinity of a nuclear plant are becoming involved in the decision on whether that plant should be completed.[11]

The statement seemed at the time, and even more so upon reflection, to overlook a fundamental flaw; namely, that a public demonstration or protest hardly constitutes a key role in making the initial decisions. To date, the Ministry of Nuclear Power in Moscow has either manifested disdain toward the protestors for their "unscientific outlook" or has quietly shelved plans for new reactors in the hope that the opposition will expend its momentum. Aside from the tragic Valerii Legasov, one would be hard pressed to think of a single conciliatory statement on the issue from a high-level official involved in the planning and operation of nuclear power plants toward those who are making the protests. Rather, scientists are furiously debating the pros and cons of alternative energy sources, such as solar and wind energy, and the possibility of raising the output of coal, oil and natural gas significantly over the remainder of the 12th plan period in order to compensate for "lost" electricity generation at nuclear power plants that will not come into service as scheduled.

In the Ukrainian SSR, the situation remains particularly volatile because the opposition is coming almost exclusively from below the Communist party leadership (in contrast to the opposition to the Armenian and Lithuanian plants, for example). Although the Ukrainian public is generally opposed to the nuclear power program, Ukrainian society has divided itself between what is perceived as an "old style" party leadership, reminiscent and indeed founded in the Brezhnev period, and those who wish to promote what they perceive as Mikhail Gorbachev's policies in the sphere of nuclear energy. The latter have on their side many Ukrainian academicians and a large majority of intellectuals, writers, newspapers and media personalities. In 1989, they are likely to become increasingly formidable.

ENDNOTES

[1] L.Ray Silver, *Fallout from Chernobyl* (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1987), 201–2.

[2] *New Scientist*, 7 January 1989.

[3] *News From Ukraine*, no. 51, 1988.

[4] See for example, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 23 November 1988; *Literaturna Ukraina*, 17 November 1988; and *Radianska osvita*, 21 November 1988.

[5] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 21 May 1987.

[6] *Literaturna Ukraina*, 27 March 1986.

[7] *Ibid.*, 21 January 1988.

[8] *Robitnycha hazeta*, 23 November 1988.

[9] *Ibid.*, 18 December 1988.

[10] See *Robitnycha hazeta*, 16 November 1988; *Vechirnii Kyiv*, 15 November 1988; and *Prapor komunizmu*, 15 November 1988. The author was part of a delegation from the World Media Association that visited Kiev the day after this demonstration took place. His account, based on a tape of the event and interview with participants is David Marples, "Mass Demonstration in Kiev Focuses on Ecological Questions and Political Situation in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 525/88, 5 December 1988.

[11] Interview, *Novosti Press Agency*, 17 November 1988.



BOHDAN HARASYMIW

Political Patronage and Perestroika:

Changes in Communist Party Leadership in Ukraine under Gorbachev and Shcherbytsky

If the age of Brezhnev was a period of stagnation, corruption, and patronage, and that of Gorbachev is supposed to be one of acceleration, openness, and democratization, then what happens to patronage? Supposedly, patronage is swept away by the healthy forces of revolutionary reform. Since Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was a client of Brezhnev,[1] he and all of his clients should now be on their way out, as should the whole system of clientelistic political promotions. The disappearance of personalistic ties among the Communist leadership in the Soviet Union generally, and in Soviet Ukraine in particular, however, depends on whether *perestroika* is more powerful than patronage and Gorbachev more powerful than Shcherbytsky.

In order to see which is stronger, new-age *perestroika* or old-fashioned patronage, let us examine the case of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1980s, and whether the long arm of Moscow has been having an effect on the selection and circulation of Communist party leaders. If it has, then *perestroika* definitely is more potent than patronage, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. In Ukraine, after the accession of Gorbachev, virtually nothing happened in the sphere of personnel changes during the balance of 1985.[2] The political fallout of the Chornobyl disaster in 1986 was infinitessimal.[3] There was, of course, in 1987, a minor flurry of activity connected with the displacement of three *oblast* (region) *obkom* (regional party committee) first secretaries—Honcharenko in Voroshylovhrad, Boiko in Dnipropetrovsk, and Dobryk in Lviv—which was commonly interpreted as an assault by Gorbachev on Shcherbytsky,[4] but by the time of the October 1988 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) the normal Brezhnevian tranquility seemed to have reasserted itself in the Ukrainian political leadership.[5] With Shcherbytsky still securely in place, either his clientelistic network is still there as well, or, if Gorbachev is having any influence on the situation and is able to by-pass the first secretary of Ukraine, that network is being gradually dismantled (perhaps replaced by another) and Shcherbytsky is being slowly undermined. To find out

what is going on insofar as change in the political elite of Ukraine is concerned, I have collected information on the proceedings of *obkom* plenums conducted between 1 October 1982 and 31 December 1988, and on their relationships to the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPU.[6] This timespan begins with the sudden death of the republic's second secretary, just before the demise of Brezhnev, and ends with his successor's retirement.[7] As the second secretary in a union republic is assumed to have responsibility for cadres and to serve as a check on the first secretary, this definition of the time period therefore introduces an important element of control on our experiment. By including two and one half years before Gorbachev's accession, it also provides an opportunity to see if there has been any change associated with the new policy of *perestroika*. Other things being equal, the promotion, demotion, retirement, and transfer of *obkom* first secretaries in this as in other republics may be determined by their links to patrons in the Politburo and Secretariat. If *perestroika* is having an effect on the political elite in Ukraine, these patterns of personal association should have been interrupted since 1985; if not, patronage along with Shcherbytsky can be expected to survive in spite of reports of their imminent, or even recent, demise.

There are 25 *oblasti* in Ukraine; since in the political hierarchy the capital city, Kiev, ranks as one of them, there are considered to be 26 *obkomy* altogether, an assumption followed in this paper. Plenary sessions of *oblast* Communist party committees are held every two or three years in order to elect (or to reconfirm) the *obkom* secretariat, consisting of the first, second and usually three other unranked secretaries. Sometimes these meetings are staggered, (usually during the winter) so that half of the republic's *obkomy* will have such report-and-election meetings in one year, and half the following year. In December 1988, all 26 units were reported as having held plenums at which elections took place (which again is a convenient end-point for the collection of data). Ordinary plenary meetings take place in the intervals, at a frequency of one to four times annually. According to the newspaper reports, all of these meetings are attended by a senior party official, most often from the headquarters in Kiev, but also sometimes from Moscow. Over the course of the period in question, I have counted 187 *obkom* plenums in Ukraine, or an average of 7.2 each, which is a little more than one per year.

On the assumption that the visiting senior official, who represents or is himself the appointive authority, may have a personal tie to the local first secretary, and based on the newspaper reports, I decided to carry out a series of tests to determine the extent of political patronage within this echelon of the Soviet Ukrainian political elite from the death of Brezhnev to the end of 1988. The first test was to see who among the senior Ukrainian and all-Union party officials had attended which meetings, whether they had done so with any regularity, and whether there was any association as between officials and particular *obkomy* or their first secretaries. The second test was to check if the second secretary of the CPU, Tytarenko, was linked in any consistent fashion with the changes of *obkom* first secretaries which would mean that he might have been plaiting his own string of clients among them and undoing

Shcherbytsky's. Thirdly, if *perestroika* is an actual and effective policy, meaning openness and accountability in matters of cadres, and if Moscow has been displeased with its implementation in Ukraine and is taking measures to correct it, then public criticism of *obkom* first secretaries, as well as the presence at plenary meetings of *apparatchiki* (officials) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), should be associated with dismissal or at the very least reassignment. This would be indicative of the power of *perestroika* over patronage, or at least over the old way of doing things. My fourth test involved looking for personal or career links between the newly-appointed *obkom* first secretaries and their ostensible sponsors. Alternatively, I attempted to see whether these sponsors might be tied to the outgoing first secretaries. Finally, I examined the changes that have occurred in the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat, and particularly whether those departing and arriving have had any plausible connection to Shcherbytsky, whether there is a process of renewal in the Ukrainian leadership, and whether clientelistic connections have played a part in the latest appointments. Since newcomers to the top two party bodies are drawn almost exclusively from among *obkom* first secretaries, the question of patronage requires an examination of that wider contingent of the elite and its interactions with its superiors if anything meaningful is going to be said. In general, the ultimate objective of these tests, if they have any validity, is to find out what has happened to the infamous Dnipropetrovsk mafia in Ukraine now that Brezhnev is gone, but Shcherbytsky remains. What, we may ask, happens to the *clientela* when the patron departs?

If the sponsors were personally involved in the appointment and protection of their client-subordinates, and if patronage in the CPU and elsewhere in the CPSU were as prevalent as we have been led to believe, it was expected that there should be a clear and regular association between first secretaries and visiting officials at *obkom* plenums. At the very least, there should be a clearly discernible territorial division of labor such that certain officials regularly attend the meetings in particular *oblasti*, probably their own old stomping grounds. This would all be consistent with the normal assumptions of the study of clientelistic behavior. After countless hours spent recording the visits of higher-level officials to *obkom* plenums in Ukraine from late 1982 to the end of 1988, however, these expectations were thoroughly shattered. Out of 187 plenums, there were 12 (or 6.4 per cent) at which the senior visitor was not identified.[8] Of the remaining 175, only 30 were repeat visits where the outside official appeared two (but usually only two) or more times in the same *oblast*. These repeat visits have occurred only in 12 of 26 *obkomy*; only ten *obkom* first secretaries have been thus visited more than once by the same senior outsider or ostensible patron during this entire period of time. Of the remaining 145 plenums a different official each time has come to oversee the plenary meeting of any particular *obkom*. The only exceptional instance is that of Shcherbytsky, who in the period examined here has participated four times in meetings of the Kiev city committee.[9] From biographical data it was impossible to establish links between local first secretaries and these high-level visitors, except for

Shcherbytsky himself.[10] Relatively speaking, therefore, there is, according to these data, hardly any opportunity at *obkom* plenums or conferences for personal relations between officials and first secretaries to develop, nor for officials to cultivate personal fiefdoms.

So the principle of rotation, rather than territorial division of labor, seems to be followed in determining which central leader or *apparatchik* will officiate at a given *obkom* plenum. This is not conducive to the development of clientelistic relations. But then most *obkom* plenums discuss what is from the perspective of this study only routine business. Perhaps clientelism actually comes into play when a new first secretary is elected, and the sponsor on that occasion is in fact the patron. What do the data tell us on this score? Out of 26 *obkomy*, 19 changed first secretaries a total of 28 times.[11] Ten different individuals shared officiating duties on these 28 occasions. Could the *obkom* first secretaries, then, be linked vertically by ten or more chains of clientelism? This hardly seems plausible, since they can really have but a single boss. In fact, one central official, Tytarenko, attended the installation of eleven first secretaries; another, Kachura, was present at three; Mozhovy, Pohrebniak and Shcherbytsky assisted at two apiece; and Hrintsov, Kapto, Valentyna Shevchenko, Hurenko, and V.D. Kriuchkov oversaw one each.[12] Again, the impression is one of sharing the burden of officiating among several secretaries and Politburo members rather than a solitary patron dispensing on his own the favor of the *obkom* first secretaryship appointment.

If the relationship between *obkom* first secretaries and their apparent sponsors were really as personalized as is being assumed here, and if the sponsors were acting in these cases as true patrons, then the presence of the sponsor, especially in the person of the second secretary of the CPU, Tytarenko, should be accompanied by benefits in terms of career movement for both the outgoing and the incoming secretaries. In other words, the person replaced should be promoted and the new first secretary moving in should also be experiencing a promotion by comparison with his previous position. In reality, this is not the case. For the small number of changes of *obkom* first secretary on which I was able to find the relevant information—some two dozen—there is no significant relationship between whether (1) the outgoing secretary was being promoted, removed, or moved laterally, and (2) the senior official present was Tytarenko or someone else. If anything, the presence of the second secretary was indicative of the gravity of the situation in the locality and was more likely to be associated with the removal (through retirement, outright dismissal, or "transfer to other work") rather than the promotion of the incumbent. In these changeovers, the second secretary acts more as a disciplinarian than a patron. This may be part of Gorbachev's *perestroika* as it applies to the party *apparat*. Likewise, there was absolutely no relationship between whether (1) the incoming secretary was being promoted, demoted or moved laterally, and (2) the presiding official happened to be Tytarenko or anyone else. In general, most newcomers were being promoted, and most incumbents were being removed without being promoted; the presence of the CPU's second secretary made absolutely no difference to any of this. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that

Tytarenko was fashioning a clientelistic chain out of the *obkom* first secretaries whose turnovers he oversaw, any more than any of the other officials who were overseeing such turnovers.

If Gorbachev's *perestroika* is having an effect on political personnel in the party *apparat* in Ukraine, the source of recruits for the position of *obkom* first secretary should have perceptibly shifted, presumably from the localities to the center in Moscow. Established patterns of clientelistic relations would thus be broken up, with local, Ukrainian cadres being replaced by outsiders, likely Russians. Of the 28 cases of *obkom* first secretaries newly-appointed between late 1982 and the end of 1988, they have come from sources that can be roughly classified as local or external. The local sources are: promotion from the position of second or unranked *obkom* secretary, or of Soviet executive committee chairman; and transfer laterally from the same post in another *obkom*. The outside sources are: the apparatus of the CC CPU or CC CPSU; secretary of the CC CPU; and first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol. Interference by Moscow with the links of career dependency, particularly if prompted by Gorbachev's radical policy, should be evident in a significant change in the sources of new *obkom* first secretaries from local to external, and the change should appear some time after the March 1985 CC CPSU plenum. In fact, the change is barely perceptible. Most newcomers are still drawn from the localities. What has happened since March 1985, which is unusual, is that personnel are being appointed who come directly from the Secretariat of the CPU, or from the apparatus of the CC CPSU in Moscow. This could be interpreted as central intervention, if the individuals concerned were truly strangers to the *obkomy* in question. Actually, these persons are usually former second secretaries of the particular *oblasti* and cannot be considered total strangers—as Gennadii Kolbin might well be, in the case of Kazakhstan. There may be a tendency for the leadership in Moscow to vet new *obkom* first secretaries through the CC CPSU apparatus, but the individuals to whom this applies can hardly be considered Muscovites.

In the age of openness (*glasnost*), it would be reasonable to suppose that an *obkom* first secretary who had been criticized openly in the press, or who had been visited by a CC CPSU (as opposed to CPU) *apparatchik* as participant in a regular plenary meeting might be in political trouble and liable to be removed from his post. Conversely, anyone who had received an award (such as the Order of Lenin on one's 50th birthday) should be in the good books of the top leaders and therefore immune to removal, all other things being equal. None of these expectations, it turns out, is justified. The chances of being replaced are even, whether an *obkom* first secretary has been chastised by name publically or not. Many of those replaced, even ones who had been criticized, were in fact promoted.[13] There is no justice in the world. The presence of a CC CPSU official at a plenum or conference of the *obkom* provides no better an indication of the political health of the resident first secretary. It makes no difference at all; if anything, such a visit seems to ensure that the secretary will *not* be remove or replaced.[14] As to awards, these did not immunize their recipients from being removed, nor did their absence interrupt

the tenure of incumbents any more often than not.[15] Incidentally, Shcherbytsky himself, awarded the Order of the October Revolution on his 60th birthday, 16 February 1978, as well as the same order again in March 1982 ("for great...work...in...1981"),[16] was conspicuously overlooked on his 70th in 1988, but is still going strong. His second secretary, Tytarenko, having been given an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday in 1975, was, by contrast, regaled with yet another Order of Lenin, the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal, as well as the title Hero of Socialist Labor on his 70th in 1987, but was pensioned off last December. Examining the entrails of *Pravda Ukrainy* (*Truth of Ukraine*) and *Radianska Ukraina* (*Soviet Ukraine*) does appear fruitless at times. None of these mechanisms—awards, criticism, or inspection (the CC CPSU official in the guise of *revizor*)—seems to work in regulating the selection and advancement of *obkom* first secretaries in Ukraine.

Our penultimate task is to see whether there is evidence of personal, local, or institutional connections between newly-appointed first secretaries of *obkomy* and their erstwhile sponsors (those officials from out of town who are in attendance when a new first secretary is elected). Also to be considered are any links between the ranking visitors and the outgoing secretaries, since these latter might well be clients of the former as well. The evidence is inconclusive, to say the least, although it does not overturn our expectations in the same abrupt manner as earlier tests carried out above have done. In brief, there is evidence for all three types of connections, but the data are not comprehensive and the conclusions to be drawn cannot be firm or systematic.

Here is what I found:

1. When Honcharenko was dismissed in February 1987 as first secretary in Voroshilovhrad, and replaced by Liakhov, Tytarenko attended. These three had nothing in common, except that Liakhov had been Tytarenko's subordinate as Head of the Organizational and Party Work (OPW) Department of the CC CPU since December 1985. Liakhov had spent the first decade of his working life beginning in 1958 in Voroshilovhrad, so he was in a sense coming home.
2. Shcherbytsky's presence at the installation in April 1987 of Ivashko in Dnipropetrovsk probably had more to do with this being the first secretary's home turf. Ivashko was ideology secretary under Shcherbytsky since February 1986. Boiko, the displaced first secretary, was assumed to have been part of the Dnipropetrovsk mafia. In December 1988, when Ivashko was relieved (to return to Kiev as second secretary) by Zadoia, another member of the Dnipropetrovsk clan, Valentyna Shevchenko, attended.
3. Tytarenko's presence at the June 1988 installation of Vinnyk in Donetsk might have had something to do with the second secretary's career as party *apparatchik* having begun there. He also oversaw the election of Sazonov in Zaporizhzhia in December 1985, where from 1962 to 1966 he had himself been first secretary.
4. Pohrebniak attended the installation of Liakhov and Novytsky in December 1983 in Ivano-Frankivsk, as first and second secretaries, respectively,

with whom he had nothing in common. He had himself been, however, that *obkom's* first secretary from 1966 to 1969. V.D. Kriuchkov, secretary of the CPU, came to Liakhov's successor's election two years later, and took Liakhov back to Kiev with him as the new OPW Department Head. Kriuchkov and Liakhov both have Dnipropetrovsk backgrounds.

5. What Ielchenko, and his successor as first secretary in Kiev city, Masyk, have in common with Shcherbytsky, who attended the turnover in April 1987, is that they served in the capital and under the first secretary. Ielchenko was an inspector of the CC CPU in 1968–70, and head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department from 1973 until being appointed the capital's first secretary in 1980. From 1960 to 1968, he was Komsomol first secretary for Ukraine. Masyk was Komsomol first secretary in Kiev and the oblast between 1965 and 1972, then a party *raikom* first secretary in Kiev in 1972–74, and finally also an inspector of the CC CPU from 1974 to 1976, under Shcherbytsky's aegis.
6. Tytarenko's presence at the election of Pohrebniak in Lviv in March 1987 may have had something to do with the two men's common roots in Donetsk.
7. Kachura's attendance in Sumy in October 1988 at the replacement of Hrintsov by V.A. Shevchenko, coincident with Hrintsov's joining him in the CPU Secretariat, might also be explained by the Donetsk connection. Specifically, Kachura began his working life in Donetsk as a factory engineer in 1954, and worked his way up to *obkom* first secretary, a position he relinquished in 1982 after six years to become secretary of the CC CPU responsible for heavy industry and construction, replacing Tytarenko. Hrintsov rose from *raikom* first secretary to *obkom* secretary in Donetsk between 1967 and 1975, at which time he was installed as first secretary in Sumy. Before 1967, Hrintsov may have worked in Voroshylovhrad, where he graduated in 1957, and where he may also have been acquainted with Liakhov, who started out there as a mine foreman in 1958, but served as a Komsomol *apparatchik* from 1962 to 1969, ultimately as *obkom* first secretary.
8. In February 1983, Tytarenko attended the election of Kornienko, until then Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary, as first secretary in Ternopil. In March 1987, Kornienko was appointed head of the OPW Department of the CC CPU subordinate to Tytarenko, replacing Liakhov.

What all of this boils down to is that there are fragmentary signs of association between some of the principals. There is a cluster of first secretaries around Shcherbytsky, connected with Dnipropetrovsk; another with Tytarenko and Donetsk; and still one more tied to the central CC CPU *apparat*. But we do not have information on all of the first secretaries and their sponsors, nor do we know how important these coincidental or tangential resemblances might be.

There has been considerable fluidity in the membership of the CC CPU Secretariat, which may be indicative of a struggle to undermine the power of Shcherbytsky, but his continued presence must mean that the net effect of these attempts has been failure if the ultimate objective has been the ouster of

the first secretary. Of the six secretaries at the beginning of 1989, only three had been there in 1986, only two in 1983, and only one (Shcherbytsky himself) in 1981. Thus the turnover in the Ukrainian Secretariat since Brezhnev has been remarkable, as has Shcherbytsky's staying power.

The rate of turnover in the Secretariat shows some increase since the accession of Gorbachev. Between 1983 and the Party Congress in 1986, there was one new face on that body out of seven. From then until the end of 1988, there were three out of six. This accelerated rate of replacement might have been part of *perestroika* and renewal, but the picture is not altogether clear.

At the start of 1983,[17] just after Brezhnev (and in Ukraine, I.Z. Sokolov, the second secretary) had passed out of the picture, the CC CPU Secretariat consisted, besides Shcherbytsky, of the following: A.A. Tytarenko, first appointed secretary in 1966, having been before that secretary and first secretary in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, as second secretary; B.V. Kachura, who had made his entire career in Donetsk, risen to *obkom* first secretary by 1976, and been appointed CC CPU secretary in 1982, on Tytarenko's promotion; A.S. Kapto, a Dnipropetrovsk alumnus and propaganda specialist, under Shcherbytsky's eye while secretary in Kiev from 1972, and CC CPU secretary since 1979; I.O. Mozhovy, an agronomist appointed CC CPU secretary in 1980; and Ia.P. Pohrebniak, another Donetsk product brought into the Secretariat in 1971. Their average age in 1983 was 58.

It should be noted that even at that time not all of the secretaries could be clearly identified as Shcherbytsky's clients. In fact, only Kapto seems to qualify. More impressive is the Donetsk cluster around Tytarenko—Kachura and Pohrebniak. As though to redress the balance, in September 1984, V.D. Kriuchkov, head of the OPW Department, was brought in. A Russian born in Tula, Kriuchkov had graduated as a mechanical engineer from the Dnipropetrovsk State University. Then in an apparent move to counter this, Gorbachev appointed Kapto as Soviet ambassador to Cuba, replacing K.F. Katushev.[18] After the CPU Congress in 1986, the only change to the Secretariat was the addition of V.A. Ivashko, an economist from Kharkiv where he had just spent eight years as *obkom* secretary; the average age rose to 61.[19]

During 1987 and 1988, the CC CPU Secretariat underwent a severe shakeup with a great many comings and goings. In March and April 1987, Pohrebniak and Ivashko were released to take over as first secretaries in Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk, respectively (replacing the disgraced Dobryk and Boiko); S.I. Hurenko, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Iu.N. Ielchenko, the first secretary in Kiev city, were added. Hurenko, an economist, began as an engineer at the Donetsk Machinebuilding Works, eventually becoming its director; from 1976 to 1980, he was a secretary of the Donetsk *obkom* (under Kachura). In October and December 1988, Mozhovy and Tytarenko were pensioned off, and V.D. Kriuchkov was released owing to his position having been abolished, (as the official communiqué quaintly put it); Ivashko was brought back as second secretary (his place in Dnipropetrovsk being filled by the second secretary there, M.K. Zadoia); and another newcomer, I.H. Hrintsov, first secretary in Sumy since 1975, but prior to that also a Donetsk *obkom* secretary,

was added. Hurenko's year of birth is not known, but the average age of the remaining five secretaries in 1989 was 60—not an overwhelming reduction from 1986, despite the considerable change in personnel.

Of the secretaries who were let go in 1987 and 1988, only V.D. Kriuchkov can be clearly identified with Shcherbytsky; of those brought on board, only Ielchenko. The net result of the changes is a further stalemate: a majority clustering around Kachura (Ivashko, Hrintsov and Hurenko), facing a minority of two, but somehow Shcherbytsky is still their common boss. If Gorbachev is undermining Shcherbytsky, then he is certainly doing it indirectly and slowly; he is furthermore doing it without altogether destroying patron-client links, as far as we can tell, at the top of the political pyramid.

Turnover in the CC CPU Politburo has been noticeably slower than in the Secretariat. Out of fifteen full and candidate members at the beginning of 1989, ten had belonged to that body in 1986, and eight had been there in 1981. In 1981, the Ukrainian Politburo consisted of: Shcherbytsky, A.F. Vatchenko, I.G. Vashchenko, I.A. Gerasimov, B.V. Kachura, A.P. Liashko, I.A. Mozhovy, I.Z. Sokolov, V.A. Sologub, A.A. Tytarenko, and V.V. Fedorchuk, all as full members; and V.F. Dobryk, Iu.N. Ielchenko, O.S. Kapto, E.V. Kachalovsky, Iu.A. Kolomiets, and Ia.P. Pohrebniak, as candidates. The average age was 57. By 1989, the Politburo consisted of: Shcherbytsky, Gerasimov, Ielchenko, Kachalovsky, Kachura, Sologub, Valentyna S. Shevchenko, V.A. Ivashko, V.A. Masol, I.H. Hrintsov, and A.Ia. Vinnyk, as full members; and Kolomiets, Pohrebniak, S.I. Hurenko, and K.I. Masyk, as candidates. The average age in 1989 was 60, indicative of the more orderly renewal.

Between February 1981 and February 1986, the following changes took place. Sokolov and Vatchenko died, on 1 October 1982 and 22 November 1984, respectively. Fedorchuk was released in October 1982 due to his appointment as USSR KGB chief, and Vashchenko to another USSR post in April 1983. These vacancies were made up by the promotion to full membership of Ielchenko in October 1982, and of Kachalovsky in April 1983. Those gaps, in turn, were filled by the election to candidate membership of S.N. Mukha in October 1982, V.P. Mironov in April 1983, and V.D. Kriuchkov in September 1984. Mironov was quickly promoted to full member in March 1984. Valentyna Shevchenko was named full member directly in March 1985, on the eve of her being elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

After the 1986 Party Congress in the republic, the Politburo featured only two additions to the previous changes: V.A. Ivashko and V.A. Masol were elected to candidate membership. In 1987 and 1988 the following changes took place: Mironov died after a long illness on 11 July 1988. Liashko, Mozhovy, Tytarenko, Dobryk, Kriuchkov, and Mukha were all retired or released or otherwise disposed of. Ivashko and Masol were promoted. Hrintsov and Vinnyk were elected directly to full membership in 1988; Hurenko and Masyk, to candidate membership in March 1987 and January 1988, respectively. The Gorbachev era has ushered in more releases and retirements from the Ukrainian Politburo than in the preceding intercongressional period, and has altered somewhat the clientelistic profile of that body. In 1981, five Politburo members

and candidates out of fifteen could be connected to Shcherbytsky through Dnipropetrovsk, and five to Tytarenko through Donetsk; in 1989, three and seven, but this time without Tytarenko.[20] Neither Shcherbytsky's following, nor followings generally, nor Shcherbytsky himself have been eliminated in the process of *perestroika*.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the turnover of personnel has been somewhat accelerated in Ukraine since the advent of Gorbachev. But there has been no wholesale overturn of cadres or of the cadres system, and at the top of the pyramid we still see clientelistic links, albeit fewer associated now with Shcherbytsky than formerly. The idea that the attending sponsor at *obkom* plenums might be a patron has been disproved, and the search for a better indicator must be carried on elsewhere. If anything, this study has shown that the seniority of the outside official paying a visit to an *obkom* probably has more to do with the center's assessment of the gravity of local political problems than it does with patronage. Moscow has not been intruding obviously and directly into the make-up of the political elite in Ukraine, perhaps because Shcherbytsky has been keeping nationalism well under control in the republic and Gorbachev, who has no policy on the national question except for the *status quo*, must be grateful for small mercies. As Bohdan Nahaylo has written, "despite its lip service to the reformist slogans advocated by the Gorbachev leadership, Shcherbytsky's team is continuing to depict those genuinely in favor of change in the Ukraine as 'demagogues,' 'extremists,' 'nationalists,' or simply 'politically immature' persons."[21] Shcherbytsky's anti-nationalism thus may serve as a cover for the *status quo*, and may run contrary to the spirit of *perestroika*, but it ties in well with Gorbachev's undeveloped policy on nationalism and serves to hold the finger in the dyke.[22]

ENDNOTES

[1] Roman Solchanyk, "The Ukraine in the Brezhnev Era: Politics and the National Question," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 459/82, 16 November 1982, 6–8; idem, "Shcherbytsky: A Long Time Going," *Soviet Analyst*, 25 March 1987, 5–7.

[2] Roman Solchanyk, "Key Post in Ukrainian Apparatus Changes Hands," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 24/86, 9 January 1986 and idem, "Ukrainian Regional Party Bosses Virtually Untouched by Gorbachev Purge," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 52/86, 23 January 1986.

[3] The Kiev *obkom* first secretary, Revenko, received the Order of Lenin on his 50th birthday on 28 April 1986, was criticized by name by the Politburo and by Shcherbytsky for inadequacies in July 1987, but was nevertheless reelected to his post in December 1988. See *Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 April 1986, 1; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 14 July 1987, 1; *Radianska Ukraina*, 23 July 1987, 4; and *Radianska Ukraina*, 18 December 1988, 2.

[4] Solchanyk, "Berkhin Affair Results in Ukrainian Personnel Shifts," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 90/87, 2 March 1987; idem, "A Gorbachev-Inspired Purge in Ukraine?" *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 164/87, 2 April 1987; and idem, "Ukrainian Party Secretaries Reshuffled," *Radio Libert Research Bulletin*, RL 174/87, 4 May 1987.

[5] Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Party Plenum: Stagnation Wins out Over Talk of Restructuring," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 481/88, 25 October 1988.

[6] The primary sources for the reports on *obkom* plenums are *Pravda Ukrainy*, *Radianska Ukraina*, and *Pravda*, supplemented by *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, and *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, all for the period cited. For the composition of the Secretariat and Politburo, I have used these same sources, plus: *Kommunist Ukrainy*, no. 3 (1981) to no. 1 (1989); "Politburo TsK Kompartii Ukrainy—Ot pervogo do nyneshnego sostava," ibid., no. 12 (1988): 51–61; *XXV Sezd kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy, 10–13 fevralia 1976 goda: stenograficheskii otchet* (Kiev: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury Ukrainy, 1976), 419–20; Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Directory of Soviet Officials, Volume III: Union Republics* (CR 79–11484, March 1979); and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Soviet Officials: Republic Organizations* (CR 85–10140, January 1985). The resulting information is by no means complete, but is about the best that can be managed at this remove.

[7] "Ivan Zakharovich Sokolov," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 3 October 1982, 2. Head of the official government funeral commission was, significantly, A.A. Tytarenko, elected as second secretary immediately thereafter, and retired on pension just before Christmas 1988. Tytarenko turned 74 on 30 March 1989. "Titarenko, Aleksei Antonovich," in *Who's Who in the Soviet Union: A Biographical Encyclopedia of 5,000 Leading Personalities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Borys Lewytzkyj (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1984), 331; and *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13 December 1988, 1.

[8] From a comparison of some of the reports of the same meetings in two different sources, it is my surmise that: (a) at least one outside official attends every plenum; (b) only the senior of these is actually indicated as having made an appearance, usually with a report of his own; and (c) no mention is not indicative of absence. Hence, my reference to the "senior official," it being understood that other persons may or may not have attended.

[9] Shcherbytsky attended the Kiev plenums in January 1986 and early April 1987, when Ielchenko was still first secretary, in late April 1987 at the installation of Masyk, and again on Christmas Day 1988. Other top leaders have been present at most at two meetings in any single *oblast*. Specifically, they are: (1) Hurenko in May 1987 and December 1988 in Voroshilovhrad; (2) Tytarenko (a) in January 1986 and February 1987, also in Voroshilovhrad, (b) in November and December 1985 in Kiev *oblast*, (c) in January 1985 and May 1987 in Khmelnytsky *oblast*, and (d) in April and July in Volyn; (3) Sologub in May 1987 and December 1988 in Ivano-Frankivsk; (4) Liakhov and Merkulov together in Kiev City in April and July 1986; (5) Kachalovsky (a) in April 1986 and May 1987 in the Crimea, and (b) in April 1987 and December 1988 in Kharkiv; (6) Kachura (a) in April 1987 and October 1988 in Sumy, and (b) in June 1987 and December 1988 in Kherson; (7) Mozhovy in October 1983 and December 1985 in Odessa; and (8) Gerasimov in July 1987 and December 1988 in Chernivhiv. I have been unable to establish a connection between any of these officials' careers, the given *oblasti*, and the resident first secretary, except for Shcherbytsky whose career overlaps and intersects with those of Ielchenko and Masyk.

[10] Biographical data on all individuals covered by this research were drawn from: *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia*, 2d ed. (1978); Lewytzkyj, *Who's Who in the Soviet Union*; *Ezhegodnik bolshoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii* (1971); and the sources cited in n. 6 above.

[11] In Dnipropetrovsk, there have been three changes: in February 1983, Boiko replaced Kachalovsky; in April 1987, Boiko was dismissed and Ivashko stepped in; and in December 1988, Ivashko became CC CPU second secretary and turned over the job to

Zadoia, until then the local second secretary. In Vinnytsia, Volyn, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odessa, and Ternopil, there have been two each. There has been one change of first secretary in Voroshylovhrad, Kiev oblast, Kiev city, Crimea, Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkassy, and Chernivtsi, according to my count.

[12] I was unable to identify the visitor for four of the installations.

[13] Eight incumbent first secretaries were never criticized, yet four of them were replaced. On the other hand, of the nineteen who were criticized, only ten were removed or replaced. Some of these were, of course, retired or dismissed, but others were even promoted. For example, Hrintsov, first secretary of Sumy *obkom*, was criticized by name in July 1987 by the Politburo for inadequacies, as well as at the CC CPU plenum, but was elected secretary of the CPU in October 1988. One individual has been singled out by name no fewer than three times, yet was still in office at the beginning of 1989.

[14] CC CPSU officials were present, according to my count, at least once during the incumbencies or terms of twenty individual first secretaries; only seven of these were replaced. Of the remaining eleven incumbencies at which such officials were *not* present, six first secretaries were nevertheless replaced sooner or later.

[15] During the period examined, five first secretaries received awards which were significant enough to be cited in the press; three of these were nevertheless removed or replaced. Twenty-two others received no awards; of them, twelve were removed or replaced. One award winner; Mironov, died in office.

[16] *Pravda*, 5 March 1982, 1; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 31 March 1982, 17.

[17] Using as a bench mark CIA, *Directory of Soviet Officials* (1985), 223.

[18] Kapto has since resurfaced as first deputy head of an unnamed department of the CC CPSU in Moscow.

[19] Ivashko could not be considered a protégé of Shcherbytsky; his only connection up to that time with any CC CPU secretary might have been with Kachura—both studied at Kharkiv Institute in the 1950s.

[20] Counting Shcherbytsky himself, the former group in 1981 included, according to my count: Vatchenko, Dobryk, Kachalovsky, and Kapto. The latter, or Donetsk faction consisted of: Kachura, Liashko, Sologub, Tytarenko, and Pohrebniak. In 1989, again out of a total of fifteen, the Dnipropetrovtsi were: Shcherbytsky, Kachalovsky, and Shevchenko. The Donetsk boys comprised: Kachura, Sologub, Masol, Hrintsov, Vinnyk, Pohrebniak, and Hurenko. The shift is not statistically significant.

[21] Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Party Plenum: Stagnation wins out Over Talk of Restructuring," 1.

[22] This paper was presented at a Conference of the Ukrainian Research Program during the Summer Research Laboratory on Russia and Eastern Europe at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, June 1989.



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Will Restructuring Change the Past?

Regardless of what journalists and writers have published in the popular press since 1986, articles and statements by professional official historians between January 1986 and January 1989 suggest that "restructuring" will not lead to changes in the official interpretation of pre-1917 Ukrainian history or of any non-Russian national history. The reticence of the professionals has important long term consequences because the content of the next survey histories of the USSR and the republics will be determined today by historians in academic journals. Unless the Departments of Agitation and Propaganda, and Culture and Learning intervene directly "on the historical front" with demands for major interpretative revision, which is unlikely, it seems that historians under Gorbachev will only incorporate into the established image of the past, new and previously omitted information.

The current official interpretation of the histories of the nations of the USSR emerged between 1934 and 1953 on the basis of decrees signed by Stalin or the Central Committee.[1] This interpretation subsumes the histories of the non-Russian republics within the history of the USSR which begins not in 1917 or 1922 in Moscow but in prehistoric Asia. The official view recognizes the non-Russian nations and republics as separate historical entities yet imposes upon their pasts a Russocentric and Russian statist framework while simultaneously denying the Russians a separate history of the RSFSR. Within this scheme, or paradigm, the history of Soviet non-Russian nationalities, before they became part of the tsarist state, is structured around the ideas of "oppression" and "class struggle" of "the people" against native and foreign ruling classes. Non-Russian political leaders before and after incorporation are judged according to their sympathy or loyalty to Russia. Improvement in the material standard of living and the rise and fall of classes and social groups in tandem with the development of the forces of production are issues ignored or treated tangentially. Official historiography admits that under tsarist Russia the non-Russians suffered political and cultural oppression but it does not

admit Russian economic colonialism. In keeping with the logic of Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, the official view argues that tsarist economic development was "progressive" for the non-Russians because it centralized production and tied "outlying regions" to the world market. Attempts to separate from the empire and the non-Russian "national bourgeoisie" are branded "reactionary" because they threatened the integration supposedly demanded by the forces of production.[2] Since 1934 official historians have not studied the history of the Russian Empire in terms of Lenin's *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. This was done by Soviet historians during the 1920s who argued that tsarist centralism impeded the development of non-Russian provinces and that "national liberation movements" were "progressive" responses to Russian economic colonialism.[3]

Today the official view claims Russians and non-Russians were "fraternal peoples" even before the Bolshevik Revolution and that annexation of non-Russian territories to the Russian state was "progressive" politically and culturally because it permitted non-Russians to struggle together with their Russian brothers against common class enemies for social and national liberation. The same criteria, it should be added, do not apply to Russian history. For instance, the official interpretation condemns foreign attacks on Russia and one would look in vain for passages in current Soviet history books explaining how the Polish occupation of 1610–12, or the French invasion of 1812 was "progressive" because these countries were on a "higher plane of development" and their presence gave the Russian lower class the opportunity of fighting alongside its Polish or French class brothers against a common exploiting ruling class. The Eastern Slavs, meanwhile, share a "desire for reunion" which supposedly determined the course of Ukrainian and Belorussian history from the thirteenth century. In October 1917, thanks to the disinterested assistance of the Russians and their party, the Bolsheviks, all the peoples of the empire attained freedom and statehood[4].

During "de-Stalinization" between 1956 and 1973, the party loosened its control over the humanities and social sciences. Historical writing became less determinist and less Russian nationalist in tone, but the analytical catagories underlying the official interpretation of the history of the nations of the USSR remained. Perhaps the most important of these is the principle decreed by Stalin in 1934 that the history of the USSR cannot separate Russian and non-Russian histories. In 1945 the ideological secretary G. Aleksandrov expressed this tenet as follows, "The history of the nations of the USSR is a single organic process. The history of a separate nation can be properly studied and understood only in connection with the history of other nationalities and first of all with the history of the Russian nation."[5] In the 1960s ideological chief Boris Ponomarev reasserted the idea in his introduction to an eleven volume history of the USSR, "It would be impossible and incorrect to depict the history of the country as if it were a mosaic, as a summary of the surveys of the history of each separate republic. Such an approach diminishes the significance of centuries of interrelationships and would not illustrate how the friendship of

working peoples of separate nationalities was formed during their struggle against a common enemy."[6]

In practice this approach produces a Russocentric and Russian statist image of the history of the nations of the USSR that eliminates from written history, and subsequently from memory, significant chunks of the non-Russian past. The existing official interpretation of these nations' pasts is a manifestation of "intellectual colonization," which, as Roman Szporluk pointed out, circumscribes the non-Russians' knowledge of their past and is part of the attempt to create a "Soviet nation."[7]

Since the 1985 decree on "*glasnost and perestroika*" much important information about Soviet history has been made public in the USSR. Noteworthy are articles on Bukharin and Trotsky, frank discussions of Stalin's crimes, the admittance of the 1933 famine, the decision to officially publish Roy Medvedev's studies and the call to republish Hrushevsky's multi-volume *History of Ukraine*.[8] Less has been published about the pre-1917 past of the non-Russian republics and what has appeared to date suggests the degree of change in this realm of historiography will be minimal.

In the published proceedings of all-Union conferences there are some truly remarkable statements. In a conference on non-Marxist historians held in July 1987 speakers claimed "bourgeois" scholars seek the truth and stated all Soviet historians must know the Western historiography of their respective subjects. To really appreciate this remark it is worth juxtaposing it to comments made forty years ago about "bourgeois" thought as "the tool of the international imperialist reaction" and " a cesspool of all sorts of conceptual refuse where there is...only putrefaction, only decay, cadaverous decomposition"[9]

In the conference proceedings we find doubt expressed about what the term "bourgeois scholar" means, reference to "fifty-seven varieties of Marxism," and condemnation of the intellectual isolation to which Soviet scholars have been subjected since the 1930s which has made them incapable of understanding terms used by Jacobson, Levi-Strauss, Braudel and Foucault. One speaker pointed out that Soviet scholarship is determined by Stalinst schemas and that by defending them "we do not defend Marxism-Leninism but its negation."[10]

In a conference on literature and history in April 1988 Iurii Afanasiev condemned Stalin for being interested in history only as a handmaiden to propaganda. In a scathing indictment of official historiography Afanasiev pointed out, "There is not, nor has there ever been a people and country with a history as falisified as ours is...In the course of falsifying Soviet history, historians also had to do the same with our pre-October past."[11] Continuing in this vein, E.A. Amabartsumov stated, "And what trash, what half truths or outright lies historians—authors of school texts have driven in childrens heads!"[12] Critical remarks on the treatment of pre-1917 non-Russian history were voiced during a conference in Tallin in October 1987 where some speakers noted that tsarist imperial policies could not be idealized. There were calls for more publications on this subject and the establishment of a strict scholarly terminology for dealing with the issue. Conversely, others stressed the need to determine the "objective progressive significance of the entering of the nations of

our country into the structure of the Russian Empire."[13] In the proceedings of the 1988 *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History) conference, academician Anisimov called for a new approach in study of tsarist colonial policy noting that apologia for and idealization of the empire was endorsed by Stalin in 1934. Academician Novoseltsov asked whether it was correct to tie the history of the Caucasus to Russia closer than the evidence allowed, and pointed out that most of the disagreements about the past of the non-Russian republics stemmed from historians in the center deciding on questions of Russian history without regard to historical truth. K.F. Shatisillo, who dramatically called on scholars to purge servility from scholarship, drop by drop, also noted that the histories of nineteenth century non-Russian national movements are blanks spots, never studied from the perspective of Lenin's dictum that tsarist Russia was the prison of nations.

To date, the most critical of the current interpretation of non-Russian history is the writer Sergei Baruzdin, editor of *Druzhba narodov* (*Friendship of Peoples*), who condemned two fundamental tenets of the official view of non-Russian history. During the all-Union Writers Congress in March 1988 he dismissed the idea of Russian "elder brothers" as Stalinist, and called for rejection of the post-Stalin innovation that non-Russians had "voluntarily joined" Russia.[14]

Ukrainian historians have been less outspoken than their Russian counterparts. Their attitude to date was described by the writer V. Shevchuk who accused the Institute of History in Kiev of not helping the nation develop its historical thought, of being confined to scholastic meanderings, and continuing to ignore the pre-1917 Ukrainian past.[15] Shevchuk's letter provoked a reply from the director, Iu. Kondufor, who wrote about plans to publish pre-twentieth century Ukrainian historical classics, and the re-establishment of a subsection at the Institute dealing with Kievan Rus'. He also asserted that pre-1917 history would no longer be ignored.[16] Kondufor did not approach the question of how Ukraine's past was and is to be presented, and how the nation's collective memory is supposed to evolve—two central issues to Shevchuk and most nationally conscious Ukrainians. The published proceedings of two Ukrainian conferences do little to amplify Kondufor's remarks or refute Shevchuk's pessimism.

In a conference on party history held in November 1987[17] we find calls for works on the famine, for the rehabilitation of Khristian Rakovsky, and for more work on the non-Bolshevik Left and Bolshevik errors on the national question between 1917 and 1921. But these relatively important matters did not dominate the published account of the conference which leaves readers with the impression that most of the discussion was devoted to the immediate post-war years and events in Moscow and Petersburg between 1917 and 1921. Much too evident are Stalinist clichés and euphemisms. Such formulations are rare in the all-Union conferences and their appearance in printed proceedings of Ukrainian conferences reflects the lower level of intellectual and political culture in "the provinces." For instance, some of those present called on historians to "master the Leninist concept of party historical analysis" and to "illuminate" the

past from positions of Leninist "party mindedness." Speakers also avoided or obfuscated key issues. Noteworthy is a statement about the Bolshevik party in Ukraine being different because it had more Ukrainian members!—What historians normally stress is the almost complete absence of Ukrainians in the Bolshevik party in Ukraine.

Not encouraging for supporters of reform are the proceedings of a round-table discussion on history sponsored by *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (*Ukrainian Historical Journal*) and the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy in March 1988.[18] Among the controversial issues raised and reported in the domestic press were the famine, Ukrainian national development, the history of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, and the ideological debates in Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s. Some participants called for more study of these subjects as well as for more attention to the history of Ukrainian Cossacks. Some also noted that not all Ukrainians abroad were nationalists and, that some historians still lacked courage to make the most of the current situation. However, alongside these statement were the "conservative" interjections that rarely appear in all-Union proceedings. One historian said there must be constant struggle against "anti-Communists" and that people must be taught to be intolerant of foreign views. Another complained about the activities of the Kiev Culture Club saying it disoriented youth, while a third complained he could no longer find the word "*partiinist*" (party mindedness) in any publications. Others stressed that good historiography must be "party minded," and that research was needed to demonstrate the Marxist-Leninist principle about differences among nations eroding in the nineteenth century. In sum, the proceedings of both Ukrainian conferences suggest that Stalinists in Kiev are strong and that "liberals" are reticent.

The decree on "*glasnost* and *perestroika*" emboldened R. Ivanchenko, and Iu. Hamretsky to raise issues associated with the history of Ukrainian socialism, Marxism and communism, and S. Bilokin to call for the political rehabilitation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Their essays, however, which appeared in newspapers, drew immediate condemnation. V. Iurchuk, the head of the Institute of Party History in Kiev, informed readers that socialism and Marxism in Ukraine will continue to be studied from the existing perspective; that is, as the history of Russian Marxism and bolshevism in Ukraine. Although Engels did not think that socialists in Ireland should have been part of a broader British socialist organization, or that Polish socialists should have submitted to Prussian, German or Russian central committees, Iurchuk tells us the attempts of Ukrainians to form an organizationally independent Marxist party in 1918 will still be regarded as a "nationalist deviation" and "anti-Leninist."[19] R. Symonenko echoed these remarks alongside a reminder that Hrushevsky's interpretation of Eastern Slavic history is inseparable from his reprehensible and inexcusable "anti-internationalist" politics.[20]

A glimmer of change on an otherwise unchanging landscape is found in an article on Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the publication of a long suppressed poem about him in a literary journal. Both treat the man sympathetically. In his article, the first published in Soviet Ukraine since 1918 devoted exclusively to

the hetman and his Russian policy, Iu. Barabash does not condemn him but notes that although the Russian church withdrew its anathema on Mazepa, it still can be heard in educational institutions. Contrary to the obligatory interpretation of the hetman as traitor, Barabash points out it was the Cossack leader's method, not his aim of separation from Russia, that is to be criticized. More startlingly, he reminds Ukrainian readers of a simple fact long-denied or overlooked in official historiography, "It happens in history that the interests of one estate, or even of one man, can converge with popular national interests."[21] The poem and Barabash finish by pointing out the Russians cannot be blamed for the crimes of the autocracy. Nevertheless, this article replaces the question mark after three hundred and sixty years of Russian-Ukrainian relations and can be construed as the first direct challenge to the official interpretation of Ukrainian history to emerge under *glasnost*, "And where is, we ask, the 'northern thief', Ukraine's strangler, where is the 'bloody Torquemada', and his helpers...where is the 'bandit' that spilled rivers of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian blood? He spilled it for whom and for what? For 'progress'? 'For Russia'?"[22]

Ukrainian historians have yet to approach the fundamental issues in pre-1917 Ukrainian national history in a less dramatic tone, while those who attempted to question the interpretation of persons and events associated with the revolution have been sharply rebuked. Whether the article on Mazepa meets a similar fate remains to be seen. Ukrainian historians seem to be more restrained than their Russian colleagues. Conversely, if "liberals" did raise fundamental issues of interpretation and their voices did not reach the printed page it would mean the "restructuring" of the pre-1917 past faces a stronger opposition in Ukraine than in Russia. Comments in the published proceedings of all-Union conferences, meanwhile, are few and provide little basis for speculation about "restructuring" of the official interpretation of non-Russian histories.

Alongside scanty discussion of how the pre-1917 pasts of the non-Russians are to be interpreted, the current academic plan, binding until the year 2000, provides additional evidence that "restructuring" will not lead to revision or rejection of the current official interpretation of the history of the non-Russian nations of the USSR. The centralist organizational character of the plan mitigates against the very notion of "national history" for the Soviet non-Russians.

The tasks the plan assigns to historians were elaborated by two top bureaucrats of the Soviet historical profession. In March 1986 the director of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, S. Khromov, noted: a) the Marxist-Leninist conception of the historical process was forged in the 1930s, b) the 1934–36 resolutions on the history of the USSR were of great significance in consolidating the creative efforts of historians, c) the first histories of the USSR, written according to these directives, provided a "scientifically based systematic history of the motherland," d) the resolutions of 1946–49, shaped by Zhdanov (who is not mentioned) had a "marked influence" on history because they focused scholarly efforts on the struggle against foreign bourgeois influences and apoliticism.[23] In a second article Khromov noted

that in the republics historical leaders were sometimes idealized and that some authors ignored the non-native nationalities and overlooked inter-republican aid. He then called for studies to demonstrate how friendship between nationalities had been formed in the course of a common struggle for national and social liberation.[24] Khromov did not refer to Ukraine in his list of shortcomings of "the period of stagnation," but the gist of his reasoning does not challenge the existing official interpretation.

Clearly, the head of the Institute of History, like many others regarded Stalinism as an obstacle to scholarship that was overcome in 1956, and not as a condition of scholarship that still exists. Significantly, when shortly afterwards Khromov lost his post for not providing a sufficiently profound analysis of why historical research "fell behind," the published criticism did not take issue with his remarks on non-Russian historiography.[25]

Khromov's comments were elaborated by S.L. Tikhvinsky, deputy chair of the Institute of Social Sciences of the all-Union Academy (since 1963 the body controlling historical research in the USSR), secretary of the Institute of History, an editor of *Voprosy istorii* and member of the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In a long article published in June 1987 Tikhvinsky outlined what he expects Soviet historians will be doing until the end of the century.[26]

After announcing that the academic plan had been set he noted it contained ten broad themes. Of these ten, three related to the history of Soviet nationalities, and of these three, one could conceivably cover subjects such as republic political, social, economic, demographic and diplomatic history—the stuff of national history and memory. This theme is called "general laws and particularities of the historical development of the nations of the USSR." The other two themes deal with ethnic, anthropological and cultural history. Tikhvinsky wrote that a major reason for shortcomings in historical writing in the 1970s was insufficient centralization and co-ordination of research and that in the interests of efficiency the new plan will impose a more rational division of labor. It will allocate conceptual and interpretative issues connected with each theme to scholars in Moscow or Leningrad and detailed research to institutions in the republics. As a result, subjects such as "Lenin on the transition from bourgeois democracy to socialist revolution," part of the theme "the history of the world revolutionary liberation process," will be studied in Moscow, while Kiev will study "Russian officers in 1917," and Lviv will study "the Ukrainian working class in the nineteenth century." Important is Tikhvinsky's list of shortcomings of 1970s republic historiography among which he includes "revival of nationalistic treatments of the past of certain nationalities" and "idealization" of the history of republic nationalities and all associated with it.

In a second article published in March 1988 Tikhvinsky spelled out in greater detail what "restructuring" would mean to official historiography. He repeated that the remedy for shortcomings lay in more centralization and that a co-ordinating committee set up in 1986 was getting on well with its job. He then revealed the desired purpose of the new interregional and interrepublican co-ordination, "The time has come to decisively break with the fallacious

tendency [*porochnaia tendentsiia*] of dividing scholarship into Ukrainain or Azerbaidzhani, central or peripheral. There is one Soviet historical scholarship firmly based on Marxist-Leninist socialist internationalism."[27]

Tikhvinsky gave more detail about "shortcomings" in the interpretation of the histories of the non-Russian republics. He accused historians there of extending national pasts back further than the evidence warranted, of stressing national differences, contrasting national histories and cultures, and not dealing adequately with the fraternal aid Soviet nationalities rendered to each other, and in particular, with the aid given by the Russian nation. Tikhvinsky took his examples primarily from the Asian republics but he criticized all except the Russian SFSR. Neither did he single out any of the official histories of the USSR for their treatment of Russian non-Russian relations. His basic concern was that non-Russian republic historians exagerrated or distorted certain events by isolating them from "regional" and "all-Russian" history.

These words appeared after the *Voprosy istorii* round-table discussion and, after a speech made in April 1987 by Central Committee secretary Iakovlev on *glasnost* and the social sciences which criticized the tendency to embellish and romanticize Russian as well as non-Russian history.[28] Tikhvinsky made no critical references about the treatment of Russian history.

The new academic plan contains no hint of change in the official interpretation of Ukrainian or any non-Russian history. It promises more Russocentrism, more stress on the "friendship of nations" theme, greater administrative control and even portends the final dissolution of a body of knowledge called "Ukrainian scholarship," and concomittantly, the disappearance of a Ukrainian interpretation of Ukrainian history. Tikhvinsky has also reminded historians that pluralism of thought does not mean pluralism of world-views.[29] His writings contain no indication of change in the official interpretation of the history of the USSR.

Kondufor, shortly afterwards, confirmed that as of 1988 the regime envisaged no major changes in the official interpretation of Ukraine's pre-1917 past.[30] In a long article on Ukrainian historiography the director of the Institute begins by asking rhetorically whether historians in the 1970s were not good men who wrote sincerely, according to the conscience of the times, and who decided, in the interests of society, not to magnify past errors. Then, with Jesuit logic, he insinuates that noble motivations can excuse questionable behavior and writings.

The bulk of what follows is divided into what historians in Ukraine will do, and what they should do. Under the category of "will do," we learn the main focus of activity for historians in Ukraine in the immediate future will be the Soviet social structure, the world socialist system, and studies on the origins and development of friendship between Ukrainians and the fraternal nationalities. Under the category "should do," we find in the approximately one page devoted to pre-1917 Ukrainian history, five subject areas Kondufor thinks should receive attention; socio-economic formations, feudalism in Ukraine, the history of Kiev Rus', "the ethnic culture of Ukrainian history" and the social consciousness of participants in Ukrainain peasant revolts. However, this

listing is preceded by a warning that not everything in the past is positive and that the source of Soviet patriotism is "our revolutionary history." The director is apologetic about the Institute having ignored pre-nineteenth century Ukrainian history, but he does not mention that from 1973 party policy discouraged work on this subject.[31] Kondufor did stress the Institute will publish a number of important pre-nineteenth century works of Ukrainian historiography. But this republication program shrinks to insignificance when viewed from the context of the tasks assigned to Ukrainian historians by the new academic plan. Disconcerting as well, in light of the all-Union conference on non-Marxist history, are Kondufor's comments on the need to study "bourgeois" scholarship to refute it. If there was one major theme at this conference it was that Soviet scholars should study Western scholarship to learn it. Kondufor notes his Institute will be sending its comments on the current plan to Moscow. It is unlikely these comments will recommend major changes.

The published proceedings of scholarly conferences and articles written by leading administrators in the historical establishment do not indicate that "restructuring" will change the current official interpretation of the histories of the nations of the USSR. There is no indication of any "intellectual decolonization" through a revision of the history of the non-Russian nationalities. Although scholarly conference proceedings are not the only source of information about developments in official Soviet historiography, during times of "liberalization" they have tended to contain particularly candid expressions by historians about their work. It has also been the case that ideas and concepts expressed during scholarly conferences reflected more closely than did articles by writers and publicists, the kind of change the interpretative authority was willing to consider.[32] On the basis of what has appeared in print as of January 1989 it appears "restructuring" will only lead to new information being incorporated into the existing Russocentric statist and determinist interpretation of the history of the USSR. Consequently, non-Russian national histories will continue to be treated as provincial variants of Russian history, mentioned in *The History of the USSR* at the moment the particular region became part of the "multinational Russian state," and afterwards receiving a few lines in the subsections, "cultures of the people of the USSR." In the official histories of the republics the stress will continue to be on "class struggle" against native and foreign ruling classes and the "progressive" influence of Russia and Russians. On the basis of what Tikhvinsky and Khromov have written, attempts to interpret the past of non-Russian republics as national histories in their own right or to dispassionately study Russian influence in Marxist terms stand to be condemned as "nationalist shortcomings" of the pre-Gorbachev "period of stagnation."

Comments by Iakovlev, Anisov, Afansiev, Burdzhalov and Novoseltsov suggest that, behind the scenes, Stalin's interpretation of pre-1917 Russian colonial expansionism and its impact on non-Russian territories is being debated. But this debate must emerge in print in professional historical journals before a real possibility of changing the official interpretation of the histories of the nations of the USSR can emerge.

The writer and critic Barabash has boldly questioned one of the main tenets of the official interpretation of Ukrainian history, but his initiative must be taken up by historians if *glasnost* is to become historiographic *perestroika*. Historians must write monographs on subjects like Russian economic colonialism, or the role of statehood in developing the forces of production in the non-Russian nations, and be able to publish them without fear of administrative censure. Senior scholars must begin questioning and debating fundamental organizational and conceptual principles. They must ask themselves why some of Stalin's tenets are rejected while others are not. They must criticize and refute the idea that focus on non-Russian national histories is a "nationalist shortcoming," and that more centralization and co-ordination is needed to improve scholarship. In particular, scholars would have to question the division of intellectual labor laid down in the new academic plan. As envisaged, this division would effectively turn academics outside of Moscow and Leningrad into research assistants and terminate national scholarship in countries of which some have academic traditions predating the establishment of the first schools in Muscovy.

ENDNOTES

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[2] See for example B.D. Datsiuk, ed., *Istoriia SSSR*(Moscow: VPSh pri TsK KPSS, 1963).

[3] See for example N.N. Vanag, *Kratkyi ocherk istorii narodov SSSR*(Moscow: 1932).

[4] Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969); M. Braichevsky, "Pryiednannia chy vozziednannia," *Shyroke more Ukrainy* (Paris-Baltimore: Smolyskyp, 1972), 21–52.

[5] G. Aleksandrov, "O nekotorykh zadachakh obshchestvennykh nauk v sovremennykh usloviakh," *Bolshevik*, no. 14 (July 1945): 17.

[6] B.N. Ponomarev, ed., *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), I: xxvii.

[7] R. Szporluk, "National History as a Political Battleground: The Case of Ukraine and Belorussia," in Michael Pap, ed., *Russian Empire. Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices* (Cleveland: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1985), 137–38.

[8] Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* (May–August 1988): 16–42.

[9] B.M. Kedrov, "O Leninskikh tetradiakh po filosofii," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 2 (1947): 61.

[10] "Sovremennaia ne marksistskaia istoriografiia i sovetskaia istoricheska nauka," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1988): 172–202. See also; "Krugloi stol: istoricheska nauka v usloviakh perestroiki," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (1988): 3–57.

[11] "Istoriki i pisateli o literature i istorii," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1988): 72.

[12] Ibid., 83.

[13] "Vsesoiuznaia nauchnaia konferentsiia po natsionalnomu voprosu," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 5 (1988): 217–221.

[14] *Literaturna gazeta*, no. 10 (1988).

[15] V. Shevchuk, "Bez korenia krona mertva," *Kultura i zhyttia*, 7 February 1988: 6; See also R. Ivanchuk, "Dukhovne zdorovia i nihilistychnyi virus," *Kyiv*, no. 4 (1988): 119–21.

[16] Iu. Kondufor, "Zhaiane nadoluzhuvaty," *Kultura i zhyttia*, 13 March 1988, 2–3.

[17] "Aktualni probemy istoryko-partiinoi nauky: perebudova, poshuky," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1988): 5–64.

[18] "Maibutne vyrostaie z mynuloho," *Radianska Ukraina*, 3 March 1988.

[19] V. Iurchyk "Perebudova i pereosmyslennia istorychnoho dosvidu Kompartii Ukrainy," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 7 (1988): 14; R. Szporluk, "National History as a Political Battleground," 147.

[20] R. Symonenko, "Pravda istorii-virnist istorii," *Kommunist Ukrainy*, no. 9 (1988): 76–88.

[21] Iu. Barabash," Ivan Mazepa-shche odna literaturna versiia," *Kyiv*, no. 12 (1988): 145. *Mazepa* by V. Sosiura was begun in 1928 and finished in 1960.

[22] Ibid., 147.

[23] S.S. Khromov, S.V. Tiutkin, "Vedushchyi tsentr po izucheniiu otechestvennoi istorii," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 2 (1986): 78–107.

[24] S.S. Khromov, "XXVII sezd KPSS i nekotorye aktualnye problemy izucheniia otechestvennoi istorii," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 6, (1986): 3–21.

[25] S.L. Tikhvinsky, V.P. Kozlov, "Postanovlenie obshchego sobraniia otdeleniia istorii AN SSSR 21 ianvariia 1988 g.," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1988): 208.

[26] S.L. Tikhvinsky, "Ianvarskyi (1987 g) Plenum TsKKPSS i istoricheskaia nauka," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1987): 3–13.

[27] S.L. Tikhvinsky, "Zadachi koordinatsii v oblasti istoricheskoi nauki," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1988): 119.

[28] A.N. Iakovlev, "Dostizhenie kachestvenno novogo sostoianiia sovetskogo obshchestva i obshchestvennye nauki," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, no. 6 (1987): 68.

[29] S.L Tikhvinsky, "70 letie Velikogo Oktiabria i zadachi po uvelicheniiu vklada istoricheskoi nauki v uskorenie sotsialno-ekonomicheskoho razvittia strany," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, no. 3 (1988): 78.

[30] Iu. Kondufor, "Zavdannia dalshoho rozvytku istorychnykh doslidzhen v ukrainskii RSR u svitli rishen XXVII zizdu KPRS," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1988): 5–19.

[31] R. Solchanyk, "Politics and the National Question in the Post Shelest Period," in Bohdan Krawchenko, ed., *Ukraine after Shelest* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 14–17.

[32] Samuel H. Baron, and Nancy Heer, eds., *Windows on the Russian Past* (Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1977); John Barber, *Soviet Historians in Crisis* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 47–79.



MARKO BOJCUN

Religious Freedom in Ukraine

On the eve of official millennium celebrations last year, the Soviet government announced its intention to issue new legislation on religious associations and to abrogate the second class status of believers in public life and the workplace. This promise of greater freedom of worship was made for several reasons. The government acknowledged that the long standing policy to combat religious belief was a failure. The second class status of believers was economically and politically counterproductive, barring the promotion of competent people to responsible posts simply because they believe in God. Mikhail Gorbachev's coalition also wished to strengthen its public support and the support of lower ranks in the Communist party by dispelling the understandable fear of believers that they would not enjoy an equal share in the benefits of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

The promise of greater religious freedoms was clearly limited to those churches and religious communities that accept continued government regulation of their religious life (through registration and its terms) and who openly support the government's foreign policy in the field of disarmament. It was limited also to the promise of greater freedom of religious worship in registered houses of prayer. This promise of religious freedom, however, did not offer a significantly greater social mission to the churches; that is, in aid to the poor, elderly and infirm, and certainly not a freedom for organised groups of believers to involve themselves in independent political action.

Essentially the Soviet leadership's new flexibility benefited the Russian Orthodox church in the opening of new churches, the return of several monasteries and the ability to publish and import more religious literature. It did not benefit the unregistered congregations of Evangelical Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals or the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic church. The right of foreign nationals to send religious literature to Soviet citizens has been granted, although it will take some time to see how well the customs and police honor this right.

In the Ukrainian republic, the peculiar situation obtaining in the Communist Party of Ukraine, that is, its resistance to the pace of political change and the retrenchment of the Brezhnev generation in the highest organs of republic authority, has meant that even these limited openings for believers have been slow to materialise and that the Ukrainian Catholic church—whose status is today the litmus test of religious freedom in the USSR as a whole—faces continued hostility and harassment on the part of *oblast* (region) and republican organs of the *militsiia* (police), KGB, the Council for Religious Affairs and the Communist Party of Ukraine itself.

It would be misleading, however, to attribute the growing importance of the religious question in Ukraine mainly to the attempts on the part of Gorbachev's coalition in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to win an adequate social base for its reform program and to the tensions thereby released between civil society and the republican authorities. The crisis of legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been created not only as a result of its own policies and past inertia, but also by the awakening of civil society and the numerous independent initiatives it has displayed.

In the field of religion there are many such initiatives. There is first of all an unprecedented campaign by the Ukrainian Catholic church to win legal status through petitions, public gatherings and attempted negotiations with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Council for Religious Affairs. Secondly, there is the continued activity of unregistered congregations in worship, religious instruction of their children and publication of religious literature in violation of the existing laws on religious association. Thirdly, a steady stream of young men are refusing service in the Soviet armed forces on grounds of conscientious objection. While these refusals are motivated primarily by the teachings of the New Testament, they are reinforced also by the slaughter in Afghanistan and the return of young men in coffins to their families and friends all across Ukraine. Fourthly, the crisis of atheist propaganda can be seen in the adherence to all the churches by growing numbers of young, educated and urbanised people, in contradiction to official expectations of the inevitable demise of religiosity under conditions of accelerated social mobilisation. Finally, the growth of national consciousness includes renewed interest in Ukraine's religious traditions and history, and a questioning of the way in which the Russian Orthodox church has come to be the dominant church in traditionally Catholic areas and areas served after the 1917 Revolution by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church.

Let me focus on the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic church, because this is the acknowledged litmus test of religious freedom today in the republic, as in the Soviet Union as a whole. This church has emerged from clandestinity, after four decades, with its own ecclesiastical leadership, a monastery, several orders of nuns and monks, over one thousand priests, a publication *Khrystianskyi holos* (*Christian Voice*), a lay committee in defense of its legalization led by Ivan Hel, and members that number somewhere between 3 and 5 million. What are the problems standing in the way of its legalization?

From the side of the Russian Orthodox church hierarchy there is great concern that the Ukrainian Catholic church's legalization will mean the loss of laity, property and political influence with the Soviet state authorities. After all, approximately half of the Russian Orthodox church's 4,300 parishes are located in Ukraine, with the greatest concentration in districts served by the Ukrainian Catholic church before its illegalization in 1946. If a legalized Ukrainian Catholic church takes away from the Russian Orthodox church these traditionally Catholic parishes in Western Ukraine the door will have been opened for the reestablishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church in regions of Central and Eastern Ukraine, leading to further losses for the Russian Orthodox church.

For the Soviet government, the greatest concern is that legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church will strengthen nationalist sentiment in the western *oblasti* and provide nationalist forces with an autonomous social institution in which to further propagate their political objectives. It must be stressed to the Soviet government—and the bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic church have done so repeatedly in statements and petitions over the past year—that a legalized Ukrainian Catholic church, genuinely free of state interference and control, is entirely possible (and in fact necessary), without such a development necessarily raising the political temperature in the republic. The visit of Aleksandr Iakovlev, member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Hungary last year where he deliberated with Catholic Primate Paskai, and the reciprocal impending visit of Paskai to Transcarpathia are intended precisely to find such a solution to the religious demands of Ukrainian Catholics. After all, the half million strong Uniate church in Hajdedorg eparchy has managed to function normally and maintain a peaceful, relatively uncomplicated relationship with the Hungarian communist state for years. If the Soviet government needs further proof that a non-political Uniate congregation is possible in this world, it needs only to send a delegation to the Ruthenian Uniate church in the United States of America to see for itself.

Of course we will not deny the fact that the Ukrainian Catholic movement intersects with a growing national movement, the movement for democratic rights, for the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism. The Soviet authorities have only themselves to blame for this intersection insofar as they themselves politicized the issue of religious freedom by perpetuating the illegalization of the Church, tarring its members wholesale with the brush of nazism, and pushing the Russian Orthodox church into the western *oblasti* as an instrument of Russification and control over religious communities.

There are perhaps three important currents within the Ukrainian Catholic church with different perspectives on legalization and the extent to which the church should involve itself in the social, national and political concerns of the laity. The first is that current which desires a legalized Ukrainian Catholic church as a house of prayer and worship, with a minimal relationship to the state and to politics, no more than to secure its freedom of unhindered worship. This is the position of the bishops who have publicly addressed the Council for Religious Affairs—Sterniuk, Kurchaba, Vasylyk, Margitych,

Dmyterko and Semedii. The Soviet government should negotiate with these acknowledged leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic church, and it should facilitate this process by not hindering their joint councils to develop the church's negotiating platform. The forcible dispersal of the 11 December 1988 meeting of the bishops in Lviv by the *oblast* Council for Religious Affairs is precisely the kind of tactic that will lose for the government this prime opportunity to resolve the issue.

While the entire church welcomes illegality and persecution as a test of its faith, there are priests within the Ukrainian Catholic church who fear that legalization will require compromises with the Soviet state that will corrupt and dilute the faith. Therefore they are not enthusiastic about seeking a political solution.

A third current, composed mainly of youth and politicized members of the older generation, does not make so great a distinction between the act of prayer and the responsibility to implement actively Christ's teaching here on earth: to seek peace, defend the poor and persecuted, to protect the dignity of humanity, who are created in God's image. On the contrary it is imperative for these Christians to take part in the movements for democracy, national self-determination and social justice for their people. And this current I can only call the adherents of a liberation theology *in statu nascendi*. I do not think that today's Latin American liberation theologians' great interest in Marx's writings makes this characterization of Ukrainian Catholics in a nominally communist state at all inappropriate. For the essence of their attitude to the world comes in the first instance from their interpretation of the New Testament and this is quite similar to the attitude of the Latin American priests who have chosen "the option of the poor." Again we should say that this third current within the Ukrainian Catholic church—politicized, nationally conscious, close to the poor and disadvantaged classes of Ukrainian society—should be welcomed by a Communist party that is in the process of positive, egalitarian reform. If it is not welcomed, then it says a great deal about whose fundamental interests of power the Communist party leadership is trying to defend.

The legalization issue involves also the relationships of the Soviet government, Russian Orthodox church and Ukrainian Catholic church to the Vatican. For the churches, the emergence of the Ukrainian Catholic church to international attention necessitates a substantial revision of the framework in which ecumenism and Christian unity in the East is pursued in the future. For its part, the Soviet government is searching for an acceptable kind of relationship between the Ukrainian Catholic church and the Vatican that skirts Cardinal Lubachivsky in Rome, leader of the Ukrainian Catholic church in the diaspora. The search is motivated by the Soviet government's perception of the church in exile as nationalist and fundamentally hostile to the Soviet government. The exiled church's hostility is quite understandable in view of the long decades of scorn and defamation heaped upon it by representatives of the Soviet government, and the persecutions visited upon its brethren in Ukraine after the World War II. But this unsettled question can also be resolved with time. For if the dialogue initiated at this conference between Ukrainians in the

USSR and abroad flourishes, and *glasnost* and *perestroika* take root in Ukraine, then a normal open relationship between the Ukrainian Catholic church in the Soviet Union and abroad will not appear as problematic and dangerous to the Soviet government as it has in the past.



IOSYP TERELIA

Ukraine—the Church—the KGB

Atheism did not arise in 1917 simply because the Communists came to power. The Communist Revolution was possible only because the core of the intelligentsia of the Russian Empire was almost 95 per cent atheist. The great majority of the intelligentsia of the Russian *ancien regime* could not rid themselves of the notion that religion is the concern of outdated and reactionary elements. This view became so rooted in their consciousness that an axiom arose: if you are a member of the intelligentsia, then you must be an atheist. Those with religious convictions were looked upon by the former as "undeveloped" and "intellectually backward." I do not wish to say that atheism was only the prerogative of the East. In the West atheism flourishes in a more veiled form. Among members of the Western intelligentsia, the religion of the people is considered to be an inevitable and natural "evil" that has to be gently and carefully "cured." In the USSR this "cure" has been directly administered by the KGB: prison, concentration camp, execution.

The events that are unfolding in the USSR today, (which the West interprets as something new and completely dependent on the good will of General Secretary Gorbachev), are proceeding at a pace that neither Gorbachev, nor the Communist party elite know what to expect of the "Soviet people," nor when to expect it. Massive demonstrations of ethnic, political, religious, and ecological groups are springing up, not by the will of the Communist party or the KGB, but by the will of individuals, and frequently without any consultation with the latter. Fear is receding gradually, and the masses are beginning to understand that they not only have been deceived for a long time, but that the future security and prosperity of their children depends on them.

The tendencies that would lead to the disintegration of the empire became apparent immediately after Stalin's death. Even during the tyrant's life, in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries, and also in the Northern Caucasus, there were armed uprisings against Russian imperialism. Ukraine was always on

Moscow's first line of concern. Not only because of its labor reserves, but because the loss of Ukraine would mean the loss of the messianic idea of Moscow—the Third Rome. Neither under the tsars, nor under the Soviet rulers, were Ukrainians allowed to develop according to God's law. They were destroyed and they continue to be destroyed simply because they are Ukrainians, and not because they did not accept Marxist-Leninist principles of life.

I will speak here about the destruction of religion in Ukraine. The opposition of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church and of the Ukrainian Catholic church is not simply the opposition of the church against communism; it is the spiritual opposition of the people against Russian imperialism. The Communists created a new religion which outwardly mimicked Russian Orthodoxy but whose core was Leninist. From 1920 on, the attacks on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church did not cease. In 1929, mass executions of its members and clergy were carried out. Practically speaking, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church did not have time to secure its hold amid the people of Ukraine. The lay Orthodox brotherhoods of the Vinnytsia region managed to hold out the longest. In 1937, the organization of True Greek Orthodox Peasants in the name of Archangel Michael and the Holy Spirit was physically liquidated. When the German armies arrived on Ukrainian territories, church life began to awaken, but the Gestapo suppressed this budding movement just as the NKVD had done. When Russian Communist armies returned, the MGB began massive repressions against the Ukrainian peasantry, to "punish" them for having been occupied. These repressions were levelled at Christians first of all.

In December 1945, a massive campaign of eradication of the Ukrainian Catholic church was begun. The entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy, together with Metropolitan Iosyf Slipy, was arrested, and most of it was physically destroyed in various prisons and concentration camps. More than 2,550 priests, monks, and nuns were arrested in Galicia. Hundreds of thousands of Catholic believers were tried by military tribunals for their opposition to the invader. Horror and grief was visited on every house. And yet, there were always altruistic souls, truly dedicated to the teachings of Christ. These individuals, not heeding persecution, continued to lead communities in secret church life and continuously exposed themselves to danger. After the death of Stalin, the remainder of Ukrainian Catholic priests and monks returned, but not many. Only 200 escaped the concentration camps alive. Not all of those who returned took up their priestly duties once again. Most of them immersed themselves in personal concerns. Even though they did not sign themselves over to Russian Orthodoxy, they nevertheless did not join the Ukrainian Catholic church underground. This work was continued by those true Christians who considered their priesthood and monastic life as a conscious service to the apostolic church and their people. After the pogrom on the Ukrainian Catholic church in Galicia in 1946, the last stronghold of this church fell in August 1951, when the Basilian monastery in the village of Imstychevo was closed, and its prior, Ivan Sarmatii, was arrested and sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor.

In 1953, a priest of the Basilian order, Petro Oros, was murdered. His tragic martyr's death strengthened the resolve of the underground clergy and faithful Catholics. In 1957–58, three more Ukrainian Catholic priests were killed in Carpathian Ukraine, including the abbot of the underground Basilian monastery of Imstychevo, Iosyp Zavadiak. However, at the time, the Church had already begun to overcome the crisis and get to its feet. Throughout its underground existence, it never ceased converting the atheistic masses to the apostolic church. His eminence Pavlo Vasylyk and his eminence Pavlo of Transcarpathian Ukraine both played a crucial role in turning the East to the Catholic church. Later, they were joined by Ivan Margitych, who is now a bishop in Carpathian Ukraine. At the time, I headed the lay movement and worked not only with Russian Catholics, but began forming ties also with Georgians.

On 9 September 1982 the Initiative Group for the Defense of Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine was established in Lviv. Its aims were the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church and freedom of dissemination of God's word throughout the USSR. I was elected to head the group. Hryhorii Budzinsky, a Studite, was made secretary, and Vasyl Korbyn, Stefaniia Petrash-Sichko and Anton Potochniak, a Basilian, were members. Together, we composed the document we called "The Memorandum on the Ukrainian Catholic Church." I was arrested two months later, A. Potochniak was arrested five months later, and we were both sentenced to a year in concentration camp. We were held near Lviv, in concentration camp VL 305/30, where, on 29 May 1984, Anton Potochniak was murdered. The small organization initiated by a group of faithful and clergy on 9 May 1982 grew in five years into the largest Ukrainian mass movement of the late 1980s. The movement to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church is a deeply national movement that demands the right to live as part of a sovereign nation.

Today, the word *perestroika* has become a magical straw that the West grasps at in the hope that the communist Gorbachev has become a humanist, and that he truly wishes to live democratically. However, it refuses to see the bloody dances of tanks over the bodies of Georgians and Armenians. The West refuses to see that *perestroika* and *glasnost* are but a new tactic of the Communist party of the USSR to lull the West to sleep, a tactic that aims to conceal their goal of establishing communism as the only world ideology. The West does not understand that communism will never allow changes in the system; that *perestroika* is only the instrument of entrenchment of dictatorship of the Communist party. Those who see it as a symptom of weakness, live in a world of erroneous conceptions about communism.

My view is that the future for Ukrainians is only in an independent state. It is for this reason that a struggle is being waged for our churches, for ecological cleanliness and against nuclear power stations, for the language, for a financial system with a national bank and currency. These are all demands which grow out of the desire for a sovereign Ukrainian state.

Translated from Ukrainian by Andriy Wynnyckyj



VASYL ROMANIUK

Hlasnist and Demokratyzatsiia in the USSR

Much attention is currently being paid in the West to the processes and changes taking place in the Soviet Union, although, realistically speaking, concrete changes have yet to occur. The one thing that leaps to everyone's attention is that talking and personal discussions are now permitted, as are criticisms of the old deceased dictators (as if to say that they were responsible for all misfortunes). There it ends! First of all, what we see is the fact that this so-called *hlasnist* has not yet been entrenched by any legislative documents. Therefore, there are no guarantees that everything that occurred yesterday will not repeat itself again. For us, as citizens of the Soviet Union, it is very important that we have been permitted to write about the tragic past. However, this is simple building of castles in the sand if it is not backed up by legislation.

Naturally, Western interest in events in the Soviet Union is based on the very real consideration that developments in the politics of this immense multinational empire will have a direct influence on the destiny of not only Europe, but of humanity as a whole. If this country's policy proceeds along the path of freedom, democracy, decolonization, and pluralism, as did that of other colonial powers in the past, such as England, France, Portugal, and others, then a certain warming in international relations can be expected, which could lead to a stable peace. However, if the old reactionary forces gain ascendancy in the Soviet Union, then a world catastrophe is inevitable. This eventuality should be seriously considered by politicians in the West.

As for me personally, I can only say that *hlasnist* until now has been just noises, naked words and this so-called *demokratyzatsiia* has yet to produce any concrete results. It has not resolved any of the burning difficulties that have arisen in the country over recent decades and which have to be resolved immediately. The worst of the matter is that the same people and the same ruling party that occupied positions of leadership in Stalin's and Brezhnev's day continue to do so. Few raise the question that these people, who committed such heavy crimes against their own citizens, have not been subjected to any,

not even moral, condemnation. They are not only not being tried for these crimes, but they are not even being deprived of the positions they have occupied for the last fifteen–twenty years. In such conditions, *hlasnist* looks very poor indeed, because the people see that nothing has changed, that there is no certainty about the days to come, and therefore the people are not showing any initiative, creative inspiration, or hope for a better future.

This oppressive atmosphere is particularly prevalent in Ukraine, where the old Brezhnevite appointee, Shcherbytsky, still heads the criminal party mafia, and in fact, is not conducting any efforts at restructuring, nor at democratization. In a word, this comedy of democratization and *hlasnist* in the Soviet Union is reminiscent of the Ukrainian folk tale. In it, the Lion, as ruler of all wild animals, is told that all vegetarian creatures are complaining about him, claiming that they have no rights and no protection against the arbitrariness of the royal functionaries—the Tigers, the Bears, the Wolves, and other fierce predators, who have far-reaching rights. The Lion did not like this report, but he knew his higher administrators well and decided to issue a fiat that was applicable throughout his kingdom. When all had gathered, his secretary, the Panther, read, "I, the great king of the forests, deserts, and fields, hereby announce to all residents in my kingdom this day forth, it is forbidden to harm any plant-eaters or weak subjects in my kingdom." Hearing this, all of the animals were overjoyed at this clement law of the Lion. They exulted, sang, danced, and shouted praises to the king, and only the Fox sat on a high stump, luxuriously twisting his mustache, and smiling malevolently. The Lion noticed this and said, "Why aren't you, Fox Mykyta, celebrating like the others? Don't you believe that my law is binding?" The Fox answered, "No, sire, your ministers, your generals, and your secretary, the fierce Panther, and I myself, we like to eat fresh meat and drink warm blood. In order for your law to be binding, you would have to change our very predatory natures."

A similar phenomenon is occurring in the Soviet Union. The predatory nature of the old communist bureaucracy will not simply change because someone has pronounced, "Henceforward, in our country there will be *hlasnist*, *demokratiia*, and *perebudova*." Words that are not strengthened by actions are dead. As Taras Shevchenko wrote, "The great power of great words."

First of all, the entire political system has to be changed and rebuilt because it has not justified itself in any sphere of society. Even the things that have been "attained" over seventy years of the regime's existence have been paid for so dearly, that it would take all the riches of the earth to compensate for all of the losses, the destruction of tens of millions of innocent people.

Everything that happened in the Soviet Union over the past decades is not conducive to normal life. Everything is touched by an anti-national, anti-human animus and is directed against the individual. There is no doubt that Gorbachev wants democracy and restructuring, but he is being impeded by an old bureaucracy that he cannot overcome. Secondly, without economic and political pluralism, democracy cannot exist. Perhaps Gorbachev could accomplish more than he has to date if the West adopted a well-thought out and realistic policy toward the Soviet Union, and provided aid first and

foremost to the democratic elements in the society. Unfortunately, the West seems not to understand this, or not to want to. It can be stated as a fact that democratic forces, those that stand for a true democracy, have not received any support, neither material nor political. There have been no protests on the part of Western nations against the various illegal actions that have been perpetrated by the old bureaucracy, which is opposed even to Gorbachev, the man to whom the West feels such sympathy. Everyone is aware that there have been several instances of brutal dispersal of peaceful demonstrations, but unfortunately, they have not been covered by the world press, and not commented upon by political observers in the West.

Some democratic circles in Ukraine believe that Gorbachev is simply rescuing the empire, and has taken up the slogan "*demokratyzatsiia, perebudova, hlasnist*," simply as a device to trick the free world into giving it aid. Others believe that he continues to believe in the viability and progressiveness of communist ideology, which can supposedly still arouse trust, even though the majority of people trust it no longer.

Translated from Ukrainian by Andriy Wynnyckyj



PETRO RUBAN

Economic Relations:

Co-operatives and the Possibilities for Development

A substantive democratization of the Soviet Union is impossible if its economy continues to be controlled by administrative-bureaucratic methods. Democratization is also impossible until the economic interests of individuals are clearly defined and safeguarded from arbitrary measures. Reforms that do not proceed from the internal needs of individuals, and which are not based on economic interests will always appear artificial, and the methods of social regulation and forms of democratic coexistence will continue to be formalities. Conversely, a transition from administrative methods of control to those which are economically viable is not possible without the democratization of society, and is impossible without the participation of democratic individuals who are conscious of their interests, and who need legal and political guarantees of their rights.

We speak of the democratization (it has recently become an absolute necessity because of the depth of the economic crisis facing the USSR) of the last empire on earth.

The concept of restructuring as a social revolution has not yet been manifested concretely. Changes in publications and in print, in the form of *glasnost*, can be called revolutionary with certain reservations, but the essential feature of all other changes—the extent to which the mechanism of control of the economy is modernised—has been marred by compromise and deviates fundamentally from its own basic principles. Functionaries in various ministries are stubbornly seeking to maintain their complete control over all enterprises. The idea of complete economic accountability and self-financing of enterprises has been subverted by state commissions, which are simply another form of the old system of detailed planning.

Restructuring is also substantially mitigated by the practice of voluntary establishment of norms of disbursement, on the basis of income, to various ministries. The practice of strictly binding producing enterprises to set

purchasers makes economic maneuvering impossible. As in the past, the means of production are subsidized, which creates artificial deficits in certain sectors and unnecessary surpluses in others. The contacts between ministries and information services all continue to be rigid. The *nomenklatura* (patronage) system of forming executive cadres is still in place. All of this serves to prove that central and local administration and information services continue to be fortresses of bureaucratic administrative methods of economic, social and state control.

Social thinking on the successes of restructuring is not optimistic and shows signs of worsening. The basic factors that are restraining a rapid restructuring of social relations in the USSR are as follows:

1. The huge expanses of the USSR.
2. The heterogeneity of social, economic, and national working and living conditions in the various regions.
3. The complexity of the system of social control decreases the possibility for reciprocal relations between the political authorities and the masses, resulting in the alienation of those in authority.
4. The lingering popular memory of the failure of the previous attempts at reform and the fear of reaction and reversal, resulting in widespread passitivity.
5. The lack of large economic reserves (capital) for initial incentives for accelerated economic development.
6. The gap between propaganda concerning the overcoming of shortages, and the increasing growth of socio-economic difficulties.

The critics of restructuring point at these difficulties without identifying their basic source: Russian neo-colonial hegemony over the peoples of this last empire on earth. If the rights of independence and of secession from enslavement in the Union are given to the various nations and peoples, the majority of the above-mentioned problems will be resolved.

Apart from this essential principle, elements in the concept of restructuring that could positively influence social relations are the following:

1. The decentralization of the political and economic structure of the USSR.
2. The activation of the mass media and the intensification of glasnost.
3. The division of state, party and economic administration.
4. The development of self-administrated production.
5. The elimination of proscriptions on all beneficial types of economic initiatives, such as co-operatives, trade, and free markets;
6. The raising of social estimation of creative work.

The above-mentioned factors obviously do not touch upon important principles and features of restructuring with regards to relations between republics, classes and social strata, but they do allow for an evaluation of the depth and complexity of the processes involved.

A law concerning co-operatives in the USSR was passed at the 9th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 26 May 1988, and came into effect on 1 July. It opens exceptional possibilities for the Western democracies to successfully promote the liberalization of economic and social life, and in the USSR to establish a new conduct of business. Is also allows for new avenues of support for national democratic movements for the liberation of republics of the Soviet Union. This law, in opening the possibility of establishing economic co-operatives, automatically increases the chances for national revival. Economic accountability, self-financing, individual labor, and the right to establish co-operatives—these attack not only the bureaucratic centralist structure of the present Soviet economy, but also the forms of the old social order. They create a new social stratum of economically independent citizens with new expectations of life, society, the state, property, and defense of their status.

How can one assist *restructuring* and *glasnost* and support the people, without assisting the strengthening of a totalitarian state that has not renounced its intention of "burying capitalism?" Assistance for genuine restructuring is assistance given to an alternative society and an alternative economy through support for co-operatives in the USSR. Co-operatives have been allowed as a safeguard by the totalitarian authorities in the event that the West does not support restructuring, and does not provide financial and technological assistance to the party-bureaucratic apparatus. It is a strange fact, but a fact nonetheless that the 18 million strong apparatus of the communist system is receiving all manner of support from the capitalist West! The state that once allowed these co-operatives to be established is now beginning its struggle against them economically, administratively, ideologically and even physically. Some have even been set on fire! In other words, the state seeks to block the rights of individuals on the economic and social level. Co-operatives are the last to receive raw materials, and have to pay the highest prices for goods of the lowest quality. They have great difficulties in obtaining leases for inappropriate buildings at very high rates, and they are made to buy used tools and apparatus from other enterprises at high prices. And yet, they manage to produce more goods that are of higher quality, with a higher rate of profit and more viably than state-sponsored enterprises.

Co-operatives that produce goods that can compete is foreign markets are eligible for special certificates from the government, but until 1 May 1989, they were only issued rarely, in exceptional cases. On 3 May, the rights of access to foreign markets were greatly expanded, and so the possibilities of interaction with Western businesses have become more realistic. If co-operatives were supported by financing and technology, they would eventually exert strong pressure on state-run companies, particularly in terms of organization, quality and low cost of production, as well as flexible and adaptable systems of economic relations. Co-operatives are run by the people's initiative, and thus they are far less likely to develop parasitic administrative structures. Support and assistance provided to development of co-operatives will greatly improve the economic conditions of the people and will thus highlight the humanitarianism of Western democracies.

If co-operatives are allowed to achieve a degree of economic independence through conscious financial and technological assistance, this will provide the surest ground for the development of democratic values. With the assistance of conscious émigré individuals and organizations in Canada, Australia and the USA, in March 1989, I was able establish the International Association of Assistance for Co-operatives in Ukraine.

Translated from Ukrainian by Andriy Wynnyckyj



TARAS KUZIO

Unofficial and Semi-Official Groups and Samizdat Publications in Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

The new dissident movement in Ukraine under Gorbachev began two years ago after many political prisoners, the majority of whom had been Ukrainian, were released under the amnesty. During these two years the number of groups, their membership, activities and publications has grown with considerable speed, far out-stripping the dissident movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In Ukraine the continuation of the Brezhnevite party leadership under Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (until 28 September 1989) has led to an unwritten opposition alliance between unofficial and semi-official groups that are supported by the Writers' Union. The gulf between the Communist party, represented by a whole layer of people associated with corruption, de-nationalization and economic mismanagement, and these unofficial and semi-official groups has grown to such an extent that during the March elections to the Congress of People's Deputies it often became a liability to declare one's membership in the Communist party.[1]

The study of dissent in Ukraine is important for any understanding of the Soviet nationality question because of the size and importance of Ukraine for the survival of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, on an unannounced tour of Ukraine in February 1989, himself admitted that Ukraine was important for the stability of the USSR. Zbigniew Brzezinski has underlined the importance of Ukraine to the survival of the USSR in his latest book:

> A key point to watch will be the growing nationalism within the Soviet Ukraine, with its fifty million people and great natural resources. Both in Kiev and Lvov quasi-underground Ukrainian political, religious and cultural activity has increased, taking advantage of the openings created by *glasnost*. Its thrust has been to emphasize the damage inflicted on the Ukraine by past Soviet policies and the national imperative of

resisting further Russification. Most Ukrainians, rightly or wrongly, blame Moscow—and thus incidentally the Russians—for the Chernobyl disaster and view it as the second-worst calamity (after the famine of the 1930s) inflicted upon their nation by the rulers in the Kremlin. Should the linguistic and cultural resentments of the Ukrainian people, already openly and quite vehemently expressed even in the official Ukrainian media, develop into separatist aspirations, supported by a significant portion of the Ukrainian population, the national problem will have become the Soviet Union's crisis of survival.[2]

UNOFFICIAL GROUPS AND PUBLICATIONS

Ukrainian Helsinki Union

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) was relaunched by former members of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (formed on 9 November 1976), who had been released from imprisonment during Gorbachev's amnesty in 1987. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, as it subsequently became known, with 40 known members was the largest of the Helsinki Groups formed in Russia, Lithuania, Armenia and Georgia. It's purpose was to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights clauses of Basket 3 of the Helsinki Accords. The first arrests of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group's members began in February 1977 and by the early 1980s the Ukrainian Helsinki Group had ceased its activities due to imprisonment or forced emigration.[3] The Ukrainian Helsinki Group forged together human and national rights on one platform:

> The Ukrainian Helsinki Group insisted that it was guided by humanitarian and legal considerations rather than political motivations. Clearly the Group was not seeking to unseat the Soviet system or its leadership, nor was it creating an opposition political party or movement. By emphasizing the humanitarian and legal nature of their activities and by minimizing the political content of their actions, dissidents were suggesting that their activities were legitimate by Soviet standards.[4]

In August 1987 Viacheslav Chornovil, a leading Ukrainian dissident and editor of the *samizdat* (self-publishing) journal *The Ukrainian Herald*, wrote an open letter to M. Gorbachev where he announced:

> I am informing you that several Ukrainian journalists and writers, who are presently experiencing a ban on their works and within their profession, including myself in this field, are legally reviving the publication of the socio-political and literary journal, *The Ukrainian Herald*, which appeared from 1970–1972 under difficult circumstances. This journal conforms to the present stipulations of *glasnost*.
>
> There is also the idea of forming our own creative circles independent from the official ones, which enforce a ban upon us, and forming our own associations of persecuted Ukrainian writers, journalists,

artists, even though the circulation of our publications may well be limited...[5]

The Ukrainian Herald was relaunched in August 1987 and was numbered as no. 7.[6] It was not until March the following year that the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), as it now called itself, announced that it had reformed because, it, unlike the Moscow Helsinki Group, had never disbanded. *The Ukrainian Herald* was to become the official organ of the UHU edited again by Viacheslav Chornovil.[7]

In March 1988 the Ukrainian Helsinki Union announced its reformation by noting that it had been, "subjected to a more devastating pogrom during the Brezhnev years of stagnation than any other Helsinki group in the USSR. All the members of this group served lengthy terms of imprisonment and internal exile, and four of its members—Oleksa Tykhy, Iurii Lytvyn, Valerii Marchenko and Vasyl Stus—died in frightful conditions in a special-regime camp..." The statement went on to state that, "despite the pogrom, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group never disbanded, as the Moscow group, and never ceased its activities." The statement declared that it will continue to base its activities upon international agreements which the USSR is a signatory to, that it confirms its membership in the International Helsinki Federation, that due to the emigration of Mykola Rudenko the new head is Levko Lukianenko and finally that, "a general declaration of principles, which will take into account the new circumstances in Ukraine and the world, will be adopted at the same time."[8]

Four months later the UHU released its Declaration of Principles and Statutes. The Declaration claims that the UHU is not a political or opposition party, but an organization which, "activates the masses in order to encourage participation in the government of the country." The Declaration of Principles is divided into 20 sections dealing with political, constitutional, language, education and economic reform. The main aim of the UHU, it states, is to restore genuine sovereignty to Ukraine because only this would guarantee national and human rights for Ukrainians and minorities living in the republic. The USSR should, in the short term, be at least transformed into a "Confederation of Independent States." The Declaration of Principles goes much further than the demands raised by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in the 1970s. The UHU believes that power should be transformed from the Communist party to democratically elected Councils of People's Deputies, that there should be Ukrainization of education, the military and government in Ukraine, the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries, the development of a mixed economy and de-collectivization, a nuclear free Ukraine, legalization of banned religious groups, reform of the KGB and judiciary and freedom to travel abroad.[9]

The UHU, active for little over eighteen months, has expanded considerably both in membership, which stands today at 1,000[10] (compared to a maximum of 40 during the 1970s), and structure (regional branches exist in every *oblast* (region), as well as in Moscow) and publications. The growth of the UHU's field of interest can be seen in the contents of the regular press service it publishes, over 90 of which have been published to date. The subjects that

these have covered include the national minorities in Ukraine, Ukrainian national symbols, reports on current events that have taken place, the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, historical anniversaries, the Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Restructuring, repression of unofficial activists and leaked Communist party internal documents attacking informal groups.[11]

The UHU has also sent a message of support to the 5th World Congress of Free Ukrainians in November 1988.[12] It has supported the Estonian Supreme Soviet and Popular Front in opposing constitutional changes that, "are reactionary and, as such, contradict the principle of establishing a state based upon legal principles. They therefore deepen imperialistic centralism in all spheres of social life." The Estonian Popular Front replied that it regards the UHU's Declaration of Principles as not, "contravening the Soviet state or social order" and offered the services of a lawyer to answer any official accusations made against them.[13] In November 1988 the UHU also initiated a petition calling for the removal of nuclear plants from Ukraine[14] and organized commemorations of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in Lviv (a demonstration in Kiev was prevented by the authorities from going ahead).[15]

The UHU now regularly publishes the journal *Ukrainskyi visnyk*, (*Ukrainian Herald*), *Lvivski novyny* (*Lviv News*), *Holos vidrodzhennia* (*Voice of Renewal*), *Opovisnyk* (*Herald*), *Obizhnyk* (*Newsletter*), *Express-visnyk* (*Express-Herald*), and *Presova sluzhba UHS* (*Press Service UHS*). The Lviv, Ternopil and Kharkiv regional branches of the UHU produce their individual weekly *Informator* (*Information*).[16] *Informator* no. 35 (August 1989) reported that the Volynia regional UHU branch had begun to publish an almanac entitled *Holos Volynia ta Polisssia* (*Voice of Volyn and Polissia*), the first issue of which was 105 pages. The Moscow branch of the UHU also began publishing in July 1989 an information bulletin in Russian entitled *Natsionalnyi vopros* (*National Question*).

The UHU initiated the formation of an Initiative Group for the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of Conscience in October 1987 that joined later with other nationalities to form the Co-ordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements of Peoples of the USSR[17]. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1988 the UHU was the major organization behind the formation of a Democratic Front to Promote *Perestroika* in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv.[18] On 16 June 1989 the *Ridna Mova* (Native Language) Society organized a meeting in Lviv attended by 8,000 people which turned into a broad debate about the undemocratic selection of delegates to the 19th Party Conference. Two main speakers at this demonstration were the former political prisoners, Bohdan Horyn and Viacheslav Chornovil. On 21 June another meeting attracted 50,000 where Mykola Muratov, a member of the UHU in Moscow, spoke. At the third meeting on 7 July, attended by 20,000 people, Chornovil and Horyn again spoke and called for the formation of a Democratic Front in Support of *Perestroika*, which would be dominated by unofficial groups, because *perestroika* had made little headway in Western Ukraine.

Throughout July and August a campaign was launched in the Soviet press against the UHU making the traditional accusations against individual members. An announcement on local television charged that, "under the cover of criticism, they engaged in slanderous and insulting attacks on party and Soviet leaders and Soviet reality as a whole; expressed ideas aimed at inflaming national enmity and nationalistic feelings; and instigated the violation of public order." Further meetings on 4 August and 1 September were brutally dispersed in Lviv. The suppression of the Democratic Front in Lviv was a signal that the authorities would not tolerate the formation of a Baltic-style Popular Front led by dissidents. Henceforth, the UHU continued to support the formation of a Popular Front but led by the official Writers' Union. At the 18 December 1988 monthly meeting of the all-Ukrainian Co-ordinating Council of the UHU therefore, the UHU stated that nevertheless it would support the endeavor to form a Popular Front but: "We recommend that local organizations of the UHU send their representatives to initiative groups of the Popular Fronts even if, at this first stage, the programs of these groups are far removed from the Declaration of Principles of the UHU." UHU members have since been elected into prominent positions in the Popular Movement in Support of *Perestroika* formed in February 1989 (Mykhailo Horyn in Lviv and Mykola Horbal in Kiev).[19]

In December 1988 the UHU called for a boycott of the forthcoming local and national elections, as well as a pre-election campaign protesting the new "undemocratic laws" on elections. The statement declared that "popularly supported representatives of oppositional organizations are effectively deprived of the possibility of being registered as candidates," yet if democratic elections were held the UHU believed that, "it would have realistic chances of victory" in a number of regions. In February 1989 the UHU modified its position by calling upon its members to either boycott the elections or cross out the names of candidates who were either unpopular or were running unopposed.[20]

At the 7 May 1989 monthly meeting of the all-Ukrainian Co-ordinating Committee of the UHU, article 2 of the Declaration of Principles was modified to read:

> Standing for the position of Ukrainian statehood, the UHU as a federation of human rights organizations defends the right of separate individuals or community-based groups to promote their ideas regarding statehood in a constitutional manner in the form of a federation, confederation with other nations of the USSR or Europe, as well as full state independence.

This change followed bitter debate both in Ukraine and in the emigration over whether the UHU should include as members those who stood for both confederation and independence—or just for independence? The insistence that the UHU should stand only on the platform of outright independence led to the expulsion of two young radical activists, Ivan Makar and Vasyl Sichko, from the UHU in May 1989.[21] Ivan Makar is on the editorial board of the samizdat journal *Ukrainskyi chas* (*Ukrainian Time*), which was established in

the early part of this year as a forum for those radicals opposed to the cautious, evolutionary approach of the UHU leadership.

The 4 June 1989 monthly meeting of the all-Ukrainian Co-ordinating Council of the UHU drew up a letter to the Helsinki Review Conference in Paris, outlined the need for a document to be released on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and drew up an appeal to the Soviet authorities to mark 26 April (the anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear accident) as a Day of National Mourning for Ukraine. Ievhen Proniuk discussed the work of the newly formed all-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed while a greeting was read out by Iosyp Zisels, a Jewish member of the UHU from Chernivtsi, from the Jerusalem-based Society for Jewish-Ukrainian Understanding. In the view of the UHU the rights of minorities should be supported because, "de-nationalized elements become a potential recruitment for all kinds of Inter-Fronts." Therefore, in the view of Mykhailo Horyn, it is necessary to call a forum of all the nationalities that live in Ukraine. The newly created Social-Welfare Section of the UHU was also discussed with a view to expanding its activities, especially among the working classes. A final appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR demanded that all international documents signed by the Soviet government and pertaining to human rights be published in the Ukrainian language in mass editions.[22]

On 6 July 1989 the UHU sent an appeal to all those candidates that it had supported and who had won the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. The UHU called upon these delegates to: take up a clear position" on the need to reduce nuclear power in Ukraine; increase economic, political and cultural republican sovereignty; abolish the present electoral system and replace it with a genuine democratic law on elections; abolish the anti-constitutional illegal law on the organizing of meetings, demonstrations and gatherings; and abolish the decree "on criminal responsibilities for state crimes" of 8 April 1989. The UHU also requested that the newly elected deputies demand the liquidation of the special forces of the MVD.[23]

Religion

In 1982, three years prior to Gorbachev, members of the illegal Ukrainian Catholic church formed The Initiative Group for the Defence of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, which began to publish the *samizdat* journal *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, 33 issues of which were published within five years. The leading figure behind both the group and the *samizdat* journal was Iosyp Terelia, who was deported to the West in 1988 and now lives in Toronto.[24] In the early part of 1988 therefore, the group was renamed The Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (CDUCC) with Ivan Hel as its head. *The Chronicle* was merged with a new *samizdat* journal entitled *Khrystianskyi holos* (*Christian Voice*). A new *samizdat* journal is also in preparation entitled *Khrystianske slovo* (*Christian Word*), which will deal with theological questions.[25]

The strength of Ukrainian religious feeling could be seen when upwards of half a million visitors came to the apparition at Hrushiv in Western Ukraine on the second anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear accident.[26] In August 1987, during the same month that Viacheslav Chornovil wrote his "Open Letter to Gorbachev," 206 underground bishops, priests, monks, nuns and faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic church emerged from their catacomb existence and wrote to Pope John Paul. Since then the CDUCC has campaigned through petitions, meetings with the Council for Religious Affairs and statements to government institutions, international bodies and high ranking religious figures to legalize their church.[27]

In May of 1989 the campaign for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church took a new twist when 3 bishops and 3 priests travelled to Moscow to meet Supreme Soviet officials. In protest at their refusal to meet them, all 6 began a hunger strike. After an initial meeting their ranks were swelled by the arrival of new priests and lay activists from Ukraine. Boris Ieltsin, Oles Honchar and Rostyslav Bratun were persuaded to try and bring up the question of the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church in the Congress of People's Deputies.[28] On 18 June 1989 over 150,000 Ukrainian Catholics, including 100,000 in Ivano-Frankivsk (a town with only 250,000 inhabitants) held prayer services in response to Cardinal Lubachivsky's call for a world-wide vigil for Ukrainian religious freedom.[29]

The Soviet authorities and the Russian Orthodox church have been left in no doubt of the strength of popular feeling on the Ukrainian Catholic question in Western Ukraine and the mass popular support it enjoys. Legalization, many people believe, is a very serious prospect in the near future. There are already 16 Ukrainian Catholic churches and parishes openly functioning in once abandoned buildings. Many churches are being renovated (some, it is reported, even with funds from Communist party officials who fear not being reelected). By the end of August it is believed that there will be 30 functioning Ukrainian Catholic parishes.[30]

In February 1989 the Initiative Committee in Support of a Revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox church was launched in Kiev with strong support from the Ukrainian Catholic church and other unofficial groups. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church was relaunched after the Bolshevik Revolution when Ukrainian Orthodox separated themselves from the Russian Orthodox church, which had supported the tsarist regime's anti-Ukrainian policies. The Ukrainian Orthodox church was liquidated during the 1930s. A number of Ukrainian members of the Russian Orthodox priesthood have reportedly sought to reregister their parishes as Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox.[31] The attitude of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox church though has remained traditionally hostile to both Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox aspirations. In May 1989 Metropolitan Filaret, exarch of the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine, replied to a question about both illegal Ukrainian churches with the claim that, "They are politicos, not church people, who want to exploit it with the aim of taking Ukrainian believers out of the Russian Orthodox church."[32]

The Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia

The inaugural declaration of the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia (UANTI) is signed by 14 well-known dissidents and former political prisoners. UANTI was formed in October 1987 and was the second informal group to be established in Ukraine. The founding declaration states that, "It is our firm conviction that the official unions for writers, artists, theatre workers and cinematographers of Ukraine do not fully represent the spiritual, literary, cultural and public processes that are expanding and gathering momentum in Ukraine."[33] In the view of one leading UANTI activist, Stepan Sapeliak, the official Writers' Union of Ukraine "discredited" itself during the 1970s, "And if we are talking about culture, then the Union of Writers, Journalists, Cinematographers and Artists created only a pseudo-culture, modelled upon socialist realism."[34] UANTI promised to publish literary periodicals and almanacs, give art exhibitions as well as support all those who desire to put their talent and civic courage at the service of the good and the spiritual development of the Ukrainian people, and the national life of Ukraine. The signatories include 7 honorary members of International Pen: Ihor Kalynets, Mykhailo Osadchy, Mykola Rudenko, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Ivan Svitlychny, Iryna Senyk and Viacheslav Chornovil.

UANTI held its first congress in Lviv in January 1989, fifteen months after it was founded, with 26 participants from throughout Ukraine. The congress discussed the further development of UANTI while reports were given on behalf of UANTI's official periodical—*Kafedra* (*Rostrum*), edited by Mykhailo Osadchy in Lviv, and other literary *samizdat* journals whose editors belong to UANTI—*Ievshan Zillia* (*Wormwood*) edited by Iryna and Ihor Kalynets in Lviv, *Karby hir* (*Mountain Tracks*) edited by Dmytro Hrynkiv, and *Porohy* (*Rapids*) edited by Ivan Sokulsky in Dnipropetrovsk. Members of UANTI are active within the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society and within the Lviv-based cultural organization *Tovarystvo Lev* (Lion Society).[35] A new literary *samizdat* journal entitled *Snip* (*Sheaf*), edited by Valerii Bondar in Kharkiv, began publication after the congress, although copies have still not arrived in the West.

One of the first acts of UANTI was to demand the reburial in Ukraine, "of the bodies of the talented poets and public-cultural figures—Vasyl Stus, Oleksa Tykhy and Iurii Lytvyn, murdered during the period of stagnation." In connection with this UANTI sent a letter signed jointly with the Ukrainian Culturological Club to International Pen in October 1987. The letter pointed out that, to this very day, the grave of Vasyl Stus, "at the camp cemetery is marked simply as no. 9." He died during, "the era of stagnation, when spiritual values plummeted catastrophically. A consumerist mentality corrupted the souls of an entire generation. Fear made people petty and mean." UANTI appealed to both International Pen and the Soviet Ministry of Culture to honor Stus' 50th anniversary on 6 January 1988, for Soviet publishing houses to print a selection of his works and for the KGB to release the works which were confiscated from him in the camps.[36]

UANTI has also appealed to International Pen to recognize a Ukrainian section and to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and émigré publishing houses to give technical and material help to *samizdat* journals in Ukraine. In an appeal dated 7 April 1989 UANTI supported Hungarian writers' protests against the destruction of villages in Romania. This policy of "administrative-territorial reorganization" threatens to de-nationalize not only Hungarians, UANTI states, but also Ukrainians and other national minorities living in Romania. The appeal ends with the words:

> UANTI supports this commendable appeal by our Hungarian brothers which calls upon all political, community, informal creative and scientific organizations, as well as individual citizens in Ukraine and abroad to calmly raise their protest voices against the disturbing polices of the Ceaucescu sword which hangs above the heads of our blood brothers—Ukrainians in Romania—our brothers on the other side of the river Prut.[37]

The Culturological Club

The Ukrainian Culturological Club was formed in August 1987, and according to the weekly *samizdat* bulletin *Express-Chronicle*, held its first meeting on 27 September in central Kiev where copies of its charter were distributed.[38] The Club was organized mainly by former political prisoners to spread democratization in the republic's capital. It immediately began to campaign for the release of all remaining political prisoners and for a widening of the discussion surrounding the blank spots in Ukrainian history (in particular, the Ukrainian famine of 1933). Leading individuals in the Club included Serhii Naboka, Leonid Miliavsky, Oles Shevchenko and Olha Matusevych.[39]

One of the first actions of the Club was to appeal to UNESCO with the proposal that 1988 be made the Year of Vasyl Stus, the Ukrainian poet-dissident who died in September 1985 in the gulag. In addition, evenings were devoted to Vasyl Stus and a petition was organized to demand the return of his body for reburial in Ukraine. Other evenings organized by the Club have dealt with: the millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'-Ukraine, the 175th anniversary of Ukraine's national poet—Taras Shevchenko, Ukrainian national figures who have fallen out of favor with the authorities, nuclear power and the environment. In addition, in May 1988 the Club held meetings with members of the editorial board of *Iunost* (*Youth*) after which they called for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church. Appeals by the Club have been addressed to the West German television station *West Deutscher Rundfunk* criticizing a Soviet official's comparison of the Russian nationalist organization *Pamiat* (*Memory*) with the Club. The Club has also spoken in defense of the seventeenth century Mohyla Academy in Kiev which is being used by the Soviet military.[40]

The authorities responded almost immediately to the activities of the Club with a harsh press campaign in both *Vechirnii Kyiv* (*Evening Kiev*) and *Radianska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine). Although the Club and its members were

described in the traditional pre-Gorbachev manner as "nationalists" exploiting *glasnost* for their own ends, and entire pages of *Vechirnii Kyiv* were devoted to letters (some of which were favorably disposed towards the Club) the campaign, by all accounts, had the opposite effect to that intended. Instead of arousing the hostility of the republic's population towards the Club, the articles publicized the Club's activities. *Radianska Ukraina* in a series of articles between 19 and 21 May 1988 claimed the Club, "approaches the history of Ukraine, especially its Soviet period, only with black paint in hand." The Club also refused to incorporate into its statute that it upholds "Marxist-Leninist ideology " and "struggles against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." The Club was reputed to have argued that "Russian great-power chauvinism" is a far worse threat.[41]

On 26 April 1988 the Club organized a demonstration in central Kiev to mark the second anniversary of the Chornobyl accident. Members of the Club held placards which read, "No More Chornobyls," "Turn Ukraine into a Nuclear-Free Ukraine" and "The Ukrainian Culturological Club is Against Nuclear Death." The authorities used loud-speakers to drown out speeches and arrested 17 people, sentencing Oles Shevchenko to fifteen days imprisonment. Two days later *Prapor Komunizmu* (*Flag of Communism*) claimed that, "a group of extremists, mostly representing the Ukrainian Culturological Club, tried to whip up unrest, interfere with street repairs, and obstruct the flow of traffic." Meanwhile, the newspaper for Ukrainians abroad, *News From Ukraine*, launched its own investigation and criticized the actions of the authorities.[42]

The Club also commemorated the annual Taras Shevchenko anniversary on 22 May although the authorities used the ingenious method of disrupting it by trying to upstage it with an official celebration. On 5 June the Club organized unofficial celebrations to mark the millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'-Ukraine. Similar unofficial Clubs devoted to culture and ecology were opened in other Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv, which became the initiators of more radical unofficial groups.[43] Both the radicalization of the opposition and members of the public at large led to a decline in the activity of the Culturological Club towards the end of 1988. Leading figures in the Culturological Club, such as Oles Shevchenko and Serhii Naboka, became the head of the Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and editor of a UHU newspaper *Holos vidrodzhennia* respectively. Leonid Miliavsky meanwhile, a leading Jewish-Ukrainian member of the Culturological Club, helped to initiate the opposition political party The Ukrainian Democratic Union and The Initiative Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

Hromada

The unofficial student organization *Hromada* (Community) began at Kiev University in the spring of 1988. Many of the original members were students in the Physics Faculty. A copy of their program has not reached the West, although the statutes have.[44] Hromada began to publish a 30-page *samizdat* journal *Dzvin* (*Bell*), 4 issues of which are known to have appeared. They also

continue to publish a regular bulletin—*Chronicle of Opposition*.[45] *Hromada* student members represent a new generation of unofficial activists brought to the fore under the new policy of *glasnost*, as opposed to the former older generation of political prisoners who control the commanding heights of the Helsinki Union and Culturological Club. One of their first activities was the holding of a meeting in defense of the Kiev Mohyla Academy, founded in the seventeenth century. They, like the Culturological Club, demanded the removal of the military political school from its premises. In fact, the close co-operation with the more senior dissidents in the Culturological Club could be seen when Bohdan Horyn read out an appeal to the 19th Party Congress which argued that people should not be solely concerned at this demonstration with the preservation of monuments, but with the question of with whom power should lie—the KGB and *nomenklatura* or Councils of People's Deputies? Over 1,000 people gathered at the Skovoroda statue with placards reading, "The mechanism of destruction does not stop by itself. It is operated by opponents of restructuring," "We will not let our monuments be destroyed" and "City council! Stop trading in the interests of Kievans and others!"[46]

In September 1988 members of *Hromada* travelled to Irevan to voice their support for the Armenians' demands over Nagorno-Karabakh. The demonstration in Kiev attended by 10,000 in November 1988 in support of the formation of a Ukrainian Popular Front and in opposition to nuclear power was mainly the work of *Hromada* also.[47] Members of *Hromada* have presided over a successful boycott of military instruction classes at Kiev University during the latter part of 1988, demanding that military education become voluntary. The boycott was suspended after a number of concessions were made, that is, military classes were shortened and abolished for second year students. In late November they renewed their boycott demanding that all military classes be voluntary and that a leading *Hromada* member, Volodymyr Chemerys, be reinstated.[48] Both Chemerys and another leading *Hromada* member, Dmytro Korchynsky, have since moved on to join the more radical Ukrainian People's Democratic League as well as jointly editing a new *samizdat* journal in April 1989 entitled *Rada* (*Council*).

The newspaper for Ukrainians living abroad *News From Ukraine* (no. 4, 1989) admitted that the military education classes are, "largely unpopular with the majority of undergraduates who do not plan a military career." Discussing the boycott of military classes the article states that, at first, the instructors refused to discuss the issue. But, gradually the boycott forced a compromise upon the authorities and the students won a cutback in training and the right not to wear uniforms in class. The action by *Hromada*, "stirred debates at a subsequent university conference involving students, the military and university administration." *News From Ukraine*, at least, believed these events signalled that, "the long-lost traditions of free thought are revived in their independent publications and political clubs. And the signs are that their aspirations are beginning to count."

The third issue of *Dzvin* published an open letter by *Hromada* to the plenum of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This open letter, dated 19 October 1988,

argues that the present republican party leadership which "has remained virtually unchanged since 1972 is responsible for the stagnation in Ukraine." Demanding the removal of Shcherbytsky and others responsible for the catastrophic state of Ukrainian culture and language, they argue for a system of republican cost accounting, Ukrainization of all spheres of life in Ukraine, the formation of Ukrainian military units, the liquidation of Communist party privileges and an end to the construction of new nuclear plants.[49]

The impact of *Hromada* can best be gauged by the hostile official reaction to it. The local Kiev University newspaper, *Kievskyi universytet* (*Kiev University*), published numerous attacks upon the student group throughout 1988 accusing them of being "overcome by demagogic nationalistic slogans." In particular, articles in *Dzvin* dealing with Ukrainian historical blank spots come under scrutiny. According to these articles in *Kievskyi universytet*, the authorities were not hostile to *Hromada* when it was first launched, but became increasingly concerned as it became more politicized during the course of the year, when finally in November 1988 *Hromada* organized a meeting to discuss the Helsinki Union's Declaration of Principles.[50] The authorities attempted to prevent *Hromada* from pursuing its activities through the expulsion of students who were members, while in November of last year they formed a new "Hromada" which would meet at the same time each week and support the republican party leadership.[51] The original *Hromada* has since organized meetings on Ukrainian national and religious holidays and helped in this year's pre-election meetings with leafleting and the organization of rallies. Recent reports indicate that because of the expulsions of students, *Hromada* declined to such an extent that a regrouping of activists took place which led to the formation of a new body named after the old Cossack military term–*Kurin*.[52]

The Lviv Trust Group

One of the first reports that an unofficial peace group existed in Ukraine was issued by the Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights. It reported that a demonstration had taken place by 30 members of the group in Lviv on 20 September 1987. The demonstrators had carried placards calling for "*Glasnost*," "*Perestroika* in Soviet life" and "Nuclear Disarmament by the USSR and USA." The demonstration, which lasted three hours, led to a tussle with the militia and a sit-in. The following day 2 student participants in the demonstration were expelled from Lviv Polytechnic.[53]

The unofficial peace group is a regional branch of the Moscow-based Trust Group, which was formed in 1982. Members of the group included both hippies and religious (Pentecostalist) conscientious objectors. A "Declaration of the Hippy Initiative Committee of Moscow-Kiev-Lviv" was released in July 1987 and many leading members of the Lviv Trust Group, such as Oles Olesevich, co-authored it. This document already reflected how the hippies were not just pacifists, but a group with political demands; such as, public accountability for the security forces and that, "representatives of opposition groups be represented in local Soviets and in other organs of power, and that they should be allowed to pronounce their views, openly and freely. They

should be permitted to publish their journals, appear on television and radio and be allowed to travel abroad."[54]

The Moscow-based *samizdat* journal *Den za dnem* (*Day by Day*, no. 9, 1987) published one of the first accounts of the Lviv Trust Group. The Group numbers between 30–50 people who are mainly students, hippies, young workers, unofficial artists and musicians. After their demonstration was interrupted on 20 September 1987 they sent an appeal to Gorbachev asking him to take action against the local authorities. The report states that after this first youth demonstration in Lviv many discussion clubs sprang up and the Lviv Trust Group began to campaign for an unofficial cultural club to be established in the city (eventually the *Tovarystvo Lev* was to be established).

On 24 October 1987 the Trust Group organized demonstrations in Moscow, Leningrad and Lviv to mark United Nations Day which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the right to conscientious objection. Another demand was reported to be full democratization of Soviet life. Further demonstrations against the occupation of Afghanistan occurred on the anniversary of the Soviet occupation on December 24. A Ukrainian pacifist from Lviv, S. Gura, was arrested at the Moscow demonstration when he reportedly asked for an interpreter in court.[55]

The Lviv Trust Group has sent a number of appeals that have reached the West. These include an appeal to the Vienna Helsinki Review Conference organized by the Hungarian *samizdat* journal *Beszelo* and the East European Cultural Foundation that states that conscientious objection is a universal human right.[56] On the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution they issued a strong condemnation of Soviet rule in Ukraine.[57] On 15 March 1988 they sent an appeal supporting student demonstrations in Poland. After the pogrom of Armenians in Sumgait they sent an appeal expressing their sorrow at the deaths and solidarizing with their demands.[58] The Lviv Trust Group has also been critical of Western governments, including American policy in central America and Australian government policy towards the aborigines.[59] During the summer 1988 demonstrations in Lviv, the Lviv Trust Group was one of the founding groups to join the Democratic Front to Support *Perestroika*.[60]

The Ukrainian Democratic Union/ Ukrainian People's Democratic League

At the founding conference of the Democratic Union opposition party in May 1988 in Moscow, Ukrainian representatives were in attendance. One of the demands raised at this conference was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the areas occupied as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including Western Ukraine. Iurii Skubko, a Ukrainian member of the Moscow-based *samizdat* journal *Tochka Zreniia* (*Point of View*) and a leading Democratic Union activist, then reported that branches had been established in Kiev, Lviv and Sumy in Ukraine.[61] Ukrainian representatives also attended the second Democratic Union congress in Riga between 26 and 29 January 1989.[62]

The Ukrainian Democratic Union (UDU) planned to hold its first founding congress on the weekend of 22 and 23 January 1989 in Kiev, the anniversary of

the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence in 1918. The authorities prevented the congress from taking place.[63] In an interview with a leading member of the UDU, Leonid Miliavsky, in December 1988 he claimed that groups already existed in Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkiv and Rivne with a total of approximately 100 members. They had decided quite early to establish a separate organization, and not be merely a regional branch of the Russian Democratic Union. In Miliavsky's view, the most preferable option for Ukraine would be outright state independence. When asked about the differences between it and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union Miliavsky stated:

> Firstly, we formed our group before the Helsinki Union. So there is no competition. Secondly, we are purely political—an opposition political organization. The Helsinki Union is not a political organization. It is a federation of human rights groups to which members of the Communist party and members of the UDU can belong. They have a wider program like the Estonian Popular Front or the Latvian one. It is really an unofficial Popular Front because an official one cannot, as yet, be recognized. We have a purely political program which is ideologically motivated. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union does not address itself to the Marxist-Leninist question, nor to the questions of socialism or capitalism.[64]

The UDU is composed of three factions—liberal democratic, Christian democratic and socialist democratic, in the same manner as the Russian Democratic Union.[65] In February the UDU changed its name to the Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UPDL) in order to completely break with any connection to the Russian Democratic Union. The programs of both the UDU and UPDL are similar, although the UPDL has adopted a new policy of not allowing separate factions. A copy of the UPDL program, adopted by the Kiev regional branch of the organization on 12 February declares that it is a "political organization that unites together people of different views and beliefs, who stand for the general principles of democracy, humanism and freedom and aims to promote the political, economic and spiritual revival of Ukraine."[66] The UPDL therefore aims to consolidate different democratic socio-political organizations and groups into a united bloc, "in opposition to the totalitarian communist regime" and for a multi-party democratic system in a sovereign Ukraine. The remainder of the program is devoted to methods and aims. The program outlines the bare minimum socio-political, legal, religious, constitutional and economic reforms that need to be undertaken in Ukraine. It plans to develop and propagate alternative programs, participate in election campaigns, form new branches, publish UPDL newspapers, journals and leaflets, conduct meetings and discussions, hold referendums and opinion polls, strikes and pickets. At the large 22 May 1989 meeting to honor Taras Shevchenko's 175th anniversary in Kiev, members of the UPDL were seen holding placards reading "Long Live a United, Independent Ukraine!"

In July 1989 the first issue of a UPDL publication appeared entitled *Bulletin 1 (Documents)*. It includes the program of the League, ratified at the inaugural

congress held in June in Riga, the "Appeal to the Citizens of Ukraine" from this congress, and "Resolutions" on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and condemns attempts by the authorities to incite inter-ethnic hatred in Ukraine. The UPDL is reported to have at least 100 members with another 200 sympathizers, mainly among the more radical and impatient younger generation. They are more prepared to take their message on to the streets of Kiev and elsewhere, in contrast to the UHU and Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring.[67] In late July 1989 the UPDL issued leaflets in support of the striking miners and organized a hunger strike in front of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in protest at their refusal to introduce legislation on Ukrainian national symbols.[68]

Social Democratic Confederation of Ukraine

Towards the end of last year a number of reports indicated that Social-Democratic groups had been formed in a number of Ukrainian cities. In Lviv, a Social Democratic group, led by a Russian, Evgenii Patrakief, began to publish a *samizdat* bulletin entitled *Na polnoi golos* (*In a Loud Voice*). Members of this group were active in local initiative committees to establish Popular Fronts in the city.[69]

Between 6 and 7 November 1988 in Leningrad the first conference of Social-Democratic organizations was held with representatives from Lviv and Kharkiv. A declaration was adopted at this conference to create a Social-Democratic party in the near future. A draft program and statute for the party will be prepared for the conference.[70] On 4 and 5 February 1989 in Leningrad the second conference of Social Democratic groups took place with 39 delegates from 14 cities. At this conference 10 groups united to form the Social Democratic Confederation. The Ukrainian groups which joined this new body included the Social Democratic Federation of Ukraine (Kiev) and the Association of Social Democrats (Lviv). The inaugural congress was to be held in the summer where an all-Union Social Democratic party would be formed and a program issued.[71] This was actually held on 21 and 22 May 1989 where it was decided to form a Social Democratic Association.[72]. A hitherto unknown Ukrainian group attended this meeting—the Idealistic Philosophy Club "Thought" from Sumy. One of the few *samizdat* documents to have reached the West by a Ukrainian Social Democratic group is a telegram to the Supreme Soviet protesting against the massacres by MVD troops in Tbilisi in April.[73]

The Social Democratic groups in Ukraine, primarily in Lviv and Kiev, did not come out into the open until this year when they released a program, a copy of which is in the West in Russian.[74] By all accounts they are still small with only 12 core members in Lviv and another 30 sympathizers. This program is divided into a number of sections: the development of the country since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution; reforms and the reasons for the crisis; *perestroika* and its development; and the final section deals with "Our Aims." The program devotes little space to the national question, a criticism levelled against it by Ukrainian national activists. Vasyl Barliadianu, in a *samizdat* analysis of "Ukrainian *samizdat* today" states that the new journal, which began

publication in March of this year by the Social Democratic Federation of Ukraine, entitled *Dialogue*, is printed in Tallin, while the majority of the articles are reprints from the official central press and "the authors in *Dialogue* do not propose to us anything new."[75] They also publish the sociopolitical organ of the Federation of Social Democrats in Lviv in Ukrainian entitled *Zbirnyk OSD* (*Collection*) as well as *Pohliad* (*Viewpoint*) in Kiev.[76] The cool reception that Ukrainian National Democrats have towards these Social Democratic groups is probably the reason why Iurii Badzio, a Ukrainian Socialist and former political prisoner, has drafted a separate detailed program which calls for an independent, socialist and democratic Ukraine and has reportedly refused to join them.[77] The strikes in July in Western and Eastern Ukraine left behind "strike committees" which Social Democratic groups, and the more nationalistic UPDL, will undoubtedly attempt to influence.

Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front

The Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front was formed in November 1988 in the highly nationalistic region of Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast*. Their first inaugural meeting was in Lviv on 13 January where a program and statute were ratified. The UCDF is headed by 2 former political prisoners, Vasyl and Petro Sichko, and stands for complete state independence for Ukraine.[78] The UCDF believes that the Communist party is incapable of solving the problems of Ukraine, which only the full recognition and adoption of religious values would allow. The UCDF believes in a multi-party system. The UCDF has promoted the revival of the youth organization *Plast*, a Ukrainian national scouting organization that was legal in inter-war Poland, and the first *Plast* camp was held in the Carpathian mountains with 30 participants.[79] The UCDF claims 520 members in Lviv and another 500 elsewhere in Western Ukraine. Western Ukraine provides fertile ground for UCDF recruitment because of its strong mix of Ukrainian nationalism and religion (Ukrainian Catholicism), which does not exist in Central and Eastern Ukraine where the religion is Orthodox and national consciousness lower. The majority of UCDF members are of the younger radical, impatient generation (in the same manner as the UPDL). The extent of their influence in Ukraine's most nationalistic region, Ivano-Frankivsk, could be seen when they organized a demonstration of 100,000 on 23 July 1989, where Vasyl Sichko, just released from a fifteen-day prison term, was the main speaker. His nationalistic cry of "Slava Ukraini" (Glory to Ukraine) was returned by 100,00 people with the reply "Heroiam slava" (Glory to Our Heroes). The UCDF has a different, more politicized and confrontational attitude towards the authorities than the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. It believes, unlike the CDUCC, that the church should be used as a vehicle for politicizing the believers, which, if the Ukrainian Catholic church is legalized, would become a real possibility.[80]

In a programmatical document entitled "What to do next," dated 1 May 1989 and presented at the 6th Conference of non-Russian National Democratic Movements in Estonia, Vasyl Sichko outlines the position of the UCDF and his reasons for criticism of the less radical UHU. In his view, Gorbachev's reforms

and his so-called policies of "democratization" are a lie which the West has foolishly been hoodwinked into believing. In his view, the USSR is nothing more than a "Russian Empire," an empire which is "despotic," "ill," "based on falsehoods" and in "economic ruins." It was not the "dissidents" or other informal groups that brought the USSR to the verge of ruin, but the Communist party, the UCDF believes. The reforms, introduced by Gorbachev, will merely turn the USSR into a despotic, Stalinist law-based state. In Sichko's view, the UCDF is the first organization, unless you also include the newly established *samizdat* journal *Ukrainskyi chas* in Lviv, to stand for the right to full state independence for Ukraine. For adopting this position the UCDF was attacked not only by the Communist party, but also by the "loyal opposition," members of the UHU who are regarded as "collaborationists" and "confederalists." Finally, the UCDF believe that if the Soviet regime begins a new policy of repression then the UCDF should be prepared to go "underground" to wage their struggle, in the same manner as the Ukrainian Catholic church did so successfully since 1946. He therefore proposes a new alliance between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and nationalist groups, like the UCDF, which proved successful in the earlier part of this century.

Youth and Unofficial Groups

A recent survey by the Komsomol organization of Ukraine revealed that there are over 800 socio-political clubs operating in Ukrainian higher education institutes. A new trend had emerged—traditional unofficial groups (rockers, hippies, etc) now represented only between 3 to 7 per cent of them. "While the popularity index of such amateur organizations as groups for the protection and restoration of historical and cultural movements, ecological societies, associations for the development of national culture, clubs of lovers of amateur songs and others had reached 60 to 70 per cent," the survey concluded. In other words, unofficial youth groups had proliferated and taken on a more radical and political orientation.[81]

This is reflected in the numbers of Komsomol members arrested at demonstrations, the low level of prestige that the Komsomol enjoys among young people and the activity of young people in support of unofficial and semi-official groups. In the early part of 1988 students were convicted in Ternopil and Zbarazh of organizing a Ukrainian nationalist group. A new group entitled *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of Ukraine) began publishing a *samizdat* bulletin this year entitled *Vilna Ukraina* (*Free Ukraine*) in Drohobych.[82]

Other informal and youth groups include: *Rukh* in Ivano-Frankivsk, *Vilna Khvylia* (Free Wave), Democratic Union to Promote *Perestroika*, *Pivdenna Hromada* (South Society), *Miloserdie* (Compassion), Odessa Ecology Club, *Leleka* (Stork), Society of Cyril and Methodius and *Rukh* in Odessa, *Diia* (Action), *Nebaiduzhi* (The Concerned Ones), Neosphere in Kiev, Pluralism in Donetsk, *Vertep* (Manger) Society in Ternopil, the Cultural Enlightenment Society of Kobilnyk in Sambir, Election—89 and April in Kharkiv.

On 21 May, fifteen informal associations met in Kharkiv with 100 participants. Twelve out of the fifteen organizations represented formed a *Democratic Assembly* which released a "Founding Resolution" and began to publish a *Samizdat* newspaper entitled *Unity*.[83]

The most important youth groups that have been formed alongside dissident groups are: Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM) and Association of Ukrainian Youth by the Helsinki Union in Lviv and Khariv, and *Plast* by the Christian Democratic Front in Ivano-Frankivsk. The *Lvivskyi Informator*(no. 38) reported that SNUM held its inaugural congress on 19 September 1989 next to the *Sichovi Striltsi* (Sich riflemen of the Austrian army who later fought for Ukrainian independence) monument in the Carpathian mountains. The congress published a program and a statute, elected an executive council and Ihor Derkach as the leader. Greetings were sent from *Plast*, The Student Brotherhood and UHU. SNUM has upwards of 200 members in Lviv *oblast*. An independent student brotherhood entitled *Malovnycha Ukraina* (Colorful Ukraine), formed by students at Lviv University and Polytechnic, was announced in the 5th issue of *Postup* (*Progress*). The Student Brotherhood already has 500 members in the Lviv *oblast*, has issued a statute and publishes a *samizdat* journal entitled *Viko* (*Eyelid*). It has organized expeditions in Western Ukraine to renovate and honor the graves of the Ukrainian soldiers who died in the national liberation struggle of 1917–1921.[84] The extent of the seriousness of the crisis facing traditional party youth organizations such as the Komsomol was outlined in *Lvivskyi Informator* (no. 41). It reported that at the Profspetskompleks Scientific-Manufacturing complex in Lviv, the Komsomol meeting decided to disband itself as not "representing the interests of young people," and voted on the need to form alternative youth structures.

SEMI-OFFICIAL GROUPS AND PUBLICATIONS

In addition to the numerous dissident groups and *samizdat* publications that exist in Ukraine, there are also a huge number of semi-official groups and publications, that are beyond the control of the Communist party and the censor. A short survey follows of those publications that have reached the West. Many of these publications are published in relatively high circulations, and therefore their readership is often higher than that of the dissident *samizdat*. The main semi-official groups that exist in Ukraine include *Rukh* (Popular Movement for Restructuring), Memorial, Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, *Spadshchyna* (Heritage), *Tovarystvo Lev*, Ukrainian Youth Club and Club of Ukrainian Deputies. All of these groups, apart from Green World and the Language Society, publish regular newspapers or bulletins. Some of their documents also occasionally appear in *Literaturna Ukraina*, the weekly organ of the Writers' Union of Ukraine.[85]

Two bulletins are geared towards the Jewish minority in Ukraine. One is published in Chernivsti, edited by Iosyp Zisels, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and is entitled *The Information Bulletin of the Chernivsti Jewish Society Cultural Fund*. In addition, in September 1989 in Kiev the first issue of *News of Jewish Organizations of Ukraine* appeared. In July 1989, the local

branch of the Ukrainian Memorial in Chornobyl began publishing an unofficial journal entitled *Kolokol* (in Ukrainian *Dzvin*) and during the earlier part of this year a Russian-language bulletin entitled *Poshtovyi Iashchik* (*Mail Box*) began to appear in Kharkiv.

Tovarystvo Lev

The cultural-educational group *Tovarystvo Lev*, based in Lviv, began publication of the monthly newspaper *Postup* (*Progress*) in April this year. Ten issues have appeared to date, with each issue 8 pages long. The first issue contains an editorial on the elections, an article on the Ukrainian nation entitled "Beware of the Boomerang" and an article on militia attempts at curbing demonstrations under the title "Stalin is Alive!" The editorial "Elections, yet again!" states that in this fourth year of restructuring the ideas of pluralism have been put forward in place of Stalin's "democracy." Citizens received not only the right but the possibility of proposing alternative candidates. They have the possibility of carrying out agitation "for" and "against," and to elect their representatives to the highest organs of state power. With respect to Rostyslav Bratun's candidacy, which *Tovarystvo Lev* strongly supported in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, the editorial states:

> It did not take long for slanderous accusations to appear in the local press. 'Competent bodies' amiably prepared 'materials' about Bratun's participation in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and his involvement with Fascists. The leader of the factory party Communist committee, who read out this 'material' was not worried by the fact that his adversary was only 14 at the time. He didn't care to check the accuracy of the accusations. When Bratun took the case up with the courts the 'material' disappeared.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> What were the reasons for this behavior by the bureaucrats? Their opposition was based on Bratun's program which he would have defended at the highest forum of state power. Bratun considers that we cannot be self-sufficient, cannot preserve the environment of our planet and therefore ourselves from death as long as the party-state bureaucratic apparatus decides at the central level, what and how much we must produce, when and where we should give the fruits of our labor, how we should organize agriculture, what prices we should set and how we should be paid! The USSR should exist like a genuine democratic federal republic on the basis of a Union agreement.
>
> Bratun is convinced that in conditions of Stalinist-Brezhnevite superiority a solution to the social and national problems, a genuine guarantee of constitutional rights and freedom of the individual can only be achieved through economic independence and political sovereignty for Ukraine and the other Soviet republics.
>
> Bratun has great hopes in the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine (*Rukh*). One other reason for the fear of Bratun is that his

name has become the symbol of the reawakening of Lviv residents to independent participation in social-political life....

The bureaucracy is afraid of our renewal, the editorial states. How else can one explain the fact that all the *oblast* newspapers (apart from the Komsomol paper *Leninska molod* (*Lenin Youth*) hastily declared the "unaminous support by the citizens" of the "operational actions of the security forces," who brutally dispersed the electoral rally on 12 March 1989. The editorial ends with the words, "Comrades! The bureaucratic apparatus is capable of all kinds of slanders and provocations against our candidates! Support programs of R. Bratun and I. Drach!" The article "Beware the Boomerang" concerns the campaign of the authorities against the *Rukh* and their attempts at creating the impression that it is an alternative party.

The third issue of *Postup* opens with words of congratulations for Bratun who won a seat in the Congress. The main subject covered in this issue is the *Rukh*. The newspaper reports that on 7 May 1989, 200 representatives of the *Rukh* agreed to form the Lviv Regional Branch. The speakers at this meeting addressed the attempts by the authorities at discrediting the *Rukh*, with supporters of the *Rukh* often accused of "nationalism." The speaker, M. Kosiv, expressed the importance of a serious analysis of the criticism of the *Rukh* which has appeared in the official press. In particular, he pointed out one of the Communist party's contradictions when, on the one hand, it claimed that there was nothing new in the program of the *Rukh* and then, at the same time, accused it of being as alternative party. Kosiv also takes to task the myth that the Communist party initiated *perestroika* and therefore is the guarantor of it. In his own words *perestroika* is a profoundly revolutionary process, and "as such is generally known in Marxism Leninism. It does not emerge spontaneously within society because of somebody's goodwill, but is formed when the people no longer want to live according to the old ways." Mykhailo Horyn, a former political prisoner and member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, was quoted as saying that the only solution would be economic independence, but that this at the moment is difficult to imagine as more than half of the industrial sector's produce is exported out of the republic.

The fourth issue of *Postup* devotes much of its space to the aftermath of the elections. It opens with an article by R. Bratun about the recently held elections and the lessons that can be learned from them. "If at a meeting somebody says that it has to be like this and not like that and does not want to listen to the opinion of the opposite side, then this is no different to the political leaders of the years of stagnation and the era of Stalinism," states Bratun. "If we cover one type of dogmatism with another," he continues, "then we will have achieved nothing." Another article dealing with the elections claims that Lviv had not witnessed such a "Spring" for over fifty years. The struggle for Ivan Drach to be nominated to the Congress raised people's sense of awareness. This struggle, claims the article, resulted in the formation of the Lviv Regional Council of the *Rukh*. It seemed at times that the administration was lost and did not know how to react to the rapidly changing pace of events. This issue of *Postup* announces the formation of a new public organization—The Ukrainian Association for

the Defence of the Historical Community (UAZIS). The founding meeting was held in Kiev on 13 May 1989. The activities of the organization are directed at preserving the "traditional, historical and natural community, ancient population centers and separate regions of Ukraine." Further UAZIS supports the preservation of monuments, archaeological and ethnographical sites. It is planned that a branch of the association will be formed in Lviv. An article entitled "Love and Goodness" by V. Kikabidze describes the events of 10 April in Tbilisi. It is clear from this article that some type of chemical gas was used against the Georgian demonstrators. Under the title "The Flag of the Ukrainian Nation," A. Hrechylo analyzes the origins of the Ukrainian blue and yellow flag. This is followed by an article devoted to the tragedy in Chornobyl in 1986, in particularly the protest movements which are campaigning against nuclear power. A series of short articles, one on Ukrainian Easter celebrations and another on recent events in Lviv, conclude the bulletin.

The sixth issue of *Postup* contains an opinion poll carried out in Lviv since late 1987 on people's views where the T. Shevchenko monument should be built. The majority regard the center of town (Lenin prospekt) as the best location. An article on the need to form republican military units is next followed by an article, "The Year 1941," that details the impact of Stalinism in Western Ukraine. During that year 35,000 were allegedly killed. There are also eyewitness accounts that detail the massacre, "Although we know today about the tragedy in Kuropaty and Bykivnia it is difficult to imagine that mass torture was taking place everywhere in the country."

Ukrainian Youth Club

The Ukrainian Youth Club in Riga, Latvia, began publication of a 4-page newsletter entitled *Trybuna* (*Tribune*) in July 1989. Four issues have appeared to date. *Trybuna* is published by the Latvian Popular Front in an attempt to isolate Ukrainians from the Inter-Fronts formed by Russian migrants, and also is purported to have close links to the radical opposition Ukrainian People's Democratic League. The first issue opens with an editorial, "Attention! Dear readers. At your request we are starting to publish a newsletter, where you may find articles on the economic, political, ethnographic, historical, religious, ecological, social and other problems and events that are happening in Ukraine and the Baltic states." The articles include material about long banned traditions, resolutions from the conference of cultural societies in the Baltic republics held on 28 May 1989. There is also material about the *Rukh* in Dnipropetrovsk and ends with the words, "There is no Ukraine without a Ukrainian nation and this people ought to be reborn and should become masters of their own land." There is also information about the formation of the Student Brotherhood in Lviv, which is supported by the *Rukh*, Ukrainian Language Society, *Tovarystvo Lev* and even the Association of Canadian-Ukrainian Students. The first issue also has material by Viacheslav Chornovil, a leading dissident on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its effects upon Western Ukraine.

The other issues of *Trybuna* to have been published include material by dissident groups, such as the "Appeal to Ukrainians in the Baltic Republics" by the Co-ordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR at its last meeting on 29 April in Estonia, Chornovil's open letter to V. Shcherbytsky, an article on the Kiev *oblast Rukh* congress held 1–2 July. There are also reprints from Ukrainian dissident groups and journals, appeals by the Student Brotherhood and *Rukh*, the draft proposals for making Ukrainian the state language of the republic, the open letter by reformist Ukrainian deputies demanding democratic elections in the forthcoming contest for the republican Supreme Soviet. Other materials include unpublished speeches by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian historian and head of the independent Ukrainian government in 1917. Further statistics about those deported and killed as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are given as well.

Memorial

The Lviv oblast Memorial branch began publication of a newspaper entitled *Poklyk Sumlinnia* (*A Call From the Conscience*) August 1989. This issue includes an editorial by Ihor Iakovsky where he writes, "Our Memorial has as its aim to revive in the people a feeling of national respect and community power, a feeling that is based upon the knowledge that the responsibility of the Ukrainian people for their economic and cultural development is their own, and that is based upon the knowledge that we, after all, are the masters of this land and are responsible for everything that happens to, with and upon it." It continues, "But Memorial is also a specific organization which has been called upon to achieve historical justice in connection with those who suffered, were lost or fell during both World Wars, during the Stalinist terror and time of neo-Stalinism, to show them respect with monuments." The editorial announced that it would establish contacts with Ukrainians living abroad, where Memorial societies should also be formed to research historical truth and analyze the causes that led to the birth of Stalinism, to support the *Rukh* and to call upon all citizens to "respect the graves of their ancestors, without regard for their party affiliation and their politics or military activity."

This issue publishes the resolutions of the Lviv *oblast* Memorial conference, which calls for the naming of all Stalinist criminals, the revealing of the victims of repression, the publication of Ukrainian history books, the abolishment of legislation that forbids unofficial activities, the rehabilitation of all those sentenced in the Brezhnev era, the legalization of the *samizdat* literary almanac *Ievshan Zillia* and others. Other information chronicles the activities of Memorial, including meetings held at the graves of the *Sichovi Striltsi*. The names of those active in the various sections are listed, including V. Chornovil (Committee on Repression) and M. Batih, editor of *Leninska molod* (joint head of the governing body). This issue ends with information about repression of cultural activists in the Stalin era and a KGB raid on an illegal *Plast* (Ukrainian scout) camp in late July 1989 in the Carpathians.

Two issues of *Dzvin* (*Bell*), the organ of the Ternopil *oblast* Memorial society, have reached the West. The first issue is dated July 1989 and includes

an editorial, "How we were Formed," an article "Democratization or neo-Stalinism?" and a chronicle of their activities and resolutions. The first page outlines the main aims of the Society: the naming of all victims of Stalinist and Brezhnevite repression and their rehabilitation; the naming of all those guilty in conducting these repressions and their punishment; historical truth about the unlawful historical methods used; the opening of a Memorial building; the development of a law-based consciousness among citzens; the struggle against unlawfulness yesterday, today and always.

The formation of the Ternopil *oblast* Memorial began after 15 April, and was disrupted by the authorities on every occasion. A discussion surrounding a secret Communist party circular sent to all party organizations detailing how to struggle against the *Rukh* and Memorial in Ternopil *oblast* then follows. This circular has as its aims, "to denounce, compromise and disinform" about these groups.

This issue also describes work done in early May on the village of Antonovets, Shumsky region which was destroyed in 1951–52 and has since not appeared on any map. The alleged excuse was that the village was a haven for Ukrainian nationalist partisans. The villagers were deported to Eastern Ukraine, others were heavily fined for returning. The village was later destroyed, leaving no trace. Ternopil oblast Memorial passed resolutions demanding the rehabilitation of the village, its placement back on geographic maps, the material and moral compensation of those who were deported or killed, the placing on trial of those who ordered its destruction.

Dated August 1989, the second issue has on the front page the Ukrainian national anthem "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina" (Ukraine has not yet perished), as well as the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. Included with these protocols is a note that states that, according to international law, people living in occupied territories do not have to serve in the occupation army. The newsletter then goes on to discuss the informal student society *Vertep* which has taken upon itself the responsbility of looking after the graves of those who were murdered during the Stalin erra, as well as the *Sichovi Striltsi*. Communist party members were not interested, we are told, in helping in this work. The *Vertep* Society also agreed to hold requiem services.

The speech given at a requiem service on 30 July 1989 attended by 80,000 people is reprinted. One member of the *Rukh* talked about the uprising in 1918 against the Poles and the declaration of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, followed by the reunification of Ukrainian lands in January 1919. Another talked about the events of 1939–1941 (the occupation of Western Ukraine by Soviet forces), criticizing the Communist party for claiming that Ukraine had "never" been independent. The true date when Ukraine was reunited was 22 January 1919, and this date, in their view, should become a national holday—in the same manner as national independence days have become official holidays in the Baltic republics. At this requiem service 14 priest officiated, with guests from Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne. The speeches described the murder of political prisoners in 1941 as the NKVD retreated.

Eyewitnesses verified the accounts. There were calls to the Soviet authorities to: rehabilitate all those murdered, with their property returned and full pension rights; release all political prisoners from prisons and psychiatric hospitals; to place Lazar Kaganovych on trial; to halt repression against the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and *Rukh*; to halt discrimination against the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox churches, granting them equality with the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine. One speech ended with the words, "Millions of our brothers and sisters were murdered, destroyed and the criminals that did this are today still living in freedom, receiving pensions and other privileges. I would like to demand on behalf of myself that if the KGB cannot bring these criminals to justice, we should appeal to the government to liquidate the KGB!" This was greeted with the words "Slava!"

Club of Deputies

Kievan members of the Congress of People's Deputies, supporters of Boris Ieltsyn's Inter-Regional Group, have started publishing their own information bulletin. The deputies, strong supporters of the *Rukh*, are hostile to the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). The newsletter is published in both Ukrainian and Russian bi-weekly issues in the Baltic republics. The first issue of *Holos* (*Voice*), dated August 1989, bears the large slogan, "No! To the anti-democratic law on the elections!" The first article is entitled, "Elections in Ukraine: Do we have a future?" and looks at the forthcoming local and republican elections. It is a statement from a collective body representing the unofficial clubs. "Who will be the authors (of the new law)," asks the statement, "the *apparat* or the people?" The statement is signed by *Hromada*, *Spadshchyna*, *Nebaiduzhi*, Neosphere, *Zelenyi Svit*, Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and Ukrainian Association in Defence of the Historical Community (UAZIS). The statement calls for a republican referendum to decide on the new laws, and puts forward the following suggestions: one person one vote, with no representation of official organizations; direct proportional elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet; direct elections for the president of the republic; voting on an alternative basis (more candidates than places).

"I sign" is an article by a member of the Congress of People's Deputies, V. Hrishchuk. It is about the forthcoming elections to republican and local soviets. In particular, Hrishchuk looks at the election law which is, at the moment, in its draft stages. The author's conclusion is that in Ukraine a law is being drafted which will give the Communist party, rather than the people, the right to form soviets. The full text of academician Andrei Sakharov's speech at the Congress of People's Deputies follows. There is also news that a Club of Deputies has begun meeting in Kiev. The first meetings were held on 20 May and 18 June where commissions were established dealing with ecology, economy and information. The commission will have two tasks: to work on the drafting of legalization, and on the organization of a forum entitled "*Dialoh*" to which will belong representatives from the Communist party, government, ministers and informal organizations. "Why did the Ukrainian delegation stay silent?" focuses upon the Ukrainian contingent of deputies and their

performance at the Congress of People's Deputies. In answer to the question, "Do the Ukrainian deputies reflect the opinions of the Ukrainian people?" the author replies, "It is difficult to give a firm reply, but among 10 leaders of official organizations (not including the Communist party and Komsomol) not one dared to stand in electoral districts."

The second issue of *Holos* contains an open letter from Ukrainian members of the Congress to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the forthcoming republican elections. The letter puts forward the five demands made by Ukrainian deputies elsewhere. At a recently held meeting on 12 August of Ukrainian deputies in Kiev to discuss the new draft law on elections, the Ukrainian Deputies' Club adopted a series of resolutions. According to the resolutions a commission is to be formed to formulate an alternative draft law, which will be published in the republican press. It was also decided to call on citizens of Ukraine to attend a large scale meeting on 2 September 1989 (40,000 people attended this meeting in Kiev).

"Democracy and the Sovereignty of the Apparat" is the title of the next article which deals with the forthcoming elections. "Goodbye Masyk, Greetings to Konstantyn Ivanovych" concerns the resignation of Masyk as Kiev's mayor. "Why does the Parliament Need Groups" advocates the establishment of parliamentary groupings that would represent a broader section of the population. These groups, claims the article, would have the right to be registered and would have close links with enterprises and establishments. The program of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies is published. It believes that the central issue of *perestroika* is the economy and proposes a series of suggestions towards economic reform. In the political field it proposes to legalize the right of workers to strike and to form their own public, socio-political and professional organizations. The group purposes other changes in the sphere of electoral and judicial reform.

Spadshchyna

The first issue of a new *samizdat* "almanac of Ukrainian studies" entitled *Chasopys* (*Newspaper*), published by the unofficial *Spadshchyna* (Heritage) Society in Kiev, with 238 pages, has appeared. The issue was published in March and begins with a "Word to Readers" which states that it is an "independent publication" and an "academic-publicist" journal. Most of the material will be that of members of *Spadshchyna* and will include documents of the club, scientific/academic works, publicistic writings, critiques and bibliographies, a chronicle of activity of the Club. The editorial states:

> The almanac of *Spadshchyna* is an independent publication. Decades of human rights violations have taught us to fear this "terrible" combination of words. During the years of so-called "deformed socialism" when there was a tendency to "compare the pen to a bayonet," independent publishing was regarded as a crime. Writers were accused of terrorism for their writings. It was considered madness or hostile propaganda to quote the freedom of speech as guarantied by the

constitution. *Perestroika* and the attempt at creating a lawful state have put an end to these shameful traditions and have made possible the realization of constitutional rights for citizens. We regard the emergence of this publication as our right to freedom of speech which is guarantied by the Ukrainian constitution (article 48). Lies have never helped to achieve important objectives; on the contrary the spirit of free academic, publicistic and artistic search, which, we hope, will become the spirit of our publication will be conducive to the progress of the Ukrainian people. Under the weight of the massive bureaucratic apparatus, we, Ukrainian intellectuals have forgotten the meaning of the integrity of the national culture and the meaning of a biospheric approach to its study and development. We were brought up as physicists or historians, biologists or philosophers, doctors or engineers and many of us were happy with the bureaucratic "geography" of a single bioshpere! How we forgot that an intellectual is the one who is aware of national culture as one whole!

The aims of the Club are outlined in the introduction and include: the raising of the intellectual, general cultural level of members; an inculcation of respect to one's history, heritage and culture; the expansion of the use of Ukrainian language. The work of the Club will include lectures, discussions, meetings with academics, community activists, state and Communist party leaders, particpation in efforts to restore monuments and meetings with members of unofficial organizations. The next item is a letter to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet dealing with draft changes to the republican constitution. Oleksandr Kovalenko writes about Lithuanian-Ukrainian relations in the fourteenth century and Oleksa Shpot writes about "The first bourgeois revolution in Ukraine" (the revolt of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the seventeenth century). M. Holiarchuk deals with the question of the Ukrainian language in scientific works and Ukrainian languages use in the Academy of Sciences. There is an article by Mykola Bohdanov on the Polish Catholic church in Kiev. The next section includes poetry by Oleksandr Radzivill, Iurko Kocherzhinsky, a short piece in memory of Vasyl Stus and a poem by Iurii Haryliuk in memory of Volodymyr Ivasiuk (a composer murdered by the KGB in 1979).

A chronicle of *Spadshchyna* activities throw light upon various aspects of their work. This includes an expedition entitled "Dneister—88" which highlights the ecological damage done to that river, an evening devoted to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ukraine's foremost historian, and a reprint of an article from *Kievskyi Universytet* (16 and 23 December 1988) dealing with unofficial groups.

Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring (*Rukh*)

Since July 1989 the *Rukh* has begun to publish numerous bulletins and newspapers throughout Ukraine. The daily party newspaper *Radianska Ukraina* (20 August, 1989) critically surveyed some of these publications. The inaugural congress of the *Rukh* in Kiev (8–10 September) was promised that it

would be allowed its own weekly newspaper *Narodna Hazeta* (People's Newspaper). The following are known about in the West:

Kiev *Rukh*

In the Kiev region there are 4 *Rukh* publications: *Perspektyva* (*Perspective*), *Dosvitni Vohni* (*Lights of Dawn*), *Visnyk Rukhu* (*Rukh Herald*), *Vilne Slovo* (*Free Word*), and *Vybir* (*Choice*).

The first issue of *Perspektyva* appeared dated June–September, no. 1, and is the organ of the *Initsiatyvnyi Informatsiinyi Tsentr* (Initiative Information Center) in Kiev. The information center is that of the *Rukh*, which believes that freedom of speech is an inalienable right and each citizen has the right to free access to uncensored information. Although published by the *Rukh*, *Perspektyva* is autonomous. It is meant to include documents, testimonies, appeals, material about other groups, all with minimal commentary. *Perspektyva* believes it has the right to criticize anybody, including leaders of *Rukh*, and will publish critical remarks from readers also. The Initiative Information Center, besides undertaking publishing work, will also deal with requests from unofficial groups, including giving them access to printing and other facilities.

Dosvitni Vohni is a new bulletin of the *Rukh* for Kiev *oblast*, the first issue of which is dated September 1989. The front cover has a *tryzub* (trident) and Ukrainian national flag next to the title. On the first page the poem by Lesia Ukrainka with the same title as the newsletter is published. The open letter by Ukrainian (pro-*Rukh*) deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet calling for a change in the draft election law appears. Page two includes a discussion of the events on 29 July (hunger strikes in defense of national symbols) and 13 August (*Rukh* protest at militia action on the previous occasion). The Kiev regional *Rukh* organization's co-ordinating council appeal in the form of an open letter to newspapers and the Communist party of Ukraine is included. The letter welcomes the new level of citizens' activity and particpation in the political life of the republic, but calls upon the authorities to give up confrontation in favor of dialogue. They propose that a place be set aside in central Kiev to supply information about the *Rukh* and other informal groups, to freely hold discussions, meetings and to collect petitions. They also propose that official newspapers objectively report on the *Rukh*, that television and radio organize round-table discussions with Communist party members, the *Rukh* and other informal groups.

Visnyk Rukhu begins with the following editorial, "Dear Friends, today you will read for the first time *Visnyk Rukhu*. You will not be able to buy our paper in a kiosk, nor will the postman deliver it to you. You will not hear about it in the press or radio." The editors state that because of regular attacks in the press against the *Rukh*, they felt they needed a vehicle to reply. Besides being a forum for *Rukh* it is also jointly prepared by Memorial and *Spadshchyna* members.

The first issue gives the reasons for the need to form a Popular Front in Ukraine, in particular the awakening of ecological concern after Chornobyl. A diary of informal activity from 13 Ukrainian cities reveals just how widespread this now is. Ivan Drach, poet and head of *Rukh*, has contributed an article

where he disputes the claim made that the majority of letters sent to the press were hostile to *Rukh*. An article, "Our Flag" supports Ukrainian national symbols. "About the Sovereignty of Ukraine" deals with a very active branch of *Rukh* at Kiev university which held a meeting on May 17 that passed a resolution that the "USSR should become a union of sovereign states, united on the basis of a union agreement." V. Cherniak, a leading deputy and radical, condemns the recent session of the People's Congress for not abolishing the clause on the "leading role of the party," because the party should be subordinated to the soviets. He is also critical of the lack of any statute for the Congress or Supreme Soviet.

From no. 2 the name changed to *Vilne Slovo*. This issue highlights the problem of critical articles in the press which are slanderous and distort the facts. A chronicle of recent activities is given, as well as information about the inaugural congress of the Kiev *oblast Rukh* where 442 delegates from 200 centers around Kiev attended. Ivan Drach again contributes an article which outlines the aims and objectives of the *Rukh* and the problems it is encountering from the authorities. Dmytro Pavlychko, head of the Ukrainian Language Society, discusses different concepts of *perestroika*, the Communist party view and the reality. Dmytro Poezd, a former militia officer, has contributed an article on the Communist party system. "The point is, that the party has usurped power, and by doing so is not giving the soviets real power," he says. Sovereignty, he believes, is only possible through deep democratization of society. "The militia should only be used against criminals!—not for political matters," and advocates the establishment of a "people's security force" that would police demonstrations. This issue contains an announcement that an "Association for the Unemployed" has been formed, which is intended for those who have been thrown out of work and need to fight for compensation.

Vybir is the name of the very active *Rukh* branch newsletter at Kiev univeristy, which can be seen by the fact it began publication as early as April 1989. Not all issues have reached the West. Issue no. 2 opens with an introduction about the anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster followed by a "Statement to all Citizens of Ukraine." This details discrimination against ethnic minorities living in Ukraine. Number 5 includes an article about Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, in honor of whom a requiem service was to be held on May 22, but received a hostile reception from the authorities. A short chronology of events in Lviv in the run-up to the elections follows, together with resolutions from a pre-elected rally. This issue ends with a *samizdat* article by Ievhen Sverstiuk and M. Kotsiubynska about Vasyl Stus.

Issue no. 7 includes condemnations of the Tbilisi and Peking massacres, with quotes from eye-witnesses. Other texts are the platform of the *Rukh*, Andrei Sakharov's speech to the Congress of People's Deputies and an interview with a newly elected deputy, V. Hryshchuk, where he discusses the results of the Congress.

Dniproderzhynsk *Rukh*

The first issue of *Rukh* from Dniproderzhynsk has reached the West. It contains a resume of *Rukh* activities and the reasons for forming the *Rukh* in

Dniproderzhynsk. The first issue also has material on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and a long article about Ukrainian national symbols.

Lviv *Rukh*

The Lviv *oblast Rukh* organization publishes *Viche* (a historical Ukrainian institution, a public assembly). The first issue provides information about the founding congress of Lviv *oblast Rukh* on 7 May, and publishes the resolutions. "Persecution of *Rukh* Members "is a short article about harassment of *Rukh* members by the authorities. Concern is expressed in in an article about false rumors circulated by the authorities that Ukrainians are preparing pogroms against Jews, Russians and Poles. "Does Culture Serve the People?" analyzes the development of Ukrainian culture since Stalin, with emphasis upon language instruction in schools and higher education.

Issue no. 2 of *Viche* includes an article "Where is the New Thinking?" which refers to recent negative speeches given by Communist party officials about member of the Ukrainian Language Society, who are called "extremist elements." There is also a discussion of the benefits of economic and political sovereignty for Ukraine, a discussion on a film about the Lviv Museum of Art (founded by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky), the new Jewish Cultural Society in Ivano-Frankivsk, followed by an excerpt from an article on the illegal Ukrainian Catholic church.

Issue no. 3 of *Viche* opens with an appeal to the citizens of Ukraine, setting out the aims and objectives of *Rukh*, growing concern for the state of the environment with strong criticism of the Ministry of Health. A letter from a group of workers demands to know whether a new factory is going to be ecologically harmful. "A Requiem Service in Tustanovychi" details the atrocities committed by the NKVD in 1941 in Boryslav, where the victims had been brutally tortured before being killed. "First Lesson" deals with the strike by the Donbas miners, followed by news of Volodymyr Mokry's victory in the elections in Poland. Mokry, a Ukrainian, was running on the Solidarity ticket.

Ivano-Frankivsk *Rukh*

Halychyna is the organ of the Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast Rukh* organization, the first issue of which has just appeared. The editorial entitled "Raise the Flag!" discusses the advent of a new uncensored publication in the Stanislav (the former name for Ivano-Frankivsk) region, the activity of the *Rukh* and its aims. Page 2 follows with a declaration by the Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast Rukh* which outlines the aims and objectives in the political, economic, ecological, cultural and general fields. Resolutions adopted at the inaugural congress of the Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast Rukh* are given. The list of 30 members of the executive council are provided, who include members of Memorial, the *Dzvin* Society, *Vidrodzhennia* Society, Ukrainian Language Society, the *Rukh* Society, *Prosvita* Society and others.

The issue of *Halychyna* ends with a discussion of the draft election law and a satirical selection of quotations from a collection of articles published in 1978 by Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the former unpopular head of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Chernivtsi *Rukh*

Bukovynsky Visnyk (*Bukovynian Herald*) is the organ of the Bukovyna *oblast Rukh* which is published in Chernivtsi and no. 1 is dated August 1989. The editors warn their readers that, for the time being at least, they cannot buy copies in kiosks, but hope this will shortly change. Because the newspapers have closed their doors to the *Rukh* it has had to begin publication of *samizdat* publications. A statement by supporters of the *Rukh* in Bukovyna adopted at the inaugural *oblast* congress on 19 July appears together with an appeal to the nation by leading Ukrainian writers and deputies calling upon them to support the *Rukh*. Both local newspapers, *Radianska Bukovyna* (*Soviet Bukovyna*) and *Molodyi Bukovynets* (*Young Bukovynian*) refused to publish the appeal. One article discusses the question "Are we for socialism—members of the *Rukh*?" The author answers that they are not opposed to socialism, but believe that Soviet socialism should be reformed to ensure a democratic frame. Another article deals with Ukrainian national symbols and the music and words of Ukraine's national hymn ("Ukraine has not yet perished...") are published.

Sub-Carpathian oblast *Rukh*

The first issue of *Holos Karpat* (*Voice of the Carpathians*) is dated June 1989 and provides an account of *Rukh* activities in Lviv *oblast*. Other information includes an article on the battle of Berestechko in Volhnia where Cossacks perished in battle against the Poles (commemorated this year for the first time). At this commemoration placards read "Glory to the Cossack Heroes" and "Take your hand away from the temple of the Ukrainian nation." Another article details the long running campaign to build a monument to Shevchenko in central Sambir, followed by a description of Ukrainian national symbols. Finally there is information detailing the authorities deliberate ruining of graves of Ukrainian soldiers who died for Ukrainian independence.

The second issue calls upon people to join the *Rukh*, first of all by establishing discussion groups at their place of work. This is followed by a report on the Kiev regional conference of the *Rukh* in early July. "Achilles Heel" discusses the economic situation in the USSR, and the author believes that Ukraine's future can only be guarantied if the republic becomes an equal partner in the international market. Information is provided about the revival of the Ukrainian Catholic church, in particular in Sambir. A long article outlines the nationality question and how it is not understood by Russians. Issue no. 3 of *Holos Karpat* opens with an article about the miners strike, and informs us that on 26 July representatives from strike committees in Chervonohrad attended the Lviv *Rukh* meeting. The strikers were frightened at what they had created, and many wanted to distance themselves from politics. The authorities deliberately circulated a rumor that two military units were stationed nearby to deal with the strikers, while the leader of the strike committee had experienced an assassination attempt. The article discusses the lack of *perestroika* within trade unions, and the trade unions' attitude during the recent strikes, and the contempt the workers have for them. Two recent gatherings are also described, one in honor of the *Sichovi Striltsi* and another for the "Victims of Stalinism."

Issue no. 4 bears an illustration of two people shaking hands, one is a Communist, the other a Nazi, and leads with an article about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The new draft electoral law is discussed, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is published at the end.

Kharkiv *Rukh*

The first 2 issues of *Na Spolokh* (*Alarm*) appeared in Kharkiv in August, but no copies have yet reached the West.

Odessa *Rukh*

In Odessa the Democratic Union to Further *Perestroika* was organized in the summer of 1988, prior to the *Rukh*, and it publishes a bulletin in Russian entitled *Tochka Zreniia* (*Point of View*).

Sumy oblast *Rukh*

Initsiatyva (*Initiative*) is published by the *Rukh* in the town of Shostynsky.

CONCLUSION

The process of *glasnost* and democratization in Ukraine, although less advanced than in the Baltic republics and Russia, has nevertheless been accompanied by the growth of numerous unofficial and semi-official groups, whose combined numbers amount to upwards of half a million individuals, as well as numerous uncensored publications, some of which are printed in large numbers either in Ukraine or illegally in the Baltic republics. The number of publications and groups has far out-stripped those that existed in the Brezhnev era. The two key cities remain Kiev and Lviv. Many new initiatives have spread eastwards after originating in Western Ukraine (the *Rukh*, Ukrainian Language Society and UHU are examples of this). In Western Ukraine, in particular in the capital city Lviv, public discontent and dissent exists in a more open form. *Samizdat* publications are openly sold on the streets, Ukrainian national flags are flown, newly-wed couples no longer go to the Lenin monument but to the Taras Shevchenko statue, while Ukrainian Catholic parishes (technically illegal) are openly functioning. The situation in this region of Ukraine has, by all accounts, developed so far under the control of the authorities, who seem reluctant to use heavy-handed tactics after the outcry over the Tbilisi massacres in April. Now the authorities are considering co-operating with stewards provided by demonstrations to keep order and prevent provocations.

Many of the unofficial groups, such as the UHU , UPDL, and UCDF, have pretensions to eventually become opposition political parties. Time, they believe, is on their side, since Shcherbytsky has now been removed from office.[86] The growth of unofficial and semi-official groups is likely to escalate, especially the *Rukh*, and with it the increased politicization of the population. The prospect of a legalized Ukrainian Catholic church is also likely to heighten Ukrainian national consciousness, while the strike committees left behind by the wave of miners' strikes could become the kernels for the birth of a free Solidarity-type trade union movement which is unlikely to limit itself solely to socio-economic demands.

ENDNOTES

[1] On the election results in Ukraine see K. Mihailisko, "Ukrainian Party Takes Stock after Election Defeats," *Report on the USSR*, no. 25 (1989). For background information see T. Kuzio, "The Ukraine Under Gorbachev," *Soviet Analyst*, 19 April 1989 and "Ukraine Unrest Grows," *The Times*, 17 July 1989; B. Keller, "Ukrainian Intellectuals Lead Challenge to Communism," *The New York Times*, 9 March 1989; H. Panchuk, "Ukraine in the Year 1988," *Smoloskyp* (spring 1989): 3–10; D. Remnick, "Ukrainian Nationalism Stirring Anew in Soviet colony," *The Washington Post*, 22 January 1989; X. Smiley, "Real Socialism demanded. Nationalist Assault Look Likely to Topple Ukraine 'Mafia' Boss," *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 March 1989.

[2] Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 98. See also S. Handelman, "Ukraine: A Sleeping Giant Stirs," *The Toronto Star*, 12 March 1989; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Why Gorbachev Must Fear the Ukraine," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 1988; P. Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev Tests Reform in Ukraine," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 1989; D. Remnick, "Gorbachev Warns Ukraine Not to Press Nationalism," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 1989; R. Solchanyk, "Sign of Red Storm Rising in the Ukraine," *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 May 1989.

[3] See *Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group* (Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1985) and *The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Five Years of Struggle in Defense of Rights* (Ellicott City: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1981). The article by V. Haynes, "Postmortem of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 102–113 provides a summary of the activities of the UHG and reviews the various books published about them in the West.

[4] J. Bilocerkowyz, *Soviet Ukrainian Dissent. A Study of Political Alienation* (London: Westview Press, 1988), 81.

[5] T. Kuzio, ed., *Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev: A Collection of Samizdat Documents* (London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1989), 6.

[6] While V. Chornovil was editor of the *Ukrainian Herald* between 1970–1972, 6 issues appeared. After the arrest of Chornovil in 1972 no. 7–8 (spring 1974) appeared edited by Maksym Sahaidak, the pseudonym of Stepan Khmara, reflecting a more nationalistic position after the pogrom of Ukrainian dissent in 1972. The relaunched *Ukrainian Herald* in 1987, with Chornovil resuming his position as editor, has therefore chosen to begin again from no. 7.

[7] Eight issues of the *Ukrainian Herald* have appeared in Ukraine (7, 8, 9–10, 11–12 and 13–14), although only no. 7–10 have been republished in the West by Suchasnist publishers and from no. 8 by the external representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, New York.

[8] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 27 March 1988 and *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 63 (1988).

[9] The Declaration of Principles is translated in T. Kuzio, ed., *Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev* (London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1989), 24. See also *Suchasnist* (December 1988): 92–99 and *Russkaia mysl*, 19 August 1989. Interviewed in *Ogonek*, no. 31 (1989) Andrei Sakharov stated that the USSR ought to be transformed into a "confederation" in the short term, a proposal similar to that advanced by the UHU. See the reply to Sakharov's idea by Iu. Bromley in *Pravda*, 7 August 1989, where he states that "confederation would be a regression" on the present federation.

[10] See the interview with Bohdan Horyn, "Chcemy byc niezawislym panstwem," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 July 1989.

[11] The documents of the press service of the UHU appear regularly in Ukrainian émigré newspapers such as *Ukrainske slovo* (Paris).

[12] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 December 1988.

[13] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press releases no. 184 and 185 (1988).

[14] T. Kuzio, ed., *Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev*, 38–39. See also Irena Maryniak, "Oles Shevchenko et al in the Botanical Gardens," *Index on Censorship* (May/June 1989): 32–35.

[15] B. Nahaylo, "10,000 Attend Unofficial Human-Rights Gathering in Lvov," *Report on the USSR*, no. 1 (1989).

[16] The majority of these publications are cited by the Ukrainian Press Agency, London, and the Ukrainian service of Radio Liberty, who both hold copies of them in their archives.

[17] See B. Nahaylo, "Representatives of Non-Russian National-Democratic Movement Hold Another Meeting," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 465/88 and B. Nahaylo, "Non-Russian National-Democrats Adopt Charter and Issue Appeal to the Russian Intelligentsia," *Report on the USSR*, no. 8 (1989).

[18] See T. Kuzio, "Nationalist Ferment in Western Ukraine," *Soviet Analyst*, 3 August 1988; R. Solchanyk, "Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika Formed in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 324/88 and R. Solchanyk, "Lvov Authorities Begin Criminal Proceedings Against Ukrainian Activists," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 327/88.

[19] *Ukrainske Slovo*, 8–15 January 1989; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release of 6 July 1989 and *Radianska Ukraina*, 5 July 1989.

[20] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 January 1989; *Ukrainske Slovo*, 23 April 1989; S. Cornwell, "Crusading Journalist Beats Communist Bosses in Ukraine Election," *The Independent*, 28 March 1989; Q. Peel, "Too-good-to-be True Milkmaids Fight for the Ukraine Vote," *The Financial Times*, 3 March 1989.

[21] See *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 63 (1989).

[22] See *Obizhnyk* no. 7, 4 June 1989 of the all-Ukrainian Co-ordinating Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

[23] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release dated 6 July 1989.

[24] See Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *Religion in Communist Lands*, 11(3) (1983): 264–279.

[25] *Ukrainian Press Service*, March 1988 *Khrystianskyi holos* is being reprinted by the Ukrainian Press Service, Rome, in Ukrainian. Extracts from each issue of the journal appear regularly in the monthly *Visti z Rymu*.

[26] See V. Shevelyov, "The Inertia of Simplification," *Moscow News*, no. 37 (1987); F. Barringer, "Ukrainian Miracle Perplexes Communists," *The International Herald Tribune*, 16 October 1987; *Zhovten*, no. 2 (1989) and *Liudyna i Svit*, no. 9 (1987).

[27] The English-language monthly bulletin *Ukrainian Press Service* of the Archeparchy of Lviv (Temporary See in Rome) as well as the Press Bureau of the Ukrainian Catholic Synod, Rome, publishes these documents regularly. See also T. Kuzio, ed., *Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev*, 40–49; the unpublished paper by Bohdan Bociurkiw,

"Gorbachev's Religious and Nationality Policies in Ukraine"; X. Smiley, "Ukraine Bishops Open Approach Tests Glasnost," *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 December 1987 and L. J. Wollemberg," John Paul II and Ukrainian Catholics," *Freedom at Issue* (May–June 1988): 28–30.

[28] See release of the Ukrainian Catholic Synod, Rome, dated 26 June 1989 and *Literaturna Ukraina*, 29 June 1989. One author writing in the official newspaper *Molodyi zhurnalist* of Kiev University, May 1989, argued that the Ukrainian Catholic Church should be legalized.

[29] Press Bureau of the Ukrainian Catholic Synod, Rome, release dated 22 June 1989 and *Keston News Service*, 6 July 1989.

[30] Information received by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone from Ukraine.

[31] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 27 (1989); B. Nahaylo, "Individual Group for Restoration of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Founded," *Report on the USSR*, no. 9 (1989).

[32] *Radianska Ukraina*, 9 May 1989; *Keston News Service*, no. 329, 6 July 1989, reported that a Ukrainian Orthodox parish had been refused registration in Kiev which has 200 faithful.

[33] *Ukrainian Press agency*, press release no. 23 (1987). See also B. Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia Formed," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 489/1987.

[34] *Shliakh peremohy* (Munich) 12 March 1989.

[35] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, no. 35 (1989). *Kafedra* is being republished in the West by the external representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and Smoloskyp publishers. *Karby hir and Ievshan zillia* are due to be republished by Suchasnist publishers.

[36] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 32 and 33 (1987).

[37] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 50 (1989).

[38] *USSR News Brief*, no. 17/18 (1987).

[39] B. Nahaylo, "Informal Ukrainian Culturological Club Helps to Break New Ground for Glasnost," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 57/88. See also *USSR News Brief*, no. 19/20 (1987). On Serhei Naboka see A. Brown, "Dissident's Route to Faith on the Bleak Streets of Kiev," *The Independent*, 11 June 1988.

[40] See *Ukrainske slovo*, 27 March 1988; *Russkaia mysl*, 27 May 1988; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 29 and 74 (1987) and 25 and 26 (1988).

[41] See B. Nahaylo, "'Informal' Ukrainian Culturological Club Under Attack," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 477/87; *Vechirnii Kiev*, 19 October 1987, 14 November 1987, 2 December 1987 and 26 May 1988; *Russkaia mysl*, 30 October 1987; *Radianska Ukraina*, 12–13 May 1988.

[42] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 73 and 80; *Associated Press*, 27 April 1988; *Ukrainske slovo*, 19 June 1988; *News From Ukraine*, no. 21 (1988) and R. Solchanyk, "Soviet Press Reports on Antinuclear Demonstration in Kiev," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 249/88.

[43] Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 67 (1988); *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 May 1988. The unofficial millennium celebrations were reported in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 June 1988; *Ukrainske slovo*, 26 June 1988, *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 95 (1988) and "Ukrainians Stage Protest," *The Independent*, 6 June 1988.

[44] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 16 (1989).

[45] The Ukrainian Press Agency has copies of no. 3 and 4 of *Dzvin*.

[46] See my unpublished paper "Dissent and Opposition in Ukraine Under Gorbachev" prepared for the 8th annual conference of the Ukrainian Research Program at the University of Illinois, 19–24 June 1989.

[47] D. Marples, "Mass Demonstration in Kiev Focuses on Ecological Issues and Political Situation in Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 325/88.

[48] See *USSR New Brief*, no. 21 and 23, 1988. See also K. Mihailisko, "Report from Kiev University on Future of Students' Military Obligations," *Report on the USSR*, no. 4 (1989).

[49] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 173 (1988).

[50] See *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 17 (1989); and *Kievskyi universytet*, 15 April, 22 April, 27 May, 23 September, 2 December and 9 December 1988; *Molod Ukrainy*, 8 December 1988.

[51] *Kievskyi universytet*, 9 December 1988.

[52] Information received by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone from Kiev.

[53] *Ekspress-Khronika*, no. 8 (1987); Ukrainske slovo, 30 January 1988, P. Kane, "Protests in Ukraine," *Socialist Organizer*, 31 March 1988.

[54] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 2 (1988).

[55] *Den za Dnem* was published by *Radio Liberty Arkhiv Samizdata* 6122 and Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 5 (1988). The anti-Afghanistan occupation demonstrations were reported by the unofficial Warsaw-based *Przeglad Wiadomosci Agencyjnych*, no. 40 (1987); *USSR News Brief*, no. 19/20 and no. 24 (1987); and Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 21 and 34 (1987).

[56] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 72 (1988); and *East European Reporter*, 3(2): 68–69.

[57] The document was published in *Glasnost*, no. 12 (November 1987) and translated in *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 93 (1988).

[58] The document was published in *Doverie*, no. 3–4 and translated in Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 135 (1988).

[59] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 170 and 198 (1988).

[60] Ibid.

[61] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 101 (1988).

[62] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 18 (1989).

[63] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 9 (1989).

[64] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 187 (1988).

[65] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 10 and 11 (1989).

[66] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 56 (1989).

[67] Information received from Ukraine by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone.

[68] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press releases dated 26 and 31 July, 1989.

[69] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press releases dated 14 and 15, 1989.

[70] *USSR News Brief*, no. 22 (1988).

[71] *USSR News Brief*, no. 3 (1989).

[72] *USSR News Brief*, no. 11 (1989).

[73] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 53 (1989). *Russkaia mysl*, 21 April 1989.

[74] A copy of this program is held by the Ukrainian Press Agency and Radio Liberty.

[75] See *USSR News Brief*, no. 9/10 (1989). Vasyl Barliadianu's article will be translated and released by the Ukrainian Press Agency.

[76] These will be translated by the Ukrainian Press Agency.

[77] Information received from Ukraine by Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone.

[78] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 25 (1989). A full copy of their program in Ukrainian is held by the Ukrainian Press Agency, although it has not yet been published anywhere.

[79] Information received from Ukraine by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone.

[80] Information received from Ukraine by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone.

[81] *News from Ukraine*, no. 17 (1989).

[82] *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 87 (1989); B. Nahaylo, "Soviet Newspapers Reveal Existence of Underground Nationalist Youth Groups in Western Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 495/1987; *Kultura i Zhyttia*, 22 November 1987.

[83] *USSR News Brief*, no. 9/10 (1989).

[84] Information received from Ukraine by the Ukrainian Press Agency by telephone.

[85] For reviews of all these semi-official publications see Ukrainian Press Agency, Vol. 2, no. 8–9 (1989).

[86] On the removal of Shcherbytsky see *The Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Financial Times*, *The Times*, *The New York Times*, 29 September 1989, and *The Sunday Telegraph*, 1 October 1989.

TARAS KUZIO

Inaugural Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Front (Rukh) in Kiev

Between 8–10 September the inaugural congress of Ukraine's Popular Front—the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring, commonly referred to as the *Rukh*, was held in the conference hall of Kiev's Polytechnic. Of the 1158 delegates chosen from each *oblast* (region) *Rukh* branch, 1109 came to the congress, representing a total of 280,000 active members. Surrounding the congress each day were hundreds of supporters who listened on external microphones to the proceedings. Close by, but not interfering, were the black bereted riot police. Students and academics were warned that going to the congress would lead to "unforeseen consequences" for them.[1]

The crowds waiting outside held aloft numerous national flags. One taxi driver, at least, had refused to accept any fare for taking them there. "I so seldom hear the Ukrainian language in Kiev. I wish the congress the very best in its work," the taxi driver stated. The crowds sang nationalist songs from the 1917 revolutionary years. The congress, coming nearly a year later than those held in the three Baltic states, was a victory for the entire multitude of groups that have long opposed the rule of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the last remaining Brezhnevite associated in the Politburo, brought in by Moscow in 1972 to crush Ukrainian nationalism. Pavlo Movchan, a leading poet and *Rukh* activist, told the congress that they were witnessing the third revival this century: "The first was shot, the second repressed, the third still has no name. Let's already give it a name—the unrepressed. And let there be above it the slogan, 'Ukrainians throughout the world Let's unite together in the name of a free, sovereign Ukraine!'"

Preparations for the formation of the *Rukh* began in the autumn of 1988 and immediately received a hostile reception from the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), the conflict leading to M. Gorbachev making an unannounced trip to Ukraine in February, which was followed finally by the publication of the aims and objectives of the *Rukh* in *Literaturna Ukraina* (16 February 1989), the

weekly organ of the Writers' Union. Since then the CPU has launched a vicious campaign against the *Rukh*, as can be seen by two internal party documents from Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa, which were leaked, that instructed party agitators how to campaign against it. Members of the CPU were warned against joining the *Rukh*.

To many at the congress therefore, the call by L. Krawchuk, ideological secretary of the CPU (and the only member of the Central Committee who attended two out of three days of the meeting) for co-operation between the *Rukh* and reformers within the CPU was taken with a little scepticism. Attempting to play the role of a "liberal" he tried to claim that the CPU could not tell the press what it should and could not publish.

Nevertheless, despite a hostile CPU which slowed, but did not prevent the growth of the *Rukh*, within the space of seven months it had grown to encompass a large body of opinion, supported, on the one hand, by dissident groups such as the Helsinki Union and National Democratic League, and, on the other, by semi-official groups such as Green World, *Tovarystvo Lev*, Memorial and the Language Society. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia, the Writers' Union and other creative collectives, supported it.

This could be seen in the steady growth in *Rukh* publications from this summer, which were the subject of a critical survey in *Radianska Ukraina* (20 August 1989): *Vilne Slovo, Vybir* and *Dosvitni Vohni* in Kiev, *Na Spolokh* in Kharkiv, *Rukh* in Dniprodzherzhinsk, *Viche* in Lviv, *Bukovynskyi visnyk* in Chernivtsi, *Holos Karpat* in Sub-Carpathia, *Halychyna* in Ivano-Frankivsk, *Tochka Zreniia* in Odessa, *Initsiiatyva* in Shostynsky, Sumy in oblast and others[2]. In Kiev an 'Initiative Information Center' of the *Rukh* has opened which publishes the bulletin *Perspektyva*.

The central theme running throughout the whole congress was independence and sovereignty for Ukraine. The congress hall was festooned with numerous blue and yellow flags of the independent Ukrainian republic of 1917–1921, the national symbol (St. Volodymyr's trident) and it ended with the once banned national hymn ("Ukraine has not yet perished"). The Communist Ukrainian flag, hammer and sickle or "International" were nowhere to be found or heard. The two planned nightly processions were to St. Volodymyr's and Taras Shevchenko's statue—not to Lenin's. But this is not surprising as only 228 of the delegates were actually members of the CPU (less then 25 per cent)[3]. The Ukrainian members of B. Ieltsin's 'Inter-Regional Group' began publishing their own bi-weekly Ukrainian and Russian-language newsletter in August entitled *Holos*.

Accreditation was refused to *Pravda Ukrainy* correspondents ("Shcherbytsky's paper" as it was described by the miners), Ukrainian state television and to the Odessa delegation which was organized by the anti-Ukrainian local party leader. Anti-*Rukh* demonstrations were, as a consequence, organized in both Kharkiv and Odessa, two heavily Russified cities, and *Pravda Ukrainy* (9 September) attacked the congress and two guests from the West as "Banderite enemies of the Soviet state." This backfired as both Taras Hunczak, editor of *Suchasnist*, and Chrystia Freeland were invited to the podium to

address the congress. But, in the manner of campaigns in the 1930s, numerous telegrams were organized from Russified regions of the republic demanding that "enemies of the people" be punished.

Every unofficial group in Ukraine openly sold their bulletins, the numbers of which seemed to grow daily as in Poland after martial law. Song sheets with openly nationalistic songs, including the *Rukh* march (which calls people to join together for a "free sovereign Ukraine"), were handed out.

Although coverage of the congress was widespread in the Western press, with 40 journalists and television crews attending, sensationalist and incorrect reporting often happened. (*The Sunday Times*, 10 September, is probably the worst example). *The Independent* (9 September) claimed that only a "minority of out-and-out separatists" were included within the *Rukh*, while *The Guardian* on the same day reported that on the first day "no one called for the republic's secession from the Soviet Union." To support the claim that "separatists" only come from Western Ukraine, Levko Lukianenko, head of the Helsinki Union and sentenced to death in 1961 for demanding a referendum on independence, is described as coming from "Lviv." (He is actually from Chernihiv, in the northeast of Ukraine).[4]

On the first day of the congress Levko Lukianenko did call for Ukrainian independence, his speech receiving a standing ovation. "In actual fact Ukraine was fought over throughout her history. But, whereas the Mongols, Lithuanians and Poles took from our people our resources, Russia took, apart from material resources, our national spirit. All our most tragic years arise from the time when Ukraine was attached to Russia. She is our occupier," Lukianenko told the delegates. He called for article 6 of the Soviet constitution to be dropped, that is the leading role of the CPSU.

Attending the congress were national minority delegates, including 77 Russians, 9 Jews, 6 Poles, 6 Belorussians and 1 Ukrainian speaking North Korean. A Russian, Oleksandr Volkov, member of the Helsinki Union and *Rukh* in Ivano Frankivsk, who had recently been expelled from the CPU for "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," was noticeable for his radical views. Popular Fronts from the three Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia, Moscow, Leningrad, Armenia and Azerbaijan (the latter two on friendly terms) attended as guests. A delegate from Odessa, Ievhen Holoborodko, said that they could not allow an "Inter-Front" to be formed in Ukraine, which is "a reactionary movement that struggles in defense of Stalinism and Brezhnevism." Shandor Podo, a Hungarian from the Sub-Carpathian region, rejected any smears of "nationalism" for the *Rukh*, whilst the head of the Russian Society of Friends of Ukrainian Culture from Lviv stated that the Russian intelligentsia were opposed to the formation of any "Inter-Front," that Ukrainian should be the state language and that Ukrainians have the right to their own national symbols. Indeed, throughout the congress the major call from the floor was always "Unity!" (of different nationalities against the CPU).

Security at the congress was organized by a former militia officer, Dmytro Poezd, who organized numerous marshals with blue and yellow armbands to prevent provocations. Poezd called upon the militia to support the people—

not the party bureaucrats—and for the formation of people's self-defense teams[5]. The head of the Kiev militia, General Shapochka, actually sent greetings to the congress, while Colonel Viley Martirosian, a military commander from Western Ukraine and a deputy from Rivne, told the congress that he and other like-minded commanders had decided to take the side of the people if a military solution was proposed in Ukraine.

The congress was attended by the Miners' Strike Committees from the Donbas, a Russified industrial region in the southeast of Ukraine. Unlike the more radical and self confident delegations from Western Ukraine, whose posture and nationalist demands resembled those of the popular fronts in the Baltic republics, the miners, led by the young Petro Poberzhny, told the congress that they were in favor of the removal of Shcherbytsky, supported the *Rukh*, wanted the intelligentsia to come to the Donbas and educate them, supported Ukrainian to be the state language (although their language was Russian) and supported greater sovereignty (and even independence) for Ukraine. The head of the strike committee told the congress that the, "political consciousness of the miners had hardened since the strike...We will not allow a repeat of October 1964. The miners request further information about the activity of the *Rukh* which we warmly support. The miners believe that the organs of mass information should be objective, and believe that newspapers of the *Rukh* or national symbols should not be repressed."[6]

Their hostility towards the CPU was evident when the strikes broke out as they completely ignored the CPU and dealt directly with Moscow. In the Donbas, they stated, the Communist party has withered away since the strikes and their strike committees have taken over. The only source of conflict was surrounding Ukrainian national symbols, which were not adopted as those of the *Rukh* due to the insistence of the Donbas miners. The unification of the intelligentsia and workers in a "Solidarity-style" popular front, which received crucial advice from Solidarity delegates at the congress, must be Gorbachev's worst nightmare, as the attempt to restrict their demands to purely economic issues has obviously failed.[7] The miners stated they would join a general strike in November if the draft election law, drawn up by the CPU, was not changed.

Both Volodymyr Mokry, newly elected Ukrainian member of the Polish parliament for Solidarity, and Adam Michnik, editor of Solidarity's daily newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and member of parliament, addressed the congress. Giving greetings from Solidarity, Adam Michnik said that they were witnessing the end of the "totalitarian system, the end of Stalinist communism." He went on, "You Ukrainians and we Poles know full well the face of Great Russian chauvinism, which throughout the course of centuries suffocated our national cultures." Every nation has the right to independence, history and national symbols, Michnik said, ending his speech with the words, "Long live a democratic, equitable, free Ukraine!"

Anatolii Artemenko spoke on the youth question in Ukraine. He called for true pluralism and stated that he believed that today the komsomol had no right to any monopoly. Young people should unite in the new unofficial youth organizations, such as the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth. Most

delegates were concerned about the draft election laws for elections to the republican Supreme Soviet. If the voice of the people is not heard in the forthcoming elections, Serhei Koniev stated, then Ukraine would just remain a "reserve for dinosaurs" (a reference to Shcherbytsky). Like all the speakers, he called for Shcherbytsky's removal to a thunderous ovation (Some went further and demanded he be put on trial for Chornobyl).

Eighteen deputies from Ukraine who are supporters of the *Rukh* (of the 262 Ukrainian delegates 68 are *Rukh* supporters) sent an appeal to Gorbachev on the eve of the congress. They strongly criticized the spread of disinformation by the official press against the *Rukh* and unofficial groups, and the numerous provocations made to incite inter-ethnic hostility, the worsening political situation in the republic, the draft election laws. They stated that the "authority of higher government representatives in the republic has fallen to nil and is continuing to decline. The lack of faith is not only towards individual government representatives but also towards the current apparatus, and also towards the renewal of socialism." They, therefore, like numerous resolutions passed at factories, called for the removal of both Shcherbytsky and Valentyna Shevchenko, president of the Supreme Soviet. (A humorous moment at the congress occurred when photocopies of a photograph and article were distributed from a 1936 newspaper where V. Shevchenko praised Stalin!) Hryhorii Musiienko, a leading writer, talked about "social justice" in Ukraine which, he claimed, was a "fantasy." He concluded by stating that Marxist ideology was "bankrupt," the Communist party had lost "credibility" and is based not on popular will but on "bayonets." "Ukraine is one of the wealthiest countries in the world and should become independent," he ended. Volodymyr Cherniak stated that he believed that the main cause of the socio-economic crisis was the, "over-monopolization and over-centralization of all spheres of life," which required that the monopoly of government over life be removed. "Yes, pluralism is the way out of the crisis. We mean here economic, political and ideological pluralism," Cherniak went on. "Gorbachev is liberalizing an authoritarian system, whilst Ryzhkov is modernizing an administrative-command government system. Ministers are changed instead of the system of government being changed," stated Cherniak.

Mykhailo Braichevsky, a historian punished in the 1970s for a monograph about Russian-Ukrainian relations, talked of the way Soviet nationality policy had made Ukrainians into a nation with an "inferiority complex." He stated that the historically Kievan Rus' was formed on Ukrainian territory in the seventh–ninth centuries, not reaching Russia proper until the twelfth century. "Should Ukrainians therefore and not Russians be called the "elder brothers"? Why cannot a 50-million people Ukraine exist as a free state? Why cannot an independent Ukraine exist among the free states of the world?" Braichevsky ended.

The speech by Mykhailo Horyn, a leading dissident and activist of the Lviv *Rukh*, was often interrupted by applause and cries of "Slava." Criticizing totalitarian ideologies of both left and right he pointed to the alternatives enshrined within the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Agreement and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples. The road to national revival should be built upon years and decades of constructive work, "and not on an unexpected moment." Another leading Kiev-based dissident, Ievhen Sverstiuk, talked about the spiritual sources of national revival, and that we should teach our children the "Law of God" as the basis for mankind's existence. "Children close yesterdays textbooks. We apologize—they are full of deceit. Not upon class, but upon general human moral values did your grandfathers live by. They were right," Sverstiuk told the congress, which in no uncertain terms meant a rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The head of the illegal Ukrainian Catholic church, Bishop Vasylyk, also addressed the congress, which in one of its many resolutions stood for the legislation of both the Ukrainian Catholic church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church.

The congress elected the well-known writer Ivan Drach as head, with Serhii Koniev, from Dniprodzherdzhynsk, as his deputy. The head of the secretariat went to Mykhailo Horyn, reflecting the new alliance between unofficial groups and the nationally conscious intelligentsia. The authorities reluctantly agreed to allow publication of the *Rukh* newspaper—*Narodna Hazeta*—and for *Rukh* to have their own premises in Kiev. Apart from the numerous resolutions adopted at the congress, it also ratified a new program and statute. Nowhere in the program, in contrast to what was published in *Literaturna Ukraina*, is there any mention that the *Rukh* supports the "leading role of the Communist party," and indeed there was no discussion of this at the congress.

Introducing the program is a negative overview of the repression inflicted upon Ukrainians this century in the USSR. The *Rukh*, we are told, was launched to, "raise the activity of citizens," and its aims are: "the widening and deepening of the democratization process, *glasnost*, the complete renewal of society as the only way out of the crisis and to ensure a better future, a guarantee for the very existence of our nation." The program, a total of 27 pages, is divided into "General Points," "Society and the State," "Human Rights, National Rights," "Economics," "Social Justice," "Ecology," "The National Question," "Culture and Language," "Ethics," "Religion," "Health and Sport." The understanding of "democratization" by the *Rukh* and its program are undoubtedly in conflict with both the CPU and Gorbachev's who uphold the "leading role" of the Communist party in society. But no mention is made in the program of "republican military units," a demand raised by other popular fronts, which means, as one participant pointed out, that Ukraine will have nothing with which to defend her "sovereignty."

The congress, in the words of Mykola Horbal, a leading Helsinki Union member from Kiev, was "a forum where people felt themselves to be human beings, a nation, completely at one." The non-Ukrainian minorities, "understood that only when Ukraine will be sovereign, will Jews have their own schools and theatres, Russians will not feel themselves to be colonisers, but equal citizens. People understood this situation, and this is the greatest result of the congress. There is a new feeling of the need for unity, for common deeds," Horbal stated.

Vasyl Barliadianu, a Helsinki Union activist from Odessa, wrote that "Never had a similar gathering taken place in recent decades in Ukraine. How will the CPU react, especially in view of the important upcoming elections to the republican Supreme Soviet? After all, the *Rukh* is in the same dilemma as the other Popular Fronts in the non-Russian republics. Although it claims to be merely a "community-political organization," to all intents and purposes it is a "party." And this, as Barliadianu writes, "means that in Ukraine today we have two parties—the CPU and *Rukh*." The congress has also, Barliadianu believes, "divided the Ukrainian nation between the people and the party." The struggle would seem to be only beginning.

The response from both the CPU and Moscow did not take long in coming. *Pravda* (15 September) wrote that the congress was a "vocal orgy" of "anti-socialism." The atmosphere was one of, "extreme exaltation fuelled by anti-Soviet, anti-social speeches, which received an approving roar from the audience...Throughout the congress, the overwhelming majority of speeches from the rostrum followed the same lines—anti-CPSU and anti-socialist." On 16 September, less than six days after the congress ended, the CPU organized poorly attended "Inter Front" style rallies in both Kiev and Lviv by people who had been given a paid day-off from work. *Pravda* (17 September) reported approvingly on these rallies, believing that the congress had shown that, "extremist forces like the Ukrainian Helsinki Union are clearly gaining the upper hand in the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring. They are overtly seeking power, advocating the withdrawal of our republic from the USSR.[8]

ENDNOTES

[1] See Taras Kuzio, "The Ukraine Stirs," *Soviet Analyst*, 27 September 1989; *The Guardian*, 7 September 1989; *The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian* and *The Independent*, 9 September 1989, *The Independent*, 11 September 1989; *The Sunday Times, The International Herald* and *Tribune*, 12 September 1989.

[2] For more detailed description of these semi-official publications see previous article by Taras Kuzio, "Unofficial and Semi-Official ..."

[3] *Radianska Ukraina*, 20 August 1989. On the reaction of the Ukrainian Communist party leadership towards the *Rukh* see Roman Solchanyk, "Shcherbytsky Assails Popular Front and Helsinki Union," *Report on the USSR*, no. 23 (1989) and *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 67 (1989).

[4] See *The Guardian*, 7 September 1989; *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian*, 9 September 1989; *The Independent*, 11 September and 14 September 1989; *International Herald* and *Tribune*, 12 September 1989.

[5] *Radianska Ukraina*, 31 August 1989.

[6] *The Independent*, 14 September 1989 and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11, 12 and 14 September 1989.

[7] Ibid. Solidarity banners were displayed at the back of the congress hall.

[8] See also *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 19 September 1989.



DANYLO SHUMUK

A Commentary

I personally would not advise anybody to invest capital in the co-operatives of the USSR. Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* as a slogan has aroused the whole world but I personally am convinced that right now even Gorbachev does not know what will come of it. Gorbachev and his brigade blame Stalin and Brezhnev only for those things that suit them, but they are silent about their greatest crimes: the mass forced deportation of the nationally most conscious and activist Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians and their families to Siberia and Kazakhstan, and the mass migration of Russian chauvinists into these same republics. This the Gorbachev brigade accepts as a *status quo*, as if to say, that what is done is done and so let it be. But this is a terrible crime. The Gorbachev brigade also accepts as *status quo* the liquidation by Stalin of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox churches. Right now *perestroika* has run against the underwater reefs of the national question about which Gorbachev knew nothing because he believed the Communist party resolutions that stated that the national question in the USSR had been resolved a long time age by Stalin and Brezhnev.

8,000 attend a meeting organized by the Taras Shevchenko "Ridna Mova" (Native Language) Society. Lviv, 16 June 1988. In the same place, 7 July 1988, 20,000 gather to form the Ukrainian Popular Front.

Manifestation in support of *Rukh* (Ukrainian Popular Front) and Ivan Drach. Lviv, 19 May, 1989.

Ukrainian People's Democratic League rally in front of Taras Shevchenko monument. Kiev, 22 May 1989.

Demonstration, 6 May 1989, in Bykivnia, location of mass grave of victims of Stalin's Terror.

Inaugural congress of *Rukh* (Ukrainian Popular Front). Kiev, 8–10 September 1989.

Newly elected presidium of *Rukh* Congress. Kiev, 8–10 September, 1989.

Ivan Drach, poet and newly elected head of *Rukh* (Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring).

Mass in the forest, celebrated by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk of the Underground Ukrainian Catholic church, 28 September 1987.

Mikhail Gorbachev meets Cardinal Casaroli, secretary of state of the Vatican. Moscow 1988.

Ukrainian collective farm worker, Olha Pavlivna Tereshchenko describes her sufferings during the man-made famine of 1933 in the documentary film *Oi hore tse zh hosti do mene* (*The Uninvited Guests*, 1989) directed by P. Fareniuk of the Ukrainian News and Documentary Film Studio in Kiev. While she describes her tragic life, there is a simultaneous radio narration of the story "Myself" by Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy, repressed by Stalin and censored until Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*.

Les Kurbas, Ukrainian avant-garde theatre director, arrested and executed in the Solovetski Island gulag during the Stalin Terror. Original 1920s film footage is used in this documentary film *Les Kurbas* (1988) directed by L. Avtonomov, Ukrainian News and Documentary Film Studio, Kiev.

Funeral procession during reburial of poet Vasyl Stus, Iurii Lytvyn, Oleksa Tykhy who died in special-regime camps during the period of stagnation. Baikiv cemetery, Kiev, 19 November 1989.



Literature and the Arts



GEORGE G. GRABOWICZ

Ukraine and the Ukrainian Diaspora in the Era of Glasnost*

A conference such as this, with the evident breadth and quality of its presentations, does not easily lend itself to summation. Just as the phenomenon of *glasnost* or *hlasnist,* and the attendant phenomena of "restructuring" and "democratization," in the Soviet Union at large and in Ukraine in particular are multifaceted, often fluid, or ambiguous, so the various attempts at describing and examining it that we have heard here, covering several disciplines and modes of analysis, are as diverse as they are valuable. My task, as I see it, however, is not to impose a definitive order or state a final evaluation. By the very fact of the ongoing, ever-changing, dialectical nature of our subject, its ordering and evaluating must be somewhat tentative and marked by a certain modesty, by a sense of our limitations. "The times change," as the classical adage has it, "and we change with them." To put it in another way, we ourselves—through this extended act of examination, stock-taking, and also, let us not forget, communing with our culture—are part of this process of openness and restructuring. After all, the fact that this meeting has brought together former dissidents and prisoners of conscience and a representative of the Soviet government, scholars and artists not only from Canada, and the United States, and England, but from Ukraine as well, that it has established—in a groundbreaking way—a new dialogue, and with it a new perspective not only on the past, and the still-cloudy present, but also the potentialities of the future—this testifies to an essential openness and restructuring for and among us, too. And for bringing it about we owe a genuine debt of gratitude to the organizers, sponsors, and gracious hosts of this symposium.

The papers and commentaries that we have heard in the past few days have dealt with many basic features of the present situation in Ukraine, with its

*This paper was originally presented as the Concluding Remarks of the York University Symposium on Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine, January 1989.

underpinnings and manifestations: the economic and political above all, the ecological, the reawakening in literature and the arts, the all-important resurgence of national consciousness and national aspirations. The various analyses and insights we have heard need not be recapitulated here. What I should like to do in these concluding remarks is to focus on something that is no less crucial, but which has not yet been in the center of our attention, namely the context of *glasnost* in Ukraine and with it some essential deeper structures of its content. By "context," I particularly have in mind the historical-cultural dimension on the one hand, and on the other the question of the resonance, or at the very least the juxtaposition of *glasnost* with Ukrainian life outside Ukraine. The questions of context and content are to my mind intrinsically interconnected. For as important as they are, the economic and political dimensions, the question of Ukraine's electrical and nuclear power, the official line on Ukrainian historiography, or even the question of the Ukrainian churches, do not by themselves define *glasnost*. While the economic crisis in the Soviet Union is clearly the antecedent and generating force of the policies that have led to *glasnost*, and while political reform—at least in the preliminary, enabling steps of relaxation of censorship, rehabilitation of major facets of cultural life and history, and above all the revelation and condemnation of the crimes and injustices of the Stalin and the Brezhnev eras—is its most manifest product, the full meaning of the processes we subsume by *glasnost*, particularly for us, students of, and in varying degree, participants in Ukrainian culture, is revealed precisely through the broader parameters that I hope to sketch out. A full examination, of course, is a major undertaking for the future.

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Let us begin with the here and now. As Provost Meininger in his opening greeting to our symposium very properly noted, there is a genuine timeliness to our undertaking: *glasnost* and *perestroika* are in the air and the various disciplines that devolve on the Soviet Union—history and political science, Russian and Soviet and Slavic Studies, and so on—not to speak of the government, and the media, and even the business sector, are all excited by the changes occurring there. *Glasnost* is in. But wherein lies the timeliness of all this for us, that is, as Ukrainians or Ukrainianists (in either the pure or alloyed version of each)? The simplest, preliminary, answer is that Ukraine, and through it those who study it, from scholars to publicists, and beyond that, ever so slowly and hesitantly the broader masses of Ukrainian society outside of Ukraine, are realizing that profound changes are occurring. For the most involved, both there and here, there comes with it the further realization that as an echo or mirror of the profound economic and social crisis shaking the Soviet Union there is a no less profound crisis facing the Ukrainian nation. The issue is crucial. As the seventeenth-century Ukrainian polemicist, Ivan Vyshenky put it: "*idetsia ne pro lychko chy reminets, a pro tsilu shkiru.*" ("We are not talking about the shoes or the belt but about the leather itself—ED.) For him, that overarching issue and value was the salvation of man's soul; the moral and existential equivalent of that in our context is the very nature and ultimately the

existence of the Ukrainian nation. Begotten, so to speak, by crisis, *glasnost*—in the all-Union framework—continues both to expose flaws and to seek to exorcise them. In the absence or inadequacy of the remedies, that is, of *perestroika* and *demokratyzatsiia* (and it has become a commonplace to observe that whereas *glasnost* flourishes, the latter two are often more a hope than a reality), *glasnost* is, at times, derided as mere talk, as mere venting of emotions and of grievances. While this is hardly tenable in the Russian context (and suggests a reductive and mechanical understanding of social processes, of the role of the symbolic dimension, and so on) it is most certainly invalid as an argument in the non-Russian republics, for there, in varying degree, the very fact of engaging in open discourse, of unfettering memory, is the first and essential step toward reversing processes of assimilation and ultimately of extinction. In the Ukrainian case, there is a further complicating feature for historically, Ukrainian culture seems to repeatedly (if not continuously) exist on the verge of crisis. To take but the nineteenth century, the appearance of Kotliarevsky and then of Shevchenko, the resurgence of Ukrainian life in Galicia after the putative death verdict of the Ems ukase of 1876 (the decree issued by the Russian tsar which banned the printing and distribution of Ukrainian-language publications—ED.), is seen in each case—in traditional historiography—as affecting a last-minute reprieve for a culture about to succumb. This is not to suggest that the threat to the culture, then and now, is not real, but that the paradigm of the culture in crisis is itself not necessarily or entirely analytical and needs to be weighed and reconsidered in the larger picture.

In terms of this larger, historical picture, however, the phenomenon of *glasnost* and the processes it has unleashed, must be seen—and such I believe is our consensus—as being of profound historical import. Whether one compares it, as many have already done, with the groundbreaking era of the 1920s of *Ukrainizatsiia* (Ukrainization), or whether one postulates, as I do, that, *in conjunction with the potential of the Ukrainian community outside Ukraine,* the situation harkens back to the period, and the potential, of the turn of the twentieth century, the case for the centrality of what we are witnessing is clear. If this is so, however, the onus of responsibility for adequately knowing those processes and for responding to them is great and inescapable. And in view of this obligation we may indeed find it necessary to pass judgement on our activities—or lack of them. For finally, *glasnost*, openness, can also be taken as a kind of ontological precondition for discussing burning issues openly and honestly, and rationally, and for doing it in an institutional, public, civic and not sectarian or partisan forum. This need surely applies not only to Soviet Ukraine, but to the Ukrainian diaspora as well. And it surely can be granted that on this score the picture *here* is hardly satisfactory.

* * *

Before turning to it, and indeed postulating a definition for the Ukrainian diaspora, we must risk a definition of what I have called the deeper content of *glasnost*. Here I would submit that above and beyond questions of economic and political reform, beyond the question of the legitimization of a given,

heretofore persecuted sector of society, for example, the Ukrainian Catholic church, or the pressing need to establish a balanced, rational relationship with the environment, there is, to my mind, the absolutely fundamental question of reconstituting national consciousness, and with it articulating and facing collective national flaws, even pathologies. The question of consciousness, of *collective will*, or, if one prefers a less Schopenhauerian formulation, of shared and integrated values is *categorical*. Without it, *glasnost/hlasnist* is meaningless. For what is the purpose of openness if it is not utilized? What is the point of opening a door if one will not step through it? What is the good of opening a cage if the bird will be afraid to fly out to freedom? This is precisely the function of internal freedom that Dr. Zhulynsky so effectively posed in terms of Khvylovy's profound dilemma. But it is not, I must stress, a case only of individual freedom, but its transformation into a collective will-to-be.

So let us stand back for a moment, and, with this imperative in mind, look in as synoptic a manner as possible at the balance sheet of *glasnost/hlasnist* . To begin with the negative. As so many have noted in general, and also at this symposium, the most evident problem is the absence or at best the glacial progress of political reform. Especially in Ukraine, the deeds do not match the words and the anecdotal definition of the country, with reference of course to the political leadership, is that of the Brezhnev reservation. Beyond that, the agency of change, the officially sanctioned institution seemingly mandated or simply willing and able to agitate for and effect reform is apparently the Writers' Union (and to a lesser extent other sectors of the intelligentsia). The evidence for this is massive, but I can also speak of this from personal experience. The 1987 June Plenum of the Union of Writers, which I had the opportunity to witness, at which Dmytro Pavlychko made his now-famous speech on the catastrophic state of Ukrainian language instruction in the republic's school system, was nothing so much as the meeting of a national assembly, a parliament. In spirit and tone it was evident that these thousand or so writers and critics and attendant scholars were the representatives of the nation, charged with preserving and protecting its interests—but of course only in words, and not *de jure*. In this the situation is remarkably like the nineteenth century, the pre-political phase of Ukrainian life, where writers like Shevchenko, Kulish, and Kostomarov, and later Drahomanov, Franko, and all the others were the only voice, the only political representatives of the nation and its interests. And while I, least of all, would doubt the resonant and abiding power of the word, of this *derzhava slova* (nation of words), as it has been called, there is not the slightest doubt that a return to this state of affairs, where only the writer is spokesman and legislator, now, at the end of the twentieth century, after all the intervening trials and sacrifices and achievements, is a terrible indictment of those who had stewardship over the nation. And, finally, most disturbing, truly catastrophic, is the state of popular national consciousness as signalled above all by the restriction, the erosion, the contempt shown for the Ukrainian language—in its very own country—its virtual disappearance from various sectors and forums of social and community life. This has been commented on at great length; most of us have personal

experience, perhaps even trauma associated with it. Let me mention just one personal instance. One of my most humiliating experiences was when at the IX International Congress of Slavists in Kiev, in September of 1983, when I first encountered Ukraine, I repeatedly heard fellow Slavists from the West, in the dining room or the elevators of our hotel, speaking with wry amusement and faint contempt of this country, this supposedly sovereign republic, where the inhabitants of the capital city seemingly do not know, and certainly do not speak in public their own language. I was reminded of this when I read in the August 1988 issue of *Vsesvit* (Universe) the memoirs of the eminent nineteenth-century Slavist V. Jagić, who visited Kiev for a scholarly congress in 1874 and encountered the very same phenomenon. More than a hundred years later, nothing seems to have changed. In a word, the situation with the popular consensus, the level of mass consciousness, influenced as it is by mass culture, and by mass media is indeed alarming.

But the positive developments, the individual events and achievements, of course, but especially the process itself and its direction, its systematics so to say, cannot be ignored and cannot be underestimated. Along with the official entitlement of the Ukrainian language as a state language—which we hope and expect is soon forthcoming—there is already a massive resurgence of literary and cultural activity. Each rehabilitation—of a Khvylovy, a Vynnychenko, Hrushevsky, and numerous others, groups as well as individuals, whole periods and styles—is more than just a discrete readmission into a sanctioned or a canonic fold. It is an opening, a door through which must come a literally inexhaustible range of attendant issues. To take the most dramatic instance, that of Khvylovy. With his reappearance we have not just the man and his works, not just his organizational activity, VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) and so on, and even not only so broad a phenomenon as the whole generation of the twenties which he inspired and with which he so totally and tragically identified himself. With him we have the full reservoir of his ideas, and with that, all the ideas and questions they in turn engender, questions in short of national direction as in "Ukraina chy Malorosiia?" (Ukraine or Little Russia?) or "Koloniia chy derzhava?" (Colony or State?) and of cultural models as in "Psykholohichna Evropa" (Psychological Europe), of cultural and political options. Or, to take another example, the publication in December 1988 in the journal *Kyiv* of Sosiura's poem *Mazepa* rehabilitates not only that work and enriches not only our literary reservoir. For with it, particularly through the excellent attendant article by Iurii Barabash, are posed essential historiographic questions—of Mazepa and the course of Ukrainian independence in the early eighteenth century vis à vis the imperialism of Peter's Russia, of the colonial status of Ukraine in the aftermath of the defeat at Poltava and of Peter's vengeful and destructive policy toward what he saw as but an insubordinate, rebellious province. For the dismantling of Ukrainian culture of the eighteenth century, and not just the all-important freedom that Shevchenko focused on, comes from this triumph of imperialism. (And we must recall that one of Peter's first acts towards Ukraine, in 1710, was to forbid book publication there.)

In short, the issue of *glasnost* is the issue of consciousness, of ideas. A dominant idea, a paradigm postulated by Ivan Dziuba, which Dr. Zhulynsky referred to in his talk, is that of the completeness of national culture. In Dziuba's subtle, descriptive and prescriptive analysis the issue of completeness is taken to show how contemporary Ukrainian culture in both its "horizontal" extension (in the range of uses for the Ukrainian language, for example, in the validity, quality or support given to various Ukrainian disciplines), and in its "vertical" extension (in the censoring of history, of national memory for example), is deficient and incomplete. Clearly one cannot argue with this. These are the facts, and Dziuba's service in conceptualizing and arguing them gives him the renown and esteem he so richly deserves. But the model, the paradigm, needs to be discussed; conceptually, it itself is not yet complete. As some of you may know, I have engaged the issue of incompleteness in my discussion of Dmytro Chyzhevsky's *History of Ukrainian Literature,* where I argued that anthropologically speaking all cultures are complete, by definition, and as products of culture, so also are all literatures. What does occur are orientations or distortions made by history and politics. These matters, of course, deserve much broader examination.

What I would simply offer here is a brief glance at the historical extension of this phenomenon, and I would define it not as incompleteness as such—that to me is a somewhat normative, or perhaps a nominalist stance—but as an adaptive response to perceived and most often real threat or crisis. The structure I would postulate, in short, is not the incompleteness of Ukrainian culture, but its recurring defensiveness. To take the issue of servilism, which so often is singled out for special opprobrium. If one looks for literary-generic models one could perhaps easily focus on Divovych's dramatic dialogue of 1762, "Razhovor Velykorossii s Malorossieiu," (The Dialogue of Great Russia with Little Russia) where the younger brother vs. older brother paradigm is given most succinctly. But its conceptual structure is not so much servilist-loyalist as *legitimist* and psychologically—and this is most crucial—activated by profound, imperially imposed guilt, for Mazepa and his "treason." The guilt that Dr. Onyshkevych, correctly I think, saw in the literature on the Chornobyl theme, has its distant and deep roots in a kind of national guilt and inferiority collectively imposed as a sanction—as with the idea of *Mazepynstvo*—for political unreliability. With Ukrainian patriotism always subject to being tarred with the broad brush of political unreliability (from *Mazepynstvo* to *Petliurivshchyna* to *Banderivschyna*) a collective adaptive response was certain to emerge.

At first provincialism was imposed, as with Peter's and Catherine's "reforms." In the course of the nineteenth century first as *Kotliarevshchyna*, then as *khutorianstvo* (*khutir*, homestead), then the broad seemingly all-embracing phenomenon of populism, of *narodnytstvo* and its most pointed thesis, Kostomarov's notion of Ukrainian literature as a literature for "home use" only, Ukrainian culture collectively adapted to the real historical circumstances and at the same time instinctively and defensively sought to orient Ukrainian culture and literature along the "safe and solid" foundation of the *narod,* in effect the peasantry. That this, with times, became a formula for stasis and a self-

imposed and debilitating provincialism is something I have argued before—and it still deserves our attention. What is remarkable is that even today this defensive response continues to exist—on the one hand, in ethnographism, in the basically misguided notion that only the traditional, folk repertoire and models are truly Ukrainian, and on the other, in purism and organicism, where, as Professor Rubchak has demonstrated with respect to various tendencies in contemporary Ukrainian poetry, and Virko Baley has often argued in the context of contemporary Ukrainian music, an ultimately self-defeating exclusionary perimeter is drawn around one's legitimate stylistic and thematic resources and possibilities. As in the time of Vyshensky and then P. Kulish, the defensive wall against the aggressive other culture becomes indistinguishable from an enclosing prison wall.

What is the relation of all this to *glasnost?* I submit that it lies in the fact that the ideas and questions spawned by it are brought to bear on such fundamental issues of Ukrainian national culture in its complex historical and psychological extension and with it engage a clearer sense of the whole, particularly the flaws and pathologies. Some of the latter, especially that of slavishness, of *kholuistvo*, of the censor within, that *Khvylovy* and Lina Kostenko wrote about, are under a continuing barrage of criticism and self-criticism, but the process of healing is neither easy nor swift. It is only through these ideas moreover, and the will, or the values they create, that one can foresee a political revival. Without them all talk of political clout is empty. If people are satisfied with an ethnographic Ukraine, a Ukraine for "home use," that is what it will be. Political power is never given—it is always earned, and taken.

Before proceeding to the other, necessarily shorter part of my topic, I should merely recapitulate the three forces, as I see it, that are actively or potentially working on and shaping *hlasnist* in Ukraine. One of these, already much discussed is the general fate and development of *perestroika/perebudova, demokratyzatsiia*, and so on. The second, which has hardly even been mentioned, but which I and many in Ukraine consider crucial, are the profound, traumatic changes occurring in Russian culture, particularly its retrenching to its core, to its ethnic roots. The picture, as we know, is very murky. The actual values, let alone program of the various versions of Russian nationalism, from *Pamiat* (Memory) and the *Fond Kultury* (Cultural Fund) to the academics like Likhachev, in their attitude to the nationalities, and particularly the Ukrainian, are far from clear. But there are very real, major voices urging that the Russian people divest themselves of their variant of the colonial white man's burden and let go all of them who want to go. As I have heard it, one statement heard at last month's meeting of the Writers' Union in Moscow was *imperia rukhnula* (the empire has fallen). How representative, and broadly felt this is, whether it extends only to the Baltic republics, and the Caucasian ones, or to Ukraine as well, is now a huge imponderable. But whatever its strength, Russian weariness with empire will never replace the need for a Ukrainian consciousness and drive for self-determination. Still, it is a factor,

The third factor, which also has not been a subject of our deliberations, is the Ukrainian diaspora, its resources and the ways in which it can affect

hlasnist in Ukraine. For at least in principle, potentially, it now seems that for the first time since the nineteenth century when Austrian Galicia was a Piedmont, a reservoir for resources and support for the Ukrainian revival in the Russian Empire, the Ukrainians living abroad are in the position to play such a role.

To postulate this eventuality one must, at least provisionally, define this diaspora. I do so tentatively, with the full understanding that the time is too short to draw a full picture and that the range of evidence is still limited. My experience is drawn on the United States, and the differences between the Ukrainian community there and in Canada, I know, are considerable, but the basic parameters, I trust, do apply.

The most important of these is that in the course of the last two decades or so, almost imperceptively, certainly without the community turning its attention to it in any concerted, public way, it has shifted from a primarily ideological to a primarily ethnic mode of existence. In effect, without any intellectual or political introspection, the Ukrainian community has moved from being an emigration to being a diaspora. This, of course, is hardly total or clear-cut, but the shift,as I wish to argue, is inescapable. It occurred primarily on the basis of demographic change and attendant processes of economic upward mobility; it occurred in conjunction with processes of acculturation to the American or Canadian milieu; it occurred, as I said, gradually and all but imperceptibly, and quite in opposition to the efforts of the traditional, that is, "new" or post-World War II émigré "political" establishment to permanently freeze, as it were, the mode of existence of the Ukrainian community in its émigré position—which in reference to our context carried with it a confrontational attitude towards everything that was not explicitly dissident in Soviet Ukraine.

Let me schematically juxtapose these two phases, the ideological and the ethnic, particularly as to their relation to, their perception of, Ukraine. I stress that these are necessarily schematic and not really nuanced—and nuance, of course, is all-important.

In the extreme ideological, especially right-wing view, Ukraine existed in a temporal and political vacuum; it was represented iconically and sentimentally, as a nineteenth-century village *khata* (house), or through the ought-to-be reality of a continuing underground struggle against the oppressor. The only good Ukrainians there were those martyred and dead or dissident and jailed; the rest—including the entire intellectual and cultural establishment—were either collaborators, or toadies, or at the very best, simply "unaware" (*ne svidomi*) The political system—and Mr. Shumuk reminded us of this perspective—was seen as entirely unreformable (as a "thing" as Sartre put it—although they would have hardly read him), and any hope for change, for improvement, was predicated either on violent revolution there or (echoing the experience of World War I and World War II) on the agency of outside intervention. Both scenarios were openly apocalyptic, involving in the worst instance a demented Dr. Strangelove-like doctrine that we would have to destroy Ukraine in order to liberate it. This, of course, easily played into the hands of Soviet propaganda and allowed it to discredit the emigration in *toto*. Not least of all, in its virulent

anti-communism it also gave Ukrainians a bad name in various intellectual and political circles of American and Canadian society.

The transition from a political-émigré society to one of a diaspora-like structure is very complex, and I am barely touching the surface, but a central role is played by the process of ethnicization, where large segments of the group, particularly the younger and middle generations become "ethnics," that is people with a basic profile of American or Canadian values, and only a very selective and invariably second-hand knowledge of, in this case, the Ukrainian culture.

The transition affects various deformations in the life of the community. One of the areas that is first to suffer is that of language, of the Ukrainian language, and of its *institutional* form, the Ukrainian language press. In the absence of the more dynamic, upwardly mobile group, who no longer actively use the language, the press is left, so to say, to its own devices, leading to its intellectual and cultural pauperization, or even to comical aberrations, where graphomaniacs, for example, are given serious and glowing reviews—by other graphomaniacs. No objective observer can escape the impression that with perhaps only the exception of a few monthly journals, like *Suchasnist* (*Contemporary*), *Vidnova* (*Renewal*), or *Nowi dni* (*New Days*), each with a small, basically elite readership, the Ukrainian press hardly does justice to the Ukrainian community. In the absence of a forum (the Ukrainian popular press is after all either in the hands of the ideologues who are incapable of addressing them or the fraternal, who are afraid to rock the boat) essential issues, precisely as the one of the sea change occurring in Ukraine and the response that the Ukrainian communities in the West should make, and the role they can play, are left entirely, one might say immorally unattended to. This irresponsibility, the fact that arguably the most important issue facing the Ukrainian nation today has to date not been discussed in an open way (which of course cannot be attributed only to the institutions or parties that own and run the press, but must be put at the doorstep of the entire community) is functionally and morally the equivalent of the national nihilism that is so much decried in Soviet Ukraine.

But I certainly do not intend to conclude with a bleak picture. On the contrary, my postulate of a transition to a diaspora-type community is predicated on the belief that the community, in great measure, especially as regards its younger, creative, intellectual forces is now in unprecedented numbers spiritually involved in, and emotionally attuned to the heartland of Ukrainian culture—Ukraine itself. This is the positive and rather unexpected, but most promising obverse of the process of ethnicization. In a paradoxical way, the ethnicization also made possible a certain de-provincialization of the mind-set. For at least some, the departure from the discredited ideological model did not signal a departure from things Ukrainian, but a reorientation to a more attractive source. This quite simply is what *glasnost* has done for us; it has revived Ukrainian culture not only in Ukraine.

What we can do for Ukraine is, of course, the ultimate question, and I can hardly resolve it here. One does what one can; and in helping them we help ourselves. For me it has been intensive work in the area of scholarly, academic,

and cultural exchanges. This is also the work of my colleagues, Dr. Krawchenko and Virko Baley who have already spoken here. In the area of co-operative ventures it is the calling of various entrepreneurs. It is becoming the work of ever-growing numbers. It is our debt to our culture and our investment in its future.



MYKOLA ZHULYNSKY

The Question of Creating a New Self-Consciousness in Ukrainian Culture

Does Ukrainian culture conceive of itself as an independent system in a single complex of other national cultures of the Soviet Union? Does it function organically and freely in this complex as a national and spiritual phenomenon? Do our contemporaries in Soviet Ukraine conceive of Ukrainian culture as an independent entity, and are they conscious of the fact that Ukrainian culture is on the threshold of transforming into a new culture with new forms, new heroes and new motifs? These and other questions, integral to the social functioning of a national culture as an independent system, are currently being actively debated in Ukraine. They are being debated thanks to the revolutionary restructuring of socialist society, as a result of the processes involved in such a restructuring, and of a liberation of individuals from an entire array of internal, external, social and administrative limitations.

In his article, "Chy usvidomliuiemo natsionalnu kulturu iak tsilisnist?" (Do We Conceive of National Culture as a Complete Entity?) Ivan Dziuba examined the essential elements of this problem. The article was based on a paper he delivered before a meeting of the Commission of Critics, of the Kiev Writers' Organization in 1987. Before its publication[1], I participated in a round-table discussion organized by *Literaturnaia gazeta* (*Literary Newspaper*) in Moscow. The topic of debate was the development of national cultures in the Soviet Union. I spoke of the need for a comprehensive and self-critical analysis of the many aspects of cultural development in our society.

I contended that in such a discussion, it is further necessary to address the level of development of various national cultures, and to examine possible means of bringing them to act in concert organically. First of all, national cultures must be considered as individual, and fully spiritually valid phenomena. However, these phenomena, these spiritual organisms are not fully alive, because the exchange of values between the cultural tradition and the real, functioning, contemporary culture has been disrupted. A tremendous barrier

has appeared between spiritual culture and the material. This is compounded by an artificial grafting of some elements of culture onto the people.

The conception and creation of a culture as a national and independent phenomenon is unthinkable without the internal freedom, both felt and acquired, of its creators. And yet, today, we cannot claim that artists in Soviet Ukraine possess the internal freedom that is both a prerequisite and a guarantee of creativity. The problem is not simply that the state, or rather, the system of administrative command, has created institutions of limitation, coercion and control, and has not left artists free of fear, face-to-face with their own conscience, their civic duty, and their conception and analysis of the development and practical realization of the ideals of socialism. It would be erroneous to reassure oneself that the system exercises the above-mentioned controls automatically, only by way of decrees and regulations, and that it can therefore be quickly removed. It functions, and will continue to for some time, as a complex system of administrative command. It is this unmoving, secretive, automatic, that is, inert, functioning of an administrative system that was seventy years in the making, that M. Gorbachev, the general secretary of the CC CPSU, sees as one of the greatest impediments to restructuring, openness, and democratization in our society. The principal reason for our current, to put it mildly, misfortunes, can be found in the many deformations of Leninist principles of socialist construction, and in the vulgar distortion of Lenin's nationality policy. As we speak today of the 1920s and 1930s as a period of renaissance of Ukrainian national culture, we begin to realize that the deformation of Lenin's nationality policy was then only beginning, and only foreshadowed what was to come.

In the year of V.I. Lenin's death, in 1924, Mykola Khvylovy wrote to his elder and deeply respected colleague, Mykola Zerov and, describing his spiritual condition as an artist, focused on the question of internal freedom:

> Now, to speak of internal freedom. As it stands, it is something I lack. A poet is undeniably the product of his times, but an individual who is imprisoned by the present of newspaper columns cannot be called a poet. This is not self-abasement, simply an old and eternally new truth. I am a completely mature human being, and know not only my worth, but can also view myself critically and severely. This internal freedom is one of my weak spots. You have ably remarked that, in my story "*Pravoberezhnyi kooperator*" (The Right Bank Co-operative Worker) I am dishevelled. This is quite true. I am thus dishevelled because I am too impressionable. And this prevents me from feeling "internal freedom." Today, I am plunged into hysterics by some art director who conducts himself boorishly towards Ukrainian literature or theatre; tomorrow I am distracted by Communist party matters; and on the third day, I suddenly "discover America," that I myself am a boor. In the midst of this, how can one be a wise observer who imparts this "inner freedom" by his mere presence. But it is this freedom that must be attained.

For Mykola Khvylovy, the awareness of the independence of his "self," which was continuously in the danger of splitting (if we remember the novella "*Ia-Romantyka*," or "Myself" in English translation), was an essential prerequisite for creativity free from external control. This does not mean that he ignored criticism of his work. On the contrary, in his letter to Mykola Zerov, he appears to be a clearly self-critical creative individual, ready to accept critical evaluations, and open and yet vulnerable to the spears of pitiless condemnation. However, with equal clarity, he abided by his principles and, as an artist, defended his right of individual expression, both in style and form. Subsequently, he would fearlessly defend the rights of Ukrainian literature and culture for sovereign spiritual growth to the levels of other world cultures. Thus, his call to aspire to equality with "psychological Europe," was not some speculative exclamation borne of a colorful coalescence of directions and currents, or a transparency that would illuminate his own artistic originality. This was a considered and spiritual action, weighed on the scales of a historical national culture, which aimed to intensify the movement of Ukrainian culture towards a fruitful union with the European cultural family. Mykola Khvylovy was a Communist and introduced perfectly legal, if not axiomatic ideas, into practical cultural life. He could not, of course, be ignorant of Lenin's statement that the most important task of the cultural revolution was the attainment of the "level of an average civilized state of Western Europe."[2]

M. Khvylovy's loss of feeling of internal freedom, or perhaps, a failure to attain it in the act of creation, led to tragic consequences. His suicide on 13 May 1933 should have, as he expected, warned the Communist party, the government of his country, and his literary opponents against a continuation of the deformations of the principles and bases of creation and functioning of cultural values. The splitting of Mykola Khylovy's "self" was inevitably catastrophic. As a human being, he wanted to live, but as an artist, as a creator and as a spiritual leader of his generation, he had to leave life. We read in his suicide note, whose full text was published on 13 December 1988 in Kiev, at a literary gathering in honor of the 95th anniversary of his birth:

> The arrest of Ialovy is the execution of an entire generation... For what? Because we were the sincerest of Communists? I understand nothing. I, Mykola Khvylovy, am primarily responsible for Ialovy's generation. "Therefore," as Semenko would say...
> It is clear.
> Today is a beautiful, sunny day.
> How I love life—you can't imagine. Today is the 13th. Remember how I've always loved this number? It's unbearably painful.
> Long live communism.
> Long live socialist construction.
> Long live the Communist party.
> P.S. I leave everything, including author's rights, to Liubov Umantseva.
> I beg of my comrades to help her and my mother.
> 13, 1933 Mykola Khvylovy

The schism within Mykola Khvylovy is readily apparent. In a conversation with Professor George Grabowicz, in the course of which I read him the same note, (which was read on 13 December 1988 by the former secretary of ideology of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, F.D. Ovcharenko) we agreed that within it, Khvylovy's role and function as a writer was crystallized. He was the organic element of his generation. More than that, he was its creator. And as such, he had to answer for it. Above all, he speaks on behalf of a generation, and with it he identifies his "self." The destruction of his generation, signalled by the arrest of the first president of VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), Mykhailo Ialovy (who wrote under the pseudonym, Iuliian Shpol) was the beginning of the destruction of Khvylovy, the artist. And what is tragic to the point of absurdity is that they were all, as Khvylovy wrote on the day of his voluntary departure from life, "the sincerest of Communists." This is the reason he writes, "I understand nothing." He cannot understand why they, "the most consciously communist" were being destroyed in the name of the ideas they defended, in which they believed wholeheartedly, and in the name of which they created a new literature and art.

The second part of the note, is the confession of Khvylovy as a human being, Khvlyovy as a lover of life, who finds it "unbearably painful" to leave the "beautiful sunny day" of life. But he had no choice. With his death, Khvylovy wanted to rescue a literary generation ("I, Mykola Khvylovy, am primarily responsible for Ialovy's generation.") In his concluding (and I am convinced, completely sincere) slogans, "Long live communism. Long live socialist construction. Long live the Communist party," he addresses the party and the government to reassure them that there was no hint of opposition to the general line of socialist construction in the activities of his generation.

He chose the 13th as the date for his suicide, not by accident, but consciously. On December 13th, he was born. On a 13th he fell in love. And on the 13th he departed from life. He wanted, in using this number, generally considered unlucky, to underscore the tragedy of his act. He deliberately assembled all of his friends at his house in order that they bear witness to his final step in life; in order that they preserve the memory of this tragic event; and engage them to read his final note and convey it to those who, by their arrest of Ialovy, began "the execution of an entire generation."

The courage shown by Khyvlovy is impressive. The suicide of the talented writer and organizer of the literary activity in Ukraine bears witness that the process of de-individualization, engendered by the control of social behavior, way of thinking, and system of values, had begun to threaten socialism. Quotations of V.I. Lenin were increasingly used to provide "theoretical" bases for the construction of socialism according to Stalinist barracks-principles, which aimed to gradually but deliberately sever the connection between individuals and the historical past, and to destroy the laboriously acquired mechanisms of socio-cultural inheritance. Thus, the safeguards of national spiritual development and the catalysts for a greater consciousness in Ukrainian culture as a national phenomenon were neutralized. Khvylovy's theses began to be

characterized as ideologically harmful and politically erroneous, particularly his and VAPLITE's contention that it was essential for Ukrainian literature to distance itself from Russian literature in order to secure a more unique national identity and an independent path of development.

In the West, critics continue to construct ideological pyramids around Mykola Khvylovy's call, "Away from Moscow" and forget, or ignore, that he loved Russian literature, but called for healthy distancing from it. He did this because he saw that it had a great, sometimes magical effect on Ukrainian literature, inasmuch as it led its writers to unconscious copying, and led them to devote themselves exclusively to the motifs, style, and forms of Russian literature.

In his third letter to *Literaturna molod* (Literary Youth), entitled "Pro demahohichnu vodychku, abo: spravzhnia adresa ukrainskoi voronshchyny, vilna konkurentsiia VUAN, i tak dali," (Concerning Demagogical Waters, or: the Real Origins of Ukrainian Voronskism, Free Competition with the all-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and other matters), Khvylovy was not referring to Russian literature as a whole, but to the Russian writers who adhered to the theses of the critic A. Voronsky, the apologist of the cults of the proletariat (*Proletkults*). Khvylovy wrote in "*Kamo Hriadeshy*," (Whither Goest Thou?) in Kharkiv 1925, "Voronsky was raised in an atmosphere dominated by fellow travellers. Russian proletarian literature is, for the time being, plumbing the depths. It has not been able to adopt any positions because it suffers from narrowness and simplistic didacticism (*prosvitianstvo*). The singers of the samovar and the sycophants of the proletariat have killed it." It is from this Moscow—the literary Moscow that bore the standards of *prosvitianstvo*—from which he called on Ukrainians to distance themselves. It is this Ukrainian *prosvitianstvo*, this mania for Cossack trousers, and this urge to unthinkingly mimic the values of other peoples, primarily those of the Russians, that Khvylovy wanted to end, but also one which he considered to be one of the more complex problems for Ukrainian literature.

In his as yet unpublished correspondence with M. Zerov, Khvylovy often underscores his admiration for Russian culture. For example: "Thanks to my father, I read through the classics at a young age, and got a firm knowledge of Dickens, Hugo, Flaubert, Hoffman, and others," he wrote in 1924. "And yet my greatest enthusiasm was aroused by the works of Dobroliubov, Belinsky, and Pisarev—this trio of names that never left my father's lips." It would be wrong to forget that Russian art produced an aesthetic environment that was particularly adept at rendering the tragic conflicts of an age in universal terms.

However, already then, in a period of genesis of a new form of national culture, Khvylovy realized that the euphoric pronouncements that Russian culture was the one that could achieve this, and that it alone was worthy of emulation, led to assertions of Russian cultural supremacy over the cultures of other recently liberated peoples. The influence of its spiritual energy on many national cultures within the USSR was indeed great. However, it had to be made clear that the impulse to copy this rich culture retarded the development of certain others. Unfortunately, it was often forgotten that a culture can

survive only if it is an integral union of phenomena and processes that actively complement one another. Of course, this is not a closed system, but, to the contrary, an open one, and one that is able to assimilate new ideas, styles, and forms. It should also open its spiritual sluice gates for an osmotic exchange of sources of national spirit and the flow of other cultures. Generally speaking, however, only a cultural organism that develops according to its own internal energies can be said to be fully alive. Unfortunately, Ukrainian culture cannot be said to be thus alive because over decades its deep spiritual roots have been undercut: its language, its national principles of morality and ethics, everyday traditions, and folk traditions have all been under pressure. In order for a consciousness of Ukrainian cultural identity to emerge, the society on which it rests must function fully. Culture should be closely tied to life, and should organically spread into all spheres of existence. Today it suffers from Byzantinism in J. Ortega y Gasset's understanding, when he said, "Life should be cultured, and culture should be alive... Life without culture is barbarism, and a lifeless culture is Byzantinism."[3]

Elitism was gradually ensconced and cultivated in culture, because of its monofunctionalism. Culture was assigned a function: defending socialism from ideological deformation. This caused an excessive politicization of literature and art, and led many to ignore the spiritual potential of national culture, and many others to literary exercises in ideology and outright mimicry. This alienated the working masses from the creation of new forms of folk culture, and depleted the spiritual energy of the people that is now so necessary to effect the far-reaching changes foreseen by the new line of restructuring, democratization and openness. A new ideological situation is undeniably taking shape in our society. It is a situation characterized by openness of expression of thought, political convictions, beliefs, information about historical events heretofore hushed up, and of outrage at tragedies that have been repressed for decades.

New problems have also emerged in the spiritual sphere, caused by the prolonged alienation of the people from active participation in the socio-historical process and in decisions concerning state and community affairs. The distressing fact is that both aesthetic concerns and needs, and aesthetic tastes and ideals have been deformed. This has had a marked effect on education in the humanities. Because of this (and this is not the only reason) the national culture does not work as an integral system, but as an aggregate of autonomous art forms. Although they interact in a system of national culture, it is impossible to determine how they interact, and according to which aesthetic principles. This has to be studied because otherwise understanding the spiritual situation of a country becomes very difficult.

Also, without a fully understanding of the "white areas" of literary, artistic and political history the development of national culture will be halted. However, what is equally distressing is that the creation of new culture values is not drawing on global creative experience. Our "incursions" into the aesthetic heights of human civilization are sporadic, and we are still dominated (as were

many Ukrainians active in the renaissance of the 1920s) by a fetish for national traditions "redone for export."

Today, we need works of quality, created without glances cast at neighbors and works freed of the weight of traditional forms, images and methods. This is a dangerous proposition because it raises sensitive areas in the nervous system of the national culture, which is already suffering from incomplete expression and understanding. This is understandable because in Ukraine today an active struggle is underway for the preservation of national spiritual treasures, for the preservation of nature, the language, and cultural monuments. For example, the city of Chernihiv is the embodiment of the ancient principles of ancient Rus', urban construction and its unique murals. The crematorium and crypt on Baikova Hora, with its sculpture and surrounding square of 1,600 square metres in area, were worked on by Ada Rybachuk and Volodymyr Melnychenko for eleven years. In one day it was smothered in concrete. The largest island on the Dnipro river, Khortytsia, is home of 1052 varieties of flora of which 63 per cent grow only in the wild and are aboriginal to the location. This is not to mention that is also a historical shrine of the Ukrainian people: the site of the Zaporizhian Sich. Also imperiled are glorious Chyhyryn and the sad town of Subotiv—proposed sites for nuclear power stations... One can only write the sacramental "three dots" that foresee further catalogues of historical and cultural treasures—treasures that must be preserved in the face of attack, and which should be included in the organic life and spiritual memory of the people. However, only if Ukrainian culture is fully rehabilitated in the consciousness of its own people and in the consciousness of other peoples, and only if the Ukrainian culture quickly adopts new horizons for development and establishes firm ties with other modern cultures can a new self-consciousness or identity arise within it.

Translated from Ukrainian by Andrij Wynnyckyj

ENDNOTES

[1] Ivan Dziuba, "Chy usvidomliuiemo natsionalnu kulturu iak tsilisnist?" *Kultura i zhyttia*, no. 1, 24 January 1988. Later the article was republished in *Suchasnist* and in Russian, in *Komunist*.

[2] V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 45, 364.

[3] J. Ortega y Gasset, *The Modern Theme* (London, 1933), 45–46.



BOHDAN RUBCHAK

Because We Have No Time:

New Poetry in 1988

Soviet Ukrainian culture could never complain of a dearth of poetry. Even in the darkest of times, hordes of new poets have sprung up, crowding the first thirty or forty pages of every "central" and "regional" literary journal with their more or less successful productions. During the fairly recent "period of stagnation," for example, some critics in the West, like Iwan Koszeliwec and Bohdan Boychuk, warned against the most serious danger of such poetic inflation: while the mediocre deafens and pushes out the accomplished, standards of judgment are in time dulled and eventually altogether obliterated.

In our exciting time of openness and reconstruction, the tremendous production of poetry has by no means decreased. No wonder that the young poet Oksana Zabuzhko thanks her stars that she is not an editor, and therefore is not condemned to read the stuff.[1] There is, however, a cardinal difference between, say, the early and the late 1980s. Although true excellence in poetry is always rare, today the enthusiastic, the innovative, the young pushes out and marginalizes the tired, the trite, the impotent. We see the individual face of a young poet not only in the obligatory photograph but also in the mirror of his text.

In order to shepherd the wealth of material facing me in this task, I have narrowed my frame to some articles and poems published last year in *Literaturna Ukraina* (*Literary Ukraine*), *Vitchyzna* (*Native Land*), *Zhovten* (*October*), and *Prapor* (*Banner*). I find the Lviv journal *Zhovten* to be the most vital and interesting when it comes to young poets; it does not shy away from moderately experimental texts, which is rare in Ukrainian literary periodicals even today. It is also there that the most daring comments on poetry are published. *Prapor* too features "centrally" unknown poets (it specializes in debuts), some of whom are mildly experimental. The trouble with that journal, however, is its "pocket" format and crowded page layout; the poetic text is squeezed in on all sides, so that reading it becomes downright uncomfortable. *Vitchyzna*, the central literary journal, publishes mainly the tried and true,

although it is quite generous to new poets—incomparably more so than are the Canadian or American literary journals of comparable stature. Its critical material, on the other hand, is relatively tame. The commanding literary weekly newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina*, being a kind of umbrella publication, offers a carefully balanced mix of the traditional and the new. As most of us know, its articles and reviews have now become indispensable.

The younger poets who saw their work published last year in the periodicals that I have examined count up to almost a hundred. At first glance, it seems difficult to keep track of their names. I counted two Ostapchuks and two Lazaruks, and at least three Shevchenkos. There is a Bazylevsky and a Mozolevsky, a Herasymchuk and a Herasymiuk and a Lytvyn and a Lytvynchuk, a Kremin and a Kameniuk. First names do not help much, because most of them seem to be either "Viktor" or "Valerii." If we were dealing here with the war poets or those of the 1950s, when everybody wrote like one man, the situation would be hopeless indeed. But, in the case of these new poets, we soon learn to orient ourselves in that deluge of names; as I have mentioned, their distinct features are reflected in their texts, and some of these "textual faces" are indeed unforgettable.

The younger poets of our time present a tremendous variety of styles, techniques, and thematic fields. One may even say that such a variety is almost too dizzying. This is especially evident in various critical texts—manifestos of sorts—where one direction seems to replace another almost as quickly as literary theories replace each other in the West. The young poet Natalka Bilotserkivets, for example, assures us that the young poets who made their debuts in the middle 1980s are now hopelessly antiquated, to be presently replaced by a "new wave."[2] One of the reason for such a rapid turnover is particularly interesting: the moment of the reconstruction is a new *fiat*, and everything that happened between it and, say 1934, is almost literally antediluvian.

There is no need to dwell on the well-known fact that the daily life of the Soviet writer, who is a crucial cog in the ideological superstructure, is fairly rigidly organized. When a young beginner proves to be sufficiently "mature" to advance from the level of local readings and the "regional" press to that of "central" literary periodicals and national recognition, his role in the structure of his profession becomes sharply and unequivocally defined. He is then carefully monitored, and by more than a single pair of eyes—not only the obvious and rather visible eyes of the Communist party, but also the more insidious eyes of his older colleagues, to whom a strong presence in the upcoming ranks represents a much graver danger than the loss of a symbolic laurel wreath. In short, a strong young talent in the Soviet Union, as opposed to Canada or the United States, cannot complain of lack of attention.

Between, roughly, 1935 and 1955, the structure of the literary establishment was monolithically uniform. Almost as in the seventeenth and the first part of the eighteenth centuries, the aesthetics of sameness (to use Lotman's term, since it too implies both of these diverse periods) was the only possible approach to art. The beginner in Ukrainian poetry immediately after the war was

expected to write according to a single central model, established in lyrical poetry by Maksym Rylsky, Volodymyr Sosiura and the somewhat younger war poet—himself an epigone of the first two—Andrii Malyshko. Rylsky, doubtless, was a great poet, and even Sosiura had his moments. But as this model moved down in time, its epigones degenerated into the automatized, somehow hysterically frozen smiling of a Dmyterko, a Voronko, a Nekhoda, a Shvets, a Leonid Kulish, and countless others of that ilk. Literary criticism, let alone literary debate, became virtually impossible.

In the late 1950s, as a result of the "thaw," Lina Kostenko, Dmytro Pavlychko, and a small number of other prodigiously gifted poets introduced, cautiously enough, new and discordant notes into the droning monotone of the poetry of that time. As it always happens, soon afterward criticism stirred. Even something vaguely resembling a literary debate became evident, but it often cancelled itself out by ugly political slander. Things became much livelier when, in the early 1960s, the powerful talents of Ivan Drach, Vitalii Korotych, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Borys Necherda, and many lesser lights illuminated the poetic firmament. Most of them availed themselves of Ukrainian myths, folklore, and history to create fresh, electrifying poetry, often invoking their acknowledged predecessors—Tychyna, Svidzinsky, Antonych, and more distantly, Bazhan—and openly absorbing those scripts as elements of a startlingly new poetic utterance. (The talented and now apparently neglected Borys Necherda stands slightly apart from that tradition.) On the periphery of that community stood the great poet Vasyl Stus who had published very little in his lifetime, was subsequently purged, and died a martyr's death in the Perm gulag in 1985. It is his name, to be sure, that in time will become the emblem of his generation.

These poets were soon joined by somewhat younger talents. Born in the late 1930s and 1940s, Ihor Kalynets, Pavlo Movchan, Mykola Vorobiov, Vasyl Holoborodko, Vasyl Ruban, Hryhorii Kyrychenko, Hryhorii Chubai, and their peers take the spirit of the poetry of the 1960s much further along the road of poetic experiment, to the borders of surrealism on the one hand, and on the other, the loosely organized and relatively imageless free verse, known in American literature of the 1960s as "the poetry of statement." Because of the impending state terrorism of the following decade, these poets suffered greatly: Chubai died, Kalynets and Ruban spent years in the gulags, Vorobiov and Holoborodko were forcibly silenced and made their living as laborers. It is they, to a far greater extent than their slightly older colleagues, who have become the "gurus" of the youngest generation of poets—Vorobiov and Holoborodko in particular seem to enjoy the status of veritable cult figures.

As the wave of the 1960s grew in strength, authentic literary criticism, with its attendant encounter and dialogue, grew along with it. It somehow took on the hue of the poetry that it was discussing, thus forming with it a single unit, a single domain of discourse. The critics of the 1960s write masterfully crafted essays, somewhat elevated, declamatory in tone, favoring a stylized historical diction, and generously larded with highly poetic, often folkloristic, metaphors. They prefer broad ideological themes to a scrupulous scrutiny of a text, or to

technical discussions of the art of poetry. The work of Ivan Dziuba or Ievhen Sverstiuk, valuable as it is in itself, is a case in point.

The literary criticism of the 1980s, although not as accomplished, is much more "professional" both in tone and in intent. It has become, moreover, central in the literary process—a sort of emblem of the new *glasnost*. This is duly noted and bewailed by older poets who complain that the critics have become more important than the poets themselves. Such snide remarks lose much of their bite, however, when we consider that most of today's criticism, for all its "professionalism," is written by practising poets.

Many of the poets of the late 1980s hold advanced degrees in what is known in the Soviet Union as "philology," and one—very active in criticism—is an academic philosopher. The sweetly sentimentalist idea of the poet singing like a bird is completely foreign to them. Neither do they pose as demiurges, sending down gnomically oracular pronouncements in two-or-three-page notes, often not very much to the point—*any* point. Poetry has again become a lot of fun—fun to write and fun to write about, and fun to be as informed and "professional" about as one can, without the bad faith of "guarding its secrets from the profane."

Some of these poet-critics' formal education entails, in a number of cases, a more or less thorough familiarity with theory, especially Bakhtin and the Tartu and Moscow semiotics (a Muscovite told me in conversation that if you could not discuss Bakhtin with thorough familiarity in Moscow in the early 1980s, your were not fit for decent company.) There are rarely direct references to theoretical issues in their articles, and yet the theoretical subtext of many of them is immediately evident to the sympathetic eye.

It is impossible to describe here all the numerous and intricate concerns of these young poet-critics; let me merely trace a general outline of their interests. One that stands out most prominently is the unqualified demand for high artistry in Ukrainian poetry. There are impressive attempts to forge a system of evaluative criteria which would orient the poets themselves, their readers, and perhaps most important, the editors of literary journals. We repeatedly hear merciless castigations of "graphomaniacs" and even, on occasion, middle-level talents. As everything else in the discourse of *glasnost*, such imperatives frequently are too impatient and, moreover, themselves badly disoriented. Our young enthusiasts seem to forget that a system of evaluative criteria cannot be forged overnight as a response to sudden changes in the political climate of the land. In themselves elusive to the point of transparency, such criteria are developed over decades—indeed, over centuries—of cultivation, against the background of a solidly grounded and uninterrupted literary process. The tragically truncated development of Ukrainian literature, in which all sorts of demands (often at the point of a gun) pulled the idea of literature in all sorts of directions, cannot be expected to generate the perception and "instinctive" recognition of excellence according to systematic criteria, although this in itself does not prevent Ukrainian poets from producing excellent poems. We see this, for example, in the fact that a single selection of poems by a single author in a journal carries accomplished texts side by side with mediocre production.

Another example is the aforementioned overabundance of published poetry. The hypothesis of a "movable aesthetics," which some young critics have been advocating, although quite vague in itself, seems to promise a useful resolution to their dilemma. Close (as far as I understand it) to Sartre's "situational aesthetics," it negates outright the value of "eternal" criteria, thus not only adapting itself to the specific restless situation of reconstruction but moving right into the aesthetic theories of Western postmodernism.

Another important concern of the new poet-critics can be summed up by Ezra Pound's once notorious slogan, "Make it new!" Mykola Riabchuk, an excellent and vocal critic, who made his name in the late 1970s, writes:

> New books of poetry, not always perfect but decidedly experimental, by their very appearance awaken though, disturb the moribund, stagnant surface of literary "decency," and pose a serious threat to those who for decades masked their own banality and mediocrity by the empty slogans of traditionalism, of loyalty to classical traditions.[3]

Hand in hand with this concern goes the question of the provincialism of Ukrainian poetry. The younger critics speak surprisingly little of the Russian "center." They seem to realize that such comparisons represent a symptom of a colonized culture—a flunkey nation which has not raised its consciousness from the grubbing level of a slave; suffering from a bad case of reaction formation, it wants to please the master by playfully competing with him, as a little boy, currying favor, pretends to compete with his father. The mere presence of the Russian culture looming over the border has been hypnotizing Ukrainians ever since the eighteenth century. That shadow, by itself, has paralyzed artistic freedom, even in those rare times when the police did not actually intervene. Who among the Polish, or Czech, or Hungarian writers worries what the Russians, in their *Literaturnaia gazeta*, might think of his work? It is plain that these intellectuals are afraid of the Russian power only as brute force, openly exhibiting that fear to the world, and thus precisely defining imperialist terrorism. This, of course, makes it that much easier for them to love the work of a Tiutchev, a Blok, or a Mandelstam, because they can embrace such texts in the freedom of an equal. So long as the paralyzing cobra stare—the stare of that Other which resides in the soul of a Soviet Ukrainian—is not overcome and banished, the Ukrainian spirit will never be free to encounter Russian culture as a *vis-à-vis*, without a trace of guilt.

Be that as it may, the poet-critics of the 1980s are after bigger and potentially more healthful game than impressing their neighbor. Les Herasymchuk seems to speak for many when he writes in *Prapor* that to view Ukrainian poetry in the context of world culture has now become imperative.[4] A lively argument has been going on about that. The 29 year-old poet-critic and professional philosopher Oksana Zabuzhko thinks that one must first examine contemporary Ukrainian poetry against the background of the Ukrainian national culture as such, and worry about the West later.[5] The somewhat older experimental poet Valerii Illia warns that free verse, for example, should not be

adopted directly from the West but should be adapted to native Ukrainian traditions.[6]

In Ukrainian literature such debates are not new. What *is* new is the approach that the younger critics take to this "eternal question," against the background of the specific configuration not only of *glasnost* but of some unexpected tendencies in the West. I have in mind theories of the neo-Marxists, like Frederick Jameson or Edward Said, bearing on a redefinition of nationalism and national literatures in view of the third-world nations, which are desperately attempting to excavate their identities from layers upon layers of alien cultural sedimentation, deposited by their imperialist oppressors.

The main thrust of these literary polemics is directed toward the question (obviously linked with the problems discussed above) of the "eternal" bifurcation of the aesthetic and social functions of poetry. This again parallels similar concerns which of late have resurfaced in the West. No doubt basing herself on Lotman, Liudmyla Taran points out that poetry not only differs from, but opposes, daily activity. If we misunderstand this, we misunderstand Marx's dialectical relationship between being and consciousness and, more important, the dialectical relationship between poetic and ordinary language. In short, those who impose on poetry tasks that other spheres of human activity are meant to perform, are "idealists" who oppose the principles of Marxian dialectics.[7] The general consensus seems to hold that the idea of the poem is disseminated not only in the content but also in the material of the form which finally proves to be one and the same; hence the ideology of the poem is defined primarily by its high degree of artistry.[8]

It obviously follows that these critics must redefine the role of the reader. And indeed, they redefine it in direct opposition to the customary Soviet conception of the reader as a passive receiver of the message; they call for a reader who is intellectually and psychologically prepared to actively enter the poetic text. Vasyl Ivashkiv, for example, holds that the reader is co-creator of the text, capable of transforming it according to his own view on the world.[9]

Those young critics who choose to defend the social function of poetry directly, also do so in unexpected ways. The most frequent line of defense involves the principle of *glasnost*. "Philological" poets, the argument goes, miss a myriad of magnificent opportunities that the new era offers. Among the most pressing is the possibility to expand the readership of Ukrainian poetry, and thus to ensure the health of the Ukrainian language itself. "Philological" poets, as the somewhat older poet-critic Volodymyr Bazylevsky argues, should finally realize that nobody in the cities will read them, and nobody in the villages will understand them.[10] (It is interesting and symptomatic of the "creative chaos" of these debates that Bazylevsky's own poetry is highly intellectual, featuring complex stanzaic forms and is partial to intertextual allusions, which only well-prepared readers are able to enjoy.)

Although they fully realize the obvious dangers that not only Ukrainian poetry but the Ukrainian language itself faces today, the "philological" poets are afraid that the baby might be thrown out with the water. Ihor Rymaruk—one of the most gifted, and indeed the most complex poets of the 1980s—

expresses the fear that when poets begin to descend to the level of the mass reader, journalism will dominate poetry, and thought will enter it as cliché, lowering itself to the musings of a schoolboy.[11] And Mykola Riabchuk writes that whenever he sees a sentence beginning with the ritualistic formula "At this time of...," he becomes apprehensive. It used to be "at this time of industrialization," "at this time of collectivization," etc. Now it is "at this time of democratization." When such a ritualistic phrase precedes a discussion of poetry, all questions of a poet's artistic worth are automatically neutralized, and professional standards become impossible.[12]

With the full complexity of this situation in mind (at least to the degree that we can perceive it from our standpoint), we cannot help sympathizing with the view of the "philologists." It is quite dangerous to assign tasks to the poet, no matter how noble their motivation—the history of Ukrainian literature should have taught us as much. Only when the poet is allowed to work at the highest level possible for him and for him alone, will he contribute to the salvation and growth of the Ukrainian language; as every dictator knows, a high level of culture is by itself of great political importance. Finally, when critics push the responsibility of social criticism onto the poets (even if these critics are themselves poets)—thus engaging in prescriptive, rather than descriptive criticism—they actually evade their own responsibility. Using the poetic texts as (what Jameson calls) the "political unconscious," critics should catalyze the latent political substratum of the text and bring it to the surface, thus co-creating with the poet, as every gifted reader is expected to do.

There is a kind of poetry that the new poet-critics are fully justified in attacking. They attack it, moreover, in ways similar to those of Jameson (although on a much more rudimentary level), making not only the content but also the form the bearer of pernicious meaning. I have in mind the work of the war poets who were mentioned in the beginning of this article, together with their numerous contemporary epigones. For example, the critics revel in making long lists of the clichés which those older poets and their progeny consider to be metaphors. The lyrical hero wants to become a little ear of wheat; the day always rings like a bell; the hammer and sickle lead mankind to truth, goodness, and happiness; the truths of Illich bring mankind to its ultimate aim.[13] Leonid Kulish, a celebrated war poet and a decorated war hero, recently published a collection of poetry; some young critics took this modest book as a paradigm of what is wrong with his generation, trying to outdo each other in ridiculing his production.[14]

These young poet-critics' ultimate verdict against that kind of poetry is that it is insidiously dishonest not only toward society but also toward language and literature. Weaving together clichés in sing-song stanzas, the older poets and their followers have attempted to prettify the ugly realities of the late 1940s and beyond. One critic aptly compares such misuses of the poetic word with the notorious "Potemkin villages."[15]

What is much more surprising is the unfriendliness that some of the new poet-critics occasionally show toward the "central" poets of the 1960s, who are generally considered to be their forerunners. Our surprise, of course, is

mitigated by the fact that here we have to do with the younger generation clearing the ground for the construction of their own settlements, since these attacks are never conducted along political lines. Riabchuk, for example, writes, "The intoxicating thrust into the future which bewinged the poetry of the 1960s with romantic imagery and fiery maximalist slogans, mouthed by a collective and generalized hero, is being tested and found wanting by the new situation."[16] "Is it such a sin for our young poets," he asks in another place, "*not* to write like Drach, or Symonenko, or Lina Kostenko, or Borys Oliinyk, or Vinhranovsky, as some critics of the young poets would want them to do?" Under the great, officially canonized "ikonostases," such critics long to build identical, only somewhat smaller, "ikonostases."[17] And Viktor Ostapchuk points out that the free verse of the young will sorely disappoint those readers who got used to the kind of poetry that is read aloud, from the stage.[18] To be sure, a number of the poets who flourished in the 1960s, now have changed or modified their styles; a case in point is the dramatic and very interesting metamorphosis of Vasyl Holoborodko, or Ivan Drach's somewhat less abrupt and milder modulations of pitch.

The poetry of the later 1980s is indeed quite different from the work of the "central" poets of the middle 1960s. More precisely, the new poets successfully avoid the traps that their prodigiously talented older colleagues have set up for themselves. Gone is the romantic striving mentioned by Riabchuk, and the declamatory, stagy quality mentioned by Ostapchuk. Gone, one might add, are those poets' showy folk stylizations (à la Narbut in graphics); their occasional mannered, and to me particularly irritating, infantilism (à la Tychyna who, somehow, got away with it); the brass notes of an almost embarrassing pathos, frequently coupled with rhetorical, and strictly decorative, hyperbolism; an open flirtation with the reader, frequently expressed in a messy, saccharine voice. Generally speaking, much of the poetry of the late 1980s is the first instance in the history of Ukrainian literature of a concerted rebellion against the spirit of romanticism which, explicitly or implicitly, has attended Ukrainian poetry since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

One must be careful not to overgeneralize this point for the simple reason that the variety of styles in contemporary Ukrainian poetry is staggering. I will now outline only two tendencies in this wide array which seem to me to be the most representative. Their radical opposition to each other, moreover, should give us an idea of the extraordinarily broad spectrum of poetic discourse in the Ukrainian literature of our day. I should warn, however, that a single poet (Henadii Moroz, for instance) can work in both of these directions.

The first style is that of the aforementioned "philological poets," as their opponents call them, or what I would prefer to call the neosymbolists. Ihor Rymaruk, Vasyl Herasymiuk, Iurii Buriak, Hennadii Moroz, Mykhailo Kameniuk, Dmytro Kremin, in spite of the various and great differences among them, seem to represent the mainstay of that direction. They write in seemingly conventional stanzas, but they often explode them from within, in the manner, say, of James Merrill or the early Ted Hughes. They favor rhyme, but their rhymes are, on the whole, daringly experimental and complex. Their lines are

dense sonic and verbal textures, frequently with foregrounded consonantal alliteration. Openly, even flagrantly literary (indeed, "philological"), they are obviously in love with the Ukrainian language, searching out old words or rare dialectal expressions, and constructing unusual syntactical patterns. They indulge in various forms of wordplay and in intertextual allusions, often wittily masked. Their poems are thick tapestries of metaphors, which sometimes echo distant, unspecified myths. These metaphors are organized elliptically to create a quasi-hermetic effect, although they almost always reflect extrinsic significations.

To illustrate this type of poetry, I will quote a poem by Rymaruk with an obviously political theme: a purged and exiled poet dreams of returning home, while his successful and carefree younger colleagues back home are destroying the traditions for which he has suffered:

Starym obrusom stolu ne zastelym—
pomyslymo... i spalym, pered tym
protsytuvavshy holosom veselym,
shcho navit' dym solodkyi, navit' dym.

I dohoryt'. I zakortyt' idylii.
I toi, u koho shche khoda tverda,
maine do zhinky u sorochtsi bilii,
do zhinky, movchaznoi, iak voda.

A tam, potoibich dymu bezimennia,
khtos' katulaie cherez kalamut'.
Tak dobuvaiut' dushu—ne proshchennia,
tak nohy obmorozheni idut'!..

Nemov ioho chekaiut' na vesilli,
nemov luna hude na trysta sil,
i svichnyky, na pisniu zdalenili,
shche zalyvaiut' voskom holyi stil.[19]

[We shall not cover the table with the old tablecloth. We shall deliberate... and burn it, quoting beforehand in a merry voice that even the smoke is sweet, even the smoke. / And it will burn up. And we shall want some idylls. And the one who still can walk steadily, will steal away to a woman in a white shirt—a woman as silent as water. / But there, beyond the smoke's namelessness, someone is dragging his feet through the mud. Thus they extract the soul, and not forgiveness. Thus his frostbitten feet walk! / It is as if they were waiting for him at a wedding, as if the happy echo thundered through three hundred villages. And the candleholders, now too distant for song, still drip wax upon the bare table.][20]

The effectiveness of this stunning poem is obviously enhanced by its understated mythical atmosphere and equally subtle intertextuality, playfully introduced by the phrase "quoting in a merry voice." The allusion is, of course, to the *Odyssey*—the famous image of the sweet smoke of Odysseus' Ithaca. It follows that the "we" in the poem may be read as Penelope's wanton grooms, usurping the city of poetry, and the woman, "as silent as water," as Penelope

herself—a mysterious, elusive Ukrainian Muse. The theme of the poem, moreover, is supported by a secondary allusion; I have in mind passages in several poems from the 1920s, whose authors were eventually purged, in which the image of the smoke of Ithaca is inscribed.[21]

The following poem by Mykola Miroshnychenko is an example of rather bold verbal and sonic experimentation, vaguely reminiscent of similar experiments by Marina Tsvetaeva and Emma Andiievska. Notice, however, that even in this case the poet refuses to abandon extrinsically coded meaning: the poem is about a woman who is also a tree.

Daryvo soniachne,
derevo sunychne,
sokom zvysochene,
trykol'orosynychne!
Shchedroiu rodistiu
rid proholoshui,
stan' meni radistiu,
shcho pryholomshuie...
Skoro skory mene
vittiam i korenem,
shche i uiaskry mene
karymy koramy.
Budem dva dereva
sokom zvysocheni,
budem dva daryva
rozloho-soniachni.[22]

A prose translation of this poem would be completely worthless; the complex punning on the word "trykol'orosynychne" alone would take a paragraph of variants ("tricolored dew," "tricolored bluebird," etc.), while the two meanings of the word "zvysocheni" ("heightened" and "glorified")—equally valid as epithets for trees—would also require commentary.

Directly opposed to this kind of intensified poetry is a sort of "antipoetry," which I would prefer to call by the term popular among American poets in the late 1960s—"the poetry of statement." This kind of poetry is written mostly by quite young authors, in their twenties or early thirties, although we already find it in the work of some poets of the late 1960s, especially Vasyl Ruban, the later works of Ihor Kalynets and Mykola Kholodny. The most visible among them are Oleksandr Hrytsenko, Viktor Neborak, Oleksandr Irvanets, Ivan Malkovych, Ivan Malenky, and Natalka Bilotserkivets, who is also their most vocal "theorist." This is an extremely active and productive group, and most of the youngest poets, who have made their debuts in the national periodicals in 1988, seem to be eager to join it. These poets are also the most vociferous, developing their credos in erudite articles which, for all their erudition, read like good old-fashioned manifestoes.

Much like the "poets of statement," and some of today's postmodernist poets in the West, these young Ukrainians cultivate themes of daily life, seemingly

insignificant incidents, fleeting emotions. Theirs is a deliberately limited, personal world, srupulously deprived of any "poeticalness" on the one hand, and, on the other, of any grand political or historical themes. It is only by the slightest, barely perceptible movements that a deeper significance is implied. They avoid ostentatious imagery; occasionally, a single delicate metaphor, frequently in the closure of the text, suddenly breaks the illusion of mundane reality, and vaguely intimates other, often mythical realms.

The signature of poetry in these texts is carried by their tone, syntax, and diction. The tone is calmly narrative, sketching the image of speech. "Low," everyday words constitute the body of the diction. And yet the poet, predominantly by a subtle manipulation of syntax, strives to create an atmosphere of wonder—the mystery of everyday words, events, objects. The control here must be absolute, otherwise the effect might be lost, and we might be lost, and we might be left with a paragraph or two of worthless prose. The poem, nevertheless, should never create an impression of monumentality and indispensability; very loosely framed, it should imply an effect of inconsequentiality—a moment of language, to be fleetingly experienced and then left behind, but hopefully not forgotten.

Although such poetry, both in Ukraine and in the West, is mainly written in free verse, Ukrainian poets sometimes employ meter, and even rhyme. The game, however, is to use such formal devices as informally and loosely as possible, almost to the point of parody (a technique perfected in modern Polish poetry). All traces of "philological" virtuosity are to be avoided; the effect must be that of haphazardness, often bordering on sing-song.

The following is an interesting poem by Klavdiia Koretska, slightly reminiscent of Patrytsiia Kylyna or the early Holoborodko, but more contemporary than they in its refusal of any kind of "poeticalness:"

Baba moia Oleksandra
sydyt' bilia zapichka—
do nei tuliat'sia puzati horniata,
i makitra hlynianym slukhom
lovyt' babyni mysli.
A babyni mysli ta vse pro robotu:
"Treba kartopliu spoloty,
podoity korovu
i trokhy soniashnyku povernuty holovu,
bo vin ne vstyhaie za sontsem."
Ia stoiu bilia pechi
i tak meni svitlo,
niby sydyt' na lavi
ne baba, a pryzakhidne sontse.[23]

[My grandmother Oleksandra sits close by the stove. Roundbellied little pots snuggle up to her, and the large clay bowl, with its earthen hearing, receives grandma's thoughts. And grandma's thoughts are always about work: "The potatoes have to be weeded, the cow has to be milked, and the sunflower's

head has to be turned a bit, because it just isn't catching up with the sun." I stand by the stove, and everything is so bright, like it's not grandmother sitting on the bench, but the setting sun.]

Grandmother's first name grounds her, imbuing her with immediate actuality. The name itself (or rather, its full version), however, is not typical for a peasant woman—"Lesia" would be more common. Hence, as early as the first line, we have the effect of simultaneous immediacy and subtle alienation. This effect of grounding-with-alienation is strengthened by the implication that a common clay mixing bowl is a strange radar dish which, moreover, is equipped to receive thoughts. But it is in the list of the prosaic agricultural tasks which grandmother has to perform that we feel the full impact of mythical alienation (the effect of its near-imperceptibility is achieved by the evenness of the narrative voice): grandmother must turn the head of the sunflower a little, because it cannot catch up with the sun. Suddenly, and almost imperceptibly, the peasant woman becomes a mythical figure—perhaps the earthmother or the sunwife—and the blending of her vast figure with the setting sun in the closure is now merely a consequence of what has gone before. It is, of course, the prosaic context, embodied in the even, "spoken" narrative tone, that makes the woman's epiphany that much more *authentically* poetic.

And here are two stanzas from a poem by Viktor Neborak, in a startingly different key, but still within the field of the "poetry of statement":

I dzhynsy nosytymu do dirok,
i karkatymu na mody novitni.
Ia budu, pevno, ostannim na sviti,
khto znatyme, shcho take spravzhnii "rok."
. . . . . .
Spysavshy virshiv os' takennyi stos,
za memuary viz'mus' potrokhu.
V nykh voskreshu ia nashu epokhu!
(Iakshcho mene ne vkhopyt' skleroz.)[24]

[I'll wear my jeans thredbare, and I'll grumble against new fashions. I'm sure that I'll be the last man on earth who knows what real "rock" is. / I'll write a pile of poems this high, and later I'll start thinking about my memoirs. In them I'll resurrect our epoch! (That is, if sclerosis doesn't get me first.)]

As the two examples show, within the general domain of the "poetry of statement," there are numerous and interesting "subdivisions"—from the playfully satirical Viktor Neborak and the somewhat more darkly sarcastic Oleksandr Hrytsenko to the intensely lyrical Ivan Malkovych. The borderlines of these "subdivisions" run in various directions. A very important boundary, illustrated by my two examples, lies between the "city poets" and the "country poets." The "country poets" do not necessarily write for the village reader, as Bazylevsky advises poets to do in a passage quoted earlier. Many of them, like Klavdiia Koretska, use the village idiom and folkloristic themes for quite complex and subtle artistic purposes. Natalka Bilotserkivets, who is the advocate of the "city poets," has not missed this; she lumps such "country poets" together

with the "philological" neosymbolists like Rymaruk, labeling all of them elitist poets who—for all their obvious talent and the important place that they occupy in the literary process—are rapidly losing readers not only of their own poetry but, more indirectly, of new Ukrainian poetry as a whole.[25]

There are, indeed, a number of Ukrainian postmodernist poets who attempt to write directly for the young city dweller, using his own language, including slang. Oleksandr Hrytsenko, for instance, does this, and advises others to do it too. Here is an excerpt from his poem "*Movoznavstvo*" (Linguistics):

A khloptsi hotsaiut' do rannia
pid bezdukhovnyi "modern toking"
nachkhaty im na isnuvannia
Antonychevykh strof vysokykh

a mozhe druzhe razyk zvazhysh
svoiu literaturnu hordist'
a mozhe ty ishche rozmazhesh
sl'ozu rozchulennia po mordi

poeziiu shchonaivysoku
zvidkil' cherpaty iak ne z toho
nemal'ovnychoho potoku
zamutnenoho ta zhyvoho

vid "Slova" azh do Vorobiova
vid tekhinstruktsii do matu
i pozychaiesh tuiu movu
v svoiu chudovu prebahatu[26]

[And the guys hoof and stomp 'til the cows come home to the soulless "modern talking" not giving a damn about the existence of Antonych's high verses/and maybe buddy you'll want to consider for a bit your literary pride and maybe you'll yet smear a tear of sentiment all over your mug/from where can we ladle up the very highest poetry if not from this unpicturesque brook muddied and yet alive / from the "Word" (of Ihor's Campaign) all the way to Vorobiov form tech-specs to screw-you *and you borrow this language and put it into your own so beautiful and rich*.]

Natalka Bilotserkivets calls such poetry "rock poetry," and interestingly points out that it fulfills for the city dweller the same needs as folkloristic-sentimental poetry does, or used to do, for the village reader.[27] Be that as it may, the fact remains that popular culture—an obviously powerful ideological tool—comes to Ukraine via Moscow, in the Russian language. For a long time, the center prevented the Ukrainian periphery from developing its urban culture; it seems that now this lack is about to be remedied.

An exciting result of such attempts is the rapidly growing phenomenon of the Ukrainian "bard"—a poet who sings or chants his verses, accompanying himself on the guitar. Panchyshyn, Chubai (Hryhorii's son), Morozov, and Oleh Pokalchuk are the most prominent among them. I am particularly fond of Andrii Panchyshyn's work, because it is imbued with the spirit of the pre-war

Lviv, liberally using its idiom and patois, and often sounding like the light verse of our own Babai.

Although I follow the growth of the new "poets of statement" with great interest, I see a serious danger threatening them. In the West, particularly in the United States, the *pretended* naiveté of such poetry is really an *image*, or a *game*, of naiveté and simplicity. Such poetry is indeed a "supersophisticated" affair, based on a long tradition, beginning with Whitman, through William Carlos Williams, and ending with such deceptively simple, and yet extremely complex, poets as John Ashbery. And perhaps most important, the tradition opposite theirs—that of intensely "poetical" (or "philological") poetry like Wallace Stevens' or, in our day, James Merrill's—acts as its dialectical Negative, reinforcing it through the tension of opposition. The younger Ukrainian poets do not always observe such complex mediations, which they could easily find in their own literature. They go directly from what they learned in their literature classes into attempting to transcribe the voices of their grandfathers, or, for that matter, their own. As a result, some of them fall into the trap that the nature of the "poetry of statement" sets up for the unwary: what we get is indeed a piece of socialist-realist prose, with a moralizing closure, haphazardly slapped on. I must repeat, however, that the best of that work is indeed excellent.

One of the reasons for the frequent slips of artistic judgment within the field of the "poetry of statement" is the result of a phenomenon that is in itself laudable—the aforementioned all-out war against the "Potemkin villages" of the inauthentic language in the production of the war poets and their numerous imitators. Liudmyla Taran makes this quite plain:

> Young poets deliberately insult the poetical pose, the drumroll, the loud rhetoric... They attack all prettifying devices, all declamatory gestures, all artifice. Young poets deliberately wish to incorporate ever new levels of life, of the everyday, of everything that is small and unnoticeable. They want to turn this into the fact of poetry.[28]

And Riabchuk wrote somewhat earlier: "In this we see the opposition of the earthy "substantiality," the full-blooded concreteness of life, to language at a second remove, conditional language which we have learned to read as falseness, as *Erzatz* [*erzatsnist* in the original]."[29]

Although the critics' objections are in themselves healthful, their tone of urgency might be misunderstood by young enthusiasts as a call for the *immediate* (unmediated infusion of ideology into poetic texts. The wounds that *glasnost* has exposed hurt so much (and the pain must be told immediately), the mistrust that has been unleashed is so deep (and must be expressed at this very moment, before it is too late) that some young poets consider the mediation of art *as such* to be in bad faith. And this, of course, threatens to bring their poetry, full circle, back to the raw ideological "statement."

The pain and the mistrust is indeed felt everywhere in the poetry of the young—not only in the work of the "poets of statement" but also in that of the most disciplined and "philological" of the neosymbolists. As these poets

themselves admit, their view on the world has little of the youthful enthusiasm and the resolute faith in the future that we saw in the poets of the 1960s; it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as hymning the new age of openness and reconstruction.

Even the most intimate poems are frequently darkened by the shadow of anxiety. Here is a stanza from a poem by the talented Iurii Andrukhovych about taking a walk with his little daughter:

I tse smerkannia—lahidne i hlyboke...
Vona bizhyt', i ii chotyry roky.
I ia uslid ii tiahnusia rukoiu,
i chym ia zasloniu, i iak zahoiu?..[30]

[And this twilight is gentle and deep.. She is running, and she is four. And I reach after her with my hand, and with what will I shield her, and how will I heal her?]

Small wonder that in such an emotional climate poets choose themes of introspection, questioning, and doubt. In intimate lyrical poems, motifs impying absence, lack, emptiness, the wasteland occur with astonishing frequency. Let me quote some lines from Viktor Ostapchuk's moving poem "*Akvarel' z chervonymy chovnamy*" (Watercolor with Red Boats):

Na bezbarvnomu vitri nimiiut' pokynuti hnizda.
Na zaliznomu vitri tripochut' doshchi zapiznili.
Vidplyvaiut' chervoni chovny do bezbozhnoho mista.
U znevirenu zemliu liahaiut' plody perezrili.
. . . . . .
Vidplyvaiut' chervoni chovny, zalyshaiuchy pustku.[31]

[In the colorless wind the abandoned nests become silent. In the iron wind the belated rains flutter. The red boats are leaving for a godless city. Overripe fruit falls into the desperate soil.... The red boats are leaving, abandoning the desolate homestead.]

In an almost relentless sequence of parallel phrases, the elegiac sadness beats like a tidal wave, intensifying our sense of loss and emptiness.

Black humor, satire, sarcasm must serve as a shield, if not as a cure. Anatolii Kychynsky, for example, wrote a powerful poem "*Avtoportret u protyhazi*" (Self-portrait in a Gas Mask). At a masked ball—obviously a re-embodiment of the Gothic topos of the orgy before collective perdition, usually from the plague—not only do the guests wear masks (which is an element of the topos itself), but they wear gas masks. We soon realize that the function of the gas masks is not only to protect the guests for a moment longer from the killing air, but—and this is more important—to protect them from each other, from the murderous atmosphere of each other's hypocrisy and ill will. "And what about me?" the lyrical hero asks at the end of the poem. "Well, I too am wearing a gas mask. It is, after, a *total* masquerade: it is not safe to be different. And finally, is it not safer to mask my face not only from others but from my own self?"[32]

Such apocalyptic themes are often linked with the tragedy of Chornobyl. The poet Bohdan Stelmakh, who had made his debut in the late 1960s, wrote a satirical poem about an old potter, significantly named Pygmalion, who suddenly decides to fashion a row of nuclear reactors out of clay, instead of his usual supply of pots and clay toys, and to exhibit them in the marketplace. Little wonder that his wife, named Galatea, is somewhat disturbed by this decision (her name implying that she knows what her husband can do when he puts his mind to it):

"Shchos' ty, Pihmalione, nache s'ohodni ne teie..."
"Teie s'ohodni ia, teie, liuba moia Halateie."
. . . . . .
Vynesla zhinka diad'kovi termos borshchu na bazar.
Bachyt'—stoit', ne kupuiet'sia atomnyi diad'kiv tovar.
"Shchos' ty s'ohodni ne teie, liubyi Pihmalione,
Lipshe lipyv by dali horshchyky pid vazony.
"Liuba moia Halateie, horshchyky—shtuka nekhytra.
Ni soloveiko, ni pivnyk, ni baranets', ni makitra.
Shtuka—take, shcho i ne svysne i maku v n'omu ne vtresh,
A ie!—movchyt' i nahaduie, shcho ty z ioho lasky zhyvesh."[33]

["Not feeling too good today, are you, Pygmalion..." "I'm alright today, quite alright, my dear Galatea. "... The wife brought to the market a thermos of borshch for her old man. She sees that his nuclear ware is standing, not selling at all. "Not feeling too good today, are you, Pygmalion? You'd be better off making flower pots, as before." "My dear Galatea, flower pots are a piece of cake. So is a bird whistle, a clay rooster, a clay ram, or a mixing bowl. The trick is to make something which does not whistle, and in which you can't pound seed, but which is!—silently reminding you that you live by its grace."]

The theme of the tragedy of Chornobyl is often expanded to embrace problems of ecology. This, in turn, provides poets with the opportunity to attack technology, or, more precisely, the cold indifference of the technological age. Oksana Pakhlovska writes:

Vzhe Dzhotto—ne khudozhnyk, a suputnyk.
Vzhe navit' des' kompiuter—dyryhent.
I z kozhnym dnem vse lehshe nam zabuty
ostanniu z naiprekrasnishykh lehend.
. . . . . .
Vse myhotyt'. Vs'omu nemaie liku.
A nebo znovu tykhe na zori.
I my—poety atomnoho viku—
ostanni trubadury na zemli.[34]

[Now Giotto is not an artist but a sputnik. Now somewhere even a computer is an orchestra conductor. And with each day we forget more and more easily the last of the most beautiful legends.... \ Everything shimmers. There is too much

of everything. Only the sky is once again silent at dawn. And we—poets of the atomic age—are the last troubadours on earth.]

Although technology itself is frequently thus criticized—in a romantic, if not a sentimentalist, spirit—technological terms are utilized again and again in metaphors, to make poetic texts sound more contemporary, more in touch with the surrounding actuality. I for one find the provincial naiveté of such use of "hardware" extremely annoying, particularly when the author attempts to combine it metaphorically with lyrical, emotional motifs. Although such practice is distantly reminiscent of the English "metaphysical" poets, it does not work in our time: as the young Ukrainian poets, in other instances, themselves show, we have lost the innocent Baroque fascination with matters of "physics."

As is to be expected, the poets devote much attention to *glasnost* and *perestroika*. But, contrary to the enthusiasm that we find daily in political and literary articles, the poets are more critical than enthusiastic; to put it more precisely, they reveal extreme caution, and a profound scepticism. Occasionally, they approach the infernally complex questions of the new openness in a very humdrum, routine manner, much as their elders approached social problems forty years ago. One becomes tired, for example, of the countless satirical barbs directed against hacks, privileged by the Communist party, who suddenly have become great democrats, shouting their heads off about creative freedom. How many poems can one write about the fact that *glasnost* gives the opportunist the opportunity to take yet another complete turn in his acrobatic career? What is much more touching and ultimately healthful is the process of poetic "rehabilitation" of those poets who were purged both in the 1930s and after the war. Last year alone, for example, I read no fewer than three poems devoted to the memory of Ievhen Pluzhnyk, and many more dedicated to the anonymous or collective poet-martyr. Ihor Rymaruk's poem, quoted earlier, is an excellent example of this.

Glasnost also gives the young Ukrainian poets the opportunity to express their patriotism with a fervor probably unprecedented in the history of Soviet Ukrainian literature, since this emotion is now completely unqualified. Their definitions of the motherland, however, are not at all uplifting. The notes of pessimism in some of these poems are reminiscent of the early Romantic poetry before Shevchenko, as we see in the following lines by Bohdan Stelmakh:

> I zarosly nedobudovy,
> Sama trava.
> Sumni slova pisen', bratove,
> Irzha vkryva.[35]

[And the unfinished buildings are overgrown. Nothing but grass. The sad words of our songs, my brothers, are covered with rust.]

The antiquated form of the word *bratove* (brothers) implies the author's wish to cast his bleak image in an historical perspective. Indeed, a large number of poets examine the question of the motherland historically, rediscovering

the national past, there to find mostly grief. Valerii Herasymchuk, for instance, goes as far back as the medieval times:

Ishly vorohy. I khtos' im khliba kraiav.
Khtos' nalyvav u kelykhy vyna.
Dilyly Rus' na kuseni okrain,
Minialy viru, nazvy, imena...
Usim distalos'! Rus' taky velyka:
Iak ne lany z zhytamy, to bory!
(Iz lyp naderty mozhna dosyt' lyka,
A vzhe z liudei shcho khochesh, te i dery.)[36]

[The enemies were coming. And somebody cut them some bread. Somebody poured them wine into chalices. They cut Rus' into pieces of borderlands (in the original, a possible pun on the word "Ukraina"), they changed the (local) faith, the names of places and of people. Everybody got a piece! Rus', after all, is large: if not fields of wheat, then deep forests! You can tear enough bast off lime tree trunks (a pun on the proverb *"dery lyko poky deret'sia"*—"grab while the grabbing is good," with a possible secondary reference to material for bast shoes) and as for the people, you can rip off them whatever your heart desires.]

Historical themes predominate particularly in the genre of the long poem, as it has been masterfully practiced by Lina Kostenko, among other poets of the generation of the 1960s. As for the younger authors, they also try their hand at it, with some notable results: Leonid Toma's powerful poem *"Danylo Apostol* (Danylo Apostol)," Valentyn Bendiuh's shorter work *"Monoloh Meletiia Smotrytskoho* (Monologue of Meletii Smotrytsky)," several works by Pavlo Movchan, and a number of others.

It is not surprising that within this thematic framework, and along with continuous coverage in the press, the fate of the Ukrainian language occupies a central place in the poetry of the young. Taking Shevchenko's famous lines as her intertext, Oksana Pakhlovska writes:

Strashnyi myslyvets' vyide znov na lovy.
V iedynu sitku vsikh ptakhiv zhrebe.
Raby—tse natsiia, kotra ne maiie Slova.
Tomu i ne mozhe zakhystyt' sebe.[37]

[The terrible huntsman will again come out for the hunt. He will rake up all birds into his single net. Slaves are a nation which does not possess the Word, and therefore cannot defend itself.]

It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that dozens of poems published in periodicals last year were devoted to the danger in which the Ukrainian language finds itself today. We have also seen strong passages, or entire poems, devoted to the hymning of language as such. The language of poetry, in particular, is glorified as the only salvation in our world—the only love that will never betray.

Finally, the new spirit of openness has opened up a new, and highly surprising, thematic vein in Soviet Ukrainian poetry—poetry about the soul, about

spiritual existence (occasionally close to mysticism), and unabashedly religious poetry. Some young poets greeted the millennium last year by accusing Christianity of having destroyed the pagan beliefs which alone had been truly Ukrainian. Many more, however, have gone the less excentric route by writing about the new barbarism having destroyed the ancient Christian churches in Ukrainian towns an villages. Valentyn Bendiuh, for instance, wrote an excellent short poem about a mute old bellringer who dies when his little village church is closed down by the authorities.[38] I will now quote in full a text by Hennadii Moroz which I consider—together with Rymaruk's poem, quoted earlier—the best work that I read in 1988:

Iak vy zovetes', doroho v kufaiechtsi hrudnia,
Khutir zabutyi, zamshila kaplytsia pusta?
Kholodno hospodu. Kholodno bohu... A liudiam?
Ot i pishly. I zabuly. Ne znialy z khresta.

Smittia—oshuiu, suvii pavutynnia—odesnu.
Z kosmosu hlianuty—i prosl'ozytys': krasa!
Mozhe voskresnut'? A spravdi, uziat' i voskresnut '.
Til'ky navishcho? Dlia koho otut voskresat'?

Babo v mohyli i viri, na samomu spodi,
V khustochtsi bilii i chornykh, iak pole, rokakh,
Pravdu kazaly vy: vse u rukakh u hospodnikh,
Vse, pochynaiuchy z tsviakhiv, u boha v rukakh.[39]

[What is your name, road, in your white cotton jacket of December, with your abandoned farm house and a moldy empty chapel? The Lord is cold. God is cold... And the people? They simply left. And forgot. Did not take Him down from the cross. /The trash—to the left, the bale of cobwebs—to the right. One could look down from the cosmos and shed a tear: Oh, how beautiful! Perhaps one should rise from the dead. Really, just go ahead and rise from the dead. But then, for what? For whom here should one bother with the resurrection? / Grandmother in your grave and in your faith, at the very bottom, in your white kerchief and your years, as black as the field—you were finally right: everything is in God's hands. Everything—beginning with the iron nails—is in the hands of God.]

Not only have I learned to distinguish between the two Ostapchuks, Herasymchuk and Herasymiuk, or Taran and Taranenko, but I have learned to respect most of their and their friends' work and to love some of it. In the time of reconstruction, the best of them are powerfully reconstructing Soviet Ukrainian poetry. It is my own deeply vital concern that this beautiful and varied garden not only survive but flourish—that it not be brutally trampled yet once again. In the meantime, I am busy taking notes on *this* year's poetry published in Soviet Ukraine.

ENDNOTES

[1] "Khudozhnii obraz perebudovy okresliuietsia: kruhlyi stil," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 24 March 1988.

[2] Natalka Bilotserkivets, "Konfidentsiina rozmova," *Zhovten*, no. 3 (March 1988): 120.

[3] Mykola Riabchuk, "Imitatsiia—ta shche i iaka!" *Zhovten*, no. 7 (July 1988): 122.

[4] L. Herasymchuk, "Krytyka na rubezhakh sohodennia," *Prapor*, no. 1 (January 1986): 86.

[5] Oksana Zabuzhko, "Kultura i tradytsiia," *Prapor*, no. 3 (March 1988): 157–168.

[6] Valerii Illia, "Vilnyi virsh—vid choho vin vilnyi? Polemichni notatky," *Vitchyzna*, no. 7 (July 1987): 156.

[7] Liudmyla Taran, "Tendentsii i paradoksy," *Zhovten*, no. 3 (March 1988): 126.

[8] See, for example, the various opinions of the younger critics in "Khudozhnii obraz perebudovy..."

[9] Vasyl Ivashkiv, "Z pozytsii zhyttieutverdzhennia," *Zhovten*, no. 7 (July 1988): 119–120.

[10] "Khudozhnii obraz perebudovy..."

[11] Ibid.

[12] Riabchuk, "Imitatsiia..." 124.

[13] Bilotserkivets, "Konfidentsiina..." 120.

[14] See, for example, Lada Fedorovska, "Komus izdastsia ote pysannia," *Zhovten*, no. 6 (June 1988): 118–121.

[15] Natalia Okolitenko, "Pospivaimo, pohraimosia... abo Potiomkinski sela v poezii," *Vitchyzna*, no. 11 (November 1988): 184–185. This article is another negative review of Leonid Kulish's poetry.

[16] Mykola Iu. Riabchuk, *Potreba slova* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1985), 170. Quoted in Taran, p. 126.

[17] Riabchuk, "Imitatsiia..." 124.

18. Viktor Ostapchuk, "Z ternovoho polia zhyttia," *Zhovten*, no. 5 (May 1988): 121.

[19] Ihor Rymaruk, "Perestupnyi vik," *Vitchyzna*, no. 3 (March 1988): 6.

[20] All improvised prose translations are mine.

[21] See, for example, Mykola Zerov's sonnet "Kapnos tes patridos," with its following strong closure:

I ty promovysh z pochuttiam lehkym:
—Tam tsilynoiu idut' lemish i ralo.
—Tam znosyt'sia Itaky synii dym.

[And you will pronounce with a light feeling: There the ploughshare and the plough traverse the virgin land. There the blue smoke of Ithaca rises in the air.]
Mykola Zerov, *Sonnetarium* (Berchtesgaden: Orlyk, 1948), 61.

[22] Mykola Miroshnychenko, *Literaturna Ukraina*, 14 April 1988.

[23] Klavdiia Koretska, "Iz knyzhky *Chas pik*," *Zhovten*, no. 4 (April 1988): 11.

[24] Quoted in Bilotserkivets, "Konfidentsiina..." 121.

[25] Ibid., 123.

[26] Oleksandr Hrytsenko, "Sered tupotu nih: Movoznavstvo," *Vitchyzna*, no. 5 (May 1988): 10. The italicized lines at the end of the excerpt constitute a quotation from Pavlo Tychyna's notorious poem "Chuttia iedynoi rodyny" (The Feeling of a Single Family). To appreciate the intent of the quotation, we should glance at its context:

Iak do chuzhoi pryidesh movy.
. . . . . .
Odna v nykh spil'na chuty nytka
vid davnyny i po s'ohodni.
I pozychaiesh tuiu movu
v svoiu,—chudovu, prebahatu.
A vse znakhodyt' tse osnovu
u syli proletariatu.

[And you will arrive at the foreign language... We hear in them (the foreign and the native language) a single thread, from antiquity to the present. And you borrow that language into your own—so beautiful and so rich. And all of this finds its base in the strength of the proletariat.] *Tvory v shesty tomakh*, vol. 1 (Kiev: DVKhL, 1961), 261–262.

[27] Bilotserkivets, "Konfidentsiina..." 123.

[28] Taran, "Tendentsii..." 125.

[29] Riabchuk, *Potreba slova*, 54–55, quoted by Taran, 125.

[30] Iurii Andrukhovych, "Napruha rusla," *Vitchyzna*, no. 11 (November): 15.

[31] Viktor Ostapchuk, "Ozhyvy: Akvarel z chervonymy chovnamy," *Zhovten*, no. 12 (December 1988): 10.

[32] Anatolii Kychynsky, "I vira, i nadiia, i liubov: Avtoportret u protyhazi," *Zhovten*, no. 9 (September 1988): 2. The intertext here is a famous drawing by Georg Grosz.

[33] Bohdan Stelmakh, "Zhyttia bezkonechne: Vylipyv diadko," *Zhovten*, no. 6 (June 1988): 3.

[34] Oksana Pakhlovska, "Tanets nad provalliam," *Zhovten*, no. 11 (November 1988): 2.

[35] Stelmakh, "Zhyttia bezkonechne: Zhal," 4.

[36] Valerii Herasymchuk, "Ia shche pryidu: Rus'," *Zhovten*, no. 12 (December 1988): 8

[37] Pakhlovska, "Tanets..." 4.

[38] Valentyn Bendiuh, "Chornyi bil: staryi dzvonar," *Zhovten*, no. 9 (September 1988): 12.

[39] Hennadii Moroz, "Pershyi prymorozok," *Vitchyzna*, no. 12 (December 1988): 5.



LARISSA M. L. ZALESKA ONYSHKEVYCH

Echoes of Glasnost:
Chornobyl in Soviet Ukrainian Literature

CHORNOBYL AND GLASNOST

In 1986 two Slavic words entered the lexicon of the world: *Chornobyl* (or rather the Russianized version *Chernobyl*) and *glasnost*. Glasnost, officially proclaimed by the Soviet government several months before the 26 April 1986 nuclear catastrophe at Chornobyl in Ukraine, was quickly put to the test in official reports on the explosion and its aftermath.[1] While staging a Russian play *Sarcophagus*, about the Chornobyl accident, the artistic director in Princeton, N.J. stated that, "Before glasnost, *Sarcophagus*, would not exist. Before Chernobyl, it would not have had to."[2] However, this statement should rather be rephrased to "Without Chornobyl, there would not have been *glasnost* as we know it today."

The progress of *glasnost* itself may well be illustrated by the manner in which the Chornobyl story was officially treated. Following the accident, a significant change in attitude was demonstrated between the first days when the scope of the disaster was denied and even several months after the explosion when many facts were slowly and gradually being admitted. The Ukrainian writer Iurii Shcherbak wrote that until early May 1986, "There was a strong feeling of fear in reference to opening up *glasnost* on certain very touchy and very sensitive subjects, among which was Chornobyl."[3] But since the nuclear fallout could not be concealed from the world, *glasnost* rode instead on the crest of demands for real facts about the actual scope of the disaster. Chornobyl also demonstrated to the world that the proclaimed *glasnost* was not really in force even at the end of May 1986, nor was it applied equally throughout the USSR.[4]

In the summer of 1986 Vladimir Gubarev, author of the play *Sarcophagus*, wondered at first whether he could publish it without special permission and cuts by a censor. He admitted in an interview that "After the accident, those of us who worked for the leading Moscow publications (*tsentralni gazety*) were allowed to print everything without any censorship."[5] Iurii Shcherbak also noted

that during that summer *glasnost* was just getting started and truth was being parcelled out differently in different places: one type of truth was allowed in the "center" (Moscow), and another in other areas of the Soviet Union.[6] The difference in treatment between "the center" versus other republics, and Ukraine in particular here, may also be seen in the fact that while the play *Sarcophagus*, has been staged all over the Soviet Union (as well as worldwide in about 150 theatres by now)—the play was not staged by local theaters in Ukraine, only once by a visiting Russian theatre from Tambov—and only after special intercession by the author. In Kiev, an opening night performance of the play at the Theatre of Drama and Comedy was cancelled a few days prior to it.

CHORNOBYL IN VARIOUS LITERARY GENRES

In Soviet Ukrainian literature, the subject of the Chornobyl accident is reflected in several literary genres, and interestingly enough, in a manner almost typical of the development of genres in old Ukrainian literature: first folklore and chronicles, then poems and epic poems, followed by novels. A Ukrainian play is yet to come—perhaps when the perspective is larger, when the wounds are not so open, when the object of fear is more specific, the guilt more attributable, and the distance provided by time is more appropriate psychologically.The Chornobyl disaster provides us—to use Rene Wellek's terminology—with an *extrinsic* approach (dealing with and explaining the social and historical content and ideas) to Soviet Ukrainian literature. It allows us to analyze this factor not only in terms of *glasnost*, of group or national as well other types of expressions, but also almost a national existential boundary situation. At the same time one may also observe how the literary works on Chornobyl have contributed in terms of *intrinsic* or strictly literary attributes, as well as to some non-literary aspects.

One may justly ask whether due to *glasnost* there is an actual difference in Ukrainian literature and perhaps also in the spirit, in a type of *Zeitgeist* that this literature reflects. These aspects may be studied in terms of more candid: 1) fact reflection and documentation, 2) socio-psychological release and historical identification and perspective, and 3) reflection of the first two in striking new images, architectonics and other literary modes.

Documentation of facts may seem as a rather unusual obligation for literature, and may even sound like an oxymoron; after all, how is the genre of poetry and the novel, or fiction, to be assessed on providing documentary facts on the whole Chornobyl story? However, constant references to that historical fact are leaving a mark not only on literature but even on the dating of events in the daily lives of people, who talk about either *b.Ch.* or *a.Ch.*, or before and after Chornobyl. The poet Ivan Hnatiuk even named a poem about Chornobyl "*Nove litochyslennia*" (A New Dating of Years).[7]

The Chronicle Category

The best known work in this genre is Iurii Shcherbak's *Chornobyl*[8] subtitled "a documentary novel."Although it does have an epic span and even occasionally reflects the mood of an epic, the work is not a novel, in the proper sense. It

is an attempt by a scientist (Shcherbak is a physician, and writer) to record and portray facts, accounts by witnesses (who serve as protagonists here), accompanied by commentaries as well as some heavy moralizing and didacticism—also very much in the epic style. In the manner of a chronicle, the author notes the history of Chornobyl (such as its earlier names, its first historical mention in 1127), and provides parts of interviews that he conducted with workers at the nuclear plant—with engineers, firefighters, and physicians, as well as with ordinary people living in the area. In this work he incorporates excerpts of their diaries, letters, and memoirs. While attempting to present facts in a kaleidoscopic manner, Shcherbak searches for the motivations for various actions and behavior of those involved before the explosion, during the accident, during the evacuation, as well as in the days that followed. As a scientist, he observes, analyzes, summarizes, and draws conclusions about who was guilty, what was the punishment and what is to be done now. He hints that one of the reasons for keeping the scope of the accident secret—was the Soviet desire to put up a good front, a pretense of a happy life, so that the world, or "the enemy," would not learn the truth. The outside world is often used as a constant pretext of a threat to Soviet life. (For example, on the second anniversary of Chornobyl, the inhabitants now living in Kiev were not allowed to have a reunion, because foreigners, people from abroad, "*z-za kordonu*," were supposedly planning to throw a bomb.) But most of all, Shcherbak castigates Soviet citizens for not considering the human factor in dealing with high technology, and for moral irresponsibility in carrying out dangerous experiments. "We have reached Chornobyl. We have reached a crisis of faith. The edge of a precipice,"[9] he warns. The writer considers that after World War II Chornobyl became the most weighty event for his country; that is why he pledged to write about the facts relating to Chornobyl, because "...I want the truth to be preserved."[10]

In this quest, Shcherbak does not ignore any elements that may not have been quite acceptable before *glasnost*; he turns even to an ecclesiastical work. And also very much in the manner of ancient chronicles, Shcherbak quotes from the Bible, from the "Book of Revelation" by St. John the Divine, who refers to "a Wormwood star" (wormwood in Ukrainian is "chornobyl," a very bitter plant, *artemisia vulgaris*):

> 10. ...and there fell a great star from heaven, burning as it were a lamp, and it fell upon the third part of the rivers, and upon the fountains of waters;
> 11. And the name of the star is called Wormwood: and the third part of the waters became wormwood; and many men died of the waters, because they were made bitter...[11]

Because of the very name, as well as the bitter taste in their mouths that people in the area had following the explosion, the quote from the Bible was immediately considered as a prediction of the Chornobyl catastrophe. Although this quotation made the rounds already several days after the accident, the excerpt was cited by the writer Oles Honchar at a public meeting and instantly became

repeated also all over the world. At the same time, Honchar's and Schcherbak's use of the reference to the Bible almost legitimized the source in the *glasnost* environment. Shcherbak went even further; he asked the metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox church to comment upon the supposed prediction. This too is a new post-*glasnost* approach, which was probably either prompted by the official sanction for the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine and Russia, or perhaps, in a way, it also stimulated the legitimatization of the commemoration.

In his determination to present the whole truth about the disaster Shcherbak is willing to use non-scientific data: such as a story about an engineer who had a dream foretelling the explosion at the very fourth block, as well as folk forecasts of the disaster, such as "It'll be green all over, but sad," and "Everything will be abundant, but there won't be anyone around" ("Bude vse, ale ne bude nikoho"). He relates how Chornobyl had brought bad luck to many people, and even the army of the fierce Khan Batii was destroyed there. Such examples of folklore and parapsychology would not have been respected in literature earlier, but it seems, that *glasnost* even opened the way for this. In an attempt to portray all the data, Schcherbak also lists the first scientific warning of an omnicide from possible radium effects, as it was expressed in 1910 by the Ukrainian academician Volodymyr Vernadsky and Pierre Curie.

In the manner of a chronicle, the work provides descriptions of the way of life of the inhabitants and their folklore about the accident. Folklore in the form of black humor was the first expression of a psychological need for a release. Publishing Chornobyl's black humor[12] anywhere may seem pretty insensitive, but including it in a documentary literary work is admissible. For example, since in Ukrainian alphabet the letter 'g' was banned, Kievites started calling themselves *hamma sapiens* (rather than *gamma* / homo sapiens). Also, while the word "fon" refers to a radiation field—everybody in Kiev could be addressed as a *von* (*von Tkachenko* or *von Rylsky*).

Poems

While some critics, such as Volodymyr Morenets[13] blame Ukrainian poetry for lagging behind others in their reaction to Chornobyl, this comment is actually unfair. True, the first works did begin to appear in Ukrainian periodicals only in January 1987; however, in many of them the authors specify the dates of writing as the previous May or June (only the editors would be able to assess when the works were submitted). Typical for Ukrainian literature in general, even in the short period since the accident, numerous poems have been written and published about Chornobyl. Some of them have already served as lyrics for songs, e.g. Dmytro Pavlychko's "The Cranes flew to Chornobyl." The nuclear explosion also retains a strong presence in poems on other topics. Probably the best example in this category is Bohdan Stelmakh's poem "*Istoriia*" (History)[14] which provides both a historical summation of Ukrainian suffering from neighboring attacks as well as from its own nature:

Dymom—porokhamy
Pomizh rep'iakhamy
Dykhaie Chornobyl
Nashymy hrikhamy.
Ti zreklysia movy
Ti zreklysia rodu ...
Otaka istoriia
Ridnoho narodu.

[Amidst the weeds / Chornobyl breathes / both smoke and dust / Chornobyl breathes our sins. / Some gave up their language / and others their roots. / Such is the history / of my own kin.]

Besides Borys Oliinyk's "The Road to Chornobyl,"[15] among the earliest notable poems on the explosion is "*Zona*" (The Zone) by Leonid Horlach. In the introduction the poet states that the people who have caused the explosion were "careless and infinitely smug, were used to dealing with things in the old manner ... and now others have to pay for their sins...."[16] The lesson is a call to honesty and decency. The author deals directly with the purpose of sending poets to see the area which is "cut away from the world by a barbed wire": because the poets are left with the function of "shedding tears of pain for the Zone." In a manner similar to Ukrainian epic songs and laments, and also using typical Shevchenko imagery, the poet asks "O fate, do not give us glory, if it cannot protect our truth!" It is not a call to physical bravery or ideological fortitude—as it would have been in pre-*glasnost* days—only a call to get to the bottom of things, to find the truth about what happened. The poet also repeatedly refers to the people's "sins."

Viktor Kordun, in his two poems "*Lyst z domu*" (A Letter from Home) and also "*Zona*" (The Zone),[17] uses a more introverted approach and a lyrical mood to deal with the images of the past and the traditional Ukrainian Whitsunday (*pomynky*) ritual of remembering the dead. However, he comments that while earlier people willingly visited the graves, now, in the deserted Polissia area, it is the dead themselves who have to plead for the traditional visits. The poet dismisses the technical explanation for the explosion at the nuclear plant, and instead puts the question in almost cosmic terms even, "Have we not betrayed our own soil?" In reply, he then asks for the land's forgiveness. He refers to earlier millennia and centuries, and takes a historical perspective. He does not so much as minimize the disaster itself, as perhaps unintentionally, he subtly contrasts its post-Chornobyl growing magnitude in terms of the socio-psychological effect on the people and the ecological effect on the countryside. This aspect is almost externalized by depersonalized emotions and the depopulated setting, as the poet states, "The icons and the wind don't know how long they shall last." And without taking on an optimistic stance, as socialist realism would have required him to do a year earlier, Kordun throws a melancholy look at the speed of progress after the accident, "Until the Earth is healed again, centuries and peoples shall come and go. But I have to wait." The distanced, and almost synthesized, concept of healing is only

in the promised stage, though wrapped in a sorrowful dimension—and beyond the wait and reach of any one person. Transcendence is implied.

A very unique and striking treatment of the future-versus-reality confrontation may be found in the poem "*Traven*" (May)[18] by Natalka Bilotserkivets. She provides rather unexpected metaphors and historical comparisons—and by means of the latter, also reproaches her compatriots. By assuming a megahistorical perspective, she sees mankind develop from dead (!) cells of salamanders or dinosaurs. Then, in a hinted circular chronological path, the resulting mutations may develop new breeds after Chornobyl. The poet reproaches her contemporaries with such haunting images as: "You see dinosaurs as free as horses; / and the most handsome one of all— / turns to you his meditative eye— / the dark eye of nature, / a pulsating and alluring call." The salamander / dinosaur, or *iashchur* has the mythical ability to put out fire or live in it. The animal ties poignantly and fittingly to the Chornobyl image. In Ukrainian folklore *iashchur* can also poison anything that it touches, such as water in a well or even the future fruit of a tree.[19] Since the poet sees the present generation related to dead dinosaurs, with this chronological megadistancing from the present, there is a cynical and teasing promise of hope in the last words of the poem, referring to the tempting nature of both Nature and Man.

The poem deals with the accident as with only one in a long list of historical disasters taking place in Ukraine; even some parallels to World War II are introduced. And the blame is expressed almost as strongly as for that war, as the poet asks, "Be they foreigners or our own scoundrels, who has the right to experiment with human beings," and "poison our youth again?" It is perhaps the first time that in literature the nazi horrors are equated with those of Chornobyl. However, the guilty are not named in the Biloteserkivets poem and because of the comparison, there is just the lingering hint that outsiders may be to blame for the disaster.

Stepan Sapeliak, a poet now living in Kharkiv (who publishes his work in unofficial Ukrainian periodicals), also seems to place the guilt beyond his own people, by entitling his 1987 poem "*Gernika Chornobylia*" (The Guernica of Chornobyl).[20] The images are just as forceful and memorable as those of Picasso. His Scythian women, who become pregnant with Hiroshima's descendants, do not bear anyone (or anything) live. By employing historical images, Sapeliak depicts a rather grim and finite picture of his country, "We disappear in our own ashes, without princedoms, without chroniclers, and without flowers in the meadows." By the analogy to Guernica, he implies that an outside force has brought the disaster to innocent people.

A young poet, Anatolii Kychynsky, in a poem, even admits quite frankly that perhaps the Chornobyl punishment is for his own earlier propagandistic verses, when he "was untruthful while underestimating evil," and was ready "to sell the bitter truth for the wretched right"[21] to excuse himself for not doing his duty. Iryna Myronenko, on the other hand, expresses the feeling differently in her poem, pointing out that people really do not know themselves, and only the silence of the evacuated Chornobyl will reawaken them asking from whence

and whither they go. She also charges the people of being spiritually dependent on the judgments and values of others, rather than on traditional Ukrainian ones. This she poignantly presents and juxtaposes in the images of nightingales (as typical Ukrainian) and cuckoo birds (who lay eggs in the nests of others). She blames the people for selling out their values and "spitting into the soul of their own land."[22]

Probably one of the first books of poetry by an individual to deal almost entirely with Chornobyl and its aftermath is Oksana Pakhlovska's first collection of poetry, "*Dolyna Khramiv*" (The Valley of Temples).[23] Similarly to Sapeliak, she is one of the few Ukrainian writers who present Ukraine as a victim, "They have put you up for sale in your own temples. / They replaced your history with a million fakes. / And are you still—Ukraine? Or are you just a myth..."[24] Out of all the literary works on Chornobyl, this is also the most direct concretization of reference to her own country. Pakhlovska also uses some of the bleakest depictions of the post-Chornobyl countryside, only in an inverted and split historical perspective: she mentions the sarcophagus and the dead water in which Prince Volodymyr wanted to baptize his people. She refers to the traditional *chornozem* (black fertile earth) which is now *Chorno byl*; the time setting is both that of the Huns and Sarmatians, and the princely era of a thousand years ago, as well as of the Apocalypse—the difference appears to be irrelevant when confronted with the magnitude of the modern day accident's aftermath. Her joining and the juxtaposition of the days of old and today forces one to concentrate on the present rather than on the element of time, and to place the horrors of the unusual accident outside of the usual time frame. She also depicts Ukraine in a position of a recurrent victim, and by using the well-known Shevchenko words, she addresses her country, "Why did you not wake up, when after being robbed you were being awakened?"[25] The poet reminds the reader of earlier painful historical situations, and worries lest "all the iron gates be shut down again."

On the other hand, Pakhlovska also sends messages of irreversibility to the days of the more peaceful recent past, when man still coexisted with nature. The immanent finite effect of radiation is ever present in the dark colors, in the turned-to-ashes landscape, all contrasted with the image of the people and nature desiring to go on living, "...And the free horse keeps running along the shore, not knowing that he has already been killed."[26]

The subject of death from the radiation is more openly developed in Tamara Severniuk's recent poems "*Zelenyi vohon zemli*" (The Green Fire of Earth).[27] While depicting the unusual situation of "having to bury topsoil together with the deadly dust," she also portrays "tormented corteges of evacuees" and "terrible death, molded from rays." Naum Tykhy, in a group of poems entitled "O, Shame, I Beg You, Don't Fall Asleep," expresses similar sentiments in more subtle and moving images. He asks, "If the radiation has already touched the young—should the sun bother to come out in the morning?" The haunting picture of Kiev without children that he presents, serves both as a reminder of what was, as well as an expression of fear of a possible permanent state.[28] One of the most direct expressions of reproach for Ukrainian passivity may be

found in Ivan Hnatiuk's poem.[29] He depicts Ukraine with a gagged mouth, like a beggar accepting only breadcrumbs. She is required to keep silent and make sacrifices, including that of sending schoolchildren to the May Day parade, right after the Chornobyl explosion. The poet differentiates, however, between passivity and guilt, which he formulates as happening because of "somebody's insanity," for which Ukraine had to pay with the health of her young ones.

Epic Poems

One of the first works in Ukrainian literature to deal with Chornobyl was Svitlana Iovenko's "*Vybukh*" (The Explosion)[30]. It became much acclaimed in the Soviet press and carries perhaps the heaviest legacy of the tenor of pre-*glasnost* (it is from her poem that the phrase *Bil i muzhnist* (Pain and Bravery) provided the title of the first literary anthology on Chornobyl, published in 1988). The poem possesses all the requisite quotations and notes of optimism required by socialist realism, all the references to "the people" and their strength to withstand anything. However, the author also reproaches the country of the guilt of homicide, of inactivity, and of irresponsibility by the state and the whole government. The poem speaks as a voice of conscience—and includes a large dose of self-flagellation. References are made to lies uttered by scientists, such as the ill-famed excuses, "science requires sacrifices" and of blaming the accident on "the human factor." The poem has intense lyrical parts, as well as epic qualities and strengths; several references within the work to "the poem with no hero" only emphasize the collective hero, and stress time, conscience, and hope.

Borys Oliinyk's poem "*Sim*" (Seven)[31] is one of the better known works on the Chornobyl theme. The number in the title refers to the first casualties: six firefighters and Volodymyr Shevchenko, the film director. With the names listed next to the title, the poet asks, "Where do you rock yourself to sleep now, children of your mothers? ..The light striking your eyes, stronger than a thousand suns...." The poem, in seven parts, also has some attributes of Ukrainian epic *dumas* and laments. It is set in the place of *Strakholissia* (Fearville), where a millennial oak tree falls down. There are references to an intention to destroy the tree, the "cursed clan," so "you'd be gone from the planet"—as a raven / devil admits (much in the style of Shevchenko's ravens or crows). Listing the sins of the nation the poem includes very sharp exchanges of reproach between the poet and the raven (the polarity brings to mind the polarity introduced by Shevchenko's two Ivans, or Khvylovy's split versions of "Myself"). Stalin is also presented here ("We were hoping to find Lenin in him"), as well as the years 1933 and 1937 (the dates of the genocidal famine and the massive arrests). The references to the past span from the Cossack era to contemporary days, and thus imply a need for a historical re-evaluation. And, just as Stalin was earlier treated in literature in a cultist fashion, so is Lenin, in this poem by Oliinyk, whom he even calls Christ of the twentieth century.

Several other important *glasnost* topics may be found in this poem. For example, Oliinyk considers it a sin to allow a nuclear station to be "at the very cradle of our blood brothers," as if the responsibility then need be heavier on his

countrymen because it affected the brothers. The raven lists the ills and sins that even descendants might carry now, the disfiguration of man and of nature, as well as the dying language of the fathers. However, in an old and upbeat fashion, all these monstrosities pale before the six rays of sunlight and humanity, as the poet declares to the raven / Cain, "The past is painful, but I regret it not."

In his third poem on Chornobyl, "*Pryshestia*" (*The Coming*).[32] Borys Oliinyk goes a step further. He refers to Stalin's crimes (including the killing of one-half of Ukraine's farmers in 1933, "while Europe watched") and asks why this was allowed to happen. He concludes that when people assume an unshakable faith in something, rather than accepting an undisputable truth, they act like a herd of sheep, allowing their members to be hurt, because of the faith in the infallibility of a leader. Although this criticism of personality cult may be applied even beyond Stalin, the poet compares the adulation of a leader to the adulation of a god. He then goes a step further and generalizes the concept to the belief in God. Oliiynyk also stresses the principle of having and using one's own conscience, and equates conscience with goodness which may bring back hope to human souls.

Out of all the poems about the nuclear accident, the most complicated in terms of structure and imagery is "*Chornobylska madonna*" (Chornobyl Madonna) by Ivan Drach.[33] In the epigram to the work, two excerpts are cited, one from Shevchenko's "Maria" and one from a *duma* about "A Poor Widow and Her Three Sons." These quotations immediately stress the pattern of imagery in the two poems, and spotlight the figure of the widowed mother, as well as the seemingly conflicting variations of this image which appear capitalized later in the poem ("You tried to write about Her—while it is She who writes with you..."). Several *madonnas* of the modern (or Soviet) era are depicted in the poem: they range from The Madonna of the Atomic Era, A Soldier's Madonna, An Old Woman in Cellophane-Wrapping, A Scythian Madonna, A Woman Tractor Driver, the Khreshchatyk Madonna, and a Mother whose mysterious footprints keep reappearing in the sand around the sarcophagus (under the exploded block at the nuclear station). The latter figure has achieved almost mythical proportions with many writers. Drach depicts her in this manner:

Mother's Eternal Elegy

She passed through the fields—
The green greening
And Her Son's Disciples greeting:
Blessed You be, Maria!
from Pavlo Tychyna's "Mother of Sorrow"

Her Son's Disciples meet her,
Lead her by the arm.
That strange woman again!
—Don't you know me, Son?
—Why d'you run away, Mother,
We have to keep catching you.

I must tell you frankly:
You can't fool me.
I'll take you to the City,
To the grandchildren, to die there.
And proudly said she:
—I am the undying mother!
Soldiers watched
The generals crying,
The old woman again
To her house hurrying.
To her stork and her well,
Her cat and her cow,
And her dreams,
Without words or curses.
She bypassed the sentries,
And passed through the barriers.
Her roses were aflame,
Like roosters—the generals.
She bypassed the sentries,
and passed through the barriers.
Her roses were flaming,
Like roosters—stood the generals.
Everything as on a blade of a knife,
Ready for cutting.
And the mother kissed a flower
Smack into the cesium.
Everything under the sun shed tears,
Not wanting to die.
And the mother kissed a flower
Smack into the strontium.[34]

It is her determination to reach her house, her animals and flowers, to be on her own that contrasts with the deserted area, and with the strong note of reproach—that actually it was she who was deserted by her sons, who are referred to as really stupid. This is a little jarring in terms of contemporary Soviet social self-appraisal in literature (however, a certain continuity of the message from O. Honchar's *Sobor* (Cathedral) may be seen here). It is a *glasnost* type of admission that children have failed to live up to human expectations of normal gratitude and care for the Mother, the Clan Begetter, or even that of a higher order—of the country itself, of Ukraine. That is why the contrasts between her simple and basic goodness and naivety, and the children's selfishness and steadily sinking standards of morals—include not only the drunks at an orgy, but also one son who planned the nuclear station, and a grandson (and a general's son to boot), who steals icons from his grandmother's house and then even pulls her by her hair. Carrying out this juxtaposition of values (in the Scythian Madonna section), an unforgettable

episode depicts "a stone baba" being forced by modern vandals to give birth to a Scythian boy, who with his arrows shoots those attending a modern orgy.

Drach blames those who were taken to court for the disaster, as well as those who were not tried (he leaves one seat empty for them), not only for causing the disaster, but for dragging their feet in reacting to it—and mentions that only in Moscow did they act quicker. The critic Ivan Dziuba, however, comments that it was not a matter of speed, only a matter of who had the right to make decisions.[35] Drach also charges the scientists, whose wisdom was so great that "we now pay for it with immortality—the immortality of such young lives," or with the fear for the state of those who are to be born. He distributes the guilt much wider, however. The whole generation, to which he uses the group reference of "sons" (as in the *duma* with three bad sons)—is "stupid from the days of yore" (the phrase immediately brings to mind Shevchenko's accusations of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's historical "stupidity" and decision). The portrayal of the grandsons shows them to be a step lower than "stupid," since they completely negate traditional morals and standards and sink so low as to sell off local cultural treasures, such as icons (the poet calls these people "Jesus sellers"). In one case, this polarity of children / grandchildren versus parents and grandparents, is somehow suspended in time, with the Mother of God and Christ (the son "with atomic nails piercing his hands") running away from the Mother, the Chornobyl Madonna. While she is shown trying to rescue him, the juxtaposition becomes even more poignant. Much in the style of Pavlo Tychyna, Drach quite strikingly employs countless examples of Christian imagery—without the cynical touches that he used to incorporate in his pre-*glasnost* works. In this poem the crazy bald Kateryna blends into the Scythian "baba" and the Mother of God bearing a no-child, an emptiness—begotten by Herod on that fateful April day.

The theme of motherhood in Drach's poem is two-fold. One aspect reflects the traditional moral standards, the natural family relationship that the "sons" have neglected to continue, and as a result have built a nuclear station and abandoned the mother. The other aspect deals with the basic concern for the well-being of the offspring and the future of mankind. It is here that the fear is expressed in quite bleak colors. The concern is not only for the physical health, but for spiritual and moral as well. It is the latter that actually dominates the whole complex structure of the epic. The poet even quite explicitly depicts the abandoned widowed mother who looks into her descendant's soul, and not finding one, instead sees only guilt there.

In this work Drach often quotes or refers to other works by Ukrainian writers about Chornobyl. By employing similar situations, symbols, and images as they do, he creates a certain credibility for these images as "facts." At the same time he also raises them to a different level of generalization and typicality, allowing them to serve almost as Chornobylian archetypes. This sharing of common imagery not only makes them more valid, but also enhances the epic universality which they carry, and provides almost an organic structure to the work. The variants of the Madonna within the poem itself serve as a common non-heroic Chornobylian image, as well as substitutes for protagonists, thus

representing one part of the community or nation. While these madonnas are shown as suffering victims after the explosion, it is within a tragic mode, since there is a strong hint that in their undisputable goodness—they are to blame somehow for the wrongs of others, especially that of their own descendants.

Another work which also reflects certain elements of the Ukrainian epic *duma* is Iurii Andrukhovych's "*Trava nikoly ne zblidne*" (The Grass Won't Ever Fade Away)[36] The poem refers to the land that was once noted for its children, the land with scars unhealed, while a hangman's poles start to become live and grow as plants. Painful expressions of pessimism and hopelessness flow freely without the typical pre-*glasnost* restraints or cosmetic concealments.

Novels

At least three Soviet Ukrainian writers have produced novels that deal specifically with Chornobyl: Leonid Daien, Volodymyr Iavorivsky, and Anatolii Mykhailenko. Daien's documentary novel is entitled *Chornobyl trava hirka* (*Chornobyl—The Bitter Grass*)[37]. In terms of structure, the work is a step beyond Shcherbak's documentary, and relies much on the epistolary form. Daien's method in providing credibility to the work was to build the story on the life of the chief firefighter Leonid Teliatnykov, by means of correspondence (from the hospital in Moscow) with his children. The author openly blames experiments for causing the explosion at Chornobyl, and places it within a list of other nuclear accidents in Western Europe, USA, and Japan. Since the book was written for young readers, few effects of *glasnost* are found here.

A similar approach in attempting to minimize Chornobyl's horrors by showing the West in the worst possible light, is Anatolii Mykhailenko's *Zapakh polynu* (*The Smell of Wormwood*).[38] However, he also mentions some of the excuses, used before *glasnost*, to block any open discussions of nuclear plants; such as, that it was considered reactionary to doubt the safety of Soviet reactors, or that the reason for not disclosing the explosion immediately was so that the enemy across the border would not learn of it. Besides making such charges against the system, the writer also asks some painful questions of the local people, as to what took place both before and after the accident. He depicts such acts as stealing of ancient icons and similarly unique treasures from the evacuated empty houses. The police then confiscated some of these from the thieves—only to have a seventeenth century Psalter or a sixteenth century icon, disappear from official safekeeping, leaving hardly anything for a planned museum called "Muzhnist" (Bravery). Other writers also portrayed how such stolen and radioactive items quickly found their way to Western European blackmarkets. This rather candid depiction not only lists the facts, but also points out the underlying explanation that people stopped caring for their culture and historical heritage and traditional values.

The one fully realized novel is by Volodymyr Iavorivsky—*Maria z polynom pry kintsi stolittia* (*Maria with the Bitter Wormwood at the End of the Century*).[39] As in most of the above works, in Iavorivsky's too there is an ever-present charge of guilt. He even places it right in the heart of the Prypiat town and the whole Chornobyl area. The nuclear station is shown as the brain child of a local

engineer, who provided a plan for the least expensive project for building a nuclear station. After the plant was erected, the surrounding new town spread further, at the cost of the neighborhood villages. As the new pushed away the old, moral standards deteriorated at all levels—in the family, at work, and in the community. The protagonist, Maria, is the eternal UR-Mother, as well as the conscience of her children and grandchildren. After the accident, Maria laments that "the elder brother brought death for the younger one," leaving only a deaf-and-dumb son alive. Chornobyl is shown as moral punishment for the community—at the cost of many innocent lives. The accident is to serve as an eye-opener for the people themselves. Hope is placed only in Maria's goodness, so that it would pass to some of her grandchildren, and thus provide the necessary tie to the standards of old. But did the guilty really see the truth about themselves and learn a lesson ? Not really, the author implies, nor does he provide a perfunctory rosy picture of the future.

CONCLUSION

Several common elements may be seen in the above works in Ukrainian literature on the Chornobyl topic. First of all, there is now a definite openness in the depiction of the *extrinsic* element—thus almost performing the function that journalism should have had in describing exactly what actually happened at Chornobyl. Noting what the situation was before and how it changed during the *glasnost* period, Soviet Ukrainian critic Hryhorii Klochek, in discussing Chornobyl admits that in the pre-*glasnost* days such painful problems could not have been discussed in literary works[40]. Similarly, expressions of fear of immanent death and long-range effects from radiation are becoming more blunt in the more recents poems on Chornobyl.

Secondly, a strong psychological need has surfaced in Ukraine, a need to blame oneself and one's own people for the disaster. While there are numerous poems written in Ukrainian in the West, as well as Russian poems written in the USSR (by such writers as A. Voznesensky, L. Visheslavsky, and O. Tkachenko), there seems to be an obvious difference in the point of view of these writers and the Soviet Ukrainian writers. The Soviet non-Ukrainian writers see in Chornobyl a disaster, they may even call for finding the guilty parties, and direct attention to the general present relaxation of morals and ethics. A Georgian poet, Raul Chilachava, in a poem, "*Derevlianska Iaroslavna z nemovliam*" (The Derevlanian Iaroslavna with a Baby)[41] is very bold in placing some charges. He asks whether the accident happened because negligence at work was being condoned, or was it because the people were trained so that others would do the thinking for them? Chilachava (who has a personal tie to Chornobyl through his wife) even describes the initial fear more vividly than do the Ukrainian poets "No one knows what awaits all of us—? Sudden extinction or suffering on a crucifix?"[42]

The Russian journalist Gubarev, on the other hand, treats the situation in a more heroic manner; he considers Chornobyl as the third greatest historical achievement of "our people," listing these events as: saving Europe from the Mongols, saving Europe from Hitler, and with Chornobyl—securing the future

of mankind, in a very expensive manner.[43] Alexander Tkachenko, a Russian poet of Ukrainian heritage, while listing similar events, places his sentiment elsewhere. He explains that in his poem the mention of the renewed misfortune refers to earlier historical sufferings by Ukrainians: in the Middle Ages from invading hordes, and in this century from Stalin, and then from the Nazis. Tkachenko sees Ukrainians and Belorussians as those who suffered the most from Chornobyl[44], a distinction that was not made by Gubarev at all.

When comparing Soviet literary works written by non-Ukrainians to that by Ukrainians, in most cases a rather different approach appears to prevail. While in the non-Ukrainian works the problem of present-day morals is also hinted at, in the Ukrainian ones it is more emphasized, and the element of guilt is ever-present.

However, in Ukrainian works reference is usually made to the moral problems in their historical aspect, and thus the guilt syndrome or the accusations of betrayal of traditional morals become quite dominant. The recurring charge against the Ukrainian society is of naively trusting others to do the deciding and the planning, while failing to keep old personal and historical values. Nothing similar has ever been as strongly expressed before Chornobyl, Mykhailenko even begins his novel with the comment, "Our guilt before the ruined earth is unforgivable, and inexcusable—I want to make you see that."[45] The community and national guilt and fear reaches almost a universal proportion due to the span of time during which the effects of the explosion are to be felt. The insiders, the Ukrainians, in most works see themselves as a nation guilty of the specific sin of trusting others and *allowing* the nuclear station to be built, of having people risk the experiment at the plant and perform similar misdeeds—as well as a multitude of other real and alleged sins. It is as if Ukrainians see themselves as historically guilty. Also morally guilty—at the threshold of the twenty-first century (this point is always stressed), and at the threshold of a new civilization, for allowing this to happen in Ukraine—and thus reaching the bottom of an existential and moral pit (as in Shevchenko's "The Great Vault"). This element is quite dominant in the works of Bilotserkivets, Drach, Iavorovisky, and Kychynsky.

While there are numerous references to the once traditional Ukrainian values, they are not identified anywhere, and are only generalized as the decent, ethical, and moral values of the past. Until the Soviet era, most Ukrainians were practising Christians, and therefore, through the centuries, many of the values were promulgated by the Christian religion. Once religion was barred or erased from Soviet lives—with it were erased many of the values that it taught. However none of the above authors tie the collapse of morals to religion. Only in Oksana Pakhlovska's poem "*Bula sumna*" (You were sad),[46] is there a reference to bringing God back to the land; after the days of mourning, or even entombment, a mythical "she" (Ukraine? Eternal Mother?) will be rejuvenated and will awaken God in the poet's land.

Thirdly, not only traditional values surface with the Chornobyl theme, but also traditional imagery, as well as Ukraine's historical identification, and the protagonists' self-identification with it. This stage appears after the preceding

complete passivity (the helpless victim), and is followed by the guilty self-flagellation. In all of these stages however, the historical identification hovers in the background. Such writers as Ivan Iov, deal with it quiet openly, and ask "How can we honor our parents in the present without knowing our own past?"[47] Although Ukraine is rarely mentioned by name in most of the early post-Chornobyl literary works on the subject (it becomes more visible in the 1989 publications)—traditional Ukrainian literary imagery is used to represent the country: a young girl, a woman, Maria, or the duped Kateryna, "the land," or even Kievan Rus'. Related literary purpose is served through the use of other traditional imagery from: a) folklore (the raven—a variation of a crow, or two / three brothers, a mistreated mother (as in the works of Bilotserkivets and Drach), or a cuckoo bird; b) literature (imagery related to that used by Shevchenko or Khvylovy); and c) from the Bible (in Oliinyk's poem "The Coming"). New imagery has quickly become very identifiable with the Chornobyl story wormwood (*chornobyl*), bitter grass (*polyn*),sarcophagus, salamanders / dinosaurs, Maria, the archetypal mother with child, an old woman who returns to feed her cow, icon thieves, and an old legendary pine tree in the Prypiat area. However, there are hardly any men (except the young victims)—thus going back to the post-World War II in Ukrainian literature, which was abundant in absentee fathers or fatherless settings, reflecting an unprotected and defenseless country. The image of the Ukrainian mother—Maria—reappears not only in the works of Drach and Iavorivsky, but also in other poems, such as Pavlo Movchan's "The Bitter Maria," where she is present as a symbol ("It is so hard to keep holding your name..."), Mykola Som's "Marusia from Prypiat"[48] or Iryna Myronenko's "Mother's Paths." In these works there is also a strong confrontation between mothers and sons, as well as between old virtues and novel twentieth century sins. Without pointing at the source of these sins, there is a strong juxtaposition of the old Ukrainian values and present day moral and cultural rootlessness, specified in numerous examples, all the way to and including probably the first mention of AIDS in Ukrainian literature. Together all these images seem to tie past and present folkloric and literary expressions into a bigger representation revealing many other aspects of life as well.

Errors of the past, errors in judgment as well as moral faults expressed in the literary works now seem to have precipitated a prevalent desire for a national *hamartia*; the tragic flaw is depicted as naive trust and submission to a new trend in the cultural and moral rootlessness. Most of the Ukrainian authors in their works on Chornobyl contrast the present with the old Ukrainian ethos. In a recent interview Shcherbak points out that for many years the official Soviet trend was to root out any sense of conscience, any ties to Ukraine's own history, culture, and values. Historical and national rootlessness leads to an absence of moral values, the author claims. Thus people become rootless. And a plant without any roots is only a tumbleweed willing to do unconscionable things.[49] As an example, he describes a group of highly placed scientists, who were responsible for poisoning the air and the soil, and blames them with acting as a mafia, desiring to reap personal rewards for building the nuclear plant quickly and cheaply. He goes deeper than the simplistic and

stereotyped new call for caring for "the ecology of the soul." He comments that "for many years in our own country everything was done so that people would get rid of their conscience. For the totalitarian system which was developed still during the Stalinist terror, conscience became vestigial; it was as superfluous, as is an appendix." Only now "for many scientists Chornobyl has become a catharsis, a spiritual cleansing and an eye-opener."[50]

Mykhailenko, in his novel subtitled *A Novel—A Memory* expresses this feeling quite vividly:

> We are all guilty. We are guilty that the young Prypiat has died ... What an immeasurably heavy payment are we making? One wants to tear one's breast and shout at the world: Wake up! Let Chornobyl not be lost in our memory and in our verbal errors—the quiet evil of our days.[51]

One author, Taras Romaniuk, treats the Chornobyl literature as a warning. He does this both in apocalyptic terms as well as in terms of national messianism. By referring to the writings of Iurii Lypa (*"Pryznachennia Ukrainy,"* 1938) he expounds the idea that Ukraine is destined to save mankind.[52] While several poets employed the image of Chornobyl saving mankind by serving as a warning on nuclear plants, Romaniuk treats Ukraine as an unwilling victim picked by God for His own purpose.

Individual, cultural, linguistic, and ecological problems are all tied to the predicament that Chornobyl is disclosing now. That is why Ivan Dziuba claims that the Chornobyl catastrophe "has placed our community before the inevatible need to know the truth about ourselves and to build all aspects of our lives on the basis of human morality."[53]

The post-Chornobyl syndrome is very much like a Pavlovian reflex; from an old habit the victims blame themselves and feel guilty even for the misdeeds done to them by others. This behavior is manifested as a so-called paradoxical psychological effect[54], since the Ukrainian nation seems to be charging itself with all its historical disasters. This expression appears to go deeper than just an intent to learn from one's mistakes in order to avoid them. It is more than just the need for catharsis—but even *that* stage seems to be postponed. And this postponement may explain the absence of the genre of Ukrainian drama on the subject, or the fear of showing in Ukraine documentary films on Chornobyl (numerous delays and censorings were explained as needed to eliminate any threats of "unpatriotic behavior").[55]

The Pavlovian reflex and the paradoxical effect syndromes blend into new expressions in Ukrainian literature: the loss of traditional moral values, the sudden desire or need for a historical self-perception, and a very strong feeling of guilt. This guilt is occasionally represented as a disappointment derived from naive trust in promises made to gullible victims by outsiders. (Such an image of Ukraine was used last century by Shevchenko.) However, Chornobyl also provides a concrete historical reference to a chain of events, albeit filled with ill fortune, but still within a historical continuity. Nothing as obvious and as strong had appeared previously in Soviet Ukrainian literature. Mykhailenko

notes that "Chornobyl has changed people. It has given them a chance to observe themselves from a vantage point."[56] He also warns, that the people who were leaving behind their homes—were also leaving behind "the memory of their ancestors."[57] Two haunting images are reflected in the work of several authors: the erased or decayed historical memory, and the deserted streets and cities with no children. Both of these are potent enough individually to shock a group into an evaluation of the present, while furtively and frantically considering the future. And it is with the future in mind that Oksana Pakhlovska asks quite directly, "Who'll find us amidst our own fields of ashes? / If generations shall become strangers— / who'll come to begin everything anew?"[58]

From the shock and the resulting self-evaluation to the fear for the future, in their Chornobyl works the Ukrainian writers are expressing a type of *Zeitgeist*. It has not been expressed to any degree in other arts (except for the film, perhaps) or disciplines; it appears, almost subconsciously and subcutaneously as the yet unrealized and unexpressed feeling of the nation facing a boundary situation and a very dim future. It is as if the nuclear disaster bared the inner world of the people's souls, shocking them, and making them face themselves. As the young poet Mykola Adamenko observes: "Chornobyl has matured us. / Yes, everything is as before. / Only we are not."[59] The people's resulting self-awareness is being expressed for them by the writers, asking them to change spiritually. It is as if the writers are saying what the people know but cannot face or articulate yet.

Ivan Dziuba identified Chornobyl as:

> one of the important battlefields in our striving for complete truth in our literature, for its civic devotion, social apoliticism, and intellectual honesty... It is important that they lead to a bold and honest understanding of our difficult apocalyptic era... lead us steadfastly to a new manner of thinking, as well as to the old and eternal principles of human morality.[60]

With *glasnost*'s permission, while we now may read not only of the admissions about the effects of the explosion, and of the socio-psychological element which echoes in the Chornobyl literature—there are also the *intrinsic* literary aspects, the literary treasures, the imagery, the architectonics found in many of the works, such as in the poems by Natalka Bilotserkivets, or Ivan Drach, or Stepan Sapeliak. We see also how Drach, in the epiloque of his poem, attempts to pass by the Pavlovian reflex affecting Ukrainians, and reach a universal level and a universal problem.

> The salt of knowledge—is the fruit of repentance...
> and the grey Chornobyl mother
> carries this child—this sick planet Earth.[61]

It is this threat to the whole planet that has left a mark on *glasnost*, not only on the environmental, on the human life aspects but also on the linguistic, cultural, and historical fields as they surface in the concerns that are widely discussed in Ukraine today. Although Soviet Ukrainian writers still complain

that the *glasnost* allowed in Moscow is not the same as the *glasnost* in Ukraine—they do at least discuss it openly. Iurii Shcherbak reminds the readers that when in 1966 Oles Honchar pointed out that the specific features of Ukrainian culture were being destroyed—even discussion on the subject was considered almost a crime. And "in Ukraine in particular, so much was done to root out all these individual cultural expressions, the uniqueness of our own language and culture."[62] Two decades later, through the pen of the Ukrainian writers, *glasnost* in reference to Chornobyl has also brought about an open historical self-awareness and self-evaluation for Ukrainians. It appears as if the moment which brought the threat of the Apocalypse, through the Revelation of Chornobyl, both for individuals and for the nation served as an epiphany, precipitated by an existential boundary situation.

ENDNOTES

[1] Prof. Bohdan Krawchenko also dealt with the subject in his Keynote Address at the Symposium on Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine at York University, January 28, 1989.

[2] Nagle Jackson, Program Notes for the McCarter Theater in Princeton. For a review of the play see Larissa M.L. Onyshkevych, "Chornobyl u piesi," *Suchasnist*, no. 12 (1987): 60–64. For a review of the production see: Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, "Chornobyl and Sarcophagus," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 April 1989, pp. 9–10.

[3] Iurii Shcherbak, "Chornobyl," *Vitchyzna*, no. 4 (1988): 18.

[4] Reports of the Soviet Ukrainian press were summarized by Larissa M.L. Onyshkevych, "Nuclear Disaster in Ukraine: Ukrainian SSR Newspapers' Accounts Provide Details on Accident," *Ukrainian Weekly*, nos. 25, 29, 30 (1986).

[5] Mykhailo Malash, "Kompetentnist vriatuie svit," *Ukraina*, no. 36 (September 1988): 3.

[6] Shcherbak, "Chornobyl."

[7] Ivan Hnatiuk, "Nove litochyslennia," *Zhovten*, no. 1 (1989): 4–5.

[8] Shcherbak, *Vitchyzna*, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 (1988).

[9] Shcherbak, no. 10, ibid., 118.

[10] Shcherbak, no. 4, ibid., 22.

[11] "The Revelation of St. John the Divine," *The Holy Bible*, Ch. viii, verses 10 and 11.

[12] Chornobyl also started to turn up in various entertainment programs, as in one by the Lviv group " Ne Zhurys!" In their skit the enemy is blamed for wanting the USSR to have a poorly designed nuclear power station; however, the Soviets have outwitted the enemy, and now their *peaceful* nuclear stations have even more nuclear power than Western nuclear *military* units.

[13] Volodymyr Morenets, "Poetychna epika Chornobylia," *Radianske literaturoznavstvo*, no. 12 (1987): 3.

[14] Bohdan Stelmakh, "Istoriia," *Zhovten*, no. 6 (1988): 9.

[15] Borys Oliinyk, "Doroha na Prypiat," *Vitchyzna*, no. 1 (1987): 24.

[16] Leonid Horlach, "Zona," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 22 January 1987.

[17] Viktor Kordun, "Lyst iz domu," "Zona," *Ukraina*, no. 39 (1988): 5.

[18] Natalka Bilotserkivets, "Traven," *Ukraina*, no. 27 (1987): 13.

[19] Ievhen Onatskyi, "Iashchur," *Mala ukrainska entsyklopediia* (Buenos Aires: 1957–1963), 2133.

[20] Stepan Sapeliak, "Gernika Chornobylia," *Suchasnist*, no. 7–8 (1988): 15–17. It should be noted that the nazi bombing of Guernica took place in 1937, also on April 26.

[21] Anatolii Kychynskyi, "Hirka travo moia chornobyl!," *Doroha zavzdovzhky v liubov* (Kiev: Molod, 1988), 40.

[22] Iryna Myronenko, "Mamyni stezhky," *Dnipro*, no. 12 (1988): 3.

[23] Oksana Pakhlovska, *Dolyna khramiv* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1988), 27.

[24] *Ibid.*, "Vydinnia sukhykh osokoriv," 27.

[25] *Ibid.*, "Chornobyl," 57.

[26] *Ibid.*, "Ne vpiznaiu...," 32.

[27] Tamara Severniuk, "Zelenyi vohon zemli," *Dnipro*, no. 3 (1989): 100–101.

[28] Naum Tykhy, "Kyiv. Traven 1986–ho," *Kyiv*, no. 11 (1988): 16.

[29] Ivan Hnatiuk, *op. cit.*

[30] Svitlana Iovenko, "Vybukh," *Vitchyzna*, no. 5 (1987): 2–21.

[31] Borys Oliinyk, "Sim," *Literaturna Ukraina*, no. 38, 17 September 1987.

[32] Borys Oliinyk, "Pryshestia," *Dnipro*, no. 1 (1989): 2–11.

[33] Ivan Drach, "Chornobylska Madonna," *Vitchyzna*, no. 1 (1988): 42–62.

[34] *Ibid.*, 48.

Proishla vsi storozhi,
Mynula vsi obvaly
Palaly ii rozhi,
Iak pivni—heneraly
    Bulo vse, mov na lezi,
    Iakomu vse stynaty,—
    I kvitku priamo v tsezii
    Potsiluvala Maty.
Vse plakalo na sontsi,
Ne khtilo pomyraty,
I kvitku priamo v strontsii
Postiluvala Maty

[35] Ivan Dziuba, "Muzy ne movchat," *Vitchyzna*, no. 6 (1988): 164.

[36] Iurii Andrukhovych, "Povik ne vyshchezne trava," *Ukraina*, no. 4 (1989): 7.

[37] Leonid Daien, *Chornobyl—trava hirka* (Kiev: Veselka, 1988).

[38] Anatolii Mykhailenko, "Zapakh polynu," *Dnipro*, no. 11 and 12 (1988).

[39] Volodymyr Iavorivsky, "Mariia z polynom pry kintsi stolittia," *Vitchyzna*, no. 7 (1987): 16–139.

[40] Hryhorii Klochek, "Uroky pravdy," *Kyiv* 7 (1988): 139.

[41] Raul Chilachava, "Derevlianska Iaroslavna z nemovliam," *Dnipro*, no. 12 (1988): 18.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Personal interviews with Vladimir Gubarev, 9 and 11 February 1989.

[44] Personal interview with Anatolii Tkachenko, 9 March 1989.

[45] Mykhailenko, "Zapakh polynu," *Dnipro*, no. 11 (1988): 23.

[46] Oksana Pakhlovska, "Bula sumna," *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[47] Ivan Iov, "Nabolile," *Vitchyzna* 12, (1988): 12.

[48] Mykola Som, "Marusia iz Prypiati," *Poeziia, 1'88* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1988), 42.

[49] Lesia Voronina "Zelenyi svit" (interview with Iurii Shcherbak) in *Ukraina*, no. 6 (1989): 2; Dmytro Iliushyn in "Zberehty dlia nashchadkiv," *Ukraina* (1989) 12 and inserts, describes some of the art treasures that are being collected in Chornobyl.

[50.] *Ibid.*, 1.

[51] Mykhailenko, "Zapakh polynu," *Dnipro*, no. 12 (1988): 40.

[52] Taras Romaniuk, "Chornobyl: Vidplata za vseliudski hrikhy chy za natsionalnyi infantylizm?" *Kafedra*, no. 4 (1988): 23–25.

[53] Ivan Dziuba, "Muzy ne movchat," *Vitchyzna*, no. 6 (1988): 157.

[54] I am grateful to Professor Ivan Holowinsky of Rutgers University for discussing this aspect with me, and for referring to these two terms.

[55] There are four major Soviet films on the subject: "The Bell of Chornobyl," "Two Colors of Time," "Chronicle of Difficult Weeks," "The Threshold." The first three have suffered severe censorship and great delays in being shown in the USSR.

[56] Mykhailenko, "Zapakh polynu," *Dnipro*, no. 12 (1988): 40.

[57] *Ibid.*, 24.

[58] Oksana Pakhlovksa, "Ia chuiu skryp...," *op. cit.*, 29.

[59] Mykola Adamenko, "Hran." *Poeziia 1'88*, (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1988), 49.

[60] Ivan Dziuba, "Muzy ne movchat," 166.

[61] Ivan Drach, "Chornobylska Madonna," 62.

[62] Lesia Voronina, "Zelenyi svit" (interview with Iu. Shcherbak).



SETH FELDMAN

A Well-Spring for the Thirsty:

Iurii Illienko's Film Times Three

Iurii Illienko's film, *Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh* (*A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*)[1], is an homage to Alexander Dovzhenko's *Zemlia* (*Earth*). As such, it is part of the sporadic dialogue that may be expected when a frequently suppressed culture (in an easily suppressed medium) is finally allowed to speak. A second assertion we may make is that, because it is a result of this sporadic dialogue, *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* is not one, but three films. It is first a film of 1930, the year in which *Earth* was made. It is a film of 1965, the year of its own production. And it is also a film of today, a text that must be brought to life by the contemporary audience viewing it.

This paper will consider all three films. It may be argued that this strategy is particularly apt given the film's central motif of the ever-flowing well. But there is yet another consideration. *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* does more than tap the well of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian cinema. Like any film, it also has something to say about the "well-spring" of cinema itself. It is within the parameters of cinema that we begin our examination.

It may be a bit odd to say so after screening Illienko's stunning text, but film, in general, is a very conservative medium. Young as it may be, film has succeeded in achieving its mass audiences by establishing aesthetic guidelines every bit as rigorous as those of Renaissance painting. Like Renaissance painting, the precision of film exposition is matched only by the narrowness of expectation enforced upon the spectator. We are trained from our first screenings to read films in an extremely efficient but highly conventionalized manner. Each screening re-enforces our notion of what film is—and isn't; that is, what we will have difficulty viewing as a "real movie."

Given our shared definition of the medium, cinema itself is a kind of "well-spring" from which the filmmaker draws. He or she may decide how deep to go in drawing upon our shared perception. Like Steven Spielberg making *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, the filmmaker may wish to exactly replicate the codes of a particular moment in cinema history (in this case, the 1930s adventure film).

Or, in a more perverse way, the filmmaker may chose to challenge the precepts of older texts; for example, Pedro Almodovar's *Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown* as the 1980s remake of a generic 1940s "women's film."

Whether the artist accepts or challenges the conventions from which s/he draws, the net effect remains that of drawing attention to the well-spring itself. This is brought out quite nicely not in a film but in one of the most striking meditations upon quotation we have, Jorge Luis Borges' "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote." That short story takes the shape of a fictional obituary. The deceased, Pierre Menard, sometime in the early twentieth century, has rewritten work for work chapters 9 and 38 of *Don Quixote*. Borges writes of Menard's accomplishment:

> It is a revelation to compare Menard's work with Cervantes. The latter for example wrote:
> ...truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present and the future's counselor.
> Written in the 17th century, written by the "lay genius" Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other hand writes:
> ...truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present and the future's counselor.
> History is the *mother* of truth; the idea is astounding. Menard, who is a contemporary of William James, does not define history as a inquiry into reality but as its origins. Historical truth for him is not what happened but what we judge to have happened. The final phrases—*exemplar and advisor to the present and the future's counselor*—are brazenly pragmatic.[2]

Borges' point of course is that the present always reads the past in the present context. The past, in fact, is the usable past. Every era chooses that moment of the past to use as its own polemic. We have our readings of Quixote, just as we chose our Shakespeare for the times. And there is nothing the past can do about it.

It is with Pierre Menard in mind that we might finally begin our discussion of—*A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*. As Borges might call him "Iurii Illienko, Author of Dovzhenko's *Earth*" has chosen to situate himself not simply in relation to the earlier film but also in relation to the period which gave it birth: the late silent cinema in the Soviet Ukraine. The first thing that we must note about this period is that it was obsessed with sound. Although *Earth* was shot as a silent film, Dovzhenko could not help but be aware of the furor created by the talkies since their introduction in the United States some three years before. By 1930, that debate was, in fact, centered in Soviet filmmaking. Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov had issued their widely disseminated "Manifesto" on the correct use of sound as a non-synchronous montage element. Perhaps even more pertinent were the experiments being performed at

VUFKU (all-Ukrainian Film Trust) in 1929 and 1930 by Dziga Vertov. Those experiments in location recording the close cutting of industrial noises with music were to yield Vertov's own concrete symphony, *Enthusiasm*.

A Well-Spring for the Thirsty is the sound film that *Earth* might have been. As Professor Virko Baley has told us, very little of the sound track is modern synchronized sound. As a concrete symphony, the film reconstructs a sense of sound cinema as it was coming into being. True to the "Manifesto" and to Vertov's experiments, it treats sound as an element in its own right to be played against the images in Soviet montage's classic sense of a "collision" of elements.

Now for the Pierre Menard question: how does *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* function as a film of 1965? Put another way, why *must* the film be read as more than the reconstruction of the concerns of a long past era? The simple answer is that between 1930 and 1965 the conventional perception of film sound (against which any theory would be measured) underwent at least two radical reassessments. In the early 1930s film sound was still read by audiences as a standard of technical achievement, proof of progress in the medium and the contemporality of the film being screened. However, as the talkies became the only films being released to audiences, the option of synchronized sound took on the second connotation of "normalcy." It was no longer a symbol of progress as much as it was the invisible norm of the industry. Conversely, these connotations led to the concept of "silent cinema" first as the despised obsolete form and later as "classical" cinema.

In the decade before *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*, synchronous sound in cinema took on a third connotation, that of veracity. Working in 1965, Illienko would have been aware of the *cinéma vérité* movement made possible by the invention of the lightweight tape recorders and portable synchronization systems. Not only documentarians, but filmmakers of all bents were, by the early 1960s, proclaiming the death of the conventional feature film and the primacy of synchronized sound films shot in the field with ordinary people as their stars. However, in 1965, Illienko may have also been aware of the reaction against *cinéma vérité*. Jean-Luc Godard, a prime instigator of this response, insisted upon a formalist rethinking of sound and image. Swept up in the applications of *cinéma vérité*, Godard, in the early 1960s, had proclaimed cinema to be "truth 24 times per second." But by the mid-1960s, he made it clear that the cinema he meant was a cinema laid bare, seen in all its elements.

Hence, the cinema debates of 1965 had returned to the formalist concerns of the Golden Age of Soviet Cinema; (Godard himself recognized this in a far more direct fashion than would have been permitted in the Soviet Union by forming his Dziga Vertov Group in 1968.) But in making this assertion, we must recognize two factors: first that the debate was informed by all that had happened in the interim; and secondly, that the discussion of these issues provided an entree into the entire usable past of cinema itself, i.e. the debate dispelled the facile notions of obsolescence of any device or format.

This second point is seen quite clearly in the rebirth of the intertitle. Godard used it in his films of this period to enact the Brechtian function of interpreting and pointing to narrative. The same may be said of the function of

Illienko's few intertitles in *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*. Unlike the conventionalsilent film intertitles of the 1920s, they do not carry dialogue or plot, so much as announce the next act (thus pointing it out as an act). They are also ironic, part of the mood to be generated by both the sound and images. In using the intertitles this way, Illienko carries forward the 1920s notion of "collision" in Soviet montage (q.v. Vertov's similarly unconventional use of intertitles in his 1926 film, *A Sixth Part of the Earth*) while simultaneously exploiting their 1960s potential.

What may be said for Illienko's use of intertitles may also be said for this use of film stocks. With the coming of sound, the lush panchromatic, nitrate based film stocks available to silent film directors were taken out of production. Sound tracks could only be reprinted onto more limited orthochromatic stocks. In the early 1950s, the look of films changed again when the extremely dangerous nitrate based stocks were replaced with slightly less transparent safety film.

Seen in this context, *Earth* is one of the last great moments in silent cinematography. Projected (as it rarely is) on the original film stocks, it offers a "look" that is impossible to duplicate today. Nor, in quoting *Earth*, does Illienko try for any such direct duplication. But what he does accomplish is even more interesting than any such direct quotation: Illienko is suggesting the idea of a "look" *per se*. In his use of high contrast, special use industrial film stock, he is eliciting an appreciation for the creative element contributed by film stocks themselves. This is another formalist gesture, another deconstruction of the medium. In the context of 1965, Illienko's choice of film stocks may be compared to a similar choice made by Godard for his 1964 film, *Les Carabiniers*.

Illienko's Pierre Menardism is, then, apparent in all his formalist allusions to the past: sound, intertitles and film stock. It is equally apparent in this quotation of formalism itself. For Dovzhenko (perhaps more in *Zvenigora*, or in Ukrainian *Zvenyhora*, and *Aresenal* than in *Earth*) formalism itself held the connotation of making cinema one's own. That "one," may have been the Revolution. In the long run, though, the Revolution, in its proclamation of socialist realism, certainly didn't think so. Nor was Dovzhenko's appropriation of cinema exactly congruent with that of the Moscow based post-revolutionary filmmakers. At the first screening of *Zvenigora* in Moscow (at which Eisenstein and Pudovkin had been hurriedly called in to interpret the work of this Ukrainian madman), the sense of comradeship was not so much theoretical as it was emotional.[3] The otherness of *Zvenigora* was grounds for celebration. By 1930, Dovzhenko's contribution to Soviet cinematic formalism was an affirmation that, within the movement, diversity was possible.

In 1965, Illienko's contribution to cinematic formalism was a challenge to all that had happened since the declaration of socialist realism. Certainly, Illienko was pushing the limits of the censorship weakened by Khrushchev's thaw (a moment, he would find, that had all but passed). But there was a second, even more subversive, connotation to undertaking the issues of the Golden Age in 1965. In the 1960s, poetic formalist cinema was revolutionary cinema. This was true not only with Godard in France, but in the underground cinemas, both political and experimental, that flourished throughout the Western world. It

was even more so in Third World cinemas as they were practiced in Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Senegal, Algeria, Mozambique. In other words, Illienko was speaking with a dangerous internationalism. In the usage of one prophet of the era, Marshal McLuhan, he was preaching a return to global tribalism, an interest in subjectively understood pre-literate perceptions—an interest that was, paradoxically, universal.

Thus, even before one turns to the plot and themes of *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*, Illienko has given us a text whose very existence uses a kind of artistic time travel in the service of broad social commentary. Looking at the film's plot and themes only strengthens the argument. To take one small example, we may speak to the Menardism that manifests itself in the death of the old man; that is, the opening of Dovzhenko's *Earth* and as the central concern of *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty*. In the 1930 film, the old man chooses his moment to die. With the village gathered around him and amid boundless fertility, he takes one last bite of an apple. After a moment's derision from Vasyl, the film's young Communist martyr/hero, the old man, in fact, dies. More importantly, from the perspective of Illienko's film, he stays dead. Later in *Earth*, one of the old man's friends is taunted by the village children for trying to communicate with him beyond the grave.

As Ivor Montague noted shortly after the release of *Earth*, this permanence of death, was central to the conceptual framework of Dovzhenko's work.

> ...the key to all the poignancy in Dovzhenko's films is death. Just that, the simplest thing of all. Death apprehended never as an end, a finish, dust to dust. But death as a sacrifice, the essential one, a part of the unending process of reviving life...Pantheism? No. Nature worship? Not at all. Sound Marxist dialectics: the union of opposites. Dovzhenko's films are crammed with deaths. No artist in any medium has torn more rawly at the heart strings. But no death in Dovzhenko was ever futile.[4]

In contrast to Dovzhenko's *Earth* as read by Montague, Illienko's film is a hymn to the futility of death. The old man, a visual quote of the Dovzhenko character, cannot chose his moment; his attempt to do so is the film's running joke. Rather than eat his apple the old man, in the end, uproots his orchard. Nor does the younger generation benefit from his attempted sacrifice. His children belittle not only him, but the very idea of his dying. Montague's Marxist dialectic of death is torn asunder. The very real sacrifice of the old man's son during World War II is rewarded only by an utterly useless statue direct from the Central People's Monument Works. Even the birth in the midst of death (another quote from *Earth*) that we see in the film's epilogue has been removed from its original context. The old man hasn't died. The land remains barren. And so does the iconography. There is no symbolic link—only the image of a woman going into labor on a sand dune.

At this thematic level, Illienko must break with Pierre Menard in order to make *Earth* readable in the context of his own times. Were he to simply remake *Earth* shot for shot, the film would be absurd to the point of being unreadable.

The director could not, in 1965, reaffirm Dovzhenko's characterization of the villainous kulaks (i.e. the ordinary Ukrainians whom Stalin was about to slaughter by the millions). Nor could his film sustain the derision of Ukrainian audiences who, in 1965, were still waiting for the tractor seen arriving in 1930. On a more subtle level, could anyone evoke the poetry of death as sacrifice after Stalin's and Hitler's genocide?

Illienko's poetry is of necessity post-apocalyptic: the iconography has failed. Objects and archetypes simply wander across the barren landscape vaguely aware of their iconographic precedents. The old man dying and the pregnant woman, the fruit, the horses are nothing but themselves. The MIG, which to Dovzhenko might have represented the future and progress, becomes nothing more than a prop in this meaningless procession.

In all this 1965 remake of *Earth* is the terrible thought that the past is barren, that the well has run dry. For an ancient culture like that of Ukraine, it is a frightening assumption. A culture that exists only sporadically is that much more dependent on a geographical center, a well-spring. Certainly, this is a central motif for Dovzhenko (e.g. the holy mountain in *Zvenyhora*, the concept behind *Arsenal*). The true horror of *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* is Illienko's posing of the question of whether that source can, after all these years, still function. What if the well contains only water?

A Well-Spring for the Thirsty in 1965 was a documentary of sorts on the state of the Ukrainian soul after decades of Soviet domination. What it condemns most strongly are not a people losing their roots but the hollowness enforced upon a culture by a conqueror. The state inspired pantheism and official folk culture are as empty as the umpteenth screening of *Earth*.

And what, finally, is *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* in 1989? Like all the *glasnost* films, it provides Soviet audiences and Westerners with a second chance at undertaking the agenda of the mid-1960s. Thanks to comrade Brezhnev's deep freeze, we have a fair body of work that has lain dormant through the ravages of 1970s structuralism and 1980s postmodernism. Indeed, if *glasnost* as a whole succeeds, it will thaw out an even deeper deep freeze and reveal to the world an intellectual and artistic sensitivity that has developed outside of modernism and postmodernism. To cite one example: just as Andrei Tarkovsky's films continued the humanist and existential struggles abandoned by much of world cinema, his writings provide a missing link between pre-War humanist film theory and the needs of contemporary film scholars.

In this context, *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* would be as hard a film to make and see in the West as it would be to make and see in the Soviet Union. Putting aside for a moment the historical and conceptual work of specialists in Soviet and Ukrainian studies, what tools would our culture have to receive it? In Hollywood, film poetry has become equated with special effects which, in turn are judged with a kind of technological linearity. ("Oh yeah, it's interesting. But it's been done before.") Nor could the film be read in the context of Hollywood cinema's salable themes: teenage farce, occult murders, the sexual adventures of yuppies. This film, from Hollywood's perspective, is art house stuff.

From their perspective, the art houses would see the film as somewhat old-fashioned. As experimental cinema, *A Well-Spring for the Thirsty* would have a certain attraction to the old guard, people whose lyrical, personal work is often derided as "romanticism." These are artists who—in this historical age—value historical links. But Illienko would mean little to the minimalist wing of experimental filmmaking or to the obscurest, politically correct postmodern filmmakers.

I do not mean to end this paper with a rejection letter from either Paramount Pictures or The Filmmaker's Co-op. On the contrary, I believe the challenge posed by the *glasnost* films—both here and in the Soviet Union—is to find a critical home for this newly thawed sensibility. Ten years ago, the new German cinema offered us just such an exercise; the spiritual grandchildren of the Wiemer period used the tools of their forbearers to question to effects of a long interim. Today, with the far more complex challenge of the *glasnost* films, we have opportunity to learn how film interacts with its own past and survives suppression. A film centered around an ancient and unpredictable well-spring is not a bad place to start that project.

ENDNOTES

[1] In the English language literature pertaining to it, Illienko's film is variously referred to as "A Well for the Thirsty" and "A Spring for the Thirsty." I am proposing here to combine the two translations with the somewhat archaic but entirely appropriate English term "well-spring." While the term may be somewhat less prosaic than Illienko may have intended, it elicits at least one of the connotations established by the film itself (see text) and certainly corresponds to the poetic ambience of the work.

[2] Jorge Luis Borges, "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote" in *Labyrinths* (New York: New Directions, 1964), 43.

[3] See Jay Leyda, *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 242–244.

[4] Ibid., 275.



NICK M. LARY

Contexts for Illienko

Illienko's two long-suppressed films, *Well-Spring for the Thirsty* and *Eve of Ivan Kupalo,* in images, structure and use of sound are examples of poetic cinema, but they are very different. Virko Baley has usefully characterized them as 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' respectively. Illienko's talent is a powerfully diverse one.

The many Soviet films that have been put into circulation as a consequence of *glasnost* present us with a range of questions, which also have a bearing on Illienko's films.

There is, first of all, the matter of contextual understanding of films. The controversial films from the Soviet Union are in the first instance commentaries on their context—particularly the dominant socialist realist tradition in film, and more generally the political, social and economic situation. The question is: are they interesting over and above this context?

We have of course learned enough from postmodern criticism to be suspicious of works that appeal to universal values and universal man. We suspect that universal man is a creation of a particular cultural and political elite anxious to protect its position (and for the term 'particular cultural elite' in this case we may substitute 'Russian cultural elite'). Nonetheless I want to make a distinction between works that seem so powerful that they make us want to seek out and understand the contexts from which they come and works that are approachable in the first instance only within certain particular contexts and traditions. (I leave aside the question of why these works reach out—and acknowledge the danger that they may do so only because they appeal to and reaffirm certain 'dominant' prejudices in our own context.) Surely, not just *any* film is worth discussing. At the same time I acknowledge that the reasons why a certain film is not worth discussing may have to be defended; they may also have to be reconsidered. Particular sensitivity is called for in examining the works of a culture that has had to defend itself from colonization.

I suggest that Paradzhanov is clearly in the first category of films; that is, those that make us want to understand the context from which they come. His stunning achievement—or rather the achievement of Paradzhanov and his cinematographer Illienko in *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors* is to create a film in which the flow of time and space belongs to the world of myth rather than reality. It is breathtaking in its direct assertion of world of myth. It immediately denies history, and thus it denies the Revolution. The beauty of the images of this film has received tribute from Toronto audiences over and over. Sokurov's film *Lonely Voice of a Man* (or *Lonely Human Voice*), which we shall be screening in the current Soviet film series after Illienko's films, is clearly in a category of films with Paradzhanov's.

Many works we saw this summer, 1988, at the Festival of Festivals in Toronto are more clearly in the other category. They are interesting above all within a context as a comment on that context—films such as German's *Proverka na dorogakh* (*Trial on the Road*) showing men who let themselves be taken by Germans in a possibly favorable light, or Panfilov's *Proshu Slovo* (*I Want to Speak*) which is a study of a type of dedicated bureaucrat in the Brezhnev era.

A group of other questions arises. Do some artists seem better simply because they are suppressed? Do some artists—with real talents—suffer because they are not given the chance to develop freely, are not subject to intelligent criticism, and do not have the opportunity to find the best artists with whom they have an affinity, and to work with them? (Even Paradzhanov arguably suffered. *Suram Fortress* shows the effects of years of imprisonment.) Are the suppressed artists part of an underground history in which they continued to inspire other talents while they themselves were deprived the opportunity to develop in same measure? We need to know this underground history. This is part of *glasnost*.

A related question arises. Do film artists need the challenge of other artists—as script-writers, actors, composers? Eisenstein constantly looked for that kind of challenge. His script-writers included Babel. For *Ivan the Terrible* he tried working with a leading novelist—Leonov—but could not get from him what he wanted. For this film he looked for the best actors he could find from an opposing tradition of acting (the Moscow Art Theatre). Illienko in *Well-Spring for the Thirsty* had the advantage of working with a script by a major poet—Ivan Drach. In *Eve of Ivan Kupalo* he worked from his own script—and I want to suggest certain weaknesses of the film are connected with this. The script is inspired by Gogol, but not sufficiently constrained by Gogol. Virko Baley has indicated the powerful contribution Illienko could make working in collaboration with Paradzhanov on *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*. Did he possibly need the constraint and stimulus of another powerful artistic talent in working on *Ivan Kupalo?*

The question overhanging this discussion is. In which category does Illienko belong? Do his films attract us over and above their context, or are they tied to a particular Soviet context (I report here the comment of one spectator, a recent émigré at the screening the other night of *Well-Spring for the Thirsty*,

"You have to live for twenty years in Ukraine in order to understand the greatness of this film").

We are fortunate in that Illienko's films bring with them two somewhat familiar contexts—and thus the question about his interest strictly within the Soviet or Ukrainian context—or over and above these contexts—is one that we do not immediately have to face. One context is filmic—Dovzhenko's *Earth* for *Well-Spring for the Thirsty*. The context for the other film is literary—Gogol's tale which we know in English as "St. John's Eve." (I realize with some apprehension that in offering this 'classical' context I shall enter the domain of controversy: Gogol is always a problematic author for Ukrainian culture because the questions he wanted to explore were finally set in the broadest Russian imperial context.)

WELL-SPRING FOR THE THIRSTY

The thing that is striking about this film is the disruption, the broken rhythms, the sense of disaster. There is reference to agricultural rhythms: watering trees; washing ripe apples. We see the work—and the well—that make this life possible; we see the family sleeping outdoors in summer (we note the deliberate refusal to make the bodies beautiful). But in Dovzhenko's great poetic film *Earth* the powerful agricultural rhythms encompass the transformation of the country under collectivization; they naturalize collectivization. In Illienko's film we see and feel the disruption of these rhythms—chopping down young trees—the intrusions—the plane that keeps appearing, and the family members, urban, tough and nasty-looking who appear on a motorcycle (the "bitch").

The war is the major disruption. It is just a disaster: it is not the great fight of Soviet people against the evil Fascists. A voice—in Russian—announces the death of the son. This discontinuity—the death of the son—is representative of all the other disruptions.

The whole structure of the film is deliberately choppy. Disruption is taken into the form: photographs of people chopping wood or just standing by are inserted. Suddenly one of the photographs turns out to be a shot of people standing almost motionless. Illienko is playing around with remembered time and present time. He also plays around with the convention of the frame in the shot of a woman framed by window, who then moves away from the window frame. What are we seeing? Another kind of disruption is that surreal shot towards the end of the film of a table set outdoors in a desolate place, with the wind blowing it clear.

The more we see the film, the more it opens up, and the more the disruption of the structure becomes apparent. In relation to Dovzhenko, Illienko's thematic and formal interruptions of rhythms are powerful. Dovzhenko provides a context which gives meaning to Illienko's minimalist shots. *But* the artistic experimentation is perhaps more exciting for an audience living under constraints of socialist realist art, with its attempt to subject all life to certain limited rhythms. It is bound to be more powerful for a scattered people who feel that the well, which should nourish them, is polluted and neglected. The

sense of forbidden themes, images, rhythms will give the film a charge for which the imagination is no substitute.—(To avoid any misunderstanding I do not mean to imply that Dovzhenko's *Earth* is socialist realist. It was of course made before 1934, but in any case its powerful celebration of nature can be read as *subversive* of the emerging socialist realist aesthetic).

EVE OF IVAN KUPALO

In approaching a film from a literary work we must fight against the tendency to say, "But of course this is not the book." I think the best adaptations send us back to the book. They are a sort of a commentary on the book. They send us back not just in the sense experienced by my good friend who went to see the six-hour, two-part film adaptation of *Little Dorrit* Part 1 and felt, after three hours, "Why stay for Part 2?" Instead she bought the book and is now reading it. The great Leningrad filmmaker, who was born in Kiev, Grigorii Kozintsev felt that an adaptation was a way of continuing the life of a book on the screen. It was also an artistic commentary on the book.

I suggested that a 'classical' literary text—Gogol's *St. John's Eve*—gives us access to this film of Illienko's. In fact the film *depends* on this context. It is arguably a narrative weakness of the film that it depends on knowledge of Gogol's story for intelligibility. I will attempt to show that it does not finally wish to use Gogol's story. (The story is the film's crutch which it wishes to throw away but cannot do without.) This context is a problematic one for another reason as well: for the text the film wishes to *substitute* a peculiarly Ukrainian view of Gogol, while *retaining* from the text a knowledge of its narrative structure to explain the film images.

Illienko is sophisticated about the question of adaptation. He does not believe in literal adaptation. He knows that the visual language of film is different than the conceptual language of literature. He is a good reader of literature. He rightly sees that the crucial moment in Gogol's tale is the sacrifice of blood—or the pact of blood, in which Petro agrees to the death of an innocent boy in exchange for a pile of gold with which he can marry his master's daughter. The power of Gogol's effect is that he is able to allude to what happens. Film must show. And so the challenge for the filmmaker is to find some visual way of expressing this major betrayal. (One question is—does Illienko succeed? This is after all a big moment—sacrificing someone for the sake of fortune—the sort of thing *Crime and Punishment* is constructed on. My own view is that this theme is not as clear in the film as in the tale).

Illienko's film is strangely pretty compared with Gogol's tale—deceptively pretty. He tells us that the prettiness is hyperbolic. He is destroying a pastoral vision by hyperbole (which he says is also present in Gogol's presentation of the old patriarchal order). Now the pastoral, patriarchal vision, hyerbolic or not, is found in the early Gogol but not in his tale we know in English as *St. John's Eve*, with its repeated stress on the poverty of the village. The people live in holes in the ground, and you know that these holes are inhabited by one of "God's creatures" if you see a plume of smoke emerging from it. They are forced to live this way because the whole Cossack society they live in is made

up of brigands. Any wealth a man acquires by pillaging has to be hidden or it will be acquired by another. This is Gogol's vision of Cossack society.

And here we come to the reasons for saying that Gogol's tale is a false context. Illienko was serious in his adaptation of Gogol. But the film is more a commentary on selected works of Gogol than an adaptation of the tale *St. John's Eve.* As Virko Baley so aptly observes, it is only 'nominally' an adaptation. Illienko has read widely—in Gogol. He has also read critics—including in particular the symbolist poet and writer Andrei Bely—who stress the presence of hyperbole and the music. From his reading of Gogol Illienko says that Gogol's patriarchal vision of old society is an ironic one. Hyperbole is a device that can find ready application in film. The awkward paradox, however, is that Illienko is not just inspired by Gogol; he specifically relies on a knowledge of Gogol's tale for an understanding of the narrative structure of the film. (Unless we know the tale it is difficult to follow the sequence in which Petro makes the pact of blood with Satan—and possibly the presentation of his wife's complicit ignorance of his crime). But this same context works against the particular ironic idealization of the patriarchal society in Illienko's film—there is no idealization—ironic or other—of the old patriarchal order in Gogol's tale.

Gogol's tale is both more direct in its view of the Ukrainian village, and more painfully ambiguous in its relationship to the culture of imperial Russia. Illienko ignores altogether Gogol's problem of 'telling the tale' which is as important a concern as Petro's Faustian deal. The story begins with a discovery of the tale transcribed and printed and on sale at a market stall. The teller—the deacon—who is shown this book, rejects the written, printed version. All writers tell lies. The oral storyteller—the deacon—too tells lies because only the story he is immediately telling is true—in the present telling, in the performance. And there is no recapturing that; there is no going back. In the narration the grandfather never told a lie and is the only authority in the tales within tales—but his remembered voice is constantly interacting with the narrator's own voice (the deacon's voice) and the voice of his old aunt. And there are two further frames: the deacon's narration is in fact being remembered by someone else; and it is given to us in the printed covers of a book, which of course is a lie. This bears on Gogol's own situation as a writer—his relationship to the oral—Ukrainian tradition if you like—which he simultaneously attaches himself to and detached himself from, and his chosen work as a published writer in the urban world of the Russian Empire. There is nothing joyful here. Betrayal is deeply built into the fabric of the story—into the telling as well as the plot. Petro achieves wealth through betrayal—a pact with Satan (Basavriuk) and the blood sacrifice of a boy who once stood up for him.

There are film equivalents to the question. What is authentic telling? Consider the question as to what is authentic seeing in Antonioni's *Blow Up.* Or various exercises in point of view. There is space for this sort of argument in film. There is also a visual equivalent of the folk voice—Paradzhanov has it. By the end of the film—cumulatively, the disadvantages, the distortions, the simplifications, the avoidances—are overcome. Illienko finds a voice in the course

of his film—even an authentic folk voice. It is a film in which he grows. What happens? Illienko has said that there are three parts in his film:

1. The ironic pastorale, in which irony is achieved through hyperbole so that the pastorale explodes from within.
2. The psychological drama—of Petro, who makes a pact with the devil and agrees to the death of Pidorka's little brother so that he can mary her, and of Pidorka who refuses to see that her husband had made a blood sacrifice and that her wealth rests on this deed.
3. The world of Ukrainian folklore, an exploration of Ukrainian history which is not tied to Gogol. This part of the film I think works best—the last, where Illienko is perhaps most freely himself—the part which does not derive from Gogol. Illienko's film here is closer to the fairy tale world of the *skaz*.

Actually these parts are not sequential but overlapping or synchronous. They are more like levels. The ironic pastorale on the first level, I feel, does not work because it is not true to Gogol in this tale, who is far grimmer (and also because some of Illienko's irony is directed against socialist realist treatments of village life—which for us in not a meaningful context). The psychological story requires further study but its narrative dependence on the tale for intelligibility remains a disturbing consideration (without which the question of whether or not Illienko is faithful to Gogol's tale in the first part would not particularly matter). The third level—the folk view of Ukrainian life—is what holds the other two parts of the film together. It is also on this level that Illienko most nearly approximates Paradzhanov's achievement in *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*.

Illienko falls between an adaptation and a visionary treatment of Gogol, a Gogol whom he wishes to restrict to a Ukrainian setting. The ironic Ukrainian pastorale would have been much better suited for an 'adaptation' of another Gogol work; indeed Illienko might have made a wonderful—subversive—*Taras Bulba*. I wish he had.

Another film artist—who repeated Gogol's journey from Kiev to Petersburg or Petrograd—Grigorii Kozintsev—was planning at the time of his death a major film "The Gogoliad"—no longer tied to adaptation, which moreover did not attempt to separate the Ukrainian Gogol from the Russian Gogol—doing justice therefore to the supreme analysis of the Russian Empire we get in Gogol. The misery of the village in Gogol's *St. John's Eve* is not so far removed from the misery of St. Petersburg in *Nevsky Prospekt* and the related tales. Kozintsev gives an exciting description of *his* vision:

> I clearly see an artist seized with horror at what he has written, at the unbearable reality of the horror, of which he has given so like a portrayal, as if the prince of darkness himself were guiding his hand. And so he hurls himself away from the capital; before him is the unbearable and inconceivable vastness of his native land. And somewhere in the north he hews out a hermitage and remains in solitude—in the midst of the quiet of the emptiness, with his thoughts about God.



VIRKO BALEY

The Poetic Cinema of Iurii Illienko:

The Eve of Ivan Kupalo

"Those were wonderful years, the mid-sixties. The upsurge of our cinema, the Ukrainian cinema in particular, the poetic cinema (a term which later became abusive), opened boundless opportunities for bringing out man's inward life."

—Iurii Illienko

Ukrainian film has a distinguished, if uneven history. Soviet sources state that the first apparatus capable of taking and projecting moving pictures was constructed in 1893 by Joseph Tymoshenko, a mechanic at Odessa University, while one of the first local productions was Alfred Fedetsky's *Train Departure From Kharkiv Depot* made in 1896. By the beginning of the twentieth century, film studios in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa began making films. The outstanding Ukrainian directors at the time were Peter Chardynin, George Stabovy, Dziga Vertov, Gregory Tasin, Ivan Kavaleridze (whose works especially need to be found and analyzed) and of course, Aleksander Dovzhenko. Ukrainian silent cinema reached its pinnacle with Dovzhenko's, *Zvenyhora* (*Zvenigora* in Russian), *Arsenal*, and *Zemlia* (Earth). His films also brought forth the movement now known as "Ukrainian poetic cinema," a movement closely associated with his name and a number of directors who brought attention to Ukrainian film after his death: Sergei Paradzhanov (*Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*), Leonid Osyka (*The Stone Cross*), and Iurii Illienko.

What a historian of Ukrainian culture (and thus by extension, film) must do first is to act out and then resist the burden of Ukrainian history. It is unfortunate that the perception by Ukrainians of their own culture is frighteningly similar to the simplified image that is projected on (and protected by) them by the outside world. It is the mere outward confirmation of the ready-made, the already-known, the cliché. Inflexible myths become reality and thus inhibit rather than free the creative factor in the people. This is a common

phenomenon for nationalities that function on the margin of economic (and thus political) power, are less autonomous, and are thus represented by very few instantly identifiable images. They produce perfect examples of local values—exotic literatures. This view from outside expressed by the nationality itself is one of a series of still-lives: the easter egg, the icon, the pastorale scene, the generic Ukrainian Cossack, the poet Shevchenko, the peasant, etc.

In approaching Ukrainian culture, it is important to understand that its peculiarity as a whole is its "non-linearity," in common with other societies whose culture was affected by shifting political, economic, and societal realities. Unlike for instance, Russian or American cultures, which were handed down and developed from one generation to the next, Ukrainian culture had a series of sporadic emergences, between which it had to keep its identity welded to each of those societies that controlled Ukrainian politics. In a sense, and this may be its central key, Ukrainian culture has lived (and to a certain extent still does now) in diaspora in its own homeland.

The non-linearity of Ukrainian culture has affected Ukrainian artistic mentality, producing a way of thinking which often defies the logic of "Western" art. It is the dream state, the passive resistance of a people in a vulnerable position. The non-linear quality of Ukrainian life has resulted in "mythopoetic realism," similar to the "poetic realism" found in South American literature. Uncommon events become everyday: are seen as everyday. Often such an attitude toward reality and unreality is marked by a kind of wild humor. Hyperbolic atmosphere pervades, in which events that are strange and fantastic somehow seem quite natural. Art becomes introspective, "anti-rational" in a way, but not in the sense of opposing the intellect, but in the sense that it allows "feelings" to dictate shape. The dominant emotional state is metaphorical motion trapped in immobility. This kind of status contrasts with the basic properties of Russian or American art, which tends to aim towards a point, and to have a certain underlying aggressive intellectuality. The above description applies with equal force to "poetic cinema" and to certain films of Iurii Illienko, especially *The Eve of Ivan Kupalo*.

Iurii Illienko burst upon the international scene in 1965 with the release of Sergei Paradzhanov's *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*, and rarely has the concept of any film been so tightly linked to the virtuosic skills of the cinematographer. Soon after that, also in 1965, he made his directorial debut with the hauntingly beautiful film, *A Well-Spring for The Thirsty*, which like *The Eve of Ivan Kupalo*, his second feature made in 1968, was banned until its release in 1987.

To a certain extent, *The Eve of Ivan Kupalo* is a companion piece to *A Well-Spring for The Thirsty*, but more as a counter melody. *Well* is in startling, woodcut-like black and white; *Eve* is in color. *Well* approaches minimalism in its clipped, economical, and slightly non-emotive style (and although powerfully influenced compositionally by Dovzhenko, it is here where he breaks with his spiritual mentor); *Eve* is maximalist in which filmic adjectives, adverbs, subordinate clauses and qualifiers multiply with dizzying intensity. But both films are linked by the use of deeply powerful images that instruct the tale and

are subordinate to the tale. As D.H. Lawrence wrote, "Trust the tale, not the teller."

Nominally, *Eve* is based on the story of the same name by Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol) who, although a Russian writer, was Ukrainian by birth and wrote a whole series of stories based on Ukrainian life and legends. Essentially, *Eve* is a Ukrainian version of the West European Faust legend, about a young man (Petro) who makes a pact with the devil (Basavriuk) to win the woman he loves (Pidorka). As part of the deal, Petro kills Pidorka's little brother, which sets into motion another aspect of the story: Pidorka's refusal to see the reality of Petro's crime and the cause of his ensuing illness (she chooses to believe her brother was kidnapped by gypsies). So in addition to the crime, what is examined by the film is this aspect of compromise. The tragic idea of the film is the folk representation of the essence of evil and of the moral duty of man.

Illienko states: "The world of Gogol is closely intertwined in its consciousness with Ukrainian folk tales, songs, and *vertep* [a form of folk puppet theater] and is a vehicle for their autonomous reality. In fact, the film is perhaps a series of variations on the themes of Gogol and Ukrainian folk tales. The plots of Gogol are like centaurs. They are dual-natured, one expressing the reality of daily life and its rituals which we perceive with our senses, the other which we perceive with our consciousness."

The opening is full of Gogolian grotesqueries and vulgar humor. It quickly establishes the fact that this story takes place in an age of belief in devils, monsters and evil fairies. Ingrained in Gogol's prose and one of the keys to the understanding of the film are three elements that run parallel, coloring each event as it unfolds on the screen: realistic portrayal, ironic presentation, and mystification. Comedy (which includes farce and parody), romance, and drama merge and emerge, transformed at different and often unexpected times. This folk tale then allows not only the merging of folkloric fantasy with the realism of daily life, but brings the spectator to contemplate the belief that all good and evil exact a price, and that perhaps the greatest evils are conformity (refusal to see) and moral superiority.

The film realizes with unflinching brilliance the treacherous cul-de-sacs of life. It is a tale of two people: Petro, who becomes trapped in an odyssey of extreme anguish trying to assemble the bits and pieces of his memory so that he can understand the source of his suffering, and Pidorka, his accomplice who, blinded by love, must also suffer by attempting to bring him back to life and thus achieve forgiveness for them both.

The Illienko method is to bring to the film a series of elements that are used in a manner that suggest historical fact: the Ukrainian village as the place of steppes, forests, and rivers—in other words, the whole of Ukraine. The use of color is closely influenced by folk paintings, an almost barbaric use of colors in highly contrasting combinations: green and red, blue and orange, white and black. The masks of evil that exist in Gogol are realized in the film in "realistic" ways, and represented by typical figures from seventeenth century Ukraine.

The film progresses along a three-way curve. The first and most realistic is the discovery of love, of the social stigma of poverty, and the performance of the crime. The second axis involves the mind of Petro and his torture by memory; self-analysis of Petro as criminal is achieved step by step, and then his death. The third axis is Pidorka's recognition of her complicity and the need for penance. This third part is pure Illienko, a departure from Gogol's tale, and a metaphorical history of Ukraine.

The film handles folklore in the only way possible: not as an ethnographic ornamentation, but as the material with which the story and characterizations are presented, and it thus become the language of the story.



ROMANA M. BAHRY

Soviet Ukrainian Documentary Films and New Directions in Filmmaking

Profound changes have occurred in all Soviet filmmaking, including Ukrainian filmmaking, as a direct result of Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. In May 1986, two months after the 17th Party Congress during which Gorbachev's policies were announced, the 5th Congress of the Union of Soviet Filmmakers took place during which a whole new secretariat was elected with Elem Klimov at is head. Replacing Lev Kulidzhanov as first secretary of the Union, Klimov began implementation of the new policies. The Union of Filmmakers with its new leaders formed the Memorial society, dedicated to uncovering the truth about the repressions of Stalin's regime, formed a bilateral American-Soviet Film Initiative to aid co-operation in cinematography between those two countries[1] and established the Conflicts Commission to review all films which had not been released in the sixties, seventies or eighties.

The Conflicts Commission began to review formerly censored films and consequently such films as *Agoniia* (*Rasputin*, 1975) by E. Klimov, *Proverka na dorogakh* (*Trial on the Road*, 1971) by A. German, *Tema* (*The Theme*, 1979) by G. Panfilov, *Komissar* (*The Commissar*, 1967) by A. Askoldov, *Pokaianie* (*Repentance*, 1984) by Tengiz Abuladze and A. Sokurov's *Odinokii golos cheloveka* (*A Lonely Man's Voice*, 1978) were released.[2] Among the Ukrainian films to be released were *Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh* (*Spring for the Thirsty*, 1965) and *Vechir Ivana Kupala* (*The Eve of Ivan Kupalo*, 1968) by Iurii Illienko and *Vidkryi sebe* (*Discover Yourself*, 1972), a film about the eighteenth century philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda, directed by Rolan Serhienko with Oleksander Koval as cameraman and based on a script by Volodymyr Kostenko and Mykola Shudria.

Another change that occurred was the replacement of the head of Goskino (State Committee for Cinematography), Philip Ermash, by Alexander Kamshalov, a former member of the Ministry of Culture. These changes have contributed to the erosion of Goskino's monopoly of Soviet filmmaking which

included ideological content, financing, production and distribution. The result has been decentralisation with the Union of Filmmakers having more control. The individual film studios are now responsible for their scripts, production and financing. The "new model" of film production and distribution, as announced by E. Klimov in February 1987 at the plenary session of the Filmmakers' Union, calls for autonomous and self-supporting studios based on free market laws.[3]

These changes have in turn resulted in the breaking down of censorship, allowing films on formerly forbidden topics. Consequently films such as *Malenkaia Vera* (*Little Vera*, 1988) by V. Pichul showing a raw "slice of life" of a Soviet working class family in not so positive a light have become possible. Alik Lipkov, Soviet film critic and artistic advisor of the Gorky Film Studio in Moscow, stated in March 1989 in Toronto, "It [censorship] hasn't entirely disappeared. None of the pictures go to distribution without a special permission—but it has become more liberal."[4] Another Soviet film critic and director, Leonid Gurevich, who headed the Glasnost Film Festival on its tour of the USA in March 1989, pointed out that not all films have been released, citing as an example the Russian documentary film *Countersuit* based on a script by Adamovich about the enemies of "perestroika." Gurevich indicated that although Goskino no longer has unconditional control of the Soviet film industry and although it can no longer ignore the Filmmakers' Union, in cases of dispute Goskino still has the final word.[5] Another obstacle to the ideological and financial independence of the Soviet film industry is that Gosteleradio (The Ministry of Telecommunications) does not support the views of the Filmmakers' Union and therefore few of the new films are shown on the state-controlled television network.[6]

An example of a film which has been held back by Kamshalov in Goskino is the animated Ukrainian film, *Pravda krupnym planom* (*A Large Dose of Truth*) by director Volodymyr Honcharov and animator Valerii Konopliov, based on a script by satirist Feliks Kryvin. Produced by the Kiev Popular Education (Science) Film Studio in 1988, it is a humorous political satire which depicts, by means of grotesque and comical visual juxtapositions, the danger of presenting truth in small doses. This film was reviewed by the Conflicts Commission which recommended its immediate release, citing the words of academician D. S. Likhachev, "Laughter by destroying the signs of culture, prepares the foundation for a new culture—a more just one."[7] In spite of this review by the Conflicts Commission, a decision has not yet been made by Goskino.[8]

Yet in spite of these obstacles, new daring films are being made and it is the documentary films that have assumed a new and leading role in Soviet filmmaking. Formerly the role of these films was to serve Communist party propaganda. Now, as a result of "*glasnost*" these documentary films have become leaders in the investigation of truth with a fervent dedication to merciless dissection of the problems of society not normally covered by the Soviet media. These documentary films deal with such subjects as Stalin's repressions, including films about writers and artists destroyed by Stalin, Soviet youth, drug problems, punk-rockers, neo-fascism, environmental problems and pollution,

Afghanistan and its aftermath, destruction of the village, destruction of the Orthodox priesthood, women's issues, current day demonstrations and their suppression by the military.[9] Some of these documentaries such as *Chernyi kvadrat* (*Black Square*, 1988) about suppressed avant-garde art in the 1920's and the 1960's and *Solovetskaia vlast* (*The Power of Solovki*, 1988) about the first gulag in the Solovetski Islands, established in 1923, where many talented artists and poets were tortured and executed (including the Ukrainian theatre director Les Kurbas and Ukrainian poet Mykola Zerov), were shown during the Royal Ontario Museum REP Soviet Film Festival in Toronto, February–March 1989.

Actually, the Soviet documentary has returned to its roots for originally the genre was developed in the USSR during the Revolution and it was Dziga Vertov, one of the most prominent documentary filmmakers (who worked in the Ukrainian film studio VUFKU) that established the theories of *Kino-Pravda* (film truth) or *cinéma vérité*.[10]

Documentary films made in Ukraine, as documentaries in the rest of the Soviet Union, are in the vanguard of *glasnost* except that most of the time (though not always) Ukrainian documentaries are produced in the Ukrainian language. Documentaries in Ukraine are produced primarily in three different studios in Kiev: the Ukrainian News and Documentary Film Studio, the Popular Education (Science) Studio (which also produces animated films) and the Ukrainian Television Film Studio. These documentaries depict a wide range of concerns.[11] and most of the issues examined are just as relevant to the Western as to the Soviet viewer.

Ecological problems are confronted in such films, made in 1988, as *I pro konykiv* (*About the Horses*) by V. Shmotolokha, *Stomleni mista* (*Tired Cities*) by Oleksandr Rodniansky, *Zhuba* (*The Dying Rivers*) by A. Kryvarchuk, *Son* (*The Dream*) by S. Bukovsky, *Zalozhnyky* (*Hostages*) by T. Rodachenko. Documentaries such as *Porih* (*The Threshold*) by V. Artemenko, *Mikrofon* (*Microphone*, 1988) by Georgii Shkliarevsky, *Dzvin Chornobylia* (*The Bell of Chornobyl*, 1986) by Rolan Serhienko (1986) and *Chernobyl*; a *Chronicle of Difficult Weeks* (1986) by Volodymyr Shevchenko present the problems of radiation from the Chornobyl nuclear accident. This last documentary was filmed immediately after the disaster with the result that the director died one year later from radiation. His camera had to be buried because it could not be decontaminated.

Microphone won the prize at the 35th International Film Festival in the West German town of Oberhausen. The film depicts the events of May 1986 and then moves to September 1988 to interviews with inhabitants of one heavily radiated area, the village of Nozdryshche of the Narodnytsky region of Zhytomyr *oblast* (county). Then the movie focusses on a mass ecological meeting that took place in November 1988 in Kiev at which the writer Iurii Shcherbak spoke. During the speeches someone disconnected the microphone and the crowd began to chant in unison "MI-CRO-PHONE" which thus in this movie grows into a metaphor for truth and openness. Shkliarevsky in an interview for the Ukrainian language film magazine *Novyny kineokrana* (*Film News*) described the unwillingness of the Soviet T.V. to broadcast the film.[12]

Another current topic dealt with in the documentaries is the exploitation of women, particularly collective-farm workers. *Slavsia Mariie* (*Ave Maria*) made in 1987 and *V nediliu rano* (*Early on Sunday*) made in 1987, both by Murat Mamedov, depict the fate of women collective farm workers, who as a result of hard physical labor are doomed to premature aging and sickness. A film that depicts the life of women workers in a chicken factory is *Zavtra sviato* (*Tomorrow is a Holiday*) made in 1987 by director Serhii Bukovsky. An extraordinary film that combines this theme of the exploitation of women with Stalin's repressions is the documentary, *Oi hore, tse zh hosti do mene* (*The Uninvited Guests*) made in 1989 by P. Fareniuk with script by F. Zubanych, O. Koval and F. Fareniuk.

This film present the tragic life of a Ukrainian peasant women, Olha Pavlivna Tereshchenko. The 83 year-old woman describes how her family was forced to collectivize in 1933. Her husband was taken away by the authorities, her old father and mother died and she and her little child were forced out of their own house by the authorities. She then lived in a dug-out in the ground with her child. This was 1933 and the height of the Great Famine. She was ordered to work on another collective for several days and left her child in the care of neighbors. When she returned she couldn't find her child. Finally she found the remains of her child wrapped in a cloth. The neighbors had eaten her.

Then during the World War II she was taken by nazi soldiers to Germany where she was forced to do slave-labor. The end of the War brought "freedom" again for her and work on the collective farm from dawn until dusk. She barely saved 150 rubles to buy a hut for herself in which she lives to this day. The authorities, having heard about the interest of the Documentary Film Studio in her life, quickly built her a house in December 1988 and wanted to destroy the hut with a bulldozer. But she wouldn't let them! She wants the hut to be a "museum" after her death.

While Olha Tereshchenko narrates her tragic life, we hear another simultaneous narration over the radio. This is the story "*Ia, Romantyka*" ("Myself") by Mykola Khylovy, a writer repressed by Stalin and censored until Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*. This story is about a fanatical *chekist* (member of the secret police) who is so blinded by his dedication to the accomplishment of what he perceives to be the ideal state that when among "the enemies of the state" that are brought to the tribunal to be executed is a group of Orthodox nuns, among which is his own mother, he rejects all basic humanity and executes her for the sake of the "cause." Thus the life of Olha Tereshchenko—reinforced by the narration of Khvylovy's story, and the camera shots of icons of the Blessed Virgin—becomes a metaphor that transcends reality.

The theme of repressed writers, poets, artists is presented in such films as *Les Kurbas: a Theatre Director for the Future* made in 1988 by director L. Avtonomov, who uses rare film footage from the revolutionary years and the 1920s in which Kurbas himself and his actors appear. This film also consists of interviews with Ukrainian actor Bohdan Stupka, theatre director Les Taniuk and poet Ivan Drach. Another film, *Maister* (*The Master Poet* 1988), by P. Voloshyn, is about the Ukrainian poet Mykola Vorobiov who was forced into

silence in the seventies and who worked as a laborer. *Stina* (*The Wall* 1988), by I. Goldshtein, describes the destruction of the sculpture "Wall of Memory" of artists Ada Rybachuk and Volodymyr Melnychenko. They were accused of modernism and their sculpture (200 meters in length and 6 meters high) in the Baikiv cemetery in Kiev was encased by cement on order of the authorities.

Writers repressed by the tsar in the nineteenth century are not neglected either and sometimes parallels are drawn either directly or indirectly between imperial and twentieth century repression and exploitation, as for example in Mykhailo Pavlov's film *Tut buly vidpochyvaiuchi, abo shliakh na koryst* (*They Rested Here* 1989). *Den pomynannia* (*Remembrance Day* 1988), another film by Pavlov about Vasyl Tarnovsky, friend of Taras Shevchenko, draws parallels between tsarist exploitation and Stalinist repressions. M. Sachenko's 1988 documentary *Nechui* (in Ukrainian a play on words "Don't hear!") is about the nineteenth century Ukrainian writer Nechui-Levytsky who suffered extensively as a result of the imperial censorship of Ukrainian language works. V. Sperkach's *Taras* (1989) describes the censorship and exploitation of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko who was born a serf. This movie uses an interesting image of the breaking up of ice-flows to describe the awakening of consciousness. These three documentaries are filmed in color and are meticulously researched with attention to detail, thus capturing effectively the spirit of the period.

Other documentaries such as *Rana* (*The Wound*, 1988) by M. Mamedov deals with the tragedy of the aftermath of Afghanistan veterans, young maimed soldiers and *Rozdiliu tvii bil* (*I Will Share Your Pain*, 1989) by V. Shkurin is about the earthquake in Armenia. *Tak i zhyvem* (*This is How We Live*, 1987) by Volodymyr Oseledchyk is about Soviet children who have grown up during the Brezhnev years and have rejected communism and have turned to fascism, and wear swastikas on their sleeves. *Rota imeni Shevchenka* (*The Shevchenko Brigade*, 1988) directed by Viktor Kolodny, based on a script by Ukrainian writer and Hispanist scholar Iurii Pokalchuk, is about the fate of the Ukrainian volunteer force, from Western Ukraine, that fought against the Fascists in the Spanish civil war. Iurii Pokalchuk is currently preparing a documentary film about youths in Soviet penal colonies.

Not all the documentary films however present problems nor are they necessarily negative. Many deal with an examination of values and a search for spiritual roots. Into this category fall such documentaries as the humorous character sketch *Galaktionovych* (1988) by A. Koval and A. Karas about a pastry cook from the town of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, who is also a weight-lifter. This man, who in addition to being very strong both physically and morally, has a good sense of humor, and describes to us his philosophy of life. *De zh ta krynychenka*? (*Where is that Well Spring*?, 1989) by O. Mykhailova examines the source of spiritual strength and artistic creativity, especially in music, of the inhabitants of Bukovyna, including composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk, brutally murdered by the KGB in 1979. The film shows abandoned churches being used as garbage dumps and contrasts this to other churches where there is a revival of religious services. *Na rizdvo* (*Christmas Time*, 1989) by V. Storozhenko, A. Karas, D. Koval,

portrays the rich folk customs and religious rituals which exist to the present day in the Carpathian mountain region of Ukraine. These last two films are especially noteworthy in that religious services are filmed, something which was not possible before *glasnost*. One even senses an urgency in the search for spiritual and religious values in these films and at the same time a strong condemnation of the loss of moral values during Stalinism and the Brezhnev era. Other examples of documentaries that fall into this category of search and examination of values, are: *Batiushka* (*The Priest*, 1989) by A. Syrykh; *Vid Panteleimona* (*From Panteleimon*, 1987) by P. Voloshyn; *Kazka odnoho sela* (*The Tale of One Village*, 1987) by Iu. Minzianov.

The most interesting films today in the Soviet Ukraine both from a thematic and artistic point of view are in the documentary genre, a genre that is also particularly suitable to capturing the spirit of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The starkness of these films—which reject all romanticism and fantasy worlds or myths whether Soviet Five-Year Plan or Hollywood ones—functions paradoxically as a stylistic device of *ostranenie*[13] (de-familiarzing), shocking the viewer by presenting reality in a new and unexpected way. As Erik Barnouw has written

> Documentaries have often been seen as disturbing elements. They sometimes show us things that don't fit our preconceptions, our stubbornly held myths. Societies tend to resist the ideas they need for their own renewal. The revealing documentary reminds us of the little child who shocked everyone by saying, "The emperor has no clothes on." That child had the true *glasnost* spirit ...
> The *glasnost* era has affected all Soviet media, all filmmaking. But its effects were visible more promptly in documentaries than in the fiction film.[14]

In Ukrainian cinematography, which is restricted to (1) "poetic cinema" (a unique and highly original style introduced and developed by Oleksander Dovzhenko in the twenties and thirties and continued in the sixties by Sergei Paradzhanov, Iurii Illienko and Andrei Tarkovsky),[15] and (2) films based almost exclusively on literary or mythological stories from the past (e.g. *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*, *Song of the Forest*, *The Eve of Ivan Kupalo*, *The Stone Cross*, *Zakhar Berkut*), these documentary films in the Ukrainian language on contemporary topics are a welcome and long-awaited addition to an otherwise confining Ukrainian film menu.

Several years ago these documentaries would have been labelled anti-Soviet and their makers anti-patriotic. This is no longer the case. Today the documentary filmmakers are actually the most engagé of all artists. There is a realization that honesty in documentaries does not destroy society but in fact improves it and that problems are not solved by being ignored or glossed over. This directness sometimes leads to very negative conclusions, for example in the ecological films; however, at the same time, it also can lead to humor and an ability to laugh at oneself and at one's shortcomings and those as in *Galaktionovych*. And humor is a welcome feature too in Ukrainian films which have been traditionally and predominantly tragic or melodramatic.

There is also a number of animated and fiction films that deserve to be mentioned. These films too are concerned with an examination of values. *Strashna pomsta* (*A Terrible Revenge*, 1988) directed by M. Titov and animated by N. Guz is a horror story based on N. Gogol's story of good and evil, wrongdoing and punishment in a Ukrainian context. Idyllic images of happy Ukrainian village scenes alternate with frightening monsters, which due to the medium of animation flow into one another in a surreal atmosphere, effectively creating horror. Animation is a medium that is particularly suited to artistic experimentation and this is the case of Ukrainian animated movies which have a reputation of being the best and most experimental in the USSR.[16] Certainly this is the case with Honcharov's *A Large Dose of Truth* (which I described above).

Another series of films that is experimental and innovative is the short series entitled *The Life of Pencils* (1988) by V. Kostyleva and the three short animated miniatures entitled collectively *My zhinky* (*We Women*) 1988 and individually: 1) *Sama Krasyva* (*The Most Beautiful*) by E. Kasavina and E. Kirich, 2) *Solodke zhyttia* (*The Sweet Life*) by L. Tkachikova, and N. Chernyshova, artist and 3) *Brevno/Koloda* (*The Log*) by S. Kushnerov. This series has no dialogue and the last two present the realities of married life from an ironical perspective.

Although it is the documentary and animation studios—the Ukrainian News and Documentary Film Studio, the Popular (Education) Science Film Studios and the Ukrainian Television Studio that are producing the most innovative films in Ukraine today, both from the point of view of subject matter and artistic style, the once famous but now problem-beset Dovzhenko studio is also experiencing a slow revival and Ukrainian language films made in the Dovzhenko studio are also experiencing a come-back. *Zahybel bohiv* (*Death of the Gods*, 1988) by A. Donchyk is based on motifs from the diaries of Dovzhenko with a script by Ievhen Hutsalo. *Povnolunnia* (*Full Moon*, 1987) is directed and written by A. Stepanenko; it is a loose adaptation of Valerii Shevchuk's *Panna Sotnykivna* (*Captain's Daughter*) in which we see a young woman's fantasies about her loved one. *Hramotnyi* (*The Literate Person*, 1987) by Stanislav Chernilevsky is based on a short story by M. Tiutiunnyk and *Ordan* (*The Jordan River*) directed and written by O. Ihnatusha is based on motifs from the "Poem of Songs" by poet I. Zhylenko.

There are also a number of recent films made in the Dovzhenko studio in the Russian language such as: 1) *Golyi* (*The Naked Man*) by Halyna Shyhaieva—a light-hearted film about a resident of Leningrad whose clothes are stolen while he is swimming in a pond; and 2) *Dom* (*The House*) by Olha Volodina—which poses serious spiritual questions while portraying a young couple as they unsuccessfully try to renovate a house.

The Dovzhenko Studio in the past has been faced with many problems. In addition to having the central financing from Moscow, by Goskino (Derzhkino), there was the corollary to that problem; having the scripts approved in Moscow, which meant that scripts had to be translated into Russian. Once a film got made, it had to be distributed centrally through Goskino and Moscow, which meant it could only be distributed in the Russian

langauge. This situation was concisely described by the Ukrainian writer Valerii Shevchuk in his article "Ukrainske kino chy ioho fiktsiia" (Ukrainian cinema or its fiction) in *Novyny kinoekrana*. Here Shevchuk commented that even the censors of Imperial Russia in St. Petersburg during the harshest period of censorship did not demand that a Ukrainian literary work be submitted in Russian translation![17]

The "new model" announced by Klimov, by decentralisation of the film industry, should help solve this serious language problem. Some changes have already occurred. Mykola Maschenko was appointed director of the studio in 1986 in place of V. Tsvirkunov and in response to the "new model" announced, "Ukrainization" of the studio in 1987.[18] He also created an artistic board which consists of such people as Ivan Drach, Ivan Dziuba, Pavlo Movchan, Valerii Shevchuk, Les Taniuk, Leonid Cherevatenko, Raissa Ivanchenko, Iurii Shcherbak, Iurii Illienko, Stanislav Chernilevsky and Hryhorii Lohvyn. The Union of Filmmakers of Ukraine with Mykhailo Bielikov at its head has declared full independence and freedom to sign contracts with Soviet co-operatives and Western producers.

Also a new Ukrainian filmmakers' association and film studio was formed in May 1989, called "Zvenyhora" with Leonid Chervatenko as its artistic director. S. Chernilevsky is editor, Olha Sokolyk is manager and Oleh Pikersky is commercial manager. The other members of this group are the film directors Olha Volodina, Volodymyr Voloshyn, Mykola Honchar, Leonid Horovets, Volodymyr Krainev, Halyna Shyhaieva and cameraman Viacheslav Onyshchenko, Borys Mykhailov and Andrii Kurkov. This group has declared its independence from the Dovzhenko studio and the "Debut" association headed by director, Andrii Shomyn. One of Zvenyhora's main goals is to allow more opportunities for young starting directors who feel they do not get support from the Dovzhenko studio.

At a round-table discussion[19] organized earlier in 1989 by the journal *Novyny kinoekrana*, and several months before the formation of "Zvenyhora," the problems facing young Ukrainian filmmakers were discussed. Participants in the discussion, besides Leonid Cherevatenko, who is a film critic, writer and assistant editor of *Novyny Kinoekrana*, included film directors, Anatolii Stepanenko, Oleksander Denysenko, Volydymyr Horpenko, academic Dr. Vadym Mikhailov, Vasyl Tsvirkunov who is dean of the Film Faculty of the Kiev Karpenko-Karyi Theatre Institute, film students Volodymyr Voitenko and Dmytro Tomashpolsky, Mykhailo Slobodian who is a secretary in the Filmmakers' Union of Ukraine, Borys Mykhailov who is a cameraman, and Marina Mednikova who is main editor of the association of young filmmakers "Debut" at the Dovzhenko Studio, writer Oleksandr Pidsukha and Volodymyr Voloshyn. At the conclusion of the round-table, Cherevatenko summarized that it was obvious that new directions for Ukrainian filmmaking are necessary because the old ones have failed. He proposed as a solution and model, small independent film studios. "Zvenyhora" then is the answer to this problem and one of the first of such studios in Ukraine. Another newly formed studio is Halfilm with its base in Lviv.

There are also a number of co-productions now between the various Ukrainian film studios and Soviet co-operatives or Western producers. An example of the latter is the Illienko film *Lebedyne ozero: zona* (*Swan Lake: the Zone*) about Sergei Paradzhanov in prison. Another co-produced film is about Taras Shevchenko. Halyna Shyhaieva's new film *Konotopski vidmy* (*The Witches of Konotop*) stars Ukrainian-Canadian actress Luba Goy, famous comedienne of Canada's Royal Canadian Air Farce.

It is evident that *glasnost* and *perestroika* and the "new model" of Soviet cinema have affected filmmaking in Ukraine. Political and bureaucratic controls are being loosened, resulting in increasing ideological and financial independence. This situation brings with it of course a whole new set of commercial problems,[20] but for the time being the new directions embarked upon by Ukrainian filmmaking appear to be positive ones.

ENDNOTES

[1] In Canada co-operation in cinematography with the USSR is ensured in the Program of Academic, Scientific and Cultural Exchanges and Co-operation between Canada and the USSR for 1989–90.

[2] A complete overview of titles of films made and released in the seventies and eighties is to be found in the article by Anna Lawton, "Toward a New Openness in Soviet Cinema 1976–1987," in *Post New Wave Cinema in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, ed. J. Goulding (U. of Indiana Press, 1989), 1–50. Anna Lawton points out that Klimov's election was the result of support from Alexander Iakovlev, head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department at the time and the main architect of *glasnost*. (p. 36). See also Karen Rosenberg, "Movies in the Soviet Union," *The Nation*, vol. 247, no. 15, 21 Nov. 1988, 526–532. Rosenberg points out that between 1975 and 1985 the attendance at Soviet films fell by one-half. Moscow Film studio productions which drew 18 million fell by one-half; Leningrad Film Studio dropped from 14 million to 6.3 million; the Ukrainian Dovzhenko Film Studio dropped from 11.2 million to 5.3 million attendance.

[3] "Toward a New Model for Cinematography," *Sovietskii ekran*, no. 6 (1987): 2.

[4] Alik Lipkov, "Film and Perestroika," paper presented in Toronto during the Royal Ontario Museum REP cinema program "The Soviet Cinema," 5 March 1989.

[5] Anna Lawton, "Searching for New Values," *The Soviet Observer*, 25 April 1989.

[6] *Ibid.*, 6.

[7] Volodymyr Honcharov, "Pro mynule i ioho oskolky" *Novyny kinoekrana*, 1 July 1989, 13.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Alik Lipkov, "Film and Perestroika." For complete list of the 22 recent documentary films shown at the Glasnost Film Festival in the USA see Louis Menashe, ed., *Glasnost Film Festival Program* (New York: Citizen Exchange Council, Inc., 1989).

[10] Erik Barnouw, *Documentary: a History of the Non-Fiction Film*, revised (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 55.

[11] The following survey is based on research I conducted while in Kiev in the summer of 1989 as a participant of the Canada-USSR Academic and Cultural Exchange. The Ukrainian documentaries that were included in the Glasnost Film Festival in the USA,

1989 are: *Chernobyl: Chronicle of Difficult Weeks* (1986) by V. Shevchenko; *Tomorrow is a Holiday* (1987) by Serhii Bukovsky; *This is How We Live* (1987) by V. Oseledchyk; *Early on Sunday* (1987) by Murat Mamedov. See Louis Menashe, ed., *Glasnost Film Festival Program* (New York: Citizen Exchange Council, Inc., 1989). A Film Screening of Soviet Ukrainian films at York University in October 22–23 1989 included: *Microphone* (1988) by G. Shkliarevsky, *The Uninvited Guests* (1989) by P. Fareniuk; *The Dying Rivers* (1988) by A. Kryvarchuk; *Les Kurbas: a Theatre Director for the Future* (1988) by A. Avtonomov; *Christmas Time* (1989) by V. Storozhenko, O. Koval, A. Karas; *Where is that Well-Spring?* (1988) by O. Mykhailova; *Galaktionovych* (1988) by A. Koval and A. Karas; *A Large Dose of Truth* (1988) by V. Honcharov.

[12] Iurii Lunkov, *Novyny Kinoekrana*, July 1989. See cover of this volume for a still from the documentary film *Microphone*.

[13] A term introduced by the Russian formalists in the 1920s.

[14] Erik Barnouw, "Foreword" in *Glasnost Film Festival Program*, ed. Louis Menashe (New York: Citizen Exchange Council, Inc., 1989), 3.

[15] Karen Rosenberg, "Now Playing at Goskino," *Index on Censorship*, vol. 17, no. 9 (October, 1988): 15–17. See also Larysa Briukhovetska, *Poetychna khvylia ukrainskoho kino* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1989).

[16] Other animated films produced in this studio are:*Their Sister Lybed*, 1981, (directed by V. Honcharov, animated by N. Guz with script by V. Korotych and A. Kostynsky and dedicated to the 1500th anniversary of the founding of Kiev); *Chumatskyi shliakh* (*The Milky Way*, 1980) directed by V. Honcharov, animated by N. Guz with script by R. Vikkers and E. Nazarenko); *Kozatskyi Serial* (*The Cossacks*) directed by V. Dakhno and animated by E. Kirich, a humorous, light-hearted series of 8 films in the style of North-American cartoons: 1) How the Cossacks Cooked Porridge, 1967; 2) How the Cossacks Played Soccer, 1970; 3) How the Cossacks Saved their Fiancés, 1973; 4) How the Cossacks Bought Salt, 1975; 5) How the Cossacks Became Olympic Stars, 1978; 6) How the Cossacks Helped the Musketeers, 1979; 7) How the Cossacks Danced at the Wedding, 1984; 8) How the Cossacks Met Aliens from Outer Space, 1987.

[17] Valerii Shevchuk, "Ukrainske kino chy ioho fiktsiia?" *Novyny Kinoekrana*, no. 9 (September 1988).

[18] See Mykola Mashchenko, "Iuvilei bez triumfu," *Novyny kinoekrana*, no. 5 (May 1988): 1.

[19] For the full text of the round-table discussion see "Ukrainske molode kino: problemy i perspektyvy," *Ukraine Today: Soviet Media Digest*, Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. UF 117 (13 June 1989): 27–44.

[20] Val Golovskoy, *Behind the Soviet Screen* (Ann Arbor Michigan: Ardis, 1986), 61 writes that research conducted in the Moscow Film Institute indicated that commercial success of a film in the USSR is based on the following ingredients: 1) Contemporary theme; 2) Russian production (as opposed to other republics); 3) Adaptation of a popular book; 4) Fast tempo; 5) Continuity (no flashbacks); 6) Simplicity; 7) Spectacle (special effects, crowd scenes, and costumes); 8) Active and attractive leading characters; 9) Appealing title. Anna Lawton adds, in "Toward a New Openness," p. 5 that if one adds sex and violence and replaces Russian production with American production these are the same ingredients that assure commercial success of a film in North America.



GERALD NEEDHAM

Ukrainian Unofficial Art and Postmodernism

The starting point for this investigation is the reception of unofficial art from the Soviet Union in the West, especially in North America. The reception as far as art critics go has largely been one of silence, even when exhibitions began to tour. Furthermore these exhibitions have not usually been held in the major museums. The museums, like the critics, have preferred to ignore unofficial art. It is sad that the artists who have worked in silence, apart from the occasional denunciations in the Soviet Union, have faced the same silence here.

The reasons why the Western art world has avoided this art is not, of course, political. Most critics have great sympathy for the artists, but they have found the art works themselves disappointing, simply not first rate in quality. Consequently critics have preferred not to write about the art rather than attack it. When I have talked to critics they have said that the art falls between two stools. It is not traditional, but neither is it genuinely modern. The artists do not have an understanding of the developments of modern art and its logic (because the artists have not had a chance to get to know modern Western art thoroughly), and they consequently create inconsistent works that misunderstand the modern aesthetic.

While there is a certain truth in this complaint, I believe also that these critics have been partially blinded by their own preconceptions, of clinging too rigidly to principles drawn from contemporary North American art. In the late sixties and in the seventies when unofficial art first appeared in the West, most critics were *modernists*, subscribing to a belief in abstraction and a pictorial minimalism (to oversimplify somewhat). Most non-official art was very figurative and quite elaborate in the use of forms. Furthermore it was observed that much official art seemed heavily dependent on surrealism, and to the modernist critics surrealism was the weak movement in modern art, one that gave too much emphasis to the subject matter and too little to style.

A comparison of two works will show this parallel to Surrealism. Igor Tiulpanov's *New Year, Aquarium and I*, 1970,[1] is typical of many pictures from the Soviet Union, while Anton Solomukha's *Ukrainian Folk Songs*, (ill. 1) 1975, is a specifically Ukrainian example. We see a collection of different figurative elements put together in a semi-abstract way, a kind of combination that occurs again and again in surrealism, especially in the collages of Max Ernst. The motif of the eye was a favorite one for the surrealists, and has been written about as one of the most significant symbolic elements, and it has a conspicuous place in both pictures. To avant-garde critics of the sixties and seventies, for whom subject matter was really only acceptable when its was a vehicle for form, as in cubist paintings or more recently in De Kooning's *Women* which were painted in the same style as his more abstract pictures, the works of the unofficial artists were turned towards the past, and to the wrong past.

While it is certainly true that many unofficial artists eagerly sought out surrealist images, asking Western visitors for books with illustrations of works by Dali, Magritte and Ernst, for example, I think that their purpose was not necessarily a surrealist one. In a paper that I gave in a symposium on unofficial art at McMaster University in 1985, I argued that these artists are frequently using surrealist ideas for concepts that are more closely allied to the symbolist tradition, one that was closely entwined with the beginnings of modernism in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. There is not space here to repeat that argument, but I would like to suggest that this is an example of the way in which we have to escape our preconceptions in order to deal adequately with unofficial art.

If we ask ourselves how these artists formed their styles, we realize that it was done in a quite unsystematic way in comparison with artists in the West who had been introduced to all the major styles of modern art in their training in art school. The unofficial artists, when they rejected the official socialist realism as meaningless to them, had to put together a style that would serve their purposes from whatever other art they could find. We might use the french word *bricoler* as opposed *to construct* (in the way that it has been popularized by Claude Levi-Strauss) to describe a handyman technique of imaginatively making use of whatever materials and oddments were at hand.

When we look at what was available to artists in Ukraine we find two older traditions, church and folk art, and much less well known, two modern possibilities, European art from post-impressionism to 1945 and Western abstract art made after the World War II.

Folk art seems to have interested them only to a small degree, perhaps because it seemed remote from life in the modern Soviet state, and was less appealing because it had been so emphasized by the Soviet authorities. Church art and the Byzantine style on the contrary provided a powerful inspiration. On the one hand it offered a spiritual sustenance that was lacking in dialectical materialism, even to artists who were not necessarily believers, and on the other, the abstracted forms lent themselves very well to a modern style. (We might note that one of the leading Canadian abstract painters, Ronald Bloore, has been fascinated and inspired by Greek Byzantine art.)

Equally important was the early twentieth century art of the cubists, expressionists, surrealists and the abstract artists, whether their work was geometrical like that of Mondrian, or of the constructivists and Malevich in the Soviet Union, or the free abstraction of Kandinsky. This important tradition had been cut off, but the unofficial artists sought out what they could find, especially when they visited cities like Moscow and Leningrad where it was more available through the artistic "underground." Their knowledge was necessarily imperfect as well as their understanding of the inner developments, but they extracted a great deal from what they could find. Contemporary Western art was less well known, and seems to have been less important for Ukrainian artists than for those in Russia and the Baltic republics. For all these artists, though, this art did not have the same significance as it did in the West, and as we have seen this helps account for the negative reception of unofficial art in the West.

From these varied sources, the artists took ideas and formed their styles, which because of the individual way in which they went about it, tend to be quite distinct and unclassifiable, as we see in the following examples.

Sazonov's paintings (ill. 2) grew progressively flatter and more geometrical, and while this relates them to recent hard-edge abstraction, he also took forms from Byzantine art. The result is neither pure abstraction nor religious art, as we recognize the allusions to Byzantine symbols, but they are too abstracted and divorced from an appropriate context to convey traditional meanings. We feel a relation to the work of Malevich and other artists working during and just after World War I in Russia who created abstract pictures within the symbolist tradition. (In contrast, in Ronald Bloore's paintings, the Byzantine elements are completely abstracted.)

Makarenko's *Yellow Cross* series (ill. 3) similarly recall both Malevich (his *White Crosses*) and Byzantine art, though in a quite different way. The still life subjects and the angels in the boxes with writing resemble the arrangement of saints in an altarpiece. The fact that the writing is largely illegible is an important factor. In this respect it resembles an icon, but it is clearly modern writing which separates it. While the use of writing in a painting is a surrealist method, it is usually very important that we can read it in the latter, the mixing of media being the intention, an intention that has been anathema to modernist critics. Makarenko's *Apocalypse*, 1975, (ill. 4) juxtaposes similar kinds of elements, but of a different kind, and reminds us of the "chaotic" compositions of Kandinsky, which are modern and totally the opposite of Byzantine order. The contrast is equally strong with Sazonov's paintings.

Byzantine elements are also evident in Zalyvakha's *Prophet*, n.d., (ill. 5) but the head and the background are integrated in a quite modern way which owes something to cubism and to later Picasso.

Finally, in looking at examples of different artists' works, we find almost traditional figuration in Humeniuk's *Ukraine*, 1979, (ill. 6). The *bandura* player, and the allegorical figure of Ukraine based on images of the Virgin show a strong dependence on the past, yet the fragmented elements which surround them create an incoherence which is quite untraditional. Ms. Daria Darewych

has suggested that Humeniuk's acquaintance with Malevich's pre-abstract paintings like *The Knife Grinder*, 1912, provided a means of rethinking the subject. "Incoherence," of course, only applies if we think in conventional terms, or perhaps I should write, socialist realist terms, if we remember the denunciations of Humeniuk's paintings a few years ago. The artist, with the modern fragmentation, has created a dynamic composition out of a static, reclining figure, and brought the traditional motifs to life.

Looking back over these pictures we can see that they are very different from one another—each artist has pieced together his paintings from a variety of sources, sometimes in a surprising mixture, but the works are unified by the vision of the artists. Western critics have seen the piecing together, and I think it has prevented them from grasping the underlying coherence. In order to overcome the preconceptions of the modernist critics I think it is useful to look at the ideas of the postmodernists who, around 1980, began to challenge the prevailing outlook.

I want to present briefly ideas that were put forward by Kim Levin in an article in *Artsmagazine* in 1979, "A Farewell to Modernism."[2]

This article was not one of the theoretical statements that have appeared more recently but a pioneering attempt by a working critic to try and come to terms with what had been happening in Western art, and is thus particularly useful in dealing with the unofficial artists. Ms. Levin begins, "The seventies have been a decade which felt like it was waiting for something to happen." What she is saying is that after the sixties with their dizzying succession of styles and movements (Pop Art, Op Art, Conceptual Art, Earth Art, Kinetic Art, Light Art, etc.), the seventies had been one long lull with no new movements. She goes on, "The fact is, it wasn't just another decade. Something did happen, something so momentous that it was ignored in disbelief: modernity had gone out of style. And the words which had been hurled as insults—illusionistic, theatrical, decorative, literary—were resurrected. Style had become a voluntary option, to be scavenged and recycled." Ms Levin compares this outlook with modernist ideas, "Modernism longed for perfection and demanded purity, clarity, order. And it denied everything else, especially the past: idealistic, ideological and optimistic, modernism was predicated on the glorious future, the new and improved." (In thinking of the unofficial artists, we might well compare the modernist doctrine as defined by Levin with that of socialist realism which these artists rejected.)

Postmodernism, on the contrary is impure and does not seek perfection. "If the grid is an emblem of modernism, as Rosalind Krauss has proposed—formal, abstract, repetitive, flattening, ordering, literal [as an example we can cite a Ukrainian-Canadian like Ron Kostyniuk's relief structures which are bare rectilinear constructions] then perhaps the map should serve as a preliminary emblem of postmodernism." Levin writes of "mapping the features of an imagery, the memory of an experience, a place somewhere else or a visionary plan" and of postmodernism as "quoting, scavenging, ransacking and recycling the past."

With these ideas in mind we can turn back to unofficial art. If we examine another Makarenko painting, *My Ukraine*, 1975, (ill. 7) we can see that it contains many of the aspects listed by Levin: it is not abstract, there are memories of experiences, a visionary quality, and, most notably, it resembles a map. Each of the other works we have seen exemplify some of these characteristics, particularly the memory of an experience rather than the direct representation of things—the Byzantine elements in the Sazanov or Makarenko's *Yellow Cross* cannot be identified but are rather ruminations on the experience of Christianity as artistic forms and cultural experience. The uses of the past and the piecing together of old and modern go with Levin's description of postmodernism. The flattening of the composition by each of the artists is significant in this transformation of the attempt to suggest something indirectly as a map does, flattening the mountains, and demanding that the spectator enter into the work to grasp it. One cannot simply identify the features as one can in a straightforwardly representational picture, in a socialist realist painting, for example.

Humeniuk's *The Hetmans*, 1982, (ill. 8), again quite different in style from Makarenko's picture, also brings representational and abstract forms together in a map-life configuration. The map like the grid is flat so that Humeniuk's use of a traditional subject does not lead to a conservative conception of art or of the subject itself.

It seems reasonable to conclude that these Ukrainian works of the seventies can be approached in the way that Levin asserts is necessary for the new works in the West. If we accept this idea, then we do not need to reject the unofficial paintings as being out of step with artistic history. They can be seen as paralleling developments in the West. I write "paralleling" as they are certainly not the same as postmodern pictures in North America. For example, in David Salle's and Julian Schnabel's pictures (to choose two of the most celebrated of American postmodern artists), we find the mixture of references to the past, writing on the canvas, quotations from the masters of modern art, the use of figurative subject matter, and the destruction of three dimensional or coherent space, that we see in the Ukrainian art, but with significant differences. Salle's paintings constitute an accumulation of references to past and present art and social themes. His admirers stress the lack of connecting threads between these elements. Similarly, Schnabel in a picture like *St. Francis in Ecstasy*, 1980, has allusions to Byzantine art, but there is nothing particularly religious about the resulting work. We remain outside these pictures by Salle and Schnabel. Sazonov's paintings with a suggestion of religious imagery, on the contrary, draw us in, just as Makarenko's *My Ukraine* or his *Memories* involve the spectator in following the complexity of the forms, disentangling the figurative aspects, though without providing any final interpretation or "meaning."

The American paintings are in a sense ragbags—the Western artist is free to choose anything from the history of art—but the choices are arbitrary, the result of the artist's whim. Unofficial paintings result from a search by the artist, the enormously difficult task of creating a style in isolation, of remaking a culture that does not exist around him or her. There thus exists a great gulf

between the art from East and West, and I would not argue that unofficial art should be labelled as postmodern, simply that postmodern ways of approaching art are extremely helpful. Of course, not all unofficial art is equally successful—there are problems in working in isolation, but the best paintings are remarkable. Today, living in a postmodern environment, we are able, I believe, to appreciate the work of the unofficial artists much better than we could in the sixties and seventies when we held too tightly to Western modernist principles.

ENDNOTES

[1] Reproduced in Norton Dodge and Alison Hilton, *New Art from the Soviet Union* (1977).

[2] This article by Kim Levin, "A Farewell to Modernism," has been reprinted in *Theories of Contemporary Art*, ed. Richard Hertz (1985).

Ill. 1 A. Solomukha: *Ukrainian Folk Songs*, 1975



Ill. 2 (above) V. Sazonov: *Untitled*, 1977

Ill. 3 (left)
V. Makarenko:
Yellow Cross, 1980?



Ill. 4 V. Makarenko: *Apocalypse*, 1975.

Ill. 5 O. Zalyvakha: *Prophet*, n.d.

Ill. 6 (above) F. Humeniuk: *Ukraine*, 1979

Ill. 7 (left)
V. Makarenko:
My Ukraine, 1975

Ill. 8 F. Humeniuk: *The Hetmans*, 1982



DARIA DAREWYCH

Glasnost in Soviet Ukrainian Art

The best proof of *glasnost* in the art of Soviet Ukraine are the Humeniuk paintings on display at the Zacks Gallery of Stong College, and, of course, the presence of the artist at this symposium. In 1976 after organizing two successful apartment exhibits of non-conformist Ukrainian art in Moscow, Feodosii Humeniuk lost his residency permit in Leningrad, was threatened with arrest and forced to move to Dnipropetrovsk, an industrial city in Ukraine, until recently closed to all foreigners and cut off from even Soviet art centers. In 1982 he was denounced on the pages of *Zoria*, (*The Star*), the official Communist party newspaper of Dnipropetrovsk. A brief quote will suffice to convey the vicious tone of the lengthy article:

> No one forces themes and subjects on an artist and no one in our country is persecuted for depicting Ukrainian historical reality. Reality, not some dubious false symbolism. ... This is the story of the moral decay of Humeniuk, the result of his indiscriminate contacts with foreigners and enemy endeavors of foreign ideological diversion. ... The mask has fallen. Underneath we have seen the terrible emptiness of the soul, the cavernous darkness, the useless rocking of a pendulum, and an artist's palette full of blotches of dirt.[1]

Most of us have seen the exhibition which includes some of the paintings being criticized and will find it difficult to understand why they and the artist were under attack. All works are figurative and mostly based on themes celebrating Ukrainian traditions and history.

As recently as 1984 *Prapor iunosti* (*Flag of Youth*) another Soviet Ukrainian newspaper had this to say about the artist:

> Humeniuk can be given as an example of nationalist, anti-Soviet activity. Emissaries of the USA. and Canada found this morally degraded person. Realizing that Humeniuk was ripe for the role of unrecognized

> artist, the foreign mass media, nationalistic groups and Zionist organizations joined in the anti-Soviet campaign. Humeniuk was enticed by foreign parcels and invitations. The revelations of these actions on the pages of the regional press, a denunciation of the unworthy deeds of Humeniuk and his wife by local artists made it possible to rip off the masks of benefactors from these foreign instigators and performers of this anti-Soviet action and to judge the behavior of the artist.[2]

In dramatic contrast to the two articles just quoted, since June of 1988, seven articles praising Humeniuk have appeared in the Soviet Ukrainian press.[3] These articles included a full color spread in the popular magazine *Ukraina* and two articles in English in publications aimed at readers outside the Soviet Union. They followed two very successfull solo exhibits of Humeniuk's paintings in Lviv and Kiev. This was the first time any of his work was shown publicly in these Ukrainian cities.

In his opening remarks at the Kiev exhibition of Humeniuk's paintings, the writer and head of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund, Borys Oliinyk stated that "Such art will last centuries."[4] Last summer, after ten years of being denied an exit visa to visit the West, Humeniuk and his wife, Natalka, were allowed to travel to Paris as guests of Mr. and Mrs. Gomola. On 25 November 1988 Humeniuk was mentioned in an article in *Pravda* as the Ukrainian artist who had suffered greatly and who had been forced to seek shelter outside his native Ukraine in Leningrad.[5]

As has been pointed out by other speakers at this symposium, *glasnost* has been much more in evidence in Moscow, than in Ukraine. However, there can be no doubt that in art, perhaps, to a greater extent than in other fields, *glasnost* and *perestroika* have reached the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, and are in the air in Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa.

In this paper I would like to mention the chronology of some of the changes indicative of *glasnost* and to point to a few of the major events that demonstrate *glasnost* in Soviet Ukrainian art, particularly in painting. Also I would like to evaluate some of these changes from an outsider's point of view and to suggest some possible future developments.

One of the first signs of change in art was the evening dedicated to Mykhailo Boichuk, a prominent artist and teacher of the twenties and thirties who was denounced, arrested and sent to die in a forced labor camp in 1937. The evening was held 19 December 1986 and was organized not by artists, but by writers who had decided to raise the issue of bringing Boichuk and his followers, known as *Boichukisty*, back from obscurity.

Raising the cause of dead artists was one thing, allowing the public to see their work for themselves was the next step. Several articles with reproductions appeared in the press, followed by exhibitions of the work of Boichuk and his followers held throughout Ukraine including such cities as Kharkiv. These exhibits did not always include original works of art because many of them had been destroyed. In Kharkiv, for example, the exhibition at the Institute of Applied Arts consisted of photographs and reproductions. In Kiev, Boichuk's drawings, as well as those of his followers were included in the graphic art of

the twenties and thirties exhibit held at the Central National Archive-Museum of Literature and Art.[6] Oksana Pavlenko, the only living Boichukist, was given a major retrospective exhibition in Kiev in the spring of 1988. The exhibit, entitled *Images of Time*, consisted of over four hundred works by Oksana Pavlenko, now 93 years of age, and was accompanied by a catalogue. It was held at the Ukrainian Cultural Fund building and was sponsored by the Artists' Union and the National Art Museum. Pavlenko studied with Mykhailo Boichuk at the Kiev Academy of Art and worked with the renowned teacher in the twenties. Fortunately for her, she was in Moscow when the arrests of Boichuk and his followers took place, and this circumstance is credited with saving her life. Giving recognition and prominence to the last living Boichukist was a major event in the cultural life of Kiev and one of the signs of *glasnost*.

In contemporary art, the new policy of openness and democratization made itself felt for the first time at the *Molodist kraiiny* (*Youth of the Country*) exhibit held in Kiev in conjunction with the 8th Convention of the Artists' Union of Ukraine which opened 2 April 1987. The Soviet Ukrainian press hailed the show as a milestone. *Radianska Ukraina* headlined its article "Morning of a New Day" borrowed from the title of one of the paintings by Ievhen Hordiets. It proclaimed, "Youth, Openness, Restructuring; These words have become the motto of the exhibition."[7]

Indeed this exhibition was an unexpected departure from the narrow confines of socialist realist art and for the first time included many interesting explorations into a variety of styles popular in the West including neo-expressionism, surrealism, photo-realism, and partial abstraction. Although all of the work remained figurative, revolutionary themes and heroic workers no longer predominated.

The 8th Convention of the Artists' Union of Ukraine brought changes in the leadership of the powerful union. Even though Alexander Lopukhov, a member of the old guard, was elected president, members of the younger generation such as Mykola Kostiuchenko and Alexander Soloviov, who were in favor of allowing more creative freedom, took over some of the executive positions. A parallel rejuvenation occurred at the local levels of the Artists' Union organizations.

This was an important breakthrough because the Artists' Union not only controls all the purse strings and employment opportunities, but also had exclusive control of all official exhibition spaces in Ukraine. I say "had" because this situation is also changing. Exhibits are now being held in spaces not controlled by the Artists' Union. For example in December 1988 there was talk in Kiev of Sputnik, an organization dealing with student exchanges, opening a gallery.[8] In the spirit of *glasnost* the new leadership, nationally and locally, staged some interesting exhibits in 1987 and 1988. They are too numerous to list so I shall mention only the ones that appear to me to be the most significant ones.

In Odessa a group show was organized at the Museum of Eastern and Western Art at which abstract, non-representational work was exhibited. This included semi-abstract, expressionistic paintings by the late Liudmyla Iastrub

(1936–1982). There were abstract non-representational works by Victor Maryniuk, Volodymyr Tsiupko, and Olexander Stovbur. Total abstraction also appeared in a group exhibit of monumental artists of Kiev called *Pohliad* (Viewpoint) that was held at the Politechnical Institute in 1987.[9] The unifying factors in the exhibition were the rejection of the socialist realism method and the search for new forms of expression.

Dialoh cherez viky (Dialogue Through the Ages), an exhibit dedicated to the millenium of Christianity in Rus' marked the appearance of art of a religious nature. It was held in Kiev in June and July 1988, also at the Kiev Politechnical Institute. In the catalogue essay Anatolii Makarov stated: "For many viewers the large number of works on biblical themes will come as a surprise. There is supposedly not much religion in our atheist society, and suddenly—crosses, churches, saints, sacred symbols, and mythology make their appearance."[10]

Christian symbolism dominated two large paintings by Iurii Levchenko, *Gold and Purple* and *Rule of Darkness*. Religious subject matter inspired some titles as well as the themes of several paintings such as Ievhen Petrenko's *Angel* 1986, and *Blahovishchennia* (*Annunciation*) 1987; Victor Hontarov's *Trinity*, 1988, and Volodymyr Isupov's series of pen and ink drawings "Bibliini siuzhety" (*Bible Themes*).

The *Dialoh* exhibit also included paintings in a great variety of styles and themes. There were neo-expressionist paintings by Tyberii Sylvashi *Dedication to My Daughter* and Volodymyr Budnikov's *Restavratory*. Iurii Lutskevych was represented by *Angels* and Alexander Borodai by a work in enamel entitled *Narodni ihry* (*Folk Games*). Oleksander Melnyk's large triptych *My idolopoklonnyky* (*We the Idol Worshippers*) 1988, echoed the monumental frescoes of M. Boichuk in their simplification of forms and controlled modelling and made a contemporary statement about ancient pagan worship. The disturbingly eerie canvases of Ivan Marchuk *Plyn chasu* (*Fluid of Time*) and *Perestoroha* (*Warning*) were representative and somewhat reminiscent of surrealism in their use of deep space, conglomeration of fantastic figures, and desolate landscape. These apocalyptic visions could be taken as an alarming foreshadowing of the destruction of the world. The exhibit also included non-representational paintings by Alexander Dubovyk such as *Sviato* (*Holiday*) 1978, *Bytva* (*Battle*) 1985, and *Futliary* (*Boxes*), as well as an abstract expressionist canvas by Ievhen Petrenko *Katarsys* (*Catharsis*) 1988. All three artists, Dubovyk, Petrenko, and Marchuk until recently had not been allowed to exhibit in officially sanctioned large group shows.

Makarov writes that *Dialoh* forced the average viewer to reject the formerly held views that abstract art has no meaning. He says, "The exhibit proves that contemporary world views and spiritual problems can be developed through abstraction and surrealism."[11]

Of the solo shows held, two merit attention as both Ievhen Petrenko and Alexander Dubovyk of Kiev have painted non-representational canvases for years, and for years were not allowed to show them to the public. Petrenko began exhibiting his abstract expressionist, yet highly controlled canvases a few years ago in Moscow. However, his paintings which evoke fantastic images of

galactic explosions were not shown in Ukraine until 1988. Dubovyk's exhibition was held in June of 1988 at the Artists' Union Gallery on Volodymyrska Street and was accompanied by a 56 page catalogue in Russian. His meticulously executed oils and tempera paintings on paper are carefully balanced compositions of geometric shapes and rich colors through which the artist tries to depict conflicting situations and opposing forces.

The Young Sculptors' symposium, also dedicated to the millenium celebrations and held in Kiev in the summer of 1988, was indicative of the changes taking place in three dimensional work. Christian images were apparent in Iurii Mysko's *St. George* and Ievhen Prokopov's *Memory*. There were references to pre-Christian traditions in Alexander Kostin's *Discourse on Time*, and not a single sculpture was dedicated to stereotypes of war, revolution, or the working class.

The nationwide painting show held by the Artists' Union in its headquarters in Kiev, called "*Svit, liudyna, podia: persha respublikanska vystavka zhyvopysu*" (World, Person, Event: the First Republican Exhibition of Paintings), marked the disappearance of socialist realism and with it the demise of the large thematic canvas. There were a few reminders of it, however, in the didactic approach in some of the work particularly noticeable in paintings which attempted to raise social consciousness over ecological problems, condemn Stalin's atrocities (*Opozolochenyi vozhd / Guilded Leader*), or warn of impending disasters. Although Dubovyk's abstraction, *Hieroglyph*, 1988, was prominently displayed, figurative works predominated. This included the hyper-realist canvases of Ievhen Hordiets (Kiev), the neo-expressionist paintings of Oleh Nedoshytko (Odessa), Victor Hontarov (Kharkiv), and Mykhailo Popov (Kharkiv). There were few obviously Ukrainian themes or depictions, and universal subject matter prevailed.

The painting show was followed by the Komsomol (Young Communist League) Exhibition that opened in November. It too was marked by a variety of approaches and freedom of expression. The six mixed media works by Alexander Tkachenko from Dnipropetrovsk were reminiscent of the watercolors by Volodymyr Makarenko and the Leningrad School in general although Tkachenko had not studied there. The large canvases by Roman Zhuk from Lviv were strikingly different and obviously influenced by postmodern art from the West.

Both of these exhibitions were very large and overwhelming for the viewer. Some of the criticism of the work centered on the fact that "There was nothing Ukrainian in the art." It is true that obviously Ukrainian themes and folk art stylizations have almost disappeared along with socialist realism, although they did not necessarily go hand in hand. In the current atmosphere of creative freedom it is not surprising that many of the artists have chosen to follow international or what they perceive as international styles and approaches to art. After all, until recently, this was forbidden fruit. It is also understandable why some Ukrainian artists and writers are concerned with the absence of an obviously national content and feel threatened by the internationalizing of the art. They see this as yet another threat to their culture, a culture that was

forcibly liquidated in the thirties and all but ceased to exist by the early fifties. However, it would appear that the newly discovered freedom to experiment, to create, and to exhibit without self-censorship and official restrictions is a healthy sign. Eventually it will allow for a more normal development of art in Ukraine that will no doubt include art which consciously tries to continue what are perceived as Ukrainian artistic traditions of the past. Hopefully this creative freedom will also allow for the synthesis of Ukrainian artistic traditions with contemporary, international trends. Not all artists, no matter what their national roots or country of origin, feel the need to express their patriotic feeling and to express them through recognizably national imagery. There are more subtle ways of conveying one's heritage. It would be a sad day for art if restictions of whatever kind were imposed once again in the name of "Ukrainian art."

Yet another sign of the openness was the travelling "Soviart Exhibition" in Kiev and Kharkiv that featured the work of a number of young American and Soviet artists including eight from Ukraine (Roman Zhuk from Lviv, Konstantyn Reunov, Iana Bystrova, and Oleh Tistol from Kiev. Serhii Sviatchenko and Alexander Hlynytsky from Kharkiv, Pavel Kerestei from Uzhhorod, and Alexander Roitburg from Odessa.)[12] Except for individual variations there were no striking differences between the works by the American artists and their Ukrainian counterparts. The American artists were present at the opening, and there were plans to have the Soviet artists travel to the United States.

By far the most unexpected changes were reflected in the number of individual exhibitions both in Lviv and Kiev which gave unprecedented exposure to several remarkable Ukrainian artists, some of whom had suffered represssions, others who were simply denied opportunities to exhibit their work. This included not only the retrospective of the abstract compositions of Alexander Dubovyk and the solo show of Ievhen Petrenko's paintings already mentioned, but also the exhibit of the relief sculptures and paintings of Halyna Sevruk (b.1929) who in 1968 made the mistake of signing a petition addressed to Brezhnev in defense of human rights. As a result, her candidacy for membership in the Artists' Union was withdrawn and she could only get work as a decorative artist working in ceramics, relief sculpture and mosaics. The exhibition at the Podol Museum in Kiev displayed Sevruk's clay sculptures and reliefs on Cossack themes, as well as for the first time some of her painings. The paintings, mostly from the 1970s, included a portrait of Alla Horska floating in a clear blue sky and rendered in a photo-realist manner. Horska also had signed the ill-fated petition and was thrown out of the Artists' Union. As is widely known, she was found brutally murdered under mysterious circumstances, and shortly after became a non-person in Soviet art. Now there is talk that her membership in the Artists' Union will be returned posthumously. A third member who signed the same petition was Liudmyla Semykina, and she was reinstated as a member of the Artists' Union in November 1988. Semykina, however, has stopped painting and is engaged in creating exquisitely designed coats and jackets inspired by Ukrainian folk dress.

December brought still another interesting exhibition made possible by *glasnost*: that of Panas Zalyvakha from Ivano-Frankivsk. It was held at the Museum of Ethnography and Applied Art of the Lviv Branch of the Academy of Sciences. Zalyvakha was one of the artists arrested in the first wave of repressions in 1965 and served a five year term for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation." Since his return in 1970 he has worked in complete isolation and without opportunities to exhibit his work. Zalyvakha is a very prolific and talented artist who has experimented a lot, but who always returns to his favorite themes of Ukrainian mythology, folklore, and "mother Ukraine" images, as some of the works from the Lviv exhibition illustrate.

I would like to conclude with the work of Feodosii Humeniuk because no other artist, officially ignored until recently, has gained so much prominence in such a brief period of time. Until 1988 Humeniuk was better known in the West, especially in Canada, than in his homeland. Solo exhibitions of his work had been held in 1978, 1980, and 1983 in Toronto and in 1984 in Winnipeg.[13] Numerous articles appeared about him and his art in the Ukrainian press in the West.

Unxpectedly in April 1988 Humeniuk was invited to exhibit his paintings in Lviv at the Museum of Ethnography and Applied Art of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. The exhibit proved so popular that the Ukrainian Cultural Fund invited Humeniuk to display his work in Kiev at the Lavra Museum of Decorative and Applied Art in June 1988.

By his own admission Humeniuk aims at what he calls a national Ukrainian art. As one can readily see from his paintings, this does not apply solely to the subject matter of his work, but also to what may be called his style in which Humeniuk seeks to synthesize Ukrainian-Byzantine art traditions, the traditions of the Ukrainian Baroque art, as well as the avant-garde art of the beginning of the twentieth century. He uses a wealth of Christian, historical, and ethnographic elements that may be difficult for the uninitiated to read, but which convey Humeniuk's love of his country and culture.

As time does not permit a detailed analysis of the paintings in the exhibit, I shall limit my discussion to just one work in which Humeniuk depicts past historical glory in order to make a statement about the future of Ukraine. The painting I shall discuss is *Ukraine* (also known as *The Bandura Player*) 1979 (ill. 6 in G. Needham article). A reclining figure of a girl in folk dress sweeps in a graceful s-curve diagonally across the foreground. She appears entwined with ribbons that also form a halo around her head. Above her at the apex of the pyramidal design Humeniuk positions a Cossack, as *bandura* player, in the familiar pose of Cossack Mamai from folk art paintings.[14] Traditionally Cossacks were considered as symbols of Ukrainian independence and its defenders while bandura players or minstrels were the transmitters of Ukrainian oral history.[15] To the right Humeniuk paints the Baroque church in Subotiv built by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1653 in flames. [16] It is not clear whether this refers to the destruction of church architecture and other cultural masterpieces by the Soviet Government or to the destruction of religion because the church itself is still standing. To the left Humeniuk depicts four Cossacks on

white horses carrying banners with religious images of Mother of God and Christ. This suggests the sanctity of the Cossack quest in their fight for independence. Behind the *bandura*-playing Cossack there is a flying angel against concentric semi-circles that echo the depiction of God the Father in old icons. The whole composition is highly reminiscent of the church frescoes and icons particularly of the Dormition type.[17] As a matter of fact it appears that there are direct parallels. Humeniuk has replaced Christ with a Cossack playing the *bandura* and the Mother of God with Ukraine. Instead of a group of saints Humeniuk depicts Cossacks on horses. The portrayal of the flying angel and the use of the traditional iconography of God the Father may be interpreted as sacred witnesses not only of the historic past, but also as being present in the attainments of the future.

By the late seventies Humeniuk's color and style had undergone a change which is evident in *My Ukraine*. He abandoned modelling in favor of flat, simplified areas of color, and a rich highly saturated palette. In *My Ukraine* there is a palpitating rhythm created by the juxtaposing of complex, multi-hued surfaces against simplified flat forms. The vibrant yellows, reds, greens, and blues are those of Ukrainian folk art of the Dnipropetrovsk region where Humeniuk lived as a student and was forced to return to in 1976. There is a new dynamic quality in the composition. Possibly there are echoes of the work of Kasimir Malevich from his cubo-futurist period of 1912–13 and such paintings as *The Knife Grinder* where the whole surface has been broken into flat facets of color and shapes that are partly modelled.[18] This is particularly true of the details in the girl's dress, but may also be seen in the drapery of the angel.

There are vestiges of three-dimensional space in the modelling of the faces, in the fullness of the skirts, and in the horses seen frontally. The faces, in particular, do not appear well integrated into the crisp areas of flat, high intensity hues. There is a strange expression of detachment in the faces of both the Cossack and the girl, and there is partial stylization of their features which parallels the contrast between flat and modelled spaces.

Several interpretations of the work are possible. It could be the depiction of the ethnographic past as suggested by the bright dancing shapes of color or it could express the feelings underlying the sad and strangely detached expression of the faces. This ambiguity of meaning parallels the more complex composition and the new abstraction and flatness evident in Humeniuk's work.

Such paintings left Humeniuk open to criticism, not only for inappropriate content, but also for rejecting "realism" in favor of "a cold, calculated stylization."[19] Claiming creative freedom to express himself as an artist, Humeniuk continued his lonely quest for an art that would best express his concerns as a contemporary Ukrainian artist. Even though he was attacked for the formalist aspect of his paintings, there can be little doubt that it was the historical content which was of the utmost importance to him and which the Soviet officials found most disturbing.

It is this obviously Ukrainian content of much of Humeniuk's work with its patriotic message that separates Humeniuk from other Soviet painters. At least

three of the artists who participated in the Moscow apartment exhibitions in 1975 and 1976 have stated that Humeniuk was responsible for instilling in them a sense of Ukrainian identity and encouraging them to search for inspiration in their national heritage.[20] There can be no doubt that Humeniuk was a guiding figure of Ukrainian non-conformist art in the seventies and a spiritual leader to the Ukrainian artists working in Odessa, Kiev, and outside their homeland in the various republics of the USSR.

In conclusion I would like to say that the variety of art to be seen at exhibitions in Soviet Ukraine at this time is a welcome change from the monotonous thematic exhibits of the socialist realism of the past. The work to be seen in artists' studios is even more interesting, but unfortunately this is outside the scope of this paper. Although much of this new art is still experimental and unfocused, after fifty years of strict controls, *glasnost* has made a rebirth of creativity possible. If the new art is to flourish, it needs to be nourished not only through contacts with Western art, but also through personal visual experience. The artists need to be allowed freedom to travel and to see the art treasures of other cultures outside the Soviet Union and outside the Communist bloc of nations. Presently one still needs an invitation in order to receive an exit visa from the USSR for personal, non-group travel. The new works of art need exposure outside the Soviet Union, and it is in this area especially that the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States can be of assistance in arranging exhibitions, promoting the work of individual artists, sending personal invitations to artists, and providing hospitality to visiting ones.

In my opinion only total artistic freedom can provide the fertile ground necessary for the full development of the many talented artists and Ukrainian art. *Glasnost* is just the beginning.

ENDNOTES

[1] Oleksa Vusyk, "Koly spadaie maska," *Zoria*, no. 225, 26 November 1982.

[2] I. Bubyr, "Blahorodnyi oboviazok kozhnoho," *Prapor iunosty*, 20 September 1984.

[3] The list of articles is as follows: M. Selivachov, "Koly mytets liubyt svii narod" *Kyiv*, no. 6 (1988): 158; O. Klymchuk, "Horobchykom khliba," *Ukraina*, 31 July 1988, p. 12; H. Linichenko, "Feodosii Humeniuk," *Dnipro*, no. 10 (1988): 137; N. Marushchenko, "Faithfulness to Ukraine," *News from Ukraine*; L. Baranevych, "Palitra chasu," *Prapor komunizmu*, no. 188 (3187), 16 August 1988, p. 3; M. Selivachov, "Devotion," *Ukraine*, no. 10 (1988): 19; V. Starchenko, "Prychetnist do dzherel," *Moloda kuznia*, January 1989, p. 3; Magazine section of the newspaper *Prapor iunosti*, 14 January 1989.

[4] Quoted from Oleksander Klymchuk, "Horobchykom khliba."

[5] From the interview with Borys Oliinyk in *Pravda*, 25 November 1988, p. 4.

[6] This exhibit at Volodymyrska 22-a also included book cover designs by émigré artist and art historian Sviatoslav Hordynsky and was probably the first time his work was publicly displayed in Ukraine since Hordynsky left his homeland for the West over forty years ago.

[7] O. Telench. "Ranok novoho dnia," *Radianska Ukraiina*, 2 April 1987.

[8] Sputnik is an organization involved in youth travel and student exchange programs in the Soviet bloc of nations. Its newly appointed co-ordinator of exhibitions is a young Kiev sculptor, Oleksander Kostin.

[9] Monumental artists are those artists who make their living decorating buildings with murals, mosaics, reliefs, sculptures, etc. They form a special section in the Artists' Union. Most of these artists also work at easel paintings, usually for their own satisfaction. The Kiev section is headed by the energetic Victor Hryhorov.

[10] Anatolii Makarov. *Dialoh cherez viky: vystavka do 1000-littia khreshchennia Rusi.* (Kiev: Ministry of Culture of UkSSR, Ukrainian Cultural Fund, Kiev Branch of the Artists' Union, 1988)

[11] Ibid.

[12] There were artists from other Soviet republics: Jurate Mikolaitite from Vilnius, Lithuania; Dmitrii Kantarov and Alexander Zakharov from Moscow, Russia; Ivars Poikans from Riga, Latvia; Mati Karmin from Tartu, Estonia. The American artists included Dana de Young Olson, Seleste Sullivan, Denis Michael Doran, Robert Lee Foster, Joice Sentofanti, and Louis Zoellar Bickett.

[13] These were the solo shows held in Canada without the artist's knowledge: 25 June–9 July 1978 at the Focus Gallery in Toronto; 2–9 November 1980 at the Gallery of the Institute of St. Vladimir in Toronto; 2–11 December 1983 at the Ukrainian Canadian Art Foundation in Toronto; 27 April–4 June 1984 at the Oseredok Gallery in Winnipeg.

[14] The pose of the Cossack *bandura* player is almost a direct quotation from the folk art paintings. The position of the hands is the same as in *Cossack Banduryst, 18th century,* reproduced on the front of the book jacket of *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, vol. 3 (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1968).

[15] *Bandura* players or minstrels were very popular in Ukraine, and quite a number of them were active until 1933. That year the Soviet government called a congress of all players and had all of the participants shot, according to Shostakovich writing in *Testimony: Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 214–215. Over three hundred were thus liquidated. This virtually wiped out the oral history tradition in Ukraine and was a deliberate act by Stalin in his attempt to destroy the Ukrainians as a separate national entity.

[16] Bohdan Khmelnytsky was Hetman of Ukraine from 1648 to 1657.

[17] See H. Lohvyn, Lada Miliaeva, Vira Sventsitska, *Ukrainian Medieval Painting* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1976), plate XXII, the icon of the Dormition, 12–13th century from the Monastery of the Tithes near Novhorod for similarity of composition and iconography.

[18] According to Makarenko, Malevich's early work was accessible to art students in Leningrad. It is very likely that Humeniuk had an opportunity to study them.

[19] See Oleksa Vusyk. "Koly spadaie maska," *Zoria.*

[20] The three artists were Volodymyr Makarenko, Vitalii Sazonov, and Volodymyr Strelnikov. These sentiments were expressed to the author in taped interviews with the three artists.



FEODOSII HUMENIUK

My Rediscovery of Ukraine Through Visual Art

An important event in the cultural life of Ukraine will take place in March of this year. The Ukrainian community will mark the 175th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko. For me personally, he has been the only teacher who has remained with me throughout, whether in art or in life in general.

I have dedicated my creative work to Ukraine—work that I have completed over the last seventeen years in the environment of our culture. It did not arise overnight. In the contemporary environment, we, as Ukrainians, must be born twice. Spiritual birth must follow the physical. My second birth occurred in Leningrad, a northern city on the Neva river, in the Academy of Arts where, in fact, Taras Shevchenko himself had studied. The idea of serving my native land came to me after I had completed my professional training. Thus the completion of my education concurred with the awakening of my national consciousness. Although by that time I had graduated from an art school in Dnipropetrovsk and had been taught in Ukraine I had no idea what a national culture was.

We had been taught the history of art of all Western and Eastern nations except for that of our very own country. At the Institute of Fine Art, we deepened our knowledge of the cultures of Greece, Egypt, Italy, the East, the West, and still there had been no mention of Ukraine. All of its accomplishments were ascribed to the Russian people.

My awakening came about because of nostalgia for my native land and for the language. In my case, truly, in beginning was the word. Many Ukrainians studied at the Institute, and there were many Ukrainian instructors as well. On the anniversary of Shevchenko's birth, the Ukrainian community in Leningrad gathered at the Academy; guests arrived from Ukraine and songs with Taras' lyrics were sung. Ukrainians seemed to take over the Academy in those fe days.

Throughout six subsequent years of study, I took an active part in paying respects to our brilliant countryman. I painted portraits of the poet and wrote articles about him. We recorded Ukrainian music and played it over the Academy's loudspeakers. At the Institute I studied the history and ethnography of Ukraine, and thanks to the Leningrad Academy's beautiful library I was able, without fear of administrative interference, to read the works of Hrushevsky, Iavornytsky and Konysky. These readings led me to write a graduate thesis on Ukrainian rural musicians. I had gathered material for this monograph in the Carpathians. I wrote about the character of the Hutsuls and learned the details of their daily lives and spiritual cultural.

My first programmatic work was *Virnist Ukraini* (*Loyalty to Ukraine*). The title itself sounds like a manifesto, an oath. I have not deviated from this path since. The painting is centered around the image of a girl, a symbol of Ukraine, and a rooster, a symbol of awakening, not of treachery. This painting led to a series of paintings based on folk songs: *Po sadu khodzhu* (I Walk in the Orchard), *Oi khodyv chumak* (The Carter Walked About), and others. This, in turn, led to a large work in which I drew on historical themes. I intended to portray all of the Hetmans of Ukraine, and began the new series with *Slavnyi Hetman Ukrainy, Doroshenko* (*The Famous Hetman of Ukraine, Doroshenko*), followed by *Hetman Vyhovsky*, *Ivan Mazepa*, *Nalyvaiko*, *Ostrianytsia*, and *Polubotok*.

Throughout 1971–79, I had completed a few dozen canvasses, and yet I could not exhibit a single one because the official Artists' Union did not allow it. They would not let my works be included in any shows and harassed me, asking where I had studied, and with whom. When I told them that I had a Fine Arts diploma and studied with eminent teachers, they accused me of lying, saying that the teachers in question would have never taught anyone to paint such things.

In 1974 a very important event in the artistic life of the Soviet Union occurred, namely, the Moscow exhibition of non-conformist painters. It came to be known as the "Bulldozer show" because of the means the authorities used to remove the works various artists had brought to the empty square. Many works perished under the wheels of contemporary technology.

Two months later, a similar even took place in Leningrad. Forty-eight artists petitioned the municipal government for a place, any place whatsoever, for a four-day exhibition. Strangely enough, the authorities seemed swayed by the incident in Moscow, and assigned us a place in the I. Gaza Cultural Building. Even as we prepared for the show, we found it hard to believe that everything would go peacefully. In the period leading up to 22 December 1974, the day the exhibit was to begin, most of us did not sleep at home, fearing arrest. However, on the appointed morning, at 10:00 A.M., it was officially opened. The Western radio broadcasts spoke about it, but our radio and press remained silent. Meanwhile, line-ups of thousands of people snaked into the hall where the works of Leningrad's non-conformists stood. Truly, a historical event, and of a sort not seen in the Soviet Union for over fifty years. After this effort, more

artists joined us, and thus a second exhibition of Leningrad artists took place in the Nevsky Palace of Culture in 1975.

That year, some Ukrainian painters rallied to organize a non-conformist exhibition in Ukraine. I approached the artists of Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa for support, but only the latter provided any. The show took place in Moscow and six artists were represented: Natalka Pavlenko (Leningrad), Volodymyr Makarenko (Tallin), Volodymyr Strelnikov (Odessa), Feodosii Humeniuk (Leningrad), Liudmyla Iastrub (Odessa) and Vitalii Sazonov (Moscow). Later, we organized another show, in which over 130 works of thirteen painters from Odessa were exhibited. It was held in a private residence, but was visited by many, and the comments left in our log were uniformly positive. Petro Grigorenko, the Ukrainian general, also came to look at the show. While the exhibition was in progress, we participated in a silent demonstration on Political Prisoners' Day, 10 December. The activities of Leningrad's creative intelligentsia grew progressively more bold, and we held open exhibitions both in the city's squares and in private residences. However, this led to unpleasant dealings with the authorities. Police reprisals became more severe, and many either left the country or were imprisoned. Some died in circumstances that have yet to be explained.

In 1977, it was my turn to be persecuted, and I was barred from Leningrad. Late one night, some militiamen came into my workshop and took away my passport. A few hours later, another group of them arrived and demanded that I show my documents. I tried to explain to them that a band of their colleagues had just taken them away, but the latest arrivals insisted that no one from the organs had been to my place, and seeing as I had no passport, I had to go with them to the station to confirm my identity. They kept me in a cell with alcoholics and prostitutes until morning. Then the duty officer informed me that my passport had been found, and it was returned to me. I noticed with trepidation that a new stamp, "*Vypisan*" (Cancelled) had been entered into it. I was told to leave the city in three days on pain of being arrested for passport violations, which carries a sentence of two years hard labor.

It was winter at the time, and I had to put my life in order quickly because I had a wife and small child. For two months I looked for work and a place to live throughout the country, and all in vain. I could not find anything on the outskirts of either Moscow or Leningrad, and so, exhausted, I turned to my parents in Dnipropetrovsk. I settled there with my wife and child, and found work in an artists' co-operative. Initially, our lives were relatively calm, but the authorities tracked me down and their efforts to destroy my livelihood began. I was visited by KGB men, subjected to provocations and intimidation, accused of anti-Soviet activities and nationalism. The charges of "propagating Western-bourgeois painting," rested on the fact that I had show slides of works by non-conformists from Moscow and Leningrad.

At the time these charges were laid, there was an exhibition of my works in Toronto, which resulted in accusations that I worked for the CIA. We could no longer endure the persecutions and applied to emigrate to the USA. We were denied, and the campaign of harassment intensified. We applied once again,

were denied once again, and this time my studio was taken away and I was denied permission to work creatively on commission. I was assigned degrading and low-paying jobs. My wife and I were called before special "Intensification of Ideological Struggle" committees at work, and were branded as ideological deviants. The co-operative voted to expel me from work and recommended that the KGB investigate how it was that my works were sent to the West. My high professional qualifications were dismissed as a clever charade that concealed my ideological deviance.

An article appeared in the press, written by a Communist party member of the Writers' Union that I had never met, in which I was viciously attacked. He made use of information obtained from personal correspondence and telephone calls that had been intercepted. One morning, as I was on my way to my studio, I was taken to a KGB station and warned by a group of ten representatives of the police, party and the press that I would be arrested if I continued my anti-Soviet activities.

In 1983, unable to endure these persecutions any longer, we moved back to Leningrad, where we continue to live. Once there, I began exhibiting my works unofficially once again, and also participated in all-Union and republican exhibitions. The press began praising my work. I was finally accepted (unanimously) into the Artists' Union, even though I showed works that had been repeatedly rejected earlier. In seventeen years of creative work, I was able to exhibit only four paintings, all of which were still-lifes. After five years in Leningrad, the KGB no longer pestered us.

Our artists have not yet worked in the genre of the historical portrait, and have yet to adequately portray historical events and the contemporary tragedy of our country. Of course, this cannot be accomplished by one individual. We should have a workshop at the Kiev Institute, a workshop with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. A school of advanced fine art should be opened and not be continuously pillaged as it has been in the past. Continuous emigration has stripped Ukraine of highly educated artists, for example, in the eighteenth century, Losenko, Borovykovsky and Levytsky, who are now known as Russian artists. The school of Mykhailo Boichuk of 1920s was entirely destroyed. When this idea of a workshop at the Kiev Institute will become a reality, it will serve as an example of restructuring. I have a dream of the first exhibition of Ukrainian painting in a Museum of Ukrainian Art in Kiev, and of the creation of a gallery of contemporary Ukrainian painting.

I proposed that my works be exhibited in Dnipropetrovsk in order that its citizens be able to decide the fate of my creativity at the time when I was most harshly persecuted for nationalism. I invited representatives of the Writers' and Artists' Unions, (who invited some KGB operatives) to my studio to see my works. Sixteen of them came, and as I showed them my paintings they watched in silence. Finally, I asked them indicate where it was that they saw nationalistic symbols or anti-Soviet propaganda. The assembled commission did not answer, although they did try to find unnatural combinations of colors.

In 1988, my first one-man exhibit was held in Lviv and Kiev. I am particularly indebted to the Ukrainian Cultural Fund and to Borys Oliinyk for making

this possible. When this show was opened, many viewers offered to help me move from Leningrad to Kiev. They claimed they would find me a place of residence and a studio, all in the best spirit of restructuring, but nothing has come of these loud protestations.

As far as my creative work is concerned, it is based on a national platform and on a knowledge of European art. All artists should give expression to the things that are natural to them and to the age in which they create, and not lose sight of the essentials in art. A work of art emerges by itself, and this is its mystery. A work lives with its own life; it creates a spiritual atmosphere. Art serves to develop the human soul. When art disappears, a void is created which is soon filled with poison.

I have worked for Ukraine, and have done my utmost to prevent our national consciousness from dying out. Today, I believe, the time has come for Ukraine to develop independently, and we should reject copying models of others. We, as Ukrainians, have no reason to doubt our cultural significance because our history and our culture have stood up to the most severe of tests. Our suffering people deserve to be addressed in their own native language. Our cultural and national life has never been halted, and we, as artists, should be its leaders.

Translated from Ukrainian by Andriy Wynnyckyj



VIRKO BALEY

Contemporary Ukrainian "New Music": *An Interview**

I: If Ukrainian contemporary music is so interesting and the Ukrainian musical heritage is so rich, why is it that we in the West know so little about either?

B: There are two reasons for this. One of them is that the bulk of literature [concerning Ukrainian composers] that the West is familiar with and considers to be essential about [the music of] the late eighteenth century, was written at a time when Ukraine virtually did not exist as a political entity. And so, the normal channels for development of the literature that could be considered standard were simply not there. To a certain extent, Poland had a similar problem. The only Polish composer we all know very well is Chopin, who essentially spent most of his life in Paris. This is more of a political and sociological problem than anything else.

Ukraine has a very rich early classical or baroque tradition, a mixture of these two. Very unique, very different. But it is mainly in choral music, and in the West, *a capella* choral music takes second place. So when you talk about [Dmytro] Bortniansky, most people have heard of him. At least that much. That they'll grant. The works—they enjoy them. But [Artem] Vedel, [Maksym] Berezovsky, [Mykola] Dyletsky, and all the others—these are names that only musicologists know about; the average audience simply doesn't. However, the average audience has probably never heard of a mass by Palestrina either. Those are the two main reasons.

In addition, in the nineteenth century, by a series of *ukazy* (or imperial decrees), Ukrainian culture was not allowed to develop independently. The language was proscribed. You couldn't write or publish in Ukrainian. These kinds of measures don't really allow for the development of any form of cul-

*An interview by Elizabeth Wells of CJRT-FM radio Toronto, 30 January 1989. Transcription by Andriy Wynnyckyj.

tural activity. It wasn't until the twentieth century that it started happening. Now at last you have a few names, particularly in North America, that are becoming more widely known. For instance, Valentyn Sylvestrov, Leonid Hrabovsky. Schirmer is now publishing catalogues with books that carry the names of those composers.

My contention is that within the next ten to twenty years, there will be a number of composers who will become very well known. But this is closely tied to the political destiny of the country in question. If *glasnost* and *perestroika* work out and result in cultural autonomy, I think you will see that happening. Certainly, there are a number of Ukrainian composers I would consider great in the balance of contemporary music. There are a number of musicologists who are beginning to see that. There is a monograph on Sylvestrov being written in Holland, and there is a French musicologist that I correspond with who is quite interested in a number of them.

It is beginning to happen, but it can only proceed if X, Y and Z also fall into place. And that means that there has to be a base of cultural autonomy, along with a recognition by interested parties that there is something worthy of investigation.

This, to a certain extent, happened in Poland right after Gomulka came to power. You had Penderecki and Lutoslawski. Why? Because there was a total renaissance, not only cultural, but a political one as well. I think that these things are closely related.

I: You are also in the process of writing a book on the subject, are you not?

B: Right. My interest has been in Soviet music as a whole. I can't see how one can deal with any part of Ukrainian, Georgian, or Estonian music separately, especially after World War II, without taking the Union into consideration, because the amount of interplay between the various peoples is enormous. Of course, there are very distinct schools. Arvo Pärt is very different from Schnittke, Sylvestrov is very different from [Giia] Kancheli. As you go down the line of composers who are Estonian, Russian, German, Jewish, Ukrainian, then on to Georgian, you notice that each one of them has a very specific profile and tendency. Each one is very distinctly his own. But when you write a study about them, you must acknowledge that these composers are in touch with each other. Everyone knows what the other is doing, yet everyone retains their own character.

When the music critic Harold C. Schonberg came to Kiev, he sat down with one of them at a table and asked, "How many of you are there?" Hrabovsky looked at him and said "About twelve." A musical revolution had occurred in this huge land, and it had been brought about by twelve people. Obviously, they would stay in communication.

The thing that amazed me is how little influence they had on each other in terms of style, if you look at their early work. If you look at Sylvestrov, Hrabovsky, Zahortsev, Volkonsky, Denisov, Pärt... Each one has a very distinct profile. They were almost jealous of it. The whole idea of one imitating another was anathema to them. When they embarked on this revolution in the late

1950s and early 1960s, they were aware of Western styles, but saw no reason to imitate them. There was no reason to reinvent the wheel. One of the things that I found interesting was that, in the midst of this society that prizes conformity more than anything else, [these composers] were able to go their own way and develop very strong personalities. Their music reflects this, and this is one of the things that makes their music very attractive.

In talking to some Western conductors and orchestras who have produced works by Soviet composers, I found that their response is extremely positive. Much more so now than was formerly the habit with critics and composers who were the first to come across them. Now it is fashionable to praise Schnittke and Gubaidulina. I remember a time in the early seventies, when there was a tremendous amount of condescension towards [Soviet composers]. "Well they are trying to be like us, are they not?" That has changed. Of course, as with anything, there are opponents and supporters, but now there is a much healthier atmosphere. There is no longer a feeling of what I call "regional superiority" that the West felt about Eastern Europe. A kind of implicit question: "Can they really be like us?" My answer to that, of course, is, "Why would they want to be like you?"

I: You are part of a symposium going on right now at York University, called *Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine*. How has *glasnost* affected musical life?

B: I think that *glasnost* has not really affected musical life as it has other things, simply because composers were really the first ones... Music was the first one to win *glasnost* for itself, even during the Brezhnev years. By the middle and late 1970s, the idea that a certain kind of style was unacceptable no longer really existed. Virtually all Soviet composers were using aleatoric techniques, tone clusters, electronics... I would say that music was one area of cultural endeavor in the Soviet Union that won independence by itself. I think that this has a lot to do with the fact that the language of music is very abstract. It is difficult to find political overtones in a C major chord. This, of course, is not the case with words or images. Socialist realism tried to create art that was political, but ultimately, composers were the first to free themselves.

Music also became an exportable item. The Soviet authorities saw music as a good export; they considered it to be a good cultural emissary, and so they released it from political censorship and, for the most part, allowed it to exist.

Performances within the Soviet Union depended on where you were. What *glasnost* did to change music in a profound way is that it opened the borders; it allowed composers to travel. Suddenly, in 1986–87, you have a rush of Soviet composers going to the USA, England, Germany and France to visit. There have been a number of composers who have been invited with commissions by orchestras in the USA. All these things are now standard, almost commonplace. It is no longer really a sensational item. In that sense, *glasnost* has made a very big difference.

Certain things, however, have been affected. For instance, religious works can now be performed and written. "God" is now once again capitalized. There was a period in the 1960s and 1970s, when Bortniansky's works were published, that disculpations had to be written about their sacred texts, and someone had

to write brand new secular texts for them. It was absurd, it was ridiculous beyond words [for the Soviet authorities] to be threatened by something like that, but that was the reality. That now is different.

I: You have brought the music of Soviet composers to Las Vegas, to the Las Vegas Symphony. You also have an annual contemporary music festival there. How do people react to Soviet music? Do you find that it is well received? Do people want to know more about it?

B: Generally I found that the audience reaction to Soviet music as a movement has been extremely positive. There are many reasons for this. There is an entirely different sight, smell and feel to this music. In Sylvestrov's *Symphony No. 5*, the composer conjures a certain typical Ukrainian lyrical magic realism or fantasy, and injects it into a rather long, sprawling, 51 movement work. It becomes like the sound of a bard singing. It has unique aspects that audiences here respond to very well.

Part of this acceptance by American audiences is due to the fact that American composers here have been very isolated. Because they tend to work within academic strictures and confines, they are not really accountable to the audience. This is not true of their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Soviet composers are much more involved, and are always dealing with the audience, in one fashion or another, even if this audience is very small.

They are also always involved with popular culture. Schnittke has written close to 60 scores for films. Schnittke was quite honest with me when he talked about it. In the USA, for a composer to start writing movie music would mean ostracism from the compositional community. I'm not sure whether Schnittke has made similar statements before, but he told me that he uses film as a laboratory for his music. His *Concerto Grosso No. 1 for Two Violins*, for instance, which is the first of his pieces to become widely popular, comes from a score he wrote for the film *Agoniia*. I went to see the film, and the *Concerto Grosso No. 1* was recognizably there, all over the place.

Soviet composers have a symbiotic relationship with popular culture and recognize that one must deal with certain materials that are common to the language of all people who listen. This is something that I found to be very positive about Soviet culture. In my opinion, the first one to understand this in the West was Charles Ives, who used popular marches and hymns. He recognized that they were part of our popular ethos, and injected them into his pieces. He was thus able to draw audiences out. They would establish a correlation between the marches and his music. That presented no problem for him. It presents no problem for me. But it did present problems for academics, who always want to differentiate between low and high art.

I: Can you see Soviet music of this kind entering into America and picking up part of the audience that feels ostracized by the intellectuals?

B: I think it already has. It was very interesting to read Rockwell's article in the *New York Times* about the best music to come out on record, in which he declared that Arvo Pärt's music was among the best. In the *Los Angeles Times*,

Martin Bernheimer said that the most vital works this year were contributions by Schnittke and Gubaidulina. What they are saying is partly journalistic polemics. In order to sell papers, they make radical statements. However, they are also saying that a communicating factor is entering into the picture.

This, in some ways, has changed the thinking of many Western composers. Even Pousseur, who was a Belgian avant-gardist, now writes neo-Renaissance pieces. There is a general movement in music, a kind of revisionism. But this has a lot to do with the realization that a dead end has been reached. In other words, when everything is allowed, nothing is interesting. Limitations are being taken on by composers. Not limitations that have been imposed, but ones that they themselves choose.

I: How do you personally fit it into the process of importing music? Are there other people in the United States who do this?

B: I'm involved with many people who are doing this. There is a group in New York called *Continuum*, with whom I have been working with closely over the past few years. I function essentially as someone who is of Ukrainian descent, and that's my central interest. But I also believe that a great deal of music that has been written over there is of a very communicable kind. As a performer, I see a need for that.

I was recently in Cleveland and attended a Cleveland Orchestra concert, and I discovered that the average age of its audience was 55. That is not good news. In every historical period, there is a crisis point when something new comes in that brings in a new audience. I believe that we are at such a point, and one of the responsibilities of performers is to look for something new.

I consider the works [of Soviet Ukrainian composers] to be very useful in a practical sense. Just as it is very practical to schedule Beethoven's 9th occasionally, because it fills up the house, it is also practical to play the works of composers they have never heard of that have an effect on the audience. When Sylvestrov's work was performed in New York in a 50th anniversary celebration in the composer's honor, we had an audience that was crying at the end. That is the kind of reaction that I, as an impresario, would want, because I know then that audiences will leave that hall with something they will remember for a very long time. This, in turn, will make them listen to other things.

As you can see, there are many reasons, emotional, practical, ideological, for the fact that I do what I do.

I: One of the highlights of the Symposium on Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine is a concert to be given 10 February in the Jane Mallett Theatre by one of Ukraine's leading violin virtuosos, Oleh Krysa, who will be playing a work by a Ukrainian composer.

B: Oleh Krysa. He is a remarkable violinist. He will be playing a piece that I recorded in the USA on piano, *Violin Sonata* by Borys Liatoshynsky, who, in my opinion, is the first important modern Ukrainian composer. I performed with Krysa in Moscow, with the Moscow Philharmonic, as a conductor.

I had commissioned a work especially for Krysa, from Myroslav Skoryk, who is a Ukrainian composer, for us to premiere in Las Vegas. All of this led to an invitation for Krysa to come to North America for the first time since 1971. After that was secured, through Goskontsert, it was a matter of setting up three additonal concerts for him, one of which will be held here in Toronto.

He is here with his wife Tatiana Tchekina, a pianist, for a violin and piano recital. It's a very interesting program. He will be performing two standard works (a Beethoven *Sonata in D Major*, and a Brahms *Sonata in D Minor*) and two unusual works, one of which the audience might be familiar with because Gidon Kramer recorded it. It's called *A Paganini*, and it was written by Alfred Schnittke. This is also interesting because it was written for Krysa. That is his piece. So he will play that and Borys Liatoshynsky's *Violin Sonata*.

The recital will give a very good overview of violin styles, starting with the classical, moving to the high romantic, then to the expressionism of the twenties. It concludes with the present style, which is that of a "Thomas Mann" age of parody, and incorporates all manners and styles.

APPENDIX: Virko Baley, Compiler, Contemporary Soviet Ukrainian "New Music" Audio Tapes in the Scott Library of York University

Bybyk Valentyn. *Symphony No. 7 for Organ, Timpani, Triangle and Strings*, 1982.

_____. *Symphony No. 4 in Memory of D.D. Shostakovich*, 1976.

Buievsky, Borys. *Symphony No. 2*, 1975.

_____. *Suite for Violin and Piano* (4-Hands).

Fylypenko, Arkadii. *String Quartet No. 4.*

Hrabovsky, Leonid. *"Kogda" for Mezzo-Soprano, Violin, Clarinet, Piano and Strings*— Introduction and 9 Miniatures (Poetry of V. Khlebnikov), 1987.

_____. *Pastels for Soprano and Four String Instruments* (violin, viola, cello and bass)—(Poetry of Pavlo Tychyna), 1964.

_____. *Trio for Violin, Contrabass and Piano*, 1964.

_____. *Symphonic Frescoes for Orchestra in 7 Movements*, 1961.

_____. *"La Mer" for Narrator, Chorus, Organ and Orchestra*, 1970.

_____. *Costanti for 4 Pianos, 6 Percussionists and Solo Violin*, 1964; 1966.

_____. *Concerto Misterioso for 9 Instruments*, 1977.

Huba, Volodymyr. *Autumn Music for Orchestra*, 1966.

_____. *DSCH (in Memory of D.D. Shostakovich) for Piano Trio, Three Ukrainian Aquarelles for Piano Trio.*

_____. *String Quartet No. 3* (After Dostoievsky), 1983–84.

_____. *Sonata for Flute and Piano, "Interrupted Music," 1981.*

_____. *Elegy for Violin and Organ*, 1981.

_____. *Nocturne for Violin and Harp*, 1981.

Karabitz, Ivan. *Concerto for Chorus, Soloists and Orchestra*, "The Garden of Divine Songs" (poems by Skovoroda), 1971.

_____. *Concerto for Orchestra No. 2*, 1986.

_____. *Symphony No. 3 for Strings*, 1978.

_____. *Symphony No. 1*, "Five Songs About Ukraine," 1974.

_____. *String Quartet No. 1*, 1974.

Kyva Oleh. *Chamber Cantata No. 3* (Tychyna), 1982.

_____. *Chamber Cantata No. 2* (F.G. Lorca), 1982.

Kolodub, Levko. *Symphony No. 3*, "In the Style of the Ukrainian Baroque," 1980.

Kyrylyna Iryna. *Sonata for Violin and Piano*, 1980.

Poloz, Mykola. *Concerto for Orchestra No. 7.*

Poteienko, Oleksandr. *Concert Suite for Brass Quintet, Triptych for Saxophone Quartet.*

Sylvestrov, Valentyn. *Symphony No. 5*, 1980–82 (Roman Kofman, conductor, Kiev Conservatory Orchestra).

_____. *Exegi monumentum* (A symphony), 1985–87.

_____. *Postludium for Piano and Orchestra*, 1984.

_____. *"Ode to the Nightingale" for Soprano* and *Chamber Orchestra*, 1982–83.

_____. *Five Songs from "Quiet Songs,"* 1974–77.

_____. *Piano Sonata No. 2*, 1975.

_____. *"Forest Music" for Soprano, French Horn and Piano*, 1977–78.

_____. *Poslednaia liubov*, 1982.

_____. *Meditation for Cello and Orchestra*, 1972.

_____. *Drama for Violin, Cello and Piano in 3 Parts*, 1970–71.

_____. *Five Pieces for Piano*, 1961.

_____. *Symphony No. 2 for Flute, Piano, Percussion and Strings*, 1965.

_____. *Poem in Memory of B. Liatoshynsky, "Spectre" for Chamber Orchestra*, 1965.

Skoryk, Myroslav. *Concerto for Orchestra*, "Carpathian," 1972.

_____. *Violin Concerto No. 1* (Oleh Krysa, violin), 1969.

_____. *Violoncello Concerto* (Maria Tchaikovska, violoncello), 1983.

_____. *Concerto for Orchestra*, "Carpathian," 1972.

Shumeiko, Volodymyr. *Four Carpathian Pastorales, Partita No. 1 for Piano, Sonata for Piano, "Duma about Three Brothers"* (1) Chamber version; 2) Orchestra version).

_____. *Quartetto Saxofonico*, 1988.

Stankovych, Ievhen. *Sinfonia Larga for Strings*, 1973.

_____. *Symphony No. 4, Sinfonia Lirica for Strings*, 1977.

_____. *"Kupalo,"* Symphonic-Choral Scenes from Opera "When the Fern Blooms."

_____. *Chamber Symphony No. 3 for Flute and Strings*, 1983.

_____. *Symphony No. 2*, "Heroic," 1975.

_____. *Symphony-Diptych for Chorus, a cappella.*

Zahortsev, Volodymyr. *Chamber Concerto No. 1, Chamber Concerto, No. 2, Chamber Concerto No. 3.*

_____. *Sonata for Piano No. 2*, 1980, 1988.

Zubytsky, Volodymyr. *Symphony No. 2*, "Concertanta."

_____. *"Oi u poli viter"* (from folk-opera).

_____. *Chamber Symphony No. 2* (words by Rimbaud), 1979.

_____. *"Concerto Rustico" for Orchestra.*

_____. *"Za nashym stolom" for Men's Chorus.*

_____. *Chamber Symphony No. 3*, in *Memory of Borys Liatoshynsky.*



OLEH KRYSA

An Interview*

I: There are many outstanding violinists in the world, but you have been recognized as one of the leaders in your field. What do you think sets you apart from other violinists?

K: Thank you for your kind words. It is difficult for me to say much about myself. It would be easier for someone who has heard me play. In any event, I do try to follow a certain path and not deviate from it. I believe that every artist follows his own star. To serve a higher form of art, this is the principal task of my life.

I: What do you experience when you play?

K: First of all, I feel a great joy of being a member of my profession. However, this fades soon after I go on stage, because then, unfortunately, I feel nothing. However, and this may not be an accurate analogy, the stage is like a narcotic. If you are able to express something essential, something deeply characteristic through your instrument, if you are able to move people and make them grateful, if your language, that is, your playing, can touch something in the hearts of the audience, then you feel the greatest joy an artist can attain.

I: You have received a number of prestigious awards for your performances and in recognition of your talent. How have these important triumphs influenced or transformed your career?

K: I have taken part in four international competitions, and each was different from the other. The first competition was the Wieniawski competition, and because the first of anything always remains first in your mind, it is very dear to me and very moving, because this was the first time that I took

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An interview by Olia Szczuryk of MTV, channel 47 (Ukrainian Magazine) 9 February, 1989. Transcription and translation from Ukrainian by Andriy Wynnyckyj.

such a responsible step in my life. This competition opened the door to subsequent public performances, for travel, and for concert tours. The second competition I participated in was the Paganini competition, where I was able to play on Paganini's instrument. This was an unheard of occurrence in my life. To be able to take the famous maestro's instrument into my hands was almost a shock. It was an incomparable feeling. Later, I appeared at the Tchaikovsky competition, one of the largest in the world. The competition in Montreal was particularly memorable because it included an incredible number of very gifted violinists. By that time, I was more mature, and I knew that it was probably going to be my last one. I was very glad that I was invited to compete with, (I'm not ashamed to say) the brightest constellation of virtuosos, in a spirit of camaraderie.

Competitions, in spite of all of the nerves and the incredible pressure one faces, can nevertheless be quite helpful to an emerging talent, in that it can help in development, and it definitely eases further access to the stage.

I: The ways competitions can be of help are obvious, but are there drawbacks that can seriously affect the musicality of a young violinist?

K: The question is neither here nor there. There are people who play beautifully on stage without ever having competed. There are individuals who cannot endure the stress, and this has no bearing whatever on their worth. There are many examples of this. If a young talent manages to overcome such an obstacle, s/he can develop well and freely. If one fails, this does not mean that one's talent is lost, or that one is not capable of richly expressing something that is inaccessible to those who are technically very well prepared.

I: As an aspiring artist, you befriended musicians such as Mazurkevych and Slobodianyk at the Conservatory in Moscow. What interested and aroused you at the time?

K: Looking back, one always exclaims, "Ah! What a time that was!" But apart from such traditional expressions of satisfaction, I must say that my period of study was probably one of the best in the history of the Conservatory, even if one speaks only of the violin section. Davyd Oistrakh, Leonid Kogan, Ian Kelevych... This was an incredible assembly of names and teachers. This is to say nothing about the atmosphere that permeated the Moscow Conservatory at the time, and what concerts took place. When we arrived from Lviv, we tried to soak all of it in like sponges, because these kind of things must be absorbed fully in one's youth. One must plunge into this atmosphere and assimilate it completely. This was, I am not afraid to say, a golden age in my life.

I: You will be performing a work by a Ukrainian composer, Borys Liatoshynsky. How has his music influenced the Soviet scene, and Ukrainian music in particular?

K: Borys Mykolaievych has had a tremendous influence on music in the Soviet Union as a whole, and in Ukraine. His was a mighty talent. I can compare his symphonies only to those of Shostakovich. His impulse gave momen-

tum to the development of a Ukrainian compositional school, whence names such as Skoryk, Stankovych, Kyva and Sylvester emerged. The list is long. I am also very glad that I have been in contact with Ukrainian composers. It also gave me great pleasure to hear that the world premiere of a work by Myroslav Skoryk will take place in Las Vegas soon. It is a work he recently completed expressly for this performance.

I: Every excellent musician has a favorite instrument. Could you say something about your violin?

K: With great pleasure. This is a violin made by Pietro Guarneri of Mantua in 1671. I have been very lucky to find and acquire such an instrument. It is like a living being. We rejoice together, we suffer together. To have such a wonderful being with me gives me incomparable joy.

I: You were invited here to attend the Symposium on *Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine*, now taking place at York University in Toronto. How has *glasnost* affected music in Ukraine?

K: I don't live in Ukraine, so I can't give you a very concrete answer. However, I can say that the general atmosphere has changed. There is more freedom, and there are greater possibilities for expression. Repertoire politics has undoubtedly changed for the better, so that now one does not have to worry whether one can play a particular piece or whether another is forbidden. It's easier to breathe. Also, it is far easier for an artist to find and follow his own individual line. This, however, raises the question that along with this new freedom comes a substantial responsibility to remain true to one's path, and, to repeat again, serve one's star faithfully.



LES TANIUK

The Berezil Theatre of Les Kurbas Beneath the Snows of Siberia*

Far away, in the snows of Siberia, amidst the cold winds of the Solovetski Islands and Magadan, sleep countless "aborted" theatres. Many artists perished in the Stalinist arctic camps during the purges. A book about the gulag camp-theatres is due to appear soon, in Moscow, in which there is a chapter devoted to the theatre of Les Kurbas on the Solovetski Islands, and the theatre of Iosyp Hirniak in the Ukht-Pechersk camps.

The *Berezil* Theatre, founded by Les Kurbas, was born in Kiev in the spring of 1922. In 1926, it was moved to Kharkiv, then the capital of Ukraine. Kurbas chose the name "*berezil*" because in Ukrainian "*berezil*" is a name for March, the first month of spring. In selecting this name for his avant-garde theatre, Kurbas referred to the poet Bjornstein Bjornson who wrote, "I chose the name *berezil* because it is a storm, because it is rebellion from which summer is born."

The *Berezil* Theatre became world famous, and Kurbas' brilliant productions of the dramas of Mykola Kulish (*Myna Mazailo*, *The People's Malakhii*, *Maklena Grasa*) were culminations of this theatre. The Kurbas system of acting was taught throughout Ukraine, and all of the country's foremost actors were followers of his school. Many of his students also became directors of theatrical companies. Stanislavsky, Lunacharsky, Meierhold, Akhmeteli: all highly valued Kurbas' talent.

However, during the tragic year of 1933, the year of the man-made famine in Ukraine and a year of purges, the *Berezil* Theatre was repressed. Later, Les Kurbas, Mykola Kulish, along with Kurbas' students, Faust Lopatynsky and Ianuarii Bortnyk, all perished. The actor Iosyp Hirniak was exiled and miraculously survived to write memoirs about his teacher.

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*English language abstract of a paper delivered in Ukrainian at the Les Kurbas International Symposium, York University, 10 June 1989. Other participants were: Romana Bahry (York University); Nelli Kornienko (Moscow); Don Rubin (York University); Virlana Tkacz (New York).

In Kurbas' system, the individual had to be independent, not subordinated to the collective; he always stressed the individual and the independent element. It was his views on freedom and the search for higher spiritual values that came into conflict with the "cog," the Philistine monster created in Stalin's era. And so, the artistic achievements of Kurbas were repressed. Even in the sixties, during the Khrushchev "thaw," the rehabilitation was minimal. Referring to Kurbas, Andrii Skaba, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party, announced, that "we rehabilitated people, but not their ideas."

Nevertheless, these very ideas are now beginning to return to us, particularly since the UNESCO commemoration in 1987 of the centennial of Kurbas' birth. Books about Kurbas and his productions have been published in Moscow and Kiev, and numerous articles have appeared in the USSR, the USA, and in Canada. These studies have demonstrated that Kurbas' creative achievements were no less great than those of Stanislavsky, Craig and Meierhold.

Kurbas was arrested on 26 December 1933, in Moscow, where he was working on a production of *King Lear* for the Jewish theatre of Michoels—after having been dismissed from *Berezil*. The production was completed by another director.

The Communist party leader in Ukraine at the time, Pavel Postishev, suggested to Kurbas that he renounce his views, inform on his colleagues (some of whom had already perished tragically that year, by suicide) such as Mykola Khvylovy and the old party leader Mykola Skrypnyk. Kurbas was told that if he turned informant, widespread acknowledgement, fame and respect would be his. He refused. When the second wave of terror came in 1937 it ironically destroyed Postishev and many of those who had been instrumental in Kurbas' death, including Andrii Khvylia, Zatonsky, Kossior, Panas Liubchenko and Bulytsky.

On 9 April 1934, a three-man tribunal condemned Kurbas to five years imprisonment, accusing him of conspiracy against the state and the Communist party.

In May 1935, he was in the camp BBK on the White Sea Baltic Canal in Medvezha Hora of the Arkhangelsk province. Here Kurbas was appointed head of the local theatre. He began with a production of Slavin's *The Intervention*. Conditions in this camp were not as harsh as in others. Kurbas could walk about in his English suit; he could choose his actors (thereby, saving lives). However, a former director of the Moscow Theatre, Aleksei Alekseev, a jealous and unscrupulous man, who was also in the camp at the time, informed on Kurbas. Alekseev also handed the camp commander a libellous political lampoon of Kurbas by Hnat Iura, a director in Kiev, entitled "The Nationalist Aesthetic of Les Kurbas." This lampoon portrayed Kurbas as a Fascist, an enemy of the people, and so forth. The rehearsals of *The Intervention* were halted, and Kurbas was sent to a strict regime camp in Vian Guba, near Vig Lake.

Even here, Kurbas did not give in. He formed a new theatre and directed Sukhovo-Kobylin's comedy *The Death of Tarelkin*, a satire on the Russian

imperial police and customs of the nineteenth century. The actor-prisoners performed in their prison uniforms, lending a dangerous contemporary significance to their rendition of the past. There are also accounts about Kurbas' work on the modern farce *The Advocate Patlen*.

Kurbas collaborated on a camp operetta with the imprisoned Ukrainian dramatist Myroslav Irchan and the Czech composer Urbani. It was a variety show on themes of life behind bars, and its title was *Son na Vian Gubi* (*A Dream in Vian Guba*). This production was an open protest against the regime. Kurbas himself performed a telling pantomime in which an old fool is forbidden, then prevented from playing on a piano. The character has his eyes bandaged, but tries to play, his loss of sight notwithstanding. Then one hand is broken, so he plays with the other. The other hand is broken, so he begins to play with his foot. They come to drag him away from the piano, and he grabs onto its lid with desperate strength, then runs to a dark corner of the stage with the lid. He begins playing on it and music miraculously surges forth again. The message is clear. Art cannot be destroyed, and its essence is invincible. This metaphor Kurbas created serves remarkably well to sum up his whole life. According to one of the spectators of this production (a commissioner sent by the camp's directors) subsequent performances were completely censored, and Kurbas, Irchan and Urbani were sent to the Solovetski Islands.

In Solovki, Kurbas became the head of the Kremlin Theatre, and staged productions in the Dormition church. The plays included Shaw's *The Devil's Disciple*, Beaumarchais' *The Marriage of Figaro*, Rubinshtein's *Demon*, and Pogodin's *The Aristocrats*. A program survives from a 1937 production of the latter play, which concerns *chekist* (secret police) "reeducation" of thieves and prostitutes in the camps. Kurbas's inversion of the action transformed the criminals into heroes, thus further infuriating his overseers.

The official date of death of Les Kurbas is given as 15 November 1942. The cause: a stroke. However, other accounts have it that Kurbas died along with Mykola Kulish and other Ukrainian prisoners of the Solovetski Island camp on 9 October 1937. Allegedly, a large group of prisoners was taken out on the White Sea in a barge, shot, then thrown into the waters with weights around their feet.

The subject of gulag theatres is only now emerging as a topic of research. What becomes obvious is that beneath the snow storms of the Stalin gulags, the ideas of freedom and rebellion persisted. Nothing could force Les Kurbas to renounce his "*Berezil*" convictions. Not even the threat of death.

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