

Studies in Ethnic and Immigration History

**Maple Leaf and Trident**  
The Ukrainian Canadians during  
the Second World War



Thomas M. Prymak

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Cover photo: A Canadian soldier, Nick Rennick,  
in basic training at Brandon, Manitoba, 1943.

TO MY PARENTS



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## Preface

In recent years the general field of ethnic history and the history of Canadian and American minority groups has been developing quickly. Much progress has been made in the accumulation of basic data and a few significant synthetic histories have been published. However, a great deal remains to be done and this is as true in the area of Ukrainian-Canadian history as it is in the history of many another Canadian or American minority group. With regard to the Ukrainian Canadians, moreover, some very specific tasks remain.

For many years the writing of Ukrainian-Canadian history has been dominated by studies of the pioneer era. The focus has been on the story of the immigrants from the provinces of Galicia and Bukovina in the Austrian Empire who came to Canada and settled the prairie in the decades that preceded the First World War. The subsequent periods – the interwar years and the decade of the 1940s – have been largely ignored. The present work is a modest attempt to rectify this imbalance, to shed some light on the interwar era and, most especially, on the stormy period of the Second World War.

The history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War brings several themes to mind. First, there is the claim often stated by Ukrainian veterans that forty thousand Ukrainian Canadians served in the Canadian armed forces during the war. This number was first used in newspaper accounts during the 1939–45 period and has never been seriously questioned. The present study seeks to document Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the war effort and test the validity of that figure.

There are other themes as well. As a minority group, and indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s a somewhat more visible minority group than they are today, Ukrainians in Canada have experienced at times the prejudices of the majority. This majority-group nativism was relatively strong during the period before 1939 and the possibility clearly existed that wartime tensions would aggravate such feelings, as in fact happened during the First World War. The present study examines this possibility, but it also examines the alternative, namely that nativist feelings toward "European" Canadians, as they were then called, were actually reduced during the war. Some space is given here to the role of federal government agencies in inducing this change.

Finally, this book considers the internal dynamics of the organized Ukrainian community, or rather communities, and examines the propaganda war between the Communists who formed one tightly knit community and the so-called nationalists or non-Communists who formed an entirely distinct and more diversified community. This

conflict between Communist and non-Communist is one of the most striking themes of the wartime years and receives considerable attention here. Moreover, because previous scholarly literature has concentrated for the most part upon analysis of the Ukrainian left and glossed over the positions and the experiences of the right, much mystery has surrounded the attitudes, ideologies and actions of the non-Communists and, most especially, the extreme rightists who have been relegated into the shadows. Therefore a special attempt has been made here to explore the history of the right and this has necessitated somewhat more space being allocated to its experience than to that of the left whose general patterns of thought and action are already more or less well known. The author hopes that the new materials presented here will increase our understanding of the dialectic between these two camps far more than could a mere repetition of a story that is already told elsewhere in great detail. In our presentation of this propaganda war between Communist and non-Communist, newspaper articles and pamphlets have been the principal sources.

With regard to still another important question, it must be clearly recognised that during the war years the level of ethnic consciousness or ethnic commitment among Ukrainian Canadians was anything but uniform. Therefore, various terms are used in the present study to describe the people in question. For example, when a high ethnic consciousness is discussed, the terms are "Ukrainians in Canada" or "Ukrainian Canadians," while when a lower ethnic consciousness is discussed the phrase "Canadians of Ukrainian origin" is sometimes used. Similarly, the term "nationalist" has at least two different levels of meaning. On the one hand, it is used here in a narrow and easily defined sense to describe the members of an avowedly nationalist organization thoroughly committed to anti-Communism and to the struggle for Ukrainian independence. In the present study, the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada (UNF) is a good example of such an organization. On the other hand, nationalist has in the past sometimes been used to describe any non-Communist Ukrainian-Canadian organization, since during the 1939-45 war any non-Communist Ukrainian Canadian who clearly accepted the idea of a Ukrainian national identity tended to become transformed into a "nationalist" as he became more political. The author has done his best to avoid the use of the term nationalist in this less definite and less political sense. However, a certain vagueness in terminology is unavoidable both with regard to the Ukrainian question in Europe and also within the narrower Canadian context.

In any study of a Slavic minority group which uses the Cyrillic alphabet in its native language, either in Canada or in the United States, problems of orthography and transliteration immediately come to the fore. The primary reason for this is that each wave of immigration to



North America occurred at a different time and under different international influences, and names were therefore spelled in accordance with these influences. Thus the pioneer immigration to the Canadian prairies, for example, which occurred at a time when German and Polish influences were widely felt among the settlers from Bukovina and Galicia and when Canadian immigration officials were ill-acquainted with modern rules of orthography and transliteration, resulted in spellings of names which tended to mix Germanic and native English phonetics. As a consequence, the pioneers themselves, and we also, must write Wasyl Swystun, Julian Stechishin and Peter Worobec rather than Vasyl Syystun, Iulian Stechyshyn and Petro Vorobets as we would do if we consistently adhered to the current simplified American Library of Congress system. The same rules of transliteration and spelling apply to the interwar immigration and so we must write Wladimir Kossar and Peter Krawchuk rather than Volodymyr Kossar and Petro Kravchuk. It is only with the third wave of immigration which occurred after the end of the Second World War that the rules of transliteration change and some of the new arrivals insisted upon using the systematic European orthography and transliteration rather than the more chaotic pioneer one, or the as yet unknown American one. But this third immigration does not concern us here so that names in the present book can be generally said to follow the pioneer traditions with their consequent English, Polish and German influences. The only exceptions to this tendency are the names of people and places in the old country – that is, in the territory of the present-day Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. For these people and for these places, the simplified American Library of Congress system for Ukrainian has been applied. Thus we spell Mykola Skrypnyk and Mykhailo Hrushevsky rather than alternate personal forms, and Lviv and Kharkiv rather than alternate place names (Lwów, Kharkov). In a few cases where an established English usage exists, this usage has been retained. Thus we write Kiev, not Kyiv, and Galicia, not Halychyna.

A number of people deserve thanks for their participation in the project of which this book is the final result. These include the members of the Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation who initiated the project and generously supported it through its earlier stages, Stephen Pawluk of this same foundation, whose faith in the project and wisdom in its execution never failed, Dr. Vivian Olender of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto for various technical services rendered, and Professor Bohdan Budurowycz of the Department of Slavic Studies, also at the University of Toronto, who graciously agreed to read the manuscript and suggest improvements. Any infelicities which remain, of course, are entirely the responsibility of the

author. The Multiculturalism Directorate of the Secretary of State is also acknowledged for a grant which helped to ensure the completion of the project. The journey has turned out to be a long one, far longer than its initiators had envisioned and to places where the author did not originally intend to go. But the destination has been reached and it is possible, at last, to bid new visitors welcome.

THOMAS M. PRYMAK

Toronto

September 1987

## Abbreviations

BUC	(BUK) Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics ( <i>Bratstvo Ukrainsiv Katolykiv Kanady</i> ).
ORU	(ODVU) Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine ( <i>Orhanizatsiia Derzhavnoho Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy</i> ).
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists ( <i>Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv</i> ).
UCC	(KUK) Ukrainian Canadian Committee ( <i>Komitet Ukrainsiv Kanady</i> ).
UCCA	(UKKA) Ukrainian Congress Committee of America ( <i>Ukrainskyi Kongresovyi Komitet Ameryky</i> ).
UCSA	(SUKV) Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association ( <i>Soiuz Ukrainskykh Kanadiiskyykh Voiakiv</i> ); afterwards UCVA (SUKV) Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association ( <i>Soiuz Ukrainskykh Kanadiiskyykh Veteraniv</i> ).
UHO	(SHD) United Hetman Organization ( <i>Soiuz Hetmansiv Derzhavnykhiv</i> ).
ULFTA	( <i>TURF Dim</i> ) Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association ( <i>Tovarystvo Ukrainskyi Robitnycho-Farmerskyi Dim</i> ); afterwards UAF (UTDB) Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland ( <i>Ukrainske Tovarystvo Dopomohy Batkivshchyni</i> ); afterwards UCA (TUK) Ukrainian Canadian Association ( <i>Tovarystvo Ukrainskykh Kanadtsiv</i> ); afterwards AUUC (TOUK) Association of United Ukrainian Canadians ( <i>Tovarystvo Ob'iednannia Ukrainskykh Kanadtsiv</i> ).
UNF	(UNO) Ukrainian National Federation of Canada ( <i>Ukrainske Natsionalne Ob'iednannia</i> ).
USRL	(SUS) Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada ( <i>Soiuz Ukrainsiv Samostiinykhiv</i> ).
UWVA	(USH) Ukrainian War Veterans' Association ( <i>Ukrainska Striletska Hromada</i> ).
WBA	(RZT) Workers' Benevolent Association ( <i>Robitnyche Zapomohove Tovarystvo</i> ).



# Chronology

*1891*

The first Ukrainian settlers arrive in western Canada.

*1914–18*

The First World War. Some Ukrainians in Canada enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Denaturalization and internments of central and east Europeans in Canada.

*1917*

Revolution in Russia. Proclamation of the autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic. Philip Konowal awarded the Victoria Cross.

*1918*

January 22: Declaration of Ukrainian independence.  
War ends in western Europe.

*1930*

Polish "pacification" of eastern Galicia. Depression begins in western Canada.

*1932*

Roman Sushko visits Canada. Formation of the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF). Ukrainian Bureau active in England.

*1935*

Danylo Lobay and others leave the Communist Party of Canada in protest against famine and purges in Ukraine.

*1938*

Ukrainian Flying School founded in Oshawa. Ievhen Konovalts assassinated. Ukrainian Canadians send aid to autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine. Danylo Skoropadsky visits Canada and the United States.

*1939*

March 15: Hungary annexes Carpatho-Ukraine.  
Summer: Wladimir Kossar visits Europe. George VI and Queen Elizabeth visit Canada.  
August 23: USSR and Germany sign Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  
September 1: Germany invades Poland and annexes Danzig.  
September 3: Britain declares war on Germany.  
September 10: Canada declares war on Germany. All Ukrainian-Canadian organizations declare their support for the war effort. Communists later change their position.  
Winter: UNF raises funds for Finland. Ukrainian Canadian Communists oppose the war.

*1940*

June: Germany conquers France. Native Canadian fascists and Communists interned. New pressure on non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians to unite behind war effort.

Summer: Vladimir Kysilewsky and Tracy Philipps tour western Canada.

November 6-7: Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) formed.

*1941*

June 22: Hitler invades the Soviet Union. Communists begin to support the war.

August: Churchill and Roosevelt issue the Atlantic Charter.

October: Labour Supply Investigation Committee reports on potential for English-Canadian prejudice hurting enlistments and causing labour shortages in war industry.

November: Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship takes form.

December 8: Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong. United States enters the war.

*1942*

February 2: In Parliament Anthony Hlynka suggests that the UCC represent Ukrainians at future international conferences.

February 5: Canada and the Soviet Union agree to exchange diplomatic representatives.

April 27: National plebiscite on conscription of manpower for service overseas.

August 19: Dieppe raid.

*1943*

January 7: (Ukrainian Christmas) Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association (UCSA) formed in England.

June 2-4: First Dominion Congress of the UCC.

July: Invasion of Sicily by Allied troops including Canadians.

September 3: Allied troops cross the Straits of Messina.

November 6: Soviet troops recapture Kiev.

*1944*

June 4: Allied troops enter Rome.

June 6: D-Day Allied landings in Normandy.

July: Soviet troops take Galicia and western Volhynia.

*1945*

February 4-11: Yalta Conference in the Crimea.

March: Canadian troops enter Hochwald Forest.

March 25: Anthony Hlynka suggests North American Ukrainians represent Ukraine at the San Francisco conference.

April 25: San Francisco conference on world organization begins.

April 30: Hitler commits suicide.

*1946*

May 29: Senate of Canada debates immigration of Ukrainian Displaced Persons from western Europe.





## The Ukrainian Canadians, 1891–1939

*Ubi bene, ibi patria.*

– Emily Greene Balch

Large numbers of Ukrainians first came to Canada during the early years of the twentieth century. They were country folk and came from the densely populated provinces of Galicia and Bukovina in the Austrian half of the Habsburg monarchy. These Slavic farmers were attracted to British North America by the Canadian government's offer of 160 acres of free land to each homesteading family. They were encouraged by Canadian advertising, European emigration agents and certain individuals among the educated classes in Galicia who wished to turn the direction of the emigration movement from Brazil to North America. By the eve of the First World War, there were approximately one hundred thousand settlers of Ukrainian ethnic origin living in the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the newcomers settled in the poplar belt which ran along the northern edge of the prairies in a wide arch that began southeast of Winnipeg and ran north and west through the towns of Gardenton, Dauphin, Yorkton, Saskatoon, Vegreville and Edmonton. Large numbers of young men worked for the railways or joined the working class in various prairie cities. After a few years a sprinkling of newly arrived Greek Catholic priests and old country intelligentsia settled among the pioneers and widened the social spectrum a little.<sup>2</sup>

The name "Ukrainian" did not appear in the early immigration records. In their own language, the settlers, former subjects of the Austrian emperor, Franz Josef, generally called themselves *Rusyny* or *Rus'ki*, and, in turn, were called Ruthenians (*Ruthenen*) by their European sovereign and most of his subjects. (Only a few professional ethnographers noted that these people were ethnically identical to the

"Little Russians" of the Tsar's empire to the east). Among Canadian officials there was a tendency to refer to them as Galicians after the Austrian province from which the majority hailed, and this name seems to have gained the widest popular currency. The term "Ukrainian," which in 1898 had been adopted officially by most Ruthenian political organizations in Austria, was slow to catch on, although community leaders such as the government translator Cyril Genyk were certainly aware of its national and political implications.<sup>3</sup>

The pioneer era saw the emergence of a number of important community institutions. On one level, Russian Orthodox missionaries from San Francisco competed with local Protestants and Greek Catholic priests from Galicia in the establishment of church organizations for the settlers; on another level, radical populists competed with revolutionary socialists in declarations of support for the working men. Both populists and socialists worked to spread literacy among the former villagers and tried to turn them into what they called "nationally conscious Ukrainians" (*svідомі Ukraïntsi*). Canadian political parties also got involved and in 1903 the first Ukrainian-language newspaper in Canada, Winnipeg's *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (Canadian Farmer), was founded by a group of populists who enjoyed the financial support of the federal Liberal party. Others followed, with the Greek Catholic Church supporting the weekly *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* (Canadian Ruthenian). The next few years saw the establishment of a Ruthenian Training School and the introduction of "Ruthenian"-language textbooks printed in the phonetic script for use in the bilingual school system which then existed in Manitoba and, to a lesser extent, in the other prairie provinces. Local reading societies modelled on the Galician *Prosvita* Society and local social and recreational clubs, which promoted music and drama with strong popular educational themes, rounded out the profile of the organized immigrant society of the pioneer era.<sup>4</sup>

The outbreak of war in 1914 completely changed this situation. When Austria-Hungary and Germany went to war with Serbia and the Russian Empire, the Greek Catholic Bishop in Winnipeg, Nykyta Budka, responded according to custom by urging the Galician and Bukovinian settlers to be faithful to their Austrian sovereign. However, once the British Empire, and hence the Dominion of Canada, entered the war on the opposite side, the embarrassed bishop was compelled to quickly reverse his position and urge his parishioners to support "the British nation." The *Manitoba Free Press*, the main Liberal newspaper in Manitoba, accused Budka, who seems to have favoured Premier Roblin's Conservatives, of an act of deliberate disloyalty to Canada and, as a result, the entire "Ruthenian" community fell under suspicion.<sup>5</sup>

There were other problems too. All recently arrived immigrants from enemy countries were compelled to register and report regularly to the authorities. About seven thousand central European labourers

and itinerants, principally ethnic Ukrainians, were deemed "enemy aliens," rounded up, and interned in special work camps in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. In 1916 the bilingual educational system was abolished in Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and Alberta quickly followed suit. In 1917 the Wartime Elections Act extended the vote to the mothers, wives and sisters of serving soldiers, but simultaneously took it away from Canadians of "enemy" origin naturalized since 1902. The disenfranchised Central European immigrants were then exempted from the conscription that the Conservative government of Robert Borden immediately introduced; but the humiliation of disenfranchisement was too much for many and the Greek Catholic organ *Kanadijskyi Rusyn*, which had been urging its readers to live up to their wartime responsibilities, declared that there was "no worse shame" than to be disenfranchised.<sup>6</sup>

The war against Austria-Hungary and Germany also influenced questions of religious loyalties and national consciousness. The war initially put Bishop Budka's Greek Catholic Church, which had been connected with the Catholic sovereign in Vienna, on the defensive. At the same time it opened up greater opportunities for Russian Orthodox missionaries, who enjoyed both the financial support of the Tsar's Holy Synod in St. Petersburg and the prestige reserved for members of an allied nation. Between 1914 and 1917, Russian Orthodox influence continued to expand, and in Alberta the Bukovinian-born MLA, Andrew Shandro, explained to the provincial legislature that Canada could count upon the loyalty of the three hundred thousand [*sic*] Austrian settlers who were, in his view, actually of Russian nationality. Simultaneously, the socialist founder of the Society for an Independent Ukraine, Paul Crath (Pavlo Krat), got into trouble for advocating the break-up of the empire of Britain's bold Russian ally.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of these difficulties, the patriotic fever which spread across Canada during the First World War did not completely by-pass the Ukrainians. As former Habsburg subjects, Galician and Bukovinian immigrants had been deemed enemy aliens and were not allowed to serve in the Canadian armed forces. Nevertheless, in order to get permission to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force that was departing for Europe, some settlers were willing to falsify their place of origin and state that they had come from "Russia" or "Poland." As early as 1916, one Canadian official estimated that two thousand Ruthenians had already enlisted in the armed forces and that as many as ten thousand could be recruited if the regulations were changed. In fact, not long afterward some 1,166 men bearing Ukrainian names were allowed to play a non-combatant role in the Canadian Forestry Corps doing logistics work in Britain.<sup>8</sup>

Of the men who fought in France one name stands out, that of Corporal Philip Konowal, who received the Victoria Cross, the highest military award bestowed in the British Empire. He was accorded this

honour for an act of outstanding bravery during frontline combat in the trenches on Vinny Ridge. Though at the time Konowal was described as a Russo-Canadian, he was, in fact, an ethnic Ukrainian, seemingly from a village in eastern Galicia near the Russian border. Many years later, in a letter to Stephen Pawluk, Dominion President of the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association, Konowal requested funds to attend a reunion of VCs in England and explained: "I am the only Ukrainian who has won the V.C."<sup>9</sup>

The revolutions of 1917 in Russia initiated still another stage in the struggle between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles in the Galician pioneer community. Socialist intellectuals who claimed to speak on behalf of the working classes, populist school teachers dedicated to raising the cultural level of their people, and even Greek Catholic leaders concerned for the spiritual welfare of their flock, welcomed the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian state with the famous Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, at its head. The Russian Orthodox missionaries, however, lost their subsidies and shared in the discredit of the Tsarist regime whose ultra-conservative ideology they had propagated. This was a real victory for the Ukrainians/Ruthenians of Manitoba, who only a few months before had endured the abolition of Ruthenian/English bilingual education in their province. "The thirty million strong Ukrainian nation in Russia," exclaimed the Winnipeg socialist paper *Robochyi narod* (Working People), "will now use its native language in its speech, writing, schools, and government. The ignorant grey masses of the Ukrainian working people will now have access to education, and, with the aid of their native language, will be able to draw literary nourishment from the storehouse of knowledge."<sup>10</sup> As early as 1909 a group of populist school teachers had demonstrated their national orientation by titling their new weekly paper *Ukrainskyi holos* (Ukrainian Voice); by 1919 even the conservative *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*, had changed its name to *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* (Canadian Ukrainian).

The Bolshevik revolution and the war between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the followers of Lenin further clarified the situation. Old-style Russophiles had almost completely disappeared on the prairies, and the new struggle was between communists and nationalists, both of whom thought of themselves as Ukrainians as they vied for the support of the wavering population. Ukrainian national consciousness was deepened further when between 1920 and 1923 the delegates of the Ukrainian republican governments in exile, Ivan Bobersky and Oryp Nazaruk, travelled the prairies gathering money for the national cause.<sup>11</sup>

International events, however, did not favour the Ukrainians. The British government was committed to the more conservative Russians – the Whites – who had been their allies during the war. It decided

to intervene against the Bolsheviks who had taken Russia out of the conflict. In consequence, a Canadian Expeditionary Force was dispatched to Siberia to help the Whites and about a hundred Ukrainian Canadians, mostly men from the Canadian Forestry Corps in England, went along as interpreters. Philip Konowal was one of the first selected to join the Siberian expedition.<sup>12</sup>

While the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force and its Ukrainian interpreters landed at Vladivostok, the veterans of the war in western Europe returned to Canada and became caught up in the complex web of unemployment, labour radicalism and hostility to "foreigners" that characterized the postwar era. Alien radicals were accused of subverting the entire political and social order. During the Winnipeg general strike, veterans' groups, which were organized against the strikers, carried signs proclaiming: "Down with Bolshevism! Deport the Undesirable Aliens! To Hell with the Alien Enemy - God Save the King!" In 1920 the Reverend Captain Wellington Bridgeman published a book accusing "Huns" and "Galicians" in Canada of all sorts of criminal activities and predicted that Canada would never achieve industrial stability until these people were swept from the country.<sup>13</sup>

It was not only the immigrant left that suffered. Conservatives and moderates of all shades from eastern Europe were often tarred with the same brush. Ukrainian nationalists, even moderate decentralizers, had still not freed themselves from the Russian monarchist charge that they were "separatist" traitors to Russia who were really in the pay of the German Kaiser. As late as 1920 the manager of Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* complained to Switzerland, to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the former leader of the Ukrainian national movement in Russia, who before the revolution had repeatedly faced accusations of Germanophilism, that "for a long time the jingoistic local press has been inciting the English masses against us. They tell the masses that Canadian Ukrainians are 'separatists'. Even the more judicious Canadian English such as university professors, economists, and lawyers gladly ascribe to this sort of thing."<sup>14</sup>

Hrushevsky was, in fact, probably the only true federalist left among the Ukrainian political émigrés. The vast majority, both from Galicia and from Russian Ukraine, while rejecting the separatist label, had already committed themselves to national unity and full national independence. In consequence, for the villagers from Galicia and Bukovina who had settled in the Canadian prairies, the term Ruthenian was quickly falling out of use, while the old geographical name Galician became a term of opprobrium used only by outsiders.<sup>15</sup>

The adoption of a Ukrainian ethnic identity coincided with the economic prosperity of the 1920s and a marked increase in cultural tolerance. The vociferous attacks on alien elements that had charac-

terized the immediate postwar years gradually gave way to well-intentioned if sometimes startlingly condescending descriptions of Ukrainian-Canadian life. The school teacher, Robert England, and the Protestant minister, Alexander J. Hunter, authored such works. In 1926 Kate A. Foster introduced the mosaic concept, while by 1928 the CPR publicity agent, John M. Gibbon, was organizing a series of folk festivals across Canada.<sup>16</sup> Thus when in 1929 an Anglican bishop in Saskatchewan attacked the further immigration of non-British peoples and objected to what he called a "mongrel Canada," Watson Kirkconnell, a young classics professor at Wesley College in Winnipeg, was able to point out in the *Canadian Forum* that greatness in civilization almost invariably came from a blending of races and cultures. The young professor mocked what he called the bishop's "insolent and unchristian fulminations."<sup>17</sup> By 1935 Kirkconnell had published a substantial anthology of "New Canadian" poetry and was contributing an annual review of "New Canadian Letters" to the *University of Toronto Quarterly*.<sup>18</sup>

The interwar era also saw the establishment of a number of important Ukrainian-Canadian cultural, religious and political organizations. The old socialists were the first to reorganize. Supporters of the communist revolution in Russia, former members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party which had been banned in 1918, soon re-emerged in the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA). The new organization eventually affiliated with the Communist Party of Canada and became one of its principal sources of financial and organizational support. As well, the cultural revival in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic during the 1920s and economic troubles in Canada during the 1930s turned the ULFTA into the strongest secular movement in organized Ukrainian society in Canada. Throughout much of this period, capable leaders such as John Navis (Ivan Navizivsky), Mathew Popowich, Mathew Shatulsky and John Boychuk steadily built up the ULFTA and rallied Ukrainian support for the Communist Party of Canada. In 1926 Bill (Wasył) Kolisnyk was elected alderman in Winnipeg, becoming North America's first Communist public office holder, while ten years later Ukrainian voters in this same city helped elect the British-born Communist, James Litterick, to the Manitoba provincial legislature, again a North American first. By 1939 the Communist *Narodna hazeta* (People's Newspaper) was the only Ukrainian-language daily in Canada and the ULFTA boasted ten thousand members, 10 per cent of whom belonged to the Communist Party.<sup>19</sup>

This impressive growth was not achieved without problems. For example, some non-Ukrainian comrades had opposed Bill Kolisnyk's bid for an aldermanic seat on the grounds that he was too conservative and, in the words of his critic, "more interested in demonstrating to

the public that Ukrainians were capable of holding public office and professional posts" than in doing important party work.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, in 1925 the Communist International headquartered in Moscow began a campaign to, in its own vocabulary, *bolshelize* all Communist parties and in Canada to dissolve all national federations and language branches and completely reorganize the party into factory cells and territorial units. Opposition to this move by John Navis, Mathew Popowich and other ULFTA leaders, as well as by Finnish and Jewish leaders, was overridden and they were accused of "sectarianism and right-wing opportunism." After appeals to Moscow and an investigation by the Communist International (Comintern), a compromise was finally worked out. Territorial organization was introduced fully into the party, but the ULFTA continued to exist while following the party line.<sup>21</sup>

With the adoption of the first five-year plan in the Soviet Union and Comintern orders to "intensify the class struggle" abroad, new tensions were introduced into the ranks of Canadian party members. A number of Ukrainian and other immigrant workers, especially older workers with secure employment in the massive Winnipeg railway yard complex, feared arrest and deportation, and some of the principal Ukrainian Communist leaders were sympathetic to their cause. Simultaneously, news arrived about the destruction of the old Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kiev, of the spread of famine conditions across the Ukrainian countryside, and of purges within the Communist Party itself and the suicides of the two most influential Ukrainian Communists, the education commissar of the Ukrainian SSR, Mykola Skrypnyk, and the writer Mykola Khvylovy. When Myroslav Irchan and Ivan Sembay, two former leaders of the Canadian ULFTA, who had returned to Soviet Ukraine a few years before, were arrested and accused of being "foreign agents," a number of important Ukrainian-Canadian Communists who, of course, knew these men personally, protested and left the party. Danylo Lobay, who was the long-time editor of the ULFTA's *Ukrainski robotnychi visti* (Ukrainian Worker News), Toma Kobzey, who was the ULFTA's national secretary, and John Hladun, who was one of the few leaders to visit the Soviet Union in person, left to establish a new non-Communist labour/cultural organization and began publishing a weekly newspaper, *Pravda* (Truth) which openly criticized the Stalin purges and exposed what its editors believed to be Stalin's new anti-Ukrainian nationality policies. But the new Workers' and Farmers' Educational Association founded by Lobay and his comrades remained small and its influence did not extend far beyond Winnipeg.<sup>22</sup>

The populists were next to reorganize. Many of their leaders were school teachers or lawyers. They were rebels who would not accept the authority of the strong-willed Greek Catholic bishop in Winnipeg

and they set out to found an independent Orthodox Church. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL) grew up alongside a new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada. The USRL was actually a federation of local organizations, but was held together ideologically by *Ukrainskyi holos*, which from 1921 to 1947 was edited by the fiery publicist, Myroslaw Stechishin. The first USRL national president was the dynamic prairie lawyer, Wasyl Swystun. Winnipeg lawyer J.W. Arsenych, and Myroslaw Stechishin's brother Julian in Saskatoon were two more pillars of the organization.

The ideology of the League was thoroughly democratic and Canadian-oriented but its members claimed to be more committed and nationally conscious Ukrainians than those who remained loyal to the Greek Catholic Church. These two aspects of the USRL (*Soiuz Ukrainsiv Samostiinykiv*) and its ideology were reflected in the organization's very name, for the last word, *samostiinyk* in Ukrainian, means as much a supporter of Ukrainian national "independence" as it does Canadian "self-reliance." The original USRL program put it in this way:

Considering Canada as the newly adopted homeland of the Ukrainians, the USRL urges Ukrainians as citizens to fully participate in all matters concerning this country, taking advantage of their civil rights and privileges as well as fulfilling their civic obligations.

Not being in the narrow sense of the term a political party, the USRL allows its individual members the freedom to vote for the party of their choosing.... The USRL considers the highest ideal of the Ukrainian nation to be the realization of Ukrainian state independence within its ethnographic territories.... The USRL accepts the idea of solidarism, or the harmonizing of class differences.... The USRL maintains a positive position in relation to the church and religion, regarding all manifestations of religious indeterminism as ruinous. The USRL recognises the importance of the church and its work; it supports that church which works for the welfare of the Ukrainian people, is under its control, and does not serve as an instrument for alien objectives.<sup>23</sup>

The USRL was thus strongly oriented toward Canadian as well as Ukrainian themes and fitted in well with the axioms of liberal democracy accepted by most Canadians. But the League also tended to be intolerant of its Ukrainian rivals, rather proud of its "enlightening" mission, and bitterly anti-Catholic.<sup>24</sup>

In the mid-1930s a stormy disagreement over Orthodox Church organization developed. Wasyl Swystun, one of the founders of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church and long-time president of the USRL, charged Archbishop Theodorovich and the Orthodox "consistory" or administration in Canada with deviating from union with the autocephalous national church in Ukraine. Supported by one of the more important Winnipeg parishes, Swystun left the consistory church



and the USRL. Shortly afterwards he joined the fiercest non-Communist rival of the League, the rightist Ukrainian National Federation.<sup>25</sup>

Unlike the pro-Communist ULFTA or the populist USRL, the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) was not a restructured version of one of the pioneer social, political or religious movements. Rather it traced its origins to the second wave of immigrants who had come to Canada after the end of the Great War and the unsuccessful Ukrainian war of independence. These veterans came to Canada in the 1920s and at first many of them joined one of the older Ukrainian organizations such as the USRL. By 1928, however, a new Ukrainian War Veterans' Association (UWVA) had been organized to serve the special needs and interests of the newcomers. It soon numbered close to six hundred members. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Eugene Konovalets, the head of the militant underground Ukrainian Military Organization in Europe, visited Canada to inspect the new association and lift the spirits of his former comrades. In consequence, the UWVA immediately began a campaign in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners in Poland. As a result of letters, memoranda and petitions addressed to the Canadian government and to the League of Nations, it managed to get the death sentences of two Ukrainian prisoners commuted. This was later billed as the first successful international political action undertaken by Ukrainian Canadians.<sup>26</sup>

In the following years, the UWVA continued its political activity and even collected enough money to build a hostel for Ukrainian war invalids in Lviv. It was also very active in protesting against Marshal Pilsudski's "pacification" campaign of 1930, which was intended to punish Ukrainians who might support the acts of sabotage carried out by Konovalets's Ukrainian Military Organization. (The latter had just transformed itself into an even more militant Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.) In fact, Pilsudski wanted to break the backbone of Ukrainian resistance to Polish rule in eastern Galicia. The UWVA in Canada protested the beatings and arrests perpetrated against Ukrainian villagers and the sacking and closing of Ukrainian reading rooms, cultural centres and co-operatives. Some prominent members of the Canadian-oriented USRL also became involved (though independently of the UWVA) and Wasył Swystun wrote a pamphlet that characterized his former homeland as *Ukraine: The Sorest Spot of Europe*. In fact, the subject of the pacification in eastern Galicia was even raised in the Canadian House of Commons by the Alberta MP Michael Luchkovich, who elicited the concern of the House and clear sympathy from the important Liberal member from Quebec East, Ernest Lapointe.<sup>27</sup>

The Polish pacification of eastern Galicia had a direct effect on the organizational life of Ukrainian Canadians. UWVA members became more immediately committed to helping underground Ukrainian

militants in Poland and in 1932 warmly greeted a delegate from the Konovalts organization in Europe, Roman Sushko, who was travelling under the pseudonym of M. Melnychuk. Sushko addressed the Third UWVA Congress in Winnipeg on the need to support the underground nationalist movement in Europe and spent eight months touring Canada and popularizing the nationalist cause. Ukrainian war veterans wished to expand and rejuvenate their aging ranks and, with Sushko's appeal in mind, they founded the broader-based Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) with a fiery new weekly newspaper *Novyi shliakh* (New Pathway). The new organization was strictly secular in nature and consciously avoided what it considered to be distracting religious quarrels. It attracted a number of intensely patriotic individuals from the pioneer immigration, including its first president, Alexander Gregorovich, and the future member of Parliament, Anthony Hlynka. A youth wing was also established and a young Saskatchewan schoolteacher, Paul Yuzyk, became one of its most effective organizers. By 1937 the UNF had seventy branches scattered across the country.<sup>28</sup>

Unlike the USRL, which had grown increasingly critical of the UWVA for its support for the authoritarian and militant nationalism of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Europe, the UNF espoused most of the doctrines and defended the actions of the European organization. The OUN was, in fact, frankly militarist and its doctrines consisted of direct action, strength on one's own, the cult of the charismatic leader, and national liberation and national revolution. It was a conspiratorial terrorist organization which in 1933, as a sign of protest against the Great Famine, assassinated a Soviet consular official in Lviv. A few months later in Warsaw, a OUN member, H. Matseiko, assassinated Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish minister of the interior who was responsible for much of the anti-Ukrainian activity in Galicia.<sup>29</sup>

OUN supporters generally believed that direct action and militant doctrines were justified in a Europe where the general malaise and retreat of parliamentary democracy stood in self-evident contrast to the success of the Nazi and Communist party organizations with their military discipline, absolute leadership and party monopoly of power. Unlike the European OUN, however, the UNF members lived in Canada, where parliamentary democracy was strong and the national problem of an entirely different nature. Therefore, the UNF organ *Novyi shliakh* generally restricted to the European context its more inflammatory articles on "the great Konovalts," on the need for "national revolution," and on what it believed to be the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict and the evils of communism. Within the Canadian context, the UNF voiced no objection to parliamentary democracy according to the traditions of British North America, but rather seemed to stand for constituted

authority and law and order. The UWVA members in the UNF frequently met and marched with the members of the Canadian Legion; in 1935 they joined the legionnaires and the Canadian militia in celebrating the silver jubilee of King George V. Canadian Communists and some USRL supporters did not hesitate to point out that the OUN leadership in Europe had contacts with Berlin and Rome and repeatedly charged that the UNF in Canada was anti-semitic and fascist, but, in spite of the extreme anti-communism which was frequently displayed on the front pages of its press organ, and the intense emotions displayed at some of its meetings, the UNF never accepted the fascist label and is not known to have had any connections with native Canadian fascist movements like that of William Whittaker. Most UNF members appeared to be conservative and respected members of the community; in the federal election of 1940, Anthony Hlynka was elected to Parliament on the Social Credit ticket.<sup>30</sup>

Canadian officials in Ottawa did not seem to think that the UNF was a very dangerous organization. By 1936-37, however, Polish consular officials, concerned by the repeated Canadian visits of Ukrainian nationalists from Europe, began pushing the Canadians into taking some notice of UNF activities. During the visit of the former Ukrainian general, M. Kapustiansky, who arrived from France in 1935 for a ten-month tour, the consul general of the Polish Republic, Jan Pawlica, charged that the OUN leader, Colonel Roman Sushko, had visited Canada earlier under a false name and was wanted in Poland for complicity in the murder of Interior Minister Pieracki. Canadian External Affairs officials checked with the Immigration Department and discovered that on December 5, 1931, Roman Sushko had indeed entered Canada on a false passport supplied by the Lithuanian government. Immigration officials, who did not usually record the entry of every visitor, had delayed his admission, but upon appeals by a priest and two members of Parliament, Sushko, alias Nykolas Melnyukas, had been allowed into the country.<sup>31</sup>

In its reply to Pawlica's inquiries, External Affairs did not directly acknowledge that Sushko had been in Canada and had helped to organize the UNF. It merely explained that records on regular visitors to Canada were not usually kept. The External Affairs official in question then assured the Polish consul that Canada would "never tolerate the abuse by subversive elements of the asylum it has offered to immigrants from every country in Europe.... I feel I must say," the official continued, "[and] at the same time remind you that the position of the Canadian government vis-à-vis Canadian nationals of Ukrainian racial origin has been complicated and rendered more difficult by the denunciation by the Government of Poland of the so-called Minorities Treaty of 1919, upon which the more moderate and responsible elements in our numerous Ukrainian community had relied for the

maintenance of the religious, civil, and linguistic rights guaranteed to their kinsmen in Poland.<sup>32</sup> Doubtless, the Polish consul was not pleased by this response.

The UNF was the largest and the most vocal rightist political organization operating within the Ukrainian-Canadian community. But it was not the only one. The much smaller United Hetman Organization (UHO) was a purely monarchist entity and supported the political claims of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who had briefly ruled in German-occupied Ukraine during the war. After the revolution had ended, Hetman Skoropadsky lived in Berlin and continued to maintain his claim to the throne of an independent Ukraine. He attracted the support of a circle of respectable intellectuals and titled landowners from the pre-1917 era. The followers of the Hetman were strongly patriotic in spirit, but disliked the OUN's republicanism and "revolutionary" style of nationalism. Their social philosophy was conservative corporatist, most clearly formulated by the Vienna émigré Viacheslav Lypynsky, and they were firm believers in a general anti-communist crusade in eastern Europe.<sup>33</sup>

The Hetman's Canadian supporters tended to be somewhat more plebeian in origin but retained the elitist spirit and anti-communism of their European models. Also the Canadian Hetmanites were strong supporters of the British monarchy and, in turn, enjoyed the support of a number of influential Greek Catholic churchmen. Canadian Hetmanites stressed the value of education and the development of a dignified character, though their proclivity for wearing uniforms and adopting military-style discipline tended to be a little theatrical. The UHO leadership tried to develop close relations with Canadian military agencies and at one point some Hetmanite or "Sich" detachments even took part in regular manoeuvres in the 10th Canadian Military District at Camp Hughes. In Canada the Hetmanites explained their conservative corporatism as "Classocracy." A postwar immigrant, William Bossy, had first organized the Hetman movement on the prairies, but by the 1930s, Michael Hethman (or Hetman, probably a pseudonym) headed the UHO and edited its weekly paper *Ukrainskyi robitnyk* (Ukrainian Toiler) which was published out of Toronto. Bossy eventually retired to the congenial Catholicism of Montreal, and Teodor Datzkiw, the editor of Winnipeg's *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, which had changed owners since pioneer days, became the most influential Hetman supporter in the Canadian west. Another prominent Hetmanite, D.M. Elcheshen, ran provincially for the Manitoba Conservatives in 1932 and was elected to Winnipeg city council in 1938.<sup>34</sup>

In 1937-38, the Canadian Hetmanites received a psychological boost and considerable publicity when Danylo Skoropadsky, the son of the Hetman, toured Canada. In the company of Michael Hethman, Danylo travelled to Toronto, where he met the mayor and other notables,

and to Montreal where he met Bossy, who was a school inspector in the Catholic school system. In Montreal he also heard the famous French-Canadian "Blueshirt" leader, Adrien Arcand, speak out against the Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine. In Ottawa he met Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir, who had become something of a hero among Ukrainian Canadians since his 1936 speech urging them to preserve their folk traditions for the sake of Canada. In Saskatoon he was welcomed by the historian George Simpson, who lectured to him on the virtues of liberal democracy. Danylo's warm and dignified manner had earned him the respect of many Canadians before he departed for his home in England where he was busy cultivating contacts in high society.<sup>35</sup> In the eyes of the left, however, the UHO's loyalty to the British monarchy and Danylo's residence in England counted for nothing. Nor did his occasional reported statements in praise of American and British democracy. His father still remained in Berlin and Communist critics were quick to label his Canadian followers as "Ukrainian Brown-shirts."<sup>36</sup>

The Communists were not entirely correct. Viacheslav Lypynsky's political philosophy, for example, was based upon a non-racial, non-ethnic territorialism, and even contained some pluralist elements. Thus in spite of its traditional ties to Germany, the Hetmanite movement in Europe remained essentially conservative, while its supporters in Canada advocated neither revolutionary nationalism in the Ukrainian lands under Poland, Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, nor violent action against liberal democracy in Canada. During his North American tour, Danylo Skoropadsky had even made conciliatory gestures toward the Poles, an action that was fiercely criticized in the UNF press.<sup>37</sup> Many of the younger UHO members were largely non-political, while some of their elders were gentlemen of the old school who had a deep appreciation for British parliamentary institutions. Vladimir Kysilewsky was a good example of the latter.

Kysilewsky had come to Canada in the 1920s and became an early leader of the Canadian Sich Organization, as the UHO was then called. For a while he edited Edmonton's Catholic weekly *Zakhidni visti* (Western News). About this time, he was naturalized and became interested in introducing the study of eastern Europe into the curricula of western Canadian universities where numerous students of Slavic background were beginning to make their appearance. In preparation for such an academic career, Kysilewsky drifted away from the Hetman's supporters and went to England to study under the famous British Slavist, R.W. Seton-Watson, at London's School of Slavonic Studies. Simultaneously, however, he became involved in a Ukrainian Bureau in London which was financed by the Ukrainian American millionaire, Jacob Makohin. Throughout the 1930s Kysilewsky ran this non-party Ukrainian information bureau; he made contacts in the British Foreign

Office, distributed an irregular *Bulletin* to some 250 British newspapers, and welcomed various North American Ukrainians who happened to pass through London on their way to the continent. Kysilewsky's mother Olena was a member of the Polish Senate from the moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Organization, and, in so far as its interest could be aroused, the British Foreign Office was able to appreciate Kysilewsky's reasoned approach and democratic background.<sup>38</sup>

Other prominent Ukrainian Canadians also went to Europe in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Several leading USRL members, including Julian and Savella Stechishin, toured the western Ukrainian lands, became personally acquainted with the local intelligentsia, and purchased rare Ukrainian and Polish books for their Canadian libraries. In 1932 Edmonton lawyer Peter Lazarowich left for the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, and a few years later arranged to bring the distinguished Ukrainian émigré historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, to Canada to give public lectures and teach at a five-week summer school for members of the USRL's youth organization. Some League members were cautious about bringing over Doroshenko, who was a prominent Hetmanite, but on being assured of his objectivity by the moderate socialist, Olgerd Bochkovsky, who had come from the Ukrainian Technical Institute in Podebrady, Czechoslovakia, on a similar lecture tour in 1936, the organization sponsored the Doroshenko visit.<sup>39</sup>

During the summer of 1937 Doroshenko lectured on the history of Ukraine at Alberta College in Edmonton and gave public lectures in several major western Canadian cities. The tour was so popular that he returned the next summer to lecture on the history of Ukrainian literature. At this time Doroshenko seems to have established relations with George Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan, who earlier had noticed the strong national feelings of many of his students of Ukrainian background and had begun to take an interest in Ukrainian history and the contemporary Ukrainian question. Simpson had learned to speak and read Ukrainian and by 1935 was offering what he believed to be the first regular course in Slavic history to be offered by a Canadian university. In the summer of 1937 Simpson toured Europe where he visited several important Ukrainian academic centres, including the Ukrainian Research Institute in Berlin, which was sponsored by the Hetman party and at this time Simpson even met Danylo's father, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. By 1938 Simpson was editing an English translation of Doroshenko's *History of the Ukraine* and had written an introduction for one of Doroshenko's books on the poet Taras Shevchenko. Thus when Doroshenko left in the fall of 1938 he took with him warm memories of the many new friends that he had made on the Canadian prairies.<sup>40</sup>

Doroshenko's lectures and the summer schools in Ukrainian culture organized by the USRI were not the only activities for Ukrainian-Canadian youth during the late 1930s. Characteristically, the activities organized by the UNF's youth wing tended to be much more colourful. In 1935, for example, the Toronto youth branch president, Stephen Pawluk, organized a Ukrainian Radio Telegraphy School which trained a number of "wireless" operators before he and his co-instructor, John Strogin, left for England at the end of 1937 to join Marconi International Services.<sup>41</sup> Even more exciting, however, was the Ukrainian Flying School founded shortly afterward in Oshawa, Ontario, by Patrick Anten (Petro Antochiw), Kornylo Magera and a number of other members of the UNF's youth branch. The officially stated objectives of the club's members were practical and Canadian-oriented, and included the eventual formation of a squadron ".....to serve the land of their birth, in time of emergency, as one fighting unit, or branch of the Canadian Armed Forces."<sup>42</sup> Unofficially, however, the Ukrainian nationalist cause in Europe was never far from the founders' minds for as the school's president, Michael Wladyka, privately wrote to the Dominion executive of the organization, "all personal glory must be discarded and we must work all for the glory and freedom of Ukraine." He then explained that this was the reason that the school had been organized but that caution should be exercised in revealing it to the membership since the Canadian government was probably monitoring the activities of the club. There is some evidence that ordinary club members were, in fact, not aware of the private motives of Wladyka and the other club founders. A youthful spirit of adventure and the simple romance of flying certainly played a role in the UNF flying school's instant success.<sup>43</sup>

The school soon boasted an enrolment of about forty students and had its own airplane which it named "Evhen" after the OUN leader in Europe, Eugene (Ievhen) Konovalets. A special aviation day was held, the purchase of a second plane initiated, and a cross-Canada series of similar aviation days planned before the outbreak of war cut short the activities of the club.<sup>44</sup>

The Communists tried to close down the flying school. By early 1939 articles had appeared in the Communist press alleging that the UNF was made up of "Ukrainian Nazis" and that "aviation clubs established by the ...[UNF] train young Canadians for war against the allies of Great Britain on the side of Hitler Germany." Thereafter, similar allegations appeared in *Saturday Night* magazine, in the *Oshawa Times*, the *Oshawa Courier*, and in the *Daily Star*, the *Evening Telegram* and the *Globe and Mail* in Toronto. Club members, especially Michael Wladyka, denied these allegations, disassociating the Ukrainian cause in Europe from Germany, and assuring the public that, if war should come, "Ukrainians in Canada will stand with other proud Canadians to face

their common enemy, whether it be Fascism or Communism."<sup>45</sup> A somewhat confused Canadian public was left to decide the issue for itself.

Events in Europe made such decisions increasingly difficult. On May 23, 1938, the OUN leader (*Vozhd*), Eugene Konovalts, was assassinated in a Rotterdam street and a Soviet agent was suspected of the act. The assassination had a tremendous impact on OUN-supporting organizations throughout the world. "This sorrowful news," the UNF activist, Michael Sharik later recalled, "which the UNF Dominion Executive distributed by telegram across all Canada, aroused the membership of our entire organization and stimulated a strong anti-Moscow reaction. As early as Saturday morning on May 25, 1938, great black flags were hung on our National Homes from Montreal to Vancouver letting both our own people and others know about the horrible murder carried out by Moscow in Rotterdam."<sup>46</sup> Solemn funeral processions, commemorative gatherings and mammoth protest meetings were held across the country and these greatly intensified the militancy of OUN supporters in Canada. Even the Canadian-born youth was affected and two of the Oshawa flying club members, Michael Wladyka and Oleska Shestosoky, fired off an intemperate letter to UNF headquarters in Saskatoon expressing their outrage at the loss of their leader and renewing their commitment "to the cause for which he fought and died."<sup>47</sup>

The UNF nationalists would miss the leadership of Konovalts. But members of rival organizations such as the populist Ukrainian Self-Reliance League had their own special grievances in Europe. In 1938 news arrived that Polish authorities in the provinces of Chełm (Kholm) and Volhynia were pressuring the Orthodox clergy and forcing Roman Catholicism upon the local population. The USRL, which was pretty much an Orthodox organization, reacted with a great demonstration in Winnipeg, a second in Toronto, and a "memorandum" to Ottawa asking the federal government to raise the matter before the League of Nations in Geneva.<sup>48</sup>

By the autumn of 1938, however, developments in Czechoslovakia had overtaken Polish events on the front pages of Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers. As a result of the Munich Pact of September 30, 1938, Hitler forced Czechoslovakia to accept agreements reached by him in consultation with the leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy; these agreements resulted in the annexation of the German-populated Sudetenland to the Third Reich and the granting of autonomy to Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus'. In the latter province, a Russophile government favourable to Hungary was quickly replaced by a government under the leadership of Voloshyn. The new Voloshyn government was formally loyal to Prague, but was fully dedicated to a Ukrainian interpretation of the local national question. Hungary and Poland



immediately threatened the new autonomous entity with diplomatic rumblings and commando-style raids across the borders; meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalists hailed the establishment of an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine as the first step toward the construction of a much larger Ukrainian national state in eastern Europe. Young OUN members rushed from Galicia to join the ranks of the Carpatho-Ukrainian defence force and speculation mounted that perhaps this small Carpathian province would be used as a "Piedmont" for the creation of a unified Ukraine supported by Nazi Germany which also desired further revision of international borders in eastern Europe.<sup>49</sup>

The news from Czechoslovakia certainly did help to unite Ukrainians in North America. In October Voloshyn's appeal for aid was answered by the establishment of a special Committee for the Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine in New York City, and by the establishment of two similar committees in Canada. In Winnipeg, earlier co-operation between the USRI and the Hetmanites was cemented by fuller joint action in aid of Carpatho-Ukraine. Meanwhile, in Saskatoon the UNF leaders, Professor T. Pavlychenko and Wladimir Kossar, organized a Representative Committee of Ukrainian Canadians which was supported by the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC) led by Winnipeg churchman, Wasyl Kushnir.<sup>50</sup>

Wladimir Kossar played an especially active role in gathering funds and organizing support for Carpatho-Ukraine. Kossar was a postwar immigrant from Galicia who had participated in the unsuccessful Ukrainian war of independence and then taken refuge in Czechoslovakia, where he worked as a government agronomist in Subcarpathia. During this period he married, got to know the people of this region, and was active in the local Ukrainian national movement. In 1926 he was dismissed by the governor and was threatened by deportation to Poland. Efforts on his behalf by several Czech friends and by Voloshyn, who was then a member of the Czech Parliament, failed and Kossar fled to Canada.<sup>51</sup>

In Canada, Kossar infused the UNF members with enthusiasm, organized public meetings and sent some \$5,200 to Voloshyn in Carpatho-Ukraine. This was a considerable sum for Ukrainian-Canadian working people during the depression.<sup>52</sup> On another level, in January 1939 the Representative Committee of Ukrainian Canadians, in which Kossar and Pavlychenko were leading members, sent a memorandum to the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King, asking that the Ukrainian problem in Europe not be viewed simply as an internal minority problem of one or two European states, but rather be treated as a whole through the creation of an international commission in which the British Empire would participate. "The British Empire," argued the memorandum, "has both the legal and moral grounds to enter as a factor in settling the great problem of Eastern Europe, as she has over

400,000 of her citizens of Ukrainian descent in Canada who are keenly interested in the proper and just solution of the Ukrainian problem under Romania, Poland, and Russia."

About this same time, the USRL also tried to interest the prime minister in the Ukrainian question. A delegation headed by Wasyli Burianyk met with O.D. Skelton, King's man in charge of External Affairs, and his aide, Norman Robertson, and informed them of their organization's loyalty to western democracy and of the desire of the Ukrainian people in Europe for national unity and independence.

Ottawa's reaction was understandably cautious. King's reply to the Representative Committee's memorandum was non-committal, and while Skelton and Robertson were polite to Burianyk and impressed by his analysis of the situation, they gave him no hints that Canada wished to become any further involved in east European affairs than she already was.<sup>53</sup>

Mackenzie King and his officials were playing it safe. By this time both in Canada and in Britain, as well as in the United States, the public viewed the Ukrainian nationalists in Europe as associates of Hitler and, as in 1914-18, the entire Ukrainian question seemed to have some connection to "German intrigue."<sup>54</sup> In fact, so great was the general interest in the Ukrainian question that George Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan decided to speak out. In January 1939 he gave a talk on CBC radio, defending the Ukrainian nationalists as being no more authoritarian or violent than were their hostile neighbours. Simpson thought that the Ukrainian national liberation movement in Europe moved in harmony with German expansionist aims, but that this was only a coincidence. He compared underground nationalist Ukraine's relationship with Nazi Germany to the old alliance between revolutionary America and absolutist France. Just as America would have achieved its independence anyway and eventually have turned against absolutist France with which it differed in principle, so too would Ukraine gain its independence and throw off German influence at the earliest opportunity. The Saskatoon-based UNF publication *Novyi shliakh* commented approvingly: "With these words, the honorable professor rebutted those opponents of the Ukrainian cause who try to turn Ukrainian nationalism and the whole Ukrainian problem into a 'German intrigue'."<sup>55</sup>

As far as Ukrainians in Canada were concerned, the break with Hitler came far sooner than even Simpson had expected. By February 1939 it had become evident that Hitler was only waiting for the right moment to dismantle the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to give his ally, Hungary, the signal to occupy all of Carpatho-Ukraine. In Winnipeg, *Ukrainskyi holos* editor Myroslaw Stechishin, who had long been thundering away at the UNF for its apparent admiration for totalitarian

methods, warned his readers of the fragility of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state.

By March 13, fighting had broken out between the Czechs and the "Carpathian Sich" defence force. Within a few days Hitler had entered Prague and given the Hungarians permission to occupy Subcarpathia. A fierce but unequal battle ensued. "On these critical days, the 14, 15 and 16 of March, 1939," Michael Sharik recalled many years later, "we in Canada also caught the 'fever' and could neither eat, nor sleep, nor work. We suffered greatly in our worry for our young Ukrainian state, which perished. But it perished in heroic battle against the much greater forces of the modern Huns of Admiral Horthy [the Regent of Hungary]."<sup>56</sup>

The basic facts of everyday life in Canada also distanced the UNF from any pro-German policies that the OUN leadership in Europe may have advocated. In the winter of 1938-39 the representative of the OUN leadership, Colonel Roman Sushko, visited Canada again and discussed international politics with Sharik, Kossar and other UNF leaders. Most probably, he filled them in on the policies of the new OUN leader, Colonel Andrei Melnyk, who had succeeded Konovalets. Melnyk seems to have believed that as war approached underground revolutionary activities were becoming less feasible and that greater co-operation with established European governments, especially Berlin and Rome, which shared with the Ukrainians a desire for the revision of east European boundaries, was becoming necessary. But London and Ottawa were also established governments. Thus during his visit to Canada, Sushko also seems to have had a private conference with Winnipeg lawyer Wasyl Swystun, who since his defection from the USRL was thinking of joining the UNF. During this conference, so Swystun told a Ukrainian acquaintance some three years later, "Sushko declared that the UNF must carry on as an independent Ukrainian Canadian organization and in all respects conform its policies in accordance with the internal and foreign policies of Canada to whom UNF members owed their allegiance." This was to be done regardless of UNF ideological ties to the OUN in Europe and whatever the policies or actions the European centre should undertake in time of peace or war. Swystun claimed that Sushko had told him that the Ukrainian nationalist organizations in other countries had also been instructed by the OUN leadership to adjust themselves according to this principle and that such a course would save the nationalists from persecution and in the end do most good for the cause of Ukrainian independence. "This was," Swystun then explained, "a very logical attitude to take and the only acceptable policy. I was convinced, and therefore joined the UNF. I would never have joined the UNF had I not been assured that the organization in its status was independent of the OUN centre

and that its policies are based on the principles of loyalty to Canada and Britain."<sup>4</sup>

Hitler's abandonment of Carpatho-Ukraine did not, in fact, end the difficulties of Ukrainian nationalists in Canada. The German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia had convinced many in the western democracies that Hitler's desires were insatiable and, by March 31, the British had announced an unconditional guarantee of Poland's borders. Poland, of course, had been treating her Ukrainian minority far worse than had the Czechs and the reaction of the Ukrainian nationalists in Canada was largely negative.<sup>57</sup>

This did not mean that Ukrainians in Canada or in Britain had entirely abandoned the cause of Anglo-Ukrainian co-operation. In particular, Vladimir Kysilewsky of the Ukrainian Bureau in London lobbied British MPs and the British Foreign Office to make improved treatment of the Ukrainian minority part of the price for British guarantees to Poland. As a result of Kysilewsky's activities, questions were asked in the British House of Commons and these were reported in Canadian newspapers. Given the difficult international situation, one Toronto paper observed that "it is rather urgently important that Poland should gain the goodwill of the millions of Slavs over whom the League of Nations made her stepmother."<sup>58</sup> Moreover, when Kysilewsky offered information and contacts with Ukrainians in Poland to the British Foreign Office, the latter readily accepted on the understanding that Kysilewsky was a representative of the legal and relatively moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Organization (UNDO), which was the largest Ukrainian political party in Poland. In fact, co-operation between Kysilewsky and the Foreign Office was so close that Germany's *Berliner Börsenzeitung* called him a British agent and claimed that his patron, Jacob Makohin, was a Jew from Bukovina whose real name was Maks Kogan.<sup>59</sup>

In spite of their disapproval of the new British guarantees to Poland, North American organizations affiliated with the OUN also wished to maintain some kind of contact with the British government. In fact, as early as 1938, in response to a request from the European leadership (Provid), the young Ukrainian nationalist from Alberta, Stephen Davidovich, was sent to Europe by the American OUN affiliate, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. He started busily writing articles for British political magazines, contacting British journalists, lobbying British officials, setting up his own Ukrainian National Infor-

\* The man to whom Swystun told this story, Michael Petrowsky, turned out to be an RCMP agent who recorded it in his report, "Prominent Ukrainians on the UNF and its Leaders," October 1941 (PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Tracy Philipps Collection, vol. 1, MG 30, E350).

mation Service, and generally irritating Soviet diplomats in London. One of Davidovich's closest contacts was the journalist Lancelot Lawton, who edited a conservative journal called *Contemporary Russia* to which the young Canadian contributed an article on Konovalets and a report on the recent events in Carpatho-Ukraine.<sup>60</sup> Another important contact was Charles Milnes Gaskell, a graduate of Eton and the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. In 1933 Gaskell had spent some time learning Russian in Riga, and became interested in the Ukrainian question. He travelled extensively in Russia in 1935 and 1936 and visited Lviv in 1938. During the tense summer of 1939, Gaskell completed a manuscript entitled "A Submerged Nation: The Ukrainian Case," which presented a deeply sympathetic national history of Ukraine. Its publication in 1939 would have made a definite mark on British public opinion.\*

While Davidovich continued his activities in England, in Canada the UNF and its associate, the UWVA, began adjusting to the immediate possibility of a new general European war. In June 1939 the UNF sent Kossar to Ottawa and to London, England, to present its views to the Canadian and British governments. While in Europe, Kossar was also to try to meet with Voloshyn, who was in Prague, and with the OUN leadership in an effort to clarify the position that the UNF should take in any future international crisis. In Ottawa, Kossar met with both Skelton and Robertson and advised them of the willingness of UNF members to serve in Canada's armed forces at home and abroad. He then went to New York where he met Alexander A. Granovsky, who was a biology professor in Minnesota and the leader of the UNF's American counterpart, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. Luke Myshuha, the editor of the influential Ukrainian American daily *Svoboda*, was also to come along but decided against it for health reasons and because his views were so close to Granovsky's that his presence was not really essential. The other two men travelled together to Europe. In Paris, Kossar and Granovsky visited the French Foreign Ministry and the British and American embassies. They then attended a general meeting of the OUN leadership in Venice. There questions about the policies to take during the coming war were discussed. The situation was complicated because in the wake of the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine Hitler and Stalin already seemed to have reached an understanding at the expense of the Ukrainians. Therefore, while some OUN leaders seem to have favoured continued co-operation with Germany and Italy, others, presumably Kossar and

\* With the outbreak of war in September, Gaskell joined the British Ministry of War and the book was never published. For further details, see the discussion in Appendix E, "Ukrainian History and the War."

Granovsky among them, favoured closer co-operation with Britain and France. Very little is known about this meeting, but there is no doubt that the Soviet Union was still seen as the principal enemy.<sup>61</sup>

Kossar and Granovsky also visited Khust, the former capital of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian state, and Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, where many Carpatho-Ukrainian Sich soldiers had taken refuge after the Hungarian invasion. The Germans would neither allow Voloshyn to visit Kossar in Bratislava, nor Kossar to visit Voloshyn in Prague, but did allow a meeting with the latter's prime minister, Julian Revay. On his way home Kossar had an interview with the Canadian high commissioner in London, Vincent Massey, who arranged a brief meeting with the British Foreign Office at which Kossar reported on his trip to Carpatho-Ukraine. Finally, before returning to Canada, Kossar went to Davidovich's Ukrainian National Information Service, where, presumably, he told the young lobbyist about the most recent developments in central Europe and about the Venice decisions of the OUN leadership.<sup>62</sup>

Upon his return to Saskatoon, Kossar informed a UNF national conference of what he had seen. He stressed the Hungarians' bad treatment of the Ukrainians in Subcarpathia and concluded that Ukrainians in Canada must not make the mistake they had made in 1914 by showing any sympathy for Germany or for Austria. Although Kossar's strong stand in favour of Canada and the western democracies raised some eyebrows among his traditional critics in the USRL and the Communist Party, it was well received by the UNF rank and file and got good coverage in the press.<sup>63</sup>

Such frank expressions of pro-British sentiment had not always been the case in Canada. The British had long been concerned about the growing nationalism of the Mackenzie King government and the isolationism of Canada's population; as early as 1934 one worried British official complained that the depression had only increased the problem. He believed that the French Canadians and what he called "great blocks of unabsorbed aliens" on the prairies could not be counted on in "Imperial Defence."<sup>64</sup> By 1939, however, war was clearly in sight and steps were taken to remedy this problem. In June George VI and Queen Elizabeth were dispatched across North America to build up enthusiasm for the empire and affirm relations between Britain and Canada. To the surprise of the British, the royal couple was enthusiastically greeted in both Quebec and in the prairie provinces. Ukrainian organizations and newspapers, which included the Hetmanites and the UNF but not the Communists, had no trouble bringing out large crowds to greet the royal visitors. In Winnipeg, a Ukrainian float took part in the official parade, and in Saskatoon thirty thousand school children from nearby Ukrainian, German and Doukhobor schools greeted the royal couple. Meanwhile in Toronto, a company

of Ukrainian war veterans under the command of the elderly General Vladimir Sikewich, a soldier from the Ukrainian war of independence, paraded to honour the royal visitors and in Ottawa King George shook the hand of the Ukrainian VC, Philip Konowal.<sup>65</sup> One month later, Kossar made his speech and outlined his experience in Europe before the UNF national convention in Saskatoon.

In September 1939 the outbreak of a new war in Europe ended an era in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians. The pioneer years from 1895 to 1914, the first general period of Ukrainian-Canadian history, had defined the geographical and social characteristics of the new community. The war of 1914-18 and the revolutionary years which followed brought major adjustments. During this second period, the central institutions of the Galician and Bukovinian settlers underwent basic changes and many of them, such as the general bilingual school system, disappeared for ever. The pioneers themselves often suffered internment or degradations of one sort or another and the experience of war was largely an unhappy one. At the same time, however, significant numbers of these pioneers served in the Canadian armed forces. Moreover, the revolutions in eastern Europe and the adoption of a new and clearly national "Ukrainian" identity raised the self-esteem of the settlers and signified the beginning of still another era.

The interwar period saw the crystallization of the Ukrainian national identity in Canada and its nearly universal acceptance by the general Ruthenian population. At the same time, however, community organizations became sharply polarized between two competing points of view. The first was represented by the pro-Communist ULFTA, which supported the Soviet Union and glorified the achievements of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic; this organization was, however, very critical of affairs in Canada and the depression deepened the commitment and widened the ranks of its members. By 1939 it was by far the strongest secular Ukrainian organization and published the only Ukrainian-language daily newspaper in the country.

The second point of view was represented by the "nationalists" who were, in turn, divided into the Canadian-oriented moderates of the USRL and the more extreme and European-oriented UNF and Hetmanites. Both of the latter organizations maintained contact with their European inspirers, but the UNF was the larger and more dynamic of the two. While the ULFTA and the Communist Party of Canada strictly adhered to the Moscow line and lost some important members because of it, both the UNF and the Hetmanites proved more flexible. By 1939 the latter had a prominent leader in England as well as in Berlin, while the former had abruptly switched from support for a Carpatho-Ukrainian state dependent upon German favour, to independence from the nationalist leadership in Europe and official support for

British foreign policy on the continent. This was coupled with reliance upon political pressure and lobbying in Ottawa and London. The UNF also expressed its willingness to rally its members for service in the Canadian armed forces. On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union and the reversal was complete. Most of the pieces were in place for the next great act in the drama of Ukrainian-Canadian history; the stage was to be the Second World War.



## The War Begins

*Bellum indicere.*

On September 1, 1939, Hitler's armies invaded Poland and precipitated a new war in Europe. Britain and France stood by their guarantees to Poland and entered the war on September 3. In Canada, the government proclaimed the War Measures Act and moved its meagre forces to war stations. On September 10, Canada officially declared war on Germany.

Most Ukrainian Canadians, it seems, had still not forgotten the unfortunate position of their fathers at the start of the First World War. Thus even prior to Canada's official declaration of war, the non-Communist Ukrainian-language press was quick to make statements of loyalty to Canada and to the British Empire. For example, on September 6, Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos*, which spoke on behalf of the USRL, declared that the members of this organization had never wavered in their loyalty to the British crown, to Canada, or to democratic institutions, and that they "will faithfully serve and defend the vital interests of Canada and the British Empire side by side with other citizens by all means at their disposal and in every manner which may be demanded of them." As early as September 5, the conservative Catholic *Ukrainski visti* of Edmonton had declared that "Canadian Ukrainians, as loyal subjects of Canada, await the command of our government," while on September 6, the quasi-Hetmanite *Kanadiiskyi farmer* in Winnipeg counselled unreserved and unconditional support for the authorities.

The UNF also maintained its loyalty to Canada. As early as August 31, in a telegram to the Department of National Defence, the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association reiterated its June offer to rally its members to active service in the Canadian armed forces. However,

the UWVA members had forgotten neither the Ukrainian cause in Europe nor the participation of many of their members in national military units in the Habsburg empire during the First World War. Wladimir Kossar, Morey de Morand and other UNF and UWVA figures were in communication with Captain Stuart Webster of the Canadian Frontiersmen Cadet corps (a group authorized by the Department of National Defence under the Militia Act) and, with the example of privately raised Canadian units during the First World War before them, a plan emerged for the organization of Ukrainian military units via the Canadian Frontiersmen. After discussions with UNF leaders in eastern Canada, Webster wrote Kossar that the British Frontiersmen in Canada had been transferred to England and that the Canadian Frontiersmen had been "reserved entirely for Ukrainian membership." Webster continued: "We are setting up plans for the effective formation of a complete Ukrainian division, and I have no doubt we shall be ready for service as a division with the forces when the time is ripe."<sup>1</sup>

The UNF did not have a monopoly on the idea of Ukrainian military units to serve with the Canadian army. On September 3, Vladimir Kedrowsky, who was associated with the USRL and with ideologically similar organizations in the United States and France, publicly made the same suggestion at a USRL youth convention in Toronto. Kedrowsky estimated that approximately thirty-five thousand Ukrainians from France with ten thousand more from Canada and the United States, could form "an army corps." If the Soviet Union should enter the war on the German side, he felt, Ukrainians in Russia would be likely to join with such a unit instead of resisting it and might even be stimulated to form pro-Allied Ukrainian units right on Russian soil.<sup>2</sup> On September 4, Kedrowsky's suggestion was further developed at another public meeting and it was revealed that his organization had already been in communication with the Department of National Defence in Ottawa.<sup>3</sup>

Kedrowsky's public statements on the formation of Ukrainian military units in Canada seems to have caused the UNF to go public with its own project. On September 7 the *Toronto Evening Telegram* reported that the UNF had resolved to raise a field force of twenty-five thousand men to be trained for service at home or overseas. General Vladimir Sikewich was the suggested commander and he announced that he was not exclusively connected with the UNF and intended to takeover command of "all the patriotic Ukrainian Canadians regardless of their political views." The previous day the paper had announced that Stuart Webster was involved in the project, that the Flying School in Oshawa was to be enlarged, and that "the division will function as a purely Canadian unit operating at its own expense until it is taken over by the Department of National Defence." Thereafter, the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* called for its supporters to stand forth and join the proposed

"Ukrainian Canadian Legion" to serve with the British armed forces overseas.<sup>4</sup>

The plan soon ran into problems. On September 12 the Ministry of National Defence announced that in view of the disorganization which had accompanied privately raised units during the First World War, the government would not allow individuals to once again raise units on their own and that all recruiting would be carried out by the existing militia organization. The UNF, however, did not abandon its project, and in view of the activities of Polish and Czech recruiters who were active in encouraging Canadian citizens of Polish or Czech origin to serve in the national forces of those allied countries, addressed to the prime minister its more modest project for the formation of Ukrainian units to serve within the Canadian armed forces. It was further suggested that the units might be modelled on the Canadian Highlanders and might be called "the Canadian Ukrainian Fusiliers." The proposal made the point that dissatisfied Czech, Polish and Ukrainian minorities under Germany and Russia could be of great use to the Allied cause. The existence of the Canadian Ukrainian Fusiliers, it was argued, "would mobilize forces in favour of [the] Western Powers within Germany and Russia of such dynamic strength that neither of these states would be able to control them in time of war." If, however, the authorities thought such Ukrainian units impracticable, the UNF project outline promised: "We will further induce our members and other Ukrainian Canadians to enlist in the Canadian forces as individuals."<sup>5</sup>

Ottawa could tolerate bagpipes and kilts; it had no interest in Cossack sabres or pantaloons trousers. The prime minister's reply to the UNF was non-committal and the project for the formation of the Canadian Ukrainian Fusiliers was quietly shelved. About this same time, the Ukrainian Flying School in Oshawa closed its doors and handed over its property to the Department of National Defence.<sup>6</sup>

Ukrainian-Canadian Communists followed a policy that was much less consistent than that of their rightist rivals of the UNF. The signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact had caught them by surprise; they had known nothing of the secret negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union and at first did not realize the extent to which the agreement would affect the international situation and their own role in Canadian politics. Thus when Hitler started the new war by invading Poland, Canadian Communist Party leader Tim Buck telegraphed the prime minister and urged upon him "full support to the Polish people." On September 12, the ULFA organ *Narodna hazeta* dutifully followed suit in denouncing the invasion and exclaimed: "Destroy Hitlerism! Save Humanity!"<sup>7</sup>

The initial quick victory of the Nazi armies and the occupation of the eastern territories of the Polish Republic by the Red Army saw a rapid adjustment in the Communist line. In the Soviet Union, the

people of western Belorussia and western Ukraine were now considered to have been "liberated" from Polish rule and were declared "reunited" with their eastern brethren. Moreover, in October the Comintern stated that the war had basically altered all international relationships and was "profoundly changing the class and political alignments within each capitalist nation." Soon after, Canadian Communists suddenly stopped describing the war as "anti-fascist" and began describing it as an "imperialist" one from which Canada should withdraw as soon as possible. However, the ULFTA and several other organizations closely associated with the Communist Party owned a considerable amount of property, and open opposition to the war by them would have immediately placed the organizations and their properties in jeopardy. With this danger in mind, the Communist Party leaders and the various Ukrainian organization heads reached an agreement that their Ukrainian-language press would not openly oppose Canada's participation in the war but rather carry on what one historian of the movement later called "subtle anti-war propaganda."<sup>8</sup> For example, on November 25, the important Ukrainian-language daily *Narodna hazeta* editorialized that "this war is bringing terrible destruction and great war burdens for all mankind, while the ruling classes, taking advantage of their position, are restricting the democratic rights of the people and intensifying fascism in their countries."

These Ukrainian-Canadian reactions to the outbreak of war in Europe were of considerable interest to the general Canadian public. After all, by 1939 Canadians of Ukrainian origin numbered about three hundred thousand. They still formed a majority in parts of the poplar belt which extended along the northern edge of the prairie region, although by 1939 about one hundred thousand of them had moved to the towns and cities of western Canada. Even in Toronto a small but significant Ukrainian community was making its presence felt.<sup>9</sup> It was Winnipeg, however, a long-time focal point of labour radicalism, the home of several influential Ukrainian-language newspapers, the seat of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishop, and the administrative centre of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church, which was already known as the unofficial cultural and political capital of the Ukrainian Canadians and a resident of this city produced the first major analysis of the various Ukrainian reactions to Canada's entry into the new war in Europe.

In 1939 Watson Kirkconnell of Winnipeg's Wesley College published his *Canada, Europe and Hitler* which analysed "European-Canadian" attitudes toward the rise of Hitler and toward the outbreak of the new war. His treatment of the various Ukrainian political organizations was fairly detailed and he characterized the Ukrainians as "the most intensely self-conscious of all of Canada's minorities." Kirkconnell also

believed that, "it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every Ukrainian-Canadian who is not a Communist is a potential nationalist." In general, Kirkconnell saw the USRL as liberal democratic and Canadian-oriented; he characterized the Hetmanites and the UNF as holding extremist anti-Polish and anti-Communist views, with a tendency before March 1939 to support Hitler's reordering of east European frontiers (he even dubbed the latter organization as "fascist"), and he saw the Communists as being extremely anti-British while openly proclaiming Moscow as the source of all political and economic wisdom. He quoted the statements of loyalty to Canada which had appeared in the various non-Communist papers at the start of the war but noted the tendency of the UNF and the "nationalist" Catholic organs to encourage enlistment in the Canadian army as a means toward the establishment of a free Ukrainian state in Europe. Kirkconnell also accused the Catholic paper *Buduchnist natsii* (Future of the Nation) of being bitterly anti-Semitic while he ignored the change in Communist Party policy after the first few weeks of the war.<sup>10</sup> It would not be long before Kirkconnell discovered that one of his major sources emanated from the pen of a leading Communist propagandist writing under an assumed name and, in consequence, substantially revised his analysis with regard to the UNF.

English-Canadian reactions to Kirkconnell's book were generally positive. Both the *Queen's Quarterly* and Frank Underhill of the *Canadian Forum* directed the reader's attention to Kirkconnell's treatment of the Ukrainian question and found it "especially illuminating."<sup>11</sup> Ukrainian-Canadian reactions to Kirkconnell's book, however, were uniformly negative. All of the Ukrainian reviewers, regardless of their political orientation, complained of Kirkconnell's neglect of Ukrainian sources and his over-reliance upon Polish and Hungarian sources, which, of course, were unsympathetic to the Ukrainians. Quite naturally, in their view, this distorted Kirkconnell's presentation of the Ukrainian question and skewed his analysis of the attitudes of Ukrainian Canadians. The Winnipeg democratic socialist Mykhailo Mandryka published a pamphlet giving the Ukrainian viewpoint on a series of historical problems raised by Kirkconnell, Wasył Swystun repeated them on CBC radio, while Myroslaw Stechishin reiterated them in the pages of *Ukrainskyi holos*. Stechishin added that Kirkconnell underestimated the number of Ukrainians in Canada, erroneously ascribing a number of Russian Orthodox on the prairies to the Ukrainian ethnic group and overestimating their importance in the process. By way of contrast, he painted the Poles, for example, as simon-pure Canadian patriots without either fascists or Communists among them, when, in fact, there was a Polish-language Communist weekly being published out of Toronto. If Kirkconnell would take the trouble to go for a walk a few blocks off his Wesley College campus, he would find a Polish

Communist hall on Manitoba Street not too far from where he was lecturing on classical languages and literatures.<sup>12</sup>

Officials in Ottawa were also very interested in fluctuations of opinion among the Ukrainian Canadians and followed them closely. For example, one of the first secret RCMP reports completed two weeks after the outbreak of war informed officials about the histories, the strengths and the views of the various Ukrainian organizations in Canada, from the extreme left to the extreme right. This report stated that Ukrainian pro-Communist organizations such as the ULFTA and the Alliance for the Defence of Western Ukraine made up about 10 per cent of the Ukrainian community. The report went on to say that these organizations were under the complete control of the Communist Party of Canada, were subject to external influences and in their publications "an attempt is being made to slander the former Polish Government and justify the invasion of Poland by the army of Stalin." Turning to the USRL, the report stated that the name of this organization suggested its basic principle: self-reliance in all individual and collective endeavours of the Ukrainian nation in Europe. It concluded that "this group is in opposition to all other Ukrainian groups here and abroad which, in the main, rely on help from foreign states in the hope that they will aid them in the emancipation of the Ukrainian people." The report then examined the UNF which it deemed "the only Ukrainian nationalist organization of note, having influence over a fairly large section of the Ukrainian population of Canada of the post-war classification." The report stated:

For a long time the political orientation of Ukrainian nationalists centred around Berlin and hopes were frequently expressed that Hitler, in his attempt to smash the Soviet Union, would aid the Ukrainians in Europe to set up their own state, probably along totalitarian lines. The UNF and its leadership, however, seldom stressed the form of government the future Ukraine was to assume; they were more concerned with the idea of the liberation of the Ukrainian people living under foreign domination.

Mentioning Hitler's consent to the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine and the German-Soviet pact, the report continued: "Whatever pro-Nazi and pro-Hitler sentiment the UNF membership had entertained or applied to their activities appears to be of a very controversial nature, and any tendencies or sympathies displayed in Canada toward Germany have been rudely dispelled." The report concluded its survey by examining the United Hetman Organization, which was considered to be "rather insignificant, so much so that other organizations are in the habit of almost disregarding its existence." The report noted the Hetmanites' conservative monarchist philosophy, their inclination toward wearing uniforms and toward military discipline,

their virulent anti-communism, and what it called their pro-British sympathies: "Young men are urged to join the Canadian defence forces wherever they can, thus showing their loyalty to the country of their birth or adoption."<sup>13</sup>

In general, this first major secret report on Ukrainian-Canadian attitudes toward the war presented a positive view of the nationalists but was fairly negative toward the Communists. Without a doubt, the report would have been much more critical of the latter had it not been completed early in the war, before the full effect of Communist objections to the struggle could take effect.

Diversity of opinion among the Ukrainian Canadians was to some degree mirrored by diversity of opinion in Canadian society as a whole. The sudden burst of enthusiasm that had accompanied Canada's entry into the war was neither as strong nor as long as it had been in 1914. There was, in fact, very little old-fashioned jingoist sentiment. Canada had entered the war mainly because of pro-British feelings among the English Canadians and, as in 1914–18, these sentiments were not shared by the French. It had taken all of Prime Minister Mackenzie King's political acumen to avoid a major split on the issue; he made it clear from the start that Canada's contribution to the war effort would be a limited one. There would be no compulsory conscription for military service overseas.<sup>14</sup>

Throughout the first months of the war there was no serious challenge to Mackenzie King's moderate policies. After the partition of Poland between Hitler and Stalin and the establishment of a Soviet military presence in the Baltic states, military action seemed to grind to a halt. In western Europe both sides sat behind their heavily fortified lines and the conflict quickly gained the reputation of being a "phony war"; in eastern Europe the allies took no direct action but encouraged the Finns to resist the advances of the Red Army.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 helped to clarify the distinction between nationalists and Communists among Canada's Ukrainians. In the case of the Ukrainian nationalists, especially the UNF members, there was a natural sympathy for little Finland which, as they saw it, was fighting for its national independence against the aggressive Red empire. The UNF Dominion Executive believed that the Soviet-German alliance legitimized this sympathy in the eyes of the English Canadians, and it decided to revive the idea of a Ukrainian Canadian Legion. It suggested that such a legion join an Allied army in the relief of Finland and later be used for what it called the "liberation of Ukraine." In some Canadian cities the UNF also raised funds directly for the Finnish war effort.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand throughout the Soviet-Finnish conflict Canadian Communists plainly favoured the Soviet Union. The Communist Party denounced the war against Hitler as an "imperialist" one and accused

the western Allies of planning to attack the USSR by way of Finland. Shortly afterward Kirkconnell wrote of the quasi-political Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) that "the Russo-Finnish War brought them clearly into focus as worshippers of Moscow."<sup>16</sup> During these same months, Kirkconnell discovered that his earlier analysis of the nationalists had been in part based upon a hostile and unreliable Communist source and he changed his mind about the UNF and ceased to characterize its leadership as fascists.<sup>17</sup>

The UNF's Finnish project was an exception. Throughout the course of the phoney war the Canadian public showed little enthusiasm, for renewed military involvement in Europe, and on May 27, 1940, Commissioner Wood of the RCMP wrote Skelton at External Affairs that the UNF "in so far as Canada is concerned, has been apathetic to the Allied cause."<sup>18</sup> On February 13, 1940, the *Winnipeg Free Press* reported that a bulletin of the Director of Public Information stated that 10 per cent of Saskatchewan enlistments were people of Ukrainian descent, though Ukrainians numbered less than 10 per cent of that province's population. But such bulletins could be deceiving. The depression had struck the prairies very hard and many recruits, including some Ukrainian boys, had joined up as much for economic as patriotic motives. For the time being the patriotic chorus, led by John Dafoe's *Winnipeg Free Press* and George McCullagh's *Globe and Mail*, largely fell on deaf ears and the Communists could continue their anti-war agitation.

The disastrous spring of 1940 completely changed this situation. The fall of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France created a new sense of urgency among English Canadians who suddenly realized that Canada was now Britain's senior ally. There was hardly a protest when Parliament passed the National Resources Mobilization Act, giving the government sweeping powers to conscript manpower for home defence.

Spurred on by news that the British authorities had arrested the English fascist leader Sir Oswald Mosley, on June 4 the government took action against the native Canadian fascist movements and ordered their leaders interned, including the popular French-Canadian Blue-shirt leader Adrien Arcand; perhaps to placate the Quebec church, the Jehovah's Witnesses were proscribed a month later. The June 4 order-in-council, issued the very day that the Germans entered Dunkirk, also banned the Communist Party and several of its supporting organizations. Though Party leader Tim Buck escaped to the United States, a number of top Communist leaders, including the majority of the Central Committee, were arrested. The ULFTA, its women's section and the Ukrainian Canadian Youth Federation were all banned and the property of these organizations, including meeting halls and printing presses, were given over to the Public Custodian.



At the beginning of June, Communist alderman Jacob Penner and the veteran Communist leader Ivan Navizivsky (John Navis) were arrested. The Ukrainian Communist papers *Narodna hazeta* and *Farmerske zhyttia* (Farmer Life) continued to appear, but by July 6, more arrests had begun and on August 27, these papers were also banned. Young Petro Krawchuk and Steve Macievich, upon orders from the underground Central Committee, prepared a short-lived illegal newspaper *Za voliu* (For freedom), but it was not long before they were both arrested and joined the other Communist activists already interned in the Kamanaskis camp in British Columbia. In fact, the Ukrainian organizations, especially the ULFTA, suffered even more than the Communist Party of Canada itself. "Not only was it the most active and the most militant of the pro-Communist language organizations," wrote a younger contemporary, "but the country of origin of its members constituted an integral part of the USSR which had a pact with Germany with whom Canada was at war. Consequently, of all pro-Communist organizations banned, only the leaders of the Ukrainian organizations were interned."<sup>19</sup> According to Communist sources, out of some 250 people involved in internments, over one-third were of Ukrainian or other Slavic origin and large numbers of Jews were also involved.<sup>20</sup>

The principal Ukrainian-Communist supporting organization that escaped complete proscription was the Workers' Benevolent Association (WBA) which, in addition to more political activity, performed a number of charitable functions. Nevertheless, its secretary, Anthony Woytyshyn, was interned as a leading Communist and the Manitoba government ordered an audit of the WBA books. The audit revealed that the organization gave unsecured loans and donations to various other Communist organizations and causes and, in consequence, the WBA was not allowed to accept new members.<sup>21</sup>

The intensification of the war and Canada's new position as Britain's senior ally also brought greater pressures upon non-Communist Ukrainian organizations. For example, British intelligence in the United States reported to the Canadian legation in Washington that the American Hetmanites were clearly pro-German, "fanatic, fascist, and anti-Semite," that the UNF's ideological counterpart, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, had earlier been openly pro-German and that the Ukrainian-American daily *Svoboda* had been tamed by the recent Dies Committee on Unamerican Activities but still "must be carefully watched when coming into Canada." The same source was also very critical of Toronto's Hetmanite *Ukrainskyi robitnyk* and informed of a new Winnipeg organization, BUK: "That is," the source suggested, "*Bog, Ukraina, Kanada* – God, Ukraine, Canada." "Its political orientation," the source continued, "is at present unknown but the initial word of its title, indicating an appeal to the childlike religious

feelings of this Slav people may well disguise a form of anti-democratic political influence."<sup>22</sup>

The Canadian authorities took these reports seriously and investigated them thoroughly. On December 5, 1940, the customs censorship division of the Department of National Revenue, at the request of the Press Censors for Canada, prohibited the importation of *Svoboda*. But the paper's American editor immediately made a special trip to Canada to get the ban lifted, and, it seems, succeeded, for by December 23 the paper was once again allowed into the country. The allegations against *Ukrainskyi robotnyk* were also looked into and found to be exaggerated, for according to the Canadian investigator, British intelligence should have known that Skoropadsky had "long ceased to be the pretender to the 'throne of the Ukraine' and that his only son, Daniel, who some two years ago was touring Canada, is at present a resident of London, England." Finally, the report on the BUK was found to be absurd, for BUK seemingly did not stand for God, Ukraine, Canada, but rather for the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, which turned out to be the largely apolitical lay arm of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. It was then concluded that such reports emanating from British sources in the United States – mostly from the British consulates in Chicago and elsewhere – had to be closely scrutinized, as misleading or confused information might be the product of Communist or Polish agents.<sup>23</sup>

The war's new phase also made unity and co-operation principal issues for the non-Communist Ukrainian-Canadian organizations. They were urged to forget old country rivalries for the sake of their new homeland and of the British Empire. On February 3, 1940, there was an attempt to revive and expand the UNF's Representative Committee of Ukrainian Canadians, which had been active during the Carpatho-Ukraine crisis, and the influential Winnipeg clergyman, Wasył Kushnir of the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUK or BUC), became its president. Funds were raised for the purchase of an ambulance for the armed forces and overtures extended to the USRL and the Hetmanites.<sup>24</sup> However, the USRL and, in particular, the volatile editor of Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos*, Myroslaw Stechishin, could not bring themselves to co-operate with the rightist nationalists of the UNF. In May the USRL, the United Hetman Organization and the small group of labour leaders led by Danylo Lobay, who had left the Communist Party at the time of the Stalin purges, cemented their earlier co-operation by uniting to form a rival Ukrainian Central Committee of Canada.<sup>25</sup>

There was little immediate chance of co-operation between these two groups. Both politics and religion were points at issue. The Representative Committee tended to be rightist and Catholic, the Central Committee tended to be liberal and Orthodox. Moreover, though the

Representative Committee was established first, the Central Committee claimed to have far more support. For example, in an editorial of June 12, 1940, *Ukrainskyi holos* argued that out of the six Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers that supported national independence, four, with a combined circulation of over thirty thousand supported the ostensibly liberal democratic Central Committee while only two, with a combined circulation of only thirteen thousand, supported what it called "the reactionary group." Thus, *Ukrainskyi holos* reasoned, the Ukrainian Central Committee represented about 70 per cent of Ukrainian-Canadian public opinion, and if wartime unity was desirable, then the minority rightists should join the majority.<sup>26</sup>

There was, of course, another point of view. In the opinion of UNF leader Wladimir Kossar, for example, the presence of the Catholic organization BUC gave the Representative Committee a great numerical advantage over the Central Committee, for about 80 per cent of Ukrainian Canadians were Greek Catholics and only 20 per cent were Orthodox. Moreover, he believed, the attacks on the Representative Committee came principally from the two Stechishin brothers – Julian in Saskatoon and Myroslaw at his editorial desk in Winnipeg. Kossar thought that the significance of the Hetmanites in the Central Committee was negligible. Their only power was through their relations with a few influential Greek Catholic pastors; the Hetmanites knew this, and therefore some of them wanted to come over to the Representative Committee. Finally, Kossar believed that Myroslaw Stechishin alone had brought Lobay's non-party "communists" into the Central Committee and that others had been unaware of such a possibility. And so, as he put it, "this conglomeration of republicans, Hetmanites, Communists, Trotskyists, and other kinds of socialists won't stick together for long.... With the Stechishins at the head, they will botch things up and harm the local activities of the Representative Committee. However, they have neither the moral nor material means to enter the international arena.... [Moreover,] their financial resources are minimal in comparison with those of the Representative Committee."<sup>27</sup>

This rivalry between the two principal non-Communist Ukrainian organizations was not welcome news for English Canadians. As far away as Britain, the War Office and the Foreign Office were taking an interest in political developments among Canada's Ukrainians and they did not like what they saw. In February 1940 the Foreign Office approached Vladimir Kysilewsky, the Ukrainian from Canada who ran the Ukrainian Bureau in London and whom the Germans had earlier accused of being in the pay of British intelligence. Kysilewsky had wanted to return home to Canada, but Professor R.W. Seton-Watson of the Slavonic school it seems, had advised him not to. Government officials in London might need him at any moment for

consultation concerning the Ukrainian question.<sup>28</sup> About this time, though, Makohin's subsidies for the Ukrainian Bureau ended and Kysilewsky had to turn increasingly to the USRL in Canada for financial support. He soon became the London representative of the USRL, and in May 1940 successfully blocked the UNF's Wasyl Swystun from visiting England as a representative of Ukrainian-Canadian public opinion. The USRL arrangement seems to have been unsatisfactory, however, and after making a Ukrainian-language broadcast on the Ukrainian question for the BBC, Kysilewsky subsequently closed his Ukrainian Bureau, returned home, and made a lecture tour of the three prairie provinces in which he stressed the need for unity and told of his efforts to inform the British about Ukraine.<sup>29</sup> In August, Tracy Philipps, a British expert on East European affairs with a special interest in Ukrainian politics, set out for Canada, it was said, with the secret approval of Lord Halifax, the British secretary of state. By November he, too, was on a Canadian speaking tour. Meanwhile, the UNF's Kossar, the Catholic leader Kushnir, and the Orthodox leader S. Sawchuk began the difficult process of reconciliation. At a conference held in Winnipeg on November 6-7, Philipps and George Simpson managed to calm personal antagonisms among the remaining Ukrainian leaders and at least superficially resolve the acrimonious dispute between the USRL and the UNF. A new Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), which united all the major non-Communist Ukrainian organizations, was finally formed.<sup>30</sup>

The general Canadian public reacted favourably to the formation of the new umbrella Ukrainian organization. The *Winnipeg Free Press* ran a front-page story under the heading "All for One – One for All" welcoming what it called the "united front of all Ukrainian organizations," while J.C. Royle of the *Winnipeg Tribune* mused that the dream of the UCC "is of a day when an independent Ukraine, bound to Great Britain in close friendship, will give leadership to a Slavic community of nations and establish a strong eastern bulwark against German aggression."<sup>31</sup>

Had the Communist press not been suppressed during the summer of 1940, it would not have agreed. As it turned out, Ukrainians in the United States provided the sharpest criticism of the merger. For example, *Ukrainian Life* of Scranton, Pennsylvania, doubted the sincerity of the move, pointing out that as late as November 6 – that is, only two days prior to the first UCC communique announcing the formation of the organization – the liberal democratic *Ukrainskyi holos* was still charging that the UNF was "executing the will of Berlin." *Ukrainian Life*, which was politically close to *Ukrainskyi holos*, remarked suggestively that only the presence of the Britisher Philipps had catalyzed the new-found unity of the Ukrainian Canadians. The magazine concluded that, unlike the recently united Ukrainian Americans of

the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), the Canadians had not declared their support for an independent Ukraine and therefore were without a serious political program or true unity since all individuals were already obliged to support the Canadian war effort in their capacity as Canadian citizens.<sup>32</sup>

In spite of these American doubts, the UCC immediately set to work organizing the war effort among Ukrainian Canadians. Through mass meetings, concerts and patriotic pronouncements, funds were raised for the purchase of war bonds and young men were encouraged to join the armed forces. *Ukrainskyi holos* was particularly vocal in this effort and almost every issue carried stories and pictures of young Ukrainian Canadians who had volunteered for active military service.<sup>33</sup> Whenever Ukrainian loyalties were questioned or Ukrainian interests were at stake, the UCC or one of its leaders was to take action.

The UCC did not have long to wait. In the spring of 1941, during a visit to Canada, the Polish premier, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, spoke of his plan to set up a strong postwar Polish-Czechoslovak federation with a population of fifty million that would presumably include the western Ukrainian regions of Subcarpathia, Galicia and western Volhynia. The Ukrainian-Canadian public, which had already been irritated by the earlier visit of another Polish general, was outraged. The UCC immediately drew up a memorandum to the Canadian prime minister protesting against the involuntary inclusion of Ukrainian territories in the proposed Sikorski federation and urging the British Commonwealth to support Ukrainian claims to a free and independent state in any postwar settlement. On May 23 a delegation headed by the MPs Anthony Hlynka, Joseph Thorson, Walter Tucker and Robert Fair, all of whom had large numbers of Ukrainians in their ridings, presented the memorandum to Mackenzie King, who in turn noted Ukrainian-Canadian loyalty "to the British cause" and said that he would bear the suggestions in mind in any peace conference in which he participated.<sup>34</sup>

Many Ukrainian Canadians were not content to lobby in Ottawa and trust the carefully worded promises of the Canadian prime minister. The UNF in particular had for some time supported its own Ukrainian National Information Service in London, which was run by the young Albertan, Stephen Davidovich. When Kysilewsky closed his bureau and returned to Canada to present the British viewpoint to the Ukrainians on the prairies, Davidovich remained in London and to some degree took over the functions that Kysilewsky had earlier performed. He was, of course, very interested in seeing Charles Milnes Gaskell's *A Submerged Nation: The Ukrainian Case* go to press, and although he was unable to achieve this, he was very active in other areas. With the help of Gaskell, Lanceton Lawton and other sympathetic Englishmen, Davidovich managed to continue publicizing the

Ukrainian cause well into the war; as late as January 1941, he was still arguing the case for Ukrainian independence in various British periodicals. On the other hand, British authorities and the British public were still very suspicious of German involvement in Ukrainian affairs and Davidovich's activities were monitored by British security.<sup>35</sup>

In Canada, too, the various security organizations paid special attention to Ukrainian and other minority groups. For example, in Saskatchewan in early 1940 a special and independent Veterans Civil Security Corps was formed and was soon investigating complaints against various people of central and east European background. The pacifist Doukhobors were one of their favourite targets, but Ukrainians were investigated too and in January 1941, the organization even received a complaint against *Ukrainskyi holos* and *Novyi shliakh*, both of which were alleged to be subversive. Nothing could be found against the two papers, however, and the matter was dropped.<sup>36</sup>

Though no Ukrainian-language paper was charged with sedition or closed down during 1941, there was mounting psychological pressure upon the various minority group editors to toe the national line with regard to Canada's war effort. This pressure was most clearly revealed at the editorial offices of the widely distributed Winnipeg weekly *Kanadiyskyi farmer*. The paper was edited by Teodor Datzkiw, who was a supporter of Hetman Skoropadsky, but owned by the Czech businessman Frank Dojacek, who was inclined towards the Canadian Liberals. There had been internal tensions at the paper for many years, with Datzkiw striving to retain what he considered to be "Ukrainian content" and Dojacek pushing for a more practical "Canadian" orientation. By early 1941, with Datzkiw privately predicting that Britain would lose the war, Dojacek suddenly fired his Hetmanite editor without notice and without allowing him a farewell editorial to his readers. Datzkiw subsequently published his farewell address on the pages of Toronto's Hetmanite *Ukrainskyi robotnyk* and his supporters in the United States labelled Dojacek a common materialistic "sneak." In turn, Dojacek hired a younger Canadian-born editor, Kost Andrusyshen, and privately denounced Datzkiw to RCMP headquarters in Winnipeg.<sup>37</sup>

Majority-group nativism and simple misunderstandings about Ukrainian-Canadian loyalties were another important problem. While the Battle of Britain raged, English Canadians expected complete loyalty from the non-English, yet at the same time sometimes turned against anyone who was not of British culture or ancestry. So R.L. Maitland, leader of the Conservative opposition in British Columbia, urged a vigorous stand against the "furtherance of foreign language or foreign creed," a relief officer in Saskatchewan publicly stated that "there should be two scales or relief, one for Central Europeans and one for 'white people'," and the RCMP was expanding its

force but requiring that "applicants must be single [and] of British racial origin." These positions were criticized in the House of Commons on November 25, 1940, when Anthony Hlynka and the MP from Rosthern, W.A. Tucker, rose to point out that such examples of racial discrimination were characteristic of "Hitlerian philosophy" and should not be acceptable in Canada. Hlynka, however, praised the Liberal government's efforts to reduce this problem, while Tucker mentioned that of the first two service fatalities in his constituency, one was a Ukrainian who had perished in the sinking of the *Frazer*.<sup>38</sup>

During the first years of the war, majority-group nativism would occasionally cause faulty judgments with regard to the loyalties of the non-English. Thus one Ottawa paper carried an article that accused Saskatchewan Mennonites of being "just about all for Hitler," and claimed that the Saskatchewan government was helping this Mennonite "fifth column" by giving its members relief. The paper also said that Ukrainians, who, it claimed, until quite recently had been sending Hitler money, "are often complacent to such [Mennonite] sedition." Taking up the challenge, the UNF representative in the UCC, Wasył Swystun, replied that these allegations were all false: Ukrainian Canadians had never sent any money to Hitler, only to Carpatho-Ukraine, whose existence was dependent upon the Munich Pact of which Britain was a signatory. Ukrainian Canadians, Swystun continued, "have given more than their proportion of young men in the West to the Canadian Active Service Force" and even established the UCC to further strengthen their effort. Swystun concluded that he knew little enough about Mennonites, but if the remarks about them were as inaccurate as the remarks about Canada's Ukrainians, then the whole matter was one of "fancies and not facts."<sup>39</sup>

These occasional outbursts of English Canadian nativism, though irksome, were not fatal. They were, in fact, to a large degree counterbalanced by occasional expressions of goodwill towards the Ukrainian Canadians and other minorities. In fact, Watson Kirkconnell, who was now at McMaster University, had made it his special avocation to defend Canada's exposed minorities from the kind of misunderstanding, intolerance and jingoism that had done so much damage during the 1914-18 war. In many newspaper articles and, in particular, in a speech before Toronto's influential Canadian Club, delivered on November 4, 1940, Kirkconnell attacked the national hatreds, anti-semitism and racial myths propagated by the Nazis, praised what he called the "European elements" in Canadian life, and gave a very positive assessment of the Canadian loyalties of citizens of non-English or non-French background. In a passage dealing with Hitler's manipulation of dissatisfied minorities in eastern Europe, Kirkconnell stressed "that there can be no real freedom for small nations in a Nazi Europe." After

dealing with Italians, Germans, Poles and Magyars, he turned to the Ukrainians and stated once again:

The Ukrainian nationalists constitute about 80% of the Ukrainian Canadians. For a short period, between the Munich Settlement and March, 1939, they were all enthusiastic over the prospect of an independent Ukraine dangled before their eyes by Hitler; but when that dream was snatched away by his abandoning the so-called 'Carpatho-Ukraine' to Hungary, their disillusionment was bitter and complete. Today, the Ukrainian nationalists in Canada, although still divided amongst themselves by savage feuds, are unanimous in their support of Britain's war effort.

Kirkconnell made this statement in a passage which argued that in alienating so many small European peoples, "Adolf Hitler has done more to unite these nationalities in a common Canadian cause than anyone else in all our history."<sup>40</sup>

There was a certain amount of patriotic rhetoric in much of Kirkconnell's wartime writings, but the sentiments he expressed were not unique. With regard to the Ukrainians, for example, the *Winnipeg Free Press* at one point stated simply that they were a good example of whole-hearted support for the war effort by one of Europe's most oppressed peoples, while a Toronto author dismissed the fears of his fellow English Canadians and quoted Joseph Chamberlain to the effect that "a naturalized foreigner becomes the most passionate patriot."<sup>41</sup>

Canadian nativism was not the only problem faced by the UCC and its member organizations. Although the Communist Party and the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) were banned and the Communist papers, the *Clarion*, *Farmerske zhyttia*, and *Narodna hazeta* had been closed down, Ukrainian pro-Communists continued to attack the nationalists and the Communists did score a few important successes. First, in the federal election of March 1940, the Communists helped elect Dorise Neilsen, the wife of a debt-ridden farmer living on relief, who ran as a "unity" candidate in North Battleford, Saskatchewan. During her first year as MP, Neilsen was dutifully critical of Canada's involvement in the war against Hitler, voted against the government's war appropriations measures and attacked the UNF. Secondly, on January 20, 1941, two months after the *Clarion* had been banned, a new Communist weekly, the *Canadian Tribune* appeared in Toronto with the aid of leftists and pacifists who propagated anti-war sentiments. Thirdly, on April 22, 1941, the Communists scored another important electoral victory when W.A. Kardash, a dedicated Communist and former ULFTA member, who had been an officer in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion in the Spanish civil war, was elected to the Manitoba legislature. (Kardash was elected in spite of calls by members of the Canadian Legion for his disqualification and arrest.) Finally, the Ukrainian Communists had an un-official organ in the



small, irregular newspaper *Holos pravdy* (Voice of Truth), published in Smoky Lake, Alberta, from the autumn of 1940. *Holos pravdy* undertook to expose what it called "the enemies of the people," but through careful language avoided running afoul of the Defence of Canada Regulations.<sup>42</sup>

These Communist victories complicated but did not stop the sale of the property confiscated by the government from the ULFTA and other banned organizations. The facilities of the Communist daily *Narodna hazeta* were leased for a while by a group of non-Communist Ukrainian figures in Winnipeg which included the Hetmanites Teodor Datzkiw, Onufrii Hykavy, William Bossy, and the democratic socialist Mykhailo Mandryka. This group was Catholic in orientation, very critical of the Soviet Union, and in consequence was unable to retain the subscribers on the old Communist mailing lists. As a result, *Narodna hazeta* folded and its printing press was sold to the UNF which eventually moved its paper *Novyi shliakh* to Winnipeg.<sup>43</sup>

Beginning in Edmonton, a large number of old ULFTA halls were also sold to the UNF. The Communists and their sympathizers, however, resisted at every opportunity and waged an unremitting war of words against their nationalist foes. For example, when the UNF applied to take over the Bathurst Street ULFTA hall in Toronto, the Communists, with the help of sympathizers in the United States, provided potentially damaging information to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association which subsequently demanded a deferment of the purchase until the completion of an investigation into the alleged "Fascist activities" of the "Ukrainian Nationalist Federation."<sup>44</sup> The general Canadian press proved so gullible in this regard that the supposedly banned Communists even got one Toronto paper to print a fantastic story in which the UNF was painted as an organization of what it called "Ukrainian-speaking Schwabs or Austrian Germans" who were never really strong enough to attract any true Ukrainians by their Nazi propaganda.<sup>45</sup> By March 4, 1941, the Communist campaign against the UNF reached the House of Commons when Dorise Neilsen defended the ULFTA and accused the nationalists of at one time supporting Hitler. In reply, the Ukrainian MP from Vegreville, Anthony Hlynka, declared these allegations to be "absolutely false and malicious" and assured the House that the UNF "among all such organizations in Canada had the highest percentage of enlistments in the Canadian forces at the beginning of the war." Hlynka was subsequently praised on the pages of the UNF press.<sup>46</sup>

The repeated Communist attacks on the UNF during the first years of the war did not completely sour English-Canadian attitudes towards the Ukrainian nationalists, nor, indeed, towards Ukrainian Canadians in general. Always on the watch, Watson Kirkconnell analysed the Communist position. In his essay "The Fifth Column in Canada," designed to protect central European minorities from misunderstand-

ings and Communist allegations, he compared this position to that of the UNF. He identified Toronto's Canadian Union of Fascists, an Anglo-Saxon enterprise, and Adrien Arcand's Blueshirts, a French-Canadian affair, as the two principal Storm Trooper groups in Canada and noted that they had already been silenced. On the other hand, Kirkconnell continued, "the Communists remain the most incorrigible of our Fifth Columnists." Their papers, only partially muted, continue to devote whole pages to Stalin and Molotov and obliquely criticize Canada's involvement in the war. The "brilliant four-page weekly," as Kirkconnell characterized it, *Holos pravdy* reported that Nazi-occupied Belgium now had a legation in Moscow and that the *Novyi shliakh* editor was "a big liar," while in Ukrainian, Hungarian and English the crypto-Communist papers saluted Mrs. Dorise Nielson "as a savior of the down-trodden proletariat of the Dominion." Kirkconnell printed this analysis, together with his essay on "European Elements in Canadian Life" and a number of other wartime pieces in a book entitled the *Twilight of Liberty*. Meanwhile in Ottawa, Tracy Philipps was alarmed by a *Globe and Mail* editorial which used Kirkconnell's initial 1939 analysis against the Ukrainian nationalists. He got Kirkconnell to write to the paper and vindicate UNF loyalty to Canada while exposing what he called the untruthful Communist "snipes."<sup>47</sup>

On another level, Kirkconnell was also involved in a special Ministry of National War Services program to increase cultural tolerance and to unite the various peoples of Canada around the war effort. The *Canadians All* program consisted of a series of CBC radio broadcasts and a campaign in print which praised the social, economic and cultural contributions of the various peoples that made up the Dominion. Continental Europeans, including Ukrainians, had an honourable place in the picture that was painted by Kirkconnell and his associates. These associates included G. Murray, J.M. Gibbon and Robert England, all of whom had previous experience with the "European" Canadians.

About the same time as the *Canadians All* campaign, occasional specific instances of praise for the Ukrainian Canadians occurred in the press and at public gatherings. For example, in the Saskatchewan legislature, the Ukrainian MLA Orest Zerebko, and the secretary of the Empire Parliamentary Association, Sir Howard d'Egville, officially dedicated a "Golden Book" recording Ukrainian sacrifices in the war. It was also reported that Ukrainian districts were responding very well to the War Bond campaign.<sup>48</sup>

In government circles, too, the importance of Canada's citizens of Ukrainian background was appreciated. For example, in early 1941 Skelton at External Affairs wrote to the Canadian high commissioner in London about the large numbers of Ukrainians in Canada and their importance in various war industries. He also passed on the message that Ukrainians in Canada were pressing for a reply to their demands for at least a statement of autonomy for Galicia from the Polish

government in London.<sup>49</sup> Both the Poles and the British were reluctant to move on such demands and continued to suspect the Ukrainian movement of pro-German sympathies, a fact that Norman Robertson alluded to in a letter to RCMP Commissioner Wood concerning the reliability of British consular sources in the United States. On May 10, he wrote:

I think there is a much better understanding of the Ukrainian question in Canada than there is in the United States, that it is a relatively much more important problem in the general foreign language complex in this country than in the United States, and that our sources of information about Ukrainian activities and political movements are fuller and more reliable than those on which the British Secret Service in the United States have been relying in the past. You will recall that we have received copies of a number of despatches on the Ukrainian situation received from the British Consuls General in New York and Chicago and forwarded by our Washington Legation. Mostly they had to do with mares' nests, and under the expert scrutiny of your Ukrainian advisor and of the Ukrainian translator in the Press Censor's Branch, proved to be full of misinformation. I suspect that most of the United Kingdom information about Ukrainian movements and personalities comes, naturally enough, from quasi-Polish sources. This origin does not discredit it but does suggest the need for a close countercheck to balance the inescapable political bias which I have always found in any Polish appreciation of the Ukrainian question.

In general, as late as the spring of 1941 the importance of Canadian Ukrainians remained considerable and the sensitivities of the "nationalist" or non-Communist majority were taken into account by top government administrators. Moreover, unfavourable intelligence reports emanating from the United States and Britain were given little credence. The Communists were unable to prevent the sale of their confiscated property and their accusations against the anti-Communist UNF could not overshadow their own reluctance to abandon the German-Soviet pact and join wholeheartedly in Canada's war effort.

By the middle of June there were signs that this situation would soon change. Large-scale German manoeuvres along the Soviet frontier and the presence of German troops in Finland were accompanied by reports that Hitler had demanded new concessions from Stalin, including control over Ukrainian wheat supplies. Echoing European opinion, the Winnipeg paper *Kanadiiskyi farmer* speculated that Stalin would grant Hitler his demands because he feared a German invasion would immediately ignite a general revolution that would put an end to his dictatorship. On the other hand, the paper noted, Stalin too was moving troops to Ukraine from the Far East.<sup>50</sup>

When on June 22, 1941, Germany finally attacked the Soviet Union, the first period in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the

Second World War came to an abrupt end. During this first period, public opinion among the Ukrainian Canadians was sharply divided but showed certain clear characteristics. On the right, the nationalist organizations had displayed great flexibility and had entered the conflict by declaring their full support for the Canadian and British war effort. This transformation had been made somewhat easier in the case of the Hetmanites by the residence of Danylo Skoropadsky in England, and in the case of the UNF, by Kossar's fact-finding trip to Europe in the summer of 1939, and by his discussions with the OUN leadership and various Canadian and British diplomatic personnel. Thus even before Canada had formally declared war on Germany, the UNF had approached the authorities with a plan for the formation of Ukrainian military units to operate within the context of the Canadian armed forces.

The Communist position was less flexible. After a brief period of support for the war against Hitler, the Ukrainian-Canadian Communists fell into line with Moscow and rejoiced at the Soviet "liberation" of Galicia and Volhynia from Polish rule and the annexations of these lands to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. They carried on subtle anti-war propaganda and whenever possible declared the war an "imperialist" one. By the summer of 1940 the ULFTA had been suppressed, many leading Communists had been interned, and many Labour Temples were being handed over to the UNF and other non-Communist organizations.

In spite of the suppression of the Communist Party of Canada and its affiliated organizations, throughout 1940 and 1941 Ukrainian leftists and their supporters continued to wage a propaganda war against the Ukrainian right, especially the UNF. But this campaign proved to be largely ineffective, and talented publicists such as Watson Kirkconnell rushed to the defence of the nationalists. Kirkconnell was also active in combatting English-Canadian nativism, which remained a serious problem during the first years of the war. On another level, differences in national origin were believed to have influenced recruiting for the armed forces and the *Canadians All* campaign was geared to address this problem.

In general, during this initial phase of the war, Canada's special position as Britain's senior ally ensured that Ukrainians in Canada would be given serious attention. On the political level, the existence of the German-Soviet Pact caused the Communists to suffer more difficulties than the nationalists. In fact, the European concerns of the non-Communist majority were occasionally taken into account by top government administrators and unfavourable intelligence reports emanating from the United States and Britain were given little credence. The collapse of the German-Soviet Pact would change this situation completely.

## The Table Turns

*Imperium habere vis magnum?  
Impera tibi!  
Publius Syrus*

The German troop movements in eastern Europe did not turn out to be without purpose. On June 22, 1941, Hitler broke his pledge to Stalin and Germany and suddenly attacked the Soviet Union. Within a few days the Soviet lines had collapsed. Ten of thousands of Red Army troops found themselves surrounded and immediately surrendered. One Ukrainian city after another quickly fell to the invaders and it was feared that all Ukraine and perhaps all Russia might fall into German hands. On the first day of the German-Soviet war, Winston Churchill made a dramatic announcement over the BBC that Britain would come to the assistance of the Russian people. The British government, while not approving of the Soviet political system, quickly concluded an agreement with Stalin. Canada became an ally of the USSR and the recently appointed minister of trade, the Edmonton businessman J.A. MacKinnon, spoke of Canadian wheat being sent to Russia, should Ukraine be lost.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union's displacement of Canada as Britain's senior ally was a cause of great consternation to the non-Communist Ukrainians. "The latest turn of events in Europe," Kirkconnell privately warned the UNF's Kossar, "will severely test the nerve and judgement of the Ukrainians of North America. I devoutly hope that they will realize how utterly false, in the long run, any promises by Hitler would prove, and how specifically he has assigned to them, along with all Slavs, a slave status in his ultimate New Order."<sup>2</sup> The UCC president, Wasyl Kushnir, and the UNF representative, Wasyl Swystun, felt it necessary to make public statements reaffirming Ukrainian dedication to Canada's war effort and stating the pious hope that British victory "would bring liberty and justice to all freedom-loving peoples."<sup>3</sup> The United

Hetman Organization and the UNF, which were the most right-wing, the most European-oriented and now, more than ever, the most vulnerable of the non-Communist organizations, took a similar approach, but did not automatically suspend their objections to Soviet rule in Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists generally believed that the Red Army would disintegrate before the Germans and that Hitler might call upon either Skoropadsky or Andrii Melnyk, the pre-eminent OUN leader in Europe, to form a Petain-style collaborationist regime. In a carefully composed editorial, *Novyi shliakh* reaffirmed its Canadian loyalties and indirectly alluded to these difficult questions:

Canadian Ukrainians are primarily interested in seeing that the armed conflict between Nazism and Bolshevism will bring the greatest benefit to the military cause of Canada and Britain, because we all hope for a quick and complete victory for our adopted homeland and the British Commonwealth of Nations to which it belongs... [But] what will happen to Ukraine?

The first answer to come to mind will certainly be: Ukraine might get a new occupier. We Ukrainians, having a pretty good knowledge of world politics and military affairs, know the weak side of the Soviet military machine and state structure. We did not err when we foresaw the result of the Polish-German clash at the end of 1939; perhaps we are right again when we foresee the result of the present Nazi-Soviet armed conflict.

And what did Ukrainians think about the present occupier, Moscow, and the future occupier, Germany?

The Ukrainian people wants to be lord of its own land. It wants to be a people with a state and throughout the ages has always striven for liberation from every occupier. It is hostile to Soviet Moscow which it considers its mortal foe. [Moscow] has made it into paupers and slaves.... [On the other hand], the Ukrainian people has always regarded the Germans with justified mistrust and caution. With German actions after the Treaty of Brest (in February 1918) and then Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939, this mistrust deepened.... However, feeling the terrifying experiences of Ukrainians under the Soviet regime... the Ukrainian masses might greet the German invasion with the words: "Better the Germans than the Red Muscovite!" But at the same time we certainly know that the Ukrainian people will *never* abandon the idea of its national independence for the exclusive use of German state interests. In pressing circumstances, it can be turned aside *for a moment*. But only for a moment.... [The Ukrainian people] will never bow before anyone, even Germany.<sup>4</sup>

In this way, *Novyi shliakh* just managed to square the circle and reaffirm its loyalty to Canada and yet simultaneously predict a negative outcome of the German-Soviet war. At the same time, it restated its commitment to Ukrainian independence.

Not everyone accepted these seemingly contradictory commitments at their face value. In Ottawa, for example, press censors and the RCMP carefully analysed the editorial and noted the uncomfortable position of the UNF. When *Novyi shliakh* continued to criticize the Soviet Union, the press censors sent the paper a polite but firm warning that such articles were likely to be harmful to the war effort and, therefore, contravened the Defence of Canada Regulations. Open criticism of the Soviet Union would no longer be tolerated.<sup>5</sup>

If *Novyi shliakh* and the Dominion executive of the UNF could not openly criticize Britain's new alliance with the Soviet Union, neither could they approve of continued Soviet rule in Ukraine. Such a position would be sure to alienate the UNF membership. Moreover, British war aims, which, it was believed, gave little hope for Ukrainian independence, and the new British alliance with the Soviet Union, which had always been recognized as a principal enemy, resulted in apathy and a reduction of activities in many UNF branches. The situation proved so serious that the Dominion executive called a national convention to deal with the question of the German-Soviet war. On August 28-30, 1941, at the Eighth National UNF Convention in Winnipeg, the Dominion executive, advised by George Simpson, managed to convince the delegates to vote to support its strong stand in favour of the Canadian war effort. The convention passed resolutions supporting the government recruiting campaign and the Atlantic Charter, which had been signed earlier in the month and which, though it contained positive elements, had caused some misgivings since it made no specific mention of the Ukrainian question. The resolutions also supported an increased information program in English-speaking countries, and approved of the formation of the UCC which was expected to be a major vehicle for implementing these policies. (There was some talk of the UCC taking over the UNF's Ukrainian National Information Service in England, but this project was abandoned, it seems, for financial reasons.) It was still hoped that Ukrainian sections could be formed in the Canadian Home Guard from among those members of the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association (UWVA) who had been thinking of joining the guard as early as the days of the abortive Finnish project.<sup>6</sup>

Although they were not openly discussed at the UNF convention, other difficult questions troubled the UNF and UCC leadership. For example, what stand should Ukrainian Canadians take should the Germans establish a puppet Ukrainian government in Nazi-occupied Ukraine? It was inconceivable that free Ukrainians would ever support Polish or Soviet claims to their country even though these governments were now allied to Britain. Therefore, the UCC developed a secret plan to establish a "Free Ukrainian Movement" along the same principles as the Free French, Polish and other movements organized

in London. Certain UCC leaders such as Wasyl Swystun had grave doubts as to whether Britain, which had guaranteed Poland's prewar borders, would ever agree to such a movement. But it was also widely believed that both Hitler and Stalin would go down in mutual defeat and in consequence the Soviet Union would eventually be broken up into several independent states. In such a case, the Ukrainian leaders believed, British support was not inconceivable.<sup>7</sup>

If Ukrainian nationalists in Canada were placed in an awkward position and disconcerted by the sudden alliance with their old foe, the Soviet Union, exactly the opposite was true of the Communists. On the day of the attack, the Politburo of the outlawed Communist Party of Canada issued a call: "All out for Soviet Victory over Fascism!" In late June 1941, a series of rallies in support of the Soviet Union were held in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. These rallies were organized by staunch Communist leaders such as the *Canadian Tribune* editor, A.A. MacLeod, but were supported by prominent individuals like John Kerry, former president of the Civil Liberties Union, J.C. Harvey, *Le Jour* editor, and others. For the Canadian Communists, the struggle against Nazi Germany was suddenly no longer an "imperialist" war, but rather a just war, or in the words of the *Canadian Tribune*, "a people's war of national freedom and liberation." Within two weeks of the German attack, fifteen hundred Ukrainian pro-Communists gathered at a mass meeting in Toronto to express what they called their "solidarity with the peoples of the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine now defending their sacred soil against a treacherous aggressor." The gathering proclaimed that the "defense of the Soviet Union at this time is in reality a defense of Great Britain and a defense of Canada."<sup>8</sup>

The sudden change in the international situation and sudden reversal of Communist policy with regard to the war enabled Ukrainian party members and former ULFTA supporters to reorganize in a different form. During the first weeks of the German-Soviet war these activists began forming committees to aid their ancestral land. On July 26, 1941, fifty-six delegates gathered in Toronto to unite these local committees into a new "Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland." The founding conference issued an appeal which condemned the German invasion of the Soviet Union, accused Ukrainian nationalist leaders in Europe of working with Hitler, maintained that others in Canada were justifying the actions of the Nazi aggressor, and concluded that the traditionally "anti-fascist" and democratic Ukrainian people now wished "to expand this struggle a thousand fold." An article in the organization's constitution stated full support for the Canadian war effort against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.<sup>9</sup>

About two weeks later, on August 7, 1941, a new Ukrainian-language weekly, *Ukrainske zhyttia* (Ukrainian Life) made its appearance in



Toronto. Edited by Steve Macievich, who had moved to Toronto from Winnipeg, and Nicholas Hrynchyshyn, who had left *Holos pravdy* because of disagreements with another editor, the new paper became the de facto organ of the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland. It began with a circulation of five thousand but, given the newly favourable climate for Soviet supporters, increased to twelve thousand within a few weeks, and within a year had grown to fifteen thousand. By 1943, a second weekly, *Ukrainske slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was launched in Winnipeg and soon served over two thousand subscribers in western Canada. Over the course of the next year or so, the Communist press hammered away at three distinct themes: condemnation of Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union with concomitant support for the Canadian war effort; demands for the release of interned Canadian "anti-fascists" or Communists, and the return of the ULFTA halls and other confiscated property; and allegations of pro-Nazi sentiment among UCC member organizations, especially the UNF.

The campaign against the nationalists was a continuation and amplification of allegations made during the period before June 1941, when accusations of UNF connections with supposedly pro-Nazi leaders in Europe was one argument in the case for deferring the sale of former ULFTA property to the nationalist organization. The German invasion of the Soviet Union made the Communists more bold. Within two weeks of the outbreak of the war in eastern Europe, a mass meeting of Communist sympathizers in Toronto urged the Canadian government to curb the activities of what it called "the many pro-Hitler and pro-fascist Ukrainian groups in Canada."<sup>10</sup> As the Communists' campaign gathered strength, well-established organs of public opinion were taken in. *Saturday Night* magazine even published an article by R.A. Davies which alleged that nationalists among Ukrainian Canadians, who up to the outbreak of the German-Russian war had been loyal to Canada, now posed a serious security risk and were a fertile field for a "Nazi Fifth Column." The following week the same magazine published a detailed rebuttal by the UNF's Wasył Swystun, but the damage had already been done.<sup>11</sup> In fact, throughout 1941 the Communists steadily increased this kind of pressure so that by January of 1942 there were demonstrations and fist fights in front of the former Labour Temples that had been purchased by the UNF. The latter organization eventually thought it necessary to appeal to the minister of justice in Ottawa for action against the Communists.<sup>12</sup>

In general, the summer of 1941 was a very difficult time for Ukrainian nationalists in Canada. Across the border in the neutral United States certain Ukrainian organizations would still take an isolationist stance or openly complain that the new anti-German agreement between the Polish government in London and the Soviets amounted to a renewed partition of Ukraine, a repetition of the Treaty of Riga

(1921),<sup>13</sup> but in Canada, which was now allied to both these powers, such criticism was out of the question. At a secret UNF meeting in Saskatoon, so the government was informed by one fierce critic of the organization who could not have been an actual witness, W. Kossar and T. Pavlychenko were outvoted by a large majority when they suggested approval of the isolationist position of the American aviation hero and possible presidential candidate, Charles Lindbergh.<sup>14</sup>

During this same period even friends of the non-Communist Ukrainians such as Tracy Philipps were very critical of the more extreme nationalists. Philipps, for example, thought that the Canadian members of the Hetman movement were, "to put it mildly, very unCanadian." He thought that Danylo Skoropadsky's companion in England, Vladimir de Korostovets, should be interned. (Korostovets had, in fact, found himself accused of financial improprieties and wound up in the British courts before the war.) Both Philipps and Watson Kirkconnell believed that the Hetman people would be the first to bolt if the government-fostered UCC came under pressure of any sort. In fact, so upset were Danylo Skoropadsky and Vladimir de Korostovets with Philipps' activities that even before the surprise German attack on the USSR they asked the British Foreign Office about Philipps' credentials and urged that a full investigation be made to determine on what authority Philipps was acting as an arbitrator of Ukrainian-Canadian affairs.<sup>15</sup> In the same way, UCC moderates such as the democratic socialist Mykhailo Mandryka would privately remark that many UNF members were still "enemies of democracy" at heart and that the energetic Wasyl Swystun was no more than the "hired negro" of the organization who was managing it for the duration of the war.<sup>16</sup>

It was common knowledge that the RCMP had long been watching the Ukrainian community, but in the summer of 1941 the observations of secret agents were supplemented by direct interrogations of various leaders and activists. Of course, the police took a special interest in the United Hetman Organization (UHO) and the UNF which had both been repeatedly attacked for their former connections in Europe and their rightist politics. Thus during a typical sweep of the northern Ontario region, RCMP constables interrogated the UNF activist Michael Sharik concerning his personal and organizational contacts and his political views. UNF activists and UWVA members were told in no uncertain terms that now was the time to join the reserves. The British authorities too took action and the UNF's Ukrainian National Information Service in London had to be closed down. (Its director, Stephen Davidovich, subsequently joined the Canadian overseas army.) Sharik, who was a member of the Canadian reserve militia, and all other UNF members were not held and their papers were returned to them, but the entire episode was a nerve-wracking experience that throughout

the remainder of the war served to frighten the men involved. Public criticism of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians were warned, would no longer be tolerated. Sharik, in particular, was convinced that Ukrainian-Canadian Communists, emboldened by the Soviet-British alliance, had denounced him and his comrades to the Ottawa authorities and had demanded their immediate internment.<sup>17</sup>

During the spring and summer of 1941 it was primarily in Ottawa that non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians scored any real victories. In June, Joseph Thorson, the Liberal MP for Selkirk, Manitoba, replaced James Gardiner as minister of national war services. Gardiner had been friendly to the Ukrainians, but Thorson, who was of Manitoba Icelandic background, had a certain special interest in the problems of Canada's non-English communities and on June 18, *Kanadiyskyi farmer*, which was now edited by the young Kost Andrusyshen, noted with obvious enthusiasm that he was "a great friend of the Ukrainians and has even studied the Ukrainian language. The electors of Selkirk riding remember several of his Ukrainian language speeches." After Thorson's appointment, proposals to establish a special Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship – already elaborated under Gardiner by the government's "European adviser," Tracy Philipps – finally came to fruition. The new committee was composed of proven friends of the non-Communist Ukrainians, and the news spread quickly. On November 10, 1941, J.W. Stechishin, a central figure in the moderate USLR, wrote to his colleague, Vladimir Kysilewsky: "I presume that you have already heard that Professor Simpson has been appointed to an office in Ottawa.... In my opinion, this is the best news that we have had during the last two years.... I am sure he is the best qualified man for the position he is to take. It came to my knowledge that he will take T[racy] P[hilipps] [in]to his office. It would follow, in my opinion, that you will be called next."<sup>18</sup>

By March 1942 the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship was in existence and its principal advisers were Simpson and Philipps; Kysilewsky (who was asked to change his name to Kaye) joined the administrative staff as head of an editorial section responsible for relations with the ethnic press. The task of the committee was to ensure smooth relations between government and the various ethnic groups, to promote co-operation in the war effort and to encourage what was called the eventual "Canadianization" of all communities. The multiculturalism program of today's secretary of state traces its origin to the formation of this novel committee and its adjunct, the Nationalities Branch.<sup>19</sup>

During the summer of 1941 non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians were also cheered by new developments in Anglo-American relations. When Churchill and Roosevelt met off Argentina, Newfoundland in August to issue their resounding Atlantic Charter, which included the

principle of national self-determination, the event was greeted with enthusiasm by most Canadians. In particular, the UCC welcomed the possibility of getting a new ally who was not an automatic enemy of Ukrainian independence and UCC representatives Wasyl Kushnir and J.W. Arsenych cabled the Canadian prime minister on August 27 about their "profound admiration of the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Declaration" and about their hope that, when the Nazis were finally defeated, "a just settlement of the Ukrainian question may be made in accordance with the true spirit of the declaration."

The prime minister, of course, was still reluctant to involve Canada in east European politics and did little more than acknowledge UCC memoranda on the Ukrainian question. Nevertheless, by October 1941, certain External Affairs officials were examining the idea of spirited certain prominent pro-Allied Ukrainian émigrés out of occupied France and bringing them over to Canada in an effort to raise the morale of nationalist Ukrainian Canadians. These pro-Allied Ukrainians, it was thought, might be able to form a counterpoint to the puppet Ukrainian government that the Nazis were expected to establish in eastern Europe. The émigrés in question, Myroslav Prokopovych and Oleksander Shulhyn, were believed to be still living in Paris, but the difficulties of such a commando operation seemed to be insurmountable and the project never got beyond the planning stage.

On a different level, the Mackenzie King government never publicly acknowledged that smooth relations with the Ukrainian community were in any danger. Thorson, in particular, never accused the Ukrainians of lacking enthusiasm for the Canadian war effort. Arthur Meighen and other Conservative Torontonians might worry about the uneven distribution of enlistments among Canada's "races," especially between English and French, and call for conscription for overseas service; but Mackenzie King and his ministers knew that French Canada would strenuously object, and the prime minister stalled. Meanwhile Thorson rose in the House of Commons to defend non-English "racial" groups and repeat the story that in some parts of Saskatchewan, Ukrainian Canadians were enlisting in greater numbers than men of other nationalities, including the English. Thorson further assured the House that Ukrainians were not "enemy aliens" and that although some people counted them foreigners, "they are not foreigners."<sup>20</sup>

Thorson's statements in the House of Commons may have been useful in strengthening Ukrainian-Canadian pride in the war effort, but they did not give a full picture of the very real problems faced by the government on the prairies. As early as August 1941, T.C. Davis, associate deputy minister in Thorson's department, was told that "there is a great deal of criticism abroad in Saskatchewan of the fact that these various elements in our population are not bearing their fair share of the burden of war in the matter of enlistments."<sup>21</sup>

In December, Tracy Philipps received a copy of a letter from a field worker who stated that he was singularly unsuccessful in getting "R", that is, reserve, recruits to go active. The worker believed that poor leadership among the Ukrainians, and pro-German sympathies among what he called the Ukrainian "national" faction, to be the root of the problem.

The real picture, however, was far more complicated and seems to have had very little to do with either the leadership of the Ukrainian community or its opinion of European events. In one of the most detailed and secret studies of Canadian manpower problems, the federal government's Labour Supply Investigation Committee described the country's enlistment patterns, manpower reserves and labour shortages. The committee noted that the Ukrainians, Poles and other Slavs who inhabited the northern parts of the prairie farm belt still formed a potentially available pool of manpower that could be used either for military enlistments, or in war industry. Unlike the Anglo-Saxons of the southern half of the prairie region, the report stated, the Ukrainians of the northern half had never experienced any major outward migration to the cities; moreover, unlike the Germans, Austrians, Romanians and other such prairie people, the Ukrainians and other Slavs did not emanate from the "Axis block"; nor did they retain any significant European loyalties. Most of the young men were Canadian-born; furthermore, in the words of the committee, "practically all of the European-born have been in Canada for more than ten years and most of them for over 20 years. There is reason to believe that a negligible percentage even of the European-born maintain any strong sense of allegiance or loyalty to any country other than Canada."<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, the committee believed that there were serious problems in utilizing this potential manpower pool. Again, this had nothing to do with the leadership of the Ukrainian community. Rather, the principal reason why there had been little out-migration from this area was that, by their own admission, English-Canadian employers, especially in southern Ontario, had refused to hire Canadians with "foreign sounding names." In certain cases young men from Alberta had travelled all the way to the industrial centres of eastern Canada and had returned home because, the committee was informed, "employers refused to hire them upon hearing their names." Similarly, there were no special measures in force for recruiting Ukrainians and other Slavs into the armed forces, and in the opinion of the responsible people interviewed by the committee, they were "not joining the armed forces in nearly as great proportions as are Anglo-Saxons." In conclusion, the committee recommended that, on the military level, active measures be taken to encourage recruitment among the Ukrainians, while on the civilian level, mobile recruiting units be

established to make job contracts with men in rural areas and help them to move to the cities where the war industries were located. The committee specifically recommended the "education" of employers to accept persons with non-Anglo-Saxon names, and it concluded:

It cannot be too strongly stated that a period is rapidly approaching at which positive direction will have to be given to the migration of labour from western farms to industry. Without this positive direction, the prejudice of industrialists and the mores of the population will impede the mobility of the people in those areas now containing the largest potential labour reserve.<sup>23</sup>

Thorson was certainly aware of these difficulties, but he refrained from discussing them in his parliamentary speeches. Presumably he wished to avoid an intensification of English-Canadian nativism, and also to maintain the morale of the leadership of the organized Ukrainian community, which had publicly supported the war effort.<sup>24</sup>

Enlistment questions were, however, frequently discussed on the pages of the Ukrainian-Canadian press. For example, *Ukrainskyi holos* noticed the government's peculiar silence on the number of Ukrainians joining up, but pointed out that every day brought news of more Ukrainian boys enlisting: at one Winnipeg school, it claimed, out of three hundred recruits, 95 per cent had "foreign names" and more than half of these were Ukrainian. The paper repeated the old story about Saskatchewan enlistments – that Ukrainians made up 9 per cent of the population, but 10 per cent of the enlistments – and calculated that, at the very least, Ukrainian recruitment still equalled the Ukrainian percentage of the population and by a very conservative estimate amounted to not less than eleven thousand men in the various services.<sup>25</sup>

The difficulty of accurately calculating the number of Canadian servicemen of Ukrainian origin was underlined in an *Ukrainskyi holos* article by a former USRL youth activist from Saskatchewan who was serving in the RCAF Wireless School in Montreal. In his article, Bohdan Panchuk estimated that of the one thousand men at his base, there were about fifty Ukrainians and that the situation was similar in almost every military base in the country. At the same time, however, he noted that many of these men could not really be considered ethnically conscious Ukrainian Canadians – "*nash*." He gave the example of a guard who was asked by an officer why he did not understand an order and the man, in reply, pretended to be a French Canadian. When Panchuk asked the man why he had behaved thus, the guard replied that "no one knows the Ukrainians, but there are a lot of French here and maybe one can get ahead if one acts like them." Panchuk concluded that if Ukrainians were to become better known as soldiers, then they would have to cease such dissimulation, become

more bold and follow the example of the Jews who were good at standing up and publicizing their service to the country.<sup>26</sup>

Other newspapers carried even more positive articles. The surprise Japanese attack on Hong Kong, which was defended by the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Canadian Rifles, was the first engagement in which Canadian troops played the principal role and, because it involved so many "prairie boys," elicited considerable comment in the Ukrainian-language press. *Novyi shliakh* reflected:

There are many sons of our Winnipeg and Manitoba Ukrainians among these Western Canadian fighters who by their heroism and devotion have won the glory of heroes among all British society. And although our hearts beat with anxiety and fear as we await news of their fate, our spirit is filled with pride; they have not let down their heroic forefathers – neither the Zaporozhian Cossacks, nor the Ukrainian Riflemen and Cossacks of 1914-1920. The heroism of these Ukrainian Canadian soldiers has inspired the Ukrainian youth in Canada. The news from the recruiting centres on the Canadian prairies indicates that Ukrainian youngsters are again enrolling *en masse* in the ranks of the Canadian army.<sup>27</sup>

A few days later, *Ukrainskyi holos* listed over eighty Ukrainian names among the defenders of Hong Kong. Private Pavlo Arsenych, son of J.W. Arsenych, one of the central figures in the UCC, headed the list.<sup>28</sup>

The many Ukrainians who seemed to be joining the Canadian armed forces and, in particular, the baptism by fire of the Winnipeg Grenadiers at Hong Kong, promised to improve the position of the UCC and various non-Communist Ukrainian-Canadian politicians who faced considerable misunderstanding on the part of those who were poorly acquainted with the Ukrainian question. During the first weeks of 1942 the prospective establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Canada and the Soviet Union threatened to embarrass the UCC and the strongly anti-Communist UNF. In particular, an exchange of diplomatic missions would strengthen official Canadian recognition of the Soviet Union's claim to the Ukrainian lands.<sup>29</sup> Thus on February 2, 1942, Anthony Hlynka, who had been a founding member of the UNF, rose in the House of Commons to bring general attention to the unresolved Ukrainian question and argue on the basis of the Atlantic Charter that the forty-million-strong Ukrainian nation had as much right to independence as any other nation. Hlynka further argued that, in view of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine and the existence of several provisional governments in exile for other occupied countries, the Allied governments should take steps to ensure that the Ukrainians too have their independent representatives at various international conferences. Hlynka suggested that the UCC in Canada and similar united committees of Ukrainians living in the United States and

Britain be invited to represent the Ukrainian people at these Allied conferences.<sup>30</sup>

Hlynka's speech caused an immediate uproar in the press, among the Communists and in government circles. The pro-Communist Ukrainian Society to Aid the Fatherland, the newly organized successor of the ULFTA, sent all MPs a "statement" denouncing Hlynka as the proponent of a quisling Ukrainian government that would only serve to help the Nazis. It accused the UCC of not supporting the Canadian Red Cross in its aid-to-Russia campaign and pointed out that there was already a Soviet Ukrainian government in existence. In reply, Hlynka informed Toronto's *Evening Telegram* that his critics represented only a small Communist group and not the majority of Ukrainian Canadians, that the UCC could not be faulted because it preferred to work for Canada rather than the Soviet Union, and that he would always stand for the principles of national liberty embodied in the Atlantic Charter.<sup>31</sup> There was further discussion of Hlynka's proposals in the various Ukrainian newspapers throughout Canada and the United States. In fact, as late as March 26, 1942, the *Edmonton Bulletin* went so far as to mix the Hlynka proposals with the newly emerged and highly explosive issue of national conscription of manpower for military service abroad and attacked his position in the following terms:

Canada's dead must groan in their graves as they consider how Anglo-Saxons have handed away our heritage, go cheerfully to fight in all the far corners of the world, while staying behind are these people who came to a ready-made British freedom which gave them legal protection to vilify us and to sneer at the country which gave them land, food, work, shelter, and in sickness and in unemployment – how quick they were to rush for relief – and how slow they are to rally to the colours. It's time for the truth. We are in a fair way to losing this war...we should try to save ourselves. But we're not going to fight, à la Mr. Hlynka, Ukrainian-Canadian MP, Vegreville, for dear old Ukraine; we want to see the aliens rounded up to fight for Canada.<sup>32</sup>

The *Edmonton Bulletin* was not the only major Canadian newspaper to criticize Hlynka's position. The *Toronto Daily Star* basically supported closer relations with the Soviets and recognized their claim to Ukraine. The *Star* even went so far as to glibly accept the official Soviet position that the autonomy of the USSR republics and their freedom to secede was guaranteed by the Soviet constitution and that the only reason why the Ukrainian Republic had not done so was that "the people in that province have not desired it." Such statements, of course, only exasperated the non-Communist Ukrainians, and while *Novyi shliakh* picked out the inconsistency of the *Star's* simultaneous accusations of Ukrainian pro-Nazi sentiment and Ukrainian pro-Soviet loyalty, the left-of-centre American critic of the UNE, *Ukrainian Life* magazine, which



in fact disagreed with Hlynka's proposals, expressed astonishment at the naiveté of the Toronto paper and could not help but wonder, as it stated, "which issue of *Pravda* these sentences were borrowed from."<sup>33</sup>

On the governmental level, too, Hlynka's suggestion was not without effect. At the time of his speech, the exchange of diplomats between Canada and the USSR had already been agreed upon, but the level of the exchange was still undecided. The Hlynka speech does not seem to have delayed the signing of an official agreement which took place, three days later, on February 5, but behind the scenes, Mackenzie King favoured consular rather than ministerial exchanges so as not to arouse further discontent among the Ukrainians on the prairies and among the Roman Catholics in Quebec. The Department of External Affairs had to persuade the prime minister that internal questions should be overridden and that a ministerial exchange was consistent with the status of the Soviet Union and the role that it was expected to play after the war had ended.<sup>34</sup>

The exchange of diplomatic representatives between Canada and the Soviet Union ended the second period in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War. This period had begun with the surprise German attack on the Soviet Union and was characterized by a complete reversal of the positions that had been staked out during the earlier period. Suddenly, the Communists became strong supporters of the war effort while the nationalists were taken aback by an alliance with their arch-foe, the USSR.

The Communists immediately saw the strength of their new position and went on the offensive. They campaigned for the release of their interned comrades, for the return of their property and for the exposure of what they considered to be their pro-fascist enemies.

The nationalists were equally aware of the weakness of their new position. The UNF membership, in particular, was thoroughly demoralized and their leaders had to endure personal interrogation by the RCMP. Moreover, there seemed to be recruitment problems on the prairies and some secret government reports tended to blame the nationalists rather than the Communists, even though the single most detailed report acknowledged that most Ukrainian Canadians were already very assimilated and cared little or nothing about the burning political questions of a Europe that they had left so many years before. It was also acknowledged that unsatisfactory attitudes among English-Canadian employers was largely responsible for the unused manpower pool remaining in the northern half of the prairie region, and that active measures had to be taken if satisfactory recruitment among the Ukrainians and other minority groups was to be achieved.

The nationalists tried to keep up their spirits by renewed declarations of loyalty and pride in the participation of so many of their

compatriots in the Hong Kong expedition. The establishment of George Simpson's Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship was also a help to the non-Communists. In the House of Commons, Anthony Hlynka even proposed that the UCC and other such organizations which had been consistently loyal to the western Allies be allowed to represent the Ukrainian nation at any future international conferences. The new alliance with the Soviet Union was making itself felt, however, and Hlynka's proposal was severely criticized in the general Canadian press. By the beginning of 1942, "the Soviet people" were beginning to acquire heroic qualities in the eyes of many Canadians and the former nationalist position was largely untenable. This was the situation when, the next spring, the government polled Canadian public opinion in the conscription plebiscite of 1942.

## The Conscription Plebiscite of 1942

*Sic et non.*  
Peter Abelard

While Anthony Hlynka was playing his modest part in the unfolding drama of Canadian-Soviet relations, a second important issue was reaching crisis proportions and threatening to divide the country. Arthur Meighen's Conservative party, with the full support of Toronto's *Globe and Mail* and much of the English-language press, was demanding that the government override French-Canadian objections and adopt a policy of "total war" by introducing conscription of the nation's manpower for overseas service. Meighen was, in fact, no stranger to splitting the nation during a wartime crisis. It was he who during the First World War had devised the Military Voters Act and Wartime Elections Act that had disenfranchised thousands of Ukrainian and other western Canadians of continental or "enemy alien" origin, thus ensuring an election victory for the ruling Conservatives; it was he who had devised the Military Service Act which in 1917 had introduced compulsory military service and pitted French against English in a way that Canada had not known since the death of Louis Riel. Meighen the "imperialist" now threatened to topple the government of King the "nationalist."<sup>1</sup>

The prime minister acted quickly to forestall the threat. On January 22 he announced that the matter would be put to the people in a plebiscite. Only they could release the government from its earlier pledges about the limited nature of Canada's commitment to the war in Europe and in Asia.<sup>2</sup> Canadians reacted variously. Meighen was outraged that King had stolen his issue and at first branded the plebiscite idea as "political cowardice." Quebec nationalists cried betrayal, while the democratic socialist CCF called for the conscription of wealth as well as of manpower. At first, the non-Communist Ukrainians were cautious.<sup>3</sup>

Four days after Canada signed the diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1942, the CCF stunned the country by soundly defeating Meighen in a Toronto by-election. It is true that Mackenzie King had deprived the Conservative leader of his principal issues and the CCF had campaigned principally on social and economic rather than international questions; but there could be no doubt about the rising prestige of the entire left, Communist as well as non-Communist.<sup>4</sup>

Meighen was gone, but the plebiscite remained. For the most part, the defeat of the Conservative leader signaled the end of a period of political posturing and the English-language Canadian press, especially in southern Ontario, began to urge Canadians to release the government from its earlier pledges and vote yes in the plebiscite. English-speaking Canadians seemed to hold pro-conscriptionist convictions; French-speaking Canadians, however, who felt that the government was breaking promises made to them in particular, remained solidly opposed and a spirited "*Ligue pour la défense du Canada*" sprang up to fight the measure.

Aside from the few administrators in Ottawa who were privy to secret reports on manpower, war production and enlistment patterns, no one seemed to have definite knowledge of opinion among the three hundred thousand Ukrainian Canadians. It might have been expected, however, that since the Ukrainians lived primarily in English-speaking provinces, they would follow the pattern of their English neighbours by voting yes in the plebiscite. The leadership of the organized Ukrainian community – both the right and the left – certainly supported such a conclusion, for the entire Ukrainian-language press seemed to be rallying its constituency in support of a yes vote. On the left, the pro-Communist Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland urged an unmistakable verdict authorizing the government to take all measures, as the Association put it, "in co-operation with our Allies," to ensure a quick victory.<sup>5</sup> An article in the pro-Communist newspaper *Ukrainske zhittia* seemed to ride roughshod over the French-English split when it categorically stated: "Voting 'yes' means voting for the strengthening of the country's war effort, for the strengthening of the fighting force of the allied peoples, for the proper defence of the country; voting 'no' means voting for the victory of fascism, for allowing fascism the right to subjugate the world, to make the world a colony of the German, Italian, and Japanese imperialists."<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, in the centre politically, Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* had long been sympathetic to the King government's management of the war effort and by April 8 was carrying a regular feature on young Ukrainian volunteers: "They give all they have for Canada!" Edmonton's *Ukrainski visti* was even more positive. Throughout January and February 1942, the paper prepared its readers for the idea of conscription by carrying several stories about the Nazis not giving Ukraine any kind of independence, or even

autonomy. As early as March 2, the paper came out squarely in favour of conscription for overseas service. It argued that the situation of total war gave the government the right to introduce conscription, so it was not even constitutionally bound to hold a plebiscite. Thus it was the patriotic duty of all electors to vote yes.<sup>7</sup> On the right, the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* moved steadily towards full support for a yes vote. By March 4, the paper was skirting over the issue of possible conscription in support of Polish and Communist Russian allies by emphasizing the dangers to Canada of the unsatisfactory situation in the Pacific and conscription as a remedy to this problem.<sup>8</sup> By April 11, the UCC, the umbrella body of the non-Communist Ukrainians, had come out in full support of Mackenzie King, and like the Communists, *Novyi shliakh* urged a definite yes vote. The leading editorial stated:

Ukrainian Canadians through their united representative Ukrainian Canadian Committee have promised to take part fully in this plebiscite. But this is not all. They have also promised to free the Dominion Government from the pledge which has tied its hands and might harm the Canadian war-effort. Thus we have promised to vote "yes" in this general ballot and we will keep our promise just as surely as we have kept other ones concerned with the war-effort.<sup>9</sup>

On the very eve of the vote, the Ukrainian papers reiterated this position, with *Novyi shliakh* arguing that the situation was one of a matter of life and death for the state, which required total confidence in the Canadian government.<sup>10</sup>

On April 27, 1942, Canadians went to the polls to answer this question that carefully avoided the dangerous word "conscription," but seemed to most to be a definite move in the direction of conscription of manpower for overseas defence:

Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligations arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?<sup>11</sup>

When the results of the plebiscite were in, they were not entirely surprising. English-speaking provinces overwhelmingly voted in favour of releasing the government from its past promises: Ontario by 82.3 per cent, British Columbia by 79.4 per cent and Prince Edward Island by 82.4 per cent. In marked contrast to this, however, Quebec voted overwhelmingly against the measure, with only 27.1 per cent being in favour. Similarly, New Brunswick, which had a large French-speaking minority, voted yes by the smaller margin of 69.1 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

The real surprise came on the prairies, where most of the Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities lived. As in Ontario or British Columbia, the prairie provinces registered big yes majorities but the major-

ities were not so uniformly large as in the more purely English provinces and there seemed to be a definite reluctance to vote yes in most non-English districts. In fact, three prairie ridings even registered a no majority: Provencher, Manitoba, which was an important French and Mennonite population centre; Rosthern, Saskatchewan, which was a Mennonite and German-speaking area; and Vegreville, Alberta, which was the home of the largest Ukrainian block settlement on the prairies.<sup>13</sup>

The contrast between the voting patterns of the English and the non-English was not restricted to farming areas and smaller towns, but also occurred in the cities. For example, in Winnipeg the no vote in the northern half of the city, where large numbers of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews and Germans made their home, was almost three times as great as in the southern half, which was almost purely English.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, towns along the poplar belt with large Ukrainian populations such as Dauphin, Manitoba, and Yorkton, Saskatchewan, came close to registering a no majority; this was not the case in English settlements south of the belt.<sup>15</sup> An analyst with the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in a private study for the federal government summed up the situation thus: "The groups opposed to a yes vote were the French, Germans, Russians, and Ukrainians, while the Scandinavians were lukewarm, as were the Poles. Wherever the people were of British descent, the yes vote was sky-high."<sup>16</sup>

These somewhat surprising results sent a shock wave through the country. A good part of the general Canadian press immediately interpreted the vote as a measure of loyalty to Canada rather than as the complex and divisive political issue that the prime minister and many of his colleagues conceived it to be. On one level, vigilante-style groups like the Saskatchewan Civil Security Corps conducted their own investigations and found central and eastern Europeans to be at fault for the no vote.<sup>17</sup> On another level, the *Vegreville Observer* headlined its post-referendum article "Vegreville Constituency Disgraces Alberta" and deduced that "in Vegreville electoral district Herr Hitler must have friends for the result in this district was almost incredible."<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile in Winnipeg, the home of Canada's largest concentration of Ukrainians and the headquarters of the UCC, the city's largest newspaper, the *Winnipeg Free Press*, ran an article that accused those whom it called "Ukrainian nationalists" of coming out in force to vote no and of joining allegedly pro-Hitler German Canadians. The latter, according to the paper, "are still Nazis at heart. They do not want Canada to win the war."

The same will be true of a number of the Ukrainian votes. They are obsessed with a phobia where Russia is concerned. Anybody who fights Stalin is their friend. Apparently they don't want Canada to help Russia, so they voted No in the plebiscite. All this

means of course that the German-Ukrainians in Winnipeg North have been the victims of some very bad leadership.... The plebiscite has shown us that Winnipeg has a large number of potential fifth columnists loose in the North End. Unless steps are taken to counteract the pro-Hitler leadership of these foreign groups, there will be trouble ahead.<sup>19</sup>

Other papers were more circumspect. In a discussion of the Yorkton vote, the Saskatoon *Star-Phoenix* expressed surprise that Ukrainians, who, as the paper put it, "have up to the present time taken the lead in enlisting for active army service," tended to vote no, especially in rural areas. The Saskatchewan paper suggested that the province's "ineffective" educational system, and the farmers' desire to keep their sons on the soil was, in fact, "what it was all about."<sup>20</sup>

The leadership of the Ukrainian organizations, and the UCC in particular, was deeply shocked by the unexpected turn of events. The surprise of the plebiscite results were one thing. But what of the allegations in the general Canadian press? The UCC leaders in Winnipeg immediately drafted a reply to the *Winnipeg Free Press* and a delegation composed of important figures – Kushnir, Sawchuk, Yaremovich and others – went to see the paper's editor, John Dafoe, with a written protest. After ushering the delegation into his office, Dafoe called in the reporter who had written the offending story, and the matter was discussed at length. Dafoe was persuaded to order a partial retraction, and he decided to print the Ukrainian protest.<sup>21</sup>

The UCC protest objected to the tone, the vocabulary and the implications of the *Winnipeg Free Press* article. The document protested against the suggestion that Ukrainian and other minority leaders were pro-Hitler, "loose in the North End," and should be "counteracted." All this, it was stated, reminded the Ukrainian leaders of the internments and other difficulties that had occurred during the 1914-1918 war. The UCC protest argued that in a democratic country there was nothing disloyal about voting no in a free plebiscite and that as far as the Ukrainians were concerned, "this freedom must have been taken at its face value." Moreover, the protest stated, voters from central Europe were confused, first by those (i.e., the CCF) who stressed that conscription of manpower without conscription of wealth is unfair, secondly by those (Meighen and the Conservatives) who claimed the plebiscite was a political manoeuvre, and thirdly by those (probably Liberal MPs) "who cleverly raised the question of confidence as being involved in the plebiscite." Finally, the protest argued that the no vote among former central Europeans was principally caused by the fact that western Canada was largely settled by people who, as the document put it, "have brought over to Canada their intense dislike of conscription which they believed they had left behind in Europe." The plebiscite, in fact, had nothing to do with loyalty:

During the whole course of the war the Ukrainians have acted loyally, and have supported Canada's war effort by large voluntary enlistments. Imputing Nazi sympathies to them is an injustice and an insult. It has caused a great deal of resentment and is not conducive to national unity which is paramount at this critical time of war.<sup>22</sup>

The UCC was not exaggerating. The day after the offending article was printed, there were long lines of angry citizens in front of Empire Drugs in North End Winnipeg; they were there to cancel their subscriptions to the *Winnipeg Free Press*.<sup>23</sup>

It was not only the Ukrainians who were upset with the powerful Winnipeg newspaper. Germans, Poles and Jews were also considerably perturbed by events. The Germans were hardly in any position to defend themselves, but one Jewish newspaper ventured to criticize the *Free Press* attack on the Ukrainians "as a group." "Jews better than any other group can understand the resentment shown by the Ukrainians," read an editorial, "because they have been put frequently in a similar position, and they, too, have burned at the assumption that the group was responsible for the offenses committed by individuals."<sup>24</sup> Léo Lafrenière, the editor of the Winnipeg French-Canadian newspaper *La Liberté et le Patriote*, went much further and even complained to the Censorship Office in Ottawa that for several months already the *Free Press* had been carrying on what it called "a real campaign of denigration against all those who have the misfortune of opposing its ideas." Lafrenière called the April 29 article against the Ukrainians, Germans and others, "a masterpiece of fanaticism of the worst kind." The press censor passed on Lafrenière's complaint to Simpson's Committee on Cooperation and Tracy Philipps informed the censor that the matter had already been noted and examined.<sup>25</sup>

The immediate action of the UCC leaders and others caused the Winnipeg paper to amend its analysis considerably. "The *Free Press* is glad to accept the statements made by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," the retraction began. "It is ready to believe that the Committee's analysis of the reasons for the No vote is more sound than the conclusions originally reached by this newspaper."

The conclusion reached by Dr. Kushnir, Mr. Arsenych, and their associates is that the No vote among their people was not a pro-Hitler vote, but an anti-conscription vote.... Our disquiet is not due to the fact that we believe every No vote in Manitoba was the vote of a fifth columnist. But we do believe that No voters in April, 1942, are the material upon which fifth columnists can work with the greatest success.... It is for this reason that we called attention to the situation as it is, and we repeat that it is an indictment of leadership, making it clear that leadership is not and cannot be confined to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, or to similar committees in other racial groups in Canada.



Thus while partially retracting its allegations of Ukrainian disloyalty to Canada, the *Winnipeg Free Press* continued to censure those who held to a no position.

In a second article, the newspaper repeated and clarified its revised opinion on the causes of the no vote. It argued that not only various community leaders, but also "the general leadership in Canada" lay at fault. At the same time, moreover, the paper praised the many Ukrainians and Poles who were serving in the Canadian armed forces, especially at Hong Kong. However, it did not change its position with regard to German Canadians, concluding once again that "Nazi sympathizers are among them."<sup>26</sup> In this way Dafoe's paper, which had firmly supported Mackenzie King during the first years of the war, was now, it seems, putting at least some of the responsibility for the western no vote at the feet of the federal government itself.

The Conservative-leaning *Winnipeg Tribune* did not let the *Free Press* infelicities escape without comment. It lambasted the Dafoe organ for equating a no vote with support for Hitler. After all, the *Tribune* explained, by *Free Press* logic millions of Canadians, including most of Quebec and a significant number of Anglo-Saxons, would all be senselessly tarred with the same brush. And why go witch-hunting only on the right among Ukrainian nationalists? Unlike the *Tribune*, which had long urged the necessity of conscription, the paper argued, the *Free Press* had agreed publicly with the prime minister that conscription was unnecessary. And this "until it was too late, until the idea had been firmly fixed in many minds that conscription for overseas was unnecessary." The *Tribune* concluded with evident relish:

The *Free Press* should examine its own conscience and decide whether its own editorials over a long period were not a factor in the "no" vote. Our contemporary needs a sedative.... We suggest to our contemporary that, when it has calmed down a trifle, it join with us in urging the Dominion government to begin all over again to "sell" the war and the need for total mobilization to all our people of every origin – Anglo-Saxon as well as French, Ukrainian, and others – beginning with certain backward members of the Ottawa Cabinet.<sup>27</sup>

During the next week, Dafoe did in fact try to undo any injuries to the Ukrainian minority by running a series of articles on its extensive participation in the war effort, but he did not join the Conservative press in its continuing criticism of the prime minister.<sup>28</sup>

The UCC, of course, approved of the more friendly tone at the *Free Press* and kept up a brave front. In private, however, the Ukrainian leadership was devastated. Winnipeg's liberal *Ukrainskyi holos*, which had campaigned for a yes vote as hard as any other Ukrainian newspaper, did not mince words. For *Ukrainskyi holos*, the plebiscite result was "a real catastrophe" which had brought nothing but "shame and

misfortune." The plebiscite was a test of maturity for the Ukrainians in Canada, and the test had been failed.<sup>29</sup> Toronto's conservative monarchist *Ukrainskyi robotnyk*, proud of its support for the military and the British crown, but perhaps nervous because of its former adherence to Skoropadsky in Germany, was even more extreme. The no voters, in its opinion, were just uneducated cowards who wanted to save their own skin: they were the heirs of the dark masses who had sold out their own princes to serve the Tartars, of the lower-class Cossacks who did not appreciate the state-building patriotism of their Hetmans or political leaders, of those who hung out white flags of neutrality while the Bolsheviks seized Kiev. They were "the contemporary rabble."<sup>30</sup>

The reaction of Edmonton's conservative Catholic *Ukrainski visti* was somewhat different. On May 5, the paper announced the results of the plebiscite but made no editorial comment. Instead, it avoided the issue on its editorial page and talked about the war in eastern Ukraine which, it claimed, the whole world was watching: Hitler was grabbing for the oil of the Caucasus region. It was only after a week of reflection upon the issue that *Ukrainski visti* finally took a stand. On May 12, the paper publicly took issue with the "shame and misfortune" editorial which had earlier appeared on the pages of its Orthodox rival, *Ukrainskyi holos*. The Edmonton paper, unlike *Ukrainski holos*, would accept no responsibility for the no vote. Rather, it divided Ukrainian Canadians into disloyal Communists and loyal "others." The paper put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Communists and claimed that Communist activists were present in all ridings registering a large no vote. *Ukrainski visti* pointed out that Dorise Neilson had spoken against conscription in the federal Parliament while William Kardash had spoken against it in the Manitoba legislature. As recently as April 1942, an anonymous pamphlet had been circulated among prairie farmers and this pamphlet attacked the UCC in terms very similar to the attacks found regularly in the Communist paper *Ukrainske zhytтя*, but at the same time urged farmers not to encourage their sons to enlist. The Communists, *Ukrainski visti* concluded, "have fought every [Canadian] government. From the beginning of the war, they agitated against the war effort, but principally against conscription."<sup>31</sup> The paper did not explain how the electors of Vegreville riding, who had two years before elected the Social Crediter Anthony Hlynka to Parliament, were suddenly falling victim to Communist propaganda.

Other explanations were also offered. The militant nationalists of the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* once again came out fighting and declared that the vote was not so much a test of loyalty to Canada as a vote against the government, against its handling of the war effort, against its toleration of discrimination by civil servants, against its refusal to use qualified Ukrainians in places of authority in the military, and against

agricultural policies which were unfavourable to western Canada.<sup>32</sup> In fact, *Novyi shliakh's* bitter complaint about the discriminatory practices of the Canadian government were not uttered in isolation. The Toronto-based, somewhat leftish *Canadian Forum* pointed to Irish, Afrikaner, Indian and French-Canadian reluctance to join in the British war effort and observed that "the non-British peoples who are supposed to 'enjoy' the blessings of the British Empire do not seem to appreciate those blessings as much as we have been taught they did."

They want democracy at home before they begin dying for it abroad.... The large "no" vote was a protest, not against the war, but against the idea of imperialism ...the idea that Canadian armies go abroad only in the interests of British imperialism.... We have been guilty of forms of racial pride that are naturally obstacles to co-operation with other races. There is a close parallel between certain difficulties in Canada and certain others in India.

The *Canadian Forum* concluded its analysis with a plea for more respect for minority rights at home, more devotion to the principles of human liberty and human brotherhood, and a war effort "free from the restricting concepts of race and empire."<sup>33</sup>

While the left-leaning liberals and moderate socialists of the *Canadian Forum* engaged in deep soul-searching about the value of liberty and the nature of the Canadian confederation, Communists in general, and Ukrainian-Canadian Communists in particular, did not waste any time in public self-criticism. In fact, just as the *Winnipeg Free Press* quickly forgot its own long-standing doubts about conscription to cry "fifth columnists," so too did the Ukrainian Communist leaders ignore the twenty-one months that they had condemned the war as an undesirable "imperialist" one, and now placed the full blame for the no vote upon the shoulders of their nationalist opponents. The *Free Press* was correct, wrote Ilya Senkiw in the Communist organ *Ukrainske Zhyttia*; the Ukrainian nationalists do not want Canada to help the Soviet Union and so they voted no. "The leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist organizations," he continued, "understandably not only regard everyone who is fighting against the Soviet Union as a friend, and hate everyone who helps the Soviet Union, but they were and continue to be exponents of fascist ideology and haters of democratic ideas."<sup>34</sup> Similar statements were broadcast over the air waves.<sup>35</sup> In fact, so strong did the Communists feel themselves in the wake the conscription plebiscite that on June 4-6 the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland held a national convention in Winnipeg. The 160 delegates decided to change the name of their organization to the less foreign-sounding Association of Ukrainian Canadians, and they passed a series of resolutions urging fullest possible Ukrainian-Canadian participa-

tion in the war effort. The convention also pledged to fight discrimination and racial hatred, to undertake financial campaigns on behalf of civilian victims in Great Britain and Soviet Ukraine and also to send food, tobacco, cigarettes and medical aid to wounded Red Army soldiers. Finally, the convention took advantage of the plebiscite results and pledged, in the words of a very combative resolution, "to unsparingly expose before the people and the government Canada's internal enemies, the fifth-columnists, Hitler agents, saboteurs and spies operating in the Ukrainian Canadian environment, and foster strong militant morale among Ukrainian Canadians."<sup>36</sup>

The renewed assault on the nationalists began almost immediately. William Kardash, a Ukrainian from Saskatchewan who had been elected in 1941 as a Labour MLA in Manitoba, and who had lost a leg in the Spanish civil war, used the plebiscite results and the atmosphere of suspicion fostered by the *Free Press* articles to attack directly the arch-foes of the Communists, the UNF. Taking out of context statements from Swystun's radio speech of January 15, 1939, which explained why the short-lived German support for Carpatho-Ukraine found favour among Ukrainians, and also taking out of context a supposed *Novy shliakh* editorial of June 29, 1941, which analysed possible Ukrainian reactions to a German conquest of Soviet-held territory, Kardash condemned the UNF as an "openly pro-Nazi" organization whose activities "must be cut short." Kardash was, in fact, arguing that it was the UNF nationalists and not the Labour Temple Communists who should be interned.<sup>37</sup>

The renewed Communist attack upon the nationalist UNF and its associates disconcerted and demoralized the membership of the non-Communist organizations and the UCC leaders definitely felt that an injustice was being done. The non-Communists would gripe and complain to themselves about their red tormentors, but because of the prerequisites of wartime unity imposed upon them by government agents and propaganda, were unable to do so in public. For example, William Burianyk, a prominent USRI leader from Saskatchewan who was a frequent and fierce critic of the UNF, its ideology and its European associations, complained in a private letter of June 3, 1942, to George Simpson in no uncertain terms:

On the one hand we hear the appeals for national unity, and at the same time we see that this Communist scum is being given all the latitude to besmirch, denounce, and publicly cast vile aspersions against individuals and organizations which [are] opposed to Communism. Our people resent this very much and the [Ukrainian Canadian] Committee gets many letters asking for some action to stop these unfair and unfounded denunciations. As you know, our press has been very lenient toward the Communists since the USSR became our war partner, and the moderate attitude

was not practiced for the lack of ammunition against the Communists, but for the sake of national unity. I am afraid that if the powers that be do not give the Communists a pertinent hint that their disruptive tactics will not be tolerated, then our press and our Committee will take up the challenge and then the fat will be in the fire properly.

For his part, Simpson had already urged Burianyk and his associates to exercise caution in their public statements, to refrain from appearing to oppose the Russian war effort, and to stress the UCC's continuous loyalty to Canada. This would, in his opinion, stand in self-evident contrast to the Communists whose position from 1939 to 1941 was already well known and who now shamelessly spoke of "our" Soviet fatherland and "our" Red Army.<sup>38</sup> On June 27, *Novyi shliakh* reported that Professor Watson Kirkconnell had made the same points in a speech delivered at a large UCC concert on June 20 at Toronto's Massey Hall in honour of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian composer, Mykola Lysenko.<sup>39</sup>

The acrimonious dispute between nationalists and Communists did not go very far in explaining the no vote of April 1942. After all, both the pro-Communist Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland on the left and the UNF and the Hetmanites on the right had publicly urged their constituents to vote yes and had sought to avoid the complications that a no vote might bring. The general English-language Canadian press might discuss nationalist hesitations or previous Communist anti-war propaganda, but when it came to serious action, government officials sought answers elsewhere. There was, in fact, no doubt that the government was concerned, because shortly after the results were in, the Department of External Affairs commissioned the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion to ascertain the accuracy of the press reports on voting among Canada's minorities.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, at this same time the UNF leader, Wladimir Kossar, was busy supplying the names of several young men who might qualify as officer material to officials in the Canadian army. Kossar took this action in response to a request from George Simpson of the Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship.<sup>41</sup> Several months later, Tracy Philipps thought it necessary to fully explain the matter of the negative plebiscite vote in a report to the new minister of national war services, General L.R. LaFleche.

Philipps' explanation of Ukrainian voting patterns was a curious mixture of self-criticism and condescension. He began by noting that the "Nationalities Branch," like other parts of the federal bureaucracy, had not promoted any particular position during the plebiscite campaign since this would have meant involvement in partisan party politics. Philipps claimed that previous anti-conscription propaganda had sunk deep into what he called "the jungle of the foreign-born,"

and that this, in part, explained the no vote. "The foreign-born from south and east Europe," he continued, "are slow to grasp French-and-English speaking ideas."

But they are very tenacious of whatever is slowly driven into their heads over a long period. In the brief period which elapsed between the announcement of a plebiscite and the holding of it, there was no pro-conscription propaganda appeal made in the foreign-born "jungle" which could possibly be adequate to effect a *volte-face* or any complete reversal of the old anti-conscription lesson which they had been taught. Practically none of them voted "no" from any spirit of disloyalty to Canada.<sup>42</sup>

In short, Philipps' position seemed to be that if the government really wanted a strong yes vote among the minorities, then the government itself should have taken appropriate actions to secure it.

The conscription crisis of 1942 marked a turning point in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War. The general crisis had been caused by a basic conflict of interest between English- and French-speaking Canadians and at first did not seem to involve Ukrainian and other minority Canadians in any special way. It was expected that English-speaking Canada would vote yes in the plebiscite and that French-speaking Canada would vote no. Since the Ukrainian Canadians lived primarily in English-speaking provinces, it was expected that they would vote in the same manner as their majority-group neighbours. Certainly, the leadership of the Ukrainian political organizations and the Ukrainian-language press favoured a yes vote that would not conflict with the opinion of the majority in the prairie provinces. This was true both of the non-Communist UCC and the pro-Communist Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland.

The plebiscite results, which seemed to indicate a solid no majority, were a real shock to Ukrainian political leaders. The weakness of their ability to mould opinion among Canadians of Ukrainian origin was exposed and a divergence of views from the majority revealed. Certain important western Canadian newspapers immediately interpreted the vote as a measure of loyalty to Canada and concluded that the Ukrainians had failed the test. The leadership of the Ukrainian community was also held responsible.

Both the UCC and the pro-Communist organizations reacted swiftly to these allegations. The Communists agreed with the *Winnipeg Free Press* and other organs of public opinion which blamed the "nationals" for the no vote; the UCC, in turn, blamed the Communists for their previous anti-war propaganda and, in any case, argued that the plebiscite was a free vote that should not be taken as a measure of loyalty to Canada. Moreover, the UCC added, the Ukrainian leadership

was not to be faulted, because it had, indeed, faithfully upheld the yes position and consistently supported a positive vote in the Ukrainian-language press. Government officials, however, seem to have been active in discouraging further allegations and discussion in the press, and, except for Communist activists such as William Kardash, Canadian public figures quickly abandoned further inquiry into the causes of the no vote among the Ukrainian Canadians.

Behind the scenes, of course, the situation was quite different. The federal government was very anxious to unite the country behind the war effort and the plebiscite results came under close bureaucratic scrutiny. Ukrainian Canadians were not censured for voting no, nor were their leaders held to be responsible. Rather, it was argued, if the government wanted to acquire the full confidence of Canadians of Ukrainian origin, then it was necessary that government agencies address themselves more directly to the constituency in question.

## A National Congress of Ukrainian Canadians: Preparations and Aftermath

*Bonum virum natura, non ordo, facit.*

The conscription of the nation's manpower for service overseas was only one point in the program of total war that was being promoted by various parties in 1942. Another point in the program was the relief of the Soviet Union from the pressure of the German armies invading it by opening a second front in western Europe. In fact, shortly after the signing of the British-Soviet agreement of July 1941, the Soviet Union began pressing the British to open such a new front in continental Europe. The British Communist Party organized a massive propaganda campaign and on July 26, sixty thousand Londoners gathered in Trafalgar Square to demand action. A Canadian soldier and veteran of the Spanish civil war, Konstantin Oliynik, was one of the many foreign guests to address the rally.<sup>1</sup>

Canadian Communists carried on a similar campaign at home. In November 1941 they held a great meeting at the Massey Hall. This gathering commemorated the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, but also called for the immediate release of interned Canadian Communists and the opening of a second front in western Europe.<sup>2</sup> Then on May 30-31, 1942, a National Labour Conference in Toronto called for total war and the Manitoba MLA William Kardash demanded the immediate opening of a second front which, in his opinion, was the only guarantee of complete victory. In August, Communists operating in the form of the Dominion Communist-Labour Total War Committee held a conference at Toronto's Royal York Hotel and about the same time published Kardash's address in the form of a pamphlet.<sup>3</sup>

Prime Minister Mackenzie King was in no hurry to commit Canadian troops to dangerous actions that did not directly affect Canadian



interests and for which Canada would get little credit. King and General McNaughton had rejected proposals that a Canadian division or even a brigade join the other Commonwealth units in the British Eighth Army fighting Rommel in north Africa. Yet this refusal to send Canadians to Africa had made Ottawa vulnerable to the British request in 1941 to send two battalions to Hong Kong and in the summer of 1942 to contribute two brigades to a proposed raid on the French coastal town of Dieppe. This raid, launched at the urging of President Roosevelt among others, was in large part a politic response to the continuing Soviet pressure to open a second front in western Europe.<sup>4</sup>

On August 19, 1942, an allied force of approximately six thousand men landed on the beaches of German-occupied Dieppe. The bulk of the force was Canadian, but it included some British and a handful of Americans and Free French. The Canadians from the Second Canadian Division, which had arrived in Britain in December 1940, included Toronto's Royal Regiment of Canada, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, the Essex Scottish from Windsor, Quebec's Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the Toronto Scottish Regiment and the Black Watch of Canada. Western Canadian regiments, which probably contained the largest numbers of Canadians of Ukrainian background, included the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders from Winnipeg, the South Saskatchewan Regiment, the Calgary Tanks and the Calgary Highlanders.

At first, the news releases were all positive and Ukrainian-Canadian papers, like the others, carried the good news: the Allies had invaded France, the Canadian army headed the expedition, German fortifications around Dieppe had been destroyed.<sup>5</sup> Shortly afterward, however, the grim reality began to sink in. Eventually, it became known that the Dieppe raid had been a complete disaster. Murderous fire from well-defended coastal fortifications had stopped the Canadians cold. Of 4,963 who had set out for Dieppe, 907 lay dead and 1,946 remained as prisoners. Several months later, when the government issued official lists of fatal casualties, *Novyi shliakh* counted thirty-eight Ukrainian names, of which seventeen were from Ontario or of unknown origin, with a high proportion from Windsor, twelve were from Manitoba, and nine from Saskatchewan.<sup>6</sup> The Saskatchewan MP, Walter Tucker, counted seven officers of Ukrainian origin who had lost their lives at Dieppe.<sup>7</sup> "The best-known battle of the Canadian Army in the Second World War," writes a prominent Canadian military historian, "would be remembered only as a catastrophe."<sup>8</sup>

The lessons of Dieppe were not quickly forgotten. It was to be some time before the western Allies would launch their major invasion of Nazi-held Europe. In the meantime, the Allied forces in Britain were steadily reinforced and the Canadian garrison stationed there grew. So did the numbers of Canadian servicemen of Ukrainian background. At first, these men had little or no contact with each other

and there seemed to be no special reason why they should. But common social background and shared experiences during youth turned out to be a definite influence upon making friends in a strange land. Friendship and good cheer had a real influence upon morale and these factors played a role in the emergence of a special social service club for Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen of Ukrainian background.

The beginnings were very modest. In late 1941, of the fifteen or so Canadians posted to Ireland and attached to the Royal Air Force, the former USRL activist Corporal Bohdan (Gordon) Panchuk made friends with two other servicemen of Ukrainian background, Steve Kalin and Walter Weslowski. During their tours of the country in their time off the three men discussed the possibility of some kind of service club that would cater to the needs of servicemen like themselves. A few Ukrainians from the Canadian forces had already established contact with the small Ukrainian community in Manchester and the Ukrainian Social Club there readily welcomed their compatriots from Canada. When Panchuk, Kalin and Weslowski managed to get themselves transferred to England, the ground work was laid for the establishment of a new organization to cater to the needs of Canadian servicemen of Ukrainian origin.<sup>9</sup>

The maintenance of good morale provided the pretext for the organization of a service club of this kind in England. The "boys" overseas could frequent the London Beaver Club and many of them could visit English relatives. But the Ukrainian Canadians who had no personal ties in the British Isles were in a peculiar position. Therefore, special arrangements were made to get together for Ukrainian Christmas during the winter of 1942-43. Many years later, Kalin described the logic of the idea thus:

In Canada, the boys were getting special leave for January 7, Ukrainian Christmas, but no such arrangement was made by the Canadian military authorities for those [who were] overseas....So the fellows decided to make their own arrangements....It is true there was the Beaver Club, the YMCA, and the Sally Anne that did a most wonderful job for which we were all more than grateful. But on the other hand, it was also true that while those Canadians who were descended from the English, Scottish, or the Irish folk had their kin to take the place of that "leave" at home, our boys were entirely dependent on the service clubs....We realized that "the Empire is our country and Canada our home," and we were proud of it. However, while in Canada all Canadians had made an equal sacrifice, in the United Kingdom it wasn't so.<sup>10</sup>

Kalin, Panchuk and some others contacted all the Ukrainian servicemen that they knew and arranged for a meeting to be held on January 7, 1943, at the pub in Manchester that served as the centre

of the Ukrainian Social Club. (The pub was owned by a Ukrainian family.) Some twenty-three Ukrainian-Canadian servicemen, mostly from the junior ranks, attended and organized what they called the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association (UCSA). The men elected Corporal Panchuk as president and Michael Turansky, who was a UNF supporter from Saskatoon, as vice president. Kalin and Weslowski were also elected to the executive and it was determined that the UCSA would meet again at Easter.<sup>11</sup>

On May 2, 1943, the second meeting of the new organization was held at the Manchester social club. This time, some seventy-five servicemen attended. Thereafter, the association grew so quickly that by the summer of 1943 a young CWAC from Calgary, Helen Kozicky, was given the job of finding a suitable location for club facilities in London. By December of 1943, a five-storey building in Paddington was rented and Panchuk was writing to quartermaster stores to introduce another CWAC, Corporal Ann Crapleve, who had taken over responsibility for the practical organization of the London club, and in order to get bunks, reading lamps, tables, chairs and other basic furnishings for the new UCSA headquarters.<sup>12</sup>

Panchuk, Crapleve, Ann Cherniawski, Olga Pawluk, John Yuzyk and a handful of others became central figures in the UCSA. Later on, professionals like Frank Martiniuk and Peter Smylski joined the organization. Panchuk, in particular, acquired a very high profile. He produced a mimeographed newsletter, chaired meetings, suggested new activities and repeatedly approached the Canadian military authorities for advice and official recognition. On October 12, 1943, headquarters replied that "any official action supporting the idea that Canadian Forces be broken up into groups would not be in the best interests of the Services or of the members themselves."<sup>13</sup> Ukrainians, of course, were at that time treated with considerable suspicion by British authorities and Panchuk often felt that he was being watched or followed on his trips to Manchester and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian servicemen cautiously but doggedly persisted in their efforts and asked the Ukrainians in Canada, in particular the UCC, to support their action. The UCC responded and supported the UCSA with financial grants and with care packages that included everything from cigarettes and chocolate to Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers and books about Ukrainian affairs by public figures like George Simpson.<sup>14</sup>

The UCSA members felt it their special duty to visit the graves of their fallen comrades and to visit Canadian soldiers of Ukrainian origin who were sick, wounded, or hospitalized. On occasion, however, this led to embarrassing situations, as, for example, when Steve Kalin visited a hospital to see and recruit into the UCSA a fellow with a Ukrainian-sounding name who turned out to be a full-blooded Canadian Indian.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, recruitments continued, and the UCC in Canada was informed of the progress of the club.

In spite of the contact with the UCC, it was extremely important that the UCSA remain as apolitical as possible. Writing many years later, Bohdan Panchuk stressed the non-political origins of the club and noted the fact that sons and daughters of prominent UNF nationalists worked together in the UCSA in complete harmony with USRI members or Hetman supporters. Panchuk noted the participation of several former members of the pro-Communist ULFTA, in particular the former ULFTA "leftist" from Winnipeg, Andrij Nykoluk, who was very active in the club and later on, when the Allies invaded Italy, seems to have been, in Panchuk's own words, "a key organizer of our first Rome Get-Together."<sup>16</sup>

Youth and the camaraderie of men and women in Canadian military uniforms saved the UCSA from the worst political battles that engaged their elders back in Canada. But political questions could not be completely ignored. A few Ukrainians from the Polish forces stationed in England (for example, the contract officer George Salsky) frequented the club, as did the British residents Danylo Skoropadsky and his colleague Vladimir de Korostovetz. Inevitably, British and Polish intelligence took an interest in UCSA affairs and this kind of surveillance was occasionally noticed by the members.<sup>17</sup> Also, the UNF Dominion Executive wrote privately to its former agent, now Sergeant Steven Davidovich, asking him to visit the UCSA and give his opinion about the club.<sup>18</sup> In general, however, strong political support from Ukrainians in Canada, the superiority of Ukraine-related RCMP intelligence over that of British and other intelligence services and, most of all, the innocuous nature of the club's wartime activities saved the UCSA from too close an involvement in political questions and the problems that such involvement entailed.

This was not the case of Ukrainian organizations back in Canada. After 1941 Communists in Canada and in the United States stepped up their activities in ways that were designed to have a direct effect upon non-Communist Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other Slavic organizations in the West. The directive came from Moscow itself. Less than two months after the German attack on the USSR a Pan-Slav committee was formed in the Soviet capital and held its first meeting in August 1941. The principal theme of the meeting was Pan-Slavic unity in the fight against the common German enemy. On April 4 and 5, 1942, Dmitri Shostakovich and Alexei Tolstoy spoke at a second Slav meeting. Shostakovich declared: "I am proud to be a Russian, I boast of being a Slav.... May all the spiritual forces, all the intellectuals of the glorious family of the Slavonic nations fearlessly fulfill the great mission entrusted to them by history!" In November Stalin, who had so recently praised the lasting friendship of Germany and the Soviet Union, publicly recognized that Hitler was out to destroy all the Slavic peoples; in January 1943, a monthly periodical *Slaviane* was founded in Moscow.<sup>19</sup>

The campaign was quickly carried over to the West. It was designed to appeal to the racial solidarity of citizens of Slav descent, somewhat as Hitler had done with regard to the Germans. At the suggestions of Soviet representatives, a great American Slav congress took place in Detroit on April 25 and 26, 1942, and the sponsors declared their intention of organizing ten million Americans of Slav descent in support of the common American-Russian struggle against Hitler. In June telegrams appealing to Ukrainian national sentiment were transmitted from Moscow to various non-Communist Ukrainian newspapers in Canada. Finally, on May 25, 1944, a congress of Slavonic nations met in London under the chairmanship of the famous English Slavist and champion of the smaller Slavic peoples, R.W. Seton-Watson.<sup>20</sup>

The Pan-Slav campaign almost certainly had some effect upon the rank and file of some of the non-Communist Ukrainian organizations in Canada. The exact influence, however, is difficult to determine. From 1943 onward more moderate Ukrainian-Canadian organizations such as the USRL experienced considerable internal tension and some members joined in the Aid to Russia Fund and other causes supported by the Communists. Even the UNF, which was almost completely impregnable to Communist propaganda, lost one of its most important leaders. However, the UCC leadership remained largely indifferent to Pan-Slavic appeals and the degree to which any disarray might have been caused by the Pan-Slav campaign (or the very limited rehabilitation of Ukrainian national sentiment in the USSR for that matter) and the degree to which it was due to other factors, remains unclear.<sup>21</sup>

Opinion was divided in government circles. On the one hand, Tracy Philipps and, most probably, other members of the Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship were critical of the new Soviet propaganda campaign. Philipps in particular recognized the foreign origins of the movement, thought it retarded rather than promoted the Canadianization process, and speculated (in this case rather speciously) that in the event of a Soviet collapse before the Nazi onslaught, the Pan-Slav movement would turn against the "Anglo-Saxon capitalist democracies" and possibly spell defeat for the Allies, since Slav labour was, in his opinion, a key element in North American war industries.<sup>22</sup>


Philipps' analysis did not carry the day. Soviet prestige was on the rise almost everywhere and government circles were not exempt from the trend. The Department of External Affairs, in particular, was most solicitous in desiring smooth relations with the new Soviet ally. Moreover, it was argued, if Slavic unity would help Canadians of east European origin to see that they had a common interest in the defeat of German aspirations, then, in the words of one External Affairs memo, "this feeling should be utilized and guided."<sup>23</sup>

For a while Philipps continued to state the case against the Pan-Slav movement. During a visit to Washington he even ventured to suggest

to the State Department that the Canadian government did not favour the Pan-Slav movement and neither should the American government. Of course, this extra-curricular activity by an employee of the Department of National War Services only aroused the further ire of External Affairs officials, who seem to have demanded the resignation of Philipps and a reorganization of the Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship. Moreover, these events happened to coincide with a Communist press campaign against Philipps and Kaye (Kysilewsky) which took in both the prestigious *New Republic* and the *Globe and Mail*. As a result, the influence of Philipps and Kaye was considerably reduced and for many months afterward the two men were targets of unfriendly bureaucrats determined to abolish, or at least reform, the Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship.<sup>24</sup> On May 17, 1943, L.D. Wilgress, the Canadian minister to the Soviet Union, who was living in the Soviet wartime capital of Kuibyshev, informed Ottawa that "it is essential that Tracy Philipps should cease to have any official connection with the Canadian government, and in this connection, it is important that he should be sent back to the UK where he can do less harm."<sup>25</sup> The bureaucratic struggle only ended in March 1944, when Philipps was persuaded to resign his position as acting head of the Nationalities Branch and take a job with a UN agency and Robert England was put in charge of reorganizing the Branch.

Philipps was not, however, without defenders. As a university professor and not a civil servant, Watson Kirkconnell was free to speak out against what he called "vicious and unprincipled" Communist propaganda. On February 1, 1943, Kirkconnell delivered an ingenious speech before Toronto's influential Canadian Club in which he distinguished between loyal Canadian minority groups and the Communist subversives. In *Our Communists and the New Canadians* Kirkconnell questioned the Communists' loyalty to Canada and accused them of spreading Pan-Slavism for their own foreign-based ends, of answering only to Moscow, and of being "robots under remote control." He accused R.A. Davies of exploiting his position on the Writers' War Council to spread Communist propaganda, and he defended Philipps, Kaye and their committee as being the true promoters of Canadian unity and the "Canadianization" process.<sup>26</sup>

The UCC and its member organizations also responded to the intensified Communist propaganda campaign that followed the plebiscite of 1942. The June 1942 national convention of the Association of Ukrainian Canadians and the many Communist-sponsored rallies and meetings that followed convinced many of the non-Communist leaders that a similar national congress of the non-Communist organizations would be a good idea. The most anti-Communist of the UCC leaders seem to have been the strongest supporters of the congress idea. Men like Wasyl Kushnir of the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Cath-



Above: Members of the UNT's youth Flying School pose before their plane in Oshawa, Ontario, 1938-39. Left: King George VI shakes hands with the Ukrainian VC, Philip Konowal, at Ottawa during the royal tour of 1939.





Top: The Ukrainian MP Anthony Hlynka (centre left in dark coat), towers over friends and supporters during the height of the war.



Left: Myroslaw Stechishin, fiery editor of Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* which, until November 1940, repeatedly attacked the UNF for its alleged pro-German orientation. Right: Wladimir Kossar, the leader of the UNF who visited Europe in 1939 and steered his right-wing nationalist organization onto an unequivocally pro-British path.



OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS  
No. C.3

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# ВІЙНА — ТА УКРАЇНСЬКІ КАНАДІЙЦІ

НАПИСАВ  
ВАТСОН КІРККОННЕЛЛ

Слобідно Переклав  
О. ІВАХ

TORONTO  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
1940

Title page of Watson Kirkconnell's propaganda tract entitled *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War*, which he wrote as a plea for wartime unity.



# Вибухла Російсько-Німецька Війна

MINISTRO DA SAÚDE: RUI PAIVA  
 MINISTRO DA EDUCAÇÃO: PAULO FREIRE

### Author's Note



### Spacemagic Crating

### Polysynaptic Erection



University of Illinois at Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois



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### Using Social Networks to Promote Health

1980-1981, 1982-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1990-1991, 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, 2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2022-2023, 2024-2025, 2026-2027, 2028-2029, 2030-2031, 2032-2033, 2034-2035, 2036-2037, 2038-2039, 2040-2041, 2042-2043, 2044-2045, 2046-2047, 2048-2049, 2050-2051, 2052-2053, 2054-2055, 2056-2057, 2058-2059, 2060-2061, 2062-2063, 2064-2065, 2066-2067, 2068-2069, 2070-2071, 2072-2073, 2074-2075, 2076-2077, 2078-2079, 2080-2081, 2082-2083, 2084-2085, 2086-2087, 2088-2089, 2090-2091, 2092-2093, 2094-2095, 2096-2097, 2098-2099, 2100-2101, 2102-2103, 2104-2105, 2106-2107, 2108-2109, 2110-2111, 2112-2113, 2114-2115, 2116-2117, 2118-2119, 2120-2121, 2122-2123, 2124-2125, 2126-2127, 2128-2129, 2130-2131, 2132-2133, 2134-2135, 2136-2137, 2138-2139, 2140-2141, 2142-2143, 2144-2145, 2146-2147, 2148-2149, 2150-2151, 2152-2153, 2154-2155, 2156-2157, 2158-2159, 2160-2161, 2162-2163, 2164-2165, 2166-2167, 2168-2169, 2170-2171, 2172-2173, 2174-2175, 2176-2177, 2178-2179, 2180-2181, 2182-2183, 2184-2185, 2186-2187, 2188-2189, 2190-2191, 2192-2193, 2194-2195, 2196-2197, 2198-2199, 2200-2201, 2202-2203, 2204-2205, 2206-2207, 2208-2209, 2210-2211, 2212-2213, 2214-2215, 2216-2217, 2218-2219, 2220-2221, 2222-2223, 2224-2225, 2226-2227, 2228-2229, 2230-2231, 2232-2233, 2234-2235, 2236-2237, 2238-2239, 2240-2241, 2242-2243, 2244-2245, 2246-2247, 2248-2249, 2250-2251, 2252-2253, 2254-2255, 2256-2257, 2258-2259, 2260-2261, 2262-2263, 2264-2265, 2266-2267, 2268-2269, 2270-2271, 2272-2273, 2274-2275, 2276-2277, 2278-2279, 2280-2281, 2282-2283, 2284-2285, 2286-2287, 2288-2289, 2290-2291, 2292-2293, 2294-2295, 2296-2297, 2298-2299, 2300-2301, 2302-2303, 2304-2305, 2306-2307, 2308-2309, 2310-2311, 2312-2313, 2314-2315, 2316-2317, 2318-2319, 2320-2321, 2322-2323, 2324-2325, 2326-2327, 2328-2329, 2330-2331, 2332-2333, 2334-2335, 2336-2337, 2338-2339, 2340-2341, 2342-2343, 2344-2345, 2346-2347, 2348-2349, 2350-2351, 2352-2353, 2354-2355, 2356-2357, 2358-2359, 2360-2361, 2362-2363, 2364-2365, 2366-2367, 2368-2369, 2370-2371, 2372-2373, 2374-2375, 2376-2377, 2378-2379, 2380-2381, 2382-2383, 2384-2385, 2386-2387, 2388-2389, 2390-2391, 2392-2393, 2394-2395, 2396-2397, 2398-2399, 2400-2401, 2402-2403, 2404-2405, 2406-2407, 2408-2409, 2410-2411, 2412-2413, 2414-2415, 2416-2417, 2418-2419, 2420-2421, 2422-2423, 2424-2425, 2426-2427, 2428-2429, 2430-2431, 2432-2433, 2434-2435, 2436-2437, 2438-2439, 2440-2441, 2442-2443, 2444-2445, 2446-2447, 2448-2449, 2450-2451, 2452-2453, 2454-2455, 2456-2457, 2458-2459, 2460-2461, 2462-2463, 2464-2465, 2466-2467, 2468-2469, 2470-2471, 2472-2473, 2474-2475, 2476-2477, 2478-2479, 2480-2481, 2482-2483, 2484-2485, 2486-2487, 2488-2489, 2490-2491, 2492-2493, 2494-2495, 2496-2497, 2498-2499, 2500-2501, 2502-2503, 2504-2505, 2506-2507, 2508-2509, 2510-2511, 2512-2513, 2514-2515, 2516-2517, 2518-2519, 2520-2521, 2522-2523, 2524-2525, 2526-2527, 2528-2529, 2530-2531, 2532-2533, 2534-2535, 2536-2537, 2538-2539, 2540-2541, 2542-2543, 2544-2545, 2546-2547, 2548-2549, 2550-2551, 2552-2553, 2554-2555, 2556-2557, 2558-2559, 2560-2561, 2562-2563, 2564-2565, 2566-2567, 2568-2569, 2570-2571, 2572-2573, 2574-2575, 2576-2577, 2578-2579, 2580-2581, 2582-2583, 2584-2585, 2586-2587, 2588-2589, 2590-2591, 2592-2593, 2594-2595, 2596-2597, 2598-2599, 2600-2601, 2602-2603, 2604-2605, 2606-2607, 2608-2609, 2610-2611, 2612-2613, 2614-2615, 2616-2617, 2618-2619, 2620-2621, 2622-2623, 2624-2625, 2626-2627, 2628-2629, 2630-2631, 2632-2633, 2634-2635, 2636-2637, 2638-2639, 2640-2641, 2642-2643, 2644-2645, 2646-2647, 2648-2649, 2650-2651, 2652-2653, 2654-2655, 2656-2657, 2658-2659, 2660-2661, 2662-2663, 2664-2665, 2666-2667, 2668-2669, 2670-2671, 2672-2673, 2674-2675, 2676-2677, 2678-2679, 2680-2681, 2682-2683, 2684-2685, 2686-2687, 2688-2689, 2690-2691, 2692-2693, 2694-2695, 2696-2697, 2698-2699, 2700-2701, 2702-2703, 2704-2705, 2706-2707, 2708-2709, 2710-2711, 2712-2713, 2714-2715, 2716-2717, 2718-2719, 2720-2721, 2722-2723,

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**Spring/Summer 2011**

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the 100 largest U.S. corporations, and  
most Americans are concerned. It is  
important, therefore, to determine the  
specific questions in the case before  
us, and to provide answers that are  
indefinite and uncertain. We are  
convinced that the company should  
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ADRIAN J. JARVIS  
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the American people would  
be more likely to accept the  
idea of a new treaty with  
the Soviet Union. The  
idea of a new treaty with  
the Soviet Union is a  
very important one. It  
is a very important one.

**Tigra and Karna**

«...che, in un'occasione, si è visto un gatto che mangiava un cane...»

[illegible]

Suppose that a group of individuals with a certain characteristic (say, a certain blood type) are more likely to be infected by a disease than those without the characteristic. This is a correlation, but it does not imply that the characteristic causes the disease. There may be a third factor, such as a common environment, that causes both the characteristic and the disease.

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Title page of Winnipeg's *Kanadiskiyi farmer*, June 25, 1941, announcing Hitler's surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Portraits of Hitler, Stalin, Molotov and Marshal Tymoshenko grace the page. The banners read: "A Russian-German War has broken out!" "Britain promises to help the Soviets!"



## Чи ВИ Будете ПРАЦЮВАТИ! ЩАДИТИ! І ПОЗИЧАТИ! для СВОБОДИ? Ваші свободи і моє!

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### ЯК КУПУВАТИ

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Government advertising from *Novyi shliakh* urging Ukrainian Canadians to buy Victory Bonds. The caption reads: "Will you work, save, and lend for liberty? For your freedom and mine?"




Professor George Simpson as he appeared while he headed the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship.



Left: Mike Gregorash, one of the first Canadian soldiers to enter Rome.  
Right: A Canadian soldier, Nick Rennick, in basic training at Brandon, Manitoba, 1943.



Above: UCSA members honour their dead in England after the Blitz.



Members of the U.S.A. gather before their headquarters in London, 1945.



Final Get-Together of the UCSA in London, November 10-11, 1945, and cover of Souvenir newsletter issued for the occasion.

# U.C.S.A. Newsletter Supplement



**Souvenir Issue**

Published by  
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LONDON — ENGLAND

NOVEMBER, 1945



olics (BUC), Kossar of the UNF, Datzkiw, who was the former Hetmanite editor of *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, and J.W. Arsenych of the USRL wished to publicize Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the Canadian war effort and raise the issue of the Ukrainian question in Europe. Initially, the volatile UNF leader, Wasyl Swystun, was also a strong supporter of this position.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, the idea of a national congress which might be critical of the Soviet ally was definitely not well received in government circles. Once again, External Affairs was the department most opposed to such a congress, and when Professor Simpson informed the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, that it would be postponed, the latter expressed relief at the decision.<sup>28</sup>

The UCC did not, however, give up the idea of a congress. During the last months of 1942 the mood was relatively optimistic; on October 15 Arsenych was even reminding Simpson of UCC plans to have, as he put it, "a capable and reliable person of Ukrainian background" included as a member of the Canadian diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> Of course, given the position of Wilgress and other External Affairs officials, such a project was quite unrealistic.

Word slowly filtered back to the UCC that discussion of Ukrainian independence or the Ukrainian question in Europe was not welcome news in Ottawa and that Ukrainian Canadians should concentrate their attention upon more purely Canadian subjects. Simpson, it seems, was important in getting this message across. As a result, the UCC executive reconsidered the kind of congress that it would like to have and after lengthy debate, on October 27, chose to go ahead and hold a congress between February 15 and March 15, 1943, and limit the program to purely Canadian issues. Only one member of the executive held out for a full discussion of the Ukrainian question in Europe and it was hoped that he would soon change his mind.<sup>30</sup>

The UNF was most public in its preparations for the upcoming UCC congress. In mid-January 1943 it held its annual convention – several months early – and there was considerable discussion of the congress. Kossar was re-elected president and was presented with a cheque for \$5,000. The Communist campaign for the restoration of the ULFTA halls was criticized and Kossar in particular denounced Communist appeals that were based on loyalties to, as he put it, "leaders who live in distant lands and issue orders and directions over which [people here] have no control." Hlynka, M. Pohorecky, Paul Macenko and many others spoke and resolutions were passed supporting the war effort, British democracy, Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter and political freedom for the Ukrainian nation.<sup>31</sup>

Behind the scenes, of course, the RCMP monitored the UNF convention. Agents in the field reported that the mood of the convention was positive, and that it had been held early to prepare UNF members

for the forthcoming UCC congress. When the Under-Secretary for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, asked where the rather impecunious UNF had got \$5,000 for Kossar and what it was for, RCMP Commissioner Wood replied that the war had brought many UNF members to well-paying industrial jobs in the east and that the UNF was becoming more wealthy; he also wrote that the \$5,000 was probably from the "Liberation Fund" which had previously been used to support Ukrainian nationalists in Europe, and that it was meant to support Kossar as a full-time organizer in Winnipeg and compensate him for the loss of his university position in Saskatoon.<sup>32</sup> In actual fact, Mykhailo Sharik and some colleagues had made a special secret collection among UNF members in northern Ontario and in Quebec to raise the money for Kossar.<sup>33</sup>

One of the resolutions passed at the UNF convention concerned the publication of literature promoting the nationalist cause and explaining the history of the UNF and its affiliated organizations. In March the first pamphlet appeared. *A Program and a Record* described the history of the UNF, its educational and political work, the Radio-Telegraphy School, the Flying School in Oshawa, and the co-operatives, credit unions and benevolent associations promoted by the organization. The pamphlet emphasized the Canadian elements in the UNF program and explained its emergence as a result of the Great Depression and the terrible drought that had hit the prairies during the 1930s. Loyalty to Canada and to the British Empire was a main theme and Communist ferment a main target of criticism. The UNF's loyalty to Canada during the first years of the war was specifically held up in contrast to the loyalties of the Communists, which were said to lie abroad. The pamphlet did not hide the UNF's commitment to the establishment of "a free Ukraine" in Europe, but rather put this cause within a Canadian context; it specifically denied any UNF subservience to similar organizations abroad and revealed a somewhat increased appreciation of the value of "democratic institutions" among its members.<sup>34</sup>

The question of Ukrainian independence was overshadowed by local Canadian themes in *A Program and a Record* and was to be avoided on the floor of the upcoming congress, but it was to be addressed directly elsewhere. On March 30, 1943, the UCC presented the prime minister with a memorandum on the Ukrainian question. The document was submitted to him by Hlynka and it reiterated Ukrainian support for the war effort. At the same time, the memorandum urged the government to consider the justice of the Ukrainian claims to national unity, self-determination and equal treatment according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had been publicly proclaimed by the Allies.<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet response was swift and severe. The USSR press immediately began a propaganda campaign against what it considered to

be "Ukrainian fascism in Canada" and no one less a figure than A.A. Bohomolets, the president of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (a medical researcher by profession), was induced to write a pamphlet against what he called the "Ukraino-German Nationalists in Canada." M.T. Rylsky, the respected Soviet-Ukrainian poet, was also persuaded to criticize his compatriots in Canada. Thereafter, the senior minister of the Soviet legation in Ottawa made a personal appearance at the External Affairs Department to protest against the position taken by the UCC. The Soviet representative again accused the UCC of being pro-fascist and said that he failed to understand why Canadian wartime censors allowed the Ukrainian newspapers to publish articles which advocated breaking up the territories of an ally. Of course, the Communist press in Canada quickly launched a vociferous press campaign similar to the one being carried on in the Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup>

On another level, the Canadian press in general questioned the validity of the UCC memorandum. General von Paulus and the surrounded 6th Germany Army had just surrendered at Stalingrad and enthusiasm for the Soviet ally was at its height. Thus the *Windsor Star*, the *Vancouver News Herald*, the *Toronto Star* and even *Saturday Night* magazine all published articles filled with admiration for the recent Soviet victors and critical of the UCC and its memorandum.<sup>37</sup>

Government as well as the public was concerned. Of all Canadian officialdom, the Canadian minister to the USSR, L.D. Wilgress was probably most at odds with the UCC memorandum. He was a first-hand witness of the Soviet press campaign against the UCC and was inclined to accept much of its content. In consequence, he informed Ottawa of the uproar in the Soviet press and urged his superiors not to accept as truth the assertions of the UCC memorandum. Wilgress charged that Ukrainian claims against the Poles were merely a cover for their basically anti-Soviet position; in his opinion the Ukrainians were really working closely with the Poles against the Soviets and, as regards the war in eastern Europe, they could be said to be "pro-German," because they were hoping that first Germany would defeat the Soviet Union, and then afterwards the western allies would defeat Germany. Wilgress believed that the Atlantic Charter was being used variously to promote Russian, Polish and Ukrainian territorial claims and concluded: "It is my hope that the peaceful atmosphere of Ottawa [where the allied leaders are shortly to meet] may permit the drafting of a statement of war aims less likely to be used to promote disunity than the document drafted on the stormy waters of the Atlantic."<sup>38</sup>

In Ottawa, Norman Robertson also felt the influence of the Soviet campaign against the UCC. He was concerned that the upcoming UCC congress might complicate relations with the Soviet ally. Nevertheless, he was better informed as to the history of Ukrainian organizations

in Canada than was Wilgress. On May 28, he wrote a detailed outline of the history of the UCC and its member organizations for the use of the Canadian diplomat in Russia. In this letter to Wilgress, Robertson even defended the UNF leader, Wladimir Kossar, saying he gave the impression of a reasonable man when he had met with Skelton in Ottawa in 1939.<sup>39</sup>

The government was taking no chances, however; during May 1943 RCMP surveillance of Ukrainian Canadians and their organizations seems to have been stepped up. A detailed report was drawn up concerning Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Toronto and Kossar himself was asked to make a statement concerning a long-standing rumour that during his 1939 visit to Europe with his American counterpart, Professor Granovsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, he had sent Hitler a golden watch as a token of the esteem in which the German leader was held by Ukrainian Canadians. In his reply to RCMP Corporal M.V. Nolan, Kossar detailed the major stops of his European trip, including his visits to British Foreign Office officials in London and to British embassies on the continent, and explained the origin of the watch story which, he stated, had been started by a Communist activist in Timmins, Ontario, where the local UNF had purchased a watch as a Christmas present for its national leader. In 1939 the local UNF had considered suing the man and had only dropped the case because its legal counsel advised that further publicity would probably do more harm than good, and that the Communist activist was penniless anyway.<sup>40</sup>

About this same time, Norman Robertson asked the RCMP about the Ukrainian nationalist General Sikewich, who was a frequent speaker at Ukrainian political meetings and was scheduled to speak at the forthcoming UCC congress; Commissioner Wood replied that Sikewich was already over seventy years old and had difficulty travelling any distance from Toronto. Wood concluded:

General Sikewich is loyal and harbours no pro-German sentiments. Not being financially well-off, his lecture tours have from a monetary standpoint, given him some returns. His speeches urge close collaboration with the Allies by Ukrainians and he expresses the confidence that the war will be won by the Allies. He continues to be a strong anti-Communist.<sup>41</sup>

By 1943, it seems, RCMP investigations into Ukrainian nationalist activities in Canada were turning up very little that could be deemed subversive.

In spite of these assurances of UCC loyalty, senior government officials still desired smooth relations with the Soviet Union and therefore tried to distance themselves from the upcoming congress. On the one hand, it was thought that Communist opinion might be partly placated

by the return of the seized ULFTA Halls. Norman Robertson in particular believed that the recent dissolution of the revolutionary Moscow-based Comintern afforded a convenient pretext for such a move.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, when the UCC requested the courtesy of the presence of a government minister at its congress, Prime Minister King and his colleagues responded negatively. On June 14 King's secretary, H. Henry, bluntly informed Arsenych that since Parliament was still in session, "absences of Cabinet Ministers from the capital are very difficult to arrange. Mr. King accordingly is not in a position to designate a representative of the government to attend the congress."<sup>43</sup>

There were other difficulties. The interminable squabbles between the USRL and the UNF continued. The USRL was badly divided on whether a congress to discuss the Ukrainian question was a good idea in the first place; USRL members were inclined to believe that the UNF was in control of the UCC. Moreover, another disagreement concerned participation in the Aid to Russia Fund to which the UNF was adamantly opposed; on the very eve of the congress the Catholic leader Wasyl Kushnir, who was allied with the UNF, openly clashed with Arsenych over this issue and the Communists did not fail to make use of the incident in their propaganda.<sup>44</sup> Thereafter Wasyl Swystun suddenly announced that he was quitting the UNF and leaving the UCC. Rumours were soon circulating that Swystun was about to go over to the Communists. After being pursued by a *Winnipeg Free Press* reporter for more than a week, Swystun finally declared that he had left the UNF and the UCC as a protest against the refusal of the member organizations to cancel their congress. Swystun explained that the congress could be expected to discuss the Ukrainian question in Europe and he concluded: "In view of the present international situation and public opinion in Canada, I think such a meeting would be most inopportune and might do more harm than good."<sup>45</sup>

Behind the scenes, RCMP agents reported that international politics had little to do with Swystun's defection. Rather, his departure was explained as a consequence of Kossar's move from Saskatoon to Winnipeg. Kossar was now the paid full-time UNF leader and RCMP agents heard it said that Winnipeg had proved too small a territory to peacefully hold two men of such strong character.<sup>46</sup>

The defection of Swystun did not halt the preparations for the congress. In addition to the USRL and the UNF, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC), the United Hetman Organization (UHO), and Danylo Lobay's Ukrainian Workers' League all took part in working out plans for the congress. General UCC principles were to provide the guideposts. These were, first, support for the Canadian war effort, and secondly, discussion of "the problems facing Ukrainians both in Canada and in Europe." The three-day event was fully advertised in the non-Communist press and hundreds of delegates were expected

to meet at the Royal Alexandra Hotel in Winnipeg from June 22 to 24, 1943. UCC President Kushnir was to deliver the keynote address and Professor George Simpson was advertised as a major guest speaker. In a final note to Simpson in Saskatoon before the gathering, Watson Kirkconnell concluded: "I shall see you at Philippi."<sup>47</sup>

On June 24 over six hundred delegates arrived from across the country to hear Kushnir's opening address, which again pledged Ukrainian-Canadian support for the cause of the United Nations and set the question of an independent Ukraine safely within the context of the Atlantic Charter. Kossar talked about Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the Canadian war effort and dwelt upon the question of enlistments. He repeated the 1940 story about high Saskatchewan enlistments and quoting a *Winnipeg Free Press* article of June 2, 1943, claimed that thirty to forty thousand young Ukrainians had already joined up. Thirty-eight had been killed and sixty-six captured at Hong Kong; two captains and five lieutenants had fallen at Dieppe, and in total, "several hundreds of men" had already been sacrificed even though the Canadian forces had not yet been engaged in any major land battles. Kossar then discussed the Victory Loan campaign, Red Cross work, and other service operations and listed numerous examples of outstanding Ukrainian contributions.<sup>48</sup>

In the following days other speakers reiterated some of the points made by Kushnir and Kossar; Simpson, C. Andrusyshen of *Kanadiyskyi farmer*, and others stressed purely Canadian themes and most other speakers again put the Ukrainian question safely within the context of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>49</sup>

There were exceptions, however, and these exceptions proved to be the most stimulating and most popular part of the congress proceedings. On the very first day, for example, Watson Kirkconnell stunned the audience with a massive two-hour speech denouncing in the most colourful terms both fascism and communism and eloquently defending the record of the UCC and the Ottawa Committee in Cooperation in Citizenship. But then in the middle of his address, Kirkconnell inserted a surprise plea for Polish-Ukrainian entente and mentioned Polish plans for "a federation of free areas in Europe, west of the Soviets." When Kirkconnell had finished, the chairman read a series of greetings to the congress from various Polish-Canadian organizations. Caught somewhat off-guard, the UCC leaders were hesitant and non-committal in their response.<sup>50</sup>

There were other highlights. General Sikewich and Anthony Hlynka both delivered strongly patriotic and anti-Soviet addresses and roused the audience to especially enthusiastic applause. Hlynka's remarks occasionally overstepped the themes set out by the UCC executive beforehand, while Sikewich climaxed his speech with the claim that neither the Soviet, nor the Polish or the Czech legations in Ottawa

were real representatives of the Ukrainian people; he reserved this honour for the UCC. "The UCC is our ambassador!" he exclaimed.<sup>51</sup>

While the delegates shouted their approval, an RCMP agent noted these statements and described the reaction of the better-informed UCC leaders who had beforehand tried their best to "Canadianize" the congress addresses: Andrusyshyn, it was reported, was "disgusted," Simpson "disappointed," and Kushnir "embarrassed." But in spite of these infelicities, the RCMP agent reported that "...Professor Simpson remarked that he was conscious of the friction between the UNF and the Self Reliance League [USRL], as well as of the extremist nature of the UNF and the Hetman groups. However he thought that the UCC serves as a stabilizing force which holds the extremist organizations belonging to it in check."<sup>52</sup> In general, it seems, the "First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada" served its primary purpose and inspired the rank and file of the non-Communist organizations with a renewed sense of purpose and a renewed enthusiasm for the goals enunciated by their leaders. The nationalists and other non-Communists had finally spoken.<sup>53</sup>

The success of the UCC congress frankly overshadowed the parallel activities of the Communists who had taken the trouble to organize rallies and meetings in direct competition with the UCC congress. G. Tounkin, a Soviet legation councillor, and Ivan Volenko, a Soviet press attaché, had been invited to Winnipeg and were, in fact, staying at the Royal Alexandra Hotel at the very time of the UCC congress. R.A. Davies was also in Winnipeg and busy issuing news releases denouncing what he called "pro-Fascist" and pro-German "elements" and linking them to UCC and nationalist support for a sovereign Ukrainian state in Europe. At the principal Communist rally, the veteran Ukrainian-Canadian leftist, John Navisivsky, introduced Volenko, who was supposed to be from Soviet Ukraine and was supposed to address the rally in Ukrainian. Volenko, however, could barely speak the Ukrainian language, stumbled over his words, and quickly disillusioned several of the Canadian comrades who thereafter complained about him. In general, the Communist efforts to diffuse the effect of the UCC congress proved unsuccessful and the nationalists were for once able to make their point without too much interference.<sup>54</sup>

Soviet diplomacy was considerably more successful in Ottawa. For example, as early as June 7, 1943, a report on the proposed restoration of the Labour Temple properties came before the prime minister. The report summed up the situation thus:

Although before June, 1941, the Left Wing Ukrainians were undoubtedly a drag on the Canadian war effort insofar as they followed the Communist party line, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Nationalist elements among the Right Wing Ukrainians

will become a greater source of embarrassment to the Canadian government insofar as their aspirations center in the creation of an independent Ukraine; we know that this irredentism among Canadian Ukrainians is being closely followed in Moscow and is resented.<sup>55</sup>

Thus on June 24, the final day of the congress, senior bureaucrats in Ottawa recommended that the prime minister should send the necessary thanks to the UCC gathering for its expressions of support for government policies but at the same time expressly advised that "the note to avoid in the reply is any indication that this body [that is, the UCC] speaks for all Canadian Ukrainians. As the text of the message may be given considerable circulation, it should be designed so as not to be usable by the Right Wing Ukrainians against the Left Wing groups."<sup>56</sup> Still another memo pointed out that the greatest controversy arising from the congress came from remarks made by certain individuals associated with Simpson's committee and its adjunct, the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services. Watson Kirkconnell's fiery speech was singled out and brought to the attention of the prime minister, who then asked, not so innocently, whether an order under the Defence of Canada Regulations could be issued to restrain Kirkconnell from further writing and public speaking.<sup>57</sup>

For most Ukrainian Canadians, the UCC congress of 1943 dominated the period which followed the conscription plebiscite of 1942. Ever since Hitler's surprise attack on the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian nationalists had been suspected of insincerity in their promotion of the Canadian war effort, and the large negative vote in the conscription plebiscite of 1942 seemed to confirm these suspicions. The Pan-Slav campaign which followed and the concurrent Communist attacks on Philipps and Kaye further reduced the strength of the nationalist element.

This political battle between Communists and nationalists, though worrisome to the Canadian government, did not seriously affect the morale of the Canadian troops of Ukrainian origin serving in Europe. On the other hand, distance from the North American homeland did. By early 1943 several ethnically conscious Ukrainian Canadians serving in England had founded the UCSA service club to cater to the needs of these men. The founders of the UCSA proceeded cautiously and tried to avoid all political questions. Their efforts were successful and soon provided the UCC with a special Canadian cause in Europe to call its own.

By early 1943 the UCC also went on the offensive back in Canada. The idea of a great Dominion Congress of all non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians had originated in the desire of the nationalists and



others to clear themselves of Communist charges of disloyalty to Canada and publicly restate their support for an independent Ukrainian state in Europe as one of their war aims. The congress idea was, however, frowned upon in Ottawa and go-betweens such as George Simpson and Vladimir Kaye began pressuring the UCC leaders to limit themselves to a discussion of purely Canadian issues and for the time being put aside the thorny Ukrainian question in Europe.

The UCC responded by separating the two themes. The organization addressed international problems and the Ukrainian question in Europe in a special memorandum to the prime minister. The memorandum stressed Ukrainian national self-determination within the context of the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. But the document got a very chilly reception in Ottawa and a very hot one in the Soviet Union. The Canadian Department of External Affairs and, in particular, the Canadian minister to the Soviet Union, reacted negatively to the memorandum and related the vociferous reaction of the Soviets back to Ottawa. Canadian Communists and much of the general Canadian public, which had been acquiring a growing respect for the military prowess of the Red Army, added their voices to the chorus.

The UCC congress had a different fate. When the gathering convened, UCC leaders such as Kushnir, Arsenych and Andrusyshyn tried to limit the discussion to the problems of the Canadian war effort. They were surprised, however, first, by Watson Kirkconnell's epic presentation which lambasted the Communists and urged co-operation with the Poles, and secondly, by the speeches of Anthony Hlynka and General Sikewich which directly addressed the problem of Ukrainian independence in Europe. These surprises turned out to be the most popular part of the congress and helped to infuse the mass of delegates with a new enthusiasm for the war effort. Communist counter-congress activities proved unsuccessful and it was only in Ottawa that Soviet criticism enjoyed any success.

## The Invasion of Europe

*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*

News of the UCC congress had just reached Ukrainians among the Canadian forces in England when the long-awaited second front in Europe finally became a reality. In fact, political considerations and the impatience of the Canadian public almost certainly played a role in the government's insistence upon the inclusion of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade in the force which General Montgomery was about to lead against Sicily in July 1943.

The Sicilian campaign was just what the Canadian public wanted: positive newspaper headlines about the "boys" overseas. It was also just what the Canadian troops needed: an easy landing with initial successes which built gradually into a bitter series of engagements against more experienced German troops. In the first days, the hill town of Leonforte fell before an assault of the Edmonton Regiment and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and ever stiffer fighting followed. The Sicilian towns of Adrano, Catenanuova and Regalbuto made headlines in Canadian newspapers and Ukrainian-language papers followed the progress of the Canadian troops as closely as did the others.<sup>1</sup> On August 6 the Canadians, who had played an honourable role in the campaign, went into reserve, and ten days later the last enemy resistance in Sicily had ended. The entire campaign had lasted only a month and a half, but the Canadian forces and the many Ukrainian Canadians in them had experienced their first major land battles since the disastrous landings at Dieppe.

On September 3 Allied troops crossed the straits of Messina and the invasion of Italy began. Calabria and then southern Italy were conquered relatively quickly. By October 14 the 1st Brigade had occu-

pied Campobasso in the very heart of the country. Thereafter, a series of deep river valleys had to be crossed and British and Canadian troops began to run into serious resistance. No sooner had the Sangro River been crossed than the Germans had fallen back along the line of the Moro River. Attack was followed by counter-attack and in the end, the Canadians stood before the town of Ortona where the Germans decided to make yet another stand. Seven days of vicious hand-to-hand fighting followed and many Ukrainian boys from western Canada took part. The units involved included Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the Edmonton Regiment and the Saskatoon Light Infantry, which had many Ukrainian Canadians in their ranks. The Edmonton men were among the first into battle and in two days of hard fighting penetrated to the centre of Ortona. The Princess Pats and other regiments engaged in difficult hand-to-hand fighting as well and on the night of December 27-28 the embattled German defenders withdrew.<sup>2</sup>

The next months saw fierce fighting south of Rome. In the shadow of Monte Cassino the Germans had constructed two great defensive lines, the Gustav Line and the Adolf Hitler Line, and the Americans, British, Indians, Poles and Canadians all had their share of bloody battle. It was at this time that Canadians of Ukrainian background first met Ukrainians serving in the Polish army. The latter had been decimated while trying to storm German defensive positions around Cassino. Some of the Canadians paid little attention to either Poles or Ukrainians while others, who were more ethnically conscious, made a point of meeting and befriending their European brethren with whom they could converse in a common ancestral tongue.<sup>3</sup>

The German defensive lines to the south of Rome were broken with great losses on both sides, but the German command thought it best to withdraw from Rome itself without a fight. On June 4 American troops entered the city. Canadian units and various individuals soon followed. Mike Gregorish from Sandy Lake, Manitoba, was a driver in the Canadian Army Service Corps and on June 6 was the first person to bring penicillin into the city.<sup>4</sup> Another Ukrainian Canadian, the UCSA activist Bill Kereliuk, was also on early arrival. Kereliuk made a point of looking for fellow Ukrainians in the Italian capital and to his delight met Bishop Ivan Buchko of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church which ran a seminary there. Kereliuk's first enthusiastic letter home, however, was intercepted by Allied intelligence, who had some suspicions about Buchko's links to various Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Europe about which little was known.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Kereliuk helped to organize what he and his friends called the Central Mediterranean Branch of the UCSA, and with the help of Bishop Buchko and six Ukrainian sisters attached to the seminary, a commemorative UCSA Christmas get-together was held in Rome on January 6 and 7,

1945. Thirty-three servicemen, thirteen seminarians and several others attended. The vice-rector of the seminary, Father Wawryk, even managed to get the Vatican radio station to play some Ukrainian Christmas carols.<sup>6</sup>

While Ukrainian Canadians on active service in the armed forces overseas were engaged in the conquest of Italy and a new military build-up in England, the propaganda war between Communists and nationalists continued in Canada. During the summer of 1943 the latest Communist salvo against the Ukrainian nationalists appeared on Canadian bookstands. *This is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler*, by the experienced Communist propagandist R.A. Davies, was by far the most extensive defence of the Communist position and the most devastating attack on the nationalists to be published in Canada during the war. Davies defended the record of the ULFTA and described it as "progressive and anti-Fascist" but not exactly "Communist." Previous Communist support for the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was explained thus:

Ukrainian members of the Communist Party of Canada, as the Party's whole membership, did not feel free to support the war. They distrusted Chamberlain's policies, later pointed to the gathering evidence that the British cabinet was preparing to fight the Soviet Union over the question of Finland, and insisted that there was no evidence to the effect that the prosecution of the war was directed against Nazism.<sup>7</sup>

Davies then went on to describe the formation of the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland and the Ukrainian Canadian Association and their contributions to the war effort after June 1941. These activities were held up in contrast to those of the various nationalist organizations which were again accused of harbouring pro-German sympathies.

The prewar era provided the Communists with most of their ammunition. The UCC president, Wasyl Kushnir, was attacked for alleged anti-semitic statements ostensibly made during the late 1930s. The UNF and the United Hetman Organization were singled out as the worst offenders and were accused of both anti-semitism and fascism. A series of very suggestive pictures dating from the 1930s were printed. The French-Canadian fascist leader Adrien Arcand was quoted as supporting Skoropadsky against the Communists in a speech made during Danylo's 1937-38 Canadian tour. The UNF member, Anthony Hlynka, was accused of having published in 1935 a magazine with what Davies called "a viciously anti-Semitic tinge," and he even reprinted a captioned caricature to this effect. Finally, Tracy Philipps, George Simpson, Watson Kirkconnell, Vladimir Kaye and even Joseph Thorson were all cited as supporting the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian

state in eastern Europe and, by implication, with association with pro-fascist elements. Joseph Thorson in particular, who was the former Minister of National War Services and, by 1943, president of the Exchequer Court, was associated with one of the Canadian visits of, as Davies put it, "the delegate to Canada of the terrorist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Colonel Roman Sushko"; Simpson was said to have earlier enjoyed "the warm hospitality" of what Davies called the "Hetman Centre in Berlin"; Kirkconnell was mocked for the flip-flop in his analysis of the nature of the UNF and Philipps and Kaye were once again accused of having "fascist" associations.<sup>8</sup>

These revelations and innuendos were, for the most part, based upon some real event and therefore must have been very disconcerting for the parties involved. On the other hand, almost all of the allegations used the technique of guilt by association or dealt with the prewar era, whereas targetted organizations such as the UNF had undergone a difficult but positive transformation since the start of the war. (*Novyi shliakh*, for example, since 1940 had steadily become less vociferous about the Jewish question and its links to Bolshevism.) Davies's single major piece of evidence dealing with the period after 1939 concerned the plebiscite results of 1942. His tactic here was to cite the analyses hostile to the nationalist cause that had already appeared in the general English-language press. The *Winnipeg Free Press* was, of course, quoted at length.<sup>9</sup>

Most of the non-Communist Ukrainian organizations did not reply to the charges. In fact, organizations such as the USRL had largely escaped direct criticism and had nothing to account for. In the case of organizations such as the UNF, however, the evolution that had begun in 1939 continued apace. Thus by the beginning of 1944, *Novyi shliakh* seems to have begun a serious re-evaluation of the entire question of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. On February 2, for example, it ran a sympathetic story about the destruction by the Nazis of one hundred thousand Jews in the city of Lviv in occupied western Ukraine. Then on February 23, the paper ran an editorial on a British white paper which proposed to deny Jewish refugees permission to enter British-controlled Palestine. The Jews, *Novyi shliakh* explained, now want a land of their own; they are giving up "internationalism" and becoming nationalists just like the Ukrainians. This meant, however, that they were in a similar political predicament as were the Ukrainians and, like the Ukrainians, would have to await the end of the war to satisfy their demands.<sup>10</sup>

A couple of months later, *Novyi shliakh* went even further. In a featured article by Honore Ewach, the paper examined the history of Jewish-Ukrainian relations and recommended distinguishing, on the one hand, between what it claimed were the oppressive Polish landlords of old and their vulnerable Jewish servitors, and on the other hand,

between what it claimed were the tolerant Ukrainian national governments of the revolutionary era and anarchists and "hooligans" of the Makhno type who more than likely were the real inciters of any pogroms that took place at that time. "Let bygones be bygones," Ewach concluded:

It is the present and the future time that belongs to us. There is enough space in this world of ours for all the races, peoples, and creeds. If we want to derive more joy and benefit from life, all of us must collaborate and help each other. The Jews need as much Ukrainian sympathy and help as the Ukrainians need Jewish help and sympathy.<sup>11</sup>

This remarkable statement appearing in the organ of the most militant and strongest Ukrainian nationalist organization in the country was immediately noted and welcomed by the Jewish press. "The *New Pathway*," commented the *Western Jewish News*, "in taking this lead in the fighting of an old and deeply rooted prejudice, deserves congratulations, though this may be the place to point out once more how artificially created has been any dislike of Ukrainian for Jew."<sup>12</sup> A few weeks later *Novyi shliakh* returned the compliment by reprinting in full the article from the *Western Jewish News*.<sup>13</sup>

However, the troubled waters of Jewish-Ukrainian relations were soon stirred up once again. On April 27, during the House of Commons debate on appropriations for the Committee for Cooperation in Citizenship, Fred Rose, the recently elected Communist who had run in the Cartier by-election under the party's wartime banner as a Labour-Progressive Party candidate, and Dorise Neilson from North Battleford, attacked the make-up of the committee, criticized the fact that it was composed only of English and French Canadians, accused Watson Kirkconnell of being "at war with the members of the United Nations," and suggested that he should be interned under the Defence of Canada regulations. Anthony Hlynka and several other members rose to defend Kirkconnell's commitment to democracy and tolerance, and to praise the role of Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Chinese and other Canadians in the life of the country. Mrs. Neilson then replied by accusing Kirkconnell and Hlynka of anti-semitism and referred to the latter's 1935 magazine, *The Call*, which had been discussed earlier in the Davies book. She further stated that she had no tolerance for fascism. Hlynka then retorted that he had never written or said anything which was anti-semitic. He did, however, admit publishing the material in question and explained that he was not the author:

One of the writers who came from Europe and who was a witness of conditions there, and who knew the history, wrote an article which condemned certain leading men of Jewish nationality in the Soviet Union. That was all. Therefore the article was not mine

at all.... I published not only articles that were anti-this or anti-that, but articles that were of various natures, articles which gave information on various topics.... I just wish to correct this propaganda which has been circulated and levelled at me personally for many years now that I am anti-Semitic. I never have been and I never will be because I have not the reason for it, and it is not in my make-up.

*Hansard* did not record the reaction of the other members of the House of Commons, but the exchange was briefly reported in a Toronto Jewish newspaper.<sup>14</sup>

Other individuals attacked in the Davies book had less opportunity to respond publicly. Philipps and Kaye were civil servants and their hands were effectively tied by current government policies of promoting accord between Communist and non-Communist elements. Simpson was also still loosely connected with the Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship and did not make any public statements on the various allegations by Davies. He did, however, react privately and made notes on the errors and distortions which were of direct concern to him. Thus, about the insinuations concerning Hetmanite sympathies and his prewar trip to Europe and to Berlin ostensibly in order to meet Skoropadsky (Davies, p. 68), he commented: "Not true. I went to Berlin for educational purposes not aware that Skoropadsky lived there. Met him incidentally and was invited to afternoon tea. Never at any time discussed political affairs with him." And concerning his address to the heir apparent, Danylo Skoropadsky, during the latter's Canadian tour of 1937-38, he commented: "reference is made to allusions to above hospitality but nothing is said regarding the other part of the [welcoming] speech [for Danylo] which had to do with our democratic institutions in Canada. My *present information* is that Danylo is in Great Britain working as consulting engineer in a British munition factory." Simpson further noted Davies's exaggerations concerning the atlas of Ukraine that he had prepared, the fact that he had had no connection whatsoever with the government at the time that the Communist Party of Canada and the ULFTA were suppressed, and that the Communist publication upon which Davies had relied for his allegations had already been sued for libel and had been compelled to make retractions. Simpson never did publish these notes and they remained in his private papers after his death.<sup>15</sup>

Only Watson Kirkconnell had both the desire and the opportunity to respond fully and publicly to the Davies allegations. In a major polemical tract entitled *Seven Pillars of Freedom*, Kirkconnell set out to show that parliamentary democracy and the rule of law in Canada were based upon seven principles: religious faith, co-operation, education, justice, discipline, fraternity and loyalty. He tried to demonstrate that on each count the Canadian Communists had failed. He included

an appendix on the recent publishing activities of Davies and his comrades. He noted that in its issue of December 26, 1942, the Communist *Canadian Tribune* of Toronto had printed "the impudent falsehood" that, in its own words, "the Ukrainian Hetmanists (head-quarters in Berlin)" had made him "the honorary president of their organization in Canada". However, Kirkconnell stated, upon hearing of this allegation, the Canadian Hetman Organization had immediately denied that he had ever had any connection to it and, in fact, it had even bitterly attacked him in 1940. Kirkconnell then dealt with Davies's accusation of a compromising sympathy with the rival of the Hetmanites, the UNF, which, of course, was also alleged to be "fascist." Davies's strongest piece of evidence was Kirkconnell's own 1939 analysis of the UNF in which he had, indeed, called it "fascist," but then in 1940 suddenly changed his mind and began collaborating with the Ukrainian nationalist organization. Kirkconnell therefore explained:

One must realize the background. Until February 1940, when Canada was at war, I had never at any time had any connection or association with any Ukrainian group or organization, in Canada or abroad. The Ukrainians had always been cool towards me, in view of my friendships for Poles and Hungarians, and that coolness was raised to positive hostility in the autumn of 1939 by the publication of my book, *Canada, Europe and Hitler*, in which I criticized certain Ukrainian groups very strongly... (some of my more extreme estimates of the Ukrainian-Canadian groups in that volume had been considerably influenced by a pamphlet entitled *Now, Hitler Over Canada*, apparently issued earlier that year by Mr. Roy [R.A.] Davies himself. I did not realize that it had been prepared by a Communist, and that while its anti-German and anti-Italian documentation might be good it would not miss an opportunity to knife the more anti-Communist elements among the Ukrainians.)<sup>16</sup>

Kirkconnell then went on to describe how he soon became appraised of the true state of affairs and took part in government-sponsored efforts at uniting the non-Communist Ukrainians behind the war effort. He ended by comparing consistent UCC public loyalty to Canada with the Canadian Communist Party which in 1939-41, as he put it, "actually issued circulars rejoicing over the worst Nazi air assaults on Britain." He concluded: "When I support the [UCC] groups, and have even met with them in public on occasion, it is not because I agree with all their theories of European settlement (for we differ violently at many points) *but because they have proved their loyalty to Canada*"<sup>17</sup> (Kirkconnell's emphasis).

Kirkconnell's polemics were, of course, well received among the Ukrainian nationalists and other non-Communists. But Kirkconnell was aware that the exchange would not end with his paperback booklet published under the auspices of the Oxford University Press. He was



well prepared for still another round in the struggle and even seemed to relish further exposure of what he considered to be misleading Communist hyperbole. On July 13, 1944, he wrote to the foreign-language reviewer in Ottawa:

My Dear Kaye:

The publishers of my *Seven Pillars of Freedom* are anxious to gather not only reviews of the ordinary sort but [also] some of the more venomous comment of the Communist press – by way of demonstrating the bitterness of Communist hostility.

I have had access to the [official Communist] *Canadian Tribune* and the [Communist] *Kanadai Magyar Munkas*. The former calls me a Fascist agent and the latter calls me a liar and a mad dog. I wonder if you could get for me, in English, some comparable comment from some of the other Communist papers? The serviceable thing would be a brief but terrific comment – only a sentence or two – from each paper, with date of issue.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours

Watson Kirkconnell<sup>18</sup>

Since Kaye was unable to reply in person to Communist allegations against him, and since he had expert knowledge of a very wide range of Canadian ethnic publications, it can be safely assumed that he was able to fulfill Kirkconnell's modest request.<sup>19</sup>

In fact, Kirkconnell did not have long to wait before he felt the chill of a new blast from the Communist left. It came from the very top and again involved the Ukrainian Canadians. In the autumn of 1944 the Moscow newspaper and official organ of the Soviet trade union organization, *Trud*, printed an article under the signature of Daniel Zaslavsky. It accused Kirkconnell of being an employee of the Canadian government who had devoted his whole life to spreading anti-Soviet propaganda, and of being "a satellite of Goebbels" and "Führer" of the "Fascist Ukrainians" in Canada.<sup>20</sup>

Kirkconnell soon warmed to the attack. He had little trouble demolishing Zaslavsky's accusations with pro-democracy quotations from the *Twilight of Liberty*, *Seven Pillars of Freedom* and his other works. He noted Zaslavsky's lengthy borrowings from Toronto's *Canadian Tribune* and suggested that "...the great space given in the article to clumsy compliments to Prime Minister Mackenzie King suggests also an attempt to help along [Canadian Communist Party leader] Tim Buck's pre-election program for a Communist-Liberal coalition in Canada."<sup>21</sup>

Regardless of the course of the propaganda war between Communists and anti-Communists in Canada, Ukrainian Canadians were encouraged to believe that they were acquiring a significant reputation in the Soviet Union. For example, a letter to the editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press* quoted "a Canadian war correspondent in Europe," a certain

A.R. Davies (?), as reporting from Moscow that a Russian naval officer curious about Canada had once asked him: "Are all Canadians of Ukrainian origin? Because," he continued, "while in Murmansk, I have met many Canadians who served on the Canadian ships that brought us supplies and practically all sailors spoke the Ukrainian language or said they were of Ukrainian parentage." The author of the letter to the editor concluded that this question was "a splendid testimony of the part [that] the Canadians of Ukrainian origin play in this war."<sup>22</sup>

Convoys through dangerous northern waters to Murmansk were not the only new area of Allied activities. The intensification of the war in eastern Europe and the Allied invasion of Italy were accompanied by massive preparations for a new campaign in northwestern Europe. The military build-up in England continued and the number of Canadians stationed there steadily grew. The Canadian forces as a whole were also growing, approaching almost a million men and women in the army, navy and air force by the beginning of 1944. Naturally enough, the numbers of Canadian servicemen of neither Anglo-Saxon nor French background was also growing. During April, May and June 1944 the man in charge of reorganizing the Nationalities Branch, Robert England, made a special study of the situation of these groups and reported on their participation in the Canadian armed forces.

England's report began by emphasizing the growing importance of various minority groups in Canadian population statistics. In 1941 these groups consisted of 17.76 per cent of the total Canadian population; the Ukrainians fell into sixth place with 306,000 people. England then remarked that at the beginning of the war, "many English-speaking Canadians in the armed forces and in industry still maintained attitudes of suspicion of any volunteers whose names were difficult to pronounce or who spoke English with an accent," and he felt that the most important part of the problem of securing "a keener participation" in the war effort by minority groups consisted in winning more understanding from the English and French groups. Nevertheless, he noted that since 1939 government policies toward these groups had been "firm, and in the main tolerant and wise." The "Canadians All" campaign initiated by the Wartime Information Board and the various activities of the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services provided good examples of positive developments. Printed matter, radio broadcasts, films on various minorities and local folk arts and unity councils all played a role in promoting the war effort.<sup>23</sup>

The results of early 1944 were fairly good even in potential trouble spots: Communist-influenced communities had finally come on side; many of the younger Mennonites in the prairie provinces had

suspended their pacifism to enlist in the armed forces; their elders contributed large amounts to government loans earmarked for peace purposes; they helped with the Red Cross, and maintained homes for refugees or air-raid victims in England, Palestine and Calcutta. Robert England then singled out the predominantly Ukrainian municipality of Ethelbert, Manitoba, which, he noted, had gained distinction as the first of fifty-two Manitoba Victory Loan units to overreach its objective. "With a quota of \$31,000.00," reported England, "Ethelbert, under the Chairmanship of Mr. M.N. Hryhorczuk, reported total sales at \$32,000.00 on the first morning of the canvass."<sup>24</sup>

England was, however, still able to point to some problem areas in the European groups with which he was concerned. Hutterite communities on the prairies maintained their traditional objections to bearing arms; the Doukhobors in British Columbia constituted an on-going problem with a small group of "fanatics" engaging in arson and other traditional Sons of Freedom "threats to law and order"; European influences upon foreign-language newspaper editors were still too strong with, for example, Canadian Poles being told by American Poles that "Russia is set to destroy Poland"; teachers with Slav or German names were finding it difficult to secure employment; and, in particular, in spite of their large numbers, "there are very few Ukrainian Civil Servants either in the Dominion or the Provincial field."<sup>25</sup>

Having outlined the problems and the progress of the "foreign-language groups" at home, England then turned to an analysis of what he called "the cosmopolitan character" of the Canadian armed forces. Military officials kept no records of the ethnic origins of the men in the forces, but England was able to get an indication of ethnic origins through analysing the Hollerith Cards which all recruits had filled out when they had first enlisted. These cards dealt with the occupational histories of the recruits but also recorded province of residence at the time of enlistment and languages spoken other than English or French. Through the linguistic skills question they could give an indirect indication of the ethnic origins of the men and women in the forces.

England found that 45,875 men out of a sample 551,273 spoke fluently a European language other than French or English. Of those, the Ukrainian speakers were by far the largest single group, contributing 12,389 men; the German speakers came second with 9,036, and the Polish speakers third with 2,884. There was also a large number of men that fell into the category of "others" (10,842), by which, it was explained, was meant Hebrew, Canadian Indian and so on.<sup>26</sup>

Fluent Ukrainian speakers in the armed forces were further broken down as follows: 10,446 in the army, 644 in the navy and 1,279 in the air force. In terms of geographical origin, there were 3,446 Ukrainian-

speaking servicemen from Manitoba, 3,105 from Saskatchewan, 2,776 from Ontario and 2,265 from Alberta. There were also several hundred Ukrainian speakers from Quebec and British Columbia and a few dozen from the Maritimes.<sup>27</sup>

These figures did not, however, indicate the true number of Ukrainian Canadians in the various services. To begin with, the sample only included half the men in the services; thus all figures had to be doubled. In other words, official records showed about 24,700 fluent Ukrainian speakers. But, England cautioned, even this figure underrated the true contribution of Ukrainian and other "European" Canadians. There were several reasons. First, early in the war many Europeans had anglicized their names and concealed their European connections in order to enlist. (England had already noted discrimination on the part of recruiting officers during the first years of war.) Secondly, many third-generation European Canadians had forgotten the language of their grandparents. And thirdly, the Hollerith question asked: "What languages do you speak fluently other than English and French?" Thus many men who spoke a continental European language, but not fluently, might not list a second language. All these factors, when combined, meant that the final figure of 91,600 European Canadians and 24,700 Ukrainian Canadians out of a total mobilization of just under a million men and women was very conservative, and the manner in which it was gathered systematically underrated the contribution of the various non-English and non-French Canadian ethnic groups.<sup>28</sup> In other words, the figures of thirty-five to forty thousand Ukrainian-Canadian servicemen, which had been accepted both by right-wing publicists such as Kirkconnell, and left-wing publicists such as Davies, were high, but not by very much.<sup>29</sup>

On June 6, 1944, large numbers of these troops saw action in the D-Day invasion that was one of the greatest combined military operations in history. Five thousand Allied ships moved toward Normandy to unload 107,000 soldiers and 7,000 vehicles in a single day. Canadians, including Ukrainian Canadians, shared in all three elements. RCAF planes flew overhead while Canadian destroyers, frigates and minesweepers escorted the landing armies. The Canadian troops, landing on Juno beach did not have an easy time. German defences were not knocked out by aerial bombardment and beach obstacles destroyed or damaged dozens of landing craft. Canada lost 1,074 killed, wounded and missing in the D-Day landing. Once again, the names of many Ukrainian Canadians, including the new UCSA activist, John Karasivich, appeared on the casualty lists; Karasivich was so badly wounded that he was compelled to retire from active service. Many others, like seaman Joseph Onysko who operated one of the landing craft, and UCSA regular Bohdan Panchuk who was involved in setting up airfields for the RCAF, escaped unscathed.<sup>30</sup> Many years later

Panchuk explained: "I was one of the first two Airforce officers to land with the advance troops. I was there at D + 4; that is at four o'clock in the morning. While we were landing the Germans were bombing us very heavily; there were snipers everywhere and the first truck with our gear floated away. BI was the name of our air-strip, one of the first two in Normandy."<sup>31</sup>

Intensive fighting continued during the following weeks. Pushing inland, the 9th Brigade ran into the 12th SS Panzer Division, a Hitler Youth formation that waged a merciless battle with the Canadians throughout the Normandy campaign. On July 9, at the end of a series of costly assaults, Caen fell to the British and Canadians. By the end of August the Normandy battle was over and the German army was in full retreat. The Germans had lost 400,000 dead, wounded and prisoners, almost twice the Allied total; but the Canadians had still lost 18,500, one-third of them dead.

Newspapers in Canada followed the Normandy campaign with a mixture of delight and apprehension. Once again, the theme of the cosmopolitan nature of the Canadian armed forces clearly emerged. One paper gave the example of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles who had played an important role on D-Day. The colonel of the regiment had remarked to a war correspondent: "I have got a grand, remarkable bunch of boys; I estimate [that] forty percent of this unit is made up of lads of foreign extraction." The correspondent concluded that "never in a million years would a Nazi be able to understand... why men of a dozen different nationalities freely bind themselves together in a Canadian fighting unit and fight for a nation and ideals that are theirs by adoption alone." He then listed the names of men of eleven different nationalities serving in the Rifles, including Sergeant A. Woods of Fort Francis, Ontario, "a full-blooded Indian who is one of the unit's best snipers"; and Captain J.G. Karasivich of Winnipeg, "who was wounded while doing a specially tough job on D-Day."<sup>32</sup>

While the Canadian army was engaging in its first major battles in the northwest Europe campaign, the war in eastern Europe continued. Throughout 1943 and 1944, the Red Army steadily pushed the Germans westward. On August 23, 1943, the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv fell to the Soviets. In November General Vatutin's "First Ukrainian Army," as it was briefly called, recaptured Kiev, and by March 1944 most of the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR had been retaken from the hard-pressed Germans. On March 30 the capital of the province of Bukovina, Chernivtsi, which had long been ruled by Germany's Romanian ally, was taken by the Soviets. By July the battles for eastern Galicia and western Volhynia – that is, the Ukrainian-populated territories of the interwar Polish Republic – were well under way. On July 22, 1944 the Waffen SS Division "Galicia," composed of anti-Communist Ukrainian volunteers, was practically wiped out at

the Battle of Brody while trying to keep the Soviets out of what Ukrainians considered to be their native "Western Ukraine." The Galician capital Lviv fell to the Soviets on July 27. These events were, of course, fully reported in the Canadian press and it was believed that most Ukrainian Canadians who, in fact, traced their roots to the Western Ukrainian lands, would greet these victories with joy.<sup>33</sup>

Not all residents of the western democracies shared the enthusiasm of the Canadian press. Most especially, the Polish government in London viewed the rapid advance of the Red Army with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it portended the imminent defeat of the hated German occupiers; on the other hand, it also threatened to do away with the borders of 1939, which included Polish sovereignty over eastern Galicia and western Volhynia. Moreover, it boded ill for the existence of an independent Poland. Thus when Moscow named Nikita Khrushchev as the new premier of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and A.E. Korneichuk, the husband of the famous left-wing Polish writer (and president of the Union of Polish Patriots) Wanda Wasilewska, as commissar of foreign affairs of the Ukrainian Republic, and then declared that the first step of the newly established Ukrainian Foreign Office would be to make a treaty with a "new" democratic Poland, the Polish government in London, which had never been favourably viewed by the Soviets, reacted with considerable alarm. Of course, all these developments were closely followed by Canadian diplomats in Moscow and reported in the Canadian press at home.<sup>34</sup>

For once, new political developments in eastern Europe did not immediately spark a new round in the continuing psychological war between Communist and non-Communist Ukrainians in Canada. In fact, both the pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadian Association (UCA) and others with different views welcomed the establishment of the Soviet Ukrainian government's new commissariats of National Defence and Foreign Affairs. Manitoba Labour-Progressive (that is Communist) MLA, William Kardash, said that the move signified the growing importance of the Union republics within the USSR; recent defector from the UNF, Wasyl Swystun, felt it was a step in the right direction and wanted to see it put into practice, while UCC spokesman J.W. Arsenych watched the move with interest but advised caution, since, he thought, it was unclear whether it was "only theoretical and devised for international play, or factual and sincere."<sup>35</sup>

The territorial dispute with the Poles brought Communist and non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians even closer together. For example, M. Shatulsky, editor of the Winnipeg pro-Communist weekly *Ukrainske slovo* flatly rejected Polish claims to eastern Galicia and western Volhynia, called Polish rule an occupation by force of arms, and (unusual for a Communist) appealed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>36</sup> Meanwhile, the UCC prepared yet another memorandum to the prime

minister. It stressed several points: that whenever the Ukrainian people had an opportunity to express their wishes freely, they had opted for sovereign rights and self-government; that the Ukrainian people wanted unity; that the Atlantic Charter clearly acknowledged the right of a people to determine its own political destiny; that the Polish government's claims served to produce differences of opinion among the Allies; and that such discussions should therefore be postponed until a permanent peace settlement, which would address the Ukrainian question, could be concluded. On March 31, 1944, a delegation led by Anthony Hlynka presented the memorandum to Mackenzie King.<sup>37</sup> A few days earlier, the independent-minded Wasyl Swystun had been quoted as saying that "every Ukrainian, no matter what his political beliefs, stands four-square behind any move to unite all Ukrainian lands into one Ukrainian state. There is no doubt that Poland has no right and should have no claim to Ukrainian territories."<sup>38</sup>

Polish Canadians, however, tended to disagree. For example, B.B. Dubiński, a prominent Polish-Canadian lawyer in Winnipeg and honorary president of the Federation of Polish Societies of Canada, reiterated the traditional Polish claim to the disputed lands and, with regard to recent strongly worded Moscow pronouncements, declared: "It is ridiculous to say that Poland desires to acquire territories at the expense of the Soviet Union."<sup>39</sup>

Ukrainian spokesmen were quite willing to speak in favour of a newly united Ukrainian polity. But the unalterable fact of the expansion of the Soviet Union westward did not really please any informed person but the Communists. Although western governments did not immediately recognize the new borders, Ukrainian nationalists could not just close their eyes to them. By the summer of 1944 signs of despair and panic were clearly evident in the Ukrainian-language press in the United States. In July the leading Catholic paper wrote that "some of the Ukrainian nationalists are so downhearted that they believe that this is the end of Ukraine."<sup>40</sup> On January 27, 1945, Winnipeg's *Novyi shliakh* ran an editorial entitled "Unity in Slavery," together with a cartoon depicting the child "Carpatho-Ukraine" being led in chains by a Red Army soldier from the little Hungarian jail into the great Russian prison-house, where it was welcomed by a Christ-like "Ukraine" in chains.<sup>41</sup>

Political developments were also unfavourable to the nationalists. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, which was held between August 21 and October 7 1944, the Americans were trying to get Soviet co-operation in the establishment of a world organization of United Nations which would ensure the forthcoming peace. Soviet ambassador Andrei Gromyko was favourable but was already proposing initial UN membership for all sixteen Soviet Republics. On February 4 to 11 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, with some seven

hundred advisers and aides, met in conference at Yalta in the recently liberated Crimean peninsula. The principles of the Atlantic Charter were mentioned and plans elaborated for the establishment of a United Nations organization. Roosevelt objected to the representation of all sixteen Soviet Republics, but when Stalin and Molotov insisted only upon the inclusion of the Ukraine and Belorussia – because of their importance and sufferings during the war, so they argued, and because of the multiple votes accorded the British Empire with its dominions – both Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to support the admission of the two republics at a founding conference of the world organization to be held in San Francisco in April. It was further agreed that Russia would take over some Polish territory, including the western Ukrainian and Belorussian lands – to the “Curzon Line” running roughly north-south through Brest-Litovsk – and that Poland would receive some German territories in the west in exchange. Though Churchill and Stalin paid little attention to it at the time, their officials agreed that refugees and displaced persons were to be repatriated to their homelands.<sup>42</sup>

Many provisions of the Yalta agreements, including Roosevelt’s agreement to support the admission to the UN of the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, were not publicly announced, but it was clear to all that the Soviet Union would soon absorb the eastern borderlands of old Poland and then expand its influence much further westward. It was thus obvious to most non-Communist Ukrainians in North America that Yalta had not helped the prospects for an independent Ukraine free from Soviet control, and the largest Ukrainian-language paper on the continent, the daily *Svoboda* of New Jersey, which was also widely read in Canada, ventured to say that the Yalta agreement strengthened the Western Allies militarily, but weakened them politically. According to *Svoboda*, Stalin now had all Ukraine and this reflected his resolve to liquidate any possible springboards for Ukrainian independence movements on the western borders of the former Soviet Ukrainian Republic. The Bolsheviks, *Svoboda* concluded, “will once more, as they did before the war, liquidate, purge, imprison, and starve those Ukrainians who aspire to national freedom.... The emphasis was simply on power politics and the devil take the hindmost.” Meanwhile, the Catholic paper *Ameryka* mused that “the Poles are being punished, but they deserve it,” and wondered how Roosevelt and Churchill felt while shaking “Stalin’s bloody hand.”<sup>43</sup> Perhaps the newly launched *Ukrainian Quarterly* which was published in New York, summed up the attitude of non-Communist North American Ukrainians best when it stated in a leading editorial that “American acceptance of these Crimean agreements can only disappoint the millions of people who looked to the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms as the foundations of a new and better life.... Everything, however,



rests now upon the forthcoming United Nations conference at San Francisco."<sup>44</sup>

While most Ukrainian nationalists either kept silent or condemned the Yalta agreement, Wasyl Swystun continued his public drift to the left. By the end of February 1945 he was advising Ukrainian Canadians to change their attitude toward the USSR. After all, he argued, in 1941 the Ukrainian population had not revolted against Soviet rule as many nationalists had earlier predicted. Instead of collapsing, he continued, the USSR had finally united the various Ukrainian lands that previously had been ruled by four different powers. In a speech before what an American Communist paper called a meeting of Ukrainian "separatists" in Winnipeg, Swystun was reported to have said:

All parts of the Ukraine are joined together again as they were in the time of Jaroslav the Wise. We should all be happy about this. We in Canada and in the United States constitute but a small part of the Ukrainian people and therefore we cannot tell the Ukrainians at home what sort of government they should have. On the contrary, we must try to give them material help. We must keep in touch with them if we wish to retain our Ukrainian culture on this side of the ocean.<sup>45</sup>

For the time being, at least, Swystun's pronouncements seemed to be more in accord with the signatories of the Yalta agreement than with the anti-Soviet stance of the UNF members whom he had abandoned.

While discussion of international politics in the Canadian press continued to be lively, in the Canadian forces overseas the situation was very different. Discussion of international politics was discouraged, enthusiasm for the war effort was simply a matter of duty, and open criticism of the Soviet ally strictly forbidden. British intelligence continued to monitor the activities of UCSA members and all mail was subject to regular rules of military censorship. In fact, many pieces of correspondence concerning Ukrainian affairs were intercepted by the postal censors and passed on to the Canadian authorities. British suspicions were further heightened by the fact that in Ukrainian affairs, British intelligence relied heavily upon White Russian émigré or Russian émigré trained personnel. This was clearly shown in a file labelled "Ukrainian Separatists in Canada," in which Ukrainian and other Slavic names were uniformly misspelled in the Russian way and the interpretation of events and organizations revealed a traditional Russian point of view, as, for example, in the discussion of Ukrainian "separatists" rather than "nationalists." In one rather unusual postal intercept, a Ukrainian in Canada wrote to Danylo Skoropadsky in England concerning the need for a Ukrainian representative – that is, a UCC representative favourable to the Hetman cause – in London,

and suggesting that the former editor of Winnipeg's *Kanadiyskyi farmer*, Teodor Datzkiw, fill the post. The letter concluded by saying that the Reverend Michael Goroshko (*sic*), the recently appointed Greek Catholic chaplain for the Canadian forces, was already on his way and might do the job temporarily.<sup>46</sup>

The Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholic chaplains arrived none too soon, for the casualties of the Normandy campaign were high. As the Canadian army moved up the Channel coast, with the object of capturing the heavily fortified ports of Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk, many infantry battalions reported a fraction of their normal fighting strength. Numerous Ukrainian Canadians were among those who fell and the Ukrainian-language papers back home were by now printing regular lists of the fatal casualties bearing Ukrainian names. Replacements and the fact that Allied air supremacy allowed many of the men to be converted from anti-aircraft units tended to mix a certain number of "prairie boys" into the regiments from eastern Canada. As a result, as Bohdan Panchuk later testified, "you couldn't find a Canadian fighting unit in which there weren't some Ukrainians."<sup>47</sup>

It was still not enough. In Canada, the generals were now pressing the prime minister to send fifteen thousand conscripted men overseas. These were the NRMA men who had been conscripted for home defence and were sometimes called "Zombies," a term of opprobrium. After a tour of the European theatre of war, the Minister of Defence, Colonel Ralston, added his voice to the chorus. Prime Minister King replaced him with General McNaughton, who had always opposed conscription. Senior officers would not be convinced, however, and there were rumours of a "generals' revolt" against the Liberal government. Mackenzie King gave in. McNaughton announced that the government proposed to send sixteen thousand NRMA men overseas. On December 7, 1944, the decision was upheld by Parliament after a very acrimonious debate. The vote was 143 to 70, with Anthony Hlynka and a very reluctant William Tucker supporting the motion, while 34 French-Canadian Liberals and 36 others, including the young John Diefenbaker, dissented.<sup>48</sup>

The country did not accept the move quietly. As in the 1914-18 war, there were demonstrations in Montreal and Quebec City. But the biggest surprise came in British Columbia, at Vernon, where there were disorders, and at Terrace at a remote camp in the mountains behind Prince Rupert. In Terrace a brigade of NRMA men, who had long endured harsh treatment for their refusal to go "active," mounted anti-tank guns on the single railway line and announced that they had gone on strike. Discipline was eventually restored and most of the men dutifully boarded trains for the east. But there were other abortive protests and reports in the *Vancouver Sun* that many French Cana-

dians and Ukrainian Canadians were involved in them. In the end, almost thirteen thousand conscripts were sent overseas, 2,463 served in battlefield units and 69 died.<sup>49</sup>

Fresh replacements were certainly needed. While the Russians waited for the Germans to suppress the Warsaw uprising and while British and American forces raced across France, the Canadians had orders to capture the coastal ports. Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais each fell after costly sieges. The capture of these coastal areas deprived the Germans of the flying-bomb sites from which Hitler's V-2s had pounded England. The Canadians were then ordered to clear the estuary of the Scheldt and suffered very high casualties in bloody fighting over flooded polder land and narrow dykes sprayed by machine-gun and artillery fire. The price for the Scheldt was 3,550 Canadian casualties.<sup>50</sup>

The battles in northern France, Belgium and Holland saw large numbers of Ukrainian Canadians among the fallen. According to one estimate, which may be somewhat high, some 724 Canadian servicemen bearing Ukrainian names perished in these operations.<sup>51</sup> Numerous soldiers, sailors and airmen won awards and medals of various sorts.<sup>52</sup> Acts of bravery were not rare. For example, Maurice Pastyr tells the story of his childhood friend Maurice (Bud) Petrow of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion. He had joined up shortly after graduating from high school, made a point of transferring to the paratroopers, because, as he quipped, "the infantry was too slow for me." Pastyr writes:

Now the time was D-Day plus one hundred and six. At nineteen, Bud was a veteran of Normandy. It appeared at first that Arnhem was to be just another jump. Opposition had been neutralized by a vast air strike, but now, after three days, "Jerry" began to rally from the initial shock. All hell broke loose as the mortars and eighty-eights thundered their message of destruction. In the "drop", Bud's unit had become separated from the main force and the situation was increasingly desperate, "Jerry" had them "zeroed" in.

The immediate objective was to locate and destroy the enemy mortar unit that was hurting them badly and Bud volunteered to lead this mission. Cautiously his squad pushed forward through the murky dawn. Suddenly a "potato-masher" landed in their midst. Without a moment's hesitation, Bud tore off his helmet and flung it and then himself upon the grenade. There was a dull thud; a body was hurled into the air. The game was over. "No man hath a greater friend," whispered his comrades.

Bud Petrow is buried in the Venray War Cemetery in Holland.<sup>53</sup>

In early March 1945 the 2nd and 3rd Canadian divisions, augmented by troops transferred from Italy, began a hard slogging advance into the Hochwald Forest. In this area on the Dutch-German border the

Germans offered stiff resistance and inflicted heavy casualties; sometimes the same men, exhausted or wounded, returned to battle again and again. Elsewhere, Canadian troops crossed the Rhine. Between April 16 and 25, the leading Soviet columns encircled Berlin. By April 25 American troops had encountered the Red Army at the Elbe. It was clear that the war was ending.

Most active Canadian troops spent the last weeks of the war liberating the northern Netherlands. In places Canadian units extended their operations into Germany. Parachute troops and ss men continued to offer stubborn resistance. Fighting continued west of Oldenburg and north of the Kusten Canal. Peter Pashe, a soldier of Ukrainian background from Winnipeg, later recalled that "the roads to Oldenburg were mined. I remember; it was a smaller city, a nice morning. Signals phoned the German major in charge and said: 'You are surrounded. Come out and surrender or we will blast you all out.' There weren't that many of us; we fired flares all around the town. They were overawed by this and gave up. There were just a few fanatical ss and that sort left. German officers were told 'Fight to the last man'. Officers told the men, but we were capturing large groups of *Wehrmacht* in fact in those last days."<sup>54</sup> On April 30 Hitler committed suicide and on May 5, the exhausted German armies in the Netherlands surrendered. For most Canadians, the fighting in Europe was over.

The Allied conquest of continental Europe, which began with the invasion of Sicily and ended with the fall of Berlin, moulded the last phase in the history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War. The period brought the war to its climax and once again changed the political climate in which Ukrainian political and social organizations in Canada operated.

The invasion of Italy saw the first major land battles in which Ukrainian Canadians had participated since the siege of Hong Kong. For the first time, Canadians of Ukrainian origin fought side by side with Polish units also containing a number of Ukrainians. The Canadians reacted variously: some soldiers were indifferent, others sought out ethnic contacts. Among the most ethnically conscious, a "branch" of the UCSA was formed so that a get-together was eventually held in Rome. Even so near the front lines, however, politics could not be completely avoided. Postal intercepts revealed that the Ukrainians were still being closely watched.

These political questions were, of course, far more acute on the home front. By early 1944, for example, the circulation of Davies' *This is Our Land* had dealt the nationalists a very severe blow and had partly destroyed the effect of the moral victory of the first UCC congress. Kirkconnell responded to this Communist pressure with his *Seven Pillars*

*of Freedom* and *Novyi shliakh* offered an olive branch to Jewish nationalists, but the Communist offensive would not be stopped. During this same period the ban on the ULFTA was lifted and much of its original property was restored.

Within the armed services themselves, the numbers of Canadians of Ukrainian origin continued to increase. Kirkconnell, Davies and others had guessed that there were approximately thirty-five to forty thousand such men and women in the services; by D-Day, the Robert England report had adjusted this figure downward to about twenty-five thousand fluent Ukrainian speakers. There were, of course, many more who were not fluent, or who concealed their ethnic origin.

The political problems intensified after D-Day. The advance of the Red Army through Ukraine and into Galicia had raised the question of the future Polish-Soviet border, and although no Ukrainian of any stripe wished to remain under the Poles, and the nationalists put up a brave front, the growing strength and size of the Soviet state threw them into a state of despair. The war was not turning out as they had expected; the Germans and Soviets had not knocked each other out and left the field clear for any smaller third parties.

The great campaign in northwest Europe formed the climax of the Canadian war effort. Fatal casualties were high and included about 725 Canadians of Ukrainian origin. The heavy casualties caused a second conscription crisis in Canada and there is some evidence that Ukrainians or other central Europeans were among the NRMA men who briefly protested against conscription in British Columbia. In this way, it may be said that Canadians of Ukrainian origin participated both on the battle fronts of western Europe and in the central political and social controversies that occurred at home in Canada at the height of the war.

## The War Ends

### *Finis Ucrainae?*

The successful culmination of the Allied invasion of Europe did not put an end to the complex and difficult questions that had arisen during the course of the war. In fact, the problem of large numbers of displaced persons located in Allied zones of occupation was greatly intensified by the collapse of the Third Reich. At the same time, the cessation of hostilities seemed to put a seal upon the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe and upon the westward movement of the Soviet frontier. Both of these problems, however, had already become serious as early as D-Day.

In the months following the D-Day landings, Ukrainians in the Canadian armed forces became acutely aware of the hundreds of thousands of eastern Europeans deported from their homelands to work for the Germans in agricultural or industrial production in western Europe. Because of the long-standing and increasing manpower shortage in the German military, some of these people were even used in a military capacity. UCSA activists like Bohdan Panchuk took special notice of this situation. Many years later, he recalled that "one of the first dead youths I found in Normandy was a young Ukrainian lad in German uniform."

The Germans used Ukrainians as slave workers and young teenagers were forced to man anti-aircraft units in defense of the "Atlantic Wall." ... The displaced persons were of various kinds and categories: "P" workers, *Ost-arbeiters*, voluntary workers, families of workers, or Ukrainians in German uniforms, slave workers in the Todt engineering organization, the political refugees of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and genuine refugees fleeing the Red Army .... We found them, in many cases in groups or clusters, already living in large German establishments that

were left vacant at the end of the war – factories, warehouses, military barracks and the like.... At the very beginning in Germany, that is in June, 1945, I found near Hamburg, for instance, about fifty Ukrainian girls in a munitions factory. They asked, "What do we do?" All I could say was, "just stay here. Somehow somebody is going to take care of you."<sup>1</sup>

In fact, word about the many Ukrainian refugees in western Europe had filtered back to North America several months before the war ended. American intelligence reported that while the war was still raging, Ukrainians in neutral Argentina had first offered to host a meeting of Ukrainians from both sides of the conflict. This idea did not seem to get very far. What did, in fact, take place was a joint meeting of the representatives of various non-Communist Ukrainian organizations in the United States and Canada.<sup>2</sup>

On September 23 and 24, 1944, delegates of the UCC and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America met in New York City to plan a joint strategy. It was agreed that, in view of the forthcoming founding meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco, the two committees should better co-ordinate their efforts in the international arena. They decided not only to co-ordinate and increase propaganda efforts on behalf of the Ukrainian cause, but also to give immediate relief on behalf of, as they put it, "the thousands of Ukrainian war victims in the Ukraine itself as well as in other parts of Europe, Asia and Africa." American intelligence further predicted that "the first fruit of the joint program... will be a debate in the Canadian Parliament on the Ukrainian problem for which Anthony Hlynka, the Ukrainian Canadian Member of Parliament from Vegreville, Alberta, is to provide the initiative."<sup>3</sup>

Canadian supporters of the Soviet Union did not welcome the new moves by the representatives of non-Communist Canadian and American Ukrainian organizations that had met in New York. In fact, while the fate of hundreds of thousands of war refugees was being decided at Yalta, Canadian Communists such as the editor of Winnipeg's *Ukrainske slovo*, Matvii Shatul'sky, were roundly condemning the earlier meeting of the UCC and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America which had initiated plans to bring to North America the Ukrainian political refugees from Europe. These refugees, Shatul'sky charged, were Ukrainian fascists who merely wanted to save themselves from a "people's court" for war crimes.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the provisions of the Yalta agreement concerning the representation of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belorussia at the United Nations were still a fairly well-kept secret and as yet elicited little or no comment in the western press.

On March 26, 1945, during debate on Canadian participation at the San Francisco conference, Hlynka delivered his House of Commons

speech on the proposed world organization and how it related to the Ukrainian question. He began by stating his support for Canadian participation in the conference. However, with the rest of the Social Credit Party to which he belonged, Hlynka defended the concept of the sovereignty of small nations and peoples which, he felt, was the basis of democratic government and had been undermined at the recent international conferences at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks where the international authority of the Big Three in the form of a proposed Security Council had been asserted. Hlynka then contrasted the British Commonwealth and the United States with Russia. The Commonwealth, he claimed, was the highest model of sovereignty and individual liberty on earth and would even shortly solve the "vexing problem" of India by according her complete sovereignty and equal partnership with the other dominions. The United States, he said, was a good neighbour which had subjugated no one. The Russian empire, however, Hlynka saw as the great oppressor of "submerged nations" which was the principal threat to the future security of the world. Submerged nations such as the Ukraine, he said, had suffered great losses during the war and therefore deserved independent representation at the San Francisco conference. He continued:

I am making this plea on behalf of the millions who cannot now speak for themselves.... In regard to the representation of the Ukrainian people I suggest that the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America be asked to send their delegations to any and all world conferences for the purpose of presenting the Ukrainian case. These organizations include the vast majority of Canadians of Ukrainian origin and Americans of Ukrainian origin... [and] have also well proven their loyalty to Canada and [to] the United States of America.

Hlynka concluded by quoting the American journalist W.H. Chamberlin, to the effect that no prime minister of Soviet Ukraine would ever publicly dissent from the positions taken by the Kremlin, and until one could, "it will be wiser to proceed on the assumption that the essential political and economic controls are still in Moscow."<sup>5</sup>

Hlynka's speech was quite naturally welcomed by the non-Communist Ukrainian press. The consensus seemed to be that North American Ukrainians should definitely attend the San Francisco conference to speak on behalf of their European compatriots. *Novyi shliakh* called Hlynka's arguments "good and fair" and his speech "historic." Jersey City's *Swoboda* congratulated Hlynka for raising the matter in the Commons, while Philadelphia's *Ameryka* exclaimed: "Well done Honourable Member, Well done! Again well done!"<sup>6</sup>

Others were less enthusiastic. In the Edmonton *Bulletin* Harold Weir argued that there were too many cases of divided loyalties in Canada



and that Hlynka should stay out of Russian affairs since he was interfering with Russian sovereignty and irritating an ally that Canada sorely needed. "Canada is still fighting for her life," Weir wrote. "It comes perilously close to disloyalty to play with ideas that might even yet imperil her security." He further argued that Hlynka's proposal would "put Canada into an impossible position."

For if Canadian Ukrainian societies should go to San Francisco to present the claims of the Ukraine, what is the matter with some fanatic group of Petainist sympathizers going to San Francisco to present the views of [the collaborationist French] Vichy [government] or with some isolationist Irish society in this country (if one could be found) going to San Francisco to present the views of De Valera?

Weir concluded emphatically: "This is Canada – no hyphens!"<sup>7</sup>

Hlynka replied immediately. He objected most strongly to Weir's insinuation that it was disloyal to even bring up the Ukrainian question. He pointed out that other members of Parliament had brought up the Russo-Polish dispute and had even made representations on behalf of the Polish people, and yet no one imputed "disloyalty" to them. He concluded by quoting a long article by Weir himself in which the journalist had defended his right to criticize the Soviet Union for its lack of democracy and had been compelled to similarly rebut accusations of prejudice and promoting disunity between allied nations.<sup>8</sup>

As it turned out, the Canadian government did not even consider acquiescing to Hlynka's proposal. In fact, as early as July 1944 British representatives had approached Canada to ascertain the Canadian position on a possible exchange of representatives between Canada and Soviet Ukraine. External Affairs, while accepting the conventional arguments that Ukraine was the second-largest Slavic state with an important role in the world economy, supported the proposal because by recognizing the international status of the Ukrainian SSR, the federal government would, with a single stroke "drive from the nationalists' minds the mirage of absolute Ukrainian independence and in this way hasten the process of their assimilation."<sup>9</sup> Hlynka's proposal about a Ukrainian Canadian delegation to the UN was quietly ignored.

The Soviet proposal about a seat for the Ukrainian SSR replaced it. In the weeks following Hlynka's speech, the western press got wind of the arrangement agreed to at Yalta and on April 5, 1945, at what was to be the last press conference before his death, President Roosevelt confirmed that he had agreed to General Assembly seats for the Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republics. In his statement to the press, Roosevelt explained that the move was necessary in view of the sufferings of these countries, as he put it, "from the point of view of humanity."<sup>10</sup>

Canadian Communists of Ukrainian origin certainly agreed and launched a press campaign to ensure that the idea of three Soviet UN votes would be accepted by the general public. For example, at a mass meeting at a Ukrainian Labour Temple in Winnipeg, Matvii Shatul'sky, editor of the Communist *Ukrainske slovo* declared that it would be just as wrong to criticize the Soviet demand for three votes as it would be to criticize Great Britain for having the six votes which included those of the overseas dominions such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Shatul'sky further suggested that Ukraine and Belorussia were more deserving of votes in the United Nations General Assembly than were Turkey or Argentina which had suffered nothing in the war and had remained neutral throughout.<sup>11</sup>

Non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians were more reserved. On the one hand, organizations such as the UNF firmly supported the idea of Ukrainian independence and Ukrainian representation at the UN. On the other hand, UNF members believed that a Ukrainian seat occupied by Soviet Ukrainian officials would in no way represent the true wishes of the newly reunited Ukrainian people. Moreover, the Soviet Union itself was viewed as an implacable enemy and the idea of recognizing it as a legitimate world power and concluding a permanent peace with it was not easily accepted. Thus articles on the UN appearing in the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* tended to have a pessimistic tone. At one point, the paper even reprinted parts of a *Oakland Tribune* article which was critical of the Soviet demand for three seats in the General Assembly.<sup>12</sup>

The UCC consulted with George Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan before taking any action. Simpson responded by drawing up a memorandum suggesting that the envisioned UCC delegation to San Francisco exercise extreme caution and not claim to represent anybody but a goodly number of Canadian citizens. Simpson believed that Hlynka's suggestion about the UCC representing European Ukrainians was simply "unrealistic" and would place the delegation in a false position. Simpson suggested that the delegation simply aim at exchanging views with as wide a public as possible, that it issue a written statement affirming the ultimate priority of humanitarian principles over power politics, and that it absolutely avoid embarrassing the statesmen at San Francisco, thus inhibiting the main objective of the conference which was world peace and security.<sup>13</sup>

The UCC accepted Simpson's suggestions and drew up a "Memorandum to the Canadian Delegation at the San Francisco United Nations Conference on International Organization." This document claimed only that the UCC represented Ukrainian Canadians. However, it stated that the Ukrainians in Europe lacked true freedom of expression, that they had helped in the war against the Nazis, and that what was needed was a "free and independent state within Ukrainian ethnographic boundaries." The document continued:

We would like to express our sincere gratification to our Canadian delegates for the stand they have already taken by casting their unanimous vote in favor of the *de jure* recognition of the principle of Sovereignty of [the] Ukrainian nation in admitting Ukraine into the General Security Organization of [the] United Nations. However, anyone who is acquainted with the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union where there is a notorious lack of freedom of expression, cannot help but realize that under such circumstances there can be no true Ukrainian representation.... Dangers to world peace have come from the unjust treatment of subjects and minorities.... To remove these dangers the conference should adopt an International Bill of Human Rights providing *inter alia* for the people of each State the inalienable rights of the Four Freedoms as provided for in the Atlantic Charter.

The UCC memorandum concluded by asking for a UN Protective Council to ensure that the proposed Human Rights bill would be enforced and suggested that without such provisions the world's unrest would continue.<sup>14</sup>

The Charter of the United Nations adopted by the representatives assembled at San Francisco did include statements about human rights and did include strong powers for the Security Council. These developments were, however, largely an extension of agreements made earlier at Dumbarton Oaks and were not a result of various petitioners to San Francisco such as the UCC representatives. In fact, the UCC memorandum did not in the least influence the vote of the Canadian delegation. External Affairs officials even assured the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D.Z. Manuisky, that undue importance should not be attached to the sentimental nationalism of Ukrainians in Canada and that its attraction would eventually be reduced by assimilation.<sup>15</sup> Once again, it seems that a UCC memorandum had produced plenty of publicity, but very little in the way of solid results.

The real achievements of UCC involvement occurred in a considerably less spectacular way. As early as March 27 to 28, 1945 – that is, in the days following Hlynka's statement in the House of Commons – representatives of the UCC and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) had met in Ottawa to co-ordinate their strategy with regard to the San Francisco conference. It was decided that the two bodies would, in fact, send delegations to the conference and that these delegations would co-operate with one another.<sup>16</sup>

The San Francisco conference began on April 25 and during the following days the North American Ukrainian delegates trickled into the city. Representing the UCCA were its president, Stephen Shumeyko, Bohdan Katamay, Professor Granovsky from the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, and Ivan Petrushevich, who was a west coast resident. The UCC delegates were Reverend Kushnir, the UCC president,

and John (Ivan) Solomon from the USRL. The tasks of the delegates would be to establish personal contacts with the American and Canadian delegations, establish contacts with other national delegations, make contact with the world press corps, and distribute such pertinent literature on the Ukrainian question as Simpson's atlas, the first issues of the *Ukrainian Quarterly* edited by Mykola Chubaty, the newly published history of Ukraine by W.H. Chamberlin, Hlynka's parliamentary address, and the official UCC and UCCA memoranda. The UCC delegation was to handle relations with the Canadians and British Commonwealth delegations and the UCCA was to concentrate on the others.<sup>17</sup>

The North American Ukrainians got a varied response from the assembled diplomats. Some of the smaller nations and those with a common border with the USSR were the most receptive. Thus Turkey, Iran and some of the Latin American countries showed a lively interest in the Ukrainian question. Good relations were also established with other unofficial delegations such as the Lithuanian, the "Free India" and the Polish delegations. Informally, moreover, Alexander Granovsky and John Solomon met several members of the various Soviet delegations and spoke to them in Ukrainian on various less political subjects. These "corridor" conversations, at the very least, let the rank-and-file Soviet personnel know of the existence of the American and Canadian Ukrainian lobby. On the other hand, Granovsky encountered a hostile and arrogant reception at the United Kingdom office, was cold-shouldered by the Yugoslavs, and got a lecture from a Czech official who was plainly Communist and claimed that there was no such thing as a Ukrainian nation and that, in fact, "Russia" was to get three votes in the General Assembly. When Granovsky, at Kushnir's insistence, phoned directly to D.Z. Manuisky, the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, it only led to an argument with Manuisky threatening to call the police if the Ukrainians did not stop their unofficial politicking. In addition, the printed copies of the American "Memorandum on the Ukrainian Situation" were late arriving and Petrushevsky and Granovsky did not distribute them until the last minute. Nevertheless, Manuisky felt compelled to hold a press conference to rebut the arguments of the Ukrainian American memorandum and the whole Ukrainian question was thus given a higher profile.<sup>18</sup>

On another level, the North American Ukrainians raised the issue of the European displaced persons with the diplomats of several countries. There were discussions with representatives from the United States, Belgium, France and several Latin American countries who were still interested in large-scale European immigration. France expressed a willingness to take many DPs if they would agree to become French citizens. The South Americans, especially big countries like Brazil and Argentina, showed a definite interest in the Ukrainian DPs,

while Peru stated flatly that it wanted labourers and professional people, not commercial people or "Communists." Peru was willing to accept up to five hundred thousand people while Venezuela and Chile also expressed an interest in Ukrainian DP immigration. The North American Ukrainians noted, however, that immigration committees to protect against oppressive local landlords and repressive social/cultural legislation, such as the anti-minority language laws enacted in Brazil in the 1930s, would have to be established. In general, the American and Canadian Ukrainians were satisfied with their work. Granovsky, in particular, was delighted and considered the labour highly successful. "We succeeded in reaching the ear of the world," he concluded.<sup>19</sup>

While Kushnir, Granovsky and others lobbied at San Francisco on behalf of the DPs, Bohdan Panchuk and other UCSA members continued their relief efforts in Europe. Panchuk, in particular, relates that wherever he went, he found large numbers of Ukrainian refugees and helped them to organize relief committees in the various liberated countries. Panchuk and his colleagues even printed up thousands of ID cards stating that the individuals in question were under the protection of the UCSA. Simultaneously, the UCC in Canada began to turn its attention toward the refugee problem, and in the United States two relief committees were formed, in Detroit and Philadelphia. These committees soon joined to form a United Ukrainian American Relief Committee. Meanwhile, in England many UCSA members were worried about the political implications of the refugee relief activities of Panchuk and certain others. In February 1945 a kind of revolt broke out and Panchuk was persuaded to send in his resignation to the UCSA headquarters in London. However, Panchuk loyalists led by William Kere-liuk soon rallied to support their leader and the resignation was not accepted. The work of rescuing Ukrainian refugees in western Europe from forced repatriation to the Soviet Union continued.<sup>20</sup>

While Panchuk and his colleagues were active in aiding Ukrainian refugees on the continent, the UCSA members already repatriated to Canada began making arrangements for the extension of their organization's activities in Canada. The UCSA was renamed the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association and several Ukrainian branches of the Royal Canadian Legion were founded. Stephen Pawluk, for example, considered the foundation of Branch 360 in Toronto to be one of the most important achievements of his public life. Other branches were founded in Winnipeg, Montreal, Edmonton and Hamilton.<sup>21</sup>

The problem of the refugees, however, would not go away. The efforts of Panchuk and his colleagues were therefore quickly supplemented by contributions by Ukrainian political leaders in Canada. Both Anthony Hlynka and Reverend Kushnir from the UCC made trips to Europe in order to ascertain the real situation there. Lobbying efforts to bring the refugees to Canada were soon under way and the UCC found itself arguing its case before Parliament. As early as

September 1945, Hlynka and William Tucker took up the question of forced repatriation in reply to the Speech from the Throne. On May 29, 1946, the question was also raised before the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour. Hlynka, Kushnir and S.W. Sawchuk testified before this committee, Panchuk came from Europe and the Communist viewpoint was presented by Stephen Macievich, who maintained that the three hundred thousand or so Ukrainians still in Germany were in the main people who, in his estimation, "were collaborating with the Germans."<sup>22</sup> A debate ensued in which Macievich maintained that most of the refugees were intellectuals unsuited to Canada's immigration needs and Panchuk declared that most of the refugees in Germany were just ordinary people, labourers and farmers who would fit in well in Canada and supply labour where it was most needed. Many years later, Stephen Pawluk recalled that appearing as he did, in full officer's uniform, Panchuk made a great impact upon the Senate committee.<sup>23</sup> In fact, large numbers of Ukrainian refugees did eventually make their way across the Atlantic to Canada and they did emanate, for the most part, from the labouring classes.

The end of the war in Europe set the stage for a new phase in Ukrainian-Canadian history but one that was also a continuation of the past. The question of the Ukrainian refugees came ever more to the fore and became a political issue that was debated in the House of Commons and in the Senate of Canada. At the same time, Anthony Hlynka was proposing that Ukrainians in the west should represent the Ukrainian nation at the founding convention of the United Nations at San Francisco. Hlynka's suggestion, however, was never taken seriously by the Canadian government and was soon replaced by a Soviet plan for a UN seat for Soviet Ukraine. On the other hand, at George Simpson's suggestion, the UCC drew up a memorandum which stressed the cause of universal human rights and a mechanism to enforce such rights. Once again, the suggestions were not taken very seriously by the Canadian delegation but were in fact to some degree recognized in the new UN charter. In addition, lobbying efforts at San Francisco by Kushnir, Granovsky and their colleagues both raised the profile of the Ukrainian question and raised the issue of the Ukrainian DPs in Europe.

While debate at the UN continued, Panchuk and his companions undertook the rescue of Ukrainian refugees in western Europe; from Europe to the Canadian Parliament was a smaller step than had originally been envisioned. But with the end of the war a new phase in the history of the refugees began. During the post-war era, many thousands of displaced persons made their way to a new life in Canada; their road had been made easier by the Ukrainian servicemen who had helped them escape the Soviets.

## Conclusions

*O Canada! Maiorum patria*  
C.H. Carruthers

In general, the history of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War went through two sharply distinct periods. The first period lasted from 1939, when the war began, to June 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The second period lasted from 1941 until the end of the war.

On another level, these two periods can be sub-divided into a number of phases, each of which coincided with a specific stage in the general history of the war. This is especially true of the post-1941 period. When the war began, it was the right that enjoyed the favour of the Canadian government while the Communist left endured the hardship of internments and confiscation of their Labour Temples. The extreme right – that is, the Hetmanites and the UNF – were helped by a flexible strategy which put loyalty to Canada first. They were aided in this by the presence of Danylo Skoropadsky in England and by Wladimir Kossar's fact-finding trip to Europe in the summer of 1939. The Communists, on the other hand, had only their loyalty to the Moscow party line to guide them. Thus they condemned the conflict as an "imperialist" war and carried on subtle anti-war propaganda. For this, they saw their property taken away, and their leaders interned. Meanwhile, the government was employing the services of Tracy Philipps, Vladimir Kaye and George Simpson to reconcile the various non-Communist Ukrainian organizations and create a Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) to serve as an umbrella organization through which the government might communicate with the non-Communists.

On a different level, during this initial phase majority-group nativism remained a serious problem both for minority groups such as the Ukrainians and for the government, which received detailed reports on how English-Canadian prejudice could be hurting enlistments and was, in fact, having an effect on war industries located in eastern Canada. Various government programs were launched to deal with

this threat and Tracy Philipps was especially active in fighting nativist prejudices.

The replacement of Canada by the Soviet Union as Britain's senior ally had an immediate and profound effect upon Ukrainian political organizations in Canada. The Communists enjoyed a rise in prestige while the nationalists suddenly came under new suspicion. In particular, the UNF was thoroughly demoralized and its leaders had to endure personal interrogation by the RCMP. At the same time, however, the establishment of George Simpson's Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship was a sign that the government still cared for "nationalist" support. Anthony Hlynka even suggested that Ukrainian organizations in the West, which had been consistently loyal to the western Allies, be allowed to represent the Ukrainian nation at any future international conferences. The alliance with the Soviet Union was making itself felt, however, and the Hlynka proposal was thoroughly criticized in the Canadian press. Moreover, the Communists had immediately begun a campaign to get their leaders out of internment and have their halls returned to them.

The Communist campaign against the nationalists received a real boost with the conscription plebiscite of 1942. Ukrainian Communists alleged that the large no vote among Ukrainian Canadians was due to equivocation among the UCC leaders and was really a vote for Hitler. Many English-Canadian papers jumped to the same conclusion, with the *Winnipeg Free Press* leading the way.

The no vote, however, was a real shock to the nationalist leaders who in their press organs had consistently supported the yes position. The UCC leadership was compelled to acknowledge that a real gap existed between the leadership and the masses of ordinary Ukrainian Canadians. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Communists had only recently begun to support the war effort and the large no vote might also partly be a result of their influence. Behind the scenes, the government noted the weakness of the UCC leadership and was advised that if it really wanted yes votes, then it had to give more attention to moulding minority opinion.

The political battle between nationalists and Communists, though worrisome to the Canadian government, did not seriously affect the morale of the Canadian troops of Ukrainian origin serving in Europe, although distance from the North American homeland did. Thus by early 1943, a number of ethnically conscious Ukrainian Canadians serving in England had banded together to form the UCSA service club to cater to the needs of the men. The UCSA provided the UCC with a special Canadian cause in Europe to call its own.

By 1943 the UCC also went on the offensive back in Canada. The idea of a great Dominion congress of all non-Communist Ukrainian Canadians had germinated in the desire of the nationalists and others to clear themselves of Communist charges of disloyalty to Canada and



publicly restate their support for an independent Ukraine as a war aim of Ukrainian Canadians. The congress idea, however, was not well received in Ottawa, and the UCC responded by separating the two themes. The congress would be held and deal only with Canadian themes while a separate memorandum would deal with the Ukrainian question in Europe.

The UCC memorandum stressed Ukrainian national self-determination within the context of the Atlantic Charter but it was still very coolly received in Ottawa. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union the reaction was vociferous and the Canadian minister stationed there conveyed this reaction back to Ottawa. Canadian Communist and much of the Canadian press reaction was also negative.

The congress had a somewhat different fate. Although the organizers had tried to limit discussion to strictly "Canadian" themes, they were surprised both by Watson Kirkconnell's epic presentation which lambasted the Soviets and urged co-operation with the Poles, and also, by the speeches of Anthony Hlynka and General Sikewich which directly addressed the question of Ukrainian independence in Europe. These speeches turned out to be the most popular part of the congress and helped to infuse the delegates with a new enthusiasm for the war effort.

While this first national congress of Ukrainian Canadians was under way, the Canadian army was playing a role in the invasion of Italy and many Ukrainian Canadians participated in the action. Even at the front line, however, politics could not be completely avoided. Postal intercepts revealed that the Ukrainians were still being closely watched.

Such political questions were, of course, far more acute on the home front. By early 1944, for example, the circulation of Davies's *This Is Our Land* had dealt the nationalists a very severe blow and had partly destroyed the effect of the first UCC congress. Kirkconnell responded to this Communist pressure with his *Seven Pillars of Freedom* and *Novyi shliakh* offered an olive branch to Jewish nationalists, but the Communist offensive continued. During this period the ban on the ULFTA was lifted and some of its property was restored.

Within the armed services themselves, the numbers of Canadians of Ukrainian origin steadily increased. Kirkconnell, Davies and others had guessed that there were between thirty-five and forty thousand such men and women in the services and this figure was never publicly questioned. By D-Day, however, this figure had been adjusted downward to about twenty-five thousand fluent Ukrainian speakers. There were, or course, many more who were not fluent, or who concealed their ethnic origin.

The political situation grew more acute after D-Day. The steady advance of the Red Army through Ukraine and into Galicia once more raised the question of the future Polish-Soviet border. No Ukrainian of any political stripe wished to remain under the Poles and a newly

"reunited" Ukraine had been a theme of all Ukrainian organizations; but the growing strength and size of the Soviet state threw the nationalists into a state of despair. The war was not turning out as they had wanted and expected; the Germans and Soviets had not knocked each other out and left the field clear for any smaller third parties.

The great campaign in northwest Europe climaxed the Canadian war effort. The heavy casualties caused a second conscription crisis in Canada, and there is some evidence that Ukrainians or other central Europeans were among the NRMA men who briefly protested against conscription for service overseas.

As the campaign in Europe ended, the issue of the Ukrainian refugees came even more to the fore and was debated both in the House of Commons and in the Senate. At this time, Anthony Hlynka was proposing again that Ukrainians in the western countries should represent the Ukrainian nation at the founding convention of the United Nations. Once again, however, Hlynka's suggestion was not taken seriously by the Canadian government and was completely overshadowed by the Soviet plan for a UN seat for the Soviet Ukrainian Republic.

While debate on the UN continued, Panchuk and his companions undertook the rescue of the Ukrainian refugees in western Europe. The UCSA was, in part, turned into a relief organization and many thousands of Ukrainian refugees benefited from the shelter afforded them by the Canadian servicemen.

From the question of the Ukrainian refugees to the first political moves of 1939, the story of the Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War was fraught with controversy and dissention. The organized Ukrainian community was sharply divided into nationalist and Communist camps which carried on their own propaganda war throughout the conflict. During the first part of the war, the nationalists held the advantage, during the second part the Communists. How much influence this war of words had over the three hundred thousand Canadians of Ukrainian origin remains, however, an open question. Government reports sometimes pointed out how weak the influence was and the conscription plebiscite of 1942 revealed this weakness to the Ukrainian leaders themselves as well as to officials in Ottawa and newspaper editors in western Canada. The masses of ordinary Canadians of Ukrainian origin remained largely untouched by this propaganda war and voted and enlisted according to motives that were very much their own. The legend of the forty thousand who served continued after the war had ended and was reinforced with the return of the servicemen to Canada. The servicemen became veterans who were proud of the job that they had done abroad. They fully expected to be accorded an honourable place in the mosaic of Canadian society.

## APPENDIX A

## Statistical Tables

Table 1. Cosmopolitan make-up of the Canadian Armed Forces

Total Enlisters Completing Occupational History Forms	Canada	Ontario	Manitoba	Saskatchewan	Alberta
	551,273	206,105	42,274	50,277	43,580
Languages					
Croatian	51	36	—	8	1
Czech	374	122	23	76	90
Danish	789	148	71	111	236
Dutch	768	200	162	165	106
German	9,036	1,525	996	3,994	1,497
Hungarian	1,092	421	63	361	131
Icelandic	665	36	448	125	21
Italian	2,247	1,162	27	20	105
Norwegian	1,907	131	106	743	546
Polish	2,884	1,080	629	342	341
Russian	948	286	78	173	135
Serb	71	34	2	8	3
Slovak	366	230	8	27	61
Slovene	147	145	—	—	—
Swedish	1,305	275	200	362	243
Ukrainian	<u>12,389</u>	<u>2,276</u>	<u>3,446</u>	<u>3,105</u>	<u>2,265</u>
Other	10,842	4,263	859	1,132	872
TOTAL	45,875	12,870	7,118	10,782	6,653

Source: Robert England Report, PAC RG 26 13A. Canada totals from 551,273 Hollerith cards punched from occupational history forms, coded to date to show by province of residence at enlistment, languages other than English (and/or) French spoken by men in the navy, army, and air force.

**Table 2. Language statistics of personnel of the Canadian Army (Active) from 1939-1945**

English Only	492,670	67.43%
French only	48,812	6.68%
English & French	110,256	15.29%
Others (ie. English and some "foreign" language other than French)	75,887	10.80%
TOTAL	730,625	100%

Source: PAC RG 24, vol. 18715, file "Language statistics." It is not stated on what basis these figures were compiled, or by whom they were compiled.

## The Problem of Ethnic Discrimination

Of the many veterans of the Canadian armed forces interviewed for the present study in the 1980s, several praised their English-Canadian officers and only one complained that ethnic prejudice on the part of the English-Canadian officers corps may have hampered his chances of promotion. This particular serviceman was a prominent UCSA activist with a very highly developed ethnic consciousness. Nevertheless, discrimination on the part of recruiting officers was a real problem at the beginning of the war (as the Robert England Report reveals) and although this problem diminished as the war progressed, and George Simpson and others approached prominent Ukrainian Canadians like Wladimir Kossar with a view to finding first-rate officer material among their younger acquaintances, the higher ranks remained overwhelmingly English. The delicacy of the problem is revealed in the following exchange of letters between Simpson and the young UCSA activist, L. Wojcichowsky. The letters are taken from the University of Saskatchewan Archives, George Simpson Papers, Ukrainian files, 1945-1949.

R155968 #2 A.N.S., R.C.A.F.  
Charlottetown, P.E.I.  
May 20, 1945.

Professor G.W. Simpson,  
Department of History,  
University of Saskatchewan,  
Saskatoon, Sask.

Professor Simpson:

Thanks very much for your letter of May 4th.

Am enclosing a copy of aims I submitted to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, as a basis for existence of the UCSA in Canada. There may be some things I haven't just thought of, but I hope they will come out during the discussions.

I would like some advice on a matter I am about to ask. The war with Germany is over now and the forces will be transferred to the far East. Without any doubt, a large proportion of Ukrainian lads will also go.

During the past five and a half years of war, it has been felt amongst the lads of Ukrainian descent that we were not treated as Canadians but as a special group. This was noticed from the day of entering the services to the battlefields.

As a few examples, I would like to add this.

The Army – the highest ranking officer is a Lieut.Col. The officer personnel is far less from the requirements of officers for the number of our boys in the service.

The Navy – the first commissioned rank we got was about a year ago, after Mr. Hlynka questioned it in the House of Commons.

The Air Force – upon graduation the fliers either get Sergeant hooks or Commissioned ranks. Only with very few exceptions, [did] Ukrainian lads get the hooks with the wing and no commissions.

These questions have been brought to my attention many times. I never knew what to say in reply and still don't. Is it because our boys are not fit for leadership that they are not given the opportunity or is there another reason?

I would like to state that in the Air Force, it seems that the interviews of personnel seem to be the answer. To a large extent our boys find themselves at a loss of what to say to the interviewing officers. These officers, in turn, show no interest to the leadership in society our boys have been accustomed to. We just haven't enough in common to impress interviewing officers to get the required recommendations. Some, of course, don't meet with the required academic standing. In such cases there are no questions. But, the boys that do meet the academic requirements, why shouldn't they be given equal opportunities?

Perhaps it is beyond my privileges of asking such questions. But I know that these lads have Canada for their home, and there aren't any intentions in our minds to ever leave this country. We are fighting for a better Canada. We love the very soil of this country. I personally saw lads overseas kiss a packet filled with this soil each night before going to bed. Such lads are true sons of a mother country. If so, are we not rightfully expecting leadership and equality with the sons of the citizens of this country?

In conclusion, I would like to ask whether any considerations were ever given in these matters, and what should my answers be to the boys who ask such questions?

Sincerely yours

Sgt. L. Wojcichowsky,  
Sec. UCSA Com. for Canada

May 25, 1945.

Sgt. L. Wojcichowsky,  
R155968,  
#2 A.N.S., R.C.A.F.,  
CHARLOTTETOWN, P.E.I.

Dear Sgt. Wojcichowsky:

Many thanks for your letter of May 20th. I consider that the questions which you raise are of the greatest importance. The task which you are undertaking is a difficult one. You and your friends are anxious to be treated exactly on the same basis as all other Canadians and yet you feel that you have certain interests in common which justify a separate organization. A separate organization will in itself tend to set you apart from other members of the Legion. This is a problem which cannot be solved by logic but only by compromise which keeps firmly and always in mind the final end to be achieved, namely complete equality among all Canadians.

The discrimination which you speak of has given me very great concern. To begin with it must be admitted, that human nature being as it is, there is always a transitional period in the assimilation process when the late comer is regarded with reserve, if not with suspicion. It takes a generation or two for this to disappear completely. I have talked with a considerable number of officers in the services. Some of them were sympathetic and understanding while with others you could sense just the opposite. For the most part the higher officers understood and were broad minded while prejudice and ignorance were sometimes found in the medium ranks. It must also be admitted that the Ukrainians have also in the past contributed to the build-up of prejudice. This has been done through the immoderate denunciation which individuals, sections and parties of Ukrainians, have indulged in. This has harmed all Ukrainians. For example, some people with whom I have talked have declared that Ukrainians must be radical since they had been informed by Ukrainians themselves of the existence of such a dangerous group. Others have told me that they had been informed that Ukrainians were all reactionary. Not knowing what the situation actually was many Canadians were inclined to maintain an attitude of reserve. The situation has been improved by the formation of the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee but the effects of years of mutual abuse and recrimination can still be seen.

I haven't any doubt about the future. Already younger leaders are emerging among the Ukrainian-Canadians who are showing character, moderation, and patience. With improvement in educational standards much more will be accomplished. As Canadians have learned to work together on the field of battle so they must learn to work together elsewhere. To hope that all discrimination will disappear, even apart from nationality origin, is to expect too much. To reduce it to a minimum by appealing to reason, fairness and a common citizenship must be the task of all of us. Some progress has undoubtedly been made but the task is a continuous one.

With kind regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
G.W. Simpson

## **Stephen Worobetz: Citation for the Military Cross**

During the course of researching the present study, several Ukrainian Canadian veterans suggested that no book about Ukrainian Canadian participation in the war effort would be complete without mentioning the name of Stephen Worobetz. During the war, Dr. Worobetz (b. 1914) served in England and in Italy and after 1945 returned to a private medical practice in Saskatchewan. He was for many years an active member of the BUC and of the Sheptytsky Institute, a student residence and cultural institution in Saskatoon. In 1970, Prime Minister Trudeau named him Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Saskatchewan and he served in this capacity until 1976. The citation is from the Department of National Defence, History Directorate, 713.065 (D2).

At 2000 hrs on the evening of 19 December, 1944, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry attacked a strongly fortified enemy position, supported by self-propelled guns and tanks, at MR 403412 (code name MAROON). The objective was only gained after hard and bitter fighting. The leading company suffered heavy casualties, not only in the initial attack but during an immediate enemy counter-attack; casualties were also caused by continuous mortaring, shelling, and fire from enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicles. The company's position was perilously held.

The unit Medical Officer, Captain Stephen WOROBETZ, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, had established his Regimental Aid Post near Tactical Battalion Headquarters at MR 410403. In the first attempt to evacuate casualties suffered by the leading company, the ambulance jeep which had gone forward was forced into the ditch by the intensity of enemy fire; the company's position represented a deep thrust into enemy lines and due to enemy dispositions on the right flank the sole approach to the position was swept by continuous fire from tanks and machine guns. A second ambulance jeep was despatched but the driver returned to say that it was impossible to get forward. Captain WOROBETZ reported the situation to the Commanding Officer at 2330 hours



and asked permission to make a third attempt himself. Leaving the Regimental Aid Post in charge of his medical sergeant, he proceeded in the ambulance carrier, accompanied only by the driver; he carried a few instruments and necessary medical supplies. Making his way through intense enemy fire along the axis of advance, Captain WOROBETZ reached MR 405415 only 300 yards short of the company position, at about midnight. Although a fierce battle was still raging at MAROON, he established his aid post in a house here, and commenced operations. Enemy fire continued at an intense rate for two or three hours, during which time the post received two direct shell hits and one hit by armour-piercing shot from a tank or self-propelled gun. Nevertheless, this officer worked without respite until 0500 hours 20 December 1944, tending the wounded and performing minor operations at this advanced post. At about 0230 hours when the enemy's fire had lessened somewhat, Captain WOROBETZ sent word back for the remaining ambulance jeep to come forward and assist in the evacuation of casualties.

During the five hours that the advanced aid-post was functioning, Captain WOROBETZ handled twenty five PPCLI casualties; in addition to these he treated eleven wounded from a neighbouring infantry unit and from supporting arms. After returning to his Regimental Aid Post he treated an additional twenty-seven PPCLI casualties plus five from another infantry unit, making a total of sixty-eight cases over a period of 36 hours. Captain WOROBETZ remained on duty throughout the whole of this time except for one hour's sleep in the afternoon of 20 December.

Captain WOROBETZ's courage and devotion to duty under enemy fire was in the highest tradition of the Medical Services, due to his bravery in going forward to administer to the wounded when it became apparent that they could not be brought back to him, he doubtless prevented loss of life and limb among the more serious cases. His hard work, over a period of the first 36 hours of the action during which he had only one hour's sleep is deserving of high praise. At the same time, the knowledge that due to Captain WOROBETZ's presence well forward, casualties could now be treated and evacuated inspired confidence and had a tremendous effect on the morale of the troops holding MAROON.

Granted an immediate M.C.  
H.R. Alexander Field Marshal  
Supreme Allied Commander in Chief  
Mediterranean Theatre.

## APPENDIX D

### The 1939 UNF Mission to Europe and “the Legend of the Gold Watch.”

As long-time head of the rightist UNF and one of its most active members during the war years, Wladimir Kossar came under intense criticism from both his Communist and his non-Communist rivals. Kossar had attended cadet school and served in the Imperial Austrian army during the 1914-18 war, and afterwards served in the Ukrainian Galician army during the struggle for Ukrainian independence. He was twice wounded and in the opinion of some retained a military bearing to the end of his days. According to former UNF youth activist, Paul Yuzyk, this, as much as his rightist politics, made him an exemplary target for the charges of “militarism” and “fascism” which were often levelled against the UNF in the 1930s and 1940s. Rumours about his secret political manoeuvring persisted for many years and as late as the early 1970s the author of this book heard the story of how the UNF under Kossar had sent a “gold watch” to Hitler. The following two documents taken from Kossar’s private papers (PAC, vol. 5, file 3, and vol. 6, file 33) tell his side of the story as he wanted it to be told while the war was still in progress. In the first document Kossar details the nature of his 1939 trip to Europe, stressing his contacts with British consular officials and omitting his meeting with OUN leaders in Venice. In the second document, a law firm in Timmins, Ontario, explains the difficulties of filing suit against the Communist activist with whom the story of the gold watch seems to have originated.

Saskatoon, Sask.,  
May 5th, 1943.

D/Cpl. M.V. Nolan,  
R.C.M.P.  
Saskatoon, Sask.

Dear Sir:

At your personal request of May 5th 1943, I wish to make the following statements:

1. Re: *My trip to Europe in 1939* – (from June 8th to July 28th)  
(a) *Personal* – Prior to my departure for Canada, I spent seven years in the city of Uzhorod, the capital of the Carpatho-Ukraine in

Czechoslovakia. I worked there as a senior officer in the Department of Agriculture in that country; at the same time I was delegated by the Department to teach agriculture in the Normal School and Theological Faculty. I was married there and buried my first son in that city. At the time of leaving the country my financial affairs were only temporarily arranged and required final settlement.

Besides my interest in Uzhorod, I also entertained the hope of seeing my relatives who were living just across the Czechoslovak-Polish border. The latter intention however did not materialize.

(b) *Impersonal* – For 2-1/2 years since 1918-1920 I was an officer in the Ukrainian Republican Army. During that time Ukraine was invaded by Germans, the Russians (red and white), and the Poles. The Ukrainian army defending the Ukrainian territories from the invaders, fought in turn with each of these forces and in certain cases with all of them at the same time. In these years my unit was in action from the Carpathian mountains to the Dnieper River. I was a personal witness of gross injustices, terror, atrocities and murders by the aggressive forces committed against defenceless Ukrainian people. After the Ukrainian Army was finally defeated in 1920, I left for Czechoslovakia and later on for Canada. I could not, however, forget the conditions in Ukraine. After the collapse of Free Republican Ukraine, events under Russian, Polish and other occupants of Ukrainian territories were most disquieting. At the same time, contradictory reports were violently forced into circulation, thus obscuring the true situation there.

Under these circumstances it was thought that personal observations would help to clarify the reality. For this latter reason my intention was to visit as many countries in Europe as my time would permit and to meet as many Ukrainian leaders of various political views as possible.

Before my departure from Saskatoon, I intimated my intention in this regard to the proper University authorities. To them I expressed my personal conviction that I [might] during this trip make such observations which [might] be of interest both to Canadian and British Governments. From them I received not only formal approval of my intention and the viewpoint, but also friendly encouragements, much advice, and letters of introduction to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, and the High Commissioner for Canada in London, with the suggestion to him to put me in contact with proper authorities in the British Government.

I visited Dr. O.D. Skelton and Dr. Robertson of the office of foreign affairs in Ottawa. In [a] long interview with each of them we discussed the matter again and at the conclusion of these conversations I was promised that they also would communicate with Canada House in London.

I was in Europe exactly one month. I visited Paris and had discussions at the Department of Foreign Affairs and visited the British and American Embassies and was invited by Mr. Bullet, the American Ambassador, to his home.

Through Switzerland I went to Venice in Italy, Zagreb in Yugoslavia, Budapest in Hungary, Uzhorod, [and] Hust in Carpatho-Ukraine, then occupied by Hungary. Not being able to obtain the necessary permits from the Hungarian authorities to travel directly from Carpatho-Ukraine to Slovakia, I went through Vienna (Austria) to Bratislava (Slovakia), with the object to get German visas for Prague (Bohemia). This however was refused three times by the German

Consulate in Bratislava, with the threat that if I persisted, I would be denied transit going West through German territories.

My interest in going to Prague was to see Dr. A. Volos[h]in, the president of the Carpatho-Ukraine Government-in-Exile. Dr. Volos[h]in was my colleague at the Normal School at Uzhorod and it was my primary intention to induce him to leave the territories under German Control and go to Great Britain or North America.

Dr. Volos[h]in not being permitted to leave Prague for Bratislava, sent Mr. Revay instead, the premier of his government, for an interview.

In each capital I visited the British Embassy or Consulate where I received necessary information, help, and advice.

From there I returned to Vienna and the next day left via France, Belgium, and Holland for London. At this point I wish to state clearly *that at no time I stopped at any point on the territories belonging to Germany proper.*

In London, I visited [the] Honorable Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada and with his help had an interview with [the] British Foreign Office. At this visit I intimated my observations of the trip and also left a written statement on the matter. Dr. William Allen, the Canadian Agricultural Commissioner to London was very helpful to me during my stay in London. I also visited the Office of the Ukrainian National Information Service in London, which was established by the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada. In connection with this office I may state that the expenses for maintaining it were covered from the "Penny Fund" collected for this special purpose through unsolicited donations of the Ukrainian Canadians.

Upon my return to Canada, I stopped at Ottawa and gave a report of my trip to Dr. Robertson, at present, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.

2. *Re: My alleged statement at Cairn's Field at Saskatoon after my return from Europe.*

You read to me a sworn statement of a supposed eye witness at that occasion which reads in part (as far as I recollect) as follows: "The Ukrainian people have no hope of getting help from Britain or Canada – but only from Germany. Long live our father Hitler".

The statement just quoted is supposed to be a part of my public address at Cairn's Field.

I wish to mention in this connection that the mayor of this city with other officials were present at that meeting.

It is absolutely untrue that I made such a statement.

Photographs were made of all the audience present. I would suggest therefore that you try at least to verify from that picture whether or not your informer is to be found in the crowd. I also suggest that you inquire of any person present shown on the photograph for the confirmation of the sworn statement in your possession. At your request I will gladly supply a copy of the photograph.

I expressed privately and publicly my high appreciation to the Canadian social and political order and to the British democracy in general on many occasions prior to 1939 while speaking before the Canadian Legion in Saskatoon, in my contacts with my numerous British-Canadian friends and before Ukrainian Canadian audiences.

I may add to this that for these very views that are so well known to Canadian Communists, I and the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada were maliciously attacked by them as being hirelings of [the] Canadian Police and Capitalists. Altogether I was accused by that group of the worst crimes to be found in the most extensive dictionaries.

3. Re: *Gold watch* – \$200 in value as you stated, presented by me personally to Hitler.

This story originated at Timmins with Comrade A[...] stating publicly that such a watch was sent (not presented personally by me) to Hitler, by Ukrainian Nationalists in Kirkland Lake. From the appendix attached you may see what action was taken by the Timmins Association and the Ukrainian National Federation in Kirkland Lake and that only for the reasons given by the lawyer, the case was dropped.

A watch really was purchased by the members of [the] Kirkland Lake branch of the UNF and sent to me as a Christmas present, and that watch is in my possession at present. Please verify this statement at that locality.

In conclusion, I may direct your attention to the fact that the historical review of the activities of the UNF of Canada since its reception in 1932 to the present time is incorporated in the pamphlet now in press *A Program and a Record*. This will be forwarded to you in due time.

From that pamphlet you may see the way we react to the unscrupulous, unethical and fundamentally false accusations against the Ukrainian National Federation.

Yours truly,  
W. Kossar

CALDBICK & YATES  
Barristers, Solicitors, Notaries

Bank of Commerce Building

Timmins, Ont.  
November 6th, 1939.

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S.A. Caldbick C.W. Yates, B.A.

Ukrainian National Federation,  
of Canada, Box 1107,  
Saskatoon, Sask.

Re Timmins Association vs  
A[...]

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Dear Sirs:

We were consulted in this matter by members of your Timmins Association with reference to remarks which were made concerning your Association by A[...] at a meeting held in the Goldfields Theatre in Timmins on September the 17th. The remarks complained of were as follows:-

"Mr. Wren has constantly attacked the Communists" he said. "It is not my desire to support or attack him on these issues, but it is very

strange he has not written an editorial attacking Fascist organizations. His policy must be dictated by the Fascist organizations. In such crises why does he not demand an investigation of such organizations as the Ukrainian Nationalists, a known Fascist organization, and that Society in Kirkland Lake which only last year sent a gold watch to Hitler on the occasion of his birthday?"

These remarks were taken from the Timmins Press reporting the meeting of that evening. We later endeavoured to secure evidence from other sources than the Timmins Press concerning the actual remarks made, but we find that it was impossible to do this as those who had attended the meeting were either sympathizers of A[....] or had no recollection of the words complained of.

The first question in the matter was whether the words themselves were slanderous. It is slanderous to say anything concerning another calculated to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or which tends to lower him in the estimation of men. Specifically it is slanderous in time of war to state of a man that he is an alien enemy, or to say that he is disloyal. It may be that in these remarks there was an implication that your Association was disloyal and we think that had everything else operated to give you a good cause of action we could have proceeded on the words which were spoken of you.

We were instructed that your Association is an unincorporated association and in a situation like this any action would have to be a class action, that is, that individuals would have to sue on behalf of themselves and all other members of your association. We are faced with the further difficulty that in an action for slander, that is for spoken defamation, it is necessary to prove actual damages. This means that each individual would have to be prepared to prove that by reason of the words which were spoken concerning the Association, he, as a member of it, suffered actual monetary damages. For example, if one of the members could show that his employer had read these words, knew that the individual was a member of your organization, and by reason of this the employer imputed disloyalty to this individual and discharged him, then, of course, we should be in a position to prove actual damages.

We interviewed the reporter from the Press who had reported the meeting at which the remarks complained of were made and unfortunately he had destroyed his notes, but his recollection seemed fairly clear on the subject. We questioned him particularly concerning the last sentence of the remarks and his understanding of it was that the Society which was alleged to have sent a watch to Hitler was a separate and distinct society from yours which A[....] left unnamed. The reporter was perfectly clear that this sentence did not apply to your organization.

We also investigated A's financial responsibility and our investigations disclose that even in the event that you could fix liability upon him it would be practically impossible to collect any judgement which you might obtain. Publicity which would inevitably be attached to any proceedings which you might bring might or might not be favourable to you, depending on the result of the action, and in dealing with people of A's kind, one is always risking a misrepresentation of facts, so that within a limited circle, at least, the publicity might be quite [un?]-favourable.

To sum the situation up it appears to us that while the words spoken concerning you might be defamatory it is very doubtful if they were actionable, due to the fact that you must be able to prove actual money damages to some members of your organization arising from the words spoken. This you have been unable to prove up until the present time at least. We think therefore that it would be inadvisable for you to commence action since, if you did, and the action was dismissed because you could not prove these damages, in the eyes of the public it might appear that the action was dismissed because the remarks were true, and this publicity might do you serious harm. There is [the] further fact that even if we obtained Judgement it would be almost impossible to collect it and the expenses entailed in the action would be very considerable.

We trust that this will give you the information that you require about this matter. However, if there is anything else which you would like to know please do not hesitate to write us and ask for it.

We have drawn our bill for our services which we are sending to the Kirkland Lake Branch and which we trust is satisfactory.

Yours truly,

CALDBICK & YATES

## Ukrainian History and the War

The "struggle for hearts and minds" has always been a part of warfare and this reality has touched upon the history of the Ukrainians living in North America as much as anyone else. At the time of the pioneer migration to the Canadian prairies, of course, the name "Ukraine" was almost completely unknown to English-speaking readers and, for the most part, western scholarship about "Ruthenians" and "Little Russians," as they were then called, simply did not exist. What was known about the Ukrainian steppelands emanated principally from Russian sources and reflected a traditional Russian point of view.

The 1914–18 war changed this situation somewhat. In England, the mysterious journalist, George Raffalovich (Bedwin Sands) and his Ukraine Committee was active publishing booklets and pamphlets on Ukrainians and the Ukrainian question, while in the United States, Omelian Reviuk (1887–1912) and the Ukrainian National Council in Jersey City, New Jersey, sponsored a series of general informational pamphlets. Raffalovich, in particular, translated an influential synopsis of Ukrainian history by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was already the foremost Ukrainian historian of his time. Hrushevsky's *The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem* (London 1915; repr. Cleveland 1981), 58 pp., was a highly partisan work, especially in its treatment of recent events, but was probably the most substantial English-language contribution to Ukrainian history made during the Great War. Other members of Raffalovich's Ukraine Committee included the Reverend Hunter-Boyd, who had been a pastor of the Protestant Church in Manitoba, where he had first come into contact with "Galician" pioneers. R.W. Seton-Watson also attended some meetings. (On Raffalovich, see "Ukrainske pyttania v Anhlії 50 rokiv tomu," *Suchastnist*, no. 3 [Munich 1963], pp. 117–120, Oryp Kravcheniuk, "Shche pro 'Ukrainske pyttania v Anhlії...' ibid., no. 9 [1963], pp. 113–17, and the remarks of David Saunders, "Britain and the Ukrainian Question," *English Historical Review*, ciii (January 1988), pp. 40–68.

During the 1920s very little new material appeared in English on the Ukrainian question. But with the 1930 "pacification" of eastern



Galicia, and collectivization and famine in Soviet Ukraine, a new series of magazine articles and pamphlets began to appear. Most of this material was highly polemical in tone. In the mid-1930s Vladimir Kysilewsky at the Ukrainian Bureau in London compiled a very full bibliography of such materials and intended to publish it at that time. But political events began to move so quickly that Kysilewsky was drawn to other tasks and his bibliography did not appear in print until the 1960s. (See V. J. Kay-Kysilewsky, *Ukraine, Russia and Other Slavic Countries in English Literature... 1912-1936*, *Slavistica*, no. 40 [Winnipeg, 1961].)

The stormy events of 1938 and 1939 once again attracted attention to the Ukrainian Question and a number of scholars and interested parties sat down to write general histories of Ukraine for the English speaking reader. The first to appear was Hugh P. Vowles, *Ukraine and its People: The Essential Background of One of Europe's Vital Problems* (London 1939), 224 pp. This book was not a work of scholarship, but rather a somewhat racy account of Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian question from a plainly pro-Soviet viewpoint. The schematization and presentation, however, were far more loose and flexible than anything that a historian living inside the Soviet Union could have written. Vowles stressed the oppression of the Ukrainian people throughout the ages, accepted the existence of the modern Ukrainian nationality, praised the Bolshevik revolution and Stalin's collectivization program, called Pilsudski a "fanatical nationalist," and claimed that Hitler intended to make use of Ukrainian "separatist" movements in favour of a Great Ukraine for the sake of his own territorial ambitions. Vowles also mentioned the importance of the Ukrainians in America where, he stated, they were one million strong, and in Canada, where they ostensibly formed the third-largest nationality after the English and the French.

George Simpson's edition of Doroshenko's *History of the Ukraine*, trans. Hanna Chikalenko-Keller (Edmonton 1939), 686 pp. with twelve maps, was the next major work to appear. Simpson's edition was an abridged translation from the Ukrainian of Doroshenko's brilliant two-volume synthesis of Ukrainian history. Unlike Vowles' book, it was a serious piece of scholarship with a decent bibliography and a dispassionate exposition of the material. However, Doroshenko's point of view was also fairly clear. His work stressed the state-building aspirations of the population of Kievan Rus', of various Cossack chieftains, and of the modern Ukrainians. Doroshenko was sympathetic to the minor nobility, the Cossack officer stratum, and the educated classes in general, and his history breathed a fairly conservative spirit. Since it was the first major work of a Ukrainian historian to be translated into English, it was very well received by Ukrainians in Canada and the United States who were hungry for basic materials about their European heritage. (See, for example, Roman Lapica, "Doroshenko's History of Ukraine," *The Trident*, IV, 4 [New York, 1940], pp. 39-41.). Several months after the war had begun Doroshenko's history was favourably reviewed by Watson Kirkconnell, who took the opportunity to urge Ukrainian Canadians to unite behind Canada's war effort. (See Watson Kirkconnell, "The Ukrainian Nation," *Tribune* February 3, 1940.) The book was quickly sold out and had to be reprinted. On the other hand, it was subsidized and distributed by the USSR and did not receive the academic publicity and scholarly attention that it prob-

ably deserved. (It was not, for example, reviewed in the *Queen's Quarterly*, and although Stuart R. Tompkins reviewed it favourably in the American-based *Journal of Central European Affairs*, I, no. 1 (1941), pp. 104-105, he also wrote that it was "doubtless intended for the very considerable Ukrainian colony in western Canada.") Kysilewsky in London investigated putting out another edition through Everyman's Library, but nothing came of the idea.

About the same time that the USRL was putting out Simpson's edition of the Doroshenko history, Pierre Bregy and Prince Serge Obolensky saw their *The Ukraine: A Russian Land*, trans. George Knupffer (London: Selwyn and Blount, 1940), 260 pp. with five maps, appear in print. Obolensky, who was a liberal and francophile Russian aristocrat, authored a learned, discursive study, reflective rather than scholarly. He stressed the geographical unity of all the "Russian lands" and viewed Ukraine as a distinct region of Russia. For Obolensky, Ukrainians were merely a regional variety of Russians and the Ukrainian people did not exist as a separate nation. Obolensky stressed the federalist rather than nationalist traditions of the Ukrainian movement of the nineteenth century and was strongly critical of twentieth-century German influences upon the Ukrainian national movement. For Obolensky, Ukraine could not exist separately from Russia, and Ukrainian literature did not go beyond the bounds of peasant literature. Obolensky was also critical of the Hetmanite movement with its German patronage, but he mentioned Danylo's successful North American tour and the fact that the "rich and numerous" Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States were strong supporters of national independence, who, however, were ostensibly willing to co-operate with local Russian organizations.

Obolensky's liberal Russian exposition, like the pro-Soviet book by Vowles, was a simple, popularly written treatment of a complex and very difficult problem. Simpson's edition of Doroshenko's history gave an alternate Ukrainian point of view, but it was a much longer and more scholarly treatment which could not appeal to the same general public. Also, Doroshenko did not treat of events after 1920, and Simpson added but a brief note to bring the reader up to date. The need for a popularly written presentation of the Ukrainian viewpoint remained apparent.

There was an attempt to fill this gap. Along with Vowles, Simpson and Obolensky, Charles Milnes Gaskell, one of UNF emissary Stephen Davidovich's contacts in London, wrote on the Ukrainian question. His "A Submerged Nation: The Ukrainian Case" (251 pp.) was in the same class as the books by Vowles and Obolensky but, as the title suggested, reflected a clearly Ukrainian point of view. It was dedicated "to the memory of Michael Hrushevsky" and surveyed the entire course of Ukrainian history, with plenty of space given to interwar developments and the current Ukrainian question. Gaskell praised the simple virtues of the sturdy Ukrainian peasantry and painted Muscovite governors, Polish landlords and Jewish servitors in darker colours. He disassociated Ukrainian nationalism from German territorial ambitions in the east and was very critical of the Soviet regime. By the end of 1939, Gaskell's book was ready for publication. He submitted it to Hutchinson Publishers in London but the firm did not think that the book would pay. Gaskell told Davidovich that if the Canadian and American Ukrainians could raise a subsidy of £ 200, Hutchinson would

be willing to print and distribute the book. Davidovich informed the UNF Dominion Executive which included Kossar, and the latter suggested that Simpson might add a preface. But neither Gaskell nor Hutchinson liked the idea and publication was further delayed. Gaskell joined the Ministry of War, the war intensified, the Soviet Union became an ally, and the book was never published. Gaskell was killed in an air crash on his way home from the Yalta conference. After his death, his wife, Lady Patricia, gave the manuscript to Olga and Stephen Pawluk in the hope that one day the North American Ukrainians would publish it on their own, but this never came to pass. (Olga and Stephen Pawluk interview, Toronto; Davidovich-Kossar correspondence, Immigration History Research Centre, Alexander Granovsky Papers, vol. 41, file UNF).

Instead, another book reflecting the traditional Russian viewpoint appeared. W.E.D. Allen's *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge University Press 1940), 404 pp. with maps, was a very scholarly work and obviously the fruit of many years of study. Allen discussed "Kievian Russia," spoke of the great Cossack revolt against the Poles and of the fate of the local "Russian" population, and was very critical of modern Ukrainian nationalism, which he repeatedly linked to Germany. Allen appended a bibliographical note to the end of each chapter and in these he was very critical of both Hrushevsky and Doroshenko whom he regarded as "nationalists." Allen had corresponded with some of the leading Russian émigré historians, such as George Vernadsky of Yale University, and his final distillation of the sources revealed it. The book was warmly received in the English-speaking academic world – especially in view of the new anti-German alliance between Britain and the Soviets – but it got a critical review in Davidovich's London-based *Ukrainian Bulletin* in which Allen's consistent russophile bias was analysed in detail. (See "Ukrainian Bulletin" pro "The Ukraine" Ellena," *Novyi shliakh* May 22 and June 26, 1941. In English; Allen-Vernadsky correspondence, George Vernadsky Papers, Russian Archives, Columbia University Library, New York).

Ukrainian leaders in both the United States and Canada were disconcerted by the appearance of Allen's book. While the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* reprinted Davidovich's critical comments from the *Ukrainian Bulletin*, Ukrainian-American leaders, especially the top administrators of the Ukrainian National Association, which published *Svoboda* and the *Ukrainian Weekly*, redoubled their efforts to publish an authoritative scholarly work that would be able to compete with Allen's history. Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O.V. Frederiksen (New Haven, 1941), with a preface by George Vernadsky, 629 pp. maps, was the result. The actual translation was done by Wasyl Halich, Luke Myshuha, Omelian Reviuk (managing editor of *Svoboda*) and Stephen Shumeyko, of the *Ukrainian Weekly*). Unaware of George Vernadsky's connections with Allen, these men invited the émigré Russian historian, whose father had been the first president of the Kiev-based Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, to participate in their project. Meanwhile, Communist-front groups in the United States began attacking Hrushevsky's reputation, slandering him as a pro-Nazi anti-semitic. Vernadsky, who wrote a complimentary preface to Hrushevsky's work and submitted it to the Yale University Press, had to assure the press that Hrushevsky had been a reputable scholar and could not be accused of ethnic prejudice. When it finally appeared in late 1941, Hrushev-

sky's history, which contained a wealth of detail, an updated bibliography with titles in both Cyrillic and Latin type, and reproductions of a number of antique maps, made a very good impression. On the other hand, because the editors used modern Ukrainian instead of the traditional Russian-style orthography and transliteration (thus Volodymyr instead of Vladimir) and insisted upon certain nationalist fetishes (such as spelling "Kozaks" instead of "Cossacks"), both in an attempt to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian cultural heritage, the book proved somewhat disconcerting to the average non-Ukrainian reader.

While he was working on Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine*, Vernadsky simultaneously completed a second study of Ukrainian history, which consisted of a biography of the famous Ukrainian Cossack leader, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. This book, too, was sponsored by the Ukrainian National Association and published by Yale University Press. It had no pretensions to scholarship, however, and was plainly a popularization. Although its romanticized tone of hero-worship undoubtedly touched the pride of many a young North American Ukrainian reader, Vernadsky's *Bohdan Hetman of Ukraine* glossed over the violent nature of the great Cossack revolt against the Poles and raised the ire of many a Polish and Jewish reviewer. (On Vernadsky and the Ukrainians, see Charles J. Halperin, "Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism," *Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte*, XXXVI [Berlin 1985], pp. 159-63.)

While Ukrainians in North America and in England were doing their best to publicize their cause and expand the scholarly corpus devoted to Ukrainian history, the course of the war in Europe was having a profound effect upon the treatment of history in the Soviet Union. After the Soviet annexation of the western Ukrainian lands, Ukrainian national sentiment, which Stalin had thoroughly repressed during the 1930s, was partly rehabilitated and books about Ukrainian history again began to appear. In 1941 Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union caused Stalin to appeal even more openly to Russian and Ukrainian patriotic sentiments. Books about Alexander Nevsky, who had driven off the Teutonic invaders during the middle ages, and about Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who had driven off the Poles, became commonplace and the newer histories had a substantial degree of national content. Of course, this phenomenon did not go unnoticed by the Ukrainian Communists living in Canada and the United States, most of whom sincerely believed that the Soviet state had "solved" the national question and had always encouraged the development of Ukrainian culture. Thus in 1944 the former ULFTA members grouped around the pro-Communist Toronto weekly *Ukrainske zhyttia* published a North American edition of the recently released *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (*Outline of Ukrainian History*) originally published by the Institute of History and Archeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (213 pp.). This book employed strictly Communist periodization, vocabulary, and themes, but contained a great deal of basic factual material that could never have been published in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. There is no doubt that such a development raised the spirits of Ukrainian pro-Communists in Canada and in the United States and that by reprinting the book in Canada they hoped to further strengthen their cause.

The final contribution to general English-language Ukrainian history did not so much reflect the Communist as it did the "nationalist" interpretation of Ukrainian history. William Henry Chamberlin's *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York 1944), 91 pp., was the popular-style survey with special attention to modern affairs that Gaskell's book was meant to be. Chamberlin was an experienced journalist who had spent twelve years in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*. His history of *The Russian Revolution 1919-1921* was already a widely read book and his wife was Ukrainian-born. Chamberlin glossed over the early history of the country and devoted a few pages to the Cossack era, but his portrayal of Soviet-Ukrainian history was detailed and first-hand. He presented an accurate picture of the purges of the national intelligentsia during the early 1930s and gave an eye-witness account of the Great Famine of 1933; he also surveyed wartime developments and speculated as to the future of eastern Europe under the Soviets. Chamberlin's book was just what the non-Communist Ukrainian organizations in North America wanted and Alexander Granovsky and his colleagues distributed as many copies as they could at the UN conference in San Francisco.

In general then, the war of 1939-45 saw for the first time the emergence of a new literature in the English language dealing with Ukraine and Ukrainians. For the first time, not only could young Canadian- and American-born Ukrainians read about the history of their people in English, but any inquisitive westerner could pick up a book giving the old-style Russian, newer Soviet, or one of several Ukrainian national points of view. The various English-language publications by Vowles, Doroshenko, Allen, Hrushevsky and Chamberlin were made possible by a momentous conflict in Europe which caused a relatively small immigrant community in North America to mobilize its resources and put forth its point of view. Good scholarship was the beneficiary.

# Notes

## CHAPTER 1: THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS, 1891-1939

1. The classic study of the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to Canada is Vladimir J. Kaye, *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada 1895-1900* (Toronto 1964), which stresses the role of the Lviv (Lemberg) professor, Osyp (Joseph) Oleskiv, in redirecting the emigration from Brazil to Canada. Ivan Franko, who was the foremost literary figure among the Galician Ukrainians, also participated. See my "Ivan Franko and Mass Ukrainian Emigration to Canada," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* xxvi, no. 4 (Toronto 1984), pp. 307-17. More generally, see Jaroslav Petryshyn, *Peasants in the Promised Land: Canada and the Ukrainians 1891-1914* (Toronto 1985), which gives further references.
2. Nestor Dmytriw, a Greek Catholic priest and editor of *Svoboda*, a Ukrainian-language newspaper published in Mount Carmel, Pennsylvania, visited the Canadian prairies in 1897-98, but soon returned to the United States. Almost fifteen years passed before significant numbers of priests arrived from Galicia. See Petryshyn, *Peasants in the Promised Land*, pp. 92-93, 128ff.; Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada* (Ottawa 1981), pp. 29-53.
3. See "The Problem of the Ethnic Name," in Kaye's *Early Ukrainian Settlements*, pp. xxiii-xxvi.
4. Petryshyn, *Peasants in the Promised Land*, pp. 128-40; Olha Woycenko, "Community Organizations: The Pioneer Years," in *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*, ed. Manoly R. Lupul (Toronto 1982), pp. 173-78.
5. The texts of the Budka letters are given in V. J. Kaye's *Ukrainian Canadians in Canada's Wars: Materials for Ukrainian Canadian History* ed. J.B. Gregorovich (Toronto 1983), i, pp. 13-18. On the other hand, Stella Hryniuk, in "The Bishop Budka Controversy: A New Perspective," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* xxiii, no. 2 (Toronto 1981), pp. 154-65, argues that general jingoist sentiment developed quite quickly in Canada and that the Budka controversy had no effect on government policy.
6. See the essays by Peter Melnycky, "The Internment of Ukrainians in Canada," and John Herd Thompson, "The Enemy Alien and the Canadian Election of 1917," in *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War*, ed. Frances Swyripa and J.H. Thompson (Edmonton 1983), pp. 1-46. In reviewing *Loyalties in Conflict*, Bohdan Budurowycz, in *Canadian Slavonic Papers* xxvi, no. 4 (Toronto 1984), pp. 380-81, pointed out that, while Canada's treatment of its minorities during 1914-18 seems deplorable to the contemporary observer, far worse happened in European states of the time such as Austria-Hungary, and Y.G. Kelebay, in "Internment in Canada or the Foxholes of Europe," *Ukrainian Echo* (Toronto), January 30, 1985, suggested that for all the mosquitoes and other troubles, Canadian internment camps in the northern bush were probably more agreeable than were the trenches of western Europe. According to Martin Kitchen, in "The German Invasion of Canada in the First World War," *International History Review* vii, no. 2 (Vancouver 1985), pp. 245-60, German officials did, in fact, seriously consider supporting an invasion of western Canada by some 650,000 German and

Irish Americans wearing cowboy-style uniforms. Kitchen summarizes the words of the architect of the project thus: "Were the Canadian government to protest the approach of 650,000 heavily armed cowboys with foreign accents marching towards their border, it would simply infuriate the American authorities and help to drive the United States into the welcoming arms of the Central Powers" (p. 249).

7. Paul Yuzyk, "The Expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church Among the Ukrainians of North America to 1918," *Studia Ukrainica* II (Ottawa 1984), pp. 213-24, discusses the religious question. Frances Swyripa, "The Ukrainian Image: Loyal Citizen or Disloyal Alien," in *Loyalties in Conflict*, pp. 47-68, deals briefly with Shandro and Krat.
8. Kaye, *Ukrainian Canadians in Canada's Wars*, pp. 36, 45.
9. See Philip Konowal, letter of April 9, 1956, to Stephen Pawluk, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), National Ethnic Archives, Stephen Pawluk Collection, vol. III, file 14, MG 31, D155, which also contains considerable biographical material on Konowal. The association provided Konowal with the requested funds. For the official citation on the occasion of Konowal's VC, see Kaye, *Ukrainian Canadians in Canada's Wars*, p. 57.
10. *Robochyi narod* (Winnipeg), March 23, 1917, and quoted in full in Nestor Makuch, "The Influence of the Ukrainian Revolution on Ukrainians in Canada, 1917-1922," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 6 (Toronto 1979), p. 53. For a well-informed account of the March Revolution in Russia, and a Canadian perspective on the revolutionary events in Kiev which led to the "First Universal" of the Ukrainian Central Rada declaring Ukrainian national autonomy, see "Rosiska revoliutsia," and "Vesna dlia narodiv Rosii i voskresenie ukrainskoho zhytia," in *Kalendar Kanadiiskoho Rusyna na 1918 rik* (Winnipeg), pp. 213-35. Both of these articles are profusely illustrated.
11. Oleh W. Gerus, "Ukrainian Diplomatic Representation in Canada, 1920-1923," in *Loyalties in Conflict*, pp. 143-58.
12. Kaye, "Ukrainian Canadians Serving in the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force," in *Ukrainian Canadians in Canada's Wars*, pp. 50-54.
13. Rev. Captain Wellington Bridgeman, *Breaking Prairie Sod* (Toronto 1920), p. 256. Also see D.H. Avery, "The Radical Alien and the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919," in *The West and the Nation: Essays in Honour of W.L. Morton*, ed. C. Berger and R. Cook (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 209-31, and his *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada 1896-1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1980), pp. 90-115.
14. P.H. Woycenko, letter of January 18, 1920, to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Olha Woycenko Collection, vol. XII, file Hrushevsky, MG 30, D212.
15. Such was the opinion of numerous informants interviewed for the present study. In parts of rural Saskatchewan, negative connotations still attach to the term Galician, which is now used only when reminiscing about old times.
16. The works of these individuals are summarized in Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of their Portrayal in English Language Works* (Edmonton 1978), pp. 34-45.
17. Watson Kirkconnell, "Western Immigration," *Canadian Forum* (Toronto), July 1928, pp. 706-707, and reprinted in Howard Palmer, *Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism* (Toronto: Copp Clark 1975), pp. 56-58.
18. See Watson Kirkconnell, *Canadian Overtones* (Winnipeg 1935), for his first collection of poetry of the "European Canadians." Seventeen Ukrainian-

- Canadian poets were represented. More generally, see Kirkconnell's *A Slice of Canada: Memoirs* (Toronto 1967), pp. 75-82, which stresses his initial interest in the Manitoba Icelanders, and Nandor Dreisziger, "Watson Kirkconnell: Translator of Hungarian Poetry and friend of Hungarian-Canadians," *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies* IV, no. 2 (Kingston 1977), pp. 117-44, which is a good biographical survey.
19. John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto 1979), pp. 1-27; Nelson Wiseman, "The Politics of Manitoba's Ukrainians Between the Wars," *Prairie Forum* XII, no. 1 (Regina 1987), pp. 95-121, especially pp. 103-109.
  20. Wiseman, "The Politics of Manitoba's Ukrainians," p. 107.
  21. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108; Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion*, pp. 14-16.
  22. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21. See also Bohdan S. Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada 1899-1962* (Kingston 1986), pp. 52-58.
  23. In Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 48-50. Compare Woycenko, "Community Organizations," p. 181; see also her *The Ukrainians in Canada* (Winnipeg: Canada Ethnica 1968), p. 191.
  24. Interview with Savella Stechishin, Saskatoon, April 1985; Interview with Ol'ha Woycenko, Ottawa, April 1984.
  25. Yuzyk, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada*, pp. 143-68.
  26. Woycenko, "Community Organizations," p. 183; *Almanakh: Ukrainska Striletska Hromada v Kanadi 1928-1938* (Saskatoon 1938), pp. 7-9; Zynovii Knysh, "Persnyi protest," in *Za chesť za slavu za narod! Zbirnyk na zolotyj invilei Ukrainshoi Striletskoi Hromady v Kanadi 1928-1978* (Toronto 1978), pp. 61-69. In fact, as early as 1911 Ukrainian Canadians had helped effect the escape from a Austrian prison of the student, Myroslav Sichynsky, who was serving a life term for the assassination of the unpopular viceroy of Galicia, Count A. Potocki. Sichynsky made his way to Norway, Sweden and the United States, where he became active in the Ukrainian-American community. See O.T. Martynowych, "The Ukrainian Socialist Movement in Canada: 1910-1918," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 1 (Toronto 1976), pp. 27-44, esp. pp. 43-44, and Bohdan Podoliansky, *Fantastychna vtecha Myroslava Sichynskoho* (Sydney, 1987).
  27. On the protests, see *Almanakh: Ukrainska Striletska Hromada*, pp. 9-17. On Swystun, see his *Ukraine: The Sorest Spot of Europe* (Winnipeg 1931). On the Ukrainian debate in Parliament, see *A Ukrainian Canadian in Parliament: Memoirs of Michael Luchkovich* (Toronto 1965), pp. 24-31, and Aloysius Balawyder, *The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle: Canadian-Polish Relations 1918-1978* (Boulder 1980), pp. 66-75.
  28. *Almanakh: Ukrainska Striletska Hromada*, pp. 198-21; Interview with Stepan Borovets, Toronto, June 1984; Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1953), pp. 85-86.
  29. On the OUN, see P. Mirchuk, *Narys istorii OUN*, I (London and New York 1968), and the excellent synopsis by M. Prokop, "Orhanizatsiia Ukrainshykh Nationalistiv," *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, v (Paris and New York, 1966), pp. 1863-67.
  30. *Almanakh: Ukrainska Striletska Hromada*, pp. 30-31; Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 59-60; Antin Hlynka, *Posol federal'nogo parlamentu Kanadi 1940-1949* (Toronto 1982). For a number of secret reports to government officials surveying opinion about the beliefs and loyalties of UNF members, see the External Affairs file, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, Part 1.
  31. See the External Affairs file, "Activities of Ukrainians in Canada, 1935-1936," PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1795, file 431. According to the UWVA activist



- Michael Sharik, in *Z viddali 50 lit* (Toronto: Proboiem 1969), pp. 186-88, the non-communist Ukrainian newspapers heard that Melnychuk was really Sushko and publicized the fact. Thereafter, the local communist press began a fierce attack on what they called this "close associate of the well-known and dangerous leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Eugene Konovalts." The Poles probably found out about Sushko's visit to Canada from such articles in the Ukrainian-language press.
32. External Affairs, letter of April 16, 1936, to Jan Pawlica, Consul General of Poland. According to Sharik, the UWVA had to explain to the Canadian authorities in Ottawa the reasons why Sushko had tried to enter Canada under a pseudonym, and being satisfied with the UWVA's explanation, allowed him into the country as the invited guest of that organization.
  33. On the Hetmanites, see Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs 1980), pp. 23-33, and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Conservatism: Ukrainian Conservatism since 1917," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984) pp. 566-67. On Lypynsky, see the special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* ix, nos. 3/4 (Cambridge, Mass. 1985), devoted to "The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyn'skyi."
  34. On the conservative philosophy of the Canadian Hetmanites, see the two pamphlets by William Bossy: *A Call to Socially Minded Christians* (Montréal 1934), and *League de la Classocratie du Canada* (Montréal 1935). More generally, see M.H. Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* (Winnipeg 1970), pp. 393-95, and the brief account of Elcheshen's activities in Wiseman, "Politics of Manitoba's Ukrainians," pp. 111-12.
  35. For a detailed description of the Skoropadsky tour, which also included the eastern United States, see *Za Ukrainu: Opys podorozi Hetmanyča Danyla Skoropadshoho do Zhuchenykh Derzhav i Kanady 1937-1938* (Edmonton 1938).
  36. See, for example, "Ukrainian 'Prince' a Nazi Agent," *Daily Clarion* (Toronto), January 8, 1938. Besides *Kanadijskyi farmer* (Winnipeg) and *Ukrainskyi robotnyk* (Toronto) which were Hetmanite papers, *Ukrainski visti* (Edmonton) which was a Catholic paper, and *Ukrainskyi holos* (Winnipeg), which was Orthodox, gave lengthy and favourable coverage of the tour. On March 2, 1938, the latter ran the story: "In passing: V.P. Hetmanych speaks favourably about American and British Democracy."
  37. See, for example, "Skoropadshchyna i Bolshevyky," *Novyi shliakh* (Saskatoon), March 27, 1939.
  38. On Kysilewsky, see Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians*, pp. 393-95, and PAC, National Ethnic Archives, V.J. Kaye Papers, 1, MG 31, n69.
  39. Ofha Woycenko, letter of February 1, 1986, to the author. For general information on the lecture tours by Bochkovsky and Doroshenko, see N.L. Kohuska, *Iuvileina Knyzhka Soiuzu Ukrainshoi Molodi Kanady...1931-1956* (Winnipeg: SUMK 1956), pp. 124-29, 132-34, and P.I. Lazarowich [Lazarowich], *Soiuz Ukrainshiv Samostiinykiv i ukrainska vyzvolna sprava* (Winnipeg: Trident Press 1951), pp. 18-19.
  40. Dmytro Doroshenko, letter of August 14, 1938, to Ofha Woycenko, PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Ofha Woycenko Collection, vol. 23, file 212. On Simpson, see his correspondence and explanatory memo in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Saskatoon, George Simpson Papers, vol. 1, Ukrainian files. Peter Lazarowich, who had become president of the USRI in 1936, also played an important role in the publication of Doroshenko's *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton: The Institute Press 1939).

- This was part of a general US&L effort to provide textbooks for future Ukrainian studies programs at Canadian universities.
41. *Seven Presidents in Uniform* (Winnipeg: Dominion Executive UNYF 1945), p. 3.
  42. See Mykhailo Sharyk [Michael Sharik], *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, *Vashkymy Shliakhany Kanady* (Toronto: Proboiem 1971), p. 125.
  43. Testimony of Stephen Pawluk to the author concerning M. Wladyka, letter of May 18, 1938, to the UNF National Executive, PAC, UNYF collection, vol. IX, MG 28, v8. Also see Paul Migus, "Ukrainian Canadian Youth: A History of Organizational Life in Canada 1907-1953" (MA thesis, University of Ottawa 1975), pp. 160-61. The UNF's sister organization in the United States, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, operated a similar aviation club in upstate New York and the Hetmanites ran one near Detroit.
  44. Migus; Sharyk, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, 127-132.
  45. Sharyk, *Z viddali 50 lit*, pp. 117-37, reprints entire articles from the Communist press together with club members' responses. The Communist Party youth branch was especially active in attacking the flying school. See, for example, the pamphlet by M. Korol, *Why Does Hitler Want Ukraine?* (Winnipeg 1939), which charged that the UNF's Canadianism was a front and that the flying school was to be used against Soviet Ukraine.
  46. Sharyk, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, p. 145.
  47. Mykhailo Wladyka [Michael Wladyka] and Oleksa Shestosoky, letter of June 8, 1939, to the UNYF, Saskatoon, in PAC, UNYF collection, vol. XVI, MG 28, v8.
  48. Kohuska, *Juvilena kryzhka*, pp. 148-51; Lazarowich, *Soiuz Ukrainiv Samostyniv*, p. 17.
  49. Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1978), pp. 234ff.
  50. See Oleh Gerus, "Ethnic Politics in Canada: The Formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," in O.W. Gerus et al., eds., *The Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Canada* (Winnipeg: UVAN 1976), pp. 467-80.
  51. See the various autobiographical notes in PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 1, file 1, MG 30, D277 (As of December, 1985), and Sharik, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, pp. 14-55.
  52. *Ibid.*, especially p. 32.
  53. See the letters and memos by Skelton and others in the External Affairs file, MG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, Part 1. The only published account of this meeting is in Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians*, p. 549, which is based on an interview with Buriannyk. See also H.R.L. Henry, letter of February 3, 1939, to T.K. Pavlychenko, King Papers, vol. 276, MG 26, J1.
  54. See, for example, R. Allen, "Ukraine's Wealth," *Saturday Night*, January 28, 1939, several notes in the *London Times*, of January 7 and 17, February 2; and several more in the *New York Times*, of January 9, 12 and 17.
  55. "Radio-promova Prof. Simpsona," *Nasyi shliakh*, January 5, 1939. The entire text of Simpson's speech is reprinted, together with a similar radio talk by Wasyly Swystun, as *The Ukrainian Cause on Radio Waves* (Saskatoon 1939). Of Carpatho-Ukraine, Simpson stated that "its national consciousness long suspended between varying tendencies, [it] has at last crystallized around the Ukrainian ideal. Its present premier, Voloshyn, is a Greek-Catholic priest, wise and experienced, cultured and kind, whom no one can accuse of fanaticism or mad political ambition." Simpson received a large number of thank you letters both from Ukrainian Cana-

- dians who belonged to no political organization and those, like W. Kossar and P.J. Lazarowich, who had long been involved in politics. See Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Saskatoon, George Simpson Papers, Ukrainian files, file 14.
56. Sharik, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, pp. 235–36. On March 18, Sharik, who was vice-president of the UNF Dominion executive, received the following telegram from the Saskatoon headquarters:  
We have received a telegram. Carpatho-Ukraine has been abandoned to fend for itself. It is being bloodied in battle with the Magyars. The Magyars have captured [the capital] Khust. The Sich Detachments are giving fierce battle in the mountains. Great losses. Voloshyn is in Romania. We live on the eve of new events. Temporary losses will not break us. The Dominion Executive demands equanimity of spirit and faith in our final victory from you. The young Sich Rifleman are by their deaths teaching us how to love our native land.
  57. See especially *Novyi shliakh*, April 3, 1939, which announced the British decision to guarantee Poland and in the same issue rejected the boundaries of Poland established by the Versailles Treaty, condemned Polish actions against Ukrainian nationalists, and welcomed British and French recognition of the Franco government in Spain.
  58. See C.H. Snider, "Forment Polish Revolution Through Minority Groups May Be Hitler's Strategy," *Evening Telegram*, May 1, 1939, who commented somewhat naively that the Ukrainians in Poland only wanted autonomy: "These men are loyal to the Polish flag, though it be a foreign one. They are corrupted neither by Communism nor Nazism, nor Fascism." About this same time, George Simpson was also suggesting that Ukrainians in Poland "should be given a fair deal" as part of the price for boundary guarantees. Simpson also suggested that Ukrainian areas in Poland be granted "full autonomy in a federal system of government with adequate guarantees such as the French-Canadians have in Canada as a matter of elementary justice." See the retrospective: "Long Conflict Colors History of Ukrainians," *Star-Phoenix* (Saskatoon), September 22, 1939.
  59. See "Ukraine-Politik," *Berliner Börsenzeitung* (Berlin), July 19, 1939.
  60. Stephen Davidovich, "Carpatho-Ukraine," *Contemporary Russia* II, 4 (London 1938), pp. 421–26; "Colonel Eugene Konovalov," *ibid.*, 3, pp. 344–47. On Davidovich, see Ievhen Stotsko, "Za voliu ridnoi zemli: spohad pro Stepana Davydovycha," *Novyi shliakh* (Toronto) 27, July 4: 28–29, July 11–18, 1987. Also see Lancelot Lawton, *Ukraine: Europe's Greatest Problem* (London 1939), which is a brochure reprinted from *Contemporary Russia* III, 1 (London 1939). In addition to these activities, Davidovich found the time to engage in an amorous affair with the young Gabrielle Roy, who later became a well-known French-Canadian writer. Information from Stephen Pawluk and George Luckyj.
  61. The Venice meeting is briefly described by Sharik, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, p. 33. Kossar's itinerary is given in his statement to the RCMP which was made some three years later in the wake of communist allegations questioning his loyalty to Canada. See Kossar's letter of May 5, 1943, to Cpt. M.V. Nolan, PAC, Vladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 5, file 3, MG 30, D277 (as of December 1985). Also see Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 67–70. On Granovsky and Myshuha, see The Immigration History Research Centre, St. Paul, Alexander Granovsky papers, vol. 14, file Correspondence 1939, USA and Canada, especially Granovsky to T. Pavlychenko, May 17, 1939.
  62. Kossar to Nolan, May 5, 1943. For the correspondence concerning Kossar's mission between Skelton in Ottawa and Massey in London, see RG 25, A12, vol. 2095, file 39/1.

63. See "Ukrainians in Europe Determined to Struggle for National Freedom: University Worker Returns from Ukraine," *Star-Phoenix*, July 31, 1939, and the letter of a prominent USSR leader in Saskatoon to W.A. Tucker, the MP for Rosthern, asking him to warn Ottawa against Kossar who, as the USSR man put it, "harped quite a lot on the subject of loyalty to Canada which I very much distrust." See the papers of Norman Robertson, PAC, vol. 12, file 133, MG 30, 1163.
64. For a brief summary of the report by Sir Maurice Hankey, British secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, see W.A. Douglas and B. Greenhous, *Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 15-19.
65. For Ukrainian reactions to the royal tour, see *Propamiatna Knyha Ukrainshoho Narodnoho Domu v Vinnipeg*, ed. Semen Koval and D. Doroshenko (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Home, 1949), pp. 361-73, and the editorials in the non-Communist Ukrainian-language press for May and June 1939, which are unanimous in their enthusiasm. On central and eastern Europeans in general, see L.J. Burpee, "Canada and the War," *Queen's Quarterly* (winter 1939), pp. 385-90.

## CHAPTER 2: THE WAR BEGINS

1. A.G. Stuart Webster, letter of September 4, 1939, to W. Kossar, PAC, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 5, file 97, MG 30, D277 (as of March 1986).
2. "Hope to Form Fighting Units of Ukrainians," *Evening Telegram* (Toronto), September 4, 1939.
3. "Fondest Wish of Ukrainians to Aid Canada: Ask Chance to Recruit Units 'to Fight Shoulder to Shoulder' With Dominion Forces," *ibid.*, September 5, 1939.
4. "Ukrainskyi lehion Kanady u brytyiskii zbroyinii syli," *Novyi shliakh*, September 11, 1939.
5. W. Kossar, letter of October 17, 1939, to Mackenzie King, and attached memorandum, "Ukrainian Canadians in the Present War," PAC, Norman Robertson Collection, vol. 12, file 138, MG 30, 1163. This memorandum specifically denied Communist charges that the UNF was fascist and suggested that it was not the nationalist but rather the Communist organizations whose loyalties should be investigated.
6. A.D.P. Heeney, letter of October 25, 1939, to W. Kossar, PAC; interview with Paul Yuzyk, Ottawa, April 7, 1984.
7. See Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion*, pp. 27-28, and Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada: A History* (Toronto 1975), p. 140.
8. Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion*.
9. The Canadian census of 1931 listed 225,113 Canadians of Ukrainian origin, that of 1941, 305,929. See William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, *A Statistical Compendium of Ukrainians in Canada 1891-1976* (Ottawa 1980), p. 26. During the intervening period, political and boundary changes in Europe and natural population growth in Canada make the exact population difficult to determine. For the urban-rural statistics, see Darcovich and Yuzyk, p. 130, and for the regional and provincial breakdown, see pp. 40-44. On the Ukrainians in Toronto, see Z. Yaworsky Sokolsky, "The Beginnings of Ukrainian Settlement in Toronto, 1891-1939," in *Gathering Place: Peoples and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1934-1945* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario 1985), pp. 279-302.
10. Watson Kirkconnell, *Canada Europe and Hitler* (Toronto 1939), pp. 137-52. It is probable that Kirkconnell's book had gone to press before the

- Communist Party's condemnation of the war as an "imperialist" one had gone into effect and been publicized in its press.
11. A.E.P., "Canada Europe and Hitler," *Queen's Quarterly*, XL (spring 1940), pp. 102-103; Frank H. Underhill, "Canada Europe and Hitler," *Canadian Forum* XIX (January 1940), pp. 318-319.
  12. M[yroslaw] S[techishin], "Kanada Evropa i Hitler," *Ukrainskyi holos*, January 3, 1940; M. I. Mandryka, *The Ukrainian Question* (Winnipeg, 1940).
  13. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Headquarters, Ottawa, "Ukrainians in Canada," report dated October 1, 1939, pp. 16, 21, 23-29, PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Ukrainian Collection, uncatalogued. I am indebted to Mr. Myron Momryk of the PAC for providing me with a copy of this report, which, he informed me, had only recently been released by the RCMP.
  14. J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto 1975), pp. 1-42; Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military and Political History* (Toronto 1981), pp. 104-109. More generally, see J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto 1977).
  15. The Finnish project is detailed in the papers of Norman Robertson, PAC, vol. 12, file 133, and in a note by O.D. Skelton, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, PAC, RG 25, A12, vol. 2095, file 39/1, who thought the proposal characteristic of what he called the "un-Canadian" nature of its advocates and their organizations. See also "Ukrainians Boost Finnish War Chest Funds," *Star* (Sudbury), January 25, 1940, and "Ukrainian People Here Support Finnish Cause," *Star-Phoenix*, February 12, 1940. In compliance with a request from the Finnish government, the Canadian government did permit Finnish nationals in Canada to join the Finnish forces, but refused to permit Canadian citizens to join the Finnish army or to supply the Finns with military equipment. See Aloysius Balawyder, "Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance," in *Canadian-Soviet Relations 1939-1980*, ed. Aloysius Balawyder (Oakville 1981), pp. 1-15, especially p. 2.
  16. See Watson Kirkconnell, *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War* (Toronto 1940), p. 14, which was written at the request of Mackenzie King as an apology for Allied policies with regard to the Ukrainian question and as a plea for Canadian unity in the war effort. More generally, see Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada*, pp. 140-41.
  17. See Kirkconnell's series of articles, "War Aims and Canadian Unity," in the *Tribune* (Winnipeg), especially November 24, 1939, which he wrote as a plea for unity among "New-Canadian groups" and for "a federal statement of war aims that would give coherence to that unity." Also see his memoir, *A Slice of Canada*, p. 275.
  18. Commissioner S. T. Wood, letter of May 27, 1940, to O. D. Skelton, PAC, External file: "Ukrainian Activities in Canada," RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, Part 1. Wood continued: "A friendly feeling will only exist while the English and French refuse to make overtures to Russia.... A further strengthening of Germany's ties with Russia would undoubtedly have a most favorable effect on the part of the Ukrainian nationalists toward the Allies."
  19. Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion*, pp. 29-30. For the chronology of the arrests and related information, see the various works of Petro Krawchuk: *Our Contribution to Victory* (Toronto 1985), pp. 30-31; *Odyn z pershykh: Biografichnyi narys* (Toronto 1963), p. 34, which is a biography of Ivan Navizivsky; and William and Kathleen Repka, *Dangerous Patriots: Canada's Unknown Prisoners of War* (Vancouver 1982), pp. 9-15, 39-41, and *passim*.
  20. See Kathleen Repka's Foreword to *Dangerous Patriots*, p. 9. More gener-

- ally, see Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communists during World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* xvii (St. John's 1986), pp. 135-66.
21. Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion*, pp. 28-29; Anthony Bilecki, William Repka and Mitch Sago, *Friends in Need: The WBA Story a Canadian Epic in Fraternism* (Winnipeg: WBA 1972), pp. 191-224.
  22. See, in particular, the memorandum of the British consulate in Chicago to the Canadian legation in Washington. The document is dated August 2, 1940, and is in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part 1.
  23. See the commentary in *ibid.* For the dating of the *Svoboda* ban, see part II.
  24. Interview with Anthony Yaremovich, Winnipeg, February, 1984. W. Kossar, letter of February 26, 1940, to A. Granovsky, Immigration History Research Centre, Alexander Granovsky Papers, vol. 14, file Correspondence USA Canada 1930s-1940s.
  25. Oleh Gerus, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee," in *A Heritage in Transition*, ed. Lupul, pp. 196-97.
  26. The papers and organizations supporting the Central Committee were: *Kanadyskyi farmer* and *Ukrainskyi robotnyk*, which were Hetmanite papers, the former with a very large circulation; *Ukrainskyi holos*, an unofficial Orthodox paper liberal in orientation; and *Vpered* (Winnipeg), a small democratic socialist paper put out by Lobay's defectors from the Communist Party. The papers supporting the Representative Committee were *Novyi shliakh*, the UNF organ; and *Ukrainskyi visti*, the Catholic paper. The *Ukrainskyi holos* editorial of June 12 is approvingly summarized in "Events in Life: Ukrainians at War," *Ukrainian Life* (Scranton, Pa.) in the issue for June 1940, p. 12, which was published by the moderately leftist Pennsylvania-based "Ukrainian Workingmen's Association," an organization in touch with the USSR in Canada.
  27. W. Kossar, letter of April 20, 1940, to S. Davidovich, in the Immigration History Research Centre, Alexander Granovsky Papers, vol. 41, file UNF.
  28. W. Kossar, letter of February 26, 1940, to Alexander Granovsky, in *ibid.*, vol. 14, file Correspondence USA-Canada 1930s-1940s.
  29. Vladimir Kysilewsky, letter of February 28, 1940, to J. Stechishin, PAC, V.J. Kaye papers, vol. 9, file 27, MG 31 D69; *Ukrainskyi holos*, July 24, 1940. On Kysilewsky's opposition to Swystun's visit, see Kysilewsky's letter of May 3, 1940, to T. Philipps, in the papers of the former, vol. 10, file 17, and the criticism of this UNF project in *Ukrainskyi holos*, May 15, 1940.
  30. Gerus, "Ukrainian Canadian Committee," pp. 198-99; Bohdan Kordan, "Disunity and Duality: Ukrainian Canadians and the Second World War" (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1981, pp. 33-34, 43-47), stresses the involvement of Tracy Philipps and behind him the Canadian government. Leon Kossar informed me of a long series of meetings between his father (Wladimir) and the Reverends Kushnir and Sawchuk, who seem to have gotten along fairly well.
  31. "United Effort: Ukrainian Canadian Committee Elects Kushnir to Presidency," *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 27, 1940; J.C. Royle, "Unity among Ukrainian-Canadians," *Tribune*, November 25, 1940.
  32. See "Ukrainian-Canadian Unity?" *Ukrainian Life*, December, 1940, pp. 3, 5.
  33. See the summaries of the evidence by various speakers at *The First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada* (Winnipeg 1943), especially the address by W. Kossar, pp. 40-48.
  34. See J.H. Fisher, "Ukrainians in Canada insist Mother Country Remain as Independent," *Evening Telegram*, May 24, 1941. The English text of the memorandum appears in full in "Ukrainska zaiava uriadovi Kanady."

- Ukrainski visti* May 27, 1941. On the earlier Canadian visit of General (Stanislaw?) Haller, see "Hen. Haller u Kanadi," *Novyi shliakh*, April 18, 1940, and on the problem of wartime co-operation between Ukrainian Canadians and the Poles, see "Tse ne protypolske stanovyshe," *ibid.*, February 27, 1941.
35. Interview with Stephen Davidovich, Toronto, December 1983. For one of the last articles by Davidovich, see *Free Europe* (London), January 24, 1941, reprinted in *Novyi shliakh*, March 17, 1941.
  36. Robert J. MacDonald, "The Silent Column: Civil Security in Saskatchewan during World War Two," *Saskatchewan History* XXXIX, no. 2 (Saskatoon 1986), pp. 41-61, especially at p. 51.
  37. T. Datskiw [Datzkiw], "Prashchaisia z chytachamy 'Kanadiiskoho farmera'" *Ukrainskyi robotnyk*, April 4, 1941; "Kham" *Nash stiah* (Chicago), April 12, 1941; F. Dojacek, letter of March 18, 1941, to Commander Mead, RCMP Headquarters, Winnipeg, in the Manitoba Provincial Archives, Frank Dojacek Papers, P533, file Datzkiw.
  38. See Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 378-87, and the original statements cited by Hlynka from the *Journal* (Edmonton), November 1, 1940, the *Bulletin* (Edmonton), November 4, 1940, and the *Star-Phoenix*, October 8, 1940. Also see "Posly Hlynka, Toker i Feir pro Ukraintsiv," *Novyi shliakh* December 12, 1940.
  39. Austin F. Cross, "Heiling Hitler on Saskatchewan Relief," the *Ottawa Citizen*, November 27, 1940; Wasyl Swystun, "Ukrainian Answer to Austin Cross," *ibid.*, December 7, 1940.
  40. Watson Kirkconnell, *European Elements in Canadian Life* (Toronto 1940).
  41. See the *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 12, 1940, and John Murray, *The New Canadian Loyalists* (Toronto 1941), which enjoyed a brief but favourable review in *Ukrainskyi holos*, September 22, 1941.
  42. For a survey of these developments, see Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pp. 30-31. On the somewhat unusual Manitoba election of 1941, see Nelson Wiseman and K.W. Taylor, "Class and Ethnic voting in Winnipeg: The Case of 1941," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* XIV, no. 2 (Toronto 1977), pp. 174-87.
  43. Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, p. 28, but incorrectly citing Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History* 1953); interview with Lew Wowk, Saskatoon, October 1984; Dojacek-Mead correspondence, Manitoba Provincial Archives, Frank Dojacek Papers, P533, file Datzkiw.
  44. See "Defer Action on Licence asked for Ukrainians," *Toronto Evening Telegram*, January 17, 1941, and "Probe Ordered of Ukrainian Nationalists," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), January 17, 1941. More generally, see Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pp. 28, 34, 66.
  45. Ivan N. Petelka, letter to the editor: "Says UNO not Ukrainian," *Daily Star*, January 22, 1941. Also see the editorial in the *Globe and Mail*, January 28, 1941, which quoted from Kirkconnell's earlier analysis of the UNF in his *Canada Europe and Hitler*.
  46. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 1206 and 1213. See also, "Ukrainski orhanizatsii u parlamentakh," *Novyi shliakh* (Saskatoon), March 10, 1941.
  47. See Watson Kirkconnell, "Ukrainian Nationalists and Canada," *Globe and Mail*, February 3, 1941, and Kirkconnell's letter to Philipps, PAC, RG 44, vol. 36.
  48. See "Ukrainian Ceremony: Golden Book of War Effort is Dedicated," *Leader Post* (Regina), March 21, 1941, reprinted in *Novyi shliakh*, March 27, 1941. On the War Bonds, see "Large Section of Ukrainians Buy War Bonds," *Bulletin*, June 12, 1941.

49. See Skelton's note of June 1941, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165A, part II.  
 50. "Mozhlyvyi ninetskyi napad na Sovity," and "Sovitskyi sfinks," *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, June 18, 1941.

### CHAPTER 3: THE TABLE TURNS

1. See *Ukrainskyi robotnyk*, June 27, 1941. More generally, see A. Balawyder, "Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance," in *Canadian-Soviet Relations*, pp. 3-6.
2. Watson Kirkconnell, letter of June 24, 1941, to W. Kossar, PAC, Wladimir Kossar collection, vol. 4, file 36, MG 30, D277 (as of December 1985).
3. "Ukrainska loialnist nezminna," *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, June 2, 1941, summarizing statements that originally appeared in the *Winnipeg Tribune*.
4. "Shcho bude z Ukrainoiu?" *Novyi shliakh*, June 30, 1941.
5. F. Carpenter, letter of August 6, 1941, to M. Pohorecky, PAC, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 3, file 43, MG 30, D277 (as of December 1985). I am indebted to Mr. Myron Momryk of the PAC for the exact reference to this file. On July 29, 1941, the RCMP completed a major report on Ukrainian activities in Canada. But this document has been removed from the "Ukrainian Activities in Canada" file of External Affairs (RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165A, part II).
6. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "[Secret] Report re: Eighth National Convention of the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada and the Affiliated Sections," PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Tracy Philipps Papers, vol. 1, MG 30, E350. Most of this report has been printed in Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 80, and 81-90.  
 So impressed was Norman Robertson by this report, which was composed by Michael Petrowsky, that on October 1, 1941, he wrote to RCMP Commissioner Wood: "Special Constable Petrowsky's report seems to me to be a quite first-rate job, which describes the dilemma in which the Ukrainian nationalists now find themselves very clearly and objectively. I would like to send a copy of it to the U.K. authorities, who are wrestling with the problem of post-war frontiers and the organization of eastern Europe...." See RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165A, part III.
7. See the report on the Eighth UNF National Convention cited above, especially the intimate conversations of Special Constable Petrowsky with various Ukrainian leaders, including Swystun.
8. See *Canadian Tribune* (Toronto), April 18, 1942; Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada*, pp. 148-50; Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pp. 31-32.
9. Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pp. 32-33; Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, pp. 34-36.
10. Petro Krawchuk, *Na novi zemli* (Toronto 1958), pp. 324-25; Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, p. 67.
11. See Raymond Arthur Davies, "Ukrainian-Canadians and the War's New Phase," *Saturday Night*, July 12, 1941, and Wasył Swystun, "The Ukrainian-Canadians and the Russo-German War," *ibid.*, July 26, 1941. The latter article is reprinted in full in *Novyi shliakh*, July 31, 1941. Raymond Arthur Davies was a pseudonym for Rudolph Shohan, "one of the top leaders of the Young Communist League" (Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, p. 37), and a member of Tim Buck's "national executive" (Kirkconnell, *A Slice of Canada*, p. 309). Just how far the magazine was taken in is clear from a letter of July 23, 1941, from editor B.K. Sandwell to Swystun. He wrote: "I am quite sure that my assistant did not realize the extent to which we were being 'used' by the Communist people. I was very glad to receive



- your article and have given it due publicity in this week's issue." Swystun sent Sandwell's letter on to Norman Robertson in Ottawa who replied a few weeks later: "Your article was very well done and I meant at the time to write you a note about it." Both letters are in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165A, part II.
12. The UNF Protest to the minister is in PAC, Tracy Philipps papers, vol. 1, MG 30 E350. For the Communist view, see the pamphlet by W.A. Kardash discussed in chapter 4 below.
  13. For a detailed analysis of Ukrainian-American opinion at this time, see the "[Secret] RCMP Report on the First National Eucharistic Congress of Eastern Rites" held in Chicago on June 25-29, 1941, in PAC, Tracy Philipps Papers, vol. 1. Also see "Polskyi i moskovskiyi uriady znovu podilylys' Ukrainoiu," *Narodnia volia* (Scranton, Pa.), August 2, 1941. According to the RCMP report and a covering letter by George Simpson, the leader of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, the UNF's American counterpart, Professor Granovsky, who had earlier accompanied Kossar on his trip to Europe, was "striving to bring the activities of this organization into line with the foreign policy of the American government and the British government." The report stated that the Hetmanites were the most pro-German of the major Ukrainian organizations in the United States.
  14. See p. 2 of the RCMP report on the Eucharistic Congress.
  15. See PRO, FO, 371/26721, as cited in Luciuk, "Searching for Place," pp. 206-208.
  16. See Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 87-88.
  17. Mykhailo Sharyk [Sharik], *Spomyny z viddali 50 lit*, 2 vols. (Toronto 1969-1971), II, pp. 317ff.; interviews with: Stephen Davidovich, Toronto, December 1983; Paul Yuzyk, Ottawa, April 1984; Stepan Borovets, Toronto, July 2, 1984. On September 15, 1941, the Saskatoon lawyer J.W. Stechishin wrote to Kysilewsky, who was then living on a farm in Ontario: "Things do not seem to be going to our liking. The situation in Europe is decidedly against us....The political set up appears also to be against our cause, and it appears that the only thing we can do is wait for further developments. I have some hope that the time will come soon when we will be at liberty to [act on] the Ukrainian problem, and Hitler's joining [the] West Ukrainian to the Polish governorship [i.e., his disregard for Ukrainian national claims] certainly prepares us all to step out against him with all our forces.... What is T[racy] P[hilipps] doing and where is he now?" On October 12, 1941, Kysilewsky replied that "T.P. is in Ottawa engaged in very important government work and has done a tremendous amount of work on behalf of non-British Canadians. The discriminations which had been causing so much regret and [so many] complaints have been eliminated etc." See PAC, V.J. Kaye Papers, vol. II, file 3, MG 31 D69.
  18. PAC, V.J. Kaye Papers, vol. II, file 3, MG 31, D69.
  19. W.H. Agnew, "Historical Review of the Canadian Citizenship Branch," PAC, V.J. Kaye Papers, vol. II, file 2. See also Kordan, "Disunity and Unity," pp. 68-70.
  20. D. Lobai, "Torson pryznaie shcho ukraintsi vstupaiut chyslenno do armii," *Ukrainskyi holos*, December 3, 1941.
  21. T.D. Davis, letter of August 21, 1941, to George Simpson, PAC, RG 44, vol. 36, file Foreign Section, Ukrainians in Canada. Davis continues: "I was given to understand that actually the Ukrainian population had enlisted in greater proportions on the basis of population than any other element in the Province of Saskatchewan, and I hope and trust that this is true."

22. PAC, J.L. Ralston Papers, vol. 113, "[Secret] Report of the Labour Supply Investigation Committee to the Labour Co-ordination Committee." See Appendix, F, p. 13.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 39. According to A. Yaremovich (interview of February 1984) and B. Panchuk (interview of June 1984), both of whom had been prominent Ukrainians concerned with Canada's war effort, the problem of majority-group Canadian nativism was not restricted to civilian employers but also occurred among recruiting agents for the armed forces.
24. As early as November 27, 1940, the Ukrainian MP from Vegreville, Anthony Hlynka had specifically asked the minister about the levels of Ukrainian, German, Polish, and Jewish recruitments and about the number of officers of each nationality, but could get no answer. See the House of Commons, *Debates*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 454.
25. "Ukrainci v zbroinykh sylakh Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, December 10, 1941. The paper also claimed that in western Canadian cities like Winnipeg the large proportion of Ukrainian soldiers was perfectly obvious from the facial and physical characteristics of the young men in uniform. *Ukrainskyi holos* also carried many articles on individual Ukrainians who had volunteered for overseas service. *Novyi shliakh* was particularly proud of the young RCAF airman Joe Romanow, and the veterans of the UNF youth organization's prewar flying school at Oshawa. For an article on William Zaleschook, who became an RCAF flight instructor, see *Novyi shliakh*, January 2, 1942.
26. B[ohdan] P[anchuk], "Ukrainski khloptsi-kanadiiske viisko," *Ukrainskyi holos*, December 3, 1941.
27. "Hong-Kong," *Novyi shliakh*, December 27, 1941.
28. "Kilko bulo ukrainsiv mizh oborontsiamy Hong Kongu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, December 31, 1941. Many years later, Paul Yuzyk, in *The Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History*, counted 104 Ukrainian Canadians in the Grenadiers and stated that 38 of these were killed in action (p. 193).
29. In actual fact, as early as 1924, Mackenzie King had stated in the House of Commons that Canada's recognition of the Soviet Union included the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic but not its non-Communist émigré rival, the Ukrainian People's Republic, which at that time still maintained a consulate in Montreal. See House of Commons, *Debates*, 1924, p. 3503, and A. Balawyder, *Canadian-Soviet Relations Between the Wars* (Toronto 1972), p. 65.
30. Anthony Hlynka, "Freedom of Nations Basis for Lasting Peace in Europe," House of Commons, *Debates*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 231-35, reprinted in *Antin Hlynka: Posol federalnogo parlamentu Kanady 1940-1949* (Toronto 1982), pp. 141-47.
31. The full texts of both the Communist memorandum and Hlynka's reply are given in "Zaiava chervonykh stupaiiv i vidpovid posla A. Hlynky," *Novyi shliakh*, February 28, 1942.
32. Quoted by Kordan, "Disunity and Duality," pp. 73-74, PAC, RG 26, vol. 6, file 34-L-2.
33. See the *Daily Star* (Toronto), February 5, 1942, and the summaries in "Natsisty i Ukraina," *Novyi shliakh*, February 11, 1942. See also, "None Are So Blind," *Ukrainian Life*, III, 2 (1942). The position of the *Daily Star* should be compared with those of the *Star* (Windsor), February 3, and the *Evening Telegram*, February 21, which gave factual accounts of Hlynka's position.
34. Memorandum for N.A. Robertson, February 27, 1942, Department of External Affairs, file A 2462-40c, cited in Balawyder, "Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance," pp. 5, 13.

## CHAPTER 4: THE CONSCRIPTION PLEBISCITE OF 1942

1. The best general account of this episode is still J.L. Granatstein, *Conscription in the Second World War 1939-1945* (Toronto 1969), pp. 29-46.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-44.
3. See, for example, "Mozhe vyide na dobro..." *Novyi shliakh*, January 31, 1942.
4. Granatstein, *Canada's War*, pp. 218-21; Morton, *Canada and War*, pp. 117-18; Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada*, pp. 150-51.
5. See, for example, the statement of the Association's Saskatchewan council in "Ukrainians ask support of Plebiscite," the *Leader Post*, March 5, 1942.
6. *Ukrainske zhyttia* (Toronto), March 26, 1942, quoted in Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, p. 51, which also gives part of the text of the Appeal of the National Committee of the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland, "Vote Yes in the Plebiscite."
7. "Plebistsyt," *Ukrainski visti*, March 2, 1942.
8. "Sprava plebistsytu teper," *Novyi shliakh*, March 4, 1942.
9. "Holosuemo 'Tak' u plebistsytu," *ibid.*, April 11, 1942.
10. "Tsil' plebistsytu," *ibid.*, April 22, 1942.
11. See Granatstein, *Conscription in the Second World War*, pp. 42-43.
12. Official plebiscite results are given in the *Canada Gazette* (Ottawa), June 23, 1942.
13. The *Canada Gazette* gives the following figures;

<i>Riding</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Provencher	3,414	5,127
Rosthern	3,527	3,958
Vegreville	5,471	9,041

Also see the discussion in Granatstein, *Canada's War*, pp. 227-28.

14. The *Canada Gazette* gives the following figures:

<i>Riding</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Winnipeg North	24,205	6,987
Winnipeg North Centre	24,071	3,482
Winnipeg South Centre	34,221	2,412
Winnipeg South	25,755	2,145

The preliminary results from individual Winnipeg polls, which enabled a person conversant with the ethnic breakdown of individual streets to draw even more precise conclusions, were given in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 28, 1942.

15. The *Canada Gazette* gives:

<i>Riding</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Belt settlements: Dauphin	7,922	5,201
Yorkton	8,246	6,668
South of the belt: Neepawa	8,606	1,644
Moose Jaw	10,669	2,191

16. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Report to the Department of External Affairs, March 4, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, vol. 186, file 3182-40.
17. MacDonald, "The Silent Column," pp. 56-57.
18. See *Vegreville Observer*, April 29, and May 6, 1942, and the brief discussion in Howard Palmer, "Ethnic Relations in Wartime: Nationalism and European Minorities in Alberta during the Second World War," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* xiv, no. 3 (Calgary 1982), pp. 17-19, 23.
19. "Where the 'No' Vote Lay Here," *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 29, 1942.
20. "Negative Vote Irks People of Yorkton, Surprise is Caused by Large Number of 'No' Ballots in Rural Areas," *Star-Phoenix*, May 5, 1942, and reprinted in *Novyi shliakh*, May 9, 1942.

21. Anthony Yaremovich, interview of February 2, 1984, Winnipeg, recalls that James Gray was the reporter in question and that he was "sort of pinkish."
22. "Protest of Ukrainians Against Vote Analysis," *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 2, 1942.
23. Anthony Yaremovich interview.
24. "Neither Censure Nor Praise," *Western Jewish News* (Winnipeg), May 7, 1942.
25. PAC, Tracy Philipps papers, vol. 1, file 1942-1944.
26. See the editorial entitled "Ukrainian Canadian Protest," and the article "Manitoba's 'No' Vote," May 2, 1942.
27. "The *Free Press* and the Fifth Column," *Winnipeg Tribune*, May 4, 1942, and reprinted in *Novyi shliakh*, May 9, 1942.
28. Anthony Yaremovich interview. According to Yaremovich, Dafoe assigned another reporter, a certain Francis Stevens, to cover the topic of Ukrainian participation in the war effort and for the next two weeks Yaremovich and Stevens met regularly to prepare stories about individual volunteers, the mothers and families of volunteers, and so on. As for Gray, many years later he wrote of the war:

For the sons of Ukrainian, Polish and German immigrants, the question was loaded with particular torment. Their parents had come to Canada, in substantial part at least, to escape wars and the omnipresent threat of being conscripted into the armies of Austria, Germany, or Russia.... The Ukrainians suffered from severe culture shock. Of all the immigrant peoples, only Doukhobors and Mennonites had a deeper antipathy towards military service. Because all had been dumped on the Western prairie to root-hog-or-die in their own block settlements, their assimilation into Canadian society had been slow. No agency of the Canadian government had ever made the slightest effort to acquaint the new arrivals with any aspect of the Canadian way of life.... In the cities, the Ukrainians, like the Jews and Germans and Poles, found the doors bolted against them when they tried to move into the Canadian mainstream, culturally and economically. It was small wonder that, in the working-class districts of the cities and in the ethnic enclaves in the country, the Ukrainians had more difficulty than anybody in making up their minds about the course of action they should take.

See James Gray, *Troublemaker! A Personal History* (Halifax: Goodread Biographies, 1978), pp. 80-82.

29. See "Sorom i shkodà," *Ukrainskyi holos*, May 6, 1942, and "Ispyt dozrilosty," May 13, 1942.
30. "Novitnia chern," *Ukrainskyi robotnyk*, May 15, 1942.
31. "Komunisty vidvichalni za slid plebistsytu," *Ukrainski visti*, May 12, 1942.
32. "Po plebistsyti," *Novyi shliakh*, May 2, 1942. In this same issue, the paper reprinted the *Winnipeg Free Press* article of April 29, under the title "Bezpidstavnyi zakyd," [Unfounded Allegation], calling it "cheap and naively sensational."
33. F.R. Scott, "What did the 'No' Vote Mean?" *Canadian Forum*, June 1942, pp. 71-73.
34. "Ukrainian Canadians and the Plebiscite," *Ukrainske zhyttia*, May 14, 1942, as quoted in Krawchuk, *Our Contribution To Victory*, pp. 52-53.
35. See Kordan, "Disunity and Duality," p. 74, note 24, who refers to a transcript of a certain CKPR broadcast of May 13, 1942, which had come to the attention of the Committee on Cooperation. Kordan cites PAC, RG 26, vol. 6, file 34-K-2.

36. In Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, pp. 46-48.
37. William Kardash, *Hitler's Agents in Canada: A Revealing Story of Potentially Dangerous Fifth Column Activities in Canada Among Ukrainian Canadians* (Winnipeg 1942). Dorise Neilsen, the pro-Communist MP from Saskatchewan, wrote a brief introduction for this pamphlet and signed it at Ottawa, June 12, 1942. As for the June 29 editorial, I have not been able to locate a copy of *Novyi shliakh* for that date. What does exist, however, and seems to have been the actual source of the Communist allegations, was the editorial of June 30 discussed in chapter two above.
38. See Kordan, "Disunity and Duality," pp. 75-76, citing Simpson's letter to Burianyk of March 19, 1942 (PAC, RG 26, vol. 1, file 22-1, part 1), and Burianyk to Simpson (PAC, MG 30, E350, vol. 1, file 32).
39. "Prof. Kirkonel pidkreslyv patriotychnu robotu loialnykh ukrainsiv," *Novyi shliakh*, June 27, 1942, outlining a report that had originally appeared in the *Toronto Evening Telegram*, June 22, 1942.
40. See note 16 above.
41. See R.W. MacMillan, letter of March 10, 1942, to W. Kossar, and Kossar, letter of May 8, 1942, to Lt. Col. A.W. Pascoe, PAC, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 1, file 6, MG 30, D277 (as of December 1985).
42. Tracy Philipps, "Brief Report for the Personal Information of General LaFleche," in PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Tracy Philipps Papers, vol. 1, file 30, MG 30, E350.

## CHAPTER 5: A NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UKRAINIAN CANADIANS

1. Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, pp. 72.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.
3. William Kardash, *1942: Year of Victory* (Toronto 1942). In this same address, Kardash also returned to the questions of internment operations and "fifth columnists" and argued that the King government should take "energetic political action" against René Chaloult, Paul Bouchard, Abbé Groulx and what he called "the fifth columnists who are dividing Quebec." Kardash pointed to the examples of Britain, which had finally taken action against Mosley, and the United States, which had acted against the rightist radio broadcaster, Father Coughlin.
4. See the general diplomatic histories.
5. See, for example, "Kanadiiska armia na choli ekspeditsii," *Novyi shliakh*, August 22, 1942.
6. "Propaly v Diepskiy kampanii," *Novyi shliakh*, September 19, 1942.
7. Walter A. Tucker, "Faith in Canadians Justified by their Actions," *Windsor Daily Star*, November 4, 1943.
8. Morton, *Canada and War*, p. 139. The official Communist position still holds that Churchill and a reactionary clique were dragging their heels about the opening of a second front to deliberately hurt the Soviet Union and that the Dieppe expedition was no mistake. Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, p. 75, writes: "The question of a Second Front was being dragged out – kept being postponed.... In spite of the small scale of the [Dieppe] expedition (6,000 men – mostly Canadians), it did make a landing on the beach, even though it was with great losses, and carried out its limited objective of diversionary reconnaissance. The raid showed that the fascist command didn't have the necessary forces in the West to repel a large scale landing military force."

9. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, ed., *Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk* (Toronto 1983), pp. 44-49.
10. Steve Kalin, "History of Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association Overseas," *UCVA Newsletter: Convention Issue* II, nos. 11-12 (Toronto 1954), p. 54, and quoted in full in my "UCSA Overseas: A Chapter in the History of the Ukrainian Canadians During World War II," *Forum* 58 (Scranton, Pa., 1984), pp. 28-31.
11. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, p. 47.
12. G. Panchuk, letter of December 8, 1943, to Lt. Frost, in the UCSA Archives in PAC, MG 28, V119, vol. 3.
13. From the UCSA Archives in the private papers of Mr. Stephen Pawluk of Toronto, and quoted in my "UCSA Overseas," p. 29.
14. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, pp. 50-54. In particular, the UCSA distributed books such as Simpson's historical atlas of Ukraine and his edition of Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine* (trans. and abridged by Hanna Chikalenko-Keller). A copy of the latter volume found its way into the hands of the wife of the English publicist, Lydia Alexandrovna Zaccapanay-Lawton, who had personal connections to Ukraine. In 1944, Mrs. Lawton gave the book as a Christmas present to the young student of Eastern European affairs, Peter Brock, who after the war brought it with him to Canada where he became a professor of history at the universities of Alberta and Toronto. In 1983, Professor Brock presented the volume to a young doctoral candidate upon the successful defence of his dissertation. I was that candidate.
15. Information from Steve Kalin.
16. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, pp. 50-54.
17. Ibid. Interview with Bohdan Panchuk, Montreal, June 1984; interview with Stephen Davidovich, Toronto, December 1983; interview with Anthony Yaremovich, Winnipeg, February 1984.
18. See the Postal Intercept of January 4, 1943, in the External Affairs files in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III.
19. Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (New York, 1960), pp. 291-302.
20. Ibid. Seton-Watson had also been Kysilewsky's mentor while the latter had studied in London. On the telegrams of June 1942, see the report by Tracy Philipps in Kordan, "Disunity and Duality," Appendix I.
21. Interview with Anthony Yaremovich, Winnipeg, February 1984. On the defection of the UNF leader and on USRL members who collaborated in the Aid to Russia Fund and other enterprises, see below.
22. See Kordan, "Disunity and Duality," pp. 82-83.
23. "Pan-Slavic Movement in Canada," July 13, 1942, cited in *ibid.*, p. 84.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-90. R.A. Davies, the Communist journalist who had earlier tricked *Saturday Night* magazine into publishing negative material about Ukrainian nationalists, was the source of the anti-Philipps story which found its way into the *Globe and Mail*, October 1, 1942, via *The Hour* (New York), September 26, 1942, which Kordan identifies as a "disguised communist publication."
25. L.D. Wilgress to External Affairs, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1986, file 165, part III.
26. Watson Kirkconnell *Our Communists and the New Canadians* (Toronto 1943).
27. Interview with Anthony Yaremovich, Winnipeg, February 1984. See in particular the detailed RCMP secret report on the congress (44 pages) in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III.

28. N. Robertson, letter to Judge Davis, October 7, 1942, in PAC, RG 44, vol. 25, file: Bureau of Public Information. Also see the discussion in Kordan, "Unity and Duality," pp. 78-80.
29. J.W. Arsenych, letter to Professor Simpson, October 15, 1942, in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Saskatoon, George Simpson papers, Ukrainian file. Arsenych added as a postscript: "Last night I received cheerful news that my son Paul is alive but a prisoner of war in Hong Kong camp." Simpson did raise with External officials the matter of a person of Ukrainian background in the Canadian diplomatic corps.
30. See the minutes of the executive meeting of October 27, 1942, and A. Yaremovich, letter of October 30, 1942, to George Simpson, in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, George Simpson Papers, Ukrainian file. In the case of Wasyl Swystun, Vladimir Kaye seems to have played an influential role. On October 20, 1942, Yaremovich wrote Kossar: "Dr. Kaye certainly influenced Mr. Swystun to change his mind. Just the day before the meeting he threatened me that if we are going to insist upon holding the Congress on a Canadian basis he is going to resign. Dr. Kaye came around and 'Lo and Behold' Mr. Swystun sees the possibility of holding the Congress on a purely Canadian basis. You should have seen the grin on everybody's face." See PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 6, file 3 (as of December 1985).
31. "Kossar again Heads Ukrainian Federation," *Winnipeg Free Press*, January 20, 1943. By this time, of course, Kossar was fully aware of the loyalty-at-home themes that Philipps, Kaye and Kirkconnell had often outlined for "respectable" Ukrainian organizations in Canada. See in particular Kirkconnell's considerable correspondence with Kossar in PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 4, file 36 (as of December 1985).
32. PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III.
33. Sharik, *Z viddali 50 lit*, II, pp. 37-38.
34. Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, *A Program and a Record* (Saskatoon-Winnipeg 1943).
35. The text of the memorandum is in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III, and is printed in "Independent Ukrainian State is urged in Brief to Ottawa," *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 1, 1943. Nesdoly, "Changing Perspectives," p. 111, calls the submission "carefully-prepared, well-documented, and moderate in tone."
36. Memorandum to the Prime Minister from N. Robertson, May 6, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III. Also see the brief discussion in Bohdan S. Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations and the Ukrainian Ethnic Problem, 1939-1944," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* XIII, no. 2 (Bellingham, Wash., 1985), pp. 8-9, and the more lengthy one in Krawchuk, *Our Contribution to Victory*, pp. 82-85, who quotes from the texts of several Canadian Communist articles.
37. See the various news clippings in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III, and the quotations and discussion in Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pp. 71-72. See, in particular, "These Questions Can Wait," *Toronto Daily Star*, May 17, 1943, which criticizes various Ukrainian groups, "one of them frankly nationalist," for wanting to take Ukraine away from Russia after the war. The *Daily Star* maintained that boundary disputes, especially those between Poland and the Soviet Union, should be postponed until the war was over.
38. L.D. Wilgress to External Affairs, May 17 and 19, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III. See also the quotations and brief discussion in Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations," pp. 9-10.

39. Robertson to Willgress, May 28, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III. On March 3, 1943, RCMP Commissioner Wood had reported to Robertson on the UNF and on the pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadian Association (UCA), and described the harassment recently endured by UNF members. He reported that the UCA had recently torn up the UNF flag and fought with UNF members during the Victory parade at St. Catharines, Ontario, and smashed windows at the UNF hall in Toronto while the latter were holding a meeting and that both "fiascos" were stopped by Police authorities. He concluded: "The UCA try to represent this as the Simon-Pure Majority Group among the Ukrainian Canadians and consistently calumniate what is actually the non-Communist majority."
40. W. Kossar, "Statement to Corporal M.V. Nolan, RCMP," Saskatoon, May 5, 1943, in PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Wladimir Kossar Collection, vol. 5, file 3 (as of December 1985). Caldbrick and Yates, letter of November 6, 1939, to the Ukrainian National Federation, Timmins, concerning the difficulties of filing suit, in *ibid.*, vol. 6, file 33.
41. Commissioner Wood to N. Robertson, letter of June 4, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III.
42. See the minutes of the June 9, 1943, meeting on the subject of the Communist halls, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III.
43. H. Henry to J. Arsenych, cable of June 14, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III. Behind the scenes, Tracy Philipps did his best to elicit, as he informed Simpson, "at least one publishable message of encouragement from the Federal Government" to the UCC, and he pointed to the advisability of sending at least as encouraging a message as had already been sent by "the imposing list of Federal Ministers" to the recent Winnipeg congress of the pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadian Association. See Philipps' undated letter to Simpson in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Saskatoon, George Simpson Collection, Ukrainian file.
44. See the RCMP report in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part III, which refers to p. 60 of the book by R.A. Davies discussed in the next chapter.
45. "Ukrainian Leader Resigns Post," *Montreal Star*, June 5, 1943. Also see Swystun's letter of June 11, 1943, to George Simpson in the latter's papers in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives. Swystun writes further: "I have been supporting the [UC] Committee for a long time while a member of it and I will be supporting it while out of it, with the exception of the proposed Congress .... The Communists and other people ... have been circulating all kinds of nonsensical speculations about the reasons for my resignation."
46. See the RCMP report on the UCC congress in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part IV.
47. Watson Kirkconnell letter of June 13, 1943, to George Simpson in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, George Simpson Papers, Ukrainian file. See also "Ukrainians Complete Congress Plans," *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 21, 1943.
48. For the text of the speeches by Kushnir and Kossar, see *The First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada* (Winnipeg 1943), pp. 23-48.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 49ff.
50. For the text of the Kirkconnell's speech, which did not appear in the same volume as the rest of the congress proceedings, see Watson Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists: The Ukrainian Canadian Committee* (Winnipeg 1943). For the reactions of the crowds and the UCC executive, see the RCMP report on the congress cited above.



51. Hlynka's speech is given, in what appears to be an edited version, in the official volume of congress proceedings, pp. 82-88; Sikewich's speech is omitted altogether.
52. See the RCMP report.
53. For press coverage of the congress, see "Communists Flayed at Ukrainian Parley," *Tribune* (Winnipeg), June 23, 1943; "Discontented Ukraine Given as War Cause," *ibid.*, June 24; and "Ukrainians to Place Canada's Interests First," *ibid.*, June 25. Similar stories appeared in the *Winnipeg Free Press* and other papers. Seemingly oblivious to political conditions in Canada, Ukrainian nationalists in the United States expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the UCC congress resolutions had avoided all mention of Ukrainian independence and were limited to general demands for "equal treatment" with "other recognised nations." *Svoboda* (Jersey City), July 10, 1943, noted that nowhere in the resolutions "is there the slightest direct mention of the fact that democratically-minded Ukrainians in their native land Ukraine and their kinsmen in Canada as well as here in America and elsewhere desire to see established after this war a free and independent state of Ukraine." Similarly, on August 12, 1943, Wasyl Swystun wrote to Alexander Granovsky in Minneapolis: "I am very glad that you evaluate the Congress the same way as I do. As far as my resignation [from the UCC and the UNF] is concerned, I do not think it matters now very much whether I am active or not, because nothing can be done for the Ukrainian cause under the present circumstances" (Immigration History Research Centre, Alexander Granovsky papers, vol. 21, file Wasyl Swystun). Of course, the non-Communist Ukrainian-language newspapers carried news of the congress for many weeks afterward.
54. See the RCMP report on the congress, and the brief article: "Davies Charges Fascist Element Among Ukrainians," *Tribune*, June 24, 1943. On the eve of the congress the former Communist, Danylo Lobay, and his small labour group did leave the UCC organizing committee and refrained from taking part in the proceedings, but this had nothing to do with Communist "counter-congress" activities. On the other hand, when the left-wing journalist Elmore Philpot called the UCC congress "a short-cut to World War Three" because it criticized the Soviet Union and claimed to speak for Ukrainians there (*Yorkton Enterprise*, July 1, 1943), he was clearly reiterating the Communist line. (Philpot's suggested reading on Ukrainians included works by Davies and Kardash.) A Ukrainian Canadian cultural group under the leadership of Brother Methodius, of Saint Joseph's College, Yorkton, protested against the Philpot article and on July 10 even wrote Prime Minister King about it. See the letter in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165-39c, part iv. Mr. King did not, of course, take any action.
55. "Restoration of Property of Ukrainian Farmer Labour Temples: Basic Considerations which should determine government Policy," in PAC, W.L.M. King Papers, vol. 336, file Ukrainian Canadians.
56. Hume Wrong, Memorandum to J. Pickersgill, in *ibid.*
57. See G. deT. Glazebrook, memo to N. Robertson, June 23, 1943, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165, part iii, and the brief discussion in Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations," p. 11, who here argues that this remark "set the stage" for the general house-cleaning in the Nationalities Branch; that is, the removal of Tracy Philipps.

## CHAPTER 6: THE INVASION OF EUROPE

1. See, for example, "Aliianty pochaly invaziiu Italii: Kanadiitsi v aktsii na Sytsylii," *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, July 14, 1943, and "Deiat Kanadiitsiv regimentiv...v Leonforte," *ibid.*, August 4, 1943.
2. For accounts of the campaigns in Sicily and Italy, see the various histories of the Canadian forces overseas by C.P. Stacey, G.W.L. Nicholson, W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, and others. There is a brief summary in George F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People*, revised edition (Toronto 1960), pp. 365-66.
3. Interview with Ed Tacium, Winnipeg, February 10, 1984, who served in a tank corps with the Canadian army all over Italy. Tacium paid little attention to his Ukrainian background; interview with Peter Sendej, Toronto, June 1984, who served with the British Eighth Army, Polish Corps, across North Africa and then across Italy. Sendej reports that he first met Ukrainian Canadians around Monte Cassino and that numerous Ukrainians in the Polish army of General Anders fell at Cassino. Poles, Ukrainians and others were all buried in great common graves, but Greek Catholic priests led special memorial services for the Ukrainians just as Roman Catholic priests led services for the Poles.
4. Interview with Mike Gregorish, Winnipeg, February 1984.
5. Postal Intercept, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165-39c, part iv.
6. "UCSA Xmas Get-together in Rome," *UCSA Newsletter* 1, no. 6 (London March 1945), p. 7; "Zizd SUKV v ukrainskii seminarii v Rymi," *Novyi shliakh*, February 14, 1945. Kereliuk's role is also mentioned in Panchuk's *Heroes of Their Day*, p. 62.
7. Raymond Arthur Davies [Rudolph Shohan], *This is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler* (Toronto 1943), p. 29.
8. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
10. "Zhynulo 100,000 Zhydiv u Lvovi," *Novyi shliakh*, February 2, 1944, and editorial of February 23, 1944.
11. Honore Ewach, "Ukrainian Jews," *Novyi shliakh*, May 24, 1944.
12. "Ukrainians and Jews," *Western Jewish News* (Winnipeg), June 1, 1944.
13. "Ukrainians and Jews," *Novyi shliakh*, June 21, 1944.
14. See the House of Commons, *Debates*, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 2477-91, and "Ukrainian Magazine Spreads Anti-Semitism, MP Charges," *The Hebrew Journal* (Toronto), April 30, 1944. The statements published in *The Call* were, in fact, racist and anti-semitic, charging that the Jews as a race were opposed to the Ukrainian national movement. The caricature was of the Kievan Jew, G.Y. Zinoviev, who was a prominent member of Lenin's Politburo. In reproducing the caricature, however, Davies and Progress Publishers translated only the anti-semitic captions and omitted the punch line: "This is Gregory Zinoviev."
15. Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, George Simpson Papers, file 25, The Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1942-1962.
16. Watson Kirkconnell, *Seven Pillars of Freedom* (Toronto 1944), pp. 212-13.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-16.
18. W. Kirkconnell, letter of July 13, 1944, to V. Kaye, PAC, National Ethnic Archives, Vladimir Kaye Collection, vol. 6, file 32.
19. For a detailed breakdown of the "foreign-language press" in Canada in 1944, see Kaye's table giving paper, frequency of publication, editorial address, circulation (where possible), owners and editorial policies: "Foreign Language Press of Canada," PAC, RG 25, vol. 13A. I am indebted

- to Mr. Myron Momryk of the PAC, National Ethnic Archives, for this reference.
20. The full text of the Zaslavsky article was unavailable to me, but there are long quotations reprinted in "Bolshevytskyi nakyd na Kirkkonnela," *Novyi shliakh*, November 4, 1944.
  21. "Watson Kirkconnell's Statement: Moscow Attack Aims to Aid Buck's Coalition," *Tribune* (Winnipeg), November 3, 1944.
  22. A. Zaharychuk, "To the Editor: Ukrainians' Part," *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 13, 1944. Joseph Onysko (interview of February 1984, Winnipeg), was a Ukrainian-Canadian sailor on the Murmansk run and testifies that because of tight Soviet security there was almost no contact between Canadian servicemen and Soviet citizens during the stops at Soviet ports. In fact, he explains, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion was fairly consistent and Canadian sailors seldom, if ever, disembarked.
  23. Robert England, "Report on Reorganization of Nationalities Branch, Department of National War Services," PAC, RG 26, 13A, pp. 1-5. I am indebted to Mr. Myron Momryk for this reference.
  24. *Ibid.* In fact, Ukrainian contributions to the Victory Loan campaigns were repeatedly noted in the press. For example, at the start of the Sixth Victory Loan campaign, the Ukrainian Labour Temple in Winnipeg raised \$11,700 and its rival UCC pledged \$20,000. See "Ukrainians Offer Thousands At Victory Loan Gatherings," *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 24, 1944, which quotes a certain D. Gerych as surveying Ukrainian-Canadian contributions to the previous drive and showing that they had purchased \$1.2 million worth of bonds at that time.
  25. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9. England also pointed out that the "Canadians All" campaign, in spite of considerable success, still lagged far behind its counterpart "Americans All" campaign in the United States.
  26. *Ibid.*, Appendix I.
  27. *Ibid.*
  28. See "Report," p. 5, where England indicates that he is aware of this systematic underrating of the participation of these groups. About this same time, Anthony Hlynka complained in the House of Commons that too many farmers' sons with good excuses for not enlisting (as, for example, the sole son left at home with elderly parents and two or three quarter sections of land to look after) were being called up for service under the NRMA plan. Hlynka declared: "I think the minister should tell the House and the country that our manpower pool is being exhausted, and that pressure is being applied to get as many men as possible for the armed services, wherever they may be obtained." The minister replied that out of 252,625 postponements, 145,529 had been granted to farmers, among whom most conscientious objectors were to be found. See the House of Commons, *Debates*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 2534-35.
  29. See Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists*, p. 27, and Davies, *This Is Our Land!*, p. 32, who, in turn, cites an article by Rev. Michael Pelech in the *Calgary Herald*, August 10, 1942. Because most of the armed services were composed of volunteers, it was safely assumed that most of the 40,000 servicemen were volunteers and not conscripts who had declined to go active. This assumption also underlay England's remarks.
  30. Interview with Joseph Onysko, Winnipeg, February 1984; interview with Bohdan Panchuk, Montreal, May 1984.
  31. Panchuk interview.
  32. Dick Sanburn, "Nazis Wouldn't Understand: 11 Nationalities Fight For Canada in Winnipeg Rifles," *Tribune*, August 9, 1944; "Canadians All," *ibid.*

33. See, for example, "Third Ukrainian Army," *Tribune*, February 7, 1944; "Ukrainian Armies' Triumph," *ibid.*, March 20, 1944; Mike Hrushka, "Winnipeg Ukrainians Hail Old Home Town [Chernivtsi]," *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 29, 1944; "The Carpathian Wall," *ibid.*, March 20, 1944.
34. See the various memos and letters from Wilgress to External Affairs beginning in October 1943, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165 part IV, and "Ukraine to Negotiate with 'New' Poland: Government-In-Exile Charged 'Pro-Fascist'," *Tribune*, February 7, 1944. The author discovered the latter item in the UCC Clipping File in the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, Winnipeg.

During this particular period, Wilgress noted the increase in Ukrainian national sentiment in Soviet war propaganda – as in the campaign glorifying the anti-Polish Cossack leader, Bohdan Khmelnytsky – and juxtaposed this to Soviet information which linked Ukrainian nationalists "...with Polish organizations, such as that of Matuszewski. Both," Wilgress reported on May 17, 1943, "are motivated by sentiments hostile to the Soviet Union, and as regards war on eastern front they can be said to be pro-German." Wilgress's observations, and especially his remarks on Canadian Ukrainians, were received with frequent scepticism by Norman Robertson in Ottawa, who replied with detailed commentaries.

35. "New Move Pleases Ukrainians," *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 3, 1944. Also see *Kanadiyskyi farmer*, February 8, 1944, the largest circulation Ukrainian-language paper in Canada, which fully supported the move, arguing that while the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was not truly independent, the Ukrainian people could hardly expect independence from a victorious Germany. For a dissenting view, see *Ukrainskyi holos*, February 9, 1944, which was downright pessimistic. Rumours quickly followed that the "reconstituted" Ukrainian and Belorussian republics wished to exchange ambassadors with Great Britain, the United States and Canada. See "Ukraine to Ask Diplomatic Exchange?" *Tribune* (Winnipeg), February 10, 1944, citing a copyrighted dispatch from the London Bureau of the *New York Herald Tribune* of the same day. For a brief discussion of the constitutional changes that had taken place in the USSR during January and February 1944, see Konstantyn Sawczuk, *The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy 1944-1950* (Boulder, Colo. 1975), p. 6.
36. "Polish Wisdom in Raising Border Line Issue Questioned," *Winnipeg Free Press*, January 17, 1944.
37. "Postponment on Boundaries Ukrainians Ask: Committee Opposes Discussion Now of Post-war Settlements – Winning War is Immediate Task," *Evening Telegram* (Toronto), April 1, 1944. The pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadian Association, of course, disputed the traditional UCC claim to represent 80 per cent of Ukrainian Canadians and, given the stress on national independence, disassociated itself from the memorandum.
38. "Ukrainians Welcome Russian Statement," *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 17, 1944.
39. *Ibid.*
40. See *Ameryka* (Philadelphia), July 13, 1944, and the report on public opinion among Ukrainian Americans, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165A, part IV.
41. "Sobornist u nevoli," *Novyi shliakh*, January 27, 1945.
42. The public declarations and the protocol of the Yalta conference are given in W.C. Langsam, *Historic Documents of World War II* (Princeton, N.J.,

- 1958), pp. 101-10. Also see Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations Organization*, pp. 15-32.
43. See *Svoboda*, February 16 and 17, 1945, and *Ameryka* (Philadelphia), February 15 and 17, 1945. See also reports on public opinion among Ukrainian Americans, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, part IV.
  44. "The Crimean Declaration - Words and Deeds," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1, no. 2 (New York 1944), pp. 101-104.
  45. See the report on Swystun's speech in the *Ukrainski shchodennii visty* (New York), February 25, 1945.
  46. "Ukrainian Separatists in Canada," PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, part IV.
  47. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, p. 61. As early as July 3, 1944, during the House of Commons debate on the budget, W.A. Tucker was careful to mention Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the war effort and linked it to Canadian diplomatic support for a "full measure of freedom and self-government for Ukraine" at any future peace conference. See House of Commons, *Debates*, 1944, vol. v, p. 4443.
  48. *Journals of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 1944-1945*, vol. LXXXIV (Ottawa 1945), pp. 957-58; House of Commons, *Debates*, 1944, vol. VI, pp. 6952-53. As late as November 30, Tucker, the Liberal member from Rosthern, Saskatchewan, a riding with a large Mennonite and Ukrainian population, had strenuously argued against conscription. During a long speech in the House of Commons (*ibid.*, pp. 6704), he stated that the demand for conscription for overseas service had been made "upon the ground of equality of service and sacrifice," and pointed to the Saskatchewan record (where over 50% of the population was of non-English-speaking origin) and to his own constituency which had recorded 50 killed in action. Tucker broke down the figures thus:

	Per cent
English, Irish, Scottish, etc.	26
Ukrainian	18
French-speaking	12
Mennonite	12
German	20
Scandinavian	4
Hungarian	8

He concluded: "I put these figures on record to show that we are building up a nation of Canadians regardless of their racial origin. These figures show that under a policy of allowing people to offer themselves freely in the defence of their country there has been a response from all peoples regardless of their religious beliefs or racial origin."

49. See, in particular, the series of articles by Elmore Philpott in the *Vancouver Sun* for January and February 1945. At first Philpott had blamed French-Canadian troops and had argued for tough measures against them (*ibid.*, December 1, 1944); later he blamed the Ukrainians. (See his "To End Zombie Disgrace," *ibid.*, January 24, 1945. The local UCC chapter responded with a protest against such articles (see the UCC clipping file in the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, Winnipeg.) One judicial inquest into the BC disorders mentioned two Slavic names, but neither of these was Ukrainian. See the Department of National Defence, History Directorate, 341.PR 009 (D27). C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments* (Ottawa 1970), p. 476, mentions that shortly afterwards he discussed the affair with the officers in charge in British Columbia who stated that it was not French-Canadian soldiers who were chiefly involved but rather "the organizers were predominantly men of Central European origin from the Prairies,

- including a certain number of Germans." More generally, see R.H. Roy, "Mutiny in the Mountains – The Terrace Incident," draft article, History Directorate 76/92, and Morton, *Canada and War*, pp. 145-47.
50. Morton, *Canada and War*, pp. 147-48.
  51. V.J. Kaye, "World War II List of Army, Navy and Royal Air Force Fatal Casualties 1939-1945," (Ottawa?: Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, 1972). Stephen Pawluk Papers, lists 1,176 fatalities, of which in a given sample 724 fell in the areas in question. However, Kaye often included names, the origin of which was not necessarily Ukrainian, or which were only indirectly related to Ukraine, as for example, the name "Dyck" which was probably of Mennonite origin.
  52. See the lists compiled by V.J. Kaye and Miss Kulyk, "Campaign Awards: World War Two" (Ottawa: Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation and Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association, 1972) Stephen Pawluk Papers.
  53. Maurice Pastyr, "A Comrade in Arms," from the personal archive of Mr. Pastyr, Toronto, who has established that Petrow was killed in action on February 2, 1945. Pastyr informs me that he verified this story by interviewing several witnesses.
  54. Peter Pashe, telephone interview of February 7, 1984, Winnipeg.

#### CHAPTER 7: THE WAR ENDS

1. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, pp. 61, 66.
2. See the secret report, "Ukrainian Separatists of the United States and Canada join forces," Office of Strategic Services, Washington DC, December 1944; there is a copy in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, part IV.
3. Ibid. See also the article by Mykola Chubaty on "The Conference of American and Canadian Ukrainians," in the American daily *Svoboda*, October 13, 1944; and the "Joint Communiqué of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," in the *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1, no. 1 (New York 1944), pp. 82-84.
4. See "Zuken Claims..." *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 5, 1945.
5. House of Commons, *Debates*; 1945, pp. 226-30, and reprinted in *Antin Hlynka: Posol federalnogo parlamentu Kanady 1940-1949*, pp. 155-58. Tucker, who also frequently defended the interests of his Ukrainian constituents in the House of Commons, differed considerably from Hlynka on the question of the United Nations. He had attended the Bretton Woods conference and had become a strong supporter of the proposed world organization. His principal reservations concerned the use of the armed forces of smaller nations by the Security Council. The interests of his Mennonite constituents were probably influential here (*Debates*, 1945, pp. 166-69.)
6. There is a brief survey of nationalist press reaction in "Istorychna promova posla Hlynky," *Novy shliakh*, April 7, 1945.
7. Harold L. Weir, "Canadians can Speak for Canada and Only Canada: Too Many Instances of Dual Loyalty in This Country," *Bulletin* (Edmonton), March 29, 1945, and reprinted in *Novy shliakh*, April 25, 1945. A similar article, only marginally less vitriolic in tone, appeared in the other Edmonton paper. See "Mr. Hlynka's Outrageous Proposal," *Journal* (Edmonton), March 28, 1945, and reprinted in *Novy shliakh*, April 25, 1945.
8. Anthony Hlynka, "The editor," *Bulletin*, April 5, 1945. See also his reply to the remarks which appeared in the *Journal* in "The Editor," April 6,

1945. Both are reprinted in "Zakydy poslovi Hlyntsi ta ioho vidpovid," *Novyi shliakh*, April 25, 1945.
9. Secret Memo for the Prime Minister dated July 4, 1944, in PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165-A part IV, and summarized in Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations," p. 12.
10. Quoted in Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations*, p. 36.
11. "Russian Demand For Three Votes Defended at Ukrainian Meeting," *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 16, 1945. As Shatulsky put it, Turkey had sat on the fence throughout the war while Argentina had remained the whole time behind the fence on the fascist side. This same meeting paid a two-minute tribute to President Roosevelt who had just died.
12. See "Konferentsiia v San Frantsisko," *Novyi shliakh*, April 28, 1945, and "Ukraina na Svitovii Konferentsii v San Frantsisko," *ibid.*, which quotes from the "Coming of Molotov to San Francisco May Solve Problem of the Ukraine," *Oakland Tribune*, April 21, 1945.
13. George Simpson, "Suggestions Regarding the Objectives of the KUK [UCC] Delegation to San Francisco," in the University of Saskatchewan Archives, George Simpson Papers, Ukrainian Files, 1945-1949.
14. Both the Ukrainian and English texts of the memorandum were printed in full in the various Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers. See, in particular, "Memorandum to the Canadian Delegation..." in *Novyi shliakh*, May 26, 1945. The position of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America was exactly the same. See "The San Francisco Conference and Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1, no. 3 (New York 1945), pp. 210-211.
15. Confidential memo to H. Wrong from L. Malania, December 5, 1945, PAC, RG 25, G1, vol. 1896, file 165-A, part IV. See also the brief discussion in Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations," pp. 12-13.
16. Alexander Granovsky, "Report on the Activities at the UN Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California," Immigration History Research Centre, Alexander Granovsky papers, vol. 43, file San Francisco Conference, 1945.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, pp. 74-85.
21. Interview with Stephen Pawluk, Toronto.
22. See Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on the Immigration and Labour* (Ottawa 1946); also Kordan and Luciuk, *Documents*, pp. 146-51.
23. Interview with Stephen Pawluk.

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## Maple Leaf and Trident

Until recently, most writing in the field of Ukrainian-Canadian history has been concerned with the pioneer era of settlement in the decades before the First World War. Dr. Prymak's book for the first time examines in detail the period of the interwar years and, most especially, Ukrainian-Canadian involvement in the Second World War.

*Maple Leaf and Trident* documents Ukrainian participation in the war effort and also the attitudes of the majority of Canadians towards the Ukrainian minority group during this period. But the main focus of the book is on the attitudes and contributions of the Ukrainian community itself, and on its internal divisions. The book deals with the propaganda war among Ukrainian Canadians, that is, between the Communists, who formed one tightly knit community, and the nationalists or non-Communists, who formed an entirely distinct and more diversified community.

Hitler's invasion of Russia, and the subsequent emergence of the Soviet Union as Britain's senior ally, had a profound effect on Ukrainian political organizations in Canada. The Ukrainian Communists enjoyed a rise in prestige, while the nationalists were immediately suspect, their leaders interrogated by the RCMP. Dr. Prymak in his analysis of this period has set out to explore the ideologies and actions of the non-Communist right in more detail than has been attempted in any previous study.

*Maple Leaf and Trident* adds an important dimension to our knowledge of the involvement of immigrant groups in the Canadian war effort from 1939 to 1945, and highlights the relationships between Ukrainians and the Canadian government, and between Ukrainian Canadians of differing ideologies. It is a valuable contribution to the series on Ethnic and Immigration History.

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