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HOLODOMOR STUDIES

Holodomor as Seen by Contemporary Observers from Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Canada

Repressions in Podillia, 1927-1928

Soviet Dumping of Ukrainian
Wheat: Impact on Ukrainian and
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Torgsin: Taking Foreign Currency
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Reports on the State of Ukrainian
Affairs, XII Congress of the KP(b)U,
January 1934

Book Reviews:

Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands*

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

When a famine broke out in one region of the Tsarist or Soviet realm, people sought refuge in another, or fled across the border. In 1921 and 1922, Russians abandoned the drought-ridden Volga valley for Ukraine, while Ukrainians left their equally ravaged steppe lands and headed for Romania and Poland. During the Great Famine of the 1930s, Ukrainians living in the eastern part of the union republic stole across the guarded border with the RSFSR, and those in the western part tried to enter Poland or Romania. Many migrants, going east or west, were stopped by the Soviet border guards, but others made their escape. Alberto Basciani analyzes the information given to the Romanian border guards by successful refugees about the famine conditions in Ukraine and the vicissitudes of their own flight.

Romania, a monarchy with an important agrarian economy, was understandably very much concerned about the politics of its communist neighbor and closely followed the impact that Stalin's "revolution from above" had on the internal development and the foreign policy of the Soviet giant. Having no diplomatic missions in the USSR, Romania relied on its embassies in other countries for information gathering. Vadim Guzun examines the Romanian diplomatic correspondence, particularly the reports on Soviet dumping of wheat and other agricultural products on world markets, and its consequences for the Romanian economy, and the aggravation of the famine conditions in Ukraine.

Complementary to the two articles on the Romanian perspective on the Soviet famine of the 1930s is Ernest H. Latham's review of the Romanian documents, compiled and edited by Vadim Guzun, on the Soviet famine, five-year plan and collectivization. The Romanian documents come as a welcome addition to the recent publication of Polish sources on the same subject.

The joint paper by Edvins Šnore and Indrek Paavle shows that the newly independent republics of Latvia and Estonia also kept a watch on the Soviet affairs. The Baltic politicians were knowledgeable about the economic difficulties and the famine in Ukraine, but refrained from discussing the calamity in public and made no representation on the victims' behalf. The Baltic public was well informed by native and foreign news media and found ways of sending private famine relief.

Serge Cipko traces the treatment of the famine problem by the mainstream Canadian media and the ethnic Ukrainian newspapers. Ukrainian Canadians succeeded in having the issue discussed in the provincial and

federal legislatures but without any concrete results and their efforts to send famine relief came to naught.

A small amount of aid came from Canada and the U.S.A. in the form of “veterans’ checks.” This subject, here supported with rare documents, needs more research in North American archives. In his study on the Podillia Torgsin network Valerii Rekrut shows that the checks were exchanged for food vouchers. Set up to service foreigners, the Torgsins ended up buying up gold and jewels from the starving population.

Volodymyr Petrenko’s study deals with Soviet repression against the population of Podillia, but during the earlier years and corresponding to the smaller famine of the late 1920s.

Myron Momryk follows the life of a German communist who worked in Ukraine during the famine, saw its horrors, but kept his faith in Marxism when he emigrated to Canada.

Yaroslav Bilinsky’s review of Timothy Snyder’s *Bloodlands*, is an occasion for the reviewer to comment on Ukrainians’ relations with other nations, and the treatment of these relations by other historians.

Raphael Lemkin’s seminal conceptualization of the Ukrainian genocide, now published in 28 languages, is the subject Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern’s review.

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Ernest H. Latham Jr. served as the American cultural attaché in Romania (1983-1987) and later as Fulbright Professor (2000-2002). At the present time he is the coordinator of advanced area studies for Romania and Moldova at the Foreign Service Institute (U.S. Department of State). Latest publication: *Timeless and transitory: 20th century relations between Romania and the English-speaking world*. (București: Editura Vremea, 2012).

Myron Momryk worked as an archivist at the Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, Canada from 1981 until he retired in 2006. He has continued his interest and research in the history of East European immigrant and ethnocultural groups. He has contributed several articles to Polish, Ukrainian and Canadian journals and publications on historical and archival subjects.

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Roman Serbyn is a retired professor of history at Université du Québec à Montréal. His publications explore the national question in Ukraine, Ukrainian Jewish relations, the famine of 1921-23, the Holodomor and Ukrainians in World War 2. Latest article: "Photographs of the Galicia Division: A Tribute to Ukrainian Patriotism," in Bohdan Maciw, ed., *The Ukrainian Division "Halychyna". A Photographic History of the Galicia Division* (Lviv, 2012).

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ALBERTO BASCIANI

*FROM COLLECTIVIZATION TO THE
GREAT FAMINE: EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS
ON THE HOLODOMOR BY REFUGEES
FROM THE UKRAINIAN SSR, 1930-1933*

The 1920s-1930s marked one of the periods of greatest tension in the complex and difficult history of political and diplomatic relations between Romania and Russia (later, the USSR). Even though Romania's conquest of Bessarabia, which took place after the collapse of the tsarist state, was sanctioned in 1920 at the international level, it was never accepted by Soviet Russia. Moscow never ceased to consider Bessarabia, which came under tsarist Russian rule in 1812 its own territory. The result was that Bessarabia became the theater of a full-scale military conflict.

The conflict, waged in the most problematic of all the new provinces of Greater Romania,¹ was a low-intensity war, on one side of which was the Romanian army, and on the other, non-communist forces consisting of various armies and formations and, after 1920-21, the Red Army, primarily irregular armed Bolshevik bands.² The latter formations were comprised of men recruited by the Comintern from among Russian and Ukrainian exiles who had fled Bessarabia after its union with Romania on 27 March 1918: from their bases in Soviet territory these bands were dispatched to Romanian territory in order to destabilize the country.³ Owing

1. On the problems of Bessarabia's integration into Greater Romania, see Alberto Basciani, *La difficile unione: la Bessarabia e la Grande Romania, 1918-1940*, 2d rev. and exp. ed. (Rome: Aracne, 2007).

2. The Romanian authorities estimated that between 1918 and 1925 the border territories along the Dniester River were the site of approximately 3,000 attacks, raids, and various types of incidents provoked by armed formations, especially Bolshevik units, who had their bases in Ukrainian territory. See Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), p. 51. For an accurate, albeit pro-Romanian, reconstruction of the situation on the Romanian-Russian border in the postwar period, see Ludmila Rotari, *Mișcarea subversivă din Basarabia în anii 1918-1924* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004).

3. In the mid-1920s Moscow became the headquarters of an association of Bessarabian emigrants and the hub of their political and journalistic activities (starting with the newspaper *Krasnaia Bessarabia*), which championed the transfer of the region to the USSR. See Iakov M. Kopanskii, *Obshchestvo Bessarabtssev v SSSR i soiuz bessarabskikh emigrantov: 1924-1940* (Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1978).

to this situation, throughout the interwar years the Romanian government maintained a state of siege in the easternmost districts of Bessarabia. Even when this undeclared war cooled down in the late 1920s and above all in the mid-1930s, the Romanian-Soviet border remained one of the most guarded and dangerous in all of Europe.⁴

Military operations and acts of sabotage caused further destruction of roads, railways, and bridges over the Dnister River. In 1919, e.g., Symon Petliura's troops, while retreating to Romania, blew up the bridge between Tighina and Tiraspol, which was rebuilt only in 1935.⁵ Nevertheless, despite the ongoing situation and the absence, until 1934, of formal diplomatic relations between the governments of Moscow and Bucharest, the Dnister, which marked the border for hundreds of miles between the Kingdom of Romania and the Soviet Union was the scene of endless border crossings.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution and during the chaotic events of the civil war, some of the estimated 1.5-2 million Russians who fled abroad passed through Bessarabia, where at first they were welcomed by the local Orthodox Church.⁶ A significant number of these exiles, estimated at over 7,000 people, settled in Bessarabia; some settled down permanently, others only temporarily. Particularly large was the community of exiled Russians in the city of Chişinău, where they founded the newspaper *Bessarabskoe Slovo*, which came out until 1935.⁷ However, those citizens and Russian soldiers, who feared the possible consequences resulting from the new political and economic order that was imposed in the former tsarist empire, were not the only ones crossing the Dnister in search of a safe haven. During the civil war thousands of Jews and peasants in what would become the Moldavian ASSR abandoned their homes and villages. Seeking asylum in Bessarabia, some of the refugees were fleeing the pogroms, while others were escaping the manifold forms of

4. A computation of all border incidents on the Dnister between Romanian and Soviet forces is found in Adrian Brişcă, "Raporturi de graniţă sovieto-române, noiembrie 1918-iunie 1941," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, 1 (1996): 46–61.

5. See Alexandru-Murad Mironov, "Pe Nistrul neliniştit. Viaţă şi moarte la graniţa româno-sovietică, 1918–1940," in *Identitate de frontieră în Europa lărgită*, ed. Romaniţa Costantinescu (Iaşi: Polirom, 2008), pp. 67–68.

6. See Boris Raymond and David R. Jones, *The Russian Diaspora, 1917–1941* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2000), p. 8.

7. John Glad, *Russia Abroad: Writers, History, Politics* (Washington, DC: Birchbark Press, 1999), pp. 209–10. In an effort to avoid worsening its already strained relations with the Soviet Union, the Romanian government, like that of Poland, did not grant recognition to any non-communist organization founded in exile, including the most important of these, the Russian General Military Union, which was created in 1924 at the initiative of General Petr Wrangel. See Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920–1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 100.

violence that had erupted during the period of War Communism.⁸ According to the latest research, 168,325 refugees arrived in Bessarabia from Ukraine and Russia over a four-year period between January 1918 and April 1922.⁹

The following years, even if somewhat less stormy, were equally tense, with new friction and unrest arising from continuous pretexts: regarding the claim to full and legitimate political and historical sovereignty over Bessarabia, neither country was willing to cede anything to the other. What happened in quick succession in 1924 was emblematic: in April the last serious attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement of the Romanian-Soviet dispute failed in Vienna; in September a dramatic armed attack organized by Bolshevik gangs in the Bessarabian town of Tatar-Bunar led to the proclamation of an ephemeral Soviet Socialist Republic of Bessarabia; and, finally, in October the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR resolved to create the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR) within the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁰

In short, the disagreement between the governments of Moscow and Bucharest was far from finding a joint solution: the situation on the ground was still marked by extreme tension, and bilateral Soviet-Romanians relations experienced relative, but ultimately only ostensible, improvement from 1934, when formal diplomatic relations were estab-

8. Dmitry Tartakovsky, "Parallel Ruptures: Jews of Bessarabia and the Moldavian ASSR between Romanian Nationalism and Soviet Communism, 1918-1940" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009), p. 10.

9. Between 1 February and 31 December 1921 a little over 26,000 Jews from the former Russian Empire were admitted to the welcome center that was established in Bessarabia by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. See Nicolae Enciu, *Populația rurală a Basarabiei în anii 1918-1940* (Chișinău: Editura Epigraf, 2002), pp. 98-101.

10. The Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was founded in October 1924. This new political-administrative entity stretched over an area of approximately 8,100 km² with a population of 545,500 inhabitants, corresponding in large part to the present territory of the Moldavian ASSR. The capital, established in the city of Balta, was transferred in 1929 to Tiraspol. The territory included 11 administrative districts (raions). In April 1925 the first Soviet Congress of workers, peasants, and soldiers of Moldavian ASSR adopted the Constitution of the autonomous republic, and the following central government bodies were established: the Central Executive Committee of the Moldavian ASSR and the Council of People's Commissars, with their respective leaders, I. Starî and Aleksei Stroiiev. See King, *Moldovans*, pp. 63-64. See also Wim P. van Meurs, *The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography: Nationalist and Communist Politics and History-Writing* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs. Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 78-79; Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, *Cominternul și originile "moldovenismului"* (Chișinău, Editura Civitas, 2009), pp. 13-29; and Maria Praporșcic, "Poziția autorităților RASSM față de Basarabia (1924-1929)," *Tyragetia* 8 (1999): 131-34.

lished.¹¹ The nearly one thousand kilometers of border which ran along the Dnister continued to be among the most volatile in Europe. Nevertheless, each year these waters were illegally crossed by dozens of individuals, even though the numbers were well below the massive flow of previous years. In many cases, infractions of territorial water boundaries were committed by ordinary fishermen, but in many other cases those crossing the border illegally were smugglers, refugees fleeing the USSR, Romanian deserters – often ethnic Russians or Ukrainians – who were lured by communist propaganda or because they were being pursued by the authorities and, lastly, many agents dispatched on missions by one side or the other.¹²

In the late 1920s Romanian security forces recorded a steady increase in attempts to cross the Dnister illegally. According to estimates made by the Bessarabian police and gendarmes, 57 cases were recorded in 1927, 91 in 1928, and 131 in 1929.¹³ Compared to the earlier period, the majority of these newcomers were peasants from the neighboring Moldavian ASSR, where, from the first half of 1927 the Soviet authorities had initiated a campaign of forced requisition of agricultural commodities, particularly grain. In large part these refugees were ethnic Romanians living in the Moldavian ASSR and in densely settled areas located along the Dnister.¹⁴

11. See Alberto Basciani, "Greater Romania and Soviet Revisionism: The Negotiations between Nicolae Titulescu and Maksim Litvinov," in *For Peace in Europe: Institutions and Civil Society between the World Wars = Pour la paix en Europe: institutions et société civile dans l'entre-deux guerres*, ed. Marta Petricoli and Donatella Cherubini (Brussels & New York: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 259-76.

12. See Mironov, "Pe Nistrul neliniștit," pp. 67-70. The events that occurred on the Dnister during those years attracted the attention of contemporary Romanian writers. In particular, Gib I. Mihăescu and Radu Tudoran immortalized this period in their two successful novels, respectively: *Rusoaica: Borderiul pe Nistru al locotenentului Ragaic*, published in 1935, and *Un port la răsărit*, which appeared in 1941 in Bessarabia, on the very border between the Soviet Union and Romania. The narrative themes revolve around the encounters and contacts (through war, love, illegality) of people living on both sides of the Dnister. During the Romanian communist dictatorship both works disappeared from the shelves of Romanian libraries.

13. See Alberto Basciani, "La Romania e la Grande carestia ucraina del 1932-1933," *Mondo Contemporaneo*, no. 2 (2009): 90. As of 1 January 1928 there were 2,085 refugees from the USSR in Chișinău, the majority of whom (1,264) were Jewish, followed by 313 Russians, 259 Ukrainians, and 242 Romanians from the Moldavian ASSR. The presence of some Armenians, Germans, and Bulgarians was also recorded. See the Summary Report of the Presence of Refugees Drawn from Police Headquarters in Chisinau in January 1928, Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova (hereinafter: ANRM), fond 680, list 1, ED XR 332.

14. Around 1930 the population of the Moldavian ASSR numbered 572,339 inhabitants, 50.4 percent of whom were Ukrainians, 34.2 percent were Moldovans (Romanians), 5.7 percent were Russians, 4.8 percent were Jews, and 4.9 percent were members of other national minorities.

Soon, these forced requisitions were followed by measures connected to the increasingly decisive policy of collectivizing all peasant properties.¹⁵ As late as 1927, only 8 percent of all farmsteads in the entire territory of the Moldavian ASSR were collectivized. The manual labor in these agricultural cooperatives consisted primarily of poor and needy peasants, and these kinds of farms, both in the Moldavian SSR and elsewhere in the Soviet Union, were hardly models of efficiency and productivity.¹⁶ The lack of mechanization and modern farming technology was a common feature of agriculture in the Moldavian ASSR: in 1929 the entire republic had only 300 tractors and 295 harvesters,¹⁷ and a proportion of these were poorly maintained. Moreover, like in many other regions of the USSR, many small family-run farming operations did not even own plows.

In the late 1920s and the early 1930s the state of agriculture in the Moldavian ASSR was marked by various contradictions. The countryside had benefited from the relative liberalization of the New Economic Policy (NEP) – on par with the rest of the USSR – which had brought improvements in the living standards of the peasantry in Soviet Moldavia. Peasants had reacquired confidence in their labor and in the possibility of developing their farms and thus bettering the lives of their families. In addition, as a result of the distribution of approximately 300,000 hectares of land, a number of poor peasants and former farmhands were afforded the opportunity to start their own farms. The availability of land in some districts, such as Tiraspol or Ribnita, led to the founding of new settlements – e.g., the villages of Molovata Noua, Cosne Noua, Mihailovca Noua – established by those peasants who had recently become owners of small properties. Despite this limited progress, the development of modern agriculture in the region was still impeded by failures resulting from the civil war, the period of War Communism, and serious technical and mechanical shortages.

In 1925 the total area of cultivated land in the Moldavian ASSR was still less than that recorded in 1914.¹⁸ But in the mid-1920s, after the harsh experiences of the past, the peasants of the Moldavian ASSR and in

15. The collectivization of agriculture was first named as one of the priorities of the Soviet state at the XV Party Congress held in December 1927.

16. On the serious managerial and administrative shortcomings of Soviet state farms, see Moshe Lewin, *Contadini e potere sovietico dal 1928 al 1930* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1971), pp. 332-33.

17. See Demir Dragnev *et al.*, *O istorie regiunii transnistrene din cele mai vechi timpuri până în prezent* (Chișinău: Civitas, 2007), pp. 269-70; Anton Moraru, *Istoria românilor: Basarabia și Transnistria 1812-1993* (Chișinău: Editura AIVA, 1995), pp. 300-01.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-99.

the rest of the Soviet Union had cause to hope for “a tolerable future” thanks to the availability of land and a certain freedom in being able to enjoy the fruits of their labor.¹⁹

It was, therefore, in the context of a revival of production, albeit a modest one, and of renewed confidence among the peasants that starting in the fall of 1929 (coinciding with the party plenum held in November), in the wake of what was happening in the rest of the country, forced collectivization was also introduced in the Moldavian ASSR. Thus, the Kremlin launched a frontal attack against the countryside in an effort to abolish the NEP and to overturn, once and for all, the social structure of the Soviet countryside at a time when, despite its significant weakness as compared to previous years, it was finally showing renewed vitality and some signs of its former strength.²⁰ In January 1930 the Politburo of the Communist Party decreed the liquidation of the kulaks, ratifying Stalin’s resolution introduced the previous December.²¹ Results were soon apparent: whereas in the early summer of 1928 collectivized farms in the Soviet Union accounted for 11.7 percent of the total, in January 1930 the percentage had increased to 18.1 percent. By March 57.2 percent of all farms were collectivized, which meant that 14 million rural households were distributed among 110,000 collective farms.²² The “mixture of violence and looting”²³ that took place during the Soviet collectivization campaign even exceeded the plans of the special Politburo committee, but the triumphant statistics hid a different reality, one that was characterized by the tenacious, and sometimes desperate, opposition of the peasants, who paid a high price for their resistance to the establishment of the new order in the countryside: the deportation of hundreds of thousands of families.²⁴ According to Lynne Viola, in 1930-31, in addition to thousands of people who were summarily executed, more than 300,000 peas-

19. Cf. Robert Conquest, *Raccolto di dolore: collettivizzazione sovietica e carestia terroristica = Harvest of Sorrow*, trans. Vittoria de Vio Molone and Sergio Minucci (Rome: Edizioni Liberal, 2004), p. 23.

20. Cf. Andrea Graziosi, *La grande guerra contadina in Urss: bolscevichi e contadini (1918-1933)* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1998), p. 70.

21. See Andrea Graziosi, *L'Urss di Lenin e Stalin: storia dell'Unione Sovietica, 1914-1945* (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007), p. 266.

22. Cf. Andrea Graziosi, *Lettere da Kharkov: la carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932-33* (Turin: Einaudi, 1992), p. 11.

23. Cf. Lynne Viola, *Stalin e i ribelli contadini* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2000), p. 58.

24. In 1929, 1,307 peasant revolts were recorded; in 1930 the number was 13,754. Many of these uprisings had an insurrectionary character and involved hundreds of thousands of peasants; the revolts led to the deaths of 3,155 Bolshevik officials and activists. See Andrea Romano, *Contadini in uniforme: l'Armata Rossa e la collettivizzazione delle campagne nell'URSS* (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1999), p. 123.

ants classified as kulaks by the Soviet authorities were deported from Ukraine to some of the most inhospitable regions of the USSR.²⁵

During the same period the authorities escalated pressure in the Moldavian countryside in light of the fact that, compared to 1927, the quota of collectivization achieved up to that point had grown by a meager 0.6 percent. It is true that, according to the Soviets' calculations, the number of kulaks in the Moldavian ASSR was quite small. In 1929 this category included the proprietors of 3,176 farms, which accounted for 2.7 percent of the total found on the entire territory of the republic.²⁶ This situation would soon change. By means of an escalating propaganda campaign and the dispatching to the Moldavian countryside of detachments of the OGPU (which institution played a key role in the repressions) and brigades of volunteers comprised of Komsomol activists and workers, the offensive launched by local authorities had its effect in a short period of time: whereas in February 1930 only some 30 percent of farms had been collectivized, one month later this figure had risen to 45.6 percent.²⁷ However, the violence that was unleashed by the authorities in the spring of 1930 provoked a harsh response from the peasants of Soviet Moldavia. Many locales reported not only cases of passive resistance but also revolts against collectivization and its executors. A large number of farmers joined a rebel movement aimed at leaving the collective farms, whose labor force of 53,766 peasants in March 1930 dwindled to 28,963; in many cases the departing peasants sought to recover cattle that they had previ-

25. Lynne Viola, "Before the Famine: Peasant Deportation to the North," 8 November 2005, Annual Ukrainian Famine Lecture. Abstract available at www.utoronto.ca/jacky/files/event_2005-11-08.pdf (accessed 28 March 28). A total of 381,000 peasant families (1.8 million individuals) were deported. See Graziosi, *La grande guerra*, p. 74. Many of the deportees never arrived at their destinations, nor did those who managed to reach their assigned locations find the so-called "special camps," which were supposed to accept them. In reality, especially at this stage, disorganization reigned supreme, and accommodations were more often than not makeshift shelters constructed by the deportees themselves. See Conquest, *Raccolto di dolore*, pp. 141-60.

26. Cf. Dragnev *et al.*, *O istorie regiunii transnistrene*, pp. 270-71. Moshe Lewin has clearly indicated the broad and deliberately arbitrary range of indicators established by the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), which allowed the authorities to include a peasant in the kulak category; depending on the circumstances, even a family member who was a priest or the leasing of some permanent or seasonal agricultural machinery provided a sufficient pretext. This was enough to trigger an endless series of "enormous abuses." See Moshe Lewin, *Storia sociale dello stalinismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 1988), pp. 114-15.

27. Cf. N. Movileanu, "Din istoria Transnistriei (1924-1940) I," *Revista de Istorie a Moldovei*, no. 1 (1993): 64. In the Moldavian ASSR, as in the rest of the Soviet Union, collectivization figures need to be treated with caution. Nicolas Werth recalls how local party leaders, eager to enhance their achievements to their superiors, inflated the official statistics, which were then reproduced and lauded in newspapers and various propaganda channels. See Nicolas Werth, *Storia dell'Unione sovietica: dall'impero russo alla Comunità degli stati indipendenti 1900-1991* (Bologna: Il mulino), p. 265.

ously handed over to the collective farms.²⁸ In short, even the countryside of the Moldavian ASSR experienced the effects of a broad rural uprising against Soviet power throughout the USSR, which led Stalin to make a strategic retreat from his frontal assault against the rural economy, a move announced in the famous article “Dizzy with Success,” which was published in *Pravda* on 2 March 1930.

The following year, however, despite the remarkable success of the 1930 harvest, the offensive was intensified. In 1931 the policy of aggressive and reckless grain deliveries, based on fanciful data – in some areas of the Ukrainian SSR and the Caucasus half the harvest was confiscated from the peasants²⁹ – was resumed throughout the USSR, and the policy aimed at the expansion of the collective farm and Soviet state farm order was reactivated. By mid-1931, 50 percent of rural households were reincorporated into the collective farms, and the fields of the Moldavian ASSR were no exception. By spring 1931, 53,766 farms were incorporated into the collective farm system, thus ensuring that the percentage of collective and Soviet state farms rose to 45 percent of all farms in the Moldavian ASSR.³⁰ By the end of that year, the percentage rate had risen to over 68 percent.³¹ Whereas in 1930, 31.8 percent of the volume of grain requisitioned by the state came from collective farms and 45.4 percent came from private farms, in the following year the percentage of grain delivered by collective farms reached 49.5 percent, while state grain deliveries from private farms reached 40.3 percent.³²

The Romanian authorities were perfectly aware of what had happened in the Soviet Union. The accounts of refugees from the left bank of the Dnister (in 1930, 159 attempts to cross the border illegally were recorded)³³ confirmed information that had been obtained by the security forces from other channels and by Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Romanian delegations operating in those countries that, unlike Romania, maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR. Already in the first weeks of 1930 dozens of people from the Ukrainian USSR (the Romanian authorities preferred to ignore the existence of the Moldavian ASSR) were able to find refuge in Romania. On 6 February five individuals, Ivan Afteniev, Ivan Shevchenko, Moisa Stepan, Nicolae Afteniev, and Alexei Afteniev, all from Jasky, a town in Kherson *oblast*, found refuge in Romania. According to the Romanian officials who interrogated

28. See Movileanu, “Din istoria Transnistriei,” p. 64

29. See Graziosi, *La grande guerra contadina*, p. 85.

30. Cf. Dragnev et al., *O istorie regiunii transnistrene*, p. 271.

31. Cf. Movileanu, “Din istoria Transnistriei,” p. 64.

32. Cf. Chiril Stratievski, “Foametea din 1932, amploarea și consecințele ei pentru populația din RASSM,” *Caiete de Istoria* 4, no. 1 (2004): 13

33. See A. Basciani, *La Romania e la Grande Carestia . . . cit.*, p. 90.

them, “. . . they took refuge in Bessarabia to escape the measures that had been adopted by the Soviet authorities, which were designed to bring people and all their property into collective farms”³⁴ The findings of border guards were also confirmed by the fugitives’ own accounts. A police report dated 22 July 1930 contains data on the questioning of an 18-year-old youth named Macarie Carpov, from the village of Molovata in the Moldavian ASSR, who recounted the adventures of a father who was forced to abandon his family and leave the village to seek work elsewhere in an attempt to find the resources necessary to meet the increasingly heavy tax burdens on their property:

. . . in 1930 there was a high tax imposed (payable to the state and the municipality) equal to 85 poods of grain . . . we have only four desiatinas of land. We were able to deliver only half the required grain and then they took away our cow, horses, and the wagon. We weren’t even able to pay what we owed in taxes with money, and for that reason we sold the house to the village community. A man from the village of Malovata, where I lived, Gheorghe Vasilovici, seeing me reduced to poverty, advised me to cross the Dnister and take refuge in Bessarabia, where he had heard that you can live well and find work. . . . On 17 July from Tibulofca Rusă I set up base on the Dnister, along with many other young people. I waited until the young people who were with me got moving, and then I too decided to cross the Dnister during the night.³⁵

The peasants’ accounts were confirmed by other sources and witnesses. On the morning of 28 August 1930 a vessel flying the Soviet flag, with its hold full of melons, docked in the port of Sulina. After undergoing medical examinations, the ship’s three-man crew was questioned. The report below, sent by the maritime authorities to Bucharest, states:

When he [the captain of the vessel] was asked if he owned any land, he said that he once worked for a farmer, who at one time was able to have 20 desiatinas of land. At that time there was plenty, but now the authorities leave each owner only 15 poods of produce from the entire harvest. There has been some resistance on the part of the peasants and especially on the part of the kulaks, and many have ceased to work. The older ones, especially, appear to be completely

34. ANRM, fond 680, list 1, file 3519.

35. *Ibid.*, file 3516. The dossier on Macarie Carpov, which is undated but most probably dates to late July 1930, was compiled by the 8th Company of the Romanian Border Guards.

dissatisfied with the current regime. He also states that the border patrol is now comprised exclusively of GPU men. The same goes for the border guards, who monitor the waterways. All those who have docked in foreign ports are placed under arrest and are then subjected to detailed investigations and, if released, they are still monitored for at least three years.³⁶

Throughout the following autumn the flight to Romania of refugees from the Moldavian ASSR continued, but the stories of those who managed to reach Romanian territory did not change significantly. For the peasants living in the lands along the left bank of the Dnister, the situation continued to be difficult:

The population is unhappy, and that is due to the decisions adopted by the communist regime, which not only took steps to confiscate the entire crop but to demand the payment of exorbitant fees I decided to leave the Soviet Union because of persecution directed against my family, which, considered "rich" by the Soviet authorities and, therefore, belonging to the category of kulak, did not wish to submit to collectivization and was stripped of all its possessions. To avoid being deported to Siberia, I decided to take refuge in Romania, where I hope to establish myself in the municipality of Talmaz in the district of Tighina.³⁷

New details emerged in the statements given on 2 November 1930 to the police of Cetatea Albă by refugees Toma Onică (a 20-year-old ethnic Moldovan from Slobozia) and Ivan Barduja (56 years old, an ethnic Moldovan, originally from Zavartailovca, located in the district of Tiraspol), who arrived in Romania a little earlier with their wives and some relatives.

The reason that led me to seek refuge is that it is no longer possible to endure the life of suffering and persecution that is waged against us by the Soviet authorities, who have plundered me of all my possessions: grain, animals, vehicles, poultry, the land and the house, and they wanted to deport me to Siberia with the whole family because I did not intend to submit to collectivization, and for other reasons that they invented. . . . I do not ever want to go back to Ukraine,

36. Central Historical National Archives (hereinafter ANIC), Bucharest, DGP, file 67/1924, Report of the Inspector General for Security of Constanta, signed by Foca, the commander of the fixed maritime defense.

37. ANMR, fond 680, list 1, file 3523. Declaration of the peasant, Pavel Parjan.

where I know with certainty that death awaits me. My mother was deported to Siberia.³⁸

The following is Ivan Barduja's statement:

The reasons that led me to flee are that life had become impossible because of the persecution of the Soviet authorities, who have classified me as a "kulak" and wanted to deport me to Siberia for not having submitted myself to the law of collectivization, which is applied to all peasants who have property or to the "kulaks." In this case, the Soviet authorities seized all my possessions, including the house. . . .³⁹

Although the vast majority of refugees who sought refuge in Romania were peasants, other social strata were represented as well. For example, on 2 November 1930 the Dnister was illegally crossed by Iosif (in other documents called Iosef) Tihotchi, a 27-year-old ethnic Pole from Katerynoslav, who was a driver and a mechanic. Compared to the testimonies of other refugees cited thus far, his is undoubtedly the richest and most detailed:

In 1925 I was conscripted into the Red Army and assigned by the military command of Ukraine to the 44th Regiment of the 1st Artillery Division, servicing a battery of cannon. After I completed my military service, I moved to Katerynoslav, where I had lived before and where I was hired as a driver/mechanic by the district central workers' cooperative. In the spring of 1928 the general assembly of mechanics sent me to the collective farm in the town of Pidhorodna, located about 8 km from Katerynoslav. The inhabitants of this community would not accede to collectivization and one night the whole area rebelled, stormed the town council, took possession of all documents and public records, and set a fire. The GPU from Katerynoslav immediately rushed in and quelled the rebellion, and proceeded to arrest about a hundred people, including me. I was accused of counter-revolutionary activities and, following investigations lasting around six months, I was deported together with my wife, Vera Ivanovna Chinalivscaja, to the town of Podolsk in the north. From there I fled

38. *Ibid.*, Declaration of Toma Onică, cosigned by his spouse Ana, 18 years old, housewife, and by his brother Andrei. The dossier dates back to 2 November 1930.

39. *Ibid.* As in the preceding case, Ivan's wife, Alexandra Măcheamă, 56 years old, signed her husband's statements. On 9 November 1930 the military organs granted political refugee status to all the members of both families.

to the city of Baku-Kaukaz with the intention of seeking refuge in Turkey or Persia, but during the escape I was once again arrested by an agent of the GPU. During the interrogation I told him that I was a native of Rostov, which is why I was sent to that city. However, during the journey I managed to escape to Moscow, where I had some good friends. From Moscow I wrote to my parents asking them to send money and a birth certificate, which, once received together with the documents, provided me with a new identity (Alexandru Andreevici Barabanov) [and] with this false name I left Moscow and came to the Dnister, which I managed to cross.⁴⁰

During the entire month of November 1930 escape attempts from the Moldavian ASSR to Romania continued. Often, as mentioned earlier, there were cases of entire families, such as that of the priest Samovici (about which little more is known) and of the 60-year-old farmer, Teodor Matruc, who had fled Bessarabia because “the Bolsheviks confiscated all his possessions and were preparing to deport him to Siberia, he being considered a rich person and opposed to collectivization.”⁴¹ In the group of refugees who arrived in Romania on 7 November 1930 there was another farmer of Moldovan origin, Roman Matveenco, with his 10-year-old daughter Marija, from Glinovaca (or Glinaja, according to other documents) a town in the district of Tiraspol, who told the authorities:

I took refuge in Romania after the Bolsheviks deported me in March 1930 to the city of Tomsk in Siberia, being considered a kulak. I fled from that place on 1 October 1930, managing to reach my native village where, however, I could no longer find my wife or one of my children. Both were dead. I am left with three children. Two I left with relatives, and I took my daughter with me to Bessarabia.⁴²

Even more detailed testimony was provided by a Russian priest named Daniel Zahabluc, who together with his wife and son fled from the village of Zavertaevca (also called Zavartailfovca), district of Tiraspol, on the same night of 7 November 1930. His dossier is quite thick, and many pages are devoted to statements about the domestic situation in the Soviet

40. *Ibid.* From the dossier, it is not clear when Tihotchi's interview took place. However, on 28 November 1930 the Romanian authorities granted him political refugee status. In the following weeks Tihotchi gave the Romanians an extensive report outlining the economic situation in the USSR, the mood of the countryside, the question of collectivization and, finally, the current situation in the Red Army.

41. See fond 680, list 1, file 3520.

42. *Ibid.*

Union. According to Father Daniel, the Soviet government's agrarian policy was literally destroying agriculture:

Collectivization has practically eliminated any desire on the part of the peasants to help improve the situation of the farms: the suppression of the farms of kulaks (rich peasants), deportation to Siberian labor camps, forests, coal mines, the forced requisition of livestock and agricultural inventory have influenced the thinking of the population and affected even more the climate of mutual suspicion, mutual monitoring by which everyone tries to resolve their situation with respect to the authorities and, for what little can be done, to save their possessions, their loved ones, without really knowing what to do, while others join the collective farms in the hope that in a couple of years they will disappear. However, before joining they rush to sell everything they own: a horse, a cow, and everything else. Of those who are considered the "most dangerous and useless" some are placed under arrest, but more often they are sent to forced labor: in fact, there is no more room for anyone in the prisons. The few available places are occupied by the most privileged categories: speculators and tax dodgers. The peasants continue to be subjected to their yoke, nor have the riots of last year brought them any advantage, indeed, they were disarmed . . . thus, the peasants have taken to alcohol and the state has supported this, placing at their disposal every kind of alcoholic beverage and dispossessing them of their last financial means, all this while food items of first necessity are increasingly more expensive. Last year, for example, butter was selling for 50 kopeks a gram; now the same amount sells for 6-8 rubles, 10 eggs, which used to cost 10 kopecks, now sell for 3 rubles; margarine is sold at the same price as real, proper butter, a liter (kg.) of milk has increased from 10 to 60-80 kopecks. In Odesa last month 400 grams of bread were selling for 60-80 kopecks.⁴³

According to Father Zahabluc's statements, the food situation looked increasingly grim for the entire population:

In front of the cooperatives one can see many people lined up in two lines waiting for products to be distributed. It can happen that the last ones in the line end up without being able to take anything for a week, i.e., until the cooperative opens again. With the start of "collectivization" another method was introduced. All the members of the

43. *Ibid.*, fond 680, list 1, file 3520. The Russian-language dossier, which was translated into Romanian was compiled by Rev. Daniel Zahabluc himself.

collective are provided for first, and then the rest of the population. All this with the aim of attracting people to the cooperatives, so much more that since the majority of people generally lack everything they need, they end up completely subjected to the cooperatives. . . . The spirit of the population is troubled, it is materially poor, spiritually plundered; we supplied ourselves with bread by mixing carrots and vegetables, fat-free. Even now you cannot bear to think about it. The people live under a regime of terror, and even the smallest and unrealistic rumor about the possibility of war breaking out is greeted with joy. Everyone believes that "if someone were to start a war, everyone would immediately revolt against their oppressors." So, the Bolsheviks make the news disappear, but even so the poverty of the citizens remains desperate. The same spirit characterizes the army: the soldiers, informed of what is happening at their parents' homes, approach their commanders with protests and complaints. They ask them to intervene but are told in reply: "Your duty is only to serve, and you cannot do anything about what is happening at home; the authorities there know what to do." In their hearts the soldiers curse the Soviet authorities and hope that they will soon be called to aim their weapons against the Bolsheviks.⁴⁴

By late 1930, by cross-referencing data and information from dozens of refugees who had arrived in Bessarabia, the Romanian security authorities were able to compile a sufficiently precise picture of the situation in the USSR, and especially of the deep unrest that was unfolding in the rural regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the neighboring Moldavian ASSR, where, in the view of the highest-ranking Romanian security officials, the Soviet authorities had unleashed an all-out hunt for kulaks in order to eliminate all forms of private property in the countryside. In November 1930 the Romanian Director General of Police himself wrote the same without much circumlocution:

The proprietors and capitalists having been eliminated, it is now the turn of the kulaks and the middle-peasants [as the Romanians defined those peasants who owned small agricultural farms without being kulaks⁴⁵ – A.B.], who, deprived of their seeds and because of

44. *Ibid.*

45. There were four categories according to which the Soviet authorities, following Leninist principles, divided rural residents: *kulak*, *seredniak* (middle-class peasant), *bedniak* (poor peasant), and *batrak* (farmhand). In reality, over time bureaucrats and politicians created more intermediate categories. On this subject, see Lewin, *Contadini e potere sovietico*, pp. 41-72.

huge taxes, have now become poor. The State has confiscated all their possessions, and many have been deported to the provinces of northern Russia or Siberia. Instead of private property, now virtually nonexistent, the Soviet government has introduced collectivization, uniting all producers in a system of forced cooperatives. . . . The real farmers have protested and continue to protest against collectivization.⁴⁶

The report highlights how the plan to collectivize agriculture was proceeding rapidly with catastrophic results for the fields, where production had dropped dramatically along with the area of cultivation and the maintenance of livestock, whose numbers were decreasing in full view of everyone, as slaughtering the animals in secret was preferable to handing them over to the authorities. In view of the resolutions adopted by the XVI Party Congress, one could not expect that any substantial changes would be introduced into Soviet agricultural policy.⁴⁷ And yet, according to the report, despite the grave situation in the countryside, the Soviet government had decided to increase the export of its agricultural products to Western Europe with the result

. . . that this economic policy of the government caused enormous difficulties in Russia, so that the government is seriously considering the possibility of introducing forced labor, not only to achieve the export goals it has set for itself, but also to ensure minimum domestic consumption; indeed, because of the exports, reserves have been exhausted and it has become necessary to introduce ration cards. . . .⁴⁸

Finally, according to this Romanian official, who was not only well informed about the situation in the Ukrainian countryside but also about political, economic, and social developments in the USSR, it was possible to conclude that

. . . [t]he system of collectivization has produced negative results, production has been significantly reduced, and what is actually achieved cannot sustain the so-called "export fund," which Russia, nevertheless, requires for its economic development needs. The absence of producers and their labor has thus created a disgruntled class that encompasses the majority of the population. In order to prevent an uprising of peasants who represent those who are most dissatis-

46. ANIC, fond DGP, file 6/1930, Report dated 30 November 1930.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

fied, the Soviets have decided to form new GPU detachments comprised entirely of communist workers and those adept at maintaining domestic order. . . . Owing to the severe discipline in the ranks of the Red Army, relations between officers and troops have soured.⁴⁹

The situation was extremely grave, and once again the Romanian authorities would have had direct confirmation of this from the accounts of many new refugees who, after the spring of 1931, a period coinciding with a new, decisive stage of collectivization, sought to leave the Soviet Union and take refuge in Romania. This time, the indecisiveness that had characterized the actions of the Soviet authorities in the previous months had been overcome, and in an operation marked by the personal involvement of Stalin and the highest-ranking Kremlin officials the Soviet government launched a frontal attack on the major agricultural regions of the USSR, particularly Ukraine, in order to implement the plan to fulfill the quotas at any cost.⁵⁰ In the Moldavian ASSR 3,200 rural households were officially designated as falling into the kulak category. They were divided into three large groups, to bear the brunt of the collectivization offensive in various degrees. The first category, which included 344 families, consisted of kulaks deemed counter-revolutionaries, and to these were applied the most severe penalties: arrest, confiscation of property, deportation and, in some cases, summary execution. The second category consisted of kulaks (by far the largest group, numbering 2,497 families), who had not tarnished themselves through anti-Soviet activities, but only through the exploitation of poor peasants. Yet, even those who belonged to this category were destined to lose their property and be deported to the most remote regions of the USSR. Finally, provisions were made for a third group of farmers (359 households), who were not subject to deportation, but were nonetheless evicted from their own lands that were slated for incorporation into collective farms. Households belonging to this last category were also allowed to keep at least part of their means of production.⁵¹

In just a few weeks entire villages on the left bank of the Dnister were depopulated, and for thousands of men, women, and children there began a painful journey to the farthest regions of the Soviet Union – the Solov-

49. *Ibid.*

50. Lewin, *Storia sociale*, p. 153; Nikolai Ivnitskii, "Il ruolo di Stalin nella carestia degli anni 1932-33 in Ucraina," in *La morte della terra: la grande carestia in Ucraina nel 1932-33*, ed. Gabriele De Rosa and Francesca Lomastro (Roma: Viella, 2004), pp. 77-78. For a critical analysis of Stalin's involvement in the war waged by the communists against the countryside, see Michael Ellman, "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited," *Europe Asia Studies* 59, no. 4 (2007): 663-93.

51. See Movileanu, "Din istoria Transnistriei," p. 65.

etsky Islands, Arkhangelsk, Tomsk, and others – many of whom were destined never to return. The following is an account of those events from a survivor named Ileana Memei, who was a child in 1931, who gave an interview a few years ago to the writer, Vladimir Beșleagă:

I was seven years old when we were evicted from our home . . . in Iaca, where there is a Soviet state farm now; before it was our home. They took us to Siberia in 1931. . . . And my mother was terrified, she was with Sașa, and they terrorized us; they grabbed her by the collar and threw her to the ground. . . . “And why are they doing this?” Beșleagă asks her. “Well . . . because they said we had wealth . . . Rich . . . It only brought misfortune; first they came, then they terrorized us and then they took us first to Odesa and from there . . . to Siberia. . . .” Until 1936 Ileana would remain in deportation in Siberia, where she lost most of her family.⁵²

It was difficult to escape the repressions implemented by the Soviet authorities. Once again, whoever was able sought refuge in neighboring Bessarabia, but since 1931 even this possibility had become increasingly risky. The Soviet government reinforced the border with extra contingents of border guards and made provisions to improve the effectiveness of the fortifications on the Dnister all along the Romanian border. A report sent to the Romanian General Staff in December 1931 states:

. . . of the impressive fortification works built along the Dnister by the Soviets with the help of prisoners . . . these works make the defense of Bessarabia difficult . . . the Bolsheviki are able to keep the Romanian river bank under threat of fire, even at points where it dominates the Russian one. In peacetime, these works function as hidden observation posts, and they make clandestine crossings from Ukraine into Bessarabia almost impossible. . . .⁵³

52. “Când o murit tata în tiumra, de foame . . . câte cincî-șese în căruță . . . cu chelea . . . îi ducea și-i adunca în râpa ceea de la Tiraspoli”: Vladimir Beșleagă in conversation with Ileana Memei,” *Destin Romanesc* IV, no. 2 (2009): 93. According to OGPU data, in the two-year period of 1930-31, 381,173 rural families, numbering 1,803,392 individuals, were deported from the Soviet countryside to special settlements that were scattered throughout Siberia, while only 10,651 people were shot in 1931. See Oleg V. Chlevniuk [Khlevniuk], *Storia del Gulag: dalla collettivizzazione al Grande terrore* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), p. 21.

53. Arhiva Ministerul de Război, fond Marele Stat Major – Secția operațiilor (fond 948). Maritime General Staff report of December 1931.

In the meantime, the situation in the Moldavian ASSR had become so critical that the leaders of the autonomous Soviet republic found themselves in difficulties. Despite the pace and violence of collectivization, the expected results were difficult to achieve: as of 1 January 1932, only two-thirds of the quota anticipated for 1931 had been reached. Meanwhile, throughout the region the lack of supplies was becoming increasingly alarming.⁵⁴ Not even the tough crackdown on the Communist Party of Moldavia, launched by none other than the Secretary General of the CP(B)U, Stanislav Kosior, which led to the dismissal of several district secretaries, rectified the situation. In February 1932 an increasing number of incidents and peasant uprisings were recorded throughout the Moldavian ASSR and, despite the newly constructed fortifications and the severity of repressions put in place against fugitives, the number of refugees increased steadily: between January and February more than 3,000 people fled the Moldavian ASSR, seeking refuge in Bessarabia.⁵⁵ In view of the reinforced border controls and ongoing repressions in the region, these numbers indicate a definite exodus, symptomatic of what had become an untenable domestic situation dominated by famine and violence, elements that by now were alarming the Kharkiv authorities, who were being increasingly thrown off-balance by the directives which continued to arrive from Moscow.⁵⁶ The phenomenon became so evident that the CC CP(B)U became involved, deciding to create an *ad hoc* committee to better monitor the evolution of events in the Moldavian ASSR. In addition, during a meeting of the CC CP(B)U held on 29 February 1932 a decision was handed down to put an end to the abuses thus far committed during the state grain deliveries, to grant amnesty to farmers who had committed minor offenses, and to adopt appropriate measures to prevent escapes across the Dnister once and for all.⁵⁷ In the two previous months (i.e., November and December 1931) some 700 fugitives, including entire families, had sought asylum in Romania, and the situation was not destined to improve. According to the Romanian authorities, these flights were determined

. . . by the collectivization of the countryside as envisioned by the communist Five-Year Plan, by the violent seizure of agricultural produce, by the increasingly greater distance of the lands entrusted to

54. See Movileanu, "Din istoria Transnistriei," p. 65.

55. See Stratievschi, "Foametea din 1932," p. 14.

56. This was clearly stated in June 1932 by Mykola Skrypnyk, the Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR, who committed suicide about a year later. See Graziosi, *L'Urss di Lenin e Stalin*, p. 332.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

peasants in respect to the villages and worked by mechanical means and, finally, the clear intention of the authorities to evacuate all the inhabited municipalities that lie along the bank of the Dnister. . . .⁵⁸

The figures for the mass exodus in these months are confirmed (at least partially) by data processed by the Romanian border authorities: in February 1932 a police detachment operating in the sector of Olănești intercepted several groups of people totaling 39 refugees, almost all of whom were members of families that had illegally crossed the border into Romania.⁵⁹ During the period of 1-15 March 1932, 51 people crossed the Romanian border into the district of Orhei; a week later, another 50 people; and between 16 and 31 March 1932 the prefecture of the district of Tighina (mere miles in the line of escape from Tiraspol, the capital of the Moldavian ASSR) recorded the arrival in Romania of 120 refugees from the USSR.⁶⁰ Overall, it is possible to determine that during the first three months of 1932, 1,300 families (numbering around 4,500 people) managed to escape to Romania. The issue was addressed once again by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Moldavian ASSR because, in addition to the escapes, violent protests against the Bolshevik authorities continued: 22 in March and 43 in April. On 9 March the secretariat of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia requested more decisive counteractions by OGPU border guards stationed along the border with Romania. However, in an effort to address the reasons why so many people were impelled to flee and/or to rebel, it was decided to grant additional food relief to 55 villages in various districts of the republic located along the border, and to affirm the need to put an end to abuses committed thus far during the course of the state grain deliveries.⁶¹ These measures were only partially implemented, and for the countryside and towns of the Moldavian ASSR the spring of 1932 brought famine and death. The local authorities seemed paralyzed, and although the authorities in Moscow and Kharkiv were perfectly aware of the situation, they did not intervene. In the midst of chaos, the Moldavian ASSR became increasingly ungovernable,⁶² as did all of rural Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the end of winter and the approaching thaw made it much more difficult to cross the Dnister, at the very time when hunger was be-

58. ANIC, fond DGP, file 115/1930. Report of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie of Romania of 20 January 1932.

59. See Pavel Moraru, "Nistrul însângerat sau drama transniestrenilor de sub regim bolșevic," *Axa, Revistă de politică, cultură și spiritualitate*, no. 10 (2009): 10.

60. See Mironov, "Pe Nistrul neliniștit," p. 70

61. See Stratievski, "Foametea din 1932," p. 14.

62. See Ettore Cinnella, "La collettivizzazione e la carestia nel carteggio segreto dei gerarchi comunisti," in *La morte della terra*, pp. 163-71.

ginning to claim increasingly more victims. Soviet security forces responsible for border surveillance, stationed in special bunkers camouflaged by the surrounding vegetation, with machine gun nests and special guard dog patrols, acted with increasing brutality.⁶³ For example, during the night of 19 March 1932

. . . a refugee family of five people, while trying to cross the Dnister to reach the territory of Romania, was machine-gunned by Soviet border guards; they were all killed. Then the Soviets also turned their fire on our guards, who retreated and returned fire until the Soviets stopped shooting. . . .⁶⁴

The Romanian newspapers of that period describe numerous failed attempts to escape: in those weeks both banks of the Dnister were piled with the corpses of refugees left at the mercy of packs of wild dogs and wolves, with no one coming to gather the bodies.⁶⁵ The alternative to the perils of escape was starvation: in April 1932 official documents of the Communist Party of Moldavia listed 25,300 people suffering from what was by then a chronic shortage of food; of these, 120 had already died, but the worst was yet to come.

In those years, even the plans to increase land productivity and the number of collective farms in the Moldavian countryside through the immigration of Jewish settlers was also faring miserably. The newcomers' disinclination toward farm work, the existing bad relations with the local Ukrainian and Moldavian populations, and the situation in this region, which was characterized by confusion, supply difficulties, etc., led to the definitive abandonment of the project, resulting in a further waste of resources during this extremely sensitive and troubled period.⁶⁶ What limited aid did arrive was totally inadequate and was frequently left undistributed owing to the disorganization of the local authorities and the lack of transport. In addition, it was not even possible to complete the sowing: in 1932 collective farms sowed 74 percent of their land surface, while Soviet state farms did slightly better, sowing 89.5 percent of the lands at their disposal. Overall in 1932, in comparison with the previous year, approximately 100,000 fewer hectares of land were sown. In particular, the sowing of cereal crops decreased by 15 percent.⁶⁷ To compli-

63. ANIC, fond PCM, file 23/1935-1936, Bessarabian police report of March-April 1932.

64. ANIC, fond DGP, file 115/1932, Gendarmes' report of March 1932.

65. *Curentul*, 7 March 1932.

66. See Tartakovsky, "Parallel Ruptures," pp. 264-69.

67. See Ch. Stratievski, "Foametea din 1932," pp. 15-16.

cate matters, shortly afterwards spring rains caused an overflow of the Dniester's waters, which flooded the lands cultivated along the river, thus ruining any possibility of a harvest in those areas.⁶⁸ Livestock was also drastically depleted: in the summer of 1932 the number of cattle decreased from 87,000 (1931 figures) to 37,000. Nor was the situation any better with regard to other farm animals: the number of pigs dropped from more than 20,000 to just over 8,000 and, lastly, sheep flocks decreased from over 82,000 to just over 13,000.⁶⁹

In July 1932 U. Holod, a senior official in the Communist Party of Ukraine, acknowledged the gravity of the situation: despite the relief that had finally arrived for the Moldavian ASSR, increasing numbers of people were starving in this small autonomous republic: 31,000 collective farmers and 13,000 independent farmers. In any case, it was no longer possible to feed farm animals, whose numbers had shrunk drastically.⁷⁰

In the summer of 1932 between 50 and 60 percent of rural families in the Moldavian ASSR did not have sufficient means to feed themselves. Whereas peasants on collective farms could draw from seed grain and other reserves, non-collectivized village residents, who had already consumed what little they had set aside or concealed, began to eat flowers, acorns, wild herbs, domestic animals, as well as dogs, cats, and mice.⁷¹ The situation in the Moldavian countryside was hardly improved by the enactment on 7 August 1932 of the so-called "law of five wheat ears," aimed at the "protection of the assets of state enterprises, collective-farm and cooperatives," which anticipated the application of draconian penalties against anyone who failed to comply – a law written by Stalin himself.

The impetus coming from Moscow center received immediate confirmation from top-ranking officials of the Moldavian ASSR, who on the occasion of the fourth session of the CEC (held that very August) powerfully reaffirmed the need to proceed with the collection of established quotas and to secure the necessary means for the fall sowing. The wishes of local leaders were immediately confronted with a very different reality. Once again, brigades of activists who were sent to the countryside encountered stubborn resistance from the peasants, and in many cases these confrontations resulted in open revolt. But, above all, the grain delivery data was completely unsatisfactory. The anticipated results were not

68. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

69. In the Moldavian ASSR approximately 499,000 hectares of land were sown in 1932, roughly 100,000 hectares fewer than the area sown in 1931. See Stratievschi, "Foametea din 1932," pp. 13-15.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

achieved in any region. For example, only 140,000 out of the planned 189,000 tons of grain were harvested. In many collective farms a large part of the crop was left to rot in the fields.⁷² During these weeks new testimony of refugees who had arrived in Romania, this time by sea, confirmed the difficult situation in Ukraine. On 12 August 1932 a ship called the *Horlik* entered the port of Sulina: in the hold Romanian security forces found 17 men, women, and children, members of various small families, all from an unspecified location in Ukraine. According to the brief report compiled by local authorities, all the stowaways claimed that they had fled their country “. . . because of relentless hunger, misery, and Soviet terror.”⁷³

By the end of 1932, the famine, like in the Ukrainian SSR, was now an increasingly dismal daily reality throughout the Moldavian ASSR. In none of the various districts of the region had the planned delivery quotas been reached. The disgruntled authorities inevitably found a scapegoat in never-lacking saboteurs, who were quickly identified by the security organs: between August and November 1932 troikas and special GPU tribunals sentenced 1,108 people on charges of hindering the plans for the delivery of agricultural products.

Flight, especially for villagers in the vicinity of the Dnister, was one of the few opportunities to escape a fate filled with suffering and oppression that seemed destined never to end. According to the Romanian border authorities, the flood of escapees from the USSR was comprised of “. . . peasants, Moldavians with relatives or some property in Bessarabia and who can no longer endure the communist regime.” As well, there was no lack of survivors, although increasingly less so, of old “. . . bourgeois families, who were unable to adapt to the communist regime and agents of communist propaganda.”⁷⁴ In one district of Tighina in the period of January-October 1932 the Rumanian border police and gendarmerie recorded the arrival of 740 refugees from the Soviet side of the Dnister.⁷⁵

Inevitably, for many fugitives the attempt to find refuge in Romania ended tragically, as in the case of a mass escape that was undertaken dur-

72. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

73. ANIC, fond DGP, file 94/1932.

74. *Ibid.* See file 115/1930. Report of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie in Chisinau on 20 January 1932.

75. See Mironov, “Pe Nistrul neliniștit,” p. 71. As early as 1921 a committee was formed in Chisinau at the initiative of a famous Bessarabian intellectual, Pan Halippa, whose goal was to help refugees from the Moldavian SSR. In cooperation with several other state institutions, its members sought to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to refugees. During this period the press and public opinion in Romania began to pay more attention to the drama of these refugees, without, however, obtaining much hoped-for support from Romanian politicians, who seemed to be exercising caution in an effort not to upset their dreaded Soviet neighbor.

ing the night of 23-24 February 1932 by 62 people (members of various families), who were intercepted by Soviet border guards, who immediately opened fire on them. Forty people were killed and only twenty-two (many with serious injuries that proved fatal) were able to reach the Romanian town of Olănești. The incident resounded throughout the Romanian press, public opinion, and political circles in Bucharest, with polemics sweeping the government, which was accused of failing to protect, with sufficient force, the rights and life of people of Romanian descent living in the Moldavian ASSR.⁷⁶ That same year the Committee for Aid to Refugees sent the League of Nations a memorandum containing eyewitness statements and direct accusations regarding the events taking place in the Moldavian ASSR.

All signs pointed to the fact that 1933 would be even worse than the previous year. In fact, in the early months of the New Year even the northeastern districts of the Moldavian ASSR were hit hard by the food shortage. The Kharkiv authorities realized that all of the Moldavian ASSR was at risk of falling even more heavily under the scourge of famine. In January Volodymyr Zatonsky, a senior official of the Ukrainian Politburo, visited Tiraspol, and the following February, local party organs decided to take some action to alleviate the consequences of famine in villages that were most affected, even more so now that hundreds of people were starving to death every day, and the phenomenon of abandoned children wandering aimlessly along the sides of roads, villages, and fields was becoming increasingly widespread.⁷⁷ Now decreasing numbers of people who had managed to find refuge in Romania spoke:

. . . of the now untenable situation in which the inhabitants on the other side of the Dnister are forced to live, and because of the utter lack of food, clothing, and footwear, people are exposed to abject poverty and are simply starving to death. Because of this situation, the majority of the population, especially those living along the banks of the Dnister, are seeking refuge with us. However, owing to the enhanced security measures adopted by the Soviets, it is now difficult to cross the border. Those who try, do so with courage and knowing that they are risking their lives. With their conduct, the Soviet au-

76. See Basciani, "La Romania e la Grande Carestia," pp. 104-05. During the parliamentary debate following the bloody affair, Iorga, the president of the Council of Ministers, called the behavior of the Soviet authorities "an unprecedented act of bestial violence directed against a peaceful populace." See Moraru, *Istoria românilor*, p. 11. For an accurate narrative of events, including data on the ensuing backlash in both the Romanian and Soviet presses, see N. P. Smochină, *Din amarul românilor din peste Nistru*, (Bucharest: PUBLISHER? 1941), esp. pp. 13-44.

77. See, Stratievschi, "Foametea din 1932," p. 20.

thorities have embittered the spirit of the population, which, however, unable to rebel can only mutter and curse softly. . . .⁷⁸

On 28 February 1933 a certain Prusakov, the head of a Machine-Tractor Station in Mardazovca, in the district of Ananiv, wrote a letter to the agriculture commissars of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, as well as to the secretary of the Regional Council of the Moldavian ASSR, in which he not only condemned the famine, but noted that among those suffering from the lack of food were also collective farmers, who had accumulated as many as 400 workdays in 1932.⁷⁹ The letter did not seem to have much effect on its recipients. The following month the famine viciously struck the same district of Ananiv, where more than 1,675 households starved to death. In short, in early spring of 1933 the famine, just like in the Ukrainian SSR, began to rage with unprecedented violence in the Moldavian ASSR. The serious problems plaguing the territories on the right bank of the Dnister were described in reports edited by the Romanian police forces:

The discontent of the population is growing day by day. There are even rumors circulating that, if rebellion breaks out, the forces of neighboring countries might be ready to intervene. The economic situation is most grave; there is a lack of most consumer products, and in particular food products, including the most common, cannot be found, nor is there any possibility to earn a living. Those who fail to pay the high taxes owed to the state are deported to Siberia or sentenced to prison. Most recently, large numbers of workers were laid off and many factories have closed. As of last January 1st, the second Five-Year Plan was launched. In schools in Romanian villages along the banks of the Dnister three hours a day are spent learning Romanian, and one hour a day is for Russian-language instruction; history courses have been abolished. Instead, young people also receive a military education and are taught how to shoot guns. Religion continues to be oppressed and all the churches have been closed.⁸⁰

78. ANIC, fond DGP, file 11/1932, vol. 1, Report of the Prefecture of the District of Orhei dated 18 February 1933.

79. See Stratievski, "Foametea din 1932," p. 20.

80. ANIC, fond DGP, file 11/1932, vol. 1, 1 March 1933 Report of the Regional Police Inspectorate of Bessarabia. In reality, in many places in Ukraine during those months schools and medical clinics simply stopped functioning. In the absence of pupils and patients, teachers, doctors, and nurses simply returned to their hometowns. See Conquest, *Raccolto di dolore*, pp. 284-85.

Since the safety valve of immigration to Romania was now blocked, in many districts of the Moldavian ASSR the populace could do little else but die of starvation inside their homes. The atmosphere in villages was increasingly ghostly. During the first week of June 1933, 445 people died in the rural district of Ananiv. There were 5,398 confirmed cases of starving people, of whom 3,200 were collective farmers and 2,198 were independent farmers. Finally, there were 1,661 diagnosed cases of dystrophy, while the authorities indicated that there were 336 children completely abandoned to fend for themselves, who were either roaming the streets of the district or waiting, in a comatose state, for death to claim them in the villages. Finally, cases of cannibalism and necrophagy were recorded.⁸¹ In short, even in the Moldavian ASSR starvation had become a daily presence.

In April Ivan Sirko, the regional secretary of the Moldavian Soviet Communist Party (B) of Ukraine sent a dramatic letter to Stanislav Kosior and Pavel Postyshev, the two most important members of the CC CP(B)U. The letter accurately describes the humanitarian disaster that was unfolding in the tiny autonomous republic: by 9 April only 72,000 of the more than 300,000 hectares of farmland had been planted; measures to bring relief to the people of the Moldavian ASSR had proved completely inadequate, just like in the rest of the agricultural areas affected by the great famine.⁸² As far as could be deduced from Sirko's letter, the district of Ananiv was once again the hardest hit by the famine: in March, 370 people starved to death, and 6,000 people – 1,500 were children – were starving. Concluding his letter, Sirko added, “. . . in some villages inhabitants who ate dead horses have been poisoned by distemper, some steal corpses from crematoria and eat them. . . .”⁸³ The only effect produced by the letter was Sirko's dismissal from office and his replacement by another official, who was dispatched from Kharkiv.

A significant number of collective farm managers in the Moldavian ASSR were caught up in the purge of 1933. Approximately a thousand people who were branded as “foreign class profiteers” were purged, including: 116 collective farm heads, 100 Soviet state farm heads, 100 bookkeepers, as well as hundreds of people belonging to other categories of workers connected to the state farms.⁸⁴ It is interesting to note that this purge was also linked to the struggle against so-called “Moldavian bourgeois nationalism,” which, under pressure from Moscow, was waged by

81. See Movileanu, “Din istoria Transnistriei,” p. 66.

82. See Viktor Kondrashin, “La carestia del 1932-33 in Russia e Ucraina; analisi comparativa,” in *La morte della terra*, p. 67.

83. See Stratievski, “Foametea din 1932,” p. 21.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the Communist Party of Ukraine, whose own Central Committee in July 1933 had condemned the alleged nationalist deviations that had been committed by the party in Ukraine. The consequences of this were soon felt in the Moldavian ASSR, where that same summer an ostentatious campaign was launched against so-called "Moldavian nationalism," which also and especially harshly targeted those politicians and intellectuals who between 1924 and 1931, responding to direct requests from the Moscow center, had designed and implemented an entirely artificial creation of a Moldovan language and culture distinct from the language and culture in Romania.⁸⁵ The work was completed on 15 November 1933, and the Bureau of the Regional Moldavian Committee of the CP(B)U handed down a decision to form special district troikas responsible for culling kulak families still living in the region and deporting them to the Ural region, Siberia, and Kazakhstan.⁸⁶ Like elsewhere in the USSR, in the Moldavian ASSR the entire panoply of repressive measures comprising what Nicolas Werth has called new social engineering,⁸⁷ served to prepare the groundwork for the Great Terror of 1937-38, which was linked in the Moldavian ASSR with the so-called "Operation Romania."⁸⁸

Naturally, even during 1933 attempts to escape across the Dnister into Romania continued, even though the high numbers of the previous year were no longer being recorded, with the partial exception of the month of June, when the Romanian authorities noted the arrival from the USSR of 61 refugees.⁸⁹ Without a doubt, the surveillance measures instituted by the Soviet authorities and the harshness of the repressions had accomplished the desired deterrent effect. Many peasants sought to escape hunger by seeking refuge in the large cities of Ukraine, including the Donbas coal region, but some even trekked as far as Leningrad, and others as far as Murmansk; in short, wherever it was possible to find some kind of employment that would allow people to obtain ration cards and thus alleviate

85. See Elena Negru, "Campania împotriva 'naționalismului moldovenesc burghez' de la începutul anilor '30 din R.A.S.S.M.," *Destin Românesc*, no. 1 (2000): 96-101.

86. See *Moldoveni sub teroarea bolșevică*, a summary of the material prepared by the Commission for the Study and Evaluation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime in the Moldovan Republic, p. 9.

87. See Nicolas Werth, *Nemici del popolo: autopsia di un assassinio di massa: Urss 1937-1938* (Bologna: Il mulino, 2011), p. 32.

88. The available data are still incomplete. However, research completed thus far has established that between August 1937 and November 1938 special troikas in the Moldavian ASSR launched 110 prosecutions, which led to the investigation of 4,762 people. Of this number, 3,497 were shot, and 1,258 were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 5 to 10 years, and then sent to the Gulag, from which many never returned. See *Moldoveni sub teroarea bolșevică*, pp. 12-13.

89. See Mironov, "Pe Nistrul neliniștit," p. 71.

their sufferings.⁹⁰ Today it is still difficult to arrive at an exact figure of how many people died in the Moldavian ASSR because of the famine that struck the region during the terrible period of 1932-33. The most reliable estimate of the total number of deaths caused directly by the famine is approximately 20,000.⁹¹

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90. See Stratievski, "Foametea din 1932," p. 21.

91. See Dragnev *et al.*, p. 271.

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*THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE OF 1932/33
AS SEEN FROM ESTONIA AND LATVIA*

This article deals with the reaction of Latvia and Estonia to the famine in Ukraine in 1932/33.¹ Unlike the neighbouring Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were democratically governed in the early 1930s. In both countries there was freedom of speech and free press, which ensured that various topics of domestic and foreign policy were openly discussed. The famine in the neighbouring USSR was one such topic. This article examines the Latvian and Estonian public and government awareness of it, reviews press publications and assesses reaction of both countries to the famine of 1932/33.

Baltic perception of the Soviet Union in the early 1930s

Naturally, Estonians and Latvians talked a great deal about their neighbouring country, the Soviet Union, which was a great power as well, that evinced hostility towards Estonia and Latvia. It was also where an interesting social experiment was taking place that directly affected the Baltic States in terms of both economic and political prospects. Tens of thousands of repatriates had returned to Latvia and Estonia from Russia and Ukraine in the early 1920s. Their interest in the Soviet Union as their recent place of residence was understandable.

The Baltic people generally thought of the USSR as a country of unlimited possibilities with poor yet carefree citizens, an enormous market for the produce and production of the Baltic States and other European countries. In the 1930s, a certain shade of admiration of the Soviet Union's achievements in industrialisation appeared in people's attitudes, even though collectivization was viewed with discomfort from its very beginning. The colossal decline that took place in Western countries during the Great Depression also instilled respect for the Soviet Union's economy. At the same time, Estonians and Latvians painstakingly looked for signs of

1. During the 1930s Baltic media and diplomats frequently referred to the USSR as Russia. When talking about Ukraine it was not always mentioned by name, instead terms like Southern Russia, Southwestern Russia and Russia's breadbasket were used. Frequently distinction between Ukrainian and Russian nationalities was not made either, referring to Ukrainian peasants as Russians.

the USSR becoming more civilized until the latter half of the decade, but nobody ventured to forecast imminent changes any more.²

Both the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union was described in great detail by the Latvian and Estonian newspapers of the early 1930s. The largest Latvian daily *Jaunākās ziņas*, as well as Estonia's *Päeva-leht* and *Postimees* published many articles about the Soviet Union in the 1920s and in the first half of the 1930s. The *Päevaleht* was particularly thorough since it had its own correspondent, Nikolaus Basseches,³ in Moscow. He wrote overviews and analyses of Soviet foreign, domestic and economic policy. Baltic newspapers also published article summaries from the major newspapers of Europe and impressions of people who had returned from the USSR. A few Estonians and Latvians from the Soviet republic who had managed to escape from the Soviet Union also found their way to the editorial offices of the newspapers.

In the early 1930s the Baltic readers were well informed about Stalin's first Five-Year Plan: the industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. The general public was also aware of the dramatic side effects of these policies, such as widespread poverty, chronic lack of basic consumer goods, the system of food cards, mass migration, unemployment and hunger. The general picture painted by the Latvian and Estonian press of the Soviet reality had been rather bleak ever since the Bolsheviks took power in 1917. In the early 1930s the portrayal of the USSR was not much different. Even during the Great Depression the general attitude towards the Soviet system remained much more critical in Latvia and Estonia than in the Western Europe, perhaps because the Baltic countries, being on the border with Russia, were better informed about the developments there. There were large Latvian and Estonian colonies in the Soviet Union, many people had relatives on the other side of the border and there were considerable Russian émigré communities in both Latvia and Estonia. These people had their own information sources in the USSR; also most of the Baltic diplomats and correspondents spoke good Russian. All of these factors contributed to the fact that the Latvian and Estonian public received detailed and high-quality information about the Soviet Union. It is worth it to

2. J. Valge, "Vaateid naabri majandusele: Nõukogude Liit ja Eesti Vabariik aastatel 1920-1940" (Views of the Neighbor's Economy: the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia in 1920-1940), *Tuna*: journal of historical culture, no. 2 (Tallinn, 1999): 92-93.

3. Nikolaus Basseches was born in Moscow and was the son of an Austrian ambassador. He was a journalist and engineer who worked at the Austrian Embassy in Moscow and worked with a number of European newspapers. See also: Liisi Rannast, "Enamliselt kaldalt. Nõukogude Venemaa eluolu ja suhted Eesti Vabariigiga Päevalehe ja Postimehe põhjal 1920-1929" (From the Bolshevik Shore. Living Conditions in Soviet Russia and Relations with the Republic of Estonia According to the *Päevaleht* and the *Postimees* 1920-1929). Masters dissertation. University of Tallinn, 2008.

note that in the West, especially American diplomats frequently translated and analysed Baltic press articles about the living conditions in the USSR.

The emergence of the topic of famine in 1932 did not come as a surprise. The last major famine in the Soviet country took place in 1921 and remained fresh in people's memory, inviting comparisons. Thus articles appeared in the newspapers from time to time throughout the 1920s, reporting the hardships that Soviet citizens faced and speculating on what the future might bring. The number of these kinds of articles increased in the late 1920s when the collectivization and industrialization campaign began in the Soviet Union. Reports predicting famine appeared in the autumn of 1930 already and henceforth with increasing frequency as the actual seriousness of food shortages increased. Therefore one may assume that the average Latvian and Estonian reader did not have illusions about the Soviet regime. On the contrary, Baltic peoples received enough critical information which might well have led them to believe that the economic chaos, poverty, food shortages and possibly even famine were part of the Soviet every-day life. Judging by the press publications, it can be assumed that readers could well consider all the above-mentioned hardships as being the norm in the USSR.

It was on this informational background that the first publications about the threat of famine in Ukraine appeared in the Latvian newspapers in the summer of 1932. For example, the conservative daily *Latvijas Kareivis* emphasized that the widespread food shortage in Ukraine was caused by the complete collapse of grain farming and agriculture as a whole, which in turn was a result of the excessive industrialization programme and the *machine-psychosis*.⁴

Latvian and Estonian press about the famine in Ukraine

In the autumn of 1932 reports began appearing about the failure of the grain harvest and increases in the price of food "to previously unheard of levels." The reduction by 50 percent of food rations to be distributed by cooperatives confirmed predictions.⁵ Alarming new reports appeared at the end of the year – the state grain-purchasing plan had not been met and the Communist party had set about "working especially energetically" to procure grain from the peasantry. Nobody had any surpluses to speak of that peasants were otherwise allowed to sell on the free market. Levies in kind imposed on farm households to be paid in the form of milk appeared to confirm the difficulties. The Soviet government adopted this measure as an attempt to "somehow cushion difficulties in providing food" that the first

4. "Bads maizeš klēti" (Famine in the granary), *Latvijas Kareivis*, 19.06.1932, p. 1.

5. "Wenemaal oodata nāljatalve. Toidunorme wāhendatud poole wōrra" (Winter of Hunger Expected in Russia. Food Rations Cut in Half). Daily *Postimees* (hereinafter *PM*), 11.09.1932, p. 2.

Five-Year Plan had caused. It was reported from Moscow that a serious shortage of bread prevailed even among peasants in the area around the capital because the very last of all the grain had been taken from kolkhozes (collective farms) and individual farms to state grain elevators.⁶

In October 1932 the Latvian bi-monthly *Ekonomists*, on the basis of the official Soviet statistics, came to the conclusion that Soviet citizens consume surprisingly little amount of bread: "It is hard to establish how much bread is being consumed per capita in the USSR. The official figure is 162 kg. It is very low . . . in Denmark this figure is 733 and in Canada – 919."⁷

The Estonian Institute of Economic Research analyzed the results of the first Five-Year Plan (1928-32) and noted they fell far short of the objectives set for industry. According to the Institute's appraisal, the poor living conditions and food conditions of workers caused these dismal results. Agricultural goals had also not been met – the grain harvest was unsatisfactory regardless of the increased area of cultivation. This was explained by a shortage of seed grain, a decline in herd size, delayed sowing and unfavourable weather. With the exception of the last factor, the other factors were in turn accounted for by collectivization.⁸

In 1932 the initial information about the famine in Ukraine, and elsewhere in the USSR, appeared alongside with news from the Far East, where international tension was growing and a threat of possible war between the USSR and Japan was in the air.⁹ The situation escalated by mid 1932. During this period the Russian émigré newspaper *Segodnya* wrote about it in nearly every one of its issues. The newspaper described how the USSR was increasing its military presence in the Far East, building up food reserves and carrying out a number of economic measures to ensure food supply for military needs. According to *Segodnya* the threat of war made the Bolsheviks carry out ruthless policies to intensify grain requisition.

Russian émigré newspapers in the Baltic States played a significant role in raising the awareness of the serious food crisis in the USSR. The Russian newspapers in Latvia had their own secret sources in the Soviet Union, which provided first-hand information about the developments there. Therefore, the Western media frequently quoted the Baltic émigré publica-

6 "Wene talupojale piimamaks" (Milk Tax Imposed on Russian Peasants), *PM*, 22.12.1932, p. 5; "Kolhoosid jätawad riigi wiljata" (Kolkhozes Leave the State without Grain), *PM*, 16.12.1932, p. 3; "Moskwa turud" (Moscow Markets), *Daily Päewaleht* (hereinafter *PL*), 18.12.1932, p. 6.

7 *Krievijas lauksaimniecības ražojumi un pasaules tirgus* (Russia's agricultural products in the world market). *Ekonomists*, 31/10/1931.

8 "Nõukogude Wenemaa kahe kawa wahel" (Soviet Russia between Two Plans), *PM*, 29.12.1932, p. 3.

9 "Kara rēgi Padomju Krievijā" (Spectres of War in Russia), *Latvijas Kareivis*, 19.04.1932, p. 2.

tions. In 1933, the Soviet mouthpiece *Pravda* mentioned publications of the Russian newspapers in Riga as an example of how the Capitalist media smirched the Soviet State.¹⁰ Moscow exerted pressure on the Latvian Government to force the closure of the leading émigré newspaper *Segodnya* in Riga. However, these efforts were unsuccessful.¹¹ Given the influence of the Russian papers abroad Moscow did its utmost to discredit them and to refute claims of the Soviet famine published by them. The pro-Soviet correspondent of the *New York Times* Walter Duranty wrote entire articles to disprove information about the famine given by the Russian émigré press in Riga.¹²

The Soviet friends and Communist sympathizers in the West went out of their way to prove that famine was everywhere, except in the Soviet Union. In Latvia the local Communists, especially the representatives in the Latvian Parliament, Saeima, propagated this message.¹³ In 1932 when the famine in Ukraine had already claimed thousands of lives, Communist MP Sudmalis addressed the Saeima: "If we compare the conditions here in Latvia with the ones in the Soviet Union, we see that the Latvian bourgeoisie has a reason to be frightened. On the other side of the border, in the Soviet Union there is no unemployment, on the contrary, there is a lack of workers, especially in the new industrial centers, while here workers face huge unemployment; to get a bite of bread, they resort to crimes; they starve to death."¹⁴

Another Latvian Communist MP Mežulis pointed to the solution of Latvia's problems, indicating that only "the Soviet socialist construction shows the only possible solution for the problems created by the Capitalist crisis, solution for unemployment and constant starvation."¹⁵ Ironically, shortly after his speech Mr. Mežulis emigrated to the USSR, obviously believing in his own words. In 1938 he was arrested and executed. The same fate was shared by most of the other Latvian Communist MPs who publicly denied the famine in Ukraine and praised the Soviet policies. Several of them (for example Jeršovs and Laicēns) themselves had visited Ukraine and therefore spoke like eyewitness experts. Laicēns declared: "I saw how the agricultural workers are supplied in those kolkhozes. They have all the

10. *Pravda*, 27.05.1933.

11. Stranga, Aivars, "Latvijas-PSRS 1933. gada 4. decembra tirdzniecības līgums," *Latvijas vēsture*, no. 3 (2011): 18.

12. "Russian Emigres push fight on Reds: Their Paper in Riga Tells of Famine Conditions in Soviet Comparable to 1921," *The New York Times*, 12.08.1933, p. 2.

13. The official title of the Communist group in the parliament was the *Fraction of Workers and Peasants* (Strādnieku un zemnieku frakcija).

14. LR IV Saeimas IV sesijas 10. sēde 1932. gada 8. novembrī, Saeimas Stenogrammas, sastādījis H. Kārklīšs, *LR Saeimas izdevums*, Rīga, 1932, p. 389.

15. LR IV Saeimas I sesijas 10. sēde 1931. gada 4. novembrī, Saeimas Stenogrammas, sastādījis H. Kārklīšs, *LR Saeimas izdevums*, Rīga, 1931, p. 350.

cultural necessities. They receive newspapers and magazines. . . . How are they supplied with food? These workers do not get sick because of scarce food. . . . The workers are not fed with a herring and processed milk. They receive very good and fresh milk, which I tasted myself... These workers had three courses. They had meat, they had soup.”¹⁶

It must be said though that such a portrayal of the Soviet reality did not receive much support in Latvia, at least judging by the ironic interjections during the Communist speeches in the Saeima, by the press articles and by the diplomatic reports.¹⁷ Not only the Latvian Communists took part in the guided tours organized by the Soviet regime, but also many Westerners travelled to the USSR and saw only what the Soviet regime wanted them to see. Perhaps the best-known example is the British playwright Bernard Shaw, whose arguments were also used by the Latvian Communists. Latvian diplomats, on the contrary, were critical about Shaw's revelations about the Soviet Union. The Latvian ambassador in Moscow reported that Shaw's remarks did not reflect the real situation in the USSR and that Shaw appears to be a “flatterer and a pigeon.”¹⁸

Early in 1933, it was reported on the basis of news from Soviet newspapers that state grain purchases and sowing in the lands of the Central and Lower Volga, Northern Caucasus, the Urals, and elsewhere, but especially Ukraine, were in the greatest danger of failure. Cities were threatened by a shortage of bread due to the “passive resistance” of the kolkhozes, as quoted from the newspaper *Pravda*. Moscow correspondent, Basseches, of the Estonian daily *Päevaleht*, warned that hunger was reducing labour productivity and the New Year promised to be a “year of ordeal” for the Soviet Union because state grain purchasing was proceeding very sluggishly, especially in Ukraine and Northern Caucasus.¹⁹

The following provides an idea solely of headlines that become ever more dramatic: *Paradise Turns into Hell*, *Days of Fear and Horror in Moscow*, *Death from Starvation in the Former Breadbasket*. *Appalling Misery in Ukraine*, *Woeful Holidays in Land of Famine*, *People Collapse in Bread Lines* – to name just a few examples. Hunger, diseases, malnourishment and misery were written about in February 1933. People were better informed about the situation in the immediate vicinity of the Baltic States in Belorussia, Pskov and Leningrad *oblast*, where “real starvation stalked millions of people” and “typhus raging in Leningrad *oblast* could

16. LR III Saeimas ārkārtējās sesijas 3. sēde 1930. gada 18. jūnijā, Saeimas Stenogrammas, sastādījis H. Kārklīņš, *LR Saeimas izdevums*, Rīga, 1930, pp. 717-18.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Latvian State Historical Archives (hereinafter LVVA), 2575. f., 15. apr., 70. l., 81. lp.

19. “Kolhooside front Moskwa vastu” (Front of Kolkhozes against Moscow), *PL*, 12.1. 1933, p. 3; N. Basseches, “Wiisaastaku lõpp” (End of the Five Year Plan), *PL*, 22.1.1933, p. 2.

fully be considered the consequence of malnourishment".²⁰ By the end of March, starvation had reached "terrifying proportions" in Moscow as well and there were reportedly only two subjects of conversation in Moscow and Leningrad: "How to get food?" and "How to get a passport?"²¹

Jaunākās Ziņas told a story about a peasant family that had left its home in Pskov region and fled to Latvia crossing the border by night. The peasants explained that due to the fact that they were unable to fulfil their grain quota, they faced imminent deportation to the Northern USSR. They therefore decided to take their four children and flee to Latvia. Peasants also spoke about the living conditions that were unbearable as a result of the Five-Year Plan. The family was granted a right to stay in Latvia. In 1933, border crossings by the starving Soviet refugees increased and they crossed the Latvian border both individually and in groups.²² The Latvian press wrote that these people were running away from the famine in the Soviet Union. Some of the refugees in Latvia had come all the way from Ukraine.²³ Given the surge of illegal cross-border migration in 1933 the Soviet authorities intensified the border patrols on the Soviet border with the Baltic States.²⁴

In March 1933 the Moscow correspondent of *Päevaleht* Basseches visited Estonia. He gave lectures in Tallinn and Tartu on the situation in the USSR and held a press conference for journalists. According to him, the last few months in the Soviet Union had been a "battle for bread." He also described his impressions of his trip to Ukraine in October of 1932 where he saw "abundant traces of distress and misery on faces," yet alongside that new buildings, machinery and tractor stations, and "resolute kolkhoz chairmen." According to the journalist, Soviet villages left such a contradictory impression that at times it was altogether impossible to comprehend what was going on.²⁵

20. "Paradiis muutub põrguks" (Paradise Turns into Hell), *PM*, 15.02.1933, p. 4.

21. "Hirmu ja õuduse päewad Moskwas" (Days of Fear and Horror in Moscow), *PM*, 31.03.1933, p. 3. The Soviet Union started introducing a "uniform passport system" in 1933. One of the aims of the system was to purge large cities of "hostile elements," yet the more general and long-term objective was total control over the movement of the entire population.

22. See, for example, "Latvijā slepeni pārbraukuši divi vezumi Krievijas pavalstnieku" (Two carriages of Russian citizens had secretly crossed the border with Latvia), *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 23.05.1933, p. 8.

23. "Навіть бабуці втікають з України" (Even grandmothers flee from Ukraine), *Svoboda*, 23.10.1933, p. 1.

24. See, for example, "Pad. Krievijas plostu pieņemšanas vietu apsargā kā karalauku" (Soviet Russian raft delivery place is guarded like a combat zone), *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 09.05.1933, p. 5.

25. "Wõitlus leiwa pärast Nõukogudemaal" (The Fight for Bread in the Land of the Soviets), *PL*, 23.03.1933, p. 1; "Wõitlus leiwa eest Wenemaal" (The Fight for Bread in Russia), *PM*, 23.03.1933, p. 3; N. "Bassechesi loeng Nõuk. Wenest" (Lecture by N. Basseches about Soviet Russia), *PM*, 25.03.1933, p. 5.

Other travellers also gave the same kind of reports. Foreign newspapers were summarized in April. British journalist Gareth Jones²⁶ published his travel impressions and said that a more appalling sight than before greeted visitors in Ukraine and that this spring people could die of starvation there. In order to establish how serious the famine was, Jones had tossed a scrap of bread into a “filthy spittoon.” A starving peasant immediately hurried over and ravenously gobbled up the morsel. The impressions of Irish writer Liam O’Flaherty, who had visited the USSR, were also imparted. The objective of his trip was actually to familiarize himself with Soviet intellectual life but the famine did not go unnoticed to him either.²⁷ The same kinds of news reports were imparted on the basis of newspapers from Germany, America, Britain, Sweden, Romania and other countries.

On April 20th, 1933 *Latvijas Kareivis* published an article entitled “Famine in Ukraine” which was based on the information passed on to the Latvian journalists by several foreigners who had lived in the Soviet Union for a prolonged period and were returning to Western Europe via Riga. The article emphasised that “recent food shortage in Ukraine is very severe. The majority of the country population survives by consuming beet-roots and the like. . . . Several small towns in Ukraine and Belorussia have completely died out.”²⁸ Given the timing of this article one cannot rule out that the foreign observer to whom the Latvian journalists spoke of may have been Malcolm Muggeridge, Moscow correspondent of the British daily *Manchester Guardian*, who was expelled from the USSR and who was returning to Britain through Riga. His eyewitness account of the famine in Ukraine was published in a series of articles in March 1933. Along with the writings of Gareth Jones it was the first major analysis of the famine conditions in Ukraine published by the Western press. Shortly after Muggeridge’s revelations appeared in print he was forced to leave the Soviet Union. In his memoirs Muggeridge gives an emotional account of his arrival in the Latvian capital Riga: “The buffet at Riga Station seemed momentarily like paradise; the crisp rolls and butter, the piles of fruit, the luscious cheeses and succulent ham – who could ever believe in such

26. Gareth Richard Vaughan Jones (1905-1935) was a Welsh journalist who was among the first to spread the news about the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 in the Western world. See Gareth Jones Hero of the Ukraine. <http://www.garethjones.org/overview/mainoverview.htm> [18.03.2012].

27. “Nāļjasurm endises wiljaaidas” (Death from Starvation in the Former Breadbasket), *PM*, 14.04.1933, p. 6; “Nālg Wenemaal wāllismaalaste kirjeldusel” (Famine in Russia as Described by Foreigners), *PL*, 02.05.1933, p. 4; Jones also told a joke heard in Ukraine about a louse and a pig who meet at the Soviet border. The louse came from Germany because people there are too clean, but the pig fled from Russia because people have eaten all his food.

28. “Bads Ukrainā” (Famine in Ukraine), *Latvijas Kareivis*, 20.04.1933, p. 2.

plenty?"²⁹ The other Western correspondents also mentioned the sharp contrast between the famine-beleaguered Soviet Union and the Baltic states at the time.³⁰

In May 1933 the Baltic newspapers reported about a new sowing campaign and the tone had momentarily become moderately optimistic because the sowing looked like it would succeed regardless of the fact that it was early. It was, however, premature to rejoice and at the same time, altogether more pessimistic tones were also heard. It was found that even the most elementary, primitive equipment for agricultural work was lacking and that if the anticipated harvest should miscarry as well, the Soviet people would face the kind of famine compared to which the catastrophe of 1921 would pale.³¹ *Jaunākās ziņas* sarcastically reported of an "ingenious Soviet invention" – sowing from the airplane. The paper ironically commented "it is not hard to imagine what will be the harvest there."³²

In June, the papers described the situation in Ukraine where people were dying as a consequence of "starvation typhus." In Kharkiv, 150 children whose parents had left them at the railway station were rounded up in one day. At the same time, sowing work was under way that took place under police guard so that the peasants would not eat the seed grain. People who did not realize the benefits of joining the kolkhozes were reportedly in particularly great danger – they were apparently doomed.³³ In this sense, correspondents were not unanimous and others found that only people who had the presence of mind to flee from the kolkhozes to the cities at the right moment had the chance to be spared.

The situation in July and August of 1933 proved to be the worst. Articles about starvation and cannibalism in Ukraine reached the front pages of the newspapers and several gruesome descriptions were published each week. People in Ukraine searched in organized groups for the burial sites of animal carcasses and fatalities that occurred due to poisoning from eating those carcasses had become frequent.

Jaunākās Ziņas, like countless Western newspapers the world over, reprinted an eyewitness account of the famine in Ukraine from the French *Le*

29. <http://www.basicincome.com/bp/itwastime.htm>

30. See, for example, Donald Day, "Hungry Russian raftsmen view food fairyland," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 09.05.1932, p. 10.

31. N. Basseches, "Maipidustused Nõukogude külas" (May Festivities in a Soviet Village), *PL*, 1933/05/13, p. 2; "Mis ootab Nõukogude kodaniku näljast suud? Lootused uuele lõikusele lähenewad nullile" (What Can the Hungry Mouth of the Soviet Citizen Expect? Hopes for the New Harvest are Nearly Zero), *PM*, 07.05.1933, p. 5.

32. "Väl viens 'ģeniāls' izgudrojums Krievijā" (Another "ingenious" invention in Russia), *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 31.03.1933, p. 10.

33. "Hirmus nālg Ukrainas" (Dreadful Famine in Ukraine), *PL*, 02.06.1933, p. 3; "Nõukogude süsteemi likwideerimine Wene külas" (Liquidation of the Soviet System in Russian Villages), *PL*, 07.06.1933, p. 2.

Matin.³⁴ It was a disturbing story of the Ukrainian-born American peasant woman Marta Steballo, who had visited her relatives in Ukraine in August 1933. She gave a startling account about the miserable living conditions in the Ukrainian countryside and told about the horrific famine and cannibalism. She also mentioned a rough estimate of the famine death toll, asserting that out of 800 inhabitants of her native village 150 had died of hunger during the spring. While retelling the story of Mrs. Steballo, the Latvian daily chose to leave out her statements regarding the causes of the famine, namely that it was caused by the Soviet regime with an aim to crush the Ukrainian people.³⁵

Quoting the *Times*, the Estonian *Postimees* wrote that peasants were starving and “in desperation they have no choice but to die. Entire villages are dying of starvation. Corpses lie about in shacks for several days and there is nobody to take them away. Dogs and cats – all now serve one purpose, food for people.” In Odesa, 18 people were reportedly arrested in a single day for eating human flesh.³⁶ The tragedy was described in “lurid detail” in private letters. For instance, a letter dated 25 July told of a mother brought to the hospital who had eaten her 10-year-old son and thereafter died “from eating large quantities of meat.”³⁷ The author of one letter lamented that “people are eating corpses and living people are being killed, mothers eat their children and husbands and wives eat each other, children eat their parents – these kinds of incidents are plentiful.”³⁸

The press followed the progress of the crop harvest with keen interest, tried to find statistics with any kind of reliability, and appraised the effect of weather conditions. More and more new forecasts and conjecture were made. In hindsight, we know that most of them were naïve – the abandonment of the kolkhoz system or other decisive changes in Soviet policy

34. “Ko vienkārši zemnieki redzējuši padomju Ukrainas sādžās” (What simple peasants observed in Ukrainian villages), *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 01.09.1933, p. 9.

35. See the original *Le Matin* articles: “L’effroyable détresse des populations de l’Ukraine” (The terrible distress of the people of Ukraine), *Le Matin*, 29.08.1933, p. 1; “Systématiquement organisée, elle tend à la destruction d’un peuple dont le seul crime est d’aspirer à la liberté” (Systematically organized, to destroy the people whose only crime is to aspire to freedom), *Le Matin*, 30.08.1933, p. 1.

36. “Wenemaa näljahäda kaswab” (Famine Spreads in Russia), *PM*, 08.07.1933, p. 2; “Wene talupoegade enamlusewastane liikumine” (Anti-Bolshevik Movement of Russian Peasants), *PL*, 13.07.1933, p. 3; “Näljatont Wenemaal” (The Ghost of Hunger in Russia), *PM*, 23.07.1933, p. 2; “Wenemaal näljarahutused” (Hunger Riots in Russia), *PM*, 20.08.1933, p. 2.

37. “Wenemaa wiljaaidas, Ukrainas, stütakse inimesi. Emad tapawad oma lapsi, et kustutada näljahäda” (People are being Eaten in Ukraine, Breadbasket of Russia. Mothers Kill their own Children to Alleviate their Starvation), *PM*, 13.08.1933, p. 2.

38. “Suur näljahäda Lõuna-Wenemaal” (Severe Famine in Southern Russia), *PL*, 07.11.1933, p. 6.

were expected, some predicted a new revolution, others an armed uprising in Ukraine (that was supposed to be led by Trotsky), and so on.

Fears of another crop failure were fortunately exaggerated this time and contrary to all expectations, the harvest was very good in 1933. Basseches wrote from Moscow that nature had provided an unexpected gift and a record harvest was in progress. At the end of August, bread was once again on sale in Ukraine for the first time in a long time and there were rumours that bread ration cards would soon be done away with. The first results of the crop harvest were disclosed at the end of October and it was found that the 22 million tons harvested according to official data did not mean the conclusive disappearance of food supply difficulties but the situation would nevertheless improve.³⁹

Results were calculated in the autumn and at the end of the year, the reasons for the famine were sought, and attempts were made to appraise its magnitude and the number of victims. Opinions on the reasons for the famine were quite unanimous. The causes were considered to be the “political fanaticism of Russian communists” and Stalin himself – “the rigid dogmas of the Caucasian dictator.”⁴⁰ Moscow’s collectivization policy was also mentioned since it had severely decreased grain production over the course of three years. Alongside unfavourable weather conditions and diseases that afflicted grain fields, hastily implemented collectivization was seen as the reason for the failure of state grain purchasing. It was concluded that the tragedy was at least partially caused artificially because the peasantry’s passive resistance to the kolkhozes in the countryside had to be broken using the “weapon of starvation.” People who fled from the kolkhozes were meant to die of hunger; this also applied to independent farmers who did not fulfill state regulations.⁴¹

Correspondent George Popoff worked in London and repeatedly wrote newspaper articles analyzing the Soviet economy supported by statistics that indicated that grain production in kilograms per resident had dropped from 487 in 1928 to 351 in 1932. He tried to predict the number of famine victims in the summer of 1933 already, stating that if production were to drop any further, the 5 million deaths by starvation in 1921 would be sur-

39. N. Basseches, “Hea wiljasaak Wenemaal” (Good Crop Harvest in Russia), *PL*, 23.08.1933, p. 2; N. Basseches, “Lõikuse tulemused Nõukogude Liidus” (Results of the Harvest in the Soviet Union), *PL*, 29.10.1933, p. 4; N. Basseches, “Ümberkujunemisi Nõukogudemaal” (Reorganization in the Land of the Soviets), *PL*, 13.12.1933, p. 2.

40. “Nälg Wenemaal wälismaalaste kirjeldusel” (Hunger in Russia as Described by Foreigners), *PL*, 02.05.1933, p. 4.

41. “Näljahäda Nõukogudemaal” (Famine in the Land of the Soviets), *PL*, 31.07.1933, p. 2; N. Basseches, “Toitlusprobleem Nõukogude Liidus” (The Food Supply Problem in the Soviet Union), *PL*, 08.09.1933, p. 4.

passed.⁴² Germany's *Völkischer Beobachter* published a map of regions affected by famine and based on that map, Northern and Trans-Caucasus, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Lower and Central Volga regions, Southern Russia and Kazakhstan were enumerated as the most critical regions.⁴³ Gareth Jones was also of the opinion that the famine was certainly not smaller than the previous one. According to agricultural specialists working at diplomatic missions in Moscow, the number of victims during the first half of 1933 extended "into the millions" and in Northern Caucasus alone, 2 million people had reportedly died of starvation. The total number of victims was thought to be "several million."⁴⁴

In early 1934 when the worst food crisis was over the Soviet Government invited Latvian and Estonian journalists to visit Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union. The delegation included such famous Latvian journalist writers as Edvarts Virza and Kārlis Skalbe. The latter described his impressions in a series of articles published in *Jaunākās Ziņas* in May 1934. Despite the fact that the tour was carefully managed so that the delegation got to see only the positive aspects of Soviet life, Skalbe wrote: "I draw my conclusions based not only on what I see, but also on what I do not see. During the whole trip I did not see a single dog or cat."⁴⁵ Although the author did not elaborate about the causes of this situation, the Latvian readers were well aware of them based on the previous publications in *Latvijas Kareivis* and elsewhere, which explained that all cats and dogs were eaten during the famine which engulfed Ukraine several months earlier.⁴⁶ The other Latvian members of the journalist delegation did not mention a single word about the food shortages or the recent famine. This fact sparked criticism in Latvia. A regional paper *Talsu Balss* accused "the big press" of being fooled by the Soviet propaganda and guided-tours.⁴⁷ Only in the late 1934, did the newspaper *Rīts* publish a brief note informing the readers of the recent famine in Ukraine that had claimed six million lives.⁴⁸

The advisor at the Estonian embassy in Moscow, Elmar Kirotar, joined the Baltic journalists during their trip. He described how the party of travellers was fed abundantly and given plenty to drink. They were shown the

42. "Töde Wenemaa majanduslikust seisukorrast" (The Truth about Russia's Economic Condition), *PL*, 29.07.1933, p. 2.

43. "Wenemaal miljoneid nälgasurijaid" (Millions of Deaths by Starvation in Russia), *PM*, 22.08.1933, p. 1.

44. "Näljatont Wenemaal" (The Ghost of Hunger in Russia), *PM*, 23.07.1933, p. 2.

45. Kārlis Salbe, "Jaunā Krievija" (New Russia), *Jaunākās ziņas*, 15.05.1934, p. 2.

46. "Par badu Pad. Krievijā" (About the famine in the Soviet Russia), *Latvijas Kareivis*, 14.09.1933, p. 3.

47. "Tur, kur valda sociālisms" (Where Socialism rules), *Talsu Balss*, 18.05.1934, p. 3.

48. "Ukrainā seši miljoni nomiruši badā" (Six million had died of hunger in Ukraine), *Rīts*, 04.11.1934, p. 6.

Soviet Union's beautiful natural scenery and the achievements of the Soviet regime, but "the other side of the coin did not remain completely concealed." "Dozens of incredibly filthy barefooted children dressed in rags" could be seen through the passenger car window in many stations moving in the shadow of the train "begging in a sad voice for a few kopeks for a crust of bread." Kirotar had also managed to speak with a couple of Ukrainian peasants who said "this year will bring the kind of famine that has never been seen before."⁴⁹

Estonians and Latvians affected by the famine in the USSR

In the early 1930s in Ukraine, Belorussia and elsewhere in the USSR there was a considerable number of Latvians and Estonians. The majority of them were peasants who had moved to Russia and Ukraine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to farm the fertile black-earth land. According to the Estonian ambassador Seljamaa, in 1930 there were 100,000 Estonian peasants in the Soviet Union,⁵⁰ many of whom lived in Ukraine and the Caucasus. In Ukraine there were a number of ethnic Estonian and Latvian kolkhozes, which, along with the German ones, were considered to be among the most productive collective farms in the Soviet Union.⁵¹

In September 1933, the Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times* Walter Duranty visited a Latvian kolkhoz in Ukraine. He reported that unlike the other collective farms in the neighbourhood, the Latvians had managed to survive the famine of 1932/33. However, the government took almost all of their grain away and they told Duranty that if this took place this year as well they would pack up and go back to Latvia on foot as their ancestors had come a hundred years before.⁵²

Since the onslaught of the forced collectivization the living conditions of Ukraine's peasants, including the Latvians and Estonians, deteriorated dramatically. This was described by the Baltic media, which regularly quoted from the Latvian and Estonian language Communist newspapers of the Soviet Union, such as for example *Komunāru Cīņa* (Communar Strug-

49. Kirotar to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1934, ERA.957.14.9, pp. 1-8.

50. United States National Archives (Hereinafter NARA) 59/861.61 Collective Farms/36.

51. This was for example the opinion of Dr. Joseph Rosen, director of the Russian activities of the Agrojoint Corporation managing the Jewish colonization project in Ukraine: NARA 59/Social Matters 861.4016/347.

52. Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Bohdan S. Kordan, *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933* (Vestal, NY: Limestone Press, 1988), pp. 309-13.

gle, issued in Moscow), which criticized the lack of discipline, low morale and shortage of food in the Latvian kolkhoz "Nacmen."⁵³

Many of the Baltic peasants in Ukraine wrote letters to their relatives in Latvia and Estonia. A letter that arrived in Tartu in early 1933 from relatives living in Ukraine summarized in the newspaper said: "Very many have to seek help at my dear mother's place. Yet she cannot help them either since there is a very long queue of people who want to come to her and they have to wait a long time." The writer used allegory in this letter out of fear that the letter might end up in the hands of Soviet authorities – since his "mother" was long since deceased; it implied that people in Ukraine are dying of starvation in such large numbers that they cannot be buried quickly enough.⁵⁴ The author of a letter summarized in another newspaper was explicit and wrote that they had not seen bread since last autumn, people are worn out and can barely stand, and that "in this city a mother is said to have already killed her child and eaten it."⁵⁵

In July 1933, a Latvian woman wrote from Ukraine: "This summer the situation here is such that many people die of hunger. Also my days and those of my [8-year-old] son are counted if we do not get some help from you soon. If you could only send me some dried bread by post. I would be very grateful for that. Without your help both of us are certainly going to die. I think I could eat ten pounds of bread at once and some five dishes of soup. . . . It is not even possible to describe the horrors which take place here. We subsist on the grass and various roots, which we collect in the field and in the forest. But I feel that my strength is slowly leaving me."⁵⁶

Just like the Estonians and Latvians who wrote to the Baltic newspapers, farmers of German origin sent calls for aid to German newspapers and those letters were also summarized from time to time in the Baltic press. It was summed up that the current famine had surpassed the scale of the famine of 1921. Over 50 percent of the population in many villages had already died of starvation but the harvest was still another three months away. It was reported from Ukraine that "grass with salt" had become people's main food.⁵⁷

The desperate peasants of Estonian and Latvian origin turned up in great numbers at the Latvian and Estonian diplomatic missions in the So-

53. "Lielinieku dzīves īstenība" (Reality of life under the Bolsheviks), *Latvijas Kareivis*, 07.04.1932, p. 2.

54. "Kohutawad pūhad nāljamaal. Ukrainas ei jōuta matta nālgasurnuid" (Woeful Holidays in Land of Famine. Too Many People are Dying of Starvation in Ukraine to be Buried), *PM*, 15.04.1933, p. 4.

55. "Hādahtūd Wenemaalt" (Cry of Distress from Russia), *PL*, 21.04.1933, p. 2.

56. "Latvieši padomju Ukrainā bada dēļ spiesti ēst zāli maizes vietā" (Latvians in the Soviet Ukraine must eat grass instead of bread), *Lauku Doma*, 07.09.1933, p. 2.

57. "Saksa kolonistid SSSR-is nālgiwad" (German Colonists in the USSR are Starving), *PL*, 09.06.1933, p. 1.

viet Union begging for help. Estonian ambassador Seljamaa told the American legation that he had received countless appeals from the Estonian nationals desperate to leave the USSR. Seljamaa said that the "conditions in the country districts of the Soviet Union at present could be compared with those in lunatic asylums." Unfortunately, the Baltic diplomats had to turn down the immigration requests of their compatriots because the Soviet regime refused to let them emigrate.⁵⁸

In 1932/33 millions of starving Ukrainian peasants left their villages and travelled to the cities in search for food. Thousands of them flooded the streets of Moscow. In the daytime they lingered around the streets and squares, at nights they slept on the stairs and in the yards of houses. Dr. Frisch, second secretary of the Latvian legation in Moscow reported of one man who slept at nights on the stairs of the Latvian Embassy and "could not very well be expelled" because he was a citizen of Latvia. Through the window Dr. Frisch observed a peasant family, mother and several children, begging on the street right opposite the Legation building, until one day the mother fainted from malnourishment and had to be carried away on a cart with all her children.⁵⁹

Employees of the Estonian consulate in Leningrad, which Estonians from the Soviet Union visited, who were looking for opportunities to emigrate to Estonia, came into contact more frequently with Soviet citizens. According to Consul General Aleksander Warma, everyone wanted to be admitted into Estonia, even Estonians from regions that were not particularly affected by the famine. Purveyance was considerably better in Leningrad and Moscow, but life in even those cities was still bleak. In Leningrad *oblast* in 1933, starvation "in its literal sense did not exist, but suffering from malnutrition was universal." Warma pointed out that regional differences were significant and that he was, to a certain extent, familiar with the situation in only those places where Estonians lived. The possibilities for Estonian foreign missions to help people who wished to emigrate were nonexistent. They assured everyone that all applications would be forwarded properly to the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, but there was no hope that the Soviet government would release these people from citizenship and allow them out of the country.⁶⁰

Since there was no Latvian consulate in Ukraine, Latvian nationals from the Western USSR turned to the Consul of Latvia in Vitebsk, Belorussia. As the collectivization and de-kulakization drive intensified in the late

58. NARA 59/861.61 Collective Farms/36.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Warma's information from Leningrad, 13 February 1934, ERA.957.13.755, p. 22; Elmar Kirotar, Chargé d'affaires a. i. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Concerning the Assistance of Estonian Colonists in Soviet Russia," 2 Aug. 1933, ERA.957.13.532, pp. 199-205.

1920s, the number of visitors at the Consulate increased. Nearly all of them sought help to emigrate to Latvia. The consul explained that he could be of little help because it was the decision of the Soviet authorities not to allow them to leave the USSR. The desperate peasants asked the consul to report their case to the League of Nations in Geneva, because they had heard that it had helped the German peasants to leave the USSR. The Latvian consul wrote to Riga: "The fate of the Latvian peasant-colonists is tragic. Previously they were a role model for the Russian people, but now they are being ruthlessly exterminated. . . . Some of them come to the Latvian embassy and consulates, ask for help and advice to get rid of the Soviet citizenship and to come to Latvia. They are ready to leave everything behind, just to be able to leave this land of violence, misery and famine."⁶¹

Latvian and Estonian diplomats about the famine in Ukraine

Reports by the Latvian and Estonian diplomats about the famine conditions in the Soviet Union and especially in Ukraine did not qualitatively differ from what the Baltic public received through the press. The possibilities for foreign missions to gather information were limited, probably even more restricted than the press. The Soviet authorities carefully supervised the tours made by diplomats. Diplomats also did not have any particular success in squeezing information out of people who happened to visit embassies and consulates because people were afraid to say anything. Just like the other European diplomats in Moscow in the early 1930s, Estonians and Latvians lived a rather isolated life. According to a Latvian diplomat only in exceptional cases did they come into touch with the Soviet population. The private dwellings of the staff were located in the building of the legation. The members of the staff had their common meals in the legation. Food and other supplies were received from abroad.⁶²

Diplomats nevertheless did travel around the country and saw what they were not supposed to see. There were so many people begging for bread at railway stations that it simply could not be concealed from people driving by. Estonia's ambassador in Moscow Julius Seljamaa travelled in Ukraine and the Caucasus in the spring of 1933 and he wrote in his report: "I do not think I will ever be able to forget the plaintive voices of children whose only request was the following: "Mister, give me a crust of bread!" (*Дядьенка, дай кусочек хлеба*). And if you hand someone a morsel of bread, dozens of people hurry over and crowd about like a herd of hungry dogs. Eventually I did not even want to get out of the passenger car at stops so I would not have to see those starving people in rags who could barely stand upright because we did not have anything to give them any-

61. LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 70. l., 275. lp.

62. NARA 861.5017 Living Conditions/671.

way – our supplies of bread and biscuits that we had with us were quickly distributed.”⁶³

The Latvian ambassador in Moscow Alfrēds Bīlmanis to whom Seljamaa talked about his visit in Ukraine, requested permission of Riga to travel to Ukraine too and see the conditions for himself. However, judging by his regular reports of 1933, Bīlmanis apparently did not receive such authorization and was not in Ukraine that year.⁶⁴ Nevertheless he gathered information from other available sources and sent detailed dispatches describing the famine, its causes and extent. In 1933 Bīlmanis emphasized that the Soviet regime, which he characterized as “Communist-Fascist,” ruthlessly exploited peasants, deprived them of means for subsistence and sacrificed everything to the “God of the Industrialization.”⁶⁵

In another despatch, Bīlmanis discussed the causes of the famine: “It is symptomatic that the sharp increase of the food shortage correlates with the percentage of collectivization. It is not related to the productivity of soil. This proves that the current famine in the South is explained first of all by collectivization.”⁶⁶

Vilhelms Munters, the general secretary of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, to whom Bīlmanis addressed the above-cited dispatch in September 1933, that same month was busy preparing for the arrival of the former Prime Minister of France Édouard Herriot, who visited Latvia on his return from a guided tour in Ukraine. Stepping out of the train in Riga terminal, Herriot declared that any talk of famine in Ukraine was nonsense. *Pravda* immediately reported that Mr. Herriot had “categorically contradicted the lies of the bourgeoisie press in connection with a famine in the USSR.”⁶⁷ Herriot's statements attracted some attention of the Estonian journalists who believed that Herriot either possessed an incorrect perception of the situation in USSR, or simply lied.⁶⁸ Latvian newspapers paid almost no attention to Herriot's denial of famine in Ukraine. They just listed the places he had visited in the USSR and mentioned his sympathetic attitude towards the Soviets. During Herriot's travel from the Soviet border to Riga a Latvian journalist asked Herriot's opinion about the situation in the USSR. The French politician replied that there was progress and development everywhere and “there was no famine.” When the journalist insisted that he was not shown everything, Herriot replied that he saw

63. “Impressions from a tour of Caucasus,” 10 June 1933, ERA.957.13.532, p. 150.

64. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 579.-581. lp.

65. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 74. lp.

66. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 337. lp.

67. *Pravda*, 13.09.1933.

68. “Herriot tahtis külastada Eestit” (Herriot wanted to visit Estonia), *PL*, 08.09.1933, p. 3; N. Basseches, “Herriot Nõukogude Liidus” (Herriot in the Soviet Union), *PL*, 15.09.1933, p. 2; G. Popoff, “Kas Wenemaa nälgib wõi mitte” (Is Russia Starving or Not)?, *PL*, 30.10.1933, p. 2.

enough.⁶⁹ The mainstream Latvian press did not raise the famine issue any more and concentrated instead on Herriot's travel programme in Latvia. Only the fringe paper *Pērkoņkrusts* wrote an extensive article about the controversy of Herriot's famine denial, citing *Figaro* and *Journal des Débats*.⁷⁰

The French delegation met with Munters in Riga and could only confirm "nowhere did they see the famine, which was so widely described by the foreign press."⁷¹ It was completely different information Munters had been receiving from the Latvian ambassador in Moscow, Bīlmanis. His reports of the summer and autumn seasons in 1933 painted a horrific picture:

A state, which can be characterised as famine is now in Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, near Volga and partly also in the Central black-earth region, as well as in the steppes of Central Asia inhabited by nomads. . . . Especially in the former three areas death from famine is exceptionally high. No statistical calculations are possible, but it is most likely that until now several million people had died, and the same number may die until next summer. The whole villages die out. On a huge scale peasants are fleeing to the cities, leaving all their possessions behind and walking hundreds of kilometres barefoot. Many die en route. In the Northern Caucasus there are special *komsomol* brigades whose work it is to clear the roads of the dead bodies. Horrible reports of cannibalism were also confirmed.⁷²

In another dispatch, dated June 9th, 1933, Bīlmanis wrote that in Ukraine "20-30 people die daily in one village. Frequently there are cases that human flesh is being used for food."⁷³ In yet another despatch Bīlmanis repeatedly emphasized that the worst situation there was in Ukraine: "From Kiev I receive news that there have been 147 cases of cannibalism."⁷⁴

It is worth mentioning that members of the Baltic legations in Moscow were frequently interviewed by the German, American and other Western diplomats, who used the obtained information in their own dispatches about the living conditions in the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ Americans, who did not

69. "Erio sveic latvju tautu" (Herriot greets Latvian people), *Jaunākās ziņas*, 11.09.1933, p. 1-3.

70. "Kādu Krieviju redzējis Erio kungs savā braucienā" (What kind of Russia did Herriot see during his trip), *Pērkoņkrusts*, 24.09.1933, p. 4.

71. LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 92. l.

72. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 337-340. lp.

73. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 579.-581. lp.

74. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 584-585. lp.

75. See, for example, *Der Ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins verschwiegener Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im Spiegel geheimgehaltener*

have their embassy in Moscow at that time, were in particularly close contact with the Latvian and Estonian diplomats and heavily relied on their information which they apparently trusted. As Robert F. Kelley, chief of the State Department's Division of Eastern European Affairs noted on one of the numerous interviews with the Estonian ambassador: "Worth noting – Mr. Seljamaa is one of the best informed foreign diplomats in Russia."⁷⁶

Baltic diplomats were also in contact with the Western correspondents in Moscow. Seljamaa for example frequently played bridge with Walter Duranty of *The New York Times*. In a conversation with American diplomats in Tallinn, Seljamaa considered it necessary to tell them that although he had the utmost respect for Mr. Duranty as a newspaper correspondent, he was inclined at times to question statements concerning conditions in the USSR, included by Mr. Duranty in his dispatches. The latter was inclined to portray these conditions too optimistically and too much in the light of the information secured by him from official Soviet sources.⁷⁷ Latvian diplomats also confirmed to the Americans, what appeared to be common knowledge among the Western diplomats in Moscow, that Duranty was viewed as a "friend of the Bolsheviks."⁷⁸

Since the famine years coincided with Stalin's industrialization drive, there were many foreign workers or so called *specialists* (engineers, mechanics, architects) in the Soviet Union during the famine. Many of them reported about the miserable living conditions to the Western press. The vast majority of the foreigners were Americans and Germans. Baltic specialists were very few. For example, in 1930 there were only 10 Latvian citizens involved in the Soviet industrialization program.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, in 1933 Latvian ambassador Bīlmanis received information from Latvian citizens in Ukraine about the famine and cases of cannibalism there, which he reported to Riga.⁸⁰

The role of Baltic-Soviet trade

In 1932/33 the Governments of Latvia and Estonia received enough information to be aware that famine in the USSR was not caused by climatic causes, but instead was a result of the Bolshevik policies. Baltic public and government officials were also aware that the Soviet regime ruthlessly took away all the grain from the peasants and exported it to the West in

Akten des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes: eine Dokumentation; aus d. Beständen d. Polit. Archivs im Auswärtigen Amt, Bonn / hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Dr. Dmytro Zlepko (Sonnenbuhl: Wild, 1988).

76. NARA 59/861.5017 Living Conditions/581

77. *Ibid.*

78. NARA 861.5017 Living Conditions/671.

79. LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 70. l., 259. lp.

80. LVVA, 2575. f., 8. apr., 59. l., 584-585. lp.

order to get the foreign currency to repay huge credits and fund the industrialization program.

The Soviet grain export had a direct influence on the economies of Latvia and Estonia in the early 1930s as both countries were agricultural lands. Statistics show that 68 percent of Latvians and 65 percent of Estonians were employed either in agriculture or forestry.⁸¹ Most of the exports of the Baltic States were made up of agricultural products, such as meat, cattle and dairy products. The global crisis hit the Baltic economies with great force and the situation was further worsened by the dumping of the Soviet (Ukrainian) grain. It was being sold at such low prices that many farmers were put out of business. To protect the national producers a number of countries introduced various trade restrictions with the USSR.⁸² Latvia and Estonia joined the so-called Block of Agrarian Countries, which coordinated their import policies of agricultural products to combat the Soviet dumping. Moscow considered every such activity that was aimed at restricting Soviet exports as hostile. Soviet propaganda sharply criticized Baltic involvement in the Block of Agrarian Countries and claimed that Latvia and Estonia had joined the enemy camp, which was trying to impose an economic blockade of the USSR.

By 1932 the Soviet trade with Latvia and Estonia had substantially decreased. Moreover, the trade balance had become distinctly negative for Latvia and Estonia. For example, in 1932 the USSR reduced orders from Estonia by 24 times compared to the average of the last five years.⁸³ Business circles repeatedly called attention to this situation and in 1932 the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry directed the attention of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fact that the concluded trade agreement was clearly more beneficial for the Soviet Union than for Estonia and recently, the Russians had almost completely discontinued purchasing goods from Estonia.⁸⁴ According to data from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, butcher's meat valued at approximately 200,000 kroons was sent to the USSR at the beginning of 1933 but after that nothing at all had been exported to the Soviet Union. At the same time, more than 2500

81. "Austrumeiropas agrāro valstu bloks" (The Block of Eastern European Agrarian countries), *Ekonomists*, 01.09.1930, p. 1.

82. For example France introduced import licences. USA prohibited imports of a number of Soviet products, such as timber which was produced by forced labor.

83. J. Valge, "Vaateid naabri majandusele," p. 94.

84. Letter from the director of the Trade Department, 4 November 1931, ERA.957.4.191, pp. 17-18; Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 Sept. 1933, ERA.957.4.193, pp. 12-13.

tons of wheat had been supplied to Estonia from the Soviet Union during 1932.⁸⁵

Soviet trade with Latvia also decreased. The trade agreement between the USSR and Latvia had expired in late 1932 and was not renewed until the end of 1933. For 10 months, high import-export tariffs were in place, which further decreased the amount of exchanged goods. The Soviet-Latvian trade negotiations in 1932 showed that Moscow was using trade to achieve political goals in Latvia. Therefore the Latvian ambassador Bīlmanis was skeptical about the future of doing business with the USSR. In May 1933 he wrote to Riga: "We should not count on the Soviet Russia as an economic partner, not even on the transit of their goods."⁸⁶

In Estonia by contrast there was an opinion that the Soviet food crisis might provide business opportunities for Estonia. At the beginning of 1933 for instance, the Estonian ambassador in Moscow forwarded information that the grain harvest in the Soviet Union in 1932 appeared to be 8-9 million tons smaller, which "cannot leave foreign export and the worsening of food supply difficulties unaffected."⁸⁷ Hopes were not realized because the Soviet side was not interested. The only product that the USSR purchased to some extent from Estonia was meat, which did not go to feed the starving people but rather was sent mostly to the *Torgsin* stores that served foreigners.⁸⁸ The same situation was with the Latvian exports to the USSR. Most of it was meat, fish and butter, which was procured by the Soviet Government and sold in *Torgsin* stores.

Unlike some other Western countries Latvia did not import cheap Soviet grain during the famine years of 1932/33.⁸⁹ However, there is no reason to believe that it was motivated by humanitarian considerations. Most likely Soviet grain was not imported because of economic and political reasons. Such conclusion may be drawn on the basis of the regular politi-

85. Minister of Economic Affairs to the Estonian ambassador in Moscow, 24 March 1933, ERA.957.4.193, pp. 12-13. Estonia wanted to supply Russia with meat and milk products first and foremost since that is what Estonia's agriculture was oriented to. Not much grain was produced in Estonia for sale during the interwar period.

86. LVVA, 2575.f., 8.apr., 59.l., 606.-617.lp.

87. Estonian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Department, 7 Jan. 1933, ERA.957.4.193, pp. 92-95.

88. *Torgsin* (*Торговый синдикат*) or the Union-wide Association for Trade with Foreigners (*Всесоюзное объединение по торговле с иностранцами*) was an establishment that operated in 1931-36, which sold goods for foreign currency and precious metals in its approximately 460 shops. *Torgsin* purchased a few hundred tons of pigs and calves from Estonia in 1933. "Sigu ja saapaid Wenemaale. *Torgsin* annab tellimusi" (Pigs and Boots for Russia. *Torgsin* Places Orders), *PM*, 06.12.1932; "Wenelastele 3000 siga ja 5000 wasikat" (3000 Pigs and 5000 Calves to the Russians), *PM*, 09.12.1932; "Teadaanne põllumeestele ja seakaswatajatele" (Announcement for Farmers and Pig Breeders), *PM*, 13.12.1932.

89. LVVA, 2575.f., 8.apr., 59.l., 354.lp.

cal and economic dispatches of the Latvian Embassy in Moscow. It is also supported by the analysis of the discussions in the Latvian Parliament about the trade agreement with the USSR in 1933. None of the MPs raised the issue of the unfolding famine in Ukraine.

Famine relief

The international public realized the seriousness of the famine in Ukraine by the summer of 1933 after the articles by Gareth Jones, Malcom Muggeridge, Suzanne Bertillon, and so on were published. Appeals for help began to appear in the newspapers of the world, emphasizing the fact that while the Soviet people were starving, grain was rotting in storehouses in the West as Western countries languished in the economic crisis and corn was used as fuel to heat furnaces in Kansas. In the summer of 1933, the belief spread that this year's harvest would fail as well and a new wave of deaths from starvation was forecast for the winter, which would lead to at least 10 million deaths.⁹⁰ The only possibility for preventing this would be to organize an international assistance campaign. The idea was discussed in Scandinavia, Germany, the USA, Canada, France and elsewhere where Ukrainians, Russians and others lived who tried to put together an assistance network.

In the case of Estonia appeals were made to help "Estonian colonists," for which purpose the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Estonian embassies were supposed to first ascertain the number of Estonians in distress. The Estonian embassy in Moscow took the position that they have absolutely no way of authentically ascertaining the number of Estonians in need or their condition in the Soviet Union. According to Kirotar, since no information was available it could confidently be presumed that this number equals the number of Estonians in the Soviet Union, in other words "around 150,000."⁹¹ He considered the assistance of people in need from the standpoint of different nationalities to be possible only as a joint action, which is what the European Congress of Minorities propagated, for instance. Its Secretary General Dr. Ewald Ammende had sent a memoran-

90. This information was originally published by Ewald Ammende in the Austrian daily *Reichspost*. "Der Massentod schreitet durch Rusland" (The mass death walks across Russia), *Reichspost*, 16.07.1933, p. 1-4. Subtitle of the article red: "10 million people have died during the last six month in the areas of Volga, Ukraine and the North Caucasus." It was reprinted by newspapers elsewhere in Europe, for example: "La famine en U.R.S.S.," *Le Figaro*, 16.07.1933, p. 3; "Hungersnøden i Rusland," *Aftenposten*, 18.07.1933, p. 3. The Soviet press denounced Amende's appeal as "vulgar slander" and "dirty invention" (*Pravda*, 20.7.1933, p. 1.).

91. The number Estonians living in the USSR according to the 1926 census was 156,000.

dum to the newspapers of the world that was published in the Latvian and Estonian newspapers as well.⁹²

Estonia's foreign missions urged the propagators of assistance to "come back to earth" – the chance that the Soviet government would grant permission for carrying out any kind of assistance campaign was very unlikely.⁹³ The embassy was not mistaken; the Soviet government treated foreign attempts to help as interference in its internal affairs and denied the famine to the very end.

The International Red Cross was also appealed to for inclusion in the campaign.⁹⁴ The Estonian Red Cross did not respond to this appeal.⁹⁵

Since there were no other possibilities, the Estonian Embassy in Moscow recommended to restrict aid to the practice in use thus far, in other words to send individual food packages to specific addresses. It was also considered possible that the Ministry of Internal Affairs could provide persons wishing to help with the contact information of people who had submitted applications for emigration to Estonia to give relatives the chance to send packages to people in need. In any case, all manner of propaganda for assisting people in need was to be avoided.⁹⁶ Sending regular packages via post was very popular. According to the despatches of US diplomats in Tallinn, there were special businesses set up in Estonia (given its proximity to the USSR), which acted as intermediaries offering people from Western Europe and even America to send food packages on their behalf to the USSR. These firms had their offices in Europe and in the USA.⁹⁷

Dispatches of the Latvian diplomats in the USSR at the time (Ambassador in Moscow, Consuls in Leningrad and Vitebsk) contain no information about any famine relief activities which would have involved the Latvian

92. Ewalds Amende, "Krievijas badakatastrofa" (Russia's Famine catastrophe), *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 31.7.1933, p 1; "Näljahäda Nõukogudemaal" (Famine in the Land of the Soviets), *PL*, 31.07.1933, p. 2.

93. Elmar Kirotar, Chargé d'affaires a. i. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Concerning the Assistance of Estonian Colonists in Soviet Russia," 02.08.1933; "More about Assisting Estonian Colonists," 09.08.1933, ERA.957.13.532, pp. 199-205.

94. G. Popoff, "Kas Wenemaa nälgib või mitte" (Is Russia Starving or Not)?, *PL*, 30.10.1933, p. 2; N. Basseches. "Toitlusprobleem Nõukogude Liidus" (The Problem of Food Supply in the Soviet Union), *PL*, 08.09.1933, p. 4; "Appi Wene näljahädalistele" (Help Russia's Famine Victims), *PM*, 15.10.1933, p. 2.

95. The Board of Directors of the Estonian Red Cross made these kinds of assistance decisions. The documents of its meetings have survived, but there is not the slightest reference to assisting famine victims in the USSR in the minutes of the meetings of 1931-34. Minutes of meetings of the Estonian Red Cross Main Administration, ERA.2048.1.8; 12.

96. Elmar Kirotar, Chargé d'affaires a. i. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Concerning the Assistance of Estonian Colonists in Soviet Russia," 2 Aug. 1933; "More about Assisting Estonian Colonists," 9 Aug. 1933, ERA.957.13.532, p. 199-205.

97. Sending of food packages to the Soviet Union from Estonia, 7 May 1931, NARA 59/861.48/2417

government. However, it is widely known that ordinary Latvian citizens regularly sent food packages to their relatives in the USSR. The famine of 1932/33 substantially increased the number of food packages being handled by post offices of the Baltic States. In Latvia the post office had a special agreement with the Soviet government, which enabled the sender immediately to pay the customs duties upon mailing. The Soviet charges were enormous, averaging four times the value of the actual contents of the package. Interestingly, the customs thus realized in Latvian post offices were paid in Latvian currency and deposited in a local bank to the credit of the Soviet trade delegation.⁹⁸ The Soviet regime used every opportunity, including the famine, to increase their foreign currency reserves. By mid 1933 the Soviet post offices no longer accepted the usual packages of bread – dried to reduce the weight, which resulted in smaller shipping costs and reduced customs charges.⁹⁹

At the end of 1931, the USSR Postal Commissariat sent the Estonian Postal Administration a list of goods permitted to be sent to the Soviet Union for personal use without special permission. Unfortunately, packages tended to be returned to the senders. The Russians justified this with errors in formulating delivery orders, for instance, “meat” was not written as prescribed, instead the word “bacon” or “salt meat” was used. The Estonian Postal Administration received no responses to its enquiries. All it could recommend to people was to write the descriptions of the contents of their parcels as correctly as possible.¹⁰⁰

Frequently the packages were stolen in the local Soviet post offices. A letter that was sent in spring of 1933 from Kuban to Latvia read: “do not send us flour or granulated sugar the next time. The postal workers bored holes in the packages and stole the contents. Send us macaroni. We can grind it to make bread and lump sugar.”¹⁰¹

It is difficult to assess the extent of this campaign but there is no evidence to indicate that the campaign of sending the food packages would have been massive.¹⁰² It must not be forgotten that the culmination of the

98. Donald Day, “Russia in grip of famine; Many die of hunger,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 21.05.1933, p. 17.

99 Donald Day, “Russia’s bread basket empty; Thousands Die,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 04.06.1933, p. 24.

100 “Wenemaal nälgiid ei lasta aidata” (Russia Stops People from Helping the Starving), *PM*, 06.03.1932, p. 5.

101. Donald Day, “Russia in grip of famine; Many die of hunger,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 21.05.1933, p. 17.

102. During the 1934/35 financial year, 2,453 postal parcels were sent from Estonia to the Soviet Union, but this data cannot be compared with anything because statistics are missing in the reports for preceding years. Statistics concerning the sale of postal payment means in Estonia indicated more of a decreasing tendency, as did the general statistics of postal parcels because while the sending of 180,000 postal parcels was registered at the Postal Administration in 1930/31, that number had declined to 155,000 the following year,

famine and the publication of appeals for assistance coincided with the most critical phase of the worldwide economic crisis, which was not easy for anyone in the Baltic States as well.

Conclusion

In summary, it can be said that people in Latvia and Estonia received a reasonably accurate picture of the food shortages in the USSR and the famine in Ukraine. Regardless of the Soviet regime's attempts to deny the famine and to conceal its extent, enough information made it abroad, including into the Baltic States. Both the media and governmental agencies did not have the opportunities or means for more precisely assessing the number of victims. Thus they had to confine themselves to the definition "millions" or "several million," whereas the extent of the famine was compared to the previous famine of 1921, the victims of which were known to number about 5 million. The Soviet Union's unsuccessful agrarian policy as expressed through collectivization was considered the reason for the catastrophe. This explains why during the Soviet occupation of Latvia and Estonia in the 1940s, the greatest fears of farmers in the Baltic countries were always connected to collectivization. That in particular was associated first and foremost with food shortages and hunger.

In the view of the Baltic diplomats and the press, the other cause of the famine in Ukraine was the class warfare and a desire of the Bolsheviks to exterminate the class of peasantry using famine as a weapon. The Estonian and Latvian public also believed the food shortage was caused by the inefficient Soviet management, which in conjunction with external factors (such as for example threat of war in the Far East and the world economic crisis) had caused a complete collapse of the Soviet agriculture in 1932. A particularly grave situation was in Ukraine because it was the main grain producing region or the so-called *granary* of the Soviet Union

Latvia and Estonia officially distanced themselves from the question of assistance. The larger scale assistance of starving Soviet citizens, if such attempts were made in the first place, was not possible because the Soviet Union treated international offers of aid as interference in its internal affairs while denying the tragedy. It was possible to render assistance to a certain extent only through private contacts by sending packages to people. Estonia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a memorandum from expatriate Ukrainian organizations in the autumn of 1933¹⁰³ but there is no information to indicate that the ministry or government reacted to it in any

and again to 113,000 in 1933/34. Reports of the Estonian Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Administrations, 1931-1934, ERA.54.1.474-477; "Valitsusastutiste tegevus 1918-1934" (The Work of Government Agencies, 1918-1934), Riigikantselei (State Chancellery): Tallinn, 1934, p. 263.

103. "Memorandum sur la famine en Ukraine," 27 Sept. 1933, ERA.957.13.775, p. 14.

way. No official statements were made in the Estonian or Latvian parliaments or anywhere else. It must, however, be kept in mind that in addition to the economic crisis, 1933 was the year of political crisis in the Baltics, which eventually led to instalment of authoritarian regimes both in Latvia and Estonia in the early 1934. 1933 was particularly stormy in Estonia. The government changed twice over the course of the year, the devaluation of the Estonian kroon was forced through parliament in the summer after serious arguments, several political scandals erupted, right and left-wing supporters clashed in the streets and rumours circulated about a possible overthrow of the government, which led to the declaration of a state of emergency. In this kind of atmosphere, what was taking place beyond the borders could not attract much attention.

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VALERII REKRUT

*BEHIND THE SCENES AT
THE VINNYTSIA TORGSIN*

As the title of this article implies, the Soviet commercial organization TORGSIN (“Trade with Foreigners”) was originally created to service the needs of foreign diplomats, tourists, and others for foreign currency, but it was soon assigned the additional task of servicing Soviet citizens who could pay with gold and other valuable metals and gems or individuals receiving currency remittances from abroad. From 1930 to 1936 TORGSIN diligently carried out the tasks issued by the Communist Party to amass gold currency reserves and other valuables in order to finance the industrialization of the Soviet Union. The historian Elena Osokina has thoroughly studied the formation and development of TORGSIN on the all-Union scale and described its workings in two solid monographs and other publications.¹ She singles out the mechanisms and methods with which TORGSIN amassed gold currency reserves, which, in her opinion, played a key role in forming the industrial potential of the USSR.

Ukrainian scholars have focused some attention on TORGSIN’s activities in Ukraine. Vasył Marochko, for example, published important information on the TORGSIN All-Ukrainian Association, as well as data on the amounts of gold currency and other valuables that were extracted from the Ukrainian population during the Holodomor of 1932-1933.²

Over the past few years, researchers have uncovered little-known historical facts on the existence in the 1930s of a discriminatory system of supplying citizens with food products and manufactured goods, which was based on the principle of satisfying, first and foremost, the needs of the party and state bureaucracy, and only then the needs of all other citizens, whom the Bolsheviks divided into social castes and groups. The scholarly contributions of Osokina and Marochko are also useful for identifying the preconditions of the Holodomor of 1932-1933. Their data on currency revenues resulting from TORGSIN’s activities, along with in-

1. Elena Osokina, *Zoloto dlia industrializatsii: TORGSIN* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009); *idem*, *Za fasadom “stalinskogo izobiliia”: Raspredelenie i rynek v snabzhenii v gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998).

2. Vasył Marochko, *Holodomor 1932-1933 rr.* (Kyiv, 2007); *idem*, “Torshsny Kyieva v roky holodomoru (1932-1933 rr.),” in *Ukraina XX st.: kultura, ideolohiia, polityka*, zb. 15 (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 2009), pp. 63-77.

formation on the export of grain products, allows scholars to grasp the essence of this disastrous famine and to determine the role and place of the concrete executors of the VKP(B)'s deadly policies.

However, Osokina and Marochko devote little attention to the activities of regional branches of TORGSIN, and thus their works do not reveal the specific features behind the organization of *oblast* associations of this commercial organization and the cadre policy of the VKP(B) with regard to the management of these organizations.

The goal of this article is to analyze the basic events behind the creation of the TORGSIN branch in Vinnytsia *oblast* (the Podillia region of Ukraine) and to shed light on the role and place of this *oblast* affiliate in the acquisition of precious metals and other valuables during the Holodomor in that region. The main sources for this article are documents and other materials held by various Ukrainian state archives.

The USSR assigned a key role to foreign trade in the process of amassing capital for industrialization, especially for making purchases abroad. In mid-1931, as a result of the international economic crisis, world prices for Soviet export goods dropped, which deepened the existing acute currency deficit. According to official data of the USSR's external economic department, world grain prices as of early 1932, on the eve of the famine, compared to 1929, fell by 2.5 times, and exhibited a stable tendency toward further decreases.³ This meant that in order to obtain foreign currency at the 1929 level, it was necessary to increase the volume of grain export by three or four times and to seek additional sources to replenish the state treasury. Realizing that without Western currency the loudly proclaimed program of the country's industrialization would turn into a fiasco, the highest party leadership of the USSR pulled out all the stops with regard to maintaining a high level of stockpiled currency resources and began implementing a number of special measures.

Stalin, who constantly stressed the importance of replenishing the gold currency reserves, issued instructions to his closest associates to focus attention on the need to find sources for replenishing the state currency treasury. In a letter to Lazar Kaganovich dated 6 August 1931 he wrote: "C[omrade] Kaganovich. A reminder . . . 7) Take into your hands . . . the identification of stock for export . . . 9) Pay special attention to the gold industry."⁴

The Politburo of the VKP(B) issued several secret documents stipulating the introduction of extraordinary measures concerning the stockpiling

3. State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Vinnytskoi oblasti; hereafter DAViO), fond R-498, list 1, file 6, fol. 143.

4. *Stalin i Kaganovich: Perepiska 1931-1936 gg.*, comp. O. V. Khlevniuk (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), p. 37.

of currency reserves. These included the acceleration of activities of such exclusive export joint-stock companies as Eksportkhliv [Grain Exports] and Eksportlis [Forestry Product Exports], and the Soiuzkhutro [Union Fur] syndicate, which were specially singled out in separate types of economic structures acting as exporters of the Soviet Union's greatest riches.⁵

Much hope for obtaining currency revenue was placed on customs offices, border detachments, and special services, especially the GPU [State Political Directorate] and the militia. The latter agency was tasked with intensifying the struggle against "currency black markets" and confiscating the maximum quantity of gold currency valuables during the execution of permanent operations targeting currency traders and various types of declassified elements.

Finally, in the formation of the state's currency treasury great importance was attached to the TORGSIN All-Union Association, for whose development extraordinarily favorable conditions were created. By a resolution passed on 10 December 1931 the SNK SSSR [Council of People's Commissars of the USSR] sanctioned TORGSIN's right to purchase precious metals (gold and, later, silver) from Soviet citizens and carry out trading operations with them for foreign currency.⁶

Much attention was paid to the selection and placement of cadres in the system of foreign economic activities. In November 1930 Arkadi Rozengoltz (1889-1938), a veteran member of the VKP(B) and a Bolshevik since 1905, was named head of the NKZT [People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade]. He was an experienced financial specialist and had been involved in foreign economic activities in England.⁷ Under Rozengoltz's direction, the NKZT soon encompassed 58 separate structures (1932) working in the sphere of export-import operations and created a management vertical that extended from the top (center) down to the *raion* level. The task of this vertical was to organize and maintain control over the implementation of state export plans and to apply maximum efforts to expanding the activities of TORGSIN. For this purpose, a resolution ratified on 13 February 1931 by the TsVK [Central Executive Committee] and the SNK SSR stipulated the introduction throughout the Soviet Union of

5. Vasyi Podolian and Valerii Rekrut, *Osoblyvosti diialnosti spozhyvchoi kooperatsii Vinnychchyny v umovakh Holodomoru 30-kh rokiv XX stolittia* (Vinnytsia: PP Baliuk, 2008), p. 184.

6. DAViO, fond R-485, list 2, file 1, fol. 79.

7. Podolian and Rekrut, *Osoblyvosti diialnosti spozhyvchoi kooperatsii Vinnychchyny*, 185. As a result of his wide-ranging espionage activities in England, Rozengoltz was expelled from the country. His expulsion was one of the causes behind the rift in Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations. As a result of his close association with Lev Trotsky, Rozengoltz was accused of Trotskyism and shot on 15 March 1938.

authorized NKZT representatives, who were given full control over the implementation of export plans and the work of TORGSIN organizations in local areas.

The Soviet government's organizational measures regarding the creation of a system of management and control in connection with the state's efforts to increase its gold currency potential were mostly in place by the spring of 1932, when eight structural units were created in Ukraine: Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Dnipropetrovsk *oblasts*, a Moldovan republican unit, and the Mykolaiv and Mariupil port boards of authorized NKZT representatives, with a combined staff of 72 people.⁸ Direct leadership of the NKZT structures attached to the government of the Ukrainian SSR was assumed by M. Kattel, who was assigned to Ukraine on Rozengoltz's recommendation and in coordination with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(B). It was this very Bolshevik who demanded the unquestionable fulfillment of all the center's targets with respect to exports from Ukraine, who meted out brutal punishment to individuals found guilty of wrecking control figures, and who, in coordination with Moscow, placed the necessary cadres in the Ukraine-wide system of offices. On Kattel's directive, Zh. Griavo was appointed head of the Vinnytsia management on 21 April 1932.⁹

It should be noted that when the TORGSIN system was first created in the USSR in 1930, it did not exist in Vinnytsia *oblast*, owing to the fact that there were no ports in this region and hence no need to provide ship-handling services (servicing foreign ships). As well, in view of the immense number of outpost facilities on the borders of Romania and Poland, foreign tourists were not permitted to enter this region, and there were practically no foreign specialists here. It was only in the fall of 1931, when the Soviet leaders permitted ordinary Soviet citizens to visit TORGSIN shops, that a turning-point in the history of this organization took place. It was granted the right to provide its services to all individuals who visited TORGSIN shops, on condition that they bring gold (jewelry, scrap gold, old mint coins) or those who were receiving remittances in foreign currencies.

That autumn, department stores (*univermahy*) – subsidiaries of the TORGSIN All-Union Association in Moscow – appeared in the cities of Vinnytsia (Kalich Street) and Berdychiv. The Moscow center called for the expansion of TORGSIN outlets in the Podillia region to encompass those districts where, according to data collected by the Soviet secret services, money was circulating and where people engaged in commerce lived. Without a doubt, the idea of creating TORGSIN in the Vinnytsia

8. DAViO, fond R-498, list 2, file 1, fols. 32-33.

9. *Ibid.*, fol. 29.

region was born in the corridors of the organization's management, thanks to various opportunistic reports and memoranda that were being sent from the *oblast*. In May 1932, Abram Zhovtis, the commercial director of the Vinnytsia branch of TORGSIN, in replying to two questions on a special report form, offered an accurate portrayal of the sociodemographic situation in the region. He reported to Moscow:

Vinnytsia *oblast* is comprised of the larger part of former Podillia Gubernia, with the cities of Vinnytsia, Proskuriv, Kamianets-Podilsky, Mohyliv-P[odilsky], and Tulchyn, part of Kyiv Gub[ernia] with the city of Uman, and part of Volyn Gub[ernia], with the large town of Shepetivka.

In the past, this *oblast* was inhabited mostly by Jews, who carried on a small-scale trade in grain and other types of commerce, and were engaged in various trades. Since they were extraordinarily restricted by the tsarist government and stripped of all rights, in the [18]90s entire Jewish families began to emigrate from Russia, in particular to America.

Under Soviet rule, the horrors that the Jews had experienced during the transitional prerevolutionary period (the Petliura period, the Polish invasion) sparked an influx, from America and other countries, of measures to assist the overwhelmed and impoverished Jewish community ('Are' [sic],¹⁰ parcels, cash remittances).

During the years of the Soviet power's existence this relationship expanded and strengthened, and right now, thanks to the introduction of institute of TORGSIN department stores, where an individual who has received a foreign remittance can obtain all indispensable goods, both food and manufactured goods; it has acquired entirely significant dimensions, and it may be said that there is not a single small town in Vinnytsia *oblast* where foreign remittances for significant sums are not arriving.

On the other hand, a significant quantity of foreign currency and gold has accumulated in Vinnytsia *oblast*, which borders on Poland and in the past – on Austro-Hungary, from where the wave of intervention came. Finally, gold coins have been retained by a significant proportion of the population of this *oblast* (especially the peasantry).

10. Read: ARA, the American Relief Administration. In late 1921 this agency, which was already sending relief to famine victims in Russia, sought permission to launch a campaign of Western aid for the starving inhabitants of Ukraine's southern regions. A large proportion of this relief was provided by the Jewish organization known as Joint, which even after the famine ended continued to finance Jewish agrarian settlements until the late 1930s.

All these facts allow one to assume that a network of TORGSIN department stores in this *oblast* may be launched, and that the prospect for them is entirely real.

These assumptions are strengthened by the turnovers of the department stores in recent times, taking into consideration, of course, the short duration of their work, organ[izational] shortcomings, and the inadequacy of the supply of food products.

In addition to points that have been opened in Vinnytsia, Berdychiv, Shepetivka, and Proskuriv, it is economically rational, in keeping with the reasons indicated above, to open points in Uman, Kamianets, Tulchyn, and Bar (instead of Mohyliv, which is at an impasse and very economically weakened, and significantly ravaged by flooding).¹¹

Zhovtis proposed organizing TORGSIN services in areas with a concentration of Jews who owned gold and other valuables, and who would be receiving considerable cash remittances in foreign currency. The number of foreign currency remittances was expected to increase after the creation of TORGSIN offices abroad, from where residents of Canada, the US, and Western Europe could remit currency to their relatives and friends in Ukraine.

At this point we should mention the influx of so-called veterans' checks from Canada and the US. Judging by the Gurevich circular (see Appendix A), these were considerable sums, and therefore the Soviet authorities sought to channel them to the TORGSIN shops.¹² Another official document refers to the institutions, which provided the financial assistance via the Ukrainian Red Cross office in the United States, as the U.S. Veterans Bureau, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Canadian Military Ministry [*sic*] (see Appendix C). The checks were received by more than 300 inhabitants of Vinnytsia *oblast*, most of whom lived in Shepetivka, Kamianets-Podilsky, and Proskuriv.¹³

In addition, the TORGSIN management anticipated – correctly – the significant influx of valuables that could be brought by the peasants of Podillia, who in the years of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917/21) had traded with various occupying armies and people of various nationalities

11. DAViO, fond R-498, list 2, file 9, fol. 37.

12. DAViO, fond R-485, list 2, file 1, fol. 107.

13. *Ibid.*, file 8, fol. 88. The topic of “veterans’ checks” remains largely unresearched. It may be assumed that among the recipients were Ukrainian émigrés who had served in the Canadian and American armed forces during the First World War and returned to Ukraine after the war. It is more likely, however, that these were spouses and children of Ukrainian soldiers in the armed forces of Canada and the US, who were killed during the First World War.

(Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Frenchmen, former tsarist officers, and wealthy Russian refugees) exclusively for Romanov- and Nicholas-era gold and silver coins.

The creation of Vinnytsia *oblast* in February 1932 boosted the work aimed at expanding the network of TORGSIN shops throughout the region. In carrying out the demands of Moscow center, the director of the Vinnytsia department store, A. Dunenman, paid a special visit to the city of Kamianets-Podilsky, where he managed to convince the head of the municipal council that the city desperately need a branch of TORGSIN. As a result, the resolution passed by the presidium of the municipal council on 26 March 1932 noted the following: "In connection with the fact that a large number of declassed people who receive financial assistance from their relatives abroad are found in the city of Kamianets . . . consider it vital to agree with the opinion of the representative of the Vin[nytsia] branch, Com[rade] Dunenman, concerning the opening of a TORGSIN branch shop and to open it in the soonest possible time."¹⁴

This resolution indicates that the Bolsheviks had resolved to extract all remaining resources or those that were still accessible to the so-called declassed element (former traders, merchants, people of non-proletarian origin, kulaks, church figures, etc.), whom the Soviet government had stripped of political rights and food rations, and who had difficulties finding employment. Above all, the Communist Party was interested in their gold and valuables, and the foreign currency that might be sent to this segment of the population.

The central TORGSIN management in Moscow had no intentions of sharing power with the leaders of Soviet Ukraine and, doing their utmost to delay the creation of the All-Ukrainian Association, sought to wield control over *oblast* offices and their various departments. Therefore, the attempt of the Moscow leaders to divest their Ukrainian counterparts of leadership and control over gold, currency, and scarce goods (caviar, whitefish, furs, imported goods, etc.) caused "resentment" in the Ukrainian political leadership. It is understandable that Ukrainian exporters, who possessed powerful gold currency resources, sought to subvert all the attempts of their "elder brothers" to restrict their sense of being full-fledged masters of their own economy. This explains the emergence of an unprecedented document whose analogs are all too rarely encountered among the masses of resolutions and decisions that were passed in this period. A Ukrainian export meeting, held in Kharkiv on 14 June 1932 to discuss the activities of the authorized representative of the TORGSIN All-Union Association, condemned the central institution's work with re-

14. *Ibid.*, file 9, fol. 3.

gard to organizational questions and the selection and distribution of cadres, and harshly criticized the Moscow leadership for delaying the creation of an autonomous TORGSIN association in the Ukrainian SSR. The resolution emphasized the high crime rate within the TORGSIN system, weak ideological work among the personnel, etc.¹⁵ (See Appendix B).

It should be noted, that the harsh criticism of Moscow's centralization of the TORGSIN system by the participants of the Kharkiv meeting was offset by their diligence in extorting as much foreign currency as possible from Ukrainian citizens. The resolution in fact introduced a corrective to Moscow center's targets and confirmed a significantly more intensive plan by increasing it by 1.7 times: "To confirm the plan for currency and gold revenues coming to TORGSIN in 1932 in the amount of 18.5 million karb[ovantsi] versus the plan calling for 12 million karb[ovantsi], which was ratified by the TORGSIN Union Management; the target in the amount of 20 million karb[ovantsi] is to be assigned to local areas, in connection with which the TORGSIN trade network is to be expanded by 15 branches in the strongest points in Ukraine."¹⁶ It may be assumed that the participants of the Kharkiv meeting hoped to gain greater autonomy for the Ukrainian TORGSIN, which would then allow Kharkiv functionaries to reap even greater advantages from the system. As could be expected, the Moscow representatives Shkliar and Kattel, who were present at this meeting, ignored the criticisms and focused attention only on the question of raising quotas. They reported on the completion of the designated targets, especially the question of preparing Ukrainian industry for the manufacturing of high-quality products specially earmarked for the stocking of TORGSIN shops.

Several days later, on 29 June 1932, the Ukrainian Economic Session (UEN) issued a resolution aimed at strengthening the management of the economic and trading activities of TORGSIN *oblast* offices. It states in part: "To create within the system of the Authorized People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade under the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR the All-Ukrainian TORGSIN Office as a branch of the TORGSIN All-Union Association."¹⁷

Thus, by mid-1932 Ukraine had an entire system for extracting valuables from its citizens, which was designed to provide goods in exchange for currency remittances and to offer scarce goods exclusively to people who had kind relatives abroad or other sources of assistance, or those who had managed to hold onto their diamonds, gold, silver, and antiques that

15. DAViO, fond R-498, list 3, file 8, fols.7-9.

16. *Ibid.*, fol. 8.

17. *Ibid.*, list 2, file 9, fol. 88.

they would give up to the state for a pittance, in exchange for basic necessities.

Throughout 1932 the Vinnytsia and Berdychiv department stores were joined by stores opened in Shepetivka (24 April), Proskuriv (25 May), Tulchyn (25 July), Mohyliv-Podilsky (29 July), Kamianets-Podilsky (29 July), Uman (3 August), Bar (12 December), and Starokostiantyniv (12 December). In December 1932 four stalls were opened in Iziaslav, Slavuta, Sharhorod, and at the Kamianets-Podilsky bazaar. By the end of 1932 the *oblast* office had a total of nine department stores (on 1 January 1933 the Uman store was transferred to the Kyiv office) and four subsidiary stalls.¹⁸

During this period the chief function of the stores was to buy up gold (in 1932 silver was not accepted), that is, citizens had the right to bring in “scrap gold” (the TORGSIN term for gold adornments), jewelry, and old mint coins. The price of gold depended on the purity established by the receiving clerk (basically, an eyeball appraisal) and, in keeping with the appraisal, each client was issued a document for the submitted article indicating a sum in “gold rubles.” Tsarist coins, for example, were accepted at their full face value, that is, five Soviet “gold rubles” were issued for one old, gold “fiver.” Other gold items were subject to appraisal by the receiving clerk, who carried out an “analysis,” weighed them, and duly calculated the so-called melting waste (*uhar*) (no less than 3 percent of the weight).¹⁹ Thus, for one gram of 14-carat gold TORGSIN clerks recorded 73 “gold kopecks”; for an analogous weight of 18-carat gold – 94 kopecks; and for one gram of 10-carat gold – 63 kopecks.²⁰

In addition to the “melting waste,” the official three-percent reduction retained by TORGSIN outlets, a client bringing in gold items was always cheated during the weighing process. In keeping with an official instruction, receiving points designated weight to an accuracy of one-tenth, and on this basis a receipt was issued in Soviet “gold rubles.” The receiver then delivered the gold to the State Bank, where weighing took place on a more accurate scale, resulting in calculations accurate down to the hundredth and thousandth gram of gold. In this way, a “gain” (*navar*) was produced, the result the difference during the weighing process, which also had to be forwarded to the state. But receiving clerks, who kept accurate weighing instruments in their homes, ably designated the purchased weight and drafted relevant documents in such a way that at the bank everything corresponded right down to the last thousandth of a gram, with the result that the state never received the anticipated windfall. According

18. DAViO, fond R-485, list 1, file 6a, fol. 2.

19. *Ibid.*, list 2, file 1, fol. 86.

20. *Ibid.*, list 1, file 76, fol. 91v.

to the appraisals made by TORGSIN specialists, in the received gold weighing one kg. the “gain” comprised between 8 and 10 grams of pure gold that never ended up in the state coffers, but always remained in the hands of crafty receiving clerks.²¹ Thus, after the time-consuming procedure of drawing up documents, the twice-duped client obtained the right to enter a TORGSIN shop, where, after standing in line for one to three days, s/he could expect to receive crucial food products. Afterwards, however, surprises and additional trials could await the unfortunate shoppers.

One of the most horrific traps for TORGSIN clients was embodied in the punitive organs’ practice of organizing roundups next to TORGSIN shops, especially on the eve of religious and state holidays (information on which was slated for reports on the successful conduct of the struggle against foreign currency speculators). Frequently, these Chekist actions, carried out with a “prophylactic” aim, were organized in individual *raions*, during which frightened citizens gave up everything (valuables, currency, etc.), and even the very goods that they had just managed to obtain.

However, the GPU leadership in Ukraine, which was aware of the low effectiveness of such measures, developed and carried out its own special operations. For example, in the summer of 1932 the GPU organized a well-planned, nationwide action aimed at confiscating foreign currency, which took place in Vinnytsia *oblast* on 27-30 July. Special brigades were created for this operation, and main bases were established in Vinnytsia, Berdychiv, Proskuriv, Uman, and Polonne, where arrested foreign currency speculators were supposed to be delivered to prison cells.²² This operation had one distinctive feature in that other Soviet punitive organs, particularly the militia, were not permitted to conduct investigations of the detainees, but were obliged to hand them over immediately to the main bases; this attests to a certain mistrust on the part of the Chekists toward their colleagues. As a result of the operation, 264 people from Kalynivka, Illintsi, Khmilnyk, Zhmerynka, Tyvriv, Lityn, and other *raions* were sent to Vinnytsia alone.²³ All of them were Jews. According to the operational data gathered by the ramified network of GPU informants, the arrestees owned foreign currency or were engaged in foreign currency operations, yet the people who ended up in prison cells were individuals who had nothing to do with such matters; most of them were elderly people – private entrepreneurs in the past – who worked in Soviet institutions or had no jobs. During the searches and arrests that took place at 3:00

21. *Ibid.*, list 2, file 9, fol. 21.

22. DAViO, fond R-1883, list 1, file 13, fols. 72-73.

23. *Ibid.*, fols. 60-84.

a.m. on 27-30 July 1932 in the cities of Vinnytsia, Zhmerynka, Proskuriv, Haisyn, and elsewhere, the Chekists confiscated paltry amounts of foreign currency, and thus resorted to all possible methods in order to achieve the designated target. According to the testimony of a city prosecutor, for an extended period of time one of the cells at the Berdychiv GPU, which measured 20 sq. m, housed more than 60 prisoners, who were exposed to unsanitary conditions and lack of ventilation at the height of the summer heat. Among the prisoners were a fifty-eight-year-old woman named R. Braverman (who sold goose meat) and several employees of the local brick factory, also over fifty years of age. According to the statements of the above-mentioned prosecutor, the nearly month-long confinement of those sixty prisoners in horrific conditions brought little benefit: "the influx of foreign currency is insignificant."²⁴ Thus, it is no surprise that higher Soviet instances were flooded with grievances and requests to release the prisoners who, under Soviet law, could not be detained for more than a month without being charged with a crime. Most of these so-called foreign currency speculators had to be released, although Georgii Zheleznogorsky, the assistant to General Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR, demanded that investigators initiate timely procedures for prolonging the period of detention.²⁵

Analysis of the above material indicates that the failure of this operation was determined not by the absence of foreign currency in the districts of Vinnytsia *oblast* but by another cause. It is possible that owners of large amounts of gold currency reserves with connections in the GPU organs were warned about the impending, large-scale operation. Instead, it was the petty "foreign currency speculators" who had no foreign currency to speak of or by that time had exhausted their insignificant reserves at the TORGSIN that ended up under arrest. The arrests, roundups, and other measures that were carried out by the GPU organs thus failed to bring any perceptible benefit to the Soviet state, but merely frightened citizens away from availing themselves of the services of TORGSIN shops. During a meeting held in Vinnytsia on 29-30 October 1932 in connection with the unfulfilled targets, the director of the Tulchyn department store P. Zozulia openly declared that the main reason was the lack of shoppers: people were terrified by the arrests that local Chekists were fond of organizing next to TORGSIN shops. His statement was echoed by B. Berliand, the director of the Kamianets-Podilsky branch, who ex-

24. *Ibid.*, fol. 92.

25. *Ibid.*, fol. 118. Georgii Zheleznogorsky (real name: Hersh Abramovych Aizenberg), the General Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR in 1936, was accused of Trotskyism and shot in the fall of 1938.

plained the failure to complete targets by the “population’s fear of shopping at the TORGSIN.”²⁶

Analysis of foreign currency remittances sent by relatives of Soviet citizens and other sources located abroad indicates that in the Vinnytsia region they were converted mostly for Jews residing in the *oblast*. The main remitters of foreign currency were citizens of the U.S., England, France, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Mongolia, Palestine, Turkey, Persia, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and several other countries.²⁷ Most of the funds – 60 percent – originated in the U.S.; Poland, 14 percent; Germany, 4.3 percent; Palestine, 2.4 percent; France, 1.4 percent; England, 1.1 percent; and other countries, 11.2 percent; domestic foreign currency remittances stood at 5.1 percent. In 1932 nearly 55,000 residents of Podillia received approximately 1.1 million “gold karbovantsi,” 970,000 of which were exchanged for goods, while 5,409 remittances totaling 110,353 foreign currency karbovantsi remained in the hands of citizens.²⁸ There were specific reasons why people kept back a certain proportion of these funds. In my opinion, most were unable to convert their checks to goods because of the lack of necessary products and excessively high prices for goods that were on offer.

An equally important factor, which had a fundamental impact on the conversion of foreign currency remittances for goods, was the sellers’ prejudiced approach to providing services to such citizens. The disrespectful – to put it mildly – attitude of TORGSIN employees in Vinnytsia came to the public’s notice and was discussed even in Moscow. For example, the Nirenberg Company sent a grievance to the Foreign Trade Bank in Moscow, complaining that the TORGSIN shops in Vinnytsia *oblast* were failing to inform clients (causing delays of between two and four months) about the arrival of remittances in their name, and that preferential treatment was being given to other clients.²⁹ The Ukrainian Red Cross sent a grievance to the All-Ukrainian TORGSIN Association, accusing it of failure to issue food products in exchange for veterans’ checks. A representative of this agency warned that this would lead to a reduction in the influx of foreign currency from abroad because these checks would not be cashed, and the complaints of their holders to American institutions might have a negative impact on relations with the U.S.³⁰ (See Appendix C)

26. DAViO, fond R-485, list 2, file 9, fol. 59.

27. *Ibid.*, list 1, file 6a, fol. 15.

28. *Ibid.*, fols. 10-11.

29. *Ibid.*, list 2, file 8, fol. 188.

30. *Ibid.*, fol. 88.

In general, the work of TORGSIN outfits was set up in such a way that all clients experienced significant losses as a result of such commerce. Clients were duped when they brought in their gold; when it was weighed during the exchange of goods for “vouchers” (*bony*), passbooks, and checks; when they were unlawfully compelled to purchase unmarketable goods and old merchandise that had lain on the shelves for a long time; and when they were sold goods that were priced significantly higher than in developed countries.

The lack of proper order and control within the TORGSIN system allowed the organization’s employees to commit a variety of abuses. For example, according to existing instructions, it was permitted in special cases to switch foreign currency goods from the export to the non-export category; in other words, they could be sold for Soviet rubles in the free retail trade. Documents contain evidence indicating that this was indeed possible. On 5 July 1932 a commission, whose members included Iu. Breslav, the director of the Vinnytsia department store; S. Zhuravel, the base supervisor; A. Shvartsman, the head of the department store division; I. Rapoport, the accountant of the *oblast* office; S. Hekhter, the head of the municipal trade union committee; and N. Kleiman, a non-staff inspector, drafted a document to the effect that “owing to its low quality, one barrel of Siberian salmon caviar . . . that had arrived at the disposal of the *oblast* office packaged in boxes of 500 grams [105 boxes] [and] 100 grams [375 boxes] should be switched to non-export.” The commission members reached the following conclusion about the caviar: “In order to avoid the further lowering of quality, it should be . . . sold at once for Soviet currency.”³¹ It may be assumed that the average Ukrainian shopper had never even clapped eyes on this delicacy, which was sold for Soviet rubles to the “right people,” including speculators.

One could list many others examples illustrating the incredible number of abuses, and they all substantiate the conclusion that the TORGSIN system was a deeply corrupt structure of Soviet trade, which, along with carrying out the important state task of stockpiling gold currency reserves, created conditions that facilitated the enrichment of its employees who were cheating and duping TORGSIN clients. The main source of these revenues was the starving populace, people who were forced to bring in their last-remaining treasured valuables and were then forced to use the services of this semi-mercantile structure. This explains why the activities of these institutions during the Holodomor of 1932-1933 sparked such a uniformly negative reaction among Ukrainians. The majority of urban and rural residents still harbor bad memories of the TORGSIN shops. The

31. *Ibid.*, file 9, fol. 10.

very name TORGSIN sparks intense regret among families who still mourn their irretrievably lost treasures and sacred symbols of their faith – gold and silver crosses, wedding rings, and many other rare and cherished items. The famine forced families to give them up in order to obtain symbolic papers in the form of “vouchers” and, eventually, “passbooks” that enabled them to purchase goods in the special TORGSIN shops for special prices. For many Ukrainians, this was their last chance to survive, a desperate attempt to save themselves from certain death by starvation.

Analysis of foreign currency revenues arriving at the Vinnytsia TORGSIN in 1932-1933 reveals a strong correlation between the intensification of famine among the ordinary population of Vinnytsia *oblast* in the period between the end of 1932 and the first half of 1933 and the sale of goods for peasant valuables. The dynamics of the activities of the Vinnytsia TORGSIN reveal the following pattern: during the fourth-quarter of 1932 all TORGSIN shops in the *oblast* issued goods to clients valued at 401,100 foreign currency karbovantsi, but as early as the first-quarter of 1933 the scale of issued goods reached 843,700 karbovantsi, that is, double the previous amount. During the second- and third-quarters (April-September) 1933 foreign currency receipts from the population totalled 1,307,000 “gold karbovantsi,” which was a more than threefold (3.3) increase over the fourth-quarter of the previous year.³² It was in the spring and early summer of 1933 that the residents of Vinnytsia *oblast* were experiencing the most acute food shortages and were forced to turn to the TORGSIN shops, but their reserve of valuables was well-nigh exhausted.

Research on the activities of the TORGSIN Association in Vinnytsia *oblast* in 1931-1935 thus demonstrates that in those years this specially created trade structure of Vneshtorg, the Soviet state foreign trade monopoly, under the leadership of A. Dunenman, A. Stepanov, A. Vinbrandt, V. Vanah, and K. Rokhlin, actively carried out the tasks of the VKP(B) with regard to extracting gold and currency valuables, silver items, diamonds, and antiques from the population. In less than four years of the Vinnytsia association's existence, nearly six million “gold rubles,” approximately two tons of domestic gold, and over twenty-five tons of silver and costly antique items and valuables were extorted from the starving population.³³

It should be noted that for peasants living during the period of the Holodomor the absence of a TORGSIN outlet would have exacerbated their plight, and perhaps several more hundreds of thousands of innocent

32. DAViO, fond R-498, list 1, file 32, fol. 130.

33. Calculated by the author on the basis of documents and other materials held by DAViO, fonds R- 485 and R-498.

people would have perished on top of the nearly one million victims of the famine in Vinnytsia *oblast*.³⁴ Therefore, despite the total amorality of this Soviet institution, it must be acknowledged that if TORGSIN had not existed, the national tragedy of the Ukrainian people would have been significantly amplified, thus leading to an even higher number of victims of this destructive genocide.

The creation of TORGSIN was not motivated by some desire of the Bolsheviks to provide relief to the starving populace. The Soviet government's iron logic was based on the principle that in order to achieve economic and political goals, all means were justified. And the goals were rapid industrialization and complete subordination of Soviet citizens. To achieve these goals they chose to ignore the lives of millions of Ukrainians for the sake of amassing foreign currency reserves by exporting grain and selling bread, meat, and vegetables to their citizens in exchange for their gold, silver, and dollars. By the will of the Bolshevik Party, the TORGSIN structure was turned into a tool for replenishing the state's gold currency reserves in order to carry out the gigantic project of industrialization and introduce a refined form of execution with regard to the Ukrainian peasantry during the process of collectivizing the countryside. TORGSIN's mission – to seize people's precious mementos down to the very last possession – was reflected in the myriad forms and methods of the activities pursued by this organization, which, in appraising the worth of a human life by several dozen grams of gold and silver, fully carried out its assigned task.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk

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svetarek@gmail.com>

34. V. I. Petrenko, *Bilshovytska Vlada ta ukrainske selianstvo u 20-30 rr. XX st.: prychny, tekhnolohii, naslidky Holodomoru-henotsydu (za materialamy Podillia)* (Vinnytsia: DP "Derzhavna kartohrafichna fabryka," 2008), p. 292.

Приложение А

С.С.С.Р.

Циркулярно

Не подлежит оглашению

Государственный Банк

К/О/А Госбанка

Правление

ОБ ОПЕРАЦИЯХ с “ТОРГСИН”ом

Госсектор О.И.О.

/по УИНО/

21 Октября 1931 г.

№ 437

По распоряжению НАРКОМВНЕШТОРГА на Всесоюзное Объединение по торговле с иностранцами “ТОРГСИН” возложена организация так называемой посылочной операции, заключающейся в том, что из-за границы в адрес “ТОРГСИН”а или его местных филиалов будут поступать переводы различных сумм в инвалюте или рублях, взамен которых “ТОРГСИН” должен будет выдавать указанным в этих переводах лицам набор товаров по прейскуранту “ТОРГСИН”а в количествах и ассортименте, согласно устанавливаемых “ТОРГСИН”ом правил. Развитию этой операции придается весьма серьезное значение, а потому является совершенно необходимым уделить этому делу должное внимание, поставив технику этой операции на такую высоту, которая содействовала бы успешному развитию этого дела, имеющего своей целью максимальное привлечение иностранной валюты.

В связи с этим подлежит иметь в виду следующее:

I. В конторы и Отделения Госбанка, которые получают непосредственные поручения от инкорреспондентов, будут поступать из-за границы переводы в адрес “ТОРГСИН”а с указанием лица, проживающего в СССР, которому “ТОРГСИН”ом должны быть выданы, взамен переведенной инвалюты, товары.

На сумму этих переводов немедленно по получении их Вами Вы должны выслать Внешторгбанку обычные кредит-авизо по М.Р.К для зачисления на счет Управления иностранных операций Торгсина-75/а, с указанием от кого поступил озвученный перевод, а также имя, фамилию и адрес, которому “ТОРГСИН” имеет выдать на переведенную сумму товар.

Если в В/городе имеется Отделение Торгсина, Вам надлежит одновременно, БЕЗ ЗАДЕРЖКИ СООБЩИТЬ О ПОСТУПАЮЩЕМ ПЕРЕВОДЕ МЕСТНОМУ ФИЛИАЛУ “ТОРГСИНА” с указанием

лица, в пользу которого сделан перевод в адрес этого лица. На основании этого сообщения филиал “ТОРГСИНА” произведет выдачу товара указанному в переводе лицу. В этих случаях в высылаемом ВНЕШТОРГБАНКУ кредит-авизо надлежит **ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬНО УКАЗЫВАТЬ**, что уведомление об этих переводах местному отд. “ТОРГСИНА” Вами послано, чем будут избегнуты возможные недоразумения или повторные выдачи “ТОРГСИНОМ” товаров по одному и тому же переводу.

2. Кроме поручений, указанных в п. 1-м, могут иметь место получения филиалами Госбанка от заграничных корреспондентов непосредственно или от Внешторгбанка, переводов приказу частных лиц. В отношении таких поручений следует в случае требований переводополучателей о перечислении поступивших для них сумм на сч. “ТОРГСИНА”:

а/ отобразить подпись на расписке в полной сумме перевода,

б/ принять от них соответствующее письменное заявление о перечислении суммы перевода или ее части на счет “ТОРГСИНА”.

И в том и в другом случае сумма перевода кредитруется филиалом Госбанка /по МКР/ Внешторгбанку. В зависимости от того, имеется ли в В/городе филиал “ТОРГСИНА”, Вы либо посылайте ему указанное в п. 1-м уведомление, либо при отсутствии филиала “ТОРГСИНА” сообщайте необходимые данные Внешторгбанку в кредитовой карточке. Порядок авизирования аналогичен п. 1.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ 1: Расписки переводополучателей отбирается Вами от последних по установленной Внешторгбанком или инокорреспондентом /соответственно/ форме.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ 2: Отобранные расписки отсылаются Вами Внешторгбанку если поручение сходило от этого Банка/ обязательно при кредитовой карточке, или заграничному корреспонденту в установленном порядке.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ 3: Авизование Вами близлежащего филиала “ТОРГСИНА”, при отсутствии такового в В/городе, не допускается.

3. Кроме перечисления на счет “ТОРГСИНА” по Внешторгбанку сумм по поступающим переводам, могут иметь также перечисления в следующих случаях:

а/ по требованию клиентов /как иностранцев, так и совграждан/ о списании сумм с их инвалютных текущих счетов в филиалах Госбанка для перечисления на счет “ТОРГСИН”а.

б/ по распоряжению владельцев авизованных или циркулярных аккредитов, выданных инокорреспондентами, в соответствии с имеющимся у Вас указанием о порядке выплат по аккредитивам.

в/ Суммы приобретаемых Вами или принимаемых на инкассо /после их инкассирования/ травеллеро чеков и банковских чеков, при наличии соответствующего распоряжения держателя чеков.

г/ Суммы приобретаемой Вами от частных лиц эффективной инвалюты при наличии требований этих лиц на перечисление сумм на счет "ТОРГСИН"а.

Указанные в п.-3 а, б, в, г, суммы перечисляются порядком, изложенным в параграфе 1 и 2 с тем лишь изменением, что суммы эти кредитуются на счету ВНЕШТОРГБАНКА по /М.К.Р./ для зачисления на счет "ТОРГСИН"а №-67/а.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: В целях правильного учета предлагается не помещать в одной кредитной карточке МКР сумм разных категорий, подлежащих зачислению на сет "ТОРГСИН"а №-75а и 67/а и другие литерные счета, на которых детализируется поступления различного происхождения для учета по инвалютному плану.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: к п.п. "б" и "в". При перечислении сумм на счет "ТОРСИНА" по циркулярным и авизорованным Вам акредитивам, если по ним не предусмотрена выплата эффективными, а также по покупаемым чекам, – надлежит из перечисляемой суммы удерживать комиссию, руководствуясь нижеследующей шкалой:

За выплату до \$50 комиссию – \$-50 цент.

свыше 50 до \$100 – \$1.

свыше 100 до \$300 – \$1,50.

свыше \$300 комиссия ½ % - минимум \$ 2.

Что касается Ветеранских чеков, то филиалам надлежит придерживаться инструкции, преподанной циркуляром от 11.VI-30 г. За №-Б/222, покупая эти чеки лишь в пределах до \$50 – каждый, при чем чеки свыше \$50 могут быть принимаемы только на инкассо. Перечисление сумм Ветеранских чеков на счет "ТОРСИНА" во Внешторгбанке за №-67а по требованию клиентов допускается лишь при соблюдении следующей шкалы:

По чекам от \$10-100 допускается перечес. н/сч. ТОРСИНА до 33%

свыше \$100-300 – до 30%

\$300-500 – до 24%

\$500-1500 – до 20%

\$1500-3000 – до 17%

\$3000-5000 – до 10%

\$5000 и выше – до 7%

но с тем, чтобы валютная цифра не превышала A[viso] \$700. Излишек сверх перечисленной суммы на "ТОРГСИН" выдается рублими.

Оформление перечислений этих сумм должно Вами производиться следующим образом: Ветеранские чеки до \$50 – принимаются Вами при соответствующем заявлении клиента, в коем должно быть указано: сумма, подлежащая перечислению на счет “ТОРГСИНА” /таковая не может превышать % предусмотренного шкалой/; 2/ имя, отчество, фамилия и адрес лица, коему “ТОРГСИН” имеет выдать товар; 3/ сумма, подлежащая выдаче ему рублями. По оплате рублевой суммы Вы высылаете Внешторгбанку дебетовую карточку на сумму стоимости чека, приложив последний и одновременно кредитовую карточку на сумму, перечисляемую на счет “ТОРГСИН”а №-67/а.

Принятые Вами на инкассо Ветеранские чеки при соответствующем Вашем письме высылаются Вами Внешторгбанку. Последний по оформлению кредитует счету “ТОРГСИН”а соответствующую сумму не свыше суммы, предусмотренной шкалой, а остальную сумму, за вычетом расходов, кредитует Вам в рублях для выдачи клиенту. */См. примечание.

По всем вопросам, которые будут у вас возникать в связи с применением данного циркуляра, надлежит обращаться непосредственно во Внешторгбанк, Москва 16, Неглинная 12.

За члена Правления Госбанка – /ГУРЕВИЧ/

За Директора УИНО – /САНДЛЕР/

Верно: Ответств. исполнитель Оргсектора ОИО – /КВАСКОВА/

* ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: Ветеранские чеки на канадские доллары должны рассчитываться по чековому курсу на канадские доллары.

Сокращения [Примечание редактора]:

К.О.А. – Комитет Общества Акционеров

О.И.О.: Отдел Иностранных Операций.

УИНО: Управлению Иностранными Операциями

Державний архів Вінницької області (ДАВіО). – Ф.Р-485, оп. 2, спр. 1, арк.. 105-108

Додаток Б

Постанова

Української республіканської експортної наради
Від 11 червня 1932 року
М. Харків

Слухали:

Про роботу Уповноваженого Всесоюзного об'єднання "ТОРГСИН"

Постановили:

1. Відзначити, що зростові торговельного обігу системи "ТОРГСИН" зовсім не відповідають організаційні форми роботи його апарату, в наслідок чого керівництво з боку Союзного Об'єднання "ТОРГСИН" периферійним апаратом і торговельними одиницями носило хаотичний характер.

2. Констатувати, що Правління "ТОРГСИН" затягувало остаточне розв'язання питання про організацію Всеукраїнської контори, безпосередньо керуючи обласними конторами й окремими торговельними одиницями.

3. В наслідок невмілого й безпланового керівництва, як з боку Союзного об'єднання "ТОРГСИН", так і його Українського представництва, апарат "ТОРГСИН'у" на Україні не забезпечував належного керівництва оперативною роботою системи, що призвело до засміченості апарату чужим елементом, масових зловживань, крадіжок та псування краму. Відсутність правильної організації торговельної мережі та її рівномірного навантаження, негнучка політика цін, неповне забезпечення сезонними товарами торговельних точок та невикористання продукції української промисловості й промкооперації, відсутність урахування місцевої кон'юнктури призвели до викривлення й дискредитації ролі та значення "ТОРГСИН'у", а також до затоварювання невідповідної якості та неходовим крамом.

4. Відзначити, що незважаючи на неодноразові вказівки з боку УпНКЗТ на неприпустимість установлених від Правління форм керівництва, на наявність злочинів і недоліків в роботі апарату "ТОРГСИН'у", а також на потребу прискорення організації Всеукраїнської контори, правління не вжило потрібних і достатніх заходів, щоб усунути ці недоліки та оздоровити роботу всієї системи "ТОРГСИН" на Україні.

5. Вважати, що УпНКЗТ також не проявив достатньої настирливості перед Правлінням Всесоюзного об'єднання "ТОРГСИН" і НКЗТ СРСР, щоб прискорити розв'язання всіх питань щодо поліпшення роботи системи "ТОРГСИН".

6. Взяти до відома заяву Уповноваженого “ТОРГСИН” тов. Перев’язко про те, що ним у зв’язку з наслідками ревізії НКЗТ СРСР та перевірки НК РСІ, знято з роботи керуючого Харківською конторою “ТОРГСИН” та що винних у безгосподарності та інших злочинах, що їх встановлено цією ревізією, як по Харківській конторі, так і по інших містах – притягнуто до відповідальності.

7. Взяти до відома заяву Голови Всесоюзного об’єднання “ТОРГСИН” тов. Скляра про те, що ним розв’язано позитивно питання, яке ще раніше порушувалось Уповноваженим “ТОРГСИН” про утворення Всесоюзної контори “ТОРГСИН”.

8. Констатувати безперервний зріст торговельного обігу “ТОРГСИН’у” і виконання ним валютного плану.

Водночас відзначити, що можливості в справі вилучення валюти, котрі планувалися передбаченими Правлінням Союзного “ТОРГСИН’у” були недораховані та що цей план можливо було значно перевиконувати.

9. Затвердити план надходжень валюти й золота по “ТОРГСИН’у” у 1932 р. в розмірі 18,5 млн. крб., проти плану 12 млн. крб., що його затверджено від Союзного Правління “ТОРГСИН’у”; планове завдання місцям визначити в розмірі 20 млн. крб., у зв’язку з чим збільшити торговельну мережу “ТОРГСИН’у” на Україні додатково на 15 філій по найбільш міцним пунктам України.

10. Взяти до уваги заяву Голови Союзного об’єднання “ТОРГСИН” тов. Скляра про те, що весь неходовий крам, який має “ТОРГСИН” по всіх склепах буде вилучено, та що, у відповідності до побільшеного плану обігу на 1932 рік, ним буде забезпечено завіз краму відповідної якості на всю суму обігу.

Доручити Уповноваженому “ТОРГСИН’у” підготувати заявку на цей крам та в декадний термін подати її до УпНКЗТ з наступним поданням до Правління Всесоюзного об’єднання “ТОРГСИН’у”.

Незалежно від цього просити Всесоюзне об’єднання “ТОРГСИН” негайно розпочати поповнення товарними фондами мережі “ТОРГСИН” на Україні.

11. Просити Правління Союзного “ТОРГСИН’у” в негайному порядку переглянути ціни на товари в напрямкові їх зниження на малоходові та надто високо оцінені товари.

12. Маючи на увазі надто недостатнє використання місцевих крамових ресурсів та, щоб реалізувати їх через систему “ТОРГСИН”, доручити УпНКЗТ, НКЛегпрому, НКПостачання, Вукооппромвиробспілці та НКВажпрому розробити питання про охоплення української продукції торговельним обігом “ТОРГСИН’у” та налагодження спеціального виготовлення високоякісної продукції для цього.

13. Зобов'язати обласні наради посилити керівництво та нагляд за роботою обласних контор “ТОРГСИН’у”, зокрема негайно допомогти в справі зміцнення його системи відповідальними керівними кадрами, а також одержати необхідні йому торговельні й склепові приміщення.

14. Просити НКПраці забезпечити систему “ТОРГСИН” необхідними кадрами спеціалістів прилавка, прийомщиками золота та рахівничими робітниками для його торговельних точок.

15. Зобов'язати Уповноваженого “ТОРГСИН’у” негайно ліквідувати викривлення у торговельному обслуговуванні, що мають місце по крамницях “ТОРГСИН’у” – черги, примусовий асортимент, брутальне поводження з покупцями, бруд в приміщеннях тощо.

УпНКЗТ через Облуповноважених встановити пильний нагляд за ліквідацією цих негативних явищ.

16. Відзначити незадовільний стан звітності та обліку краму на базах і в крамницях “ТОРГСИН’у”, запропонувати Уповноваженому “ТОРГСИН’у” звернути особливу увагу на усунення цих недоліків, зокрема, в місячний термін привести до ажура звітність по всій системі “ТОРГСИН’у” на Україні.

17. Взяти до відома заяву тов. Скляра про те, що портовим відділенням “ТОРГСИН’у” дозволяється проводити купівлю безпосередньо на ринках краму, який швидко псується (свіжі фрукти, овочі тощо) у тих випадках, коли цими продуктами не забезпечується потреби чужоземних пароплавів відповідними експортоб'єднаннями та заготівельними організаціями.

18. Пропонувати тов. Каттелю категорично настоювати перед НКЗТ СРСР про забезпечення мережі “ТОРГСИН’у” необхідним автотранспортом і моторними човнами, щоб обслуговувати його торговельні одиниці в містах та портах.

19. Надаючи виключної ваги роботі “ТОРГСИН’у” в портах, а також справі обслуговування інтуристів і переводоодержувачів, запропонувати УпНКЗТ негайно розробити конкретні заходи в напрямкові досягнення максимального валютного ефекту в цій галузі роботи “ТОРГСИН’у”.

20. Доручити УпНКЗТ порушити перед НКЗТ СРСР питання про передачу краму, що його конфіскується таможнями України, до системи “ТОРГСИН’у” для реалізації через його крамниці.

21. Доручити НК РСІ спільно з УпНКЗТ і Уповноваженим “ТОРГСИН’у” в десятиденний термін проробити питання:

а) про порядок встановлення цін на крам, що його реалізує мережа “ТОРГСИН’у”;

- б) порядок постачання системи “ТОРГСИН’у” крамом, планування крамообігу та зберігання краму по його крамницях і на склепах;
- в) порядок відпуску товарів, при якому було б забезпечено першочергове задоволення посилочних, переводних операцій та інтуристів.

Секретар УРЕН - Запорожець

Державний архів Вінницької області (ДАВіО) . – Ф.Р-498, оп. 3, спр. 8, арк. 7-9.

Додаток В

Коміт.
ЧЕРВОНОГО ХР.
08-32 г.
09/А

Не підлягає оголошенню

ДО ВСЕУКРАЇНСЬКОЇ КОНТОРИ ТОРГСІНУ

Як Вам відомо через Червоний Хрест УСРР більш як 300 громадян одержують щомісячно за допомогою нашого представництва в Америці грошову допомогу як від Американського Бюра Ветеранів, Департаменту Скарбниці та Канадського Військового Міністерства.

Останні півроку за погодженням з Валютним Сектором Наркомфіну ми надали можливість нашим претендентам одержувати по цих чеках крам через ТОРГСІН за відповідним оформленням в кожному окремому випадкові цієї видачі в Держбанкові.

Більшість претендентів мешкають на терені прикордону а саме: Шепетівці, Каменці та Проскуріві, але за повідомленням наших Комітетів Червоного Хреста претенденти в останній час відмовляються інкасувати свої чеки лише в зв'язку з тим, що В/філіях на місцях не видають харчових продуктів цим претендентам, в зв'язку з тим, що нібито є розпорядження, що по переказам Держбанку харчових продуктів не відпускають.

Маючи на увазі, що затримка в інкасуванні чеків нашими претендентами не дасть можливість одержати нам цю валюту за кордоном з одного боку, а з другого їх скарги до Американських установ можуть взагалі відбитися на наших взаємовідносинах, просимо Вас негайно дати розпорядження до всіх В/Філіялів щоб видавати претендентам Червоного Хреста по цим чекам харчові продукти.

Відповідь на цей лист просимо не затримувати.

Зам. Голови ЦК
Зав. Чуж. Сектором

/ЛІННІЧЕНКО/
/ЛЮДОВИЧ/

Згідно: підпис

Appendix A

USSR

By circularNot for publication

State Bank

K/O/A of the State Bank

[Executive] Board

ON OPERATIONS with "TORGSIN"

State Sector O.I.O.

/of UINO/

21 October 1931

№ 437

On the instructions of NARKOMVNESHTORG [People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade], TORGSIN, the All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners, is entrusted with organizing a so-called mail-order operation consisting of the following: remittances of various sums in foreign currencies or rubles that will be coming from abroad to TORGSIN or its local branches, in exchange for which TORGSIN will have to issue to the individuals indicated in these remittances a set of goods in keeping with TORGSIN's price list in quantities and an assortment corresponding to the regulations established by TORGSIN. Great importance is attached to the development of this operation, and therefore it is utterly crucial to pay the requisite attention to this matter, having placed the technology of this operation on such a level that would promote the development of this matter, whose goal is the maximum attraction of foreign currency.

In connection with this, the following should be kept in mind:

1. Remittances from abroad addressed to TORGSIN, with an indication of individuals living in the USSR, to whom TORGSIN will be obliged to issue goods in exchange for the remitted foreign currency, will arrive at the offices and Departments of Gosbank [State Bank], which receive direct orders from foreign correspondents.

For the sum of these remittances, immediately after your receipt of them, you must send Vneshtorgbank [Foreign Trade Bank] according to the MRK [Maximum Amount of Credit] the usual credit-tickets to be entered in the account of the Directorate of the Overseas Operations of TORGSIN 75/a, indicating from whom the given remittance has arrived, as well as the name, surname, and address [of the individual] to whom TORGSIN is to issue goods for the remitted sum.

If there is a TORGSIN Branch in your city, at the same time you must IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE LOCAL TORGSIN BRANCH ABOUT THE ARRIVING REMITTANCE, indicating the individual for whose

benefit the remittance is made for this individual. On the basis of this information, the TORGSIN branch will transact the issuance of goods to the individual indicated in the remittance. In these cases, in the credit-ticket sent to VNESHTORGBANK it is necessary TO INDICATE WITHOUT FAIL that notification of these remittances has been sent by you to the local TORGSIN dep[artment], so that possible misunderstandings or repeated distributions by TORGSIN of goods for one and the same remittance will be avoided.

2. In addition to the orders indicated in p[oint] 1, Gosbank branches may receive remittances of private individuals' orders directly from foreign correspondents or from Vneshtorgbank. With respect to such orders, in the event that remittance recipients request the remittal of sums on the TORGSIN account, it is necessary:

a) to take a signature for the receipt of the full sum of the remittance;

b) to accept from them a relevant written declaration about the remittal of the remitted sum or part of it on the TORGSIN account.

In both the first and second case, the sum of the remittance is credited by the Gosbank branch (according to the MRK) to Vneshtorgbank. Depending on whether there is a TORGSIN branch in your city, you either send a notification, as indicated in Paragraph 1, or, in the absence of a TORGSIN branch, you report the necessary data to Vneshtorgbank by means of a credit card. The order of advisement is analogous to Paragraph 1.

NOTE 1: Receipts from remittance recipients are collected by you in the form established by Vneshtorgbank or the foreign correspondent (in conformity).

NOTE 2: The collected receipts are sent by you to Vneshtorgbank if the order came from this Bank/ mandatory with a credit card or for a foreign correspondent in the established order.

NOTE 3: Notification by you of a nearby TORGSIN branch, in the absence of such in your city, is not permissible.

3. In addition to the remittal of sums connected to arriving remittances on the TORGSIN account through Vneshtorgbank, there may also be remittals in the following cases:

a) at the demand of clients (both foreigners and Soviet citizens) concerning the charge-off of sums from their foreign-currency current accounts in Gosbank branches to be entered on the TORGSIN account;

b) on the instructions of holders of direct or circular letters of credit issued by foreign correspondents, in keeping with the instructions at your disposal concerning the order of payments in keeping with letters of credit.

c) Sums acquired by you or accepted for encashment (after the cashing process), travelers' checks, and bank checks, if there are relevant instructions from the check holder.

d) The sums acquired by you from private individuals in a utilized foreign currency, if these individuals demand the remittal of sums on the TORGSIN account.

As indicated in Paragraph 3, [subsections] a, b, c, d, sums are remitted in the order set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2, the sole change being that the sums are credited according to (MRK) by VNESHORGANK to the TORGSIN account №-67/a.

NOTE: For the purposes of correct calculation, it is suggested not to record on one MRK credit card various categories of sums that are subject to being credited to TORGSIN №-75a and 67/a and other lettered accounts, in which incoming [remittances] of diverse provenance are listed in detail for accounting according to the foreign-currency plan.

NOTE RE: Paragraphs b and c. In entering sums on the TORGSIN account according to circular [letters] and letters of credit notifying you, if they do not envisage payment in valid foreign currencies, as well as by purchased checks, you must charge a commission on the remitted sum, governing yourselves according to the scale indicated below:

For payments under \$50, a commission of \$.50 (cents);

Over \$50 to \$100 – \$1;

Over \$100 to \$300 – \$1.50;

Over \$300, a commission of .5%, minimum of \$2.

As concerns veterans' checks, branches must abide by the instruction given in circular №-B/222 dated 11.VI-30, purchasing these checks only within the range of less than \$50 each, while checks over \$50 may be accepted only for encashment. On clients' demands, entering the sums of veterans' checks on the TORGSIN account №-67a in Vneshtorgbank is permissible only by observing the following scale:

For checks valued at \$10–\$100, up to 33% is permitted for entry on the TORGSIN account;

over \$100 up to \$300 – up to 30%

\$300–\$500 – up to 24%

\$500–\$1,500 – up to 20%

\$1,500–\$3,000 – up to 17%

\$3,000–5,000 – up to 10%

\$5,000 and higher – up to 7%

on condition that the currency figure does not exceed a notice of \$700. The excess over the sum entered on the TORGSIN account is issued in rubles.

You should carry out the paperwork on the remittals of these sums in the following manner: Veterans' checks up to \$50 are accepted by you upon the client presenting a relevant declaration, in which the following should be indicated: the sum subject to entry on the TORGSIN account (it cannot exceed the percentage stipulated by the scale); 2) name, patronymic, surname, and the address of the individual to whom TORGSIN is to issue goods; 3) the sum subject to its issuance to him in rubles. Following the payment of the ruble sum, you send Vneshtorgbank a debit card for the sum of the check's value, attaching the latter and simultaneously the credit card for the sum being entered on the TORGSIN account №-67/a.

Veterans' checks accepted by you for encashment, along with your relevant letter, are sent by you to Vneshtorgbank. According to the paperwork, the latter credits to TORGSIN a corresponding sum no higher than the sum stipulated by the scale, and the remaining sum, after deduction of expenses, credits you in rubles for issuance to the client.* (See note.)

With regard to all questions that may arise in connection with the application of the given circular, you must refer directly to Vneshtorgbank, Moscow 16, Neglinnaia [Street] 12.

For: Member of the Board of Gosbank (GUREVICH)

For: Director of UINO (SANDLER)

True: Resp[onsible] executor of the Organizational Sector of the OIO (KVASKOVA)

* NOTE: Veterans' checks in Canadian dollars should be paid out according to the check rate in Canadian dollars.

DAViO [State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast], fond R-485, list 2, file 1, fols. 105-8

Abbreviations [Editor's note]:

K.I.S.: K.O.A. Committee of the Shareholders' Society

O.I.O.: O.I.O.: Department of Foreign Operations

UINO: УИНО: Management of Foreign Operations

Translated from the Russian by Marta D. Olynyk

Appendix B

Resolution of the Ukrainian Republican Export Meeting [UREN] held on 11 June 1932 City of Kharkiv

Heard:

About the work of the Authorized Representative of the TORGSIN All-Union Association.

Resolved:

1. To note that the organizational forms of the work of its apparatus do not correspond at all to the growth of the trade turnover of the TORGSIN system, as a result of which the TORGSIN Union Association's direction of the peripheral apparatus and trade units was chaotic in nature.

2. To assert that the TORGSIN Management delayed the final resolution of the question concerning the organization of the All-Ukrainian office, directly controlling oblast offices and individual trade units.

3. As a result of inept and unplanned direction both on the part of the TORGSIN Union Association and its Ukrainian representation, the TORGSIN apparatus in Ukraine did not ensure the requisite management of the system's operational work, which led to the apparatus being plagued by a foreign element, mass abuses, thefts, and spoilage of merchandise. The lack of correct organization in the trade network and its balanced workload, inflexible pricing policy, partial supply of seasonal goods to trading points, and the non-exploitation of the products of Ukrainian industry and cooperatives, [and] the failure to reckon with the local situation led to the distortion and discreditation of TORGSIN's role and importance, as well as to the stocking of unmarketable merchandise of unsuitable quality.

4. To note that, despite the UpNKZT's [Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade] frequent indicators concerning the inadmissibility of the management forms established by the Management, the existence of crimes and shortcomings in the work of the TORGSIN apparatus, as well as the need to accelerate the organization of the All-Ukrainian office, the management did not apply necessary and adequate measures to eradicate these shortcomings and improve the work of the entire TORGSIN system in Ukraine.

5. To consider that the UpNKZT also failed to demonstrate sufficient persistence before the Board of the TORGSIN All-Union Association and the NKZT USSR in order to speed up the settling of all questions with regard to improving the work of the TORGSIN system.

6. To take note of the statement made by the Authorized TORGSIN Representative, Com[rade] Pereviazko, [to the effect] that, in connection with the results of the audit by the NKZT USSR and the verification by the NK RSI [People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection], he dismissed the head of TORGSIN's Kharkiv office, and that those guilty of mismanagement and other crimes which were established by this audit both at the Kharkiv office and in other cities have been called to account.

7. To take note of the statement made by the Head of the TORGSIN All-Union Association, Com[rade] Skliar, [to the effect] that he has positively resolved the question raised earlier by the Authorized TORGSIN Representative concerning the creation of an All-Union TORGSIN office.

8. To note the continuous growth of TORGSIN's trade turnover and its implementation of the currency plan.

At the same time, to note that the possibilities in the matter of confiscating currencies, which were planned as stipulated by the Management of the Union TORGSIN, were under-calculated and that it was possible to significantly overfulfill this plan.

9. To approve the plan for incoming currency and gold to TORGSIN in 1932 in the amount of 18.5 million karb[ovantsi] versus the plan calling for 12 million karb[ovantsi], which was confirmed by the TORGSIN Union Management; assign the planned task for local areas in the amount of 20 million karb[ovantsi], in connection with which the TORGSIN trade network in Ukraine is to be enlarged by 15 branches in the strongest points of Ukraine.

10. To take into consideration the statement made by the Head of the TORGSIN Union Association, Com[rade] Skliar, about the fact that all unmarketable merchandise that TORGSIN has in all shops will be removed and that, in keeping with the expanded turnover plan for 1932, it will ensure the delivery of goods of suitable quality for the entire sum of the turnover.

To instruct the Authorized TORGSIN Representative to prepare an order for this merchandise and within a ten-day deadline to submit it to the UpNKZT with the following presentation to the Management of the TORGSIN All-Union Association.

Irrespective of this, to request the TORGSIN All-Union Association to launch the immediate stocking of the TORGSIN network in Ukraine.

11. To request the Management of the Union TORGSIN to review without delay the prices of goods with the goal of reducing them with regard to goods in low demand and those that are priced too high.

12. Keeping in mind the markedly inadequate use of local merchandise resources and in order to sell them through the TORGSIN system, in-

struct the UpNKZT, NKLehprom [People's Commissariat of Light Industry], NKPostachannia [People's Commissariat of Supplies], Vukoop-prombyrobopilka [All-Ukrainian Cooperative Manufacturing Union], and NKVazhprom [People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry] to work on the question of encompassing Ukrainian production in TORGSIN's trade turnover and setting up the special manufacturing of high-quality production for this.

13. To oblige oblast sessions to strengthen the direction and supervision of the work of oblast-based TORGSIN offices; in particular, to render immediate assistance on the issue of strengthening its system by means of responsible leading cadres, as well as to obtain trade and shop premises that are indispensable to it.

14. To request the NKPratsi [People's Commissariat of Labor] to staff the TORGSIN system with indispensable cadres of salespeople-specialists, gold-receiving clerks, and bookkeepers for its trading points.

15. To oblige the Authorized TORGSIN Representative immediately to liquidate the distortions in trade service, which are occurring throughout TORGSIN shops – lineups, compulsory assortment [of goods], brutal treatment of shoppers, dirty premises, etc.

Through Authorized Oblast Representatives the UpNKZT is to establish close supervision over the eradication of these negative phenomena.

16. To note the unsatisfactory state of accountability and stock-taking at bases and in TORGSIN shops; to suggest that the Authorized TORGSIN Representative pay special attention to eliminating these shortcomings, in particular, within one month to bring accountability up to date throughout the entire TORGSIN system in Ukraine.

17. To be informed about the statement made by Com[rade] Skliar [to the effect] that TORGSIN's ports division are permitted to carry out the purchase, directly from markets, of merchandise that spoils quickly (fresh fruits, vegetables, etc.) in those cases where these products are not used to supply foreign steamships's needs by relevant export associations and procurement organizations.

18. To propose that Com[rade] Kattel categorically insist to the NKZT USSR about supplying the TORGSIN network with indispensable motor transport and motorized boats in order to service its trading units in cities and ports.

19. In giving exclusive weight to TORGSIN's work in ports as well as to the issue of servicing foreign tourists and remittance recipients, to propose that the UpNKZT immediately draft concrete measures with the goal of achieving the maximum currency effect in this branch of TORGSIN's work.

20. To order the UpNKZT to raise before the NKZT USSR the question of transferring merchandise that is being confiscated by customs offices of Ukraine to the TORGSIN system to be sold through its shops.

21. To order the NK RSI, along with the UpNKZT and the Authorized TORGSIN Representative, to carry out the following questions within ten days:

a) concerning the order of setting prices for merchandise that is sold by the TORGSIN network;

b) the order of supplying the TORGSIN system with merchandise, the planning of goods turnover, and the storage of merchandise in its shops and vaults;

c) the order of releasing goods, whereby the top-priority satisfaction of mail-order, remittance operations, and foreign tourists would be ensured.

Secretary of the UREN – Zaporozhets

DAViO [State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast], fond R-498, list 3, file 8, fols. 7-9.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk

Appendix C

Red Cross Committee
August 1932
09/A

Not for publication

TO THE ALL-UNION TORGSIN OFFICE

As you are aware, each month more than 300 citizens receive cash assistance from the U.S. Veterans Bureau, the Treasury Department, and the Canadian Military Ministry [*sic*] through the Red Cross of the Ukrainian SSR, with the help of our mission in America.

In the last half-year, in coordination with the Currency Sector of the Narkomfin [People's Commissariat of Finance], we have granted the opportunity to our claimants to obtain merchandise through TORGSIN with these checks, with the proper paperwork in each individual case of this issuance in the State Bank.

The majority of the claimants live in the border area, specifically: Shepetivka, Kamianets[-Podil's'kyi], and Proskuriv [now Khmelnytsky], but according to a communiqué from our Red Cross Committees, in recent times the claimants are refusing to cash their checks simply because your local branches are not issuing food products to these claimants, in connection with the fact that there is allegedly a directive stating that food products are not issued in exchange for State Bank remittances.

Keeping in mind that the delay in cashing checks by our claimants will not give us the opportunity to obtain this currency abroad, on the one hand, and on the other, their complaints to [North] American institutions may affect in general mutual relations, we are requesting you to issue immediate instructions to all your Branches to issue food products for these checks to Red Cross claimants.

We request that the response to this letter not be delayed.

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Deputy Head of the C[entral] C[ommittee] | (LINNICHENKO) |
| Director of the For[eign] Sector | (YUDOVYCH) |
| In conformity: | signature |

DAViO [State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast], fond R -485, list 2, file 8, fol. 88

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk

VOLODYMYR PETRENKO,

MASS REPRESSIONS AGAINST THE PEASANTRY OF PODILLIA IN 1927-1928

As the NEP was drawing to a close, the decisions of party meetings and directive documents issued by Bolshevik party leaders intensified political and economic pressure, first of all on the peasantry. This is no surprise, since the industrialization of the USSR was supposed to be accomplished at the expense of the countryside.

In December 1927 the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(B)) adopted the first Five-Year-Plan of national economic development for 1928-1933, and announced the course toward the total collectivization of agriculture.¹ All these cardinal decisions were taken simultaneously because the implementation of the grandiose five-year industrial plans was impracticable without increasing the export of grain and acquiring foreign currency, technical equipment, etc.

The Bolshevik state planned to obtain the necessary quantity of cheap grain from the submissive collective farms.

At this time, the systematic implementation of the state grain deliveries exacerbated the relations between peasant owners and the state and led to a grain crisis, as the plans were not completed. Peasants had no grain surpluses, or only had them in limited quantities.

The shortage of grain for export led to a permanent increase in the tasks connected with the plan, and the intensification of repressive measures during the grain procurments.

On 14 December 1927, while the VKP(b) congress was still in session, the Central Committee (TsK) issued a directive to secretaries of district [*okruha*] party committees, emphasizing the crucial need to accelerate the state grain deliveries. Ten days later, this directive was followed on 24 December by another one, but in no way did it alter the situation.²

On 6 January 1928 the TsK VKP(b) circulated another directive, stamped "Secret" and signed personally by Stalin, secretary of the TsK VKP(b), which demanded, in a threatening tone, decisiveness in the im-

1. *KPRS v rezolutsiiah i rishenniakh z' izdiv, konferentsii i plenumiv TsK* (Kyiv: Politvydav, 1980), 4: 11.

2. State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Vinnytskoi oblasti; hereafter DAVO), fond P-29, list 1, file 378, fol. 7

plementation of the state grain delivery policy and the achievement of a significant breakthrough. Point 4 of this directive stated:

During the recovery of arrears of various sorts of payments, immediately institute a harsh penalty, first of all toward the kulaks. Repressive measures are especially indispensable in relation to kulaks and speculators, who are sabotaging agricultural prices. . . . The TsK is warning you that delays in carrying out this directive and the failure to achieve real successes within a week's time will place the TsK before the necessity to replace current leaders of party organizations.³

The intensification of the state grain requisitions caused great dissatisfaction and protests among the population because, in addition to the grain deliveries, they not only had to fulfill the plans pertaining to the agricultural tax, self-taxation, loans for industrialization, state insurance, and "expert" taxation, but also to finance land reapportionment, make target investments in savings banks, and pay the cartage tax (*trud-guzhnalog*), etc.⁴

GPU memoranda "On the Moods among Individual Groups in the Countryside in Connection with the Self-Taxation Campaign," which were sent to the secretary of the Vinnytsia district committee of the KP(b)U for January 1928, reported that speeches delivered during rural meetings featured the following content:

Self-taxation is being imposed on us by force. . . . In newspapers they write one thing, that 35 percent must be taken, but in practice this is not the way it is at all; we are being fleeced; one cannot live under such rules, in this kind of situation it is impossible to strengthen your farm, and the population will remain forever poor. . . . What is this – tax, insurance, self-taxation, loans? Is this not preparation for war? . . . We have no reason to tax ourselves, let the state tax us. . . . The Soviet government is stripping seven skins from us. . . . Self-taxation is like a knife in the heart. . . . They're always taking and taking; we'll have to grab our sawed-off shotguns. . . .⁵

But, despite the worsening relations between the state and the peasantry, the Bolshevik leadership continued to implement its forced grain

3. *Ibid.*

4. V. Petrenko, *Bilshovytska vlada ta ukrainske selianstvo u 20–30-kh rr XX st.: prychny, tekhnolohii, naslidky Holodomoru-henotsydu (za materialamy Podillia)* (Vinnytsia: DP "DKF," 2008), pp. 89-90.

5. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 373, fols. 48-51.

procurement policy. In the second half of January 1928 members of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) dispersed throughout the country in order to help speed up the process of resolving the crisis of grain procurement. Stalin went to Siberia, where he began putting into practice his own "Ural-Siberian" state grain delivery method that was later implemented throughout the country. This method was based on the principle of forcible implementation of state grain delivery plans with the use of repressions.

The peasants of Ukraine's Podillia region also experienced the effects of this method. On 20 January Marchenko, the secretary of the Tulchyn district party committee, wrote a letter to Kaganovich, the secretary of the TsK KP(b)U, in which he declared: "After launching the accelerated development of the state grain deliveries in the month of January, we immediately implemented a number of harsh repressive measures. . . . Twenty-two people were arrested, [and] fifteen people from whom grain was confiscated were sentenced. We began to carry out these measures at our risk and peril because there was no precise and clear-cut legal guideline."⁶

As a result of these repressive actions, the introduction of the element of extra-economic duress into the state grain delivery policy facilitated the procurement, by January 1928, of 29 million poods of grain instead of the planned 25 million. The delivery plan in Ukraine was fulfilled by 116 percent.⁷ However, this action destroyed the grain market, sowed uncertainty, and exacerbated the domestic political situation. Rumors began spreading throughout the countryside about the abolition of the New Economic Policy and the restoration of food apportionment (*prodrazkladka*).⁸ As a result, the peasants had no desire to have anything to do with state government bodies and state grain procurement organizations, and reduced their sowing efforts. They divided their farms among family members and headed to the cities in search of work.

The switch to extra-economic grain procurement methods was accompanied by the mobilization of party activists, which came to resemble the Civil War period. On 28 January district party committees received a directive marked "Secret" from Kaganovich, with the following remark:

6. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 772, fols. 66-70.

7. Central State Archive of Civic Associations of Ukraine (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy; hereafter TsDAHOU), fond 1, list 20, file 2778, fol. 1

8. In Russian *prodrazverstka* – confiscation of surplus foodstuffs practiced during War Communism (1919-1921). Ed. note.

An employee who was being dispatched to a *raion* was at one and the same time an agent for levying the agricultural tax and state insurance, an agitator for urging loans to the state and carrying out self-taxation; an employee who stimulated grain delivery and was a grain procurer. Of course, such a combination of tasks could not help but adversely affect the implementation of the main task of the day – direct work on the state grain deliveries. In order to eliminate this shortcoming, the TsK demands the immediate selection of a group of responsible workers familiar with the grain issue (from 25 to 75 people), depending on the vigor of leading district activists, who should be assigned exclusively to the grain procurement work.⁹

According to incomplete data, in January-March 1928 alone nearly 6,000 district, city, *raion*, and small town party workers were mobilized in Ukraine and dispatched to the countryside in order to speed up the state grain deliveries.¹⁰

Even as the grain delivery plan for January was surpassed with the help of forcible means, while the crisis in state grain procurement was reaching its apogee, the Bolshevik regime continued to press for a “decisive breakthrough on the grain procurement front and for the expansion of the planned tasks.

On 13 February party organizations received a directive from the Politburo, signed by Stalin, in which the Leader insisted on stepping up the state grain deliveries, recommended the application of Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding article in the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (127), which permitted the use of repressions against the peasantry. In order to encourage the poorer strata to become involved in this affair, Stalin indicated the need to give them 25 percent of the confiscated grain “surplus” on long-range credit terms.¹¹

In connection with the policy of encouraging poor peasants with the distribution of 25 percent of the confiscated grain, the bureau of the Vinnytsia district committee of the KP(b)U adopted a similar resolution on 2 July 1928, marked “Top Secret.” It stated: “Order the [Party] fraction of the District Executive Committee to issue a directive to rural soviets to accelerate work on state grain delivery. . . . Once again confirm with a resolution of the bureau [the directive] to leave in the countryside 25 percent of the grain confiscated from kulaks for the needs of the poorer segment of peasants.”¹²

9. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 378, fol. 94.

10. TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 20, file 2770, fol. 4

11. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 378, fols. 121-23.

12. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 369, fol. 17.

This resolution was preceded by a resolution passed by the TsK KP(b)U on 17 February.¹³ It should be recalled that by no means was this a new measure for the Bolsheviks, who had introduced the compulsory food apportionment policy back in 1920, according to which between 10 and 25 percent of grain were left in *volost* granaries for the needs of the proletarianized strata in the countryside. This was supposed to ensure that the village poor would support the grain confiscation campaign. In his telegram to Stalin in Kharkiv, Lenin praised the adoption of this measure in Ukraine during the course of the compulsory state grain deliveries.¹⁴

Thus, the policies that the Bolshevik leadership introduced towards the end of 1927 and the first months of 1928 set into motion a radical breakdown of economic relations in the countryside. Without officially changing its political course, the government abandoned the market relations of the NEP period and reverted to “war communism” and to forcible food apportionment. This policy was based on violence and repressions, which drained the Ukrainian peasantry of its resources and soon led to tragic consequences.

In implementing Stalin’s decisions, state power structures and local party and executive government bodies began with increasing regularity to institute punitive-repressive measures against those peasants who were unable to fulfill the huge state requisitions: fines, increases to the amounts of self-taxation, the inventorying and confiscation of property, arrests, lengthy prison terms, and deportation.

In connection with this, memoranda issued in March 1928 by GPU district divisions generally discuss the acute worsening of the peasants’ standard of living and their readiness to fight the government. In letters to Red Army soldiers, peasants living in Dzhulyn *raion*, Tulchyn district, wrote:

This year they are simply robbing for the tax; they are inventorying everything that a farmstead has and taking away the last pillows out of the house. Above all, they are robbing for non-fulfillment of self-taxation. . . . It is so difficult that it is better to die. You paid the tax, 80 r[ubles]; self-taxation, 40 r[ubles]; for land management, 32 r[ubles]; stocks, 20 r[ubles]; and, in addition, there is also state insurance, and whoever does not fulfill them, they take away the cattle or put you in prison. . . . Three thousand stocks arrived; without a receipt for their purchase it is impossible to grind a single pood any-

13. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 378, fol. 143.

14. *V. I. Lenin pro Ukrainu* (Kyiv: Derzhpolitvydav USRR, 1957), p. 636.

where. Everywhere people are saying: give us war or we are turning back to 1918.¹⁵

Despite everything, during the year in question local party leaders' attitudes to the outrages being inflicted on the peasantry during the implementation of the Soviet government's state grain delivery policy were far from uniform. Realizing that they were witnessing the destruction of agriculture, middle- and low-ranking administrative personnel frequently wrote letters to secretaries of the TsK VKP(b) and the KP(b)U, arguing the impossibility of fulfilling the increased target plans. On 5 and 17 April 1928 Marchenko, the secretary of the Tulchyn district party committee, wrote to Kaganovich, secretary of the TsK KP(b)U, in which he emphasized:

In April we should procure 230,000 poods, as much as in March – this proposition is absolutely hopeless. . . . Until this time we were fulfilling the targets of the state grain procurement plan, but now, no matter what you do to us, we are saying that we are not able to do this. Therefore, we are asking [you] to reduce our plan to 100,000 poods, which will also be extraordinarily difficult for us to complete. . . . The preponderant majority of peasants have between 20 and 40 poods left. . . . It would be absurd to take administrative measures against such grain holders as are in our midst, and we are not permitting this. . . . Once more we declare that the complete fulfillment of the plan is impossible.¹⁶

Moreover, Marchenko sent a circular to *raion* party committees, which reads in part:

To all *raion* party committees. Secret. It is proposed, without decreasing attention to the state grain deliveries, under no circumstance to institute methods of administrative-forcible confiscation of grain from the peasants. Unquestionably, this does not signify a refusal to apply to kulaks Art. 127, when considerable grain surpluses and speculation with them are found. Keeping in mind that the practice of searching for grain very often leads to the discovery of only small supplies of grain, this attests to the fact that our comrades are implementing this practice without sufficient verification of information about grain surpluses. And therefore we consider it essential to remind you that a search for grain is to be carried out only in cases

15. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 706, fols.12-14.

16. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 772, fols. 61-62.

where you will be certain that there is grain and that this farmstead is truly a kulak one.¹⁷

But, despite the catastrophic state of agriculture, the joint plenum of the TsK and the TsKK VKP(b) held in April 1928 declared:

In order to paralyze the threat of a general economic crisis and to ensure not only the supply of grain to cities, but also to maintain the country's industrialization tempos adopted by the party, the TsK should adopt a number of measures, including one of an extraordinary nature. The immediate goal of these measures is the confiscation of part of rural accumulations in monetary form . . . the application of article 107, the distribution of 25 percent of the confiscated grain to the rural poor . . . the party's intervention in the task of grain procurement and the mobilization from top to bottom of party forces for the successful completion of the state grain delivery campaign.¹⁸

The plenum ratified the exemption of 35 percent "of weak farms from the agricultural tax as one of the most important achievements of recent years" and an increased the agricultural tax for other village strata.¹⁹

Thus, during the class stratification in the Ukrainian countryside, undertaken by the Bolshevik power in the 1920s, the number of poor peasants rose significantly, to reach no less than 35 percent of the rural population, and in the majority of villages in the Mohyliv-Podilsky district of Podillia, the figure rose to 72 percent²⁰ due to systematic requisitions (in the early 1920s the percentage of poor peasants in Podillia gubernia mainly stood at 12-15 percent and never rose above 17 percent).²¹ Exempted from taxes and encouraged by the distribution of grain confiscated from their fellow villagers, the majority of the lumpenized army of poor peasants, who were quite often in a state of semi-starvation, was ready to carry out the plans of the Stalinist regime.

At this time, the above-mentioned party resolutions indicated that the state grain delivery campaigns would only intensify.

On 25 April 1928 the TsK VKP(b) circulated a directive ordering the unswerving implementation of the monthly state grain delivery plans for May and June, as well as loading and shipping according to instructions

17. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 677, fol. 83.

18. *KPRS v rezoliutsiakh i rishenniakh*, 4: 73.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

20. DAVO, P-31, list 1, file 384, fol. 18.

21. S. Stepanchuk, "Dyferentsiatsiia selian Ukrainy shchodo ikh hospodarskoi spromozhnosti v umovakh Novoi ekonomichnoi polityky," *Naukovi zapysky VDPU im. Kotliubynskoho*, no. 2 (Vinnytsia: DP "DKF," 2000), p. 132.

issued by the People's Commissariat of Trade [*Narkomtorg*]. This directive also called for the mobilization of party forces for the completion of the state grain deliveries, brutal punishment for violations of the single state grain delivery front, and the intensification of pressure on "kulaks."

Lazar Kaganovich, secretary of the TsK KP(b)U, immediately issued this same directive on the republican level, ordering the government (headed by Vlas Chubar) and M. Chernov, the head of Ukraine's Commissariat of Trade, to adopt it for "unswerving implementation." The Ukrainian Economic Council and the *Narkomtorg* were also instructed to curtail the domestic consumption of grain in the republic. As a result, a critical grain situation arose in local areas.²²

In their turn, the republican organs of justice and the courts sent a circular to district committees of the KP(b)U, with the goal of enshrining the violent grain delivery policy in law; the latter forwarded it to *raion* party committees. The contents of the May circular, which was signed by district prosecutor Nelson and the head of the district court Krasnov, and sent to the Tulchyn district committee of the KP(b)U, was as follows:

Top secret with regard to the state grain delivery. To all People's Investigators, heads of raion militia divisions, and People's Courts. . . . Conditions demand a number of measures, which, in the coming months of the completion of the state grain delivery campaign (May-June), should be the main core of the activities of organs of justice, the GPU, and the militia. It is proposed: 1) Immediately to complete the inquiry and investigation (case based on art. 127 and 135 of the C[riminal] C[ode]) and hear them immediately in courts; 2) To expose kulaks and speculators in the countryside that are maliciously concealing grain . . . ; 4) Individuals indicated in the preceding points are to be held for criminal prosecution within a three-day period . . . ; 5) The grain found among the indicated individuals is to be sent as material evidence to responsible state and cooperative organizations . . . ; 6) Attention is drawn to the need to strictly apply repressions . . . ; 10) Heads of raion militia divisions and People's Investigators . . . are to inform the Prosecutor's Office about every case connected to the state grain deliveries. . . . The People's Courts are to examine such cases outside the regular schedule. . . . By 12 May it is mandatory to send copies of verdicts based on art. 127 and 135 to the Separate Prosecutor's Office.²³

22. Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Government and Administration of Ukraine (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia: TsDAVOU), fond 1, list 20, file 2771, fol. 59.

23. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 677, fols. 60-61.

As a result of the systematic monthly increase of the state grain delivery plans for Ukraine (the plan for April called for 15 million poods, and 17 million for May),²⁴ crop failure (25 percent of the winter wheat froze in the Podillia region),²⁵ the legalization of the grain requisitions, and the curtailment of grain supplies for domestic consumption, an increasing number of reports of famine in villages and cities of various districts began to arrive at district party committees.

In May 1928 the Vinnytsia district committee of the KP(b)U received a report from the GPU entitled "About the Political Situation in the Zhmerynka sector *luchastokl*, which contained the following information:

The grain crisis is felt throughout the railway sector and the adjacent 15-verst zone. . . . The grain shortage situation is distressing the working masses. . . . There is mass dissatisfaction among the employees with the lack of an indispensable quantity of grain; everyone is talking about a famine. . . . In the village of Yurkivka, Tulchyn district, the peasants are against the Soviet power, and in other villages poor peasants are experiencing starvation. In villages people are saying that the Soviet power is robbing the peasants. They have taken away all the grain and given it away abroad.²⁶

In June the Tulchyn district GPU division reported the following:

In the city of Haisyn on 2 June a crowd numbering 300-400 people appeared at the building of the *raion* executive committee with shouts of "Give us bread." . . . In the village of Tarasivka leaflets with the following content were hung near the reading room: "The steamship is sailing past the pier, we will feed the little fish with communists." . . . In Bershada *raion* the secretary of the *raion* executive committee is receiving the following notes: "Where are you sending our bread; our cattle is dying from hunger; we too are starving." . . . In Tomashpil *raion* the peasants are saying that it has become more difficult to live than in the hungry years; there is not a single piece of bread; the Soviet power has organized an artificial famine. . . . In Tulchyn *raion* the militia is dispersing starving people lining up for bread; in the lineups people are claiming that the government is continuing to ship

24. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 768, fol. 67.

25. DAVO, fond P-31, list 1, file 388, fol. 31.

26. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 373, fols. 99-106.

grain abroad while we are starving here. . . . A significant reaction to the grain shortage is being felt among teachers in Soboliv *raion*.²⁷

In July the secretary of the Vinnytsia district committee of the KP(b)U received a memorandum from the district GPU division, stating:

According to intelligence reports, the majority of the population of the village of Bahrynivtsi, Lityn *raion*, approximately 300 farms, has absolutely no grain and is expressing dissatisfaction with the fact that during the state grain deliveries 10,000 poods were shipped out of the village. . . . Poor peasants told Sakevych, a member of the board of the Bahrynivtsi cooperative: "We will beat you up and take all the grain from the cooperative. Why should we swell up from starvation?"²⁸

Special reports of the Vinnytsia district GPU division for the first six months of 1928 attest to the escalating grain crisis and the worsening food situation in the region:

Already in early spring letters began arriving about the insufficient supply of grain to the village poor. In the last few days alone we have received information from a whole number of villages: Sloboda (Khmilnyk *raion*), Dashiv (Illintsi *raion*), Sosny (Lityn *raion*), Bondurivka and Marianivka (Nemyriv *raion*). . . . From Obodivka they are writing that 300 people need flour. . . . People fight during the distribution of grain at the cooperative. In the words of rural correspondents, poor peasants who have nowhere to get bread are starving. . . . The government has extracted the grain without reckoning with the needs of the countryside, and now we have famine.²⁹

Ignoring the cautioning information sent by functionaries of party and power structures about the emerging mass starvation, the highest party organs of power continued to pursue the Stalinist course and the forcible grain confiscations.

In the past, the Bolshevik government had used the compulsory contract system (*kontraktatsiia*), which was economically disadvantageous to the peasants, who were obliged to sign a contract compelling them to give the state part of the harvest of specific types of grain, sugar beets, meat, and other food products. This measure forced the peasants to give away

27. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 772, fols. 73-75.

28. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 373, fol. 115.

29. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 373, fols. 222-23.

their harvest straight from their fields. This is specified in a directive issued on 10 July 1928 by Ostrovsky, secretary of the Vinnytsia district committee of the KP(b)U:

Top secret. To all *raion* party committees. Considering that this year the winter and spring were very unfavorable in the steppe districts, owing to which a large proportion of the winter crop perished, and also that we have already taken a considerable amount of grain surpluses from the countryside, this situation decisively puts the party and the Soviet power before the question of the urgent procurement of winter crop seeds. . . . With this goal in mind, a rural cooperation campaign will begin right away for concluding agreements with collectives, land communities, and peasants with the object of signing a purchasing contract for the harvest of winter crops on the stock.³⁰

Even though the grain crops had not yet ripened and the harvest had not even begun, the peasants were already being compelled to sign the crushing terms of a contract for the future harvest, thereby dooming them to starvation. The directive concludes with a warning to *raion* party committees that the harvested grain must be delivered to the state no later than according to the contracted terms.³¹

The government's switch to the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry sparked resistance not only among the peasants and some local party leaders. Among the top ranks of the government were opposition forces that were prepared to defend the NEP and the main grain producers in the state.

The members of the so-called "right" opposition – Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky – succeeded in doing everything in order to ensure the passage on 19 July of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, entitled "On Carrying out the Deliveries of Grain from the New Harvest (1928)." The resolution demanded the following:

- 1) To prohibit the application of all kinds of extraordinary measures and to order all government bodies: a) immediately to suspend all measures concerning the forcible confiscation of grain from the peasantry, as e.g., making the rounds and conducting searches for the purpose of confiscating grain surpluses, extrajudicial arrests, and other exactions and prosecutions of peasants for delaying the release of grain on the market, etc.; b) to put an immediate stop to all manner of prohibitive measures with regard to bazaars and internal rural turn-

30. DAVO, fond P-58, list 1, file 105, fol. 91.

31. *Ibid.*

over, like, e.g., the closure of grain bazaars, the installation of barrage detachments, forcing peasants who have brought grain to bazaars to sell it to state or cooperative organizations, etc.³²

The conflict raging in the highest party leadership further exacerbated the situation in the country. Its essence lay, first and foremost, in the attitude to the introduction of the forcible, all-out collectivization of agriculture. The economic links between the city and the independent farming village could be built only through the market, with the peasants themselves deciding whether or not to sell their products to the state. However, this absolutely did not suit Stalin and his associates, who wanted to collectivize the countryside in the shortest period of time and switch to extra-market relations, in which the mechanism for safeguarding at least an approximately equal exchange between the city and the countryside automatically disappeared.

The alienation of the means of production in the form of collectivization also entailed the alienation of each individual toiler from collectively generated production. In this situation, both the means of production and agricultural production were managed by the head of a collective farm (board) who was responsible for its direction. Through direct administrative influence on this head, the government itself decided how much production to leave in order to meet the needs of the collective farm workers (or whether to leave any at all) and how much to requisition for the centralized fund.

In destroying market principles in the countryside during the forcible state grain deliveries and ruining prosperous peasants, the Soviet government was fully aware of the fact that only an impoverished and starving peasantry brought to the brink of despair would become more submissive and thereby be forced to join the collective farms.

Therefore, the Stalinist regime's adoption of a repressive grain requisition policy in the countryside was not just a response to the needs of industrialization. The grain requisitions were also politically motivated, and were aimed at the fundamental destruction of the farming system, the introduction of total collectivization, and, as a result, the emergence of submissive collective farm workers who were ready to build a communist society together with the proletariat. The Stalinists had no desire to remain dependent on rebellious, "petty bourgeois" village producers.

An immense number of documents, stored at the State Archive of Vinnytsia *Oblast* (DAVO), attest to the famine which continued to rage in

32. *Zbirnyk zakoniv ta nakaziv Robitnycho-Selianskoho Uriadu SRSR, 1928 r.*, art. 400.

Podillia, in the second half of 1928. Memoranda sent by district sections of the GPU to district committees of the KP(b)U announced:

Top secret. Whereas earlier anti-Soviet protests during the implementation of the self-taxation campaign were staged by kulaks, at the present moment we are observing mass peasant protests in connection with the grain crisis. These are attested by such facts (statements by peasants): "Last year the harvest was not bad. There is grain in Ukraine. Where is our grain disappearing? Our cattle are starving to death. We too are starving. . . . It has become more difficult for peasants to live than during the hungry years [of 1921-23]. I do not have a single piece of bread and my cattle are starving to death. At the bazaar it is impossible to get even a single pound of bread because the government confiscated and shipped out all the grain. And not just from me but from all the peasants. . . . The government is shipping the grain abroad, but we are croaking from hunger here. In Odesa grain is being loaded onto steamships. And we have been left without bread. . . . The Soviet government is organizing an artificial famine. Everywhere there are lineups of starving people and the militia is chasing them away. . . . The communists are bringing the country to devastation and famine; we peasants must put an end to this. Representatives of the *raion* executive committee will keep on coming to us until such time as we grab scythes and pitchforks and chase them out of the village."³³

The complex food situation in Ukraine was discussed at the TsK KP(b)U plenum held in Kharkiv on 1-5 November. Hryhorii Petrovsky, head of the VUTsVK, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, expressed some concern. Reproaching some leaders for unreliable data on Ukraine's possibilities in state grain delivery, which had been sent to Viacheslav Molotov, he expressed the fear that now another emissary from the TsK VKP(b), Anastas Mikoian, might receive the same kind of information. The Ukrainian elder politician declared that no one was in a hurry to tell him, like Molotov in his time, about the real difficulties; about the famine in the villages and cities of Ukraine.³⁴

But, what could Petrovsky do when the budget of Ukraine with its 30-million-strong population stood at only 500 million karbovantsi [rubles] in 1928, the equivalent of the Moscow Gubernial Council's budget?³⁵

33. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 706, fols. 65-67, 77.

34. TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 1, file 306, fol. 35.

35. *Komunist*, 1928, p. 284.

In general, the Ukrainian government recognized its helplessness in organizing relief for its starving population, on the one hand, but on the other, it demonstrated its readiness to continue putting repressive pressure on the countryside and, in fact, used the famine as a way of drawing the peasants into new agrarian relations.

Instead of effective assistance to the starving, on 29 November 1928 district committees in Ukraine received a telegram personally certified by Stalin, which stated:

The state grain delivery campaign is the most important economic political campaign. . . . The TsK and the SNK are directing attention to the fact that November and December are the decisive months for the entire state grain delivery campaign, and the completion of the designated annual plan of the centralized grain procurements can be ensured only on condition that procurements are carried out in November and December. The TsK and the SNK propose: 1) To step up the implementation of all measures connected with the extraction of cash from peasant farms. . . . To confiscate agricultural insurance payments, hold trials in connection with agricultural credits. . . . Adopt all measures that would guarantee the reinforcement of the collection in the countryside of loans for industrialization. . . . At all costs, complete the designated annual state grain delivery plan.³⁶

In the fall of 1928 *raion* troikas appeared, endowed with special and unlimited authority, and with the task of facilitating the state grain deliveries.³⁷ This was the logical finale that culminated in the introduction of "military-communist" methods for carrying out the state grain deliveries.

Against the background of declarations about strengthening the political alliance with the peasantry, the Soviet government began curbing the influence of middle- and well-to-do peasants on farming life. The escalation of administrative pressure on the peasant masses produced the first "positive" results: in October 1928 the number of collective farms in Ukraine rose to 73,000.³⁸ However, at this point they were still economically weak, and from the social point of view composed of poor peasants. The percentage of collective farms with alienated means of production and cattle was very small.

36. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 380, fols. 229-30.

37. V. Loskutov, "Istoricheskaiia ontologiia marksizma," in *Marksizm i Rossiia* (Moscow: Institut filosofii i prava, 1990), p. 5.

38. V. Danylenko, G. Kasianov, and S. Kulchytskyi, *Stalinizm na Ukraini: 20-30-ti roky* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991), p. 89.

The attitude of the Podillian peasants to the collective farms is illustrated by the following data on the type of association they chose:³⁹

| Year | Communes | Agricultural co-ops | Joint cultivation |
|------|----------|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1925 | 7 | 60 | 24 |
| 1926 | 4 | 67 | 37 |
| 1927 | 4 | 61 | 221 |
| 1928 | 3 | 74 | 316 |

As the data in the above table indicate, peasants were more inclined to be members of agricultural cooperatives (*artili*) and associations for the joint cultivation of land, and the increase in the number of collective farms took place only thanks to them. As a rule, the indicated associations were organized only for the period of agricultural work, which entirely suited the peasants. For example, in the Vinnytsia region there were 415 such collectives in the beginning of 1928, and the only 128 remained by of the year.⁴⁰ The peasantry's attitude to the communes, associations in which they were alienated from all means of production, was becoming increasingly more negative.

Thus, the evolution of events in 1928 attested to the economic and political crisis in the country, which sparked mass protests among the population and outrage at the government's actions even among poor peasants and members of KNSs, the Committees of Poor Peasants that were the Bolsheviks' source of support in the countryside. A complex political and economic situation emerged: peasant resistance to the government was escalating, poor peasants were being left with no grain, and cities faced a growing need of bread, while the state was systematically seeking to increase its grain exports.

During this period the formation of the Stalinist totalitarian system, which could not tolerate the appearance of Ukrainian autonomy, or any other kind, was reaching its logical conclusion.

The GPU organs were receiving with increasing frequency the latest guidelines from their higher-ups about intensifying the struggle against the counterrevolution in the countryside. On 3 December 1928 a resolution from the speech of Rubinshtein, head of the Tulchyn district GPU division (which resolution was confirmed at a meeting held at the bureau of the district committee of the KP(b)U), noted:

39. V. Petrenko, "Podilske selo naperedodni sutsilnoi kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva," in *Tezy dopovidei i povidomlennia 18-oi Vinnytskoi oblasnoi istor.-kraiezn. konferentsii* (Vinnytsia, 1998), p. 67.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

The work of the GPU has a number of achievements. . . . Sufficient attention has been paid to the question of the struggle against various types of Ukrainian-Petliurite elements. . . . A purge of the economic-administrative apparatus has been carried out. It is still necessary to intensify the isolation and elimination of the kulak/anti-Soviet element from villages in the district. . . . In the sphere of the struggle against Petliurism, the GPU should unfold work in such a way as to focus its attention on former Petliurite figures and on the timely reaction to the work organized by them. Eliminate more of the remaining enemy element from economic and Soviet organizations.⁴¹

This document bears out the fact that the nationally aware peasantry posed the greatest threat to Bolshevik rule in Ukraine during the course of the state grain delivery plans. It is no accident that back at the VII RKP(b) Congress in 1919 one of the first post-revolutionary discussions was about the national question, which was viewed as an aspect of the peasant question.⁴² The current problem was exacerbated by the fact that the peasantry comprised the preponderant majority of the population. In the national republics Soviet power was consolidated, and maintained in the 1920s, by means of Red Army bayonets, and enjoyed minimal support from the population.

In fact, the civil strife in the country, which had only died down during the NEP period, flared up with renewed force. The question of the ultimate victor emerged precisely in 1928: the abandonment of the principles of market economics and the repressions accompanying the grain procurements sparked large-scale and determined resistance to the Bolsheviks on the part of most of the Soviet population, particularly in Ukraine. The normal and more or less stable system of farmers's life was being ruined, their freedom was coming to an end, and the entire country was turning into a barracks filled with starving serfs.

In its struggle against the peasantry, the Soviet government opted for and introduced the practice of economic compulsion: the systematic grain requisitions, the application of every possible repressive action against peasants who had nothing more to give, and the mass starvation that began as early as 1928 was not the result of natural causes but of state policy. With utter deliberateness Stalin resolved to starve the Ukrainian countryside and destroy an immense number of peasants, viewing the sacrifices in this war as absolutely justified.

41. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 672, fol. 486.

42. *KPRS v rezoliutsiakh i rishenniakh*, 2: 44, 76-78.

On the demand of the TsK VKP(b), on 10 December 1928 all rural *raion* committees of the KP(b)U were sent a letter from the Ukrainian Central Committee with the following content:

Secret. . . . The control figures ratified by the last plenum of the TsK VKP(B) indicate new, mighty steps forward on the path to industrialization, on the path of socialist construction. Without a doubt, the completion of this task will depend on the completion of the state grain delivery plan. . . . Finally, the TsK is forced to declare that, despite the decision, grain procurement organizations were not strengthened by workers in a timely fashion. Corrupt elements of the low-level apparatus, connected with the kulak part of the countryside, have remained in their places, negatively influencing the grain procurement work.⁴³

At this very time a decision was adopted to reinforce and strengthen the grain procurement brigades with workers.

On 19 December the TsK KP(b)U issued the following directive:

To all OPKs [district party committees] and the Moldavian oblast committee. The TsK has decided to dispatch workers from manufacturing (including non-party members) to the countryside, as a practical way to achieve a breakthrough in the state grain deliveries. In connection with this, the TsK proposes that a group of class-steadfast workers from the bench be immediately selected, which, after receiving instruction, is to be sent for 2-3 weeks to the countryside with the proviso that they will be replaced later by a new group of workers.⁴⁴

Therefore, the worker brigades for grain procurement resumed their activities in the Ukrainian countryside already at the end of 1928. Together with party and rural activists, they comprised the basis of the grain procurement brigades that began functioning on a permanent basis, requisitioning the peasants' grain. Starting in 1929, they were forbidden to leave the countryside if the grain delivery plans were not completed.⁴⁵ In time, the government would call these groups of workers *buksiry*, "tug-brigades." During the early 1930s they played the most criminal role, car-

43. DAVO, fond P-29, list 1, file 380, fols. 236 and 238.

44. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 675, fol. 200.

45. V. Petrenko, "Khlibozahotivelnna polityka bilshovykiv v Ukraini v 1929 r.," in *Naukovi zapysky: Istoriiia, VDPU im. M. Kotsiubynskoho*, vyp. 10 (Vinnytsia: DP "DKF," 2006), pp. 108-17.

rying out the latest Bolshevik mission – the confiscation of all food products.

Also at the end of 1928, the Soviet government adopted decisions concerning the compulsory payment of *mirchuk*, a measure of grain collected as milling tax. The party resolutions demanded: “The transfer of the *mirchuk* is still in an unsatisfactory state. To this time grain-milling enterprises have still not been completely covered by the terms for delivering the *mirchuk*. . . . The *mirchuk* should be calculated at 10 percent.”⁴⁶

The peasants, who ground part of the grain into flour for their own use, were now forced to give the state one-tenth of their milled grain (later increase to 20 percent).

In 1932 and 1933 the Stalinist regime would not only forbid the peasants to grind grain into flour, but also order resolutions to be issued to oblast party committees about the confiscation of millstones⁴⁷ and meat grinders⁴⁸ throughout the countryside, claiming that this decision was motivated by the “squandering of grain.”

Thus, the 1928 state grain delivery policy in Ukraine acquired a clear-cut character of “war-communism”. The peasants’ reaction to the forcible methods of the grain procurements was blatantly negative. Having destroyed the economic foundations of market relations and introduced *diktat* into the sphere of price setting, the Soviet government placed the peasantry in the position of an opposition to the existing regime. In response, the peasants – mostly independent producers of the majority of commercial grain in the country – launched an “undeclared” war on the Bolsheviks’ agrarian course.

In this struggle, economic forms of resistance figured widely besides armed protests: the reduction of sown areas, concealment of grain, leaving grain in sheaves after threshing, the sowing of other technical crop, etc., as well as terrorist acts, mass strikes (*volynky*, literally “go-slow” protests), “women’s revolts,” and anti-Soviet agitation.

The return to military-feudal methods of the food requisitioning (*prodrazviorstka*) system led to mass starvation in many regions of Ukraine, including Podillia, as early as the spring of 1928. It was caused not just by the state’s economic policies: for the Bolshevik government, famine became a tool of political terror aimed against the peasantry’s growing resistance.

However, the last stage of the struggle waged against the Ukrainian nation by the Stalinist regime, which had almost completed its transformation into a totalitarian dictatorship (totalitarianism could not have be-

46. DAVO, fond P-33, list 1, file 672, fol. 513.

47. DAVO, fond P-136, list 1, file 11, fol. 44.

48. DAVO, fond P-136, list 3, file 161, fols. 31-32.

come so deeply enrooted in the Soviet Union if such a significant state organism, albeit relatively independent, as Ukraine had continued to exist), was the Holodomor of 1932-1933, during the course of which the main grain producers⁴⁹ were destroyed and Ukraine suffered huge population losses.

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49. DAVO, fond P-136, list 3, file 219, fol. 135.

VADIM GUZUN

ROMANIAN MONITORING OF SOVIET DUMPING PRACTICES IN 1930-33

The Romanian government's interest in the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and its relations with the outside world in the early 1930s may be explained by three factors: geographic proximity, ideological antagonism, and the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries. During this period Soviet economic, political, and military developments were closely followed by the Romanian authorities, who considered this collected data crucial to the formulation of an effective defense strategy, consolidation of Romania's security, and maintenance of public order. They were very useful, especially in the context of the prevailing insecurity, to both the political elites and the population.

The topic of Soviet dumping was regularly featured in articles published in the West European press of the time.¹ It also appears in the internal reports of diplomats attached to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and in dispatches from Romanian missions accredited in various capitals (Riga, Warsaw, Athens, Prague, Stockholm, Sofia, Ankara, Bern, Hague, Berlin, Vienna, London, Washington, etc.).

The Bolsheviks' unfair competitive practices in the European and world markets are an important subject for the study of international relations in the 1930s, since their main consequence was the undermining, through economic measures, of the USSR's foreign political enemies, among which were all the states located immediately west of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet dumping was also important from the perspective of the internal costs that ensured the success of this practice: the forced depletion of human and material resources, as well as the deliberate sacrifice of the population. Thus, the Soviets' dumping policy is a secondary component of accelerated industrialization and militarization, which appears in both internal sources (documents from former Soviet archives)² and external

1. See, e.g., "Contre le dumping soviétique", *Journal de Genève*, 10 Sept. 1930; "Russie. La lutte contre le dumping", *Le Temps*, 20 Oct. 1930; "Campaign in Soviet Russia for Strengthening the Red Army," *Central European Press*, June 1931; "La menacé soviétique," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, 10 July 1931; "O plano quinquenal da Russia só lhe causarà prejuizos," *O seculo*, 23 Aug. 1931.

2. See A. Berelovich and V. Danilov, eds., *Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD, 1918-1939: Dokumenty i materialy v 4 tomakh* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998-); Nikolai Teptsov, *V dni velikogo pereloma: istoriia kollektivizatsii, raskulachivaniia i krestianskoi ssylki v Rossii (SSSR) po pismam i vospominaniiam 1929-1933 gody* (Moscow: Zvonitsa, 2002); V. Serhiichuk et al., eds, *Ukrainskyi khlib na eksport: 1932-*

ones (diplomatic reports, observations of foreign observers, etc.).³ Thanks to the export of goods produced as a result of the large-scale exploitation of inhumane labor and rampant and abusive confiscations of the fruits of this labor, this policy may be regarded as one of the general reasons for the impoverishment of the population and, moreover, of the man-made famine in Ukraine that peaked in 1932-33.

A report prepared by the Romanian Legation in Warsaw (no. 2857 dated 21 August 1930) gives an accurate picture of the economic situation in the USSR in that year and analyzes the general atmosphere, which favored the Soviets' use of the dumping policy.⁴ Although the Communist Party represented a small segment of the population (less than 1 percent), it exercised absolute dictatorship and control over all major economic entities. In 1930, after the abolition of the so-called "right-wing opposition,"⁵ all power was concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee headed by Joseph Stalin. The most efficient body for enforcing the implementation of political and economic objectives was the political police (OGPU). Private property had already been abolished and all resources, including domestic and foreign trade, had been transferred to the state. The declared objective of the Soviet regime was the transformation of the archaic agricultural system so that the USSR could become a highly developed industrial-agrarian country, like the United States. One of the instruments for achieving this goal was the total collectivization of agriculture.

According to the above-mentioned report, the plans of the Soviet government envisaged the "standardization not only of industry but also of private life," with everyday needs – clothing, food, and housing – reduced

1933 (Kyiv: PP Serhiichuk M. I., 2006); Volodymyr Serhiichuk, *Iak nas moryly holodom*, (Kyiv: Ukrains'ka Vydavnycha Spilka 2003).

3. See *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933*, ed. Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and Bohdan S. Kordan (Kingston, Ont.; Vestal, NY: Limestone Press, 1988); Andrea Graziosi, ed., *Lettere da Kharkov: la carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932-33* (Torino: Einaudi, 1991); M. Wayne Morris, *Stalin's Famine and Roosevelt's Recognition of Russia* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1994); Jan Jacek Bruski, ed., *Hołodomor 1932-1933: Wielki głód na Ukrainie w dokumentach polskiej dyplomacji i wywiadu* (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2008); Robert Kuśnierz, ed., *Pomór w "Raju Bolszewickim: Głód na Ukrainie w latach 1932-1933 w świetle polskich dokumentów dyplomatycznych i dokumentów wywiadu* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008); Vadim Guzun, ed., *Foametea, piatiletka și ferma colectivă: documente diplomatice românești, 1926-1936* ([Baia Mare]: Editura Universității de Nord, [2011]).

4. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMFA), file 71/1920-1944, USSR, vol. 27, pp. 294-319.

5. A. Nove, "The Challenge of Industrialization," in *The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era*, ed. Robert V. Daniels, 3d rev. ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1990), pp. 25-34; see also Stephen F. Cohen, "The Moderate Alternative," *ibid.*, pp. 35-53; Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1974), pp. 368-421.

to the minimum. The decision to export was motivated by "the government's tendency always to have enough foreign currency at its disposal to cover the costs of imported goods." The Soviets exported mainly timber, oil products, furs, textiles, and flax. Although they were on the domestic market, several foodstuff items were also exported: grain, eggs, butter, fat, sugar, etc. In 1930 agricultural and household goods represented 40 percent of all exports. The government adopted forceful measures to export grain, expecting a considerable increase in domestic production as a result of collectivization and the mechanization of agriculture. The authors of the Warsaw report warned that the international market should be "more careful" with respect to international trade because if the Soviet government defaulted on its foreign financial obligations, the default would lead to reduced imports and increased exports of the above-mentioned goods. Other reports on this issue confirmed the view of the Warsaw report, which was borne out by subsequent developments.

On 8 August 1930 the Romanian minister in London wrote another diplomatic report (no. 2155/A-11) underlining the Soviets' unfair economic maneuvers in international trade. He directed the attention of Romania's foreign ministry to the virulence of Western public opinion against the first Five-Year Plan, which was perceived as a way for the Soviet Union to conquer world markets, and he also indicated specific cases of dumping that were uncovered in Great Britain. The report mentioned the sale of Soviet candy and forestry products below the asking price of domestic producers for similar items.⁶ In the opinion of the Polish minister in Moscow, the wide support that some Western companies offered to the USSR made dumping an important factor in the rising threat represented by the growing influence of Soviet trade over world markets. Soviet dumping appeared "almost unlimited." In August 1930 the threat of Soviet economic expansion reached the level of a military threat, the former being considered much more real than the latter because of industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture.⁷

The financial counselor of the Romanian Legation in Washington, in his report no. 4107/X-27 of 29 September 1930, quoted the vice-president of the Soviet commercial agency in New York: "The Soviet government practices dumping systematically with the goal of causing revolutions through the collapse of the European markets and, considering the current general economic and financial situation, wide unemployment, dislocation of industries, and the agrarian crisis, it is rather risky to believe that the Soviet tactic cannot be dangerous."⁸ The subversive nature of the Soviet dumping policy was also noted on 10 October 1930 in a dispatch sent by the Romanian Legation in London. The Riga correspondent of *The Times*

6. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 45, pp. 295-97.

7. *Ibid.*, vol. 23, pp. 313-16.

8. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 26, pp. 119, 119/3-119/4.

revealed that dumping had the “goal of obtaining, on the one hand, the necessary funds for continuing this plan [the Five-Year Plan], and, on the other, sparking economic and financial turbulence that would facilitate the Soviets’ subversive propaganda in all the countries affected by the policy of dumping Russian products.”⁹

On 1 October 1930, the Romanian Legation in Riga sent the MFA a wide-ranging analysis of the dumping issue that was profoundly affecting the economies of the Baltic states, which were becoming overwhelmed by a unanimous “feeling of helplessness toward Soviet economic tyranny.” Referring to France, Mihail Sturdza noted the “insensitivity and slow reactions” of the big industrial powers to the “Russian economic offensive.” In a report entitled “The Soviet Economic Threat and Our Means of Defense,” the same diplomat indicated that the resumption by some states of diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviets, in the hopes that the latter might democratize in the future, was an error: “There is only one worry nowadays for the Soviet industrial, agrarian, commercial, financial, and military mechanism: the creation of an irresistible mechanism of destruction in order to ruin capitalism and Bolshevize the world entirely. The prosperity of the Russian population has no place in a plan that puts its whole strength to resist to the test.” The minister was highlighting the fact that the Soviets were squandering their resources on aggressive propaganda campaigns in neighboring states, while ignoring the needs of its own population. All this was done in order to “gather larger and larger quantities of merchandise needed for the economic war, which may already be considered unleashed.”

Romania had a three-part defense strategy: general international agreements, regional treaties, and domestic measures. With regard to the dumping of cereal in the world market, the issue that most interested Romania, Sturdza indicated the possible difficulties stemming from the advantages of a “European preference clause,” which would open up the issue of a European federation that excluded the USSR. In his view, it was possible to reach a compromise on an international agreement. The prospect of organizing a “front of the bourgeoisie” to combat Soviet dumping was also very unlikely because of the short-term benefits that certain Western industries (in the US, Germany, Great Britain, etc.) were obtaining from massive purchases of raw materials at very low prices, on the one hand, and from the sale of machinery to the USSR, on the other. Sturdza was convinced that the ultimate goal of Romania’s foreign policy should be to “persuade other foreign chanceries daily and patiently” in order to formulate a coordinated European agreement on antidumping measures.

Achieving a regional alliance was seen as having a greater chance of success, taking into account the community of interests – “at least relative” – between Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary; the list could

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.

also include Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria. The Romanian diplomat does mention, however, the failure of the negotiations with Estonia and Latvia, both affected by dumping, regarding the establishment of a customs union. In his opinion, their geographic unity and the compatibility of their political goals would have been sufficient to counter the various conflicts of interest in the market. Sturdza was convinced that Soviet economic aggression was targeting Romania's main exports: grain, oil, and timber. The arguments that Romania was the country that was "most exposed to danger" from the Soviet Union were economic, geographical, and political: Romanian agricultural production was the main target, and the integrity of the state itself remained under threat because the Soviets had not recognized the border on the Dnister River. He stressed the need to adopt measures for building up resistance in those sectors in which the country was in a "position of grave inferiority" compared to other states affected by the Soviet dumping policy: the consolidation of the domestic market, reorganization of domestic credit, etc.

Assessing Soviet military and economic threats against the European states, the minister in Riga considered the economic threat to be more real and urgent. Short-term developments confirmed this view: despite rumors to the contrary, in the early 1930s the USSR was not ready to launch a military attack against its neighbors; the army's role was simply that of "a back-up in the general economic and military offensive plan of the Communists." The "economic long-term war" was the one that was worrying decision makers in the European capitals. The Romanian economy was among the first targets of the Soviets' "destructive action." Although the Romanian official in Riga recognized the artificial and arbitrary nature of the Bolshevik system, especially in its attitude to the human factor, he rejected the signals predicting the bankruptcy of this system. The prospect of the total collapse of the Soviet system was even more remote, as it was sustained by the help of experts from the US, Germany, France, England, and Italy – the industrial powers were competing with each other to provide the "material and experience the USSR needed to build a formidable instrument of destruction." Sturdza was nonetheless confident in the possibility of building a "bourgeois front," and pleaded in favor of a total boycott against Soviet goods.¹⁰

The Romanian Legation in Bern, in its communication no. 1814 of 17 October 1930 was also in favor of a "common defense action" against Soviet economic policies. According to *Le Front National*, in 1928-29 "the Soviets had exported 160 million rubles' worth of food products that were sold below normal prices, despite the famine that had stricken large areas of Russia [*sic*]." The Romanian mission agreed with the conclusion that the temporary lowering of prices as a result of dumping was not acceptable because this was ruining the industries of other countries while tolerating

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-68, 80-84.

famine at home.¹¹ A week later the same legation filled in the picture of the Soviet economic offensive in Europe with information on Swiss imports. While it could not specify the quantity of Soviet imports, the report identified the merchandise as grain, meat, timber, matches, etc. In the context of public pressure, demanding measures to establish whether Switzerland was involved in the “criminal maneuvers” of Soviet dumping, the year to year increases in imports from year to year, especially of wheat, was considered “rather abnormal.”¹²

In his report no. 113/9 of January 27, 1931, the Romanian minister in The Hague sent the president of the Council of Ministers – the head of the Romanian government – his notes from a meeting in Paris with a French representative of a grain company that was active in the Soviet market. The agricultural situation in the USSR was desperate because of the “absolute impoverishment of the peasants, which had been brought about by the Soviet authorities in the space of several months with such barbarism that entire counties in Russia are now under the reign of famine.” At the same time, the “accumulation of Russian products in the world market (huge barns in Rotterdam and Liverpool were filled to capacity with Russian grain) has caused such a drop in prices that the financial predictions of the Soviet government, on which Stalin had based the current stage of the Five-Year Plan, were rendered erroneous, and thus Russia’s depletion through dumping was done with no financial gain for Moscow.” The conclusion of the French expert was clear: “The Russian treasury is empty, as empty as it has ever been since the war, and no matter how much dumping they try to do, revenues cannot cover the commitments to foreign industry.”¹³

The fact that Soviet peasants were well aware of the destination of the grain that the Soviet authorities were forcibly confiscating from them was reported in the Romanian newspaper *Universul*, in an article entitled “Grave Turmoil in Ukraine; Peasants Are Leaving Their Farms and Arming Themselves: The Manifesto of the Revolutionary Committee.” The author highlights the main objective of the “general grain raids,” the drastic measures instituted against starving peasants who were trying to conceal grain, and the determined resistance of the peasants. The article also quotes from a “manifesto” of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee: “The Bolsheviks export our grain abroad, and the money robbed from our population is wasted on Bolshevik propaganda in England, France, Germany, Poland, Romania. Hundreds of thousands of Bolshevik agents are sent abroad to spread the ideas of the heaven they have brought to

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-33, 138-39, 145-47.

13. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 81, pp. 19-21.

Ukraine. If this money were used for purchasing bread for the starving, there would be no mention of famine."¹⁴

In a report (no. 183) dated 20 January 1931 the Romanian minister in Athens refers to the Greek periodical *Estia*. Citing diplomatic sources and concrete examples to analyze the "political basis" of Soviet economic plans, the author of the report issued an appeal to launch joint European action. The Romanian diplomat offered the following explanation of how Soviet prices were undermining the economies of the Western states: "Russia can sell its products for cheap prices . . . because all the Russian people were condemned to forced labor. And in this way, although all rail transport is very expensive, Russia succeeds in selling its coal cheaper than the English, to export to Sweden, the country of matches, matches 40 percent cheaper than the Swedes sell, to paralyze all European markets successfully. Wheat, oil, and all metals are offered by the Russians at extremely low prices, which are worsening the world economic crisis dreadfully."¹⁵ The fact that forced labor was at the heart of the Soviet dumping policy in the external markets of agricultural and forestry products was also highlighted in the report of the Romanian Legation in London, no. 258-A11, dated 30 January 1931. Moreover, the MFA received from London the British government's *Blue Book* on Soviet labor legislation.¹⁶

The impact of the Soviet dumping policy on domestic developments in the USSR is analyzed in a report written by Greek diplomats accredited in Moscow. Dated 6 February 1931, the document entitled "The Five-Year Plan: A General View of the Past Year," was sent to Bucharest by the Romanian Legation in Athens.¹⁷ This report was part of a multipart series regularly circulated among Romanian diplomats, thanks to the close cooperation between Greek and Romanian diplomats at a time when Romania had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Reporting the findings of an inspection ordered by Stalin, the Greek diplomats noted that most of the machinery that had been imported to the USSR had deteriorated soon after being used. The machinery had been paid for with revenues obtained from the export of grain. In the opinion of the analysts, that was "the first cause that led to the Soviets' famous dumping, which not only had a strong impact on the world market, but also brought about a famine deeply felt by all of Russia, because food and other staples of first necessity were totally gone." The financial means used for attaining the objectives of the Five-Year Plan "had totally drained the peasantry after first having killed 6 million rich peasants (*kulaks*) and having brought masses of other farmers to a pitiful state." Another direct consequence of Soviet exports in general and grain in particular was the growing complaints within the Red Army,

14. *Ibid.*, vol. 39, p. 166.

15. *Ibid.*, vol. 26, pp. 389-91.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 404-06.

17. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 18, pp. 42-49.

“whose soldiers came from peasants families that lacked everything and were suffering acutely from starvation.”

The document also alludes to disagreements among Bolshevik leaders regarding the expediency and level of exports, and cites the opinion of the representatives of the so-called “right-wing opposition” headed by Rykov, who had been ousted from the Soviet leadership: “Russia has to be fully self-sufficient. It should not import or export. Contrary to other countries, for example, England, America, Germany, she does not suffer from over-production. It was wrong to export, at any cost, agricultural products that could have been consumed in the country by the working masses, which make the industrial products and merchandise needed by the farmers.” Although the domestic economic situation in the Soviet Union was catastrophic, the opinion of Stalin the dictator prevailed, which was seen as a revolutionary one and not the result of a “sick imagination.”

The deterioration of the Soviet standard of living was the subject of a report (no. 538) of the Romanian legation in Vienna dated 17 February 1931. The author explained the concept of “social dumping,” a term coined by the Austrian newspaper *Reichspost*: “Compressing the standard of living of the workers and the population in general is taken to the extreme, showing that it is, rather, about a forced process, about a kind of self-destruction, and not about a well-controlled plan.” The findings sent to Bucharest were far from promising: “The Soviets are forcing exportation with all their means because their currency is seriously threatened. They sell so cheaply because they need every dollar; they sell at a loss just to sell, with the desperate hope that the world revolution will commence after their economic catastrophe. . . . Moscow’s tactic cannot lead to the implementation of Marxist ideas; rather, in the best-case scenario – from their point of view – to the collapse of Europe.”¹⁸ The special Moscow correspondent of the *Turkish Post* attributed the unfavorable Soviet trade balance in the 1929-30 fiscal year “to the critical food situation” and the prohibitive measures adopted by France, the US, Belgium, Romania, etc., against Soviet dumping.¹⁹

In its 15 April 1931 report on Germany’s contribution to the development of Soviet industry – the sale of heavy machinery – the Romanian Legation in Berlin came to the conclusion that Great Britain and the US were not being honest in their protest against dumping. The report provides concrete examples that British-Soviet trade was ongoing and points to the suspension by the US of the ban on importing Soviet goods. The report directed attention to “the shortages endured by the Russian population”: “each worker receives only 7 grams of butter a day. The need for fats obliges them to eat sunflower seeds. A worker receives only 400 grams of low-fat meat a week. Conversely, there is an abundance of vegetables and

18. *Ibid.*, vol. 26, p. 446.

19. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *Romania*, vol. 194, pp. 194-95.

grain. There is a total lack of leather, also due to the considerable decrease of cattle in Russia. Because of this, factory workers walk about with feet wrapped in rags.”²⁰

On 30 April 1931 E. H. Dimitriu, a member of the Romanian Legation in Washington, sent Romania’s foreign minister a report on the “formidable expansion of Soviet foreign trade.” Moscow’s policy had sparked indignant protests on the part of numerous Western governments – including Romania, France, Belgium, Hungary, Canada, Latvia, Spain, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Persia, Tunisia, and the US – which had been forced to adopt anti-dumping legislative measures, such as raising tariffs and introducing import controls and embargos. At the same time, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Poland preferred to abstain from sanctioning the dumping policy. Some countries set up a special system focusing only on the importation of certain Soviet products: France (grain and food supply), Belgium (grain, flour, wine), Hungary (animal glue), Spain (forestry products), Latvia (hemp), and Yugoslavia (increased tariffs on wheat, corn, and flour).²¹ The Romanian Legation in Prague was convinced that the negative statistical data on the agricultural campaign launched by the USSR and the imbalance generated by the implementation of the Five-Year Plan were a positive signal for Romania, which viewed these as concrete factors in the move to dodge a new wave of Soviet dumping in the grain market.²² However, the Romanian Legation in Tokyo offered a different opinion: Soviet dumping of grain, forestry products, and oil in the Japanese market was good for Japan but a disadvantage for competing states, including Romania.²³

Mihail Sturdza believed that the dumping issue was forcing the Soviets to “demonstrate pacifism and conciliation” toward the Western economies, even if the “collapse of the bourgeois world” was still their main objective. The minister did not subscribe to the theory that for the Kremlin dumping was “the means of obtaining, at any sacrifice, the resources needed honestly to fulfill its commitments in foreign markets,” and he was convinced that the real goal of the Bolshevik actions was to obtain new foreign credits under the most favorable conditions. The diplomat warned about the danger of strengthening the Soviet economy: “If there is no new development to get back to reality, both the economic and disarmament confabulations, [. . .] it would be prudent to expect the continuation and intensification of the aid given by bourgeois finances and industry to the Soviet regime, which is in real trouble today. This help is important for us because

20. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 18, pp. 84-87.

21. *Ibid.*, vol. 27, pp. 139-48.

22. *Ibid.*, vol. 34, pp. 50-51.

23. *Ibid.*, vol. 27, p. 236.

at some point it could impose a definite and great obligation on the other camp, which until now has reserved its right to withdraw.”²⁴

According to a report drawn up by the Romanian minister in Riga on 10 July 1931, entitled “A Baltic Interpretation of Russian Realities” (no 330), poverty, compulsion, and exports below current market prices were the three factors that contributed to the growth of the Soviets’ fiscal and commercial revenues. Their plan to penetrate foreign markets was three-pronged: “1) to ensure the technical equipping of the Five-Year Plan, 2) to maintain a special source of inflation within bourgeois production by providing credit to the Soviets, thereby placing the social destinies of several countries, such as Germany or the Baltic states, at the discretion of Russian orders, which could stop any time, 3) as a result of the continuous growth of the Soviet stock shares in circulation by extending deadlines and multiplying warranties and endorsements, a strange and unhealthy solidarity was formed between bourgeois finances and a communist economy, an interdependence that would ultimately play in favor of the latter.”²⁵

With the onset of the world economic crisis, Soviet exports diminished, after having first “assumed a broad dimension” as a result of dumping. This was the conclusion of a report prepared by the Greek Legation in Moscow on 1 October 1931, which was sent to Bucharest by the Romanian minister in Athens. These developments persuaded the Greek diplomats to conclude that the Soviet government, “the owner and uncontrolled administrator of all the wealth and products of the country,” would sell elsewhere in the domestic market the products it could not export at dumping prices to their former customers. This line of reasoning would have been compelling only in a normal situation. In reality, Soviet exports – especially grain – continued to flow. This is attested by the Warsaw-based Romanian Legation’s confidential report no. 3754, dated 14 November 1931. Monitoring the Polish press, the Romanian diplomats discovered evidence of 40,000 tons of rye imported from the USSR, which sparked a local farmers’ revolt.²⁶

While most European countries were lowering the level of their exports, Germany’s machinery exports in 1929-32 were booming thanks to Soviet orders. The figures sent to the MFA by the chargé d’affaires in Athens on 17 September 1932, are eloquent in this regard: in the first six months of 1932, the value of exported machinery reached 89.5 million marks, which, compared to the first eight months of 1929, represented an increase of 750 percent. Diplomatic reports note that the period during which the Kremlin was purchasing a vast amount of industrial products from abroad was marked by “harsh” repressions against Soviet collective farms. This was no coincidence. The peasants’ refusal to take part in agricultural activities,

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-58.

25. *Ibid.*

26. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *Romania*, vol. 196, pp. 202-05, 213-15.

their indifference to their crops, which no longer belonged to them, rampant abuses on collective farms, and other problems led to a dramatic drop in grain production.²⁷ The tragic situation in agriculture, as described by the Italian senator Conti after his visit to the USSR, where he witnessed the famine and disorganization in the transport system, led him to oppose the dumping of Soviet agricultural products but not that of forestry products.²⁸ This information was echoed in a report prepared by the Romanian Legation in Athens on 18 November 1932.²⁹

On 10 January 1933 the Romanian Legation in Riga prepared a summary on the economic results recorded in the last year of the Soviet Five-Year Plan for Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Titulescu. The document notes: "No material hardship (technical, financial) and no economic or social consideration (the needs of the population, poverty, annihilation of entire social categories) stopped Moscow from achieving its political goal, in other words, to create that huge instrument of destruction, into which European and Asian Russia are rapidly being transformed." Despite the world crisis, the USSR's goal to industrialize remained constant, and it was achieved "by sacrifices that probably have never been demanded of any other people." But it was also achieved with international support, in the form of loans, machinery, and experts. To compensate for the devaluation of the ruble, in 1932 imports of consumer products for the state economy, tractors, vehicles, and agricultural machinery were drastically reduced. In the same period, the importation of industrial machinery increased. As regards foreign loans, crucial data point to German loans that were extended to the USSR, as well as repeated repayment deferments in exchange for the acceleration of gold exports to Berlin in 1931-32. One example cited by Sturdza refers to the largest-ever transports of gold rubles through Riga, as of the date of his report: 50 million gold rubles.³⁰

A report written by the Romanian Legation in Prague (no. 602/16 dated 29 March 1933) on the foreign trade of the USSR during the Five-Year Plan described the major difficulties that the Soviet Union was encountering in its efforts to accumulate foreign currency. It referred to the massive gold export in the previous two years, "in an amount much greater than gold extractions, for which reason Soviet gold reserves reached a minimum."³¹

On 12 July 1933 a memorandum was prepared for Romanian diplomats dealing with the issue of Soviet dumping. It remarked on the "dreadful famine" that was devastating in the most fertile regions of the USSR, and explained that the consumption level of the masses was at an overall low

27. AMFA, file 71/1920-1944, *USSR*, vol. 19, pp. 5-7.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

29. *Ibid.*, vol. 28, pp. 130-33.

30. *Ibid.*, vol. 19, pp. 123-31.

31. *Ibid.*, vol. 28, pp. 202-04.

“owing to the poverty of the population, whose income is systematically confiscated by the government under different pretexts, to be invested mainly in the huge industrial plan.” Commenting on the Soviet government’s unfair trade policies, the authors of the memorandum blamed the Soviet administration “for aggravating the consequences of the economic crises and of causing, in certain conditions, real damage to the stability of commercial prices, especially for agricultural products.” Drawing attention to the low prices asked by the USSR for its exported wheat while the “population was haunted by famine,” the authors deemed rightly that such prices affected the cost of wheat in exporting countries. The signatories of the memorandum (E. Sablin, former Minister Plenipotentiary of Russia to Great Britain, and A. Baikalov, former president of the United Committee of the Russian Cooperative Organization in London), were convinced that “giving credits and loans to the Soviet government would be a very detrimental action vis-à-vis the real interest of the Russian people and the Russian national economy” because those credits would be totally reserved for the objectives of the Communist Party.”³²

Reporting on his trip to the USSR, on 25 August 1933 W. Eisenbach, the vice-consul of Romania in Leipzig, informed the president of the Council of Ministers, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, about the precarious living conditions, the famine, and the persecution and discrimination of the rural population, whose life was far worse in comparison to that of the urban population, and the situation of the privileged Red Army. He also pointed out the lack of financial resources and the fact that “everything was sold to cover budgetary expenses.” Regarding the desperate situation in the Soviet Union and the connection between the domestic socioeconomic situation and international dumping, Eisenbach recalled the following: “The Soviet government continuously exports any items it considers foreigners might need, and does not consider that a large proportion of these items should remain inside the country for domestic consumption. Not even enough food was left in the country because they are exporting too much, as is well known. Everything that is exported from Russia is offered for sale at such low prices that the European competition loses any chance of profit, because the Soviets are avidly seeking cash.”³³

This assessment is confirmed by a report (no. 1479) prepared on 18 September 1933 by the Romanian Legation in Stockholm for Romania’s foreign minister N. Titulescu. The report, entitled “Famine Haunts the Peasants of Soviet Russia; Entire Counties Are Depopulated; The Brutal Bolshevik Policy,” analyses an article that was published in the Swedish newspaper *Socialdemokraten*. Noting correctly that because of the “frightening” events unfolding in Germany, the drama of the Soviet people was going unnoticed, the author focuses on the direct link between “the con-

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-52.

33. *Ibid.*, vol. 19, pp. 241-48.

centration of all food products in the grip of the state," the famine, and international trade: "The Soviet government continues to export as though nothing has happened. Using tsarist-era methods, they snatch even the last piece of bread from the starving peasant." The determining factor behind the food crisis in the USSR is not the crop levels during 1932-33 but rather "the systematic confiscation of food from peasants and collective farms without any compensation."³⁴

This line of argument was supported by an article that appeared in the Romanian newspaper *Adevărul* on 14-15 November 1930, entitled "Russia As a Factor in the International Grain Trade" (in fact, this was a translation of an article written by the director of Getreide-Industrie und Commission Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin, M. Hirsh, for the *Bulletin of the Romanian-German Chamber of Commerce*): "If someone wants to characterize the international grain trade as it has been in the past few months, then it can be said in very few words, 'Russia exports!,' because without a doubt this has been the most significant event in the international grain market, a market so full of surprises lately."³⁵ Indeed, after overcoming the diplomatic blockade in the mid-1920s and eliminating the internal opposition, the Soviet Union also succeeded in cracking the economic blockade, and re-entered the international markets, including the grain market, with consequences that proved to be tragic in the end.

The short- and long-term consequences of the sale of Soviet goods in foreign markets, including essential consumer goods, at prices lower than those current in the world market, took their toll internationally but especially internally. The reckless exportation of anything that could be sold was among the major factors that generated and fueled one of the biggest tragedies of the twentieth century – the man-made famine in the late 1920s-early 1930s, which peaked in 1932-33. In the medium- and long-term perspective, this policy encouraged the Soviet regime to use forced labor in all sectors of the economy, which deeply and irreparably affected the psychology of the people, including farmers. It had a demoralizing effect, eradicating any sustainable involvement of the peasantry, which was transformed into an agricultural proletariat. Exporting grain in the midst of a famine contributed to the sudden and massive disappearance of millions of people and put an end to the traditional rural society. Soviet exports of grain and raw materials at dumping prices ensured the accumulation of the monetary resources needed for attaining the regime's primary objective of "modernization" – in fact, industrialization, collectivization, and accelerated militarization by means of the Five-Year Plan.

As for the Soviet regime's external relations, its unfair competition alerted the international community, including Romania, to the Soviets' real objectives, first, the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, and

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 259-61.

35. *Ibid.*, vol. 26, pp. 167-68.

then the process of Bolshevization. Soviet foreign relations were a major risk factor that had a negative impact on the confidence of their trading partners, and especially on domestic markets that were already affected by the world economic crisis. Moreover, Soviet dumping was a policy that skilfully put to the test the solidarity and unity of the Western world in the face of the Bolshevik threat. From the Romanian and all-European diplomatic perspectives, not all who were involved in trade with the USSR understood, over the course of time, the essence of the Soviets' plans, failing to look beyond their "economic" surface or refusing to deprive their large companies of the chance to make a profit. The effects of the partial failure to organize a joint economic front against the Bolsheviks took their toll, above all on the states neighboring the Soviet Union. Finally, the immoral nature of this commercial practice needs to be stressed, since it favored the criminal actions of the Bolshevik leaders, who were depriving their own citizens of their most basic and human needs.

MYRON MOMRYK

A WESTERN COMMUNIST EYEWITNESS TO THE FAMINE

Among the sources on the famine are memoirs and autobiographies published by foreigners who, for one reason or another, had sojourned in Soviet Ukraine during the early 1930s and personally witnessed the effects of this catastrophe. Written in English or other Western languages, these autobiographies are significant in that they were published outside the Soviet Union and thus escaped Soviet censorship. These works corroborate and add credibility to accounts found in autobiographies and memoirs written by famine survivors, and contribute to a more detailed description and understanding of these tragic events.

Many foreign witnesses of the famine had come as friends of the Soviet Union; some eventually lost their faith in the regime, but others remained attached to Communism because of what they considered to be its achievements. Autobiographical writings by foreigners who were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), had witnessed the famine, and written about it while remaining sympathetic to the Soviet Union are extremely rare. One such person was Hans Blumenfeld, who went to the Soviet Union in 1930, joined the CPSU, and worked there as an architect until 1937. Eventually, he emigrated and settled in Canada, where his autobiography was published in 1987.¹

Hans Blumenfeld was born in 1892 in Osnabruck, Germany, into a family of assimilated German Jews. The family was a prosperous one, and Blumenfeld attended private schools and later the state-run *Realgymnasium*. He attended the Technical University of Munich, planning to become an architect. During his years at the university he became interested in the German labor movement. With the outbreak of the First World War, Hans enlisted in the German Army and served in the artillery on the Eastern Front in East Prussia, Latvia, Romania, and the Crimea. While still a soldier in the German army, Blumenfeld supported the Bolshevik

1. Hans Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65: The Not Entirely Candid Autobiography of a Drifter* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1987). Some biographical information on Blumenthal is located in the James G. Endicott and Family fonds, (MG30 C130), vol. 94, file 94-23, Hans Blumenfeld, at the Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

seizure of power in Russia in November 1917 and identified with the Bolshevik Party.

After his return to Germany, Blumenfeld left the army and became actively involved in the revolutionary events then sweeping the country. As a member of the Volksmarine Division, he took part in the Spartacus Revolt.² The revolt was suppressed by government troops, but Blumenfeld was able to escape. In Munich he participated in political mass meetings and demonstrations. In August 1919 he was arrested and imprisoned for five weeks.³ He was released but continued his revolutionary political activities, and by 1921 he was a member of the Communist Party of Germany. Intent on becoming an architect, he worked with various architectural firms in Hamburg and traveled to Italy and the United States to broaden his education and experience. In 1928 he worked in Vienna as a city planner and became involved with local Austrian Communist groups.

From Vienna Blumenfeld applied to work in the Soviet Union as an architect. In 1930 he was hired by the Second Building Trust and left for the Soviet Union, where he worked in the cities of Moscow, Vladimir, and Gorky. Shortly after his arrival Blumenfeld was admitted into the CPSU, considered a rare honor for members of foreign communist parties. In 1932 he found employment in Makiivka, the center of large-scale steelworks in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, which by then had grown into a city of about 200,000.⁴ This area was one of the main industrial regions of the Soviet Union, and plans were made to increase the number of workers and expand municipal institutions, housing, schools, and other facilities. Blumenfeld was involved in the planning of housing for workers.

Before traveling to Makiivka, Blumenfeld enquired about local conditions with a German architect who had worked there. The architect told him: "It is difficult: they will not talk to you."⁵ According to the architect, some of the workers refused to communicate in Russian and insisted on speaking in Ukrainian. It would seem that he had encountered examples of the Ukrainization⁶ policy, which effectively ended in 1933. As for

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-70.

4. In his book, Blumenfeld used the Russian transliteration spelling of the name of this city: Makeyevka. In 1926 the population of the city was only 79,000. See *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 279

5. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, p. 151.

6. Ukrainization was part of the Bolshevik policy of *korenizatsiia*, the indigenization of the Soviet regime. The policy of Ukrainization was intended to make the Communist Party of Ukraine as well as the state administrative and educational institutions in Ukraine more Ukrainian and acceptable to the Ukrainian population, since a large percentage of the communist administration of Ukraine, especially the upper echelons, was of non-Ukrainian origin. See *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5, pp. 46465.

Blumenfeld, he did not experience this attitude because “a [Communist] party resolution stated that the fight against ‘Great Russian chauvinism’ had gone too far and that it was necessary to fight the opposite extreme of ‘bourgeois nationalism.’”⁷ Blumenfeld also encountered some vestiges of the Ukrainization policy. For example, when he wanted to subscribe to *Pravda*, which was published only in Russian, he was granted this privilege only on condition that he also subscribe to a Ukrainian-language newspaper.⁸ This policy was also evident in the building of Ukrainian-language schools rather than Russian-language ones. As Blumenfeld notes in his autobiography:

When I told the head of the city school department that we were going to build a school in the “settlement,” he said, “That is fine, but we need one even more urgently in the city.” I replied in surprise, “But we just built a big school for you there.” His answer was, “Yes, but that is an [*sic*] Ukrainian school; we are terribly short of schools for Russian children.” When I suggested that they might convert a school from Ukrainian to Russian, he rejected that as quite unthinkable.⁹

According to Blumenfeld, under these conditions there was little cause for anti-Russian or “separatist tendencies among Ukrainians, and I never encountered them.”¹⁰ What Blumenfeld had encountered was, in fact, the end of the Ukrainization policy and a struggle between those members of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) who wanted to maintain and expand this policy and those who were actively curtailing it.¹¹ The intricacies and implications of this struggle were not grasped by the German architect, who was not aware of the new course in the Soviet nationalities policy: the emphasis on the Russification of the Ukrainian population. Blumenfeld’s impression, based on his own observations, was that if there was discrimination with regard to languages in Ukraine, it was in

7. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, p. 151. The struggle was now against Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism,” which was never defined in Soviet legal terms and was interpreted by Soviet bureaucrats as any policies and activities that insisted on the Ukrainian language and culture and were therefore deemed “counterrevolutionary.” The policy of Ukrainization was gradually phased out, and by 1933 it was replaced by a return to Russification, a policy that continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 151

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 152.

11. See entry on the Communist Party of Ukraine in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 552.

favor of Ukrainian. He thus concluded that there was nothing for Ukrainians to complain about with regard to the national question.

If there were no separatist and anti-Russian tendencies in Ukraine, then there should have been no reason for the Soviet authorities to institute repressive measures against the Ukrainians. While he was writing his autobiography, the question of the Ukrainian famine was once more discussed in the world press, this time with new accusations. Blumenfeld wrote: "I was therefore rather surprised to read recently in the respected French paper *Le Monde*, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the starvation of 1933, that it was due to a planned 'genocide' of the Ukrainian nation."¹² The mid-1980s were a time of rancorous public debates about the extent and nature of the Ukrainian famine, and it is possible that this controversy prompted Blumenfeld to comment on the tragic event from the perspective of an eyewitness and as one who had kept his faith in the Soviet system. The space he devotes to the tragedy in his autobiography is just a little over two pages, but it gives an idea of the information that a foreigner could have possessed while in the country.¹³

Blumenfeld wrote: "There was indeed a famine in 1933, not just in the Ukraine, but also in other semiarid regions of the USSR, the Lower Volga and the North Caucasus; and Makeyevka, located near the junction of these three regions, felt the full impact of it." His argument against the idea of Ukrainian genocide is that starvation was taking place in other parts of the Soviet Union, so Ukraine was not unique in that respect. He presents several other arguments to counter the accusation of genocide. To the absence of any national animosity between Russians and Ukrainians, cited above, he added an economic factor: "the dire shortage of labor in the Soviet Union at that time" would have made intentional loss of manpower unthinkable. Nor did he believe that "any government could be so stupid as to believe that starvation could be an effective means to break national resistance," and he cites the Irish famine of the 1840s in support of this argument.

As an eyewitness, his own familiarity with the tragic event was personal but limited.

Only once did I see a child with spindly legs and a swollen belly; it was in the garden of a nursery school at the hand of a nurse waiting for a doctor. Nor did I ever see a corpse lying in a street. I did, however, find a boy of about 15 years of age, lying on the sidewalk one evening, obviously near death. With the help of a passer-by I carried

12. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, p. 152.

13. All the following quotations concerning the famine are taken from these two pages of Blumenfeld's autobiography. (*Ibid.*, pp. 152-53).

him to the other side of the street, where an awning sheltered him from the drizzling rain, and went to the police station. On my insistence a policeman went with me to confirm that the boy was actually in their precinct, and he promised to take care of him. When I returned half an hour later, the boy was still lying there, so I again went to the police station. They claimed that the hospital would not accept him before the next morning. I went to complain to the GPU,¹⁴ who, however, confirmed the information concerning the hospital. When I went to look the next evening, the boy was no longer lying there. But if his body was removed alive or dead, I will never know.

The starving people that Blumenfeld saw in Makiivka were peasants from the eastern regions of Soviet Ukraine, the Lower Volga, and the North Caucasus, who had arrived in search of work in the city's industries. Blumenfeld writes that "the steelworks tried to employ some of them, but most left, finding the work too hard." He noted that some of the refugees had swollen limbs and "were already too far gone." He notes that "there were also many lost children," and some of them were taken into children's institutions while others were adopted by urban families. Two of Blumenfeld's friends, "building workers from Vienna, each adopted one such child." He had "no doubt that the famine claimed many victims," even though he had "no basis on which to estimate their numbers." He suspected, however, that "most deaths in 1933 were due to epidemics of typhus, typhoid fever, and dysentery," adding that "waterborne diseases were frequent in Makeyevka," and that he himself had "narrowly survived an attack of typhus fever."

Denying the crime of genocide, Blumenfeld nevertheless acknowledged the tragedy of the famine and even placed partial blame on the Soviet government, noting, however, that there were exonerating or at least extenuating circumstances. One was the "hot dry summer of 1932 . . . [which] had resulted in a crop failure in the semiarid regions of the south." Another problem was the lack of good management during the collectivization drive. Encouraged by the CPSU, at the end of 1929 poor peasants began to expropriate the "kulaks," but they themselves proved to be inefficient in organizing a "cooperative economy." In early 1930, when the Communist Party tried "to stem and correct excesses," the local Communists opposed any restraint and "the Party put on a drive again in 1932. As a result, the kulak economy ceased to produce during that year, and "the new collective economy did not yet produce fully." The food that was produced was channeled to workers in "urban industry" and the

14. The GPU (State Political Administration) was the Soviet political police that carried out mass repressions during collectivization in 1929-33.

Soviet armed forces – “the future of the entire nation.” Blumenfeld concluded that existing supplies were inadequate to feed the entire population of the Soviet Union and a famine followed.

Ostensibly plausible, Blumenfeld’s arguments are in fact seriously flawed. By the time the famine broke out, most of the peasants already had been collectivized. There was no extensive drought in the grain-producing regions of the USSR in 1932, and that year’s harvest, together with grain reserves, was sufficient to feed the entire population of the Soviet Union. The famine was the result of the requisition of that year’s agricultural production, an unwillingness to release grain reserves for internal consumption, the export of significant amounts of grain, and rejection of all offers of foreign aid.

Blumenfeld asks: “What could have been done to avoid this terrible calamity?” His answer is that the Soviets could have imported grain, but that they lacked funds: the depression had destroyed the world market for Soviet oil and timber, foreign debts had already been incurred for the development of Soviet industry, and the West refused to provide new loans. Blumenfeld admits that the Soviets could have used their gold reserve, but he did not wish to fault the USSR alone. “If blame for the terrible suffering of 1932 has to be assigned, it falls in equal parts on the Soviet government for refusing to part with their gold reserve, and on the West for refusing a loan when it was needed.” He was, of course, stretching the truth. In 1921 the Soviet government under Vladimir Lenin had asked Western countries for famine relief and received it; in 1932 the Soviet government under Joseph Stalin denied the famine, did not request any aid or loans to buy food products, and qualified all talk of starvation as anti-Soviet propaganda. The loans that the Soviets wanted to obtain were for investment in industrialization, not for feeding the starving population.

Blumenfeld’s conclusion about the famine was a rejection of the accusation of genocide, an acceptance that the famine existed but was due to climatic conditions and administrative shortcomings, and an admission of culpability which the Soviets shared with the West. As for his appraisal of the Soviet economy, although “stupidity and callousness inflicted much avoidable suffering during the process of collectivization . . . Soviet agriculture is not the monumental failure which it is often regarded as in the West.”

Regardless of his speculations on the causes of the Ukrainian famine, Blumenfeld failed to draw any conclusions from his personal experiences and observations concerning the lack of any immediate food aid that could have been provided to the victims at the local level by the militia and other Soviet state authorities. Since all political and administrative

orders came from Moscow, the withholding of immediate food aid to victims of the famine by the Soviet authorities did not lead him to question the motives of the Soviet leadership behind this policy of denying food relief.

Blumenfeld was also witness to the Soviet government's treatment of "criminals". He writes:

Subsequently, however, I was shocked on occasion to see large groups of men and women being roughly herded through the streets by soldiers. I found it hard to believe that they were all criminals. But I could not then, and for many years thereafter, believe that people were physically mistreated, beaten, or tortured in the Soviet Union.¹⁵

In 1935 Blumenfeld returned to Moscow and applied for Soviet citizenship. A campaign of arrests of foreigners working in the Soviet Union was launched, but Blumenfeld concluded that this was due to the "exaggerated fear of spies."¹⁶ During a review of CPSU members his membership was suspended and never restored. Blumenfeld complained and even sent a letter to Stalin, with no success. He met with various Soviet government officials, including Maria Ulianova, Lenin's youngest sister, but she claimed that she could not help him, and he was forced to leave the Soviet Union; this was during the period of the "Great Terror." Several of his friends and acquaintances were arrested, but he claimed not to know what happened to them. He later discovered that some of them were sent to work in remote areas of the Soviet Union. Blumenfeld claimed that he was disturbed by the "purges" of the old Bolsheviks, but believed their "confessions" at the public show trials.¹⁷ One of Blumenfeld's acquaintances, a founder of the Austrian Communist Party, was arrested by the Soviet authorities and handed over to the Germans after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; he later perished in a Nazi concentration camp. Blumenfeld was concerned about the arrests of his friends and acquaintances, but preferred to remain a spectator and live a "peaceful contemplative life."¹⁸ At the time, he concluded that, despite the obvious political confusion and contradictions of these events, he could trust Stalin's leadership.¹⁹

15. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, pp. 167-68.

16. For an example of a Canadian Communist who was arrested and executed during the Stalin Terror, see Myron Momryk, "From the Streets of Oshawa to the Prisons of Moscow, The Story of Janos Farkas (1902-1938)," *Hungarian Studies Review* 38, nos. 1-2 (2011): 69-82.

17. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, p. 174.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

Blumenfeld was eventually labeled as a “Trotskyite,” an “agent of the Gestapo,” and a “venomous and irreconcilable enemy of the proletarian revolution”²⁰ in a local Soviet newspaper. His efforts to clear his name with the Soviet authorities were unsuccessful. He was unemployed for some months and his residency permit was not renewed. As a result, he was compelled to leave the Soviet Union. His protests fell on deaf ears once again. As a Jew and a Communist, he could not return to Nazi Germany. He left the Soviet Union on 30 April 1937, traveling by ship to France. Despite his expulsion from the Soviet Union, he remained a supporter of Communism and the Soviet Union, a “Bolshevik” but not a “Stalinist.”²¹ He began to view Stalin as an utterly ruthless and paranoid individual, and blamed what he called the “mistakes” of this period on Stalin’s “personality cult.” He concluded that there was “no rhyme or reason” why some became victims and others were spared.²² In retrospect, Blumenfeld felt very lucky to have left the Soviet Union at that time, but he justified his work in 1930-1933 because he was building a “better society.”²³

After leaving the Soviet Union, Blumenfeld traveled to France and England, and in 1938 he settled in the United States. In 1954 he decided to move to Canada, where he began working for the Planning Board of the City of Toronto. In 1959 he traveled to Europe and also to the Soviet Union. In Moscow he met several of his old friends and acquaintances, including some of those who were arrested in the 1930s and had been imprisoned in camps for many years. In Canada Blumenfeld became active in the Canadian Peace Congress and the Toronto Association for Peace, and attended peace rallies.

In August 1960 Blumenfeld applied for Canadian citizenship, but his application was refused. He suspected that his membership in the Canadian Peace Congress may have been taken into consideration. He reapplied in 1963, and this time his application was supported by statements in the local Toronto press. An editorial in *The Toronto Daily Star* quoted Blumenfeld’s words:

During my last years in the Soviet Union and in subsequent years, I became aware that the oppressive aspects of the Soviet regime had grown and become institutionalized. This has made it impossible for me to identify myself in any way with the Communist Party. I remain, however, a Marxist Socialist, and, as such, sympathetic to the

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-64.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 173-74.

22. *Ibid.*, p.175.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

economic and social development of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.²⁴

Four years after his initial request, Blumenfeld's application for Canadian citizenship was approved.

Blumenfeld joined the New Democratic Party (NDP), and in 1979 he ran unsuccessfully as an independent candidate in the federal elections.²⁵ He served on the national executive of the Canadian Peace Congress and wrote letters to the press about the peace movement. He taught at universities in Toronto and Montreal and served as a consultant on numerous projects, including Expo 67 in Montreal. In 1978 Blumenfeld was awarded the Order of Canada for his professional work in Canada.²⁶ He continued his academic activities and his involvement in the peace movement. His autobiography was published one year before his death in Toronto on 30 January 1988.²⁷

Hans Blumenfeld's autobiography is an example of how a person's ideological commitment can profoundly influence his personal experiences and interpretation of events. Despite the fact that Blumenfeld had held a young famine victim in his arms in Makiivka in 1933, he continued to support the Soviet Union and believed that the terrible events of 1930-1933 were a necessary part of building socialism and a "better society" in the Soviet Union. His speculations on the factors responsible for this famine failed to bring him to rigorous conclusions based on his personal observations and other evidence to which he was privy at the time of the famine and in subsequent years. His knowledge of the "purges" of the late 1930s, the "madness" of the postwar political trials of Communist leaders in Eastern Europe,²⁸ and his later meetings with friends and acquaintances who had survived lengthy prison sentences in Siberia, failed to persuade Blumenfeld, that the Stalinist Terror, which he himself described as a "nightmare,"²⁹ became an integral part of the functioning of the Soviet state.

24. Ron Haggert, "Hans Blumenfeld: Man without a Country," *The Toronto Daily Star*, 29 Nov. 1963; *idem*, "Why Can't This Man Become a Citizen"; "A Citizen We Should Have," *ibid.*, 2 Dec. 1963.

25. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, pp. 299-300.

26. Jackie Smith, "Former Communist among 64 Appointed to Order of Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 25 Dec. 1978.

27. Blumenfeld's obituary appeared in *Peace News* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1988).

28. Blumenfeld, *Life Begins at 65*, p. 280.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

SERGE CIPKO

CANADA AND THE HOLODOMOR: A BRIEF DISCUSSION

In 1934 *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent William Henry Chamberlin posed the following question: "Is it conceivable that the famine of 1932-33 could have taken place if civil liberties had prevailed in the Soviet Union, if newspapers had been free to report the facts, if speakers could have appealed for relief, if the government in power had been obliged to submit its policy of letting vast numbers of the peasants starve to death to the verdict of a free election?"¹

That same year, an article titled "Russian Economic Realities" appeared in the British periodical *Fortnightly Review*. Its author, Lancelot Lawton, wrote about the Soviet government's attempt to conceal the famine from the outside world. "At the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 came famine, chiefly in Ukrainia and the North Caucasus," he wrote. Lawton then went on to declare that "No more remarkable instance of suppression has been recorded in history than the Bolshevik concealment of this great calamity." The Soviet government, he said, "to the present day" would not acknowledge that a famine had occurred. He described it as a "pose of ignorance" that was "absurd" because "the fact has been proved by a host of eye-witnesses, including foreigners of repute."²

Although newspapers in the Soviet Union were "not free to report the facts" and in spite of Soviet attempts to suppress news about the famine, stories about mass starvation traversed its borders and reached countries such as Canada. This North American country was home to a large number of immigrants whose roots were in territories of the Soviet Union that were famine-stricken. Letters describing famine conditions were obtained by Mennonites and Ukrainians (although the majority of Canada's Ukrainians came from territories which in 1933 were under Poland, not the Soviet Union) in the Canadian West. The Ukrainian-language press in

1 "Freedom Means Food," *New York Times*, 5 Nov. 1934, p. 18.

2. Lancelot Lawton, "Russian Economic Realities," *Fortnightly Review* 135 (Aug. 1934): pp. 175-76. In 2006, the British Embassy in Kyiv hosted the presentation of a collection of articles by Lawton, who was a journalist and among the founders of the Anglo-Ukrainian Committee formed in 1935. See "A Book for Skeptics," *Day*, no. 15 2006 (<http://www.day.kiev.ua/162552/>).

Canada also extensively covered the famine. Among the major Ukrainian-language periodicals published in Canada at the time was *Ukrainskivisti*, a weekly closely associated with the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada. Published in Edmonton, *Ukrainskivisti* received newspapers from western Ukraine and from Ukrainian diaspora communities outside Canada and informed its readers of stories about the famine that appeared in such publications. It also ran editorials about the famine and published a pastoral letter by Bishop Basil Ladyka, the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada. *Ukrainskivisti* printed items concerning developments not only in Ukraine but also in Kuban (a region in the North Caucasus Territory) and the Volga region of the R.S.F.S.R. The majority of the population of Kuban, which also experienced famine, was of Ukrainian origin.³

Edmonton was home to two daily newspapers, the *Edmonton Journal* and *Edmonton Bulletin*. An article about the *Edmonton Journal's* coverage of the famine has been published and is available online.⁴ A conclusion that can be drawn from a review of the two newspapers' contents content is that coverage of the famine in the mainstream Canadian press was far from insignificant. Newspaper reports and other sources, show that the famine was widely discussed in Canada during 1932-34.

3. Kuban largely corresponds to the region known as Krasnodar krai. Its inhabitants include descendants of Ukrainian Cossacks who moved there in the late eighteenth century and migrants from Ukraine who came later in the nineteenth century. A Ukrainization policy that was put into effect in the Ukrainian SSR from the early 1920s also extended to Kuban and to other regions of the Russian Federation. Hundreds of schools offered instruction in Ukrainian, the Ukrainian language was used in local administration and mass media. Ukrainianization in the R.S.F.S.R. was abolished on 14-15 December 1932. In January and February 1933, *Ukrainski visti* reported that the threat of hunger had brought people in the Kuban region to the point of revolt. A revolt that encompassed several districts allegedly briefly resulted in the setting up of a Cossack government. The revolt was suppressed. Subsequent stories about Kuban in *Ukrainski visti* included references to inhabitants searching for food, to the disappearance of cats and dogs, and to cannibalism and the dangers posed to the lives of children who could be set upon and killed. See, for example, "Povstannia kubanskykh kozakiv," *Ukrainski visti*, 18 Jan. 1933, p. 2; "Iak vyhliadalo povstannia kubanskykh selian-kozakiv," *Ukrainski visti*, 15 Febr. 1933, p. 2; "Shcho dietsia v SRSR," *Ukrainski visti*, 31 May 1933, p. 1; "Liudoidstvo na Kubani," *Ukrainski visti*, 21 June 1933, p. 1; and "Holod na Ukraini," *Ukrainski visti*, 2 Aug. 1933, p. 4.

4. "Readers Had Ample Evidence of Holodomor," *Edmonton Journal*, 8 Nov. 2008, at: <http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/ideas/story.html?id=9882b329-654f-4a84-8c26-123c37064e43>. A longer article on the topic of Edmonton press coverage, including the *Edmonton Bulletin*, will appear in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. An article in Ukrainian about Edmonton press coverage was published as "Zvity edmontonskykh hazet pro holod 1932-33 rr. v Ukraini," in *Zakhidnokanadskyyi zbirnyk*, vol. 5 (Edmonton: Kanadske naukove tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka, 2008), pp. 218-22. For examples of how the famine was covered in the *Western Catholic* (now the *Western Catholic Reporter*), see my "Pope Wept over Starving Ukrainians," *Western Catholic Reporter*, 6 Dec. 2010.

The question of the famine was raised and discussed in provincial and federal legislatures. The most publicized case was the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, which took the unusual step on 15 March 1933 of suspending its sitting on the motion of Dr. John M. Urich, a member of the Liberal opposition in the house. His motion proposed that the house adjourn to "consider a matter of urgent public importance." After some discussion, the Saskatchewan Legislature agreed to press the federal government of Canada to act on behalf of people starving in the USSR. And the next day a resolution was passed that read:

That this assembly requests the Dominion government to accord the fullest measure of assistance to the promotion of trade between Canada and other countries on a barter and exchange basis, and that this principle of trading be especially considered in regard to the possibility of Canada supplying Russia with wheat and cattle to the end that the present suffering from lack of food by residents of that country may, to some extent, be alleviated and that this action may also have some beneficial effect on the price levels of these commodities.⁵

Not much concrete action seems to have stemmed from the Saskatchewan resolution. As Jamie Glasov has noted, Canada "avoided any formal diplomatic contact or large-scale business relations with Moscow throughout 1930s." In 1931 the Conservative administration under Prime Minister Richard B. Bennett had imposed an embargo on Soviet imports, to which the Soviet Union responded by placing a ban on Canadian products. The Canadian embargo was not lifted until in 1936.⁶

The issue of the famine was also introduced to the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, albeit later, in May 1933. It was brought forth by Dr. Cornelius W. Wiebe, who represented the riding of Morden and Rhineland as a member of the Liberal Party. On 3 May he drew attention to constituents who had learned of the plight of relatives in the USSR. "These people, most of them living in the Ukraine, have been dying in large numbers both from actual starvation and from undernourishment as a result of excessive levies made on farm products by the Soviet authorities," the *Winnipeg Free Press* noted Wiebe had said. Wiebe added that the "people had protested and pleaded with the authorities without avail." Unlike the Saskatchewan case, Wiebe had no motion in connection with

5. For more on the topic, see my "The Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan and the Holodomor," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 18 Sept. 2011.

6. Jamie Glasov, *Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2002), p. 6.

the famine but wanted to bring the information to the attention of the other members of the assembly.⁷

Still later, Michael Luchkovich, the Member of Parliament for Vegreville, Alberta – Canada’s first and at the time only MP of Ukrainian origin – spoke about the famine in detail on 5 February 1934. The catalyst for the speech had been the eyewitness account of the famine by another MP, Humphrey Mitchell (Labor party, East Hamilton, Ontario). Although Mitchell himself never mentioned the famine in the House of Commons, a message that he relayed to Hamilton Mayor John Peebles about conditions in the USSR was widely publicized in Canadian newspapers in the mid-1933 and Mitchell himself elaborated during interviews with the press after his return. His description of conditions prompted an editorial in Toronto’s *Globe and Mail* (July 1933) and also, separately but on the same page as the editorial, the following comment: “Mr. Humphrey Mitchell, Hamilton member of Parliament, has been visiting in Russia. He writes that he never saw such suffering as he witnessed in the land of the Soviets. And Mr. Mitchell is a calm, level-headed representative of Labor. Evidently he got away from the beaten paths that Moscow has prepared for notable visitors, such as Mr. George Bernard Shaw.” On 5 February 1934, John R. MacNicol, Conservative Member of Parliament for Toronto Northwest, in drawing attention to the effects of socialism in the Soviet Union, mentioned in the House of Commons an interview that another Toronto newspaper, the *Toronto Star*, had conducted with Mitchell. And thus the subject of the famine was introduced to Canada’s federal parliament – an introduction that prompted Luchkovich’s speech on the same.⁸

Although no direct relief or government action resulted from the information presented in the provincial assemblies and the House of Commons, the newspaper coverage of the deliberations in Regina did provide an opportunity for further public discussion. In response to that coverage, W. S. Plawiuk, in a letter to the editor of the *Edmonton Journal*, wrote that thousands of letters had been received by Ukrainian Canadians in the fall of 1932, asking not for money, but for grain and flour. “We tried to make arrangements to collect 400,000 to 500,000 bushels of wheat to be shipped to Ukraine,” he said, “but the Soviet government through their charitable institutions refused to accept our offer, stating: ‘In view of satisfactory harvest this year, proposal is not necessary in the absence of real

7. “Great Privations in Russia Told to Legislature,” *Winnipeg Free Press*, 4 May 1933, p. 3.

8. For more on Luchkovich, see my “Michael Luchkovich and the Famine,” *Ukrainian Weekly*, 26 June 2011.

need [sic]’.”⁹ The complaint that efforts to provide relief to starving people in the Soviet Union were undermined by the lack of cooperation of the Soviet authorities was echoed by Eugene Volodin of the Border Cities Workers’ Educational Circle in a June 1933 letter to *Border Cities Star* of Windsor, Ontario. Volodin began his letter by declaring that “we Russians, as Canadian citizens, residents of the Border Cities and members Border Cities Workers Educational Circle” had assembled in Windsor’s Polish Canadian Citizens’ Club in order to “raise our voice against the recognition of the government of the country of our birth by the government of Canada.” Volodin noted that “From many regions we are daily in receipt of letters reporting numerous cases of cannibalism,” and that the Soviet government was “restricting to receive any kind of help outside of the land of the so-called Communism.”¹⁰ And in a September 1933 letter to the editor of the *Toronto Star*, Rev. D. D. Leschisin reinforced what Plawiuk had said earlier in the year. “In 1932 an offer to ship some grain and thus help the starving people in the Ukraine was made by Ukrainian farmers in western Canada through the Canadian Red Cross,” he wrote. But, he continued, “the offer was refused by the Soviet government, denying at the same time there was any famine.”¹¹ A couple of years later, Lesio Sysyn, in an article published in the *Herald-News*, New Jersey, and reprinted in the American Ukrainian periodical *Svoboda*, also mentioned the Canadian Red Cross. “In 1932 the Canadian Red Cross, upon the request of Ukrainian farmers of Western Canada to send some flour and bread to Soviet Ukraine, asked from the Soviet government permission to do some relief work there,” he wrote. The Soviet Red Cross, however, “denied any existence of famine and refused to admit any supplies of food stuffs to the Ukraine.”¹²

In their references to the famine the politicians, as well as individuals who wrote to the newspapers’ editors, mentioned letters that had been received in Canada.¹³ There were eyewitness accounts that were publicized by the newspapers, too. In addition to the one by Humphrey Mitchell, Canadians also heard the famine confirmed by others from Canada who had traveled to the Soviet Union. In October 1933, H. Satanove, returning

9. “Soviets Refused Wheat,” *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1933, p. 4.

10. “Warns against Trade with Russia,” *Border Cities Star*, 27 June 1933, second section, p. 5.

11. “Ukrainian Independence,” *Toronto Star*, 28 Sept. 1933, p. 6.

12. See “Soviet Russia’s Crime against the Ukraine,” *Svoboda*, 25 July 1935, p. 4.

13. When Saskatchewan’s politicians discussed the famine on 15 March 1933, excerpts of letters received from the Soviet Union were read out that day in the legislature. See for example the newspaper clippings for March 1933 in *Clippings Hansard* (Regina: Saskatchewan Archives Board, 1984). The clippings, on microfilm, are available in Library and Archives Canada and the Legislative Library in Regina.

to Canada after a tour of the USSR and Palestine, reported scenes of starvation in Ukraine. Earlier in the year, as she “stood talking to a banker in Romna [Romny?], Russia,” she felt “something beneath her heel. She turned, looked down . . . It was a child – dead of starvation.”¹⁴ On a rare occasion or two, Canadians heard about the famine from individuals who were allowed to join relatives in Canada. The testimony of Marie Zuk, who came to Canada from Soviet Ukraine in (or close to) September 1933, was included in a letter about the famine that a Canadian Ukrainian organization sent to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.¹⁵

By the fall of 1933 a number of rallies across Canada (from Calgary in Alberta to Oshawa in Ontario) had been organized by Ukrainian community groups to draw attention to conditions in Soviet Ukraine. These rallies would conclude with resolutions calling on the various tiers of government to assist. The meeting that was organized by the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada (a lay organization of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) in Toronto in September 1933 drew over 500 people. An “appeal to the world” was issued demanding that the Soviet Union cease its “policy of ruthless grain collections from the starving population of the Ukraine, which aggravates and prolongs the conditions of starving and famine in the Ukraine.”¹⁶

Both Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic leaders in Canada were concerned about the spread of Communist sentiments among Ukrainians in Canada. Pro-Soviet Ukrainian periodicals in Canada preferred the accounts of former French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot about the Soviet Union to those about the existence of widespread famine in Soviet Ukraine. Herriot, who visited the USSR in August-September 1933, said that he had not seen “anything resembling a famine” in Ukraine.¹⁷ In addition to the rallies that protested the famine, others were

14. “Marching War Legions, Starving Children, City Woman’s Picture of Soviet Russia,” *Edmonton Journal*, 5 Oct. 1933, p. 1.

15. M. Wayne Morris, *Stalin’s Famine and Roosevelt’s Recognition of Russia* (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1994), pp. 193-96. See also Bohdan Klid, “Early Survivor Testimony on the Holodomor,” *New Pathway*, 2 Dec. 2010, p. 6.

16. “Ukrainians Appeal,” *Toronto Star*, 2 Oct. 1933, p. p. 7.

17. See, for example, Marco Carynyk, “Swallowing Stalinism: Pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadians and Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s,” in *Canada’s Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, edited by Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 190. Sources on the attitude of pro-Soviet organizations toward the matter of the famine can be found in John Kolasky’s *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990). On a day that the French daily *Le Matin* announced that Herriot had left Rostov-on-the-Don and was now in Moscow, the newspaper published an appeal by Jan Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz (“Prince de Tokary Tokarzewski Karaszewicz, ancien ministre”) for an official humanitarian mission to visit Soviet Ukraine. Describing the situation there as “terrifying,” Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz said that

organized that urged the Canadian government to be firmer in their approach toward Communist propaganda.¹⁸

Occasionally, there were editorials and exchanges about the famine in the mainstream press. In at least one instance a Canadian newspaper editor made a statement about the famine after a visit to the Soviet Union. In July 1933, at a time when the Canadian government was being lobbied to expand trade with the Soviet Union, Robert J. Cromie, publisher of the *Vancouver Sun*, said in reference to the famine that: "some critics say that conditions were not too bad in Moscow, but down in the Ukraine people were starving. Someone from the Ukraine told me that the people in Moscow are starving, too." Everything that one heard about the USSR, he continued, was both "true and untrue."¹⁹ Cromie's comments were publicized across Canada. His statement (along with comments that had been made by Herriot and others) was also recalled by a letter-writer in the British newspaper *Manchester Guardian* in an exchange about conditions in the USSR and the famine.²⁰

Cromie was not the only Canadian associated with a newspaper to travel to the Soviet Union in 1933. That year the Netherlands-born journalist Pierre van Paassen was sending "hot cables" on his "Russian trip" to Canada, and thus Canadians also read about the famine in the dispatches that he remitted.²¹ Van Paassen was educated in a Calvinist parochial school and studied for the ministry at Victoria College in Toronto. He served as an assistant pastor in a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) mission for the Methodist Church. During his career as a journalist, he wrote for several Canadian and American newspapers, and travelled to various parts of the world. Beginning in 1932, van Paassen spent three years in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for the *Toronto Star*. In August 1933 he was assigned to investigate reports about the famine, specifically in Ukraine.

the country was gripped by famine and a typhus epidemic. People were dying, he said, and Ukraine was being depopulated ("Les populations se meurent, l'Ukraine se dépeuple!"). Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz added that it was necessary to send an official mission to Soviet Ukraine to investigate conditions there and noted that a Franco-Ukrainian committee had been struck for that purpose. See "M. Herriot a Moscou," *Le Matin*, 2 Sept. 1933, p. 3, and "Il faut qu'une mission officielle aille voir ce qui se passe en Ukraine," *Le Matin*, 2 Sept. 1933, p. 2.

18. Texts of resolutions passed at these rallies can be found in Library and Archives Canada and in the archives of the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre (Oseredok), Winnipeg.

19. "Vancouver Publisher Says That Russia Like Anywhere Else," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 29 July 1933, p. 6.

20. See "The Truth about Russia," *Manchester Guardian*, 20 Sept. 1933, p. 16.

21. For an announcement of the trip, see "Pierre Van Paassen to Send Hot Cables on Russian Trip," *Edmonton Bulletin*, 14 Aug. 1933, p. 1.

Apart from the *Toronto Star*, his reports were carried by other Canadian newspapers.

In one of his reports, van Paassen spoke of "a bitter social and political conflict," of "a drought," and of a "campaign to bring the government to a fall or at least to embroil it in grave difficulties." He recognized that the "grain collectors were ruthless last year" but said that he was told "that the privations in the Ukraine did not quite reach the proportions of that earlier catastrophe [of 1921] when ten millions died of hunger and typhus."²²

Another journalist, Carleton J. Ketchum, who had worked for the *Ottawa Citizen*, *Vancouver Province*, and later, *Daily Express* of London, also visited the Soviet Union and brought back pictures to show in public lectures across the country. In December 1933 he spoke in Winnipeg at "the Canadian Ukrainian institute, 'Prosvita' auditorium." There he mentioned the famine, stating that at least five million and possibly ten million people had "died from starvation and malnutrition in the Ukraine," though, oddly, the years for when the deaths had occurred were given as 1931-32. Ketchum added that the worst was now over. For the first time in three years, he said, "people will now have bread because of the good crop." But he cautioned that there were "still serious shortages of meat and other foodstuffs, and also clothing."²³

By the close of 1933 foreign correspondents in Moscow had been reporting successful harvests in the Soviet Union. Thus, when the archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Theodor Innitzer, predicted that a famine would again occur in the winter, in early December 1933 the *Edmonton Journal* informed its readers that dispatches from Moscow in October had indicated that the crops were good which "gave assurance of adequate food supplies."²⁴ Reports of a good harvest made it easier for Soviet sympathizers to dismiss any talk of the famine. Thus, in November 1933, George Palmer, who had worked as a reporter for *Moscow Daily News*, when asked about food shortages in the USSR, denied that there were any. "I never saw so many healthy, robust men and women as I did there," the *Edmonton Journal* quoted him as saying. Palmer's remarks prompted an exchange in the letters' page of the newspaper.²⁵

Toward the end of the year some of the attention of Canadian newspapers vis-à-vis the USSR had been drawn to the question of whether or not

22. "Ukraine Practically Won over to Soviet Farm Plan," *Toronto Star*, 16 Sept. 1933, pp. 1 and 3.

23. "Plans to Disturb Ketchum Lecture are Frustrated," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 Dec. 1933, p. 2.

24. "Appeals for Aid Soviet's Starving," *Edmonton Journal*, 2 Dec. 1933, p. 19.

25. See, for example, "Ukrainian Citizen's Reply," *Edmonton Journal*, 28 Nov. 1933, p. 4, and "Russian Conditions," *Edmonton Journal*, 20 Dec. 1933, p. 6.

the United States would extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. Ukrainians in Canada joined Ukrainians in the United States in petitioning the U.S. government to not recognize the USSR until the matter of the famine had been adequately investigated. Notwithstanding such petitions, the U.S. government recognized the Soviet Union before the close of the year.

After the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States, during 1934 the question was raised of whether the USSR would be admitted to the League of Nations. The United States was never a member of the League. Canada was, and its government was very much aware of the protests about the famine from the resolutions it had received that had been passed at rallies across the country. In fact, in the opinion of Glazov, Canada's anti-Soviet policy under the Bennett administration was to some extent influenced by the local Ukrainian community. "This policy," he wrote "resulted largely from the sentiments of Catholics in Quebec and immigrants from the communist world (especially Ukrainians), both of whom abhorred Moscow's persecution of their political and religious compatriots."²⁶ Still, the Canadian prime minister was not anti-Soviet to the extent of voting against the admission of the USSR to the League. (It should be noted that a year before the vote, in 1933, Nazi Germany [and Japan] had withdrawn from the League.) In September 1934, 38 nations voted in favor of the resolution recommending the USSR's admission to the League of Nations. Seven nations – Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Luxembourg, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela – abstained. Panama, one of the countries that had abstained, had apparently gone back on a "gentlemen's agreement" about voting for Soviet admission. The *Manchester Guardian* said it had done so under the influence of an article on Soviet Ukraine that had appeared in a Swiss newspaper.²⁷ The *New York Times* elaborated: "The Panama delegate recorded with his abstention the statement that he did not feel justified in voting for Russia's admission after reading in the press about the condition of her starving masses."²⁸ Three countries, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, voted "no." The Swiss were represented by M. Giuseppe Motta, who mentioned the famine in his speech. The text of Motta's speech before the sixth committee of the League of Nations was published by the *New York Times*.²⁹ Albeit with reservations, Canada was among the countries that voted "yes." The Do-

26. Glazov, *Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union*, p. 6.

27. See "Russia Accepts Membership of the League," *Manchester Guardian*, 17 Sept. 1934, p. 14.

28. "Russia to Become a League Member with Council Seat," *New York Times*, 16 Sept. 1934, p. 36.

29. See "Motta's Attack in League of the Soviet System," *New York Times*, 18 Sept. 1934, p. 10.

minion's position before the sixth committee of the Assembly was presented by Oscar Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. During his speech, Skelton spoke of the "apprehension felt by many thousands in Canada who have relatives and friends" in the Soviet Union "as to the continuance of the sufferings and the famine which were reported in many districts of the Soviet Union last year [1933] and on previous occasions."³⁰

Almost a year earlier the League had revealed that it was unable to intervene to help the "famine-stricken populace of the Russian Ukraine" after receiving many appeals. Johan Mowinckel, the president of the Council of the League of Nations, had brought up the subject of the famine at a secret session and had urged for some action to be taken. But the council maintained that a country that was not a member of the League could not be approached on an internal matter. It was suggested that the issue be deferred to a non-political body such as the Red Cross.³¹ In 1934, members of the League voted to admit the USSR to its fold and presumably the obstacle the council described was now removed. And during the discussions over its admission the famine was mentioned by delegates of at least three countries. One of those countries was Canada.

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30. For more on this topic, see my "The USSR's Admission to the League of Nations and the Holodomor," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 Oct. 2011, p. 8. In an additional vote, on whether to grant the Soviet Union a permanent seat on the League Council, forty countries voted in favor and ten abstained. See "Moscow Takes Seat as Member of the League," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Sept. 1934, p. 2.

31. "Council of League of Nations Unable to Intervene in Ukraine Famine," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 30 Sept. 1933, 31

DOCUMENTS

ROMAN SERBYN, compiler and editor

PAVEL POSTYSHEV AND VADIM BALITSKY AT THE 1934 CONGRESS OF THE KP(b)U

From 26 January 26 to 10 February 1934, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – VKP(b), held its Seventeenth Party Congress, hailed as the “Congress of Victors”. The meeting was convened to celebrate the victories of Stalin’s “revolution from above,” to assess the party’s achievements since its Sixteenth Congress in 1930, and to chart a second five-year plan for the country’s future developments. In preparation for the Moscow gathering, the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine – KP(b)U – held its own preliminary Twelfth Congress, from the 18th to the 23rd of January in Kharkiv, then the capital of Soviet Ukraine.

Reports and position papers from the two Congresses give a good account of the regime’s objectives, the means and methods chosen to achieve them, and the official excuses for, and the justification of, the injustices and crimes that these measures entailed. The two documents reproduced here in the Ukrainian and Russian, and translated into English, are taken from the speeches delivered at the Kharkiv Congress by two key figures of the Ukrainian administration, Pavel Postyshev and Vadim Balitsky. Distrustful of the Ukrainian hierarchy (Stanislav Kosior, the general secretary of the KP(b)U, Hryhorii Petrovsky, the nominal head of state, Vlas Chubar, the prime-minister, and Mykola Skrypnyk, the minister of education), Stalin mused for a time about sending Lazar Kaganovich to reestablish stricter control over Ukraine, but decided that he needed his most trusted collaborator and accomplice in Moscow. On 24 January 1933, a resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) delegated Postyshev and Balitsky, who already had extensive experience in Ukrainian affairs, to take up the challenge of transforming Ukraine into “a model republic” of the USSR. Both envoys had proved their mettle with unswerving loyalty to Stalin and unwavering service to the cause: Postishev in the party and state administration, and Balitsky in the OGPU (All-Union State Political Administration), in other words – political police.

Significantly, Postyshev devotes most of his report to the problems of fighting Ukrainian nationalism and nationalist deviations in the Ukrainian party and state organs. The correct implementation of the Leninist nationality policy is indivisible from the development of the economy, in all its branches. For this reason, he affirms that the fight against the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and the other nationalist organizations, which strove to separate Ukraine from the USSR, and the liquidation of the Ukrainian kulaks, who sympathized with these movements, require the same vigilance and violent repression. Postyshev's boasting that the construction of collective farm took off, and "immense victories" were achieved, when the party and *komsomol* activists adhered to violent repression against the peasants is rather revealing about what Raphael Lemkin later identified as the regime's first and third prongs in the destruction of the Ukrainian nation: the slaughter of the intelligentsia and the starving of the independent peasants.

Balitsky's testimony is that of the enforcer-in-chief of Stalin's politics in Ukraine. It was under his guidance that the clandestine SVU organization was concocted, its invented members rounded up and tried, and nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia purged from public functions. It was his GPU that hunted the real and imaginary "kulak-Petliurist" elements and linked them to the SVU and other "counter-revolutionary" organizations.

The resolution of 14 December (1932) mentioned by Postyshev refers to the decision to reverse the policy of Ukrainianization in the RSFSR and deprive its eight million ethnic Ukrainians of the use of the Ukrainian language in schools, mass media, and local administration.

П. ПОСТИШЕВ

БОРОТЬБА КП(Б)У ЗА ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ЛЕНІНСЬКОЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ НА УКРАЇНІ

Товариші! На останньому, листопадовому, пленумі ЦК КП(б)У та й на попередньому червневому пленумі ЦК про національне питання не мало говорилося. Тому я постараюся скоротитися. Однак, дати аналіз, хоча б в основних рисах того шляху, який КП(б)У проробила від XI до XII з'їзду в справі здійснення ленінської національної політики на Україні, я вважаю абсолютно необхідним. Адже увесь той аналіз, який я в своїй доповіді даю, я даю не для “приємних” спогадів, а для того, щоб на цьому наші партійні кадри і ми самі в першу чергу вчилися, щоб ми не повторяли більше минулих помилок. А в період, як ви знаєте, ми тепер вступили сугубовідповідальний і складний.

Так от, який же був шлях КП(б)У за цей період в її боротьбі за здійснення ленінської національної політики на Україні?

Ті успіхи і перемоги, яких КП(б)У досягла до XVII з'їзду партії в галузі промисловості, сільського господарства і поліпшення матеріального та культурного становища робітників і колгоспників, є безпосередній і прямий результат здійснення на Україні ленінської національної політики, бо боротьба за здійснення національної політики партії на Україні є боротьба за всебічний розвиток усіх галузей господарства України, за безперервне зростання матеріального добробуту робітничих і колгоспних мас, за розквіт радянської української культури, за безперервне зростання України-невідійманої частини великого Радянського Союзу.

В боротьбі КП(б)У за здійснення ленінської національної політики на протязі від XI до XII з'їзду КП(б)У треба розрізняти два основних етапи: перший етап – від XI з'їзду КП(б)У до постанови ЦК ВКП(б) і Раднаркому СРСР від 14 грудня та рішення ЦК ВКП(б) від 24 січня й другий етап- після цих історичних рішень.

Прослідкуймо тепер докладніше боротьбу КП(б)У за здійснення ленінської національної політики за час від XI до XII з'їзду. У політзвіті ЦК ВКП(б) XVI з'їздові партії т. Сталін, говорячи про ухили в національному питанні, указував:

"Націоналістичні ухили можна було б назвати повзучими ухилами. Але це ще не значить, що вони не існують. Ні, вони існують і, головне, – ростуть. У цьому не може бути ніякого сумніву тому, що загальна атмосфера загострення класової боротьби не може не вести до певного загострення національних тертів, які мають своє відбиття в партії".

Цією своєю вказівкою т. Сталін сигналізував партії про зростання націоналістичних ухилів, показував партії, що зростання націоналістичних ухилів є результат загострення класової боротьби в зв'язку з наступом соціалізму по всьому фронту, і кликав партію до боротьби з цими націоналістичними ухилами – агентурою класового ворога.

Але тов. Сталін на XVI з'їзді партії не тільки указував на небезпеку зростання націоналістичних ухилів, він показав також суть, тактику і маневри як ухилу в бік великодержавного шовінізму, так і ухилу в бік місцевого націоналізму.

Ось що він з цього приводу казав:

"Не може бути ніякого сумніву, що ухил в бік російського великодержавного шовінізму в національному питанні, який прикривають до того ж маскою інтернаціоналізму, є найвитонченіший і тому найнебезпечніший вид великоруського націоналізму

Небезпека ухилу в бік місцевого націоналізму полягає в тому, що він культивує буржуазний націоналізм, послаблює єдність трудящих народів в СРСР і грає на руку "інтервенціоністам".

Тов. Сталін, як бачите, дав на XVI з'їзді партії розгорнену поставу національного питання і це зрозуміло, бо XVI з'їзд був з'їздом розгорненого наступу соціалізму по всьому фронту, а це неминуче означало різке загострення класової боротьби в країні і активізацію націоналістичної контрреволюції та її агентури в партії.

Які висновки повинні ми були зробити для себе з усіх цих вказівок т. Сталіна в національному питанні на XVI з'їзді?

Ми повинні були, по-перше, піднести більшовицьку пильність своїх лав відносно націоналістичних елементів.

Ми повинні були, по-друге, перевірити кадри на всіх ділянках соціалістичного будівництва і особливо на теоретичному фронті та інших ділянках будівництва радянської української культури і вигнати звідти націоналістичні елементи.

Ми повинні були, по-третє, перевірити свої власні лави, посиливши боротьбу проти найменших проявів як руського великодержавного, так і українського націоналізму.

Ми повинні були, по-четверте, широко розгорнути роботу по інтернаціональному вихованню як своїх власних лав, так і найширших мас робітничого класу і колгоспників.

Ми повинні були, по п'яте, широко розгорнути роботу показу справжнього лиця українських націоналістичних організацій та їхніх керівників, викриваючи їх зв'язок з інтервенціоністськими штабами.

Ось ті висновки, що їх ми, більшовики України, повинні були зробити для себе з вказівок т. Сталіна по національному питанню на XVI з'їзді партії.

Чи зробила КП(б)У ці висновки з вказівок т. Сталіна на XVI з'їзді? Ні, не зробила. А тим часом КП(б)У мала кілька досить серйозних сигналів з боку націоналістичної контрреволюції, що активізується. Я маю на увазі процес СВУ і справу "українського національного центру".

Процес СВУ був надзвичайно серйозним сигналом для КП(б)У. Що виявив цей процес?

Процес СВУ виявив, що українська націоналістична контрреволюція перейшла до перекидання основних своїх сил і концентрації основної своєї роботи тут на Радянській Україні, а не за кордоном. Ось що свідчив тоді член СВУ Дурдуківський:

"Наша лінія полягала в тому, щоб збирати на Радянській Україні всі найкращі, найталановитіші, найвідданіші українські сили, розкидані мало не по всьому світу. Де головний фронт – туди кращі бойові сили".

А головним фронтом зони, зрозуміло, вважали Радянську Україну, і ось з усього світу все своє "найкраще" і все "бойове" збирали сюди. Чому ж з цього не зробили ніяких висновків? Чому?

Процес СВУ виявив, що тактика української націоналістичної контрреволюції полягала в тому, щоб, як свідчив підсудний Івченко:

"Проштовхувати своїх людей всюди, де тільки можна. Впроваджувати людей в усі сфери суспільно-господарського і культурного життя. Проникати в партію і комсомол".

Процес СВУ показав, нарешті, що найбільш міцні ядра націоналістичної контрреволюції були у вищій і трудовій школі, в Академії Наук, видавництвах, письменницьких організаціях.

Ось, що свідчив тоді небезвідомий Єфремов, керівник СВУ:

"Щороку тисячі селянської молоді поповнюють радянські ВИШ'ї. Скінчивши ВИШ'ї, ця молодь звичайно вертається назад на село вчителями, лікарями, агрономами, кооператорами.

СВУ звернула особливу увагу на вищу школу, використовуючи її для прищеплення націоналістичних ідей, вибираючи надійні кадри із учнів цієї школи".

З усього цього ви можете зробити висновок, що вже процес СВУ виявив головні пункти концентрації сил націоналістичної контррево-

люції, її тактику і маневри, а також явну недостатність пильності членів партії.

Чи зробила КП(б)У всі необхідні висновки з цього процесу? Ні, не зробила. Вийшло так, ніби процес СВУ-ізолюваний епізод. Викрили, засудили-ну й кінець. Тим часом ясно, що в силу загострення класової боротьби в нашій країні, особливо на тому етапі, діяльність націоналістичної контрреволюції на цьому не кінчилася і кінчитися не могла.

У 1931 році КП(б)У дістала другий надзвичайно гучний і серйозний сигнал. Я маю на увазі викриття так званого “українського національного центру”, який являє собою блок українських і галицьких націоналістичних партій. До цієї організації входили Чечель, Голубович, Мазуренко Василь, Лизанівський, Христюк, Матвій Яворський і інші. Це була бойова націонал – фашистська організація, яка ставила перед собою завдання об’єднання всіх сил націоналістичної контрреволюції і підготовку повстання на Україні, яке мало збігтися в часі з початком інтервенції, проектованої спершу в 1930 році, а потім перенесеної на 1931 рік.

Справа “українського національного центру” різко ставила перед КП(б)У питання про більшовицьку пильність, про вигнання націоналістів з державного апарату, про боротьбу з націоналістичними ухилами в своїх власних лавах.

Але ми повинні констатувати, що все лишилося по старому. Справа “українського національного центру” пройшла знову таки як ізолюваний епізод, не відбившись на житті і боротьбі КП(б)У.

Тим часом класова боротьба в країні і далі загострювалась. Націоналістичні елементи особливо міцно в 1931 і 1932 році активізувалися, з кожним днем проникаючи на нові і нов ділянки соціалістичного будівництва.

І ось на початку 1933 року ДПУ розкрило нову організацію – “Українську військову організацію” (УВО). Лише тепер видно, наскільки ця болячка на тілі Радянської України встигла розповзтися.

Їм удалося розсадити своїх людей і цілі групи на різних ділянках соціалістичного будівництва і особливо будівництва радянської української культури.

Надзвичайно цікава їх система розставлення своїх кадрів. Ось, наприклад, сектор Наркомосу. Ще в 1925 році керівником цього сектора сів Матвій Яворський. Пішов Яворський, – сів Озерський, пішов Озерський, – сів Коник, а всі ж вони виявилися згодом членами УВО і навіть її керівництва. Або ось Уповнаркомзаксправ. Заступником Уповнаркомзаксправ був у 1924 році Максимович, пішов Мак-

симович-сів Петренко, пішов Петренко – сів Тур, знову таки всі члени УВО і навіть її керівництва.

Як бачите, вони мали свій розпод-відділ, свою продуману систему розподілу і розставлення кадрів. І так майже на всіх ділянках, захоплених ними, вони додержували цього організаційного принципу наступності своїх людей. Раз захопивши ту чи іншу відповідальну ділянку, вони вже її із своїх рук не випускали.

Немалу роль тут відіграла наявність в КП(б)У невикритого на протязі ряду років націоналістичного ухилу на чолі з Скрипником. Про ухил Скрипника багато писалося і говорилося.

Ясно, що своїми настановами і діяльністю націоналістичний ухил в КП(б)У змикався з націоналістичною контрреволюцією і сприяв її шкідницькій роботі.

З усього цього також стає цілком очевидним, що націоналістичний ухил на чолі з Скрипником був прямим продовженням ухилу Шумського в 1927 році.

І шумськізм і ухил Скрипника жилися одними і тими самими коріннями і соками. І той і другий працювали на справу відриву України від Радянського Союзу, на справу імперіалістського поневолення українських робітників і селян. І той і другий стремились геть від Москви – центру світової пролетарської революції.

Але в тому то й річ, що Шумського ЦК КП(б)У в 1926-27 р. Викрив, і шумськізм КП(б)У розгромила. А ось націоналістичний ухил Скрипника КП(б)У прогледіла, і при тому в момент найгострішої класової боротьби.

Справді, поставимо перед собою питання: коли оформився націоналістичний ухил Скрипника? Націоналістичні помилки Скрипник робив давно. ЦК ВКП(б) і ЦК КП(б)У його багато разів поправляли. Але ухил Скрипника почав оформлятися, як ухил, як ціла система націонал-опортуністичних поглядів в період боротьби за ліквідацію куркульства як класу. Саме тоді Скрипник уже почав особливо міцно змикатися з інтервенціоністською агентурою на Україні – Баданами, Яворськими, Сліпанськими і інш. Саме тоді інтервенціоністська агентура в особі українських націоналістів на Україні стала всіяко використовувати Скрипника, як авторитетну фігуру, як пряме своє знаряддя.

Якщо на червневому пленумі я говорив про Скрипника тільки як про ширму для націоналістичних елементів, то зараз, покопавшись трохи в його архіві, я можу сміливо сказати, що Скрипник був не ширмою, а прямим знаряддям, хоча й несвідомим, цих націоналістичних елементів.

Наведу вам пару фактів для того, щоб показати, як ця націоналістична наволоч використовувала Скрипника.

ДПУ мало вислати в 1927 році 13 чоловіка націоналістів. Серед них Шпарага, Синчук, Никончук і ін. Бадан пише Скрипникові з обуренням про наступне вислання. Скрипник дослівно переписує цього листа Бадана і вже із своїм підписом направляє в ДПУ, домагаючись скасування цієї висилки.

А ось що свідчить тепер Бадан з цього приводу:

“У 1927 році Приступа доручив мені, щоб я через Скрипника добився повернення на Україну групи увіствів-всього, здається, 15 чоловіка. Я написав заяву Скрипникові, де, вказуючи на героїчну революційну роботу цих осіб, настоював перед ним, щоб він зажадав від ДПУ перегляду постанови про висилку. Скрипник цю мою заяву охоче прийняв і за своїм підписом направив її в ДПУ”. . . .

А ось другий факт. Націоналістам треба було переправити ішпигуна Воцедалека до Чехії. І ось Бадан знову таки пише Скрипникові про те, що Левицький, “відомий” секретар житомирського окрпарткому, підтримує прохання Воцедалека про поїздку за кордон, але на це потрібен дозвіл ЦК КП(б)У, і тому просить Скрипника просунути цю справу. Скрипник цю заяву від Бадана прийняв, але Воцедалека ДПУ категорично відмовилося за кордон відпустити, тому, що ще до того було точно встановлено, що Воцедалек є шпигун, агент чеської контррозвідки.

Ви бачите, як націоналістичний ухил змикався з цією наволоччю, як він був зняряддям цієї націоналістичної контрреволюції. Чи дивно, що вони нахабніли з кожним днем, переходячи всякі мислимі границі, і розперезалися в нас тут на всю?

Для характеристики того, як знахабніла ця націоналістична наволоч, цікава така заява Ерстенюка до партійної трійки по перевірці в 1929 р. осередку Наркомюсту УСРР про Романюка-одного з главарів “Української військової організації”.

Ось що він там писав:

“Бюлетень комунара”, висвітлюючи хід перевірки, партосередку “Наркомюсту, кидає, на мою думку безпідставно, тінь на тов. Романюка. Я вважаю своїм обов'язком довести до відома парттрійки таке:

а) Восени 1924 року наше повпредство в Празі доручило Романюку бути комендантом першого транспорту політемігрантів з Чехії до СРСР. Я, як тодішній секретар осередку, свідчу, що т. Романюк провів велику роботу серед політемігрантів, б) За час роботи в УСРР, з 1924 року, я ні разу не помічав у т. Романюка вагань або занепадництва. Романюк тоді, як і тепер, безумовно, інтернаціоналіст, має на-

шу більшовицьку мету, для неї працював і не даром ‘хліб їв’. З комуністичним привітом – Ерстенюк”. (*Загальний сміх у шаг*).

А ось вам ще один зразок нахабності націоналістів. Ось що писав Василь Мазуренко Скрипникові в липні 1929 року:

“Комісія преміювання наукових праць при обговоренні розподілу премій імені Леніна за наукові роботи спинилася на ваших працях, оскільки вони найбільш послідовно відбивають заповіді Ілліча у національному питанні. Комісія вважає, що цю премію треба також дати т. т. Річицькому і Бадану”.

Василь Мазуренко встановив Річицькому і Бадану премію разом зі Скрипником. За що? “За найбільш послідовне відбиття заповітів Леніна в національному питанні”. Скрипник “відбиває”! Ми знаємо, які в Скрипника були “ленінські” погляди в національному питанні.

Хто ж цей Василь Мазуренко? Він був у свій час послом Петлюри в Римі, а потім за радянської влади став професором і членом президії Асоціації сприяння будівництву соціалізму (сміх у залі). Правда, ми цього “будівника соціалізму” посадили в справі Українського національного центру. Ми його вислали, щоб він не “сприяв” соціалізові, без нього якнебудь обійдемося (*загальний сміх у залі*). Ось як нахабніла контрреволюційна націоналістична зграя.

Чи дивно, що ця націоналістична наволоч так нахабніла? Адже писав ось один дуже відповідальний працівник Скрипникові:

“Ми домовилися, що нема рації добивати Матвія Яворського. Але й зв'язуватися з ним не слід. Тому треба дати йому змогу “тихо зникнути”. Хай працює, тільки не на очах у всіх, як це виходить у ВУАНТ”.

Ви бачите, тільки б не на очах. А то- бувало, харківська організація, при виді Матвія Яворського вся запалюється від обурення. Ось яка обстановка. Це серйозний момент і це було в той період, коли треба було, як т. Сталін говорив, “мобілізувати саму партію для організації всієї справи наступу, зміцнити й відгострити парторганізацію, вигнавши звідти елементи бюрократизму, переродження”.

А тут кажуть “не заважайте Яворському, не добивайте, хай він ‘тихо зникне’”!

Постанови ЦК ВКП(б) від 14 грудня і 24 січня піднесли КП(б)У на боротьбу за виправлення помилок і промахів у здійсненні національної політики партії на Україні.

Останній рік був роком розгрому націоналістичної контрреволюції, викриття і розгрому націоналістичного ухилу на чолі з Скрипником, розгортання великої творчої роботи в галузі будівництва радянської української культури.

Це допомогло КП(б)У міцно вирівняти увесь свій фронт в цілому, це не могло минути безслідно і не могло не позначитися і на нашій промисловості, і на вугіллі, і на металургії, і на машинобудуванні.

Це загальне піднесення позначилося на всіх галузях народного господарства, де ворог міцно орудував.

Його треба було розбити, організуватися, треба було мобілізувати маси, відгострити партійні організації і повести їх у бій. Треба було сказати більшовикові: бий Бадана – не бійся, бий Василя Сірка – не бійся! Бий Черняка – не бійся, бий Озерського – не бійся, бий їх, цю націоналістичну наволоч, яка тут розперезалася, знахабніла, почувала себе прекрасно, ці “висуванці”, в яких було 100 проц. крові від поміщика, від Коновальця, від Скоропадського. Треба було сказати: бий, – не бійся, бий міцніше! (*Бурхливі оплески*).

А то яке становище було: і бачать, ніби не наша людина, і не по більшовицькому діє, але він-кандидат ЦК, шановна людина, де ж тут малограмотному більшовикові на селі, колгоспникові, біднякові і середнякові, де ж їм було розібратися? Хоча ці дії видавалися Річицькими і Скарбеками за методи партії і радвледи, вони-ці колгоспники, не могли не дивуватися, їм все це було незрозуміле. Такі дії Річицьких, Скарбеків були незрозумілі, але ж це – шановні, авторитетні люди. А Яворському кажуть: “тихо зникнути”! Ось яка обстановка була.

І коли сказали: бий його націоналіста, контрреволюціонера, бий цю наволоч, бий міцніше, не бійся, – ці активісти, партійці, комсомольці взялися за справу по більшовицькому – і колгоспи пішли вгору. Навколо цих партійців, комсомольців малограмотних, але активістів, відданих колгоспній справі, навколо цих більшовиків, кращих людей колгоспної справи, об'єдналися кращі люди колгоспів. У цьому була сила, тільки в цьому.

“Товариші! Це тільки потверджує”, як глибоко вкорінилося в свідомість робітників і селян те, що ми йдемо по вірному шляху і ведемо їх до соціалістичної мети, до їх щастя і хорошого життя, що, не зважаючи на всю цю історію, маси робітників і колгоспників нас міцно підтримали, і ми з цих утруднень вийшли і, не зважаючи ні на що, прийшли до XII ідо XVII з'їздів з величезними перемогами. (*Бурхливі оплески*).

З чим же КП(б)У приходиться до XVII з'їзду партії в здійсненні лєнінської національної політики? Ми бачили, як гігантськи зросла між XVI і XVII з'їздом соціалістична промисловість і соціалістичне сільське господарство України – економічна і соціальна основа радянської української державності. Величезні успіхи КП(б)У має і в справі будівництва радянської української культури.

Тов. Сталін на XVI з'їзді партії різко поставив питання про розгортання загального обов'язкового навчання:

“Головне тепер – перейти на обов'язкове початкове навчання. Я говорю ‘головне’ тому, що такий перехід означав би вирішальний крок в справі культурної революції. А перейти до цього давно пора, бо ми маємо тепер усе необхідне для організації загальної початкової освіти в переважній більшості районів СРСР”.

Візьмемо нижчу школу. В 1930 році ми мали 4360 семирічок і ні однієї 10-тирічки, а в 1933 році ми маємо 13450 чотирирічок, 8240 семирічок і 282 10-тирічок. В загальній сумі- 21970 шкіл з загальним охопленням 5 млн. дітей, з них 4,5 млн. тих, що навчається українською мовою. Зростання охоплення дітей школою ми бачимо і із зростанням учительських кадрів. Якщо в 1930 р. кількість учителів першого концентру становила 76611 чол., а другого концентру – 25190 чол., то в 1933 році кількість вчителів становила 88505 чол. по першому концентру і 46210 по другому концентру.

Значні також успіхи в ліквідації неграмотності і малограмотності серед дорослих. Якщо на час XI з'їзду КП(Б)У ми мали на Україні ще більше 4 млн. неграмотних, або 25 проц. населення, то зараз неграмотних всього лише 63 тис, або 4 проц. і малограмотних – 77 тис, або 4,7 проц.

Візьмемо далі вищу школу, 350 тис. чол. вчиться нині в робітфаках, технікумах і інститутах України, з них 55 проц. українців. З осені 1933 року створено 4 державні університети- в Харкові, Києві, Дніпропетровську і Одесі, які мають 180 різних кабінетів та лабораторій і нараховують до 7 тис. студентів.

Значно зросла також за ці роки преса на Україні. Ось, деякі дані про газети України:

| | 1930 р. | 1933 р. |
|--|---------|---------|
| Газет (центральных, обласних районних) | 95 | 440 |
| Газет політвіддільських | | 700 |
| Багатотиражок заводських (з них 70 щоденних) | 240 | 856 |
| 89 проц. усіх газет України виходять на українській мові. 106 журналів видається тепер на Україні. | | |

Книжна продукція зросла в 38 мільйонів екземплярів 1928 р. до 75 мільйонів екземплярів, виданих 1933 року.

Ми маємо нині на Україні величезне розгортання науково-дослідних установ. Досить сказати, що Україна має тепер 4 академії і 263 науково-дослідних інститутів.

Значно зросли кількісно і якісно кадри художньої літератури України. Більше 300 письменників – таке основне ядро художньої лі-

тератури України. Поряд з цим зростало число літературних гуртків, які охоплюють тепер до 3500 чол.

Основними досягненнями на цій ділянці будівництва радянської української культури є підвищення якості продукції художньої літератури після рішення ЦК ВКП(б) про перебудову літературних організацій.

Ми можемо тепер назвати такі твори, як “Дівчата нашої країни” Микитенка, “Загибель ескадри” Корнійчука, “Невідомі солдати” Первомайського і ряд інших.

Зрушення за останній час сталися і в виробництві кінофільмів-“Коліївщина”, “Молодість”, “Рейд” і ряд інших фільмів свідчать про зростання ідейного змісту і якості нашої української кінопродукції за останній час.

Ми маємо найсерйозніші досягнення за ці роки і по лінії українізації державного апарату УСРР. 54% складу президій райвиконкомів, 50,3% складу президій міськрад, 72% всього керівного складу працівників районів є українці. Значні зрушення відбулися і в складі робітничого класу України. Якщо 1929 р. українці за національністю складали в робітничому класі України 47,9%, то тепер процент українців у робітничому класі України піднявся до 56,1.

Такі є найбільш основні цифри і дані, які характеризують величезні досягнення КП(б)У в будівництві радянської, української державності, радянської української культури.

Товариші, які ж основні завдання стоять тепер перед нами в дальшій боротьбі за здійснення ленінської національної політики партії на Україні?

Перше найважливіше завдання-це держати весь час партійні організації в стані більшовицької пильності щодо націоналістичної контрреволюції. Було б надзвичайно небезпечно, коли б у партійних організаціях України з'явилися такі настрої, що, мовляв, “УВО” зліквідовано, націоналістичні елементи розгромлено, ДПУ пильнує і, значить, усе в порядку. Нам не слід забувати уроків процесу СВУ і справи “Українського національного центру”. Нам треба також врахувати події останнього місяця-двох. Уже після розгрому “УВО” розкрито ряд нових націоналістичних організацій. Нам треба врахувати, що націоналістична контрреволюція тепер піде глибше в підпілля, що вона ще більш законспірується, що вона ще більше маскуватиметься.

Виникає питання, що ж породжує ці націоналістичні контрреволюційні організації, що є, так би мовити, їх поживною базою?

Тут треба врахувати два основні моменти. Класова боротьба не йде на спад, і опір соціалістичному будівництву з боку решток розгромлених класів продовжує наростати.

Володимир Ілліч не раз указував на те, що:

“Диктатура пролетаріату є уперта боротьба, кривава і безкровна, насильна і мирна, воєнна і господарська, педагогічна і адміністраторська, проти сил і традицій старого суспільства”.

На Україні класовий ворог, як я вже казав, завжди виступав і виступає проти диктатури пролетаріату і соціалістичного будівництва під національним флагом. Так було в момент Жовтня, в період громадянської війни і на всьому протязі періоду будівництва соціалізму. Немає нічого дивного, через це, в тому, що і на даному етапі, коли рештки загибаючих класів чинять буквально озвірілий опір дальшому наступові соціалізму, вони будуть намагатися організаційно оформитись у вигляді різних націоналістичних організацій, готових застосовувати які завгодно методи боротьби проти радянської влади аж до терористичних актів проти її керівників.

Ось вам одна сторона поживної бази націоналістичних контрреволюційних організацій.

А тепер друга сторона. Суперечності між системою соціалізму і системою капіталізму неминуче породжують нові і нові спроби інтервенції проти Радянського Союзу. Інтервенціоністські штаби імперіалістичних країн увесь час ведуть підготову інтервенції проти СРСР. Особливо активні тепер у цьому відношенні Японія і Німеччина. Україна в планах міжнародного імперіалізму займає дуже солідне місце. Активізація інтервенціоністських елементів, особливо Німеччини, активізує українську націоналістичну білу еміграцію, яка перебуває на службі у цих інтервенціоністських штабів. Українські націоналістичні білоемігрантські організації є поставщиками організаторів шкідництва, шпіонажу, диверсійних актів. Вони перекидають нелегально свої кадри на територію Радянської України, організуючи тут за прямими завданнями імперіалістичних штабів опір соціалістичному будівництву з боку класово-ворожих нам елементів і підготовляють відповідні умови на випадок інтервенції.

Ось, якщо врахувати, поперше, дальше загострення класової боротьби в нашій країні і те своєрідне офарблення, якого класова боротьба набирає на Україні, подруге вищезазначену діяльність інтервенціоністських штабів та їх прямої агентури в лиці української білої еміграції, і, потрете, те, що ще далеко не всі рештки націоналістичних організацій викорчовані, то стане зрозумілим, що живить собою утворення націоналістичних контрреволюційних груп на Україні. Все це говорить про те, що першим і найважливішим нашим завдан-

ням є безперервне підвищення настороженості й пильності партійних організацій відносно націоналістичних елементів.

Друге найважливіше завдання-це викриття до кінця націоналістичного ухилу Скрипника і найнепримиренніше ставлення до найменших ухилень від ленінської національної політики.

Листопадовий пленум ЦК КП(б)У в своїй резолюції у питанні про підсумки й найближчі завдання проведення національної політики на Україні записав:

“Великодержавний російський шовінізм є, як і раніше, головною небезпекою в масштабі всього Радянського Союзу і всієї ВКП(б). Але це ні в якій мірі не суперечить тому, що в деяких республіках СРСР, особливо на Україні, в даний момент головну небезпеку становить місцевий український націоналізм, який змикається з імперіалістичними інтервентами”. Треба показати кожному членові партії, що це нове формулювання обумовне дальшим загостренням класової боротьби на Україні, де куркульство є переважно українським; боротьбою міжнародного імперіалізму проти міжнародного більшовизму та СРСР, як його оплоту і роллю України, як аванпосту СРСР на Заході; консолідацією сил націоналістичної контрреволюції як за кордоном, так і на території Радянської України: наявністю в КП(б)У на протязі ряду років націоналістичного ухилу на чолі з Скрипником.

Викриття і розгром до кінця націоналістичного ухилу в КП(б)У, не послаблюючи ні на хвилину боротьби з великодержавним шовінізмом- таке є друге основне завдання.

Третє наше основне завдання полягає в розгортанні роботи коло виховання КП(б)У і широких робітничих та колгоспних мас України в дусі пролетарського інтернаціоналізму. Нам треба звернути особливу увагу на розгортання цієї роботи серед молоді, бо “за душу молоді” бореться тепер усяка націоналістична наволоч. Характерна в цьому розумінні стаття, надрукована в серпневому номері “Розбудови Нації” органу Коновальця:

“Вирішальну роль для українського націоналізму грає тепер український молодняк з його фанатизмом, готовістю до самопожертвування, з його вірою в себе і в свої сили. Тому мова українського націоналізму повинна бути мовою цієї молоді. Наша ставка – це ставка на молодь”.

Усім цим зазіханням націоналістичної контрреволюції на “душу” молоді ми повинні протиставити ще ширше розгортання виховної роботи серед молоді в дусі пролетарського інтернаціоналізму.

І, нарешті, четверте наше основне завдання полягає в тому, що і розгорнути ще ширше й глибше творчу роботу в галузі будівництва радянської української культури.

Такі є основні чергові наші завдання в боротьбі за правильне здійснення ленінської національної політики на Україні, за будівництво національної формою і справді соціалістичної змістом української культури.

П. Постишев. "Боротьба КП(б)У за здійснення ленінської національної політики на Україні," *Червоний шлях*, № 2-3 (1934), с. 165-176. [З доповіді на XII з'їзді комуністичної партії (більшовиків) України, 18-23 січня 1934 р.]

P. POSTYSHEV

*THE STRUGGLE OF THE KP(B)U
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LENINIST NATIONALITY POLICY IN UKRAINE*

Comrades! Much was said about the national question at the last – November – plenum of the TsK KP(B)U and at the previous, June, plenum of the TsK. Therefore, I will try to be brief. However, I consider it absolutely crucial to offer an analysis, at least the main features of that path which the KP(B)U covered between the Eleventh and Twelfth congresses regarding the issue of implementing the nationality policy in Ukraine. However, I am not offering that entire analysis contained in my speech as “pleasant” memories, but so that our party cadres and we ourselves, above all, will learn from this, so that we no longer repeat past errors. And as you know, the period that we have now entered is crucially important and complex.

So, what was the KP(B)U’s path during this period in its struggle to implement the Leninist nationality policy in Ukraine?

The successes and victories that the KP(B)U achieved by the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress in the branches of industry [and] agriculture and the improvement in the material and cultural situation of workers and collective farm workers are the immediate and direct result of the implementation of the Leninist nationality policy in Ukraine, for the struggle to implement the party’s nationality policy in Ukraine is the struggle for the comprehensive development of all branches of Ukraine’s economy, for the uninterrupted growth of the material wellbeing of the masses of workers and collective farm workers, for the burgeoning of Soviet Ukrainian culture, for the continuous growth of Ukraine, which is an indissoluble part of the great Soviet Union.

In the KP(B)U’s struggle to implement the Leninist nationality policy in the period between the Eleventh and Twelfth congresses of the KP(B)U, it is necessary to distinguish between two main stages: the first stage is from the Eleventh Congress of the KP(B)U to the 14 December resolution of the TsK VKP(B) and the People’s Commissariat of the USSR and the 24 January resolution of the TsK VKP(B); and the second stage is after these historic resolutions.

Let us now trace in greater detail the KP(B)U's struggle to implement the Leninist nationality policy in the period from the Eleventh to the Twelfth congresses. In the TsK VKP(B)'s political report to the Sixteenth Party Congress, Comrade Stalin, speaking about the deviations in the national question, stated:

“Nationalist deviations could be called creeping deviations. But this does not mean that they do not exist. No, they do exist, and the main thing is that they are growing. There can be no doubt about this because the general atmosphere of the escalation of the class struggle cannot but lead to a certain exacerbation of national frictions that are reflected inside the party.”

With this instruction Comrade Stalin was signaling to the party about the growth of nationalist deviations, he was showing the party that the growth of nationalist deviations is the result of the escalation of the class struggle in connection with socialism's offensive along the entire front, and he was calling the party to a struggle against these nationalist deviations – the secret agents of the class enemy.

But at the Sixteenth Party Congress Comrade Stalin not only pointed to the danger of growing nationalist deviations, he also showed the essence, tactics, and maneuvers both in the direction of great-state chauvinism and in the direction of local nationalism.

This is what he said in this connection:

“There can be no doubt that the deviation in the direction of Russian great-state chauvinism in the national question, which is being concealed beneath the mask of internationalism to boot, is the most sophisticated and therefore the most dangerous type of Great Russian nationalism. . . .

The danger of the deviation in the direction of local nationalism lies in the fact that it cultivates bourgeois nationalism, weakens the unity of the working peoples of the USSR, and plays into the hands of the ‘interventionists’.”

As you see, at the Sixteenth Party Congress Comrade Stalin offered a developed stance on the national question, and this is understandable because the Sixteenth Congress was a congress of the large-scale offensive of socialism on the entire front, and this inevitably signified the acute escalation of the class struggle in the country and the quickening of the nationalist counterrevolution and its secret agents within the party.

What conclusions should we have drawn from all of Comrade Stalin's instructions on the national question at the Sixteenth Congress?

First of all, we should have increased the Bolshevik vigilance of our ranks regarding nationalistic elements.

Second, we should have verified the cadres in all spheres of socialist construction and especially on the theoretical front and other areas of the

building of Soviet Ukrainian culture, and expelled nationalistic elements from there.

Third, we should have verified our own ranks by intensifying the struggle against the slightest manifestations both of Russian great-state and Ukrainian nationalisms.

Fourth, we should have launched wide-scale work on the internationalist upbringing of both our own ranks and the broadest masses of the working class and collective farm workers.

Fifth, we should have launched wide-scale work aimed at showing the true face of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and their leaders, exposing their links with the headquarters of interventionists.

These are the conclusions that we, Bolsheviks of Ukraine, should have reached on the basis of Comrade Stalin's instructions on the national question at the Sixteenth Party Congress.

Did the KP(B)U reach these conclusions from Comrade Stalin's instructions at the Sixteenth Congress? No, it did not. Meanwhile, the KP(B)U had several rather serious signals from the nationalist counter-revolution, which is becoming more active. I am referring to the SVU trial and the case of the "Ukrainian National Center."

The SVU trial was an extraordinarily serious signal for the KP(B)U. What did this trial reveal?

The SVU trial revealed that the Ukrainian nationalist counterrevolution had switched to deploying its main forces and the concentration of its main work here in Soviet Ukraine, not abroad. Here is what Durduktivsky, a member of the SVU, confessed at the time:

"Our line consisted of gathering in Soviet Ukraine all the finest, most talented, most devoted Ukrainian forces scattered practically throughout the entire world. Where the main front was, that was where the best fighting forces were."

And, of course, Soviet Ukraine was regarded as the main front of the zone, and all their "finest" and all the "fighting forces" were assembled here. Why were no conclusions drawn from this? Why?

The SVU trial revealed that the tactic of the Ukrainian nationalist counterrevolution lay in what the defendant Ivchenko confessed:

"To push our people through wherever possible. Install people in all spheres of socioeconomic and cultural life. To penetrate the party and the Komsomol."

The SVU trial ultimately showed that the most potent nuclei of the nationalist counterrevolution were in higher educational institutions and workers' schools, in the Academy of Sciences, publishing houses, [and] writers' organizations.

This is what Yefremov, the not unknown head of the SVU, confessed at the time:

“Every year thousands of young villagers enroll in Soviet higher educational institutions. After completing higher educational institutions, these young people usually go back to the countryside as teachers, doctors, agronomists, cooperators.

The SVU paid special attention to higher education, exploiting it in order to graft nationalistic ideas, selecting reliable cadres from among the students of this school.”

From all this you can reach the conclusion that the SVU trial had already revealed the main points of the concentration of the forces of the nationalist counterrevolution, its tactics and maneuvers, as well as the obvious lack of vigilance on the part of party members.

Did the KP(B)U draw all the necessary conclusions from this trial? No, it did not. It turned out that the SVU trial was seemingly treated as an isolated episode. People were exposed, sentenced, and that was the end of that. Meanwhile, it is clear that as the class struggle was escalating in our country, especially during that stage, the activities of the nationalist counterrevolution did not stop at this, and could not stop at this.

In 1931 the KP(B)U received a second extraordinarily loud and serious signal. I am referring to the exposure of the so-called “Ukrainian National Center,” which is a bloc of Ukrainian and Galician nationalist parties. Chechel, Holubovych, Vasyl Mazurenko, Lyzanivsky, Khrystiuk, Matvii Yavorsky, and others belonged to this organization. This was a militant national-fascist organization whose goal was to unify all the forces of the nationalist counterrevolution and to plan an uprising in Ukraine, which was supposed to coincide chronologically with the beginning of an intervention, first planned in 1930, and later deferred to 1931.

The case of the “Ukrainian National Center” harshly confronted the KP(B)U with questions about Bolshevik vigilance, about expelling nationalists from the state apparatus, about the struggle against nationalist deviations within its own ranks.

But we must assert that everything remained as of old. Once again the case of the “Ukrainian National Center” passed as an isolated episode, without leaving its reflection on the life and struggle of the KP(B)U.

Meanwhile, the class struggle in the country continued to escalate. Nationalistic elements became particularly more active in 1931 and 1932, penetrating more and more areas of socialist construction with every passing day.

And then in early 1933 the GPU uncovered a new organization, the “Ukrainian Military Organization” (UVO). Only now has it become evi-

dent to what extent this boil on the body of Soviet Ukraine managed to spread.

They succeeded in placing their people and entire groups in various areas of socialist construction and especially the building of Soviet Ukrainian culture.

Their system of placing their cadres is extraordinarily interesting. Take the sector of the People's Commissariat of Ed[ucation]. As early as 1925 the head of this sector was Matvii Yavorsky. Yavorsky left, Ozersky came, Ozersky left, Konyk came, and all of them eventually turned out to be members of the UVO and even of its leadership. Or take the Authorized Representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In 1924 the deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs was Maksymovych. Maksymovych left, Petrenko came; Petrenko left, Tur came; once again, all members of the UVO and even of its leadership.

As you see, they had their own placement department, their own well-thought-out system for the distribution and placement of cadres. And, thus, in nearly all the areas that they had seized they upheld this organizational principle of the succession of their people. Once they seized one important area or another, they never let it out of their hands.

A not inconsiderable role was played here by the presence in the KP(B)U of a nationalist deviation headed by Skrypnyk, which was undetected over a number of years. Much has been written and said about Skrypnyk's deviation.

It is clear that with its attitudes and activities the nationalist deviation in the KP(B)U was allied with the nationalist counterrevolution and assisted its wrecking work.

From all this it is also becoming utterly obvious that the nationalist deviation headed by Skrypnyk was a direct continuation of Shumsky's deviation in 1927.

Both Shumskyism and Skrypnyk's deviation were nurtured by one and the same roots and saps. Both the one and the other worked for the cause of separating Ukraine from the Soviet Union, for the cause of the imperialistic enslavement of Ukrainian workers and peasants. Both the one and the other sought to go away from Moscow, the center of the world proletarian revolution.

But the point is that the TsK KP(B)U exposed Shumsky in 1926-27 and the KP(B)U smashed Shumskyism. Yet here the KP(B)U failed to note Skrypnyk's nationalist deviation, and at the very moment of the most acute class struggle.

Indeed, let us ask ourselves the question: when was Skrypnyk's nationalist deviation formed? Skrypnyk had been committing nationalist errors for a long time. The TsK VKP(B) and the TsK KP(B)U corrected

him many times. But Skrypnyk's deviation began to form as a deviation, as a whole system of national-opportunistic views, during the period of the struggle to liquidate kulaks as a class. That was precisely when Skrypnyk began to unite particularly solidly with the interventionist secret agent network in Ukraine – with the Badans, Yavorskys, Slipanskys, and others. That was precisely when the interventionist secret agent network, in the persons of Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine, began to exploit Skrypnyk in all ways as an authoritative figure, as their direct tool.

Whereas at the June plenum I spoke about Skrypnyk only as a screen for nationalistic elements, then at the present moment, after digging a bit through his archive, I can state boldly that Skrypnyk was not a screen but a direct tool of these nationalistic elements, albeit an unconscious one.

I will cite a couple of facts in order to show how this nationalist scum used Skrypnyk.

In 1927 the GPU was supposed to deport thirteen nationalists. Among them were Shparaga, Synchuk, Nykonchuk, and others. Badan writes to Skrypnyk in indignation about the next deportation. Skrypnyk literally re-copies this letter of Badan's and sends it under his signature to the GPU, demanding the cancellation of this deportation.

And this is what Badan has now confessed in this connection:

"In 1927 Prystupa ordered me to seek, through Skrypnyk, the return to Ukraine of a group of UVO members, a total of fifteen people, I think. I wrote a statement for Skrypnyk, in which, indicating the heroic, revolutionary work of these individuals, I insisted that he request the GPU to review the decision about the deportation. Skrypnyk gladly accepted my statement and sent it to the GPU under his own signature."

And here is another fact. The nationalists needed to ferry the spy Votsedalek to Czechoslovakia. So, once again Badan writes to Skrypnyk about the fact that Levytsky, the "well known" secretary of the Zhytomyr district party committee, supports Votsedalek's request for a trip abroad, but the KP(B)U's permission for this is required, and therefore he asks Skrypnyk to help push this matter through. Skrypnyk accepted this statement from Badan, but the GPU categorically refused to let Votsedalek go abroad because even before this it had already been precisely ascertained that Votsedalek is a spy, an agent of Czech counter-intelligence.

You see how the nationalist deviation allied with this scum, how it was a tool of this nationalist counterrevolution. Is it any wonder that they have become more insolent with every passing day, crossing all possible borders, and have thrown aside all restraint in our country?

In order to characterize how insolent this nationalist scum has become, it is interesting [to cite] Ersteniuk's statement about Romaniuk, one of the heads of the "Ukrainian Military Organization," [submitted] to the party

troika after the review in 1929 of the center of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR.

This is what he wrote there:

"In my view, *Biuleten komunara* [The Communard's Bulletin], in elucidating the course of the review of the party center of the People's Commissariat of Justice, unjustifiably casts a shadow on Comrade Romaniuk. I consider it my duty to bring the following to the party troika's attention:

a) In the fall of 1924 our authorized mission in Prague instructed Romaniuk to be the commandant of the first transport of political émigrés from Czechoslovakia to the USSR. As the then secretary of the center, I attest that Comrade Romaniuk carried out important work among the political émigrés; b) During the period of my work in the Ukrainian SSR, from 1924, not a single time did I observe any hesitations or decadent views on Comrade Romaniuk's part. Then, as now, Romaniuk was unquestionably an internationalist, he espouses our Bolshevik goal, he worked on its behalf and did not 'eat bread' for free. With communist greetings, Ersteniuk." [*Accompanied by general laughter*].

And here is another example of the nationalists' insolence. Here is what Vasyl Mazurenko wrote to Skrypnyk in July 1929:

"During a discussion of the distribution of Lenin awards for scholarly works, the commission to award scholarly works focused on your works, inasmuch as they reflect most consistently Lenin's testaments on the national question. It is the commission's view that this award must also be given to comrades Richytsky and Badan."

Vasyl Mazurenko awarded the prize to Richytsky and Badan along with Skrypnyk. For what? – "for the most consistent reflection of Lenin's testaments on the national question." Skrypnyk "reflects!" We know the kind of "Leninist" views Skrypnyk had on the national question.

Who is this Vasyl Mazurenko? At one time he was Petliura's ambassador in Rome; then under Soviet rule he became a professor and member of the presidium of the Association for the Advancement of Socialist Construction [*laughter in the hall*]. True enough, we planted this "builder of socialism" in the affair of the Ukrainian National Center. We deported him so that he would not "advance" socialism; somehow we'll manage without him [*general laughter in the hall*]. This is how insolent the counter-revolutionary nationalist gang has become.

Is it any wonder that this nationalist scum has become so insolent? Here is what one very important associate wrote to Skrypnyk:

"We reached an understanding that there is no point in finishing off Matvii Yavorsky. But one shouldn't associate with him. He has to be given a chance to 'disappear quietly.' Let him work, just not in full view

of everyone, as this happens in the VUAN [All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences].”

You see, just not in full view of everyone. At one time, the Kharkiv organization, catching sight of Matvii Yavorsky, becomes completely inflamed with indignation. This is what the situation is like. This is a serious moment, and this happened during a period when it was necessary, as Comrade Stalin said, “to mobilize the party itself to organize the entire matter of the offensive, strengthen and hone the party organization, after having expelled elements of bureaucratism [and] regeneration from there.”

But here people are saying, “don’t bother Yavorsky, don’t finish him off, let him ‘disappear quietly!’”

The TsK VKP(B)’s resolutions of 14 December and 24 January elevated the KP(B)U to a struggle for the correction of errors and blunders in the implementation of the party’s nationality policy in Ukraine.

The last year was a year marked by the rout of the nationalist counter-revolution, the exposure and smashing of the nationalist deviation headed by Skrypnyk, the development of great creative work in the sphere of building Soviet Ukrainian culture.

This helped the KP(B)U solidly to smooth out its entire front in general; this could not pass without a trace and also could not fail to leave a mark on our industry, and on coal, and on metallurgy, and on machine building.

This general uplifting left a mark on all branches of the national economy, where the enemy was active in a very powerful way.

He should have been smashed, [we should have] organized, the masses should have been mobilized; party organizations should have been honed and led into battle. The Bolshevik should have been told: beat Bada, don’t be afraid; beat Vasyl Sirko, don’t be afraid! Beat Cherniak, don’t be afraid; beat Ozersky, don’t be afraid; beat them, this nationalist scum which has thrown aside all restraint, become insolent, felt wonderful, these “nominees,” whose blood was 100 percent from the landowner, from Konovalts, from Skoropadsky. It should have been said: beat, don’t be afraid; beat harder! [*stormy applause*].

And what a situation it was: they see that this person is seemingly not one of ours and does not act in the Bolshevik manner, but he is a candidate to the TsK, a respected person; how could an uneducated Bolshevik in the countryside, a collective farm worker, a poor peasant and a middle peasant get to the bottom of things? Although these actions were passed off by the Richytskys and Skarbeks as the methods of the party and the Soviet power; they could not fail to be amazed, all this was incomprehensible to them. Such actions on the part of the Richytskys [and] Skarbeks

were incomprehensible, but these were respected, respected people. But Yavorsky is told: "Disappear quietly!" That's what the situation was like.

And when it was said: beat him, the nationalist, the counterrevolutionary, beat this scum, beat harder, don't be afraid, these activists, party members, Komsomol members started working on the matter Bolshevik-style, and the collective farms improved.

The best people from the collective farms united around these party members, uneducated Komsomol members, but [who were nevertheless] activists devoted to the collective farm cause; around these Bolsheviks, the finest people of the collective farm cause. Strength resided in this, only in this.

Comrades! This merely confirms how deeply enrooted in the consciousness of the workers and peasants is the fact that we are proceeding along the true path and leading them to the socialist goal, to their happiness and wonderful life, that despite all this history, the masses of workers and collective farm workers gave us powerful support, and we came out of these difficulties and, despite everything, arrived at the Twelfth and Thirteenth congresses with immense victories. [*stormy applause*].

With what is the KP(B)U coming to the Seventeenth Party Congress in regard to the implementation of the Leninist nationality policy? We have seen how gigantically socialist industry and the socialist agriculture of Ukraine – the economic and social foundation of Soviet Ukrainian statehood – has grown between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth congresses. The KP(B)U also has immense successes in the matter of building Soviet Ukrainian culture.

At the Sixteenth Party Congress Comrade Stalin strictly formulated the question of developing general, mandatory schooling:

"The main thing now is to switch to mandatory elementary schooling. I say 'main' because such a move would signify a decisive step in the matter of the culture revolution. And this transition should have been done long ago, for we now have everything that is needed for organizing general elementary education in the majority of raions of the USSR."

Let's take lower education. In 1930 we had 4,360 seven-year schools and not a single ten-year school, but in 1933 we have 13,450 four-year schools, 8,240 seven-year schools, and 282 ten-year schools. In total, 21,970 schools generally encompassing 5 million children, of whom 4.5 million are learning in the Ukrainian language. We also see an increase in the number of children attending school in the growth of teaching cadres. Whereas in 1930 the number of teachers of the "first level consisted of 76,611 people, and of the second mass – 25,190 people, in 1933 the number of teachers stood at 88,505 people in the level and 46,210 in the second.

There are also major successes in the liquidation of illiteracy and semi-literacy among adults. If, at the time of the Eleventh Congress of the KP(B)U we had more than 4 million illiterate people in Ukraine, or 25 percent of the population, then at the present time there are only 63,000 illiterate people, or 4 percent, and 77,000 semi-literate people, or 4.7 percent.

Let's go on to take a look at higher education. Today 350,000 people are taking workers' courses, [studying] at technical colleges and institutes in Ukraine; 55 percent of them are Ukrainians. Starting in the fall of 1933, four state universities were created: in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa, which have 180 different departments and laboratories, and they number up to 7,000 students.

During these years the press also expanded in Ukraine. Here are a few facts about the newspapers of Ukraine:

| | 1930 | 1933 |
|---|------|------|
| Papers (central, <i>oblast</i> , <i>raion</i>) | 95 | 440 |
| Papers of political departments | | 700 |
| Large-circulation factory (incl. 70 dailies) | 240 | 856 |

Eighty-nine percent of all newspapers in Ukraine are in the Ukrainian language. A total of 106 magazines are now published in Ukraine.

Book production has increased from 38 million units in 1928 to 75 million units issued in 1933.

In Ukraine today we are seeing a huge expansion of scientific research institutions. It suffices to say that Ukraine now has four academies and 263 scientific research institutes.

The cadres of artistic literature have significantly increased numerically and qualitatively in Ukraine. There are more than 300 writers: this is the basic nucleus of Ukraine's artistic literature. In addition to them, the number of literary groups encompassing up to 3,500 people has been growing.

The main achievements in this area of building Soviet Ukrainian culture are the rise in the quality of production of artistic literature following the TsK VKP(B)'s resolutions on the reform of literary organizations.

We can now name such works as Mykytenko's *Divchata nashoi krainy* (The Girls of Our Country), Korniiichuk's *Zahybel eskadry* (The Demise of the Squadron), Pervomaisky's *Nevidomi soldaty* (Unknown Soldiers), and a number of others.

In recent times improvements have also taken place in the production of films: *Koliivshchyna* (The Koliivshchyna Era), *Molodist* (Youth), *Reid* (The Raid), and a number of other films attest to the growth of the ideological content and quality of our Ukrainian film production in recent times.

In these years we have also had the most significant achievements in the Ukrainization of the state apparatus of the Ukrainian SSR. Ukrainians comprise 54 percent of the composition of presidiums of raion executive committees, 50.3% percentof the composition of presidiums of city soviets, [and] 72 percent of the entire staff of *raions*. Significant improvements have also taken place in the composition of Ukraine's working class. Whereas in 1929 Ukrainians comprised 47.9 percent of Ukraine's working class, now the percentage of Ukrainians in Ukraine's working class has risen to 56.1 percent.

These are the most basic facts and figures that characterize the immense achievements of the KP(B)U in the building of Soviet Ukrainian statehood, Soviet Ukrainian culture.

Comrades, what are the main tasks that we are now facing in the further struggle to implement the party's Leninist nationality policy in Ukraine?

The first most important task is to maintain party organizations at all times in a state of Bolshevik vigilance with regard to the nationalist counterrevolution. It would be extraordinarily dangerous if the following moods appeared in the party organizations of Ukraine, to wit, the UVO has been liquidated, nationalistic elements have been smashed, [and] the GPU is keeping watch, so this means that everything is in order. We should not forget the lessons of the SVU trial and the case of the "Ukrainian National Center." We must also reckon with the events of the last one or two months. Since the UVO has been smashed, a number of new nationalistic organizations have been uncovered. We must take into consideration the fact that the nationalist counterrevolution will now go deeper underground, that it will become even more secretive, that it will mask itself even more.

The question arises: What is generating these nationalistic counterrevolutionary organizations, which are their base of nourishment, so to speak?

Two key moments must be reckoned with here. The class struggle is not abating, and resistance to socialist construction on the part of the vestiges of the smashed classes is continuing to grow.

Vladimir Illich often pointed to the fact that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is an intractable struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative, against the forces and traditions of the old society."

As I have already said, the class enemy in Ukraine was always opposed and is opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction under the national flag. It was thus during the October [Revolution], in the Civil War period, and throughout the entire period of

the building of socialism. There is nothing surprising in the fact that at the present stage as well, when the vestiges of the dying classes are putting up literally savage resistance to the further advance of socialism, they will be seeking in an organized fashion to take shape in the guise of various nationalist organizations ready to apply any methods of struggle whatsoever against the Soviet power, including terrorist acts against its leaders.

That is one side of the base nourishing nationalistic counterrevolutionary organizations.

And here is the other side. The contradictions between the system of socialism and the system of capitalism inevitably give rise to newer and newer attempts to launch an intervention against the Soviet Union. The interventionist headquarters of the imperialistic countries are constantly preparing for an intervention against the USSR. Japan and Germany are now particularly active in this respect. Ukraine occupies a very solid place in the plans of international imperialism. The activation of interventionist elements, especially Germany, is stirring up the Ukrainian nationalist white emigration, which is in the service of these interventionist headquarters. Ukrainian nationalist white-émigré organizations are the suppliers of organizers for wrecking, espionage, [and] subversive actions. They are illegally deploying their cadres to the territory of Soviet Ukraine, organizing resistance there to socialist construction by elements that are class-hostile to us, in keeping with the direct tasks of the imperialistic headquarters, and they are preparing the proper conditions for the event of intervention.

If one reckons, first of all, with the continuing escalation of the class struggle in our country and that unique hue that the class struggle is acquiring in Ukraine, second, with the above-mentioned activities of interventionist headquarters and their direct secret agent network as represented by the Ukrainian white emigration, and third, that far from all the vestiges of nationalistic organizations have been uprooted, then that which nourishes the creation of nationalistic counterrevolutionary groups in Ukraine is becoming clear. All this speaks to the fact that our primary and most important task is the uninterrupted increase of party organizations' alertness and vigilance with regard to nationalistic elements.

The second most important task is to utterly expose Skrypnyk's nationalist deviation and to adopt the most implacable attitude to the slightest deviations from the Leninist nationality policy.

In its resolution on the question of the conclusions and the immediate tasks of implementing the nationality policy in Ukraine, the November plenum of the TsK KP(B)U noted:

"Great-state Russian chauvinism is, like earlier, the main danger throughout the entire Soviet Union and the entire VKP(B). But this in no

way contradicts the fact that at the present moment in certain republics of the USSR, especially in Ukraine, local Ukrainian nationalism represents the main danger, which is allying with the imperialist interventionists." Every member of the party must be shown that this new formulation is determined by the further escalation of the class struggle in Ukraine, where the kulak class is mostly Ukrainian; by the struggle of international imperialism against international Bolshevism and the USSR, as its bulwark, and the role of Ukraine as the USSR's outpost in the West; by the consolidation of the forces of the nationalist counterrevolution both abroad and on the territory of Soviet Ukraine; by the years-long presence in the KP(B)U of a nationalist deviation headed by Skrypnyk.

The exposure and ultimate rout of the nationalist deviation in the KP(B)U, without scaling back the struggle against great-state chauvinism for a single minute – this is the second main task.

Our third main task lies in developing work around raising the KP(B)U and the broad working and collective farmer masses of Ukraine in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. We must pay special attention to expanding this work among young people because all kinds of nationalist scum are now battling for "the soul of youth." Typical in this regard is an article that was published in the August issue of *Rozbudova natsii* (The Building of the Nation), the mouthpiece of Konovalts:

"A decisive role for Ukrainian nationalism is now played by the Ukrainian youth with his fanaticism, readiness for self-sacrifice, with his faith in himself and in his strength. That is why the language of Ukrainian nationalism ought to be the language of this youth. Our stake is a stake on young people."

We should counter all these encroachments by the nationalist counterrevolution on the "soul" of young people with the even broader development of educational work among youth in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

And, finally, our fourth main task lies in expanding creative work in the sphere of building Soviet Ukrainian culture even more broadly and deeply.

These are our next main tasks in the struggle for the correct implementation of the Leninist nationality policy in Ukraine, for the construction of a Ukrainian culture that is national in form and truly socialist in content.

P. Postishev. "The Struggle of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine for the Implementation of the Leninist Nationality Policy in Ukraine" *Chervonyi Shliakh*, № 2-3 (1934), pp. 165-176. [From a speech at the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, 18-23 January 1934.]

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk

В. БАЛИЦКИЙ

ВЫШЕ БОЛЬШЕВИСТСКУ БДИТЕЛЬНОСТЬ И НЕПРИМИРИМОСТЬ В БОРЬБЕ С КЛАССОВЫМ ВРАГОМ

Товарищи, наша партия идет к своему XVII съезду с величайшими победами. Тов. Косиор в своем докладе дал анализ успехам, которых добилась партия в деле укрепления международного положения СССР на основе правильного проведения генеральной линии нашей партии, направленной на индустриализацию страны, на создание собственной технической базы – советских машин, на полное наше освобождение от капиталистической зависимости, на бесперывное укрепление обороноспособности нашей страны.

В итоге первой пятилетки мы добились исключительных успехов в области промышленности. В период между XVI и XVII съездами партии произведен полный переворот в сельском хозяйстве СССР. К XVII съезду наша страна в основном стала страной колхозной и совхозной. Этих огромных успехов партия добилась благодаря тому, что она едина, как никогда, что она сплочена вокруг ЦК, что она сплочена вокруг тов. Сталина. Все эти огромные успехи достигнуты также благодаря твердому проведению генеральной линии нашей партии, решительной борьбе с оппортунизмом, разоблачению всяких антипартийных группировок, осколков прошлых оппозиций, связанных с классовым врагом. Все эти успехи достигнуты благодаря тому, что руководит нами Центральный Комитет партии, во главе с величайшим вождем рабочего класса всего мира – тов. Сталиным.

Эти успехи особенно ощутимы здесь у нас на Украине не только потому, что Украина является страной хлеба, свеклы, металла, угля, руды и имеет огромное значение в хозяйственной и политической жизни страны, но также и потому, что в течение второй половины 1931 и в 1932 году были допущены глубокие прорывы не только в области сельского хозяйства, но также и в области промышленности (уголь и черная металлургия) и в проведении ленинской национальной политики.

Мы теперь, товарищи, знаем, что объясняется это все неправильными методами руководства, теми ошибками, которые допущены были ЦК КП(б)У и всей украинской партийной организацией. Объяс-

сняется это, прежде всего, отсутствием конкретности и оперативности в методах руководства. Не было достаточной мобилизованности для выполнения грандиозных задач, стоящих перед партией. Не были перестроены методы руководства в сельском хозяйстве. Недостаточно была развернута массово-политическая и организаторская работа. Не было большевистской бдительности, что позволило врагу рассестись на различных участках социалистического строительства и даже захватить ряд важнейших постов социалистического строительства на Советской Украине, особенно в строительстве советской украинской культуры. И только благодаря решительному вмешательству ЦК нашей партии и лично тов. Сталина, благодаря укреплению руководства ЦК КП(б)У и решающих областей, благодаря огромной помощи, которую оказал нам ЦК партии и союзное правительство, – в 1933 году Украина достигла больших успехов и вышла из прорыва. Но эти успехи, товарищи, – наши первые успехи, это наши первые победы. Большевикам Украины придется еще крепко драться за превращение Украины в подлинно передовую страну Советского Союза.

Я хочу остановиться на трех вопросах: на вопросе угля, на вопросах транспорта и на новых методах и формах борьбы классового врага.

Что угольный Донбасс имеет огромное значение для всего народного хозяйства страны – это общеизвестно. Мы также знаем, что угольный Донбасс вышел из прорыва, успешно борясь за такое положение, при котором не было бы ни одной шахты, не выполнившей программы. Всем известно решение партии о том, что в 1934 году Донбасс должен дать стране 60 млн. тонн угля. Но для этого, чтобы драться за выполнение программы 1934 года, необходимо немедленно приступить к устранению целого ряда недостатков. В первую очередь необходимо обратить исключительное внимание на состояние подготовительных работ на шахтах. Подготовительные работы продолжают оставаться одним из отстающих участков работы шахт и лимитируют добычу угля, так как до сих пор происходит:

а) на ряде больших шахт систематическое невыполнение планов и снижение темпов подготовительных работ;

б) затягивание подготовительных участков, подлежащих вводу в эксплуатацию взамен уже выработанных;

в) отставание основных выработок, сокращение углубления очистных забоев;

г) в ряде случаев хищническая эксплуатация шахт и выработка более близких и легко доступных полей.

Я хочу это проиллюстрировать на примерах: в тресте “Донбассантрацит” благодаря невыполнению плана подготовительных работ осталось неподготовленными для эксплуатации 32.240 погонных метров выработок, что выражается в потере 186 тыс. тонн угля. Кроме того съедено вскрытых запасов, ранее заготовленных 1.300 тыс. тонн. Наряду с таким положением в целом ряде шахт оставлены вне эксплуатации готовые лавы и участки. Например, по Свердловскому рудоуправлению заброшены в течение 10 месяцев 3 лавы, которые по своим возможностям могли бы дать 75 тыс. тонн угля. По шахтам Шварцевского рудоуправления брошены 8 подготовительных штреков. По шахтам Боковского рудоуправления брошены 2 лавы с возможной добычей 74 тыс. тонн угля. То же отмечается по шахтам Хрустальского рудоуправления, на шахте “Капитальная” треста Чистяковуголь и на ряде других шахт.

Я, товарищи, думаю, что здесь еще кроме нашей общей расхлябанности есть результаты старого вредительства в угольном Донбассе, так как мы знаем, что кроме диверсии, кроме уничтожения отдельных агрегатов, вредители ставили своей задачей скрывать от советской власти пласты, задерживать программную мощность той или иной шахты.

У меня кроме того имеется также ряд чрезвычайно характерных примеров работы отдельных шахт, которые я передавал на обсуждение Донецкой партийной конференции. Два из них, особенно характерные, я хочу привести здесь вам.

Шахта “Лутугино” -сдана в эксплуатацию в 1931 году с проектной мощностью 1.800 тонн в сутки. Заложена эта шахта в 1926 году, но по плану полную проектную мощность она даст лишь в 1935 году. Не ясно ли, что здесь, безусловно, есть элементы вредительства? В течение 1931-1933 гг. шахта не только не увеличила подготовку, а вынула запасы, подготовленные к момент сдачи шахты в эксплуатацию. Шахта дает теперь 565 тонн в сутки. Учтите при этом, что капиталовложения по шахте на 1 октября 1933 г. составляют 11.200 тыс. рублей.

Возьмем другой пример. Шахта “Карл” – сдана в эксплуатацию в 1931 году при проектной мощности 2.800 тонн в сутки. По плану шахта достигает своей проектной мощности тоже только в 1935 году, в то время как заложена она еще до революции, а возобновлена проходкой в 1926-27 году. Сейчас шахта дает 540 тонн в сутки; подготовительные работы в 1933 году выполнены только на 41%. Капитальные вложения по шахте на 1 октября составляют 16.700 тыс. рублей.

Все это, товарищи, говорит о том, что угольный Донбас имеет все возможности программу в 60 млн. тонн не только выполнить, но и перевыполнить. Нам необходимо сейчас вести самую непримиримую борьбу с хныканьем, с отдельными нытиками и оппортунистами, которые заявляют о том, что не успел Донбасс выйти из прорывного состояния, как его опять перегружают этой непосильной программой. Это, товарищи, разговоры не из нашего лагеря. Так может говорить или оппортунист, или классовый враг. Недаром Донецкая партийная конференция и все делегаты – шахтеры, выступавшие на конференции, заявляли, что механизация добычи, те огромнейшие капиталовложения, которые получил Донбасс, а главное – работа поновому, дают возможность не только выполнить, но и перевыполнить план.

Мы, товарищи, знаем, что Донбасс имеет сейчас значительные запасы угля и мы знаем, что чрезвычайно остро стоит вопрос с вывозом этого угля, особенно на север. Транспорт не только лимитирует угольную промышленность, но он является самым отсталым участком народного хозяйства и тормозит не только угольную, металлургическую промышленность, но вообще все народное хозяйство.

Мы также знаем, о том, как в тезисах второй пятилетки поставлен вопрос относительно реконструкции технической базы железнодорожного транспорта и необходимости решительного перелома в его работе.

Я хочу иллюстрировать скверную работу нашего транспорта на примерах объединенных дорог – Южной и Донецкой. Дороги всегда, особенно наши Южная и Донецкая, привыкли объяснять свою скверную работу исключительно недостатком вагонов. Мы провели некоторый анализ и приходим к другому выводу. В частности, это так: вагонов не хватает. Кой – когда север вагонов не добавляет. Но вместе с тем и в методах руководства нужно желать много лучшего. Нет рационального использования фактически имеющихся на дороге вагонов, благодаря чему погрузка изо дня в день падает. Я обращаю ваше внимание на следующие чрезвычайно характерные цифры, на следующие примеры: если во второй пятидневке ноября 1933 года при наличии 48.492 вагона грузилось 8.924 вагона, или 93% плана, то во второй пятидневке января 1934. г. при парке в 50.056 вагонов грузилось только 7.454 вагона, что составляет 75% плана. За третью пятидневку января, с 11 по 16, при 100% вагонного парка погрузка составляла 79% плана.

Благодаря этому, конечно, скопились значительные запасы угля, металла. А мы ведь знаем, что целый ряд дорог и в частности отдельные агенты железной дороги старались объяснить недогруз

угля отсутствием его на станциях погрузки. Фактически же это объясняется, как мы видим, просто неправильной и нечеткой работой транспорта.

Вагонный парк можно было бы значительно повысить. За счет чего? В течение января на Южной дороге в среднем имеется в сутки до 16 тыс. груженых вагонов, подлежащих разгрузке в пределах дороги. В первую пятидневку ноября 1933 г. из этого количества вагонов подавалось под разгрузку 9.600 вагонов, а разгружалось из числа поданных 6.683. В январе 1934 г. подавалось только 6.370 вагонов, а разгружалось только 4.903 вагона. Таким образом разгрузка вагонов упала в январе против ноября на 26%. Из этого само собой ясно и понятно, что количество груженых вагонов увеличилось, и уменьшилось количество порожняка. Если во второй пятидневке ноября имелось на дороге сверх нормы груженых только 465 вагонов, то во второй пятидневке января груженых сверх нормы вагонов скопилось 8.457. Такое положение создает закупорку узлов и станций, резко сокращает пропускную способность железных дорог, вообще парализует работу дороги. Мы не вывозим как следует угля, не вывозим металла; я уже не говорю о том, что железная дорога, идя по пути наименьшего сопротивления, производит зажим вывоза всех остальных грузов, как, например, флюсов, сахара, сельхозмашин и т. д. Нужно еще обратить внимание на то, что железные дороги скверно подготовились к зиме, особенно по паровозному парку. Даже по официальным данным дороги, при норме больных паровозов 16%, мы имеем в основных депо — Дебальцево, Красный Лиман — процент больных паровозов 20, а в Харькове — даже 22. Вместо борьбы за здоровый паровоз некоторые агенты дороги занимались прямым очковтирательством. По основным депо паровозы были в большинстве пропущены только через текущий ремонт. Специальной комиссией управления дороги по депо Красный Лиман допущена была преступная халатность: комиссией этой после осмотра 39 паровозов дано было заключение об их исправности, в то время, как все эти паровозы требовали немедленного ремонта. К началу осенне-зимних перевозок только по депо Дебальцево, Красный Лиман, Гришино и Волноваха из 400 паровозов 206 оказались негодными. В отчетных же данных они были показаны как годные. Такое состояние паровозного парка вызвало массовую неподачу паровозов под поезда и порчу их в пути.

Наряду с необходимостью подачи на Южную дорогу с соседних дорог потребного количества порожняка, со стороны Южной, а теперь Южной и Донецкой дорог, необходимо: наладить своевременную сдачу груженых вагонов, немедленно организовать ремонт па-

ровозов, в первую очередь Дебальцево, Красный Лиман – как решающих депо, организовать и полностью обеспечить своевременную и полную разгрузку груженых вагонов, с местными грузами и продвижение грузов дальнего следования по выходным пунктам. Наряду с этим нужна большая гибкость в руководстве и оперативность в управлении. Мне думается, что наряду с полной расхлябанностью в аппарате дорог и неумением руководить порученным делом, причинами отставания транспорта является и то, что антисоветский элемент, классовый враг использует все эти неполадки, все прорывы в работе; вам известно, что формы и методы борьбы с нами контрреволюция, классовый враг избирает, используя политическую обстановку, используя наши ошибки, наши прорывы.

Переходя к последнему вопросу о методах и формах классовой борьбы, я очень кратко остановлюсь на разгроме украинского контрреволюционного подполья в 1933 году. Решительный удар по контрреволюции выразился прежде всего: а) в ударе по низовым антисоветским группам, в которые входили кулацко – петлюровские элементы на селе, организовывавшие саботаж и подрывную работу в сельском хозяйстве, и б) в решительном разгроме руководящих центров, в первую очередь так называемой “Украинской военной организации”, которая возглавляла повстанческую, шпионскую и диверсионную работу, а также организацию саботажа в сельском хозяйстве. Был вскрыт блок украинских националистических партий – УКП, боротьбистов, эсеров, эсдеков, увистов и других, – который является прямой агентурой международной контрреволюции, в первую очередь немецкого и польского фашизма.

Тем, что руководящая роль в борьбе с СССР, в подготовке интервенции перешла к фашистской Германии и японскому империализму, объясняется также и то, что исключительную активность в деле возобновления контрреволюционной работы, особенно в годы прорыва на Украине (1931-1932 гг.) проявил немецкий фашизм, связанный с закордонным центром УВО, ставящий своей конечной целью отрыв Украины от Советского Союза.

Наиболее непримиримые элементы польского фашизма идут наговор с гитлеровцами с целью создания единого антисоветского блока. Особенно окрыляют активную украинскую контрреволюцию надежды на близость интервенции в связи с усилением влияния военных кругов Японии. Несмотря на разгром националистической контрреволюции, нам необходимо быть особенно внимательными и бдительными к классовому врагу. Классовый враг понимает, что ставка на массовые формы борьбы сорвана. Он переходит к новым

формам, к новым методам борьбы, еще более острым, еще более утонченным.

В годы, когда партия решала вопрос об индустриализации страны, т. е. решала вопрос нашего народного хозяйства, высвобождения от иностранной зависимости, международная контрреволюция пыталась нанести удар советской власти путем организации вредительства в промышленности. Происки классового врага были разоблачены. Когда партия выдвинула лозунг ликвидации кулачества как класса на базе сплошной коллективизации, классовый враг все свои силы бросает на этот участок борьбы. Мы должны признать, что у нас на Украине в 1932 г. контрреволюционным элементам удалось провести большую разрушительную работу в сельском хозяйстве. Вредительство в сельском хозяйстве в области животноводства носило плановый, широкий характер.

Несмотря на понесенные потери, враг не откажется также от такой формы борьбы, как шпионаж, диверсия. В условиях так называемой “малой войны”, т. е. подготовки к войне, империалисты всех мастей, особенно немецкий и японский фашизм, через своих агентов – белогвардейскую националистическую эмиграцию, через остатки враждебных нам классов внутри страны – будут готовить активные действия, диверсионные акты в отношении основных объектов нашей промышленности, будут ставить широко экономический и политический шпионаж.

Благодаря решительному удару по националистической украинской контрреволюции, уцелевшие остатки этого подполья на разгром хотят ответить террором.

Мы знаем, что украинская националистическая контрреволюция вела свою подрывную работу в тесном союзе с польскими буржуазно – националистическими элементами, которые вскрыты по делу “польской военной организации” (ПОВ). Установлено также, что украинские националисты блокировались с русскими шовинистами, которые считают, что Украина является основным плацдармом, на котором развернется борьба против советской власти.

Не только вопрос проведения национальной политики на Украине, но и вопросы классовой борьбы были широко поставлены на обсуждение всей украинской партийной организаций, с достаточной четкостью освещены в ряде выступлений тов. Постышева, в докладе тов. Косиора на ноябрьском пленуме ЦК по национальному вопросу.

Я хочу остановиться здесь на том, что мы должны повысить еще больше свою большевистскую бдительность, так как уцелевшие остатки контрреволюционного подполья, начиная от хлебоборско – гетманских контрреволюционных кругов до “левых” укапистских и

боротьбистских групп включительно, работая в подпольи на платформе “единого национального фронта”, переходят на фашистские позиции борьбы с нами.

В наши руки попал интересный документ. Послушайте, как одним из видных представителей этого националистического блока сформулирована политическая программа:

“... Наша программа должна представлять из себя что – то среднее между программой гитлеризма и украинских хлеборобов.

Должны существовать сословия и украинская аристократия. Я не реакционер, но нация должна быть разносторонней.

Нашу национальную программу нужно тесно увязать с нашими историческими традициями, в частности с историей казачества.

Рабочий класс должен быть связан с ремеслом, при чем необходима денационализация промышленности. Должна существовать крупная земельная собственность”.

По вопросу консолидации сил он говорит:

“... Нынешний момент требует консолидации сил как за кордоном, так и здесь. Много наших людей деморализовано, от них нужно очиститься и набрать новых.

Нашей задачей сейчас является работа по объединению всех национальных сил – от хлеборобов до социалистов включительно”.

И дальше:

“... Вся зима и часть весны 1934 г. уйдет на организацию блока иностранных государств против СССР с целью интервенции. Летом вспыхнет война. Нам нужно быть готовыми. Сейчас организация ослаблена и разбита. Поэтому нашей ответственной задачей сейчас является сохранить до конца свои старые кадры, которых осталось уже очень мало. Необходима тактика зашифровки, временного отступления, большей конспирации, собирания еще неразбитых сил.

В случае войны самостоятельно мы выступить не можем. Поэтому вею нашу работу мы должны координировать с работой организаций других республик, например, с Грузией, Белоруссией. Все наши боевые группы и боевой центр необходимо переключить на военную работу, подготовку кадров к восстанию, ознакомление их с теорией военного дела и партизанской войны и для проведения агитации в Красной армии.

Задачей боевых групп должно сейчас являться создание боевых кадров, которые в случае войны могли бы в тылу вызвать разрушения и активные повстанческие выступления”.

Мы должны, товарищи, не забывать, что не только оголтелая украинская националистическая контрреволюция ставит вопрос о насильственном свержении советской власти. Все контрреволюци-

онные группы, начиная от махровых белогвардейцев и до правых и троцкистов включительно, ставят вопрос о насильственном свержении советской власти.

Партия добилась огромных успехов благодаря разгрому классового врага, разоблачению новых форм работы классового врага тихой сапой, разгрому целого ряда антипартийных группировок и осколков разбитых прежних оппозиций, смыкавшихся с классовым врагом. Еще больше бдительности и непримиримости к классовому врагу!

Накануне XVII съезда партии, который явится съездом, открывающим новый этап развернутой работы над осуществлением второй пятилетки – пятилетки построения бесклассового социалистического общества на основе полного завершения коллективизации крестьянских хозяйств, кооперирования всех кустарей, окончательной ликвидации частной собственности на средства производства и установления социалистического способа производства как единственного способа производства, превращения всего трудящегося населения страны в активных строителей социалистического общества, – партия, выросшая, окрепшая, поднявшаяся на высшую историческую ступень перед лицом стоящих перед ней огромных задач социалистического строительства, – под руководством нашего ЦК, под руководством нашего Сталина пойдет к новым боям, к новым победам за дело коммунизма.

(Бурные, продолжительные аплодисменты)

Балицкий В. “Выше большевистскую бдительность и непримиримость в борьбе с классовым врагом.” *Речь на XII съезде КП(б)У.* К., 1934. 16 с. (18-23 января 1934)

<http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Balytsky.php>

VSEVOLOD BALYTSKY

*FOR A GREATER BOLSHEVIK VIGILANCE
AND IMPLACABILITY IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE CLASS ENEMY*

Comrades, our party is heading toward its 17th Congress with the greatest victories. In his speech Comrade Kosior offered an analysis of the successes that the party has achieved in the cause of strengthening the USSR's international situation on the basis of the correct implementation of our party's general line, which is aimed at the industrialization of the country, the creation of our own technical base – Soviet machines – our complete liberation from capitalist dependence, the continuous consolidation of our country's defense capability.

In sum, during the first Five-Year-Plan we achieved exceptional successes in the sphere of industry. In the period between the 16th and 17th party congresses a complete turnaround was carried out in the USSR's agriculture. By the 17th Congress our country has generally become a country of collective farms and Soviet state farms. The party achieved these huge successes thanks to the fact that it is one, like never before, that it is rallied around the CC; that it is rallied around Comrade Stalin. All these huge successes were also achieved thanks to the firm implementation of our party's general line, the decisive struggle against opportunism, the unmasking of all kinds of anti-party groupings, splinters of former opposition groups linked with the class enemy. All these successes were achieved thank to the fact that we are led by the party's Central Committee, headed by the supreme leader of the working class of the entire world, Comrade Stalin.

These successes are particularly felt here in Ukraine not only because Ukraine is a country of grain, beets, metal, coal, and ore, and has immense importance for the economic and political life of the country, but also because during the second half of 1931 and in 1932 profound failures were permitted not only in the sphere of agriculture but also in the sphere of industry (coal and ferrous metallurgy) and in the implementation of the Leninist nationality policy.

Comrades, we now know that all this is explained by incorrect leadership methods, by those mistakes that were made by the CC CP(B)U and the entire Ukrainian party organization. Above all, this is explained by the

lack of specificity and efficiency in management practices. There was not enough mobilization for carrying out the grandiose tasks facing the party. Management methods were not restructured in agriculture. Mass political and organization work was not developed adequately. There was no Bolshevik vigilance, which allowed the enemy to entrench itself in various areas of socialist construction and even to capture a number of key positions of socialist construction in Soviet Ukraine, especially in the construction of Soviet Ukrainian culture. And it was only thanks to the decisive intervention of our party's CC and of Comrade Stalin personally, thanks to the strengthening of the leadership of the CC CP(B)U and of the crucial *oblasts*, thanks to the immense assistance rendered to us by the CC of the party and the federal government, that in 1933 Ukraine achieved great successes and overcame the failure. But, comrades, these successes are our first successes, these are our first victories. The Bolsheviks of Ukraine will still have to struggle mightily for Ukraine's transformation into a genuinely leading country of the Soviet Union.

I would like to focus on three questions: on the question of coal, on issues of transport, and the new methods and forms of struggle by the class enemy.

It is generally known that coal-producing Donbas is of immense importance to the country's entire national economy. We also know that the coal-producing Donbas has overcome its failures and is successfully struggling for the situation whereby there would not be a single mine not fulfilling the plan. Everyone is familiar with the party's decision on the need for the Donbas to provide the country with 60 million tons of coal in 1934. But in order to strive for the implementation of the 1934 program, it is necessary to commence the immediate elimination of a whole range of shortcomings. The first step is to give exceptional attention to the condition of preparatory work in the mines. Preparatory work continues to be one of the areas in which the mines are lagging, and this is limiting the extraction of coal because the following is taking place to this very day:

- a) systematic non-implementation of plans and decrease in the pace of preparatory work at a number of larger mines;
- b) procrastination in preparatory areas slated to be put into exploitation in place of already depleted ones;
- c) a lag in basic output, reduction of the intensification of cleaning coal-faces;
- d) in a number of cases, the rapacious exploitation of mines and output of closer and easily accessible fields.

I want to illustrate this with examples: at the Donbassantratsit Trust, because of the non-implementation of the preparatory works plan, 32,240

linear meters of output remained unprepared, which is manifested in the loss of 186,000 tons of coal. In addition, 1,300,000 tons of earlier prepared unsealed reserves were eaten up. Along with this situation, ready long-wall faces and areas were left out of exploitation at a whole number of mines. For example, in the Sverdlovsk Ore Administration, during a ten-month period three long-wall faces, which could have yielded 75,000 tons of coal according to their resources, were abandoned. At the mines of the Shvartsevsky Ore Administration eight preparatory drifts were abandoned. At the mines of the Bokovsky Ore Administration two long-wall faces, with a potential extraction of 74,000 tons of coal, were abandoned. The same thing is observed at the mines of the Khrustalsky Ore Administration, at the Kapitalnaia mine of the Chistiakovugol Trust, and at a number of other mines.

Comrades, I think that, in addition to our general slackness, we have here the results of old wrecking in the coal-producing Donbas, since we know that, besides subversion, besides the destruction of individual aggregates, wreckers made it their task to conceal seams from the Soviet government, to delay the planned capacity of one mine or another.

In addition, I also have a number of extraordinarily characteristic examples of individual mines, which I submitted for discussion to the Donetsk party conference. Here I would like to offer you two of them, which are particularly characteristic.

The Lutugino mine was put into operation in 1931 with a projected capacity of 1,800 tons a day. This mine was created in 1926, but according to the plan, it will yield full projected capacity only in 1935. Is it not clear that here, absolutely, are elements of wrecking? In 1931–1933 the mine not only did not increase preparation, it also extracted reserves that had been prepared for the moment that the mine was put into operation. The mine now yields 565 tons a day. Also keep in mind that as of 1 October 1933, investments in the mine stand at 11,200,000 rubles.

Let's take a second example. The Karl mine was launched into operation in 1931 with a projected capacity of 2,800 tons a day. According to the plan, the mine has been reaching its projected capacity only since 1935, even though it was created before the Revolution and tunneling was resumed in 1926–1927. At present, the mine is producing 540 tons a day; in 1933 only 41 percent of preparatory works were completed. As of 1 October, capital investments in the mine stand at 16,700,000 rubles.

Comrades, all this means that the coal-producing Donbas has all the capacities not only to complete the plan by 60 million tons, but also to exceed it. Right now it is crucial for us to institute the most implacable struggle against sniveling, against individual whiners and opportunists, who say that the Donbas has not succeeded in overcoming the failure

situation because it is again being overburdened by this plan, which is beyond its strength. Comrades, this is not talk from our camp. This can be said only by an opportunist or a class enemy. It is not without reason that the Donetsk party conference and all the delegates – miners speaking at the conference – declared that the mechanization of extraction, those immense investments that the Donbas received, and the main thing – a new style of work – are offering the possibility not only to fulfill but to exceed the plan.

We, comrades, know that right now the Donbas has significant coal reserves, and we know that the question of the transportation of this coal, especially to the north, is extraordinarily acute. Transportation not only limits the coal industry, it is also the most backward sector of the economy, and it is hindering not only the coal and metallurgical industries but the entire economy in general.

We also know that embedded in the theses of the second Five-Year-Plan is the question pertaining to the reconstruction of the technical base of railway transport and the need for a decisive change in its work.

I want to illustrate the poor work of our transportation with examples of the united [railway] lines, the Southern and the Donetsk. Railways, especially the Southern and the Donetsk, are accustomed to explaining their poor work exclusively by the lack of train cars. We completed an analysis and have reached a different conclusion. In part, this is the way it is: there is a shortage of train cars. Occasionally, the north does not add train cars. But, along with that, much better must be desired of leadership methods. There is no rational use of train cars that are actually on the road, and as a result loading decreases from day to day. I direct your attention to the following extraordinarily characteristic figures, to the following examples: whereas in the second five-day period of November 1933, with an availability of 48,492 train cars, 8,924 cars were loaded, or 93% of the plan, during the second five-day period of January 1934, with a fleet of 50,056 train cars only 7,454 were loaded, which comprises 75% of the plan. During the third five-day period in January, from the 11th to the 16th, with a train-car fleet of 100 percent, loading comprised 79 percent of the plan.

Thanks to this, of course, considerable reserves of coal and metal have accumulated. And we know that a whole number of [rail]roads and in particular individual railway agents sought to explain the underloading of coal by its absence at loading stations. In fact, this is explained, as we can see, simply by the incorrect and fuzzy work of transportation.

The train-car fleet could be significantly increased. At the expense of what? During January, there is an average of up to 16,000 loaded train cars a day on the Southern Railway, which are slated for unloading within the limits of the route. During the first five-day period of November

1933, of this number of train cars, 9,600 cars were slated for unloading, and of that number 6,683 were unloaded. In January 1934, only 6,370 were slated and of that number only 4,903 cars were unloaded. Thus, the unloading of train cars fell by 26 percent in January versus November. From this it is clear and understandable that the number of loaded train cars increased and the number of empties decreased. Whereas during the second five-day period of November there were only 465 train cars on the railroad, loaded over the quota, during the second five-day period of January, 8,457 train cars were loaded over the quota. This situation is creating a bottle-neck at junctions and stations, sharply reducing the throughput capacity of railways, and generally paralyzing the work of the railroads. We are not shipping out coal and metal properly; no need to repeat that the railway, taking the path of least resistance, is creating a clampdown on the transportation of all remaining cargo, like, e.g., flux, sugar, agricultural machines, etc. Attention should also be paid to the fact that the railways are poorly prepared for the winter, especially the locomotive fleet. Even according to official railway data, with a 16 percent rate of ailing locomotives, 20 percent of locomotives in the main depots – Debaltsevo, Krasnyi Lyman – are ailing, and in Kharkiv, even 22 percent. Instead of the struggle for a healthy locomotive, certain railroad agents were engaged in out-and-out hoodwinking. In the main depots the majority of locomotives were passed through only routine repairs. The special commission for the railway administration of the Krasnyi Lyman depot was guilty of criminal negligence: after an inspection of 39 locomotives, the commission issued a finding on their satisfactory condition, even though all these locomotives required immediate repairs. Toward the beginning of the fall-winter transportation only in the Debaltsovo, Krasnyi Lymna, Grishino, and Volnovakha depots, 206 out of 400 locomotives turned out to be unfit. In the accounting data they were indicated as fit. This state of the locomotive fleet has led to a massive short-fall of train locomotives and their breakdown en route.

Along with the crucial need to supply the Southern Railway from neighboring railways with the necessary number of empties, it is crucial for the Southern Railway, and now the Southern and Donetsk railways, to adjust the timely delivery of loaded train cars, to organize the immediate repair of locomotives, above all Debaltsevo, Krasnyi Lyman as the decisive depots, to organize and fully ensure the timely and complete unloading of loaded cars, with local cargos and the movement of long-distance cargos along exit points. Along with this, great flexibility in leadership and management efficiency are required. I think that, along with the utter laxity in the railroad apparatus and the inability to direct the assigned matter, the reasons for the backlog of transport is that the anti-Soviet ele-

ment, the class enemy, is exploiting all these malfunctions, all the work failures. You are aware that the counterrevolution, the class enemy, chooses the forms and methods of the class struggle with us, he exploits the political situation, exploits our mistakes, our failures.

Moving to the last question about the methods and forms of the class struggle, I will pause briefly on the rout of the Ukrainian counterrevolutionary underground in 1933. The decisive blow to the counterrevolution was manifested above all: a) in the blow to lower-level anti-Soviet groups comprised of kulak-Petliurite elements in the countryside, which were organizing sabotage and subversive work in agriculture, and b) in the decisive rout of leading centers, above all the so-called "Ukrainian Military Organization, [UVO]" which spearheaded guerilla, espionage, and diversionary work as well as the organization of sabotage in agriculture. A bloc of Ukrainian nationalistic parties was exposed – the UKP [Ukrainian Communist Party], the Borotbists, SRs, SDs, UVOs, and others – which is the direct intelligence agency of the international counterrevolution, above all of German and Polish fascism.

The leading role in the struggle against the USSR, in the preparation of an intervention passed to fascist Germany and Japanese imperialism. This also explains the exceptional activeness, especially during the years of failure in Ukraine (1931-1932), of German fascism in resuming counterrevolutionary work, associated with the external center of the UVO, whose ultimate goal was the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union.

The most implacable elements of Polish fascism are colluding with the Hitlerites with the goal of creating a single anti-Soviet bloc. The active Ukrainian counterrevolution is particularly inspired by hopes for the proximity of intervention in connection with the growth of the influence of Japan's military circles. Despite the rout of the nationalistic counterrevolution, it is crucial for us to be particularly attentive and vigilant toward the class enemy. The class enemy understands that his reliance on mass forms of struggle has been broken. He is shifting to new forms, to new methods of struggle, which are even more acute, even more sophisticated.

During the years when the party was solving the question of the country's industrialization, i.e., solving the question of our economy and liberation from foreign dependence, the international counterrevolution was seeking to inflict a blow at the Soviet power by organizing wrecking in industry. The intrigues of the class enemy were exposed. When the party advanced the slogan of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivization, the class enemy throws all his energies against this area of the struggle. We should admit that in Ukraine in 1932

counterrevolutionary elements managed to carry out great destructive work in agriculture. Wrecking in agriculture in the sphere of animal husbandry was of a planned, broad nature.

Despite their losses, the enemy will also not refuse such forms of struggle as espionage, subversion. In the conditions of a so-called "small war," i.e., preparation for war, imperialists of all stripes, particularly German and Japanese fascism, through their agents – the White Guardist nationalistic emigration, through the vestiges of classes that are hostile to us inside the country – will be preparing vigorous actions, subversive acts in relation to the main facilities of our industry; they will be setting up broad economic and political espionage.

Thanks to the decisive blow to the nationalistic Ukrainian counterrevolution, the surviving vestiges of this underground want to respond to the rout with terror[rism].

We know that the Ukrainian nationalistic counterrevolution carried out its subversive work in close alliance with Polish bourgeois-nationalist elements that were exposed in the affair of the "Polish military organization" (POV). It was also established that the Ukrainian nationalists had formed a bloc with Russian chauvinists, who believe that Ukraine is the main bridgehead, on which the struggle against the Soviet government will develop.

Not only the question of implementing the nationality policy in Ukraine but also questions of the class struggle were broadly raised for discussion by the entire Ukrainian party organization, and were elucidated with adequate clarity in a number of speeches made by Comrade Postyshev, in Comrade Kosior's speech at the November plenum of the CC on the nationality question.

I would like to focus here on the need for us to increase our Bolshevik vigilance even more because the surviving vestiges of the counterrevolutionary underground, ranging from the rural-hetmanite counterrevolutionary circles to the "left" UKPites and Borotbist groups, inclusively, which are working in the underground on a platform of a "single national front," are switching to fascist positions in the struggle against us.

An interesting document has fallen into our hands. Listen to how one prominent representative of this nationalistic bloc has formulated the political program:

"... Our program should present itself as something more to the middle between the program of Hitlerism and Ukrainian agriculturalists.

Classes and a Ukrainian aristocracy should exist. I am no reactionary, but the nation should be diversified.

Our national program should be tightly bound up with our historical traditions, partly with the history of the Cossacks.

The working class should be connected with the trades, and the denationalization of industry is indispensable. Large-scale land ownership should exist.”

On the question of the consolidation of forces he states:

“. . . The present moment requires the consolidation of forces both abroad and here. Many of our people are demoralized, it is necessary to cleanse ourselves of them and gather new ones.

Our task right now is the work on the unification of national forces – from farmers to socialists, inclusively.”

And further:

“. . . The entire winter and part of spring 1934 will be spent on organizing a bloc of foreign states against the USSR with the goal of intervention. War will break out in the summer. We need to be ready. At present, the organization is weakened and shattered. For that reason, our most important task right now is to preserve our old cadres, very few of which remain now. The tactic of encryption, of temporary retreats, greater conspiracy, and the gathering of forces not yet smashed is crucial.

In the event of war, we cannot act independently. For that reason, we must coordinate all our work with the work of organizations in other republics, e.g., with Georgia, with Belarus. It is crucial to switch all our combat groups and the combat center to military work, prepare cadres for the uprising, familiarize them with the theory of the military art and guerrilla warfare and for conducting agitation in the Red Army.

The task of fighting groups must now be the creation of combat cadres which, in the event of war on the home front, could cause destruction and active insurgency.”

Comrades, we must not forget that it is not only the unbridled Ukrainian nationalistic counterrevolution which is raising the question about the violent overthrow of the Soviet power. All counterrevolutionary groups, ranging from double-dyed White Guardists to rightists and Trotskyites, inclusively, are raising the question of the violent overthrow of the Soviet power.

The party has achieved immense successes thanks to the rout of the class enemy, the unmasking of the class enemy's new forms of work on the sly, the rout of a whole range of anti-party groupings and splinters of smashed former oppositions allied with the class enemy. We need even more vigilance and implacability toward the class enemy!

On the eve of the 17th Party Congress, which will be a congress unveiling a new stage of work unfolded in order to implement the second Five-Year-Plan – a Five-Year-Plan of the construction of a classless socialist society based on the total completion of the collectivization of peasant farmsteads, the gathering of all handicraftsmen in cooperatives, the final

liquidation of private property of the means of production and the establishment of a socialist method of production as the sole method of production, the transformation of the entire laboring population of the country into active builders of the socialist society – the party, which has matured, become more firmly established, ascended to a higher historical stage in the face of the immense tasks of socialist construction that it is facing, under the leadership of our CC, under the leadership of our Stalin, will head out into new battles, toward new victories for the cause of communism.

(Loud, prolonged applause)

V. Balitskii, “Vyshe bolshevistskuiu bditelnost i neprimirnost v borbe s klassovym vragom,” in *Rech na XII sezde KP(b)U* (Kyiv, 1934).

<http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Balytsky.php>

Translated from the Russian by Marta D. Olynyk

REVIEW ARTICLE

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

*SNYDER DENIES STALIN'S HOLODOMOR/ FAMINE-GENOCIDE, RE-AFFIRMS HITLER'S HOLOCAUST AND "OST-PLAN"; ALSO, BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD, SOVIET JEWS AVOIDED STALIN'S "RESETTLEMENT":**

Much is admirable about the 524 pages Timothy Snyder's book.¹ His chapter 1, "Soviet Famines," predominantly deals with Soviet Ukraine. He effectively uses the testimony of the Welsh journalist Gareth Jones, who observed the hungry in Kharkiv, after commenting on "hundreds and hundreds of poor fellows . . . [in New York]." "In Kharkiv, the republic's capital, Jones saw a new sort of misery. People appeared at two o'clock in the morning to queue in front of shops that did not open until seven. On an average day forty thousand people would wait for bread"² Snyder writes well. A veritable *bon mot* is his: "When Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna tried to appeal for food aid for the starving in summer and autumn 1933, Soviet authorities rebuffed him nastily, saying that the Soviet Union had neither cardinals nor cannibals – a statement that was only *half-true*" [emphasis added].³ More to the point, he acknowledges the finding of Raphael Lemkin: "Rafał Lemkin, the international lawyer who later invented the term *genocide*, would call the Ukrainian case 'the classic example of Soviet genocide.'"⁴ Regrettably for readers of this journal, Snyder refers to Roman Serbyn's "Lemkin on Genocide of Nations," *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2009): 123-130,

* Most cordially, I would like to thank my old German friend, Hans-Joachim Lehmann, for sending me, as a gift, by registered mail, Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939* [Germans and Ukrainians, 1914-1939] (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2010), 1085 pages.

1. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

not to the inaugural issue of *Holodomor Studies*, Vol. 1, issue 1 (Winter-Spring 2009), which is dedicated to Raphael Lemkin and includes the full text of his "Soviet Genocide in Ukraine" on pp. 3-8. Nevertheless, Snyder correctly renders Lemkin's point.

Reading and re-reading Snyder's book, my overall impression is mixed. Snyder is correct that Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were soul brothers and temporary allies. Throughout the book, Snyder deftly refers to the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of September 28, 1939. Above all, Hitler and Stalin competed with each other in killing millions of Jews and non-Jews. Millions of Ukrainians were first killed by Stalin, and his lieutenants Lazar Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov. Hitler and his two lieutenants Heinrich Himmler (p. 145) and Hermann Goering (pp. 162-63) meant to kill millions of Ukrainians after victory in World War II. Ominously, Goering called for a Hunger Plan, which was formulated by 23 May 1941. Stalin was the more successful of the two mass murderers or, should we say, *genocidaires*. Stalin died in his bed, as did Kaganovich and Molotov. Hitler shot himself in his *Reichskanzlei* in Berlin. Himmler swallowed a poison pill when accosted by British troops. Goering took poison before his scheduled execution, by hanging, at Nuremberg.

Snyder is at his best when discussing the persecution of Poles. Though in my introductory political science course at the University of Delaware I had been teaching for thirty years that the Katyn massacre was not a war crime, but genocide, I missed that one of the Polish officers shot at Katyn was a woman, Janina Dowbor. It is also to Snyder's credit that he found a record of her sister being shot by the Germans. In Snyder's eloquent words:

Janina Dowbor was the only female among the Polish officers taken prisoner by the Soviets. An adventurous soul, she had learned as a girl to hang glide and parachute. She was the first woman in Poland to jump from a height of five kilometers or more. She trained as a pilot in 1939, and enlisted in the Polish air force reserve. In September 1939 she was taken prisoner by the Soviets. According to one account, her plane had been shot down by the Germans. Parachuting to safety, she found herself arrested by the Soviets as a Polish second lieutenant. She was taken to Ostashkov, and then to Kozelsk. She had her own accommodations, and spent her time with air force comrades with whom she felt safe. On 21 or 22 April 1940, she was executed at Katyn, and buried there in pits with 4,409 men. Her younger sister Agnieszka had remained in the German zone. Along with some friends, she had joined a resistance organization in late 1939. She was

arrested in April 1940, at about the time that her sister was executed. She was killed in the Palmiry Forest on 21 June 1940.⁵

He is wrong, however, when he writes that the two sisters received “sham trials” (p. 149). Janina was put on Beria’s list of victims to be secretly reviewed by a troika. The success of the Katyn massacre depended on Janina and her fellow-officers not knowing that they were about to be shot.

Frank Golczewski, a German historian born in Katowice (Poland), who originally wanted to write a single volume on German relations with Ukrainians, has published only the first part of his project. He warned the Ukrainians that they were about the last to expect real benefits from Germany: “Für die Deutschen war das Verhaeltnis zu den Russen und den westeuropaeischen Nationen wichtiger – *selbst an Polen hatte man mehr Interesse als an der Ukraine*” [For the Germans, the relationship to the Russians and the West European nations was more important – *there was even more interest in Poland than in Ukraine*; emphasis added].⁶ For both Snyder and Golczewski it mattered a lot that Poland was an independent country in the interwar period, whereas Ukraine was not. Golczewski also did not address himself to the German coverage of the Holodomor. Golczewski did, however, confirm that, unlike during World War I, Germany had drastic bloody plans for the Ukrainians after 1941. In his words: “. . . Nicht länger mehr oder weniger Macht, sondern Unterdrückung und Vertreibung (und bald *Vernichtung*) standen zur Debatte” [On the political debating agenda, there was no longer more or less power (for the Ukrainians), but suppression and expulsion, and, before long, *wholesale destruction*] [emphasis added].⁷ Golczewski thus confirmed the findings of Snyder about Himmler’s “Ost-Plan” and Göring’s Hunger Plan.

Snyder is also objective in accounting for losses of Germans. He writes:

The territory of postwar Poland was the geographic center of Stalin’s campaign of postwar ethnic cleansing. In that campaign, more Germans lost their homes than any other group. Some 7.6 million Germans had left Poland by the end of 1947, and another three million or so were deported from democratic Czechoslovakia. About nine hundred thousand Volga Germans were deported within the So-

5. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

6. *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939* [Germans and Ukrainians, 1914-1939] (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2010). The quotation is on p. 1021.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 1019.

viet Union during the war. The number of Germans who lost their homes during and after the war exceeded *twelve million* [emphasis added]. . . .

The flight and deportation of the Germans, though not a policy of deliberate mass killing, constituted the major incident of postwar ethnic cleansing. In all of the civil conflict, flight, deportation, and resettlement provoked or caused by the return of the Red Army between 1943 and 1947, some 700,000 Germans died. . . .⁸

Though temporarily misled by Hitler, Germans received Snyder's respect.

Mindful of Mark von Hagen's injunction to add to the collective memory about what happened to the Ukrainians in the 1930s and during World War II, here are some details from our family and family friends. My father-in-law, Juchym Rusaniwskij, was a "kulak" and part-time veterinarian. He was arrested by the Soviets during the Holodomor. He survived because my mother-in-law, Motria, bribed a local physician and the Soviet jailers. One of the reasons why my wife's family left Ukraine was a German soldier who threatened to shoot Juchym on the spot, unless he would cure a badly wounded horse that had been pulling a munition cart. The horse was really "gone." (Juchym had to go into hiding.)

My wife's brother Petro (Peter) was very gifted. He was also somewhat rebellious. He survived the Holodomor and escaped punishment for his refusal to join Stalin's Komsomol. He was drafted as Hitler's *Ostarbeiter* and perished in a concentration camp.

The elder son of my father's best friends, Rostyslaw Sotschynskij [Rostyslav Sochynsky] studied medicine in Berlin. He was gifted and worked very hard (he was *tüchtig*, in German). Unlike some other Ukrainians, he was not politically active. All of a sudden, in 1943 he was arrested and put into the Oranienburg concentration camp. My father tried to appeal his arrest, but to no avail. Rostyslaw was about to take the first place during the final medical state examination, and his German superiors found this intolerable. (A politically "savvy" Ukrainian would have "thrown" the examination to an ethnic German.) The commandant at Oranienburg was not a fool and put Rostyslaw to work in the camp's infirmary. As a result, the inmates had very good medical care and our friend himself gained more medical experience than he would have had as a regular intern or resident doctor in Berlin. Fellow-Ukrainians in Berlin helped him to escape from Oranienburg. Later he married the daughter of the family that helped to hide him. He immigrated to the United States. In 1953, as a widely respected general practitioner in Brooklyn, N.Y.,

8. Snyder, *Bloodlands*, pp. 331, 332.

Rostyslav Sochynsky, M.D., treated my mother, Natalia, for free. In 1962, he referred my wife Wira to an eminent Ukrainian-American specialist doctor in Manhattan.

In August 1944, my mother and I went to Freiburg, Breisgau. My father had asked Sochynsky's younger brother Jaroslaw to help us with housing and schooling. Jaroslaw had served as an interpreter in the German Army (*Wehrmacht*). After his brother's arrest, he was studying to be a dentist. Living in a West Polish city, my father, who had been involved with anti-Bolshevik governments in Ukraine and the Kuban (Northern Caucasus), was afraid of Soviet troops who were rapidly approaching Warsaw. Little did we know that, after encouraging the Poles to make an insurrection, Stalin deliberately halted Soviet troops in Warsaw's suburb Praga. Snyder's analysis of the Warsaw uprising led by the London Exile Government Home Army is good – except for his statement on page 306 (“Though there is no reason to believe that Stalin deliberately halted military operation at Warsaw, the delay at the Vistula suited Stalin's political purposes”).⁹ Not only George F. Kennan, then a junior American diplomat, was shocked by Stalin letting German troops butcher the insurrectionists (page 307), but so was Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow.

I have fond memories of my German friends in Goslar/Harz. Even more fondly I think of British Quakers, who helped the local Germans and non-German displaced persons. I graduated with an *Abitur* [Honors Matura] from Class 12b of Goslar's *Oberschule für Jungen* [Boys' High School], now the *Ratsgymnasium*. After immigrating with my mother to the U.S. in May 1951 (father had died of heart attacks in 1950), I was pleasantly surprised when Harvard College admitted me as a sophomore – a tribute to the quality of German education.

Returning to Snyder: here and there, he does allow for a “national,” read ethnic, or genocidal interpretation of the Holodomor. For instance: “. . . A convincing national interpretation of the famine is Martin, “Ukrainian Terror,” at 109 and passim. . . .”¹⁰ But he does not accept it himself, because he remains too focused on the territory of Soviet Ukraine. “Although Stalin, Kaganovich, and Balytskyj explained the repressions in Soviet Ukraine as a response to Ukrainian nationalism, Soviet Ukraine was a multinational republic [emphasis added].”¹¹ As Roman Serbyn and others have argued, we must not neglect the total destruction of ethnic Ukrainian peasants and elimination of the Ukrainian language in the Northern Caucasus. A major document that Snyder has ignored is that of

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 288-307.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 466, note 56.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

December 14, 1932, signed by Stalin and Molotov: "Party and government resolution on grain procurement in Ukraine, North Caucasus and Western Oblast and *limitations to Ukrainization in Ukraine and North Caucasus* [emphasis added]."¹²

There is another problem, in that Snyder misinterprets a quotation from a Soviet document in Robert Conquest's *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*.¹³ Wrote Snyder: "One day in 1933 a staff writer for the party newspaper *Pravda*, which denied the famine, received a letter from his Jewish father. 'This is to let you know,' wrote the father, 'that your mother is dead. She died of starvation after months of pain.'"¹⁴ In Conquest, there follows another sentence, which Snyder dropped: "I, too, am on the way, like many others *in our town* [emphasis added]." The point of the Soviet document in Conquest's book is that there were Jewish victims of the famine in a town setting, where most of the Jews lived. Snyder tries to generalize the suffering of the Jewish victims of the Holodomor. For balance, there are the newly translated documents by Harry Lang, of the Jewish Daily *Forward*. Lang, who visited Ukraine in the fall of 1933, spoke Russian. His wife Lucy, who traveled with him, had relatives in Kyiv. If Lang, an expelled member of the Socialist Party with Zionist leanings, had witnessed a truly major impact of the Holodomor on ethnic Jews in Ukraine, he would have written about this. The primary victims of Stalin's famine genocide in Soviet Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus were the Ukrainians.¹⁵

Partly wrong is Snyder on page 54: "The leading Soviet Ukrainian writer and the leading Soviet Ukrainian *political activist* both committed suicide, the one in May and the other in July 1933 [emphasis added]." To call Mykola Skrypnyk, who shot himself July 7, 1933, a political activist, is *not* a bon mot. A Communist believer, Skrypnyk was also a supporter of Ukrainian political power in the Soviet Union, including the Northern Caucasus. Furthermore, he defended the Ukrainian language. A close associate of Lenin's, and with the help of not yet purged Georgian Communists, he successfully opposed Stalin's plans in 1923 to set up the Soviet

12. See *Holodomor Studies* [henceforth *H.S.*], Vol. 1, No. 2: 81, 83, 85, 87. Also, Bilinsky, "Genocide as a Reinforcer of National Identity: Reflections on the 'Armenian Massacres' of 1915; 'Katyn,' 1940; and Holodomor ('Famine-Genocide') in Ukraine, 1932-1933," *H.S.*, Vol. 2, No. 1: 41-42.

13. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 256.

14. Snyder, *Bloodlands*, p. 55.

15. See Roman Serbyn, comp. and ed., "Harry Lang of the Jewish Daily Forward (Forverts) on Ukraine in the Autumn of 1933," *H.S.*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2010): 203-248; especially, "A Trip to the Jewish Kolkhozy of Ukraine and White Russia," of 30 Dec. 1933, pp. 229-240.

Union as a unitary state, modeled on the Russian Empire. By 1933, he was outmaneuvered in Soviet Ukraine and committed suicide.

Snyder's mischaracterization of Skrypnyk may also be a put-down of the Ukrainian political elite. On balance, he rejects the notion of the Holodomor being famine-genocide because genocide includes the killing of the elite. Notably missing from his book is the discussion of the 1930 show trial of "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," or SVU. Excellent on this is Yuri Shapoval.¹⁶ As a pithy counter-weight to Snyder's denial, is Shapoval's concluding paragraph:

Stalin launched his all-out war for the subjugation of the Ukrainian nation with concurrent attacks on three fronts. The decimation of the national elites began with the SVU trial, continued in the form of purges of the Ukrainian state and communist cadres, and reached its peak during the Great Terror of 1936-1938. Dekulakization and deportation initiated the destruction of rural elites, which also reached its denouement during the Great Terror. The most extensive physical annihilation of Ukrainians began with the forced collectivization of the peasantry, the mainstay of the Ukrainian nation, and ended with the deliberate, state-imposed starvation of 1932-1933. These, along with the destruction of *the Ukrainian culture*, were the basic components of the Ukrainian genocide, as interpreted by Raphael Lemkin, in the light of the United Nations Convention on Genocide [emphasis added].¹⁷

Surprisingly, Snyder not only denied the Holodomor, but he denied how vicious and almost fatal had been Stalin's anti-Semitism.

Snyder does acknowledge the killing in January 1948 of Solomon Mikhoels, the moral leader of Soviet Jews (pages. 339-41). But on page 369 he stresses that "Stalin killed no more than a few dozen Jews in these last years of his life." He mentions that Stalin refused to have Kaganovich investigated. Molotov was not so lucky. "Polina Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's [Jewish] wife, was arrested in June 1949. She denied the charges of treason. . . . Zhemchuzhina was sentenced to forced labor, and Molotov divorced her."¹⁸ Molotov had fallen out of Stalin's favor in the late 1940s. Stalin still needed Kaganovich to control the not-yet-fully killed Ukrainians. In August 1932, Stalin had wanted Kaganovich to simultaneously

16. "The Case of the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine': A Prelude to the Holodomor," *H.S.*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 153-182. New even to me was Shapoval's discovery of a top-secret GPU document of November 1926 "About Ukrainian Separatism (*ibid.*, p. 174).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

18. Snyder, *Bloodlands*, p. 350.

run the Communist Party of Ukraine while doing his Politburo job in Moscow.¹⁹ In 1947, Kaganovich was sent back to Ukraine as a kind of overlord over Nikita S. Khrushchev, who had run into political and economic problems.

Apart from the special case of Kaganovich, but for God's grace, Soviet Jews narrowly escaped "resettlement" or genocide in early 1953. I infer this from the memoirs of Andrei Sakharov:

Stalin's final months were ominous. In early 1953, the Soviet press began hammering away at the "Doctors' Plot": a group of physicians in the Kremlin Hospital, nearly all Jews, had supposedly committed several well-disguised medical murders of Party and government officials, including Alexander Shcherbakov and Andrei Zhdanov, and had begun plotting the assassination of Stalin. The investigation ostensibly had been triggered by a letter from Lydia Timashuk, also a physician in the hospital (and no doubt a secret KGB collaborator). In fact, however, everyone who had lived through the campaigns of the 1930s quickly understood that the Doctors' Plot was a wide-ranging anti-Jewish provocation, an extension of the chauvinist "anti-cosmopolitan campaign" directed against Jews and foreigners, a continuation of the anti-Semitic atrocities like the 1948 murder of Solomon Mikhoels and the 1952 execution of Perets Markish and other Yiddish-language writers.

After Stalin's death we heard that trains had been assembled in the beginning of March to transport Jews to Siberia and that propaganda justifying their deportation had been set in type, including a lead article for Pravda entitled: "The Russian People Are Rescuing the Jewish People." The article was rumored to be the work of Dmitri Chesnokov, whom Stalin in 1952 placed on the Presidium of the Central Committee (Stalin enlarged the Presidium at that time after he began to distrust its members). Meetings were held everywhere to denounce the medical murderers and their accomplices, and a number of Jewish physicians were fired. The campaign at the [nuclear] Installation was muted, but I know of at least one dismissal (that of the ophthalmologist Dr. Katsenelenson, husband of my university classmate Lena Feldman), and there may have been more. Passions grew more frenzied with each passing day, and people began to fear that pogroms were in the offing. [Emphasis added].²⁰

19. Bilinsky, "Genocide as a Reinforcer of National Identity . . .," *H.S.*, vol. 2, no. 1: 41f.

20. Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs*, rans. from the Russian by Richard Lourie. (New York: Vintage Books / A Division of Random House, Inc., 1992), pp. 162-63.

The wholesale deportation did not happen and hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives were spared, despite Stalin's plans. Academician Sakharov was the father of the Soviet H-bomb and he knew Stalin well.

A delicate question is whether Ukrainians who were the *actual* victims of Stalin's famine-genocide – and the *intended* victims of Hitler's *Ostpolitik* – have participated in the Holocaust. By and large, Snyder is fair in describing the violence against the Jews by “local Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, *Ukrainians*, Belarusians, and Poles who had themselves cooperated with the Soviet regime. . . . [emphasis added].” “Yet this psychic nazification would have been much more difficult without the palpable evidence of Soviet atrocities. The pogroms took place where the Soviets had recently arrived and where Soviet power was recently installed, where for the previous months Soviet organs of coercion had organized arrests, executions, and deportations. *They were a joint production, a Nazi edition of a Soviet text* [emphasis added].”²¹ The concluding sentence is one of Snyder's most felicitous.

“In 1988, I posed some tough questions about the pogroms in . . . Galicia, where semi-spontaneous pogroms against the Jews were organized or, at the very least, partially organized by the Germans. . . .” One of the toughest is: “. . . Were there Jews among those executed by the NKVD just before its retreat, and if so, how many? Did local Ukrainians know this. . . ?”²² In 2006, Serhiy Hrabovsky, a journalist with Radio Liberty, quoted historian Vladyslav Hrynevych: “. . . Nikhto ne kazav todi, pro tse malo kazhut' zaraz, shcho pryblyzno do 10 % zahyblykh v tsykh butseharnyakh buly yevreis'ki pidpil'nyky, yevreyi z riznomanitnykh sionists'kykh orhanizatsiy, yaki buly zareshetovani bil'shevykamy i znyshcheni naperodni nimets'koho nastupu.” [Nobody was saying then (in 1941), and few people are mentioning this now, that approximately 10 percent of the victims in those awful prisons were members of the Jewish underground, Jews from all kinds of Zionist organizations, who had been arrested by the Bolsheviks and killed on the eve of the German offensive.]²³ See also Hrabovsky, “22 chervnya [2011 roku] u L'vovi: pro ‘pravyl'no’ i ‘nepravyl'no’ vbytykh yevreyiv” [“22 June (2011) in Lviv:

21. Snyder, *Bloodlands*, p. 196.

22. Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War.” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Univ. of Alberta, 1988), p. 376).

23. (Serhiy Hrabovsky, “‘Krayina Inkohnita’: Sionisty Ukrayiny u borot'bi protybol'shevyt'koho rezhymu” [“‘Terra Incognita’: Ukraine's Zionists in the struggle against the Bolshevik regime], 21.01.2006 <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/articleprintview/939349.html>.

Jews who had been killed (politically) ‘correctly’ compared with those, who had been killed ‘incorrectly’].”²⁴

Henceforth, to accentuate the positive, I would like to focus on Ukrainians as rescuers of Jews. A Ukrainian school teacher helped to save the 1981 American Nobel Prize laureate in Chemistry, John A. Newman, Professor of Physical Science at Cornell University. (During the war, he was a five year old boy, whose name was Roald Hoffmann.)²⁵ *En passant*, in 2010 Richard F. Heck, Professor Emeritus of the University of Delaware, won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. In the profession, it is widely known that Galician-born Ukrainian historian Taras Hunczak was told by his father to carry a secret message from Jews, who had escaped from the Pidhaitsi ghetto, to Dr. Milch, who was still in the ghetto, and back from Dr. Milch to the escapees. For this, his father could have been shot and Taras himself put into a concentration camp. When Taras asked his father about this, his father replied: “Lyudy musily pomahaty lyudyam” [Human beings had to help (other) human beings].

There was a veritable cottage industry for saving Jews under Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky, the head of the Greek Catholic Church. There is no reference to it in Snyder’s book. Golczewski’s coverage, in an English book, however, is very good:

The Greek Catholic Church, despite its German subsidies and ties to both OUN factions, also contains several examples of clergy who tried to save Jews, first and foremost Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky, the head of the church, who rescued at least 150 Jews. With Sheptytsky’s help, Rabbi David Kahane spent the war disguised as a Greek Catholic librarian and taught Greek Catholic monks Hebrew. Kliment Sheptytsky, the metropolitan’s brother and head of the Greek Catholic Church’s Studite convents, together with convent abbess Ihumena Iosefa, helped hide Kahane’s wife and daughter. Natalia Dresdner of Lviv hid for eight months in Mosty under the protection of a priest by the name of Korduba.

The Greek Catholic Church, it should also be noted, also used baptism to save some Jews, but this was not widespread. The Sipo-SD [*Sicherheits-Polizei – Sicherheits-Dienst*, Security Police and (Party) Security Service] in District Galicia counted 40 cases of Jews being officially baptized in the first half of 1942. The practice was officially ended after consultation between the Sipo-SD command in Lviv and Sheptytsky. Although the metropolitan issued a decree forbidding the baptism of Jews, it appears that this practice continued. In Peremysliany, the Greek Catholic

24. *ePoshta* – Your Independent Ukrainian Internet Newsletter<ePOSHTA_110622_CanadaUS.html>, p. 25f of 103.

25. *New York Times*, 20 Oct. 1981, p. C2, or Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems. . . .” p. 382.

priest Omelian Kovch was deported to Majdanek and murdered there [in 1944] for baptizing large numbers of Jews.

Kahane also later related how the director of the Ukrainian city library in Lviv, Omelian Masliak, constructed special shelves for the purpose of hiding Jews and sold rare books to earn the money necessary to feed them. A watchman at the Lviv Botanic Gardens hid the musician and jurist Julius Sperber as a gesture of gratitude for free violin lessons given to his son before the war. Beyond Lviv, reports from Peremyshliany speak of 1,700 Jews who were able to survive the occupation in the woods protected and supplied by Ukrainian and Polish foresters. Mass rescues also took place in towns such as Sambir, where Oleksandr Kryvoiaza rescued 58 Jews, and Pidhaisi, where Levko and Roman Biletsky saved 23 Jews. Another notable example is that of the Przemyśl gymnasium teacher Zahaikivych who saved a family. This was dangerous work, as illustrated by the case of a Ukrainian woman by the name of Anna Masiaga, who was sentenced to death for aiding and abetting Jews in Stry [Stryi] in early 1944.²⁶

On May 17-19 2011 in Lviv, there was an International Academic Conference on "The Righteous – Saviors of Life: Historical Experience and Moral Lessons." A most welcome guest of honor was Yanina Heshles. Ms. Heshles, who is 85 years old, now lives in Jerusalem. She had been born in Lviv, was put in the Yaniv concentration camp. Then twelve years old, she escaped and in September 1943 was rescued by the Polish underground organization Zhegota. Her memoirs had originally been published in Polish, but now they were translated into Ukrainian. "Ms. Heshles pointed out that there are many stories similar to hers and that, although she was apprehensive about returning to Lviv, she was glad that she and her family could come."²⁷ At the same conference, a Holocaust survivor, "... Dr. Itzhak Komem of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ... said that for each of the rescuers who helped his family survive, there were five others who gave essential help. *Apart from individuals there were also institutions – organizations, monasteries and so forth* [empha-

26. Frank Golczewski, "Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia," in Brandon, Ray, and Wendy Lower, eds., *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008); Published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum], pp. 144-45. First rate is also Taras Hunczak, "Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky – savior of Jews during World War II," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Parsippany, NJ; published by the Ukrainian National Association), Sunday, Jan. 29, 2006, pp. 1-2.

27. Orest Zakydalsky, "Lviv conference considers 'The Righteous' – Ukrainians who saved Jews in World War II," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. LXXIX (79), No. 27, Sunday, July 3, 2011, p. 9.

sis added].”²⁸ It is truly astounding that of the almost 100 persons attending the 2011 Lviv conference, none had the good sense – and grace – to mention by name Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky.

Prominent – or, at least notable – as a rescuer, is the late Kost’ Turkalo. He was a chemical engineer, who was one of the few survivors of the 1929 Union for the Liberation of Ukraine show trial. When I interviewed him in late December 1978 in New York – he died in 1979 – he explained, how he had saved the life of Dina Pronicheva and her two young children, a boy and a girl. Pronicheva was given false documents by Ukrainians and told to stay out of the city of Kyiv. She was also strongly advised to give up her two children for temporary safe-keeping. Dina Pronicheva, the master puppeteer, had married a Russian. Pronicheva also did not look Jewish. On pages 201-203, Snyder describes rather well the mass shootings in Babi Yar, mentions that her two parents and her sister were shot. He dramatically describes, how Pronicheva “threw herself into the gorge, and then feigned death.” He fails, however, to explain why she and her two children survived. They were saved by Kost’ Turkalo and his Ukrainian friends. Snyder also does not mention Pronicheva’s children. More scholarly is Karel C. Berkhoff’s account.²⁹

Rather insightful is Volodymyr Viatrovych’s biographical sketch of Havrysh Mandyk.³⁰ The son of Zhysik Khasman of Drohobych, who had served as a captain in the Austro-Hungarian Army in World War I, Mandyk was about to be shot by the Germans, after the liquidation of the city’s ghetto. His father had already been shot, when the 12-year old Mandyk escaped, together with his 9-year old brother. To make a long story short, Mandyk Khasman joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

There is a major conceptual flaw in Snyder’s book. By himself he draws a map of the “Bloodlands,” where both Stalin and Hitler had committed “mass murder” in the 1930s and especially during World War II. But why did they kill millions of people? According to Snyder, Stalin wanted to industrialize the country. But is strengthening the Soviet Union against Hitler a sufficient explanation for Stalin’s vicious, wholesale attacks on Ukrainians, Poles and Jews? Snyder also gives Stalin the benefit of the doubt, as, for instance, by not admitting that Stalin ordered Soviet troops to stop east of Warsaw during the Polish Home Army uprising from August until October 1944. Nor does Snyder accept that Stalin was

28. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

29. Karel C. Berkhoff, “Dina Pronicheva’s Story of Surviving the Babi Yar Massacre: German, Jewish, Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian Records,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine . . .*, pp. 291-317.

30. “Povstans’kyi Havrosh Mandyk Khasman [UPA’s Havrysh Mandyk Khasman], *Istorychna Pravda*” [Historical Truth] http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/06/8/41955/view_print.

both planning and partly implementing his version of the “Final Solution,” from January 1948 until his death in March 1953.

As to Hitler, he was ready to lose World War II for the largely accomplished Holocaust and for disclosing plans for the eventual destruction of all Ukrainians, to gain more living space for ethnic Germans. Never mind that Germans were not ready to relocate to Ukraine! Was the Holocaust incomparable to other “mass killings?” Was it truly unique? This appears to be the unstated premise of *Bloodlands*. If so, Snyder should have stated it plainly in his conclusion.

An alternative conception is that of Lemkin, the father of the UN genocide convention of 1948. Lemkin accepts the Holocaust as the most intense manifestation of genocide. But with Lemkin the Holocaust is not unique, but comparable to the wholesale killing of Poles under both Stalin and Hitler. It can also be compared with Stalin’s Holodomor/famine-genocide. Vasilii Grossman, who had written about the Holocaust, accepted the basic humanity of the Ukrainian “kulak.” The genocidal character of the famine was then acknowledged by historians Conquest, von Hagen, Andrea Graziosi, and Nicholas Werth.

Ukrainians have many faults, such as not electing good presidents. The first three presidents – Leonid Kravchuk (1991-94), Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) and Victor Yushchenko (2005-10) – confirmed the genocidal nature of the Holodomor. The fourth, Victor Yanukovych, who was elected in 2010, did not. Yushchenko also deserves much credit for publishing old GPU documents relating to the Holodomor from the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

Nor have Ukrainians reached consensus on a seemingly secondary matter, viz., the number of victims. Snyder correctly states that Walter Duranty of the *New York Times* “did his best to best to undermine Jones’s accurate reporting” (p. 56). He ignores, however, a major document, which provides contemporary evidence on numbers. In his debriefing at the British Embassy in Moscow, 26 September 1933, Duranty said: “. . . the population of the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga has decreased in the past year by 3 million, and the population of the Ukraine by 4-5 million.”³¹ This is paragraph 5 in the dispatch. There were Ukrainians in the Northern Caucasus whom Stalin had Russified, deported and ultimately killed. Most interesting is the 2nd but final paragraph.³² From the

31. William Strang (Moscow) to Sir John Simon, 26 September 1933, “Tour by Mr. W. Duranty in North Caucasus and the Ukraine,” in Lubomyr Luciuk, ed., *Not Worthy: Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize and the New York Times* (Kingston, Ont.: Kashtan Press, 2004; Published for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association), p. 259.

32. “13. Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year [emphasis added].” *Ibid.*, p. 262.

context it appears that Duranty may have been commenting on a figure given by German agricultural expert Dr. Schiller.

Lang in a 1935 article, which had been translated into English, gave the figure of 6 million victims in Ukraine alone. The context of that estimate is very important. Wrote Lang: "Only when I came to Ukraine did I understand why Moscow kept foreign journalists out of it. A high Ukrainian Soviet official confidentially told me that 6,000,000 people had perished in that territory alone, once the granary of Russia."³³ Lang also correctly observed: ". . . the Ukrainian Soviet, *the Ukrainian nationalists*, are constantly at odds with Moscow [emphasis added]."³⁴ In view of Duranty's confidential de-briefing and Lang's passing on the estimate of an unnamed Soviet Ukrainian official in Kharkiv, Snyder's figure of some 3.5 million in today's Ukraine, "[who] fell victim to Stalinist killing policies between 1933 and 1938 . . ." (p. 404) is on the low side. Furthermore, that number is not limited to ethnic Ukrainians. It also includes Polish and Jewish victims.

Whatever the number of Ukrainian victims, there is another bitter, painful aspect. Wrote Lidiya Kovalenko about the quality of those who died:

V mohyly, de lezhat' 7 z polovynoyu mil'iioniv ukrayins'kykh selyan, ziishly naiikrashchi. Hynulypratsiovyti, samostiini khazayai, yakym pryshyvaly "kurkul's'kyi sabotazh." Vidkhodyly v nebuttya sil's'ki maistry ii vynakhidnyky, yakykh nikoly ne brakuvalo na Ukrayini i sered yakykh bulo chymalo shchedro obdarovanykh pryrodoyu lyudey. Lyahaly v syru zemlyu nepokirni nashchadky kozats'ki, yaki ne mohly zmyrytysya zi svavoleyu vlady,--nedaremno zh sered svidchen' ochevydtsiv holodu stil'ky opovideii pro trahediyu vidomykh svozeyu nazalezhnisty i dostatkom davnikh kozats'kykh sil. Vyhybala sil's'ka intelihentsiya, nosii kul'tury i natsional'noyi ideyi, ob"yekt osoblyvo pyl'noyi uvahy DPU-NKVS. [Into the grave, where 7.5 million Ukrainian peasants have been buried, went *the best*. It was the industrious, independent farmers who perished – they were falsely accused of "kurkul sabotage." There vanished forever the village master craftsmen and inventors, who had never been lacking in Ukraine and among whom there always had been many truly gifted people. Into the fresh earth went the rebellious Cossack descendants, who could not accept the total arbitrariness of the regime.

33. Harry Lang, "Soviet Horrors Told by Socialist," *New York Journal*, 15 April 1935, as cited in Serbyn, "Harry Lang of the Jewish Daily *Forward* . . ." *H.S.*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2010), pp. 207-08.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

It is not in vain that among the eye witnesses of the famine we find so many accounts about the tragedy of ancient Cossack villages, which had been renowned for their independence and prosperousness. The village intelligentsia, the carriers of culture and of the national idea, was perishing. They were being watched most closely by the GPU and the NKVD.] [emphasis added].³⁵

Stalin almost succeeded in destroying the Ukrainians, especially the best among them.

To conclude:

At bottom is the question whether the Ukrainians, as a nation, are equal to others. If the world in the twenty-first century is still divided into nations, Lemkin's concept of genocide should be applied to them, as did Lemkin himself, but not Snyder. Moreover, with ex-KGB officer and Stalinist Vladimir Putin ruling Russia, this is not the time to paint Stalin as anything other than what he really was. He was a vicious *genocidaire*, not simply a mass murderer.

35. Lidiya Kovalenko, "Dukhovna ruyina" [Ruin of the spirit], in Lidiya Kovalenko and Volodymyr Manyak, compilers, *33-y: Holod; Narodna knyha – memoriyal* [(19)33-Famine: People's Memorial Book] (Kyiv: *Radyans'kyi pys'mennyk* [Soviet Writer], 1991), p. 22.

BOOK REVIEWS

Vadim Guzun, Editor. *Foametea, piatiletka și fermacolectivă: documente diplomatice românești, 1926-1936 (Famine, Five-Year Plan and the Collective Farm in Romanian Diplomatic Documents. 1926-1936)*. Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Academy, "George Barițiu" History Institute, 2011 (Baia Mare: Editura Universității de Nord, 2011. 780 pp.

The editor of this compilation, Vadim Guzun, brings to his task impressive qualifications. He has studied law in the Faculty of Law at Craiova University. At the time this book was published, he was a candidate for a doctorate at the Romanian Academy's Institute of History "George Barițiu" in Cluj-Napoca. He is a diplomat at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he works in the Division of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He was a member of the Romanian delegation to the United Nations when the question of the Holodomor 1932-33 was to be discussed as a man-made famine and genocide against Ukraine. This was at the United Nations in October of 2008 when Russia's ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, was able successfully to block a discussion and resolution in the General Assembly by arguing that the famine was wide spread in the Soviet Union and not suffered only in Ukraine.

The present work is the second volume of a series, *Afaceri Orientale (Eastern Affairs)*, founded by Vadim Guzun. The first volume, *Marea foamete sovietică, 1926-1936 (The Great Soviet Famine. 1926-1936)*, and the second were described by their author at a book launching for the two books in Craiova at the county library on October 24, 2011, as follows:

The first volume is a monograph analyzing and comparing some of the greatest tragedies known to humanity in the last century. It concerns the great Soviet famine, which by one calculation killed millions or even tens of millions of people. The second volume is a collection of Romanian diplomatic documents, a short selection from a list of all the diplomatic documents on this subject.

Thus it is that this second volume with its 248 documents functions as a sort of appendix to the first volume, illustrating and explicating the assertions already made. The majority of the documents are reports concerning Ukrainian affairs coming into the foreign ministry in Bucharest from some 20 Romanian diplomatic establishments throughout the world. There are as well pertinent articles from the Romanian press and such international newspapers as *The Times* and *Le Temps*.

Most of the articles in the foreign press were sent to Bucharest, usually without translation into Romanian, as a result of the monitoring done by the Romanian missions abroad.

The first document in the collection is from the Romanian mission in Warsaw and dated July 20, 1926; the last is from the Romanian mission in Moscow on September 17, 1936. Of course these dates extend in both directions beyond the Holodomor, which Robert Conquest dates in *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror* from July 1932, when Stalin made the decision to extract the exorbitant 7.7 million tons of wheat from Ukraine, to the end of May 1933 when the number of famine deaths was observed to be declining. The book's spread of dates is appropriate, however, as it is concerned with the Five Year Plan and collectivization in Ukraine as well as the Holodomor; and the three economic phenomena are inexorably intertwined with reciprocating influences and impacts on each other.

There are some groups of documents that deserve to be highlighted. The bulletins and publications of Ukrainian press offices in exile, primarily in Paris, command attention. All were stridently anti-Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist. It is interesting with 20-20 hindsight to see how accurate their reportage was and how realistic their assertions. As it is now clear that Soviet intelligence had penetrated deeply and well virtually all such exile organizations, it is no less interesting to look for possible Muscovite fingerprints on some of these publications, as for example impossibly exaggerated statistics.

Certainly worth a second reading are the documents issued from within the Romanian Foreign Ministry, sometimes authored by individual officers stationed in the ministry. There are forty such documents. The large majority are bulletins written by the Ministry's Eastern Political Division – Eastern Section. Some of these are clear distillations or modifications of specific reports coming in from foreign diplomatic posts, but others appear to be compilations and syntheses from several sources. These are entitled to particular attention because they represent the ministry's best thinking on Ukrainian subjects, such as the collectivization, harvests, agricultural exports etc., to be circulated as appropriate within the ministry and probably elsewhere in the Romanian government. Their importance and historical interest rest in the fact that when circulated at the highest reaches of the Romanian state, they would have been a major ingredient, perhaps the major ingredient, in shaping opinions and then in the formulation of Romanian foreign policy.

For peculiarly Romanian and Polish reasons the correspondence from the Romanian mission in Warsaw to the foreign ministry in Bucharest has special significance. Both countries had long, troubled eastern frontiers with the Soviet Union. Poland had beaten the Red Army back from the gates of Warsaw in the summer of 1920. With greater ease the Romanian army in a few weeks put down the Soviet led and inspired so-called Tatar Bunar Rebellion in September 1924. Only a few months later the Soviet Union left a visible reminder of its ambitions with the founding of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the east bank of the Dniester (Nistru) River from where provocations of all sorts against Romania were launched throughout the interwar period. Thus it was that both countries were natural allies, with

common fears, common interests and a common need for all the information they could get about their turbulent, restless common near-enemy.

Of course Romania had at this time an additional concern with the Soviet Union in general and Ukraine, with which it shared a common border, specifically. It was during this period that Stalin, to earn hard currency with which to pay for his frenzied industrialization, was dumping wheat in quantities at below market prices on the world market. Not only was this contributing importantly to the famine in Ukraine; but because Romania was a major wheat exporter, it was driving down the value of a key Romanian product.

There was, however, a major difference between Romania and Poland. Romania had no official diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union during most of the period covered in Guzun's books and all of the Holodomor. Of course at one time it had. Following the Romanian War of Independence a Romanian legation was opened in Moscow October 12 (o.s. September 30) 1878, only to close in the chaos of the Russian Revolution on January 28 (o.s. January 15) 1918. Relations would not resume nor would a legation reopen until June 9, 1934.

The situation with Poland was altogether otherwise. Not only did Poland have a sizeable legation in Moscow as soon as it was possible to do so, she had two consulates in Ukraine alone: Kyiv with four persons and Kharkiv with seven. Both are understood to have operated an extensive network of agents. (See Robert Kusnier's most informative study, "The Question of the Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933 in the Polish Diplomatic and Intelligence Reports" in the first issue of this journal).

Poland had two other important advantages from which Romania was able to benefit. The first was in personnel. Polish diplomacy and intelligence had available, in what was then Eastern Poland, a large pool of ethnic Ukrainians who spoke Ukrainian at native fluency levels, who were thoroughly familiar with Ukrainian issues and who, most importantly, for personal among other reasons, were deeply anti-Soviet. Doubtless Polish diplomacy and intelligence did not overlook this priceless resource in recruiting personnel.

The second advantage Poland had were her intelligence services themselves. Too often forgotten is the reputation for excellence these services deservedly enjoyed. Within the more limited scope in which it operated, Polish intelligence rivaled the British and Soviet intelligence services. Anyone inclined to question this need only recall it was Polish intelligence that recognized the importance of the Enigma encrypting machine, broke into its factory, copied its plans, spirited them back to Poland and with the help of three mathematicians at Warsaw University broke the resulting Ultra code. The rest of the epic is well known. The Poles gave their priceless gift to the British, who used it with strategic results to the end of the war in May 1945. The Germans never knew that Ultra's integrity had been lost. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that there are in the collection nearly 20 substantial documents from the Warsaw legation, one 16 pages long.

The above should make abundantly clear the important scholarship in this series. Happily the author has recently made good on his promise of a third volume in the series to deal with the first Soviet famine of the early 1920s and the situation of the refugees who were able to evade the Soviet frontier forces on the east bank of the Dniester (Nistru) River and reach Bessarabia.

In closing it is appropriate to quote from Guzun's foreword to volume II. In considering the work of Romanian diplomats in the 1930s, he sees "a confirmation of the quality of the Romanian diplomatic corps." This reviewer, having examined in detail Guzun's scholarship, concludes that the tradition of quality in the Romanian diplomatic corps is still very much alive today.

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Raphael Lemkin: Soviet Genocide in Ukraine. Article in 28 languages. Edited by Roman Serbyn, compiled by Olesia Stasiuk (Kyiv: Maisternia knyhy, 2009). 208 pp.

In October 2007, the Ukrainian House (former Lenin's Museum) in the center of Kyiv hosted an exhibition dedicated to the Holodomor. All three floors of the building were stocked with evidence, reflections, and feedback. An entire hall in the first floor displayed copies of alarming reports to Kyiv and Moscow by regional party heads, some of them Ukrainians and Russians, other Jewish, all of them in despair: food shortages kill hundreds of peasants. Several huge halls on the second floor introduced modern painters' reflections on the Holodomor: particularly impressive were the black-and-white series of posters such as "A 1932-33 Cookbook" advertising a soup from wormwood and a desert from oak tree-roots. The exhibition was opened with pomp and broadly advertised. Its governmental support seems to have signified that the Holodomor would become a pivot in post-communist Ukrainian self-perception, a key event in modern history textbooks and a key point in the understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian relations. With the monument to the victims of the Holodomor just near the walls of the Laura Monastery, then being built and now finally inaugurated, it seemed that the national 1932-33 victimhood would finally be embedded in the cultural memory of the Ukrainians.

This did not happen. The new regime showed no desire to make the Holodomor a significant event in the nation-making process, curtailed subsequent commemorative events, cut the sponsorship of the institutes responsible for the publication of documents on the Holodomor, ordered radically to diminish the awareness of the Holodomor among secondary school students, and dismissed the conceptualization of the Holodomor as a genocide. The book publication of the 1953 speech of Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew, given at the New York Manhattan Center to Commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine, and reproduced in 28 languages, cannot stop this trend. Yet such publications help enhance the awareness of the Holodomor among the reading public, in Ukraine and abroad, and remind us that the victimized Jews were among the very first who understood the significance of the Holodomor.

Before Lemkin, Osip Mandelshtam in one of his 1930s poems wrote about the "dead shadows of Ukraine and Kuban." In his *Life and Fate*, Vassili Grossman traced direct parallels between the Holocaust and the Holodomor, pointing to the genocidal aspect of the Ukrainian victimhood. These remarks were not left unnoticed: Ukrainian Diaspora thinkers such as Roman Rahmanny sympathetically noticed that two Jews had raised the issue of the Great Ukrainian Famine amidst a complete international silence on the matter. As a person born in the Russian Empire, Lemkin should be placed in this context – yet he occupies a unique place in it.

Roman Serbyn informs us in his short but informative study that Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) was born to a Jewish family in Grodno Province. He grew up in Poland, studied the law, and worked as an assistant prosecutor at a district court. In 1933, he suggested to include “barbarity” and “vandalism” to the penal code of the European countries at a conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid. Later, already as a professor of law in the United States teaching (according to different sources) at Yale, Duke and Virginia, Lemkin designed and developed a new concept of genocide. The UN Convention on Genocide, adopted in 1948 and approved in 1951, together with its newly coined concept, could never become life if not for the tireless efforts of Lemkin to turn his newly coined concept into a practice of the international law.

The publication of Lemkin’s speech pronounced before several thousand American Ukrainians early in the 1950s proves beyond reasonable doubt: cut off from the documentary sources, lacking any historically valid study of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and thinking along the lines of the international justice, Lemkin managed to articulate the key points that shaped and to a great degree continue to shape the understanding of the Holodomor in a broad comparative, legal, and historical context. In a way, what Lemkin tried to prove went far beyond the contemporary vision of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin policies on ethnic and national minorities, and the Soviet Ukraine.

First, Lemkin sought to prove that the Ukrainian famine was part of the Soviet policy of social engineering capable of wiping out the entire groups to achieve its political goals – the idea which nowadays became a consensus among modern Sovietologists such as Ronald Suny and Timothy Snyder. Second, Lemkin pointed to the Russian imperial practice of targeting ethnic minorities over centuries (Tartars, Jews, Poles), which Andreas Kapeller recently put into a broader imperial context. Third, Lemkin claimed that undermining Ukrainian sovereignty and making Ukrainians into a submissive Soviet vassal was a high priority on the Kremlin agenda in the 1930s. The taming of the Soviet Ukraine followed three stages: systematic destruction of first, its “national brain” – cultural elites; second, of its autocephalous, independently-oriented clergy; and third, of the repository of tradition,” the peasants. This analysis allowed Lemkin to make a profound point, which historians such as Terry Martin only fifty years later contextualized as the end of the *korenizatsia* (indigenization campaign): the great Ukrainian Famine was the act of genocide targeting the destruction of the Ukrainians as an sovereign ethnic entity and their enforced assimilation into the Soviet Russo-centric nation. Highly sensitive to cultural, not only to the legal aspects, Lemkin emphasized that his genocide decimated the Ukrainian culture, that is, had ramifications far exceeding the physical extermination of the social groups of the Ukrainian society such as the kulaks and the intelligentsia.

Given that the documental evidence, such as the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich, was made public only in recent fifteen years, Lemkin’s remarks border on the prophetic. Therefore the idea to publicize Lem-

kin's speech in many languages is a plausible undertaking, yet it needs further continuation and expansion. We learn from Serbyn's preface to the book that Lemkin was working on his major project, most likely seeking to create a broad legal and theoretical framework for the comparative study of the twentieth-century genocides. Between 1948 and 2008, however, nothing from Lemkin's archive has been made public in a book format. Only in 2008, the Center for Armenian Remembrance brought to life the dossier on the Armenian genocide from Lemkin's archive, deposited with the American Jewish Historical Society. It is a scholarly desideratum to uncover Lemkin's papers on the Holodomor, written before his 1953 public presentation on the Ukrainian famine and after, and bring them to the attention of scholars (in English) and general public (in Ukraine).

The first person to invent the concept genocide, Lemkin deserves a proper place among those individuals whose intuition far exceeded intellectual capacities of his contemporaries. Drawing on his understanding of the Great Ukrainian Famine, Lemkin arrived to a brand new understanding of the twentieth-century political realities he called the genocide. It seems crucial to bring Ukrainian events of 1932-33 back into that genocidal context that shaped Lemkin's legal, historical and political imagination.

Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern


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ХРОНІКА КОЛЕКТИВІЗАЦІЇ
ТА ГОЛОДОМОРУ В УКРАЇНІ
1927–1933

Том I
1927–1929

Книга 1



КРИТИКА

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