


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
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Contents

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the UKRAINIAN *review*

Contributors	2
Current Events	
Beyond Politics: Internal Problems of the Ukrainian Language JENNIFER PICKUREL TAYLOR	3
Some Aspects of the Development of Tourism in Ukraine VSEVOLOD KOBRZHYTSKYI	29
History	
The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada OLEH BUDZYNSKYI	34
Chyhyryn Roots of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi's Family Tree MYKOLA KUCHERENKO	40
The Veneti, Slaveni and Antae in the Light of Archaeology VOLODYMYR BARAN	49
Arts and Culture	
<i>Literary Anniversaries</i>	
Bicentenary of Kotlyarevskyi's <i>Aeneid</i> (1798–1998)	64
To the Eternal Memory of Kotlyarevskyi TARAS SHEVCHENKO	65
Kotlyarevskyi IVAN FRANKO	68
Volodymyr Sosyura (1898–1965)	69
I recall... VOLODYMYR SOSYURA	71
Ukraine _____	71
The golden-horned star... _____	72
Love Ukrayina!... _____	72
Beyond the fence... _____	73
Visual Poetry in Ukrainian Literature MYKOLA SOROKA	74
Reviews	89



 *the* UKRAINIAN *review*

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Current Events

Beyond Politics: Internal Problems of the Ukrainian Language

Jennifer Pickurel Taylor

Along with other language planning issues concerning the Ukrainian language, the debate over what is acceptable, correct or pure Ukrainian continues. This focuses not on external linguistic issues such as government policy, education or media usage of the state language, but rather on internal questions of lexicon, spelling and style. After stating that Ukrainian must assert its functional differentiation, and develop a standard, neutral lexicon and spelling system, the question remains: whose Ukrainian?

This question is perhaps more complicated than it appears at first glance. A number of aspects must be examined. Firstly, which words and phrases, or even spellings and gender endings, should be preserved? Which sources of enrichment are acceptable, and how should new words be adapted to fit Ukrainian? Though translation itself is not directly relevant to internal language problems, the coining of terms for new concepts, especially those for which other languages already have a word, clearly is, as is also the incorporation of the international lexicon. How long does a word need to be part of the general lexical fund to be deemed acceptable, and how should new terms be popularised in order to weed out old Soviet words? How much variation is acceptable? Lastly, why interfere in the development of the language, why are some forms permissible when others are not, and why continue the struggle against Russian?

The process by which Ukrainian underwent standardisation and revision under the Soviets to reflect better its similarities with Russian is well-documented elsewhere by Shevelov and Wexler.¹ The process of adapting standard Ukrainian continues as part of post-independence language planning. The efforts made both by linguists and government policy-makers have received generous coverage in Ukraine and are widely available in a variety of sources

Farmer somewhat problematically describes two different approaches to language planning and purification. Firstly, he explains what he terms 'non-nationalist' planning, which ignored origins of words and dialect features. Instead, the language was encouraged to become more efficient and flowing – using aesthetic criteria alone. In contrast, 'nationalist' language planning concerns itself 'with the pursuit of ethnic authenticity and differentiation through the effort to exclude external linguistic influences – the pursuit of linguistic purity'.² This approach may

¹ G. Shevelov, *Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, and P. Wexler, *Purism and Language*.

² Kenneth C. Farmer, 'Language and Linguistic Nationalism in the Ukraine', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. vi, no. 2, 1978, p. 140.

have been applicable at some stages in Ukraine's linguistic development, but with reference to the twentieth century, other distinctions better apply. Some modern linguists adopt a third approach, allowing pragmatism and a variety of sources to decide which forms are for various reasons acceptable, and which should be encouraged out of the language. Still, Farmer's classification could be altered slightly so that 'nationalist' language planning might represent those who seek actively to promote Ukrainian, using the language's resources to the fullest, with the aim of increasing both usage and the functional load of the language. 'Non-nationalist' planning remains, however, difficult to define. Even this changed definition remains problematic, since Russian speakers may regard as 'nationalist' planning any promotion of Ukrainian at the expense of Russian in Ukraine. Ukrainian speakers, on the other hand, would perhaps argue that the support and spread of Ukrainian need not have a negative effect on Russian usage, and, in fact, that the two trends are not linked.

The key problems faced by Ukrainian as a changing language are amply covered in Ukrainian academic and public writing, but there is little recent coverage of the subject in English. Certainly no work has been uncovered which assimilates relevant information from a number of approaches to establish a common 'task list' for Ukrainian, or traces trends present in the overall social and linguistic climate in Ukraine. Though a detailed historical discussion or even a lengthy pure linguistic analysis would be well beyond the scope of this work, it is possible to trace problems of standardisation and modernisation over the course of the twentieth century to the present, where work is still being done to universalise terms, print dictionaries purged of excessive Russification, and establish grammatical norms based on Ukrainian models. A complete examination of every language issue would still present a formidable task for a researcher. The manageable option suggests extracting examples of types of issues, some of which directly result from Russification and others which remain from earlier decades. Spelling, particularly the letter for the phoneme [g], remains a problem.³ Grammatical forms such as the present active participle (which is viewed as a Russian calque) or certain syntactic questions of phraseology (including the preposition *po*) vex linguists, as do also issues of style. The entire lexicon appears to be under discussion, but immediate relevance and need for rapid standardisation characterises some branches such as scientific terminology, military lexicon or the language of the Constitution. This widens into a discussion of which sources may contribute to the language out of the possible donors, including diaspora Ukrainian, Western Ukrainian, Russian, Russian calques and borrowings and international vocabulary. All of these have made contributions which must be evaluated. In this manner, a number of revealing profiles establish an overall image of flux and change in Ukrainian.

In this discussion, examples will be cited only to illustrate the nature of the problems, not to present every instance that a given problem occurs. Extensive listings

³ For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that phonemes appear in square brackets, while letters, words, or parts of words that appear in italics are transcriptions of Ukrainian, Russian or German words as noted in the text, so that the actual letters (not phonemes) present are documented.

of problematic spellings, terms or phrases would be appropriate to a linguistic survey or analysis, but not within the frame of reference of socio-linguistics and language planning. Instead, one must investigate the character of core problems so as to abstract common themes and trends, and to generalise the implications for Ukrainian language. Furthermore, *why* certain terms bother linguists is more significant than the mere fact that they are troublesome, particularly when suggestions are offered for improvement. This sheds light on what is acceptable as a corrective. Essentially, this means that a roll-call of Russianisms in Ukrainian is less valuable to this research than the fact that they exist, and on several levels; this then allows us to estimate the depth of their penetration into the language and further to understand what kind of efforts must then be made to either accept and incorporate them, or to reject and replace them. By clarifying attitudes towards the problems facing Ukrainian, one can discern new directions language planning may take.

The overall attitude of language specialists can be assessed: is there a trend towards purism or some other system of regulation? The enrichment of the lexicon from the fund of international vocabulary receives a mixed reaction partly due to the concurrent and perhaps consequential importation of Western culture. Whether objectively true or not, the liberalising of society and the lifting of social taboos on certain subjects is perceived as demanding imported terminology to cover the lack of indigenous vocabulary for these long-forbidden areas of conversation. If the typical *movoznavets*⁴ is not following a Purist approach in Wexler's sense of the word, what approach is used?⁵ And, most importantly, whose opinions are most influential, those of linguists, policy-makers in the government or the general Ukrainian-speaking public? Some of these concerns have appeared in the general discussion of Ukrainian by such scholars as Karavanskyi, Taranenko, Yermolenko and Buryachok. Now they can be placed in the context of other questions of the changing language.

To Tinker or not to Tinker

Any critic must decide whether to remain an observer or to become a participant in the subject he or she hopes to analyse. This is one of the most serious issues confronting linguists, whether it is acceptable to interfere or, more accurately, to practice 'prescriptive intervention' in an effort to dictate the way their language will develop.⁶ Those who believe intervention to be acceptable or even productive may, nevertheless, disagree over what kind of interference is beneficial. Some linguists who consider themselves 'purists' (those who oppose non-native forms) have been criticised for inconsistency and impracticality. Wexler cites the example of *Telephon* in German, which was criticised by German purists and the

⁴ This term remains difficult to translate while preserving the exact meaning. 'Linguist' does not convey the degree of expertise such scholars usually have concerning their language, and the terms 'enthusiast', 'specialist' and 'supporter' also fall short. Even the Russian *yazykovod* is not used in the same manner. Hence, the term *'movoznavets'* in the meaning of one who avidly researches and studies, and is an expert on the Ukrainian language, appears untranslated in the text.

⁵ See the discussion of Purism in Wexler, op. cit., for his definition and approach to the problem.

⁶ Wexler, op. cit., p. 2.

alternative *Fernsprecher*, a neologism suggested to replace it. This form, however, did not carry over to the derivatives of *Telephon*, such as the verb for 'to telephone', showing attention to lexical items but not syntactic ones.⁷

Motives for intervention can also affect the results the linguists achieve. For example, the Soviet interpretation of Marxist ideology supported the heavy Russification imposed on the Ukrainian language by advocating that languages and peoples should 'merge'. Most speakers of a language have their own ideas about what constitutes correct, good or proper speech – though their ideas may not be in accordance with the standard form, or may have particular regional or social biases.⁸ In all of this it is important to remember that factors outside the language itself, such as culture, politics, social forces and attitudes may have an effect on what kind of intervention occurs and how successful it is.

Languages have a number of potential sources for new terms, which must then be evaluated as acceptable or otherwise. Ukrainian has so far failed to take advantage of all the potential 'donors', but at various times has used dialects, archaic vocabulary, related languages and 'international vocabulary' to form new terms.⁹ Some or all of these have been rejected at one time or another. Soviet planners disliked using Galician forms or other dialect influences, while Ukrainian planners have rejected overtly Polish imports. The result is a modern language which has all the necessary terminology, laboriously produced and documented, but which has not always been widely accepted by speakers or spoken uniformly by everyone who uses it.

Language Issues in Twentieth-Century Ukraine – a Resumé

Normalisation and regulation have long concerned linguists in Ukraine. Since the language had been stigmatised as 'backward' and 'provincial', the terminology associated with modernisation early on attracted the attention of the authors of dictionaries and grammars. The first attempt at a real system of terminology was that of the Galicians Volodymyr Levytskyi and Ivan Verkhratskyi in the 1880s and 1890s. Following the foundation of the Shevchenko Learned Society, they began to publish small terminological handbooks in its *Zapysky*. This was followed by the work of the terminology commission attached to that Society in Kyiv. There was a surge of activity in 1917, when the Central Rada and the Ukrainian National Republic were established. There were both public and private efforts to produce dictionaries and record the 'folk' lexicon.¹⁰ The Terminology Commission of the

⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 1–9.

⁹ Wexler explains the problem with this term thoroughly. Most 'international' words in Ukrainian are scientific or technical terms, which are indeed 'based on ancient Greek or Latin lexicon', or else words which fit the more loose definition of 'terms which appear in three non-related languages', such as *faks*, *student* and the like. For non-related languages, one may assume Wexler means languages from different language 'families', such as Romance languages, Slavic languages or Asian languages.

¹⁰ O. Kocherha and V. Kulyk, 'Ukrayinski Terminolohichni Slovnyky Dovoyennoho Periodu', *Visnyk AN Ukrayiny*, 1994, no. 2, p. 55.

Kyiv branch of the Shevchenko Learned Society established a number of specialist sub-committees which produced subject-dictionaries covering such subjects as botany, zoology, geology, meteorology, anthropology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, agriculture, medicine and veterinary science. Other committees were added in the fields of orthography, natural sciences and technology. In 1921, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language of the Academy of Sciences was established, which became the centre of work in terminology.¹¹

This institute had six sections, which covered a wide range of scientific, mathematical, linguistic and socio-economic topics. It employed a large staff, all working on the creation of thirty-four dictionaries (twenty-four of which were published). Although Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries were by far the most usual, work was also done on Ukrainian-German, -French, -Latin and -English dictionaries. These works contained not only the recommended term, but also included dialect and other existing words along with each etymology. This Institute established a standard in terminology, which served as a widely used reference by those working in a variety of fields.¹²

The 'thirties brought purge-associated re-shuffling here as in all other aspects of Ukrainian life. Although the repressions had already started in the Academy, four dictionaries were published between 1931 and 1933. Then, in 1933, things changed for the worse. The attacks on Ukrainian nationalism in linguistics, which would last throughout the 1930s, began with an announcement by Andriy Khvylya Ukraine's deputy commissar of education, that 'ideological verification' would be the new *modus operandi* of language specialists in Ukraine. During the next two years, a special team proof-read the dictionaries created by the Institute and prepared bulletins which dictated a new lexicon for the creation and production of terminologies more acceptable to the Moscow-centred frame of reference. Certain terms were forbidden, and replacements suggested to eliminate unacceptable words. Usually the new word was Russian calqued into Ukrainian or introduced from international vocabulary via Russian. According to Kocherha and Kulyk, these new lexical items appeared in an (otherwise unspecified) 'pure' dictionary in 1936, and the offending dictionaries of previous years were confiscated or destroyed.¹³ Overall, it is estimated that 50–80 per cent of terms were 'cleaned up', a total of around 14.5 thousand words.¹⁴ Vovk lists calques which are obviously Russian derivatives such as *probirka*, *duyzbok*, *burav*, *voronka*, *koukkva* and *parus*, which replaced Ukrainian forms *probiivka*, *dihunets*, *sverdel*, *liyka*, *zburavlyna*, *vitrylo*. He notes words which exist in both languages, but in different meanings, which in Ukrainian were changed to include the Russian meaning.¹⁵ These include *horilka*

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 56.

¹³ Ibid. The article goes on to list those works which remain from the pre-Ukrayinizatsiya era and where they can be found, to be used for reference in restorative endeavours.

¹⁴ Anatol Vovk, 'Naukova mova i polityka: 55 rokiv Ukrayinskoyi terminolohiyi v URSR', *Suchasnist*, July–August 1979, no. 4.7–8 (223), pp. 87–8.

¹⁵ In my own comparisons, I found various confusion surrounding words such as *plattya*, meaning either clothes or dress, and *robity/pratsyuvaty*, meaning 'to do' and 'to work', though the meaning of

(*palnyk* = Eng. burner), *maslo* (*oliya* = Eng. vegetable or mineral oil), or *trava*, which best corresponds to 'grass' but expanded to include 'herbs' as well.¹⁶ We shall return to the subject of such changes later.

The Soviets sought to justify these activities in several ways. The new, Russian-based terms were referred to as 'international', a word that suggested that access to the world scientific community was possible only via Russian. Enthusiasts of the new terms called old Ukrainian words antiquated and archaic, and impractical for use.¹⁷ These claims would later be augmented by the Marr theory, and aggravated by assertions that Ukrainian nationalism manifested its treacherous presence in dialect words, folk lexicon and words of Polish origin.¹⁸

From the 'forties until the 'sixties, newly united post-war Ukraine struggled under the influence of two predominant trends: firstly, the expansion of the education system and the creation of mass media covering the country, which had a normative effect on the language. This tendency towards a common standard contrasted sharply with the inherent resistance to dialect words (in particular, Galician forms) typical of Russophile linguists. This period represents two diametrically opposed events in the Ukrainian language: the spread and development of Ukrainian, contrasted with the overall assimilation and Russification of the language.¹⁹

When the glasnost era began, Ukrainians were able to turn their attention to their own language again. From around 1989 onwards, articles appeared expressing concern and even anger at what had been done to the Ukrainian language, with lists of controversial words, cataloguing Russianisms, Sovietisms and older Ukrainian forms for comparison. During this run-up to independence, great emphasis was placed on the value of the Ukrainian language, and past efforts at standardisation were cited as guidance. While ideological arrows flew thick and fast, diagnostic work that was both observant and thorough filled newspapers and journals alike.²⁰

With the establishment of an independent Ukraine, new problems confronted its *movoznavtsi*. These scholars knew that language is a strong indicator of national identification, and that many of the people in Ukraine speak Russian or the *surzhyk*. Hence, the prospect of first creating and then widely implementing a new (or at least rejuvenated) version of standard literary Ukrainian must have seemed a formidable task. Firstly, the *pravopys*²¹ had to be revised, or as some

the first was expanded to match Russian *rabotat*. Another example of the expansion of a Ukrainian word to incorporate the meaning of its Russian equivalent (or, in this case, a word which sounds like the Russian word) is *bolity*. It is often used as a synonym for the Ukrainian verb *kbvority*, which means the same thing as Russian *bolet*.

¹⁶ Vovk, op. cit., pp. 92–3.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 87–8.

¹⁸ The Marr Theory, as interpreted by Stalin during part of his regime, was used to advocate that all nations of the Soviet Union should gradually become one 'Soviet' nationality.

¹⁹ S. Ermolenko, N. Dzyubyshyna-Melnyk, 'Novi Tendentsiyi u zahal'noliteraturniy normi ukrayinskoyi movy', *Języki Słowiańskie wobec Współczesnych Przemian w Krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej* (Opole, 1993), pp. 199–204.

²⁰ For examples of diagnostic works, Karavanskyi is a good source. He comments on a number of problems with Soviet language planning, and suggests guidelines for replacing obvious Russian words with Ukrainian ones.

²¹ This word appears in Ukrainian in the meaning of 'orthographical dictionary'. It contains proper spellings for foreign words, difficult Ukrainian words and other questions of lexicon and style.

would argue, a new *pravopys* had to be created. Then, this standard version of Ukrainian, which should reflect social and political changes and technology, had to be popularised – i.e., made accessible and useful to the general public. Before either of these processes could begin, the language required serious diagnostic and rehabilitative work. Soviet intrusive language policy, along with a rather lamentable apathy on the part of much of Ukraine's population, left the language in no condition to serve as the new state's single, official and national vehicle for communication at every functional level.

What Ails the Ukrainian Language?

An allegory characterises the effect of years of Russification on the Ukrainian language: A certain King had a beautiful wife, whom he adored. He commissioned a portrait showing her high forehead, her long face, her dark eyes and hair. The beloved Queen died, and the King swore never to remarry unless he found a girl exactly like his deceased wife. One day he was out riding and saw a shepherd girl with a pleasant chubby face and blonde hair with blue eyes. Several days later, he went to look at the portrait of the Queen and thought her hair looked too dark, so he lightened it a little. After a few more days, he thought the picture's eyes were really not just the right colour and painted them light blue. Every day, he noticed little things about the portrait that did not please him and little by little changed it. One day an advisor remarked to him that the portrait was exactly the likeness of the pretty shepherd girl, and thus the King could marry again.²²

This viewpoint seems especially bleak: the reworking of Ukrainian so that it resembles Russian. Kachurovskyyi, who cites this allegory, further laments small changes which in his opinion could cumulatively transform the beautiful Queen into a lowly shepherdess, and which he attributes to the prolonged lack of exposure to good spoken Ukrainian for six decades under the Soviets. He cites, for example, the pronunciation of *bAtkiushchyna* as *batkiushchYna*, which, while not an example of a Russified term, he perceives as symptomatic to the degradation of Ukrainian from a lack of knowledge, which he evidently fears as much as the Russification of the language.²³

The effects of Russification remain 'public enemy number one' for certain linguists and nationalists alike in Ukraine, though there are a host of equally complicated and potentially damaging problems to conquer. The damage inflicted by Soviet efforts to 'tidy up' Ukrainian is still evident today. Overall, Russification of terminology occurred on several levels: lexical, semantic, syntactic, morphological and orthographic. The net result was, *de facto*, an undermining of the language to bring it closer to Russian. With these considerations in mind, one can examine areas where this Russification occurred.

Kachurovskyyi states 'One of the first victims of language policy was the letter *r*'. This letter has since been rehabilitated, and appears in the new *pravopys*. This letter appears in numerous words in old and new sources alike. Yet it was removed from

²² I. Kachurovskyyi, 'Na Movni Temy', *Vyzvolnyi Sbylyakh*, vol. XLIV, no. 3, March 1991, p. 341.

²³ *Ibid.* This article lists noted linguists who suffered repression under Soviet rule in Ukraine (pp. 341–9).

the language for two main reasons: firstly, there was no corresponding letter in Russian. Secondly, with the [g] and the [h], Ukrainian could accurately reflect foreign spellings, especially European names such as Hegel, thus increasing the status of Ukrainian as a language capable of coping with international information and vocabulary better than Russian. This change produced a paradoxical effect. The Ukrainian intelligentsia have grown accustomed to pronounce words as written in the Soviet era, i.e., with an [h], even when this represents an original [g] – *hyrlyba*, instead of *gyrlyga*. The average Ukrainian citizen would probably say *gyrlyga* anyway under the influence of Russian or the *surzhuk*. Without the letter for the phoneme [g], educated speakers have no way of guessing the correct pronunciation of such words.²⁴ Articles such as Kachurovskyi's, which appeared around the time of Ukrainian independence, provide valuable information concerning linguistic casualties of the Soviet era, the depth of Russian influence, and the deplorable state of Ukrainian as it appeared in Russified dictionaries at that time, when so-called dialect or archaic words did not appear.

Besides the banishment of [g] under Russian rule, Ukrainian underwent other types of metamorphosis. Lexical changes could be blatant, as in the replacement of native words with a borrowing, or more subtle. Russian words were simply introduced instead of Ukrainian ones. Vovk's examples (as mentioned earlier) include *yashchuk*, *nasos* and *parus* for Ukrainian *skrynnya*, *pompa* and *vitrylo*. Morphological changes include – as has been mentioned above – the substitution of Russian endings or prefixes for the Ukrainian forms. These include *pro-* for *vy-*, *-chuk* for *-nyk* and *-ach*, or anything ending in *-ovka* and *-ka*. Sometimes the number or gender might be affected at this level too, changing Ukrainian forms to resemble Russian ones. Syntactic changes include Russified forms such as *zbidno teoriyi*, *komunikatsiya po telefonu* or *kafedra po matematytsi* instead of *zbidno z teoriyeyu*, *komunikatsiya telefonom*, or *katedra matematyky*. Even common idioms enter the language from Russian, such as the non-Ukrainian adjective *nevmysnyi*, which copies *neumestnyi* (from the phrase *ne u mesta*). Ukrainian has a corresponding idiom – *ne do rechi*, which would give the adjectival form *nedorechnyi*.²⁵ This does not mean, however, that people will agree to say *nedorechnyi*, especially as the Russian calque is so well-established as not to sound peculiar to most speakers. Russian endings were introduced, or parts of Russian words calqued.

Another area of Russification was in the derivation of technical terms such as those used in chemistry. Ukrainian and Russian are among a number of languages which use a 'native' basis instead of the Latin roots familiar to English speakers. Here, too, Ukrainian forms were deemed unacceptable and replaced with Russian ones. For example, *kblorak sodyi* (*kblorak sodovyi*), as suggested by Levytskyi (1903), or *kbloryd*, as preferred by Horbachevskyi (1905), became *klorystyi natryi*, in Zenkevych (1928), a direct calque from Russian.²⁶ Sometimes, the new Russian

²⁴ Hrychenko's dictionary of 1907, which included every variant and dialect form the editor could locate, includes approximately 230 words with 'r'. Bekh (conversation, December 1997) suggests there may be approximately 50 words in contemporary Ukrainian which should be spelled with this letter.

²⁵ S. Karavanskyi, 'Ne mynaymo nizhe tytly, nizhe tiyi komy...', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1997, p. 98.

²⁶ Levytskyi, Horbachevskyi and Zenkevych, as cited by Vovk, op. cit., p. 90.

word, transcribed into Ukrainian, would be given alongside a word based on the international Latin words.²⁷ Official terminology also changed under Soviet influence, leaving Ukraine with a rather artificial bureaucratic jargon. An analysis of the Russified terms and preferred alternatives is given below.

Spelling of foreign names and places presents a different kind of problem. Russified forms usually employ *-kb* where English shows an *-b*, for example, even though Ukrainian has the *-b* sound already (Hegel, Helsinki). *Ay* versus *Ey*, as in Einstein, presents a similar problem.²⁸ In fact, spelling of foreign names and places encapsulates neatly the difficulty of this kind of spelling problem: usually variations in spelling arise when transliterations are made from Russian. The standard and a uniform *pravopys* have not existed long enough, nor become sufficiently wide-spread to fulfil their corrective function in such cases. Thus, differences in spelling may appear out of ignorance or an insecurity about Ukrainian spelling, or even a desire to sound and write in a more 'Russian' manner. Suggestions for an acceptable means of transliteration are discussed below.

Russification carries the bulk of the burden for incorrect or historically inexplicable forms in Ukrainian, but it is not the sole culprit. International vocabulary has enriched the language, but has also complicated the spelling system and the terminology lexicon. Diaspora Ukrainians have helped keep the language alive, but also introduced spelling 'errors' as their Ukrainian was both archaic and influenced by other languages. In addition, since diaspora Ukrainian is based on the Galician dialect, it retains a number of Russianisms introduced under the influence of 'Moscophile' intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century. Émigré linguists, however, are some of the most vocal critics of 'Sovietisms' in Ukrainian.²⁹

Russification brought with it a host of related problems, including the emergence of the mixture (*surzhyk*),³⁰ spelling problems and disagreement over terminology. Some of these problems are not directly attributable to the influence of Russian, since the influx of international vocabulary or the contributions made by diaspora Ukrainians in publishing and broadcasting have had a visible influence on the shape of Ukrainian as well. Social attitudes exacerbate these kinds of problems: diaspora Ukrainian may be rejected, since some indigenous Ukrainians feel these émigrés deserted the homeland, international vocabulary may be seen as the messenger of European or American influence, while many speakers of the *surzhyk* are looked down upon instead of receiving encouragement to develop their language skills.

The response in the language community to the emergence of the *surzhyk* and the lack of knowledge of correct Ukrainian has varied. In *Ukrayinska Mova v Shkoli*, for example, one author suggested a game of linguistic questions as a way to drill language knowledge. The questions show an acceptance of the variety pre-

²⁷ Vovk, op. cit., pp. 90–1.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 92–4.

²⁹ A. Hlytskyi, 'Chyyi Rusyzmy Krashchi?', *Suchasnist*.

³⁰ The *surzhyk* refers to a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian usually associated with less educated speakers who wish to incorporate Russian words into their speech in an attempt to sound more educated. It is quite likely, however, that this mixing of languages occurs in more educated speakers as well, and instances can certainly be found in the press.

sent in Ukrainian (*alfabit*, *abetka* and *azbuka* are all given as acceptable words for 'alphabet'), an interest in how international words enter the general lexical fund, and therefore Ukrainian (Captain Boycott inspired the 'international' word *bojkot*, the Latin word *canis* in astronomy marked the time when the sun was in that constellation, corresponding to the summer holiday months called *kanikuly* in Ukrainian), and an assumption that students in Ukraine will be familiar with both Russian and Ukrainian.³¹

Others criticise the use of the *surzhyk* instead of educated Russian or Ukrainian, as in Marharya Zhuykova's 'Chy potribna Ukrayintsyam Russkoyazychnaya Mova?' in *Literaturna Ukrayina*, or her 'Yak hovorytymut nashi nashchadky: Ukrayinskoyu movoyu chy "malorossiyskim narechiem"?'³² One author derisively lists 'kvitky' like *na rakbunok tobo pytannya* (confusion with Russian *raschet*) or 'Yuriy Meshkov ne vidbyvavsya yak prezydent' (confusion with Russian *ne sostoyalsya*) as examples of this mixture. He blames both the *surzhyk* and the confused spelling of foreign names on an insecurity complex in Ukraine towards Russian.³³ Karavanskyi wryly notes 'Tsarstviyu tsoho surzhyku ne vydno kintsya'.³⁴

Karavanskyi again speaks out against the poor usage of Ukrainian in the press and in education. He notes that many speakers did not learn their Ukrainian at home, but at school and from newspapers. He notes that the press in Ukraine fulfils not only the role of 'orhanizator i propagandyst', but also educator. Using examples from various articles, he highlights not only lexical or orthographic mistakes, such as *semydesyatelitniy* for *simdesyatylitniy* or *simdesyatlitniy*, and stylistic problems like *po sbkilnym fondam* which should have been first of all *po sbkilnykh fondakh*, and secondly would have been better expressed as *metodysty sbkilnykh fondiv*, not the non-Ukrainian sounding *metodyst po sbkilnykh fondakh*.³⁵ Karavanskyi accuses the Ukrainian press of tolerance for the *surzhyk*, and also of rather sloppy attempts at purism.³⁶

Perhaps the most heated spelling disagreement concerns the phoneme [g], and the re-introduction of 'r' to distinguish this phoneme from [h]. In the 1989 *pravopys*, 'r' was still not included, and foreign words were still spelled in the Russian manner, rendering [h] (which Russian lacks) by the cyrillic letter 'x'.³⁷ This publication included heavily Russified vocabulary, calqued from Russian forms that did not reflect older or more accurate Ukrainian. The efforts of *movoznavtsi* continue to concentrate on the removal of questionable forms, and their replacement by Ukrainian words, not only in dictionaries and textbooks but in daily usage.

³¹ O. V. Ostapchenko, 'Linhvistychna Viktoryna', *Ukrayinska Mova v Shkoli*, 1990, vol. 1–6, pp. 67–72.

³² M. Zhuykova, 'Yak hovorytymut nashi nashchadky: Ukrayinskoyu movoyu chy "malorossiyskim narechiem"?', *Suchasnist*, October 1993, pp. 123–8.

³³ B. M. Zadorozhnyi, 'Shehe raz pro te, yak nam pysaty inshomovni slova', *Movoznavstvo*, 1995, no. 2–3, pp. 10–11.

³⁴ S. Karavanskyi, 'Besidy pro movu', *Vyzvolnyi Sbyakh*, vol. xivi, 1993, no. 1, p. 74.

³⁵ S. Karavanskyi, 'Drukovane slovo yak chynnyk osvity v Ukrayini', *Vyzvolnyi Sbyakh*, vol. xivi, 1993, no. 8, pp. 993–7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 994.

³⁷ Karavanskyi covers this [g], [kh] v. [h] topic more than once. In 'Hanna chy "Khanna"?', he connects the use of the [h] to Ukrainian independence, *Vyzvolnyi Sbyakh*, vol. xivi, 1993, no. 6, p. 720.

The new *pravopys* attempts to correct a number of previous problems in orthography. This includes the spelling of geographical and foreign names and places. Recommendations include correcting [g] and [h] inconsistencies; using [kh] only for velar fricatives (as in *Dachau* or *loch*), finding a reasonable compromise for sounds not in Ukrainian such as *le*, *la*, *lo* and *lu*. Careful use of the soft sign and apostrophe are also recommended, especially where confusion with Russian might occur. Double consonants should be kept, although rules which suggest changes in root spelling in declension should also be obeyed. A more phonetic spelling of the problematic German *ei/ey* (Einstein) is suggested, using Ukrainian *ay* and not *ey*, while for German *eu*, Ukrainian *oy* should be used (Neuman). *Th* and *eu* in words derived from Greek should be rendered by *t* and *ev* in Ukrainian, as in *katedra* and *euforiya*. The transliteration using the Ukrainian letter 'y' (corresponding to the phoneme [u]) to represent the English phoneme [w] (following the Russian practice), is rejected in favour of Ukrainian 'в', which in final positions is pronounced similarly, so that 'know how' is spelt 'НОВ РАВ' (nov hav) instead of the objectionable 'HOY XAY' (nou khau). (Even this form could elicit some protest as the word for a dog's bark is *hav*). These suggestions take advantage of the phonemic system of Ukrainian which includes the bilabial [w] and the voiceless velar [h] (both of which Russian lacks) which were banished from standard Ukrainian in the 'thirties. They were re-introduced into the *pravopys* only in 1993.³⁸ In general, the aim should be a careful compromise, balancing an accurate representation of the phonemes (not necessarily the *letters*) of the donor language with what is realistic with respect to the Ukrainian phonemic system.

The discussion surrounding the more recent editions of the *pravopys* remains complicated. Diaspora Ukrainians usually favour earlier editions, especially that of 1928 and the dictionary by Holoskevych based on it. In contrast, until recently the accepted (albeit heavily Russified) edition was the 1960 *pravopys* and its subsequent revisions. After glasnost, new editions began to appear which launched various debates including those mentioned above. The opinions of various linguists and scholars working on and around the new edition are discussed below. Judging from the response elicited by the newest version, the controversy is far from resolved. It is safe to say, whichever side one takes on the linguistic issues, that the main problem remains consistency: once the rules are decided for good, they must then be applied universally, rather than listing page after page of exceptions and variations. When compromise and uncertainty as to the correct form become less of an issue, the *pravopys* should become much more 'user friendly'.³⁹

The most-argued aspects of the spelling system are: [g] v. [h], [l] v. [l'] (as in *zalya/zala*), the declension of type III nouns in the genitive, locative and dative (Holoskevych uses *-i* in the locative and *-y* in the others; the 1997 edition uses *-i* for all of them), the declension of surnames ending in *-iv* (normal rules demand the *i* become *o* in oblique cases, but then the name resembles the Russian variant

³⁸ B. M. Zadorozhnyi, 'Shche raz pro te, yak nam pysaty inshomovni slova', *Movoznavstvo*, 1995, no. 2-3, pp. 10-11.

³⁹ Interview, Olena Bekh, 25 December 1997.

so many Ukrainians preserve the *i* even though this is against spelling rules), the use of the phoneme [j] between vowels in words such as *spetsialnyi/spetsiyalnyi*, and the spelling of foreign words which include phonemes not in Ukrainian (*Einsbtein* or *Einstein* in German, the spelling of English [w] and [h] among others); the doubling of consonants in words and names of foreign origin (*Hrimm* v. *Hrim*), the spelling of [w] in foreign words; the transliteration of θ by 'f' or 't', according to whether the word in question was borrowed directly from Greek or via Latin ('kafedra' versus 'katedra'); and the presentation of -ya in Ukrainian as я.⁴⁰ Some of these disagreements involve more than just orthography, however. In particular, the *l* versus *l'* not only indicates a difference in spelling but potentially one in pronunciation: Ukrainians who use the *l* do not believe that those who use the *l'* (the diaspora and certain Galicians) are speaking correctly – much less using correct Ukrainian spelling.

The number of available sources discussing or arguing various points in connection with the *pravopys* is substantial. Ermolenko, for example, discusses the function of the *pravopys* as a universal guide, meant to be available to all speakers of Ukrainian and its contradictory nature as both a solid, stable reference and a dynamic reflection of the language as it changes. She explains her view that the earliest versions of the reference were not consistent since the language was not yet completely codified. Thus she discounts the reliability of

[t]he 1928 edition, known as the Skrypnykivskiyi pravopys, which was in force in Western Ukraine until 1939 and is also used today, although not always closely followed, by the Western diaspora. For the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in Ukraine, this pravopys is already history, even in its lexical practices which were published in the 'twenties and 'thirties in this century.⁴¹

The arguments surrounding the latest edition highlight larger cultural debates. There is no neat and tidy way to divide and classify the nature of the conflict. Essentially, disagreement occurs on a variety of levels. Firstly, native Ukrainians favour a standard language which reflects recent social and technological changes. Diaspora Ukrainians tend to prefer a radical overhaul and a return to Holoskevych and the 1928 *pravopys*. In addition, Eastern and Southern Ukrainians tend to want only very limited, gradual changes, perhaps symptomatic of their support of the Russian language, and therefore of the more Russified editions of the *pravopys*, while the West and Centre would prefer more fundamental alterations which would reflect the modern language's *sui generis* path of development. This leaves the diaspora, the South-East and the West/Central regions of Ukraine in conflict with one another. The varying degrees of conservatism, radi-

⁴⁰ These are gathered from a variety of sources which list most of the same problems. These sources are documented throughout this article. *Ukrayinskyi Pravopys: Tak i Ni* (hereafter *UPTN*) (Kyiv: Dovira, 1996) edited by O. Taranenko contains several comprehensive listings, as does an article in *Den*, entitled 'Hramatychna anarkhiya skoro maye skinchytysya', by Mykola Siruk (22 July 1997). One could also consult the *Pravopys* itself to observe the rules for spelling contentious forms as they now stand.

⁴¹ S. Ermolenko, 'Zminy zakonomirni, postupovi, ale ne revolyutsiyini', *UPTN*, p. 45.

calism and positions on each particular issue (*i* or doubling of consonants in foreign words, for example) complicate the picture even more.

Professor Taranenko, the head of the commission which made decisions concerning the latest edition, reflects the government view. He explains the problems highlighted above, and remarks that there can only be one *pravopys* which must serve Russophone Ukrainians, Ukrainian speakers, Westerners and Easterners. Although an ideal and perfect reference is impossible, he comments that some countries take a more theoretical stance towards their written standard, and preserve rules that no longer apply in the natural language, i.e., that of its speakers. He suggests that in Ukraine the editors and compilers on the committee attempted to reflect real Ukrainian. This raises questions not only about the 'official' Ukrainian enshrined in the *pravopys*, but also standard literary Ukrainian, which may or may not have stable, reliable norms to follow. Therefore, the controversy around the *pravopys* is now assuming another dimension: it is no longer simply an argument as to whether the book correctly captures Ukrainian in the best and most suitable manner, but also about what actually is the correct, standard literary Ukrainian, the language the *pravopys* must attempt to characterise.⁴²

Taranenko leaves aside the specifics of the Ukrainian situation, and describes the grammatical and lexical normative works of any language. Firstly, it should present the living language as accurately as possible. Secondly, it must be reasonably stable and reliable. Thirdly, in the writing of foreign words, a good compromise must be reached between correctly capturing the original word and the restrictions of the phonetic system of the recipient language. Fourthly and finally, the *pravopys* must be internally coherent and consistent and embrace the maximum orthographic and stylistic potential of the language.⁴³ He adds that the commission working on the newest edition must be governed by realism and not romantic idealism. Taranenko concludes by saying the nation awaits their work, which will not only produce a 'vseukrayinskyi pravopys' but also help consolidate the country.⁴⁴

Those in the East view the *pravopys* in a slightly different way. For many of these Ukrainians, or Russians living in Ukraine, the more recent editions with Russified vocabulary may not be wholly objectionable, and a return to norms of 1928 would be undesirable. One writer from Luhansk suggests that changes to the *pravopys* must be gradual and realistic, 'evolutionary, not revolutionary'. Many of his sentiments do resemble others from different regions, such as the need for a single standard used uniformly throughout Ukraine.⁴⁵

What is perhaps most astonishing about the debate surrounding the *pravopys* is the number of participants and their combined contributions to the discussion.⁴⁶

⁴² O. Taranenko, 'Linhvistychnyi i sotsialnyi kompleks problem navkolo suchasnoho ukrayinskoho pravopysu', *UPTN*, Kyiv, 1997 (see this paper for biblio. note).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 16–8.

⁴⁵ V. Uzhchenko, 'Deyaki rekomendatsiyi do novoyi redaktsiyi "ukrayinskoho pravopysu"', *UPTN*, pp. 160–2.

⁴⁶ N. Marchuk, 'Propozytsiyi shchodo suchasnoho pravopysu'; O. Rybalko, 'Propozytsiyi shchodo vdoskonalennya "ukrayinskoho pravopysu"'; B. Smolyak, 'Nova redaktsiya ukrayinskoho pravopysu (zauvahy, mirkuvannya, propozytsiyi)'; I. Yushchuk, 'Pravopys povnyen buty stabilnyi, ale...'; and

Another major problem is that of neologisms and recent borrowings. International vocabulary and Russian terms have both invaded Ukrainian over the course of the twentieth century. This creates still another area for confusion: advocates of international words cannot understand those using native Ukrainian creations, who in turn cannot talk with users of Russian-influenced terminology. Why is terminology given so much attention? One linguist offers the explanation:

By the intellectualisation of the standard language, which we could also call its rationalisation, we understand its adaptation to the goal of making possible precise and rigorous, if necessary abstract, statements, capable of expressing the continuity and complexity of thought, that is, to reinforce the intellectual side of speech. This intellectualisation culminates in scientific (theoretical) speech, determined by the attempts to be as precise in expression as possible, to make statements which reflect the rigour of objective (scientific) thinking in which terms approximate concepts and the sentences approximate logical judgements.⁴⁷

Another linguist, writing about multi-lingual dictionaries as a terminological base for the formation of standard Ukrainian terms, speaks of language as not only a reflection of reality, but the embodiment of all a given nation has learned in the world, and an influence on that nation's view, 'something more than blood'.⁴⁸

As in science, both military and legal terms display a lack of uniformity. Karavanskyi criticises the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary for military servicemen on several grounds, which highlight terminology problems. Firstly, he says the dictionary suggests forms which are hard to say, rendering them inefficient as commands. He lists *uzuttya znyaty ta sklasy* (better *znyaty y sklasy*), *Zakincheno rezhym 'tysba'*, but would prefer *Kinets rezhymu 'Tysba'*. One expression is rendered *Zbilsh prosto!*, which he complains is lifted straight from Russian, though the more Ukrainian *'Doday prosto'* is admittedly harder to pronounce. Secondly, some forms are not effective or unclear in the dictionary. He does not like *usi donyuzu; rozsharprnuty; tykb, kbto kupausya, pereviryty; zrobyty pereruu*, and offers *usi nanyz; rozderty; kbto kupausya, na perevirku; pererva*. Thirdly, commands listed in the dictionary do not have wide acceptance. He finds that some divisions use what is suggested, while others have their own forms. This eliminates mutual understanding.

If the common elements were to be emphasised a more understandable, unifying lexicon could be established. Karavanskyi laments that editors of the dictionary did not avail themselves of 'helpful instruction books or handbooks'. Finally, commands need not be copied from Russian, but should follow Ukrainian language traits instead. In any case, a unified, universal lexicon for the military must eliminate ambiguity in commands, identification units and vocabulary.⁴⁹ This lack of agreement could obviously make joint exercises difficult when translators are unfa-

books, including *Fonemy G ta H. Slovnyk i Komentar* by O. Ponomariv (Kyiv, 1997) and *Sbcho Zminylosya v 'Ukrayinskomu Pravopysi?'* by A. Buryachok (Kyiv, 1997). All of these articles are available in the *UPTN* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1996).

⁴⁷ N. Nepyvoda, Interview, 26 August 1996, Kyiv.

⁴⁸ T. Kyiak, 'Bahatomovni Tlumachni Slovnyky yak terminolohichna baza dlya formuvannya suchasnykh standartiv Ukrayinskykh terminosystem', *III Mizhnarodnyi Konbres Ukrayintsiv*, Kharkiv, 1996, pp. 250-6.

⁴⁹ S. Karavanskyi, 'Viyskovi komandy u "Rosyisko-Ukrayinskomu slovnyku dlya viyskovykyv"', *Vzvolnyi Sbyakh*, vol. 1, no. 2, February 1997, pp. 238-42.

miliar with terminology, or when the translator and Ukrainian military personnel use different words for the same concept. The more disastrous war-time implications of a lack in mutually comprehensible commands are obvious.

One potentially interesting area of terminology is currently under study in a new project, outlined in a paper by Wolf Moskovich.⁵⁰ He seeks to analyse the development of new Ukrainian political terminology since 1985. His work may well yield evidence of linguistic trends which, on further investigation, may also apply to other areas of terminology. He suggests the following classification for new terms:

- Soviet terminology with a change in connotation;
- new original Ukrainian terms;
- revived Ukrainian terms;
- terms, which were previously used mainly in Galicia and the diaspora.⁵¹

One can see how these categories might lend themselves to wider application. He continues with hypotheses about sources for these terms. He suggests that Russian terminology will continue, temporarily, to serve as a pattern, but that time and the growing status of Ukrainian will diminish the number of borrowings and calques from Russian. On the other hand, the number of foreign loans, especially American English words, is also large. Perhaps most interestingly, Moskovich claims that language previously used in dissident circles has been transferred to official usage, though he gives no examples of such words.⁵²

Some linguists seek to produce terms which conform to Ukrainian stylistic and lexical norms, rather than denoting new phenomena by means of a hodge-podge of borrowings. One author notes that a large number of new terms occur in pairs, one with a Ukrainian suffix and the other with a non-native suffix: *algebraichnyi*, *algebraichnyi*; *synusiodalnyi*, *synusoidnyi*; *binomialnyi*, *binomnyi*. The first term in each case reflects what the author calls Russified international vocabulary. The use of the second member in each pair would not only tidy up a confusing situation, but would also support the assertion that Ukrainian has sufficient lexical means to express any scientific concept without resorting to Russian. Some dictionaries (such as the 1993 edition of the Anglo-Ukrainian mathematics dictionary) use the form which follows Ukrainian word-formation rules. Others preserve the more Russified term (such as the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary of physics terms, 1994 edition).

This shows two things about terminology in Ukraine, firstly that the effects of Russification still linger in some areas of Ukrainian linguistic terminology, and secondly, that non-objectable borrowings from international vocabulary may be adapted to fit standard Ukrainian rules, or, in other words, rendered nearly native.⁵³ In addition to linguistic considerations, one must not forget the macrosystem within which terminology operates. Terminology must express not only the

⁵⁰ The outline of Moskovich's talk appears in *Movoznavstvo*, the collected papers of the 1996 Kharkiv Congress.

⁵¹ W. Moskovich, 'New Ukrainian Political and Economic Terminology since 1985', *III Mizhnarodnyi Konbres Ukrayintsiu*, Kharkiv, 1996, pp. 260–2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 261.

⁵³ L. Barova, 'Movna norma i terminolohiya', *III Mizhnarodnyi Konbres Ukrayintsiu*, Kharkiv, 1996, pp. 247–50.

relationships between words, but also the relationships of concepts to one another, and of terms to the concepts they classify.⁵⁴

These situations extend beyond merely stylistic concerns: orders must be understandable to soldiers, and legal documents must express in exact terms what they seek to enforce. These are separate but overlapping issues, concerning spelling, leanings towards purism, value judgements on whose Ukrainian is best and the need to standardise all aspects of the language, particularly as it is now officially a state language which will have to be correctly and efficiently implemented, taught and learned everywhere in Ukraine. In every article and in every argument, linguists seem to agree on one thing: terminology must not 'impoverish' Ukrainian by introducing borrowings, but rather enrich the lexicon by expanding the forms and meanings of existing native words.

Expert Opinion

A great deal is still being written on these linguistic problems by both Ukrainian and foreign linguists. This section attempts to identify and analyse any general trends in opinion, or the endorsement of a popular approach.

One quickly discovers that the experts do not exactly agree. For example, the foreword to the new *English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Business* states 'we draw your attention to the fact that we have avoided forms that are not characteristic of Ukrainian (e.g. active participles with the ending *-учий, -очий*, and others).'⁵⁵ One finds as a lexical category in a new stylistic handbook, 'words, in the place of which often erroneously other lexemes are used, for example: *vynyatkovyi-vyklyuchnyi, zavdyaky-dyakuyuchy*' (objectionable form underlined). Besides rejecting archaic and dialect words generally, this handbook also claims there is no difference in meaning or usage for *plattya-suknya, plyty-plysty*, though some would suggest a Russian influence in *plattya* and *plyty*.⁵⁶ (Though, in this case, *plyty* might actually be preferable, according to Nepyvoda, because *plysty* can be confused with *plisty*, 'to braid'). Hlytskyi rejects all Russianisms, whether introduced by Galician Moscovophiles or Soviets, while Svyatoslav Karavanskyi somewhat reluctantly concedes that Russian imports may be treated as any other borrowing, provided Ukrainian words are not displaced, and the new lexeme conforms to Ukrainian word-formation rules.⁵⁷ This tension between different sources for new lexical items can be seen by contrasting the choices of dictionary editors Popovych (*vyzyvaty, zaklyuchaty pakt, narushennyya, nevmisnyi, nebudovannyya, typobrafyya, ushcherb*) and Bartoshchuk (*vyklykaty, ukladaty pakt, porushennyya, nedorechnyi, oburennyya, drukarnyya, shkoda*) who used different

⁵⁴ Iryna Kochan, 'Teoretychni peredumovy ta linhvistychni zasady ukkladannyya slovnykiv Ukrayinskykh tekhnichnykh terminiv', *III Konbres Ukrayintsiv*, Kharkiv, 1996, pp. 256–60.

⁵⁵ A. Krouglov, K. Kurylko and D. Kostenko, *English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Business* (McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London, 1997), preface, p. viii.

⁵⁶ S. Holovashchuk, *Ukrayinske Literaturne Slovozhyvannya* (Kyiv: Vyscha Shkola, 1995), p. 4.

⁵⁷ Hlytskyi, op. cit.; S. Karavanskyi, 'Mova: Mavpuvannyya chy tvorchist?', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. XLVII, no. 12, December 1994, p. 89.

pre-Soviet dictionaries as their sources.⁵⁸ Karavanskyi himself explains the basis for using both sets of words but dislikes *nehoduwannya* in particular. This word suggested by Popovych as a translation of 'disapproval' is a calque from Russian '*negodovanie*'. Karavanskyi would prefer the use of a similar building process as in English: prove-approve-approval-disapproval; *khvalyty-skhvalyty-skhvalennya-neskhvalennya*.⁵⁹

One of the problems in such discussions is a certain lack of meticulousness on the part of those writing about linguistic problems. It is difficult to ascertain if this is academic hubris, or indicative of the damaging effects of Russification on even expert knowledge. For example, in discussing the carelessness of the press and his fellow linguists, Karavanskyi quotes Popovych and Bartoshchuk as supporting certain words in the lexicon. Popovych claims his list is acceptable, since those words appear in the Ukrainian-German dictionary published in Leipzig in 1943, when anti-Russian feeling would have been very prevalent indeed. His list includes *vyzyvaty*, *zaklyuchaty pakt*, *narushennya*, *nevmysnyi* (previously mentioned as an acceptable alternative) *nehoduwannya*, *typobrafiya*, and *ushcherb*. Of these words, two are blatant Russianisms (*nehoduwannya* and *ushcherb*) and three do not actually appear in the 1943 dictionary at all. The 'rival' list furnished by Bartoshchuk contains the words *vyklykaty*, *ukladaty pakt*, *porushennya*, *nedorechnyi*, *oburennya*, *drukarnya*, and *shkoda*. Of these words, six appear in the 1943 Leipzig dictionary as acceptable Ukrainian words. In addition, although the two lists are supposed to contain possible synonyms, or alternatives with the same meaning, this is not entirely true. *Nedorechnyi* and *nevmysnyi* are defined differently, as 'inopportune or unreasonable' and 'illicit, unbecoming' respectively. *Typobrafiya* is translated as 'typography', while *drukarnya* is taken to mean 'a print shop'. Essentially, a list of potential synonyms is offered, when the words do not actually correspond.

These mistakes or inaccuracies may be blamed on Popovych originally, though Karavanskyi is guilty of his own errors later. He creates a 'chain' of words created adding prefixes and suffixes, linking the English words prove-approve-approval-disapproval. He creates a related chain in Ukrainian using *khvalyty-skhvalyty-skhvalennya-neskhvalennya*. This is also problematic because he is mixing criteria, linking words which (in both languages) are no longer generally perceived as being semantically related. In the Ukrainian chain, the words cited mean, respectively, 'to praise', 'to approve', 'approval', and 'lack of approval' (*not* disapproval, which is *oburennya*). Karavanskyi rightly claims that the Russianism *nehoduwannya* is objectionable as it does not mean 'disapproval' as Popovych would like, and as it is a direct calque from Russian. He is also correct in asserting the word is

⁵⁸ Karavanskyi explains that Popovych's choices reflected his use of the Ukrainian-German Dictionary of 1943, Kuzeli and Rudnytskyi, eds. The list from Bartoshchuk reflects loyalty to the 1930s Dictionary of Paneyka. Karavanskyi cites the 'Little Russian-German Dictionary' of E. Zhelekhivskiy, published in Lviv in 1884-6, as a source of both archaic and Russian introductions. (From 'Ne mynaymo nizhe tytly, nizhe tyti komy', in *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1997, p. 98).

⁵⁹ S. Karavanskyi, 'Ne mynaymo nizhe tytly, nizhe tyti komy...', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1997, pp. 98-9.

a 'fifth wheel', since Ukrainian already has words to mean both disapproval and indignation.⁶⁰ These valid observations notwithstanding, Ukrainian linguists must be more careful to check and verify their sources. Clearly, some of them are not as familiar with their native language as they should be, and entering meticulous debates necessitates careful research and documentation.

Variation and linguistic choice, some linguists assert, represents viability and diversity in the functional load of a language. Others feel the influence of diaspora Ukrainian, based on Galician dialects, ruins 'pure' Ukrainian, i.e., Shevchenko's central dialect. Ermolenko and Dzyubyshyna-Melnyk comment that the first view seems more objective and fact-based. They are quick to point out that too much variation can however effectively dismember the system of the language. When several versions of a term exist, as they do in the military, it makes vital communication difficult. Companies from different regions may find working together difficult if they do not have the same orders. Similarly, lawyers who seek to draw up contracts and agreements may discover they cannot achieve the necessary precision if no one agrees upon terminology. This situation can become dangerous when medical vocabulary is not agreed upon, as is often the case with frequent revision, potentially preventing effective communication between laboratories and doctors, doctors and pharmacists, and medical personnel and the public.

Their work documents a trend towards neutralisation within variation in Ukrainian. This occurs in a number of lexical areas, including words which may have been previously marked as dialectal, rarely used, or archaic in dictionaries (*fundatsiya, svitlyna, ofiruwaty, lektura, mapa, naklad, poetka, or zaky*); borrowed words from the colloquial or conversational vocabulary (*zaushe, perevodom, ruinatsiya, chyslo* in the sense of 'number' – *zadlya, popervakh, sbtyb*); words which, although the dictionary does not indicate the fact, are stylistic and not in regular use (*bizbuchyi, subolosnyi, provid, spilnota, znosyny, filiya*); or some words which are marked neutral but have a 'tone' or inferred colour when used in typically Ukrainian phrases (*na tereni, v tsaryni, dilyanka, dramnytsya, chasopys, tlo*); and finally words which do not appear in many dictionaries at present (*zauvaby, zanykaty, tyablist, rizbnyi, rizbnytsya, zasadnychi, pozem*). In all of these areas, the process of neutralisation may be observed, so that while these lexical items could be deemed 'marked' or non-neutral at present, they are becoming more acceptable and losing their inferred semantic colour. These linguists also caution against the phenomenon of 'hyperism', meaning an enthusiastic purism which roots out normal, historically Ukrainian words which happen also to appear in Russian. They likewise depreciate 'exaggerated' use of [g] (especially under the influence of émigrés, who also use another language regularly). Examples of 'abuse' of the phoneme [g] and the letter 'r' which they cite include *pedagogika, original, argument, gerb, or gazeta*. Newsreaders and others in the media receive some criticism for encouraging by their own careless speech the maintenance of poor Ukrainian. These authors assess such conflicts, and the presence of variation in the language as signs that Ukrainian is in transition.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 98–9.

⁶¹ S. Ermolenko and N. Dzyubyshyna-Melnyk, 'Novi tendentsiyi u zahalno-literaturniy normi Ukra-

Besides all of the political compromise and debate surrounding Ukraine's new Constitution, some linguistic issues have created tensions. The best known example is perhaps the phrase 'people of Ukraine' which won over 'Ukrainian people' in the preamble. Legal language, along with military and academic terminology, remains a problem area. Karavanskyi takes up this cause comparing phrases which appear in the Constitution, which could have been phrased differently. His complaints include the lexicon, grammar, word usage and stylistics. For example, the Constitution uses the phrase *prava lyudyny*, although *lyudski prava* means the same thing. He complains this is a calque on Russian, where forms are written such as *noga cheloveka*. He dislikes the word *isnuyuchyi*, which resembles other objectionable forms (*rakbuyuchyi*, *temperaturyachyi*) because this word is not Ukrainian. He prefers *teperishniy* for that meaning, and suggests other words such as *zafiksovani prava*, *nayavna merezha*, *chynnyi poryadok areshthu* to cover other places where the offending *isnuyuchyi* appears. Complaints of this type, concerning grammar and lexicon/semantics, are common in his writings. On the subject of stylistics, Karavanskyi notes problems with the active versus the passive (*zabezpechuye*, *zabezpechuyetsya*), impersonals (*pokladeno*, *pokladayetsya*), and *tsenzuru zaboroneno* or *tsenzura zaboronena* (he prefers the former). He notes two grammatical errors and several word usage problems (*ne dopuskayetsya* should have been *zaboroneno*; *vyrazbennyya*, which is a borrowing, was used instead of *poshyrennyya* and *vyyav*). He blames the occurrence of most of these errors on translation from Russian (whether in the heads of the authors or in actuality).⁶²

A similar argument appears in the pages of *Literaturna Ukrayina*. The author, Bohdan Kinash, discusses the creation of new nouns and adjectives from verbs.⁶³ He urges linguists to use the existing lexicon of Ukrainian, which he believes is not poor or scant, in creating new words. As an example, he lists fifty-two words created from the verb '*stavyty*' to demonstrate how the use of prefixes and suffixes can aid in forming new words (*vystava*, *vystavka*, *vystanova* and *vystanovka*, for example). The first column of words are general nouns embodying the nature of the action, the second column are subjects, the third – '*slova orhanizovanoho kharaktery*' (organisational-type words), and the fourth – words expressing an action or the result of an action.⁶⁴ He urges linguists to protect the purity of Ukrainian, and not to pollute the language with borrowings (he mentions American English words like *ofis*, *reytinh*, *bryfinh*, *seks*) at the expense of good Ukrainian words, and not to try to be 'trendy'. That this contributor to the debate is an engineer shows that the concern for the health of the language has spread far beyond the professional linguists.

yinskoyi movy', *Jezyki Slowiańskie wobec Współczesnych Przemian w Krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej* (Opole, 1993), pp. 199–204.

⁶² S. Karavanskyi, 'Pro movu konstytutsiyi', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. XLIX, no. 12, December 1996, pp. 1411–16.

⁶³ B. Kinash, 'Mova ne povynna maty povityranykh yam ta porozhnyh', *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 17 June 1997.

⁶⁴ I. Levytskyi, 'Navishcho nam pozyky z chuzhykh mov', *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 17 June 1997.

Another topic under hot discussion is the phoneme [i] and its relationship to [o] and [e]. Because of regular sound changes, many words which appear with an [i] in Russian have an [i] in Ukrainian – *kon/kin, dom/dim, rodniy/ridnyi*. However, as a consequence of language confusion, this phonemic difference in otherwise similar words means that sometimes speakers overcompensate and substitute [i] for what should properly be [o] in Ukrainian, or leave out [i] and use the Russian word instead. Since there are words which have preserved the [o] phoneme through another set of linguistic changes and developments, this spelling challenge for Ukrainians is not an easy one. Nor do all linguists agree on the use of [i].

An example of how heated such arguments may become appeared in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukrayina*. A certain Oleksiy Dmytrenko printed an article entitled ‘*Sich-Zaporozka!*’⁶⁵ This sparked a volley of literary missiles, published in the 17 June edition of the paper. Among these, the Canadian-Ukrainian Yu. Levytskyi pointed out that, according to the *Dictionary of the Language of Shevchenko*, no less a person than Ukraine’s national poet used the form *Zaporozka*.⁶⁶ Ponomariv agrees the word is often written this way, and suggests this may be the result of Ukrainian speakers’ confusion from writing a great deal in Russian. Those who know both languages realise the [i] in Ukrainian usually corresponds to [o] in Russian equivalents, and when a closed syllable becomes open in declension, the [o] replaces [i] in Ukrainian as in *porib-u poroha, Kyiv-do Kyyyeva*. One would therefore expect *Zaporizka*, since the third syllable is closed. However, a variety of sources in addition to Shevchenko support the [o] spelling, despite some protest that this is really a calque from Russian.⁶⁷

Another possibility is that the [o] form is not a Russianism at all, but a reflection of sound changes taking place around the time of Shevchenko’s career, when rules of Ukrainian spelling were less firmly fixed. As with many languages, spelling does not always indicate pronunciation. Therefore, Shevchenko may have said *Zaporizka* while adhering to the existing orthographical rule calling for *-ozka*.

Why did the spelling of one word create such a furore? This example shows the affect of cultural and social issues which add importance to spelling questions. Firstly, this period in history is revered by Ukrainian patriots and nationalists for the independence it symbolises. It is interesting to note that Ponomariv supports his explanation of the problem with historical data and several dictionaries, in contrast to Levytskyi’s complaints of linguistic ‘trendiness’ and his call to defend the purity of the language. Hence one may say that these two authors represent the pragmatic and the neo-Romantic schools of thought respectively.⁶⁸

This issue touches another sensitive topic – the spelling of surnames. Ponomariv, for example, could be expected to decline his surname *u Ponomarova*, which some Ukrainians feel causes confusion as to the ethnicity of the person in question

⁶⁵ O. Dmytrenko, ‘*Sich-Zaporozka!*’, *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 13 May 1997.

⁶⁶ I. Levytskyi, ‘*Navishcho nam pozyky z chuzhykh mov?*’, *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 17 June 1997.

⁶⁷ Dictionaries consulted include Lviv, 1957 Ukrainian-Polish dictionary, Leipzig, 1943 Ukrainian dictionary, and Rome 1941 Ukrainian dictionary. Only the Lviv dictionary has the form as *Zaporizka*.

⁶⁸ This distinction aids analysis of relevant trends in Ukrainian scholarship and language promotion. Essentially, pragmatists such as Taranenko or Yermolenko concern themselves with using the language

– in this instance, he could be the Ukrainian Ponomariv, or the Russian Ponomarov. Some Ukrainians have adopted an alternative spelling, *u Ponomariva*. It is curious that Levytskyi calls this arrangement artificial, especially since he writes from Montreal and likely does not have the heightened sensitivity of local Ukrainians to Russian-sounding forms.⁶⁹ This brings up another question: should Ukrainian names automatically undergo sound changes when they are under discussion in Russian, especially as most speakers are presently bilingual and can easily make this change? Ponomariv mentions Maksym Kryvonis, and Petro Kryvonos, Lyudmyla Starytska-Chernyakhivska and Ivan Chernyakhovskiy as examples. But if Kryvonis and Starytska-Chernyakhivska were topics of conversation in Russian, would Ukrainians pronounce them the same as the others mentioned? A more accurate and also more nationally-aware ‘transliteration’ into Russian would use the corresponding Russian letter for the phoneme [i], rather than the mechanical change of Ukrainian [i] to Russian [o].

Solutions and Suggestions: What to do

Two problems confronting Ukrainian demand immediate attention. Firstly, whatever standard eventually emerges, it must, for the sake of easy communication and mutual intelligibility, encompass forms understandable to all speakers of Ukrainian. Secondly, and perhaps more optimistically, the language enthusiasts would like this standard to be aesthetically pleasing, following rules of Ukrainian style and word-formation. This would then lead to functional differentiation, allowing Ukrainian to serve as the only means of communication needed for normal daily business, and elevate the language’s status in the eyes of both its speakers and the world community.

How best to handle Russianisms and other questionable forms in the language? Here, opinions vary considerably. Vovk adopts a pragmatic view that the speaker must differentiate between useful words borrowed from Russian, and those which obscure a good Ukrainian term and should therefore not be used.⁷⁰ There is a definite trend away from words perceived to be Russian. One example is the preference for *sbtampovannya* over *sbtampovka*, reflecting the choice of a Ukrainian ending over the Russian *-ovka*. Some suggest avoiding borrowings from Polish as well, but often words have been in the language so long they are no longer recognised as having foreign origin. In fact, as in the case of *palyty*, which

as a state-building tool and as a practical way of supporting independence in Ukraine. These scholars wish to make the new orthographical dictionary user-friendly, and hope to produce a stable yet truly reflective description of the standard. Neo-Romantics, in contrast, concern themselves with the spirit and fate of the Ukrainian nation, and believe that the language is the only way fully to understand and participate in Ukraine’s culture, art, education and statehood. This school of thought is headed by Petro Kononenko under the auspices of the Ukrayinoznavstvo movement. Though the Academy of Sciences supports a more pragmatic approach, at the time of writing, Kononenko had the ear of the government on language policy.

⁶⁹ Olena Bekh, in a discussion of this problem, offered the example *Stakbiv-u Stakbiva* v. *-u Stakbiva* as an example. As a scholar of the language, she adopts the view that while this spelling is not in accordance with orthographical rules, it is a permissible variant to avoid confusion with Russian.

⁷⁰ S. Ermolenko, Interview, 22 August 1996, Kyiv.

is often quoted by native speakers of Ukrainian as a 'Polonism', what is now perceived as a Polish import may arguably be an older Slavonic word. The instincts of even linguists and *movoznavtsi* may not always be a reliable filter.⁷¹ There are Russian words which fit this category as well, such as *velosyped* or *sportsmen*.⁷²

How are Ukrainians to decide which words may stay in the language, and which are too obviously remnants of Russification (or unacceptable new creations from whatever source)? In 1994, Karavanskyi proposed the following set of rules:

- the lexicon should be understandable;
- words should be pronounceable and not too long;
- obvious Ukrainian words should be kept;
- words should have Ukrainian roots;
- rules of Ukrainian word formation should be followed;
- words should not have any 'undesirable undercurrents'.⁷³

As far as the introduction of new words is concerned, he suggests an additional few criteria: the new words should not replace existing Ukrainian ones, and are particularly desirable if a word can replace a phrase.⁷⁴ Krouglov wrote on the same problem in 1995, suggesting the criteria of specificity, usage, self-descriptiveness and the approval of authorities.⁷⁵ Nepyvoda, who is an expert in stylistics, believes concern for readability must be taken into account. She chooses words which she feels are pleasant to read and easy to understand.

Common sense will dictate which words are useful enough to keep, and which are archaic or unrecognisable for speakers. Ermolenko reflects this pragmatic attitude, and suggests leaving usage to individual taste and sense, as this is a policy in itself. She does not reject dialects of Ukrainian outright, but feels everyone should know the standard. Her other concern is to avoid extreme slang, or extreme high style. She does reject attempts to maintain some kind of artificial language, which is not democratic neutral language, including Soviet coinages (abbreviations *Ukrderzhmyasokombinat* or *Komzavod*, for example). Personal style and feeling for the language are universal criteria, although there is concern that many people's sense of what is good Ukrainian has been damaged by bilingualism and years of hearing bad Ukrainian. A rejection of Russification is not the only issue in determining what the ideal lexicon of Ukrainian should be. New words, both accept-

⁷¹ This also touches on a topic beyond the scope of this work but which might prove fruitful ground for further research – the process by which existing words expand their semantic load to cover new concepts. *Palyty* originally meant to 'burn' or 'give off smoke', as did Russian *kurit*, both of which were essentially intransitive verbs. The meaning expanded when tobacco entered the culture (originally the English verb primarily meant 'to give off smoke' as well, not 'to smoke' transitively). It would be interesting to explore whether Ukrainian pursued similar lines of incorporation with other new terminology.

⁷² S. Karavanskyi, 'Mova: mavpuvannya chy tvorchist?', *Vyzvolnyi Sbylyakb*, vol. xlvii, no. 1, January 1994, pp. 85–8.

⁷³ B. M. Zadorozhnyi, 'Shche raz pro te, yak nam pysaty inshomovni slova', *Movoznavstvo*, 1995, no. 2–3, pp. 10–11.

⁷⁴ Karavanskyi, 'Mova: mavpuvannya chy tvorchist?', op. cit., pp. 85–8.

⁷⁵ Alexandr Krouglov, 'Problems of Translation and Lexicography (English-Ukrainian Business Dictionary)', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 42, no. 1, spring 1995, p. 26.

able and unacceptable, enter from a variety of sources not only Russian. The new lexicon of Ukrainian allows regulation using a set of criteria, or a combination of recommendations to test individual words and phrases for feasibility.

For example, the expression *blyzke zarubizhzhya* (near abroad) entered Ukrainian via Russian. This term fulfils all of Karavanskyi's requirements even though it is Russian in origin. This alone, he says, is not reason to discount a term. He appears more uncomfortable with the ideological weight of this neologism coined to denote the former Soviet republics. He suggests that this phrase reflects Russia's refusal to call the new entities 'countries', preferring to call them the 'near abroad'.

The diaspora may supply new lexicon, as in the case of *dovkilliya*. This word follows the structure of other Ukrainian words, such as *zillya*, *pidpillya* and *Podillya*, and is instantly understandable. This word receives less criticism than the calque *vytoky* which copies Russian *istoki*. A number of criticisms are possible: it appears in place of the Ukrainian words *dzberela* and *korinnya*, the word is hard to say correctly and speakers who do not know Russian will not understand it. Such criticisms, which differ from expert to expert, obviously reflect subjective views and cannot be deemed absolute. A particularly good example of a new Ukrainian coinage is *letovysbche* which replaces the foreign words *aerodrom* and *aeroporto*. It fills the other criteria: easily understandable, from Ukrainian roots, easily pronounceable and follows the model of other words already in the lexicon like *vydovysbche*, *kladovysbche*, *rodovysbche* and *stanovysbche*.⁷⁶ It should be noted that in instances such as this, linguists may be unsuccessful, as the general public appears less concerned about word origins than convenience, and is unlikely to stop saying the more familiar word. While purist instincts may have the best of intentions, it is necessary that linguists remember who will be using the language and the practicality required to encourage the average speaker to use Ukrainian.

Borrowings must not be universally rejected, since they appear in most world languages. Here again, criteria are offered which would help regulate their inclusion in the lexicon. Essentially, borrowings must enhance and enrich the language, and they must not replace native Ukrainian words. *Imidzh* fails the test, as it replaces *obraz* and does not cover any new concept. Once more, there is a problem with such criticism. 'Image' in English no longer means simply the form or visual representation of an object, but has assumed the further meaning of one's public persona and reputation. The Ukrainian word *obraz* has thus far not expanded in a parallel manner, making it unsuitable as a synonym for 'imidzh'. Other words from English perturb Karavanskyi, including *konsensus* and *prevahyvaty*. Sometimes the problem relates not to the actual word, but its pronunciation. The adverb *tsilodobovo* (based on Russian *kruglosutochno*) has vowels i-o-o-o-o, which do not flow in Ukrainian. The Russian word, in contrast, has a normal Russian vowel pattern of u-a-u-a-a, and therefore sounds pleasing to Russian ears. Karavanskyi remarks that in situations such as this, 'treba ne kopiyyvaty, a tvoryty svoiyi movni standarty i movni zrazky'.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Karavanskyi, 'Mova: mavpuvannya chy tvorchist?', op. cit., p. 87.

⁷⁷ S. Karavanskyi, 'Besidy pro movu', *Vyzvolnyi Sbhlyakh*, vol. xivi, no. 1, January 1993, p. 73.

This kind of problem – the non-correspondence with Ukrainian rules of style – emerges in other words calqued from Russian. The clash may result from the use of a participle when Ukrainian calls for an adjective, or represent a stylistically and aesthetically displeasing phrase. Examples of this include *temperaturnyachyi khvoryi* (more acceptable would be *khvoryi z temperaturoyu*), *halopuyucha inflyatsiya* for *nestrymna* or *bezupynna inflyatsiya*, *koordinuyuchy tsestr* for *koordinatsiynyi tsestr* and *vybukbonebezpechnyi* instead of the preferred *peredvybukhovyi*.⁷⁸ Confusion may emerge when similar forms based on a Ukrainian root become confused with a Russian word: (Ukrainian) *dukhovyi* (spiritual) is not the same as *dukhovnyi* (ecclesiastical); the two can be confused by those who equate the second form with Russian *dukhovnyi*.⁷⁹

This highlights the language's potential for creating and accepting interesting new words, but, as Karavanskyi reminds his readers, *'mova mozhe, a movoznavstvo ne opratsyuvalo usikh mozhylostey ukrayinskykh slovtvorchykh birtsiv'*. The language needs not only creation, but also regulation.⁸⁰

Conclusions

Answers are not as satisfactory a means of summarising this area of work as a list of good, relevant questions. Overall the internal problems of Ukrainian represent a problem that is both aesthetic and symbolic. The linguistic war embodies the struggle of Ukraine to free itself from Russian influence and participate independently in the international community, and creates a thumbnail sketch of the bruised self-esteem of Ukraine as a state, its learning processes and development out of post-Soviet puberty into young nationhood. Were a critic to form an opinion based simply on what has been achieved thus far, he could be forgiven for finding much of Ukrainian language either copied or retrospective, borrowed from neighbours or the past. Such an assessment would not be entirely fair to that new state, which despite its present and ongoing troubles has made great strides in improving the language situation, and has recognised the importance of Ukrainian as a national symbol supporting and representing independence and bolstering national pride.

Any good critic must offer constructive suggestions for change, or characterise in a usable way the main challenges facing a subject. Therefore, it seems only fair to suggest a task list for the Ukrainian language. First on the list, one must mention the lexicon. At present, a great deal of variety exists, which may add to the richness of the language but also cause confusion. Some variations retain non-objective 'colour', betraying dialect origins, Soviet-era borrowings and calques or international vocabulary borrowings. Many linguists argue that borrowings or 'trendy' international words replace easily-attainable Ukrainian words created using prefixes and suffixes, or by creating new nouns and adjectives from existing verbs and vice-

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ S. Karavanskyi, 'Slovo, yak more', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol. XLII, no. 6, June 1989, p. 694.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

versa. Time will show which variations lose this colour and become synonyms within the standard. Even terms and vocabulary items which are not archaic, obvious new introductions or Russianisms, including the newly-set standard terminologies for scientific, legal and business fields, are not widely or universally used by the population. A universal standard must emerge to eliminate confusion and provide guidelines by which everyone can operate. Karavanskyi recommends a central linguistic committee to regulate this emerging standard, and keep the press, educational and academic spheres and government in line with one another.⁸¹ Certainly the idea could help regulate new forms and ensure that good examples are available for new or reluctant speakers.

The grammar and syntax of the language might benefit from a similar clean-up. Phrases have entered colloquial Ukrainian and, to a lesser extent, written Ukrainian, which draw the attention of linguists due to their resemblance to equivalent Russian phrases. Many of these linguists dislike the Russian-sounding forms and offer archaic or Western Ukrainian alternatives. Time will decide whose Ukrainian will gain the necessary status to prevail. A universal rejection of all things Russian, while natural and understandable, may be counter-productive. Polish, English or French forms are not being subjected to this kind of purge; and Ukrainian is related to Russian more closely than to any of these. Some Russianisms serve a useful function in the language and could well be missed if they were to be forced out by excited purists.

Finally, one must turn an eye to the spelling system, already under as much corrective attention as the other two areas. Here caution must be exercised. The return of [g] should not be an excuse to change good, Ukrainian pronunciation for diaspora Ukrainian with English or French influences. At the same time, Ukrainian does not need to follow Russian practice, by using [kh] as the best approximation to [h], since it possesses the latter phoneme itself. The same drive to weed out Russian influence could also lead to the elimination of words containing [o] or [e] as previously discussed. In some cases Russian influence has indeed changed Ukrainian spellings over time, and corrections are necessary to accurately follow spelling rules and represent sound changes which occurred in the past.

There is also the matter of competing or at least co-occurring trends towards variation and standardisation within the normal literary language; neutralisation of previously marked forms and competing political trends towards pragmatism and neo-Romanticism. All of this, compounded by the relatively few speakers of standard literary Ukrainian and the role of the press as a primary language educator, complicates the linguistic situation in Ukraine almost beyond comprehension.

What does this mean for Ukrainian? Essentially, speakers who wish to improve their language skills may find a dictionary handy until the process is complete. School-children may have to resign themselves to learning entirely different words for elements or new spellings of foreign countries and names. Military personnel and lawyers might have to put up with some confusion until one set of

⁸¹ S. Karavanskyi, 'Drukowane slovo yak chynnyk osvity v Ukraini', *Vyzvolnyi Shlyakh*, vol XLVI, no. 8, August 1993, p. 997.

terms wins over the others and gains wide acceptance. Government officials must seriously consider their policy options, and whether their support of a non-objective, nationalistically inclined language approach really presents the best picture of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language both at home and abroad. Those in the media, intelligentsia and educational spheres have a duty and responsibility to accurately reflect the standard, as it is at the moment, in every utterance and written work. Theirs is the arena where the language battle must eventually be won, where new terms must fight it out with old Russified words and coinages – and will either sink or swim. □

FOR ALL UKRAINIAN STUDIES RESEARCHERS

The British Association of Ukrainian Studies web site is now up and running. It is located at <http://www.bvx.ca/baus/>

The site currently includes the following features:

- Latest Ukrainian Studies Events/News
- Register of Ukrainian Studies Researchers in the UK
- Ukrainian Studies Resources in Britain
- Selected Ukrainian Research Links (On-line publications, Government, etc.)
- Information for Ukrainians wishing to study in the UK
- Information on reading Cyrillic over the Internet
- Register of private accommodation in Ukraine for researchers

It would be helpful if you would send the following biographical information to us:

1. Full name and postal address
2. Brief c.v.
3. Research interests
4. List of up to five publications.

Please indicate if you prefer your e-mail address not to be posted on the web site.

If you know of other UK researchers in Ukrainian studies, please pass on details of the site to them.

For suggestions, additions, questions or comments regarding the web site contact: Paul Pirie – pirie@spectranet.ca or Roman Zyla – rzyla@ssees.ac.uk

To contact BAUS directly: Andrew Wilson – alw1006@cus.cam.ac.uk

Some Aspects of the Development of Tourism in Ukraine

Vsevolod Kobrzhytskyi

Present-day tourism has evolved into a sector which plays a significant role in the economy of many countries. In Ukraine, however, tourism has not yet attained the importance it has in the developed European countries. This is a consequence of the general level of the economy and the level of preparedness and qualification of the personnel of the tourism business in Ukraine. For the sake of fairness, one should note that in Soviet times, when the state had a monopoly in all walks of social life, there was no proper training of organisers or managers of tourism. Personnel for the tourism of the time ('Intourist' for foreigners, and youth and trade union tourism for Soviet citizens) were selected from the ranks of the Komsomol, the Party, trade union workers or, in the best cases, from guide-interpreters. And the success of any travel agency, to a large extent, depends on the professionalism, knowledge and level of information of its staff.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the process of slow transition to the principles of a market economy began in Ukraine. This also involved the demonopolisation of sectors of the economy. In the tourism business this led to a significant, sharp rise in the number of new travel agencies. Undoubtedly, this process can be seen as positive. However, an increase in the sheer number of travel agencies is not always conducive to an improvement in the quality of service provided for domestic and foreign clients. But to ensure that the activity of travel agencies conforms with present-day international standards, special institutions have been set up to implement the state policy on tourism, which are guided in their work by the Ukrainian Law on Tourism, and also internationally recognised documents, including the 'Recommendations on International Travel and Tourism' (1963), the 'Code of Ethics for Tourists' (1980) and the Manila 'Declaration on World Tourism' (1980).

In mid-1994, in order to protect the interests of consumers of tourism services and create equal opportunities for entrepreneurs in the tourism sector on the one hand, and to preserve elements of state regulation of private business on the other, the licensing of a number of types of activities in the sector was introduced in Ukraine. They include:

- the reception and servicing of foreign tourists in Ukraine;
- the reception and servicing of domestic tourists in Ukraine;
- the organisation of trips for Ukrainian tourists outside Ukraine;
- excursions;
- mass health-resort and sport tourism.

Tourism-related entities requiring a license include travel agencies and tour operators, travel and excursion bureaux, hotels, motels and camping sites, catering and transport businesses, self-catering facilities and various tourist bases and complexes, joint-stock companies, associations, foundations, unions, societies and other bodies carrying out entrepreneurial activity in the tourist sphere, as envisaged in their

Articles of Association. The Ukrainian tourism license is issued for a period of three years, either for all the above forms of activity, or for individual ones.

After the collection and submission of close on a score of different documents, and payment of the necessary fee to the State Committee (Ministry) of Tourism of Ukraine, the license should be received within one month. Only then can the firm legally begin tourism-related activity, including advertisement of its services. At the present time, in Ukraine there are close on 2,500 licensed travel agencies. And each of them is engaged in a battle for clients, in our case – the tourist.

Whereas, let us say, British citizens have a wide choice of travel agencies which invite them to visit picturesque or historic places in Great Britain or to travel to any corner of the world at their convenience and by whatever means of transport they choose, for the Ukrainian citizen the situation is somewhat different. There are many travel agencies, but the choice of holidays in Ukraine is limited, for the most part, to the Carpathians, Crimea, or several well-known spa resorts in Truskavets (Lviv oblast) or in the Donetsk region.

There are a number of interesting excursion routes. Among them one may note steamer trips along the Dnipro, coach tours of Transcarpathia and Subcarpathia, Slobozhanshchyna,¹ the Kherson region (with a visit to the unique Askaniya Nova nature reserve), the Chernihiv, Poltava and Cherkasy regions, extensive excursions around Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Chernivtsi and Chernihiv. Excursion routes to Shevchenko's Mound in Kaniv occupy a particular place. Every year hundreds of thousands of people visit this place, which is sacred to every Ukrainian. Foreign tourists, however, are still fairly reluctant to travel to Ukraine. They are not attracted by a country with an unstable economy, a low level of services for which high prices are charged, the lack of many amenities to which the Western tourist is accustomed, etc.

However, according to the State Committee on Tourism of Ukraine, in the last 5 years the number of foreign tourists in Ukraine has increased, while that of Ukrainians who travelled abroad has decreased significantly.

Fig. 1. The number of tourists in Ukraine, 1992–1996 (millions)

	1992	1995	1996
Tourists			
Foreign citizens in Ukraine	0.12	1.9	2.4
Ukrainian citizens abroad	10.0	3.5	3.6
Day-/Half-day trips	2.0	10.0	10.0

¹ 'Slobozhanshchyna' (Slobidska Ukraine), the historical name of a region of north-eastern Ukraine, derived from the self-governing 'sloboda' settlements there in the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries. The inhabitants of such settlements were exempted by the landlord (a nobleman, the church or the state) from various taxes and impositions for a period of 15–20 years, in order to attract skilled labourers and peasants from other regions.

Foreign destinations offered by Ukrainian travel agencies extend to almost every corner of the globe, but they are accessible only for very wealthy people (who travel to where they have not yet been, and, most frequently, to expensive and modish resorts). In winter 1997–8, for instance, it was chic to visit Cancun in Mexico. A one-week trip to this resort cost \$3.5–4,000 per person. This sum is greater than the annual salary for most jobs in Ukraine for which a university degree is required.

Fig. 2. Average monthly wage and pensions in 1996 (\$ US)²

Country	Ukraine	Belarus	Russia
Wages	45	81	149
Pensions	20	38	47

What is on offer for the less affluent is limited, in general, to cheap resorts in Turkey and Bulgaria, or slightly more expensive resorts in Cyprus and Egypt (a trip to which may involve a certain risk for tourists). Trips to these countries are facilitated either by the absence of visa requirements altogether or else a very simplified procedure to obtain them. Coach or train/coach excursion tours to London and Paris for 5–7 days are also fairly popular with both adults and children, particularly during school holidays.

Particular note should be made of a specific form of tourism typical of post-Communist countries – mass-scale shopping-tourism. This was, in its time, to a greater or lesser extent characteristic of Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and particularly Poland. At the present time, it is part of the life-style of many citizens of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine. For the past eight or so years, Ukrainian citizens have been exporting to neighbouring countries everything they could sell there, returning with goods which were not on open sale in Ukraine's shops, or were extremely difficult to obtain. This became a classic exchange of goods manufactured in Ukraine for the currency of the neighbouring state and the purchase there of local goods to be taken back for resale. High- or medium-quality consumer goods, which were in short supply in Ukraine, were thus imported, with individual citizens – the shopping-tourists – not the state satisfying the needs of Ukrainian citizens for consumer goods. Their constant shuttling to and fro, carrying goods across the frontier, earned them the nickname 'chovnyky' (little boats). Gradually, as Ukraine's large factories began closing down (first and foremost, in the defence industry), the 'fleet' of 'little boats' grew larger. However, within a few years it stopped carrying goods in both directions. Today Ukraine's 'little boats' go on shopping-tours with a single suitcase full of money and return with several bags of goods, exporting mountains of foreign currency from Ukraine in the process. Markets where Turkish, Chinese, Polish and other manufactured goods are readily available have sprung up in the large cities. There are now

² *Ekonomika Ukrainy*, 1997, no. 1, p. 19

few Ukrainian-produced goods, and those that there are have to stand up to very severe competition from low-quality foreign goods, which are more attractively packaged or have been well advertised in the media – television, in particular. From time to time, the government has taken various measures to regulate this commercial flow by increasing import duties and other taxes. But Ukraine's 'little boats' have more or less managed to overcome the tax burdens and continue to saturate the Ukrainian market with inferior yet cheaper goods. This is unfortunate, but it is a clear example of how from 1990–7 the real incomes of the population of Ukraine have decreased five-fold, and Ukraine's level of prosperity dropped from 45th place in the world in 1994, to 95th place in 1997, and today is on the level of Third World countries.

However, what worries people most is low-quality food-stuffs. Food-stuffs with an elevated content of nitrates or containing banned preservatives and colouring agents are being imported into Ukraine from various European and Asian countries on a massive scale. Importing food into Ukraine may appear ludicrous at first glance, but, in fact, there are hundreds of commercial companies importing a wide variety of food-stuffs. These, however, have nothing to do with either the 'little boats' or tourism.

A number of travel agencies in Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Uzhhorod and other cities are doing good business with a particular form of shopping-tourism – used cars. They organise tourist trips to Germany, Belgium or Holland. Clients get a Schengen visa, transit by coach or train to their destination point, and stay in a hotel for several days. At used car lots they find an old or very shabby car, and after completing the necessary paperwork, they leave for home. In this way, over the last decade the car pool of Ukraine has increased by almost fifty per cent. And although the wealthier countries of Europe are glad to get rid of such old bangers, in Ukraine they find their second or third youth and give their new owners good service. Car shopping-tourism, probably, has seen its best days. A new government decree, coming into force on 1 April 1998, bans the import and registration of cars older than 5 years and with a value of less than \$5,000. Well, now Ukrainians will drive around in newer cars and those which will be built in Zaporizhzhya at the Ukrainian-Korean joint venture 'AvtoZAZ-Daewoo' plant.

Perhaps, in these cars citizens of Ukraine will finally 'drive in' to a society with a true market economy. And then they will be able to afford to spend more on trips

Fig. 3. Contribution of tourism and excursion services to the total services sector, 1985–1995 (%)

Type of service	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Tourism and excursion	4.1	5.3	4.9	5.5	3.0	3.2	1.8
Spas and health resorts	4.0	4.0	6.9	10.6	11.6	13.5	10.1

Source: Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine

and excursions. The existing state of the services sector clearly cannot please those engaged in the tourism business.

The low level of development of the tourism sector in Ukraine led the government to draw up the Programme 'Fundamental Directions of the Development of Tourism in Ukraine until the year 2005', which was adopted at the end of 1996. This has all the proper motives and takes in all the principal elements of the tourism business, including improving the quality and expanding the range of available tourist services, the reconstruction of existing tourist facilities and the design and construction of new ones, and much more. What is most important, however, is that this Programme does not simply remain a paper testimony to the good intentions of its authors; it must be implemented by all those involved in the tourism industry. Alongside this Programme, in accordance with Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on Tourism, in October 1996 the State Committee for Tourism of Ukraine adopted its own Programme to Ensure the Protection and Safety of Tourists during 1996–2000. This document envisages the implementation of the state policy for tourism so as to ensure the protection of tourists, their rights, interests and property. It is intended to foster the establishment of legal, organisational and financial and material conditions for the further development of tourism in each region of Ukraine.

Undoubtedly, tourism, as a highly-profitable sector of the economy, can make an important contribution to the economic recovery of the country. What Ukraine needs is qualified personnel, a sufficient base of financial resources and facilities, a willingness and desire of those employed in running businesses in this sector to see their work not only as a means of making a livelihood for themselves, but also as a contribution to the building of independent Ukraine. □

History

The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

Oleh Budzynskyi

The words 'From this day forth, the Ukrainian National Republic becomes an independent, subject to no one, free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people', emerge in the memory of every Ukrainian whenever there is a mention of the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and the building of the Ukrainian state during the second decade of the twentieth century. These words are from the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. They signify not merely the juridical formulation of Ukraine as an independent state, but also the return to the international scene of a nation with a thousand-year state tradition, with its roots in the state of Volodymyr the Great (980–1015).

The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada was the outcome and culmination of its previous state-building activity. It was proclaimed on the basis of certain legal foundations, which were formulated when the UCR was established¹ as the representative organ of the entire Ukrainian population. The legal validity of the Fourth Universal has to be understood in the context of the entire activity of the Central Rada during the Ukrainian revolution.

The Ukrainian state of 1917–20 was born as part of the revolutionary events which overthrew the Russian Tsarist regime. But for the young Ukrainian democracy social and national justice was not simply a matter of fashionable jargon, but the true foundation of its activities. The UCR, which was headed by the notable Ukrainian historian and civic activist Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, became, in the course of a few months, the centre of national life, and the spokesman of national hopes and expectations, deriving its authority and power from the people.

From the very beginning, the Central Rada included political activists from various Ukrainian parties, which were united by a powerful national element in their programmes. But, quite understandably, these parties were not supported by the entire Ukrainian population. On 17–21 April 1917 the All-Ukrainian National Congress was convened in Kyiv under the auspices of the UCR. This was attended by representatives of political, cultural and professional organisations (of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, military, clergy, etc.) from various parts of Ukraine. The Congress reorganised the Central Rada and elected a new presidium, consisting of a president (Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi), and two vice-presidents (Volodymyr Vynnychenko² and

¹ The Ukrainian Central Rada was founded in Kyiv on 17 March 1917. Originally, it was envisaged as a pan-Ukrainian umbrella for existing political, community, cultural and professional organisations. Following the meeting of the All-Ukrainian National Congress (Kyiv, 17–21 April 1917), it became the proto-parliament leading and directing the Ukrainian national movement.

² Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951). Writer, statesman and politician. In 1917, while being the leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) he was elected one of the two Vice-

Serhiy Yefremov³). To deal with day-to-day matters, the Rada elected an executive committee, later renamed the Little Rada, consisting of members of the presidium, secretaries of the Rada, and two representatives from each political party. The Congress, which directly or indirectly represented in the person of its delegates the whole of the contemporary Russian-ruled Ukraine, did not simply become a festival of Ukrainianness, but also gave the Central Rada a legal legitimacy in the name of the majority of its population. Later, the membership of the Central Rada was increased by coopting members delegated by the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress (23 June 1917) and members of the Council of Peasant Deputies, elected at the First All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress (15 June 1917), and representatives elected at the First All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress (24–27 July 1917), as well as representatives of Ukraine's ethnic minorities, thus consolidating the representative basis of this proto-parliament of Ukraine from the social and ethnic point of view.

Analysis of the political demands of the UCR, as expressed in its First (23 June 1917) and Second (16 July 1917) Universals, reveals that during the period when the Rada coexisted with the Russian Provisional Government, Ukrainian aspirations to statehood went no further than national-territorial autonomy within the Russian state. This limitation should not be attributed simply to weak instincts of statehood in the Ukrainian people and its leaders. One must take into account that, for a century and a half, Ukraine had formed part of the Russian imperial state, and this had created a stereotype of that state in public opinion. The moral and legal principles which bound the leaders of the Ukrainian movement to the central authorities likewise played a significant role.

However, the great-power chauvinism of the Provisional Government and subsequently the Bolshevik terror quite quickly oriented the interests of the Ukrainian people towards an independent state. The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd on 7 November 1917 put paid to the hopes of the leaders of the Central Rada of achieving the social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people on the basis of autonomy and a federative link with Russia. The voluntarism of the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin was leading Russia, and with it Ukraine, to ruin and bloody, all-encompassing anarchy. Under these conditions, and fearing for the fate of Ukraine, the UCR issued its historic Third Universal on 20 November 1917. The epochal significance of this document for Ukrainian statehood and the establishment of Ukraine as a national-democratic state can hardly be overestimated. It proclaimed the creation of a Ukrainian National Republic (albeit within a federated Russia of equal and free peoples), which would be governed by a legislature – the Central Rada, and a government – the General Secretariat, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly of Ukraine. It set 9 January 1918 as the date for election of the Assembly and 22 January

Presidents of the Central Rada, and subsequently head of the General Secretariat, the government of Ukraine. Under the Hetman government which followed, he led the opposition Ukrainian National Union, and then (from its inception on 14 November 1918 until February 1919) the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic.

³ Serhiy Yefremov (1876–1939). Writer, historian and politician. He was one of the leading members of the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party and its successor, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. In 1917, Yefremov became a Deputy Chairman of the Central Rada, a member of the Little Rada, and General Secretary of International Affairs in the General Secretariat.

as the day of its convocation. Furthermore, it defined a wide range of socio-economic issues: abolished the death penalty and the ownership of land by non-toilers; declared all land the property of the working people without compensation to its former owners; introduced an eight-hour working day and state control over all production; granted full amnesty to all political prisoners and national-personal autonomy to Ukraine's ethnic minorities; directed the government to strengthen and broaden the local self-government rights; affirmed the freedom of speech, the press, religion, assembly and association, the right to strike, and the inviolability of the person and home; and called upon the citizens to struggle against the Bolsheviks.



Members of the Ukrainian Central Rada, Kyiv, 1917.

The eighth session of the Central Rada, which opened on 25 December 1917, welcomed the 'consolidation of democratic authority and the proclamation of Ukraine as a free National Republic' laid down in the Third Universal. Concluding the session, the head of the Central Rada, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, stressed:

While as regards social issues we have not yet achieved our objectives, as regards political ones we have achieved more than we thought. We stood and still stand for the principle of federation, but circumstances have arisen so that Ukraine has in fact become a truly self-governing and independent state. This is already beyond dispute, and even the most stubborn and least supportive among us do not argue with this.⁴

These words of an eminent Ukrainian are an eloquent testimony that the delegates of the Central Rada were well aware that the Third Universal was, effectively, a document at state level, and *de facto* a proclamation of independence of the

⁴ *Ukrayinska Tsentralna Rada. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 36–7.

Ukrainian state. The federative association which it mentions between the Ukrainian National Republic and Bolshevik Russia, since it was not embodied in any concrete form, remained no more than a declarative concession.

The juridical formulation of the sovereign existence of Ukraine was accomplished by the passing of the last, Fourth Universal on 22 January 1918. What impelled the Ukrainian Central Rada to take such a step was a matter of international politics. Hrushevskyyi explained the situation in an article entitled 'Ukrainian Independence and its Historical Necessity', written after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, which brought peace between Ukraine and the Central Powers. The making of peace, according to Hrushevskyyi, was the first motive for the declaration of independence.

This motive was justified fully, and the most proximate facts clearly assured the historical inevitability of the declaration of independence of Ukraine. According to the most recent information, the Great-Russian 'people's commissars' have broken off the peace negotiations and simultaneously declared full demobilisation – which left Russia completely at the mercy of Germany. The Ukrainian delegation, acting as the representative of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent state, has achieved a peace with honour, dignified, democratic...

The second motive behind the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian Republic was the need for a more decisive policy to defend Ukraine against the attacks of Great-Russia under the leadership of the people's commissars. Until this final word of Ukrainian statehood was spoken and the Ukrainian Republic was clearly and decisively separated from other provinces of the Russian state, there were still some people willing to regard the struggle of Ukraine against the Bolshevik government of Great-Russia as a party struggle. This was envisaged as being between advocates of Ukrainianness on the one side, and supporters of Bolshevism on the other, with those who favoured neither side remaining neutral. After the declaration of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, all its inhabitants irrespective of their views and beliefs are obliged to support the Ukrainian government.⁵

Hrushevskyyi also mentions a third motive, which triggered the proclamation of the Fourth Universal – the need for full freedom to put in order the social, economic and financial affairs of Ukraine. These motives are fairly important, too: they testify that the declaration of the full independence of the Ukrainian Republic was a necessary demand of the moment, conditioned by the historical situation.

Surprisingly, not all the members of the Little Rada, which carried out the legislative activities between sessions of the Ukrainian Central Rada, considered the enactment of a Universal proclaiming independence to be appropriate at that time or even necessary at all. Some, like Mykhaylo Tkachenko⁶ and Oleksander Shulhyn,⁷

⁵ M. Hrushevskyyi, *Na porozni novoyi Ukrainyiny: Hadky i mriyi* (Kyiv, 1918), p. 74.

⁶ Mykhaylo Tkachenko (1879–1920). Politician and activist. He was a member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (1902–4) and then the USDRP, becoming one of its leading ideologues. In 1917, he became General Secretary of the Central Rada, and Minister of Justice (November 1917 to March 1918) and Minister of the Interior (to April 1918) of the Ukrainian National Republic. From January 1919 onwards, he led the left, pro-independence wing of the USDRP, which in 1920 became the Ukrainian Communist Party.

⁷ Oleksander Shulhyn (1889–1960). Historian, sociologist and politician. After the February Revo-

considered the declaration of *de facto* sovereignty by the Third Universal fully sufficient for Ukraine to become a player in the international arena. Others, like Oleksander Zarudnyi⁸ and Mykola Porsh,⁹ proposed deferring the enactment of such a Universal until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly had been convened. Active opposition to the Fourth Universal also came from representatives of the ethnic minorities – they were worried that an independent Ukraine might not ensure them free development in accordance with their traditions and aspirations.

The need to pass the Fourth Universal before the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly became apparent to the majority of activists of the Little Rada and the General Secretariat early in January 1918. On 22 January, three drafts of the Universal: one by Hrushevskyy, one by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and a joint one by M. Soltan and Mykyta Shapoval¹⁰ were submitted to the Little Rada. These drafts were considered by a constitutional commission which drew up a final version, incorporating what was common to all three. In the process of the discussions it became clear that the ethnic minorities linked their support of the Universal with the ratification by the Central Rada of a Law on National-Personal Autonomy. On 24 January the Little Rada produced a draft of such a law and ratified it.¹¹ Only when this was done did the delegates resume their consideration of the Universal. At 1.00 a.m. on 25 January at the session of the Little Rada and in the presence of numerous guests Hrushevskyy read the final text of the Universal, on which the delegates had worked since 22 January. In the Universal, after a description of the internal and external situation: anarchy, ruin, Russo-Ukrainian war, Hrushevskyy proclaimed the words sacred to every Ukrainian: 'People of Ukraine! By your efforts, your will, and your word, a free Ukrainian National Republic has been created on Ukrainian soil...'. The Fourth Universal renamed the General Secretariat the Council of National Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic and directed it to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers. It underlined the obligations, assumed by the Central Rada and the government in the Third Universal; announced an immediate end to the war and that the army would be replaced by a people's militia after the ratification of the peace treaty; prescribed new elections to rural-district, coun-

lution, he was elected to the Central Rada and the Little Rada. From July 1917 to 30 January 1918, he served as General Secretary for Ethnic (later, International) Relations.

⁸ Oleksander Zarudnyi (1891–1918). Politician. He was a leading member of the left-wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, a member of the Central Rada and a Minister for Land Affairs under the Ukrainian National Republic. After the Bolsheviks seized Kyiv in 1918, he was executed during their reprisals.

⁹ Mykola Porsh (1879–1944). Economist and civic activist of German-Jewish descent. He was a leading member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party and the USDRP. He became a member of the Central Rada and the Little Rada, and in January 1918 was appointed Minister of Defence and Labour of the Ukrainian National Republic.

¹⁰ Mykyta Shapoval (1882–1932). Politician and publicist. He was a co-founder of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and head of its central committee. He was a member of the Central Rada and the Little Rada (1917–8), and after the Third Universal (November 1917), became Minister of Post and Telegraph. He took part in the drafting of the Fourth Universal.

¹¹ Under this law, the Jewish, Russian and Polish 'nations' (i.e., ethnic minorities) in Ukraine were granted the right to govern their own cultural and community affairs through what were termed 'national unions'.

ty and urban councils; affirmed that a land law would soon be ratified and that all land would be transferred from the land committees to the people before spring tilling; nationalised all the natural resources of Ukraine and the most important branches of commerce; imposed state control over banks; reaffirmed all democratic freedoms and national-personal autonomy, etc.

Following the proclamation of the Universal, which the members of the Rada and those present rose to their feet to hear, there was a roll-call vote, in which 49 members of the Rada took part. The results were as follows: 'for' – 39 (members of all the Ukrainian parties represented in the Little Rada, and the representative of the Polish 'left'); 'against' – 4 (3 Russian Mensheviks and the representative of the Jewish Bund); and six abstentions (members of the factions of the Polish Central, Jewish socialists, Poale-Zion, and Russian Social Revolutionaries).

The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was an act of recognised political importance. The independence of the Ukrainian National Republic, declared by a legitimate legislative organ according to the laws then in force, was and remains a historical fact. In matter and form, the Universal met accepted international norms. Whether or not other states recognised the independent Ukrainian republic was a matter of political pragmatism – not law. Henceforth, Ukraine, even after losing its independence, remained, although subjugated, *de jure* a state. The fight for its freedom became the task of Ukrainian patriots for the next seven decades.

Today, once again, there has appeared in the world political arena a free sovereign independent state of the Ukrainian people – the legitimate successor of the Ukrainian National Republic, hallowed by the historic Fourth Universal. □

Chyhyryn Roots of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy's Family Tree

Mykola Kucherenko

Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, the doyen of Ukrainian historians and the first President of the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic (1917–20), was born in what in mediaeval times was Kholm, the capital of the Ukrainian Prince Danylo of Halych, but from which the Ukrainian population was forcibly re-settled after World War II, making it what is now the entirely Polish town of Chełm. His birthplace bears a memorial plaque in Polish and Ukrainian, dedicated in 1991: 'In this building, on 17 September 1866, the most eminent Ukrainian historian and the first President of the Ukrainian National Republic, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, was born'.

Hrushevskyy's ancestral roots in the paternal line, however, lie in Central Ukraine, in the region of Chyhyryn, the capital of an equally eminent later ruler of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazepa.

Hrushevskyy's genealogy has only recently attracted the interest of Ukrainian scholars, in connection with the establishment of the new Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy Memorial Museum in Kyiv.

The only previous work in this field was carried out by a kinsman, Marko (Fedorovych) Hrushevskyy (1866–1938) – a priest and regional ethnographer. However, family members say that after Fr. Marko was arrested in 1938, the family papers he had collected and the genealogical table he had compiled vanished without trace. A considerable amount of information is provided by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy himself in his two 'autobiographies' (1906, 1926), and other personal archival materials, covering the years 1914–9, and, naturally, in his *Memoirs*.¹ Unfortunately, we have only a part of his *Memoirs*, his fundamental autobiographical work. Further information is contained in the accounts of surviving members of the Hrushevskyy family. But the most prospective sources are, naturally, the archives, first and foremost, the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv: holding 1235 (family holding of the Hrushevskyyis) and holding 127 (holding of the Kyivan Clerical Consistory). Since the majority of the male members of the Hrushevskyy family were clerics, the Imperial Russian bureaucracy has left us a considerable amount of data on their biographies, careers, families, parishes, etc., carefully preserved in church records. Many details can also be found in the registers of births, marriages and deaths. These archival materials supplement and add fine detail to Hrushevskyy's *Memoirs* and family accounts, substantiating them with documents. There are many such documents; the registers for the Chyhyryn district from the beginning of the nineteenth century occupy 253 volumes. Researching these archives thoroughly, therefore, may well extend over many years. The list of sources of information on the Hrushevskyy family must also include various regional-ethnographic materials – books, newspapers and journals, and bro-

¹ M. Hrushevskyy, 'Spomyny', *Kyiv*, 1988, nos. 9–12; 1989, nos. 8–11.

chures of places where Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy or his relatives lived, since these help build up the historical background and give a fuller picture of life in those times.

In our opinion, research into this subject is still only in the very preliminary stages. Nevertheless, it is already possible to get a general impression of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's family tree, and to draw up a genealogical table in which more than 200 persons are identified. Many of his forebears turn out to have been distinguished for their patriotism, love of freedom and devotion to the Christian faith – a psychological and spiritual legacy which was reflected in Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's own life and work.

So far it has been possible to trace the history of the Hrushevskiy family back to the first half of the seventeenth century, when the south-eastern frontiers of the Kyiv region were settled. At some time in the seventeenth century, in the picturesque valley of the river Tyasmyn among now long-vanished forests and lakes² the village of Khudoliyivka was founded. According to Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, the village 'owes its name, of course, to [the Cossack] captain Khudoliyiv, who after the treaty of Zboriv [18 August 1649] tried to organise an uprising in Zaporizhzhya, but lost the issue and paid for it with his life'.³ Khudoliyivka was the earliest known home of the Hrushevskiy family, which originally bore the surname Hrusha. 'Our family', writes Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, 'was very poor. It was a clerical family, but only rarely did any of its members attain the priesthood. It was the custom that the members of such families started out as sextons, and then, if a parish and some benefactors were found, they would be ordained as a priest'.⁴

But did the Hrusha family always belong to the clerical order? In the church documents for 1798 (the oldest source mentioning Khudoliyivka so far located in Kyiv), we find five persons with this surname. That is: sacristan Vasyly Hrusha (great-grandfather of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy) and subprecentor Petro Hrusha (probably his brother), both from Khudoliyivka,⁵ Petro's son – the subprecentor Dionisiy (in later documents he appears as Hrushevskiy) and the sacristan Sy-



Serhiy Hrushevskiy.
Mykhaylo's father (1890s).

² For the natural features of the area at that time, see: L. Pokhilevich, *Skazaniya o naseleennykh mest-nostyakh Kievskoy gubernii* (Kyiv, 1864), p. 678.

³ Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, pp. 115–6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁵ Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukrainy v m. Kyievi (henceforth TsDIA), holding 127, file 1009, item no. 14, folio 58.

meon Hrusha, concerning whom, to date, we have little further information – both resident in the village of Yaskivtsi⁶ (adjacent to Khudoliyivka), and also sub-precentor Ivan Hrusha, residing in neighbouring Topylivka.⁷ And that is all. There were no further references to the surname Hrusha or Hrushevskiy for that year in the whole of the Chyhyryn district. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there were considerably more clerics with the name Hrushevskiy in the Chyhyryn region. This suggests that their ‘specialisation’ in the church began only in the second half of the eighteenth century. The question then logically follows: what was



Hlafira Hrushevka.
Mykhaylo's mother (1880s).

the previous social status of the Hrusha family? Further research is needed on this point, but it seems likely that the remote ancestors of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy were Cossacks, as one might expect in the Cossack Chyhyryn region. This hypothesis is to some extent substantiated by the article of the Polish-Ukrainian writer and historiographer Josyp Rolle, ‘Women at the court of Chyhyryn’, written on the basis of private archives and first published in his account of the life in Subotiv of Olena (née Statkevych) Vyhovska (wife of Ivan Vyhovskiy, Hetman from 1657–9). Rolle mentions among her entourage the wife of the military scribe Hrusha (unfortunately without mentioning his given name).⁸ This reference to the Cossack scribe Hrusha (the only one located to date) would require further investigation even apart from the fact that the surname Hrusha does not appear in the

‘Register of all the Zaporozhian troops’, drawn up only eight years previously, in 1649, neither in the Chyhyryn regiment, nor in the neighbouring Cherkasy, Kaniv and Korsun regiments. One should note, however, that the register gives related surnames derived from the same root: Mysko Hrushyshyn in the Chyhyryn regiment,⁹ Panko Hrushkivskiy and Fedir Hrushovskiy in the Cherkasy regiment¹⁰ and Tymish Hrushetskiy in the Kaniv regiment.¹¹

⁶ Ibid., folio 46, 54 verso.

⁷ Ibid., folio 56.

⁸ J. Rolle, *Zhinky pry Chyhyrynskomu dvori* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 43, 45.

⁹ *Reyestr usyoho Vjyska Zaporozkoho pishya Zboritskoho dohovoru z korolem polskym Yanom Kazymirom skladyenyi 1649 roku, zbotnuya 16 dnya y vydany po dostemennomu vydannyyu O. M. Borodyanskym* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 50–1.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 107, 108.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 130.

If one takes into account the fact that, at that time, surnames, or rather by-names, were by no means fixed, but often underwent considerable changes, one can surely not rule out the possibility that these Cossacks belonged to what would eventually become the Hrushevskyyi family. Such a variation is also recorded among the immediate forebears of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi: his grandfather changed his surname from Hrusha to Hrushevskyyi, while his uncle Ivan (Fedorovych) at the very end of his life suddenly began to sign himself Hrushkovskyyi.¹² The old surname Hrusha is typical of the Cossack-peasant masses, but not, strictly speaking, of a clerical family. Hence one may assume that the change in surname was related to the transition from a Cossack tradition to a clerical one.

Were Petro, Vasyl and Ivan (the earliest Hrushy so far identified) the first in their family to hold minor posts in the church? Surely not. In his time, Marko Hrushevskyyi told Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi that ‘once, when the well in Khudoliyivka was being cleaned out or something, a square-cut beam was pulled out, on which were carved out the name of the priest Danylo Hrushevskyyi and the year 1770-something’.¹³ What attracted the Cossack Hrushy into the clerical establishment: the struggle against Polish Roman Catholic expansion, or simply as a way of avoiding serfdom in an era when the Polish and later Russian authorities were extirpating the Cossacks and enserfing former Cossacks? The answer to that question is, alas, long since lost.

One must remember that this is all hypothesis, an attempt at reconstruction in an almost complete absence of documentary sources. The first reliable evidence about the family of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi occurs in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, relating to the year 1798. Thus ‘Vedomost imennaya Chyghirinskoy protopopii...’¹⁴ relates that in Khudoliyivka (population 659), the surpliced subpreceptor Petro Hrusha and the nominated sacristan Vasyl Hrusha served at the church of St Paraskeva. Petro was then 49 years old, and Vasyl – 43. Their patronymics are not given (the use of patronymics was not customary in Ukrainian tradition). One may, however, postulate that Petro and Vasyl were brothers – or at any rate close kin – since their great-grandsons – Marko and Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi – regarded themselves as cousins. The listing of family members in this document is incomplete: it mentions only those sons still living under the parental roof, and makes no reference to wives and daughters. Hence, it notes only two sons of Vasyl – the thirteen-year-old Dmytro and the four-year-old Fedir, the future grandfather of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi.

Fedir lost his father early on. The next relevant piece of information from church sources, dated 1817, refers to Vasyl Hrusha ‘deceased’.¹⁵ Fedir (Vasylovych) began his own church career in 1810, when, as a sixteen-year-old, he was ordained a subpreceptor and began to serve at the wooden church of St Michael in the village of Kozharka, near Chyhyryn. According to tradition, this was built in the mid-eighteenth century by a certain Cossack Dmytryk, who had come from

¹² TsDIA, holding 127, file 1012, item no. 3607, folio 154 verso–155.

¹³ Hrushevskyyi, ‘Spomyny’, 1988, no. 9, p. 116.

¹⁴ TsDIA, holding 127, file 1009, item no. 14.

¹⁵ Ibid., item no. 134, folio 51–2.

beyond the Dnipro.¹⁶ From later information, we know that Fedir 'in 1821 on August 30 [...] was consecrated precentor by the Most Reverend Iryney [Bishop of Chyhyryn] in the basilica of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross in Chyhyryn'.¹⁷ The said basilica was at that time in the final days of its existence. Two years later, it was replaced by a new church, where Fedir continued to serve as precentor. From his father's stories, Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy remembered that his grandfather Fedir 'was like a gypsy – a lean, dark-haired swarthy man, lively... insouciant, merry, careless of the problems of everyday life, a fine singer and conversationalist, and a fairly independent character'.¹⁸

Around 1823, he married Mariya (Kyrylivna) Botvynovska from neighbouring Subotiv, where the Botvynovskiy family had held the living for generations. The best-known of them was Fr. Yukhym Botvynovskiy, a priest at one of the small Kyivan churches close to the St Sophia Cathedral, whom Nikolay Leskov described in his *Pecherskie antiki* (1883) as an exceptionally good and sensitive person. In 1859, when the poet Taras Shevchenko was arrested outside Kaniv, it was Fr. Yukhym Botvynovskiy who got him released on bail and lodged him in his home in Heorhiyivskiy Lane.

Fedir Hrushevskiy spent ten years in Chyhyryn; most of his children were born there, including Serhiy, the future father of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy. Entry No. 78 in the Register reads:

year one thousand eight hundred and thirty month of October seventh day; [in] the basilica of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross in the county town of Chyhyryn to precentor Fedir Vasylovych, son of Hrushevskiy, and his spouse, primo voto, Mariya the daughter of Kyrylo, was born a son, Serhiy, prayed over and christened on the ninth day of that month by Protovicar Andriy Nesterovskiy and assistant clergy. The Godparents were: residents of the town of Chyhyryn, the Chancellor of the district court Dmytriy [illegible] son [illegible] and the deceased priest Andriy Berezhnyskiy's daughter, the maiden Evfrosyniya.¹⁹

Probably, Fedir (Vasylovych) would have remained with his family in Chyhyryn, except that his wife's brother, Kyrylo Botvynovskiy, according to Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, 'made a career, having become a person of influence with the metropolitan',²⁰ and began to help his brother-in-law – Fedir Hrushevskiy – trying to get him transferred to Kyiv. First he got him a post in the Kyiv district: in 1831, to the village of Zabuyannya, and in 1836 to the village of Lisnyky. In 1836, Fedir and Mariya were recorded as having five children: Maryna (12), Yevfymiya (10), Anastasiya (7), Serhiy (6) and Mariya (2);²¹ two more sons, Ivan and Ihnatiy, were born there in the course of the next few years. However, Fedir never moved to Kyiv itself, although at one point he did have a chance to do so. But he was apparently too independent a character for his brother-in-law, and eventually Kyrylo Botvynovskiy broke off relations with him. As a result, Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy

¹⁶ Pokhilevich, op. cit., p. 669.

¹⁷ TsDIA, holding 127, file 1010, item no. 46, folio 27 verso.

¹⁸ Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, pp. 116, 117.

¹⁹ TsDIA, holding 1235, file 1, item no. 1, folio 25.

²⁰ Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, p. 116.

²¹ TsDIA, holding 127, file 1010, item no. 46, folio 27 verso.

records, Fedir Hrushevskiy 'languished in the poor parish in Lisnyky'.²² And there his children, in particular Serhiy, grew up.

Although Lisnyky was situated close to Kyiv, five versts from Pyrohiv, and had belonged earlier to the Vydubychi Monastery and the Monastery of the Caves, it was, nevertheless, a small village (in 1836, 487 people lived there), and we read in Hrushevskiy's *Memoirs*,

did not have a suburban character, being situated among forests and waters, thus living up to its name [*lis* = forest], [where the people supported themselves by] fishing and all types of forest-based industry. [Serhiy] spent a very interesting childhood among the village children, with excursions into the forest and on the water, catching fish and crayfish, etc., and he was very fond of reminiscing about them.²³



Oleksander Hrushevskiy. Mykhaylo's brother as a student of Kyiv University (1890s).

Fedir died at the beginning of the 1850s, and was buried in the Lisnyky cemetery adjoining the church of the Transfiguration. Since that was almost a century and a half ago, we were not very optimistic about locating the grave of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's grandfather. However, the reality proved more depressing. A teacher at the Lisnyky school, Lyudmyla (Fedorivna) Ruban, wrote to us that

the church was made of wood, and was pulled down in the 1930s. It is now the site of the school. Adjoining the place where the church stood is a mass grave of soldiers who died during the liberation of the village [from the Nazis], with a monument to the unknown soldier above it... When the team from the state farm was building the school... when they were digging the foundations, they came upon a number of burial sites. This summer [1992], they were drilling a well in the school grounds, and some bones were found there too. I have lived in the village since 1987, and I remember that during the first few years, when they used to have Victory Day meetings near the mass grave, there was a black gravestone lying, or rather just dumped on a hummock beside the mass grave. Later, it just disappeared... In short, every trace of the church and the graves has long since vanished. But people still remember what the church looked like and roughly where it stood.

²² Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, p. 117.

²³ *Ibid.*



Hanna Hrushevska.
Mykhaylo's sister (1880s).

Fedir was survived by seven children. Serhiy was the middle one. According to Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, when Fedir died, Serhiy

was studying at the theological school, he was a good student, which means, for a Hrushevskiy, an exceptionally good one, since, in general, they found study tough going. Therefore the hopes of the family were soon pinned on him, as the future breadwinner. The death of my grandfather was a watershed in his life. By nature, he was generally light-hearted, carefree, and bright, and his childhood years bright and happy... But after my grandfather's death he had to take thought for the family. My father quickly got through theological school, went on to the seminary, graduated with high marks, and got a place at the theological academy. For those times, for that poor environment from which father came, that was an unprecedented success, a triumph.²⁴

Serhiy Hrushevskiy's diploma, certifying his graduation from the Kyiv Theological Academy in 1859, and the successful defence of his dissertation are preserved in the Hrushevskiy family archive.²⁵

Serhiy was appointed a lecturer at the Pereyaslav seminary (which at that time was in the process of moving to Poltava), but a year later he moved to the Kyiv seminary. Young as he was, he was already regarded as a candidate for a lectureship at the Kyiv Theological Academy. Serhiy taught in Kyiv from 1860 to 1865. During that time, he took care of his younger brothers and sisters, and gave a home to his widowed mother. In his reminiscences about his father, Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy later wrote that he

treated the Ukrainian language with sympathy and, at the same time, with a certain fear, obviously due to the derisory talk in 'serious' circles in Kyiv about 'Ukrainomania'. He had a sincere love for the ideals and aspirations of the Ukrainian people. He knew a huge number of songs and sung them well – in his youth he had a good tenor, and sang in the academy's trio. All in all, he had an exceptional love for Ukrainian song – as did the entire group among whom he moved... This was a certain tacit fronde against the Russian government... They had real horror of real politics, as the source of real misery.²⁶

However, the political situation in the Russian empire led him down a completely different path. After crushing the Polish rising in 1863, Tsarism began, among

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 117, 118.

²⁵ TsDIA, holding 1235, file 1, item no. 1, folio 1.

²⁶ Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, p. 118.

other measures, to introduce the Russian system of schooling within the Kingdom of Poland (which, until then, although under Russian rule, had preserved a certain autonomy). The selection of suitable personnel for this purpose began in Kyiv, with promises of great fringe benefits. Hence, instead of going to lecture at the Kyiv Theological Academy, Serhiy accepted an invitation to teach the Russian language in Kholm. Before his departure, he decided to marry Hlafira Oppokova, the daughter of the priest in the village of Sestrynivka, Berdychiv district. Comparing the family backgrounds of his parents, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi associates the differences between them with various historical circumstances which had a formative effect on them. He wrote that

The family from which my mother came was also a clerical one, but of a different complexion from that of my father. Their surname was really Opotskevych: my grandmother revealed this to me shortly before her death, but for some reason it was kept secret and my grandfather did not like it and never mentioned it. [The family] came from the western part of the Kyiv region, and there was a profound difference between the Dni-pro basin with its incessant Cossack-Haydamak struggle against Polish rule, and the western Kyiv region, which had borne this rule passively and more or less obediently; this, too, was reflected in the character of both families.²⁷

The young couple thus spent the first three years of their marriage in Kholm, where from 23 December 1865 to 19 December 1868 Serhiy worked, primarily, as a teacher of Russian language and literature in the Kholm Rus'-Greek-Uniate gymnasium.²⁸ And it was there, on the night of 17 September (old style) 1866, in what had formerly been a Piarist monastery, that Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi was born.

Life in Kholm, where they were surrounded, according to the historian, 'by a population hostile to incomers and Russifiers',²⁹ was probably not congenial. In addition, Serhiy began to have serious problems with his throat. On medical advice, he sought work in the south, and so ended up in the Caucasus, where he worked as a teacher of Russian language and literature in the Kutay classical gymnasium (1869–70),³⁰ an inspector of elementary state schools in the Stavropol *guberniya* (1870–8)³¹ and director of elementary state schools in the Terek *guberniya*, working from a centre in Vladikavkaz (from 1878 until his death on 27 January 1901).³²

This was the time of the pacification of the Caucasus, after a prolonged war of conquest. The Tsarist government was using every possible means to assist the colonisation of these lands by immigrants from the Russian and Ukrainian *gubernii*. Numerous new settlements sprang up, where education was a burning issue. Much later, when summing up his father's activities, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi wrote that,

to this cause he devoted [himself] with all his soul and gave it all his time, to the last days of his life, although by then he had assistants on to whom he could easily unload the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²⁸ TsDIA, holding 1235, file 1, item no. 1, folio 2–13 verso.

²⁹ Hrushevskyyi, 'Spomyny', 1988, no. 9, p. 122.

³⁰ TsDIA, holding 1235, file 1, item no. 1, folio 2–13 verso.

³¹ *Ibid.*, folio 2–13.

³² *Ibid.*, folio 14–24.

greater part of his work. But he had an exceptional love for the village, village people, village children and the education of the people, and this matter was for him not just a professional duty, but also the joy and light of his life.³³

The text-book which he wrote, *Pervaya uchebnaya kniga tserkovno-slavyansko-go yazyka*, went into many editions and was re-published in hundreds of thousands of copies. Serhiy Hrushevskiy bequeathed a significant proportion of the royalties from this book to establish a school for children of the ordinary population in the Kyiv district of Kurenivka. He always dreamed of returning to his native Kyiv region.

Under the prevailing autocratic and despotic regime, the family was perhaps the only place where Serhiy Hrushevskiy was able to be himself. The Hrushevskiy family always gave particular significance to the family. So it was a tremendous tragedy for them when, in the spring of 1882, three of their children – Zakhar, Fedir and Mariya – died suddenly in an epidemic. At some time in the second half of the 1880s, Vasyl also died, while still an infant. Thus only three of the seven children lived to grow up – Mykhaylo, Hanna and Oleksander. From their mother, they inherited the traditions of Christian morals, and from their father – a love for their native land. Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy recalled that

Under the influence of my father's tales, in which there was concealed a warm bond to everything Ukrainian – language, song, tradition – I felt early on the awakening and consciousness of Ukrainian national sentiments, which were underpinned... by rare trips to Ukraine, which was painted therefore in the aura of a far-off 'native land' and a contrast to the foreign-peopled and foreign-speaking 'foreign land'.³⁴

Instead of forgetting their roots and becoming assimilated into the boundless expanses of the empire, the Hrushevskiy family grew to love even more their unhappy native land, to which they eventually returned, leaving behind five graves in distant Vladikavkaz.

If one wishes to understand Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, who expressed on a qualitatively new level the centuries-long aspirations of his people for freedom and attempted to make them a reality, one should remember the truth of the old saying: if you want to know someone better, get to know the area from which he comes. For the Hrushevskiy family, this was the Cossack-Haydamak Chyhyryn region. The only place in the Dnipro basin which can be compared with it is the Zvenyhorod area, which gave Ukraine another key figure – the national poet, Taras Shevchenko. The long freedom-loving tradition of that area, undoubtedly, had an exceptional effect on the formation of the outlook and activities of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy – the scholar and politician. □

³³ Ibid., folio 26–9 verso.

³⁴ M. Hrushevskiy, *Autobiografiya* (Kyiv, 1926).

The Veneti, Sclaveni and Antae in the Light of Archaeology

Volodymyr Baran

The written sources of the first centuries of our era (Pliny, Tacitus, Ptolemy, the Peutinger Table, etc.) are still unaware of the tribal divisions of the Slavs. They refer to them simply as the 'Venethi' (Veneti), whom they locate as living to the east of the Vistula, in the borders of European Sarmatia. In the Peutinger Table (a copy of a Roman map from the end of the third to the fourth centuries AD, made in 1265 by a monk from Colmar in Alsace), the Veneti are recorded under two names in two places – in Dacia and in the country between the lower Dnister and the Danube. Jordanes, the Gothic historian of the sixth century AD, who was fairly well acquainted with the Slavonic world, mentions, in addition to the Veneti, the Sclaveni and Antae. However, his work, written in *ca.* 551 AD, is not original, but is an epitome of one written several decades earlier by Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus




Fig. 1. Slav cultural groups at the beginning of the Middle Ages.

I – Kolochnyn culture; II – Penkivka culture; III – Prague culture; IV – Ipoțești-Cândești-Ciurelu cultural group; V – Dziedzice group.

(an official at the court of Theodoric the Great). Accordingly, he also calls the Slavs by the old, collective, name of 'Veneti'. He writes:

After the slaughter of the Heruli, Hermanaric [Ermanaric, king of the Ostrogoths, 350–75 or 76] also took arms against the Venethi. This people, though despised in war, was strong in numbers and tried to resist him. But a multitude of cowards is of no avail, particularly when God permits an armed multitude to attack them. These people, as we started to say at the beginning of our account or catalogue of nations, though off-shoots from one stock, have now three names, that is, Venethi, Antes and Sclaveni. Though they now rage in war far and wide, in consequence of our neglect, yet at that time they were all obedient to Hermanaric's commands.¹

On the basis of this text, we may conclude that Jordanes, on the one hand, underlines the common origins of the Slavs, and on the other, points to their tri-partite division in the first half of the sixth century AD, when he was working on his *De origine actibusque Getarum* (commonly referred to as the *Getica*). This was noted by V. P. Petrov, who underlined that Jordanes' use of the word 'now' (nunc) indicates that the three-fold name 'is... an acquisition of a later time...'. Thus, in his opinion, in some places Jordanes uses the name Veneti as a general ethnic designation in the broader sense, and sometimes as a narrow and unambiguous one, synonymous with the two others – Antae and Sclaveni.² In particular, describing the war of the Ostrogoths under the leadership of Vinitharius (who succeeded Ermanaric as king) against the Slavs after the Huns conquered the Ostrogoths in 375 AD, Jordanes deliberately uses the term 'Antes'.³ Furthermore, he was irreproachably well acquainted with the political situation of the Antae, since he names their tribal leader Boz (d. ca. 375) and mentions seventy of his nobles, crucified together with him by order of Vinitharius. On the basis of Jordanes, we may infer that the process of the division of the Slavs into Veneti, Antae and Sclaveni began not in the sixth century, but significantly earlier, at least during the times of Vinitharius, that is at the end of the fourth century AD. By the sixth century, this division had been completed, as is corroborated also by the archaeological sources, discussed later.

There is an ongoing discussion in the scholarly literature about the Sclaveni and Antae – tribal formations which emerged with new names as a result of the split of the Veneti into two parts, as to whether this reference by Jordanes assumes a tri-partite division of the Slavs. We are inclined to support this latter point of view, which was argued by Petrov and Pasternak.⁴ Moreover, on the basis of

¹ Jordanes, *De origine actibusque Getarum*, Istituto storico Italiano per il Medio Evo. Fonti per la Storia d'Italia (Rome, 1991), xxiii, 119–20, p. 53: 'Post Herulorum caedem idem Hermanaricus in Venetos arma commovit, qui quamvis armis despecti sed numerositate pollentes, primum resistere conabantur. sed nihil valet multitudo imbellium, praesertim ubi et Deus permittit et multitudo armata advenerit. nam hi, ut in initio expositionis vel catalogo gentium dicere coepimus, ab una stirpe exorti, tria nunc nomina ediderunt, id est Veneti Antes Sclaveni, qui quamvis nunc, ita facientibus peccatis nostris, ubique desaeviaint, tamen tunc omnes Hermanarici imperiis servierunt'. Translation from *The Gothic History of Jordanes*, translated by Charles Christopher Mierow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915), pp. 84–5.

² V. P. Petrov, *Etnogenez slovyan* (Kyiv, 1972), p. 15.

³ Jordanes, op. cit., xlviii, 247, p. 121.

⁴ V. P. Petrov, op. cit., pp. 11–8; Ya. Pasternak, *Ranni slovyany v istorychnykh, arkeolohichnykh ta linbuvistychnykh doslidzbennyakh* (New York, Paris, Munich, 1975), pp. 5–106.




Fig. 2. Slav sites and finds, end of the fourth–fifth centuries AD.

I – Chernyakhiv; II – Kyiv; III – Chernyakhiv–Kyiv; IV – individual finds of fibulae (fifth century) in the middle Dnipro basin area; V – Prague; VI – Penkivka; VII – Kolochyn finds.

1 – Ripniv II; 2 – Cherepyn; 3 – Vodnyky; 4 – Pidberiztsi; 5 – Zelenyi Hay; 6 – Rashkiv II; 7 – Rashkiv III; 8 – Sokil; 9 – Luka Kavetchynska; 10 – Ustye; 11 – Teremtsi; 12 – Bakota; 13 – Bernashivka; 14 – Kodyn I; 15 – Kodyn II; 16 – Horecha; 17 – Rohizna; 18 – Hlyboka; 19 – Khodosivka; 20 – Vyshenky; 21 – Khlopki; 22 – Taymanovo; 23 – Novyi Bykhiv; 24 – Ullyanivka; 25 – Sybyrezh; 26 – Royishche; 27 – Mezyn; 28 – Zayarye; 29 – Tselykiv Buhor; 30 – Sencha; 31 – Kurhan Azak; 32 – Kamenevo II; 33 – Pischane; 34 – Parkhomivka; 35 – Kynya; 36 – Kochubeyivka; 37 – Bukryn; 38 – Hryhorivka; 39 – Studenets; 40 – Buchaky; 41 – Pekari; 42 – Mezhyrychi; 43 – Mykhaylivka; 44 – Khmelna; 45 – Khreshchatyk; 46 – Khyttsi.

archaeological materials, one may assume that this tri-partite division did not exhaust the tribal diversity of the Slav world. What the late-classical and, later, Arab sources recorded about internal relations within the Slavonic world depended not so much on their actual state at a given point in time as on the knowledge and interests of the authors themselves and the social strata which they represented. The Slav tribes of the Veneti, who by the middle of the first millennium had occupied vast expanses of territory to the east of the Vistula and to the north of the Carpathians (indeed, some had filtered into the area between the lower




Fig. 3. Slav finds from the second half of the first–mid-second centuries AD in Ukraine (after D. N. Kozak and R. V. Terpylovskiy).

I – Extent of the Baltic cultures (according to V. V. Syedov); II – migration of the population of the middle Dnipro basin region; III – late-Zarubyntsi settlements; IV – settlements of the Volhynia–Podillya groups; V – late-Zarubyntsi burial grounds.

1 – Belz; 2 – Svytyazi; 3 – Pidryzzhya; 4 – Boratyn I; 5 – Semky; 6 – Lutsk–Hnidava; 7 – Bilche; 8 – Boromel; 9 – Khoriv; 10 – Pidberiztsi; 11 – Pidbirtsi; 12 – Pasiky Zubretski; 13 – Zubra; 14 – Zvenyhorod; 15 – Maydan Holohirskiy; 16 – Velyka Slobidka II; 17 – Oselivka; 18 – Hrynevychi Velyki; 19 – Lestynovychi; 20 – Chaplyn; 21 – Kyselivka III; 22 – Zmiyivka; 23 – Stara Butovka; 24 – Chulatovo; 25 – Hremyach; 26 – Synkovo; 27 – Pocep; 28 – Borodyanka; 29 – Lyutezh; 30 – Obolon; 31 – Novi Bezradychi (Hlyboke); 32 – Tatsenky; 33 – Divych-Hora; 34 – Birky; 35 – Selyshche; 36 – Korzhi; 37 – Vovchkiiv; 38 – Kartamyshevo II; 39 – Shoseyne; 40 – Osyzivka; 41 – Nosivtsi; 42 – Rakhny; 43 – Maryanivka.

Dnister and the Danube), could hardly have remained a single monolith without any internal division.

Byzantine sources of the sixth century, likewise, define approximately the regions inhabited by the Sclaveni and Antae. According to Jordanes,

[t]he abode of the Sclaveni extends from the city of Noviodonum and the lake called Mursianus to the Danaster, and northward as far as the Vistula. They have swamps and forests for their cities. The Antes, who are the bravest of these peoples dwelling in the

curve of the sea of Pontus [Euxine or Black Sea], spread from the Danaster [Dnister] to the Danaper [Dniro], rivers that are many days' journey apart.⁵

Procopius of Caesarea knows the Antae as the neighbours of the Utigurs, who in the sixth century were roaming in the steppes of the Dniro basin. 'Now the people who are settled there were named in ancient times Cimmerians, but now they are called Utigurs. And above them to the north the countless tribes of the Antae are settled'.⁶ According to the *Strategicon*, attributed to the Byzantine Emperor Maurice (reigned 582–602) and even if not by him, dating from or soon after his reign, these tribes occupied adjacent regions: '... The tribes of the Sclaveni and Antae are similar in their way of life, their customs, their love of freedom'.⁷ Later in the same work he observes that '[t]he localities occupied by the Sclaveni and Antae are situated along a river, and interact in such a way that there is no great distance between them, which is worth noting'.⁸

According to Jordanes, the border between them, or rather the zone of contact, in the sixth century lay along the Dnister, presumably midstream. In the south, according to Jordanes and Procopius, the Sclaveni and Antae, by the sixth century, had already reached the middle trans-Danubia. At the end of the seventh century, when large masses of Sclaveni and Antae settled in the Danube basin, they became mixed and created a local cultural group, which in archaeological literature even received a separate name.⁹ Antae, as the name of a separate tribal confederation. Surviving Byzantine sources from the seventh century onwards no longer mention 'Antae' as the name of a separate tribal entity. The latest reference to them is in the *Historiae* of Theophilactus Simocatta, in his account of the wars of the Emperor Maurice (d. 602), where he records the defeat of the Antae. Does this mean that the whole tribe simply disappeared – perhaps as the result of this defeat? Surely not. The Antae were too numerous for that. This opinion is pro-

⁵ Jordanes, op. cit., v, 35, p. 16: 'Sclaveni a civitate Novietunense et lacu qui appellatur Mursiano, usque ad Danastrum et in boream Viscla tenus commorantur; hi paludes silvasque pro civitatibus habent. Antes vero, qui sunt eorum fortissimi, qua Ponticum mare curvatur, a Danaastro extenduntur usque ad Danaprum; quae flumina multis mansionibus ab invicem absunt'. Translation from *The Gothic History of Jordanes*, pp. 59–60.

The location of 'Civitas Novietunensis' (the city of Novientun) is still a matter of scholarly dispute. The 'Mursianus lacus' (Mursian Lake) has been variously identified, with most scholars taking it as a reference to the swamps at the mouth of the Drava near ancient Mursia (now Osijek).

⁶ Procopius of Caesarea, 'Οι ὑπὲρ τῶν Πολέμων λόγοι, book viii, ch. iv, 8–9: 'ἄνθρωποι δὲ οὐ ταύτη ἄκηνηται Κιμμέριοι μὲν τὸ παλαιὸν ὀνομάζοντο, τανυν δὲ Οὐτίγουροι καλοῦνται. καὶ αὐτῶν καθύπερθεον ἔς βορρᾶν ἄνεμον ἔθνη τὰ Ἀντῶν ἄμετρα ἴδρυνται'. Translation by H. B. Dewing, Loeb Classics (London, 1928).

⁷ Mauricii, *Strategicon*, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae vol. xvii (Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1981), book xi, chapter iv, lines 1–2: 'Τὰ ἔθνη τῶν Σκλάβων καὶ Ἀντῶν ὁμοδιαίτῃ τε καὶ ὁμότροπᾷ εἰσιν καὶ ἐλεύθερα, μηδαμῶς δουλοῦσθαι ἢ ἄρχεσθαι πειθόμενα...'

⁸ Ibid., lines 165–8: 'Τῶν γὰρ χωρίων τῶν Σκλάβων καὶ Ἀντῶν κατὰ τοὺς ποταμοὺς ἐφεξῆς διακειμένων καὶ συνημιμένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε μὴδὲ διάλειμμα εἶναι μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἄξιον λόγου ἕλης τε ἢ παλουδίων ἢ καλαμεῶνων ἐγγιζόντων αὐτοῖς...'

⁹ This group of Slavonic relics are known as the Ipotești–Cândești–Ciurelu finds, from the sites in Romania where they were discovered.

pounded by Pogodin, Lubor Niederle, Skrzynska, Petrov and others.¹⁰ Most probably, it is simply that those Antae who together with the Sclaveni settled between the Dnister and the Danube, who by virtue of their geographical position were best known to Byzantine authors, gradually lost their identity and adopted the name of their Slav neighbours. Hence the name Sclaveni, which embodies the Latinised form of the name of the Slavs, gradually came to include all the tribes of the Antae, and eventually became the collective name for all the Slavonic tribes, including the Veneti. It occurs more frequently in historical sources than the previous collective term 'Veneti'. This change of tribal name is surely strong evidence in favour of the Antae being, in fact, Slavs.

As is known, this identification is a matter of dispute among historians and linguists. Some of them doubt that the Antae were Slavs. Thus Vernadskyi favoured the theory that the Antae were of Sarmatian-Alan origin.¹¹ Wirth, Schmidt, Orlyk and others regarded the Antae as Circassians.¹² These ideas, however, have been challenged on numerous occasions by notable Slavonic historians.¹³

In our time, archaeological materials also substantiate the Slavonic identity of the Antean tribes. During the past few decades, more than a hundred archaeological relics dating from the fifth–seventh centuries have been discovered in the areas where, according to documentary sources, the Antae lived. These have been unequivocally recognised as Slavonic, which would appear to resolve this issue.

The discovery of early-mediaeval archaeological materials in Eastern and Central Europe allows a number of thorny problems relating to the early history of the Slavs to be defined and, to a certain degree, resolved.

Systematic research into Slavonic finds from the early-mediaeval period (fifth–seventh centuries), that is, the period when the Slavs entered the historical arena of Europe as an active political force, did not begin until the 1950s, although some individual items had been found and identified much earlier;¹⁴ indeed, in 1940, Ivan Borkovskiy, a Czech archaeologist of Ukrainian origin, wrote a research monograph on this subject.¹⁵ But, since his work was published during World War II, it attracted relatively little attention until normal academic life was resumed in the 1950s. Only then did Borkovskiy's work inspire other scholars in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Ukraine in particular, to investigate those Slavonic sites which were contemporaneous with the written sources

¹⁰ Petrov, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹¹ G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia* (New Haven, 1948), p. 105.

¹² A. Wirth, *Geschichte Asiens und Osteuropas* (Halle, 1905), pp. 249, 250; A. Orlyk, *Radnarok, Die Sagen vom Weltuntergang* (Berlin–Leipzig, 1922), p. 464; L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme, Die Ost-germanen* (Munich, 1941), p. 252.

¹³ M. Hrushevskiy, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*; vol. 1, (Edmonton–Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1997), pp. 418–20; H. Lowmiański, *Podstawy gospodarcze formowania się państw słowiańskich* (Warsaw, 1953), p. 252.

¹⁴ S. S. Gamchenko, 'Raskopki v bassejnye r. Sluchi', *Trudy XI Arkheologicheskogo syezda*, vol. 1, 1896, pp. 360–84.

¹⁵ J. Borkovskiy, *Staroslovanska keramika ve Stredni Europe. Studie k počatkam Slovenske kulture* (Prague, 1940).




Fig. 4. Slav finds from the second half of the second–third centuries AD in Ukraine (after D. N. Kozak and R. V. Terpylovskiy).

I – Extent of the Baltic cultures; II – migration of Germanic tribes; III – settlements of the Hryni type and early settlements of the Kyivan culture; IV – burial grounds of the Kyivan culture; V – relics of the Volhynia–Podillya group of the Sokilnyky I–Davydiv type; VI – Germanic settlements.

1 – Korchivka; 2 – Berezen; 3 – Sokilnyky II; 4 – Pidberiztsi; 5 – Davydiv; 6 – Kozhychi; 7 – Zhyrivka; 8 – Tvirzh; 9 – Sokilnyky I; 10 – Borshchovychi; 11 – Pasiky Zubretski; 12 – Volya Komuletska; 13 – Velyka Slobidka I; 14 – Brest-Tryshyn; 15 – Romosh; 16 – Bayev; 17 – Hirka Polonka; 18 – Boratyn; 19 – Velemychi I, II; 20 – Lepesivka; 21 – Demydivka; 22 – Hunka; 23 – Slobidka; 24 – Hryni; 25 – Kozarovychi; 26 – Bilhorodka; 27 – Kyiv; 28 – Bortnychi; 29 – Hlevakha; 30 – Novi Bezradychi (Mytkiv Kut); 31 – Obukhiv; 32 – Reshitky; 33 – Sushky II; 34 – Abidnya; 35 – Verkhnyestryzhinske; 36 – Besyedivka; 37 – Hochevo I; 38 – Shyshyno.

on the early Slavs. The archaeological materials not only filled a chronological lacuna of three centuries in the chain of historical development of the material culture of the population of South-Eastern and Central Europe, but also to a considerable degree supplemented and made coherent the often fragmented and sometimes obscure written sources.

Four groups of Slavonic archaeological remains from the fifth–seventh centuries were distinguished in this area, identified in the archaeological literature as




Fig. 5. Slav finds from the third–fourth centuries AD in Ukraine.

I – Extent of the Baltic cultures of the forest zone; II – extent of the Chernyakhiv culture; III – settlements of the Kyivan culture; IV – settlements of the Chernyakhiv culture; V – burial grounds of the Kyivan culture.

1 – Neslukhiv; 2 – Ripniv; 3 – Rakobuty; 4 – Cherepyn; 5 – Chyzyhiv; 6 – Demyaniv; 7 – Bovshiv; 8 – Verkhniy Ivaniv; 9 – Luka Vrublyvetska; 10 – Sokil; 11 – Teremtsi; 12 – Bakota; 13 – Zhurivka; 14 – Lomovate; 15 – Khlopki; 16 – Khlepche; 17 – Hlevakha; 18 – Obukhiv II, III; 19 – Vyshenky; 20 – Pohreby; 21 – Abidnya; 22 – Taymanovo; 23 – Desnyanka; 24 – Vybli; 25 – Saltykova-Divytysya; 26 – Mena; 27 – Kyriyivka; 28 – Vyshenky; 29 – Obyrok; 30 – Koron; 31 – Lavrykiy Lis; 32 – Forostovychi; 33 – Byryn; 34 – Kvyetun; 35 – Bukreyivka II; 36 – Shyshyno V; 37 – Boromlya II; 38 – Holovyno; 39 – Ridnyi Kray III.

the Kolochyn, Penkivka, Prague and Dziedzice cultures.¹⁶ The cartography of these sites showed that in the sixth and at the beginning of the seventh centuries these peoples occupied compact regions on a vast territory from the headwaters of the Desna and Psyol in the north-east to the area between the Elbe and Saale in the west, and from the Prypiat and Western Dvina in the north to the Danube in the south (Fig. 1). During the process of the further re-location of the Slavs

¹⁶ W. Baran, 'Entstehung und Ausbreitung der frühslawischen Kulturen', *Starigard/Oldenburg. Einslawischer Herrscherort des frühen Mittelalters in Ostbaltien* (Neumunster, 1991), pp. 28–51.

their settlements and fortified townships covered the territory of the Balkan peninsula, and appear at points as far north-west as Lübeck, Hamburg, Oldenburg and other cities.¹⁷ Their internal divisions are fairly clearly defined. The Kolochyn culture occupied the left bank of the upper Dnipro, including the Desna and Sula basins, and the upper reaches of the Psyol to the Dinets Siverskyi. Further south the Penkivka culture began, extending in a broad band north-east to south-west from the upper reaches of the Dinets Siverskyi past the middle Dnipro basin, the southern Buh, the middle Dnister basin to the Prut basin. The right-bank Dnipro basin from the Prypiat to the upper Dnister and the upper reaches of the Prut and south to the Danube was occupied by the Prague culture. Along the Danube, the relics of the Prague culture go as far as its upper reaches and into the area between the Elbe and the Saale. To the north of the Carpathians they reached the headwaters of the Vistula. The borders of all these three cultures meet in the Kyiv area. In the south, in the Danube basin, the finds from the Penkivka and Prague cultures intersect. Superimposed on the general substrata of what is today Romania, they gave rise to the Ipotesti-Cândești-Ciurelu group (Fig. 1).

To the north-west of the Prague culture, on the territory of central and northern Poland, in the sixth–seventh centuries another – fourth – group of Slavonic settlements has been identified – the Dziedzice type.¹⁸ Herrmann links this group with the wider one under the name Suckow–Dziedzice or Suckow–Szeligi.¹⁹ Linking the Dziedzice group of Slavonic relics with the Suckow group in northern Germany can be justified only on typological grounds. The Dziedzice group is chronologically earlier and stratigraphically lower than the latter.

The Suckow–Feldberg group emerged no earlier than the second half of the seventh century with the appearance there of a Slav population, which migrated from Pomerania to the region between the Oder and the Elbe (Fig. 1).

On the territory of Ukraine, the Kolochyn, Penkivka and Prague cultures were contemporaneous, and finds from all three date from the middle, and possibly the first half of the fifth century. Fifth-century complexes in the settlements of the Prague and Penkivka cultures have also been found in the Prut basin and in Romania (Fig. 2). In Poland, Slovakia, Moravia and Germany, the Prague sites are dated not earlier than the sixth century, thus helping to determine the appearance of Slavs on this territory. However, finds of the Dziedzice group for the same period have also been found, which have their own sub-strata.²⁰

To which of the Slavonic groups mentioned in the documentary sources should these finds be attributed?

On territorial and chronological grounds, the finds of the Prague culture may be associated with the Sclaveni, and the Penkivka culture – with the Antae of Jordanes and Procopius. The Sclaveni, according to Jordanes, lived in the upper

¹⁷ M. Müller-Wille, 'Abodriten und Wagrien im nord-westen der slawischen Welt', *Starigard/Oldenburg...*, pp. 53–72.

¹⁸ A. Porzezinski, 'Zasiedlenie Pomorza Zachodniego w VI–VII w. w swietle dotychczasowych wyników badań archeologicznych', *Slavia Antiqua*, vol. xxi, 1975, pp. 29–63.

¹⁹ J. Herrmann, *Die Slawen in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1985).

²⁰ Baran, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–46.




Fig. 6. Typical finds from the early Mediaeval Slav settlements: ceramics, datable finds, dwelling types.

A – Kolochyn culture; B – Penkivka culture; C – Prague culture; D – Dziedzice culture.

reaches of the Vistula, the Dniester and Danube basins; while the Antae were located between the Dniipro and the Dniester, south of the Sclaveni. These areas correspond to those of the said cultures. This allows us to postulate from the Prague and Penkivka finds the northern and eastern limits of the Sclavenian and Antean tribes, which were not known to Byzantine authors, and so were not mentioned by them. The location of finds from the Prague and Penkivka cultures indicate, in fact, that the bearers of the Penkivka culture (whom we may reliably identify with the Antae) did not settle the entire region from the 'Danaper to the Danaster'. The northern part of this region, that is Galicia and Volhynia, from the upper reaches of the Vistula to the Dniipro, was occupied by the bearers of the Prague culture – the Sclaveni. The border of those cultural areas ran approximately along the line Kyiv–Mohyliv Podilskyi (Fig. 1). The Dziedzice culture of the sixth–seventh centuries, located in the west, north of the Prague-culture sites, on the territory of Poland, should, in our view, be associated with that group of Slavs for which the Byzantine authors retained the old name of Veneti. The Prague culture, which was centrally located, belonged to the group whose name later became the generic term for all these related peoples, i.e. the Sclaveni.

We do not know the name of the people of the Kolochyn culture, to the north-east of the Prague and to the north of the Penkivka sites. Some researchers believe that this group of finds belongs to the Antae, since their origins, like those of the Penkivka culture, go back to the Kyivan culture.²¹ However, this matter has still not been fully elucidated. The Kolochyn culture, which includes a Baltic component, may have belonged to still another grouping, which, being so remote from the centre of the Gothic confederation of tribes, was not mentioned in the *Getica*, so that its name has not come down to us.

The Prague culture developed on the basis of the Slavonic part of the multi-ethnic Chernyakhiv culture with only a slight influence from the Kyiv culture. In its turn, the latter can be traced back to the late-Zarubyntsi and Volhynia–Podillya finds of the first–second centuries AD.

By mapping the finds with fairly clearly determined local attributes, starting with the Zarubyntsi culture at the beginning of the first millennium AD, it was possible to establish a certain stability in their location in the wide forest and forest-steppe border zone, up to the fifth century AD. Since the earliest relics of the early-mediaeval Slav cultures, which emerged in the fifth century, are also found in this belt, and, as a number of scholars have shown, are associated typologically with the region,²² one may conclude that the forest-steppe of Ukraine and certain adjacent oblasts of Belarus and Russia were occupied by Slavs (proto-Slavs), at least from the beginning of our era. The findings of archaeological research coincide with documentary sources of the first/second–sixth centuries and do not contradict the information of linguists (Figs. 3–5).

All these sites from the first half of the first millennium AD, irrespective of which culture they represent, are linked typologically and in time-sequence with

²¹ R. V. Terpilovskiy, 'Kievskaya kultura', *Elmokulturnaya karta territorii Ukrainской SSR v I tys. n.e.* (Kyiv, 1985), pp. 58, 59.

²² R. V. Terpilovskiy, N. S. Abashina, *Pamyatniki kievsкой культуры* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 95–9.

the early-mediaeval Slav cultures (Prague, Penkivka and Kolochyn), which implies genetic continuity and kinship between their bearers.

All this leads to two principal conclusions: firstly, that during the first millennium AD Slavonic peoples occupied a territory, the heartland of which corresponds to today's northern Ukraine, and, secondly, that they never formed a homogeneous mass, but consisted of various related tribes. Moreover, the archaeological cultures of this vast region included, in addition to the basic Slavonic ones, elements of Baltic, Germanic, Thracian Hallstatt, Iranian-speaking and Turkic ethnic groups. Only after the onslaught of the Huns caused the Gothic tribes, and with them the Sarmatians–Alans, to depart from Ukrainian territory into the Danube basin and further west, did the Slavs become the fundamental political force in the forest-steppe region of Eastern Europe. A new era began in the history of the Slavs, when, in the fifth century, their material culture emerged in full flower (Fig. 6). This culture gradually spread southwards and westwards beyond its original borders. This large-scale Slavonic expansion process did not affect the entire East Slavonic population. The majority of it remained in the same place. In its development, it created three new cultures, dated eighth–tenth centuries.

The Prague sites yield finds from the Rayky culture between the upper Vistula, Dniester and Dniro, while objects from the Penkivka culture constitute components of the Volynitseve and Romen–Borshcheve cultures of the left bank of the Dniro, in which elements of the Prague culture are equally perceptible. In the seventh–eighth centuries, the heirs of this culture spread fairly intensively along the left bank of the Dniro (Fig. 7). For example, in addition to ceramic forms, which are typologically close to the utensils of the Prague culture, one may also find in the settlements of the Romen–Borshcheve culture ovens, the lower part of which was cut out in the yellow clay subsoil, left for this purpose in one of the corners of the dwelling. At the sixth–seventh century sites, such ovens have been found only at Prague culture sites along the western Buh (Ripni I, II, III), in Volhynia and Romania, where some bearers of the Prague culture migrated.²³

Thus, on the basis of the archaeological materials, it appears that by the end of the seventh–eighth centuries the successors of the Sclaveni – the bearers of the Prague culture – had not only settled the entire right (western) bank area of the Dniro, including the regions where one finds earlier relics of the Penkivka culture, but had also crossed to its left (eastern) bank.

The eighth–tenth century finds are associated chronologically with a later list of tribes, well-known from the Primary Chronicle. These are the Dulibians–Volhynians–Buzhanians (successive names of the same tribe), Derevlyanians and Croats in Volhynia and sub-Carpathia (where numerous relics of the Rayky culture have been found), and the Siveryanians on the left bank of the Dniro, represented by antiquities of the Romen–Borshcheve culture. In addition, the Polyanians, Ulychians and Tivertsians occupied the regions which in the sixth–seventh centuries formed the interface between the Prague and Penkivka cultures.

It is quite within the bounds of possibility that these tribes formed that part of the East-Slav population which in its further development led to the formation of a *sui*

²³ V. D. Baran, *Ranni slovyany mizh Dniprom i Prypyattyu* (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 80–94.

generis ethno-cultural community with their language particularities, which became the nucleus of Ukraine-Rus'.²⁴

If this assumption is true, then the new archaeological evidence means that the views of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, the founder of modern Ukrainian historiography, about the origins of the Ukrainians, needs to be made more precise. However, archaeological finds made in the past 50 years (and hence not known to Hrushevskyy) have forced us to seek the origins of the Ukrainians' ancestral cultures not only in the Penkivka finds (which, indeed, go back to the Antae), but also the Prague ones on the territory of the upper and middle Dnister basin and Volhynia, where a number of well-populated settlements of the Sclaveni have been located.

This is all the more possible since the eighth–tenth century finds from the Rayky culture, which developed on the basis of the Prague culture of the Sclaveni, are not only found throughout the whole right-bank area from the Dnipro to the Vistula and from the Prypiat to the Carpathians and Bukovina, but also became one of the most significant components of the Volyntseve and Romen–Borshcheve cultures of the Dnipro left bank. From the second half of the seventh century onwards, the name Antae stops appearing in documentary sources, while the generic name of 'Slavs' becomes widespread. This to a certain degree has been reflected in the material culture, the relics of which show the infiltration of the Sclaveni into the regions of Antean settlement. All the tribes mentioned in the chronicles in the eighth–tenth centuries as living on the right bank of the Dnipro are recorded in the realms of the Rayky culture; while the left-bank tribe of Siverianians is to be found in the mixed Sclavenian–Antean area.




Fig. 7. Map of Slav finds from the eighth–tenth centuries AD. I – Rayky culture; II – Volyntseve culture; III – Romen culture.

²⁴ H. P. Pivtorak, *Formuvannya i dialektychna dyferentsiatsiya dawnyoruskoyi movy* (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 52–87.

All this determines the place of the Slaveni in the historical processes leading to the inception of the ethnocultural community, which in its final stage of development became the nucleus of the Ukrainian people.

The present state of archaeological research indicates that, beginning in the sixth century, one part of the Antean population migrated to the Balkans, while the Slaveni moved to the middle and upper Danube and the region between the Elbe and Saale, where their presence is recorded by documentary sources, and substantiated by archaeology. This explains the occurrence of the same tribal names on both sides of the Carpathians (Dnister–Volhynian Dulibians, Czech Dulibians, Pannonian Dulibians, North-Carpathian Croats, White Croats, Czech Croats, etc.).

The political activity of the Dnipro tribes – the successors of the Slaveni – is recorded by Arab authors, particularly al-Mas‘ūdī (d. 957). Basing himself on earlier sources, he writes in his book *The Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems* that among the numerous East Slav peoples, the principal tribe was the Valinyana (Volhynians), whose leader was Prince Madzhak. The other East Slav leaders of the time were subordinated to him.²⁵

It is generally accepted that Volhynians is the later name of the Dulibians, who are mentioned only in the sixth–seventh centuries in connection with the Avar conquests. During this time, the Dulibians had their own centre – a fortified settlement in the village of Zymne, Volhynian oblast, which can be regarded as the first well dated Slav settlement of this type in Europe. It was surrounded by timber fortifications. Finds included more than twenty thousand fragments of Prague-type ceramics and more than 200 different products of metal, coloured metals, bone, marl, and a Byzantine coin of Justin or Justinian (it was impossible to determine accurately). The presence of casting moulds, melting pots, anvils, ingots and production waste indicates a centre of metal-working. According to V. V. Aulikh, leader of the team which excavated the site, traces of cult buildings were also discovered.²⁶ We may assume that the Zymne settlement was the tribal centre of the Dulibians, which in the seventh century was burnt down by the Avars. (Evidence of the destruction includes clear traces of fire and finds of Avar arrow-heads). The fact that this sixth-century centre existed on the territory of the Dulibians (who were part of the Slaveni, and not, as previously thought, the Antae) differentiates them from the other south-eastern Slav tribes, and indicates that the preconditions for inter-tribal confederations may have developed here.

This may be taken as support for V. O. Klyuchevskiy and M. I. Artamonov, who regard the tribal confederation of the Dulibians–Volhynians as the first proto-state formation of the East Slavs, which emerged at the end of the sixth–seventh centuries in the upper reaches of the Dnister and the western Buh.²⁷ Klyuchevskiy writes: ‘... In the sixth century, we encounter a large military confederation under the leadership of the prince of the Dulibians... This military confederation is a fact which can

²⁵ Pasternak, op. cit., p. 89.

²⁶ V. V. Aulikh, *Zymnitske horodysbche* (Kyiv, 1972).

²⁷ V. O. Klyuchevskiy, *Kurs russkoy istorii* (Moscow, 1987), part 1, pp. 122–4; M. I. Artamonov, ‘Pervye stranitsy russkoy istorii v arkhologicheskoy osveshchenii’, *Sovetskaya arkhologiya*, 1990, no. 3, pp. 274, 275.

be placed at the very beginning of our history. It began in the sixth century in the north-eastern slopes and foothills of the Carpathians'.²⁸ It is quite possible that, when from time to time the political centre of this inter-tribal confederation was relocated, the confederation itself changed its name. At the beginning it was the Dulibian confederation with its centre at Zymne. After the destruction of Zymne by the Avars, the centre moved to Volodymyr Volynskiy – and a new name was needed.

The Dulibian tribal confederation, which, in addition to the Dulibians/Volhynians, may have also included the forebears of the Derevlyanians, Polyanians, Croats, and even the Ulychians and Tivertsians, never evolved into a fully-developed state. It appears to have disintegrated. The *Tale of Bygone Years* contains no further references to it, but places the Dulibians and Volhynians on an equal footing with other East Slav tribes. Moreover, all right-bank Slavs, irrespective of their tribal division, merged, archaeologically speaking, into the single Rayky culture, which developed in the fifth–seventh centuries on the basis of the Prague culture. The bearers of the latter were the Sclaveni, a community which also included the Dulibian–Volhynian tribal confederation. If we take into account, too, that the name of the Sclaveni gradually spread to all the Slavs, then their role in the formation of the nucleus of East Slav statehood becomes even more distinct. All the more so in that the tribe of Polyanians, which became the core around which the Kyivan state developed, appears, on the basis of archaeological finds, to derive its origins from the Sclaveni – the bearers of the Prague culture, and not the Antae.

From the seventh–eighth centuries onwards, we know of no ecological, military or social cataclysms which could have produced a complete change of population of the forest-steppe area of present-day Ukraine. The population of this vast region, independently of internal changes of tribal structures and their borders (due, first and foremost, to socio-economic factors), gradually became the main factor in the ethnogenesis of the Ukrainian nation. The chronology and essence of the processes involved have yet to be determined; nevertheless, their roots clearly go back to late Roman/early mediaeval times, when the artefacts of the Sclaveni laid the foundations of the cultures of all the East Slav tribes of the Dnipro–Dnister interfluvial, and (by integration with the Penkivka culture tribes of the Antae) for the Volyntseve–Romen-culture Siveryanians. □


²⁸ Klyuchevskiy, op. cit., p. 124.

Arts and Culture

Literary Anniversaries

Bicentenary of Kotlyarevskyi's *Aeneid*

(1798–1998)



1998 marks the bicentenary of the publication of the first three parts of the *Aeneid* of Ivan Kotlyarevskyi (1769–1838), the work recognised as the beginning of modern Ukrainian literature. This mock-heroic poem, a travesty of Virgil's epic, in which Aeneas and his companions figure as Cossacks, Queen Dido becomes the hostess of an inn, and so forth, was the first work of literature to be written in the Ukrainian vernacular, instead of the formalised and archaic 'literary' language used until that time. Furthermore, it is written in accentual (iambic) verse with regular rhymes, instead of the traditional syllabic measures.

Kotlyarevskyi was well-equipped to tackle such a task, both as regards classical scholarship (he was a graduate of the Poltava Theological Seminary), and familiarity with the peasant vernacular (he worked as a tutor on the country estates of gentry families).

His *Aeneid* – with its social satire, telling use of ethnographic detail, and colourful language – was an immediate success, and a number of his contemporaries turned to writing in the Ukrainian vernacular. Later generations of Ukrainian writers, including the greatest – Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko – spoke of him and honoured him as the founding father of Ukrainian literature. Two such tributes follow.

* * *

The following works are translated by Vera Rich.

Taras Shevchenko

To the Eternal Memory of Kotlyarevskiy

Sun is glowing, breeze is blowing,
 From field to the valley,
 O'er stream's billows, with the willows,
 Guelder rose leans sadly,
 On the guelder-rose a little
 Lonely nest is swaying...
 And what befell the nightingale?
 The breeze naught is saying!
 Evil, you recall – what matter,
 It is passed and over;
 Or good, you recall – the heart pines,
 Why stayed it not ever?

So I look, so I recall:
 Of old, with daylight dying,
 Twittering filled the guelder-rose;
 None could pass it by then,

Whether rich man, whom good fortune
 Pampers as a mother
 Tends and watches o'er her babe,
 He cannot pass it ever:

Or an orphan who, ere dawnlight
 Must rise for toil dreary,
 Listen and, as is with mother
 Or father, sincerely
 Speaks and, questioning, converses,
 Heart beats lightly, pain-free
 And the world seems Easter-bright,
 And humans act humanely!

Or maiden who each day beholds
 The one she loves so deeply,
 Who like an orphan droops and withers,
 Knows not where to flee to –
 She comes down the path to weep,
 Among the willows crying,
 The nightingale begins to sing –
 Straightway her tears are drying.
 She listens, and she smiles again,
 Wanders in the dark spinney,
 As if she talked with her beloved...
 And the bird is singing...

So smoothly, so couthly, as if to God hymning –
Until the thief comes on the pathway to lurk
With a knife in his boot-top – echoes run through the spinney,
Resound – and grow silent: why sing in the murk?
Song cannot check thief's coarse soul, nor amend it,
It can teach him no good, 'twould be waste of good voice,
Let him rage until he too comes to his life's ending,
And ravens o'er his headless corpse scream, rejoice.

The valley sleeps, on guelder-rose tree
Nightingale is slumbering,
The wind through the valley blows now,
Echo through the oak-grove rings,
Echo plays, 'tis God's word spoken,
Poor folk rise for daily toil,
Cows are wandering through the oak-grove,
Girls come with their water-pails,
The sun peeps out – it is sheer heaven,
Willow smiles – feast-day all round,
The evil thief to tears is given...

So it was once – behold it now:

Sun is glowing, breeze is blowing,
From field to the valley,
O'er stream's billows, with the willows,
Guelder-rose leans sadly,
On the guelder-rose a little
Lonely nest is swaying...
And what befell the nightingale?
The breeze naught is saying!

Not long, nay, not long past in our Ukrayina,
Old Kotlyarevskiy sang forth in like way,
His voice has grown still, we like orphans remain now,
And hills and seas, where he first greetings did say,

Where the Far-roamer once led,
His warrior band duly,
All abandoned, all is grieving,
Like Troy's ruins truly,
All is grieving, only glory
Like the sunlight veiled him,
The bard dies not, for time eternal,
Glory still will hail him.

So long as people shall live, Father,
 Thou shalt rule forever,
 So long as sun shall shine in heaven,
 Men will forget thee never!

O righteous soul! Pray accept my words spoken,
 Accept them and greet these words, unwise, sincere,
 Do not leave the orphan, though he left the oak-grove,
 Pour forth to me at least one word as token,
 Sing to me of Ukrayina so dear.
 May my soul smile, in this foreign land lonely,
 Smile at least once, seeing how thou didst bear

All the glory of Cossackdom, in one word only,
 Into an orphan's poor frugal home there.
 Pour it, grey eagle, for I am alone here,
 Orphaned in this world, in a foreign land faring;
 Look at the sea, so deep, so widely flowing,
 And back to the further shore – no boat will bear me!
 I recall now Aeneas, recall kindred dear now,
 Recall and at once, like child, shed bitter tears now:
 And the waves to the further show hasten and roar.
 And, maybe, I am dark here, and nothing can see now,
 Maybe on the other shore evil fate weeps now?
 Everywhere at the orphan will men laugh and scorn!
 So, let them laugh, but the sea plays there lightly,
 The sun and the moon over there shine more brightly,
 Gravemound in the steppe with the wind can speak rightly,
 And there, with the mound, I'd be lonely no more.

O righteous soul! Pray accept my words spoken,
 Accept them and greet these words, unwise, sincere,
 Do not leave the orphan, though he left the oak-grove,
 Let at least one word flow to me as token,
 Sing to me of Ukrayina so dear.

(1838)
 St Petersburg

Ivan Franko

Kotlyarevskiy

A mighty eagle on a snow-peak hoary
Perched, and his eye roamed keenly, far and wide,
Then, suddenly, above snow-shallows soaring,
He winged his strong way to the azure height.

But he struck loose a snow-clod in his flight,
And down it rolled across the rocky scourings –
And in a little while, in all its might,
The avalanche plunged down with thunder roaring.

Thus Kotlyarevskiy, in a time most blest,
With a Ukrainian word set his song flowing,
And oft, indeed, that singing seemed a jest.

And yet it bore rich pledge of forces growing,
And the small spark he struck was not suppressed,
But blazed to warm us all in its bright glowing.

1873



Volodymyr Sosyura

(1898–1965)

January 1998 marked the centenary of the birth of Volodymyr Sosyura, one of the leading poets in Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s.

Sosyura was born on 6 January 1898 in the small mining settlement of Debaltseve, Katerynoslav *guberniya*, where he grew up. He received some basic education, first in a two-form village school, then in a craft school, and finally in an agricultural school. He began working when he was twelve years old, first of all in the mines, and then in a soda factory.

He took part in the Ukrainian-Soviet war of 1918–20, first in the army of the Ukrainian National Republic, and then in the Red Army. His change of allegiance appears to have been a genuine and idealistic one, and, in 1920, he became a member of the Communist Party.

After the war, he studied at the Artem Communist University in Kharkiv (1922–3), and at the workers' faculty of the Kharkiv Institute of People's Education (1923–5). By the time he completed his studies, he was already an established poet. Sosyura's first poem to be published appeared in 1917. His first collection, entitled simply *Poeziyi* (Poems), appeared in 1921. This was followed in 1922 by a narrative of the revolution in the Romantic mode, *Chervona zyma* (The Red Winter), which brought him overnight fame.

During the 1920s, Sosyura played a leading part in the various literary organisations of the time – Pluh, Hart and Vaplite (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) and VUSPP (All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers). In spite of his membership of the Communist Party, Sosyura, like almost all his contemporary Ukrainian writers, found it increasingly difficult to reconcile his allegiance to the Party with his feelings of love and duty towards Ukraine.

As a result, his work came under increasing criticism from Party ideologues, and his collection of poems *Sertse* (The Heart), which encapsulated this dilemma, was banned immediately after its appearance in 1931. The famine of 1932–3 (deliberately induced by the Soviet leaders in order to force through the collectivisation of Ukrainian agriculture) and the purges of Ukrainian intellectuals and artists during the 1930s increased the pressure, bringing Sosyura to the verge of a complete mental breakdown. He managed, nevertheless, to keep writing, and was the major Ukrainian poet during the 1930s writing lyric love poetry, published in his collections *Chervoni troyandy* (Red Roses, 1932), *Novi poeziyi* (New Poems, 1937) and *Zburavli pryletily* (The Cranes have flown back, 1940)

During World War II, Sosyura worked as a war correspondent, and also produced two war-related collections *Pid hul kryvavyyi* (During the Bloody Rumblings of War, 1942) and *V hodynu hnivu* (In the Hour of Anger, 1942) and the poem 'Oleh Koshovyi' (1943).



In 1948, he received what was then the highest award for literature in the Soviet Union – the Stalin Prize. Three years later, however, he came under attack from the ideologues once again, being accused, together with a number of other Ukrainian writers, of ‘bourgeois nationalism’. In Sosyura’s case, the main evidence against him was his poem ‘Lyubit Ukrayinu’ (Love Ukrayina!...), written in 1944. This criticism was spearheaded by the Communist Party daily *Pravda*, which, in an article entitled ‘Against Ideological Distortions in Literature’ (2 July 1951), denounced Sosyura for praising in this poem ‘eternal Ukraine’ rather than Soviet Ukraine as an integral part of the Soviet Union. Sosyura responded with a statement of self-criticism and repentance, in which he thanked the authorities for leaving him alive and free to continue his literary work. One can only guess how far this penitence was genuine. It is significant, however, that Sosyura did not destroy his own, autograph copy of the poem, which survived to form part of a memorial exhibition to mark the centenary of the poet’s birth, at the Central State Archive Museum of Literature and Art of Ukraine, in January 1998.

By 1957, however, Sosyura was clearly back in favour with the Soviet Ukrainian literary establishment; the *Anthology of Ukrainian Poetry* published in that year by the State Publishing House of Artistic Literature in Kyiv devoted no less than 28 pages to (politically correct!) examples of Sosyura’s work. The same year, a three-volume edition of his *Collected Works* appeared.

Sosyura’s later works include the collections *Zelenyi svit* (Green World, 1949), *Solovyini dali* (The Nightingale Distances, 1956) and *Tak nikhto ne kokhav* (No one has loved like this, 1960). He died on 8 January 1965, leaving a number of major works unpublished, including an autobiographical novel *Tretya rota* (The Third Company), and the full text of the narrative poem ‘Mazepa’ (only excerpts from which had appeared in 1929), both of which were eventually published in 1988.

It has become a truism of literary criticism (at least outside Ukraine) to regard Sosyura as a poet whose later output did not fulfil the promise of his early works. This may in part be due to the ‘political’ content of a significant number of his works. For, as a poet working within the Soviet Union and – at least initially – a convinced Communist, Sosyura wrote a considerable number of poems dealing more or less with ‘Communist’ themes. Versifying politics is easy enough for anyone with a moderate gift for rhythm and rhyme; producing genuine poetry on a political theme is far more difficult. Furthermore, when the political system concerned is later revealed as a monstrous tyranny, it is difficult to be objective about the literary merits of the works it generated. Perhaps all that one should point out at this stage is that Sosyura’s ‘political’ poems are, from a literary point of view, certainly far superior to most works of their kind. Their impartial literary appraisal, however, is best left to a future age, for whose critics the Soviet period will be just one more painful historical phenomenon which has to be researched in order to assess and understand the literary products of that time.

What is beyond doubt, however, is Sosyura’s lyrical talent, and a selection of his poems in this genre is presented below.

* * *

The examples of Sosyura’s works which follow are translated by Vera Rich.

* * *

I recall: cherry-trees had done singing,
 And the orchard with sun was aglow.
 And your farewell words to me were ringing:
 'I shall find you wherever you go...'

And in darkness, in torment, exhaustion,
 Where they shot even love through and through,
 Your well-known profile I often
 Saw 'gainst the pane's yellow hue.

The fiery past sank into slumber...
 And I know not why I am alive...
 And why mingled in weapons' thunder,
 Your voice blended, fresh and naive?

Now today cherry-trees will cease singing,
 And the orchard is warm with the sun.
 As ever for you I am seeking,
 But to find me you still have not come.

1928

Ukraine

Sabre-clang, songs, soldiers' going,
 Hawk's will unrestrained,
 Quiet stars, clear waters flowing,
 These are my Ukraine.

Blue of spinnies, fields, days' rising,
 Nightingales' sweet strain,
 Soft low whispering and sighing –
 These are my Ukraine.

And in your eyes my beloved,
 Iridesces, reigns,
 With sunlight of fortune covered,
 My own dear Ukraine.

* * *

The golden-horned star already,
There, where wormwood was blossoming,
Upon the fiery threshold spreading
Has now imposed its greying wing,

There are no lilies on the pavements,
No swans' cry in the heavens now –
On high a booming, plumbless cavern
Is blazing with its pensive brow.

Into the fields went autumn, seeding
From fragrant hand its coins of gold...
Somewhere there are iron horses speeding,
And grass breathes forth a smell of cold.

Love Ukrayina!...

Love Ukrayina as you love the sun,
The wind and the grass and the water,
In fortunate hour and when fleeting joys come,
Love her in the hour of misfortune.

Love Ukrayina awake, asleep too,
With the cherry-blossoms that ring her,
Her loveliness ever living and new,
Her language like nightingales' singing.

Among brotherly nations, like orchard so fair,
She shines through the long ages in beauty,
Love Ukrayina with all your heart's care,
And with every deed, every duty.

For us she is in this world sole and unique
In the sweet charm of her spaces,
She is there in the stars, in the willows, she speaks
In the heart's every pulsation.

In the bird, in the flower, in electrical lights,
In each song, in each lay the bard utters,
In the child's smile, in the maiden's eyes bright
In porphyreal banners a-flutter.

Like the bush of old, burning but never consumed,
In paths and oak-groves the lives ever,
In waves of the Dnipro, in siren's shrill tunes,
And in clouds of purple she hovers.

In the cannonades' fire that invaders did slay,
 Those green-uniformed strangers inglorious,
 In the bayonets which through the dark forced our way
 To springtimes sincere, bright, victorious.

Young man! May you give for her all of your smiles,
 And your tears, till you've nothing left over,
 For you cannot love other nations, meanwhile,
 If you do not truly love her.

Young maiden! As you love her skies fair and blue,
 You must love her with love ever keener,
 The lad that you love will feel no love for you,
 If you do not love Ukrayina.

Love her in toiling, in loving, in war,
 Like a song starlike and vernal...
 To Ukrayina give all your heart's store,
 – And we shall be with her, eternal.

1944

* * *

Beyond the fence the sunflower droops its head of gold,
 Beyond the river somewhere a girl's song unfolds.
 With alarm I listen to that distant song.
 Ah, my youth is straying somewhere out beyond!

The song has caught my heart, my blood it strangely moves,
 It holds all my hopes within it, all my love.
 Is it you, my youth, then, straying yonder there,
 Hazel-eyed and in embroidered blouse so fair?

Sit at least beside me, dearly I love you,
 Like the earth so verdant, like the heavens blue!
 But Youth does not hear me... In a fire I burn,
 But from beyond the river only a laugh returns...

Further, further yet, that young voice fades and dwines,
 Only the wind ruffles this grey hair of mine.
 Grey hair... Voice. A willow. Evening. Song unfolds.
 Beyond the fence a sunflower droops its head of gold.

1955



Visual Poetry in Ukrainian Literature

Mykola Soroka

A number of books have been published in the Western literary world in recent years, which attempt to characterise visual poetry in Ukrainian literature. These approach the subject in its comparative and historical contexts, as well as its relationship to other visual arts. However, although some attempts have been made to give an impartial assessment of Ukrainian visual poetry, it has to be said that some of these studies are superficial and imprecise.

Written Ukrainian literature has flourished since the conversion of Kyivan Rus' – the first Ukrainian state – to Christianity in the tenth century. Despite Ukraine's prolonged loss of statehood, Ukrainian literature has always functioned as an independent cultural phenomenon with, on the one hand, its own national features (language, system of artistic images, genre and style specificity, etc.) and, on the other, forming a part of the European literary tradition. Ukraine's declarations of sovereignty (1990) and independence (1991) aroused a new and more widespread interest in Ukrainian literature in all its forms. In this article, we shall attempt to analyse the role of visual poetry in Ukrainian literature, and to highlight and correct certain erroneous views, engendered mainly as a result of carrying over certain concepts of Polish and Russian literary criticism.

First, one must mention the book of the American scholar, Dick Higgins, *Pattern Poetry: Guide to Unknown Literature*.¹ Obviously, one of the main purposes of this book was to present the widest possible range of available materials. Indeed, this extensive collection of visual poems from many different literary traditions world-wide, from their beginnings until the twentieth century, must impress by its sheer size, so that it could well serve as a bibliographic textbook. However, so large a work cannot either study all the available literature in depth, or verify all sources, in particular those of Ukrainian visual poetry.

Higgins demonstrates that visual poetry appeared in Ukrainian Baroque literature as a result of the spread of this style in world literature. But he mentions only two of the most prominent poets who use such forms – Ivan Velychkovskyi and Mytrofan Dovhalevskyi, citing their books, which had in fact remained in manuscript until the early 1970s, when they were published in Kyiv.² But there have been many others: Stepan Berynda, Afanasiy Kalnofoyskyi, Lazar Baranovych, Dymytriy Tuptalo, to name but a few, as well as many anonymous authors. Of course, one could hardly expect Higgins to say a great deal about Ukrainian Baroque visual poetry, since it has been little studied by specialists in Ukrainian literature, and because most of the works concerned have never been published and still exist only in manuscript form.

Nevertheless, Higgins' book does exhibit certain faults. Firstly, he speaks of the Ukrainian literature of the period as language-specific. But it is well-known that the

¹ Dick Higgins, *Pattern Poetry: Guide to Unknown Literature* (New York University Press, 1987).

² I. Velychkovskyi, *Tvor'y* (Kyiv, 1972); M. Dovhalevskyi, *Sad poetychnyi (Poetyka)* (Kyiv, 1973).

or overlooking the fact that Church Slavonic was one of the literary languages in general use in Ukraine at that time. Furthermore, he erroneously states that the author of this poem was Fr. Yelysey – although the poem itself identifies him as the recipient. Moreover, there exist literary sources which clearly attribute it to Berynda.³

In his book *Russian Word-play Poetry from Simeon Polotskii to Derzhavin: its Classical and Baroque Context*, the English scholar Charles Drage treats visual poetry as word-play poetry.⁴ He draws a cultural bridge representing Europe-Ukraine-Russia and points out the primary impact of Kyiv-Mohyla College (later, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy) scholars on the appearance of visual poetry in Muscovy. All courses in literature in Ukraine were based on West-European poetics. However, Drage does not avoid the typical mistake of Western literary critics, which is to consider Ukrainian literature as part of Russian literature. For, although he correctly identifies Velychkovskiy as a Ukrainian, he proceeds to discuss his literary activity in the chapters on Russian word-play poetry. Possibly, Drage intended simply a comparison between Velychkovskiy's work and developments in Muscovy, but in this case the title of the book itself leaves his intention open to misconstruction.

There are also a number of studies of Ukrainian visual poetry by Western authors of Ukrainian origin: Dmytro Chyzhevskiy, Myroslava Mudrak, Oleh Ilnytskyi. Chyzhevskiy, a literary critic and philosopher, is generally considered to be the first scholar to have paid attention to Ukrainian visual poetry, particularly that of the Baroque period,⁵ while Mudrak and Ilnytskyi made fairly comprehensive studies of the visual poetry of the early twentieth century. As in European literature generally, this was a period characterised by an interplay of various and often conflicting artistic trends. In Soviet Ukraine, however, the in-depth study of such works was forbidden. The ideological straitjacket imposed on literature by the First Congress of Proletarian Writers (Moscow, 1934) sanctioned the writing and study of only literary trends deemed to be 'proletarian'. The political bias was clearly not a scholarly approach, and, as a result, the literary work of writers was artificially split into the pre-proletarian and post-proletarian periods. The former was either suppressed, or mentioned without any proper evaluative commentary. In general, it was fiercely condemned because (it was said) it imitated modern anti-artistic Western trends and was ideologically inconsistent. Mudrak and Ilnytskyi have thus filled a major gap by analysing in detail the futurist phenomenon, which, *inter alia*, revived the tradition of visual poetry in Ukrainian literature.


Ilnytskyi demonstrates that visual poetry does not emerge in and of itself, but is engendered by an overall search in art in which visual materialisation of artistic images and synthesis of different art-forms are of primary importance. This generates such hybrid genres as letter-poems, editorial-poems, speech-poems, radio-poems, facto-stories, poetry-films, screen-novels and poetry-painting.⁶ The visual

³ *Ukrayinska poeziya. Kinets XVI–pochatok XVII stolittya* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978).

⁴ C. Drage, *Russian word-play poetry from Simeon Polotskii to Derzhavin: its classical and baroque context* (London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1993).

⁵ D. Chyzhevskiy, *Istoriya ukrayinskoyi literatury* (New York, 1956); D. Tschizewskij, 'Formalistische Dichtung bei den Slaven', *Heidelberger Slavische Texte* 3, (Wiesbaden, 1958); D. Cyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature* (Littleton, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1975).

⁶ The term 'poetry-painting' is used for visual poetry in Ukrainian futurist literature. It was invented by Mykhayil Semenکو and is mostly applied to his poetry.



Stepan Berynda, 'Easter Gift...
to Fr. Yelysey Pietenetskyi' (1623).

arts gave the impetus to poetry-painting: '... the greatest impact of the visual arts lay in the shift they produced in literature from an exclusively semantic dimension to a new graphic plan'.⁷ It is this shift that has, since the 1950s, resulted in the predominance of graphic elements and in the emergence of a new artistic variety — 'concrete poetry'. '... [C]oncrete poetry begins by being aware of graphic space as a structural agent'.⁸ This was demonstrated by the Brazilian Noigandres group in 1958.

Mudrak, in her book *The New Generation and Artistic Modernism in the Ukraine*,⁹ extended the scope of this study, placing Ukrainian visual poetry in the con-

⁷ O. Ihlytzkyj, 'Visual Dimensions in Ukrainian Futurist Poetry and Prose', *Z.Slav.* 35, (1990) 5, p. 723.

⁸ Pilot plan for Concrete poetry, see: *The Avant-Garde Tradition in Literature*, ed. by R. Kostelanetz, 1982, p. 257

⁹ Myroslava M. Mudrak, *The New Generation and Artistic Modernism in the Ukraine* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1986). Partly she addresses this topic in her articles: 1) 'Panfuturism — The Artistic Vanguard in Ukraine', *Coexistence among the Avant-Gardes* (Ljubljana: Društvo za estetiko, 1987), vol. II, pp. 73–84; 2) 'Le Panfuturisme ou le Constructivisme vu d'Ukraine', *Ligeia. Dossiers sur l'art*, no. 5–6, 1989.

text of European developments in literature and the visual arts. The most influential trends were Italian futurism and the visual poetry of Guillaume Apollinaire.

Mudrak also discusses Russian Leftism and the Baroque traditions of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries, and asserts that new trends and genres appeared as a spin-off from major social changes, the technical revolution and the cult of the machine. ‘The machine therefore not only offered a new context for art, but assisted in effecting a synthesis of artistic media and functional inventions of the modern day’.¹⁰

Visual poetry is now beginning to feature once again in Ukrainian literary criticism. During the Communist period, with its political dogmas, when the only ‘politically correct’ artistic method was that of socialist realism, visual poetry, with its trend towards formalism, received little attention. It was in effect dismissed as poetry of the past, which was virtually extinct in contemporary literature. That is why the *Dictionary of Literary Terms* stated categorically: ‘Nowadays “pattern” poetry appears only on occasion in literature for children’.¹¹ The most comprehensive works of Hryhorii Syvokin and Vitaliy Maslyuk are also based on this historical principle. They discuss *carmina curiosa et figurata* within the general framework of poetics in a fairly cursory manner.¹²

Visual poetry has its own tradition. ‘The story of pattern poetry’¹³ is, in fact, not the story of a single development or of the simple form, but the story of an ongoing human wish to combine the visual and literary impulses, to tie together the experience of these two areas into an aesthetic whole’.¹⁴ One may consider the acrostic ‘Alphabetic Prayer’ composed either by St Cyril, the Apostle of the Slavs, or by his disciple Constantine Preslavskiy, as the first surviving example of emerging visual elements in Slavic literature. However, as in a large part of European literature, the tradition of visual poetry is connected with the Baroque era (seventeenth–eighteenth centuries), which stressed the aesthetic nature of form, rather than content.

The first known visual poem in Ukrainian literature is an acrostic, written by Hryhorii Chuy in the 1560s. Piotr Rypson, a famous Polish scholar of visual poetry, considers his work part of Polish literature.¹⁵ But, in fact, the poet referred himself to Ukrainian literature in his signature: ‘Hryhorii Chuy, rusyn iz Sambora’ (Hryhorii Chuy, a Ukrainian from Sambir). Another visual poem from the sixteenth century is the alphabetical acrostic from the Primer of Ivan Fedorov (1574).¹⁶

The Ukrainian visual poetry of the Baroque era was strongly influenced by the *Greek Anthology*, which became known to European literature when it was tran-

¹⁰ Mudrak, *The New Generation ...*, p. 161.

¹¹ *Slovník literaturoznaučnykh terminiv*, ed. by V. Lesyn and O. Pulynets (Kyiv, 1971), p. 444. However, the latest *Literaturoznaučnyi Slovník-Dovidnyk* (Kyiv: Akademiya, 1997) considers ‘pattern poetry’ as part of the general literary process.

¹² H. Syvokin, *Davni ukraýnynski poetyky* (Kharkiv, 1960); V. Maslyuk, *Latynomovni poetyky i rytoriky XVII–pershoi polovyny XVIII stolittya ta yikh rol u rozvytku teorii literatury na Ukraýyni* (Kyiv, 1983).

¹³ The term ‘pattern poetry’ is usually applied to old literature and can be considered as part of ‘visual poetry’.

¹⁴ Higgins, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵ Piotr Rypson, *Obraz słowa. Historia poezji wizualnej* (Warsaw, 1989), p. 191.

¹⁶ Ivan Fedorov, *Bukvar*, reprint edition (Kyiv, 1975).

scribed in 1301. It contained pattern poems by Simias (in the shapes of an axe, eggs and wings), Theocritus (syrinx or panpipe), Dosiadas ('The Altar of Jason') and Bezzantinus or Vestinus ('The Altar of Muses'). Similar visual images are widespread in European literature – not only in Ukrainian. An *Ovum pusillum* (small egg) and *Ovum grandius* (large egg) were found in 1995 in a work on Greek poetics, dating from the end of the seventeenth century, written by Ioanykiy and Sophroniy Lykhuda.¹⁷ The *Ovum pusillum* is clearly that of Simias, whereas the author of the *Ovum grandius* has not been identified. Possibly, it is by one of the authors of these 'poetics'.

Another oviform poem written in Latin occurs in a book by the Polish-German scholar Iohannes Herbinus: *Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae, s. Kijovia subterranea* (1675).¹⁸ The author obtained his materials about the monastery from its archimandrite, Innokentiy [Gizel]. The poem was written round the circumference of a circle, not in the traditional linear form.

Afanasiy [Kalnofoyskiy], a monk of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, wrote one poem (in Polish) in the shape of an altar.¹⁹ Incidentally, the influence of Greek literature could have taken place not only through the mediation of European literature, but also directly. After all, Kyivan Rus' adopted Christianity from Byzantium, and Byzantine culture was the main source in the development of Ukrainian culture from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries. Only then did it become oriented more towards 'Latin' Europe.

Mediaeval European theory about *carmina curiosa* was the second source for the appearance of visual poetry in Ukrainian literature. *Carmina curiosa* formed part of Latin poetics – the standard course in the theory of literature. These 'poetics' were formulated in European universities. They appeared in Ukraine at the beginning of the seventeenth century (mainly through Polish intermediaries), and became compulsory for all students. One should be careful when studying these various school 'poetics', particularly when determining the authorship of the examples quoted, since many visual poems were simply transferred from one textbook of 'poetics' to another. For instance, the labyrinth-poem '*Nomen bonora*' can be found in many Ukrainian poetics. It may even have 'migrated' to Ukraine from some other non-Ukrainian literature.

There are a great number of these Latin 'poetics', mainly in manuscript form, in Ukrainian literature. The first known example was written in 1637 at the Kyiv-Mohyla College, just five years after that institution opened. *Carmina curiosa* is dealt with in the section on epigrams, and includes various genres which possessed an additional visual element: palindromes, acrostics and their mesotic and telestic analogues, labyrinth, correlative, co-ordinated, numerical, musical, alphabetical and pattern poems, emblems, symbols, epitaphs, etc. One of the special features of these Ukrainian 'poetics' was that they were written by people who

¹⁷ See Vernadskyi Central Scientific Library, Petrov No. 337, Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, p. 93.

¹⁸ Iohannes Herbinus, 'Religiosae Kiovensis Cryptae', *Seventeenth-Century Writings on the Kievan Caves Monastery*. Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. Texts: vol. iv (1987), p. 397.

¹⁹ A. Kalnofoyskiy, 'Teraturgema', *Seventeenth-Century Writings on the Kievan Caves Monastery*. Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. Texts: vol. iv (1987), p. 156.

ЛЯБИРИНТ 1	ЛЯБИРИНТ 2
я і р а М а р і я	І с ү с М с ү с І
і р а М с М а р і	с ү с М а М с ү с
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ЛЯБИРИНТ 3	ЛЯБИРИНТ 4
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і р а М с М а р і	с ү с М а М с ү с
я і р а М а р і я	І с ү с М с ү с І
і р а М с М а р і	с ү с М а М с ү с
р а М с ү с М а р	ү с М а р а М с ү
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М с ү с І с ү с М	М а р і я і р а М

Ivan Velychkovskiy, 'Labyrinth'.
From the book *Mleko* (1691).

'Easter Gift' mentioned above achieves a striking pattern of a juxtaposed crescent and cross. Undoubtedly, the most famous visual poet in Ukrainian Baroque literature was Velychkovskiy. His book *Mleko* (Milk, 1691) analyses visual poetry and presents its theoretical principles, citing more than 20 examples in the contemporary vernacular of Ukraine. In his preface, Velychkovskiy writes: 'I have never so far seen such works in our Ukrainian literature. That is why I have decided to write such poems, not to translate them, but to create them by analogy to the foreign ones, or even to create [entirely] new ones, which could be expressed only in our native language'.²¹

The most popular genres of that period were the pattern poem, the acrostic and the labyrinth. (The latter form consists, typically, of a block of text through which key letters spell out a word). Among pattern images we can name the following forms, traditional in European literature: a cross, a pyramid, a heart, a crown, a sword, a shield, a column, a star, a building, etc. Many poets embodied their names or the names of their friends in acrostics, in the hope of literary immortality.

actually taught the subject, and in addition to compiling textbooks, sometimes composed examples as well. For example, in his *Hortus Poeticus* (Poetic Garden, 1736), Dovhalevskiy produced a unique form in the shape of a heart and a crown.²⁰

Furthermore, Latin 'poetics' generally cited examples in Polish, Church Slavonic or Ukrainian. For example, Velychkovskiy's Ukrainian palindromes were included in many Latin 'poetics'.

Yet another source of visual poetry was a group of poets who, in searching for their own literary identity, were not confined by the scholastic demands of academic programmes, and were oriented not towards the old, but towards modern Christian traditions. These include Berynda, who in the poem

²⁰ Dovhalevskiy, op. cit., p. 280.

²¹ Velychkovskiy, op. cit., p. 71.

The subjects of the visual poetry of this era were primarily religious. For example, Velychkovskiy's labyrinth is about Christ and Mary. In addition, there are panegyrics in honour of patrons of art and noble men, such as Lazar Baranovych, Varlaam Yasynskiy, Ivan Mazepa. A secular and philosophical *Weltanschauung* – and a certain sense of humour – is revealed in the following epitaph inscribed on a tomb:

Much did I eat, and much did I drink, likewise, moreover, did I swear,
Into the grave this self-some 'much', did drive me friend, farewell.

Ukrainian literature encouraged the growth of Muscovite literature. Many poets, scholars and clergymen went to Muscovy. Among them was Simeon of Polack, who was born in Belarus, and graduated from the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. It may well have been he who brought the tradition of visual poetry to Russian literature.²²

Thus, visual poetry in Ukrainian Baroque literature entered the genre and formal system of the time, so forming part of the pan-European literary process.²³

After the general decline of visual poetry in European literature at the end of the eighteenth century it began to revive only in the early 1900s. At this time, it became associated with such new trends as cubism, Dadaism, futurism and surrealism, which reflected an irrational philosophy and the cult of the machine in literature. Words, letters, and their mutual arrangements became symbols – atoms of human thought, penetrating to the subconscious world.

Futurism, together with elements of Dadaism and constructivism, became the most influential and even trouble-making trend in Ukrainian literature. It revealed itself not only as a literary stream, but also as an artistic tendency, which strove to unite, or at least to interact, with different kinds of art: literature, painting, architecture, theatre, cinema, photography. In spite of the considerable influence of West-European literature, Ukrainian futurism tried to create its own image. According to Mudrak, the beginning of the twentieth century 'was an era marked by two basic aspirations: firstly, a conscientious and deliberate alignment with the international mainstream of modern art; and, secondly, the affirmation of a national cultural identity'.²⁴

The search for new artistic techniques and the attempt to broaden and intensify the expressive possibilities of poetry led to the creation of additional visual elements. In Ukrainian literature this was strongly reflected in an invention of the chief exponent of futurism, Mykhayil Semenko (poetry-painting), in the futurist prose of Andriy Chuzhyi and in the visual experiments of some other futurists. The indisputable leader was Semenko, who published two books of visual poems: *Kablepoema za okean* (Cablepoem across the Ocean, 1920–1)²⁵ and *Moya mozaika* (My Mosaic, 1922). First and foremost, Semenko opposed the traditional canons of literature and 'shabby artistic ideas', because 'there is no art

²² L. Sazonova, *Poeziya russkogo Barokko* (Moscow, 1991).

²³ For details, see Mykola Soroka, *Zorova poeziya v Ukrayinskyi literaturi kintsya 16–18 stolittya* (Kyiv, 1997).

²⁴ Mudrak, op. cit., p. 2.

²⁵ There are other translations of this book: *Cablepoem across the Sea* (Oleh Ilnytzkij) and *Cablepoem Abroad* (Myroslava M. Mudrak).

where there is a cult'. With inherent eccentricity he appealed to the young generation not to shake hands with their parents, who 'took pleasure in native art'. He taught his younger brother Vasyl the following: '... you cannot be absorbed by Ukrainophilism. You can be a nice Ukrainian and not put its literature at the top, because it is too young in comparison with other world literature'.²⁶

In 1909, the author of the first futurist manifesto, Filippo Marinetti, declared a break with the static past and proclaimed a dynamic future: 'We shall sing the love of danger, the habit of energy and boldness'. In 1914, Semenko wrote in his *Manifesto*: 'There is no absolutely perfect art. It exists only in dynamic movement'.²⁷ Marinetti's revolution in syntax and language, which included, for example, an emphasis on nouns and infinitives, the elimination of adjectives and adverbs, and changes in current punctuation, was very close to Semenko's chaotic and distorted poetry-paintings, and to his endeavour to liberate words from old forms of versification:

I've grown weary of rhymes
I want to keep surveillance on the movement of words
so my thoughts could then trail and pursue them
and the music flow allbyitself

Both Semenko's books of visual poetry were presented in the same form – the pages were made to look like post-cards, written over with the text. The manner in which the text and separate words are printed within the 'cards' is characteristic. The poet encloses words within boxes, underlines them, misaligns them, displaces them spatially, to give the effect of perspective. In other words, he creates an additional visual plane, which produces a dynamic perception in which words appear to be forced to move and to fly, to fall and to produce different impulses. But in content the books are very different. *Kablepoema za okean* is clearly influenced by political events, and is somewhat reminiscent of a revolutionary manifesto, intended for immediate dissemination all over the world. In fact, Semenko invented this new genre of the cablepoem because it combined both a poetic text and the form of a radio-telegram. The visual effect is emphasised by tricks with the typeface: significant words and, in particular, acrostics, are in larger or bold type. The poet was inevitably influenced by the cult of the machine, eulogised by such contemporaries as Filippo Marinetti. The name of the genre, and of the book – *Cablepoem across the Ocean* – are themselves evocative of what was at that time state-of-the-art technology. The rhythms and elasticity of this new 'visual language', and the use of vocabulary associated with industry (iron, steel, smoke, mines, ore, etc.) intensify this impression.

In contrast, Semenko's second book, *Moya mozayika*, contains practically no politics. This is, in essence, a small mosaic of the poet's life: from village landscape and everyday life, to the current critical views on art in Ukraine. This book shows the influence of Dadaism, with its demonstration of the absurdity of things, chaos and randomness. Some poems are composed of isolated words or fragments of

²⁶ Department of Manuscripts, Institute of Literature, holding 156, no. 33, p. 96.

²⁷ M. Semenko, *Kverofuturyzm* (Kyiv, 1914), p. 2.

words, without any syntactical links. But when one looks closer, one sees a complete and integrated system – a *Weltanschauung* being built out of these random pieces. One of the poems, indeed, is actually called ‘System’. This presents, in a poster-like form, Semenko’s views on the contemporary literary scene. According to Ilnytskyi, who has studied this work in some detail: ‘In place of rectilinear order, this poem gives us “words in freedom”. It is composed almost entirely of place names, personal names, and literary titles that float at odd angles and arcs. A variety of typographic styles and sizes create a dynamic, circus-like mood – quite appropriate for a work whose theme is modernism and the avant-garde’.²⁸ The names themselves fall into two distinct groups. ‘Western’ names (Picasso, Marinetti, New York, London, Paris, Cezanne, van Gogh, Boccioni, Gerard de Nerval, Walt Whitman, and Gauguin) occupy the top third of the poem. Then comes the word ‘Revolution’ repeated four times across the page, and below this come the names of various Ukrainian literary figures and movements. Position is used to indicate the literary ‘rating’ assigned to them by Semenko – the higher up the page, the higher the rating. At the very bottom he places the key text of Ukrainian poetry – the *Kobzar* of Taras Shevchenko, a work which some years previously Semenko had burned – as a sign of his own literary emancipation.

Unfortunately, Ukrainian literary critics of the Soviet period either tried to avoid the phenomenon of poetry-painting, or else criticised it, not on artistic grounds, but because of its divergence from the monolithic canons of socialist realism. For instance, Yevhen Adelheym associated poetry-painting with the impending doom of the world avant-garde,²⁹ Mykola Bazhan linked it with the egocentrism of Western poets,³⁰ while Berta Korsunska sees it simply as a way chosen by certain poets to express defiance and non-conformity.³¹

A common tendency in modern Ukrainian visual poetry is a preference for traditional textual forms. This means, in effect, that the poet writes a poem in the traditional manner, but arranges the letters and words to form visual shapes. However, new types of visual poems are also appearing more and more frequently. These use not only words as their building-blocks but other elements too: space, movement, colour, collage, etc. This seems quite natural within the context of the concrete art movement, founded in the 1950s. In fact, this movement first affected the poets of the Ukrainian diaspora, even though, to a certain extent, they continued to observe the traditions of pattern poetry.

Zinoviy Berezhan³² (USA) used experiments in poetry to try to plumb the unconscious mind, and constructed his visual plane for this purpose. His poem ‘A Spider’ combines visual and kinetic elements, which not only outline the shape of a spider, but also indicate its movement. In ‘Nocturne’, where he is pursued by nightmares, he marks graphically those words which are particularly significant to the main idea of the poem. Then, when these visions are intensified, and, as


²⁸ Oleh S. Ilnytskyi, *Ukrainian Futurism, 1914–1930, a Historical and Critical Study* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), p. 327.

²⁹ Y. Adelheym, *M. Semenko. Poeziyi* (Kyiv, 1985), p. 39.

³⁰ M. Bazhan, *ibid.*, p. 10.

³¹ B. Korsunska, ‘Mykhayil Semenko’, *Radyanske literaturoznavstvo*, 1968, no. 6, p. 31.

³² *Koordynaty. Antolohiya ukraïnyns'koyi poeziyi z diyaspori* (Vydavnytstvo Suchasnist, 1969), vol. 2.



Mykola Luhovyk, 'Church' (1991).

George Grabowicz says, reach a 'paranoic condition',³³ these words develop into a graphic image of a nuclear mushroom:

Tak ne mozhe tryvaty dali
KATASTROFA
nad
tsym
uzhe
nikhto
NE PANUYE!

It cannot last any longer!
CATASTROPHE
nobody has
power
over
this
ANYMORE!

The most attractive visual image in the poetry of Lyubomyr Hoseyko is the Eiffel Tower³⁴ – the shape of which enhances the content of the poem, in which the reader and the author together observe the life of the city from the top of the tower. Apollinaire, we may recall, also used a visual image of the Eiffel Tower. But

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ L. Hoseyko, *Sonyasbnychymya na novomisyachbchi* (Brussels-Leuven, 1969).

was the Ukrainian work a borrowing of the French poet's image, or is it Hoseyko's own original idea?

The visual poems of Jars Balan (Canada) are in the main examples of concrete poetry, except those constructed according to Semenکو's style of poetry-painting. Balan clearly prefers graphics and painting, and uses letters and words as construction materials. His main means of producing his visual effects are tricks with form and layout, creating an impression of movement and kinetic energy. Each letter, in fact, is painted with a brush, or – in recent years – generated by computer graphics. Balan also created a series of visual poems using only one letter – Ya,³⁵ as in his poem 'Ya pid mikroskopom' ('I under the Microscope'³⁶), which attempt to encapsulate the complex human temperament. In such poems as 'Ya vyshyvatel virshiv' (I am an Embroiderer of Poems), 'Ya u vesni' (I am in Spring), and 'Pysmennyi pysankar' (A Literate Egg-painter), Balan introduces and synthesises elements from Ukrainian decorative patterns. Balan has had exhibitions of his visual poetry in Toronto (1985), Edmonton, Alberta (1987, 1997), Winnipeg (1988) and Kyiv (1990), and assisted Higgins in writing the section on Baroque Ukrainian visual poetry in the latter's aforesaid book.

At the present time, there are many poets in Ukraine who use visual forms in their poetry, including Mykola Miroshnychenko, Mykola Luhovyk, Mykhaylo Sachenko, Kost Shyshko, Viktor Melnyk, Anatoliy Moysienko, Volkhv Slovovezha, Leonid Strelnyk, Vasyl Trubay, Ivan Iov, Myroslav Korol, Anatoliy Pererva, Konstantyn Pavlyak, Volodymyr Luchuk, Ivan Luchuk, Nazar Honchar, Roman Sadlovskyi, Ivan Trach, Taras de V. Dyuk, Bohdan Savytskyi, Iryna Kodlubay, Ulyana Krakovetska, Oles Noha, Mariya Shun. Translators of visual poetry include Vsevolod Tkachenko, Oleh Zhupanskyi and Oleksander Mokrlovskyi. Most of them, however, write visual poems occasionally, and, otherwise, write stanzaic poetry. For a long time, however, it was difficult to get visual poetry published, mostly because it was accused of 'formalism'. This produced some odd results. Volodymyr Luchuk concealed some palindromes in the titles of his books *Nurt strun* (Tumult of Strings) and *Dyvovyd* (Wonderful View). The titles read identically from left-to-right and right-to-left. Miroshnychenko pointed out to his editor the fact that the title of his book *Rik-osokir* was a palindrome only after the book was in print. Sachenko was, and remains, unable to get his visual poems published, even though he pointed out that similar poems had already appeared in Russian literature in the 1960s. In fact, the main areas where visual poetry was permitted in the Soviet period were children's literature and translations.

The breakthrough came only in the latter half of the 1980s, in particular, with the appearance of Miroshnychenko's book *Oko* (Eye) in 1989. This author's first visual poems were written at the beginning of the 1970s, under the strong influence of Apollinaire. Since it was impossible to get his original work published, he decided to do translations, in which he did not always follow the original strictly, but instead created his own variations. His first translations, in fact, from the Tur-

³⁵ The visual value of this letter is that it resembles a person.

³⁶ *Zoloty homin. Ukrayinska poeziya svitu* (Kyiv, 1991), p. 10.

kish poet Can Yücel – ‘Yak zmiya’³⁷ (Like a Snake), and of the Azerbaijani poets Abbas Abdulla – ‘Kulya zemna’³⁸ (The Globe) and Fikret Hoja – ‘Vnochi’³⁹ (In the Night), were close to the originals. Then, in his book *Oko*, Miroshnychenko included variations on themes by Apollinaire – ‘Fountain’, and by the German poet Reinhardt Dohl – ‘Apple’. Here, too, one finds his philosophical programme-poem ‘Oko’ and a short humorous poem, ‘Portret zabutoyi’ (Portrait of a Forgotten Woman). Miroshnychenko was greatly influenced by the Baroque visual poetry of Velychkovskyi, and he made use of some traditional Baroque forms (e.g., rectangular poem, palindrome). He linked the palindrome form with the primary bilateral dimension perceived by man. Obviously, palindromes cannot convey the whole range of sensations present in the universe, and are thus somewhat limited. However, in writing them poets can enjoy the fluent and skilful wielding of words, and demonstrate the lexical and grammatical potentialities of the Ukrainian language. On 29 September 1991, the Founding meeting of the new ‘Heraklit’ literary palindrome group took place in Kyiv. The group’s ‘Declaration No. 1’, drafted at this meeting, began with the following statement: ‘Finally, the period of socialist realism in Ukrainian literature has been successfully wound up. Now Ukrainian literature can return to its natural state’.⁴⁰

After Miroshnychenko’s *Oko*, a number of other ‘visual’ works appeared, including the books *Skrypka dlya Orfeya*⁴¹ (Violin for Orpheus, 1991) by Mykola Luhovyk, *Vjshbuky*⁴² (Seekings, 1992) by Viktor Melnyk and *Zbvaltovannya realnosti* (The Rape of Reality, 1987) by Vasyl Trubay, as well as visual poems in various periodicals. These are written mainly in the traditional visual form, unlike the works of Myroslav Korol and Mykola Soroka.

Luhovyk appears to be searching for very accurate textual shapes. The texts themselves are not as expressive and extraordinary as they might be in the visual poetry genre. He seems to be deliberately avoiding any ambiguity between text and form. However, the poems have a wide range of themes, including episodes from World War II, the destruction and restoration of a church (depicted in the shape of a church in a poem of the same name), ‘Kozatska mohyla’ (Cossack Mound), which symbolises the historical memory of the people, and ‘Pamyati Dzhona Lennona’ (In Memory of John Lennon), embodied in two shapes: Lennon’s spectacles and Paul McCartney’s guitar.

Two of the three sections in Melnyk’s book *Vjshbuky* are devoted entirely to visual poetry. The first section, ‘Modernovyi sonetariy’ (Modern Sonnet-book), includes the following titles: ‘Sonet navyvorit’ (Sonnet inside out), ‘Nakhylenyi sonet’ (Leaning Sonnet), ‘Povishenyi sonet’ (Upside-down Sonnet), ‘Sonet navstoyachky’ (Standing Sonnet), ‘Sonet (pysavsya tak, yak smazhatsya kotlety)’ (Sonnet [written as rissoles are being fried]), ‘Sonetort’ (Sonnet-cake). Melnyk used the traditional

³⁷ *Vsesvit*, 1982, no. 10.

³⁸ *Dnipro*, 1982, no. 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1986, no. 3.

⁴⁰ *Ratusha*, Lviv, October 18–19, p. 6.

⁴¹ M. Luhovyk, *Skrypka dlya Orfeya* (Kyiv, 1991).

⁴² V. Melnyk, *Vjshbuky* (Khmelnitskyi: Dolya, 1992).

form of a sonnet possibly, in part, to pique the reader, but primarily to challenge the stagnation existing in Ukrainian literature. He did not change the traditional structure of sonnet stanzas, simply the layout. In the section 'Kinetychna poeziya' (Kinetic Poetry), Melnyk created a series of poems which convey the dynamic movement of the poetical text. This may be perceived simply by reading the titles: 'Miy sumniv' (My Doubt), 'Nich z nehrytyankoyu' (A Night with a Black Girl), 'Viter na travi' (Wind on the Grass), 'Ukrayinska fantaziya na temu "Beatles"' (Ukrainian Fantasy on a Theme of 'The Beatles') and 'Virshi na ostsylorafii' (Poems on an Oscillograph). At the beginning of the book, he defines his 'Post' of a futurist: 'Futurism is the self-irony of literature, futurism is when one can do what is forbidden'. Thus, this book can be considered a historical continuation of the artistic quest in Ukrainian futurist literature, particularly in visual poetry.

Visual forms are used by some new literary groups in Lviv. A famous one is LUHOSAD (LU is Ivan Luchuk, HO – Nazar Honchar, SAD – Roman Sadlovskiy). They describe themselves as a 'literary rearguard', who have to maintain the achievements of national literature, as opposed to the avant-garde. According to Taras Luchuk, a literary critic, this stance may be explained as follows: 'Literature was not founded by us: and so we cannot say anything about any avant-garde'. Insofar as they define an aesthetic ideal, it is 'rooted in the value of perfect form', which comes from the Baroque era, and from poetry from the beginning of the twentieth century. To cherish these formal values is the main task of the artistic conception of the literary rearguard.

Pysankarstvo (Easter-egg painting) is well-known as a traditional decorative art in Ukraine. Usually the Easter-eggs (*pysanky*) are painted with different dyes and designs. Kost Shyshko from Lutsk has composed a number of poems, oviform in shape, and evoking the colours and designs of traditional *pysanky*.⁴³


MOV	AS
MALYOVANE	A PAINTED
YAYECHKO MISTECHKO BERESTECHKO	EASTER-EGG
CHERVONYI KOLIR	SO IS THE VILLAGE OF BERESTECHKO
SHAL ZVYTYAH	IN THE COLOUR OF SCARLET
Y CHORNIYE	EXCITEMENT OVER VICTORIES
SPALENE	IN BLACK SHADES
ZHYTTYA	EXTINGUISHED
	LIFE

Moysienko has created a unique form of poetry, which he called chess-poetry. This consists, essentially, of a poem accompanied by the diagram of a chessboard with a given combination of chessmen. This reveals a certain inner state of the poet, by showing a relevant game situation that can be safe or hazardous, pessimistic or optimistic. But to write chess-poetry one should be a chess-player as well as a poet.

In March 1994, there was an exhibition of Ukrainian visual poetry in London. This was a major event for Ukrainian literature. More than 50 works, mostly by contemporary poets, were on display. My first book of visual poems was also

⁴³ *Ukrayina*, 1991, no. 19.

published at this time, thanks to the assistance of the English poet Bob Cobbing. Entitled *Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina* (Still Ukraine lives on),⁴⁴ it contains a parallel English translation throughout. The title of this book is intended to evoke not only the first line of the Ukrainian national anthem, but also the renaissance of Ukrainian visual poetry, and its present place in the world literary scene. While



Mykola Soroka, 'Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina' (Still Ukraine lives on).

researching Baroque Ukrainian literature at the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv University, I suddenly discovered a whole new literary 'country' – pattern and 'curious' poetry from the Baroque era, and poetry-painting of the futurist Mykhayil Semenko. However, it was difficult to find the more recent visual poems, which had been fiercely condemned and treated as an extreme manifestation of formalism or as a deviation from socialist realism. Consequently, I was more impressed by Western concrete poetry, particularly by Cavan McCarthy, whose works I found in a special collection in Leeds University Library.

McCarthy's work exemplifies a movement from traditional textual structure towards a more abstract form, incorporating a mixture of different meaningful symbols (a letter, a number), space, kinetic energy, colour, etc. This fusion of multi-faceted artistic 'materials' leads to new poetic insight and creates a unique aesthetic value for visual poetry.

In June 1997, an international conference on visual poetry, 'Eye-Rhymes', was held in Edmonton (Alberta). This was an impressive demonstration of the growth of visual poetry world-wide, and, as a spin off, led to the establishment of the International Association of Visual Language. Six 'visual' poets from Ukraine took part in the conference – the largest delegation from Europe. □

⁴⁴ M. Soroka, *Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina* (London: Writers' Forum, 1994).

Reviews


Ukrainian Futurism, 1914–1930. A Historical and Critical Study by Oleh S. Ilnytskyj (Harvard University Press/Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1997), xviii+413pp., illustr.

Ukrainian Futurism, Ilnytskyj says in the final section of this book ('Conclusions') has been

[m]ore often than not... *compared* rather than *studied*. Invariably, comparisons found it deficient, a faint echo of some purportedly more original, more perfect proto-movement. Blinded by the name, critics saw in it little else than what they had already witnessed in a foreign 'source'.

This book is intended to remedy the situation. The author deliberately eschews 'comparative excurses', considering that 'one first needs to know a subject before it can be productively juxtaposed to others', taking as his 'primary task... to allow Ukrainian Futurism to define itself by elucidating its history, theory, and writings'. The result is a work of considerable scholarship, covering (Parts I and II) the history and theory of Futurism, and, finally, in Part III its 'literary legacy' and 'major practitioners'.

Yet, this very arrangement of the material must raise some doubts: for whom is the book intended. For Ukrainians? Certainly – as Ilnytskyj notes in his Preface – 'serious scholarship on the movement still remains in its infancy', in Ukraine, no less than abroad, and one can easily envisage that this, like the works of other scholars from the Ukrainian diaspora, may be translated into Ukrainian and become a standard text in Ukrainian universities. Or is it meant for the literary world at large – to disentangle Ukrainian Futurism from the tendency of scholars of comparative literature to lump together as 'Russian' all the various 'modernist and avant-garde movements of late Imperial Russia and the early Soviet period' – to give the movement, in short, its proper status as a distinct entity within the development of European and world literature at that time? Such an aim would accord well with the self-perception of the 'Futurists' themselves. However, one cannot help feeling that those unfamiliar with the Ukrainian literary scene of the period will find this book extremely tough going. How many such readers, one wonders, will persevere through the intricacies of Part I: 'The History of a Movement'? or – which is even more complex to the non-specialist – Part II: 'The Theory of a Movement'? Part I, in effect, is an analysis of literary politics in Ukraine, both immediately before the Communist period and up to 1934 (when, effectively, all authorised literary activity became subject to the *diktat* of Moscow), while Part II anatomises the literary theories not only of the Futurists and their avant-garde contemporaries from other



groups, but also of the Soviet ideologues. The reader who is more interested in literature itself than in literary and political theory has either to plough through the first 200-plus pages of the book, or else skip directly to Part III: 'The Literary Legacy and the Major Practitioners'. Perhaps the author should consider, at a future date, reworking and expanding Part III into a separate work, targeted at a readership whose interest is comparative world literature. In such an event, he would, doubtlessly, deal more explicitly with certain points which he assumes, for an audience concerned with Ukrainian studies, need no explanation. A prime example is the incident when Mykhayil Semenko, the founding father of Futurism, first burned his copy of Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, and then adopted the title for his own collection of poems. For the 'outside' reader, unfamiliar with the quasi-religious reverence which Ukrainians pay to the work of their national poet, the full shock of this act to Semenko's contemporaries would not strike home.

As a work for specialists, however, this book is undoubtedly a scholarly breakthrough in a largely un-researched field. The subject matter (for all its complexity) is expounded lucidly (even when dealing with the literary politics of the 1920s, with their plethora of acronyms and initials), and the extracts from the Futurists' work well-chosen. Where the translation seems less than adequate, the fault may well lie not with Ilnytzkyj himself but with the differences between American and British usage (for example, the translation of Ukrainian 'Semafor' by 'semaphore' – a term which to the British reader evokes images of flag-waving Scouts rather than the railway signal which appeared on the Futurist journal of that name). There are also a few minor – but annoying – faults in production; for example, Semenko's visual poem 'Systema' is duly listed in the index but no page reference is given.

These, however, are only minor flaws in what is undoubtedly a major contribution to the study of Ukrainian literature. It appears, moreover, at an opportune moment, since as the article of Mykola Soroka which appears elsewhere in this journal notes, there is currently a new interest in Ukraine in the works of the Futurists, while today's Ukrainian exponents of one of the forms the Futurists pioneered – 'visual poetry' – are attracting attention world-wide.

Chernobyl: A Decade. Proceedings of the Fifth Chernobyl Sasakawa Medical Cooperation Symposium, Kiev, Ukraine, 14–15 October 1996 edited by Shunichi Yamashita and Yoshisada Shibata (Amsterdam-Lausanne-New York-Oxford-Shannon-Singapore-Tokyo: Elsevier, 1997), 613pp.

The conference which generated this book was the final event in a five-year co-operation project between Japan's Sasakawa Memorial Health Foundation and medical teams in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, monitoring the health effects of the fallout from the Chornobyl nuclear accident of 26 April 1986.


The Japanese role in post-Chornobyl studies is an interesting one. Immediately after the accident, the Japanese offered their help and expertise, since they had unique data and experience on the epidemiology and treatment of radiation-related diseases. In the event, it turned out that the Japanese exposure to nuclear

weapons produced very different morbidity patterns from the low-level but long-term exposure of inhabitants of the Chernobyl-contaminated areas. (Only for the 'liquidators' who worked at the Chernobyl station itself in the first few days after the explosion was there any similarity to the Japanese experience). Nevertheless, during the first months after the accident, when (in spite of the declared policy of *glasnost*) the governments of both the Soviet Union and neighbouring Poland were making every effort to conceal the extent of the contamination, Japanese physicists and doctors were frequently given access to data and areas barred to their Western colleagues. This seems to have been partly due to the attitude of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who, while admitting that an accident had indeed occurred, tried to utilise it as a propaganda weapon for attacking the West's nuclear weapons policies. The Japanese physicists, while 'playing the Hiroshima card', made it difficult for the Soviet authorities to deny them access, and much vital early data was 'leaked' to Western scientists by the Japanese – in particular, the presence of 'hot-spots' (heavy particles of highly radioactive material, including plutonium, from the reactor core) far beyond what were then officially designated the boundaries of the affected area.

When, eventually, almost three years after the accident, the Soviet authorities found themselves obliged to admit the full extent of the damage, they turned to the Japanese for help. An aid programme was inaugurated in May 1991, and, a few months later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, became a joint project between Japan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. A coordinated programme of health screening was inaugurated, based at five centres (Kyiv and Korosten in Ukraine, Mahileu and Homiel in Belarus, and Klintsy, Bryansk *oblast*, in Russia), concentrating on children aged from new-born to 10 years at the time of the accident, and using state-of-the-art equipment (provided by the Japanese). Annual conferences of the participants have been held since 1992, culminating in the Kyiv 1996 conference, whose papers form the content of this book.

This is, obviously, a work for specialists in radiation medicine. More than two-thirds of the volume consists of statistical material from the screening of close on 160,000 children, while the papers themselves are highly technical. Nevertheless, they – and the discussions which they sparked – yield a number of conclusions of interest to a lay readership.

In particular, according to Ilya A. Likhtarev (Scientific Centre for Radiation Medicine, Kyiv), specialists in radiation medicine are still divided into two camps: 'those who are working hard on the problem of radiation-induced thyroid cancer, and... people who doubt the results'. The latter still try to attribute the increase in morbidity to improved screening and reporting or psychological stress – anything, it would seem, rather than exposure to radiation. The work of the Sasakawa project, however, has revealed that '[i]n Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, the spots of high contamination after the accident in 1986 are statistically correlated as places of residence corresponding to the highest incidence of childhood thyroid cancer'. Furthermore, says Likhtarev, '[i]n 1986 we reported the secret information about the projections on thyroid cancer in the Ukraine. The same people who agree with our data now did not believe the fact that we discovered the childhood thyroid cancers at that time'.



Studies to date have concentrated on goitre. This, warns Anatoly K. Cheban (Scientific Centre for Radiation Medicine, Kyiv), could mean other serious diseases being overlooked. More work needs to be done, he suggests, not only on the effect on the thyroid of short-lived radioactive iodine ¹³¹I, immediately after the accident, but also the correlation between thyroid disease and radioactive caesium ¹³⁷Cs (half-life 30 years). Furthermore, Cheban urges, in further studies a distinction should be made between the high-risk groups of children – those evacuated from the town of Prypyat (3km from the Chernobyl power station) the day after the accident, and those evacuated from the 10-km zone around the power station on 5–6 May 1986.

Screening should also be extended to adults who have worked in the 30-km zone for 5–10 years, Cheban says.

The studies revealed that children under three years of age at the time of the accident form a particularly high-risk group, and therefore, according to Aldo Pinchera (University of Pisa), further investigations should be focused on these 'in order to save time and money and to be more effective in programming appropriate treatment'. Yevgenia I. Stepanova (Scientific Centre for Radiation Medicine, Kyiv) stresses that this group should include 'those prenatally affected'. She also identifies another high-risk group where further research is necessary: children born to participants of the initial clean-up operation.

Chernobyl, in short, is a problem which will not go away. International cooperation is necessary (participants from Ukraine and Belarus expressed their anxieties of how they could continue their work once the Japanese funding came to an end), but in many cases has led to duplication of effort. More and closer co-ordination is required, the conference participants stressed, including the establishment of an international data bank, possibly under the auspices of the World Health Organisation.

The results of the Sasakawa project would, of course, form a major contribution to such a bank, and it is pleasant to note that the contribution of that foundation both in humanitarian relief and epidemiological studies of the Chernobyl victims has been formally appreciated in Ukraine – with a decree of President Leonid Kuchma conferring the Order of Merit (Third Degree) on the president of the foundation, Yohei Sasakawa, and diplomas of honour from the Ukrainian government to the Japanese members of the organising committee and the manager of the project.

Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia

edited by Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 357pp.

This is a collection of 16 papers on what the blurb describes as the 'fluid military and security policy processes' in the various republics of the CIS. Nine of the papers are devoted to specific countries or groups of countries (four to Russia, two

to Ukraine, one to Belarus, one to the states of the Caucasus, and one to Central Asia). Four are devoted to conflict management and current conflicts (Tajikistan and Chechenia), and three to general issues – the network of security policy relations in the CIS, arms control and proliferation, and relations between the post-Soviet space and Europe.

The papers are the result of a joint research project between the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London and the Bundesinstitut für Internationale und Ostwissenschaftliche Studien in Cologne. As the list of contributors indicates, four of the papers were commissioned from scholars in the countries concerned, including the major contribution on Ukraine by Alexander Goncharenko of the Department of National and International Security of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, in Kyiv. His paper opens with a statement which effectively summarises the theme of the book:

The successor states of the Soviet Union are attempting to come to terms with what it means to become an independent state. This involves an articulation of national interests to provide a conceptual basis for independent foreign and security policies. Such interests are based on a society's understanding of the nature of its own identity as a people and a state, and on basic values, such as 'democracy', 'freedom' and 'independence'. Among the significant factors influencing this process are threat perceptions, analyses of the current political and economic situation, and also more traditional conceptions of a role in the international system.


For Ukraine, he continues, the 'principal objective' of

foreign policy is to assert the independence of the state in the international community and especially *vis-à-vis* Russia. The dispute with Russia since 1991 has been largely rooted in Russia's failure to treat Ukraine as an independent sovereign state and its assumption that Russia is the successor state to the USSR. Ukraine has thus challenged Russia's attempt to assume a leadership role in the CIS and to institutionalize such a role.

Following this preamble, Goncharenko proceeds to give an able analysis of the problems and dilemmas facing Ukraine immediately after independence, beginning with the 'Catch-22' situation that 'the building of a national state necessitates a national consensus on the identity of the state and its people... and yet the consolidation of such a consensus is difficult, if not impossible, without a strong unified state'. He then analyses the 'official' concept of national security, as approved by the Ukrainian parliament in May 1995 ('ensuring the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity; overcoming the nation's economic crisis and developing a market economy; creating a civic society subject to the rule of law; and integration into the European and world community'), stresses the vital importance of 'real economic independence' as a prerequisite of political independence, outlines the steps taken by the Kuchma government in its early months to introduce the necessary economic reforms, and puts considerable stress on the constitutional agreement of 9 June 1995, as the legal basis for the 'strong and competent executive power' necessary to put through 'tough and consistent' reform policies.

Unfortunately (and somewhat unusually for a publication from Chatham House, which puts considerable emphasis on topicality), Goncharenko's paper appears to have been written in late 1995 and only superficially updated – at one point he

speaks of the time of writing as being 'almost four years' after the establishment of independence. As a result, the second section, 'Ukraine in the former Soviet space', goes no further than the December 1995 'open row... in the Ukrainian parliament' over Ukraine's status regarding the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS, and Russia's attempts to use that body to promote CIS integration. Hence, although much of Goncharenko's analysis remains relevant – particularly as regards Ukraine's national interests and its opposition to the conversion of the CIS into a new, Moscow-centred 'USSR Mark-2', he does not address such important later developments as the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia and the resolution of the disputes over the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. The final section, 'Options for Ukrainian security policy', does, indeed, bring events forward to the Helsinki summit of March 1997 and the NATO Summit of July 1997, but in it Goncharenko concentrates on the various options facing Ukraine within its 'current



and, no doubt, future role' as a 'buffer, or, in Kuchma's words, a "bridge", between Russia and the CIS and the West'. 'Ukraine', Goncharenko concludes, 'thus finds itself in an almost classic situation: as a smaller country, wanted not just by one but by two large powers or blocs, the newly independent state has a chance to survive'. One might surely have expected, therefore, a reference to negotiations so vital in normalising relations with the potentially more dangerous of those 'large powers'.

Goncharenko's prognosis for Ukraine is cautiously optimistic. 'Ukraine', he says,

has always been and will continue to be a part of Europe and the European cultural tradition. The republic's integration into European political, economic and security structures is historically preordained by virtue of its national and cultural development. Unfavourable devel-

opments in the international environment and/or the policies of certain countries could slow down or delay this process. But its artificial termination in the present atmosphere of national revival in Ukraine, including the increasing understanding of the Ukrainian people of their national identity and their basic national interests, is no longer possible.

Goncharenko discusses Ukraine's security options in the macro-context of geopolitics and world economic and political trends. In contrast, the second of the two specifically Ukraine-oriented papers, Taras Kuzio's 'Ukrainian security planning: constraints and options', focuses on those options from the point of view of the specific problems facing the armed forces: budgetary constraints, the socio-economic crisis, low morale, corruption and lack of discipline. Hence, whereas Goncharenko considers the security 'options' of potential alliances, and the extent to which Ukraine should be involved in them, Kuzio deals rather with military capability, plans for reform of the armed forces (and opposition to it), and military doctrine. He pinpoints the economic and social constraints on security planning (including inadequate finance, the lack of a 'closed domestic military cycle', and the low educational level and poor health of conscripts), and notes that while '[i]t is

accepted by the government that a reform of the armed forces is necessary... such reform, including a reduction in manpower from 420,000 to 350,000 by the year 2005 and an evolution from a Soviet organizational system to one of corps, brigades and battalions, will be staunchly opposed both within and outside the armed forces'. He touches briefly on the Friendship Treaty with Russia and the negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet, observing that, while these developments have 'reduced the likelihood of an actual threat coming from Moscow', they have 'not yet altered the Ukrainian *perception* of threat. Even after the Russian-Ukrainian treaty had been signed, 48 per cent of Ukraine's elites continued to perceive Russia as the country's greatest threat'. As to the future, Kuzio, like Goncharenko, envisages a Europe-oriented scenario. But in place of Goncharenko's mellifluous rhetoric on Ukraine's historical destiny, Kuzio simply opines that Ukraine will 'continue to drift westwards', thus 'balanc[ing] its relations with Russia'. The paper concludes with an Appendix on Ukraine's armed forces, essentially a reworking of Kuzio's articles on this subject in *Jane's Intelligence Review*.

Although these two papers will undoubtedly command the prime attention of readers concerned with developments in today's Ukraine, it would be a major error to ignore the other contributions to this extremely informative and worthwhile book. The four papers on Russia, as Ukraine's largest and most powerful neighbour, are obviously of major importance. Hannes Adomeit, in 'Russian national security interests', not only notes the continuing tendency of Russian policy-makers to consider that Russia's security interests give them a right to intervene in what they term the 'near abroad'; he also stresses the 'lack of moral quality' and prevalence of double standards in the Russian policy debate.

Hans-Henning Schröder, in 'The Russian army in politics', investigates the 'strangely ambivalent', role of the Russian armed forces during the post-Soviet transition, both 'guarantee[ing] the continuation of Russian statehood and a certain stability', and, at the same time, 'constitut[ing] a latent threat to democratic development'. He concludes that '[o]verall in the post-Soviet period the influence of the Russian military has been decisive only in situations where the politicians have failed' as in 1993, and that while 'the majority of the Russian population appears to react positively to "strong men" from a military background', nevertheless 'this has not led to any attempt by the Russian armed forces to take politics into their own hands'. He makes no prognosis, however, of what may occur in the future, and the results of various opinion polls conducted in the armed forces, which he presents in an appendix, give one cause for serious thought.

Christoph Bluth's paper, 'Russian military forces: ambitions, capabilities and constraints', analyses the military doctrine and force requirements designed to implement national security policy and the contradictions between force and capabilities. He stresses the need for military reform and the down-sizing of the huge military establishment and nuclear arsenal inherited from Soviet times, and shows that this is being hindered, not only by Russia's continuing economic crisis, but also by the patterns of thought of 'many in the military establishment' who 'see Russia's strategic nuclear forces as the guarantor of the country's great-power status and seek to maintain as much as possible of the former Soviet Union's capabilities for large-scale conventional warfare'.

Parallel with the reform of the military, Russia clearly needs a radical restructuring of its defence industry. Julian Cooper's paper, 'The future role of the Russian defence industry', begins by outlining the Soviet production capacity 'lost' to Russia with the collapse of the USSR. Post-1991 Russia thus lacks a 'genuine across-the-board capability' in defence production, although, as Cooper correctly notes, the 'impact of fractured supply links' was to some extent cushioned 'by the existence of stockpiles of materials and components and also by the ability of enterprise directors to draw on long-standing personal contacts in order to maintain supplies, often on a barter basis'. Cooper goes into some detail about Russia's slow progress (to date) and prospects for restructuring its defence industry, including the re-forming of old Soviet-era links. The most significant of the latter, he notes, is

the Russian-Ukrainian FIG *Mezhdunarodnye aviatsionnye motory*, which brings together almost 40 design organizations and enterprises engaged in the development and manufacture of aero engines, the principal members being the Zaporizhzhia Progress design bureau and AO Motor Sich, the biggest aero-engine factory of the FSU.

Important, too, for those interested in the Ukrainian defence scene is the paper on Ukraine's northern neighbour, Belarus, by Vyachaslau Paznyak, Director of the International Institute for Policy Studies in Minsk – an insightful but depressing analysis of that country as being in a 'transition adrift', and what its President's commitment to 'reintegration' with Russia (and his constant fomenting of anti-NATO sentiments) means for the sovereignty and security of Belarus.

The four papers which together make up the section 'Conflicts and CIS collective security efforts', although interesting in themselves, are perhaps less relevant to Ukraine, since, to date, Ukraine has stood out against joining any Moscow-led CIS peacekeeping force. Jonathan Aves' paper on the Caucasus states and Oumirserik Kasenov's on Central Asia, on the other hand, do have a Ukrainian dimension – in view of the development of a 'southern corridor', by-passing Russia, to supply oil and gas to Ukraine.

The two papers final papers by Christoph Bluth ('Arms control and proliferation' and 'The post-Soviet space and Europe') effectively place the dilemmas and developments of the FSU in a context of world-wide security, and suggest possible scenarios for the future – including the worst-case scenario of the destabilisation of the Russian Federation, and possible "afghanization" of some parts of Central Asia', with a consequent 'very considerable pressure' on NATO 'to provide security guarantees to the countries of central Europe and the Baltic states at least'. What would happen to Ukraine under such circumstances is not spelled out – Bluth merely forecasts that 'neighbouring countries could be drawn in, resulting in the destabilization of much of southern central Europe'. But anyone concerned with the fate of Ukraine must agree with him that 'the prevention of such an outcome must be the highest policy priority for western Europe'. □

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Current Events

Elections 1998 in Ukraine: Expectations and Results

Serhiy Tolstov

I. 'Great Politics' in Action

One may, without exaggeration, consider the ratification by the Supreme Rada of the first post-Soviet Constitution of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 as the prologue to the election campaign of 1997–8. This was an intrinsically important event in political life – the creation of new legislative activity of the power structures of the country as a whole. However, this innovation, vital as it was for the consolidation of democratic society, gave rise to a visible increase in political tension, first and foremost in relations between the President and Parliament. A characteristic feature of the entire political history of Ukraine after the ratification of the Constitution in 1996 was a sense of foreboding that a conflict between the legislature and the executive was near at hand.

The final text of the Constitution defined some significant changes in the interrelation of the powers of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Supreme Rada and the judiciary. However, a more accurate definition of the real distribution of authority and the exercise of power was left to various constitutional laws which were to be drafted and ratified by the Supreme Rada in the near future.

President Leonid Kuchma, who on 11 October 1994 had solemnly proclaimed a course of economic reform, soon lost interest in practical economic problems, and put the onus of formal responsibility on to the government. However, although Article 113 of the Constitution stipulates that the Cabinet of Ministers 'is the highest body in the system of bodies of executive power', its real powers usually depend on the executive 'vertical', which is appointed and controlled by the President. Hence, the state of the actual powers of the government and the methods of forming the government course was gradually to be perceived by the majority of opposition politicians to be the direct cause of the protracted decline of the economy and the ineffectiveness of the measures taken by the executive in the hope of curbing the systemic crisis. These circumstances triggered the aspiration of various opposition groups to amend the Constitution so that a government could be formed by the Supreme Rada on the basis of the parliamentary majority, and the political responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers for its programme and current activity be increased.

For two years, the Presidential Administration successfully defended the right of the head of state to appoint all office-holders in the state apparatus. The President's advisers strove to compensate for what they had lost in the constitutional process, and to restore the autocratic form of government, which had existed in Ukraine during 1995–6 in the form of the provisional Constitutional

Agreement between the President and the Supreme Rada. However, in the new situation this would have been managed only by preserving and consolidating the informal control exercised by the Presidential Administration over the Cabinet of Ministers, by the issuing of presidential decrees and the use of the presidential veto to block the passage of constitutional and other, general, laws which the Administration found uncongenial. The only alternative to such methods of covert administrative-bureaucratic control would be a putsch and the establishment of some form of dictatorship.

The Presidential Administration showed itself ready to utilise any opportunity for a confrontation with Parliament, which, according to the President's entourage, was the principal obstacle to economic reform. There were even several attempts during the lifetime of the Supreme Rada of 1994–8 to oust Oleksander Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party, from the position of chairman (i.e. Speaker), and to replace him by someone more complaisant.

In the autumn of 1996, the Presidential Administration consciously opted for a political showdown situation and launched a new round of the power struggle, aimed at exposing and quashing the opposition to Kuchma. The President himself, speaking on 16 September 1996, unexpectedly revealed his intention to run for a second term of office, and alerted the political milieu to the possibility of a pre-term election campaign. This looked like a blatant provocation, particularly as according to the Constitution the next presidential election was due in October 1999. In 1996, former prime minister Yevhen Marchuk (1995–6) and the incumbent parliamentary speaker Oleksander Moroz also declared their intention to run in the next presidential election. The former justice minister Serhiy Holovaty, the leader of the left-populist Progressive Socialist Party Nataliya Vitrenko, and several less well-known politicians followed suit with similar declarations. Former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko (1996–7), the head of the National Bank of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and, possibly, the leader of the Communist Party Petro Symonenko are also potential candidates for the presidency.

The fact that political forces are to a marked degree identified with personalities had an effect on the parliamentary election campaign of 1997–8. This influence was twofold. Firstly, most of the prospective candidates for the presidency (with the exception of Serhiy Holovaty and Viktor Yushchenko) had established themselves as leaders of powerful political parties. Accordingly, in the election of 29 March 1998 these parties passed the 4 per cent barrier and won seats in the Supreme Rada on the basis of proportional representation. Secondly, in the situation established in Ukraine by the 1996 Constitution, namely a presidential-parliamentary republic with a substantially major share of power going to the President, the personalised nature of the political struggle helped accelerate the division of political forces into pro-presidential and opposition.

II. Economic Background of the Election

The parliamentary election of 29 March 1998 took place in extremely difficult conditions with the deepening of the general economic, political and social crises. Despite the lack of foreign investment, Ukraine's foreign-economic and political dependence on the industrially developed countries was increasing. The

budget deficit and steep rise of the state debt constantly raised the threat of a financial crash, which could only be averted by new, increased borrowing on disadvantageous terms.

The general economic decline, which had been going on in Ukraine since Gorbachev's perestroika, cannot rationally be explained by blaming everything on the phenomenon of 'post-Soviet transition'. The government's apparent inability to implement a realistic model of development, to define and defend the national interests of Ukraine, to realise the transition from the all-powerful rule of a bureaucratic oligarchy to a citizen society has preserved the crisis situation. The continuation of such a situation threatens the ultimate loss of the prospect of development, which is a fundamental feature of developed states.

In the context of the 1998 general election, the economic situation served as a backdrop to the developing election campaign. As a result, social security issues and social populism came strongly to the fore in the election manifestos of most parties, whether pro-government or opposition.

At the session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 19 January 1998, Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko declared that the rate of increase of the overall volume of salary arrears in the state employment sector had been stabilised. He said that during his premiership the total volume of the salary debts had remained virtually unchanged. He noted that in 1997 the salary arrears due to employees in the state sector had been reduced by approximately 35 per cent. The total volume of salary arrears in all sectors of the economy rose by almost 29 per cent during 1997, and in the second half of the year – by 5 per cent. As of 1 January 1998 it amounted to about 5.3 billion Ukrainian Hryvnyas (UAH) and did not decrease in the first quarter of 1998.¹ According to data from the National Bank of Ukraine, on 1 April 1998 arrears stood at 5,337 billion UAH.

According to Minister of Finance Ihor Mityukov, the back-log of pensions paid from the State Pension Fund as of 1 January 1998 totalled 1.287 billion UAH. Thus, the overall amount of arrears on salaries and pensions continued to increase and reached 6.6 billion UAH. Inefficient economic policy and recourse to loans meant that, according to official government figures, at the beginning of 1998 the external debt of Ukraine was running at US \$9.8 billion. In 1998, this will require more than 2.6 billion UAH from budgetary funds for debt servicing. The total state debt of Ukraine rose by 43 per cent in 1997, to reach 31.1 billion UAH (or nearly US \$15.5 billion) by the end of the year.²

The situation with domestic debt bonds was also aggravated. Expert estimates indicated that the total value of these bonds had reached the equivalent of US \$7 billion by the beginning of 1998. The rate of return on the internal debt bonds reached levels unprecedented in world practice. According to the head of the Accounting Chamber of the Supreme Rada, Valentyn Symonenko, the issuing of

¹ *Den*, 22 January 1998; Address by the head of the Accounting Chamber, Valentyn Symonenko, at the session of the Supreme Rada on 19 May 1998, *Holos Ukrayiny*, 22 May 1998.

² Address by the head of the Accounting Chamber, Valentyn Symonenko, at the session of the Supreme Rada on 19 May 1998, *Holos Ukrayiny*, 22 May 1998.

such treasury bills of internal debt means an unprecedented cost to the state budget. From January to 1 April 1998, the government floated bills to the value of 2.9 billion UAH. From their discounted 'sale' the budget received only 2.1 billion UAH. At the same time, 2.5 billion UAH were paid out for the servicing of the existing domestic debt bills. Hence, government operations on these bills were clearly loss-making and could only deepen the budget crisis.³

On 8 April 1998, at an All-Ukrainian conference on the implementation of the presidential Decree 'On the fundamental directions of social policy for 1997–2000', the following official data were announced regarding unemployment: as of 1 April 1998 unemployment in Ukraine was running at close to 2.8 per cent, or, according to the international methodology of counting – 6.7 per cent. However, taking hidden unemployment into account, in certain individual regions of Ukraine it reached over one-third of the potential work-force.

The findings of various public opinion polls on perceived standard of living revealed that around 40 per cent of the citizens of Ukraine claimed that they did not have enough money for proper nutrition and approximately 40–45 per cent said that they could afford only the most staple foodstuffs. About 80 per cent of the adult population said that their standard of living had recently deteriorated. No less than 40 per cent believed that in 1998 their financial position would get even worse. Asked to rate the problems which were causing them concern, the respondents invariably put forward their disastrous financial situation at the top of the list.

The international image of the country was steadily declining. The rating of the *Central European Economic Review*, drawn up at the beginning of 1998, covering 26 former socialist Central European countries and former Soviet republics, allocated Ukraine 19th position out of 26. On a rating scale from '0' to '10' Ukraine received 3.9 points, while Hungary (in first place) had 8.0 points. Tajikistan (in last place) received 2.2 points. Among the European post-Communist countries only Yugoslavia which had suffered a civil war and Albania where there had been ruinous civil disturbances had economic conditions worse than in Ukraine.

In contrast to the political realities of neighbouring Central-European countries, the ruling administrative bureaucracy in Ukraine has managed to halt the formation of a modern political system of the European type, in which political parties act as the voices of broad, nation-wide and social-group interests, and where the parties which succeed in winning the support of the majority of citizens at elections form the organs of legislative and executive power. Nevertheless, one may state that the election campaign of 1997–8 was an important step forward in the reduction of bureaucratic high-handedness in the state and brought society significantly closer to the principle of party responsibility in politics.

At the same time, one can also observe the constant presence of significant danger signals, warning against the threat posed by the resistance of the administrative-bureaucratic circles to the changes taking place in the political system of the country. Thus, representatives of the executive power deliberately advocated the need to introduce extraordinary and emergency powers (e.g., an 'economic

³ Ibid.

state of emergency'), tried to reduce the significance of the Constitution, deliberately flouting its provisions, attempted to get society accustomed to unconstitutional methods of pressure on the opposition, and so on.

III. The Party Mosaic

The Ukrainian electorate was by now long-past being surprised. Over the past 7 years, it had grown accustomed to every type of unexpected development and vicissitude of life. Despite the government's constant promises of changes for the better and the overcoming of economic recession, every new wave of pseudo-reforms brought Ukrainian citizens only new hardships and tough endurance tests.

The pre-election tapestry of Ukrainian political parties was extremely confusing not only for politically inexperienced citizens but also for experts in political science. The primitive political system was not conducive to the precise classification of political parties in terms of a traditional left-to-right political spectrum.

The specific conditions of Ukrainian political development over recent years had compelled various parties and public associations to a greater or lesser extent to seek and establish closer ties with the executive authorities (which were, for the most part, formally non-partisan) in order to get favourable conditions or even banal neutrality on the part of the administrative bureaucracy in certain regions. The overwhelming majority of these parties were run by persons with some experience of holding high state posts, and their manifestos, with the exception of those of the Communists, nationalists and various extremist groupings, were presented mostly in centrist terms. However, the true nature of the programmes was very different.

A formal analysis of the election platforms of the 30 parties and blocs which participated in the elections reveals that, from the point of view of their place in the present political spectrum of Ukraine, they can be ranked as follows (from left to right).

Left (3 parties and blocs): Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU), 'Trudova Ukrayina' (Working Ukraine), Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU). The dominant member of this group is undoubtedly the KPU, and its platform in comparison with other left-wing parties, particularly the PSPU, appears more moderate.

Left-Centre (11 groupings): Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU), All-Ukrainian Party of Workers, Green Party (PZU), 'Bloc of Democratic Parties – NEP (Democracy, Economy, Order)', Socialist and Agrarian Parties (SPU/SelPU) election bloc, Party of Regional Rebirth, Party of Spiritual, Economic and Social Progress, Party of Defenders of the Native Land, Party of Muslims, Agrarian Party, Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) – SDPU(o).

Specific phenomena of this group are the Agrarian Party (an administrative-bureaucratic party, whose platform included elements of state regulation of the economy), the SPU/SelPU bloc, which is rapidly evolving in a centrist direction, and the SDPU(o). In the SDPU(o), representatives of large capital are predominant, however, its platform contains left-centre elements, particularly as regards state regulation of prices. The dominant members of this group are the SPU/SelPU bloc and the SDPU(o). A number of parties in this group, to a greater or lesser extent,

declared their support for state-monopoly methods of regulating the economy and the social sphere, in particular, the NEP, the Green Party, the Agrarian Party, and the SDPU(o). In spite of the left-centre orientation of the Greens' platform, their party list was composed predominantly of representatives of business.

Centre (4 parties and blocs): 'Hromada' (Community) Party, 'Soyuz' (Union) Party, the 'European Choice of Ukraine' election bloc, the Christian-Democratic Party.

Right-Centre (3 groupings): The liberal orientation is represented by the 'Party of Labour and Liberal Party of Ukraine – Together!' election bloc. The Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) and the Republican Christian Party are of a nationalist orientation.

Right (7 groupings): the 'SLOn – Social-Liberal Union' election bloc, the 'Vpered Ukrayino!' (Forward Ukraine) election bloc, the Party of 'Reform and Order', the 'National Front' election bloc, the National-Democratic Party (NDP), the Party of National-Economic Rebirth, the All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives.

Extreme Right (2 groupings): the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA; right-wing, moderate-extremist, which officially declares its orientation to be centrist. A certain eve of election moderation of the UNA's platform did not imply a renunciation of extremist principles and methods of political activity) and the 'Less Words' election bloc (extreme-right, fascist groupings of national-socialist orientation).

Regarding the attitude of the principal participants in the election campaign of 1997–8 towards the government, we can distinguish eight groups.

1. 'Party of Power'

The increased challenge from the opposition compelled the administrative-bureaucratic circles to speed up the formation of their own party-type structures, in order to participate in the electoral process. The party scheme clearly depicted the focus of power, dominated by the National-Democratic Party (founded in 1996). The nucleus of this grouping was made up of influential figures from the executive and a number of deputies of the Supreme Rada, who, over the past few years, had held leading posts in the state apparatus. The leaders of this party had the greatest influence on the shaping of the policies of the Cabinet of Ministers of Valeriy Pustovoytenko, who headed the party list of the NDP. The NDP had its people at the head of the Vinnytsya and Kharkiv provincial administrations, and numerous county executive structures, and enjoyed a favoured position when administrative posts were being allotted.

The Agrarian Party had considerable support from the central executive structures. This party was founded in 1996 as a counterbalance to the Peasant Party, which formed part of the parliamentary faction and the election bloc led by Oleksander Moroz. A number of Agrarian Party members held the posts of government ministers, and headed a number of provincial (particularly Odesa and Lviv) and county administrations.

The Ukrainian 'party of power' differed from the ruling parties in countries of developed democracy in that their ruling status was informal. Since the executive

power structure formally had no party ties, this specific situation of an informal 'ruling party' was manifested only in its influence on the Presidential Administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, individual ministries, state committees and local (provincial and county) administrations. At the same time, since the party status of persons in administrative posts does not depend on election results, the 'party of power' in actual fact is not politically accountable for its actions.

2. 'Loyal' Centre

By the of spring 1998, the gravitation towards the pole of executive power of the majority of centrist parties was clearly perceptible. Persons recruited from the executive structures figured strongly on the election lists of almost all of them, which was evidence of the growth of internal conflicts in the bureaucratic circles and the system of executive power as a whole, and reflected the clash of ambitions and interests.

The loyalty of the centrists to the executive may be considered as primarily a tactical one, conditioned by specific pre-election interests and the need to take advantage of the current public mood. The dependence of any centrist party on the Presidential Administration is determined by its leaders' calculations of how to get their own people into key posts in the state apparatus. When a conflict of interests arises, the centrists from the pro-presidential parties are sometimes inclined to assume the role of a moderate opposition. In particular, this is true of former prime minister Yevhen Marchuk, who was initially on the party list, and later led the Social-Democratic Party (united) parliamentary faction.

The disunity within the democratic movement in the first half of the 1990s and the growth in the number of political parties displaying the social-group interests of individual clans, meant that there was no chance for a realistic opposition to develop. In this regard, the executive power not only did nothing to discourage the proliferation of political groups with little influence and small membership, but actively encouraged the founding of pocket parties, the total number of which eventually reached 50.

However, the variations within this political spectrum were far more apparent than real. It was not based on any meaningful differences in programme or ideology. Hence this political spectrum inevitably grew narrower, and this was accelerated by the electoral process and in particular by the decision of a number of political parties and citizens' groups to sign, in November 1997, a Memorandum on coordinated actions for the duration of the election campaign of 1997–8, an idea which was put forward on the initiative of the President and his team.

The 'party of power' was, thus, in essence, officially founded as an actor in the electoral process. Otherwise-differing political tendencies were brought together by their loyalty to President Kuchma and the policies of his Administration. The Memorandum was signed by the National-Democratic Party (NDU), the Agrarian Party (APU), the Democratic Party (DemPU), the Liberal Party (LPU), the International Bloc of Reform (MBR), the Labour Party, the Social-Democratic Party (united), the Ukrainian Party of Justice (UPS), the Christian-Democratic Party (KhDPU), the social-political movement 'Crimea – our Home', the union 'New Ukraine', the

Social-Liberal Union (SLOn), and the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen (USPP).

The opposition stance of the SDP(o) and SLOn was to some degree determined by their desire to win the support of the electorate. This suited their leaders down to the ground, since it allowed them to make use of the personnel and financial support of the administrative structures during the election campaign, and at the same time to disclaim responsibility for the catastrophic state of the economy and the social sphere.

Although there was a large number of centrist parties, only the party lists of the SDPU(o) and the Green Party got through to the Supreme Rada. In the constituencies (where the system was first-past-the-post) members were returned from the 'Reforms and Order', the Inter-regional Bloc of Reform (SLOn union), the Democratic, Christian-Democratic and Liberal Parties and the Party of Regional Rebirth. Nine constituency members were elected from the Agrarian Party.

3. Centrist Opposition

The nationwide centrist opposition is represented by the 'Hromada' (Community) Party, founded in 1994. This party has openly declared that it disagrees in principle with the course pursued by the executive power. In the opening stage of the election campaign, 'Hromada' was able to capture the political and organisational initiative. Its role in the campaign depended to a considerable degree on the ability of this party to withstand the destructive assault of the executive structures and its leaders against, first and foremost, former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko.

The overall temperature of the election campaign was to a considerable degree determined by the race for the opposition between the *de facto* ruling National-Democratic Party and 'Hromada'. Until late summer/early autumn 1997, the only realistic opposition to the executive power was offered by the left-wing parties with their traditional slogans of restoring socialism, bringing back the USSR, etc. This meant that the Left encountered a sharply confrontational response in society, and increased the polarisation of the latter. On the other hand, this reminder of the threat of a Left victory gave the government the chance to invoke the Russian scenario of the presidential election campaign of 1996 ('Don't let the Communists back into power!'), a strategy in which they had the approval of the USA, European countries and Russia. It was evident that the initial scenario of the election campaign devised by the Presidential Administration and the NDP was built on future resistance to the Left. The shift of 'Hromada' to opposition in principle to the political course of the Kuchma-Pustovoytenko group destroyed this model and resulted in the formation of a centrist alternative to the government in power – a precedent for Ukraine.

The ideological platform of 'Hromada' represents an attempt to make a synthesis of European Social-Democracy, the Ukrainian national idea (in the sense of economic and spiritual rebirth) and a strategy of national rescue. 'Hromada' represents a model of popular capitalism, aimed at European standards, which re-echoes the ideas of notable European reformers, including Willi Brandt, Olaf Palme, Leszek Balcerowicz.

Now, to a greater or lesser degree, all the minor opposition parties which proved unsuccessful in the March 1998 elections are gravitating towards 'Hromada'. This is true, in particular, of individual representatives of the KhDPU, URP, UKRP, and other minor parties.

4. 'National-Democrats'

The national-democrats are represented by the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh). Its influence in society has decreased substantially in comparison with the 1990 election, when Rukh acted as the main force of democratic opposition to the Communist regime. This party has regular, traditional supporters in most regions of the country. No one doubted that it would pass the proportional-representation 4 per cent threshold, however, the aspiration of its leaders to become part of the 'party of power' led to a further decline in its support from the voters. For Rukh constituency candidates the most acute problem was rivalry with representatives of the 'National Front' in the western provinces (Galicia and Volhynia), where Rukh formed a bloc with the NDP.

For purely tactical reasons, Rukh did not sign the pro-presidential Memorandum on agreed actions during the election campaign of 1997–8. In fact, its leader Vyacheslav Chornovil adopted a stance of consistent support for the government. Having in its ranks representatives of the government (two leading ministers and the governors – of the Chernivtsi and Ternopil provinces), and *de facto* control of the city councils of Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, the Rukh leadership tried artificially to imitate the opposition to the existing ruling authorities. The leader of Rukh focused all his energy in the election campaign on fighting the opposition parties, first and foremost, 'Hromada' and the 'National Front'.

5. National-Patriots

The right-wing, nationalist opposition was represented in the election campaign by the union 'National Front', comprising the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP). This coalition differed from Rukh in its opposition to the executive and in its greater ideological conservatism, particularly in ethnic and cultural matters and questions of forms of ownership and relations with Russia.

6. The Traditional Left

At the 1998 elections the left-wing parties (a bloc led by Oleksander Moroz, consisting of the Socialist and Peasant Party and the Communist Party of Ukraine) appeared more or less consistently as a single front, taking its orientation from the leadership of Moroz. In the hope of avoiding rivalry between left-wing candidates during the election, on 28 January 1998 the Communist, Socialist and Peasant Parties signed a tripartite agreement on the division of the majoritarian constituencies. Throughout 1997, the speaker of the Supreme Rada, Oleksander Moroz, while officially not abandoning his left-wing views, was certainly cultivating the image of a centrist state activist. This factor allowed part of the Left to conduct a nation-wide election campaign from left-centrist positions that were more explicit than might

have been expected. Moroz significantly increased his influence in the course of the constitutional debates of 1996. He may well be considered as a virtually irreplaceable leader of the Left as a whole, and potentially the most respectable one. Moroz's political paradigm can be defined as a gradual transition from Soviet populist dogma to a social-democratic programme of European standard in conditions of the regrouping of forces of the Left and left-centrist sectors of the political spectrum. The only significant obstacle to this course of events could be the opposition of the Communists, which has increased as a result of their domination of the left wing in comparison with the Socialist and Peasant Parties, not to mention the various petty parties.

The unstable internal political situation meant that the position of the left-wing leaders during the election focused on blocking the attempts of the government to abolish or postpone the election, to refuse to recognise the validity of their results, or even to dissolve the newly elected Parliament.

7. The 'New Left'

A number of alternative left-wing movements also fielded candidates in the election. The most successful was the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU), led by Nataliya Vitrenko. By means of its active public campaign and impudent ultra-Communist demagoguery, this party was able to put some pressure on the traditional Left – the Communists and Socialists. The Presidential Administration counted on using the PSPU as a counterbalance to the Socialists and Communists in the campaign for the votes of the left-leaning electorate. The Presidential entourage made active use of the leaders of the PSPU as a tool against Oleksander Moroz and Pavlo Lazarenko. The increase of the popularity of the PSPU also helped Nataliya Vitrenko's declaration of her intention to run for the presidency in 1999.

8. Radical Nationalists

At the far right of the political spectrum there is a series of extremist, radical-nationalist and pro-fascist groups, which for the most part try to alarm society with the prospect of chaos and disorder should the government slacken its control. The chances of these groups exercising any real political influence on public opinion seem negligible.

According to data from a public opinion poll, in the first stages of the election campaign, some 7–9 parties and blocs enjoyed a significant degree of popularity, in particular the Communists, the bloc of the Socialist and Peasant Parties, the NDDP, SDPU(o), 'Hromada', Rukh, the 'National Front' and the bloc NEP (in which the Democratic Party of Ukraine participated).

In January 1998, a fairly realistic forecast of the election results was publicised by the then presidential adviser, Dmytro Tabachnyk, who during 1994–6 held the post of head of the Presidential Administration.⁴

In an interview for the newspaper *Kyivska Pravda*, Tabachnyk expressed his belief that in the new Supreme Rada there would be an increase in the representa-

⁴ *Kyivaska Pravda*, 1998, 20 January, pp. 1, 2.

tion of the KPU and SPU/SelPU among the Left. In his opinion, this would mean that action on many urgent issues, including land and property rights would be indefinitely deferred. However, in Tabachnyk's view, the total proportion of the Left in parliament would not exceed 40 per cent. At the same time, he expected the election to Parliament of many wealthy representatives of the business community, who would oppose the Left. Among the centrist parties which had a chance of winning seats, Tabachnyk named the NDP, SDPU(o), DemPU, Labour Party and 'Hromada'. The forecasts for the share of votes were 8–12 per cent of the electorate; and for 'Hromada' – 4–6 per cent. Tabachnyk described the NDP as a non-viable, artificially created party which might possibly get through the 4 per cent barrier, but would have no major success. In his opinion, the centrist parties failed to take the elections seriously, when they allowed as many as 30 independent parties and blocs to register on the proportional representation lists.

IV. The Content of the Election Campaign

The 1998 election campaign in Ukraine proceeded rather unusually – convulsively, chaotically, with a profound sense of drama and prophesies of surprises and freak results. The new Law on Elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine approved by the Supreme Rada on 24 September 1997 and signed by the President on 22 October was introduced with a substantial delay.

The ratification by the Supreme Rada of a new electoral law was possible in the first place due to the tactical concurrence of interests of the leaders of the influential alternative parliamentary groupings – Oleksander Moroz, Pavlo Lazarenko and Yevhen Marchuk, who supported the need for modernisation of the political system. With the support of the Communists and Rukh in the previous Parliament, they were able to overcome the opposition of the pro-presidential deputy group 'Constitutional Centre'.

From the very beginning of the election campaign, presidential and government structures felt a sharp change in the political climate. Against the background of a practically unviable system of power of the post-Soviet oligarchy, a new system of competitive access to power began clearly to emerge. This threatened to halt the uncontrolled rule of the President and bring his powers in line with the 1996 Constitution. Nor should one underestimate the competence of the presidential apparatus, which immediately realised the potential consequences of introducing a new electoral law, and hence put up a resolute opposition to it. On 10 October 1997, the date of the official opening of the parliamentary election campaign (as specified by law), the President deferred signing the Law on Elections. Under pressure from the Presidential Administration and the Constitutional Court, on 12 and 30 December 1997 various amendments to the law were introduced. Now there appeared some groups of pro-presidential deputies who threatened to use the Constitutional Court to abolish the proportional representation part of the electoral process. From January to March 1998, the Constitutional Court on more than one occasion framed amendments to the law and changed the interpretation of its individual articles. However, despite all the attempts and efforts on the part of the Presidential Administration to sabotage the holding of the election on a party, proportional-representation basis, the election campaign began to gather momentum.

The introduction, in late 1997, of a mixed system (part first-past-the-post, part proportional-representation) turned the election campaign into a kind of political theatre. Old political parties and nascent political blocs began running at top speed to board the election campaign 'express'. And the most amusing part of it all was that virtually any party or bloc that wanted to take part in the campaign could do so.

As a result, the political palette in the elections included a huge number of components. Prior to the opening of the campaign, only a handful of party groupings had developed their own theoretical principles or sophisticated ideological concepts. The factor of personal political leadership in the parties and blocs, together with the extent to which they represented economic and regional interests was becoming ever more important, although it would be imprudent to underestimate the influence of party ideologies, which played an unquantifiable but clearly increasing role during and especially after the election campaign.

The first major sensation that ran counter to the expectations and forecasts of political observers came in December 1997, when the Central Electoral Commission registered 30 out of the 32 parties and blocs which had submitted applications to take part in the proportional-representation part of the elections. To get on to the proportional-representation list, parties had to submit a petition with the signatures of 200,000 electors, collected in 14 (out of 26, including the city of Kyiv) administrative territorial regions and units of Ukraine, and it had been thought that not more than 8–10 parties and blocs would manage this. Many of the minuscule parties made use of a loop-hole in the Law on Elections, which permitted a citizen to sign the petitions of more than one party. Indeed (according to experts), more than 10 parties and blocs gathered the requisite number of signatures simply by copying each others' lists, and so managed to pass the stipulated mark. Parties which could not manage to collect the necessary signatures in some regions came to a mutual arrangement about sharing and swapping lists. It is also patently clear that the Presidential Administration was in favour of having as many parties and blocs as possible taking part in the election. This logically demonstrated that only the presidential team and the executive power as such would benefit from such a situation.

It is clear that if several strong parliamentary parties emerged, and, having passed through the electoral fire, grew in numbers, political weight, authority and influence, this would have imposed a strict control over the activities of the executive branch. But with the votes spread thin over thirty parties and blocs, the creation of a politically based Parliament and society would be far more complicated.

It was also clear that the Presidential Administration counted on part of the left electorate giving its support to such quasi-left parties and blocs as 'Labour Ukraine' and the All-Ukrainian Party of Employees, which were founded right on the eve of the election campaign. Thus the newly introduced mixed election system, even though it was approved by the President only after a long and tedious drudgery, initially took a form which seriously threatened to discredit the concept of responsible party politics. The intrigues of the executive authorities were quite obvious, and consisted of an attempt to stop Parliament from imposing its control over the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidential Administration and other executive bodies and departments.

One got the impression that the executive officials were preparing for the elections rather quietly and confidently. Since they had little grounds for hoping that the new Parliament would be more complaisant than the old one, and feeling the burden of protracted conflicts with the leadership of the latter and with the anti-presidential factions, the executive authorities continually and fairly openly took the soundings of the probable public reaction should Parliament be unconstitutionally ousted from the political scene.

At a press conference on 25 December 1997, President Leonid Kuchma came out with his sensational statement about the existence of 'hypothetical circumstances' under which the future Parliament could be dissolved. Such circumstances would include the Constitutional Court ruling part or all of the Elections Law to be invalid, 'if the new Parliament makes a U-turn that would pose a threat to the national interests and state sovereignty of Ukraine'.⁵ In effect, this threat of blatant infringement of the Constitution contradicted the pledges intrinsic in the Presidential oath of office. According to the Constitution, the President may prorogue the Supreme Rada before its full term is expired only in one unique case: if, within thirty days of the official opening of its regular sitting, it proves impossible to convene a plenary session (Article 90 and Article 106, para. 8 of the Constitution). This, however, was no great surprise since the President on more than one occasion has shown that he considerably over-estimates the extent of his prerogatives. What was strange, however, was that such statements, which could be considered as an obvious test of the Constitution's 'durability', did not raise a storm of indignation either from the Parliament or from the press and those party politicians who aspired to a strong and independent rule. In fact, this threat to dissolve the new Parliament passed virtually unnoticed, and was, so to speak, 'swallowed' by the entire political community, except for the 'Hromada' Party.

The reaction of the Speaker of Parliament, Oleksander Moroz, was unexpectedly mild, though he did mention 'the Korean variant', meaning by this the possibility of prosecuting an ex-President for abuses committed while in office. Moroz noted that

the President's Statement could be treated as the words of an ordinary person rather than the words of a Guarantor of the Constitution. There are no legal grounds for statements about dissolution of the Parliament, hence it is not worth commenting on the President's words. They do not stand up to criticism and simply show that the President does not have competent lawyers. The Guarantor of the Constitution should worry about its implementations by all subjects of legal relations and he himself cannot be an exception. A carefully planned action to discredit the Supreme Rada is in progress, together with the preparation of public opinion for the idea that non-constitutional steps may be necessary.

At a press conference on 19 January, Moroz stated that there are articles in the Constitution which envisage legal responsibility and legal consequences for the violation of the system of state power. He noted that from time to time the Kazakh, Moscow or Belarussian options were prophesied for Ukraine. However,

⁵ *Interfax-Ukraina*, 25 December 1998.

there are others, in particular, the South Korean model (alluding to legal consequences for the criminal activities of those in the highest positions of authority). Moroz speculated that the President's Administration had elaborated a plan to dissolve the Supreme Rada if the latter failed to approve the state budget for 1998. At the same time, however, he stated that he was sure that the President would act in full accordance with the Constitution.⁶

On 9 January 1998, Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko openly declared that the Cabinet of Ministers would be ready to adopt its Programme of action unilaterally at a Cabinet meeting, if Parliament failed to approve the said Programme. The *Den* newspaper observed on this occasion that President Leonid Kuchma 'had not pulled up (at least publicly) the Prime Minister, who had patently "gone too far"'. Subsequent events showed that the political crisis was becoming ever more acute.⁷

The next day, 10 January 1998, Moroz declared the aforesaid statement of the Prime Minister to be unconstitutional. He emphasised that in the event that the government's programme fails to get the approval of Parliament, the latter has the right to demand the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers. However, on 13 January, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted its Programme in the form of an internal resolution but did not present it to the Supreme Rada for the latter's consideration.

On 16 January 1998, presidential adviser and deputy head of the Presidential Administration Anatoliy Halchynskiy (who was also a member of the Political Council of the Popular Democratic Party) made an astounding statement. Referring to Parliament's appeal to the President to dismiss the Prime Minister, on the grounds of alleged abuses during refurbishment of the 'Ukrayina Palace' hall in Kyiv, Halchynskiy said: 'The President should put an end to the activity of the Supreme Rada which has completely discredited itself, and introduce direct presidential rule for a period of 2–3 years. Our successors as well as the world community will understand that such a step is inevitable'. Halchynskiy accused the Speaker of Parliament, Oleksander Moroz, of attempting 'to disrupt the process of economic stabilisation and carry out a "red *revanche*"'. On 17 January, the head of the Presidential Administration, Yevhen Kushnaryov, declared that Halchynskiy's words were 'not just his personal opinion'.

Such statements seem to have been intended to sound out public opinion regarding the possible restriction of constitutional freedoms and introduction of a state of emergency and direct Presidential rule. The President and his staff showed no reaction of any kind to this demand for the suspension of constitutional rule uttered by the senior official of the Presidential Administration. On 28 January 1998, the executive authorities for the first time in the history of the independent Ukrainian state suppressed publication of the *Pravda Ukrayiny* newspaper, which did not belong to the state-controlled enterprise.

Further symptomatic threats and infringements of the current legislation were the Decree of the President installing his nominee, the Crimean governmental

⁶ *Den*, 20 January 1998.

⁷ *Den*, 10 January 1998.

official Volodymyr Marchenko as acting mayor of Yalta city instead of the duly elected candidate and the high-profile actions of the militia (police). Parliament held an immediate debate on the report of the Minister of the Interior, Yuriy Kravchenko, but took the whole episode fairly tranquilly.

Similar actions by the executive on the eve of the elections testified to the danger of the executive institutions attempting a coup d'état.

At the present time it is virtually impossible to give a definitive answer to the question: whether and under what circumstances the executive authority could attempt extreme measures like the cancellation of the parliamentary elections, introduction of a state of emergency and direct rule or the banning of political parties.

However, there was nothing fantastic in such a scenario. Post-Soviet political experience (as may be seen from recent events in the political history of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan and Armenia) does not rule out brutal and violent actions by the executive authorities; indeed, when such actions occur, they often pass without either special indication or counter-action within society. Public opinion polls regularly demonstrated that the majority of the population of Ukraine was unprepared to support any resolute protest actions. Dissatisfaction with the actions of the executive institutions would induce at the most not more than 18–20 per cent of citizens to 'take to the streets' in protest; in reality, the proportion of Ukrainians ready to support such actions was even smaller.

The public opinion polls showed that in spite of the disastrous economic situation the majority of the population was ready to support only 'soft' forms of public protest (petitions, letters to the press, etc.) but not 'hard' actions (non-authorized demonstrations, rallies, etc.).

According to Moroz, it was highly unlikely that if an authoritarian regime were established in Ukraine there would be any acutely negative reaction from either the West or Russia. In one newspaper interview, when he was asked whether the executive authority could take certain unconstitutional steps in relation to the Parliament and whether approval for such actions had been received from government circles in Russia, the USA, etc., Moroz gave an extensive answer, which, in effect, said little more than that the government (as was revealed at a closed session of Parliament on Ukraine's financial situation) had tried to obtain external financial assistance to liquidate in part the state debts but that this had been done, first and foremost, to satisfy the interests of creditors who were non-residents of Ukraine. Moroz said that for the sake of these interests foreign creditors of the Ukrainian executive might well be prepared to tolerate many risky and undemocratic actions by that executive. He said that he considered it most unlikely that such a hypothetical dictatorship in Ukraine would be able to get military and political support from abroad, but thought foreign financial assistance at a rate of US \$3–4 billion in relief for the destitute quite possible.⁸

Furthermore, public opinion began to reveal a potentially dangerous proliferation of authoritarian views. According to an opinion poll conducted in November 1997 by sociologists from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the

⁸ *Den*, 21 January 1998.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, more than 43 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that 'a strong and powerful leader could contribute to Ukraine more than any laws'. The corresponding figures for 1996 and 1995 were 41 per cent and 35 per cent respectively.

The executive authorities seemed to be well aware of this trend, and felt secure enough to be able to act without hesitation in a situation requiring, in their opinion, 'extreme measures'. For example, the dissolution of the Parliament without any legal grounds could be 'justified' by the fact that (in accordance with the Constitution) it had passed a motion of no-confidence in the government. Conversely, this trend was also clearly grasped by a number of members of the outgoing Parliament who preferred not to exacerbate the pre-election political situation and trigger forceful intervention by the executive. However such tactics on the part of the deputies could not fully eliminate the existing threats and challenges to the democratic order.

Parliament's moderate attitude was also partly due to the specific features of the tactics of attack practised by the government structures, which had chosen a course of ignoring constitutional norms and gradually *de facto* abolishing them and eroding political freedoms without officially abrogating or suspending the Constitution.

In this sense, one may say without exaggeration that the fate of democracy in Ukraine was being decided by the course of the parliamentary and local elections of 29 March 1998.

It must be noted that these tactics continued after the election. On 26 May, President Kuchma created a significant precedent by appointing Deputy Premier Mykola Biloblotskyi as 'temporary acting mayor' in Odesa, after the Supreme Court overturned the election of Eduard Hurvits as the local mayor.

V. Upheaval in the Political System

The parliamentary and local elections showed a significant acceleration of the processes of establishing in Ukraine a party-based political system – processes which for a considerable period of time had been put on hold. However, these new changes took place in an atmosphere of political hysteria, which, to a certain degree, had been artificially created by the executive power. The rules of the game, laid down by the government, envisaged kindling a confrontation and conducting a deliberate campaign of discrediting and marginalising the opposition. In order to present voters with an atmosphere of artificial pluralism and an apparent range of platforms and approaches, the executive power advocated and subsidised the creation of parties and blocs of unquestioned loyalty, albeit non-viable and with only a tiny membership. The principal message of the government leaders to the electorate was that all opposition forces were anti-reform and/or criminal.

A distinguishing feature of the election campaign was the unremitting effort of the pro-presidential circles and the government structures under their control to maintain power in the hands of the leaders of the current regime. The entire propaganda machine of the state was deployed on behalf of the NDP, the SDPU(o), the Agrarian Party, the Liberals, 'Trudova Ukrayina', etc., and was directed gener-

ally against 'Hromada' and the SPU/SelPU bloc. On the one hand, this confrontational character of the election campaign undoubtedly obstructed free political campaigning, the free expression of the citizens' will, and the election of a political party or bloc on the basis of its avowed goals and political platform. On the other hand, however, the acute nature of the election campaign helped accelerate the structuring of political forces, and the strengthening of political parties as the principal players in the new political system.

Of the 30 parties and blocs approved by the Central Electoral Commission to participate in the proportional-representation part of the election, only eight passed the requisite 4 per cent barrier:

1. The KPU won 24.68 per cent of the votes in the proportional-representation system (84 PR seats, 121 seats in all);

2. Rukh – 9.40 per cent of the votes in the proportional-representation system (32 PR seats, 47 seats in all);

3. SPU/SelPU – 8.64 per cent of the proportional-representation votes (29 PR seats, 35 seats after the formation of the faction 'Left Centre');

4. The Green Party – 5.46 per cent of the proportional-representation system (19 PR seats, up to 24 seats in all);

5. NDP – 4.99 per cent (17 PR seats and close to 80 seats in all, mainly due to the independents. In practice, during May 1998, some 77–89 members acted as a permanent part of the NDP);

6. 'Hromada' – 4.68 per cent (16 PR seats, 41 seats in all);

7. PSPU – 4.04 per cent (14 PR seats, 17 seats in all);

8. SDPU(o) – 4.02 per cent (14 PR seats, 25 seats in all).⁹

Out of these parties and blocs the stances of the KPU and PSPU can be clearly designated as left-wing. The SPU/SelPU bloc, which has the reputation of being left-wing, in fact chose a left-centre orientation. 'Hromada', the SDPU(o) and the Green Party took up a centrist position. Rukh and the NDP constitute the right wing of Parliament.

The NDP, Rukh, the Greens and the SDPU(o) have formed a pro-presidential coalition in the new Parliament. The KPU, for their part, conducted some complex intrigues with the government, giving the government and the Presidential Administration their *de facto* support.

'Hromada' and the SPU/SelPU 'Left Centre' parliamentary faction have a considerable potential to transform themselves into the nucleus of a centrist patriotic opposition.

Hence, it is useful to look at the results of the election from two aspects – firstly, from the point of view of the confrontation between the authorities in power and the opposition movements, and, secondly, from the point of view of the electorate's support for parties and blocs of a left-wing, centrist and right-wing orientation.

The parties and blocs which declared or defended opposition slogans and were critical of the authorities in power are:

⁹ *Uryadovyi Kur'yer*, 4 April 1998; *Tovarish*, no. 21, May 1998.

1. The Communist Party of Ukraine, the election campaign of which was based on the principles of left-wing *revanche*.
2. The SPU/SelPU bloc, which criticised the ruling regime usually from left-wing ideological positions.
3. 'Hromada' – the best organised forces of the centrist opposition;
4. The PSPU, which acted as a 'double opposition', usually directed against the Socialists, Communists, and 'Hromada'. This fact allows us to evaluate the role of the PSPU in the election campaign as that of a pseudo-opposition and blatant provocation.
5. The 'National Front', which criticised the government from a national-patriotic position.

The above parties and blocs were associated with various socio-political trends that in some places ran opposite to each other. Together with other groupings, which to a greater or less extent may be regarded as anti-government opposition, these parties and blocs won the support of some 50 per cent of voters. However, the great majority of the votes, cast in favour of opposition groupings, went to the left-wing – KPU, SPU/SelPU and PSPU.

During the course of the election campaign, the opposition parties did not establish any lasting, formal mechanisms of coordination and cooperation (apart from the division of first-past-the-post constituencies between the KPU and the SPU/SelPU).¹⁰ This may be viewed as quite natural, in view of the fact that these were the first-ever elections with a proportional-representation component. However, the multiplicity and different orientations of the campaigns of the various opposition parties helped to a considerable degree the victory of candidates of pro-presidential parties in many constituencies.

The left-wing opposition parties (KPU and SPU/SelPU) managed to attract the support of 33.32 per cent of the electorate. Their success might well have been even greater had not the power structures given behind-the-scenes support for the PSPU and launched into the election arena a number of artificially created groupings of a pseudo-left direction ('Trudova Ukrayina', All-Ukrainian Party of Labourers).

A characteristic feature of the election campaign was the attempt of the government leadership to destroy and discredit 'Hromada' at all costs, by administrative methods, including anti-constitutional actions. This attack on the political opposition by the state power structures against the political opposition posed a real threat to the principles of democratic constitutional order in the state. Under these conditions, a significant part of the electorate, particularly young people and the intelligentsia, were alarmed by the wave of compromise in the official media, and began to think of politics in general as a dirty and dishonourable business. This may explain the sudden swing of a significant number of voters to the Green Party, which built its campaign on directly apolitical slogans. It is worth recalling that the principal slogan of the Greens was the declaration that they do not 'do' politics.

¹⁰ *Tovarish*, no. 6, February 1998.

The voters' spectrum of support for the various political-ideological orientations makes the election figures look as follows:

- for the Left (including pseudo-left-wing groupings) the proportion of votes cast was 41.54 per cent;
- for the Right and centre-right (Rukh, NDP, 'Reforms and Order', the 'National Front', the 'Party of Labour and Liberal Party – Together', 'Forward, Ukraine!', the Party of National-Economic Development, SLOn, the All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives, the Republican Christian Party) – 26.88 per cent.

Hence it would appear that the centrist parties were comparatively the weakest. Of these, only 'Hromada' and the SDPU(o) won seats in the new Parliament. The political positions of the Greens are still unclear, although they may also be included in the centrist movements.

As regards the SPU/SelPU bloc, which until now maintained the image of a left-wing grouping and established the 'Left Centre' faction in Parliament, one cannot fail to observe its evolution towards political centrism, which took place during the course of the recent election campaign. The relative weakness of the political centre in the Supreme Rada was also exacerbated to a significant degree by the split of the centrists into pro-government and opposition factions.

If we analyse the results of the election from the point of view of the rivalry between the ruling regime and the opposition, then we find that 30.42 per cent of the turnout voted for pro-presidential parties and movements (ignoring the possibility of the election results having been falsified in favour of these groups, which has been alleged but which in the present circumstances is virtually impossible to prove).

The main opposition parties, which won seats in Parliament ('Hromada', KPU, SPU/SelPU) got 38 per cent of the votes, and if we add the other more or less opposition parties and movements, the total is close to 50 per cent. This result may be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the government and its pseudo-reforms generally. Of the eight principal parties of the pro-presidential bloc some failed to get into Parliament at all, and others barely scraped through the 4 per cent barrier, a situation which led Oleksander Moroz to declare: 'the executive power lost everything there was to lose'.¹¹

VI. Preliminary Conclusions

An attempt to draw general conclusions of the election campaign leads to contradictions and paradoxes, due to the inconsistent and contradictory results of the election itself.

As a whole, the results of the election may be viewed as according to expectations and forecasts. The attempt of the government to prevent the mixed-system election and to get a compliant Parliament clearly failed. Out of the 30 parties and blocs which took part in the elections, the main parties which won seats in Parliament had propounded definite ideological positions in their programmes. The sole exception was the NDP – the only corporate party representing the spe-

¹¹ *Holos Ukrayiny*, 4 April 1998.

cific interests of the *nomenklatura* bureaucracy. The left-wing/left-leaning tendencies of the electorate, according to the general conclusions of analysts from the main political parties, reveal not so much a nostalgia for the Communist past, as the dissatisfaction of a large majority of the population of Ukraine with a government policy, which leaves no hopes for any improvement in the economic situation, and leads to the further impoverishment of the majority of the people.

From another aspect, to some degree, the slowing down of the process of political-ideological structuring of the Ukrainian political system is by no means accidental. It reflects the lack of socio-economic structure of society generally, which is a result of the catastrophic economic state of the country and the lack of an influential 'middle class'.

The division of parliamentary factions and groups as regards their attitude towards the executive power will be intensified and may possibly change as the 1999 presidential election campaign approaches.

If one attempts to draw general conclusions about the effect of the 1998 election on the development of the political system of Ukraine, one can formulate several fundamental points.

1. A state of unstable equilibrium has been established in Parliament, in which no faction or coalition has sufficient power to carry out a steady legislative policy. As regards socio-political and socio-economic orientations, the new Parliament has in fact generated more structures than the previous one. However, the evident cleavage of Parliament into pro-presidential and opposition parts may considerably complicate or even block altogether the passage of the most controversial bills and the ratification of politically important decisions.

2. During the election campaign, the parties of the Left strengthened their positions. This was predominantly a matter of the left-wing parties, in particular the Communists, and not of the more centrist SPU/SelPU bloc. In comparison with the previous Parliament, where the faction of the KPU and the SPU/SelPU had in all, on 1 January 1997, 112 seats, in the new Supreme Rada they have 156. The political line of the Left opposition will be, to a significant degree, determined by the leaders of the Socialist and Peasant Parties, first and foremost, by the rates of their drive to the centre, and also by the degree of support given by the members of the Communist faction to the leader of the Socialists, Oleksander Moroz.

3. In the new Parliament it is the political 'centre' which possesses the least coherence. It will be made up, primarily, from the opposition factions – 'Hromada' and the SPU/SelPU – on the one hand, and the till-now pro-presidential factions – SDPU(o) and the Greens – on the other. As a result of the SDPU(o) and the Green Party joining up with the pro-presidential coalition, the parliamentary centre will be significantly weaker than the number of seats held by the centrist factions would imply. This may have an adverse effect in view of the current dominant positions in the legislature of the Left (Communists, progressive Socialists) and the Right (NDP, Rukh) by generally increasing the tendency to confrontation. Hence the prospects for the centrist parties to have any real political influence seem limited, due, first and foremost, to their split into two rival groupings and their consequent inability to create the nucleus of a parliamentary major-

ity. However, centrists from both sides of this divide will still possess a certain scope for political manoeuvre as regards the ratification of various laws. Temporary alliances on concrete issues may well be formed that include some or all the Social-Democrats, the Greens, Rukh, 'Hromada' and the SPU/SelPU.

4. The right-wing in Parliament is represented exclusively by pro-presidential groupings – NDP and Rukh. Rukh has 47 seats (as compared to the 26, held by the faction 'Rukh for the People, for Ukraine' in the previous Parliament). As regards the NDP, which got into the Supreme Rada with a total of 28 members from its proportional representation list and the constituencies, the size of its faction will depend on the line taken by Valeriy Pustovoytenko's government. In the previous Parliament, the NDP members formed part of the 'Constitutional centre' group, which comprised some 50–60 deputies. In May 1998, the NDP faction consisted of some 77–89 MPs.

5. In spite of the obvious defeat of the pro-presidential circles in the election, they have nevertheless managed to form in Parliament a fairly numerous faction, which at least for the immediate future will have a policy of supporting the government. This faction includes the NDP, Rukh, the Greens and the SDPU(o). In all, they account for 175–85 deputies. In actual fact the radical-left faction PSPU is also drawn towards them – a faction which, due to certain covert factors, is likely, at least in the immediate future, to support the line of the Presidential Administration in matters of principle. These factions could form a fairly powerful coalition grouping, which could block the opposition from overturning the presidential 'veto' on any bill involving a matter of principle (to overturn a presidential veto on some bill, a minimum of 300 votes is required, i.e. no less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the Supreme Rada, which according to the Constitution is 450). As regards political-ideological matters, the general orientation of the pro-presidential bloc may be defined as centre-right. Since their possibilities of increasing their size by bringing in other non-faction deputies are, effectively, already exhausted, these factions are incapable of forming a working parliamentary majority.

6. Within the pro-presidential coalition particular note should be made of Yevhen Marchuk. It appears that, with the current clear decline in popularity of President Leonid Kuchma, some elements in the ruling regime are adopting as a fall-back position the possibility of supporting Marchuk at the next presidential election, with the idea of a smooth transfer of power to him without any essential change in the system of power which has been established in Ukraine. It is not impossible that certain groups of businessmen and bureaucrats from the administration will try to field in the coming presidential election campaign individual 'second-rank' candidates, for example Viktor Yushchenko, Serhiy Holovaty, or even Borys Tarasyuk. The time seems too short, however, to develop their image into that of personalities of national significance. At the same time, influential internal and external interests see in Marchuk a guarantee against the introduction of cardinal changes.

7. The political opposition in Parliament is represented by the KPU, SPU/SelPU and 'Hromada'. Although these three factions take a sharply critical attitude to-

wards the ruling regime, they adhere to different political and ideological doctrines, which makes cooperation between them on a permanent basis difficult.

This could have an adverse effect on their possible cooperation in important economic matters. Likewise, one must not dismiss out of hand the possibility of deliberate efforts by the Presidential Administration to block the formation of an opposition left-centrist parliamentary majority. Such tactics by the executive power could also include playing on the ambitions of the leaders of the Communist Party – the most numerous in Parliament – giving them economic concessions and other ‘inducements’.

Relations between ‘Hromada’ and the SPU/SelPU and KPU factions seem likely to present, in the foreseeable future, the most contradictory and complex aspect of the parliamentary opposition. Under certain conditions, three opposition factions (KPU – 121 deputies, SPU/SelPU – 35 deputies, ‘Hromada’ – 41–5 deputies) could, with the addition of some independent deputies, form a broad parliamentary working coalition, sufficient to ratify bills requiring a simple majority. The emergence of such a grouping with SPU/SelPU and ‘Hromada’ playing the dominant role could keep a major brake on the left-wing radicalism of the Communists. However, if such a left-centrist coalition did emerge, it is hardly likely that it would hold together in full strength after the next presidential election. Conditions which could facilitate a tighter and longer-lasting broad opposition coalition might well result if the authoritarian tendencies of the executive in internal matters increased, or there were an attempt to establish a dictatorial regime.

In theory, the only thing which can oppose tendencies aimed at the crushing of democracy is the rousing of a mature patriotic consciousness in the population at large, which would become a constant influence on deputies, leading them to group around a constructive anti-crisis programme of national economic rebirth. In this event, a decisive step of the new Parliament would have to be the ratification of a package of new economic and social laws, and the formation of a normative basis for dealing with the socio-economic crisis.

If this does not happen, Ukraine will be threatened by stagnation and transformation into a weakly-developed semi-colonial state, which would mean the total loss of its European historical perspective.

In spite of all the paradoxes and inconsistencies in the results of the 29 March 1998 election, one can assuredly state that its net outcome has been a significant acceleration of political processes in society via the initiation of a new structure of the Ukrainian Parliament, built on party-political attributes and principles of political responsibility. *In toto*, the political upheavals generated by the 1998 election may well do more for the introduction of European political and economic standards of development in Ukraine than any official declarations of office-holders on their desire to participate in the processes of European integration. □

History

The 'Goal, Meaning and Fortune' of Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy's Life

Larysa Fedorova
Svitlana Pankova

The 'goal, meaning and fortune of my life, I envisaged as serving the Ukrainian national renaissance'.¹ So wrote Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy in 1935, in the preface to a collection of his early stories, entitled 'How I used to be a creative writer', so defining the personal credo to which he remained true throughout his life.

Throughout the seven decades of Soviet power, the Communist ideologues did everything in their power to distort and eliminate from Ukrainian history the role, legacy, and, if possible, the very name of the eminent historian, political and community leader and the builder of Ukrainian statehood, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy. However, in spite of the political cataclysms which befell the Ukrainian people during this century, or which may yet befall them, two facts will undoubtedly preserve Hrushevskyy's name in history. *As a scholar*, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy was the first to present the history of Ukrainian people as a component of European and therefore of world history, equal in status with that of any other nation. *As a community and political leader* and founding-father of the Ukrainian National Republic, Hrushevskyy brought the Ukrainian nation on to the world stage and into the general historical process, when, in 1917–8, its state-building potential was realised and its national state reborn. For this fact alone, Hrushevskyy's name occupies a dignified place in Ukrainian and world history, *sub specie aeternitatis*, irrespective of any subjective assessments or attempts to 'rewrite history'.

This article will attempt to give a brief outline of the most prominent landmarks of his life and diverse activities as a citizen and patriot, activities which were distinguished by a sense of conscience, awareness and commitment.

This sense may well have had its roots in the origins of the Hrushevskyy family, which was closely connected with the Chyhyryn region. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the family surname was Hrusha, and, according to the historian Ivan Krypyakevych, 'this family was probably originally a Cossack one'.² Documentary sources are extant from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which make it possible to trace the history of Hrushevskyy's direct ancestors, and which indicate that, during that period, they worked for the church as members of the (mainly minor) clergy. Hrushevskyy himself on a number of occasions un-

¹ M. Hrushevskyy, *Predok* (Kyiv, 1990), p. 7.

² I. Krypyakevych, 'Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy. Zhyttya i diyalnist', *Velykyi Ukrayinets: Materialy z zhyttya ta diyalnosti M. S. Hrushevskoho* (Kyiv, 1992), p. 451.



The Hrushevskiy family. Vladikavkaz, 1887. (Sitting, left to right: Hlafira, Mykhaylo, Serhiy, Oleksander. Standing: Hanna)

derlined his genetic relationship with the Chyhyryn region, and its Cossack spirit and freedom-loving traditions. In his *Memoirs*, he wrote about his family as follows: 'Our earliest home of which I know is the village of Khudoliyivka, which owes its name, of course, to [the Cossack] Captain Khudoliyiv, who after the treaty of Zboriv [18 August 1649] tried to organise an uprising in Zaporizhzhya, but failed and paid for it with his life'.³ Three generations of Hrushevskiyis grew up in Khudoliyivka: Mykhaylo's grandfather – Fedir, his great-grandfather – Vasyl, and great-great-grandfather – Danylo. They all entered the church. From 1836–51, grandfather Fedir served as priest at the Church of the Transfiguration in the village of Lisnyky near Kyiv. (He was eventually buried there, but his grave was

³ M. Hrushevskiy, 'Spomyny', *Kyiv*, 1988, no. 9, pp. 115–6.

destroyed in the 1930s). Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's father – Serhiy – graduated from the Kyiv Theological Academy and lectured at the Kyiv seminary. He 'treated the Ukrainian language with sympathy and, at the same time, with a certain fear', wrote Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy,

obviously due to the derisory talk in 'serious' circles in Kyiv about 'Ukrainomania'. He had a sincere love for the ideals and aspirations of the Ukrainian people. He knew a huge number of songs and sung them well – in his youth he had a good tenor, and sang in the academy's trio... This was a certain tacit fronde against the Russian government... They had a real horror of real politics, as the source of every kind of misery.⁴

Following the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1863, the Tsarist government imposed a policy of Russification in the Kingdom of Poland (which, until then, although under Russian rule, had preserved a certain autonomy). Teachers to work in Poland were recruited in Kyiv, and promised high pay and considerable fringe benefits. Serhiy Hrushevskiy accepted the post of teacher of Russian language in Kholm – a small provincial town in a Polish region of Ukraine, which in mediaeval times had been the capital of Prince Danylo of Halych (1201–64). Before leaving for Kholm, Serhiy married Hlafira Oppokova. She, too, came from a clerical family, which had made its home in the village of Sestrynivka, Berdychiv county. Serhiy and his wife made their home in the building of the former Piarist monastery in Kholm, where the seminary was located. It was here that their elder son, Mykhaylo, was born on 17 (29) September 1866. (In 1991, a plaque commemorating this fact was solemnly unveiled).

In 1869, Serhiy obtained a post in the Caucasus, and it was there, in Stavropol and Vladikavkaz, that Mykhaylo spent his childhood, and his sister Hanna and brother Oleksander were born. The three children were brought up in a spirit of family piety, Christian morality and love for their native land.

Under the influence of my father's tales... I felt early on the awakening and consciousness of Ukrainian national sentiments, which were underpinned... by rare trips to Ukraine, which was painted therefore in the aura of a far-off 'native land' and a contrast to the foreign-peopled and foreign-speaking 'foreign land'...⁵

Mykhaylo later recalled. In 1880, he entered the Tiflis *gymnasium*. Before he set off for school, his maternal grandfather Zakhar presented him with an icon of Christ the Saviour, which from that time on he always 'took with him, like Aeneas his Penates'.

While at the *gymnasium*, Mykhaylo began to shape his future character and identity through the private reading which he did in addition to his formal classes. This additional self-tuition in Ukrainian studies drew, first and foremost, on the volumes of *Kievskaia starovina*. They formed the foundation for his self-education and self-training in community, national and political affairs. As Hrushevskiy himself observed later, it was thanks to the works of Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhaylo Drahomanov, Mykola Kostomarov, that 'I perceived Ukrainian studies as my future special field'.⁶ There was no teacher who could have helped him choose

⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵ M. S. Hrushevskiy, 'Avtobiohrafiya, 1906', *Velykyi Ukrayinets*, op. cit., p. 198.

⁶ Ibid.

this path; he chose it for himself, and his sole guide was Ukraine. Thus, for example, he wrote in his diary on 15 November 1883: 'Over these days I have been thinking that it would be nice to become a leader of a Ukrainian group, to become, as they say, the chief warrior of all the boys who love their native Ukraine. Well, who knows, maybe God will help me to become a leader, I shall work for it, all that I can'.⁷ Such were the thoughts of this 17-year-old. To his later school-days also belong the beginning of his interest in creative writing and his first literary efforts ('... I wrote as a Ukrainian patriot'):⁸ a cycle of poems, which included 'Duma', 'Cossack', 'Ukraine' and 'I am a Little-Russian', the stories 'Nimyí svidok' (Dumb Witness), 'Ostannya kutya' (The Last Christmas Frumenty), and 'Bekh-al-Dzhugur'. They are all signed by the pseudonym 'Mykhaylo Zavoloka' – Mykhaylo the Vagabond ('Fate has brought me among alien people, made me a vagabond'). (The school exercise book containing his diary entries and poems was confiscated at the time of his arrest in 1914, and was preserved in the archives of the Kyiv provincial gendarmerie, stamped 'Material Proof').⁹

In 1884, Hrushevskiy plucked up the courage to send a letter to his favourite Ukrainian writer, Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi: '... I hope that you, good Sir, will not pour scorn on my sincere desire to do something for Ukraine...'.¹⁰ It was thanks to Nechuy-Levytskyi that in 1885 Hrushevskiy made his first appearance in print, when his story 'Bekh-al-Dzhugur' was published in the Lviv newspaper *Dilo*. Writing to congratulate Hrushevskiy on this occasion, Nechuy-Levytskyi wrote: '... Literature is your vocation, that goes without saying'. 'In Galicia, you have been recognised at once; they said that a true talent has appeared'.¹¹ But in the end it was his steadfast interest in history which determined his future profession. Hrushevskiy wanted to go to Ukraine, 'to get to Kyiv as quickly as possible, which appeared to me the focus of Ukrainian scholarly and literary work'.¹²

'I came to politics through history...',¹³ wrote Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, and this statement succinctly and precisely reflects the process which, in 1917, a year so crucial in the life of the Ukrainian people, led to his being elected head of the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) by the unanimous vote of the representatives of all social strata and political inclinations, and which made it possible for him, in a short space of time, to overcome the lingering nostalgia for pan-Slav federalism, and to make the concept of an independent and sovereign Ukraine into a political reality. Crucial to his development were the years 1886–1914, which he spent in Kyiv, at the faculty of history and philosophy of the St Volodymyr University. Here he acquired the principles of historical scholarship and the habits of research work from two eminent representatives of mutually antagonistic approa-

⁷ M. Hrushevskiy, 'Shchodennyky (1883–1889). Publ. ta pryमितky L. Zashkilnyaka', *Kyivska starovyna*, 1993, no. 5, p. 17.

⁸ M. Hrushevskiy, *Predok*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁹ Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv (hereafter TsDIA), holding 1235, catalogue 1, file 260.

¹⁰ TsDIA, holding 1235, catalogue 1, file. 267, folio 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, file 594, folio 10 verso.

¹² M. S. Hrushevskiy, *Autobiografiya* (Kyiv, 1926), p. 5.

¹³ M. Hrushevskiy, *Na porozi novoyi Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1918), p. 3.

ches: great-power imperialism and Ukrainian populism. The former, Vladimir Ikonnikov, a Corresponding-Member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences of St Petersburg, was the leading expert on Russian historiography of his time. From him, Hrushevskiyi became thoroughly conversant with the official view of Russian history, as laid down by such historians as Tatishchev, Karamzin and Solovyov, which, contrary to historical facts and simply on the basis of dynastic connections, considered the mediaeval state of Muscovy as the legitimate successor of the Kyivan-Rus' state. Hrushevskiyi's real academic 'godfather', however, was Volodymyr Antonovych, one of the founders of the new Ukrainian historiography, a recognised expert on the history of the Lithuanian-Rus' state and the Cossack period. Antonovych was a pioneer in putting Ukrainian archaeology on a firm scholarly basis. He was the founder of the Kyivan school of 'documentalists', which was interested, in particular, in putting the study of Ukraine's mediaeval Princely era (ninth–fourteenth centuries) on a scholarly basis, and a talented organiser of research, to which he constantly attracted the most talented and nationally conscious young scholars. 'His sincere patriotism was free from chauvinism', Hrushevskiyi wrote later, in his obituary.

Domination, subjugation, coercion, exploitation were all odious to him, irrespective of whence they came... Having a fervent desire for a better fate for his people, the deceased did not even allow himself to think of the possibility that the Ukrainian people, once they had themselves come to power, might oppress other, less fortunate peoples.¹⁴

His course of studies under these eminent scholars, including seminar papers and course-work projects, prepared Hrushevskiyi to write his first major piece of research: *Ocherk istorii kievskoi zemli ot smerti Yaroslava do kontsa xiv veka* (Survey of the History of the Kyivan Land from the Death of Yaroslav to the End of the xiv Century, 1891) – which not only demonstrated the maturity of his scholarship, but also showed that this period indeed belongs to Ukrainian national historiography. This work, furthermore, clearly reveals his concept of the complex: people–territory–state, and demarcates through logical argumentation the difference between a political and an ethnic entity, and the resulting contrast existing in the specified era between the Dnipro basin and the newly-acquired North-Western area of the ancient Rus' state. This treatise was published in the *Universitetskie Izvestiya*, and received first prize in a competition for scholarly work by students. Four years of intensive undergraduate work received their just accolade in the 1890 final examinations. Hrushevskiyi received a First Class degree, and was recommended for a lectureship at the University. But it took almost eight months of effort and lobbying by faculty members, in particular Volodymyr Antonovych, before Hrushevskiyi received official confirmation in this post. On 3 May 1891, he officially started working on his Master's dissertation, which dealt with the history of one of the territorial-administrative units in Podillya – Bar county. The next few years were filled with intensive work, expanding both his geographical and temporal field of expertise to include the Dnipro basin and the

¹⁴ M. Hrushevskiyi, 'Volodymyr Antonovych, osnovni ideyi yoho tvorchosty i diyalnosti', *Ukrayn-skyi istoryk*, 1984, no. 1–4, p. 199.

fourteenth–eighteenth centuries. Furthermore, his principal source of research material now changed to archival data, on the basis of which Hrushevskiy now began seriously to address the question of defining the essence of the Cossack era. By the time he came to defend his Master's dissertation, he had published a monograph and two volumes of edited archival documents.


The defence of his dissertation was a further irrefutable proof of the fruitful development of Ukrainian historiography, regardless of the active opposition of the imperial authorities. *Barskoye starostvo: Istoricheskiye ocherki* (Bar County: Historical Survey, 1894) was a significant contribution to Ukrainian studies, which, on the basis of extensive archival material in Kyiv, Moscow and Warsaw, demonstrated that it was the Ukrainian people who played the leading role in the reconquest and socio-political development of Podillya. The title of the dissertation veiled the larger task which the young historian hoped to resolve, since, he said, 'it seems to me that the study of the local nobility in Bar can help resolve the obscure and complex issue of the origins of the Cossacks'.¹⁵

Hrushevskiy's university years also served as a school of community and political service, and saw the beginning of his active work and struggle for the Ukrainian cause. Hrushevskiy became the informal leader of the branch of the patriotic 'Hromada' organisation in the Kyiv Theological Seminary, the members of which included the future founders of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, in particular, Oleksander Lototskyi. At the urging of Volodymyr Antonovych, he joined the moderate wing of the Kyivan 'Old' Hromada (as frequently happened, the original Hromada had now spawned a 'new' group which, while sharing the general ideals of the parent body, differed from it on a number of points). The leading activist of these 'moderates' was Oleksander Konyskyi, who became Hrushevskiy's 'godfather' in community and political life. He also joined the circle of Kyiv historians, centred on the journal *Kievskaya starovina* and the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler. This brought Hrushevskiy into contact with such outstanding scholars as Oleksander Lazarevskiy and Mykola Vasylenko. His first publications began to appear in the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. T. Shevchenka u Lvovi* (Annals of the Shevchenko Learned Society in Lviv), and he became a member of the NTSh, eventually dedicating a significant part of his scholarly life to it.

On the strength of his Master's dissertation, and once again on the initiative and recommendation of Antonovych, in 1894, Hrushevskiy was appointed to the recently opened chair of world history at Lviv University, which was to focus, in particular, on Eastern Europe. Thus, while still a young man, Hrushevskiy was effectively responsible for coordinating the efforts of scholars in both parts of Ukraine – under Russian and under Austrian rule.

It is appropriate to mention here that, in 1993, the International Foundation of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy established several 'Hrushevskiy' scholarships for students at what is now the Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv. One should note, too, that Mykhaylo's father Serhiy had bequeathed the money to endow two maintenance stipends for students from the Hrushevskiy family: one at the Kyiv Theological

¹⁵ State Archive of the city of Kyiv, holding 16, catalogue 465, file 1029, folio 65.



Interior of the Hrushevskiy's home. Lviv, early 1900s.

Seminary, and the other – at the Kyiv-Podil Theological College. A bequest from Serhiy Hrushevskiy also made possible the establishment in the 1910s of the Teachers' Association in Kyiv, which bore his name (in 1996, a memorial plaque was unveiled there).

While Hrushevskiy's time in Kyiv was primarily one of the accumulation of academic knowledge and experience in organisation and administration, his Lviv period was distinguished by enormous output of scholarly and organisational work, which made him a figure of Ukraine-wide significance, and, in effect, a symbol and personification of the Ukrainian national renaissance. During the competition for a professorial post at Lviv University, Hrushevskiy once again could witness the establishment view prevailing in Austro-Hungary, which – no less than in the Russian empire – considered 'Ruthenian' (i.e. Ukrainian) history to be a phantom. There was some justification for this point of view, in as much as there existed no systematic and scholarly history of Ukraine, properly substantiated by archives and documents. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Prof. Hrushevskiy dedicated his next twenty years in Lviv to resolving this problem, and that his work in this field, like his measures to develop Ukrainian studies, had a single, concentrated aim – to put the 'Ukrainian question' on the agenda of the day, and to bring it to the attention of Europe as a whole by integrating Ukrainian scholarship into that of Europe.

During his first ten years in Lviv, Hrushevskiy's work was connected almost exclusively with Galicia. Later, however, when the controls of the Tsarist regime were

weakened and a measure of political freedom introduced, he became more and more involved with the upsurge of activity in Russian-ruled Ukraine. This was a 'golden age' in the history of the NTSh (according to its members); a time of development and implementation of a fundamentally new scheme of extending the historical process into the East-European region; the training of a new school of highly professional historians, who did so much to guide and define the development of Ukrainian historical scholarship in the twentieth century; and an immense effort to bring the Ukrainian national idea to the attention of all strata of the population.

Although, unlike other subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians of Galicia were not officially allowed their own Academy of Sciences, Hrushevskiy, in effect, transformed the Shevchenko Learned Society (NTSh) in Lviv into an unofficial Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, attracting into it scholars and researchers, old and young, who represented, in effect, the entire scholarly potential of Ukraine. Eminent scholars of European repute, such as Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatyuk, Ivan Pulyuy, Pavlo Zhytetskiy, Oleksander Barvinskyi, Volodymyr Antonovych worked tirelessly through the NTSh to develop Ukrainian studies. The Society was reorganised to raise the status of the scholar, and the broadening and deepening of research programmes. Significant advances were made in all fields covered by the NTSh: history, ethnography, literary criticism, art, folklore, geology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc. A library and research depository were established, and various museums founded.

Publishing activity was stepped up; print-shops, binderies developed, and book-shops opened, and with the help of patrons from Russian-ruled Ukraine premises were obtained for the NTSh. The *Zapysky* of the NTSh, individual monographs, collections of source materials on the history of Ukraine, the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, the *Istorychna biblioteka* (History Library) and other popular works, aimed at the non-specialist reader, add up to hundreds of publications which are still relevant today. In 1907, in Kyiv a Ukrainian Learned Society was founded on Hrushevskiy's initiative and with his help. This had its own publication – the journal *Ukrayina* – and brought together the members of Hromada and the scholars associated with *Kievskaia starovina*.

It was in Lviv that Hrushevskiy developed his full potential as an innovator in scholarship and as a talented teacher. In 1904, he propounded his own, innovative scheme of extending the historical process into the regions of Eastern Europe, based on irrefutable facts concerning the special features of ethno-cultural and socio-political development in the lands of old Rus'. By so doing he struck the first blow against the prevailing imperial Russian historiographical scheme, which was founded on a methodologically unsound genealogical principle. As a result, some leading Russian historians (Matvey Lyubavskiy, Aleksandr Presnyakov) revised their views on the formation of the Muscovite state – eloquent proof of the soundness of Hrushevskiy's argumentation.

In Lviv, too, Hrushevskiy produced one of the important and necessary foundation-stones for the continuation of the cultural-national and state-building traditions of the Ukrainian people, its birth certificate – *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusy* (The History of Ukraine-Rus'). In this fundamental ten-volume work, on which he con-

tinued to work until the end of his life, Hrushevskiy presented a huge base of evidence on which he developed the concept: people-territory-state, a monumental piece of scholarship, which together with the *Kobzar* of Taras Shevchenko became the cornerstone of Ukrainian national ideology. At the same time, the *History* was also an extremely significant contribution to the integration of Ukrainian historical scholarship into that of Europe as a whole. Parallel with his purely historical work, Hrushevskiy was writing his famous *Istoriya Ukrayinskoyi literatury* (History of Ukrainian Literature), and publishing a series of historical works for the general public – *Narys istoriyi ukrayinskoho narodu* (Survey of the History of the Ukrainian People), *Pro stari chasy na Ukrayini* (On Olden Times in Ukraine), *Ilyustrovana istoriya Ukrayiny* (An Illustrated History of Ukraine), etc., including certain works in Russian.

In Lviv, Hrushevskiy trained a constellation of notable scholars in the field of Ukrainian studies – resolute and dedicated campaigners for the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine, including Ivan Dzhydzhora, Ivan Krypyakevych, Stepan Tomashivskiy, and Myron Korduba. Young people learned from him at the university and through the Shevchenko Learned Society. He involved them in the work of the Society, and made them thoroughly conversant with the new, scholarly scheme of Ukrainian history and the methodology of academic research, and provided them with opportunities to publish the results of their own studies. He gave financial support to poor students via the special ‘Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy Foundation’, in which he did all in his power to create the best possible conditions for the development of Ukrainian national historiography.

To this one must add his active and multifaceted efforts to make the Ukrainian question something of significance to the entire Russian empire, his active help to the Ukrainian parliamentary group in the State Duma (and the founding of the *Ukrainskiy Vestnik* – its official publication; the preparation of a memorandum on the granting of autonomy to Ukraine, and his personal correspondence with Deputies – Myron Slavivskiy, Illya Shrah, Volodymyr Shemet, Pavlo Chyzhevskiy, Mykola Onatskiy, and Havrylo Zubchenko), together with journalism aimed at presenting a profound political analysis of current events and defining priority tasks. One may cite here such books as *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskiy vopros*, *Z bizbuchoyi khvyli*, and the newspaper which he founded – *Selo* (Village).

The February Revolution in Russia in 1917, which radically changed the fate of countless numbers of people, kindled in the historical firmament the star of Hrushevskiy the politician – a star whose magnitude only emphasised the blackness which marked the beginning, apogee and end of Hrushevskiy’s political career. His involvement in politics was a logical continuation of his previous community, educational and scholarly activities that had made him into a leader of the first rank, and which now led him willy-nilly to the forefront of Ukraine’s political history. Prior to the February Revolution, Hrushevskiy had stood aside from major political activity. However, the chauvinism and Great-Russian, Ukrainophobic sentiments then prevalent in Russia had given such issues as the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian schools, and the Ukrainian press overtones of political opposition. Hrushevskiy did not join a political party, although he was one of the most authoritative members of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (TUP) – the infor-



Ivan Trush, Severyn Danylevych, Ivan Franko, Mariya Hrushevska with her daughter, Stefaniya Levytska (Mariya's niece), Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy. 1900s.

mal coordinating centre of the entire Ukrainian movement. At the time when the storm of revolution dragged Hrushevskyy from his academic chair and hurled him on to the political stage, he was a person of firm convictions and aspirations with a vision of Ukraine as a democratic, national, federative republic, within the boundaries of the Russian state but with considerable autonomy, based on socialist principles of coexistence both in inter-personal relations and in person-state relations. As head of the Ukrainian national representation – the Ukrainian Central Rada – on the demand of the people, Hrushevskyy demonstrated his abilities as a statesman and democratic leader. Balanced and far-sighted, he piloted the Ukrainian ship of state through the troubled waters of revolution, to the long-dreamed-of harbour of national liberation, drawing the Ukrainian nation together in a joint effort to build a new state – the state of the Ukrainian people.

What lay behind this rapid and unequivocal step towards the Revolution. He gave his own explanation in the collection of his articles published in 1918 under the title of *Na porozi novoyi Ukrayiny* (On the threshold of a new Ukraine): 'It is more important to make history well than to write it well'.¹⁶

¹⁶ Hrushevskyy, *Na porozi novoyi Ukrayiny*, op cit., p. 27.

Perhaps, too, he was impelled by what had happened to him, personally, in the past three years. Hrushevskiy has envisaged 1914 as the final year of his sojourn in Lviv. He had completed twenty years as a lecturer and professor, which entitled him to a state pension from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The pension made it possible for him to resign his chair and dedicate himself to scholarly and community work. He planned to move to Kyiv. There, in 1909, he had built a fine large building, part of which he intended as his future home, and part to be let out as a source of income, and where friends and relatives waited to welcome him. There, too, the Ukrainian Learned Society and the *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk* (which had moved its headquarters to Kyiv) were going from strength to strength. In addition to his new home, he had close by the well-stocked university library, local archives, and also access to the archive holdings of St Petersburg and Moscow, with no intervening state frontier. All these gave good grounds for facing the future with optimism. However, all Hrushevskiy's plans were nullified by World War I. He managed to make his way to Kyiv through neutral states. His return was 'welcomed' by the Tsarist authorities with a quick arrest and the Lukyanivska prison. He was accused of activities aimed at detaching Ukraine from Russia and annexing it to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was exiled to Simbirsk, from where he later made his way to Kazan and, eventually, due to the efforts of certain leading Russian scholars, to Moscow, where he once more had the chance to do normal academic work. Very soon, Hrushevskiy became one of the most active members of the Moscow Ukrainian community, working closely with the local journals of Ukrainian affairs *Promin* and *Ukrainskaya zhizn*.

To the events of February 1917, Hrushevskiy responded thus:

A great moment has come! The fetters placed on Ukraine by the evil policy of Muscovite Tsarism fell away ... Once again, we are no longer subjects but citizens, free and fully-enfranchised, and we can once again make our own decisions, and establish the right, too, to build for ourselves the fate of our people and our land!¹⁷

Hrushevskiy received numerous telegrams and letters appealing for him to return. In the meantime, an Executive Committee of United Civic Organisations – (an organ of temporary government) and a Council of Workers' Deputies (a community of left-wing parties) had been established in Kyiv. Ukrainians rallied around the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR). Its founders were members of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives – Dmytro Doroshenko and Lyudmyla Starytska-Chernyakhivska, joined by revolution-minded young people, led by Dmytro Antonovych. On 3–17 March 1917, there was a meeting of representatives of all Ukrainian parties and movements, which resulted in the founding of the Ukrainian Central Rada to represent the Ukrainian cause at the government level. The only person who at that time had the authority and charisma to weld the Ukrainians into a coherent whole, and direct their efforts into constructive channels was Hrushevskiy. Accordingly, he

¹⁷ M. Hrushevskiy, 'Velyka khvylya', *Hrushevskiy M. Na porozhi novoyi Ukrainy. Statti i dzberehni materiyaly. Red. i ustupna st. L. Vynarna* (New York–Lviv–Kyiv–Toronto–Munich, 1992), p. 141.

moved to Kyiv and became the head of this newly created but still little-known organisation, which operated out of two rented rooms in the Pedagogical Museum. Under Hrushevskiy's leadership, the UCR immediately began to play a role in the community and political life of Kyiv and the whole of Ukraine. The Rada's early work included the organisation of a 'Festival of Freedom', which drew a crowd of around 100,000 people – clear evidence of the popularity of the Ukrainian idea even in Russified Kyiv, an event which helped raise the profile and popularity of the UCR and its head. On Hrushevskiy's initiative, a Ukrainian newspaper, *Nova Rada*, was founded as the organ of the Central Rada, and in it he published regular articles on the burning issues of the time.


The UCR and its activities acquired legitimacy and a legal basis when on Hrushevskiy's urging an All-Ukrainian National Congress was convened in April 1917. The Congress supported the idea of national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine, proclaimed the Central Rada to be the supreme representative body of Ukraine vis-à-vis the Provisional Government, and re-elected its members. In the months that followed, All-Ukrainian Military, Peasant and Workers' Congresses were held under the aegis and influence of the Central Rada, which gradually acquired additional members representing all strata of the population and political parties.

A characteristic feature of Hrushevskiy's work at this time (and hence, too, that of the Rada) was his wish to achieve results if at all possible via negotiations, and to avoid unnecessary confrontations, and to take balanced decisions beneficial to the majority. In his political activities, he was guided, first and foremost, by the interests of the Ukrainian people, without infringing the rights of other ethnic communities living in Ukraine. At the same time, relations with the Provisional Government did not proceed easily. To ensure firm order in its land, the Rada had in its I Universal universally proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine and the formation of a General Secretariat – to govern Ukraine. The proclamation of the I Universal was the first step towards an independent Ukrainian state. Ukrainian popular reaction to the proclamation of the Universal forced the Provisional Government into a dialogue, in the course of which an agreement was eventually reached allowing Ukraine to set up its own state apparatus, without seceding from the pan-Russian super-state. But the Bolshevik revolution and seizure of power by Lenin and his party evoked a strong protest from Ukraine.

Bolshevik military action against the lawful government of the Ukrainian people put an end to the possibility of Russian-Ukrainian coexistence within a single state. In January 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada proclaimed its IV Universal, which provided a legal basis for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. The fact that the members of the Central Rada, who were drawn from very different social backgrounds and political affiliations, managed within less than a year to reach agreement on the necessity for an independent Ukrainian state, and to overcome their ingrained complex of being a 'fraternal state', a weakling province, incapable of its own independent state life, must rank as one of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's great achievements. But we must mention, too, other members of the Central Rada, which had now become the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine: Dmytro Antonovych, Serhiy Veselovskiy, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Serhiy

Yefremov, Fedir Kryzhanivskiy, Andriy Nikovskiy, Symon Petlura, Mykola Shrah, Mykola Chechel, Levko Chykalenko, Volodymyr Naumenko, Yakiv Levchenko, Khrystofor Baranovskiy, Ivan Steshenko, Vsevolod Holubovych, Oleksander Zarubin, Borys Martos, Mykola Porsh, Valentyn Sadovskiy, Mykhaylo Tuhanyan-Baranovskiy, Pavlo Khrystyuk, Oleksander Shulhyn, Moysey Rafes, and other notable activists.

Hrushevskiy was heeded both by the members of the Central Rada, and its executive nucleus, the Little Rada. His words carried considerable weight in the legislative activities of the Ukrainian parliament. Unfortunately, Hrushevskiy, as a steadfast democrat, likewise based his legislative initiatives on the Hippocratic principle 'do no harm'. Hrushevskiy and those who shared his principles planned



The Hrushevskiy family: Oleksander, Hanna, Mykhaylo, Mariya, Hanna's children – Serhii and Olha Shamray, Kateryna and Hlafira. Kyiv, 1900s.

to submit all the fundamental laws of the new state for review by the Ukrainian Constituent Congress, scheduled to convene in January 1918. As a result, many vitally necessary laws were passed only after considerable delay, during the Ukrainian-Bolshevik war. Due to this war, the elections to the Constituent Congress did not take place, and the projected land law and law on the Ukrainian armed forces were never passed.

Nevertheless, the UCR and Hrushevskiy personally achieved a great deal towards the national development of the people. Ukrainian schools were established all over the country, books on Ukrainian history were published, including a number of historical and political works by Hrushevskiy himself. Efforts were made to establish an Academy of Sciences, and a National Academy of Arts was opened. During the war against the Bolsheviks, the Rada passed a number of laws, dealing with such matters as the national currency, the state flag and coat-

of-arms, citizenship, and the police. The Ukrainian government established diplomatic relations with the Entente states – Britain and France.

The commissars in Petrograd did not recognise Ukraine's claim for autonomy, considering it simply a raw materials-producing appendage of Russia, and issued an ultimatum, demanding that Ukraine should provide Russia with the raw materials and foodstuffs it so urgently needed. Ukraine's refusal to provide free maintenance to the 'hungry revolutionaries' triggered open aggression by Russia. The scanty Ukrainian military units were unable to resist the Russians. The left-bank Ukraine (i.e. the area east of the Dnipro) soon fell under Russian occupation, and in January 1918 Kyiv too. The capture of Kyiv meant a personal loss for Hrushevskyyi. On the night of 25–26 January, the ex-tsarist colonel Muravyov, who led the assault, opened cannon-fire at Hrushevskyyi's building on 9 Pankivska Street. The incendiary shells immediately set it on fire and it burnt down. Hrushevskyyi himself was in the Central Rada at the time, but his wife Mariya and daughter Kateryna, who were in the burning building, barely escaped with their lives. This incident was so traumatic for Hrushevskyyi's mother that she died shortly after. Fortunately, Mykhaylo's brother and sister lived in an outbuilding, which was undamaged.

The fire destroyed all Hrushevskyyi's possessions, including a unique collection of antiquities. The fire consumed a collection of Ukrainian and Persian rugs from the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries (123 items), a collection of glassware (from Bohemia, Venice and Ukraine), a collection of silver church vessels, a collection of embroidery (including a cope from Ivan Mazepa's church in Baturyn), bone and metal *objets d'art*, engravings on wood, table-ware (including some 100 place services), furniture, ancient printed material, a huge collection of historical documents, paintings, including portraits of a number of hetmans. The fire also totally destroyed the possessions of the artist Vasyly Krychevskyyi, who rented an apartment in the building and had his studio there. He, too, was a notable collector, whose collection included engravings by Hryhoriy Levytskyi, an artist from the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv, ecclesiastical rugs from the fifteenth century, and a large number of paintings.

This personal tragedy enhanced the bitterness of the political one, but this did not break Hrushevskyyi. The Central Rada continued its work under his leadership. However, this difficult political situation forced the Ukrainian government to seek outside help. Since autumn 1917, a Ukrainian delegation had been conducting peace negotiations with the Central Powers, and on 9 March 1918 an armistice was signed. In addition, Ukraine negotiated an agreement on military aid from Austria and Germany against the Bolsheviks. As a result, the Russian armies were forced to withdraw from Ukraine.

It seemed that the Central Rada, under Hrushevskyyi's guidance, would now be able to renew its legislative activities. However, by a tragic coincidence, on the very day that the law on land and the Constitution of the Ukrainian National Republic were ratified there was a right-wing putsch in Ukraine, which proclaimed the establishment of a Ukrainian state headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyyi. Hrushevskyyi was now excluded from any active participation in political life. For a time he lived a quasi 'underground' existence, and, eventually, went abroad. In

1924, he returned to Ukraine. Later, during the celebrations in 1926 to mark his sixtieth birthday and fortieth anniversary of scholarly work, he explained the motives behind this decision: 'I want to go on living in order to work, suffer and fight together with you'.¹⁸

The jubilee was a special event in Hrushevskiy's life. On the one hand, it was a public recognition of his authority as a scholar both in Ukraine and far beyond its borders.

Your 'History of Ukraine' – ... is the first full scholarly and accurate history of our land... Now that it exists, it is quite difficult to imagine how it was possible to live without it. As an historian – you have become famous not only within Ukraine, not only within our [Soviet] Union, but also far away beyond the border. Even had you had only this one work to your name, it would be an eternal and super-human monument,

said Volodymyr Lypskyi, President of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.¹⁹ (In fact, Hrushevskiy's scholarly output numbers some two thousand published works).

One of the participants of this celebration, the eminent literary scholar Hryhoriy Kostyuk, described it as the bursting forth of a great force of Ukrainian state consciousness:

At that moment, for the participants in the celebrations (with the exception of the handful of informers undoubtedly present in the audience) one may surely say that neither the Soviet authorities nor the Communist Party and its dictatorship existed. In their consciousness there reigned only the image of a great sovereign Ukraine and its spiritual leader, the scholar Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy.²⁰

In another way, too, the celebrant himself that day testified to the steadfastness of the guiding principles and aspirations of his life. He made it clear that the hopes of the state and Party leadership would not be realised: they heard from him no public repentance, renunciation of the past, or exaltation of the Bolshevik authorities.

Hrushevskiy's return from emigration in 1924 should be regarded as not only the desire to have a quiet, regular job, but, first and foremost (as convincingly argued by the historian Oleksander Ohloblyn), in order to 'continue the fight for the national independence and sovereignty of Ukraine, with those weapons which in his hands were the most powerful, the weapons of scholarship'.²¹


The true aspirations and the true face of Hrushevskiy could be understood even by those who, no sooner than he had returned, began to frame charges against him and to include him on their list of 'undesirables'. He did not know that in 1925 the GPU would issue a secret directive banning his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* as a 'hostile, pseudo-scholarly history, detrimental to Soviet power... by the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism'. In one denunciation, dated 6 March 1926, we read: '...

¹⁸ *Yuviley akademika M. S. Hrushevskoho 1866–1926* (Kyiv, 1927), p. 38.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰ H. Kostyuk, *Zustrichi i proshchannya: Knyha spobadiu* (Edmonton, 1987), book 1, p. 193.

²¹ L. Vynar, *Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy v ukrayinskyi i svitoviy istoriyi. U 125-littya z dnya narodzhennya* (New York–Toronto–Kyiv–Paris, 1993), p. 38.



Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy. Kyiv, 1 May 1918.

Hrushevskiy M.S. – scholar with a European reputation... Great organiser... Extremely ambitious. He keeps silent, selecting people... He does not change his political views and orthography, he bends but does not break'.²²

Hrushevskiy's strongest reasons for returning to Ukraine were related to his academic plans – he wanted to finish the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and to restart the work of his historical school. It is no exaggeration to say that Hrushevskiy's activity in the period 1924–31 – his own writing and research, his work organising academic activities and the publishing of scholarly books and periodicals, was a unique phenomenon in the annals of Ukrainian scholarship. In this brief period of time, he managed to restore the activity of the Historical section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, established and chaired numerous commissions, including one dealing with the local history of Ukraine, county by county. He drew into the activity of the section members of the older generation of professional historians, including Oleksander Hrushevskiy, Yosyf Hermayze, Volodymyr Shcherbyna, Leonid Dobrovolskyi, Antin Synyavskiy, Vasyl Lyaskoronskyi, Oleksiy Novytskyi, Kostyantyn Kharlampovych, Fedir Ernst, Mykola Makarenko, Vasyl Krychevskiy, and many others.

The research department of Ukrainian history headed by Hrushevskiy was of unique significance in the development of the historical school of Hrushevskiy in Kyiv, and for Ukrainian historiography as a whole. In building up his historical school, Hrushevskiy was aware that he was training a future generation of true scholars of the history of Ukraine to carry on his work and that of Ukrainian historical research generally. And, indeed, all the students of the Hrushevskiy school

²² V. Prystayko, Yu. Shapoval, *Hrushevskiy i HPU–NKVD. Trachibne desyatylyttya: 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 23.

accepted his view of history as the basis of Ukrainian national historiography. This new generation included such young scholars as Kateryna Hrushevka, Serhiy Shamray, Mykola Tkachenko, Viktor Yurkevych, Sylvestr Hlushko, Vasyl Denysenko, Mykhaylo Karachivskiy.

In spite of adverse circumstances, Hrushevskiy, as head of the section, managed to maintain the regular appearance of the scholarly journal *Ukrayina*, the magazine *Pervisne bromadyanstvo*, and a number of collections of papers from the various sections, including *Za sto lit*, *Kyiv ta yoho okolytsya*, *Kyivskiy zbirnyk arkhеolohiyi y istoriyi*..., and a Festschrift for Volodymyr Shcherbyna. He continued working on the ninth and tenth volumes of *History of Ukraine-Rus'*; acted as editor-in-chief of all the publications of the section, published a great number of separate articles and studies, and performed a countless number of tasks related to the organisation of academic life. The scholarly publications of the section were sent to more than 100 scholars and learned institutions abroad.

During the past few years, many secret documents of the GPU-NKVD have been declassified and studied. These show that no sooner had Hrushevskiy returned to Ukraine than the security police began a constant and wide-ranging search for 'compromising material' against him, as a result of which he was arrested (23 March 1931) as, allegedly, the leader of an anti-Soviet underground organisation, the 'Ukrainian National Centre' (UNC). One such document, dating from 1930, says that:

In actual fact he is sceptical of all actions undertaken by the Party and the authorities, expressing doubt in the legality of the trial of the Industrial Party. He is also sceptical of Marxist methodology, remains convincingly eclectic, and in his political views is a nationalist-populist... Hrushevskiy's appeal is too strong, his authority too great... Thus, all Hrushevskiy's activities, behaviour, and environment testify that Hrushevskiy has not laid down his arms...²³

The people in power fixed their sights on their target; to destroy Hrushevskiy, it was necessary to disarm him:

- to take away the possibility of doing his own, invaluable scholarly work, by sending him on a long-term posting to Moscow;
- subsequently to put into operation a campaign of frenzied ideological destruction of the historical institutions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) by purges and critical attacks on their scholarly achievements;
- next, to arrest Hrushevskiy himself and beat out of him a confession to being the leader of the alleged counter-revolutionary UNC;
- and, finally, mass repressions against the future of Ukrainian historical research – the students of his school.

Everything connected with the name of Hrushevskiy was systematically eradicated and destroyed – scholarly works, the institutions founded by him, students, co-authors and fellow-workers and his whole milieu.

On 25 November 1934, in Kislovodsk, Hrushevskiy died, under circumstances that can only be described as mysterious. The coffin containing his remains was

²³ Ibid.

brought to Kyiv on 28 November, and the following day was interred in the Baykov cemetery in Kyiv. Even posthumously, however, Hrushevskiy remained a symbol of the independence and unity of the Ukrainian nation. The Soviet authorities were forced to organise a grand funeral. An obituary was published in *Pravda*, putting an apparent seal of approval on Hrushevskiy, but his *magnum opus*, the very name of which sums up the historical and political views of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy – the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* – was renamed the *History of Rus'-Ukraine*. It proved possible to erect a monument (sculptor, Ivan Makohon, architect, Vasyl Krychevskiy), on his grave, which adjoins the grave of his family. However, the burial-places of his daughter Kateryna and brother Oleksander, who fell victim to the repressions of 1938, remain unknown, as, too, is the grave of his kinsman Serhiy Shamray, repressed in 1937.

During the past few years, the name of Hrushevskiy has once more been openly honoured by the Ukrainian people. The current process of building an independent Ukrainian state cannot be imagined without an objective study and analysis of the national-liberation movement led by Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy, the contemplation of his politico-legal concept, the kingpin of which was the 'Ukrainian idea', including the lessons of the past. How true, today, are the words of this founding father of Ukrainian statehood:

You, lily-livered, timid-minded people! If all that you value is your own peace of mind and safety, and if you are terrified to deviate from what has become established dogma – then get out of the arena of politics and community action, and leave the place free for those who do have the courage to work and create a new life...²⁴ □

²⁴ M. Hrushevskiy, *Na porozi novoyi Ukrayiny*, op. cit., p. 9.

Arts and Culture

The Work of Vera Rich in the Context of Ukrainian-British Literary Relations

Roksoliana Zorivchak



In 1957, *The Ukrainian Review* published a translation of the Prologue to the narrative poem 'Moses' by Ivan Franko. The translator was Vera Rich, and its appearance marked the beginning of her career as a translator of Ukrainian and other Slavonic Literature.

In 1997, the 40th anniversary of the publication of the 'Moses' Prologue, the Union of Writers of Ukraine awarded her their Ivan Franko prize, which is given for outstanding work in presenting and popularising Ukrainian literature among the world literary community. The formal presentation of the prize took place on 19 May 1998 in Kyiv.

Until recently, the restrictions of Soviet censorship meant that Vera Rich's work was virtually unknown in Ukraine itself. One scholar, however, who did know it, and who made valiant efforts, even in the Soviet period, to bring it to the attention of the Ukrainian academic and literary world, was Dr Roxoliana Zorivchak of Lviv, a specialist in transla-

tion theory. It was on the initiative of Dr Zorivchak that the Lviv branch of the Union of Writers of Ukraine proposed Vera Rich for the Ivan Franko prize.

Dr Zorivchak's article which follows first appeared in the Ukrainian literary journal *Vsesvit*, no. 8–9, 1997, pp. 175–80). Bibliographical references and footnotes have been added by the Editors of *The Ukrainian Review*.

* * *

At the present stage of the development of mankind, the English language is the most widely spread in the world (if one considers: 400 years ago, it was spoken only by 7 million people in the British Isles). Today, for some 350 million people this language is native, for a further 400 million it is the second language, to which they constantly have recourse, while a further 150 million speak it well as a foreign language. In more than 60 states of the world, it has the status of an official or one of the official languages. For this reason, English translations of Ukrainian *belles-lettres* is a major factor in the consolidation of Ukraine as a nation in the world literary context. The earliest such translation identified so far is that of Matthew Guthrie, a Scottish doctor and polymath who spent most of his adult life in St Petersburg. His manuscript volume *Noctes Rossicae*¹ (preserved in the British

¹ Matthew Guthrie (1743, Edinburgh–1807, St Petersburg) went to Russia in 1769 as an army doctor. In 1778, he became chief medical officer to Russia's Land (First) Cadet Corps, and eventually rose

Library in London), a collection of folk-lore and ethnographic material gathered during the years 1794–1806, includes an annotated translation of the ancient Ukrainian folk-song ‘Oy, pid vyshneyu, pid chereshneyu’.² To date, more than 300 translators have attempted to present the *belles-lettres* of Ukraine to the Anglo-phone reader. These include our contemporary, Vera Rich.

Vera Rich was born on 24 April 1936 in London to an English family. Her talent for poetry was awakened early on: from the age of ten she wrote poems, and from 15 she published them. After finishing secondary education, she studied at Oxford University, specialising in Old English and Old Norse languages, then in London University, where she studied mathematics and as an extra option the Ukrainian language.³ Here Vera became acquainted with Ukrainians, who, in their turn, introduced her to Ukrainian poetry, and in particular Taras Shevchenko. As a sensitive artistic personality, she perceived Shevchenko’s greatness and the genius of his Word, and realised what an extraordinary responsibility she was taking upon herself in attempting to introduce to the English-speaking world the poet whose creativity had become an inalienable part of the spiritual substance of the Ukrainian people. Soon after, her individual translations of Shevchenko appeared in the English-language press: the first – ‘The Caucasus’, in the spring issue of the London-based quarterly *The Ukrainian Review* for 1959, together with an introduction by the translator.⁴ This brief essay showed how profoundly Vera Rich understood Shevchenko’s poetry. She called ‘The Caucasus’ a ‘structural triumph’, identifying three main themes, each related to the others, and to the whole poem as the movements of a symphony are inter-related – everlasting suffering under oppression; the Caucasian war as an example of such suffering; and mourning for his

to be a state councillor. In addition to wide-ranging interests in the sciences, he also had strong literary and historical interests, trying, in particular, to relate the folk customs and rituals of the East Slavonic peoples to the traditions of classical Greece and Rome. He was the author of a work in French *Dissertations sur les antiquités de Russie* (St Petersburg, 1795), which, according to the title-page, was ‘traduits sur son ouvrage anglais dédié à la Société Royale des Antiquaires d’Ecosse’. This seems to imply a published version in English. However, The Scottish Society of Antiquities have no record of a published version, nor why the manuscript, presumably once in their possession, ended up in London, in the British Library. However, this manuscript, entitled *Noctes Rossicae*, is clearly loosely related to the content of the *Dissertations*. But the logistics of the still continuing move of the British Library to the new St Pancras site makes it currently impossible to carry out a page-by-page identity check.

² This song presents a particular problem for translators, since both the trees mentioned in the first line have to be rendered in English by ‘cherry’. A possible solution would perhaps be on the lines of ‘Neath cherry-trees fruiting red, fruiting black...’. Guthrie evades the difficulty: his (prose) version begins: ‘Under a Cherry Tree Sat an old man and a young girl...’ (*Noctes Rossicae*, p. 190). The French version, in *Dissertations* likewise has only one tree: ‘Un viellard s’assit sous un cerifier avec une jeune fille...’.

³ The course in question (one hour a week) – given at London University’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), was not aimed at imparting an active knowledge of Ukrainian. It formed part of the syllabus of the Comparative Slavonic Linguistics course, and focussed on showing the development of the specific features of Ukrainian. It could therefore give, at most, a passive reading knowledge of the language. As will be seen below, the author of this article became, in 1992, SSEES’s first *lectrice* in Ukrainian.

⁴ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. vi, 1959, no. 1, pp. 41–53.

friends. Here it is worth recalling that excerpts from the poem 'The Caucasus' were the first of Shevchenko's lines to be heard in English (in 1868, thanks to Andriy Humnytskyi, known under the pseudonym of Ahapiy Honcharenko).⁵

At the beginning of the 1960s, in Britain and throughout the world (and, in particular, where the Ukrainians had been cast up by capricious fate), preparations were under way for the Shevchenko jubilees of 1961 and 1964. A Shevchenko Jubilee Committee was set up in the UK in 1960, and set itself the task of publishing all the works of Shevchenko in English in new translations. This was a mighty undertaking, particularly if one takes into account the large Ukrainian population in Britain, and the small number of experts in Ukrainian studies. The first volume (in several books) was to have encompassed all the poetic legacy of the poet; the second – prose; the third – dramatic works, diary, correspondence.

Vera Rich dedicated herself to translation work without reservation. Luxuriating in the Ukrainian word, feasting her eyes on its pictorial force, she attempted to enter into Shevchenko's world, furthermore attempted to recreate this world by means of her own native language for the reader of a completely different era and mentality. In the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) of London University – the scholarly centre of Ukrainian studies – she had full access to Shevchenko-studies and to Ukrainian literature in general. Victor Swoboda, a lecturer at SSEES, originating from steppe Ukraine, gave her considerable assistance. His official job-description was 'lecturer in Russian', but his own scholarly interests were exclusively Ukrainian-oriented. She consulted Professor Pavlo Zaytsev, a noted scholar of Ukrainian literature, then resident in Munich. Another expert who saw and highly approved her working drafts was Percy Paul Selver, a translator himself, who although best known for his work on Czech literature, had also rendered some of Shevchenko's works, including 'The Testament' (1915), the autobiography and excerpts from the diary (1916) and the novella *The Artist*, on which he was working in the early 1960s.

Vera Rich's interest in Ukrainian poetry was not confined to Shevchenko. Thus the winter issue of *The Ukrainian Review* for 1959 contained an account by Victor Swoboda of the first-ever literary evening of Ukrainian poetry in English translation.⁶ This was organised by the Anglo-Ukrainian Society on 28 May 1959, and included 22 examples of the works of Ukrainian writers, including Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrayinka, Ivan Franko, Mykola Zerov, Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara, principally translated by Vera Rich. From 1962–9, she published her own poetry magazine, *Manifold*, and wrote her own poems. During these years, she published three collections of her own poetry: *Outlines* (1969), *Portents and Images* (1963), and *Heritage of Dreams* (1964). The poem 'Elizabeth, the Wise King's Daughter', about the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise, was published in the latter. And, in 1990, inspired by the changes in Eastern Europe and the Declarations of Sovereignty of Ukraine and Belarus, Vera Rich wrote the poem 'Prologue' ('Be swift, my friends, be swift'), which was publicly recited for the first time at an

⁵ Ibid., vol. 43, no. 1, 1996, pp. 68–70.

⁶ Ibid., vol. iv, no. 4, p. 91.

impromptu gathering in London to celebrate the Ukrainian independence referendum of December 1991.

In the academic year 1991–2, SSEES introduced the study of the Ukrainian language as a subject in its own right, and I had the honour of becoming the first fully-fledged lecturer of Ukrainian in a higher educational establishment in Great Britain. Vera Rich at once enrolled in my advanced class. She did not care that the classes finished at 21.00 hours and that she had a long journey home by public transport, or that all the other students were much younger. She explained that she was attending the classes, first and foremost, to improve her spoken Ukrainian, but, maybe, the primary reason was that she had developed an intense spiritual need to support any Ukrainian issue. We had corresponded since 1981, but met for the first time only at the Fourth World Congress of Slavists in Harrogate in July 1990, and during my year in London met very frequently: either during University classes, in libraries, or the Belarusian Library and Museum, or the premises of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain. Often Vera would telephone me for advice on the interpretation of one or another Ukrainian expression or custom (at that time she was revising her translation of ‘Boyarynya’ by Lesya Ukrayinka⁷ and Shevchenko’s poems). I was enthralled by her attention both to every single word of the original, and, so to speak, the ‘sub-text’, her feelings of responsibility for every translated line. And also her profound knowledge of English history, literature and traditions. When we walked together around the streets of London, I had the impression that history itself, through the voice of Vera Rich, was talking to me from the distance of the ages. She told me not only about London or Great Britain; she spoke about the various countries she had visited – she is a seasoned traveller: to date she has visited 35 states, including the USA, Iceland, India, Israel. But it was only in 1991, in the dying days of the Soviet Union, that she was able to visit Ukraine for the first time – to attend the Shevchenko celebration in Kyiv in March 1991 (a trip undertaken – she proudly boasts – in defiance of the Soviet authorities, who, as a sop to *glasnost*, were at last prepared to give her a visa, but restricted its validity to Moscow!). By the time of her second visit – to Lviv in August 1992 – Ukraine was already independent, and she was able to play an active part in two very important events: the unveiling of the Shevchenko monument and the reinterment of Patriarch Yosyf Slipyj.

Vera Rich is a regular contributor to leading English periodicals, particularly about the state of education and scholarly life in the former Soviet Union, and in general in Eastern and Central Europe. For 20 years (1969–89), she wrote regularly for the British scientific weekly *Nature*. Her materials are frequently printed in *The Economist*, *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, and the medical journal, *The Lancet*. Since 1993, Vera Rich has been deputy editor of *The Ukrainian Review*, playing a major part in that journal’s efforts to make Ukrainian literature known to the English-speaking world.

From 1959–69, Vera Rich published translations of 51 poems by Taras Shevchenko (including 9 major works) and excerpts from the narrative poem ‘The Prin-

⁷ Published under the title ‘Her Excellency’ in *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. xl, 1992, no. 1, pp. 31–54; no. 2, pp. 23–37; no. 3, pp. 37–44.

cess'. Sixteen of these works, including 'Bewitched', 'The Neophytes', 'The Cold Ravine', 'Chyhyryn', 'To Little Maryana', were translated into English for the first time. Thirty-eight of these translations appeared in the collection *Song out of Darkness*,⁸ which includes a foreword by Paul Selver, in which he gives a high evaluation of the skills of Vera Rich, and articles on Shevchenko by W. K. Matthews and Victor Swoboda. This book also contained a bibliography, compiled by Swoboda, of English-language Shevchenkiana in Britain and a list of the principal English-language version of Shevchenko's works, published outside Britain. To date, this book is the sole one to see the light of day from the planned 3-volume set. Many of Vera's translations of Shevchenko, notably the epic 'The Haydamaks', remain unpublished to this day.

Several translations by Vera Rich, particularly the ballads 'Pretty Kateryna...', the poems 'I am not ill...', 'Paraphrase of the Eleventh Psalm', and others, appeared in the quadri-lingual volume of Shevchenko's works, published in Munich in 1961.⁹ The translation by Vera Rich of the cycle 'In the Fortress' saw the world in the summer issue of *The Ukrainian Review* in 1965.¹⁰ Her translation of 'The Dream' ('She reaped the wheat in serfdom's labour', appeared in *The Ukrainian Review* in 1964.¹¹ The spring issue of *The Ukrainian Review* in 1993 carried her translation of Shevchenko's poem 'To Osnovyanenko',¹² and in spring 1998, to mark the bicentenary of the publication of the *Aeneid* of Ivan Kotlyarevskiy, it published her translation of Shevchenko's poem 'To the eternal memory of Kotlyarevskiy', together with the sonnet 'Kotlyarevskiy'¹³ by Ivan Franko.

How did Vera Rich convey Shevchenko's word to her fellow countrymen? An analysis of her translations and a comparison of them with the original shows that she feels at home in the role of translator with her, so to speak, professional bilingual and bicultural status. Her translations are almost entirely free of creolisation (that is excessive influence of the culture of the recipient), and of its opposite, exotism (predominance of the culture of the original). Of the most talented, one

⁸ Taras Shevchenko, *Song out of Darkness—Selected Poems*, translated from the Ukrainian by Vera Rich, with Preface by Paul Selver, a Critical Essay by W.K. Matthews, Introduction and Notes by V. Swoboda (London, The Mitre Press, 1961). Of the poems listed above, the following appeared in *Song out of Darkness*: 'Bewitched' (pp. 1–6), 'The Neophytes' (pp. 96–110), 'The Cold Ravine' (pp. 81–3), 'Chyhyryn' (pp. 23–5), 'To Little Maryana' (p. 83).

⁹ Taras Shevchenko, *Poems, Poésies, Gedichte*, Ed. George S.N. Luckyj (Munich, 1961). In this collection, the opening of the ballad 'U tiyeyi Kataryny' (pp. 92–4) is rendered as 'Pretty Kateryna had/A house with fine wood floor'. Later, however, the translator became acquainted with the observation of Maksym Rylskiy, that it is only after the death of the heroine that Shevchenko gives any indication that she is, in fact, pretty. In poetry readings to audiences familiar with the Scottish ballad tradition, therefore, Vera Rich normally renders the first line as 'Mistress Kateryna had...', with appropriate emendations throughout. However, since for some readers, particularly in the USA, this might prove ambiguous, she considers this only a stop-gap solution. The other translations by Vera Rich in this collection, not included in *Song out of Darkness*, are 'Lines from "The Princess"' (p. 79). 'I am not ill...' (p. 104), Paraphrase of the Eleventh Psalm (pp. 107–8).

¹⁰ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. xii, 1965, no. 2, pp. 56–64.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, 1964, no. 4, p. 63.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. xi, 1993, no.1, pp. 36–8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. 45, 1998, no. 1, pp. 65–8.

should mention the translation of the works: 'Once I was walking in the night...',¹⁴ 'The Neophytes',¹⁵ 'Hamaliya',¹⁶ 'Bewitched',¹⁷ 'The Caucasus',¹⁸ 'Beside the house, the cherry's...'.¹⁹ Here are the opening lines of the latter of these poems in the original and in translation by Vera Rich:

Садок вишневий коло хати,
Хрущі над вишнями гудуть,
Плугатарі з плугами йдуть,
Співають ідучи дівчата,
А матері вечерять ждуть.

Beside the house the cherry's flowering,
Above the trees the May bugs hum,
The ploughmen from the furrows come,
The girls all wander homeward singing,
And mothers wait the meal for them.

Or the ardent lines from the dedication (to M. S. Shchepkyn),²⁰ which precedes 'The Neophytes':

Привітай же благодуже
Мою сиротину,
Наш великий чудотворче,
Мій друже єдиний!
Привітаєш: убогая,
Сірая, з тобою
Перепливе вона Лету,
І огнем-сльозою
Упаде колись на землю
і притчею стане
Розпинателям народним,
Грядущим тиранам.

With your kind heart give welcome then
To my hapless orphan,
You who are my only friend,
Our great wonder-worker!
You will greet the wretched orphan,
She, then, at your side
Will sail across the Lethe's waters,
And with tears of fire
Will fall, some day, upon the earth,
A parable become
For crucifiers of the nations,
Tyrants yet to come.

This is a perfect example of artistic, semantic and stylistically equal, fully-fledged translation. For many of Shevchenko's imaginative coinages ('great wonder-worker', 'tears of fire', 'A parable become for crucifiers of the nations, tyrants yet to come') Vera Rich has found the optimally possible equivalents in English.

Likewise, she skilfully recreated in English Shevchenko's pearls from the poem 'Chyhyryn':²¹

Нехай же вітер все розносить
На неокраєнім крилі,
Нехай же серце плаче, просить
Святої правди на землі.

Then let the wind bear all away
In its untrammelled flight,
And let the heart then weep and pray:
On this earth – holy right!

It is virtually impossible to convey fully in English the denotative and connotational semantics of the expression 'Na neokrayanym kryli', rendered here as 'in its untrammelled flight', all the more so in view of the fact that in the *Dictionary of*

¹⁴ *Song out of Darkness*, p. 112.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 96–110.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 16–20.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 69–73.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–5.

*the Language of Shevchenko*²² the explanation of the semantics of this interesting expression is reduced to the note 'Образн.' [figurative].

In Vera Rich's translations, the reader encounters shining artistic examples of the reproduction of the onomatopoeia of the original as, for example, the very successful recreation of the uncanny exclamations of the *rusalky*, in essence, lines of the folk-song: 'Whisht! Whisht! Will o'the wisp!'²³

And this is how the half-rhymes and internal rhymes were put across in the poem 'Hamaliya':

Гамалію, серце мліє:	Hamaliya! Valour's fleeing
Сказилося море...	The sea has grown enraged!...
... Гамалію, вітер віє,	...Hamaliya! Winds blow freely!
Ось-ось наше море!	Soon our own sea again! ²⁴

In order to convince ourselves of the accuracy of Vera Rich as a translator, let us look more carefully at her interpretation of the ballad 'Bewitched', in particular, let us turn to the metric scheme of the original and the translation. In the prologue to the poem, the metre is iambic tetrameter:

Та ясен раз у раз скрипів.	And now and then ash-tree creaked.
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Later, with the start of the action, the iambics are transformed into a *kolomyika* verse:²⁵

В таку добу під горою,	Such a night, beneath the mountain,
Біля того гаю...	There beside the spinney...

Then, when the poet interrupts the action to ponder over the destiny of the heroine, the change is marked, metrically, by the appearance of a *kolyada* metre,²⁶ which is composed of four amphibrachs

Кого ж сиротина, кого запитає...	But whom, then, O whom can the orphan approach...
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Turning again to a description of nature, which plays such an important role in the life of the heroine, Shevchenko again reverts to iambs and – accordingly – so does Vera Rich:

Широкий Дніпр не гомонить...	The Dnipro flows on silently...
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although, in the last translated line the splendid personification of the original has disappeared.

Vera Rich, likewise, works on the principle of phonetic transcription as the only proper manner of rendering Ukrainian toponyms and personal names in English graphemes (taking into account the limitations of English phonetics).

²² *Slovník mowy Shevchenka*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1964).

²³ *Song out of Darkness*, p. 3.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 20.

²⁵ A traditional metre of Ukrainian folk-song, consisting of alternating eight-syllable and six-syllable lines, with the six-syllable lines carrying the rhyme-scheme.

²⁶ A traditional Ukrainian verse-form, with 11- or 12-syllable lines, and a generally amphibrach rhythm.

Obviously, in the translations of Vera Rich there are also some semantic lapses and stylistic infelicities, which the professional scholar of translation studies must point out. Here is an example of such a slip: in the beautiful historical-lyrical miniature 'Za bayrakom bayrak...' ('Wooded valleys abound'),²⁷ Shevchenko creates a moving, original (somewhat mysterious) verbal image, strengthened by the alliteration of the sound (s):

Нас тут триста як скло!
Товариства лягло!

In Vera Rich the calqued expression is absolutely incomprehensible to the reader, and may even lead to the distortion of the original sense: as if the Cossacks are smashed as quickly and easily as glass.

Cossacks then, fifteen score,
Like to glass, rose no more!

Vera Rich has also translated a number of major works of Lesya Ukrayinka. In 1968, a collection of these was published by the University of Toronto Press.²⁸ These include the dramatic poems 'Cassandra',²⁹ 'The Orgy',³⁰ the drama 'The Stone Host',³¹ the poem 'Robert the Bruce, King of Scotland',³² and also a selection of lyrics: the cycle 'Seven Strings',³³ 'Contra spem spero!',³⁴ 'And thou, like Israel, once fought great battles',³⁵ 'Epilogue'.³⁶ The most recent Lesyana of Vera Rich to be published include the play 'Her Excellency',³⁷ the dramatic poem 'Babylonian Captivity'³⁸ and the fairy drama 'Forest Song'.³⁹

Her translations also include works of Ukrainian poets of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries (including Mazepa's poem 'O woe to the lapwing'⁴⁰), and also the poems of Markiy Shashkevych,⁴¹ and twentieth-century poets Yevhen Pluzhnyk,⁴² Pavlo Fylypovych,⁴³ Lina Kostenko,⁴⁴ Yevhen Hutsalo,⁴⁵ Mykhaylo Orest,⁴⁶ et al.

²⁷ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. XII, 1965, no. 2, pp. 56–7. This expression is, in fact, by no means easily comprehensible to the Ukrainian reader, and is discussed at some length by George Y. Shevelov in 'Як скло: On and around a simile in Ševčenko's poetry', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1–2 (Summer/Winter 1989), pp. 9–20.

²⁸ *Lesya Ukrayinka, Selected Works translated by Vera Rich, Life and Work by Constantine Bida* (University of Toronto Press, 1968).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 181–239.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 143–80.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–142.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 240–51.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 252–5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 237–8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

³⁷ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. XI, 1992, no. 1, pp. 31–54; no. 2, pp. 23–37; no. 3, pp. 37–44.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. XI, 1993, no. 3, pp. 46–60.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. XII, 1994, no. 1, pp. 66–73; no. 2, pp. 33–58; no. 3, pp. 40–60; no. 4, pp. 48–64.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. VI, 1959, no. 3, p. 47.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, vol. VIII, 1961, no. 4, pp. 91–2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, vol. VII, 1960, no. 3, p. 43.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. XV, 1968, no. 3, pp. 55–8.

⁴⁵ *Manifold*, no. 28, 1969, p. 3.

⁴⁶ *Manifold*, no. 10, 1963, p. 13; *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 42, 1995, no. 2, pp. 50–2.

Another major field of her interest is the poetry of Ivan Franko. In 1973, under the aegis of the Shevchenko Learned Society in New York, her translation of Franko's narrative poem 'Moses'⁴⁷ was published together with certain reprints of translations from Franko by Percival Cundy. Her translation of 'The Prologue' to 'Moses' had originally appeared in *The Ukrainian Review* in 1957;⁴⁸ subsequently, this journal published various other of her translations from Franko's, including 'O Heart of Woman, are you wintry ice',⁴⁹ 'The Idyll',⁵⁰ 'Come Easter Day, Dear God Almighty'⁵¹ (chapter 18 from the poem 'Panski zharty'), 'Prison Sonnets',⁵² 'The Spirit of Revolt',⁵³ part of the cycle 'Spring Songs'.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, a great bulk of her Franko translations still remain unpublished, including the cycle 'The Poet', and a major part of the cycle 'Excelsior!' Her translation of 'The Death of Cain' appears for the first time, following this article.⁵⁵

Apart from the already mentioned studies, Vera Rich is also the author of research comparing Ivan Franko with English poets,⁵⁶ about Taras Shevchenko and Shakespeare,⁵⁷ Lesya Ukrayinka's 'Boyarynya',⁵⁸ the marriage of Elizabeth, daughter of Yaroslav the Wise, to the Norwegian King Harald Hardrade,⁵⁹ and the illumination of this event in the Scandinavian sources. From her deep knowledge of English literature, she looks at the phenomena of Ukrainian *belles-lettres* in the context of her own native culture, while paying due attention to the work of Ukrainian researchers. For example, in the article about Franko and English poets, Vera Rich compares Byron's mystery 'Cain' and Franko's legend 'Death of Cain': 'Byron's work is centred on dramatic effects; Franko's legend is more profound in its essence. This is a deeper search for the human soul, a deeper perception of themes of suffering, justice, temptation, reconciliation'.⁶⁰

Apart from Ukrainian works, Vera Rich has also translated the poetry of Cyprian Norwid,⁶¹ and examples of Old English and Old Norse literature.⁶² On the commission of UNESCO, she edited an anthology of Belarusian poetry, adding her

⁴⁷ Ivan Franko, *Moses and other Poems*, trans. Vera Rich and Percival Cundy (New York, 1973).

⁴⁸ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. iv, 1957, no. 1, pp. 7–8. This was her first translation from Ukrainian poetry to appear in print.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. viii, 1964, no. 3, p. 44.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. xiii, 1966, no. 3, pp. 24–6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.

⁵² *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. xiv, 1967, no. 2, pp. 78–83.

⁵³ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. xv, 1968, no. 1, p. 23.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xi, 1993, no. 1, pp. 39–43.

⁵⁵ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, 1998, no. 2, pp. 55–77.

⁵⁶ 'Ivan Franko and the English Poets', *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. xxii, 1966, no. 1, pp. 122–8.

⁵⁷ 'Shevchenko and Shakespeare', *The Ukrainian Thought*, 21 May 1964, p. 6, and 28 May 1964, p. 6.

⁵⁸ Delivered as a seminar at the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2 May 1985.

⁵⁹ *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. x, 1963, no. 4, pp. 29–41.

⁶⁰ *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1966, no. 1, p. 127.

⁶¹ A selection of these was published in *Orzel Biały*, vol. 9/1238, 1972 (London), pp. 20–2.

⁶² Some translations from Old Norse appear in her articles 'Ellisif Jarizleifr in the Northern Sources', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. x, 1963, no. 4, pp. 29–41, and 'Harald Hardrade, Rognvald Brusason and the Cities of Cherven', *ibid.*, vol. xi, 1964, no. 4, pp. 67–72. For an example of her rendering of Old English poetry, see *Manifold*, no. 20, 1966, p. 16.

own introduction and commentary.⁶³ In 1984, Vera Rich published a very interesting monograph *The Image of the Jew in Byelorussian Literature* (published together with a similar but much shorter monograph by Jakub Blum on Russian literature).⁶⁴

Unfortunately, she, who has dedicated more than forty years to Ukrainian literature, cannot boast of attention from Ukrainian experts in translation. Under the totalitarian regime, Vera Rich very quickly found herself on 'black lists'. Those unversed in the system of 'totalitarian diligence', may wonder: why did she become 'undesirable'? Many factors contributed to this. Even her forename gave rise to suspicion (for the English, it is certainly very rare,⁶⁵ and still Vera Rich maintains that, to the best of her knowledge, she does not have a single drop of Slavonic blood). But the main factor was that the totalitarian regime in general was not interested in the popularisation of Ukrainian literature in the world. Furthermore, Vera Rich was published in *The Ukrainian Review*, which took a clearly anti-totalitarian line. In many of her articles, she made a strong stand against the violation of human rights, in particular in the USSR, Poland and Hungary. She worked closely with Victor Swoboda, who in 1966 raised with Amnesty International the question of political arrests among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Nor can one ignore the fact that certain translators approved by the totalitarian regime tried to brand their fellow translators as 'hostile', out of a spirit of petty rivalry. Thus, in 1962, *Literaturna Ukrayina* published a destructive review of *Song out of Darkness* by John Weir (himself a competent translator, who should not have feared competition), entitled 'Shevchenko in the English Fog'.⁶⁶ This was a sentence which foretold many years of either silence or denigration. Some thirty years had to elapse and the period of 'glasnost' had to come before it was possible to write objectively in Ukraine about Vera Rich. The first positive information about her in *Literaturna Ukrayina* appeared only in March 1991.⁶⁷

What could professional scholars of translation who understood the importance of Vera Rich as a translator do? Firstly, at a considerable risk to themselves, they (in particular Oleksandr Zhomnir and the author of this present article) introduced into academic circulation materials about Vera Rich in their dissertations for academic degrees.

On 11 June 1993, at a meeting of the board of examiners in Taras Shevchenko Kyiv State University the young scholar Ihor Kondratyshyn defended his PhD dissertation on the theme 'Poetic intonation in the original and in translation (on the materials of the poems of Taras Shevchenko and their English translations)'. On the

⁶³ *Like Water, Like Fire. An Anthology of Byelorussian Poetry from 1828 to the Present Day* (London, 1971).

⁶⁴ In: Jakub Blum and Vera Rich, *The Image of the Jew in Soviet Literature – the Post-Stalin Period* (New York, 1984).

⁶⁵ sic. Dr Zorivchak is under some misapprehension here. Although the name 'Vera' entered the English language only in 1882–3 (via an early and unsuccessful play by Oscar Wilde), it has been distinguished in this century by such notable figures as Vera Brittain and Dame Vera Lynn – Ed.

⁶⁶ *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 5 June 1962.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 14 March 1991.

face of it, this was a routine event in academic life. However, in actual fact it was a very notable event: the first defence of a dissertation on the problems of English-language Shevchenkiana, which did not have to adopt Aesopian language, or stoop to humiliating slander (to demonstrate the researcher's own 'diligence'), or where the writer of the dissertation did not have to watch with fear and trembling the pens of informers noting down his every word. This scholar had clearly taken the majority of examples for his theoretical generalisations from translations of Vera Rich. I have to admit that, as one of the official opponents of the dissertation, I frequently found my eyes filled with tears during Kondratyshyn's defence. Were these tears of joy for the researcher, who was at last able to speak the truth and nothing but the truth without fear? Or did those tears contain an element of sorrow for past humiliations, for wasted time, for the persecution we suffered? Well, I shall not deny it – for both these reasons.

But we are, however, surprised and saddened by something different: why have no serious reviews of Vera Rich's translations (like the translations of John Weir and the joint efforts of K. H. Andrusyshyn-W. Kirkconnell) appeared in the English-speaking world? After all, one cannot consider the sentimental description by M. Luchkovych⁶⁸ a professional review. In the English-speaking world, there are extraordinarily valuable bibliographers and specialists in translation studies, including Marta Tarnavsky, Oksana Pyasecky, Joseph Krawcheniuk, Bohdan Wynar and Oleh Ilnytzkyj. But there are almost no critics of translation. In June 1988, Prof. George Grabowicz, who was asked in an interview for *Visti z Ukrayiny* 'Are you satisfied with the translations of works of Ukrainian literature into the English language?' replied: 'In the majority of cases – no. Take the translations of Taras Shevchenko: as a specialist, I state with responsibility: not one of them stands up to any criticism'. The Canadian researcher Oleh Ilnytzkyj expressed a similar opinion at a Shevchenko jubilee conference in March 1989. One cannot in any way agree with such apathy towards the fate of their own literature in universal scale, with views that in principle write off all existing English translations of Shevchenko's word, since this hopelessly distances Ukrainian literature from all those who do not speak Ukrainian, and restricts Ukrainian literature to something for 'domestic consumption only'.

In his monograph *The Poet as Mythmaker*,⁶⁹ George Grabowicz gives all quotes from Shevchenko in Ukrainian alongside his own (semantically absolutely accurate) non-poetic 'cribs', which tell the Anglophone reader very little about Shevchenko as a poet, as a master of the word, creator of unsurpassed verbal images, as an extraordinary master of poetic intonation. To take but a few examples, here are Shevchenko's lines from the epistle 'To My Fellow Countrymen Living, Dead and as yet Unborn...' in the original, in translation by Vera Rich and in Grabowicz's crib:

⁶⁸ *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. xx, 1964, pp. 178–80.

⁶⁹ George Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Shevchenko* (Harvard University Press/Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Mass., 1982).

Доборолась Україна
До самого краю.
Гірше ляха свої діти
Її розпинають.

Ukraina struggled on,
Fighting to the limit:
She is crucified by those
Worse-than-Poles, her children.⁷⁰

(The Ukraine in her struggle has reached the final end/Her children crucify her worse than the Poles).⁷¹

And here are the opening lines from the speech of the demonic crow (from the mystery play, 'The Great Vault') with a very interesting onomatopoeia, which is brutally handled by George Grabowicz's crib:

Крав! крав! крав!
Крав Богдан крам.
Та повіз у Київ,
Та продав злодіям
Той крам, що накрав.

rendered by Vera Rich:

Кг-гг, Кг-гг, Кг-гг!
Bohdan cribbed crocks
And carted to Kyiv,
And sold to crooks
The crocks he cribbed.⁷²

and by Grabowicz:

(He stole! He stole! He stole! Bohdan stole the stuff/and carried to Kiev/and sold to thieves/the stuff that he stole).⁷³

Further comment is clearly unnecessary.

Now, surely, despite all our past problems, we Ukrainians must make up for lost time and give proper attention to the works of Vera Rich, this creative personality of 'absolutely literary taste'. We should give the translator her due, since at the cost of dedicated work over several decades she has worthily presented Ukraine to the world. □

NB. The references given here refer only to the works cited by Dr Zorivchak. They are by no means a complete bibliography of all Vera Rich's translations.

⁷⁰ *Song out of Darkness*, p. 78.

⁷¹ Grabowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁷² *Song out of Darkness*, p. 45.

⁷³ Grabowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

Ivan Franko

The Death of Cain

So, having killed his brother, many years
 Cain wandered through the world. Like bloody scourges,
 Something drove him ever from land to land.
 And the whole world was hateful to his eyes,
 Hateful to him the earth, the sea, the morning
 Blaze of the heavens, and the quiet-starred night.
 Hateful to him was every human being,
 Because in every human face he saw
 The blood-bespattered, blue-tinged face of Abel –
 As once in his death-agony, so now
 He saw that frozen image of dread anguish,
 Reproach, and terror of impending death.
 Hateful to him, also, was she, the woman
 Whom he had loved once more than love of father
 Or mother, more than the whole universe –
 Sister and wife at once to him, unloved now
 Since she, too, bore the name of human creature,
 Because she looked at him with Abel's eyes.
 And Abel's voice and Abel's sincere heart –
 Because she loved him so devotedly
 That, though herself sinless and pure in heart,
 She had not hesitated to abandon
 Everything, and to share with one accursed
 His accursed doom.

So, like a shadow,
 She walked beside him. Never from her lips
 Did Cain receive even one sad reproach.
 Although her very face and voice and love
 Were for him the most harsh and never-ceasing
 Reproaches. Sometimes, when fierce agony
 Would overwhelm him, he, like one demented,
 Drove her away from him – and she would vanish
 Obediently and, a quiet, mournful guest
 Appeared midst people, children, grand-children –
 But not for long. Mysterious as she came,
 So she would vanish, go into the desert,
 Intuitively guessing out the paths
 Whither had wandered her unhappy brother.
 She was like a silver thread which bound him,
 Lonely and stony-hearted, to the life
 Of human beings. With the warmth which glowed

Within her woman's heart, she strove to warm
The murderer's soul.

All Vainly! Like a fish
Which beats against a sharp ice-floe, till it
Is frozen into it, so all her life
And strength she poured away. She was like tinder,
Which kindles flame but perishes within it.
Once in the dark primeval forest they
Passed the night in a rocky cave, worn out,
She fell asleep, laying her head to rest
Upon a stone. Cain kindled up a fire
And sat beside her there, drowning his eyes
In the bright flames. Fantastic scenes appeared,
And visions rose up, time and time again,
Among the fiery tongues – and catching them
In his glance, Cain, as it were, softly drowsed,
Quiet dream of what long since had once been true.
Long, indeed, since his eyelids knew the like.
But when the morning broke, it was in vain
He waited for her to rise from her bed,
To fetch the water in a wild gourd shell,
To pick the berries, and to gather roots
And honey for their breakfast. The sun was
Already soaring high; with slanting rays
It peered into the fastness of the cave.
And Cain went in, approached her, and at once
He recognised what had befallen her.
Ah, only once before had he seen death,
But that one time would be enough for ever
To recognise death in its every form,
And here she lay, seeming so free from sin,
So peaceful and so happy! That same face
Which only yesterday had been all furrowed
With care and weariness, now seemed to shine.
It had grown young again. That self-same love,
Which had shone in her youth still shone in it,
But yearning and all anxious thoughts had vanished,
As if, it seemed, all that her soul had striven
Towards, and aspired to in life was now
At last attained.

The very sight of death
Seemed to draw out of him all will and strength.
He felt no pain nor sorrow in his heart,
But only powerlessness and utter torpor,
He sat down by the body, and all day,

All night, stayed there, unmoving. But next day,
 He roused himself, gathered dry leaves and brought them
 Into the cave, covered the corpse completely,
 Then started rolling stones down from the height,
 Toiling the whole long day, with bleeding hands,
 To hide and block the cave-mouth up completely.
 Then in a brook he washed his blood-stained hands,
 Just as after his brother's death, and slowly,
 Without looking back, and never resting,
 Went off into the desert.

Where? Why? Whither?

Long time he did not think of this. Why think?
 Wherever he might go, wherever turn
 Everywhere the same sadness, and the same
 Solitude, and the self-same bitter sorrow.

The forest now had ended. Desert sands
 Crunched 'neath his heavy heel. The jackal howled
 In the wild wastes, an eagle shrieked on high.
 A lone cicada chirped amid the sand,
 All else around was silent like a tomb.
 And often in that silence, suddenly
 A sandstorm, like a giant, would rise up
 In a greyish pillar to the sky,
 And, whirling, move across the level land
 Like a king – and then sudden fall to earth,
 Gone like a wraith.

Now the sun's fiery wain
 Was sinking downwards. With no wisp of cloud
 All heaven glowed redly, like a cauldron when
 The householder forgets to pour in water.
 And yonder there, right on the very rim,
 There where the sky and desert fused together,
 And both with a bright purple were suffused
 Under the setting sun – something approached,
 Tall, straight and, as if crystal, shimmering.
 Was it a river, that, all turned to ice,
 Some great and mighty hand had stood on end,
 And set it up to stand 'gainst the horizon?
 Some play of light? Some strange trick of the desert,
 A fantasy to lure the wanderer on?
 The sun went down in a bright blaze of gold,
 Etching the burning edges of that wall,
 Its crenellations and its towers which drowned
 Like needles in the azure of the sky.

Below it, like a waterfall of purple,
Came down the evening twilight, and then slowly
Drowned in the darkness which spread o'er the lowland.
And for the speechless wanderer, this vision
Was like to heaven's thunder, like an earthquake.
Thunderstruck, he stood there, like a corpse,
And thither like two eager hawks, let fly
His eyes into the far far burning distance.
Ah, yes, this was a sight he knew full well!
Oft both while waking and in heavy dreams
It had appeared to him. Sudden, he trembled
And a sharp pang of anguish pierced him through,
A wild, fierce hatred blazed forth in his eyes,
While upon his bloodless, frozen lips
A curse took form – and died away, unwhispered.

'Eden it is! Home of lost happiness,
Which like a dream is passed away and gone!
It is the well-spring of unbounded sorrow,
Which presses on the human race as close
As its own skin presses upon the body,
So, while life lasts, it cannot be torn away.
So, be accursed, thou treacherous cruel vision,
Which only poisons more my anguished wounds
But will give neither respite to me nor death!
Accursed be thou, and accursed too that moment
When thou wast planted there, that moment when
My father the first time set eyes on thee.
In the name of all man's torments, all his yearning,
And of all aimless striving, be accursed!
Clenching his teeth, Cain turned away to go
Far from that place – but, suddenly, a deep
Measureless sorrow came on him, engulfed him.
He felt so weak, alone in all the world,
Unhappy and forlorn as ne'er before.
Hanging his head, he buried his face in
His hands, and so stood rooted to the spot,
Bathed in the blood-red light of eventide,
His shadow stretched away, far out across
The plain, and drowned in the dark dusk of twilight.
And the wish came to him for one more time
To look upon the west. Instinctively,
He cast his eyes that way, and his whole body
Turned thither. Then once more he resolutely
Conquered the impulse; in his hands again

He hid his eyes. But, after a brief moment,
Those hands fell, strengthless.

As when, weak from fever,
A man may feel unreasoning delight
In scratching his own wounds, just so could Cain
Not tear himself away from that dread vision
Which made him shudder inwardly. His heart
Was filled with rising, boiling clouds of anger,
Despair and grief. It seemed to him that half
His very soul had rushed away in rage,
While half, without memory, like moth to flame,
Flew thither to the crystal gates of Eden.
But now the sun had sunk, and straightaway,
Like a dog released from off its tether,
Black darkness leapt sudden upon the earth,
The wondrous vision vanished in the distance.
Cain, in exhaustion, fell upon the sand
To pass the night. The wild beast of the desert
Caused him no terror, for the brand that God
Had placed on him, repelled and drove away
Far from him every terror, every death.
But likewise drove away sleep and repose.
Throughout the night, like a fish in a net,
Upon the chilly sand, he tossed and struggled.
And when the sun blazed redly in the east,
And glanced upon the plain, there in the sand,
It found a deep hollow where Cain had slept.

But he long since had started on his way –
He walked towards the west. Something was drawing
Him thither, though yesterday's wondrous vision
Was veiled in a grey mist which densely lay
In a thick bank round half of the horizon.
But why go thither? That he did not know.
He sought for nothing, hoped for nothing there.
Yet on he went. Just so, the crane that senses
That far across the sea, in the cold northlands,
The spring is drawing near, will spread its wings,
And with a honking cry will take flight thither,
Hundreds of miles, paying no heed to storms,
Or the sea's rollers, or the hunters' skill.
All day the mist concealed it like a sea,
But with the evening, sudden, it dispersed,
And for a moment, then, the setting sun
Revealed the wondrous vision of yesterday:

The walls of crystal and the golden towers –
And yet, so distant, in fantastic distance,
It seemed to be as twice as far as heaven.

But what was distance to him? A man's step
Is petty, true – yet with it he can measure
All the earth's circle, come to the world's end,
If he but have some goal to draw him there.
Since Abel's death, so many, many years,
Cain had roamed without goal, and like a startled
Beast, he had fled, seeking where he could hide,
Self from himself – but now, for the first time,
A goal shone for him! Now his weary spirit
Could find some rest in it. Ah yes, indeed,
This rest was upon thorns, upon hot embers,
Yet it was rest, repose, oblivion.
So, after a night in the desert, he
Set forth once more. Day after day, he walked,
But the wondrous vision of Eden's walls
Appeared to him only in rare brief moments,
Luring him onward with its peaceful gleam,
And then dissolved into itself; yet something
Like a mysterious promise there abode
In that golden-roseate gleam.

The desert

Like a step-mother, fed him niggardly
On roots and honey of wild bees, it gave him
Saline and stagnant water as his drink.
But he had grown accustomed to this. Often,
Rivers, expanse of swamps, and saline lakes
Lay across his path. He, without fear,
Walked straight into the waters, fought the waves,
Wind and rain and hailstorm he resisted.
Nature could do its utmost to torment him,
Like a step-mother with an unloved child –
But death itself feared him.

Sometimes, there came

A yearning inexpressible upon him,
Piercing him, once more evil, bitter hatred
Rose up beneath his throat and clutched his heart
As if with pincers. He menaced the west,
Cursing God and himself. But soon the fit
Passed off, and once more he felt himself helpless,
Weak as a worm, and in his weakness fell
Amid the desert, and lay like a corpse.

Then an alarm incomprehensible
 Would start to pierce him, at the very thought
 That maybe he would never reach his goal.
 Then up he'd leap, and, as if someone chased him,
 With spirit quailing hastened, ran and chased,
 Sinking deep into the sands of the desert,
 Through thistles that tore his legs till they bled,
 But going westward, ever west.

How long
 He hastened in this way, who knows? It seemed
 To him, perhaps, like centuries. The past,
 All that had been, like a land drowned by floods,
 Slowly sank down into oblivion;
 There remained only, when he tried far back
 To cast his memory, only recollections
 Of this strange wandering.

So it was, at last
 He reached his goal. It was a stormy evening,
 The sun long since rolled down behind the clouds.
 Weary, unhappy and emaciated,
 Cain stood at last beneath the wall of Eden.
 Below it, all was deeply drowned in shadow,
 Somewhere afar, as if beneath the earth,
 Thunder growled, and the wind beyond the wall
 Groaned and lamented. Whether the stormy night
 Or weariness caused it, but in that moment,
 Cain at last could feel some kind of peace,
 And, for the first time since his brother's death.
 Like a child to its mother, nestled close
 To the cold wall, he slept throughout the night.

But even here Cain could find no true peace,
 And all night dreams of dread exhausted him.
 He tossed and cried aloud, and with his cry
 Drowned out the mighty wailing of the wind.
 And in the morning, he rose like one broken,
 Feeling yet more unhappy than before.
 It was a cold morning. The heavens all
 Were covered with thick cloud, and poured down streams
 Of chilly rain. Like a grey sea, the desert
 Stretched out afar into the endless distance.
 And right and left, as far as he could see,
 The wall stretched uniform, as smooth as ice,
 And high, it seemed, as heaven, without entrance
 Or gate, or angle-stone. Even, so even

It ran, as if it would divide the world,
Sundered in two, for ever, ever-more.
And at the meeting-point of these two giants,
The desert and the wall, Cain stood alone,
As weak and fragile as a tiny gnat.
But no, the gnat is happier! It has
Its wings, it can soar upwards, it can reach
The wall's crest, and from there look upon Eden,
Upon that primal happy native land.
The little gnat can fly there, but for him,
Lord of creation, to ancestral Eden,
There is no way!

And so, in dumb despair,
He beat his head against the mighty wall,
Beat at it with his fists, and gnashed his teeth
Until, strength gone, he fell there like a corpse.
Three days he beat against it so. His cry
Roared like a wounded beast, and spread alarm
Through the dead silence of the desert. Sometimes
He tried to make a prayer, but from his lips
Only his proud and God-reviling words
Flowed forth. His heart, hardened by its long pain,
Knew only struggle, not humility.

And then, at last, he ceased to rage, and said:
'So let it be! I am accursed, I know!
My brother's blood stains my hands. I have lost
Ancestral Eden. Be it so! No place
For me within. But for the boundless pain,
For all the endless torments I have borne,
And still shall bear, so long as I shall live –
Now I have only one wish left, O God!
Grant me, once only, and but for a moment,
If only from afar to look on Eden,
To cast my eye upon that patrimony,
Which is lost to me forever more.
To look but once! Only an instant's peace!
And then let every punishment and torture
Fall on me, as is doomed'.

So saying, Cain,
Raising his eyes to heaven, made his prayer.
But out of heaven there came no reply,
Only on high a kite shrieked in the azure,
A jackal in the desert howled.

‘No use’,
 Cried Cain, ‘This ever-curséd voice of mine
 Will not reach God. It is through my own guilt
 That heaven does not hear and gives no answer.
 Once it was otherwise, but that is over!
 So be it! But this is what I shall do:
 Somewhere in this wall must be the portal
 Through which God drove my parents out of Eden,
 An angel, they say, with a fiery sword
 Stands there on guard. What matter, let him stand!
 Let him slay me! To me it matters naught,
 If not – I shall fall to the earth before him,
 And lie upon the threshold like a worm,
 There I shall writhe and there I’ll make my prayer,
 There I shall cry out and there lament,
 Until at last he will fulfil my plea’.

Swiftly, impatiently, he made his way
 Along the wall. He thought: the gate is close.
 But the day passed, and then the black night passed,
 A day more, night more, more, and more, and more –
 The wall seemed to stretch to infinity,
 And from midday, covered the sun before him,
 But no gate to be seen, none to be seen.

But Cain no longer yielded to despair.
 He cursed and raved not. He heard how some beast,
 Maybe a hyena, far afield
 Circled around him, froze the soul in him.
 But, summoning up all his strength, he conquered,
 And drove that black nightmare far, far from him
 And walked, and walked...

Then, sudden, a new sight:
 Amid the desert rose a soaring, steep
 Mountain. With sunlight poured on it, its peak
 Bathed itself in the azure of the heavens,
 And gleamed and glittered with an icy helmet
 Blinding the eyes. Below were naked crags
 Which rose, jagged, projecting like the teeth
 Of a fierce beast, striving to eat the sun
 Out of the heavens. Lower were grassy slopes
 Of greyish green, and lower still were forests,
 Mighty and wild, conifers drowned in mist.

Cain stayed his steps. For the new sight had woken
 A swarm of new thoughts in his soul.

But still Cain

Went on, unresting. High, the mountain peak
 With its magic glitter shone before him,
 And lured him on! Although all drenched with blood,
 And slashed, disfigured, wounded, pierced and torn,
 Yet still he persevered upon that road,
 Until the grassy slopes brought him some ease.
 Beside a spring bubbling in a deep cleft
 He fell, and rested for a while, then bathed
 All of his body in that gentle water.
 Here, in this place, there was sweet bracken growing
 On the rocky precipice. He dug
 Its roots and having rinsed them clean of earth
 In the spring-water, ate, and kept the rest
 As a store. Having rested there a day
 He went on further. Now his feet were slipping
 Upon hard moss. His veins were swollen, straining
 The air poured into his exhausted breast
 As if it were cold lead. Before his eyes,
 Great wheels of fire gyrated, dazzled him,
 And the wind, ever stronger, ever colder,
 Pierced him through. Yet, still, like an ant, Cain crept
 On, ever upwards. Now, indeed, he envied
 The very ant; to it the wind was nothing
 Nothing to it steep crags and precipices,
 Weariness nothing.

All was poor and grey.

Now, no more green. Everywhere naked crags,
 Dead, terrible. No trace of life was here.
 Only wind whistled, and sometimes an eagle
 Shrieked and rent apart its hapless prey.
 Here each uncertain step meant certain death,
 Here, at each step, death had deployed a hundred
 Sentinels waiting, eager for their prey:
 The rain, the snow, the wind and the sun's glare,
 Eagles and stones, all here conspired with death.

And then, one day – it was already evening –
 Cain stood at last upon the topmost peak,
 A haggard skeleton, covered with wounds,
 Chilled through and through, and barely still alive.
 With his last forces spent, he stood upon
 The naked ice-cap. There great winds blew wildly
 Through his rough hair, ripping his tattered clothing,
 Freezing the blood within his veins. But he

Felt nothing. All his last remains of strength
And all his soul he focused in his eyes,
And sent those eyes into the boundless distance,
Thither, where in purple radiance bathed
The mighty, brilliant 'city of the Lord God'.
What did he see in it?

Empty throughout.

Only the lonely trees stood mournfully
Whispering with their leaves, while wondrous flowers
Swayed on their stalks. But nothing more beside,
No human soul was there, and not a sound.
But no! Amid Eden, on an open green
Two trees stood, lofty and magnificent.
Oh, Cain was well acquainted with those trees
From his father's tales. There on the right –
That was the Tree of Life; heaven's great thunder
Had crushed its crown to splinters, cleft its trunk,
Sundering it down to the very ground,
But the life-force in it could not be killed,
Still the tree grew, widely put forth its branches
Put forth new brushwood shoots on every side!
And on the left – that was the Tree of Knowledge
Of good and evil. 'Neath it coiled a snake,
And upon its branches, many fruits
Hung in profusion. Those fruits gleamed so fairly,
Allured and glistened, clutching at the soul.
There came a gust of wind, and like to hail
The fruits fell, thickly strewn upon the ground,
Where they at once crumbled and fell to ashes,
Spurred forth flame, and oozed with pitch and tar.

And Cain saw further: in a rosy mist
Something was swarming, light, transparently,
Like midges. And – imagine! – these were people,
People in thousands and in millions.
Like dust blown by the winds, they eddy round,
And strive, strive in a measureless advance,
All of them crowding round the Tree of Knowledge.
All tearing, trampling, falling, rising up,
And struggling upwards in the hope to grasp
At least one fruit, at least one sour crab-apple,
From the Tree of Knowledge. Streams of blood
And seas of tears mark out their path. In vain,
For if a man tastes of that fruit, at once
It crumbles into ashes on his lips,

Bursts into searing fire. And having tasted
 That fruit, then he at once grows fiercer far,
 And rages furiously through the whole world,
 Murdering, slaying, casting into fetters,
 Smashing and breaking all that is another's,
 Burning and ruining – simply run mad.

But the Tree of Life stands there and grieves.
 No one will tear at it. On it there hang
 Some fruit, but they do not gleam to the sight,
 Hidden they are among the leaves and thorns,
 And no one will be drawn, allured by them.
 And if, at times, someone from out the crowd
 Will turn and make his way to it, and taste
 Those wondrous fruit, and then begin to call
 To others to come thither, then they
 Like carrion crows will straightway fall on him
 And beat and tear and torture him, and maim
 Him as if guilty of the gravest crime.

And there upon the green were two great beasts.
 One of them slept beneath the Tree of Knowledge,
 Mighty and motionless and fierce, it had
 A woman's face that was of wondrous beauty,
 And a lion's body. And like moths to flame,
 In a swarm measureless the human wraiths
 Surrounded it, as if to ask it something,
 A grief profound and hellish suffering
 Upon their faces showed. Their shadows trembled,
 And their eyes and souls hung on the lips
 Of that strange monster. It spoke not nor blinked
 Its eyes. Again, the swarm of people crowded
 About the Tree of Knowledge, fighting, tearing
 After its fruit. They ate – and then returned
 Back to the beast, and never could find rest,
 Like leaves in autumn, driven forth and beaten
 By dread winds blowing one against the other.

Under the Tree of Life a second beast
 Sat, with a bat's wings, and a peacock's tail,
 The talons of an eagle, and the body
 Of a chameleon, and a serpent's sting.
 And every moment it would change and charge
 And charm all to it, and lead them away
 From the Tree of Life. And he who placed

All his hopes in it, and chased after it,
Would fall and wound himself upon sharp stones,
And find himself in thorns and deep ravines,
And raising up his hands, would imprecate
His curses, not on the deceiving beast,
But on the Tree of Life itself. 'That Tree
Is a chimera, all deceit and lies!
So the air echoed with the grim lament.

Cain looked upon this vision, and he felt
As if sharp knife had pierced him to the heart.
It seemed to him that all the pain, all torments,
All disenchantment of these millions
All seethed within his soul, crushing his heart
As if with pincers, tearing at his entrails.
Cain buried his face, hidden in his hands,
And cried aloud: 'Enough, enough, O God,
I can no longer bear to see this sight!'

In that same moment, the sun sank, and darkness
Descended on the earth, concealing Eden.
But the pain persisted in Cain's soul,
An other-worldly, bitter pain. He groaned,
And there, upon that place of frozen ice,
Fell and lay like a corpse.

The icy cold
Awoke him. There already in the heavens
The sun was feebly shining, coldly smiling
Like a hope defrauded and betrayed.
Where yesterday Eden had been, there stood
A white mist, like a wall that reached to heaven
Like a curtain. Cain did not regret
The sight of Eden; for he only heard
In his heart that voice: 'Hence, get thee hence!'
And, like a thief, who having entered in
A stranger's room, instead of a rich treasure,
Snatches up a piece of burning iron –
So Cain sped downwards from the snowy height,
And, like ravens over carrion,
Heavy thoughts wheeled and cawed over him.

And he thought: 'And so God has deceived
My father, me and all mankind! For surely
Without His knowledge and His will, this could not
Have come to be. Who else has put asunder

Knowledge and life, and curséd enemies
 Made out of them? Is this not all His work?
 For there, in Eden where, Himself, He planted
 Those two great Trees, why did He create
 Adam, cursing him from the beginning,
 And dooming all his progeny to torment,
 To eternal sorrow! For if knowledge
 Is enemy to life, why do we long
 For knowledge? Why are we not stocks nor stones?
 For if He wished that we should never taste
 The fruits of knowledge, why plant such a tree,
 And then give to its fruit such an allure?
 And if He wished, that we be living creatures –
 Then why not order us at once to eat
 Fruits from the Tree of Life?

And like a lapwing,
 Wailing above its young, winging above
 The marshes, with care beating in its breast,
 Then once more soaring sunwards in its flight,
 Sadly lamenting, flapping, circling ever –
 In such a way Cain's thoughts did twist and turn
 In an unending spiral, twisting, flapping
 With no way out. He sat beneath the crag,
 He rested, bathed all over in cold sweat,
 He closed his eyes, and once again beheld
 That vision of lost Eden, and his thoughts
 Set out on a new path.

'What is this knowledge?
 And can it truly be life's enemy?
 So it would seem! For 'twas unhappy knowledge
 Which kindled enmity within my heart
 Against my brother, made a killer of me –
 Because he, without taking thought, quite simply
 Wanted to fetter me in that self-same
 Childish simplicity, from which my soul
 Long since departed. Whither will this knowledge
 Lead my descendants, then? Beasts, birds they murder,
 And their own kind. The whole earth they have plundered,
 Seeking for someone or some thing to kill.
 Now every stone that is both sharp and hard
 Becomes for them a knife, a spear, an arrow;
 They tear away the stag's horn for this purpose,
 The fang of the wild beast. The woman told me
 That they have found a special kind of stone
 Which in the fire grows soft, as it were wax,

And they have learned how to make arrows from it,
And knives and spears, far harder and far sharper
Than those of flint. That is where knowledge leads!
Blood, wounds, and death, they are its gifts, its first-fruits!

'So, for what reason do we wish for knowledge?
We wish for death, then? No, this is not true!
And was it truly Abel's death I wished for?
I wanted to live my way – nothing more.
And does the bowman wish the wild beast's death?
He wants to live, and so he needs the meat!
He wants to live, and so he has to fight
So that the beast does not eat *him*. The man
Who thought up bow and arrow, did he wish
For someone's death? No, he wished but to live!
Knowledge, therefore, is not a wish for death,
Is not the foe of life! It leads to life!
It makes life certain! That is the whole matter!
Just as the arrow-head which slays a bird
Is not, itself, a bird! Just as the knife
Is not, itself, the slayer! Just so, knowledge,
Here bears no guilt. 'Tis neither good nor evil.
And good or evil it becomes according
As it is used for good or evil ends.
But who so uses it? Who takes it in
His hand, just as the bowman takes an arrow?
Who is this bowman?'

Then, unused to thinking,
His ageing reason, like a wounded bird,
Flapped and beat its wings against the darkness,
And yet to find an answer to these questions
It had no power, And to the other side
He went back.

'What, then, is this Tree of Life?
What is the power hidden in its fruits?
Truly can it grant immortality?
Surely that is not so! For those few people
Who tasted of that fruit long since in Eden,
Under the cruel onslaught of the crowd
Have died, so it would seem, and perished thus.
What did that fruit avail them? Ah, I see it!
They went forth to their death as to a wedding,
And with a smile, they died: from wounds, from torture
Called blessings on their executioners.
What means this? That for them, death held no terror!

It means the source of life was in their hearts!
 What is that source, though?...’.

‘I have seen: as soon
 As someone tasted the fruit of this tree,
 All became brightness, in a blessed calm
 He was enraptured, he raise his voice and called
 All people to him, the most bitter foes,
 Like friends, he did embrace; and, he seemed to be
 A comb of purest honey, filled with sweetness
 Fragrant, and gleaming bright with wholesomeness,
 One holy feeling pierced him through and through
 A feeling, it would seem, of a great love –
 That is the source of life!’

And Cain leapt up
 Like a startled beast and looked around,
 And whispered softly as in a dull trance:
 ‘Feeling, and love! Can it be so, then, God?
 Can it be in these two small words there lies
 All the unriddling of that which the Tree
 Of Knowledge will not give, nor riddling beast
 Will say? O wretched, poor and wretched people!
 Why do you struggle so to reach the Tree.
 Why do you wait some answer from the Beast?
 Look deep in your own heart, for it will tell you
 Far more than all such beasts can ever do!
 Feeling, and love! And we have these within us,
 A mighty seed of these in every heart
 Is living, only cultivate it, tend it,
 And it will flourish. This means that we have
 The source of life within us, and no need
 To press our way to Eden to obtain it!
 O God, my God! Can this indeed be true?
 Didst Thou but jest with us, the way a father
 Jest with his children, when from Eden Thou
 Didst drive us, and Thyself placed in our hearts
 That Eden, and set us upon the road?’

In that same moment, brightness shone on Cain,
 A wondrous peace and calm at once suffused
 His soul. All sufferings were now forgotten!
 And the sun shone, and all the earth grew bright.
 Everything wrapped in gold and roseate gleam,
 Like a maiden when she comes from bathing.
 At that moment, drunk with happiness,
 He forgot everything, clutched at his breast,
 It was all unbelievable.

'O God!

Can this indeed be true? That in my heart,
Though it be rotten, beaten, turned to stone,
There lives and flourishes and blossoms still
That seed of Eden, that fair, holy love!
Ah, yes! I feel it! Now, after the long
Accurséd years, I am once more reborn.
I live again. And, like a floe of ice,
All hate now melts away within my heart.
I feel so great a sorrow for all people,
Those poor blind wretches, and a savage grief
For all their strivings towards goodness. Dread
Mighty the trials Thou giv'st to them, O God,
For Thou didst set them on the road, yet made
Their nature weak. Ah, miserable indeed,
That knowledge which, like a small spark, they hide
Then fan to flame – what is it for them? Darkness
And riddles sit ever round them on guard.
And that road which leads straight to the heart,
To a love sincere, another beast
Blocks for them – it is a swift-winged chimera
Which can beguile even the clearest truth
Into a wraith, change it to empty guile.
And they are swept along like a dry leaf
In the autumn wind, they slash and murder
Each other, far more wildly than wild beasts,
Dig in the earth, or charge towards the heavens,
Sail on the sea – in heaven or at sea
They seek for Eden, happiness and peace,
They seek for what only in their own hearts,
And in mutual love is there to find!

'And can it be they shall roam so for ever
And can it be that they will never find
The true straight path? And all in vain that they
Were given this insatiable yearning?
No, each one of them wants to live. And each
Has the understanding to distinguish
Well between life and death. And so, if someone
Should reveal to each the road to life,
Certainly he'd not tread the way of death.
So, it is I that shall show them this road,
I, their forebear, will unveil the truth,
Won by such harsh and age-long suffering,
I shall press them to my heart, and teach them

To love each other truly, and renounce
 Dissentions, quarrels, thievery and murder.
 I, the first murderer, will redeem my sin,
 By leading all mankind away from murder,
 O people, children, grandsons, hapless orphans!
 Come, cease your weeping for the loss of Eden!
 I shall bring Eden to you! Bring the wisdom,
 To help you to achieve it for yourselves,
 And in your own hearts create new Eden!"

So pondered Cain, and with a faster step,
 With a heart full of yearning towards people,
 And warm unquenchable deep love, he made
 His way towards a village. Now he stumbled,
 Grudging a moment's pause to catch his breath,
 If he could but go faster! His old heart
 Laboured and fluttered like a bird. A whirlwind,
 Old and long-forgotten dreams began
 To swirl round him when, from behind a hill
 Like a dark-blue cloud, the smoke appeared
 Of a settlement of people. Child-like
 He ran with all his might to climb that hill,
 Then stood there long long drinking in the vision
 Spread out before him, sight a hundred-fold
 Sweeter than the recent wraith of Eden.

A sumptuous and fruitful landscape! In its depths
 A great lake lay, extending like a mirror
 Of azure crystal, somewhere in the distance
 Melting into the heavens. Its banks clad
 In rich and luscious greenery, reached down
 With their sleeves trailing far into the water,
 And coyly gazed down upon their reflection
 In the tranquil depths of that fair mirror.
 Nearer, there rose up hills all clad in forest,
 That like a mighty garland did divide
 This tranquil nook from the great world.

Behold!

There in a tranquil bay, a little distance
 From the shoreline, like a flock of ducklings,
 A village spread. Supported on thick piles
 That had been driven in the lake-bed stood
 Little low houses with thatched roofs of rushes,
 With overhanging eaves and wide plank walkways,
 Smoke curled up from the roofs. And in the houses,

Women called to each other. On the lake,
Like spiders, small light boats were slumbering,
There fishermen were hauling in great nets,
Shouting and paddling with their oars, and sunwards
Flashing with the teeth of their bronze spears.

And there, facing the village, on the bank,
Was a broad green, and on it there were playing
– Not swarming bees nor droning bumble-bees –
The village young-folk playing in the sun.
Naked, sunburned flesh was shining fair,
Silver voices chimed, a gentle breeze
Ruffled and tousled their black flowing locks.
Some of them were running races. Others
Wove in a winding dance. While by the water
Still others gathered up the gleaming shells.
And yonder, some were bending a great bow,
And shooting at a target, others, too,
Were clustered round a grandsire who was sitting
Upon a rock, strumming at the strings
And singing something.

All of this Cain saw

As if in his own palm, he wept and laughed
From joy. So long it was since he had seen
People, the vision of their peaceful life,
Their daily toil and leisure and enjoyments,
All appeared to him so wondrous fair
That he stood there, enchanted, on the spot,
And looked unblinking, drinking in the vision,
As if the greatest joy that earth can give.
A cry broke from the children. The bow's string
Had snapped. 'Come, Grandsire, Grandsire Lamech, help us
To mend the bow!' The grandsire ceased his playing,
And took the bow, stroking it carefully
On all sides with his hands, bending his head
And shaking it the while. And straightaway
Cain realised that the old man was blind.
But from his bosom he took out a string,
And fixed it carefully to the bow's horns
And twanged it. Like a swallow the string twittered,
And roused and woke something in the old man.
'Eh, children!' cried he, rising from his place,
'I have grown old and blind, but still I am
Ready to have a shooting-match with you!'
'Ho-ho, now, Grandsire Lamech, come and shoot!'

The lads all cry in chorus, 'Bravo, Grandsire!
 Now come along with us to shoot the target!
 'Where is the target, then? Come, lead me thither,
 Where to stand!'

At that instant, as they ran
 The lads saw Cain was drawing near the margin
 Of the green.

'Alas, some stranger comes!
 A wild-man! Thief! Some goblin of the forest!
 Oh, save us, Grandsire!'

And like chickens, fleeing
 From a hawk, so to the old man they sped.

Then grandsire Lamech spoke.

'Where is this wild-man?'

He sternly asked.

'He came out from the cedars,
 He comes towards us!'

Not another word
 Did Lamech speak. He fitted a new arrow
 To his bow, and let fly.

'Stop, Lamech, stop!
 A voice rang out. 'I am thy forebear, Cain!'

But in that very instant, the sharp arrow
 Took him full in the heart. Cain gave a leap
 Upwards, and then fell face-down on the ground,
 So that the point emerged between his shoulders,
 And his hands, in convulsions, clawed the earth,
 And so turned rigid.

'Hurrah! Grandsire Lamech!
 The lads all shouted, but old Lamech only
 Wrung his hands. Like a corpse he stood, stock-still
 And pallid, bow and arrows fell unheeded
 To the ground.

'Why, what ails you, Grandsire Lamech?'
 The children murmured, but the grandsire hardly
 Could frame the whispered words. 'What did he say,
 That wild-man?'

'He said that he is Cain,
 Your forebear'

'Cain? But no, it cannot be!
 My forebear Cain! Children, it would be dread
 Misfortune if it prove that this is true.
 But look where is he, and how fares he?'

'He
Fell by the cedars, and lies there, quite still'.

'Let us go to him, Maybe he yet lives!
O God defend me from so great an evil
That it was I who had to shed Cain's blood!'

And stumbling and trembling in all his frame,
Grandsire Lamech went, and after him
The lads all thronged. Though blind, he made his way
Straight thither where he had let fly the arrow,
Until at last he reached the spot, and fell
Upon Cain's body.

'It is he! Yes, he!'

Like one demented, Lamech cried. 'My children,
We are now lost, and all our kin are lost,
For ages evermore. Cain found his death
At my hands. Run, children, and tell your parents,
Tell all the people!'

While the children ran
To tell their parents, grandsire Lamech sat
Beside the corpse, and, tracing with his hand
Cain's features and his arrow-wounded breast,
Crooned as above the cradle of a child
In a trembling voice an age-old song:

'Hearken Zillah, hearken Ada,
You joys of my house unfading,
This God's voice hath told:
From him who strikes Lamech, smiting,
Lamech shall demand, requiting
Vengeance sevenfold.
But from him who smites Cain, slaying,
God Himself exacts the paying
Seventy-seven-fold'.

Again, again, like one bereft of sense,
He sang this strain. The village all had come
At the dread news. In a great ring, they stood
Gathered around the body and its slayer!
At long last, grandsire Lamech gave a start,
And raising up his head, as in a dream,
Spoke out: 'Well, is there someone here with me?'
'We all are here, Grandsire!' cried the assembly.
'Then, children, weep! This is our forebear, Cain,
Accursed by God, he that did slay his brother,
And seven-fold accurséd for the fact

That he came hither to our settlement
And from my hands received his death. That death
Has brought the curse of God upon our heads,
And vengeance on our children and descendants.
So weep, my children, weep now for yourselves!
As for his body, that accurséd flesh,
Let it be buried without touching it,
So that it does not foul God's world of light,
So that the bright sun will not look upon it
So that no beast run mad from eating it,
So that no bird from rending it may choke!
Bring hither stones, and like a dog pile them
To cover it, then heap sand over it,
And plant it round with thorns. And let it be,
Accursed for ever, the place where he lies'.

The crowd hurled forward, and with a wild cry
And groan began hurling great stones upon
The dead man. And he lay there, like a child
Lulled into slumber, which his arms stretched out,
With peaceful and bright countenance on which,
It seemed, even in death there glimmered
Some inexpressible delight and love.
But swiftly with a heap of stones the body
Was covered, a stone hurled from close at hand,
Shattered his skull, pressing it to the earth,
Burying it for ages evermore.



Kyiv's Architectural Monuments: An Uncertain Future

Kyrylo Tretyak

The twentieth century was the most tragic in all the long history of Kyiv. From 1917 onwards, the city suffered wide-scale destruction of its notable monuments of architecture and sculpture. The peak of the destruction of the cultural treasures of the Ukrainian capital came in the 1930s–40s. During this period possibly as many architectural masterpieces were destroyed as when the city was sacked by the Mongols in 1240.

The first major blow to Kyiv's architectural jewels was struck during the Ukrainian-Soviet war of 1918–20. Bolshevik artillery fire caused serious damage to the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael, the Garrison Cathedral of St Nicholas, the Monastery of the Caves, and many other churches. Numerous examples of Ukrainian lay architecture of the early twentieth century were also destroyed, including, in particular, the apartment court built and owned by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy on the corner of Pankivska and Mykilsko-Botanichna Streets. This multi-storey building, designed by the architects V. Maksymovych and Vasyl Krychevskyy and built in 1909 in the Ukrainian national style, was destroyed in February 1918. In 1920, the famous suspension bridge was blown up by Polish troops during their retreat from the city; and many other buildings of architectural and historical interest were also destroyed.

The 1930s were the blackest moment for the ancient churches of Kyiv. The ideology of the new rulers – militant atheism – led to the destruction of some of the most significant masterpieces of ecclesiastical architecture from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. To make way for the 'Socialist reconstruction' of the new capital of Soviet Ukraine,¹ more than sixty famous ecclesiastical buildings of the city – jewels of Ukrainian architecture – were destroyed: monastery complexes, churches, bell-towers and chapels, including such unique buildings as the Pyrohoshcha Church of the Mother of God (twelfth century), the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael (twelfth century), two churches of St Nicholas in the Pechersk district (seventeenth–eighteenth centuries), the Church of Sts Peter and Paul in the Podil district (seventeenth century), the Church of the Presentation in Lviv Square (mid-nineteenth century), and numerous others. They were all destroyed in a remarkably short period of time (from 1934–7), which shows the deliberation with which the demolishers acted.

World War II brought to Kyiv, like the whole of Ukraine and Europe, grief, death and suffering. Thousands of Kyivites were killed; the city was destroyed... Mines laid by the retreating Soviet forces destroyed entire streets in the city centre. Khreshchatyk, Prorizna, Lyuteranska, Architect Horodetskyi Streets and others lost most of their buildings from the end of the nineteenth and beginning of

¹ Until 1934, Kharkiv was the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.



Pyrohoshcha Church of the Mother of God after reconstruction, April 1998.

the twentieth centuries. However, the most tragic loss to the city and Ukrainian culture as a whole was the blowing up of the Dormition Cathedral of the Monastery of the Caves on 3 November 1941. In their turn, during their retreat from Kyiv, the Nazis likewise destroyed numerous architectural monuments.

The destruction of the historical buildings of Kyiv did not cease with the war. In spite of the colossal losses to its cultural heritage already sustained by the city, in the 1960s–80s, bell-towers, churches and beautiful buildings were mercilessly demolished. Numerous historic buildings were reconstructed – in the process losing partially or completely their artistic value. The reconstruction of such buildings was often attributed to the need to adapt and refurbish premises which had formerly been used for religious purposes for secular purposes – theatres, clubs, shops, etc. Throughout the 1930s and the 1950s–80s, there was wide-scale ‘refurbishment’ of many neglected and ruinous buildings in Kyiv, during which part of their decor was simply destroyed. Thus the majority of four-to-six-storey apartment blocks from the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries lost their crowning glories of turrets and cupolas. The authorities deemed it unnecessary to preserve these ‘superfluous’ and ‘non-essential’ details.² In general, the official attitude towards examples of architecture one hundred or so years old was extremely contemptuous. Regardless of their status as architectural monuments, the authorities saw no need for careful restoration of buildings dating from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Furthermore, there was no unified concept of preserving and researching examples of architecture from that era. Architectural

² S. Hylyarov, N. Morhylevskiy, ‘Vyvesti arkhitekturnye borodavki’, *Arkhitekturnaya gazeta*, 23 April 1935, p. 4.



Ruins of a Kyivan building, 1997.

monuments from earlier periods were likewise in a far from perfect condition. The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, built in 1703–40 on Kontraktova Square, was being ruined by neglect. Dozens of classic buildings of the early nineteenth century were also in an appalling state. The damage caused to the cultural heritage of Kyiv over the last two decades, naturally, cannot be compared with the bacchanalia of the 1930s or the destruction of the city during World War II. However, even this recent devastation is striking by its

sheer scale. In the early 1980s, the historic buildings of the former Potters', Tar-boilers' and Leather-workers' quarters were completely demolished. The valley between the Starokyivska, Zamkova and Dytnka hills, which had been the core of the birth of the civilisation of the city, had been inhabited mainly by small craftsmen. Before their demolition, the buildings of these quarters, which for a long time had had no repairs or attention whatsoever, were a terrible sight. But with their destruction, Kyiv lost a very valuable example of a crafts' district characteristic of the end of the nineteenth century.

During the 1980s, some restorers made individual attempts to restore architectural monuments which had once adorned the city. The most successful was the reconstruction of the 'Samson' fountain on Kontraktova Square in the Podil district, demolished in the 1930s. Built in 1748–9 by the architect Ivan Hryhorovych-Barskyi, the fountain and canopy above it were a striking example of Ukrainian baroque. The reconstruction, in 1982, of this monument, which today adorns the square, was uncharacteristic of the years of 'stagnation'.


Some reconstructions were carried out without the approval of historians and restoration specialists. One such example is the recreation of the legendary Golden Gate, built by Yaroslav the Wise (reigned 1015–54). In 1982, a superstructure was built over the surviving ruins, supposedly in the form of the gate as it would have looked in the eleventh century. However, the rules of ancient masonry were disregarded and the resulting structure has a somewhat 'artificial' form. All the mentioned reconstructions were undertaken for the celebration of the 1500th anniversary of the founding of Kyiv. The Golden Gate became the symbol and incarnation of how meaningless and contrived such jubilees are.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation regarding the protection of architectural monuments, historic buildings and the state of the present buildings of Kyiv was an extremely unhappy one. Old buildings were slowly being destroyed; parts

of their decor periodically disappeared; all over the city, ugly new 'boxes' were going up, even in districts of great historical significance. As the overall economic crisis grew worse, the money allocated to restoration and reconstruction work grew less and less.

Although today Ukraine is far from experiencing its most auspicious times, nevertheless, there is a perceptible change of attitude towards the renaissance of monuments of the past. Ancient churches and monasteries, palaces, castles and other buildings are being restored and rebuilt. This process of reconstruction has also encompassed Kyiv. In 1996, the reconstruction began of several churches and bell-towers destroyed in the 1930s. The first to be re-erected was the bell-tower of the former Greek Monastery of St Catherine on Kontraktova Square. The Church of St Catherine was built by an unknown architect in 1740 in the style of the Ukrainian baroque. Its lofty bell-tower was built in 1914 to the design of L. Eisner. The new building is stylistical-

ly similar to the massive classical bell-tower of the Brotherhood Monastery, which formerly stood alongside it.³ Both bell-towers dominated Kontraktova Square, and could be seen from the whole Podil district. In 1929, the Monastery of St Catherine was demolished. This was the first complex of church buildings destroyed by the Bolsheviks in Kyiv. It is therefore symbolic that the first shrine to be restored in the capital of independent Ukraine had been the first victim of the militant atheists. However, in spite of urging from the Church, the bell-tower together with the structure of the former ambon church was handed over to the




Reconstructed bell-tower of the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael.
Re-dedicated in May 1998.

³ Destroyed in 1935.

National Bank of Ukraine for use as administrative offices. So the artistic value of the building was restored, but not the religious use for which it was intended.

The Pyrohoshcha Church of the Mother of God on Kontraktova Square met a different fate. Its reconstruction was completed recently and services were immediately restored. But the restoration plans sparked many quarrels among restorers and historians. Scholars were split into two groups. The first considered it appropriate to rebuild the church as it was in 1934, that is in the classical style. This would have blended in well with the nineteenth-century buildings in the square. However, the decision went in favour of those who wanted to rebuild the Pyrohoshcha Church as, in their opinion, it would have looked in the twelfth century. The resulting Byzantine-Romanesque building was consecrated in April 1998. The building of the church cost the city more than six million hryvnias. This fact plays into the hands of those who oppose the reconstruction of destroyed churches, on the grounds that in the current adverse economic circumstances money should be spent on other, more urgent, needs. From the technical point of view, there were serious miscalculations in the reconstruction. No damp course was laid between the foundations of the church and the ground, which will inevitably lead to the erosion of the lower courses of the foundations. The work was hurried to meet an unrealistic deadline, going ahead even during harsh



Church on Askoldova Mohyla. Restored in April 1998.

frosts. This will affect the plaster-work, in particular, making it likely to flake off in the near future.

The reconstruction of the twelfth-century Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael has also been carried out at top speed, with the deadline for the re-dedication of the bell-tower on Kyiv Day (the last Saturday in May). The basilica is scheduled to be completed by January 2000, in time for Ukrainian Christmas Day on 7 January. The costs of this project were the subject of a special programme signed by President Kuchma on 27 January 1997, which lays down the timetable and sequence of research work and reconstruction of two major shrines – the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael and the Dormition Cathedral of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. The reconstruction of the latter, the principal church of the Monastery of the Caves, is scheduled to be completed in 2001. A presidential decree of 12 June 1996 set up the Oles Honchar All-Ukrainian Foundation for the Reconstruction of Notable Monuments of Ukraine's Historical-Architectural Heritage with the aim of collecting funds for the reconstruction of churches destroyed by the Communists. Unfortunately, the restoration of the Dormition church has not yet begun, whereas part of the walls and the goods' entrance of the Monastery of St Michael have already been rebuilt (November–April 1996–7); the reconstruction of the bell-tower is, at the time of writing, nearing completion, and the rebuilding of the church is proceeding at full speed. When the reconstruction is complete, the centre of Kyiv will once more be graced by a beautiful architectural ensemble in the Ukrainian baroque style of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries, as the monastery was on the eve of its destruction.

At the end of April 1998, restoration was completed of the round Church of St Nicholas, built by the architect Andriy Melenskyi in 1809 in the historic Kyivan cemetery on the Askoldova Mohyla. After the destruction of the cemetery in 1936, the church was reconstructed as a restaurant and then a museum. The restored church has been given to the Eastern-Rite Catholic community.

The great Church of St Panteleymon, which belonged to the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael, has been returned to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This church was built in 1912. In the 1930s, its four domes and the cupola of the fifth were demolished. The interior of the church with details of the decor was destroyed and one of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences was housed in it. Today, the original appearance of the Church of St Panteleymon has been restored. The Polish church on Volodymyr's Hill has likewise been restored in accordance with original drawings. This church, which was built in 1817, was used during the Soviet era as a planetarium and a library, which, naturally, was extremely detrimental to its condition.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the domes were restored on the Church of our Lady's Protection, belonging to the convent of the same name, which is situated in the historical Kudryavets area almost in the centre of Kyiv. This complex of churches and cells was built at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, the largest church of the convent and, indeed, of the whole city – St Nicholas' – still lacks its cupolas, destroyed in the 1930s. So, too, does the small Church of the Protection of our Lady in the Solomyanska district. The latter

church was built in 1897 in a typical pseudo-Russian form. Like many churches of Kyiv, in the 1930s its cupolas were smashed so that the structure would not be conspicuous among the local buildings and trees.

The restoration of the Kazan church of the St Florus's Monastery in the Podil district is proceeding quite slowly. This church, with its very original architecture, was built by the architect D. Sparro in 1844. In 1934, it was crudely adapted to house a children's clothing factory. Today, it is being renovated at the expense of the church although funds are running short. Small churches in outlying districts of the city are also being rebuilt. Donations from pilgrims are being used to restore the Church of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan in Bratska Borshchahivka, the Church of St Nicholas in Svyatoshyn, and several other churches.

In addition to the restoration of the churches destroyed during the Soviet era, new churches are now being built in Kyiv. Most of the modern churches currently going up all over the whole country have the stylistic features once dominant in the church architecture of Ukraine. People are not prepared to accept new trends in church building. This, in our opinion, may be attributed to the inner need of the Ukrainian people to compensate for the huge losses which Ukrainian culture has suffered in the twentieth century. Architects and the faithful alike have developed a particular image of the Ukrainian church as being the baroque or the Romanesque-Byzantine styles. Today, not only individual monuments but also entire lost strata of Ukrainian architecture are being restored. Grand churches in Ukrainian baroque style are today being built in the outermost suburbs of Kyiv, such as Darnytsya and Troyeshchyna, on the left bank of the Dnipro, where, by 1963, every single church had been demolished. All this church-building is undoubtedly raising both the spiritual and aesthetic consciousness of the population of these districts, where the 'hunger' for examples of original and ancient architecture in contrast to the dull stereotyped buildings of Soviet times is particularly acute. The complex of churches commemorating the victims of the Chornobyl accident form a *sui generis* oasis among the typical housing blocks of the Darnytsya district. The Church of the Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem and a chapel have already been built, and a large basilica is in the process of construction. The construction of the Church of St Anne for the Ukrainian Eastern-Rite Catholic community on Voznesenskyi Uzviz (formerly Smirnova-Lastochkina Street) is due to start shortly. Plans to build churches, chapels and even a mosque in various corners of the city have been approved. Thus, today one may rightly conclude that church building and the restoration of the ancient shrines of Kyiv is on the increase.

Nevertheless, the historic heritage of the city is still in grave danger. Unfortunately, the political changes of recent years have not put an end to the destruction of the architectural monuments of past centuries.

Seven or eight years ago, hardly anyone expected that Kyiv's lost masterpieces of architecture would be restored. They did, however, tend to believe that with the coming of democracy there would be an end to the destruction of historical treasures. Paradoxically, the opposite has come to pass. Monuments are still being destroyed, at the very time that the reconstruction of lost buildings is in progress. It is difficult to understand how the city could have been deprived of some of its most



Mercantile building on 3 Naberezhno-Khreshchatytska Street.

notable structures even at the beginning of the 1990s. One may mention, for example, the 'mercantile building' on the corner of Naberezhno-Khreshchatytska and Ihorevska Streets, which seven years ago still featured in all guide-books and photo albums of Kyiv. Constructed in the first half of the nineteenth century as a hotel and premises for a restaurant, shops and stores, it was built in its own, very specific style, which did not resemble the rest of the Empire style buildings of Kyiv. There was a distinctive cruciform mezzanine above the first floor, which gave the building its own original outline. This building was demolished, and now on the site there is only a fenced-off rubbish tip.

Another building, which had appeared in numerous guide-books and books on the history of architecture, was demolished some five years ago. This was the 'Staropecherskyi building' on Moskovska Street. This typical building had features of provincial classicism and was an example of the structural style of Kyiv of the first half of the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the 1990s, this building was in an appalling state of disrepair, and was demolished in order to be reconstructed in the same place.


A similar practice of 'reconstruction' is presently widely employed by many architects and officials of the city council. The former Hotel Français (Teatralnyi) on the corner of Volodymyr and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Streets was completely demolished. A 'replica' of the demolished hotel (but with several additional storeys) is currently under construction. Together with the hotel a wall with ornamental metal railings, designed by the architect Beretti, was removed. So, too, was the adjoining apartment court from the beginning of the twentieth century. Its fate

remains incomprehensible. According to the original plans, the intention was to restore the building. However, the structure currently being erected on the site has no resemblance to the style of the demolished building.

The 'hotel mania' currently rampant in Kyiv is swelling the number of demolished monuments. The construction of ultra-modern four- and five-star hotels on Volodymyr Street (St Sophia and Hilton) has meant the destruction of building no. 17, which, ironically, at the beginning of the twentieth century housed the editorial offices of the journal *Kievskaia starovina* (Kyiv Antiquity). As a sop to those campaigning to protect the city's monuments, the architects promised to include in their plans for the site the construction of a replica of the demolished building. There are also plans to demolish and rebuild buildings no. 47 and 49 on Volodymyr Street, which are 'in the way' of the construction of the next monstrosity of the tourist business. But if one acts on the presumption that everything can be demolished and then rebuilt, then will one

not end up with the paradoxical conclusion that there is really no need to preserve the material evidence of Ukraine's historic past? Indisputably, Kyiv urgently needs reconstruction and restoration work in the city centre. A certain amount of rebuilding and new modern construction is clearly necessary. But this should be done only after careful consideration of the huge value of this area for Ukraine's culture. Were the errors and crimes of previous years against the historic buildings of the capital not enough that we are still, today, continuing to destroy the last remnants of what is left?

Nowadays everyone condemns the destruction of the city's churches, monasteries and other notable buildings in the 1930s–80s. At the same time, we are witnessing today the germination of the next stage of the same nihilistic attitude towards monuments of the past. The only difference between the demolitions of the Soviet era and those of the present day is the motivation. In the past, Ukrainian architectural treasures were sacrificed in the name of ideology (militant atheism, the struggle against petty bourgeois 'survivals' in architecture, etc.). Today, they are perishing at the hands of speculators hoping to make a huge profit from the construction of hotels, business centres and car parks on the empty sites.



Building on the corner of Volodymyrska and Prorizna Streets. Early twentieth century.



Construction of a building in the Ukrainian baroque style, Podil district, 1997.

Foreign investors are prepared to invest huge sums of money in the reconstruction of Kyiv – but only on condition that they get the sites they want. Foreign businessmen have little interest in the significance and value of what is being lost, and the city council is making no attempt to protect Ukraine’s historical legacy – rather, it panders to the slightest whims of the businessmen. The most recent example of the Kyivan local authorities’ ‘betraying’ the cultural monuments is the demolition of the three-storey building on 30 Shevchenko Boulevard, situated in the very heart of the city. This building – one of the last remaining examples of Kyivan architecture of the first half of the nineteenth century – was torn down at the beginning of March 1998. Today, American entrepreneurs are going to construct an office block on the site. Once again, our legal system has revealed its utter incompetence as far as the protection of Ukraine’s national treasures is concerned.

While architectural and investment projects for the reconstruction of the central districts are being drawn up, Kyiv’s famous architectural monuments are slowly being lost. The building on the corner of Volodymyr and Prorizna Streets, the former ‘Snizhko’ block (architect M. Artynov, 1901) on the corner of Pushkin Street and Lev Tolstoy Square, and many others are constantly being destroyed. Once again, a threat hangs over the Khreshchatyk, which has already suffered so much. Moreover, many projects for the reconstruction of the area between Shevchenko Boulevard and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Street (certain of which are not without intrinsic interest) make no provision for the preservation of part of the old buildings. An entire district between Bessarabska Square and Velyka Vasylkivska Street in the centre of the city is standing in ruin. Once-beautiful buildings, built at the end of the last century, are being destroyed before our eyes.

Under an agreement between the city council and DAEWOO, the Koreans will 'develop' it as a business centre with modern hotels, shops, etc. Other investors want to put up several sky-scrapers alongside old buildings, which, naturally, will completely alter the appearance of the central part of the city. The city's architects are presently arguing the pros and cons.

Numerous buildings in the capital are in a very dilapidated state. Practically every building in the city requires repair and restoration in one form or another. A seven-storey block on 14 Yaroslaviv Val is a sad symbol of the attitude of the city council to the protection of old buildings. One of the best examples of high Viennese modern, built by the architect M. Klug in 1911, did not have the least repairs for dozens of years. Today, most of the rich highly-artistic decor of the building has been lost, and the massive oriels, balconies, cornices, etc. have been demolished. The monument is falling to bits before our eyes. And at the same time plans are being drawn up to build a sky-scraper (the President Hotel) on the Dnipro cliffs at Pechersk, which, like the notorious 'Motherland' statue of the Brezhnev era, will over-top the ancient Kyivan skyline, ruining the entire view from the Left Bank.

A paradoxical situation has been created: investors are fighting for every scrap of land adjacent to the historical buildings of Kyiv, although there are entire empty areas in the city centre which at best have been turned into parking lots. Such are Kosior and Volodarskyi Streets, parts of Dmytrivska Street, and several other low-rise buildings which were demolished at the beginning of the 1980s.

Today, we need to combine the development and reconstruction of the city with a caring attitude and the reconstruction of the best creations of former generations. Without such a combination there can be no talk of the renaissance of the Ukrainian capital as a true, European-level, cultural, economic and political centre. One may say that today Kyiv is on the threshold of a new era of its architectural history. If only one could be sure that the bad old days of the destruction of monuments, grey, ill-considered building up of the centre and outer districts have gone for good, and that instead we are about to witness the birth and implementation of a new, modern philosophy of construction and restoration of Kyiv. □

Reviews

The War Correspondents. The Crimean War (reprint edition).

By Andrew Lambert and Stephen Badsey (Bramley Books, London, 1997), 335 pp., illustr., £15.99.


This is a reprint of a work first published by Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd. in 1994, presumably in connection with the 150th anniversary of the start of the Crimean War. The very fact that it was reprinted after the topical interest generated by the anniversary had died away is evidence of the undoubted merits of this work.

The Crimean War has an enduring place in the national mythos of Britain. This is due to Tennyson's 'Charge of the Light Brigade' (which, however often parodied and derided, still remains one of the few poems which virtually every person educated in the United Kingdom can quote a few lines), and to the charismatic figure of Florence Nightingale. More pertinently, perhaps, it was the first war which brought home to the newspaper-reading population of Britain the horrors of modern warfare, with eyewitness reports and even photographs from correspondents sent to the front by leading newspapers.

Yet, other than historians, relatively few Britons could explain off the cuff how the war started. Once past the hurdle of GCSEs (or their older equivalent), all that they retain are confused memories of some kind of quarrel between the Churches as to who should have custody of the Holy Places, or a British determination that 'The Russians shall not have Constantinople' (though the song they quote comes, in fact, from a confrontation later in the century!). Nor is it generally realised that the Crimean campaign was, in fact, only one theatre of the war. Lambert and Badsey put the Crimean campaign into its proper historical context, with an excellent introduction which outlines, succinctly and clearly, the confrontations and failed diplomacy which led up to the declaration of hostilities, and an excellent chapter on the Baltic campaign. Their approach is radical and revisionist:

the Crimean War so familiar to twentieth-century readers has no historical reality. The Crimea never held the central position in strategic decision-making that it has achieved in historical studies. The war did not begin or end in the Crimean peninsula, it was not decided there, and the end of the sanguinary siege of Sevastopol on 9 September 1855 had little bearing on the Russian decision to accept the allied terms in March 1856. Furthermore, the British and French did not occupy the city of Sevastopol. Contemporary observers were well aware that the Crimean campaign was only a part of the wider Black Sea theatre, and of the vital linkage with the equally significant Baltic theatre. In so far as allied military pressure had any bearing on the Russian decision to accept peace terms, that pressure came from the Royal Navy in the Baltic.

Even in the Crimean campaign itself, the authors say, 'the Charge of the Light Brigade, Florence Nightingale and the horrors of the Crimean winter... were real



enough, but had almost no impact on the outcome of the war'. The authors, both eminent lecturers in war studies (Lambert at King's College, London, and Badsey at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst), present, in effect, a reassessment of the causes, course and results of the campaign, which is largely made up of correspondents' accounts of the campaign together with contemporary photographs, maps and 'artists' impressions' of key events, linked and interspersed with commentary.

The accounts presented are all of British origin. This is hardly surprising – since its sub-title (or rather, in view of the lay-out of cover and title page, 'sur-title') is 'the war Correspondents' and the main source material is the British press of the time. This does not mean that the activities of Britain's French and Turkish allies are neglected. They are extensively reported, on occasion to the detriment of the British (in particular, the organisation of British base facilities comes under heavy criticism in comparison with the French), but there are no accounts from representatives of those nations themselves. Though it should be noted that the Bibliography commends A. P. Saab's, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance* (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1977) 'a particular welcome addition to the field, being the first major work based on the Turkish archives'. Nor was there any attempt to include reports from the enemy side – although such do exist, including an account by Lev Tolstoy himself, who was in Sevastopol until shortly before its fall. As for the indigenous population of Crimea, they pass almost unmentioned, with the exception of a few telling highlights, notably the account of the Allied capture of Kerch, when '[t]he Tartars who were in the town hailed the arrival of the Osmanli with delight, and received them as liberators, and as brethren to whom they were bound by ties of religion, of language, and of hatred to the Russians'.

Perhaps, some day, these or some other equally able historians will compile a synoptic account of the campaign, using reports and archive materials from all sides of the conflict. In the meantime, this book must be hailed as a valuable contribution to Crimean War studies, which should appeal not only to a specialist, but also to all those with an interest in history or militaria.

It should also prove of particular value to present-day historians in Ukraine as source material on a campaign which took place on what is now Ukrainian territory, but concerning which, until recently, the only texts available to them reflected only the Russian viewpoint.

Soviet Science Under Control. The Struggle for Influence.

By Jeffrey L. Roberg (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998), xii +169 pp.

This book, according to the author's 'Acknowledgements' at the beginning of the volume, is based on a year's field research in Russia and Ukraine. However, from the text itself, one would be unlikely to guess at a Ukrainian connection. 'Soviet science' is treated throughout as a monolithic entity. Except for the special case of Jews, no reference is made to the ethnicity of scientists – although a careful reading of Soviet academic journals suggests that all non-Russians were liable to encounter more stringent conditions in obtaining the higher degrees of 'Candidate' and 'Doctor' of Sciences.

Yet since Roberg treats science as, essentially, a part of the Soviet establishment, it is perhaps natural that he treats that community monolithically. To rise in science


in the Soviet Union required an overt self-identification as a 'Soviet citizen'.

Within this conceptual framework, Roberg addresses his subject from a somewhat unconventional standpoint. He challenges the standard view of Western commentators that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exerted an effectively 'uni-directional' influence on the careers and activities of scientists. He argues, rather, in favour of a 'bi-directional' relationship between the scientists and the Party/State *nomenklatura*, with scientists playing a significant role as policy-makers in certain fields. He focuses on two such issues: nuclear policy and human rights – the first involving scientists within the establishment, the second by those scientists

– notably Academician Andrei Sakharov – who had broken with it. '[Even] after he no longer considered himself a member of the *nomenklatura*', Roberg writes, 'Sakharov's status was still very high and his activities and requests could not simply be ignored'. But this is to argue from hindsight – at the time, it often appeared that those requests *were* being ignored, and one could well argue that it was not so much the status of Sakharov himself, as the fact that the world-wide scientific community, and, in particular, the premier scientific weekly *Nature*, for more than 20 years kept Sakharov's appeals and protests at the forefront of international public opinion.

Roberg likewise challenges 'received opinion' by claiming that 'the ideological control of scientific knowledge in the former USSR has been exaggerated' and that 'Lysenkoism... was an exception and not the rule'. He seems to be unaware of Stalin's 'ideological' ban on cybernetics (imposed on the basis of one less-than-precise sentence by Engels) or of the spectacular moment at the 1977 Venice Biennale on Cultural Dissidence, when the octogenarian scientist Arnost Kolman, who considered himself largely responsible for the implementation of that ban, made a formal apology and plea for forgiveness. Nor, while making some passing allusion to the incarceration of dissidents in mental hospitals (mainly in the context of Sakharov's appeals on their behalf) does he mention the all-important fact that they were so confined on the basis of a 'politically correct' psychiatric theory which postulated a disorder called 'sluggish' or 'creeping' schizophrenia – which was manifested in one symptom only – a compulsion to political dissent. When, in 1983, the Soviet All-Union Society of Psychiatrists and Neuropathologists was expelled from the World Psychiatric Association (WPA), many leading WPA members stressed that the expulsion was necessary on scientific, as much as human-rights grounds, since one could no longer hold a meaningful academic dialogue with persons who officially promulgated such views – any more than, 30 years previously, a geneticist could work together with a Soviet Lysenkoist.

From the dust-cover blurb, Roberg would appear to be fairly young (he took his Masters' degree in 1991 and PhD in 1996), so that his 'experience' of Soviet science comes presumably from books, not first hand. He cites an impressive bibliography – yet makes no specific mention of what is surely the prime English-language




source for Soviet 'science politics' (including the campaigns and sufferings of dissident scientists, from 1968 onwards), the journal *Nature*. The value of the latter lies, not in any specific article, but in the whole, cumulative, blow-by-blow account – written with no certainty of what the outcome would be. Dr Roberg's account, which has the advantage of hindsight, contains much interesting material, and marshals its arguments well. One cannot, however, recommend it as, in any way, a definitive work on the subject, and any student or graduate-researcher would be well advised to supplement it by a careful reading of the source material of the era.

The Caledonian Connection. Scotland-Russia Ties. Middle Ages to Early Twentieth Century. A Concise Biographical List.

By Dimitry Fedosov (Centre for Scottish Studies, University of Aberdeen, 1996), 122 pp.

One of the less fortunate legacies of a colonial past is that historians of a now-independent country may find themselves obliged to do archival research in the libraries of the former colonial power – Icelanders in Copenhagen, Finns in St Petersburg, Indians in London – or to make references



to older scholarly works which reflect the political realities of the time of writing, as, for example, a Pole may turn to C. C. Rafn's monumental *Antiquités Russes* (published 1839–40) for Scandinavian source material on early mediaeval Poland. What is less understandable is when a work, published *after* the independence of such countries, still tacitly assumes them to be part of the fallen imperium. And this book, published five years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, tacitly assumes, in its title and contents, that the term 'Russia' may still be used to apply to the whole territory of that state, over a span of time going back to Kyivan Rus'. All the more so, when the author asserts in his preface that although 'Professor A. G. Cross (whose work I admire and use in my research) has observed that it is hardly "possible or even meaningful to distinguish Scoto-

Russian relations from Anglo-Russian at any period". I believe the distinction is as meaningful as that between Scots and Englishmen themselves'. A pity that he does not perceive as 'meaningful' the distinctions between Russians and their formerly subject nations! However, since he is dealing with what he terms 'the Russian Empire as it was before 1917, from Archangel to the Caucasus, and from Lithuania to Kamchatka', one might argue that the word 'Russian' is used in a historical sense. Even so, the sub-title is unfortunate.

This need not necessarily invalidate totally the use of this volume as a source-book. (It comes, after all, with the imprint of Aberdeen University). But closer examination reveals some remarkable omissions – particularly as regards Ukraine and Kyivan Rus'. And, however one assesses the propriety of including these top-

ics in this volume, the fact remains that, having decided to include them, the author should at least have done so thoroughly and consistently.

Thus, for example, Agatha of Hungary, the mother of St Margaret of Scotland, is included on the grounds that 'She has an Orthodox name and probably came from Russian princely dynasty of Kiev, closely connected with Western Europe and Hungary in particular'. But while she gets in on the strength of a 'probably', there is no mention of Elizabeth, the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise, the wife of Harald Hardrade of Norway, who spent the autumn and winter of 1066–7 in Orkney with her daughters Ingigerd and Maria (the latter died and was buried there). Nor is there any mention of the Orcadian Rognvald Brusason, who served as one of Yaroslav's mercenaries in 1031–5.

Three Counts de Balmain are included as a 'Branch of clan Ramsay' – Deodatus, Anthony and Alexander, but there is no mention of the Yakiv de Balmen killed in the Caucasian campaign against Shamyk, in mourning for whom Shevchenko wrote 'The Caucasus'. Maria Guthrie, who wrote and in 1802 published 'A Tour through the Taurida... or Crimea', gets no separate entry (or even a mention of her given name); she is subsumed under the entry for her husband, Dr Matthew Guthrie, who, it is noted, edited 'his wife's' book. And although Matthew Guthrie himself is said to have 'Translated and published first piece of Russian fiction to appear in English', there is no mention of his also being, as far as is known, the first translator into English from Ukrainian (see p. 43 of this issue).

Even on Russian matters there are some odd lacunae. The Learmonth family are naturally featured, having 'over eleven generations produced many outstanding figures in [the Russian] military and civil service, the greatest of them being the poet MIKHAIL YURYEVICH LERMONTOV (1814–1841)'. But no mention is made of the family's thirteenth-century ancestor, the poet Thomas Learmonth 'the Rhymer'. Nor of the fact that the 'Russian' branch of the Learmonth's gave not one but two major poets to the world – for the Belarusian poet Natalla Arsiennieva (1903–97) was a scion of that family.

Nevertheless, the book does contain many interesting allusions to the minutiae of history, such as Dr Robert L. Lee (1793–1877) who lived on the estates of Count M. S. Vorontsov in Ukraine and promulgated the use of quinine to combat malaria, Thomas M. Mackenzie (ca. 1745–86) who 'laid foundations of Sevastopol where local hills still bear his name', or John S. Shiplaw (died 1921 in Kharkiv), 'stonemason in Russian Poland and Ukraine'. It may well prove, therefore, of limited use to historians of Ukraine's foreign contacts. But, as the few examples cited here show, it is by no means comprehensive in its listings.

Ukrainian Minstrels. And the Blind Shall Sing. By Natalie Kononenko (M. E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY & London, 1998), xvi + 360 pp., illustr., \$62.95 (hardback), \$25.95 (paperback)

This book is the first in a new series of publications from M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 'Folklores and Folk Cultures of Eastern Europe', which – according to the series editor, Linda Ivanits, 'aims to offer the English-speaking public a wide range of primary

texts and scholarly works on major subjects in Eastern European folklore and folk culture'. In its paperback form at least, it carries no information about other projected volumes – however, if Ms Kononenko's work is typical of what is planned, then the series will surely, over the years, provide a most valuable contribution, not only to folklore studies but also to scholars in other disciplines (literature, sociology, history) dealing with Eastern Europe.

For the author's intention was originally the study of texts and the compilation of a complete edition of Ukrainian folk epics (*dumy*) that would update and represent to the scholarly community the 1927 and 1931 collections of Kateryna Hrushevska, most copies of which had been destroyed on the orders of the Soviet ideologues. Instead, Ms Kononenko found herself diverted into the study of the minstrels themselves, their traditions, life-style, training, guilds – and most significant their blindness. The figure of the blind minstrel goes back millennia (it can be found, for example, in the *Odyssey* – indeed, according to tradition, Homer himself was blind), and appears in many cultures. This, initially, caused Ms Kononenko some problems. 'I assumed', she writes in her preface,

that blindness in the Ukrainian tradition functioned the same way that it did in other traditions with which I was familiar: more as a symbol of past excellence than as a real trait of actual performers... I had run into something similar during my field work in Turkey: legends about great blind performers of the past, a few rather mediocre living blind minstrels, but no domination of the tradition by the blind.

Gradually, however, she came to realise that 'blindness was obligatory to minstrelsy in Ukraine' – that *all* Ukrainian minstrels, including those of the present day, were and are blind. 'Did this mean', she wondered, 'that blindness somehow facilitates art, as popular belief so often claims' or '[w]as there something about specifically Ukrainian beliefs which irrevocably linked blindness with art?'


In her approach to this question, Ms Kononenko focuses on the guild tradition of the minstrels. The training of a minstrel by formal or informal apprenticeship to an older master was widespread in the past (indeed, it is difficult to imagine how else a blind or illiterate performer could have acquired his repertoire). What, according to Ms Kononenko, was unique to Ukraine was the incorporation of the master-apprentice relationship into a well-organised structure of guilds, which 'like trade guilds and Cossack regiments, were linked to Orthodoxy, and helped support churches or monasteries'.

The 'obligatory' blindness of the minstrel, and the guild structure, constitute the two guiding principles of this book. The picture which emerges – for nineteenth century Ukraine at least – is one where blindness was relatively common, in particular as a result of childhood illness, but where blind teenagers were as a matter of course apprenticed to the craft of minstrelsy which would, henceforth be 'our scythe and our plow... our livelihood... how we live and pay taxes'. This equating of the minstrel's craft with the agricultural work performed by the majority of the population leads the author to conclude that 'Because the disabled were expected to substitute musical performance for farming, some sort of musical instruction must have been almost universal for the blind and possibly for all who could not work'. Even blind girls, it appears, could be accepted for minstrel-train-

ing, although the evidence from nineteenth century collectors is somewhat sparse, something which Ms Kononenko explains by the fact that scholars were interested in minstrels 'as bearers of heroic poetry', and since women 'were not part of the heroic image', they were ignored. However, she argues, 'there must have been a way to take care of blind girls as well as blind boys'. True, but singing was surely not the only available means of livelihood – there are, for example, the various craft skills which in other societies are the traditional preserve of the blind, such as basket-making. Certainly, there is evidence for the existence of women minstrels, including restrictions on where and what repertoire it was considered permissible for women to perform. But to imply from this 'almost universal' training of blind girls in minstrelsy seems to be straining the evidence.

The scarcity of knowledge about the guilds (which Ms Kononenko duly acknowledges) is of a different kind. Here there was no lack of interest on the part of the scholars; the guilds were secret, and even at the beginning of the present century, when the traditions of minstrelsy were beginning to break down, the only sources likely to talk to an outsider were 'minstrels who were alienated from their guilds or... people peripheral to the profession'. The motives of such informants were clearly mixed – Ms Kononenko cites one such informant at the beginning of this century as being 'especially interested in money and in pleasing intellectuals'. However, one scholar, Porfiryi Martynovych, Ms Kononenko says, 'perhaps because he did not publish his data and reveal guild secrets, had access to the minstrels themselves. His data show that the published studies, despite their problematic sources, are accurate'.

Like most secret societies, the minstrels' guilds had their own initiation ceremonies, secret language, and penalties for offenders. The latter, we are told, could, in extreme cases, entail the destruction of the offender's instrument, reducing him to the status of a common beggar, or even taking away his very right to beg. This, Ms Kononenko says, was effectively equivalent to a sentence of death by starvation; however, she does not inform us of how a guild managed to enforce such a fate. Furthermore, the guilds, at least at 'some point in the past', seem to have run their own schools, and throughout their existence introduced the new initiate to the area in which he would henceforth ply his trade. This would be at some distance from his home village, or, if he resided in a town, well away from his own vicinity. For, it appears, the image of the minstrel as homeless wanderer – in particular, *Perebendya*, in Shevchenko's poem of that name, owes more to poetic symbolism than to historical fact; in reality, says Ms Kononenko, '[w]hen not travelling, minstrels lived lives similar to those of their neighbors. Almost all married and raised families... Having a wife and family was the village norm, and this norm extended to blind people'. Furthermore, we are told, that 'the minstrel's neighbors knew him as an ordinary man and were often ignorant of the fact that he was a minstrel'. (This seems inconsistent with Ms Kononenko's earlier assertion of the 'almost universal' training of the blind in at least the rudiments of



minstrelsy. Surely, if this were so, the periodic absences of a blind neighbour must have prompted speculation that he was a minstrel!) But, even if Perebendya's solitary state is a poetic device, Ms Kononenko nevertheless sees the minstrel as alienated from society by his disability – and at the same time providing a service to that same society. In this respect, the guild system

provided a home and a community for activities that were absolutely necessary to survival but that could find no home in the Ukrainian village. The nature of village life, with its emphasis on work, demanded that a blind person seek an alternate occupation. This same village made it difficult to be both its citizen and a professional. Minstrel guilds responded to this problem by offering a well-articulated structure for the professional part of life.

According to Ms Kononenko, the origin of these minstrel guilds is to be found in the Orthodox Church, and, in particular, in the lay 'brotherhoods' of Orthodox believers which developed in the sixteenth century. (Some minstrel guilds even called themselves 'brotherhoods'). Ms Kononenko discusses at some length the religious links and background of the guilds, including, the 'central tenet of the [minstrels'] profession, the belief that minstrels were like the Apostles, disseminating religious information among the people'. She stresses, in particular, the religious and quasi-religious content of many genres of Ukrainian minstrelsy: suffering and martyrdom, death, captivity (in particular to the infidel), the power of a mother's prayers, the importance of charity, laments for the dead, Biblical and apocryphal themes. Seventy or so pages of the book are devoted to translations of songs of various kinds, and even in what she calls 'epics' (though 'heroic lay' might be a more felicitous translation), the religious element is strong.

Ms Kononenko's attitude to these heroic *dumy*, is, incidentally, interesting. Originally, it was precisely the *dumy* which she had intended to study and publish, including, possibly, even Soviet adaptations of the form (the 'Duma about Lenin' and its analogues). But this proved 'too politically sensitive'. The *dumy* have become so identified with Ukrainian national strivings, and as a factor legitimating Ukrainian culture, that

While the Soviets were still in power... a collection of Ukrainian *dumy* was to be thwarted for fear that it might be the straw that would break the back of Communism in Ukraine. Now that Ukraine is independent, quite the opposite is true, and everyone seems to be competing to get an epic collection to press.

For that reason, she has refrained from 'overplaying the nationalistic dimension of minstrelsy'. Ukrainian minstrelsy is, she says,

worthy of study in its own right, regardless of nationalist or other implications... I want to establish the legitimacy of the study of Ukrainian minstrelsy for its own sake... I want to show that a romantic portrayal of minstrels is unnecessary to make them interesting. Minstrels were an underclass, and they can be studied as such. They do not need to be turned into something else to make them legitimate artists.

The result is a book that, drawing on the research of past scholars, and the author's own meetings and interviews with those blind minstrels who still practise their art in today's Ukraine, throws a valuable, if possibly controversial, new light on a major aspect of Ukrainian folk tradition. □

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the UKRAINIAN *review*

Contributors	2
Current Events	
Ukraine Between Russia and NATO: Politics and Security MIKHAIL A. MOLCHANOV	3
Constituting Statehood: The New Ukrainian Constitution KATARYNA WOLCZUK	17
Political Aspect of Linguistic Processes in Ukraine SVYATOSLAV KARAVANSKYI	39
History	
Archaeological Survey of Ancient Halych, 1991–1996 VOLODYMYR BARAN, BOHDAN TOMENCHUK	48
The Volokytyno Porcelain of Andriy Myklashevskiy ALLA POSTOVOYTENKO	63
Arts and Culture	
The Genesis of Ivan Franko's Poem <i>The Death of Cain</i> OKSANA DZERA	70
New Light on Lesya Ukrayinka and Serhiy Merzhynskiy TETIANA KOBRZHYTSKA	79
The lips proclaim... LESYA UKRAYINKA	88
125th Anniversary of Ukraine's Oldest Learned Society	89
Reviews	92



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the UKRAINIAN *review*

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Current Events

Ukraine Between Russia and NATO: Politics and Security*

Mikhail A. Molchanov

In the post-cold war era, Russian-Ukrainian relations directly bear upon European and global security. Russia remains the second nuclear power in the world in terms of pure quantity of weapons (inherited from the former Soviet Union). Its seat at the UN Security Council gives it additional leverage over matters of international security. It still has one of the largest land armies in the world, while its military-industrial complex, though a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, is by no means negligible.

The international role of Ukraine is best seen in terms of its vital importance for Russia. Whether or not post-communist Russia will ever represent a threat to the international community as a whole will be determined, first and foremost, by the character of its relationships with Ukraine. Recent publications on the subject increasingly acknowledge Ukraine as a linchpin of European stability, and rightly so.¹ Without Ukraine, the regeneration of the Russian empire in any form is impossible; thus, Russia has no option but to concentrate on its still neglected domestic agenda rather than pursuing ambitious goals in foreign policy. On the other hand, if Ukraine is forced to follow Belarus and join another Moscow-dominated Union, this may prompt Russian rulers to revive the ambitions of a global superpower. In that case, the Russia-led military alliance, facing NATO expansion on its western borders, will probably re-establish an 'iron curtain' in Europe, thus driving the world into a new cold war period, determined this time by sheer geopolitics rather than ideology.

Moscow's perspective on Ukraine as an erstwhile legitimate part of a 'bigger' Russia renders complex problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations all the more dramatic. The closeness of language and culture, the mutually intertwined history, and the important concessions Soviet rulers granted to Ukraine and Ukrainians as 'junior partners' in running the collective communist empire all make Russia's current leaders feel betrayed by the 'ungrateful' Ukrainians, who are trying to steer clear of the emerging Russian hegemony in the area.

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¹ See John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin', *Foreign Affairs*, 1996, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 55–62; Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

On the other hand, academic monographs and media analyses published in Ukraine not infrequently present Ukrainian history in deceptively clear-cut terms of Russian exploitation and Ukrainian subservience. Several influential politicians in Ukraine (notably the Ukrainian Republican Party) argued against the signing of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries, while others devoted considerable efforts to predict that the Treaty would never be signed anyway owing to irredeemable Russian malevolence. This later message was still being directed at audiences on both sides of the Atlantic even when preparations for the relevant summit were on the way to completion.²

The two peoples' relationship has been complex and asymmetrical. Their linguistic and ethnodemographic proximity and densely intertwined histories throw these differences in mutual perceptions into even sharper relief. In view of the clear similarities in the Russian and Ukrainian post-communist transitions, an analyst might expect a certain congruity in the foreign policies of the two countries. However, the post-communist history of Russian-Ukrainian relations reveals for the most part distinctly different approaches to the various international, regional and bilateral issues that engage the politicians of both countries alike. Public opinion differs, too: when questioned on their attitudes towards possible reintegration with Russia, Ukrainians regularly exhibit far less enthusiasm than Russians or Belarusians.³

As the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Nations Anatoliy Zlenko has noted, the fact that Ukraine and Russia adopt different stances in practically any question of international importance may be traced back to fundamental differences in their foreign policies and international interests: geopolitical in the case of Russia, purely national in the case of Ukraine.⁴ Russia has never dropped its traditional pretensions to superpower status. Since 1991, these ambitions have been somewhat confined to the sphere of immediate interest – the former Soviet space, where Russia has assumed a self-proclaimed 'peacekeeping' role and has actively engaged its military forces in a number of local conflicts from Tajikistan to Abkhazia. Russia also managed to maintain some of its former spheres of influence in Bosnia and rump Yugoslavia, to re-establish links with Iraq, Cuba, Vietnam and other ex-Soviet satellites world-wide. It has exerted significant diplomatic and economic pressure on Ukraine, in an attempt to persuade the Ukrainian leadership to accept a 'strategic partnership', which, as interpreted by Russia, would imply major limitations on Ukraine's sovereignty and non-aligned status. Ukraine, however, has refused to treat Russia any differently from other powerful partners of the Ukrainian state – the USA, Canada, Germany, or Great Britain, resulting in a protracted period of Russian bullying on almost all aspects of bilateral relations: oil and gas supplies, Crimean

² Taras Kuzio, 'Why Ukraine and Russia Will Not Sign an Inter-State Treaty', *Analysis of Current Events*, 1997, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 9–10.

³ See periodical bulletins of the Kyiv-based research centre Democratic Initiatives, e.g., *A Political Portrait of Ukraine*, no. 4, 1994, p. 41; *A Political Portrait of Ukraine*, no. 5, 1995, pp. 10, 22, etc. A more optimistic assessment of the Ukrainian readiness to reintegrate is given by V. Malinkovich, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 20 March 1996, p. 11. Comparable Russian data is available from a variety of polling agencies, including, among the better known, VTsIOM and Vox Populi.

⁴ Personal interview, Edmonton, Alberta, 31 May 1996.

autonomy, dual citizenship rights for the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, and procrastination over signing a comprehensive treaty on friendship and cooperation.

This Russian pressure on Ukraine and its implications for regional security has received a fair deal of analytical attention. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase, Ukraine is now perceived as a 'geostrategic pivot', which may be used by the West to bring some order into the Russian 'black hole'.⁵ Though the Russian-Ukrainian debate over Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet eventually cooled off, it was not until 1995 that the relations between the two countries began to normalise on the basis of equal sovereignty. Russia dropped its demand for dual citizenship rights for the Russians resident in Ukraine, and a host of other compromises was achieved soon thereafter. Ukraine's active diplomacy helped to transform the seemingly benign, but also patronising attitude of the Russian establishment into one more respectful of Ukrainian independence.

Even with the conclusion of the long-awaited friendship Treaty (31 May 1997), Ukraine has retained a unique perspective (sometimes less than flexible, from Moscow's point of view) on the most significant issues of international politics. The Ukrainian leadership remains firm in its resolve not to give to Moscow more than is necessary for Ukraine's own national interest. Understanding the objective disparity in the political 'weight' of the two countries, the Ukrainian government does its best to maintain good relations with Russia. But, at the same time, it seeks reliable international guarantees of security, should the potentially dangerous issues of Ukrainian-Russian relations flare up into confrontation.

Most Russian politicians, including the younger generation of reformers, have never really abandoned the traditional Russian perception of Ukraine as a province in a jointly run state. This inherited political culture of Soviet quasi-federalism meant that after December 1991 Russian-Ukrainian relations got off to a false start. Where direct negotiations took place, they were often marked by attempts at domination by the Russian side. When Moscow could not secure the dominant position, it tried to avoid contact altogether.⁶ The friendship Treaty proved insufficient to resolve fully a number of contentious issues, most notably the status of Sevastopol, the divergent attitudes towards NATO, and the precise meaning of the 'strategic partnership' which Russia has offered Ukraine.

Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet

Crimea was an integral part of Russia from the late eighteenth century till 1954; both nationalists and neo-communists in the Russian parliament question its transfer to Ukraine. In the predominantly Russophone Crimean Autonomous Republic, the Ukrainian government allows a *de facto* monopoly of the Russian language as a medium of both official and day-to-day communication. Most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval bases are located on Crimean territory. The biggest

⁵ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

⁶ No less than six cancellations of the planned official visit of the Russian President to Ukraine illustrate the tactics.

one is in Sevastopol – a city emotionally loaded for the Russians, with a history of military endeavour and sacrifice. Disagreement over the political and military status of Sevastopol remains one of the most sensitive issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations today.

The 1997 agreement provides a twenty-year lease of the naval facilities in Sevastopol by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian Constitution, however, stipulates that there should be no foreign military bases on Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian insistence on the temporary nature of the Russian naval presence in Crimea provokes Russian fears that the lease agreement may not be renewed when expired. A thinly veiled desire to keep Sevastopol as a permanent Russian base can be observed in official and semi-official Russian pronouncements on the issue.

Before the agreement was concluded, the fight over the exact wording of the agreement formula ('the Russian naval base *in* Sevastopol', as preferred by the Ukrainian side, versus 'the Russian naval base – Sevastopol', advocated by the Russians) revealed a latent mutual mistrust. First came the official Russian Security Council announcement that 'Kiev has shown a tendency to go back on its commitments'.⁷ Yuriy Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow and potential presidential contender, made a controversial statement which proved worrying to both the Russian and Ukrainian governments. In January 1997, Luzhkov alleged that 'after a drinking binge', Khrushchev presented Crimea to Ukraine, 'Sevastopol was turned into a separate administrative entity and was not handed over to Ukraine'.⁸ Just over a year later, in February 1998, he promised to demand 'that Sevastopol be placed under Russia's jurisdiction again', denounced what he called the 'forced Ukrainization' of ethnic Russians and warned that 'relations between Ukraine and Russia will never be transparent or sincerely fraternal if injustice continues with regard to Sevastopol and Crimea'.⁹

Luzhkov's statements could be dismissed if it were not for the feeling that his thoughts are tacitly shared by other top Russian politicians. Viktor Chernomyrdin, for example, has claimed that Moscow is worried by what he called 'Ukraine's increasingly distinctive policy of squeezing out the Russian language and culture' from Ukraine.¹⁰ The lower house of the Russian parliament – the State Duma – is currently dominated by neo-communists from Gennadiy Zyuganov's CPRF and a broad coalition of nationalists, where people like Sergey Baburin, Konstantin Zatulín, or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy are unanimous in their view of Ukraine's 'proper place' in a Moscow-dominated Union of some sort.

If one compares how the Russian and the Ukrainian legislatures address the key issue of ratification of the friendship treaty, one observes marked discrepancies. The Ukrainian parliament ratified it on 14 January 1998. Shortly thereafter, a statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry declared 'that there has never existed and cannot exist' any territorial dispute between Moscow and Kyiv.¹¹ The Russian

⁷ *OMRI* online, 10 September 1996.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 20 January 1997.

⁹ *RFE/RL* online, 23 February 1998.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 28 May 1997.

¹¹ *ITAR-TASS*, 23 February 1998.

Duma, on the other hand, was in no hurry to ratify this important agreement, while the Russian media kept insisting that the treaty could give Ukraine a one-sided advantage and therefore rapid ratification might run contrary to Russian interests.¹² On 3 March 1998, most Duma members spoke out against quick ratification of the treaty, while some of them proposed delaying ratification until the new Ukrainian parliament ratified agreements on dividing the Black Sea Fleet. Georgiy Tikhonov, the Chairman of the Duma CIS Affairs Committee, went as far as to hand the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation a proposal to hold a referendum to reunite the two countries. The Ukrainian delegation felt obliged to describe this proposition as a 'provocation'.¹³

Russian nationalists continue to lament the loss of Crimea, advancing irredentist claims to what now is an officially recognised territory of the sovereign Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, with the adoption of the new Ukrainian Constitution (28 June 1996), Crimean autonomy has been further curtailed, and a clause stating that Crimea is an inalienable part of Ukraine has been enshrined in the fundamental Law of the State. The Russian separatist deputies in the Crimean parliament could not put up a sustained opposition to these developments, since they no longer commanded the overwhelming majority they had in 1993–4. However, unexpected assistance came from the Russian politician Konstantin Zatulin.¹⁴ In an article published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 28 March 1997, he tried to persuade the Russian establishment to undermine independent Ukrainian diplomatic activity within the CIS and to refuse to recognise its current borders with Ukraine unless and until Kyiv agrees to sign a federal treaty with Crimea. This idea was taken further in an article in the same newspaper, published anonymously, but believed to be by Zatulin and another well-known policy analyst, Andranik Migranyan. This advocated bringing back the former Union republics, first and foremost Ukraine, into the Russian embrace by force, not excluding the deliberate destabilisation of the domestic political situation in the targeted countries.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the current situation in Crimea, however tense, is in no way comparable to 1994–5, when the separatist Yuriy Meshkov, acting as an elected president of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, tried to initiate Crimea's secession from Ukraine and its reunification with Russia. This détente may be attributed to Ukraine's improved economic performance: although by the end of 1993 Ukraine's monthly inflation was approaching 91 per cent per month, which was significantly worse than in Russia,¹⁶ the situation changed drastically in the next three years. By summer 1996, inflation levels in Ukraine had dropped below 5 per cent and stayed at this low thereafter, successfully competing with the respective Russian indicators.

The 1994–5 crisis in Crimea could have led to major repercussions for both regional and European security, if all the top Russian politicians had shared these

¹² *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 March 1998, p. 1.

¹³ *RFE/RL* online, 4–6 March 1998.

¹⁴ A former Chairman of the State Duma CIS Affairs Committee (1994–5), currently Luzhkov's adviser on CIS matters and Director of the Institute of CIS Countries.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Fuller, 'Russia: Influential Article Warns Of CIS Laxity', *RFE/RL* online, 1 April 1997.

¹⁶ Anders Åslund, 'Eurasia Letter: Ukraine's Turnaround', *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995, no. 100, p. 136.

irredentist feelings. However, top figures in the Russian executive, first and foremost the president and his team and the Cabinet of Ministers, showed significantly more restraint on the Crimean issue than did the members of the State Duma. As the executive arm is traditionally more important in Russian politics than the often weak legislature, the prospect of the nationalist extremists winning the day is, at the moment, remote. According to certain analysts, the relative cooling of Russian-Ukrainian tensions over Crimea may be attributed to this dominance of the more reasonable executive over the largely nationalist legislature. It is Russian prudence and restraint, they assert, rather than (largely debatable) economic improvements in Ukraine, which should take the credit for the absence of 'hot' conflict in the area.

Indeed, it would be difficult to provide firm evidence of any sustained attempt by the Russian government to destabilise the internal situation in Ukraine, despite all the ups and downs in the post-Soviet relations of the two countries. One year after Ukraine became independent, Russia was still financing up to 22 per cent of the Ukrainian GDP with subsidised credits.¹⁷ In 1993, Russia continued its subsidies to Ukraine, as well as to other former Soviet republics. The IMF experts calculated that the total of Russian donations to newly independent states for that year amounted to US \$17 billion 'in goods at concessionary and subsidized prices'.¹⁸ As late as 1995, the financial support of the Ukrainian economy by two of its former Soviet sister-republics (and currently major creditors) – Russia and Turkmenistan – outweighed the financial contribution of the IMF and the World Bank combined.¹⁹ On these grounds, one may well feel obliged to agree with Hannes Adomeit's view on Ukraine's current predicament: 'If the country were to fall apart, or fall into Russia's lap, it would be not because of destabilization attempts from the outside but because of Kiev's inability to make the best of its independence'.²⁰

And yet, it would be premature to regard the Crimean issue as closed. Just because, so far, there have been no sustained destabilisation attempts as far as centrally coordinated policy is concerned, one should not ignore a number of provocative statements by individual Russian politicians, or the vote in the Russian Duma rejecting the 1954 decision of the former Soviet parliament, which transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. Though Russia has so far made no attempt to transform this vote into executive action, it sent a clear signal to the Ukrainian leadership. In 1993–4, when Russian-Ukrainian tensions were running high, the issue was even put before the UN Security Council. Some Ukrainian diplomats and experts suggested submitting it to the UN International Court of Justice in the Hague. However, the idea was rejected by the Ukrainian government for fear of an unfavourable decision.²¹

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁸ Karen Dawisha, 'Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond', *Current History*, October 1996, vol. 95, no. 603, p. 332.

¹⁹ Calculated from Åslund, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²⁰ Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs: Images and Reality', *International Affairs*, January 1995, vol. 71, no. 1, p. 61.

²¹ Personal interview with Dr Olexander Horin, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations, New York, 16 September 1996.

Many Russians remain unhappy with the loss of the region. Although they no longer question (at least openly) the formal sovereignty which Ukraine exercises over Crimea, Russians continue to consider the region to be traditionally 'theirs'. This attitude, plus the existence of sizeable Russian separatist groups on the peninsula, and the political clout which the separatists demonstrate in the Crimean parliament, make the problem potentially explosive for the new Ukrainian-Russian relations. The outcry on the further reduction of Crimean autonomy in the newly adopted Ukrainian Constitution was heard well beyond the Crimean borders. When not only people regarded as champions of the Russian nationalist cause (Rutskoy, Zhirinovskiy, Baburin et al.), but also those considered the political centre (Luzhkov, former presidential contender Aleksandr Lebed) issue statements implying that Crimea is still regarded as a zone of specific Russian interests, there is some reason to be alarmed.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Ukraine, in essence, is literally defenceless against any future Russian intrusion. Despite all efforts to 'Ukrainianise' the national armed forces, they will remain, of necessity, largely Russian in their ethnic composition. Ukraine is ill-prepared to fight the Russians – both psychologically and materially. Nationalist myth-making has seemingly failed to arouse the desired level of animosity – as might have been expected – given the current shape of the Ukrainian and Russian ethnonational psyches. Such factors as the rather weak history of Ukrainian-Russian conflicts, the high percentage of inter-ethnic marriages, internal regionalism and the successful incorporation of the Ukrainian élites into imperial and Soviet Russian state-building should all be taken into consideration. Ukraine's disadvantage in conventional arms is well known. Its nuclear deterrence option was renounced voluntarily (albeit under some international pressure).

With all this in mind, the Ukrainian government would have little room for manoeuvre if faced with an imminent conflict with the Russians. At one time, it could be asserted that if Russia stepped up its pressure on Ukraine over Crimea, the showdown 'could slow or halt Ukraine's transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, thereby complicating the entire denuclearization program'.²² However, on 1 June 1996, the Ukrainian President announced that the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia had been completed. With that threshold crossed, Ukraine lost the security guarantees it might have had against Russian military pressure. International assistance became the only viable option.

The link to Ukraine's position on potential NATO membership is clear. However remote this possibility may seem at present, no analyst would stake his or her own career on saying that Ukraine will have no chance of admission at some time in the future. If Ukraine moves closer to NATO, it would obviously not want a Russian naval base on its territory. NATO would back its new (or shortly upcoming) member on the issue, and a clash over Sevastopol would follow.²³ The leg-

²² John W. R. Lepingwell, 'START II and the Politics of Arms Control in Russia', *International Security*, Fall 1995, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 85.

²³ See Anatol Lieven, 'Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion', *The World Today*, October 1995, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 196–9.

end of Russian military glory, which holds the city in high esteem as a site of Russian sacrifice and military valour, will work against peaceful resolution of the potential conflict with the West. For the Russian top brass, Sevastopol is worth dying for, while, for example, Chechnya is not. This attitude should never be forgotten in any analysis of the problem.

Culturally, Russians consider Crimea as an inseparable part of their legitimate sphere of interest. They are concerned about the growing 'Tatarisation' of the peninsula by the influx of Tatars repatriated from Central Asia, and the attempts of the Ukrainian government to reduce Russian local autonomy there. Russian politicians understand perfectly well that, if the battle for the Russian local autonomy is lost in Crimea, they have little hope of winning it in, say, the Narva region of Estonia, where Russians are in the majority, or in the Latvian capital, Riga, where they form a sound plurality. Thus, in Kuzio's words, the 'Ukrainian "threat" to Russia is not military – but political, cultural, and psychological'.²⁴ Crimea serves as a visible manifestation of a half-real, half-imaginary threat to Russian national pride and political identity.

Ukrainians do not and cannot perceive Crimea with the same degree of emotional attachment. All else being equal, the symbolic importance of Crimea for the Ukrainians is marginal; indeed, it is sometimes asserted that the problems the separatist enclave causes outweigh any potential benefits for the Ukrainian state. Besides, 'as a new and economically weak state Ukraine clearly cannot afford to support the BSF in anything like its present form'.²⁵ The problem, however, is that 'all else' is *not* equal as far as Ukraine and Russia are concerned. Russia laments the loss of its former imperial grandeur; while for Ukraine the issue is its hardly-won sovereignty in a very basic, elementary form. For Russia, territorial contraction may still be interpreted as shedding the remnants of former 'colonial' or pseudo-colonial possessions. Ukraine cannot take refuge in this soothing interpretation. Thus, Ukraine, in effect, is more sensitive to the Crimean issue than Russia itself. On both sides, national pride and historic memories are involved. The fact that in one case the memories are of erstwhile glory, and in the other of past subjugation, does not make the situation any more manageable. International monitoring of Crimean developments is necessary from the point of view of both regional and European security.

The CIS: A New Alliance?

Faced with growing Russian assertiveness, Ukrainian politicians are intent on keeping Ukraine's status of a formally neutral, non-aligned state. For this reason, Ukraine has withdrawn from the CIS military structures, except for limited participation in a joint air defence system with Russia,²⁶ and restricted its cooperation with NATO to the Partnership for Peace programme (which is also open to Rus-

²⁴ Taras Kuzio, *Russia – Crimea – Ukraine: Triangle of Conflict* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), p. 1.

²⁵ John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 48.

²⁶ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 October 1997, p. 3.

sia) and to the IFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, in which Russia participates as well. Meanwhile, the rest of the CIS is currently showing centripetal tendencies in Moscow's favour, as witnessed by the recent transformation of the Russian-Belarusian Community into the Union of Belarus and Russia (under the agreement signed on 2 April 1997).

Russia makes no secret of its ambition to play the leading role in formally multilateral CIS structures, be it financial, economic, political, or military. In practice, this means that all important decision-making is done in Moscow. 'Can we be indifferent', Boris Yeltsin asked the CIS heads-of-state at the January 1997 CIS summit, 'when powerful enterprises, connected to the Russian partners by thousands of threads, are put into the hands of foreign companies, changing the direction of their sales or stopping them altogether?'²⁷ The economic interests of the Russian state and Russian private capital determine the direction and long-term goals of Moscow's attempts at 'reintegration' with its CIS partners. Ukraine cannot accept this kind of leadership for fear of renewed Russian dominance. The West, however, is quite content with the idea that Russia may, in fact, inherit the hegemonic role it played in the former Soviet Union.²⁸ For this reason, Ukraine is desperately trying to diversify its international links, as an at least partial counter-balance to the still predominant Russian influence.

The treaty on the Russian-Belarusian Union was most instrumental for the ongoing Russian attempts to consolidate its military position within the CIS. The treaty and related documents have made Belarus a part of the Russian system of military planning – at least as far as defence of the 'western frontier' is concerned. The CIS joint air defence system had put the Belarusian and Kazakh air forces under the *de facto* control of the Russian high command – and Russia has hopes of extending that control further, by bringing in Georgia and Armenia.

And if, as Russia hopes, Armenia and Georgia become active participants, Moscow's control will extend even further. CIS peacekeeping operations have helped to re-establish Russian presence in the Caucasus (South Ossetia, Abkhazia) and Central Asia (Tajikistan). The North Caucasian theatre entailed the compliance of the Georgian government, while the peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan draws auxiliaries from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, thus bringing some substance to the Russian claim that this is in fact a multinational force. In addition, neither the Armenian nor the Azeri sides to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could afford to ignore the Russian presence in the area, and both concluded their own bilateral treaties on military assistance and consultations with Moscow. The Russians, however, clearly favoured the Armenians and did not hesitate to breach the rules of international conduct with massive illegal supplies of arms to the Armenian side.²⁹ Finally, retired and semi-retired officers of higher rank have joined the independent armed forces of the self-proclaimed separatist republics

²⁷ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 April 1997.

²⁸ Wynne Russell, 'Russian Relations with the "Near Abroad"', in Peter Shearman, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 55.

²⁹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1997, p. 3.

of Trans-Dnister (east Moldova) and Nagorno-Karabakh (south-west Azerbaijan) ostensibly as mercenaries outside the control of Moscow.

These developments have had two major consequences of military-political significance. Firstly, they have moved the CIS states further towards the establishment of a bloc structure, which would possess formal authority over the military and defence planning. Secondly, they have made Russia the undisputed leader of this emerging structure. Russia had to face unavoidable accusations of 'neoimperialism' – which are usually countered by claiming that Russia is a 'protector of democratic transformations' in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine, however, has had – and continues to have – its doubts, based largely on Russia's methods of dealing with domestic opposition, as demonstrated by Yeltsin's treatment of the Russian parliament in October 1993, and especially by Moscow's handling of the Chechen crisis in its own southern periphery. The state of Russian-Ukrainian relations could not give ground for optimism either, since both before and after the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty, both chambers of the Russian parliament displayed and continue to display hostility towards Ukrainian independence.

While CIS military coordination and, in particular, cost sharing have never approached the NATO level, the first steps in this direction have nevertheless been taken. However, the claim of Russian policymakers that the CIS must be taken seriously as a kind of counterpart to NATO lacked one vital factor – Ukraine. Ukraine, with its 52 million-strong population, its huge industrial potential, deliberately geared to the military-industrial complex, and its Soviet-era military installations of the first and second lines of defence against attack from the West, is vital to any Russian plans 'to negotiate with Europe as equals, not as inferiors'.³⁰

Ukraine's reaction to the flexing of Russia's military muscles was predictable. It could not change its status within the CIS from that of observer to full member without denouncing part of its sovereignty in the most sensitive area of defence planning and political-military decision making. At the same time, it could not realistically expect to apply for and be granted NATO membership. The Western Alliance was having enough trouble with anticipating and dissuading fierce Russian resistance to the acceptance of the Central European states. Some analysts have pointed out that even a hint at Ukraine's possibly joining NATO could prompt the Russians to backtrack on the SALT-II and the CFE treaties, and even to move their nuclear weapons as far west as the Kaliningrad (former Königsberg) *oblast*. Belarus, too, as its President has stated on a number of occasions, would make launch sites available in such an eventuality. Under these circumstances, the only viable option still open to Ukraine's leaders is the same delicate balancing act that has distinguished foreign policies of the country since its independence.

The most likely future for the CIS would appear to be as some kind of confederative structure with intensely coordinated industrial, financial and trade policies, but more or less independent national diplomacy, sovereign governments and autonomous electoral processes. It is already clear that Russia will fail in forging

³⁰ Personal interview with the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Mr Victor L. Vassiliev, New York, 16 September 1996.

anything like a uniform, homogenous entity of several satellite states equally tied to their Moscow patron. Even now, the 'union of the two' (Russia and Belarus), which is the closest implementation of the Russian idea of integration, competes with the 'union of the four' (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus). Ukraine has launched an 'informal' drive to balance the pro-Russian developments in the CIS on the basis of subregional economic integration, and laid the foundations of the GUAM union (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). 'The principal common denominators of this latter alignment', writes Liz Fuller, 'are an unequivocally pro-Western orientation and the development of transportation links and a pipeline network for the export of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil, both of which would circumvent Russian territory. The alignment thus poses a threat to Russian hopes of preserving a leading role within the CIS'.³¹

One may fairly safely predict that CIS military coordination will continue to develop at both regional and subregional levels, which means that only part of it will be controlled by politicians in Moscow. The actual posture of the Moscow-centred alliance (pro-European or to the contrary) will be defined primarily by the stance NATO takes towards Russia and its allies, but also by the Russian attitude to the CIS-based alliances in which Moscow is not present. If Ukraine's neutral status is preserved, the country may become a 'buffer zone' separating Russia from Europe. The alternative, which is the preferred vision of the Ukrainian government, is to serve as a 'bridge' linking the West and the East of the continent together. On the other hand, Ukraine may shed its neutrality and form a military alliance with other GUAM countries. The prospect of NATO membership remains, in the short term, unfeasible.

Cooperation with NATO

To make Ukraine more visible in the international arena and to improve the often sceptical international assessment of the country's defence capabilities, the Ukrainian leadership decided to step up its participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), and to make Ukrainian troops readily available for UN peacekeeping operations. The latter decision made Ukraine the only other post-Soviet state apart from Russia to participate in UN peacekeeping missions on a permanent basis. Ukrainian troops have taken part in seven UN peacekeeping operations all around the globe, plus one mission under NATO sponsorship in Bosnia. Their important role in the peacekeeping contingent in Angola was praised by both the local powers and the United Nations. The performance of Ukraine's peacekeepers, who make a noticeable part of the UNPROFOR force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, won the approval of the Croatian authorities. Ukraine has also been acting as a mediator in the on-going negotiations between Moldova and its breakaway region of Trans-Dnister, mostly populated by ethnic Slavs. Ukrainians are ready to participate in peacekeeping missions throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, specifically in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, pending the approval of such a mission by either the UN or the OSCE.

³¹ Liz Fuller, '1997 in Review: The CIS – Half Alive or Half Dead', *RFE/RL* online, 22 December 1997.

For Ukrainian policymakers, participation in the expanded Pfp remains high on the list of priorities. While for the Russians Pfp has been valuable, first and foremost, as an instrument delaying the admittance of East European countries to NATO, the Ukrainians have regarded it as a vehicle for closer cooperation with the West in the military and political spheres. Ukraine applied to join the Pfp before Russia or other CIS states. It has regularly hosted joint military exercises with NATO countries, readily exchanged relevant information, and actively cooperated in peacekeeping. Since the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed at the 1997 Madrid Summit, Ukraine and NATO have launched the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, a joint group in the field of civil emergency planning, and opened a NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. Other areas of prospective cooperation are being explored.³²

By participating in Pfp, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)³³ and the Council of Europe, Ukraine is re-establishing itself as a sovereign European power with a foreign policy fully independent of Russian influences. As a neutral power, Ukraine does not wish to become a member of any military bloc. At the same time, as President Leonid Kuchma mentioned on several occasions, the current non-aligned status of Ukraine should not be regarded as its eternal destiny. The Ukrainian leadership tries to keep its options open. Despite its economic hardships, Ukraine still manages to maintain the world's third-largest air force and Europe's third-largest standing army. Participation in Pfp programmes, including military exercises with NATO countries, the IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia and the joint Poland-Ukraine Battalion, should make the Ukrainian army prepared for cooperation in the field with the Western armies and demonstrate this readiness to Russia.³⁴

Ukraine regards itself as a normal European state, whose main international concerns are the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the development of the best possible relations with its neighbours and other members of the world community. Russia's self-perception is different in the sense that the Russian political leadership and diplomatic corps continue to think in terms of a supranational Russian 'mission', conceived as global in scope and manifestations. Russians policymakers still treat their country as an aspiring, if not actual, superpower. Consequently, Russia's goals in the Permanent Joint Council established by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act go beyond the regular bilateral partnership open to any other Pfp country. Russia would like to use the enhanced military-to-military dialogue envisaged by the Act as a vehicle for advancing its interests in the West. To give but one example, the mechanism of consultations and information exchange with NATO countries presents convenient opportunities to influence decision-making in the Alliance. Russia wants a partnership tailored to its 'size, importance, and potential', especially 'in those areas where Russia can make a unique and important contribution commensurate with its weight and responsibil-

³² *NATO Press Release* (98) 34, 26 March 1998.

³³ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was established on 30 May 1997, superseding the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-7), of which both Russia and Ukraine were members.

³⁴ Personal interview with O. Horin, New York, 16 September 1996. Cf. US Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, 'U.S.-Ukraine Relations', *Fact Sheet*, 18 June 1997.

ity as a major European, world, and nuclear power'.³⁵ Though toned down in the wording of the 1997 document, Russia's self-image as a powerful and influential country with a significant say in pan-European affairs has not been abandoned.

Ukraine does not and cannot make similar claims to special treatment. Its main reason for participating in Pfp is to avoid being squeezed between the expanding NATO and the emerging CIS military alliance with Russia at its core. The Ukrainian leadership continues to view CIS military integration with suspicion. The original theory that member-states would have joint control over combined CIS forces has never been implemented. Indeed, to date such CIS forces do not even exist as a distinct entity; what goes by this name is in effect Russian troops, slightly diluted and supplemented with some troops of the allied countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And – viewed from Kyiv – a more active role for Belarus looks all too likely. However, at the moment 'Russia appears content with the use of the early-warning bases and is uninterested in financing the Belarusian armed forces'.³⁶

The only example of a moderately successful Ukrainian-Russian military collaboration in the post-Soviet space dates from 1993, when naval forces of the then undivided Black Sea Fleet took part in a peacekeeping mission in western Georgia.³⁷ The subsequent dispute over the division of the BSF ships and infrastructure poisoned an already precarious relationship. Fear of paving the way to Russian domination kept Ukraine from signing the CIS Statute or the 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security. Instead, Ukraine has sought to establish 'special relations' with NATO. Ukraine's joining Pfp has been considered as an important step towards that end. Ukrainian participation in the NATO operations in Bosnia, without any pretensions to the 'independent' field command demanded by the Russians, was another step in the same direction. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO has, it would seem, established a hardly-reversible trend.

Conclusion

The key powers in the post-Soviet space, Ukraine and Russia, represent a dilemma for both regional and international security. They obviously need each other for a number of reasons, including, but not limited to, economic cooperation and development. At the same time, their potential drawing together raises the ghost of resurgent Russian imperialism, which, historically and geostrategically speaking, specifically frightens Russia's immediate neighbours and, until recently, junior partners – the Ukrainians. Russia's emerging regional hegemony is institutionalised via the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian-Belarusian Union. Uk-

³⁵ Protocol on the Results of Discussions between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the NATO Council, in Michael Mihalka, 'European-Russian Security and NATO's Partnership for Peace', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 25 March 1994, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 34–45.

³⁶ Ustina Markus, 'Imperial Understretch: Belarus's Union with Russia', *Current History*, October 1996, vol. 95, no. 603, p. 339.

³⁷ Alexander A. Pikayev, 'The Russian Domestic Debate on Policy Towards the "Near Abroad"', in Lena Johnson and Clive Archer, eds., *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia* (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 58.

raine's distinct position in the CIS and its reluctance to join the Union, which, according to Leonid Kuchma, is 'absolute nonsense' and 'the way to the destruction of the CIS',³⁸ has so far evoked no major economic or other sanctions from Russia. However, as Russia's foreign policy stance becomes more assertive and increasingly utilitarian, no one can be certain that its current balanced attitude towards Ukraine will not deteriorate. If this happens, the Ukrainian distinctive partnership with NATO may prove its best guarantee of safety.

Political and military developments in the area need to be closely and continuously monitored by the international community. Ukraine's special significance for international stability in Europe is all the more evident in view of the forthcoming enlargement of NATO, which will put Ukraine directly between what may evolve into two potentially hostile camps. In the worst-case scenario, Ukraine will have to serve as a *cordon sanitaire* in the border zone between the expanded NATO and the Russia-dominated CIS, or the extended version of the Russian-Belarusian Union. The best-case scenario may see Ukraine paving the way to the new, enlarged NATO for other CIS countries and, most importantly, the Russian Federation itself. In any case, Ukraine's distinct position vis-à-vis Russia should be supported and used as a strategic asset rather than a liability. □

Constituting Statehood: The New Ukrainian Constitution

Kataryna Wolczuk*

Although the study of constitutions is well-established, it can hardly be said to have been at the leading edge of political science, since with the advent of society-centred approaches, constitutional studies became a backwater of the discipline. Only during the last decade or so has there been a revival of the state-centred approaches, which at the same time rejected the dull and narrow legalism characteristic of early political science. Undoubtedly, this revival of interest has been encouraged by recent changes. Deepening European integration has generated a search for an acceptable and flexible political formula preferably coherently expressed in some kind of European constitution.¹ Simultaneously, following the collapse of communism, new and old states in Eastern Europe have been busy promulgating fundamental new laws in order to renew the basis of political life, assert their sovereignty, and mark their return to the much idealised 'European home'. While in such a context constitutions have sparked off a great deal of interest, at the same time, these developments have promoted a rethinking of the meaning, role and function of constitutions. In particular, their role in the state-building processes in post-communist states needs to be examined. This article will focus on the case of Ukraine, where constitution-making brought to the fore all the conflicting views on the nature of the new state.

Constitutions Revisited

Although the relationship between democracy, as the rule of the majority, and constitutions, as superior documents binding that majority, is far from clear-cut, constitutions are viewed in Central-East Europe as the keystone in building democracies. The new post-communist constitutions are thus usually analysed as instruments, by which usurpation of power can be prevented, governments made accountable and human rights and freedoms enforced.² In this respect, those constitutions seem to institutionalise the anti-communist 'revolutions', by imposing democratic restraints on governments after years of unconstrained rule by the

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¹ See, for example, essays in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione, and Victorio Bufacchi, eds., *Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); Richard Bellamy, ed., *Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives* (Vermont: Avebury, 1996) or Ulrich K. Preuss, 'Prospects of a Constitution for Europe', *Constellations* 3:2 (1996), pp. 209–24.

² See, for example, Istvan Pogany, 'Constitution Making or Constitutional Transformation in Post-Communist Societies?', *Political Studies* XLV:3 (1996), pp. 568–91.

Communist parties. In other words, by focusing on the need to guard society against the state, the negative and defensive role of constitutions is prioritised.³ Such an emphasis reflects the original rationale behind the drafting of constitutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. It was precisely because of the drive to limit government (by requiring those who govern to conform to laws, procedures and rules) that it can now be claimed that 'the history of modern European constitutionalism is the history of the progressive transfer of sovereignty from princes or kings, under whom state power had been centralized and consolidated, to the people and their representatives'.⁴

Since, however, in Western Europe constitutionalism and democracy developed over time within the framework of established states, and since, too, constitutions reflected a qualitative change in the mode of governing within existing polities, the Western liberal notion of constitutions obscures the wider imperatives for constitution-making which prevails outside 'old' and established nation-states. In considering why constitutions are adopted, Wheare points out that they demarcate a 'fresh start' and symbolise a break with the past.⁵ Most often this means a change of political regime. A good example of this is France, where each of its republican incarnations has been accompanied by a new constitution. However, the most profound break with the past is represented in the act of creating a state. Be it in Africa, Asia or more recently in Eastern Europe, the emergence of a new state has almost always involved the adoption of a new constitution as a way of defining the distinctive, sovereign body politic and its operative 'rules of the game'. Under such circumstances, the functions of the constitution cannot be limited to defending and guarding pre-existing structures. These have to be created in the first place. According to Castiglione, a constitution in broad terms performs three main functions: it constitutes, structures and limits. First of all, constituting a polity is 'the act of giving origin to a political entity and of sanctioning its nature and primary ends'.⁶ Providing an identity through the constitution has a primary symbolic and integrative dimension since the constitution defines a people who as a community aspire to their own way of governing: the political system. The second function is thus concerned with providing an institutional and procedural framework for a political community. This allows the state power not only to be organised, but also to be exercised on the basis of order and regularity. Finally, the function of the constitution is to limit state power and protect an individual from state interference. The doctrine of modern liberal constitutionalism emphasises this last function by focusing on constitutions

³ On this point, see Stephen Holmes, 'Conceptions of Democracy in the Draft Constitutions of Post-Communist Countries', in Beverly Crawford, ed., *Markets, States and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 71–80, and Ulrich K. Preuss, 'Patterns of Constitutional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe', in Joachim Jens Hesse and Nevil Johnson, eds., *Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95–126.

⁴ Donald P. Kommers and W. J. Thompson, 'Fundamentals in the Liberal Constitutional Tradition', in Hesse and Johnson, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵ K. C. Wheare, *Modern Constitutions*, 2nd ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 6. The lack of desire to start afresh also helps to explain the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a written Constitution.

⁶ Dario Castiglione, 'The Political Theory of the Constitution', *Political Studies* XLIV: 3 (1996), p. 422.

as mechanisms of constraining government: the rulers – ‘checked and balanced’ by constitutional provisions – are to be held accountable to the ruled and are to refrain from trespassing on the private domain of the ruled.

While the above functions are intertwined and in principle difficult to disentangle, they may acquire varying degrees of importance. The significance of constitutions, although linked by a common theme, differs between polities, since every constitution is deeply embedded in a specific socio-economic, political and cultural context. In new states the constituting and organising functions are paramount, expressing, as they do, the will of a political community to form a political structure. This explains the worldwide appeal of written constitutions, although at the same time, far more states possess them than actually use them as a meaningful basis for political interactions between state institutions and between the state and the individual. Constitutions are far more widespread than constitutionalism, a concept which encompasses the binding superiority of constitutional norms and imperatives of the ‘rule of law’. The vast gulf between political practice and formal constitutional rules which prevails in so many states might be interpreted as the devaluation of constitutions in the modern world. However, it could also be argued that the popularity of constitutions can be attributed precisely to the constitutive function they perform. Constitutions have become one of the key attributes and symbols of sovereign statehood. Thus, the focus on constitutions as a pre-condition for liberal constitutionalism is too narrow to encapsulate all the ends they serve. It is in this light that the role of the constitution as an expression of statehood, nationhood and sovereignty in Eastern Europe needs to be examined, since the newly independent states, being built on the rubble of the communist federations, face the task of defining themselves in territorial, national and political terms.

The Constitution and Statehood in Ukraine

Ukraine proclaimed its independence in August 1991 and confirmed it in a referendum in December of that same year. Yet this speedy and unexpected passage to independence lacked a thorough reflection on the nature of its statehood. This stemmed largely from Ukraine’s heterogeneity. Only after the Second World War, were the various ethnically Ukrainian regions united in a single administrative unit, the Ukrainian SSR. Having been divided and ruled for centuries by neighbouring empires, these regions differed markedly in linguistic, cultural, religious and economic respect. The net effect today is a population that differs in terms of its political traditions, levels of national awareness and adherence to socialist or nationalist ideologies. The Soviet regime not only failed to eliminate such cleavages, but often exacerbated them: Western Ukraine, for example, was continuously depicted as a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism, and thus portrayed as irreconcilably different from the rest of Soviet Ukraine, which had spent a much longer period under Tsarist and Soviet rule. Opinion polls since independence reflect these profound regional differences in world outlook.⁷

⁷ See, for example, Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, ‘The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine’, *The Harriman Review* 9:1–2 (Spring 1996), pp. 81–91.

Even though the framing of constitutions in new states rarely reflects pre-existing beliefs regarding the political structure, goals of the state and the definition of the political community, a 'fresh start' as a new state has to be preceded by a broad agreement on the faults of the past, which are seen as a justification for creating a new constitutional association. In Ukraine, this would be a rejection of the Soviet 'republican' past and the desire to reverse its institutional, economic and cultural legacies. Yet, despite some limited historical precedence of statehood, in Ukraine the understanding of independence was far from shared and taken for granted. Divided by the interpretation of the pre-Soviet and Soviet past, the political actors engaged in constitution-making lacked the minimal common platform needed for a consensus on what political and socio-economic structure of society should be taken as an optimal formula for the future. The constitutional process revealed profound fault-lines (*kaminnyya spotykan'nyya*), the sheer number of which made constitution-making a challenge akin to opening Pandora's box. Since the Constitution brought to the fore all the conflicting views on the meaning of Ukrainian independence and the institutional form of the state, it resulted in an intense, and highly contentious process of elaborating the concept of statehood. This accounts for the delay in the promulgation of the Constitution, despite the urgent need to deal with the prevailing legal disarray in the country. Ukraine was the last of the post-Soviet states to adopt a new constitution, eventually doing so in a dramatic although peaceful climax. And, in Ukraine, the importance of the Constitution lies in its role in setting the parameters of the state rather than in building liberal democracy.

Constitution-making in Ukraine was a distinctively élitist enterprise, albeit conducted in *the name* of popular sovereignty. In Ukraine, the political élites not only reflected the existing social disunity, but deepened it by emphasising ideological differences and acting as a magnifying glass for societal cleavages. The result was a bi-polar political spectrum with the main political formations located at its opposing ends, and possessing diametrically opposed conceptions of statehood.

During the process of constitution-making, the Leftist bloc, made up of Communist, Socialist and Agrarian parties with their geographical powerbase in eastern, southern and rural central Ukraine, was united by a shared idealised view of the Soviet past, its achievements, and political and economic institutions. This was accompanied by a passionate rejection of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' – equated with the constitutionally enshrined official status of the Ukrainian language and symbols. This bloc's preferred concept of statehood was ultimately a perpetuation of the Soviet model. Nevertheless, it was not a homogeneous grouping, being split by varying attitudes towards independence. The Socialists and Agrarians (and some Communists) accepted Ukrainian independence and did not advocate the restoration of the Soviet Union (although they did favour close cooperation with Russia and the CIS), but preferred the preservation of a socialist path of development *within* an independent Ukraine. The hardline Communists openly denied the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood, and called for the reincarnation of the USSR.⁸

⁸ See, Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, no. 49 (1998).

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the 'National Democrats' (represented mainly by Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Ukraine) derived their support from Western and Central Ukraine. This bloc sees itself as an avant-garde pressing for Ukraine's 'return to Europe' after centuries of Russian 'slavery'. They are passionately anti-communist, and equate Soviet rule with the genocide of the Ukrainian nation, the distortion of Ukraine's economic development and the degeneration of its social tissue. Rebuking the past means repairing the damage done to the Ukrainian language and culture as a matter of priority in building the Ukrainian nation-state. The socio-economic transformation needed to establish a market economy and political reform leading to a strong and efficient democratic state figured highly on their agenda, although defined far less precisely than their strategy on the national question.

This bi-polarity of ideas on statehood was projected on to constitution-making. The aim of the Leftists was to prevent change and minimise the 'freshness of the start', and to retain in the new Ukrainian state the institutions and goals of the previous regime. Conversely, the National Democrats perceived the Constitution as a vehicle for shedding the Soviet past and rooting out the vestiges of the Communist order during Ukraine's journey to 'the civilised world'. The Constitution was, for them, a birth certificate signifying Ukraine's emergence as a European nation-state. In this context, although the protracted and publicly aired constitutional debate had significantly eroded the legitimacy of the outdated and much amended Soviet-era 1978 Constitution, for the first five years of independence the main political actors, being frozen in their mutually-exclusive stances, were unable to agree on constitutional choices.

The predicament in Ukraine was that, according to the Soviet legal tradition, the constitution was drafted as a comprehensive and rigid code. This form of fundamental law (although not its content) was borrowed by the Soviet regime from the tradition of the Western European *Rechtsstaat*, in which constitutions set out precise responsibilities, rules and procedures (a somewhat different concept from the minimalist frame-of-government constitutions in Anglo-Saxon legal tradition).⁹ The legitimacy of the constitution-as-a-code depends on the achievement of a formalised consensus in the constitution-making body representative of popular sovereignty (usually with the requirement of a larger than normal majority). In Ukraine, however, the number of disputed issues which had to be dealt with in a detailed manner, for a long time precluded the achievement of such a consensus.

Passage of the Constitution

In 1994, in the first free parliamentary elections, political parties were disadvantaged owing to an electoral law which in terms of the consolidation of the party system was a step backwards. As a result, less than half of the members elected had formal party affiliations. However, within a short span of time, numerous parliamentary fac-

⁹ Daniel J. Elazar, 'Constitution-Making: The Pre-eminently Political Act', in Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., *The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 233–4.

tions emerged, although some of them were ephemeral and had no clearly defined social constituency. This meant that the parliament comprised three political blocs: Left, Right and the Centre. Both the Left and Right factions were essentially party-based (apart from the Leftist agrarian lobby) with deep ideological commitments and the firm and rigid ideas on statehood outlined above. The 'Centre', on the other hand, was merely a label for the space between Right and Left, rather than reflecting any clear and coherent political stance; indeed the Centrists could be more precisely described as being an amalgam of Left-Centre-Right orientations. The centre was made up of amorphous factions such as Yednist, Centre, the Interregional Group, Independents, Social Market Choice and non-affiliated deputies. Overall, they tended to be too preoccupied with sectoral, functional, regional or personal interests to engage in ideological discussions on the concept of statehood, which were time-consuming and exhausting, yet brought few tangible benefits. Although, the Centre was hardly united, it could be differentiated on the basis of the 'national question' and support for economic reforms, two criteria which determined the propensity of individual groups to side with the Left or the Right. No overall discipline, apart from the final vote on the Constitution, was ever established in this bloc. At the same time, its sheer mass made it a critical component in parliament, accounting as it did for nearly half of all deputies.

In such circumstances, the parliament never managed to attain a clear division into a majority and an opposition. In the 1994 elections, the Leftist bloc commanded one-third of all seats, while the National Democrats secured a quarter of all seats. The fragmented Centre was unable to become a stabilising force. This, on the one hand, further hampered the constitutional process by producing tedious and time-consuming negotiations not only between the parliament, President, and the various parliamentary factions, but even between individuals within factions. On the other hand, however, it was precisely this volatility of the political actors which left room for manoeuvre, and provided the pressure and influence, which, despite all odds, eventually allowed the Constitution to be adopted. Ultimately it was Leonid Kuchma, the second President of Ukraine, who acted as midwife, delivering the Constitution under the trying conditions of a divided parliament unable to muster a constitutional majority.

On coming to power, Kuchma could be best classified as a Centrist. Rejecting the national character of the new state, favouring closer ties with the CIS and Russia, and yet supporting political and economic reform, he was simultaneously at odds with the Right and Left ideological blocs. Yet, with the passage of time the President's stance changed on the questions which initially had made an alliance with the Right impossible. This can be attributed to his pragmatic desire to go beyond his limited powerbase, and acquire a much needed ally in parliament, in order to push through his political and economic reform package. It was also due to his position as head of state with a unique role in the forging of national unity and asserting the sovereignty of the state. Thus with time, Kuchma came to downplay points of conflict (for example, the status of the Russian language in Ukraine), and instead focused on the constitutional and economic crisis. This made him a crucial partner of the Right in its struggle to deal with the Soviet lega-

cy. This pragmatic Presidency, which cut across the ideological blocs entrenched in parliament, played a key role in overcoming the rift within that body. This was possible since the elaboration of the concept of statehood was intertwined with the struggle for power. Kuchma consequently sought institutional advantages in the delineation of authority between the branches of power, and pushed the constitutional process forward.

The first step in this direction was the Constitutional Agreement (*Dobovir*) on 'The Basic Principles of the Organisation and Operation of State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine until a new Ukrainian Constitution is adopted'. This was agreed between the President and parliament in June 1995. The agreement dealt only with the structure of government and replaced the relevant sections of the 1978 Constitution. It significantly expanded the powers of the President, granted him the right to appoint the Cabinet of Ministers unilaterally, to issue decrees on economic issues (not already regulated by existing laws), and to appoint executive structures in localities, to oversee local self-government. Since the Agreement was adopted by simple majority (the Communist faction depicted it as a constitutional coup d'état and refused to sign it), it was only an interim and quasi-legal solution to the constitutional crisis. Crucially, though, the *Dobovir* established a twelve month deadline for the adoption of a new full-bodied constitution. As a result, in March 1996, the constitutional commission representing the President, the Supreme Rada and the judicial branch, tabled a draft constitution in parliament.¹⁰ (In fact, since the commission failed to reconcile the cleavages between its representative membership, the draft was actually prepared by a group of experts.) This, being based on the Constitutional *Dobovir*, favoured Kuchma's predilections, including a proposal for a bi-cameral legislature. All of the parliamentary factions raised objections, although their scope and number varied greatly between the Left and Right. While the Left became adamant in its opposition, the Right and Centre formed an informal conciliatory commission aiming to 'improve' the draft. With no parliamentary bloc commanding even a simple majority,¹¹ it was understood that the draft had to incorporate at least some postulates from each faction, if it was to command even a simple majority. Thus, the parliamentary commission made some critical changes to the March draft. For example, it scrapped the bi-cameral parliament and circumscribed Presidential powers; this allowed for the draft to be passed by a simple majority in its first reading in June 1996. However, the impasse continued as the Left, unsatisfied with the limited scale of changes which failed to address the bulk of their objections, hindered promulgation. This Leftist strategy of

¹⁰ The precise procedure for the ratification of the draft was disputed, as the *Dobovir* stipulated that the Constitution should be agreed between the President and parliament and ratified by a referendum, whereas according to the 1978 Constitution, it should be promulgated by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Overall, it was largely agreed that the draft had to be first approved by the Supreme Rada and perhaps further sanctioned by a nation-wide referendum.

¹¹ According to the 'Rules of the Parliament of Ukraine', 226 votes are required for a simple majority. This number is derived from the total number of seats in parliament (450) rather than those actually elected (by June 1996 only 405 deputies were elected and 45 seats remained vacant). The two-thirds majority for the passage of the Constitution, accordingly, was 301, which, because of so many vacant seats, was effectively closer to a three-quarters majority.

procrastination in Ukraine was due to the impending presidential elections in the Russian Federation, in which the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin was challenged in the second round (July 1996) by the Communist candidate – Zyuganov. The latter's victory would give a new lease of life to Communist forces across the former Soviet Union, and boost the standing of the Communist Party of Ukraine in its drive to restore the system of soviets and re-integrate with Russia. As Zyuganov's win would present a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, the Russian 'factor' influenced the constitutional timetable in Ukraine.

On 26 June 1996 President Kuchma, who repeatedly had criticised parliament for its inability to deliver results, decided to dispense with legal niceties and issued a decree which envisaged putting the March draft (opprobrious to the Left) to a referendum. This strategy leaned heavily on his high level of popularity (in contrast to the widely discredited parliament). With the threat of an imminent referendum, parliament sharply accelerated its pace of work, and after a record 23-hour marathon adopted an emended version of the March Draft on 28 June 1996. This was possible only because part of the Left wing (Socialists, Agrarians, some Communists) abandoned their cause, on the urging of Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Socialist Party and speaker of parliament, who used his influence to get the Constitution ratified by the parliament he led, rather than being taken to a referendum. Throughout that crucial night, awkward issues (such as the status of the Russian language, symbols, property rights or Crimea) were tackled by repetitious voting (10–20 times in some cases) in a highly tense and emotional atmosphere until a majority was reached (see Table 1).¹² In such a context, the passage of the Ukrainian Constitution represented a successful attempt to 'square the circle'. This achievement is all the more remarkable when one considers that in May 1996 a group of experts estimated the probability of its passage through parliament as 3 per cent.¹³

Elster conceptualised the goals and motives which inspire constitution-makers as 'reason' (an impartial concern for public good), 'passion' (including both long-standing and impulsive emotional convictions), and 'interests' (preoccupied with maximising group, institutional and/or personal gains).¹⁴ When those three factors are juxtaposed, the result is a dense matrix of preferences and interests, in which individual preferences can be either reinforced or weakened according to the various circumstances. In Ukraine, under the threat of a referendum, 'reason' as well as personal and institutional interests took precedence over long-standing passions. MPs recognised that the costs of failure would be too high to incur for the country at large and for themselves personally. Both the fate of the current parliament (and their careers as members) were at stake and the consequences of a failed referendum (such as political instability) were hard to predict, and could be potentially disastrous. It was under these conditions that a compromise and eventual constitutional majority was finally achieved.

¹² The requirement of the constitutional majority of 301 was reached when 315 of deputies voted in favour in the second reading of the Constitution, while 36 voted against, 12 abstained and 30 did not vote.

¹³ Artur Bilous et al., *Proyekt Konstytutsiyi Ukrainy: Stan, Problemy, Perspektyvy* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 44.

¹⁴ Jon Elster, 'The Role of Institutional Interest in East European Constitution Making', *East European Constitutional Review* 5: 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 63–6.

TABLE 1. *Voting Results from the Adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution (28 June 1996)*

	For	Against	Registered Abstentions	Did not Participate
LEFT				
The Communists	20	29	10	20
The Socialists	17	6	2	0
The Agrarians	21	0	0	2
CENTRE				
Inter-Regional Bloc for Reforms	23	0	0	1
Independents	22	0	0	0
Social Market Choice	23	0	0	3
Yednist (Unity)	24	0	0	1
Tsentr (Centre)	26	0	0	1
Agrarians for Reforms	25	0	0	0
RIGHT				
Reforms	29	0	0	1
Rukh	26	0	0	1
Derzhavnist (Statehood)	25	0	0	0
NON AFFILIATED	34	1	0	0
TOTAL	315	36	12	30

Source: The Supreme Rada of Ukraine.

The Constitution asserted Ukrainian statehood in institutional, national and socio-economic terms. Firstly, it established the parameters of the 'nation' by defining the nature and attributes of the 'political community'. Secondly, it specified the political framework of the state – the institutions, rules and procedures. Thirdly, the socio-economic foundation and goals of the state were established, including the status of private property and the role of the state in the socio-economic sphere. The remainder of this article will analyse the concept of statehood embedded in the new Constitution of Ukraine, the contested options and how they were reflected in the final constitutional choices. Each of the three clusters of issues will now be examined in more detail. It will be seen that the final constitutional reconciliation was the result of painstaking negotiation and enforced compromises between conflicting ideas, beliefs and interests.

The 'National' Question

As we have already noted, constitutions in new states, in addition to re-creating instruments of governmental accountability and protecting human rights and liberties, have other more fundamental functions, such as defining the political community and establishing a collective identity. As Offe points out, 'at the most fundamental level' a 'decision' must be made on who 'we' are, i.e. on identity, citizenship, and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation-state.¹⁵ National self-determination remains the most powerful principle legitimising the formation of a modern state. As a logical extension of the act of self-determination, the Ukrainian Constitution strove to define the political community as an organic unity – a nation, the boundaries of which coincide with the state and whose needs that state legitimately serves. In the context of Ukrainian history, the reconciliation of the multiethnic and multicultural nature of Ukrainian society with the principles of the nation-state would seem to presuppose the criterion of 'belonging' as that of *ius soli*: civic and territorial allegiance based on loyalty to the state and its institutions, rather than founded on the ethnic ties of *ius sanguinis*. Thus, the position of the titular majority vis-à-vis ethnic and linguistic minorities and the extent to which its role should be promoted in the new state became a critical question: should ethnic Ukrainians be equated with and thus 'diluted' by the mass of over 100 nationalities living in Ukraine, or should the new Constitution assert the cultural and linguistic rights of the ethnic Ukrainians? The issue was made even more contentious owing to the fact that the titular majority is split along a linguistic line into Russophones and Ukrainophones for whom the cultural and ethnic revival bears a different significance.

The Right-wing, while seeing Ukraine as a 'pluralistic nation-state' advocated the 'creation' of the Ukrainian political nation (*narod*) on the basis of the core ethnic Ukrainian nation (*natsiia*). At the same time, it recognised the right of national minorities without historical homelands outside Ukraine (*korinni narody*) and other national minorities (*natsionalni menshyny*, including Russians, who comprise 22 per cent of the population) to some kind of cultural and linguistic autonomy.¹⁶ However, the Right also insisted that the state language and symbols must reflect the historical role of Ukrainians in their own homeland. In contrast to the National Democrats, the Left interpreted (and hence rejected) the concept of the nation-state (*natsionalna derzhava*) in exclusive, ethnic terms, which, they claimed, lacked deeper resonance in Ukrainian society at large, apart from a narrow group of nationalists confined to Western Ukraine. Effectively, while the new Constitution was to define the citizens of Ukraine as a nation, the basis of definition was disputed. Overall, the 'national issue' led to dramatic tensions, which overshadowed the constitutional debate from the outset and remained a bone of contention until the very night of adoption. In Elster's terms, it evoked passions, which 'reason' could not easily subdue.

First of all, the constitution-makers had to agree on the sovereign subject, in whose name the state exists: the 'Ukrainian People' or the 'People of Ukraine'. For

¹⁵ Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design', *Social Research* 58 (1991), p. 867.

¹⁶ Significantly, the Right-wing parties stressed the difference between the indigenous people of Ukraine without historical homelands outside Ukraine and other national minorities, such as Poles,

both the radical Right and the National Democrats the only acceptable formula was the 'Ukrainian people'. It contrasted with the Soviet regime's internationalist assertion that 'Ukraine [was] a state of all people, expressing the will and interests of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia: the working people of all nationalities of the Republic' (1978 Constitution of the UkrSSR). For the Left, 'the Ukrainian people' (*Ukrayinskyi narod*) had overly ethnic connotations, although in Ukrainian it is the word *natsiya*, which conveys the ethnic notion of nationhood. The Left insisted on a territorial definition of 'the people of Ukraine' (*narod Ukrayiny*), as a genuine recognition of Ukraine's multi-ethnic composition. This would ensure that no ethnic group could claim any special rights, and thus circumvent the excesses of Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism'. The Centrists were divided on the issue, and the President, although in principle indifferent, sided with the National Democrats, in exchange for their support for a stronger presidency.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the definition finally hammered out in the Preamble to the Constitution: 'The Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities' seemingly reconciled the difference in a genuine compromise apparently satisfactory to all sides.

The next fundamental disagreement was over the status of the Russian language, in particular, whether Russian is a 'legitimate' language *beyond* the Russian minority. Ukrainian was made the only state language in 1989 largely as a token gesture to Ukrainians, (despite the fact that a large percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in eastern and southern Ukraine are Russophones¹⁸). For the national-democrats, granting Russian official status in the Constitution would fix the status quo; legitimise the centuries-long discrimination against the Ukrainian language, and prevent the eradication of the legacies of Tsarist and Soviet rule – Russification. If there is to be a revival of the Ukrainian language – they argued – no further provision for Russian should be made in the Constitution. For the Left, such arguments were equated with the 'rampant excesses' of forced Ukrainisation in both education and the public sphere. The split in the Centrist bloc followed its linguistic composition with Russophones, for example the Interregional Group for Reforms, siding with the Left, and Ukrainophone factions such as the Centre aligning themselves with the National Democrats.

Although none of the official draft constitutions granted Russian official status, the March draft envisaged that 'in areas of *dense* population of citizens of one or several national minorities, the language accepted by the *majority of the population* of a certain location may be used in the activities of bodies of state power

Russians, Romanians. Apart from the Crimean Tatars and other small ethnic groups, the former category included ethnic Ukrainians. According to the National Democrats, the possession of a homeland outside Ukraine conferred a different status and different rights on ethnic groups in Ukraine, compared to those lacking such a homeland.

¹⁷ Author's interview with members of parliament – Serhiy Sobolyev, head of the Reforms faction, and Mykhaylo Syrota (head of the Special Parliamentary Commission for the Constitution between March and June 1991) in September 1996, Kyiv.

¹⁸ The very number of Russophone Ukrainians is disputed. The actual usage of the Russian language in Ukraine is more widespread than the Russian minority and the 12 per cent of Russian-speaking Ukrainians that the official 1989 Soviet Census recorded. See Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine'.

and state organisations, along with the state language' (emphasis added). This was in line with the progressive Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities (November 1991): if Russian is accepted by the majority of the population (and presumably not necessarily only ethnic Russians), it could become the language of the local administration. This meant the effective recognition of Russian as an official language at the local level. Yet, the Left remained unsatisfied with the March version and demanded more explicit guarantees for the status of Russian to prevent the Ukrainian language from gaining the upper hand.

Yet, in comparison with the March draft, the final June version, although somewhat vaguer, and thus open to various interpretations, turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for those who sought to upgrade the status of the Russian language. The Ukrainian language remained the only state language. The 'free development, use of and protection of Russian, along with other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed' (Art. 10),¹⁹ but the same article stipulates that the state 'ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in *all* spheres of social life throughout the *entire territory* of Ukraine'. Russian can develop freely, yet Ukrainian *has* to be promoted by the state (emphasis added).²⁰ While the Left-wing was especially adamant about including the word 'Russian' in the Constitution (to placate the Russophones) the article, while referring to 'Russian', effectively reduced its status to that of a minority language. Thus, the Constitution defined the aims of the state in the sphere of language as a progressive Ukrainisation of public life.

In a similar manner a compromise on state symbols emerged: the flag, emblem and anthem, despite some concessions, were the preference of the Right and objected to by the Left. Using highly emotional rhetoric the Left and Russophone deputies insisted that the 'Banderite'²¹ symbols adopted in 1991, were antagonistic outside western Ukraine, in contrast to the Soviet hammer and sickle, which innocently 'signified the importance of labour'.²² Thus they recommended that the choice of symbols be subjected to a referendum (as was the case in Belarus in 1995), or even excluded from the Constitution. However, this was not acceptable to the Right-wingers who were eager to ensure that, for example, the trident was recognised as the pre-eminent, national Ukrainian emblem. The search for an acceptable, non-aggravating formula is reflected in the elaborated wording of Article 20, which avoids the word 'trident' at all cost:

¹⁹ Article 13 in the Ukrainian-language original text actually reads 'the free development, use of and protection of Russian, other languages of the national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed'. The awkward wording was adopted, since the National Democrats would not allow an 'and' between Russian and other minority languages. This, in their opinion, would emphasise the special status of Russian in Ukraine, whereas they wanted to emphasise its 'minority status'.

²⁰ A National Democratic deputy, Roman Bezsmertnyi, commented on such an outcome: 'The Left must have suffered an intellectual block when they voted on this article' (Author's interview in September 1996, Kyiv).

²¹ These symbols were used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought the German and Soviet armies during and after the Second World War. The UPA was depicted in the Soviet Union as an arch-symbol of Ukrainian nationalism with fascist inclinations.

²² Author's interview with a member of the Communist faction, Volodymyr Moysyenko (Kyiv, November 1995).

The Great State Emblem of Ukraine shall be established with the consideration of the Small Emblem of Ukraine and the Emblem of the Zaporozhian Host, by the law adopted by no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine.

The main element of the Great State Emblem of Ukraine is the Emblem of the Royal State of Volodymyr the Great (the Small State Emblem of Ukraine).

Thus, the trident, disguised as the Small State Emblem of Ukraine remained. In their only major concession to the Left, the Right agreed to drop the provocative text of the national anthem 'Still Ukraine lives on, undying', though retaining the original Verbytskyi score. The new words of the anthem are to be decided by competition.

Overall, the 'national' question proved to be the most difficult to resolve. The opposing stances, accompanied by deeply felt passions, prevented cool-headed bargaining and an eventual satisfactory compromise. When the 'national' question came up as the ultimate point of dispute during the crucial night, the anti-nationalist forces capitulated in the face of the immense pressure to adopt the Constitution. As a result, the final, agreed, version of the Constitution asserted Ukraine to be a nation-state, implying homogeneity and uniformity, without any actual agreement on what unites and turns citizens of Ukraine into 'the people'.

The Political Structure of Society

Institutions at the Centre

The drafting of the chapters on the form of government, apart from being driven by different visions of the institutional framework of statehood, was also coloured by personal, group and institutional interests. This could hardly have been avoided, since the drafting of the Constitution was assigned to two bodies: parliament and the President, both of whom had to allocate powers to themselves and agree on the means by which they would be held accountable. The fact that the Constitution was being drafted and promulgated by institutions which would then be governed by its norms provided ample opportunity for those institutions to pursue their own interests rather than the 'public good'. Ukraine was not unique in this respect: the same situation characterised constitution-drafting in other East-Central European states.²³

The main bone of contention in Ukraine was whether or not the Presidency should exist at all and if so what its role should be. The Left's overarching objective was to preserve the Soviet system of power intact. Power was to be vested in a vertical chain of people's radas (the Ukrainian word corresponding to the Russian term 'soviet') with the Supreme Rada (Parliament) being the highest state body. The Supreme Rada was to perform and/or delegate the executive functions and oversee the judicial apparatus. In such a system there is no need for either a President (the chairman of the Supreme Rada and the Presidium would perform

²³ See, for example, essays in A. E. Dick Howard, ed., *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe* (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1993); or Frank Bealey, 'The Slovak Constitution', *Democratization* 2:2 (Summer 1995), pp. 179–97.

the representative functions of the head of state) or Constitutional Court (since the Supreme Rada has the exclusive right to interpret the Constitution). The Left acclaimed the system of soviets (radas) as the highest form of democracy, which by definition precluded a dictatorship, something they associated with the Presidency. The Left's interests were also at stake here because it had a strong representation in the Supreme Rada and was well entrenched at the local level in the densely populated eastern and southern Ukraine; thus it would control the composition of the executive branch at the centre and in many localities. Effectively, in constitution-making the Left attempted to revert to the Soviet-era institutional set up to prevent the erosion of its power, while the Centre-Right utilised the opportunity to re-shape relations between the branches of power, in order to weaken the institutional powerbase of the Leftists.

The majority of Centrist MPs supported the Presidency, but preferred that the balance between parliament and President should favour the former. Apart from those MPs who had positions in government, such as the 'Centre' faction, the rest of the Centrists, driven by their personal interests, opted for a stronger parliament. The National Democrats, in turn, agreed to allocating to the President the role of chief executive, but not that of a 'be-all and end-all' authority, which could emasculate the parliament altogether. Overall, both the Centre and the Right allocated the President more than the role of a figure-head, recognising that the Supreme Rada was incapable of coherent policy-making and that an executive Presidency was an indispensable even if not entirely satisfactory solution to the crisis of ungovernability. However, they were not ready to place the fate of the country in one person's hands. In turn, the President's goal was, not surprisingly, to maximise the powers of his office, especially the legislative and appointive spheres.

Overall, the preferred forms of government were the following:²⁴

The Left – (Soviet) parliamentarism

The Centre – parliamentary-presidential

The Right, The President – presidential-parliamentary

However, it should be noted that although the above concepts were widely used in the constitutional debate, they served as labels for vaguely defined yet different forms of government in terms of the structure and status of the executive branch. There was, however, a general consensus that a 'parliamentary-presidential system' meant one centred around parliament rather than the President, although the latter would perform some selected executive functions (to be defined later). Conversely, a 'presidential-parliamentary system' would give extensive executive powers to the President, although parliament would retain con-

²⁴ It should be pointed out that the classification of forms of government used in the constitutional debate in Ukraine was 'indigenous' and as such not based on any Western classifications such as those presented by Maurice Duverger, 'A New System Model: Semi-Presidential Government', *European Journal of Political Research* 8 (1980), pp. 65–87, or Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

trol over the Cabinet of Ministers. With numerous competencies to be allocated and each of them being dealt with separately, the debate was acrimonious and progress slow. However, ultimately the Centre, the Right and the President favoured a move towards Western models of institutional arrangements rather than Soviet parliamentarism, and the disagreement became focused on the precise delineation of prerogatives between parliament and the President.

The resulting constitutional compromise made the President head of the executive branch in all but name (Art. 37), while parliament retained control over the government (Art. 87) whose programme of activity it has to approve, and which it can dismiss with a no-confidence vote (although only one year after the approval of the programme). Significantly, the President was denied the most powerful instrument of control over parliament, the right to dissolve it (unless it does not convene for 30 days – Art. 90). At the same time, the President can be impeached by parliament for state treason or other crimes through a complex procedure involving a three-quarters majority in parliament, a review by the Constitutional Court, and the opinion of the Supreme Court (Art. 111). Furthermore, the principle of the separation of powers was vindicated as the Constitutional Court was given the sole authority over constitutional jurisdiction. The court decides on the issue of conformity of laws to the Constitution, and interprets the Constitution and laws (Art. 147). The court consists of 18 judges nominated for 9 years, with the President, parliament and the Council of Judges appointing six each.

The second contentious issue in executive-legislative relations was whether the form of the parliament should be uni- or bi-cameral. The most fully developed proposal for a bi-cameral legislature (*Natsionalni Zbory*) was incorporated into the March 1996 draft, which envisaged two chambers directly elected, with the upper house consisting of representatives of provinces (oblasts), Crimea and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. Arguing that the existing uni-cameral Supreme Rada had proved incapable of performing all the functions of modern parliaments, President Kuchma – at least initially – was an outspoken advocate of adding an upper chamber – a Senate. This enthusiasm, however, was not shared by the Supreme Rada at large and, since it did not fit the model which in Soviet times had been used by the Left, rejected it outright. The National Democrats' criticism, in turn, was fuelled by the fear that regional representation at the centre would lead to federalisation by the back door and the further regionalisation of Ukraine. (The only exception was the *Derzhavnist* faction, which, firstly, was eager to bring its image into line with 'European' conservatism, and hence supported an upper chamber; and, secondly, strongly supported the President's stance.) Furthermore, the proposed division of powers between the *Natsionalni Zbory* and the President in the March draft was too heavily biased in favour of a President-Senate tandem for the liking of the Centrists and some National Democrats. The Centrist factions especially vigorously opposed the idea, being keen on preventing any change to their personal position. Effectively, as only about 82 MPs supported bi-cameralism,²⁵ the Supreme

²⁵ The list of supporters of bi-cameralism, which was handed to the conciliatory parliamentary commission when this issue was debated, had only 82 signatures. (Materials of the Parliamentary Commission on the Constitution, Supreme Rada of Ukraine).

Rada was uniquely united on the merits of uni-cameralism, and rejected the proposal. With no substantial constituency for bi-cameralism, a compromise was easily reached, even if such an institutional arrangement would seem more suited to Ukraine's regional diversity.²⁶ As a token gesture to the Left, parliament kept its Soviet-era name: *Verkhovna Rada*.

The overall picture of interests and preferences was a complex one, as the main cleavage did not run between President and parliament (as it did in Russia in 1993), but within the parliament itself. Ultimately, it symbolised the clash between the incompatible ideals of the Soviet system of *narodovladya* (people's power) favoured by the Left, and Montesquieu's classical system of the separation of powers advocated by the Centre, the Right and the President. The remnants of the Soviet system of power centred around the Supreme Rada was dismantled in the Constitution, despite the opposition of the Left. The Left only 'won' on the uni-cameral form of parliament, and even that suited the Right. The resulting executive-legislature relations were the result of a complex matrix of ideals, interests and *ad hoc* negotiations, which account for the inconsistent and somewhat 'innovative' distribution of 'checks and balances'. While the excesses of the presidential authority were tempered, the resulting president-parliamentary system with a strong, executive Presidency was the heaviest loss incurred by the Left.²⁷

The Territorial-Administrative System

While the Senate was proposed as one of the institutional arrangements at the centre to accommodate regionalism in Ukraine, the constitution-drafters faced the task of defining a model for centre-periphery relations: a unitary or federal model of the state; the position of Crimea; the form and competencies of local self-government, and the structure of state administration.

Federalism, despite cropping up in the constitutional debate, did not enjoy the widespread support of the drafters, apart from the Interregional Group. However, at the same time, it was agreed that Crimea, as a distinctive part of Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority which found it difficult to accept its separation from Russia, required some special arrangements with the central government. Crimea had already been granted autonomy in 1991, and this was further extended when it became an autonomous republic in 1992. Yet, the relations between Kyiv and Sevastopol had been strained and confrontational. While the Left and Centrist fac-

²⁶ The regions did not participate directly in constitution-making but their interests were represented by the advisory body – the Council of Regions – nominated by the President. Although, in theory, they would benefit most from the formation of an upper chamber, which would further regional interests, they did not support the proposal. The Eastern Ukrainian oblasts were not interested in such an institutional representation, since it would be based on equal representation from each oblast and would therefore fail to reflect their proportional weight in terms of population.

²⁷ A Presidential-parliamentary system was defined by Shugart and Carrey as a regime characterised by the primacy of the President along with the dependency of the Cabinet on parliament, so that there is an overlapping authority of the President and parliament over the Cabinet. See Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, pp. 24–5.

tions (which included the deputies from Crimea) preferred the preservation of the autonomous republic, the Right (mainly Rukh and *Derzhavnist*) vigorously opposed such a far-reaching concession, and insisted on circumscribing Crimean autonomy. Seeing that autonomy as a source of separatism and a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, it advocated taking away all the attributes of statehood from Crimea, and providing it with a charter (*statut*) rather than a constitution. Eventually, as the issue remained unresolved until the very end, the Right gave way on the status of 'autonomous republic' only when the issue was coupled in a *quid pro quo* arrangement with national symbols and voted on as a package on the very last night.²⁸ Effectively, the Crimean republic was granted the right to its Constitution, parliament and Council of Ministers, but was refused the right to collect taxes, to have separate (or dual with Russia) citizenship, or maintain diplomatic relations with other states (without Kyiv's consent). Although the Crimean Autonomous Republic was declared 'an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine and [it] decides on the issues ascribed to its competence within the limits of authority determined by the Constitution of Ukraine' (Art. 134), the Crimean question was a case of far-reaching concessions on the part of the Right.²⁹

Crimea clearly was defined as a special, federal component of an otherwise unitary state. Although federalism was discarded as too dangerous to a still consolidating Ukrainian state, devolution of power to the regions remained on the agenda. All sides subscribed to the idea of de-centralisation, but their declarations conceded various meanings and interests. The Left, entrenched at the local level, favoured the system of soviets, while the National Democrats vaguely supported the idea of de-centralisation, but feared separatism; the Centrists were keen to boost their regional links (and maximise their support in the next elections). Without an agreement on the merits and perils of centralised and de-centralised models, no coherent concept of centre-periphery relations was worked out, as reflected in Art. 132 of the new Constitution: 'The territorial structure of Ukraine is based upon the principles of unity and individual state territory and is based on the principle of centralisation and decentralisation in the exercise of state power'.

In fact, despite the rhetoric on de-centralisation, the abandonment of 'democratic centralism' proved an empty promise as the allocation of excessive authority to oblasts was perceived as potentially too obstructive to the state-building process. Neither the President, the National-Democrats nor the Centrist factions were prepared to devolve power from the centre to elected representative bodies in localities.³⁰ Furthermore, despite objections of the Left and some Centrist factions, the rigid vertical executive pyramid was institutionalised in the Constitution as the heads of local state administration (oblast/province and rayon/county level) are to be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and

²⁸ Vadym P. Hetman, *Yak Prynymalas Konstytutsiya Ukrayiny* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 58.

²⁹ As Oleksandr Lavrynovych, a deputy head of Rukh, concluded: 'The Chapter on the Crimean republic is the worst in the Constitution'. (Author's interview in September 1996, Kyiv).

³⁰ The main issue was the powers of local government and whether the representatives of the executive branch in localities should be elected in the oblasts or appointed by the President.

are subordinated to heads of administrations at higher levels. However, the oblast or rayon councils were granted some leverage against the metropolis, in that they can oblige the President to recall the head of the respective state administration (Art. 118). Overall, the model of local self-government was ill-defined in the Constitution, since in Art. 142–4 its power vis-à-vis the state administration was only vaguely delineated. The constitution-drafters failed, for example, to stipulate how oblast and rayon councils are to be elected.

Despite the overall emphasis on state control of localities, the Constitution did not clarify centre-periphery relations. While the institutions at the centre are described in a detailed manner, the territorial question was confined to a sketchy outline. The need to compromise resulted in vague provisions, open to conflicting interpretations. The passage of the Constitution merely postponed, rather than finalised the final battle over the form of local government.³¹ Nevertheless, the vestige of the past – the system of soviets, uniting the representative and state administration functions as an institutional framework for *narodovladya* – was dismantled.

The Socio-Economic Parameters of the State

The Constitution in Ukraine also had to establish the foundation of the economic system and to define the goals of the state in the socio-economic sphere. The demise of Communist ideology and its political system in Ukraine did not provide an automatic answer to what kind of economy the country should develop. While the debate centred around the concept of a socially oriented market economy, the precise balance between the 'social' and 'market' ingredients was open to interpretation. In such a context, the Centre-Right wanted to assert the right to private property as a cornerstone of the market economy. The Left, adamant to preserve the special position of collective and state property, wanted the explicit protection of *all forms* of property, not only private property, as a boost to 'social orientation'. This was conceded to them in Art. 13. Yet, the guarantee of private property in Art. 41 remained an issue of dispute until the 'constitutional' night, and a compromise was only reached when an additional safeguard was added, specifying that 'the right of private property is acquired by a procedure determined by law'. This sentence ensured the crucial extra votes of Left-wingers.³² Although the concessions made by each side are viewed differently,³³ the basis for the transformation to the market, however circuitous, was placed in the Constitution.

Communist-era constitutions were saturated with 'negative' liberties and rights, such as freedom of speech, thought and association, which the regime repeatedly infringed. They also incorporated an array of 'positive' socio-economic guarantees

³¹ By September 1996, nine draft laws on local self-government were prepared on the basis of the Constitution, some of them diametrically contradictory. (Author's interview with Member of Parliament Roman Bezsmertnyi in September 1996, Kyiv).

³² Author's interview with the head of the Reforms faction, Serhiy Sobolyev (September 1996, Kyiv).

³³ See, for example, Vadym Hetman, who commented that the Left will aim to take revenge after losing the constitutional battle on that issue (Hetman, op. cit., p. 59). In contrast, Serhiy Sobolyev concluded that 'we lost the article on property, since the references to laws means that its acquisition can be limited by ordinary laws'. (Author's interview in September 1996, Kyiv).

of free education, housing, work, holidays, etc., which placed a duty on the state to act in the socio-economic sphere. The post-communist constitutions extensively re-stated those 'negative' rights, aiming to turn them into a meaningful instrument of protection against the government's interference in the private sphere. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Constitution incorporated an array of human rights and political freedoms (see, for example, Art. 27–32), which, to a large degree, were copied from the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. There was hardly any disagreement on that issue.

However, the issue of 'positive' rights, that is of socio-economic guarantees, created tensions. Ukraine, in that respect, was not unique: all post-communist constitution-drafters, to various degrees, were puzzled by that question and somewhat reluctant to abandon the rhetoric of 'developed socialism'. In Ukraine, the Left bloc insisted on keeping the guarantees as a symbol of 'socialist achievements'. The National Democrats were inclined to drop them altogether as a symbol of the failure of the socialist state to live up to its exaggerated socio-economic promises. The President, along with the Centrists, supported re-emphasising the general aims of the state in providing its citizens with welfare rather than any outright constitutional guarantees.

In general, the preservation of certain rights, like the 'right to work', has been criticised by Western observers as obstructing the transition to a market economy by authorising the state to interfere with the market. It was also pointed out that vaguely defined socio-economic rights, e.g. to 'a decent standard of living' (Art. 48), or to 'an environment that is safe for life and health' (Art. 50), are teleological statements which cannot be enforced in the legal system.³⁴ Thus, being a vestige of the past, they merely devalued the role of the Constitution as a meaningful 'fresh start'.³⁵

In such a context, their inclusion in the new Ukrainian Constitution suggested a victory for the opponents of the socio-economic transition to a market economy. However, while the Left staunchly opposed omitting the 'socialist achievements', the Right and Centre did not push *that* hard to exclude them. Although the Right longed for a 'civilised' European constitution free of promises that cannot be realistically fulfilled, they did appreciate the symbolic dimension of such guarantees for society at large.

As pointed out above, constitutions perform various functions in different polities, and the content of the Constitution should not be regarded as 'une idée fixe'. In particular, as Preuss pointed out, the inclusion of socio-economic pledges should be viewed not in terms of efficacy and rationality, but rather in terms of their inte-

³⁴ Of special interest is Article 49 in the Constitution which states that the existing health service provisions cannot be reduced, something which was suggested by a Socialist deputy and had to be incorporated as one of the Socialist faction 'inputs' to the Constitution. Taken literally, it means that even the closure of a small local surgery will be in breach of the Constitution.

³⁵ For a criticism of their inclusion, see Cass Sunstein, 'Why Social and Economic Rights don't Belong in the New Constitution of post-communist Europe', *East European Constitutional Review* 2:1 (Winter 1993).

grative role. He argued that placing 'social fields of actions' under state protection can serve to compensate for the lack of an organic nation-state, as was the case in (post-war) West Germany; constitutional pledges to socio-economic security and welfare consolidate the nation.³⁶ In Ukraine, hindered by a fragile popular legitimacy, the promise of welfare provisions, even if declarative and symbolic, was much too vital a link between the state and its citizens to be disrupted. It was that consideration that made the National Democrats ready to compromise. Furthermore, as each side in the process had its hierarchy of preferences, for the National Democrats the national question was a much higher priority. Thus, while a compromise was reached on the preservation of socio-economic rights, so that on this point the defenders of the 'old system' appeared to have won, their victory was in fact more apparent than real.

Conclusion

The above preliminary survey of the disputed areas is not comprehensive, but suffices to illustrate the scale and nature of the compromises underlying the successful passage of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, compromise is an integral part of any constitution-drafting, but the nature of that settlement is of special interest in Ukraine, where diametrically different concepts of statehood and cohorts of rules and institutions deemed as best suited to Ukrainian society, were pursued. In the Constitution, Ukraine was defined as a nation-state, which protects the rights of its national minorities, yet asserts the leading role of the titular, indigenous majority. The semi-presidential form of government with a unitary territorial structure of local government sounded the death knell for the institutional basis of Soviet *narodovladya*, while a constitutional basis for the development of a free market economy, however hesitant, was provided.

Such a concept was not endorsed equally by all sides in the constitutional process. As was pointed out above, it was the President, the Centre and the Right's visions and preferences, which, although differing in terms of their priorities, ultimately shaped the new Constitution. Despite being the strongest in Ukraine, the Left-wing bloc made the most concessions; not only was the circle 'squared', it was tilted to the right. Although many Centrist MPs sympathised with the Leftist stance, especially on the 'national question', there was insufficient commonality of interests to form a meaningful alliance, especially as the Centrists were repelled by the Left's doctrinaire ideologisation, and exhibited a more pragmatic and flexible approach, being influenced by group and personal interests. Thus, the most important cleavage to develop was that between the Left and 'the rest'.

Nevertheless, the 'squaring of the constitutional circle' was possible only because some on the Left (Socialists, Agrarians, some Communists) abandoned their cause. The Left's strategic choice of non-cooperation in the process left them ill-positioned to control the outcome, when they faced a determined coalition of the Centre, the Right and the President. The Left bloc, previously renowned for its

³⁶ Preuss, 'Patterns', op. cit., p. 102.

voting discipline, splintered under pressure during the final night. Only anti-sovereignty hardliners within the Communist faction opposed the constitutional compromise to the very end.

There are few doubts that the disarray of the Left was a temporary setback rather than a mark of a profound change in the Ukrainian political landscape. The passage of the Constitution, nevertheless, crystallised the situation in fundamental terms: who was in favour and against a sovereign Ukraine, since the group of MPs who voted for the Constitution and then swore an oath of allegiance to it³⁷ effectively came to symbolise the strength of pro-statehood positions in Ukraine. This in itself is of profound importance, since the extent of support for independence was questioned many times both in Ukraine and the West. An overarching consensus on the primacy of Ukrainian sovereignty was symbolically sanctioned in the formalised procedure of voting by a constitutional majority in parliament. Because of this, the adoption of the Constitution was proclaimed the most important event in Ukraine since 1991 and was portrayed as a great achievement during the celebration of the fifth anniversary of independence in August 1996.

However, not only did the passage of the Constitution itself acquire symbolic meaning in the construction of Ukrainian statehood, but so did the content of the Constitution. The Constitution, by removing the ideological and institutional residuals of the *sui generis* Soviet model, strives to turn Ukraine into a modern nation-state, embodying national sovereignty with its homogenising undertones and uniformist institutional set up. And this concept – as it was perceived in Ukraine – was the only one which could legitimise statehood, by providing it with a ‘universal’ constitutional framework.³⁸

The design of state institutions outlined in the Constitution is, as was argued above, not clear-cut and coherently delineated in some places. Most importantly, however, the Constitution uses the *lingua franca* of constitutional theory to describe the institutional relations at the centre and in the localities. It draws upon universally endorsed principles and models when it says, for example, that ‘state power in Ukraine is executed on the basis of its separation into legislative, executive and judicial branches’ (Art. 6), and that ‘local self-government is recognised and guaranteed’ (Art. 7). At the same time, the Constitution ‘covers up’ much of Ukraine’s diversity, disunity and disagreement, by localising popular sovereignty with the ‘Ukrainian people’, when this term has little shared meaning in Ukraine. The Constitution becomes an instrument of nation-building, by aiming to instil a sense of belonging and allegiance by pointing out the nation’s individual name, public symbols, language and ‘centuries-old history of Ukrainian state building’. In sum, the 1996 Constitution dressed Ukraine in modern and universal clothes

³⁷ Whereas 90 deputies refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new Constitution in July 1996, by December only 57 Communists and 6 other deputies had not sworn allegiance. (*Den*, 20 December 1996).

³⁸ The dominant discourse on ‘normality’, ‘civilised practices’ and ‘universal models’ in the constitutional process, caused even the Left to adjust its language; as a result, it attempted to present its concepts in terms of the ‘universal’ values of democratic accountability, human rights, prevention of dictatorship, popular sovereignty, etc. (See *Holos Ukrayiny*, 26 December 1995).

(i.e. 'sovereign people', presidential-parliamentary institutions, local government, goals and traditions), although with some creases and the occasional bit of patchwork. But it must be remembered that such an 'outfit' was neither readily available nor could it be easily tailored in 1991.

From this point of view, Ukraine's Constitution is far from an 'innovative leap' or 'conceptual revolution'; it predominantly aspires to match and conform to uniform standards rather than to 'invent' new ones. The main goal the constitution serves is to include Ukraine in the dominant, authoritative forms of constitutional recognition, and to lift the paradigm of 'stateness' in Ukraine to a new, 'higher' level. □

FOR ALL UKRAINIAN STUDIES RESEARCHERS

The British Association of Ukrainian Studies web site is now up and running. It is located at <http://www.bvx.ca/baus/>

The site currently includes the following features:

- Latest Ukrainian Studies Events/News
- Register of Ukrainian Studies Researchers in the UK
- Ukrainian Studies Resources in Britain
- Selected Ukrainian Research Links (On-line publications, Government, etc.)
- Information for Ukrainians wishing to study in the UK
- Information on reading Cyrillic over the Internet
- Register of private accommodation in Ukraine for researchers

It would be helpful if you would send the following biographical information to us:

1. Full name and postal address
2. Brief c.v.
3. Research interests
4. List of up to five publications.

Please indicate if you prefer your e-mail address not to be posted on the web site.

If you know of other UK researchers in Ukrainian studies, please pass on details of the site to them.

For suggestions, additions, questions or comments regarding the web site contact: Paul Pirie – pirie@spectranet.ca or Roman Zyla – rzyla@ssees.ac.uk

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Political Aspect of Linguistic Processes in Ukraine

Svyatoslav Karavanskyi

Does language have anything in common with politics? In Ukraine, it does. At present, the linguistic problems there are essentially political. From the decrees of Peter I, aimed at 'there being no difference' between the language of the empire and that of 'Little Russia' right up to the very last Soviet decrees on improving Russian language teaching in Ukraine, the imperial centre fostered the linguistic assimilation of the Ukrainian people. This was state policy, supported by decrees, repressions, executions, and also the selection of 'suitable' linguists.

The particularly thoroughly elaborated article by Jennifer Pickurel Taylor 'Beyond Politics: Internal Problems of the Ukrainian Language'¹ corroborates the need to take into account the 'cadre' factor in studying linguistic problems in Ukraine.

Apart from some minor slips, one can hardly over-estimate the content of this article. It is written at a highly-professional level (citing almost 50 references), and gives the reader an accurate picture of the linguistic situation in Ukraine. The conclusions drawn by the author are also thoroughly substantiated. For the researcher of current problems – and not only Ukrainian – Pickurel Taylor's article may be an example of how to approach the knotty phenomena of the present day.

Nevertheless, one cannot avoid a certain 'but', concerning not the content, but the terms selected by the author to define opposing tendencies in the Ukrainian linguistic controversy.

The author calls the successors and continuers of the Soviet policy of the 'fusing of languages' pragmatists. The opponents of this directly assimilationist tendency are referred to as neo-romantics. It is difficult to agree with this terminology, for it fails to convey the essence of these two tendencies. In order to avoid empty speech, we must make here a necessary digression.

Digression from the Main Theme

Since in our subsequent discussion we shall have to touch on the value of Soviet academic titles, let us first examine this issue.

In the USSR, academic titles in the humanities were awarded not for knowledge and research in a particular field, but for loyalty to the regime. In the Ukrainian SSR, such loyalty entailed: unconditional condemnation of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' and complete support for the Russifying policy of the Soviet imperium. We may note that 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' was understood to include even the slightest manifestations of national consciousness. This is a fact well-known to everyone who lived in the 'happy past'. To cite but a few

¹ Jennifer Pickurel Taylor 'Beyond Politics: Internal Problems of the Ukrainian Language', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, 1998, pp. 3–28.

quotations: '... at the academic level, what mattered most was not what you knew, but whether you were "for" or "against"'.²

'Academic degrees [in the humanities – SK] were often accorded to those who "needed" them to progress up the hierarchical ladder. One could literally buy an academic degree for money. If a dissertation were required, someone could always be found to write it'.³

Furthermore, the subjects of dissertations reflected the spirit of official patriotism: 'Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity', 'The Party leads', 'Translations of the works of V. Lenin into Ukrainian'.

The linguist O. Taranenko's doctoral (!) dissertation was on the latter subject. In other words, the quality of academic degrees in the humanities, conferred under the Ukrainian SSR, does not conform to international standards. The very publications of the holders of such degrees confirm this.

In 1992, Taranenko, a doctor of philology, co-authored, with V. Britsin, the *Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary for Businessmen*.⁴ This dictionary (hereafter the Dictionary) provides the reader with convincing evidence that Yevhen Sverstyuk and Myron Kuropas, cited above, are entirely correct, and that Taranenko's doctoral degree does not reflect an appropriate level of knowledge.

This is shown by extracts from the Dictionary listed below:

I. **Ryad** (*sovokupnost lits, obedinyonnykh v kakoy-libo organizatsii*) lava (p. 135). The definition given ('an assemblage of people united in some organisation') corresponds neither to the Russian *ryad* nor the Ukrainian *lava*, but to the plural forms *ryady* and *lavy*. It is difficult to explain this error by anything else other than lack of knowledge.

II. **Dlina rabocheho dnya** dovezhyna robochoho dnya (p. 27). This is an attempt to express the concept 'length of the working day'. But the use of (Russian) *dlina* and (Ukrainian) *dovzhyna* is unknown in this sense. The correct words would be (Russian) *dlitelnost* and (Ukrainian) *tryvalist*.

III. **Shum** shum, -u; -Y radiopriyomnika shumY radiopryimachA... (radio noise) (p. 195). (Stresses in capitals).

The plural of the Ukrainian word *shum* is *shUmy*. Why should Ukrainian have to copy Russian technical jargon (which does stress this term as *shumY*)?

IV. **Zaimoderzhatel** pozykoutrymuvach (p. 32). Zaimoderzhatel (borrower) has five syllables. Pozykoutrymuvach has eight. This is an 'elephantised' form. The word 'pozykoderzhets' sounds much better, for it is shorter (five syllables), easy to pronounce and understandable. But one cannot find such terms in the Dictionary. However, the Dictionary beats all records in length of forms: 'navantazhuvalno-rozvantazhuvalnyy' (p. 94), 'puskonalahodzhualnyi' (p. 123), 'vnutr-

² Ye. Sverstyuk, 'Komunist z psikhologichnoho boku', *Vyzvolnyi sblyakh*, no. 5, 1998, p. 247.

³ M. Kuropas, 'It's back to the future in Ukraine', *The Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 2, 1998, p. 7.

⁴ *Russko-ukrainskiy slovar dlya delovykh lyudey* (Kyiv: Ukraynyskiy pysmennyk, 1992).

ishnyohaluzevyi' (p. 16). Will anyone, apart from the authors themselves, ever use these words?

V. **Ponuzhdenie k dache lozhnykh pokazaniy** sponukannya do davannya nepravdyvykh pokazan [compulsion to give a false testimony] (p. 102). What an expression! In the Russian expression there is no repetition of identical stressed syllables. In the translation of these highly-certificated linguists there are three such repetitions: '-Annya', '-Annya', '-An'. Ukrainian language has an elegant form 'kryvosvidchennya', which corresponds to the clumsy expression 'davannya nepravdyvykh pokazan'. The expression 'sponukannya do kryvosvidchen' is short, easy to pronounce, understandable, without any jingling rhymes. But 'kryvosvidchennya' for the authors of the Dictionary is *terra incognita*.

It is well known that one cannot simply translate mechanically from one language to another, word for word. One should translate the content of the word, and not the word itself that expresses this content: the Russian idiom 'na samom dele' cannot be translated in Ukrainian as 'na samiy spravi'.

The authors of the Dictionary, however, ignore this basic truth and indulge in mechanical translations:

VI. **Pravo preimushchestvennoho proyezda** pravo perevazhnoho proyizdu [right of priority passage] (p. 118). The academics are unaware that although preimushchestvennyi sometimes is translated as 'perezvazhnyi', in this particular text another translation is needed: 'pravo na pilhoviy proyizd'.

Certain translations, if read without the Russian original, are almost impossible to understand. Thus the Dictionary contains the expression: 'pryinyaty spravu do provadzhennya' (p. 114). Which sense of 'provadzhennya' is meant here? It is the Dictionary's rendering of **prinyat delo k proizvodstvu** (to take over a case for processing). But 'pryinyaty spravu do provadzhennya' is meaningless. It is a still-born product of 'mechanical' fantasy. I would translate this expression as 'pryinyaty spravu v robotu', or 'pryinyaty spravu dlya dalshykh protsedur'. This may not be ideal, but at least one can understand what is meant.

VII. **Natsionalnaya prinadlezhnost** natsionalna nalezhnist [ethnic affiliation] (p. 114). Ukrainians never used 'nalezhnist' in the context of 'prynalezhnist', and no dictionary specifies such a usage. Taranenko and Britsin to the end remain unaware of the accepted linguistic forms and usages – even those established in the Ukrainian SSR.

VIII. **Rasplachivatsya po schetam** rozplachuvatysya po rakhunkam [to pay the bills] (p. 28). Every Ukrainian pupil knows which case the Ukrainian preposition 'po' requires – namely, the ablative. But clearly, the holders of Soviet academic decrees do not share this basic school knowledge. The grammatically correct form would be: 'rozplachuvatysya po rakhunkakh'. But this mechanically reproduced form sounds false. Why? Because translation is an art which requires many factors to be taken into consideration, including euphony. Untalented, mechanical, translation creates distortions of the type 'nanosyty vizyt' (p. 57). Such forms reduce the efficiency of the language, and at the same time are evidence of the

utter linguistic incompetence of their inventors. Getting away from mechanical copying, the expression **rasplachivatsya po schetam** may be translated as 'vyp-lachuvaty rakhunky'.

IX. **Uchytyvanie** 2. zvAzheniya [take into consideration] (p. 186). 'ZvAzheniya' is a derivative form from 'zvazhyty', while 'zvAzhaty' has the derivative 'zva-zhannya'. These are elementary truths, defined as the standard not in the diaspora, but in the Ukrainian SSR. Should not the authors know them?

X. **V zavershenie** v zavershennya [in conclusion] (p. 31). The Ukrainian language knows the form 'na zavershennya', formed on the basis of a common model for a number of expressions: 'na zakinchennya', 'na dodatok', 'na dover-shennya', etc. To recommend the forms 'v zavershennya', 'v dodatok', 'v zak-inchennya' is possible only by someone who has no knowledge of the Ukrainian language at all.

The authors of the Dictionary do not even bother to make their translations consistent:

XI. **V denezhnom vyrazhenii** v hroshovomu vyrazi [in money terms] (p. 26), and **V stoimostnom vyrazhenii** u vartisnomu vyrazhenii [in value terms] (p. 165).

In both instances it would be better to say 'v obchyslenni': 'u hroshovomu obchyslenni', 'u vartisnomu obchyslenni'.

The authors also mistake pronunciation: 'polOhovyi' (p. 133), when it should be 'polohOvyi'; and 'syrokopchEnyi' (p. 169), when the (Soviet) norm is 'syrokOpchenyi'. And this is far from being a complete list.

The scope of the present article is too short to list all the 'inventions' found in the Dictionary.

It is clear from the above that the authors of the Dictionary have an inadequate knowledge of both Russian and Ukrainian languages, fail to understand the fundamental principles of word-formation, clutter up the linguistic space by 'elephantised' forms, support the 'mechanical' theory of translation – the one most appropriate to their level of scholarship – and at the same time present clear evidence of their own professional incompetence and the low value of Soviet academic titles.

From 'Mova' to 'Yazychiya'

Taranenko and Britsin reason roughly as follows: since Russian **po privyчке** (as customary) is the equivalent of Ukrainian 'za zvychkoyu', then every time Russian **po** occurs, it must be translated by 'za'. Such logic is far from academic, but it is dominant in the Dictionary.

Where the Russians say **po**, Ukrainians depending on the context use a number of prepositions, including 'po' (**odet po formi** – 'ubranyi po formi), and also make use of the ablative case (**po kachestvu** – yakisty). And this is laid down in academic dictionaries.

In the *Academic Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary*, published in the Ukrainian SSR, the expression **po adresu** translates as 'na adresu', as used in current speech. But Taranenko and Britsin's Dictionary reworked 'na adresu' into 'za adresoyu', accord-

ing to their rule: Russian **po** = Ukrainian 'za'. Furthermore, they find it difficult to come to terms with the fact that Ukrainians usually render both the Russian expressions **po adresu** and **v adres** by the single phrase 'na adresu'. Every language has its own particularities: where one requires two expressions, another employs only one. A failure to grasp this does professional linguists no credit – but it was this lack of understanding which drove Taranenکو and Britsin to 'invent' the expression 'za adresoyu', and, indeed, to stick in 'za' wherever conceivably possible.

Po predyavlenii [upon presentation of] za predyavlenniyam (p. 110). What extraordinary feat of the imagination can have produced the idea that someone sometime might utter the expression 'za predyavlenniyam'. Practice has shown that in rendering this idea Ukrainians are better off using other constructions: **Vkhod po predyavlenii dokumenta** (Entry on presentation of papers) – 'Shchob zayty, pokazhit dokument' (To go in, show your papers).

Starshyi po zvaniyu – 'starshyi za zvanniyam [senior in position] (p. 164). The form in the living language is 'starshyi rangom' or 'starshyi zvanniyam'.

Po utverdzhenyu za tverdzhenniyam [on confirmation] (p. 184). The form approved by practice is 'yak tverdyt', or 'yak tverdyyat'.

Po faktu za faktom (p. 186). Here 'za' is totally unnecessary: **rassledovanie po faktu vorovstva** (investigation of the fact of the theft) is simply, in Ukrainian, 'rozsliduvannya faktu kradizhky'.

Po shtatu za shtatom (p. 196). The Russian means 'according to staff rules'. But 'za shtatom' could be taken as equivalent to 'poza shtatom' ('outside of staff rules'). Here again the Russian should be translated without a preposition: **predpisano po shtatu** 'peredbacheno shtatom' or 'u shtati'.

The 'mechanical' procedures favoured by the authors of the Dictionary bear ludicrous fruit. So one finds in the press: 'turnir po lystuvanniyam', when one should say 'zaochnyi turnir' or 'turnir shlyakhom lystuvannya'; 'dzvonyty za telefonom', when it is easier and more comprehensible to say 'dzvonit telefonom' or 'dzvonit na telefon'. The blanket use of 'za' where the Russians say 'po' creates artificial neologisms, makes people forget our own idioms which are simpler and roll more easily off the tongue. It irons out the individuality of the Ukrainian language, and opens up the way for it to change into a pseudo-Ukrainian pidgin mechanically copied from Russian. This pidgin is a real bonus for newly-baked 'patriots', for it allows them to imitate a knowledge of the Ukrainian language, simply by converting Russian pronunciation. The spread of pidgin in Ukraine is a degradation of the Ukrainian language. And Taranenکو and Britsin have done it a great service, for their Dictionary promotes pidgin. And the reason is not pragmatism, but linguistic incompetence.

Orthographical Stubbornness

Taranenکو, who heads the leading linguistic institute in Ukraine, is a most zealous champion of the spelling rules of the Ukrainian SSR, rules which are striking in their orthographical stupidity. For example: Ukrainians write and say 'kutniy'

(angular), but according to the whim of the 'Moskvoznavtsi' they are to write 'trykutnyi', 'pryamokutnyi' (triangular, rectangular) without any logical explanation. Why has 'kutnyi' in conjunction with 'try' and 'pryamo' become 'kutnyi'? Why should adding a prefix reduce the length of the final syllable? Ukrainians say and write 'trylitnyi' (triennial) from 'litnyi' (annual), 'trystoronniy' (three-sided) from 'storonniy' (sided) without any such reduction.

Taranenko defends his spelling of 'pyatykutnyi' (pentagonal), in *Literaturna Ukrayina*,⁵ by referring to the dictionary of Borys Hrinchenko, in which the word 'kutnyi' is given with the ending '-iy', and the word 'pyatykutnyi', like in the dictionary of Yevhen Zhelekhivskyi, is given with the ending 'yi'. Taranenko cites this discrepancy in support of the current (Soviet) orthography and the rejection of the 'soft' ending in the words 'trykutnyi', 'pyatykutnyi', 'pryamokutnyi'

To understand the said discrepancy correctly, one must take note of several facts about Ukrainian dialectology and their role in the development of Ukrainian orthographies.

A 'hard' ending to certain adjectives is specific to west Ukrainian dialects (as opposed to central Ukraine): 'serednyi', 'litnyi', 'piznyi', 'ostanniy', 'kutnyi', 'pokutnyi', 'zakutnyi', 'pyatykutnyi', and it is these forms which are given in the dictionary of the Galician lexicographer Zhelekhivskyi. Borys Hrinchenko compiled his own dictionary after the publication of Zhelekhivskyi's, and, being a conscientious lexicographer, added references to all words borrowed from other sources. Beside the word 'pyatykutnyi' is the remark (ignored by Taranenko) 'Zhel.', indicating that this particular form was taken from Zhelekhivskyi's dictionary. The academic level of Hrinchenko's work did not allow him to make any changes in the borrowed word. Words taken from central Ukrainian sources he spelled according to the pronunciation of central Ukrainians: 'kutnyi', 'pokutnyi', 'serednyi', 'litnyi', 'piznyi', 'ostanniy'.

The great influence which central Ukrainian literature had on the development of the Ukrainian language led to the Galicians adopting a whole series of lexical, morphological and phonetic characteristics of the literary language of the central Ukrainians. They also adopted the soft ending of the aforesaid adjectives. The Galicians fully understood the need for a unified Ukrainian orthography, and hence gave their support to the Ukrainian unified orthography of 1929, in which these adjectives, including 'pryamokutnyi', 'pyatykutnyi', 'trykutnyi', had a soft ending.

After the purge of the Ukrainian intellectual élite, the imperial assimilators introduced a new orthography in 1933, which perverted the language. This gave no logical explanation to the 'hard ending' forms: 'pryamokutnyi', 'pyatykutnyi', 'trykutnyi'. However, those in charge of this 'merging of languages' had no great linguistic skills. As a result, they 'overlooked' the soft ending in the words 'kutnyi', 'pokutnyi', 'zakutnyi', and left them unchanged, thus showing their successors the academic level of their 'work'.

In my time, I published articles defending the spellings 'pryamokutniy', 'trykutniy'. I hoped that the linguists of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine would support my entirely apolitical and purely linguistic proposal to restore to Ukrainian orthography the characteristics artificially and illiterately removed from it by the Russifiers. Unfortunately, I was wrong.

Taranenko, as director of the Institute of Ukrainian Language of the National Academy of Sciences, and other representatives of the 'old guard', stood like a rock in defence of the colonial orthography. No logical arguments about the illiteracy of the rules of this orthography, could persuade them. They continue to seek for any kind of pseudo-academic way to defend the honour of the orthography of the Ukrainian SSR.

One must, too, note the inadequacy of the Ukrainian SSR orthography in rendering personal names. In that orthography, the surname of the current vice-president of the USA is 'Hor'. In fact, of course, his name is Gore. But it comes out in the Soviet Ukrainian pronunciation as a homophone for the abusive English word 'whore'. This is hardly tactful – and could well lead to misunderstandings. The stubborn adherence to the rules of the Ukrainian SSR orthography in this case throws a poor light on Ukrainian diplomacy. In the West, much attention is paid to the pronunciation of the names of leading figures, and for Ukrainian diplomats to mispronounce them due to the inadequacies of their spelling system can only detract from their authority and diplomatic 'clout.'

The orthography of the Ukrainian SSR copies the Russian system, and in effect caricatures personal names, so that the former Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka comes out as 'Khanna' and the capital of Finland as 'Khelsinki'.

The limits of the present article make it impossible to list all the linguistic paradoxes in the orthography of the Ukrainian SSR. There are literally hundreds of them, and each example is an example of allogicism and unreason. And Taranenko and other 'pragmatists' defend this unreason.

Return to the Main Subject

Can one really call 'linguists' who have so low a level of professional skills pragmatists? What practical expediency can they justify with such a level of knowledge? These are experts of the 'happy past', who, protected by Soviet academic titles, attempt to mask their abysmal professional expertise by an unconditional defence of colonial linguistic norms. In their theoretical articles, they defend the colonial orthography, and in practice (as in the Dictionary) they display their ignorance of the rules and the very orthography and lexicography which they are, in theory, trying to defend. It is difficult to call this 'line' pragmatic. There are other terms to describe it.

Taranenko's attitude, his *Dictionary for Businessmen* and the ignorance he reveals of the history of Ukrainian orthography, together with his lack of comprehension of the place and role of dialects in the development of the Ukrainian literary language, show that it is futile to expect major changes for the better in the linguistic situation in Ukraine, so long as philologists of the colonial school remain at the 'linguistic helm'.

In Agreement with the Authorities

In defence of his views, Taranenکو states that the orthography, developed under his direction, is meant to serve the Russophone and Ukrainophone inhabitants of eastern and western Ukraine. But these 'Russophone Ukrainians' are in reality the Russian-speaking representatives of more than a hundred ethnic groups. To date Ukrainian orthography, even under the Ukrainian SSR, has never had so ambitious an aim.

Discussing Taranenکو's views on the Ukrainian orthography of the future, Jennifer Pickurel Taylor remarks that Taranenکو reflects the views of the current Ukrainian government. Let us, though, consider the nature of this government. A whole series of observers have described this government as 'non-Ukrainian'. Back in Soviet times, there was a higher percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine than there is in the current Presidential Administration, which, for the *nomenklatura* brought up in 'conditions of Socialism', carries out the functions of that former CPU Central Committee.

Hence, Taranenکو reflects the views of a 'non-Ukrainian' government, which, in its personnel policy, focuses on the non-Ukrainian population. And Taranenکو, in his work on Ukrainian linguistic norms, focuses on that same ethnic group.

For the 'old guard', such a stance is not new. Back in colonial times, it similarly parroted the views of a non-Ukrainian government (in Moscow), defending the 'theory' of the merging of languages in the formation of a new historic entity – the 'Soviet people'. Is not Taranenکو's concept of an orthography aimed at the Russophone population a *sui generis* variant of the theory of a 'single Soviet people'?

The theory of a 'single Soviet people' came down in ruins in 1991, when the 'single people' (in the view of the Communist mystics) ended its mythical unity in a 'parade of sovereignties'. What parade will blow away the utopian theory of the 'Russian-Ukrainian' orthography, defended by Taranenکو?

That section of the Russian-speaking population which is attuned to the old imperial mind-set will not accept any Ukrainian orthography, even if the adepts of the past era Russify it in every possible way. While the majority of the Russophone population simply accept whatever orthography is officially ratified by law.

Unacademic Arguments

Pickurel Taylor correctly states that: 'Ukrainian does not need to follow Russian practice, by using [kh] as the best approximation to [h], since it possesses the latter phoneme itself'.⁶

But Taranenکو and other 'pragmatists' do not wish even to hear about this.

Let us see how another scholar of the Soviet school – S. Ermolenko – defends the pro-imperial orthography in an article in *Literaturna Ukrayina*: '... how many people in Ukraine, who acquired education in secondary and higher schools, were brought up on single linguistic [i.e. colonial – SK] standards! And these standards re-

mained virtually unchanged for half a century'.⁷ Is this a sufficient reason for letting slip a chance of correcting the damage inflicted on the Ukrainian language?

The 'old guard's' defence of its views has nothing to do with scholarship. It is clear that the defenders of the 'cultural values of the Ukrainian SSR' have no firm scholarly foundation; instead they have ordinary narrow-minded stubbornness: 'We were brought up on this orthography and we have taught it. Why should we have to learn something new?'

For more than fifty years, all secondary and tertiary education in the Ukrainian SSR taught that Ukraine cannot exist without Russia, rammed home the concept of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR (Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Russians, etc.), argued that there existed a new ethnic entity, the 'Soviet people', and promulgated other demagogic fantasies. But does this have to be accepted as valid currency, simply because it was hammered into the heads of generation after generation for more than half a century?

For more than half a century, we were taught to write and say 'Khelsinky', 'Khofman', 'Khuseyn', 'Khanna'. But does that mean we have to go on doing so?

Those who defend this illiteracy and the castration of the Ukrainian language are linguists of the colonial school, selected by Moscow's imperium to implement its Russification. And they are trying to carry on with this task, by blocking the rebirth of organic characteristics of the Ukrainian language.

The 'old guard' still continues to select linguist cadres. Young patriotic linguists do not last long in the institutions under its control – they are dismissed on one pretext or another. The official Orthographical Commission was selected in a similar manner – the majority of its members are linguists of the 'colonial school'. The same process is taking place during learned conferences convened under public pressure. The 'old guard' takes its cue from the authorities, and the authorities see in it their power-base for future elections.

The symbiosis of the power structures with the heads of scholarly institutions in the humanities, which was inherited from the 'happy past', has become in Ukraine an accomplished fact. Each recognises his own kind. And this symbiosis and continuance of the former colonial linguistic élite is the greatest threat to the future Ukrainian language. Spineless linguists bring in stillborn, non-viable lexicography, invent distortions and spelling rules which will not work in practice, and, all in all, bring dishonour on the Ukrainian language. Consciously or not, they are acting in the interests of the 'pro-imperial' fifth column in Ukraine. By refusing to listen to the voice of the Ukrainophone population, they are, in effect, fuelling the linguistic-orthographic chaos in the young state.

Conclusion

The current conflict of opinions in Ukraine about orthography shows that for a proper understanding of the linguistic processes taking place there, one must take into account the vital role played by the personnel factor. And this factor – given Ukraine's situation as a former colony of Russia – is essentially a political one. □

⁷ S. Ermolenko, 'Ne eksperimentuymo z movoyu!', *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 30 November 1997.

History

Archaeological Survey of Ancient Halych, 1991–1996

Volodymyr Baran
Bohdan Tomenchuk

The history of archaeological excavation in ancient Halych goes back more than a century, and has involved more than twenty scholars from Ukraine, Poland and Russia, in particular Yaroslav Pasternak and Vitold Aulikh. The Halych Slav-Rus' Archaeological Expedition of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ivano-Frankivsk Museum of Regional Studies began working here in 1991. In 1996, this team was expanded into the permanent Halych archaeological expedition of the 'Ancient Halych' national reserve (under Volodymyr Baran and Bohdan Tomenchuk).

This expedition carried out its first excavations in the Kachkiv site on the invitation of the Halych district administration, which was then making plans to restore the Metropolitanate of Halych.

The driving force behind this project came from the 'Dormition Cathedral' citizens' association, which was planning to rebuild the Dormition Cathedral (originally built in 1157) and former residential/administrative complex of the metropolitanate, part of which has survived as a museum.

The site of the metropolitanate buildings was a plot adjacent to the 'Halych Mound', which is mentioned in the chronicles. The latter had long-since been completely levelled and turned into a common grazing-land with all that term implies.¹ We decided to include 'what was left of the Halych Mound' in our study in order to carry out excavations there for the fourth time, to establish at least the construction features of the burial mound, if even we were not fortunate enough to discover any traces of burials. The three former digs, of which we shall speak later, had been unsuccessful in this respect. However, they did at least obtain the data needed to make a reconstruction of this site. Unfortunately, all graphic documentation of those earlier digs had been lost during World War II.

Archaeological work to locate the Halych Mound began at the end of the nineteenth century. Initially, it was assumed to be one of the burial mounds of the Krylos forest on the Dibrova site, at the fortified settlement in the village of Pitrychi, in the Viktorivskiy forest and the Krylos stronghold. It was only in the 1880s,

¹ We mention this fact in order to draw the state of the mound prior to our excavations to the attention of those 'defenders' of sacred antiquity (Prof. Antin Rudnytskyi), who, now that the mound is being restored, consider it a great sin to show to the Ukrainian people articles of military equipment *in situ*, where they were discovered in the mound, making, in their opinion, the reconstruction of the mound unnecessary.





Fig. 1. Krylos settlement – the stronghold of Princely Halych, 12th–13th c.
 1. Halych Mound; 2. Dormition Cathedral; 3. Zolotyi Tik; 4. Tsarynka site; 5. Church of the Annunciation; 6. Nad stinkoyu site.



Architectural and archaeological research of the Dormition Cathedral led by Yuriy Lukomskyi. Krylos, Halych, 1998.

after many years of excavation, that archaeologists and historians came to the conclusion that the Halych Mound must be the isolated mound located on the southern plateau of the Krylos stronghold in the Kachkiv site.

A reference in the Chronicle to the Halych Mound occurs under the annal for the year 1206 (Hypatian Recension).² The fact that the name of the mound is a homophone of the name of the city of Halych – the capital (from 1144) of Yaroslav Osmomysl's Principality of Galicia, and from 1199 the capital of Roman Mstyslavych's Principality of Galicia-Volhynia – and that it is mentioned in the Chronicle, suggests its historical significance.

The Chronicle refers to the mound in connection with events which took place in Halych at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Boyar unrest against Prince Roman Ihorevych led to the Hungarians occupying the city. The Hungarian King Andrew sent his voyevode Benedict to Halych. Benedict easily removed Roman and sent him to Hungary. However, cruel treatment of the Galicians at the hands of the Hungarians led to fresh disturbances. Prince Mstyslav Yaroslavovych of Peresopnytsya came to the aid of the Galicians with a small force, but was unable to break into the city. Before the Prince departed to Peresopnytsya, according to the

² *Litopys Rus'kyi. Za Ipatskym spyskom.* Translated by L. Makhovets (Kyiv, 1989), p. 371.

Chronicle, Ilyya Shchepanovych, a Galician boyar, led him out to the Halych Mound and said: 'O, Prince, inasmuch as thou hast seated thyself on the Halych Mound, thou hast ruled in Halych'.³ This was done in mockery of Mstyslav, concludes the Chronicle. The reference to the Halych Mound does not end here, however. The chronicler promises to say more later '... of the Halych Mound and of the origins of Halych, from whence it arose'. Although there is, in actual fact, no further reference to the Halych Mound or Halych, this gloss gave Mykhaïlo Hrushevskyy grounds to postulate that the founder of the town of Halych may be buried in the Halych Mound. Hrushevskyy writes:

... near Halych was the 'Halych Mound'. It was associated with the origins of the town. Although the chronicler, having mentioned this mound, promises to tell elsewhere of the origins of Halych, he did not keep his promise. Evidently, this was believed to be a burial mound of the eponymous founder of the city, by the name of Halych, after whom it was believed to be named, as Kyiv was said to be named after Kyi, and from this it can be seen that the origins of Halych go back to times immemorial. In recent times, there have been efforts to identify this mound among the early burial mounds in the vicinity of Halych, which have been excavated but, one understands, without results.⁴

After searching for many years, archaeologists and historians came to the conclusion that the Halych Mound must be the isolated burial mound located in the southern plateau of the Krylos stronghold (Kachkiv site). This mound is situated at its highest point (315.8 m.). The first excavations of the Halych burial mound were carried out by Tadeusz Ziemięcki (1883). He measured the mound. At that time, it was three metres high, with a diameter of 36 m. Excavations in two transverse trenches, however, yielded no results.⁵ In 1911, Pelenskyi used the same method in his excavations, but also without success.⁶ During World War I, two shelters were dug in the centre of the mound with an entry trench to them, which led in effect to the destruction of the site. In 1934, Yaroslav Pasternak⁷ began his field work on ancient Halych with the Halych Mound. He made a large excavation 15 m. in diameter, to a depth of 1.8 m. in the centre of the burial mound – that is to the footing of the burial mound. Finding no relics of an interment,⁸ Pasternak interpreted the Halych Mound as a 'place of enthronement of the first Halych princes long before Volodymyrko, and then, when this custom had become obsolete, or was, perhaps, forbidden by the church, the mound remained a historical place'.⁹ This explanation satisfied archaeologists of Halych, both predecessors and successors of Pasternak.

³ Ibid.

⁴ M. Hrushevskyy, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (Kyiv, 1992), vol. 2, p. 466.

⁵ T. N. Ziemięcki, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej w r. 1883 dokonanej (Halicz, Krylos, Podhorce)', *Zbiór wiadomości do antropologii krajowej* (Cracow, 1884), vol. VIII, pp. 88–94; F. I. Svystun, 'Galichina Mogila', *Nauchno-literaturnyi sbornik galichino-russkoy matitsy* (Lviv, 1901), vol. 1, pp. 16–25.

⁶ Ya. Pasternak, *Staryi Halych* (Lviv, 1944), p. 52.

⁷ During the same period (1934–6), there was a major debate in Poland about the role of the Varangians in the formation of the mediaeval Polish state, the mound of Krak in Cracow was investigated. The results failed to come up to the hopes of Polish Normans.

⁸ Pasternak's trench did actually penetrate a small area of the grave pit, but he failed to recognise the latter for what it was.

⁹ Pasternak, op. cit., pp. 51–2.

In the post-war years, a number of archaeological teams, notably from the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ivano-Frankivsk Museum of Regional Studies, discovered new traces of churches, domestic buildings and workshops, but until 1991 none of them dared to return to the investigation of the Halych burial mound itself.

During excavations in 1991–2, an area of 841 m. was dug. It was established that the diameter of the original burial mound together with a wooden kerb was 26 m. The height of the mound in the central part reached 1.8–2 m. from the original ground level; the mound itself consists of clean sandy soil of a light-grey colour with occasional fragments of animal bones, charcoal, and small shards of pottery. In the central part of the dome, the outline of Pasternak's extensive dig of 1934 was clearly visible. The remains of the two military shelters from World War I (1915) were likewise revealed. In the earthwork of the burial mound individual traces of the transverse trenches from the excavations by Pelenskyi (1911) and Ziemięcki (1883) have survived. Moreover, the remains of five late-mediaeval craftsmen's furnaces and remains of individual pits were discovered in certain parts of the outer edge of the bank. Evidently, during the era of the Halych metropolitanate the 'pagan' burial mound, the location of which had not yet been established, lost its numinous quality as a place for the commemoration of solemn events.

Along the edges of the burial mound bank were discovered remains of a kerb of wooden logs 3–5 m. long, laid in a radial order in relation to the centre. The diameter of the logs was 0.15–0.30 m. In certain places, two to four courses usually of charred logs could be observed. Thus the height of the wall – kerb – was approximately one metre. The banked up material of the mound lay on an ancient surface which was a dark, humus rich layer 0.2 m. thick, in which occasional fragments of Carpathian-Hallstatt ceramics were found.

In the centre of the burial mound, at a depth of 1.8–2 m. from the present surface, was discovered an ancient burial (Fig. 2), traces of which were still visible on the original surface at that time. The latter, in its south-western part, had been partly cut by Pasternak's dig. The burial was made in a pit of elongated form, lying along a north–south axis. Its maximum length was 3.6 m., the width was 1.45 m., and the depth – 0.2–0.4 m.

As a whole, the pit had a distinct boat-like form. Along the edges of the entire perimeter of the pit were charred remains of a wooden boat – a monoxyla – the sides of which fitted closely against the walls of the pit. Thus the pit had clearly been dug specifically for the boat. Hence the length of the boat was 3.5 m., the width in the stern (northern) part was 1.4 m. The prow was tapered. In addition, the stern was 0.4 m. lower than the sides, and there was a charred thwart with a width of 0.4 m., which served as a bench.

In the prow of the boat were found various artefacts – clearly the accoutrements of a notable warrior. The central place had been occupied by a shield, of which there had survived a trace of circular thin gold foil with a diameter of 42.6 cm. This had evidently once covered the wooden base of a round shield. Beside it lay the point of a long (37 cm.), narrow spear (in three fragments), two narrow pedicel arrow-heads (trihedral and tetrahedral), a large scramasax (35.5 cm. long), and three




Fig. 2. The Halych Mound and artefacts discovered inside the burial site.

flat-butt flanged battle-axes. One of them was embedded in the prow of the boat. In the northern part of the boat, under its eastern side, an iron adze was discovered. Opposite it, close to the western side, closer to the stern, there was discovered a large iron plate with two rings and two pairs of rods, which had been fixed to the side. This was, evidently, an iron base for mounting the steering oar. The whole boat had been covered with a fabric into which gilt threads had been woven, the impressions of which could be observed on most of the iron objects discovered.

No traces of a burial could be found, which indicates that it was either a cenotaph or else that a cinerary urn had been removed during the construction of the (1915) military shelters, the base of which lay only 7–10 cm. above the level of the artefacts found in the mound. The very existence of a boat-burial and the construction of a large tumulus of a diameter of 26 m., at the highest point in ancient Halych, together with the name of the mound and the mention of it in the Chronicle suggest that it was raised in honour of a prince – possibly, the founder of the city. This is also corroborated, in particular, by the dating of the artefacts of the burial inventory, which can be assigned to the mid-tenth century. Our investigation of the defensive structures of the Krylos stronghold have likewise yielded materials from the mid-tenth century onwards, when Halych was established as a mediaeval fortified settlement, possibly the capital of the Galician (Croat) land.

The Halych Mound is one of a small group of individual princely burial mounds mentioned in the chronicles. Written sources of the early and high Middle Ages in Eastern, Central and Northern Europe mention around ten similar burial mounds – eponymous tumuli connected with princely burials of the pre-Christian era. These include the mounds of Oleh the Seer on Shchekavytsya hill (Kyiv), Askold (Kyiv), Ihor (Iskorosten), Oleh Svyatoslavych (near Ovruch), Svyatoslav I (in the Carpathians), Svyatopolk I the Accursed ('between the Czechs and the Lyakhs'), Krak (Cracow), etc. Archaeological investigations have, in the main, failed to reveal any traces of a princely burial in them. It has been suggested that apart from ritual significance, these mounds had a socio-cultural function,¹⁰ similar to that of mounds which contained burials, for example the Chorna Mohyla (Black Mound) – the grave of Prince Chornyi (the legendary founder of Chernihiv).¹¹ These were the burial mounds of hierophant princes, who carried out both cultic (sacerdotal) and political-military roles. All these assumptions also accord well with the description of the Halych Mound, beside which was a moot ground of pre-Christian princely Halych of the tenth century.

One may have some reservations in attributing the mound to a Slav prince, owing to the presence in it of a boat, which is a feature associated rather with Scandinavian burials. However, the boat here is of a different type – a monoxyla. Moreover, the Scandinavians placed their boats on a platform, but our monoxyla was

¹⁰ O. P. Tolochko, 'Do pytannya pro sakralni chynnyky stanovlennya knyazivskoyi vldy na Rusi u ix–x st.', *Arkheolohiya*, Kyiv, 1990, no. 1, p. 58; G. S. Lebedev, *Epokha vikingov v Severnoy Yevrope* (Leningrad, 1985), p. 215.

¹¹ B. A. Rybakov, 'Drevnosti Chernigova', *Materialy i issledovaniya po arkheologii*, 1949, no. 11, pp. 14–51.

inserted into a pit especially prepared for it. The warrior's gear found in the barrow consisted of a javelin and arrow-heads – the usual weapons of a Slavonic man-at-arms. Axes with a flanged butt may have been used both as tools and in battle. Analogies are known in many Slavonic settlements and fortified towns (Bytytsya, Novotroytske, etc.). A gilded shield with a wooden base may well have been used by a distinguished Slavonic warrior, and, moreover, of princely origin. As regards the knife – a scramasax – then this is the only artefact of West European origin, which is truly rare in Slavonic sites. But this, too, in our opinion, in conjunction with the gilt shield, distinguishes this burial-site.

If we take into account the situation of the southern group of East-Slav tribes in the tenth century, the fortifications of Varangian princes in Kyiv and the general Scandinavian influences on the European continent, then the honouring of a Slav tribal prince – the founder of a city – by the introduction into the local burial rite of certain elements of Scandinavian customs (a boat, although locally made) may be regarded as a quite natural phenomenon. Evidently, in the second half of the tenth century, Slav towns and cities were beginning to adopt certain customs of the metropolis – Kyiv.

The presence in the barrow of three axes, which at that time were used both as an everyday working tool and as weapons of war, attracts attention. We are inclined to believe that this is the symbol of a warrior-builder, the founder of ancient Halych, as Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy believed.

In 1992–4, investigations were carried out on all the outer defensive ramparts of the Krylos stronghold. The best preserved are the triple ramparts in its southern part (Fig. 1). Rampart no. 1 is preserved to a height of 1.5 m. and a width of 7 m. The base of the rampart was built of yellow, compacted clay, reinforced on the outside by a wooden wall of horizontally laid logs. In front of the rampart was a defensive ditch 2.5 m. in depth and 10–11 m. wide. The inner slope of the rampart had a gentle gradient. On its narrow crest stood a palisade. Rampart no. 2 was completely identical to rampart no. 1; rampart no. 3 was somewhat higher than the other two. Its present height is 2–2.5 m. and width – 13–14 m. It consisted of two earthen sections piled on both sides of a mass wooden wall. The inner rampart was 9–10 m. wide, and the outer – 5 m. wide. The outer one served as a large earth escarpment. This rampart was clearly constructed in the tenth century, but to some extent it was still in use in the twelfth–thirteenth centuries. Traces were found here of a contemporary small tower-like structure. On the inner side of the rampart was a defensive ditch 10–11 m. wide. This showed evidence of two phases of construction. The original depth of the ditch was 5 m. At a distance of 80–100 m. from the triple ramparts was a fourth earth rampart. Its configuration is identical to the triple ramparts which formed the front line of defence.

Rampart no. 4, which was 11 m. wide, is almost completely destroyed, and its ditch filled up. Its base was made from yellow clay. On the inside of the rampart were found traces of individual cells with lafted tree-trunk walls (width 4 m.). The outer part of the rampart had traces of a strong palisade. A trench has been pre-




Fig. 3. Defensive cells. Halych, 12th-13th c.

served, 1.7–2 m. wide and 2.1 m. deep. In front of the palisade was a terrace 1.25 m. wide, after which there began a 10 metre-wide defensive ditch.

This whole system of ramparts which protected the fortified settlement from the south, at the eastern end abutted on the Mosol's brook, and in the west reached the deep ravines which drop down to the river Lukva. The line of the ramparts and the gullies in all cases exactly coincide.

Rampart no. 6 (Zolotyi Tik). The Zolotyi Tik had its own local defences, surrounded by an earthen rampart around its entire perimeter. In our opinion, Zolotyi Tik did not form the centre of the Halych fortified settlement (the site of the princely palace, traces of which in a century of research no archaeologist has been able to locate), but was, in fact, the lightly-defended monastery quarter. The rampart which we have designated as no. 6 was built above the Carpathian-Hallstatt level, from compacted yellow clay, which was dug out from the ditch. On the inner side, three levels of stone footing were identified, evidently corresponding to the tenth, twelfth–thirteenth, and fourteenth–sixteenth centuries.

In 1993–6, the principal defensive rampart of the Krylos stronghold was investigated (excavation I, 16x16 m.). Three phases of construction of the defences were identified, dating respectively from the tenth, twelfth–thirteenth, and sixteenth–eighteenth centuries.

The investigation showed that on the western, final section of the rampart, the original terrain had shown a significant drop in relief. Thus above the natural gully, which was utilised as a defensive ditch, a massive earthwork was raised, with a height of up to 3 m. and width up to 14 m. On top of the earthen rampart thus formed was erected an outer defensive lafted wooden wall with a width of 3–3.5 m. Externally, it was defended by a short earthen slope with a width of 1.5 m. At a distance of 1 metre from this outer defensive wall was located the inner defensive line, which consisted of a number of individual cells with a width of 3–3.5 m. The presence in one of them of a hearth indicates their use for domestic or artisan purposes. Ceramic material found in the cells dates their construction to the middle of the tenth century.

After the defences were burned by the Tatars in the mid-thirteenth century, a clay superstructure 0.35–0.45 m. thick was erected over what remained. On top of this, new strong defensive structures 9.5–10 m. wide were constructed. They consist of two parts: outer and inner cells. The outer line of defensive cells (1.5–2 m. wide and 5 m. long) went along the high ridge of the rampart (Fig. 3). This formed individual narrow block-houses which occupied the crest and the internal slope of the rampart. The second, parallel, line of cells, constructively connected with the first, is situated along the base of the rampart (the width of these cells was 2–2.5 m., length – 3–3.5 m.). Some cells contained stoves, indicating that they were used for domestic and artisan purposes, as well as defence. There were in all 8 outer and 7 inner cells, which have been dated by the ceramic material found there to the second half of the twelfth–first half of the thirteenth centuries. These were the strongest defences of Halych when it was the capital of the Galician-Volhynian land at the time of the Romanovychi.

At the end of the sixteenth century, a small clay superstructure was erected on top of the burned remains of the twelfth–thirteenth century defences. The top of this superstructure was closely packed with large stones. On the rampart there was a tower-like (3.3x3.15 m.) structure with a furnace (0.75x0.95 m.), which was sunk some 1.1 m. into the earthwork of the rampart. This evidently formed part of the late-mediaeval defensive system, which is dated by coins and ceramics to the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, the time of the temporary re-establishment of the Halych episcopal see.

In 1995–6, excavation III (Sad site) investigated a large wooden building – a Great hall. This was situated on the western edge of the central square of the settlement in the eastern part of which stood the Dormition Cathedral.

This was a large four-unit structure. The overall measurements were: length 26 m., width 15 m.¹² The western unit measured 11x7 m., the central one 13.5x6.5 m., the large eastern unit 11x5.5 m., and the small eastern unit 5.5x4 m.¹³ The longitudinal axis of the structure lay approximately along the east–west line with a small deviation to the north-east (Fig. 4).

The western unit above the slope evidently served as the residential and domestic quarters. Much ceramic material was found there (most of it in the form of shards) and also the remains of two stoves. One of these seems to have been located in the upper storey, so that its remains fell through to the lower storey when the building collapsed. Stratigraphical observations and the character of the foundations make it possible to speak, at least tentatively, of upper storeys of this complex. The foundations are made of thick wooden posts, sunk into specially prepared pits, along the entire perimeter of the building, at a distance of 0.75–1 metre (on average) from one another.

In all, 42 post-holes were cleared, of which 14 were ‘double’. The latter were situated along two inner walls. The diameters of the post-holes were on average 0.8–1 metre, while the double (eight-shaped) holes measured 1.7–2.1 m. The holes were almost perfectly circular, with vertical walls and a level horizontal bottom. The depth of the pits was 1.6–1.85 m. below the present level, and 0.85–1.10 m. below the level of the find. That is, they were dug 0.85–1.1 m. into the undisturbed soil. The in-filling was compacted argillaceous soil containing fragments of charcoal. The walls frequently revealed impressions of wooden pillars which had rotted away. Evidently, the holes had contained large logs (0.8 m. in diameter), inserted into them to form the main foundations on which lay the lower courses of the lafted walls. The unusual features of the foundations of the structure were necessitated first and foremost by the relief of the site, which had a gradient both along the north–south axis for 1.5 m. and along the east–west axis (approximately 2.7 m.). Furthermore, if the building did, indeed, possess two or three storeys it would have required strong foundations capable of bearing considerable loading. This would appear to be the explanation for the duplication of the pillars of the two internal walls. These excavations also yielded ceramic materials of typical

¹² Dimensions from the edge of the post-holes.

¹³ Dimensions from the centre of the post-holes.




Fig. 4. Remains of the wooden Great hall. Halych, 12th–13th c.

old Rus' types (from the second half of the twelfth–first half of the thirteenth centuries), many ceramic tiles (some with plant motifs and designs of griffins), three iron shutters, an iron stylus, etc. Particularly remarkable is the large quantity of shards, which amounts to some fifty per cent of all the fragments of vessels found. This building was possibly the Great hall of the Halych princely men-at-arms. In general, the lay public buildings of Kyivan Rus', unlike church architecture, have been little studied. This is particularly true in the case of the relatively few examples dating from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries.¹⁴ Such buildings include both stone (ninth–eleventh centuries) and wooden ones (twelfth–thirteenth

¹⁴ P. A. Rapoport, 'Drevnerusskoe zhilishche', *Svod Arkheologicheskikh pamyatnikov*, no. 32 (Leningrad, 1975), p. 112.




Fig. 5. Dwellings in pre-Chronicle Halych, 11th-12th c.

th centuries). It is interesting that the Great hall, like the majority of such buildings found so far, particularly in Smolensk, Harodnia and Polotsk, etc., are situated at the very edge of the central stronghold of the old Rus' town, above the slope down to the river.¹⁵

Historians and archaeologists have never doubted the existence of a princely palace on the territory of ancient Halych. However, the building which we investigated seems more than likely to have been some civic building.

We find a description of the Halych palace in the writings of Byzantine historian Nicetas Choniates.¹⁶ This is described in particularly ornate and artistic terms, and may well have been a ceremonial building. It was most probably in front of the Dormition Cathedral. There in 1996 under a wooden column we discovered a stone foundation (the western part) and a large floor (the main stone part) with traces of wooden joists and some post-holes. Excavations are still in progress here, and there is every reason to hope that this site, with its remains of some large wooden building, will prove to be the princely residence of the twelfth–thirteenth centuries, as the archaeological material uncovered so far would suggest. Our study of the palace building (no. 1) and in particular its western wing in 1995 also uncovered another semi-subterranean dwelling (no. 2).

The dwelling was rectangular in shape and its walls were oriented at some 20° to the cardinal points (Fig. 5). The measurements of the dwelling were 3.8x3.6 m., and its depth 2.2 m. below the present surface. The walls of the foundation trench were dug into the undisturbed soil to a depth of 1 m., the floor was level and covered with a sooty layer up to 8 cm. thick, in which small fragments of reinforcement were embedded. Beneath the walls the lower courses of a lafted wooden structure were uncovered. The logs have been well preserved due to the damp, argillaceous soil. In the north-east corner, behind the stove, three courses of the structure have been preserved. The logs stand out from the walls of the foundation trench by 0.25 m. This gap is filled with an argillaceous filling. The diameter of the preserved part of the logs is 7–10 cm. During the excavation of the stove it was established that in this area the lower logs were placed on stones, which also served as the base of the stove. The latter is situated in the north-eastern corner of the dwelling. The oven was made of large stones, sometimes grouted with clay and earth. The internal measurements of the stove are 0.35x0.5 m., and the external – 1.25x1.25 m. The stove has survived to a height of 0.24 m. The hearthstone is smeared with clay. Here was found a fragment of a pottery pitcher from the eleventh century. The base of the dwelling consisted of undisturbed

¹⁵ Nicetas Choniates (?1160–?1213). The Halych principality (Γάλιτζα) is mentioned on two occasions in his chronicle, under the annals 1164–66, when Andronicus Comnenus took refuge there, and under the annals for 1200–1, when its Prince is mentioned as 'Ρομανὸς'. P. A. Rapoport, E. V. Sholokhova, 'Dvoretz v Polotske', *Kratkie soobshcheniya Instituta arkhologii Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1981, no. 164, pp. 91–9; N. V. Kholostenko, 'Chernigovskie kamennye knyazheskie teremа xi v.', *Arkhitekturnoe nasledstvo* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Arkhitektury SSSR, 1963), no. 15, p. 3; N. N. Voronin, P. A. Rapoport, 'Smolenskiy detinetz i ego pamyatniki', *Sovetskaya Arkheologiya*, 1967, no. 3, p. 229.

¹⁶ Yu. S. Asyeyev, *Mystetstvo starodavnyobo Kyieva* (Kyiv, 1969), p. 149.

soil, on which there could be seen a sooty layer with a thickness of 8 cm., with inclusions of gravel. This evidently served as insulation between the base and a wooden floor. The presence of the latter is demonstrated by the fairly clear traces of two joists sunk a small distance into the soil base of the floor. The distance between the beams is 1.04 m.

Post-holes were discovered in the corners of the building and in the centre of the wall. These served as additional internal reinforcement of the wooden walls of the dwelling. In addition to the post-holes, a square hole was uncovered in the central part of the dwelling, between the foundation-beams. As a whole, the dwelling may be dated to the end of the eleventh century.

At a distance of 6 m. to the east of dwelling no. 1, a semi-subterranean dwelling (no. 2) was investigated in 1996.

This dwelling is rectangular in shape, oriented to the cardinal points (Fig. 5). The measurements of the foundation trench are 4x3.7 m. The depth from the present surface is 1.2 m., and it is sunk 0.7 m. into the undisturbed soil. Beneath the walls were discovered the lower courses of wooden walls fixed in vertical pillars, traces of which were found in the pits. These were found in all four corners of the dwelling, and in the centre of the western and eastern walls. Their diameter is 0.35 m. and depth – 0.3 m. The gap between the wooden walls and the walls of the foundation trench is grouted with a clean, yellow, clay in-fill. In the north-western corner of the dwelling is situated a stove and hearth made of large rocks (2x1.5 m.). The hearthstone is made of clay, in some places with inclusions of ceramic fragments and fine stones. In the central part of the dwelling is a double pit (post-hole). Beside the eastern wall there was found a round entrance 0.8 m. wide and 0.55 m. long, which was cut into the soil and laid with gravel. From the ceramic materials, the dwelling may be dated to the end of the eleventh–beginning of the twelfth centuries.

This would therefore appear to be one of the last of the semi-subterranean dwellings of pre-chronicle Halych, which survived in this case until the middle of the twelfth century, when Halych became the capital of the Galician Principality.

In 1993–4, in addition to our ongoing work in ancient Halych, we carried out small reconnaissance digs at the multi-stratum (Carpathian-Hallstatt, Lypytysya culture, Chernyakhiv culture, Kyiv-Rus' period) settlement, situated on the high left bank of the former bed of the river Lukva (Nad stinkoyu site). Dig no. 1 (area 16x18 m.) revealed a line of pits dating from various times. In particular, there was evidence of a rich cultural stratum from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries. Along the whole terrace within the limits of Krylos–Pidhoroddyia, is located the western part of the settlement of Halych. Along the right bank of the river Lukva (Fermi, tsarynka, Vynnytsya sites) a cultural stratum from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries was located, covered by a massive (0.7x0.9 m.) layer of silt. Evidently, the oldest part of the settlement of princely Halych was also located below the Krylos stronghold. Following the demise of the town (mid-thirteenth century), when the defensive structures on the Lukva were destroyed, this territory was flooded and it was a long time before life returned there. □

The Volokytyno Porcelain of Andriy Myklashevskiy

Alla Postovoytenko

Andriy Mykhaylovych Myklashevskiy, a scion of the noble Myklashevskiy family, became famous as the founder of one of the leading porcelain industries of the Russian empire, established in the second quarter of the nineteenth century in the village of Volokytyno, Chernihiv guberniya.

Myklashevskiy could trace his lineage back to the middle son of the famous Colonel of Starodub, Stefan Mykhaylovych Myklashevskiy. Stefan (or Stepan) served in the Zaporozhian army, was a notable warrior, and took part in various military campaigns. Both he and his father were rewarded for their services, as is shown by a decree of Hetman Skoropadskiy, dated 1710. This states that the Hetman 'took him under the Hetmanal patronage and protection and conferred upon him the villages of Kocherly, Vorsol and Zazerki' in the Hlukhiv Company. Other enactments were added later, granting the villages of Volokytyno and Doroshovka, which is situated 'in the Volokytyno lands, beside the Yastrebnno forest'.¹

In his will, Stefan Myklashevskiy bequeathed the village of Volokytyno to his son Petro, who, in due time, succeeded his father as landlord. It is also known that Petro Stepanovych also served in the Zaporozhian army, and was an ensign. However, his son, Petro Petrovych, served in the life-guards of the Russian Preobrazhenskiy Regiment, joining with the rank of corporal, and later being promoted to that of cornet of guards. He was the grandfather of the founder of the Volokytyno factory, church and country-seat.

Unfortunately, no detailed information has survived about his son Mykhaylo, the father of Andriy Myklashevskiy. We only know that in 1801 he was the owner of Volokytyno. In that year, on 7 July, his son Andriy was born in the village of Yaroslavets, Hlukhiv county (the village belonged to the Kochubey family). Andriy probably received his primary education at home, as was customary at the time. At the age of thirteen, he was enrolled in the newly opened Nobility Boarding School attached to the lyceum at Tsarskoye Selo near St Petersburg, which served as a preparatory establishment for the lyceum itself.²

Andriy Myklashevskiy graduated from the lyceum in summer 1819, and in the autumn of the same year, was enrolled as a cornet in the Akhtyr Regiment of Hussars.³ This regiment had a famous history. Only a few years previously, during the 1812 campaign against Napoleon, it was awarded the silver bugle of St George, and it was under the personal supervision of Field-Marshal Osten-Saken. The regiment was based in the town of Lubar, and its staff in Berdychiv.

After a few years of 'exemplary' service (in 1821) Myklashevskiy was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. In 1824, he retired with the rank of staff-captain of caval-

¹ V. L. Modzalevskiy, *Malorossiyskiy Rodoslovnyk* (Kyiv, 1912), vol. 3.

² D. Kobeko, *Imperatorskiy Tsarskoselskiy litsey, ego nastavniki i pitomtsy* (St Petersburg, 1911).

³ Modzalevskiy, op. cit.

ry, due – as the relevant orders stated – to ‘domestic circumstances’.⁴ At that time, he was still only 23 years old.

After leaving the army, Myklashevskiy settled in Volokytyno, and devoted all his time to the building and beautifying of his country-seat. It should be noted here that, apart from Volokytyno, he also owned several other villages, including Kocherhy and Kubarovo, with a population of some 2,500 peasants.

The building of the country-seat was completed in the 1830s. Its appearance can be deduced from an article by Petro Doroshenko, who collected and studied monuments of Ukrainian antiquity, published in 1915 in the journal *Stolitsa i usadba*. This noted that the balance of proportions between the various buildings and their harmony with the surrounding countryside made this one of the finest country-seats of landowners in the Russian empire.

The property was surrounded by a wall, the gates of which were of considerable interest. One was in a Gothic style, decorated with fine porcelain medallions and coats-of-arms. Another, built later, in 1875, was a complete structure in itself, with two towers and three openings, with open-work cast-iron and bronze grilles, through which the road to Hlukhiv could be seen. Doroshenko describes how the buildings were located in the estate, paying special attention to the monument of the country-seat, which Myklashevskiy built in honour of his wife, Darya Oleksandrivna Olsufyeva, who died at the comparatively youthful age of 30. The monument was in the form of an open-fronted pyramid of dressed stone, within which was a marble statue of a woman, bending over an urn.

This monument stood in an orchard close to the mansion. Any building and its furnishings will always reflect the tastes of the owners, and hence a description of the various apartments and interiors can provide interesting information about the character of the owner. It is appropriate, therefore, to give a description of Andriy Myklashevskiy’s residence.

The building was made of wood with a portico and a pediment with ornate capitals. The walls were smooth with simple cornices, and had elongated windows with white ornamental carved frames with black trim. The façade was simple, but the balanced proportions of the whole building, columns and pediment gave it a very pleasing aspect. The rear façade of the building gave on to an open, semicircular terrace, which was adorned in the summer with hot-house plants. In front of this façade was a large lawn with occasional trees, including a particularly notable venerable chestnut with branches that touched the ground. The façade was very handsome and provided a typical example of a landowner’s building in the ‘empire’ style. The central section was rusticated and the upper storey had a balcony and a fine pediment with coats-of-arms carved in wood. On the roof of the building was a circular platform with a flag-pole. The main entrance to the building was from the front façade. Wide stone steps led to a spacious vestibule, to the left of which were doors to the living quarters. Facing the entrance were stairs to the mezzanine, and on the right the entrance to the formal reception rooms. Here there was first a service-room with its cupboards filled with old sil-

⁴ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (hereafter TsDIA), holding 834, file 1, document 21, folio 1.

ver, porcelain (mainly from the Volokytyno factory) and also crystal, including ancient goblets, with Russian imperial monograms, and heavy Bohemian glassware. This room also contained a remarkable porcelain fireplace. Directly ahead of the service room was a salon, and on the left a reception-room. The salon extended the entire depth of the building and was a really wonderful room adorned with marbled yellow columns. Here, as in the other formal rooms, there was a frieze and the ceiling cornice was painted by the Volokytyno masters. On one wall of the salon was a shield with the mace and personal weapons of his famous ancestor, the Colonel of Starodub. Here, too, hung the Colonel's portrait, a copy of the one in the Vydubetsk monastery in Kyiv. On the opposite wall is a half-length portrait of Andriy Myklashevskiy by the artist Mykola He. Doroshenko considered this portrait one of that artist's best works, describing it as a 'striking', little-known portrait, painted in 1879. It is known that He left St Petersburg in 1876 and took up residence in the Ivanovskiy settlement in the Chernihiv guberniya, painting portraits on commission. Not all of these turned out well; his best work was done when he had an interesting sitter, or one with a sympathetic personality. A letter from the artist's daughter, dated 18 June 1879, describes the circumstances under which this portrait was painted:

In the course of the next few days Father will be going to the Myklashevskiy, who have asked him to paint a portrait of a man for 500 roub.

This unusual situation has greatly cheered him up; he's only afraid whether he will get the job done, since the original still has to come from St Petersburg. Father has stated that he will be able to stay with them from 24 June to 5 July.⁵

This portrait, which showed him at the age of 78, has, alas, disappeared without trace. All that is known to have survived is a lithograph produced by West European masters, which shows Myklashevskiy at the age of 34. In this he appears as a young man with an elongated oval face, high forehead, large eyes, wavy hair: a face that, taken as a whole, gives the impression of a very energetic individual.

To return to the description of the hall, we learn that between the windows there was a large mirror with a very elaborate, richly painted, porcelain frame. On the walls of the hall there were engravings from the Volpato series⁶ in antique frames. The furniture of the salon was white with touches of gold.

The first thing which Doroshenko notes in the reception-room is the large porcelain chandelier with very fine modelling. In this room there were also many porcelain objects, representing the finest products from the Volokytyno factory. The reception-room also contained a large family portrait of countess Hanna Olsufyeva (Myklashevskiy's daughter) with her sons, also the work of Mykola He.

The reception-room was furnished with divans and mahogany chairs (of the era of Nicholas I, 1825–54), small oval Jacob tables,⁷ a beautiful table of Florentine work with the top made of polished stones, an antique marquetry, and many other choice items; the bronze Louis XV clocks were particularly fine.

⁵ *Nikolay Nikolaevich He* (Moscow, 1958), p. 108.

⁶ Giovanni Volpato (1735–1803), Italian engraver and sculptor.

⁷ Georges Jacob (1739–1814), founder of a long line of French furniture makers.

The residential apartments and servants' quarters were furnished in a simple but cosy style. They also had much nice furniture. On the other side of the reception-room was the office, which contained birch-wood book-cases, portraits, lithographs, water-colours and a large portrait in oil of Count Pavel Kiselyov.

The mezzanine had five well-appointed rooms with fine antique furniture and cupboards with porcelain from various factories in the Russian empire and abroad, which had served as models for the Volokytno factory.

Historians in the applied arts date the start of porcelain production at the Volokytno factory to the period 1836–9. The *terminus ante quem* is 1839, when the owner of the factory was awarded a major silver medal at an all-Russian exhibition for the 'art of the best porcelain artefacts'. In 1849, Myklashevskiy won a gold medal for the products of his factory. This success of the Volokytno products was well-deserved. The high quality of the materials, response to the latest trend in porcelain and the taste of the buyers made the factory one of the best in the Russian empire. The provincial engineer, Gutman, who was a specialist in porcelain production, assessed the porcelain from the factory as follows:

I know in SPb [St Petersburg] the imperial factory, have seen such products of the well-known porcelain factory of the Kornilov brothers, and therefore want to make a certain comparison with the factory of Mr Myklashevskiy. At this factory... they produce porcelain, which is no worse than the Sèvres, in the finest forms, the preparation of the porcelain mass is made with the necessary care, the kilns are not worse in their construction than the best kilns of this type; the tools and equipment work properly; the painting on the porcelain of Mr Myklashevskiy is fine.⁸

In 1860, the factory consisted of two brick-built, wooden-roofed buildings, one of which had two storeys. In addition, there was a two-storey storehouse, where the finished products were kept, and buildings for the storage of clay, stone and other raw materials. There was also living accommodation for the craftsmen and office staff. The owner spent 200,000 paper roubles on the building of the factory. The money came from a distillery, and the rents from inns in Zinkiv, Hadyach, Lebedyn, and other towns. The estate managers advised Myklashevskiy to shut down the production of porcelain as unprofitable, but he wrote to the financial controller of the estate, Moskalenko: 'I have to convince you not to think that I may some day think of closing the factory, which has cost me an incredible outlay and several years of unremitting work'.⁹

Myklashevskiy invited François d'Art to be the first director of the factory. He was a member of the notable Paris family of porcelain-makers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. D'Art's assistant (who succeeded him as director) was Fedir Petruni – a local peasant. It must be noted, though, that both the director of the factory and his assistant worked under the ever-observant eye of Myklashevskiy. Even when he was abroad (in Paris, Nice and Frankfurt), he kept *au courant* with all the smallest details of production.

⁸ *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti*, 1852, no. 16.

⁹ Central State Archive of Literature, holding 990, file 1, item 242.

A school of painting was set up at the factory, which instructed serf-children from the age of 14. The founding of this school made a profound impression on the director of the Kyiv-Mezhyhirskyi factory, who was in Volokytyno in 1849. 'Women and serf-girls work here painting on fine porcelain, and one really has to marvel that in the brief period the factory has been in existence they managed to become so acquainted with the art of painting porcelain'. He added, too, that he intended 'to establish such a school at the Kyiv-Mezhyhirskyi factory'.¹⁰

In the course of time, some of the factory workers developed into notable masters of their craft. Myklashevskyi set great store by the talents of his peasants. He wrote from Frankfurt in 1841: 'I do not know how many pupils Stepan Andreyev has in the school, but if there are less than twenty, more girls must be recruited without delay'.¹¹

At the beginning of the 1840s, Myklashevskyi brought from France examples of vessels, about which he wrote in a letter to the financial manager. But these imported vessels simply served as general models for designs, which were then elaborated in the factory's own style. During this time, the factory produced a china service unique in form and design – 'Napoleon in Russia' – commemorating the Russian victory of 1812 (preserved in the National Museum of History of Ukraine, Kyiv).

The range of products of the factory was very wide: vases, table and tea services, vessels, inkstands, frames for pictures, mirrors and icons, mantelpieces, candle-sticks, chandeliers.

The factory produced services for 24, 50 and 100 persons. These unique works of local masters were sold at a price higher than Sèvres or Dresden china. The products were shipped throughout the whole of the Russian empire.

Among the figurines was an entire gallery of portraits of persons famous in French history: Napoleon, King Henri IV, Joan of Arc, and the particularly well known, brilliantly witty sculpture 'Bibliophile'.

Out of all this range of almost 200 porcelain figurines, one particularly attractive one shows a girl in Ukrainian national costume. The art-historian Panteleymon Musiyenko stressed its value as an artistic and ethnographic record of contemporaries in porcelain.

In the 1850s, there were virtually no waged workers at the factory.

The masterpiece of the porcelain factory craftsmen was the decoration of the iconostasis of the church, which was built on Myklashevskyi's estate in the 1840s. Tsar Nicholas I personally reviewed and approved the plans – and himself rounded off the lines and dome. But the portal of the bell-tower, the stone spires at the corners of the roof and other architectural details gave the building a Gothic overall character. The church was built by an architect from Hlukhiv. Shortly before building work began on the church, near the village of Kocherhy, they discovered some of the stone from which millstones are made, and which is used in building work. This stone was used for the steps up to the church door, the steps to the

¹⁰ TsDIA, holding 1219, file 1, item 487, folios 100, 104–11.

¹¹ P. Musiyenko, Central State Archive of Literature, holding 990, file 1, item 242.

church from the gate, and the forecourt of the church. In 1852, a contemporary wrote as follows: 'Mr Myklashevskiy in the building of this church brought together the two main products associated with his name – porcelain and millstone'.¹² And the newspaper *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti* in that year proclaimed: 'There are reports that Mr Myklashevskiy has undertaken to adorn with porcelain bas-reliefs the iconostasis in the church which he is having built on his estate. This will be a new form of art in architecture, which will, of course, serve as an everlasting memorial to him'.¹³

Work on the iconostasis lasted from 1852–7, and the church was consecrated in 1857.

The church had three porcelain iconostases for its three altars. The main (central) altar – in honour of the Virgin Mary – was two-tiered.

The most complete description of it was given by Selivanov, a notable pre-revolutionary connoisseur of porcelain products:

Among the finest products of the Volokytno factory is the wonderful iconostasis, and also the porcelain ornaments in the church of the village of Volokytno. Large icons, their frames, columns – everything is from porcelain; they are beautifully painted and the whole iconostasis impresses one with its lightness and subtlety. Particularly beautiful are the columns which support the iconostasis, blue, wound round with a gilt porcelain band.¹⁴

The support-frame of the iconostasis was made of wood, and the porcelain details were mounted on it. Six icons on the Royal Doors were painted on porcelain. Once icon on the Royal Doors is at present preserved in the Museum of the History of Kyiv. It depicts St John the Evangelist. The icon was based on the painting 'St John' by the artist Dominicano, an engraving of which had been made by the engraver Ivan Arkhypovych Bersini (President of the Academy of Arts in 1762).¹⁵

The lowest row of icons on the iconostasis were painted on copper plates by the artist Kalmykov.

Most of the frames of the iconostasis were decorated with relief medallions with miniature paintings of bouquets or individual flowers.

Contemporaries were also enthralled by other porcelain ornaments. Three large censers, which were designed after paintings by superior St Petersburg masters, they considered 'a real treasure'.

Doroshenko considers the most significant decoration the 'exceptionally delicate and intricate work of the tabernacle, for which drawings of altars and tombs of the best period of Gothic sculpture undoubtedly provided the motif for the design of the architectural monument'.¹⁶

Unfortunately, most of the names of the artists are unknown. Folk memory has the name of one Mariya Sarzhanova, a serf-paintress who took an active part in the painting of the church.

¹² *Pamyatnaya knizhka Chernigovskoy gubernii* (Chernihiv, 1862), pp. 107–8.

¹³ *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti*, op. cit., p. 159.

¹⁴ F. S. Petryakova, *Ukrainskiy khudozhestvennyy farfor* (Kyiv, 1985), p. 15.

¹⁵ D. A. Rovinskiy, *Podrobnyy slovar russkikh graverov xvi–xix vv.* (St Petersburg, 1895), vol. 1.

¹⁶ P. Doroshenko, *Stolitsa i usadba*, 1915, no. 44.

It is known, too, that the master-craftsman Kulyhin, who had been given to Myklashevskiy by the landowner Rostovtsev, spent the last years of his life in Volokytyno. Myklashevskiy wrote thus about this event: ‘They hoped that he would mend his ways, which to date had been deplorable’.¹⁷ One may assume that the factory owner enjoyed the respect of the peasants and his neighbours.

We can complete our description of the interior of the Volokytyno church by an account of the Chernihiv eparchy,¹⁸ which refers to icons from an earlier epoch, preserved in the church. In the church of St Barbara there were preserved ancient icons with silver gilt cladding, which had been transferred from the old church of St Barbara. In front of the sanctuary icons and behind the altar there were nine porcelain candlesticks. The ancient icons also included Our Lady of Tykhvyn, Our Lady of Volodymyr, the icon of Sts Peter and Paul, St Nicholas – all with silver gilt cladding. Some of the ornaments on these icons were very old, and others were donated by Hanna Petrivna, the daughter of the founder of the church, (i.e., the ancient church of St Barbara), Petro Myklashevskiy; Hanna Myklashevskya, ‘‘a diligent handmaid of the Lord’’, applied all that she possessed to the beautification of the church and the relief of the poor’. The description of the church concludes with the words ‘it is not easy to put a price on such a shrine’.

Our account of Andriy Myklashevskiy would be incomplete without taking note of his charitable activities.

In 1849–51, a school was opened in Volokytyno, which was maintained at his expense.

From his letters, we learn that a hospital was established in the village. In a letter to the governor, he gives instructions for top-grade Antonov apples to be provided, for proper standards of hygiene to be maintained, and for the appropriate provision to be made for the doctor who would look after the patients.

Throughout his life, Andriy Myklashevskiy travelled a great deal. He often visited Western Europe, and even in old age – in his seventies and eighties – would go to St Petersburg and to Moscow, where he had his own building. He also had a building in Kyiv, at 12 Khreshchatyk. This building had three floors and was built in the 1840s to the plans of the notable Kyivan architect, Oleksander Beretti. On the ground floor was a shop, selling Volokytyno porcelain, which the Kyivites loved to buy.

The residential premises on the two upper floors had fine porcelain fireplaces in the reception-rooms. The notable antiquarian Fedir Ernst published photographs of these in the guidebook *Kyiv*, which appeared in 1930.¹⁹

This building was levelled in the 1980s during the reconstruction of Khreshchatyk.

Myklashevskiy lived a long life, dying at the age of 94. He was buried to the right of the entrance of the church. Long before his death, the site of his future grave was marked by a plaque: ‘The last resting-place of the builder of this church’.

¹⁷ P. Musiyenko, Museum-Archive of Literature and Art, holding 990, file 1, item 242.

¹⁸ *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisaniye Chernigivskoy eparkhii* (Chernihiv, 1873), book 7, pp. 325–6.

¹⁹ F. Ernst, *Kyiv* (Kyiv, 1930), p. 389.

Arts and Culture

The Genesis of Ivan Franko's Poem *The Death of Cain*

Oksana Dzera

Ivan Franko's poem *The Death of Cain* is the result of a complex, four-stage process of interpretation. The initial stage comprises received motifs: the Biblical motif of fratricide, the apocryphal one of the death of Cain (included in the collection *Apocrypha and Legends* compiled by Franko in 1896) and the Renaissance German motif of Faust. The second stage covers the development of these motifs in Byron's *Cain – a Mystery*, Victor Hugo's poem 'Conscience' and Goethe's drama *Faust*. The penultimate stage was Franko's translation of the works mentioned. Thus, Franko's own original poem *The Death of Cain* is based upon a succession of textual linkages with Byron's *Cain* at its core. Franko translated Byron's work in 1879, i.e. ten years before writing his 'sequel'.

Franko's interpretative thinking concerning Byron's *Mystery*, in the course of his translation work, developed into the concept of *The Death of Cain*. Therefore, it seems worthwhile and interesting to trace out the beginnings of the motifs of the latter in Franko's translation of *Cain*.

The underlying theme of Franko's poem is close to the Biblical: 'Love thy neighbour': 'Owe no man any thing, but to love one another, for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law (...) therefore love is fulfilling the law'. (Romans 13:8, 13:10).¹ On opening his heart to people, Cain frees himself from the interior curse, but becomes vulnerable to exterior attack. Though Lamech's arrow (the symbol of mankind's spiritual blindness) kills Cain, he finds salvation for he has fulfilled this law of love. That is the essence of Franko's poem *The Death of Cain*.

Subliminal allusions to this future motif may already be found in Franko's translation of Byron's *Cain*. Developing latent semantic components in Byron's work, Franko accentuates the choice facing mankind: intellectual striving or love. Byron's Cain chooses a rationality that aggravates his suffering and incites him to crime. As translator, Franko stresses the oracular prediction that mankind will obtain not only the fruit of knowledge but also that of life:

Lucifer. One is yours already,
The other may be still. (Act I, lines 211–2)²
Люцифер. Один вже ваш і другий буде ваш.³

¹ All Biblical quotations are given according to the edition: The Holy Bible (the King James Version) (London: Trinitarian Bible Society, s.a.).

² All quotations are from Byron's *Cain – a Mystery* and line references thereto are given according to the text in: G. S. Truman, *Lord Byron's Cain. Twelve essays and a text with variants and annotations* (University of Texas Press, Austin & London, 1968).

³ All quotations from Ivan Franko's original works and translations are taken from Ye. P. Kyrlyuk

The modality of possibility is replaced by a real promise – ‘may be’ becomes ‘will be’. Thus, the translator confirms the inevitability of the bright prospects which seem rather doubtful in the original and which will find fulfilment in the consciousness of Cain in Franko’s legend.

To accentuate the alternative for mankind, Franko often transforms simple statements into laconic quasi-proverbial maxims. In particular, Lucifer is an ardent supporter of rationality:

Lucifer. (...) I, who know all things, fear nothing; **see**

What is true knowledge (Act I, lines 300–1)

Люцифер. (...) я все знаю і нічого не боюся.

Знання – то лік.

Lucifer in Byron’s play presents Cain with a choice. In Franko’s interpretation, knowledge is stressed as a possible solution of the main problem of the *Mystery*. The translator introduces the word ‘лік’ with the symbolic Biblical semantic component ‘comfort for the afflicted’.

The same key concept is to be found in the Bible: ‘A merry heart doeth good like a **medicine**’ (Proverbs 17:22). In Byron, this Biblical wisdom is pronounced by Adah, Cain’s wife, ‘the ideal of new mankind’ as Franko calls her in his Afterword to the translation.

Adah. What else can joy be, but – spreading joy? (Act I, line 480)

It is typical of Byron’s Adah that she frames her ideas as questions, which seem rhetorical to her and meaningless to Cain. In Franko’s version, Adah puts her point of view as statement, not question:

Ада. Найбільша розкіш – других веселити.

Franko attached a special importance to the image of Cain’s wife-sister, in the Afterword to his translation he describes her as equal or even superior to Lucifer in enunciating the principles of existence: ‘Her love for people is boundless and this love like a miraculous kindness solves and disentangles all the problems which make Cain suffer in confusion’.⁴ This philosophy of the heart which is spontaneous in Byron’s Adah becomes in Franko’s own poem a truth revealed to Cain only after and as a result of long wandering, suffering and hypertrophy of thought. In Byron, Adah is the first to realise that true paradise should be sought in one’s own soul and not in the forbidden Garden of Eden. Thus she reproaches Cain,

Adah. Why wilt thou always mourn for paradise?

Can we not make another? (Act III, lines 37–8)

The translator replaces this gentle suggestion by the call to act:

et al (eds.), *Franko I. Ya. Zibrani tvory v 50 t.* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1976–80), hereinafter *Zib.Tv.* The translation of Byron’s *Cain*, *Kayin-Misteriya v tryokh diyakh*, is in volume 12, pp. 559–642. Franko’s original poem *Smert Kayina* (The Death of Cain) is in volume 1, pp.). The translation (by Vera Rich) of *The Death of Cain* is in *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1998, pp. 55–77.

⁴ Franko, *Zib.Tv.*, vol. 12, p. 664. Translation by Oksana Dzera.

Ада. Що жалувать все за раєм пропалим?
Ми насадім новий рай.

Adah's question in the original has now become a statement: 'we shall plant', while 'another' has become 'new'. The latter semantic development is characteristic of Franko's interpretation, and introduces, as it were, the New Testament motif of renewal – rebirth, resurrection, and the 'new heaven and new earth' of the Apocalypse. Franko's original poem contains an important allusion to this text: His Cain shifts his ground to that of Byron's Adah as a result of a long search for the meaning of life:

О люди, діти, внуки, сиротята!
 Покиньте плакати по страті раю!
 Вам його несучи! Несу ту мудрість,
 Котра поможе вам його здобути,
У власних серцях рай новий створити! (lines 774–8)

O people, children, grandsons, hapless orphans,
 Come, cease your weeping for the loss of Eden!
 I shall bring Eden to you! Bring the wisdom
 To help you to achieve it for yourself,
And in your own hearts create new Eden!

In Byron, Lucifer's final speech seems similar on the surface level, but at a more profound one, takes on an opposite sense:

Lucifer. (...) form an **inner world**
 In your own bosom – where the outward fails. (Act II, lines 463–4)

Люцифер. (...) У власній груді
Збудуйте кращий світ, як цей вам збридне.

Here the 'inner world' of the original has become a 'better world', a term which (unlike the source text) carries the connotation 'paradise'. But Byron's Lucifer calls upon people to build the new world (or paradise) by means of their intellectual power; Franko's Cain sees it as the kingdom of love.

Hence, in his translation Franko brings out the concept of rationalism as the unhappy choice, while in *The Death of Cain* he proposes the alternative, and in so doing develops the image of Cain's wife as a symbol of love. In particular, the concept of a special spiritual alliance between Adah and Abel, hinted at in Byron:

Adah. Our brother comes.
 Cain. Thy brother Abel. (Act III, lines 161–2)

becomes explicit in Franko: Cain hates his sister/wife (in his poem, she is given no name)

За те, що їй ім'я було – людина,
 Що Авелеві були в неї очі,
 І голос Авелів, і серце шире. (lines 18–20)

Since she too bore the name of human creature,
 Because she looked at him with Abel's eyes,
 And Abel's voice and Abel's sincere heart –

The word ‘**серце**’ (heart) is used with reference to her three times in Franko’s poem,⁵ and thus outlines the opposition to the misanthropic character of Cain introduced through the repetition of the emotionally loaded epithet ‘ненависний’. The description of Cain’s wife as ‘чиста **серцем**’ (pure in heart), evoking the Beatitudes, puts her among those who will ‘see God’ (St Matthew 5:8). This Biblical motif symbolises the final truth gained by Franko’s Cain through much suffering:

У власних серцях рай новий створити. (line 778)
And in your own hearts create new Eden.

Franko had begun to develop the significance of ‘**серце**’ (heart) with respect to Cain in his translation of Byron’s *Mystery*. This, in the form of an endearment, is introduced into Cain’s description of Adah;

Cain. (...) my Adah, my
Own and beloved. (Act I, lines 186–7).
Кайн. Моя **сердечна**, люба жінка Ада.

The meaning of the original is amplified in a similar manner in the dialogue where Adam stresses the sincerity of his prayer:

Cain. Have ye not pray’d?
Adam. We have, most **fervently**. (Act I, lines 23–4).
Кайн. Чи ж не молились ви?
Адам. О, так, **сердечно**.

The word ‘fervent’ contains the semantic component ‘emotionally intense’; and heart is considered the emotional centre of man.

Thus, the word ‘**серце**’ of the target text overlaps the semantic structure of the corresponding word of the original and, simultaneously, enters the semantic field of the translation with the key notion ‘heart’. Again, we may compare Byron’s original:

Adah. These are a goodly offering to the Lord,
Giv’n with a gentle and a contrite **spirit**. (Act III, lines 107–8)
Ада. Се все для Господа приємна жертва,
Лиш принеси її з скрухою, смирним **серцем**.

The word ‘**серце**’ (heart) is used here in the sense of ‘the seat of one’s inmost thoughts and secret feelings; one’s inmost being, the depth of the soul, the spirit’,⁶ thus corresponding to the ‘spirit’ of Byron’s original. At the same time, it adds the meanings ‘the seat of the emotions generally, the emotional nature, as distinguished from the intellectual nature, placed in the head’,⁷ and ‘the seat of love and affection’.⁸

The absence of ‘heart’ in this sense drives Cain to fratricide. Franko stresses this in his rendering of Eve’s final curse:

⁵ In addition to the passage quoted, see ‘... though, herself, sinless and pure in heart’ (line 24) and ‘Within her woman’s heart she strove to warm The murderer’s soul’. (lines 40–4).

⁶ Heart, definition 6a in the *New [Oxford] English Dictionary*.

⁷ Heart, definition 9a, *ibid*.

⁸ Heart, definition 10a, *ibid*.

Eve. All bonds I break between us, as he broke
That of his **nature**. (Act III, lines 409–10)
Єва. Я вирікаюсь го, як він ся вирік
Чуття і серця.

The moral lexical overtones of the expression 'human nature' include the components 'feeling, heart, mercy'. The translator preserves the balance between his interpretative position and the source text. Simultaneously, Franko explicitly introduces what will become a key theme in *The Death of Cain*, which is correlated with the Biblical motif of 'blessedness' through love.

The image of Cain's wife forms an important link in the allegorical chain of concepts associated with the key 'life/death' dichotomy of Franko's poem.

In Franko's symbolism, death is seen as a reflection of the mystery of life and conversely. Thus, the contrast between the murdered corpse of Abel and the peaceful, happy face of the dead woman pinpoints the contrast between the external results of hatred and the inner world of selfless love:

Криваве, синє Авеля лице...
З застиглим виразом страшного болю,
Докору і предсмертної тривоги. (lines 10, 13–14)

Лице (...) мов просіяло,
Відмолоділо. Та сама любов
Що за життя, й тепер на нім світилась,
Та щезла туга і тривожна дума,
Немов все те, к чому душа її
Неслась і рвалась за життя, було
Осягнене тепер. (lines 79–85)

The blood-bespattered, blue-tinged face of Abel...
He saw that frozen image of dread anguish,
Reproach and terror of impending death.

Her face...
... now seemed to shine,
It had grown young again. That self-same love
Which had shone in her life, still shone in it,
But yearning and all anxious thoughts had vanished,
As if, it seemed, all that her heart had striven
Towards, and aspired to in life was now
At last attained.

Byron's Cain is impelled to fratricide by his own subjective fear of death. Following the Biblical source, Franko's Cain bears a mark which preserves him from physical death. Nevertheless, his soul is laid waste and dead since it lacks love, the only source of life:

(...) чуття, великая любов –
Ось джерело життя. (lines 693–4)

A feeling... of great love –
That is the source of life.

To accentuate this allegory, in the course of his description of Cain's wanderings, Franko repeatedly applies to him the simile 'мов труп' ('like a corpse').⁹ Death in a revalued existential sense becomes a vital element in the allegorical picture of paradise. Those who have tasted the fruit of life (or love) do not fear death:

(...) вони на смерть ішли, мов на весілля,
Вмирили з усміхом, із ран, із мук
Вони катів своїх благословляли. (lines 679–81)

This implicit evocation of the sufferings of Christ thus extends to the image of Cain. According to Osyp Makovey,¹⁰ Franko himself admitted that he had almost turned Cain into a Christ-figure. The first murderer acquires these Christ-like features as a result of an interior rebirth which becomes externally visible only with his physical death. In particular, in his *Mystery*, Byron indicates the absence of calm in Cain's soul:

Cain. Nothing can **calm** me more. **Calm**, say I? Never
Knew I what calm is in the soul. (Act III, lines 204–5)

Каїн. Ніщо мене не успокоїть.
Вспокоїть, кажеш? Серцем я ніколи
Не був спокійний.

The repetition of the word 'calm' in the original (and the morphological repetition of the stem 'спокій' in the translation) intensifies the portrayal of Cain's agitated and unbalanced state. And here again the translation includes the word 'серце' with all its connotations of love and blessedness – that is, those very qualities which Byron's Cain lacks. In *The Death of Cain*, Franko develops the theme of Cain's inability to find rest:

(...) божее клеймо,
Наложене на нього, гнало геть
Від нього всяку твар, усяку смерть,
Та гнало геть і сон, і супокій. (lines 187–90)

The brand that God
Had placed on him repelled and drove away
Far from his every terror, every death,
But likewise drove away all sleep and peace.

Death restores to Cain these same blessed gifts taken from him by his own hatred:

А він лежав, немов дитя,
Вколисане до сну, простягти руки,
З лицем спокійним, ясним. (lines 985–7)

⁹ Namely: line 131 'Thunderstruck, he stood there, like a corpse'; lines 253–4 'in his weakness fell/Amid the desert, and lay like a corpse'; line 316 'Until, strength gone, he fell there like a corpse'; and lines 878–9 'And there, upon that place of frozen ice,/Fell and lay like a corpse'. Significantly, Lamech, after killing Cain, also stands 'like a corpse... stock-still!' (line 879).

¹⁰ Osyp Makovey (1867–1925), writer, translator and literary scholar. For two years (1897–9) he worked with Franko on the editorial board of the Lviv journal *Literaturno-naukovi vistyky*.

And he lay there, like a child
Lulled into sleep, lay with his arms extended,
With peaceful and bright countenance.

Another motif which Franko developed both in his translation of Byron's *Mystery* and his own poem is that of Faust: the primary motif from the German legend and the secondary one from Goethe's play. Franko mentions in a letter to Mykhaylo Drahomanov that in *The Death of Cain* he has worked in 'a piece of the legend of Faust who looked upon Paradise from the peaks of the Caucasus'.¹¹ Franko tries to show that the way to spiritual perfection lies through suffering and long concentration of spiritual and emotional efforts. The protagonist of Byron's *Mystery* perceives the Universe in less than two hours. Franko's Cain earns a brief glance at the Garden of Eden (the symbol of the internal principles of existence) only at the cost of long wandering and self-torment. One can draw a parallel between Franko's Cain and the Faust of the legend. The image of the mountain in the Goethe acquires the symbolic connotations of 'spiritual self-cognition and self-renewal'. Faust is transported up the mountain by a single wave of Mephistopheles' hand, but cannot discern paradise in the glimmering light. (Mephistopheles hints at his blindness and lack of concentration which prevent him from seeing the true paradise). Franko makes use of a similar image in his poem *Moses*, where Azazel ('the desert's dark demon'¹²), like Mephistopheles, shows to the prophet the promised land and the future of Israel, but (again like Byron's Lucifer) shakes his faith by means of an equivocation, which, while formally true, conceals the true intention of the Creator. This symbolic vision of Eden, seen from above, is a specific feature of Byron's *Mystery* too: hovering in the depths of space, Cain cannot discern the location of Eden when Lucifer taunts him to do so. Franko's Cain reaches the mountain top only as a result of long and painful efforts, and, as a result of this purgation, is spiritually prepared for the vision.

In Biblical imagery, a mountain may have various symbolic connotations: 'God's power and bliss' (Psalms 35:7, Isaiah 2:2), 'shelter' (Psalms 29:81) or 'obstacle' (Zachariah 4:7, St Matthew 12:20), etc. All these are successively developed in Franko's poem. In the Bible, most theophanies and significant acts of God take place on high mountains (from the covenant with Noah to the ascension of Christ). It would be possible, for example, to draw a symbolic parallel between the Transfiguration of Jesus (St Matthew 17:1) and the spiritual rebirth of Franko's Cain, both of which take place on a high mountain – thus reinforcing Franko's words about his Cain's transformation into Christ.

Franko's interpretation of Byron's *Mystery* and his own conception of *The Death of Cain* were undoubtedly influenced by Goethe's Faust, which Franko

¹¹ Franko, *Zib.Tv.*, vol. 49, p. 204. Franko's remark, in fact, does not seem to allude directly to Goethe's *Faust*, although in the latter, at one point (Part II, Act IV) Faust and Mephistopheles are on a 'high mountain' (Hochgebirg), from which Mephistopheles shows him 'Die Reiche der Welt und ihre Herrlichkeiten' (an allusion to 'All the kingdoms of the earth and the glory of them', St Matthew 4:8). Presumably, Franko is referring to some other version of the Faust legend.

¹² Franko, *Moysey (Moses)*, Part XIII, lines 79–80, *Zib.Tv.* vol. 5. For a translation of *Moses*, see Ivan Franko, *Moses and other Poems*, trans. Vera Rich and Percival Cundy (New York, 1973).

translated in the period 1875–82. During this time, he must have perceived Faust's final victory over the devil as a possible resolution of Cain's dilemma. Byron's *Mystery* ends with what in *Faust* is an intermediate episode: the protagonist (Cain/Faust) is responsible for the death of an innocent person (Abel, Gretchen). Hence, the key idea of *The Death of Cain* coincides with Franko's perception of *Faust* outlined in his preface to his translation of Goethe's work: '(...) knowledge of itself cannot make man happy if he always thinks exclusively of himself. Only when he devotes all his achievements and forces to making other people happy, can the man be happy too'.¹³

There is a well-recognised analogy between Goethe's Mephistopheles and Byron's Lucifer. A powerful demonic principle that transcends the boundary between good and evil is a typical feature of Romanticism. Goethe's Mephistopheles proclaims himself to be part of the power which aspires to evil but creates good. Byron's Lucifer calls himself 'the part of all things, (...) the leaven of all life and lifelessness'. The difference between these images lies in the grand irony of Mephistopheles and apparent benevolence of Lucifer. However, in his translation of Byron's *Mystery*, Franko tries to accentuate the ambiguity of Lucifer's character, i.e. not only his 'divine' features but also those akin to Mephistopheles. At the very beginning, Byron's Cain discerns a dark side of the mighty Spirit of Light:

Cain. (...) sorrow seems
Half of his immortality. (Act I, lines 95–6)

Franko substitutes the quantitative description for the qualitative one by means of the apt metaphor:

Кайн. (...) сум якийсь
Мутить його красу.

Cain. Some sadness
 Besmirches his beauty.

The negative connotation of the word 'мутити' implies that Lucifer has come to tempt and confuse Cain, thus accentuating the original subtext that dresses Lucifer in the ominous mask of Mephistopheles. Likewise, Byron's Lucifer agrees to endow Cain with knowledge 'upon one condition' (Act I, line 302). In Franko's translation, the neutral English word 'condition' is replaced by the allegorically charged 'вимінка' ('**за одну вимінку**'), which implies that something must be given in exchange – hence evoking legends and archetypes of those who sell their souls to the devil in return for some temporary gain.

Thus, Franko's interpretative role as translator enables him to accentuate the contrast of light and shadow in the image of Lucifer.

One may also observe a contrast between Franko's Cain and Victor Hugo's poem 'Conscience'. Franko translated the latter work in 1897, eight years after finishing *The Death of Cain*. Hugo's Cain tries to escape the all-seeing eye of his conscience:

¹³ Franko, *Zib.Tv.*, vol. 13, p. 353. Translation by Oksana Dzera.

L'oeil était dans la tombe et regardait Cain.¹⁴

... око в гробі ще на Каїна гляділо.¹⁵

Franko's Cain aspires to behold the lost paradise, which comes to symbolise both his sin and his purgation.

Many of Franko's greatest works address the theme of a prophet unhonoured in his native land. *The Death of Cain* may also be numbered among them. The Biblical motif of fratricide (both canonical and apocryphal) and its interpretation in various literary works, forms a major strand in Franko's artistic legacy. And, gathering to itself a complex of Biblical and personal allusions, the Biblical image of the first murderer is thus subsumed into that of prophet and protomartyr. □

¹⁴ Victor Hugo, *La Légende de Siècles. Tome Première. I. D'Eve a Jésus*. ii. La Conscience, line 70.

¹⁵ Franko, *Zib.Tv.*, vol. 12, p. 295.

New Light on Lesya Ukrayinka and Serhiy Merzhynskyi

Tetiana Kobrzhytska

The national consciousness of a people may be compared to a great dome, held aloft by the titanic figures which architects call *Atlantes*. It is rare we find among them a female figure, a *caryatid*. Yet this is so in the case of Ukraine: the great triad of literary geniuses includes, besides Taras Shevchenko (1814–61) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916), a woman, ‘Lesya Ukrayinka’ – the pseudonym of Larysa Kosach (1871–1913), a brilliant writer who throughout virtually her all-to-brief life was crippled by osteo-tuberculosis. It was Lesya Ukrayinka who invigorated Ukrainian literature by grafting on to its already flourishing tree implants from the best of classical and contemporary European literature. And of her, Ivan Franko wrote: ‘Not since the time when Shevchenko proclaimed in his *Testament*:

Make my grave there, and arise
Sundering your chains,¹

was there heard such strong, ardent and poetic words as from the lips of this frail, sick girl’,² whom he termed ‘the only real man in the whole of Ukraine’.

For a whole century, Lesya Ukrayinka’s works have been read, pondered, researched from various aspects, with a greater or lesser degree of professional knowledge, plumbing the secrets of her skill and the depths of her philosophical richness and diversity.

Only her individual ‘ego’, intimately feminine, which is reflected in the psychology of her work, has not yet been properly addressed. Why? First and foremost, this is due to our notorious apathy and lack of interest about the authors of our national classics. I seem to hear a chorus of disagreement and disapproval: ‘What about the right to privacy?’ Certainly, in their time Lesya’s mother, Olena Pchilka, and Klement Kvitka, whom Lesya married in 1907, tried, for what seemed to them good reasons, to prevent the general reader from learning too much about her personal life. But today such matters belong not to her mother, nor to her husband, nor to her family, but to world culture. All the more so when such details demonstrate the high level of her integrity, virtue, altruism and self-sacrifice. Furthermore, the ‘women’s issues’ of the time – the west European campaign for the emancipation of women which was beginning to have a considerable impact in Ukraine, versus the traditional Ukrainian family mores and concept of the role and duties of a wife – had their effect on Lesya’s own life, and, in any case, as a writer, she could not ignore them.


Yet to date this aspect of Lesya’s life and work has never been addressed at a scholarly level.

¹ Taras Shevchenko, *Zapovit* (The Testament), 1845, a poem which has become, *de facto*, Ukraine’s ‘second national anthem’. The translation is from V. Rich, *Song out of Darkness* (London, 1961), p. 85.

² I. Franko, *Tvory: U 50-tyt.*, vol. 31 (Kyiv, 1951), pp. 265–6.

Some attempts have been made to describe Lesya Ukrayinka's personal life – in greater or lesser detail – but all proved more or less superficial and, on the whole, tendentious.

Only recently has there been any attempt to write about Lesya's relationship with the political activist Serhiy Merzhynskiy. With one exception – 'Porvalasya neskinchena rozmova' (The conversation was interrupted, unfinished), Lesya never published the poems which she dedicated to him (and which may be rated among the world's greatest love lyrics), either at the time or later in her life.³



Serhiy Merzhynskiy

However, in the period immediately after World War II, Soviet literature was expected to produce resounding propaganda phrases about victory and the triumph of the Soviet regime over Nazism. The dedicatee of these works, Serhiy Merzhynskiy, remained on the list of 'non-persons' until the post-Stalin thaw – when at last it was permitted to read books on the precursors of Marxism – books in which history was written objectively, without the mandatory interpolations exalting the role of Stalin, and when key publications were once more accessible to the general run of researchers.⁴ During this period, Merzhynskiy began to be portrayed as an active member of social-democratic groups, one of the first propounders of Marxism in Kyiv and Minsk, and an organiser of the First Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (RSDRP), held in Minsk in 1898. In their haste to take advantage of the new relaxations, certain people hurried into print with articles and notes on Merzhynskiy. Thus, the *Byelorussian Soviet Encyclopaedia* included an entry on Merzhynskiy by the author M. Melnikaū – which contained a number of serious errors and misrepresentations.⁵ According to this article, Lesya Ukrayinka was said to have visited Minsk twice, remaining beside her dying friend throughout the last week of his life, and writing the dramatic poem 'Oderzhyma' (A Woman Possessed) on the day of his death. In his search for 'fresh' facts, Melnikaū displayed the same dilettante level in his article 'Druzhba sylnykh bortsiv' (The Friendship of Mighty Warriors).⁶ Other publications claim that Lesya Ukrayinka was in Minsk on three occasions. However, a careful perusal of her correspondence, published in the 10-volume collection of her works (Kyiv, 1965), indicates that she was in Belarus at least four times: in February, March and

³ Most of them were eventually published in *Lesya Ukrayinka. Neopublikovani tvory* (Lesya Ukrayinka. Unpublished Works, Lviv, 1947). The rest were published in 1946 in the journals *Ukrayina*, *Vitchyzna* and *Radyanskyi Lviv*.

⁴ Such sources included: *Na putyakh k I syezdu RSDRP. 80-e gody v kievskom podpole* (I. N. Moshkiy, Moscow, 1908); *Iz perezhitogo* (P. L. Tuchanskiy, Odesa, 1923); 'Iz moikh vospominaniy', *Katorga i ssylka*, 1930, no. 6, by V. G. Kryzhanovskaya-Tuchanskaya.

⁵ M. Melnikaū, 'Miaržynski Siarhej Kanstancinavič', *Bieltaruskaja Savieckaja Encyklapedija*, vol. 7, (Minsk, 1973), p. 341.

⁶ *Vitchyzna*, 1960, no. 7.

September 1900, and January–March 1901.⁷ Her last visit was due to the deterioration in Merzhynskiy's health – he was in the last stages of tuberculosis. Lesya Ukrayinka remained constantly at his bedside from 7 January until his death on 3 March, and left Minsk on 5 March 1901 after his funeral. According to her own dating, she wrote the poem 'A Woman Possessed'⁸ during the night on 18 January 1901 (and not, as Melnikaŭ implies, on 3 March), while keeping watch at the bedside of her dying friend, in a state of physical exhaustion, but with a surge of almost superhuman intellectual energy.

Much has been written about 'A Woman Possessed'. But, as Lina Kostenko rightly noted, if one reads the majority of these works, one forms a 'frightful picture of some theoretical chaos', ranging from a 'poem of excessive individualism' to a 'poem of revolutionary romanticism'.⁹ This is one of the most striking examples of the misrepresentation of Lesya Ukrayinka's thoughts and feelings.

Undoubtedly, Lesya Ukrayinka and Merzhynskiy yearned for a transformation of society, and their outlook on politics and social issues was shaped by the humanist ideas of 'liberté, égalité, fraternité', which at that time, in the Russian empire at least, still remained uncorrupted and uncompromised. Under Merzhynskiy's influence, Lesya Ukrayinka read the writings of various social-democrats, and took up certain aspects of these in her own works. (Later, the Soviet censorship would allow scholars to write enthusiastically about Lesya Ukrayinka's interest in Marx's *Das Kapital* – but forbade them to discuss the reasons for her critical attitude towards Marxism).

Today, at last, it has been definitively established that Lesya Ukrayinka did not adopt the Russificatory tendencies of the Russian social-democrats, and was categorically opposed to the Marxist attitude of ignoring the national question. Soviet scholars had portrayed her relationship with Serhiy Merzhynskiy in far too narrowly ideological terms, and had constantly stressed the influence of Merzhynskiy's Marxist views on her *Weltanschauung*. It is clear, however, that Lesya did not later rally to the banner of Bolshevism. From one of her letters to Mykhalo Kryvnyuk, we learn that she belonged to a Ukrainian social-democratic group, but did not join the Kyivan RSDRP organisation (letter of 27 November 1905).¹⁰ Prior to that, Lesya Ukrayinka expressed herself unambiguously about the split of the RSDRP into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (letter from 18 February 1903). Her

⁷ It has been suggested that Lesya also visited Minsk in March 1898 for the RSDRP Congress. In view of the fact that she was already acquainted with Merzhynskiy, this seems quite possible, but there is insufficient firm evidence either way.

⁸ *Oderzhyma*. This was Lesya Ukrayinka's first work in the field of poetic drama, in which she would later write her greatest masterpieces. To date, no English translation has appeared. For the Ukrainian text, see Lesya Ukrayinka, *Tvory u 10-ty tomakh* (Kyiv, 1973), hereinafter cited as *Tvory*, vol. 3, pp. 131–52.

⁹ Lina Kostenko (b. 1930), poet; one of the earliest and most outstanding of the 'Shestidesyatnyky' (the Sixtiers), the literary generation that began to publish in the second half of the 1950s, during the post-Stalin thaw, reaching their literary peak in the early 1960s. Her remarks in an essay entitled 'Poet, shcho ishov skhodamy hihantiv' (A Poet who walked with giant strides), in L. Ukrayinka, *Dramatychni tvory* (Dramatic Works) (Kyiv, 1989), p. 17.

¹⁰ The letter in question, dated 27 November 1905, was first published in Petro Odarchenko, 'Lesya Ukrayinka. Rozvidky riznykh rokiv', *Ukrayinoznavstvo diaspori* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 187. This was the first time this letter appeared in print.

position was firm: the social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people, concerning which she wrote 'it is not our job to serve the cause of Russification – not even in a revolutionary guise'.¹¹

Serious researchers on Lesya Ukrayinka (Mykola Zerov, Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara et al) divide her work into three periods: 1884–93, 1894–1903, and 1904–13. Thus, during 1894–1903, her life and activities were marked by a certain singleness of purpose. And when she met Merzhynskyi in the summer of 1897, she was already a mature and well-formed personality. Thus, knowing the strength of her convictions and *Weltanschauung*, an inalienable part and dominant factor of which was the national idea, how can one reduce her friendship with Merzhynskyi to something banal and straightforward.

A few years ago, a book came out in Belarus by Yakov Basin, a doctor by profession and an amateur of literature. This work, *Zov Prometeya* (The Call of Prometheus), purports to tell the story of Lesya Ukrayinka and Merzhynskyi.¹² Although it contains much interesting material, I am convinced that such a book should have been written only by someone who had a real understanding of the feeling of national dignity which is so fraught with tragedy for Ukrainians (and Belarusians). Basin's book repeats the old clichés that have so long set our teeth on edge – including the 'despotism' and 'cruelty' of Lesya's mother, the lack of character of her father, the 'phony liberalism' of their family and the like. Basin was clearly captivated by the beauty and romanticism of the relationship between his protagonists – however, he proved unequal to the task of placing it in the context of Lesya Ukrayinka's entire creative processes, for which he lacked the specialist knowledge. The main failing of the work, however, is its basic concept: it is a fundamental error to attempt to portray Lesya Ukrayinka without taking into account her profound and active commitment to the Ukrainian national cause. Furthermore, Merzhynskyi, during his final illness, found himself in a state of unexpected and inexplicable isolation. Formerly, according to his friends' recollections (as expressed by Basin) he had been 'most emphatically liked by everyone who knew him, ironically humorous, sensitive, sincere, genuine, with well-matched physical and spiritual graces'.¹³ Moreover, he had been at the heart of the preparations for the First Congress of the RSDRP in Minsk in March 1898. Yet now – but for Lesya – he was virtually alone. Many factors may have contributed to this, but one may well have been a certain estrangement from his former political colleagues following the broadening of his *Weltanschauung* to include Lesya Ukrayinka's 'Gospel' of the Ukrainian cause, in addition to purely revolutionary issues. If this is indeed so, it adds a particular poignancy to their joint tragedy.

Taking this into account, this is the first step towards uncovering the full picture.

The second step is to recognise that this was a deep psychological and emotional commitment, and it was love that, first and foremost, defined the nature of their relationship. Behind the terse entry in the *Encyclopaedia*, that Lesya Ukrayinka 'went to Minsk three times to visit the sick Merzhynskyi, on the last occa-

¹¹ Ibid., p. 147.

¹² Ya. Basin, *Zov Prometeya: Povest o Sergeje Merzhinskijom* (Minsk, 1987).

¹³ Ibid., p. 58.

sion she lived [there] (January–April 1901) until the death of her friend',¹⁴ there lies an entire epic canvas with a large cast of characters. Let us look at Lesya Ukrayinka's 'correspondence'. Undoubtedly, the people closest to her understood the whole profundity and depth of her feelings and anguish. The two family members to whom Lesya felt closest, her aunt Elya (her father's sister) and her favourite sister Lilya, came to Minsk to give her their moral and practical support. Mykhaylo Kryvnyuk, a friend of long-standing and her sister's fiancé, came on 23 February and stayed to the end, helping her to carry out Merzhynskyi's last wishes regarding his funeral. During Lesya's last weeks with Merzhynskyi, her mother's silver jubilee as a writer occurred. However, Lesya Ukrayinka did not return home for the celebrations, but remained in Minsk. She also ignored her own 30th birthday, on 25 February 1901. Can this really be explained simply as 'duty to a friend'? Surely not. Lesya was in love.

From Lesya's works, the discerning reader becomes aware that she had for a long time been, so to speak, preparing herself psychologically for just such a love. One may note, in particular, her insight into the nuances of teenage psychology in her story *Pryyazn* (Friendship),¹⁵ which bears the subtitle 'A tale of life in Volyn Polissya', and which, although written in 1905, nevertheless reflects her own youthful psychological development.

Even more telling is her fascination with external beauty, talent, delicacy, extraordinary sensitivity and physical incapacity, and some indescribable subtlety, in her work *Holosni struny* (Resounding Strings),¹⁶ written in 1897, the year she met Merzhynskyi. One cannot fail to see in the character of Nastya in that work a clear reflection of Lesya's own autobiography. Consider, for example, the passages:

Nastya took Nadson, her favourite poet... Nastya smiled bitterly: 'Is that me? Did I think to write poems, or what?... What a pity! They will never see the light, unless the fire reads them, – oh, it has read many such!'

'Nastya did not like being alone among the dark trees, – like every invalid, she found the spreading darkness upsetting'...

'I think that I am unlucky forever: as long as love is alive, it burns with fire; when love dies. He does not love me, and I am unlucky; if he loved me, we should both be unlucky. I know this but love him all the same, burn myself with fire...'.¹⁷

That was written in 1897. In the summer of 1898, Merzhynskyi stayed for a prolonged period in the Poltava region, a guest of the Kosach family. According to Basin's fictional version, it was during this time that Lesya Ukrayinka first declared her love to Serhiy Merzhynskyi – and he coldly rejected her. A photograph from that time has survived. On it are Lesya Ukrayinka and Serhiy Merzhynskyi. She looks beautiful – and sad. It may well be that, at this time, Merzhynskyi had had to tell her that marriage between the two of them would be impossible – he had been born into a tubercular family and was himself a congenital victim of the disease.

¹⁴ Khv. Žyčka, 'Ukrainka Lesya', *Bielaruskaja Savieckaja Encykłapedija*, vol. 11 (Minsk, 1974), p. 441.

¹⁵ *Tvory*, vol. 7, pp. 205–9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 143–55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 150–1.

Furthermore, Merzhynskiy's family background may, to some extent, explain the ambiguity of his attitude to the national question. His father, Kostyantyn, was of a Belarusian family, with an estate near Minsk, and ranked as a nobleman. His mother, Vira, was partly Irish (her father's given name is recorded as 'Vilyan' – presumably 'William'). Soon after Serhiy was born, she died of consumption, and the boy was brought up by his maternal grandmother in Kyiv, while his father remained in Minsk.

Such was his heredity – and Lesya Ukrayinka clearly gave some thought to this. Let us recall her first drama *Blakytina troyanda* (Azure Rose),¹⁸ which Merzhynskiy made such efforts to get staged, both in Minsk and elsewhere. In this work Lesya predicted her own destiny and revealed herself as Cassandra. This work brought down on her the venom of the critics, both at the time, since it broke away from the canons of traditional Ukrainian rustic comedies, and in Soviet times, when psychology and the genetics of heredity were censored topics. This is further evidence that Lesya Ukrayinka had for a long time been thinking seriously and responsibly about her own personal life. In the most recent edition of the scholarly *History of Ukrainian Literature* it is stated that:

The main heroine of 'The Azure Rose' – is Lyubov Hoshynska – a victim of hereditary insanity, who therefore considers that she has no right to a personal life, love, family. However, the essence of the tragedy lies not in her illness, but in the impossibility – in a trivial, temporising bourgeois environment inclined towards socio-political compromises – of achieving self-fulfilment and establishing oneself as an individual through the fullness of the emotion of love.¹⁹

Through this artistically stylised image we see, once again, something that is directly autobiographical and Lesyan.

Let us now consider her story *Nad morem* (By the Sea).²⁰

The new modern trends of the time had brought about great upheavals, not only at the social level, but also in personal mores – the sexual revolution. Lesya also gave these matters considerable thought – but while considering these new ideas, she always kept before her the problem of spiritual values. This story is dated 19 November 1898. On doctors' orders, Lesya Ukrayinka had spent the preceding year in Yalta, where she had gathered countless ideas, observations, and impressions of the 'freedom of behaviour' of resort life. These, taken in conjunction with her friendship with Merzhynskiy, their time together, and her own personal concept of proper conduct, gave rise to this tale. The central character is a capricious, lazy, empty-headed, frivolous Russian girl. The writer is not cruel to her heroine. Her essential nature is revealed, as it were, in the sentence: 'For you "worldings", it is all utterly boring – endless shilly-shallying, you do not know how to be virtuous to the end, nor licentious to the end, but everything half way'.²¹

Thus, Alla, the protagonist of the tale, is 'neither one thing', 'nor the other'. From both *By the Sea* and *Pryyazn* it is clear that Lesya Ukrayinka was acquaint-

¹⁸ Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 7–116.

¹⁹ Leonila Mishchenko, 'Lesya Ukrayinka', *Istoriya ukrayinskoyi literatury*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1987), p. 591.

²⁰ *Tvory*, vol. 7, pp. 163–201.

²¹ Ibid., p. 179.

ed with French boulevard literature; she refers to a novel by Gyp²² and the works of Prévost,²³ who in his novels combined the portrayal of an adulterer, and detailed erotic scenes with singing the praises of Christian virtues and duties. The above quote from *By the Sea* clearly alludes to Prévost's works *Les Demi-vierges* (both the novel and play by that title) about the sex life and licentiousness of worldly young Parisiennes, which was a major sensation at that time.

Thus some of her female protagonistists keep Gyp and Prévost hidden in their dressing-tables or under their pillows, make love *à la Bohème*, and flippantly and



Vulica Kujbašava 10, in Minsk, where it has been proposed to erect a memorial plaque. The actual house where Lesya Ukrayinka stayed with Merzhynskyi has been destroyed. It stood on what is now part of the court-yard of this building.

licentiously want to 'snatch' everything 'from life', while others are like the unnamed girl who acts as a contrast to Alla in *By the Sea*, and who reads Turgenev to try and escape from her illness. Turgenev's heroines, we may recall, have souls open to beauty, knowledge, spirituality, and pure romantic love. Regarding Lesya

²² 'Gyp' was the pseudonym of Sybille-Gabrielle-Marie-Antoinette, née Riquetti de Mirabeau, by marriage, Comtesse de Martel de Janville (1849–1922). Lesya Ukrayinka gives the title of the book in question as apparently *L'amour Moderne*. No such work is listed in the catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale, and Lesya has presumably invented the title to epitomise the themes of Gyp's works such as *Autour du Mariage* (1883), *Ce qui femme veut* (1883), *Autour du Divorce* (1886), *Mariage Civil* (1892), *Mariage de Cibiffon* (1894), *La coeur d'Ariane* (1895), *La Bonheur de Ginette* (1896), etc.

²³ Eugène-Marcel Prévost (1862–1941). *Les Demi-vierges* was published as a book in 1894, and staged as a play the following year. The *Encyclopedia Britannica* (11th edition, Cambridge, 1911, vol. xxii, p. 312) notes the 'great sensation' caused by what it terms this 'exaggerated and revolting study of the results of Parisian education and Parisian society on young girls'.

herself, one must add yet another undoubted virtue – a readiness to act on behalf of the down-trodden. Significantly, the unnamed girl who narrates the story and who may be considered a mouthpiece of the author's ideas, is compared in the story to a certain Englishwoman, Miss Forester,²⁴ who was clearly greatly discussed at the time. This lady had travelled from England to Moscow, where she set about fund-raising, and from there to the leper-colonies of Yakutia. She was widely known as the 'Teacher of the lepers', by some as a term of respect and by others with a tinge of petty-minded scepticism and irony. Such a character was close to Lesya Ukrayinka's. Not an outward show of heroism, nor trumpeting about one's achievements, but rather the inner strength of the spirit, hidden stoicism, resolution, undisplayed nobility and self-sacrifice.

'Not idly do I sometimes compare myself with ivy, there is in me something gloomy; perhaps that is why people turn to me in their grief, perhaps, too, this is why other people's pain never seems empty and not worth my attention through this', wrote Lesya Ukrayinka to her sister Lilya from Yalta in 1897, shortly after she had first met Merzhynskiy. This letter contains the image of ivy, which later will become an essential part of a poem – a memorial wreath to a friend. The self-sacrifice which she showed so profoundly in her association with Merzhynskiy was dominant in her original poetic images. In her verseplay *Kaminnyi hospodar*,²⁵ her sympathy is not with the imperious Donna Anna, the beloved of Don Juan, but with Dolores, who is ready to sacrifice her good name for him. In *A Woman Possessed*, we have Miriam whose self-sacrifice in the name of Christ, as it were does penance for the guilt of humanity towards Him. Finally, in *The Forgotten Shadow*, she writes not of Dante's beloved, but his wife Gemma, who bore all the burdens of his troubled life.²⁶ This search for parallels may be continued in her prose works. But the crowning triumph of her poetic imagination in this regard is the wood-nymph Mavka in *Lisova pisnya*.²⁷ Here we have the same problem of emancipation which confronted Lesya Ukrayinka and Merzhynskiy, and which is echoed in Lesya's letters of advice to her sister Olha in connection with her relationship with Kryvnyuk; it is Mavka, who first admits love, who does not demand pledges and promises, who loves without the need for official contracts, and gives without demanding sureties nor expecting anything in return. A description of free love? Yes, but a free love that 'creates treasures', gives birth to wonders, which through pain gives inspiration, which is on the level of art, which gives the person a soul...

Thus the chronicle of Lesya's heroes is the philosophy of her and his love.

²⁴ Apparently a fictional name, but founded on the real-life Kate Marsden, whose memoirs of her work among the lepers, *On Sledge and Horseback to the Outcast Siberian Lepers* (London, 1893) was epitomised in a Russian pamphlet *Miss Marsden – Anglichanka Yekaterina Marsden v Sibiri u prokazbenykh* (St Petersburg, 1894).

²⁵ For a translation of *Kaminnyi Hospodar* (The Stone Host) see *Lesya Ukrayinka, Selected Works, translated by Vera Rich, Life and Works by Constantine Bida* (University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 30–142.

²⁶ A translation of this poem appears in Percival Cundy (translator) *Spirit of Flame, a collection of works of Lesya Ukrayinka* (New York, 1950), pp. 44–5.

²⁷ For a translation of *Lisova pisnya* (Forest Song), see *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. xlii, 1994, no. 1, pp. 66–73; no. 2, pp. 33–58; no. 3, pp. 40–60; no. 4, pp. 48–64.

And if anyone doubts this: then let him read more carefully Lesya Ukrayinka's work, which has a title with a hidden double meaning – *Pomyłka* (Mistake),²⁸ and read:

I have deliberately selected 'objective' themes, from history or from a social sphere unfamiliar to me, but this was only a 'masquerade of the soul', – people did not recognise this, my 'subjective, individual' soul, and, indeed, sometimes took it for a 'collective conscience', but if anyone knew it to the bottom, he would say: 'I have recognised you, O mask!' I shared out my heart in bits to my heroes, and from the various manifestations of their love... (it would seem, such diametrically different manifestations) there could have been put together my own one great and entire love...²⁹

The end of the Cold War division of Europe has provided new opportunities for research into *Lesyana*, since scholars from the former Soviet Union now have access to the archives of persons who had close contact with her but who ended their lives abroad. Thus one may search for material on Lesya Ukrayinka in the archives of the Russian émigrés, with whom she had become acquainted during her time in Minsk – Yevgeniy Chirikov, who settled in Prague, Vladimir Posse who went to London, and others.

This may well result, too, in imaginative, belletristic, interpretations of Lesya's life. Already, the Grand Old Man of Belarusian literature, the poet Siarhiey Hrachoŭski, who recently celebrated his 85th birthday, has written a narrative poem *Apantanaja* (Bewitched) about Lesya Ukrayinka and Serhiy Merzhynskiy.³⁰ This brings a fresh, original approach to the theme. He pictures Lesya going to the market to buy cranberries for her sick friend. She buys them from a man who has a little son Jas, who writes poems in (how strange) Belarusian. Lesya gives her blessings to the budding poet, who in time grows up into the great Janka Kupala³¹... What Ukrainian writer, one wonders, will tackle the theme of Lesya. Time will tell. In the meantime, let us concentrate on reading Lesya's own works with a more profound perceptiveness.

Afterword

In 1990, Zachar and Sofja Sybek published a book, *Pages from the Life of Pre-revolutionary Minsk*. The chapter on 'Old Minsk Addresses' makes it possible to locate places in the city associated with Lesya's visit.

The Union of Writers of Belarus together with the previous staff of the Ukrainian Embassy in Belarus have raised with the Minsk city authorities the question of erecting a memorial plaque on the building which now stands on the site formerly occupied by the house where Merzhynskiy lived, signifying that Lesya Ukrayinka also lived and worked there during her time with him. So far no decision has been taken. □

²⁸ *Tvory*, vol. 7, pp. 260–79.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

³⁰ Siarhiey Hrachoŭski, born 12/25 September 1913 in Nobel, then in the Minsk gubernia.

³¹ Janka Kupala (real name Ivan Luckievič), 1882–1942, and Jakub Kolas (real name Kanstancin Mickievič), 1882–1956, are considered the joint 'National Poets' of Belarus.

Lesya Ukrayinka
[in memory of Serhiy Merzhynskyi]

The lips proclaim that 'He is gone forever!'
But heart says: 'No, he has departed never!'
Hear you that string which echoes, trembles, yearning,
Re-echoes, trembles, like to hot tears burning?
It beats and throbs here, deep within me hiding:
'Forever I am here, with you abiding!'

So, ever, if in song I seek forgetting,
Or if someone my hand in friendship presses,
Or if there is a pleasant conversation,
Or someone kisses me in salutation,
That string re-echoes, its notes gently gliding:
'For ever I am here, with you abiding!'

If I plunge in mysterious dreams unfathomed,
Abode of shadowy or shining phantoms,
Known and unknown, that cast their spells enchanting,
And where the soul is conquered by their haunting,
A voice re-echoes, sings with a sad chiding:
'Forever I am here, with you abiding!'

Or if sleep chance to seal my eyelids over,
Placing on my dream-weary eyes its cover,
Then throughout all the nightmares on me weighing,
I hear the voice of some sweet phantom, saying –
Re-echoing strange sorrow in its chiding –
'Forever I am here, with you abiding!'

And every time it echoes, in that hour
Within my heart tremble those self-same flowers,
Which in this life to pluck you were forbidden,
Which you wished not to lie in coffin hidden;
They tremble and proclaim, within me hiding:
'You are not, yet with you I am abiding!'

Translated by Vera Rich



125th Anniversary of Ukraine's Oldest Learned Society

Ukraine's oldest learned society, the Naukove Tovarystvo imeny Tarasa Shevchenka (NTSh)¹ this year celebrates its 125th anniversary. Its life has not been an easy one – twenty-five years ago, its centenary could only be celebrated in the Ukrainian diaspora – for the Society had long been banned in Ukraine itself by the Soviet authorities.

The Society – originally called simply the 'Shevchenko Society' – was founded on 11 December 1873 in Lviv, with founders and patrons both from Austrian-ruled Galicia and from the Russian-ruled Ukrainian lands. At first, its aim was fairly limited: to promote Ukrainian literature and culture. This it did with some vigour; its first act was to acquire a printing press and establish its own publishing house. By 1891, it had published 20 major works, including a three-volume history of Ukrainian literature, and had founded its own journal *Zorya* (Star). Meanwhile, within the Russian Empire, in 1876, the 'Ems edict' had come into force, prohibiting the printing and importing of books in the Ukrainian language. In 1893, therefore, the NTSh redefined its aim: to 'foster and develop learning and the arts in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian language [and] and to preserve and collect... the monuments of antiquity [and] scholarly objects of Ukraine-Rus'. The adjective 'Naukove' (Scholarly) was added to its name, and the Society was reorganised to fulfil the role of a 'progenitor of a future Ukrainian-Ruthenian academy of sciences'. Its membership was divided into three sections: Philological, Historical-Philosophical, and Mathematical-Scientific-Medical. It built up an extensive library, which by 1914 totalled some 70,000 printed books and 500 manuscripts – the largest collection of Ucrainica in the world.

NTSh hopes of acquiring the status of an Academy were blocked *de jure* by the Austrian government which, although permitting some of its subject peoples their own Academies, was not prepared to allow the Ukrainians to have one. However, under the Presidency (1897–1913) of the eminent historian Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy,² the NTSh went a long way towards acquiring this status *de facto*. Virtually all prominent Ukrainian scholars from both empires were members; these were divided, on Hrushevskiy's suggestion, into 'full' members – eminent scholars who were entitled to be members of the various 'sections' – and a larger body of 'regular' members who could attend meetings of the sections but who were not entitled to vote on scholarly matters. (Later, various eminent foreign scholars were offered honorary full membership, including Albert Einstein, Max Planck and Tomas Masaryk.) For the major part of Hrushevskiy's Presidency (1898–1908), the

¹ The Society's name is normally rendered in English as the 'Shevchenko Scientific Society'. This is somewhat of a misnomer – the Ukrainian word *nauka* and its derivatives cover the entire range of scholarly learning. In view of the strong commitment of the NTSh to the humanities, 'Shevchenko Academic Society' or 'Shevchenko Scholarly Society' would be a more appropriate rendering.

² Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy (1866–1934), eminent Ukrainian historian, and, in 1918, first President of the Ukrainian National Republic. See, Larysa Fedorova and Svitlana Pankova, 'The "Goal, Meaning and Fortune" of Mykhaylo Hrushevskiy's Life', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1998, pp. 25–42.

Director of the Philological Section was the eminent writer and literary scholar Ivan Franko.³ Among his other activities for the NTSh, Franko was, effectively, the principal editor⁴ of the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (Literary and Scholarly Journal), a wide-circulation monthly founded by the NTSh in 1898, to raise the literary and cultural awareness of the Ukrainian public. Other, more specialised, publications of the NTSh in this period included the 'flagship' *Zapysky NTSh* (Annals of the NTSh),⁵ the *Khronika NTSh* (Chronicle of the NTSh),⁶ as well as serial and occasional publications of the various sections and commissions.

The 1905 revolution in the Russian empire resulted in the lifting of the restrictions on Ukrainian writing and scholarship. A Ukrainian Scholarly Society was founded in Kyiv, and took over the publication of the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*. In 1913, Hrushevskyyi resigned as President, prior to his own return to Kyiv. Nevertheless, the NTSh continued to flourish, and eventually the Austrian government gave the NTSh the long-hoped-for promise: that it would recognise it as a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and create a Ukrainian-taught university in Lviv. Before this could be accomplished, however, the First World War intervened.

During the war-time Russian occupation of Galicia (1914–15), the NTSh was suppressed, and its buildings and printing presses confiscated. During the war, too, many of its library and museum holdings were destroyed, and also its student residence. Following the war, its activities revived, but on a lesser scale than in its pre-war 'golden age'. Lviv had been incorporated into the Polish 'Second Republic' and the Poles, after more than a century-and-a-quarter of partition between three empires (Austrian, Russian and Prussian), had their own agenda of nation- and state-building – and consequently little sympathy for Ukrainian aspirations. Various restrictions were imposed by the state – for example, the Society's right to publish school textbooks was withdrawn. Publications from Soviet Ukraine or the Ukrainian diaspora addressed to its library were confiscated, making it difficult for the NTSh scholars to stay abreast of the latest developments in their field. Promised government subsidies were slashed, and heavy taxes imposed on the Society. The new frontiers separated Lviv scholars from their confrères in Kyiv. A number of prominent NTSh members had gone abroad, in particular to Prague,⁷ which became a major centre of Ukrainian émigré scholarship. Furthermore, the establishment of an Academy of Sciences in Kyiv in 1918⁸ meant that

³ Ivan Franko (1856–1916) ranks, in the Ukrainian literary pantheon, second only to the national poet, Taras Shevchenko himself. In addition to his own outstanding works in both poetry and prose, he also translated into Ukrainian many of the leading works of west European literature.

⁴ The nominal Editor-in-Chief was Hrushevskyyi himself.

⁵ Founded 1892; it became a quarterly in 1895, and then, under Hrushevskyyi's editorship (1895–1913) from 1896 onwards, a bi-monthly.

⁶ Founded 1900; a quarterly, the main purpose of which was to provide information about NTSh activities.

⁷ In addition to being the headquarters of various specialist Ukrainian learned societies, Prague in the inter-war years was the location of the Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Higher Pedagogic Institute, and the Ukrainian Fine Art Studio, as well as a number of Ukrainian publishing houses.

⁸ On the founding of the academy, see Elizabeth Luchka Haigh, 'Was V. I. Vernadsky a Ukrainian Nationalist?', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 43, no. 2, 1996, pp. 55–62.

the NTSh could no longer be considered, unequivocally, the premier Ukrainian scholarly organisation.

Nevertheless, the work of the NTSh continued. Its library was rebuilt and expanded (with holdings of over 300,000 works by 1939). Its Museum collections were divided up to form three new museums – Culture and History (founded 1920), Natural Sciences (1920) and Ukrainian Militaria (1937). An Institute of Normal and Pathological Psychology and a Bacteriological-Chemical Institute were established under its aegis – these being, it should be noted, among the ‘leading-edge’ of scientific disciplines of the time. During the early 1920s, when access to higher education in Poland was effectively barred to Ukrainians, the NTSh operated an underground Ukrainian University and a Ukrainian Higher Polytechnical School. For a time, NTSh scholars managed to cooperate with their confrères at the Academy of Sciences in Kyiv on various scholarly matters, in particular, the standardisation of Ukrainian orthography. And when, in the 1930s, Stalin launched a new policy of Russification and suppression of all meaningful expressions of Ukrainian culture, the NTSh, to a large extent, resumed its old role as the principal scholarly guardian of things Ukrainian.

In September 1939, under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet army occupied Galicia. The NTSh was forced to dissolve, and its properties were expropriated by the state. Many of its members simply disappeared into Stalin’s gulag. Others fled to Nazi-occupied Poland. Under the Nazi occupation which followed, the NTSh was not allowed to resume its activities, and before the Soviet army re-occupied Lviv in 1944, most of the surviving NTSh members had fled to the West.

Their presence abroad ensured the Society’s survival. In June 1947, the NTSh was relaunched by a meeting of its exiled members in Munich. As the refugee scholars resettled in various countries, the NTSh established four autonomous centres: a headquarters, with the Society’s library and archives, at Sarcelles, near Paris (1951), and centres established in New York (1947), Canada (1949) and Sydney (1950). Between them, over the next four decades, a programme of publications was implemented, impressive both in scale and in scholarly merit.


Then, in 1989, taking advantage of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, which, *inter alia*, allowed Soviet citizens to establish ‘informal’ clubs and associations, the NTSh re-established itself in Lviv. The formal date of its rebirth was 21 October – a day so significant to the current membership that it was decided to hold this year’s 125th anniversary celebrations in October, rather than on the original ‘birthday’ of 11 December. The original statutes and their subsequent emendations (including those introduced in emigration) were reconfirmed, and the publication of the NTSh *Zapysky* was brought back to Lviv. The four émigré centres, however, were not wound up; they continue to flourish as autonomous entities, and in 1991, an international edition of the NTSh *Zapysky* was founded to report on their activities. □

Reviews

The Origins of the Old Rus' Weights and Monetary System. Two Studies in Western Eurasian Metrology and Numismatics in the Seventh to Eleventh Centuries. By Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute/Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1998), xii + 172 pp., illustr.

This book, the author informs us in his Preface, had its origins in 1977, when for half a year he had to stay in bed following open-heart surgery. That medically imposed sabbaticals can be productive of profound scholarly insight is well-established, at least anecdotally; the return to active academic life after a long break may often mean delays in carrying the project to completion. So it was with Dr Pritsak. Although he decided to use his convalescence to pursue the numismatic research which he required as ancillary to his main field – the origins of Rus' – once he resumed his work as lecturer and director of the Harvard Ukrainian Institute – it took a further thirteen years to consolidate this initial reading with consultations with other scholars and visits to museums. This was not altogether a disadvantage – by the time the manuscript was substantially complete, the collapse of the Soviet Union made it possible for him to visit the Hermitage Museum and obtain photographs of the necessary coins. However, the same changes also meant that from 1990 to 1997 Dr Pritsak spent a major part of each year in Kyiv, as Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. His absences from the USA further delayed the production of the book, while his new work-load made it impossible to incorporate new scholarship published after 1990. He directs the reader's attention in particular to two works with which he would have liked to have dealt with; to judge from what he says of them in the Preface, his regrets are due mainly to a scholarly concern for completeness and rigour, rather than for any deficiency in his text as published.

The book, as its subtitle indicates, covers two main themes. Part I discusses 'Monetary Systems in Early Medieval Western Eurasia' – a somewhat clumsy (but academically neutral) term for the area in which Kyivan Rus' arose. Like many nascent states and peoples, the Rus' utilised the coinages of their neighbours long before developing a monetary system of their own. Indeed, to the Rus', who (as Pritsak reminds us in his opening sentence) 'first appeared on the stage of history as both pirates and merchants', must have had a particular interest in coined metal. This section begins, therefore, by outlining the various monetary systems available within the range of activities and contacts of the Rus'; Anglo-Saxon England, Gaul/Francia, the German lands, the Byzantine empire, the Muslim



world, and Khazaria. This last receives an entire chapter to itself, in view of the scholarly controversy over whether or not that state had a money economy. Pritsak argues that it did, and discusses the evidence for the names and values of coins and money of account, formulating the relationships between them and (in the case of the actual coins) their weights. A separate chapter is also devoted to the upper Volga state of 'Great Bulgaria'. Pritsak then proceeds to the origins of the Rus' '*grivna serebra*' and other Old Rus' coins, a name which Pritsak calls a 'calque' on the Germanic *skilling* (shilling). Whether the term 'calque' is completely valid here is debatable; *skilling*, as Pritsak notes, derives from a hypothetical earlier **skilding*, 'connected to the Old Norse verb *skilja* "to split, to cut", originally meaning "a cutting from a (gold) ring"; the word which gives modern Ukrainian *bryvna*, however, derives not from a word meaning 'cutting' (which would be a calque according to the strict definition), but from *grivna* meaning a ring. The connection with *skilling* is an intricate one: the latter was the term used in the West (Frisians, Franks, Anglo-Saxons) as the equivalent of the Latin *tremisis*, which had 'the special meaning "one-third (of the standard money of account)"'. In the same way, says Pritsak, 'the Rus' used the word "grivna of silver" for one third of the *ratl*', the standard Khazar 'money of account'.

The 'shilling' also appears under a Slavonic variant of its own name (*ščyljag*) in the Rus' Chronicle, referring 'to the money of account in which the Vjatiči and Radimiči were required to pay tribute to the Khazars'. Pritsak argues that this was the Anglo-Saxon – more specifically the West Saxon – scilling, 'and that those who transmitted this particular unit were the Frisians, who were active both in England and in Eastern Europe'. Pritsak then goes on to discuss the establishment of the Old Rus' systems of weights and measures, and the establishment of an indigenous coinage in the early eleventh century. These systems have been, as he notes, the source of considerable controversy among scholars who analysed them in isolation, and, indeed, his own work is almost certain to spark further controversy. For by considering the weights, measures and coinage of Old Rus' in the context of neighbouring systems, Pritsak, in his own words, 'show[s] – and it is witnessed by its terminology – that the Old Rus' weights and monetary systems do indeed reflect the West/East–North/South international trade relationship (centered in what is now Ukraine) in the period between the eighth and eleventh centuries'. He lists the names of the various monetary and weight units concerned, showing that they are all derived either from the Khazarian or Franko-Frisian originals, either as linguistic borrowings or calques. And to certain entrenched schools of thought, such ideas, in spite of their careful grounding in linguistic and numismatic scholarship, may well prove unpalatable.

Part II is a survey of the known Old Rus' coins, their iconography and epigraphy in relation, in particular, to Byzantine models. There is a special discussion of the tridents and bidents which appear in various forms; Pritsak terms these 'symbol[s] of royal victory', the function of which, he says, was 'identical to both the Iranian fire-altar raised on three steps with an attendant priest (*mōbedb*) facing, on either side, or, with the Byzantine symbols, Cross potent on base and three steps, or even "Victory of the Emperor/an Angel," holding *orb Cruciger*'. This is clearly

material for the specialist numismatist. In view, however, of the contemporary significance of the trident and the political debates concerning its adoption as the state coat-of-arms, Pritsak's analysis of its role on the coins of Old Rus' is clearly of far broader significance.

The final sections of this excellent and erudite work consist of photographs, establishing a typology of Old Rus' coins, and an extensive (22-page) bibliography.


As has already been noted, this work is intended primarily for a specialist readership. It establishes, with a wealth of careful and exact scholarship, the numismatic base which Pritsak required for his ongoing and comprehensive study of the origins of Old Rus'. At the academic level, it is of undoubted value, throwing light on a number of hitherto-obscure issues, and demonstrating the importance of appraising the cultural beginnings of the Old Rus' state in the context of geographical location and known trading links. However, since the origins of Rus' are a matter of pressing importance in the process of nation- and state-building of today's Ukraine, this is far too important a work to be left to the specialist. In spite of the technical nature of much of its content, it is written in a lucid and comprehensible style, which should put it well within the range of comprehension of the reasonably educated lay-person. Many of Pritsak's conclusions will undoubtedly in due course find their way into general histories of Ukraine. In the meantime, anyone with a genuine interest in Ukraine's past, and the intellectual courage to tackle a new subject, should find the going tough – but fascinating.

Between Kyiv and Constantinople. Oleksander Lototsky and the Quest for Ukrainian Autocephaly. By Andre Partykevich (Church Studies Papers, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta), 101 pp, \$14.95

One of the main principles of Orthodox Church governance is 'autocephaly' – the right of each national church to be ruled by its own self-chosen hierarchy. It is natural, therefore, that when empires fall apart and new states emerge that the Orthodox believers in those states want to establish their own, independent

Churches, and to break with the former Metropolis in the things which are God's no less than those which are Caesar's. However, the Orthodox establishment of former imperial powers is frequently reluctant to have its jurisdiction curtailed. This has, in the past few years, given rise to bitter disputes and confrontations, as the Orthodox in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia put forward their claims for autocephaly. Archimandrite Partykevich's monograph focuses on an earlier such attempt, during the era of the Ukrainian National Republic of 1918–20.

Oleksander Lototsky, who spearheaded that campaign, was well-equipped to do so. The son of an Orthodox priest and himself an alumnus of the Kyiv Seminary and (theological) Academy, his patriotic zeal



for Ukraine barred him from employment in his original choice of profession – teaching. Instead, he eventually found a post in the auditing offices of the Imperial Russian Finance Ministry, first in Kyiv and later in St Petersburg. While so employed, he gave devoted service to the Ukrainian cause, helping to found the *Vik* (Age) publishing house, and to establish a Ukrainian caucus in the *Duma* (Russia's embryonic parliament). During the two years of Ukraine's independence, he served at a time as Minister for Religious Affairs, and then as Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, where he was well-placed to put the case for Ukrainian autocephaly to the officials of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the *primus inter pares* of all Orthodox Church authorities, whose recognition of the autocephaly of other national churches is all-important. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the Patriarchal throne was vacant at that time, and although the *locum tenens*, Metropolitan Dorotheos, had – as Partykevich makes clear – a warm personal regard for Lototsky and his family – he did not possess the competence to issue the necessary *tomos* (grant) of Ukrainian autocephaly. A Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was, indeed, established – but not with the backing of Constantinople – and once the Soviets came to power, it was suppressed and for the next seven decades could exist only in the diaspora.

These historical developments, however, do not detract from the importance of Partykevich's work. Lototsky had gone into his negotiations with Dorotheos, in his own words, 'armed to the teeth', with a memorandum in Greek on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Although this was never published, and the original Ukrainian version was eventually destroyed with much else of Lototsky's archives at the beginning of World War II, it marked the beginning of two decades of scholarly research into the theory of autocephaly, and, in particular, how a would-be autocephalous Church can be legitimately and canonically emancipated from a Mother-See – a subject which has been controversial since the fourth century and to which Orthodox Canon law gives no clear answer. Partykevich devotes his closing chapter – one fifth of the whole book – to a detailed analysis of Lototsky's writings on autocephaly, work which is clearly of major significance not only for Ukraine, but for the whole family of Orthodox Churches.

Autocephaly and the Ukrainian cause are the twin pillars of Partykevich's work. Hence, although he makes considerable use of the memoirs of Lototsky's son, Borys (who, confusingly, spells his surname 'Lotocki'), biographical material is subordinated to these two main themes. Thus Lototsky's youthful activities for the Ukrainian cause are described in considerable detail, while his life in emigration (in Prague and later in Warsaw) are passed over in a few sentences. Nevertheless, in the key chapters 'Revolution and Autocephaly, 1917–1919' and 'The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukrainian Orthodoxy, 1919–1920', the reader is given a number of fascinating glimpses of Ukrainian political and diplomatic life during those brief years of independence. For this reason, and because the whole problem of Ukrainian Orthodox Church governance still has major political overtones today, this book should prove invaluable to a far wider research than the specialist Church historians for whom, at first glance, it appears to be intended.

Although Partykevich's work had its origins in a doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago, the language of this book is refreshingly free from the pedantic language which so often mars works with a similar origin. Inevitably, the author has to have recourse to the technical terms of Orthodoxy, but these are introduced in such a manner as to cause no problem to the non-specialist reader. There are a few minor infelicities – Partykevich seems uncertain whether the Turkish capital to which Lototsky was accredited as ambassador was, at that time, called Constantinople or Istanbul, while literary scholars may well take exception to his description of Ukraine's national bard and prophet, Taras Shevchenko, as a 'Romantic poet'. And there is one curious misunderstanding: Partykevich writes that the Church Militant 'was founded on the faith of St Peter. In stressing the primacy of faith, the Orthodox Church differs from the Roman Catholic, which bases Peter's primacy on his having been the first bishop of Rome'. In fact, like the Orthodox, the Catholic Church bases Peter's primacy on his avowal of faith, which was followed by Christ's pronouncement: 'Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church' (Matthew xvi.18), and the primacy – in Catholic eyes – of Rome is based on the fact that St Peter was its first bishop! □


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Roksolana. A painting by Ivan-Valentyn Zadorozhnyi, see pp. 69–77.



the UKRAINIAN *review*

Contributors	2
Current Events	
The Lack of Determinacy in Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy JENNIFER D. P. MORONEY	3
History	
The First Unified Representation of the Ukrainian People. On the 80th Anniversary of the Labour Congress of Ukraine ANDRIY HOSHULYAK	15
1100th Anniversary of Halych VOLODYMYR BARAN	25
The Year of Revolutions: 1848 and Ukrainian National Consciousness THEODORE MACKIW	37
Press and Publishing in Kharkiv, 1920s–1930s OLHA RIZNYCHENKO	44
The Family Archives of Vasyl Tomara MARHARYTA CHERNOBUK	51
Arts and Culture	
Yuriy Shevelov (On the Occasion of his 90th Birthday) ROKSOLIANA ZORIVCHAK	65
Ivan-Valentyn Zadorozhnyi, 1921–1988	69
Kotlyarevskiy's <i>Aeneid</i> and the Ukrainian Baroque Tradition BOHDANA KRYSA	78
Kotlyarevskiy's <i>Aeneid</i> : The 1898 Celebration	82
Yevhen Pluzhnyk, 1898–1936	90
Judge me then... YEVHEN PLUZHNYK	90
Now in the North... _____	91
How futile – to deck stanzas lavishly... _____	91
What has not come to pass?... _____	91
Reviews	92



 *the* UKRAINIAN *review*

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Current Events

The Lack of Determinacy in Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy

Jennifer D. P. Moroney

Introduction

Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has faced challenges that even the most established of states would have had difficulty in addressing. In terms of foreign and security policy-making, the greatest challenge has been how to facilitate cooperation with the West in the changing security environment of Europe, while maintaining positive, productive, and mutually respectful relations with Russia. This proves no easy task, particularly in the light of Russia's blatant objection to an enlarged NATO that would include any of the former Soviet Republics. Ukraine's room for manoeuvre in its foreign and security orientation is thus currently limited by both economic and geopolitical factors. Until both the economic situation in Ukraine improves drastically, and the Russian government's attitude towards NATO enlargement becomes more positive, this will most likely continue to be the case.

The Ukrainian government is at present dually constrained in its ability to shape its own foreign and security policy. Internally, there are considerable divergences in the ideologies and foreign policy goals of the major political parties in the Rada (parliament). Also, the executive and legislative branches do not on the whole work very well together. Debates are regularly centred on individuals and personal vendettas, such as those between President Kuchma and former Premier Lazarenko. Moreover, old Soviet style bureaucratic structures are still in place, which tends to increase the time involved in reaching decisions. Externally, Ukraine is constrained by the growing tension between the West and Russia, and is finding itself in an ever-more uncomfortable geopolitical position while it simultaneously struggles to alleviate its economic crises at home. Because the Ukrainian government is facing considerable political and economic challenges both internally and externally, its foreign and security policy decisions are constantly changing, responding, and adapting to the external environment in a manner that makes the highest level political decisions appear to lack determinacy¹ and without lasting authority.

This article sets out and discusses various explanations for Ukraine's lack of determinacy in foreign and security policy-making, and attempts to draw certain conclusions from this behaviour. The focus will be on the issue of Ukraine's sovereignty, and we shall attempt to explain how the fact of having achieved only negative sovereignty² can be a significant constraint on a state's manoeuvrability in its

¹ In other words, due to both internal and external limiting factors, there appears to be no overwhelming consensus as to the development of a solidified foreign policy agenda.

² i.e. Freedom from outside interference in its domestic affairs. See below.

international relations. We shall commence with a discussion of 'weak' states in the international system, which is intended to set the context for the following section on Ukraine's negative sovereignty dilemma. These sections will help to provide a partially empirical, partially theoretical explanation of Ukraine's lack of determinacy in its foreign and security policy-making. This discussion provides the foundation for understanding Ukraine's overall policy towards the West and NATO, and also towards Russia and the CIS. The following section will consider to what extent Ukraine's foreign and security policy is becoming more 'determined', by looking at 'established' trends and patterns of its international relations. Finally, we shall examine the extent to which the West's attitude to Ukraine is becoming more favourable, taking into account its partnership treaty with NATO, as well as the support received from international financial organisations. Moreover, taking 'negative sovereignty' into account will help to further Western understanding of the precarious situation that the Ukrainian government is facing, both at home and abroad.

Medium-Sized Power, Weak State

Ukraine's technological advancements and military capabilities give it the potential to be a medium-sized power. Nevertheless, it is currently considered by the international community to be a weak state. Ukraine's 'weakness' is demonstrated by the fact that its government, in most situations, does not have the means to oppose or appease its enemies or woo its friends.³ Weak states, such as Ukraine, are particularly vulnerable to the interference of external actors in their domestic affairs, since they tend to seek the economic and political support of international organisations or of individual state actors. They are likely to sacrifice control of domestic activities in exchange for much-sought-after financial or political support. This course may sometimes enable the state in question eventually to lose its image as a weak state. It may, however, also be a means for external actors to increase their economic and political leverage over the said state.

The protection of the inhabitants of a state from military attack by another state is and always has been universally perceived as one of the major functions of every government. No matter what other functions are legitimate practices, protection of its own population takes priority. Likewise, and just as universally, there has always existed an inequality among countries in their ability to provide this protection. Weak states simply do not have the power to protect themselves from the military or economic onslaught of their stronger neighbours. Sometimes geographic location or topography has been a factor, but given the absence of natural defences, weak or threatened states have traditionally been forced to seek assistance from more powerful states. This in turn has presented another dilemma for weak states: whether to join an alliance with its neighbours or adhere to a policy of neutrality? If the alliance is powerful, might not the stronger members try to take advantage of the weaker state's vulnerable position?⁴

³ Sherman Garnett, 'Reform, Russia, and Europe: The Strategic Context of Ukraine's NATO Policy', in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *From Madrid to Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), p. 74.

⁴ Marshall Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1972), pp. 273–4.

In every period of history, weak states have been faced with this predicament, and have often pleaded neutrality. But as the Belgians learned in 1914 and 1940, and the Cambodians in the early 1970s, neutrality only holds good so long as the more powerful neighbours accept and respect this policy and have no great interest in taking resources from the neutral. In the case of post-1991 Ukraine, its government has adhered to a policy of non-bloc status, seeking a working relationship with the West, including NATO partnership structures (without ruling out future membership in the alliance), and detachment from the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement of the CIS, while still being involved in the economic structures of the CIS. Ukraine seeks a normalisation of relations with Russia, based on bilateral negotiations (indicating a desire to bypass the CIS), while aiming to limit these relations to the economic and political spheres.

Weak states such as Ukraine which are in the process of nation- and state-building will normally seek to enlist international support in many forms, even if these are only insubstantial and symbolic. States in the throes of economic and political reform and whose domestic institutions are still relatively unstable will seek to obtain external support for their negative sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. This is particularly so if the state in question feels threatened by a powerful neighbour.

Immediately after gaining independence, the Ukrainian government pursued two major themes in its foreign and security policy. Firstly, Kyiv sought to obtain security guarantees from the world's great powers and international institutions. In December 1994, Ukraine gained the political support of the world's nuclear powers in return for its ratification of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In July 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed a partnership treaty largely motivated by the latter's gratitude for Ukraine's support of NATO enlargement. The second major issue for Ukraine since independence has been how to obtain legal recognition of its borders to protect much of what it gained from post-World War II territorial changes. This was finally achieved in May and June 1997, when Russia and Romania signed border treaties with Ukraine, although this was by no means the end of the matter for the Russian Duma (lower house of parliament) proved reluctant to ratify the treaty, while in the case of the Romanian-Ukrainian treaty, the question of the continental shelf off Serpent Island was deferred for further negotiation, and if the two sides do not reach an agreement within two years, it will go to arbitration.⁵ As a weak state with a somewhat precarious sovereignty, Ukraine must continue to seek ties with more influential actors and institutions that share similar economic and political ideologies so as to protect the agreements that have already been reached.

The Negative Sovereignty Dilemma

Negative sovereignty is a condition typical of states which have recently achieved independence and been recognised as sovereign entities by other international actors. It may be defined as freedom from outside interference in a state's internal

⁵ As explained to this author in October 1998 by a member of NATO's Political Affairs Division.

affairs. It is a formal legal condition or entitlement, and is the legal foundation upon which a society of independent and formally equal states fundamentally rests.⁶ States with negative sovereignty are, for the most part, in the throes of economic, political, or social transition, and their precarious domestic situation imposes constraints on their international relations. Nevertheless, they are sovereign as regards their internal affairs, and thus must be accorded due respect in accordance with international law.

One may also think of independence and non-intervention as the 'distinctive and reciprocal rights and duties of an international social contract between states – when it is held it is held absolutely in the sense that it is not dependent on any conditions... and only requires observance and forbearance'.⁷

Positive sovereignty, conversely, can be described as 'freedom to' as opposed to the 'freedom from' (negative sovereignty) – being active and self-directing, choosing, pursuing and realising goals. It also points towards the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities, and not just immunities, because it postulates agents and conditions that are enabling. Positive sovereignty presupposes capabilities that enable governments to be their own masters, and is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively sovereign government is one that not only enjoys the rights of non-intervention and other international immunities, but one that is in the position to provide political goods to its citizens. Moreover, it describes a government that can collaborate with other governments in defence of alliances and similar international and regional arrangements, and reciprocate in international commerce and finance. According to Jackson, positive sovereignty is the means which enable states to take advantage of their independence, which is usually indicated by able and responsible rulers and productive and loyal citizens.⁸ Positive sovereignty is the distinctive, overall feature of a developed state, and is not a legal but a political attribute, if political is understood to include sociological, economic, technological, psychological, and wherewithal to declare, implement, and enforce public policy both domestically and internationally.⁹

Ukraine can be considered to be a negatively sovereign state, according to the above definition. The Ukrainian state achieved negative sovereignty under international law the moment its independence was recognised by the international community. Ukraine has the right of non-intervention, or 'freedom from' outside encroachment. However, since Ukraine is in the throes of political and serious economic transition, its government is actively seeking the assistance of external actors, and hence voluntarily relinquishing some measure of control over its internal policy-making as a trade-off for the attainment of international assistance. A case in point is the prescriptive approach taken by Western international financial organisations such as the IMF and World Bank when they consider loans to applicant

⁶ See G. Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, *A Manual of International Law*, 6th edition (London, 1976), pp. 54–5.

⁷ Robert Jackson, *Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 27.

⁸ Jackson, p. 29.

⁹ Schwarzenberger and Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 and 564.

states such as Ukraine. Stringent prerequisites, based on the Western-style approach to dealing with economic crises, are attached to such loans. Moreover, the economic decrees recently initiated by President Kuchma were intended to convince international financial institutions that the government was working towards real economic reforms, although at that time tougher reforms were unpopular.

Another example of Ukraine's negative sovereignty is the decision of the Ukrainian government to halt its negotiations with Iran over the proposed sale of turbines for the building of an Iranian nuclear station. This decision was taken just after the visit of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Kyiv in March 1998 to discuss with President Kuchma Ukraine's pending arrangements with Iran, a country 'unfriendly' to the US.¹⁰ As a result, Ukraine suffered an economic loss by terminating the deal with Iran, but hoped to receive some kind of compensation from Western governments.

But what does this negative sovereignty situation mean for the Ukrainian government and its manoeuvrability in terms of policy-making? What does the discourse reveal about the connection between Ukraine's negative sovereignty dilemma and its lack of determinacy in foreign and security policy. Ukraine is in a particularly difficult situation; it receives much attention from the West both on account of its geopolitical position in the newly emerging security architecture in Europe, and for its potential for economic and political instability. The former may be termed positive attention, and the latter, negative. In terms of its unique geopolitical position, Ukraine has been successful in negotiating several foreign and security policy agreements, ranging from various border settlements with its neighbours to a special Charter with NATO which gives it specific recognition as an important component in future security arrangements in Europe. Yet, Ukraine is often projected in the foreign media as unstable in economic terms (due to the slow progress with reforms aimed at transition to a market economy), and in political terms on account of the Communist majority in the Rada and the inability of the executive and legislative branches to work together to implement the necessary reforms.

These different approaches have contributed to Ukraine's apparent lack of determinacy in its foreign and security policy making, since the Ukrainian government is not always able to ascertain the West's position on key economic and political matters which could affect its ability to defend its sovereignty and independence. For example, during US Vice President Al Gore's recent trip to Kyiv, he declined to endorse an international loan package on the grounds that Ukraine needs to implement further economic reforms. Ukraine was hoping for US political support for the pending loan from the IMF, whose representatives were in Kyiv at that time for negotiations. Kuchma commented to reporters after the meeting saying that Ukraine has done the best it realistically could, and thus deserves the loan.¹¹ Furthermore, he has repeatedly warned of economic catastrophe without international financial support.

¹⁰ *RFE/RL Newsline*, 6 March 1998.

¹¹ Daniel Williams, 'Gore declines to back Ukrainian loan appeal', *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, 23 July 1998, p. A26.

After much speculation in the media, the IMF finally announced that its team would recommend the approval of a \$2.2 billion low-interest loan to Ukraine. In August, the IMF Board of Directors announced that the initial tranche of \$200–250 million would be released immediately. Yet, as always, the continued release of this loan is subject to Kyiv living up to the terms of the agreement, and Ukraine has a history of falling out of line with IMF conditions. The most recent was in March 1998, when a \$542 million tranche was suspended due to the lack of progress in economic reforms.¹² Ukraine cannot seek to pursue a confident and absolute *Westpolitik* without some definite evidence of Western support for Ukrainian reforms. Any other course simply should not be expected of the Ukrainian government and indeed of a negatively sovereign state.

Other Contributing Factors to Ukraine's Lack of Determinacy

Ukraine's multi-directional approach to foreign and security policy-making

Since independence, and particularly since 1994, the Ukrainian government has pursued a fairly ambitious approach in its external relations. Ukraine has had at least three clear goals in its external relations: to deepen ties with key Western institutions and actors, to normalise relations with Russia, and to establish itself as a Central European state. Yet these goals may well be incompatible, i.e. normalisation of relations with Russia might not be realised if Ukraine is viewed by Moscow as a Central European state, detached from the former Soviet Union. But, nonetheless, Ukraine is compelled to continue with this multi-directional approach, which at times will appear to teeter more in one direction rather than another, depending on both internal and external developments.

Ukraine's partnership with NATO

Ukraine's short-term goals for its partnership with NATO may be summarised in three points: 1) active participation in all Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC) activities that do not require membership; 2) implementation of the *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine*, which was signed at the Madrid Summit, raising it *de facto* to the level of the Russia-NATO Founding Act; and 3) assurances that membership of NATO at a later date is not ruled out.¹³ It can safely be stated that Kyiv has been successful in achieving these goals on a broad scale. Ukraine's activities within NATO's Partnership for Peace are becoming more numerous and detailed, even in the face of Russian objections. Moreover, Ukraine has successfully concluded its own specific charter with NATO, but only in the course of time will the actual value of this document from a Western perspective be revealed. Whether or not the West

¹² Volodymyr Zolotnycky, 'IMF support eases Ukrainian debt crisis', *The Kyiv Post*, 4 August 1998, p. 1.

¹³ Tor Bukkvoil, *Ukraine and European Security* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 1997), p. 365.

truly considers Ukraine to be its 'strategic partner' cannot be said for certain at this time. Moreover, the door to NATO in theory remains open to Ukraine and the other states not included in the first enlargement, but again external developments such as NATO-Russia relations will have a hand in Ukraine's potential membership in the Alliance.

Due to the unpredictability of future regional developments in Eastern and Southern Europe and also in relations between Russia and the West, it is unrealistic to expect that Western policy-makers would state unequivocally that Ukraine will in the future be a welcome member of all European and Transatlantic institutions. But without clear statements of this kind and evidence that NATO partners take seriously the new Charter with Ukraine, and until the Ukrainian economy begins to show considerable improvement, this trend of lack of determinacy is likely to continue.

Relations with Russia/CIS

A major foreign policy priority for Kyiv is the establishment of positive relations with the east – Russia and the Caucasian and Central Asian republics. But major differences are evident between President Kuchma and his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, in their dealings with Russia and the CIS. Although both leaders were committed to Ukrainian statehood and independence, Kuchma's 'pragmatism' has replaced the 'romanticism' of Kravchuk. Kuchma has preferred to treat Russia less like an adversary and more like a business partner, in which a partnership built on cooperation, trust, and mutual respect is likely to bring about positive economic (as well as political) changes. But, at the same time, he has refused to bow to Russian pressures, for example, regarding joining the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement, or other suggestions put forward by the Russian government for closer political or military ties within the CIS framework.

Although 'normalisation' is a term used so often to describe the trend in Russian-Ukrainian relations, it should not be forgotten that Russia still exerts a considerable amount of economic and political leverage over the Ukrainian government. For example, Ukraine is dependent on Russia for oil and gas supplies, and by October 1998 had an outstanding debt of almost US \$1 billion to Russia's oil and gas firms. In terms of political leverage, one may cite the example of the Duma's reluctance to ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which affirms the 'immunity of existing borders' between the two states. The three inter-governmental agreements on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), signed on 28 May 1997,¹⁴ are of key importance to the normalisation of relations between these two countries, and the fact that over a year has passed since the signing and the Duma has delayed ratification is significant.

As we have already noted, Ukraine prefers direct bilateral relations with its CIS neighbours. At present there is a CIS working party, drafting proposals for a fundamental reform of CIS structures; the Ukrainian members of this advocate a drastic reduction in areas of cooperation at the supranational level.¹⁵ They propose exclud-

¹⁴ The Verkhovna Rada ratified the agreements on 14 January 1998 by a vote of 317 to 27.

¹⁵ Ukraine is itself not a full member of the CIS organisation, having never signed its Charter.

ing from such cooperation political, military, border protection, military-technical, humanitarian, legal, exchange of information, ecology, and collective security issues. Instead, they want to reduce the CIS to a mechanism for economic cooperation, whose structures would not duplicate those of other European and international bodies, or hinder the integration of CIS member countries into those bodies.¹⁶

The Ukrainian leadership appears to realise that closer economic cooperation with its CIS neighbours is one way of ensuring an increase in Ukrainian trade and exports, and hence helping to overcome the current economic crisis. When economic reforms become more evident, Ukraine will be able to demonstrate to Western states and organisations that it should be considered a stable Central European country, worthy of economic and political support, and possibly resulting in eventual membership in Western institutions.

Relations with key regional actors

Immediately after the declaration of independence, Ukraine began to strive vigorously for international recognition of its geopolitical identity as a Central European state. It still keeps up these efforts, and, in placing great emphasis on its relations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania, Ukraine has shown itself eager to be seen as a Central European nation within the larger European continent. The Ukrainian government has hoped that this would lead to a recognition of its independence, national borders, and territorial integrity, distancing itself from Russia, and a diversification of its international ties. Moreover, neighbouring states were seen as the 'gateway to the West', and Kyiv has counted on their support in its efforts to establish links with Western Europe. It therefore should come as no surprise that Ukraine has placed and still places great importance on friendly relations with the front-runners for NATO and EU membership.¹⁷

Yet, at the same time, Ukraine's neighbours saw it in their national interests to bolster ties with Kyiv, with the recognition that an independent and stable Ukraine served their larger interests in regional security. This resulted in several treaties of friendship as well as border agreements. During 1992 and 1993, three bilateral political treaties on friendly relations and cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours were signed: the Ukrainian-Polish Treaty (1992) and the Ukrainian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Slovak Treaties (1993). These renounced mutual territorial claims, recognised the inviolability of existing borders, and guaranteed the rights of existing minorities. The agreements between Ukraine and Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have formed the basis for the development of positive political and economic relations in the region.

Ukraine and Russia finally concluded an agreement on friendship and cooperation in May 1997, which recognised Crimea as Ukrainian territory, while leasing the Black Sea port of Sevastopol to Russia for 20 years (open to renewal).

¹⁶ 'Ukrainian reform proposals could scupper CIS', *RFE/RL Daily Newswire*, 23 July 1998.

¹⁷ Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and regional co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Security Dialogue*, 1997, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 348.

This was an historic achievement for Ukraine, since it finally settled the debate over the control of Crimea. Moreover, in June 1997, Ukraine concluded a border agreement with Romania, the last of the contiguous states which posed a threat to its territorial integrity.

The Ukrainian government appears to recognise the importance of reliable regional partners, yet, at times, Western interference has influenced the foreign policy stance of some of these states. For example, the prospects of NATO and EU enlargement have had a profound impact on regional ties, since certain states are uncertain as to which policies would put them on the 'fast track' to NATO and EU membership. Should they concentrate their efforts on fulfilling the criteria for membership in these organisations, or should they look to their neighbours for support in terms of regional organisations (like CEFTA), or to bilateral agreements aimed at the promotion of stability? Western policies can be obscure, indeterminate, and counter-productive as regards the development of regional ties in East-Central Europe, and can also skew the policies of states such as Ukraine in a manner that makes some government policies appear to lack determinacy.

Is Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy becoming more Determined?

Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko once described Ukrainian foreign policy as coherent and predictable. However, it is precisely the absence of these traits that strikes foreigners attempting to analyse Kyiv's foreign and security policies in the international arena. On the other hand, since the spring of 1997, Kyiv has pursued a steady trend of orienting itself towards integration in European and transatlantic organisations.

In his public speeches, President Kuchma has on numerous occasions made it clear that Ukraine is trying to move closer to Europe, and out of the Russian sphere of influence. Perhaps this shift can be partly attributed to the Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk, who, in April 1998, on receiving word of his nomination, stated that he would do everything he could to help integrate Ukraine into European and transatlantic structures, and to strengthen the country's independence by means of foreign policy.¹⁸ Tarasyuk is clearly pro-Europe, being a former ambassador to the BENELUX countries, as well as the former head of Ukraine's mission to NATO in Brussels.

In July 1998, at a conference in Berlin, Tarasyuk pressed for Ukraine to receive associate membership in the EU, stating that, 'Ukraine still hopes to draw closer to the European Union, with membership the ultimate goal'.¹⁹ Although Ukraine was refused associate status in June and again in November 1998, Kyiv is still pushing for a clear political signal about joining the organisation. Wanting to keep the momentum going, the Foreign Minister made a two-day visit to Washington

¹⁸ 'Ukrainian President appoints new Foreign Minister', *RFE/RL Daily Newslite*, 17 April 1998, taken from ITAR-TASS.

¹⁹ Rostislav Pavlenko and Jaroslav Koshiw, 'Tarasyuk pushes EU associate membership', *The Kyiv Post*, 7 July 1998, p. 2.

for talks with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about both US-Ukrainian relations and Ukraine's efforts to join the EU.

At the outset, it appeared that Tarasyuk has been equally successful in formulating a basis for the continuance of positive relations with Russia. After his meeting with his Russian counterpart Yevgeniy Primakov in May 1998, it was reported that they had reached a 'complete understanding', and that 'both sides managed to agree even on those issues that had earlier been a stumbling block in [their countries'] relations'. Both sides had shown a constructive approach and good will in discussing bilateral relations.²⁰ However, following NATO Secretary General Solana's visit to Kyiv, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's statements once again put relations with Moscow under strain. Tarasyuk stated that NATO poses no threat to Ukraine's national security, and that its eastward enlargement is seen as the expansion of a zone of stability and security, which is in Ukraine's interests.²¹ But why was Tarasyuk appointed in the first place, unless a pro-Western movement was already on the cards? And can we assume that Tarasyuk's presence as a high-ranking official means a lasting movement towards Europe?

Being a strategic partner with all of its neighbours might seem an attractive strategy for Ukraine, but it is inappropriate and unrealistic in the post-Communist era. Ukraine's neighbours to the West have pinned their hopes on integration into NATO and the EU, and the most successful of them are only a few months away from membership in NATO and well on the way to the EU. What this will mean for Kyiv is an added strain on the development of ties, at least along economic lines, with the Central European states, since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for example, will be preoccupied with bringing their countries up to Western standards. This will also mean that Ukraine will be faced with trade barriers as a non-member and non-aligned country, putting Kyiv precisely in the position it fears most: behind a new economic and strategic 'iron curtain'.²²

Moreover, on the domestic level the Ukrainian government has yet to develop a coherent policy towards the West, as the legislative and executive branches have in general been unable to work together for the good of the Ukrainian state. With a Communist majority in the Rada, and many powerful forces working against Kuchma in the legislature in the run-up to the 1999 Presidential elections, it is unclear whether this apparent pro-Western trend can and will continue.

Is the West's Attitude to Ukraine Changing?

Western policy-makers and analysts have on frequent occasions made reference to Ukraine as a strategic cornerstone of European security, a keystone in the arch of a secure and stable Europe,²³ an East-West pivot, and a potential bridge to positive East-West relations. Ukraine was the first state from the former Soviet Union

²⁰ "Tarasyuk, Primakov reach "complete understanding", and "Russia says "positive dynamics" in relations with Ukraine", *RFE/RL Daily Newslines*, 27 May 1998.

²¹ "Closer NATO link irks Moscow", *The Kyiv Post*, 10 July 1998.

²² Rostislav Pavlenko, 'Ukrainian foreign policy setting course', *The Kyiv Post*, 24 July 1998, p. 8.

²³ See Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

to join NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme, and has also participated in joint exercises, including 'The Shield of Peace' (1996), 'Cooperative Neighbour' (1997), and 'Sea Breeze' (1997), which took place on or near Ukrainian soil. But the most significant achievement for Ukraine in its NATO policy has been the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter (July 1997). This document encountered virtually no opposition from the participants. Perhaps this is due to the fact that it envisaged that the relationship between NATO and Ukraine would continue to be based on mutual cooperation and respect for each other's roles in European security, and implied no legal or military obligations. The agreement is nonetheless a great psychological achievement, since Ukraine has been given special recognition, similar to that accorded to Russia, which is seemingly proof of NATO's commitment to building a partnership specifically with the Ukrainian government.

President Kuchma, in his opening statement at the NATO Madrid Summit, declared that he was certain that this historic document would demonstrate yet again that a new security architecture, based on openness and partnership, is steadily being constructed on the European continent. Kuchma referred to the importance of developing strong and positive ties between NATO and Russia, saying that he could not refrain from mentioning so important an event in the development of international security as the conclusion of the Russia-NATO Founding Act.²⁴ Furthermore, he stated that 'Ukraine has made its choice and is ready together with the NATO member-countries and the partners of the Alliance to take an active part in the construction of the secure future for Europe... and thus for the whole world'.²⁵

Likewise, during his State-of-the-Union address in January 1998, President Clinton made particular reference to NATO's new partner, Ukraine, and has on various other occasions commented on Ukraine's important strategic position in the emergent security architecture in Europe. Of course, these statements in themselves do not imply any firm security guarantee for Ukraine. Nevertheless, they should not be overlooked, since psychological assurances are of utmost importance during this period of economic and political transition and of state- and nation-building.

During a visit to Kyiv at the beginning of July 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana voiced his support for Ukraine's role in NATO enlargement at a news conference: 'The stability, security, and prosperity [of Europe] is impossible without strong relations between Ukraine and NATO'.²⁶ The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry responded that, 'Ukraine considers NATO an alliance of democratic states which poses no threat to its national security'.²⁷ Solana also praised the opening of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, the first of its kind in a non-NATO country, which aims to improve Ukrainian understanding of the military alliance.

However, in spite of these noteworthy achievements, Western policy-makers and, in particular, financial institutions have been and remain critical of Ukraine's lack of

²⁴ Opening statement by the President of Ukraine, H. E. Leonid Kuchma, at the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, Madrid, 9 July 1997.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Tiffany Carlsen, 'Visiting NATO chief praises Kyiv', *The Kyiv Post*, 10 July 1998, p. 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

concrete economic reforms, and the inability of the legislative and executive branches of government to put through the necessary enabling legislation for such reforms. President Kuchma has been very vocal about his difficulties with the Rada, and the lack of support for his economic reform programmes. He has also been adamant about his goal of receiving the pending \$2.5 billion IMF loan, which he believes will help to alleviate the current economic crisis, urging that without it Ukraine is doomed to suffer economic hardships far worse than those currently prevailing. In one interview, he painted a gloomy picture of a stagnant economy hamstrung by fierce internal battles over economic reform. 'Frankly speaking', he said, 'without financial support, we await a catastrophe no less severe than in Russia'.²⁸ He also asked for Ukraine to be compensated for the financial losses incurred when the government cancelled its sale of turbines to Iran, as had been promised at the time.

The West, for the most part, has been unsympathetic to Ukraine's economic hardships, and far too rigid on its criteria for qualifying for the IMF loan. President Kuchma recently claimed that Western aid does not match the rhetoric accorded Ukraine as a hedge against the potential rivalry of Russia, and that too often the role and place of Ukraine has not been fully understood.²⁹ It seems quite clear that the West does not yet fully appreciate the importance of Ukraine; otherwise by now NATO's description of it as a 'strategic partner' would be more than a diplomatic euphemism. However, it will take time to determine exactly how the 'strategic partnership' resulting from the Madrid Summit will take effect. For this reason, the Ukrainian government should not place too much weight on the details of its Charter with NATO, but should rather seek to expand its Western policy with other organisations such as the EU and the OSCE, and also with key individual actors.

Ukraine continues to suffer the constraints associated with negative sovereignty, as has become evident in terms of its lack of determinacy in its external relations. Ukraine is in no position to take full advantage of its independence or to provide much-needed goods to its citizens, since it still has to rely on international support to deal with the economic crises at home. Although the Ukrainian government has exemplified time and again its desire to integrate and work closely with the West, such integration and cooperation seems unlikely to reach the level envisioned by Kyiv for some time. For the immediate future, NATO and the EU will be preoccupied with both internal and enlargement issues. Hence, it will be up to the Ukrainian leadership to deepen ties with key actors in the region, such as Poland, in order to continue normalising relations with Russia, and to demonstrate its worthiness as a key player in the future of European security. Only then will Ukraine be able fully to determine its future foreign and security policy line with confidence and conviction. □

²⁸ Daniel Williams, 'Ukraine asks for more aid', *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 22 July 1998, p. A22.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

*History***The First Unified Representation of the Ukrainian People****On the 80th Anniversary of the Labour Congress of Ukraine**

Andriy Hoshulyak

In the history of the national state-building process during the era of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic,¹ the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine (to give it its official title) occupies an important place. True, in the works of different historians, one can find diametrically opposed evaluations of it. Several who themselves played an active part in the war for Ukraine's independence were particularly critical, basing their assessments, for the most part, on subjective criteria, first and foremost their own political inclinations. Possibly for this reason, or, more probably, the fact that the Directory lost that war, the history of the Labour Congress and the resolutions it passed have received insufficient attention from historians. This article addresses some little-known aspects of the Congress, focusing particularly on its role in strengthening the sense of Ukrainian national unity.

The successful outcome of the anti-Hetman coup of November–December 1918 faced the Directory with the urgent problem of finding an appropriate form or model for the organisation of state power. On 12–14 December, this issue was discussed at the State Conference in Vinnytsya; participants included, in addition to members of the Directory, representatives of Ukrainian political parties (Socialist Revolutionaries,² Social Democrats,³ Ukrainian Party of Socialists–Independen-

¹ The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic was a temporary, revolutionary state authority, headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko (see Note 5), which was set up by the Ukrainian National Union on 14 November 1918, to mastermind the overthrow of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi. The latter, who had been installed as ruler of Ukraine with the help of the Germans, after the armistice of 11 November, could no longer count on their protection. Possibly for this reason, he had, earlier on 14 November, declared a 'federative union' with a future, non-Bolshevik, Russian state. This triggered the uprising against him. As a result, Skoropadskyi abdicated in favour of his council of ministers, which in turn handed over power to the Directory. A new government, the Council of National Ministers of the UNR was established by a decree of the Directory on 26 December 1918, with Volodymyr Chekhivskyi as its chairman.

² Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR). A national-liberation revolutionary socialist party that played an important role in Ukraine during the revolutionary period of 1917–20.

³ Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP). A socialist workers' party founded in September 1899 by members of the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia, who had formed a Ukrainian social democratic organisation in Lviv in 1897, and by a minority faction that split away from the Ukrainian Radical Party.

tists,⁴ and others). A motion, proposed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko,⁵ was adopted for establishing a system of 'labour councils', consisting of representatives of all elements of society, which did not exploit others' labour. 'In other words', as Vynnychenko pointed out, 'this was to have been a dictatorship not of the proletariat and the prosperous peasantry, but a dictatorship of the working people'.⁶

In the middle of December 1918, a draft declaration was produced, and later published in the Kyiv press, which for the first time set out the Directory's intention to convene a Congress of the Working People of Ukraine. This was to comprise elected representatives of the peasants, the military and working people. After long and bitter discussions in state and party circles, the final text was promulgated on 26 December. By now the projected composition of the future Labour Congress had somewhat changed. Instead of soldiers' representatives, there were to be elected representatives of the 'working intelligentsia', defined as that section of the intellectual community which 'works directly for labouring people, that is: workers in the field of mass education, medical staff, enlightenment, doctors' assistants, organisers of cooperative societies, and persons employed in offices and other institutions'.⁷

The Directory's declaration stressed that the 'Congress of the Working People of Ukraine shall have all the supreme rights and plenipotentiary powers to resolve all the issues of social, economic and political life of the Republic'.⁸ It was regarded as a revolutionary representation of the organised working masses and was viewed as a temporary proto-parliament for Ukraine. The Declaration outlined the basic principles for election to the Labour Congress. It noted that the Congress would not be convened according to 'a full-fledged formula of elections, to which it [was] impossible to adhere at this time'. In the future, when peace was restored, it was to have been replaced by representatives of the working masses, elected on the basis of a full-fledged system of election, that is by a Founding Meeting.⁹

On 5 January 1919, an 'Instruction' on the election to the Labour Congress was issued, signed by all the members of the Directory. This stipulated representation, the rules for election of deputies to the Congress, the order of voting. The elections were to have been held on the basis of curias, each of which consisted of the members of a specific social group (workers, peasants, intelligentsia) in a given territory. Suffrage was granted to all citizens of the UNR who had reached

⁴ Ukrainian Party of Socialists–Independentists (UPSS). A small nationalist party founded in Kyiv on 30 December 1917 by members of the former Ukrainian People's Party and by senior officers of the Army of the UNR.

⁵ Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951). Writer, statesman and politician. In 1917, while being the leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) he was elected one of the two vice-presidents of the Central Rada, and subsequently head of the General Secretariat, the government of Ukraine. Under the Hetman government which followed, he led the opposition Ukrainian National Union, and then (from its inception on 14 November 1918) until February 1919, the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic.

⁶ V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrozbennyia natsiiv* (Kyiv, 1990), part 3, p. 141.

⁷ *Konstitutsiyni akty Ukrainy 1917–1920. Nevidomi konstitutsiyni Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1992), p. 102.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

the age of 21 (with the exception of persons deprived of civil rights by the verdict of a court, and those serving in the army of the UNR). In view of the great services rendered by railway and postal workers during the anti-Hetman coup, they were accorded a special representation. A special representation was also accorded for the Western-Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR),¹⁰ which was of major significance for reinforcing the sense of unity of the Ukrainian lands. According to the Directory's plans, the Labour Congress was to have opened on 19 January 1919 in Kyiv. This allowed only two weeks to prepare for and hold the elections, which was obviously not enough. But the current course of the war for independence meant that no longer time-span could be allowed.

The representation to the Congress from the territories and curias was as follows:

Territory	Peasants	Workers	Working Intelligentsia	Total
Kyiv region	50	12	5	67
Podillya	47	8	4	59
Kharkiv region	50	11	4	65
Kherson region	37	11	4	52
Volhynia	46	10	4	60
Chernihiv region	42	9	3	54
Poltava region	46	8	4	58
Katerynoslav region	31	12	3	46
Tavriya	14	3	1	18
Kholm region, Pidlyashshya, Polissya district	14	4	1	19
All-Ukrainian Railway Congress	—	20	—	20
All-Ukrainian Postal Congress	—	10	—	10
Total	377	118	33	528
ZUNR (Galicia, Bukovyna, Hungary)	—	—	—	65
Total	—	—	—	593 ¹¹

¹⁰ Western-Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR). A nation-state established on the Ukrainian ethnic territory of former Austria-Hungary on 19 October 1918 by the Ukrainian National Rada in Lviv.

¹¹ M. Shapoval, *Velyka revolyutsiya i ukraïnська vyzvolna prohrama* (Prague, 1928), p. 128.

Thus, it was originally planned to elect 593 delegates, and this is the number always quoted by historians. But it is not correct, since it overlooks a number of amendments which the Directory made a few days later, and the Supplement to the Instruction for the elections to the Labour Congress. The Supplement envisaged adding to the total number of deputies a further 14 from the Khotyn, Akkerman and Sorokskyi districts of the former Bessarabia *guberniya*, settled by Ukrainians. The commissar of the Mohyliv-Podilskyi district of the Bessarabian *guberniya* was made responsible for organising the elections in these districts. Elections were also to be held in other parts of Ukraine not included in the system of districts and *guberniyas*.¹²

The idea of the Labour Congress received wide public support. The press carried regular reports on the progress of the elections in various regions. Nevertheless, the prevailing emergency conditions meant that everything was done in great haste. In some regions there was neither time nor favourable conditions for a proper election campaign. But all the same, as a result of the extreme situation, they were conducted hurriedly. A significant part of Ukraine was under enemy occupation, and no elections could be held there at all. Hence it proved impossible to have the planned amount of over 600 delegates to the Congress. Furthermore, on the very eve of its opening, there was a bitter dispute over what would constitute a quorum. As a result, the opening of the Congress had to be postponed several times, that is from 19 January to 20 January, then to 22, and finally to 23 January.

It is possibly for this reason that different historians give different dates for the opening of the Congress. Some, including such authoritative figures as Mykyta Shapoval,¹³ Matviy Stakhiv,¹⁴ et al state that it opened on 22 January 1919. However, the general consensus is that it began on 23 January – and this would appear to be the correct date. Two contemporary scholars, O. and M. Kopelenko, have tried to reconcile the discrepancy by asserting that: 'In principle, either of these dates can be accepted, since the formal opening of the Congress took place on 23 January, the various inter-factional discussions and meetings of the "Councils of Elders" began earlier'.¹⁵ But it is not easy to accept this explanation. We may note that the inter-factional consultations and meetings of the 'Council of Elders' seem to have begun on 21 January, or even earlier. But none of these dates can be regarded as the proper opening.

Moreover, the capital's newspaper *Nash put* (evening edition on 23 January 1919), citing a source in the government of the UNR, informed its readers that the 'opening of the Labour Congress did not take place on 22 January, solely for technical reasons'. Neither the Directory nor the Council of Ministers exerted any pres-

¹² *Narodna volya*, 1919, 16 January.

¹³ Mykyta Shapoval (1882–1932). Political and civic leader and publicist. He was the co-organiser of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and head of its central committee. He was a member of the Central Rada and Little Rada (1917–18) and became postal and telegraph minister in November 1917. He helped organise the rebellion against Hetman Skoropadskyi in November 1918, and was subsequently minister of lands in the Directory from December 1918 to February 1919.

¹⁴ Matviy Stakhiv (1895–1978). Lawyer, historian, and political leader from Galicia.

¹⁵ O. L. Kopylenko, M. L. Kopylenko, *Derzhava i pravo Ukrainy 1917–1920* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 124.

sure to postpone the Congress. On the contrary, the Directory resolved to grant it full freedom of action. The Congress could freely discuss all aspects of Ukrainian independence. However, the issue of Ukraine's independence itself was a *sine qua non*: the independence of the Ukrainian state, won with the blood of the people, must remain inviolable.¹⁶ This clearly indicates that the leaders of the UNR harboured some doubts about the political direction of the future forum, particularly as the current clash of political ideologies, the course of the civil war, and the escalation of military aggression (first and foremost, Bolshevik Russia and newly re-emergent Poland) made the situation in Ukraine extraordinarily unstable and complex.

It is hardly surprising that in these conditions the UNR leaders placed great hopes on the delegates from the ZUNR, who had come with the aim of a solemn promulgation of an Act of Union of the ZUNR with the UNR. The UNR leaders saw the West Ukrainian delegates as a consolidated and dependable force as regards nation and state. Hence on 19 January, during its first meeting with the presidium of the ZUNR delegation, the Directory proposed that the whole 36-member West Ukrainian delegation, should take part in the Labour Congress with full voting rights. This was in spite of the fact that in Galicia there had been no elections to the Congress, and the delegation from the ZUNR did not have a mandate from the Ukrainian National Rada¹⁷ to take part in it. Following a special discussion of this issue, the ZUNR delegation unanimously resolved to participate fully in the Labour Congress. The 'delegation's decision', wrote Stakhiv, 'raised the Directory's spirits considerably since it was very worried about the way the election of delegates to the Congress had turned out'.¹⁸

To date, the total number of delegates who eventually took part in the Labour Congress has not been definitively established. Pavlo Khrystyuk¹⁹ and several other scholars consider that there were no more than 300 participants. However, many scholars, including the Kopylenkos, put the figure at close to 400. Matviy Stakhiv in his fundamental work wrote that when the Congress opened there were exactly 400 delegates.²⁰ Some authors seem to confuse desideratum and fact, and simply cite the number of delegates laid down in the Instruction of 5 January 1919, namely 593. In our opinion, however, the estimate of nearly 400 delegates

¹⁶ *Nash put*, 1919, 23 January.

¹⁷ Ukrainian National Rada. A council formed in Lviv on 18 October 1918 to represent the Ukrainian ethnic territories within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in their quest for self-determination. Its membership included all Ukrainian deputies in both houses of the Austrian parliament and the diets of Galicia and Bukovyna, 3 representatives from each Ukrainian political party in the two crown lands, a group of non-partisan specialists, and selected deputies from counties and towns. Several seats were also reserved for national minorities.

¹⁸ M. Stakhiv, *Ukrayina v dobi Dyrektoriyi UNR*, vol. 3 (Scranton, 1963), p. 15.

¹⁹ Pavlo Khrystyuk (1880–?). Cooperative organiser, political figure, and publicist. During the revolutionary period he was a leading member of the central committees of the UPSR and the Peasant Association. He served as a deputy of the Central Rada and a member of the Little Rada, general chancellor in the first UNR government (1917–18), led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, minister of internal affairs and later state secretary (from the end of February 1918) in Vsevolod Holubovych's UNR government, and deputy minister of internal affairs in Isaak Mazepa's UNR government (1919).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17

is probably close, although the issue undoubtedly demands further detailed investigation.

As mentioned above, the Labour Congress opened on 23 January 1919 in the Kyiv Opera House. It began, however, not at 2 p.m., as had been originally planned, but at 4.45 p.m., since faction meetings were in progress right up to that time. In his opening speech, Volodymyr Vynnychenko stated that the Directory had done everything in its power to ensure the best possible conditions for the Congress to convene.

We are not responsible for the fact that it was impossible to assemble all the representatives from the whole of Ukraine as should have been. But I think that those assembled here have the fullest possible authority to speak on behalf of the working people of Ukraine and to decide their destiny.²¹

After the head of the Directory had spoken, the delegates proceeded to elect a presidium of the Congress. The bloc of left-wing, destructively-minded representatives boycotted the voting. After failing to elect a chairman of the presidium, the Congress elected three vice-chairmen: Dmytro Odryna (a Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary from the Peasant Association), Tymofey Starukh (from a bloc of Galician parties), Semen Vityk (a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Galicia). They also elected V. Zlotchanskyi (Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party), S. Bachynskyi (a Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary from the Peasant Association), L. Havrylyuk (Russian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries), Mykola Voronyi (Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party [Independentists]), and I. Bisk (Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party) as secretaries. Owing to a split of the largest of the factions – the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries – it proved impossible to elect a chairman of the Congress; hence it was chaired by Semen Vityk, a Galician Social Democrat who possessed a wealth of experience of parliamentary activities in the Austrian parliament, and as vice-president of the Ukrainian National Rada.

The fundamental issue of the first day was the ratification of the Acts of Union of the UNR and ZUNR. After outlining their immense significance, Vityk stressed, with considerable vehemence, the need for consolidation and a united front of the workers of all the lands of Ukraine in the fight for full social and national liberation. After that, the secretary of the ZUNR delegation Stepan Vytvytskyi read out the Proclamation of the Ukrainian National Rada of 3 January 1919 on the union of the ZUNR with the UNR, and Labour Congress secretary Zlotchanskyi read the Universal of the Directory of 22 January 1919 on the union of the ZUNR and UNR into a single unified state.

With profound attention, the participants stood to listen to these very significant historical documents. Then the head of the ZUNR delegation Bachynskyi spoke. 'The age-old dreams by which the finest sons of the Ukrainian people lived have now become a reality', he said.

The Directory wrote these words in its solemn Universal, which declares the union of the two Ukrainian Republics. A single Ukrainian National Republic has been created.

²¹ *Ukrayina*, 1919, 24/11 January.

We Ukrainians of Galicia, Bukovyna and Hungarian Rus' particularly welcome this moment. We have been waiting for it to come to pass as quickly as possible. The realisation of our dream became possible once those states which had been the prisons of their peoples began to fall apart, but until now in Ukraine the conditions and situation offered no possibility to effect this union. Now, with the Ukrainian National Republic headed by the Directory, which has given its guarantee that Ukraine will be an independent state and that there will be established in it a situation and system in which the working people can have a good life, we have come to ask to be accepted as part of a single United Ukraine. The High Directory has acceded to our request and issued a universal which we shall keep forever in our heart and about which we shall tell our grandchildren and children. We hope that the Congress, too, will accept our petition to be part of it forever.²²

The reply on behalf of Central Ukraine was given by M. Lyubynskyi, who formerly had been foreign minister of the UNR during the Central Rada period (1917–18): 'When brother meets brother after a long separation', he said,

then he is overcome with emotion and cannot speak. But I, in welcoming you on behalf of Central Ukraine, fight down my heartfelt emotions and direct them to the seat of reason. When [brothers] meet, they greet one another. I shall begin by saying: greetings to you [applause].

Neither the sound of cannons, nor the blood of war could numb our feeling so much that we could not appreciate the festal nature of this day. On the contrary, the blood of war and fratricidal conflict has forced us to listen more closely to the voice of brotherly union, and he, who has waited long ages for this day, knows well how long we have dreamed of this, of which and only today can we speak aloud. This dream has been handed down from generation to generation since the moment when we were divided. This dream, however, lived, like a fire, in our hearts and the hearts of our forefathers. But it was not only national sentiment, not only a single ethnography which united us. While we were divided, centuries rolled by, and culture lowered, but our people, divided by a border, remained true to the same culture. We were waiting for the moment of unification.²³

In conclusion, Lyubynskyi expressed his confidence that once Ukraine was established as a united, neutral and working Republic, then no eagles would perch on its trident, whether single- or double-headed, black or white.

The next speaker was Tymofey Starukh, the delegate from the Galician peasants, who was a member of the Congress Presidium.

In your applause, we can see that we have one thought – union must be achieved; that we are all of one mind, that Ukraine united and whole should live and develop, that it will be one body, which no-one will be able to tear apart. ... When we came to union, we were not steered by anything other than the thought of living with you in a single destiny, other than the thought that the Ukrainian people should live united.²⁴

After this, Vityk as Chairman formally asked the participants whether the Congress members agreed with both Acts of Central and Western Ukraine. All those present, save for a handful of Russian Social Democrats, rose to their feet as a sign of

²² *Robotnycha bazeta*, 1919, 26 January.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

consent. Thus the Labour Congress almost unanimously ratified the Act of Union of the ZUNR and the UNR, giving it a legal juridical character.

At this point, the first day of the Congress ended. At 5.50 p.m., the chairman adjourned the meeting.

The principal task of the Labour Congress for the following days was to define the fundamental principles of internal and foreign policy, and the form of the state system of the UNR. All these and other matters of principle provoked bitter conflicts between the various party factions at the Congress. The largest such was the UPSR, but this split into various fragments right at the beginning of the Congress. The next in number of mandates was the USDRP. The UPSS had a sizeable representation, and the UPSF a considerably smaller one. Other parties were very weakly represented. The bloc consisting of social democrats, the group of delegates of the ZUNR, delegates from the Peasant Party and part of the faction of Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries commanded a compact constructive majority, which ultimately determined the decisions ratified by the Congress.

On 24 January, the Congress held no plenary sessions, since the entire day was taken up by meetings of the various factions. The next plenary session was on 25 January. This heard reports from the Directory and Government, presented, respectively, by Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhivskyi. These were followed by speeches from the Minister for Military Affairs, Oleksander Hrekov, and other ministers. The following day, various other ministers spoke, as well as Supreme Otaman Symon Petlyura²⁵ and the commander of the Corps of Sich Riflemen Yevhen Konovalts.²⁶ The latter two addresses revealed what a critical situation Ukraine was in, owing to the aggression of Soviet Russia. To constructively-minded faction leaders it became ever-clearer that very little time remained for protracted and, unfortunately, sometimes fruitless discussions. Hence a meeting of heads of factions agreed that the speeches given in plenary sessions should not be discussed, and that these sessions should henceforth be confined to faction's statements of their principles and aims, and proposals for establishing constitutional order for the UNR.

On 26 January, the delegates heard declarations, statements and draft resolutions from various factions, in particular from the UPSP (central tendency), the Bund, Socialists-Federalists, Independentists-Socialists, the professional association of railway and postal workers, the ZUNR delegation, Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Russian Social-Democrats.

The majority of the factions demonstrated a profound concern with the situation in the country, expressed confidence in the Directory, and spoke in favour of a democratic parliamentary model of a state system. For example, Tymofey Starukh, a representative of the Galician peasantry and a member of the Congress presidium, stressed in his speech that 'For six centuries, frontiers separated us. We

²⁵ Symon Petlyura (1879–1926). Statesman and publicist; supreme commander of the UNR army and President of the Directory of the UNR.

²⁶ Colonel Yevhen Konovalts (1891–1938). Military commander in the UNR army, and political leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

suffered in servitude and a whole sea of blood had to be spilt for the dismembered lands to be united with their mother – Ukraine'. Having pointed out that the fight for statehood had not been waged without mistakes, he urged that,

This is not the time for party quarrels, when the enemy is standing on our threshold. The Labour Congress should state that it is prepared to stand forth in solidarity and with force in defence of the working people... Let us leave party quarrels, for we need to defend the country. This is no time to speak of changing the Directory, we should be expressing full confidence in its work. This is no time to be holding meetings – that is a matter for the future. Let us now wind up the Congress, go to the villages, and raise an army that is both disciplined and fearsome...²⁷

In conclusion, Starukh read out a declaration from the peasantry of Western Ukraine. In view of the political importance of the time, and the uncertain military and domestic situation of the UNR, this proposed, in particular, 1) to express full confidence in the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, and give it a mandate to continue in the future as the supreme authority in the UNR; 2) to close the Session of the Labour Congress and mandate the Directory to convene, as soon as the statehood, territory and peace of Ukraine are ensured, an All-Ukrainian national assembly on the basis of universal, equal, simple, secret and proportional suffrage; 3) to express support for compulsory military service and the immediate raising of a powerful and disciplined army for the defence of the independent working UNR; 4) to abolish large-scale land-ownership, leave small-holdings in private hands, and, bearing in mind that this is the opinion of the peasantry of Central Ukraine, to put on record a separate resolution on this issue relating to Western Ukraine.²⁸

The bitter factional debates on these propositions continued the following day. There were also interfactional negotiations on joint resolutions; as a result, most of the factions of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (central tendency) reached agreement with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP) faction on proposing a joint resolution on the principles of the provisional constitution of the UNR.

On its final day, 28 January, the Congress in an overwhelming majority ratified a Law on the Form of Power in Ukraine, based on the aforesaid joint resolution. In it the Directory was given full confidence and thanks for its liberation of the Ukrainian people from aristocratic-hetmanite rule. In view of the dangerous military situation, authority and the defence of the country was accorded to the Directory, whose membership was to be extended to include a representative from Western Ukraine. The mandates of supreme power in Ukraine were to remain with the Directory until the next session of the Labour Congress. It was noted that all legislation, adopted by the Directory prior to the said next session, was subject to eventual ratification by the Labour Congress. Executive power in the UNR was assigned to the Council of National Ministers, formed by the Directory.

This Law noted that the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine opposes the establishment of a workers' dictatorship, and supports a democratic system in the

²⁷ *Ukrayina*, 1919, 29/16 January.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

UNR. In order to strengthen the democratic system, the government of the UNR in conjunction with the relevant commissions (see below) was to draft a law for elections to a national parliament of the Great United Ukrainian Republic. On the basis of nation-wide elections, new organs of power should be convened in local areas, and until that time, in the interest of national defence, authority there should rest in the hands of commissars appointed by the government of the UNR. These commissars were to work in contact with and under the control of the local labour councils. For drafting legislation in the interval until the next session of the Labour Congress, six commissions were appointed – defence, agrarian affairs, budget, foreign affairs, food supply, culture, and education. The document further stated that

in relation to the occupation of Ukrainian territory by the forces of the states of the Entente, and the Soviet, Polish, Don, volunteer, and Romanian armies, the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine declares its resolute protest against these infringements of the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Ukrainian people wishes to be neutral and in friendly relations with all other peoples, but it will not suffer any state to use military force to impose its will on the Ukrainian people.²⁹

After adopting the law on state power, the Congress promulgated a Universal [Decree] to the Ukrainian people. This in effect repeated all the fundamental propositions of the said law. An appeal to the nations of the world was likewise adopted.

The military situation was by now rapidly deteriorating (the Red Army had occupied all Ukraine east of the Dnipro and had reached Kyiv), the work of the Congress was ‘temporarily’ halted, and its delegates went away intent on implementing its resolutions, first and foremost that calling for the mobilisation of the population in defence of their country. But ‘temporarily’, in fact, turned out to mean ‘permanently’, since the Congress was never to convene again.

Nevertheless, the Congress was of major significance for the national state-building of that era, and the gathering of state-building experience for the future. Particularly valuable is the fact that in spite of Ukraine’s difficult domestic situation and extraordinarily complex external conditions, the Congress represented one of Ukraine’s first attempts at truly democratic elections, and wide-ranging and free discussion of various courses of national state-building. Today, scholars rightly note that, ‘In comparison with the Central Rada, the Congress has more grounds for being regarded as [Ukraine’s] proto-parliament since it was formed on the basis of – albeit incomplete – territorial representation’.³⁰

All serious scholars of the subject likewise particularly stress that the Labour Congress personified united Ukraine, and was the first united representation of the Ukrainian people in history.³¹ As regards its role in the legislative endorsement of the Act of Union, this has already been discussed in sufficient detail above. □

²⁹ P. Khrystyuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istoriyi ukrayinskoyi revolyutsiyi*, vol. 4 (Prague, 1922), p. 67.

³⁰ Kopylenko, Kopylenko, op. cit., p. 126.

³¹ See O. Mytsyuk, *Doba Dyrektoriyi UNR. Spomyny i rozdumy* (Lviv, 1938), p. 40; Stakhiv, op. cit., p. 91; Kopylenko, Kopylenko, op. cit., p. 126, et al.

1100th Anniversary of Halych

Volodymyr Baran

On 18–20 September 1998, Ukraine celebrated the 1100th anniversary of Halych, the capital of the mediaeval principality of that name, which included the lands of Galicia and Volhynia. (The very name ‘Galicia’ is simply a Latinised form derived from the name ‘Halych’).

The focal point of the celebrations was the unveiling of a statue of the mediaeval prince Danylo Romanovych of Halych, one of the key figures in the history of the Halych principality. The statue stands in the central square of the modern town of Halych, and the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, delivered an address at the unveiling ceremony.

The celebrations also included a two-day scholarly conference on ‘Halych and the Galician Land in the State-Building Processes of Ukraine’. This paid particular attention to the archaeology of Halych and its environs, an academic discipline which, prior to Ukraine’s gaining independence in 1991, had on occasion yielded results which by no means accorded with the political preferences of the ruling powers of the time. Since 1991, there has been a new burst of activity in the excavation of the Old Halych site, which, fortunately for the archaeologists, is at some distance from its modern namesake.

The approach of the anniversary triggered a major effort to put the archaeological remains of Halych into a form readily appreciable by the general public. The interior of the Halych Mound – excavated by an archaeological team in 1991–6 (see, *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, no. 3, autumn 1998) – was made safe for tourist access, lighting was installed, and it was provided with replicas of the original artefacts. The mediaeval Metropolitan’s palace (which previously had housed a somewhat dreary Soviet-style museum) was refurbished, and the museum completely reorganised to focus on the archaeological and ethnographic artefacts from the Old Halych site and its surroundings. The twelfth-century Church of St Panteleymon, in the nearby village of Shevchenkove, was thoroughly restored.

The first documentary reference to Halych occurs in the Hungarian chronicle collated by an anonymous notary of King Bela II (1131–41), which records that Almos, a leader of the Magyars, stopped in Halych on the way to Pannonia. At its peak of importance, after Prince Roman Mstyslavovych had united the Volhynian and Halych principalities in 1141, Halych was a large mediaeval city, made up of several distinct districts, surrounded with multiple-lines of defences, and dozens of stone churches, various artisans’ workshops, market squares, military barracks, and the palaces and mansions of wealthy notables.

This picture of a well-built, well-defended and prosperous capital has been built up on the basis of careful archaeological research. Below, the leader of the present Permanent Halych Archaeological Expedition, Professor Volodymyr Baran, outlines the history of archaeological research at the site and the controversies it engendered.

* * *

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, mediaeval Halych has attracted the attention of antiquaries and enthusiasts for regional history. The first of these was Fr. Antin Petrushevych, a specialist in ecclesiastical history and amateur archaeologist. In the latter capacity, during the 1850s he made ground-level surveys of the then still-visible ruins of churches and defensive earthworks from the princely era; he also studied the walls and towers of the palatine’s castle. In his report on his observations, which he published in the journal *Zorya halych*




Fig. 1. Krylos settlement – the stronghold of Princely Halych, 12th–13th c.
1. Halych Mound; 2. Dormition Cathedral; 3. Zoloty Tik; 4. Tsarynka site; 5. Church of the Annunciation; 6. Nad stinkyoyu site.

tska,¹ Petrushevych raised a vital issue, which later turned out to be extremely complex: which of the ruins still visible at that time in Halych and its vicinity was, in reality, the site of princely Halych and its Metropolitan cathedral. (We must point out, straightaway, that this question has still not received a final and definitive answer). Petrushevych considered that Old Halych stood on the site of the contemporary town, with its castle hill and the palatine's castle; the latter, he thought, was built where once the prince's palace had stood. He likewise thought that the Church of the Nativity in modern Halych occupied the site of the (Old Halych) Cathedral of the Mother of God.² Petrushevych propounded this theory vigorously and consistently to the very end of his life.

His immediate successors in the field, likewise amateurs of archaeology, were Isydor Sharanevych, a professor of history at Lviv University, and Lev Lavretskiy, a priest from Zalukva. Together they undertook the first excavations of the ruins of the mediaeval churches still visible in the vicinity. They took a different view of the site of Old Halych.³ Sharanevych located it on the Zalukva plateau, between the rivers Limnytsya (Chechva) and the Dnister, west of present-day Halych. In 1882, Fr. Lavretskiy carried out excavations on the Zalukva plateau for a whole season and uncovered the remains of the foundations of three stone structures. One of these, at the 'Karpysya' site, was identified by Sharanevych as the Church of the Holy Redeemer, the second, beside what Yosyp Pelenskyi called the 'Dibrova' wood, was termed the Church of Sts Cyril and Methodius. The remains of the third building – a rotunda – became known in archaeological literature as the 'Polygon'. In 1884, throughout the summer season, Lavretskiy discovered the remains of a further three small churches. These were, firstly, the monastery Church of St Elijah in the 'Prokaliyiv orchard' site on the right bank of the Mozol Brook, the foundations of which, after repeated excavations, Mikhail Karger and Bohdan Tomenchuk eventually brought to the surface. Secondly, at the 'Old Church' site, Lavretskiy discovered the foundations of the Church of the Annunciation, where there was a well-preserved section of floor made of the beautiful glazed tiles which are now known to be specific to Old Halych. The remains of the third church at the 'Old Church' site, beside the road from Zalukva to Chetverky, have not been definitively identified. Sharanevych at first believed them to be the Church of the Annunciation, and later – the Dominican Church of St Anne. At the end of the 1884 season, at the 'Voskresenskyi' (Resurrection) site on the right bank of the Mozol Brook in the Krylos area, Lavretskiy discovered the remains of the foundations of the small Church of the Resurrection, a rotunda which Prof. Volodymyr Antonovych believed to be a tower. (The excavations of Yaroslav Pasternak in 1941 and Yuriy Lukomskiy in 1989 eventually demonstrated that Lavretskiy's identification had been correct).

¹ *Zorya halytska*, Lviv, 1850, no. 55.

² A. Petrushevych, *Istoričeskoe izvestie o tserkvi sv. Panteleymona* (Lviv, 1881), pp. 73–5. A. Petrushevych, *O sobornoy Bogorodichnoy tserkvi v gorodi Galicbi proiskhodyashchey iz pervoy poloviny XII stolitiya* (Lviv, 1899).

³ J. Szaraniewicz, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroświątecznego grodu Halicza w r. 1860, 1880 i 1882* (Lviv, 1883); J. Szaraniewicz, *Rezultaty badań archeologicznych w okolicy Halicza* (Lviv, 1886).

During the 1880s and 1890s, Oleksander Cholovskyi also took up the study of Old Halych. One can still make out his excavations around the existing (sixteenth-century) Church of the Dormition in the village of Krylos, in his search for the cathedral. Cholovskyi maintained that this church was proof that it was the Krylos citadel, not the one on the Dnister, which had been the seat of the Rostyslavychi and Romanovychi dynasties of princes of Halych.⁴

Cholovskyi found no traces of the Dormition Cathedral, the site of which remained an open question. His excavations, which he carried out together with Sharanevych, showed that the materials from the foundations of the Krylos church included individual architectural details from an older church. It is now known that these came from the nearby Cathedral of the Dormition, the ruins of which were quarried by the builders of the newer, late-mediaeval church.

A major contribution to the study of the architectural remains of Old Halych was made in the early years of this century by the art historian Yosyp Pelenskyi. He made the first major survey and study of the one more-or-less well preserved mediaeval church in the area, that of St Panteleymon. (This has now been completely restored due to the dedicated work over many years by Academician Ivan Mohytych and his talented team).

Pelenskyi also surveyed the important area between present-day Halych, Krylos and Zalukva. He pointed to a number of sites with ruins, which had not been noted by previous researchers.⁵ In his search for the cathedral, Pelenskyi dug several more trenches around the present church in Krylos, but these yielded no positive results. Nevertheless, in Pelenskyi's opinion,

... the high, tongue-shaped cliff has since the twelfth century been called Krylos... it was... the capital city of the Rus' chronicles and tales of Dluhosh. On it, there stood,... in the middle the largest stronghold – the cathedral Church of the Dormition of the Holy Virgin built from dressed stone...⁶

This assertion, although based essentially on intuition, was later corroborated by the work of the notable Ukrainian archaeologist Yaroslav Pasternak.

We shall return to Pasternak's findings later. First, though, we have to mention the study of Old Halych by the person whom Pasternak described as the '... ardent, amateur-archaeologist Lev Chachkovskyi and his notable assistant, the local medic and later doctor – Yaroslav Khmilevskyi'.⁷ During the period 1921–32, they made a ground-level survey of the whole territory of Old Halych, its suburbs and close vicinity, mapping the locations of fortifications, churches, and barrows, including the Halych Mound, and giving brief descriptions of them. The two maps they produced thus delineated graphically the historical topography of Old Halych. Their cartographic work was published in 1938 in their joint monograph *Knyazhnyi Halych*, which appeared after Chachkovskyi's death. Their maps have been used

⁴ A. Czołowski, *O położeniu starego Halicza* (Lviv, 1890).

⁵ J. Peleński, *Halicz w dziejach sztuki średniowiecznej na podstawie badań archeologicznych i źródeł archiwalnych* (Cracow, 1914).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁷ Ya. Pasternak, *Staryi Halych* (Cracow–Lviv, 1944), p. 40.

by all subsequent researchers of Old Halych, particularly Pasternak, and have been reprinted in book after book.

In actual fact, Chachkovskiyi and Khmylevskiyi, on the basis of their own surveys and previous archaeological work, defined the boundaries of Old Halych, in the era when it was the capital of the Galician-Volhynian Principality.⁸ This was, for its time, a large, though somewhat scattered city, with a Lower Town and numerous suburbs, extending from the Dnister in the north to the ‘Dibrova’ wood outside the village of Sokoly in the south. Its heart – the fortress – is located in the area of the village of Krylos. Between the river Lukva and the Mozol Brook, it was protected in the south by mighty defensive ramparts. Chachkovskiyi and Khmylevskiyi definitively identified and mapped almost all the defensive systems of Old Halych, including the stone churches and monasteries. The centre of the Krylos citadel – the fortress – was divided, in the opinion of the researchers, into two parts. In the southern part of the fortress stood the Dormition Cathedral (still unlocated), while in the northern area, at the ‘Zoloty Tik’ site, they assumed the remains of the princely palace and Volodymyrko’s Church of the Holy Redeemer to lie. In the gully between the cathedral and ‘Zoloty Tik’ was a square, where merchants and pilgrims stayed. Today it has been built over, but it still retains its mediaeval name – ‘Bazar’.

Pasternak, who had a high opinion of the work of Chachkovskiyi and Khmylevskiyi and made full use of it, continued the study of the Krylos fortress which they had identified, and brought it to fruition. Pasternak, a gifted scholar and professional archaeologist, located and excavated the foundations of the largest church in the area of Old Halych – the Cathedral of the Dormition – bringing to an end a search which had lasted almost a century. However, as regards ‘Zoloty Tik’, neither Pasternak nor any subsequent archaeological team up to the present day has ever located any remains of the princely palace or its ‘chapel-royal’ – the Church of the Holy Redeemer – at this site.

In his monograph *Staryi Halych* – one of the key works in the literature on the subject – Pasternak, following Chachkovskiyi and Khmylevskiyi, attests that the princely court was located on the ‘Zoloty Tik’ site. However, recent archaeological research suggests that there are stronger grounds for assuming that, like the cathedral, it was built during the reign of Yaroslav Osmomysl, the son of Volodymyrko, who ruled in Halych from 1153–87, and was located somewhat higher up and to the north of the Cathedral of the Dormition, somewhere adjacent to, or, possibly, partly below the Metropolitan’s palace. In any case, the latest excavations by Bohdan Tomenchuk and Yuriy Lukomskiyi give certain indications of this. The residence of Prince Volodymyrko (1104–53), which was connected to the Church of the Holy Redeemer, should most probably be sought at the ‘Karpysya’ site, whence, the Chronicle tells us, the road to Bovshiv, along which departed Petro Boryslavych, the envoy of Prince Izyaslav of Kyiv, is clearly visible. All the more so, since our 1960s dig adjacent to Bovshiv revealed settlements from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries.

⁸ L. Chachkovskiyi, Ya. Khmylevskiyi, *Knyazhyi Halych* (Stanislav, 1938).

Pasternak's work launched a new stage in the archaeological study of Old Halych; this lasted from 1934 to the outbreak of the Second World War. Pasternak's research was financed by Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

Pasternak, who had an expert knowledge of the mediaeval chronicles and who had studied the historical topography of Old Halych, had two aims in his fieldwork. Firstly, to find and investigate the foundations of the Dormition Cathedral, the site of which would determine the location of the princely capital, and so answer the question: which of the Halych citadels had actually been the seat of the Rostyslavychi and Romanovychi dynasties. Secondly, when had the fortification work which turned the Krylos citadel into a town been undertaken. Pasternak began his fieldwork with the second objective.

During his season, in 1934, he began to study the Halych Mound. The Chronicle mentions the Halych Mound, which is situated at the highest point of the Krylos citadel on the 'Kachkiv' site, under the annal for 1206. The name of the Mound itself is eponymous with the town of Halych, and the fact that it was known to the chronicler indicates its historical significance. The chronicler mentions the Mound in connection with an uprising of the citizens of Halych against voyevode Benedict, who was temporarily ruling Halych in the name of King Andrew of Hungary. Prince Mstyslav Yaroslavovych 'the Dumb' brought a small force to the aid of the citizens of Halych from Peresopnytsya but did not succeed in breaking into the town. Before he returned to Peresopnytsya, one of the Halych boyars, Illya Shchepanovych, led him to the Halych Mound and mocked him, saying 'O, Prince, in as much as thou hast seated thyself on the Halych Mound, thou hast ruled in Halych'. The text goes on to promise that the chronicler will say more later about '... the Halych Mound and of the origins of Halych, from whence it arose'.⁹

Although the chronicler did not keep his promise, this remark prompted Mykhaylo Hrushevskiyi to postulate that in the Halych Mound may be buried 'some Halych (or Halysya) – the founder of the eponymous town'.¹⁰ Hrushevskiyi likewise thought that the centre of Old Halych was located 'more-or-less along the line between the outfall of the Limnytsya and present-day Halych, where in two places the knolls alongside the Dnister rise more-or-less to the level of the Krylos citadel'. Clarifying this further, he said that 'this is the present-day castle hill and the bank of the Limnytsya'.¹¹ Pasternak quotes this passage in his *Staryi Halych*. By the time he came to write his monograph, Pasternak knew where the cathedral had stood – he had found it himself – and this fixed the site of the capital on Krylos hill, contrary to the theories of Petrushevych and Hrushevskiyi. But we should like to quote another passage, from the second volume of Hrushevskiyi's *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusi*, which is not cited in *Staryi Halych*: which says that 'all in all, the question of this [the location of Halych] still remains open. There is nothing impossible in [assuming] that Halych, together with its suburbs (scattered, surely, not a cramped mass),

⁹ *Litopys Rus'kyi. Za Ipatyskym spyskom*. Translated by L. Makhovets (Kyiv, 1989), p. 381.

¹⁰ M. Hrushevskiyi, *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusy*, vol. II (Lviv, 1904), p. 466.

¹¹ Pasternak, op. cit., p. 34.

occupied with some gaps the entire area from the Limnytsya to Krylos and present-day Halych' (p. 468). This view, in the light of present-day archaeological research, is extremely fruitful. The residence of the Halych princes may well have been in different citadels at various times.

First, however, let us return to the Halych Mound, with which Pasternak began his research. By 1934, it was no longer intact; it had twice been partially excavated (by Tadeusz Ziemięcki in 1883 and by Yosyp Pelenskyi in 1911) – but without result. In 1915, during the First World War, two dug-outs and an access trench were cut in the middle of the Mound, which effectively destroyed this ancient monument. Like his predecessors, Pasternak, too, was unable to find any traces of a burial in the Mound. He interpreted the site as a 'Place of enthronement of the first Halych princes long before Volodymyrko, and then, when this custom had become obsolete or was, perhaps, banned by the Church, the Mound remained a historical place'.¹² This interpretation satisfied archaeologists, both Pasternak's predecessors and successors. No further work on the Halych Mound was done until 1991. Then in 1991–2 a joint dig from the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ivano-Frankivsk Museum of Regional Studies discovered traces of a burial in the Mound. (We shall return to this discovery later).

Pasternak's major achievement was the location and study of the Dormition Cathedral. After making a study of the terrain of Old Halych and a successful reconnaissance dig, he excavated a number of barrows, including one in which Magyars were interred during the ninth–tenth centuries. This latter find corroborated the report by an anonymous chronicle of King Bela II (1131–41) which notes under the annal for 898 that during their migration to Pannonia, a group of Magyars led by one Almos had been guests of the Prince of Halych. This reference – and Pasternak's corroborative discoveries, was the basis for the 1998 celebrations of 1100 years of Halych.

Locating the foundations of the Dormition Cathedral was not easy. Pasternak was successful only at his tenth attempt. However, once he had discovered the foundations and the remains of the alabaster-tiled floor, he was able to announce with confidence that these were, '... the remains of the largest princely building of the Galician-Volhynian state, for which his predecessors had searched for many decades'. He continued digging in 1937, 1938, and 1939. The cathedral was completely unearthed. According to Pasternak, it, '... was one and a half metres shorter and narrower by the same amount than St Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv. The Dormition Cathedral had three apses, while St Sophia's in Kyiv has five apses'.¹³

The stone Cathedral of the Dormition of the Holy Virgin was built by Yaroslav Osmomysl, in the crypt of which he was buried. A stone sarcophagus with the remains of the prince was discovered by Pasternak during his excavation of the cathedral. During World War II, before the arrival of the Soviet Army in Galicia, Pasternak concealed the remains of the prince in the crypt of the Cathedral of St George in Lviv. Today, there is much discussion about where they should be re-interred.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 51–2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 49–79; 82–111.

Beside and to the east of the sarcophagus of Yaroslav Osmomysl, another burial was discovered; this was a young woman who was interred in a wooden coffin. Pasternak suggested that this was a daughter of Osmomysl, who is unknown to written history.

Pasternak compiled a detailed description of his excavation, with diagrams and photographs, including extensive analogical material, together with a careful study of the various artefacts and materials unearthed during the dig. This makes it possible to visualise how the Cathedral – the largest shrine in Halych and the Galician-Volhynian land – once looked. In addition, one should note that Pasternak's monograph *Staryi Halych* also contains a brief description of all the other churches and chapels, discovered by his predecessors. In 1939–41, the vicinity of the cathedral was also investigated. Some late-mediaeval interments were discovered, which cut across those of the princely era, as well as the remains of dwellings from a much earlier period. One of the latter dwellings contained a stone-built oven, which intrigued Pasternak considerably. At that time, such ovens were unknown, and Pasternak interpreted it as a stove in a building which served as the bath-house. Since then, subsequent teams have discovered some fifteen dwellings with stone-built ovens in the Halych citadel, while in the whole of Ukraine east of the Dnipro several hundred have been found, and there are no longer any doubts about their use. Furthermore, it has now been established that semi-pit dwellings with stone ovens first appeared in the Dnister basin at the end of the fourth century AD, and remained the principal type of dwelling there right up to the first half of the twelfth century. Mapped geographically, they show the migration of Slavs from the Northern Carpathian area to Central and Western Europe. For example, in the ninth–tenth centuries, they were known in Slav settlements between Hamburg and Lübeck.¹⁴

Pasternak's work on the 'Zolotyi Tik' site of the Krylos fortress in 1938–9 deserves special mention. There he excavated the ramparts and uncovered a fairly significant area on the plateau. He exposed a series of domestic pits, found numerous ceramics dating from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries, metal products, usually of sacral use, and episcopal seals. But he found no traces of the princely castle, nor the Church of the Holy Redeemer. Nor, subsequently, did any others who excavated the 'Zolotyi Tik' site; neither Mikhaïl Karger nor Vitold Aulikh, nor Yuriy Lukomskyi, nor Bohdan Tomenchuk and myself. From this one may deduce that they are not to be found there, although Pasternak was convinced that the residence of Volodymyrko Volodarevych and the Church of the Holy Redeemer linked to it were located on the 'Zolotyi Tik'. A careful study of all the discoveries made on the territory of the mediaeval city of Halych tend to make one support the view put forward by Bohdan Tomenchuk that the court of Volodymyrko and the Church of the Holy Redeemer were located in the 'Karpysya' site, and that it was only in the time of Yaroslav Osmomysl that the capital was moved to the area of the Krylos hill, and that massive defences were raised to protect it on the vulnerable, southern side.

¹⁴ V. Baran, *Davni slovyany* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 79–89.

A special section in Pasternak's *Staryi Halych* is devoted to his excavations at the 'St George's monastery' site in 1939 and 1941. Here he discovered a number of artisan's workshops, including bronze-founding, jewellery, glass-making and a two-level potter's kiln. The finds included matrices for casting, bronze shavings, slag and metal blanks. Pasternak went so far as to call this site the 'industrial park' of Old Halych.


When one considers Pasternak's undoubted achievements in the archaeological study of Old Halych, one cannot fail to remark yet again that, in spite of all the difficulties of the war years, he nevertheless was able to make a profound study of all the archaeological material from Old Halych, together with the written sources and documentary evidence. This bore fruit in his monumental monograph *Staryi Halych*, published in 1944. This work is an exemplar for all future archaeological teams working on the territory of Halych.

We would now like to describe the archaeological research carried out by the Halych expedition of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ivano-Frankivsk Museum of Regional Studies, which was led by Vitold Aulikh. But before we do so, we should like to mention briefly the occasional digs carried out by Vasyl Dovzhenok and V. Honcharov from Kyiv and Mikhail Karger and O. Ioannisyian from Leningrad in the 1950s–80s in the area of princely Halych. The two Kyiv archaeologists discovered a number of dwellings, workshops and domestic buildings, while the Leningraders studied the remains of ecclesiastical architecture.¹⁵ They made a new and more detailed study of several churches: the quadriform church in the village of Poberezhzhya; the Church of St Elijah; the Church of the Holy Redeemer, on Karpytsya hill; the 'Polygon', on the 'Karpiv grove' site; and an unidentified church on the 'Cemetery' site. Their publications significantly increased the amount of archaeological knowledge available about princely Halych. Dovzhenok, a recognised specialist on the feudal structures of the Kyivan state, after studying the historical topography of Halych, expressed the view that the boyars' palaces as it were blocked the princely capital, and that the boyars often used their own considerable economic and military power to impose their will on the princes of Halych, thus creating social tension and destabilising the political situation in the state. This idea proved extremely fruitful.

Aulikh began systematic work on Old Halych in 1969. This encompassed the fortress of the Krylos citadel, the Lower Town beside the river Lukva, and a series of suburbs. A large number of dwellings and domestic outbuildings were identified, artisan's workshops, cemeteries, and individual interments were uncovered and excavated, together with a quantity of (archaeologically) valuable materials.¹⁶ Yuriy Lukomskiy's team, which formed part of the Aulikh expedition, excavated a number of relics of monumental architecture. A second team, that of Bohdan Tomenchuk, studied the surroundings of princely Halych. This work is continuing to yield positive results. The detailed appraisal of the results of Au-

¹⁵ V. K. Goncharov, 'Drevniy Galich', *Visnyk AN URSR*, no. 1, Kyiv, 1956; M. K. Karger, 'Osnovnye imogi raskopok drevnego Galicha v 1955 g.', *Kratkie soobsbheniya Instituta arkhologii AN SSSR*, no. 81, Moscow, 1960, pp. 61–71; O. M. Ioannisyian, 'O rannem etape razvitiya Galitskogo zodchestva', op. cit., no. 164, 1981.

¹⁶ V. Aulikh, 'Istoricheskaya topografiya drevnego Galicha', *Slavianskie drevnosti*, Kyiv, 1980.



Statue of Prince Danylo Romanovych, Halych. Unveiled in September 1998 to mark the 1100th anniversary of the city.

likh's expedition, which they undoubtedly deserve, is, alas, beyond the scope of this short article. Let us pass on then to his 1980–1 dig in the southern part of the Krylos citadel (on the Shevchuk family estate). Here he discovered the best and richest collection of domestic artefacts and tools in the whole history of archaeological research at the Old Halych site. In the store-room of a Halych jeweller were found 142 complete and 15 fragmented earthenware crucibles, eight bronze matrices, three stone and two bronze icons, buckles, clasps, plaques, pendants, a complete bronze vessel, an ivory chess-piece (queen), and fragments of a candelabrum, six fragments of crosses, two iron axes, a lock, keys, whetstones, lead weights, 31 fragments of glass bracelets, and fragments of earthenware pots (from the twelfth century). One of the richest dwellings in Krylos was also excavated – a semi-pit building of the twelfth–thirteenth centuries – which had eventually been destroyed by fire. In one corner, the skeleton of a woman was unearthed. The finds included the coulter for a plough, 2 scythes, 2 fragments of a chain-mail, 3 axes, a drill, knives, fragments of a spur, a stirrup, horses' hobbles, nails, metal blanks, beads, 7 whetstones, 91 fragments of glass bracelets, and a bone arrow-head.

Unfortunately, illness prevented Aulikh from writing up his investigations in a definitive monograph, but his extensive and well-substantiated notes have opened up new pages of the archaeology and history of Old Halych.¹⁷

Archaeological work on princely Halych was then continued by Aulikh's younger assistants: Bohdan Tomenchuk and Yuriy Lukomskyi.

Over the next 18 years, their work included the architectural and archaeological study of 15 major objects, 6 of them for the first time. Lukomskyi made surface-level measurements of the churches which had already been discovered, identified their ground plans more precisely, and established the structural and technological features of their construction. He also dated them more precisely, and made graphical reconstructions.

A team working at the 'Tsarynka' site in the area of the Lower Town of Old Halych in 1986–92 also produced significant results. They uncovered four unidentified religious structures which had stood on the same spot at different times, and also investigated part of a cemetery from the princely era. One must mention in particular the wooden cruciform tri-apsidal mausoleum, which was in use from the middle of the twelfth century to the first decades of the thirteenth century. During the first half of the thirteenth century, the construction of a cruciform domed stone church on the same site was begun, for which purpose the foundations were reinforced by timber beams. This, however, was interrupted by the Mongol invasion (1241). In the second half of thirteenth century, a wooden chapel was built on the traditional site of the church, beside which the inhabitants of the Lower Town continued to be interred.

In recent years, important work has also been done on Castle Hill in present-day Halych by Yuriy Lukomskyi's team, and also by the conservation digs of Vasyl Ivanovskyi and Vasyl Oprysko, and, this year, by Mykhaylo Rozhka, too. There

¹⁷ Reports by Vitold Aulikh about the archaeological study of Old Halych are located in the archive of the Institute of Archaeology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

materials and artefacts from the eleventh and twelfth–thirteenth centuries were found. Thus the palatine's castle was built in a citadel dating from the princely era.

Another team, led by Bohdan Tomenchuk, which included Ihor Kochkin and students from the Department of History of the University of the Carpathians, began with a conservation dig at the 'Kachkiv' site.¹⁸ In 1991–2, we began a dig at the Halych Mound, which unlike the three previous attempts, proved fruitful.

Our discovery of a buried monoxyla-type boat containing rich war-gear, covered with a gold-embroidered cloth, tended to support Hrushevskyi's theory that the founder of Halych was interred in the Halych Mound. It is probably no coincidence that the building of the Halych Mound, at the end of the tenth century, was simultaneous with the construction of the first defences of the Halych citadel. The Mound has now been reconstructed so that visitors can go into it and view replicas of the finds. The replica monoxyla was made by Professor M. Fihol, author of the monograph *Mystetstvo starodavnyoho Halycha* (The Art of Old Halych), and his students.

For the first time, a thorough study was made of the Krylos citadel. It was established that the triple ramparts and the main ditch, which surrounds the southern part of the fortress, were started in the tenth century. The main, middle phase with wooden defensive cells dates from the twelfth–thirteenth centuries, and was burned by the Tatars in 1241; the final, late phase – to the fifteenth–seventeenth centuries. This year, under the main ditch of the fortress, prehistoric defences, dating from the seventh–sixth centuries BC, were discovered.

In 1995–6, on the western escarpment opposite the Dormition Cathedral, were discovered traces (post-holes) of a large two-storey hall in the central area (length 26 m.; width 15 m.). Judging by the material (spurs, stirrups, a stylus, numerous amphorae shards) it housed the prince's men-at-arms.¹⁹

In addition to dwellings and domestic outbuildings, in 1996–7, adjacent to the Dormition Cathedral, a square, paved with white stone and running up to the Metropolitan's palace was uncovered. In 1998, Yuriy Lukomskyi and his team uncovered the wooden foundation-beams of some large wooden structure. One may postulate that these two discoveries are connected and that these are the first, although not unequivocal, traces of the princely court to have been discovered.

However, even if remains of the princely palaces are found, this will not mean that the whole Rostyslavychi dynasty, from Volodymyrko onwards, had their seat in the citadel in the present-day village of Krylos. Mediaeval Halych consisted of a whole system of citadels. The first residences of the Halych princes, both the Rostyslavychi and the Romanovychi, may have been by the Dnister, in the citadels where the Churches of the Holy Redeemer and St Panteleymon are situated.

Nevertheless, several decades of archaeological investigation have now established beyond doubt that when the power and influence of the Galician-Volhynian principality was at its height (for example, under Yaroslav Osmomysl and Danylo of Halych), the princely residence was located in the Krylos citadel, which had the best defences and strategic advantages. □

¹⁸ From 1991, Volodymyr Baran has been the head of the archaeological expedition in Halych.

¹⁹ V. Baran, B. Tomenchuk, 'Pidsumky doslidzhen Halychskoyi arkhеolohichnoyi ekspedytsiyi v 1991–1996', *Halych i Halychska zemlya* (Kyiv–Halych, 1998), pp. 10–17.

The Year of Revolutions: 1848 and Ukrainian National Consciousness

Theodore Mackiw

The 'year of revolutions', 1848, is one of the key dates in the nineteenth century history of Central Europe. Although the Ukrainians of Austrian-ruled Galicia, unlike their Polish and Hungarian neighbours, made no direct bid for independence, the events of 1848 played a significant role in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness and political awareness.

The name 'Galicia' is the Latinised form of the Ukrainian Halychyna – which originally designated the principality ruled from Halych, the city founded by Prince Volodymyrko as his capital in 1140. When Galicia was united with neighbouring Volhynia in 1199, it became known as the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria.¹

The Austrian claim to Galicia goes back to a marriage arranged in 1214 between Kalman, the five-year-old second son of King Andrew II of Hungary (reigned 1205–35) and Salome, the three-year old daughter of Prince Leszek the White (reigned 1202–10 and 1211–27), the senior ruler in Poland, which at that time consisted of a number of feudal principalities. Under the marriage-settlement, it was agreed that Kalman would take the (vacant) throne of Galicia, which, in due course, he did, receiving his crown from the Pope. More than a century later, King Casimir III 'the Great' of Poland (reigned 1333–70), with the aid of the Hungarian King Louis I 'the Great' (reigned 1342–82), annexed Galicia to Poland on the basis of that dynastic marriage.

The kings of Hungary, and later the Habsburgs, who ruled as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, retained in their formal list of titles the appellation 'rex... Galiciae et Lodomeriae'. In 1772, under the First Partition of Poland, the then ruler of Austria-Hungary used this title to claim Galicia for her empire. And, together with Galicia (which was populated predominantly by Ukrainians), she also annexed the Principality of Cracow, which had a mainly Polish population, combining the two into a new, artificial, administrative unit, designated the 'Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, with the Grand Principality of Cracow'. This comprised an area of some 1500 square miles, with a total population (Poles and Ukrainians) of around three million. Shortly afterwards, in 1774, Austria took advantage of the Russo-Turkish war (1768–74) and annexed Ukrainian-populated Bukovyna, placing it first under military governors, and then, in 1867, attaching it (as a separate region) to Galicia.

When Austrian troops occupied Galicia, the officials, mostly of Czech origin, reported to Vienna that only a small minority of nobility was Polish and that most of the people were Ukrainians, or, as they were called at one time or another, 'Rusyny' or 'Ruthenians'.

¹ Lodomeria is the Latin name of the Volodymyr-Volynskyi principality. It appeared in the title of Andrew II of Hungary starting in 1206, and in the title of the Austrian emperors following Austria's annexation of Galicia in 1772.

Galicia at the time of the Austrian annexation was in a most precarious social and economic state. The prolonged and oppressive Polish domination for four hundred years (annexed in 1439) had left deep scars. The Ukrainians had become a politico-economically backward ethnic group, unconscious of their national identity. Yet they survived as a people because they possessed and transmitted a rich cultural heritage: unwritten literature in the form of tales, poetry, and songs, distinct customs, and especially the Greek Catholic Church, all of which set them apart from the Poles.

The Greek Catholic, or Uniate, Church played a very important role in the history of the Galician Ukrainians in the nineteenth century. The Austrian government granted the Greek Catholic Church and clergy equal status with their Roman Catholic counterparts. In 1774, Empress Maria Theresa founded the Barbareum, a Greek Catholic seminary at the Church of St Barbara in Vienna; this provided Galician students not only with systematic theological training, but also with an invigorating exposure to Western culture. In 1783, a larger theological school – the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary – was established in Lviv, which replaced the Barbareum seminary in Vienna, and in 1787 the Studium Ruthenum Greek Catholic seminary was established in Lviv for students who did not speak Latin. The Studium was affiliated with Lviv University, and drew its lecturers from it. These foundations, which were sponsored by the Austrian government, raised the educational level of the Greek Catholic clergy, not only as regards religious matters, but also in public affairs. From 1848, the Greek Catholic clergy provided the political leadership of the Ukrainians in Galicia. Although, later, the leadership gradually passed into the hands of the lay intelligentsia, many of these were the sons of clerical families.

The next step was the formation of a patriotic circle in the Greek Catholic theological seminary in Lviv. Its founders were Markiyian Shashkevych,² Yakiv Holovatskyi³ and Ivan Vahylevych,⁴ known as the Ruska Triytsya (Ruthenian Triad).⁵ These three young, idealistic seminarians, who had become captivated by Herder's

² Fr. Markiyian Shashkevych (1811–43). Poet and leader of the literary revival in Western Ukraine, based on the vernacular.

³ Yakiv Holovatskyi (1814–88). Noted historian, literary scholar, ethnographer, linguist, bibliographer, lexicographer, and poet.

⁴ Ivan Vahylevych (1811–66). Romantic poet, philologist, and ethnographer of the Galician revival.

⁵ The Rus'ka Triytsya (Ruthenian Triad) was a Galician literary group named after the number of the predominant members, Markiyian Shashkevych, Yakiv Holovatskyi, and Ivan Vahylevych, which existed in the late 1830s, while the three were students at the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary in Lviv. Since the group came into being in the period of Romanticism, it retained the predominant interests and features of that movement – an interest in folklore and history, and a striving for Pan-Slavonic unity. The group united around itself other youths who were burning with a desire to work for the good of their people. Most were engaged in collecting oral folk literature, studying the history of Ukraine, translating the works of other Slavonic authors, and writing their own verses and treatises. The group maintained that the 'Ruthenians' of Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia were all part of one Ukrainian people who had their own language, culture and history. Their first two collections, *Sym Rusi* (The Son of Rus', 1833) and *Zorya* (The Star, 1834) were not published. Their third collection *Rusalka Dnistrovaya* (The Dnister Nymph, 1836) was published in Buda, but most of the copies were confiscated. Although the collection was short-lived, its importance was immense, in that it was written in the spoken Ukrainian and initiated the use of vernacular Ukrainian for literature in the Ukrainian lands in the Austrian Empire.

ideas, decided to publish an almanac, entitled *Rusalka Dnistrovaya* (The Dnister Nymph), which would contain folk songs, poems, and historical articles written in the vernacular. After some difficulties with censorship, a small volume appeared in Buda in December 1836. The *Rusalka* was the beginning of modern Ukrainian literature in Galicia, and hence a milestone in the formation of national consciousness.

The Austrian empire was a multinational state, in which the Czechs, for example, achieved various political gains which served as a model for the Ukrainians of Galicia. In fact, the Czechs, Croats and Ukrainians benefited from what was known as the Austro-Slavonic policy. The celebrated Czech journalist, Karel Havlíček Borovský, advised the Austrian government in 1846 to support the Ukrainians in Galicia, in the hope of engendering pro-Austrian attitudes among the Ukrainians of the Russian empire.

In 1846, one member of the 'Ruthenian Triad', Yakiv Holovatskyi, writing under the pseudonym 'Havrylo Rusyn', published an article 'Zustaende der Russinen in Galizien' (The Conditions of the Ruthenians in Galicia), in which he wrote that 'the Ukrainians have sunk very low among all the Slavonic peoples'.⁶ After describing the social plight and cultural stagnation of his people, oppressed by the Polish gentry and neglected by their own conservative senior clergy, Holovatskyi explained why, in spite of these unsatisfactory conditions, the Galician Ukrainians felt no attraction towards Russia. The peasants, he said, knew that in Russia there was no legal protection for the serf against abuse. The Greek Catholic priests had a better life than their Russian Orthodox counterparts. Therefore, the Ukrainians remained faithful to their (Austrian) Emperor, and continued to place their hopes in Austria. Moreover, since the centralising Russian government suppressed the publication of Ukrainian literature, Holovatskyi suggested that by favouring Ukrainian literature in Galicia, Austria could exert influence on (Russian-ruled) Ukraine. He categorically rejected the assertion that the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) were a danger to Austria because of their geographical proximity to Russia. This article may be considered to embody the first political programme of the Ukrainians in Galicia, namely, that they would stay faithful to Austria.

The chain-reaction of revolutionary movements in Europe in 1848, and in particular the Vienna uprising of 13 March 1848, roused the Ukrainians of Galicia to formulate their own national rights. When, on 19 March 1848, news reached Lviv of the riots in Vienna and the resignation of the hated Prince Metternich,⁷ the leaders of the Galician Poles immediately sprang into action. They dispatched a petition to the Emperor calling for greater political rights for the Poles of Galicia, but totally ignoring the Ukrainian presence there, treating Galicia as a purely Polish-inhabited province. In support of these demands, a Polish People's Council (Polska Rada Narodowa) was established in Lviv on 13 April 1848. Soon afterwards, a network of local councils was formed, a Polish National Guard organised, and a newspaper *Dziennik narodowy* (People's Daily) founded.

⁶ *Jahrbuecher fuer slawische Literatur. Kunst und Wissenschaft* (vol. iv, nos. 9–10, pp. 261–379).

⁷ Klemens Fürth von Metternich (1773–1859). Austrian statesman, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1809–1848), champion of conservatism.

The Polish leaders demanded self-government for the Poles only, ignoring the question of the Ukrainians' rights. This restricted outlook led to an anti-Polish reaction among the Ukrainians. One Greek Catholic priest, Fr. Ivan Biretskyi (1815–83), wrote a letter to the editor of the Polish newspaper *Postep* in Lviv, in which he categorically rejected the Polish assertion that the Ukrainians were simply of Greek Catholic Rite, and emphatically demanded equal treatment for them. The letter (published on 11 April 1848) is indicative of the democratic character and patriotic thrust of the literary, cultural and educational work of this priest, who, we may note, was very active in the revolutionary year 1848.

Another Ukrainian priest, Fr. Vasyl Podolynskyi (1815–76), published in 1846 a pamphlet in Polish *Slowo przestrogi* (A Word of Warning), which was of great political significance. This ranks as another key document of Ukrainian political thought of the mid-nineteenth century, which categorically rejects the tendentious Polish assertion that the Ukrainians are not a separate nation. Quoting the Polish newspaper *Dziennik narodowy* (no. 39), Fr. Podolynskyi asked rhetorically: '... What is the purpose of denying the name and the language of the Ukrainians, when in history and in Ukrainian hearts it is written that our ancestors called themselves Ukrainians and spoke Ukrainian, and I assure you that our grandchildren will be Ukrainians'. Furthermore, he put forward the idea of a united, independent Ukraine ('Yes, we Ruthenians also firmly believe in the resurrection of a free independent Rus'. Whether sooner or later is of no account').

To the great disappointment of the Poles, the Ukrainians – whom the Poles did not consider a separate nation – rejected the invitation to join the Polish efforts. Instead, on the suggestion of the Governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion, on 19 April 1848, a group of Greek Catholic clergymen led by the Coadjutor-Bishop of Lviv, Hryhoriy Yakymovych,⁸ addressed a petition to the Emperor. Unlike the earlier Polish appeal, this was a timorous, loyalist document. The preamble consisted of a historical survey stressing the national distinctiveness of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, the past glories of the mediaeval principality of Halych, and its subsequent subjugation and exploitation by the Poles. The petition itself requested the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools and the administration, access for Ukrainians to government positions in Galicia, and genuine equality between Greek and Roman Catholic clergy.

Two weeks later, on 2 May 1848, the first modern Ukrainian political organisation, the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rus'ka Rada),⁹ was established in Lviv, thereby nullifying the claim of the Polish People's Council to speak for Ga-

⁸ Hryhoriy Yakymovych (1792–1863). Ukrainian Catholic metropolitan, professor, and civic activist.

⁹ The Holovna Rus'ka Rada (Supreme Ruthenian Council) was the first legal Ukrainian political organisation in modern times, founded in May 1848 in Lviv. It was established in direct response to the revolution of 1848–9 in the Habsburg monarchy, in particular to the formation in Galicia of the Polish National Council (Rada Narodowa), which declared itself the representative political body for the province. The purpose of the Rada was to strengthen the Ukrainian people in Austria by encouraging publications in Ukrainian, introducing the Ukrainian language in schools and the local lay and church administration, and defending the constitutional rights of Ukrainians. It served also the parallel function of upholding the interests of the Greek Catholic clergy. Another primary concern of the Rada was the partition of Galicia into separate Ukrainian and Polish provinces.

licia as a whole. The Supreme Ruthenian Rada, which was headed by Bishop Yakhymovych, consisted of sixty-six members. Its social composition was dominated by the urban clerical and secular intelligentsia, nearly one-third of its members being Greek Catholic priests, one-third civil servants, and the remainder students, teachers, lawyers and townsmen. In the weeks that followed, fifty local and thirteen district branches of the Rada were established throughout Galicia. The first-ever Ukrainian-language newspaper in the world, *Zorya halytska* (The Galician Star), commenced publication on 15 May 1848. Contacts were established with Ukrainians elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire – notably Bukovyna and Transcarpathia.

Since the founding of the Supreme Ruthenian Rada was a direct challenge to the Polish claim that Galicia was an organic part of Poland, the Galician-Polish leaders tried to undermine its credibility by fostering a counter-body which allegedly represented a pro-Polish trend among the Ruthenians. Accordingly, on 23 May 1848, a handful of Polonised nobles and intelligentsia ('gente Rutheni, natione Poloni') met in Lviv and founded a (pro-Polish) Ruthenian Congress (Sobor rus'kyi).¹⁰ The Congress began to publish a newspaper *Dnewnyk Ruskiy* (Ruthenian Daily) in Ukrainian, but in the Latin alphabet, and using Polish orthographic conventions. They hired as its editor Ivan Vahylevych, a former member of the Rus'ka Triytsya. The Ukrainians who supported the Supreme Ruthenian Rada denounced the Congress as a sham, and both the Congress and its newspaper proved extremely short-lived.

The question of national identity was answered by the Rada in the 'Ukrainian' sense, that is, by asserting the distinctiveness of their people not only from Poland, but from Russia as well. The Rus'ka Rada's manifesto of 10 May 1848 stated that: '... We Galician Ruthenians [Rusyny halytski] belong to the Great Ruthenian (i.e. Ukrainian) nation, who speak one language and number fifteen million, of whom two and one half inhabit the Galician land'.

During the Slavonic Congress in Prague in June 1848,¹¹ the Ukrainian delegates from the Rada demanded that Galicia be divided into separate Polish and Ukrainian provinces, an idea the Poles adamantly opposed. The Czechs, working behind the scenes, mediated a compromise solution: the Ukrainians agreed to postpone the issue of Galicia's division, and the Poles conceded the principle of the equality of the two nations in all administrative and educational matters. This

¹⁰ The Ruthenian Congress (Sobor rus'kyi) was a political committee that was active in Lviv during the 1848 Revolution. It was founded in May by Polish and Polonised nobles and intellectuals as a counterbalance to the Supreme Ruthenian Council. Its 64 members opposed the Polish-Ukrainian administrative partition of Galicia and collaborated with the Polish National Council. Although a number of Polonophile Ukrainians were members of the Congress, it received little Ukrainian support. On 6 October 1848, the Congress was absorbed by the Polish National Council and ceased to exist as a separate organisation.

¹¹ Slavonic Congress in Prague (1–10 June 1848). A congress of representatives of the Slavonic peoples of the Austrian Empire, convened to consolidate the forces of the Slavs in response to calls for the unification of all German lands (including Austria and Czech-inhabited Bohemia) by the German parliament in Frankfurt. The Congress was attended by a number of Galician Ukrainians, including delegates from the Supreme Ruthenian Council.

agreement remained a dead letter, since Austrian troops began bombarding Prague, forcing the Congress to disband; nevertheless, the Ukrainians had made a debut on the international political stage.

While the Slavonic Congress in Prague was still in session, elections began in Galicia to the Austrian Reichstag, or lower house of the newly founded imperial parliament. For the Ukrainians, the peasants in particular, these elections were a new and confusing experience. In contrast, the Poles were politically much more sophisticated, and hence managed, by means of rumours and threats, to keep many Ukrainian peasants away from the polls. In the event, Ukrainians won only 25 of the 100 seats allotted to Galicia. In the parliamentary debates that took place in the latter part of 1848, first in Vienna and then in Kromeriz, the Ukrainian deputies concentrated on two issues: compensation to landlords for the abolition of the *corvée* (serfdom), and the administrative division of Galicia into separate Ukrainian and Polish provinces. Meanwhile, the imperial government was slowly regaining control of the situation, and in December, soon after the new emperor, the 18-year-old Franz Joseph, ascended the throne, parliament was dissolved. Once revolution in the Austrian Empire was suppressed, the Habsburg monarchy returned to absolutism.

The neoabsolutist decade which followed (1850–60) has often been called the ‘Bach era’, after the Minister of the Interior, Alexander von Bach. In Galicia, it could well be called the ‘Gołuchowski era’, after its governor. As a high aristocrat, Count Agenor Gołuchowski¹² won the full confidence of the Emperor and was appointed Viceroy of Galicia. He used his office and the confidence of the Emperor to remove all obstacles to Polish dominance in Galicia, filling the ranks of the civil service, which prior to 1848 had been predominantly Teutonic, with Poles. Moreover, he convinced Vienna that the Ukrainians were Russophiles and hence a dangerous threat to the security of the Austrian Empire. As a result, in 1851 the *Rus’ka Rada* was forced to disband and its leaders went back to their predominantly ecclesiastical occupations. Nevertheless, they were kept under close surveillance by the authorities.

It must be noted that during the period 1849–1916 all Governors of Galicia were members of the Polish nobility, appointed to office by the Emperor himself. In Galicia, the Governor, as the highest state authority, was simultaneously Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Education. From 1855 onwards, he was also chief of police and the chairman responsible for economic programmes. He had the right, *inter alia*, to censor all publications, to control labour movements and to suppress any organised opposition.

Polish historiography generally puts the blame for this clamp-down on the Supreme Ukrainian Council, since in the word of the eminent Polish historian, Jan Kozik, the Council ‘instead of leading [its] people to fight for its rights in alliance with the forces of revolution, it imposed upon it loyalty and support for reaction. It taught people to rely on the Austrian authorities and to expect some change from that side,

¹² Agenor Gołuchowski (1812–75). Polish count and Austrian statesman. Viceroy of Galicia in 1849–59, 1866–7 and 1871–5, Austrian Minister of Internal Affairs in 1859, and Minister of State in 1860.

instead of teaching the Ukrainians that they should rely on themselves and that they should feel their own power'. Hence, the council contributed to the origin of the dishonourable name with which the Ukrainians were called: 'the Tyrolese of the East'.¹³

However, Kozik contradicts himself. He writes that the Poles themselves rejected the Ukrainians, neglecting their national rights and identity.¹⁴ When the Poles revolted against the Habsburgs, they expected to gain support from the Ukrainian serfs, whom they had long oppressed. In fact, it turned out that even the Polish peasants turned against the Polish revolutionaries and then proceeded to massacre the Polish gentry. Similarly, when – a few days after the Austrian uprising – the Hungarians rose against Vienna, they too hoped, as had the Poles in Galicia, to obtain the support of the non-Hungarians (Croats, Ukrainians and others), whom they had exploited and oppressed in the past. The Ukrainians, however, rejected Polish and Hungarian blandishments and pledged their loyalty to the Habsburgs, rather than choosing the brand of 'liberty' offered by the Polish and Hungarian gentry. Had they supported the Poles and/or the Hungarians, the Ukrainians stood to gain nothing. In 1848, the Ukrainians of Galicia were neither politically mature enough nor prepared to fight for independence. Participation in the 1848 uprisings would not have brought the Ukrainians independence, but would have threatened their very survival as a nation.

The greatest achievements of the 227 days of the 1848 Revolution were undoubtedly the abolition of the *corvée* and the introduction of constitutional government. However, considering the total lack of political experience on the part of Ukrainians, their own achievements were not inconsiderable: the formation of the Supreme Ukrainian Council with its smaller local branches throughout Galicia; the founding of the first Ukrainian newspaper *Zorya balytska*; participation in the Slavonic Congress in Prague; a campaign for election to the first Austrian Reichstag and participation in parliamentary work; the formation of a Ukrainian National Guard and military detachments, which took part in the war against insurgent Hungary; the holding of a Congress of Ruthenian Scholars (Sobor uchenykh rus'kykh, 19–26 October 1848)¹⁵ to determine guidelines for cultural and educational policies; and the organisation of public meetings. Thus, 1848 marked a turning point in the history of Galicia, putting an end to the long inertia, passivity and isolation of the Ukrainians, and launching them on the long and hard struggle for national and social emancipation. □

¹³ J. Kozik, *Między Reakcją a Rewolucją: Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849. Zeszyty naukowe uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, cccxxx: Prace historyczne* (Warsaw–Cracow, 1975), p. 236.

¹⁴ Kozik, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–5, 216.

¹⁵ The Congress of Ruthenian Scholars (Sobor uchenykh rus'kykh) was the first educational conference in Galicia. It was convened by the Supreme Ruthenian Council. The Congress took place in Lviv on 19–26 October 1848. The participants produced a broad programme for organising Ukrainian scholarly research and public education (including the publication of general-education school text-books), agreed to set up the Society for Public Education, and discussed the question of the Ukrainian literary language.

Press and Publishing in Kharkiv, 1920s–1930s

Olha Riznychenko

According to the *Handbook of State Institutions and Publishing Houses* for 1930,¹ 86 titles of various newspapers and journals were published in Kharkiv.² Of these, 26 were newspapers, and 60 magazines. Eighteen newspapers were published in Ukrainian; 3 in Yiddish; 2 in German; 1 in Bulgarian; 1 in Polish; and 1 in Russian. The newspapers *Komunist*, *Visti*, *Robitnycha hazeta Proletar*, *Kharkivskiy proletar*, *Vseukrayinskyy proletariy*, *Komsomolets Ukrayiny*, *Chervona armiya* appeared daily in Ukrainian. The Yiddish newspaper *Der Stern* was likewise a daily. Other newspapers came out thrice-weekly or weekly; this group included the newspapers of various ethnic minority groups of Kharkiv: *Sovetsko selo* (in Bulgarian), *Yunge gvardye* (in Yiddish), *Głos młodzieży* (in Polish), *Jung Sturm* (in German) appeared 8 times a month. *Das Neue Dorf* (in German), *Krasnaya armiya* (in Russian), *Zay-greyt* (in Yiddish) were weekly. Of the journals, 55 titles were published in Ukrainian; 3 in German; 2 in Russian; and one each for the Jews, Poles and Bulgarians. For young people, adolescents and children there were: the newspapers of the 'Pioneer' movement *Na zminu* and *Yunyi leninets*; *Dytyachyi rukh* – a children's monthly; *Druh ditey* – the monthly organ of the 'Druh ditey' (Children's Friend) society;³ *Zboutenya* – a monthly for younger children; *Znamya ta pratsya* – a monthly for children; *Tuk-tuk* – a monthly magazine for the under-sevens; and *Chervoni kvity* – a monthly for children. All these were published in Ukrainian. Also for these age groups there were *Yunge gvardye* – a newspaper for the Jewish working and peasant youth; *Zay-greyt* – a Pioneer newspaper in Yiddish; *Głos młodzieży* – a newspaper for the Polish peasant youth; *Die Trampe* – a bi-weekly children's magazine in German; *Oktjabrskie uskhody* – a bi-weekly illustrated magazine for older children in Russian; *Bandż gotów* – a bi-weekly Pioneer magazine in Polish; *Bădi gotov* – a bi-weekly Pioneer magazine in Bulgarian.

Education and teachers' periodicals included: *Radyanska osvita* – a monthly journal of civic education; *Robitnycha osvita* – the organ of the central council of working education of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, a monthly; *Shklyakh osvity* – a pedagogic monthly. These periodicals were published in the Ukrainian language. The teachers' monthly *Erzung und Aufklärung* was published in German.

While dealing with youth and educational periodicals, it is worth mentioning that the 1930 *Handbook* lists the addresses of 80 schools, of which 60 had Ukrainian as the

¹ *Dovidnyk derzhavnykh ustanov i vydavnytstv* (Kharkiv: Molodyi Robitnyk, 1930).

² Kharkiv was the capital of Soviet Ukraine from 1920–34.

³ *Druh ditey*, a society in the Ukrainian SSR (1923–35), whose purpose was to help the agencies of the People's Commissariat of Education and the Communist Youth League to combat juvenile delinquency, and to provide elementary education for all children.

language of instruction; 5 taught in Ukrainian and Russian; 13 in Russian; 4 in Yiddish; 2 in German; 2 in Polish; 2 in Bulgarian; 1 in Armenian; and 1 in the Tatar language.

We should also note that the various Ukrainian-language periodicals, both educational and general, published diverse works of *belles-lettres* and scholarship, both by Ukrainians and members of minority-language groups in Kharkiv. These included such writers as Leib Kvitko, Del Nister, Friedkin, Holman, who published their works primarily in Yiddish, for example, in the journal *Di royte welt*, but who also featured regularly in the Ukrainian-language press. Furthermore, when scanning the periodicals of the 1920s, we found nothing to suggest any pressure on the rights of minority language groups. It is obvious that almost all the creative intelligentsia of Kharkiv knew Russian and valued Russian classics, but the policy of Ukrainisation⁴ then in force was based on the principle that the literature of Pushkin and Tolstoy should not outrank that of Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrayinka and Ivan Franko, or of Mickiewicz, Kochanowski, and Norwid. Nevertheless, people had a chance of becoming familiar with Russian and world classics both in the original, and in Ukrainian translation.

However, at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, just as the process of the restructurisation of Ukrainian socio-civic and cultural life was gaining strength, there began a wave of repressions: group after group of writers was disbanded, most Ukrainian newspapers and journals ceased publication, publishing houses were closed. Yet, against a background of arrests, executions, deportations of Ukrainian writers, artists and scholars, the print-runs of the Ukrainian classics increased, as well as all kinds of events and activities which invoked the names of major literary figures: Shevchenko, Franko, Nechuy-Levytskyi,⁵ Panas Myrnyi.⁶ However, their works were applied to serve the formation of vulgar-ideological stereotypes, with which the names of the Ukrainian classics became identified. No such crude experiments were attempted with Russian classics, which were always treated with a serious, scholarly approach. One of the mechanisms of the Russification of Ukrainian cultural life in Kharkiv was the physical elimination of the bearers of that culture, and also the degradation of the public perception of Ukrainian literature and culture as something primitive, inferior and mediocre. Thus throughout the Soviet period works such as *Evgeniy Onegin* or *War and Peace* were perceived and discussed in schools at the level of such issues as the meaning of life, individual freedom, moral choice; while in contrast

⁴ Ukrainisation, a series of policies pursued by the CP(B)U in 1923–33 to enhance the national profile of state and Party institutions, and thus legitimise Soviet rule in Ukrainian eyes. Ukrainisation was the Ukrainian version of the all-Union policy of indigenisation. This included making state and Party cadres fluent in Ukrainian and familiar with Ukrainian history and culture, recruiting Ukrainians into Party and state apparatuses, establishing separate Red Army units with Ukrainian as the language of command, giving financial support to non-Communist cultural institutions, such as the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, developing a Communist or pro-Communist Ukrainian intelligentsia to play a leading role in the 'Ukrainian cultural process', and greatly expanding education and publishing in Ukraine.

⁵ Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi (1838–1918). Ukrainian writer. Began writing in 1865, but because of Russian imperial censorship his works appeared only in various Galician periodicals.

⁶ Panas Myrnyi (1849–1920; pseudonym of Atanas Rudchenko). Ukrainian writer and translator. He greatly expanded the lexicon of Ukrainian literary language and with his talent for rhythmic and melodious phrasing enriched Ukrainian syntax.

Shevchenko's *Kateryna* or Franko's *Boryslav smiyetsya* (Boryslav Laughs) were analysed simply in terms of their class/sociological content. The perception of Ukrainian literature as one-dimensional, tendentious, and obvious, and Russian literature as multi-valued, polyphonic, and paradoxical was actively instilled into the psyche of the masses during eras of repression on the one hand, and Russification – on the other. (This manner of presentation, one may note, may still be encountered today). We must also recall that the Russification of the cultural life of Kharkiv did not consist only of the banning or liquidation of certain Ukrainian socio-literary, artistic, and scholarly societies, periodicals or publishing houses. The authorities also found it expedient to keep members of the creative intelligentsia under control, and this control was best exerted through various associations and groupings. Thus one after another groups with a clear Ukrainian outlook, which had among their members leading Ukrainian literary figures, artists, scholars, were ordered to merge with other organisations, which obeyed instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, and hence, indirectly, from the authorities in Moscow.

This mechanism is illustrated by the history of the literary group VAPLITE, the Vilna Akademiya Proletarskoyi Literatury (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature). This included the most influential Ukrainian writers of the day, including Mykola Khvylovyi,⁷ Pavlo Tychyna,⁸ Mayk Yohansen,⁹ et al. VAPLITE existed in Kharkiv from 1926–28. It published its first booklet, also called *VAPLITE*, in 1926, with an editorial board which included Yohansen, Kulish,¹⁰ Senchenko,¹¹ Slisarenko,¹² and Tychyna, and the Statute of VAPLITE appeared in it. The VAPLITE almanac (1926) published poetry by Tychyna, Sosyura,¹³ Yanovskyyi,¹⁴ Bazhan,¹⁵ prose works by Dosvitniy,¹⁶ Slisarenko, Epik,¹⁷ and included new translations of poetry from Turk-

⁷ Mykola Khvylovyi (1893–1933; pseudonym of Mykola Fitilev). Ukrainian writer and publicist of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the 1920s.

⁸ Pavlo Tychyna (1891–1967). Poet; member of the Vseukrayinska Akademiya Nauk (All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences – VUAN), and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

⁹ Mayk Yohansen (1895–1937). Poet, prose writer, screen-writer, translator, literary theorist, and linguist. He began writing in Ukrainian after 1919. Member of the writers' associations Hart and VAPLITE.

¹⁰ Mykola Kulish (1892–1937?). Renowned playwright. Member of Hart and VAPLITE. Repressed during the Stalinist terror.

¹¹ Ivan Senchenko (1901–75). Writer and member of Pluh, Hart, and VAPLITE.

¹² Oleksa Slisarenko (1891–1937). Poet and prose writer. Editor of the *Knyhospilka* publishing house in Kharkiv. Arrested in 1934 and deported to the Solovets Islands, where he was shot in 1937.

¹³ Volodymyr Sosyura (1898–1965). Poet; member of the writers' associations Pluh, Hart, VAPLITE, and the All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers.

¹⁴ Yuriy Yanovskyyi (1902–54). Writer. He began publishing poems in Ukrainian in 1924, and prose after 1927.

¹⁵ Mykola Bazhan (1904–83). Poet, writer, translator, and Soviet Ukrainian cultural and political figure. One of the most prominent representatives of the literary renaissance of the 1920s. Member of the writers' associations VAPLITE and *Nova heneratsiya*, and the journal *Literaturnyi yarmarok* (Literary Fair), a literary and art almanac in Kharkiv, edited by Mykola Khvylovyi, as the organ of the group of former members of VAPLITE, following its dissolution.

¹⁶ Oles Dosvitniy (1891–1934). Writer and literary critic. From 1925, he was one of Khvylovyi's closest associates, and a leading member of VAPLITE, from which he was expelled in 1927, together with Khvylovyi by order of the CP(B)U central committee. Shot in 1934, during Postyshev's terror in Ukraine.

¹⁷ Hryhoriy Epik (1901–?). Writer and critic; member of Pluh, VAPLITE, and the Prolifront. Arrested in 1934 and died in the labour camps. The exact date of his death is unknown.

ish, Yiddish, and other languages. Later, a literary-artistic bi-monthly, *VAPLITE*, was brought out, and ran to five issues. The sixth issue was to have published the second part of Khvylovyi's *Wood-cocks*, however, this work was confiscated, and the journal itself proscribed. As a result of ideological pressure, on 28 January 1928 *VAPLITE* formally dissolved itself. Instead, its former members grouped again around the monthly journal *Literaturnyi yarmarok* (Literary Fair), twelve issues of which appeared from 1928–9. However, following criticism from the Communist Party, this journal ceased publication in 1929. Nevertheless, the same year, the former *VAPLITE* members formed a new literary association called 'Prolitfront' – Proletarskyi literaturnyi front (Proletarian Literary Front), which in addition to its aesthetic canons adopted a more definite ideological line. In 1929–30, 'Prolitfront' published a literary-civic monthly under the same name. The editors of this journal were Mykola Kulish and Ivan Momot,¹⁸ and its secretary was Ivan Senchenko. However, this organisation, too, in spite of its ideological commitment, was also forced to disband, under pressure from the Party. The writers, who had belonged to 'Prolitfront', like Khvylovyi, Kulish, Dniprovskiy,¹⁹ were attracted by various means (in particular, the possibility of publishing their works) into the Vseukrayinska Spilka Proletarskykh Pysmennykiv (All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers) – VUSPP, which had been founded at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Proletarian Writers, which was held in Kharkiv in January 1927. The organisation of VUSPP was based on the structure of the Proletkult,²⁰ which had existed in Kharkiv in 1919–20, and which Ukrainian writers had quit in protest at the line enforced by Moscow representatives, that Soviet literature should develop exclusively in the Russian language, since, they argued, this was the language of the victorious proletariat, and would eventually become the language of the world, when the proletariat came to power worldwide. At the All-Russian Congress of Proletarian Writers, in Moscow, in 1929, VUSPP was incorporated into the Vserossiyskaya Assotsiatsiya Proletarskikh Pysateley (All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) – VAPP. But, in 1932, this organisation, too, was liquidated. In its place, in 1934, the Spilka Pysmennykiv Ukrayiny (Union of Writers of Ukraine – SPU), was established, and this was formally controlled by Moscow. In 1932, the literary, artistic and critical journal *Hart* – the organ of the VUSPP, was closed down.

All other literary associations suffered a similar fate to that of *VAPLITE*. The literary association 'Pluh' (1922–32) disappeared together with its periodicals. The last publication of the Ukrainian futurists was the journal *Nova heneratsiya*, which under the editorship of Mykhaylo Semenko²¹ appeared from October 1927 to December 1930.

¹⁸ Ivan Momot (1905–31). Literary critic.

¹⁹ Ivan Dniprovskiy (1895–1934; pen name of I. Shevchenko). Writer, member of *Hart*, *VAPLITE*, and *Prolitfront*. He was a close associate of Khvylovyi.

²⁰ Proletkult (Proletarska kultura). A leftist mass movement in the immediate post-revolutionary period, which originated in Russia in 1917. It was opposed to classical traditions, regarding them as bourgeois and inimical to the proletariat. The mass orientation and ignorance of the members of this movement was opposed by *VAPLITE* and the Neoclassicists, which was reflected in the Literary Discussion of 1925–8, a wide-ranging debate which coincided with the policy of Ukrainisation.

²¹ Mykhaylo Semenko (1892–1937). Poet, founder and theoretician of Ukrainian futurism. Arrested in 1937 and shot.

In the same way, the 17 Ukrainian publishing houses, which existed in 1930, were all disbanded. These included the publishing house of the newspaper *Komunist* (which produced the newspapers *Komunist*, *Komsomolets Ukrayiny*; and the journals *Robselkor*, *Komunarka Ukrayiny*); the publishing house of the newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta Proletar* (which also produced the newspaper *Proletar* and the journals *Dekada*, *Chervonyi perets*, *Tekhnika – masam*); and the publishing house *Visti VUTsVK* (which in addition to the newspapers *Visti*, *Vseukrainskyi proletar*; also brought out the journals *Vsesvit*, *Auto* and *Sblyakhy*).

The fate of the most popular newspaper in Kharkiv – *Visti*, clearly demonstrates how the Ukrainian press was suppressed. Publication of this paper began in Kharkiv in 1918. Originally in Russian, from 1921 it appeared in Ukrainian. Its first editors Vasyl Blakytynyi²² and Yevhen Kasyanenko²³ persuaded many leading writers to publish in it, including Ostap Vyshnya,²⁴ Volodymyr Sosyura, Valeriyian Polishchuk,²⁵ Hryhoriy Kosynka,²⁶ and Ivan Senchenko. Oleksander Dovzhenko²⁷ published his caricatures. In December 1922, this published extracts from Tychna's poem 'Skovoroda'. It had a weekly supplement (originally 'Literature, Learning and Art', after 1925, 'Culture and Life') in which Mykola Khvylovyi published his essays, and ex-members of VAPLITE and writers of a similar outlook appeared. This supplement triggered a major literary discussion, which took place on its pages. *Visti* also provided a platform for other issues, particularly the problems of setting the Ukrainian orthography, both prior to the 1927 conference and in 1928–9, when it brought out a special supplement on this issue. At the end of the 1920s/beginning of the 1930s, the editorial board of the newspaper was completely changed, and by 1938 nearly the whole editorial board and the majority of active contributors had fallen victim to Stalin's purges. From January 1938, parallel to *Visti*, a Russian-language newspaper *Sovetskaya Ukraina* was launched, which circulated throughout Ukraine. (In 1944, it was renamed *Pravda Ukrayiny*). On 3 May 1941, the newspapers *Visti* and *Komunist* closed down, and were replaced by *Radyanska Ukrayina*.

Let us now turn our attention to the fate of what was in the 1920s–30s the biggest and most-influential publishing house in Ukraine, the State Publishing House of Ukraine (DVU). This was established in Kharkiv, in 1919. In the 1920s, its editors included Mykola Khvylovyi, Arkadiy Lyubchenko,²⁸ Serhiy Pyly-

²² Vasyl Blakytynyi (1894–1925). Ukrainian revolutionary and political figure, writer, poet, and journalist. In 1921, he became director of the State Publishing House of Ukraine and the editor of *Visti VUTsVK*. He was also one of the founding members of the literary associations *Borotba* and *Hart*.

²³ Yevhen Kasyanenko (1889–?). Political leader and journalist. Disappeared in the late 1930s during the purges in Ukraine.

²⁴ Ostap Vyshnya (1889–1956; pseudonym of Pavlo Hubenko). Writer, humorist, and satirist.

²⁵ Valeriyian Polishchuk (1897–1937). Writer and literary critic. In 1923, he joined *Hart* and in 1925 in Kharkiv he founded the organisation *Avanhard*, which put forward a programme of constructivist dynamism and relied on Russian, Western European and American avant-garde literature.

²⁶ Hryhoriy Kosynka (1899–1934; pseudonym of Hryhoriy Strilets). One of the more outstanding Soviet Ukrainian story writers of the 1920s–30s.

²⁷ Oleksander Dovzhenko (1894–1956). Film director. In 1923–6, he drew caricatures for the newspaper *Visti VUTsVK* in Kharkiv, and played an active part in the artistic and literary life of the city.

²⁸ Arkadiy Lyubchenko (1899–1945). Writer, active in the literary movement of the 1920s–30s.

penko,²⁹ and Ivan Dniprovskiy. Its periodicals included the journals *Chervonyi sblyakh*, *Zhyttya y Revolyutsiya*, *Literaturnyi yarmarok*, *Hart*, *Pluh*, *Nova ben-eratsiya*. The DVU played a significant role in the standardisation of the Ukrainian literary language in the spirit of the Vseukrayinska Akademiya Nauk (All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) – VUAN. In 1930, under increasing pressure from the Soviet Ukrainian government, the DVU was reorganised into a network of eleven publishing houses: ‘Radyanska shkola’; ‘State Technical Publishing House’; ‘State Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature’; ‘Proletar’; ‘State Publishing House of Artistic Literature’; ‘State Publishing House of Children’s and Adolescent Literature “Molodyi Bolshevyk”’; ‘State Publishing House of Professional-Working Literature “Ukrayinskyi robitnyk”’; ‘State Medical Publishing House’; ‘State Publishing House of Military and Physical Training Literature “Na varti”’; the ‘Centre of Book and Journal Distribution “Ukrknyhotsentr”’; ‘Administration of Polygraphic Enterprises’. Some years later, in 1934, the DVU was radically restructured; it ceased to be a system of individual publishing houses, and became, in effect, a subsidiary of the State Publishing House in Moscow.

‘Knyhospilka’ (Ukrainian Cooperative Publishing Union) was founded in 1918 in Kyiv; in 1922, its head office was moved to Kharkiv. This publishing house specialised in the series ‘Literaturna biblioteka’ (selected works of Ukrainian classics), ‘Svitova literatura’ (translations from Balzac, Anatole France, de Maupassant, et al), works by Franko, Lesya Ukrayinka, Mykhaylo Kotsyubynskiy,³⁰ school textbooks, ‘Muzychna biblioteka’ (edited by Lev Revutskiy³¹). ‘Knyhospilka’ was closed down in 1931, and its editors repressed.

The ‘Rukh’ Ukrainian cooperative publishing house, founded in 1917 in Vovchansk, was transferred to Kharkiv in December 1921. It mainly published the works of Ukrainian pre-revolutionary writers, in a series intended for mass distribution: ‘Biblioteka ukrayinskoyi literatury dlya selyanskykh i robitnychykh knyhozbiren’ (Library of Ukrainian Literature for Peasants’ and Workers’ Book-cases), ‘Illustrated Library for Children’, ‘Franko Library’, a ‘Theatre Library’, which published over 100 plays, artistic monographs, and complete editions of the Ukrainian classics, including the works of Ivan Franko – in 30 volumes (1924–31); Olha Kobylyanska³² – in 9 volumes (1927–9); Borys Hrinchenko³³ – 10 volumes (1926–30); Mykola Chernyavskiy³⁴ – (10 volumes,

Secretary of Hart, co-founder and permanent secretary of VAPLITE; co-founder of Prolifront and *Literaturnyi yarmarok*.

²⁹ Serhiy Pylypenko (1891–1934). Writer and journalist. Founded *Pluh* and was editor of its publications. He took an active part in the Literary Discussion of 1925–8. In addition, he was a director of the Knyhospilka publishing house and the State Publishing House of Ukraine. In 1933, he was arrested and shot the following year.

³⁰ Mykhaylo Kotsyubynskiy (1864–1913). One of the finest Ukrainian writers of the late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries.

³¹ Lev Revutskiy (1889–1977). Composer, teacher, music activist.

³² Olha Kobylyanska (1863–1942). A pioneering Ukrainian modernist writer.

³³ Borys Hrinchenko (1863–1910). Prominent public figure, educator, writer, folklorist, and linguist.

³⁴ Mykhaylo Chernyavskiy (1868–1948). Writer and pedagogue. Under the Soviet regime, he suffered political persecution, and his works were prohibited.

1927–31); Hnat Khotkevych³⁵ (8 volumes, 1928–32). In 1933, 'Rukh', as a private cooperative publishing house, was wound up, together with its extensive book-distribution network that included the entire Ukrainian SSR. The staff of 'Rukh' were repressed.

By 1938, the Ukrainian press, periodicals and publishing sector had been effectively unified and brought under the total control of Moscow. In the post-war years, provincial newspapers, as a rule, had a parallel publication in the Ukrainian and Russian languages; for example, in Kharkiv there were *Sotsialistychbna Khar'kivs'kychyna* (in Ukrainian) and *Krasnoe znamya* (in Russian). In addition to the provincial papers, there was a local one – *Vechirniy Kharkiv* (in Ukrainian). In 1992, however, this changed to Russian. Today in Kharkiv only one newspaper is printed in Ukrainian – *Slobidskyi kray*, though occasionally materials in Ukrainian appear in the newspapers *Panorama* and *Sloboda*. The telephone directory *Zolotyie stranitsy Kharkova* for 1997 listed 49 periodicals, of which only the following are in Ukrainian: the journals *Berezil*, *Sil'skyi zburnal*, and *Selyanska hazeta*; the newspapers *Slobidskyi kray* and *Rayonni visti* (the organ of the council of deputies of the Lenin district); and the children's newspaper *Zhuravlyk*, published by the Kharkiv Prosvita organisation. □

³⁵ Hnat Khotkevych (1877–1938). Modernist writer, scholar, composer, theatre director, and civic figure. He was arrested during the Stalinist terror and died under unknown circumstances.

The Family Archives of Vasyl Tomara

Marharyta Chernobuk


Among the archives of the Museum of the History of Kyiv there is a unique collection of documents, acquired in 1989, which once belonged to Vasyl Tomara, a Privy Councillor and Senator of the Russian Empire, and a notable diplomat of the late eighteenth century. Until this collection was acquired, virtually nothing was known of Tomara's biography. This article addresses, for the first time, the problem of reconstructing his curriculum vitae from this archive material.

The scholarly significance of such family archives, first and foremost, lies in the fact that they are chronological collections of documents, which not only throw light on the family concerned but may also contain unique material on the participation of its notable members in the civic, political, and cultural life of their country, and the social development of the state. The Tomara family archive, had it been preserved in full, would have been an invaluable source for scholars researching into the history of Ukraine of the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries. Even the relatively small fragment in the possession of the Museum of the History of Kyiv contains much valuable material.

The Tomara family is fairly notable in the history of what was termed Little Russia (i.e., Left-bank Ukraine, east of the Dnipro, which from the mid-seventeenth century was under the rule of the Russian state). It became connected by marriage with many eminent Cossack families, and a number of members of its branches rose to prominence and won it renown. Representatives of this family fought in the wars against the Turks of the end of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries and the war of 1812; later scions were involved in the Decembrist movement, becoming distinguished among their contemporaries for their courage, education, and progressive views.

Vasyl Tomara's archive contains 33 documents: these are principally the various Deeds and official papers referring to his service career. These include: a certificate of Attestation from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, instructions and orders of Field Marshal Grigoriy Potemkin, rescripts of successive Russian monarchs – Catherine II, Paul I, Alexander I, letters to Senator Tomara from Empress Maria Fyodorovna (wife of Emperor Paul I), the draft of a letter from Tomara to Empress Catherine II asking for his discharge, and notes on his 30-year irreproachable service, copies of Decrees of the Senate, and also, of particular interest, the wills of Tomara's father and himself. These documents make it possible to discover something of the family circumstances of Vasyl Tomara, his connections, and views, and to form an impression of this remarkable individual.

The archive includes a letter which reveals what became of these documents after the death of Tomara's widow – Yelyzaveta (née Kalamey, the daughter of a nobleman from the Grand Duchy of Tuscany). The letter, dated 1840, was addressed to the nephew of Vasyl Tomara, the retired cornet Yevhen Tomara, and



The Tomara family coat-of-arms.

sent from St Petersburg. In it the author (signature illegible) announces that finally he has been able to send these important papers. Their further fate – right up to their acquisition by the Museum – remains unknown, and it is evident that much material was lost from the archive during this century and a half. However, even in its present form, the archive is of considerable historical and genealogical importance. In particular, the biography of Vasyl Tomara himself was almost unknown, a fact noted by Petro Bartenev, the collator of the 'Archive of Prince Vorontsev', which includes letters from Vasyl Tomara, written between 1775–1803. 'Unfortunately', he wrote, 'the biography of V. S. Tomara is unknown to me. We only know that he was renowned as an astute diplomat'.¹

Some details of Vasyl Tomara's biography, including the identity of his parents and closest relatives, were established by the historians Oleksander Lazarevskiy and Vadym Modzalevskiy. Lazarevskiy's article 'Lyudi Staroy Malorossii' (The People of Old Little Russia), provides some information about the founder of the

¹ Archive of Prince Vorontsev (Moscow, 1881), book xx, pp. 231–60.

family (an incomer from Greece) Ivan Tomara, and his two sons – Stepan and Vasyl.² Modzalevskiy collected further detailed data about other members of the family. He intended to include them in the fifth volume of his *Malorossiyskiy rodoslovník* (Little Russian Genealogy). But this volume never appeared and remained in manuscript form.³

The archive has made it possible to work out one of the branches of the widespread Tomara family tree: from the elder son of Ivan Tomara – Stepan – to the owner of the archive – Vasyl Tomara, whose great-grandfather he was. Stepan Tomara's will, dated 1715, is preserved in the archive.

It appears that under the regime of Hetman Ivan Samoylovych (ruled, 1672–87) Stepan Tomara was Colonel of Domontovsk, later he became Aide-de-Camp of the Pereyaslav Regiment, and in 1707, on the order of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, he was promoted to Colonel of the said Regiment, which he held until his death in 1715.

Stepan Tomara was married twice. This is apparent from his will, which bequeaths his lands with many villages and estates to his wife Pelaheya Yakivna (née Lyzohub, the daughter of the Chernihiv Colonel Yakiv Lyzohub). At the same time, it notes that no bequests are made to the (adult) children of his first marriage (to Varvara Voytivna, maiden name unknown) – a son Ivan and daughter Hapka – since they had already established their own households and, at appropriate times, had received [from their father] substantial moneys.

From his second marriage, Stepan Tomara had a son Vasyl and six daughters. This Vasyl received a good education, and later, like his father, entered upon a military career: he was a Military fellow, and subsequently Colonel of the Pereyaslav Regiment. He was killed during the Crimean campaign of 1735–6, and his remains were interred on the family estate, the village of Kovray (presently in the Zolotoniskiy district, Cherkasy province).⁴

Concerning the family status of Vasyl Tomara, we know that he was married to Elizabeth von Brinken, a close relative of General-en-Chef, Baron Karl Ewald Renne, who commanded a division from Little Russia. From this marriage, two children were born – a son Stepan and a daughter Hanna.

Stepan Tomara the younger was born in 1719, and, like his father and grandfather, served in the Zaporozhian army. In 1737, as a Fellow of the standard, he took part in the Khotyn campaign of 1739.⁵ In 1761, he retired, and from 1784 was

² A. M. Lazarevskiy, 'Lyudi Staroy Malorossii', *Kievskaya starina*, 1885, no. 5, pp. 14–20.

³ Institute of Manuscripts, V. I. Vernadskiy Central National Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, holding 2, 16609–16610.

⁴ i.e., the Russo-Turkish war, 1735–9. This war was preceded by a raid of the Crimean khan (1735), who, on orders of the Turkish government, led a large army through the Russian dominions to attack the territories returned by Russia to Iran (the provinces of Mazendaran, Hylyan, Astrabad, and the towns of Baku and Derbent on the shores of the Caspian Sea). There was a clash between the Crimean Tatars and Russian troops. In the spring of 1736, Russia declared war on Turkey. See, *Istoriya SRSR* (Moscow, 1967), vol. 3, p. 348; *Dnevnye zapiski malorossiyskogo podskarbiya generalnogo Yakova Markovyicha* (Moscow, 1859), no. 2, p. 10.

⁵ The Khotyn campaign of 1739 was the concluding act of the Russo-Turkish war (1735–9), when Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Minikh delivered a devastating blow to the Turks at Stavuchany on 17 August 1739, and on 19 August captured Khotyn, and later Iasi. A peace treaty was signed on 18 September 1739. See, *Istoriya SRSR* (Moscow, 1967), vol. 3, p. 349.

a deputy from the nobility of Pereyaslav county, Kyiv *gubernia*, and a counsellor of the Little Russian Collegium.

Stepan Tomara was married to the daughter of the Poltava Colonel Vasyl Kochubey – Hanna, by whom he had three sons: Vasyl, Pavlo, Mykhaylo, and five daughters – Ulyana, Yelysaveta, Sofiya, Nadiya, and Marfa.

The eldest son of this marriage – Vasyl the younger – is of particular interest, since he was the owner of the archive. He appears to have been born in ca. 1748. Virtually nothing is known of his childhood and adolescence – apart from one interesting fact. When he turned five, it was decided to employ a resident tutor for him. By a fortunate chance, the choice fell on Hryhoriy Skovoroda, who was recommended to Stepan Tomara by his friends.⁶

Residence in the Tomara home was not easy for Skovoroda. Although the father of his pupil was an intelligent man, he was proud, and took considerable pride in his aristocratic descent. He never spoke to his son's teacher, nor paid any attention to him. This situation was humiliating to Skovoroda. He felt the implied humiliation, but tried not to react to it. For, having lost his membership of the Pereyaslav Collegium on account of his progressive ideas, he decided to endure his one-year contract to the end. Skovoroda immersed himself in his pedagogic work, using the innovative principle that the teacher should seek out the natural abilities of his pupil, and then try to assist their development discreetly, without overburdening the young mind with other fields of study. This method of teaching evoked in the boy a sincere affection for his teacher. However, shortly after, an incident occurred, which caused the departure of Skovoroda from Kovray. One day, during lessons, Skovoroda, growing exasperated with his pupil's answers, called him a 'pig's head'. This came to the knowledge of the boy's parents, and, on the insistence of his wife, Stepan Tomara dismissed Skovoroda – at the same time expressing his sympathy and apologising to the philosopher.

Skovoroda returned to Pereyaslav, where he met a friend from the Kyivan Academy, Kalihraf. Together they travelled to Muscovy, to the Sergeyev-Posad. Skovoroda spent a whole month at the Monastery. Its superior, Kyrylo Lyashchevetskyi, who recognised Skovoroda's eminent scholarship, offered him a post as a lecturer in the seminary there. But love for Ukraine impelled Skovoroda to return to Pereyaslav.

Stepan Tomara heard that he was back, and tried to get Skovoroda to return as Vasyl's resident tutor. However, in spite of the urgings of his friends, Skovoroda was unwilling to accept the invitation. And then a curious incident occurred: during the night, Skovoroda's friends conveyed him in his sleep to the Kovray estate. Next morning, Stepan Tomara pleaded with Skovoroda to resume his duties as tutor, promising never again to interfere in matters of the boy's education. Persuaded, apparently, by little Vasyl's affection for him, Skovoroda remained in Kovray for six years, until it was time for the boy to continue his schooling in official educational institutions.

⁶ Skovoroda was recommended by the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Tymofiy Shcherbatskyi. See, *Narodna tvorchist ta etnobrafiya*, 1972, no. 5, p. 40; 'Skovoroda, ukrainskiy pisatel XVIII v.', *Osnova*, 1862, August, pp. 21–3.

When Vasyl turned twelve, Skovoroda wrote his pupil a birthday poem in Latin.⁷

On the Birthday of Basilius Tomara, a boy of Twelve Years

The circle is completed, now a new year is beginning,
 This is the primal day with which the year must open,
 On this day thou wast born, thou lad of talent, Basilius,
 Auspicious were the omens that the fates bestowed on thee,
 Just as thou didst come first into the light, an infant,
 First in virtue shalt thou be, and first likewise in honour,
 First thou art gifts of mind, first in gifts likewise,
 Which for seemly harmony of the body are needed.
 Firstly thee did first nature kindly fostering cherish,
 Though to those born after thee she prove step-dame unkindly.
 So first did the Creator of all things shape Adam,
 Later he shaped Eve, yet Eve became the lesser.
 Hence I congratulate thee, to whom many gifts have been given,
 Many gifts are thine from Powers good and auspicious,
 Yet bear in mind! To thee the Creator so much has entrusted,
 At the Judgement He will ask that to Him much thou rendr'est
 Strive then in thy studies, meetly perform every duty,
 And, in deeds as in name, thou shalt be truly 'Basilius'.⁸

The six years (1753–9) that Skovoroda spent with the Tomara family proved fruitful for him. During this time, he wrote a cycle of poems, which eventually became part of his famous collection *Sad bozhbestvennykh pesney* (Garden of Divine Songs). These years likewise had their effect on Vasyl Tomara. He received

⁷ *Hryhoriy Skovoroda. Literaturni Tvory* (Kyiv, 1983), p. 181.

The Latin text reads:

Perfecto circo rursus novus incipit annus.
 Haec est prima dies, quam caput annus habet
 Hocce die nasci, puer ingeniose Basili,
 Omine felici fata dedere tibi,
 Ut cum primus es in lucem puer editus infans,
 Primus virtute ac primus honore fies,
 Primus es ingenio, primus quoque dotibus illis,
 Consona quas poscit corporis harmonia.
 Primi prima tibi indulsit natura benigna,
 Quae post te natis dura noverca fuit
 Sic prius ille opifex rerum confinxit Adamum,
 Finxit post et Evam, set minor Eva fuit.
 Gratulor ergo tibi, quod tam bona multa dedere,
 Multa dedere tibi numina dextra bona,
 Sed tamenpeheu multum tibi credidit ille creator,
 Illio in iudicio reddita multa volet,
 Magnam puer, te cura manet toleranda laborque,
 Ut sis Basilius nomine reque simul.

⁸ The first two lines of the poem imply that Vasyl Tomara was born on 1 January, the date to which Peter I had moved the opening of the civil year in the Russian empire. His name lends credence to this view; in Ukraine at this period children were frequently named after the saint on whose day they were born. 'Vasyl' is the Ukrainian version of the Greek 'Basilius' – meaning 'Kingly', and 1 January, in the Byzantine religious calendar, is the feast of St Basil the Great.

a basic education, and throughout his life retained a warm affection and sincere respect for his first tutor, keeping up a correspondence with him. In one of his letters, dated 1778, he wrote to Skovoroda as follows:

My Dear tutor Hryhoriy Savych! I received your letter with heartfelt affection for you, that amounts to love. You will recall, my dear friend, your Vasyl, who may not appear unfortunate, but who within needs more advice, than when he was with you. O, if only the Lord had inspired you to remain with me! If only you could hear just once and knew, then you would take no joy in the boy you reared. Have I wished for you in vain. If not, then be so kind as to write and tell me how I can see you, my dear Skovoroda. Farewell and do not grudge giving, just once more, at least a little of your time and peace to your old pupil Vasyl Tomara.⁹

The letter is redolent of his affection for Skovoroda, the need to confess his own deeds, and the wish to receive much-needed advice. It shows clearly how deep a mark the exceptional personality of the tutor had left on the soul of his pupil.

From the end of his studies under Skovoroda until the first mention of his activities in the Imperial service, no information is available about what Vasyl Tomara was doing. We may assume, however, that like other bright and ambitious young men from the East-Slavonic world, he studied at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. This seems likely on two accounts; firstly, his tutor, Skovoroda, was himself an alumnus of the Academy, and secondly, proximity of the family residence to Kyiv, where his parents could rent accommodation for their son and keep an eye on him. We may also assume that, after the Academy, Vasyl Tomara also studied abroad, as did many Kyivan students.

Quite a few young Ukrainians, after graduating from the Academy, went on to take up government posts in Moscow and St Petersburg. Vasyl, too, went to St Petersburg. His education and intellect made it possible for him, while still only 21, to enter the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, where he spent a considerable time occupying various posts. His work there is corroborated by a Certificate of Service, issued on 6 May 1779, that is after ten years of his service. According to this document, Vasyl Tomara took part in a number of important diplomatic activities of the Russian government. He was present at all the negotiations which preceded the signing of the peace treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) with the Ottoman Porte, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74. Thus, in 1772, Tomara was a member of the Russian delegation led by Count Grigoriy Orlov, Director General of Engineers and General-en-Chef, and the Russian ambassador to Turkey, O. M. Obreskov, during the peace negotiations in Focşani, and later to Bucharest.

During the Bucharest Congress, the Turks proposed conditions which could have led to a renewal of hostilities; however, Russia was in no situation to fight. In the autumn of 1773, a peasant rebellion broke out under the leadership of Yemelyan Pugachev, which caused considerable alarm to the Russian nobility, and induced the government to sign an immediate peace treaty.

These mandates were given to the commander of the First Russian Army, the renowned military leader, Pyotr Rumyantsev. In two successful campaigns be-

⁹ G. P. Danilevskiy 'Skovoroda G. S.', *Ukrainskaya starina*, 1886, no. 10, pp. 52–3.

yond the Danube, he defeated the Turks, and forced them to sign a peace agreement. Tomara was present during the final stage of negotiations, on 10 July 1774, in the village of Kuchuk Kainarji. Shortly after, he was sent to the capital of the Ottoman empire – Constantinople. Here, as an assistant to the Chargé d'affaires, he conducted important negotiations with representatives of the Turkish government on the various points of the treaty still in contention. As a result of his efforts, on 21 July 1774, the peace treaty was signed.

Years later, Vasyl Tomara wrote to the Empress Catherine II a curriculum vitae, evoked by extraordinary circumstances. In this he gives a fairly coherent account of the main stages of his service. Referring to the ratification of the Kuchuk Kainarji treaty, Tomara states with regret that many officials were given various rewards at that time, but he, who had done much to bring it about, was simply given a Diploma of the Foreign Affairs Collegium.

Tomara spent some time in Constantinople with General-en-Chef Nikolay Repnin, who was Plenipotentiary Ambassador Extraordinary to the Ottoman Empire. For this, he was raised to the grade of titular counsellor (though this was only ninth place in the table of civilian ranks). However, his conscientious performance of his official duties did not go unnoticed. When he returned home, Tomara received a new appointment – he became a counsellor to the embassy in Constantinople. Thus his ascent of the complex hierarchical ladder of ranks progressed.

In the course of Tomara's professional career, a number of changes took place. In 1779, Field Marshal Grigoriy Potemkin had him transferred to the military establishment, and sent to Warsaw, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, under orders to evacuate the Russian armies from Poland.

According to his curriculum vitae, this was quite a difficult diplomatic assignment, since the government of Catherine II was reluctant to withdraw its troops, and tried by various diplomatic ploys to interfere in this matter. Tomara's curriculum vitae reads:

... that year [1779], I was sent to Warsaw under orders to evacuate the troops from Poland, but empowered, if this removal is a cause of great concern to the Polish authorities, to cancel those instructions, and to instruct the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-General Romanius, to make ready for a campaign, awaiting new orders; I carried out all this, and conveyed to the Imperial Prince [Potemkin] from the King [Stanisław August Poniatowski] and the Polish Government those instructions, according to which Your Majesty desired at that time to leave troops in Poland.¹⁰

Vasyl Tomara carried out this important assignment with honour. In 1783, he was given an even more responsible task, of which he writes as follows:

In 1783, I was sent to Georgia in order to convey to King Erekle [II] a treaty concerning his vassalage to Your Imperial Majesty. This treaty, which I delivered in Tiflis, was accepted by the King and conveyed by me to the Georgievsk fortress to the Georgian plenipotentiary for the signature of this tractate by Lieutenant-General Pavel Serg. Potemkin on behalf of Your Imperial Majesty.

¹⁰ Holdings of the Museum of the History of Kyiv (hereafter MIK), DK-7014. Draft of a curriculum vitae by Vasyl Tomara on his 30 years of service.

For his part in this assignment, Tomara was promoted to full colonel.

That same year, Tomara went to Imeretiya, to persuade its ruler, too, to allow his kingdom to become a Russian protectorate. After some complex manoeuvring, he brought this to a successful conclusion. In 1784, he was also sent on a special mission to Persia, and, on returning, was appointed commander of the Lyuben Regiment of Carabineers, with which, as he wrote in his curriculum vitae,

... during the [Russo-]Turkish war [of 1787–91], which broke out shortly afterwards, I served initially in the Katerynoslav [army] and later in the Ukrainian army, and was present at the defeat of the Turks and Tatars in Hanhuri and Salkutsy, then [the defeat of] Hasan Pasha on the River Salga; at Izmail and at the capture of Bendery.

For his participation in these campaigns, Tomara was promoted to brigadier. According to the table of ranks, this was fifth overall, and the lowest rank of general. Of his subsequent assignments, Tomara writes:

As brigadier I was posted by the late Field Marshal as General-en-Chef and Knight in place of: Prince Yuriy Volodymyr[ovich] Dolgorukiy to the allied Imperial army against the Turks, and then, after my promotion to Major-General [I was posted] to the Austrian army against the Prussians. In the first of these postings, I commanded a regiment during the Campaign against Izmail and Bendery; as regards the second, I was not actually sent, owing to peace negotiations which were just beginning in Reichenbach...

Vasyl Tomara stresses the especial trust, which Field Marshal Potemkin placed in him, and on account of which he was, in May 1791, appointed commander of the Russian flotilla in the Archipelago in the Mediterranean. A few months later, in December 1791, Russia signed a peace treaty with Turkey at Iași. This new appointment meant only trouble for Tomara. The flotilla was in a pitiful state. He wrote:

The independent flotilla had by then been almost completely destroyed by the Turks; the small vessels which they had left plied between the islands of the Archipelago, while the commander Lieutenant-Colonel Knight Lambro Kachoni and his officers were far away in German lands. Unserviceable vessels had been disarmed and were ignored by the armourers who served on them, and the regular flotilla was reduced to 3 vessels and 60 sailors with no provisioning.

Tomara took his new responsibilities seriously. He began to refit the flotilla, and within a short time there was a major improvement. 'By now', he wrote, 'the regular flotilla comprised 10 vessels, which had been acquired and armed by me'. The main cause of the chaotic situation of the flotilla was, in his opinion, the fact that there was no proper information about the strength of crews on each vessel. Hence, it was impossible to calculate pay accurately or provide the necessary rations. He therefore introduced rules which laid down the number of sailors in each flotilla under war conditions and in peace-time; this, he believed, would put an end to all abuses. He describes in detail how he restored the pitiful remnants of the flotilla into proper fighting units once again, and how he managed to satisfy the demands of the crews, particularly those of the independent flotilla, whose commanders had received no payroll since the very beginning of the war.

Tomara gives details of the costs incurred in putting the flotilla in order: for the arming of the vessels, provisioning them, refitting them and dispatching them to

the Black Sea with stores for six months. This all added up to 98,000 'red guilders'. '... I will dare to add', he writes, 'that the construction of this flotilla and its long-term maintenance in home waters could not have cost your [Imperial] majesty less'.

Tomara was obliged to go into so much detail about everything connected with his command of the flotilla because complaints about him had reached St Petersburg, and Catherine II had ordered a special commission to be set up to investigate them. Tomara was greatly disturbed by this, particularly since he felt no cause for blame or guilt. He had restored order to the flotilla, defended the state interests, and, as far as circumstances would permit, had tried to satisfy the complaints coming to him from the various vessels.

The commission rejected the charges against Tomara as groundless, however, no formal decree was issued appraising his activities as commander of the flotilla. He felt, therefore, that, in the absence of such a public declaration, he remained discredited in the eyes of society. Accordingly, he wrote to the Empress, tendering his resignation. She, however, considered that his conduct had been irreproachable, and, instead of accepting his resignation, refused to dismiss him, appointed him counsellor to the embassy in Spain. This, it is clear, was in 1796, since the draft of the curriculum vitae is dated January of that year.

Some time later, Tomara received a new assignment: he was sent as Envoy to Constantinople, where he remained from 1798 until 1807. In the years that followed, he received numerous rewards for his meritorious service. Emperor Paul I appointed him a Knight First Class of the Order of St Anne, and soon afterwards a Commander of the Order of St John of Jerusalem (which brought with it an annual honorarium of 1,000 roubles). At the same time, he was granted in perpetuity for himself and his heirs an estate in the Podillya *gubernia*, which the Treasury had acquired from Prince Lyubomirskiy. This comprised six villages and 1,499 male peasants.¹¹

¹¹ MIK holdings, DK-7008. Rescript of Paul I creating Privy Councillor Tomara a Knight of the Order of St Anne First Class; DK-7006. Rescript of Tsar Paul I creating Privy Councillor Tomara a Commander of the Order of St John of Jerusalem.

Both orders were established in Russia by Tsar Paul I (1797). At that time, all Russian Orders were recognised as a single Knightly rank or order (individual orders were considered its classes and received a common statute and administration which became known as the Order Chancellery). In 1798, this was renamed the Chapter of the Order of Chivalry. At that time, a number of individual 'officials' were also ratified: Chancellor, Master-in-Chief of Ceremonies, Master of Ceremonies, secretaries, and heralds. Three principal order 'officials' – the Chancellor, the Master-in-Chief of Ceremonies and the Treasurer – formed the general core of the Chapter. The secretaries of the Order classes, whose main task was to keep the lists of Order members, were accountable to it.

Every order had a special festival on the feast of its patron saint. In addition, Paul I also established a general festival for all Russian knightly orders – 8 November, the feast of St Michael the Archangel, and also assigned to each class a particular church in St Petersburg.

The members of these orders had the duty of taking part in charitable activities, supervising educational establishments in Moscow and St Petersburg, opening in both capitals refuges for the care of the poor and needy. To pay for the establishment and equipping of such charitable concerns, newly-created members of an order had to make a one-time contribution to the Chapter of the Russian Chivalric Society. Knights of the orders were given an annual pension. See, F. F. Brokgauz and I. A. Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* (St Petersburg, 1897), vol. xxii, pp. 117–20.

№ 14.

Господинъ Тайный Советникъ Томара
 Сказавное вамъ урядѣе, въ Суревѣ нашей
 во вѣренномъ вамъ постѣ и тогное
 исполненіе предписаній НАШИХЪ
 обращаютъ на васъ МАНЕ БЛАГОВОЛѢ-
 ніе, въ изъявленіи же оного поручава-
 мь МЫ васъ Кавалеромъ Ордена Свя-
 твѣя Анны першаго Класа, носго Зна-
 ки у сего препровождаемъ возлори-
 те на себя. Предвѣщаемъ въ протелѣ
 вамъ благодарности.

Павелъ!

Въ Санкт
 Петербургѣ 11:
 1798

Decree of Emperor Paul I informing Counsellor Vasyl Tomara of the granting to him of the Order of St Anne First Class, 11 September 1798.

Tomara's career continued to prosper. He became a Privy Councillor – an official of the third rank, above which there remained only two grades: Actual Privy Councillor and Chancellor. In the course of time, he became an Actual Privy Councillor, and towards the end of his career, was granted the honorary title of Senator.¹²

¹² Senator was a civil title and post of honour, introduced at the end of the seventeenth century; it was granted to members of the Council of Ministers and other top-level civil servants (grades 2–4, princi-

Vasyl Tomara's archive, however, has not preserved copies of the decrees of the monarchs he served, granting him these titles and awards. In other words, a number of documents are missing, which would have been invaluable aids to reconstructing his biography and career.

Particularly valuable for such research is Tomara's will, from which one can ascertain his address in St Petersburg and the circle of his friends. The will was drafted three years before his death – 15 May 1816. Tomara begins with the following words:

Not knowing how long the Almighty will deign to prolong my life in this world, in the case of the hour of death, I, the undersigned Actual Privy Councillor and Knight, Vasiliy, son of Stepan Tomara, being of sound mind and body make the following spiritual bequests.¹³

According to this will, the stone-built building in St Petersburg, no. 47 in the first quarter of the Admiralty section, which had in its time been acquired from Count Arakcheev, was to pass into the absolute and long-term ownership of his wife – Yelysaveta. Tomara also bequeathed absolutely to his wife five estates in the Simbirsk, Volodymyr, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Kherson, and Poltava *gubernias*. In the case of her predeceasing him, the estates were to pass to Vasyl Tomara's brothers – Pavlo and Mykhaylo, and his sister Sofiya.

Tomara ends his will as follows:

in concluding these bequests, I sincerely request to act as witnesses and executors my kinsman Count Viktor Pavlovich Kochubey and my dear friends Count Aleksey Kirillovich Razumovskiy, Count Nikolay Nikolayevich Golovin, Mikhail Ivanovich Danaurov, Prince Aleksandr Nikolayevich Golitsyn, Count Lev Kirillovich Razumovskiy, and Zakhar Nikolaevich Posnikov, and I especially request them to be gracious guardians and protectors of my wife, inasmuch as she is not knowledgeable either in business matters nor in the language, and to execute all these bequests with every precision.¹⁴

The document was endorsed with his personal seal, which replicated the device of his great-grandfather, the Pereyaslav Colonel Stepan Tomara. It was an oval shield, bearing a coupé Latin cross standing on a crescent, and surmounted by a helmet and three ostrich feathers. These were the principal elements of the coat-of-arms, which is described as:

Azure a Latin cross *or* issuant from a crescent *or*; above, an estoile of six points argent. Crest a peer's helmet, crowned. Mantling *azure*, countercharged argent. Supporters two storks. Motto: Ducit aut Salvat.¹⁵

The golden cross, placed above a crescent moon and chosen as the central motif, was intended to symbolise victory over the Muslims, and in particular the

pally to the third class) on their retirement. The title of Senator was comparable to the title of Guardian, which was introduced in 1798 to reward members of the Councils of Guardians, which headed charity institutions, or who gave significant donations to charity. See, L. E. Shepelev, *Otmennyye istoriye chiny, zvaniya y tituly v Rossiyskoy imperii* (Leningrad, 1977), p. 98.

¹³ MIK holdings, DK-7004. Will of V. S. Tomara.

¹⁴ Viktor Kochubey (1768–1834). Notable statesman; along his maternal line, he was a relative of Vasyl Tomara.

¹⁵ V. N. Lukomskiy, V. L. Modzalevskiy, *Malorossiyskiy gerbovník* (St Petersburg, 1914), p. 185; *Obshchiy gerbovník dvoryanskikh rodov Vserossiyskoy imperii* (St Petersburg, 1799–1840), part VII, p. 13.



Silver tea-pot with the Tomara family coat-of-arms. Made ca. 1715 by the Kyivan jeweller Ivan Ravych to the order of the Colonel of Pereyaslav Stepan Tomara. Now in the Museum of Historical Treasures of Ukraine.

participation of Vasyl Tomara in military campaigns against the Crimean khanate and the Russo-Turkish wars of the turn of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries. The storks, which symbolise sagaciousness, diligence, exuberance, and watchfulness, indicate the predominant traits of the members of this family.

One may deduce from Vasyl Tomara's dispositions concerning his property that his marriage was without issue. Hence there were various bequests to his relatives. The available information about the latter is by no means complete; but even the fragments which we have are not without interest.

It is known that, in the eighteenth century, Vasyl Tomara's sister, Ulyana, lived in Kyiv, at Moskovska Street, 46. She was married to Ivan Vyshnyevskiy, a colonel of the guard and head of the Imperial Palace of Justice. It is noteworthy that in 1787, when Catherine II visited Kyiv, a member of the Empress's entourage, one N. Naryshkina, a relative of Vyshnyevskiy, was accommodated in their home.

During Catherine's visit, life in the city became much livelier. All the notables from the surrounding areas came into town to attend balls and masquerades. Catherine II's favourite pastime was playing cards, and Naryshkina organised card-parties in the Vyshnyevskiy's house, which were attended by a select circle of their acquaintances from the gentry – and the Empress herself.¹⁶

Another of Vasyl's sisters – Sofiya – also lived in Kyiv, though her exact address is unknown. Her husband, Hryhoriy Krasnokutskiy, a member of the nobility of the Kyiv *gubernia*, was a State Councillor, and held the post of the Prosecutor of the Kyiv *gubernia*.

Their son, Semen, had a brilliant but tragic career. He was born around 1788. After training in the First Cadet Corps, he served as an ensign in the Life Guards of the Semeniv Regiment. He took part in the campaign of 1807 (the Russo-Turkish war), displaying conspicuous bravery for which he was awarded a golden sabre of honour. In 1811, he was promoted to Staff Captain. During the war against Napoleon in 1812, he took part in the major battles – Borodino, Tarutin, and Maloyaroslavets – as well as foreign campaigns. In 1821, Semen Krasnokutskiy retired with the rank of Major-General, and was appointed to the Senate, in the first section of the fifth department, where he held the post of Senior Prosecutor and the rank of Actual State Councillor – the fourth grade in the table of ranks.

Semen Krasnokutskiy was a member of the young generation of officers, scions of the nobility, who after the war against Napoleon wanted reform in Russia. In 1817, he joined the 'Union of Salvation' in St Petersburg, and then gradually became involved with the Southern Society of Decembrists, and helped prepare the uprising on the Senate Square. For his participation in the Decembrist movement, he was arrested and exiled to Siberia for a term of twenty years. There he became seriously ill with rheumatism, and in 1831 became unable to walk. In view of this, his mother was permitted to send a servant to Krasnoyarsk, where he was living.

The fate of Semen Krasnokutskiy was clearly a cause of great concern to Yeliasveta Tomara, Vasyl's widow. In her own will, she bequeathed 50,000 roubles in

¹⁶ *Kyivski zbirnyky istoriyi, arkhеолоhii, pobutu ta mystetstva* (Kyiv, 1930), collection 1, pp. 307–14.

securities in the State Bank, for the income to go to the support of her husband's kinsman in Siberia. (Yelyzaveta died on 19 June 1835). However, after a relatively short time, Semen Krasnokutskyi died in Tobolsk in 1838, to which town he had been transferred as a result of the efforts of his sister Nadiya.¹⁷

A great-nephew of Vasyl Tomara, Lev Tomara, the grandson of his brother Mykhaylo, is known to have been living in Kyiv in the 1880s. He was a prominent personality in the city, and for many years (1885–98) held the post of Governor of Kyiv. In 1897, Governor Lev Tomara did much to assist the organisation of the All-Russian Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition in Kyiv, and was given a testimonial of gratitude from the organisers. He resided at Volodymyrska Street, 22.¹⁸

Another member of the Tomara family, Oleksander, the great-grandson of Vasyl's brother Pavlo, is known to us from documents in the Kyiv provincial archives, in the holdings of the Kyiv Assembly of Noble Deputies.

He was born on 9 March 1866 and educated in the Orlov Cadet Corps. In 1885, he entered the Kyiv Assembly of Noble Deputies, where he was assigned to the third rank of officials. He served from 27 June 1885 until 24 March 1886, that is, until his prescribed term of military service. He then asked for his discharge and transferred to the 36 Okhtyr Dragoon Regiment.

After leaving the army, Tomara returned to Kyiv and continued at his previous post (1891). Two years later, he was appointed registrar of the Little Russian Collegium, and after a further three years – secretary of the governor.

Oleksander Tomara was married to Zinayida, the daughter of a titular counselor – Avhustyn Kryzhanivskyi. In Kyiv, the family lived at various addresses. In 1891, they lived in the Lukyaniv borough, where they owned a house, no. 44. In 1896, they moved to Bezakivska Street, 6.¹⁹

It is further recorded that in 1896 Oleksander Tomara entered the Ministry of the Court of His Imperial Majesty. Later, he served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and later still – in the Ministry of Communications.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the family archives of Vasyl Tomara are fairly fragmentary, and that without recourse to other documents the full reconstruction of the family tree would be difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, further research will doubtless bring to light additional information about the ramifications of this family, whose members included so many notable people. □

¹⁷ *Dekabristy. Biograficheskii spravocnik* (Moscow, 1988), p. 84.

¹⁸ *Kalendar. Adresnaya i spravocnaya kniga g. Kieva na 1914 god* (Kyiv, 1913), p. 246.

¹⁹ State Archive of the Kyiv Oblast, holding 782, file 4, item 180, folios 1–5.

Arts and Culture

Yuriy Shevelov

(On the Occasion of his 90th Birthday)

Roksoliana Zorivchak

Yuriy Shevelov, one of the leading Ukrainian philologists of this century, celebrates his 90th birthday this December.

Shevelov was born on 17 December 1908 in Łomża in Russian-ruled Poland, where his father was a civil servant. Two years later, however, the family moved to Kharkiv, the city with which Yuriy Shevelov was associated for almost the entire 'Ukrainian' period of his life. Here, in 1931, he graduated from the Institute of Professional Education. Here, too, in 1939 he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of 'Candidate of Sciences': 'Observations on the Language of Contemporary Poetry'. During the 1930s, he worked as a lecturer and then Associate Professor at the Ukrainian Institute of Journalism (1933–9), and at Kharkiv University (1939–41), becoming, in 1941, head of the Department of Ukrainian Philology. Shevelov began to be published in 1929, his earliest appearances in print being reviews of plays. His first book – *Grammar of the Ukrainian Language* (in two parts, co-authored with Naum Kahanovych) appeared in 1934. It was reprinted in two subsequent editions, in 1935 and 1936. Kharkiv, to a marked degree, formed Shevelov as a Ukrainian scholar. There he had the opportunity to become acquainted with the most prominent members of the Ukrainian Renaissance of the inter-war period, working alongside such personalities as the linguists Mykola Nakonechnyi and Kostyantyn Nimchynov, whom he regarded as his mentors. And it was in Kharkiv that, as a young man, he came face to face with all the horrors of the Soviet system, during the period which his close friend, the literary scholar Yuriy Lavrinenko, termed the 'Executed Renaissance' – a tragic phrase which became part of the terminology of Ukrainian literary history.

In 1943, Shevelov moved to Lviv, where he became closely acquainted with Professor Vasyl Simovych, who, as Shevelov himself said later, 'was at that time the only exponent in Ukraine of the ideas and methods of the Prague Linguistic Circle', and where he was able to be in touch with Nikolay Trubetskoy 'himself'.¹ The young scholar worked extensively in the library of the Shevchenko Learned Society (NTSh), the director of which, Volodymyr Doroshenko, willingly shared with him his memories of thousands of key events of Ukrainian cultural life stretching back to the turn of the century. From Lviv, Shevelov emigrated to Germany; from 1946–9 he was an Associate Professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich (where it had been transferred from Prague in 1945). It was there

¹ Yu. Shevelov, Foreword, *Halychyna v formuvanni novoyi ukrayinskoyi literaturnoyi movy* (Galicia in the Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Literary Language) (Lviv, New York, 1996), p. 8.

that, in 1947, he published (in cyclostyled form) his monograph *Do benezy nazvy-nobho rechennya* (On the Genesis of the Nominal Sentence), which he had written in Ukraine in 1941–2. This work formed the core of his doctoral dissertation, which he defended successfully in 1949 at the Ukrainian Free University. This was a topic which had, at that time, never been addressed in Western linguistics.

While in Munich, Shevelov was also the vice-president of the literary association 'MUR' (Mystetskyi ukrayynskiy rukh)² (1945–9). In 1950, he moved to Sweden, where for two years he lectured on the Ukrainian and Russian languages at the University of Lund. Eventually, like so many other Ukrainian displaced persons, he emigrated to the USA, where he arrived on 15 July 1952. There, after mastering the English language and the American scholarly methodology, he became, in due course, one of the best-known Slavists in the USA.

Initially (1952–4) Shevelov taught Russian and Ukrainian at Harvard University; later (1954–77) he was Professor of Slavic Philology at Columbia University. He also gave a series of lectures at various universities in the USA, Canada and Western Europe. He was also, simultaneously, very active in émigré Ukrainian academic institutions. Since 1945, he had been a full member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN),³ and since 1949 of the Shevchenko Learned Society (NTSh). During the years 1959–61 and 1981–6 he served as president of UVAN. He was also a founder-member of the Slovo Association of Ukrainian Writers in Exile⁴ (1954), and a member of the Society for the Development of the Ukrainian Language (from 1964).

Shevelov has made significant contributions to a broad spectrum of Ukrainian studies, in particular, phonology, morphology, syntax, etymology, and onomastics. He developed the conceptual and historiographical principles of Ukrainian linguistics, synthesising in his works the diachronic and synchronic approaches to the study of the Ukrainian language. Shevelov carried out ground-breaking research on the syntax of the simple sentence *Syntaksys suchasnoyi ukrayynskoyi literaturnoyi movy. Proste rechennya* (The Syntax of Modern Ukrainian Literary Language: The Simple Sentence) (1951; in English in 1963). In his English-language monographs *A Prehistory of Slavic: The Historical Phonology of Common Slavic* (1964, 1965) and *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* (1979), he demonstrated the development of the phonological system of the Ukrainian language from its proto-Slavonic origins to the present day, using a wide range of historical, dialectical, inter-language and textual evidence, and, by establishing the underlying causative links between individual phonetic changes, gave a panoramic view of the development of the Ukrainian language in a historical cross-section, substantiating its origins in the seventh century and the completion of its formative period in the sixteenth.

² MUR (The Artistic Ukrainian Movement), an artistic-literary organisation of Ukrainian émigrés in Europe.

³ UVAN, the official name of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (Ukrayynska Vilna Akademiya Nauk). An academy of Ukrainian émigré scholars, founded in Augsburg in November 1945.

⁴ Slovo Association of Ukrainian Writers in Exile, an association initiated in New York in June 1954 to continue and develop the ideology and activities of its European predecessor MUR (see note 2), which comprised all Ukrainian writers outside Ukraine, the USSR, and its satellites.

Rejecting existing views of proto-Slavonic linguistic unity and the three East-Slavonic languages, prior to the beginning of written records with the coming of Christianity at the end of the tenth century, he developed his own original – and controversial – theory of the configuration and re-grouping of dialectic groups (Kyiv-Polissya, Galicia-Podillia, Polotsk-Smolensk, Novgorod-Tver, Murom-Ryazan dialects), which evolved into the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian languages.

In addition to his works on historical, contemporary and dialectal Ukrainian linguistics, Shevelov's scholarly publications include monographs on various mediaeval texts, critical appraisals of the works of other Ukrainian linguists, and works on other Slavonic languages. He wrote extensively on the (still controversial) topic of the development of a standard Ukrainian orthography, and also wrote extensively on literary topics, for both scholarly and general audiences.

In honour of his 75th birthday, in 1983, a *festschrift* was compiled, published in 1985 as *Studies in Ukrainian Linguistics in Honor of George Y. Shevelov*. This – as the spelling of the title implies – appeared in the USA. For, throughout Shevelov's whole active career in the West, his work remained virtually unknown in his native Ukraine, and the many academic honours he received came from US or other Western institutions.⁵ Only in the final months of the Soviet Union, after Ukraine had already declared its 'sovereignty', was Shevelov able to return to his native Ukraine, for the First International Congress of Ukrainicists, in August 1990. Since then, he has been a frequent visitor. In 1990, he was elected a Member Abroad of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences of Ukraine, in 1992 – a member of the editorial board of the journal *Movoznavstvo* (Linguistics), and a number of his most significant articles have been reprinted in this and other scholarly journals in Ukraine.

As his 90th birthday approaches, Yuriy Shevelov may truly be termed, after more than four decades in the diaspora 'wilderness', that rare phenomenon – a prophet honoured in his own country, no less than abroad. □

⁵ These include honorary doctorates of the Universities of Alberta (1983) and Lund (1984), and prizes from the Guggenheim Foundation (1959), the American Council of Academic Associations (1964; 1967), and the National Fund of Humanitarian Studies (1974).




ZADOROZHNYI, Ivan-Valentyn. Kyiv, tapestry, 1980–2. Hotel Lybid, Kyiv.

Ivan-Valentyn Zadorozhnyi, 1921–1988

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the death of Ivan-Valentyn Zadorozhnyi, one of the most original and innovative Ukrainian artists of his time.

Ivan Zadorozhnyi was born in Rzhyschiv, Kyiv province, on 7 August 1921, into a working-class family. In 1933, when Ukraine was in the throes of the Great Famine imposed by the planners in Moscow, his dying father sent him to Kyiv where he found a place in a children's home, and where the supervisor, for some reason, gave him the additional forename of Valentyn. He completed his schooling in Kyiv, simultaneously holding various part-time jobs, including working as a courier for the 'Druh ditey' (Children's Friend) Society, and then as a stoker and 'retoucher' for the newspaper *Visti*. In 1937, at the age of 16, he became a student at the Shevchenko Art School in Kyiv. In 1939, he reached the age of compulsory military service, and entered the Caspian Naval School in Baku (Azerbaijan). During World War II (which for the Soviet Union began with Hitler's 'Operation Barbarossa' against the USSR in June 1941), Zadorozhnyi served as an officer with the 68th Marine artillery brigade. He was twice wounded (in actions at Rostov and Novorossiysk), and in 1943 was transferred to an artillery reserve brigade based at Vologda in Russia.



By 1945, he was working as an artist on the staff of the White Sea military district in Russia's far north. Here he produced what was, as far as is known, his first 'political' poster, entitled 'Glory to the victorious Soviet warriors'. Later that year, he enrolled in the Kyiv State Art Institute, in the faculty of painting, from which he graduated in 1951.

Zadorozhnyi's artistic education, naturally, followed the canons of Soviet aesthetics of that time, with a strong emphasis on 'socialist realism'. However, even his early paintings showed a marked degree of originality; these included, in particular, 'Bohdan Khmelnytskyi leaving his son, Tymish, as a hostage with the Crimean Khan' (1954) (for which he received his 'Candidate's' degree), 'Sonata' (1957) and 'Apassionata' (1960), for which he was awarded the title of 'Distinguished artistic worker of the Ukrainian SSR'.

His first major change of style came during the literary and artistic 'thaw' of the early 1960s, to which Zadorozhnyi responded by moving away from the naturalism of his earlier works to a stylised, semi-abstract treatment of his subject matter. This



At the Site of Past Battles (My Fellow-Countrymen). Fragment, 1963-5.

approach was developed over several years of dedicated effort and experiment, which had resulted in bulging portfolios of sketches, rough outlines, mock-ups, and the figure sketches which were to serve as his human raw material. The main features of Zadorozhnyi's new style were already apparent in his triptych 'The Song of Taras' (1962–4). In this, the figure of Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko, on the centre panel and the side-panels with their characters from his works 'Kateryna' and 'The Fettered One' were treated in a fairly stylised and symbolic manner. The head of Shevchenko, the 'apostle of wisdom, truth and right', rose high above his subjugated native land, defiantly touching the low-hung, brooding sky.

The landmark work of Zadorozhnyi's new style, however, was the painting 'At the Site of Past Battles (My Fellow-Countrymen)', on which he worked during 1963–5, and which portrayed stylised and dramatic figures of Ukrainian collective farm workers, standing as if turned to stone. The exhibition of 'My Fellow-Countrymen' evoked a furore of criticism both from less innovative artists and from the then Minister of Culture, Babiychuk, who told Zadorozhnyi curtly to 'Paint like everyone else'. Nevertheless, at an All-Union exhibition in Moscow, 'My Fellow-Countrymen' received a Grade II diploma.



Wedding Party. Bas-relief, 1971–2. Kremenchuk Palace of Culture.

Simultaneously with his mastery of the forms, colours and tones of the new technique came Zadorozhnyi's deliberate decision to go and live in the village of his forebears – Shchuchynka, once known as Chuchyn, a settlement in prehistoric times of the tribe of the Antes (see *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, spring 1998). Throughout the 1960s, Zadorozhnyi continued to strive for an idealised technique, based on a limited palette, monumentalised figures, and frieze-like compositions, culminating in his anti-militarist canvas 'That the Orchards may bloom', which portrays a war-blinded soldier and his aged mother. These two figures dominate the entire canvas, and the eponymous orchard is reduced to a semi-abstract pattern of trunks and a few bunches of leaves and fruits. After this, it was clear to everyone that Zadorozhnyi could never return to mere naturalism; indeed, in 1974, in a symbolic autocatharsis from all traces of the past, he destroyed and discarded all his materials from the past 24 years – studies, sketches, paintings, everything.

By then, however, Zadorozhnyi's creativity had undergone another major change of direction, from painting to what may be termed 'civic' art – a development which was greatly deplored by his fellow artist, the Paris-trained landscape painter Mykola Hlushchenko. This new development, which began in 1966, led Zadorozhnyi into significantly broader principles of imagery and composition. His first work in this field (produced in conjunction with F. Hlushchuk and Vasyl Pereval'skyi was a stained-glass window, 'Taras Shevchenko and the People', for Kyiv University. This was followed by the mosaic panel 'My Homeland' (1970), the stained glass window 'Our Song is Our Glory' (1971–2) and the bas-relief 'Wedding Party' (1971–2) for the Palace of Culture in Kremen'chuk, the stained-glass window 'Necklace', the mosaic 'Tenderness', the murals 'The Well' and 'The Flute of Guelder-rose', the painted ceilings 'The Young Shoot', 'The Winter's Tale', 'Flowers of Memory', produced during 1972–4 for the Palace of Culture in Kalyta village, the stained-glass window 'Ballad of the Cosmos', the mural 'Birth of Technical Thought', the carving 'Workers' Chorale' (1975), and the stained-glass windows of the Kyiv funicular (1984). At the same time, he worked on wood-carvings representing the pagan gods of Old Rus' – Svaroh, Stryboh, Dazhboh, Yarylo, Veles, Duzha, Kupalo, Marena, Troyets, Slava, Lada, Khors, Svitovyd. These, together with his tapestry portraying semi-legendary figures from the mediaeval chronicles – Kyi, Shchek, Khoryv and Lybid, and his encaustic painting: 'Glory in this World to the Sun and Peace on Earth to you, Good People!' established, as it were, a broad-based code for the Ukrainian people, glorifying the wonders of the world, and linking them with Nature and the universal order. His stained-glass window 'Our Song is Our Glory' (the largest in Ukraine) in the Palace of Culture in Kremen'chuk portrays the later-mediaeval period of Ukrainian history, after the fall of Kyivan Rus', when the people found within themselves the strength to resist the Tatar horde, and producing their own immortal archetype, the Cossack-Mamay. Zadorozhnyi's window portrays Ukraine's national characteristics as follows: in the foreground, a brachycephalic moustached bardic sage gazes wide-eyed at the hundred-faceted human world, and the prevailing atmosphere of peace. He sits firmly on his steed, wearing a curved sabre, as if to warn off any future foreign



Our Song is our Glory. Stained-glass window,
1970–1. Kremenchuk Palace of Culture.



Attila: Military Leader, Statesman, Ruler of the Huns, Scythians, 1979–83.

invader. His hands hold the traditional instrument of the Ukrainian bard, the kobza. The surrounding panels show the themes of his songs: his moustached Cossack brethren, sailing off to attack the Turks, a young couple in love, the bard-enchanter Lelya with his magic reed pipe, the beasts of the field and the birds of the air, two by two according to their kind, apple-trees heavy with fruit, and mother-Dana herself, praying that the world will be kind to her children, and that they may be fruitful and multiply. And, as was said of the legendary bard Boyan, the willows and poplars, the sun and stars listen to the Cossack's song, to which, in Shevchenko's words, 'the dead and the living and the as-yet-unborn' all respond.

Other symbols used here include the Sich Riflemen marching into battle to defend Ukraine against invasion, swearing a knightly oath on their sabres, and

planting the eternal Tree of Life in the black earth of Ukraine, so that 'the Cossack Host shall not perish', while above, the bird of freedom soars up to the sun and stars. Similar folklore images, with multiple layers of meaning, are to be found in his other stained-glass windows of this period. His concept of the unity of nature: water, earth, fauna, flora, atmosphere and human beings, became increasingly important in these works, and found their full expression in his window 'People, Protect the Earth' in Bila Tserkva, which he completed in 1980, six years before the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. This composition – a multi-faceted design focusing on a central figure, Gaia, Mother-Earth, the all-fruitful, who stretches out her hands to the people as if entreating: 'Protect... and you will possess'. The message of the window is clear: only by working in harmony with nature can we preserve Earth as an abode fit for people to live in, and only a peaceful development of civilisation and a just society can protect us from war and a nuclear holocaust.

Another facet of Ukrainian folklore may be seen in Zadorozhnyi's large-scale wood-carvings, which combine stylised, simplified forms with a wealth of allusions and associations. Works in this genre include his stela 'Kotsyubynskyi's well' (1978–83) in the Chernihiv museum devoted to the writer Mykhaylo Kotsyubynskyi, and the 'Scythia' woodcarvings at the Prolosok camp-site on the outskirts of Kyiv. The latter include all the woodwork of the establishment, from the hall and doors right down to the stools and lamps; the artist's 'foray' into the mysterious historico-archaeological world of one of the tribal ancestors of Ukraine. The forms and images, rich in symbolism and perception, are enhanced by the reddish tone of the wood, which gives an aura of great antiquity. Once again, at the centre, we find the all-fruitful Great Mother, with her Son, with her hands (as by now had become typical of Zadorozhnyi's vision) poised as if in prayer. As a halo, she wears the ancient bird of Scythia and the serpent of wisdom which ever renews itself.

According to Zadorozhnyi, the Scythians were a people skilled in all the necessary arts and crafts of life; to fight when necessary, to live in eternal brotherhood, to win themselves a livelihood, and to play sweet music – an intelligent, strong and wise people. His series of carvings use the findings of archaeology to portray scenes from Scythian life; a man scythes hay for the horses, housewives carry their milk-pots, a kneeling lad presents a flower to his sweetheart, an eagle soars into the sun, and the mythical griffin, half-lion half-eagle, rules over all... And, here, too, is a bard, whose song takes wing like a bird... a marching song for his people.

Zadorozhnyi's focus on history was not simply an artistic quirk. Rather it was an appeal to his fellow Ukrainians to consider their past, to be aware of their traditions, and to be reborn into true brotherhood.

But a third stage was to appear in his work. From 1973 onwards, he adopted a new style of symbolic painting, with expressive, deliberately 'distorted' figures and symbolic accessories, presented on a plain background, in clear, unmuddied colours and a limited palette. This is an approach which requires considerable conceptualisation of national and universal motifs. The subjects chosen were historical: 'Attila', 'Yaroslav the Wise', 'Petro Mohyla', or symbolic: 'The Universal Supper', 'We are crucified on the eternal road'. There were portraits, too, of Ukrainian writers (Shevchenko, Volodymyr Sosyura, Lina Kostenko) and world fig-



Mother-Scythia. Carving, fragment,
1976–8. Motel Prolisok, Kyiv.

ures (Gandhi, Paganini), and illustrations to Shevchenko's poetry. He also began work on several other major canvases: 'Dying for the Truth (Socrates)', 'Afghanistan', 'Famine-1933', and 'Chornobyl'. These, however, were still not completed, when he died on 21 October 1988.

In spite of the shock which his work had initially produced among Soviet establishment 'art experts', during his later years Zadorozhnyi received a number of state honours and awards, including a prize from the Council of Ministers of the USSR for his decorative works in Kalyta village, the Order of the Fatherland War (2nd class), and the medal for the 1500th anniversary of Kyiv. These were, however, essentially the 'routine' honours an artist might expect in the Soviet Union. The greater prizes, however, escaped him – and when, in particular, he was proposed for Ukraine's highest artistic award, the Shevchenko Prize, the necessary documents mysteriously went missing in the offices of the Union of Artists of Ukraine. Indeed, although his civic art – carvings, stained glass, tapestries – could be seen in many towns and villages of Ukraine, he never once in his life-time had a one-man show. Only three years after his death, with the Soviet Union collapsing, and Ukraine moving towards full state independence, was such an exhibition put on in Kyiv.

In the course of his creative life, Zadorozhnyi won a well-deserved reputation in a number of artistic fields, including posters, stained glass, art for children, and writings on the theory of art. He several times made sudden changes of theme, genre and style, discovering new forms of imagery, and addressing the burning issue of contemporary life and the history of his country and nation. In particular, he focused on Ukraine's history and pre-history – the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Middle Ages, Kyivan Rus', the pre-historic Slavs and their tribal forebears and neighbours. At the same time, his work brought into close focus the phenomena and events of contemporary life in Ukraine, portrayed with a yearning for the renaissance of the nation's psyche. □

Kotlyarevskyi's *Aeneid* and the Ukrainian Baroque Tradition

Bohdana Krysa

Ukrainian baroque literature is rooted in a phenomenon which developed at the turn of the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries – a perceived need to imitate the forms of antiquity, with, simultaneously, an equally pressing need to create one's own tradition, which in contrast to the classical heritage, became conventionally termed 'simplicity'.¹



At the same time, the Ukrainian-Renaissance-Baroque paradigm of antiquity developed along its own unique lines, introducing ever more specific borrowings, ranging from the citation of names as *sui generis* cultural *topoi*, and unattributed quotations to imitations, translations and travesties.

A third determinant of the Baroque was the inter-relation between antiquity and Christianity and their somewhat exemplary reconciliation, which has become accepted as a criterion of the development of Baroque.

It may be further observed that this reconciliation persisted as a living and developing trend throughout the entire literary process from the 1630s to the end of the eighteenth century, introducing a certain movement into the ongoing literary and philosophical discourse. The debate eventually culminated in the dictum of Hryhoriy Skovoroda,² who stressed the absence of any essential antinomies between the thinkers of antiquity and the Christian era.³

Thus, Ivan Kotlyarevskyi's travesty of the *Aeneid*, on the one hand, fits naturally into a literature with a developed Baroque philosophy, and a unity of high and low, which did not exclude even Biblical subjects, and which functioned and

¹ B. Krysa, *Peresotvorenniya svitu. Ukrayinska poeziya xvii–xviii stolit* (Lviv, 1997), pp. 78–99.

² Hryhoriy Skovoroda (1722–94). Philosopher and poet; one of the most outstanding figures in the history of Ukrainian literature and scholarship.

³ H. Skovoroda, *Povne zibrannya tvoriv: U 2 tomakh* (Kyiv, 1973), vol. 2, p. 450.

developed in all artistic registers. Its success, therefore, was due not only to the undoubted talent of the author, but also to the fact that it arose from and fitted into the current artistic tradition.

On the other hand, when one considers Kotlyarevskiy's work against the background of that tradition, it becomes increasingly clear that he was breaking the bounds of the Baroque, bringing to the foreground not the poets or heroes of antiquity, as his predecessors in the tradition had done, but the multitude of the gods of the Graeco-Roman pantheon, thus creating a world which did not depend on the will of a single, omnipotent God. This was a *sui generis* challenge to an existing and long-standing literary tradition, which attributed all good things to God's favour and all that is bad to God's punishment for sin. In this view, the defining trait of man's humanity was trying to win God's favour, and to avoid His punishments. At the same time, shorn of its sacral context, this outlook relates directly to the plot of the *Aeneid*: all events in it are driven by the deeds and actions of the gods.

In the one and three-quarter centuries before Kotlyarevskiy, the acceptance of the ideals of antiquity as the proper basis for the development of one's personal literary culture was a matter for 'serious' literature. The proclaimed cult of 'simplicity' did not go so far as advocating that the living popular language should become the language of literature. Kotlyarevskiy, however, first and foremost, dealt much more simply with antiquity. His travesty, which is permeated with the essential spirit of Ukrainian 'low' Baroque, legitimises and expands the formula of 'simplicity', putting antiquity on the same footing as Ukrainian popular tradition and using a prosody based on the vernacular language.

One could easily be over-critical here, recalling that we are dealing with a derivative work at second or third remove from the original Roman classic. Thus, for example, Aeneas behaves at times like a Christian, having persuaded Neptune 'for half three-score of cash' to give him a calm sea, the first thing he does is 'cross himself five times'. Furthermore, the *Aeneid* of Kotlyarevskiy is clear evidence of 'how at the turn of the eighteenth century the thousand-year-long European vision of the world as organised around a God-Absolute and His Will finally lost its power. From then on, Europeans changed to a *Weltanschauung* which has at its centre the category of a sovereign self-sufficient People...'⁴ For Skovoroda said: 'The people does not want to go to the grave'. This was, therefore, a time of transition outlooks, the Baroque and the Romantic. And thus Kotlyarevskiy cannot avoid looking back at what had been in the past. In his travesty he unintentionally evokes the Ukrainian ideas that were once of pressing importance, old motifs are developed to an absurd degree, the Ukrainian world is seen once more through the mask of foreign toponyms and names. The overall artistic consistency of the *Aeneid* of Ivan Kotlyarevskiy from this point of view would be difficult to deny, although individual passages may show some ambivalence of motifs and images. Thus, for example, the idea of a 'common good', which at the beginning

⁴ V. Skurativskiy, 'Do dvokhsotrichchya "Eneyidy" Ivana Kotlyarevskoho. Prospekt monohrafiyi', *Suchasnist*, no. 12, 1998, p. 144.

of the seventeenth century must surely have been one of the major (albeit virtually unimplemented) Ukrainian ideas, creates a *sui generis* counter-point, becomes an anthology quotation ('love for the homeland'), which cloaks the profundity of the author's sub-text, which in a striking manner gives to old ideas a hierarchy of layers of meaning arising from the chimerical nature of historical realities, so that it is the 'outsiders' – foreigners and mercenaries – who show themselves to be the most courageous and steadfast. Likewise in Kotlyarevskiy's *Aeneid* the Baroque 'wanderer' motif undergoes striking changes of meaning, because not everyone can feel the temporary nature of his sojourn on Earth, and not everyone will leave his native land and become an exile.

This breathes new life into the uncertainty of the Ukrainian early Baroque chronotope; however, this is no longer a preoccupation with spiritual spheres, nor the light of high culture, but the uncertainty of the future. Apart from the complete absence (for various reasons) of ambivalence in the *Aeneid* of Kotlyarevskiy, the intrinsic motif is the same: Virgil's hero also strives to understand whither he has come. And here we have an interesting paradox. In the development of the Ukrainian Baroque antique toponyms played a particular role: they were used to seek coordinates for one's own, Ukrainian culture, one's own roots. When, later, these coordinates were lost, the eternal rhetorical question 'where?' was expressed through classical analogies.

Finally, the language of Kotlyarevskiy's *Aeneid* also stands in a particular relation to popular tradition. It not only innumerable strengthens that current of the living vernacular, perceptible in the works of the 'lower' Baroque; for Kotlyarevskiy's work, these connections are significantly wider. First and foremost, as has been mentioned above, they have an ideological character, to personify the vision regarding 'simplicity' of language, rhythm, rhyme, which was very clear in the first half of the seventeenth century. From then on, the success of the *Aeneid* occurred at a time when the Baroque exuberance of language was coming under criticism because it touched on high spiritual registers, as it happened, for example, with the young Kyrylo-Tranquillon Stavrovetskyi in his sermons. The linguistic relation of Kotlyarevskiy's *Aeneid* to the previous era was more apparent through its contrast with typical Baroque style: lines rich in synonyms are, as it were, set with their vivifying force against lines of *vanitas*, the emptiness of human existence, stylistically expressed in the long catalogues of ominous phenomena and signs, the very naming of which conveys a warning.

It is difficult to use anything to give a warning to the heroes of the *Aeneid*: having lost everything, they make preparations to win everything. And language becomes here truly the single home of Existence, which cannot be violated by the chaos of the world, nor any ruin of it.

The features of the Baroque character, which at every turn opens up with different facets, the ambivalence of the *Aeneid*, and even more so its artistic profundity are manifested in variant readings, in new versions of the text. The historic sub-text provides, for example, for that reconstruction of the meta-text, which Shevchuk made, on the basis of a consideration of the eternal image of Ukrainian

history, 'movement of Cossackdom in time'.⁵ One may find echoes of other events, have doubts about details. But in general such an approach, all-encompassing, and congruent with Baroque practice touches upon very important functional structures, in a word, leads to artistic form.⁶ And in that, the historic sub-text of the *Aeneid* becomes a support for the whole weight of its artistic 'reality', like the piers of a bridge. And the attainment of this artistic reality takes place in various ways, because it is open both to the past and to the future. Thus it is present in both. □

⁵ V. Shevchuk, *'Eneyida' Ivana Kotlyarevskoho v systemi kultury ukrayinskoho baroko* (Lviv, 1998), p. 50.

⁶ N. Fedorak, 'Na perepravi ukrayinskoho mystetstva', *Dzvin*, no. 4, Lviv, 1998, pp. 115–8.

Kotlyarevskyi's *Aeneid*: The 1898 Celebration

In 1798, Ivan Kotlyarevskyi published the first three books of his *Aeneid*, a travesty in the Baroque tradition, in which Aeneas and his Trojan companions were presented in the guise of Ukrainian Cossacks (see *The Ukrainian Review*, no. 1, 1998, p. 64). This was the first work of Ukrainian literature to be written in the vernacular of the day, rather than formalised language (much influenced by Church Slavonic), which had been used hitherto. Its publication is therefore considered to mark the beginning of modern Ukrainian literature.

In 1898, to celebrate the centenary of this event, a gala performance was staged in Lviv of another of Kotlyarevskyi's works, the operetta *Natalka Poltavka*. To inaugurate the evening, and to stress the importance of Kotlyarevskyi for the survival of the Ukrainian nation and language, the pre-eminent Ukrainian writer of the day, Ivan Franko, wrote a brief 'masque', which, beginning with the opening stanza of Kotlyarevskyi's *Aeneid*, becomes a call for Ukrainian state-building.

CENTENARY MASQUE

The stage is completely dark; in the darkness can be seen the glow of a great conflagration, downstage right is a burial mound.

THE COSSACK-IMMORTAL

an aged grandsire, with a bandura, sits on the mound. At first only a faint outline of his silhouette can be seen in the darkness. He gazes at the fire, and declaims in a dull, ironic voice.

Aeneas, he was lithe and limber,
A fine lad, as true Cossacks are!
In troubled times, his wits grew nimbler,
The boldest wanderer he, by far.
So when the Greeks their fire came strewing,
And made of Troy an utter ruin,
He pulled his pack on with due zeal,
Then, calling a few Trojans over,
Brown as a berry, all bold rovers,
He showed Troy a clean pair of heels.

He rises up, stands erect. The bandura twangs.

And so she burns. Our Troy-Ukraine is lying
In flames. She's lost. From her heart the blood flows.

It seems this is her last dread hour of dying.
 It seems, indeed, that nimble-witted foes
 Have won. Our warriors, slain in their defying,
 All dead, the walls all burned, and now there goes
 Too the last shroud which might the fallen cover,
 Stolen by the ravening throng that hovers.

And that is not the sum. Within us more
 Fires raged, and left in us but grieving ashes,
 We are worm-eaten to the very core,
 And in the soul all the eternal flashes
 Of living faith are quenched. Our strength of yore
 Laid on the pyre. Down, down, still down woe dashes
 Our brows once lofty to the ground. O Mother!
 Thou art left poor and naked, childless ever!

Thus are we all! What others would think shame,
 We take as daily bread to us imparted,
 What others 'traitor' we 'good fellow' name,
 Others say 'base', we say 'obeying smartly!'
 What others simply and quite clearly claim
 As 'spinelessness' we denote 'simple-hearted'.
 There is no shame in us! Quiet and contented,
 Proud in the base depths to which we descended.

Distant thunder. The glow of the fire becomes nearer. The scene becomes a little lighter.

COSSACK

pointing to the west.

Yes, there he goes, that Cossack lithe and limber,
 Escaping as his home goes up in flames.
 Make mistake! His wits were surely nimble,
 Let ruin come here, death his brother claim,
 Let the black ravens rend his mother grimly,
 Let executioners fell the warriors famed...
 He's well away! Clutching his own Penates,
 Off now to seek another home he's started.

He showed you a clean pair of heels, sweet Mother!
 He left you there amid your wounds and blood!
 Out of his breast his heart he tore and severed,
 And ran off like a dog – for life is good!

Loudly he shouted: 'Come on, lads, for never
Will dew fall here, nor grass grow as it should!
Our Mother's fallen. So, in this night's gloaming,
Let's leave her corpse, into the wide world roaming!

'A better fortune waits us there, where roasted
Pigeons come flying straight into your jaw.
If you want luxury, Carthage will host you.
If as a ruler above men to soar
You wish, bags brimming gold and fame far-boasted –
To Rome with me! Our shrine forever more!
Let us forget Troy! What good is burned wreckage?
Now Rome with power, Carthage with pleasure beckons!

So off they went! A byword among nations!
To seek themselves a mother new, somewhere!
Quenched in their hearts even that inclination
Which drags a dog back to its native lair.
Where do you go, Aeneas? Lamentation
They do not hear. Vain the cries of despair!
Go! And to every nation shown proclaiming,
Your beggar's bag, your countenance quite shameless.

*During this speech, it has grown a little lighter. The burned-out shells of
villages can be seen, and a field strewn with corpses.*

Sun, rise no more upon Ukraine! The morrow
Would terrify you with a scene so fall.
Let me grow blind in such an hour of sorrow.
Lest this dread picture, far more grim than hell,
Should, like a thorn, pierce through my heart with horror
Forever more! But... do I hear a bell?
It is an angel tolls a nation's passing,
For, should something still live... enough of asking!

A bell tolls in the distance.

Indeed, an angel tolls. With diamond clapper,
He strikes the crystal bell-vault of the sky.
Ah, what dread agonies at once are racking
My old wounds. This blood-crust mark did I
Take at Berestechko. This bone-wound happened
At Chudniv. This scab that all cure defies
After a century came from Andrusiv's marching,
This from Poltava and Tsar Peter's parching!

The bell becomes louder and is mingled with the growling of thunder. It grows dark once more. The Cossack falls to his knees on the gravemound.

O God, is this to be my song's last ending?
 Ukraine is dead! Let me now rest in peace!
 Grant that these hands, long tortured in surrender,
 Lie now unfettered in the grave at least!
 Blot out our memory, so that our descendants
 May not know how we came to our surcease,
 And, Lord, forget us in that hour of evil,
 When with the earth our gravemounds are made level!

There is a clap of thunder. The Cossack sinks into the earth. Once more, the thunder rolls for a moment, then it gradually grows lighter, a great rosy dawn-glow appears in the east. The sun rises. The scene reveals the same landscape, but now with green orchards and neat cottages; far off to the right are the towers of a city with golden domes. Around the gravemound, bushes are flourishing. Guelder-rose and bird-cherry are in flower.

THE COSSACK-IMMORTAL

the same, but now rejuvenated, with a bandura, rises up from the gravemound. At first he moves gloomily and pensively; then slowly his movements become filled with energy, and his voice grows stronger.

I've had a mighty sleep, I see,
 In Cossack style, through years five-score,
 Well, be it gain or loss to me,
 I'll look upon the world once more,
 Upon my own dear Ukraina,
 Which bloomed of old like paradise,
 Which more than aught else on the earth was
 Dearest to me, beyond all price.
 But who there now rules as master,
 But who there now lives out his days,
 How do they speak, how do they sing now,
 The generation of this age?
 Dear God, my heart is gripped by terror:
 For, surely, they are all long gone,
 And none is left to know and cherish
 Our native language and our song.
 Kalmyks and Kyrgyz somewhere trample
 The steppe where we laid down our bones;
 Yea, Mordvin, Chukhan, Finns have taken
 The villages which were our homes.

Dear God, why from my sleep eternal
Didst thou call me to rise amain?
Only that with a heart grief shattered,
I might lie in my grave again?

*He moves forward. Off-stage a choir is heard singing, at first pianissimo,
and then growing stronger, but still muted as if far off:*

'Oh see, mother, see,
The Cossacks riding free!
Fair and fortunate, is the road they follow,
As they ride on free.

And when they ride out,
Then the meadows shout,
And before their onslaught every dastard foeman
Shall be put to rout!

COSSACK

with an expression of supreme joy.

Dear God, it is our native language,
Our native song lives yet and thrives,
The generation of this age yet
Keeps our memory alive!
Of Cossackdom they still are singing,
And of its wars in olden times,
And so it is *not* dead and buried,
That nation well-beloved of mine!

He looks around him.

Ah yes, indeed, the flowering orchards,
Ploughlands and villages are there,
These are indeed Ukrainian homesteads,
These Ukraina's garlands fair!
And there rise high the ancient gravemounds
Where warriors in last sleep were laid,
Adorned with flowers, set there, surely,
By fair hands of Ukrainian maids.
And some Ukrainian from these ploughlands
Garners still his daily bread,
And still no stranger tramples over
Our graves, and kills our glory dead.

He comes further forward, and catches sight of the audience.

And there, behold, wonder of wonders,
 Mystery among dread mysteries great!
 Lo, the descendants of Aeneas!
 But what today can be their fate?
 Their grandsires who, a hundred years back,
 When flames engulfed our own dear home
 Showed a clean pair of heels, not thinking
 That ever such a day would come, –
 That under her maternal wings would
 Folk nestle lovingly once more,
 Wishing in their native homeland,
 A paradise here to restore.
 And see, behold, their eyes are gazing
 Afire with that holy flame,
 Which of old in that night was blazing,
 When my friend, my sworn brother came,
 When that famous yet luckless hero,
 Our Bohdan, our good father, bade
 His Cossacks, in an hour of trouble,
 To muster forth in their parade.
 Like this same day I can recall it,
 That night, around us Dnipro moaned,
 And the Insatiate rapid seething,
 Gnawed gnashing at his ribs of stone.
 And in the steppeland, the Sich facing,
 It was not an owl that spread
 Forth its talons as a raptor
 But the Kudak fortress dread.
 Tears in Bohdan's eyes were shining,
 But fire in his soul and cry:
 'Brothers, let us either perish
 Or raise freedom's banner high!
 Perish must we, no path other,
 Or in fetters or in war;
 But he who hates fetters shall not
 Find in fight a terror sore!
 Does our strength, enfeebled, perish?
 Blunted now our sabres bright?
 Have your hearts now ceased to cherish
 The true spirit of a knight?'
 Louder than the waves of Dnipro,
 Roared the Cossacks' shout straightway:
 'Either we shall fall in battle,

Or the foeman we shall slay!
In the yellow flare of torches,
Bright before us in the dark,
In the eyes of Cossacks shone then,
Full ten thousand gleaming sparks.
And, my brothers, those ten thousand
Sparks did light the tinder trail,
Which raised a dread conflagration
To the Buh and to Syan's vale.
And, my brothers, those ten thousand
Sparks proved a decisive goad
That caused Ukraina's history
To turn to another road.
Yes, I see, I see those sparks now!
You say: 'So few of that kind?'
What? Out of full thirty million,
Are ten thousand hard to find?
You say: 'Where to get our Bohdan?'
Only you will have the skill,
For the great and holy cause to
Temper breast and thought and will!
If you do but test your wings now,
Pluming them for lofty flight,
Bohdan will come, culmination
Of your striving, of your might.
If each one of you is ready
For that mighty moment, why –
Each of you may be a Bohdan,
When the appointed hour draws nigh.
You say: 'Now our wars are different!'
So, forge weapons which can cope,
Steel your will and whet your reason,
Only fight, and do not mope!
Only strive, no compromising,
Fall, but waste strength not, aimlessly,
Stand you proudly, never yielding,
Perish – but no traitor be!
Each of you think, on you depends
The way that millions shall live,
That for the fate of these millions
It is you must answer give.
Each of you think: in this place, here,
Where I stand amid the fire,
All of fate stands in the balance
Of a huge and mighty war,

Can I aid you, I can say not,
I shall hover, like a shade,
Blood-stained toil of many, many
Generations first must fade.
With these thoughts keep up your courage,
To your children teach them sure:
Easter bread there will be, truly,
If there be wheat clean and pure –
'And must we wait long for victory?
Must wait long!' No, do not wait!
Study victory now – tomorrow
Victory will be your fate.
Not in vain so long endured the
Vigorous Ukrainian kin.
Not in vain bright sparks are beaming!
These young people's eyes within!
Soon new broadswords will be gleaming,
In their right hands, bold to win,
Long we have endured fate's trying,
Enough misery: We cry
Forth now: 'She lives on, undying,
Lives undying, will not die!'



Yevhen Pluzhnyk, 1898–1936

December 26, 1998 marks the centenary of the birth of Yevhen Pluzhnyk, one of the most gifted Ukrainian writers of the 1920s. However, in spite of his undoubted talents (which have led some critics to compare him to



Rilke), his work came into disfavour with the Soviet literary establishment which found his contemplative and frequently gloomy lyricism and his denunciation of the excesses of the Revolution unpalatable. Although he contributed poems to several leading Soviet Ukrainian journals, Pluzhnyk only published two collections of poems: *Dni* (Days) in 1926 and *Rannya Osin* (Early autumn) in 1927. In 1928, he published a novel *Neduba* (Illness), which was, however, banned shortly after it appeared. The following year, two of his plays *Profesor Sukhorab* and *U dvori na peredmisti* (In a suburban courtyard) featured in the journal *Zhyttya i revolyutsiya* (Life and Revolution); however, apart from these plays, which may well have already been accepted before the ban on *Neduba*, Pluzhnyk published very little more of his original work. What was

to prove his last major literary effort was (1930–2) participation in compiling an anthology of Ukrainian poetry.

In December 1934, during a major campaign against Ukrainians deemed to be ‘anti-Soviet’, Pluzhnyk was arrested, and, in March 1935, a military tribunal sentenced him to death by firing-squad. This was then commuted to 10 years imprisonment in the Solovetskyi Islands in the White Sea. However, Pluzhnyk, who since 1926 had been suffering from tuberculosis, served less than a year of this sentence; he died in his Arctic prison on 2 February 1936.

Twenty years later, in 1956, during the post-Stalin ‘thaw’, he was posthumously rehabilitated. Collections of his poems were published in Kyiv in 1966 and 1988, and also in Germany – in Augsburg (1948) and Munich (1979).

* * *

Judge me then with your severest judgement,
Man of this age! Posterity unbiased
Will pardon me my faults and vacillations,
And my late grief and my untimely gladness –
To them my quiet sincerity will speak.

* * *

Now in the North the snows are all afire...
 Here in the North the slender elk are running...
 The sign of northern vigour flares,
 The lofty chill Aurora, stunning
 The eyes with its swift flicker...

Blow

Into the now-cold heart, Aquilo!
 Thy voice I understand and know,
 For now the blood flows sluggish, chilly;
 For lower, ever lower, head is leaning,
 Like clash of colours, coldly gaze gives greeting
 And ever oftener I see in dreaming
 Deserts of snow...

Hail, desert, on our meeting!

* * *

How futile – to deck stanzas lavishly...
 The flame of thought endues them, unavailing...
 The poet's gift (bitter as all gifts be)
 Is but to understand his poems' failings.

You take the fire – its heat at once grows faint,
 Let your ink run dry upon some verse...
 Fire truly quaint!

– so to say nothing worse...

* * *

What has not come to pass? The years are flowing,
 The heart grows cold... and grief in silence rests...
 So welcome, welcome
 final hopelessness...

I yearned, I learned that you would come! But, see!
 Save my grey hair, all is as once it was...
 What has not been?


Long since, it came to pass!

Translations by Vera Rich.

Reviews

Kistiakovsky. The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism. By Susan Heuman (Harvard University Press for Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Mass., 1998), xiv+218 pp., illustr.

Bogdan Kistiakovsky – to use the orthography preferred by this author – was one of the most interesting political thinkers in the Russian empire in the early years of this century. Well aware of his Ukrainian heritage, and with a permanent sense of deprivation that the Tsarist ban on the use of the Ukrainian language had prevented him receiving his childhood education in that language, he nevertheless went no further in his political concern for Ukraine's future than to advocate the transformation of the Russian imperium into a constitutional, law-governed, federal state, in which every ethnic entity would enjoy considerable autonomy. Furthermore, while ostensibly embracing socialist principles, he was more interested in establishing what, almost half a century later, would become known as the human and civil rights of the individual than in the 'class struggle' principles of the classical Marxists.



Indeed, in 1903, Kistiakovsky attacked Lenin's concept of a 'vanguard party' with a leading role in the coming Revolution, observing that he did not wish to see the autocracy of the Romanovs replaced by the despotism of Lenin – even if the latter were to go by the name of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.

How and why Susan Heuman first became interested in this enigmatic figure is unclear. She merely tells us in her preface that her research began back in the days 'before the era of Gorbachev and perestroika, when revolutionary ideas were still in vogue and issues of national autonomy had not yet reached the consciousness of most historians specializing in the [East European] region'. After completing the draft, she left the USA to teach in Zambia and then Zimbabwe, where, in the early 1980s, 'the question of establishing a representative form of government that was based on human rights and democratic principles was a pressing reality'. In both these countries she lectured to university audiences on Kistiakovsky's ideas of constitutionalism, social justice, and human rights. This experience undoubtedly gave an extra dimension to her work, sharpening the distinctions (which Kistiakovsky himself stressed) between universal general principles, and their applications to a specific historical context.

Professor Heuman addresses her subject in seven main chapters. Only the first – 'A Cosmopolitan in Three Worlds', may be termed biographical, and even this is more concerned with the impact on him of the 'three worlds' – Russia, Ukraine, and Germany (where he completed his education) – than with the minutiae of his life.

His marriage is dealt with in two paragraphs – of which the second focuses on the difficulties he suffered as a result of his wife's arrest and internal exile to Vologda. (A third paragraph, a little later, touches briefly on the fact that, on their return to Kyiv in 1904 'both Kistiakovsky and his wife created the "Banquet Movement" to spread the liberal constitutionalist program of the Union of Liberation'. The fact that this union produced 'offspring' is mentioned only in the 'Usage Note' at the beginning of the book, explaining the choice of spelling of his name.

The other six chapters deal, specifically, with Kistiakovsky's ideas within the context of the intellectual movements, theories and debates of the time: 'Neo-Kantianism and the General Theory of Law', 'Human Rights: a Pre-Revolutionary Model', 'Constitutionalism and the Rule-of-Law State', 'The Role of the Intelligentsia', 'The Ukrainian Movement within the Multinational Russian Empire', and 'The Debate on the Ukrainian National Question: Kistiakovsky vs. Struve'.

A fundamental theme underlying this book is the long debate by legal theorists, in the closing decades of the Russian empire, on the establishment of a state based on the rule of law. For Kistiakovsky, this concept meant not merely a state based on a constitution (*Rechtstaat*) but, in the author's words, 'a constitutional form based on the inalienable rights of the individual, universal suffrage, and democratic principles'. For him, the question of Ukrainian (and other minority) rights was an integral part of this; accordingly, he denounced the Russification propounded by some Russian advocates of reform no less than that of supporters of autocracy:

Those among Russian progressive people who advocate an ideological struggle against the Ukrainian popular movement should know that there are no devices with which they can relieve themselves of the moral responsibility for that violence to the human spirit which is inherent in compulsory Russification,

he wrote. Yet at the same time, he was, Professor Heuman says, 'wary of the developing Russophobia among Ukrainian nationalists' after 1905, pointing out that Ukrainian nationalists who attacked 'Russian liberals and radicals who did not stress the national rights of Ukrainians... were losing sight of the enemy that Ukrainians shared with Russians and other non-Russians – the autocracy'. However, 'when the Russian attacks on Ukrainian cultural and political activities increased', he resumed the pro-Ukrainian activity of his student years in Germany, publishing articles aimed at raising 'Russian political consciousness about the Ukrainians' and 'build[ing] support for a possible collaboration between Russians and Ukrainians (as well as other non-Russian nationalities) in the building of a federation of nationalities for the Russian Empire'.

Professor Heuman devotes the major part of her work (as the title itself indicates) to the last years of tsarism, tracing Kistiakovsky's contacts (and conflicts) with other political thinkers, not only within the Russian empire, but also in Austria-Hungary. The last months of his life, after the declaration of Ukrainian independence in January 1918, are merely outlined. Professor Heuman tells us that he 'withdrew completely from the Russian intelligentsia and focused his energies on the Ukrainian national cause', becoming a professor of law in Kyiv and a co-author of the first citizenship law of Ukraine. She tells us, too, that his life during this period was 'complicated by his brother Igor's activities as minister of

internal affairs for the controversial Skoropads'kyi government'. But the intriguing question of how this former 'federalist' adjusted to the fact of Ukrainian independence is left unanswered. Possibly, no material has survived to show us his evolving views at this key period. A manuscript on the Ukrainian movement on which he was working at the time of his death in 1920 has long disappeared.

Nevertheless, for the period up to 1917, this book provides not only a fascinating study of Kistiakovsky's life and thought, but also some valuable sidelights on other key Ukrainian figures of the period, including Mykhaylo Drahomanov. Moreover, its importance is not simply historical – for Kistiakovsky's views have gained a new lease of life and significance in the on-going discussions of constitutional law and its development in the successor states of the Soviet Union. Scholars wishing to follow and understand that discourse will undoubtedly find this book invaluable background reading.

Professor Heuman's interest in Kistiakovsky focuses, as we have seen, primarily on his constitutionalist ideas, and she appears to have come to Ukrainian studies only as a by-product of that interest. Occasionally, when dealing with Ukrainian matters peripheral to the main theme, she makes some small errors. Thus, she writes that, following the 1905 Revolution, 'the new periodical, *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* [The Literary Scientific Herald], published in Ukrainian was launched in both L'viv and Kyiv'. In fact, this journal had been published by the Naukove Товариство імені Тараса Шевченка (Shevchenko Scholarly Society) in Lviv since 1898, and it was only in 1907 (and not, as Professor Heuman implies, immediately after the October Manifesto of 1905) that the editorial office was moved to Kyiv. Again, she states, that '[i]n 1918 Kistiakovsky was elected professor of law at the newly established Ukrainian State University of Kyiv'. Since there is no reference elsewhere to the existence of any other University in Kyiv, the less-informed reader might well assume that this was the first time that a University had been established in Kyiv. In fact, this university was established by Hetman Skoropadskyi as part of his 'Ukrainisation' programme, as a rival to the existing Russifying 'St Vladimir' University of Kyiv, with which – under Bolshevik rule and with a change of name – it was merged the following year.

These, however, are only minor blemishes on a work that must surely find a well-deserved place in any scholarly library specialising in history, constitutional theory, or human and civil rights.

Transition report 1998. Financial Sector in Transition (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, 1998), viii+234 pp.

This fifth annual report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) focuses on the financial sector. The EBRD, in fact, reports twice yearly: an annual report in November and an update in April. This is thus the first report since the May 1998 Annual Governors' Meeting of the EBRD, which was held in Kyiv, indicating the importance which the Bank, established to 'foster the transition' of the formerly Communist states 'to an open market-oriented economy and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative', gives to Ukraine.

The report was finalised in the wake of the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia – an event which had a harmful knock-on effect throughout much of the former Communist world. That crisis, writes the EBRD's Chief Economist, Nicholas Stern, in his Foreword, 'arose largely from a failure of the state – its ability to collect taxes, to enforce laws, to manage its employees and to pay them – and constitutes a significant setback in transition'. The lesson to be learned from it, Stern concludes, is

that the way in which markets are liberalised and state enterprises privatised – that is, the nature of the early transition decisions – can have important implications for the capacity of governments to enforce the rule of law, to promote competition and to regulate effectively.

In contrast to the Russian débâcle, he praises the 'strong performance of many transition economies in central Europe': 'Having substantially liberalised markets and privatised state enterprises, they are now responding to the difficult challenges of the next phase of transition, building the necessary institutions and business practices'.

How does Ukraine, geographically sited between these two extremes of exemplary and failed transition, and the second most populous state in the post-Communist world, rate with the experts? The latest values of the EBRD's cumulative transition indicators (covering progress in the whole post-Communist era) give Ukraine the following ratings:

Large-scale privatisation 2+, Small-scale privatisation 3+, Governance and enterprise restructuring 2, Price liberalisation 3, Trade and foreign exchange system 3-, Competition policy 2, Banking reform and Interest rate liberalisation 2, Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 2.

For comparison, we may note that in Estonia and Slovenia, front-runners for admission to the European Union, the values of these indicators are: 4, 4+, 3, 3, 4+, 3, 3, 3 and 3+, 4+, 3-, 3, 4+, 2, 3, 3 respectively, while Belarus trails in the rear with 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2.

Against this background of generally optimistic long-term progress, the report notes a number of setbacks arising from the Russian crisis. 'The collapse of the Russian rouble', it says, 'led to strong pressures on the hryvnia'. Among other anti-crisis measures, 'the currency band was widened to 2.5 to 3.5 hryvnia to the US dollar at the beginning of September, leading to a depreciation of over 50% within a month'. This fall in the currency is pinpointed as a 'key challenge' to reform, which, the report warns, 'will necessitate tight budgetary policies and an acceleration of structural reforms'.

Other constraints on market liberalisation are the increase in import tariffs and trade barriers (particularly for agricultural products), and certain tax exemptions and constraints intended to foster the production of automobiles in Ukraine (in particular from the Daewoo-Avtozaz joint venture), which, the report warns 'appear to



contravene the most-favoured nation rules' of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and hence, presumably, could hinder Ukraine's accession to that body.

Privatisation has made some progress, particularly of large industrial enterprises; by July 1998, over 7,800 of the original 9,500 medium-sized and large enterprises included in the Mass Privatisation Programme had been 'privatised' (i.e., more than 70 per cent of the shares sold). However, the sale by open tender of 200 of the largest enterprises has been slower (only 40 sold by mid-year) and, comments the report, 'Continuing disagreements between the President and parliament have held back the pace of privatisation'. In the agricultural sector, the report says, the pace of privatisation 'lags behind', being 'thwarted by constraints on the sale of land', although the small-scale privatisation programme was 'largely completed at the end of 1997, with over 45,400 enterprises privatised'. Privatisation of infrastructure – in particular, power distribution companies – is now under way, although '[i]nitial interest of potential strategic investors was limited'.

The banking sector, the report says, 'remains small and under-capitalised'. Total bank assets were estimated, in early 1998, at almost US\$12 billion. The five sectoral banks, into which the former monobank was broken up, account for over 70 per cent of all assets in the banking sector. (Three of these five have been privatised, leaving only the savings bank and foreign trade bank in state hands). In April 1998, the National Bank of Ukraine abolished the 15 per cent limit on foreign ownership of Ukrainian banks; by mid-year there were 25 banks in Ukraine with foreign ownership. At the same time, Ukraine is listed among the countries where 'extensive state control remains an impediment to the evolution of the banking sector'.

During 1998, the securities market (both via the four stock exchanges and the PFTS over-the-counter electronic trading system) initially performed well, with an average weekly turnover on the PFTS of \$4–6 million, with both membership and the number of listed stocks increasing. The markets were, however, adversely affected by the Asian and Russian financial crises, and the growth which was expected as a result of the large-scale privatisation programme failed to materialise – an indication, yet again, of how closely the health of the Ukrainian economy is dependent on the world climate, and of that of Russia in particular. □

 *the* UKRAINIAN *review*

**A
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